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PARK, PAMELA
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IDEAS, 1801-25.

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THE ROLE OF MEMORY IN STENDHAL: HIS EVOLVING

IDEAS, 1801-25

by

PAMELA PARK

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in
French in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City
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May 14, 1979
date

Harold K. L. Haney
Chairman of Examining Committee

May 14 - 79
date

Henri Peyre
Executive Officer

Harold K. L. Haney
Bethia L. Haney
Henri Peyre
Supervisory Committee

The City University of New York

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Introduction

Marie-Henri Beyle, born in the eighteenth century, continues the tradition of Condillac, Helvétius, and Destutt de Tracy in thinking that man is born for happiness in this world. Happiness is the satisfaction of desires acquired through interaction with the world, which moves one agreeably or disagreeably. Through contact with life desires are born; these determine a person's notion of happiness, which is the satisfaction of desires. Destutt de Tracy writes about the source of happiness: "Le désir . . . exclut l'indifférence; il est de sa nature d'être une jouissance s'il est satisfait, et une souffrance s'il ne l'est pas; ensorte que nécessairement notre bonheur ou notre malheur en dépendent. . . ."

Stendhal's view of happiness is sensualist. Happiness, both in its causes and its effects, is rooted in concrete experience, in nature. It is not mystical, dependent upon an experience of the supra-terrestrial. Suffering caused by recognition of one's fallen physical state, purging oneself from attachments to the temporal delights of this reality, such attributes of a mystical conception of man's joy in no way characterize Stendhal's view. Man's condition is wholly worldly; in this realm he finds fulfillment.

This outlook was formulated early, thanks to one of the effects of the Revolution, the Ecoles centrales. At the Grenoble Ecole centrale Stendhal was educated in the ideas of Condillac, whose world view, which Stendhal met again in the works of Helvétius and of the Idéologues, among the most influential of his readings, will remain with him until the end of his life.

Happiness is of and through this world, which is a system governed by laws. At least this was the conviction of the philosophes, the thinkers and moralists of the French Enlightenment who aspired to determine the laws of nature as they could be discovered through direct and objective observation of phenomena, by means of the human tools of knowledge: the senses and the power of reason.

Stendhal was such a philosophe. He held that life was regulated by discoverable laws. Léon Blum asserts: "Il réduit ainsi l'univers à une sorte d'unité mécanique qui englobe les états de conscience aussi bien que les phénomènes extérieurs et qui soumet les problèmes du cœur aux règles ordinaires de la méthode expérimentale."² Our author desired to know these laws, to be a philosophe, and this wish is logical, at least for one concerned with happiness.

If one knew nature's laws, which govern the universe and man himself, and if one shared the notion that happiness is a result of a person's contact with concrete phenomena, could not one reasonably

assume that knowledge of the laws would allow one to bring about, to control one's pleasure? Stendhal asked himself this question, and we may see his development as a thinker as his response. One with a sensualist world-view, like Stendhal, logically becomes a thinker. If a person considers his field of self-actualization to be bounded by the realm of the concrete, which is regulated, how may he bypass the possibility to know what are those very conditions that will bring about happiness?

We began with desire, the promise of happiness, before we took up the role of knowledge in the fulfillment of this promise. Our order duplicates Stendhal's priorities; it is a crucial point. Stendhal was a thinker, and it is in this role that he figures in our thesis. We shall trace the development of his ideas on the role of memory in man. However, Stendhal's interest in ideas was subservient to the end of happiness. He was not a philosophe for the sake of knowledge alone.

His vocation as a thinker is utilitarian, which is evidenced by the program of his intellectual endeavor: Stendhal wanted to know how and why people behave. From 1801, the year Stendhal begins his diary, the Journal, to 1825, the year of the publication of Racine et Shakespeare II, the period on which we focus in this study, Stendhal devoted himself to formulating theories on human behavior. He read enormously on subjects pertaining to psychology, strict

theoretical treatises as well as memoires, personal journals, and histories, and he observed behavior himself. The fruit of his readings and his personal observations fills his journal and correspondence and is the foundation of the theoretical works published during this period. Stendhal had two main desires, which surfaced early and which always constituted his ideals of happiness: he wanted to be successful in love, and he hoped to be an artist, a writer. Knowledge about human behavior would serve both aims.

Were he able to arrive at sure ideas about the passion of love, as he and others experienced it, he could hope to know which routes would lead him to the maximum satisfaction of his romantic desires. Furthermore, knowledge about psychology would enable Stendhal to be a successful writer, and in this conviction, conceived early, our author announces himself as the champion of the new ideas about the creative process and the aesthetic experience launched in the eighteenth century, the most convincing defender of which was Diderot. Margaret Gilman points out that Diderot could not consider the work of the artist except in connection with his psychophysiology: "With his central interest in rappports, his ideas on the nature and special faculties of the poet are linked with his physiological and psychological interests." Stendhal is of the same school. The sensualist aestheticians also believed that knowledge about the psychological basis of a person's experience of the

beautiful was imperative for anyone interested in creating successful works; Stendhal too was convinced that the beautiful had to be conceived in connection with what the living experience of it was. For results, one had to know causes, to sound the laws of nature, and Stendhal took it upon himself to investigate what constitutes the production and experience of art.

Stendhal sought specific knowledge for specific goals. But even in this already limited range of interest, Stendhal is selective. In 1804 he writes about himself: "En général le froid génie de l'observation est bien plus propre à faire des découvertes dans l'homme que l'être passionné tel qu'Henri B . . . je ne crois pas que je fasse jamais de grandes découvertes dans l'analyse des sentiments ordinaires de l'homme."⁴ One familiar with any of Stendhal's diverse writings appreciates this self-observation by Beyle: ultimately, Stendhal is really interested only in the behavior of people like himself, the legendary "Happy Few," the famous Stendhalian epithet, probably taken from Goldsmith's The Vicar of Wakefield,⁵ which appears for the first time in a letter of 1805. In love and in friendship Stendhal seeks out people that resemble him. When he finally becomes an artist, with the writing of Armance, in 1826, he will address the audience of the "Happy Few." Most of his reflections on psychology center on this personality, and if Stendhal must be concerned with how ordinary men think and feel,

it is because they have an effect on the success of his endeavors. In line with Stendhal's own concerns, we shall concentrate on his ideas about the behavior of the âmes sensibles.

Stendhal does not attempt to formulate ideas without first establishing how man thinks. His life-long admiration for Destutt de Tracy is explained by the fact that the latter's Ideology, or science of ideas, fully answered young Beyle's search for an effective means to arrive at sure ideas. Stendhal was constantly preoccupied with the laws of thought as well as those of passion, for to establish the latter he had to know how to think well.

V. Del Litto has, of course, the distinction of having fully, and unsurpassedly, accounted for Stendhal's intellectual development in his work La Vie intellectuelle de Stendhal.⁶ Without this history, our undertaking would have appeared unfeasible. In the history of the evolution of Stendhal as a thinker, we found recurring a concern for the psychological function called memory. Stendhal deemed that memory is the foundation of knowledge and as well, that it can be a condition of happiness through the experience of love and of the arts. Stendhal's ideas on memory thus offer a privileged opportunity to trace Stendhal's development as a thinker as it was undertaken for the goal of happiness. To know about the specific psychological power of man called memory would enable

Stendhal to determine how men think, with which knowledge he could set about establishing ideas about his preoccupations: love and art, which are themselves based on a functioning of memory. The means and end of Stendhal's development as a thinker converge on the topic of memory; we shall endeavor to describe the evolution of Stendhal's ideas on these two lines of thought as they engage the role of memory.

The early journals, both the personal and literary ones, and his correspondence are particularly rich in these considerations. Almost half of our study is devoted to describing Stendhal's thinking on memory during the period 1801-06. His work during this time is the foundation of his ideas on human behavior, which are also the basis of his theory of the beautiful. We then take up the last stages of Stendhal's development as a thinker, of his ideas on memory, as we find them indicated in the Histoire de la peinture en Italie, Racine et Shakespeare I and II, and De l'Amour. These works reiterate the theories on memory Stendhal had earlier formulated, and either build on them--Histoire de la peinture en Italie and Racine et Shakespeare--, or masterfully explain and apply them--De l'Amour.

With the completion of De l'Amour and Racine et Shakespeare II Stendhal is in full command of a body of ideas on which he may rely to direct his behavior effectively in the direction he chooses. It is hard to determine whether a person achieved personal happiness or not; we may not say that Stendhal's attempt to

understand the role of memory was fruitful as concerns his happiness in love. But his ideas on the role of memory in the realm of art appear to be contributing factors to the success he achieved as a novelist.

Notes

1

Antoine L. C. Destutt de Tracy, Idéologie proprement dite, Vol. I of Elémens d'Idéologie, 3rd. ed. (Paris: Mme V. Courcier, 1817), p. 68.

2

Léon Blum, Stendhal et le beylisme, 2nd. ed. (Paris: Paul Ollendorf, n. d.), p. 161.

3

Margaret Gilman, The Idea of Poetry in France (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 49.

4

Stendhal, Journal littéraire, 3 vols., Vols. 33-35 of Oeuvres complètes, ed. Victor Del Litto and Ernest Abravanel (Geneva: Cercle du Bibliophile, 1967-74), II, 102. All further references to the Journal littéraire appear in the text, indicated by J. L., followed by the volume and page numbers.

5

Stendhal, Correspondance, ed. Henri Martineau, 3 vols. (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Gallimard, 1962-), I, 87. All further references to the Correspondance appear in the text, indicated by Cor., followed by the volume and page numbers.

6

Victor Del Litto, La Vie intellectuelle de Stendhal (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1962).

Chapter I

1801-05, Stendhal's Education in Paris:

The Foundation of His Ideas on Memory

The personal Journal begins in 1801, antedating the Journal littéraire, when Stendhal is still in the army, stationed in Italy. In 1802 he has returned to Paris, where he will reside, for the most part, until 1806. During this time Stendhal returns occasionally to Grenoble, the home of his family, where he was born, and he spends almost a year in Marseille, 1805-06. He comes to Paris in 1802 with the epistemological perspective of a sensualist, the orientation that determined his schooling in Grenoble. Stendhal will reaffirm this foundation and build on it during this very early yet formative period in Paris. He devotes himself to readings in sensualist philosophy, aesthetics, history and literature. He will reflect on them as well as on the ideas that come to him through his own efforts at defining phenomena pen in hand, which will produce the numerous cahiers of the Journal and the Journal littéraire and his valuable correspondence with his sister Pauline. Stendhal also tries his hand at creative writing, or rather he draws up plans of possible works--epic and dramatic--to write.

In this chapter we follow Stendhal's thinking until 1805, the year in which he discovers the Idéologues, whose influence on Stendhal's ideas will be the subject of Chapter II. Before this influence, Stendhal has, however, already reflected on the role of memory in knowledge, in happiness, in the aesthetic experience, and in creativity, and he has even come across a potential conflict between the pursuit of knowledge and that of happiness. In this chapter we shall account for and describe his various ideas on memory in three parts. In Part I Stendhal's ideas on the role of memory in knowledge and in happiness will be described, while in Part II we shall focus exclusively on its function as Stendhal sees it in the realm of art. Finally, in Part III we present Stendhal's view of where happiness lies for him, which engages the various functions of memory, and the conflict this presents: it has a bearing, as well, on the creative process.

I. Memory, a Means to Happiness

Stendhal's thinking on memory is based almost unquestionably on the sensualist precept that a person's prior experience consists of that to which he has responded in the environment. Stendhal's ideas reflect most predominately his readings in De l'Esprit by Helvétius, about whom Stendhal affirms: "Helvétius m'a ouvert la porte de
¹
 l'homme à deux battants" (J.L., I, 124). A man's memory is the record of those impressions which have caused him to respond:

"Toutes nos idées nous viennent par nos sens . . ." (Cor., I, 54).

Nothing is in man which is not the product of his response to stimuli from the outside world which addresses the senses first. In the Correspondance Stendhal gives a definition of sensitivity which incorporates this idea: "La sensibilité est cette faculté, ce pouvoir, cet effet de notre organisation, ou, si vous voulez, cette propriété de notre être en vertu de laquelle nous recevons des impressions de beaucoup d'espèces, et nous en avons la conscience" (Cor., I, 174). Stendhal rejects patently the existence of innate ideas; man is not dualistic, or endowed with a soul equipped with ready knowledge: "L'anatomie des passions telle celle qui se voit dans Helvétius prouve . . . que nous ne voyons dans l'homme aucun effet de l'âme, qu'il n'y a que des effets de sens . . ."²; the vital principle is material and is educated, molded, by its relationships with the outside world. H.J. Delacroix in the Psychologie de Stendhal affirms about Helvétius' psychology of man: "Sa philosophie pourrait être définie un sensualisme sociologique: c'est la négation de toute puissance, de tout dynamisme interne; sur un minimum de nature, sur une constitution naturelle commune et indifférente se dressent les constructions de la société."³ The characteristics of a man are the result of his education; men have no memory of phenomena not first introduced by contacts with the external world.

Stendhal points to two uses of the matériel of memory: a recalling of prior experience to serve as the means to arrive at

knowledge; what he refers to as active memory in the Filosofia nova:

"La mémoire est active dans ses rapports avec l'âme, car elle lui⁴ offre les objets plus ou moins éclairés suivant que l'âme le désire"; and, a more passive reliving or reexperiencing of prior experience in memory.

Stendhal sees both these uses of memories as being ultimately means of making a person happy. In a letter to Pauline he writes that knowledge is necessary for happiness: "Je crois que tout malheur ne vient que d'erreur et que tout bonheur nous est procuré par la vérité" (Cor., I, 93). On the other hand, the pleasure he has in remembering certain memories is frequently expressed: "La pluie me dispose à cette divine tendresse que je sentais en Italie" (J., p. 475). The rain recalls his first stay in Italy, while he was in the army, the memory of which brings on the happiness of the feeling "divine tendresse."

We begin by discussing Stendhal's thinking on prior experience as a means to knowledge, which will lead us quite naturally into his considerations on reliving prior experience in memory as a source of happiness, for in the case of Stendhal the effect of the second use appears to interfere with the functioning of active memory.

Memory and Knowledge

For Stendhal, prior experience is the foundation of knowledge, for knowledge of something is a series of judgments upon it: "Pour une vérité il faut jugement et comme tout jugement est comparaison, il faut deux idées ou deux sensations" (J.L., I, 310). Prior experience allows for judgment; remembered sensations enable comparisons between them and new sensations, which will uncover truths about the new phenomenon. Picavet in his book Les Idéologues lists Stendhal in the company of Tracy, Cabanis, etc., according to whom he states: "Or l'esprit marche toujours du connu à l'inconnu. . . ." ⁵

Advances in knowledge depend upon a bedrock of experience that allows us to understand the new; in comparing it with former sensations, we see how the new is like old experience, which leads at the same time to discovering how it is different and thus new. To Pauline Stendhal recommends constant judging in order to discover more and more truths: "On acquiert un grand esprit, non pas en apprenant beaucoup par coeur, mais en comparant beaucoup les choses qu'on voit" (Cor., I, 52). Esprit here is meant in the Helvetian sense: "L'esprit n'est qu'un assemblage d'idées neuves." ⁶

The premise that prior experience is the basis of knowledge underpins journal entries like the following:

Un voyage pour être instructif doit être une suite de jugements sur les divers objets que vous rencontrez. Lorsque je suis arrivé en Italie, je ne connaissais pas la France; mon voyage ne peut être utile que lorsque je connaîtrai la France ou tout autre pays, et que je serai à même de comparer. (J., p. 419)

Forming ideas on Italy depends upon his being able to perceive relationships between it and his prior experience of another country. To have knowledge requires the perception of relationships, the quality and quantity of which depend upon a person's memory.

This diary entry from 1801 corroborates Helvétius' affirmation in De l'Homme that ideas about something depend upon memory of other things: "Point de sensations sans âme; mais sans mémoire, point de comparaison d'objets, point d'idées." ⁷ To have knowledge, "idées," one must remember experience.

Stendhal, for whom passion, desire, is the "mobile de tous nos actes" (Cor., I, 47), sees knowledge as the means of satisfying passion: "Le bonheur consiste à pouvoir satisfaire ses passions . . ." (Cor., I, 193). H. J. Delacroix comments about this logician's stance of Stendhal regarding happiness: "Pour Stendhal comme pour les ⁸ Idéologues . . . la conquête du bonheur est au terme de la science." Stendhal is convinced that through observation and reasoning, men can arrive at the logical means necessary to attain their goals, to satisfy their passions. He believes with Helvétius that all men's minds are

of equal capacity and that "la finesse plus ou moins grande des cinq sens ne donne ni plus ni moins d'esprit. Homère, Milton étaient aveugles . . . l'éducation seule fait les grands hommes; par conséquent . . . on n'a qu'à le vouloir pour devenir grand génie. Il faut s'appliquer à une science et la méditer sans cesse"

(Cor., I, 52). The term science is used in the general sense of a body of knowledge about a specific object, and with knowledge men can expect to accomplish their desires; for example, to be a successful writer, Stendhal will gather data through observation, analyze these memories, and arrive at the means of writing successful plays: "Le génie n'est qu'une plus grande dose de sens; or le bon sens s'acquiert à force de travailler, c'est-à-dire à force d'observer et de réfléchir sur ses observations" (J. L., I, 19). A powerhouse of memories provides the groundwork of knowledge and allows men to form ideas about their passions.

In connection with this topic of knowledge and happiness and the role of memory in knowledge, Stendhal sees prior experience as a condition of passion. He quotes from Hérault de Séchelles' De l'Ambition: "'L'amour ne naît, ce me semble, que de la physiognomie et, des manières parce qu'elles promettent un caractère qui produira une suite d'actions qui satisferont successivement et toujours tous nos besoins, parce qu'elles promettent le bonheur'" (J. L., I, 228). He makes his own the Helvetian definition of passion: "'La passion est la continuité du désir d'une même chose'"

(J. L., I, 96), and in the quotation from Hérault de Séchelles he points to the fact that this "continuité" depends upon a judgment based on prior experience; the object of desire is capable of satisfying desire that it awakens through reminding us of an associated object, "elles promettent un caractère." Knowledge about, or judgments about, the future, necessary to give rise to passion, depends upon some past experience that will serve as the basis for projections about the power of the newly desired object to make us happy.

Stendhal is also inspired in this thinking by Hobbes, with whose Elements of Natural Law he was familiar, in the translation by d'Holbach, from which he quotes: "'La conception ou image de l'avenir n'est qu'une supposition produite par la mémoire du passé'" (J. L., I, 377). Memory of a similar past experience allows for the hope of future satisfaction, necessary to give rise to and to sustain passion: "L'amour ne peut naître sans l'espérance" (J. L., I, 96). Without prior experience man would not, therefore, have passions, which for this feverish disciple of Helvétius, are the "seul mobile des hommes" (Cor., I, 47).

Passions keep men from boredom: "Tous les hommes désirent quelque chose; l'absence du désir est l'ennui! lorsque cette absence devient habituelle, l'homme se tue" (Cor., I, 170); passions engage men in the pursuit of knowledge, of acquiring and analyzing experience, towards the end of satisfying them. Stendhal sees passions as the condition of self-actualization, and they are founded

on prior experience. He quotes from Vauvenargue's

Introduction à la connaissance de l'esprit humain: " 'L'esprit est l'oeil de l'âme, non sa force. Sa force est dans le coeur, c'est-à-dire dans les passions. La raison la plus éclairée ne donne pas d'agir et de vouloir' " (J. L., I, 24). Passion is the expression of will, of self and the reason to actualize self, or "d'agir et de vouloir."

Active Memory and Language

Beyle quotes Hobbes who speaks of two types of "science," a quotation that indicates two manners of knowing an object in memory:

La première [science] est l'effet des sens c'est-à-dire l'image, la conception et son souvenir en plus; exemple: le souvenir de l'impression de l'objet; la deuxième est le souvenir: que tel nom est appliqué par les hommes à telle chose. (J. L., I, 367)

The first state of knowing is sensing or refeeling in memory a sense impression; the second is grasping in language. This is how experience must be recalled for reasoning, notes Stendhal, in another quotation from Hobbes: " 'La raison n'est plus qu'une suite de mots pour la plus grande partie' " (J. L., I, 366).

Stendhal becomes aware of language as a logical system that can organize experience by the very act of naming it. He

paraphrases passages from Brissot de Warville's De la Vérité

that testify to the classifying action of language:

Si la tête ordonnait à la langue de prononcer tous les mots qu'elle, langue, sait . . . ces mots se trouveraient réveiller:

1. ou des souvenirs d'une chose telle qu'on l'a vue . . . ;
 2. ou le souvenir de choses plus nombreuses . . . ;
 3. ou le souvenir de l'image ou perception que nous avons eue au nom d'une chose qui n'est jamais tombée sous nos sens . . . ;
 4. ou des souvenirs individuels pris pour généraux. . . .
- (F.N., pp. 463-64)

Stendhal realizes that when we refer to something by a word, we do not see it alone but as it compares with other things to which we may also refer by the same word. Prior experience that is rendered in language serves, therefore, more easily to build ideas, for naming something in language establishes relations and facilitates judging.

Stendhal allies thinking with writing, a conscious use of language:

"Tu sais comme mon imagination trotte; main enfin je viens de tâcher de me raisonner, et au lieu de jurer, je me suis mis à t'écrire"

(Cor., I, 51).

The diary enterprise and the keeping of the literary journal seem to respond to Beyle's growing consciousness of the usefulness of putting into language his daily memories, from which he hopes to learn: "Lorsque . . . j'aurai besoin de pensées, les chercher dans mes cahiers. Ils sont mes magasins" (J.L., II, 128). He encourages Pauline to write down her thoughts and to keep a

notebook: "Je t'enverrai toutes les définitions que je trouverai; fais-en un cahier . . . dis-moi dans ta première lettre de quel format . . . est ce cahier, et combien il a de feuilles de son format" (Cor., I, 94); writing, or the choice of words, will encourage judgment; it forces the mind to focus on the objects of thought. Stendhal writes to Pauline: "Prends l'habitude de m'écrire plus souvent. Je vois bien ce qui t'est pénible, c'est de te rappeler les divers objets sur lesquels tu as à me parler" (Cor., I, 236). He points out the painful concentration writing requires; but it forces us to judge, to consider more closely the objects of our thoughts. Uncannily, from the beginning, before his immersion in Hobbes and Brissot in 1804, Stendhal seemingly understood the value of recording his experience for the purpose of knowledge, for he begins the Journal: "J'entreprends d'écrire l'histoire de ma vie jour par jour" (J., I, 410). In 1801 he felt that writing, "écrire," would lead him to know himself better.

Stendhal seems particularly concerned about the mot juste. Given the fact that associations are established in the act of naming, as indicated in the quotation from Brissot, accurate transcription of experience requires hitting upon correct, classifying terms that will elicit accurate associations: "Je veux, en composant, que chaque mot soit parfait" (J., p. 562). Stendhal maintains

elsewhere that incorrect appellation causes incorrect ideas:

"Chaque caractère a un mot pour son idée, tout autre mot . . . est un contresens" (J., p. 449).

The Fallibility of Memory

Because his happiness is dependent upon how much he knows, Stendhal is very sensitive about the degree of certainty a person may have about his ideas and he notes the limitations which prevent memories from being complete and accurate.

He is very aware of the relative nature of human experience. Men interact with a constantly changing environment, and their memories about phenomena are dependent upon how things appear at a specific time and place. Stendhal cites Hobbes's conclusion in this respect: "Une conception en image n'en suit point une autre suivant notre choix mais suivant le hasard" (J.L., p. 363). What is remembered and the cause and effect relationships that appear to suggest themselves in memory are relative to the moment and place of our perception. Men never see phenomena completely, néver having the opportunity to see phenomena in all possible settings. Stendhal notes that the ideas he forms from his experience are sometimes contradictory because none of them is

complete: "Cependant parmi les vérités que j'écris ici et ailleurs, il en est qui semblent se contredire. C'est qu'elles ne sont pas complètes . . ." (F.N., p. 470). His conclusions are based on experiences that are relative, which may be experience of same things but seen differently, and they are, thus, all incomplete perceptions of what are abstractly whole things. Establishing truths on particular experiences leads to contradictory truths, differing experiences leading to differing judgments.

Furthermore, Stendhal understands that how a person responds to circumstances, and thus remembers, is also relative. Men remember what attracts their attention, forget rapidly what is weakly attractive, and have no record of what does not affect them. In the same circumstances we experience and remember differently. This notion is maintained in the following explanation of differences in passion:

Les passions sont l'effet des objets extérieurs sur nous. Il ne faut donc pas s'étonner que le même archet produise des sons différents sur des violons dont les caisses ne se ressemblent pas.

Chacun voit à sa manière les objets de sa passion.
(J.L., I, 29)

No two men experience the same desire for a same object because each perceives and feels the object differently, according to the history of his formation, the influences that molded this response.

As an aspiring playwright, Stendhal is extremely aware of how this relativity of response, dependent upon individual histories of pleasurable and unpleasurable experience, must enter into his considerations of how to please an audience: "Tout l'effet du poète est dans le coeur des spectateurs . . . Etudier ce qui s'y passe, cela vaut mieux qu'⁹étudier Aristote." An individual's education will determine what he finds pleasing, and the poet must look there and not to abstract theory to know what to write in order to be successful.

In connection with his realization of the factors that determine what a man recalls, Stendhal is struck by Helvétius' comments on the effect of the degree of passion felt about what is being remembered and upon which one is reflecting. First of all, having a passion for something, which engages personal happiness and amour-propre, renders a person more sensitive to experience concerning his passion, and thus increases his memories. Echoing Helvétius, Stendhal writes: "Une tête éclairée par une passion découvre dans les choses que cette passion lui a ordonné de considérer bien des choses qui n'ont été conçues que par des têtes obéissantes à des passions aussi fortes" (F.N., p. 435). Thus, being passionate increases one's store of memories. Stendhal hears, however, Helvétius' caution about establishing ideas on that which we desire: "La passion rend attentif aux circonstances qu'elle croit influencer

sur son bonheur" (J.L., II, 21). Even though passionate men may perceive more, they do not necessarily have more complete memories; rather, they penetrate more deeply into what attracts them and have, therefore, exaggerated and distorted memories of the desired phenomenon. We have already observed Stendhal's realization of his own tendency to pay attention only to what concerns his passions: "L'être passionné tel qu'Henri B [ne] fasse jamais de grandes découvertes dans l'analyse des sentiments ordinaires de l'homme."

Finally, Stendhal notes those conditions that limit the accuracy of the record of our experience. Memories erode over a period of time. Impressions that we could initially recall disintegrate little by little. Stendhal quotes from Hobbes: "'L'on peut définir l'imagination une conception qui reste et qui s'affaiblit peu à peu à la suite d'un acte de sens'" (J.L., I, 354). "Conception" has the specific meaning of the impression an object leaves with us. Thus, we may be able to refer to a prior experience in language, but lose the sensorial evidence, the forgotten image that founds language. Not having an image, evidence, to control judgment allows for errors in judgment.

Situations that cease to concern us, Stendhal observes, are forgotten: "Je remarque que depuis que my love for A [dèlè] is tombé, le souvenir du bonheur de Frascati perd peu à peu de son

charme et s'efface. Appliquer cela généralement" (J., p. 497).

Memory and Imagination

Finally, Stendhal is aware that the power of imagination has an effect on the accuracy of one's memories. From an overview of his use of the word imagination we can determine that Stendhal ascribes to a standard, sensualist bipartite definition of this power, as it is, for example, defined by Condillac in the Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines, and which Voltaire, after Condillac, succinctly defines and describes in "Imagination" in the Encyclopédie.

Voltaire defines a passive function of imagination: "C'est le pouvoir que chaque être sensible éprouve en soi de se représenter dans son esprit les choses sensibles. . . ." ¹⁰ Condillac had written, similarly, that the power of imagination is the operation whereby "une perception, par la seule force de la liaison que l'attention a mise entre elle et un objet, se retrace à la vue de cet objet Quelquefois, par exemple, c'est assez d'entendre le nom d'une chose, pour se la ¹¹ représenter comme si l'on l'avoit sous les yeux." In both definitions, we find essentially maintained that part of memory is in images. This idea is reflected in a definition of memory

Stendhal gives in the Filosofia nova: "Mémoire le pouvoir par lequel une image ou conception reste dans la tête" (F.N., p. 434). Remembered experience in the form of an image is provided by imagination.

Stendhal, following Hobbes's thinking, sees images as those conceptions that remain with us from our experience of the material world: "'Originairement toute image procède de l'action de la chose dont elle est l'image. Lorsque l'action est présente, la conception que cette action produit se nomme sentiment'" (J.L., I, 354). It is the image formed of the object through the senses that remains in memory. In passages in the Journal littéraire that refer to his readings of Hobbes, Stendhal, for purposes of clarity, prefers to refer to all that can be visualized in memory as image, using the word conception for the impressions related to the other senses, and he notes about himself that practically all his sensorial impressions take on visual metaphors: "Faut-il appeler images le souvenir de Je suis encor dans mon printemps chanté par Phylis à Feydeau . . . J'appelle cela conception, laissant le nom d'image aux conceptions des yeux. Presque tous nos souvenirs sont images, du moins chez moi qui aime à voir. Au mot de son, je vois la grande cloche de saint André en balançant" (J.L., I, 354).

More than his terminology, however, what is important is what Stendhal sees as the effect of recalling experience in images, for

this is what interferes with reasoning. He remarks to Pauline about a secret admirer of hers: "Il se fit la plus douce image de toi; je vis que cette image l'avait frappé . . ." (Cor., I, 107); and about his cousin Gaétan: "Son imagination a besoin d'être secouée; il est bon, mais n'a pas assez de force dans sa bonté" (Cor., I, 132). Stendhal indicates that having the power of recalling experience in images enables us to feel that experience again: "C'est à la mémoire . . . à l'imagination que nous devons beaucoup d'émotions" (J.L., II, 9). In the first quotation from the Correspondance the image recalled moved the person strongly; in the second Stendhal recommends recourse to imagination to provoke feeling and passion in Gaétan.

Voltaire in his article in the Encyclopédie credits passive imagination for the birth of passion: "Cette faculté passive . . . elle nous pousse vers les objets qu'elle peint ou nous en détourne, selon la manière dont elle les représente."¹² The recalled image-memory causes sensations as its reference--the concrete object--once did, bringing about feelings and desires.

Stendhal finds pertinent affirmation of the affective effect of recalling experience in Dugald Stewart's Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, the sixth chapter of which, "Imagination," Stendhal read in the Bibliothèque Britannique, in 1804. Stewart pointed out that imagination may interfere with reasoning particularly in persons who have an extremely vivid

one: the more vivid this power, the stronger the feelings elicited will be: "'Lorsqu'un homme d'une imagination ardente s'engage dans les affaires, il court le risque d'être la dupe de son

¹³
enthousiasme.'" Stewart used Rousseau as the prime example of a man overendowed with forceful imagination, a striking example for someone like Stendhal who considered Rousseau responsible for his sentimental education: "Jean-Jacques . . . qui m'a donné the character loving and the great loves" (J., p. 549).

It is in reaction to Stewart's chapter in the Bibliothèque Britannique that Stendhal wrote the passage where because of his temperament he claims to be interested only in a certain kind of person: "En général le froid génie de l'observation est bien plus propre à faire des découvertes dans l'homme que l'être passionné tel qu'Henri B . . . " Stendhal saw himself as possessing an extremely moving imagination. Consider this passage where Stendhal describes the violent affective state that overcame him upon the sudden memory of one of his first belles dames sans merci, Victorine Mounier:

Pendant que l'a[bbé] H [élie] était avec nous aux Tuileries, il a passé une femme nullement remarquable qui avait dans l'ensemble des yeux un trait de ressemblance bien léger avec V [ictorine] . Cela m'a renversé, j'ai été deux secondes hors de moi. (J., p. 486)

That certain memories, like that of Victorine, upset him to such a degree makes it impossible for him to reason well on recalled experience about which he is passionate.

If Stendhal sees negatively the emotional effect of imagination when used in thinking, elsewhere he considers this effect more positively. Thanks to this ability to refeel prior experience, memory becomes a source of happiness: "Je pense à Mélanie, et ce souvenir m'a charmé comme le plaisir lui-même (as the pleasure itself) . . . " (J., p. 578); he can relive past experiences through recall. He goes so far as to declare that he prefers that literary glory rather than love be his main passion because the former passion will provide more reliable "souvenirs," which are as much sources of happiness as the primary experience they allow us to relive:

Je remarque que depuis my love for A[dèle] is tombé, le souvenir du bonheur de Frascati perd peu à peu de son charme et s'efface . . . cependant, il n'en fut pas moins grand au moment même; la somme seulement de ce qu'il m'aura procuré de bonheur dans toute ma vie sera moins grande à cause du plaisir de m'en souvenir qui n'aura duré que deux ans, tandis que le souvenir des jouissances procurées par l'amour de la gloire durera plus longtemps. Du moins, ne me sens-je pas disposé à quitter cette maîtresse. (J., p. 497)

Secondly, Stendhal's aesthetic theory is founded upon pleasing the audience: "Tout l'effet du poète est dans le coeur de ses auditeurs. Ce n'est que là que sont ses véritables victoires" (Art dramatique, p. 427). He finds that the artist can do this best when he creates from his own experience and on the feelings this experience causes:

Cette année, je n'ai plus cette passion à la même force; comme poète il m'est très utile de l'avoir éprouvée. C'est, j'espère, la seule haine furieuse que je sentirai de ma vie. Tâcher de graver dans ma mémoire les sentiments que j'éprouve pour les retrouver au besoin et avoir en écrivant cette noble hardiesse qui me fera donner à mes personnages franchement le sentiment que je me souviendrai d'avoir éprouvé. (F.N., p. 473)

Stendhal finds imagination to be one of the key powers of the artist: "J'ai la qualité la plus essentielle peut-être à l'homme qui veut devenir poète; une imagination excessivement vive, qui voit tout ce qu'elle pense" (J.L., I, 217). Through this power, the artist can feel anew what it is he wants to express, and thus, he will be able to create characters that will move and please the audience. The artist should have a vivid imagination: "Toutes nos idées nous venant par nos sens, un discours est une suite d'images. On est plus ou moins poète suivant que ces images se présentent plus ou moins distinctement à l'esprit" (J.L., I, 212-13).

Thirdly, because image-memory allows us to feel again it is to this power in the audience that the artist must aim in order

to move the audience. In the following quotation Stendhal expresses concern as to how to arrive at an accurate measurement of an audience's capacity to picture what a play recounts, for this capacity to imagine determines its ability to feel what is being depicted:

L'imagination augmente la pitié. Lorsque ceux qui vous écoutent n'ont pas cette faculté, il faut y suppléer en détaillant. Il faut donc lorsqu'on veut plaire à un public étudier à quel point il a cette faculté. Etudier à quel point l'ont mes contemporains. . . . (J. L., II, 121)

Helvétius sees the pleasurable experience of literature as one of
 the "plaisirs de l'imagination."¹⁴ In the Bibliothèque Britannique Stendhal found Dugald Stewart's prescription that the audience requires the capacity of imagination to enjoy art as the artist requires it to create: "'Dans la poésie . . . où l'auteur entreprend de présenter, au moyen du langage, les objets qui occupent son imagination, cette faculté doit se trouver à la
 fois . . . chez l'auteur et chez ceux qui l'écoutent. . . .'"¹⁵

As to the second half of the definition of the power of imagination, which Voltaire identifies as l'imagination active, we meet what constitutes the creative power in man, the imagination which, Voltaire writes, "arrange ces images reçues et les
 combine en mille manières."¹⁶ It is this power that creates new images from the matériel of memory and orders them in

different ways. Condillac describes it thus: "L'imagination est une opération qui en réveillant les idées en fait à notre gré des combinaisons toujours nouvelles." ¹⁷ Stendhal describes this operation of his imagination on memories of a painting by Raphael: "Je m'étais rappelé d'une figure de Raphaël que j'avais vue aujourd'hui, j'ai remarqué que mon imagination en avait forcé tous les traits" (J. L., II, 212). Because of this power Stendhal realizes that when thinking men may recall distorted memories. This would not intrinsically have a bearing on the formation of accurate ideas except that he notes: "Un corps quelconque créé par l'imagination fait impression sur la mémoire. Il y a des choses que je vois dans ma mémoire et dont je ne sais plus si je les ai faites, vues, songées, ou si elles m'ont été racontées . . . " (F. N., p. 434); one cannot know that one's memories have been disfigured.

His thinking on active and creative imagination is undoubtedly inspired by Hobbes's definition, which he paraphrases: "h[enri]-La faculté d'agrandir ou de rapetisser dans tous les sens les images des choses observées, et celle de lier des images observées dans différents corps (occasionnées par différents corps, Hobbes) forme l'imagination . . ." (J. L., I, 583); and by Helvétius', which definition, quoted in the Journal littéraire, indicates that the motivating force of this power is passion: "'Dans une combinaison un assemblage nouveau d'images et un rapport

de convenances aperçues entre ces images et le sentiment qu'on veut exciter'" (J. L., I, 204). Stendhal treats as important-- "L'excellente idée celle de l'influence du coeur sur la tête en altérant les images et les conceptions en dépôt dans le cerveau." (J. L., I, 356)--his discovery that the distortion of memory is brought on by passion: "Je crois que l'imagination n'est causée que par les passions de manière qu'un homme qui n'aurait point de désirs n'aurait point d'imagination" (F. N., p. 434). He must be skeptical about the accuracy of his memories concerning his objects of desire which move him to transfigure his experience to suit his desires. Thus, concluding a passage describing an encounter with Victorine Mounier, whom he desires so ardently, he ends: "Ce récit, quoique fait avec raison, peut être à mille lieues de la vérité" (J., p. 531). He knows that his description risks being partly fabricated due to his desire to rediscover experience in a light favorable to his desire: "Les images conservées dans la mémoire prennent la teinte du caractère" (J. L., I, 580).

Dugald Stewart depicted Rousseau as a man made miserable by his imagination, whose transforming activity removed him dangerously from real contact with reality. Stewart writes in general: "'Mais chez l'homme dont l'imagination n'est pas bien réglée, les circonstances extérieures ne servent guère qu'à exciter des pensées et des sentiments qui lui sont propres; aussi

sa conduite est-elle en général moins calculée sur sa situation
 réelle que sur celle qu'il imagine.'"¹⁸ Stewart in praising Mme
 de Staël's book on Rousseau, Lettres sur les ouvrages et le
caractère de J. -J. Rousseau, paints Rousseau as such a man of
 unregulated imagination: "Lugubre tableau de la sensibilité et du
 génie touchant aux bornes de la folie. . . .'"¹⁹ Stendhal struck by
 this analysis of Rousseau in Stewart refers to similar analyses of
 Rousseau by others; Mirabeau and Helvétius point out Rousseau's
 poor reasoning ability: "Mirabeau juge comme Helvétius que J[ean]-
 J[acques] est plus grand par la multitude d'observations morales ou
 de leçons applicables au bonheur journalier de l'individu . . . que
 par les systèmes généraux" (J.L., II, 38). Stendhal determines
 to "dérousseauiser" himself: "Dérousseauiser mon jugement en
 lisant Destutt, Tacite, Prévost de Genève, Lancelin" (J., p. 465).
 He must curtail the impetus his passionate nature gives to his
 imagination, causing the distortion of experience that he must rely
 on for reasoning.

Revery

As with passive imagination, Stendhal marks, however, the
 positive results of active imagination. Active imagination that
 transforms memories of a man's experience may provide a person

with limitless pleasures. Guided by passion, a man's imagination may tailor his memories to suit his desires, make them conform to an ideal model. In memory, through the power of imagination fired by his desire, a person can constantly enjoy those sensations he seeks from objects of desire, for remembered objects can be changed to resemble objects of desire.

Stendhal believes that all men form and hold on to modèles idéals: "Il me semble que tous les hom[mes] se forment un certain modèle qu'ils se proposent d'atteindre" (J. L., I, 260). He notes that the paradigms of behavior to which he aspired were given to him especially by his readings in Rousseau, the comportment of the characters of La Nouvelle Héloïse: "Jean-Jacques eut la préférence; je me figurai les hommes d'après les impressions qu'il avait reçues de ceux avec qui il avait vécu. Par là, il fit sur moi ce que les romans, dont il avait nourri sa jeunesse, avaient fait sur lui" (Cor., I, 162). All men are subject to the natural law of the search for agreeable sensations: "Chaque individu, ce me semble, se fait même dans ses moments de plus grand sang-froid l'image d'un bonheur auquel il désire parvenir . . ." (J. L., II, 72); men are constantly engaged in fantasizing, rapt in their visions of what is for them ideal, their images of what will give them happiness. This passion for an ideal, individually construed, is what motivates imagination to

change memories of real experience to suit the ideal. Stendhal notes this to be true particularly about the artist: "Dans un poète, les images dont il cherche à se souvenir exactement ne doivent-elles pas prendre à la longue la teinte du modèle idéal qu'il s'est formé?" (J. L., I, 580) In memory, by the power of imagination, the real is transformed to allow us to enjoy in contemplation of it those sensations that our vision of the ideal has conditioned us to seek. Stendhal notes this activity in himself. His memories of Adèle de Rebuffel, his cousin whom he was pursuing in 1802-03, were altered to make her conform to an ideal of womanhood: "Je m'étais fait d'A[dèle] une de ces âmes passionnées digne d'être la maîtresse d'un homme de génie" (F. N., p. 470). Julie d'Etange was one of Stendhal's principal ideal models: "Ce qui m'a gâté jusqu'ici, c'est la fausse opinion que j'ai eue d'elles. Je les ai crues des Julies, elles ne sont que des Parisiennes de Dancourt" (J., p. 698). Rousseau's character is undoubtedly the âme passionnée to whom Stendhal made the memories of Adèle de Rebuffel conform. Thus transformed, memories of Adèle provided Stendhal with moments of happiness. In a letter to Pauline, Stendhal, cognizant of the transforming power of imagination which enabled him to alter his memories, acknowledges that the illusion that real men were like his ideals was divine: "Cette folie me donna quelques moments de la plus divine illusion,

dont celles [des personnes]mêmes qui en étaient la cause ne se doutèrent pas, ou qu'elles ne purent comprendre" (Cor., I, 162). His transformed memories of reality allowed him to be moved as he desired to be moved. Active imagination that changes memory truly makes of it a means of happiness.

Besides his appreciation of the power of active imagination to transform memory, Stendhal values its ability to arrange images, to order impressions in new ways, to form an original world so to speak; this power that "rapproche plusieurs objets distans . . . sépare ceux qui se mêlent, les compose et les change," as stated in the Encyclopédie.

Voltaire writes in particular about this active imagination that it is responsible for invention in the arts: "Ce don de la nature
20
est imagination d'invention dans les arts . . ."; creativity and originality in the arts are the successful combination of the artist's memories by his imagination. Helvétius accounts, in De l'Esprit, for the greatness of Milton thus: "La grandeur de l'imagination de ce poète est moins l'effet d'une grande étendue de mémoire que d'une méditation profonde sur son art. C'est cette méditation qui, lui faisant chercher la source des plaisirs de l'imagination, la lui a fait apercevoir, et dans l'assemblage nouveau des images
21
propres à former des tableaux grands . . ."; from among his memories the imagination of the artist, like Milton's, picks and

chooses, removing from memories elements present in reality that interfere with a pure representation of characters, themes, and situations, to form original constructs that will please.

Stendhal knows from personal experience that this revery can be responsible for both pleasurable and useful creations. It is revery that Voltaire and Helvétius describe when speaking of the free play of imagination in the artist, those states where he is given up to the flow of images proffered by imagination. This is the meaning Rousseau gave to the word when defining it in the "Deuxième Dialogue" of Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques: "Dans la rêverie on n'est point actif. Les images se tracent dans le cerveau, s'y combinent comme dans le sommeil sans le secours de la volonté."²² Feeling guides the creation. The images arise unwilled but naturally, in an order that conforms to feeling, emotion.

Stendhal delights in revery, in the opportunity to abandon himself to memories bound to move him agreeably. In speaking of those heroes, the characters of his adolescent readings, that gave rise to his passion for virtue, he notes gratefully the moving themes they provided for his "douces rêveries": "Je lisais la vie de S[aint]-Preux, de Brutus, de Gracchus, d'Othello, d'Henri V; je me disais: à leur place j'en aurais fait autant, et je repassais celles de mes actions qui par leur motif ressemblaient aux leurs.

Toute me faisait donc trouver du charme dans cette étude, mère et nourrice des douces rêveries" (J.L., II, 39). Not only did they give him the heart that makes him noble, privileged but these readings allow for the pleasures of the imagination. He delights in the ability to cast himself in the roles that such memories of heroes enable him to play.

Moreover, Stendhal maintains that it is in such a state of revery that means to contact Victorine were suggested to him: "A force de rêve, j'ai cependant trouvé un moyen de lui écrire; mais que pensera-t-elle de ma lettre?" (Cor., I, 146) The fanciful constructs made of prior experience suggest previously unforeseen possibilities of behavior. Revery because of the inventiveness for which it is responsible can serve to suggest new ideas.

Limited Certainty

Knowledge is needed to be able to satisfy passions. Given the limitations that determine the completeness and accuracy of what a man may recall, which founds knowledge, Stendhal, seeing the range of certitude a person may hope to have, works with memories and the ideas that stem from them in a way that reflects his grasp of their potential to establish truths. He works within the limitations to establish the only sure knowledge that is possible under these conditions:

Tant que je n'ai pas marqué les limites d'une vérité, que je ne l'ai pas sommée, elle n'est qu'à moitié découverte pour l'utilité qui est toujours l'échelle du mérite. . . .

En marquant les limites je me préserverai de la vérité mal appliquée, grande source d'erreurs. (J. L., II, 79)

Stendhal is cognizant of the dangers of generalizing ideas that are suggested by his experience, which he knows to be so relative. He must strive to see events as particular, because each is determined by uncontrolled arrangements of elements that meet at a particular time and place and to which each man responds differently. He must certainly guard against generalizing from his own experience to that of others:

Il ne faut jamais généraliser le fait dont on tire une conséquence. C'est s'exposer à de grandes erreurs lorsque je puiserai des pensées dans mes cahiers.

Par exemple quand je songe à une action de mon père il faut dire mon père et non pas un père. (J. L., I, 341)

Ideas derived from an experience must be seen as essentially limited to that experience.

Stendhal feels that the use of language when recalling experience encourages generalizations because of the relations words automatically establish; what Stendhal sees to be the result of the commonness of nouns:

Comme diverses choses nous donnent des conceptions valables, il faut nécessairement que plusieurs choses aient les mêmes appellations.

Les noms sont communs (Hobbes: universels) comme homme; individuels comme Le Tasse.

L'universalité d'un même nom a jeté les hommes dans des erreurs. Ils ont soutenu sérieusement qu'entre Pierre, Jean et le reste des hommes nés ou à naître, il devait y avoir quelque chose que nous appelons l'homme en général. (J. L., I, 364)

The use of the same word to describe different phenomena induces thinking things that are different--everything and everyone being so, having been molded uniquely by the relative interplay of environmental influences and individual responses--are the same.

In connection with this, Stendhal, inspired no doubt by many of his readings--for example, his readings in Hobbes, Helvétius, Brissot, Lancelin, who emphasized the danger of the equivocalness of word meanings in philosophy--was aware that different men assigned their own meanings to the same word, and that errors in reasoning could be attributed to incomprehension of another's language. He recommends to Pauline that she be vigilant as to the meaning of the words she uses in order to avoid errors in thinking: "Les divers sens que nous attachons aux mots dont nous nous servons souvent, sont une grande source d'erreur. Attachons-nous donc à voir ce que disent ces mots" (Cor., I, 93).

Del Litto suggests that Stendhal's attempt in 1803 at a Dictionnaire analytique was in response to the necessity of establishing unambiguous language for the accurate transcription²³ and description of his experience. Stendhal launches this attempt thus: "Quelques articles du Dictionnaire qu'il faut se faire pour entendre soi et les autres" (J. L., I, 204).

Stendhal, following Hobbes's line of thought, maintains that ideas stemming from personal experience, even though limited, should be given priority. Quoting from Hobbes he observes that truth must be "'fondée sur quelque commencement ou principe de sens'" (J. L., I, 367). Men interested in truth should be able to trace their ideas back to concrete phenomena personally perceived. Knowledge taken from others is especially prone to lead to error because of different meanings assigned to words. Stendhal claims that it is better to observe the Delphic oracle as Hobbes recasts it: "'Au lieu de lire des livres, il faut lire ses propres conceptions et images, et c'est dans ce sens que le 'connais-toi, toi-même' (de Delphes) est digne de sa réputation!'" (J. L., I, 366) The ideas and observations of others must be considered as only theoretical until Stendhal can experience personally what they have found to be: "Regarder tout ce que j'ai lu jusqu'à ce jour sur l'homme et sur les hom[mes] comme une prédiction. Ne croire que ce que j'aurai vu moi-même" (F. N., p. 458).

Thus, Stendhal realizes the necessity to provoke experience, to have something concrete to which to refer when thinking. He laments in himself a lack of experience: "Ce qui me manque le plus, c'est l'expérience . . . on est bien autrement convaincu de ce qu'on a vu que de ce qu'on a lu" (J.L., I, 237). The Filosofia nova was an effort to "faire un cahier des vérités à moi évidentes, sans preuve, pour être repassé quand je voudrais inventer" (F.N., p. 431). Georges Blin in Stendhal et les problèmes du roman claims that for Stendhal, the world exists for mankind only inasmuch as we experience it somehow sensually; what is not founded in a concrete perception of it, a sensorial experience of it, is not known: "Il ne se borne pas à soutenir que nous ne connaissons rien que par les sens . . . il transporte aussitôt son positivisme sur le plan de l'évidence à la fois sensible et rationnelle . . . rien n'existe que ce que nous éprouvons . . . ce que nous éprouvons comme vrai, dans le moment même." ²⁴ To enlarge one's power, to render means to ends more accessible, one must increase one's sensorial experience of life, which alone allows us to know that our ideas are certain, because we can trace them back to the sensorial evidence used in judging, in arriving at ideas. When we appear to learn from others, their ideas can only relate to what we have experience of, to what we remember; we can understand them only inasmuch as we understand ourselves.

Stendhal's decision not to generalize from one situation to another affects most importantly his approach towards arriving at knowledge about human behavior and motivation. He has decided not to generalize his ideas on human behavior from one situation to another because he knows that one situation cannot explain the behavior manifested in another. Man's behavior is in response to unique situations; to understand behavior, one must consider behavior in connection with the particular circumstances that elicited it. What caused response is never the same, nor are we ever the same: "On ne trouve point de ressemblance parfaite ou d'identité: 1. parce que les circonstances changent, 2. parce qu'à force de faire juger la tête, la passion a de meilleurs moyens de parvenir" (F.N., p. 439). Thus, understanding men is understanding them at a particular moment of their development in a particular context. Stendhal must rely on his memories of the details of situations--the facts about the situations and the persons involved as they appear in a specific event; these are what affects men, causes response, and thus, they are the key to understanding why men acted in such a way at that moment. "Il n'y a dans le monde que les faits de certains" (Cor., I, 165); it is upon the particulars of a situation, not on applications of abstract theory, that men must rely to understand a situation. It is the memory

of details that will enable Stendhal to know what motivates behavior, what environmental influences elicit specific behavior in men.

To complement his own reserves of experience, Stendhal enlists Pauline to provide him with specific facts culled from her experience of the provinces and of women: "Aide-moi à connaître les mœurs provinciales et les passions. Décris-moi les mœurs de chez mademoiselle Lassai[^][gne]. J'ai besoin d'exemples, de beaucoup, de beaucoup de faits . . ." (Cor., I, 144). He asks particularly for details about women, about whom he does not trust his observations because his passions cause distortions of his memories:

Tu m'aideras à me corriger de mes folies.
Contribue donc à me faire connaître les
femmes. Je compte beaucoup sur toi pour
cela. Commence tout de suite. Fatti, fatti:
des faits, des faits! (Cor., I, 144)

Considering people in situations where they actualize the manners of a period at specific moments and places will reveal which circumstances produce specific manifestations of certain behavior.

From the beginning Stendhal is careful to note particular aspects of events, which if otherwise listed in his journal would appear to be interchangeable; all would equally serve to explain his behavior. He wants, however, to indicate through his manner

of recording those aspects of situations that differentiate one event from another; for example, in the third entry of the Journal Stendhal gives an account of the day's activities and ends with the statement not that he had been to a ball, but to a "bal où les femmes honnêtes ont dansé" (J., p. 402). The phrase that qualifies "bal," the detail "où les femmes honnêtes ont dansé," serves to distinguish this dance from any other to which he may have been and will serve, if needed, to explain his feelings that night when he was for the most part bored: "Scène lyrique assez ennuyeuse au grand théâtre et bal où les femmes honnêtes ont dansé."

Since human behavior is in response to particular situations, detailed, particular knowledge of his experience is important to Stendhal as an aspiring playwright. To create scenes that will provoke a specific reaction in an audience, his own memories of what in a situation causes him to feel in a particular way will enable him to create effective scenes. He sees the characteristic of being particularly responsive to the environment, particularly sensitive; as an important attribute of the artist, which enables him to select effective details:

J'ai une sensation agréable; celle de mes cheveux divisés en deux masses sur les deux tempes. Je m'arrête à en jouir, à en goûter les nuances; le philosophe l'eût détruite pour voir si elle était bien vraie.

Voilà comment le poète bat le philosophe dans les détails, il n'y a que lui qui les ait sentis, il est donc le seul qui puisse les peindre.
(J. L., II, 78)

He notes about the aesthetic experience: "Point de sensibilité sans détails . . ." (J., p. 534); in so stating he draws a parallel between the condition of reacting to an artistic representation and the general model of human response to the environment: men when participating in art react to the particular representation. They are as moved by it when its component parts suggest to the audience pleasing or displeasing images as they are moved by a situation in reality endowed with many aspects that charge the senses and recall memories or suggest ideas. It is because we respond to specifics that it is necessary in art to supply specifics: "Le poète ne tirerait-il pas un grand avantage de particulariser beaucoup plus les comparaisons? Je montre un fleuve majestueux, pourquoi ne pas nommer le Rhône ou le Rhin? Il me semble que c'est la manière de l'Arioste" (J. L., I, 34).

Furthermore, Stendhal is a partisan of Lavater: "Pour un homme à qui Lavater a ouvert les yeux sur les physionomies et qui a éprouvé par lui-même la signification des traits . . ." (J., p. 598). Stendhal is convinced that moral attributes are revealed by the physical make-up of a person's face: "Ce jeune homme a une physionomie singulièrement spirituelle, telle que

je me figure celle de Miguel de Cervantes" (J., p. 515). The physical details of an actor's face, because such traits are expressive of moral attributes, have the power to touch the audience; it will respond to what the concrete details suggest, as he responds: "En étant en scène à côté de Mlle R[olandeau] et tantôt me jetant à ses genoux, tantôt lui prenant la main, je vois mille sentiments se peindre sur sa figure et agiter mon âme" (J., p. 536). The concrete in this respect is communicative, expressive of meaning.

As a writer, Stendhal must know which details, in what circumstances will produce feelings. In the following passage from the Journal, he admonishes himself for not faithfully keeping his journal: "Cette soirée me charma. Je ne pensais qu'à ça le lendemain; mais n'écrivant pas chaque soir, je perds tout ce qui est utile de ces petits événements, leur physionomie, et ce que j'écris n'est plus que des niaiseries" (J., p. 485). In forgetting the specific appearances that made up this situation, he has lost the ability to determine why he felt in a certain way, and he cannot attempt, therefore, to provoke these same feelings in an audience: he has forgotten the "utile" of the situation, its particular characteristics--the "physionomie" of the scene--responsible for response.

Memory as an Immediate Source of Happiness

If Stendhal sees the recall of prior experience that engages his feeling and activates creative imagination as an obstacle to arriving at accurate knowledge, we have seen, however, his appreciation of the fact that memory, which allows for recall, permits a reliving of experiences either for themselves, as transformed by imagination, or as the component parts of reverie. "Je deviens rêveur, je me rappelle le charmant sourire de celle que j'aime encore" (Cor., I, 42), he remarks happily to Edouard Mounier, brother of Victorine, whom he is actually addressing in the correspondence with her brother. The "charmant sourire" remembered provokes the associated feelings, his imagination is moved, and he enjoys the state of reverie: "Je deviens rêveur."

He quotes Helvétius who states that the reverie about a desired object preceding concrete attainment of the object of desire provides in the long run the greatest pleasures:

"L'état de désir est un état de plaisir. Le corps s'épuise, l'imagination jamais. Le désir joint à l'espérance donne un plaisir de prévoyance, sans doute moins vif, mais plus durable que le plaisir réel et physique. Ces premiers plaisirs sont ceux qui dans notre vie nous donnent la plus grande somme de bonheur." (J. L., I, 117)

Our desire feeds the inexhaustible transforming power of imagination, which offers us visions of happiness created from our memories of related states of pleasure. Imagination provides, therefore, limitless experiences of agreeable feelings at the moment these are so intensely desired. In the Filosofia nova Stendhal reaffirms this notion that the state immediately preceding a positive satisfaction of desire is the most intense experience of feeling: "Je crois que la passion la plus forte est l'amour. S'il en est ainsi, le moment où l'on n'est pas encore sûr de l'avoir est l'extrême de l'activité de l'âme" (F.N., p. 435). The activity of imagination, spurred on by desire, allows for constant stimulation of feeling. Imagination, in transforming memories, permits unceasing revelations about the desired object. Newness is always perceived, about which Stendhal remarks: "La nouveauté produit l'attention, et l'extrême attention se laisse ravir" (J.L., I, 114). Imagination can constantly move us, an idea Stendhal will meet again when reading Maine de Biran.

Besides the fact that memories can be altered indefinitely by imagination, making this experience of feelings so privileged, Stendhal notes that the manner in which they are altered intensifies the pleasure of the original experience. The imagination, which follows the dictates of desire, makes sublime memories.

Stendhal defines the sublimating activity of this power in the Journal littéraire, speaking specifically of the goal of the poet in creation:

Dans toute poésie (discours tendant à mouvoir)
il y a deux degrés de mérite. Il faut:

1. que tous les sentiments et idées de votre personnage soient naturels.

2. qu'ils soient choisis parmi tous les sentiments et les idées naturels de manière à produire le plus certainement possible tel effet sur l'âme de tels spectateurs. C'est cette seconde opération que j'appelle sublimer.

(J. L., II, 45)

In revery, imagination, guided by desire and its goals, chooses, "choisit," among memories, selecting those and aspects of those that will provide for the maximum experience of feeling on the part of the person they are destined to move; it rejects all that which would interfere in the satisfaction of desire.

Stendhal's thinking about the sublime refers to passages in De l'Homme, where Helvétius discusses the "plaisirs factices" sought by men through contact with the constructs of imagination. It is to the "pouvoir d'abstraire," of imagination or "pouvoir d'élaguer, si je l'ose dire, d'un objet tout ce qu'il a de défectueux et de créer des roses sans épines", that a person owes these "plaisirs factices," for in so working on memories, imagination
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allows for "sensations plus vives, plus distinctes." Because

of the "abstraction" of all interferences, of all that would obstruct the desired sensations to be had through images in reverie, even in single memories transformed by imagination, and in art, men experience more purely and richly those sensations than they do in reality. Stendhal laments the impossibility of reality to provide him with such pure sensation, which for him is happiness, and he claims to enjoy in solitude more happiness-giving experiences:

J'ai passé mon temps depuis trois mois dans une extrême solitude; ce contraste m'a plu en sortant de Paris où tout était pour l'esprit et rien pour le coeur . . . Il me semblait que dans l'ordre actuel de la société les âmes élevées doivent être presque toujours malheureuses, et d'autant plus malheureuses qu'elles méprisent l'obstacle qui s'oppose à leur félicité. (Cor., I, 83)

In solitude, he derives happiness from his sublime reveries, which move him more forcefully. In reality there are too many interferences that prevent being touched by sensations that would move as strongly.

Stendhal claims to have "une âme toute sublimée" (J.L., II, 68), feelings and desires that are entirely suited to directing the selection of imagination from among the contents of his storehouse of experience; a soul that will allow, therefore, for those images and ideas that will touch and move most strongly. This makes his interior source of happiness more effective than

reality as a source of happiness, where obstacles must be overcome or accepted in the pursuit of happiness. Also, his privileged ability to sublimate from his memories that which is unpleasant and obstructive of desired sensation establishes him as worthy to be a poet: "Quand je ferai des tragédies, j'aurai au moins pour moi la connaissance et le sentiment du vrai grand et du sublime . . ." (J., p. 525). Because of his privileged feelings, he will be able to create those sublime works most suited to move an audience.

Through the effect of his imagination on his experience, Stendhal can find in memory a source of great happiness for himself and aesthetic pleasure for others. Helvétius observes: "Le bonheur parfait et tel qu'on le désire ne se rencontre que dans
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les palais de l'espérance et de l'imagination."

Helvétius, like Condillac, sees the states of happiness afforded by recall of certain memories and revery as compensation. Through them we are released from anxiety, so that "'l'état de désir est un état de plaisir,'" to requote Stendhal's observation borrowed from him. Condillac remarks that creative imagination is especially operative when our desires are frustrated:

Il n'y a, je pense, personne qui dans des moments de désœuvrement, n'imagine quelque roman dont il se fait le héros . . . qu'il survienne quelque sujet de tristesse, qui nous fasse éviter nos meilleurs amis, et prendre en dégoût tout ce qui nous a plu; alors, livrés à tout notre chagrin, notre roman favori sera la seule idée qui pourra nous en distraire.²⁷

Stendhal writes to Pauline that he seeks the comfort of revery as a means to escape from the painful feelings of disappointment contact with reality causes him: "Rien ne m'intéressait, j'avais besoin d'être auprès de gens que j'aimasse, de leur parler . . . J'ai donc passé toute ma journée à rêver . . ." (Cor., I, 146).

The arts have the same effect on man. They represent a sublime reality, from which the defective has been removed, and therefore the sensations they produce are as strong and as pure as the sensations produced by sublimated memories visited in imagination. They are, thus, antidotes to ennui, serving as another means of escape from the disagreeable: "J'ai montré que leur principal objet est de nous soustraire à l'ennui," ²⁸ writes Helvétius. Stendhal subscribes to Helvétius' definition of ennui as the painful state of not being stimulated: "L'ennui est une maladie de l'âme. Quel en est le principe? L'absence de sensations assez vives pour nous occuper. Une grande passion donnant de l'importance aux moindres choses nous sauve donc de l'ennui" (J. L., I, 197). Stendhal remarks personally that literature provides him with agreeable feelings when he feels otherwise frustrated and thus bored, ennuyé: ". . . voir qu'il n'y a de bonheur que dans la rencontre d'une âme compréhensive, et se dire cette âme n'existe pas. Je lis les poètes, cela me distrait. En dernière analyse, c'est le plus vif plaisir" (Cor., I, 155).

The "Happy Few"

Ennui is a state familiar to Stendhal and to those like him, he would claim, the "Happy Few," who share a "tempérament" (J., p. 155). The latter term he uses occasionally, and he qualifies at one point this temperament as "mélancolique," and reiterates Vauvenargues' description of such men: "ardents, timides, inquiets" (J. L., I, 29). Stendhal and the other "âmes mélancoliques," "tendres," "passionnées," "élevées," "belles," and "sensibles," to cite several of the ways he describes the moral fibre of these people because of how they are able to feel, can seek happiness in memory and in revery which they have found impossible to experience in reality, because they have acquired impossible passions; reality causes them to know ennui: "J'ai donc passé toute ma journée à rêver . . . Ce n'est pas que l'état dans lequel je suis, cette surabondance de tendresse, soit pénible, il serait le bonheur si on avait à qui dire: 'Je vous aime!' mais je ne puis voir ici que des esprits ou des demi-âmes. Toutes ces petites filles d'ici m'ennuient . . ." (Cor., I, 146). In his memory, while dreaming, "rêver," this "ardent" man will find and enjoy those images and ideas that will console him.

Although he uses the word "tempérament" during this period, suggesting his later use of it, which will mean the innate characteristics of a group of men who share a similar biological organization, Stendhal, until his contact with the Idéologues, generally abides by Helvétius' claim that human behavior results from the conditioning of the environment: "Toutes nos idées nous viennent par nos sens."

Happiness According to the "Happy Few"

Stendhal credits his upbringing for his preference for the pleasure he has in remembering experience and for the disappointment in the kind of happiness reality can offer. During this solitary upbringing his chief source of feeling, of sensation, was his imagination, which was fed and stimulated by literature and biography: "Ne voyant personne chez mon gr[and]-p[ère] je portais toute mon attention sur les ouvrages que je lisais" (Cor., I, 161). This sentimental education by the sublime images of literary creations, devoid of all that which would interfere with the purity of the sensations, caused him to feel more intensely, richly. "Ton éducation t'a donné une âme très passionnée" (J. L., II, 150), he writes, referring to his inordinate capacity to respond passionately to sensations; he has been accustomed to feel intensely. Reality, which is not sublime, cannot move him as

purely and as strongly as his imagination developed by literature can. His memories of his readings and his memories of reality transformed by imagination according to ideals taken from literature cause in him stronger sensations than reality can.

Being raised in solitude, he had little experience that would have enabled him to know that the constructs of his imagination were unreal and thus that the strong, deeply moving feelings had from consulting his privileged memories were not the normal affective experience afforded by contacts with real society: "Les faits qu'on voit dans la nature n'étant pas sublimés ne font pas, à beaucoup près, une impression aussi forte que celle qu'on lit dans les romans. Il faut que je fasse tout mon possible pour me délivrer des préjugés que m'ont donnés ceux-ci. R[étif][de] La[Bretonne]" (J. L., I, 239). In this quotation, we find Stendhal being rational and giving his education and not reality the responsibility for the disappointment men such as he feel in the experience of reality. He should not have expected that reality provide him with emotional experiences which he could have by lapsing into revery guided by his sublime ideals culled from literature.

Being accustomed to richer experiences and knowing that one has the capacity in oneself, through imagination, to procure such experience makes contact with reality, for such men at least, less desirable as a source of happiness: "Cette disposition qui me fait

voir mille défauts là où les autres voient la beauté . . ."

(J. L., II, 150). In revery and in art that feeds his revery may he find the sublime to which he is accustomed. For Stendhal happiness is the ability to feel, the state of emotion caused by the effect of phenomena upon us: "Quand je me figure Adèle of the gate, tout le bonheur que j'ai n'est que celui que j'espère qu'elle pourrait me donner par le sentiment; et, comme j'en espérerais très peu auprès d'elle, il est très petit" (J., p. 622). His education by his imagination in conditioning him in this happiness accustomed him to feel strongly, because the imagination sublimates experience.

But it is not only the limp, dissatisfying sensations that contact with society offers that disappoint persons with such a formation, they cannot find men in contemporary society worthy of being loved for themselves, which is the emotional experience Stendhal has been used to. Stendhal derives happiness from his capacity to love another purely, that is for himself, conceived as an end of desire. It is not only strong experience of sensations that constitutes happiness for Stendhal, an âme élevée, the emotional response of love to the object causing those feelings is also part of the happiness he seeks. In indicating how he knows that Mélanie Guilbert loves him, Stendhal describes what constitutes happiness for her: "Je crois qu'elle m'aime. Cette joie souriante

et ce ravissement d'une âme sensible qu'elle a éprouvés en me voyant me le prouve" (J., p. 603). Mélanie feels happy at the sight of him, "cette joie souriante"; her joy is being able to appreciate Stendhal for himself; he is the good, the object of her passion. In another example, Stendhal maintains again that happiness consists in the feeling of love for another desired as an end in itself. He compares the feeling had at the sight of a loved one with that derived from appreciating an object of art: "Elle [Mme de Staël] ne sent pas le bonheur d'aimer. Elle veut toujours du retour. Elle ne sent pas qu'on a du plaisir à aimer comme une âme sensible aime la vue de l'Appollon du Belvédère" (Cor., I, 214). It is clear here that the beloved is not found desirable merely because he is considered as a useful means to bring about self-centered pleasure, but because he is found beautiful, like the work of art. He has qualities and attractions that are admirable, which causes one to love him purely. Stendhal suggests that egotistic goals constitute the end of passions for most people, even for Mme de Staël; a self-serving motive feeds their passion: "Elle veut toujours du retour." Men who have been educated like him have been trained to find happiness in the ability to love selflessly. They experience a change of emphasis: from on oneself onto another.

The characters of his childhood and adolescent readings, those of La Nouvelle Héloïse and of Tasso's Jerusalem Delivered for example, educated Stendhal to seek happiness in the ability to love another for that person's sake. It is under their influence that he developed this âme tendre, a soul that responds compassionately or sympathetically to sensation. We have seen Stendhal remark upon how excitable feeling-wise he is in the example of the violent emotion he experienced when a woman in passing reminded him of Victorine Mounier. He notes elsewhere: "Il n'y a pas eu d'homme aussi accessible à la pitié que moi: la moindre chose m'émue, me fait venir les larmes aux yeux" (J., p. 613); his tenderness enables him to feel another to the extent that he can forget himself, become concerned about another. It is the ability to respond compassionately that enables men so educated to love others truly; their ability to react emotionally, to feel, enables them to get out of themselves and to understand another and thus to love that person for his own qualities. This is the noble attribute of an âme tendre: "Elle m'aimait dans ce moment. Sa figure marquait le plus grand attendrissement. Voilà peut-être le plus fort mouvement d'émotion tendre . . ." (J., p. 655); his well-being was the sole object of her attention; her concern was all for him.

Stendhal speaks of a feeling of transcendence, of an overcoming of self that he experiences when he is happy:

Voilà le plus vif bonheur que j'aie senti de ma vie,
mais qu'il est doux. . . .

Si tu savais le latin, je te dirais que je suis nil
mortale senans, je ne sens plus rien de mortel, de
terrestre dans moi. (Cor., I, 209)

This declaration of happiness concerns a moment of happiness he experienced because of his love for Mélanie Guilbert, the actress he pursued in 1805-06 and with whom he lived in Marseille. He seems to suggest that in his love for her, his concern for her happiness and welfare, he has new feelings. He experiences something that is beyond the gratification of the senses. He is bodiless, boundless; he takes on an unknown state, suggesting that in forgetting himself--the familiar--he is able to feel in an unknown way. He is truly liberating himself in being able to experience previously unknown emotions.

H. J. Delacroix discusses how Stendhal's view of the capacity of passionate men to love others is a transcendence of self while it still respects the tenet of sensualism that all ideas and passions are acquired through the senses and are, therefore, based on initial pleasurable and disagreeable sensations. Stendhal recognizes that even though a person is capable of truly loving another so that he forgets himself in his appreciation of the other,

he would not do this if he did not derive some pleasure from it. Even moments of apparent selflessness are personally pleasurable. "Les objets nous ont frappés plus ou moins vivement suivant les désirs qui nous agitaient" (J. L., I, 372), claims Stendhal. He asserts that all behavior is primitively egotistic, in that we respond initially to all objects according to whether they move us agreeably or disagreeably. Delacroix attempts to explain, however, the transcendence of egotism Stendhal nevertheless claims to feel in the state of happiness:

Tout plaisir est en nous et nous-même, comme toute activité; mais ce n'est point nous-même, ni notre plaisir que la passion recherche comme sa fin; du moins nous ne recherchons ce nous-même qu'élargi par notre passion: notre passion s'aime soi-même et ses objets, au-delà du Moi superficiel, sensible et aperçu. ²⁹

Delacroix points out that for Stendhal it is undeniable that we derive purely selfish pleasure from the passion of loving others--the enjoyment of feeling strongly and freely--and that our love is based on discovering ourselves in others--an ego gratification. We have seen Stendhal, who considers himself formed in the image of Saint-Preux, claim that he can love only those who resemble Rousseau's characters. Delacroix indicates, however, that this egotistic pleasure is accompanied by another experience: a feeling

of the greatness of something beyond ourselves, derived from the view of "nous-même . . . élargi par notre passion"; by discovering ourselves in others, we find something about ourselves that surpasses the limits of our own being; what we had thought to be individual is greater than we. In this discovery we feel transcendence: "au-delà du Moi superficiel"; we overcome the ego that approaches all exterior objects only in terms of how they can best serve our limited personal ends.

What Stendhal laments is that he meets few people in society who cause him to love them for themselves; he finds scarcely a man who resembles St-Preux: " . . . c'est-à-dire que je haïssais les hom[m]es tels qu'ils sont à force de chérir des êtres chimériques tels que St-Preux, milord Edouard, etc." (Cor., I, 162). Stendhal can find happiness only in loving those who resemble him. He appreciates those with the qualities that enable them to seek happiness as he does: "Il me faudrait une âme de poète, une âme comme la mienne, une Sapho, et j'ai renoncé à la trouver; mais alors nous goûterions des bonheurs au-dessus de l'humain" (J., p. 590-91).

In a passage from 1806 in the Journal Stendhal remarks that the happiness he enjoyed by being visited by certain memories evoked by a scene of courtship between a young man and woman would be augmented were he able to share them with others who

feel the same as he: "Mes compagnons ne prennent aucun intérêt à ce genre de remarques, ou ne les comprennent pas: ils sont tout occupés de choses plus solides . . . J'étais doucement ému, j'avais des pensées tendres et délicates dont la jouissance se serait déculpée en les voyant augmentées par celles des autres, en voyant d'autres coeurs émus comme le mien" (J., p. 817).

Were he able to know that the others were as tender as he, as easily moved and visited by pleasing reminiscences, "des pensées tendres," he would be able to feel tenderly towards them, to love them, which emotion would augment the happiness already attained by the feelings recalled through the memories. To find worthy men Stendhal must maintain the illusion that people are virtuous: "J'estime peu les hommes parce que j'en ai vu très peu d'estimables; j'estime encore moins les femmes parce que je les ai vues presque toutes se mal conduire; mais je crois encore à la vertu chez les uns et chez les autres. Cette croyance fait mon plus doux bonheur; sans elle je n'aurais point d'amis, je n'aurais point de maîtresse" (Cor., I, 87).

Stendhal observes that he unfortunately developed illusory passions for real objects which he assumed corresponded to ideal models of behavior. His contact with reality revealed that such passions were only "chimères": "J'en suis à regretter de m'être formé une chimère que je cherche depuis cinq ans. Je veux

employer toute ma raison pour la chasser . . ." (Cor., I, 79).

Reality which so disillusioned him, upsetting his hopes, must now be found acceptable by dint of reasoning: "Je veux employer toute ma raison."

Let us recall that for Stendhal the birth of passion requires a projection of past experience on the future; we can hope that a goal is attainable because we have experience that allows us to think a new object of desire will afford us happiness. In forming passions based on the projection of ideals, the âmes sensibles were bound to be disappointed by reality: "Etonné de ne point trouver dans le monde ces hom[m]es parfaits (en bien comme en mal) que j'y attendais, je crus que mon malheur m'avait fait tomber dans une société d'ennuyeux et de gens froids" (Cor., I, 162).

Stendhal notes that it is particularly characteristic of the young to project these models on reality and to form passions based on them: "Les jeunes femmes comme les jeunes hommes se forment tous un modèle idéal, but de tous leurs désirs et termes de comparaison de tous leurs jugements. Moi qui écris ceci j'ai besoin de toute ma raison pour m'écarter de mon modèle . . ." (J. L., I, 198). The young can hope that reality will bear out their imagined ideals because of their lack of experience. He sees, furthermore, that their desire for concrete satisfaction is more

intense because of an ardor only the young, or those like them who can feel purely, know, for their feelings are not checked by experience that would lessen or mediate expectation of satisfaction and thus curb passion. Their free-coursing emotions encourage, therefore, exaggerated distortions of reality to suit their ideals. Stendhal warns Pauline, a younger sister, of the potential in herself, an inexperienced adolescent, to see reality inaccurately because of her keen, unmitigated desire to have it conform to her ideals:

Ayant l'âme bien plus tendre et ne l'ayant pas dégoutée par quatre ans de vie dans le grand monde, avant deux ans tu brûlerais de trouver un homme aimable. Tu le désirerais tant que tu finirais par te persuader . . . que tu l'as trouvé, et il n'en serait rien . . . A force de désirer une chose dans ce genre où l'illusion est si facile, on finit par se persuader qu'elle est. (Cor., I, 148)

The young are naturally geared to experience their first ennui in reality.

The modèles idéals of Stendhal, which screened his initial view of reality, are, however, made up of memories of his readings in literature. Let us recall a previously quoted passage: "Jean-Jacques eut la préférence . . . je me figurais les hommes d'après les impressions qu'il avait reçues de ceux avec qui il avait vécu. Par là, il fit sur moi ce que les romans, dont il avait

nourri sa jeunesse avaient fait sur lui" (Cor., I, 162). He formed paradigms of behavior and of happiness in line with the moral comportment of his sublime company. It is due to this, Stendhal exclaims, that he has "une âme grande et vertueuse . . . formée dans la solitude, et sans communication . . . les plus nobles passions à leur maximum et l'amour" (J., p. 559); the tender soul easily moved so that he is able to be noble, to be concerned for others as he is for himself.

In a passage in the Journal littéraire he describes the goal of his love for Victorine: "Toute la politique pour plaire aux âmes à la V[ictorine] est de ne pas se cacher . . . Peu à peu chacun quittera une pièce de son habit, vous vous verrez; voilà le seul bonheur qui existe pour vous, alma grande" (J.L., II, 37-38).

This passage from 1804 depicts a desired relationship with his lady that corresponds to a situation in the Marriage of Figaro, which he describes rapturously in a letter from 1802 to Edouard Mounier, that is to Victorine: "Je n'ai jamais rien vu de si touchant que ce jeune homme [Chérubin] aux pieds de la comtesse [la comtesse Almaviva] qu'il adore . . . des deux côtés . . . ces yeux qui s'entendent si bien quoique leurs bouches n'aient pas osé parler" (Cor., I, 31). The scene from literature appreciated by Stendhal, where the lovers achieve a type of unobstructed communication and mutual rapture, is a precursor of the very situation he describes

in the fantasy of his relationship with Victorine, suggesting that the former in so moving him established his tastes. The love felt by Chérubin and the Comtesse Almaviva, found by Stendhal in the Marriage of Figaro, described two years prior to his sketch of his fantasy with Victorine, has become an ideal for him. His memories of Victorine are transformed to resemble his ideal provided by his early readings. We find Stendhal suggesting again that happiness consists in loving another for himself, for his own value. In the ideal of love described in both quotations the lovers find happiness in the ability to contemplate each other. Furthermore, Stendhal shows that because they are in complete sympathy--each one sees himself in the other--there is no need for verbal communication, for the behavior of the other is perfectly understood.

Because of this unusual education which gives rise to sublime passions, i. e. . desires to be moved ecstatically and by objects of love who can be loved selflessly, Stendhal is extremely deceived by reality; more so than other adolescents, more than what is normal for adolescent disillusionment. Reality at best causes ennui for such men. Stendhal mentions several times his bouts with misanthropy: "Je croyais avoir à me plaindre d'eux [of men] , je m'en plaignais, et devenais sans cesse plus misanthrope" (Cor., I, 162). People who have memories of ideal experience, of novels like La Nouvelle Héloïse, find in memory relief from

disappointing reality: "Un homme, qui a profondément aimé et qui trouve du plaisir à relire ses sentiments dans la Nouvelle Héloïse, a une grande peine, affliction, désespoir, de vanité, il se réfugie dans son Héloïse, cette partie de son âme, toute la réunion des passions aimantes, jouit"; they, in their memories populated by the characters of fiction, his "Héloïse," or in memories of reality which they perceive to resemble ideals, find passionate experiences that satisfy them. The passions he experiences in his private world compensate for the unsatisfying passions that society fosters: "Le désir du bonheur est distrait de la douleur qu'il sent dans le système des passions vaniteuses" (J. L., II, 20).

Stendhal is concerned about the melancholy that accompanies retreat from reality and escape to one's private world of sensations. This bitter-sweet feeling of "je méritais un meilleur destin," that comes from the inability to satisfy desire--"La mélancolie vient d'une passion non satisfaite d'une certaine manière." (J. L., I, 260)--soothes; it is "un sentiment profond et doux à la vanité," and because it gratifies the ego, --we feel as though we are worthy of what we desire, even though it is impossible to satisfy this desire--he sees it as an incentive to find reality disappointing and to seek happiness in memory: "Je croyais avoir à me plaindre d'eux . . . et devenais sans cesse plus misanthrope, nourri dans ma folie par la mélancolie" (Cor., I, 162). For Stendhal and men of his

temperament, who naturally experience melancholy at the recognition of the insurmountable difference between their expectations about reality and how they actually find it, the pleasure of melancholy will encourage disillusionment and abandonment of reality and recourse to memories for happiness. Stendhal's use of the label âmes mélancoliques to characterize those with an education similar to his is not inappropriate.

Finally, Stendhal sees those smitten with sublime images of reality as suffering from shyness, timidité. He is particularly shy: "Guérissons-nous de la timidité . . ." (F.N., p. 457), which in preventing him from acting towards specific ends interferes with attempts to find reality worthwhile. Even if the status quo were not so different from his modèles idéals, he would be prevented from attaining his ends by the thought of his inadequacy, for his "fantastic" education has provided him with supra-real modes of behavior that he cannot imitate: "Je sens et je vois trop quel est l'homme parfaitement aimable, pour avoir une parfaite assurance tant que je serai éloigné de ce brillant modèle. Tel butor dont toutes les actions sont des ridiculités, a toute l'assurance possible, parce qu'il ne conçoit rien de plus parfait" (J., p. 592). Thus, memory, again, is a means of happiness for the timid person, incapacitated by his sense of being

inadequate. In the Vie de Henri Brulard Stendhal describes himself during this period in the following manner: "Je vivais solitaire et fou comme un Espagnol, à mille lieues de la vie réelle." ³⁰ He did not trust himself to act in reality and sought sensations and emotional experiences in dreaming, in memory.

The Âme Sensible and the Vain Man

We have seen that for Stendhal education, reinforced by the pleasing experience of melancholy, is responsible for the happiness certain men find in recalling their privileged experience or memories of reality worked over by imagination rather than in encountering reality. Stendhal, in one of the opening paragraphs of the Filosofia nova, points to the ennui that reality unfortunately causes âmes sensibles; the ennui experienced by all who acquire impossible passions, the result of an unfortunate education:

Je me souviens avec peine du temps que j'ai passé
dans la solitude.

Je trouve ceci commun, lourd et orgueilleux.
Je trouve bien plus utile de vivre dans le monde.
(F.N., p. 431)

His education was unfortunate because it did not prepare him to deal effectively with society; it rendered every day life unpalatable.

Stendhal does not altogether agree, however, that his moral development was unfavorable. On the one hand he realizes that such a background can only occasion severe deceptions, referring to his impossible longing that reality resemble his modèles idéals as madness: "cette folie"; but this madness produces "quelques moments de la plus divine illusion . . ." (Cor., I, 162). Stendhal cherishes the force of sensations and the ability to love selflessly to which he is accustomed. These are feelings that men should be able to experience in reality, not just in revery.

What he experiences through his remembered experience is privileged: "Qu'est-ce qu'une belle ame? C'est celle à qui son imagination a créé des récompenses qui ne sont réelles que pour elle et chimériques pour le reste des hommes" (J. L., I, 93). Most men formed in society, the "âmes froides" and "sèches," as he frequently calls them find happiness of a moral kind, that is apart from carnal gratification, in the reflection that they are admired or have succeeded through flattery in leading someone to think that he is admired, and assuring themselves, thus, the favor of this person. Happiness is derived from being admired, which required manipulation of others toward this purely egotistic end: another is liked because he is found to be a useful means to purely selfish happiness. In the following passage from

a letter to Pauline, Stendhal explains how to be happy and successful in society, and he recommends behavior destined uniquely towards flattering and managing egos, a comportment geared to make another feel esteemed and to win his good will: "En général flatter la vanité, faire de jolis compliments, on ne les croit pas, mais on estime la peine qu'on a eue à les faire par leur gentillesse, et cette peine est une marque de considération" (Cor., I, 219).

Men raised in society are primarily self-centered and do not respond naturally to sensations. They are not moved emotionally by what affects them: they are not tender. They are preoccupied with determining how the exterior world can best serve their interests. In the following passage, part of which we have already quoted, Stendhal compares the way natural men, who have been educated to feel, and strongly, and to respond unquestioningly to sensation, the âmes tendres, and men of society, or the âmes froides, seek happiness:

N'est-il pas vrai que si un hom[me], qui a profondément aimé et qui trouve du plaisir à relire ses sentiments dans la Nouvelle Héloïse, a une grande peine, affliction, désespoir, de vanité, il se réfugie dans son Héloïse, cette partie de son âme, toute la réunion des passions aimantes, jouit. Le désir du bonheur est distrait de la douleur qu'il sent dans le système des passions vaniteuses.

Mais l'hom[me] comme fauve qui ne sent que par vanité, où se réfugiera-t-il des peines de la vanité? Il n'avait du plaisir que par vanité. Par exemple, en lisant ce vers:

Je t'aimais inconstant, qu'aurais-je fait fidèle?

Il sentait le plus grand plaisir que lui procurassent tous les livres d'amour parce qu'on lui avait dit que c'était là un des plus beaux traits. (J. L., II, 20-21)

The first man feels his "Héloïse," he is moved by what the memory of her produces in him. Happiness for the âme tendre is a state of feeling, of emotion. The vain man, on the other hand, cannot feel what the line of poetry may evoke in his imagination. He can only derive pleasure from the reflection that others would admire him if they saw him reading the play; he cannot feel the poetry, be moved by it. For Stendhal the pleasure of the vain man is limited since he is denied the ability to feel naturally and to respond purely and spontaneously to the exterior world or to the images recalled in his imagination suggested by the poetry.

For Stendhal, being able to feel freely and energetically is a state of happiness:

Mais que le science est froide auprès du sentiment!

Malheureux et bien à plaindre, le coeur froid qui ne sait que savoir . . . je perds, à apprendre ces choses, les jours qui me sont donnés pour en jouir. (Cor., I, 40-41)

He was educated by art whose purpose was to move; he has been trained to feel and he is used to responding emotionally. Vain men,

not being able to feel "mille choses, qui glissent sur leurs âmes sèches et qu'elles n'aperçoivent pas" (Cor., I, 192), not having an âme tendre that would permit them to feel, to experience another, are denied the liberating experience of feeling freely and the transcending experience of truly loving in friendship or in romantic love, a state of happiness that Stendhal, like his mentor the solitary Rousseau, can find in memories of his ideal and in revery, but not in society because society is populated with such vain people.

Vanity, a Dominant Passion

During these early years, Stendhal tends to blame others for his unhappiness. It is the vanity of contemporary society that necessitates his refuge to the world of revery. We find Stendhal's coherent thinking on vanity and why it is the dominant passion principally in his writings on literature. This should not surprise us, for Stendhal, as we mentioned, believed that moving an audience, making it relive passion, was pleasing it. Touching an audience necessitates, therefore, knowing its passions, which change. Stendhal was convinced that political regimes determine behavior-- they educate men and thus select dominant passions. He was early a student of Montesquieu and learned from him, in the Esprit des lois, that political regimes determine moral conduct, selecting the

passions of a people and determining the means to satisfy them:

"L'hom[me] a des penchants différents suivant le climat et la
31
législation" (J. L., I, 160).

Stendhal notes cause and effect relationships between governments and leading passions. He sees artistic styles and even genres arrived at towards the end of moving an audience as corresponding to types of government. In this connection he notes about comedy: "L'égoïsme vient du gouvernement monarchique; mais la comédie ne peut régner que dans l'extrême politesse; donc, il n'y a point de bonne comédie sans monarchie" (Cor., I, 109).

From the various passages about government and the arts, we can understand why the society in which Stendhal lived was bound to repel him, being the antithesis of everything he was trained to value as essential to happiness: "Tu as été élevé dans des moeurs presque entièrement étrangères aux moeurs de la société de ton siècle, et ton éducation t'a donné une âme très passionnée" (J. L., II, 150).

Stendhal sees that vanity is a consequence of living in society: "La vanité est la passion actuelle de la société, c'est une suite de la civilisation" (Art dramatique, p. 414). The continuous view of others brings the idea of self into consciousness, fostering reflection upon oneself which founds "égoïsme;" Stendhal defines "égoïsme" as

"(se préférer à tous les autres plus ou moins)" (Cor., I, 109). Such love of self necessitates in society means of mediating antagonisms that develop from conflicts of interest among men conscious of their will and desirous of achieving their individual goals of happiness. Peaceful living in society requires a certain abdication of self-centeredness: "L'homme qui se jette dans le monde renonce à vivre par lui; il ne peut plus exister que par les autres" (Cor., I, 103). People take on a posture of concern and respect for others in response to the need for harmony: "La politesse est un fruit nécessaire de l'égoïsme . . ." (J. L., I, 360), and they experience consequently the admiration and the esteem of others; they taste vanity.

In Stendhal's opinion, the political establishment of monarchy in France dating from the reign of Louis the Fourteenth established vanity as the leading passion. In this respect he is heavily influenced by the ideas of Mme de Staël and Alfieri, who both railed against the effects of tyranny on society. Del Litto shows that Stendhal was imbued with both Del principe e delle lettere and Delle Tirannide of Alfieri. Passages like the following: "Alfieri m'avait tellement monté que je ne regardais les Tuileries qu'avec un mouvement de rage" (F. N., p. 472), confirm Del Litto's contention that Stendhal was impressed by Alfieri's conviction that monarchistic regimes suppressed natural energies in men. In passages like the following from De la littérature, where Mme

de Staël describes the nefarious effects of a tyrannical political regime on men: "Le règne d'Auguste avait avili les âmes; un repos sans dignité avait presque effacé jusqu'aux souvenirs des vertus courageuses auxquelles Rome devait sa grandeur,"³³ Stendhal finds added support for his growing conviction that the political system that developed in France during the period between the reign of Louis the Fourteenth and the Revolution produced a type of society that prevented the realization of a state of being that he was taught in solitude to desire and that shocked him: "N'étant pas accoutumé aux maux de tes contemporains, et ayant conçu le modèle idéal de la meilleure société possible, tu es donc non seulement étonné de tout ce que tu vois, mais choqué parce que tu le compares au modèle plus parfait que tu t'es figuré" (J. L., I, 150).

In monarchistic societies, where law is the king's pleasure, men can satisfy their desires only through winning favor and appearing worthy and estimable. Winning esteem makes one powerful; one becomes a favorite, and through influence, one can set about to satisfy desires indirectly. Before these can be realized, a delay is necessary, which causes the suppression of natural urges. Behavior, not necessarily corresponding to original desire, must be adopted to win favor and thereby to acquire the power to satisfy the original goals. Stendhal claims, following the Helvetian behavior model of the habit of a passion,

that "notre attention ayant été longuement fixée sur les moyens, nous prenons souvent ces moyens pour la chose même . . ."
 (J.L., II, 139). Therefore, in monarchistic societies where means such as flattering and winning favor, being esteemed, were necessary and habitual, these same societies saw their means become ends; the desire to be flattered and admired became through habit the chief passion of men living in the tyrannical situation of having to bend to the will of a single man.

In the following passage, Stendhal characterizes Molière's audience as being made up of men who had always to curry favor and who necessarily cultivated the passion of vanity:

Chez les Français: pour qui Molière a fait ses pièces, les hommes entièrement livrés à la société ne trouvaient point leur bonheur dans eux-mêmes, ni dans leur famille; la manière dont on était dans le monde (à la cour) était tout pour des hommes qui n'espéraient d'influence sur les autres (ou de bonheur) que de la portion de crédit que le tyran voudrait bien leur déléguer.

Ce crédit qu'on ne considérait que pour les choses futures (dont les marques présentes n'étaient aimées que comme gage des futures), ne flattait presque que la passion de la vanité, passion qui mettait sa plus grande satisfaction dans les preuves de crédit.
 (J.L., II, 111)

Men so educated are never natural; their real intentions are always hidden because they have been trained to go about satisfying them indirectly. Such men are, rather, hypocritical, the leading quality of society contemporary to Stendhal, the heritage of the preceding

monarchistic generations: "Voilà le digne fruit de nos moeurs corrompues, la n cessite de l'hypocrisie" (Cor., I, 179).

Stendhal is far from believing that this state of things changed with the collapse of the Ancien Regime, at the time of the Revolution. Vanity is still the chief passion of France in 1804. There is no monarch who determines appropriate comportment by the exercise of which one wins favor, but society sets it: "A Rome on  tait consid rable par ses vertus et par ses talents; ici on l'est par la mani re dont on est dans la monde . . . Nos moeurs actuelles (an 12) sont plus raisonnables que sous Louis XIV. Nous faisons d pendre notre consid ration de la mani re dont on est parmi nous et non plus de la mani re dont on est avec le ma tre" (Cor., I, 110). Still, in France, unlike in republican Rome, real feelings about and spontaneous reactions to objects causing sensations must be denied first in the interest of tailoring behavior to suit egotistic men and to win their esteem in order to consummate desires. This fosters the habit of suppressing feeling and makes for men who only calculate, whom Stendhal can only find to be froids, unfeeling.

The political exigencies which have selected vanity as the leading passion of French society are what prevents men like Stendhal--who have been educated to give free expression to their nature, who respond passionately and freely to sensations and who seek to consummate their natural desires, their passions for the

modèles idéals--from finding in society men who will provoke their passions and enable them to love their fellow man. Stendhal laments the impossibility of achieving his notion of happiness in reality, except among those who have been educated like he:

J'aurais besoin de toi ici, ma chère Pauline: il y a des moments où l'âme, dégoûtée du travail, cherche à aimer, s'attache de plus en plus aux objets de son affection, se renferme dans eux et voudrait pour tout au monde être auprès d'eux. (Cor., I, 145)

Parisian society, wrapped up in egotistic interests, that sees Stendhal as an instrument for their vanity, can neither touch him nor respond to his need to communicate with and to devote himself to frank, equally sympathizing men: "Sous la monarchie, les hommes ne s'intéressent plus les uns aux autres comme dans les républiques; ils n'ont plus d'intérêts communs et en ont de contraires" (Cor., I, 109). He finds Parisian society to be like that society which he described under the reign of Louis the Fourteenth: vain.

A republican society is yet to come, a mentality prevalent among citizens that recognize the "nécessité où la réunion en grande masse mettait les hommes d'être plus agréables les uns aux autres" (J., p. 805), he writes in 1806; but where the desire to please will stem from a virtuous intention. Stendhal particularly admires Brutus: "De tous les hommes c'est Brutus que j'aime

le mieux. J'aurai du plaisir à relire souvent sa vie. Acheter le Plutarque de Dacier . . ." (J.L., II, 15). Society should be formed of such virtuous citizens who, like Brutus, place the interest of others on a plane higher than their own: "C'est le plus grand comme le plus aimable à mes yeux" (J.L., II, 14). Meanwhile, Stendhal seeks in revery and in memory stimulation for those feelings that make him happy. He will write in 1806: "Il faut qu'une grande âme soit elle-même la source de toutes ses jouissances" (Cor., I, 335). Happiness possible in society will not satisfy the grandes âmes who seek the transcendent joy that comes from being able to devote oneself to another. In the realm of their memories, in themselves, they can find, however, such intense experience of feeling.

II. Memory and the Realm of Art

Memory and Art

Because memory allows for the renewed experience of past sensations, particularly as imagination changes memories to conform to ideals, it offers Stendhal the opportunity to relive happiness that he cannot find in reality. According to Stendhal, it is the faculty of memory, because of this same power, that permits the most

pleasurable experiences of art. This is through sympathizing, through the ability to experience feelings similar to those expressed by the characters of a work of art and to feel for the characters as we would feel for ourselves in a similar situation. "Sympathie," writes Stendhal, is the "faculté de s'identifier avec autrui" (J. L., I, 101); one shares the feelings of a character, or as he writes in 1806: "Cette propriété de quelques hommes qui leur fait éprouver les sentiments qu'ils voient être éprouvés par d'autres" (J., p. 771).

According to Stendhal the experience of being moved affectively is the chief pleasure afforded by art. In the Histoire de la peinture en Italie Stendhal affirms about the Italians of the Renaissance: "Les passions, qui font la possibilité comme le sujet des beaux-arts, existaient . . . La sympathie avait soif de sensations. Elle devait donner avec fureur dans le premier art qui lui présenterait des plaisirs." ³⁴ The passionate Italians who looked to be moved welcomed art that could satisfy this desire; they sought the experience of feeling in art. Stendhal remarks that he took great pleasure in a theatrical performance because he allowed himself to be moved by it rather than having taken a judgmental attitude towards it: "La pièce m'a fait plaisir, parce que je me laissais toucher au lieu de juger" (J., p. 585). In a passage where he notes what is the appropriate behavior of an

actor, Stendhal maintains that the purpose of art is to touch the audience, to appeal to its heart: "Déclamation et composition - C'est pécher contre la règle générale et sans exception que, dans l'art d'émouvoir (ou poésie), tous les noms doivent être donnés aux actions de l'agent d'après l'état du coeur du spectateur, but unique du poète, que d'appeler chaleur la plus grande dans moi un état de contraction générale et d'emportement qui ne touche point le spectateur autant que possible" (J., p. 585). Earlier we pointed out that for Stendhal, both revery and the arts serve as antidotes to ennui, and it is because in both we are brought to experience intense emotional states, which, we know, are for Stendhal the condition of happiness.

Stendhal's belief that art pleases an audience when it moves it stems originally from his early education in Grenoble when he was taught Du Bos' Réflexions sur la poésie et la peinture. Del Litto comments on this influence, maintaining that Du Bos was one of the first sources of Stendhal's conviction that the arts should touch us emotionally: "Sans oublier que si Du Bos fondait sa critique sur l'expérience et le sensualisme philosophique, il reconnaissait aussi le rôle de premier plan joué par le sentiment, le sixième sens."³⁵

Stendhal found corroboration for his early training in Helvétius and in Chateaubriand. This represents one of Stendhal's rare positive reactions to the ideas of Chateaubriand. Quoting

from Helvétius' De l'Homme Stendhal defines the beautiful in the following way: " 'La beauté d'un ouvrage a pour mesure la sensation qu'il fait sur nous . . . Toute poétique n'est que développement de ce principe' " (J. L., I, 223). What is beautiful is what causes us to feel pleasurable, "la sensation qu'il fait sur nous." The more sublime a work of art, i.e. divested of all that may interfere with and prevent a pure and rich experience of sensation, the more it pleases, which is an opinion of Stendhal's that we have already discussed with respect to the enjoyment of revery: "Dans toute poésie . . . il faut . . . que les sentiments et les idées soient choisis parmi tous les sentiments et les idées naturels de manière à produire le plus certainement possible tel effet sur l'âme de tel spectateur" (J. L., II, 45).

In his reading of Chateaubriand's the Génie du Christianisme, he finds thinking parallel to that of Helvétius', particularly in the following excerpt from the Génie, which Stendhal paraphrases in the Journal littéraire (J. L., I, 36):

Que la fille d'Agamemnon meure pour faire partir une flotte, le spectateur ne peut guère s'intéresser à ce motif. Mais la raison presse dans Zaïre, et chacun peut éprouver le combat d'une passion contre un devoir . . . De là dérive cette règle dramatique: Qu'il faut . . . fonder l'intérêt de la tragédie non sur une chose mais sur un sentiment.³⁶

Chateaubriand's premise is that "sentiment" can move us; having the passionate life of a character as the focus of the play will make us "éprouver," and thus interest us; Zaïre is more beautiful than Iphigénie because it provides more emotion. The artist works to have his audience relive feelings, and apropos his reading, in 1804, of Fénelon's Lettre sur l'Eloquence Stendhal remarks: "Dans Fénelon, tout favorise l'idée que je me suis formée du poète, celui qui émeut" (J. L., I, 309). The artist works to "déterminer les causes du plaisir que nous éprouvons au théâtre et de là les moyens de le porter à son maximum" (J. L., I, 95), and he will be concerned with finding the "causes" of a work's ability to move.

Memory plays a role in the ability to sympathize. Stendhal determines that identification with a character is dependent upon the latter's power to make the audience recognize its own concerns in his. In order to make us feel emotion so that we identify with his experience of feeling and are thus able to feel concern for him and to share his plight, the character must call up in our memory images from our own experience to which we respond with emotion. This produces a state in us similar to his, which allows us to feel as he does. In the following passage Stendhal indicates that a young woman is in deep sympathy with Hermione of Racine's Andromaque, feels for Hermione as she would for herself, and he shows that the young woman's ability to sympathize is dependent

upon Hermione's first recalling in her a personal image of being abandoned by a lover, a memory to which she can respond emotionally:

On donne Andromaque . . .

Il est possible que la jeune femme la sente beaucoup mieux que moi poète. Elle qui s'est vue méprisée par un homme qu'elle aimait et importunée par un autre, s'attache à Hermione, reconnaît ses sentiments et éprouve ceux que le poète a voulu faire naître dans le spectateur.
(J. L., II, 103)

In being reminded of her own experience, the young woman is moved as is Hermione. The recall of emotion that harmonizes with that of the character enables the audience to see itself in the character. It transfers its attention to him and feels for him. The chief pleasure of art being for Stendhal the experience of emotion, eliciting emotion depends, therefore, on the power of art to recall memories that will trigger emotional response. Memory is the basis of identification, the premise of sympathy, through which the desired, rich emotional experience is attained.

A public is able to sympathize only inasmuch as the characters touch it and appeal to its personal experience:

Nous n'estimons jamais les hom[mes] qu'en fonction de nous-mêmes . . .

Pour produire le maximum de sympathie il faut offrir à un hom[me] un personnage qui soit exactement tel qu'il croit être.
(J. L., II, 139)

Sympathizing requires that the details depict a situation so that we recognize our own concerns in those of the hero. Stendhal quotes from Helvétius, from De l'Esprit: " 'Tout sentiment qu'on n'éprouve plus est un sentiment dont on n'admet point l'existence' " (J. L., I, 127); an audience cannot sympathize if there is nothing with which to identify, if it has no experience of the feelings of the characters. In 1802, inspired by Chateaubriand, Stendhal remarks: "Les choses nouvelles ne sont point touchantes, car elles n'ont point de souvenirs" (J. L., I, 55). Effective art addresses our memories.

Helvétius in De l'Homme points to the pleasure afforded by the arts as being based essentially on a reliving of the audience's prior experience: "Si les arts nous charment, c'est en retraçant, en embellissant à nos yeux l'image des plaisirs déjà éprouvés; c'est en rallumant le désir de les goûter encore." 37

Stendhal in a passage about Hobbes makes a similar observation that the pleasure we have in listening to music probably comes from a reexperience of those feelings suggested by the strain:

Hobbes explique très bien le plaisir de l'ouïe . . .
 J'ignore pourquoi les airs agissent. Je présume seulement que quelques airs imitent ou font revivre en nous quelque passion cachée tandis que d'autres ne produisent point cet effet. (J. L., I, 377)

The greatest pleasure in art depends, therefore, on the correspondences that are established between the work and the

prior experience of the audience. Hence, passionate men who are denied in reality the accomplishment of their desires can experience through art the privileged feelings they seek in memory: "J'ai pu m'enthousiasmer pour les beaux caractères et les belles passions que j'ai vus jusqu'ici" (J. L., II, 34). Those works of art that portray characters and passions of a caliber equal to those the âmes élevées know in memory and in revery, i.e, virtuous and natural characters and passions, in permitting them to identify, produce those states of feeling which constitute happiness for them: "Je lis les poètes, cela me distrait. En dernière analyse, c'est le plus vif plaisir. Hier voulant lire 4 vers pendant mes nausées je parcourus tout Pompée de notre Corneille et je fus ravi" (Cor., I, 155). Through identification the âmes sensibles can attain states of being otherwise attainable only in memory. Stendhal speaks enthusiastically of those rare sensations lately experienced at a production of Fabre d'Eglantine's Philinte de Molière which caused him to refeel his "true happiness," to live the feelings of being virtuous: "Il m'a enflammé pour la vertu . . . il a vraiment mis le bonheur dans mon âme, un bonheur plus analogue à ma manière d'être, plus noble, plus profondément fondé" (J., pp. 540-41). Images of ideal virtue are brought up in his imagination that elicit the feelings that he claims make for his true happiness.

Since art, literature specifically, is responsible for the memories and imaginative creations from which he derives happiness, Stendhal, like those from similar backgrounds, will more readily discover correspondences between his prior experience and sublime art. He notes specifically that he enjoyed a performance of The Barber of Seville because it brought back memories of the ideal of his youth formed on the model of this play: "Le Barbier est de toutes les pièces que j'ai vu jouer celle qui me fait le plus de plaisir, elle m'enchanté à cette heure en me rappelant mes châteaux en Espagne de 16 ans, formés sur son modèle" (J.L., I, 187).

Early, Stendhal is convinced that only the sublime can move pleasurable. As in revery, the audience finds pleasure in art when the representation conforms to what it desires life to be; the way imagination can present life. Stendhal feels that the view of familiar reality, with its obstacles and frustrations, reminds us of the too real limitations on the possibilities of our own happiness: "Les événements de la tragédie présentés entre gens de notre état forment la tragédie bourgeoise, genre le pire de tous. Car l'homme abhorre le malheur ne produisant que la simple impression désagréable du malheur, il n'aime qu'on le lui présente qu'autant qu'il en tire une sensation de bonheur" (J.L., II, 120-21). The stronger, purer sensations sought in art come, as we know, from representations of the sublime, from the

representation of characters who are wholly, perfectly the embodiment of the characteristics with which they are endowed. Sublime characters are divested of any traits that would temper the force of their essential nature or interfere with the strong, pure expression of it. For Stendhal it is this sublimeness that moves; for example, the works of Corneille move him because they are so ideal, or the real sublimated: "Je vais à Cinna . . . Jamais peut-être Cinna n'avait été écouté par des spectateurs plus attentifs. Corneille avait une tête sublime par la grandeur des vérités qu'elle contenait . . . la cause du caractère original de ses écrits" (J., p. 494). By identifying with perfect characters, we are reminded of ourselves, but we relive emotions on a purer plane, detached from any other experience of emotion that could interfere with the principal feeling. Thus, we experience the familiar transformed, our condition sublimated. The purity of this experience is the "sensation de bonheur" that is impossible to be felt in art that resembles non-sublime reality too closely.

The Relativity of Taste: Approaching the Notion of the "beau idéal"

Since a work is successful when it moves an audience, it must reflect the dominant passions of a society, which passions

when depicted will touch the audience: "Mais ce n'est plus au Français de Louis XIV que nous voulons plaire, mais à celui de 1803" (J. L., I, 215). Stendhal is following his line of reasoning, previously discussed, that government educates society, selecting its passions. An audience from a different political system will not be moved by what touched another audience; it will have a different idea of what is beautiful, sublime.

Stendhal has personal experience that confirms this ideal. Having been raised in solitude, not in the same context as those educated in contemporary society, the pleasure he derives from the theater (his chief concern during this period, for he aspires to be a playwright), that is of sympathizing and of reliving his privileged passionate life, is not elicited by certain plays of the seventeenth century and those from other periods: that resemble them. The theater of Racine, Voltaire, and of those contemporary playwrights who imitate Racine leaves Stendhal cold: "Iphigénie est la pièce du monde après les mauvais drames qui m'ennuie le plus" (J., p. 611).³⁸

This theater, geared towards an audience of vain men, the conventions of which were established towards the end of gratifying the leading passion of vanity, cannot call up memories of similar experiences in Stendhal unpractised in the passion of vanity:

"Intérêt, qualité d'un ouvrage qui nous émeut. Ex: nous prenons intérêt à quelqu'un quand nous sommes affectés . . . des mêmes sentiments que lui" (J. L., I, 341). He blames the characters of Voltaire's Adélaïde du Guesclin for their vanity:

. . . rien de naturel, on voit qu'ils font tous de belles actions par amour-propre . . .

Ce qui attache dans Shakespeare c'est qu'on voit le caractère de ses héros, ceux de Voltaire supposent presque tous le caractère du roi de Prusse, faisant de grandes choses mais peu aimable, et le coeur sec à force de vanité. (J., pp. 491-92)

It is impossible to sympathize with vain characters: "Les personnages n'ont que de la vanité, sentiment avec lequel on compte et avec lequel on ne sympathise pas" (J., p. 611); the activity that passionate men seek at the theater, sympathizing, is thus impossible with vain characters. Likewise, Stendhal insists that plays that had depicted passionate feelings and virtuous men would have bored the vain audiences of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; they, unfeeling, were incapable of sympathizing: "Tu sens que, pour ces secs, la tristesse d'une grande âme, quand même elle leur serait intelligible, est d'un ennui mortel (elle ne leur est pas intelligible), parce que, pour avoir pitié, il faut se mettre à la place et ils ne se reconnaissent pas dans nous" (Cor., I, 194-95). Such an audience could only

have ridiculed out of jealousy what greatness it was capable of feeling and understanding: "La supériorité excite leur haine la plus irréconciliable" (J., p. 558).

It is the theater of Shakespeare, Alfieri, and Corneille that moves Stendhal. Corneille figures among Stendhal's favorite playwrights because he did not cater to an audience like that of Racine's. Corneille's public was that of the Fronde, a society that understood passion and wanted to be moved by natural representations of passion. Racine and Voltaire, on the other hand, sought the applause of courtiers, the flatterers and they who respond to flattery. The plays of Stendhal's favorite authors present natural characters, even when not virtuous, moved purely by their feelings, who undertake behavior directly aimed at satisfying their desire. He praises Corneille thus: "Leur entrevue [that of Jocaste and Philoctète in Voltaire's Oedipe] est encore la même chose que celle de Pauline et de Sévère, avec la différence que celle de Corneille parle à l'âme, tandis que celle de Voltaire ne parle ni à l'âme, ni aux esprits relevés; elle ne peut plaire qu'aux esprits vulgaires" (J., p. 465); and Shakespeare: ". . . ce Shakespeare si naturel, si passionné, si fort . . ." (J., p. 491).

Stendhal considers both form and content as acting towards the end of touching an audience. Not only do the characters of

Racinian drama fail to tap the memory of an âme sensible but the form serves to reinforce a passionate man's unsympathetic response to such works. The form is frequently hypocritical, the detection of which repels; we suspect an attempt to manipulate us towards ends that are self-serving to the creator. When an audience detects a hidden motive in expression, it suspects that "nous faisons cela pour quelque autre but; nous n'en [of the matter in question] sommes donc pas entièrement possédés. Nous espérons une portion de bonheur, si petite que vous la voudrez, d'une autre source" (J., p. 561).

Stendhal holds that the means of expression should be subservient to content: "Le style des passions est l'art de faire des phrases françaises de manière à ce qu'elles montrent le plus exactement et le plus clairement possible le caractère ou la chose que je peins, en lui donnant le vernis qui lui convient. L'harmonie imitative" (J.L., I, 158-59). The goal of form is to give expression to feelings and to ideas so that they can be felt purely. Stendhal writes that "les actions d'un protagoniste ne sont donc pas considérables par elles-mêmes, mais par ce qu'elles montrent de son caractère" (J., p. 528). Means of expression--for example, "les actions d'un protagoniste"--are superfluous when they do not purely communicate the subject, and in claiming our attention distract us from feeling the expression of passion and being reminded of ourselves. Our enjoyment of the theater is threatened.

Stendhal maintains that the form of much seventeenth-century drama and its imitations, supposedly created as a vehicle of expression, seeks really to call attention to itself for the purpose of providing gratifying reflections to the audience, who in turn look favorably upon the author. In another comment on Iphigénie, Stendhal zeroes in on the defect of the form of Racinian tragedy: "Je trouve qu'Iphigénie est le type du génie de la monarchie . . . Dans Iphigénie tout le monde bavarde et personne n'agit" (J. L., I, 172). Talking and little action are inconsistent with passion: "L'homme passionné n'aperçoit point en philosophe les nuances de sa passion" (J. L., II, 22). Form that acts against the evocation of authentic experience cannot recall for the audience those images that would provoke similar affective experience in it. In a note to this criticism of Iphigénie, Stendhal explains Racine's intention in not creating a suitable means to express passion forcefully: "'Quoi, madame . . . ' Toute cette tirade est pour le public. Elle devait avoir six vers et non point de développement de l'injure et de la vengeance" (J. L., I, 172). Through the tirade the audience is to have the pleasure of exercising its finesse in determining the success of the writer's attempt to harmonize thought with verse well and according to the rules. The audience is flattered that the playwright gave it the pleasing opportunity to employ its powers of discernment--the

"plaisir épique" as described in Racine et Shakespeare I: "Le public . . . aime à entendre réciter des sentiments généreux exprimés en beaux vers. Mais c'est là un plaisir épique. . . ." 39

The realization that the author took pains to provide it with this pleasure is also gratifying; we repeat a previously quoted passage that affirms this: "Faire de jolis compliments . . . on estime la peine qu'on a eue à les faire par leur gentillesse, et cette peine est une marque de considération" (Cor., I, 219). Stendhal will note in the "Chapitre Premier" of Racine et Shakespeare I that this vanity gratification replaces even for the Parisian audience of 1823 the emotional experience of sympathizing, which other men--the âmes sensibles--seek:

Une des choses qui s'opposent le plus à la naissance de ces moments d'illusion, c'est l'admiration, quelque juste qu'elle soit d'ailleurs, pour les beaux vers d'une tragédie.

C'est bien pis, si l'on se met à vouloir juger des vers d'une tragédie. Or, c'est justement là la situation de l'âme du spectateur parisien. . . . (R.S.I., p. 60)

Stendhal remarks, as well, that the author receives egotistic satisfaction from providing feasts of language: he is seeking "nos applaudissements" (J.L., II, 22), the gratification of being admired. The vain man plays into the hands of the dramatist who seeks to manipulate the audience, to win its favor.

Because of the disguised purpose in the form of plays like Iphigénie, the audience of âmes sensibles is displeased. Passions and feelings are being spoken about but not communicated, depriving them of the pleasure they seek at the theater. Stendhal reiterates Mme de Staël's moral indictment, in De la littérature, of the hypocrisy of expression that merely appears to be the natural form of content: "'L'affectation est de tous les défauts des caractères et des écrits celui qui tarit de la manière la plus irréparable la source de tout bien, car elle blase sur la vérité même dont elle imite l'accent'" (J.L., I, 137). In denying expression to authentic feelings, we jeopardize the power to feel them; feelings represent for Mme de Staël "la source de tout bien," and certainly for Stendhal as well, because for him feeling is the very essence of happiness. Art that refuses to express naturally discourages sympathy, the source of virtue, or concern for the welfare of others, which is happiness for Stendhal. Such art can never represent for him the beau idéal.

In rephrasing a couplet from Boileau's Art poétique, Stendhal indicates what is characteristic of a form that can touch:

"De cette passion la naïve peinture
Est pour aller au coeur la route la plus sûre!"
(J.L., II, 176) 40

Form that is totally unselfconscious, "'la naïve peinture'" --that poses no obstacle to a direct and natural communication of

passion--does not call attention to itself and divert our attention from the feeling being expressed. Such form recalls our own experience of the represented feelings best: " 'est pour aller au coeur la route la plus sûre! ' "

Comedy and Tragedy

Because the audience of âmes sensibles seeks the experience of art to relive its passions through memory freely and naturally, Stendhal is uncertain as to whether it can enjoy the comic and wit: "La comédie est la peinture des ridicules et doit plaire aux gens du monde" (J. L., II, 7). Stendhal discovers in Hobbes the pleasure people have in laughing; he quotes from Natural Law: " 'On pourrait donc en conclure que la manière d'être nommée Rire est un mouvement subit de vanité produit par une conception soudaine de quelque avantage personnel comparé à une faiblesse que nous remarquons actuellement dans les autres, ou que nous avions auparavant' " (Art dramatique, p. 413). The comic affords the view of absurd behavior in another: "La comédie est la peinture des ridicules . . ." (J. L., II, 7), causes us to laugh, allows us to perceive our superiority vis-à-vis that person. Wit, or plaisanterie, is a "discours qui découvre finement à notre esprit

quelque absurdité" (J., p. 472), causes us to laugh as well as provides, like the comic, an equivalent ego satisfaction: we astutely detect an agreeable truth; we are flattered that the author gave us such an opportunity.

Stendhal feels, however, that men cannot sympathize with a comic character, with one whom the author presents as being defective: "On ne s'attendrit plus par ce qui vous a semblé ridicule" (J. L., II, 154); we can only enter into an observing, reflective relationship with him: "Le poète ou la nature peuvent nous présenter des personnages de telle sorte que, au lieu de sympathiser complètement avec eux, nous ne les considérons que par les rapports qu'ils pourraient avoir avec nous" (J. L., II, 140). The audience of âmes sensibles is denied by the comic that sublime emotional experience it seeks in the arts and must be content with the vanity pleasure that results from the reflection that it is superior to the comic character.

On the other hand, the real pleasure of tragedy consists in being able to sympathize with the heroes; Stendhal claims: "La tragédie est fondée sur la sympathie" (J., p. 771). In tragedy, an audience is moved by the expression of passion, the "actions extraordinaires qui excitent la pitié, la terreur ou l'admiration" (J. L., II, 120); it is reminded of its own emotional life, and through identification with the tragic heroes it achieves the desired

emotional experience. The audience of âmes sensibles necessarily prefers tragedy. The limited egotistic pleasure derived from the appreciation of being superior that is proper to comedy may not be compared to the fuller experience of reliving one's emotions possible through tragedy, at least for those who are capable of feeling tenderly.

Upon consideration of a day's events from which he can conceivably derive intense ego satisfaction, Stendhal remarks in the Journal that the pleasure he has in remembering his love for Mélanie Guilbert far outdistances the pleasure he has in reviewing his astuteness, his superiority, about which he could be vain:

J'ai déployé un grand talent; c'est la première fois que je l'ai vu en moi à ce point; c'est assurément le cas d'avoir une jouissance de vanité. Eh! bien, je l'ai senti hier, et je le sens encore aujourd'hui (7 ventôse), j'en suis absolument incapable. C'est l'amour seul qui me fait trouver de la douceur dans le souvenir de ma journée. Je ne désire que le bonheur que je puis goûter par l'amour de Mélanie, le reste est peu de chose. (J., p. 621).

The memories of his love are more pleasurable than those of his astuteness. The ability to feel tenderly, compassionately is more rewarding, and Stendhal remarks about the âmes sensibles a consequence of their ability to feel: "Nous sentons davantage les impressions fortes de la tragédie" (J., p. 541).

As we mentioned before in the context of the determination of taste by political regimes, Stendhal sees comedy as the preferred genre of a society whose leading passion is vanity; thus, it is the privileged genre of monarchies: "Il n'y a point de bonne comédie sans monarchie" (Cor., I, 109). Because vain men cannot respond tenderly to others, they do not know the pleasure attendant upon sympathizing; through comedy they seek, rather, the limited delight of finding themselves superior.

Stendhal notes that he is not practised in such self-serving reflection which discovers absurdities in others and causes laughter; he has not developed that finesse which detects ridicule: "Je manque de sensibilité aux traits comiques, ce n'est que par réflexion que je les trouve beaux. Cela vient de deux causes: manque d'usage, habitude de voir la société en homme passionné à la Rousseau" (J., p. 527). The tendency of people like him, brought up to respond purely and immediately to stimulation, is to abandon themselves to feeling and thus to sympathizing with others, not to find characteristics in others worthy of laughter. Their education prepares them for enjoyment of the tragic which depends upon sympathy.

Memory and the Artist

We have seen Stendhal stress the importance of relying upon personal memory when reasoning, because, then, that upon which we think is always evident to us: "h [enri] Un raisonnement cesse d'être évident dès que l'imagination cesse d'avoir la force de figurer à la tête l'image complète signifiée par le terme abstrait dont elle se sert" (J. L., II, 78). Similarly when an artist sets out to create a character, to be sure that his creation is authentic, he must refer to his own experience of life that will enable him to detail accurately:

J'ai vingt ans passés, si je ne me lance pas dans le monde et si je ne cherche pas à connaître les hommes par expérience je suis perdu. Je ne connais les hommes que par les livres, il y a des passions que je n'ai jamais vues ailleurs. Comment puis-je les peindre? mes tableaux ne seraient que des copies de copies.
Toute ma science, ou du moins une grande partie, est de préjugés. Si tous les auteurs que j'ai lus s'étaient accordés à supposer une passion qui n'existe pas, j'y croirais.
(J. L., I, 130)

For accuracy the artist must look to his memories in order to select those details that will express the content. Stendhal hails the excellence of the means used by Shakespeare: ". . . la vérité dans les détails de Shakespeare" (J., p. 658); Shakespeare's details

always ring true. Stendhal comments frequently upon his readings during this period: "Lu dans mes sensations, vrai" (J.L., II, 78). He felt that observations by others could be useful to him, to help him in creating expressive works: "Prendre chaque caractère de la manière la plus forte possible, pour cela, chercher dans l'histoire le trait où le prince à qui le caractère peut le mieux aller et travailler là-dessus" (J.L., II, 151); but he likes to be able to confirm by his own experience what others describe. The components of a play must conform to our experience of reality in order for us to be touched by it. He remarks that Jean-Baptiste Rousseau in the Ceinture magique is a failure as a comic poet because his depiction of reality does not reflect what we know to happen in reality: "Il me semble que R[ousseau] n'avait nul génie comique, il outre trop . . . Cela me fait pas rire, nous savons bien qu'il n'y a nulle comparaison entre cet homme et nous" (J., p. 473). Had Rousseau consulted his own experience of men, he would have seen that his depiction departed from natural law.

The artist must choose from his memory those aspects of his experience of passion best suited to please a particular audience. He decides which means will communicate what he wants to express: "Principe bien fécond. Voir sans cesse en composant le coeur du spectateur, dès qu'on vient de tracer un trait il faut regarder quel effet il produit sur le spectateur" (J.L., II, 169). In reviewing

his prior experience, an artist attempts to determine how and why passion is experienced so he can judge which material will probably be effective: "Pour trouver le moyen de le faire trouver aussi ridicule que possible examiner les raisons qui me le font paraître ridicule et tâcher de les augmenter dans le spectateur" (J. L., II, 146).

The art of creation, as Stendhal sees it, reflects this intellectual work of establishing cause and effect relationships. Concerning his own attempt to write plays, Stendhal sees as the first step the drawing up of a plan or the establishing of the sceneggiatura, Alfieri's term, which Stendhal defines as "l'art d'émouvoir par la disposition" (J., p. 490), the art of presenting characters and of ordering the scenes. Effective sceneggiatura requires a knowledge of states of passions, of how these are manifested in specific conditions. The artist must know what are the cause and effect relationships which explain human behavior. Stendhal observes that his cousin Martial Daru wrote a partly unmoving poem because he did not analyze behavior; consequently, he presented illogical, unnatural behavior: "Il me récite en revenant dans son cabriolet au clair de la lune, des vers de lui sur la maîtresse d'un chevalier de Malte, où il y a du bon. Il y a de l'esprit parce qu'il a cherché le genre passionné-spirituel, mais les gens passionnés ne

le sont pas, et il ignore cela, n'ayant pas assez étudié le coeur humain" (J., p. 509). Had Daru more knowledge of how man's emotions work, he would not have created an unnatural work that cannot move.

As is now quite evident, the audience is the first judge of the beauty of a work. Only it can judge whether a work is moving or not. Stendhal who affirms that the artist must rely on his own experience for his work to be accurate cannot but assert as well that the artist must rely on his experience of contemporary society, his knowledge of the audience of his epoch to know what will move his public. Since audience tastes change with political changes and advances in knowledge, to whom may the artist turn but to himself in order to know contemporary tastes. Personal experience which provides the basis of accurate depiction of passion--the communication half of art--must also serve to enlighten the artist as to the nature of his audience and what it will find pleasing--the addressee of the communication, the second half of the aesthetic experience. In speaking of Molière's Précieuses ridicules, Stendhal notes the necessity to know his historical period in order to create comedy that would be as effective as Molière's: "Voilà la vis comica qu'il faut acquérir et sans laquelle il n'y a point de comédie . . . Etudier bien les moeurs de mes contemporains,

c'est-à-dire ce qui leur paraît juste, injuste, honorable, déshonorant . . . etc. Voilà ce qui change tous les demi-siècles." (J., p. 486). Referring to poetics of other generations will not give him the knowledge he needs about his public: "Ne point se former le goût sur l'exemple de mes devanciers, mais à coups d'analyse, en recherchant comment la poésie plaît aux hommes, et comment elle peut parvenir à leur plaire autant que possible" (J. L., I, 134-35). He would do better to reflect on his memories and derive from them conclusions as to contemporary human behavior: "Suivre mon projet de Grenoble de décrire tous les êtres humains que j'ai connus, c'est là que j'ai vu la nature, tout le reste est cru d'après les livres" (J. L., I, 339).

Secondly, Stendhal notes about the portrayal of passion that the artist must have memories of personal experiences of passions in order to present characters with authentic emotions and passionate behavior: "On ne peut peindre ce qu'on n'a pas senti" (J. L., II, 61). It is personal experience--"On peint toujours les hommes beaucoup d'après son coeur." (J. L., II, 68)--that gives the rhythm necessary for successful creations of passion: "Peut-être est-ce la liaison des sentiments entre eux ou la manière dont les pensées les font naître, et dont ils font naître les pensées, que l'homme qui n'a pas senti ne peut trouver que par hasard" (J. L., II, 62). Rhythm "se fonde

presque entièrement sur la liaison des idées" (J. L., II, 86).

Natural expression of feeling can come only from one who remembers how he felt.

Stendhal theorizes that writing is best done on the tide of emotion: "Quand il me viendra des moments d'inspiration écrire sur le champ" (J. L., II, 85). What he is feeling will direct the choice of expression: "Le sentiment invente . . ." (J. L., II, 169).

In an early entry in the Journal littéraire, from 1803, Stendhal maintains that the artist can move his audience forcefully when he is fired by his recalled feelings (this follows upon a paraphrased observation from Helvétius that a forceful style is the most effective, like that created by an impassioned "poète-sculpteur"): "Il faut tâcher de devenir poète-sculpteur: pour cela se figurer tous les objets que l'on veut peindre, ne s'occuper du style que lorsqu'on se sera étonné de la facilité qu'on éprouvera à écrire supérieurement" (J. L., I, 121). If the artist feels at the moment of creation that which his recollection suggests, he will express naturally and strongly.

The artist must, thus, depend on his memory: both for accuracy and authenticity. We have already mentioned Stendhal's conviction that his passionate nature, his capacity to desire strongly and purely, has put him in good stead to be a writer of tragedy: "Quand je ferai des tragédies, j'aurai au moins pour moi la

connaissance et le sentiment du vrai grand et du sublime, et le naturel des sentiments et du style" (J., p. 525). In his reflections on comedy and tragedy we find him referring often to the opinion that the subject of tragedy is passion: "La tragédie est la peinture des grandes passions . . ." (J.L., II, 7). He considers the theories of Chateaubriand and Alfieri who, he remarks, see the tragic act as a result of a conflict between two passions either in the same person or in different characters; Stendhal writes: "Le grand poète tire ses effets de l'opposition des parties, ou de leur accord" (J.L., I, 114). He feels that this genre is not difficult; it is a matter of looking into one's soul and finding passion there:

Pour produire du grand pathétique: Hermione, Phèdre, etc., l'homme qui possède une âme tendre et passionnée n'a qu'à se souvenir de ce qu'il a senti, à choisir parmi ces sentiments les plus convenables possible au personnage qu'il met en scène, qu'à avoir bâti l'intrigue de manière à produire sur des âmes telles que la sienne la plus forte impression de frémir, pleurer, ou admirer . . .

Alors cet homme [me] a fait une belle tragédie.
(J.L., II, 153)

But the artist must be able to sympathize, to feel with his characters to write well. This is Shakespeare's leading attribute, why he was able to create such real characters. Stendhal quotes from Hugh Blair's Readings in Rhetoric and Belles-Lettres

(from a passage where Blair sets forth some of Dryden's ideas):

" 'He [Shakespeare] was the man, who of all modern, and perhaps ancient poets, had the largest and most comprehensive soul . . . They who accuse him of wanting learning, give him the greatest commendation, he was naturally learned . . . He looked inward, and found her [nature] there' " (J. L., I, 245). To be able to sympathize is for Stendhal a leading characteristic of the successful artist: "Ce qui constitue le mérite de l'acteur, comme celui du poète is a comprehensive soul" (J., p. 460).

As we know, our author feels, however, that for comedy his prior experience is inadequate. Comedy which shows ridiculousness requires knowledge of the society in which the characters appear ridiculous: "L'étude de la comédie est à peu près celle du monde . . ." (J., p. 502). Being raised in solitude, Stendhal's knowledge of contemporary manners, where he must look for illustrations of absurd behavior, is insufficient; furthermore, he has too little experience of the passion of vanity to know which characters and defects will best gratify this passion. He finds it logical that he should experience difficulty in creating characters that appeal to vain audiences: "La meilleure étude des passions se fait sur soi-même. Mais comment étudier sur moi les passions des gens du monde que j'ai tâché de ne pas laisser naître dans mon coeur ou d'en extirper?" (J. L., I, 387) He has insufficient

memory of this passion to produce adequate comic characters. To become a comic poet, he must increase his knowledge of contemporary manners; he notes specifically his intention to build up experience of the work habits of men of the early nineteenth century: "Faire une liste de tous les états actuels de la société, les connaître et chercher leurs ridicules. Chercher celui des banquiers" (J. L., I, 386). He must cultivate, in addition, feelings of vanity, which he otherwise disdains to experience: "Les jouissances de la vanité existent donc à peine pour moi; je ne les considère un instant que poussé par le désir universel de connaître tout ce qui se passe dans l'homme" (J., p. 622). To be a writer, he needs the storehouse of a universal experience of feeling; to be a comic playwright, of that of vanity in particular.

The Prestige of Comedy

Because of the role memory plays in the passionate man's experience of art and if he is an artist in the creation of art, Stendhal seems to view the comic as the aesthetic experience and artistic genre least fitting for the âmes passionnées. Stendhal wants, however, to be an author of comedies. There seems to be a contradictory wish; he respects the tastes of virtuous, passionate men, his own, yet he is passionately interested in the comic genre.

Stendhal is aware of this clash of interests in himself. He is tempted to achieve immediate literary success which he feels would take place if he could write a comedy that would please contemporary, vain society. The collection of observations and ideas in Art dramatique is devoted to determining how a comedy must be written to appeal to an audience. On the other hand, he expresses the conviction that he will write only to please the "Happy Few" and the more natural, republican men of future generations: "Voilà vu ce public choisi et peu nombreux à qui il faut plaire; le cercle part de là, se resserre peu à peu et finit par moi. Je pourrais faire un ouvrage qui ne plairait qu'à moi et qui serait reconnu beau en 2000" (J., p. 540). The egotistic desire for immediate glory, which would be achieved if he could write a successful comedy, is mitigated by Stendhal's intention to write comedy that would criticize, ridicule the characteristic of being vain: "La vanité est la passion actuelle de la société, c'est une suite de la civilisation. Quel parti peut-on tirer de cette passion pour la comédie? Peut-on faire une comédie en cinq actes ayant pour protagoniste le Vaniteux?" (J. L., I, 414) He has a strong desire to change contemporary manners, to make society more virtuous; Stendhal defines virtue thus: "La vertu est ce qui est utile au public" (J. L., II, 172). A work could make society more virtuous: "L'ouvrage le plus utile qu'un bon citoyen pût faire

serait un petit catéchisme de cent pages au plus qui ferait comprendre au peuple les vérités qui lui sont utiles" (F.N., p. 479). Comedy that ridicules the passion of vanity could improve men and manners.

Besides these reasons why Stendhal would want to excel in comedy, we find a very pertinent one, which involves our study of the role of memory: Stendhal saw a potential means to touch an audience more in the way an author of comedy must go about establishing a ridiculous character. Stendhal believed in the argument of perfectibility, as expounded by Condorcet and Mme de Staël. Advances made in knowledge of the laws of nature will change society's way of viewing the world and mankind. He quotes from Condorcet's Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain to the effect that it is ignorant to think that any Weltanschauung is absolute: "'Les inventeurs, les défenseurs de ces absurdités ne pouvaient prévoir le perfectionnement successif de l'esprit humain'" (J.L., I, 228). As people come to understand better what motivates behavior they will require that art duplicate their view of how men behave; for an audience to take interest in a character, to be reminded of itself in him, it must find the character authentic, feel that his behavior rings true. The public will soon require, thanks to the work of the Enlightenment, that characters appear to be determined by their education. Stendhal

writes: "Alors le grand art est de faire sentir dans la peinture exacte du moment présent, l'état passé de l'objet" (J. L., I, 111); works that succeed in arresting attention will be those that show men behaving in such a way that the audience will know that this comportment is a natural product of the forces that determined it.

The epic is the superior genre in this respect, because the epic, in being able to show "les principaux événements de la vie d'un homme" (J. L., I, 114), shows the development of a character which explains, renders believable, the action of the period of his life on which the artist focuses. This developmental approach, Stendhal affirms, is "la meilleure forme que l'on puisse donner aux portraits" (J. L., I, 114). The limitations of time and place imposed on the theater restrict the showing of a character's formation: "Le théâtre n'est point propre du tout à faire voir les motifs secrets qui font faire les actions que nous voyons tous les jours dans la nature . . ." (J. L., II, 43).

Stendhal is not going to write epic at this point; he is interested in the theater. He finds, however, that the format of comedy is better suited to satisfy the requirements of a more modern audience. He notes that "pour connaître le caractère d'un homme par ses actions il faut découvrir dans ses actions le motif qui l'a fait agir . . . Or aux yeux d'un homme clairvoyant, une action isolée ne nous découvre que très peu le caractère de celui qui la

fait . . ." (J.L., II, 99). Tragedy which depicts one passionate action risks running into this difficulty with a modern audience; knowledge of the character is limited by the format of tragedy which develops just one situation. Stendhal observes that we know little about Othello that allows us to believe fully that his murder of Desdemona was more than a moment of fury: "Tout ce que je sais du caractère d'Othello après l'avoir en cinq actes sous les yeux est qu'il est susceptible de grandes passions" (J.L., I, 162). We do not see Othello engaged in any other concern but this. Stendhal suggests in Art dramatique that the most convincing portrayal of a personality trait possible in the theater is showing this attribute to be habitual: "Quand le poète ne prouve pas la passion de son protagoniste par des habitudes, il n'a peint que l'homme passionné momentanément" (Art dramatique, p. 422). Seeing a character demonstrate a particular behavior in more than one context, showing that his behavior is habitual, will allow the audience to accept this character as authentic. Comedy has this format. Comedy is "le développement d'un caractère" (J., p. 470), proves that a character is defective by showing him behave in more than one situation. This leads Stendhal to affirm: "La comédie a un grand avantage sur la tragédie, c'est de peindre les caractères" (J., p. 467). In presenting the comic character in different situations which illustrate in various ways his absurd behavior,

the author establishes his character's behavior as habitual, constant; tragedy limited by the "développement d'une action" (J., p. 470) cannot communicate the personality and temperamental traits of a character as well--the characters are not seen in situations extraneous to the tragic act. The audience is more readily convinced in comedy that a character possesses the traits under observation.

If we find a character's behavior authentic, natural, if we are unencumbered by observations that his behavior is inappropriate or psychologically false, we can more readily identify with him. And if Stendhal faults Shakespeare occasionally, on the whole he sees part of Shakespeare's greatness as lying in his ability to create characters whom we accept spontaneously as natural, real; we rarely question their authenticity and for this reason we can so easily sympathize with them; they recall our own experience so readily: "Nous sourions de plaisir de voir dans S[hakespeare] la nature humaine telle que nous la sentons au-dedans de nous. Nous nous mettons entièrement à la place de ses personnages et deux scènes plus loin nous frémissons avec eux de l'apparition d'un spectre . . . Imiter Shakespeare ou plutôt la nature" (J. L., I, 296). Being able to create characters who are psychologically believable will increase the audience's power to identify.

If the pleasure of tragedy is sympathizing and if identifying depends upon the characters' recalling of our own experience, the more a character convinces us of the naturalness of his behavior, that it is proper to him, the more we shall be able to identify; the more we accept him as real the better we shall be reminded of ourselves in him. A combination of elements of both genres, tragic and comic, would work to produce a more perfect aesthetic experience. In praising tragedy for its superior capacity to move yet at the same time in praising comedy for its superior creation of fictional characters Stendhal seems to be moving towards the idea that a blend of the two genres would furnish works appropriate to the tastes of a modern audience. Comedy will lend its format to tragedy so that reminiscences on the audience's part, allowing for the pleasure of sympathizing, will be more easily provoked; we shall accept the characters as real. The author will have convinced us that behavior is authentically motivated, and we shall be able to sympathize more fully with the characters.

Tastes of Stendhal during this period seem to be signs of the later development and indicate that in this formative period ideas of the blend of the two genres were present to him. We mention that Stendhal particularly liked Molière's Tartuffe, one of the reasons being that it allows for sympathy, the attribute of tragedy: "Molière a eu recours au principe tragique pour augmenter le plaisir des

spectateurs à ses pièces. Les amants dans le Tartufe" (J. L., II, 135). In this play we do not sympathize, however, with the same character whose exposition is the focus of the play. More significantly, we find Stendhal being touched by works which are essentially comic in that a character is exposed and is seen to act absurdly, against his better interests, but with whom Stendhal can identify as well: "Le poète comique nous présente des gens semblables à nous (à ce que nous croyons être), il les fait agir et réussir . . ." (J. L., II, 135). In such works the happiness-giving experience of sympathy is provided; one identifies with the character: "Le poète comique me présente un jeune homme semblable à moi . . . avec qui je me suis identifié . . ." (J. L., II, 141). Dorante of Corneille's Le Menteur and Tom Jones of Fielding's novel Tom Jones "produisent cet effet" (J. L., II, 141). Authors have achieved exposition of a character; at the same time, they have allowed us to identify with them and in the context of a comedy where we see a defective trait in the character causing him unhappiness. Stendhal sees this as possible because the sympathetic character is never found to be ridiculous, which, as we pointed out before, he feels prevents sympathy: "Il faut remarquer que Dorante n'est jamais ridicule" (J. L., II, 141).

Comic works that incorporate sympathetic characters are possible because the fault of the characters, which causes unhappiness,

is also responsible for their happiness: "Le poète comique me présente un jeune hom[mé] semblable à moi qui, par l'excès de ses bonnes qualités, devient malheureux et qui, par ces mêmes qualités, devient heureux; cela, me procurant la vue du bonheur, m'intéresse et me fait sourire" (J. L., II, 141). Thus, the fault is a good quality; it is not essentially defective, rather it is exaggerated in the personality. It is because the character is essentially superior: "l'excès de ses bonnes qualités," that we can identify with him, even though he acts absurdly. It is the smile, not the derisive laugh, that is the pleasure of such comic works; the smile that stems from the achievement of happiness by the character with whom we identify: "Quand on voit son bonheur, on sourit de plaisir, le gros rire vient (ce me semble) quand on dit: ' Oh! comme j'ai plus d'esprit!'" (Art dramatique, p. 424) The sympathetic experience of satisfaction of desire pleases

Stendhal finds such aesthetic experiences delightful, and we note that it is a pleasure that depends upon the incorporation of elements taken from what is the proper of comedy--its format of presenting a character--and of tragedy--its ability to make us sympathize--in one work. In 1804 Stendhal sees the possibility of providing for the experience of identifying and of bringing it about by an artistic plan that creates authentic believable characters.

Memory and Details

Another advantage of the format of comedy and epic is that in showing different situations, the artist has greater means to exploit the power of details. Chateaubriand points out that an advantage of the epic genre consists in this very capacity to depict characters and their actions more extensively than comedy even, allowing epic poetry to move an audience more, establishing it, thus, as the greatest genre. Stendhal quotes from the Génie du Christianisme: " 'Le merveilleux, les descriptions, les épisodes ne sont point du ressort dramatique. Toute espèce de ton, même le ton comique, toute harmonie poétique, depuis la lyre jusqu'à la trompette, trouvent place dans l'épopée' " (J. L., I, 114). Stendhal appends to this the comment that he as a playwright should aim to include such a diversity of expressive elements: "Voilà où il faut tendre," which all serve to impress the audience, enabling it to experience more subtly and thus more closely emotions that the author seeks to elicit in it. Stendhal notes, in the same passage, the advantage of a modern poet, who has more knowledge of the natural laws of behavior and of how behavior expresses itself: "Nous avons de plus une plus grande connaissance de l'homme. . . ." A modern writer thanks to his knowledge of how people respond, i.e. they react to what attracts their attention and engages their interest in their

surroundings, will know to fill his scenes with evocative, effective details: "Il faudra que j'aie le courage de mettre beaucoup de détails sur la scène et de faire dire par exemple: 'Le roi dort dans cette chambre' " (J., p. 534).

We have already observed the importance Stendhal accords to details: the facts, the specifics of situations, including their physiognomy, are what moves us, causes the sensations to which we respond agreeably or disagreeably. Artists use details chosen for their expressive power to move an audience as it is moved by the details of reality: "Il y a une manière d'émouvoir qui est de montrer les faits, les choses" (J., p. 579); the details cause sensations that recall past experiences. "Ducis semble avoir oublié qu'il n'est point de sensibilité sans détails. Cet oubli est un des défauts capitaux du théâtre français" (J., p. 534), notes Stendhal, which explains why he was bored by the Frenchman's translation and adaptation of Shakespeare's Macbeth: "La pièce de Ducis qui m'a constamment ennuyé. . . ." Not being engaged by expressive traits that would touch off sympathetic feelings, Stendhal lost interest in the play. He criticizes even Corneille for the dictates of tastes he observed in not incorporating more expressive details in Rodogune: "C'est une fausse délicatesse qui empêche les personnages d'entrer dans les détails"; this prevents a stronger

emotional reaction: "Ce qui fait que nous ne sommes jamais serrés de terreur comme dans les pièces de Shakespeare" (J., p. 490).

It is imperative that the artist know the capacity of the imagination of his audience so he can judge how much detail is necessary to set off feelings:

Les anecdotes que je conte manquent leur effet.
Je suppose à ceux qui m'écoutent autant
d'imagination qu'à moi, avec une égale attention,
ce qui est absurde. Dites: Mlle une Telle est
morte en deux jours au moment de donner sa main
à un amant qu'elle aimait depuis deux ans . . . peu
de personnes pleureront. Racontez ce fait avec les
circonstances les plus touchantes en vingt lignes,
quelques personnes pleureront, les larmes de
quelques autres ne commenceront à couler qu'à
trente lignes, quarante lignes de détails.
(J. L., II, 121-22)

Since the effect of details is to elicit feelings, it is incumbent upon the artist to know how much he should suggest and to what extent he can depend upon the imagination of the audience to supply its own images. The artist is dependent on details, whether directly supplied by him or not. Stendhal would like that posterity say about him: "Il avait, en racontant d'imagination la vérité dans les détails de Shakespeare" (J., p. 658), the recognition that he had been able to move an audience, which he assumes will be effected by the "détails" à la Shakespeare.

We note Stendhal's insistence that the imagination of the audience works to complete details. Stendhal observes this again in an example of a lover who feels for his lady; what she suggested is completed by his imagination, his memories flesh out specifically what her physiognomy seems to express:

Charles [the hero of the Deux Hommes, an unfinished play of Stendhal's from this period] amoureux fait donc mille jugements sur son bonheur futur . . . Il y a 1 contre 2, 1 contre 3 . . . à parier qu'elle m'aimera, c'est-à-dire me donnera cette jouissance que j'espère.
Quant à cette jouissance, l'imagination la conclut d'après la physionomie. (J.L., II, 54)

We remember the passage quoted earlier where Stendhal shows that identification in art is based on recalled feelings; he wrote: "Il est possible que la jeune femme sente Andromaque beaucoup mieux que moi. Elle qui s'est vue méprisée par un homme . . . s'attache à Hermione, reconnaît ses sentiments et éprouve ceux que le poète a voulu faire naître," indicating that the young woman responds to what her imagination prompted by Hermione's expression of passion recalls; she remembers her beloved, whose memory recreates in her an emotion. Stendhal appears to suggest that art can move us only inasmuch as it first appeals to our individual, personal experience, to what is particularly stored in our imagination-memory, for such images, more than abstract ideas, have the power to move us.

That for Stendhal individual memory should be the basis of being moved at the theater is not surprising, for we know how aware he is of the differences that exist among the reactions of individuals to the environment. Earlier we saw him affirm: "Il ne faut pas s'étonner que le même archet produise des sons différents sur des violons dont les caisses ne se ressemblent pas"-- each person's unique formation conditions him to react in certain ways to the environment. Passionate response is always individual: "Chacun a ses idées à lui de tout ce qui est tombé sous ses sens" (J. L., II, 181). A character's emotional life and dilemmas can never duplicate any member's of the audience; no one's experience is ever the same, and we cannot empathize, or experience vicariously, the character's feelings and be moved, because we have no experience of his feelings. Stendhal observes, after the manner of Helvétius: "On ne comprend les hommes qu'autant qu'on leur ressemble . . ." (J., p. 471); we understand when we recognize ourselves. We do not really know another, but ourselves as we appear in another. Our lives are never really acted out on stage, but an effective character in expressing naturally his feelings can suggest images from our personal experience that cause us to be moved, to feel as he is suggesting that he is feeling; we feel in association with him, in a sympathetic relationship.

The artist must rely on particulars to move an audience, to touch off those recollections that will engage its emotional life. Stendhal notes that novels are a valuable source of details; thus, "il faut donc nourrir l'imagination en lisant de temps en temps un roman le moins mauvais possible. Sophie en Prusse m'a fait faire la belle découverte ci-dessus" (J. L., II, 78). Reading novels will stock him with images that will provide expressive, concrete details when he recalls them in the act of creation. He notes in a letter to Pauline that novelists are conscious of details. We see characters in varied scenes a good novelist has attempted to detail: "Tu sens bien que, dans les romans l'aventure ne signifie rien: elle émeut et voilà tout; elle n'est bonne ensuite qu'à oublier. Ce dont il faut, au contraire, se rappeler, ce sont les caractères: le trait de l'archevêque de Burgos et de Gil Blas, par exemple: 'Monseigneur, ne faites plus d'homélies, ' est aussi célèbre que charmant'" (Cor., I, 136); scenes in novels that appear authentic, i. e. that present what appear to be natural interactions between all the elements of a particular situation, will supply Stendhal with material to detail his plays with natural, expressive particulars.

We have seen Stendhal as an appreciator of the novel Tom Jones, because of the depiction of a sympathetic comic hero. We now find him valuing the powers of observation of a good novelist, like Le Sage, the author of Gil Blas, who aptly created characters

with appropriate natural behavior. This is the advantage of a genre that affords many opportunities to see a character in action.

Although the novel is not considered by Stendhal at this time as a suitable genre in which to excel, he is, nevertheless, able to appreciate its potential to touch an audience. In the case of Tom Jones and of Gil Blas Stendhal finds aspects about the presentation of characters praiseworthy.

Memory and Nature

As Stendhal views it, the aesthetic experience of sublime and natural, or unaffected, art brings passionate men back to the world of those memories the reexperience of which creates the privileged state of happiness. Finally, from several passages in Stendhal's writings during this period, we discover that nature, like art, recalls for Stendhal memories that permit the experience of privileged sensations. In De l'Amour he will write specifically that art and nature act to recall memories of one's beloved: "La vue de tout ce qui est extrêmement beau, dans la nature ou dans les arts, rappelle le souvenir de ce qu'on aime. . . ." He describes to Edouard Mounier, in 1803, how he looks forward to visiting the countryside of Claix, the site of the Beyles' summer home,

for it will provoke reverie and give rise to the ideal emotional experience of the worthy pining lover:

Pour moi, je m'en vais errer dans les rochers
comme le malheureux Cardénio. Au fait ce pays
m'enchanté et est d'accord avec ce qui reste
encore de romanesque dans mon âme; si
vraiment une Julie d'Étange existait encore,
je sens qu'on mourrait d'amour pour elle parmi
ces hautes montagnes et sous ce ciel enchanteur.
(Cor., I, 77)

The countryside recalls images from his prior experience, composed of his encounters with literature, of Cervante's Don Quixote and Rousseau's La Nouvelle Héloïse, which allow him the ecstasy he describes.

Nature is direct, incapable of hypocrisy, of appearing to be one way yet really expressing something different, which is the experience so familiar to Stendhal in most of his contacts with the social environment. What nature effects upon him is necessarily unreflected; nature is spontaneous, natural. He feels a course of sensation that is direct, the issue of motives beyond suspicion. These pure sensations are comparable to those Stendhal knows from the experience of sublime art. Contact with nature brings on a state similar to that experienced when he is moved by art. When in nature, recollections about moving episodes from literature come naturally, are spontaneously suggested; the similarity of the experiences causes one to recall the other.

Nature calls forth feelings and silences the machinations of the mind: "Parmi les bois et leur vaste silence, l'esprit s'en va, il ne reste qu'un coeur pour sentir" (Cor., I, 78). The mind, the finesse, to which we must have recourse in society to determine the hidden motives of social man, practised in disguising natural feelings and desires, is put to rest and we can experience feelings; in nature, where we are touched by what is straightforward, our passions can flow unobstructedly in response to the direct, single-minded stimulation nature offers.

III. Beylisme

Beylisme

If Stendhal states in a letter to Pauline that "tout mal vient d'ignorer la vérité" (Cor., I, 108), that knowledge is necessary to achieve happiness, it is because his own experience of unhappiness led him to affirm this truth. As he would say in confirmation of it: "Lu dans mes sensations, vrai." It is due to ignorance of reality--not being able to form sure judgments about it based on personal experience--that he was so severely disappointed; he continues in the same letter: "Toute tristesse, tout chagrin vient d'avoir attendu des hommes ce qu'ils ne sont pas en état de vous

donner." Had he been able to form ideas about reality by comparing his memories of it, he would not have projected his ideals upon it and expected more than reality can objectively offer.

Now that he has experience, Stendhal can begin forming ideas. He can select those passions that will bring him happiness: "Il faut que j'acquièrè l'usage du monde pour choisir le plaisir" (J., p. 414). He writes to Pauline that happiness depends upon the choice of correct passions, those which one knows are possible to satisfy; he recommends to them both: "Tâchons de déraciner les passions que probablement nous ne pourrons satisfaire; d'aviver, au contraire, celles que nous ne pourrons pas désaltérer, et nous serons très heureux" (Cor., I, 139). From his experience he will determine which passions are possible and what are the possible means to satisfy them. It is in the context of someone who has been sorely deceived for want of knowledge that Stendhal sees "le bonheur au terme de la science," as Delacroix suggests.

Beylisme is the title Stendhal gave to this system, to use the word Léon Blum suggests in his work Stendhal et le beylisme:

"Stendhal n'a jamais cessé de croire à l'efficacité pratique de la

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méthode. . . ." Blum indicates that by acquiring "la connaissance exacte des faits" and "l'application rigoureuse de procédés logiques,"

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Stendhal believed that he could attain happiness. Facts and analysis of them will reveal what is possible in reality and will

provide the means to attain the possible. We have shown that Stendhal sees memory as one of the foundations of this system: the record of one's experience allows for knowledge. An accurate, extensive memory is the cornerstone of sure knowledge, the base which allows us to formulate truths.

This is not to say that Stendhal will give up experiencing again those states of happiness known only to those with an education similar to his; that Beylisme means that he will substitute goals of happiness common to the vain men of society contemporary to him: "Un an de luxe et de plaisirs de vanité, et j'ai satisfait aux besoins que l'influence de mon siècle m'a donnés, je reviens aux plaisirs qui en sont vraiment pour mon âme, et dont je ne me dégoûterai jamais" (J., p. 556); rather, it is that thinking on his experience has brought him to understand that reality permits small hope of satisfying these passions and that to seek to find means to satisfy them concretely causes unhappiness. He resolves to steel himself against ennui caused by expecting society to be different than it is: "Employer le temps où je sentirai la douleur non point à m'affliger, chose inutile, mais à chercher les moyens d'éviter pareil malheur à l'avenir. Voilà une des meilleures recettes pour le bonheur" (J. L., II, 8). It is better to get from reality what happiness it can offer: "Chercher les plaisirs de sa position" (J. L., II, 9), and keep the private world of memory as a source

of real happiness when tired of the mediocre pleasure possible in vain society. He counsels himself to "changer l'extérieur pour [son] bonheur, mais conserver précieusement cette âme-là" (J. L., II, 68); this soul that will allow him to experience the delights he finds in sympathizing with the characters of his revery or of literature, through his recalled feelings by the power of imagination. This activity is to be enjoyed, however, only in private: "Les moments d'exaltation de Rousseau étaient devenus ma manière d'être habituelle. Je prenais ça pour du génie, je le cultivais avec complaisance et regardais en pitié ceux qui ne l'avaient pas. La réserver pour le cabinet, autrement je serais à jamais malheureux dans le monde" (J., p. 694). In another passage he notes even more forcefully that his feelings are to be given only to the characters of his revery: "Ma sensibilité, n'étant pas employée sur la terre, se répandra tout entière sur les personnages de Shakespeare" (J., p. 591).

As we have seen, the life of his inner world is particularly important to Stendhal, who wants to be a writer and who will depend upon his sublime feelings and imagination to create perfect works of art: "Toutes les opérations de mon corps, de ma tête, et de mon âme, ont tendu là . . . Cela doit m'avoir donné une tête très dramatique, non pas dans le genre de Goldoni, faisant vite une comédie d'une belle médiocrité, mais au contraire le génie

sublimant, cherchant à faire dans chaque chose le mieux possible et à tirer l'échelle après moi" (J. L., II, 9).

Because Stendhal feels the risk of endangering this capacity to feel, he hesitates before experiencing low passions: "Le vulgaire nuit aux grands hommes" (J. L., I, 38). Were he to substitute the passions of vain men, "le vulgaire," he would begin to respond less intensely and purely to the sublime images of his memory. He will need, however, to experience common, low feelings. As we brought up before, Stendhal felt that artists had to sympathize with their characters in order to depict them accurately. In the following quotation, he prescribes how to acquire such experience at the least possible risk of endangering his privileged ability to feel: "Tu rentres dans le vulgaire par tes amours de la société et des plaisirs. Il faut cependant les voir le plus tôt possible pour l'expérience et pour t'en dégouter" (J. L., I, 39). By keeping conscious or aware of the purpose of the experience of the common and by limiting the number of such experiences, he can hope not to be tainted by these feelings.

Stendhal attempts to achieve what constitutes a type of negative happiness in society. Accurate knowledge will enable him to keep the possible torturing and generally depressing effect of cold, egotistic society in abeyance. He warns Pauline: "Tu as tout pour être une femme rare, suis ta destinée . . . pour la suivre, il faut

te cacher aux badauds; sans cela, ils te tuent à l'entrée comme la malheureuse Delphine" (Cor., I, 179).

Stendhal needs to know how to keep his âme toute sublimée hidden, unknown and thus beyond ridicule, which is the torture vain men can inflict upon the superior man: "J'ai lu que les grandes actions (celles des Brutus, etc.) étaient ridicules aux yeux des gens du monde" (J. L., I, 387); knowing themselves to be incapable of sublime ideals, ordinary men are jealous of what they can admire, but not feel themselves. The âmes sensibles are found odious; the recognition of their virtue threatens the self-esteem of vain men. Stendhal remarks that he was a victim of such jealousy when in foolishly expounding his ideas and hopes, he wounded the vanity of Félix Faure:

Si le philosophe montre ses idées aux hommes vulgaires, en paraissant étonné de ses idées on l'étonne lui-même, en le traitant de fou . . .

Voilà pourquoi la société des Faure me rendait si malheureux l'année dernière. Il me rendait malheureux et j'offensais profondément sa vanité. Cette année que je garde mes idées pour moi . . . je suis plus heureux . . . en un mot, ne pas blesser la passion plus ou moins dominante chez tous mes contemporains si je veux avoir d'eux le moindre plaisir. (F. N., pp. 471-72)

Faure got his revenge by treating Stendhal as a person with nonsensical, ridiculous ideas.

Stendhal must know how to deal with vanity, keep egotistic man's attention on himself: "Pour plaire aux gens, il faut les occuper d'eux . . ." (Cor., I, 134); he must avoid behavior that risks wounding another's self-esteem and provokes attack: "Dès que je suis avec quelqu'un songer qu'en ménageant sa vanité je m'en ferai adorer" (F.N., p. 469). He needs knowledge about men to prevent himself from being victimized by them because of his ideals: "Le seul danger des âmes grandes est de prendre des secs pour leurs égales, et de se mettre à les aimer comme elles savent aimer; alors que de douleur!" (Cor., I, 195) It is in this sense that knowledge leads to happiness; happiness that consists in avoiding pain.

Blum, also, stresses that Beylisme includes creating a protective covering against vain society. Hypocrisy, Blum affirms, is the necessary conclusion at which Beyle arrives at the end of his determination of how to cater to the enjoyment of his inner world while keeping this hidden from the unappreciative:

Ces mêmes voiles que nous écartons d'autrui doivent rester serrés autour de notre secret intime . . . Il faut . . . dérober ses actes sous une apparente soumission aux lois sociales, ses émotions sous un air impassible, et "à milles lieues de la sensation présente." Nous l'avons dit: pour l'homme d'élite opprimé ou menacé par une société hostile, l'hypocrisie est l'unique moyen d'assurer son

indépendance. Soustrayons au monde notre originalité, nos différences; consentons-lui les concessions qu'il exige; puis à l'abri de ces grimaces et la paix une fois assurée, vivons secrètement, à notre gré et selon notre loi.⁴⁴

Hypocrisy is necessary to keep alive his inner values. To enjoy his reveries, to delight in intense, noble passions, Stendhal must guard against anyone's knowing that this is his pleasure. It is not so much that Stendhal enjoys fooling others; rather, their behavior demands it: "Je ne veux pas mentir, mais ne dire que ce qui conviendra" (Cor., I, 217). If people are upset at the view of our greatness, let us hide it.

Stendhal needs, furthermore, knowledge about how to avoid ennui caused by lack of interest in what constitutes ordinary happiness. He writes to Pauline that ridding themselves of this ennui requires accepting it as a pre-condition of living. In order for the âmes élevées to dispel ennui they must accept it and then work to overcome it. Through their knowledge of men and manners, they can attempt to manipulate conditions to provide for agreeable living even in a society ruled by the passion of vanity: "Es-tu toujours ennuyée? Tu n'aurais pas, à coup sûr, cet ennui, si tu connaissais un peu plus le monde. Ma bonne Pauline, lorsque sans nous perdre, nous ne pouvons pas changer de position, il faut rester

où nous sommes, et, une fois bien convaincus qu'il y faut rester, chercher à nous la rendre le plus supportable possible, à nous y amuser même" (Cor., I, 105-06).

Stendhal determined that the state of gaiety that can be produced by wit, plaisanterie, is the most agreeable condition of living in society. Only in a gay, smiling atmosphere can the âmes sensibles deal pleasurably with the secs; he observes to Pauline:

Il faut considérer que ce sont les hommes avec qui vous êtes destiné à vivre qui vous rendront heureux et malheureux . . .

Il faut donc se faire un système de gaieté avec ce vulgaire, étudier ce qui les fait rire.
(Cor., I, 194-95)

As we have already shown, for Stendhal wit gratifies the vanity of men: "Une plaisanterie est un éclair qui fait voir que nous sommes plus parfaits qu'un autre" (J. L., I, 389). Being witty is, therefore, the comportment best suited to please the primarily vain men of this time.

Through wit, Stendhal keeps the attention of others agreeably preoccupied; thus, he protects himself against them. He creates, also, a smiling, gay atmosphere. Satisfaction of desires causes the smile and gaiety: "La satisfaction des passions en général, ou autrement la vue du bonheur, donne le sourire de satisfaction" (J. L., II, 29); wit satisfies both the universal desire to apprehend

truth and the passion of vanity, and so we smile and being thus contented or satisfied, we are gay, or happy to be alive: "Partie impromptu, gaie parce que tout le monde y satisfait sa passion dominante" (J., p. 723). Being personally satisfied and happy with ourselves, we are well-disposed towards our company; we can feel kindly towards it. Because Stendhal flattered a waiter, he remarks that the waiter was inclined to act tenderly towards him:

Rien n'est fort comme le sentiment employé en sa juste mesure, je l'ai senti par un mot agréable que j'ai dit bien dans les circonstances et dans la mesure au garçon Louis du Caveau; toutes ses actions m'ont prouvé que je lui avais donné un moment fort agréable, il m'a même montré de la tendresse. (J., p. 508)

The illusion is created that one is part of a group of men with whom freedom and naturalness are the modus vivendi; people appear to be natural and worthy because they are smiling and kindly, even though this stems really from being self-satisfied. The illusion is fragile, dependent upon not reflecting objectively upon the situation: "Je suis gai le reste de la soirée . . . Pour rester dans cette bonne disposition quand je me le sens, agir beaucoup, ne pas me donner le temps de la réflexion, si je le prends, je suis perdu" (J., p. 694).

Stendhal describes a social experience where the gay atmosphere caused by the witty conversation of a certain Dupuy created an illusion of dreamed-of brotherhood:

J'éprouvai, pendant trois quarts d'heure, un des plus vifs plaisirs que j'aie sentis depuis longtemps. D [upuy] a une figure singulièrement vive, franche, spirituelle; il ajoutait à l'illusion; je me crus au milieu de ce peuple si brave, si franc et si généreux . . . et vivant comme un frère avec tous ces hom[m]es si aimables et si grands qui excitaient le rire par leurs ouvrages ingénieux [the works of Spanish authors] . . .

Voilà de ces plaisirs vifs que donne le monde.
(Cor., I, 160)

By creating gaiety, Stendhal can create, for moments, the illusion that he can feel freely, in a society where he can live "comme un frère avec tous ces hom[m]es".

Wit, which is the perception of an original and unexpected view of something, relies upon the experience of a person and his ability to perceive relationships swiftly. The greater the range a person's experience is the greater his chances are to delight his audience: he will not so easily exhaust the means of producing witty observations. Stendhal writes: "Avec de la mémoire on a autant d'esprit qu'on le veut" (J., p. 692); if one has more memories, one's repertoire of pleasing conversation is insured. To be successful a person's analytic capacities should be keen, rapid; relationships must be perceived immediately if we want to dominate a group by seemingly endless volleys of pleasing observations.

Wit is enlightenment, a source of knowledge; it is the sudden view of previously unperceived ideas. As Stendhal points out in the

following passage, wit is an act of thought: "L'envie de parler vite et d'avoir cette vivacité de diction que j'ai vue à Fleury, en disant des choses d'esprit . . . m'empêche de penser et, par conséquent, d'en avoir" (J., p. 679); or a game of the mind: "Une plaisanterie est un éclair; d'ailleurs nous savons que souvent ce n'est qu'un jeu d'esprit" (J. L., I, 389). Wit is knowledge; because Stendhal delights in the aftereffect of plaisanterie, the creation of a gay ambiance, his happiness may be seen here as a direct result of knowledge.

Lack of knowledge or misinformation about women during his initial encounters with society caused Stendhal pain. He will attempt to remedy his ignorance to prevent further bouts of ennui caused by this deficiency; but first we note a specific effort on his part to discontinue the search for an ideal woman or at least certain illusions he entertains about this pursuit. Following upon his disappointing contact with reality, Stendhal tries to take on a less idealized view of real women and of love. He must not continue to find women who please him as resembling in his imagination Julie d'Etange. He writes: "Sans doute, l'intérêt guide les femmes" (J., p. 675), and refers to Chateaubriand's estimation of the fair sex: "La femme est essentiellement vaniteuse" (J. L., I, 323); women are incapable of tenderness. At another point Stendhal insists that real love, devoid of any illusionary aspect of being a kind

of selfless devotion to a person of superior qualities, is the desire for carnal gratification: "J'adorais en elle la volupté elle-même, tous les plaisirs réels de l'amour, dégagés du triste et du sombre de cette passion, tout le réel de l'amour" (J., p. 590). Viewing love this way will eradicate any possibility of being disappointed at a discovery that one whom he considered to be tender is really calculating, egotistic.

Although he expresses this purely materialistic view of love, Stendhal does not generally hold to it. He does not really believe that there are no women as noble, as generous as he, with whom he could achieve the state of mutual communication and tenderness. What he realizes is that his ideal of perfect communication between lovers has to be achieved, has to be brought about; it is not immediate. The high points of his relationship with Mélanie are characterized by variations on the following remark: "Je goûtais le pur contentement, nos âmes se parlaient" (J., p. 638); but Stendhal has to achieve this "contentement," to manipulate a situation so that Mélanie will be able to see him. In a fantasy about Victorine, he visualizes the scene of her recognition of him, the scene of the moment when she will come to know and to love him: "Voici ma confession, voilà ce que je me vois, et la base de ce que je dirais à Victorine si, étant à ses pieds, elle me demandait: 'Qu'êtes-vous?' Dans cette âme, encore souillée peut-être par quelques

défauts, elle verrait les plus nobles passions à leur maximum" (J., p. 559). What he had not realized prior to his immersion in society was that this recognition on the lady's part is not immediate, whereas in his fantasies, like that about Victorine, his imagination alters memories to suit his ideals; the scene of his revery recalls the loving recognition of each other by Chérubin and the Comtesse Almaviva in the Marriage of Figaro.

We find Stendhal extremely concerned about how to express himself, how to behave so that he will be seen and loved. He realizes that another is understood only inasmuch as he aptly makes himself intelligible. He remarks that one becomes aware of the sensitivity of another when that person communicates it through intelligible signs: "Chacun de nous ne la [la sensibilité] connaît par expérience qu'en lui-même. Il la juge dans les autres par les signes de la déclamation" (Cor., I, 174). Stendhal frequently despairs at the fact that his behavior depicts him other than what he is: "Si V[ictorine] me repousse, elle en refuse un autre que moi, mes lettres ne me montrent pas tel que je suis, et, contre l'ordinaire, elles me montrent horriblement en mal" (J., p. 558).

He needs knowledge about how to communicate effectively. He must overcome his timidity towards women which stands in the way of experience: "Si mon bâtard m'envoyait de l'argent, et que

j'eusse eu Rolandeau, ma timidité serait passée . . ." (J., p. 558).

To gain experience and self-assurance Stendhal engages in a kind of provisional Donjuanism:

Attaquer toutes les femmes que je rencontrerai . . .
alors seulement je serai digne d'avoir une passion.

Me former la caractère en un mot. Le caractère
consiste à faire ce que j'ai résolu de faire . . .
Avoir toutes les mesdames Mortier que je
rencontrerai . . .

Il sera temps de me livrer à mon caractère trop
tendre après la victoire; jusque-là, voir une femme
ordinaire, analyser son coeur, et jouer sur ses
passions. Autrement, à jamais timide et sot. . . .
(J., p. 559)

Stendhal will seduce and conquer women indiscriminately; behavior he tries out in Marseille. With hope, he will be able to turn this experience to his advantage; he will learn to communicate effectively.

Stendhal relies on knowledge to produce a gay ambiance and to be able to touch the women he loves. For both, he must understand human behavior, to know how to please and to communicate. Happiness in reality requires calculation, a willful employment of means to attain ends, which in revery are reached effortlessly. Wallace Fowlie comments in his Stendhal on the originality of this crucial beyliste design: "Whereas the point of departure in Beyle's search was materialistic and frankly objective--in keeping with eighteenth-century philosophy--the first goal, the happiness of the soul, the discovery of the deepest energies of the soul, was a

spiritual acquisition . . . Can the functioning of man's intelligence . . . lead to that exaltation of the heart where all worldly ambitions are surpassed?"⁴⁵ From the sensualists Stendhal takes the instrument of achieving worldly, physical success. Observation and analysis--the tools--will show men how to satisfy all their physical and sensual needs, the only needs recognized by Helvétius. But Stendhal will use these tools to uncover the workings of the human personality, to manipulate circumstances so that he can achieve spiritual states. He will learn by dint of reasoning to make people "gai" and to seduce his beloved; but it will be towards the end of achieving those special states of feeling where his tender soul is overcome with beneficent emotions.

Advantages and Disadvantages of the Âme Sensible in the Quest of Happiness

The Âme passionnée must learn to live and thrive in the world. To remain miserable is foolish. He must endeavor to build up his knowledge, upon which he depends for contentedness in reality. Stendhal considered impassioned men capable of observing more about the object of their desire: "La passion rend attentif aux circonstances qu'elle croit influer sur son bonheur" (J. L., II, 21):

the force of their feeling engages them to pay more attention. Stendhal writes, furthermore, in this respect: "L'esprit tient beaucoup à l'imagination" (Cor., I, 138); those with vivid and active imaginations, like the âmes sensibles, who have been formed primarily through this power, well-exercised in solitude, will arrive at more ideas through the suggestions of the creative power and the enthusiasm its images will fire.

Thus, the ability of sensitive men to feel deeply and to respond passionately to sensation, which encourages them to seek happiness in revery, is also what will enable them to have more sensations and consequently more ideas. Stendhal remarks in 1806 that people who feel less perceive less: "La bêtise vient d'un coeur extrêmement froid . . ." (J., p. 753). The secs have fewer memories on which to reason because not being easily moved, they pay less attention to the environment.

Stendhal notes as well an important side effect for passionate men in their search for knowledge. Through the effort to observe well and to profit from experience, passionate men increase their field of sensations, they become susceptible to more sensation, discovering more details of phenomena: "Nous qui avons le bonheur inappréciable d'être passionnés . . . Observons donc; cela ne fait qu'augmenter la possibilité de notre âme, et sans sensibilité point de bonheur" (Cor., I, 139). Their efforts to increase their memory banks can work to bring about unexpected pleasurable states of feeling.

Stendhal is, however, aware that passionate men encounter difficulties in their attempts to analyze prior experience. As we have shown in Part I, their active imagination spurs feeling that interferes with objective and accurate judgment. Stendhal remarks that his imagination prevents him from ever arriving at an uniquely abstract notion: "J'ai la qualité la plus essentielle peut-être à l'homme qui veut devenir poète, une imagination excessivement vive, qui voit tout ce qu'elle pense. La preuve est que je ne puis pas faire d'abstraction complète" (J.L., I, 217). He always sees a specific image which causes him to respond to recalled sensations affectively.

Stendhal is, moreover, revulsed by common reality, common society. The view of banal life, which is no longer supposed to move him, to cause him melancholy and ennui, continues to affect him, and adversely so. These memories repel him, causing him to flee from such thoughts and to seek refuge in his trusted inner world; he writes in July of 1804: "J'achète le matin le Opere varie del divino Alfieri comme contrepoison au méphitisme de bassesse qui m'entoure" (J., p. 484).

As an aspiring playwright of comedy, the difficulty experienced in studying vulgarity threatens his desire to write comedy; he does not want to analyze his experience of the low: "C'est l'amour de la gloire seule, qui peut me pousser à cette dissection

repoussante . . ." (J. L., II, 34). On the other hand, because his passions do not correspond to those of men with ridiculous behavior, he need not fear that his imagination, prodded by passion, will distort his memories of ridiculous situations: "Il n'est pas étonnant que je ne m'échauffe point pour les caractères essentiellement bas qu'il faut que j'étudie. J'en jugerai mieux l'effet que leurs copies peuvent produire sur des gens (pur troppo!) médicores" (J. L., II, 34).

In addition to disdaining reality as an object of study, Stendhal, who can abandon himself to revery or to the similar effects of art and of nature, finds wearisome the intellectual work and the activity necessary to bring about happiness in reality. He remarks the relief he experiences when in communication with Pauline, "a comprehensive soul," or "une âme qui comprend tous les chagrins et toutes les joies, qui a le plus haut degré de sympathie" (Cor., I, 155). As in his private world of memories, with Pauline Stendhal can experience the happiness of giving unrestrained vent to his feelings; in reality he must constantly judge all aspects of situations to know how he must act in order to avoid unhappiness or to bring about a satisfying situation, and this is tiring: "Ma pauvre petite, je suis si las de faire de l'esprit"; he is tired of being witty, especially since he is doomed to discovering what happiness is possible without the hope of finding sympathetic persons, a task which tires the body, offering little consolation to

a soul like his, whose true happiness lies in a direct, spontaneous expression of feeling: "Ma pauvre petite, je suis si las de faire de l'esprit avec le corps et le coeur souffrants que je suis trop heureux de trouver a comprehensive soul" (Cor., I, 155). Achieving happiness in reality causes weariness.

Stendhal's passionate nature, responsible for his tendency to be happy only with the ideal and for his strong feelings that move his imagination, interferes with his logician's approach to happiness in society.

The Danger of Beylisme

Stendhal wants to preserve his privileged tenderness, the quality whereby he can react deeply, emotionally to sensations, and he is aware that an unfeeling stance towards one's memories, required for thinking objectively and accurately, may interfere with the privileged power of the "Happy Few" to feel, rendering them insensitive to recalled images, which prevents revery and the enjoyment of the arts.

The analytical stance, he remarks, lessens the capacity to feel: "Grand moyen de consolation: faire que l'affligé, s'occupe à analyser sa douleur, à l'instant elle diminuera" (J., p. 508). Such a distanced approach to remembered experience, where one attempts

to consider relationships instead of responding to the content affectively, acts necessarily to stop feeling. The necessity to be calculating, to treat all experience as potentially useful if analyzed encourages sang-froid or unresponsiveness towards experience. These habits, he observes, decrease his capacity to feel: "Je vois plus distinctement et plus exactement les choses; mais j'en suis frappé moins fortement" (J. L., II, 32). He observes: "Je me trouve bien plus raisonnable," meaning that he has more realistic expectations about happiness in society; he has "peu pensé à [ses] anciens châteaux en Espagne de bonheur par amour"; he continues: "J'ai plus de bon sens mais peut-être je suis plus médiocre" (J., p. 450). He calculates more to achieve this reasonableness and feels less; thus, he is more like the average man of his time--"médiocre"--who has not been educated to be as passionate as he.

He even notes that his new found reasonableness to take from reality what it can give, to derive from his experience all that is useful, has awakened tastes in art akin to those of vain, unfeeling men:

Je sens que je deviens raisonnable, que je me mûris. Je vois s'affaiblir, et mourir d'anciens préjugés d'école que j'aurais mis dans mes écrits si j'avais produit plus tôt . . . Chez nous autres Français, dans ce moment-ci (messidor XII), la vanité remplit toute l'âme. Pourquoi est-ce qu'on aime le délicat, pourquoi préfère-t-on Racine et

Raphael à Corneille et Michel-Ange? . . . C'est par vanité. Moi-même, à mesure que je deviens plus semblable à ceux qui m'entourent, ce que j'appelle plus raisonnable, je sens que j'aime mieux le gracieux que le grand, le poids de l'admiration m'opportune. (J. L., I, 402)

The habit of egotistic calculation, of being "raisonnable," reduces the ability to feel and to be touched by greatness, and like vain men Stendhal cannot sympathize as much with the sublime characters of Corneille; rather, their greatness wounds his vanity, "l'admiration m'opportune." Not being able to feel limits his experience of art and thus the reexperience of those feelings for which memories elicited by art are responsible.

Men endowed with the possibility of feeling more intensely and more selflessly face a conflict with respect to the effects of the two possible approaches toward prior experience. The contrastive habits that the two uses of memory develop: analysis vs. abandonment to sensation and the cult of revery work against each other. Stendhal is left undecided as to which use to favor: the use of memory that leads to happiness in reality, achieved through effort, at the risk of diminishing one's capacity to feel, or the use of prior experience that may cause transcendent exhilarating experiences but lead to the madness of Rousseau.

Stendhal sees the artist, who must rely also on both approaches to prior experience--feeling and judgment--, as facing the same conflict. He must be able to think and to be moved.

As we have seen, an artist, according to Stendhal, is characterized by his ability to feel. He claims that Shakespeare was a great poet because he was able to feel: "Mon admiration pour Shakespeare croît tous les jours. Cet homme-là n'ennuie jamais . . . C'est le manuel qui me convient. Il ne savait rien: n'apprenons donc pas le grec. Il faut sentir et non savoir" (J. L., I, 248). It was Shakespeare's ability to sympathize, to respond passionately to sensations, that made him a great artist: "Shakespeare a une âme compréhensive . . . le plus haut degré de sympathie" (Cor., I, 155). The effective artist must be able to relive his experience emotionally so that he can use this experience to create authentic characters.

Stendhal heeds the comments of thinkers such as Brissot and D. Stewart who insist that the artistic personality has characteristics different from that of the philosopher. The artist responds to sensations and the philosopher observes and analyzes what causes them: "Brissot me fait penser que les qualités du philosophe, c'est-à-dire de celui qui cherche à connaître les passions, et du poète ou de celui qui cherche à les peindre pour

produire tel effet, sont incompatibles. Voir cela, lire Brissot" (J., p. 480). He finds confirmation in Dugald Stewart who maintains that an artist is characterized by his unusual ability to feel: "Au reste Stewart est un des hommes que je dois lire avec le plus d'attention. J'y retrouve mot pour mot ma description de la manière de composer des Corneille . . . Lire Mme de Staël qu'il cite avec éloges, et il a raison. Il paraît qu'elle a senti de fortes émotions" (J. L., II, 102).⁴⁶

If Stendhal must develop his analytical faculties in order to achieve happiness in reality, he jeopardizes his chance to be an artist, especially a writer of tragedies, whose characters must be found sympathetic, must express passions naturally so that the audience will be touched and moved to identify: "Il en est de même du poète tragique et du comique. Le premier sympathise avec tous les hom[mes] qu'il voit, entre dans leurs affections, et tâche de sentir ce qu'ils sentent" (J. L., II, 160).

As a writer, however, he is also required to study his experience. He must rely on his memory for accurate creations of characters and for knowledge of audience tastes, as we have discussed earlier. The necessary reflective attitude towards experience for the purpose of discovering what elements in a representation will move an audience requires an unfeeling attitude: "Je cherche à me dépassionner pour redevenir froid philosophe et faire mon plan" (Cor., I, 90). He remarks in

1806 that an artist becomes emotional when he sympathizes too much with his characters, which interferes with the reasoning process necessary to arrive at a good plan: "La faculté de s'identifier avec les personnages, portée à un degré un peu haut, nuirait en faisant un plan" (J., p. 745).

Scrutiny of experience will uncover more details, more information about what went into moving us in a situation: "On a bien des pensées de détail en faisant le plan qu'on devrait noter" (J. L., I, 259). In knowing his feelings, in judging them fully, new possibilities for provoking response in the audience will be suggested. He should attempt to see the possible "extent" of his passions, all the different manners in which he can experience them: "Avant d'entreprendre de peindre un caractère, il faut en tracer l'étendue . . ." (J. L., II, 171). For want of considering all the possibilities that could conceivably express his character of the gambler, Regnard did not present situations in Le Joueur that would have depicted his hero better: "Si Regnard avant de peindre son joueur eût fait l'étendue du caractère, il aurait eu parmi les situations un joueur jouant. C'était même celle qui se présentait le plus naturellement . . ." (J. L., II, 171). The search for knowledge increases a person's field of sensations; new aspects of phenomena are uncovered, which may be potential means of moving an audience.

In addition, by exercising his judgment of his experience, an artist can train himself to feel more subtly: "Porter toujours un peu de papier blanc et un crayon au spectacle. Après la pièce, j'ai oublié mes réflexions. Cela me formera le goût" (J. L., II, 175). Stendhal suggests that judgments on experience will improve the quality of future, affective aesthetic experiences. He postulates in response to a passage quoted from Marmontel's Mémoires d'un père pour servir à l'instruction de ses enfants that this refinement of the ability to feel brought about by analysis of remembered feelings is the explanation for the privileged sensibility of a certain Picinni whom Marmontel describes thus: " 'Il avait pour saisir les plus délicates inflexions de la voix une sensibilité si prompte (si fine) qu'il exprimait jusqu'aux nuances les plus fines du sentiment' " (J. L., II, 179). In affirming that the artist should possess a similar sensitivity Stendhal places responsibility for this acute sensitivity on the activity of the intellect: "Voilà ce que doit avoir l'auteur. C'est peut-être de cette manière que l'esprit (la tête) augmente la sensibilité (le coeur)" (J. L., II, 179); Stendhal notes: "Etudier la naïveté? Oui; lorsque, comme hier, je ne me porte pas très bien, que j'ai des idées fines et en même temps que je sens, mon âme étudie la naïveté, apprend à la sentir" (J., p. 521). By understanding, having ideas about naivety, he will feel it better.

Language: A Seat of the Conflict

As an artist Stendhal will want to employ language capable of grasping and rendering the sensations of experiences as he has felt them. This is a task he finds exceedingly difficult:

Je ne continue point la description, parce qu'il faudrait trop la travailler pour lui faire représenter ce bonheur fastueux que j'ai goûté pour la première fois . . .

Ces mémoires ne me rendent pas assez mes sensations. (J., p. 503)

As a philosophe, however, he is not concerned with "rendering" his sensations, but in analyzing and explaining them. The habits of the latter prevent feeling again what has been recorded in the Journaux. Stendhal claims, on the one hand: "L'art d'écrire un journal est d'y conserver le dramatique de la vie; ce qui en éloigne c'est qu'on veut juger en racontant" (J., p. 445); however, we know that he undertook to record his memories so that he would be able to judge. Stendhal's concern with language reflects his preoccupations with the conflict between the two uses of memory; he needs to develop both uses of language for different purposes, but the habit of writing discursively impinges at other times upon his ability to suggest, to evoke feeling.

Stendhal's personal experience of the effect of his own writings, even though troubling, leads him to formulate fruitful ideas about creative writing. As an artist he must use language that will create the impression of life, cause the audience to respond as it does in reality: to react forcefully to a particular, seemingly incomparable, unique plexus of sensation-giving details. If he wishes to relive his memories, he must render his remembered experience in his journals so that the language he uses will make him experience it again. Experience is not reason; thus, a moving language is not rational discourse. Stendhal observes: "Le poète doit faire sentir aux spectateurs les vérités, et non pas les leur dire. Les dire en philosophe ne sert qu'à les faire lire malgré eux aux spectateurs" (J. L., II, 161). The audience is not moved by language that analyzes; rather, it thinks. In another passage in the Journal littéraire, Stendhal affirms that the goal of the artist is to suggest images to the audience; these move, not discourse which is abstract: "Voilà le poète: il veut émouvoir, il rend par une image que tout le monde saisit ce que tout autre aurait exprimé d'une manière abstraite" (J. L., I, 312). When the language--a language that creates images--of a work enables the audience to feel before it recognizes what it feels (as we feel sensually first in reality and then understand), its emotional experiences are tapped and recalled, allowing for identification and the reliving of passion.

Notes

1

Although Stendhal was profoundly influenced by Helvétius' work, he has reservations about Helvétius' explanation of the passion of love. Because Helvétius was ignorant of certain feelings, he could not speak about them with authority; Stendhal writes in 1803: "Enfin, j'ai cru reconnaître qu'Helvétius, n'ayant jamais senti ces douces affections, était, d'après ses propres principes, incapable de les peindre. Comment pourrait-il expliquer ce trouble inconnu qui saisit à la première vue, et cette constance éternelle qui nourrit sans espérance un amour allumé? Il n'y croit pas à cette constance dont j'ai ouï citer tant d'exemples . . ." (Cor., I, 84).

2

Stendhal, Journal, in Oeuvres intimes, Vol. 3 of Oeuvres, ed. Henri Martineau (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Gallimard, 1955), p. 538. All further references to this edition of the Journal appear in the text, indicated by J., followed by the page number.

3

Henri J. Delacroix, La Psychologie de Stendhal (Paris: F. Alcan, 1918), p. 6.

4

Stendhal, Filosofia nova, in Vol. I of Journal littéraire, Vol. 33 of the Oeuvres complètes, ed. Victor Del Litto and Ernest Abravanel (Geneva: Cercle du Bibliophile, 1967-74), p. 435. All further references to the Filosofia nova appear in the text, indicated by F.N., followed by the page number.

5

François J. Picavet, Les Idéologues (New York: Arno Press, 1975), p. 20.

6

Claude A. Helvétius, De l'Esprit, Vols. I and II of Oeuvres (Paris: Briand, l'An II (1793)), I, 363.

7

Claude A. Helvétius, De l'Homme, Vols. III-V of Oeuvres (Paris: Briand, l'An (1793)), III, 108.

8

Delacroix, p. 23.

9

Stendhal, Art dramatique. Du rire, in Vol. I of Journal littéraire, Vol. 33 of Oeuvres complètes, ed. Victor Del Litto and Ernest Abravanel (Geneva: Cercle du Bibliophile, 1967-74), p. 427. All further references to Art dramatique. Du rire appear in the text, indicated by Art dramatique, followed by the page number.

10

Voltaire, "Imagination," Encyclopédie (New York: Readex Microprint Corporation, 1969).

- 11 Etienne B. de Condillac, Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines, in Vol. I of Oeuvres philosophiques de Condillac, ed. Georges Le Roy (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1947), pp. 14-15.
- 12 Voltaire.
- 13 Del Litto, p. 162.
- 14 Helvétius, De l'Esprit, I, 360.
- 15 Del Litto, p. 163.
- 16 Voltaire.
- 17 Condillac, p. 31.
- 18 Del Litto, pp. 162-63.
- 19 Del Litto, p. 163.
- 20 Voltaire.
- 21 Helvétius, De l'Esprit, I, 360.
- 22 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques, in Vol. I of Oeuvres complètes, ed. B. Gagnebin and M. Raymond (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Gallimard, 1959), p. 845.
- 23 Del Litto, p. 122.
- 24 Georges Blin, Stendhal et les problèmes du roman (Paris: J. Corti, 1954), p. 20.
- 25 Helvétius, De l'Homme, IV, 293.

26 Helvétius, De l'Homme, IV, 294.

27 Condillac, p. 30.

28 Helvétius, De l'Homme, IV, 295.

29 Delacroix, p. 32.

30 Stendhal, Vie de Henri Brulard, in Oeuvres intimes,

Vol. III of Oeuvres, ed. Henri Martineau (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Gallimard, 1955), p. 10. All further references to the Vie de Henri Brulard appear in the text, indicated by H. B., followed by the page number.

31

During this period Stendhal gives little heed to Montesquieu's and Mme de Staël's ideas on the influence of climate; however, Stendhal will consider the effect of climate on behavior more seriously in the Histoire de la peinture en Italie.

32

Del Litto, p. 57.

33

Mme de Staël, De la littérature, Vol. IV of Oeuvres complètes (Paris: Treuttel et Würtz, 1820), p. 176.

34

Stendhal, Histoire de la peinture en Italie, 2 vols., Vols. 26 and 27 of Oeuvres complètes, ed. Victor Del Litto and Ernest Abravanel (Geneva: Cercle du Bibliophile, 1967-74), I, 65. All further references to the Histoire de la peinture en Italie appear in the text, indicated by H. P. I., followed by the volume and page numbers.

35

Del Litto, pp. 28-29.

36

François-René Chateaubriand, Génie du Christianisme

(Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1966), I, 267.

37

Helvétius, De l'Homme, IV, 298-99.

38

Although Stendhal criticized much in the theater of Racine, he appreciated, however, Racine's felicitous creation of tender heroines. According to Stendhal heroines of Racine's plays express "ce genre de tendresse éperdue" (J., p. 563).

39

Stendhal, Racine et Shakespeare I, ed. Roger Fayolle (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1970), p. 53. Racine et Shakespeare consists of two pamphlets, which are referred to in the text as Racine et Shakespeare I and Racine et Shakespeare II. All further documentation for these pamphlets appears in the text, indicated by R.S.I and R.S.II respectively, followed by the page number.

40

Boileau wrote "la sensible peinture," not "la naïve peinture."

41

Stendhal, De l'Amour, ed. Victor Del Litto (Paris: Livre de Poche, Gallimard, 1969), p. 47. All further references to De l'Amour appear in the text, indicated by Amour, followed by the page number.

42

Blum, p. 159.

43

Blum, p. 161.

44

Blum, pp. 166-67.

45

Wallace Fowlie, Stendhal (Paris: Collier-Macmillan

Limited, 1969), p. 39.

46

Stendhal fluctuates in his appreciation of Mme de Staël^u.

He respected her for her intelligence, her powers of observation , but he comments frequently that she writes poorly when she attempts to describe feelings she has not personally experienced: "Ce livre donc si enflé est excellent au fond. Il se nomme De l'influence des passions sur le bonheur . . . Mme de Staël^u n'est pas très sensible et elle s'est crue très sensible. Elle a voulu être très sensible. Elle s'est fait dans le secret de son coeur une gloire . . . d'être très sensible. Ensuite elle a mis là-dessus son exagération" (Cor., I, 213).

Chapter II

1805-06, The Influence of the Idéologues on Stendhal's Ideas on Memory

In October of 1806 Stendhal succeeds in acquiring a post with the French government in Germany, thanks to his relatives the Darus. This marks the end of a very feverish period of reflection and intellectual development, which he will experience again during his stay in Milan from 1814 to 1821. Upon leaving Paris, Stendhal embarks upon a worldly career, which does not stop him from reading and thinking, but he enjoys no longer the freedom to spend time as he wished; however, Stendhal leaves Paris an Idéologue; he has increased confidence that he can be happy in reality. His life should now be more a matter of applying what he has learned, rather than continuing to be a period of preparation.

We saw Stendhal with the frame of mind that happiness is possible, after his realization that there was no objective reason for reality to conform to his ideals. In 1805-06 Stendhal grows more and more certain that by reasoning well, by increasing and

by refining his knowledge, he will put himself in good stead to be happy in society. This growing certainty that a series of judgments, or reasoning, will lead to happiness coincides with Stendhal's immersion in Ideological readings. He read Destutt de Tracy's Eléments d' Idéologie, the first and third volumes of which he was most familiar: Idéologie proprement dite and Logique. Stendhal knew well Maine de Biran's Influence de l'habitude sur la faculté de penser and Philippe Pinel's Manie. Although he was familiar with Pierre Cabanis' Rapports du physique et du moral, Stendhal's reading of this text was to bear fruit in Histoire de la peinture en Italie.

Stendhal became acquainted with some of the major works of the Institut National's second class, the Classe des sciences morales et politiques, which was responsible for setting up the Ecoles centrales, the Grenoble branch of which Stendhal attended, and whose members were dubbed Idéologues by Napoleon; he feared the political outcome of their theories about human behavior.

The coincidence of these readings with Stendhal's growing conviction that happiness is to be the product of knowledge is more than a contiguous relationship. He finds theories about behavior, particularly in the work of Tracy and Biran, that support his belief that he can successfully act to be happy. With respect to our interest, Stendhal finds the importance of memory in

knowledge amply reaffirmed. The Idéologues continue in the tradition that memory is necessary for judgment, for thinking: "Les règles que Tracy prescrit à la suite de sa Science de nos moyens de connaître sont si simples que je puis fort bien tâcher de les mettre en pratique. Elles consistent à bien se retracer le souvenir de la chose sur laquelle on veut raisonner, et ensuite à prendre garde que le sujet contienne toujours l'attribut qu'on lui donne" (J., p. 727). It is the remembered form of the phenomenon in question that is used in reasoning; without the record there would be nothing to judge.

It is, however, less the Idéologues' thinking on the process of reasoning and the role of memory therein which influences Stendhal; he already understands that reasoning is comparing and judging through his readings in the sensualists, although aspects of the Idéologues' theories about these processes act to improve Stendhal's grasp of the subject. Tracy and Biran reveal, rather, to Stendhal the different psychological states in which men are when either using memory as a means to knowledge or as a direct, immediate source of happiness and the consequences of being in such states. The Idéologues will increase his understanding of man's behavior conceived of as being either active or passive.

Perception and Sensation

Stendhal realizes that when remembering for the purpose of knowledge, he is performing a conscious, effortful activity. Men perceive their memories, i. e. they see them as being different from themselves, are conscious of them. In a paraphrase of Maine de Biran, Stendhal establishes the state of consciousness as that of containing both a subject and an object:

A B
 Je sens que je sens . . .
Myself sent bien que dans: je sens (A) que j'ai
 senti (B), le sens A n'est pas un souvenir du sens
 B. (J. L., II, 188)

When recalling a memory for the purpose of judgment, the subject is conscious of the memory as being separate, apart from him. In so remembering he is also making an effort, "un mouvement contraint," as Biran defines this term, expressive of the will to know the memories; we make the effort of judging. Stendhal would term this conscious, active, or effortful, attitude toward remembered prior experience as the state of perception; it fits the definition of this state that he gives in the Journal littéraire, again paraphrasing Biran: "Lorsqu'on est actif, c'est-à-dire que l'on remarque ce que l'on sent, et cela au moyen de la disposition donnée à l'organe il [Biran] l'appelle perception" (J. L., II, 189).

In the Influence de l'habitude Biran describes the psychological attitude of a person remembering, stressing the effort, the movement of the mind and the concomitant lack of emotion that accompanies such conscious behavior: "Le rappel des idées, par leurs signes naturels ou artificiels, laisse à l'individu tout le calme nécessaire pour les contempler, en visiter les détails et y appliquer en quelque sorte son tact intérieur, comme il applique lentement sa main au solide dont il veut connaître les formes; l'effort qui accompagne le rappel a toujours quelque chose de réfléchi, de concentré, incompatible avec les émotions trop fortes et les illusions de la sensibilité exaltée." ²

In approaching memories thus detachedly, we are, of course, feeling them, feeling meant in the general sense of receiving an impression, in the sense given to the word in Stendhal's assertion to Pauline: "Penser et sentir sont la même chose" (Cor., I, 173). But the feeling is a perception. In thinking, we observe and review experience rather than being moved by it and responding emotionally. Biran indicates that a strong emotional reaction is contrary to making an effort: "L'effort . . . a quelque chose . . . d'incompatible avec les émotions trop fortes." In the activity of remembering for the purpose of judgment one does not feel memories in the limited sense of to feel: to be sensitive to or emotionally disturbed by.

The state of remembering where we attain states of feeling-- the chief form of this recall is images; it is they that effect an emotional reaction equivalent to the effect of a concrete object-- produces an unconscious, passive state. This psychological attitude Stendhal would determine as the state of sensation, as he defines this state: "Biran nomme sensation ce que l'on aperçoit lorsqu'on est passif dans l'impression" (J. L., II, 189). Stendhal is in a state of sensation when objects bring about an emotional reaction in him so that he is identified with the feeling, that is unconscious of any difference: of the difference between himself, or the subject, and the object, or the cause of the sensations; for example, he describes the unconscious state the actual presence or the memory of Mélanie has on him: "Je sens qu'elle occupe toute mon âme. Je n'ai plus de sensibilité pour sentir autre chose . . . ma pensée est toujours fixée sur elle" (J., p. 640). He describes himself as being one with feeling: he is in the state of sensation, completely identified with an emotional feeling. In this state he is passive, without will, having no consciousness, no perception; he has no desire, feels no will. Continuing his description of the effect of Mélanie on him, Stendhal stresses his passivity: "Tout ce que je fais est fait machinalement; ma pensée est toujours fixée sur elle" (J., p. 640). He has no consciousness of his will: his movements are automatic, effortless, for he is passively subject

to the sensations that control him; thus, Stendhal's use of memory as a source of happiness, that is as a source of feeling--for Stendhal happiness is a state of emotion--induces the state of sensation, where he submits passively, effortlessly to the effect of impressions, memories upon him.

In what appears to us to be a corroboration of Helvétius' thinking, specifically of his ideas on the powerful effect of memories sublimated by imagination on man's sensitivity, Biran points out that image-memories produce a state of sensation better than the presence of the object. Memories often move us more, allowing for more intense identification with feeling and render us more completely without will: "La production spontanée des images, quand elle a un certain degré de vivacité, est toujours accompagnée de sentiments affectifs semblables et souvent supérieurs à ceux que la présence même de l'objet pourrait exciter. . . ." ³ Stendhal finds reaffirmed in Biran why he seeks happiness in memory: imagination improves on the remembered object; the memory of this transformed by imagination can move more forcefully, more purely.

Stendhal understands now that it is because his faculties are differently engaged in the two uses of memory--remembering for the purpose of knowledge and for the purpose of experiencing emotion--that he is not able to feel, react emotionally, to his

memories when trying to analyze them; for example, he knows now why when in trying to analyze his memories certain experiences no longer cause pain: "Je vais user au Palais-Royal une demi-heure qui a été peut-être une des plus pénibles de ma vie; ma seule distraction était d'observer mon état, c'en est une grande" (J., p. 630). When remembering for the purpose of judgment, "observer mon état," he moves his mind; this effort occupying him, he cannot feel in any other way except to feel the effort of thinking, to experience his will to observe. In the state of sensation, in the state of happiness brought on by privileged recollections, we make no effort but yield to the emotions that come up spontaneously in response to the memories. Passivity precludes effort, that which obstructs emotional response.

In the Journal, while discussing the passion of love objectively and obviously considering his own experience, Stendhal observes his inability to continue reasoning because an emotion is overcoming him: "Je m'arrête parce que je sens venir un éblouissement; l'attention et le sentiment sont trop forts . . ." (J., p. 561). In a note to this journal entry Stendhal remarks that in having changed the subject, he prevented himself from lapsing into a state of unconsciousness: "Physiologie idéologique--Je sens que ce changement d'objet de raisonnement a empêché l'éblouissement." By putting out of his mind the memories causing the "éblouissement,"

the state where he would have lost all consciousness of differences between himself and his memories, he was able to prevent a loss of the perceptive attitude.

Stendhal has learned, thus, the necessity of maintaining a perceptive attitude towards his memories if he hopes to be able to judge in order to arrive at ideas about reality. Previously, thanks to his reading in Helvétius, he knew to be wary when reasoning upon memories which engaged his passions. He now understands that memories which tend to induce a state of feeling, remove his will, make the effort to judge impossible.

Happiness and the State of Sensation

Although we shall emphasize Stendhal's thinking on memory as the source of knowledge, because this is the focus of his own thinking during this period, when he wants intensely concrete happiness, we intend to investigate how the new information about the differences in psychological behavior affects Stendhal's thinking about states of happiness.

Since the state of sensation happens when one begins to be less perceptive of the object causing sensation and more yielding to its effect, enjoyment of sensation is greater the more one loses self-consciousness and will, the more one succumbs to the state of

pure feeling. In 1802 Stendhal had already sensed this idea, undoubtedly suggested by his reading in La Rochefoucauld. He writes in the literary Cahiers: "Tant que l'on aime on ne réfléchit point; dès qu'on réfléchit on n'aime plus" (J. L., I, 23). If one is able to concentrate, emotion is not being felt, or at least not being felt strongly. The condition of being identified with a feeling allows for a more forceful experience of feeling; thus, for Stendhal, for whom happiness is a state of intense emotional activity and who seeks also in art ecstatic states of feeling, the more overwhelming the state of sensation the happier he is. In the following passage where Stendhal draws a parallel between intellectual pleasure and the "jouissance" stemming from the experience of emotions at the theater, he states that the pleasure depended on the fact that he was able to concentrate wholly on one thing: "Toute mon attention est à considérer les choses qu'il me dit"; this allows him to be more fully moved by what has literally become him: his consciousness is merged with the object of his thought and feelings:

Il me donne par son récit une jouissance d'esprit qui me met exactement hors de moi; toute mon attention est à considérer les choses qu'il me dit; c'est la seule jouissance de ce genre, que j'aie éprouvée depuis la Confession exécutée à Gr[enoble] par Diday et Felix Mallein, celle-ci est moins vive.

Celle de l'Opéra, avec Martial, était d'un degré moins forte, je n'étais pas hors de moi, je voyais mon bonheur et avais assez de force pour l'analyser. (J., p. 515)

Stendhal remarks that his enjoyment of the "Opéra" was less because his emotions were less strong. His attention was divided between feeling and thinking. He was active, conscious--able to analyze--which in lessening feeling interfered with a more complete experience of sensation, and this tempered emotional response, the experience of his feelings.

As a man who is able to achieve happiness through the use of memory, the more Stendhal is able to abandon himself to the emotions memories elicit, the more completely he enters into the state of revery, the greater the happiness he will experience.

Through his understanding that perception interferes with responding to stimulus tenderly, Stendhal comprehends better why vain men do not find happiness where he does. The vain person must constantly be perceptive to derive his ego gratification of feeling superior. Instead of spontaneously responding to sensations, he must be conscious of the other, seek out the ways he can bring others to serve his interest. In the following passage, Stendhal affirms that a difference exists between his way of responding to situations and that of vain persons: "Comme nos coeurs sont très différents, il est très probable que j'aurai des sensations

extrêmement différentes dans les mêmes situations" (J., p. 700).

Their response is perceptive and his is generally one of feeling.

They are ignorant of what it is to feel intensely, giving their attention rather to calculating. They are unable to be tender and Stendhal must avoid giving them the opportunity to influence his happiness:

"Que de pareilles gens . . . des coeurs froids . . . influencent sur mon bonheur, c'est une grande bêtise à moi" (J., p. 699). Being insensitive to him, not having formed the behavior of sympathizing, a result of being able to react emotionally, they can never act naturally to make Stendhal happy; rather, he must manipulate them, direct their behavior so as not to be hurt by them. Further knowledge about human behavior confirms him in his Beylisme.

The Experience of Art and the State of Sensation

In realizing that his happiness is increased the more unconscious he is of himself in states of feeling, Stendhal sees that this same behavior will increase the happiness he derives from the experience of art.

The pleasure of sympathizing in art, whereby through identification with the characters we are deeply moved, can now be accounted for by the loss of self-consciousness and by our oneness

with the characters and their emotions. By losing perception of oneself in the act of sympathizing with another, by being "hors de [soi]," as Stendhal describes the condition of his state of pleasure, one is able by this direction of attention to be affected strongly. In being one with a character, the audience fully feels the emotions he suggests. Stendhal maintains that actors should take care not to jeopardize the possibility of the audience's identification with the characters and thus limit the pleasure of feeling by shocking it with extreme outbursts of feeling with which the audience has not been prepared emotionally to sympathize: "Il faut se posséder et s'échauffer peu à peu pour engager la sympathie de l'auditeur, autrement, vous voyant furieux du premier abord, il compte avec vous au lieu de partager vos sentiments et de se voir dans vous" (J., p. 585).

It is clearer why an âme tendre, who seeks states of feeling, takes less pleasure in comedy the primary goal of which is to make one feel superior. Because we cannot sympathize with a ridiculous character, but must be satisfied with the vanity gratification of feeling superior, conditioned on being perceptive, we cannot know the intensity of feeling that comes from having transcended the emotionally restricting state of being conscious of self.

Stendhal speaks of the "illusion" of art, indicating by this term that sympathy is so strong, the audience is, to repeat a phrase, so "bien lié à l'acteur" (J., p. 585), that it is able to lose consciousness of the fictiveness of the character, of the fact that the life which is represented is artificial: "L'illusion du spectacle était parfaite pour moi, parce que je ne songeais pas à y voir la non-illusion. Je me laissais doucement aller" (J., pp. 540-41). It is this "illusion" he was seeking during the "Opéra," but which he failed to experience; he did not become one with an emotion so as to be able to lose all perception of artificiality; he knew at all times that he was watching a play. We find in Racine et Shakespeare I the same definition of the artistic illusion being upheld: "L'illusion théâtrale, ce sera l'action d'un homme qui croit véritablement existantes les choses qui se passent sur la scène" (R.S.I., p. 58). He reaffirms, as well, the condition of this illusion:

Mais recherchons dans quels moments de la tragédie le spectateur peut espérer de rencontrer ces instants délicieux d'illusion parfaite . . .

Ces instants délicieux et si rares d'illusion parfaite ne peuvent se rencontrer que dans la chaleur d'une scène animée, lorsque les répliques des acteurs se pressent; par exemple, quand Hermione dit à Oreste, qui vient d'assassiner Pyrrhus par son ordre:

Qui te l'a dit?

(R.S.I., p. 59)

During such moments the audience is totally enveloped in the emotions being acted out on stage; it experiences the "chaleur," the heat of passion. The artistic illusion depends on the loss of self-consciousness brought about by an emotional identification with passionate characters.

On one occasion Stendhal offers a biological explanation of the state of sensation occurring at the theater: "Cette forte impression vient peut-être de ce que mon âme n'avait point de nerfs . . . et au contraire se laissait aller . . ." (J., pp. 540-51). He accounts for his passive attitude that encourages abandonment to feeling by the tranquillity and suppleness of his nervous system during the performance. Organic contraction and the kind of nervous tension that accompany consciousness and that are evidence of a will of some kind are gone, and one begins to lose perception.

We include Stendhal's considerations on the experience of art in this study because of the role the audience's memory plays in the enjoyment of the arts. As we have seen, experience of the arts is particularly sought by Stendhal's âmes élevées because their privileged experience of happiness is made possible by identification with characters who alone--during this period of egotistic and vain men--remind them of their cherished memories and reveries. The state of sensation where we have become one with a character, in

deep sympathy with him, depends upon his ability to remind us of our own experience. Sympathy is, consequently, greater, providing for more happiness, the less perceptive we are of differences between a character and ourselves. The less cognizant we are of differences the more we can respond to the images recalled in our memory by the work. The Preface to Racine et Shakespeare I makes a similar point. There Stendhal writes that the audience experiences the "illusion théâtrale," is emotionally identified with the characters only inasmuch as the characters remind the audience of its concerns, where there are not shocking differences which prevent identification:

Je prétends qu'il faut désormais faire des tragédies pour nous, jeunes gens raisonnurs, sérieux et un peu envieux . . .

Les règnes de Charles VI, de Charles VII, du noble François Ier, doivent être féconds pour nous en tragédies nationales . . .

Le genre niais de l'ancienne école française ne convenait plus au goût sévère d'un peuple chez qui commençait à se développer la soif des actions énergiques. (R.S.I., p. 51)

The youth of 1823, more passionate, with more natural desires, will need to identify with characters that will remind them of their energy and spirit if they are to have the full emotional experience of art.

Stendhal finds reinforcement for his theory that memory is at the basis of sympathizing. In 1806 he reads Mme de Condorcet's translation and commentary of Adam Smith's A Theory of Moral

Feelings and notes the intelligent widow's remarks about the physical basis of sympathy; a physical memory is recalled. He summarizes his reading in a letter to Pauline, observing that a physical sensation is activated and relived when a character or a person reminds us of our condition: " 'De même nous ressentons cette impression douloureuse lorsqu'en état de discerner les signes de la douleur, nous voyons souffrir un être sensible, ou que nous savons qu'il souffre' " (Cor., I, 302). He quotes Mme de Condorcet's proposition that the body retains a generalized memory of an experience, of pain specifically:

"Un homme ferme une porte avec violence; il s'écrase le doigt entre les deux battants:
 1. Il sent une douleur locale à son doigt;
 2. Elle produit de plus une impression douloureuse dans tous ses organes, impression très distincte de la douleur locale, et qui accompagne toujours cette douleur, mais qui peut continuer d'exister sans elle." (Cor., I, 301)

It is this generalized physical memory that is recalled when sympathy is felt for someone.

He goes on to remark that we sympathize less intensely with experiences of happiness; not because there is any less of a physical memory, but because a person who is happy appears more self-contained, which discourages seeing ourselves in him, who appears apart from us, highly individual: " 'Presque tous les plaisirs

physiques ont en eux-mêmes quelque chose d'exclusif qui en nous donnant l'idée et le sentiment de la privation balance l'impression agréable que l'idée du plaisir d'autrui devait nous faire éprouver, et peut même aller jusqu'à la détruire' " (Cor., I, 305). This is why tragedy, where we identify with unfortunate characters, produces a greater emotional experience: we are able to sympathize with a victim of misfortune better; we see ourselves in a sorrowful creature. Shortly after his reading of Mme de Condorcet's letters, Stendhal recalls a highly pleasurable experience of sympathizing with an unfortunate, virtuous character:

Nous parlons d'actions courageuses, il me raconte un enlèvement d'E . . . Il me monte à ces actions dont, de sang-froid, je sens si bien la duperie aux c . . . Je le quitte avec ce sentiment de grandeur, d'enthousiasme, de crainte (je n'ai pas le temps de chercher le vrai nom), qui produit un extrême plaisir et que je goûtais souvent dans mon enfance. (J., pp. 759-60)

Almost in confirmation of Mme de Condorcet's theories, he shows how emotionally satisfying sympathizing with tragic characters is: they recall his own experiences better; he more forcefully feels with them. Even in those comedies which Stendhal enjoys, which cause him to smile rather than to laugh, the heroes with whom he sympathizes experience misfortune first before they attain happiness. Owing to his reading of Mme de Condorcet Stendhal would undoubtedly consider the ability to sympathize with characters

who wind up happy to be dependent upon their first being miserable, which recalls a physical feeling of unhappiness; this establishes the sympathetic bond.

The discovery that recalled memories necessary for sympathy are partly physical as well as conceptual and emotional is one of the many observations where Stendhal stresses the influence of man's organic organization and functioning on moral behavior.

Madness and Happiness

If the ability to yield to the emotional effect of objects on us is the power that allows us to reach the summit of happiness, or emotional ecstasy, Stendhal also sees that this ability stands in the way of arriving at ideas. If we react only emotionally to memories, if they serve only as signs of feelings, we cannot know them. Since Stendhal has determined that he wants to achieve happiness in society and to be no longer satisfied with the self-indulgent attitude of melancholy, he must be able to perceive his remembered experience so that through his judgment he will be able to accomplish his goals.

As a reinforcement to the position that he must perceive more and respond emotionally less, he suggests that emotional ecstasy or "éréthisme moral" (J., p. 622), as he now refers to it, is

debilitating if repeated too often. As his use of the term "éréthisme," or extreme irritability or sensitivity of any organ or tissue, suggests, Stendhal considers emotional happiness as having a corporeal state; he remarks: "Ils mettent leur bonheur dans des états différents et de l'âme et du corps, ou pour mieux dire, du dernier seul, corps étant pris dans le sens de Cabanis" (J., p. 762). For the Idéologues all functions of man have a physical means of operation. The state of happiness that Stendhal knows, even though not carnal, has, nonetheless, a physical expression.

He writes to Pauline that such happiness is a state the body can bear only infrequently: "Un peu d'étude de l'homme moral apprend la rareté de cet état délicieux, un peu d'étude de l'homme physique montre comment il est rare. Pour le produire, il faut un éréthisme . . . voilà nos nerfs. L'état d'extase les met dans un état qui ne peut durer sans produire d'horribles douleurs" (Cor., I, 214). The body is physically exhausted. If Stendhal holds this state to be that of happiness, he should not expect to achieve it often, as this would only waste him. Frequently he expresses discontent that he is often emotionally exhausted; after a day of intense emotional involvement with Mélanie, he remarks how physically incapacitated he was in the evening: "Le soir, j'étais absolument épuisé, je n'ai rien pu faire" (J., p. 622).

For reasons of health, thus, it is better that he not respond affectively to memories so frequently. He reads in Pinel's Manie about the importance of maintaining physical well-being to ward off fits of melancholia, and he writes in paraphrase of the doctor: "Sobriété extrême pour donner plus d'essor à ses facultés morales: Pinel, 54" (J., p. 703). He gives more elaborate details, mentioning the necessity to avoid indigestion or stomach problems, from which Stendhal suffers, to keep in good psychic shape: "Le moindre dérangement d'estomac influe sur ma tête, m'y donne mal, ou m'empêche de voir nettement mes idées par un trouble d'un autre genre" (J., p. 730). Pinel hypothesizes that stomach ailments are frequently symptomatic of insanity, a warning signal.⁴

Being less exhausted, being in a less negative physical state, Stendhal will not so readily succumb to negative emotional reactions to reality, one of the causes of melancholia, a type of madness: "C'est en m'étudiant que j'ai vu la manie de la mélancolie me posséder à Paris . . ." (Cor., I, 220). In one passage he aligns his prior state of being frequently emotionally ecstatic with a state of madness he was approaching: "J'aimais A [dèle] of the gate et je prétendais m'en faire aimer. Je me bourrais de café; je ne comptais pour heureux que les instants d'éréthisme moral. Cela tendait, ce me semble, à me faire devenir fou." (J., p. 622).

His frequent condition of nervous exhaustion which accompanied his reveries about Adèle, his imaginary encounters with her, caused him to be less resistant to the ennui he experienced in comparing his imaginative world with the real world. In reality their relationship was merely one of polite meetings; his love for her was built on fantasies. The melancholy this caused combined with the moral erethism he describes threatened to bring on delirium. If he responds to his memories less, he will be in better physiological shape, which will act to control any inclination to go insane.

Creativity and the State of Sensation

Perception of memory is the only way of controlling the possible emotional effects of reminiscing about experience. As an artist, who must rely on his own experience of passion to produce similar states in an audience, this fact is particularly important.

Stendhal comes to see--it flows as a natural consequence of the definition of a passive attitude towards experience--that in the state of sensation, where one is identified with feeling, it is frequently impossible to remember what this state is. Remembering means perceiving, seeing an object, even oneself, as being different from oneself, the subject. We can remember only when we are conscious of ourselves as being other than the object that is

making an impression on us; consequently, when in the state of feeling, the state opposite to that of perception, we have no memory of it. Stendhal makes frequent allusions to this fact: "J'ai peu de souvenirs, parce que je ne me voyais pas parler; j'étais naturel et trop occupé de l'effet de ce que je disais pour cela" (J., p. 648). Because his attention was undivided, he was not conscious of his activity. Therefore, when memories bring on a strong state of sensation, this state is not grasped, known, which is an idea that will remain with Stendhal. It always serves to explain why he cannot provide memories about intense moments of happiness; he writes in 1806, in the Vie de Henri Brulard: "Il ne me reste pas le moindre souvenir de mon départ pour Dijon et l'armée de réserve, l'excès de la joie a tout absorbé" (H. B., p. 370); his emotional state prevented perception. Maine de Biran writes: "Il n'y a donc point d'idées correspondantes aux sensations pures, mais seulement aux perceptions." ⁵ A state of pure feeling does not allow for memories, upon which ideas are based.

If the artist needs to relive his emotions, it is not because being in this state, where little conscious activity is possible, will reveal better how to bring an audience to the same affective pitch; rather, it appears that the function of inducing emotion during the creative process is to enable the artist to try to perceive which memories and aspects of memories act to make him feel: "Il est

bon d'avoir de ces états de maximums de passion, car sans ça il ne serait pas possible de les peindre . . ." (J., p. 586). The intensity of experience is useful, for through this the writer chooses details bound to please the audience; once being moved, the artist can draw conclusions as to which aspects touched him.

Stendhal's earlier concern to remember the physiognomy of situations finds itself amply justified, for it is by being able to determine what causes him to feel that an artist can hope to move others. By perceiving his memories of phenomena, he can control emotional states; by the manipulation of these details he can bring about pleasurable states of emotion.

Stendhal must seek to perceive which memories function as signs of feeling, that which when experienced acts to signal emotional response. In one instance he chides himself for dwelling too abstractly on the significance of a particular display of behavior. He remarks that it would have been better to perceive what had brought it about, what were the signs that had provoked a specific human response: "Tout ce que j'ai écrit dans ces deux pages sent trop le génie. Elles auraient été charmantes si j'avais décrit tout bonnement les charmantes circonstances qui m'ont fait tirer ces conséquences" (J., p. 653).

Biran speaks of the human tendency to form signs, our natural proclivity to endow phenomena with the power to signal

automatic response. A phenomenon triggers imagination, which produces an image or series of images that it has associated with the phenomenon, and which it recalls upon encountering it again: "Le nom de l'objet, quelque circonstance associée de lieu et de temps, tout dans ce cas peut servir de signe à l'imagination, la remettre sur la voie de ses anciennes habitudes, et déterminer le jugement de réminiscence."⁶ Biran supports his claim that imagination remembers what it had associated previously with a phenomenon by a passage from Grétry's Essai sur la musique which gives a physiological reason for why memory persists: " 'Les fibres du cerveau conservent longtemps les impressions que le sentiment a produites, et quoiqu'elles semblent éteintes, soyons sans inquiétude; dès qu'un sujet analogue les rappellera, vous serez sûr alors qu'elles ne se représenteront que pour se placer mieux que la première fois. . . . ' "⁷ The impression is engraved in the mind; if a part of the impression is experienced again, what it is associated with will be recalled. It is the audience's emotional response to associations--what the imagination recalls--signaled by the work of art that the artist seeks to provoke. He manipulates its response by selecting appropriate signs.

As we know, on the personal level Stendhal is concerned about appropriate signs. One of the reasons for his concern about remembering experience is that he wants to move Mélanie in his

favor; he wishes to see which attitudes, situations, etc. from his experience function to signal emotional states in her; for example, in reviewing his behavior to determine what produces the maximum state of tenderness for him in Mélanie, he discovers that in acting conceited, he moves her the most: "J'étais amant tendre et soumis avant-hier; hier, j'entrepris le bon effet que ferait la fatuité; aujourd'hui, j'ai été fat comme il faut l'être . . . et jamais je n'ai été si aimable aux yeux de Mélanie" (J., p. 652). This discovery causes him chagrin; he would prefer not to be hypocritical; nevertheless, he sees confirmed the principle that emotional states can be controlled by knowing what acts to produce them.

Language and the State of Sensation

In Chapter I we showed Stendhal cognizant of the fact that the use of discursive language cannot produce the feelings that he had felt and tried to evoke again through writing. In seeking to bring about a reexperience of feeling, he wrongly undertook to analyze them: "Je trouve que j'affaiblis, donne un air grave et sévère à mes sentiments en les écrivant . . . c'est que je les explique en les peignant" (J., p. 652). Rather, he must use a language that will suggest to the audience appropriate remembered images that move. He has now a clearer understanding of this necessity. Only

perception can be accurately communicated by discursive language; perception is seeing relationships. A state of feeling cannot be broken up into parts, which one can then compare and analyze, if one wants to communicate the state of sensation. Stendhal describes feeling as a point; feeling is undivided, whole: "Je ne peux pas les écrire[his feelings] en un point, comme je les sens" (J., p. 652). The state of sensation is single, and within it we do not see relationships. Expository writing presents something in fragments, as a broken line, each part viewed at different moments.

In writing about states of sensation, he can give only his perceptions, the relationships between himself and the situation, the different phases of existence. He sees this type of description merely as a blueprint, an outline which enables one to see the relationships of the whole--the only thing that is knowable about sensation, i. e. how its external manifestation, gestures, attitudes appear to correspond with the different objects causing sensations: "Voilà le squelette sans vie de l'heure la plus charmante, le plan des îles Borromées et du rivage du lac Majeur, exactement cela. C'est cela, et rien n'est plus loin de ce que ces îles ont été pour notre âme charmée. Le plan nous montre tout ce que nous n'avons pas vu . . ." (J., p. 656).

He was justified, therefore, in his criticism of Racine and Voltaire, who, in creating their plays, gave characters a language

that reasoned on feeling rather than providing them with language that would act to signal feeling; words that would tap appropriate images in the audience's imagination in order to bring about an emotional reaction. To move an audience a poet should seek the language of passion, i. e. determine how a man in the throes of feeling talks; "Etudier le langage des passions" (J. L., I, 127), he wrote in 1803. This will communicate the state of sensation; it is the language associated with the condition of pure sensation.

Stendhal knows only too well from personal experience that when feeling strongly, when identified closely with the sensations electrifying him, he is rendered practically speechless; if he speaks, his language is mechanical, incomplete, repetitive: "J'ai cependant toujours de ces moments où ma bouche seule parle, mon coeur étant occupé à sentir, alors elle rabâche toujours la même idée" (J., p. 603). His own experience confirms the Ideological theory that effort cannot be made--the desire to express oneself--while one is beyond consciousness, taken up with a single concern, which is feeling: "Le moment où je suis le plus ému moi-même n'est pas celui où je puis écrire les choses qui toucheront le plus les spectateurs" (J., p. 586). When at the maximum of feeling, he cannot judge what will communicate this feeling: he has not the power of judgment.

The Will to Be Perceptive

Innatism and Habit

As a man and as an artist Stendhal needs to cultivate perception of his memories. He suggests that in recording his memories, the effort of writing, the physical act of moving a pen on paper, in further occupying his attention, in further engaging his will, discourages the inclination to submit to the impressions of memories on him. He alludes to this in a passage where he expresses difficulty writing because this effort goes against his feeling:

"Certainement ce moment-là n'était pas bon pour écrire. Souvent, je ne puis pas écrire à force de chaleur, depuis un quart d'heure je me fais effort pour écrire, je sens si fortement qu'écrire (l'action physique) est une rude peine pour moi . . ." (J., p. 586). The physical act, requiring will, in acting against the desire to exist passively, encourages the state of perception.

Most of life is spent in fluctuation between the two extremes of perception and sensation. Stendhal notes an imperfect balance in himself: "Quand je serai davantage perception et moins sensation . . ." (J., p. 599). When more in the state of sensation, he has no desire to perceive his memories and thus to write: "Il faut que j'écrive tout auparavant, parce que, dès que je serai heureux, je n'écrirai plus un mot" (J., p. 647). When happy,

he is unconscious of any desire, thus of a will to write, for he is mostly given up to feeling. When in states of sensation, he loses opportunities to record observations. He is concerned also by the fact that emotional exhaustion coming from "éréthisme moral" leaves him with insufficient energy to write: "Mon âme était épuisée à force de sentir; d'ailleurs, j'aurais eu huit pages à faire, je n'écrivis rien" (*J.*, p. 606).

Since Stendhal must depend on his memory for knowledge, he is frequently distressed at his marked inability to maintain a perceptive attitude towards his memories: "Si pendant ce temps, je veux penser aux douces impressions de l'Italie, à l'instant éblouissement prochain mal à la tête" (*J.*, pp. 561-62). He falls into ecstasy too easily at the recall of certain memories.

The will to be perceptive towards experience is not immediately translatable into art. Conditions work against this will. From the above observations Stendhal makes about himself, he shows that it is his state of feeling that interferes with any desire to perceive, and this realization is connected to important discoveries about what determines human behavior, which develops his fundamental sensualist view of man.

Stendhal becomes aware that he is more sensation than perception: "J'ai toujours plus senti que perçu. . . ." (*J.*, p. 632). Rather than perceiving prior experience he tends to react to the

impressions it causes. In general he succumbs to feeling rather than to observing: "C'est ma sensibilité qui me fait souffrir, ou être timide, au lieu d'observer" (J., p. 737). Until this time he considered his tender nature, which lends itself to responding so easily to sensation, to have been the product of his education. In line with Helvétius, he held primarily to the theory that his education by literature trained him to submit easily to feeling and to desire this. Now we begin to hear Stendhal entertain notions of innatism and instinct. In his readings of Tracy, Biran, and Pinel, who acknowledge enthusiastically Cabanis' work in establishing connections between biological formation and moral comportment, he discovers the idea that what a man conceives happiness to be may be in part determined by instinct:

Je vois dans Cabanis que nous agissons souvent pour satisfaire à des besions qui viennent d'après des idées qui viennent de l'intérieur du corps au cerveau: La réunion des désirs qui nous viennent de cette manière se nomme instinct . . .

Donc, dans le cas de l'instinct comme dans tous les autres, l'individu suit encore ce qui lui semble le mener à son plus grand bonheur. (J., pp. 574-75)

Therefore, his proclivity to find happiness in the experience of feeling may have been developed not only through education but may also have been a result of his physical organization.

Since the divulgation of Cabanis' ideas, few thinkers of the period of a sensualist or materialist bent challenged the idea that physical organization affected moral behavior. Stendhal echoes this thinking in observations like the following: "Avec des sens et des facultés intérieures si mobiles et si sensibles, il est très possible que je devienne fou" (J., p. 562); he suggests that the flexibility of his organization in allowing sensation to excite him inordinately threatens his ability to judge, to keep in touch with reality. Such a sensitive organization makes effort difficult, which involves muscular contraction and directed movement. For Stendhal it is easier to experience passively the impression caused by an object.

He writes to Pauline that they both are the products of education and of instinctive or temperamental tendencies: "J'étais comme toi, ma bonne amie, les circonstances et le tempérament nous ont donné à peu près la même âme" (Cor., I, 261). It is not only his education by the sublime that has conditioned him to seek strong emotion: this capacity for delight in emotional ecstasy, which exhausts him so, has also a physiological basis. He is biologically inclined to feel rather than to perceive, which his education has reinforced.

And if Stendhal finds himself to be more sensation than perception, inclined to "éréthisme moral," and thus to exhaustion, we know that it is because he has an active imagination, whose image-memories and creations cause him intense feeling: "Toutes

tes pensées sont à te monter à l'éréthisme de la passion, tout ton corps en raidit" (J., p. 571). His active imagination incorporates him in the group of people who run a higher risk of insanity than others. Stendhal finds in Manie passages like the following: "It has been already observed, that people of great warmth of imagination, acuteness of sensibility and violence of passions, are the most pre-⁸ disposed to insanity." Thus, if Stendhal learns that he owes the greater pleasure he finds in memory rather than in reality to a naturally, innately active imagination that changes his memories and causes him to feel more strongly, he also learns that this natural hyper-functioning puts him in the position of going mad. We have already pointed to his concern that physical and nervous exhaustion may line him up for a mental breakdown; Stendhal also sees that the melancholy and ennui he feels, because reality does not measure up to the world of his reveries and of his constantly revisited memories of his readings, can become acute melancholy or insanity. Pinel gives specific characteristics of the madness of melancholia, many of which suit Stendhal's description of himself: "Delirium exclusively upon one subject: no propensity to acts of violence, independent of⁹ such as may be impressed by a predominant and chimerical idea." Stendhal, appearing to have this description in mind, refers, in the Journal, to a period of intense passion when he was completely given

to fantasizing about worldly success and where he contemplated acts of violence in function of his seemingly frustrated dreams to succeed, which causes melancholy:

Je n'étais plus attentif, j'étais à me figurer le bonheur que j'éprouverais si j'étais aud[iteur] au C[onseil] d'E[tat] ou tout autre chose . . .
 Je me sentais capable des plus grands crimes et des plus grandes infamies . . . Ma passion me dévorait, elle me fouettait en avant . . . j'aurais eu plaisir à battre M[élanie].
 (J., p. 735)

Pinel mentioned other signs of melancholic insanity which suit only too well the tendencies that Stendhal finds in himself: "Habitual depression and anxiety, and frequently moroseness of character amounting even to the most decided misanthropy and sometimes to an insatiable disgust with life. . . ." ¹⁰ Stendhal has spoken frequently about the misanthropy he felt towards real men. because he found in his memories types of men--the heroes of fiction--who taught him how to feel and to love, which caused antipathetic reactions to real men.

Stendhal not only learns about the responsibility of biological organization for his proclivity to yield to sensations caused by memories but also about the role of habit; this "effet que produit sur chacune de ces opérations sa fréquente répétition," writes Tracy with respect specifically to the habits of the operations of

the mind; but in general, "on appelle habitude la disposition, la manière d'être permanente qui naît de cette fréquente répétition: c'est là le vrai sens du mot habitude."¹¹ Thanks to his readings in the Idéologues, Stendhal understands that a habit is an action performed unconsciously. No perception of this behavior is required, no will or desire need be felt for the action to be accomplished; it is done so as though it were part of our nature, as though it were a second nature. Stendhal sees such automatic response as the natural endpoint of all behavior that is repeated; for example, in an explanation, written to Pauline, of how we learn to reason well, he indicates that the result of having resolved a problem is to make that resolution automatic to us, accepted thereafter imperceptibly as a natural, unquestioned, phenomenon:

Mais comment apprendre à bien raisonner? Comme nous apprenons à bien marcher, en nous regardant faire, je m'aperçois, que tous les cinq ou six pas, mon talon droit heurte, en passant en avant, ma cheville gauche interne . . . Cette partie est très sensible; cet accident me fait vivement souffrir; je porte mon attention sur mon pied droit; en deux jours de marche, l'habitude de ne plus me couper est prise, je n'ai plus besoin de penser à mon pied droit, et je ne souffre plus. (Cor., I, 171)

His manner of walking, undertaken at first consciously as the resolution of the problem, becomes imperceptible; it is an automatic response no longer willed and is performed effortlessly.

Tracy and Biran account for much of man's behavior by habit. It is they who provided Stendhal with the understanding that habitual acts are unperceived, unwilled behavior. Tracy writes: "Plus un mouvement est facile et rapide, moins il est senti, ensorte que souvent il finit par ne plus donner lieu à aucune sensation, par être tout-à-fait inaperçu. . . ." ¹² Biran's work the Influence de l'habitude is, of course, dedicated to an explanation of habit: its causes, its nature, and its effects. He corroborates Tracy's idea that the result of an action become habitual is to render us unconscious of the activity. Biran goes on to note that the effect of habit is to return us to the state of sensation, to that state of unconsciousness where we exist without even knowing it:

La réaction exercée du centre sur un sens externe mobile, devenant toujours plus prompte, plus facile (et par conséquent l'effort moins aperçu ou senti) à mesure que le jeu de cet organe se perfectionne, la perception peut devenir plus distincte et plus précise d'un côté pendant que de l'autre l'individu s'aveugle plus complètement sur la part active qu'il y prend, sur les opérations et les jugements qui concourent à lui donner sa forme et son caractère . . . enfin la fonction composée de percevoir tend toujours à se rapprocher, par la promptitude, l'aisance et la passivité apparente, de la sensation proprement dite. ¹³

From the state of being fully aware of what activity one was performing, one passes through habit to the state where one performs the same activity as though instinctively, without

cognizance of it happening: no effort is required, no desire felt.

Stendhal considers habit as part of the explanation of why he tends to be more feeling than judging. In the following quotation, it is habit that is responsible for the effect that "sans cesse la sensation l'emporte sur la perception," which Stendhal states, "m'empêche de suivre le moindre projet" (J., p. 613). His unquestioned, unperceived proclivity to respond emotionally to what he encounters rather than to observe and to remain conscious of the difference between himself and a phenomenon is partially explained by habit. After having repeatedly succumbed to sensation, this behavior became automatic. In the following passage, he explains that it is this habit of lapsing into feeling, into the state of sensation, that does not allow him to make an effort, to carry through willed behavior: "En approchant de chez D [ugazon] je me sentais oublier tout ce que, hier et ce matin, je sentais que j'avais à dire à Louason [Mélanie], tant est grande la force de l'habitude en bien et en mal" (J., p. 587).

Stendhal's present understanding of habit, principally his realization of the effect of habit to render one unconscious to previously willed activity, is an improved understanding of the determining effects of education. Habits are acquired behavior, resulting from our interaction with phenomena. Condillac and Helvétius speak of habit, and Stendhal in his pre-Ideological days

frequently resorted to habit to explain why acquired ideas and feelings seemed natural; for example, in the Filosofia nova, he shows that a person's personality, which appears to be god-given, so much it is natural, spontaneously expressed, is really the result of habits:

"Certaines sensations mettent l'âme dans un certain état qui devient habituel. J'appelle cela état de l'âme" (F.N., p. 444). Our normal way of being, how we naturally feel and respond, or our "état de l'âme," is a result of habit.

Before the Idéologues Stendhal knew, thus, that habitual response was unquestioned, unfelt, automatic response. The Idéologues stressed, however, that loss of perception, loss of the ability to know how and why one was acting, was a loss of control; once an activity becomes habitual, our will can affect it no longer, for it is lost to consciousness. In a passage in the Journal, Stendhal describes how successful he was because he was conscious rather than purely feeling, and he expresses gratitude to the Idéologues for this revelation of the power that comes from consciousness.

Il est très difficile de peindre ce qui a été
naturel en vous, de mémoire . . . M'exercer
à me rappeler mes sentiments naturels, voilà
l'étude qui peut me donner le talent de
Shakespeare.

Voilà où l'étude de l'Idéologie (Tracy et Biran)
m'est utile. (J., p. 643)

Maine de Biran begins the Influence de l'habitude with the famous sentence of Mirabeau that emphasizes the effect of habit to render us powerless: "Nul ne réfléchit l'habitude," which Stendhal rephrases thus: "Nous réfléchissons le moins sur ce qui nous est le plus habituel" (J. L., II, 187). Both teacher and student realize that habit in making us unaware of how we behave prevents us from improving upon our behavior; we can no longer perceive. Although they simplify our lives, releasing us from the burden of having to make a same effort repeatedly, habits decrease our ability to control our behavior, to direct it more effectively. In having the habits of passivity, which weaken his will--he identifies with what he feels, losing perception of himself and his goals--Stendhal cannot hope to know himself and others, to submit experience to judgment.

To be a happy man, to be a successful writer Stendhal must change his habits and develop new ones: "Faire une description des moeurs de Marseille; sans doute elle sera loin de la perfection, et même de ce que je pourrai faire dans dix ans, lorsque j'aurai acquis l'habitude de voir les bornes des vérités ou, ce qui en est le moyen, de ne pas me laisser entraîner par mon imagination" (J., p. 741). In order to perceive his memories rather than feel he must form other habits; particularly since his biological organization already inclines him towards sensation rather than perception. He

must willfully cultivate habits that will work against these innate tendencies and towards producing in him a more automatic perceptive response. He writes to Pauline that she must study unfortunate men to know those habits that keep them in misery in order to avoid acquiring them herself: "Vois comment ils [les sots] sont parvenus avec beaucoup de peine à se rendre aussi sots, ce en quoi les circonstances ont contribué à ce noble dessein, ce qu'ils ont fait eux-mêmes. Cherche le chemin que tu aurais dû tenir, si tu avais été à leur place, pour éviter les habitudes de la tête et du coeur (ou le caractère) qu'ils se sont données" (Cor., I, 193). She must, rather, form efficient habits, that will put her in good stead to avoid unhappiness: "Il faut ensuite acquérir les habitudes propres à diminuer autant que possible les inconvénients qui paraissent inévitables" (Cor., I, 193). Stendhal recommends especially that she acquire the habit of good reasoning: "Tu vois donc qu'il importe de bien raisonner: tout le monde sent cette vérité qui est triviale, mais beaucoup d'entre eux croient raisonner parfaitement et se trompent" (Cor., I, 171). She must learn to judge well, because, as we know for Stendhal, happiness in society depends upon this. And as we have seen Stendhal point out earlier, reasoning well can become a habit like walking well: "Mais comment apprendre à bien raisonner? Comme nous apprenous à bien marcher. . . ."

In another reference to Pinel, he mentions to Pauline that the very esteemed doctor recommends forming new habits to counteract the bad ones that lead to insanity: "Ce sont de nouvelles habitudes à former, et c'est la chose la plus difficile, c'est cependant la plus nécessaire. Lis la Manie de Pinel, et tu sentiras la vérité de ce passage" (Cor., I, 278).

Memory and Knowledge

The Idéologues through their teachings on human psychology put Stendhal in the position of knowing how to go about taking control of his destiny; he knows now that in being more perceptive, his power to act upon circumstances will be increased. He recognizes his debt to Ideology for this knowledge: "Voilà la grande utilité pour moi de l'idéologie, elle m'explique à moi-même, et me montre ainsi ce qu'il faut fortifier, ce qu'il faut détruire dans moi-même" (J., p. 551).

We mentioned in the beginning of this chapter that the Idéologues in no way refute the sensualist principle that reasoning relies on memory; judgments require memories. Stendhal reiterates Tracy's affirmation after again recommending to Pauline Idéologie and Logique:

Lis-tu l'Idéologie . . . Tu peux . . . lire tout de suite la Logique . . .

Tu y verras comme quoi nos jugements ne sont que l'énoncé d'une circonstance remarquée dans un souvenir. (Cor., I, 284)

Stendhal finds affirmed in Ideology the necessity to provoke experience, to build a large basis for arriving at ideas: "C'est donc un immense avantage d'avoir une bonne mémoire. J'en ai, je crois, une très bonne . . . Cultiver la mienne, non point en apprenant par coeur, mais en me rappelant pour exercice des faits avec toutes leurs circonstances" (J., p. 727). He observes that a lack of experience is responsible for his not being able to judge the artistic works of others: "Autant que j'en puis juger avec mon peu d'expérience et les défauts que je vais reprocher à Restif, il me semble d'être entraîné par la sensibilité et manquer de ce jugement froid, de cette force de perception que donne l'usage du monde" (J., p. 764). He does not have enough memories, remembered perceptions, which will enable him to judge better how Restif de la Bretonne erred in his portrayal of characters.

Tracy does more than to reinforce the ideas of the sensualist school. With thinkers like Condillac and Helvétius, one has the impression that people, as they conceive of them, play a very small role in what they remember. What is stored in memory is

subject to the dictates of time and space and the tastes of a person: we remember only what attracts our attention. The Idéologues have a more dynamic view of man. Man has a will, can be effortful and can constrain himself to increase his memory. Delacroix writes about Destutt de Tracy: "Son idée prédominante est l'influence de la volonté sur la faculté de penser. . . ."¹⁴ Man can ever improve his store of knowledge because he can will to increase his thoughts and thus to take steps to improve his ideas. Delacroix quotes Tracy's definition of man: "'Être voulant et être résistant, c'est être réellement, c'est être."¹⁵ For Tracy, a person is a being who wills. He taught Stendhal that he could will more knowledge principally by maintaining a constantly perceptive attitude.

Stendhal becomes aware of the fact that the quantity of remembered experience depends upon how much of it we perceive. Just as we must perceive memories in order to be able to judge, so must we perceive experience in order to remember. We have already referred to Stendhal's new realization of the necessity to be conscious in order to remember in our discussion of why the artist must perceive his memories. We saw there that the state of sensation leaves no memories; perceiving what causes the state of sensation is the only way to control it. Thus, if Stendhal's experience causes him to lapse into the state of sensation, the time spent being identified with sensation will be lost to perception.

Stendhal remarks about himself: "J'ai été très naturel hier dimanche pendant quatre heures que j'ai passées avec elle; je n'ai pas encore fait la perception; de manière que je ne sais pas encore ce que je lui ai paru" (J., p. 643). As a passive, tender man, both by constitution and habit, he observes that in acting naturally, i. e. in being more feeling than analytical, he was prevented from remembering what was happening. Stendhal even laments his habit of revery, of concentrating on past experiences, which prevents him from having experience, forming perceptive relationships with phenomena: "Une âme non sensible . . . n'a que les choses extérieures à regarder, l'âme sensible, même lorsqu'elle n'est pas distraite par ses sentiments actuels, regarde ses sentiments passés. Voilà ce qui empêche de voir et de connaître les choses extérieures" (J., p. 593).

It is because of his nature that thrives on the sensations of feeling, of being moved strongly, that he has little experience, i. e. little memory. Biran notes that memory of something depends upon active engagement of a conscious self: "Les mouvements volontaires qui ont formé les impressions actives, ou concouru essentiellement à les rendre distinctes, sont encore les moyens ou les sujets
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uniques du rappel. . . ." Only as objects of some kind of effort on a person's part can phenomena be recalled. Stendhal paints

himself mostly as someone prone to making little effort, but he notes how clear his memories are when he consciously acts out behavior:

"On peint mieux le factice, le joué, parce que l'effort qu'il a fallu faire pour jouer l'a gravé dans la mémoire . . . On se voit aller en jouant, on a la perception. Cette sensation est facilement reproduite par l'organe de la mémoire . . ." (J., p. 643).

Making an effort, when he is in full consciousness of himself and of his will, will insure the recording of experience in memory.

To improve upon one's ideas, to make conceptions of phenomena more complete, Tracy points out as well the necessity of maintaining a continual perceptive attitude towards past experience. Constant scrutiny of what we know, reviewing the foundation, i. e. the memories, of our ideas will cause us to become conscious of previously unseen facets. This is the famous contribution of Tracy to Stendhal's thinking, that theory of reasoning the method of which Stendhal compares to "les tuyaux en lunettes" (Cor., I, 579). It is the process whereby truths, what is known, can reveal, if the effort is made, new truths. All knowledge is essentially ascertaining the attributes of a subject and their relationships:

Raisonner n'est point une opération différente de celle de juger, remarquer de nouveaux détails dans les choses.

Un raisonnement est une suite de jugements. Ces raisonnements s'enchaînent de manière que l'attribut du premier devient le sujet du deuxième. (Cor., I, 249)

This notion is essentially Cartesian; one breaks down truths into components, trying to perceive about a known quantity hitherto unforeseen aspects. In the paraphrase of Tracy recently quoted Stendhal demonstrated this view of reasoning; he wrote to Pauline: "Nos jugements ne sont que l'énoncé d'une circonstance remarquée dans un souvenir." Reasoning is the perception of relationships between a known, a truth, and what was previously unknown until the new relationship was established.

As we know, Stendhal was very aware of the incompleteness of a person's ideas, which causes one uncertainty. Tracy shows him that this uncertainty can be reduced if one scrutinizes accepted ideas constantly. This will provoke the recognition of previously undetected aspects of phenomena. By being resistant to his perceptions, by constantly reviewing their content, Stendhal will eke out new ideas: "Les obstacles que nous rencontrons nous font faire de nouveaux jugements" (J. L., II, 187).

In the Correspondance Stendhal cites an instance of where he perceived new details:

Ce soir, me promenant sous les galeries de bois du Palais-Royal, j'ai remarqué qu'une partie était en pierre. Mante a été étonné; je n'avais pas vu ça, m'y promenant depuis trois ans une fois tous les deux jours au moins. J'aurais bien juré que le tout était couvert en bois; il ne faut pas jurer de ce qu'on n'a examiné; cela m'aurait fait perdre un beau pari. (Cor., I, 176)

For want of having sounded his memories, of constantly judging his experience, he remained in ignorance of attributes of the Palais-Royal, which he had been convinced he knew well.

Stendhal writes, echoing Tracy: "Toutes nos erreurs viennent donc de l'inexactitude de nos souvenirs" (Cor., I, 248). The incident of the Palais-Royal demonstrates this Tracyan contribution to Stendhal's thinking of how men err: men assume that what they perceive is all that exists about an object, unaware that they are ignorant of all aspects, as Stendhal wrongly assumed he knew all there was to know about the Palais-Royal.

If a mistake is made one must go back to the memories which formed the reasoning and attempt to find out what about those memories is inaccurate. This is not a new idea. Hobbes had already underlined the necessity to turn to memories for evidence of truth; however, Tracy shows the obstacle people face in this attempt. The difficulty lies in the fact that we do not feel consciously that our memory is inexact; if we did we would correct it. Stendhal quotes from Logique to this effect:

"Mais puisque nos perceptions . . . ne consistent que dans le sentiment que nous en avons (car quand nous ne les sentons pas, elles n'existent pas), il est manifeste qu'elles sont toujours et nécessairement telles que nous les sentons, par cela seul que nous les sentons, et que nous ne pouvons jamais nous tromper sur la perception que nous avons actuellement, et comme nos perceptions sont tout pour nous, il semblerait qu'étant toujours

parfaitement sûrs de toutes, les uns après les autres, nous sommes complètement inaccessibles à l'erreur. Cependant ce deuxième point est malheureusement loin d'être vrai." (Cor., I, 250)

When an error is made, we must assume that our memories are inaccurate, despite our not feeling it to be so, and test them, verify our notions against the real phenomenon. After putting to the test several memories, Stendhal states that he discovered many new ideas; he saw that his memories were inexact: "Quoique très occupé de ces sublimes découvertes, j'ai déjà cherché à vérifier quelques souvenirs, et il m'est venu, surtout sur les caractères ridicules, une foule d'idées neuves" (Cor., I, 246).

Another difficulty with respect to correcting false ideas is the effect of habit. Frequently, we unconsciously judge objects with which we are familiar, comparing them effortlessly to memories which we no longer know, because they are automatically recalled. It is impossible to know why we err unless we become conscious again of the series of judgments and the memories on which they are based that led to defective behavior. Stendhal's previously quoted paraphrase of Biran: "Nous réfléchissons le moins sur ce qui nous est le plus habituel," is also a comment on the difficulty people experience, because of habit, in becoming perceptive of their judgments. In order for one to realize how many ideas are founded on what is tantamount to idées reçues--so much of daily behavior

is a function of automatic, unperceived judgments--, one must frequently rely on obstacles, encumbrances that force consciousness and bring unperceived judgments into question; an idea which precipitates the following observation: "Les obstacles font naître la réflexion . . ." (J. L., II, 187).

We find Stendhal's faith in the role of language as a tool of reason reaffirmed in this Ideological stage. Jean-Pierre Richard maintains in "Connaissance et tendresse chez Stendhal" that for Stendhal language is the means of immobilizing perceptions: "Il importait cependant de maîtriser tous ces bondissements: dans un monde de réalités débordantes ou volubiles l'analyse vise à rétablir un ordre, une immobilité. Et c'est pourquoi elle a pour premier instrument le langage. Stendhal, à la suite des idéologues, fait donc confiance aux mots: il voit en eux des garde-fous, des moyens de
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fixer et de déterminer l'informe." Stendhal sees the importance of perceiving constantly, of forcing the manifest to reveal its facets so he can determine its relationships, understand it, and thus control it. Richard points out that it is Stendhal's disinclination to be boundless, out of control, that prompts him to grasp the meaning, the sense of what affects him. We interpret this disinclination as a counteractive response to his proclivity to lapse into the state of sensation, the condition of being subject to, not in control of, forces.

He must seek to overcome this tendency to be unconscious of boundaries if he hopes to act effectively in the world, a behavior requiring ideas or seeing relationships, i. e. establishing boundaries.

Melancholy

On the whole we have seen Stendhal downplay his capacity to experience emotional ecstasy. We have shown, however, his understanding of how to intensify states of sensations: one must provoke a more complete loss of self-consciousness and passivity. The protected world of memory, which is beyond the range of being intruded upon by obstacles that may mar our happiness in reality by distracting us from feeling, is a privileged source of all-encompassing and therefore pleasurable emotions; everything is happening internally and one is in an ideal situation to remain in the state of sensation. Stendhal speaks with delight of the happiness-giving experience of revery, the pleasure of which is often due to the fact that he is alone, solitary, and thus out of the range of anything that could possibly interrupt his oneness with feeling: "J'ai passé mon temps depuis deux heures éloigné de M[élanie] et de M[ante] qui sont à la compagne, j'ai passé mon temps dans la solitude . . . J'ai eu le temps de jouir de mes sentiments. Je me promenais,

plein du génie d'artiste, sur le cours d'Aix . . ." (J., p. 707).

In De l'Amour he will write concerning solitude: "On peut tout acquérir dans la solitude, hormis du caractère" (Amour, p. 238), supporting the idea that happiness, which does not require activity for Stendhal, is accessible in the inner world.

But, it is precisely against this intensity of emotion that seeking happiness in memory affords that we have seen Stendhal rail: "éréthisme moral" exhausts the body, encouraging the despondency, known only too well by temperaments like his, that leads to madness. Furthermore, the melancholy that results from entertaining the unreal, dwelling upon one's memories, and comparing one's reveries with reality is one of the chief inducements to madness.

Stendhal notes, before his departure for Germany, that the view of the Tuileries will tap memories of his ideals of glory conceived during his previous stay in Paris. This revery will bring on melancholy: "Je tomberais dans une mélancolie niaise à la vue des arbres des Tuileries, de ceux qui sont sous mes fenêtres, de la grande route d'ici à Clamart" (J., p. 825). This feeling, he notes, is dangerous, "augmente de beaucoup la sensibilité aux chagrins" (J., p. 825). Recurring experiences of melancholy, encouraged by too frequent communion with imagination, cause him to feel more and more disgusted with reality.

Stendhal expresses now more decidedly the will to reduce the amount of times he achieves his special happiness of intense emotion. He would do well to be satisfied with gaiety, the happiness he can find in society: "Voilà où nous devons tendre tous les deux; je ne sais si tu y trouveras ton bonheur; pour moi, après tant de passions, j'y trouverai la tranquillité riante et l'aimable gaieté de tous les jours me retirera de l'abîme des passions" (Cor., I, 198). Instead of his passion for virtue, which is fed by dwelling on memories of his formative readings, he should find happiness in feeling good will towards another, despite his limitations, and in being the recipient of it as well. He observes that he sought the gay atmosphere of a comedy to shake off memories that were causing melancholy: "Cette douce mélancolie m'empêche de travailler à Letellier. Je me sauve le soir dans l'esprit de Chamfort et l'Opéra-Comique . . . C'était plein de jeunesse gaie" (J., p. 691). He wants to avoid melancholy and to be satisfied, rather, with egotistic happiness: to use others to his own ends, instead of hoping to devote himself to them as ends of passion: "Mais souviens-toi de la règle de la somation du bonheur. Il ne faut demander à chaque chose que la quantité de bonheur qu'elle nous peut donner" (Cor., I, 241).

As we pointed out in the first chapter, Stendhal was aware that an analytic stance towards experience reduces the ability to respond emotionally. In the new vocabulary of the Idéologues,

by cultivating the habit of being perceptive, he can lessen the occurrence of states of euphoria. Taking an habitual perceptive stance towards those memories, the experience of which moves him and thus causes him to feel melancholy, will leave him unaffected. He observes from time to time that he has reached a plateau where he is no longer prey to ecstatic states: "Les transports sont morts pour moi, excepté des transports de demi-heure pour les femmes" (J., p. 807).

If Stendhal insists, however, that he must give up seeking his idea of happiness because of its deliterious effects, he treasures at the same time the experience of happiness that is possible for the âmes élevées through sympathy in the experience of art, which is the emotional experience similar to that he experiences in revery. Stendhal values his capacity to be moved by the characters of fiction with whom he can sympathize; through them he enters into privileged states of feeling:

Je viens de finir le Paysan pervers, je le commençai hier, il m'a fait pleurer deux fois. La première fois, de générosité, je crois, à ces mots: "On l'appelle l'ami du galérien," et, au testament de madame Parangon, d'attendrissement.

J'ai senti parfaitement le sentiment auguste qu'inspire un vieillard constamment malheureux, quoique criminel. . . . (J., pp. 763-64)

Because the ability to sympathize is dependent upon the character's recalling of the audience's experience, Stendhal sees that for souls like his identification can best come about when experiences of melancholy are recalled. It is because of the side-effects of melancholy that Stendhal must cease resorting to reverie to achieve emotional ecstasy; but it is precisely this feeling that he seeks in art: "Nous voyons que les amants malheureux des romans (Werther, Gustave de Linar, Claire d'Albe) nous ont touchés" (Cor., I, 288). He recounts enthusiastically the pleasure he had in sympathizing with Othello; he was reminded of his causes for melancholy and was able to experience with Shakespeare's hero a strong feeling of melancholy:

En en revenant, j'ai bien senti le plaisir de la mélancolie, je répétais avec enthousiasme, ravissement, cet autre passage d'Othello: "C'est là le destin des hommes généreux et des grands caractères que", etc.

J'avais une jouissance indicible en prononçant ce mot généreux. (J., p. 628)

In the Correspondance Stendhal writes that the melancholic scene in Jerusalem Delivered where Tancredi recognizes his beloved Clorinde, whom he has just killed, is the most beautiful subject of art: "Tous les grands peintres sensibles ont aussi commencé par la mélancolie; elle est inspirée par les têtes du divin Raphaël . . . Tancredi reconnaissant sa maîtresse qu'il vient de tuer! Pour

un génie sensible en peinture, c'est le plus beau sujet existant . . ."

(Cor., I, 191).

To allow the audience of âmes sympathiques to remember what causes them melancholy and thereby to relive through identification these feelings is to provide them with the pleasure of the feeling "je méritais mieux," that Stendhal finds otherwise harmful. He seems to suggest that feelings of self-pity which cause people to withdraw dangerously from reality but which are nonetheless avidly desired can be safely satiated in the experience of art.

He appears to think, moreover, that the experience of art, even if it does not incorporate the theme of melancholy, functions, nonetheless, to provoke this feeling in the audience capable of feeling melancholy: "L'homme le plus corrompu qui fait un ouvrage y peint la vertu, la sensibilité la plus parfaite, tout cela ne produit d'autre effet que la mélancolie des âmes sensibles, qui ont la bonté de se figurer le monde d'après ces images grossières."

(Cor., I, 229) The view of the sublime in art in reminding spectators of personal sublime images causes the feeling of melancholy associated with the sublime.

Stendhal alludes to Biran's theory of association in an entry in the Journal where he explains that falling in love passionately requires a prior period of preparation when an ideal is formed.

During this period we associate circumstances, details with the state of being in love, so that when, for example, a man finds the woman whom he feels corresponds to this ideal, she reminds him of those circumstances he has come to associate with being in love:

Je me figure tous les plaisirs que pourrait me donner tel caractère, je me figure cela pendant trois ans, je vois la figure qui me promet ce caractère . . .

Si j'ai changé de climat, que j'ai habité l'Italie dans ma jeunesse, que j'y ai goûté des sentiments délicieux qui ont contribué à former cette passion . . . dès que je l'ai vue, je lui transporte le charme du regret que je sens pour cette suave Italie. (J., p. 560)

Stendhal's notions about association in this passage, whereby the love object recalls Italy and his emotional reactions to Italy, seem to refer to Biran's idea that a seemingly unrelated phenomenon can recall another. A woman reminds him of Italy because imagination contains a large picture where various elements are involuntarily grouped together, so that "si donc l'un des accessoires vient ensuite à se reproduire isolément à la vue, il déterminera l'apparition imaginaire plus ou moins vive du tableau entier; de même si l'objet principal se reproduit seul ou entouré de nouveaux accessoires, il réveillera l'image des premiers, etc." ¹⁸ According to Biran, one part of what the imagination has grouped as a whole when perceived recalls the other associated parts. This explains how being in love

with a woman can recall Italy: in recalling the ideal woman of imagination the real woman also recalls what is associated in imagination with the ideal woman, namely Italy. We remember that nature is able to recall to Stendhal his memories of sublime love because he associates the purity of the former with his ideals.

In saying that the experience of art provokes melancholy, is Stendhal not applying a similar rule of association? Does not art which is sublime, the representation of characters and situations that are created to be the epitome of the traits they exhibit, quintessentially heroic, evil, tender, etc., serve to recall the individual experience of our modèles idéals, which are also sublime? Art and revery are associated through the experience of the sublime. Our reaction of melancholy caused by the experience of the one is elicited through association when experiencing the other.

The melancholy experienced by the âmes tendres can be usefully sublimated to serve as motivation for creativity. The melancholic experience of the contrast between the ideal and the real can make artists of such persons. It is good, therefore, to entertain ideals: "Garder la conception de ce beau idéal for thy works" (J., p. 698); melancholy can be functional. Stendhal affirms that this feeling is the motive power of creativity: "Une chose fait naître le grand génie, c'est la mélancolie" (Cor., I, 190). This is a notion we find proclaimed in the work of Mme de Staël, in De la littérature (which

Stendhal reread with greater pleasure in 1806), where the authoress writes:

Le dégoût de l'existence peut inspirer de grandes beautés de sentiment . . .

A l'époque où nous vivons, la mélancolie est la véritable inspiration du talent: qui ne se sent pas atteint par ce sentiment, ne peut prétendre à une grande gloire comme écrivain.¹⁹

According to Mme de Staël feeling disappointed with the state of things, a reaction that comes from being able to imagine a better state, was a motive power of creativity particular to the times. Stendhal, however, expresses an opinion that melancholy was always a reason for creating the sublime. An artist is someone who seeks to recreate reality because he has despairingly found it inferior to what he imagined it to be. He tries to recreate his ideal in art so that this can move as much as his privileged images moved him:

Une chose fait naître le grand génie, c'est la mélancolie. Une âme grande et qui conçoit les jouissances célestes se les figure dans la vie, et les attend ensuite lorsqu'elle voit qu'elles n'y sont pas . . . elle se croit malheureuse et se dit à elle-même: "Je méritais mieux!" . . . Alors, ces jouissances acquièrent un charme de plus par le regret de ne pas pouvoir les trouver; on se les détaille pour se consoler, et, par là, on devient capable de les peindre. (Cor., I, 190-91)

For Stendhal the creation of the sublime has to be the product of the artist's ability to be affected deeply by what his imagination depicts

reality to be, followed by the moving experience of melancholy, derivative from the realization that reality is not equal to one's imaginings.

In holding that melancholy is the motive force of creativity, Stendhal is insisting again that the artist must be able to feel; he must be able to respond emotionally to his ideas, to experience melancholy. Furthermore, he reaffirms in the above quotation that the artist must be able to respond emotionally to those images he hopes to create in order to be able to depict them well: "On se les détaille pour se consoler, et, par là, on devient capable de les peindre"; in being moved anew, the artist will be able to perceive what it is that moves, causes emotional reactions.

Inasmuch as he seeks to cultivate the habits of being perceptive, Stendhal runs the risk of rendering himself insensitive, of being moved with difficulty--a fear that is substantiated by personal experience: "Je ne retrouve plus que par instants rapides et rares comme l'éclair ces sentiments délicieux . . ."
(J., p. 780). Furthermore, in order to look forward to the experience of art as a part of the audience, to be able to experience melancholy, he must keep intact his privileged power to sympathize, his tender soul that is so responsive to the situation of other worthy souls, by means of which he can feel the melancholy experienced by the characters.

Thus, with respect to the experience of melancholy we encounter again the conflict, brought up in the first chapter, of the counteractive effects of cultivating analysis and emotional response, or perception and sensation. Stendhal, at this point, envisions, however, a resolution of this conflict. Ideally he will not have to eliminate either state of being, both of which are necessary for happiness. Despite his reservations about lapsing into strong states of feeling, he realizes that in the context of art, both as creator and as audience, this state is not dangerous; moreover, he realizes that the most effective communication with others depends upon our feeling what we are communicating. His goal should not be to banish states of sensation but rather to temper the degree of his abandonment to feeling.

Stendhal seeks a state of equilibrium where expression of feeling or of ideas, which requires analysis, perception, is supported by the experience of the feeling that is to be communicated. He takes a stance different from that expressed by Diderot in "Le Paradoxe sur le comédien," which claims that the effective artist does not feel what he is expressing because emotion prevents control, the power to select what is appropriate to move an audience: "L'acteur s'est longtemps écouté lui-même; c'est qu'il s'écoute au moment où il vous trouble, et que tout son talent consiste non pas à sentir, comme vous le supposez, mais à rendre si
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scrupuleusement les signes extérieurs du sentiment . . .";

Diderot also notes: "Moi, je lui veux beaucoup de jugement; il me faut dans cet homme un spectateur froid et tranquille; j'en exige, par conséquent, de la pénétration et nulle sensibilité, l'art de tout imiter, ou, ce qui revient au même, une égale aptitude à toutes sortes de caractères et de rôles."²¹

Stendhal read Diderot's writings on aesthetics in January of 1806, and he remarks in a note in the Journal that he was not particularly impressed by them:

Lire la Poétique de Diderot, et en général, ses oeuvres. Jacques me semble charmant. (20 décembre 1805)

Fait: poétique absolument médiocre. (10 janvier 1806). (J., p. 712)

For Stendhal manipulation of the feelings of others happens best when the person--actor, writer, lover--himself feels. When one is merely being hypocritical, when one expresses what is not felt, the performance is not expressive. Stendhal observes that he was not moved by Duchenois' (Joséphine Rafuin, a leading actress of the period) interpretation of Phèdre, and he credits this failure on her part to the fact that she did not feel what she was saying: "Je la trouve outrée, déclamante, et froide dans Phèdre, ayant l'air de jouer la comédie et non de sentir" (J., p. 810). Again, in another passage, he affirms that the ability to feel must characterize an actor:

Voilà le sentiment qui m'aurait donné un
organe enchanteur, si j'avais été comédien.
Ce son est dans moi, il faut apprendre à
l'entendre 1., 2., à le produire. (J., p. 810)

Effective manipulation requires first, for Stendhal, the ability to feel, "le sentiment," and thus to hear, "entendre," what one is trying to express in order to produce the feeling in the heart of the audience.

The frequent references to acting are explained by the fact that Stendhal since 1803 has been taking acting lessons. Many of his ideas on moving others are expressed in the context of an actor's role. For someone who has realized that it is necessary to make an effort, to give an intelligible form to what one feels, the role of the actor, whose function is that of a mediator--he makes intelligible a character's life so that it is grasped by a third party--, serves as the best symbol of the role all people find themselves forced to play when they want to reveal themselves to another; at least this is the role that most appropriately satisfies the condition of reality where spontaneous, immediate communication among people is rare.

To lose the ability to feel and to be moved deeply jeopardizes effective manipulation; rather, Stendhal should cultivate more manageable states of feeling, which allow him to make an effort, so that he is sufficiently perceptive to choose forms of communication:

Voilà sans doute la plus belle journée de ma vie. Je puis avoir de plus grands succès, jamais je ne déploierai plus de talents. La perception n'était que juste ce qu'il fallait pour guider la sensation; un peu plus, et je me laissais entraîner par la dernière. La perception me donnait assez de politique pour sentir s'il fallait dire un couplet, et, le premier mot lâché, je sentais ce que je disais; il est impossible de mieux jouer la passion, puisque je la sentais en effet. (J., p. 621)

Del Litto mentions that during this period Stendhal seems convinced that to be the leading dramatist of the nineteenth century, he must be a "poète-philosophe": "Convaincu sans doute dans son esprit, mais ne pouvant étouffer les appels de son âme sensible, ²² Beyle s'efforcera d'être à la fois poète et philosophe." He must attempt somehow to achieve a perceptive stance towards the memories that move him, whereby he will be able to externalize, to communicate his feelings.

It is as though, Prévost suggests, Stendhal realized early that his intellectual activity, his developing calculating mind, was to prepare him for the passionate moment of creation; that if constant analysis did not render him cold, then all the imposed self-restraint (controlling feeling) and the objectivity needed to discover the dynamic of stimulus-response would end in a moment of perfect expression of feeling. Prévost maintains that Stendhal early believed that effective artistic creation was improvised, flowed spontaneously but knew that he had to prepare himself,

refine himself as an instrument, so that sublime expression would come of itself on a manageable tide of relived emotions: "Il subit là le tourment de l'esprit qui veut exprimer ses intentions toutes pures; non seulement tous les écrivains mais tous les artistes épris de vérité ont dû le connaître . . . Tourment de l'instantané, pour qui toute technique délivre; par trente ans d'exercices elle accorde enfin d'improviser aussi bien que l'on composerait; elle se dépasse et se fait oublier dans la transparence du style."²³ At the moment of the composition of Le Rouge et le Noir Stendhal is able to trust that his remembered feelings will find instantaneously means of expression that will have been made ready, literally, by a life-time of perception of passion.

Fear of Knowledge

In the Ideological phase Stendhal is uncertain as to whether he can always achieve an equilibrium, a perceptive stance towards his memories and the preservation, at the same time, of the power to be receptive and emotional. There is, moreover, another fear, expressed from time to time, characteristic of inveterate dreamers. Stendhal seems to feel that knowing, having clear ideas about what can cause intense states of feeling may act to dispel the power of that object to move him; knowledge, particularly when transcribed in language, may decrease the capacity of certain memories to

induce states of sensation. We find recurring phrases like the following: "Je troublerais mon bonheur, en cherchant à le décrire" (J., p. 826); or, "Je n'écris plus les souvenirs charmants, je me suis aperçu que cela les gâtait" (J., p. 681). These are comments that on the one hand corroborate his thinking that states of happiness are impossible to describe; therefore, he should not attempt to do so. However, he fears as well that by perceiving what moved him he will thereby lose the ability to feel happiness again, that these memories when written down (that is described in language, which analyzes naturally) will no longer move him. In another passage he states specifically that a written rendition of what moved him will destroy its power to do so ever again:

Je cesse de décrire parce que j'ai observé que je gâtai mes souvenirs, cette douce partie de la vie. Il me faudrait cinquante heures de travail, avec une sensibilité brûlante comme un fleuve remplissant tout, pour décrire ce que j'ai senti . . . Cela est impossible; je décrirais donc mal, et dans quinze jours je ne me souviendrais plus de ce que j'aurais décrit. Je n'écrirai donc que les anecdotes ridicules, satiriques; je serais bien fou de gâter les souvenirs tendres. Je ne parlerai donc pas de ce qui me gouverne, du sentiment qui remplit tous mes moments, je ne sens presque rien d'étranger à lui. (J., p. 707)

Is it his incompetency? He cannot write well yet; what he writes does not induce states of feeling. He suggests, however, more than this. It is as though he feels that in transposing the unperceived and undelineated memories of happiness into the realm

of the known, the memories will lose their power automatically: "dans quinze jours je ne me souviendrais plus de ce que j'aurais décrit."

In our opinion, there is an underlying understanding that refers to Biran's thinking. Through analysis Stendhal may discover that what has a hold on him, his memories, has no basis in reality and this realization may deactivate the power of these memories to affect him. It is this understanding, whether consciously or unconsciously admitted to, we feel, that deters Stendhal from recording what in revery caused him happiness. It is as though he knows that in describing those memories and images, in truly facing what it is that he loves, he woefully will discover that he has no substantial cause to be moved. He will discover that what he loves is imaginary, the product of active imagination.

Maine de Biran devotes a whole section of the Influence de l'habitude to the special habits of imagination, where he describes what happens to people when this power gains ascendancy over any other source of sensation, when the functioning of this power motivates all behavior: "Concentré dans la sphère des mêmes moyens d'excitation, l'individu s'y attache tous les jours avec plus de force et d'opiniâtreté, les appelle sans cesse, et ne peut ni ne veut plus s'en distraire." ²⁴ Biran is describing a potential maniac, who is consumed with passion for the images tantalizing him, oblivious to

all other reality and incapable of judging his behavior. Biran's insistant point about imagination, why it can so forcefully take control of someone so that one loses his senses, is that its functioning is not subject to a man's will: ". . . la nature et l'intensité des causes organiques qui déterminent l'apparition spontanée des images." ²⁵

The imagination is a power of the mind which is stimulated by interior causes or in response to exterior stimuli, over which one has no control; a person cannot act upon it. Thus, imagination creates out of memories, without our effort, pleasing realms, without the control of reason limiting its creative power; it has carte blanche to compose as it wills and to trap a person in its web of delightful images. It is to this unreal world that Stendhal often retreats.

Biran sees, however, a weapon against the attraction of imagination's creations. Simple possession of the real object, e. g. the object of a revery, which holds a person captive will cause him to cease to respond emotionally to it: "Mais dès que l'objet est atteint, si l'imagination ne voit rien au-delà, si la possession est paisible, uniforme, non contestée, le prisme séducteur se brise, ²⁶ le charme est détruit et l'habitude reprend ses droits." In possession of the real object, one can no longer believe the creations of the imagination; they fail to move us if they do not correspond to what we know is possible, and Biran notes that we soon tire of the possessed object. Stendhal seems to have read well

this chapter and indeed his disinclination not to possess through knowledge his privileged memories appears to correspond to what Biran predicted to be the consequence of such possession: they will
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 no longer move.

Passion and Imagination

In connection with the attraction of the unreal, its status of providing for pleasing images and ideals, which Stendhal cannot prevent himself from enjoying, we find him discovering a notion of passion which is dependent upon and prepared by indulging in unreal ideas. In the passage to which we referred earlier with respect to Stendhal's thinking on association, Stendhal speaks of a violent species of the love passion, termed "le grand amour," whereby a woman is instantaneously loved and becomes an end of passion with little knowledge of her or hope that she will reciprocate a man's love. She recalls a passion that has been alive for an image formed by imagination, which has been a focus of desire over a period of time; the real woman is loved because the lover associates her immediately with the unreal woman whom he has been adoring in memory:

L'amour violent, subsistant sans être alimenté (tel que celui que j'ai eu pour elle [Victorine] du 14 prairial XI au 23 nivôse XIII), ne peut subsister qu'avec une imagination ardente et vaste. Je me figure tous les plaisirs que pourrait me donner tel caractère, je me figure cela pendant trois ans, je vois la figure qui me promet ce caractère . . . lorsque je la vois, je l'aime donc comme le bonheur, je lui applique cette passion que je sens depuis trois ans et qui est devenue habitude chez moi. (J., p. 560)

Love for the real woman "subsistant sans être alimenté" is entirely founded on supposed knowledge of her for which imagination, the creator of the unreal, is responsible. In a continuation of the above passage Stendhal underlines the necessary role of the unreal in passion which is immediate and strong: "On voit que toutes les causes qui empêchent l'imagination et qui, avec de l'imagination, lui empêchent cette manière de s'exercer, empêchent cette passion préparatoire de l'amour, qui en est le commencement" (J., p. 560). Passion for the real woman could not come about so immediately--the effect of the coup de foudre--without the lover's being already devoted to an ideal, which has become his good, the object of desire.

It is this recalling of the imaginary by the real that undoubtedly caused Stendhal to desire Mélanie before having real, prolonged experience of her, for in February of 1805 he writes about her, in the beginning of their relationship: " . . . elle m'a raconté son histoire, il m'est prouvé qu'elle a une âme sensible

comme la mienne parce qu'elle m'a raconté des circonstances qui n'ont pu être remarquées que par une âme sensible . . ."

(J., pp. 602-03). He finds that she immediately fulfills the requirements of his ideal; she is the sensitive woman à la Julie d'Etange .

He will write, however, in May of 1806, during their stay in

Marseille, uncomplimentary observations, the fruit of real knowledge

of her: "Je commence à trouver M [Élanie] bête. Je me rappelle

mille traits prouvant peu d'esprit" (J., p. 797). His experience of

her no longer allows him to endow her with the qualities she seemed

to have at first. He no longer finds her sensitive but dense, and

her behavior which acted to signal memories of Stendhal's ideal

woman was wrongly interpreted. Stendhal did not love her but the

unreal woman he projected upon her.

In 1819, possessing a fuller understanding of human psychology,

Stendhal sees clearly how much imagination determined his behavior

during this period, creating passions for which there was no real

basis. Rereading the Journal: "(Ces mémoires sont ennuyeux parce

que je ne décrivais pas le bonheur d'août 1805 à février 1806, de

peur de la faner)" (J., p. 763), he appends a remark to the effect

that his love for Victorine Mounier was "une passion de tête." He

had no real grounds for falling so madly in love with her; rather,

he observes, he was "amoureux de l'amour" (J., p. 763). He

was seeking a concrete form of the ideal woman with whom he had

incessant contact in reverie. He loved Victorine through his "chimère," perceived through the filter of the visions of his "tête."

We noted Stendhal's earlier observation that youth in particular feels passion for real objects because these recall ideal models, derivative especially from literature. In Biran's work, he finds a more elaborate view of modèles idéals and their attraction. The memory of a particular object remains with us, is transformed and becomes a focus of attention and emotional activity, completely controlled by the workings of imagination: "Toute passion est une sorte de culte superstitieux, rendu à un objet fantastique, ou qui, dans sa réalité même, sort du domaine de la faculté perceptive, pour passer tout entier sous celui de l'imagination." The attraction of such an image is, of course, that it changes limitlessly, and Biran notes that a same memory can be at the base of all the passions a person experiences throughout his life: "C'est peut-être toujours la même image que poursuit le jeune homme amoureux; mais de combien d'accessoires variables son imagination mobile se plaît à la nuancer! . . . car le monde imaginaire est sans bornes. . . ." Since reference to reality is not used to control our notions about this image, we do not question, thus, the changes imagination works on it, transforming it, enabling us to be moved newly, differently all the time in response to the transformation: "Le cadre du tableau imaginaire peut être bien fixe, mais c'est

comme un tableau mouvant dont les figures successives se groupent, se combinent en mille manières; il n'y a point là de continuité³⁰ d'impression, point de monotonie, de répétitions uniformes."

Stendhal provides personal proof that imaginary material can move limitlessly:

Je ne puis plus me figurer V[ictorine] dans aucune position, mon imagination est épuisée, mais non pas mon amour. Je sens parfaitement ces deux choses. Je ne suis plus sensible aux positions dans lesquelles je veux me la figurer, parce que je l'y ai vue trop souvent; mais l'amour en elle pour moi m'enchanté toujours. (J., p. 574)

He knows nothing about Victorine's love for him. All he knows is what is suggested by imagination. With no experience that would function to check the suggestions of imagination, Stendhal is able to enjoy indefinitely the images presented to him; or he can be tortured by the uncertainty of the meaning of her behavior: "Chacun de ses regards, de ses soupirs, de ses plus petits gestes, me découvre quelque chose qui règle mon bonheur ou mon malheur dont j'ai donc le plus grand intérêt à m'assurer" (J., p. 763). Without real knowledge, all interpretations are subject to change, which enlists, keeps his attention riveted and prevents him from ever being hopeless, certain of impossibility. Even if his interpretations are negative, speak negatively against his hope of her loving him, he knows that they can change, and he exclaims: "C'est vraiment ici

qu'espérer c'est jouir" (J., p. 763). Hoping that a woman who is essentially unknown to him will find him pleasing is an open-ended course, where the lover can find unending satisfaction of his hopes in revery.

On the other hand, because there are known limits about the physical side of love, what the imagination can suggest about love-making will be circumscribed by what Stendhal knows to be possible, so that he is rendered finally insensitive to these suggestions by imagination, as he notes concerning his erotic fantasies about Victorine. He is eventually bored by erotic images which cannot be transformed repeatedly; there are known limits.

The real hold of imagination, according to Biran, consists in this power to transform. Helvétius had already suggested to Stendhal that the ability of images to change in imagination was one of the sources of the "plaisirs de l'imagination"; images that constantly change move us differently all the time. We suggested this idea in discussing Biran's theory about how to dispel the hold of imagination, which ensnares men precisely because of the pleasure it affords in constantly changing. For Biran, this changeability explains why we never become insensitive to an image. Recourse to the image becomes a habit, but a particular one. Instead of becoming desensitized to it, we are, rather, constantly moved by it.

The habit becomes appetitive; we come to desire more and more the experience of being newly, freshly stimulated: "Les mêmes images, les mêmes sentiments, les mêmes pratiques, loin de s'attiédir par l'influence ordinaire de l'habitude, prennent au contraire plus d'ascendant; charme ou tourment, c'est un besoin toujours plus pressant de s'en occuper. Concentré dans la sphère des mêmes moyens d'excitation, l'individu s'y attache tous les jours avec plus
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 de force. . . ." Stendhal used the word "habitude" in connection with the imaginary woman and the passion alive for her that serve as reference and inspiration for the love of a real woman: "Je l'aime donc comme le bonheur, je lui applique cette passion que je sens depuis trois ans et qui est devenue habitude chez moi." Is he not declaring that his abandonment to revery was necessary? That he had formed a habit of imagination, whereby he was compelled by his desire for sweet sensation to visit often that memory that ever afforded him happiness by its miraculous, spontaneous ability to strike him as ever different?

Stendhal was very cognizant of his penchant for revery. In the Vie de Henri Brulard he observes that this behavior characterized his life more than any other: "Je vois que la rêverie a été ce que j'ai préféré à tout, même à passer pour homme d'esprit" (H. B., p. 14). Because of its unlimited ability to tantalize, the world of imagination becomes desired; one wants to give way to

revery. Stendhal affirms in 1805 about Biran's influence on him:

"Biran qui m'explique les mystères des passions senties en moi . . ." (J., p. 567); Biran explained the power and attractions of imagination, which is the source of Stendhalian happiness.

Notes

- 1 Pierre Maine de Biran, Influence de l'habitude sur la faculté de penser, ed. Pierre Tisserand (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), p. 47.
- 2 Maine de Biran, pp. 39-40.
- 3 Maine de Biran, pp. 40-41.
- 4 Philippe Pinel, A Treatise on Insanity, trans. D. D. Davis (London: W. Todd, 1806), pp. 16-17. In the collection of the New York Public Library, Pinel's Manie was available only in the translation by D. D. Davis.
- 5 Maine de Biran, p. 197.
- 6 Maine de Biran, p. 94.
- 7 Maine de Biran, pp. 94-95.
- 8 Pinel, p. 16.
- 9 Pinel, p. 149.
- 10 Pinel, p. 149.
- 11 Destutt de Tracy, p. 253.
- 12 Destutt de Tracy, p. 255.

- 13 Maine de Biran, pp. 68-69.
- 14 Delacroix, p. 16.
- 15 Delacroix, p. 16.
- 16 Maine de Biran, p. 37.
- 17 Jean-Pierre Richard, "Connaissance et tendresse chez Stendhal," in Littérature et sensation (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1954), p. 131.
- 18 Maine de Biran, p. 41.
- 19 Mme de Staël, pp. 510-11.
- 20 Denis Diderot, Paradoxe sur le comédien, in Oeuvres, ed. André Billy (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Gallimard, 1951), p. 1010.
- 21 Diderot, p. 1006.
- 22 Del Litto, p. 171.
- 23 Jean Prévost, La Création chez Stendhal (Paris: Mercure de France, 1967), p. 74.
- 24 Maine de Biran, p. 101.
- 25 Maine de Biran, p. 36.
- 26 Maine de Biran, p. 102.

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In line with Biran's thinking, Stendhal remarks that the possession of a desired object ends finally in ennui: "Se guérir de l'enthousiasme pour le bonheur qu'on n'a pas. Se rappeler que dans celui dont on jouit, après les premiers moments on le désirera bien moins vivement" (J., p. 786). The habit of something desensitizes us to its effects.

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Maine de Biran, p. 102.

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Maine de Biran, p. 104.

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Maine de Biran, p. 103.

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Maine de Biran, p. 101.

Chapter III

Histoire de la peinture en Italie and Racine et Shakespeare:

Stendhal's Maturity as a Thinker

The Histoire de la peinture en Italie, first published in 1817, written and rewritten over a period of almost six years, and the two Racine et Shakespeare pamphlets, published in 1823 and 1825 respectively, gave to the contemporary public a host of Stendhal's thoughts on the beautiful, the artist, and the audience, and included many, more general ideas on behavior. Much of this is familiar to us while, at the same time, we can point to developments in his thinking as it stands in these two works. Notably, during this period Stendhal launches his notion of Romanticism.

We shall work with both the Histoire de la peinture and the two pamphlets, which reiterate and develop points made in the history. Henri Martineau in his Oeuvre de Stendhal, while referring to Racine et Shakespeare as Stendhal's deposition of the
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 "idées littéraires de sa maturité," remarks that the Histoire de la peinture, as well as the other works which precede the pamphlets,

"contient à l'état d'ébauche l'essentiel de ce qui va constituer sa doctrine romantique."² Both works deal with a body of ideas that are related and together they present the essential movement of Stendhal's theories since his early writings.

The Vies de Haydn, de Mozart et de Métastase, published in 1815, is another important chapter in the development of Stendhal's thinking on aesthetics, but inasmuch as Stendhal is a writer, his thoughts on painting, rather than on music, are more significant as concerns his development, and we shall not discuss the Vies. Stendhal himself pointed to a stricter correspondence between painting and the theater:

Mais il y a une circonstance remarquable dans le talent du peintre et du poète dramatique.

On ne voit pas les passions . . . avec les yeux du corps. Leurs effets seuls sont visibles.

(H. P. I., II, 32-33)

This is a similarity that he had noted in 1803: "L'art du poète se rapproche de celui du peintre . . . Alors le grand art est de faire sentir dans la peinture exacte du moment présent, l'état passé de l'objet" (J. L., I, 110-11). Artists and playwrights face similar problems in representing passions so that characters will effectively move an audience. Besides this affirmed correspondence between the two media, which makes the Histoire de la peinture a

wiser choice of study if one wishes to uncover the development of our novelist, we find in this work a more general theory of the conditions that give rise to art than is found in the Vies.

This period covers approximately fourteen years of Stendhal's life. He begins the Histoire de la peinture in 1811 and publishes Racine et Shakespeare II in 1825. During this time, Stendhal is part of the Napoleonic administration; he does the Russian campaign of 1812; after the fall of the Emperor and consequently of his own position in government, Stendhal leaves for Italy. From 1814 to 1821 Stendhal lives primarily in Milan, where he comes into contact with the circle of Lodovico di Breme, who introduces him to Italian Romanticism and Liberalism. In 1821, at the point of being expelled by the Austrian Police, Stendhal leaves Milan for Paris. He is 38 years old on his return to Paris, where he remains until 1830.

During this period Stendhal publishes other works besides the history and the pamphlets: the Vies de Haydn, de Mozart et de Métabase (1815), Rome, Naples et Florence en 1817 (1817), De l'Amour (1822), which we shall discuss in the next and final chapter, and the Vie de Rossini (1823). This is an extremely active time in our author's life, both as man and as thinker.

This chapter is divided into two sections. In Part I we shall concentrate on Stendhal's ideas on Romanticism as they concern our interest in memory. In Part II we shall discuss developments in Stendhal's thoughts on the audience and techniques of artistic creation to engage its sympathy, genre, and on the psychological functioning of man in connection with the role of memory.

I. Stendhal's Romanticisme

Le Romanticisme

The Histoire de la peinture is, before the pamphlets, a defense of le romantisme, as Stendhal defines this Italianate version of the French le romantisme in the Racine et Shakespeare I: "Le romantisme est l'art de présenter aux peuples les oeuvres littéraires, qui, dans l'état actuel de leurs habitudes et de leurs croyances, sont susceptibles de leur donner le plus de plaisir possible" (R. S. I., p. 71). This view of the purpose of art, to please a contemporary public, is a leading theme of the Histoire de la peinture; indeed, according to Stendhal, the success of the Florentine painters stems from their having painted for their
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 period. Stendhal maintains that Michelangelo, like Dante, addressed himself as an artist to his times: "Ils pénétrèrent au principe: Faire ce qui plaira le plus à mon siècle" (H. P. I., II, 283).

Much of the Histoire de la peinture, similar to Racine et Shakespeare, is polemics. Stendhal argues against the prevailing notion in France that art is a product of prescribed rules based on a universal and abstract notion of what beauty is. He maintains that the Italian Renaissance is an illustrious case in point of a completely successful art movement that came about due to certain determining circumstances that had little to do with artists' obeying immortal aesthetic rules: "Que la beauté . . . soit le fruit inattendu de la civilisation tout entière, c'est ce que les savants allemands les plus opposés à mon idée ne nieront pas" (H. P. I., II, 102). In the history, as in Racine et Shakespeare, Stendhal is anti-classical, that is against the La Harpes and Winckelmanns, powerful literary and art authorities, who teach that beauty is universal and ever the same. Pierre Martino in his authoritative preface to Racine et Shakespeare quotes from La Harpe's influential Lycée, where the critic affirms his universalist and eternal theory of art: " 'Le beau est . . . le même dans tous les temps, parce que la nature et la raison ne sauraient changer. --Ce qui est beau dans Homère et dans Virgile n'est pas beau parce qu'ils l'ont fait. . . . ' "

Stendhal's thinking on aesthetics in the Histoire de la peinture leads up to his exposition of what he holds Romanticism to be in Racine et Shakespeare. In the time between the publication of the history and of the pamphlets, Stendhal prepared a pamphlet,

in 1818, Qu'est-ce que le romantisme? Dit M. Londonio (which he never published), that is a defense of Romanticism. Many of these ideas will appear in Racine et Shakespeare. There are also articles written by Stendhal after the publication of Racine et Shakespheare I that develop his thinking on comedy and that reply to Lamartine's criticism of the first pamphlet. These works, both the pamphlet and the articles, were published posthumously by Romain Colomb in his edition of Racine et Shakespeare (1854) and they are now included in most editions of Racine et Shakespeare. In discussing those points in Stendhal's notion of Romanticism that refer to a role of memory, we shall have occasion to refer to these works.

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The Beau Idéal

In the Histoire de la peinture, Stendhal, bolstered by many readings in history and in art history--Paul Arbelet describes the work as "un long et savant plagiat"⁶--attempts to show what conditions gave rise to the works of the eminent geniuses of Italian art. Stendhal tries to determine which circumstances allowed for the development of artists whose work so aptly grasped and immortalized the notion of happiness of the Italians of the Renaissance.

He declares in the Histoire de la peinture that beauty is the depiction of one's ideal of happiness. The beau idéal, as he calls it, is "l'expression d'une certaine manière habituelle de chercher le bonheur" (H. P. I., II, 85); he notes again: "Mozart a vu que les beaux airs n'étaient beaux que parce qu'ils portaient en eux l'expression du bonheur et de la force" (H. P. I., II, 85). Both statements prefigure the famous definition of beauty in De l'Amour: "La Beauté n'est que la promesse du bonheur" (Amour, p. 54). The Italian artists were outstanding in that they were able to translate their audience's conception of happiness, which is the beautiful. In these definitions of beauty we find reaffirmed what Stendhal had been declaring earlier in his thinking on why the âmes sensibles delight in art. We recall how he maintained that for the "Happy Few" what is beautiful, what is pleasing, is art that recalls their privileged revery, the representations of their ideals of love and virtue, or their notion of happiness. Stendhal declares the same in the Histoire de la peinture: the beautiful, one's beau idéal, is the representation of the subjects of one's revery, i. e. where one finds the "expression d'une certaine manière habituelle de chercher le bonheur." As Stendhal had surmised earlier, he states in his history that art to be pleasing must address itself to the remembered and cherished experience of the audience.

The Florentine painters of the Renaissance seized so well upon their audience's conception of happiness. They were able to recall these memories in their audience forcefully. Their tour de force consisted in the fact that they were romantic, that is they did not look for immutable guidelines; they trusted their experience of men and manners and created from their own memories of what affords happiness. Stendhal makes the point that both Dante and Michelangelo believed to be following aesthetic guidelines used by the artists of Antiquity: Dante supposedly imitated Vergil and Michelangelo, the classical sculptors. In both cases he notes: "Personne n'a plus aimé Virgile que le Dante, et rien ne ressemble moins à l'Enéide que l'Enfer. Michel-Ange fut vivement frappé de l'antique, et rien ne lui est plus opposé que ses ouvrages" (H. P. I., II, 283). In neither case did the artist follow guidelines from another period, even if he had consciously willed to, but created out of his particular experience of life.

The Renaissance artists were allowed to be original, to follow their individual inspiration and thus to translate successfully their souls and their experience, which would correspond to that of members of their audience. This is a prescription for modern times as well: "Chaque artiste devrait voir la nature à sa manière . . . s'il a quelque génie, il saura

y [dans la nature] apercevoir les choses qu'il doit imiter à son tour pour plaire aux âmes faites comme la sienne" (H. P. I., I, 168-69).

In following their own inspiration artists produce work that is able to speak to audiences that have the same experience.

In connection with Stendhal's belief that by translating his own experience the artist is enabled to recall the experience of the audience, we find reaffirmed the notion that the artist must rely on personal memories of what he attempts to create; only this will allow for authentic presentations of character:

On ne voit pas les passions, comme des incendies . . . Leurs effets seuls sont visibles. Werther se tue par amour . . . mais les mouvements qui ont porté Werther à se tuer, où les verra-t-[on] ?

On ne peut les trouver que dans son propre coeur. Tout homme qui n'a pas éprouvé les folies de l'amour, n'a pas . . . d'idée des anxiétés mortelles qui brisent un coeur passionné . . . Nulle description ne peut donner la sensation de cette neige piétinée par un animal dont les pieds seraient ronds. (H. P. I., II, 32-33)

It is from personal experience that an artist derives the inspiration necessary to create the image of happiness, the beau idéal.

Stendhal's insistence that an artist create from memory and that Renaissance art is beautiful because it captured the longings of the Italians of that period is connected with a larger point, the axis of his romantic theory: the experience of an audience is relative,

the memories of happiness to be recalled by a work of art change when the circumstances that determined these memories change:

"Ou prononcez que la beauté n'a rien de commun avec l'imitation de la nature, ou convenez que, puisque la nature a changé entre le beau antique et le beau moderne il doit y avoir une différence"

(H. P. I., II, 104). The heart of Stendhal's romantic theory is that there can be no absolute beau idéal. When circumstances that formed the experience of a people have changed so that a group's notion of beauty is different, art that hopes to please must reflect these changes: "De mémoire d'historien, jamais peuple n'a éprouvé, dans ses mœurs et dans ses plaisirs, de changement plus rapide et plus total que celui de 1780 à 1823; et l'on veut nous donner toujours la même littérature!" (R. S. I., p. 74) The beau, which is the representation of memories, which change, is relative.

Stendhal's theory of the relativity of the notion of beauty is not new for us. We have seen him come to understand that a person's memory is composed of experience determined by educative forces and innate proclivities. His early readings in Dubos, Helvétius, Montesquieu, Mme de Staël, Alfieri, and the Idéologues, among others, opened his eyes to the relative nature of experience and thus to the relative nature of the beautiful.

Guided by the thinking of Cabanis and Pinel, Stendhal claims in the Histoire de la peinture that climate creates differences in physiology, which affects behavior, making for the notion of temperaments (a subject we shall take up later in more detail).⁷

Thus, ideals of happiness can be conceived on a national, geographical basis; they reflect the dominant temperament of a country. Stendhal declares also that governments educate people. Subjects of a monarchy seek, therefore, happiness in other ways than citizens of republics do: "Quelles que soient les vertus du roi, il ne peut empêcher que la nation ne prenne ou ne conserve les habitudes de la monarchie; sans quoi, son gouvernement tombe. Il ne peut empêcher que chaque classe de sujet n'ait intérêt à plaire au ministre, ou au sous-ministre, qui est son chef immédiat" (H. P. I., I, 54). Vanity pleasures become a chief source of happiness in monarchies, an idea with which we are familiar as well as the notion, which Stendhal puts forth in the Histoire de la peinture, that advances in knowledge affect the world view and thus notions of happiness. This is the subject of several of the chapters, for example, Chapitre CXVIII, the very name of which "Nous n'avons que faire des vertus antiques" indicates that what was proper for one historical period is not suitable for another; society's world view changes. The lack of scientific knowledge in

Antiquity caused physical prowess to be esteemed, while such a capacity is superfluous in modern times, where thinking enables one to deal with danger better.

From our reading of the early journals and correspondence we know that Stendhal's awareness of relativity predates his writing of the Histoire de la peinture. Martino points out, however, that it is from Stendhal's exposition of his ideas on relativity in both the Histoire de la peinture and in Racine et Shakespeare that the following generations will profit:

Il faut ouvrir Baudelaire, Sainte-Beuve, Taine, les livres de tous ceux qui ont connu et compris l'esthétique de Stendhal, qui l'ont repensée, qui se sont pénétrés de sa conception maîtresse: le rapport du beau idéal, en chaque lieu de l'espace, en chaque moment du temps, avec les conditions de la vie de société, les habitudes morales et intellectuelles de l'homme . . . Racine et Shakespeare l'a développée et illustrée aussi heureusement que l'Histoire de la peinture en Italie.⁸

The Beau Idéal Moderne

In both the Histoire de la peinture and the pamphlets Stendhal is concerned with pointing out what is to be the beau idéal of the nineteenth century. A main point of both works, and more centrally of Racine et Shakespeare, is that the conception of beauty of the nineteenth century will correspond to that of the Renaissance.

The final chapter of the Histoire de la peinture is entitled "Le goût pour Michel-Ange renaîtra"; Stendhal claims about his century: "La soif de l'énergie nous ramenera aux chefs-d'oeuvres de Michel-Ange" (H. P. I., II, 328). In this work, where Stendhal accounts for the beau idéal of the Renaissance Italians, he is accounting as well for the new aesthetics that he projects will soon dominate in Europe. It is because the circumstances that determine and bring about an ideal are similar that a contemporary and an earlier period share a same notion of beauty:

Par hasard, la nouvelle tragédie française
ressemblerait à celle de Shakespeare.

Mais ce serait uniquement parce que nos
circonstances sont les mêmes que celles de
l'Angleterre en 1590. (R. S. I., p. 75)

Stendhal attempts to show through an exposition of the forces operative at that time what determined the experience of the Renaissance Italians so that they sought a particular ideal of happiness in art. Stendhal declares that their ideal of beauty was a state of emotion: "Les passions, qui font la possibilité comme le sujet des beaux-arts . . ." (H. P. I., I, 65). This is a passage we quoted before when describing what Stendhal found to be beautiful in 1804. The kind of beauty he had proposed as the chief attraction of tragedy is the idea of beauty shared by the Renaissance.

Stendhal maintained that tragedy provides for the greatest pleasure because it allows the audience to relive its emotions through identification with characters enthralled in passion, and he affirmed that Shakespeare was the greatest playwright because his natural works permitted, at least the âmes sensibles, great moments of identification with the Bard's passionate characters. What Stendhal had personally considered as beautiful, scenes of pathos, because they recalled his privileged moments of happiness, he considers to be the aesthetic ideal of the Renaissance. Stendhal describes a scene from Tasso's Jerusalem Delivered where he indicates what is pleasing:

Vous connaissez Hermione arrivant chez les bergers:
c'est une des situations les plus célestes qu'ait
inventées la poésie moderne; tout y est mélancolie,
tout y est souvenirs.

Il faut sur cette charmante figure de la faiblesse,
de l'amour malheureux, le besoin du repos, de la
bonté venant de sympathie et non d'expérience.
(H. P. I., II, 111-12)

It is a moment of emotion, a scene of pathos where a tender lover is in the throes of melancholy, for she is separated from her beloved. This episode speaks directly to Stendhal, who can sympathize with a character whose emotional experience closely resembles his own and who finds happiness in experiencing melancholy and tenderness.

The qualities of works of art which Stendhal had ever found pleasing, natural, forceful, causative of emotion, are typical of Renaissance art, and he finds that these same characteristics will please the larger audience of the nineteenth century:

C'est la passion elle-même que nous voulons.
C'est donc par une peinture exacte et enflammée
du coeur humain que le dix-neuvième siècle se
distinguera de tout ce qui l'a précédé. (H.P.I., II, 327)

We shall present Stendhal's ideas on what gave rise to the Renaissance ideal of emotion briefly, for they shed light on why he sees that this ideal will soon be shared by his own period.

Stendhal accounts for the rise of art in Italy in his Introduction, which was first written in 1814. He relies on Voltaire's Essai sur les moeurs and on other works but primarily on Robertson's The History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V and Sismondi's Histoire des républiques italiennes au Moyen Age.

He explains in his Introduction that Italians experience passions deeply. The climate of Italy, which nurtures--the influence of the sun--, breeds a temperament that desires ardently and that responds energetically to sensations. It is for lack of this climate that England produced in general less in the arts: "Personne n'a reproché aux Anglais de manquer d'originalité, d'énergie, ou de richesses. Ce qui leur manque pour avoir des arts, c'est un soleil et du loisir"

(H.P.I., I, 56). The sensations the Italians seek from art are not sought by the more phlegmatic English because of their climate. Thanks to its geography Italy is ever for Stendhal the cradle of the arts: "Ce sol privilégié de la nature," where life "est toujours revenue fraîche et vigoureuse" (H.P.I., I, 61); it always creates men who desire sensation and who keep the arts alive to satisfy this need.

Secondly, Stendhal notes that many of the Italian states in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries moved towards republicanism: "A peine les Italiens eurent-ils quelque idée de la propriété, qu'on les voit aimer la liberté avec la passion des anciens Romains. Cet amour s'accrut avec leurs richesses . . . Tandis qu'ils s'enrichissaient au dehors, leur pays se couvrait d'une foule de républiques" (H.P.I., I, 6). Besides the influence of climate which makes for a people easily moved, a republican regime, which guarantees personal liberties, encourages the expression and the realization of self: "C'est que, depuis trois siècles, chaque Italien se battait parce qu'il le voulait bien, et pour obtenir une certaine chose qu'il désirait. Les passions de chaque individu étaient mises en mouvement . . ." (H.P.I., I, 65). Because of the advent of republicanism Stendhal concludes that Italy "devait donner avec fureur dans le premier art qui lui présenterait des

plaisirs" (H. P. I., I, 65). We meet with ideas that Stendhal had espoused upon his early contacts with Alfieri and Mme de Staél and that were closely set forth in Sismondi's work. Del Litto writes about the historian: "Pour Sismondi, l'esprit républicain a favorisé l'éclosion des passions, qui, à leur tour, ont exercé la plus⁹ heureuse influence sur les beaux-arts."

The Italian Renaissance, like the Napoleonic era, was a period of a release of passion. Men were engaged in an audacious defense of their property and of their rights. Their republican instincts encouraged a defense of who they were and a output of energy to achieve their ends. This political climate extolled the experience of passion and made possible the fifteenth century, the period of the High Renaissance, the apex of artistic creativity during this epoch. The Napoleonic era, out of which Europe was emerging as Stendhal writes the Histoire de la peinture, sharply parallels the period of the Renaissance prior to the fifteenth century, and it should thus give rise to another high point of artistic creation.

Finally, there is the factor of leisure time, which acted to condition certain classes of Italians to being passionate. Thanks to considerable wealth accrued through commerce and during periods of relative peace, like the fifteenth century, certain Italians could know leisure time; wealth and periods of peace made possible for certain people periods in which to experience boredom and

consequently to formulate a desire to dispel this painful state.

Stendhal writes: "Les passions des gens riches, excitées par le loisir . . ." (H. P. I., I, 8); in spare time a person may reflect upon his desires, thrive on the sensations caused by imagination and find his desires stronger, his passions greater for having the time within which to savor them better.

It is in leisure time following upon a period of intense passion and activity that one discovers that one was happy in being passionate. Faced with boredom, a person recalls with pleasure those moments when he was given up to emotion. It is in such a civilization, where society has had the opportunity to experience passion intensely and has the luxury of being able to reflect in peace on it, that passion is viewed as a state of happiness. To satisfy this ideal of happiness well-to-do Italians patronized the arts that promised to provide them with feasts of sensation to enable them to while away their leisure time delightfully: "Il [the fifteenth century] eut la partie principale du goût, celle qui peut les suppléer toutes . . . je veux dire la faculté de recevoir par la peinture les plaisirs les plus vifs. Il aimait avec passion cet art bienfaiteur qui embellit de plaisirs faciles les temps prospères de la vie . . ."

10

(H. P. I., I, 48). In periods of peace, happiness is to be found in daydreams of energy that stimulate a prosperous dreamer: "Un

peuple mélancolique et sombre n'avait pour unique aliment de sa rêverie que les passions et leurs sanglantes catastrophes . . ."

(H. P. I., I, 15). The experience of feeling in and of itself became in modern times a goal of happiness. In Racine et Shakespeare I Stendhal affirms that this goal characterized the idea of happiness of the Renaissance English, who also knew leisure time (thanks to the reign of Queen Elizabeth) following upon a century of turmoil: "Cent ans de guerres civiles et de troubles presque continuels, une foule de trahisons, de supplices . . . avaient préparé les sujets d'Elisabeth à ce genre de tragédie . . . Les Anglais de 1590, heureusement fort ignorants, aimèrent à contempler au théâtre l'image des malheurs que le caractère ferme de leur reine venait d'éloigner de la vie réelle" (R. S. I., p. 72). Periods of rest and of security give rise to a notion of the beautiful as being that which will recall passionate sensations in the audience. In the era following the Congress of Vienna (1815), one meets a similar period of stability following upon the cataclysmic epoch of the Napoleonic wars. For Stendhal the generation of the 1820's finds itself in a situation parallel to that of the Elizabethan English. It was brought up on tales of unleashed passions, accustomed to experiences of sensation, but lives in a time of peace, and it will seek sensations, stimulus for emotion in art.

Michael Wood in his book Stendhal affirms that happiness for Stendhal is less the moral quality of the feeling; rather, it is the experience of feeling itself, which acts fundamentally to dispel ennui. Wood claims that this essentially Helvetian notion is the basis of the pleasure Stendhal feels in being in love:

It [love] is all very extreme and doesn't sound sublime, doesn't sound like the elevating passion it is made out to be. And it isn't. Stendhal, for all the romantic dash of a lot of his pronouncements, is never mystical, metaphysical or even particularly soulful about love. When he says heart he usually means nerve. What are the joys of the love he offers us? " . . . a man who trembles isn't bored" (Amour, 260) . . . These are thoughts for a man mortally afraid of stillness, a man for whom boredom is not a pose and not a passing mood but a familiar, threatening monster wearing the faces of death and old age.¹¹

Helvétius defined man's natural state as being that of movement. With advances in civilization, periods of stasis become possible, a condition where the stimulation of absent passion seems desirable in the face of stupefying boredom, particularly when a population has been recently accustomed to passionate experiences. Stendhal's beau idéal moderne, which is the representation of characters who are feeling intensely, so that by sympathizing with such persons the audience is able to experience sensation itself, seems to be founded on this view that a man's natural state is one of motion. The state of desire, is a condition of happiness for modern societies who know leisure time. Surely, Stendhal exclaims, if a contemporary

artist were to attempt to create such a beau idéal for the nineteenth century, "quel torrent de sensations nouvelles et de jouissances ne répandrait-il pas dans un public!" (H. P. I., II, 190)

In his thinking that the nineteenth century was prepared for the art of Michelangelo, that the beau idéal of the Renaissance was to be usurped by the artists of his and coming generations, we detect the influence of his Italian friends--the circle of Lodovico di Breme, who introduced Stendhal to the illustrious Edinburgh Review. Stendhal met di Breme in 1816, before the completion of the final version of the Vie de Michel-Ange, Book VII of the Histoire de la peinture, and read his first issue of the Scottish periodical in the same year. Both influences acted strongly to confirm him in his opinion that the aesthetic criteria of seventeenth-and eighteenth-century French literature could no longer dictate to artists. The Italian Liberals who formed the coterie of di Breme shared Stendhal's dissatisfaction with Racine and his enthusiasm for Shakespeare. Also, in edition #45 (April 1814) of the Edinburgh Review, Stendhal comes across Francis Jeffrey's article on the poetry of Byron, "The Corsair, a Tale" and "The Bride of Abydos, a Turkish Tale," and Beyle discovers here a program for modern art and a history of aesthetics to support it. Much of Jeffrey's points conform to already formulated thoughts of Stendhal, namely that monarchies temper passionate natures and make for enervated, dull expressions of emotion in art,

ideas that are expressed repeatedly in the Histoire de la peinture and Racine et Shakespeare.

Jeffrey praised passion and energy, as had Mme de Staël and Alfieri, and traced the history of its being unleashed and restrained by the determining influences of the values of a civilization in conjunction with the history of poetry; the artistic depiction of passion reflects the values of a civilization. Stendhal finds in this history a prescription for the kind of art that should be born of the nineteenth century. Jeffrey believed that the political climate in Europe had changed; the experience of contemporary audiences was different from that of recent previous audiences. In his opinion the experience of the nineteenth century coincides with that of earlier periods of energy. Stendhal found Jeffrey asserting that contemporary art should more closely resemble that of the Renaissance Italians and English, which are the very ideas Stendhal extols in the Vie de Michel-Ange and in the Racine et Shakespeare pamphlets. ¹² Passages like the following, some of which we have already quoted, taken from the chapter "Le goût pour Michel-Ange renaîtra," refer to Jeffrey's article: "Les émotions fortes seront de nouveau cherchées; on ne redoutera plus leur prétendue grossièreté" (H. P. I., II, 324); or: "Il est difficile de ne pas voir ce que cherche le dix-neuvième siècle; une soif croissante d'émotions fortes est son vrai caractère" (H. P. I., II, 326).

We point out a change in Stendhal's attitude towards the contemporary French audience. He finds it ready for the theater of Shakespeare. The Stendhal of 1804-05, who feverishly frequented the French theater at Paris, found the French audience to be too vain, too monarchistic to appreciate the art of Shakespeare, whose depiction of unrestrained passion had to nettle the sensibility of an audience forced to subjugate individualism so as not to offend the self-esteem of others. Stendhal did not feel that he, with his tastes, was the vanguard of a new generation; rather, he felt that he was part of an alienated, privileged group of âmes sensibles, out of the mainstream of French society. Undoubtedly, it was the long stay in Italy, giving him emotional distance, that enabled him to view the situation of his compatriots more objectively. Although he will never relinquish his conviction that the French are temperamentally inclined towards being vain--the satire that occurs in his novels about France always jabs at what he considers to be the self-satisfaction of the French, their desire to be admired and to be found superior--, which accounts in part for their anti-romantic tastes in art, in Racine et Shakespeare, written two years after his return from Italy, Stendhal no longer maintains that the French are unable to seek strong sensations in art. He shows, rather, that because of their experience of the Revolution they would relish sympathizing with Shakespearean characters if they were allowed to.

In the pamphlets Stendhal provides reasons that account for French resistance to what is to become the beau idéal of the nineteenth century, despite their having been emotionally educated to find therein their experience idealized. Briefly we summarize Stendhal's main points: the greatest cause is habit, the habit of a certain taste that makes one resistant to the attractions of new effects. Stendhal, an Idéologue, writes: "L'habitude exerce un pouvoir despotique sur l'imagination des hommes les plus éclairés, et par leur imagination, sur les plaisirs que les arts peuvent leur donner" (R. S. II, p. 104). The young audience has been taught La Harpe and at the theater it seeks the pleasure of good verse and the audition of noble ideas couched in plays that respect the golden unities: time, place, subject. Stendhal does not hesitate to point out that this habit serves to gratify the inescapable national passion, vanity: "J'ai demandé la liste des livres qu'on lit le plus; ce n'est point Racine, Molière, Don Quichotte, etc. . . . mais bien le Cours de littérature de La Harpe, tant la manie jugeante est profondément enracinée dans le caractère national, tant notre vanité craintive a besoin de porter des idées toutes faites dans la conversation" (R. S. II, p. 125).

Stendhal also realizes that patriotism, loyalty to things French and contempt for the work of those foreigners who defeated Napoléon, wrongly leads the young French to despise romantic

theater. The Liberal press, particularly, urges those French who love liberty and democracy to reject imports from the countries who reestablished monarchy in France. Stendhal points out the influence of the Liberal press on the young who would otherwise appreciate the naturalness of Shakespearean theater: "La seule barrière qui s'interpose entre la caisse du théâtre et d'excellentes recettes . . . c'est l'esprit des grandes Ecoles de droit et de médecine, et les journaux libéraux qui mènent cette jeunesse. Il faudrait un directeur assez riche pour acheter l'opinion littéraire du Constitutionnel [the famous liberal periodical], et de deux ou trois petits journaux; jusque-là, auquel de nos théâtres conseilleriez-vous de monter un drame romantique? (R. S. II, p. 124) To change the opinion of the Constitutionnel would be to render a part of France amenable to Romanticism.

The young audience of France has been formed, educated by historical circumstances to find its reveries and ideals recreated in Shakespeare's dramaturgy; yet it is this very youth that closed, in 1822, the theater la Porte-Saint-Martin, where an English company was doing Shakespeare. Egged on by the Liberal press students believed to be acting in the worthy cause of defending France's honor: "Cette jeunesse égarée . . . a cru faire du patriotisme et de l'honneur national en sifflant Shakespeare, parce qu'il fut Anglais" (R. S. I, p. 54). It was in response to this cabal

of the Liberals that Stendhal published in October 1822, in the Paris Monthly Review of British and Continental Literature, the article that in March 1823 constituted the first chapter of Racine et Shakespeare I, Stendhal's attempt to enlighten the younger generation as to its error in preferring Classicism to Romanticism: romantic theater incorporates more the ideals of the Revolution.

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The Ames Sensibles

What of the âmes sensibles, tendres, mélancoliques? the individuals with whom we were most familiar in reading the diaries and correspondence of the early years? From a reading of the Vie de Michel-Ange and of Racine et Shakespeare, where Stendhal praises the aesthetics of Byron, we hear small mention of those âmes sensibles, who delight in reminiscences of intimate scenes of perfect communication between tender lovers, who revel in the melancholy caused by unrequited love and in movements of the heart caused by the presence of the beloved. Michelangelo, who is supposed to speak to the nineteenth century, is ignorant of tenderness: "Toujours confiné dans les pensées directement relatives aux beaux-arts, il mena trop la vie retirée d'un cénobite. Il ne nourrit pas la sensibilité de son âme en l'exposant aux chances ordinaires de la vie: il eût trouvé bien ridicule cette mélancolie

qui fit le génie de Mozart" (H. P. L., II, 178). Representations of the violent reigns of Charles the Sixth and of Charles the Eighth, called for in Racine et Shakespeare, will not cater to such a public, who seeks "le silence des bois" to indulge better in reveries about their beloved.

Although Stendhal defends Michelangelo and proclaims his beau idéal to be that of the nineteenth century, he is not moved by his work. Artists like Correggio and Raphael provoke in him the tender reveries in which he delights, the emotional experience he enjoys recalling.

Paul Arbelet remarks that Stendhal at the period of the composition of the Histoire de la peinture was not yet sufficiently confident in his artistic tastes to assert his preference for certain artists and his reasons: "Quand il s'agit de peinture, Beyle est timide. Il ne se permet pas encore de choisir tout seul, et
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 d'avouer hautement ses préférences." He relied on the opinions of established art historians. In praising Michelangelo, however, he was taking a stand against authoritative opinion. His undivided support for Michelangelo's work and the recommendation that artists provide for experiences of emotion similar to those which Michelangelo offered, the same aesthetics espoused in the Racine et Shakespeare pamphlets, demands another explanation in light

of the fact that Stendhal did not personally find such art to be the most moving. It is our opinion that Stendhal's support for art that depicts energetic passion answers the exigencies of polemics. To have engaged himself in demonstrating discrepancies in audience tastes of the contemporary period would not have had the same effect as declaring that the present and following generations will demand a specific experience of art, which is being denied them by obsolete principles and the authority of pedants. For the sake of argument, of accomplishing the goal of ridding France of the prejudices that prevent respect for Romanticism in France, Stendhal does not point up variations in taste in the nineteenth-century audience nor does he undertake a discussion of his personal tastes. Furthermore, we know that Stendhal was ambitious. He had wanted to write comedy to achieve universal glory, to perform in the arena in France where he stood the chance of receiving the most acclaim. It would have been through producing art that appealed to the "thirst for sensations" that he might have been able to achieve the dreamed of glory. If we conceive of the Stendhal of the pamphlets from this perspective, his espousal of the aesthetics of energy is understandable.

To defend the kind of art that appeals to melancholics, to persons of tender feeling, is to limit one's address to a particular, select audience. This is, of course, the road Stendhal will eventually take: he will write novels. This is the genre he had

earlier considered suitable for love stories. In 1804, in reference to an anecdote from Dieudonné Thiébauld's Souvenirs de vingt ans de séjour à Berlin, Stendhal writes: "Effets de l'amour chez la princesse Amélie de Prusse qui aimait le baron de Trenck, les plus forts possibles; ils ne mouraient ni l'un ni l'autre parce qu'ils espéraient de se revoir. Beau et neuf sujet de roman à remplir par une femme . . . Voilà le plus beau sujet de roman qui existe"

(J. L., II, 98). Passionate love is the privileged subject for the novel. In De l'Amour he alerts the reader, in the Preface of 1826, that even though he writes of love, he is not writing a novel:

"Quoiqu'il traite de l'amour, ce petit volume n'est point un

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roman. . . ." In his mind the theme of love is inextricably

linked with the novel. He notes further in De l'Amour that the

pleasure of the novel is to give rise to reveries on love: "La

réverie . . . est le vrai plaisir du roman" (Amour, p. 49). As he

sees it in 1822, the date of the publication of De l'Amour, the novel

is a genre entirely suited to communicate with the audience of âmes

sensibles, who seek reveries in art, and he is to dedicate his novels

to the "Happy Few." But the voice of Racine et Shakespeare places

itself in the line of the great dramatic artists. Stendhal is not yet

reconciled to the fact that his tastes enable him to please best the

small audience of his cherished âmes élevées.

There is no essential contradiction between the beau idéal of the "Happy Few" and that proposed in Racine et Shakespeare: Stendhal has personally always sought natural, uncompromising expressions of feeling, exactly what the audience of the nineteenth century seeks. It is not, however, the depiction of heroic, grand passions, of men seeking glory engaged in the defense or the destruction of social systems, nor of horrible, destructive passions, such as those lived by Macbeth and Othello, which move Stendhal the most. His is a soul like Canova's, and in addressing Canova, in describing the sculptor's preferences, he indicates what in nature moves him: " 'Vous, auteur sublime des Trois Grâces et de la Madeleine, vous n'aimez dans la nature que ses aspects nobles et touchants; ce sont les seuls qui vous jettent dans cette douce rêverie qui fit le bonheur de votre jeunesse. . . . "

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Canova sought to recreate what is "touchant," what causes compassion, reactions of tenderness; the representation of characters who are "touchants" is what will move Stendhal, not the art of Michelangelo, sympathy with whose work elicits the experience of terror.

In the chapters preceding those in the Vie de Michel-Ange, Stendhal indicates what works move him. He is drawn to those paintings that allow him to relive his feelings of love and that

give rise to reveries about his beloved. He explains what happens to an âme sensible when viewing a Madonna by Raphael: "La pensée soulève ces voiles; elle entre en conversation avec cette vierge charmante de Raphaël, elle veut lui plaire, elle jouit de ces qualités de son âme, qui font qu'elle lui plairait, qualités si longuement oisives dans notre système de vie actuel"

(H. P. I., I, 50). The painting causes the recall of feelings of love, feelings of a caliber bound to please the Madonna, that is feelings that are pure and beneficent; the viewer is involved in a full-scale revery: he lends all his desires to the Madonna who recalls them in him.

Arbelet suggests that passages like the following: "Il [the fifteenth century] aima avec passion cet art bienfaiteur qui embellit de plaisirs faciles les temps prospères de la vie, et qui, dans les jours de tristesse, est comme un refuge ouvert aux coeurs infortunés" (H. P. I., I, 48), refer to Stendhal's personal recourse to art. Dwelling on the paintings of his favorite masters will help him forget his despair over his affair with Angela Pietragnua. In a note to this passage Arbelet remarks: "C'est une confidence personnelle. Au temps où Stendhal écrit cette Introduction, à la fin de 1814 au début de 1815 'battu par les orages d'une passion vive,' il essayait de trouver dans la peinture l'oubli des trahisons
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d'Angela Pietragnua." In writing about his favorite masters he hoped to conjure memories that would delight him.

This is consoling, for one is able to be melancholy, the feeling provided by reveries of how a love affair could have been. Furthermore, Stendhal has been made aware of another source of pleasure. In his reading in 1810 and in 1812 of Burke's Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas on the Sublime and the Beautiful Stendhal comes across Burke's idea of what he calls "douleur regrettante," and he copies some of these thoughts into his literary notebooks. Burke believes that the pleasure of remembering unfortunate experience consists in the imagining of what could have happened, the possible pleasure: "Or faire attention aux circonstances qu'on aurait joui, est un plaisir" (J. L., II, 305). Reveries about unfortunate love affairs are thus pleasurable, and Stendhal remembers this idea when he writes in the Histoire de la peinture: "La distraction la plus facile pour l'homme que les passions tendres ont rendu malheureux n'est-elle pas celle qui se compose presque en entier du souvenir même de ces passions?" (H. P. I., I, 172) In writing about painting that produces reveries on his love passion, he is putting himself in a position to experience the delicious "douleur regrettante." Stendhal believes that music, more than the other arts, provokes tender reveries, but nonetheless, they are to be culled from all types of art by the âme sensible.

Stendhal finds that the passion of love as he knows it is frequently the motivating passion of artists. Melancholy caused by disappointments in these desires moves men to create. In the paragraph following the previously quoted passage, where Stendhal claims that the delight of a disappointed lover consists in revisiting his memories, Stendhal suggests that a work of art results from such reveries: "Travailler, pour un artiste, dans ces circonstances, ce n'est que se souvenir avec ordre des idées chères et cruelles qui l'attristent sans cesse" (H. P. I., I, 172). An artist has only to recall his disappointing love affairs and he will create works that will move others tenderly.

The passion of love, like the development of the arts, becomes a dominant one in advanced civilizations. Men who have leisure time discover this type of emotional occupation: "Dès qu'on s'ennuie au Forum, ou qu'il ne faut plus prendre son arquebuse pour s'aller promener, le seul principe d'activité qui reste c'est l'amour" (H. P. I., I, 173). Helvétius had pointed out that the cult of love, where more than physical satisfaction and procreation are implied by the term, resulted from the obligation to amuse oneself. Stendhal claims that the Ancients, who did not have ample amounts of leisure time, did not conceive of love as a state of being charmed by the attributes we appreciate in another: "Les nobles qualités qui nous charment," of exulting in movements of tenderness,

of compassion for another: "La tendresse . . . l'abandon aux mouvements du coeur" (H. P. I., II, 113), which may characterize certain individuals in love in Western civilization.

Stendhal makes a similar point about sympathy. The ability to sympathize, like the ability to love someone tenderly, requires a forgetting of self so that one is enabled to share the concerns of another, to sympathize with that person. To be able to forget oneself requires a level of civilization where it is not necessary to be concerned at all times with self-preservation. Stendhal queries: "Jusqu'à quel point l'homme peut-il oublier son intérêt direct pour se livrer aux charmes de la sympathie?" (H. P. I., II, 85) The ability to put aside concern for self so as to feel with another is a risk or a luxury that can only be afforded by men who know that their physical welfare is being taken care of by others. Love is a similar luxury: one can afford to forget certain personal concerns to enjoy the attributes of the beloved. Advances in civilization, the division of labor and wealth, allow for a body of citizenry enabled to spend time free from being preoccupied with pressing personal needs: "Le pouvoir de la sympathie augmente, de siècle en siècle, avec la civilisation, avec l'ennui. Le danger était trop grand dans la retraite de Russie pour avoir pitié de personne" (H. P. I., II, 85).

Artists who address an audience with the ideal of love and of emotional intimacy with another are not any less romantic than those who appeal to one's desire for violent emotions of terror and of horror. Both experiences are common to modern audiences. In Racine et Shakespeare I, Stendhal indicates that Shakespeare provided for both ideals: "Shakespeare fut romantique parce qu'il présenta aux Anglais de l'an 1590, d'abord les catastrophes sanglantes amenées par les guerres civiles, et pour reposer de ces tristes spectacles, une foule de peintures fines des mouvements du coeur, et des nuances de passions les plus délicates" (R. S. I., pp. 71-72).

Stendhal believes that it is from so being in love, from being attendant to what one is experiencing and to the person causing such delicate emotions, that an artist achieves greater powers of expression: "Les Giorgion, les Corrège," he writes, "portèrent cette habitude, fille de l'amour, de sentir une foule de nuances, et d'en faire dépendre son malheur ou sa félicité, dans l'art qui fait leur gloire" (H. P. I., I, 171). Their training as leisured lovers, where they dwelt on what they were experiencing, this habit of being sensitive to nuance, fostered by so being in love, enabled them to depict the subjects of their canvasses more accurately; they had been prepared to distinguish between states of feeling and to be aware of what causes different reactions.

Greek art is relatively devoid of detail; particular states of a passion are not represented, rather the abstract form of it is, or as a god would wear this passion, that is the unchanging essence of it. Stendhal sees that such sublimeness is achieved not out of choice. Earlier civilizations perceived nuances less: "Les premiers sculpteurs aussi n'exprimaient pas les détails . . . c'est qu'en faisant tout d'une venue les bras et les jambes de leurs figures, ce n'étaient pas eux qui fuyaient les détails, c'étaient les détails qui les fuyaient" (H. P. I., II, 94-94). They had no spare time in which to savor distinguishing differences. They valued syntheses, a grasp of the whole, which is characteristic of a civilization that is forced to be prudent. The passion of love, which encourages one to appreciate differences, movements, prepares artists to select those signs that will express accurately and thus forcefully a particular state of emotion, which is the beau idéal of modern times. It was for Stendhal, well-versed in love, to show, eventually, that the novel was a privileged means to create characters who could immortalize this very ideal of love which prepared him to write.

II. The Realm of Art and Temperaments

Besides being involved in formulating his romantic theory, Stendhal continues to reflect on related topics, such as techniques of writing, the psychology of the audience, and genre, and on human psychology in general. In this part we shall take up these ideas as they concern his ideas on memory.

Details

In the Histoire de la peinture Stendhal refers frequently to the idea that an artist should not overburden his work with details in order to avoid creating works that are too particular. He has long been aware, we pointed this out in the first chapter, that the imagination of the audience is the key to its pleasure. It is by stimulation of this faculty that the artist causes his public to discover its own concerns in those of the characters. Recalled images of personal experience trigger emotional response, which allows for sympathy.

In 1807 Stendhal is aware of the dangers of being meticulous; he writes in the Journal: "Il faut trop de paroles pour bien décrire . . . Il serait utile d'écrire les annales de ses désirs, de son âme; cela apprendrait à la corriger, mais aurait peut-être

l'inconvénient de rendre minutieux" (J., p. 841). Precision would particularize too much and thus inhibit imagination and would, as well, draw attention to itself, interfering with abandonment to sensation.

Too many details make us aware of the distinct nature of a situation; its difference from our own. Instead of being reminded of itself, which allows for identification and passionate involvement, the audience becomes concerned with the specific nature of an event, its interesting particularities. It is thus not moved, but perceives instead. The artistic illusion is threatened by a too rigid faithfulness to historical accuracy: "Si nous avons la vision du dernier repas de Jésus dans toute la vérité des circonstances judaïques qui l'accompagnèrent, frappés d'étonnement nous ne songerions pas à être émus" (H. P. I., I, 222). The purpose of details is to express a situation and to create and to identify the characters. Once recognition is established, Stendhal sees the pleasure of the audience as consisting in the power to finish the representation with images from its own memories:

L'art est d'inspirer l'attention. Quand le spectateur a une certaine attention, si un auteur, dans un temps donné dit trois mots, et un autre vingt, celui de trois mots aura l'avantage. Par lui le spectateur est créateur. (H. P. I., II, 19)

Le poète laisse à l'imagination de chaque lecteur le soin de donner des dimensions aux êtres qu'il présente. (H. P. I., II, 26)

Stendhal prefers Da Vinci to Michelangelo because he can sympathize more with the work of the former; his imagination is provoked and indulges in rapturous revery.

Maine de Biran, undoubtedly, impressed upon Stendhal the pleasure enjoyed by an audience allowed to complete scenes according to cherished desires, images stored in memory:

Tout le mystère de leurs procédés [of the beaux-arts] consiste à réveiller le plus vivement et le plus agréablement possible une impression analogue à celle qu'eût excitée la présence même de l'objet et c'est par cette impression que l'objet même se trouve rappelé. Au lieu de rassembler péniblement les détails dont on compose une image, ces arts, qui s'adressent plus à l'imagination qu'aux sens, se bornent à faire ressortir uniquement les traits particuliers que leurs moyens peuvent rendre de la manière la plus sensible, la plus frappante, la plus propre à reproduire l'effet de l'ensemble.¹⁸

This notion was again brought to Stendhal's attention by Edmund Burke during the period of the initial composition of the Histoire de la peinture. In a section of the Journal littéraire dated "1er juillet 1812" and titled "Suite de Burke," Stendhal disagrees with the terminology of Burke but nevertheless agrees with the Englishman's idea that effective art is work that enlists the

imagination of the audience, and it does so by not rendering suggestions definite:

Burke, page 112, dit qu'une idée obscure, convenablement exprimée, est plus puissante sur notre âme qu'une idée claire.

Mais nous ne voyons point ici que le poète manquant de clarté et de netteté, au contraire son image serait claire et nette mais ne serait pas prolongée, la continuation serait l'affaire de l'imagination du lecteur . . .

Autrement: le poète a peint nettement une image peu nette. (J. L., II, 382)

The audience is invited to dream, to indulge in its privileged fantasies when a work demands to be completed by its public.

Works that provide too many details have the quality of enigmas. The audience becomes curious and is engaged in understanding the significance of the foreign objects: "Le lecteur tout occupé s'amuse à deviner des énigmes;" thus, "les moyens de l'art ne traversent plus rapidement l'esprit pour arriver à l'âme" (H. P. I., I, 222-23).

Stendhal believes in the relativity of taste. The youth of the 1820's would delight in tragedies based on events that occurred during the French Middle Ages not because of the historical interest of such topics but rather because the behavior of the French of this period would be greeted with enthusiasm by the contemporary public who could identify with such sympathetic

characters. The historical veracity of details is not what causes the artistic illusion, rather it is the expression of feeling: "On pardonne à Shakespeare les ports de mer qu'il met en Bohème, si d'ailleurs il peint les mouvements de l'âme avec une profondeur au moins aussi étonnante que le savoir géographique de MM. Dussault, Nodier, Martin, etc." (H. P. I., I, 223) Stendhal, affirms Martino, will be disappointed with what will come to be known as the triumph of Romanticism in French theater, exemplified by the works of Vigny and Hugo, which exploited historical themes for the sensational effect of local color. The emphasis on glittering details distracts from concentrating on a state of the soul: "L'auteur de Racine et Shakespeare vit le théâtre conquis par les poètes, qui ne se souciaient pas du tout de la vérité ni de la théorie du coeur
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humain."

As Georges Blin indicates, Stendhal in his own creative works resists defining too closely a situation whereby a suggested image would tyrannize, preventing the reader from bringing to the work his own memories: "Stendhal s'est bien gardé de surcharger ses romans de renseignements accessoires, de descriptions . . . qui obligent le lecteur à pousser jusqu'à l'image expresse et
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tyrannique."

Blin points out a typical use of details by Stendhal: they are indicated as perceived by a personality. Through this means the psychology of the hero is expressed. We come to understand how he thinks and feels:

Il n'évoque guère le monde qu'au travers d'une sensation rapide, telle que le héros lui-même l'interprète: en fonction de son intérêt et dans le cadre de son avenir . . .

Le véritable nocturne est vécu non comme spectacle, mais à travers un projet où un souvenir . . . comme romancier se garde-t-il bien d'éblouir les yeux du lecteur par la description d'un paysage que le personnage n'a peut-être pas regardé.²¹

We come to know the character better, which is a condition of sympathizing, and through this process the reader, more and more identified with the hero, may unite with him totally, in sharing with the character an unspoken elaboration of details, suggested by him and completed by the reader.

The Sublime

In the Histoire de la peinture Stendhal marks the moment when Italian painters begin to represent a sublime depiction of reality and stop producing faithful but non-selective imitations of life. The greatness of the painters of the High Renaissance,

beginning with Masaccio, consists, in part, in having idealized, or sublimated reality. Before Masaccio, Stendhal writes:

On avait beaucoup fait, puisqu'on était parvenu à copier exactement la nature . . . Mais les peintres n'aspiraient qu'à être des miroirs fidèles. Rarement choisissaient-ils.

Qui aurait pu songer au beau idéal?

(H. P. I., 158-59)

Stendhal felt early, as we have shown, that an imitation of reality, which is necessary to engage an audience and to remind it of its own experience, that is too faithful appears odious; it reminds one of imperfections impossible to overcome. In the Histoire de la peinture, Stendhal takes another perspective. In establishing that the beau idéal moderne consists in the representation of a state of emotion, he is affirming as well that art is not the imitation of all reality. Art is given to expressing an aspect of human experience: "Un tableau sans expression n'est qu'une image pour amuser les yeux un instant" (H. P. I., I, 128). It is the expression of the soul that is compelling, the presence of which in a work reminds us of ourselves. The artist obscures this expression when he does not choose from reality, selecting what best communicates. Stendhal states that the earmark of modern art is that it is clear, its communication is distinct and forceful: "Rendre l'imitation plus intelligible que la nature, en

supprimant les détails, tel est le moyen de l'idéal" (H. P. I., I, 160).

Art to communicate better should be sublime. To suggest more effectively a state of emotion, it is advantageous not to include extraneous details, even though they may be present in reality.

Stendhal takes issue with the negative criticism of Michelangelo's work made by critics such as J. J. Winckelmann, who accused the sculptor of deforming reality. Stendhal cites examples of this criticism, for example: "'Michel-Ange . . . a sacrifié la beauté à la précision anatomique et à sa passion favorite, le terrible ou plutôt le gigantesque'" (H. P. I., II, 277).²² The success of his art resides precisely in the sure-fire effect of his work: one feels terror, the emotion he was depicting and the expression of which dictated the means of his art.

Masaccio was the first of the Italian painters to apprehend that art was expression and not imitation; thus, "Masaccio ouvrit à la peinture une route nouvelle" (H. P. I., I, 127). He began to sublimate, to remove from his work unnecessary details: "Masaccio bannit des draperies tous les petits détails minutieux" (H. P. I., I, 129). These would have interfered with the communication of the subject by diverting attention. As a result of his insight, he prepared the way for the masterpieces of his followers, allowing for Stendhal's rich experiences of feeling before his Raphaels and Correggios.

Romantic Tragedy and Comedy and the Novel

In Stendhal's early criticism of classical theater, we found objections to the style of Racine and Voltaire, which was created not to express and thereby to touch an audience, but rather to exercise its finesse. Mme de Staël was the primary influence for this early opinion, which will not change but will be reinforced, and other criticisms will emerge reflective of Stendhal's association with the Italian Romantics and his readings in the Edinburgh Review.

Stendhal declares in Racine et Shakespeare, particularly in the second pamphlet, that the conventions of classical tragedy, verse and the unities of time and place, hamper or prevent effective artistic communication. The Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes in France during the first third of the nineteenth century was fought primarily on this ground. Stendhal defines romantic tragedy thus:

Qu'est-ce que la tragédie romantique?
 Je réponds hardiment: C'est la tragédie
 en prose qui dure plusieurs mois et se passe
 en des lieux divers. (R. S. II, p. 98)

Verse, requiring that expression fit its exigencies, interferes with the natural expression of feeling, the goal of tragedy: ". . . cette tragédie qui tire ses effets de la peinture exacte des mouvements de l'âme et des incidents de la vie

moderne" (R. S. II, p. 138). The public of the nineteenth century that insists upon the superiority of classical tragedy is afraid of energy, the unrefined. They suffer from "bégueulisme," writes Stendhal, or "l'art de s'offenser pour le compte des vertus qu'on n'a pas." ²³ Sublime transcription in prose of a perfect moment of passion, such as the following scene in Macbeth, where Macbeth cries: " 'The Table is full' . . . quand il voit l'ombre de ce Banco' " (R. S. II, p. 138), touches the imagination of the audience not afraid to feel most effectively because it is an authentic passionate cry: "C'est le cri du coeur " (R. S. I, p. 138). Rules of versification should not have priority over the communication of what is natural if the author is concerned with touching his public: " . . . et le cri du coeur n'admet pas d'inversion. . . ."

Stendhal's stand against respect for the unities of time and place is often defensive. He claims that plays which have disregarded these can be successful. The works of Shakespeare and of Schiller for their unconventionality are not any less moving; one does not fail to achieve exalting moments of identification with characters because substantial moments of time elapse between scenes, which may be geographically distant from each other.

On the offensive, Stendhal suggests, as in the unpublished pamphlet Qu'est-ce que le romantisme? Dit M. Londonio, that classical drama affords fewer occasions for sympathetic

involvement because the unities are respected. After affirming that differences in time between scenes in no way alter the state of "ecstasy," which the public reaches, for example, in performances of Shakespeare's Antony and Cleopatra and Schiller's Don Carlos, he remarks that this state is rarely achieved at a play by Alfieri: "La vérité est que nous n'avons pas le bonheur de trouver au théâtre un tel degré d'extase . . . Les spectateurs sont toujours dans leurs bon sens, et savent fort bien, depuis le premier acte jusqu'au²⁴ dernier, que le théâtre est seulement le théâtre. . . ."

We have shown Stendhal concerned about the presentation of characters, how to present a character in a play so that the audience accept his behavior as authentic, convincing, and be able thereby to recognize its experiences in him. We saw Stendhal appreciate the format of comedy which allows for changes of scene so that an author is able to show a character's behavior as being habitual and therefore more readily able to convince the audience that the character is real. He sees now that romantic tragedy, without the limitations of the unities, has the opportunity to present characters more advantageously, so that more of these movements of "extase" are possible, which, he has shown, are rarely experienced at representations of classical tragedies: "Les spectateurs sont toujours dans leur bon sens."

By doing away with the limitations of time and place, one permits representations that show psychological development, which encourages the sympathetic response of the audience: the intellectual exigencies of the modern audience, which knows that actions of characters are motivated, determined by influences, are satisfied; its need to understand motivation is satisfied by seeing the development of a character. It is able to accept a character as real and to sympathize better. Stendhal gives an outline of Népomucène Lermercier's Christophe Colomb, where the audience is transported from Italy, to Spain, and to America, all of which movements enable Lermercier to show more effectively "un grand homme luttant contre la médiocrité qui veut
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l'étouffer."

The flexible form permitted a most effective expression of the subject and Stendhal exclaims: "Cette suite d'actions . . . oserez-vous la remplacer par de froids récits? . . . Par là [cette suite d'actions] la tragédie s'empare d'une partie des avantages de la musique." Music touches us, envelops us in feelings. In the sixteenth letter on Haydn, in Stendhal's Vies de Haydn, de Mozart et de Métaſtase, our author indicates what is the effect of music: "Vous distinguez un bel air, deux ou trois fois vous voudrez reprendre votre lecture, mais en vain: votre

coeur sera enfin tout à fait entraîné, vous tomberez dans la
 rêverie . . . La bonne musique ne se trompe pas, et va droit au
 fond de l'âme. . . ."²⁶ The effect of music is to recall cherished
 memories the recollection of which renews states of feeling;
 Stendhal holds that drama which builds a character, which makes
 him live psychologically for us has this same effect: we are able
 to sympathize with him, give way to feelings which his behavior,
 in allowing us to identify with him, has brought up. "Racine ou
 Alfieri," remarks Stendhal, "traitant le sujet de Christophe Colomb,"
 respecting seventeenth-century aesthetics, would deprive a modern
 audience "du spectacle le plus intéressant," and prevent that
 "chacun de nous[n] en [soit] touché à sa manière."²⁷

For Stendhal movements in time and in space, which
 introduce and develop the characters--we are witness to the
 chemical reactions of the meeting of temperament and circum-
 stances--, prepare us for moments of heightened identification:
 "Or dans le genre dramatique ce sont les scènes précédentes qui
 donnent tout son effet au mot que nous entendons prononcer dans
 la scène actuelle"²⁸ (R. S. II, p. 139). In Racinian tragedy,
 where the emphasis is on verse and where development must be
 limited to a space of approximately twenty-four hours, prior
 scenes cannot show the motivation for scenes of passion: "La
 tragédie racinienne ne peut jamais prendre que les trente-six

dernières heures d'une action, donc jamais de développements de passion" (R. S. I., p. 76). About Macbeth, where we see development, Stendhal claims, in contrast, that the audience is moved markedly; it responds to a character who has become for it a passionate man: "Ou je me trompe fort, ou ces changements de passions dans le coeur humain sont ce que la poésie peut offrir de plus magnifique aux yeux des hommes, qu'elle touche et instruit à la fois" (R. S. I., p. 76).

What Stendhal most appreciated about comedy, its particular advantage of presenting character, he can now appreciate about tragedy that foregoes the constraints of the unities. By presenting more believable characters, tragedy can provide greater moments of sympathy.

Stendhal thus divests comedy of its prestige of being superior to tragedy in the art of presenting characters. And he goes even further in breaching the strict classical definitions of the genres in claiming that the serious criticism of men and manners, long-heralded as the cornerstone of Molière's genius, should not be part of comedy:

Ses pièces sont remplies de scènes probantes,
si j'ose parler ainsi, de scènes qui prouvent les
caractères ou les passions des personnages qui
y sont engagés.

Ces scènes donc, qui sont fortes, mais qui
ne sont pas comiques. . . . ²⁹

A strong representation of character causes a "plaisir philosophique," the pleasure of seeing behavior truthfully accounted for, which will not please the contemporary public.³⁰ The nineteenth-century, republican citizen must be concerned with protecting his rights and is seriously engaged in earning money. Such a public seeks easy laughter in comedy, which will allow it to forget reality: "En sortant de dîner, après la bourse, si j'entre au théâtre, je veux qu'on me fasse rire . . ." (R. S. I, p. 70). Stendhal sees that romantic comedy should bring about light-hearted laughter: " . . . une imagination folle qui me fasse rire comme un enfant" (R. S. I, p. 67); or: " . . . une gaieté vraiment folle . . ." (R. S. I, p. 70); certainly not the reaction of fear that is brought about by some of the scenes in Tartuffe:

Il n'y a rien de comique à voir Orgon maudire et chasser son fils, qui vient d'accuser Tartuffe d'un crime évident . . . L'oeil aperçoit tout à coup une des profondeurs du coeur humain, mais une profondeur plus curieuse que riante . . . une telle vérité annonce une sorte de danger; or, dès qu'il y a danger, il n'est plus question de la comparaison futile qui fait naître le rire.³¹

Stendhal had appreciated comedy because it allowed for the depiction of more believable characters, and such an authentic depiction presented the possibility of using comedy as a means to improve society. Were he to become a playwright, Stendhal would be able to point to stupidities in human behavior that prevent

happiness. In proscribing a serious investigation of behavior, necessary if one desires to bring serious attention to vice or the source of unhappiness, he is divesting comedy of its potential to bring men to reflect on behavior and therefore to correct absurdities.

Before his reading in 1815 of A. W. Schlegel's Lectures on the History of Literature, Ancient and Modern, which suggested a new definition of comedy, Stendhal was already on the path to revising his ideas on the nature of the comic genre. ³² Stendhal wrote to Félix Faure in 1812: "Il me semble que mon goût particulier pour les bons opéras bouffes vient de ce qu'ils me donnent la sensation de la perfection idéale de la comédie. La meilleure comédie pour moi serait celle qui me donnerait des sensations semblables à celles que je reçois du Matrimonio segreto . . ." (Cor., I, 659-60). Even at this early date, Stendhal finds that the presentation of absurdities that do not involve circumstances the view of which causes one to reflect is the essence of comedy. Stendhal found confirmation and exposition of his incipient thoughts in Schlegel's work, particularly in passages like the following: " 'De même que le sérieux, animé par l'inspiration poétique, est l'essence de la tragédie, celle de la comédie consiste dans la gaité. La

disposition à la gaité est une sorte d'oubli de la vie, un état ou nous sommes enlevés à toutes les idées tristes, par le sentiment d'un bien-être actuel. . . .³³ " This is the type of pleasure and release a serious, republican citizen seeks at comedy.

Thus another of the attributes that Stendhal previously found appealing about the genre: its potential to correct behavior, he no longer thinks to be proper to comedy. The fleeting but much enjoyed illusion of bonhomie that Stendhal had earlier discovered to be the attractive effect of wit practised in social gatherings is the same pleasurable illusion towards which contemporary authors should aim when writing comedies. This as well as his divestiture of comedy of its quality of being the superior genre in terms of the presentation of characters announce the end of his earlier concerns with this genre. Stendhal had criticized comedy that does not cause the pleasure of sympathizing; nonetheless, it had had value to the budding author who found there a format conducive to creating strong characters. He no longer finds this exclusive to the genre; furthermore, he discontinues to maintain that comedy should be a means of correcting vice.

There is yet one more point, that undoubtedly accounts for Stendhal's abandonment of the genre. We recall that Stendhal hoped to write comedy because here lay the route to conquer immediate,

universal literary glory. Comedy would appeal to a vast public. He points out, however, that comedy in the period of the Restoration is shackled. Any ridiculing of the manners of the powers that be: Church and State, be it light-hearted as Stendhal would have willed it, would be censored. He describes the contemporary attitude toward the mocking of the authorities:

" 'Les privilégies sont en fort petit nombre, riches et enviés, la plaisanterie serait une arme terrible contre eux . . . ' "

(R. S. II, p. 122). The arm of Church and State working through the office of censorship holds restricted the range of comic topics. Censorship reduces the possibility of writing good comedy. Had he decided to write romantic comedy, Stendhal would have risked being censored.

In this same section on censorship Stendhal makes the point that the novel will inherit comedy's mission to mirror the absurd goings-on in society. Because of their prestige--recognized by public and authorities alike--plays risked censorship more than the less well-considered novel; plays carried more weight. Stendhal wonders whether novels will take over comedy's function to poke fun at ridiculous behavior: "La comédie peut-elle survivre à cet état de choses? Le roman, qui esquivé la censure, ne va-t-il pas hériter de la pauvre défunte?" (R. S. II, p. 122) Stendhal will

dedicate his novels to the expression of love, but this will require a social setting wherein the passion is cultivated and influenced. He will take this opportunity to ridicule behavior. Indeed he answers his own question: the novel will inherit comedy's function to ridicule, and it will do it seriously; for example, in Le Rouge et le Noir, the absurd vanity of the provincial bourgeoisie, investigated and mocked by Stendhal, will be seen to enter into the decision to guillotine Julien. This is a serious criticism of manners.

The novel benefits, as well, Stendhal points out, from the proscription of romantic tragedy by the arbiters of taste. He notes that authors since the eighteenth century resorted to the novel because there are no rules to respect that interfere with the creation of scenes which would please the contemporary public: "Nos pédants trouvant que les Grecs et les Romains n'avaient pas fait de romans, ont déclaré ce genre au-dessous de leur colère; c'est pour cela qu'il a été sublime."³⁴ Writers prevented by restrictive classical rules from creating dramatic literature that would have provided plaisirs dramatiques for a contemporary audience had recourse to the novel, which they could create as they willed. They avoided boring their public by writing obsolete tragedies: "Ainsi l'ennui a déjà brisé toutes les règles pour le roman."³⁵ A novel is in prose and is bound neither by unities

of time and place nor by conventional themes--classical or biblical--, the subject of a novel may be contemporary. Such an undefined form is well suited to develop a character; motivation can be carefully accounted for through any choice of sceneggiatura found to be effective, and its subject may be as appropriate as possible to clinch the interest of a public; therefore, it provides for those ecstatic moments of identification, the pleasure of art. Stendhal praises such novels that have substituted for the production of romantic tragedies in France: "Quels tragiques, suivants d'Aristote, ont produit, depuis un siècle, quelque oeuvre à comparer à Tom Jones, à Werther, aux Tableaux de famille, à La Nouvelle Héloïse ou aux Puritains?"³⁶

All the works have contemporary subjects, which would engage the audience, reminding it of its own experience and allowing for a reliving of its emotional life.

In the political and literary climate of the times, when the Liberals were closing down theaters which produced Shakespeare's plays, when it was unpatriotic, anti-republican, in France to be a Romantic, one understands why Stendhal should choose to write a novel in 1826, the year he begins to write Armance, instead of a play.

Furthermore, the triumph of Hugolian theater in 1830 with Hernani, the supposed triumph of Romanticism over Classicism in France, had to discourage Stendhal totally in any hope he might

have held to produce a successful play in the future. The new wave in France disregarded his call for energetic representations of passion, concentrating instead on melodrama and sensationalism and even employing verse! It turned its back on a faithful representation of psychological development and found an adoring public. Stendhal had to give up any hope of writing for a large audience if he were to write a play according to his prescriptions. The generation of 1820 had been won to another definition of Romanticism. From the large audience of the theater Stendhal turned to the small audience of the "Happy Few." They will be his public, and he will try to please them, to be successful, through the novel, where he will be able to create his beau idéal and theirs, and at least taste the pleasure of spending time with what is most precious to him. With a smaller public, he could even attempt satire, risk a serious exposé of stupidities, which would have been unwise when addressing a larger audience.

Temperament

In Chapter II we spoke of Stendhal's realization that certain people seek happiness in memory because they are innately programmed to enjoy profound states of sensation, which are more perfectly attained in revery or through reliving prior experience in art.

Stendhal, we shall recall, writes in the Histoire de la peinture that one of the chief pleasures of art is that it gives rise to reverie. Reverie and art are protected worlds, where one achieves sublime sensations unobstructedly.

The Histoire de la peinture is known for Stendhal's exposition of the theory of temperaments, which he illustrates in De l'Amour and in the novels in the creation of characters. This theory is a more comprehensive explanation of innatism, aligning in a causative relationship specific physiological traits and functioning with moral characteristics. It maintains, as well, that physiology is conditioned by climatic circumstances--"Les climats, à la longue, font naître les tempéraments." (H. P. I., II, 75)³⁷--and by diet. This theory offers a more complete explanation of why the "Happy Few," who are of the melancholic temperament (one of the six described by Stendhal), find happiness in memory and not in reality.

What Stendhal proposes is not original thinking. He finds the theory of temperaments expounded chiefly in Cabanis' Rapports du physique et du moral and Pinel's Manie. Lavater's Essai sur la physiognomie was also referred to, but undoubtedly Du Bos, with whom Stendhal has been familiar since the Ecole centrale in Grenoble, first revealed to him the theory of temperaments.

In 1811 Stendhal and his fellow disciple of Ideology, Louis Crozet, carefully reread Cabanis' Rapports. Many of the extracts from and commentaries on this work from this time appear in the published version of the Histoire de la peinture.

Stendhal's theory of temperaments is in no way revolutionary in terms of his intellectual development. It is a more comprehensive understanding of biological determinism. But it represents the final stage of his theories on human psychology, and what we find particularly significant about Stendhal's exposition is the level of objectivity he achieves. In the first stages of his thinking we met a Stendhal struggling to face reality, to study and to know it, instead of reacting negatively to it, as was his wont. In the Histoire de la peinture we find the Stendhal who has mastered his subjective, emotional reactions and who understands that men react differently to reality for many reasons, determined by education and biology. In the chapters on temperament, in Book V of the history, Stendhal is able to enunciate coherent ideas about motivation. The theory of temperaments as well as his understanding of the determining effects of political regimes on moral behavior, expressed as well in Racine et Shakespeare, are the culmination of his early effort to curb the distorting effects of his emotional life when attempting to see reality as it is. He can see what causes men to behave, including what caused him such an early misanthropic reaction to

others. This achieved objectivity, the ability to see what governs behavior, is consequently what empowered him to create himself, his temperament, in the character of his heroes. By having perceived himself, he can recreate himself. Stendhal admires in Leonardo a similar approach to reality. The Renaissance artist wanted to discover what governs behavior. He sought the laws of nature that determined human morality instead of relying on untested opinions and prejudices. Leonardo understood that manifest behavior was not arbitrary but motivated. Stendhal postulates about Da Vinci's approach to nature: "Suivant les préceptes pratiqués par Léonard pour le tableau de la Cène, le peintre italien eût pénétré dans les prisons et dans les loges de Bedlam. Il eût reconnu la vérité de ces traits caractéristiques" (H. P. I., I, 247); Leonardo would want to understand what caused those "traits caractéristiques," he knew that necessary conditions produced them. Stendhal's grasp of motivation enabled him, like Leonardo, to recreate men accurately; he knew what elicited behavior.

38

The theory of temperaments is introduced as an aid to modern artists. We are familiar with Stendhal's belief that an artist must be aware of signs. Creators must signal appropriate memories in the audience for them to become emotionally involved. Artists would be wise, therefore, to know which temperaments are capable

of which passions and to what degree and what kind of physiology suits this temperament; for example, Stendhal writes: "Apollon, délivrant la terre du serpent Python, sera plus fort; Apollon, cherchant à plaire à Daphné, aura des traits plus délicats" (H. P. I., II, 84).

A muscular Apollo, signaling an athletic temperament and moral characteristics, will not recall memories of a tender lover to an audience, while the physical representation of a melancholic would. Stendhal notes: "Werther ne sera pas indifféremment sanguin ou mélancolique . . ." (H. P. I., II, 80-81); his physical make-up and comportment will communicate one or the other personality, and the words and behavior of the character should not belie, therefore, the information communicated by the physical signs.

Stendhal realizes that it is not the reality of a necessary relationship between physical and moral characteristics that will force artists to present appropriate physical traits with passions. He admits that Cabanis' theory is, after all, theoretical: "Il fallait voir dans son livre des observations et non des assertions"

(H. P. I., II, 331). However, the dissemination of the Idéologue's theories, creating a public that understands motivation, will necessitate respect for the theory of temperaments in the arts. Although a scientist must be aware of variations and of exceptions, an artist must please his audience: "Cette vérité [that the theory of

temperaments is just theoretical] , très importante pour le médecin et le philosophe, ne signifie rien pour le peintre" (H. P. I., II, 48).

We have found within the theory of temperaments that Stendhal's discussion of melancholics sheds some new light on the pursuit of happiness by the "Happy Few," or those of the melancholic temperament. We shall select a few points which concern the melancholics' use of memory for happiness, which, in our opinion, completes his theoretical reflections on this subject.

Stendhal notes again that his predilection for extreme states of sensation--besides being encouraged by education and the habits he formed therefrom--is due to physiology. He paraphrases from Cabanis' Rapports: "Les extrémités nerveuses ont une sensibilité vive, les muscles sont très vigoureux, la vie s'exerce avec une énergie constante" (H. P. I., II, 60); the sensitivity of the nervous system and the responsiveness of the muscles, which allows for movement, condition the organism to much sensation and organic response. The physiology of a person like Stendhal fosters a need for activity, for stimulation.

What makes a melancholic person different from a bilious one, who is equally sensitive, is that the circulation is less forceful, barriers are overcome only with difficulty: "Si dans le tempérament bilieux si fortement prononcé vous substituez seulement à la vaste capacité de la poitrine un poumon étroit et

serré, et que vous supposiez un foie un peu volumineux, les résistances deviennent à l'instant supérieures aux moyens de les vaincre" (H. P.I., II, 59). The effect of such an organization is to create an individual who hesitates to act despite his desires. He is easily stimulated, easily moved, but reluctant to undertake measures that will concretize desires: "Des mouvements gênés, des déterminations pleines d'hésitation et de réserve, décèlent le mélancolique. Ses sentiments sont toujours réfléchis, ses volontés semblent n'aller au but que par des détours" (H. P. I., II, 60-61). For this reason, Stendhal, in 1811, notes: "Les appétits ou les désirs du mélancolique prennent plutôt le caractère de la passion que celui du besoin" (J. L., II, 330). The desired object becomes an end in itself, no longer a mere means to gratification. It is because of such physiology, which makes action difficult, that people so endowed, the âmes sensibles, seek the gratification of their desires in memories or in fantasies.

Stendhal indicates that the pain of feeling impotent, frustrated is both aggravated and assuaged by another physical attribute common to melancholics: active seminal fluid, which, according to Cabanis and Pinel, stimulates imagination (we smile at the seriousness with which Stendhal champions such precise physiological explanations: our present knowledge gives such a vastly more complicated

picture of human behavior and its causes). This power, of course, acts to make unsatisfied desires more tantalizing and at the same time, as we have pointed out before, and often, assures the individual a realm wherein he may satisfy desires: "L'humeur séminale tyrannise le mélancolique . . . c'est elle qui . . . crée dans le sein de l'organe cérébral ces forces étonnantes employées à poursuivre des fantômes . . ." (H. P. I., II, 60).

Stendhal easily recognized himself in the moral portrait of the melancholic. What becomes clearer through this explanation of his behavior is the cause of his frustration in adolescence and early manhood, his dissatisfaction with reality, and his consequent recourse to revery and the arts for happiness. Obstacles to his happiness are partly internally constructed, not entirely the fault of froids, insensitive men. A melancholic lacks the force to carry through desires. Decidedly his adolescent anger directed towards a frustrating reality was in part wrongly directed. His is a temperament that obstructs itself fulfillment of desire.

Stendhal's timidity, which he knew entered into his inability to act, is a result of this temperament, which broods over possible action. An undertaking becomes monumental through obsessive reflection, behavior which appears ridiculous to those of other temperaments: "On rit de trouver l'anxiété d'un désir violent dans la proposition d'aller [se] promener au bois de Boulogne plutôt

qu'à Vincennes" (H. P. I., II, 61). Instead of acting to realize desires, a melancholic becomes timid and obsessive.

The recourse to compensatory memory, to imagination, for satisfaction of desires is thus self-explanatory in this temperament, which finds action difficult.

Stendhal feels that many artists share this temperament: "Les artistes, les gens de lettres, les savants, remettent sans cesse la moindre démarche, sont presque toujours affectés de quelque engorgement hypocondriaque, et ont les apparences du mélancolique" (H. P. I., II, 78). Their melancholy, often stemming from frustrated ideals of love, which motivates them to create, is primarily temperamentally determined.

In a note to the above remark that artists are frequently melancholic, Stendhal makes an interesting observation: artists as we know them through their work often seem bilious, and he explains this: "Le mélancolique paraît bilieux dans ses écrits, où l'activité constante ne peut pas se voir" (H. P. I., II, 78). It is because a work is completed, an action is performed, that the artist gives the impression that he accomplished his will forcefully, but this impression is an illusion. The periods of hesitancy and inactivity that stall the melancholic, for whom production appears impossible, are not evident in the finished product. We are reminded of Valéry's distinction between the voice of the poem and the man

who labored to create it. The latter is not evident in the finished product, which flows effortlessly from an artificial voice.

That melancholics, the âmes sensibles, who experience hardship realizing desire and who seek consequently the comfort of revery, should exult in tender love and in art that depicts feelings and invites revery on tender themes is not surprising. We know Stendhal's thoughts on love and leisure time, the effects of being able to reflect leisurely upon one's sensations; this temperament is suited for the passion of love as conceived by Stendhal. He will write in De l'Amour: "Le tempérament mélancolique, que l'on peut appeler le tempérament de l'amour. . ." (Amour, p. 79).

Because of their inability to act with assurance, melancholics have time to reflect on their feelings, to experience the range of an emotion, to probe the state of desire. For them happiness is with difficulty any kind of conquest or achievement of a concrete goal, as it may be for a bilious person (Napoléon, for example). The passive state of sensation where one loves the cause of sensation, derives happiness from feeling compassion and concern for the beloved as well as from the numerous delightful sensations he causes is an entirely suitable ideal of happiness for one who shies away from activity. Such a state of love or of happiness does not require real accomplishments and the melancholic is at ease here.

Notes

1

Henri Martineau, Oeuvre de Stendhal (Paris: Albin Michel, 1966), p. 242.

2

We recall that the Histoire de la peinture en Italie is an uncompleted work. Stendhal was to have written the whole history of painting in Italy, but he presented only the Florentine school of Italian painting, and even this is not complete.

4

Pierre Martino, Pref., Racine et Shakespeare, by Stendhal, in Vol. 37 of his Oeuvres complètes, ed. Victor Del Litto and Ernest Abravanel (Geneva: Cercle du Bibliophile, 1967-74). pp. VIII-IX.

5

Chateaubriand uses this term in the Génie du Christianisme; for example: "Il y a deux sortes de beau idéal, le beau idéal moral, et le beau idéal physique . . ." (I, 275).

6

Paul Arbelet, Pref., Histoire de la peinture en Italie, by Stendhal, 2 vols., Vols. 26 and 27 of his Oeuvres complètes, ed. Victor Del Litto and Ernest Abravanel (Geneva: Cercle du Bibliophile, 1967-74), I, XXXVI.

7

Montesquieu and Mme de Staël had earlier suggested to Stendhal the importance of the influence of climate. As Arbelet notes in his preface to the Histoire de la peinture, the Abbe Du Bos, as well, spoke of the determination of temperament (pp. IV-V); Stendhal's reading of Du Bos' Réflexions sur la poésie et la peinture was an early influence.

8

Martino, pp. CXXXII-CXXXIII.

9

Del Litto, p. 363.

10

Helvétius is the essential source of this idea. It is he who impressed upon Stendhal that the "principal objet [of the arts] est de nous soustraire à l'ennui" (See Chapter I, p. 55). In a civilization where the luxury of leisure time is possible, the arts develop to waylay boredom and to provoke sensations.

11

Michael Wood, Stendhal (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1971), p. 37.

12

See Del Litto's discussion of Jeffrey's thesis and its influence on Stendhal in La Vie intellectuelle de Stendhal, pp. 518-22.

13

Racine et Shakespeare II was also written in response to provocation. This time the attack against Romanticism came from L. S. Auger, the member of the Académie Française who delivered the notorious speech against Romanticism in 1824.

14

Arbelet, p. LI.

15

Stendhal, Pref. (1826), in De l'Amour, ed. Victor

Del Litto (Paris: Livre de Poche, Gallimard, 1969), p. 328.

Further references to this Preface appear in the text, indicated

by Amour, followed by the page number.

16

Stendhal, "Réponse à quelques objections," in Racineet Shakespeare, ed. Roger Fayolle (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion,

1970), p. 181.

17

Arbelet, p. XXVII.

18

Maine de Biran, p. 85.

19

Martino, p. CXXIX.

20

Blin, p. 35.

21

Blin, p. 100.

22

Stendhal is quoting from a letter by Henry Fuseli to

J. J. Winckelmann.

23

Stendhal, "Nouveau chapitre sur Molière," in Racineet Shakespeare, ed. Roger Fayolle (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion,

1970), p. 209.

24

Stendhal, Qu'est-ce que le romantisme? Dit M. Londonio, in Racine et Shakespeare, ed. Roger Fayolle (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1970), pp. 157-58. We call attention to the fact that for Stendhal Alfieri now figures in the company of Racine and Voltaire. In this same pamphlet Stendhal indicates the cause of his change of heart: "Nous repousserions des plaisirs entraînants uniquement par respect pour Alfieri, qui a imité, sans le savoir, les Français, parce que, lorsqu'il se mit à faire des tragédies, c'était le seul théâtre qu'il connût" (p. 162).

25

Stendhal, Qu'est-ce que le romantisme? Dit M. Londonio, p. 161.

26

Stendhal, Vies de Haydn, de Mozart et de Métastase, Vol. 37 of Oeuvres complètes, ed. Victor Del Litto and Ernest Abravanel (Geneva: Cercle du Bibliophile, 1967-74), pp. 161-62.

27

Stendhal, Qu'est-ce que le romantisme? Dit M. Londonio, p. 161.

28

Stendhal's attack against the aesthetic legitimacy of the unities of time and place in his 1818 pamphlet reflects the position of the Italian critic Ermès Visconti, with whose ideas, expressed formally in his Dialogo sulla unità drammatiche di luogo et di tempo (1819), Stendhal was familiar; Visconti was part of di Breme's circle of friends.

29

Stendhal, "Nouveau chapitre sur Molière," pp. 212-13,

p. 214.

30

Stendhal, "Nouveau chapitre sur Molière," p. 214.

31

Stendhal, "Nouveau chapitre sur Molière," p. 213.

32

Del Litto, p. 465.

33

Del Litto, p. 466.

34

Stendhal, "Nouveau chapitre sur Molière," p. 208.

35

Stendhal, "Nouveau chapitre sur Molière," p. 208.

36

Stendhal, "Nouveau chapitre sur Molière," p. 208.

37

Cabanis lists other influences, such as age and sex,

but Stendhal does not single these out.

38

In the name of many artists and critics Sainte-Beuve pays a debt of gratitude to Stendhal in the Causeries du lundi. He recognizes how much he and they benefited from the criticism and theories of Stendhal. Sainte-Beuve maintains that in his published polemical writings Stendhal was addressing the cognoscenti primarily; he wanted to show artists what their concerns should be. Sainte-Beuve claims: "Il nous a tous sollicités, enfin, de sortir du cercle académique et trop étroitement français, et de nous mettre plus ou moins au fait du dehors; il a été un critique, non pour le public, mais pour les artistes, mais pour les critiques eux-mêmes . . ." (Causeries du lundi, 4th ed. (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1852-76), IX, 321).

39

We have only to think of Julien Sorel for an example of such behavior. This melancholic was positively waging war against his shyness about taking Mme de Rênal's hand, an act that had become a veritable passionate goal. Julien's self-comparisons with the bilious Napoléon can only occur in revery.

Chapter IV

De l'Amour or the Pursuit of Happiness: Poet and Philosopher

De l'Amour is a pivotal work in Stendhal's development. It provokes a decision as to what happiness is for him, and this decision touches upon his vocation as an artist. Stendhal's development as a thinker, on which we have been concentrating, and the relationship of this to his personal goals of happiness and success, which dictated his intellectual interests, come to a head in De l'Amour. The treatise brings up the question of the integration of Stendhal's personality, to which we address ourselves in this final chapter.

Stendhal began this work first as a novel, the Roman de Métilde, an effort that lasted a day and which produced a few pages. Then, on what Stendhal called a "day of genius," December 29, 1819, the idea occurred to him to take an analytical
 1
 approach. In this switch from artist to analyst we find that Stendhal is putting to the test his long held conviction that knowledge of one's experience will lead a person to ascertain where happiness lies for him.

The subject of De l'Amour is his love affair with the Milanese Matilde Dembowska, née Visconti, whom Stendhal called M^étilde. He began the novel in November 1819 and the treatise shortly after, in December, after the moment of the decisive event in Volterra, where M^étilde accused Stendhal of compromising her. She took on henceforth behavior that brought home to Stendhal the futility of any further effort to woo and to win the haughty yet sublime Mme Dembowska. On their return to Milan, she from Volterra and he from Grenoble, Stendhal was permitted to visit her twice a month on the condition that he never again speak to her of his love, a situation that lasted until Stendhal's departure from Italy in 1821. Stendhal put the finishing touches on De l'Amour upon his return² to Paris, and the work was finally published in 1822.

Stendhal's decision to write about love following closely upon the Volterra event suggests that De l'Amour was an effort to explain himself, the nature of his love and the behavior this necessitated. He is arguing for his honorable intentions. Stendhal believed that he had been maligned by a cousin of M^étilde's, Mme Traversi. In having given heed to the slander about Beyle, M^étilde believed that Stendhal was merely toying with her. She called him "prosaic," a term that crops up a few times in De l'Amour, a word Stendhal says he loves because it was used by a beloved person (Amour, p. 241), even though he knows that this

conception of him ruined him in the eyes of his *Métilde*. He defines a prosaic person in *De l'Amour* as "tout égoïsme," "un modèle d'esprit de conduite" (*Amour*, p. 242). According to Del Litto Stendhal wrote his treatise on love to justify himself, to show *Métilde*, in the hope that she would read his text, the purity of his love, and as well, to blame *Métilde* for his unhappiness and hers: *Métilde*, had she been less proud, would have perceived the noble caliber of Stendhal's suit and would have loved him.³

We can only be in agreement with this explanation of what motivated Stendhal to write. Certainly, anyone familiar with the events of the three-year courtship, documented in the *Journal* and *Correspondance* of the years 1818-1821, recognizes the barely disguised inclusions of aspects of it in *De l'Amour*. Our author is trying to show his lady what she failed to see and that he communicated so ineffectively at the moment of the actual events.

De l'Amour is rightfully considered as a communication to *Métilde*, but it may also be taken as Stendhal's attempt to come to terms with the phenomenon of being in love in face of the moral devastation he was experiencing, even while writing the work, due to the unhappy outcome of his passion for *Métilde*. Victor Brombert writes that "*De l'Amour* is simultaneously a *plaidoyer*, a self-administered therapeutic and a Stendhalian *Vita Nuova*."⁴

Following Brombert's inspiration, we should like to focus on an aspect that seems related to the therapeutic intent of Stendhal in writing De l'Amour. Stendhal is attempting an objective analysis to arrive at sure ideas. But it is our opinion that this analysis serves the end of pointing out where happiness lies. We have maintained--it is one of the premises of our investigation of Stendhal's thinking on memory--that for Stendhal knowledge is a means to happiness. We see De l'Amour as Stendhal's attempt to arrive at ideas about his personal experience of being in love so that he may know whether this state, a possible aftermath of which is psychic torture, which he experiences, really constitutes happiness for him.

The concern for therapeutics, which Brombert has pointed out, seems to reinforce our contention that in writing De l'Amour Stendhal is making a decision as to the value of being in love. Stendhal remarks that an outcome of his analysis of love will be suggestions as to remedies for this "sickness": "Ensuite je tire quelques conséquences de cette description; par exemple, la manière de guérir l'amour" (Amour, p. 29). He refers to love as a "maladie" (Amour, p. 329), and in the text he devotes two chapters to "Remèdes à l'amour." His appellation of love as "sickness" and frequently as "madness" recalls our earlier discussion of the Stendhal, enlightened by Pinel, who felt that love

as he knew it threatened mental and physical well-being. To live in the world of imagination, indulging in transformed memories of one's beloved, which is the type of love at issue in De l'Amour, merely readies one for a crushing, deluding contact with reality and inevitable states of exhaustion.

Since Stendhal himself brings up the idea of a cure, perhaps he was concerned that he fulfilled too closely Pinel's description of behavior that risks loss of sanity. By writing De l'Amour he would exorcise the demon. One of the remedies that he recommends for deactivating the passion of love: "Bien loin de chercher grossièrement et ouvertement à distraire l'amant, l'ami guérisseur doit lui parler à satiété, et de son amour et de sa maîtresse . . ."

(Amour, p. 134), he is, in a sense, fulfilling by writing his treatise: he constantly revisits his memories of Métilde. There is, perhaps, the hope that by fatiguing his imagination and emotional response, he will cease to feel love; he will be satisfied. In any case, the consideration of cures indicates that Stendhal was confronting the problem of happiness. In the face of fresh experience, he has doubts as to whether the state of being in love is the summit of happiness for him. He turns to knowledge, the act of deriving ideas about one's experience, and from this very experience, to show him whether his experience of love is happiness. His formation as a philosophe is to be applied and

exactly towards the end for which he so prepared himself to be a thinker. The De l'Amour enterprise may be seen as Stendhal's effort to decide through analysis whether happiness for him is the state of love, that is the state of revery. His decision is that it is. The final chapter of Book II, "Werther et don Juan," is the enthusiastic affirmation that happiness through revery, in the realm of memory, is the summit of happiness.

Love-Passion

Book I of De l'Amour is devoted to the description of a person passionately in love, of one who experiences the type of love Stendhal terms amour-passion, love-passion. He describes how this passion comes about, the nature of it, the behavior this causes in the lover, the type of happiness particular to this type of love, and remedies for this state. For us it offers little new information. Stendhal presents those ideas about love which we have seen him reflecting on and formulating since he began his career as a psychologist. Maine de Biran's earlier explanation of passions founded on imagination is the basis of his theory of love in De l'Amour. Etienne Rey in his well-known preface to De l'Amour affirms, as well, that Stendhal is presenting ideas

with which he has long lived: "La remarque a déjà été faite que la personnalité de Stendhal, si complexe soit-elle, s'est trouvée formée et fixée très tôt. Tel il apparaît en 1819, à trente-six ans, tel il était déjà depuis sa première jeunesse. Il y a, chez lui, à travers une existence incertaine et brisée, une continuité interne remarquable." ⁵ De l'Amour represents Stendhal's concerted

organization of these ideas towards the end of presenting an intelligible picture of himself to Métilde, and as we should like to suggest, also to himself in order that he may weigh the wisdom of his behavior. We know the nature of Stendhal's way of being in love; it is Saint-Preux's, his early model, it is Werther's, whose passion is regarded in De l'Amour as the epitomy of love-passion. De l'Amour launches these ideas and gives them an unforgettable vocabulary.

As he describes love-passion in the treatise, "le principal phénomène de cette folie nommée amour" (Amour, p. 29) is "cristallisation"; "c'est l'opération de l'esprit, qui tire de tout ce qui se présente la découverte que l'objet aimé a de nouvelles perfections" (Amour, p. 25). A lover "se plaît à orner de mille perfections une femme" (Amour, p. 24), that is he gives full reign to imagination, which changes memories of his beloved to suit his ideals of perfection, the contemplation of which makes him happy: "La beauté que vous découvrez étant donc une nouvelle aptitude à

vous donner du plaisir, les plaisirs variant comme les individus, la cristallisation formée dans la tête de chaque homme doit porter la couleur des plaisirs de cet homme" (Amour, p. 43).

He reaffirms, thus, through his neologism crystallization (the connotation is new) that this source of happiness is entirely dependent upon the inner world of memories: "L'amour est la seule passion qui se paie d'une monnaie qu'elle fabrique elle-même" (Amour, p. 301); it is an opportunity to exult in those cherished sensations associated with one's remembered ideals, to which one holds despite the facts. Such a lover is oblivious to reality: "J'ai donné une idée bien pauvre du véritable amour, de l'amour qui occupe toute l'âme . . . la rend complètement insensible à tout le reste de ce qui existe" (Amour, p. 91).

Crystallization is not particular to love-passion. Any person desiring something may crystallize on it; for example: ". . . le ravissant bonheur du pouvoir, celui que les ministres et rois font semblant de mépriser. Ce bonheur a aussi sa cristallisation . . ." (Amour, p. 259). The difference between love-passion and other passions is that crystallization is the central activity of the former, the chief source of happiness. This can be so while the passion is noble, the thrust of one's feeling is not egotistic: "Cependant l'amour n'est une passion qu'autant qu'il fait oublier l'amour-propre" (Amour, p. 229). One experiences happiness by contemplating

the qualities of another. In love-passion one moves towards another:

"Il nous emporte au travers de tous nos intérêts" (Amour, p. 21).

Crystallization is the privileged means to attain this happiness, while in other passions the goal of which is possession of an object for self-centered gratification, the functioning of imagination is partly compensatory, partly ornamental: the real goal is possession.

This state of happiness is eminently passive. It requires no attempt to possess, and given its foundation in imagination, there is no need to perceive one's beloved objectively. The life of this passion is revery; one knows happiness that is particular to the state of sensation; a person is one with feeling, the soul "est la sensation elle-même" (Amour, p. 48). Stendhal compares the happiness of being in love with the state caused in a sensitive person listening to music, and in so doing he shows that pleasure consists in effortless response: "Je viens d'éprouver ce soir que la musique, quand elle est parfaite, met le coeur exactement dans la même situation où il se trouve quand il jouit de la présence de ce qu'il aime . . ." (Amour, p. 51). One has merely to be in a situation--in the presence of the beloved--for happiness to come about; feelings associated with images recalled by the situation come spontaneously. Stendhal in another passage underlines the involuntary nature of this kind of love: the imagination is a free

agent, crystallization happens without consent: "L'amour est comme la fièvre, il naît et s'éteint sans que la volonté y ait la moindre part. Voilà une des principales différences de l'amour-gout et de l'amour-passion, et l'on ne peut s'appaudir des belles qualités de ce qu'on aime, que comme d'un hasard heureux" (Amour, p. 32).

This résumé of the nature of love-passion as Stendhal defines it in De l'Amour, while harking back to his earliest personal experiences of love and Maine de Biran's theories on the passions of imagination, bears a few resemblances to Destutt de Tracy's uncompleted work De l'Amour, particularly Stendhal's opinion on the passive nature of this passion. Tracy's treatise was first published in Italian (Dell'Amore, the translation by Giuseppe Compagnoni; the original French text has never been recovered), in 1819. The mentor of both Stendhal and Maine de Biran (although Biran's work on passion in the Influence de l'habitude antedates Tracy's treatise on love) maintains that in the passion of love "nous sommes entièrement passifs. On peut dire avec vérité que dans les autres passions nous agissons sur notre organisme; dans celle-là l'organisme agit sur nous. . . ." ⁶ This very note resounds in Stendhal's De l'Amour.

Not surprisingly for us, Stendhal affirms that because of the passivity of this state of happiness, love-passion is especially

attractive to melancholics. Continuing the comparison between music and love, Stendhal states that music is appealing to the âmes tendres because they derive therefrom pleasurable sensations without any thought of activity: "Un air tendre et triste, pourvu qu'il ne soit pas trop dramatique, que l'imagination ne soit pas forcée de songer à l'action, excitant purement à la rêverie de l'amour, est délicieux pour les âmes tendres et malheureuses" (Amour, p. 52). Crystallization provides a same kind of effortless enjoyment, causing love-passion to be the most suitable kind of passion for those who cannot translate their desires into concerted activity.

Stendhal completes his presentation of the nature of love-passion with many descriptions of an unfortunately necessary activity: the suit. The necessary condition for crystallization is hope that one's love will be reciprocated. This brings about the courtship, the effort to express one's love and to elicit a reciprocal expression in the other. These observations on courtship are found throughout the work, but one finds a concentration of them in Chapitre XXIV, "Voyage dans un pays inconnu." This chapter must have been of particular concern to Stendhal, for here he confronts one of the sources of his sorrow: his poor communication.

From our discussion in Chapter II of the difference between the state of perception and that of sensation we are not surprised to find Stendhal in De l'Amour remarking on the paradoxical situation in which a passionate lover finds himself: he is all feeling in the presence of the lady, yet he is expected to overcome this state of sensation in order to have the concentration necessary to communicate his love appropriately; an effort which Stendhal finds countereffective: "L'effort qu'on se fait est si violent qu'on a l'air froid. L'amour se cache par son excès" (Amour, p. 69). The effort is necessary, but the goal of perfect communication, where form accurately expresses content, is unattainable. In the case of love-passion, the recipient of the communication must know that the sign of passionate love is coldness.

Ease of expression, suave behavior, indicating that a lover is sufficiently perceptive to communicate eloquently, are signs of a small degree of passion, the nature of which is to unsettle, so that the sign of a truly passionate lover is his discomfiture, clumsy expression, or even apparent disinterest:

L'âme prosaïque reçoit justement le degré de chaleur qui lui manque habituellement, tandis que la pauvre âme tendre devient folle par excès de sentiment, et, qui plus est, a la prétention de cacher sa folie. Toute occupée à gouverner ses propres transports, elle est bien loin du

sang-froid qu'il faut pour prendre ses avantages, et sort brouillée d'une visite où l'âme prosaïque eût fait un grand pas. Dès qu'il s'agit des intérêts trop vifs de sa passion, une âme tendre et fière ne peut pas être éloquente auprès de ce qu'elle aime . . . L'âme vulgaire, au contraire, calcule juste les chances de succès . . . l'âme tendre, qui, avec tout l'esprit possible, n'a jamais l'aisance nécessaire pour dire les choses les plus simples et du succès le plus assuré. (Amour, p. 68)

We note the rhetorical tone of this passage, where Stendhal terms a non-passionate lover "prosaic" or "vulgar," "common": he is addressing Métilde, showing her that the terms with which she described him suit a person whose behavior was exactly the opposite of his own.

Stendhal's fantasy has always been that he could forego active communication, that his love for his lady and hers for him would be spontaneously expressed without the effort, unnatural to this state, of making love intelligible: "S'il y a le naturel parfait, le bonheur de deux individus arrive à être confondu" (Amour, p. 105). He believes, however, that spontaneous behavior, or "le naturel parfait," has been made impossible in women by rules of society. Women risk danger if they express their feelings naturally. They must be reserved and guarded or else they may lose their reputation: "Une légère liberté, prise du côté tendre par l'homme qu'on aime, donne un moment de plaisir vif; s'il a l'air de la blâmer ou

seulement de ne pas en jouir avec transport, elle doit laisser dans l'âme un doute affreux" (Amour, p. 74). Has she compromised her good name, necessary for respect?

Woman of this extreme modesty and pride, who have difficulty acting on their desires, prefer, therefore, men with character, who will take steps to engage them in love: "Serait-ce par un effet de la pudeur et du mortel ennui qu'elle doit imposer à plusieurs femmes, que la plupart d'entre elles n'estiment rien tant dans un homme que l'effronterie? Ou prennent-elles l'effronterie pour du caractère?" (Amour, p. 79) With passionate lovers, who act clumsily and with fear, such women do not think that they will be led to overcome their modesty, and they find such men uninteresting: "L'excès de la pudeur et sa sévérité découragent d'aimer les âmes tendres et timides, justement celles qui sont faites pour donner et sentir les délices de l'amour" (Amour, p. 79).

Women's pride, which discourages them from giving way to spontaneous behavior, is what makes the suit necessary, which requires the lover to act, behavior contrary to the state of love and the melancholic temperament: "Un homme qui aime vraiment, quand son amie lui dit des choses qui le rendent heureux, n'a plus la force de parler" (Amour, p. 103).

Stendhal sees that it was the inaccurate communication between Métilde and him, her misinterpretation of his behavior,

that prevented her from loving him or at least recognizing the caliber of his soul. But the nature of his love for her, the nature of amour-passion, is, however, what leads him to proclaim that here is happiness, regardless of any unfortunate real outcome of passion. The unhappiness the rejected Stendhal feels has to do with ennui, the pain of the "dead blank" (Amour, p. 95), of suddenly enjoying no longer the pleasure of reverie, which is impossible when there is no longer any hope that the other loves one. It is partly the sorrow which comes from being out of love that proves to him that the state of being in love is happiness:

Avec l'amour, je sens qu'il existe à deux
pas de moi un bonheur immense et au-delà de
tous mes vœux . . .

Sans passion comme Schiasseti, les jours
tristes, je ne vois nulle part le bonheur,
j'arrive à douter qu'il existe pour moi, je
tombe dans le spleen. (Amour, p. 95)

Knowledge, Stendhal has claimed, is the result of judgment, of comparing. He has satisfied this condition when he claims that "les Werther" are "plus heureux" (Amour, p. 231); when he is passionately in love he is the happiest. We know what the nature of this happiness is. Because of the activity of crystallization the focus of which is another, the lover is constantly ecstatically and newly moved. We have discussed the advantages of passion based on imagination. Images of the object of desire change endlessly so

that it never becomes habitual; new, delightful facets of it are uncovered unceasingly. The activity of imagination is abetted by the nobility of this passion. One's concern not being for oneself but for the welfare of the beloved, one's fantasies, which take the route of admiring reflections on the perfection of one's lady: the lover "se plait à orner de mille perfections une femme," know no bounds, for in transcending oneself, one meets the unknown or the other. Stendhal compares the joy of a lover with the experience of wonder of someone who is discovering an enchanting new world: "L'amour-passion jette aux yeux d'un homme toute la nature avec ses aspects sublimes, comme une nouveauté inventée d'hier" (Amour, p. 235).

Stendhal reaffirms as well in De l'amour that love "à la Werther ouvre l'âme à tous les arts, à toutes les impressions douces et romantiques, au clair de lune, à la beauté des bois" (Amour, p. 229). The qualities admired in one's lady are suddenly recalled by nature and art: "La vue de tout ce qui est extrêmement beau, dans la nature et dans les arts, rappelle le souvenir de ce qu'on aime, avec la rapidité de l'éclair" (Amour, p. 48). Due to the phenomenon of association, which Stendhal had earlier discovered, the passionate lover's opportunity for revery is increased manifoldly, and thus his experience of happiness. We remark that Stendhal stresses that it is the experience of the

sublime: "la vue de tout ce qui est extrêmement beau," the ability to lose oneself in ecstatic experience of the properties of another, in art and in nature, that recalls one's beloved. Being so moved, which is the beau idéal of modern art, is common to the experience of art, nature, and love; one experience recalls the others. The aesthetic experience is possible outside of art; it is also the primary experience of love-passion: "L'amour à la Werther ouvre l'âme . . . au sentiment et à la jouissance du beau, sous quelque forme qu'il se présente . . ." (Amour, p. 229).

Stendhal has compared the happiness of love-passion chiefly with that resulting from Donjuanism, and he does not find them equivalent. Chapitre LIV, "Werther et don Juan," is devoted to this comparison. The decision to weigh love-passion against Donjuanism is significant. Donjuanism was undoubtedly the only type of love that tempted Stendhal. We have seen him consider this route during his pursuit of Mélanie Guilbert. It is a type of amour de vanité, but the goal is not to win esteem from others, but rather to exult in the knowledge of one's superior talents: "L'amour à la don Juan est un sentiment dans le genre du goût pour la chasse. C'est un besoin d'activité qui doit être réveillée par des objets divers et mettant sans cesse en doute votre talent" (Amour, p. 235). It is the opposite of love passion: the former completely self-centered, the latter, other-centered. Don Juan must test himself

in the real world, triumph over real obstacles; Werther, passive, reacts passionately to spontaneous images, in total self-forgetfulness. Stendhal had bouts with ambition; he lusted for power from time to time, for the opportunity to exert his talents, which would afford him the experience of power, which is the goal sought by a Don Juan. Also, besides personal inclinations that may have led Stendhal to choose Donjuanism as a point of comparison, there is also the fact that M^étilde accused him of it in his dealings with her. Thus, his decision to compare love-passion and Donjuanism, to know which affords greater happiness, is dictated by profoundly personal motivations.

He shows that the choice of Donjuanism is unwise. Its pleasures are limited and exhaustible. A Don Juan seeks ever the same pleasure, conquest; thus, he is cut off from the experience of newness. Since he operates in the realm of the real, there comes the moment when he will have exhausted all possible objects of conquest and he meets ennui: " 'Il n'y a pas vingt variétés de femmes, et, une fois qu'on en a eu deux ou trois de chaque variété, la satiété commence' " (Amour, p. 223). Thanks to his source of happiness, a Werther, on the other hand, experiences ever new sensations: " 'Il n'y a que l'imagination qui échappe pour toujours à la satiété' " (Amour, p. 233). To be able to love like Werther, even though one may lose hope of reciprocation and

consequently know grim emptiness, is to be endowed with a propensity towards superior happiness: " 'Et du côté des affections, que ne doit-on pas à l'amour? Après les hasards de la première jeunesse, le coeur se ferme à la sympathie Au milieu de ce désert aride, l'amour fait jaillir une source de sentiments plus abondante et plus fraîche même que celle de la première jeunesse Tout [prend] pour moi une teinte mystérieuse'"

(Amour, pp. 98-99).

We remark that Stendhal bases his decision on positive, sensual evidence: the quality and quantity of sensation. Even though Werther's source of happiness is imagination, not reality, his experience of pleasure is concrete. Turning one's back on reality and insulating oneself in the world of memory is a condition of greater positive happiness:

Par toutes les raisons présentées jusqu'ici, il me semble que la question se balance. Ce qui me fait croire les Werther plus heureux, c'est que don Juan réduit l'amour à n'être qu'une affaire ordinaire. Au lieu d'avoir comme Werther des réalités qui se modèlent sur ses désirs, il a des désirs imparfaitement satisfaits par la froide réalité. . . .

(Amour, p. 231)

In showing that a lover who lives in revery is happier than a Don Juan with brilliant conquests, who must depend upon and know reality well, Stendhal is also showing that knowledge is not

essential to the experience of happiness. Forming accurate ideas plays no part in Werther's love for Charlotte. Not only is knowledge immaterial, it is impossible to attain. His earlier fear, sometimes hope, that contact with reality would stop imagination is resolved. He writes in De l'Amour: "Dans cette passion terrible, toujours une chose imaginée est une chose existante" (Amour, p. 108).

While knowledge is not necessary for the experience itself of happiness, the state of crystallizing, knowledge has nonetheless affirmed to Stendhal where it lies for him. The reason for his interest in Ideology or in the science of forming ideas is fulfilled. Through analysis of experience, Stendhal had always hoped to arrive at accurate ideas which would enable him to make correct choices as to his happiness. Analysis of his own experience has fulfilled its purpose. It shows him the direction that will lead to his greatest pleasure.

Perhaps, too, it is this knowledge that prevents madness. It is the shock of delusion that causes the mania of melancholy, the disenchanting realization that what we were entertaining has no hold in reality. Knowledge of what love-passion is teaches that reality has no hold on this passion; it shows the almost auto-generation of passion and that this is on what happiness is dependent, and not on a correspondence between our images of the love object and itself. Stendhal remarks that someone first disappointed in love loves even

more passionately the second time because the experience of ennui has shown him that being so preoccupied is his happiness: "Or une âme tendre se connaît à vingt-huit ans; elle sait que si pour elle il est encore du bonheur dans la vie, c'est à l'amour qu'il faut le demander . . ." (Amour, p. 37). He can love again almost in the comfort of his present understanding that reality has little bearing on his happiness. Madness is unnecessary if we know what is our pleasure.

Happiness and the Vocation of the Artist

De l'Amour may be seen as one of the culminating points of Stendhal's preparation as a psychologist or a philosophe. His novels are the other apex. In both instances, in the case of determining what is one's happiness and of recreating human experience effectively, Stendhal believed that an understanding of behavior was crucial to success.

But the De l'Amour experiment was necessary for the novels to come. In coming to fill consciousness of where his happiness lies, in privileged memories, Stendhal affirms to himself that he will find happiness in the vocation of the artist, and specifically of the novelist.

We have seen Stendhal observe in the Histoire de la peinture en Italie that artists are often motivated to write out of the desire to relive their memories of their love for their lady, for the pleasure of melancholy and of "douleur regrettante." He offers the anecdote about Fra Filippo Lippi to illustrate this point: "Quelquefois il ne pouvait pas même pénétrer jusqu'aux femmes célèbres qu'il s'avisait d'aimer. Sa ressource alors était de faire leur portrait. Il passait les jours et les nuits devant son ouvrage, et faisant la conversation avec le portrait, il cherchait quelque soulagement à sa peine" (H. P. I., I, 140). Stendhal considers that creation is a means to remain in the world of revery, as Fra Filippo Lippi used it. Thus, the vocation of the artist will allow Stendhal to indulge in revery, to attain the desired sensations, which he has decided is his means of happiness.

The motivation to write first a novel, the Roman de Métilde, is easily seen as similar to Stendhal's explanation for what prompted the Friar to create. Denied unlimited access to Métilde, he could still attain her in memory kept active through recourse to it for creation. The fact that Stendhal abandoned this possibility may be interpreted, as we have done so throughout this chapter, as a consequence of his will to know, rather, whether his embrace of revery as a source of happiness is valid. His discovery leads to an affirmative answer, and Stendhal will proceed to be an artist.

The Roman de M^étilde will finally materialize. The nature of the love-passion that characterized the affair Beyle-Dembowski will be recreated in the major novels: Armance, Le Rouge et le Noir, Lucien Leuwen, and La Chartreuse de Parme. One is even reminded of facts and scenes of this affair in the novels. There are interfering third parties: Mme Derville in Le Rouge, Dr. Du Poirier in Lucien Leuwen, and misreadings of signs of love between the lovers, particularly in the incomplete Lucien Leuwen, where it adds to the unfortunate outcome of the passion between Lucien and Mme de Chasteller--indeed, this novel reads often as a dramatization of love-passion as described in De l'Amour. Mme de R^ênal, like M^étilde, is the devoted mother of two sons, and both Mme de R^ênal and Mme de Chasteller, like M^étilde, have had poor initial contact with love; all three knew the experience of having husbands unsuited to their nature.

Stendhal opts for the world of imagination; he affirms his predilection for being a writer. The novel as genre had to suggest itself to Stendhal as the suitable vehicle for what was going to be an expression of a rarefied state of the soul. We have already discussed how Stendhal came to abandon the theater when he gave up hope of appealing to a larger audience. Besides this consideration that may have caused him to turn instead to the novel, could the theater support his highly undramatic view of love, which takes

place practically all internally? Is not the novel the best genre for the expression of love-passion?

Love is a good subject for a novel perhaps because its visibly uneventful course made it suitable for this genre. In an early passage about the epic genre, from 1803, Stendhal observes that the narrative form of the epic serves to express best criminal or incestuous passions, which must be hidden: "Les passions qui cherchent à se cacher elles-mêmes comme les passions incestueuses ou criminelles, font beaucoup plus d'effet dans l'épopée où le poète peut raconter ce qui se passe dans l'âme de ses personnages que dans le drame, où le spectateur ne sait que ce que les acteurs lui disent" (J. L., I, 152). He can now add love-passion to the list of passions that are hidden, and thus difficult to dramatize. A narrative genre where "le poète peut raconter ce qui se passe dans l'âme de ses personnages" would express love-passion the best. He observes, however, in De l'Amour, that novelists have not achieved effective expression of love-passion; they communicate its nobility poorly: "C'est que, par les lois du roman, la peinture de l'amour vertueux est essentiellement ennuyeuse et peu intéressante . . . Mais tout cela est une infirmité de l'art de peindre, qui ne fait rien à la passion telle qu'elle existe dans la nature" (Amour, p. 232). Stendhal does not provide a list of these "lois du roman," but obviously, novelists have not yet

exploited the narrative potential of the genre, where one of Stendhal's great contributions to the novel form will lie. Stendhal realized the potential of the narrator to add to the creation of the characters. His status of being an outsider, an observer allows him to reveal about a character what the latter is unaware of himself. Furthermore, Stendhal conceived of the interior monologue: characters who think out loud and unconsciously so, a technique by means of which we are made witness to otherwise imperceptible, interior workings of the mind and heart of the character. A character may reveal thoughts and feelings of which he himself may be unaware. The fact that he is ignorant that he is performing assures the naturalness of his behavior, which convinces the reader of the authenticity of it. The theatrical monologue, even though a character may be alone and deeply lost in personal thoughts, cannot be as revealing; a character from a play can speak only of what he is conscious, and it cannot have the same effect, for he must speak, which means make an effort, translate his ideas into words. Thus, he is conscious and the impression that we are present at the most natural, that is spontaneous, direct expression of the soul is not as strong.

In a novel, through the narrator and the characters who think out loud, Stendhal could present characters more fully and express their passionate natures more effectively. He made the novel into

a genre perfect for the psychological investigation of what is often most unspeakable, unknown even to the characters themselves. His choice to be a novelist enabled him to recreate his state of happiness in all its detail.

Michael Wood terms De l'Amour a "false start". Stendhal misunderstood that his best expression of love was to be a creative one; rather, at this time, given his formation as a thinker, he felt obliged to give an analytical expression of love: "In De l'Amour all Stendhal's early intellectual baggage hangs heavily on him, the book is a false start, a move in a direction which was not to be his." ⁷ Wood suggests that Stendhal believed that he could adequately account for the passion through analysis, a position that would reflect his philosophe formation. Yet, we do not find an insistence on the author's part that his analysis describes love adequately. On the contrary, he is conscious throughout that his descriptions are imperfect; for example, he writes that "La rêverie de l'amour ne peut se noter" (Amour, p. 48); he admits that the central activity of the passion is unknowable, and we know his reason: one has no memory of the state of sensation where perception is dormant: "Mais comment peindre le bonheur s'il ne laisse pas de souvenirs?" (Amour, p. 102) Moreover, Stendhal knew that the experience of feeling is incommunicable discursively.

It is our opinion that Stendhal had to write an analytical work before a novel, where he will express love effectively, in order to satisfy the irrepressible part of his personality that wants to know, and for the very reason that knowledge, according to Stendhal, leads to happiness. De l'Amour was not an attempt at knowledge for knowledge's sake. Stendhal had to answer to his intellectual side before continuing in a course that he knows is rocky.

The development of Julien Sorel parallels Stendhal's closely. Julien consciously holds to the need to be analytical so that he may more successfully confront reality and achieve his goals of ambition (although the narrator keeps us aware of how little this stance corresponds to the fundamental personality of this Tartuffe) only to discover in prison that his happiness lies in love-passion (needless to say that prison is the ideal location to be in love. One can dream there endlessly, without interruption). Julien needed the knowledge of experience to know what real happiness is.

The personal outcome of the De l'Amour enterprise is an affirmation that knowledge is a means to happiness but an indirect one. It is a support necessary to one who thirsts for a particular kind of happiness but who is unsure as to whether the happiness he chooses will really satisfy him. This need for support is reflective of the times in which Stendhal lived, indeed for all times following upon the discovery of relativity and of the possibility of a godless

universe. Stendhal wanted happiness in this life; he sought all from actual experience, placing no faith in a compensatory afterlife.

The De l'Amour effort marks the period of a major decision in Stendhal's life. Should he follow his own inclinations or should he be a Don Juan? Should he turn his back on reality or choose to live the more conventional life of egocentricity? This is a decision that bears, of course, on his artistic vocation. Will he write novels that consecrate his ideal and keep alive his beloved reveries or should he produce a literature that will appeal to a mass audience whereby he could attain gratifying accolades? Stendhal needed the proof of analysis to make this decision that concerned his well-being directly.

Stendhal, Idéologue

Since De l'Amour is an analysis of love, we should like to show in this section how Stendhal put into practice what he had learned about the science of forming ideas. This is Stendhal's only treatise, his one concerted effort to describe a passion; thus, it is the perfect work to determine whether Stendhal's formation as a thinker really had an effect.

We have discussed the personal motivation for this enterprise, but we also recall that as an aspiring artist Stendhal had always considered that knowledge about passion was necessary for

the creation of characters. It is from this perspective that the whole of De l'Amour, Books I and II, gains unity. It has often been observed that the two books of the treatise deal with love from the inside and from the outside respectively. I quote Martineau's description:

"L'auteur a divisé son grand sujet en deux parties, bien tranchées: dans la première, c'est l'amour étudié par le dedans, avec l'analyse de la passion et son évolution, et sous ce couvert, on l'a vu, une sorte de confession, de monographie personnelle. Dans la seconde, c'est l'amour vu du dehors, une véritable étude idéologique, avec l'examen minutieux de toutes les conditions extérieures à l'âme même de l'individu et qui en amènent les variations incessantes: les climats, les gouvernements, les tempéraments, le sexe, l'éducation des femmes, le mariage." ⁸ Stendhal's concern for what determines the development of a particular kind of passion bears on his vocation as an artist, who must account for the motivation of his character's behavior. He needed to analyze love well to represent it.

Stendhal calls De l'Amour an attempt at Ideology: "J'ai appelé cet essai un livre d'idéologie" (Amour, p. 29), avowing at the same time that this is an incorrect appellation, for Ideology is the science of ideas; but his intention is to proceed with an analysis of love as Tracy analyzed the function of forming ideas: "Si l'idéologie est une description détaillée des idées et de toutes les

parties qui peuvent les composer, le présent livre est une description détaillée et minutieuse de tous les sentiments qui composent la passion nommée l'amour" (Amour, p. 29).

We find foremost recognized in this campaign to know love Stendhal's conviction--what prompted us to undertake the study of the role of memory in Stendhal's thinking--that he is suited for this analysis because he has personal experience of it; he is in command of the necessary foundation, positive memories, which will enable him to arrive at truths. He will determine the nature of amour-passion, which was his ideal of happiness before writing the work and which will remain so after.

Stendhal affirms his rejection of idealism - Platonic or Cartesian - in his Preface of 1826 to De l'Amour. He states again that his work was an attempt to explain love "simplement, raisonnablement, mathématiquement" (Amour, p. 332), but this can only be done in the face of experience. Ideas deduced from an apriori, abstract idea of love hold no water; rather, ideas to be valid must be derived from experience. In comparing his attempt to describe the experience of love to that of analyzing a geometrical figure, he insists: "Imaginez une figure de géométrie assez compliquée, tracée avec du crayon blanc sur une grande ardoise: eh bien! je vais expliquer cette figure de géométrie; mais une condition nécessaire, c'est qu'il faut qu'elle existe déjà sur

l'ardoise . . ." (Amour, 332). Stendhal is faithful to his early sensualist preparation that valid ideas are the result of experience.

He goes even further in insisting that memory is the foundation of knowledge by declaring that only that public which has personal experience of love-passion is able to accept his analysis as true; they alone have the necessary memories which will validate his deductions for them: "Qu'est-ce donc que connaître l'amour par les romans? que serait-ce après l'avoir vu décrit dans des centaines de volumes à réputation, mais ne l'avoir jamais senti, que chercher dans celui-ci l'explication de cette folie? je répondrai comme un écho: 'C'est folie' " (Amour, p. 333). We confront yet another instance of his conviction that memory is the foundation of knowing. He sees that to understand love, more than any other attempt to know something, requires a foundation of personal experience because love is composed of so many nuances all of which are impossible to describe since so many of them resist being grasped by discourse: "L'amour est comme ce qu'on appelle au ciel la voie lactée, un amas brillant formé par des milliers de petites étoiles, dont chacune est souvent une nébuleuse" (Amour, pp, 332-33). The reader must be able to complement with his own indescribable impressions that which the analyst can only suggest and not plot out graphically.

Stendhal's concentration on love-passion, besides the purpose to communicate his love to M^étilde, is a function of his belief that he may write only from personal experience; this is the type of love he is really in a position to know. He briefly describes other varieties of love: love-taste, love-vanity, and physical love. While it is true that he undoubtedly would have found it impossible to concentrate on them, so well did he describe himself in 1804: "Je ne crois pas que je fasse jamais de grandes découvertes dans l'analyse des sentiments ordinaires de l'homme"--he had no interest in such types of love--, he has also small experience of them, which is necessary to substantiate ideas.

But our affirmation that Stendhal concentrated on love-passion for the sake of truth, besides personal reasons, points up a paradox: his constant disclaimers that he speaks from personal experience; for example: "On rappelle que si l'auteur emploie quelquefois la tournure de je, c'est pour essayer de jeter quelque variété dans la forme de cet essai. Il n'a nullement la prétention d'entretenir ses lecteurs de ses propres sentiments" (Amour, p. 104). He is ostensibly translating the journal of an Italian, Lisio Visconti (who died in Volterra in 1819!). This apparent contradiction is easily resolved, and the repeated insistence that what he writes is translation actually serves an analytic goal.

In claiming that he is solely translating, Stendhal gives the responsibility for the ideas to Visconti and he has written from personal experience. In the first part the translator assures us that we are reading ideas drawn from Visconti's personal experience of being in love. In the second half, in indicating what forces determine a particular manifestation of love in different societies, Visconti is supposedly drawing conclusions mainly from his personal observations of these societies. We know that Stendhal had solid experience of the French, Italian, and , to a lesser extent, German society. Through Visconti, he gives voice to ideas that he is able to substantiate with references from his own experience. Furthermore, Stendhal-Visconti is often frank when he is relying on the experience of others: "J'aime trop l'Angleterre et je l'ai trop peu vue pour en parler. Je me sers des observations d'un ami" (Amour, p. 158); he has small experience of England, Spain, and Switzerland and none at all, naturally, of Provence in the twelfth century and of pre-Islamic Arabia. However, when depending upon sources other than personal observations, Stendhal is careful to provide anecdotes, scenes of actual behavior that give credibility to the abstract ideas formulated about love in these areas. He takes pains to show that these ideas, even though not deduced from his personal experience, have at least some concrete reference attested to by another.

Thus, on both counts, the analysis of love from the inside and from the outside, Stendhal does not err against his prescription for arriving at truth. In claiming that he is merely translating, he is nonetheless translating the ideas of another who has had real contact with love and who has lived abroad.

But the dishonest disclaimer has honest functions, one of which is to enable the author to be more truthful. Very obviously it serves to veil actual personalities and thus to protect the right to privacy. Still wincing under the pain of being called indiscreet by Métilde, Stendhal would not risk an even more serious accusation of this kind by the very proud Métilde. Furthermore, by nature and by principle, Stendhal shied at the prospect of a public disclosure of what was passionately preoccupying him

What is, however, more significant as concerns our interest in Stendhal as Idéologue is that the mask of Visconti serves the important function of fostering objectivity. Stendhal comes to De l'Amour with full awareness of his melancholic temperament. He writes in the treatise, the now well-known Chapitre IX: "Je fais tous les efforts possibles pour être sec. Je veux imposer silence à mon coeur qui croit avoir beaucoup à dire. Je tremble toujours de n'avoir écrit qu'un soupir, quand je crois avoir noté une vérité" (Amour, p. 40). These words point to Stendhal's consciousness that he perceives the object of his emotions with

difficulty. We have already mentioned his reaffirmation in De l'Amour that one can have no memory of states of happiness that are pure emotion: "Mais comment peindre l'amour, s'il ne laisse pas de souvenirs?" He has long been conscious of the difficulty faced by anyone who wants to know what resists being grasped in discourse. One may wax only lyrically, not analytically, about experience that is unperceived; one can offer "sighs" easily and truths only with difficulty. But Stendhal is concerned as to whether he can perceive accurately or not what he can remember, because his is a "heart" that dominates over any imperative to reason. He will easily abandon himself to revery over the subject of his study, especially as he writes in the throes of his passion for Métilde, the obsessive subject of his attention; in 1818 he writes in the Journal: "Je l'aime trop pour travailler." Can he hope to know what is fact and what is fiction? His so active imagination is working at full speed, creating its own facts out of positive memories; he notes in 1820: "Le bonheur de D [ominique] [one of his well-known pseudonyms] consiste à avoir l'imagination occupée." 10 Stendhal insists that one must have personal experience to write accurately about love, but this condition is exactly what makes one tend to write a novel: "Cette impossibilité [i. e. to write about love without experience] est ce qui rend si difficile de faire sur l'amour un livre qui ne soit pas un roman" (Amour, p. 332).

When writing on love, one tends to write creatively, that is to give expression to the feeling of being in love rather than to describe this state coldly.

In the face of this self-knowledge, where Stendhal sees lucidly that he will have difficulty being "sec," dry, or detached, we are prompted to conclude that displacement of his experience into the life of another is an effort on his part to force himself to be more objective. Seeing himself as another functions as a kind of self-discipline, silencing the voice of subjectivity that shouts down any remonstrance from distant, unfeeling observation. He further objectifies himself in speaking of another, in using the third person.

Stendhal does not, however, always silence his heart. In the chapters, which from the scrupulous organization of them in the Table of Contents promise to be strict expositions of the matter in question, the author frequently introduces developments that reflect biases stemming from personal, emotional reactions. The author is not always detached; for example, in Chapitre XIV Stendhal introduces the notion of the association among love, art, and nature with the reasoning that "tout ce qui est beau et sublime au monde fait partie de la beauté de ce qu'on aime" (Amour, p. 47). This theme is treated objectively for most of the chapter until Stendhal is led, very naturally, to a discussion of the artist, whose privileged activity is similar to that of a lover.

This development provokes a switch from objectivity to subjectivity. The artist, like the lover, is subject to living in the world, which interrupts his periods of revery. It is not society that interrupts but "les hommes, avec leurs intérêts grossiers," who "viennent le tirer des jardins d'Armide, pour le pousser dans un bournier fétide, et ils ne peuvent guère le rendre attentif à eux qu'en l'irritant" (Amour, p. 49). Stendhal has interjected a moral judgment, out of place in a treatise, in a "physiologie de l'amour" (Amour, p. 336); he releases his emotions. We can follow the movement of his heart and mind. Speaking of art and love, Stendhal is reliving the cherished feelings proper to the activity of an artist and a lover, and he is made melancholy by the recognition that this activity is temporary. Instead of pulling back from this melancholy, he speaks from the perspective of a person in pain, who can only see what is causing it as evil. He remains in his subjectivity instead of surmounting it in order to consider both the artist and the world he must deal with objectively.

What he leaves is another kind of truth, the truth of lived experience, his emotion. As regards the choice of happiness, emotion is the arbiter of this choice, that is subjectivity is the judge. Stendhal's given capacity to feel is what leads him to know that love-passion is his greatest experience of happiness. Stendhal writes: "L'homme n'est pas libre de ne pas faire ce qui lui fait plus

de plaisir que toutes les actions possibles" (Amour, p. 32). A person's subjective response to sensation determines his ideas about what is desirable. The truth about happiness thus derives from subjective experience.

In digressing from objective analysis Stendhal is in a sense reverting to reality, to what is usual experience. While it is possible that he could view both artist and adversary detachedly, is such detachment part of normal experience? In being subjective Stendhal is communicating a truth, a common reaction of the artist, who does find the interfering world vulgar.

A completely objective analysis of love does not necessarily account for the way the experience of love actually materializes in reality. Analysis imposes an order that does not exist in experience. Stendhal's abandonments to subjectivity interject into the text a taste of the disorder that exists in reality and which is often caused by the subjective behavior of men. Certainly these emotional intrusions give the accent of truth, of lived experience, to the text that reminds the reader that the analysis is of something that exists positively; it intrudes even into the text.

There is, however, a balance. Concern for objective study of experience is evident in both parts of the work, as evidenced in particular by Stendhal's will to be precise, to present his memories and his ideas about them with exactness, devoid of the fuzziness caused by a lyrical expression of ideas.

Analysis of his memories means first and foremost using language, and we recover a familiar Stendhal, with his heightened awareness of the importance of the mot juste, exact terminology. Given the difficulty of the task at hand, particularly in Book I where he attempts to describe the individual experience of being in love, an intrinsic part of which leaves no memories, Stendhal admits that analysis cannot completely account for the passion; however, it is only the exactness of the analysis that will make it worthwhile: "J'ai uniquement pensé à décrire avec toute la maussaderie de la science, mais aussi avec toute son exactitude certains faits" (Amour, p. 99). Language enters as a consideration in this concern for precision.

Naming is defining, and Stendhal is careful to use words that distinguish, that establish differences, pinpointing different aspects of what may be a same thing but with different qualities. He laments at times the inadequacy of language, its lack of distinguishing terms, particularly with respect to the subject of amour-passion: "La langue est trop grossière pour atteindre à ces nuances" (Amour, p. 110). He realizes as well that the particular nature of a person's experience requires ideally that a specific noun be assigned to each experience to establish these distinctions. He chooses four different terms to distinguish four kinds of love, and then he throws up his hands in frustration, admitting that so many

more types of love can be perceived: "Au reste, au lieu de distinguer quatre amours différents, on peut fort bien admettre huit ou dix nuances. Il y a peut-être autant de façons de sentir parmi les hommes que de façons de voir . . ." (Amour, p. 23). Enlightened by Hobbes and Tracy, Stendhal is aware of the tendency to generalize, to seek and to establish likenesses, but the nature of experience is unique and Stendhal tries to be faithful to nature.

As a corollary to the necessity to use words that are precise for the sake of truth, Stendhal knows that he must provide specific definitions of them, for connotations of words are not held universally. Hobbes taught him the confusion that is possible when words are undefined, where the reader may assign one acceptance of a term while the author supposes another. Stendhal, for example, takes pains to define what he means by "naturel," for it is not to be confused with "habituel," or "ce qui ne s'écarte pas de la manière habituelle d'agir" (Amour, p. 105); "naturel et habituel sont deux choses" (Amour, p. 105). When in love, habitual behavior is impossible because the experience is so different from all others; rather, one becomes natural, or spontaneous, which permits the uniqueness of one's feelings to be seen. To give "une description exacte et scientifique" (Amour, p. 325) of love-passion, so that

the reader may be one with the author in understanding what is being described, Stendhal must define his terms, establish their references.

Stendhal also reaffirms the advantage of describing passionate experience: it causes feeling to cease: "La noter [the revery of a lover] c'est la tuer pour le présent, car l'on tombe dans l'analyse philosophique du plaisir" (Amour, p. 49). Again, we detect evidence of a will to approach his experience objectively. Analysis silences feeling, writes Stendhal, and he chooses this instead of deciding to write a novel. He seeks to distance himself from subjectivity and the influence of feelings.

He remarks, interestingly, after maintaining that description stops feelings, that if revery could be perceived, it would be rendered impotent. One's not being able to remember which phenomenon caused pleasure keeps it free from the effect of becoming habitual: "L'âme est apparemment trop troublée par ses émotions pour être attentive à ce qui les cause ou à ce qui les accompagne . . . C'est peut-être parce que ces plaisirs ne peuvent pas être usés par des rappels à volonté, qu'ils se renouvellent avec tant de force . . ." (Amour, p. 48). Once we perceive revery, we risk becoming desensitized to it, as we are to all experience that becomes familiar; we hear the pupil of Maine de Biran speaking.

Stendhal's concern that language be precise, particularly evident in Book I, where he tries to pin down his experience of love, is related to the effort of Book II to account for the varied influences that select a particular manifestation of love. In both instances we can almost hear resounding in Stendhal's mind Destutt de Tracy's description of the search for truth:

Raisonner n'est point une opération différente de celle de juger, remarquer de nouveaux détails dans les choses.

Un raisonnement est une suite de jugements. Ces raisonnements s'enchaînent de manière que l'attribut du premier devient le sujet du deuxième. (Cor., I, 249)

One sounds memories in the attempt to provoke new perceptions. In the case of transcription into language, Stendhal seeks to name more and more attributes of the subject. As concerns the determinants of behavior, he tries to account for the circumstances that determine the appearance of a particular kind of love. In Book I Stendhal intransigently reviews actual experience. He wants to provoke ideas, to force awareness of previously undetected aspects of his memories of his behavior; in Book II, he is not satisfied with blanket statements that Italians are such and such, but he provides anecdotes, draws parallels with the behavior of persons of other nationalities, and points to antitheses, which provoke endless occasions for insight.

Determinants of the Passion of Love

In this final section we should like to discuss what Stendhal emphasizes in the determinants of love, which, we feel, will bear fruit in the novels.

We know well what are the influences on behavior in general as Stendhal sees them; they are now familiar to us. We have traced Stendhal's view of the determination of government and of temperament, or climate, as these influences select happiness through memory and through art. They determine, of course, what type of love will appear in different countries.

Our interest has always been with Stendhal's understanding of love-passion, for this is the type of love that stems from and thrives on memories. But love-passion is also Stendhal's primary interest in Book II of De l'Amour. In discussing what causes particular types of love to appear in specific geographical regions, ruled by a particular type of government, he is really determining why love-passion develops in such regions or not; what selects recourse to memory as the source of happiness. Love-passion will be the subject of his novels; in De l'Amour Stendhal is preparing himself through his analysis of the influences on the behavior of being passionately in love to create this passion in his novels.

Before we take up those determinants on which Stendhal focuses, we should like to point out Stendhal's praise of the Italians and of the female sex; they know well the pleasure of crystallization, the happiness to be discovered through revery.

We are not surprised to find that Italy is Stendhal's choice of the privileged land for the cultivation of love-passion: "Je prie qu'on me pardonne si je reviens souvent à l'Italie, dans l'état actuel des mœurs de l'Europe, c'est le seul pays où croisse en liberté la plante que je décris" (Amour, p. 114). We remember that De l'Amour is presumably the translation of an Italian's journal.

Political and climatic, or temperamental, conditions in Italy foster the functioning of imagination, encourage crystallization, and make Italy the privileged locality for the flowering of love-passion.

The Italian claims the right to pursue his desires, to give himself over to passions, and we know that the cultivation of passion is encouraged in Italy by its luxuriant climate, which makes one intensely responsive to sensations. But with respect to contemporary Italy, Stendhal may no longer maintain that a republican government encourages the passionate nature of the Italians. Republican governments no longer exist in Italy, but neither do monarchies, or at least monarchies as they existed in France. The governments of Italian states resemble more closely tyrannies, absolutist governments by force that must continually

flex their muscles to keep their people subjugated. Such governments force a recourse to the passion of love as a source of happiness.

The spirit of republicanism animates Italians; they are lovers of liberty, and they defy rule by force. They do not bend spiritually if they must do so by force ostensibly: "On y sait par coeur le vers de La Fontaine: 'Votre ennemi c'est votre M [aître]' "

(Amour, p. 173). The modern Italian is characterized by extreme defiance. He has contempt for the arbiters of power. His passionate nature is thus not enervated by absolutism but it has few conventional means for expression. Love is one of them; an absolutist government encourages love-passion. Stendhal notes that besides the temperament of the Italian, which inclines him to seek sensation-giving revery, his "défiance extrême et pourtant raisonnable . . . augmente l'isolement et double le charme de l'intimité" (Amour, p. 149). Thrown back on himself as the unique source of happiness, because of his contemptuous attitude towards political authorities that forbid self-expression, an Italian reacts to his impotent situation, creative of much leisure time, by indulging in love-passion. Tyranny proscribes activity; desired goals cannot be achieved. Thus, the arts and sciences suffer; no one is encouraged to bring desires to fruition. The modern Italian must rely on the self-contained world of love to realize his passionate nature.

Whereas the result is lamentable as concerns the literary and intellectual glory of Italy, Stendhal sees that the individual Italian is somewhat compensated by his necessary recourse to love, to imagination for happiness. Certainly the foreigner benefits from this situation, for the imaginative Italian in giving all his attention to love offers the tourist an opportunity to discover a fresh, original experience of love. Love Italian style is the subject of La Chartreuse de Parme; it is Stendhal's enthusiastic celebration of the resourceful aspect of the Italian nature that succeeds in achieving the liberation of passion in the midst of the most odious political restraints.

Stendhal knew his Montesquieu well and as the latter used his Persians to criticize the French, the purpose of Stendhal's praise of the Italians seems, likewise, to serve an intent to castigate the French. The two peoples are constantly under review, and one is rarely spoken of except in connection with how it differs from the other. These comparisons are, of course, central to Stendhal's personal preoccupations. He finds himself French yet drawn to the Italian character. This paradox is, however, a dialectic, and one that will characterize Stendhal to the end, for Stendhal could never totally abjure all French traits. He values his ability to analyze, this characteristically French attribute, hardly developed beyond a primitive level in Italy,

where government discourages thought and temperament fosters impatience, spontaneity. It is well known that while serving as French Consul in Civita-Vecchia--he finally regained his beloved Italy in 1831--the often extremely bored Stendhal eagerly sought French tourists with whom to hold a decent conversation. Despite his knowledge that sharpness of wit, esprit, is often symptomatic of vanity, Stendhal adored it! His own perceptiveness is responsible for the nuanced representations of feelings that will characterize all of his novels.

Stendhal singles out the Italians for their capacity to love passionately, a praiseworthy attribute. In De l'Amour, he honors yet another group of people, women, whom he finds severely disserved by the customs of society. Stendhal feels that women on the whole have an inordinate capacity to experience happiness through love-passion; this endears them to him.

This praise of women is couched in a more general discussion of the plight of women in Western civilization. Stendhal establishes himself as a feminist, a role that surfaces particularly in his discussion of the influences on behavior in Book II. Not that Stendhal's feminism represents a new development in his thinking, for he has always included women among the âmes tendres and mélancoliques. We have only to think of Stendhal's relationship with his sister Pauline, his chief confidant during his

early manhood. What is significant about De l'Amour is that Stendhal addresses himself directly to the cause of the lamentable inequality between the sexes, and he combats arguments that call for the maintenance of this inequity. For Stendhal a woman, like a man, has the ability to use memory, to arrive at knowledge and to experience happiness through revery and imagination.

Different from Cabanis, Stendhal sees that the inequality of the sexes is primarily a function of education, not of physiology. Women are morally different from men not so much because of biology but because of training or lack of it, for which men are responsible, who fear competition with women and who enjoy tyrannizing them: "Par l'actuelle éducation des jeunes filles, qui est le fruit du hasard et du plus sot orgueil, nous laissons oisives chez elles les facultés les plus brillantes et les plus riches en bonheur pour elles-même et pour nous" (Amour, p. 199).

Stendhal downplays the determining influence of physiology in accounting for differences in behavior between the sexes. True, women are physically weaker than men but the effect of this disparity has little bearing on intellectual development, which is the primary means to success and happiness in modern times. Stendhal presents a forceful and witty proof of this argument: "J'avouerai que les petites filles ont moins de force physique que les petits garçons: cela est concluant pour l'esprit, car l'on sait que Voltaire et d'Alembert étaient les premiers hommes de leur

siècle pour donner un coup de poing" (Amour, p. 202). Women can think, this is not physiologically impossible; and he writes: "Si j'étais maître d'établir des usages, je donnerais aux jeunes filles, autant que possible, exactement la même éducation qu'aux jeunes garçons" (Amour, p. 215), for "le génie est un pouvoir, mais il est encore plus un flambeau pour découvrir le grand art d'être heureux" (Amour, p. 215). Knowledge leads to happiness; this is denied women.

Although Stendhal feels that women are more sensitive than men--their capacity for "ivresse nerveuse" (Amour, p. 35), which may interfere somewhat with the emotional discipline required for objective analysis--, he knows full well from personal experience that the habit of restraining feeling is contractible, but this habit is not encouraged in women: "Une femme ne peut être guidée par l'habitude d'être raisonnable, que moi, homme, je contracte forcément à mon bureau en travaillant . . . à des choses froides et raisonnables" (Amour, p. 35). But, perhaps, this is the key to Stendhal's feminism, his recognition that women are sensibles.

Stendhal found many women capable of loving as he does. Amour-passion is not particular to men. In Book I Stendhal devotes several chapters to how this passion develops and is manifested in women. Héloïse, the Portuguese nun, Julie d'Etange, Hermione and women of real flesh and blood, Métilde, Pauline, Mme de Roland,

Stendhal finds in all these women, fictive and real, kindred souls. We know that he could love no one who did not conform to his personal ideal of nobility, générosité, and tenderness. Women may function like men in passion, and given the state of manners that condemn women to practically total leisure time, they can cultivate the delicate flower of love even more resourcefully:

Même hors de l'amour, elles ont du penchant à se livrer à leur imagination, et de l'exaltation habituelle; la disparition des défauts de l'objet aimé doit donc être plus rapide.

Les femmes préfèrent les émotions à la raison; c'est tout simple: comme , en vertu de nos plats usages, elles ne sont chargées d'aucune affaire dans la famille, la raison ne leur est jamais utile. . . . (Amour, p. 35)

The irony of the Beyle-Dembowski tragedy is that Métilde refused to love Stendhal because she failed to recognize the conformity of their souls, the discovery of which would have caused her to love him. She accused him of not being sincere, which is exactly what he was. May we not suggest that Stendhal compensates for this misunderstanding in the outcome of the love affair between Julien and Mme de Rênal, who finally arrive at full, mutual comprehension? They overcame the obstacles, internal and external, and fulfilled Stendhal's cherished fantasy, enunciated in 1802, we will recall, in the passage about Chérubin and the

Comtesse Almaviva: "Ce jeune homme aux pieds de la comtesse qu'il adore . . . des deux côtés . . . ces yeux qui s'entendent si bien quoique leurs bouches n'aient pas osé parler."

If one could account for the interest of so many women in Stendhal, myself included, one might say that in reading Stendhal, a woman feels herself in the company of a man who likes women for who they are, a result of his sisterhood, of his identification with women. Stendhal had reason to be bitter, so few of his meaningful love affairs were successful, but it is proof of his essential respect for the female person that important personal experiences never changed his view of women. He calls upon society in De l'Amour to recognize the potential of women to contribute to advances in civilization; they are a resource as much as men, and their gifts should not be overlooked. Furthermore, a woman's happiness is engaged in this liberation; it will afford her the opportunity to actualize herself truly.

While the primary influences of temperament and government are given emphasis in the Histoire de la peinture en Italie, in Book II of De l'Amour it is rather to what these give rise on a social level, that is manners, that is the focus. Stendhal is primarily concerned with how national codes of behavior select particular manifestations of love. Concentration on manners is significant;

it shows a respect for fact, for the pre-eminence of what is concrete. Social behavior is apparent, and from this one deduces what brought it about if one is really interested in sure knowledge. One must rely on a concrete memory: "Vu dans mes sensations, vrai."

His method of discussing manners reflects a similar respect for the weight of remembered, concrete evidence. He makes abstract pronouncements about typical national behavior, for example: "Rien ne fait un appel plus énérgique et plus direct à la disposition de l'âme la plus favorable aux passions tendres: le naturel. Rien n'éloigne davantage des deux grands vices anglais: le cant et la bashfulness (hypocrisie de moralité et timidité orgueilleuse et souffrante . . .)" (Amour, p. 158); but he substantiates these with examples, anecdotes. Earlier he provided an example of this very cant in English society: "Comme demander un verre d'eau quand on a soif est vulgaire, les héroïnes de miss Burney ne manquent pas de se laisser mourir de soif. Pour fuir la vulgarité l'on arrive à l'affectation la plus abominable" (Amour, p. 156). Knowing that valid ideas derive only from sensual evidence, he provides for his readers those memories, preferably personal ones, or if not, from others, that gave rise to the abstract statements.

Furthermore, the fact that he concentrates on manners and his illustrative and anecdotal approach to them is significant in

terms of his career as a novelist. De l'Amour is not the first work where he uses anecdotes, but it is more significant as concerns his artistic vocation, since the anecdotes concern love behavior, the subject of his novels.

We know Stendhal's thinking on how a character must be created for the audience to find his behavior authentic: the character must appear convincingly motivated. For a modern audience, the artist must, therefore, use all possible means to show what influences a character's behavior. Because of the continuing perfection of man's knowledge an audience which knows that behavior is determined will expect that determinants be accounted for in order to accept behavior as authentic. Stendhal was to write for this audience, which he projected would surface fifty years after the publication of his novels. The triumph of Hugolian aesthetics, which cast aside the representation of psychologically sound behavior, stalled the maturation of the audience educated in the Ecoles centrales. Once the glitter of this Romanticism vanished, audiences would demand authenticity.

At the same time, Stendhal holds that art is an expression of the soul, not a discourse on it. To speak abstractly of the determinants of politics and of temperament is like "un coup de pistolet au milieu d'un concert. Ce bruit est déchirant sans être
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énergique"; a famous Stendhalian notion: the audience is no longer

asked to sympathize but to think. The novelist can, however, recreate in his work, particularly in a novel, a social environment where characters portray those manners resulting from a clearly delineated temperament and government. This is what Hippolyte Taine was to discover in Stendhal's novels, and which served as the basis of his theory of art. Relating behavior with circumstances without pedantic formulation of this principle, which would distract, affords the reader an unspoken and thereby unobtrusive explanation of behavior, the necessary foundation for identification.

Erich Auerbach in "In the Hôtel de la Mole," from Mimesis, finds that the behavior of the characters in Le Rouge et le Noir is incomprehensible without the context in which they operate. He describes this deterministic approach toward the representation of behavior as a breakthrough in the arts, a major contribution of Stendhal to his craft:

The characters, attitudes, and relationships of the *dramatis personae*, then, are very closely connected with contemporary historical circumstances; contemporary political and social conditions are woven into the action in a manner more detailed and more real than had been exhibited in any earlier novel, and indeed in any works of literary art except those expressly purporting to be politico-satirical tracts. So logically and systematically to situate the tragically conceived life of a man of low social position . . . within the most concrete kind of contemporary history and to develop it therefrom--this is an entirely new and highly significant phenomenon.¹²

Stendhal conceived of characters as products of the conditions in which they lived, a technique of characterization geared towards creating sympathetic characters, which crowns his development as a psychologist-philosophe.

Stendhal's concentration on manners in De l'Amour, his investigation of which ones appear where and why and in connection with love behavior, and specifically love-passion, and the anecdotes that substantiate his findings prepared him to choose just that social behavior that would account for the behavior of his heroes. The titles of his first two novels: Armance ou Quelques scènes d'un salon de Paris and Le Rouge et le Noir, Chronique de 1830, alert the reader immediately as to the particular context of the manners that will govern the behavior of the heroes.

The work accomplished in De l'Amour, the analysis of a passion, serves Stendhal as a means to success. The knowledge he establishes here will be used in the creative process, as knowledge about the superior happiness possible through revery functions to assure him where happiness lies for him. Stendhal has long known that a poet must be a philosopher. If his purpose is to give expression to a state of the soul, the artist must know this state, that is have accurate ideas whereby he will choose those details that communicate, give intelligible form to the soul. De l'Amour is Stendhal's final preparatory intellectual work as a

poet-philosopher: he analyzes the passionate lover and accounts for the influences on this behavior. And as in the case of the search for happiness, knowledge is a means: it serves the goal of expression, 'as it serves the goal of happiness. The role of thinker is subordinate to that of the artist and of the âme sensible, yet necessary.

Notes

1

Stendhal, Feuilles de Journal, in De l'Amour, ed. Victor Del Litto (Paris: Livre de Poche, Gallimard, 1969), p. 431. Neither Martineau's edition of the Journal nor that by Del Litto and Abravanel includes this entry, which Del Litto, however, incorporates in the passages from Stendhal's Journal that he provides in his edition of De l'Amour.

2

Stendhal wrote prefaces to De l'Amour in 1826, 1834, and 1842, when he was thinking of republishing it. He decided not to include the chapter "Des Faïscos" in the publication of 1822 of De l'Amour, and he wrote fragments connected with the subject of De l'Amour that were also not part of the edition of 1822. All these writings--prefaces, chapter, fragments--, unpublished during Stendhal's lifetime, are included in most modern editions of De l'Amour.

3

Victor Del Litto, Introd., De l'Amour, by Stendhal, ed. Victor Del Litto (Paris: Livre de Poche, Gallimard, 1969), p. 14.

4

Victor Brombert, "Stendhal, Analyst or Amoris?" in
Stendhal: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Victor Brombert
 (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962), p.
 157.

5

Etienne Rey, Pref., De l'Amour, by Stendhal, 2 vols.,
 Vols. 3 and 4 of his Oeuvres complètes, ed. Victor Del Litto and
 Ernest Abravanel (Geneva: Cercle du Bibliophile, 1967-74), I,
 VI.

6

Del Litto, p. 642.

7

Wood, p. 33.

8

Martineau, pp. 191-92.

9

Stendhal, Journal, 5 vols., Vols. 28-32 of Oeuvres
complètes, ed. Victor Del Litto and Ernest Abravanel (Geneva:
 Cercle du Bibliophile, 1967-74), IV, 229.

10

Stendhal, Journal, ed. Del Litto and Abravanel,
 IV, 252.

11

Stendhal, Le Rouge et le Noir, in Romans et Nouvelles,
 Vols. I and II of Oeuvres, ed. Henri Martineau (Paris: Bibliothèque
 de la Pléiade, Gallimard, 1955), I, 576.

12

Erich Auerbach, "In the Hôtel de la Mole," in Mimesis,
 trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
 University Press, 1971), pp. 457-58.

Conclusion

Stendhal's career as a novelist begins with Armance, published about one year and a half after Racine et Shakespeare II. After spending approximately twenty-five years formulating ideas about behavior, Stendhal will employ the following nineteen writing novels and short stories, putting to use what he learned during the years of intellectual formation.

Having embarked on the vocation of a novelist, Stendhal wrote rapidly--at the beginning and at the end of his creative period--, which contrasts with the long period of preparation. Martineau in his preface to Armance notes:

Il en commença la rédaction le 30 ou le 31
[janvier 1826], et il la poussa fort activement
jusqu'au 8 février. A ce jour, le premier jet
en étant à peu près terminé, il s'arrête
brusquement . . .
Dès le 19 septembre il reprend Armance . . .
Le 10 octobre il a terminé son livre. . . . 1

As for La Chartreuse de Parme:

Ayant commencé son roman le 4 novembre [1836],
il en envoie la copie à Romain Colomb le 25
décembre. En sept semaines il a terminé ce gros
livre. . . . 2

Stendhal came to his artistic vocation with clear ideas about writing, the beautiful, the psychology of the audience, and how men behave, which we have seen him formulating throughout our study of the evolution of his ideas on memory. May we not see this preparation as one of the reasons for the alacrity with which he created?

Stendhal's long development as a thinker prepared him for the moments of creation; long-winding discourse made for quick elaboration of artistic inspiration. Each of the major novels is an expression of the passion of love, whose nature is the same: love-passion. The novels are all different in that the conditions under which love flowers in each of them are not the same. Stendhal was ready to create without obstacle, almost in one breath each of these expressions of passion; he had at his fingertips well thought-out ideas about passion and what determines it, creativity, and the beau idéal of his audience. Prévost comments about the creation of Le Rouge et le Noir: "Après trente ans de travail acharné, il est digne d'improviser; il sait peindre d'un premier trait, d'un seul trait. Il a lentement créé cet instrument de prose, qui est lui-même: son style le plus parfait est devenu sa voix naturelle. L'originalité n'est plus un but qu'il se propose: elle est en lui."³

Early, Stendhal hypothesized that creation should be spontaneous: "Quand il me viendra des moments d'inspiration écrire sur le champ" (J. L., II, 85). A first draft bears the accent of feeling freshly experienced, of insight immediately conceived, which communicates that one's writings are natural, authentic expressions; however, there is one crucial condition for the success of such immediacy: the artist has readied himself through a history of practised discernment so that he can almost effortlessly and spontaneously transcribe his ideas and feelings into an effective form. Stendhal had thus prepared himself.

The ideas Stendhal formulated about the role of memory in the realm of art and in the pursuit of happiness may be seen as contributing factors to the success of his improvisations. Stendhal believed that an artist should write about what he had experience of. His creation would be accurate and authentic if he chose to express what he had lived emotionally himself. In so doing, expression could come easily to an artist; he is intimately allied with the topic of his work. Stendhal followed his own prescription: he chose to write about love-passion; therefore, he set himself up to write with immediacy. But Stendhal had also the advantage of having analyzed the nature of his experience of love and the conditions that determined its appearance and development; he had written De l'Amour. His belief that an

artist should write from memory and his knowledge of his memories permitted Stendhal to dare to attempt perfection in his first drafts.

Stendhal was undoubtedly able to create rapidly because he had waited until middle age to do so. He believed that an author should write from memory so that his feelings recalled through these memories would give a natural rhythm to his writings. But a writer must be able to control these feelings, to maintain a perceptive attitude so that he can express what he is feeling. In a sense, by waiting until middle age to create, Stendhal was providing for emotional distance, enabling himself to dominate his sensitive nature that at an earlier age had prevented him from concentrating fruitfully on his experience. Stendhal will write about youth, early adulthood, and he relies upon his own experience to recreate this passionate period of life, but he waits until he is mature, until he has enough distance to be able to channel the feelings he recalls, to use them to suggest appropriate form. Maturity allowed him to give immediate expression to relived feelings which had to guide his expression but not be so strong so as to prevent him from concentrating. Stendhal waited until he could attain the necessary equilibrium between the perception and the feeling of memories, which he prescribed as essential to the creative artist, and this allowed him to write spontaneously.

Beyle was devoted to discovering how a person thinks, for this permits one to form sure ideas. He wanted sure ideas because then he could control his destiny and achieve happiness. It is our conviction that Stendhal's ideas about the artist, the audience, the beau idéal, and human behavior brought about his success as a novelist. About his happiness as a lover, however, we can only hypothesize. From what he writes in De l'Amour we are led to believe that his ability to think and the ideas that he formulated about love played an important part in the judgment which he proclaims there, that Werther is happier than Don Juan.

Stendhal's analysis of love-passion convinced him that this passion was his happiness. That the Stendhal of the Vie de Henri Brulard maintains that his history as a passionate lover pleases him, that he has no regrets about having devoted himself to love-passion: "Elles [all his ladies] m'ont occupé beaucoup et passionnément et laissé des souvenirs qui me charment . . ." (H. B., p. 15), can be seen as a kind of proof that the intellectual endeavor of De l'Amour did lead to happiness.

Even if his preparation as a thinker did not bring about happiness as a lover, however, Stendhal's concern with discovering how a person thinks and his ambition to form ideas about happiness in love prepared him to create his characters with facility. We have concentrated on Stendhal's ideas on the role

of memory in thinking and its role in love-passion, namely the phenomenon of crystallization. Stendhal in his novels will create characters who will look for happiness as he did and who will find it in love-passion, that is characters who will rely on memory. Stendhal's worked-out ideas on psychology, on the functioning of memory specifically, allowed him to improvise successfully in the creation of his heroes.

The heroes of Stendhal's novels, with the partial exception of Fabrice Del Dongo, are Idéologues and melancholic lovers, Fabrice, an Italian, has little flair for analysis, but crystallize he does! Octave de Malivert, Julien Sorel, and Lucien Leuwen are analysts. They observe, reflect, and act upon their reflections; Stendhal establishes intellectual activity as a central attribute of these heroes, and thus calls attention to the functioning of memory as a means of knowledge in their behavior. Jules C. Alciatore points out that Stendhal singles out the leading role of memory particularly in the logicians Octave de Malivert and Julien Sorel:

Ainsi donc, Stendhal, qui avait une foi illimitée dans la logique, n'a pas manqué de souligner, dans ses écrits divers, le rôle que jouent les souvenirs exacts dans l'art de raisonner. Mais c'est surtout dans ses romans qu'il a mis en oeuvre la seule règle prescrite par Destutt de Tracy pour éviter l'erreur. Octave de Malivert et Julien Sorel,

les deux personnages stendhaliens qui se distinguent le plus par leur supériorité intellectuelle, raisonnent d'autant mieux qu'ils ont des souvenirs exacts. En douant ce dernier d'une mémoire extraordinaire, Stendhal a certainement songé aux remarques de Destutt de Tracy sur la cause première de toute erreur.⁴

Julien astounds everyone with his superior capacity to remember. The Marquis de la Mole suggests to him: "Parlons un peu de votre
5
mémoire . . . on dit qu'elle est prodigieuse."

Besides relying upon memory for analysis, the heroes use it to dream. Revery is a privileged activity of Stendhal's âmes tendres, always provoked by the remembrance of their ladies, and often by nature and music. The summit of happiness occurs for Julien and Fabrice when they are in prison, where they may dream unobstructedly, crystallize without interruption.

Stendhal was able to create quickly because he believed in a style of writing that is unfinished, suggestive. Brombert notes: "He is the master of the short cut, the understatement, the
6
ellipsis. The rapidity of his transitions flatters the intelligent." Stendhal sought to express the idea of the moment, in its range as felt at the moment. Martineau describes the method whereby Stendhal wrote La Chartreuse: "Chaque matin il se remettait au travail après avoir relu la dernière page dictée la veille et qui lui donnait l'idée de la suivante. Sans savoir au juste où il

allait . . . il se fiait à son imagination émue et il improvisait,
 tout au plaisir de retracer de si exaltantes aventures."⁷

Stendhal wrote according to immediate promptings, creating the impression of incompleteness, but this is by no means a defect.

We should like to suggest that this style, which contributed significantly to the joy of creation, was suggested to Stendhal through his ideas on the role of memory in the audience. The audience sympathizes with a character, derives aesthetic pleasure, when it lends its life to him, when the character recalls to the audience its own experience. Stendhal's swift transitions from one action to another, his carefully chosen details, the specific signals of meaning--as opposed to Balzac's style of panoramic detailing--, and his irony bring the reader into a dialogue with the text. We are forced to refer to our own understanding of the processes of life to fill out the gaps Stendhal leaves in his creation and to appreciate the significance of the details and Stendhal's criticism of men and manners through irony. Stendhal was encouraged to suggest, to leave scenes, details, and ideas unfinished, which permitted a rapid execution of his works, for he believed that this style was best suited to engage his audience,

to invite them to finish his work with its own memories, an activity which encourages revery; as we know, Stendhal wrote in De l'Amour that revery was the goal in reading a novel.

Stendhal's intellectual preparation had a purpose, and we suggest that his labors to think well and to know were productive: they readied Stendhal to create. Stendhal proved himself to be a magnificent novelist; his novels have the effect on us that he sought: in the great novels, Le Rouge et le Noir and La Chartreuse de Parme, we do lose self-consciousness and enter into the fresh, beautiful emotional life of his natural, energetic heroes, and we seem to live on a higher plane, in communion with a purer, more perfect reality. The preceding intellectual period permitted Stendhal to formulate ideas on his beau idéal, which he then proceeded to illustrate. The clarity of a philosophe induced the spontaneous expression of the poète.

Notes

1

Henri Martineau, Pref., Armance, by Stendhal, in his Romans et Nouvelles, Vols. I and II of Oeuvres, ed. Henri Martineau (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Gallimard, 1955), I, 18-19.

2

Henri Martineau, Pref., La Chartreuse de Parme, by Stendhal, in his Romans et Nouvelles, Vols. I and II of Oeuvres, ed. Henri Martineau (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Gallimard, 1955), II, 15.

3

Prévost, p. 240.

4

Jules C. Alciatore, "Stendhal et Destutt de Tracy: Sur la cause première de toute erreur," Symposium, 4 (1950), 364.

5

Stendhal, Le Rouge et le Noir, I, 569.

6

Victor Brombert, Introd., Stendhal: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Victor Brombert (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1962), p. 5.

7

Martineau, Pref., La Chartreuse de Parme, II, 15.

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The abbreviations correspond to the system of references within the text.

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