

PLUTARCH'S *FORTUNE*

A Close Reading

by

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Abstract

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by

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Plutarch's *Fortune* has been ignored, if not dismissed, as a work of little or no importance. Certainly, there has been no in depth critical treatment of it in the current century or the twentieth century. To be sure, it seems an expression of superficial ideas. A closer reading, however, reveals a dense text which alludes or refers to numerous sources and literary genres, including philosophy, tragedy, lyric, comedy and oratory. Plutarch creates a subtle and complex fabric of association, which does not create a clear enough pattern to suggest his purpose in writing the work.

Possible clues toward an understanding of such a work as this one appears to be, are provided by Leo Strauss, Eduard Zeller, William Thomas, and John Toland, authors of the twentieth, nineteenth, and eighteenth centuries, as well as Cicero, Gellius and Plutarch, in antiquity. They describe a technique used by ancient writers which presented a superficial, exoteric teaching for the casual reader, while a more sophisticated reader would discern a deeper, esoteric

teaching. As Plutarch's opusculum demonstrates a number of the signs of such writing, it is possible that he has employed such a technique of obscure writing.

This dissertation begins with an introductory chapter which outlines brief biographical details for Plutarch and the basic problems in studying the figure of Tyche, a description of the existing editions and previous treatments of the work, and introduces the problem of obscure writing as a possible approach to this essay of Plutarch. The complete text is presented in a commentary, which explores the references found throughout the essay and questions apparent discrepancies. The concluding chapter adds another aspect of the process of writing secretly, that of reading related works of different authors together to learn more of the underlying message. A short comparison between Plutarch and his contemporary, Favorinus, is presented. No firm conclusions have been drawn here, about the content of the inner teaching, but the project is intended as a foundation for further work.

For A. & E. v W.

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Plutarch's *Fortune*: A Close Reading

INTRODUCTION

Plutarch and *Fortune*

Plutarch is best known for his biographies of Greek and Roman statesmen. The details of his life are known largely from personal remarks he makes throughout his works.¹ He established a reputation in his time, not only as a writer, but also as a teacher, public official, and priest, both in his native province of Boeotia and abroad, through his extensive travels and residence in Rome.² It is thought that Plutarch became a teacher through a reputation earned through lecturing, which in turn, led to regular teaching activity. This activity did not so much reflect the intent on Plutarch's part to formally establish a school of his own, but developed out of meeting individuals of similar interests, which resulted in what must have been, in essence, discussion groups on subjects of scientific and philosophical interest.³

It is attested throughout Plutarch's works, that he was a Platonist and taught the views of that school, as we see in *De soll.*⁴ that Plutarch's father, Autobulus, informs Soclarus that his son had been influenced by Plato. As a religious official, he held the

1. Ziegler, 1949, col.4.

2. Ibid. cols. 17-29.

3. Ibid. cols. 26-29.

4. *Plutarchi Moralia*, vol. 6.1, 964D.

highest priestly office in Delphi,⁵ and in his writings he often mentions Delphic matters,⁶ as well as the focus of other religions, reflecting an interest in the subject beyond the social strategy of acquiring religious office as a mark of status in society.

It is known that his family had been settled for multiple generations in his home town of Chaeroneia,⁷ but the exact year of Plutarch's birth is not firmly attested. The generally conjectured date for his birth is between 45 and 50 A.D.,⁸ and it is believed that he lived until at least 125 A.D.. It is suggested that he began writing some time in the 70s A.D.,⁹ when he would have been in his later twenties or early thirties. In addition to the celebrated *Lives*, Plutarch is responsible for a large body of work on scientific, religious and philosophical topics known collectively as the *Moralia*.

Peri Tyches, or *De Fortuna*, in recent years known in English, by the title *Fortune*, is a very short opusculum from Plutarch's *Moralia*, occupying Stephanus pages from 97C through 100A. It appears in the Planudian corpus, is absent from the Lamprias catalog, but is considered authentic Plutarch. Because of its rhetorical character it is placed among the early works--probably written in the 80s A.D.¹⁰

Its title indicates the subject is Greek Τύχη, Roman Fortuna, translated into English as Fortune or Chance.

5. Ziegler, op. cit. col. 24.

6. Loc. cit.

7. Op. cit, col. 6.

8. Op. cit. col. 4. The closer estimate is that he was born between 46 and 48 A.D..

9. Loc. cit..

10. Op. cit. col. 80.

Texts and Translations

While *De Fortuna* is found in complete editions and translations of the *Moralia*, it often is not included in editions of selections. So far, I haven't encountered a true critical commentary of it from any period—certainly none in the last century.

The twentieth century editions in which it can be found, are the Teubner *Plutarchi Moralia* (Vol. I) by Paton and Wegehaupt, with an introduction by Pohlenz of 1925, updated/reprinted/corrected in 1974,¹¹ the Loeb Classical Library *Plutarch Moralia*, (Vol II) of 1928, with English translation by Frank Cole Babbitt,¹² the Budé *Plutarque Oeuvres Morales* (Tome I—2e Partie), of 1989,¹³ Biblioteca Clásica Gredos *Plutarco Obras Morales Y De Costumbres* (II) of 1986¹⁴ which consists of a Spanish translation based on the Teubner text. There is no Oxford text. The *Corpus Plutarchi Moraliu* with Italian commentaries has not published one of *De Fortuna*, nor is it on the most recent available list of upcoming publications.

A monograph, a translation into Italian by Antonella Marzucchi and Elisabetta Salvestrini, with Greek text of the 1989 Budé edition facing, came out in 1993.¹⁵ It is a volume of thirty pages, with no commentary of any type included, just Greek text and Italian translation, with a short introduction and a few words about Plutarch's life and *De*

11. Paton, W.R., Wegehaupt, I. edd., *Plutarchi Moralia*, Vol. I, Teubner, Leipzig, 1974.

12. Babbitt, F.C., *Plutarch, Moralia*, Vol. II, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1928.

13. Klaerr, R., Philippon, A., Sirinelli, J., *Plutarque, Oeuvres Morales*, Tome I-2e Partie, Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1989.

14. Morales Otal, C., García López, J., *Plutarco, Obras Morales y de Costumbres*, II, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1986.

15. Marzucchi, A., Salvestrini, E., *Plutarco, Sulla Fortuna*, Millelire, Viterbo, 1993.

Fortuna. As far as books of selections from the *Moralia* are concerned, Otto Apelt included *De Fortuna* in a collection of six essays (1926), which he called *Parallelschriften zu Seneca's Dialogen*.¹⁶ It was not included, however, in Zofia Abramowiczowna's Polish translation (1954) of a collection of ten of Plutarch's essays on popular philosophical topics.¹⁷ Nor does it appear in the substantial 1983 Russian edition, *Plutarch, Souchineniya* (Compositions) ed. S. Averintsev, introduced by A. Losev.¹⁸

Of translations into English, besides the Loeb, a 1909 collection of Plutarch's complete works was reprinted in paperback in 2003, currently available from bookstores by special order.¹⁹ It has an introduction by Richard Chenevix Trench, taken from that author.²⁰ The publisher of the 1909 edition, Thomas Crowell & Co., includes a note that the translations have been based on seventeenth century translations and Arthur Richard Shilleto's 1898 translations²¹ have been used when existent. *Fortune* was among Shilleto's choices, so this early twentieth century edition has reprinted a late nineteenth century translation of *De Fortuna*. In that Crowell edition, no editor is listed. *Of Fortune* was included in another anthology of *Moralia* selections, edited by William W. Goodwin

16. Apelt, O., Plutarch, *Moralische Schriften*, Zweites Bändchen, Felix Meiner, Leipzig, 1926.

17. Abramowiczowna, Z., Plutarch, *Moralia*, Zaklad Imienia Ossolinskich-Wydawnictwo, Wroclaw, 1954.

18. Averintsev, S., *Souchineniya*, Khudozhestvennaya Literatura, Moscow, 1983.

19. *Plutarch's Complete Works*, Essays and Miscellanies, vol. II, Thomas Y. Crowell, New York, 1909.

20. Trench, Richard Chenevix, Plutarch, his Lives and his Morals: Four Lectures, Macmillan and Co., London, 1873.

21. Shilleto, A.R. *Plutarch's Morals*, George Bell and Sons, London, 1898.

for publication in 1874.²² This edition featured an introduction by Ralph Waldo Emerson.

Dent's Everyman's Library issued an edition of Plutarch in three volumes (printed and reprinted between 1911 and 1948) which included the Dryden translation of the *Lives* and (according to the *OCD*) selections from the *Moralia* in Philemon Holland's sixteenth century translation.²³ Volume I contains eighteen of the *Lives* and appropriate syncrisis, and, as volumes 2 and 3 of this set seem to be hard to find, I have only been able to determine from second-hand information that *De Fortuna* was one of the twenty chosen selections from the *Moralia* in volume 3 of this set.

T.G. Tucker did not include *De Fortuna* in his 1913 edition entitled *Selected Essays of Plutarch*,²⁴ nor did D.A. Russell in his collection of 1991 *An Anthology of Greek Prose*,²⁵ which contained five selections from the *Moralia* including *De Fortuna Romanorum* .

Of editions aimed at a popular audience, neither the Penguin Classics of 1971, entitled *Moral Essays*, and translated by R. Warner,²⁶ nor its 1992 volume, *Plutarch Essays* translated by Robin Waterfield with introduction and notes by Ian Kidd,²⁷ included *De Fortuna*. Nor was it included in the 1993 Oxford World's Classics,

22. Goodwin, William W., *Plutarch's Morals*, Vol. II, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1874.

23. Holland, P. *Plutarch's Moralia: Twenty Essays*. J.M. Dent & Sons / E.P. Dutton & Co., New York, 1911.

24. Tucker, T.G., *Selected Essays of Plutarch*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1913.

25. Russell, D.A. *An Anthology of Greek Prose*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991.

26. Warner, R. *Moral Essays*, Plutarch, Penguin Books, London, 1971.

27. Waterfield, R. *Plutarch Essays*, Penguin Books, London, 1992.

Plutarch, Selected Essays and Dialogues translated by Donald Russell.²⁸

The upshot of these observations is that even when a translation of parts of the *Moralia* is published, *De Fortuna* more likely than not is one of those excluded, with the result that, in the last hundred or so years, little attention has been paid to it, and there may never have been a thorough critical commentary. Wyttenbach's 1795 edition of the entire *Moralia*²⁹ contains a Latin translation at the foot of the page, with an apparatus above that. He includes information about the history of editions, and a concordance of words used, but has not apparently made, so far as I can tell, any point by point critical discussion.

Treatments of *De Fortuna*

It is undeniable that very little has been written about *De Fortuna* throughout the twentieth century, with only one article, that I have been able to find, devoted to that essay alone. That is "The Source of Plutarch's *Peri Tyches*", by A.A. Buriks,³⁰ which attempts to pin down a definite source for the essay, arguing for Sphaerus rather than any other of the older Stoics as some other scholars have maintained.

The lack of attention this work has suffered may stem from the difficulties presented by the piece. It is short, and not altogether clear, and it has a surface opacity that seems almost simple-minded. Plutarch appears to take a definitely negative

28. Russell, D.A. *Plutarch Selected Essays and Dialogues*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993.

29. Wyttenbach, Daniel, *Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia*, Clarendon, Oxford, 1795.

30. Buriks, 1950.

approach to the role of chance in the lives of people, seeming to invoke φρονήσις as the real guiding principle in “τὰ θνητῶν πράγματα”. In fact, Barigazzi³¹ has wondered why Plutarch called it *De Fortuna* at all since it looks to him as if φρονήσις is the real subject of the piece. Also, there are some views expressed in it that are contradictory to Plutarch’s views in other works in the Plutarchan corpus. Brenk,³² in looking to the essay to determine Plutarch’s view of τύχη, calls it “bald and unsatisfactory” for that purpose, and asserts that it is "only concerned to rebut the Epicureans." Barigazzi cites Ziegler’s opinion that it is incoherent and Pohlenz’ assertion that it is incomplete.³³ Barigazzi’s hypothesis is that with four other opuscula in the *Moralia*, *De Fortuna* was a part of a study or notes toward a larger work on virtue. It is interesting that Barigazzi has also written about Favorinus, who wrote two essays also entitled *De Fortuna*, which show some intriguing correspondences to Plutarch’s small work. Favorinus was a contemporary of Plutarch, and according to Wyttenbach, a friendly rival.³⁴

It is true that Plutarch does, indeed, appear to play τύχη against φρονήσις through much of the essay--to the apparent disadvantage of the former. He also involves a number of contexts representing some of his pet themes--as the Budé editor has noticed, according to what seems a not very orderly or logical method, which might have prompted Zeigler’s opinion. Then, there is the question of what specifically, it has to do

31. Barigazzi, 1994, p. 9.s

32. Brenk, 1977, p.156.

33. Barigazzi, loc. cit.

34. Wyttenbach, v. I, Praefatio, xxxix. "Certe Plutarchus fuit et amicus et aemulus."

with τύχη, and what Plutarch's ideas about τύχη might be, which are not satisfactorily answered by the text. That lack may account for Brenk's disappointment in the piece. Those same characteristics could easily lead a reader to suspect the work was never finished, or constituted notes toward a longer piece, as Pohlenz and Barigazzi have thought. When given a close reading, however, the text begins to look, not incoherent or incomplete, but dense, and a number of interesting problems emerge.

Tyche

Plutarch's treatment of the nominal subject of his essay has been disappointing to some, puzzling to others; the subject itself, however, presents even more problems. The literary record of this figure is broad and well known, with invocations in lyric, tragedy and particularly in New Comedy, where Tyche is a frequent issue and even a participant, as in Menander's *Aspis*. In oratory, frequent references are made to Tyche, and the philosophers also discuss the effect of Tyche on a variety of matters.³⁵ Clearly the literary evidence of Tyche is considerable, yet it has been suggested that the information is filtered through the vision and artistic purpose of each individual writer, so the best indications of the character of the deity would come from cult.³⁶ The study of the cult of Tyche, however, while there is also ample evidence of its existence, is a mass of confusion.

35. A relatively modern, i.e. mid twentieth century, study by A.A. Buriks, traces the development of the concept of tyche in philosophy down to the Roman era. She follows the literary sources from the archaic age. A.A. Buriks, 1948, *Peri Tyches*.

36. Ziegler, 1948, col. 1673.

It has become a truism that the worship of Tyche, or a heightened awareness of the personification, became pronounced after the campaigns of Alexander in the fourth century overturned the established social order, and the people looked to a deity who represented change and the uncertainty of the future.³⁷ However true that may be, according to Jacqueline Champeaux, it is possible to follow a continuous development of the representations of Tyche, not from the fourth, but from the sixth century. She notes a slow, continuous evolution from the archaic age to the fifth and fourth centuries.³⁸

The ultimate source of the deity and the cult, as proposed by Allegre, the author of the late nineteenth century work which for some time was the primary source for the subject, might be in Phrygian and Phoenician cult.³⁹ He also suggests that there may have been a cult of Tyche as early as Homer, even though no mention is made in either of the epics, which he puts down to the fact that the divinity is not an Olympian, but one of the nymphs who do not figure in Homer.⁴⁰

An inscription from Petelia, to Θεὸς Τύχα, an appellation of uncertain significance,⁴¹ dates from 540 B.C., roughly coeval with a statue of Tyche, the Tyche of Smyrna, as described by Pausanias.⁴² This statue is supposed to have been the first to

37. As described by Champeaux, 1987, p. 40.

38. Ibid., 1987, p. 42.

39. Allegre, p.17.

40. Ibid., p.1-2; 17.

41. Champeaux 1987, 44. Champeaux is not certain if, at that early date, Tyche was already known as an authentic deity, or whether the inscription indicates a formulaic expression as in Ἄγαθη Τύχη.

42. Champeaux asserts that the testimony of Pausanias is now given credence by archaeologists, and the belief is that a statue such as he describes probably did exist. 44-45.

demonstrate a Tyche equipped with the attributes of the spherical crown, or *πόλος*, and the cornucopia, and these are credited to the innovations of Boupalos, the sculptor of that statue. In Rome, the cult of Fortuna, which was connected to primeval functions such as fertility and maternity, is also very old, dating from the reign of Servius Tullius in the second quarter of the sixth century.⁴³

Among the difficulties for the study of Tyche, is the fact that the figure has virtually no mythology--there seem to be no stories about her as there are for other divinities. In the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*,⁴⁴ Tyche makes a brief appearance as a nymph, one of the daughters of Ocean, a playmate of Persephone, and in *Theogony*,⁴⁵ where Tyche is again listed as one of the Oceanids.⁴⁶ A genealogy is offered by Alcman,⁴⁷ that she is the sister of Eunomia and Peitho, the daughter of Promathea as recorded by Plutarch.⁴⁸ Cited also,⁴⁹ is the attestation by Pindar, that she is the child of Zeus Eleutherios,⁵⁰ and one of the Moirai.⁵¹ Other than that, there is nothing to offer any clues about the background and function of this deity. It has been noted, that none of these varied genealogies

43. Rausa, p. 141.

44. *Hymn to Dem.*, 5, 420.

45. Hesiod, *Theog.* 360.

46. Allegre, p. 2.

47. Alcman, Fr. 21, p. 21.

48. De fort. Rom. 318.

49. Villard, 1997, 115.

50. Pindar, Ol. XII, 1-2, p.42.

51. Ibid., 2001 vol. 2, Fr. 41, p.13.

support the iconography of Tyche in art, which, however, is attested in literature.⁵²

Visual representations of the goddess in art show her with attributes of the spherical crown, spherical pedestal, cornucopia, rudder, and the blindfold.⁵³

Her genealogy becomes even more befuddled in the case of Roman Fortuna, as inscriptions at Praeneste name Fortuna Primigenia the daughter of Jupiter, while a statue of the goddess shows Fortuna suckling the infant Jupiter. Was she his daughter or his mother? The meaning of the contradiction is not understood, although there has been speculation based on additional inscriptions.⁵⁴ In the context of the Praeneste sanctuary, Fortuna was also known as a protector of the young, a sea goddess and an oracular goddess. This last was the most lasting association for the Roman world, according to Champeaux.⁵⁵ It is considered surprising that, with the evidence of connection to Jupiter at Praeneste, there is no mention at Rome, of any association of Fortuna with Jupiter, nor is she named among the feminine associates with whom he is credited. Moreover, there is no oracle of Fortuna at Rome.⁵⁶

The Fortuna of Italy, became Hellenized at the end of the third century, demonstrating the syncretistic tendencies of that era.⁵⁷ Tyche and Fortuna both, however, had been assimilated to numerous other deities, such as Demeter, Isis, Artemis, and

52. Villard, 115, 116.

53. Villard, p. 116, 124.

54. Champeaux, 1982, 22 ff.

55. Ibid., 1982, 24.

56. Ibid., 1982, p. 195.

57. Champeaux, 1987, 38.; Rausa, p. 141.

Astarte, from much earlier times. As we have seen, clear understanding of the cults and functions of both Tyche and Fortuna, has been impeded by the difficulties in understanding the archeological and epigraphical evidence, as well as the evidence of the goddess provided by plastic art and literature.

The Tyche of Classical and Hellenistic Greece is the incarnation of chance, good luck, good fortune, and the universal entity to whom people appeal for favors. She governs the universe and human destiny.⁵⁸ There appear to have been three types of Tyche: the most general form, Agathe Tyche, the purveyor of good fortune, good luck, chance, to whom people appeal for favors; the Tyche of cities; and the Tyche of rulers. She is the bestower of wealth and success on both individuals and states.⁵⁹ One of the primary characteristics of Tyche is ambivalence, which at least in part, accounts for the difficulty in finding a clear, defining concept from which a concrete idea may be drawn.⁶⁰

Encountering the word in literature, it is difficult to pin down just when what is meant is an abstraction, allegory or symbol, or if a reference is being made to actual cult practice and religion.⁶¹ This fact is relevant for a study of Plutarch's *Fortune*, in as much as the author does not speak directly of a divine entity, but seems to treat the concept as a common noun.⁶²

58. Ibid., 1987, p. 42; Villard, 1997, p.115.

59. Champeaux, 1987, p. 39.

60. Loc. cit., Villard, 1997. p 115.

61. Ibid., 1987 p. 38.

62. On the basis of this observation, I have used upper or lower case for Tyche/tyche (or Greek Τύχη/τύχη) according to which seemed appropriate. When Plutarch speaks of the concept in what seems a general fashion, as he does most of the time in this work, I have typed the word in lower case. If he seems to be referring to a specifically personified deity, I have used the upper case. The same logic has been

How is Plutarch's *Fortune* to be approached?

To return to *De Fortuna*, such material as this small work seems to be, might tempt the reader to conclude that there is little or no value in it and that it should continue to be ignored. That opinion, however, scarcely does justice to an author whose other writings have been given universal recognition for nearly two millennia. To simply say that Plutarch was less able in the realm of moral philosophy than as a biographer, does not address the issue of how an author whose ability has been proven in one area, would be content to produce a work which is, as this item seems in some ways, inept. One can not help but wonder if there might be some explanation for the apparent deficiencies of the work.

If we turn to works by authors in relatively modern times, which examine some of the peculiarities of writing by ancient authors, some suggestions emerge toward a possible understanding of what Plutarch may have been doing. A number of scholars have weighed the matter of what has been called exoteric and esoteric writing. Eduard Zeller⁶³ writing in 1862, about the problem of classifying the works of Aristotle, refers to statements by Aristotle himself, to the effect that certain of his writings were what he termed *exoteric*, or written for the general public. Furthermore, the philosopher classified other of his works as *acroatic*, or designed for the limited audience of a special selection of pupils. In the *Life of Alexander*,⁶⁴ Plutarch reports that Aristotle held Alexander

applied to fortune/Fortuna and chance/Chance.

63. Zeller, 105-136, 1897.

64. *Life of Alexander*, Ch. 7.

worthy to be among the latter group, corroborating the contention that Aristotle separated his teachings according to the audience for which they were intended.

Also in the mid nineteenth century, one William Thomas,⁶⁵ writing about the exoteric works of Aristotle, and those of Cicero written in the same vein, discusses the matter in detail, offering citations from ancient sources to make his point. Cicero is reported as having written to Atticus about his own intention to imitate Aristotle's technique of exoteric writing in a project of his own.⁶⁶ The term, ἐξωτερικόν, is rendered in Greek in Cicero's letter, establishing that the term, as well as the usage and practice of preparing works to be read by the general public were familiar to him through the works of Aristotle. In *De Finibus*, Cicero refines the point by describing not just the exoterica, but another class of writings which he describes as *limatius* (more polished) and notes that the two classes of works do not always seem to say the same thing.⁶⁷

Both Zeller⁶⁸ and Thomas⁶⁹ note the treatment of the subject by Gellius, who gives a more complete description of the exoteric and acroatic, or esoteric works.⁷⁰ He cites the example of Alexander, who, in a letter to Aristotle, chided the philosopher for having published his acroatic works. Again in the *Life of Alexander*, Plutarch corroborates this anecdote by noting in much the same way, that Alexander held it against his tutor that the

65. Thomas, 1860, pp. 26-27.

66. Cicero Ad Atticum, IV 16 2.

67. Cicero De Finibus, V, 1-4.

68. Op. cit. pp. 111-113.

69. Op. cit., p. 28.

70. Marshall, 1968, *Noctes Atticae*, XX, V.

secret works had been published.⁷¹ Gellius reports that Aristotle replied that the works were both published and not published in the sense that only those who knew his work would understand them. The suggestion is that Aristotle had somehow expressed his secret doctrines in such a way that they would be recognized only by those whom he had taught. This too is corroborated by Plutarch in the *Life of Alexander*.⁷²

In his list of ancient authors who discuss this practice of writing, Thomas includes Clement of Alexandria, who gives considerable space to the enumeration of various kinds of obscure writing and the causes for it.⁷³ He maintains that, among the ancient philosophers, not only the Pythagoreans and Plato, but also the Epicureans and Stoics, kept certain of their tenets secret.⁷⁴ In fact, he declares that his life would run out before he could enumerate the number of philosophers who teach by symbols.⁷⁵ The motivation for their practice, he claims to have been first, to show the truth only to those whom they had established as worthy and who would most benefit from it, second, to enhance the truth through allegory and symbols, giving it deeper perspective.⁷⁶

The inclusion of other authors beyond Aristotle is found also in an even earlier work by John Toland.⁷⁷ This author discourses at some length on the common practice of

71. Loc cit., supra n.63.

72. Loc. cit.

73. Früchtel et al., Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata*, 5, 7-9.

74. Op cit., 5.9.58

75. Ibid, 5. 9. 56.

76. Loc. cit.

77. Toland 1720, *Clidophorus*.

all the ancient philosophers of what he describes as "Exoteric and Esoteric, or External and Internal Doctrines."⁷⁸ The reason for writing in this manner for the philosophers was that "all things ought not to be declared to all men."⁷⁹ In addition, Toland notes the practice among the priests, to conceal their mysteries from the philosophers out of a concern that the philosophers would mock them. Likewise, the philosophers concealed their doctrines in allegories so that the priests might not accuse them of impiety and stir up the vulgar against them. The example of Socrates comes to mind. Toland asserts that Plato wrote poetically to protect himself against the fate suffered by Socrates; further, the author finds that Plato's works are full of "the Exoteric and Esoteric Distinction."⁸⁰

The above establishes that the phenomenon of obscure writing was well known and acknowledged from antiquity onward. The various sources who discuss the practice vary in their emphasis, each telling us a little more about the process. In the twentieth century, the problem of esoteric writing was treated most succinctly by Leo Strauss in his well-known 1941 article "Persecution and the Art of Writing," republished in a 1952 collection of the same title, consisting of essays concerning philosophy and politics. Since Strauss, in describing the phenomenon according to his own perceptions, outlines some of the signs of esoteric writing, and since his explanation is the clearest and fullest of all the authors noted above, his essay merits some attention.

At the outset, Strauss's stated focus is on the effect of politically adverse times on

78. Ibid. p.66.

79. Ibid. p. 73

80. Ibid, p.75.

the expression of independent thought by writers. This point of view recalls what Toland said about the causes for secrecy. As a result of that adversity, Strauss says, those writers have developed a technique which requires "reading between the lines." By this, he means that, as a way of protecting themselves from any harm that could come from overtly expressing their views, authors came to express themselves obliquely, only hinting at their real meaning by means of numerous devices. Like his eighteenth and nineteenth century predecessors, he states that the true meaning in the text is intended only for a select audience, which would be likely to recognize the message or thesis underlying the obvious, superficial teaching in the material. As we have seen, there is corroboration for these views found in the ancient authors themselves.

Strauss too, describes this double faced character as the creation of both an *exoteric* teaching, aimed at a casual, uninitiated reader, and an *esoteric* teaching, aimed at the select group for whom the serious ideas are reserved. He describes the intended audience and the indications of writing between the lines as follows:

...the potential philosophers are to be led step by step from the popular views which are indispensable for all practical and political purposes to the truth which is merely and purely theoretical, guided by certain obtrusively enigmatic features in the presentation of the popular teaching--obscurity of the plan, contradictions, pseudonyms, inexact repetitions of earlier statements, strange expressions, etc. Such features do not disturb the slumber of those who cannot see the wood for the trees, but act as awakening stumbling blocks for those who can.⁸¹

Although, according to Strauss, the prime motivation for authors to obfuscate the meaning of their writings was to protect themselves from harm in times in which there

81. Strauss, p. 36.

might be objection to a view contrary to what was held as correct, from persecution in other words, of which he mentions more than one type, he also mentions another phenomenon, perhaps more fundamental to the issue of a subtle inner meaning, but not unrelated to the fear of persecution. Citing ancient authors such as Plato and Cicero,⁸² he points to a belief that a gap between the general public and the intellectual elite was a fact of nature and that as a result, 1) the general public opposed and feared philosophy as a threat, and 2) philosophy and science were considered the privilege of the few, and 3) free expression of important truths was neither possible nor desirable. In these remarks, he manages to cover the various causes for the adopting of such a technique as explained by Thomas and Toland. A possible third use of the technique may be seen as an exercise for the gifted students who would receive the mantle of learning from the masters of the day, as we saw in the description of Aristotle's method of separating his lectures and published writings into material aimed at particular groups of students and readers.⁸³

Strauss was not alone among twentieth century writers in noticing confusing practices in authors from pre-modern times. Through his researches into the works of the medieval alchemists, C.G. Jung noticed a similar phenomenon in those writings. In his *Psychology of the Transference*, in a short passage referring to a certain contradiction by an alchemist, to an earlier statement made, sounding remarkably similar to Strauss, he says:

It is difficult to tell whether the alchemists were so helplessly muddled that they did

82. Op. cit, 34 + n. 16.

83. Ibid. 36.

not notice these flat contradictions, or whether their paradoxes were sublimely deliberate. I suspect it was a bit of both, since the *ignorantes, stulti, fatui* would take the texts at their face value and get bogged in the welter of analogies, while the more astute reader, realizing the need for symbolism, would handle it like a virtuoso with no trouble at all. Intellectual responsibility seems always to have been the alchemists' weak spot, though a few of them tell us plainly enough how we are to regard their peculiar language.⁸⁴

He furnishes a note to that statement which quotes an alchemist who offers a suggestion for how to read alchemical books.⁸⁵ It is mentioned also, in other of Jung's writings, that the alchemists deliberately made their writings mysterious, that they appeared to be aware that their works employed an obscure, even secret language.⁸⁶

What Jung says bears striking similarities to Strauss's hypothesis of esoteric writing, and to his description of the phenomenon, as quoted above. His reference to contradictions corroborates Strauss's point that contradictory statements within the same author are, or may be, symptomatic of an esoteric teaching which lies under the surface.⁸⁷ Also, the suggestion that the select audience who were intended to read the esoteric matter, would have the ability to decipher the signs, falls in with Strauss's claim that the texts of the ancient philosophers were designed to attract those of like mind, who would be able to recognize the message below the surface.⁸⁸ Then, the charge of intellectual irresponsibility on the part of the alchemists, recalls what Strauss has to say about the

84. Jung, 1946, p. 125.

85. Jung, loc. cit. n.15

86. Jung, *Psychology and Alchemy*, p 243 ff. et passim. Originally published in 2 parts in the Eranos Jahrbuch for 1935+36.

87. Strauss, passim

88. Ibid. 34-5.

willingness of great writers to stoop to telling 'noble lies' in the course of protecting a true doctrine from falling into the wrong hands.⁸⁹ As Jung notes, the alchemical tradition which began in antiquity and made use of neo-Pythagorean precepts, began to disintegrate with the onset of the Age of Enlightenment, which can be traced to the mid 1600s, when the general outlook no longer supported a system so at odds with material reality.⁹⁰ Strauss also puts the demise of "writing between the lines" in the mid seventeenth century, with the growth of the belief that free expression would serve toward eliminating persecution.⁹¹

Zeller found exoteric and acroatic writings in Aristotle, Thomas provided a long list of examples in which ancient authors identified the process of exoteric and esoteric writing in antiquity, Toland and Clement asserted that the habit was common to all in antiquity, priests and philosophers alike, and Strauss suggested an approach to reading for subtext. The suggestions of all these authors are of use and create a credible basis for taking a closer look at Plutarch's odd little essay, whose defects might now be evaluated in terms of whether its author were employing such a technique.

To begin with, there are the faults discerned in it by Pohlenz, Zeigler and Brenk, that it is incoherent, possibly incomplete, and generally unsatisfying toward an understanding of its author's views on his subject. Then, in her article about a possible

89. Strauss, op cit. p. 35.

90. Jung, Introduction to the Religious and Psychological Problems of Alchemy, pp. 16, 480. vol. 12, 2nd ed. rev.1952

91. Strauss, p. 33 et passim.

source for Plutarch⁹² Buriks has commented on a poorly constructed sentence (Ch.5) and another which shows bad grammar (Ch.4). This she considers would be almost impossible for Plutarch himself to have written, reiterating her contention that Plutarch has stolen the lines, and effectively the whole essay, from a Stoic source.⁹³ If, however, rather than assuming these defects indicate inauthenticity through wholesale adoption of an earlier work, (and sloppy adoption, at that), one were to apply Strauss's hypothesis to the problems Buriks notes in those sentences, it might be read as one of the identifiable ploys used by an author writing between the lines. It is to be remembered, that Strauss did not intend his hypothesis to be applied only to subversive works or authors who might have been expected to attract negative attention. Rather, he makes clear that it is his opinion that all ancient writers could be read in such a way as to consider the possibility of writing between the lines--as the earlier authors cited also have asserted. Moreover, the fact that many of Plutarch's repeated themes, as noted in the Budé, are woven into the essay, suggests that perhaps Plutarch was writing more seriously than might seem from the fatuous tone he takes in parts of *De fortuna*..

In my investigation of this work, rather than actively trying to follow the varying guidelines encountered in a number of sources, of which Strauss's provides the fullest description, it has been my intention, while keeping in mind the information gotten from those sources, to give the work a very close reading. I have relied on my own perceptions of references to persons, historical events, allusions to literary sources, and

92. Supra, p. 8+ n.35

93. Op. cit. p. 65.

the context of quotations which come from extant works and fragments. As far as seemed profitable, I have followed up on these issues, each in turn.

At the outset, it had been my plan, as the work is very short, to exhaust all possible references to be found in it. Very soon, however, I found that the allusions and other associations made by Plutarch, even in so small an essay, were so many and so discursive that, I thought, like Clement, that it might not be possible to exhaust them all in a single lifetime. Nonetheless, I proceeded line by line, reading closely, asking questions prompted most often by Strauss's points and allowing those questions to take my investigation into the many references found in the essay. Those references included the works of other ancient authors such as Demosthenes, Plato, Cicero, the tragedians and comic authors, as well as fragments of tragedies, comedies, fragments of Pre-Socratic philosophers, and the Alexander Romance. As already noted, any one of those leads could have been fleshed out more fully; the purpose however, was to comment on the entire text.

As I proceeded, it became clear just how much of what Plutarch's audience would have been able to understand as a matter of course from Plutarch, whether of his overt program or between the lines, has been lost. Not only that, but a contemporary reader is subtly influenced by cultural trends and ways of understanding typical of his or her own time, and applies those influences to reading Plutarch. The cultural background of Plutarch's readers, whether they were his students or colleagues, would have been different from that of anyone living today. Although it would be an impossibility to hope to reconstruct the cultural ambience of Plutarch's time, it seemed to me, that following

up on some of Plutarch's many references and allusions, would have the effect of adding dimension and contour to our perspective of the essay and work towards a better understanding of it. Any written work is more than the sum of the words on its pages.

An ideal result of this investigation would be first, to determine whether it is reasonable to conclude that Plutarch is, in fact, likely to have been practicing an exoteric-esoteric writing technique, and second, to uncover what the inner text he was shielding might have been. Of the two, the latter would be difficult and perhaps impossible to assert positively. Therefore, no hard and fast conclusions are promised, but in my concluding chapter I will try to bring some of the many threads together to see if there is a discernible figure in Plutarch's carpet.

CHAPTER ONE

97C-100A

ΠΕΡΙ ΤΥΧΗΣ

About Fortune

I. Chaeremon's fragment

97C2

1. Τύχη τὰ θνητῶν πράγματα, οὐκ εὐβουλία.

Tyche (is) the deeds of mortals, not euboulia.

Plutarch opens his essay with a quotation from a fourth century tragedy by Chaeremon. This short, pithy line enjoyed widespread use in antiquity as a direct quotation as well as in different forms, as we will see below. A preliminary search of the *Moralia* shows that this is the only essay in which Plutarch uses a quoted line for an opening. The Budé and Loeb texts print the quote as a superscript, as did Wyttenberg. The Teubner text keeps it within the body of the essay but distinguishes it with quotation marks. The position of prominence it enjoys, as well as the appearance of the subject heading, or title of the opusculum, justifies giving it some attention.

The quotation comes from *Achilles Thersitoktonos*, a tragedy by Chaeremon, a tragic poet of the fourth century, which, unfortunately, has been lost but for two lines of verse. Almost nothing is known about either the play or the poet. Snell, however, in *TrGF*,¹ offers some intriguing clues to the scenario and the genre of the play. Its author-

1. Fr. 2, Snell, *TrGF*, Vol. I, 215-17.

ship is attested by Stobaeus who identifies it as Chaeremon's work, and the name of the play as the source of the line of verse.²

The play appears, from the title, to have dealt with the death of Thersites at the hands of Achilles. This story from the *Aithiopsis* of the *Epic Cycle* has been described by Proclus as concerning Achilles' anger with Thersites over the latter's ridicule of the great warrior for his love of Penthesilea, queen of the Amazones. According to Proclus, the murder provoked Diomedes, Thersites' kinsman, to attempt to avenge his death, creating unrest among the Greeks, until the Atreidae were able to subdue Diomedes' anger. After that, Achilles sailed to Lesbos and sacrificed to Apollo, Artemis and Leto, whereupon he was purified of the murder by Odysseus.³ Eustathius adds that, according to a newer story, Achilles punched Thersites.⁴ He may have had Quintus Smyrnaeus' account in mind as this is the version of the story that is found in Quintus.

Quintus Smyrnaeus' account of the death of Thersites

The fourth century AD poet, Quintus Smyrnaeus, offers a fuller account of the battle in Book I of his epic poem, the *Posthomerica*, or *The Fall of Troy*, lines 538-830⁵. The poet's sources for the story are unknown. His description includes the confrontation

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2. An ostrakon published by Paul Collart, CRAI 1945, attributes the line to Euripides, but that is the only attribution to any other poet than Chaeremon, and it appears accepted that that poet was the originator of the line.
 3. Proclus, *Chrestomathia*, 170-204.
 4. Eustathius, *Commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem*, vol. I, p. 317.
 5. Lines 538-830.

between Achilles and Penthesilea in which Achilles killed the Amazon queen, his remorse at the sight of her beauty as she lay dead on the battle field, and Thersites' crudely expressed scorn in a speech of substantial length (lines 723-740), which resulted in his murder by Achilles, acting in anger at the insult which described him as less than manly for being capable of exhibiting pity and tenderness toward a woman. Quintus does not describe Achilles' atonement but instead focuses on the burial of Penthesilea, and ends the book with a glimpse of Achilles being feasted in Agamemnon's tent.

Evidence of the play and its dramatis personae in art

A scene from Chaeremon's tragedy is shown on an Apulian volute krater dating from the mid fourth century BC.⁶ It is agreed that the scene depicted represents a play because stage scenery and clothing recognized as actors' costumes are shown.⁷ The characters, pictured on the vase, are named including a decapitated Thersites.

There is no suggestion of decapitation in the account of the story according to Quintus. That version has Achilles hitting Thersites in the face, knocking out all his teeth, after which Thersites collapses dead. Eustathius refers to a 'newer' story, perhaps Quintus's treatment, in which Achilles punched Thersites. Perhaps earlier treatments of the story had Thersites killed in a different way and perhaps that is the reason behind Eustathius's remark about the newer story. Proclus doesn't describe the cause of death. Oth-

6. Boston Museum of Fine Arts.

7. Trendall and Webster, 1971, pp 106-7.

er than Thersites, characters shown on the vase are Achilles, Phoenix, Diomedes, Agamemnon, and Menelaus. Some minor characters are identified, namely Phorbas, Automedon, a character called simply the Aetolian, and another called simply Dmos. Also depicted are the divinities Hermes, Athena, Pan and Poina.

Some critical speculations

Nothing further is known about the structure or action of the play. *In toto*, as previously stated, only two stichoi from the play are extant, the one used by Plutarch here, and one other:

ὥς οὐχ ὑπάρχων, ἀλλὰ τιμωρούμενος⁸

It is impossible to say anything about the context of the words of either line, who spoke them, or under what dramatic circumstances they were spoken. In spite of that, however, Snell suggests that the εὐβουλία in question might refer to that of Odysseus, citing a quotation of the line, or at least, the appearance of those very words, in the Alexander Romance. (See below.)

C. Collard, whose 1970 article on Chaeremon offers a closely considered discussion of the poet's fragments, suggests that Fragment 2 (Τύχη τὰ θνητῶν πράγματα, οὐκ εὐβουλία) may have been spoken by Achilles defending his aggressive action, and that Fragment 3 (ὥς οὐχ ὑπάρχων, ἀλλὰ τιμωρούμενος) could have been from the same con-

8. Fr. 3, Snell, Vol. I, p. 218

text.⁹ He doesn't explain why he draws these tentative conclusions, merely quoting J.D. Beazley, who maintains that Achilles would normally have been the aggressor in any quarrel.¹⁰ This interpretation is difficult to understand, since in this story, what we have of it, it appears that Thersites, not Achilles, was the aggressor in the argument, to his own misfortune. Unless, what Beazley means is that Achilles, in speaking Frag.3, is denying aggression, stating that it was Thersites who provoked him.

The fragment in literature

In addition to this unattributed citation by Plutarch, as part of Snell's list of occurrences, the fragment appears verbatim, also without crediting the poet, in Menander's *Aspis* line 411; and in Oration 25 of Libanius. It turns up in sentiment, but paraphrased in Plato's *Laws*, 709B, Demosthenes *Second Olynthiac*, and in Nicostratus Fragment 19. There are numerous other occurrences in mostly later sources listed by Nauck in *TGF*¹¹. Many of these are transformations of the original.

A. Menander-*Aspis*

Aspis is a partially preserved comedy by Menander. Its story revolves around a putative heiress, her brother, a greedy uncle, a good uncle, his daughter and stepson, and

9. Collard, 1970, p. 26.

10. Ibid. p. 26, n. 28.

11. Nauck, 782-3.

a clever slave, as well as minor characters including a cook, his assistant and a waiter. In typical New Comedy fashion, there is a dispute over the marriage of an orphaned girl and the acquisition or pilfering of wealth.

The heroine's brother, her guardian, who has gone to war, is believed by his faithful (and clever) slave Daos, to have been killed. The news of this misfortune leads the greedy uncle to make plans to marry the heiress, as he would have been expected to do under Athenian law, not to safeguard her family's wealth, which was in the hands of the soldier/brother after the death of their father, from falling into the hands of strangers, but to acquire it for himself. This development is not to the liking of this set of characters because the girl, who has been raised by the good uncle and his wife along with their own daughter, has been betrothed to the good uncle's stepson. An explanation of the events leading up to the opening of the play, and the ensuing results in the scenes which have survived, are verbally predicted by goddess Tyche in the prologue¹² where she also informs the audience that the brother/soldier has not actually been killed. She finishes her speech saying:

...λοιπὸν τοῦνομα το]ῦμὸν φράσαι, τίς εἶμι, πάντων κυρία τούτων βραβεῦσαι
καὶ διοικῆσαι· Τύχη.

...it remains to tell my name--who I am--the administrator who judges and controls all these things: Tyche.

12. *Aspis*, 97-148

Her self description is much like what Chaeremon said, except that she defines her role more specifically as a judge and manager.

To deceive the greedy uncle into dropping his marriage suit to the heiress, and into making another suit to the daughter of his brother who is much wealthier than the soldier/brother, Daos hatches an elaborate scheme involving the feigned death of the good uncle. It is in the scene where Daos, preparing to carry out the *dolus*, informs the greedy uncle of his brother's (the good uncle's) imminent demise that Chaeremon's line appears. The 'news' is broken by Daos speaking in quotations from numerous tragedies including this line from *Achilles Thersitoktonos*.¹³ Daos seems to like to quote maxims and aphorisms (as Plutarch also does) since, early in the play, again in conversation with the same character, he pretends to remind himself of the adage "...γνώθι σαυτόν.." ¹⁴ Tyche is directly invoked by Daos after the greedy uncle's exit, when he laments the sort of new master she has assigned him with the death of the brother/soldier who at that early point, all the characters believe is dead.¹⁵ In this comedy there are two false deaths--one the mistaken identity of a corpse, and the other a deliberate ruse, which turns the situation around to the satisfaction of the sympathetic characters. Chaeremon is quoted in the context of the deliberate ruse.

In Collard's article on Chaeremon, there is an interesting point to be noted, namely, the author's remarks on the narrowness of the sample of the poet's remaining frag-

13. Ibid. 411.

14. Ibid, 191.

15. Ibid. 215.

ments. Of the two main sources for fragments of Chaereon, Athenaeus and Stobaeus, Collard tells us that Athenaeus cites examples to illustrate technique, while all of Stobaeus's examples (22 in all) are gnomic in character. Collard finds this limited character of the fragments a deterrent to accurate evaluation of the poet's style.¹⁶ What is interesting in this discussion of Plutarch's *Fortune*, is that like all the examples from Stobaeus, the line Plutarch uses has a distinctly gnomic, aphoristic character. Further, it has appeared in a comedy in which a character who has demonstrated a tendency to use aphorisms, uses it to communicate information to another character. Perhaps Plutarch chose it for that reason too, and if so, it may have some relation to his choice of it in introducing his topic.

Although Snell in one place¹⁷ notes that it is uncertain whether the line has been used by Plato, Demosthenes and Nicostratus, in another,¹⁸ he lists citations in these authors as instances in which there is an apparent paraphrase of the sentiment of the line, right along with other verbatim examples.

B. Plato--*Laws*

In naming Plato's *Laws* 709 as a possible paraphrase of Chaereon, Snell is surely noticing a similarity of vocabulary in several places:

16. Op. cit., p.24.

17. Op. cit. 216.

18. Op. cit. 217n.

...οὐδεις ποτε ἄνθρωπον οὐδὲν νομοθετεῖ, τύχαι δὲ καὶ συμφοραὶ παντοῖαι
πίπτουσαι παντοίως νομοθετοῦσι τὰ πάντα ἡμῖν.¹⁹

*...no one among mortals ever frames laws at all, but chance happenings and all
sorts of circumstances which come about in all kinds of ways frame the laws for
all things.*

A plain statement is made to the effect that, as with Chaeremon's sentiment, humans have nothing to do with the making of laws. Rather, laws emerge from the necessities created by τύχαι δὲ καὶ συμφοραὶ παντοῖαι. The idea is expanded in the examples that follow, which include wars, poverty and diseases which require the changing of laws and constitutions. Thus, says the Athenian, it would be tempting to make the conclusion that law making is entirely up to chance. Here we see again how the vocabulary recalls Chaeremon.

...τὸ θνητὸν μὲν μηδένα νομοθετεῖν μηδέν, τύχας δ' εἶναι σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ
ἄνθρωπινα πράγματα.²⁰

*...that a mortal in no way ever frames any law, but that nearly all human deeds/
concerns are chance happenings.*

The Athenian immediately refines this assertion to state that the 'god' with the participation of τύχη and καίρος are the pilots of human affairs--with the addition of τέχνη.

19. *Laws*, 709, a1-3

20. *Op. cit.* 709, a8-b2.

Ὡς θεὸς μὲν πάντα, καὶ μετὰ θεοῦ τύχη καὶ καιρός, τᾶνθρώπινα διακυβερνῶσι
σύμπαντα. ἡμερώτερον μὴν τρίτον συγχωρῆσαι τούτοις δεῖν ἔπεσθαι τέχνην·

*As the god, and together with the god, tyche and the critical moment, pilot all
human concerns, all entirely. Truly, to concede more gently, it is necessary to
join a third to these, skill.*

These three 'forces' together form a subtle network through which human affairs are governed. Plato offers a viewpoint that allows for the integral role of chance in human affairs, as proclaimed by Chaeremon, but allows for equal participation of other forces. The description of Tyche as one (at least) of the pilots, or stewards of human affairs shows some similarity to the way the Tyche in Menander's comedy describes herself.

C. Demosthenes--Olynthiac II

We see a similar sentiment expressed by Demosthenes in Olynthiac II.22, 4-5:

μεγάλη γὰρ ῥοπή, μᾶλλον δ' ὅλον ἢ τύχη παρα πάντ' ἔστι τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
πράγματα·

...tyche is a great weight, in fact it is everything in human affairs:

The sense is close to the Chaeremon quote--some of the vocabulary is the same--τὰ
πράγματα--while θνητῶν and ἀνθρώπων are close synonyms. Although Demosthenes
doesn't polarize τύχη and εὐβουλία as Chaeremon does, he praises the σῶφρων
(σωφροσύνη is one of the words, or values Plutarch opposes to τύχη right under this
quote) who considers Philip a formidable adversary, recognizing Philip's good fortune.

Yet, he would rather have Athens' fortune than Philip's because Athens is more likely to stand in good favor with the gods--Philip, on the other hand, is no slacker but an active participant in every campaign, for which reason he gets the better of Athens--not because he is lucky--or at least not luckier i.e. more in fortune's favor than Athens. So-- Demosthenes acknowledges that fortune plays a major role in human affairs, and that Philip has a fair share of good fortune, but the real reason for his success is his willingness to work hard. Such a point of view is not that far from Plato's in the above mentioned passage where the combined roles of τύχη, καιρός and τέχνη allow the god to bring about law. The Athenians, however, in Demosthenes' view, are probably more beloved of the gods than Philip, but fail with respect to his aggressions because they don't stand up to him energetically, which allows him to acquire the appearance of good fortune in their perceptions.

D. The Alexander Romance

The fragment also appears in connection to the *Alexander Romance*²¹ as part of the cycle of Alexander's letters. This cycle has been studied by Merkelbach²² and the papyri, including the letter in which Chaeremon's line occurs, by Pieraccioni.²³ In the letter from Polyeidus to Darius, number XIII according to Merkelbach, one Polyeidus

21. The authorship of this work was falsely ascribed to Callisthenes who was a native of Olynthus. Callisthenes actually did accompany Alexander on his campaigns. In the *Life of Alexander*, Ch. 53, Plutarch reports that the presence of Callisthenes on the campaign was explained by the philosopher's wish to influence Alexander to rebuild Olynthus, his home city.

22. Merkelbach, 1977, *Die Quellen Des Griechischen Alexander-Romans*.

23. *Papiri Greci E Latini*, vol. 12, 1285, 166-171.

writes to the Persian king to report Alexander's fine treatment of the king's family, notably the female members of it, and himself. Polyeidus's letter is one of those in the cycle which is generally agreed to be fictitious. The identity of this Polyeidus has been suggested to be either the fourth century dramatist, a rough contemporary of Chaerephon, or some Greek teacher by that name who was part of the retinue of Darius, captured with the family, by Alexander. Pieraccioni, while he does not eliminate this possibility as totally unlikely, prefers the view that the author of the letter was intended by the compiler of the cycle to be the dramatist, in order to give some cultural and historical color to the letter. Merkelbach agrees in that respect, citing Pieraccioni's remarks.

The dramatist Polyeidus is an even more shadowy figure than Chaerephon--his life and work as a poet is attested only in the works of later authors, and possibly he can be identified as the poet whose recognition scene in an Iphigeneia tragedy is mentioned by Aristotle.²⁴ There is no indication of exactly in which years he was living or active as a poet.²⁵ Chaerephon, while some of his fragments have survived, is also dated only as a fourth century tragedian. The two surely could have been contemporaries. To further make the point that the letter is a fiction, Pieraccioni doubts that the actual Polyeidus would have been alive in 333 BC, which is when Alexander defeated Darius. How he has determined how long into the fourth century Polyeidus might have lived is not stated. The author of the letter refers to his advanced age, perhaps to further lend an air of

24. *Poetics* 1455a

25. Pieraccioni, identifying the nominal author of the letter as the dramatist Polyeidus of Selimbria, refers to stylistic elements in the letter but doesn't indicate any hard biographical facts. Pieraccioni's concern is how to establish the inauthenticity of the letter, rather than uncover any details of the life.

veracity to the letter, in Pieraccioni's view.

Pieraccioni's further opinion is that this letter is an old text, albeit fictitious, which was already in circulation together with other texts of diverse origin, when the author of Pseud.- Callisthenes. assembled his cycle. His guess is that it dates from the second century BC--or at very latest, first century BC. If he is correct in his surmise about the age of the text, considering the fact that Plutarch has quoted directly from other letters in the cycle, although not this one, it is not unreasonable to assume that Plutarch would have been familiar with this letter of Polyeidus. It should also be noted that Plutarch has, in the *Life of Alexander*, referred to the incident documented in this particular letter, in which Alexander displayed respectful treatment of the women of Darius's family.²⁶ He mentions it again, in *De fort.* just below at 97D10-E2.

Pieraccioni remarks on the many poetic references in it--as Merkelbach also notes--from epic and tragedy. Polyeidus begins by quoting Homer, ι 14,

τί πρῶτον, <τί> ἔπειτα, τί δ' ὑστάτιον καταλέξω.

what first, what next, what last will I recount,

as Odysseus says as he begins to relate his story to Alcinous and the Phaeacians. He continues, Τύχη γὰρ ἀνωμάλῳ παλαίσας καὶ τῶν σῶν ἐπιλέησμαι πραγμάτων·

for having wrestled with an unpredictable fortune I have overlooked my own affairs:

Pieraccioni notes that the preceding recalls Euripides' fragment 684, Nk2:

φεῦ τῶν βροτειῶν ὡς ἀνώμαλοι τύχαι,

26. *Life of Alexander*, 21

Alas, irregular are the fortunes of mortals,

Finally, Chaeremon's fragmentary line is given within the following line:

εἰρήσθω δέ μοι ὅτι καὶ τύχη τὰ θνητῶν πράγματ' οὐκ εὐβουλία·

It has been told to me that tyche is the deeds of mortals not euboulia:

He has added the introductory phrase εἰρήσθω δέ μοι ὅτι καὶ, indicating that he's repeating something that has been told to him. It also puts the line into indirect discourse.

Given that the line was written by Chaeremon, Polyeidios's remark could be understood to mean that he had the line, and its sentiment, directly from a colleague, or at the very least that he was familiar with the play. Such a reading corroborates Pieraccioni's preference for interpreting the identity of the author as the dramatist.

Further references from the tragedies include Aesch. *Septem* 671; *Coeph* 430; Eur. *Iph A* 413. Finally, returning to Homer, in remarking the futility of an old man trying to overcome Alexander's strength, Odysseus is again recalled, described as δολόμητις.

αἱ γὰρ βουλαὶ τηλικούτων καὶ τοσοῦτων οὐδὲν ἤνυσαν <ἄν> πρὸς τὴν
Ἄ[λε]ξάνδρου πάντολμον δύναμιν, εἰ καὶ αὐτὸς Ὀδυσσεὺς δολόμητις
<παρ>εγένετο.

*The counsels of those of such and age and so great an age accomplish
nothing in the face of the all daring strength of Alexander, even if wily
Odysseus himself were present.*

Pieraccioni notes that δολόμητις is not an epithet of Odysseus in Homer. Homer calls

Odysseus either δολοφρονέον or πολύμητις, reserving δολόμητις for Aegisthus²⁷.

II. The fragment and the rhetorical question

97C2-3

πότερον οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη τὰ θνητῶν πράγματα οὐδ' ἰσότης οὐδὲ σωφροσύνη οὐδὲ
κοσμιότης,

*Are the deeds of mortals then, also not dikaiosune, nor isotes, nor sophrosune, nor
kosmiotes,*

Thus far we have observed a graphic representation of Chaeremon's tragedy on a highly regarded volute crater from Apulia, the appearance of the fragment in one form or another in Aristophanes, Plato, Demosthenes, Pseudo-Callisthenes and Plutarch. The occurrence and dispersion of Chaeremon's line of poetry throughout different genres of literature as well as art indicate widespread familiarity with the line in antiquity, as well as with its possible implications. It surely is not insignificant that Plutarch, writing in a later era, himself familiar with the other examples, used it as a spring point for an essay on the role of chance. That being so, it pays to attempt a systematic analysis of exactly what Chaeremon has left us.

Chaeremon's line, as we have it out of context, appears to state that human deeds/concerns are the result of τύχη rather than εὐβουλία. Instead of considering any possible meanings or interpretations of the statement, let us examine the actual words. The poet has constructed a symmetrical statement, placing the phrase τὰ θνητῶν πράγματα at the

27. *Odd* .γ 198

center, with the two abstract nouns at either end. The two nominatives which open and close the statement appear to be in opposition to each other through their position in the sentence, however, the nouns τύχη and εὐβουλία are not, of necessity or by definition, opposites.

There is no verb, suggesting that ἐστί/εἶσί is understood. Τύχη appears first, claiming prominence, but as all the nouns are nominatives there could be some dispute about just which is the subject of the understood verb. It is possible to read

τύχη = τὰ θνητῶν πράγματα,

but just as easily, as it is poetry, it is possible to read it as

τὰ θνητῶν πράγματα = τύχη,

with little or no difference in meaning beyond emphasis based on position. Then, is it possible to understand

τύχη, οὐκ εὐβουλία = τὰ θνητῶν πράγματα

or

τὰ θνητῶν πράγματα = τύχη, οὐκ εὐβουλία

which should have the same meaning? Or is it something else altogether:

τὰ θνητῶν πράγματα οὐκ εὐβουλία = τύχη

Or is that another way of saying the same thing as well? The reverse of the above reverts to the original, which exhausts all the possible permutations.

In keeping with the recognized rhetorical character of this essay, immediately after the bare quotation, without introduction or explanation (hence no context created by Plutarch), of a line of poetry, we meet with a rhetorical question. In using this figure of

speech, Plutarch suggests the substitution of any or all of four more abstract nouns for εὐβουλία:

πότερον οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη τὰ θνητῶν πράγματα οὐδὲ ἰσότης οὐδὲ σωφροσύνη
οὐδὲ κοσμιότης,

The question seems to imply that if the quotation, which is a kind of equation, is true, then perhaps the equation is also true with certain substitutes (for εὐβουλία) --of which he provides the four stated. Keeping the phrase τὰ θνητῶν πράγματα in a central position and, negating the nouns as Chaeremon does, we would see them in the equation, in place of εὐβουλία, suggesting the following:

Τύχη τὰ θνητῶν πράγματα, οὐκ δικαιοσύνη.
ἰσότης
σωφροσύνη
κοσμιότης

Plutarch has made a symmetry of his substituted words by arranging them so that they alternate according to which suffix they have. Two have suffix -σύνη and two have suffix -της²⁸. (Chaeremon's original features an abstract ending in -ία.)

...οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη τὰ θνητῶν πράγματα οὐδὲ ἰσότης...
...οὐδὲ σωφροσύνη οὐδὲ κοσμιότης,

28. Palmer (The Greek Language, p. 251) says the suffix -σύνη forms nouns from adjectives which denote personal qualities. These are frequent in the vocabulary of the Ionic philosophers. The -της ending is an agent noun ending which creates nouns from verbs. The -ία ending in Chaeremon's line, according to Palmer, is the most common abstract noun ending. The words Plutarch has chosen which end in suffix -σύνη are relatively common and widely used. The two ending in -της, less so.

Definitions

It might even be said that Plutarch has arranged the words in two pairs. It is not clear at first sight whether he considers them close in meaning, which might explain his choice of juxtaposition, or if there is some other rationale. At any rate, the symmetry is so striking that it must be significant of something. A prudent first step toward analyzing what Plutarch has up his sleeve might be to review some of the meanings of each of the words as they're glossed in LSJ, and follow up on any associations that seem promising for Plutarch and his subject.

δικαιοσύνη

LSJ offers five basic meanings with examples of usage in a range of authors from which they have taken their glosses. As not all are relevant here, I have only included those which seem helpful:

I. righteousness, justice--the obvious, and most familiar, first definition.

III. a personification of justice as illustrated by:

a) a two line epigram, (IX. 164, Anth. Palatinae) Εἰς Δικαιοσύνης ἄγαλμα, which apostrophizes Dikaiosune.

b) Two inscriptions identifying Δικαιοσύνη with Isis.

IG 3.203, from Athens, an altar stone dedicated to Isis Dikaiosune

(Ἴσιδ[ι] Δικαιοσύν[η]).

SIG 1131, from Delos, a dedication, again to Isis Dikaiosune (Ἴσιδι

Δικαιοσύνη. There is a note remarking the frequent transference of both epithets and proper names of Greek goddesses on to the Egyptian goddess in this as in other inscriptions. The names

applied to Isis are those of goddesses associated with the guiding of human affairs. Examples are cited including Nemesis, Nike and Tyche which are added to the name Isis. Also noted is Plutarch's recognition of this phenomenon in De Iside 352B, Where, deriving the genealogy of Isis from either Prometheus or Hermes, he cites the name of the first Muse at Hermenopolis as Isis and

Dikaiosune:

διό καί τῶν ἐν Ἑρμοῦ πόλει Μουσῶν τήν προτέραν Ἴσιν ἅμα
καί Δικαιοσύνην καλοῦσι...

IV. This gloss cites the *Theologumena Arithmeticae*²⁹ of Iamblicus as describing this word as the Pythagorean name for four.

The above work, although written in the fourth century A.D., is considered an accurate reflection of the religious aspect of Pythagoreanism as practiced in the fifth-fourth centuries B.C.³⁰

V) Finally, in Hesychius, which is item number 1801 in the Lexicon,

δικαιοσύνη: ἡ χοῖνιξ μυστικῶς,

Perhaps this is meant to indicate a unit measure in a mystic vocabulary.

The last two definitions connect the word, δικαιοσύνη with religious and mystical practice. Gloss number III, shows δικαιοσύνη personified and identified with a deity--as τύχη is also.

29. De Falco, 1922, p. 29. (Iamblichus, chapter 23,14)

30. Waterfield, p.24. The identification of 'justice' as applied to the tetrad is attributed to Anatolius, Bishop of Laodicea, the teacher of Iamblicus, a Neoplatonist, who is credited as authoring the work. (p.. 23)

Next, to continue with associations suggested by the words Plutarch uses, we should recall that Plato, who is a credible source for Plutarch, who identified himself as a Platonist, is concerned with δικαιοσύνη in *The Republic*. Book I is devoted to the definition of justice and the establishment of the same as a virtue in contradiction to Thrasymachus's claim that justice is simply the advantage of the stronger. In Book IV, Socrates is compelled to demonstrate the presence of δικαιοσύνη in the hypothetical city, which he does by finding three other virtues first--namely wisdom, courage, prudence. (see below on Ch.2) Justice emerges as the fourth of four, appropriately enough since, as we have been told by the author of *Theologumena Arithmetica*, that it is a Pythagorean name for Four.

A.A.Buriks³¹ has noted that the Stoics counted δικαιοσύνη among the four cardinal virtues. It has been noted by Adam, however, that the discussion of four essential virtues appears for the first time in Greek literature in Republic IV.³² Adam further speculates that the readiness of Socrates' interlocutors to agree with the existence of four essential virtues, suggests that such an idea was already part of Plato's system.³³ Also cited by Adam, is the obvious comparison to Pythagoras and the importance of the number four in that circle.

31. Buriks, 62.s

32. Adam, 224, on 427e33

33. Loc. cit

σωφροσύνη

LSJ gives us :

1. soundness of mind, prudence, discretion
2. sanity
3. moderation in sensual desires, self control, temperance

Hesychius, entry 3110--σοφία, ἐπιστήμη

from σῶφρων,ον--of sound mind, hence discreet, prudent

Plato, also in Republic IV, uses this term as one of the virtues they must find in the city before finding δικαιοσύνη. It is discovered next to last, and there is considerable discussion of the subtleties of σωφροσύνη as a trait and its relation to the elusive δικαιοσύνη. The remaining two of the full set of four, ἀνδρεία and φρόνησις are absent here, in *De Fort.* at 97C3, but Plutarch will bring them into play in Chapter 2, 97E-F.

Considering the importance of these two words in an important work of one of Plutarch's intellectual antecedents, it is tempting to see their appearance here as provocative (as well as evocative) particularly noting the absence of the full set, and the substitution of ἰσότης and κοσμιότης instead of the missing parts of the familiar tetrad of virtues. (Plutarch has already performed another substitution in inserting the four abstract words under discussion for Chaeremon's εὐβουλία.) There is nothing at this juncture to give us a clue as to why Plutarch chose the two words he used. Neither is as common a word as the previous two, what purpose he might have had in creating another tetrad is

not immediately clear.

As defined in LSJ, we find only glosses applied to each as follows:

ἰσότης

1. equality
2. fair dealing, impartiality

In Hesychius it is entry 990, given as equivalent to φιλότης. (*friendship*)

Plutarch, himself, uses this word fairly frequently--a TLG search yields forty-two instances in a full range of cases, more often in the *Moralia* than in the *Lives*. He also uses its opposite, ἄνισότης. Plato also uses it in a number of dialogues, including *Phaedo*, *Parmenides*, *Philebus*, *Phaedrus*, *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Republic*, *Timaeus*, and *Laws*. In the *Laws* and *Parmenides*, it appears thirteen times apiece, but only one to three times in any of the others. In the *Definitions*, it is used in describing the meaning of δικαιοσύνη: ἰσότης κοινωνική. (*social equality*) From that instance, it is possible to find some rationale in its use alongside that virtue.

κοσμιότης

propriety, decorum (these two only).

Plutarch uses it only twice in his entire corpus--here, in the nominative, and the other time, in the genitive in the pseudo-Plutarch, *De liberis educandis*. It does not seem a very popular word, although a canon search in the TLG shows that it appears a few times per author, in numerous, usually later than classical authors, often in conjunction with

words for the other virtues and particularly σωφροσύνη. Plato uses the word in four dialogues, including in lists in conjunction with σωφροσύνη, in Alcibiades and Gorgias. There is apparently, as in the case of ἰσότης, some precedent for using κοσμιότης with the virtues based on Plato's texts. In *Definitions* (412d), of Plato defines κοσμιότης as follows:

Κοσμιότης ὕπειξις ἔκουσία πρὸς τὸ φανέν βέλτιστον· εὐταξία περὶ κίνησιν σώματος.

Kosmiotēs, voluntary compliance toward the best appearance: coordination of the movement of the body.

In Republic IV, Socrates describes σωφροσύνη as follows:

Κόσμος πού τις, ἧν δ' ἐγὼ, ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστίν...

Further investigation of the sonic and denotative similarity can be found below on Chapter 2.

Since all these words have been used as alternatives for εὐβουλία in the equation, let us also consider some of those definitions in LSJ:

εὐβουλία

good counsel, soundness of judgement, prudence.

It is also however, cited as the Pythagorean name for Three in *Theologumena Arithmeticae*.³⁴

34. De Falco [Iamblich] 14;18.

The triad is called 'prudence' and 'wisdom' (ὅτι ἢ τριὰς εὐβουλία καλεῖται καὶ φρόνησις...) Again, in Republic IV 428b2-3, the polis is called σοφὴ because it is εὐβουλος. Further, εὐβουλία is described as a kind of ἐπιστήμη (428 b4-5).

φρόνησις

The familiar glosses for this include;

purpose, intention, thought, sense, judgement, and practical wisdom, prudence in government and affairs. The use by Plutarch here in *De fort.* is cited by LSJ as an example of the last definition. However, φρόνησις is also cited by LSJ as the Pythagorean name for Three in *Theol. Ar.* This would make εὐβουλία and φρόνησις virtual synonyms--at least to the Pythagoreans. It seems relevant to note that we have now seen Pythagorean vocabulary for two numbers of the decad.

Based on the synonymous³⁵ character of εὐβουλία and φρόνησις, Plutarch seems to be creating yet another substitution in (or in addition to) the equation. Later in the essay, starting with Chapter/Paragraph 2, he uses φρόνησις almost exclusively in this context.

Representative behavior in good and bad men

Within the same rhetorical question he has posed, Plutarch now asks whether chance is the cause of choices made and behavior exhibited by five named individuals:

35. Perhaps, strictly speaking, it would be more accurate to describe εὐβουλία and φρόνησις as alternate names for the triad in the Pythagorean vocabulary, rather than as synonyms of each other. For purposes of convenience, however, I have used the term synonym throughout.

two who seem to represent good choices and three who seem to represent bad.

97C4 - C9

ἀλλ' ἐκ τύχης καὶ διὰ τύχην...

but (was it) from and through tyche...

This language is similar to what Plutarch uses in *De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute* 343B13-C13, where he also names a list of outstanding individuals, disingenuously claiming that they owed their fine deeds, character, etc. to tyche. Aristeides, named here, is again one of those in the list. His reliance on tyche is introduced by ἀπό (C2). For the others, Solon and Miltiades, Plutarch uses διά. In *Fortune*, Plutarch chooses two names and prefaces them with prepositions ἐκ and διά plus the noun. At this place in *De Fort.*, ἐκ τύχης καὶ διὰ τύχην are repeated with ironic emphasis to contrast good and bad behavior, introducing first Aristeides and Scipio, then Philocrates and Lathenes and Euthykrates.

A. Aristeides

97C7-8

Ἀριστείδης ἐνεκαρτέρησε τῇ πενίᾳ, πολλῶν χρημάτων κύριος γενέσθαι δυνάμενος,
that Aristeides persisted in poverty, when he was able to control much wealth,

This is the Athenian statesman of the fifth century B.C., who was known as 'the just' (ὁ δίκαιος). It is, perhaps, appropriate that Plutarch places this name first of the group, following the occurrence of the word δικαιοσύνη above. Although the adjective as applied to individuals has some implications which vary the idea of the abstract noun,

righteous and lawful are among the choices of meaning and those are clearly in line with Plutarch's allusion to the cardinal virtues. In choosing Aristeides as an example it would appear that Plutarch is invoking the ideal of an individual of unimpeachable character, and indeed, many other ancient authors use Aristeides as an exemplar of incontestably good conduct.³⁶

In the 3rd *Olynthiac*, sec. 21, line 4-22 line 1, Demosthenes lists orators from the past who put the state above their own popularity, remarking that present day politicians praise them but seldom emulate them. (line 9.) Shortly after that, at section 26 line 1, Demosthenes again mentions Aristeides, this time in the company of Miltiades, saying that those orators were distinguished by their modesty, that their houses were no fancier than those of ordinary citizens--this after beautifying the state with temples etc:

ἰδίᾳ δ' οὐτῶ σὺ φρονεῖς ἦσαν καὶ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ τῆς πολιτείας ἤθει
μένοντες, ὥστε τὴν Ἀριστείδου καὶ τὴν Μιλτιάδου καὶ τῶν τότε λαμπρῶν
οἰκίαν εἴ τις ἄρα οἶδεν ὑμῶν ὅποια ποτ' ἐστίν, ὄρα τῆς τοῦ γείτονος οὐδὲν
σεμνοτέραν οὔσαν·

in private life, they were of sound mind, in every way keeping to the ethic of the constitution, so that if someone among you knows in what sort of house Aristeides or Miltiades and the shining lights of the time lived, you see that it is no more stately than that of a neighbor.

36. A humorous example can be found in *Aspis*, where the cook, who has been contracted to cater the wedding of the heiress and the stepson, is upset at the sudden abandonment of the festivities over the funeral--it's the story of his life--he winds up not getting paid. He reviles his assistant, whose name is Spinther, for not having stolen anything on the way out, sardonically referring to him as Aristeides (1.230).

(Compare mention of Lasthenes and Euthykrates, below.)

In the speech *Against Aristocrates* (209, 2) Demosthenes describes Aristeides' control of the tribute without enriching himself at all (οὐδὲ μιᾷ δραχμῇ).

Demosthenes uses the word σώφρονες. Plutarch, in *Fortune*, uses the form of σωφροσύνη, immediately before his mention of Aristeides. Shortly after, there is mention of other figures with subtle reference to behavior which was less modest. Again in *On Organization*, (29,3) he makes the point that the houses of Aristeides and others were no different from those of their neighbors.

Plutarch uses a good deal of the *Life* to establish Aristeides' setting up of the tribute and his even handed management of it. In the *Life* generally, Plutarch presents him as an individual of high character who was most loved for his 'justice'--δικαιοσύνη is the word used in Chapter 6. In section 5 of that chapter, Plutarch remarks that power, one of the things which mortals most aspire to, lies in the hands of tyche. Here, at 97C7-8, Aristeides is said, to have persevered in his poverty although he had the ability to have become, not powerful but rich. Surely Plutarch would not have disagreed that power and wealth go hand in hand, but in the *Life of Aristeides* he credits tyche with bestowing power, and in our present context, it is asked with apparent mockery whether tyche was the cause of Aristeides' choice to remain poor. Although he does not specify exactly how Aristeides chose to remain poor, he is surely calling to mind the well known and much admired honesty Aristeides demonstrated in the matter of the tribute, and why would he not have expected his listener/reader to pick up the allusion? In this respect, i.e. that of tribute, Aristeides is similar to Scipio (see below), who did not claim any of the booty

after sacking Carthage.³⁷

Plutarch tends to describe Aristeides. as a poor man, although the *Life* opens with a discussion of the differing accounts of his financial situation. The traditional reports of Aristeides' lifelong poverty seem to have existed side by side with reports that he actually was considerably better off than usually supposed. Plutarch presents each view, but finishes the subject with accounts which attempt to explain the differing opinions that arose regarding Aristeides' being less poor than tradition presents him. (Ch. 1) The *Life* ends with another discussion of the impoverished circumstances of Aristeides at his death and the subsequent necessity of his descendants to require public charity.³⁸ (Ch. 27)

As Plutarch has presented contrasting versions of his wealth or poverty, he also presents differing views about Aristeides' indisputably excellent character in all respects. Citing Craterus the Macedonian, he describes how false accusations were made of Aristeides, and bribery charges brought against him, for allegedly dipping into the tribute from the Ionians. Again, explanations are offered, and we are told there was no written proof of any of the proceedings. Plutarch cites Theophrastus who says that although Aristeides kept to his reputation for justice in his personal life, in matters of state, he followed policy, which was not always just. On the whole, though, Plutarch takes the view that his subject, Aristeides, was uncompromisingly just. This point of view is presented consistently in the *Life*, e.g. Ch.3,5, where Aeschylus's description of

37. Plutarch's description at this point in *Fortune* is similar to Polybius's description of Aemilius Paullus who had a kingdom at his disposal and did not enrich himself.

38. Here again, there is similarity to Polybius's account of Scipio.

Amphiaraus prompts the people to turn to Aristeides;³⁹ his advice to the Athenians to reject Themistocles' suggestion that they burn the ships belonging to the other Greeks as an unjust, if advantageous plan (Ch.22); and the statement that the Athenians won favor with the rest of the Greeks through the justice (δικαιοσύνην) of Aristeides and the moderation (ἐπιείκειαν) of Cimon (Ch. 23).

The famous account of the request by the illiterate man for Aristeides to write his own name on the ostrakon, simply because he was tired of hearing Aristeides referred to as "the just," establishes his reputation. (Ch. 7 sec. 7) Plutarch's *Life of Aristeides* explores a possible dark side of the legendary just man, but seems to conclude that, although there might have been tales that questioned his sterling reputation, there is no concrete evidence to back up those stories.

In Chapter 25 (*Life*), Plutarch cites Plato crediting Aristeides with being the only one among the highly thought of and famous at Athens who was worthy of mention. (Πλάτων δὲ τῶν μεγάλων δοκούντων καὶ ὀνομαστῶν Ἀθήνησι μόνον ἄξιον λόγου τοῦτον ἀποφαίνει τὸν ἄνδρα.) He goes on to say that (according to Plato) the other generals of that time were responsible only for improving the external trappings of the city whereas Aristeides governed with a view toward excellence. (Ἀριστείδην δὲ πολιτεύσασθαι πρὸς ἄρετήν.) These references can be found in *Gorgias* at 518 and 526b.

Actually, when we consider what Plato really said, it isn't quite as Plutarch would

39. This is quite an interesting point, that Plutarch has cited an example of how a description of one individual can recall someone else--to a whole group of people. Perhaps Plutarch himself is doing something like that for his readers, i.e. naming certain individuals with the expectation that they will recall others, or perhaps less literally, more of that individual's personal associations.

have us believe. *Gorgias* 526 is in the middle of Socrates' attempt to explain to Callicles how, although there have been powerful people who were good, most are tempted to become bad or unjust, Aristeides was an exception in this respect. (εἷς δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἐλλόγιμος γέγονεν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλληνας, Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου· οἱ δὲ πολλοί, ὧ ἄριστε, κακοὶ γίνονται τῶν δυναστῶν.) There is no mention of Themistocles, Cimon, or Pericles at that place. At 518, we find Socrates expressing impatience with Callicles for being unable or unwilling to understand Socrates' distinction between those who fundamentally care for the body and those who have skills which provide accessories which are good for the body such as bakers or shoemakers. Here there is no mention of the politicians Plutarch mentions. Perhaps Plutarch has conflated the acknowledgement, made through the person of Socrates at 526, that Aristeides was a good man who was well known in Athens for being a good man, and the discussion at 418 which distinguishes between gymnastics and medicine and simply ancillary crafts, for the purpose of contrasting Aristeides' contribution to the city and that of the other generals he names.

Dodds, in his commentary on *Gorgias*,⁴⁰ notices that Plutarch's claim that Plato said Aristeides governed with a view to excellence, suggests that although Aristeides' ostracism places him on a level with Themistocles and Cimon, it implies that in Plato's view, Aristeides failed at establishing *arete* among the Athenians. He also mentions that in *Meno* (94A1), Plato has Socrates establish that Aristeides, although an undeniably good man himself, did not succeed in making his son such, in spite of the best education.

40. Dodds, 1959, p. 382.

Dodds maintains that Aristeides' inability to teach the principles of true statesmanship to his son meant that in Plato's view, Aristeides did not possess them. Dodds may or may not be correct and it is not indicated what Plutarch thought about that.

Also, in *Theaetetus*, at 150b-151a, Socrates describes his function as midwife of the soul, and how those who associate with him make progress by finding in themselves good and important things which Socrates helps them to bring to light. Some however, leave too soon, with regrettable results--they fall under bad influences, do not follow up on the work Socrates helped them start, and eventually fall out of public favor. He counts Aristeides among this number. In *Laches*, the subject of which is ἀνδρεία, Aristeides' son, Lysimachus, takes his son, namesake of his father, to Socrates to be educated so as to be able live up to his grandfather's name. Here again, there is an allusion to one of the four virtues, this time ἀνδρεία.

In addition to the *Life*, Plutarch has made Aristeides one of the leaders whose sayings he recalls in *Apophthegmata*. In a short selection are included his political independence, the anecdote about the ostrakon and his subsequent ostracism, his opposition to Themistocles, his honesty about money matters, and the incident in the theatre where the description of Amphiaraus caused the audience members to turn to Aristeides.

B. Scipio

97D2-3

καὶ Σκιπίων Καρχηδόνα ἔλων οὐδὲν οὔτε εἶδε τῶν λαφύρων,

and Scipio, when he took Carthage, did not even see any of the spoils,

Scipio is the only Roman on the list. At first glance, he seems a little bit out of place in the midst of four Greeks (Aristeides and those described below) of an earlier age. Within Plutarch's own oeuvre, there was a *Life of Scipio*, which is not extant, a *Synkrisis* of Scipio and Epaminondas (his parallel, also lost) and another *Scipio*. Besides mention of his name in the fragments of those works, his name appears in Plutarch's extant writings numerous times. Many of these citations refer to the elder Scipio, which are not relevant since Plutarch's reference is to the destruction of Carthage. Both Scipiones are among the leaders quoted in the *Apophthegmata*, however none of those occurrences sheds much light on Plutarch's choice to include Scipio in the present company. Some interesting observations on Scipio's character can be found in Polybius's *Histories*, with which Plutarch must have been familiar, considering his interest in lives of statesmen both Greek and Roman.

Scipio was the biological son of Aemilius Paullus, who after the fall of Macedon, was responsible for bringing much Greek culture to Rome. Polybius, of course, was personally acquainted with Aemilius and the Scipio family, and a personal mentor to the the younger Scipio,⁴¹ who had been adopted by the son of the elder Scipio, a relative. In the *Histories*, Polybius presents a lengthy and detailed analysis of Scipio's character and

41. In *Histories*, Book 38,22,3, Polybius describes himself as the young man's διδάσκαλος.

its development.⁴² He describes how, in his early youth, Scipio undertook to develop a virtuous character, and a reputation for such, with respect to three (rather than four) virtues, i.e. σωφροσύνη, τὸ περὶ τὰ χρήματα μεγαλοψυχία καὶ καθαροτητι διενεγκεῖν τῶν ἄλλων (a single word is not used), and ἀνδρεία.

We are told that Scipio had an impulse, just as he attained adulthood, to achieve reputation for moderate behavior (ἐπὶ σωφροσύνη).⁴³ The word used by Polybius is already familiar. Scipio's inclination in this respect was in sharp contrast with the other young men of his generation, who gave themselves over to sexual dalliances with prostitutes and boys. Instead, he established a reputation for himself through temperate behavior. (...ἐποίησατο τὴν ἐπ' εὐταξίᾳ καὶ σωφροσύνη δόξαν.)⁴⁴

The next concern Scipio had toward establishing his reputation was in fairness in the handling of money. Polybius chooses to express this ambition as a desire to distinguish himself from his peers in money matters,⁴⁵ as he had in the matter of σωφροσύνη. It describes fairness in money matters as μεγαλοψυχία and καθαρότης. These are two more abstract nouns with endings we have seen before. The emphasis seems to be on generosity (great spiritedness) and honesty (purity of intent, moral purity).

It is Polybius's contention that Scipio decidedly benefited, in developing a morally superior character from the influence of his biological father, Paullus Aemilius,

42. *Histories*, XXXI, 22-30.

43. *Ibid.* 31, 25,2

44. *Ibid.* 31, 25, 8,6.

45. As described above, n.34..

whom the author compares to Aristeides.

It is interesting that Aemilius's character and circumstances, as described by Polybius, are in some ways more analagous to Aristeides' than the younger Scipio's. Book 31, 22 states the financial circumstances of Aemilius at his death as penurious. It seems that there was so little in the estate, that it was not possible to restore his wife's dowry from the movable property (ἐκ τῶν ἐπίπλων) and his sons had to give her actual land (τῶν ἐγγείων τινὰς προσαπέδοντο κτήσεων). This is noted as an irony in view of the fact that Aemilius had brought more gold from Spain to Rome than anyone else, and had had the enormous resources of Macedon at his disposal. Polybius actually recalls the reputation of Aristeides at this juncture, and one is led to wonder why Plutarch didn't choose to pair Aemilius with Aristeides rather than his son, given that he invokes both Aristeides and a refusal to claim booty. In the Apophthegmata (200C), however, Plutarch describes Scipio's own order to his household members not to take or buy any of the booty from Carthage. The first entry concerning Scipio in that work (199F) compares in interesting ways with Polybius's treatment of Aemilius. According to Plutarch, a small amount of money is said to have been left in Scipio's estate, in spite of having been the lord of Carthage (καὶ ταῦτα Καρχηδόνοσ κύριον οντα) and that he was the general who had enriched his soldiers the most. Polybius's description of Aemilius is as follows:

ὁ γὰρ πλεῖστον μὲν τῶν καθ' αὐτὸν ἐξ Ἰβηρίας χρυσὸν εἰς τὴν Ῥωμὴν μετενηνοχῶς, μεγίστων δὲ θησαυρῶν κύριος γενόμενος ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, πλείστης δὲ περὶ τὰ προειρημένα τετευχῶς ἐξουσίας...

For he was the one who, of his contemporaries, had brought the most gold from

Iberia to Rome, was overseer of the largest treasury in Macedonia, and who actually had the most authority over the aforesaid.

In the context of Polybius's comparison of Aemilius with Aristeides, I would like to call attention to the remarks made at XXXI, 22. In commenting about the admirable traits exhibited by Greek statesmen who kept clean hands in money matters, he compares Aemilius Paullus favorably to his Greek predecessors. This is so, he explains, because he had a whole kingdom at his disposal and still did not claim any of it. He is making these seemingly incredible remarks, says Polybius, even being aware that his work will be read by Romans since it is an account of their great accomplishments. That fact, since they would know if he deviated from the truth, should be borne in mind by the reader, if any of Polybius's statements about Romans seems hard to believe.⁴⁶ This last remark seems to indicate that Polybius expected his readers to come from both Greek and Roman populations. Likewise, we might understand some similar expectation on Plutarch's part about who might be readers of his works.

In addition to paternal influence, Polybius tells us that chance⁴⁷ offered Scipio three opportunities to exhibit magnanimity and Roman pietas. First,⁴⁸ when the mother of his adoptive father died, and he inherited her property, which included precious objects used by women for religious purposes as well as slaves, Scipio gave these things and

46. Walbank, 1979, p.494-5. Walbank notes Polybius's attempt to establish his own credentials by offering Roman readers as a guarantee of his accuracy. Greeks might have doubted that Scipio might have been that incorruptible.

47. ταῦτόματον, op.cit. 31, 25.10

48. *Histories*, 26.

people to his own mother whose material circumstances were reduced through separation from her husband. The second example of Scipio's magnanimity emerges⁴⁹ through his handling of the portion of the estate owed to the daughters of the Elder Scipio. Instead of paying the amount over the legally allowed period of time, he paid the full sum at once. The third instance⁵⁰ describes events around and following the death of Aemilius Paullus. Although both he and his brother, who had been adopted by Fabius, were joint heirs, Scipio gave all of his share to his brother who was not as well off as himself, and contributed to the cost of the memorial games from his own resources. When his mother died, the property he had given her was turned over to his sisters instead of being used to recoup any of his own expenses.

The final respect in which Scipio needed to develop a sterling reputation was bravery (ἄνδρεία). This virtue is held, by Polybius, to be almost the most supreme, or the most connected to authority/rulership, (...καὶ κυριωτάτου σχεδὸν...) particularly in Rome. As in the case of honesty in money handling, Polybius tells us that once again, Scipio was aided by chance⁵¹. Following the Macedonian war, Aemilius had put Scipio in charge of the Macedonian wildlife preserves in order to offer his son the best training for leadership. Naturally, Scipio took to the sport of hunting enthusiastically, which aided him in forming a reputation for bravery.

There are two points which may be taken from these examples. First, is

49. Ibid., 27.

50. Ibid., 31, 28.

51. Ibid., 31, 29.

Polybius's insistence that the development of Scipio's character was the result of his own personal wish to become a virtuous man, but helped by both parental influence and chance. Second, neither in the case of bravery, nor in the previous, of fairness in handling money, does Polybius say explicitly what role chance plays--or how. It is fairly obvious how parental influence would work, and perhaps some argument could be made for genetic influence, through the idea of innate nobility expressed in the Greek word γενναῖος.⁵² We can assume that chance aided Scipio in demonstrating his good character in money matters by placing him in the privileged position of heir to several fortunes, and by creating circumstances which provided an opportunity to be generous--i.e. his mother's poverty, his brother's greater need than his own, etc.⁵³ Likewise, as far as bravery is concerned, he was lucky enough to be present when Aemilius was victorious over Macedonia, and then the game preserves there had not been hunted for some time, and provided plenty of game. These are plausible enough guesses, but one is left not entirely satisfied and wondering, in the absence of any clear description of how he considers chance to work, what exactly Polybius meant by saying that chance afforded those opportunities.⁵⁴ He is clear enough in saying that Scipio's fine deeds should not be put down to the effect of chance except in a few instances.⁵⁵ Are those instances the above noted roles of chance in offering opportunities to Scipio? If so, there is still no

52. This word is used by Polybius in the *Histories* with some frequency and it is applied, in adverbial form, to Scipio's generous treatment of his relatives . See Bk. 31, 27, 15,1.

53. Walbank, 1979 p. 503. "In this case, the right relatives died at the right time."

54. Op. cit., p. 512. Observes the synonymous meaning of ταὑτόματον and τύχη, but does not speculate about the exact role it played in shaping Scipio's character in these instances.

55. *Histories*, Bk. 31, 30, 3.

explanation of what sort of role has been played. He is not explicit.

At the end of Book XXXIII, Ch. 17, Polybius attempts to outline his point of view about the role of τύχη and εἰμαρμένη in human affairs. He lists a number of uncontrollable events, such as flood, drought and plague, a similar list to what Plato has enumerated in *Laws* 709. Polybius describes these as matters in which it is reasonable to appeal to the gods, as it is not possible to determine the root causes of those matters. In other cases, such as the recent decrease in birth rate in Greece, the root cause lies in human habits and behavior. He suggests the improvement of habits or enactment of laws which will demand the producing and raising of children.

Finally, in this digression, he names an event which he considers truly unexplainable, namely, the case of recent Macedonian history. Polybius remarks how the Macedonians were defeated by the Romans when they were fighting for Demetrius and Perseus. After their defeat, they enjoyed significant freedoms under Roman rule. When the pretender Philip took over, and the population began to suffer more serious grief than under legitimate rulers, they were able to defeat a Roman army fighting for Philip. Polybius thinks that in the face of no attributable cause, these events and their outcome must express a wrath sent from the gods.

In addition to refining an assessment of the role of chance in political events, Polybius demonstrates an interest in the organization of states and has given an outline of the Roman constitution in Book VI. In Ch. 5 of said Book, he offers a summary of the theory of political development as described by "Plato and certain other philosophers" as

their treatments are "accessible to few."⁵⁶

In the statements noted just above, as in the long report of the development of Scipio's character, we meet once again, through a subtle allusion by Plutarch, an author concerned with the development and structure of constitutions and the character of statesmen. In this context, however, no mention of Scipio would be complete without acknowledging his role in yet another such work, namely Cicero's *De RePublica*, and that it is Scipio who is the recipient of the famous *Somnium* with its Pythagorean imagery, at the end of that work.⁵⁷ The main concern with Cicero's work in considering Plutarch's *Fortune*, is that Scipio is its primary participant and surely that connection would have been made by a reader/listener in picking up Scipio's name in Plutarch's list of examples.

A modern commentary on the *Somnium*,⁵⁸ includes an introduction which provides some interesting information and insightful comments about the work as a whole, including the *Somnium* itself. The *Somnium*, something of a puzzle, as it employs undeniably mystical imagery when its author is not otherwise known for such conceits, was preserved in the commentary on it written by Macrobius, who lived and wrote in the fourth century A.D. It was popular in the Middle Ages and much has been

56. At the beginning of Polybius's digression on the types of states, Ian Scott-Kilvert's Penguin translation of the *Histories* makes a note (p.303) apropos of Polybius's remark about the other writers who have written on the subject. Scott-Kilvert remarks that it is his belief that Polybius is "not necessarily referring" to classical authors, such as Herodotus, Plato and Aristotle, but that he probably was thinking of authors more contemporary to himself. A very short bit later, though, comes the reference to "Plato and certain other philosophers' noted above. Why would he not have been thinking of them all along, since he offers as his rationale for the digression that their explanations are too complicated for everyone? The Greek text that corresponds to Scott-Kilvert's translation can be found in VI 3, 5-7, and 5, 1-11.

57. It seems worth noting that Cicero is the parallel to Demosthenes in the *Lives*.

58. J.G.F. Powell, *Cicero: On Friendship & The Dream of Scipio*, 1990.

written about it since. The finale of Book VI, the last book of the work, it was separated from the main text at an early date and survived almost as a separate work. The remainder of the *De RePublica* was not known until the discovery in 1820 of a manuscript in the Vatican, dating from the fourth or fifth century A.D., when it was found to have survived in fragmentary condition.

Powell acknowledges the obvious connection between Cicero's and Plato's *Republics*, while allowing that Cicero has produced an independent work of literary merit. Cicero's concerns are entirely for the Roman state and statesmanship and borrowings from Plato or dependence on the prior model are expressed entirely in a Roman context. Scipio is a Roman example of a statesman of virtue, and Cicero has given him some connection to Pythagorean ideas by sending him the prophetic dream he recounts in the *Somnium*. We will recall the connection of some of the abstract vocabulary Plutarch uses a few lines above to Pythagorean issues.

Again and again in Polybius's treatment of the moral character of Scipio and Aemilius Paullus, there is language and tone reminiscent of Plutarch in our example. Plutarch, however, unlike Polybius (as well as Demosthenes and Plato in their discussions of the role of chance in various contexts) appears not to allow for any role for tyche in matters of moral character. It seems increasingly evident, however, that he must have been familiar with the pertinent texts of those authors and, through the similarities of vocabulary and context, it may not be too far a stretch to suppose that he might have referred to them in writing this opusculum.

In contrast to the previous two names of superior statesmen, Plutarch presents a

list of three who seem to embody the worst possible characteristics for that social purpose. He uses, however, a slightly different method in making this presentation. In the case of Aristeides and Scipio, Plutarch has mentioned their names with his own reference to how their reputations regarding the handling of wealth, invoking a well known incident in each case. For Philocrates, and the paired Lasthenes and Euthykrates, he has used quotations or near quotations from the speeches of Demosthenes.

C. Philocrates

97D4-6

ἐκ τύχης δὲ καὶ διὰ τύχην Φιλοκράτης λαβὼν χρυσίον παρὰ Φιλίππου “πόρνas καὶ ἰχθῦς ἠγόραζε,”

and was it from and through tyche that Philocrates, after taking money from Philip, bought "whores and fish,"

Plutarch mentions the fourth century Athenian statesman, who was Demosthenes' enemy, by name only a few times--four in all, including this one.⁵⁹ One of those occurs in the *Life of Demosthenes*, which seems a simple description of Demosthenes habits regarding his enemies.⁶⁰ The remainder occur in the *Moralia*, and are almost identical to this example with minor changes. The example comes from Demosthenes' speech *De falsa legatione*,⁶¹ about the embassy to Philip which included himself and Philocrates. It

59. In the *Lives*, *Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus* contains two mentions of a household slave by the name of Philocrates (Chapter 38, lines 2&3), but because of the obvious time lapse, it can't be the same Philocrates and has no bearing on this investigation. Those would bring the total to six mentions.

60. Op. cit., ch. 16, 4,1.

61. Op.cit., 229. 5

is only one of fifty one times Demosthenes names Philocrates in all his speeches, but within the entire corpus of Plutarch's works, it is the only mention that he refers to. It appears that what interested Plutarch about Philocrates, the statesman, was that he took money from Philip and used it to procure corporeal comforts for himself.

There is, however, a difference between the original and Plutarch's usage. In *De fort.*, it is invoked as if it referred to Philocrates himself, and it may, but there are some things in Demosthenes' actual statements that merit observation. The passage at 229-230, describes the embassy by naming the participants, who included Philocrates, and what each of them did with respect to the mission. All have exhibited some form of unacceptable or even treasonable behavior, except for one of them, presumably Demosthenes himself. The quote in question comes later in Demosthenes' speech, and doesn't seem, in context, necessarily to implicate Philocrates, based on the order of telling—or does it?

In *De falsa legat.*, the reference is complicated. Demosthenes tells a story of four ambassadors and names them: Philocrates, Aeschines, Phryno, Demosthenes. Each is then described according to how he behaved, without mention of the actual name, except for Phryno. It seems as if the author intended to imply that it should be obvious who is meant by each description, yet it is hard to tell, from the text, just how the descriptions should be sorted. It seems to have been accepted by modern commentators that Plutarch knew which to apply to Philocrates, as his has been mentioned as if it were fact.⁶² It may help to take a closer look at just how the list works as Demosthenes has set

62. Douglas M. MacDowell in his commentary, *Demosthenes: On the False Embassy, Oration 19*,

it down.

At 229 of *De fals.*, Demosthenes names the four ambassadors in the order cited above. Next, listing the various behaviors, he separates them using ὁ μὲν...ὁ δέ:

1--ὁ μὲν--one got no profit from the mission but freed captives at his own expense. Demosthenes apparently, but ὁ μὲν usually refers to the former, and ὁ δέ to the latter--here he reverses the order. At any rate, in this instance, if we assume that Demosthenes and Philocrates are the ones described, ὁ μὲν refers to the last mentioned in the list (Demosthenes) and ὁ δέ to the first (Philocrates).

2--ὁ δέ--another bought harlots and fish with money with which he had betrayed his country (Philocrates?) This is evidently what Plutarch thought, and MacDowell identifies Philocrates in this place based on Plutarch's reference (as he says, p. 298), i.e. all three of them as listed above.

3--one--Phryno--(named) sent his son to Philip (ὁ μὲν)

4-- another did nothing unworthy of his country (Demosthenes ?) ὁ δέ.

Then, in a new sentence after ὁ μὲν, he mentions paying for a chorus and trireme and again mentions expense of his own funds for ransom.

5-- a final ὁ δέ--another helped to bring a large number into captivity with

Philip.

It seems clear that the blameless descriptions all belong to Demosthenes himself--there are 2 of those. Phryno is mentioned by name so no mystery there. The other two, only

Oxford, 2000. See below for specific citations.

remaining are Aeschines and Philocrates, the trulls and trout and betrayal of a whole district and 10,000 of the infantry, and 1000 of the cavalry. I don't know what this last refers to and in this case, Babbit in the Loeb, includes no note, nor does MacDowell make it any clearer.⁶³ Plutarch obviously connects the first with Philocrates and there is the section at about 307-9 which refers to Philocrates' dissolute life--with specific references to Olynthian women.

So we have three sets of ὁ μὲν...ὁ δέ for the 4 ambassadors. Demosthenes is apparently comparing himself favorably to the other three. However, he switches the order around--sometimes he is ὁ μὲν, sometimes ὁ δέ. Then, if we accept the comparison of good ambassador to bad ambassador, there is a problem with which description applies to each of the other 3--the author doesn't follow a clear line--he mentions the profligate second (2) (whom Plutarch takes to mean Philocrates then names Phryno (3), then the traitor last (6). He puts himself in position (1), (4), (5). The pattern works out to good-bad-bad-good-good-bad, and the original list ran bad, bad, bad, good. That makes it difficult to determine which ambassador was to be matched with which behavior. It is almost as if Demosthenes is offering his listeners a choice from column A and one from column B and one from column C.

No matter how one rationalizes Demosthenes' choice as rhetorical and stylistic, it must have sounded confusing even to a listener acquainted with the individuals, and one wonders just what rhetorical purpose his choice is serving. It is tempting to think that he

63. Macdowell cites Plutarch as the identifier of #2 in my list above as Philocrates--and mentions his reference to this passage 3X as I have found. MacDowell identifies the last as Aeschines, but is he relying on Plutarch's identification of Philocrates? That would make Aeschines the other one by default. There is no other rationale given for that choice.

was trying to be fast and loose about who did what--but why? It is especially confusing to a reader who doesn't know details and particulars after 2400 years, even with the words fixed on the page. Another question is how much did Plutarch know of those details after only 400-500 years? Did he know more than we do today, or did he know just as little? In any case, why, when Philocrates occurs in a list of 3 equally bad men, does he choose Philocrates alone to mention beside Lasthenes and Euthykrates? The connection with Olynthus and the tales of Philocrates' behavior with the free Olynthian women may have something to do with it, keeping in mind that Plutarch refers to Alexander's temperate treatment of Darius's family in this same chapter of *Fortune*, which he describes in detail in the *Life* of Alexander.⁶⁴

At *De Fals.* 309, Demosthenes accuses Philocrates of bringing free Olynthian women to Athens, for some questionable purpose, reminding the listeners of Philocrates' well known unsavory lifestyle, stating that everyone knew the outcome, and pitied the poor unfortunates. No details are provided and the women in question not named. MacDowell interprets Demosthenes' intent with regard to the women, as slavery, and questions whether this could be true, suggesting that Demosthenes may be deliberately misinterpreting what could have been an act of charity. He opines that perhaps Philocrates had sheltered a homeless Olynthian family.⁶⁵ MacDowell gives no rationale for his interpretation. His translation reflects what the Greek says, to the effect that Demosthenes' audience knew the consequences to those Olynthians who lived with

64. As already noted, Callisthenes, a native of Olynthus, joined the expedition in hopes of influencing Alexander to rebuild Olynthus, his home city. This is attested by Plutarch in the *Life of Alexander*.

65. MacDowell, p 340-341.

Philocrates. It is interesting that he suggests deliberate misrepresentation by Demosthenes, whether he substantiates it or not, given that there have been observable irregularities in other citations of Demosthenes by Plutarch (more below). In this connection it seems worth while to note the story of Satyrus's request of Philip and the story of the Olynthian girl at the banquet, both of which Demosthenes relates in this speech,⁶⁶ although he acknowledges they did not have anything to do with the embassy.

After the fall of Olynthus, at a banquet to celebrate athletic competitions held by Philip, artists were invited, including the Athenian comedian, Satyrus, who when asked why he hadn't made a request of Philip as the others had, requested the release of a friend's daughters, now among Philip's captives, so he could marry them off to appropriate husbands, with dowries. When his friend, their father, Apollophanes of Pydna, had been assassinated, the girls' relatives had sent his daughters to Olynthus, where they fell into Philip's hands. The response to this request was so emotional that Philip released the girls to Satyrus, even though their father had participated in the murder of Philip's brother, Alexander.

This is offered in contrast to the behavior of men at a banquet in Athens in the time of the Thirty. Xenophon introduced a freeborn Olynthian girl who in time was compelled to sing at the banquet, which she wasn't able to do. Aeschines and Phryno began to abuse her on the assumption that a captive should do what was told and wound up horsewhipping her. It seems odd that this story appears, in the text of the oration, so shortly before the mention of the quote Plutarch used, that he fixed on Philocrates as the

66. The complete text of this story is found at *De falsa legat.*192-198.

example next to Lasthenes and Euthykrates. Perhaps he is playing on the names-- Philocrates has the same initial syllable as Philip, and he uses the play on names between Alexander the son of Priam and Alexander the son of Philip as contrasts in behavior toward women and hosts. Moreover, Plutarch never acknowledges the effect of chance on two individuals of such different character having the same name.

If we look for a common denominator in these stories, there is in them, a concern about outrages perpetrated on (free) women. This is interesting in light of Plutarch's treatment of the story of Darius's family by Alexander, as already mentioned. It also seems consistent with the mention immediately below, of Philip and Alexander, father and son, in contrast with the behavior of the mythological Alexander and his father Priam, another royal father and son duo. Direct reference to the Alexander/Darius incident is made in *De Fortuna*, below. Of course, there is also the issue of wrongdoing to Philocrates' country as a consequence.

D. Lasthenes and Euthykrates

97D5-8

καὶ Λασθένης καὶ Εὐθυκράτης ἀπώλεσαν Ὀlynθον, “τῆ γαστρὶ μετροῦντες καὶ τοῖς αἰσχίστοις τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν”;

and Lasthenes and Euthykrates destroyed Olynthus "measuring good fortune by their appetites and shameful deeds?"

These are the two Olynthian traitors, who are often, but not always

mentioned together.⁶⁷ Plutarch doesn't mention them that often at all--twice apiece in his entire corpus of work. Even in Demosthenes' speeches, which often mention Olynthus, they are mentioned together only 3 times, and Lasthenes alone twice more. They are not the highest profile names, and are always associated with the betrayal of Olynthus in 348 B.C.. Each of Plutarch's mentions can be traced to one or more of Demosthenes' speeches.

It is attested by Diodorus that these two hipparchs betrayed their troops to Philip BC, allowing Philip to take the city.⁶⁸ Their betrayal of Olynthus is also mentioned in the Suda.⁶⁹ Hyperides recounts how the Athenians passed a decree of condemnation against Euthycrates, which Demades tried to lift and to get a grant of proxeny for him.⁷⁰ It is not clear whether an identical decree was passed against Lasthenes. Lasthenes seems not to have been active in politics after that incident. Plutarch's mention of these names at this place is cited by Wankel, apparently to corroborate the idea that Lasthenes suffered a fall from grace. Philip's remark in Plutarch's *Apophthegmata* (more below) is also cited by Wankel.

Plutarch:

1) in *De Fort* at 97D6--καὶ Λασθένης καὶ Εὐθυκράτης ἀπώλεσαν Ὀλυνθον τῆ γαστρὶ μετροῦντες καὶ τοῖς αἰσχίστοις τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν--concern of the present

67. Wankel, 1976, 335-8.

68. *Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca historica* 16.53.

69. *Suda*, Kappa 356.

70. *Hyperides Fr.* 76.

investigation. This is the one time Plutarch puts the names together. This instance, however, which uses the citation from Demosthenes, τῆ γαστὶ μετροῦντες καὶ τοῖς ἀλγίστοις τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, presents some problems.

Babbitt in the Loeb, identifies Demosthenes' *De Corona* as the source for this citation by Plutarch, and says that Demosthenes includes these two in the catalog of traitors named in *De Corona* at 295, 8-17. That is a mistake. The quotation comes from *De Corona* 296, 8 (as Babbitt says), and follows the list of traitors, but these two names are not found in that list, and the phrase is there applied, not to Lasthenes and Euthykrates, but to Aeschines and his associates.

In his commentary on *De Corona*,⁷¹ Wankel discusses Demosthenes' rhetorical use of these names. He first comments about the mention of Lasthenes (48) and the betrayal of Olynthus, although no mention of Olynthus comes at 295 (the passage in which the phrase quoted by Plutarch appears). Wankel explains this omission by suggesting that Demosthenes did not wish to make too frequent mention of Olynthus because he himself had been unsuccessful in managing its rescue. He suggests that Olynthus is mentioned in this place, (at 48) because it is linked with Lasthenes' name, which is brought up in reference to the fate of traitors once they cease to be useful.⁷²

What particularly interests Wankel, is the omission of Euthykrates in this context, based on Demosthenes' use of the two together in *De Chersoneso*, 40.⁷³ Again,

71. Wankel, 1976. Wankel is described as the source of a full account of the evidence on this issue by S. Usher, 1993, p. 188.

72. De Cor. 48, 3-4 ...μέχρι τούτου Λασθένης φίλος ὠνομάζετο, ἕως προὔδωκεν Ὀλυνθον...

73. The whole quote is as follows....εἰ δὲ μή, σκεψάσθων Εὐθυκράτη καὶ Λασθένη τοὺς Ὀλυνθίους, οἱ

Demosthenes is interested in the limited term of the usefulness of traitors. Wankel is caught by the apparent allusion to the fate of the two, here described in what seems like dire terms--πάντων κάκιστ' ἀπολώλασιν. There has been considerable debate about what Demosthenes could have meant, which Wankel outlines, since it has been demonstrated that possibly, both men lived well beyond the date of the *De Chersoneso* (341BC). In fact, Wankel presents evidence that Euthykrates not only lived beyond the end of Philip's life, into Alexander's reign, but that he remained in favor with the Macedonian court. This finding, of course, contradicts Demosthenes' premise that the worst outcome eventually awaits all traitors. Wankel puts the omission of Euthykrates' name in the *De Corona* to the fact that, at that time, (330 BC) it did not apply to Euthykrates.

Wankel does not, however, say what evidence there is about the actual fate--what, when or how, of Lasthenes. He spends considerable space outlining arguments suggested by others, to explain what might have happened or what Demosthenes might have intended.

After offering the metaphorical interpretation of the use of the word ἀπολώλασιν, by Westermann and Blass (they were morally dead or they perished from misery and contempt), several pages later, having rejected attempts by some others to make more sense out of Demosthenes' choice of words, he seems satisfied to conclude that Demosthenes was simply alluding to public opinion about 'those scoundrels.'⁷⁴

δοκοῦντες οἰκειότατ' αὐτῶ διακεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴ τὴν πόλιν προὔδοσαν, πάντων κάκιστ' ἀπολώλασιν.

74. 'Buben', boys, is the German word Wankel uses.

Wankel and his sources,⁷⁵ however, have not succeeded in giving more than a superficial explanation of Demosthenes' statement, and what is no more than an *argumentum ex silentio*, since they present no evidence of what actually happened to Lasthenes beyond a fall from favor (see below). Although Euthykrates' life and fortunes can be attested well beyond the date of the speech, Demosthenes actually did say πάντων κάκιστ' ἀπολώλασιν.

The difficulty of this passage is also mentioned by MacDowell in his commentary on *De Falsa Legatione*,⁷⁶ which cites Wankel's discussion. He also sees the problem in the fact that Euthykrates, at least, could not have died as he was present at the battle of Chaeroneia in 338. MacDowell interprets Demosthenes' remark as meaning that the traitors lost their honorable position at Olynthus. That is obvious, since not only had they betrayed their country, the state fell to Philip. Demosthenes' point in *De Corona* at least, is that Lasthenes fell out of favor with Philip after his usefulness ended. So far, the only attestation to Lasthenes' possible fall from favor, is in Plutarch's *Apophthegmata* (below), which still does not suggest anything like πάντων κάκιστ' ἀπολώλασιν.

It is particularly interesting to me, that Plutarch's mention here, at *De Fortuna* 97, uses the same compound of the same verb as Demosthenes uses, but in the aorist, ἀπόλεσαν rather than Demosthenes' perfect, ἀπολώλασιν. This verb, in the aorist and perfect, has alternate forms for a transitive or intransitive meaning. Demosthenes, using an intransitive form, makes the traitors the subject, while Plutarch, using an active,

75. Wankel, 1976, p. 337.

76. Op. cit. 316-17.

transitive form, provides an object to the verb--Λασθένης καὶ Εὐθυκράτης ἀπόλεσαν Ὀλυνθόν. A quick look into LSJ shows that the verb in the active, transitive sense means destroy utterly, kill, lose, whereas the intransitive and middle meaning is perish, die. Could Plutarch also have been wondering what Demosthenes meant, and made his own adjustment toward understanding? Or did Plutarch actually understand, or think he understood what Demosthenes was trying to say and was alluding to that with his usage in this place? There is no obvious answer to the question.

However, despite the difference in meaning and syntax, based on the few occurrences of these names in both authors, and the number of references to Demosthenes' speeches concerning treason, Philip's aggressions, and Olynthus, all in a very short space in a very short essay, I do not think it too great a stretch to suggest that Plutarch was consciously conflating two different references from at least two different speeches of Demosthenes, and that he was alluding to whatever use, rhetorical or other, that Demosthenes was making of his inaccurate statement (or implication) that either or both of the traitors was dead (in some sense or other) at the time the speech (*De Chersoneso*), was delivered.

2) Απορηθγματα, 178,16--Τῶν δὲ περὶ Λασθένην τὸν Ὀλυνθιον ἐγκαλούντων καὶ ἀγανακτούντων, ὅτι προδότας αὐτοὺς ἔνιοι τῶν περὶ τὸν Φίλιππον ἀποκαλοῦσι, σκαιοὺς ἔφη φύσει καὶ ἀγροίκους εἶναι Μακεδόνας τὴν σκάφην σκάφην λέγοντας.

About those soldiers of Lasthenes the Olynthian, who were complaining and disgruntled, because some of those in Philip's army disparaged them as traitors, he said,

that Macedonians, who called a spade a spade, were clumsy and rude by nature.

This example illustrates the fall from favor Wankel spoke of, in his commentary on *De Corona*. He also cited this story as reported by Plutarch. There is not, however, any indication of anything like the dire fate Demosthenes may have been hinting at, which perhaps corroborates the metaphorical interpretation favored by Wankel et al. On the other hand, perhaps it indicates a mistake made by Demosthenes, whether intentional or not.

This report by Plutarch does not mention Lasthenes himself at all--just his followers and their annoyance at verbal abuse by Philip's men. Philip's reply doesn't really even indicate that Lasthenes himself had suffered a fall from favor--Philip simply excuses the manners his soldiers show saying that it is Macedonian habit to speak roughly and bluntly. It certainly doesn't indicate that Philip himself felt any disgust with Lasthenes (or his men) for informing to his (Philip's) advantage--which is what Demosthenes maintains is the plight of traitors in *De Corona*. Perhaps Plutarch did think Philip's remark indicated scorn for traitors, but the *Apophthegmata*, being a collection of sayings, doesn't create a particular context, so it is hard to determine what exactly Plutarch might have meant by recording a particular quote.

3) De Garrulitate--Εὐθυκράτης μὲν οὖν ἤρρεψε τὴν οἰκίαν τοῖς ἐκ Μακεδονίας ξύλοις'

Euthycrates roofed his house with wood from Macedonia.

In the Loeb, Helmbold calls this mention of Euthycrates an error for Lasthenes.

Demosthenes, in *De Falsa Legatione* (265, 3-5), says that it was Lasthenes who roofed his house with Macedonian⁷⁷ wood, and Euthycrates who kept a herd which he hadn't paid for.

καὶ Λασθένης μὲν ἤρεψε τὴν οἰκίαν τοῖς ἐκ Μακεδονίας ξύλοις, Εὐθυκράτης δὲ βοῦς ἔτρεφεν πολλὰς τιμὴν οὐδενὶ δούς,

While Lasthenes roofed his house with wood from Macedonia, Euthacrates then, raised a herd for which he had given payment to no one.

The quotation by Plutarch is practically verbatim--with the exception of the addition of οῦς and the name switch. Whether the substitution represents a mental lapse on Plutarch's part, or whether he did it deliberately, is not possible to tell.

The above three occurrences represent every use of these two names in all of Plutarch's works. Every one of them correlates with speeches--both in Plutarch's citations and in Demosthenes' originals.

In Demosthenes' speeches, Other mentions of these traitors include:

Philippic 3, 66 καλῶς Ὀλυνθίων ἐφείσατο τῶν τὸν μὲν Λασθένην ἵππαρχον χειροτονησάντων, τὸν δ' Ἀπολλωνίδην ἐκβαλόντων.
He spared the Olynthians very nicely, electing Lasthenes hipparch and driving out Apollonides.

De Corona 48 μέχρι τούτου Λασθένης φίλος ὠνομάζετο, ἕως προὔδωκεν Ὀλυνθον.
Lasthenes was called a friend until he betrayed Olynthus...

This is the passage discussed by Wankel, which raises questions about the *De*

77. The issue of the modesty of the homes of statesmen has been encountered before, in the cases of Aristeides and Aemilius.

Chersoneso passage, which is so difficult to explain or understand. Finally, another passage in *De Falsa Legatione*, 342,6:

ποῖον Εὐθυκράτη, ποῖον Λασθένη, τίν' οὐχ ὑπερβαλεῖσθαι προδότην;
What sort of Euthycrates, what sort of Lasthenes will any traitor not surpass?

Comparison: the two Alexanders

97D8-10

ἀπὸ τύχης δ' ὁ μὲν Φιλίππου Ἀλέξανδρος αὐτός τε τῶν αἰχμαλώτων ἀπείχετο
γυναικῶν καὶ τοὺς ὑβρίζοντας ἐκόλαζεν,

*and (was it) from tyche that Alexander the son of Philip himself held back from the
hostage women and chastised those who would have maltreated them,*

ἀπὸ τύχης, Here as in *De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute* ἀπὸ is the preposition used with τύχης immediately above.

ὁ μὲν Φιλίππου Ἀλέξανδρος--Alexander is referred to as the son of Philip rather than the descendant of Ammon, as he is usually referred to in the *Alexander Romance* and the cycle of letters, except the one from Polyeidus to Darius. Philip himself, of course, was of tremendous importance to Greece, as Plutarch must have been thinking, considering the allusions to Demosthenes' speeches which deal with Philip and the threat he represented.

αὐτός τε τῶν αἰχμαλώτων ἀπείχετο γυναικῶν καὶ τοὺς ὑβρίζοντας
ἐκόλαζεν, Alexander is noted for his sexual continence and kindly treatment of Darius's family and his refusal to allow others in his retinue to treat them otherwise as described in both the *Life*, Chs. 21, 29 and 30, and *De Alex. Magni fort. aut virt.*B, 338 D-E. The sen-

timent in these examples is reminiscent of Polyeidios's letter in which the author quotes Chaeremon, extolling that aspect of Alexander's character.

97D10-E2

Ὁ δὲ Πριάμου δαίμονι κακῶ καὶ τύχῃ χρησάμενος συνεκοιμᾶτο τῆ τοῦ ξένου
γυναικί, καὶ λαβῶν αὐτὴν ἐνέπλησε πολέμου καὶ κακῶν τὰς δύο ἡπείρους;

and the son of Priam, employing an evil genie and tyche⁷⁸ seduced his host's wife and by kidnapping her, filled the two continents with with war and ills?

Ὁ δὲ Πριάμου, contrasted with Alexander the son of Philip, is one who has committed the unthinkable social sin of abusing the ξενία of his host, the king of Sparta, by seducing and abducting his wife (συνεκοιμᾶτο τῆ τοῦ ξένου γυναικί). By so doing, he created a world conflict of enormous magnitude (ἐνέπλησε πολέμου καὶ κακῶν τὰς δύο ἡπείρους). The historical Alexander, according to Plutarch was abstemious and respectful when it came to women of royal standing, even when they were from the family of an enemy.⁷⁹ Likewise, although his campaigns involved conflicts of enormous magnitude, it could be argued that he succeeded in uniting the 'two continents'. The omission of the actual name, Ἀλέξανδρος, heightens the contrast, and points out, without Plutarch's re-

78. It is not clear to me whether in this place, as well as just above, Plutarch is implying the action of two deities in δαίμονι κακῶ καὶ τύχῃ, or whether he intends that the daimon is the actual perpetrator along with the presence of chance in the general sense. For this reason, I have left the lower case. The three editions show lower case.

79. Ch. 21 of the *Life* reports the presence of the royal women among the prisoners. Ch.29 cites a letter from Darius to Alexander offering money for the ransom of prisoners. Ch 30. describes Alexander's response to the death of Darius's wife. A letter is cited in which Alexander assures Darius that his family members were generously treated in life and that Stateira had received proper burial as well.

marking it, that these two individuals at opposite ends of the scale have, perhaps only by chance, the same name.

The Homeric Alexander, of course, is also known as Paris. Plutarch seems to use both names with equal frequency when he refers to the son of Priam. There is something to be noticed, though, in his habit when speaking of the two Alexanders together. An anecdote which appears in both the *Life* and *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute*⁸⁰ shows some differences in the handling of the names and the telling of the story. The story concerns Alexander's visit to Troy at the beginning of his campaigns.

In Plutarch's biography of him, Alexander goes to Troy immediately after arriving in Asia. Plutarch describes his sacrifices to Athena and the heroes, and his devotions at the tomb of Achilles. This last involves not only anointing the gravestone, but competing with his comrades in a race and placing the garland on the grave. While sightseeing, he is asked if he would like to see the lyre of Alexander. To this offer he replies that he thinks very little of that lyre, but he was looking for Achilles' lyre on which he sang the glory and deeds of noble men (τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν). The name Alexander is used for Paris, and Alexander's own name is not mentioned at all in the entire paragraph.

De Alex. Magn. fort aut virt. tells the same tale another way. Alexander's visit to Troy is mentioned in the context of Alexander's admiration of Homer. While he was sightseeing at Troy, he relived (ἀνατυπούμενος) the heroic deeds told by Homer. Some comparison might be made between the religious devotion and active athletic activity pri-

80. *Life*, Ch. 15, 334 C,8-11; *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute*, 331 section D line 7.

or to sightseeing, which is described in the *Life*, and the more passive mental meandering involved in reshaping the events told by Homer described at this juncture.

When someone offered to give him the lyre of Paris, he declined, which is expressed as a direct quote. Alexander is supposed to have said that he didn't need that lyre because he already owned Achilles' lyre on which he sang the glorious deeds of men.⁸¹ Plutarch has Alexander quote the Homeric line. Alexander goes on to say that Paris's lyre sounded a soft and female harmony to erotic lyrics. He compares Achilles' manly songs of heroic deeds to Paris's love songs. His judgment must be thought of as a purely mental perception since Alexander couldn't have known what sort of sound Paris's lyre had, or what kind of singing voice Paris had, or even what kind of songs he sang.

The name used here is Paris and Alexander himself uses that name when speaking of him. Alexander's own name is absent from the narrative as it was in the *Life*. Further, in the *Life*, Alexander is offered the lyre to look at (ἰδεῖν) and he claims to be looking for (ζητεῖν) Achilles' lyre, while in *De Alex. Magn. fort. aut virt.* the unnamed individual offers to give (δώσειν) him the lyre, but Alexander claims to have already acquired (κέκτημαι) the better one and expounds on the differences between them. Both versions make an explicit comparison between Achilles and Paris/Alexander without bringing up the fact of the subject's having the same name as the weaker model. It is only in *De fort.* that there is a clear opposition stated between the natures of the two individuals who have the same name.

81. ἄειδε δ' ἄρα κλέα ἄνδρων· *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute* A, 331D11.

It may be reasonable to speculate whether Plutarch's omission of the issue of name similarity creates an implicit comparison.⁸² At any rate, in the two works mentioned, Plutarch acknowledges Alexander's admiration of Homer and in particular, his identification with Achilles. In both these works, of which Alexander Magnus is the subject, the matter of comparison between Paris/Alexander and Achilles has arisen. These two figures are otherwise connected in mythology, as according to Homer, Alexander/Paris was the slayer of Achilles.

There is something known about how Priam's son got to be dual named. In mythology, Alexander/Paris is said to have been abandoned at birth because of a dream which came to his mother.⁸³ The dream states that the child to be, called Alexandros by his parents Priam and Hecuba, will be the cause of the fall of Troy; the parents are advised to expose the child to avert the disaster foretold in the dream; the child is rescued by shepherds who name him Paris. An alternate version reverses the source of the names.

In this tale of his origins and early life, he is much like Oedipus, who is similarly abandoned to avert a disaster attached to his birth, and rescued unexpectedly. Oedipus's story as to how he learned of the oracle and attempted to cheat fate is familiar. Paris learned of his true identity when emissaries of the king took his prize bull to be given as a

82. *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute* B 334A describes behavior of Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Φεραιῶν τύραννος, saying that this individual should be known only by the latter part of his appellation so as not to shame the name of Alexander (τῆν ἐπωνυμίαν). Plutarch is not so explicit above, but from the other example, it is clear that he is aware of the same name to different sorts of individuals.

83. The full story can be found in Gantz, 561-4.

prize in a festival to honor Alexandros (himself believed dead). He goes to Troy to claim his livestock, which is possible only by entering and winning contests. In these contests he prevails over his own brothers. His true identity is revealed by Cassandra.

Both Sophocles and Euripides composed tragedies on this theme, both of which have been lost.⁸⁴ In the *Life*, when Alexander Magnus goes to Troy, Plutarch describes how after sacrificing and paying proper respects, Alexander takes part naked in traditional athletic contests with his comrades at the gravesite. Presumably victorious, he lays the wreath on Achilles' stele. In the context of Plutarch's treatment of Alexander's emulation of Achilles, it is particularly interesting that it was in Achilles armor, taken from Troy, that ὁ μὲν Φιλίππου Ἀλέξανδρος was fighting at the Granicus when he was nearly killed by Spithradates, but for quick work on the part of Cleitos the Black. In this he was more like Patroclus, killed by Hector, when wearing Achilles' armor, than Achilles himself. It is obvious that Alexander was luckier than Patroclus, in spite of Plutarch's recollection of this incident, among others, as proof of Alexander's bad luck.⁸⁵ It should not be forgotten also, that Ch. 46 of the *Life* reports a visit to Alexander from the queen of the Amazons, for which Plutarch carefully lists those who assert the truth of the story and others who deny it. It was Achilles' posthumous infatuation with Penthesilea, of course, which triggered the events of Chaeremon's tragedy.

Achilles seems to figure in this chapter in a subtle way. Plutarch has opened the essay with a quotation from a tragedy dealing with Achilles' killing of Thersites, and

84. Loc. cit.

85. *De Alex. Mag. Fort. aut Virt.* 327A7

now, in periodic fashion, brought his reader around to the beginning again. In only a few lines, through allusions to numerous historical incidents and texts of various sorts, he has made a rather long and rambling period, with a kind of sub-text.

δαίμονι κακῷ καὶ τύχῃ χρησάμενος Here we see a stylistically different choice from above where τύχη is used with a preposition. In this instance, the subject of the participle, (Ὁ δὲ Πριάμου) is presented as having employed an evil divinity AND chance. This usage, with the middle voice indicating the subject is acting for his own advantage, suggests a more deliberate attempt to manipulate chance as a deity who might be propitiated, than when chance is represented as a randomly acting agent. This last seems the implication when expressed as object of a preposition.⁸⁶ It is also the first time Plutarch has placed τύχη in close proximity with divinity in spite of the frequent personification of τύχη as a daimon in his time.

Conclusion to Chapter 1: Animal nature and Tyche

97D2-7s

εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα γίγνεται διὰ τύχην, τί κωλύει καὶ τὰς γαλᾶς καὶ τοὺς τράγους καὶ τοὺς πιθήκους συνέχεσθαι φάναι διὰ τύχην ταῖς λιχνείαις καὶ ταῖς ἀκρασίαις καὶ ταῖς βομολοχίαις;

86. Buriks, *Περί Τύχης* 1948. In this study of the phenomenon of tyche in Greek philosophy the author distinguishes between different aspects, or ways of looking at chance. She sees a development of the concept over time from a sense of tyche as factum--something done--to tyche as agens--a doer. It is possible that Plutarch, in making choices of syntax, is playing with some such distinction as this.

For if these things come about through tyche, what prevents our saying also that weasels and goats and apes engage in greediness and incontinence and ribaldry, through tyche?

Plutarch closes the first chapter concluding that some traits of certain species of animals are attributable to fortune if we believe that the aforesaid, phrased as rhetorical questions, are true. Plutarch has fashioned a noticeably symmetrical sentence. In the middle there are two infinitives--one, **φάναι**, complementary with **κωλύει** which sets up the indirect statement, and **συνέχεσθαι**, of which the animals in the accusative are the subjects. The traits, which correspond to the animals, follow in the dative as objects of a compound verb. These traits, all bearing negative connotations, follow directly after the phrase **διὰ τύχην**. A diagram of the sentence might look like this:

τί κωλύει καὶ

τὰς γαλᾶς καὶ τοὺς τράγους καὶ τοὺς πιθήκους

συνέχεσθαι

φάναι

διὰ τύχην

ταῖς λιχνείαις καὶ ταῖς ἀκρασίαις καὶ ταῖς βωμολοχίαις;

Comparison with mentions of these animals and their characteristics elsewhere in Plutarch's writings shows a range of treatment. Of weasels, he mentions their appetite for meat⁸⁷ and their nuisance value along with mice, as compared to that of sea animals.⁸⁸ He doesn't, however, apply *λιχνεία*, as a characteristic. The instinct to hunt for (or steal)

87. *De curiositate*. 519 D7.

88. *Quaestiones convivales*. 730 B 6.

meat is simply part of the animal's make up, and elsewhere notes that their appetite is the result of hunger.⁸⁹ On the other hand, he notes that the Egyptians honored weasels, like scarabs, for their likenesses to the gods.⁹⁰

Goats can be found portrayed as licentious⁹¹ like dogs, yet they appear in a list of animals identified as sacred to the gods in Egypt.⁹² In the context of Egyptian religion, the goat is called Mendes and among the people who are known by that name, that is the word for goat.⁹³ Plutarch also mentions Herodotus's telling of the goat of Mendes who mated with a woman in public.⁹⁴ Gryllus explains that when penned with female goats this very goat showed no interest in other females than goats and displayed continence. These remarks take place in the context of a discussion of σωφροσύνη.

Both weasels and goats are sacred to certain gods in Egypt, and although they possess the mentioned characteristics, these can be understood according to context. Monkeys or apes, on the other hand, are chosen as a measure of flatterers. Because they have no useful purposes as other animals have, they become the butt of jokes.⁹⁵ The flatterer is credited with unflatteringly self serving behavior, whereas the ape is simply a

89. *De sollertia animalium*. 959 E.

90. *De Iside et Osiride*. 380 F.

91. *Conjugalia praecepta*. 139 B.

92. *De Iside et Osiride*. 380 E.

93. Loc. cit.

94. *Bruta animalia ratione uti*. 989 A; Herodotus 2,46.

95. *Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur*. 64 E.

clown. Plutarch takes the character traits attributed to various animal species in different ways, according to the requirements of his subject.

CHAPTER TWO

97E-98B

Plutarch returns to the material in his rhetorical question of 97C2-3

At the beginning of Chapter 2, Plutarch reiterates two of the abstract words he used early in the essay, which constitute a part of a set of four essential virtues encountered among various schools of philosophy, i.e. σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη. In addition to those repeated, he introduces for the first time, the two remaining elements of that set of four, namely ἀνδρεία and φρόνησις. The first few lines of this text show some inconsistencies in the various manuscripts, which are noted in the Teubner and Budé editions.¹ There have also been some suggestions in those standard editions, for precedents of the treatment which follows, in Plutarch's own corpus as well as in Zeno and the other Stoic philosophers and Plato. Teubner² points the reader to *de virtute morali* 440F-441B, and *de Stoicorum repugnantibus* 1034 C, which is the source of fragment 200 of Zeno³ while Budé identifies the list as Plutarch writes it as, à la manière de Zènon⁴. A closer look at the passage cited, shows that Plutarch refers to Zeno's exposition of four virtues, as he says that Plato had done, but follows up with criticism of Zeno's method.⁵ Cherniss in the Loeb volume XIII, suggests that if Plutarch had been thinking of any particular pas-

1. Teubner, note p. 198, Budé, note 237.

2. Ibid.

3. Loc cit.; SVF I 200.

4. Loc. cit.

5. See below.

sage of Plato in writing that reference, it would have been found in *Resp. IV*, 427-435, as well as 441-444 and *Laws XII* 963c-964b7.⁶ Cherniss's observation may offer a helpful clue in a reading of Plutarch's possible intentions in the present passage.

97E 1-3

2. Εἰ δ' ἔστι σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία, πῶς λόγον ἔχει μὴ εἶναι φρόνησιν, εἰ δὲ φρόνησις, πῶς οὐ καὶ εὐβουλίαν;

But if there is sophrosune and dikaiosune and andreia, how is it reasonable that there is not also phronesis, and if phronesis how is there not also euboulia?

Plutarch asserts that if there is φρόνησις, there must be εὐβουλία; an obvious statement if we remember that, as we have seen in Chapter 1, the words are used by the Pythagoreans to indicate the same thing, namely the triad. The implied interconnectedness of the virtues in Plutarch's statement, (if there are three, how can there not be the fourth⁷), recalls Socrates' laborious and lengthy search for δικαιοσύνη in the city, in *Resp.IV*, in which he first establishes the presence of the other three virtues. That being the case, since Plutarch, a Platonist, may be employing this passage from the *Republic* as an model of sorts, it may be timely to digress a bit and look at how Socrates conducted his search for the virtues, at what he found, and how he ultimately defined them.

6. Cherniss, *Plutarch's Moralia* XIII, 424, note *a*.

7. Emphasis on the number four also recalls the Pythagoreans, as Adam notes, p. 224 on 427e.

Respublica IV--Discovery and definition of σοφία in all its aspects.

At 427d, At Glaucon's behest, Socrates agrees to continue their quest for δικαιοσύνη. Their city, if properly established, will be found perfectly good (...τελέως αγαθὴν...). The city is good because it is σοφή, ἀνδρεῖα, σώφρων, and δικαία. It is σοφή because it is εὐβουλόν and that εὐβουλία, which the city has, is declared a form of wisdom--in this case, ἐπιστήμη.

Καὶ μὴν τοῦτ' ὅ γε αὐτό, ἡ εὐβουλία, δῆλον ὅτι ἐπιστήμη τις ἔστιν.⁸

And indeed, this very thing, euboulia, it is clear that it is some kind of knowledge...

There are many ἐπιστήμαι to be found in the city. It is stipulated however, that the εὐβουλία characteristic of the good city is not to be understood as synonymous with any of the particular, limited ἐπιστήμαι found among the various participants, but in the specific ἐπιστήμη of the guardians who have been selected for their unique leadership qualities and educated accordingly. Their unique preparation results in their special form of wisdom, or εὐβουλία. It is this special ἐπιστήμη, the guardians' εὐβουλία, which characterizes the city and makes it σοφή. So, εὐβουλία and ἐπιστήμη both seem to fall within the range of meaning of σοφία, and to denote some specific aspect of that noun. Likewise φρονήσις⁹, which Plato doesn't use until a bit later, at 431d, when he slips it into the discussion instead of using σοφία, without explanation, and for a limited time.

8. 428b4-5. Socrates is defining εὐβουλία, effectively the same thing as φρονήσις, as ἐπιστήμη, . τις followed by two enclitics is Plutarch's exact formula just below where he defines σωφροσύνη as φρονήσις. Later, when Socrates defines σωφροσύνη, τις will again follow its noun.

9. See below, where Plutarch's definition includes φρονήσις.

Discovery and definition of ἀνδρεία

Introducing ἀνδρεία, Socrates identifies it as residing in the soldier class, where it occurs as a result of the education, ordained by law, which renders them unshakably protective against things which are to be feared. Understanding of the definition escapes Adeimantus, who asks Socrates to repeat what he said. By way of clarification, Socrates calls ἀνδρεία a kind of σωτηρία,¹⁰ preservation, which is imbued in the members of that class through a conviction about which things are to be feared, as set by law, which that portion of the population will not lose, even in the face of great deterrents such as grief, pleasure, desire, and fear. Here Socrates employs the image of wool being prepared to best 'take' dye and not lose any of the color even with vigorous laundering.¹¹

Although Plato spends almost twice as much text on defining ἀνδρεία as he has spent defining εὐβουλία, he has Socrates finishing off the discussion of it rather abruptly, while reminding Adeimantus that what they have thrashed out is specifically courage of the civic variety, in order to proceed to the real object of the search which is δικαιοσύνη. If Adeimantus would like, they will continue their discussion of ἀνδρεία some other time.

So far, they have isolated and identified two virtues:

1). σοφία, which breaks down into different kinds of wisdom, specific, limited ἐπιστήμαι, and one of those, the unique characteristic of the guardians, εὐβουλία, some-

10. 429c5. Σωτηρίαν ἔγωγ', εἶπον, λέγω τινὰ εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. The formula is slightly different, with different cases, but the indefinite pronoun is again used.

11. This is another example of a passage which has generated much discussion. Adam and Shorey are among those who have commented on it. Sometimes they differ over proposed emendations of the text.

times called φρονήσις later on in Book IV. It is this precise quality which allows the city to be called wise.

2) ἀνδρεία, which is described as σωτηρία, a protective characteristic instilled in the military class by their education and training.

It remains to come upon the remaining two, and again Glaucon and Adeimantus are reminded that they must find the third one before finding the fourth. After briefly considering whether it might be possible to find δικαιοσύνη, the primary object of their ζήτησις, without further exerting themselves over σωφροσύνη. He seems a little disingenuous in this proposal, and his interlocutor is quick to reject the idea.

Discovery and definition of σωφροσύνη

Immediately, Socrates points out to the young men that they are on somewhat different terrain with this third virtue. He tells them he senses in it, more to do with ξυμφωνία and ἄρμονία than in the two virtues previously explored. He calls it κόσμος πού τις¹²...(430e) It is also ἡδονῶν τινῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἔγκράτεια. It is in this section that the issue of ὁ ἑαυτοῦ κρείττων, is addressed. Although the comparative means literally stronger or better than oneself, most translators render this phrase as 'master of oneself'. A little bit coyly, Socrates acknowledges that he finds this expression silly (γελοῖον 430E7), and an implicit contradiction since both the terms greater and lesser refer to the same individual. From this observation, Socrates proposes that what the

12. See above, n.1

phrase is trying to express is the idea that in each individual, there is a better and a worse aspect. When the better has the upper hand, the individual is praised as σώφρων, while the individual who succumbs to his baser instincts, so to speak, is censured as ἄκόλαστον¹³. (431 a-b) It is demonstrated how the city reflects this idea in the fact that the rulers, the smallest part of the population, and its elite sector, hold sway over the greater part, which lacks the refinement of the rulers. In this way, the desires of the guardians outweigh those of the other classes, and the city is rendered virtuous--and master of itself. In another aspect of how their city exemplifies the virtue of σωφροσύνη, that virtue is cited as characteristic of all three classes, rather than residing in only one particular class, as did the first two. It is through this shared virtue, which pervades the entire city, that the rulers and ruled agree about who is to rule and be ruled. In fact, this very quality of pervasive agreement is what Socrates finally deems to be the σωφροσύνη of the city (432A). This mutual agreeability prevalent in the city lays the groundwork for the emergence or recognition of δικαιοσύνη, the remaining virtue to be found.

Discovery and definition of δικαιοσύνη

Once more a little coy in his avuncular expostulations, (it almost seems that Socrates thinks he is talking to eight-year-olds rather than the brightest adult or nearly adult scions of educated Athenian citizens) Socrates exclaims how the object of their quest has been with them all along, without their recognizing it. The plan for the city in-

13. This word may have some significance for Plutarch's point whatever it is--it shows up later in Ch.2 as an articular infinitive τὸ ἀκόλασταίνειν in the context of "if tyche is everything let τὸ ἀκόλασταίνειν be assigned to that as well."

cluded the precept that each individual do the work most fitted to his or her nature and abilities, and not attempt to do someone else's work. This behavior, the tending to one's own business, to which one is suited by nature (and education) and not tending to someone else's, is what turns out to be δικαιοσύνη. Socrates declares it to be the virtue which produces the power by which the preceding three come into being and through which they persevere. It provides also, a σωτηρίαν for the others as long as it remains.¹⁴ (433b) He is satisfied that he has demonstrated that δικαιοσύνη would be found if only they found the other three. At 434c it is clearly reiterated that δικαιοσύνη in the city is the tending to its own business of each of the three classes and that is what makes the city just. A further task, however, is still ahead, i.e. to use their discovery of δικαιοσύνη in a larger entity to be better able to recognize it in an individual. In fact, the purpose of setting up a hypothetical city, as has been decided in *Resp. II*, was to provide just such a larger entity in which justice would be more easily recognized than it is in the smaller quantity of an individual.¹⁵ They go on to apply their findings to the individual through the rest of Bk IV.

Modern criticism of Plato's technique and its results

Adam has some notes about the definition and function of δικαιοσύνη, citing some overlap with definitions of σωφροσύνη as Plato has employed them in other dialogues--namely in *Charmides* (161B0) where σωφροσύνη is found to be the faculty of doing one's own

14. σωτηρία is also the word used to elucidate the character of ἀνδρεία earlier on, at 429 C 3-4.

15. Adam, 1902, *Republic* 368d-369b

business (τὸ αὐτοῦ πράττειν). He goes on to mention varieties of meaning in popular usage, and that even among philosophers, there was often little distinction made between σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη. Certainly, in this *Respublica* passage, they are treated together, as two virtues which unlike the σοφία/φρονήσις and ἀνδρεία, separate characteristics of single classes, are common to all who live in the city. Adam goes on to ponder the fundamental unity of different virtues--while objecting that Plato, in the *Republic*, appears to present each as a separate entity,¹⁶ but somewhat interdependent. Citing the axiom 'things equal to the same thing are equal to each other',¹⁷ Adam posits δικαιοσύνη as the virtue which allows the others to come about through τὸ αὐτοῦ πράττειν. For this reason, τὸ αὐτοῦ πράττειν is δικαιοσύνη.

Adam seems to make this attempt out of a sense of dissatisfaction with the sequence followed by Socrates in this passage and its result, and remarks that Plato seldom requires such mental gymnastics. While he makes an attempt to summarize the definition of δικαιοσύνη as the virtue which is exemplified by τὸ αὐτοῦ πράττειν, as practiced by the three components of the city, it is also the source of the other virtues tracked down and identified (σοφία/φρονήσις, ἀνδρεία, and σωφροσύνη).

Adam is not the only scholar to have had misgivings about Plato's handling of the above. Cross and Woolley (1964), in their comments about Bk IV, find fault with what they characterize as Plato's presuppositions, not only of the existence of four virtues to make the city perfectly good, but that the four be the ones he has Socrates name and only

16. Adam, p. 239, 433b9

17. Ibid. 433b11.

those.¹⁸ They express further dissatisfaction with the procedure used, the argument by elimination to illustrate the definition, position and function of justice in the city, and they accuse Plato of not offering any reason for its acceptance by the reader. They have some criticism of more specific details as well.

White (1979) questions that Plato allows without illustration, that the city actually is perfectly good.¹⁹ He also remarks whether Socrates' assumption that the four virtues named, actually qualify to be considered virtues. He also points out Plato's assumptions on numerous counts, including the assumption that justice is a virtue, and that it is good for the city. White brings up the problem that Socrates' assumptions might not convince his opponents as was seen in *Resp. I* with Thrasymachus and his arguments. While White can find some rationale for Plato's arguments about justice, what it is in the city and its benefit to the city, he is not sure that Plato's intention in presenting his point is clear.

Annas also finds Plato's methodology wanting.²⁰ She also asks on what grounds Plato asserts that the city is perfectly good, as there has been no explanation of why that should be so, presumably expecting the reader to accept his explication of the education of the guardians as sufficient premise. Another objection is the assumption that the goodness of the city rests on the existence of four virtues and that the fourth can be

18. Cross and Woosley, 1964, pp.104-5.

19. White, 1979, pp113-115.

20. Annas, 1981, 110ff.

found by isolating and identifying the other three. She finds problems also in the description of the virtues, particularly justice.

As in the case of his allusions to Demosthenes' speeches, and in particular the material concerning Lasthenes and Euthykrates, Plutarch has again taken us into problematic material. Problematic as this section from Plato is, Socrates' definitions of the virtues can be somewhat corroborated in another ancient source.

Socrates' definition of the virtues according to Xenophon

Xenophon, like Plato, is another credible source for Plutarch, considering that Plutarch has quoted Xenophon in numerous works. As Xenophon has also written about Socrates, most particularly in *Memorabilia*, and his definition of three of the virtues being examined both in *De fort. and Resp. IV*, it makes sense to look into what Xenophon can tell us about how Socrates used those words. In *Mem. 9*, we are told that Socrates did not distinguish between σοφία and σωφροσύνη. Rather, he evaluated as σοφόν τε καὶ σώφρονα the person who, understanding good and noble things, employed them, and recognizing disgraceful things, was wary of them. Here is a clear example of the terms and their definitions getting reshuffled and applied to other virtues in another context. In this case it is σοφία and σωφροσύνη which show the overlap rather than σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη. Of δικαιοσύνη, Xenophon says that Socrates maintained that it, along with 'every other virtue', was wisdom.

ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι.

And he also said that dikaiosune and every other virtue is wisdom.

This practice is significant in view of what Plutarch is about to do just below, by way of reshuffling definitions and virtues.

As Plato brought the issue of personal virtue into the construction of the ideal city, Xenophon, too, includes some discussion of the same in the organization of a smaller but still complex social unit, namely the household. At *Oeconomicus* VII 14, Ischomachus tells Socrates how he explained to his wife that as both men and women possess σωφροσύνη, they must jointly apply that virtue to the preservation and increase of their property. Thus the desired result, by their application of the virtue, will come about nobly and justly.²¹ The demonstration of the role of virtue in the household, is somewhat like what Socrates and his young friends accomplish in discovering the virtues in the city. Again, at XII 12, Ischomachus notes that rulers ought to be possessed of σωφροσύνη, if they wish to succeed in ruling successfully, i.e. by ruling over willing subjects.²²

Summary of the virtues in *Resp. IV*

While we are considering how Socrates discovers the virtues, there are a few points which come to mind.

1. First is the fact that Socrates, when listing the virtues, as he does twice in 433, at b6-7, uses φρονήσις instead of σοφία.

21. Pomeroy, 1994, p. 140; n. p. 275.

22. Ibid, pp. 208-9; n. p.344.

τό ὑπόλοιπον ἐν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐσκέμμεθα, σωφροσύνης και ἀνδρείας και φρονήσεως...

the remaining thing in the city, of the things which we have examined, sophrosune and andreia and phronesis...

A few lines later, at c2-d4, demonstrating how hard it would be to determine which of the four virtues contributed most to the ἀγαθή of the city, he gives a longer, fuller, more descriptive list of the virtues, emphasizing how they work together. In this list also, the word used for the virtue of the guardians is φρονήσις, as stated at the beginning of the whole sequence.²³

2. There is another point apropos of the order in which the virtues are named.

σοφία/εὐβουλία is demonstrated first (428b) followed by ἀνδρεία (429a), and σωφροσύνη (430d) with δικαιοσύνη making an appearance last (432d). In describing all except δικαιοσύνη, Socrates names the other three in reverse order of discovery at 433b 5-6. A few lines later, 433c 4-10, in describing the mutual importance of the four to the city, he uses the same order--reverse to the order of discovery, but uses fuller descriptive language rather than the specific vocabulary he has applied to each virtue until now, (with the exception of the alternation between σοφία and φρονήσις):

ἡ ὁμοδοξία τῶν ἀρχοντῶν = σωφροσύνη

ἡ περὶ δεινῶν τε και μή, ἅττα ἐστὶ, δόξης ἐννόμου

σωτηρία ἐν τοῖς στρατιῶταις ἐγγενομένη, = ἀνδρεία

23. Adam does not take any notice of the shift in vocabulary.

ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἄρχουσι φρονήσις τε καὶ φυλακὴ ἐνοῦσα = σοφία/εὐβουλία/φρονήσις
 +
 τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀγαθὴν αὐτὴν ποιεῖ ἐνὸν...κτλ = δικαιοσύνη

3. A third point--when all the virtues are located and identified as to their function, Socrates, in differentiating between the character of the first two virtues and the remaining ones, winds up with a total of four which is essentially two pairs--the first two which apply to distinct separate classes and not to the others, and the second two are pervasive throughout the city and appear to have a certain interdependence.²⁴ The first of this second pair is characteristic of the whole city, and the fourth is the one thing that particularly makes the city ἀγαθή, and through the workings of which, the other virtues come about.

4. Finally, it seems meaningful to acknowledge that in employing the method he has used, Socrates is attempting to define abstract ideas by means of concrete examples. This necessarily limits the scope of the definition. More than once, Socrates remarks, as in the case of ἀνδρεία, that more could be said but what they have said will suffice for their purpose. Of δικαιοσύνη, he goes further in the text to examine the presence and function of it in the individual after defining its function in the state.

24. Adam's remarks about the shifting definitions of the two in *Resp.* and his citations of apparently different definitions of them in other works, underscore this point.

Relation of Plutarch's text to *Resp IV*.

The points noted above seem relevant because Plutarch may have employed some similar method in what we have already seen of *De fort.*, and in what is coming up just below. Going back to the rhetorical question Plutarch poses immediately after quoting Chaeremon, δικαιοσύνη is the first word he uses. δικαιοσύνη is paired with ἰσότης, closely followed by σωφροσύνη paired with κοσμιότης. When he returns to this vocabulary at 97E, he reverses the order, adding the other two virtues, substituting φρόνησις for εὐβουλία, reminiscent of Socrates' substitution of φρόνησις for σοφία.

To reiterate, Plutarch's statement at 97E (Εἰ δ' ἔστι σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία, πῶς λόγον ἔχει μὴ εἶναι φρόνησιν, εἰ δὲ φρόνησις, πῶς οὐ καὶ εὐβουλίαν;) seems like an acknowledgment of the interdependence and possibly, the interchangeability of the virtues as discussed in the *Republic* and perhaps other works as well. If there are three (σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία) there must be a fourth, in this case φρόνησις, since he has already mentioned δικαιοσύνη. (Socrates' argued that he expected to find δικαιοσύνη in the last place they looked.) According to Plutarch, if there is φρόνησις, there must be εὐβουλία, its close synonym.

97E3

ἢ γὰρ σωφροσύνη φρόνησις τίς ἔστιν

For sophrosune is a certain phronesis,

That is, of course, not quite what Socrates said at *Resp. IV* 430E3-5;
...σωφροσύνη ἔστιν--not φρόνησις τίς but κόσμος πού τις...²⁵ We will recollect that Xenophon noted that Socrates did not distinguish between σωφροσύνη and σοφία, and that in *Resp. IV* the city was deemed σοφή through the εὐβουλία of its guardians, and that later in the book, he lapsed into the use of φρόνησις instead of either of the above. As we have observed the use of these words by Socrates, according to both Plato and Xenophon, Plutarch's exchange of one for another is not inconsistent with his antecedents. The appearance of τίς following the noun in the context of defining an aspect of wisdom, seems, in spite of how frequently it is encountered in Greek, significant here, considering Plutarch's criticism of Zeno's definition of the virtues in *De stoicis repugnantis* to which the reader was directed by the editors of the Teubner.²⁶

We will also recall, of course, Plutarch's first mention, at the beginning of Ch. 1, of σωφροσύνη, paired with κοσμιότης. Perhaps here is a clue as to why Plutarch has chosen to pair those particular words. κοσμιότης--propriety, orderly behavior, is a characteristic within the range of meaning of σωφροσύνη as Socrates defines it in *Resp. IV*. Can such a relation be found between δικαιοσύνη and ἰσότης? In Plato's *Definitions*, ἰσότης κοινωνική is included as part of the range of meaning of δικαιοσύνη.²⁷

25. See above n.2. What Plutarch uses here is the exact formula used by Socrates when he defined εὐβουλία as ἐπιστήμη.

26. Op cit. 1034 C. See discussion below.

27. 411e.

97 E4

ὥς λέγουσι,

as they say,

In the Teubner and Budé editions, the text reads ὥς λέγουσι. The Loeb shows ὥς φασι, following manuscript D according to Budé apparatus. The Loeb, which doesn't include a note about varying textual readings, seems to be following that manuscript as there is some divergence from the text as presented by the other editions, even in the previous sentence. In the Teubner apparatus, a lacuna is suggested after λέγουσι. The notes read that Paton believed there was a lacuna there. There is no lacuna shown in either Loeb or Budé, although Budé has a note acknowledging Paton's opinion.²⁸ Another Teubner note states that several manuscripts leave out ἀνδρεία. It is not clear to me whether that omission is meant of the previous sentence in which the two virtues which Plutarch left out in the opening to the essay are introduced for the first time (97E), or whether it explains the absence of that virtue in the following list of equivalences, which does not show in any of the three editions. Instead, there is mention of καρτερίαν and ἀνδραγαθίαν in all the editions. The text in that section seems minutely, but possibly importantly, difficult to read. It is also noted in Teubner, that Pohlenz thought that the phrase ὥς λέγουσι was compressed from ὥς λέγει τοῦνομα and that Wilamowitz considered the Stoics the unexpressed subject of the verb.²⁹

28. Klaerr, et.al., n. 1, p. 237.

29. Teubner, *Moralia* vol I, p.198.

If, however, we look at the passages indicated in the Teubner, and also at *De Stoic. rep.* 1034 c, and *De virt. mor.* 441a, it is evident that Plutarch, rather than identifying Zeno as a source for the virtues, is calling Zeno to task for the manner in which he describes the virtues. Although he does state that Zeno isolated four distinct virtues which were intimately connected to each other, as Plato did, he takes issue with Zeno's presentation, claiming that actually, through defining each virtue as φρόνησις employed toward different purposes, he is naming only one virtue which appears different according to how it is applied. Is it implicit that he acquits Plato of the same fault by naming Zeno alone in his criticism? As we have seen, the interconnections between the virtues were discussed at length in that section of *Resp. IV*. Plutarch himself, here in *De fort.* 97E, is doing something, if not identical, at least similar. Is he making a subtle distinction between Plato and Zeno on that point, or has he contradicted himself as he accused Zeno of doing in *De Stoic. rep.* 1034 C? It may be possible to read the former alternative through the difference in meaning implicit in his use of τις in making those connections, which also appears in the Platonic text.

Oddly enough, there is also a textual dispute in Plato's work as there is in Plutarch's, also over the verb of speaking, in the very passage in which σωφροσύνη is described (430E--as noted). The verb here, is φασί followed shortly after by λέγοντες, which is taken by most as having the same subject as the finite verb. Some manuscripts replace λέγοντες, with φαίνονται, which according to Adam, is corrupt. He adds some

speculation about the source of the error.³⁰ Perhaps verbs of speaking lent themselves to scribal error.

It should be noted though, that in the text of *De Stoic. rep.*, Plutarch uses a singular verb of which Zeno is the subject (...φησὶ...), while his followers are censured separately, in another sentence--grammatically distinct from Zeno. In Plato's text, the disputed verb is also plural, with a nearby plural participle. Perhaps the consonance of number, as well as Cherniss's opinion stated in his note on *De Stoic. rep.* at 1034C, allows some credence to the speculation that Plutarch had the Platonic text in mind rather than the Stoics, as Wilamowitz supposed.

Plutarch's ὡς λέγουσι (or ὡς φασί) does seem to jump out of nowhere, with no subject, leaving the reader to wonder who he means, or if he is using the expression conversationally, in a general way, with no specific subject intended. On the other hand, Plutarch is presenting what appears to be a rhetorical essay, rather than a dialogue where one might expect colloquialisms. When this passage from *Resp. IV*, which is a dialogue, is brought to mind, the possibility emerges that the reminiscence is deliberate, although stylistically out of place, with the subtle intention to suggest the reference to the reader. This seems particularly so as we consider the next section of the text.

30. Adam, 233 on 430e4 and appendix, p. 270.

καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς φρονήσεως δεῖται παρούσης·

and dikaiosune is necessary when phronesis is present.

Keeping in mind Socrates' discussion with Glaucon and Adeimantus, their recognition of δικαιοσύνη at long last leads to Socrates presenting it as the fundamental virtue which allows the other three to develop.

Δοκεῖ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἐν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐσκέμμεθα, σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φρονήσεως, τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ πᾶσιν ἐκείνοις τὴν δύναμιν παρέσχεν, ὥστε ἐγγενέσθαι, καὶ ἐγγενομένοις γε σωτηρίαν παρέχειν, ἕωσπερ ἄν ἐνῆ. ΚΤΛ...

It seems to me, said I, that the remaining thing in the city, of the things which we have examined, sophrosune and andreia and phronesis, is this, the thing which provided the force to all those others, so that they come to be, and when they come to be, provides security as long as it is there.

Again, if δικαιοσύνη leads to the other virtues, including φρόνησις, and if we meet φρόνησις, then δικαιοσύνη must be there somewhere--so here too, Plutarch's assertion is not inconsistent with Socrates'. As he goes on, he continues to use vocabulary similar to that found in *Resp. IV*.

μᾶλλον δὲ τὴν εὐβουλίαν γέ τοι καὶ φρόνησιν ἐν μὲν ἡδοναῖς ἀγαθοῦς παρεχομένην ἔγκράτειαν καὶ σωφροσύνην καλοῦμεν, ἐν δὲ κινδύνοις καὶ πόνοις καρτερίαν καὶ ἀνδραγαθίαν, ἐν δὲ κοινωνήμασι καὶ πολιτείαις εὐνομίαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην.

But rather, the euboulia and phronesis which renders people good in pleasures, we call continence and sophrosune; in dangers and toils, we call it perseverance and bravery; in communications and government, order and dikaiosune.

This is a very dense sentence, which must have been quite a mouthful, and in fact, reads a little bit like double talk at first glance. Perhaps the most efficient way to begin an analysis of it, is to start with vocabulary. It is easy to pick out the by now familiar virtues in the accusative--the synonymous εὐβουλίαν, and φρόνησιν, then σωφροσύνην, with δικαιοσύνην last as in *Resp.IV*. As Paton noticed in the preceding passage, ἀνδρεία is missing. Either there is another lacuna here, or Plutarch has deliberately ignored the 'second' virtue for some reason. On the other hand, he may have been satisfied, with having created a tetrad of terms by citing both εὐβουλίαν, and φρόνησιν, although, through the evocation of the passage from *Resp.IV*, it would be clear he was aware of their synonymous character.

In addition to the above, we find ἡδοναῖς, ἀγαθοῦς, ἔγκράτειαν. As Socrates' described it, their imaginary city was found ἀγαθή, through the presence of the virtues. When he described σωφροσύνη, he said that, in addition to being κόσμος πού τις, it is also ἡδονῶν τινῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἔγκράτεια. Plutarch's statement here pairs that word with σωφροσύνη, once more recalling Plato's Socrates. So the first part of this clause,

which states that 'we call the (particular) εὐβουλία, and φρόνησις which renders people noble in pleasures ἔγκράτεια and σωφροσύνη, echoing *Resp.* IV, holds no surprises.

The next section though, which also depends on the centrally placed καλοῦμεν, presents some variation of Socrates' vocabulary. We find that the two already stated virtues/qualities in two other situations, are called something else. First, κινδύνοις καὶ πόνοις--in dangers/hazards/risks and hard labor/toil/bodily exertion/business--or their consequences--suffering/distress/pain. In these circumstances, εὐβουλίαν, and φρόνησιν are called καρτερίαν--patience/patient endurance and ἀνδραγαθίαν--bravery/manly virtue/character of a brave, honest man. Perhaps this element in the clause substitutes for the missing ἀνδρεία, although this description does not resemble very strongly Socrates' definition of the city's ἀνδρεία. That ἀνδρεία was described as characteristic of the soldier class whose function was protective and their characteristic virtue a concern for safety (σωτηρία) against 'the things to be feared', which makes that class of the ideal society seem a bit like robots programmed to respond for the greater good. Plutarch's virtues fall more into the category of characteristics belonging to an individual who displays those traits.

Finally, ἐν δὲ κοινωνήμασι καὶ πολιτείαις--in communications/interpersonal dealings and citizenship/government/administration/and the name of Plato's long dialogue (Πολιτεία), εὐβουλίαν, and φρόνησιν are called εὐνομίαν--good order, and δικαιοσύνην--as before.³¹

31. As previously noted, δικαιοσύνη has been identified with Isis, and Hesiod identified Eunomia as the daughter of Themis--both at times have been abstractions personified as goddesses, or goddesses identified with abstract qualities.

These words, do not seem to be very reminiscent of language used by Plato in either the *Republic* or the *Laws*. Εὐνομία does appear a few times in both works--in *Resp.*, at 425A3, just before the virtues are discussed, which describes children's natural sense of εὐνομία through music, in their play, and *Laws* at 713e2, which cites the presence of εὐνομία during the rule of Cronos. Ἀνδραγαθία does not occur at all in either work.

The term εὐνομία, however, appears fairly often in Plutarch's own works. It crops up in *Life of Lycurgus* several times: first in the description of Lycurgus's trip to Delphi, when the Pythia informs him that his prayer for εὐνομία has been granted, and later, in praising Sparta for its excellence as a result of its laws and constitution.³² It is also met with in *De fort. Rom.* as a personification, when Εὐνομία and Πείθω are called sisters of Τύχη.³³

For all the similarities that can be found between the derivation of the virtues in the city of *Rep. IV*, it is not to be assumed that Plutarch's knowledge of this material, or of Plato's work in general, or of the tradition around Socrates, or of the views of other philosophical schools, was limited to this passage in the *Republic*. The material we have been observing here, was reworked by Plato in the *Laws*, and Plutarch has already hinted, in his mention of Scipio with Aristeides, at treatments of similar subjects by Polybius and Cicero, with suggestions of Demosthenes' speeches.

What Plutarch may be doing with all this is a little perplexing. Because his exposition doesn't literally repeat what Plato has presented, it suggests that he was not pre-

32. *Life of Lycurgus*, V, 3,5; XXIX, 6, 3; XXX, 2, 16.

33. *De fort. Rom.*, 318 A 7. See also below, in Chapter 6.

senting a literal, simple reprise of Plato's established statement on the subject of the cardinal virtues. He may not even have been totally dependent on Plato's material.

Consider the emphasis on Stoic ideas by Paton, Wilamowitz, Buriks and the Budé edition. Consider also, Plutarch's own criticism of Zeno and the other Stoics.³⁴ Still, the question arises as to what he was trying to do, even if we assume for the sake of argument that his exposition was either dependent on or derivative of Plato. Was he a) improving on Plato? or b) interpreting Plato for the benefit of his intended audience whoever that might have been (whether colleagues or students), or c) using a variation on Plato's themes for the purpose illustrating his own point?

Plutarch's conclusions about the works of the virtues and τύχη

The remainder of Ch.2 can be divided into three sections.

1. What follows immediately on the above section, is a very long sentence which works in a number of ideas, yet at its conclusion, seems to have said nothing but the obvious. It too, shows reminiscences of Plato and Socrates in *Resp.IV*.

E8-F3

ὅθεν εἰ τὰ τῆς εὐβουλίας ἔργα τῆς τύχης δικαιοῦμεν εἶναι, ἔστω τύχης καὶ τὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης, καὶ νῆ Δία τὸ κλέπτειν τύχης ἔστω καὶ τὸ βαλλαντιοτομεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀκολασταίνειν, καὶ μεθέμενοι τῶν οἰκείων λογισμῶν εἰς

34. *De Stoicis rep.* 1034.

τὴν τύχην ἑαυτοῦς ἀφῶμεν ὥσπερ ὑπὸ πνεύματος πολλοῦ κονιορτὸν ἢ συρφετὸν ἔλαυνομένους καὶ διαφορομένους.

If we consider that the works of euboulia are those of tyche, then consider also that the works of δικαιοσύνη and sophrosune are those of tyche, by god, let even stealing be the work of tyche, and purse snatching and licentiousness, and letting go of our native reasoning let us give ourselves up to tyche, and be driven and carried away just like dust or refuse, by a strong wind.

If we break the sentence into its component parts, we notice some things which may help shed some light on whatever Plutarch is trying to say or do.

ὅθεν εἰ τὰ τῆς εὐβουλίας ἔργα τῆς τύχης δικαιοῦμεν εἶναι,

Plutarch seems to like symmetry in this essay--again he has made a perfectly balanced phrase, placing ἔργα between τῆς εὐβουλίας (attributively placed between article and noun) and τῆς τύχης. Chaeremon also placed τύχη and εὐβουλία at opposite ends of the line. Plutarch substitutes τὰ τῆς εὐβουλίας ἔργα for τὰ θνητῶν πράγματα, dropping the qualifying genitive noun. Aside from any denotative or connotative differences between ἔργα and πράγματα, it seems significantly different to speak of 'works' in general, as opposed to the 'deeds/affairs of humans'. Chaeremon, moreover, did not say that the works of εὐβουλία are due to τύχη. Rather, he said (or may have said) that the works of humans are due to τύχη and not due to εὐβουλία. Plutarch is stretching the point. Note also that the verb has the root δικ-. Perhaps that choice of verb is intended to suggest something about the source of our judgment of what is right and just as something other than chance.

ἔστω τύχης καὶ τὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης,

Considering that he has just above demonstrated, at least by allusion, the close connection between δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη, and their relation to εὐβουλία, it is not surprising to find Plutarch listing these two together in opposition to τύχη. For the present, he omits the other virtues. The article τὰ stands for the noun (ἔργα), which is not repeated.

καὶ νῆ Δία τὸ κλέπτειν τύχης ἔστω καὶ τὸ βαλλαντιοτομεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀκόλασταίνειν,

The list of what must be consigned to τύχη continues with stealing, purse snatching and intemperateness--presumably the opposites of the aforementioned virtues. We will recall the fiscal abstemiousness of Aristeides and Scipio, and the lack of self control (among other things) observable in Philocrates, Lasthenes and Euthykrates. Perhaps we are seeing, in this phrase, a triad of evils meant to be matched, literally or not, to the triad of bad statesmen who follow a pair of good statesmen, who themselves, could be thought of as representing τὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης. κλέπτουσι and βαλλαντιοτομοῦσι are words which occur later in *Resp. IX*, 575b6, (the latter verb occurs this one time in the *Resp.*) in a list of small evils likely to be perpetrated by citizens who are not possessed of σωφροσύνη.

Also noteworthy is the mention, in *Resp. IV* (431 A-B), where ἀκόλαστον is identified as the quality of the individual who succumbs to his lesser side. The exclamation, νῆ Δία, is a little reminiscent of Socrates' habit of exclaiming in Plato's dialogues, and in particular, his avuncular expressions as he and his two young interlocutors search

for δικαιοσύνη. Plutarch's tone here is similar to the above passage in Chapter 1, where certain animal characteristics are assigned to the work of τύχη.

καὶ μεθέμενοι τῶν οἰκείων λογισμῶν εἰς τὴν τύχην ἑαυτοὺς ἀφῶμεν

Plutarch utilizes two different compounds of ἴημι to express release from native reasoning power and giving ourselves up to chance. The phrase τῶν οἰκείων λογισμῶν is perhaps vaguely reminiscent of Heraclitus.³⁵ Fr. 2, Diels. Apparently Plutarch too, considers the faculty of reason to be resident in human beings.

**ὥσπερ ὑπὸ πνεύματος πολλοῦ κονιορτὸν ἢ συρφετὸν ἐλαυνομένους καὶ
διαφερομένους.**

The image of dust or rubbish blown by the wind, is reminiscent of *Resp. VI*, 496D, where those citizens who have kept to the principles of philosophy are described as having taken refuge from dust driven by the wind. The positions are reversed in the present passage--rather than taking refuge against those objects driven by the wind, we are encouraged to give ourselves up to such a wind as if we were those objects, if we insist on crediting the works of the various virtues to τύχη. The word λογισμῶ also appears in the same passage in *Resp. VI*, 496D. ζάλη, or sea spray is replaced by συρφετὸν in Plutarch.

ταῦτα πάντα λογισμῶ λαβόν, ἡσυχίαν ἔχων καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττων, οἷον ἐν
χειμῶνι κονιορτοῦ καὶ ζάλης ὑπὸ πνεύματος φερομένου ὑπὸ τειχίον ἀποστάς,

Taking all these things into account, keeping a quiet existence, and doing his own

35. Diels-Kranz, 1952, Fr. 2.

business, just as if, in winter when the dust and the sea spray are carried by the wind, he had stood under the shelter of a wall.

2. It would seem that, by this time, Plutarch had made his point, but he goes on.

97 F3- 98 A5

εὐβουλίας τοίνυν μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲ βουλήν εἰκὸς εἶναι περὶ πραγμάτων οὐδὲ σκέψιν
οὐδὲ ζήτησιν τοῦ συμφέροντος, ἀλλ' ἐλήρησεν εἰπὼν ὁ Σοφοκλῆς ὅτι

98A

πᾶν τὸ ζητούμενον

ἄλωτόν, ἐκφεύγει δὲ τὰ μελούμενον

καὶ πάλιν αὖ τὰ πράγματα διαιρῶν

τὰ μὲν διδακτὰ μανθάνω, τὰ δ' εὐρετὰ

ζητῶ, τὰ δ' εὐκτὰ παρὰ θεῶν ἠτησάμην.

Accordingly, since there is no euboulia, it is reasonable there also is no planning of actions, no speculation, no searching for expediency, but Sophocles was raving when he said that

Everything that is searched out

is attainable, the thing that is neglected gets away

and again, once more, dividing deeds into types

I learn the things which can be learned, and I seek the things which can be found,

and I have asked of the gods the things to be wished for.

If we dissect the sentence, with its contained quotations, for purpose of analysis, we see first, that Plutarch has, for the moment, dropped use of φρόνησις, in favor of εὐβουλία, allowing him to make a play on the root, with βουλήν. He recalls also

πραγμάτων from the fragment of Chaeremon, telling us that if there is no εὐβουλία, it is likely that there is also no consideration/council (βουλή) about matters/affairs/deeds.

εὐβουλίας τοίνυν μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲ βουλήν εἰκὸς εἶναι περὶ πραγμάτων

The remainder of the clause adds σκέψιν and ζήτησιν to the list of deficits that result from there being no εὐβουλία.

οὐδὲ σκέψιν οὐδὲ ζήτησιν τοῦ συμφέροντος,

It should be mentioned that ζήτησις is the word used by Socrates in *Resp.* to describe the pursuit of δικαιοσύνη, and that σκέψις occurs quite frequently in the *Resp.*, but that in *De fort.*, these words occur only here at this place. τὸ συμφέρον is used frequently in *Resp.*, indicating that Plutarch may still have been thinking of Plato, or *Resp.* in particular, or works about states and statesmen generally.

For the first time in the essay, Plutarch cites an author by name:

ἀλλ' ἔληρησεν εἰπὼν ὁ Σοφοκλῆς ὅτι...

Before investigating the quotations themselves, the verb ἔληρησεν stands out. The meaning is generally 'to talk foolishly', however LSJ's second definition suggests "of a sick person, to be delirious." We can't help but remember that not only were the poets not to be included in the ideal city of *Resp.*, but Socrates, as he states in *Apologia* 22a-c, found the poets wanting in wisdom. It seemed to him that they themselves did not understand the sage remarks they were capable of making. These, he deduced, were the result of divine inspiration. There is, or ought to be, a fine line between delirious ravings and being, effectively, a mouthpiece of the gods. Surely a speech of divine inspiration is

worth something, even if the speaker is not, and maybe Plutarch is playing with us a little, in choosing these words.

Two quotations are cited, one from *Oedipus Tyrannos* and the other from a lost tragedy of Sophocles, known only from Plutarch's having included it here.³⁶ A look at each of Plutarch's choices might show us how they relate to the subject matter of the essay so far. The first, from *Oedipus*, is spoken by Creon:

πᾶν τὸ ζητούμενον

ἄλωτόν, ἐκφεύγει δὲ τᾶμελούμενον

At this place in the prologue, line 110, Creon, having returned from Delphi, crowned with bay leaves, speaks this line after being questioned by Oedipus about the response by Apollo to the problems Thebes has been experiencing. The lines come after an ambiguous comment about how, if difficulties can be worked out, they can turn out to be of good fortune. (*O.T.*ll 87-88)

ἔσθλην· λέγω γὰρ καὶ τὰ δύσφορ', εἰ τύχοι

κατ' ὀρθὸν ἐξιόντα, πάντ' ἄν εὐτυχεῖν.

A favorable report: for I say that even things that are hard to bear,

if they should work out correctly, would turn out well.

Oedipus acknowledges the ambiguity of this remark and at length receives the god's opinion, that the city of Thebes is harboring a pollution in the person of the perpetrator of

36. Radt, Fr. 843; Nauck, Fr. 759.

a crime, who is living in the city. The line quoted by Plutarch follows on these observations. The verses, roughly translated mean, "Everything that is the object of a search is attainable, what is overlooked, gets away." It's difficult to imagine how such a line relates to Plutarch's diatribe against τύχη unless we stay with the Platonic references. We will remember that ζήτησις is the word used by Socrates for the pursuit of δικαιοσύνη, which, like the Theban problem, was right under their noses all along. It is ironic for Oedipus, of course, as his enthusiastic pursuit of the truth in the face of a plague that affects the whole city, leads to his tragic downfall. That being the case, his example is an odd one for Plutarch to have chosen to illustrate the importance of persisting to the end of a ζήτησις. Equally odd, in an essay which seems to question the viability of regarding chance as the source of human affairs, is the fact that Oedipus defines himself as the "child of Fortune."

ἔγω δ' ἑμαυτὸν παῖδα τῆς Τύχης νέμων

τῆς εὖ διδούσης οὐκ ἄτιμασθήσομαι. (1080-81)

But I, considering myself the child of Tyche,

who brings about good, will not be dishonored.

This statement is made to Jocasta, before he is aware of the truth of his circumstances, and in response to the possibility that his lineage may have been from an other than royal source--his immediate concern when, as a young man, he set out from Corinth to ask the oracle about the truth of his parentage. At this point in the play, he has again begun to think in terms of the possibility of having mistaken his origins. It would seem, that perhaps, having received the information the oracle was willing to divulge, that the shocking

fate described to him drove away his primary concern, at that time, i.e. illegitimacy, and possibly lowly origins.

Perhaps a connection for Plutarch, in creating an allusion to the unlucky Oedipus, may be found in the similarities between Oedipus's early life and the resultant confusion about his real identity, and those of Paris, ὁ δὲ Πριάμου, slayer of Achilles, as noted above. Finally, we should bear in mind that Sophocles' tragedy treats Oedipus at the end of his reign as king of Thebes. He is yet another head of state whose character and its flaws have been examined, though in a different context.

The second quotation,³⁷ is attested only here and virtually nothing has been said about it beyond noting variations in the different manuscripts. Teubner, Bude and Loeb all present it as follows:

καὶ πάλιν αὖ τὰ πράγματα διαιρῶν

τὰ μὲν διδακτὰ μανθάνω, τὰ δ' εὐρετὰ

ζητῶ, τὰ δ' εὐκτὰ παρὰ θεῶν ἤτησάμην.

Since we are left to our own devices regarding this fragment, in trying to understand something about what it may mean and why Plutarch chose to place it at this point in his essay, after the previous quotation, it seems best as always, to examine closely the literal verbal information it contains, starting with Plutarch's introduction of it. He describes Sophocles' purpose as distinguishing affairs/matters/deeds. (τὰ πράγματα διαιρῶν) The appearance of πράγματα immediately recalls Chaeremon and τὰ θνητῶν πράγματ'. Cor-

37. Above, n. 36.

responding to Plutarch's description as τὰ πράγματα', Sophocles has given three verbal adjectives ending in -τος, which Smythe (358) defines as denoting possibility. Each of these is the object of a different verb: learnable things, findable things, and things that are possible to be prayed for. It will also be obvious that the list of transitive verbs, learn, seek, and ask, includes ζητέω, which is the only word in common with the previous quotation. Also in common however, with the previous quotation, is the use of a verbal adjective with the -τος ending, indicating possibility.³⁸ Perhaps what has attracted Plutarch, besides the convenient vocabulary and any convenient coincidence of story line, is the expression of a useful activity of searching for something that it is *possible* to find--as Socrates and company succeeded in doing with respect to δικαιοσύνη. Likewise, learning what is possible to be learned, and asking of the gods the things it is possible to pray for.

The truth about Oedipus's origins was findable and Creon's speech may be emphasizing the possibility of finding everything or *anything* you really look for. In light of these observations, we might want to retranslate Creon's statement to Oedipus as something like: "It is possible to find anything one looks for, what one ignores gets away." Whether or not Creon is aware of the irony of his remark to Oedipus's situation, it is a fact that in consulting the oracle, Oedipus did not really *pursue* (ζητέω) the details of his origin. Instead, when the god refused to answer his original question about the truth of his parentage, perhaps distracted by the shocking and troubling revelation from

38. There is however, a difference in syntax--the Oedipus lines use the middle/passive participle, whose subject, πᾶν, is modified by the adjective in -τος; the second example makes the adjective into a substantive expressed as the object of the active verb.

the god, he appears to have forgotten what he was there for and responded before considering what the oracle might mean, and what course to take. As a result, he walked right into the very situation he tried to avoid, making the belated emergence of those details more than he wished to know. Oedipus's problem and its unfortunate outcome is well known and has generated much discussion in recent enough times, as undoubtedly it had even by Plutarch's time.

For Plutarch's purpose, in his apparent rant against any role of chance in human affairs, Oedipus, the self proclaimed child of fortune, is perhaps an odd choice, in spite of any point which might be made about the advisability of his having applied more conscious effort to pursue his quest. Any criticism of Oedipus on that account however, overlooks some of the facts of his situation as the various sources recount it, as well as the subjective factors implicit in it. The fact that Oedipus did not pursue his question fully, for all the varied reasons that can be called in, is one of the chance elements which set off the chain of events--chance in this connection being the unpredictable subjective response of any given individual to unforeseen information. In this case it is information that Oedipus, like most of us, would not even have dreamed of wondering about. Moreover, the element of chance in how any given individual receives information and acts on it is conditioned by numerous things, the notable ones in this drama being character, age, and circumstance.

The Oedipus we see described in flashback in Sophocles' play, is most probably a very young man, unmarried and still living with his (supposed) parents, who seems, from the story in which we are meeting him, to have some hastiness in his character, and to be

a little impatient and quick to anger--his tragic flaw(s). To have pursued a true ζήτησις in a situation like the one facing Sophocles' Oedipus, might have required an older, wiser man, and yet there is no way to know if even such an individual would then have coolly and objectively examined all the aspects of the situation before deciding on a plan based on a thorough understanding. It might also be observed that the conditions under which a Socratic ζήτησις is undertaken--a measured, presumably leisurely discussion of philosophical topics--differ significantly from a situation in which a fictitious or mythological individual, deliberately kept ignorant of sensitive personal information, is given only partial information in response to requests for enlightenment from what should have been reliable sources, i.e. his adoptive parents and Apollo. Surely Plutarch was aware of such a difference, when he invoked the imagery of tragedy following remarks which evoked the practice of philosophy. Perhaps, by using such tactics, he was 'setting up' his reader to continue thinking in the same vein. The same charge might even be applied to Sophocles, whose plot and characterizations have posed conundra for readers for roughly two and a half millennia.

In thinking of Oedipus, it pays to consider the variants to his story and his character beyond what can be found in *Oedipus Rex*. Numerous variations of the story, and details sometimes contradictory to each other, come about in such sources as other tragedians, Apollodorus, Hyginus, and archaic sources including Homer and Hesiod.³⁹ Among these details are included a twist in which Laius had an older wife before Jocasta, creating some doubt as to which wife was the biological mother of Oedipus. There are vary-

39. Gantz pp.488-502

ing accounts of when Jocasta died--not always with the revelation of the horror, as in the version followed by Euripides in *Phoenissae*. Another version has Oedipus marrying again, after the catastrophe, which creates stories leaving some doubt as to which wife gave him his four children.⁴⁰ Sophocles, possibly invoking artistic license, chose the version or elements of the myth best suited to the construction of a tragedy he thought would work.⁴¹ Plutarch has put Sophocles' tragedy in his reader's mind by quoting from the Oedipus play, as well as citing another of his (unknown) plays. He could not, however, have been ignorant of Euripides' different treatment of the details of the same story, as we will see below, at 98B, he quotes a passage from Plato's *Timaeus*, which paraphrases a line from the end of the *Phoenissae*.

The *Phoenissae* is set later than *Oedipus Rex*, during the siege of Thebes. It is immediately clear to the viewer that Euripides has followed a different rendering of the tale from Sophocles since Jocasta speaks the prologue. Rather than hanging herself after the revelation of her relation to Oedipus, she commits suicide over the bodies of the two sons she bore to Oedipus. Oedipus too, is given a different fate since he has not been exiled after Jocasta's death and his own self mutilation. He has been kept secluded in the palace where he has had occasion to curse his sons, which leads to their deaths in hand to hand combat. It is only after all this, that he is banished from the city accompanied by Antigone--and he speaks the lines to which Timaeus, in Plato's dialogue, refers.

40. Loc. cit.

41. Ganz suggests that the second prophecy could have been an invention by Sophocles.

Some vocabulary familiar to *De fort.* appears in Euripides' tragedy. Jocasta asks Eteocles to honor the deity Ισότης, without whom there is no δίκη.⁴² Eteocles praises his own προνοία⁴³, and the Messenger leaves remarking that the city's fate is distinguished by the luckiest and unluckiest.⁴⁴ The interplay of forces in the fate of Oedipus and Thebes begins to remind us of Chaerephon, Plato's description of the role of chance and externally imposed necessities in the making of laws, and of Demosthenes' description of Philip's combination of good fortune and hard work in his military successes, which led to the downfall of the city of Olynthus.

3. The final passage in Ch. 2, makes use of some interesting imagery, while continuing Plutarch's reuse of roots in different forms.

98 A6

τί γὰρ εὐρετὸν ἢ τί μαθητὸν ἔστιν ἀνθρώποις, εἰ πάντα περαίνεται κατὰ τύχην;

For what is to be found or what is to be learned by humankind, if everything is brought about according to tyche?

Plutarch continues in the same vein, using more verbal adjectives in -τος, from roots already seen in the verbs just used above. Below, he suggests the anarchy which would result from leaving governments to be formed by chance alone.

42. *Phoen.* 542 ff.

43. *Ibid.* 736 Plutarch will explore the idea of forethought in the figure of Prometheus later in the essay.

44. *Ibid.* 1478-9.

98A7-9

ποῖον δ' οὐκ ἀναιρεῖται βουλευτήριον πόλεως ἢ ποῖον οὐ καταλύεται συνέδριον
βασιλέως, εἰ ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης πάντ' ἐστίν,

*What sort of council of a state would not be swept away, or what sort of assembly of a
king would not be dissolved, if everything is yoked to tyche,*

As he has done before, Plutarch constructs a symmetrical clause:

ποῖον δ' οὐκ ἀναιρεῖται βουλευτήριον πόλεως ἢ...

balanced by,

...ποῖον οὐ καταλύεται συνέδριον βασιλέως,

"if everything *is* on account of chance,"

The verbs in this clause, ἀναιρέω, and καταλύω, both carry implications of destruction. The former includes a variety of definitions not so destructive, both when applied to governments denote the destruction, annulment, or dissolution of said government. It seems that Plutarch has still got organization of government on his mind. He has paired two forms of government in the council of a polis, and the council of a king. The words used for council, i.e. βουλευτήριον and συνέδριον are both words that can signify either the place where the council meets or the council itself. The latter is cited in Polybius for the Roman Curia, and in the New Testament for the Jewish Sanhedrin. Neither of these words is unknown to Plutarch elsewhere in his corpus of work, but neither is used with great frequency. In spite of Plutarch's frequent allusions in this essay to Plato's

works on government, these words are not found very often in Plato, with βουλευτήριον appearing more frequently of the two.

98A9-10

ἦν τυφλὴν λοιδοροῦμεν, ὡς τυφλοὶ περιπίπτοντες αὐτῆ;

whom we revile as blind, while being blind ourselves, we stumble around her?

Τύχη is described as blind, a commonly employed image for the apparent irrationality of chance or fortune. Plutarch is using rather strong language in choosing λοιδορέω, the definition for which includes the ideas of 'revile' and 'abuse' listed before 'rebuke'. This usage by Plutarch is one of those cited in LSJ as support for glossing the meaning as 'rebuke'. One wonders what is τύχη to Plutarch or Plutarch to τύχη that he works himself into such a lather? Why mock the afflicted? Would it not make more sense to mock anyone who consigns his fate to τύχη, Oedipus for instance, whose example is alluded to, rather than chance itself?

The image of blind people embracing, or literally 'falling around', a blind leader⁴⁵ recalls Breugel's painting of the blind leading the blind, actually an illustration of the familiar NT quotation from Matthew 15:14, in which Jesus, speaking of the Pharisees, dismisses them as blind leaders of blind people:

ἄφετε αὐτούς· τυφλοὶ εἰσιν ὄδηγοὶ τυφλῶν· τυφλὸς δὲ τυφλὸν ἔὰν ὀδηγῆ,
ἀμφοτέροι εἰς βόθυνον πεσοῦνται.

45. Oedipus, of course, was just such a blind leader, though his blindness was self inflicted.

Leave them: they are blind leaders of blind people: and if the blind lead the blind, both will fall into a ditch.

This is a more direct, albeit longer, statement than Plutarch's, but the similarities are obvious, i.e. repetition of τυφλός for both leader and follower, and use of a verb or verbal from πίπτω. Plutarch of course, uses a compound of the verb in περιπίπτοντες; Matthew, the future tense uncompounded. Although it seems scarcely credible that either of these authors would have been reading each other's works, they are both documents of the Hellenistic-Roman era, thus it seems worthwhile to note any likenesses. One is tempted to wonder whether there was a common expression, proverb, or some other such formulaized saying in that time, that would have been known to the general population. It is, after all, a striking image. So striking in fact, that one is tempted to take a step further and speculate that Plutarch, with his interest in leadership, religion and biography, might have been interested to read Matthew, had the material been known to him and available to him. For what are the synoptic gospels, if not *Lives* of a charismatic religious leader? Unfortunately, any such speculation is probably unverifiable, and it will be necessary to simply note the coincidence.

98 A10-B2

τί δ' οὐ μέλλομεν, ὅταν ὡσπερ ὄμματα τὴν εὐβουλίαν ἐκκόψαντες αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου τυφλὴν χειραγωγὸν λαμβάνωμεν;

What else are we doing, when cutting out euboulia as if cutting out our own eyes, we latch onto a blind mentor?

This last question is particularly arresting after all of the above, in continuing much of the imagery of the previous lines. In saying

ὅταν ὥσπερ ὄμματα τὴν εὐβουλίαν ἐκκόψαντες αὐτῶν,

Plutarch again evokes Oedipus who, lacking in εὐβουλία at the outset of his quest, wound up putting out his own eyes. Next,

τοῦ βίου τυφλὴν χειραγωγὸν λαμβάνωμεν;

reminds us of the recent image of blind people stumbling after a blind leader. Although the NT passage uses the image figuratively, Plutarch's use, which also has a figurative application, plays on the literal as well, with the allusion to Oedipus. This trend, i.e. figurative and literal treatment is followed up at the beginning of Chapter 3, when the relation of chance to sense perception is considered.

CHAPTER THREE

98B-F

Plutarch turns to previous authors to strengthen his points

In Chapter 1, in apparent opposition to the statement expressed by the line of poetry borrowed from Chaereon, Plutarch led the reader through a list of references which were not the result of chance. Most of those references used examples of human behavior, both good and bad. Chapter 2 was characterized by a discussion of the character of εὐβουλία/φρόνησις and the other cardinal virtues. That led into more quotations from tragedies from which Plutarch drew a parallel between the figurative use of seeing as understanding and the literal function of the eyes. Chapter 3 is a puzzle. It seems confused and to scarcely make sense, yet some connections to the previous parts of the essay can be noted.

This chapter begins by making a neat transition from the suggestions made in Chapter 2, about the literal and figurative implications of seeing, to a reference to the derivation and implications of the senses as described in Plato's *Timaeus*. A little further into the chapter, however (at about 98C4), the author takes a different route, allowing earlier authors, through quotations, to effectively write the section for him. The points he has to make, however, are not clear from the quotations cited, if we try to consider the context or probable context of the quotes he uses. The fact that most of them are from works which survive only in fragments, or which are not known at all outside of Plutarch's mention of them here, does not make it easier to follow Plutarch's line of

thought, through his choices of quotation. The only course of action, however, is to try to make as much sense as possible out of what Plutarch has left for us.

Previously, toward the end of Chapter 2, where Plutarch has hinted at how or whether chance plays a role in sense perception, he reminded us of the example of Oedipus, who did not 'see' his situation clearly, and finally put out his own eyes, literally blinding himself. Plutarch then invoked an image of blind people following a blind leader, to the disadvantage of both. Here, he continues his interest in seeing with a direct quote from Plato, whom he names as the source, although without naming the work he quotes from. The fact that it is the *Timaeus* is attested by the editors of all three editions where the exact chapter and line is identified.¹

Perception through the senses is not the work of τύχη

98B3-5

Καίτοι φέρε λέγειν τινὰ ἡμῶν ὡς τύχη τὰ τῶν βλεπόντων πράγματα, οὐκ ὄψις οὐδ' "ὄμματα φωσφόρα," φησὶ Πλάτων,

And further, suppose that someone among us says that the business of the eyes is tyche, not the process of seeing or light bearing orbs as Plato says,

The phrase ὄμματα φωσφόρα can be found in *Timaeus*, at 45b. Plutarch quotes only the descriptive phrase without reference to the context. Taking a look at the context

1. Teubner, p. 199; Loeb, n. b and c, p78; Budé, n. 4 and 5, Notes Complémentaires

ought to be helpful in any attempt to form an idea of what Plutarch intended. The material of the *Timaeus*, however, does not make it easy to simply find the quotation, identify the context, and make even a tentative conclusion.

According to *Timaeus*, the eyes were the first of the organs of the head to be constructed. There follows, in the dialogue, a quasi scientific explanation of the process of seeing. A little farther on, at 47A, *Timaeus* explains that the purpose of seeing is to allow humans to be able to observe the natural phenomena of the physical universe, e.g. the occurrence of night and day, orbiting of planets and circuit of the year, which gave rise to the development of number and philosophy. He remarks that one who is no philosopher (ὁ μὴ φιλόσοφος), having become blind, would lament the loss of that sense to no avail². A shocking assertion, if we are asked to believe that only philosophers can truly appreciate the loss of any bodily function. That, however, seems to be *Timaeus's* contention and a line from Euripides' *Phoenissae* is almost quoted, misquoted or paraphrased. One might wonder if Oedipus and his fatal blunders are still on Plutarch's mind. This speculation does not seem far fetched when we consider that the line in question, from the end of *Phoenissae*, is spoken in that play by Oedipus himself as he prepares to depart from Thebes.³

2. 47B4-5 ὣν ὁ μὴ φιλόσοφος τυφλωθεὶς ὀδυρόμενος ἄν θρηνοῖ μάτην.

3. *Phoenissae* 1762. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τί ταῦτα θρηνοῦ καὶ μάτην ὀδυρόμαι; According to Philip Vellacott in his Penguin translation, modern editors generally agree that the end of *Phoenissae* is spurious. Considering the appearance of an allusion in a dialogue of Plato, either the end of the play became corrupt at an early stage, or, the differences in the manuscripts and Plato's dialogue reflect familiarity with another version. Since it is uncertain how the original went, it is difficult to determine how far from the original *Timaeus's* statement is.

98B5-7

καὶ τύχη τὰ τῶν ἀκουόντων, οὐ δύναμις ἀντιληπτικὴ πληγῆς ἀέρος δι' ὠτὸς καὶ ἔγκεφάλου προσφερομένης·

...and that tyche is the business of hearing, not the perceptive force of air beaten and carried through the ear and the brain:

This time, citing *Timaeus* 67b, Plutarch includes part of the quasi scientific explanation of hearing, without giving us an exact quotation. Timaeus's exact words are:

ὅλως μὲν οὖν φωνὴν θῶμεν τὴν δι' ὠτων ὑπ' ἀέρος ἔγκεφάλου τε καὶ αἵματος μέχρι ψυχῆς πληγὴν διαδιδόμενην, τὴν δὲ ὑπ' αὐτῆς κίνησιν, ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς μὲν ἀρχομένην, τελευτῶσαν δὲ περὶ τὴν τοῦ ἥπατος ἔδραν, ἀκοήν·

...accordingly, let us reckon that in general, sound is a striking which is passed by the air through the ears and the brain and the blood even to the soul, and that the motion of it, which begins from the head, and comes to completion around the seat of the liver, is hearing:

The original is considerably more cumbersome than Plutarch's paraphrase. Nonetheless, even if Plutarch had not told us the imagery was borrowed from Plato, it would be evident that Plutarch is thinking of this passage if we compared the vocabulary and the gist of his statement about the process of hearing. Immediately prior to the quoted passage, Timaeus has stated the necessity of describing a third perception--τὴν ἀκοήν. Plutarch refers to τὰ τῶν ἀκουόντων, following the pattern established by τὰ θνητῶν πράγματ' at the opening of the essay. δύναμις is a term, not visible in the present quotation, which Timaeus regularly uses to describe the effect of physical stimulus on the body.⁴ πληγῆς/

4. In *Timaeus*, δύναμις can be found in the nominative three times, in reference to the force of a bodily

πληγὴν with a participle--Plutarch substitutes προσφερομένης for Timaeus's διαδιδόμενην. ἄερος in the same case, with the organs δι' ὠτὸς καὶ ἐγκεφάλου compared to Timaeus's δι' ὠτων ὑπ' ἄερος ἐγκεφάλου. It should be noted that Timaeus distinguishes between a sound (φωνήν) and the physical process of hearing (ἀκοήν), which Plutarch does not deal with. Still, the reader can be reminded of Timaeus's explanation from the use of chosen parts of it.

98B7-8

καλὸν ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὴν αἴσθησιν.

it would seem a good thing to beware sense perception.

An apparent mock caveat, which is contradicted just below.

98B8-10

ἀλλὰ μὴν τὴν ὄψιν καὶ ἀκοήν καὶ γεῦσιν καὶ ὄσφρησιν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος τάς τε δυνάμεις αὐτῶν ὑπηρεσίαν εὐβουλίας καὶ φρονήσεως ἢ φύσις ἤνεγκεν ἡμῖν,

Yet truly, nature has brought us sight, and hearing, and taste and smell and the remaining faculties of the body and their powers, as a team for the furtherance of euboulia and phronesis,

function or the faculty or property of the stimulus for a sense perception, as at 65e1; 71b4; 83e7.

In this clause, Plutarch attempts a better explanation for the existence of the senses than the simple occurrence by chance. Returning to his previous vocabulary, he states that the senses are the provision by nature of a 'crew' or assistants to φρόνησις and εὐβουλία. Is Plutarch still following Timaeus's lead? There is considerable space spent in *Timaeus* on description of sense perception and its objects; there is also mention of cause and purpose. As already mentioned (45b-c), Timaeus contends that the eyes and vision have served the purpose of allowing men describes to develop philosophy and number--certainly higher functions. Sound and hearing were given for the same purpose as seeing; likewise speech and music. (47c) A more detailed description of the senses begins at 64a2, and continues through 68d, in which the phrase quoted by Plutarch above, occurs.

Although a variety of sensations come to be described, including sounds, colors, and smells, not all the words used by Plutarch at this point in *De fort.* can be found in the *Timaeus*. While ὄψιν and ἀκοήν appear fairly regularly in multiple cases, neither γεῦσιν nor ὄσφρησιν ever appear in the entire dialogue. To describe the sense of smell, Timaeus uses τὴν τῶν μυκτῆρων δύναμιν and τὸ γὰρ τῶν ὀσμῶν πᾶν, both of which occur at 66d2. Touch is described as ἅ ξύμπαντα μὲν χροᾶς ἐκαλέσαμεν as at 67c6. On the other hand, Plutarch does use some of the words Timaeus favors--δυνάμεις appears again, along with μέρη, another word which Timaeus uses often.⁵

5. μέρος, in the nominative/accusative plural alone, occurs fifteen times in the *Timaeus*.

Also notable is the image seen above, in the use of ὑπηρεσίαν. At 46c, after his explanation of mirror images, Timaeus declares that all the above are συναιτίων, used by the god as agents/attendants of the best. Ταῦτ' οὖν πάντα ἔστιν τῶν συναιτίων οἷς θεὸς ὑπηρετοῦσιν χρῆται... The context is not identical with Plutarch's, since Plutarch applies the image to εὐβουλία and φρόνησις. The former does not occur in Plato's *Timaeus* at all, but φρόνησις is used a number of times, as when Timaeus tells his listeners that there are two desires natural to humans, namely τροφή, for the body, and φρόνησις for the most godlike part of us.⁶ We have seen Plutarch use the two synonymously. However, it is later in this very passage (at 46e) that Timaeus, in distinguishing the secondary causes, remarks that those συναίτια, joint causes, work together with νοῦς to create καλὰ καγαθά. In fact, like Plutarch, in calling the senses ὑπηρεσίαν, a 'crew' of helpers, Timaeus also personalizes them a bit, referring to them as δημιουργοί.⁷ It seems that Plutarch's assertion in this place, is not entirely out of line with what we can observe from Timaeus. A difference, which may or may not be significant, is Plutarch's insistence on the term φρόνησις, while Timaeus has used νοῦς at this place. Whether or not there were any strong distinctions made by the ancients in general, between the two words, Timaeus seems to apply his choice of vocabulary less consistently than Plutarch, who, in this essay has stayed with φρόνησις as a substitute for the εὐβουλία of Chaeremon's line.

6. 88b2

7. 46e4

98C1

καὶ “νοῦς ὄρῃ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει, τ᾿ἄλλα” δὲ “κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά.”

and "nous sees and nous hears, anything else is deaf and blind."

More corroboration from the past, this time in a line by Epicharmus, a Sicilian author of comedies, active in the fifth century B.C., whose lines Plutarch quotes a number of times throughout his corpus of work. This particular fragment is also used in *De Alex Magn. Fort. aut Virt.*, 336B, where Babbitt in the Loeb notes it 'an oft-quoted line', naming two other citations of it or part of it in *De Soll.*⁸ It seems that Plutarch is a source for this fragment, as Diels cites the Plutarch works above⁹. Plutarch is also a source for the tradition that Epicharmus was one of the Pythagorean school as stated in the *Life of Numa* at VIII 9, 4-7. This point is interesting in view of the presence of some Pythagorean ideas already encountered in the essay, as for example with the synonymy of εὐβουλία and φρόνησις. The term apparently used by Epicharmus, however, is νοῦς, a word frequently found in the *Timaeus*.

8. *Moralia*. 336b; 961a

9. Diels-Kranz, vol I, 200, fr.12 [249].

98C2

καὶ ὡσπερ ἡλίου μὴ ὄντος ἔνεκα τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρον εὐφρόνην ἂν ἤγομεν, ὡς
φησιν Ἡράκλειτος,

*and just as, if there were no sun, even with the other stars, we would live in darkness, as
Heracleitus says,*

This fragment of Heracleitus¹⁰ has been used by Plutarch in another place, namely, *Aquane Ignis Utilior* at 957A. The form there is slightly different from what we have here at 98C:

Ἡράκλειτος μὲν οὖν, "εἰ μὴ ἡλιος," φησίν, "ἦν, εὐφρόνη ἂν ἦν."

Accordingly, Heracleitus says, "if there were no sun, there would be night."

In that instance also, the quotation is used as the basis for a parallel statement--where Plutarch maintains that, as there would be night if there were no sun, likewise, if there were no sea, humanity would be uncivilized. The sea, a subsidiary element from water, has afforded humanity the possibility of establishing relations between diverse cultures. The analogy seems clumsy, as it apparently does to Cherniss and Helmbold of the Loeb edition, where it is noted that the citation of the fragment in *De fort.* is fuller and more appropriate.¹¹

10. Ibid. 172, fr. 99.

11. Loeb, *Moralia* XII, 298. The reader is also referred to references in *Wege und Formen*, Frankel. Teubner notes only the occurrence of fr. 99 at 957A. Budé offers the same with a note that Clement of Alexandria mentions this passage of Plutarch's in the *Protreptique*, 2,3.

It is fuller in as much as the words attributed to Heraclitus form a slightly longer statement. Diels-Kranz cites the longer version, apparently considering the 'fuller' one the more authentic. Actually, in *De fort.*, even allowing for the effect of editors' decisions, the fragment is embedded in a longer sentence, which makes the citation look more like a paraphrase than a quotation, whereas, in the shorter version, above, it seems presented more as a quote. The context of Heraclitus's remark will never be known, and as these two instances in works of Plutarch appear to be the source of the fragment, the exact form it took is also in question.

Yet another question arises as to what use Plutarch is making of the quotation-- which could be applied to both instances. Cherniss and Helmbod remark, as already noted, that the use in *De fort.* is more appropriate. Since the analogy made in *Aquane Ignis Utilior* is so clumsy, its appearance here is perhaps more appropriate inasmuch as a comparison is made between the sun and the function of νοῦς in humans which distinguishes them from the beasts, rather than between the sun as a source of light which distinguishes day from night, and the sea as a means of transport which creates the ability to interact with other nations.

98C3-4

οὕτως ἔνεκα τῶν αἰσθήσεων, εἰ μὴ νοῦν μηδὲ λόγον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔσχευ, οὐδὲν ἄν
διέφερε τῷ βίῳ τῶν θηρίων.

Thus, if the human race did not have nous or reason, but only sense perception, it would differ not at all in its mode of living, from the animals.

This time, the analogy is perfectly clear. A question arises as to whether there is a contradiction implicit in the authorities Plutarch invokes--in this case Heracleitus, just previously Plato, in the persona of Timaeus. As we have seen, Timaeus contends that the senses, particularly sight and hearing, were created in order to facilitate development of higher functions in the beings he describes. Plutarch himself has just above, stated that the senses are given by nature to be guides (ὕπηρεσίαν) to εὐβουλία and φρόνησις. He then quoted Epicharmus as saying that νοῦς is possessed of the faculties of sight and hearing. The current analogy is based on Heracleitus's statement that if not for the sun, even though there are other stars, there would be no light. Plutarch makes the senses equal to the other stars, and νοῦς (which must be used here as a synonym for φρόνησις) to the sun, through which humanity is possessed of more than sense perception. He seems to have made a shift from stating that the senses accurately inform reason, to the senses are not effective without reason, φρόνησις. On the other hand, it could be argued that Plutarch takes the analogy further, stating that it is the possession of φρόνησις which separates humans from animals.

Humankind is superior to the animals through εὐβουλία and φρόνησις

98C5-9

νῦν δ' οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδ' αὐτομάτως περίεσμεν αὐτῶν καὶ κρατοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ὁ

Προμηθεύς, τουτέστιν ὁ λογισμὸς, αἴτιος

ἵππων ὄνων τ' ὄχεϊα καὶ ταύρων γονᾶς

δοῦς ἀντίδουλα καὶ πόνων ἐκδέκτορα

κατ' Αἰσχύλον.

Now, we do not excel and control them by tyche or automatically, but Prometheus, that is to say, reasoning power, is the cause:

Having given the generation of horses and mules and the offspring of bulls for use as slaves and as relievers of toils

as Aeschylus says.

In contradiction to any surmise that it might be tyche who makes humanity superior to the animals, Prometheus is named as the cause, which reminds us once again of the opening of the essay and Chaeremon. In this sentence, which includes a quotation of two verses of poetry, Plutarch makes a number of statements: that we are superior to the animals and control them; that this does not occur by chance; and that it is the ability to use the mind, personified by Prometheus, a metaphor for the mental functions, that affords humanity this superiority over the animals. The source of the quote is Aeschylus, from one of the Prometheus plays.¹²

12. Which tragedy the line is taken from is disputed .

These lines are part of a dilemma in Aeschylean scholarship. There is considerable scholarly discussion with little agreement,¹³ over where these lines belong in the Prometheus trilogy. The only citations of this fragment from antiquity occur in Plutarch's corpus twice, and in Porphyry's *De Abstinencia*. As Porphyry, a neo-Platonic philosopher and student of Plotinus, lived and wrote substantially after Plutarch's time, Plutarch, who clearly cites Aeschylus as the source, is the earlier source for the fragment.

In addition to the controversy over where the lines belong, there is further disagreement about whether Aeschylus was actually the author of *P. Desmotes*, and whether there were three plays or four. It has been suggested that *P. Pyrphoros* and *P. Pyrkaeus* may have been one play, others think they were distinct, the latter possibly a satyr play.

Since Plutarch states that the lines were written by Aeschylus, and uses the citation also in *De soll.* where he attributes them to Prometheus himself, it is generally agreed that they must have occurred in one of the Aeschylean tragedies about Prometheus; the most common opinion seems to be the (possibly) second in the trilogy *P. Lyomenos*. There is an interesting suggestion that, if the first play (*P. Desmotes*), is not by Aeschylus, the author of that play may have seen the play of Aeschylus's which these lines came from and imitated it, as there is a similar passage in the extant *Desmotes*.¹⁴ Likewise, F.E Romer goes so far as to assert that whoever the correct author was, the extant play ought to have been written by the same individual, on account of the similarities

13. Radt, TGF 302ff.

14. Ibid. 304

in the two sources.¹⁵ In the *Desmotēs*, Prometheus makes a long speech to the chorus in which he lists all the benefits he has bestowed upon the first men.¹⁶ In lines 462-65 we can observe something like what is found in Plutarch's quotation:

κᾶ̅ζευξα̅ πρῶ̅τος̅ ἐ̅ν̅ ζυγοῖ̅σι̅ κνώ̅δαλα
ζεύ̅γλαι̅σι̅ δου̅λεύ̅οντα, σῶ̅μα̅σιν̅ θ' ὅ̅πως
θνη̅τοῖ̅ς̅ μεγί̅στων̅ διά̅δοχοι̅ μο̅χθη̅μάτων̅
γέν̅οι̅νθ'...

And I, first, fastened savage beasts to yokes with loops, and in this way came about the successors to mortal bodies in the greatest labors.

Earlier in that speech, Prometheus mentions how the men at that time, were very primitive, unable to use their eyes and ears, mark the change of seasons, the movements of the stars, and until he taught them, they were ignorant of number. The list is tantalizingly like the repertoire cited in Plato's *Timaeus*,¹⁷ quoted by Plutarch earlier in this chapter, with a direct reference to the mechanics of vision and hearing. Admittedly, these comparisons make a moot point, since Plutarch has not quoted lines from this play, but from another one which has been lost. It is still tempting to notice such striking similarities, and underscores the magnitude of the loss of some material which might have yielded some clue as to what Plutarch had in mind in quoting these lines here.

15. Romer, 2000, p.71.

16. Although in general, I have kept to non-specific gender nouns in translating such Greek words as ἄνθρωπος and θνητός, the creatures of Prometheus must have been male as there do not seem to have been any women until the creation of Pandora.

17. In *Timaeus* also, the first generation is exclusively male, as animals and women, however they may have resulted, appeared in the second generation as forms of the earlier men who had not lived well.

The lines in question, as Plutarch quotes them, seem at face value to imply that Prometheus, the personification and bestower of λογισμός, has provided the beasts to be used by his creatures 'as slaves' and as 'relievers of toils'. The word ὀχεῖα, however, being a kind of biological term, suggests cycles of generation;¹⁸ and ἐκδέκτωρ, after a reliever of toils, has a secondary meaning of successor. It is not hard to imagine that a reader of Plutarch's time, given the beginning of this chapter, with its earlier overt reference to the *Timaeus*, would be reminded of Timaeus's derivation of the animals from previous generations of those men who have not lived well. Not knowing the context of the quotation, as already said, makes it impossible to know if Plutarch is doing violence, for his own purposes, to the poet's intended use of the words, or if the poet's intention, in fact, were corroborated by Plutarch's use of the lines here.

Animals are luckier than people

98C9-D5

ἐπεὶ τύχη γε καὶ φύσει γενέσεως ἀμείνονι τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἀλόγων κέχρηται. τὰ μὲν

γὰρ ὤπλισται κέρασι καὶ ὀδοῦσι καὶ κέντροις,

“αὐτὰρ ἔχίνοις,” φησὶν Ἐμπεδοκλῆς,

“ὄξυβελεῖς χαῖται νότοις ἐπιπεφρίκασι,”

τὰ δ' ὑποδέδεται καὶ ἡμφίεσται φολίσι καὶ λάχναις καὶ χηλαῖς καὶ ὀπλαῖς

ἀποκρότοις·

18. Romer's article, *op. cit.*, offers in intricately considered view of the correct meaning of ὀχεῖα, as well as arguments against the traditional lexicographical treatment and former emendations of the text.

Then, the majority of the speechless creatures are furnished by a better τύχη and kindlier treatment by nature, from their origin. For they are armed with horns and teeth and stings,

"and again, sharp pointed manes bristled down the backs of hedgehogs," says Empedocles, as to these things, they are shod below and clothed around with scales and fur and sturdy hooves:

Plutarch's next point is that the animals are luckier than humans in being better endowed by nature as they have been given natural weapons such as horns, teeth and talons. To reinforce this point, the authority of Empedocles is again enlisted in the form of another quotation, which cites the example of the hedgehog, which has sharp quills on its back.¹⁹ Plutarch furnishes further examples, namely, the aforementioned claws, hair and hooves. Surely, in this instance too, Plutarch's reader would have remembered Timaeus's explanation for the development of nails and hair in the first generation of men--namely, that their animal descendants would some day need those attributes in the form of hooves or claws.²⁰ Timaeus does not consider this phenomenon a sign of greater fortune for those creatures, but necessities for the kind of lives they would be compelled to lead. They are descendants of men of lesser character, as are women, for whom the creator provided by including in the structure of the first men, rudimentary forms of the ὄπλα described by Plutarch.

19. Diels-Kranz, vol. I, 341, Fr. 83.

20. 76d9-e7

98D5-7

μόνος δ' ὁ ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα “γυμνὸς καὶ ἄνοπλος καὶ ἀνυπόδετος καὶ ἄστρωτος” ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀπολέλειπται.

Humanity alone according to Plato, has been left by nature "naked and unarmed and unshod and without bedding."

Now we are shown how helpless humans have been left by nature--once again in the words of Plato. The quotation comes from the *Protagoras* (321C), where appropriately enough, Protagoras tells the story of the creation of humankind which left it vulnerable as described, in his opinion, as a result of the oversights of Epimetheus. The quoted line describes how Prometheus, who appears for the second time in this chapter, albeit obliquely, saw men²¹ in a state of embarrassment and need, which he attempted to remedy by stealing fire and imparting the various wisdoms which enabled them to survive.

98D8-9

' ἄλλ' ἔν διδοῦσα πάντα μαλθάσσει τάδε '

τὸν λογισμὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν.

"but giving one thing mitigates all these things"

21. See above, n. 16 & 17.

reasoning, and diligence, and forethought.

Quoting from another tragedy of unknown authorship, Plutarch adds that the gifts of λογισμός, the ability to calculate, as well as ἐπιμέλεια, care and attention, and πρόνοια, foresight make up for the lack of the natural weaponry granted to the animals. πρόνοια is surely the influence of the example of Prometheus just above. Neither the older (Nauck) or newer (Snell & Kannicht) collections of tragic fragments has anything whatever to say about this fragment except that Plutarch cites it in this place, and that there is a variation in μαλάσσει for μαλθάσσει in one manuscript.²² Another unknown is the subject of the participle and finite verb. Further, Plutarch has finished the thought in supplying the gifts given. Again, it is unknowable what the context was or what meaning the author intended for those words, as well as what Plutarch intended his reader to understand from the reference.

In spite of their natural advantages, the animals are the servants of humanity

98D10-13

' ἤ βραχὺ μὲν σθένος ἀνέρος· ἀλλὰ

ποικιλίᾳ πραπίδων

δεινὰ μὲν φύλα πόντου χθονίων τ' ὀρέων

δάμναται παιδεύματα '

22. TrGF, Vol.2, p112, Fr.. 367

"In truth, the bodily strength of a man (ἄνθρωπος) is slight: but through the subtlety of his intelligence, his pupils, the dread creatures of the sea, land and mountains are subdued."

This quote from the *Aeolus* of Euripides²³ states that although the strength of a man is insignificant,²⁴ cleverness allows the subjugation of other life forms in spite of physical limitations.

In myth and literature, Aeolus was one of those encountered by Odysseus, as Homer describes in *Odyssey* 10.²⁵ He is a king, beloved of the gods, who married his six sons to his six daughters, no further questions asked. Euripides wrote a tragedy entitled *Aeolus*, in which one of the six sons, Macros, who had fallen in love with one of the sisters and got her pregnant, suggested the marriage to their father. Canace, the sister of his choice, did not become his bride as he had planned, and Aeolus, when he became aware of the truth, sent his daughter a sword, presumably to do away with herself. Possibly Macros did so as well, which would have made the couple a kind of incestuous Romeo and Juliet, a pair of star-crossed lovers. Although a number of fragments remain, the actual outcome of the events of the play is not known.²⁶ The quotation, from one of the choruses gives no clue as to what, if anything, Plutarch thought was pertinent to his line of argument about the role of chance in bodily functions or the ability of people to subdue

23. Ibid, p. 168, Fr.. 24b; TGF, 370-71, Fr.. 27.

24. LSJ, definition 4.

25. *Odyssey*, 10, ll. 5-6.

26. Gantz, p.169

the animals through superior intellect. It is possible that after the example of Oedipus and his unfortunate stumbling into a mother/son incestuous relationship, he thought it appropriate to suggest an example of sibling lovers as an example of another variety of incest which, in this case was the result of moral weakness rather than insufficient use of god given mental ability. If so, it would seem counterproductive to his point that humanity is capable of dominance through φρόνησις, since recollection of Oedipus suggested that character's sins of omission with regard to the effective use of his own φρόνησις. Perhaps Plutarch is either not convinced of the truth of that point himself, or that is not his fundamental point.

Another recollection brought about by reiteration of the pitfalls resulting from compulsions of the body (if we are ready to assume that incestuous relationships are the results of such--or that Plutarch thought so) is that of Laesthenes and Euthykrates and the Alexander who caused the Trojan war, in Chapter 1. That chapter ended with an ambiguous comment about the 'natural' characteristics of certain animals being attributable to chance if τὰ θνητῶν πράγματα are also to be attributed to chance. It seems that if animals are the slaves to their bodily compulsions, historically people have been also. If humans in general are superior to the beasts with respect to φρόνησις, it appears that they don't always make use of it.

98E1-6

**κουφότατον ἵπποι καὶ ὠκύτατον, ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ θεοῦσι· μάχιμον κύων καὶ
θυμοειδὲς, ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπον φυλάττει· ἡδύτατον ἰχθῦς καὶ πολύσαρκον ὕς,**

ἄνθρωπῳ δὲ τροφὴ καὶ ὄψον ἔστί. τί μείζον ἐλέφαντος ἢ φοβερώτερον ἰδεῖν; ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο παίγιον γέγονεν ἀνθρώπου καὶ θέαμα πανηγυρικόν, ὀρχήσεις τε μανθάνει καὶ χορείας καὶ προσκυνήσεις,

Horses are very fleet and swift, but they run for the benefit of humanity: the dog is war-like and high-spirited but it guards humanity: the fish is very sweet tasting and the swine very rich, but they provide sustenance and food for humanity. What is larger or more dreadful to behold than an elephant? Yet even this beast becomes a plaything and a spectacle fit for public display, and it learns pantomimes and choral dances and curtseys,

Unlike the characteristics attributed to animals at the end of chapter 1, which are disagreeable, and not to be attributed to chance, those noted here are useful qualities. They are also useful to humanity and available to it through his ability to subdue the animals through the application of φρόνησις, as will be explicitly stated just below.

The characteristics assigned to each animal bear closer analysis. Horses are credited with nimbleness and speed which is applied to humanity's benefit. Plutarch does not state clearly just how nimbleness and fleetness of horses are useful--perhaps he assumes the reader understands and takes it as obvious. The speed of a horse can be useful if the horse is a means of transportation or for war. The horse's speed is also an advantage in racing, which is not a necessary pursuit and of interest only to the rich.

While horses are truly much speedier than humans, dogs are noted for their ferocity and high-spiritedness, which is made useful by people. Surely Plutarch is not unaware that humans can be as ferocious and easily enraged as any dogs. In fact, these very qualities in certain measure (and speed too, if we recall one of the frequent epithets of Achilles

in the *Iliad*) were considered desirable in the Homeric warriors, who, whether by the use of φρόνησις or not, learned to devise weapons which made them far more dangerous than their dogs. These particular qualities in dogs are important as watchdogs and also hunting dogs, but other qualities associated with dogs, companionship, for instance, which would less likely be the result of subduing the animal through mental superiority, are not mentioned. In fact, that trait might imply some independent ability on the part of the animal to relate to another species and form a bond, possibly itself a form of φρόνησις, but this also is not considered. In *Gryllus*, one of Plutarch's 'animal' works, the point is made strenuously that animals not only use reason, but actually excel humans in that respect. In *De Soll.* also Plutarch makes much of the comparison between the animal species with respect to intelligence.

Most curious, in a list of advantages the animals have over humans, is Plutarch's statement that fish and pigs are tasty, yet they provide food. The line as reported by the Budé and Loeb editions barely makes sense. The Teubner, which rejects the above reading, has a variation which reads

ἰσχυρὸν ὤζ καὶ πολυσαρκον, ἄνθρωπῳ τροφή καὶ ὄψον ἐστὶ.

There may be slightly more grammatical sense, but there is still little connection between being strong and fleshy, and being unable to avoid being turned into food for another species. In fact this statement, regardless of the textual reading is curious in more than one respect. First, as stated, Plutarch has claimed to provide a list of examples of ways in which animals are actually superior, or luckier, than people. Tastiness hardly seems a quality which could be said to give an animal an advantage over people. It might

actually be considered significant bad luck, since it results in being eaten. Further, Plutarch has devoted an entire essay, *De esu carniū*, to the evils of eating meat, and most particularly the cruelty of culinary art which makes eating into an enjoyable pastime. In that work, he takes the position that humans who eat meat are worse than animals who kill for food out of necessity.

If the assertion that the succulence of food animals is an advantage over humans is absurd, Plutarch's assessment of the superiority of humanity is demonstrated in his ability to make a large and dangerous beast such as an elephant, into an entertainment is scarcely relevant to his point. It might have been more relevant to remind the reader how people have used the size and dangerousness of the elephant for military purposes, which surely must have been considered of greater import than circuses, but Plutarch doesn't make that point.

98E7-10

οὐκ ἀχρήστως τῶν τοιούτων παρεισαγομένων, ἀλλ' ἵνα μανθάνωμεν ποῦ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἢ φρόνησις αἴρει καὶ τίνων ὑπεράνω ποιεῖ, καὶ πῶς κρατεῖ πάντων καὶ περίεστιν.

...it is not without purpose to introduce these things, so that we might learn how phronesis elevates humanity and places it above these, and how it holds sway over all and surpasses all.

In this line, perhaps Plutarch defends his choice of example in the last mentioned above, to stress his point that the humbling of elephants into trained performers demonstrates how φρόνησις has elevated the human race. He could have found more convincing evidence. If, as he says here, this example as well as the prior ones, shows how the fineness of intelligence possessed by humans makes him superior to the animals he subdues, the results are not very impressive.

98F1-2

οὐ γὰρ πυγμάχοι εἰμὲν ἀμύμονες οὐδὲ παλαισταί, οὐδὲ ποσὶ κραιπνῶς θέομεν,

For we are not peerless boxers or wrestlers, nor do we run swift footed...

The Budé and Loeb texts identify the first half of this sentence as an adaptation of a line from *Odyssey* 8. The Teubner merely cites the source as line 246 of that work. What is not stated in any of the three editions is that the 'adaptation' appears to consist of Plutarch's changing ἄλλὰ to οὐδὲ. The Oxford text of the *Odyssey*, at least, gives no indication that there is any indication that that may have been a variant reading.²⁷ Making this change allows Plutarch to effectively turn the meaning of the original inside out.

The original is spoken by Alcinous of his people, the Phaeacians, whom he describes as neither wrestlers nor boxers but fast runners and good seamen who enjoy a good dinner, music and dancing, fine clothing and other creature comforts. Plutarch does

27. There is also nothing noted in *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey* Vol. I. Heubeck, West, Hainsworth, 1988.

not give any examples of animals boxing or wrestling, and Alcinous makes no mention of a comparison between his people 's capabilities and those of animals. He does say that they are swift of foot, which Plutarch's adaptation seems to have him deny. Their other characteristics include a concern for fine food and comfortable living, not unlike Lasthenes and Euthykrates. By the juxtaposition of this reference to his argument that φρόνησις raises people above the animals are we to understand that that elevation was for the purpose of soft living? Would Plutarch actually have believed that? If we take his expostulations in Chapter 1 at face value, especially those regarding Lasthenes and Euthykrates, it would appear that he most decidedly would not have believed that.

98F3-7

ἀλλ' ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἀτυχέστεροι τῶν θηρίων ἐσμέν· ἐμπειρίᾳ δὲ καὶ μνήμῃ καὶ σοφίᾳ καὶ τέχνῃ κατ' Ἀναξαγόραν σφῶν τ' αὐτῶν χρώμεθα καὶ βλίττομεν καὶ ἀμέλγομεν καὶ φέρομεν καὶ ἄγομεν συλλαμβάνοντες· ὥστ' ἐνταῦθα μηδὲν τῆς τύχης ἀλλὰ πάντα τῆς εὐβουλίας εἶναι καὶ τῆς προνοίας.

but in all these things we are less fortunate than the beasts: yet, we employ our experience and memory and wisdom and skill over them, as Anaxagoras says, and taking hold of them, we get their honey, and we milk them, and we lead and drive them: so then, all these things are not at all the work of tyche but of euboulia and pronoia.

Fragment 21b of Anaxagoras²⁸ is simply a repetition of the first clause of this sentence. The context of Anaxagoras's remarks as well as the actual form can not be known from Plutarch's usage. Once again, we can't look to the context of the original for any insight into Plutarch's intent. We can see that Plutarch persists in his point that we are less fortunate (ἄτυχέστεροι) than beasts, although we have an advantage over them in the form of skills unique to humans which allow them to make use of them. As noted here, those skills include experience, memory, wisdom and simply, skill. As we see, Plutarch has created another list of interesting and evocative words. σοφία καὶ τέχνη are familiar from earlier in the essay (Chapter 2) but ἐμπειρία and μνήμη are new to this discussion. Lastly, Plutarch maintains that this state of events is not the result of chance, but of εὐβουλία and προνοία. The final word is particularly interesting in view of our recent encounters with Prometheus. Apparently Anaxagoras had some input on that subject too.

If we look back at this chapter, it can be read as a list of quotations taken from a variety of authors. Plutarch invokes the authority of those authors through various remarks they have made in a variety of contexts, not all of which are known. Ostensibly, this technique is used toward making the point that authors of the past agreed that humanity, although less well endowed by nature, is able to dominate the beasts and employ them and their various products, for his own benefit, through his superiority of intellect. The examples themselves, and the associations they must have produced, don't always make Plutarch's point effectively, and Plutarch seems in some cases at least, where there

28. Diels-Kranz, Vol. 2, pp. 43-44.

can be some verification, to have applied the quotations rather loosely from their original contexts.

Moreover, the section in question is not an independent unit, but a part which has grown out of the immediately preceding section of the essay which dealt with the senses. That section too, grew out of a previous section which invoked a simile between figurative and literal seeing, and that in turn followed a discussion of the meaning and interconnection between a variety of abstract Greek words. Working backward in this fashion, we find ourselves at the end of Chapter 1 (97D6-9), where some animals and their typical characteristics are mentioned for the first time.

That sentence, placed by an editor long ago, at the end of the first chapter, seems when encountered, to have little connection to what has gone before except rather generally to reinforce the apparent irony in the rhetorical question as to whether human behavior can be attributed to chance. There should be no reason however, to assume any parallel between human and animal traits, and the effect that comes about is a rather lame expostulation about the absurdity of assigning animal behavior to chance. This sentence also does not appear connected to what immediately follows in Chapter 2, the discussion of the four virtues. Since, however, each of the sections or subsections which follows that first mention of animals, does move fairly predictably onto each subsequent topic (for lack of a better word) it might help to create some logical sequence in the essay if we consider the first mention of animals, at 97D6, the beginning of a fairly long piece of the essay which culminates in the statements about animals at the end of traditional Chapter 3.

As stated earlier about Chapter 1, a circular or periodic trend could be discerned in the way Plutarch moved from one subtle allusion to another to finally end up with an allusion, in the mention of the mythological and historical Alexanders, to some of the associations found in the initial fragment from Chaeremon's tragedy, namely that Achilles, the slayer of Thersites, with whom the historical Alexander identified himself, was slain by the other Alexander, whose personal failings led to a devastating war. If we consider 97D6-9 the beginning of a new section of the essay, which threads through some philosophical ideas to end with mention of animals which was what opened the section, we can at least identify 97D6-98F7 as a reasonably cohesive unit. It does not, however, explain the inconsistencies within that unit.

CHAPTER FOUR

99A-C

Concrete mortal concerns

At the beginning of Chapter 4, Plutarch returns to the opening of the essay with a statement which incorporates part of the quote from Chaeremon, τὰ θνητῶν πράγματ', with the words reversed. This time, rather than contemplating abstract implications of the statement, he investigates its more concrete applications, such as the products of the crafts.

99A1-4

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ τεκτόνων δήπου “πράγματα θνητῶν” ἔστι, καὶ τὰ χαλκοτύπων
καὶ

οἰκοδόμων καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιῶν, ἐν οἷς οὐδὲν αὐτομάτως οὐδ' ὡς ἔτυχε
κατορθούμενον ὀρώμεν.

But again, I suppose the works of craftsmen also are "human concerns," and those of copper workers and builders and sculptors, among which we see that they are successfully accomplished not at all automatically or "as it happens."

Plutarch supposes that the works of mortals would include the products of the trades, and names four types of craftsmen, i.e. carpenters, copper workers, builders, and sculptors--representing a fairly broad range of skills which produce a correspondingly

broad range of products. The works of carpenters and builders are of clear importance to everyone all the time, as are the products of the copper workers. The sculptors make art, which serves yet another purpose. The results of these activities is hardly accidental, as Plutarch remarks, and he may be thinking that the ability to practice all of them have raised humankind above the miserable existence it endured before Prometheus. He does, however, allow that there may, from time to time, be some minor effect of chance for these activities, as he will state just below, which he will express in greater depth still later.

Limited role of Tyche for the crafts as indicated by earlier authors

99A4-9

ὅτι γὰρ τούτοις βραχεῖά τις παρεμπίπτει τύχη, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα καὶ μέγιστα τῶν ἔργων αἱ τέχναι συντελοῦσι δι' αὐτῶν, καὶ οὗτος ὑποδεδήλωκε

βᾶτ' εἰς ὁδὸν δὴ πᾶς ὁ χειρῶναξ λεώς,

οἷ τὴν Διὸς γοργῶπιν Ἐργάνην στατοῖς

λίκνοισι προστρέπεσθε.

That for these activities a certain limited tyche creeps in, but the arts accomplish the most and greatest things by themselves, even this (poet) illustrates.

All the brotherhood of craftsmen go in procession,

those who supplicate the stern faced daughter of Zeus,

Ergane, with winnowing fans presented.

These few lines are extremely difficult. Plutarch has made rather free use of a saying of Epicurus, joining it to a quote of a tragic fragment he has attributed to Sopho-

cles in a different work. The initial clause of the sentence, which comes from Epicurus, is presented differently in each of the standard editions. The TLG follows the Loeb, shown above, which notes that most manuscripts show the text differently, following a citation from Epicurus as found in Diogenes Laertius. Teubner and Budé show slight variations, and they too, acknowledge manuscript variations including the debt to Epicurus through Diogenes Laertius.¹ The works of Epicurus have been collected by G. Arrighetti,² who presents Sententia 16 as follows:

Βραχέα σοφῶ τύχη παρεμπίπτει, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατα ὁ λογισμὸς
διώκηκε καὶ κατὰ τὸν συνεχῆ χρόνον τοῦ βίου διοικεῖ καὶ διοικήσει.

*A limited tyche creeps in for the wise person, but reasoning power governed the
greatest and most supreme things and it governs and will govern (such) all
through the complete span of a life.*

This rendering appears identical to the fragment as preserved by Diogenes Laertius.

In the original, the emphasis seems to be on the role of chance in the life of the wise person, rather than its role or lack of it, in activities requiring skill. Of course,

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1. Teubner reads "καὶ ὅτι μὲν βραχεῖα σοφῶ τύχη παρεμπίπτει [χαλκοτύπῳ τε καὶ οἰκοδομῳ]... Budé reads"Ὅτι γὰρ Βραχεῖα σοφῶ τύχη παρεμπίπτει, χαλκοτύπῳ τε καὶ οἰκοδομῳ...showing some difference in particles and without bracketing the nouns.
 2. Arrighetti, 1973, pp. 121-137.

Plutarch has made the point that the skills are the result of λογισμός which might be read as a kind of wisdom, especially in light of remarks he has made throughout the essay.

True to form, Plutarch has followed the general form of the sentence, making substitutions. Epicurus makes ὁ λογισμὸς³ the subject of the verb(s) διώκηκε/διοικεῖ/διοικήσει, with objects τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατα. Plutarch, discussing the conduct of the arts, makes αἱ τέχναι the subject of συντελοῦσι with objects τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα καὶ μέγιστα τῶν ἔργων. The addition of ἔργων underscores his point that work, not chance, is the determining factor in creating finely crafted objects, and in his invocation of the sponsorship of Ergane for the arts as he will state below. It also may take us back to Demosthenes' relation of the reason for Philip's success which was basically due to his own hard work rather than his good fortune.

To strengthen his assertion that the achievement of craft is accomplished by work rather than by luck, Plutarch employs another quotation, which is only part of the fragment as it is recorded. Oddly enough, all three editions put a period after προστρέπεσθε, in spite of the fact that 'the rest' of the fragment, as found in *Praec. gerend.* is included in TrGF ed. Radt,⁴ as well as in Nauck, TGF⁵. At this point in *De fort.*, Plutarch does not identify the poet, however, at 802B, in *Praec. gerend.*, using a paraphrase of the idea ex-

3. ὁ λογισμὸς is the term with which Plutarch identifies Prometheus in his quote of the Aeschylean fragment 189a.

4. Op. cit. p. 555, Fr. 844.

5. Op. cit. p. 309, Fr. 760.

pressed in the lines and what has been accepted as the end of the fragment (...παρ' ἄκμονι τυπιαδι βαρείᾳ...) he identifies Sophocles as the poet. (...ὡς φησι Σοφοκλῆς...)

Divine patron of the arts and crafts is not Tyche

99B 1-2

τὴν γὰρ Ἐργάνην καὶ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν αἱ τέχναι πάρεδρον οὐ τὴν Τύχην ἔχουσι.

For the arts have Ergane and Athena as patron, not Tyche.

This statement also obliquely recalls Chaeremon, who has said that the concerns of humans are τύχη, not εὐβουλία. Instead, Plutarch asserts that αἱ τέχναι have Ergane as an associate, not Tyche. In addition to the obvious fact that Athena is usually associated with certain specific arts, it is disingenuous of Plutarch to assert that the crafts might have one πάρεδρον and one only, particularly in the era in which he was living and writing. The religion of that time was characterized by syncretism, through which, not only were local and national deities identified with various foreign deities, but new ones were even constructed, as in the case of Serapis. In addition, as Plutarch wrote a *Life of Demetrius*, he would surely have been cognizant of the 304B.C. decree passed by the Athenians to Athena Nike, Agathe Tyche, and the Saviors.⁶ It is relevant that according to *Theologumena Arithmeticae*, the number seven is called τύχη and καίρος;⁷ it is also called Athena.⁸

6. SEG XXX, 1980, 69, pp. 29-30.

7. De Falco, p. 59.

8. Ibid. p. 70-71. As we saw earlier in that work, the number three was called εὐβουλία and φρόνησις and four, δικαιοσύνη. Is it possibly significant that three plus four equal seven?

The epithet Ἐργάνη, for Athena, in addition to the Sophocles fragment quoted by Plutarch, is attested in inscriptions.⁹ References to the goddess by this title can also be found in Pausanias and Aelian. Pausanias¹⁰ simply remarks that the Athenians were the first to call the goddess by this title. The dictionary entry for Ἐργάνη, while listing examples of its application to Athena, is just 'a worker', while acknowledging the use of it as an epithet for Athena as seen in the above Sophocles fragment and the other authors mentioned above. The Loeb edition of Aelian's *Historical Miscellany*, also cites the use of the epithet for the goddess but specifies that it applies to her particularly with respect to the craft of weaving¹¹.

The use of the term by Aelian, writing considerably later than Plutarch, is connected with spiders and their habit of weaving webs. In *Varia Historia*¹² he states that these animals are simply following an instinct to trap prey rather than exhibiting an interest in the δῶρα Ἐργάνης δαίμονος. In *De Natura Animalium*, however, he makes an apparent about face in describing their skill in the manner of Athena Ergane¹³ including a further epithet to that effect, adding goddess Penitia, another name for Athena in this capacity. He further describes the ingenuity of spiders, attributing to them skill in geome-

9. An example can be seen in a dedication to Athene Ergane by a daughter of Acharnes. IG2 561 (p. 206)

10. Pausanias, I. 24.3

11. Wilson, Aelian: *Historical Miscellany* p. 27, n. b

12. VH I.2

13. De Nat. Anim. 6, 57, 3...κατὰ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν τὴν Ἐργάνην τε καὶ Πηνίτιν θεάν...

try, citing the circular character of their webs. He comments further on the fine texture of the webs produced.¹⁴

All this being so, it is odd that Plutarch left out the weavers in his catalog of workers, if he was going to invoke Ergane as patroness of the arts. Apropos of the emergence of Athena as patron, and recollecting that the Prometheus myth has figured in the essay, we must remember that Hesiod says it was she who endowed Pandora with womanly skills. We may also choose to recall that Plato's Protagoras tells of Prometheus enlisting the aid of both Athena and Hephaestus in stealing fire, thus there may seem some subtle connection between those deities and Prometheus in his role of benefactor of humanity,¹⁵ as well as some subtle connection to this essay.

The celebrated example of the limited role of chance in the arts

99B2-9

ἓνα μέντοι φασὶν ἵππον ζωγραφοῦντα τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις κατορθοῦν εἶδεσι καὶ
χρώμασι, τοῦ δ' ἄφροῦ τὴν περὶ τῷ χαλινῷ κοπτομένην χαυνότητα καὶ τὸ
συνεκπῖπτον ἄσθμα μὴ κατορθοῦντα γράφειν τε πολλάκις καὶ ἐξαλείφειν, τέλος δ'
ὑπ' ὀργῆς προσβαλεῖν τῷ πίνακι τὸν σπόγγον ὥσπερ εἶχε τῶν φαρμάκων
ἀνάπλεων, τὸν δὲ προσπεσόντα θαυμαστῶς ἐναπομάξαι καὶ ποιῆσαι τὸ δέον.

14. The association of Athena with spiders can't help but suggest the story of Arachne in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, VI, 1-145.

15. As noted above, one group of artisans named by Plutarch were the copper workers whose patron is Hephaestus, omitted by Plutarch in this citation of Athena as patroness of the arts.

Of course, they say that one artist who was painting a horse, successfully accomplished everything else in terms of form and color, but he was not able to successfully depict the sponginess of the foam surging around the bit, and the animal's panting, and he wiped it out many times. Finally, in anger, he threw the sponge straight at the panel just as it was, full of paints which, amazingly, got stamped on and created the necessary effect.

Described above is an anecdote which received a fair amount of attention in antiquity. In addition to Plutarch's mention of it here, it appears with some variation in works by the elder Pliny, Valerius Maximus and Favorinus. All are concerned with the artist's frustration at his inability to create a realistic illusion of an animal's saliva as exhaled from its mouth, and all cite the happy coincidence of a chance occurrence which achieved the successful illusion of lifelikeness. All use the same word, foam (spuma, ἄφρός) to describe the elusive object.

Pliny the Elder¹⁶, in a list of famous artists, describes an experience of the painter Protogenes, who, in executing a painting of Ialysus in the Temple of Peace in Rome included a dog realistically rendered except for the foam created as the animal exhaled (...spuman anhelantis...) The reader is told of the artist's dissatisfaction with his own efforts, and how he criticized his excessive use of technique, which lessened the illusion of reality. Finally, the exasperated painter threw his sponge at the area of the picture which dissatisfied him, thus producing the desired result. Pliny describes this effort as an example of success through skill and good fortune combined. (ita Protogenes demonstravit et fortunam.) He also states that the dog appeared to have been equally painted by

16. *Natural History*, XXXV 101-4

skill and by chance (...ut quem pariter ars et casus pinxerit.) Lastly, he records another example of a painter, Nealces who, inspired by the example of Protogenes' success in that fashion, also achieved success in the same way when attempting to paint a horse's foaming mouth.

Valerius Maximus¹⁷, explaining how some things cannot be rendered by skill alone, cites the example of an unnamed painter, who used the same procedure in attempting to show foam issuing from a horse's nostrils. Again, the artist, trying to add foam coming from the nostrils (...naribus spumas...) found himself repeatedly frustrated in his attempt to get it right. Finally in a fit of rage, he threw the sponge, which contained all the colors (...imbutam coloribus...) at the painting to destroy it. The painting was saved by Fortuna, who directed the sponge to the correct place with the desired effect.

itaque quod ars adumbrare non valuit, casus imitatus est.

...and so, what skill was not able to outline, an accident expressed.

Favorinus¹⁸, writing about favorable effects of chance--even in such a dire circumstance as falling out of a ship--uses the story of the painter and his sponge as an example of the happy result of a favorable τύχη. It is the fullest description of the four. After describing tyche as οὐρανός, when there is clear sky and not darkness, he refers to the experience of Apelles, another famous painter. Again, as in Valerius, and Pliny's post-scripted example, the animal in question is a horse. Again, it is the saliva as blown

17. *Facta et Dicta Memorabilia* VIII. 11

18. Pseudo-Dio *Or. LXIII*

from the mouth or nostrils that has challenged the painter's skill. Again, the painter throws the sponge with the exact right result. This time though, we have a detailed description of the position of the horse in the scene of the painting, whereas Pliny and Valerius simply described the animal as wonderfully executed in every other respect. In addition to the description of the animal's position, the charioteer's use of the bridle or bit (τοῦ χαλινοῦ) to control the horse is mentioned. Following is a very detailed description of the character of the breath and saliva, which Favorinus, calls ἄφρός, foam, as do the Roman authors above. As we have been told before, the painter in exasperation, took the sponge, which was full of pigment, and threw it at the painting with the desired result. Favorinus declares that the painting was finished by tyche rather than by skill.

The similarity in all three versions should be obvious. Even though told in different languages, similar vocabulary is used. The same emphasis is placed on the painter's concerns, and his frustration and anger which just happened to create the right effect. The sponge is always filled with a mixture of pigment. Only Favorinus and Plutarch, however, mention the bit in the horse's mouth. That small detail may point to a greater similarity between the versions of Favorinus and Plutarch. The source of the story, or whether any of all of these authors were familiar with each other's treatment of it, most particularly, whether Plutarch knew of them is difficult to guess, but as all of them were writing in roughly the same time frame, the story must have been current.

In the case of Plutarch's version, he describes the horse as correct in everything except, again, the appearance of the foam (τοῦ ἄφροῦ) around the bit (χαλινῶ). He too, notes the painter's frustration with his own work after numerous unsuccessful efforts to

create the illusion of foam, until finally in anger, once again we are told how he throws the sponge which yields the desired result. Plutarch's treatment, only seven lines of his text, is abbreviated in comparison to Favorinus's, or even the Roman writers, and his position of it at this juncture, after the assertion that the arts have no need of tyche, is curious, although it explains his previous hint, in quoting Epicurus, at a minimal participation by tyche in the practice of the arts. It is included in the midst of further strenuous assertions that the arts have no need of tyche, which employ the authority of a tragic poet, possibly Sophocles, whose lines are said to demonstrate the dependence of skill on effort, where by using the example, Plutarch has effectively demonstrated the breakdown, from time to time at least, of technique and the happy effects of chance in such an instance.

99B 9-10

τοῦτ' ἔντεχνον τύχης μόνον ἱστορεῖται.

This single instance of tyche within the province of craft is recounted.

Plutarch claims that this instance is the only one recorded in which a technical feat was accomplished by chance. His bland certainty is a little unsettling, since he could hardly have known how many such instances have ever occurred. All three authors, cited above, who have commented on the occurrence could have been known to Plutarch. If he were familiar with all or any of the three, the attribution of the experience to different painters could not have escaped him, especially in the case of Pliny, who cited two examples (Protogenes, Nealces)--one based on the other, each successful.

99B 10-C1

κανόσι καὶ σταθμαῖς καὶ μέτροις καὶ ἀριθμοῖς πανταχοῦ χρῶνται, ἵνα μηδαμοῦ τὸ εἰκῆ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε τοῖς ἔργοις ἐγγένηται.

They use rulers and plumb lines and measures and numbers entirely, so that in no way does anything at random or "as it happens" come about in their works.

The mention of tools for accurate measure is another odd choice, since Plutarch has just demonstrated the failure of those instruments toward a particular effect, and he appears to overlook the fact that not the instruments themselves, but the painter's skill at using them is what accounts for technical excellence in a work of plastic art. Moreover, the development of skill in drawing and painting is not usually dependent on the use of tools of the type mentioned above, but on freehand use of pencils, brushes, or sponges. A notable example, albeit from a much later age, is the anecdote about Giotto who, when asked for an example of his work, sent simply a perfect circle drawn freehand. However artists were trained in antiquity, it seems unlikely that they were taught using rulers and the other tools of measurement listed by Plutarch. The contradiction is underscored by his remark that works of art in no way are dependent on chance, when he himself, just above, has allowed for minor effects, at least.

Perhaps Plutarch is displaying an academic naiveté about the creative process, or perhaps he's pretending. Whichever is the case, his assertion raises the perennial question of what makes art--which is well beyond the scope of this investigation. It takes little to

point out however, that the creation of art is a complicated process, involving both specialized physical technique, which is the result of education and training, and an assortment of factors, some of which may be inborn in gifted individuals, such as talent, imagination and aesthetic judgment to name just a few of the ingredients of any creative enterprise. There is also to be considered, inspiration, whether divine or some other sort.

If Plutarch's statement includes the idea that talent without technique is of little value, he is correct, as most people would agree. The same point can be made for inspiration and any of the other factors. On the other hand, it is equally true that a highly trained practitioner who has no talent for art--however that elusive quality may be defined, or perceived--is no more than a mechanic. For at times, as Plutarch's anecdote illustrates, all the training in the world just doesn't make it; that is when the intervention of the unexpected becomes a happy accident which balances the artist's energies. In the story Plutarch cites, the painter seems to have overworked his technique, which had the ill effects that so infuriated him, and led him to a drastic response. It was his painterly eye, however, that determined that the result was effective and led him to leave it alone and stop tinkering with it.

Moreover, the elusive effect in question, saliva dripping from a horse's mouth, is a random phenomenon. No two drops are alike, nor does the horse produce it in a predictable or controllable pattern. What was Plutarch thinking, to invoke the use of implements of measure to reproduce a random effect? His painter was making the wrong choice from the start, which he recognized only after he lost patience with himself, and inadvertently found a technique as random as the phenomenon--the logical approach to

the problem--the right tool for the job. The ability to find variable approaches is another aspect of the artist's education--the development of less obvious skills than the manipulation of brushes and paint, which also improve with practice and experience.

At the risk of beating a dead horse, I would like to point out that there is a degree of randomness also in the tools used to create even the most calculated art. Every paintbrush has some random variation in the number, density, texture, and quality of the bristles (or the comparable characteristics of sponges), every pot of paint mixes up differently; on any given day a technician may hold his pencil (or stylus) at a slightly different angle. Depending on the weather, his hand may perspire more or less from one day to the next and affect his hold on the stylus, and so on *ad infinitum*. Randomness in life as well as in art, its so-called imitator, is inescapable. Thus, Plutarch is caught in an enormous contradiction when he claims that *τύχη* has little or no role in art.

On the other hand again, we have to consider whether Plutarch, in naming instruments of calculation and number, is intentionally reducing art to a series of arithmetical calculations and measurements or making another subtle reference to the Pythagorean system of numbers and ratios which were credited with mystical significance. Or again, is it a reference to the gift of number, a benefaction from Prometheus, who, after his entrance into the essay through the lines of Aeschylus, and by implication in Plutarch's recalling of the description of pre-Promethean men in the Protagoras, as we saw in Chapter 3, is about to make a reappearance immediately below.

The gift of Prometheus has established the character of the arts and crafts

99C2-3

καὶ μὴν αἱ τέχναι μικραὶ τινες εἶναι λέγονται φρονήσεις,

And again, the arts are said to be tiny intelligences...

This statement recalls Chapter 2, when we were treated to an explanation of how one abstract quality embodies and overlaps with some of the aspects of another. We were informed then, that σωφροσύνη was a kind of φρόνησις, the presence of which implied the presence of δικαιοσύνη. That short exegesis may recall Plato's longer one from *Resp.* IV. Now we are told that the arts are said to be μικραὶ τινες...φρονήσεις. We might ask by whom the arts are said to be such. As Plutarch continues, his observations continue in that vein with the re-emergence of Prometheus as the bringer of fire and all its uses.

99C3-9

μᾶλλον δ' ἀπόρροιαὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀποτρίμματα ἐνδισπαρμένα ταῖς χρείαις περὶ τὸν βίον, ὡσπερ αἰνίττεται τὸ πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ Προμηθέως μερισθὲν ἄλλο ἄλλη διασπαρῆναι. καὶ γὰρ τῆς φρονήσεως μόρια καὶ σπάσματα μικρὰ θραυομένης καὶ κατακερματιζομένης εἰς τάξεις κεχώρηκε.

...or rather, rubbed off emanations of phronesis which have been dispersed throughout the requirements of life, just as it is told obscurely that the fire was scattered in portions here and there by Prometheus. For then, portions and tiny shreds of phronesis which has been shattered and cut up into small pieces, come into position.

Prometheus, who in chapter 3 was identified as ὁ λογισμός, or the power which allows us the ability to make the animals useful to us, is now described scattering bits of

fire here and there to create the various arts. The act of scattering that Plutarch cites here, is not described by Hesiod in either *Works and Days* or *Theogony*, where it is simply stated that Prometheus stole fire and hid it in a fennel stalk.¹⁹ Nor does it figure in the *Protagoras*, where fire was stolen with the aid of the appropriate deities.

Since Plutarch has already cited a fragment (189b) from a tragedy he identifies as Aeschylean, which lists some of the gifts of Prometheus, it could be safe to surmise that Plutarch may be referring to some such action in one of the lost Prometheus plays of Aeschylus. From Prometheus's division of fire into the various gifts, Plutarch seems to be creating an analogy between fire and φρονησις, the division of which created the various arts and crafts.

19. *Works and Days* 50-54.

CHAPTER FIVE

99C-E

More works of artisans and artists which do not require chance

In the next chapter, Plutarch does three things: first he expostulates about an unidentified 'greatest skill' receiving less than its due; then he reduces to absurdity, outrageous expectations of chance; finally, he cites the example of Iphicrates the general, who claimed the role of organizer of the army, rather than being a player of any one part.

I. The greatest art

99C8-11

Θαυμαστὸν οὖν ἔστι πῶς αἱ μὲν τέχναι τῆς τύχης οὐ δέονται πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον τέλος, ἡ δὲ πασῶν μεγίστη καὶ τελειοτάτη τέχνη καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης εὐφημίας καὶ δικαιώσεως οὐδέν ἔστιν.

Accordingly, it is amazing how, on the one hand, the arts have no need of tyche toward the accomplishment of what is their own, and on the other hand, the greatest and most finished art of all and the pinnacle of human praise and judgment is nothing.

Plutarch's statement that since the arts have no need of tyche, it is surprising that the highest art of all is nothing (οὐδέν ἔστιν), is a puzzle in itself. First of all, as already stated, with his own acknowledgement of the potent contradiction immediately above, he has not demonstrated that the arts have no use at all of chance. At best, he has demonstrated that if there are more effective means of producing the results of the crafts, some

of the time they do benefit from the intervention of chance. Or as he says, on one recorded occasion, chance saved the day for a craftsman.

Moreover, how has the 'greatest art' been considered 'nothing' or worth nothing, and by whom? True, Chaeremon's line, (or Plutarch's reading of it) seems to give τύχη precedence over εὐβουλία, and, by Plutarch's extension, precedence over σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη and related concepts. His use of τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης in the above passage creates a parallel with his reference at the beginning of Chapter 4 to πράγματα θνητῶν.

Next, what does he mean by the ἡ δὲ πασῶν μεγίστη καὶ τελειοτάτη τέχνη? Just above, he has cited the visual and plastic arts as examples, and just below he will continue with a list of other examples of arts and skills from various departments of life. The 'greatest and most perfect skill' itself is not named, no doubt with the expectation that the reader would immediately make a connection with what the author meant. Such a connection may have been possible in Plutarch's time, but to a reader of the present, so removed in time from Plutarch and his associates, such assumptions only lead to confusion and misunderstanding.

A number of candidates for the 'highest art' do occur: first, the art of government or statesmanship, since Plutarch, in Chapter 1 listed examples of individuals holding high public office or living within the households of kings, who demonstrated good and bad behavior. Then philosophy might be intended²⁰, since in Chapter 2, he opined about the presence and effect of various abstract concepts typically of interest to the ancient

20. Buriks (p. 65) assumes that philosophy is what is meant, although there is really no indication of anything so specific.

philosophers. Also, in Chapters 2 and 3, he has quoted a number of those philosophers as well as some poets.

Presumably Plutarch, himself a Platonist and teacher of philosophy, would have had high regard for the philosophic art of dialectic. Yet is there any reason to think that Plutarch is taking such a narrow view of the area of expertise he describes as the highest art--particularly with examples from plastic art preceding and music following? Possibly, in a more general mode, could he mean, by the highest art of all, the ability of superior individuals to make effective use of φρόνησις in human affairs. This last seems a plausible choice since Plutarch has, so far in this essay, maintained that the possession of λογισμος is what elevates humans above the animals.²¹ Of course, it would be philosophy which so trains the superior individual. Whichever our preference, we remain in the realm of speculation as there is no concrete evidence offered.

II. Chance can not accomplish the work of εὐβουλία and φρόνησις

There follows next, what amounts to a list of activities, skilled and otherwise, which rely on conscious effort and skill rather than chance. In four areas, music, culinary art, the cleaning of clothes, and the social education of children, the guiding principle of each is equated to τίς εὐβουλία.

21. 98C7

99C13-14

ἀλλ' ἐν ἐπιτάσει μὲν χορδῶν καὶ ἀνέσει εὐβουλία τίς ἐστὶν ἣν μουσικὴν καλοῦσι,

...but in the stretching and loosening of strings there is a certain euboulia which we call music...

It is unsurprising to see music included in the list, as learning music was part of the education of the youth of the privileged classes. It also entered into the concerns of the Pythagoreans in the imputation of mystical meaning to the numerical proportions between intervals and in the music of the spheres. Following the mention of painting and sculpture, as yet another example of fine art, it does not seem out of place.

99C14-15

καὶ περὶ ἄρτυσιν ὄψων ἣν μαγειρικὴν ὀνομάζομεν,

and around the seasoning of meat which we name cookery...

On the other hand, for the second time in this essay²² cooking and eating are represented in some sort of positive light, in opposition to positions taken by Plutarch elsewhere in his writings. In antiquity there is evidence that preparation of food was, for those who could afford it, subtle and complex enough to be considered an art. The term ἡ μαγειρικὴ τέχνη, refers clearly enough, to the art of cookery. The dictionary entry for the verb, μαγειρεύω, however, shows the gloss, to cook, with the more specific meaning

22. see above 98D where pigs' natural advantage over humans was that they were good to eat.

to cook meat or to be a butcher. Which gloss can be taken as most apt to express Plutarch's meaning, is suggested by his use of ὄψων, which very clearly indicates that he is thinking of the cooking of meat. In addition to the essay in which he reviles the killing and eating of animals,²³ in *De soll.*, Plutarch has his father, Autobolus, disdain the practice of creating lavish dishes for banquets, as opposed to the taming of animals to be useful toward human needs, without harming them.²⁴ Suddenly we are asked to count haute cuisine among αἱ τέχναι without reproof of it.

99C13-D1

καὶ περὶ πλύσιν ἱματίων ἣν γναφικὴν·

...and around the washing of garments which we call cloth dressing..

Plutarch refers to the washing and dressing of cloth to prepare or clean it. With this example, it would appear that he is taking care to include more work-a-day trades than the above. To be sure, those 'humbler' occupations also require skill and practice.

99D1-4

τοὺς δὲ παῖδας καὶ ὑποδεῖσθαι καὶ περιβάλλεσθαι διδάσκομεν καὶ τῇ δεξιᾷ
λαμβάνειν τοῦ ὄψου τῇ δ' ἀριστερᾷ κρατεῖν τὸν ἄρτον,

23. *De esu cranium I, II*, passim.

24. *De soll.* 965 A-B. Autobolus also decries any practices, such as hunting and fishing, which harm animals.

and we teach children to put on their shoes and to dress themselves and to take meat with the right hand and bread with the left...

Even the teaching of children to dress themselves and observe table manners requires τὴν εὐβουλίαν. In this, is Plutarch referring to an art implicit in successfully imparting correct behavior to a child, or is he referring to the art of correct behavior itself, which the child is expected to learn, or possibly both? In either case, we are in the realm of what is expected, which would not ordinarily be thought of in company with any of the above.

In a way, the scope of the list recalls another fragment of Heraclitus, which Plutarch has not quoted. That is, Fr. 2, where the universal presence of ὁ λόγος is stated in the phrase, τοῦ λόγου δ' ἔόντος ξυνοῦ²⁵. Can Plutarch be obliquely making a similar point in stating the need for the use of reason in such a wide array of examples? Or is he expanding on the idea by asserting that everything we do requires some special preparation to identify and channel the particular λόγος of an activity, as he more or less states just below? He has already quoted Heraclitus once in this essay, identifying him by name. We will remember that in Chapter 1, Plutarch made some clear allusions to speeches of Demosthenes without naming the orator, perhaps this is another example of such an ellipsis.

25. Diels-Kranz, 151.

99D4-5

ὥς οὐδὲ τούτων γιγνομένων ἀπὸ τύχης ἀλλ' ἐπιστάσεως καὶ προσοχῆς δεομένων·

so that these things do not come about by tyche but are needful of care and attention...

In this line, noting by means of a hendiadys, that all the above require conscious effort, Plutarch emphasizes the reliance on λογισμος, rather than chance--hardly for the first time.

99D5--8

τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν οὐ παρακαλεῖ τὴν φρόνησιν, οὐδὲ μετέχει τοῦ κατὰ λόγον καὶ πρόνοιαν;

...do not the greatest and most august matters for the acquisition of happiness invoke freeness, do they not enjoy a share in order and foresight?

The point is made again, this time about the things which promote happiness. These are said to call for τὴν φρόνησιν, the alternate term for τὴν εὐβουλίαν, as seen before. The statement is expressed as a rhetorical question, also as seen before, in Chapter 1. Curiously, this time, Plutarch stresses μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, when he has just mentioned quite mundane activities. It is also the first time that the issue of happiness in life has been raised--except to note that the traitors named in Ch. 1 measured happiness by animal gratification. What follows does not exactly conjure up a vision of lofty pursuits either. Plutarch has done that before also, when at the beginning

of this chapter, he bemoaned the undermining of the highest art, then did not clarify, listing instead, a whole range of arts.

99D8-12

ἀλλὰ γῆν μὲν οὐδεὶς ὕδατι δεύσας ἀφῆκεν, ὡς ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ αὐτομάτως πλίνθων
ἔσομένων, οὐδ' ἔρια καὶ σκύτη κτησάμενος κάθηται τῇ τύχῃ προσευχόμενος
ἱμάτιον αὐτῷ καὶ ὑποδήματα γενέσθαι·

But no one having drenched earth with water leaves it alone, with the bricks appearing from τύχη and of their own accord, nor having acquired wool and leather does one let it fall, and sit praying to τύχη that a garment and shoes for oneself will appear...

Over reliance on chance is reduced to absurdity. As already noted, after invoking the μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατα, Plutarch begins with mundanities. Again, he provides a list of things which can not be entrusted to chance: the items are three in number, namely, the formation of bricks, the sewing of cloth and leather for clothing and shoes, stated as a unit, and the construction of a meaningful life, which have need of intelligence. This time, he moves from the mundane and useful to everyday life, to the μέγιστα, in reverse order from earlier in this chapter.

In the case of acquiring wool and leather and expecting the useful objects to appear through the vain hope that chance might be able to fashion clothing and shoes, well-known children's stories or folktales from European literature come to mind. Is it possible that similar stories existed in Plutarch's time, probably in the form of stories for chil-

dren, and that he is obliquely alluding to material of that sort, which most people might not take seriously, to make his point?

99D12-E5

χρυσίον δὲ πολὺ συμφορήσας καὶ ἀργύριον καὶ πλῆθος ἀνδραπόδων καὶ πολυθύρους αὐλὰς περιβαλόμενος καὶ κλίνας προσθέμενος πολυτελεῖς καὶ τραπέζας οἴεται ταῦτα φρονήσεως αὐτῷ μὴ παραγενομένης εὐδαιμονίαν ἔσεσθαι καὶ βίον ἄλυτον καὶ μακάριον καὶ ἀμετάβλητον;

...and having collected much gold and silver and a quantity of slaves and having surrounded himself with halls that have many passages and having set out very expensive chairs and tables does one think that these things without the presence of φρόνησις will equal happiness and a life that is without pain and blessed and unchangeable?

Almost as a simile to the examples of untoward hopes for the intervention of chance, Plutarch describes a person who has 1) collected luxuries, i.e. gold and silver and a host of attendants; 2) surrounded himself with palatial living quarters, 3) fitted out his domicile with expensive furniture. Would such a person, it is asked, think that those things alone would be the equivalent of happiness and provide him with a life that is without pain and free from change, if he does not have or use φροόνησις. Once more, Plutarch takes a liberty--the expectation of the good life from wealth without contemplation is surely a little bit different from moistening clay and expecting bricks to appear spontaneously. The use of ἀμετάβλητον prompts one to ask what Plutarch is thinking of,

after speaking of happiness and freedom from pain. It is possible that what is meant is the suggestion that, even for a wealthy individual who has everything, chance misfortunes can come and reverse his lot. Plutarch inadvertently (or not) attributes chance with the ability to change the life circumstances of even the most fortunate individual-- a far more momentous power than simply producing the results of craft.

This passage recalls Chapter 20 in the *Life of Alexander*,²⁶ after the young king has taken possession of Darius's living quarters, and the remarks Plutarch provides for him to say. In that passage, although different words are used, there are utensils and articles made of gold, opulent furniture and gracious dining facilities enumerated. Alexander makes a comment to his companions to the effect that to enjoy those luxuries must be what makes a king. In using the aorist participle διαβλέψας, to describe Alexander's direct gaze toward his companions, Plutarch may intend some irony in the remark, as Darius has just been bested and forced to flee, having suffered a change of fortune, which put Alexander in his place to enjoy the opulence he was forced to leave behind.

III. The relation of φρόνησις to the parts of the whole.

99E6-9

Ἡρώτα τις Ἴφικράτην τὸν στρατηγόν, ὥσπερ ἐξελέγγων, τίς ἐστιν; “οὔτε γὰρ ὀπλίτης οὔτε τοξότης οὔτε πελταστής.” κἀκεῖνος “ὁ τούτοις,” ἔφη, “πᾶσιν ἐπιτάττων καὶ χρώμενος.”

26. *Life of Alexander* 676, 8-15. Ziegler, p.178.

Someone asked Iphicrates the general, as if cross-examining him, who he was. "For you are neither hoplite, nor archer, nor peltast." And he said, "The one who, imposing commands, puts them to use."

Iphicrates' self determination as the one who correctly employs the others who have specific limited roles makes him an analog of φρόνησις in this statement, which is defined in the following and final chapter, as to what it is and is not. Perhaps this sentence more correctly belongs with Ch.6 The analogy echoes what Plutarch has said in Ch. 3 when quoting Heracleitus, Fr.99. There, the sun as the source of light, allowed the other heavenly bodies to reflect that light. If it did not, the night sky would be dark, in spite of the fact that there were other heavenly bodies. There is perhaps some significance in the fact that the analogy has occurred again, although in different forms.

CHAPTER SIX

99E-100A

The summation of the essay

99E10-11

οὐ χρυσίον ἢ φρόνησις ἔστιν οὐδ' ἀργύριον οὐδὲ δόξα οὐδὲ πλοῦτος οὐδ' ὑγίεια
οὐδ' ἰσχὺς οὐδὲ κάλλος.

phronesis is not gold or silver or reputation or wealth or health or strength or beauty.

Initially, in Chapter 6 we are told that φρόνησις is neither gold nor silver, neither fame nor wealth, nor is it health, strength or beauty. The arrangement of the words in this sentence deserves noticing. As he often has done before, Plutarch uses a list to describe the character of an idea, in this case, in negative terms, what φρόνησις is not. Here, ἢ φρόνησις ἔστιν sits between the first two elements of the list, οὐ χρυσίον οὐδ' ἀργύριον. Gold and silver recall the remark just above which states that one who has amassed riches does not necessarily expect a happy life. The two most precious metals also have generally a metaphoric significance to ancient authors, as seen most especially in the succession of the ages from gold to iron, and in Hesiod's five races, which he likens to different metals.

Following closely after these, we meet with οὐδὲ δόξα οὐδὲ πλοῦτος, reputation and wealth. These are not so metaphorically charged as the precious metals, but were important values to people of antiquity in terms of an individual's relation to society. Having been conditioned by seeing two pairs so far, we might have expected to see another pair or two. Instead we see a group of three. Are we to feel the asymmetry, or are we to

perceive the parts of the list as four then three, a different logical progression, which does not necessarily show a loss of balance? In any case, the final three represent values important to an individual's well being in more personal, physical ways, namely, health, strength and beauty.

99F3-4

τί οὖν ἔστι; τὸ πᾶσι τούτοις καλῶς χρῆσθαι δυνάμενον

Then what is it? The thing which is able to use well all of those...

When Plutarch asks what is φρόνησις, he responds to his own rhetorical question that it is the thing which is able to make use of all of the above, an answer which seems repetitious since he has so recently made the analogy with Iphicrates, although surely this explanation was intended to spell out the meaning. To continue what must seem a condescending tone²⁷, he explains the effect of φρόνησις on 'all of these'.

F5-6 καὶ δι' ὃ τούτων ἕκαστον ἡδὺ γίνεται καὶ ἔνδοξον καὶ ὠφέλιμον· ἄνευ δὲ τούτου δύσχρηστα καὶ ἄκαρπα καὶ βλαβερά, καὶ βαρύνει καὶ καταισχύνει τὸν κεκτημένον.

...and through which each of them becomes pleasant and honorable and advantageous: and without which each becomes useless and fruitless and harmful, and weighs down and dishonors the one who has acquired it.

27. Buriks too, (p. 66) has noted the bombastic tone Plutarch takes in the final chapter in his "sonorous but not very meaningful rendering of a Demosthenic phrase,"

Again we have a list of attributes, this time equally balanced as to the good effects of the presence of φρόνησις and the ill effects of its absence. Pleasant, honorable and serviceable seem ordinary enough descriptions for the influence of so fundamentally important a value as Plutarch has made out φρόνησις to be. On the negative side, its absence renders the attributes useless, unfruitful and harmful to one who has acquired them.²⁸

Prometheus

For the fourth time in this short essay, we meet Prometheus, now warning his brother:

F7-11

ἢ που καλῶς ὁ Ἡσιόδου Προμηθεὺς τῷ Ἐπιμηθεῖ παρακελεύεται

μή ποτε δῶρα

δέξασθαι παρ Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου ἀλλ' ἀποπέμπειν,

Indeed the Prometheus of Hesiod, well advised Epimetheus

not ever to accept

gifts from Olympian Zeus, but to send them away...

The quotation is almost verbatim from Hesiod,²⁹ *Works and Days* 86, where it follows on the description, beginning at line 60, of Zeus's response to Prometheus's theft of fire for

28. Perhaps coincidentally, Favorinus's *De Fortuna* describes misfortune as the absence of Tyche. In this case, Plutarch is effectively describing the unfavorable qualities he indicates as the absence of φρόνησις.

29. Both the TLG and Loeb have singular δῶρον, all three editions of *De fort.*, including TLG, show the plural.

the benefit of men, by creating Pandora, the first woman, as a punishment to them. Hesiod describes the 'gift' in detail, both her attractive qualities and some very nasty traits, e.g. a shameless mind and a thievish character (κύνεόν τε νόον καί ἐπίκλοπον ἦθος). The poet tells us that those last traits are effected in her by Hermes.

Oddly enough, Ἐπικλόπειος is an epithet of Zeus, according to Hesychius³⁰, although the lexicographer does not provide any examples of the use of that name for Zeus. He does offer a gloss for the adjective seen in the Hesiod passage which includes trickiness, wickedness, and being desirous of stealing.³¹ When we consider that the myth involves cunning, deception, and theft, which has enraged the now all powerful victim of said sneaky tactics, and who himself, at some time or other has been known or will become known, by a title of the same definition, we could say that, in this story, like has met like. In fact, not to be outdone, the Zeus of Hesiod fashioned the very traits that have both bested him and for which he himself has been known, into the instrument of punishment, i.e. Pandora.

The reward reserved for Prometheus is somewhat less subtle than the one devised for men,³² which created dependence on a creature of obviously appealing attributes and unpredictable behavior which can turn disastrous as seen in the opening of the jar. It could be discerned that Prometheus, τουτέστιν ὁ λογισμός, has gotten himself and his

30. (4868.) Ἐπικλόπειος· Ζεὺς οὕτως καλεῖται

31. (4869.) ἐπίκλοπος· δόλιος, πανοῦργος, ἢ ἐπιθυμῶν τοῦ κλέπτειν (φ 397)

32. See above, Ch.3, n. 16 & 17.

proteges into an awful pickle. Perhaps there is a downside to calculation and mental acuity--or to φρόνησις itself.

Also noteworthy is the use of κύνεόν with its animal based root as a modifier for νόον. Since Pandora, the bane of men, has been fashioned with a 'bitchy' mind, we might wish to recall the end of Chapter 1, where Plutarch, in a seeming non sequitur, remarked on the unlikelihood of τύχη as the source of the similarly negative characteristics of several animals. What then would have been the source of those traits, he does not answer.

We might also ask if Plutarch is trying to draw a parallel between the τύχη invoked by Chaeremon, the polar opposite of εὐβουλία/φρόνησις, and Pandora, a dubious gift from Zeus to be put aside. Or is he drawing on the view of τύχη as unpredictable and fickle, which might be thought to have some relation to the character of Pandora? If so, he has not indicated that overtly, when throughout this essay τύχη has been if anything, ineffectual, according to his recurrent denial of any influence of chance.

The story of Prometheus as told by Hesiod in both *Works and Days* and *Theogony*, portrays a complicated rivalry between Prometheus, a god of the old order, and the newly established Olympian gods, of whom Zeus is the leader. The Prometheus myth, or the stories which grew up around the figure of Prometheus create quite a tangle of sources³³ a number of which Plutarch refers to in this essay. As we have just seen, Hesiod has been quoted in the matter of Pandora, the treacherous, disastrous gift of Zeus. In addition to that, we have felt the presence of Prometheus in a quotation from fifth century

33. Gantz, *Early Greek Myth* vol. 1, 152 ff.

tragedy, and from Plato's working of the story in the *Protagoras*. It has been suggested by Gantz, that the version of the story appearing in that dialogue was either of Plato's own devising or learned from the Presocratic philosophers. He gives no explanation for this surmise beyond noting that that version is first encountered in the *Protagoras*.³⁴

In tragedy, Prometheus is the protagonist of a trilogy, mostly lost, of Aeschylus. The one extant play, the *Desmotes*, is now disputed as to authorship (see above, ch.3). In spite of the uncertainties presented by the authorship, or its relationship to the fragments of the other plays, or Plutarch's text, that tragedy presents a certain body of information about the myth that has formed a significant part of the understanding of the story.³⁵ Some of that material, namely the Io episode, which represents a sizable portion of the action of the play, may be relevant to *De fort*. Lines 561-886, roughly one third of the entire tragedy, involve the characters of Io, Prometheus and the Chorus, in which Io is instructed by Prometheus on the way to Egypt where she is to establish the rites of Isis. The importance of Isis and her religion in Plutarch's era is well known, as is Plutarch's own interest in the subject, considering the length and detail of his *De Iside*. Moreover, τύχη, the titular subject of this essay, whose significance in Plutarch's meandering argument has not yet developed beyond being the apparent object of the author's scorn, was often identified with Isis.

34. Ibid. 166.

35. Ibid.

In *De fort. Rom.*,³⁶ Plutarch has cited a genealogy of the personified Tyche in a fragment of Alcman.³⁷ As we have seen so often, Plutarch is the sole source of the fragment. She is named the sister of Eunomia and Peitho, and the daughter of Promatheia. The similarity of the mother's name to Prometheus is striking and suggestive, considering the repeated appearances of that figure in this essay. Also, Eunomia, may be taken to have some slight resemblance to Euboulia, in sound and in meaning. That a genealogy has arisen, is in itself interesting, in view of the fact that the figure of Tyche has no real mythology, which has been noted by more than one scholar.³⁸ The few mentions of Tyche³⁹ in literature, include the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*, where Tyche is a playmate of Persephone,⁴⁰ and one in a long list offered by Hesiod in *Theogony*,⁴¹ of the oldest⁴² daughters of Tethys and Ocean. This might bear remembering in light of the fact that the chorus in the extant Prometheus tragedy consists of Okeanides. Beyond that, there is the Pindar fragment which Plutarch cites in that work⁴³, and a fragment attributed to Archilochus:

36. 318A10

37. PMG, Alcman 64

38. Allegre, 1--4; Gantz, 150-1.

39. op cit., 15.

40. *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* 420.

41. *Theogony* 360

42. LSJ notes that the term *πρέσβυς* always implies dignity.

43. Pindar Fr.(40*.) Τύχα ἄπειθῆς et δίδυμον στρέφοισα πηδάλιον

πάντα Τύχη καὶ Μοῖρα Περικλεεὺς ἄνδρὶ δίδωσιν.⁴⁴

Tyche and far-famed Destiny give all things to a man. (ἄνδρὶ)

This line is interesting to compare with the Chaeremon line which Plutarch has used to begin this essay. Aside from the changes implicit in adding Moira as a partner to Tyche, the finite active verb, is considerably less open ended than the Chaeremon. The use of ἄνδρὶ rather than θνητῶν or ἀνθρώπων imposes a limitation on the defining character of the recipient, also.

Plutarch's treatment of Tyche in that portion of *De fort. Rom.* bears a brief mention. At chapter 4,⁴⁵ he describes the circuit of a personified Tyche across the ancient world, listing empires/regimes that have enjoyed her favor, until she settled in Rome. His tone is quite different from the tone he takes in *De fort.*, at times positively gushing. It is in this context that he has cited the genealogy recorded by Alcman, noted above, after contradicting Pindar who has described Tyche in terms which use familiar images of the fickleness of chance⁴⁶. In addition to Hesiod and Plato, Plutarch has identified Aeschylus as the source of another quotation he has used in Chapter 3, which identifies Prometheus as the source of domesticated animals who lighten burdens. Another reference to the Titan comes at the end of Chapter 4, where Prometheus is named in his capac-

44. *Iambi et Elegi Graeci*, 16.

45. Op. cit. 317E8-318A13

46. loc. cit.

ity of fire bringer who also seems to have organized human society into an orderly arrangement by the scattering of fire as bits of intelligence.

Plutarch has made all those varied allusions to the Prometheus story with the above quotation from Hesiod near the end of his essay. His next statement, however, bears no resemblance to anything in or around Hesiod's lines.

100A 1-6

τὰ τυχηρὰ λέγων καὶ τὰ ἔκτος, ὡς εἰ παρεκελεύετο μὴ συρίζειν ἄμουσον ὄντα μηδ' ἀναγιγνώσκειν ἀγράμματον μηδ' ἱππεύειν ἄνιππον, οὕτω παρακελεύόμενος αὐτῷ μὴ ἄρχειν ἀνόητον ὄντα μηδὲ πλουτεῖν ἀνελεύθερον μηδὲ γαμεῖν κρατούμενον ὑπὸ γυναικός.

Meaning fortunate things and external things, as if he were advising him not to play the flute if unmusical, and not to read if illiterate, and not to ride if lacking a horse, thus advising him not to govern if unintelligent and not to be rich if stingy and not to marry if mastered by a woman.

Plutarch asserts what it was that Prometheus meant by δῶρα...παρ Ζηνός, i.e. τὰ τυχηρὰ...καὶ τὰ ἔκτος, 'lucky things' and 'external things'. It is not evident why the gifts of Zeus should be categorized as such, any more than the gifts of Prometheus. It is understandable that, speaking in the character of Prometheus, who has reason to distrust Zeus, Hesiod would have given him such a speech. Hesiod is speaking specifically about the gift of Pandora which, in this version of the story, in *Works and Days*, is given to Epimetheus who recognized the evil after he had accepted it. While Hesiod uses δῶρον, in the singular, Plutarch takes the plural, which may seem a minor change. Since Plutarch, however, has made some odd choices in the scope of this essay, it makes sense

to consider any possible ramifications. The first that comes to mind is that Plutarch is expanding on the composite character in the gift of Pandora, as a group of the Olympians was instructed to provide her with an attractive attribute from each of them. If that is the case, he may be including all the good things that came with her as τὰ τυχηρὰ...καὶ τὰ ἔκτός. This however, is only a surmise and Plutarch seems to have taken a liberty, whether for any purpose, it is hard to know.

It may pay to examine in more detail, the nature of the gifts which went along with Pandora. By Zeus's order, Hephaestus, an unusual choice perhaps, as he is not performing metallurgy but acting as ceramist, by mixing earth and water, determines her human shape. A pleasing voice and divine beauty are then added. Athena includes the arts of weaving and needlework, a set of useful womanly skills. Aphrodite provides grace and erotic magnetism. Finally Hermes gives her the above noted shamelessness and thievishness of mind, which, as we have seen, are actually sometimes characteristics of Zeus himself, not to mention Prometheus. If we consider that there is some parallel between the gifts embodied in Pandora and the gifts of Prometheus to men, it may seem that Zeus has proven himself a match for Prometheus in producing a creature parallel to men and an equal match for them. We may be tempted to think, in recalling that Plato's *Timaeus* (Plutarch has cited this work also) describes the origin of women as the next generation of men who did not live well. Is it really a very different sort of moral fable to have a generation of men which, through guilt by association, was presented with a partner and rival to be reckoned with?

Another list follows, consisting of two groups of three, which claims to further explain in different terms, the message of Prometheus to his brother. It is not an easy leap to recognize how Plutarch has drawn a parallel between Prometheus's words, which warn against receiving gifts of chance and of external material character, and the series of flute playing, reading, horsemanship, and the running of government, amassing of wealth and undertaking marriage. The most obvious observation is that the first three represent fairly finite pursuits which require instruction in the rudiments of each; the second group represent more subtle undertakings which are not learned through direct instruction. Perhaps Plutarch has the idea that those latter skills are the result of some sort of moral excellence which results in correct management of those activities.

Demosthenes

Plutarch caps off his essay with a direct quote from Demosthenes,⁴⁷ as opposed to the veiled references made in Chapter 1, to a number of his speeches. As Plutarch has referred by subtle allusion to Demosthenes and his orations at the beginning of the essay, his reappearance in a direct citation at the end must certainly mean something. To the quotation he presents at this point, he appends a clever rewording which he seems to intend as an encapsulation of the point he has been making.

47. *Olynthiac I. 23*

100A6-10

οὐ γὰρ μόνον “τὸ εὖ πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἀφορμὴ τοῦ κακῶς φρονεῖν τοῖς ἀνοήτοις γίγνεται,” ὡς Δημοσθένης εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἀφορμὴ τοῦ κακῶς πράττειν τοῖς μὴ φρονοῦσιν.

For not only is it so that, "to do well beyond worth, becomes the start of miscalculation for those who are unintelligent," as Demosthenes said, but to be fortunate beyond worth becomes the start of misfortune for those who do not use reason.

The statement as made by Demosthenes, is more complex than it appears on the surface. To paraphrase, or loosely translate: "Doing well beyond one's due becomes the start of thinking badly for those who are unintelligent." It is immediately clear that Plutarch is citing a passage which makes use of the roots of νοῦς and φρόνησις which he has exploited throughout the essay. It is less clear how to read τοῦ κακῶς φρονεῖν. Does Demosthenes mean that unintelligent people who have enjoyed ill gotten gains, as a result, will think illogically, or that such people will be encouraged to think they can expect unlimited success? Or is the one the necessary result of the other?

Demosthenes, at this juncture in the speech, is speaking of Philip, who has enjoyed considerable military success, undeservedly, as we can suppose, in spite of the fact that in *Olynthiac* II, Demosthenes has demonstrated how Philip is not so lucky as hard-working, which is really what accounts for his success. Philip's situation, as described in *Olynthiac* I, however, has been worsened, with renegeing by the Thessalians and the expectation that the Paeonians and Illyrians will not submit to Philip easily, as they are accustomed to freedom, while Philip is considered an arrogant man, who would be an intol-

erant ruler. Then comes the line Plutarch quotes, but it turns out that he has only quoted the first half of it. Demosthenes continues:

...διόπερ πολλάκις δοκεῖ τὸ φυλάξαι τᾶγαθὰ τοῦ κτήσασθαι χαλεπώτερον εἶναι.

...because often it seems to be more difficult to guard than to acquire fine things.

In other words, Philip has arrogantly, aggressively attacked other nations, enjoying military success without difficulty. Such successes have led him to draw incorrect conclusions about his power, and as a result, he may, in the near future, find he has his work cut out for him if he intends to retain the power he won so easily. Although Demosthenes could not have said so, it is an easy leap to imagine that Philip could have found himself in the same position as Darius, after that king met up with Philip's son, Alexander.

Plutarch is not satisfied to simply repeat Demosthenes' words, and he revises it by substituting some of those words. How does that revision relate to the original and to the essay?

ἀλλὰ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἀφορμὴ τοῦ κακῶς πράττειν τοῖς μὴ φρονοῦσιν.

First, he replaces τὸ εὖ πράττειν with τὸ εὐτυχεῖν--being lucky instead of faring well, which may not be very different from each other in meaning. Second, and also not very different in meaning is Plutarch's substitution of τοῖς μὴ φρονοῦσιν for τοῖς ἀνοήτοις. Third, and more problematical to compare, is τοῦ κακῶς πράττειν for τοῦ κακῶς φρονεῖν. This phrase, τοῦ κακῶς πράττειν, could be interpreted as the reverse of τὸ εὐτυχεῖν, resulting in a statement that says to be lucky is the start of being unlucky.

On the other hand, Plutarch may be playing on the range of meaning of πράττειν, to mean simply doing/performing, e.g. bad acts. Of course, if we believe what Plutarch says, that is the case if the subjects are people who do not use φρόνησις--with perhaps, the implication that the behaviors of the malefactors mentioned in Chapter 1, is explained by their lack of that faculty. If we are willing to accept that reading, we can consider that Plutarch has brought us full circle, back to the beginning of the essay.

CONCLUSION

After a thorough reading of the essay, it is far from clear how all the elements encountered in the scope of the essay relate to each other and, in fact, what explicit point the author is making about τύχη (or Τύχη), Demosthenes and his orations for the ill fated city of Olynthus, and Prometheus, as well as the various other references to old philosophers, poets, and mythological figures. It remains to try to draw some reasonable conjectures, from the observed material, about Plutarch's intent in writing *Fortune*, and whether an esoteric meaning can be discerned.

I. An Exoteric Message

The usual interpretation seems to take *De Fortuna* as a superficial little diatribe against the idea that chance plays any significant role in human affairs. At the opening of the essay, quoting a line from a play, which states that all human affairs are (dependent on) chance, the author responds to that sentiment in the form of a rhetorical question. Because the line of poetry, a fragment, has no context as it stands, it could be interpreted as meaning that chance dominates over εὐβουλία, which is the question Plutarch poses when he asks whether chance holds the same advantage over other qualities. The rhetorical device is continued, asking whether certain historical figures known for certain kinds of good behavior, as well as a number of individuals associated with correspondingly bad behaviors were so as a result of chance. Finally, Plutarch gives an oblique answer to his

own rhetorical question, with the statement that if the above are all true, then certain characteristics attributed to a variety of animal species must also be due to chance.

The next chapter returns to the high moral qualities Plutarch has placed on a plane with the εὐβουλία of the quoted line, saying effectively, that if any of them exist, then all must exist. Further, if chance is the cause of the results of one, εὐβουλία, then the results of all the others must be caused by chance also. A *reductio ad absurdum* is again used, attributing even thievery and purse-snatching to chance. Then, we are told, if what is maintained about the influence of chance on human behavior is true, it would follow that no purposeful consideration of serious matters, such as government, would be possible. The figure of Oedipus is conjured through a quotation from *Oedipus Rex*, with allusions to blind leaders following.

Plutarch takes the absurdity of the proposal a step further in maintaining that someone might even try to say that the perceptions of the senses are due to chance. Using quotations and paraphrases from Plato's *Timaeus*, he dissents from this opinion, stating that nature has provided the senses as agents of εὐβουλία and φρόνησις. From this point, he moves into an aspect of chance closer to the concept of luck instead of random occurrence, namely that the beasts are more fortunate than humans, in that their natural characteristics afford them defenses and advantages which humans lack. Humans, however, excel the animals, and are able to employ them to their advantage, by virtue of their ability to reason. The upshot of these observations seems to be that good fortune is less desirable than having the ability to employ φρόνησις, for with that superior mental function, humanity has overcome the good fortune of the beasts and made use of them.

The next point Plutarch makes is that the products of the crafts are the work of φρόνησις, and not of τύχη. Although he cites the necessity for artistic technique, in the form of applying instruments of measure to the creation of art, he does allow for some small element of chance with an oblique allusion to a saying of Epicurus, and in his version of an anecdote which illustrates the role of chance in such endeavors, in at least one historical instance. The overall position though, is that the arts rest on effort and skill, not chance, and that they themselves are minute intelligences. Likewise, many other human preoccupations from the elevated to the mundane require attention and purpose rather than chance. The example of Iphicrates is given, a general who fulfilled none of the specific military functions of the army, who described himself as the one who directed the others to be effective.

From that example, Plutarch draws a parallel between the general and his role in organizing the army, and φρόνησις as coordinator of human skills--rather than τύχη. Using a quotation from Hesiod, where Prometheus warns his brother to be wary of gifts from Zeus, the essay finishes with a warning about the hazards of trusting fortune.

As noted by Villard, encountering the word τύχη in Greek literature poses a problem as to what is actually referred to--an abstraction or reference to an actual divinity.¹ This work of Plutarch, is no exception, so for the purposes of this dissertation, chance or fortune in lower case will refer to an abstraction or as used in common speech, and capitalized will indicate the personalized goddess.

1. See above, Introduction, p. 13.

II. Is there an esoteric message?

If we are following Strauss, we can consider the above paraphrase the gist of the essay's exoteric message. The earlier authors who commented on the habit of obfuscating among ancient writers would surely agree. From the many inconsistencies, contradictions and questionable assertions observed in the commentary, it does not seem unsafe to imagine a corresponding esoteric teaching, also in the manner of Strauss's hypothesis. While Strauss delineates characteristics to watch for, which would indicate that an author is writing between the lines, he does not say specifically how one might go about unveiling the complete esoteric message. To find that inner text, would be a difficult task, and perhaps impossible, even if we consider only the gaps in the literary record, of which Plutarch makes frequent use. In addition, the social and intellectual context of the material can not be fully understood, as the outlook of people of Plutarch's time, his readers and listeners, has not been part of the experience of those of us who dwell in the present time. So it seems, that in spite of reading closely, and attempting to flesh out a bit, the context of some of Plutarch's allusions, his intent is still not evident.

Furthermore, since Strauss, who has provided the fullest explanation of the esoteric writing process, is still not perfectly clear about the impetus toward choosing the two sided style of exposition he describes. In fact, he and the earlier commentators offer more than one explanation, or perhaps, multiple facets of the causes of the phenomenon. It might then, be worthwhile to step outside the box and look at Plutarch's essay from

another standpoint. As noted earlier,² Jung cited a portion of a poem from Norton's *Ordinal of Alchimy*, in which the author attests to the belief by the brotherhood of alchemists that their work should not be taught to everyone. The poem appears in a seventeenth century compilation of such poetry by Elias Ashmole, *Theatrum Chemicum Britannicum*. This work was reprinted in the nineteen sixties, with an introduction by Allen G. Debus, a science historian. Debus notes the practice of secrecy by the alchemists and their employment of secret signs such as anagrams³. He also remarks, sounding quite similar to both Strauss and Jung, that the intent of such subterfuges was to "make fools more ignorant, while the wise would surely understand and profit immensely."⁴ He also mentions the expectation that the reader must read and reread a book numerous times in order to thoroughly understand it. According to Norton himself,⁵ in addition to wishing to limit the scope of his audience, an author included only one or two points in a work, making the provocative statement that the reader should not limit his studies to one book alone, but should consult the books of numerous authors.

Francesco Adorno, in his article "Plutarco e La Scienza Alchemica"⁶ considers the relation of Plutarch and his religious thought to alchemy. Although he acknowledges that the term does not appear in Plutarch's works and was not in usage until after Plutarch's

2. See above, Introduction, p. 19, n 84.

3. Ashmole, 1967, Introduction, xxxviii.

4. Ibid. xxxix.

5. Ibid. p. 41.

6. Adorno, 1992.

time, the science itself grew from a very ancient, holy Egyptian secret practice, which was passed from father to son.⁷ It had connections to the Hermetic tradition. Adorno is interested in the development of Plutarch's theory of the gods and he spends most of the article deriving it from traditional Delphic religion, Plato's philosophy, and influence from Iranian and Egyptian religion. He concludes that Plutarch's theology is not new but shows the influence of, among other things, what was to become alchemy.⁸ Seen in this light, it seems less unusual to consider Plutarch's work in relation to alchemy, and perhaps more insights could be gained from a more thorough reading of Norton and the hints he divulges in his poem about how to go about reading alchemical texts. For the purpose of the present study, however, Norton's last suggestion, i.e. to read the books of more than one author, presumably on the same subject, is resonant enough for the present purpose.

III. Plutarch and Favorinus

It should be recalled that there were a number of points in the *De Fortuna* essays of Favorinus, the anecdote of the painter of the horse,⁹ for example, which corresponded to points in Plutarch's essay. It will also be recalled that Wyttenbach referred to Favorinus as an *aemulus* of Plutarch.¹⁰ If we consult the OLD, we find that in definition 1, the

7. Ibid. pp. 61-62.

8. Ibid. p 70.

9. *Or. LXIII*, 6.

10. *Supra* p. 7 + n. 34.

glosses of "emulator" and "rival" are included, in 3a, "a diligent imitator, zealous practitioner", 3b. includes "disciple or follower", while definition 4 offers "one equal in ability" and "a peer." The thought occurs that perhaps Wytttenbach, as recently as 1795, may have known something that has since been forgotten.

Is it possible to understand *aemulus*, in that part of its range of meaning, to mean somebody who has a close participation with the work of another within a certain discipline? If so, we might be tempted to infer that Wytttenbach saw Plutarch and Favorinus as brethren in the sense we see invoked above, by the alchemist, Norton, and the science historian, Debus. Even if this speculation is not so, there is some justification to consider their works on fortune together, as they have the same title and some overlap of examples has been noted.

There are two *Orationes*, now attributed to Favorinus, Ps.Dio *Or. LXIII*, and *Or. LXIV*, both entitled *De Fortuna*. *Or. LXIII* is very short and expresses much the same sentiment as the longer *Or. LXIV*. The Favorinus works on Tyche¹¹ are much more favorable in tone toward that concept than this one of Plutarch's. In fact, they could be viewed as polar opposites to Plutarch's which seems to take the position that it is ridiculous to think that tyche has any role in human affairs at all--φρόνησις representing the significant influence. In his essays, Favorinus declares that all good things come from

11. In Plutarch's *De fort.*, as he seems to treat τύχη as an abstraction, polarized with other abstract concepts rather than as a distinct deity, I have not capitalized the noun, except where it seemed appropriate. This decision is corroborated, in my opinion, by the irreverent tone Plutarch takes toward τύχη. It does not seem likely that a priest would speak of a deity in such a manner. On the other hand, as Favorinus clearly seems to be speaking of a distinct divinity, I have capitalized Tyche or Fortuna.

Tyche¹² and that things go badly when people do not trust in Tyche. *Or. LXIII* ends with an exhortation not to name any Tyche bad¹³ while *Or. LXIV* ends with two examples of mistaken trust, i.e. Polyneices, who entrusted his choice to go to war against his brother, to youthful passion (ἡλικία), and Hector, who put his trust in judgment (γνώμη) rather than Tyche.¹⁴ He even maintains that bad fortune is the result of an absence of Tyche, rather than an unfavorable Tyche, which he virtually deems a contradiction in terms.¹⁵ Both authors' views are extreme, and equally lacking in credibility, if one were to think about the implications. The direct opposition itself, being as neat as it seems, could indicate some collusive connection between them, especially as there is shared material, as already noted.

That being the case, I propose one last, brief exercise comparing specific parts of the *De fort.* works of the two authors. As I have not subjected the Favorinus works to the same detailed scrutiny that I have imposed on the Plutarch, the comparison will of necessity be limited. I have chosen to deal with three issues: the anecdote of the painter of the horse, the appearance, both stated and implied, of the figure of Oedipus, and the recurrence of Demosthenes and his speeches.

12. *Or. LXIII*, Chs. 1-3 & passim.

13. *Ibid.* Ch. 7.

14. *Or. LXIV*, Ch. 25.

15. *Or. LXIII*, loc. cit.

IV. Tyche and the painter

The first point I wish to deal with is the story of the painter, the likenesses of which, between Plutarch's and Favorinus's versions, I have already compared somewhat, in terms of vocabulary and material in the study of Plutarch Chapter 4. That included the mention of the bit in the horse's mouth, which, of all the versions considered, appeared only in Favorinus and Plutarch.¹⁶ Plutarch inserted the episode of the frustrated painter into his argument that the arts have no need of tyche.¹⁷ This story was, in his words, the only recorded example of such an occurrence. In the case of the version produced by Favorinus, the painter, Apelles, is named, in contrast to the Plutarch, which does not name the artist.

If Plutarch's version seemed oddly out of place in his argument, Favorinus's is oddly a *non sequitur*, following on some platitudes about the divine character of Tyche. After remarking that a person could survive even falling out of a ship, if Tyche were willing, he introduces the example of the exasperation of the painter over his execution of the foam around the horse's mouth. The artist's situation, as disagreeable as it was for him, carried no great hazard in contrast to that of a person who falls out of a ship, nor does Favorinus make any attempt to create a neat segue into this next example of the ubiquitous power of Tyche. After spending a substantial portion of this very short oration on that anecdote, he ends with the bald statement that the painter was pleased and seemed to

16. See above, p.161.

17. In Plutarch's *De fort.*, as he seems to treat τύχη as an abstraction, polarized with other abstract concepts rather than as a distinct deity, I have not capitalized it, while in the case of Favorinus, I have.

have accepted that Tyche, not he, had finished the painting.¹⁸ Next, he moves on to assertions to the effect that Tyche, accompanying Heracles, was responsible for his successful accomplishment of the labors, also a *non sequitur*.

It may be significant that the *Or. LXIV*, while it makes no mention of Apelles and his troubles, presents the paraphernalia associated with the depiction of the goddess in art, the rudder and the cornucopia, as the creation of the artists who modeled the statues.¹⁹ Tyche is described standing ready for duty and holding the rudder, followed by a disclaimer of the literal interpretation of the equipment designated as hers, which states the metaphorical meaning that she acts as a helmsman or guide to those navigating the sea of life, as it were. The description here, of the function of Tyche as indicated by the appurtenances supplied by the artists who model her images, is reminiscent of the prologue to Menander's comedy, where Tyche describes herself as a judge and manager of all.²⁰

Considering the treatment in the two orations as to how Tyche interacts with artists, it is possible to understand that Favorinus was suggesting that artists, who, in his opinion, are dependent on the beneficence of Tyche, were also the creators of her image to humanity. On the other hand it could be taken as a contradiction by the same author in different works, à la Strauss. Plutarch, in contrast to Favorinus, at no point in his essay made any mention at all of those attributes of the goddess as depicted in art. The only reference to chance as a possible divinity occurs in Chapter 1, when Plutarch, perhaps

18. Loc. cit.

19. Chapter 5, 1-4.

20. *Supra*, p. 29.

facetiously, asks if it was an evil daimon and τύχη who inspired the misdeeds of the son of Priam. We might even wonder if Plutarch were questioning whether there was any such divinity, a possibly dangerous position. Perhaps a safer conjecture would be that, Plutarch chose to invoke the abstract concept of chance and did not invoke the personified image of the deity, since Favorinus had done so. In other respects also, their works have exhibited direct opposition which could be seen as collusive.²¹

V. Oedipus

As for Oedipus, Plutarch does not mention that figure directly, or by name, either. The references, or mental associations to that character, come through the quotation from *Oedipus Rex*, for which Sophocles, as the named author, is given credit. Further associations were made through the reference to following a blind leader, and through the reference to the *Timaeus* in which there is a rendering of a line from the *Phoenissae* of Euripides. By contrast, Favorinus, early in the second oration, in Chapter 6, identifies Oedipus by name, as a fortunate man--at the beginning. He does not include the second line of the fragment from the lost *Antigone* of Euripides, which is attested in *The Frogs* of Aristophanes.²² The entire extant line states that Oedipus afterwards became the most wretched of mortals. We have seen a similar device employed when Plutarch quoted only part of

21. *Supra*, p. 199.

22. *Ranae* 1182; TrGF 263.

something an author has written or said, as in the close of the essay, where he quotes only the first part of Demosthenes' sentence from *Olynthiac I*, 23.

In explaining how Oedipus was fortunate, Favorinus uses a present middle participle of ποιέω with περι- to describe the action Tyche has taken with respect to him:

ἡ Τύχη γὰρ, αὐτῷ τὸ μηδὲν παθεῖν περιποιομένη τὸ ἀγνοεῖν ἔδωκεν...

We will remember that Plutarch in ridiculing those who would follow a blind leader, described them as περιπιπτόντες, using a compound of πίπτω with περι-, in the nominative plural of the present active participle.

There are some other aspects of Favorinus's treatment of Oedipus at *Or. LXIV* 6, namely, the *non sequitur* introduction. The use of such a *non sequitur* is an apparent technique in the oration, which has already been noted in the treatment of the anecdote about the painter. The unusual interpretation of Oedipus's fate and how it illustrates good fortune, has been noted by Adelmo Barigazzi, in his commentary on the work.²³ The effect I have described as *non sequitur*, Barigazzi calls *ex obrupto*, or *ex abrupto*. This quality has attracted Barigazzi's attention in a number of places in the oration, in particular, the interpretation Favorinus offers for the details of Oedipus's history.

Having ignored the second half of Euripides' line, or perhaps anticipating it without acknowledging it as a source for the remarks which follow, Favorinus proceeds to explain how Tyche saved Oedipus by allowing him to remain ignorant--presumably of the

23. Barigazzi, 1966, 268-9. In this commentary, there are other comments about the sudden introduction of an example, as well.

conditions of his birth and parentage. It was only after he learned the truth that his troubles began. Such a notion in itself raises all sorts of questions. For one, there is no accounting of the effect of the details preceding Oedipus's birth or the oracle which led to his exposure as an infant. Consequently, the questions which arise about his own responses at each step of his progress toward his tragic fate, are completely ignored--the very points which are the stuff that makes the story so compelling.

Further, Favorinus declares that Oedipus's self inflicted blindness was fortunate in as much as he did not have to see the dreadful things that happened between his children, in contrast to Tellus, Cydippe, and Aeolus, who had reason to be proud to gaze upon their offspring. Aeolus is another figure whom Plutarch brought to mind with a quotation from Euripides' lost tragedy of the same name. The *Aeolus* dealt with issues of deception and sibling incest which did not make Aeolus proud.²⁴

Moreover, the events following Oedipus's recognition of his situation and his self mutilation, namely, the war over rulership of Thebes, in which both sons were killed, and the dispute, in the version told by Sophocles in his *Antigone*, between Creon and Antigone over the burial of Polyneices, which in turn, led to the suicides of Antigone and Haemon, were more or less the results of the continual unravelling of events connected to Oedipus's fate. Whether or not each individual character, as we meet them in tragedy, complicates his/her own particular fate is moot, and it is questionable to assign any blame to the children of Oedipus, who if anything, must be considered victims of their father's

24. See above 143-144.

woes. To assert that Oedipus himself, profited as a result of not being able to see these things, is a weak statement, particularly since, in many of the versions of his story, he is still living and presumably aware of the dreadful events--not to mention the grisly and painful aspects of his actions. It appears, that in this instance with Favorinus, as in many instances encountered with Plutarch, it is possible to question assertions made by the author in his way of telling a story. Consider what Plutarch did with his "adaptation" of *Odyssey* 8, 246. The substitution of one word for another changed the original meaning considerably.²⁵

In these instances, it seems safe to assert that the two authors are employing similar tactics. There is shared and overlapping material, and unusual means of expressing familiar myths and texts. It remains to look at how they deal with the presence of Demosthenes, and whether he is evoked as an individual who stands for something, or simply the author of certain points he has made in some of his speeches.

VI. Demosthenes

Those passages which have to do with Demosthenes are perhaps the most salient passages for our purpose of analyzing the overlap between Plutarch's and Favorinus's works on *Fortune*. Beginning with the latter, his first reference to Demosthenes occurs at Chapter 3 of *Or. LXIII*, where in the course of a description of how catastrophes such as earthquakes, are the result of the abandonment of the earth by Tyche, an example is given

25. See above, 148-149.

of a certain time when something very bad happened because Tyche was no longer looking after Athens. Demosthenes, in the nominative, appears to be the subject of the nearest finite verb. The sentence is very difficult to understand because of a problematic text. The exact text is as follows:

Ἀθῆναι ποτε εἷς ῥήτορας ἠδικήθησαν καὶ ἤγετο Δημοσθένης,
οὐκέτι τῆς τύχης ἐπισκοπούσης τὰς Ἀθῆνας.

In his commentary on this work, Eugenio Amato acknowledges the difficulties in this line, considering various possible emendations that have been proposed.²⁶ Whatever attempts at emending the syntax may be employed, and Amato lists a number of them, it remains an ungrammatical sentence. That circumstance calls to mind Strauss's remark about how badly constructed and ungrammatical sentences can signify that an author is writing between the lines. Moreover, some such confusing syntactical aspect in an original could easily have lent itself to scribal error, with the difficulties compounded as the text was transmitted.

In spite of the problems in determining what the sentence means, Amato has identified the event referred to as the Harpalus affair, which may very well be so. The genitive absolute of which Tyche is the subject, is explained as a reference to the role of Tyche as tutelary guardian of a city--i.e. this bad thing happened when Tyche abandoned Athens. Amato does not remark on the oddness of a tutelary divinity leaving her protégé without protection. For what reason would such a thing come to pass? Would it even be

26. Amato, 1998, pp. 70-73.

a possibility according to state religion? And yet, it is one of Favorinus's assertions throughout the oration, that misfortune is the absence of Tyche--there can be no bad Tyche, only the absence of Tyche. Somehow, there seems to be an implicit contradiction in that assertion, for surely, a withdrawal of Tyche must be considered a hostile act by the divinity.

A question arises, as to whether it might be possible that Amato has been mistaken in identifying the reference as the Harpalus scandal. Since the Olynthian speeches have figured in the instances observed in Plutarch, and as we will see just below, also in *Or. LXIV*, could Favorinus have intended to indicate some other event which had to do with Olynthus? Or if not Olynthus, might it possibly have been the *De Falsa Leg.*, to which allusions were found in Plutarch's reference to Philocrates?²⁷ The question is probably unanswerable due to the condition of the text, yet it remains a tantalizing possibility.

It is provocative to encounter a mention of Demosthenes early in this work, as Plutarch, early in his *De fort.* made a number of allusions which led us to consider a line in a speech of Demosthenes in light of the quotation from Chaeremon with which he opened the essay. *Olynthiac II.22, 4-5*: μεγάλη γὰρ ῥοπή, μᾶλλον δ' ὅλον ἢ τύχη παρα πάντ' ἔστι τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα: was proposed in TrGF as a possible paraphrase of the line from *Achilles Thersitoktonos*. In the context of the speech, it commented on the relation between fortune and Philip, although Demosthenes declares that he feels more confidence in the fortune of their city than in Philip's with respect to the good favor

27. See above 63-69.

of the gods. The exact quotation, or the attribution of the sentiment to Demosthenes was not overtly stated by Plutarch, yet the line of Chaeremon, so similar in thought and vocabulary, and the citations of morally deficient behavior of the individuals described in other speeches of Demosthenes, strongly suggested this statement from *Olynthiac II*.²⁸

Perhaps by chance--or not, *Or. LXIV* quotes directly, the above statement *Olynthiac II.22*, 4-5, close to its conclusion. It is noted by Barigazzi in his commentary on that work, that Plutarch also closes his *De fort.* with a quotation from Demosthenes.²⁹ The example used by Plutarch, *Olynthiac I*, 23, 6-10, also cites the influence of tyche in relation to Philip, in terms of the consequences of the misuse of fortune.

As we can see both authors are making considerable use of Demosthenes. As the quotation from Chaeremon, which Plutarch employed at the opening of his work, might have caused his readers to think of the line of Demosthenes, which Favorinus cited at the end of his second oration, a reader or listener of Favorinus might have been prompted to think of the line from Chaeremon's lost tragedy, and also, Plutarch's work on *Fortune*--in circular fashion. As Favorinus cites the Demosthenes, it reads:

μεγάλη γὰρ ῥοπή, μᾶλλον δὲ <τὸ> ὄλον, εἶπέ τις, ἡ Τύχη.³⁰

28. See discussion on Chapter 1, above, pp. 33-34 and 63-74.

29. Barigazzi, 1966, p. 293.

30. *Olynthiac II*, 22.

He does not name Demosthenes, simply inserting εἰπέ τις, before the name of the goddess. Moreover, he has not included the complete sentence,³¹ the full text of which is:

μεγάλη γὰρ ῥοπή, μᾶλλον δὲ ὅλον, ἢ τύχη παρά πάντ' ἔστι τὰ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων πράγματα.³²

The second half of that sentence is what so strongly recalls Chaereon's line. In fact, it is a bit difficult to guess how the sentence was understood, as Favorinus quoted it, unless the listener was expected to pick up the association.

Both authors have placed their references or allusions to Demosthenes in prominent positions in their works. Favorinus has mentioned the orator by name at the beginning of one oration, *LXIII*. He refers to him again at the end of the second oration, *LXIV*, this time with a direct quote. Plutarch at the beginning of his essay, uses a line by another author, Chaereon, which strongly recalls Demosthenes' statement from *Ol.II,22*, and by alluding, through episodes described in other speeches, to specific examples of deficient moral behavior. At the end, he quotes, if not fully, from another of the Olynthian speeches, identifying the author by name--ὡς Δημοσθένης εἶπεν. Favorinus has not identified the author in his citation at the end of *Or. LXIV*, stating only part of the statement without identifying the author--εἰπέ τις. One is tempted to wonder if Plutarch's Δημοσθένης, was intended to make definite, Favorinus's τις.

31. As noted, Plutarch has not quoted the entire sentence he uses at the end of *De fort.*

32. Loc. cit..

Plutarch, in his quotation from Demosthenes, *Olynthiac I*, 23, has taken some interesting liberties with an actual comment, in leaving out the second part of the sentence, as Favorinus has done with *Olynthiac II*, 22.³³ Demosthenes' remark about Philip, in *Ol.I*, 23, invoking the consequences of ill gotten gains, almost contradicts what was said in *Olynthiac II*, 22, which Plutarch does not quote overtly, where Philip, although blessed with good fortune, was successful through industry rather than by relying on his luck.

In addition to the implications of interplay between fortune and diligence, which Demosthenes demonstrates in the lines following the quote, he has made some interesting implications leading up to it. At *Ol.II*, 22, 1-3, he states, that in his opinion, the person who recognizes that Philip's good fortune makes him a fierce opponent, is " using the reasoning power of a sensible individual."

Εἰ δὲ τις ὑμῶν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν Φίλιππον εὐτυχοῦνθ' ὄρων ταύτη φοβερὸν προσπολεμῆσαι νομίζει, σῶφρονος μὲν ἀνθρώπου λογισμῷ χρῆται·

One could find much of the content in the above sentence, which appears in various ways, throughout Plutarch's *De fort.* There is familiar vocabulary in σῶφρονος and λογισμῷ. Further, the idea that it is prudent (i.e. σῶφρων) and an employment of λογισμός to consider someone who enjoys good fortune a serious adversary is provocative considering how Plutarch has polarised the concepts of τύχη and φρόνησις, ridiculing the idea that chance could influence human affairs. Consider the implicit contradiction of Plutarch's position in Chapter 1 of *De fort.* that to assert that τύχη is everything in human

33. See above, 206-7.

affairs, implies a nullification of σωφροσύνη and the other qualities he proposes. Later, in Chapter 2, he demonstrates how those qualities evoked by those abstract Greek words are interconnected. His apparent concern still is to contradict the supposed assertion by Chaeremon that τύχη supplants all the others. Here, on the other hand, Demosthenes asserts that someone who recognizes the power of fortune is σώφρων, of sound mind, and utilizes λογισμός, a characteristic for which Plutarch has expressed admiration, invoking the figure of Prometheus as a personification of that quality. Surely, a listener/reader/student of Plutarch's would have picked up the connection and have begun to ask questions about Plutarch's position on the relation between chance and diligence, based on the idea as developed by Demosthenes in the Olynthian speeches.

Demosthenes was a prominent figure in his time and a consistent opponent of Philip and his campaigns to control Greece. Plutarch, in his *Life of Demosthenes*, describes him as always having the power of his convictions, but weak in terms of his courage in war. The lack of the latter, according to Plutarch, cost him a place among the greatest of Athens' leaders.³⁴ Plutarch also reports a story of how Demosthenes left his shield on the battle field at Chaeroneia. Supposedly the inscription on the shield read, ἀγαθὴ τύχη.³⁵ If the tale is authentic, it would appear that Demosthenes himself lost faith in Fortune at a critical time. There is irony in that circumstance, in light of the remarks he made in the Olynthian speeches, about the interplay of industry and fortune, which Plutarch and Favorinus have brought to mind in their works on Fortune. It would

34. *Life of Demosthenes*, Ch. 13

35. *Ibid*, Ch. 20.

appear that the same orator who inveighed against the betrayers of Olynthus, performed less than heroically at Chaeroneia, the final battle, after which Philip gained complete control of Greece. Demosthenes' cowardice could be viewed as another kind of betrayal. Perhaps the idea evoked is the unpredictability of individual response under stress--an effect of chance. We have considered the same idea in relation to Oedipus.³⁶

Viewing the matter this way, the personal figure of Demosthenes as a focal point in these works, begins to make some sense. Another aspect of his importance to these works, is the era in which he lived and the events he was involved in--namely the unsuccessful attempt by Greece to maintain its sovereignty. Perhaps Demosthenes' unwavering position on political matters balanced by his all too human deficiencies is meant to exemplify the relation of human endeavor to the vagaries of chance. A possible issue is that the results of Philip's campaigns were inevitable due to the complex interrelation between human ideals and the objective efforts to effect them, and human unpredictability--the subtle connection between control over human concerns and the unpredictable appearance of chance.

An interesting aside can be made about the prevalence of Philip, whose son, Alexander, is held up as an exemplar of virtue as opposed to the son of Priam. Alexander Magnus figures prominently in Plutarch's work overall, not only as the subject of a *Life*, but in other essays on τύχη in the *Moralia* in which his good fortune or virtue is the sub-

36. See above on Ch. 2, p. 119.

ject. How might his descent from a fearful figure who combined good fortune with diligence reflect his own relation to those concepts?

VII. Summation

Over the course of time, it has been assumed that Plutarch's *Fortune* is a slight piece of work with little to say, and little to recommend it. As a result of having given the work a close reading, it seems clear that there is more to it than generally has been thought. From the above examples, where Plutarch's and Favorinus's works on the subject of Fortune have been compared, it seems reasonable to think that the two authors, having constructed their essays/orations, with similar ideas, could well have been working in tandem to some purpose. The works of both authors could, surely, be read together more closely to determine more about their view of the role of tyche/Tyche in human affairs--whether it is as different as their writings seem, or whether they have more in common than is evident on the surface. This idea of consulting the work of more than one author, as suggested by Norton, adds a dimension to the idea of writing between the lines.

Apropos of that, it also seems reasonable to agree with Strauss, Zeller, Thomas and Toland, that these authors have created the kind of multi-layered works they have discussed, which do not reveal their entire meaning on the surface. Strauss delineated a technique which, he said, may have been intended to protect the author from political persecution, and that in general, there was a belief that most of the uninitiated world had a hate and fear of philosophy. He wrote also about the matter of an attitude prevalent in

antiquity, that the general public should not be treated to esoteric information, and that authors of such material used the device Strauss described as writing between the lines, as a means of sheltering the esoteric message to any but very savvy readers, perhaps gifted students, the next generation of philosophers. We must not forget that Plutarch himself, in the *Life of Alexander*, reported just such a practice on the part of Aristotle who had chosen Alexander as one of his select pupils.³⁷

Through this investigation of Plutarch's *Fortune*, we have encountered numerous examples of the kind of 'symptoms' Strauss encourages a reader to notice. Some of the same was even discernible in the brief consideration of the Favorinus works which were compared to Plutarch's. After reading Plutarch closely, and considering indications of writing between the lines, and how that evidence might be utilized toward a provisional understanding of some internal message, it also seems possible that the outer and inner essay may not be completely divorced from one another and that the so called exoteric reading might itself, also help toward an understanding of the inner message. As Strauss says, the informed reader will encounter a few lines of truth somewhere in the work.

In passing, it seems worthwhile to note some of the observations on and objections to this essay, as reported earlier. Barigazzi's sense that the work might be part of a larger one could be seen as another way of saying that Plutarch's essay, to be better understood, belongs alongside the work of another author or authors--so that in effect, it actually is part of a larger work. Likewise, the observation by Ziegler that it is incomplete

37. *Life of Alexander* 7, 17ff.

or incoherent, is also true for the same reason. It is incomplete without its complement(s).

It has been noted by Barigazzi, that although the work is entitled *Πέρι Τύχης*, it seems to focus much more on φρόνησις. As we found, εὐβουλία and φρόνησις are alternate terms for the triad according to the Pythagoreans, and as such, either term could be understood as the foil to τύχη in the quoted passage with which the essay begins. Seeing the problem in those terms, it is less mysterious that Plutarch should have placed considerable emphasis on φρόνησις. Still, the nominal subject of the essay remains τύχη so there must have been some authorial intent with regard to that concept. Perhaps it will be possible to undertake some attempt to understand Plutarch's view of τύχη from what we have observed through this rudimentary effort at reading between the lines, and from the essay itself.

Employing his chosen device of *reductio ad absurdum*, Plutarch repeatedly ridicules the influence of τύχη in numerous contexts, effectively but not directly, telling us what τύχη is not--it is not a substitute for the virtues, or a means of sense perception, of governing, or the patron of the arts, etc. He does not tell us what it is. On the other hand, in the last chapter of the essay, he does tell us what φρόνησις is. It is the faculty which makes useful everything which is desirable, such as wealth, health, strength and beauty--on the model of Iphicrates the general in his capacity of organizer of the army, or the sun which lights the stars of the night sky, implicit in the citation of Heraclitus's fragmentary statement to that effect. Not having determined where in the essay there might be found the few lines of factual truth that Strauss encourages the reader to expect, it oc-

curs to me it is possible that this straightforward description of the character of φρόνησις, could be the place--if there is in fact, only one.

If, according to Plutarch, φρόνησις is a metaphorical general, according to Favorinus and Menander, Tyche is a pilot, who steers an individual through the sea of life. Favorinus specifically states just that. There must be a subtle connection between στρατηγός and κυβερνήτης which allows that they are not mutually exclusive, as Plutarch seems to have maintained on the surface of his essay.

We have noted Plutarch has indicated subtle interrelations of chance with other factors in his allusions to the speeches of Demosthenes, where although chance was a factor in Philip's success, there was the fact that he was also a hard worker. Then, in Plato's *Laws*, 709, the laws were not the product of human endeavor and wisdom, but the results of chance occurrences of disease, war and natural disasters which the lawmakers observed and experienced, thus affecting their creation of laws. We might be encouraged to think that Plutarch would allow that τύχη might have its place in the overall scheme of things regarding human affairs, but that his present essay limits its scope through the delineation of the role of φρόνησις/εὐβουλία, and its apparent exaltation by him.

By placing τύχη in comparison with abstract nouns as he does, and considering the fact that he never in this essay refers directly to Tyche as a personalized deity, it could be argued that Plutarch is underscoring the abstract character of the concept, rather than its divinity. This view is not to be assumed indicative of Plutarch's general outlook on the subject, since he has written elsewhere, specifically in *De Fortuna Romanorum*, on the personified deity, Fortuna. As Plutarch was a priest, and through a review of the titles

in the corpus of his works an interest in religious subjects is evident, most particularly his treatment of the religion of Isis, to whom sometimes, in that era, Tyche was assimilated, it would not appear that he was uninterested in the religious significance of the subject. Isis brings to mind the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius, where conversion to her rite restored the anti-hero to his human shape. Plutarch, from whom Apuleius claimed descent, has dealt with animals and their relation to humanity at some length in this essay.

As noted earlier, Favorinus took a devotional tone, and made much of the divinity of Tyche. Plutarch chose to extol the virtues of the reason and to ridicule the irrational as meaningless. It is possible to speculate, if we agree for the sake of argument, that there was collusion between the two authors, that each may have agreed to include only one side of the issue in each work. Perhaps the sum of the two authors' efforts is that reality requires both. The idea of a world in which only the rational or the irrational is recognized is impossible, clearly demonstrable as false, and stupid. Surely, both authors would have been aware of that.

Since we speak of the tension of opposites and of how opposites attract, the polarization of τύχη and φρόνησις makes one wonder if a conjunction of those two "opposite" concepts is proposed. We might still wonder what might have made the subject a sensitive enough issue to be revealed only in a limited fashion. It's impossible to answer such a question with all the unknowns present. All sorts of matters held mystical significance and called for secrecy. As Brenk has noted, Plutarch does have some reputation as a mystic which might account for his participation in writing in the obscure fashion we

have been considering,³⁸ and likewise could put some weight to a hypothesis that the hidden subject matter under the surface of his essay has some such meaning as has been suggested. Yet, what that meaning might be in concrete terms, is still to this date, veiled in uncertainties.

It would be, perhaps, possible to go on speculating further and further, raising more questions that can not, to this date, be answered. The objective of this study was not ever to provide answers, but to find in Plutarch's opusculum, material with which to frame questions which might serve to open out one of Plutarch's less admired works and suggest further investigation.

38. Brenk, 1975.

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