Conspiratorial Modernism:
Modernism and Conspiracy Theory in Proust, Joyce, Faulkner, and Musil

By

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A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in English in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York
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ABSTRACT

Conspiratorial Modernism:
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Adviser: Marc Dolan

This project investigates the concurrent emergence of literary modernism and anti-Semitic conspiracy theory in Europe and America between 1894 and 1942. This period, stretching from the Dreyfus Affair to the beginning of the *Endlösung* (final solution), represents the most significant shifts in anti-Semitic discourse in Europe, and roughly outlines the most important years of modernism. By bringing these two discourses into conversation, this project documents their remarkably similar reactions to modernity's fragmentation and dislocation. Both modernists and conspiracy theorists believed that modernity had fractured an erstwhile total and complete reality. They therefore wrote vast, totalizing works that tried to create a complete worldview. The critical difference was that modernists concluded that such a worldview was no longer possible, while the conspiracy theorists were convinced that they are being thwarted by

Jews. In uncovering a previously undocumented history, this study not only reveals the pervasive and multifarious influence of anti-Semitism on literature, but also contributes to a growing body of scholarship on modernism's relationship to other early twentieth century discourses.

Methodologically, this thesis is supported through a three-pronged approach that combines history, biography, and aesthetics. First, I construct a historical model that documents the transmission of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in Europe and across the Atlantic. Second, I situate Marcel Proust, James Joyce, William Faulkner, and Robert Musil within this context through their personal biography, especially their contact with anti-Semitism and anti-Semites. Third, I align the aesthetics of conspiracy theory with that of each authors' magnum opus, respectively, *A la recherche du temps perdu*, *Ulysses*, the Yoknapatawpha novels, and *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*.

In its historical approach, this study uses the current transnational approach in Modernism Studies, and applies this model to conspiracy theories. Traditionally, scholars have explained anti-Semitic conspiracy theories by situating them within a national discourse. My comparative approach highlights the substantially different antipathies that people had towards Jews in each of the countries studied, while at the same time revealing an extensive transatlantic economy of anti-Semitic ideas. Though often couched in nationalist rhetoric, anti-Semitism's theoretical underpinnings were established through this larger conversation.

This discourse of anti-Semitism touched the lives of all these authors in different ways, and shaped how they represented Jewishness in their texts. Through letters, journals, and other often-overlooked biographical material, I uncover biographical connections between each author and anti-Semitism. All the authors demonstrate various levels of sympathy for Jews, while also harboring negative stereotypes.

Beyond the historical and biographical overlap, modernism and conspiracy theory share a similar aesthetic. Modernist and conspiracy texts were encyclopedic and omnivorous in their scope. Consequently, the narrative drive of such texts relies on assembling and fashioning the work into a coherent whole. Yet, their sheer overwhelming size continuously resists complete comprehension. Further, at the center of each work is a region of unknowability that ostensibly masks a transcendental truth that, when revealed, will make the world complete again. I conclude that for the modernist the point is that such a transcendental truth no longer exists, and that for the conspiracy theorist this truth is obscured by a vast Jewish conspiracy. Modernism therefore undermines and resists the conspiratorial project by revealing totality as an impossibility. I structure the chapters around specific dates that indicate real and fictional moments of rupture that modernists attempt to reveal and conspiracy theorists try to close.

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It is a platitude to say that writing a dissertation is a very lonely experience. This is perhaps only true of the physical and mental labor of reading books and typing words into a document, everything else surrounding the dissertation and the long arduous road to completing the PhD is far from solitary. The list of people without whom this degree would not have been possible is long indeed. As these acknowledgements, will be officially copyrighted and archived for posterity, I think I am permitted all the saccharine and lachrymose sentimentality commensurate with a project over six years in the making.

In the scheme of things, the process of writing a dissertation is relatively brief. The process of thinking it is much longer. Some of the first people who helped me become a scholar in a real way were Hans Bertens, Aleid Fokkema, and Ann Rigney at the University of Utrecht. Their belief in my work propelled me to take a chance and leave the comforts of house and home country behind and trade them for New York.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Many of the works studied here are canonical texts. Where possible I have maintained the standard abbreviations.

AA	*Absalom, Absalom!* 1936. *The Corrected Text*. New York: Vintage International, 1990
CS	*Collected Stories of William Faulkner*. New York: Random,
LA	*Light in August*. 1932. *The Corrected Text*. New York: Random, 1987
MOS	*Mosquitoes*. New York: Liveright, 1955
NOS	*New Orleans Sketches*. Ed. Carvel Collins. New York: Random, 1968.
S	*Sanctuary*. 1931. *The Corrected Text.* New York: Vintage International, 1993
SF	*The Sound and the Fury*. 1929. *The Corrected Text*. New York: Vintage International, 1990
SL	*Selected Letters of William Faulkner*. Ed. Joseph Blotner. New York: Vintage, 1978.
JJI	Ellmann, Richard. *James Joyce*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959.
P	Joyce, James. *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. Eds. Gabler, Hans Walter and Walter Hettche. New York: Garland Publishing, 1993. Print.
U	Joyce, James. *Ulysses* ed. Hans Walter Gabler, et al. New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1984, 1986. In paperback by Garland, Random House, Bodley Head, and Penguin between 1986 and 1992.
MWQ	*The Man Without Qualities*. Trans. Wilkins, Sophie. Ed. Pike, Burton. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1995. Print.
MoE	Musil, Robert. *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*. Vol. I. Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 2009. Print.

INTRODUCTION

October 6th, 1894, France, Paris, Rue Dominique, Ministry of War

Overture

In late September of 1894, a French spy working as a cleaner in the German Embassy in Paris retrieved six pieces of covering paper to a document, commonly called a *bordereau*, from the trash. The writing, oddly in French and not German, revealed details about the French artillery. The spy dutifully handed this, and other documents she had pilfered, to her senior officer Major Henry in the Statistics Section of the War Ministry. He, in turn, showed the document to his superior, Colonel Sandherr, a patriot and an anti-Semite, who immediately sent it up to the highest ranks. There had been a number of leaks in the ministry recently and the high command was keen on routing out the source. They ineffectively tried to match the handwriting to that of other intercepted files, but to no avail. The case was going nowhere fast.

This was until Lieutenant-Colonel d'Oboville was shown a photograph of the document. A recent hire, d'Oboville was eager to prove himself. He swept in with a new plan of action. Rather than pursuing the evidence, d'Oboville wanted to create a profile of a possible suspect, and locate the traitor by process of elimination. The suspect had to be a high-ranking officer with

knowledge of artillery. He and his superior, Colonel Fabre, sorted through records and arrived at the name of Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a young and talented artillery officer. Fabre had given him a bad evaluation some time ago, in part because of his "indiscreet curiosity," and his handwriting had a superficial resemblance to the *bordereau.* With this flimsy evidence in hand they went to Sandherr around October sixth. When Sandherr learned the suspect was Dreyfus, the only Jew in the General Staff, he excitedly replied, "I should have known!" (Cahm 2-4).

In light of Dreyfus's subsequent arrest, public degradation, imprisonment, and the decade long controversy that saw the Third Republic nearly tear itself apart, Sandherr's comment hardly appears significant. From the moment he passed the information to his superiors, he quickly receded into the shadows as a bit player on a grand historical stage. Yet, the seemingly trivial incident embodied in a microcosm the entire history of anti-Semitism that was to follow. The men, faced with a crisis, searched for a traitor, they found Dreyfus, and when they learned he was Jewish, they realized that the conspirator had been right in front of them all along. In a time of calamity, Dreyfus's Jewishness suddenly became visible, and as a result he suddenly found himself accused of being at the center of conspiracy to subvert the French state.

All the evidence that seemed to exonerate Dreyfus actually helped solidify the case against him. When his handwriting did not match that of the *bordereau*, his accusers concluded that he must have disguised his handwriting (Read 69). The fact that he was only thirty-five and already a trainee in the General Staff was not a sign of hard work and dedication, but more evidence of the elaborate lengths he had gone through to hide his true, nefarious intentions. Even when the real culprit Ferdinand Esterhazy was found years later, it was steadfastly maintained that this was another elaborate Dreyfus plot (Lindemann 113). Perversely, Dreyfus was

suspicious because there was circumstantial evidence against him, his handwriting was vaguely similar to the *bordereau*, and guilty because there was a lack of evidence against him.

The conspiracy logic of men like Sandherr was emblematic of larger perceptual shifts taking hold in Europe with regard to the place of Jews in the modern nation state. The people who sought a solution to this "Jewish Problem," much like Sandherr, saw Jews both as physically and visibly Jewish, and, more abstractly, as invisibly "Jewish" – understood vaguely as an indefinable quality of evil. This combined visibility and invisibility of Jewishness was to become the central tenet of all anti-Semitic conspiracy theories that were to follow. Indeed, some fifty years later, fifteen high-ranking representatives from all branches of the National Socialist government and military met at a bucolic house in Wannsee outside of Berlin to decide how to deal with the visible and invisible threats posed to their racial state by the "Jewish Problem." Their final solution was absolute, even if their concept of Jewishness was not.

Of course, the path from Dreyfus to Wannsee was not this straight, narrow, and uncontested; history is never so simple. Early twentieth century anti-Semitism both shaped and was shaped by other prevailing discourses of modernity. One such discourse was literary modernism, and the "Jewish Question" would weave itself through the lives and work of some of the most influential writers of the period.

The plight of Dreyfus rallied a young aspiring writer in France to take action against this miscarriage of justice. As the first to gather signatures among his intellectual friends for a petition to re-open the Dreyfus case, Marcel Proust would later boastfully recall that he was, "le premier Dreyfusard" (Painter *Proust; The Early Years* 273). At the time Proust had written little of note. An edition of short stories, *Les plaisirs et les jours*, had been published in 1896, and was well received but remained "unpurchased and unsold" (Carter 216). Although Proust would need

another decade to start composing his masterpiece, *A la recherche du temps perdu*, it is during this turbulent period that he collected the bulk of his materials. For the time being, he was too wrapped up in the Dreyfus Affair to start remembering it.

In 1902, about a year after the always diplomatic Proust successfully threw a dinner party for sixty Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards, a recent college graduate from University College Dublin ten years his junior made his way to Paris to study medicine. A Catholic by birth and a Hellenic by disposition, James Joyce had been relatively ignorant about Jews throughout his youth, but news of the Affair had been trickling into Dublin. While the furor of the trial was over by the time he reached Paris, there was no shortage of openly anti-Semitic placards and posters that marred the otherwise picturesque streets. It was in this hostile anti-Jewish atmosphere that he first realized the common struggle faced by his Irish nation and the scattered nation of the Jews (Davison 89). These stirrings would become more resonant in 1904 after he moved to Trieste and started tutoring well-to-do Jews, who, in turn, invited him into their homes and families.

Proust, half-Jewish by birth, and, Joyce, Jewish by association, would render these experiences in their vast panoramas of a lost pre-war Europe. The Frenchman portrayed the Jews of the drawing-room, while the Irishman contented himself with the bar room. The two would meet at a dinner party in 1922. Joyce had just published *Ulysses*; Proust would die in a couple of months. Drabbed in a lush fur coat, Proust spent the evening as the irrepressible socialite that he was, Joyce, having no formal attire, spent the night shadowing the salonard and drinking heavily to cover his embarrassment. The meeting of the great authors was to be a relative non-event. Proust had never read Joyce, and Joyce lied that he had never read Proust (Carter 778).

The works of both authors made their way to Oxford, Mississippi where William Faulkner fell under their spell (Ellmann *JJI* n297). He reportedly stated, "this is it" after reading Proust (Meriwether and Millgate 72). As a developing writer in the early twenties Faulkner was heavily influenced by the aesthetics of both authors, but left many of his narrow racial preconceptions intact. It would not be till the late twenties that Faulkner truly started exploring the fraught racial landscape he had inherited as a Southerner. The growing anti-Semitism of the twenties and the increasing prominence of racial scientists would impose themselves as dangerous sign posts on that landscape. By August of 1932, the racially enigmatic Joe Christmas would find himself hunted down and murdered by the proto-fascist Percy Grimm in *Light in August*.

While fiction was chasing fiction in Yoknapatawpha, Robert Musil found himself running from actual Nazis in 1933. The middle-aged Austrian had left his homeland for Berlin some years earlier, right after he published the first volume of his magnum opus *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*. Back in Austria, Musil would find only a temporary respite from the Fascism that hovered as a dark cloud over central Europe. With the German Anschluss of Austria in 1938, he would see the dragnet closing in on him. The Nazis had come after his books, his Jewish financial backers and publishers, and now his Jewish wife. Destitute and downtrodden Musil and his wife fled to Switzerland, leaving behind friends who would not be so lucky to get out.

The authors studied here did not disconnectedly write in a time of rising intolerance, they lived through it in very real and tangible ways. *Conspiratorial Modernism* argues that their experience of the pervasive anti-Semitism that gripped Europe during the Dreyfus Affair and continued to spread up until the Holocaust fundamentally influenced the representations of Jewishness in their work. Perceptively, each identifies Jewishness as a fluid category that

becomes visible or invisible depending on the context. While each author approached and understood Jewishness through a different prism, all of them understood, on some level, that the "Jew," as constructed by anti-Semites like Sandherr, was exactly that: a construction. In doing so, each was reacting to prevailing prejudices against Jews and challenging the basic premises on which these rested.

Yet these authors were not exclusively concerned with Jewishness, their massive works covered an innumerable amount of people, places, and events, which, taken together, paint a vivid portrait of early twentieth century transatlantic society. Central to their work was a profound distress over the nature of representation in the modern world. Relinquishing their nineteenth century forebears, these authors could no longer abide the pretention of realist objectivity. They saw before them a world that was becoming increasingly complex, and the complete, organic relationships between man and world they had imagined existed in earlier times had fallen apart, fragmented.

They were not alone in their anxieties. The very people these modernists tended to revile, the crude anti-Semites and race demagogues, also feared the changes wrought by modernity. Industrialization had wreaked havoc on small towns and displaced peoples who had been rooted to the land for centuries. The new urban centers reduced mankind to a degenerate sludge of materialism, secularism, and vice. Most dangerously, the necessities of a dynamic labor force increased the circulation of bodies and polluted the erstwhile "pure" nations of France, Ireland, the United States, Germany, and Austria.

Both groups of thinkers, modernists and conspiracy theorists, faced the same epistemological crisis. They each reacted with dismay to what, T.S. Eliot called, the "immense panorama of futility and anarchy [of] contemporary history" ("Ulysses" 177). On the surface it

seemed that they dealt with it in the same way. Each tried to write vast encyclopedic and totalizing works as a way of recapturing this earlier world. The sheer scope of these works required not only a temporal reading, but, more so, a spatial reading that combined often disparate strands of thought into a coherent narrative. Gilberte's curious glance to the Narrator in the initial pages of the *Recherche* is only explained in its final volume several thousand pages later, and yet the reader is expected to uphold both ideas in the same continuous space. In much the same way, all that is required to believe, as the anti-Semite does, that Jews are both capitalist exploiters and communist subversives, is contingent upon a large-scale view that erases all contradiction.

Despite their superficial similarities, modernists and conspiracy theorists had fundamentally different projects. Conspiracy theorists wrote these voluminous works to prove that the epistemological crisis they faced was caused by Jews. As anti-Semitism expanded as a discourse it became increasingly totalizing and all-consuming. Hitler created entire research divisions focused exclusively on the Jewish Problem, and by the height of the Second World War anti-Semitism had evolved from a perspective into a total worldview. The modernist path was quite distinct from this. Rather than moving towards totality, modernist projects increasingly questioned the very possibility of a totality. While early modernists, like Proust, would argue that a return to this unity was only possible through art, later modernists like Musil abandoned the idea of creating such a totality altogether.

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This dissertation connects the histories of anti-Semitic conspiracy theory and modernism in the period stretching roughly from the Dreyfus Affair in the 1890s to the Holocaust in the 1940s. In doing so, it makes two different claims, one historical, the other theoretical.

Historically, it contends that anti-Semitism was a widespread international phenomenon that became a central concern for a transnational coterie of modernist authors: Proust, Joyce, Faulkner, and Musil. In particular, the different representations of Jewishness in their works are emblematic of an increasingly virulent and ubiquitous anti-Semitism leading up to the Second World War. Theoretically, it argues that while these authors rejected the discourse of anti-Semitic conspiracy theory, they shared its epistemological and aesthetic assumptions. Specifically, both anti-Semitic conspiracy theorists and modernists wrote vast, encyclopedic, and totalizing works in an attempt to recapture a lost connection between people and the world around them.

By placing modernism and anti-Semitism within the same historical and theoretical context, this project not only recovers a lost historical framework through which to view modernism, it also recuperates a mode of reading modernism formally. As such, I demonstrate that the cultural historical conditions of modernism helped structure its form, and, additionally, that looking at modernism's form reveals its connection to otherwise seemingly unrelated discourses. In doing so, I combine two trends in modernism studies, the focus on transnational historicism of the last two decades and the more recent calls for a return to formalism in modernism studies (Rabaté "Modernism and Theory"). My method therefore contextualizes form not merely along a literary-historical continuum but, more so, sees form historically determined by the prevailing discourses of any given period.

The size and scope of both modernism and anti-Semitism can only truly be appreciated with a panoramic lens. Modernist ideas circulated throughout Europe and across the Atlantic. At the same time, it is important to underscore that Modernism was never a uniform and monolithic movement. In this respect, the epic modernist works studied here represent a very narrow band

on a wide spectrum. Nevertheless, the emergence of epic modernism in different places and times speaks to its appeal as a literary answer to the crisis of modernity. While there was certainly cross pollination between some of these authors they never engaged in a concerted discussion about aesthetics in the same way the Bloomsbury group did.

This is not true of the active and extensive economy of anti-Semitism between Europe and America. Although largely forgotten now, these anti-Semites formed a relatively cohesive and inclusive sub-culture that numbered in its ranks racial theorists, eugenicists, criminologists, degeneration theorists, religious fundamentalists, artists, politicians, and public intellectuals representing a range of class and social interests. While their discussions of race was incredibly varied, their transnational dialogue established an international language of anti-Semitism. Ironically, this international discourse was generally applied by fervent nativists as means to explain local conditions.

Showing the overlap between two distinct discourses circulating in five different countries over a period of fifty years is an incredibly complex task. As a means of controlling all the moving parts I establish three theoretical terms in Chapter 2. These terms, conspiratorial semiosis, epic modernism, and conspiratorial modernism, largely serve a heuristic function to illuminate points of comparison while leaving room for individual differences.

Briefly, conspiratorial semiosis is derived from current theories of conspiracy theory. In opposition to these theories, I argue that it is not possible to have a theory of individual conspiracy theories, but, instead, that it only is possible to conceptualize conspiracy theorizing. In this vein, conspiratorial semiosis can be understood as a means of interpreting the world by trying to constitute reality into a unified totality. Conspiratorial semiosis does so by omnivorously and quite indiscriminately synthesizing a vast array of facts, figures, narratives,

counter-narratives, and, in general, information into a coherent and singular worldview. In such a worldview discrepancies and lacunae inevitably emerge. Rather than seeing these aporia as weaknesses in their system, conspiracy theorists merely see them as proof of a larger conspiracy, and, therefore, support for their worldview. A lack of evidence therefore functions as a form of evidence. Importantly, while conspiratorial semiosis tends to be a consistent response to the long-term changes engendered by modernity, this type of thinking tends to be catalyzed during moments of epistemological crisis – events whose rapid changes outstrip means of explanation. This is why this project is organized around specific dates. Each date represents a moment of epistemological crisis, either fictional or actual, during which fictional characters or real world figures resort to conspiratorial semiosis to explain the world around them.

This theory is brought to bear on the specific discourse of anti-Semitism from the 1890s to the 1940s. I establish that this discourse created a dualistic image of Jews as both a monstrous visible racial presence, and a nefarious invisible force. While racial theorists refined the crude physical stereotypes about Jews into a pseudo-scientific discourse, other anti-Semites focused on the mythological aspects of "the Jew" as an invisible force in human events. The history of anti-Semitism can be explained as the intertwining of these two forces, scientific and mythological, into a single worldview.

Having established the framework for anti-Semitic conspiratorial semiosis, I move to define epic modernism. The massive projects undertaken by Proust, Joyce, Faulkner, and Musil have traditionally been taken as representative of high modernism. More recently, modernism studies has called into question the centrality of their work and instead describes this period as a series of modernisms – emanating from different cultural sites – thereby decentering the notion of a canon. Standing between these two traditions, I argue that the works by these authors

actually represent a sub-genre called epic modernism. Epic modernists reconstruct a lost totality by creating vast, all-encompassing works that usually attempt to capture and suspend a specific moment in time. Indeed, their various projects are all focused on rendering a very narrowly defined place and time. Proust had his belle époque salons, Joyce his day in Dublin, Faulkner was the sole proprietor of a small town in Mississippi, and Musil tried to capture Viennese society the year before the Great War. In each, there is both a debt to and an abnegation of the sprawling realist novels of the nineteenth century, and the experiments of the avant-garde. For these modernists, the only way to reconstitute the lost world before them was through one of the most ancient literary forms: the epic.

I conclude this theoretical chapter by arguing that conspiratorial modernism is a means of interpreting epic modernism through the lens of conspiratorial semiosis. Due to their vast scope these works require of the reader a studious attention that moves beyond simple interpretation into intense scholarship. Every part of the text can be linked in some way back to another part and it is up to the reader to reconstitute the unity back together again. Yet, this unity, this lost totality, is always receding just beyond the horizon.

The subsequent chapters explore each of these authors through this theoretical prism. Chapter 3 discusses Proust and takes as the date of its epistemological crisis January 13th, 1898, the day Emile Zola published "J 'Accuse" in *L'Aurore* and the Dreyfus Affair exploded. It is this central event that forms the pivot around which the social kaleidoscope of the *Recherche* revolves. I contend that Proust's narrator is a keen observer of and complicit with changing perceptions of Jewishness. In particular, I demonstrate how the physiological descriptions of the novel's various Jews change depending on their opinions about the Dreyfus Affair; where they stand on the issue makes them appear more or less Jewish. Despite the ostracism Proust's Jews

face during the Affair, they will ultimately come out on top. The sweeping arc of Proust's work and his aesthetics of subjective perception lead the reader to conclude that the protean nature of society, culture, and politics is not determined by dark and nefarious forces, but one that is entirely indifferent to human affairs: time.

In Chapter 4 we get a broader picture of the influence the Affair had on European anti-Semitism. Everywhere Joyce went in Europe, he was confronted with various kinds of anti-Jewish hatred. In opposition to these currents, Joyce made the main character of *Ulysses*, Leopold Bloom, Jewish. Throughout his long day in Dublin on June 16th, 1904, Leopold will experience various levels of intolerance, and thereby expose the mechanisms of anti-Jewish hate. His day culminates in the near-physical altercation with the Citizen in Barney Kiernan's pub and by confronting deep seated psychological fears about Jewishness in Bella Cohen's brothel. Like Swann in the *Recherche*, Bloom's Jewishness becomes visible in a time of crisis, most notably in the heated nationalist debate of the pub. Although rooted in very similar epistemological assumptions, Joyce diverges from Proust aesthetically. His textual experimentation pushes the narrative towards the limits of interpretability, and within the fluctuating form of the novel lurks a total work of art that seems always just beyond comprehension.

On the surface, Chapter 5 does not belong in this project. After all, with only one Jewish family living in Faulkner's hometown of Oxford, Mississippi, it is hardly obvious that issues of Jewishness would appear on his radar. Faulkner therefore functions, in many ways, as a test case, if anti-Semitic conspiratorial semiosis was truly ubiquitous it should appear even in the most unlikely places. Surprisingly, it does so quite prominently in the Southerner's work. As Faulkner's writing becomes more complex, his racial views become more nuanced. By the thirties he is integrating Jews into a comprehensive and diverse social portrait of the South. This

portrait tended to subvert, sometimes in explicit ways, the racial hierarchies established by pseudo-scientific nativists throughout the twenties.

Importantly, these hierarchies differed significantly from their European counterparts. America's pre-existing racial tensions and growing heterogeneity did not allow for simple binaries between Aryan and Semite, but required a complex language that ranked the world's races. The overriding anxiety of such a worldview was not exclusively geared towards one race, but rather it feared the mixing of races which would corrupt the rigid hierarchy. Therefore, the central text for understanding how Jewishness worked in the South is *Light in August*, precisely because American fears of conspiracy during this period were deeply rooted in fears of hybridity. These fears boil over into a moment of crisis on August 15th, 1932 when the racially hybrid Joe Christmas tries to escape police custody after being arrested for killing Joanna Burden.

Aesthetically Faulkner also differed from his European counterparts. His Southern epic did not play out in one single work, but across multiple works that each tell his story from a different angle. The effect is similar to that of Joyce. While there appears to be an underlying unity that holds the works together, Yoknapatawpha County, the narrative uncertainty of each of his novels does not allow that unity to be revealed. Hence, Jefferson and environs always looms large on the horizon, but there are no roads that lead there.

Chapter 6 takes us back to Europe where the rising Fascism visible in Faulkner's work reaches critical mass on January 30th, 1933 when Hitler came to power. Robert Musil is a very natural end to this project. Not only was he personally affected by German, and later, Austrian National Socialism, his work directly engages the tenets of Nazism. Throughout *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*, the main character, Ulrich, will struggle to find a "single epistemology" in which "precise facts…somehow add up to a meaningful unity or totality" (Thiher 265). In this search he

will come across various doctrines of the era, the most violent and dangerous of which is National Socialist anti-Semitism. Ulrich goes through great lengths to disprove its basic premises of a total racial soul that drives a unified state.

Ulrich's search for a unified epistemology is replicated in the aesthetics of the work. As the novel progresses the narrative function of its plot increasingly deteriorates. In his search for meaning in the chaos of modernity, the narrator lapses into fragmented essayism and metaphysics, thereby denying the very kind of recuperative totality that began the search. That is to say, Musil's aesthetics reproduce totalization in order to demonstrate that it is impossible.

This work closes with an extract from the January 20th conference at Wannsee. During this conference fifteen high ranking representatives from the various branches of the Nationalist Socialist government officially established Nazi policy towards Jews and other undesirables. The importance of this meeting is not uncontested; some argue that this was merely a rubber stamping policy already in place, while others suggest that this was the true starting point of the Holocaust. What is clear is that this is one of the key moments during which Nazi policy was officially articulated. The remaining minutes show both a chilling exactitude, while at the same time maintaining Jewishness as an abstract quantity. It is in this moment that we see the refinement of the anti-Semitism that had been developing for over fifty years.

While anti-Semitism would move towards a complete and total worldview, epic modernism splintered and fell apart. After Musil there would be no European author to continue the tradition. Indeed, the most anointed heir apparent of this tradition, Samuel Beckett, would fundamentally reject Joyce's aesthetics by writing sparsely populated works. Literary trends would shift decidedly towards works that either rejected encyclopedic scope or the formal experimentation of epic modernism. The conditions of the late thirties would call for movements

that were either more explicitly political and class conscious like social realism and those that rejected mass movements like existentialism.

Nonetheless, I speculate that the critical heir of epic modernism is actually the New Criticism. The New Criticism distills from epic modernism its reading practice, conspiratorial semiosis. When a applied to epic modernism, these New Critical reading practices still provide valuable insight into interpreting "high" modernist works. Crucially, the institutionalization of this reading practice in the post-war period led to its misapplication to texts that resisted such readings. The New Critics, like so many other critical schools, would fail to recognize their own historical position relative to their object inquiry.

Yet, far from concluding with a very belated disavowal of a very much dead New Criticism, I suggest that by re-contextualizing their reading practices, *Conspiratorial Modernism* actually functions as a provisional rehabilitation of their work. This is not a rehabilitation that seeks to reintroduce concepts like irony, paradox, and artistic autonomy back into undergraduate textbooks. Instead, I contend that there is value in the New Critical focus on form. This is not form as an elusive marker of art, but rather as a historically determined structure of thought. By contextualizing the literary form of epic modernism, with the form of anti-Semitic conspiracy theory, I am pushing Modernism Studies towards a new appreciation of form that incorporates the lessons of the recent transnational turn.

CHAPTER ONE

Conspiratorial Modernism: Theory and History

This chapter will set out to explain the three key terms of this project, conspiratorial semiosis, epic modernism, and conspiratorial modernism in three sections. The first section will provide an introduction to conspiracy theory and reveal the current paucity of theoretically sound concepts within the field. It identifies that the major problem with current theories about conspiracy theory is that they inaccurately try to explain the theories themselves, rather than the underlying mode of thought that creates these theories. I offer the term conspiratorial semiosis as a way to understand the process through which conspiracy theories are created. By focusing on the process and not the product, this critical term explains conspiracy theories operate while recognizing that each is contextually unique.

Subsequently, I demonstrate how conspiratorial semiosis operates within the history of anti-Semitic conspiracy theory. I first provide a short conceptual overview of the history of anti-Semitism from the 1890s to 1945 and then move to explain how conspiratorial semiosis operated within these contextual parameters. Specifically, anti-Semitism operated along a duality of visibility and invisibility of Jewishness. That is to say, the fear of Jews was catalyzed by both

their visibility and their invisibility. In many ways, the history of anti-Semitism during this period can be seen as a refinement of this dualistic language.

The next section explains the term epic modernism. This is a form of modernism which is focused on recuperating a lost, total, and organic worldview through art. These modernist texts tended to be encyclopedic in scope and moved beyond realist narratives by requiring a spatial as well as a temporal reading. In essence, this is a recuperated New Critical formal reading of modernism that argues that traditionally High Modernist works like those of Proust, Joyce, Faulkner, and Musil actually function as a genre of modernism among many.

Finally, I show that conspiratorial modernism is the interpretation of epic modernist texts along the lines of conspiratorial semiosis. I conclude that what connects anti-Semitism and Modernism is that they are both dealing with the same fundamental epistemological crisis at the end of the nineteenth century. This crisis was a perceived loss of meaning in the world due to modernization. It was a crisis exacerbated by three major events: the Dreyfus Affair, the Great War, and the global economic collapse of the 1930s. Indeed, the structure of the dissertation ties each novel discussed to a particular moment of either fictional or non-fictional crisis: the explosion of the Dreyfus Affair on January 13st, 1898 in *A the Recherche du temps perdu*, Leopold Bloom's confrontation with the anti-Semitic Citizen on June 16th, 1904 in *Ulysses*; Percy Grimm's chase of Joe Christmas on August 15th, 1932 in *Light in August*; and the two crucial dates of Musil's work, the year before the start of the Great War on June 28th, 1914 and Hitler's rise to power on January 30th, 1933.

Both conspiracy and epic modernist texts dealt with these short-term, explosive manifestations of a deeper epistemological crisis in a similar manner. Anti-Semites and modernists, created vast totalizing works that required both a temporal, and a spatial reading of

the world. Such readings would ostensibly lead to an epiphanic moment in which the true nature of reality was revealed and the connection between mankind and the world would be recovered. The crucial difference is that for anti-Semites the way to explain this lost connection is by seeing everything as part of a vast Jewish conspiracy. Conversely, these modernists offered that this lost connection could possibly and provisionally be recovered through the process of artistic interpretation, though they did so with an increasing skepticism. Consequently, these texts use similar formal strategies towards radically different political ends.

Theories of Conspiracy Theory

Given the wide range of conspiracy theories and conspiracy theorists, there has been little consensus about conspiracy theory as an object of study. As a result, it has been theorized in a wide array of scholarly and non-scholarly texts including: history, philosophy, critical theory, psychoanalysis, cultural studies, sociology, and a spate of popular articles that are usually filled with more vociferous condemnations than actual analysis.[1] This diversity of approaches creates a significant problem for consistent definition, and highlights both the fluidity and variety of conspiracy discourse. As of yet, these different theories of conspiracy theory have not been comprehensively put in conversation with one another. Doing so reveals that there are three broad conceptual categories through which conspiracy theories are understood: psychological, political, and ontological.

Psychological

The earliest theories of conspiracy theory relied on a psychological model that saw conspiracy theorists as mentally unstable. This is the theory that Richard Hofstadter lays out in his seminal essay on conspiracy theory "The Paranoid Style in American Politics" (1964). He argues that there is a "paranoid style" in American politics. This style imitates many of the

mannerisms of a classic paranoid with the exception that the paranoid sees himself as the victim of conspiracy, while the spokesman of the paranoid style, "finds it directed against a nation, a culture, a way of life whose fate affects not himself alone but millions of others" (3). It is a thought echoed and developed by his student David Brion Davis's in his equally important volume, *The Fear of Conspiracy: Images of Un-American Subversion from the Revolution to the Present* (1971). Both thinkers see the paranoid style as a type of psychosocial pathology, and therefore the result of a warped mind. Although Hofstadter's and Davis's remarks were intended to be largely expository and phenomenological they have had an amazing longevity, and still appear in recent studies of conspiracy (Pipes 44).

This theory has not been without its critics. For example, Gordon Wood argues that far from aberrant, conspiracy theory actually emerged during the Enlightenment as a rational way to explain the rapidly changing economic, political, and ideological forces acting upon people without resorting to abstract concepts like luck, fate, or God. He explains, "Conspirational interpretations…became a major means by which educated men in the early modern period ordered and gave meaning to their political world" (411). For Wood, this mode of thinking eventually went out of fashion with the rise of positivism in the nineteenth century.

Meanwhile, theorists of postmodernity argue that conspiracy theory is not only a reaction to modernization in the eighteenth century, but also the effect of the post-industrial organization of economic, social, and political institutions. Basically, conspiracy theory is a rudimentary form of analysis used by people who do not have access to the advanced economic, sociological, and political knowledge required to comprehend their own place in an increasingly complex society. Most famous among these critics is Fredric Jameson who points out that conspiracy theory is, "the poor person's cognitive mapping, in the postmodern age; it is the degraded figure of the

total logic of late capitalism, a desperate attempt to represent the latter's system, whose failure is marked by its slippage into sheer theme and content" (355). Jameson, much like Hofstadter, argues that conspiracy theory represents an illegitimate means to conceptualize the world.

His theory has become commonplace among other postmodern theorists, and it is a tacit assumption that the postmodern age is the most pervasively conspiratorial (Knight 29; Mason 54; Willman 25). These theorists contend that contemporary reactions to complexity and change are somehow fundamentally different from those of people of earlier periods. While it is true that certain types of conspiracy theories are more pervasive, notably alien invasion, this is ultimately a presentist and parochial understanding of conspiracy theory. The fact of the matter is that conspiracy theories of power have always existed in different places and different times.[2] Nor do these theorists take into account that the worst excesses of conspiracy theory occurred before the Second World War in Nazi Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union. In fact, as Slavoj Žižek argues these particular regimes were extremely skilled in "cultivating the myth of a secret parallel power" in order to "compensate for the blatant inefficiency of the public, legal power and thus assured the smooth operation of the social machine…." (Žižek "Invisible Master" 96). It therefore makes, little sense to argue for conspiracy theory as a symptom of any particular period, be it the Enlightenment, modernity, or postmodernity.[3]

Conspiracy theories are not paranoid, ill-educated, or otherwise psychopathological aberrations. Instead on a psychological level, conspiracy theories tend to be short term solutions to moments of rapid and complex change. The fact that this is done with the available language of the hegemonic discourse only speaks to the desire of the theorist's desire to be rational not irrational. As such, conspiracy theories tend to emerge in times of crisis and dissipate in periods of relative calm.

Political

In contradistinction to the psychological school of thought, political theories of conspiracy have emerged. These argue that conspiracy theories are essentially a “theory of power” (Fenster xiv), that explain a "feeling of disempowerment in contemporary society” (Mason 51). As such, they are a means for people to express a rudimentary sociology of their own subjectivity. These theories tend to attribute a certain politics to conspiracy theory. Some argue that conspiracism is a “Poisoned discourse” that “encourages a vorticism of illusions and superstition” (Pipes 173). While others argue that these theories represent a populist utopianism, which “displaces the citizen’s desire for political significance onto a signifying regime in which interpretation and a narrative of conspiracy replace meaningful political engagement,” and thereby causes political stasis (Fenster 80). The reason for this wide disparity in the ends of conspiracy from malevolent, to utopian, to paralytic is that while conspiracy theory is inherently political it has no inherent politics.[4] Hence, political readings of conspiracy theories perceptively examine the basic social mechanisms behind conspiracy theories, but fail to account for their radically different ends.

Ontology

More recent, largely philosophical discussions of conspiracy theory have focused on its validity as a worldview, that is, its ontological status. In this respect, one of the most common reactions to conspiracy theory is labeling it as an illegitimate form of knowledge or as Damien Thompson derisively calls it, “counter knowledge” (13), which problematically begs the question as to what “real knowledge” is.

The post-structuralist turn has addressed the problem of “real knowledge” by arguing that both “real” and “knowledge” are concepts constructed and constituted in the discourse through which they are articulated. This basic epistemological assumption has justified the validity of a

wide array of ontologies. More simply, by revealing the constructed nature of reality and knowledge, post-structuralism legitimizes the possible importance of every discourse. This premise has been used to shed light on knowledge that has historically fallen outside of hegemonic discourses.

To a certain extent Harry West and Todd Sanders call for this type of redemption of conspiracy theory by arguing that conspiracy functions like science for the conspiracy theorist, it is a rationalized way to explain the world (15). Although, this is somewhat reminiscent of Wood's argument, it is different in that it recognizes the internal logic of conspiracy as a valid perception of the world, irrespective of the time and context in which it is articulated. Likewise, Martin Parker has effectively shown that conspiracy theory, in its attempt to obtain an elevated position that reveals the overarching systems that control human interaction, is not dissimilar from the human sciences (209).[5]

Despite this similarity with the human sciences, the concept "conspiracy theory" in this sense still raises problems because it gives a separate but equal status to conspiracy theories. Not only does this isolation of conspiracy theory from mainstream discourse suggest some version of "real knowledge" of the world, it is also problematic because, as Jack Bratich aptly points out, "The context is not separate from conspiracy theories; it is constitutive of them" (19). That is to say, conspiracy theories cannot be seen or even studied as isolated phenomena because they themselves are part of the very context they are describing and re-describing.

Hence, sorting out the difference between conspiracy theory and other social theories purely on the basis of their methodology is quite problematic within a post-structuralist framework. Both conspiracy theories and other theories of power gather vast amounts of evidence, create causal links, and hypothesize information flows.

In a different vein, Karl Popper has argued that one way to distinguish conspiracy theories from actual social theories is falsifiablility – conspiracy theories are not 'theories' in the modern scientific sense because they cannot be falsified (96). There is no way to disprove a conspiracy theory because there is no evidence that can be brought against it. In fact, any contradictory evidence becomes evidence of a larger and larger conspiracy.

While Popper's argument is well taken, Brian Keeley has argued that falsifiablity is not necessarily as applicable to conspiracy theory as it is to the physical sciences, because the objects of science studies are value neutral and do not actively work against the scientists. In actual conspiracies the conspirators do try to provide counter evidence. In cases like Watergate and Iran-Contra there were attempts to cover up the conspiracy. Thus, what distinguishes conspiracy theory from other theories, according to Keeley, is not their falsifiablility but, "rather the increasing degree of skepticism required by such theories as positive evidence for the conspiracy fails to obtain" (121). More simply, when conspiracy theorists cannot find any actual proof for their worldview they resort to an intense questioning of any evidence brought against the conspiracy. Not only do basic facts get called into question, but the very institutions which in democratic societies are responsible for obtaining and verifying information – e.g. the news media, the university, research labs – are viewed with intense doubt (121). All the effort on the part of these institutions to be open and democratic, only enhances the skepticism of the conspiracy theorist. After all, according to the conspiracy theorist, if these institutions are not actually hiding anything then there is no need for them to be so suspiciously open. Paradoxically, transparency leads to more, not less, conspiracy theory.

Towards a Theory of Conspiracy Theory

The above delineation of the various theories of conspiracy theory shows both the variety and complexity of conspiracy theory, yet it does little towards explaining what it actually is. In fact, it is not possible to arrive at a specific definition of conspiracy theory because, I argue, conspiracy theory has more to do with the mode of thought than the actual content of that thought. This particular mode of thought is here called conspiratorial semiosis.

This term is derived from Umberto Eco's "Interpretation, Overinterpretation." In this paper, Eco proposes the concept of hermetic semiosis. For Eco, hermetic semiosis forms the epistemological foundation underlying the "over-interpretation" of a text. During hermetic semiosis the interpreter of the text presupposes a certain outcome and therefore steers all of his or her interpretation towards that outcome. In hermetic semiosis there is no coincidence as every sign is a sign of something else (133).

Although, this logic might seem to contradict some fundamental law of common sense, Eco reminds us that, "*from a certain point of view everything bears relationships of analogy, contiguity, and similarity to everything else*" ([Emphasis in the Original]165). Once hermetic semiosis starts it is hard to stop, because every revealed sign can only imply another sign that must metaphorically stand in for something; the logic is viciously circular (163).

For Eco, *hermetic semiosis* is what occurs when a person "overinterprets" a text, which is certainly similar to conspiracy theory, but not the same. While conspiratorial semiosis – like hermetic semiosis – also uses the logic of analogy, contiguity, and similarity to read presupposed conditions into the visible world, it goes one step further and uses a lack of evidence as a form of evidence. For example, the fact that 'we' cannot see a conspiracy of Jewish bankers only means that 'they' are cleverly out of sight, and therefore the subversion is much more real and extensive

than we originally anticipated. While hermetic semiosis is predicated on what is there, conspiratorial semiosis is based on what is not there. Absence is proof of presence. Therefore, conspiratorial semiosis is the interpretive short-circuit in which both the visible and the invisible are used as proof of the conspiracy's presuppositions. Conspiratorial semiosis thereby accounts for the spectral quality of conspiracies. They are simultaneously visible and invisible for different observers in different contexts.

This theory of conspiratorial semiosis is substantially different than the theories that have preceded it. Certainly, all theories of conspiracy theory have to some extent addressed the problematic circularity of its logic.[6] What makes this theory unique is that it locates the mechanism through which conspiracy thinking operates not in its product, but in its process. Conspiracy theory presumes that the world was at some point a totality – a coherent order that was both observable and knowable and allowed for an organic relationship between people and the world. Through nefarious forces this totality is no longer available to the observer. Instead, the reality projected before the conspiracy theorist is false and fragmentary and masks the true power relations that control the world. Conspiracy theory is therefore the means by which the corruption can be exposed, order can be restored, and people can once again obtain an unmediated perspective and experience of the world.

This basic presumption enables the very possibility of reconstituting the world and functions as proof of the totality's existence. Therefore, the process and not the product of conspiracy thinking is the proof of conspiracy. So while other theorists of conspiracy theory presume to a certain extent that conspiracy theories are proved by a conspiratorial mode of thought, I am arguing that the ability to have a conspiratorial thought proves the conspiracy theory. Counterintuitively, conspiracy theorizing is proof of conspiracy theory. The fact that the

conspiracy theorist can always keep moving towards the totality – much like Zeno's Dichotomy paradox, half the distance each step – must mean it is there, just past the horizon. It is only through its absence that the totality can be imagined.[7]

Usually, this reciprocal process between the conspiracy theory and conspiratorial semiosis is facilitated by external events. This external event is usually an epistemological crisis in which the old means of understanding no longer sufficiently explains the current context. When the institutions and traditions which have traditionally been the sources of knowledge, Government, Religion, Science, somehow become corrupted, latent conspiratorial beliefs manifest themselves as conspiratorial semiosis.

Still, while an external event might provide the impetus for conspiracy theorizing it does not necessarily provide a basis for the conspiracy theory itself. That is to say, there is not by necessity a correspondence between the conspiracy theory and the crisis it is trying to explain. For example, one explanation of the First World War is that Jews had conspired to make the French and Germans wipe each other out, this despite the fact that Jews fought on both sides.

Due to this disconnect between theory and the external world, there is an almost epiphanic quality to conspiracy theories. They rely on a latent conspiratorial language whose truth suddenly becomes visible in a time of crisis. For instance, during the Dreyfus affair it was suddenly revealed that there was a vast Jewish conspiracy against the French state, just as the conspiracy theorists had always suspected. Yet, this revelation was only possible, because conspiracy theorizing had been possible in the first place.

Since the process of conspiracy theory proves conspiracy theories, the theories themselves tend to be radically different. It therefore makes no sense to have a general theory of conspiracy theories, precisely because they are all unpredictably different. It would be much like

having a theory of "literature," "music," or "science." In each case there is a sacrifice of phenomenological specificity to accommodate hermeneutic universality. It is therefore crucial to analyze and understand the main ideas and conditions that feed into the conspiratorial semiosis of a conspiracy theory.

Anti-Semitic Conspiratorial Semiosis

As the previous section concludes it is not possible to have a general theory of conspiracy theory. Instead it makes more sense to talk about how conspiratorial semiosis works in a specific context. The context here is the anti-Semitic conspiracy theory that emerged between 1890 and 1945 and provided much of the intellectual justification for the Holocaust. While the particular national and authorial contexts of anti-Semitic conspiracy theory will be dealt with in each subsequent chapter, a brief overview is useful to frame the discourse.

Essentially, anti-Semitic conspiracy theory is something that starts to appear around the middle of the nineteen century with the advent of pseudo-scientific racial theories. In this regard, the undisputed "father of modern racism" is Joseph Arthur Comte de Gobineau who argues that there are three distinct races spearheaded by the superior Aryans. Gobineau was not an anti-Semite but his racial thinking probably influenced German thinkers around the time of the Unification 1871. What emerges is a concept of Jews that is no longer religious, but racial. As such, the traditional religious conflict between Christians and Jews was recast as a race war between Aryans and Semites. This new racial concept of Jewishness would enable the emergence of explicitly anti-Semitic political parties.

While this German and Central European anti-Semitism has its own unique history, one of the places where it emerges is in France during the Dreyfus Affair. One particularly influential thinker during this period is Edouard Adolphe Drumont, who crudely combined much of the

anti-Semitic language coming out of Germany with that of the new anthropometric racial science of men like George Vacher de LaPouge. The controversies surrounding the scandal provided Drumont a fertile platform for spreading his anti-Semitic message. It is at this point that anti-Semitism specifically, and racial science generally becomes a more mainstream discourse. This is also the moment that it finds its way to England and the United States.[8] As it does so an international discourse of anti-Semitism emerges that involves a range of thinkers in the United States and Europe. Ironically, these racial thinkers tended to couch their arguments in nativist terms even thought the sources of their thoughts are very much derived from an internationalist context. Be that as it may, after the Affair anti-Semitic conspiracy theory generally starts to wane.

The Great War not only reinvigorates anti-Semitic sentiment, but also radicalizes it. The postwar years see the creation of a large amount of political groups who have anti-Semitism as an explicit political platform. Anti-Semitism is no longer merely the hatred of Jews, but actually becomes its own complex and multifaceted political position. Anti-Semitism becomes such a prominent feature of the political landscape that the anti-Semite becomes a recognizable type in literature. For example, in the works of Proust and Joyce about the pre-War period, there are characters who are anti-Semitic, most prominently Charlus and the Citizen, but this is really only one aspect of their character. In the postwar years, characters whose whole identity is articulated through their anti-Semitism start to appear. In Faulkner, we can think of Percy Grimm, while in Musil Hans Sepp fulfills this role.

Along with inspiring anti-Semitic groups, the Great War also makes anti-Semitism an international discourse. It is no longer believed that Jews are intent on subverting one nation, be it France or Germany, but they are invested in undermining all Aryans. This is why the war

between the western powers lasted as long as it did, because in the mind of conspiracy theorists, Jews wanted these superior peoples to kill each other and make them ripe for conquest.

Throughout the 1920s these anti-Semitic groups enjoyed a measure of influence. In Europe the relatively weak post-Versailles liberal democracies of continental Europe could barely contain the constant threats of violence from these groups, and riots and assassinations abounded. Furthermore, the anti-Semitic movement fit well into an increasingly racial interpretation of the nation-state. While concepts of a racially pure nation had existed since the late nineteenth century, the War, for many, underscored the failure of pluralistic liberal democracies and was a clear warning that nations could only exist if they were racially homogenous.

The global economic crisis that started with the great stock market crash in 1929 provided an opportunity for anti-Semites and Fascists to translate their influence into real power. Across Europe, right-wing parties took political office, either legitimately or illegitimately, and either implicitly or explicitly promoted the exclusion of Jews from civic life. The notable exclusions here are Britain and the US, both of which saw a rise of anti-Semitism, but in neither country were the Fascist party leaders, Oswald Mosley in Britain and William Dudley Pelley in the US, able to exert any real influence.

At the same time that the prominence of anti-Semitism increased in transatlantic discourse, its content also shifted. Obviously, it is impossible to briefly summarize the contributions of the nearly two dozen major anti-Semitic thinkers this dissertation covers. Nevertheless, perhaps the largest development that occurs during this period is the refinement of the categories of Jewish visibility and invisibility. In essence, anti-Semitic conspiracy theory operated on a dualistic notion of Jewishness that saw Jews as both monstrously present and

insidiously absent. Perhaps the best example of this logic is Konstantyn Jelenski's example of Polish anti-Jewish sentiment:

> Poles have never come out against Jews "because they are Jews." But because Jews are dirty, greedy, mendacious, because they wear earlocks, speak jargon, do not want to assimilate, and also because they do assimilate, cease using their jargon, are nattily dressed, and want to be regarded as Poles. Because they lack culture and because they are overly cultured. Because they are superstitious, backward and ignorant, and because they are damnably capable, progressive and ambitious. Because they have long, hooked noses, and because it is sometimes difficult to distinguish them from "pure Poles." Because they crucified Christ and practice ritual murder and pore over the Talmud, and because they disdain their own religion and are atheists. Because they look wretched and sickly, and because they are tough and have their own fighting units and are full of khutspah. Because they are bankers and capitalists and because they are Communists and agitators. But in no case because they are Jews. (Reizbaum *Judaic* 9)

Here Jews are resented because of both their visibility and their invisibility. Tragically, this perverse logic never allows Jews to escape the prejudice of the anti-Semites because even if they assimilate and stop acting "Jewish" they will be faulted for being Jewish.

Almost all anti-Semitic conspiracy texts during this period operate along the lines of this same duality. On the one hand they expound on the racial and physiological qualities that define Jews, and on the other hand, they purport that invisible "Jewish" forces control modernity. More so, from the Dreyfus Affair to the Holocaust the language describing both the visibility and the invisibility became increasingly sophisticated. In the case of the former, the crude Jewish

stereotypes and caricatures that dominate the Dreyfus Affair are codified into a complex racial language that sought to categorize and define Jewish racial traits with great exactitude. Importantly, this new racial science barred the possibility of Jewish assimilation, because Jews could adapt their religion and their culture, but not their inherent racial disposition. As Adolf Hitler argues, "Thus the Jew is everywhere the Jew, who consciously or unconsciously – furthers decisively the interests of his race" (Phelps 406).[9†] There was no way for Jews not to be Jewish.

Meanwhile, the invisible power of Jews, evolved from a relatively simplistic form of scapegoating into an elaborate world historical and mythological doctrine that purported that Jews were the invisible driving force behind all negative events in the world. This is why Himmler can make the outrageous claim about the looming war in 1938 that:

> It is not only the struggle of the nations, which in this case are put forward by the opposing side merely as a front, but it is the ideological (*weltanschauliche)* struggle of the entire Jewry, freemasonry, Marxism, and churches of the world. These forces – of which I presume the Jews to be the driving sprit, the origin of all negatives – are clear that if Germany, and Italy are not annihilated, *they* will be annihilated (*vernichtet werden*). ([Emphasis in the original]Kershaw 449)

The idea that Jews were somehow simultaneously behind freemasonry, Marxism, and the churches of the world seems implausible. Freemasonry and Marxism both disavow organized religion, while the churches of the world obviously promote this. Freemasonry believes in a powerful elite, while Marxism rejects any notion of an elite. Finally, historically, the churches of the world have been responsible for the persecution of the Jews. It makes little sense that Jews would orchestrate pogroms against themselves throughout the ages in order to subdue the

[†] With the exception of the authoritative translations of Proust and Musil, all translations are mine. I have supplied the original text in the endnotes for all cases where it helps clarification. Generally, issues of translation are dealt with in the notes, unless they significantly alter the reading of a passage, at which point they are brought into the main text.

Christians. Nevertheless, Himmler craftily preempts any of these questions by labeling Jews as the "origin of all negatives." As Jews are the origin of everything bad with the world, it does not matter that these evils ostensibly contradict each other, their very negativity implies that they are Jewish.

These two broad conceptual categories, dispassionately rational and viscerally irrational, end up being embodied by the National Socialist party in general and Hitler specifically. Because these categories defined Jews both by their visibility and their invisibility anti-Semitism became a complete worldview that saw Jewishness as the exact inverse of Aryanism. As Philippe Burrin points out, "Hitler constructed a relationship of total opposition that implied a total rejection of not only Judaism but also its poisoned fruits, Christianity and all its avatars, which ranged from liberalism to Bolshevism" (Burrin 47). Consequently, everything that did not support the National Socialist system was by default an enemy of that system.

For the National Socialist, anti-Semitism was a means to establish a total and all encompassing worldview. As Žižek points out, "The Jew is the means, for Fascism, of taking into account, of representing its own impossibility: in its positive presence, it is only the embodiment of the ultimate impossibility of the totalitarian project – of its immanent limit" (*Ideology* 127). Hence as long as the thousand year peace was not yet achieved it only meant that anti-Semitic efforts needed to be increased. Since, the totalitarian state represented a utopian desire, it would never be reached. Therefore, Nazi leaders, like Joseph Goebbels, could only arrive at one logical conclusion: "The Jews are guilty of everything!" (Herf 209).

Obviously, Nazism represents only one specific kind of hatred of Jews that followed many decades of anti-Semitism in Europe and America. As this dissertation will show, anti-Semitism expressed itself differently in each country where it manifested itself. For example, the

fear of Jews as national traitors was actually much less prevalent in the US than it was in France. Likewise, the concerns over Jewish racial degeneracy were not as present in France as in Germany. Despite these local inflections there was an established framework through which to express anti-Semitic ideas. Indeed, as the next chapters will show there was an extensive transatlantic commerce of racial and conspiracy ideas throughout this period, conspiracy theorists in one place could often adapt a foreign conspiracy theory to meet local needs. More importantly, what allowed these ideas to travel with relative ease was a common assumption about the duality of Jewishness as both a visible and invisible category. This duality allowed these thinkers to argue that Jews were dangerous because of their ubiquitous presence, but also because of their nefarious absence. As such, Jews represented an epistemological problem that could only be solved through anti-Semitic conspiratorial semiosis.

Epic Modernism

Anti-Semitic conspiratorial semiosis was just one of many responses to the fundamental political, technological, and epistemological shifts that were occurring during the end of the nineteenth century. One response that shares an uncanny amount of similarities with anti-Semitic conspiratorial semiosis is the emergence of epic modernism: a literary movement that focused on creating epistemologically uncertain works that attempted totalization. To be sure, many critics have highlighted the overlap between fascism and modernism, and the anti-Semitic leanings of certain modernists, notably T.S. Eliot, Wyndham Lewis, and Ezra Pound (Kermode 104-11). The argument here is that the propinquity between anti-Semitic conspiratorial semiosis and modernism is not political, rather it is epistemological. More bluntly, anti-Semitic conspiratorial semiosis and epic modernism were parallel ways of coping with the impact of modernity.

Just as the concept of conspiracy theory is vague and nebulous, the concept of modernism does not lend itself to easy definition either. And although there was never a moment during which modernism was a rigidly defined idea, the older more conservative definitions of modernism have been supplanted by newer, more open concepts. Perhaps one of the most significant changes in this respect is what Douglas Mao and Rebecca Walkowitz call the "transnational turn" (Mao and Walkowitz 372). Traditionally, modernism was seen as a form of white-male European and American resistance to mass culture between the world wars through recondite and experimental aesthetics (Childs 13). In contrast to this conservative definition of Modernism, Mao and Walkowitz point out that after the transnational turn modernism has come to signify a range of cultural practices that stretch across the globe from Australia to Argentina to Asia and throughout history from the 17th to the 21st century. These cultural practices react against/work through mass culture, reject/embrace technological innovation, are cosmopolitan/local, condemn/celebrate popular culture, are masculinist/feminist, and strive for the new or wax nostalgic for the old. In short, the expansion of Modernism Studies has created a field so vast that its internal coherence is not at all apparent. No doubt, the methodological and theoretical discrepancies between works on modernism and its relation to, say, bioscience (Gordon 3), the information society (Rayward 5), paranoia (Trotter 12), manifestos (Winkiel 3), efficiency culture (Cobley 13), and little magazines (Morrisson 9) could not seem greater.

Arguably however, these ostensible disparities do share one underlying commonality: all modernisms are reactions to some sort of concept or aspect of 'modernity' and the confusion, uncertainty, and dislocation endemic to it. Whatever modernisms may or may not be, in all cases they are conceptually built upon a framework of fundamental epistemological change. There is then much wisdom in Virginia Woolf's oft-quoted observation in response to the Post-

Impressionist Exhibition in London that, "on or around December 1910 human consciousness forever changed" (Woolf 421).

What is not so much relevant here is the date or even the observation itself. Critics have implicitly and explicitly argued against Woolf on both counts. Some critics have come along and tried to peg their own key dates for modernism, though always with the qualification that these are important dates within a range, to name a few: the 1890s (Hughes 34), 1913 (Rabaté *1913 the Cradle of Modernism* 5), 1922 (North 3-30). Others contend that human consciousness did not actually change (Pinker 404). Yet such critiques are quite wide of the mark, the actual date is somewhat irrelevant as Woolf herself facetiously documents this as "on or around December," knowing full well that historical change happens over an extended period.

What is important is that the observation was made. There is the decided sense in her phrasing that a fundamental change had taken place. This perception, that the past is no longer contemporaneous with the present is a quintessentially modernist concept. It is the key principle that dictates so much of modernist art. Since, the traditional ways of looking at the world were no longer valid; art became a search for conceptually different forms.

This is not to argue that concepts of change and newness are unique to modernism, all periods in history see themselves on the brink of a fundamental change. What does set modernism apart from other periods is its particular perception of change and newness: modernism imagined a fundamental rupture with the old and abandoned "the idea of a linear historical development" (L. B. Williams 2). This radical division between past and present is not readily apparent in other historical periods.[10] So while modernity can be traced back to the early modern period and the emergence of investment capital, market economies, scientific rationalism, new world exploration, liberal concepts of the individual, the secularization of

society, and democratic notions of governance, the moment during which those changes seem to fundamentally and irrevocably sever mankind from its forebears is during the late nineteenth century.

It is after the Second Industrial revolution that it is possible to witness the type of alienation and disarticulation of the subject that haunts so much of modern literature. While this revolution took many forms some of the most fundamental changes that occurred during this period were without a doubt the emergence of the concept of the unconscious (Levenson 270); the creation of a professional managerial class due to the growth of the welfare state, the modern university and the financial services sector (Marx 5); the increasingly rapid transmission of information horizontally across space, but also vertically across social class (Kern 316); the rise of the women's movement (Matthews 138); ever expanding commodification, even to the point where 'authenticity' itself becomes a commodity (Outka 156); a concern with efficiency through Fordism and Taylorism (Rayward 5); urbanization, secularization, and mass forms of social interaction (Childs 22); the fragmentation of fixed communities and the dissolution of class structures due to increasing migration and circulation which increasingly require a statistical sense of human population for the purposes of analysis and control (Armstrong 2). While there are arguably more aspects of modernity, the above list gives a good overview of the sense of dislocation and isolation that confronted people during the rise of modernity.

Admittedly, there is nothing revolutionary about saying that 'modernisms' are at their most basic level reactions to a perceived fissure between past and present. In fact, such a view can be traced throughout the history of modernism studies (see for example: Armstrong 2; Bradbury and McFarlane 20; Calinescu 41; Childs 18; Jervis 4; Matthews 8; Rabaté *1913 the Cradle of Modernism* 141). The power of the argument then lies not in its novelty, but in its

ubiquity. The fact that these sea changes in culture are so widely recognized as the underlying causes of modernism's aesthetic is also an explanation for the way in which that aesthetic articulates itself. Indeed, as Brooks Hefner points out, modernism does not merely include any work written during the modern period. It is, in fact, a manner of speaking about the modern period, "modernism is not present in what you say, but in *how* you say it; one does not have a modernist 'perspective,' one presents her perspective in a modernist fashion" (15).

The particular perspective, or rather aesthetic, of interest for this study is what I define as epic modernism. Epic modernism both rejects and restores the severed links between the past and the present through a narrative that assimilates a wide range of knowledge into a vast totalizing project. Since there are obviously physical limits to a text, these epics can never be a complete totality. Instead epic modernism uses both metaphoric and metonymic interrelationships between its component parts to simulate the process of totalization, rather than totality. This totalizing force gives the work a scope beyond the sum of its parts. Paradoxically, epic modernism's drive towards totality also helps to underscore rupture and fragmentation. Consequently, epic modernist works always hover between chaos and order; they are always one page away from completion, while at the same time one page closer to be being rendered meaningless. The process of totalization could arguably go on ad infinitum.

The concern for the epic in modernism is something that was identified by critics at an early stage. The first person to make the observation was very famously Eliot, who in 1924 wrote that *Ulysses* used a "Mythic method" that creates "a continuous parallel between contemporaneity and antiquity", which "is simply a way of controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape and a significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history" ("Ulysses" 177). For Eliot, Joyce's work has a recuperative function. It is a way to

structure the chaos of modern life. Walter Benjamin makes a similar observation about Alfred Döblin's *Berlin, Alexanderplatz*. He argues that novelistic tradition of the nineteenth century had become isolated and solipsistic, and that the epic is a way for novelists, in particular Döblin, to get back to the people: "Through the Epic the people rest after their daily work; they listen, dream, and gather" (230).[11] Meanwhile, Janko Lavrin, in his early attempt to establish a critical concept of modernism, echoes both Eliot and Benjamin, stating that modernity's "atomization of the individual" led to a "passionate though impotent will to achieve at least some balance and harmony in spite of all" (Lavrin 9). Interestingly, even though all three thinkers are quite different from each other, they each focus exclusively on the recuperative function of the epic's totalization.

This encyclopedic nature of modernism was not necessarily well regarded in all circles. For example, when commenting on the German Expressionism of the 1930s, Georg Lukács argues that its myths, symbols, and abstractions are a "fake radicalism/Scheinradikalismus" (134), and that it could easily be appropriated by Fascism (Lukács "Gröβe und Verfall" 148). Later he takes more direct aim at *Ulysses*, contending that Joyce's endless cataloging leads to "compositional monotony/kompositionellen Eintönigkeit," which "destroys the old epic composition" (Lukács "Erzählen oder Beschreiben?" 280).[12] Although Wilson is more forgiving than Lukács, he levels a relatively similar complaint against Joyce, remonstrating that, the Irishman, "elaborated 'Ulysses' too much…he tried to put too many things into it" (214). Despite their ideological disparities Lukács and Wilson actually voice a similar criticism: their own social reality is not accurately reflected in the modernist epic.

Suffice it to say, a return to the epic has been a commonly understood aspect of modernism from a very early stage, and it is a point continually rehashed by modern

commentators (Armstrong 35; Levenson 270; Matthews 67). Despite this acceptance, epic modernism has never been formally defined. This is largely because many of the works that fall under the rubric of epic modernism are, in fact, canonical modernist works. Hence, the notion of the epic is elided because they are simply called modernist. What I am arguing here, in keeping with more recent modernist studies, is that these canonical works are in reality a specific genre of modernism. I am thereby disarticulating them from their canonical positions and placing them on a spectrum of various reactions to modernity. Doing so allows me to place these texts horizontally next to other discourses circulating at the time, namely anti-Semitic conspiracy theory. Still, while this somewhat stricter definition confines these works to a specific category, the texts themselves are by no means constricted. In their epic structure these works both represent totality, but also total possibility. That is to say, the very fact that these works hint at totality means that the reader could arguably find anything he or she wanted in them. Thus, when Eliot, Lukács, and Wilson label epic modernism respectively, restorative, counter-progressive, or excessive this is altogether limited.

Their readings of the epic imply that there is a coherent correspondence between the epic mode and epic content. This is simply not the case. While the modernist epic both nods towards the originary epic form in terms of its scale, it also severs its links with the past through its experimental style. As such, it hovers ethereally between past and present. This liminal existence is the consequence of epic modernisms attempt to establish its own epistemology ex nihilo. Speaking specifically of the epic *Cantos*, Mary Ellis Gibson argues that Ezra Pound could not rely on earlier modes of epic construction such as religion or the imperial state as an authority, instead: “The poem itself must construct the basis on which to found authority and to project, if fleetingly, a telos” (108). In much the same way, the epics of Proust, Joyce, Faulkner, and Musil

relied on internal signifying regimes to legitimize the authority of their own construction. The texts were, in a sense, self-sufficient. While the post-structuralist turn generally and postmodernism specifically, has shown that an internal signifying regime is impossible because it implies a strict dividing line between internal and external, the very attempt to make such a construct is of interest here.

Epic modernist works in their attempt to reconstitute the past had to build their works from the ground up. In order to do this, they had to move towards new forms of representation. It is important to note that this did not always preclude older sources. In fact, some of the more conservative modernists, especially Eliot and Pound, used older texts as part of their new epistemology. As the narrator of the "Waste Land" self-consciously reflects near the end of the poem, "These fragments I have shored against my ruins" (*The Waste Land* 83). Such representations and reconstitutions of the past were intimately related to the epistemology of the works. As Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane note, modernist works did not operate according to "historical time" or character development; instead they worked "spatially or through layers of consciousness, working towards a logic of form." Consequently, the work was not so much about plot or character, but rather the nature of its own construction. They go on to explain that the modernist work created a sense of "synchronicity" because all connections within the work are connections to other parts of the texts. Accordingly, they conclude that there is a sense of "generative distillation" (50). While Bradbury and McFarlane side with Eliot about the "preservative function" of Modernism, their concept of "generative distillation" hints towards epic modernism as a mode of writing rather than a type of work. Once the process of signification starts, it cannot be halted and "the book, after it is done, reaches forward to that which can never be said in any book" (Josipovici 115). The book through its mode of

signification – its tessellation of symbols, its reticulation of interrelationships, and its over determination of metaphor and metonym – suggests a totality that is not there.

Traditionally, this has been read conservatively as a type of conciliation for the fragmentation brought forth by modernity. This need not be the case, as Tammy Clewell points out, it can also be read as its exact opposite, the suggestion of totality can also underscore loss (Clewell 2). To be sure, the point here is not to discuss the relative merits of either a conservative or progressive reading of this mode of writing. Instead, I suggest that it is the mode of writing itself that is essential. In the words of David Adams, works like *Ulysses*, evoke an "absent totality" (60). Specifically, he states that *Ulysses*, "In its variety of style and plenitude of detail, the book seems to frustrate any search for unity; yet it also invites the reader to search and to hope for a coherent pattern of mimesis" (58). In both its apparent fragmentation and its professed unity, the epic modernist work actually reproduces the process of its own interpretation. In a sense, it becomes a writable text.

It is here instructive to turn to a point Joyce made about *Ulysses* early on: "I've put in so many enigmas and puzzles that it will keep the professors busy for centuries" (Ellmann *JJII* 251). To some extent this is surely a wry joke on the part of Joyce. Nevertheless, his words also betray his method, in particular his focus on puzzles. More than merely a facile parlor game, a puzzle, in particular a jigsaw puzzle, also presents a profound paradox. The object of a puzzle is to put all the pieces together, and yet once this is done a puzzle ceases to be a puzzle as it is no longer solvable. Like all great puzzles *Ulysses* suggests unities and relations that may be there, but can only be found when the work ceases to be a puzzle. Yet, this final epiphanic moment when the puzzle is solved, when the modernist work is unified, will never arrive because within

the tapestry there are always more connections. The work thus suggests a totality, and in doing so inadvertently reveals its own nature as an unsolvable puzzle.

It is on this point that I suggest epic modernism shares a lot of similarities with conspiratorial semiosis. Both modes of representation are attempts to establish an epistemology ex nihilo. That is, outside of the traditional institutions, which both conspiracy theorists and modernists view with incredible distrust. They are both more concerned with highlighting the process of knowledge production rather than the actual product. This allows them to suggest an absent totality. The crucial difference lies in the absent totality. In modernism, the absent totality functions as both an artistic parallel and opposite to modernity's fragmentation, discordance, and chaos. Conversely, the absent totality in anti-Semitic conspiratorial semiosis represents the possibility of an Aryan state and therefore justifies systemic hatred of Jews as long as that state is not achieved.

To be absolutely clear, this dissertation is not arguing that the modernist authors discussed here were anti-Semitic. Indeed, all but Faulkner could be labeled philosemites. The argument is rather that both movements were dealing with the same epistemological crisis of modernity in similar ways. The similarity ran along two different levels. One could be labeled 'deep' parallel. These are the epistemological and aesthetic parallels that are the result of cultural and ideological cross-fertilization; they represent in Raymond William's terminology a "structure of feeling" of a period (64). Beyond these underlying cultural and ideological structures there were also more direct influences among authors. Indeed, as the next chapters will show there was on occasion intimate if antagonistic contact between epic modernist writers and anti-Semites. Marcel Proust knew Drumont the leading anti-Semite of France, Joyce had been raised with the anti-Semitism of the Irish Catholic church, Faulkner was certainly aware of the

racial stereotypes against the Jews in the South, and Robert Musil and his Jewish wife were forced to flee Austria because of the Nazis. These were not two distinct discourses circulating separately that happened to have some similarities. They intertwined, overlapped, and most of all shared a common mode of thinking that formed the basis of so much of twentieth century history.

CHAPTER TWO

Marcel Proust
January 13th, 1898, France, Faubourg St. Germain

Introduction

The Dreyfus Affair was undoubtedly the single most important event in the history of modern anti-Semitism before the Holocaust. Not only does the Affair, as it came to be known, bring the Third Republic to the brink of implosion, it also transforms France into a breeding ground for a new type of radical and racial anti-Semites who were able to perpetuate and disseminate their crude racial beliefs to an anxious and therefore receptive public. Indeed, while racially anti-Semitic ideas emerged in Europe about two decades before the Affair, these ideas never gained general currency. The decade long trial of Alfred Dreyfus became a catalyst for these nascent ideas, and enabled anti-Semitism to become a mainstream discourse. There is perhaps no better and simpler evidence of this complex historical mechanism than the book sales of Drumont's racist *La France juive*. In 1886 he could barely find a publisher for his voluminous

anti-Semitic text, but during and after the Affair it quickly became the bestselling book in France and went through over 200 editions (Busi *Drumont* 4). While the Affair, with its respective camps Dreyfusard and anti-Dreyfusard, did not ultimately destroy French society as people feared, it resonated intensely throughout twentieth century.

The Affair inspired a range of literary and artistic endeavors from Emile Zola's famous "J'Accuse" and the infamous *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, to now forgotten Anti-Dreyfus cartoons by the anti-Semitic "Gyp" (Hyman 107), and novelties like souvenir buttons, cigarette cases, sheet music, and even board games (Derfler 3). The literature of the Affair was often either anti-Semitic or to a much lesser extent pro-Semitic, with little gray area in between (Wolitz 158). Along with their starkly contrasted viewpoints, both anti-semitic and pro-semitic texts shared the ignominious quality of being poorly and broadly written.

The notable exception to this trend is an author often accused of being apolitical, Marcel Proust (M. Schmid 961). In *A la recherche du temps perdu*, Proust renders the Affair, and in particular its effects of French society, with a sensitivity and a critical acuity that borders on the sociological. The Affair is much more than merely an incidental event that provides the background noise for the narrator's larger themes like love, art, and time. Instead, this chapter contends that the Affair is one of the fundamental structuring devices of the *Recherche* as a whole.

As early as *À l'ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs* Proust anticipates the trial and the effects it will have on society in the narrative. In the middle volumes, *Le côté de Guermantes* and *Sodome et Gomorrhe* the Affair is the central axis along which people are divided. Afterwards, the closing volume, *Le temps retrouvé,* demonstrates the way the "kaleidoscope" of society has flipped because of the Affair. Indeed, the people who start out as parvenus, Odette, Mme

Verdurin, Gilberte, Bloch, and Rachel, all become the social leaders of the Faubourg St. Germain because of the Affair. Meanwhile, many of the characters who are either actively or passively Anti-Dreyfusard and anti-Semitic, the Duchess de Guermantes, M. de Charlus, and Albertine, end up *déclassé*, as good as dead, or actually dead. The difference between the three is, of course, negligible in high society.

At the same time that social fortunes reverse, so do notions of Jewishness. Characters' status as Jews depends on their relationship with the Affair. Moreover, the expression of their Jewishness is not merely cultural but also physiological; characters go through physical changes that make them appear more racially Jewish. As with the other authors covered in this dissertation, Jewishness thus functions as a latent quality that becomes manifest in times of crisis. While the racial marking of Jews is not as pronounced in Proust as it is in the more concretely postwar novels of Faulkner and Musil, it still reveals the basic mechanism behind anti-Semitic conspiracy theory. Conspiratorial semiosis is a means to solve a short term epistemological crisis that is the result of more long term forces.

Beyond being a plot structuring agent, the lack of objective evidence in the Affair and its conspiratorial air, inflect the epistemology of the work. The limited, often claustrophobic, and sometimes dishonest narration of the *Recherche* replicates the way in which the Affair required people to renegotiate social norms and provisional truths. Rather than allowing for an outside, static perspective on characters, Proust's narrator creates a realm of free-floating and colliding subjectivities that may or may not be forthright. It is the reader's task to disentangle this web and search for its center. Yet, by grasping one strand the reader disturbs another. The center of the novel constantly shifts depending on the perspective of the reader, in much the same way that peeling away one layer of a conspiracy will only reveal another layer.

Aesthetically, the novel also reproduces the same desire of conspiracy texts to be all encompassing. Not only does it try to capture the politics, art, entertainment, fashion, and popular culture of the Belle Époque in the lambent amber of the narrator's prose, it also moves at a glacial pace covering on average two days per page. In the case of the matineé chez la princesse Guermantes set piece, Proust uses well over a hundred pages to document a few brief hours. This attempt to weave even the minutest details into the text speaks to a desire to capture lost time. In much the same way, conspiracy texts are organized around a single event that brought the downfall of a golden age. For many French anti-Semites this moment was, first, the Revolution, and then the Affair. For Proust such a golden moment never existed. The work constructed in the first six volumes is a house of cards to be summarily knocked down in the final volume. Unlike the conspiracy theorists who blame Jews for the fundamental upheavals in society, Proust does not blame anyone or anything for the changing world orders, only Time.

The Belle Époque, the Dreyfus Affair, and Proust

In his work on the French Right, J.S. McClelland states that to explain why the Dreyfus case caused such intense controversy would "require an account of the whole history of the Third Republic" (26). Indeed, Dreyfus's conviction for treason and the public firestorm that followed involved a number of long and short term historical factors. These included institutional forces like the media, the military, and the government. Within these larger institutional frameworks, the individual actions of men like Picquart, Zola, and Drumont all played a significant role in determining events. In the context of the *Recherche*, the most salient result of Dreyfus's case was that it shifted power away from the aristocratic class at the same time that it redefined notions of citizenship, specifically with respect to the place of Jews in France. Counterintuitively, the trial

improves the status of Jews in France, while at the same time inspiring and amplifying the spread of anti-Semitic discourse in Europe and America.

The Affair brought such fundamental and sweeping changes because it involved the very highest levels of the military and the government. To understand how their actions could bring the Third Republic to the point of collapse, a rough outline of the events is necessary. In 1894, it was discovered that someone in the War Ministry had been leaking secrets to the Germans. The General Staff, incompetently – but not necessarily insidiously (Cahm 4) – laid the blame on the Jewish Alfred Dreyfus with little evidence. The case against Dreyfus was insubstantial and a conviction did not look likely. That was until the press, and in particular the anti-Semitic Drumont, found out about it. The Catholic firebrand loudly proclaimed that there was a Jewish traitor in the French General Staff (Bredin 75 - 76). Fearing public embarrassment, the ministry quickly moved to get a conviction. Dreyfus was found guilty in a sham trial and the matter was supposedly over. Two years later, lieutenant-colonel, Marie-George Picquart discovered that the actual traitor was the morally and financially bankrupt son of a general, Marie-Charles-Ferdinand Esterhazy. He tried to bring Esterhazy to trial, but the latter was acquitted. Meanwhile, Picquart himself was accused of forging evidence and was forced to stand trial. Around this point, January 13th 1898, Zola publishes "J'Accuse" in *L'Aurore*. In it, he accuses the entire French military and government apparatus of corruption and racism. The article sets off a firestorm and the Affair reaches its climax, causing anti-Semitic riots all over France and its colonies (Cahm 72). Facing mounting pressure, the General Staff has a retrial in 1899 and Dreyfus is once again found guilty, but with extenuating circumstances. He is pardoned several weeks later. Still, he is not fully rehabilitated until 1906. To the public, these intense struggles

over the fate of one man, made the military and the government appear incompetent at best, if not corrupt and anti-Semitic.

On a societal level, the Affair challenged the entrenched power of the lingering aristocracy and the very definition of what it meant to be French. It also heralded the collapse of a Centrist Republican government and the emergence of a left wing coalition that legislated the separation of church and state, thereby significantly reducing the power of the Catholic Church. This government was far more representative of the working classes and tended to eschew moneyed interest. In short, it posed a direct threat to the self-described Aryan Catholic aristocracy that ruled the social scene of the Faubourg St. Germain.

Moreover, the close knit nature of fin-de-siècle France meant that relatively few people had a tremendous amount of influence. In this respect, Drumont was a perfect example. Author of *La France juive* and editor of the highly influential anti-Semitic newspaper, *La libre parole*, Drumont's incendiary writing stirred up a constant sense of panic among the French populace during the Dreyfus Affair. He was a well-known figure in the highest echelons of society, visiting Victor Hugo's salon in his youth (Strauss 502), and even dueling future prime minister Georges Clemenceau in a sword fight (Schwarzschild 20). His reach was therefore both indirect in terms of the media outlets he controlled, and direct with respect to his powerful acquaintances. Due to Drumont's ubiquity, there is a historical consensus that the Affair would not have occurred without his intervention (Busi "Dreyfus" 26). Even though his anti-Semitism did not have a long term effect on the Jewish communities of France (Marrus 284), it did influence a number of important anti-Semites in Europe and America, and inspired many later anti-Semites including Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the authors of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, and Hitler (Busi *Drumont* 100, 153; Field 173; Michelis 281).

Proust certainly knew Drumont, not only from his work, but also through their mutual friend, Alphonse Daudet. Daudet, the famous writer, was so close to Drumont that when the latter could not find a publisher for his work it was Daudet who helped him out (Recanati 12). It is very likely that Proust brushed shoulders with Drumont on occasion at Alphonse's salon.[1] It is certain that during Alphonse's funeral in 1897, Proust actually walked behind Drumont and Zola who were bitter enemies at the time (Painter *Marcel Proust, A Biography* 220). Whatever Proust may or may not have gathered about anti-Semitism directly from Drumont, he could have easily gotten from Alphonse's son, Léon, who was one of Drumont's most avid disciples. The young Daudet would go on to become the editor of the *L'Action Française*, the newspaper of the most influential extreme right group for the first two decades of the twentieth century (Arnal 16).

The influence of Drumont's work cannot be underestimated. He and his lesser known acolytes were responsible for popularizing racial anti-Semitism. In the decades before *La France juive*, there had been a growing discourse of racial inequality. The genesis of this discourse is often attributed to Gobineau whose *Essai sur l'inegalite des races humaines* (1856) is a racial re-imagining of history. Although not anti-Semitic, Gobineau argued that there were three distinct races, black, yellow, and white. Within the white race there was a special subcategory of Aryans, who represented the most superior of all the races (Fortier 342). Entirely unconvincing in his logic, Gobineau was, nevertheless, an immensely talented prose stylist and much admired by Proust and his friends (Spiro 106). Gobineau's basic idea of a racial history of mankind had widespread implications and influence across Europe and the Atlantic.

One of the places where his theories were cropped up was post-Unification Germany. Here the concept of Aryan superiority were useful to the young German nation. While these Germanic theories will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6, suffice to say here that he

probably influenced Wilhelm Marr (Schleunes 26). Marr, an otherwise obscure journalist, took Gobineau's racial framework and imagined a racial war between Aryan's and Semites, and likely coined the term anti-Semitism around 1879 in the process. This concept quickly gained currency when it was adopted by the most influential racial theorist of the German Empire, Heinrich von Treitschke (Volkov 230; Zimmermann 112 - 113). The new racial language significantly shifted the dynamics of the already tense relationship between Jews and Christians. Rather than simply belonging to a different religion, Jews now represented a race distinct from that of the Aryan. Since the races were inimical to each other there is no other way to resolve the conflict other than mutual extermination. While the doctrine was intended as scientific, it was very much tied to the *Völkisch* anti-Semitism popular at the time. This anti-Semitism tried to redeem German culture through its folk traditions, and, as such, Marr's anti-Semitism is far more mythological than racial.

Meanwhile, Gobineau would also be important to his fellow Frenchmen. He influenced the anthroposociologist, LaPouge, who refined Gobineau's specious racial mythology and gave it scientific credibility (Jackson and Weidman 108). Like Gobineau, he conceived of all history as a race struggle. Unlike Gobineau, he only identified two races: the superior dolichocephalic (long-headed) and servile brachycephalic (round-headed) peoples (Llobera 104). Although not overtly anti-Semitic, his divisions often relegated Jewish characteristics to the racially inferior brachycephalic category. Importantly for LaPouge, these two groups did not have distinct national identities, instead they existed everywhere in some measure or other. As we will see in later chapters, Anthropometrists like LaPouge gave an air of credibility to scientific racism. In fact, Alphonse Bertillon, who was involved with making a case against Dreyfus was from the anthropometric division of the Prefecture of the Police (Harris 23). Drumont borrowed heavily

and quite inaccurately from LaPouge's painstaking anthropometric research, much to the chagrin of the former (Hecht *End of the Soul* 189). Unlike LaPouge though, Drumont was convinced that most Aryans were of French origin. As such, he appropriates this racial language at the behest of a nationalist anti-Semitism.

Drumont's inflammatory rhetoric took LaPouge's questionable but mundane statistical science and fused it with the propagandistic *Völkisch* anti-Semitism coming out of Germany. In an ironic twist, he left the inspiration for both discourses, the racial language of Gobineau, largely untouched because it was not anti-Semitic enough (Busi *Drumont* 60). The mixture of the two substantially different discourses, scientific and mythical, made for a particularly potent form of hate speech. The race struggle between Jews and Aryans was no longer the slow complex process of Darwinian racial selection, but a Manichean battle between two distinct races "irreconcilably hostile towards one another" (14).[2] His theory's wildly simplistic conclusions and freewheeling inconsistencies did not hinder his argument, rather they were the very vehicles that fueled it.

The work's strength lay in its ability to cast Jews as both a dangerous physical menace, while at the same time being an almost invisible threat to society. On the surface, the apparent contradiction between visibility and invisibility would seem to counteract the efficacy of the argument. It is, in fact, the central epistemological principal that gives the theory such immense power. It explains that the concrete evils wrought by modernity – industrialization, beaurocratization, secularization – by blaming the visible presence of Jews, while at the same time maintaining that the abstract evils of modernity – fragmentation, alienation, chaos – were also wrought by the presence of invisible Jews. This powerful duality is one that will reticulate throughout all the prominent conspiracy theories about Jews.

Nowhere is this duality more apparent than in Drumont's hyperbolic description of Jews. On one page of his massive two volume, 1200-page tome he notes that Jews can be recognized for their:

> famous hooked nose, blinking eyes, closely set teeth, prominent ears, square fingernails instead of round almond shape ones, excessively long torso, flat feet, round knees, exceptionally outturned ankles, the soft and melting hand of a hypocrite and a traitor. Often one arm is shorter than the other. (39)[3]

The portrait he paints of Jews is both monstrous and highly visible. The effect is to create the image of a perfect monster from which individual characteristics can be projected onto actual Jewish people. After all, the chances of such a decrepit creature stalking the streets of Paris are very small, but the chances of any person exhibiting one of these descriptions is not unreasonable. As such, a personal defect is abstracted into a "Jewish" defect. In Proust, these "Jewish" defects will be read retroactively onto the bodies of the Dreyfusards once the crisis hits the salons.

Several pages later Drumont argues that Jews are precisely so insidious because of their apparent normality and invisibility. He complains that:

> The Jews disguise as liberal thinkers…who put their Jewish qualities in their pocket and persecute Christians in the name of the glorious principles of tolerance and the sacred rights of liberty. The conservative Jews, Christian in appearance, hand over useful secrets to their comrades. (54)[4]

This invisibility might seem to contradict the earlier notion of Jews as highly visible. Quite the opposite is true, it follows conspiracy logic perfectly. Jews are dangerous not only because they are monstrous and visible, but precisely because they are invisible. The fact that it is impossible

to "prove" that Jews are responsible for a massive world conspiracy, must mean that they are cunning enough to cover it up. This logic is very much present among the Anti-Dreyfusards in the *Recherche*. The Duc claims that they "can't produce the proofs of Dreyfus's guilt" because "he's the lover of the War Minister's wife" (*III* 320).[5] He thus sees the lack of evidence against Dreyfus as merely another form of evidence for a far deeper conspiracy.

There is no way out of this viciously circular logic. Indeed, it is a logic that Drumont will apply indiscriminately to any possible Jewish machination. What is particularly tragic is that once this logic is in place, it is almost impossible to stop. This is why the subsequent trial of Esterhazy did little to assuage flaring temperaments; it was merely evidence of a much larger conspiracy. It would take the entire collapse of the government and a radical shift in politics to unseat Drumont from his powerful position. By that time, much of the damage had been done, as will become clear later: the genie was out of the bottle.

Proust's own relationship to the Affair and anti-Semitism and their subsequent appearance in the *Recherche* has been extensively documented by other scholars. This scholarship seems to fall into two basic camps. One camp tends to rely on largely Freudian psychoanalytic models that view Proust's Jewish characters as a combination of his social anxiety about being Jewishness and his desire for his Jewish mother. In this vein, Sherban Sidéry even, quite implausibly, states that, "the Jewish elements of his [Proust's] psychology refused to allow themselves to be forgotten" (Sidéry 94). A second group of scholars interprets Jewishness in Proust as the result of his belief in biological determinism. That is, Jews cannot escape their racial instinct.

While this scholarship, collectively, has done much to reveal Proust's biographical and historical indebtedness to concepts of Jewishness, both sets of readings tend to fall into a trap

tragically common to Proust scholarship: conflating Marcel Proust with Marcel the narrator (Landy 91). True, Proust was raised Catholic, but was also half-Jewish on his mother's side. He was deeply affected by the anti-Semitism of the Affair, and years later would claim that he was the first Dreyfusard (Painter *Proust; The Early Years* 273). Still, this does not mean that the text's Catholic Dreyfusard is the same as the author. Instead of taking sides, Proust is more concerned with showing how the Affair affected society (Chesney 882).

Furthermore, while it is also true that Proust was to some extent influenced by the racial determinism theories of Maurice Barrès in his youth, these views do not necessarily carry over into his work. Proust recognized that he was neither Jewish nor non-Jewish, instead he was an artist and that his path is determined not by biology but by the individual choices and accidental relationships that turn Marcel into a writer (David 919).

Moving beyond these two schools of thought, it is more productive to see Proust's account of Jewishness as fluid, and determined by the context and the narrator. In a time of national crisis like the Dreyfus Affair, people with Dreyfusard opinions suddenly become more Jewish in the eyes of the characters. Meanwhile, in periods of stability Jews are able to intermingle, even assimilate with high culture. At the same time that characters in the novel treat Jews as more or less Jewish, the perception of the narrator is also changing, and therefore the lens with which he views Jewishness is also distorted. This is not the same as saying that Proust had a scapegoat theory of Jewishness. Such a theory would suggest, that Jews are a quick and simple group to blame for large and complex problems. Instead, Proust is showing something more sophisticated. For him, Jewishness is a category that is always present, but only becomes visible when long term problems explode into a short term epistemological crisis. His subtle reading of society therefore incorporates the fact that Jews were circulating in society regularly

and were not outsiders who were easy targets. Furthermore, by having the narrator perceive Jews more and less Jewish racially, Proust shows that these racial constructions are not biological facts but entirely subjective projections.

Quite consistently, Jews and Jewishness function in much the same way as other major themes in the *Recherche*. That is, they are subject to the narrator's projections, his actual experience of them, and then the memory of his change in perspective. There is therefore a tension between the narrator's idea of an object and its actuality. Just as the narrator finds out that the church at Balbec does not overlook the cliffs, the Duchesse de Guermantes is a mortal, and Albertine is not his true love, Jews are not what he imagines them to be.

While this technique of projection and revelation runs throughout the narrative and will be dealt with in regard to specific characters, it is instructive to work through Proust's most explicit example in order to frame the discussion. By the middle of the *Le côté de Guermantes*, the narrator's childhood Jewish friend, Bloch, has managed to be invited to the salon of Mme Villeparisis. As he enters, the narrator reveals that the guests do not view Bloch as Bloch, but rather as the manifestation of a racial Jewishness. The narrator points out that while the guests may read into Bloch's appearance a type of mythical Jewishness, in actuality "to speak of racial persistence is to convey inaccurately the impression we receive from the Jews, the Greeks, the Persians, all those peoples whose variety is worth preserving." The impression is inaccurate because it is derived from classical art and ancient ideal forms. These classical images are "superficial," and when someone sees an actual Jew these images acquire depth and extend "into three dimensions." Thus, when Jews physically enter salons, the predisposed images the Christian salonards carry around suddenly become animated, and it "makes them [Jews] appear stranger still." This strangeness is caused by the discrepancy between the idea that people have

of race and the actual embodiment standing before them. Proust's metaphor for this is that of an overexposed photograph. It strikes the narrator that if he had made photographs of Bloch in the Villeparisis drawing room, "they would have given an image of Israel identical with those we find in spirit photographs – so disturbing because it does not appear to emanate from humanity, so deceptive because it none the less resembles humanity all too closely" (254-55).[6] There is thus a spectral quality to race that becomes visible when a person's actions align with preconceptions and prejudice. For Proust, this spectral Jewishness becomes visible during the Dreyfus Affair.

By reading Jewishness contextually it is possible to account for the changing social status of individual Jewish characters, while at the same time recognizing the narrator's own development and therefore his own shifting perceptions. Thus, as Swann, Bloch, Rachel, and Gilberte change throughout the novel, so does the perception of them by the narrator. Meanwhile the narrator himself is changing, which therefore changes how he himself perceives. The perception of Jews is therefore not separate from the text but thoroughly integrated in its epistemology and aesthetics. In doing so, Proust actually exposes the logic of conspiracy theorists like Drumont who attack Jews for their monstrous visibility in times of crises and fault them for their nefarious invisibility in relative calm. Since these changing perceptions are most visible in the shifting character descriptions, it is best to read the *Recherche* in light of individual character development rather than an overarching plot.

Representations of Jewishness

Swann – The Insider Ousted

The most prominent Jewish character in the *Recherche* is also its hero: Charles Swann. Proust based Swann on Charles Haas, the son of a wealthy Jewish industrialist who was a regular habitué of literary and artistic salons, a member of the Jockey Club, a former lover of Sarah Bernhardt, and who, ironically, the author did not know very well (Tadié 320 - 322). Like Haas, Swann represents the height of Jewish assimilation into French society at the end of the nineteenth century. Smart, debonair, and attuned to the sensibilities of the haute société de Faubourg St. Germain, he befriends artist and aristocrat alike. His acceptance into French high society speaks both to his redeeming personal qualities, and, to some extent, to the salon fashion of the day to incorporate people deemed transgressive and dangerous, like Jews and homosexuals, as a form of excitement (Chesney 882-883).

Although his relationship with the disreputable Odette de Crecy sparks rumors in social circles, it does little to knock him from his esteemed pedestal. When Swann takes an aggressive Dreyfusard position he breaks two fundamental rules of salon etiquette: discussing political matters and being openly Jewish. His stance makes him a social pariah. This outsider status also manifests itself physically on the body of Swann. Not only does he become sick with cancer, the ravages of the disease and age coupled with his social ostracism, make him appear more Jewish at the end of his life.

Swann's tragic trajectory and social and physical punishment for being a Dreyfusard has caused some critics to argue that he is a mirror image for Proust (Ebert 196). Such an assessment is too simplistic given the complex inspirations for Swann. Instead, he is a prime example of how anti-Semitism functioned during the Dreyfus Affair. It was not the violent and vocal anti-

Semitism of the working class. Instead, this "civilized" anti-Semitism was a slow process of social exclusion, dehumanization, and ultimately elision from the very history of society.

This "polite" anti-Semitism will reappear in *Ulysses* and *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*, as it does so, it will become increasingly less polite and far more openly violent, so much so that Hans Sepp is allowed to call for the extermination of the Jewish race in Viennese high society without anyone batting an eye. Not only does this arc demonstrate the spread of anti-Semitism, it also shows how the educated and refined middle and upper classes were complicit in its dissemination.

Swann appears very early in *A côte de chez Swann*, yet he does not make a full appearance. He is seen through the dim light of the narrator's garden and described as having an "arched nose," "green eyes," and "a high forehead fringed with fair, almost red hair, done in the Bressant style" (*I* 17).[7] His identity, however obscured, is fair, almost Aryan. Not only is he physically appealing, his personality also speaks to his class, he leads a "brilliant social life," but does not mention this to the narrator's family due to the "reserve and discretion of his character" (*I* 19). Even though these are the youthful remembrances of the narrator who readily admits that "it is a labour in vain" to try to recapture the past, they establish Swann's imposing appearance and admirable personality as central aspects of his character (*I* 57).

Despite his unassailable refinement, there are already subtle jibes at his Jewishness in the opening volume. When Mme de Gallardon and Princesse des Laumes learn that Swann has been spotted at the salon of the highly regarded Mme de Saunte-Euvert they react with spiteful jealousy. They cannot bear the thought of a "Jew in the house of a sister and sister-in-law of two Archbishops" because "the converted ones remain more attached to their religion than the practicing ones…it's all just a pretence" (*I* 475-6).[8] While such aspersion is reminiscent of the

traditional Catholic hatred of Jews, it sets the pattern for the type of disdain people, especially unsuccessful social climbers, will have for Swann.

When the narrative skips back to the narrator's present in the opening of *À l'ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs*, there is already a significant shift in how Swann is perceived by his peers. When the narrator's mother expresses regret that Swann cannot make it to dinner with the eminent ambassador M. de Norpois, his father callously responds that such a dignified guest would never want to dine with such a "pestilential fellow" (*II* 1). His motivation for doing so stems not only from the father's own anti-Semitism, but also from his resentment of Swann's superior social position. After all, Swann and Norpois have known each other for a long time through the Guermantes set.

As the narrator spends the rest of the volume at Balbec there is no mention of Swann. In fact, in much of the next volume, *Le côté du Guermantes*, Swann is absent as well, and only brief mention is made of him in relation to Mme Swann. It is only at the height of the Dreyfus affair that Swann returns. The narrator has not seen him for a long time. He notes that he has greatly "changed," due to illness (*III* 793). Importantly, the narrator does not reveal how Swann has changed physically, only that he had become harder to recognize. It is only after Swann's Dreyfusism is revealed that the physical changes are perceived in a certain light.

Swann's Dreyfusism is perhaps the most outspoken in the novel. While in the candid company of the narrator, he claims of the aristocracy that, "at heart all these people are anti-Semites" (*III* 796).[9] He invents stories about the Prince de Guermantes that sound improbable: "he allowed a wing of his castle to be burned to the ground because he would have had to send for extinguishers to the place next door, which belongs to the Rothschilds" (*III* 797).[10] In much the same way that the anti-Semites spread lies and rumors about Jews, so does Swann develop

conspiratorial thoughts about the aristocracy's rampant anti-Semitism. His suspicions are confirmed when he reveals to the Guermantes couple that he is dying of cancer. Although both of them feign concern, the Duc's larger concerns are the Duchesse's black shoes which do not match her red dress, and they leave Swann to his own devices. The scene is by far the most famous snub in the novel, and is a taste of things to come for Swann.

Sodome et Gomorrhe opens with the narrator discovering M. de Charlus's homosexuality. After this revelation the narrator significantly changes his view of the world, and he interprets homosexuality in terms of Jewishness. In his mind, Jews and homosexuals have developed their own unique culture because they were persecuted. Both groups try to cast off suspicion of their true origin by "seeking out those who are most directly their opposite" and "denying that they are a race" (*IV* 22). At the same time that they denounce their culture in public they practice it among themselves. In order to do so, they have developed an elaborate system, whereby members, "recognize one another immediately by natural or conventional, involuntary or deliberate signs" (*IV* 23). Such is that case with both Swann, and Bloch, who have accepted that they need to keep their Jewishness to themselves in order to assimilate. When Swann reveals his Jewishness he is met with disapprobation and ostracism in the same way as Charlus when he becomes indiscreet about his homosexuality. In both cases, everyone already knew their "secret," but the polite thing to do was not to mention it.

In much the same way that homosexuality is suddenly revealed to the narrator, the revelation of Swann's Jewishness changes the optics with which people view him. Thus, before ever entering the salon at the Princesse de Guermantes, many of the guests, including some of Swann's oldest friends, already view Swann with a conspiratorial distrust. Even the duchesse Guermantes dreads shaking hands with him in such anti-Semitic surroundings (*IV* 98). Her

husband is more openly malicious towards Swann, claiming that he has, "always been foolish enough to believe that a Jew can be a Frenchman," (*IV* 104)[11] and that Swann has shown that Jews "are to some extent forced to give their support to anyone of their own race, even if they do not know him personally" (*IV* 107-8).[12] For the Duc, Swann does not belong to French society because he is Jewish. Further, Swann, in unabashedly expressing his Dreyfusard views, causes the Duc to suspect that there is a larger racial collusion happening among the Jews, which represents a "public danger" (*IV* 108). The idea that Swann, a dying socialite, would somehow be able to rouse and rally the Jewish masses is an absurdity. Nonetheless, since he has revealed his Jewish side, it appears to be everywhere.

The rabid anti-Semitism of the salon alters the perception of the guests and that of the narrator. When Swann enters, "all eyes were fastened upon that face the cheeks of which had been so eaten away by disease" (*IV* 121).[13] The disease, in accordance with his status as a social outcast, has changed the way his face is perceived, and his "Punchinello nose, absorbed for long years in an attractive face, seemed now enormous, tumid, crimson, the nose of an old Hebrew rather than of a dilettante Valois" (*IV* 121).[14] The narrator suggests that, "the race was making appear more pronounced the physical type that characterizes it" (*IV* 121-2).[15] Albert Sonnenfeld has read this passage as a confirmation of Proust's concern with racial atavism (31). Such a reading undermines the narrative position and the subtlety of this passage. The narrator watches people watch Swann, after just having condemned him in his absence. Their perception is skewed and so is that of the narrator. Hence, they and the narrator notice Swann's Jewishness more. It has become visible. His nose used to be absorbed by his face, but now it has become exposed. Before when they looked at his face they saw Swann, and now they see a Jew. While it might seem like "the race" is making a certain "physical type" more pronounced, the statement is

actually begs the question. If race is defined by type, then what defines type? That is to say, what does a Jew "look like"? Since these categories are not absolute, they are only matters of perception. Swann seems more Jewish because he acts more Jewish.

The calumny and the cancer take their toll on Swann, and he passes out of the scrutinizing gaze of the narrator. The latter learns about his death from the newspaper and is crushed by the passing of his old family friend. Particularly because the newspaper article reduces him "to a mere name, a written name, that has passed in a moment from the real world to the realm of silence" (*V* 263). Already the process of forgetting Swann has begun. The history of the once great man will be rewritten, and it will not be kind. His upstart wife and snobbish daughter climb the ranks of the Faubourg St. Germain to fill the space his death vacated. As they reach their social summit, Swann, to the dismay of the narrator, is written out of the annals of society and vaguely remembered as a disreputable "adventurer" who was Odette's first husband (*VI* 392). By going against the anti-Semitic codes of society, Swann disappears from its circles socially, physically, and ultimately, historically.

Bloch – From Ghetto to Drawing room

Whereas Swann's decline ostracizes him from society and erases him from its history, Bloch's ascent is fraught with adversity, but ends in full assimilation. As the childhood friend of the narrator, Bloch represents the Jewish mirror image to the narrator's own social climbing. In the young Bloch, there is still "a lingering ghetto-Jewishness" (Ebert 204). Proust reinforces this by giving him a Jewish surname commonly associated with anti-Semitic jokes (Wolitz 187). Bloch's path is therefore far more challenging than that of the narrator, and, indeed, his ascent is more successful than that of Swann (Hyde 840).

Not only does he have to fight the inherent hostility of the aristocracy, but he must also compete against the ranks of other Jews. The narrator describes him as trapped on the bottom of the ocean with, "the incalculable pressures imposed on him not only by the Christians at the surface but by all the intervening layers of Jewish castes superior to his own, each of them crushing with its contempt the one that was immediately beneath it" (*II* 442).[16] Paradoxically, it is Bloch's initial anonymity that allows him to enter society at the height of the Dreyfus Affair, because, "Bloch whom no one knew might pass unnoticed, whereas leading Jews who were representative of their side were already threatened" (*III* 253).[17] Despite this advantage Bloch's social indiscretions get him banned from the aristocracy throughout the novel, and it is only after the war that he is able to fully solidify himself within society.

Along his trajectory there is a particularly potent irony in the narrator's not always well-hidden scorn for Bloch's sometimes Machiavellian social climbing. This scorn is simply misplaced envy because, "The narrator's emphasis on Bloch's difference, of course, points accusingly to their similarities" (Wilkinson 982). The narrator engages in the very same behaviors as the Bloch, the difference is that Bloch's social indiscretions are attributed to his "Jewishness" whereas those of the narrator are simply the youthful foibles that prepare him to become a great writer.

In the narrator's youthful days at Combray, Bloch faces much of the same subtle prejudice to which Swann is subjected. For instance, when Bloch, or any other Jew, visits the narrator's house, his grandfather would "start humming the '0, God of our fathers' from *La juive*, or else 'Israel, break thy chains'" (*I* 125). The narrator apologizes for his grandfather claiming that these were just "little eccentricities" and that he bore them no "ill will" (*I* 126). This apology

is quite insincere, because after his first visit Bloch is promptly barred entry because he is not a Jew of the "best quality" (*I* 125).

For Bloch to assimilate it is essential for him to denounce his Jewishness. So when he finds himself surrounded by less assimilated Jews at the beach resort at Balbec, he is heavily invested in distancing himself from them. He shouts, "I am not in principle irremediably hostile to the Jewish race, but there is a plethora of them. You hear nothing but. 'I thay, praham, I've chust theen Chacop.' You would think you were in the Rue d'Aboukir" (*II* 433).[18] This open hostility towards his purported co-religionists is a means for him to boost up the social ladder by kicking the people below him.

Such self-serving tactics are implicitly deplored by the narrator, who paints a surprisingly nuanced picture of the Jews at Balbec. Despite their odd appearance, the narrator reasons that, "it is probable that this set of people contained, like every other, perhaps more than any other, plenty of attractions, merits and virtues. But in order to experience these, one had first to penetrate its enclosure" (*II* 435).[19] To the sympathetic narrator, the "set" of Jews must be governed by the same laws as that of the young girls at Balbec, and later as that of the Guermantes. The group has its redeeming qualities and its internal variations just like any other group; it is just that the observer is on the outside, so they appear to be one uniform block.

By *Le côté de Guermantes* Bloch has managed to curry enough favor to be invited to the salon of the Marquise de Villiparisis. The evening is an unmitigated disaster for the young arriviste. While the event opens with Bloch simply being comically awkward and clumsy, towards the end his openly Dreyfusard opinions are met with a palpable hostility. Throughout his social misadventure his Jewishness will transform from an interesting affectation into a

perceived threat to the salon. So much so, that the hostess ultimately denies him the dignity of a departing handshake for fear of seeming like a collaborator with the enemy.

The narrator opens the set piece ominously by explaining that, "It was true that the social kaleidoscope was in the act of turning and that the Dreyfus case was shortly to relegate the Jews to the lowest rung of the social ladder" (*III* 252).[20] Nevertheless, Bloch is allowed to enter the aristocratic world via Mme Villeparisis whose salon has fallen somewhat out of fashion. His entry is not particularly auspicious and he looks assimilated with his "goatee beard," "pince-nez," and "long frock coat" (*III* 253). He is clumsy and walks into things, but otherwise relatively innocuous.

Bloch comes to the attention of the guests when he unwisely starts to engage Ambassador de Norpois, an avid anti-Dreyfusard, about the case. Thus, Bloch breaks three central rules of the salon, talking politics, being a Dreyfusard, and defending Jews. Socially naïve, Bloch is convinced that he and M. de Norpois are merely engaging in polite conversation. Instead, their conversation attracts the attention of everyone present, and the situation in the salon starts to become uncomfortable. Rumors about Bloch start to circulate. The marquise Villeparisis worries that people, in particular the nationalistic archivist with whom she is talking, will suspect she has invited a "a Jew more or less affiliated to the 'Syndicate'" (*III* 319), a secret Jewish conspiracy. The idea that the fumbling Bloch would have any connection with a conspiracy is laughable. When Bloch wants to include the Duc de Guermantes into the conversation, the latter snubs the well meaning neophyte and replies, "Forgive me, Monsieur, if I don't discuss the Dreyfus case with you; it is a subject which, in principle, I never mention except among Japhetics" (*III* 334).[21] The open and hostile reference to Bloch's heritage makes the rest of the guests give him dismissive and apprehensive smiles. The archivist takes his apprehension further and wonders if

he is "a secret emissary of the Syndicate, come to collect information" (*III* 335).[22] When he reports this to Mme Villeparisis, she is horrified at the possibility. Her fear runs so deep that rather than shaking Bloch's hand when he leaves, she merely lets her "eyelids drop over her half-closed eyes" (*III* 335). Bloch is officially and very publically snubbed. In the forced politeness of the salons, it is a damning reaction to an outreached hand.

Certainly, such anti-Semitism is a far cry from the violence perpetrated against the Jews during the Dreyfus Affair. At the same time, the mechanisms through which rumors are established and the way people collude against Bloch are little different than those of Drumont and the other rabble-rousers. The only difference is that there is a strict etiquette against open anti-Semitism in high society (Ebert 202). It is a difference in degree and not in kind. As stated earlier, the extent to which these theories are amplified among the middle and upper classes increases exponentially after the war and during the Depression. For example, in Joyce's prewar Dublin the height of violent anti-Semitism is that the Citizen throws a biscuit tin at Bloom. Meanwhile, in the darker Faulknerian Depression era anti-Semitism, the Senator Clarence Snopes wants "drastic laws" against the Jews.

The exception to these polite social codes is M. de Charlus, who because of his extremely privileged lineage and increasingly erratic behavior is far more openly hostile in his vituperations against Bloch. When he and the narrator leave the party together, he accuses the narrator of having "foreign" friends. While the narrator protests that Bloch is French, Charlus replies that he, "took him to be a Jew" (*III* 390). The narrator defends his friend's loyalty to the nation, but Charlus dismisses it. Instead, he suggests that Bloch partake in an elaborate incestuous and sadomasochistic spectacle:

> For instance a contest between your friend [Bloch] and his father, in which he would smite him as David smote Goliath. That would make quite an amusing farce. He might even, while he was about it, give his hag…of a mother a good thrashing. That would be an excellent show, and would not be unpleasing to us, eh, my young friend, since we like exotic spectacles, and to thrash that non-European creature would be giving a well-earned punishment to an old cow. (*III* 391)[23]

Admittedly, in light of later revelations of about Charlus's desire to be beaten at the hands of young rogues, it is possible to read this as a projection of his own desire, as father figure, to be tortured by the young Bloch. Nevertheless, given Charlus's later comments about Jews, it is possible to understand this as the narrator does, as, "terrible, almost insane words" (*III* 391). Having Bloch beat his parents is a means to extirpate his familial blood. As the slightly more assimilated Jew, he must beat his parents, and overcome them like David did Goliath. For as long as Bloch does not overcome his bloodline, he will remain an "Asiatic spectacle" in the eyes of Charlus and perhaps the rest of the salon as well (*III* 392).

Later this need for Bloch to contain and quarantine Jewishness is amplified in *Sodome et Gomorrhe.* It is ironically Swann who is the very person to put Bloch in his place. When the aspirant asks Swann to get the Prince de Guermantes to sign a pro-Dreyfus petition, the more seasoned socialite tells him that such a request is impossible because it would put the Prince in a compromising situation. Furthermore, Swann himself refuses to sign the petition because he considers it too "Hebraic" (*IV* 152). The moment provides a temporary setback to Bloch, but it is also a moment of transition. By not putting his name down, Swann does not record his Dreyfusism in the scrolls of salon history. As such, he will be misremembered and forgotten in

salon society. Additionally, the incident actually represents an exact transition point between Bloch and Swann. The former will overtake the latter in social status precisely because of his Dreyfusism.

Despite his ultimate acceptance, his path to society is fraught with obstacles. When Charlus learns that the Blochs have bought his former family estate, La Commanderie, he becomes irate. He feels that this is out of an inherent Jewish racial desire to sacrilege Christian places, "As soon as a Jew has enough money to buy a place in the country he always chooses one that is called Priory, Abbey, Minster, Chantry" (*IV* 688).[24] Like Swann, Charlus believes that Jews should keep to themselves. He even suggests confining them to one quarter of town and suggests that Bloch should live in the "Juddengasse of Paris," because, he reasons, "a ghetto is all the finer the more homogeneous and complete it is" (*IV* 690).[25] Charlus thereby anticipates the exclusionist logic that will lead to the later forceful exclusion of Jews into ghettoes.

Bloch's successful assimilation will take twenty years. He has managed to blend in at the final *matinee* of the novel by significantly altering his appearance. When the narrator sees him, he barely recognizes him. Bloch was no longer Bloch; he has adopted the name and style of Jacques du Rozier, thereby denying his blood lineage. Instead of being Jewish, he has an "English chic." His curly hair is now "brushed flat" and his nose "remained large and red," but this could be attributed to a "permanent cold" which also explained his "nasal twang." Due to these changes, "his Jewish nose was now scarcely more visible than is the deformity of a hunchbacked woman who skillfully arranges her appearance" (*VI* 384). So whereas Swann's "Jewish" nose protruded from his face as he became more Dreyfusard, Bloch's nose curiously, recedes back into his face as he assimilates. Of course, both noses are the same throughout, but their perceived racial quality changes depending on the context.

The most important accessory to cover his Jewishness is his monocle, which "By introducing an element of machinery into Bloch's face…relieved it of all those difficult duties which a human face is normally called upon to discharge, such as being beautiful or expressing intelligence or kindliness or effort" (*VI* 384- 385). Apparently emotionless and stale, Bloch has become a successful member of the aristocracy. It is ultimately a pyrrhic victory, as the narrator realizes that society is a "néant"; a void and a frivolous waste of time (Chesney 876). Bloch has arrived at the top, but at a great cost to himself. It is a final touch of irony that his last name should be "du Rozier." Wolitz points out that this is the name of the most prominent Jewish street in Paris (205). Bloch, in trying to outrun his past, inadvertently exposes his Jewishness.

Rachel and Gilberte – Jewish Women as Salomé and Salonard

Beyond Jewish men, two Jewish women play a significant role in the *Recherche*: Rachel and Gilberte. The two women, twinned through their relationship with Robert Saint Loup, face inverse social pressures due to their Jewishness.[26] As Gilberte climbs socially her Jewishness becomes more apparent, while that of Rachel becomes less apparent as she reaches the top. For each, their Jewishness is a latent category that only becomes manifest in relation to society.

Despite their somewhat less prominent place in the novel, Proust portrays their position with a remarkable sensitivity. He aptly demonstrates that Jewish women and women with Jewish roots had a fundamentally different experience in society than men. Indeed, as Sander Gilman has pointed out, albeit in a German context, that as both a woman and a Jew, Jewish women represented two contradictory categories as both complementary to man, but exclusionary to Christianity (Gilman "Salome" 196-197). Jewish women were both attractive but also somehow repulsive. As a result, the common stereotype that circulated because of this was that they were "fatal women" from a "sensual but sterile Oriental culture" (Bergman-Carton 55). At the turn of

the century, this stereotype commonly manifested itself as the Salome myth. While Rachel is very much a representation of Salome, Gilberte falls outside of this category. Ironically, Rachel is able to ascend socially precisely because she plays the role of Salome. Gilberte, the daughter of a Jew and a prostitute, is very much Salomesque figure, but because she refuses to accept a position as either, is scorned by society for her background.

Rachel's social ascent is not as closely witnessed by the narrator as that of Swann and Bloch, but it is exceptional given her initial doubly othered position as both prostitute and Jew. In fact, she is so *déclassé* that she does not even have a surname (Hyde 841). Rachel faces calumny for her history as a prostitute, but unlike the Jewish males, not for here Jewishness. Her social climb is remarkable by any measure; she manages to go from prostitute to actress to finally performing at the Princess Guermantes (*née* Verdurin) matinee in the closing scene of the book. Throughout her development her Jewishness becomes part of her allure as an actress. Her relatively minor presence is significant because she broadens conceptions of Jewishness by demonstrating that only Jewish men were seen as threatening.

The first time the narrator sees Rachel is in an "inferior" brothel, to which Bloch takes him. He describes her as, "dark, not pretty, but intelligent-looking" (*II* 206). Still, she somehow manages to grab the attention of Saint-Loup and the two soon start seeing each other in earnest. The young nobleman is at her beck and call throughout the relationship, and she soon becomes the *femme fatale* that people expect of a "Jewess." She is "literary" and the pearls Robert gave her remind him that "she is a woman of great price" (*III* 216). Later, when Rachel does not get the necklace she wants, she suspects Saint-Loup of giving it to Mme Marsantes, and wildly claims that her name "smells of the race" and accuses her of being a "Jewess" (*III* 237). Of course, the complete irony is that Mme de Marsantes is not at all Jewish, and that Rachel is. Like

Bloch, she uses anti-Semitism to mask her own Jewish heritage. Yet, all of this is forgiven and forgotten when she performs at the Guermantes matinee. She has become the most preeminent actress of her time, and despite her bad acting and that she is now "old and ugly," she is more liked than Berma, the erstwhile famous actress who snubbed her in her youth (*VI* 459). The shift is largely due to changing social fashions after the war that led to a "Jewish vogue" (Ebert 201). Rachel is therefore able to climb socially because of a change in fashion, but not through any inherent qualities.

Interestingly, this "Jewish vogue" only applied to actresses and artist types like Rachel, who are in society but not of it. Gilberte has her Jewishness exposed precisely at the moment that she tries to enter society. There is little to no mention of her being Jewish throughout the work. In fact, the narrator even points out that there was "little evidence" of her Jewishness (*VI* 16). It is only when she marries Saint-Loup that this comes to the forefront. The marriage between the most eligible bachelor of the Faubourg St. Germain and the bourgeoisie daughter of a prostitute and a Jew represents a moment of crisis for society. The crisis makes her racial lineage visible and her actions are suddenly framed in the context of her Jewishness. For example, when she is in charge of running the family finances and refuses to spend prodigiously on her mother and her husband, the narrator asks, "what Israelite strain controlled Gilberte in this?" (*V* 931). Later during the war, she criticizes the French soldiers for their lack of civility, and the narrator suspects she will be derided for her, "Jewish internationalism" (*VI* 89). Finally, at the matinee the Duchesse de Guermantes, resentfully suggests to the narrator that in her new social position Gilberte had gotten away "from the slime where she belonged," that she had been unfaithful to Robert and had not mourned his death, and, finally, much out of character that, "she is a bitch [cochonne/pig]" (*VI* 499 – 500).[27] Her motivations for deriding Gilberte, the daughter of her old

friend and possible lover Swann, to such an extent are multiple. For one, it speaks to the inherent aristocratic resentment against Jews becoming part of society. Furthermore, the narrator points out that her use of the word, "cochonne/pig" so much below her social station, speaks to her downward social path. To be usurped in preeminence is all the more painful because the usurper is a young woman whose father was a Jew and her mother a prostitute. She cannot but represent her as both sensual and adultering, but also physically repulsive, a "cochonne." In short, Gilberte is fulfilling her role as Salome, precisely because that is what she is not trying to be.

Proust and the Epistemology of Prejudice

There is no shortage of works that deal with Proust and epistemology. Indeed, like the other modernists studied here, Proust had a deep, abiding fascination with the foundations of knowledge. Unlike other authors such as Joyce and Faulkner, this concern for epistemology does not subtend the text, but is treated explicitly in much the same way that Musil deals with epistemology later. The best source for Proust's epistemology is therefore Proust himself. Given the scope and length of the *Recherche,* Proust deals with problems of knowledge in a remarkably coherent and consistent fashion. He manages to create a system of thought that accounts for the individual's relationship to material objects, which translates into the relationships between individuals, and in turn how these individual relationships play out on a group level.

In essence, Proust argues that individuals always have a limited view of the world around them. As such, their relationships with other individuals are always to some extent provisional. On a national level, relationships between nations are determined by the collective and imperfect knowledge of one people about another people. Nations and peoples are therefore in a constant state of misunderstanding. Yet, since this misunderstanding is collective and not individual it does not appear subjective, and becomes objectified into a form of knowledge. For Proust,

confusing the subjective nature of national prejudice with objective fact is the cause of all conflict.

One firmly established opinion about Proust's writing is that it demonstrates the subjective nature of perception. Even though Vincent Descombes has shown that this is philosophically illogical, because subjectivity cannot be shared, while perspective by definition is shared (36 - 37), it is nevertheless an effective starting point of Proust's epistemology. In particular, because, despite its philosophical inconsistencies, it still argues for a mediated and fragmentary understanding of reality as a result of the limits of perception, something which is logically consistent with other modernist authors.

For Proust this imperfect version of reality manifests itself in time and language. In the case of the former, the understanding of an experience comes from moving forward through repetition while at the same time comparing that experience to ones in the past through recollection. Mary Ann Caws points out that, "The Proustian narrator, leaning forward into the present and future, in which the sensation may be repeated, however imperfectly, and its essence seized, at the same time leans back into the past experience, as it recollects and recalls" (284). Thus the narrator is constantly trapped between the uncertainty of the future and the ambiguity of the past. When trying to recall his past, the narrator, concedes that, "The past is hidden somewhere outside the realm, beyond the reach of intellect" (*I* 59). Since the past gives order and explanation of the present this epistemological gap creates problems in language. After all, it is impossible to speak properly about the world, if the world is not properly understood. He admits as much later, and claims, "The truth which one puts into one's words does not carve out a direct path for itself, is not irresistibly self-evident. A considerable time must elapse before a truth of the same order can take shape in them" (*II* 257). That is to say, the truth of a statement can only

be tested against other statements, which, in turn, are tested against yet more statements. This collectively of statements must be tested against the fallible faculty of memory. While this does not make communication impossible it certainly makes it imperfect. It is a model of language in which language and experience are in a constant tautological tension to define one another.

This imperfect communication carries over into personal interactions between people. In fact, much of the novel's principal action relies on people not meaning what they say or not saying what they mean. The consequence is that people can never really truly know each other. As Joyce Megay explains, "In the eyes of Proust every person, is, in effect, a closed universe, without the possibility of spiritual communication. Neither lover nor friendship are capable of overcoming this distance. Their bodies might touch each other, but there is not an interpenetration of souls" (55).[28] Thus, there is a fundamental language gap between people, which translates into an experience gap. Due to the imperfections of memory there is not a continuous experience of a person, but rather discreet moments in which a person experiences the other, which are all perhaps similar in some way, but not the same. There is no one essential version of a person, only the versions the narrator has encountered. Hence, when he kisses Albertine in the *Le côté du Guermantes*, he sees not one but ten Albertines, because, he "had sought to contain them all in the space of a few seconds so as to reproduce experimentally the phenomenon which diversifies the individuality of a fellow-creature, and to draw out one from another, like a nest of boxes, all the possibilities that it contains" (*III* 499).[29] There is no one Albertine, any more than there are singular, essential versions of any character, precisely because an essence would imply that such knowledge is possible.

While it may be possible for people to accept this problematic subjective position in their day to day interactions, it is a different matter where groups are concerned. Proust argues that

since groups of people are collectively observed the knowledge about them tends to become externalized and therefore has the appearance of being objective. We can think here, for the sake of simplicity, of a newspaper article about the Dreyfusards. By necessity this article will generalize the opinions of the Dreyfusards into one collective opinion thereby making it an objective fact disembodied from the individuals who hold it, even though Dreyfusards, as any group, held a range of opinions about the case. Part of his inspiration for this theory of social psychology were the sociologist, Gabriel Tarde, and the crowd psychologists, Gustave Le Bon, the latter of whom famously formulated that people in crowds acquire a "sorte d'âme collective/sort of collective spirit" (Fraisse 83). In this collective spirit people say and do things that they would not necessarily do as individuals.

Proust captures crowd psychology perfectly in regard to the Great War and the narrator's growing Germanophobia. He realizes that the judgment France has passed on Germany, as one of the vilest nations on earth, was really just the "objectification of feelings as subjective as those which had caused Rachel and Albertine to appear so precious" (*VI* 324). There is nothing intrinsic that makes the Germans evil merely the subjective interpretation of their actions. After all, many of the same men praised as heroes in their fight against Germany were condemned as the worst traitors during the Dreyfus Affair. The narrator postulates that an anti-Dreyfusard might object that it is not the "same thing." He deftly counters this by arguing, "But then it never is the same thing, any more than it is the same person with whom after an interval we fall in love." Since emotions are driving the construction of a different person or group of people, we feel that these emotions are somehow more unique than the past ones. Therefore the intellect creates a new rationalization for hating a collective. Such rationalizations might include "that it is against nature to have schools directed by the religious orders, as the radicals believe, or that it

is impossible for the Jewish race to be assimilated into a nation, or that there exists an undying hatred between the Teutonic and the Latin races, the yellow race having been temporarily rehabilitated" (*VI* 325).[30] In all cases, the new national enemy is merely the embodiment of old hatreds driven by miscommunication and misunderstanding. This is not to say that the Affair and that the War do not objectively exist in reality. Rather, it is to say that projecting hate onto one monolithic group strips that group of its individual subjectivity. This, in turn, facilitates conspiratorial thinking because all individual actions are not seen as the actions of one person who happens to support Dreyfus, the Germans, or the Church, but rather as a person at the behest of a collective. For Proust, the real danger in the inherent miscommunication between people resides in the capacity for misunderstanding to translate onto larger collectives. Indeed, as Julia Kristeva has pointed out, the Affair provides the perfect set of circumstances to test his theory of perception: "L'Affaire is presented as a junction of mistakes, excesses, imitations, changes of opinion, sincere contradictions, and ambiguities that are cravenly maintained." Adding that, "Truth is never partisan, for there can never be an 'appropriate' bias. In the end, and whatever one may initially or naively believe, everything is a pretext for schemes and abuses" (145). That is to say, the Affair itself becomes the central site of linguistic indeterminacy and suspicion, and it reveals the limits of humans to effectively communicate.

Proust's epistemology is remarkable for its heuristic potency. Not only does he manage to explain the individual's relationship to the world, but he also able to take that model and translate it, with relative fluidity onto larger social structures. In these larger social structures he demonstrates the logic behind anti-Semitic conspiracy thinking. People in essence transpose their personal subjective relationship with the world onto objectified structures of emotion. Once these objectified structures come into question, the observer has two options: accept that his or her

original presumption was flawed, or search for someone to blame for the discrepancy between subjective perception and ostensibly objective fact. In the case of anti-Semites, Jews thereby become one of the mechanisms to compensate for uncertainty in the world.

Aesthetics – Searching for Conspiracy, Searching for Lost Time

It is easy to get lost in aesthetic discussions about Proust. After all, much of the narrative is spent exploring the nature of art, the relationship between the artist and his or her work, and the relationship between the work and the reader. The topic is therefore a ripe site for scholarship. Yet, I would boldly contend that in relation to conspiracy thinking Proust's aesthetics can be reduced to and extrapolated from one sentence. It is actually a relatively innocuous sentence from *La prisonnière* that only stands out because it is somewhat longer than Proust's already notoriously long sentences. From this one very long sentence it is possible to deduce both the theory and practice of Proust's aesthetics.

In the sentence the narrator observes the Verdurin sofa at their summer estate at La Raspelière. This sofa, which has become a fixture in the Verdurin drawing room, represents to the narrator not merely the history of the drawing room, but also the men and women who peopled it, the conversations they had, the relationships they built, the time that passed over them, and, ultimately, the ideal, however vague, of the Verdurin Salon. The relationship between the narrator and the sofa is metonymic to the relationship between reader and work. The sentence does not only reveal the object being narrated but the narrative quality of narration. That is to say, as the narrator interprets the meaning of the sofa he also reveals the process of interpretation.

Since the sentence is quite long it makes sense to break it up into five sections. The first part of the sentence is the mise-en-scene of the couch, the way in which it is framed by the

objects around it. The second part could be considered the mise-en-histoire, or rather the framing of the couch as an historical object. The third part is the sofa and the people's lives it has touched. The fourth part reflects on the objects that people have brought into the salon, which have become part of the identity of the couch. Finally, the last, and longest part, details how the sofa and the objects around, function as an ideal representation of the Verdurin drawing room. The sentence, then, is this:

> [1] A sofa that had risen up from dreamland between a pair of new and thoroughly substantial armchairs, little chairs upholstered in pink silk, the brocaded covering cloth surface of a card-table raised to the dignity of a person since, like a person, [2] it had a past, a memory, retaining in the chill and gloom of Quai Conti the tan of its sun-warming through the windows of Rue Montalivet (where it could tell the time of day as accurately as Mme. Verdurin herself) and through the glass doors at la Raspelière, where they had taken it and where it used to gaze out all day long over the flower-beds of the garden at the valley below, [3] until it was time for Cottard and the musician to sit down to their game; a bouquet of violets and pansies in pastel, the gift of a painter friend, now dead, the sole fragment that survived of a life that had vanished without leaving any trace, epitomizing a great talent and a long friendship, recalling his gentle, searching eyes, his shapely, plump and melancholy, hand while he painted it; [4] the attractively disordered clutter of the presents of the faithful which had followed the lady of the house from place to place and had come in time to assume the fixity of a trait of character, of a line of destiny; the profusion of cut flowers, of chocolate-boxes, which here as in the country systematized their efflorescence in

> accordance with an identical node of blossoming; the curious interpolation of those singular and superfluous objects which still appear to have just been taken from the box in which they were offered and remain for ever what they were at first, New Year presents; [5] all those things, in short, which one could not have isolated from the rest but which for Brichot, an old habitué of Verdurin festivities, had that patina, that velvety bloom of things to which, giving them a sort of depth, a spiritual Doppelganger has come to be attached-all this sent echoing round him so many scattered chords, as it were, awakening in his heart cherished resemblances, confused reminiscences which, here in this actual drawing-room that was speckled with them, cut out, defined, delimited-as on a fine day a shaft of sunlight cuts a section in the atmosphere-the furniture and carpets, pursued, from a cushion to a flower-stand, from a footstool to a lingering scent, from a lighting arrangement to a colour scheme, sculpted, evoked, spiritualized, called to life, a form which was as it were the idealisation, immanent in each of their successive homes, of the Verdurin drawing-room. (*V* 380 - 381)[31]

This sentence, serpentine in its seemingly ceaseless array of non-relative clauses, appositions, prepositional phrases, and adverbials, can be broken down into a simple subject and predicate: A sofa calls to life the Verdurin drawing room. Indeed, in much the same way that Gerard Genette's very famously and somewhat facetiously summarized the *Recherche* by saying, "Marcel devient écrivain/Marcel becomes a writer," this sentence too is fairly straightforward in its relationship between subject and predicate (Genette 237). The key to Proust's aesthetics is the ambiguous space between the subject and the predicate. The sentence embodies the process

through which this connection is made: it is provisional, experiential, associative, and seemingly formless.

In the first part of the sentence there is a description of the sofa, but also the objects that frame it. The sofa cannot be viewed in absence of the objects that define its outlines and must be contextualized. This context is the new Verdurin drawing room at La Raspeliere. The establishment of place necessitates the invocation of time, and this humble sofa, ignored for the better part of five volumes, suddenly acquires a lifetime that goes back to the early days of the Verdurin drawing room on Rue Montalivet. It is an earlier time the narrator cannot possibly know about because he had never been there. The time and place of the sofa bring to the fore the people who made use of it and thereby the meaning they gave it. For the musician and Cottard it was a place of relaxation, while for the painter it was a place for inspiration. Beyond the people it affected, the sofa also evokes the material objects gifted to the Verdurin's. These gifts, although meaningless in themselves, are the physical traces of the friendships they represented. This collectivity of objects and memories calls into being the abstract concept that is the Verdurin drawing-room.

Such a narrative summary cannot come close to capturing the experience of reading this sentence. As the sentence, like the sofa, distends out in meaning, it pushes the limits of comprehension. The reader is forced to understand one singular discreet moment out of time, through a process of interpretation that is very much in time. The stark contradiction between no-time and time, makes the reader project forward towards the possible ending of the sentence, while at the same time recalling its beginning. While this process is possible with shorter sentences, it becomes impossible in more complex structures. As such, Proust highlights the impossibility of concurrently understanding being and becoming. In the former there is the

presupposition of a whole, while in the latter the whole is by necessity incomplete. Therefore, the sentence, the work, and for Proust, life, resides in this tension between being and becoming. More so, the capturing of this tension is actually what Proust might consider Art. It is a reading process that is constantly searching for meaning and coming closer to a whole, while at the same time the whole recedes over the horizon of understanding. In this process Proust reveals the very nature of interpretation, which is truly his intended object of representation.

The process is in many ways similar to that of conspiratorial semiosis. Here too the conspiracy theorist is endlessly striving to reveal, to uncover, to make visible, the true state of affairs in the world. He never arrives there because once you reveal a conspiracy it is by its very definition no longer a conspiracy. Therefore, boldly arriving at truth only deflects attention away from that truth onto a more likely truth.

These similarities between conspiratorial semiosis and Proust's modernist aesthetics are not accidental. They are both reactions to the radically uncertain landscape of the Dreyfus Affair. In both cases there is an attempt to trap reality within the covers of the book. Drumont spends well over twelve-hundred pages trying to document the conspiracy he sees everywhere, and supplements this with a ceaseless ream of articles over a period of years in *La libre parole*. For Drumont, the way for the separation between subject and world can be bridged is by showing how Jews are the cause of this dislocation.

Proust too, sees a society in disarray. He too goes on an extended search for lost time. In the end, he concludes that time is not lost, that the relationship between subject and world has not become confused. Rather, it has always been thus. The misapprehension between man and world is the very nature of existence. The solution to this fundamental problem is Art. It is not art as a product, but rather as a process. The critical inquiry required to bridge man and world, being

and becoming, relies on the interpretive processes of artistic production. For Proust, it is through artistic thinking that moments of unity can be found, and it is through this continuous critical process that time can be regained.

CHAPTER THREE

James Joyce
June 16th, 1904, Ireland, Dublin

Introduction

This chapter will show the influence of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories on James Joyce and *Ulysses* on a biographical, epistemological, and aesthetic level. It follows other critics in arguing that Joyce was profoundly dismayed by the hatred of Jews that surrounded him at the time of writing, and that by making Leopold Bloom Jewish he was trying to both address and undermine the logic of anti-Semitism. Accordingly, Bloom will face a range of anti-Semitism throughout his day. In "Hades" he faces the religious and economic hatred of Jews, and "Aeolus" is confronted by the Hellenistic ideas of the middle classes. This polite middle-class language is amplified into anti-Jewish nationalism in Barney Kiernan's pub and transformed into racial anti-Semitism in "Circe." In making this transition from religion to culture, and from nation to race, Joyce demonstrates an incredible sensitivity to the changing nature of anti-Semitism. While written about a period before the war, *Ulysses* already anticipates the far more pronounced racial anti-Semitism of the postwar period. The text thus serves as a logical bridge between the crude nationalists anti-Semitism displayed in Proust and the racial anti-Semitism present in Faulkner

and Musil. More so, in displaying a plurality of anti-Semitisms, Joyce highlights the fluidity with which Jewishness passes between the visible and the invisible. Indeed, throughout the novel, Leopold Bloom's Jewishness becomes visible in moments of epistemological crisis, particularly in the "Cyclops" and "Circe" episode.

Even though Joyce may have rejected the arguments of the anti-Semites, the epistemological framework through which he does so shares surprising similarities with them. Both argue that an ontologically coherent world underlies the inherent epistemological uncertainty of modernity. More simply, *Ulysses* and conspiracy theory argue that there are regions of unknowability in a knowable world. The crucial difference between *Ulysses* and conspiracy texts is what they do with the region of unknowability. While Joyce's style engenders this unknowability to highlight subjective nature of the modern human existence, conspiracy texts fill in these unknowable regions with one common trope: Jews.

These divergent epistemologies have remarkably similar aesthetic consequences. Perhaps an obvious point to make is that *Ulysses* and conspiracy texts are very large. The reason for this is that both are epics that try to provide a complete version of reality. They are therefore heavily steeped in a wide array of discourses mashed together in the most unlikely contexts. This internal discordance between textual elements encourages conspiratorial semiosis because every detail must be scrutinized, every fact be related to another, every part of the plot be evaluated and reevaluated, in order to arrive at a totality. For Joyce the point of highlighting this aesthetic is to demonstrate that no such totalization is ultimately possible. Meanwhile for the conspiracy theorist the totality is always deferred by nefarious forces.

Biography – A Portrait of an Artist's Jewish Man

While there has been a fairly consistent debate about Jewishness in Joyce, the most recent scholars, Marlyn Reizbaum and Neil Davison argue that Joyce was trying to represented the multifaceted and fluid nature of anti-Semitism at the turn of the century.[1] In this vein, Joyce recognized that anti-Semitism was an incredibly malleable weapon and pointed out that, "anti-Semitism is the oldest and easiest prejudice to 'prove'" (Ellmann *JJII* 709). Joyce would have become familiar with these different "proofs" of Jewish perfidy throughout his life. Growing up in Ireland, and going to a strict Catholic school like Clongowes, he was inculcated with the Religious anti-Judaism of the Church that purported that Jews had killed Christ, and in more extreme cases committed blood libel – using the blood of Christian children to make unleavened bread at Passover. These beliefs became the explicit topic of controversy in Limerick during the spring of 1904, when one of the Priests of that town started preaching anti-Semitic sermons. Joyce would have been aware of the controversy, and having *Ulysses* take place about a month after the controversy died down was probably no accident on Joyce's part (Magalaner "Limerick" 1223).

Another form of Jewish cultural denigration he encountered while studying at University College Dublin was the turn of the century intellectual fad of promoting Hellenism over Hebraism. At the University he read the works of Matthew Arnold and befriended Arnold's brother Thomas. Joyce shared affinities with this more intellectual version of anti-Judaism, until he started reading Nietzsche (Davison 113).

For a period in 1902, Proust's Paris, was also that of Joyce. Undoubtedly, the Irishman was exposed to much of the same nationalistic anti-Semitism that so deeply affected Proust. Although it is clear that Joyce knew who Drumont was, it is not clear whether he actually read

any of his work. Be that as it may, Joyce had plenty of opportunities to learn about Drumont's theories second-hand through his fellow Irish expatriate Finian Patrick Casey who was a fervent believer in anti-Irish conspiracies and a loyal supporter of the Irish anti-Dreyfusard and fan of Drumont, Arthur Griffith (Costello 202; Fairhall 176).

Yet, without a doubt, Joyce learned the most about Jews and the anti-Semitism they faced in Trieste. Once moved to the charming Adriatic city, Joyce made friends with Jews, most notably Ettore Schmitz (Italo Svevo), and found himself deeply tied to the Jewish community and the challenges it faced. Hence, most of his direct knowledge of Jewishness comes from his interactions with the liberal-secular middle class Jews of Trieste, who undoubtedly provide much of the inspiration for Leopold Bloom.[2]

In fact, before moving to Trieste Joyce replicated the same Jewish stereotypes as his countrymen. For example, in a 1899 essay on Michael Mumkacsy's "Ecce Homo" he describes a "well clad jew," who is "a rich man, with that horrible cast of countenance, so common among the sweaters of modern Israel" (McCourt 217). This roundly negative and easy caricature of Jews is increasingly brought into question in Trieste. Upon having first arrived in Trieste Joyce finds himself sauntering the streets during a Jewish holiday, only to find that nearly one third of the shops were closed. In his diary he remarks his surprise at noting that men like Morpurgo and Bolaffio were Jewish, whom he "thought thoroughly Italian" (217). He goes on to add, "One never really knows where Jews are" (217). This observation is interesting in two respects. First, it shows Joyce's newfound awareness of the presence of Jews in European civilization. Secondly, it also underscores the contradictory perception of Jews. Jews are both incredibly visible due to their purported physical degeneracy but they are also invisible due to their uncanny ability to mask their presence.

Despite Joyce's initial naiveté about Jews, he soon had a wide-ranging network of Jewish friends in Trieste and made an effort to be knowledgeable about their culture. One of the most important reference points for this is his purchase of Maurice Fishberg's *The Jews: A Study of Race and Environment* (1911) and Theodore Herzl's *Judenstaat* (1896). Critics have identified this as a central source for Joyce's knowledge about Joyce, because it was on his bookshelf. Along with Jewish writers, Joyce also spent his time familiarizing himself with Anti-Semitic authors such as Richard Wagner, Otto von Weininger, and Henry Wickham Steed. While in Trieste he would have also been exposed to the local anti-Semitic newspapers. These broadsheets espoused conspiratorial views and purported that the Jews were, "an effective force for cosmopolitanism and national decomposition" (McCourt 230).

As a result of these influences, Joyce was aware of a wide array of sources on anti-Semitism. Even in a relatively liberal place like Trieste there was a steady stream of anti-Semitism, and Joyce did not have to look far to find it. The most ironic instance of this is when Joyce himself was barred entry into Switzerland in 1939, because the border guards thought he was Jewish (Reizbaum *Judaic* 26). Joyce's interest in Jews was not a passing fancy, he saw it as a central question of European politics. Furthermore, his choice of a Jewish hero is quite natural, even if relative to the general European myopathy to Jewish issues he seems exceptional. Be that as it may, throughout his long but rather mundane day Bloom is confronted with many of the forms of anti-Semitism that Joyce himself encountered. There appears to be an underlying chronology that moves from the more subtle cultural and religious anti-Jewish slights in the opening episodes to the more vicious nationalist Jewish hatred into the racial anti-Semitism of "Circe." In doing so, Joyce traces a trajectory that increasingly amplifies the perfidiousness of anti-Semitism that climaxes in "Cyclops" and "Circe."[3] This trajectory not only indicates the

expansive and expanding nature of anti-Semitism, but, more importantly, the complicity of ostensibly less dangerous anti-Jewish biases in facilitating an atmosphere of intolerance and hate.

Hades: Religious anti-Judaism

The religious hatred of Bloom as a Jew is carefully woven throughout the Hades episode. Tellingly, this hatred is very implicit. Rather than outright vociferation, the trio that surrounds Bloom throughout this episode, Simon Dedalus, Martin Cunningham, and Jack Power, use more refined machinations to alienate their Jewish companion. As will become clear in the "Cyclops" episode their contempt of Bloom is only kept in check by the social veneer of middle class propriety. In Barney Kiernan's pub, Martin Cunningham's true feelings about Bloom will come to the surface.

From the opening exchange, it is clear that Bloom does not belong. Upon entering the funeral carriage going to Paddy Dingam's funeral, Cunningham beckons Dedalus to "Come on" (*U* 6.4). Bloom courteously lets Simon enter before him. Rather than thanking him, Simon Dedalus, simply replies, "Yes, yes" (6.7) to Cunningham, ignoring Bloom altogether. Cunningham asks, "Are we all here now?" and then adds "Come along, Bloom" (6.8). Initially, it would seem that Cunningham's "all" would include all four men, but it decidedly does not. He specifically means Dedalus and Power, and only adds Bloom as an afterthought, someone who simply has to "Come along." The scene establishes a power dynamic repeated throughout the episode and constantly reminds Bloom that he does not belong to the group.

This alienation becomes more apparent when the carriage passes by a "blackbearded figure, bent on a stick" (6.252), who turns out to be Reuben J. Dodd, a local solicitor, generally perceived as an unscrupulous moneylender. Cunningham quickly identifies him as part of the "tribe of Reuben" (6.251), suggesting, inaccurately, that he is Jewish (Reizbaum *Judaic* 13).

Simon quickly jumps in and declares, “The devil break the hasp of your back!” (6.256). The insult is met with approval by the men in the carriage with the exception of Bloom. Cunningham intercedes and admits, “We have all been there,” (6.259) looks at Bloom and adds, “Well, nearly all of us” (6.261).

The meaning of the scene is particularly fraught, because as is so often in *Ulysses* the events relate closely to Joyce’s personal life.[4] Whatever the biographical basis, the scene shows Simon directing his ire at the innocent old man, rather than finding fault with his own reckless spending habits and drinking (Osteen 169). Compounding his insults is the insinuation that Dodd is Jewish. The only evidence on which the men base this is that Dodd acts “Jewish” (Davison 59). More importantly, the other men in the carriage approve of the baseless anti-Semitism through both their laughter and verbal recognition. Cunningham even goes so far as to point out that Bloom has never had problems with moneylenders, because, once again by implication, he is Jewish and perhaps somehow in cahoots with Dodd. The accusations leveled at Dodd and by extension Bloom cannot but make him uncomfortable.

Bloom, perhaps in an attempt to fit in, tells an anti-Semitic story about Dodd. In the story, Dodd grossly underpays a boatman who saves his son from drowning in the Liffey. Before he can finish, he is rudely interrupted by Simon, who lobs yet another anti-Semitic jibe at him, yelling, “Drown Barabbas!” adding, “I wish to Christ he did!” (6.274). Pontius Pilate gave the Jews the option of freeing Jesus or Barabbas, a rebel thief, the priests convinced the masses to release Barabbas (Gifford and Seidman 110). On one level, Barabbas is a reference to Dodd, but it is also a more general aspersion against Jews.

In a very short space Jews are accused of both being usurers and Christ killers. The incident clearly has an effect on Bloom. While sitting the church he thinks about, “those jews

they said killed the christian boy" (6.771). The stream of consciousness leads him to a blood libel case undoubtedly because of the anti-Semitic slights of the other men and is part of the psychological build up that will explode later in the day.[5]

Aeolus: Hellenism versus Hebraism

These forces continue to build up around Bloom when he goes to work. Here as opposed to religious and economic hatred of Jews, his culture is belittled. While the cultural exclusion of Jews varied, it was usually disguised as Hellenism.[6] Although not the first person to popularize the term, Matthew Arnold defined it in his "Hebraism and Hellenism" chapter in *Culture and Anarchy* (1869). He basically argeed for two different genealogies of Western thought, Hellenic in which the main idea was to "see things as they really are" and Hebraic which desired "conduct and obedience" (Arnold 88). While both ostensibly helped shape Western culture, Hellenes came to be seen as "fancy free" and "live as they can," while Hebraics were associated with "straightlaced Victorian morality" (Theoharis 158).

Arnold's dichotomy was widely popular in Britain, and Joyce certainly knew of it, especially since he had class with Matthew Arnold's brother, Thomas Arnold (Davison 106). The theory may have served as a passing fancy of Joyce's for a short time, but Davison has shown that he rejected Arnold and moved towards Nietzsche's views on Hebraism around 1903 (108). Throughout *Ulysses* it becomes clear that Joyce, like so many other dichotomous constructions between Jew and Gentile, does not take Arnold's theory seriously either.[7] In fact, the entire "Aeolus" episode can be read as a parody of the Hellenism and Hebraism binary.

The episode pits the commercially minded and practical Hebraic Bloom against the band of Hellenics in Myles Crawford's office at the *Evening Telegraph*. Throughout the episode, Bloom is hard at work trying to place Alexander Keyes's advertisement in the newspaper.

Meanwhile the Hellenics, the ostensible saviors of Western culture, stand around gossiping, joking, having ill-informed discussions about culture, mocking Bloom, nostalgically looking at the past, and, in general, not really doing anything to further Irish civilization.

When Bloom goes to see Crawford in his office, the latter is surrounded by a group of men, most of whom do not work there. He cannot adequately get his attention and is forced to leave in pursuit of his advertisement. Lenehan spots Bloom quickly walking in the street with newsboys capering around him, and begins to "mazurka in swift caricature across the floor" (7.450). The dance mocks Bloom's supposed femininity, his jaunty way of pursuing his task, and is perhaps also a reference to his Jewishness.[8]

With Bloom gone, the proud Hellenes waste away the time with idle conversation. Most of this conversation is focused on promoting the Irish by way of the Greeks. Professor MacHugh draws elaborate parallels between the Irish and the Greeks. For example, both were proud cultures until they were forced to speak a language not their own, the Greeks had to speak Latin, while the Irish have to speak English. The only true path for Ireland is therefore oddly the Greek path. He proclaims, "The Greek! he said again. *Kyrios!* Shining word! The vowels the Semite and the Saxon know not. *Kyrie!* The radiance of the intellect" (7.562-3). Hellenism thus becomes an elaborate defense mechanism for Ireland's failures. Even though both Greece and Ireland have suffered terrestrial domination, they still preside in the world of the intellect. In their minds, Bloom will never be like them, because he does not know the "radiance of the intellect."

A few moments later, Myles Crawford surveys the room and concludes that he has gathered, "All the talents..Law, the classics….Literature, the press" (7.605, 7). By which he means, O'Molloy the solicitor, MacHugh the professor of classics, Stephen the writer, and himself the editor. MacHugh mockingly adds, "If Bloom were here…the gentle art of

advertisement" (7.608). Once again, Bloom becomes the subject of ridicule because what he does is not important in the minds of the men in the office. He is merely a doer and not a thinker. Yet, the joke seems to be on the self-aggrandizing men. After all, all the talents presented are hardly paragons of their field. Molloy is creeping towards destitution, MacHugh has a relatively vague understanding of Greek and Roman culture for a professor, Stephen is an unpublished writer, and Crawford spends his time looking at the past when a good newspaperman should be looking at the present. Of all the talents present Bloom is the only one actively pursuing any measure of success, though he never does get that Keyes ad.

Once Bloom arrives back at the office the men are already departing for the pub to grab a drink. When he stops Crawford to ask about Keyes's ad, the editor scoffs, "Will you tell him he can kiss my arse" (7.981). The unproductive response makes Bloom "A bit nervy" and he thinks, "Look out for squalls" (7.983). Bloom's trepidation no doubt stems from past experiences when Crawford rudely dismissed him. He makes one more attempt to get an answer out of Crawford who more angrily replies, "He can kiss my royal Irish arse" (7.991). The show of male bravado is not only meant to put Bloom in his place as one of Crawford's underlings. More so, it highlights the complete lack of respect Crawford has for what Bloom does even though the newspaper rests on Bloom's shoulders; without advertising, there is no newspaper.

The episode is thus an extended parody of Hellenism and Hebraism. While the uncreative and materialistic Hebrew, Bloom weaves in and out of the building trying to get work done, the self-indulgent Hellenics stand around chatting, smoking, mocking Bloom and preventing him from doing his job. However great the Hellenic ideals might be, they only serve as a pathetic substitute for actual labor. Besides, Joyce demonstrates the pervasiveness of anti-Jewish thought among the professional classes. These classes generally had an abstract cultural notion of

"Jewishness," and did not necessarily traffic in the more grotesque anti-Jewish stereotypes. As with the Hades episode, this passive middle-class acceptance of Jewish inferiority legitimizes the more extreme manifestations of anti-Semitism in Barney Kiernan's pub.

Cyclops: Irish Nationalism

In terms of anti-Semitism, the Cyclops episode is certainly one of the climaxes of the work.[9] This is the moment when so many of the insinuations that have been made about Bloom throughout the day come to a head. Davison contends that the episode is a "smorgasbord of religious, economic, and nationalistic anti-Jewishness" (Davison 215). While this is true, the religious and economic anti-Jewishness are utilized only in as much as they relate to the question of Irish nationalism. Arguably, Irish nationalism is most central in two significant ways. First, Joyce stresses the question of the Irish nation throughout the discussions that take place in the pub, that most Irish of political fora. Second, the form of the chapter undercuts the idea of a unified Irish nation. Whereas the men in the pub imagine a nation as a homogenous people, the radical heterogeneity of discourses that undermine what is said call into question the very possibility of a homogenous nation-state. After all, the very mechanisms that produce the concept of a nation over space and time: newspapers, books, advertisements, and textual culture generally, paradoxically counteract national hegemony through their often multifarious discourses.

It is this confused and garbled notion of the modern nation as represented by the microcosm of Barney Kiernan's pub that Bloom unwittingly walks into and further destabilizes. He is an aberration the men cannot account for in their ideal of Ireland, and therefore, on some level, causes an epistemological crisis. To wit, Bloom born and raised in Ireland is legally Irish, but because he is also Jewish he is somehow not "Irish." His presence thereby elicits and

provokes conspiratorial semiosis by the men in the pub generally, but by the Citizen specifically. Having no concrete conceptual mechanism for understanding the vicissitudes, deracination, and fragmentation endemic to the modern nation state, the men can only conceive that Bloom is not actually Irish and consequently is out to subvert their abstract mythical concept of a nation. The unified totality, the complete Ireland they yearn for, although extant in their minds, cannot fully materialize because the figure of the Jew disrupts it. For the bar flies Ireland will return to a halcyon, unified state of existence once they remove the corrupting elements. It is through the intense parody of this type of thought and action that the narrator reveals both its profound sadness and insidious threat.

The narrative structure of "Cyclops" is a significant departure from previous episodes (Groden 167). While the textual experiments could be seen as the mediation of the real world through a character's consciousness, in "Cyclops" there is both the voice of the narrator, Nameless, and the entirely unexplained voice of the second narrator. This second narrator, or the Arranger, interpolates everything Nameless says in often parodic fashion.[10] Yet, there is no justification for the Arranger, the voice comes out of nowhere. While several commentators have argued that both narrators are myopic in their understanding and therefore cyclopean (Sicari 110; Schwarz 175), this answer is somewhat unsatisfactory. It is not as if the second narrator is interpolating the other according to a regular pattern. Instead, it is doing so in a continuously new way. Hence, it is better to see the Arranger as the multitude of heterogeneous discourses that impact and subvert the Citizen's desire for a homogenous Irish narrative.

Before Bloom even enters the pub there it has already been imbued with an oppressive atmosphere of anti-Semitism and Irish nationalism. While, Nameless, the narrator, complains of his debt to a Jewish moneylender, the Citizen regales the patrons with glorious stories of Irish

history. When the Citizen spots Bloom outside the pub he calls him a bloody freemason" (12.300), and after he pops his head in to see if Cunningham is there, Nameless compares him to a snake who "slider[s] off" (12. 381).[11]

When Bloom enters the bar, it is as a definitive outsider. Still, he is relatively oblivious to their attitude against him, and in the brief span that he is there he quite innocently incurs their wrath by contradicting everything they say. The men praise an Irish hero's virility because he had an erection after he was hanged and Bloom points out that this is just a physiological reaction.[12] They ask him what he is drinking, he tells them he is not drinking. Then he proceeds to explain how he is helping out Dignam's widow after the funeral, but does it in such a complicated way that the men think he is scheming her out of money. The Citizen calls for the revival of Gaelic sports, and Bloom blithely responds that he likes tennis.[13] In short, Bloom manages to quite unintentionally belittle everything that is important to them, which only underscores his difference from them.

It is at this point that the conversation takes a darker turn. The next outrage the men in the pub aim their ire at is the Canada swindle case. Basically, a man operating under the alias Saphiro offered passage to Canada for 20s. While it is unclear who the man actually was, Nameless assumes he was Jewish and describes him in anti-Semitic fashion as "one of the bottlenosed fraternity" (12.1086), associating Saphiro's fraudulent actions with distinct racial features.

The discussion of yet more Jewish perfidiousness causes the Citizen to go into an anti-Semitic and xenophobic rant. Referring to Jews, he claims, "Those are nice things…coming over here to Ireland filling the country with bugs" (12.1141-2), and echoes the common association of Jews with disease. Bloom pretends to ignore the comment, while the Citizen abrades him, "We

want no more strangers in our house" (12.1150). Clearly, the Citizen is trying to rile Bloom, who remains unmoved. He even strikes at him personally by saying, "A dishonoured wife…that's what the cause of all our misfortunes" (12.1163-4). Ostensibly, the Citizen is referring to Irish legend, but certainly, he is also implying that Bloom is a cuckold.

Bloom ignores the ranting, and to the credit of the other men in the pub, they try to diffuse the tension by changing the conversation. To little effect though, the Citizen, now enraged, will not stop until he has provoked Bloom. He continues his ranting when the issue of the Gaelic language comes up, which is an excellent opportunity for him to berate the English. He calls it a "syphilisation" who have "No music and no art and no literature worthy of the name" (12.1199-200). Bloom, rather unwisely, tries to defend the British, in response to which the Citizen chronicle the glories of Ireland that he has cobbled together from specious and suspect folk tales, and, generally, historical untruths. To the Citizen, Ireland's glories stretched all the way across the Mediterranean, and that the Irish were known for their wool, lace, wine, and marble.

Whereas the men initially took a half-hearted interest in the Cyclops's myopic nationalism, like an infection his sentiment slowly starts to spread. To the mounting xenophobia, Lenehan adds, "*Conspuez les francais*/Scorn the French," (12.1389), while Joe, the earlier peacemaker, calls the "Prooshians" and "Hanoverians," "sausageeating bastards" (12.1390-1) and Queen Victoria a "flatulent old bitch" (12.1392). Seeing the rising tide of nationalism, Bloom tries to cool the unchecked sentiments by telling John Wyse, "Persecution…all the history of the world is full of it. Perpetuating national hatred among nations" (12.1417-8). Not only does his remark cut right into the Citizen's plundering of Irish history in search of jingoist justifications for his xenophobia, it also shows a profound understanding of how nationalism

could be appropriated for nefarious ends. Indeed, the men in the pub do not know anything of the war that will destroy Europe in ten years, but Joyce's readers would certainly catch the parallels to their own lives.

Despite his clarity at understanding the dynamics between history and nationalism, Bloom is at a loss as to how to define a nation. He bumbles his way through his definition, "A nation is the same people living in the same place," adding when pressed, "Or also living in different places." (12.1423-4; 12.1428). As a member of two nations, Bloom's confusion is understandable. The first definition of a nation is one of geography, and traditionally tied to the nation state and the legal concept of jus soli. This concept of a nation is particularly suited to Ireland. After all, no region is more geographically delimited than an island. Power may shift hands in the Ardennes, and Kings may rise and fall across the Apennines, but Ireland will always be bound by the sea. The second, ethnic definition of a nation as defined by jus sanguinis, is far more applicable to Bloom's Jewish side. Israel is not a nation bound by the sea, but rather a people at sea. What ties them together is their propinquity and sense of nationhood, irrespective of place.

Yet, both definitions are unsatisfactory. The geographic boundaries of a people are constantly shifting, even on an island, and, for the Irish, especially on their island. Meanwhile, people may self-identify as a similar ethnicity or race, but that hardly makes them a homogenous nation. For all of Bloom's Jewishness, he does not understand Hebrew, is unfamiliar with basic Jewish customs and rituals, and is uncircumcised. Nations are thus, in the words of Benedict Anderson, "imagined communities."

Bloom's seemingly inadequate response only elicits more hostility from the Citizen who asks him what his nation is. He responds, "Ireland…I was born here," and then adds, "And I

belong to a race too…that is hated and persecuted" (12.1431; 12.1467). While in the plot of the story Bloom is saying this as one continuous statement, it is important to note that he is interrupted by the Arranger who goes into exhaustive detail about an Irish tapestry. The effect is one of bifurcation with Bloom's Irish identity and Jewish identity as two separate things. Indeed, it is irrelevant to the men in the bar that Bloom was born in Ireland, all they care about is his Jewishness.

When Bloom reminds them of the persecutions suffered by the Jews, they try to rouse him into defending the Jews by force. He responds to their call for violence by suggesting "love." This directly contradicts the uncompromising, sacrificial, Irish nationalism that the Citizen has been pushing for during the past hour. It is further incentive for the men to see Bloom, and, in fact, all Jews as weak and effeminate. This, even though the Jews have managed to survive persecution much longer than the Irish.

Seeing tensions rise, Bloom leaves the bar in search for Cunningham. Once he has left Cunningham, Jack Power and Crofton arrive shortly after. In the mean time, the men show their true colors and slander Bloom behind his back. The nationalist infection that had been spreading around the bar, now breaks into a pitched fever. Reflecting on Bloom's motto to spread love, the Citizen proclaims that, "Beggar thy neighbor" is his motto, because he sees Bloom as stingy for not drinking (12.1491).

Lenehan suggests that Bloom has gone to the courthouse to collect his winnings from his bet on the racehorse *Throwaway*. Earlier in the day, Bantam Lyons had asked Bloom about the Ascot Gold Cup, thinking Lyons was asking about the newspaper he was holding, Bloom replied that he was going to throw it away, which the former sees as a betting tip. Bloom never bet on the horse, but everyone thinks he has. Suspecting that he is not sharing his winnings with the

men at the bar, Joe calls him a "bloody dark horse" (12.1558). John Wyse interprets Bloom's "suspicious" behavior as part of a larger conspiratorial plot, and suggests that he gave ideas for Sinn Fein's subversion of British institutions to Arthur Griffith. The plan, which involved defrauding the British government of taxes, had no connection to Bloom, other than the unsubstantiated rumor that Griffith had a Jewish advisor (Gifford 366). Despite the fact that the plot might actually help Ireland, Nameless interprets this as yet more Jewish scheming and laments, "Give us a bloody chance" (12.1578-79), as if Irelands woes can all be blamed on Jewish subversion. Questioning Bloom's loyalty to Ireland, Ned sarcastically asks, "Is he a jew or a gentile or a holy Roman or a swaddler or what the hell is he? (12.1630). To which Cunningham, his ostensible friend in the Hades episode responds, "He's a perverted jew." (12.1635). Thus when Bloom returns to the bar all the men but J.J. O'Molloy have turned against him and believe he is at best miserly, but maybe also part of Jewish intrigue to subvert Ireland. He is, in the word's of the Citizen, "A wolf in sheep's clothing" (12.1666).

Adding to the hostile atmosphere is Bloom's refusing to drink at the bar. Not only does it make him look effeminate in the eyes of the pub crowd, it also makes them believe he does not want to buy a drink or else he will have to treat. Furthermore, like the Cyclops in the original Odyssey, the Citizen and many of his compatriots have been drinking quite steadily. Nameless, Joe, and the Citizen have had no less than three pints in one hour. Even for seasoned drinkers, as they surely are, this would be enough to make them more volatile. In short, Bloom is walking into a proverbial hornets' nest when he returns.

When Bloom enters, the Citizen immediately starts verbally attacking him. Bloom, who had been docile throughout and simply ignored the Citizen, now stands up for his heritage. Cunningham and Jack Power, who see trouble on the horizon escort Bloom out of the bar and

into a jarvey. Meanwhile, Bloom shouts "Three cheers for Israel!" (12.1791). In a twist of irony he adds, "Mendelssohn was a jew and Karl Marx and Mercadante and Spinoza" (12.1804). While it is not clear which Mendelssohn he means, Marx and Spinoza were born Jewish but renounced Judaism, and Mercadante was an Italian Catholic. He thus provokes the Citizen through his own misunderstood version of Judaism. Davison points out Bloom's, "naming of 'non-Jewish Jews' is more a recognition of his own type of 'Jewishness' than a good defense of the Citizen's insults" (219). Consequently, he once again raises the question as to what constitutes Jewishness.

To further underscore his point, Bloom yells, "And the Saviour was a jew and his father was a jew. Your God" (12.1805). Fully enraged, the Citizen seethes, "By Jesus…I'll brain that bloody jewman for using the holy name. By Jesus, I'll crucify him so I will (12.1811-12). Complementing Bloom's own ironic understanding of history, the Citizen too does not see the manifest contradictions of his threat. Jesus was after all a Jew who was crucified.

The Citizen then takes the biscuit tin and throws it at Bloom. In mock epic fashion the Citizen, famed former shot-putter and head of the Irish athletic league, misses, thereby demonstrating the impotence of his anti-Semitic nationalism. Joyce underscores this point through a reference to the Dreyfus affair. The tin missile he throws destroys the façade of the "palace of justice" (12.1865), a building that does not exist in Dublin, but was the site of Dreyfus trial in Paris (Fairhall 176).

Meanwhile, Bloom too is mocked by the Arranger, and described with halo of light surrounding him while a voice from the sky calls him Elijah. The return of Elijah would mark the coming of the second Messiah for Jews. Bloom's somewhat bumbling defense of Judaism is

interpolated as him being their new leader. While the Citizen's physical prowess is undercut, so is Bloom's spiritual legitimacy.

Despite the mock epic tone of the closing scene, the episode as a whole articulates the dangers of nationalism. The power dynamics in the pub highlight middle class complicity with anti-Semitism's violent paroxysms. When Cunningham and Power first enter the pub, they do little to defend Bloom. On the contrary, Cunningham helps stir up anger against him. While Cunningham may have helped Bloom 'escape,' he was also one of the reasons why Bloom was in that position in the first place. When the middle class sits idly by and does not react to xenophobic rabble-rousers it gives legitimacy to a fringe contingent.

Moreover, the episode also shows how rumor and gossip quickly turn into conspiracy thinking. The individual facts leveled against Bloom are fairly innocuous. Yet, when combined in a pub setting with an already disaffected and disempowered group of people, the false accusations can quickly blossom out into an established pattern of abuses and betrayals, and finally these abuses are seen as evidence of a larger conspiracy. Indeed, the suggestion that Bloom of all people is behind Sinn Fein is patently absurd. Left unchecked these rumors quickly coalesce into a form of conspiracy theory.

Working against this mounting anti-Semitism are not only Bloom's own words, but also the narrative interruptions by the Arranger. Throughout the episode Nameless's text is interpolated and parodied thirty-three times in eighteen different styles (Gifford and Seidman 314).[14] The dizzying array of discourses calls into question the Citizen's demand for a unified and Gaelic Ireland. The very mechanism through which an Irish nation could be unified linguistically, print culture, is also the means of its increasing heteroglossia. There is no "Ireland" in the way the Citizen fantasizes about it, only a series of Irelands.

Circe: Racial and Sexual Jewish Degeneration

Bloom's earlier religious, cultural, and national exclusions all build up to the second, psychological, climax in "Circe." His escapades real and imagined at Bella Cohen's brothel are not so much about other people confronting Bloom about his Jewishness, but rather Bloom confronting himself about his Jewishness. Most if not all the anti-Semitism in this episode plays out inside Bloom's imagination, rather than in real life.

"Circe" presents multiple coalescing forms of anti-Semitism, and the abstract prejudices about Jews from Hades, Aeolus, and Cyclops, here turn into a more modern racial anti-Semitism. Interestingly, Bloom becomes racially marked and the person doing the marking is Bloom himself. The increasing anti-Semitism of the episode is directly related to the existential and epistemological crisis he experiences throughout the day. This internalization of the most severe racial language about Jewishness has to occur before Bloom can accept his origins and himself in order to be at peace with himself.

Bloom's first confrontation with these images occurs when he follows Stephen and the rest of the men from the laying in hospital into night town. He imagines that his father Rudolph appears, "garbed in the long caftan of an elder in Zion and a smoking cap with magenta tassels" (15.248-9). While several critics have pointed out the connection between this image and the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, it remains unclear whether Joyce ever possessed a copy of the text (Davison 96). Arguably, Joyce's familiarity with the document is somewhat irrelevant, given that its name had become synonymous with the worst type of anti-Semitism at the turn of the century.

Subsequently, Rudolph turns into a vulture and touches Bloom's face with his "feeble vulture talons" (15.259-60).[15] Bloom's transmogrification of Rudolph into a bestial form doubly inflects on his anxieties about his heritage. On one level, by portraying his father in this way, he

is revealing his shame and abhorrence at being the son of a Jew. On a deeper level, the caricature plays into popular theories that purported that racial degeneration entailed a return to atavistic forms. The vulture thus embodies both fears of paternity and ancestry.

This theory of atavism is further developed when Bloom comes before the jury in a mock trial about his indecencies with other women. Martha Clifford, Mina Beaufoy, and Mary Driscoll all accuse Bloom of sexual harassment. In his defense, Bloom claims, "I am being made a scapegoat of" (15.775). This further incenses the women, and they level ever more damning accusations against him. He tries to defend himself, but he can only give an "unintelligible speech" (15.899). The garbling is symbolic of the silencing he has been experiencing throughout the day. Bloom cannot speak on his own behalf because everything he says is used against him.

The only person to come to his defense is J.J. O'Molloy, the down and out solicitor, who if not altogether Bloom's ally in Kiernan's pub, was the only one who was not outwardly hostile. Unfortunately, the defense mounted by Molloy is riddled with the very same stereotypes that colored the court's biases against Bloom in the first place. He incorrectly claims that, "My client is an infant, a poor foreign immigrant who started from scratch as a stowaway and is now trying to turn an honest penny" (15.942-44). Bloom is by no accounts an immigrant, in "Cyclops" he explicitly states that he was born in Ireland. Additionally, his economic rise and thrift have fairly little to do with his supposed sexual indiscretions. The solicitor offers this version of Bloom, because it is the only one that the court, and probably Molloy as well, understands.

Molloy then moves into a racial understanding of Bloom and claims, "The trumped up misdemeanor was due to a momentary aberration of heredity, brought on by hallucinations, such familiarities as the alleged guilty occurrence being quite permitted in my client's native place, the land of the Pharaoh (15.944-7). The close conjunction of "stowaway" and "Pharaoh" imply a

parallel between Bloom and Moses. Through this symbolic lineage, Molloy also argues that his client is having a race memory back to the times of the Israelites in Egypt. As such, his salacious disposition is a function of heredity, he argues, "I would deal in especial with atavism" (15.949-50). Once again, Molloy reinforces the link between atavism and racial degeneration. In doing so, he strips Bloom of any agency he may have, and inadvertently legitimizes the idea that Jews could not be assimilated into the nation state because of inherent character defects.

Problematically, Molloy's entire defense is cobbled together from pseudo-scientific arguments about Bloom's racial character. Molloy continues, "His submission is that he is of Mongolian extraction and irresponsible for his actions" (15.954-5).[16] As Emer Nolan points, Molloy's arguments, "demonstrate, in a comic mode, how apparently enlightened scientific classifications quickly begin to betray connotations of genetic determination and racism" (127). Nevertheless, there is a more serious side to this comedy Molloy has effectively marked Bloom racially. Now that his atavism is visible a whole host of other features are also revealed. As the trial continues, the charges are continuously increased. Bloom is somehow accused of being, Jack the Ripper, a Mormon, anarchist, of no fixed abode, dynamitard, forger, bigamist, bawd, cuckold, public nuisance, white slave trafficker, and odious pest (15.1153 – 15.1168). While the charges are no doubt part of a general calumny, they also correspond to a symptomatology of degeneracy. Bloom is an atavistic Jew and is therefore suddenly transformed into sexual and violent criminal, a political radical, a vagrant, a fraud, and a pest.

These accusation carry over into Bloom's sexual humiliation at the hands of the pseudo-medical establishment. Bloom asks "Dr. Malachi Mulligan" to testify as a sex specialist on his behalf, the text turns to theories of Jewish sexual deviancy. One thinker who figures prominently

in this respect is Otto Weininger, who believed that all people were "bisexual" and that in Jews the feminine side was more pronounced.[17]

Using this framework, Mulligan makes several Weiningerian observations. He observes that Bloom is "bisexually abnormal" (15.1775-6). Thus, stipulating that his sexuality is unbalanced, and that his femininity is more pronounced. He also argues that Bloom suffers from "hereditary epilepsy" (15.1778), which according to Weininger is a sign of deviancy.[18] He next diagnoses latent "ambidexterity," echoing Havelock Ellis, who believed this was a sign of bisexuality (Brown 84). This, in conjunction with Weininger's concept of abnormal bisexuality, once again re-affirms Bloom as feminine. This femininity is amplified when Bloom is accused of being "prematurely bald" from "self-abuse"(15.1780-81), and therefore not a real man who sleeps with his wife. Mulligan even goes so far as to state that Bloom is a *virgo intact* (15.1786-7). Bloom's late onset virginity seems related to what Dr. Madden calls, "hypsospadia" (15.1789), by which he probably means hypsopadia, a widening of the urethra that makes male genitalia seem female.[19] In Weiningerian fashion, Punch Costello connects this femininity back to Jewishness, and remarks, "The *fetor judaicus* is most perceptible" (15.1796). This "Jewish stench" was a particular obsession of Drumont's, and racially marks Bloom. As Dr. Dixon points out, "Professor Bloom is a finished example of the new womanly man" (15.1798-7999). The Weiningerian analysis is brought full circle, and so as to punctuate it, Bloom promptly gives birth.

Joyce's knowledge of sexology is more than merely a humorous departure into Bloom's psyche. Through his joco-serious use of contemporary sexology he demonstrates its absurdity. For Joyce, the sweeping generalizations and categorizations of Weininger and Havelock Ellis

belie the individual human experience. What these men considered sexual deviancy was simply part of a spectrum of human behavior for Joyce (Brown 83).

While it is possible to speak at length about Bella Cohen's sodomizing of Bloom later in the episode, this seems somewhat superfluous given that it is an acting out of much of the sexological theory established earlier in the chapter. These later scenes are not riddled with the anti-Semitism of the beginning of the episode. Instead, they are the psychological resolutions of earlier repression. Much of the first half of the chapter builds up the respective demons for Bloom and Stephen, while the latter half destroys them. At times this is quite literal, such as when Stephen swings at the chandelier, more often than not it is their own abyss that stares back at them.

Closing the novel: Stephen's Anti-Semitic Ballad

After the stylistic pyrotechnics of "Circe" the novel has reached its climax, and the narrative can be described as post-coital. In "Eumaeus" the clichéd and hackneyed writing slow the narrative to a turgid pace, while the catechismal style of "Ithaca" is almost deadening to the narrative in its exactitude. Stephen and Bloom are exhausted and so is the narrative. The last and final flourish comes from Molly. Between his departure from night town to when he rests his head at Molly's feet, Bloom does not confront any more significant anti-Semitic demons, with the notable exception of Stephen's "blood libel" song.

During "Circe" several major themes in *Ulysses* have come to a head. For the time being Bloom has confronted his sexual desires, embraced his Jewish background, and come to terms with the loss of his son Rudy. Stephen has recommitted to being an artist, dealt with the death of his mother, and overcome the yoke of his father. It appears that Bloom can transfer his desire for

a son onto Stephen, and the latter can transfer his need for a father onto Leopold. Yet, these visions so grandiosely established in "Circe" are quickly undercut in the following episodes.

In as much as Bloom affirms his Jewishness in "Circe", he quickly disavows it in the cabman's shelter. He tells Stephen that he told the Citizen that, "his God, I mean Christ, was a jew too and all his family like me," and then adds "though in reality I'm not" (16.1084 – 16.1085). He recounts with relish the argument he had with the Citizen, but denounces the very basis of the argument, his own Jewishness. Contradicting this temporary departure from his Jewishness, Bloom once again comes to the defense of the Jews telling Stephen, "Jews…are accused of ruining. Not a vestige of truth in it, I can safely say" (16.1119 – 16.1120). Bloom thus falls back into the familiar pattern of Jewish self-abnegation and self-affirmation that has come to typify him throughout the novel. All of the earlier resolutions are only temporary.

The case is much the same with Stephen. He has little interest in Bloom, and rarely if ever gives anything more than a cursory response to his temporary guardian's attempts at conversation and conviviality. Stephen's reasons for going home with Bloom are purely practical. He has no place to sleep and, although not falling down drunk, he does need Bloom's help to walk. Arguably, he is still not in possession of his full faculties when he decides to go with Bloom. Once Stephen sobers up, he leaves Bloom on his own. Joyce is thus ironically undercutting the triumphant return of the hero and the meeting between father and son. This was merely a shared fantasy between Bloom and Stephen that turned into an impractical real world solution.

So when Stephen and Bloom arrive at 7 Eccles street, what is to come can only be anti-climactic and somewhat mundane. The pair continue their polite, if somewhat forced conversation, from the cabman shelter. On the topic of nationhood and race the narrator reveals

that, “Neither,” “openly allude[d] to their racial difference” (17.525-6). As to what this racial difference is the narrator has the following call and response:

> What, reduced to their simplest reciprocal form, were Bloom's thoughts about Stephen's thoughts about Bloom and about Stephen's thoughts about Bloom's thoughts about Stephen?
>
> He thought that he thought that he was a jew whereas he knew that he knew that he knew that he was not. (17.527-31)

This is not the most self-evident explanation of their racial divisions. Not surprisingly, much critical ink has been spilled trying to interpret this syntactically and semantically convoluted line. It is perhaps best to take the approach by Michael Seidel who replaces the pronouns with their proper antecedents. This produces the following line: “Bloom thought that Stephen thought that Bloom was a jew whereas Stephen knew that Bloom knew that Stephen knew that Stephen was not” (107). This reading reveals several important points. First, it is never clear if Stephen actually knows that Bloom is a Jew. More importantly, it is not clear if Bloom thinks that Bloom is a Jew. He only knows that Stephen knows that Stephen is not.

In a pattern that runs throughout the novel, Bloom’s Jewish identity is constructed relative to the people around him. He feels more or less Jewish relative to what people he thinks might think him Jewish. It is a supremely sensitive and prescient concept of contextual identity on Joyce’s part. In a more negative way, in the realm of anti-Semitic conspiracy theory this is also one of its most enabling components. As Jewishness is not an absolute value, not even for secular Jews themselves, it allows the conspiracy theorist to label anything “Jewish” that is perceived as pernicious.

Despite the relative ambiguity of their racial interrelationship Bloom and Stephen turn to talk about their respective cultures. While Bloom tries to replicate, quite poorly, some Hebrew, Stephen rejoins with some equally basic Gaelic. Both men dispossessed from their nation have lost touch with it. When they start exchanging folk songs, Bloom sings the opening lines of the anthem for the Zionist movement. In response, Stephen sings a folk ballad about blood libel. It features a young man named Harry Hughes who, while playing with a ball, accidentally breaks a window of a Jew's house. The Jew's daughter asks him to come get the ball, but he initially refuses because he is afraid of her. Once he accedes to her lure she cuts off his head with a penknife.

While the song clearly pains Bloom, Stephen's motivation for singing it is not clear. The only explanation the text provides is an aesthetic one. For him, the story is about the predestination of the victim who "once by inadvertence" and "twice by design…challenges his destiny" (17.833-4). Harry is ultimately not able to prevent his doom due to the temptation of youth and innocence represented by the Jew's daughter. In light of the context of Stephen both being in Bloom's house and having already confessed that he has been the victim of Anti-Semitism throughout the day, the choice of poem seems impolite at best, if not downright insulting. His explanation of the aesthetics of the piece is therefore all the more puzzling given that the content is more pressing.[20]

For the sake of argument we can presume that Stephen is still drunk and not fully cognizant of his surroundings. We can also assume that he is not an anti-Semite. After all, he was the one who ignored Haines's anti-Semitism in the opening episode and so deftly cast aside Deasy's Jewish conspiracy theories at the school. Finally, Stephen is not intentionally trying to be offensive. Even if Stephen despises Bloom, which he almost certainly does not, it is out of

character for him to openly confront his enemies, his devices are "silence, exile, and cunning" (*P* 275). He broods quite resentfully about Haines and Mulligan, but other than swinging his ashplant at a cheap chandelier in a brothel which he thinks is his mother's ghost, he is not one for open confrontation. It therefore seems unreasonable to assume that Stephen would willingly try to offend someone he feels relatively indifferent about or maybe even likes somewhat.

Perhaps the more satisfactory answer is that Stephen does not know that he is deeply hurting Bloom. This is not to excuse Stephen's actions in any way. In fact, the narrator reveals that Bloom is quite clearly offended and hurt. There can be very little doubt that what Stephen has done is wrong. Still, what makes it all the more pernicious, I would argue, is that Stephen does not know it is wrong. To Stephen this is simply a harmless folk tale. His dry aesthetic interpretation demonstrates that he has not given the anti-Semitism in the song a second thought.

This is the same type of passive enabling of anti-Semitism as the men in Barney Kiernan's. While the Citizen is loud and obnoxious, he is allowed to be so because no one stands up to him. In the same way, there seems to be a lack of a general outcry against anti-Semitism because people like Stephen do not see how such folk traditions like the ballad of Harry Hughes are part of a larger pattern of cultural denigration. Only when Deasy is openly hostile does Stephen spring into action. When the anti-Semitism is part of a school primer, Stephen is oblivious. Stephen's obliviousness can be seen in direct relation to the poem's insidiousness. Much like the way minstrelsy legitimized racism against African-Americans, these folk ballads legitimize anti-Semitism. The reasoning is that there must be a historical precedent for their existence, there is always some assumed essential truth about a stereotype. As Bloom himself thinks, there must be some basis in the ritual murder charge.

The relatively mild anti-Semitism of *Ulysses* itself should be seen in the same light. While no one actually gets hurt, and while the most degrading imagery of Jews occurs in Bloom's own hallucination, it does not make it any less dangerous. Ireland's passive acceptance of intolerant racists, dangerously gives those racists a voice, in much the same way that the acquiescence of the general British populous enabled hundreds of years of Irish oppression. The dangerous Britons are not necessarily forces of history like Cromwell, but people who simply think history is a force like Haines. The scene in Barney Kiernan's and Stephen's song bear witness to the dangers of not confronting history. In a rather prescient moment Bloom refers to his experience in the bar as a Holocaust. Of course, Joyce could not have known the even more horrific connotation that word would acquire, but perhaps he could see the relationship between threatening someone out of bar because he was different, and killing them for their ethnicity, because the Irish were in a similar position.

Epistemology – The Ineluctable Modality of the (In)visible

The previous section has gone through extensive lengths to demonstrate Joyce's awareness of and sensitivity to anti-Semitic theories in circulation at the turn of the century. Beyond Joyce's awareness of the conspiracy theory in its many forms, he was also writing from a similar epistemological position. This position was, of course, not the result of influence, but of circumstances. Conspiracy theorists like Drumont dealt with the fragmentation and alienation of modernity by conceiving of a large totalizing framework, which would account for the epistemological uncertainty he was experiencing. Such an account increasingly relied on a ubiquitous conspirator: Jews. Joyce too believed in this fragmentation, but instead highlighted the aporia engendered by modernity, while at the same time suggesting, like Proust, that the last realm of complete unity is art.

Joyce's basic epistemological supposition is that knowledge of the world was always incomplete because reality was mediated through the mind.[21] Yet, as opposed to writers like Woolf who were influenced by the emerging theories of psychology, Joyce is actually working through a modified Aristotelian framework. Perhaps the most elucidating article on this aspect of Joyce's work is Joseph Duncan's "The Modality of the Audible in Joyce's *Ulysses*." He explains how Stephen delineates this Aristotelian framework in the opening of the "Proteus" chapter. Stephen contends that the ineluctable modality of the visible is subject to the problematic modality of existence in the sublunary world. As Duncan explains, Stephen is working out how the random sights and sounds can be accounted for in "Aristotelian theories of modal logic which deal with the uncertainty, potentiality, and variability of the sublunary world" (288). That is to say, Stephen is developing a theory of perception that always assumes uncertainty. While the human mind orders and structures the world around it through patterns and regularities, these are upset by the operations of chance. Perhaps the best metaphor for this process is Joyce's own, the sea. The sea is both regular, in the sense that there is consistent tidal pattern, but it is also chaotic in that the individual currents are unpredictable. The larger implication of such a theory is that existence is organized chaos. People act according to regular patterns and structures, until these are disrupted, which causes them to act differently, their different actions adversely affect others around them, who in turn act differently, and so on and so forth. People act predictably until they do not. It is a theory that deeply influences the plot of *Ulysses*, which at times hovers inexplicably between fate and chance.

Additionally, knowledge and perception are coextensive. That is, knowledge can be arrived at through perception by studying facts. Whereas for Aristotle those facts, and indeed the world, are known through both apodictic and problematic modal propositions, for Joyce there are

only problematic modal propositions; meaning that it is impossible to construct, in a Kantian sense, synthetic a priori propositions. There are no absolute justified true beliefs, only temporarily justified beliefs. Nevertheless, this does not nullify any exterior ontology of the world, rather it means that the world as such is mediated through the senses. Hence, truthful propositions are the result of an interface between perception and the modality of the audible and the visible. The information that is taken in is only a series of substances, knowledge of which is a posteriori. Thus, the diaphane, or the container, of reality stretches out ad infinitum and does not presuppose an observer for its existence, but at the same time knowledge of the diaphane is limited by subjective position of the observer. That is to say, the world does not exist because of perception, even though it is limited through perception. As such, there are by necessity epistemological lacunae, as a single observer could never physically take in something which stretches out ad infinitum. Yet, it does suggest that there is a totality that exists that could be comprehended given world enough and time. For all practical intents and purposes the knowledge of the totality is fragmentary, if not at times contradictory. After all, without a real mechanism for verifying the 'truth' of any statement two contradictory statements could equally be true. This might represent a null point epistemologically, but not existentially.

What is important to glean from this rather complex metaphysical explanation is that there is a totality of knowledge about the world. One could move towards comprehending this world by translating perceptions into facts, which form the basic, if provisional basis for knowledge. As people progress and acquire more knowledge of the totality, the totality also recedes more quickly from sight. The world is more knowable at six thousand years old than at four billion years. Progress is paradoxical, because while it paves the road to understanding, it reveals ever more avenues of ignorance. While progress, of course, is not a modern concept, the

accelerated pace at which the world has changed since the industrial revolution cannot be denied. Joyce tries to capture this cacophony of different voices and discourses not only by imbuing his text with some of the most elaborate and dense references of any literary work, but also by appealing to a wide array of styles. The work represents the epistemological confusion of modernity, while at the same time articulating the means of its comprehension.

It should be noted, therefore, that Joyce shares the basic epistemological framework of the conspiracy theorist. Both believed that there was a knowable totality that had become more complicated and fragmented by the forces of modernity. Both believed that there was a possibility to approach the totality through the scrupulous accumulation of facts. The way in which both read the world requires an indiscriminant and omnivorous assimilation of knowledge. The crucial difference is that Joyce believed in the ineluctable totality of the visible, while conspiratorial semiosis goes one step further and believes in the ineluctable modality of the invisible. In the former, everything that is known is ultimately a matter of perception and this perception is subjective. As such, the totality could never be achieved because of a logical impossibility. Conversely, conspiratorial semiosis does not merely argue from presence, but also from absence. For Joyce, there are known unknowns, for the conspiratorial thinker there are unknown unknowns. Consequently, conspiracy theorists believed that key information was being forcefully withheld by the conspirators. So while both views stem from the same basic epistemological assumptions they lead to fundamentally different aesthetic conclusions.

Joyce and the Aesthetics of Conspiratorial Modernism

Critics of *Ulysses* tend to fall into one of two broad aesthetic camps. Earlier critics who believed that Joyce was trying to create a comprehensive total artwork that controlled the chaos of modernity through aesthetics, and later critics who argue that he undermines the viability of aesthetics as a means of controlling and structuring reality. In the former Joyce is said to structure the chaos of modernity through aesthetic, in the latter Joyce embodies that very same chaos through his aesthetic mode. Taking a cue from Kenner, I argue that these two need not be mutually exclusive; rather, they are two different sides of the same textual process. By suggesting the possibility of a totality, while at the same timed denying the reality such a totality, *Ulysses* short-circuits the interpretive process, and forces the reader to bring ever more readings to bear on the work. Each reading approaches the totality of the work only in as much as it recedes away. The form of the work generates ever more plausible meanings, while at the same time subverting the possibility of real meaning. Ultimately, this reading practice is akin to a form of conspiratorial semiosis.

The first critics of *Ulysses*, Stuart Gilbert and Eliot in particular, saw the basic drive of the work move towards a formal totality. In this respect, we may recall Eliot's discussion of *Ulysses* in Chapter 2. He argued that, "Mythic method" that creates "a continuous parallel between contemporaneity and antiquity", which "is simply a way of controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape and a significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history" (Eliot "Ulysses" 177). For Eliot, Joyce's work has a recuperative function. It is a way to structure the chaos of modern life. It is a theory that casts a long shadow, and even Umberto Eco writing in 1966 argued that *Ulysses* is "a great epic of the classical mode"

(*Chaosmos* 56). He argues that the contradicting forces of Cosmos and Chaos that compose the distinction between the novel's symbolic structure and its chaotic rhetoric ultimately melt together and create "the very order of our 'being-in-the-world,' our 'being-in-nature,' our 'to-be-nature'" (58). What Eco thus proposes is a complete harmony with modernity.

Alternatively, later critics argued that Joyce's work embodied rather than structured the chaos of modernity. One of the first critics to do so Robert Adams who in *James Joyce: Surface and Symbol*: *consistency of James Joyce's Ulysses*, reveals the "social facts" behind the novel, thus separating, somewhat problematically, its "surface" from its symbols. This forces him to conclude that, "Readers who think there is a complicated, coherent symbolic message stitched into the crevices and laced through the casual references of the novel are certainly in trouble" (248). Still, even in this move, which has the great potentiality for a more chaotic reading, he assumes that Joyce "arranged and patterned his materials" and that "life is freed from its customary clutter" as in "any work of literary art" (8-9).

This discovery of seemingly random "clutter" in *Ulysses* has prompted critics to push these readings further and claim that the novel represents the arbitrary nature of modernity. Leland Monk contends that the aesthetics of *Ulysses* offers, "another way to think about chance in the novel (*any* novel) that does not necessarily yield to an altogether fateful reading" (111). That is, a reading that does not lead inexorably to a predetermined conclusion. In a similar vein, Patrick McGee suggests that Joyce's writing is, "the deconstruction of style in conjunction with the dismantling of the autonomous subject. He adds that, "This gesture reveals the 'truth' of style as ideology, as the symptom or imaginary resolution of overdetermined historical contradictions" (183). Consequently, there is no more controlling aesthetic mode in *Ulysses* and the rhetorical

inflections are entirely aleatory. In their opposing views, these critics argue that *Ulysses* unravels and deconstructs form, ultimately moving towards chaos.

The transition is hardly a surprising one, and says more about the changing modes of literary scholarship than it does about *Ulysses*. After all, it is somewhat temerarious to assume that as sensitive and as knowledgeable a readers of literary form as Eliot and Eco could somehow be entirely wrong. It is also innaccurate to assume that these two modes of reading, concordant and discordant, or more explicitly New Critical and Deconstructive, are mutually exclusive. Kenner, perceptively asserts that although order and chaos might appear incommensurate, they are actually different sides of the same coin. He explains very eloquently that the chaos and order are inspired by the text, but exist within the reader:

> We reread in quest of patterns, finding them in plenty, largely created by ourselves from selective observation of cues, often cues planted by Joyce in those final frantic months of revising the whole while composing the last two episodes….It is this compliance with our collaboration, this symbiosis of observer with observed, that marks the radiant novelty of *Ulysses*. Whatever tasks we may set ourselves with its aid, we are oddly liberated from an anxious sense of living in the great Taskmaster's eye, confined by the intentions of the author. (155)

That is to say, whatever order or disorder the text produces is actually the product of the reading process and not an inherent way the text is intended. Kenner very presciently accounts for the changing dynamics in literary studies and the multiplicity of lenses through which *Ulysses* is read.

To Kenner I would add that this aesthetic embodiment of order and chaos in *Ulysses* is the result of the epistemological assumptions engendered by the historical circumstances of

modernity. That is to say, the aesthetics of *Ulysses* are a means of interpreting an old established order quickly receding into the past, while at the same time confronting a newer, protean uncertainty in the future. Although, most works of literature hover been tradition and modernity, modernist works in general, and *Ulysses* in particular, come at a historical moment when the present has been severed from the past without an interpretive framework for the future. As such, old interpretive means are brought to bear on new aesthetic forms. Consequently, the work promotes interpretation through Victorian rational inquiry while at the same time eschewing the very form that makes such interpretation possible.

What emerges is the dissonance created by an ordered reading of a chaotic world, which results in a type of conspiratorial semiosis. Each word moves the work more steadily towards stability and order in the same way that every new fact in the world increases our knowledge. Concurrently, each new word also dilates the possible meaning of the words and the order of the work recedes again. To the modernist reader this signifies that every word has the potential to unlocking the work's final meaning, it is one step closer to the totality. At the same time, the final meaning is always deferred because the word's potentiality is also wrapped up in its modality. To the conspiratorial modernist reader, it is not merely the present words, but the unspoken words, the unarticulated lacunae that form the basis of understanding the text.

These are, admittedly, very bold claims and merit some textual support. One of the first instances of this aesthetic principle is in the "Nestor" episode. While the boys in the room grapple to understand Stephen's joke about the pier being a disappointed bridge, he thinks about the paradoxical nature of history being both irrevocable and contingent:

> Had Pyrrhus not fallen by a beldam's hand in Argos or Julius Caesar not been knifed to death. They are not to be thought away. Time has branded them and

> fettered they are lodged in the room of the infinite possibilities they have ousted. But can those have been possible seeing that they never were? Or was that only possible which came to pass? Weave, weaver of the wind. (2.48-55)

It is impossible to conceive of Pyrrhus and Caesar not having suffered their respective fates now that they have come to pass. At the same time, up until the moment of their happening their fates were not predestines. Their existence therefore hovers somewhere between contingency and certainty. In much the same way, the plot of *Ulysses* exists in the indeterminate space between the chance happenings of characters and their inevitability.

We can see this in the various odysseys that take place throughout the novel. On the one hand, it is entirely contingent Bloom meets Stephen. At the lying in hospital, Bloom meets Dixon who once treated him for a bee-sting, and he is invited into a room where Stephen and the medical students are spending their time. Bloom goes to the lying in hospital because Josie Breen told him earlier in the that that Mina Purefoy was in labor, after she confused her name with that of Mrs. Beaufoy, whom Bloom was actually asking about. The only reason the two even talk is because Bloom is in mourning clothes after just having come from Dingam's funeral, who died unexpectedly. Odysseus's return to Telemachus is therefore prompted a mixture of misinterpreted cues and social conventions bookended by an unexpected death and a bee-sting. Conversely, Bloom's meeting Stephen is fated because he is looking for a son. In "Circe" he thinks, "If I hadn't heard about Mrs. Beaufoy Purefoy I wouldn't have gone wouldn't have met. Kismet" (15.640 - 1). Consequently, the plot may or may not be related to the Odyssey. The meeting only appears fated *Ulysses*, it is a projection by the reader. Kenner points out, "Were the book untitled, had we only the assurance that it is organized round a system of allusions to a classic, we should most likely guess *Hamlet* and not guess wrong. In giving the Odyssey priority,

the title does not tell us how the Odyssey is present: retrieving its marks is our doing" (155). The aesthetics of the work therefore provide enough plot lines to allow for any number of mutually contradictory symbolic readings.

The same can be said about the stylistic contingencies of Ulysses. In the opening of "Aeolus" the narrator relates that: "Grossbooted draymen rolled barrels dullthudding out of Prince's stores and bumped them up on the brewery float. On the brewery float bumped dullthudding barrels rolled by grossbooted draymen out of princess stores" (7.21-4). The lines use the same words but change the order. This can be read in either of two ways. In one respect, it demonstrates the exact measure of control that the narrator has over the story. The sentences are all a conscious choice. It underscores that for every sentence the narrator could equally well have written it differently, but decided not to. The narrator is in complete control. Alternatively, it also represents the potentiality of language. There is no set way to describe reality, no inherent relation between the object being described and how it is described. By highlighting the constructedness of style, the sentences also reveal its arbitrary relation to mimesis.

In that same episode there is no clear consistent relationship between the running headlines and the content of the narrative. For example, the section "CLEVER, VERY" opens with, "Clever, Lenehan said. Very," thus showing a direct correspondence. In other sections this connection is not so narrow. In "HIS NATIVE DORIC" the men deride Ben Dawson's speech, but it is not clear whose native Doric this is. Furthermore, Doric could refer both to that period in ancient Greece, or a Scottish dialect. How either one would be related to Dawson or any of the other men is not established.

Finally, we can think of the repetition of phrases and language throughout the novel that seem implausible. For example, when the Arranger describes the belt of Irish heroes that the

Citizen wears, he mentions that one of the figures is the "Last of the Mohicans" (12.184-5). Later when Bloom pays at the cabman's shelter the "four copper" are "literally the Last of the Mohicans" (16.1687-8). Molly's episode is particularly rife with textual overlap. The amount of times Molly shares Bloom's consciousness is almost prophetic. She thinks of Dennis Breen in "his slippers to look for £10000 for a postcard U p up" (18.228). She could have seen Breen through her window, but the fact that she draws the comparison between him and Bloom is a pretty strong coincidence. In the same vein, she thinks of the "wonderworker" advertisement "they sent him [Bloom] addressed dear Madam" (17.716). The advertisement and the product, a small tube inserted in the rectum to prevent the sounds of flatulence, are on Bloom's mind at several moments in the day. The fact that this catches Molly's attention is also quite coincidental, it is after all junk mail.

Later she recalls that Bloom was "going to be run into prison over his old lottery tickets that was to be all our salvation" (18.1224-5). This coincidence is even stronger than the previous instances. The Hungarian lottery incident occurred in 1893 or 94 over a decade before the current day, and Bloom thinks about it in "Laestrygonians" and it comes up again in "Cyclops." While perhaps an important incident in their lives, it seems implausible that both would remember it on the same day, ten years later. When she thinks of him taking home Stephen, it is like "the night he walked home a dog" (18.1086 – 7). Earlier in "Eumaeus" when Bloom is vacillating about inviting Stephen to his house, one of his considerations is "the night he misguidedly brought home a dog" (16.1607). It is as if Bloom and Molly are of one mind. The mental overlap between husband and wife seems forced, almost artificial. The correspondences force the reader what other similarities there are between different parts of the text. Undoubtedly there are many more to be revealed, though it is not conceivable that someone would be able to retain textual

similarities among 250,000 words, probably not even Joyce himself. Nevertheless, these overlaps force the reader to create ever more connections and correspondences that may or may not have been intended. The text is interpreted and constructed continuously anew. In doing so, it both contracts into an analyzable totality as there are physical limits to the text, but at the same time the meanings dilate the text beyond the scope of analyzability.

There is perhaps no better example of this than the last page of the novel. The final word is famously, "yes" (18.1609), whose final "s" nicely circles back into the opening "Stately" (1.1). The work thus makes a complete circle. It is the complete closed ending to a complete closed day that will repeat itself on June 16, 1904 every time it is read. This is, of course, if you assume these are the last words of the novel. The ending is followed by two more phrases: "Trieste – Zurich – Paris" and "1914 – 1921", the place and date indications of the novel. These are decidedly not Dublin, June 16, 1904. Joyce thus destabilizes the closed time and space of the composition and opens it up to the variable time and place of its composing. It allows for two distinct readings of *Ulysses* it is about Dublin in 1904, but also about not-Dublin in not-1904. Depending on what the reader chooses in the rereading the outcome will be once again different.

Ultimately, Joyce tries to capture the fragmentation of modernity through the multiplicity of discourses in *Ulysses*. In essence, reading *Ulysses* simulates the process of totalization actively involved in trying to comprehend modernity. Yet, like totalization in the real world, Joyce sets limits to his work. It represents a microcosm of the real world, and in its exuberant attempt to convey knowledge about the world it also viciously exposes its gaps. This totalization could go on ad infinitum. In doing so, the work borrows many of the mechanics of conspiratorial semiosis.

CHAPTER FOUR

William Faulkner
August 15th, 1932, Yoknapatawpha County, Jefferson

Introduction

In a dissertation about anti-Semitic conspiracy theory, perhaps the most unlikely author present is William Faulkner. While there is no shortage of critical readings of Faulkner and representations of race, this scholarship, for obvious reasons, focuses on the representation of Anglo and African-Americans in the South, and there is almost no research on Faulkner and Jewishness. The reasoning behind this is quite clear. Jews had a very small presence in the South, and therefore they, presumably, did not figure heavily in Faulkner's work. Scholars who are interested in Jewishness and Faulkner, such as Michael Dobkowski, Alfred Kutzik, and Ilse Dusoir Lind have roundly rejected this presumption, arguing that, "Jews as a fictional subject engaged his [Faulkner's] imagination throughout the entire span of his literary career" (Lind 119). Yet, none of these authors investigate the entire gamut of Faulkner's work. Doing so reveals an almost disproportionate presence of Jews and Jewishness in Yoknapatawpha. Given that there was only one Jewish family in Oxford during Faulkner's lifetime (Lind 126), it is surprising how consistently Jews appear in his fiction. References to Jews and Jewishness occur

in: "New Orleans" (1925), "Damon and Pythias Unlimited" (1925), *Soldier's Pay* (1926), *Mosquitoes* (1927), *The Sound and the Fury* (1929), "Honor" (1930), *Sanctuary* (1931), "Death Drag" (1934), "There was a Queen" (1934), *Pylon* (1935), *The Wild Palms*/*If I Forget Thee Jerusalem* (1939), *The Hamlet* (1940), *Go Down, Moses* (1942), *Intruder in the Dust* (1948), *Knight's Gambit* (1949), *A Requiem for a Nun* (1951), *The Mansion* (1959), and most famously in *A Fable* (1954). Expressed statistically, of the nineteen novels he wrote, thirteen in some way, shape, or form involved Jewishness. Thus, Jews in Faulkner are not incidental, as previous critics have presumed, they are integral.

It is the unlikely presence of Jews and anti-Semitism in Faulkner that makes it a compelling topic. After all, Proust, Joyce, and Musil were had close ties to the Jewish community and were exposed to the discourses of anti-Semitism. There were relatively few Jews in the Southern United States, and yet Faulkner emplots both their presence and the hostility people had against them. For instance, when Jason Compson rails about his misfortunes on the stock market he blames the "eastern Jews" (*SF* 191). This, despite the fact that Yoknapatawpha would seem like the last target for a Jewish conspiracy.

This chapter will demonstrate that anti-Semitic conspiracy theory influenced Faulkner's work throughout his career, but specifically in the twenties and thirties. The fact that these theories play a part in an oeuvre largely about Anglo and African American relations, speaks volumes about their ubiquity. Beyond influencing his work on a thematic level, Faulkner's experimentation with epistemology and aesthetics also mirrors Southern conspiracy theory's concern with modernity's incursion upon the south. That is to say, in creating a fundamentally incomplete totality by emplotting his texts with epistemological lacunae, Faulkner's oeuvre embodies an aesthetic that requires a constant reassessment and reassembly that incorporates an

ever more elaborate network of characters, places, and symbols that all hint towards, but never arrive at, a complete totality. On a much more sophisticated and literary level, his work embodies and replicates the same epistemological assumptions as conspiracy theory.

On face value, the critical excavation of anti-Semitism from Faulkner's work during this period seems like a rather forced critical activity. After all, there is an established critical literature on authors who explicitly incorporate anti-Semitic theories and images into their work in order to map the American cultural landscape during the interbellum. We may think here of, for example, F. Scott Fitzgerald, John Dos Passos, Djuna Barnes, and, in a different way, Mike Gold. There was a conscious choice not to discuss these almost exclusively northeastern, urban authors. None has the status or the epic quality of Faulkner's work. True, taken by themselves Faulkner's individual novels are not totalizing epics in the same way the *Recherche* and *Ulysses* are, but the collection of novels about Yoknapatawpha all combine in one large narrative. A testament to the epic quality of Faulkner's work is the map of Yoknapatawpha he creates along with the elaborate genealogies he provides for the *Portable Faulkner*. These actions speak to a singular vision around which all the novels revolve. The entire series of Yoknapatawpha novels therefore operate along the same lines as other epic modernism.[1]

Moreover, Faulkner's work demonstrates how intimately concerns over Jewishness are part of larger anxieties about the American racial landscape. That is, Anglo-Jewish relations are almost always triangulated through Anglo-African concerns. As opposed to his European counterparts, in Faulkner's work Anglo-Jewish tensions are of one of several racial tensions present in America. It is this multiplicity of racial tensions that makes American conspiracy theory both more ubiquitous, and more diffuse. While always concerned with counteracting un-American subversion, American conspiracy theory during the interbellum cannot maintain the

same level of sustained targeting of one group that occurs in Europe. Indeed, throughout this period there is a constantly renewed focus on different minorities that represent a dangerous threat to the American way of life.

Finally, more than any other American novelist, with the possible exception of Gertrude Stein, Faulkner engaged in the kind of prose experimentation commensurate with that of the European Modernists. This is not to argue that there was no prose experimentation in America, but most of the experimentation tended to self-consciously reject European tradition in an attempt to create a distinctly American voice. Even though there are very few voices as characteristically American as Faulkner, he achieved this voice through European influences. In particular, his distinctly highfaluting, contemplative, and metaphysical prose shares an epistemological and an aesthetics overlap with his European counterparts.

While no American author unambiguously embraced the changes brought by modernity, few portrayed the division between the past and the encroaching future in such sharp relief as Faulkner. It is through these two distinct forces, tradition and modernity, that Faulkner imagines the passing of an organic, complete, if imperfect, universe in the face of an irrevocable modernity that brings alienation, fragmentation, and dislocation to the communities of the South. The only way for the members of these erstwhile temporally and socially hermetic communities to make sense of the world is by trying to plot out relationships, real or imagined, between themselves and the encroaching foreigners, who appear to be the embodiment of modernity. The small towns form a microcosmic representation of an increasingly permeable America, in which the traditional pillars of family, religion, and community are eroded by the anonymous forces of economics, industrialization, and globalization. Curiously, in the Yoknapatawpha saga we see many of the same turns of the "social kaleidoscope" that happened in the Faubourg St. Germain.

After all, as modernity encroaches on the county the social fortunes of the old Aristocracy radically change. In much, the same way that the Jewish Bloch family moves into the formerly aristocratic La Commanderie, the Snopes move into a once stately plantation the "Old Frenchman's Place." The crucial difference, of course, is that in Proust the frictions caused by the turn of the kaleidoscope hardly result in more than an impolite rebuff, while in Faulkner the result is usually gruesome violence.

It is in these tensions that the forces of history increasingly appear to be colluding against the residents of Yoknapatawpha. As a reaction against these divergent forces, some characters resort to imposing totalizing worldviews on their community. In such a frame of mind, anything outside this worldview must be inimical to it; must be an evil agent of change. As their frame of reference they often look to a halcyon past in which there was an organic and natural social order that determined relationships in the town. Thus, the citizens of Yoknapatawpha combat the havoc wrought by modernity by imagining the past as an absent totality. It is a type of thinking that moves towards conspiratorial semiosis.

Faulkner captures this slippage into conspiratorial semiosis at its finest by rendering the traditional struggles of the South in a language of un-muted modernity. His highfaluting, recondite, and kaleidoscopic language rips apart the very completeness that the people of Yoknapatawpha are trying to maintain. The only way the fantasy of the unified traditional South is maintained is through the collaboration of the reader. By combining the stories and characters of Faulkner's Yoknapatawpha, the reader attempts to recreate the very community that is in the process of dissolving. It is a dissolution that has perhaps always already happened. Yet, the reader is never afforded a full view; the South, both as a place and a time, is always described from someone's perspective. With each new voice, the reader has more information, but also

more heterogeneity. In the words of Shreve McCannon, each character is asked to "tell about the South" (*AA* 142) in his or her own way. What is left is a fragmented Yoknapatawpha only held together by the reader's desire for completeness. Thus, Faulkner's work, like that of Joyce, forces the reader to engage in conspiratorial semiosis as he or she tries to reconstitute an entire community by relating all the parts to the whole.

This chapter develops this argument in three steps. The first section will show Faulkner's awareness of racial discourses and his own utilization and later rejection of them. The second section will show how anti-Semitism works across his oeuvre. Finally, it will show how his epistemology and aesthetics are similar to conspiratorial semiosis.

Anti-Semitic Conspiracy in Faulkner's Time

The appearance of anti-Semitic conspiracy theory in Faulkner's work during his most prolific period is not coincidental. On a national scale, racism generally and anti-Semitism especially saw an incredible rise during the twenties and thirties. Disparate forces like the popularization and Americanization of European racial science, grassroots vigilantism embodied in the Ku Klux Klan, and outright populist anti-Semitism in media outlets such as Henry Ford's *Dearborn Independent*, all combined to create a nativist atmosphere of xenophobia and intolerance. At the beginning of the twenties, the focus of this xenophobia was relatively diffuse, and immigrant groups bore the brunt of racist attitudes relatively equally. By the beginning of the thirties these ambiguous racial attitudes coalesced into a virulent and concerted anti-Semitism espoused by extreme right, sometimes openly Fascist, groups. Regionally, Faulkner's South internalized and promulgated many of the nationally sanctioned racial precepts and pejoratives about Jews. Nevertheless, unlike in the Northeast, this abstract rhetorical anti-Semitism rarely translated into actual violence against Jews in the South. Southerners tended to hate the concept

of the wealthy northeastern finance Jew and its polar opposite the subversive communist, but could be indifferent, even kind, to their Jewish neighbors. Faulkner's work is a very sensitive reflection of the extremely complex interweaving of national conspiracy rhetoric contextualized into the local racial conditions of the South. At their worst, Faulkner's characters hate "the Jews" as an abstract group, but are rarely more than impolite to actual Jewish people.

The years after the Great War were an incredibly turbulent time in United States, and America's newfound position as a major power on the world stage brought many rapid social, economic, and political changes. These changes were not always wholeheartedly embraced and one heavy handed author of the period suggests that America suffers from a "fear complex" that is endemic to "every educational, political, or industrial danger" (Chapman 334). Though such overblown rhetoric exists in all periods in history it does speak to a more general fear among segments of the population who feared that control was slipping away from the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant Male power structure, and that the American ideal was beset upon on all sides. The general tenor of the decade, as various authors have pointed out, is not so much a lashing out against a specific enemy, but rather a defensive consolidation of a set of symbols all identified with an American Protestant ideal. In a word, it was a return to nativism (Davis *Conspiracy* 207 - 209; Higham 266-7; Michaels 205 - 206).

The most prominent example of this nativism is the massive rise of the Ku Klux Klan. At its peak in the early twenties, the fraternal order had over four million members in a country of just over one hundred million (Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 39). The Klan was so prominent that it was to become a contentious campaign issue in the 1924 election (Chalmers 213-215). Unlike, the first post-Civil War Klan, this second incarnation was neither exclusively rural (Jackson 243), nor specifically anti-African-American. Usually, the Klan would canvas the community

and figure out which group was causing the most anxiety and then set a campaign of hate and intolerance in motion against them (Blee 21). As a result, major conflicts with the Klan flared up in different places for different reasons.[2]

Even though many of the Klan's ideals – prohibition, stricter Protestantism, and Bibles in school – barely deviated from other conservative groups of the time (Lay 220), at its most extreme and dangerous, the Klan represented the racial conspiracy theorist's obsession with the invisible power of the conspirator. Jews and minorities were suspected of willfully corrupting the order and peace in America's towns and cities, even though there was no evidence of them doing anything wrong. Indeed, Jewish small business owners were often seen as a threat even though they had been in the community without causing trouble for decades (Blee 147).

While the Invisible Empire of the Klan focused on routing out largely invisible threats, Progressive Era racial science sought to make immigrants visible racially. Faulkner most likely was not familiar with the work of these racial thinkers directly, but the ubiquity of their thought influenced debates about race generally (Wainwright 89). The most influential and important of these thinkers was Madison Grant.

Grant, a lawyer by training and racial theorist by calling, was representative of a Northeastern Patrician class that saw its position at the apex of the American social hierarchy eroding away with each new wave of immigration. Grant was inspired by European racial theorists like Vacher LaPouge, the British eugenicist and nephew of Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and Houston Stewart Chamberlain. While LaPouge has already been discussed in previous chapters, Chamberlain will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Suffice it to say, that Chamberlain, like LaPouge, sought to recast all historical conflict as a radical race struggle between the Aryan and the Semite. Inspired by their basic model Grant lays out a complex

hierarchy in his most influential work *The Passing of the Great Race*. This hierarchy divided all the human races into different species and subspecies. To crown this hierarchy he introduces the concept of the racially superior Nordic peoples into the American lexicon. Hereafter, Nordic will become a common racial designation in America throughout the twenties. Indeed, in a 1925 letter to Sherwood Anderson, Faulkner writes an ironic short story about one of Andrew Jackson's descendents, Al Jackson, who is, "the finest time of American manhood, a pure Nordic" ("Jackson" 477). After *Passing*, racial identification becomes an increasingly complex process, and the detailed maps and charts that litter his major work all attempt to interpret the world through the prism of race.

Such a system is fundamentally different than that of his European counterparts, which tended to be, at bottom, dualistic systems with Aryans and Semites representing two fundamentally inimical forces of humanity. Grant, probably influenced by the immense racial diversity of his native New York, saw a world in which the natural racial hierarchy was falling apart. This is why the most threatening thing to Grant was racial intermixing because, by mixing two races the result was always the return to a "lower type" (18). Protecting the racial health of the nation would require sterilization of the degenerates already within the US, and closing the borders to racially inferior foreigners (Spiro 234, 197). In particular, with regard to the latter he was incredibly influential. Grant cajoled Congressman Albert Johnson in promoting the anti-immigrant legislation that culminated in the Reed-Johnson immigration restriction acts of 1924 (Spiro 221). Although based on country of origin, these acts codified Grant's racial hierarchy into law and therefore remained influential in the US for a long time. Moreover, Grant was also influential in shaping racial theories in Europe. He established extensive correspondences with

LaPouge and Chamberlain, and he even received a letter from a young Hitler who called the book "his bible" and made significant references to it in *Mein Kampf* (Spiro 357).

The two groups, the racial scientists and the KKK, created an image of Jewishness as both a distinct and visible racial type and a corrupting invisible force. As we will see in Musil, these two different representations of Jewishness will come closer and closer together as the Second World War looms larger. Thus, even though Grant, the KKK, and their followers lost direct influence by the late twenties, their mark is on much of the racism in the thirties.

The global economic meltdown of the early thirties spurred the emergence of two opposing ideologies: communism and fascism. Both movements caused the marginalization of Jews. Although never numerically as great at the name "Red Decade" would suggest, the emergence of a highly visible, sometimes openly communist, leftist political movement reignited fears of a communist takeover (Heale 99).[3] Problematically, many Americans conflated Bolsheviks and Jews, thereby isolating Jews from social life. More troubling to Jews though was the emergence of highly active and visible Fascist groups.[4] Led by extremists like William Dudley Pelley[5] and radiovangelist Father Charles Coughlin,[6] this movement promoted violent anti-Semitic sentiments and, at times, openly supported Nazism.[7] Consequently, the thirties was one of the most anti-Semitic decades in American history, and, with the obvious exceptions of African-Americans and Native Americans, Jews were more discriminated against than any other minority (Dinnerstein 105). Whereas the early twenties saw a wide range of nativist theories emerge, many of these either slowly dropped away or merged into a more focused anti-Semitism.

These national trends did not always translate to the south equally. On a religious level, Southerners were of two minds about the Jews. On the one hand, in accordance with tradition they believed the Jews killed Jesus, and anti-Semitic folktales like the "Jew's Daughter" – the

song Stephen sings to Bloom – were still in circulation in the thirties (Gresham 201). On the other hand, they also believed Jews were the model witnesses waiting to be converted, and therefore signified the second coming of the messiah (McGraw 93). From a cultural perspective, Southerners shared a historical kinship with the Jews. Aristocratic Sephardic Jews had been living in the South since the eighteenth century and therefore shared many southern opinions about slavery, secession, and the Civil War (Bauman 270). At the same time, the influx of largely lower-class Ashkenazy Jews at the end of the nineteenth century strained this relationship. This was particularly true of Faulkner's Northern Mississippi, which did not have a Sephardic population, but did have a significant immigration by petty bourgeois Ashkenazy (Kutzik 222). Although the well-worn stereotype of Jews as usurious money lenders also had resonance in the South, most Southern Jews were small dry grocers and peddlers; they therefore performed a vital and appreciated economic function (Rabinowitz 270).

For Southerners, the most vexing issue was the racial identity of the Jews. There was a tradition of viewing Jews as "white" in the South up until the Civil War. After the war and with the advent of Jim Crow laws, Jews increasingly found themselves on the other side of the color line (Goldstein 135). This position was exacerbated when influential Progressive Era race theories, like those of Grant, made their way to the South. Jews were increasingly seen as non-white. This non-whiteness was justified through three broad racial beliefs: Jews were their own race; Jews were an African race; or Jews were a "mongrel" race (Rogoff 391). Whatever the theoretical underpinnings of these theories, the practical result was an increased marginalization of Jews in the South and a growing acceptance of the anti-Semitic conspiracy theories about them.

It is extremely difficult to make general assumptions about this overlapping mix of religious, cultural, economic, and racial beliefs. Different combinations of these beliefs had radically different results.[8] That being said, for the most part, Jews were not actively discriminated against as African-Americans were, nor were they actively harassed or assaulted.[9] For the most part, their existence amounted to an implicit segregation from Southern society. Leonard Rogoff argues that, "Whatever racism Southern Jews experienced was rarely more than impolite" (419). Indeed, Southerners may have been imbued with negative Jewish stereotypes, but they did not directly translate this onto their Jewish neighbors (416). This is in contrast to places like New York and Boston where Jews were physically abused (Dinnerstein 121). Howard Rabinowitz even goes so far as to suggest that the South is the least anti-Semitic region in the country (275). All of this is to say that there was no generalizable anti-Semitism in the South. Southerners were aware of the most current European racial theories (Rogoff 390) and viewed Jews differently as a result, but did not actively persecute them.

These were then the complex forces framing Faulkner's development as a writer. On a national level, fears over the immigrant other fueled popular racial science, nativist vigilante organizations like the Klan, and extreme right Fascist groups. The emergence of these groups and openly communist organizations sparked fears of a rising anti-democratic mobocracy. On a local level, Jews engendered these fears. They became abstractions of a changing America and a modern South. Still, in as much as Southerners despised Jewish immigrants in the northeast, they tolerated and, on occasion, treated them kindly on native soil.

Faulkner's Early, Down-home Anti-Semitism

Understanding how this complex perspective on Jewishness and Jewish conspiracy theory inflected Faulkner's work, is not without its problems. It would be unfair to assume that

Faulkner inherited the prejudices of his day wholesale, just as it would be naïve to assume that as a great author he was somehow above, or outside of, the general racial discourse. Yet, these are the two stances of previous research on Faulkner and Jewishness. Kutzik and Dobkowski are strongly in favor of the former view, arguing respectively that Jews in Faulkner are "unequivocally negative" (217) and "something mysterious and pernicious that has infiltrated into American society" (103). Their argument is not without evidence. Early stories like "Death Drag" and *Mosquitoes* have quite unambiguously anti-Jewish characterizations, but it is unfair to assume that Jason's anti-Semitism in *The Sound and the Fury* is Faulkner's.

Coming to Faulkner's defense is the more recent work by Lind, who argues that Faulkner, "stands far clearer of anti-Semitic prejudice than most of his great American contemporaries" and that he "never promulgates anti-Semitic ideology" (Lind 120). Further, Faulkner's modernist aesthetic relies on the collaboration of the reader to establish a work's "social and historical import" (124). Such reasoning is problematic because it assumes that Faulkner's recondite aesthetic principles place him outside of the political realm, and therefore he is not culpable for anything he writes. Furthermore, it also assumes that all of Faulkner's work is aesthetically Modernist, a questionable assumption since he also wrote popular stories for the purpose of mass consumption.

These critics erroneously assume that Faulkner's opinion of Jews was static. More than most authors, Faulkner did not hold the same aesthetic and political views throughout his career. As David Rampton points out, Faulkner had different "literary lives" (5). Starting out as a dilettantish dabbler in experimental prose, Faulkner became one of America's foremost modernists, transitioned to more conventional works, and finally, after the Nobel prize, became a conservative ambassador of American culture. Throughout these different lives, his

representation of Jewishness follows in lock step with his development as a writer. Faulkner's early, unsophisticated work is complemented by a crude anti-Semitism that relies on common Jewish stereotypes. As his work grows in complexity so does his representation of Jewishness. During his High Modernist period, he is more concerned with Jewishness as a contextual category in the same way meaning itself is contextualized and re-contextualized throughout these works. The later pre-World War II period of consolidation shows an increasing abhorrence of fascist and racist thought that develops into outright philosemitism after the war.

To speak of the early Faulkner then, is to speak of an extremely precocious, if somewhat naïvely sophomoric, young man inculcated with the established mores of the Mississippian South. Raised on the chivalric tales of his grandfather, the Protestantism of the church, and the Victorian standards of rural Oxford, Faulkner, by all accounts, had a traditional childhood. Throughout his education and edification, Faulkner absorbed the most common racial precepts of his day. Indeed, while it is hard to trace what particular theories Faulkner was exposed to during this period, Michael Wainwright argues that he shared a theory of racial pangenesis popular in the American South. This theory supposed that racial traits were passed on through blood and that the intermixing of blood weakened the white race (90). The aspiring writer's racial views during this early period were hardly forward thinking. In an alleged statement for which Faulkner has often been taken to task, Sherwood Anderson claims the Mississippian told him, "that the cross between the white man and the Negro woman always resulted after the first crossing, in sterility" (91). Various critics and defenders of Faulkner have claimed that this was one of his usual tall tales. After all, at twenty-seven by this point, he would surely have known better (Blotner *Faulkner; a biography* 499: 1).

Be that as it may, his racial views of Jews strayed little from the common stereotypes of the day. Faulkner portrays them as largely degenerate, atavistic, and deceptive. For example, in 1918 when Faulkner writes home to his mother while training for the Royal Air Force in Toronto he gleefully recounts an anti-Semitic story he heard. The story features two American men and "a little, undersized Jew" at a medical examining board. The two American men claim a "bad heart" and "flat feet" in order to be exempt from fighting. Meanwhile, the "Yid" does not claim any exemptions, but exclaims, "I dont want the Government should spend no money on me training me und buying me a outfit, I only want to go tomorrow to the trenches to fight." Inspired by the Jew's courage, the doctor lashes out at the American men for malingering, and praises the "foreign born" and "poor Jewish lad". To which the Jew responds "insinuatingly", "But, Doctor, dondt you t'ink I'm a liddle crazy?" (*Home* 120). The scene is deeply imbued with racial characterizations. There are three "men", two of whom are "American", the third is a diminutive Jew. The tacit assumption is that American men are normal, while the Jew is abnormal. Not only in his degenerate stature is the Jew different, but he is also "foreign born" which is heavily marked by his speech. The perverse twist is that all three men are "foreigners," they are, after all, Americans in Canada. Additionally, though they are patriots on the North American continent, when they go to fight in Europe it is logically the Jew who is not foreign, because it is his homeland. Faulkner, presumably, does not see this because the Jew is eternally foreign. Finally, the parable speaks to the "cunning" of the Jew. What on first sight appears to be selfless heroism, is actually a form of self-effacement and draft-dodging. Only a crazy man would go into the trenches unprepared and untrained. Thus, at age nineteen Faulkner is replicating and uncritically propagating many of the Southern racial preconceptions he learned growing up.

When Faulkner goes to New Orleans seven years later, these views have not changed much. In his first published prose "New Orleans Sketches" Faulkner uses traditional Jewish stereotypes as grist for his creative mill. In the opening of his story "New Orleans", he paints a picture of a "Wealthy Jew." The Jew loves three things, "gold; marble and purple; splendor, solidity, color" and stems from an old and pure race, in contradistinction to the "mixed races". What is more, the "Wealthy Jew" is deracinated, but in a positive way: "No soil is foreign to my people" (*Sketches* 4). James Watson notes that the Jew's love of gold, marble, and purple is actually a reference to a Theophile Gautier's art for art's sake manifesto-cum-novel *Mlle. de Maupin* (1835), and Faulkner's homage to his editor Julius Weis Friend (223). Beyond simply a vignette, Watson claims this piece signifies Faulkner's concern with "spiritual transcendence" (223). This reading belies the quite blatant Jewish stereotyping in this passage. There is nothing spiritual about the Jew. In fact, he is "wealthy" and therefore his transcendence is material and not spiritual. More so, the Jew's homelessness plays on a common stereotype of Jews as a physically persistent and isolated "pure" race. If this were actually about spiritual persistence then the Jew would not need to be pure or physically present, the Jewish spirit would simply live on.

Other stories do not cast Jews in a positive light either. In "Damon and Pythias Unlimited" the first person narrator is confronted by two confidence men, who take him to the race track to scheme him out of his money. When the narrator meets the first man, Morowitz, he relates, "His soft, melting brown eyes-like a spaniel's-bathed me in a moist, hot glow, his broad Semitic face shone" (*Sketches* 20). When they step into a cab, the driver refuses to take them to the St. Charles hotel because he does not believe that they would let Morowitz into the hotel. The accusation speaks to both an implicit segregation of Jews from Southern society, and to the lower

socio-economic status of the Jew. At the racetrack, the Jew lures the narrator into a confidence scheme, but is himself outwitted by the narrator. Trying to win back the narrator's favor he "pawed" him "affectionately" (Faulkner *Sketches* 27). The description harkens back to older descriptions of Jews as animals. Unlike the abstraction of the Wealthy Jew, this crasser version of Jewishness utilizes many of the negative Jewish stereotypes endemic to mid-twenties anti-Semitism.

Faulkner conflates these stereotypes in his description of the Semitic man in his second novel *Mosquitoes.* The novel tells the tale of a hodgepodge of New Orleans personalities trapped on a boat while taking a river cruise. The characters represent the varying artistic positions, among them is a Semitic man called Julius, whom Fredrick Karl contends is based on Julius Weis Friend, Faulkner's publisher. The portrait is overtly negative, and evinces common derogatory stereotypes about Jews. Karl qualifies this early anti-Semitism as "small-town provincialism, a kind of knee-jerk xenophobia" (2), but arguably it is evidence of more deeply rooted racial preconceptions. The Semitic man is deracinated, atheistic, anti-establishment, condescending, and decadent in his artistic leanings. In fact, he conforms to the stereotype of Jews as cosmopolitan and unpatriotic nihilists. For example, he says the Protestant religion is the, "The worst of all…to raise children into" (42). He claims that it is hard for an artist to develop, "if his lot is cast outside of New York City" (52). Thereby representing a type of northern and foreign incursion on southern soil. Even Fairchild, a stand-in for Sherwood Anderson, establishes a fundamental difference to the Semitic man. Echoing Madison Grant, he argues that, "we Nordics are at a disadvantage…We've got to fix our idea on a terrestrial place. Though we know it's second rate, that's the best we can do. But your people have got all heaven for your old home town, you know" (51). The distinction by the northerner doubly removes the

Jew from a Southern context. He is both not Southern and not Nordic. He has no real home and does not fix on a "terrestrial place," but "all heaven." Once again, it is a reversion to common Jewish stereotypes to flesh out a character.

In short, Faulkner's early writings reveal both an awareness and internalization of racial caricatures, in general, and of Jewish stereotypes in particular. While some critics have qualified Faulkner's overtly racial language, it is hard to deny that he was not only aware of the racial discourse of the twenties, but also promulgated some of its main assumptions about Jews. These racial assumptions shift significantly as Faulkner moves towards the end of the decade. For all its faults, *Mosquitoes* shows the shimmering of Faulkner's later work. In as much as his novels of Yoknapatawpha are about time, epistemology, and aesthetics, they also function as sweeping panoramas of Southern racial attitudes and ideological positions. More and more, Faulkner became concerned with writing the South's racial epic. Such an epic required more complicated character portraits than the rough sketches of *Mosquitoes*. Arguably, it is around this time that Faulkner's racial views become more subtle. Granted, Jews still tend to be portrayed quite simplistically in Faulkner's popular fiction[10] and his rendering of Jewishness is far more nuanced in his high modernist prose. More so, their presence is no longer that of a roughly sketched aberration, but is more closely integrated into the fabric of Southern life. By integrating them into a Southern context more substantially, Faulkner also reveals how some of his characters resort to anti-Semitic conspiratorial semiosis in times of epistemological crisis. Compared to the protracted anti-Semitism in Joyce these are merely flashes, but they are a testament to the ubiquitous anti-Semitism of this period.

The 'dam eastern jews' in *The Sound and the Fury*

Traditionally read for its portrayal of the decline of the Compson family and the larger changing dynamics of the South, *The Sound and the Fury* also incorporates, somewhat belatedly, a treatment of America's changing racial profile due to immigration. While Quentin is most directly confronted with the new face of America in Boston, it is actually Jason who most acutely demonstrates how deeply these demographic shifts affected the racial dynamics of America. Throughout his eventful day trying to keep Miss Quentin in line and holding together the family, Jason will project the family's failure on her, but, also more curiously, on "dam eastern jews."

Even though Jason is far removed from the immigrant masses of the northeast, their distance makes them all the more integral to Jason's experience of America. In his mind, the dissolution of the Compson family and his own inability to move up in life are the result of the financial schemes of "eastern jews" (191). Jason is perhaps Faulkner's best sketch of the Southern anti-Semitic conspiracy theorist. Jason's portrayal coincides remarkably with the historical evidence regarding Southern anti-Semitism. Briefly, Jason believes in a northeastern, urban financial conspiracy that is corrupting the traditional south. This theory, importantly, does not translate into a hatred of individual Jews, instead, as elsewhere in Faulkner, Jews as a people come to represent everything non-Southern: duplicitous, avaricious, manipulative, and morally bankrupt. Ironically, these are also the very characteristics that typify Jason.

Jason's racial views reveal his Southern upbringing. When he speaks with his mother about reprimanding Miss Quentin, he bluntly claims, "When people act like niggers, no matter who they are the only thing to do is treat them like a nigger" (181). That is to say, Miss

Quentin's ostensibly loose moral standards, are not merely a reflection upon her, they also reflect negatively on her race. Her moral impurity is indicative of a larger Southern racial failing.

For Jason the internal pressures that have beset the family are complemented by the external circumstances eroding the South. Thus, not only is the decline of the Compson family catalyzed in the short term through Caddy and Miss Quentin's non-white behavior, but also through the long term shifting labor relations of the South. Specifically, he ties his family's fate to the vanishing of the traditional agrarian lifestyle engendered by the intrusion of northeastern, urban finance capital.

On its most basic level, Jason's theory of political economy relies on traditional notions of labor relations. As he says crudely, "What this country needs is white labor" (190). In part, this is a direct response to "trifling niggers" (191), but they are only the epiphenomenal expression of shifting cultural and economic relations. When speaking to a "drummer", a petty-goods salesman usually assumed to be Jewish, he complains that "Cotton is a speculator's crop" (191).[11] The choice of cotton as the object of his ire is not random. The traditional Deep South thrived on cotton, which constituted the vast majority of US exports between the Revolution and the Civil War (Davis *Slavery* 9). Not only does cotton symbolize, nostalgically for Jason, the former, stricter power-relationship between whites and blacks, it also signified the north's dependence on the South. In short, cotton symbolized the myth of the Lost Cause.

While there have always been cotton speculators, in Jason's mind this current speculation has destroyed farming. Speculation puts money in the hands of the financiers, and all the farmer gets is a "red neck and a hump on his back" (191). Jason is not incorrect in observing this shift. The Civil War brought a definitive end to the South's unique and already diminishing factorage system (Woodman 269), which left merchants without a means of product distribution, and they

therefore had to turn to Northern finance capital (Clark 160). In line with many Southerners at the time, Jason blames this complex shifting of economic fortunes on "a bunch of dam eastern jews" (191). He does so, not through a sophisticated critique of political economy, but rather through conspiracy theory. He accuses the men at the telegraph office of being in a "conspiracy with those dam eastern sharks" (217). He suspects that the Western Union is acting "hand in glove with that New York crowd"(227). He also believes his money has been stolen by, "dam jews" who used "their guaranteed inside dope" (234). In short, it would appear that the entire financial system, stretching from Jefferson to New York, and encompassing the telegraph company, Western Union, and Wall Street stockbrokers, are all in cahoots with, or directly run by, Jews who have their minds set on taking Jason's investment in the cotton market, which, by the way, is a grand total of five dollars. As Jason cannot comprehend the complexities of finance capital and the incursions of a new globalizing modernity on Yoknapatawpha, he resorts to a type of conspiratorial semiosis in which everything is systematized into a belief about "eastern jews."

Nevertheless, like many Southerners at the time, he does not conflate this hatred of "eastern jews" with those Jews living in the South. At the same time that he resents the invisible force of "Jewishness," he is relatively indifferent about visibly racially marked Jews. While disparaging Jews in front of the drummer he quickly, qualifies his remarks, and tells him, "I'm not talking about men of the jewish religion….I've known some jews that were fine citizens. You might be one yourself" (191). Jason's backpedaling perfectly reflects Southern attitudes towards Jews. Southern anti-Semitism was usually wrapped up in abstract notions of the Jew being a rich financier from the Northeast whose cupidity was causing the destruction of the southern economy. On the other hand, in day-to-day interactions, Southerners were actually

relatively accepting of Jews, even though they were often seen as a distinct racial type. Tellingly, this is one of the few moments in Jason's narration, if not the only one, where he is concerned about offending someone. On three occasions Jason says "No offense" to the stranger, a relatively anonymous itinerant peddler no less.

When the man says that he is not a Jew, but an American, Jason quickly apologizes and rewords his assertion. Jason takes his statement to mean that he is not of the Jewish religion, but might still be Jewish by virtue of his racially marked trade: a small-goods salesman. He continues, "No offense….I give every man his due, regardless of religion or anything else. I have nothing against jews as an individual….It's just the race. You'll admit that they produce nothing. They follow the pioneers into a new country and sell them clothes" (191). The shifts in Jason's thoughts indicate his fluid and multilayered racial beliefs. In the same breath that he claims to be largely sympathetic to people generally "regardless of religion", he also disqualifies the entire Jewish "race" from contributing something to society.

The drummer takes exception to the remark and tells Jason that he must be thinking of Armenians, thus deflecting attention from his possible economic Jewishness. To underscore the point that he is not Jewish, the peddler explains, "I'm an American. My folks have some French blood, why I have a nose like this. I'm an American, all right" (191). The explicit explanation of the racial origin of his nose, suggests that Jason has been doubting the peddler's origins all along; as if the salesman could be secretly Jewish. It is only after this last positive double affirmation of his Americanism that Jason fully accepts the drummer, claiming, "So am I" and adding, "Not many of us left" (191). The sudden inclusion of the peddler among the "us" of Jason's imagined America, speaks to the narrowness of what constitutes an American. Not only

are there so few that he does not automatically assume the peddler is American, but he also contends that there are few left.

This xenophobia, and in particular, his anti-Semitism is an integral part of Jason's day. During moments of family crisis, he is continuously reminded of the stock market. Right after he chases Miss Quentin around town, someone hands him a telegraph detailing his declining stock. When Jason is humiliated by Miss Quentin and the man in the red tie who let the air out of his tires, he seethes that he is being laughed at by, "a man in a red tie" (243). As a defense mechanism, he fantasizes about taunting her with his stock market money, "Forty times five dollars; buy something with that if you can, and she'll say, I've got to have it I've just got to and I'll say that's too bad you'll have to try somebody else" (243). Finally, as his day comes to an end he has two things on his mind, Miss Quentin and the stock market: "Like I say once a bitch always a bitch. And just let me have twenty-four hours without any dam New York jew to advise me what it's going to do" (263-64). The conflation of Miss Quentin and "dam New York jew" is not accidental, but represent both the internal and external forces eroding the Compson clan. In Jason's mind these forces are intimately related. Caddy's endogamy, her pregnancy through adultery is the cause of her divorce with Herbert, which results in Jason not getting a job at the bank. Miss Quentin therefore represents the loss of seemingly more traditional and certain financial prospects for Jason. More so, it represent the dilution of pure Compson blood, it is the type of racial intermingling that is causing America to regress to its lowest racial type. At the same time, Caddy's promiscuity is also economically driven. An increasing need for transient labor has eroded the traditional interpersonal relations that used to maintain unspoken law and order in small agrarian communities. Her lack of fear of community reprisal makes her more likely to find a partner outside of her immediate network, and perhaps the father is a transient

laborer himself. Consequently, Miss Quentin is simultaneously the result and cause of the South's decline in Jason's mind. Nowhere in Faulkner do we see someone so obsessed with blaming Jews and everyone else for his failures. Of course, the real cause of Jason's problems is Jason.

Sanctuary and the 'Memphis jew lawyer'

Around the time that Faulkner was working on the story "Death Drag", he was also starting *Sanctuary*, a commercially oriented novel about a young woman, Temple Drake, who finds herself stuck at Lee Goodwin's bootlegging mansion after tagging along with the alcoholic Gowan Stevens. Left to her own devices by Gowan, she is raped with a corncob by the nefarious Popeye, who first kills the halfwit Tommy to get to her. Once the murder is discovered, Goodwin is the prime suspect, and fearing Popeye, he does not reveal the details of the crime. The high-minded Horace Benbow comes to his defense. Goodwin, who refuses to speak, is promptly found guilty, tortured, hanged, and immolated by a lynch mob that night. While Faulkner's infamous potboiler has always had a somewhat precarious position in the Yoknapatawpha cannon in terms of its literary merit, recent criticism has shown that it is a productive site for investigation.

In part, the novel also functions as a courtroom thriller. Horace Benbow, who believes in "the law, justice, and civilization," is pitted against what Jay Watson identifies as the Lawyer-Citizen, Eustace Graham (67). Benbow's uncompromising and idealistic belief in the law's ability to prosecute the guilty and acquit the innocent, as well as his certainty that his client, Lee Goodwin, is not being tried by "common sense", but by a "jury", will ultimately be his downfall. In the face of the glib and golden-mouthed Graham, who is more in tune with preying on community values rather than the facts, Benbow's ideals are meaningless.

On the margins of this showdown, there is a third figure of the law in the work that has been relatively unexplored: "the Memphis Jew." A figure who shows up for the prosecution on the second day of the trial, but remains curiously reticent. He merely attends the trial. Yet, he emits an aura of power:

> His skull was capped closely by tightly-curled black hair thinning upon a bald spot. He had a long, pale nose. He wore a tan palm beach suit; upon the table near him lay a smart leather brief-case and a straw hat with a red-and-tan band, and he gazed lazily out a window above the ranked heads, picking his teeth. (281-282)

The description invokes deeply racial connotations. His "skull" is "capped" by a bald spot, where normally his kippah would be. Thus, indicating that even without wearing a kippah his Jewishness expresses itself. This bald spot is complemented by a "long, pale nose". His attire is urbane and cosmopolitan (Arnold and Trouard 216). His insouciance indicates that he knows the trial is a foregone conclusion. It would appear that Faulkner has once again resorted to a very stereotypical representation of Jewishness. Not only is this man marked racially, he is also differentiated culturally, and somehow pulling the strings. Cleanth Brooks suggests that the Memphis Jew lawyer has already told Graham what to say, and therefore, the trial is a done deal (*Faulkner* 124). Indeed, Watson calls him a "shadowy puppetmaster impervious to legal or moral strictures" (76). It is this portrayal that Kutzik understandably finds objectionable to Jews, though he incorrectly assumes the lawyer works for the defense and not the prosecution (215).

Arguably, the Jew's presence is a red herring, and he has nothing to do with the trial being a foregone conclusion. The Jew is indifferent to the trial because he probably knows that when it comes to sex crimes in small towns, it is the court of public opinion that matters and not the court of justice. True, the jury finds Goodwin guilty, but after only eight minutes of

deliberating, and his sentencing is exacted by an angry mob, not the legal system. The sophisticated lawyer knows that this is how small town law works, and can only sit and pick his teeth as the inexorable unfolds. The Jewish lawyer is therefore not a nefarious figure, but more an ironic outsider there to observe the mob mentality of the small town judicial system.

He is apparently also the same lawyer who refuses to pay senator Clarence Snopes a substantial amount of money for information regarding the trial; information Snopes has already sold to two other "southron gentlemen" (265). This is quite noble on the lawyer's part, and does not play into the scheming stereotype. Snopes's reaction to this affront is telling:

> …the lowest, cheapest thing on this earth aint a nigger: it's a jew. We need laws against them. Drastic laws. When a durn lowlife jew can come to a free country like this and just because he's got a law degree, it's time to put a stop to things. A jew is the lowest thing on this creation. And the lowest kind of jew is a jew lawyer. And the lowest kind of jew lawyer is a Memphis jew lawyer. (*Sanctuary* 265-266)

Much like Jason, Snopes does not only see his personal misfortune as the result of one person giving him a raw deal, but rather as part of a larger group that is invading America, and taking what rightfully belongs to Americans. Importantly, Jews do so by illegal means. After all, if they did it legally, there would not be a need for laws against them, "drastic laws." Ironically, the Memphis Jew lawyer is the only one acting within the bounds of the law. It is Snopes who is acting illegally, as are Judge Drake and Horace Benbow, the men who bought the information. The reason he is insinuated in the scheming has to do with the racial preconceptions of the townspeople generally, and Snopes in particular. Other than picking his teeth, Faulkner does not tell us that he has any more involvement in the trial.

In Snopes we see a classic case of anti-Semitic conspiracy, not only is he affected on a personal level, but his status as an American is under attack by "the lowlife jew." What is especially telling is his antipathy for Memphis Jew lawyers. This resentment is directed at both Memphis as an urban antipode to rural Jefferson, and at Jewish lawyers as a common stereotype. Perhaps he is even imagining him to be representative of a whole group of Memphis Jew lawyers. Still, at this time a "Memphis Jew lawyer", would have been the exception rather than the rule. Although it is hard to establish an exact number, there were statistically speaking about 9 Jewish lawyers out of a total 430 lawyers in Memphis.[12] Perhaps there were a few more. Still, even with double the numbers they would have barely outstripped the 10 African-American lawyers in Memphis.[13]

The larger point is that Jews who immigrated to the south, and Memphis specifically, set up shop as grocery store owners, secondhand clothing shop owners, and pawnbrokers near the poor white and African-American sections of town (Raphael 275). In short, Jews in the South were rarely lawyers. So for Clarence Snopes to rail against the evils of a Memphis Jew Lawyer, plays into larger national fears of immigrants subverting the rule of law for their own gain, and has no basis in statistical reality. It is tempting to think that what Snopes is actually imagining is a stereotypical New York lawyer. Yet, in relation to small town Jefferson, Memphis must seem like New York.

Anti-Semitism and Jewish conspiracy in *Sanctuary*, as in *The Sound and the Fury*, is far more ambiguous than in Faulkner's early work. While these works certainly exploit worn Jewish stereotypes, these views are perpetuated by flawed, scheming individuals who themselves do the very things they accuse Jews of doing. Consequently, the anti-Semitism in these works functions to highlight the character flaws of the people who espouse these views. In doing so, Faulkner

exposes anti-Semitic conspiracy theory as a vacuous means of scapegoating, which belies more fundamental systemic breakdowns in Yoknapatawpha like that of the family or the rule of law.

Light in August – The Epistemological Crisis of Hybridity

Faulkner's works in the early thirties demonstrate a concern with a wide-spread anti-Semitism. Increasingly this anti-Semitism was spread by emerging Fascist groups. These groups, inspired by racial theorists like Madison Grant, also tried to create a racial state. Yet, unlike Grant, these groups tended to mold his racial language with a mythical language of transcendence. Much like their counterparts in Germany, these Fascists sought a complete physical and spiritual harmony between state and citizen. As such, any threat to this harmonious relationship needed to be dealt with extreme prejudice.

Faulkner was extremely vexed by this rise of Fascism and mobocracy (Atkinson 117). Despite criticism from leftist critics in the thirties accusing Faulkner of being a "gothic fascist" (Blotner *Faulkner: A Biography* 411), Faulkner was, in fact, avowedly anti-fascist. For instance, when Faulkner was accused of being a "nigger-lover" for his support of desegregation, he ostensibly replied, "Well, I guess that's better than being a fascist" (Brinkmeyer 176). Although Fascism is a theme that will occupy Faulkner throughout the thirties, especially in *Absalom, Absalom!*, it is *Light in August* that best captures the epistemological foundations of Fascism's desire for racial order. In particular, Joe Christmas's racial hybridity represent an epistemological challenge to the racial hierarchy of Jefferson. This challenge boils over into an epistemological crisis on August 15th, 1932 the day that Joe Christmas is found guilty of murdering Joanna Burden and subsequently hunted down, murdered, and castrated by the Nazi avant le lettre, Percy Grimm.[14]

This chapter would therefore, quite radically, like to suggest that while anti-Semitic conspiracy theory played a significant role in Faulkner in both the content and structure of his work, it is, in fact, racial hybridity that is the main catalyst for conspiratorial semiosis in the American South. Such a move does not undermine this project, rather it suggests that anti-Semitism in the US borrowed much of the racial language from its European counterparts, but applied that in a fundamentally different way to local conditions. In the relatively homogenous and solidified cultural communities of Europe it was possible to construct an entirely dualistic system. In the diverse and rapidly shifting demographics of early twentieth century America this was simply not an option. While Nordicism does exhibit a type of duality in its opposition of Nordic and non-Nordic, it still relies on a range of racial categories to be a successful device for containing anxieties about race. The fact that race operated as a hierarchy and not a binary during this period in America, is also the reason why racist extremists could be prevented from achieving the levels of influence that racial ideologues in Europe enjoyed. Of course, extremist like Grimm prove that a very real and very dangerous physical threat was always lurking around the corner for minorities, but the outright persecution and extermination of non-Nordics was simply not on the horizon. Particularly because a racial hierarchy imposed social rigidity, while at the same time inadvertently implying racial permeability, hate could never coalesce around one particular minority.

To be sure, Joe Christmas is not Jewish, nor is the text about Jewishness.[15] Still, focusing exclusively on the white and black opposition within Christmas is also wide of the mark. The point is that Christmas's racial identity is ambiguous throughout the work. As the narrator points out, "He never acted like either a nigger or a white man. That was it. That was what made the folks so mad" (*LA* 350). Indeed, Christmas's racial identity never becomes clear throughout the

novel, he is suspected of being a "foreigner", "wop", "nigger", "Hiram" (Jewish),[16] and "Mexican".[17] Through this ambiguity, Jay Parini explains, "Faulkner offers a subtle critique of the deeply arbitrary quality of racial prejudice in the South" (181).

Christmas's racial ambiguity poses a direct threat to the racial hierarchy precisely because he cannot be placed. Indeed, while other characters do not suffer Christmas's horrific fate, they do suffer social exclusion because they subvert the racial standards of Jefferson. The white Joanna Burden lives outside of town because her father was an abolitionist. Joe Brown/Lucas Burch is a social pariah because he is slightly darker than most. Meanwhile, Lena Grove is treated with contempt because she is pregnant out of wedlock. Hence, the racial origins of the father could be uncertain. Even when it is established that the child's father is Burch's and properly white, she is viewed with suspicion because she got pregnant without having a means to take care of the child.

Interestingly, Christmas's downfall is actually facilitated by these three outsiders. Lena's search of the father of her child leads the police to Lucas Burch/Joe Brown who is living outside Joanna Burden's property and, in turn, points them to Christmas. More so, it is Brown who sets the conspiratorial wheels in motion. Brown tries to collect the reward money for information about the murder, but soon finds that suspicion has been cast on him. In order to get the money and to absolve himself of the accusations he blames Christmas. Rather than providing actual evidence of the crime, which Brown cannot produce because he was passed out drunk, he accuses Christmas of being black, telling the sheriff: "Go on. Accuse me. Accuse the white man that's trying to help you with what he knows. Accuse the white man and let the nigger go free" (97). Once Brown makes this racial insinuation it completely changes the dynamic of the crime. There is no longer ambiguity between who did what, because Christmas now fits well into the

black rapist/murderer stereotype (Roberts 182). As Byron Bunch observes, "It's like he knew he had them then. Like nothing they could believe he had done would be as bad as what he could tell that somebody else had done" (98). It would appear that it is immaterial that Brown has abandoned his pregnant lover and was a notorious bootlegger; these do not tarnish his believability as a white man.

Importantly, Brown's racial accusation represents an epistemological crisis for the town. The racial mixing of the ousted Joanna and the racially ambiguous Christmas poses a direct threat to the established racial hierarchy. The solution to the crisis is the violent Percy Grimm. A cold and calculating white supremacist with a reverent awe for militarism, Grimm combines the rational hatred of non-whites demanded by the new racial science with a mythical respect for power, and therefore embodies Fascist conspiracy logic. Faulkner would later boast that in Grimm he invented a Nazi in 1931 before Hitler did (*Selected Letters* 202). As we will see with Hans Sepp in *The Man without Qualities*, Grimm is obsessed with the visible and invisible forces corrupting America.

Too young to have served in the Great War, Grimm spent his youthful days lost and aimless. It was not until the civilian-military act that he found his calling. After joining the national guard he developed a, "sublime and implicit faith in physical courage and blind obedience, and a belief that the white race is superior to any and all other races and that the American uniform is superior to all men" (451). This belief, both mythical and rational, inspires in Grimm a paradoxically passionless vigilance.

Thus, when Christmas is arrested for the rape and murder of Burden, he quickly marshals a force disproportionate to the actual threat. Gathering up a posse of about twenty men, he patrols the town in a foolhardy attempt to make sure that "Uncle Sam is present in more than

spirit" (453). Grimm's fanatical vigilance cannot but end badly. Before a chase even ensues, the narration switches into a prophetic mode that indicates larger, mythical forces are at work, stating that, "It was all over then" (458). The logic of the tale, the black rapist/murder, the sham trial, the angry mob, the chase, the lynching, is all too familiar in the South. More importantly, the focalization of the narration is through Grimm, and therefore indicates his mythical conspiratorial mindset. It is "all over," because the incident provides Grimm with the necessary racial crisis to put his racial theories into practice.

As soon as Christmas tries to escape, Grimm's pursuit is plotted out with inexorable precision. The narrator postulates Grimm in conspiratorial terms, as a pawn on a chessboard being moved around to bring about Christmas's demise. When he has Christmas pinned down behind a house, the narrator describes him, "moving again almost before he had stopped, with that lean, swift, blind obedience to whatever Player moved him on the Board" (462). The fantasy of an invisible conspiracy perpetrated by visibly marked agents has suddenly become real for Grimm, and it is up to him to connect the plot lines he has been imagining. So when Grimm falls into a ditch, he gets right back up, because "He seemed indefatigable, not flesh and blood, as if the Player who moved him for pawn likewise found him breath" (462). Soon other pieces become involved in the chase, and when a car of policemen show up it is as if, "The car which had passed him and lost him and then returned was just where it should have been, just where the Player had desired it to be" (463). Grimm runs into Hightower's house and the old preacher tries to stop him. After pushing him out of the way, it almost appears that no time has passed in the game: "It was as though he had been merely waiting for the Player to move him again" (464). Once he has caught and shot Christmas in the kitchen it would appear the game is over, but "the Player was not done yet" (464). In the last act, Grimm castrates the still breathing Christmas.

The narration postulates an entirely emplotted universe for Grimm and his ilk. As hybrids like Joe do not fit into their worldview it is inevitable that they are ultimately exterminated. The overall sequence of events is almost secondary. With men like Grimm around, threats to the racial hierarchy will be chased down and hunted; expelled from the midst of the homogenous. It is the most violent conclusion to racial conspiracy logic.

Mapping Yoknapatawpha – The Aesthetics of Faulknerian Conspiracy

Perhaps beyond the dark themes of his novels, one of the most frequently investigated topics of Faulkner's work is their aesthetics, and more specifically their narrative structure. While the earliest New Critical approaches to Faulkner imagined that the works were constitutive of a larger unified whole, later criticism has generally rejected this unified view in favor of one that highlights the fragmentation in his work (Burton 605, 608). Even so, like the shifting critical approaches to Joyce, the initial unified approach is not unwarranted. After all, most of Faulkner's novels are stories told and re-told about Yoknapatawpha County, his "postage stamp of native soil." In this regard, the novels collectively speak to a desire to represent a coherent totality much like other epic modernist texts. This is not entirely accidental. After finishing the *Recherche* Faulkner proclaimed, "This is it!" and wished that he had written it himself (Meriwether and Millgate 72). Faulkner's desire for a grand epic on the scale of the *Recherche* would mean unifying plot lines and genealogies across multiple works. At the same time, Faulkner, like his two great inspirations Proust and Joyce, was also troubled by a very modernist crisis of representation that purported that any perception of reality is limited to the subject and therefore fragmented.

I contend that, paradoxically, this fragmentation does not run counter to the narrative drive for an epic, but rather complements it. As was demonstrated in Joyce, the fragmentation in

the narratives continuously invites the readers to reassess, reassemble, and represent the epic unfolding before them. Donald Kartiganer points out that, "the novels are aesthetic exercises in the attempt to become themselves, to become the single stream of their alienated parts" (617). Hence, the text is able to imply a textual totality while at the same time revealing the very impossibility of such a textual totality. The reader is thus forced to navigate through the fragmented accounts in search for characters, places, and symbols that structure the universe of the text. It endows every character, plot, and basic fact with a potential centrality to the Yoknapatawpha myth. Consequently, the reader is forced to incorporate everything to approach the continuously receding totality. In short, the reader falls into conspiratorial semiosis. While, to my knowledge, no such sweeping statement has been made about Faulkner's entire oeuvre, critics have long made this argument about individual works.

For example, in Faulkner's first real experimental novel, *The Sound and the Fury*, he creates a four part structure with four distinct narrators while leaving the center action ambiguous. Olga Vickery, has pointed out that, "by fixing the structure while leaving the central situation ambiguous, Faulkner forces the reader to reconstruct the story and to apprehend its significance for himself" (qtd. in Burton 625). The central situation, as Faulkner later recounts, is the vision of Caddy's soiled underwear in the tree from which the rest of the story unfolds (Meriwether and Millgate 244). In this context, it is possible to see *The Sound and the Fury* not as just four different narratives, but also as a continuously widening spiral in which events are repeated and re-explained. Each turn of the gyre requires readers to reassemble the story temporally and spatially, but it never leads them any nearer to narrative closure.

Even when Faulkner seems to provide a definite ending to the tale in the Appendix to the *Portable Faulkner* in 1946, he opens up the narrative with more questions. The central subject of

the novel Caddy, remains elusive. According to the Appendix, in 1943 a Jefferson librarian thinks she finds a local newspaper picture of Caddy next to a Nazi Staff General on the Riviera. She brings the picture to Jason, who first laughing says, "It's Cad alright." Then later he rescinds and smugly rejects the theory, "That Candace?....Dont make me laugh. This bitch aint thirty yet. The other one's fifty now" (*SF* 231 - 232). In doing so, Caddy's fate once again becomes uncertain. There is no other source to which the librarian can go as everyone who knew Caddy is either dead, or in Dilsey's case, blind. The Appendix gestures toward a conclusion, but defers to yet another mystery. It is Faulkner once again performing a "form of mock writerly authority" (Stoicheff 462). The central image of *The Sound and the Fury*, thus remains unresolved no matter how much bibliographic evidence is provided. Yet, the reader is invited to produce continuously new interpretations. It is a process set in motion from the very beginning. Burton argues that, "*The Sound and the Fury* provokes this dialogic participation from its first pages, for as soon as a reader recognizes the severe limits of Benjy's perceptions, he or she attempts to supplement what that difficult narrator has to say" (625). The reader is thus caught in an endless cycle of restructuring, recombination, and re-reading for a "truth" that is not there. It is a process continued throughout the Yoknapatawpha tales.

Structurally, the *Light in August* is quite a bit different than the *Sound and the Fury*. Instead of four different narrators the text is a patchwork of three overlapping plot lines, that of Lena, Hightower, and Christmas. These plot lines are continuously interrupted by ever greater flashbacks from the characters' lives. With the introduction of each new personal history the narrative past elucidates but also obfuscates the narrative present. As Carolyn Porter very lucidly explains, the novel continuously introduces larger "chunks of time" into a narrative framework that is trying to incorporate it into a "unified vision." The novel also calls attention to this

principle by willingly "biting off more than it seems able to chew." As different parts of the novel expand and overlap the whole appears increasingly inadequate in its attempt at creating order. As a result, "the tension keeps mounting between time's ceaseless motion and the need to impose a structure large enough to give that motion meaning" (91). At the very heart of this motion is of course the meaning of Joe Christmas. Cobbled together, the fragments of Joe's life do not directly translate into a meaningful existence, and his meaning is deferred and wrapped up in the narratives about him. As Ellen Goellner explains in a slightly different context, "Faulkner's assays and experiments in *Light in August* work not toward a single, climactic and revelatory moment, but instead as a continual redirection and transformation of textual energy through his characters' recounting and retellings, both of their lives and the lives of others" (106). That is to say, the central "truth" of the narrative is missing due to the conflicting voices. Paradoxically, Christmas is central to the Yoknapatawpha myth, but it is not clear how.

A last example of this aesthetic is *Absalom, Absalom!*, undoubtedly Faulkner's most complex novel. Not only does the story consist of four different narrators like the *Sound and the Fury*, they also make extensive use of stream of consciousness as in *Light in August*, but, more so, the narratives overlap and interject one another. In previous novels these devices were relatively discreet, but here they meld and coalesce into one narrative stream. Patricia Tobin notes, "*Absalom, Absalom!* offers obstacle upon obstacle to the seeker after continuity" (253). The novel continuously asks the reader to integrate more and more discordant information.

On the surface, the story of Thomas Sutpen would seem entirely chaotic and haphazard, with each narrator invested for his or her own reason. Still, Lynn Levins has convincingly shown that what appear to be four chaotic narratives are actually four distinct voices, each expressing a different genre. She argues that, Rosa Coldfield's is Gothic Mystery, Mr. Compson Greek

tragedy, Quentin chivalric romance, and Shreve, through ironic detachment, the tall tale. Consequently, she concludes that, "each narrator, by reacting to the fragmented pieces of the Sutpen puzzle with an individual response, creates his own version of truth, and the result is that not one figure of Thomas Sutpen emerges by the end of the novel, but four" (35). The interplay of these different genres does not merely call into question the veracity of each different speaker, but also poses larger questions about narrative form and meaning.

By self-consciously highlighting the relationship between what is said and how it is said, the novel problematizes the very possibility of truth. As a result, the text seems to operate as increasingly alienated fragments of meaning. R. Rio-Jelliffe remarks that the increasingly discordant narratives raise, "questions on their reliability and on the fictive mode itself, is the technical analogue to the novelist's skepticism about language which falsifies, and his ability to represent reality or truth" (76-77). As a result, the texts would seem to reach a semantic null point. Indeed, written in the heyday of deconstruction, such criticism disavows the possibility of any textual unity. Yet, paradoxically, this centrifugal force pulling the text outward is counteracted by the centripetal force of the reader trying to put it together. John Basset describes this process quite eloquently, echoing Rio-Jelliffe by arguing that *Absalom, Absalom!* "examines the fictionality of history, the relativity of knowledge, and the making of myth." In contradistinction to him, however; he explains, "More precisely, it illustrates man's need not merely to make sense of the past but to do so in causally consistent chronological narratives" (277). That is to say, the narrative exposes our drive to create a coherent, past, present, and future. It asks us, to "tell about the South."

Ultimately, Faulkner is trying to capture the irrevocable fragmentation of an imagined unified South, through narratives which themselves are marked by that very fragmentation. Yet,

unlike perhaps any other modernist work, the works of Yoknapatawpha represent the longest sustained effort to capture the changing dynamics in one small community. From this community an entire totality can be inferred and reconstructed in the mind of the reader time and time again. In the end though, it is a totality with the parameters of its own impossibility already fully integrated. Unlike the conspiracy theories with which it shares a close relationship, Faulkner's writing is self aware of the possibility of ever arriving at a totality, something that escapes a conspiracy theorist like Grimm who projects an invisible order on the world without ever questioning its veracity.

CHAPTER FIVE

Robert Musil
June 28th 1914, Austro-Hungarian Empire, Vienna
January 30th 1933, Germany, Berlin

Introduction

Considering the impact the rise of Nazism had on his life and work, it is fitting to close this dissertation with Robert Musil. Married to a woman of Jewish ancestry, and deeply tied to the Viennese Jewish community, Musil's fortunes rose and fell with that of the Jews. Sustained financially by generosity from the Jewish community throughout his career, he spent the last, turbulent, years of his life in Switzerland after his wife, his Jewish financial backers, and his books all became targets of Nazi persecution. There he died at age 61, tragically leaving his magnum opus, *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften* [*The Man without Qualities*] unfinished. Set in Vienna the year before the Great War, the work records the panoply of figures and ideas representative of the fading Austro-Hungarian Empire. Occasionally a novel, but more often a philosophical treatise, *The Man without Qualities* embodies and builds upon many of the modernist tropes and techniques developed by Proust, Joyce, and Faulkner. Proceeding from the epistemological assumption that the world has fallen apart, the main character, Ulrich, attempts

to shore up the fragments of a lost totality by exploring the various philosophical, intellectual, and political doctrines of the early twentieth century. Musil eschews a traditional plot, and creates a pastiche of essays, observations, and random vignettes that propel the book forward chronologically, but not narratively. In the completed portions of the work, he never arrives at a satisfactory solution to the fragmentation and the loss that so marked the interwar period in Central Europe. Indeed, having worked on the novel nearly a quarter century, critics argue that it is doubtful he ever would have finished, because finishing would have been inimical to his project: capturing the fundamental incompleteness of the modern world.

In its inability to arrive at a conclusion, *The Man without Qualities* perhaps represents one of the final and finest articulations of epic modernism's concern with the loss of a totalizing worldview. Although resonant in Proust, Joyce, and Faulkner, the lost totality in their work is always contained within the covers of the book, with Musil it lurks in the abyss of the books discontinuation. Presciently, the Austrian once revealed that he wanted the work to finish in the middle of a sentence, perhaps with a comma (Schwartz 98). Admittedly, this gives Musil a tremendous amount of artistic foresight that places him within the realm of later postmodernists. Another, more sober, reason why Musil may not have finished it is that by the time he is working on the second volume epic modernism is already a fast fading form. Alternatively, a less generous critic could argue that was simply a modernist who failed.

The novel is not merely a dissection of pre-war Vienna. Many of the observations by the narrator are filtered through the lens of an emerging Nazism and a pervasive anti-Semitism. The book is therefore thematically situated as anticipating the Great War, but historically embedded in the coming Second World War. Thus, Musil explicitly foreshadows the conditions leading to the Great War, and implicitly works through the conditions of the interbellum.

The Great War, the political dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the complete economic meltdowns of the Great Depression, all force Austrian society to fundamentally re-evaluate its new relationship with the world. Musil's work both embodies this confusion and documents how it gives rise to such radically different ideologies, as Fascism, socialism, liberalism, and spiritualism. Each of these ideologies claims to fill the epistemological void. As Ulrich investigates these various answers to modernity's chaos, he finds each of them inadequate. While the work does not focus on any particular ideology, the one that is most dangerous is National Socialist anti-Semitism.

As this chapter will show, the novel ultimately rejects any notion of a unified understanding of the world, while at the same time lamenting the loss of that idea and ideal. Instead of such a universal truth, it reveals the mechanisms through which such totalizing views are created, and undermines them in the process. Like the fictions of Yoknapatawpha the reader is asked to reconstruct an erstwhile complete world, in this case, the pre-Great War Austro-Hungarian Empire. The differences, then, between modernity's effect on small-town Mississippi and the capital city of an ancient empire are only differences of degree and not in kind.

From an epistemological and aesthetic point of view, the narrative structure and historic scope of the work represents a problem for the reader. Narratively, it is written as a series of essays, pastiches, and fragments; the work assimilates and regurgitates wholesale the ideas and ideologies of early twentieth century Viennese society in no particular order. Historically, the work is as much about the pre-War period as it is about the interwar period, and shifts with the changing intellectual currents of the late twenties and early thirties. The novel thus ripples out spatially and temporally almost at random from a singular time and place, Vienna the year before the Great War. Given these challenges, the reader is forced to draw connections across nearly

twelve hundred pages of text, and is each time asked to assemble and re-assemble a complete picture of the work. More so, because the work transcends genres the reader is also required to hierarchize and de-hierarchize the knowledge presented. By giving readers chaos that suggests totality, the epistemological and aesthetic relationships in the text tease out the process of conspiratorial semiosis. At the same time, the text also rejects this very type of thinking, by continuously suggesting that a comprehension of the whole might be impossible.

This chapter will make this argument in the following steps. First, it will address how anti-Semitism spread in Central Europe generally and affected Musil specifically. Second, it will demonstrate how the rise of Nazism and conspiracy theory influenced *The Man without Qualities*. Third, it will show how the text simultaneously evinces and eschews conspiratorial semiosis through its epistemological and aesthetic framework.

The Rise of Anti-Semitism from the Austro-Hungarian Empire to the Anschluss

One of the main contentions of this dissertation has been that anti-Semitism was part of a larger international response to modernity's decentralizing tendencies. Therefore, there was little fundamental difference between the various forms of national anti-Semitisms. Indeed, there were different emphases due to local conditions, but many of the same key players emerge on both sides of the Atlantic. Thus, paradoxically, while anti-Semitic conspiracy theory was nativist in its articulation, it was internationalist in its conceptualization. Musil already observed this in his own time. He asks, "But why is it then that today the invocation of the national, whether as race or culture, in any case as a mysterious unity, is a phenomenon of thoroughly ironic internationalism?" ("PS" 162). As Musil points out, it is strange that discussions of nation should be articulated through an international discourse. More so, the construction of this "mysterious unity", that is the nation, generally relied on a system of differences. While these differences

were sometimes in relation to other nations, one common means was often anti-Semitism. Indeed, as should be clear by now from the previous chapters anti-Semitism was a general feature of European discourse. This general anti-Semitism was often catalyzed by short term local crisis as for example the Dreyfus Affair. In the case of Germany and Austria, the crisis actually ran much deeper than the Affair. Both nations were in a protracted state of disunity stretching from the late nineteenth century all the way to the Second World War, and, as a result anti-Semitism turned so particularly vicious relative to other European countries. In essence, these states experience the exact opposite tendencies, but use surprisingly similar tactics to create a nation.

In the case of Germany, the slow process of nationalization of the German states up until the unification in 1871 created a need for a strong national myth that would catalyze centralization (Pulzer 96). As the various states had been politically disparate, it became expedient to hold the different factions together through consanguinity. Initially, this consanguinity was purely an abstract *Völkisch* notion of Germanic culture, but this later transformed into a concept of actual blood ties that would become the Nazi *Blut und Boden* racial doctrine.

Contrary to the centralizing process of Germany, the exact opposite process was taking place in Austria. Whereas Germany represented the rise of the new, the fall of the Hapsburg Monarchy heralded the end of one of the longest lasting empires in European history. The Great War foreshortened the decentralization of the empire that had seemed inevitable since the creation of the dual-monarchy in 1867.[1] After all, the vast cosmopolitan empire consisted of so many different national groups that it could hardly be said to have a central identity, barring a legal one. While these groups were tied together geographically and politically, they often had

few linguistic and cultural affinities. As Musil so aptly points out, the Austro-Hungarian Empire had largely been a fiction composed of no longer extant kingdoms, "So if you asked an Austrian where he was from, of course he couldn't say: I am a man from one of those nonexistent kingdoms and countries; so for that reason alone he preferred to say: I am a Pole, a Czech, an Italian, Friulian, Ladino, Slovene, Croat, Serb, Slovak, Ruthenian, or Wallachian – and this was his so-called nationalism" (*MWQ* 491).[2] When the empire collapsed and new countries were formed, these various national groups Czechs, Hungarians, Serbians, constructed their states around an identity they had been creating in opposition to the Austro-Hungarian Empire for some time. Meanwhile, the last remnant of the empire, the young Austrian Republic was put in a very odd position. Consisting largely of Austrian-Germans, its identity had been historically determined through its heterogeneity, and because they never developed their own identity "the German-speaking Austrians were prevented from realizing the nationalist myth as a result of their historical and cultural position" (Spencer 52 - 53). Unable to return to the old empire, but lacking the institutional machinery and unifying myth to forge a nation, Austria's political identity crisis was vexing, and many Austrians felt like a people in search of a nation.

These divisions were especially apparent in the general animosity between Vienna and the countryside. The former was still the home of Ancien Régime liberalism, cosmopolitanism, and "foreignness."[3] Conversely, rural Austria shaped itself in opposition to the cosmopolitan heart of central European Modernism through an intense Germanic nationalist myth embodied in the tenets of National Socialism.[4] Emblematic of this rural contempt for Vienna was Hitler. Born in a small town, the young German-Austrian despised Vienna and saw the imperial city as a "Babylonian realm" and promoter of "everything non-German" (Jenks 143). From the end of the war throughout the thirties there was a consistent desire among a significant part of the populace

to unify with Germany. Hence, when Hitler marched south towards his homeland in 1938 the Anschluss was almost a foregone conclusion and the result of a fundamentally unstable Austrian Republic. For many Austrians the Anschluss was seen as the restoration of empire (Spencer 59).

Beyond looking to Germany, a significant portion of the Austrian people would find the solution to their national identity crisis in anti-Semitism. Due to the relative cultural similarities the transmission of anti-Semitic ideas between Germans and Austrian-Germans was very fluid. This is why many of the same groups in Austria and Germany were attracted to anti-Semitism (Perry and Schweitzer 158). Perhaps one of the crucial differences between the two nations was that Germany saw anti-Semitism as a way forward towards Germanic glory, while the Austrian-Germans viewed it as a return to former Habsburgian domination.

This general appeal of anti-Semitism in Austria was catalyzed by short term crisis. The Austrian Republic had been unstable since its founding and experienced a series of crises throughout the interwar period, including: a failed revolution in 1918; a stock market crash in 1924; the burning of the Palace of Justice in 1927; and the banning of the Social Democrats in 1934 (Holmes and Silverman 7). No doubt a general sense of unease compounded by crisis fomented a search for scapegoats. Complicate this with a very fragile civil society and marginally effective government, and Austria readily became what Karl Kraus had already called it before the war, an “experimental laboratory for world destruction” (Levene 336).

Needless to say, the emergence of Anti-Semitism in both Austria and Germany before the Holocaust has been more documented than any other anti-Semitic phenomenon. There is no room here to add to this history in any detail. Still, there were several key players with whom Musil was either familiar with or whom he directly reacted against.

Jewish hatred had a long history in Germany and Europe generally, and although this hatred came in many forms, it usually expressed itself as a form of religious hatred. In Germany, this hatred changes in 1871 when the unification of Germany raised the question among intellectuals about who and what was a German, and perhaps more importantly, who and what was not German (Crowe 55). There were two distinct but often overlapping answers to this question. One group of anti-Semites found their rallying call in Wilhelm Marr's *Das Sieg des Judenthums über Germanenthum* [The Victory of Judaism over Germandom] and Eugen Dühring's *Die Judenfrage als Frage der Rassenschädelichkeit fur Existence, Sitte und Kultur der Völker* [*The Jewish Question as a Question of Racial Harmfulness for the Existence, Morals, and Culture of Peoples*] (1881). Both authors believed that Jews were a distinct racial group that needed to be extirpated from German soil through either deportation or extermination (Crowe 55; Nicosia 24; Perry and Schweitzer 105).[5] The other group consisting of cultural anti-Semites, found their leader in Paul de Lagarde who was the patron saint of *Völkisch* nationalism, which sought to remove the participation of Jews from German cultural life (Stern 90 - 91). This *Völkisch* thought was a "romantic German nationalism that exalted everything German – the medieval past, German language and landscape, fatherland and Teutonic tribes and Teutonic Gods, the simple peasant life and pre-industrial village community" (Perry and Schweitzer 104). It rejected the urbanization and industrialization of modernity and its liberal humanist underpinnings which it associated with France, the West, and "alien" Jews (104).

These two movements expressed two significantly different versions of anti-Semitism. Racial anti-Semitism was largely rationalist. It promoted the exploitation of technological and industrial resources for the creation and betterment of a racial state. Later, with the advent of genetics and eugenics, racial antisemitism becomes the ultimate expression of a faith in science

to create a better nation. Cultural anti-Semitism was almost entirely visceral. It relied on abstractions and symbols to motivate the German people, in both Germany and Austria, to return to an earlier time of purity. These different types of anti-Semitism appealed to different groups. These two strains were very much at the root of the visible and invisible duality of Jewishness we have seen throughout this dissertation.

Houston Stewart Chamberlain, an English expatriate living in Germany, is the first to combine these different strains of thought into a cohesive doctrine in his *Die Grundlagen des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* [*Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*] (1899). His biographer Geoffrey Field points out that Chamberlain successfully amalgamates a wide variety of racial myths including, "Aryan supremacy, anti-Semitism, messianic and mystical notions of race, Social Darwinism, and recently developed doctrines of eugenics and anthroposociology. Above all he joined the Teutonic myth, German nationalism, and cultural idealism" (223). He does so by combining the thought of a wide array of anti-Semitic authors including Dühring and Lagarde, but also French thinkers pivotal to the Dreyfus Affair like Drumont and LaPouge (Field 173, 454; Young 246).In fact, he arguably did for Germany and Austria what Drumont did for France. He created a totalizing worldview by casting the Jew as both a pernicious invisible force for evil, and, at the same time, a very visibly distinct inferior race. In order to achieve cohesion between these at times disparate and contradictory thinkers, Chamberlain engages in a type of "paranoid style" that syncretizes away all difference into a simplistic racial dogma (Field 193). George Mosse labels this a "scavenger ideology, which annexed the virtues, morals, and respectability of the age to its stereotypes and attributed them to the inherent qualities of a superior race" (234). More to the point, Chamberlain and authors like him, provide a totalizing reading of the world that is commensurate with conspiratorial semiosis.

Chamberlain's importance in the rise of National Socialism cannot be underestimated. Many people within the party had read his work and openly confessed to have been influenced by him. These people included, Rudolf Hess, Dietrich Eckart, Heinrich Himmel, and Baldur von Shirach, but also Rosenberg, Goebbels, and Hitler (Field 452). The future Führer even met with Chamberlain on a number of occasions starting in 1923 (447). Across the channel, Winston Churchill and George Bernard Shaw openly praised the book (463-64). Meanwhile, as we saw in the previous chapter, Madison Grant made extensive use of Chamberlain's work (Spiro 112), while Theodore Roosevelt also had a generally favorable opinion (465-66). Given this widespread influence, it is little surprise that Chamberlain and his *Foundations* become a foil for Musil. The anti-Semitic Hans Sepp bases many of his on *Völkische* ideas on that of Chamberlain in the earlier parts of the novel (Wolf 116). He too reduces everything to abstract notions of Nordicism.

Chamberlain's life and influence traversed the Great War, and his work did much to lay the seeds for the postwar anti-Semitic boom that occurred in Germany and Austria. The war becomes a cataclysmic event that galvanized Germanic fears of Jewish domination. In particular, it became a common belief that the Jews conspired against the Germans during the war (Field 259).[6] As a result, postwar Germany saw the emergence of over four hundred overlapping right-wing groups that were usually anti-Semitic (Perry and Schweitzer 157). Not only that, but it was believed by anti-Semites that Germany's decay was accelerated by the "Jewish" Weimar Republic (157).[7]

Post-war pessimism bolstered pre-war beliefs in European degeneration and decay, and one important historian to capitalize on this sentiment was Oswald Spengler. Although influential to the Nazis, Spengler was more of a traditional conservative nationalist and did not

approve of violence or Jewish extermination (Biddis 96). Spengler's *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* [*The Decline of the West*] (1922) represents a cyclical philosophy of history in which cultures followed a pattern of growth, maturation, and decay (L. B. Williams 10). For Spengler, the lost war represented the opportunity for the New Germany to reject the old culture of the West. In its stead, Germany would create a culture of youth consisting of warrior elites that would take down the forces of capitalism and its political vehicle democracy (Hickman 112). Although Spengler would later be openly hostile to the Nazis, his early attacks on Weimar Germany helped pave the way for their ascendancy (Farrenkopf 167, 238). Musil attacks Spengler's model of history in his essay "Geist und Erfahrung" ironically subtitled, "Anmerkungen für Leser, welche *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* entronnen sind" [Mind and Experience; Remarks for those who eluded *The Decline of the West*]. He is extremely skeptical of Spengler's notion of a biological or organic outlook on history (Gnettner 83). For Musil such an outlook is far too deterministic. As we will see, Spengler will provide Musil with a model for the proto-fascist Hans Sepp. In particular because, Spengler's concept of an "Ursymbols" overlaps Sepp's obsession with a Symbolic understanding (Albertsen 108; Müller 22).

Alfred Rosenberg also formed a major counterpoint to Musil's thinking.[8] His ideas follow in the footsteps of Chamberlain. His main work, a central text of Nazi ideology, *Der Mythus des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts* (1930)[*The Myth of the Twentieth Century*], clearly reflects the extent of this debt (Field 453). Perhaps more than any other anti-Semitic author he was able to deftly combine both the visceral and irrational resentment of Jews with the pseudo-scientific and objective outlook of the racial thinkers. He did so by arguing that a new "race-soul" was emerging from the blood of the German martyrs from the Great War, and that racism was the one true "people's Church" (qtd. in Mosse 189). He concluded that there was a mythic Nordic "state

type" that transcended the confines of his or her corporeal existence by connecting to the German state via his or her soul (Crooke 47- 48). Rosenberg thus argues that the only way to save the German state is by having everyone connect with their racial German essence (51). He thereby collapses history, culture, and race into one transcendental Germanic signified.

Of course, the most influential person to emerge during this period was Hitler himself. Hitler added little to the discourse of anti-Semitism that had not been already articulated by others, but he significantly changed its scope. He turned the hatred of Jews into a total war on a cosmic scale that would not end until every last Jew was eradicated. He gave the "German-spirit" focus and resolve, and elided any internal contradictions within his system of thought, because anything negative could be considered Jewish. Consequentially, the comprehensiveness of Hitlerian anti-Semitism cannot be underestimated. Philippe Burrin explains, that Hitler's anti-Semitism was "apocalyptic-racist." Apocalypse, "conjures up the figure of a prophet, evokes a metaphysical passion, nourishes an existential hatred, the angst of salvation or annihilation". While racist suggests "a would-be scientific approach, connoting objectivity and detachment" (48). Hitlerian anti-Semitism was effective in galvanizing the masses, precisely because it seemed to have two contradictory impulses. It appealed to rational intellectuals who saw themselves above the facile hatred of Jews, but strove for a racially hygienic state. Contrarily, it evoked a visceral, almost primal hatred against an abstract symbol, "the Jew" by people who felt that their way of life was under attack. Jewishness essentially became everything non-German. Groups that had no bearing on each other, and even at times hated each other, were all thrown into the same general Jewish mass, liberals, socialists, Bolsheviks, capitalists, Freemasons, homosexuals, and Christians.[9] As this dissertation has been arguing it is precisely this refinement

of the two Jewish categories visible and invisible that represents the trajectory of anti-Semitism before the Holocaust.

Many people, Musil among them, recognized the danger of Nazism early on. Musil's intimate connections with the Jewish community and his Jewish wife probably put him more directly in danger than other non-Jewish writers (Bringazi 510). Hence, he was quite apprehensive about the consequences of his writing. So much so, that when he wrote about National Socialists in his diaries he used abbreviations, lest they should fall into the wrong hands (Hickman 168). Despite putting himself in danger by publicly protesting the Nazis in Vienna in 1938, Musil has been criticized for not as openly denouncing Fascism as his contemporaries Thomas Mann and Bertolt Brecht (Payne 11). Yet, his publically ambiguous stance had less to do with individual resolve than with his desire for complexity. Simply denouncing Nazism would relegate him to the base level of a propagandist. Undoubtedly, he hated the Nazis, but to attack them as simple-minded racists does not get to the root of the problem for Musil. Instead, Musil takes a far more philosophical approach. For example, in his unfinished 1933 essay, "The Ruminations of a Slow-witted Mind," he worked through Nazi ideology by taking its point of view. He asks himself if it is possible that the Jews could simultaneously blind him to their presence while also causing the total and universal corruption of everything (Thiher 309). Such a claim he concludes is impossible.

In a later essay, "Uber die Dummheit," [On Stupidity] implicitly aimed at Nazism, he argues that it is not its followers, not even its ideas, but its means of thought that are corrupted. Frank Thiher provides a particularly good reading of this essay. He demonstrates that Musil sees stupidity as complex. Stupidity is not merely the lack of intelligence, but also the "form of feeling" (313). Thus, a person can be intelligent intellectually, but lack proper feeling. He sees

this as a form of "higher stupidity," which he calls "Bildungskrankheit" – in this context it is roughly a malady of the soul. Therefore, the fundamental fault of the Nazis is not their lack of intelligence, as they have proven that they are quite capable of higher level thinking, but their lack of emotional intelligence guiding their goal. More acutely, they lack "Geist" [mind/spirit] (315). It is a damning analysis that both recognizes the intellectual capacity of the Nazi regime and its inherent danger. At the same time, by attacking the mode of thinking rather than the thinkers he also disempowers the individual members of the Nazi party. As he states elsewhere, Hitler is, "ein Person gewordener effekt, ein sprechender effect" [a person become effect, a speaking effect] (Spencer 122). The Führer is really the culmination of modernity's ideological presuppositions, rather than an individual historical agent. Consequently, people cannot blame external circumstances for Hitler, but need to question the patterns of thought that enabled his ascendancy.

By condemning the mode of thought, Musil provides a much more profound and problematic analysis of modernity. If there were a way to overcome modernity's fragmentation through a new doctrine, be it capitalism, socialism or fascism, people would simply have to adopt that new order. Musil implies that no such new order will succeed in its end. Inherent to any order that tries to establish hegemony is a form of tautological thinking. He points out, "Every existing order says: Man is good, man is altruistic. It calls its own requirements good, and accordingly the person who is subordinated to them is *illis ipsis* good. (Moreover, the new order is continually depositing itself on the remains of older ones)" ("PS" 155). Thus, the basis of any new order is the presupposition that it is good. The new order proves its goodness by excluding from itself anything bad. It thereby defines itself negatively, in what it is not. Since no order is by default perfect, there will always remain things that fall outside this order. These

exclusions therefore prove the validity of the order, but, paradoxically, prove that the order is also invalid, because a perfect order would have no exclusions. In essence, for Musil any order that imposes structure on the world is doing so from an implicit Archimedean point that is never questioned (McBride 368).

It is perhaps easier to see this process of exclusion and affirmation with a more concrete example. In reference to Nazism, this could be constructed in the following matter. Aryans are all-good, noble, and honest, yet there is corruption. Corruption is proof of the existence of the 'non-Aryan', because the non-Aryan exists there must be Aryans, and if there are Aryans, they must by definition be good. In its most basic sense this is the process of conspiratorial semiosis that Musil sees underlying all worldviews.

Instead of constructing merely another worldview, Musil reasons that we fundamentally need to change the way in which we view the world. Understanding the world in a new light therefore becomes the responsibility of each individual. His work therefore tries to open up new ways of understanding that stand in direct opposition to the totalizing and dehumanizing narratives that try to shore up modernity's fragments. While these narratives include communism and capitalism, his greater counter image is certainly National Socialism. Consequently, the production of the *Man without Qualities* and the emergence of Nazism stand in direct tension with each other throughout the period. It is this tension that best defines Musil's place in the modernist cannon.

The Man without Qualities and Modernism

One of the most consistent claims made about the *Man without Qualities* is that it resists summary. In an astute reading Phillip Payne, observes that the novel's plot lines are a "concatenation of non-events" (63). Certainly, these non-events overlap and transect each other and, in a sense, shift around, but they are not moving forward in the way a traditional plot does, because there is no clear end in sight. Be that as it may, it is possible to conceive broadly of three major story arcs. The novel begins in August 1913, a year before the start of WWI. The main character, Ulrich, has decided to take an "Urlaub vom lebens" (leave from life) for a year. Essentially, this is a sabbatical from the bourgeois project of making forward "progress" in his life. His year is filled with sexual liaisons, appearances at fashionable salons, and a peculiar obsession with the sex-murderer Moosbrugger.

Through this leave from life he inadvertently becomes secretary of the "Parallelaktion" (Parallel Campaign), which forms the second plot line. This is a plan to celebrate the 70 year rule of Emperor Franz Joseph in 1918, and the campaign is supposed to be the complete embodiment of the Austrian ideal. The campaign is created in opposition to a German campaign to celebrate the thirty year anniversary of the German Keiser's reign, and thereby constructs the Austrian "idea" in complete opposition to the German idea. The leader of the campaign is the arch-aristocrat Count Leinsdorf. His wife Diotima, is Ulrich's cousin, and hosts an array of people in her fashionable salon. Due to its increasingly broad scope, the campaign draws in evermore characters from the Vienna elite, and it is therefore Musil's main vehicle for social satire.

The third plot arc is his relationship with his sister Agathe. When Ulrich's father dies, he, quite implausibly, suddenly remembers he has a sister. The visit to his sister puts his

involvement with the Parallel Campaign on hold, and the two become increasingly close. Although Musil never finished this part, some of the notes suggest that they are to develop an incestuous relationship (Hickman 182). Still, as the incest never makes it into the published text, some critics are skeptical that it would have ever done so (Payne 55).

While these three plot lines give a basic outline, they fall far short from capturing the complexity of the innumerable sub-plots, characters, and themes that develop throughout the work. Moreover, much of the novel is not focused on plot development, but is, in fact, a series of philosophical essays. These essays range across the entire panorama of modern existence, from the modern city to horse racing, from epistemology to billiards, and from criminal law to the hypothetical return of Plato.

Ulrich is the focal point that holds these loose plot threads together. Throughout the novel his main driving force is the search for the "Andere Zustand," the Other Condition, a mystical state of extreme ecstasy in which someone knows his or her true self. Musil described this as a contrast to the ordinary state of affairs in which "the self-masters the world," in the Other Condition, "the world flows into the self, or mingles with it or bears it, and the like" ("PS" 186). The means of arriving at this state is through a process of "Precision and Soul," which is the successful marriage of both rationality and imagination. In this light, Musil is quite distinct from his contemporaries. Unlike Proust, Joyce, and Faulkner who essentially wanted to reconcile a world fractured by modernity through art, Musil wanted to reconcile modernity and art into a harmonious relationship. He therefore does not eschew science and industrialization as inimical to art, but rather integrates them into a perspective that seeks to cause the "dereification of the self as of the world" (187). For Mark Freed, this approach is Musil's attempt to simultaneously dereify both historically and methodologically "the border between science (subject-centered

reason) and its possible alternatives" (110). The space created falls somewhere in between modernism and postmodernism, which Freed labels as the non-modern, and is a rejection by Musil "to perpetuate the aporias of Modernity by replicating the intellectual practices that gave rise to them and set off the dialectic of enlightenment" (111). Hence, he wants to create a modernity that does not rely either on one form of reason over another, or as the return of a repressed other. It is questionable if the text ever arrives at the Other Condition, but it becomes the absent totality that shapes the reading. The search for the Other Condition configures and reconfigures the text, and the work therefore exhibits the same epistemological crisis that marks the other texts in this study. Still, like anti-Semitism, epic modernism also changes over time, and Musil represents a significant departure from the previous authors in that he no longer sees art as a possible way to reunify the relationship between man and world.

Underlying this vast project was also a compositional process that resists historical and biographical interpretation. Although he started writing sketches of the work as early as 1920, he worked on it continuously until 1942 (Payne 49). Throughout this period, Musil never had a master plan for the novel.[10] Instead, he let the historical context from which he wrote the novel guide him. Thus, the time of composition not only informed the scope of the novel, but also shaped the substance. Throughout the process, Musil changed the narrative according to the events around him. As Payne so eloquently explains, "Such changes, like stones thrown into a pond, affect not only the immediate narrative context; their ripples spread out through the whole text – but Musil is rarely able to make the necessary adjustments through the whole novel before some new change claims his attention" (53). Therefore, the characters gain a depth and maturity that is far more accelerated than the mere span of one year makes plausible. Furthermore, it makes the palimpsest of historical layers that much more complex. Each layer is not only a

reflection on 1914 from the perspective of say, 1927, but it is also a reflection on the 1927 reflection on 1914 from the perspective of 1930, and each later subsequent reflection that is added to it.

What complicates the work even more is its convoluted publishing history. He starts the work in earnest in 1927 and publishes book 1 in 1930, which consists of parts I and II in 123 continuously numbered chapters. Then, he moved to Berlin and under increasing pressure from his publisher, he submits the first 38 chapters of Book 2 late in 1932, right before Hitler comes to power. He labels these chapters part III and starts the chapter numbers over again (Thiher 229). Musil sorely regretted this somewhat forced 1933 publication, because it locked him into plot lines he had not fully developed yet. Importantly, Hitler's rise to power and the subsequent persecution of Jews forced him and his wife back to Vienna. There he lectured and continued to work on the novel. By 1938, the galley proofs of twenty more chapters were at the publisher. Around this time the Nazis form the Anschluss with Austria, and Musil's works are banned. Fearing for his life, the publisher, Gottfried Bermann-Fischer fled, his firm was confiscated, and Musil took the galleys with him (15). The largely Jewish Musil-Society also disbanded, and Musil lost a major source of income. He moved to Switzerland mostly on funds raised by admirers. There he died virtually destitute in 1942 (Payne 50). Without a doubt, the Nazi threat directly foreshortened both Musil's life and his work.

Still, Musil's failure to bring the work to a successful conclusion does not merely speak to the fraught historical circumstances of his life, but also to the epistemological foundations of modernism. Musil's inability to finish the work is emblematic of a larger modernist failure to transform or save culture through literature (Thiher 230). More so, the project is founded on the mockery of early twentieth century pretentions of total knowledge. As such, it can only stay true

to itself by mocking the very idea of salvation. Thiher concludes that, "if the novel's lack of completion illustrates a failure, it is the failure to create a discourse of salvation, a very modernist failure to create a viable myth" (230). Musil's distrust of any resolute meaning in modernity pervades the text. He argues that, "A world of qualities without a man has arisen, of experiences without the person who experiences them, and it almost looks as though ideally private experience is a thing of the past, and that the friendly burden of personal responsibility is to dissolve into a system of formulas of possible meanings (158-9).[11] That is to say, mankind's experiences are now wholly structured by the possibilities modernity has to offer. There is no experience outside of the systems of meaning of the modern world. Yet, the qualities of these systems exist entirely outside of people. They do not offer people a real connection to the world around them.

In this highly uncertain modernity, the novel's various characters try to carve out a reality for themselves. This is particularly true of the first part of the novel in which various positions on reality are presented and ultimately rejected through the vehicle of the Parallelaktion. This process of proposing and eliminating different ideologies should not be confused with any type of plot movement. This would suggest that the plot was somehow moving towards a truth, towards a totality, and conjures a level of order that belies the chaotic and provisional foundations of the novel. Instead, the subversion of an intellectual fad is quite arbitrary. Even Ulrich's final search for a form of *Geist* (both spirit and mind) commensurate with the modern world appears to veer towards another failure. If the novel were to arrive at a type of truth, it would undermine the very project developed over twelve-hundred pages.

While the approaches to truth on the part of different characters are wildly divergent they make the same underlying assumption: there is a totality that can be known. Hence, most, if not

all, the major characters try to understand the world by assimilating all the knowledge available within the realm of a certain discourse and projecting that on a totalizing worldview. This totalization is not merely the framework through which people acquire knowledge generally, but is a reaction engendered by modernity specifically. Such a view suggests that totalitarian thought is not modernity's aberrant and often barbarous offshoot, but rather its logical extension.

This totalizing mechanism and its relationship to conspiratorial semiosis can be explained by looking at the thought process of several divergent characters. What is interesting in these characters is not so much their diversity, but their consistency. While the person most obviously associated with anti-Semitic conspiracy theory is the mythical fascist Hans Sepp, others such as General Stumm, the psychotic killer Moosbrugger, and the Jewish financier Arnheim, all, to a certain extent, share conspiracy theory's basic assumptions. As a counter to this, Musil uses Ulrich as a foil to undermine all of these positions.

General Stumm – The Total Order of the Ancien Régime

Perhaps one of the most naive examples of totalitarian thought is General Stumm von Bordwehr. A military man with a craving for intellectualism, Stumm is above all a sympathetic character. He is sent as an emissary of the war department to keep an eye on the developments of the Parallel Campaign. As a soldier, he takes on the intellectual world of Diotima's salon by coming up with a coherent battle plan to determine the best idea that has been thought in the world for the campaign (Payne 60). This approach to knowledge as the rational accumulation of facts reveals an outmoded notion of progress typical of the Ancien Régime (Hoffmeister 122). Despite Stumm's faults, Musil does not follow other post-war portrayals of senior officers as callous brutes, instead the General is kind, even peaceful (Bernstein 50). Because of Stumm's involvement, the Parallelaktion ultimately decides to settle on armaments as the goal of their

campaign for peace. This ironic reversal lays the blame for the war not just on the bellicose generals, but also on a deeper pre-war mindset.

Before Stumm and the campaign arrive at this conclusion, he sets out to find the "der bedeutendste" [best/most important] thought that has been thought (*MoE* 459). In order to do so, he heads to the Imperial library. His initial plan is to read a book a day until he finds the perfect thought. He soon realizes this requires him to read for the next 10,000 years. The poor general is overwhelmed by the amount of books available, and is frustrated that the librarians do not know anything about the content of the books. In fact, their years of extensive study only give them insight into the logic behind the library catalogues, but no knowledge beyond ordering books. Bordwehr quickly finds himself in a vicious regression of knowledge, reading books, books about books, and books about books about books.

When Ulrich dismisses the General's desire for complete knowledge through books, the military man cleverly responds: "You may say that it isn't necessary to read every last book. Well, it's also true that in war you don't have to kill every last soldier, but we still need every one of them" (501).[12] Despite himself, Stumm points out one of the fundamental paradoxes of acquiring a complete worldview. Surely, not every piece of knowledge is necessary to build a comprehensive picture. Yet the only way to know that certain knowledge is not necessary is to know what that piece of knowledge is. Hence, all knowledge is necessary, and needs to be assimilated until proven otherwise.

Such a vision is at its basis transcendental. As Ines Gnetter points out, Bordwehr wishes for "a total order that would provide salvation from chaos" (79).[13] Paradoxically, such an order negates the very principles of dynamism, development, and mutability that make life what it is. It is a static codification of knowledge that ossifies it into the past, and therefore negates its

usefulness to the continuously evolving present (Dowden 77). Consequently, the General represents the still prevalent progressive notion of history at the turn of the century. This model, in presupposing that mankind is approaching a conclusion in terms of its accumulation of knowledge, also presumes that a totality can be known. The general's frustration is therefore a common one. Still, this is not conspiratorial thinking as such, because it relies purely on an accumulation of facts towards a perfect truth. In the end, Bordwehr does not build these facts out into a vast totalizing system.

Moosbrugger – Totality through Solipsism

The desire to not only accumulate facts, but also to make them coalesce and form into a coherent shape is better expressed by the psychotic killer Moosbrugger. Musil's inspiration for this character is most likely a synthesis of Florian Großrubatscher, a woman killer from 1900 (Corino 130), and Fritz Haarmann a notorious serial killer of the 1920s who was somewhat of a media sensation (Honold 399). By all accounts insane, Moosbrugger is also a parodic example of rationalism's natural consequences, because Moosbrugger is actually hyper-rational. Rather than distinguishing between categories of knowledge, he treats all forms of knowledge as equal. To that end, he solipsitically assimilates knowledge with regard to how it relates to him (Magris 301).

Briefly, Moosbrugger is an uneducated journeyman carpenter of simple upbringing with a penchant for violence. One day while traveling, a prostitute makes advances upon him. He tells her to leave him alone, but she persists. In a moment of possessed panic, he stabs her to death. His trial turns him into a celebrity of sorts. Not only because the authorities cannot establish his sanity and therefore his culpability, but also because they cannot control his courtroom antics. Moosbrugger colors his speech with bits of pieces of French and Latin legal terminology he has

picked up and mixes these terms with his poor attempts at High German, leading to such overwrought sentences as "I had imagined her to be even more vicious than the others of her kind in my usual estimation of them" (71).[14] To add to the courtroom spectacle, every time the prosecution would call him a menace, Moosbrugger would yell out "Bravo!" in self-satisfied agreement.

The only thing that outstrips his ignorance is his arrogance. During one of his psychiatric evaluations Moosbrugger feels the need to expound on the various colloquialisms regarding squirrels. He recounts, "A squirrel in these parts is called a tree kitten" continuing, "In Hesse on the other hand, it's called a tree fox. Any man who's traveled around [weitgewanderter Mensch] knows such things" (258).[15] Moosbrugger is replicating the erudite tone and register of cosmopolitan academic discourse, but is applying it to an entirely trivial subject matter. Musil thus demonstrates the fundamental vacuousness of academic discourse when used inappropriately by hollowing it of its substance and leaving only the style.

Due to Moosbrugger's inability to properly categorize and evaluate knowledge, he slips into conspiratorial discourse. Since he assumes himself rational and his motivations honorable, he does not understand why the system is against him. After an earlier altercation with four bricklayers whom he severely injured in a fight, he emigrates to Turkey, but soon returns, "because the world was in league against him everywhere; no magic word and no kindness could prevail against this conspiracy" (71).[16] He killed the prostitute out of moral principle, because in reality it was the fault of "those snickering women who were in the forefront of the conspiracy against him" (72).[17] During the trial he even goes so far as to claim that, "he was a 'theoretical anarchist' whom the Social Democrats were ready to rescue at a moment's notice if he chose to accept a favor from those utterly pernicious Jewish exploiters of the ignorant working class"

(72).[18] Thereby suggesting he is connected to a vast network of agents beyond the courtroom. Conversely, he also claims the exact opposite, that it is in fact the "Freemasons or the Jesuits or the Socialists" who are against him (257).[19] In short, everything for Moosbrugger is cast in conspiratorial terms. He does so because old notions of nineteenth century deductive rationalism are clashing with twentieth century conditions of individual alienation. He conceives that there must be order, but since he only feels chaos, his disorientation must be the result of pernicious forces. Ironically, the other characters in the novel assume that his paranoid delusions are epiphenomenal to his psychosis, without ever realizing that the conspiracy fears he represents are endemic in their society. They are simply seen as insane when articulated by a serial killer, but normal when espoused by an intellectual.

Arnheim – The Totality of the Markets

The character often placed in direct contrast with Moosbrugger is Dr. Paul Arnheim. The Prussian-Jewish industrialist and popular man of letters is based on the historical figure of Walter Ratheneau who was also an industrialist, writer, and statesman (Thiher 258). Musil had actually met Ratheneau on one occasion in 1914, and did not care for the man. He thought he made a "selbstgefälligen, gönnerhaften und bornierten" [self-satisfied, patronizing, and narrow-minded] impression (Hogen 111). A few months later he wrote a scathing review of one of Ratheneau's books, calling it the "Verhängnis im Ganzen" [collapse of totality] (111). While Musil certainly had a disdain for the popular statesman, he should not be confused with Arnheim, who is largely a caricature.

Arnheim represents the totalizing worldview of the capitalist. There is nothing for him that cannot be appropriated. Certainly, he coats his expropriation in vague bourgeois terminology commensurate with the spirit of man, but he is ultimately a hollow character. He is presented as

the supreme polymath of the age, knowledgeable about a seemingly innumerable range of intellectual fields and discourses; he ostensibly embodies the concept of a totality. He is both respected for his vast knowledge, but at the same time treated with suspicion because of his Jewish ancestry. Thus, when he becomes an integral figure in the Parallel Campaign he is treated with ambivalence. On the one hand, he appears as the benevolent benefactor of the age, while on the other, people suspect he is a nefarious puppet-master.

The narrator explains that he could discuss industry and economy with industrialists and bankers, "but he could also chat just as freely about molecular physics, mysticism, and pigeon shooting" (201).[20] In almost complete adulation the narrator recounts that:

> His reading and his memory were of truly extraordinary compass; he could give experts the subtlest cues in their own fields, but he also knew every person of note in the English, French, and Japanese nobility, and was at home at racetracks and golflinks not only in Europe but in Australia and America as well. So even the chamois hunters, champion horsemen, and holders of boxes at the Imperial Theater, who had come to see a crazy rich Jew (something a little different, as they put it), left Diotima's house shaking their heads with respect. (202)[21]

All those around Arnheim are enthralled by his genius and stand around "gaping" at him (203). It would appear that he is the culmination of total knowledge of the world. Yet, his perceived genius says more about the world than Arnheim. Hildegard Hogen explains that, "Arnheim embodies a combination of naiveté and arrogance, of philosophical superficiality and societal success, which he himself cannot comprehend" (110).[22] These qualities belie the deeper epistemic problem's with Arnheim's approach to the Campaign. He essentially sees the search for truth as a summation of facts as opposed to the complete unity of ideas (Drevermann 137).

For example, Arnheim tells Diotima one of his "breathtaking stories about the ramifications of international finance, overseas trade, and their connection with politics." He explains that the Franco-German conflict can essentially be explained as "a Gallo-Celtic-East European-Transalpine complex interlinked with the problems of coal mines of Lorraine and the oil fields of Mexico as well as the antagonism between Anglo – and Latin America" (356).[23] Such a view is undeniably complex. His framing of a local conflagration within the context of global capital flows and international political tensions requires a certain level of depth. Nevertheless, other than adding more variables to the conflict, Arnheim, from Musil's point of view, does not really explain it, he merely explains it away. He never truly reveals the root of the conflict, merely a more complex version of it. The problem with Arnheim's knowledge is that it is a summation of facts that never takes a "Qualitätssprung" [Qualitative leap] that synthesizes this knowledge into a comprehensive whole (Albertsen 76).

This lack of qualitative thinking is a sign of modernity for Musil. So much becomes clear when the narrator sardonically hypothesizes the return of Plato. Initially there would be great excitement about the great philosophers return. He would probably do well for himself and garner publishing contracts for his short stories, travel pieces, and perhaps even a movie adaptation of some of his earlier work. Yet, as his novelty wears off, he would soon be reduced to writing small columns in the Life and Leisure section on an as-needed basis. Although the men at the newspaper realize Plato is important in his own right, they have to admit that, he "was a bit outdated, and certainly not in a class for current newsworthiness with a man like, for instance, Paul Arnheim" (352).[24] The displacement of Plato by Arnheim speaks to a shift towards shallowness during modernity.

Such a cutting portrayal of Arnheim is not unproblematic. Not only is he the central figure in a vast campaign against Germany, and possibly Austria-Hungary, but he is also a Jewish polymath who seemingly pulls the strings of all facets of society. Combine this with the fact that the actual famous Jewish statesman, Ratheneau, was viciously assassinated by far right-wing anti-Semites who believed he was one of the Elders of Zion (Millen 45), and Musil's portrayal would appear anti-Semitic.

In opposition to such an argument, Franka Marquardt demonstrates, that it is, in fact, all the other characters around Arnheim who construct his Jewishness. Arnheim remains somewhat of a mystery, because of all the things he talks about, he talks very little of himself, and the Parallel Campaign's purported "Prussian-Jewish Center" remains an enigma (299). Indeed, Arnheim mentions his own Jewishness only once, when he tells his servant he could not become an officer in the army because he was a Jew (*MWQ* 592). Despite this, speculations and rumors about his Jewishness abound, and characters make presumptions and assumptions about him based on this. Thus, when it is found out that he has interests in the oil fields in Galicia, it is viciously used against him, as proof of his Jewish plotting (Bringazi 532 - 533). There is no evidence to corroborate this, and it would appear that if he had not been Jewish this would not have been an issue. In so many ways, Musil redeems Ratheneau through Arnheim by showing that the great man is ultimately betrayed by the very people he was helping.

More importantly, Musil uses Arnheim as a lightning rod for anti-Semitic resentment, and thereby reveals the underlying dynamics of anti-Jewish hatred. When things are going well, everyone is obsequious to Arnheim, but as soon as the Parallel Campaign falls apart he becomes the source of their woe. Like Swann, in the *Recherche* Arnheim's Jewishness, barely mentioned

by him throughout the novel, suddenly becomes visible in a time of crisis. Musil's analysis is therefore particularly prescient. Friedrich Bringazi explains that,

> In the spiteful rejection of the Jew Arnheim, Musil exemplifies and analyzes the anti-Semitic hatred of a society, which because of its racist paranoia went from the political and economic exclusion and confinement of Jews to their open physical abuse and ultimate extermination just a few years after the book appeared. (Bringazi 534)[25]

Like Joyce, Musil does not reject anti-Semitism through simple philosemitic means that would turn Arnheim into some type of martyr. Rather, he is a man of errors and his Jewishness needs to be seen as simply a part of a complex and multifaceted identity. Therefore, Musil explicitly rejects the prevailing racial logic which tries to abstract a few general qualities out of a person based on genealogy. Whether these qualities are positive or negative is irrelevant for Musil. In their abstraction of a person, they reduce his or her fundamentally indefinable humanity.

Hans Sepp – The Totality of a Racial Soul

Although *The Man without Qualities* is not a book that works through simple opposing dyads, the person who stands in starkest contrast to Arnheim is Hans Sepp. Pugnacious, pimple-faced, and sophomoric, Sepp is the embodiment of emerging Austrian National Socialism. A graduate student and leader of a Christ-Germanic circle, he has two simple demands, the Anschluss with Germany and the suppression of racial minorities.

He plies his trade in the home of Leo Fischel, an unexceptional Jewish bank director. Hans has eyes for Fischel's daughter, Gerda, and eventually becomes her Seelenführer, [spiritual guide], much to the dismay of her father. Fischel is forced to listen to Sepp's increasingly anti-Semitic rants in his own house. Yet, his liberal attitudes, typical of upper-middle class Viennese

Jews, disable him from speaking out against Sepp. In their home, "nationalism and racism [Rassenideologie] were treated as nonexistent, even though they were convulsing half of Europe with hysterical ideas" (337).[26] Instead, Fischel minimally tolerates Sepp and on occasion tries to engage him in conversation. He does this to little effect, and it is only Ulrich who is able to effectively undermine and frustrate the proto-fascist. All the more so, when Ulrich, through an odd coming together of circumstances ends up sleeping with Gerda.

As previously stated, one of the central real-world examples for Sepp is Spengler (Albertsen 84). Like Spengler's "Ursymbol," Sepp also structures his worldview around a vague symbol (Wolf 108). For him this "symbol" is "the great images of grace, which made everything that is confused and dwarfed in life…clear and great, images that suppress the noise of the senses and dip the forehead in streams of transcendence" (338).[27] These symbols used to litter the historical record, but were now far and few between because of modernity, and include the pyramids, Novalis, and Beethoven. Such symbols can only be the exclusive goal of the Aryan race because they do not, "deal in dry formulas." Sepp goes out of his way to point out that they are not racial anti-Semites. Instead they are against, "'the Jewish mind,'[jüdischen Gesinnung] by which they meant capitalism and socialism, science, reason, parental authority and parental arrogance, calculation, psychology, and skepticism" (338).[28] Sepp does not see the contradictory forces at work in his portrayal of the Jewish mind. After all, capitalism and socialism are complete opposites, meanwhile science, reason, and skepticism all fly in the face of parental authority and arrogance. In short, Sepp specifically, and anti-Semites generally, find in the "the Jewish mind" a repository of all the things they do not like, instead of a coherent ideology. This thinking represents a further abstraction and refinement in the invisible power of Jewishness.

Rather than the simplistic supposed machinations of Jews during the Dreyfus Affair, or the Wall Street conspiracy Jason imagines, Jews are now responsible for mytho-historical forces.

Beyond this, Sepp's dissociation with racial anti-Semites is feigned. Later he is dismayed to hear that Diotima might be having an affair with Arnheim, demonstrating her inability to distinguish, "between persons of her own race [rasseneigenen] and those of an alien race [rassenfremden]" (521).[29] Race and mind are connected for Sepp. The "Jewish mind" is merely the moral, political, and social views he sees inherent in the Jewish body.

As the novel proceeds, and the context in which Musil is writing the novel changes he radicalizes Sepp's opinions. At yet another meeting about the Parallel Campaign at Count Leinsdorf's house, Fischel characterizes the Christ-Germanic circle as "Extraordinarily savage", to General Stumm, warning him that the military man is, "out of touch with our rebellious younger generation" (1098).[30] More nefariously, Sepp and his ideas have started to infiltrate the Campaign. When Stumm wants to make an agreement with the anti-Semites in order to get their guns, Fischel vehemently objects. Stumm callously replies that, "a little anti-Semitism more or less hardly matters when people are already so anti to begin with" (1099),[31] thereby condoning anti-Semitism in light of other national hatreds.

The passive acceptance of anti-Semitism allows Hans and a fully transformed Gerda to espouse their increasingly radical opinions. They are currently fans of a racial theorist Bremshuber, who demands, "the ruthless suppression of all alien races" (1105).[32] By 1933 it is clear that Musil documents the rising specter of National Socialism. The openly hostile opinions of Sepp and Gerda are no longer those of the *Völkisch* pro-Germanic groups that sought to promote German cultural domination, and are now those of a vicious Nazi anti-Semitism that seeks to assert cultural domination through extermination.

Through Sepp's youth, mysticism, and racialist mindset, Musil identifies everything that is dangerous in rising the National Socialist movement. As an order bent on improving the future by recreating a mythical past through a scientifically determined racial state, Nazism is dangerous because it appeals to a broad array of people, and in particular, very passionate discontented youth who believe in the possibility of revolution. Furthermore, by marrying both racial science and mysticism, Musil captures both the visceral and rational mindset behind National Socialism. In doing so, he, like the other authors discussed here, highlights the way Jewishness is constructed along categories of both the visible and the invisible.

Sepp, therefore, represents the most dangerous form of totalitarian thought. While General Stumm represents the Ancien Régime desire for order, Moosbrugger the solipsistic desire for control, and Arnheim the capitalist need to expropriate everything, Sepp embodies the ability to unify the world through one central symbol perpetuated by a strong leader, or a Seelenführer as he calls himself. Such logic is more dangerous because it explicitly relies on a logic of exclusion and ultimately extermination. Since all things must lead towards the "symbol" – Christian-Germanic Ideas – everything that falls outside this prevents transcendence. That which is outside cannot be brought inside, and must be purged from the system. Such a system is clearly utopian and cannot be achieved. From the Nazi's point of view, the reason for deferral of transcendence is due to impurities in the system. Thus, increasingly extensive and expansive measures must be taken to eliminate the impurities. The totality continuously beckons while at the same time receding, because life cannot be reduced to a symbol. As Spencer explains, "Hans's search for a community united by a single, redeeming goal is itself a mark of decadence, for it is a pseudoreligion that, because the goal is illusory, must lead to its opposite, namely,

disintegration and nihilism" (120). Yet, Hans is merely a representative of a larger striving among people who search for meaning through increasingly abstract and grandiose worldviews.

Totality through Unity – Ulrich as counter Epistemologist

As a rejection to the totalities these characters represent, Musil offers the Other Condition – a state in which there is reciprocal unity between objects and subjects that is so complete that the two become indistinguishable from each other. The Other Condition is the central goal of Ulrich, the narrator, and the aesthetic of the work. Although there are distinct positions associated with Musil, the narrator, and Ulrich, "within the limits imposed by their different functions, author, narrator and protagonist are essentially one" (Holmes 297). Refining this argument, it is possible to structure, protagonist, narrator, and author along the lines of the Other Condition. Ulrich provides provisional and local resistance to the totalizing narratives of modernity. Meanwhile, the narrator cuts deeper into the fabric of modernity's illusions and reveals its underlying epistemic assumptions, thus creating a space for the Other Condition. Finally, Musil in his structuring of the work tries to reveal the Other Condition through the aesthetics of the novel. As this is a different discussion, this latter aspect is dealt with in the next section.

In many respects, Ulrich is a perfect exemplar of the fading Austro-Hungarian Empire. Raised Catholic in a well to-do family, he is part of the bureaucratic upper-middle class that ordered and maintained the state machinery. Before he takes his "leave from life" he tries his hand at several different vocations, including the military and a graduate study in mathematics. He is therefore the perfect insider. At the same time, he also takes an ironic distance from his endeavors. He is never truly committed to anything. Hence, his friends, Clarisse and Walter, call him a "man without qualities" [Mann ohne Eigenschaften] because he cannot be categorized.

Importantly, this is where translation falls significantly short. There is no English word that captures both the contextual usage of Eigenschaften, and its etymological foundations. While contextually this word does signify something close to qualities, the two component words Eigen and schaft(en) indicate a more fundamental relationship between object and ontology. Eigen means "own," while the modifier "schaft" turns it into a property. Thus, it is quite literally "own-ness," or something akin to self-identity. Eigenschaft is therefore the fundamental property that makes a thing, a thing. It is the Platonic "horseness" of "horse". For Ulrich not to have Eigenschaften does not merely mean he does not have qualities, but has also has no discernible identity.

This is why Walter exclaims, "Just look at him! What would you take him for? Does he look like a doctor, a businessman, a painter, or a diplomat?" (63).[33] His inability to be appropriated for the state apparatus highlights a fundamental problem of modernity. A state that both offers increasing social and geographic mobility, also requires that its human capital is moved as efficiently as possible for the purposes of exploitation. This movement is only possible if human beings have a clear, singular identity that is easily categorized.

For Ulrich, the problem with such a system is that it fundamentally distorts the relationships between human beings. As the system relies on a series of simplistic signifiers to indicate a person's being, it creates false binary opposites. He explains,

> Regrettably, a great many people nowadays feel antagonistic toward a great many other people. It is a basic trait of civilization that man deeply mistrusts those who are outside his own circle, so it is not only the Teuton [Germane] who looks down on the Jew but also the soccer player who regards the pianist as an incomprehensible and inferior creature. Ultimately a thing exists only by virtue of

> its boundaries, which means by a more or less hostile act against its surroundings: without the Pope there would have been no Luther, and; without the pagans no Pope, so there is no getting away from the fact that man's deepest social instinct is his antisocial instinct. (21-2)[34]

True, Ulrich admits that man's antisocial instinct has been around for a long time, but this need for antisocial behavior is exacerbated by modernity. Since identities only exist through their boundaries, the fragmentation of identities collapses their boundaries. This evokes the antisocial instinct that seeks to reify identities by erecting yet more boundaries. Likewise, all the previous characters discussed try to create a worldview by erecting artificial boundaries. This is why modernity sees an ever growing amount of identities and increasing animosity between non-mutually exclusive identities like the soccer player and the pianist.

Such a system is so totalizing that it cannot be regulated by individuals. That is to say, people work at the behest of a system rather than the system working for them. Ulrich experiences this logic for himself when he is arrested during an altercation between a worker and two bourgeois gentlemen. Rather incautiously, Ulrich gets involved and offends a police officer. In doing so, he reveals the ghostly workings of a well ordered state:

> You cannot step into the street or drink a glass of water or get on a streetcar without touching the balanced levers of a gigantic apparatus of laws and interrelations, setting them in motion or letting them maintain you in your peaceful existence; one knows hardly any of these levers, which reach deep into the inner workings and, coming out the other the other side, lose themselves in a network whose structure has never yet been unraveled by anyone. (165-6)[35]

It is a condition where people do not fully understand what is going on, or understand how to control the system. The only thing they know is their own role. Such a totalizing worldview requires that everyone be appropriated. That which cannot be appropriated forms a danger to the state. When Ulrich is brought into the police station he feels the dehumanizing effects of the ghostly machine: "He felt as though he had been sucked into a machine that was dismembering him into impersonal, general components before the question of his guilt or innocence came up at all" (168).[36] The bureaucratic machine does not care about any of the personal qualities that make-up Ulrich. His name, his publications, his reputation, are all irrelevant and he simply becomes an "aggregate of officially describable features" (168).[37] To Ulrich the process is horrifying. After all, as a privileged member of the upper-middle class he was, "unaccustomed to regarding the state as other than a hotel in which one was entitled to polite service" (167).[38] His arrest thus makes him aware of his subjectivity before the state.

Surely this example of state power functions as a warning for looming totalitarian states. Not only is state power impersonal and indifferent, it also cannot be controlled once it is set in motion. It is only by virtue of Ulrich's accidental relationship to Count Leinsdorf that he is released by the police. Without these higher level connections he simply would have been processed, tried, and arrested for sedition.

Ulrich's function within the novel is to destabilize these vast totalizing structures and worldviews that form a threat to personhood. For example, Ulrich undermines the state's system of identification quickly following his arrest. After Ulrich's distinguishing features are impersonally noted, he observes that they do not come close to describing him. He recounts that in his mind he is "tall and broad-shouldered, with a chest curving like a fined sail on the mast: and joints fastening his muscles like small links of steel" (169) whenever he is with his lover,

Bonadea, or fighting. Conversely, he feels "slender, fine-boned, dark, and as soft as a jellyfish floating in the water" whenever he reads a book that touches him or when he is moved by love (169).[39] His identity for the State cannot be simply documented. Even his physical descriptors are not simple binaries, he is "blond" and "dark", "broad-shouldered", and "slender," strong but also "soft". In short, his identity, like that of everyone else, is entirely contextual and therefore falls outside of the appropriations of the system.

This breakdown of systems takes on a higher level function for the narrator, who seeks to undermine the very presumptions upon which such systems are built. In particular, the narrator attempts to undermine the traditional subject – object model that has been prominent in the West since the Enlightenment. The narrator does so by reframing and undercutting Ulrich, thereby destabilizing the central force for destabilization. For example, when Ulrich first joins the parallel campaign, the narrator ironically remarks that he was "accustomed, instinctively and without vanity, to regard himself as the instrument of a not unimportant purpose" (160).[40] Ulrich's pretentions to grandeur still imply a basic dichotomy of subject and world, because he imagines he would become a "philosopher King" (160), who not only wants to act in the world, but act on the world. He is still "narrowly focused and goal oriented" (Musil "PS" 185). The narrator makes short work of these lofty goals. Ulrich feels that he has the mind/spirit [Geist], to make a valid contribution to the world, but in doing so confuses intellect and spirit. Intellect is useless, perhaps even dangerous without spirit. Yet, it is exactly spirit that is impossible to define or capture. It is as the narrator states, "a ghost to whom would like to lend a sheet" (161).[41] After all, "It passes right through the person who wants to absorb it, leaving only a small tremor behind" (161).[42] Ulrich's relationship is still fundamentally problematic because he tries to act on the world rather than through or with it.

Later, when thinking of the Moosbrugger trial he tries to conceive of an intellectual mode that evades the calculating legal logic of the courts and Arnheim's own, Whiggish notion of progressive history that does not allow negatives to prevail, both of which reduce human beings to a cipher within a vast system. In opposition, Ulrich develops an intellectual mode called essayism. He postulates that, "all moral events take place in a field of energy whose constellation charges them with meaning" (270).[43] It is a form of moral relativism that sees events as situated in their context and not dictated by legal absolutes or the determinist arc of progressive history. Instead, he reasons that, "every play of forces tends in time toward an average value and average condition, toward compromise and inertia" (271).[44] He concludes that in the long-run mankind will reverse its position and what it regarded as a "crime it regards as a virtue, and vice versa" (271).[45] Ulrich's logic certainly provides an alternative to the deterministic logic of the other discourses he confronts.

Nevertheless, in its relativism Ulrich's theory does not capture the full weight of change and time which are not a "single, homogenous experience," but happen in a succession. Therefore, Ulrich still falls into the trap of opposing one system with yet another system. For the narrator, "a conscious human essayism would face the task of transforming the world's haphazard awareness into a will" (271).[46] That is to say, the goal is to find a unity between all systems. Therefore, essayismus aims to "destabilize modernity's tacit epistemological assumptions without lapsing into chaos" (Freed 7). Ulrich's essayism is too shortsighted; it only seeks to undermine modernity's facile dichotomies without exploring the more fundamental problem of dichotomization. Ulrich still implicitly relies on a worldview that utilizes subject-object relations.

The narrator reinforces this view later while Ulrich intervenes in a heated exchange between Fischel and Sepp about the possibility of progress. Fischel, solidly bourgeois, firmly believes in progress while Sepp espouses a vague mysticism. The latter argues that it is impossible for him to live without some ultimate value. Ulrich interjects that, "Everything we can do depends on our not being overly perfectionist, not waiting for the ultimate inspiration. That's what the Middle Ages did, and ignorant they stayed" (527).[47] Sepp counters this by arguing that modern man is far more ignorant now than people in the Middle Ages thereby disavowing progress. Ulrich responds that, "Progress always exists in only one particular sense. And since there's no sense in life as a whole, neither is there such a thing as progress as a whole" (528).[48] Ulrich thereby collapses the artificial dichotomy between progress and regress. It would seem that he has won the argument, because shortly afterwards Sepp storms out furious at having been reduced to silence. Yet, the sympathy the narrator has for Ulrich is short lived.

Ulrich is left alone with Gerda, and she moves from one predatory sensualist to another. They continue their discussion of progress, but Ulrich's postulations come across as hollow to the narrator. It was the same conversation he had with Diotima with some superficial differences, because it did not make, "much difference which woman happened to be sitting there facing him; a body introduced into a given magnetic field, invariably sets certain processes in motion" (533).[49] The narrator thereby suggests that the real motivation for Ulrich to have this conversation is quite different. Their discussion soon turns to Gerda's relationship with Hans and then her relationship with her father. He is slowly trying to lure her towards him, and at the end of the chapter he asks her to come see him because they "can't speak freely" (540).[50] When he says this, the narrator relates that, "Male ruthlessness shone out of his eyes in a blaze of empty light" (540).[51] Ulrich's predatory behavior calls into question his very motivation behind

attacking Sepp. He could be doing so out of a pure ideological conviction that the Christ-Germanic circle is wrong, but he could also be trying to drive a wedge between Hans and Gerda. It appears the latter is closer to the truth because he ends up sleeping with Gerda, and then promptly letting her go. As the narrator underscores so pointedly, Ulrich may be using his critical acuity to collapse the platitudinous systems that dominate the pre-war era, but his reasons for doing so are not entirely selfless. His knowledge still has an object, because he still sees himself as a subject.

Writing after Hitler – The Aesthetics of the Other Condition

Although the beginning of book two is focused on Ulrich's search for the Other Condition, he arguably never achieves this. The Other Condition is something that by definition cannot be represented because representation implies a subject-object relationship. Instead, it can only be experienced. Therefore, Musil cannot have his protagonist experience the Other Condition because it would come across as hollow. Hence, Musil's work tries to evoke the Other Condition in the reader, and the aesthetics of the book all work to facilitate a synthesis of wildly disparate characters, plot lines, and discourses into one unifying whole in which everything becomes visible and the reader arrives at transcendence. The structure of the work therefore explicitly calls attention to its means of representation (Eisele 115). This is particularly true of the later scenes between Ulrich and Agathe in which the language becomes increasingly "imagistic" and "impassioned" (Bernstein 54). Surely, Hitler's coming to power in 1933, played no small part in this. The emergence of visible totalitarianism amplified the author's efforts for a viable counternarrative. The increasing essayism of the uncompleted parts constitutes a means of resisting the National Socialist appropriation of art.

Be that as it may, the other condition must be seen as purely hypothetical. For one, because the book is not finished, arguably there is no way of knowing if Ulrich would have ever arrived at the Other Condition. More theoretically, since it is something that can only be felt and not described – recognizing, let alone verifying – such a state on the part of the reader is impossible. The reader is therefore set on a search for something that he or she cannot grasp and can only feel. Even more problematically, the whole Other Condition may not exist. Thiher points out that, "the quest for the possible, as an advance on the real, has been a fundamental undertaking of the European mind since at least the Enlightenment, or even earlier" (247). That Musil should hit upon such an understanding would be a feat indeed. Furthermore, putatively arriving at such a condition would also undermine his entire project. After all, he continuously subverts his own narrative because to Musil, "any representation of reality is at best a critical heuristic postulate about reality and can never make any claim actually to be the truth" (Dowden 81). Any representation of the Other Condition will always hover slightly over a real representation of the truth without ever touching it.

Nevertheless, the quest for total unity, for the Other Condition, determines the form of the novel (Thiher 265). It enables Musil to incorporate any and all things that could be brought to bear on 1913 Vienna specifically, and Europe generally. Like other epic modernist works, *The Man without Qualities*, too, is omnivorous in its scope. Moreover, since there is no specific plot direction, no direct path towards the Other Condition, it frees plot from an artificial teleology. Not only does Musil thereby expose other narrative forms as a "Scheinordnung, die das Chaotische, Diffuse, Zwiespältige der Existenz verdecken und weglügen müßte" [Fake order that has to cover and lie away the chaotic, diffuse, and dualistic nature of existence] (Rasch 79). He also calls into question the reader's relationship to any narrative of reality.

In doing so, he is directly engaging the increasing proliferation of conspiracy texts in the late twenties and early thirties in Central Europe. What is particularly striking about this form of cultural resistance is that it borrows and replicates so much from the very thing it rejects: conspiracy theory. *The Man without Qualities* is a vast totalizing novel that omnivorously assimilates all aspects of modernity and directs it towards achieving some form of transcendent worldview that reaffirms a unity between the subject and the world. Nazi leaders in their attempt to create unity, too, argue for such a totality, as Hitler states, "We know today that between the state, nation, culture, art, and labor there exist reciprocal relationships, and it is madness to say that these can exist independent of one another" (Phelps 403).[52] The crucial difference is that for Musil the central figure in the midst of these forces is a man without qualities, thus offering infinite possibilities. Meanwhile, for the Nazis the central figure was the Aryan, a man of only one possibility who excludes all other possible men.

Modernism and conspiracy theory thereby recognize the same problematic relationship between man and modernity, but solve this problem in radically different ways. Late epic modernism seeks to open up the possible relationships between man and modernity by exposing the lack of meaning in the world, which catalyzes a search for meaning that necessitates possibility. Conversely, conspiracy theory attempts to close up the possible relationships between man and modernity by distilling everything down to one monolithic and totalitarian symbol.

CONCLUSION

January 20th, 1942, Germany, Wannsee

On January 20th, 1942, a group of fifteen men representing different factions of the German political and military machine met at a house in the tranquil Wannsee suburb outside of Berlin. They were there to confer for two days about the radical reorganization of the German National Socialist state. They were trying to find, a "legal way to purify the German lands [Lebensraum] of Jews" (Heydrich 3).[1] The conference would establish the parameters and implementation of the "Final Solution to the Jewish Problem/der Endlösung der Judenfrage" (3). The rest of the fifteen pages of minutes, in the sheer banality with which they were composed, elide their true horror. On the surface, the document appears to be purely logistic, replete with a chart documenting the estimated number of Jews present in each European country, and a statistical breakdown of Jews in various professions. Removing all of these peoples would require a vast coordinated operation.

Determining who would be removed was its own complex issue. To facilitate this task the regime would follow the Nuremburg laws that determined race to select people who would

be subject to the "Evakuierungsaktionen/Evacuation moves" (9). The child of a Jew and someone of pure Germanic blood should be considered a "*Mischling*/Mixture" in the first degree, and therefore Jewish. Subsequently, any child of a Mischling in the first degree and a pure blooded German, someone one quarter Jewish, should be considered a German. These offspring, Mischlingen in the second degree, were therefore safe from deportation. There were several exceptions to these Second degree mixtures, one of which was: "A particularly unfavorable racial appearance of the *Mischling* 2nd degree that classify him as Jewish outwardly" (12).[2]

The technical jargon of this caveat belies a fundamental contradiction. In essence, people who were one-fourth Jewish were no longer to be considered Jewish, unless they appeared Jewish. One the one hand, the Nazis were using exact racial science to determine someone's Jewishness. On the other, they contended that someone should also be considered Jewish if they had a Jewish appearance. Consequently, Jewishness operates as both a visible genealogical category while at the same time being an abstract invisible category. This contradiction at the center of the Wannsee Protocol represents fifty years of anti-Semitism in the making. While Drumont did not have the sophisticated racial language of National Socialism he did use the same conceptual categories. For him too, Jews were physically monstrous, and an abstract force. Working from the crude caricatures of people like Drumont and the shoddy racial science that followed, the National Socialist government established an entire bureaucratic arm dedicated to racial hygiene that included thousands of doctors, scores of research institutes, and powerful university chairs across the country (Proctor 64-94). Problematically for the Nazis and other racial scientists, they could never provide any evidence that Jews were physically different than Aryans. In fact, the Nazi regime would struggle to define the physical characteristics of both Aryans and Jews throughout its existence (Ehrenreich 1-11). The Nazis and other earlier anti-

Semites compensated for this fundamental flaw within their racial science by purporting a broader cultural difference between the Aryan and the Semite. This is why *völkisch* thought is so incredibly persistent in the history of anti-Semitism, and why Nazi propaganda focused heavily on creating a *Volksgemeinschaft* [a people's community] (Welch 217).

The combination of these two strands, scientific and mythical, created a total sense of Aryanness that completely isolated and excluded Jews. The logic was entirely circular. The existence of the Jewish race was proven through an abstract concept their cultural inferiority, this cultural inferiority was in turn proven by the fact that it was product of the Jewish race. The Nazis compensated for this epistemological crisis at the heart of their worldview by attributing ever more perfidious activities to the Jews, until finally concluding, as Goebbles does in 1943, that "The Jews are guilty of everything" (Herf 209).

In Musil, too, there is a similar move towards science and mysticism. His doctrine of precision and soul operates on the same basic tenet that to move forward requires both rational thought and a pure spirit. The crucial difference is that for Musil such an ecstatic state is produced through the individual and not the community. More so, for Musil, it is the individual who shapes the community and not the community who should shape the individual. He is therefore using the same dualistic vocabulary for radically different ends.

Yet, he was very much alone in this. By the time Musil was trying to finish his novel epic modernism's high mark had already passed. The radical experimentation of the twenties was supplanted by more formally conservative and socially conscious works in the thirties. The writers of the global depression era, John Steinbeck, George Orwell, Bertolt Brecht, and André Malraux, were explicitly concerned with art as a means to change political conditions.

The old guard modernists slowly dwindled away. Joyce started writing almost exclusively for himself, Faulkner went to Hollywood and authored more conventional books, Eliot became a Catholic, and Yeats spent his days having séances. Such is the traditional picture of 1930s modernism; the twenties were a period of experimentation while the thirties were a period of consolidation (Armstrong 38). More recent critics, including Armstrong, have attempted to alter this monolithic view of the thirties, arguing that generally aesthetic experimentation expressed itself in a different way (Giovacchini 3; Mellors 23; Miller 7). Nonetheless, it is hard to deny the more overtly realist and political aesthetics of the thirties. For example, writers like Auden, Dos Passos, and Cèline are as much known for their stylistic innovations as for their explicit political stances.

This prevailing dichotomy between the twenties and thirties, poses a problem for one of the central tenets of this dissertation. Namely, that one of the roots of epic modernism was to the fundamental epistemological crises wrought by rapid modernization. These crises resulted in aesthetically experimental works that tried to capture the process of totalizing reality, while at the same time denying the possibility of a totality. If epistemological crisis is a predictor of aesthetic experimentation then the global economic meltdown of the thirties would have been a ripe ground for another intense period for the emergence of new epics.

Despite the smattering of stylistically innovative works throughout this period, none of them obtain the epic quality of Proust, Joyce, Faulkner, and Musil. Even epic modernism's most promising heir, Samuel Beckett, will move towards shorter, and not longer works. Epic modernism's heyday appears to have been the mid-twenties to early thirties, with works like the *Magic Mountain* (1924) by Thomas Mann, Alfred Döblin's *Berlin, Alexanderplatz* (1929), and the first volume of Dos Passos's *U.S.A. Trilogy*, *The 42nd Parallel* (1930) – the second two

volumes follow but do not significantly depart from the experimental aesthetics of the first volume.

This period, the late twenties and early thirties is also the moment in which Musil started composing *The Man without Qualities*. Perhaps one of the main challenges in finishing such a massive work is that epic modernism as a form was fast becoming irrelevant. Despite its explicitly anti-totalitarian aesthetics, his work would also later be perceived as too politically tame in a time of intense political turmoil. From an artistic point of view, Musil therefore represents the end of the epic modernist tradition.

Yet, it is tempting to speculate that this tradition does not disappear entirely. One of the places where it is possible to see a continuation is with the institutionalization of epic modernist reading practices through the New Criticism. For men like John Crowe Ransom, Allen Tate, and Cleanth Brooks, every part of a poem is intimately related to its other parts, especially if the poem was paradoxical or ironic, and thereby gained an autonomous status. As a unified aesthetic object the poem stood in opposition to the commodifying and politicing tendencies of the late thirties and the postwar period. The New Critical imperative of reading a poem for its unity therefore required a type of conspiratorial semiosis. Every part is somehow related to another part and therefore the meaning of a work of art can be established by seeing it as an entirely closed system. The crucial difference is that for epic modernists the goal was to demonstrate that no such closed system of symbols existed while for the New Critics it represented an explicit end. New Critical readings therefore shared an overlap with the very kinds of readings rejected by the epic modernists: anti-Semitic conspiratorial semiosis.

Indeed, much has been made of the conservative politics of the New Critics. Never a fan of anything not Marxist, Terry Eagleton argued that this was a “recipe for political inertia” (50).

He was joined by a chorus of other critics who alternatively called the New Criticism "an instrument for obscuring reality" (Kampf 28); "disciplinary machinery that would ensure the enforcement of conformity" (Buttigieg 15-16); and the New critics themselves "crypto-fascists" (Lentricchia 236); and "crypto-Christian-apologists" (Rubin 5), whatever that might mean. While such hyperbolic aspersions might prove cathartic by way of critical patricide, they are hardly apt descriptions of the mild mannered and, by all-accounts, kind Brooks. They are also not useful heuristic categories for understanding the New Critical literary theoretical project.

Instead, it is better to understand the New Criticism as an application of reading principles reserved for epic modernism to texts that were produced in an entirely different context. Epic modernists texts evoke conspiratorial semiosis as a reading practice, which in combination with the text produces conspiratorial modernism; a reading practice which strives for totalization as a means of demonstrating the impossibility of such totalization. When applied retroactively to texts written under different aesthetic principals, say that of the Romantics, it tends to lead to a totalization of those texts into a hermetically sealed meaning, as opposed to the critical hermeneutics of conspiratorial modernism.

Evidence for this reading technique is readily available in Brook's *The Well Wrought Urn*. In his famous reading of Keats's "Ode on a Grecian Urn," Brook's takes Keats's famous ode to mutability and lived experience over cold pastoral perfection, and transforms into a grand epic in which the autonomy of art to stands in opposition to the ephemeral nature of human affairs. Thereby, art resists appropriation for political, historical, and economic ends.

While arriving at this conclusion, Brook's relies heavily on reading a total unity within the work, and integrating the confounding last lines into the poem – "truth is beauty, beauty truth," as proof that art can speak for itself. Yet in order to get to this point he not only argues

through presence, but also through absence. In the fourth stanza of the poem, Keats describes a procession of people who have come to the religious sacrifice, who in turn leave their towns and seaports empty. The town and the seaports are not on the urn, but they are suggested through the artistry of the poetry. For Brooks this ephemeral "'reality' of the little town" is emblematic of the "urn's character as a historian" (*Urn* 162). That is, by combining a few essential facts the art object is able to conjure and create a complete, autonomous reality. Such a reading essentially relies on a logic whereby absence is proof of presence. After all, it is just as possible to see the empty towns as the limits of art. The urn is of finite dimensions and by necessity can never represent a total view. The only reason it does so for Brook's is because this is a reading practice that works particularly well for epic modernist texts. Arguably, it does not work quite as well for Romanticism, which exploited narrative uncertainty to highlight the limits of individual perception.

While it is tempting to speculate about the relationship between New Critical reading practices, conspiratorial semiosis, and post-war fears of communist conspiracy, such speculation elides the substantially different types of conspiracy contexts. Furthermore, it is, of course, easy to fight and win critical battles against the New Critics, now that they have already been fought and won by others. Instead, it is better to think of how their critical practices have informed this project.

After all, this dissertation is very much indebted to New Critical formalist reading practices. In particular, it works through an aesthetic definition of modernism largely based on that of the New Critics. The substantial difference is that unlike the New Critics, the formal readings are produced through their historical context. While for the New Critics form

represented a literary work's autonomy from history, I argue that form is the very expression of history.

I am thereby trying to push Modernism Studies in a new direction that rehabilitates the formal analysis of modernism(s) while understanding that this form is both historically determined and determining. The aesthetics of Proust, Joyce, Faulkner, and Musil, were both shaped by their context and at the same time shaped that context. Form therefore is not only the expression of a literary-artistic genealogy, or the incidental result of cultural material forces impinging on a work, or the expression of an individual proclivity, but, more deeply, a means of negotiating an historical moment while at the same time changing that very moment. In this negotiation it should not be surprising that there is a crosspollination with forms whose theme and content is substantially different if not inimical, as is the case with modernism and anti-Semitic conspiracy theory.

Taking this angle, I would like to boldly claim that beyond literary-historical scholarship, *Conspiratorial Modernism* also represents an incipient and implicit argument for method. Rather than viewing formalism and transnationalism as opposite ends of the spectrum, I have moved towards combining them into what can provisionally be called transnational formalism.

NOTES

CHAPTER ONE

[1] The seminal essay for any research on conspiracy theory is of course Richard Hofstadter's "The Paranoid Style in American Politics," *The Fear of Conspiracy: Images of Un-American Subversion from the Revolution to the Present*, ed. David Brion Davis (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1971). While this essay is the starting point for almost all works on conspiracy it has inspired two very important historical works, David Brian Davis's *The Fear of Conspiracy; Images of Un-American Subversion from the Revolution to the Present* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971) and Gordon S. Wood's historical response to Hofstadter, "Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style: Causality and Deceit in the Eighteenth Century," The William and Mary Quarterly 39.3 (Jul., 1982). There have also been other historical works that look at conspiracy during a specific period: Bernard Bailyns piece on conspiracy during the American Revolution *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992), Victoria Págan's *Conspiracy Narratives in Roman History* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), and Peter Robert Campbell, Thomas E. Kaiser and Marisa Linton, eds., *Conspiracy in the French Revolution* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2007).The first philosophical essay on conspiracy theory is in Karl Popper's *The Open Society and its Enemies*, 4th ed., Vol. 2. The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath (London: Routledge, 1962) This is responded to much later by Charles Pidgen "Popper Revisited, or What Is Wrong with Conspiracy Theories," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 25 (1993), and by Brian Keeley "Of Conspiracy Theories," *Journal of Philosophy* 96.3 (1999). All three articles deal with the problem of falsifiability. The biggest critical theorist to comment on conspiracy has been Fredric Jameson in "Cognitive Mapping," *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture,* eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988). While Slavoj Žižek has taken a more psychoanalytic approach *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (New York: Verso, 1989), "'I Hear You with My Eyes'; or, the Invisible Master," *Gaze and Voice as Love Objects*, eds. Renata Salecl and Slavoj Žižek (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996). By far the most amount of works on conspiracy are of the cultural studies variety and are of varying quality: Peter Knight's books are excellent *Conspiracy Culture: From the Kennedy Assassination to the X-Files* (New York: Routledge, 2000), *Conspiracy Nation: The Politics of Paranoia in Postwar America* (New York: New York University Press, 2002), along with the work of Michael Barkun *A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America*, Comparative Studies in Religion and

Society, ed. Mark Juergensmeyer (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Timothy Melley's *Empire of Conspiracy: The Culture of Paranoia in Postwar America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); Martin Parker and Jane Parish, eds., *The Age of Anxiety: Conspiracy Theory and the Human Sciences* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001), and Harry West and Todd Sanders's *Transparency and Conspiracy: Ethnographies of Suspicion in the New World Order* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003) Lesser books that tend to condemn conspiracy theory include Robert Alan Goldberg *Enemies Within: The Culture of Conspiracy in Modern America* (New Haven: Yale University, 2001), Gregory Camp *Selling Fear: Conspiracy Theories and End-Times Paranoia* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1997), Mark Fenster *Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), Daniel Pipes *Conspiracy: How the Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where it Comes from* (New York: Free Press, 1997) Finally, there are a couple more sociological works Patricia Turner "Church's Fried Chicken and the Klan: A Rhetorical Analysis of Rumor in the Black Community," Western Folklore 46.4 (1987), and Jack Bratich *Conspiracy Panics: Political Rationality and Popular Culture* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2008) One full length diatribe of the popular variety against conspiracy theory is Damien Thompson's *Counterknowledge: How We Surrendered to Conspiracy Theories, Quack Medicine, Bogus Science and Fake History*, 1st American ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008).

[2] Even a cursory list reveals examples from the Roman Empire (Págan 7), Medieval Europe (Crowe 21-29), the American and French Revolutions (Bailyn 144; Linton 128), contemporary Christian Indonesia (Schrauwers 127), and Nigeria (Bastian 82).

[3] The reasons why conspiracy theories seem more prevalent in postmodernity than in the past are several. First, conspiracy theorists can currently disseminate their texts far more easily relative to previous periods, which makes them more visible. Furthermore, this increased visibility may only be a change in medium as there is no way to account for the number of orally transmitted conspiracy theories that have historically been in circulation. Secondly, the proliferation of the mass media and its continuous information flows from around the world have also created the sense that crises are incessantly occurring everywhere. As conspiracy theories are conceptualizations of complex crises, the perceived presence of more crises makes conspiracy theories more abundant. It therefore makes sense that conspiracy theories have become a more viable option of explanation, because the overwhelming speed and quantity of information does not allow for the long term in depth processing required to analyze historical events. Yet, it may not be a question of more conspiracy theorizing overall, but, because of the heterogeneous information available, far more divergent conspiracy theorizing. Conspiracy theory therefore seems to be everywhere because it touches many different and contradictory small groups of people, militias, environmentalists, new age spiritualists, anti-globalists, etc. This is a change from previous eras where conspiracy theorizing tended to be localized in larger group, e.g. Roman politicians, American Revolutionaries, SS-members.

[4] For example, the theory that White Star Lines replaced the *Titanic* with another ship, the *Olympic,* because the former was not finished at the time of the maiden voyage, is relatively harmless because the people who believe it have no direct target for their anger (Newton 351). Contrarily, conspiratorial beliefs can also have devastating consequences. For instance, William Pierce's *The Turner Diaries* (1978), a dystopic novel describing the battle of Aryans against the Zionist Occupation Government, featuring a truck bombing of a federal building, has been the inspiration of several wide-ranging extreme right domestic acts of terror. Mostly infamously, Timothy McVeigh used it as a blueprint for his bombing of the Murrah Federal building (Newton 354).

[5] For example, Marxist theory of ideology presupposes that the very relations of labor that we do not observe are the ones that form and guide people in their daily lives. Moreover, Michel Foucault's theories of ubiquitous power relations also imply, just like conspiracy, that the forces of power are

always already present, and can therefore never be observed from a position absent of power. Implicit in both Marx and Foucault is a charge of false consciousness, much akin to conspiracy thinking.

[6] To this end, Fenster's term "hyperactive semiosis" is most closely related to conspiratorial semiosis (Fenster 78). While his concept is relatively similar, his approach is slightly different, but to great consequence. He argues that, "Each kernel of information or empirical detail thus becomes evidence of the existence of a conspiracy" (86). This is, of course, generally true and echoes Eco's hermetic semiosis. The difference is that I argue that conspiracy theories do not actually argue from presence, they argue from absence. While this discrepancy might seem like pointless semantics, it is crucial to understanding how conspiracy theory develops and, as we will see later, its relationship to modernism. In Fenster's sense, conspiracy theory is a totalization of epistemological absence, any fragment that does not belong is made to belong; a chaotic world is confected into a whole.

[7] Interestingly this line of reasoning shares a lot of kinship with Anselm's ontological argument for the existence of God. Anselm argued that since we can conceive of an omnipotent and omnipresent being it must exist, as non-existence would mean the being was neither omnipotent nor omnipresent. In much the same way for the conspiracy theorist, there can be no conspiracy theory without a conspiracy. Hence, conspiracy theory calls itself into being in relation to its internal logic.

[8] Of course, both countries had a history of anti-Judaism.

[9] "So ist der Jude überall der Jude, der entschlossen bewuβt oder unbewuβt die Interessen seiner Rasse vertritt"

[10] For example, early modern concepts of newness are perhaps best epitomized through Shakespeare's "brave new world." Despite the discovery of new lands Prospero is never a harbinger of the new world, but a continuation of the old. As Renaissance scholar Walter Mignolo has shown new world discoveries did not fundamentally change Western conceptions of historiography (Mignolo 4). In much the same way the Romantics were also concerned with the new, but only in as much as it was the artistic expression of the present, and not so much a direct break from the past (Calinescu 40). Furthermore, the Romantics never questioned the basic truth of their own worldview with the level of skepticism that the modernists did (Josipovici 109).

[11] "Im Epos ruht das Volk nach dem Tagwerk; lauscht, träumt und sammelt."

[12] "zerstört die alte epische Komposition"

CHAPTER TWO

[1] Daudet's salon managed to attract a wide range of characters. Interestingly, at some point Proust also would have met Theodore Herzl here, and Herzl, in turn, met Drumont here (Cambor 150).

[2] "irrémédiablement hostiles l'une à l'autre"

[3] "ce fameux nez recourbé, les yeux clignotants, les dents serrées, les oreilles saillantes, les ongles carrés au lieu d'être arrondis en amande, le torse trop long, le pied plat, les genoux ronds, la cheville extraordinairement en dehors, la main moelleuse et fondante de l'hypocrite et du traitre. Ils sont souvent bras plus court que l'autre."

[4] "Les Juifs déguisés en libres penseurs…qui mettent leur qualité de Juif dans leur poche et persécutent les chrétiens au nom des glorieux principes de la tolérance et des et des droits sacrés de la liberté; Les

Juifs conservateurs, …chrétiens d'apparence… livrent à leurs camarades les secrets qui peuvent leur servir."

[5] "on ne peut pas montrer preuves de la trahison….il est l'amant de la femme du ministre de la Guerre…(*2* 206)"

[6] "Mais, au reste, parler de permanence de races rend inexactement l'impression que nous recevons des Juifs, des Grecs, des Persans, de tous ces peuples auxquels il vaut mieux laisser leur variété. …Nous ne connaissions qu'une image superficielle; voici qu'elle a pris de la profondeur, qu'elle s'étend dans les trois dimensions, qu'elle bouge. …en animant les figures, les rend plus étranges, comme s'il s'agissait en effet d'être évoqués par un effort médiumnique. ….Il me semblait que si j'avais dans la lumière du salon de Mme de Villeparisis pris des clichés d'après Bloch, ils eussent donné d'Israël cette même image, si troublante parce qu'elle ne paraît pas émaner de l'humanité, si décevante parce que tout de même elle ressemble trop à l'humanité, et que nous montrent les photographies spirites." (*2* 169) More of the original passage has been rendered to allow for contextualization.

[7] "nez busqué…yeux verts…cheveux blonds Presque roux, coiffés à la Bressant." The passage actually presents a problem of translation. Interestingly, Montcrieff chooses to translate "busqué" as arched and not hooked. The subtle difference is that the latter does point to Swann's Jewishness. Of course, the more common term for hooked, is "recourbé," which is what Drumont uses, or the more derogatory, "crochu." In any case, Proust is leaving the shape of Swann's nose and therefore his Jewishness ambiguous here. (*1* 34)

[8] "un juif chez la sœur et la belle-sœur de deux archevêques" "les convertis restent plus attachés à leur religion que les autres, que c'est une frime." (*1* 280)

[9] "au fond tous ces gens-là sont anti-Semites" (*2* 469)

[10] "a laissé brûler une aile de son château, où le feu avait pris, parce qu'il aurait fallu demander des pompes au château voisin qui est aux Rothschild." (*2* 469)

[11] "j'avais eu la faiblesse de croire qu'un juif peut être Français." La faiblesse could also be translated as "weakness," meaning that believing that Jews could be part of the French nation is a fundamental character flaw. (*2* 559)

[12] "Il prouve qu'ils sont en quelque sorte forcés de prêter appui à quelqu'un de leur race, même s'ils ne le connaissent pas." (*2* 560)

[13] "tous les regards s'attachèrent à ce visage duquel la maladie." (*2* 568)

[14] "le nez de polichinelle de Swann, longtemps résorbé dans un visage agréable, semblait maintenant énorme, tuméfié, cramoisi, plutôt celui d'un vieil Hébreu que d'un curieux Valois." (*2* 568) It is interesting to note the description of Swann's nose here is "polichinelle" – referring to a stock buffoon character from the eighteenth century Italian Commedia dell'Arte. Normally, portrayed as the fool of the ball, Proust's Punchinello is closer to that of Eduard Manet, who in painted Punchinello in military garb in 1874 (Hutton 83). In much, the same way Swann donned in military garb, has a similar buffoonish and sad quality. At the same time, Punchinello is not Jewish.

[15] "la race faisait-elle apparaître plus accusé le type physique qui la caractérise."(*2* 268)

[16] "les incalculables pressions que faisaient peser sur lui non seulement les chrétiens de la surface, mais les couches superposées des castes juives supérieures à la sienne, chacune accablant de son mépris celle qui lui était immédiatement inférieure." (*1* 611)

[17] "Bloch, que personne ne connaissait, pouvait passer inaperçu, alors que de grands Juifs représentatifs de leur parti étaient déjà menacés." (*2* 168)

[18] “Je ne suis pas par principe irréductiblement hostile à la nationalité juive, mais ici il y a pléthore. On n'entend que: «Dis donc Apraham, chai fu Chakop.» On se croirait rue d'Aboukir.” (*1* 606)

[19] “il est probable que ce milieu devait renfermer comme tout autre, peut-être plus que tout autre, beaucoup d'agréments, de qualités et de vertus. Mais pour les éprouver, il eût fallu y pénétrer.” (*1* 607)

[20] “Il est vrai que le kaléidoscope social était en train de tourner et que l’affaire Dreyfus allait précipiter les Juifs au dernier rang de l'échelle sociale.” (*2* 168)

[21] “Excusez-moi, Monsieur, de ne pas discuter de Dreyfus avec vous, mais c’est une affaire dont j’ai pour principe de ne parler qu'entre Japhétiques.” (*2* 213)

[22] “un émissaire secret du syndicat venu pour le renseigner….” (*2* 214)

[23] “Par exemple une lutte entre votre ami et son père où il le blesserait comme David Goliath. Cela composerait une farce assez plaisante. Il pourrait même, pendant qu'il y est, frapper à coups redoublés sur sa charogne, ou, comme dirait ma vieille bonne, sur sa carogne de mère. Voilà qui serait fort bien fait et ne serait pas pour nous déplaire, hein! petit ami, puisque nous aimons les spectacles exotiques et que frapper cette créature extra-européenne, ce serait donner une correction méritée à un vieux chameau.” (*2* 245)

[24] “Dès qu'un Juif a assez d'argent pour acheter un château, il en choisit toujours un qui s'appelle le Prieuré, l'Abbaye, le Monastère, la Maison-Dieu.” (*2* 881)

[25] “un ghetto est d’autant plus beau qu’il est plus homogène et plus complet.” (*2* 881)

[26] Interestingly, both women have relationships with Saint-Loup, a homosexual. His homosexuality speaks to the metaphoric infertility of these women because as women they are not suitable partners, even though Gilberte, of course, has a child by him.

[27] “c’est une cochonne.” Montcrieff’s use of “bitch” is somewhat problematic. The word for this in French is either “chienne,” “grace,” or “salope.” Pig is probably a better, more direct translation, and corresponds with the slime she Gilberte is said to have crawled out of. Gilberte is not just acerbic and boorish in her personality, but also filthly in the mind of the Duchesse. (*3* 826)

[28] “Aux yeux de Proust chaque homme, en effet, est un univers ferme, sans possibilité de communication spirituelle. Ni l'amour ni l'amitié ne sont capables de franchir les distances. Les corps peuvent se toucher, mais il n'y a pas d'interpénétration des âmes.”

[29] “voulu les faire tenir toutes en quelques secondes pour recréer expérimentalement le phénomène qui diversifie l'individualité d'un être et tirer les unes des autres, comme d'un étui, toutes les possibilités qu'il enferme—dans ce court trajet de mes lèvres vers sa joue.” (*2* 305)

[30] “enseignement contre nature des congréganistes selon les radicaux, impossibilité de la race juive à se nationaliser, haine perpétuelle de la race allemande contre la race latine, la race jaune étant momentanément rehabilitee.” (*3* 739)

[31] “Canapé surgi du rêve entre les fauteuils nouveaux et bien réels, petites chaises revêtues de soie rose, tapis broché de table à jeu élevé à la dignité de personne depuis que, comme une personne, il avait un passé, une mémoire, gardant dans l’ombre froide du quai Conti le hâle de l’ensoleillement par les fenêtres de la rue Montalivet (dont il connaissait l’heure aussi bien que M. Verdurin elle-même) et par les baies des portes vitrées de Doville, où on l’avait emmené et où il regardait tout le jour, au delà du jardin fleuri, la profonde vallée, en attendant l’heure où Cottard et le flûtiste feraient ensemble leur partie ; bouquet de violettes et de pensées au pastel, présent d’un grand artiste ami, mort depuis, seul fragment survivant d’une vie disparue sans laisser de traces, résumant un grand talent et une longue amitié, rappelant son regard attentif et doux, sa belle main grasse et triste pendant qu’il peignait ;

incohérent et joli désordre des cadeaux de fidèles, qui ont suivi partout la maîtresse de la maison et ont fini par prendre l'empreinte et la fixité d'un trait de caractère, d'une ligne de la destinée ; profusion des bouquets de fleurs, des boîtes de chocolat, qui systématisait, ici comme là-bas, son épanouissement suivant un mode de floraison identique ; interpolation curieuse des objets singuliers et superflus qui ont encore l'air de sortir de la boîte où ils ont été offerts et qui restent toute la vie ce qu'ils ont été d'abord, des cadeaux du Premier Janvier ; tous ces objets enfin qu'on ne saurait isoler des autres, mais qui pour Brichot, vieil habitué des fêtes des Verdurin, avaient cette patine, ce velouté des choses auxquelles, leur donnant une sorte de profondeur, vient s'ajouter leur double spirituel ; tout cela éparpillait, faisait chanter devant lui comme autant de touches sonores qui éveillaient dans son coeur des ressemblances aimées, des réminiscences confuses et qui, à même le salon tout actuel, qu'elles marquetaient çà et là, découpaient, délimitaient, comme fait par un beau jour un cadre de soleil sectionnant l'atmosphère, les meubles et les tapis, et la poursuivant d'un coussin à un porte-bouquets, d'un tabouret au relent d'un parfum, d'un mode d'éclairage à une prédominance de couleurs, sculptaient, évoquaient, spiritualisaient, faisaient vivre une forme qui était comme la figure idéale, immanente à leurs logis successifs, du salon des Verdurin."(*3* 231 - 232)

CHAPTER THREE

[1] Approaching Jewishness of a somewhat different order in Joyce than with the other writers discussed in this dissertation. For one, the sheer volume of Joyce literature precludes this study from ever approaching something resembling thoroughness, and indeed to do a full investigation of Joyce, this dissertation would have to consist of several book length studies. Nevertheless, the critical literature on Joyce and Jewishness is somewhat more limited. The first piece of Joycean criticism to discuss Bloom and anti-Semitism at any length, significantly, did not appear until after the Second World War. Marvin Magalaner's, 1953 *PMLA* article, "The Anti-Semitic Limerick Incidents and Joyce's 'Bloomsday'" is the first to demonstrate Joyce's awareness and sensitivity to anti-Semitism generally, and Irish anti-Semitism specifically. Magalaner later famously quipped that Bloom is, "a Jew by ancestry, non-practicing Catholic by marriage, [and] scapegoat by circumstance" (Magalaner *Time* 68). His initial foray into discussing anti-Semitism in *Ulysses* shows that Joyce made significant use of anti-Semitic texts to aid his portrayal of Irish cultural beliefs. Indeed, he was the first critic to give Bloom's Jewishness more than tertiary importance. After Magalaner, there have been sporadic accounts that deal with Joyce and Jewishness. For example, Joyce's biographer, Richard Ellmann, largely relates anecdotal connections between Joyce and Jews in his *James Joyce* (1959). Meanwhile, in 1966 Robert Adams in *James Joyce and Common Sense*, gives slightly more importance to Jewishness by highlighting the fact that Joyce was working with a common set of Jewish stereotypes to add historical texture to the work, and that Bloom is able to fit into all of these stereotypes (Reizbaum *Judaic* 7). Conversely, Erwin Steinberg has argued quite unconvincingly that Bloom is not Jewish at all, neither in a religious sense or a secular sense (48-49). Yet, it is not until fairly recently that full length published studies of Joyce and Jewishness have started to appear. For example, Ralph Robert Joly's dissertation *The Jewish Element in James Joyce's* Ulysses was written in 1979, but never published. Marilyn Reizbaum's 1985 dissertation, *Joyce's Judaic Other* is not published until 1999. Subsequent to the publication of Ira Nadel's *Joyce and the Jews* in 1989, Jewish studies starts to play a more central role in Joyce criticism. This is evidenced by Neil Davison's dissertation that was quickly turned into a book *James Joyce and the Construction of Jewish Identity* in 1996. It is the work of Nadel, Davison, and Reizbaum, and to a certain extent Brian Cheyette's *Modernity, culture, and 'The Jew'*, that has set the parameters of current discussions about Jewishness and Joyce. While all four authors agree that Jewishness is as of yet an under-researched topic, the reasons for this vary from institutional racism on the part of other Joyce scholars, to an

excessive concern with aesthetics and experimentation. Nor can the authors seem to agree on how Bloom is meant to be studied. Nadel argues that "Joyce's Judaism is textual, and his Jewishness is cultural" (Nadel 9). That is to say, Joyce's later works are meant to be read with the same level of textual scrutiny as the Talmud, and, as such, *Ulysses* tries to reify artistic existence through the word rather than the world. In addition, Nadel argues that Joyce himself found many affinities with his Jewish friends. So much so, that a large part of the intellectual work done by *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* is meant to collapse the Arnoldian dichotomy of Hellenism and Hebraism, which Joyce despised. To be sure, Joyce roundly rejects the popular theories of Hellenism calling it "European Appendicitis" (Nadel 3). While Nadel defines many of the parameters along which discussion will follow, his argument ultimately lacks a significant amount of historical evidence. It is Davison, in particular, who takes issue with the lack of historical research into Joyce and Jewishness. Hence, his work is an exhaustive catalogue of Joyce's life in relation to any possible Jewishness. His study covers in detail any and all Jews Joyce's father and mother may have known to Joyce's own intimate relationship with Italo Svevo. Part of Davison's argument is that Joyce uses Bloom to highlight the anti-Semitism in Irish culture, and in doing so he demonstrates the contradictory and often expedient nature of anti-Semitism. He argues that, "Rather than fixing 'the Jew' as a static reality, *Ulysses* presents a spectrum of anti-Jewish myths for analysis from 'the Jew' of Christianity to that of racial degeneracy to that of nationalistic pariahism" (Davison 8). Consequently, *Ulysses* collapses anti-semitic myths by demonstrating their constructedness. Alternatively, Reizbaum argues that the text does not provide a kaleidoscope of anti-Semitic theories, but offers up and overdetermines "the Jewish Question," stating, "What is overdetermined is the impossibility of such identification, not just because Bloom's construction as partial Jew accommodates denial, but, again, because of the nature of such impossibility, which dictates that the search for affirmation is counterbalanced by the imperative of denial" (Reizbaum *Judaic* 3). Davison and Reizbaum's arguments are not oppositional, but complementary. Whereas Davison discusses the perception of Jewishness from the point of view of non-Jews, Reizbaum demonstrates the perception of Jewishness by Jews.

[2] While in Ireland, Joyce actually knew very few Jews (Davison 28), and the Jews of Ireland were significantly different than Bloom. Cormac Ó Gráda points out, that the overwhelming majority of Jews in Ireland were Latvik Orthodox and of Latvian extraction. As a converted Jew and an agnostic of central-European origin, Bloom would not have received a warm reception from his co-religionists. Ó Gráda explains that Bloom, is "a historically implausible character" (204).

[3] Arguably, this progression could also be attributed to some extent to the six year time lapse between the initial episodes written in 1914 and "Circe" which he started writing in 1920, and the postwar amplification of racial Jewishness. Still, many of the source materials for the latter episodes were at Joyce's disposal before the war (Groden 168).

[4] Much of the debate revolves largely around the actual Dodd to whom James Joyce's father, John Joyce, owed money. To John's mind, the solicitor took unfair advantage of his financially precarious situation, something the young James internalized as a particularly painful memory (Davison 58). One reading of this passage therefore suggests that this is Joyce's way of getting revenge on his father's enemy, by portraying him as a Shylock. Conversely, Davison suggests that Joyce is rewriting his old hatred of Dodd by portraying Simon as petty, hateful, and responsible for his own downfall (59). The latter argument is perhaps more convincing.

[5] Critics have remarked that this may be a reference to the 1911 case of Mendel Beilis who was accused of killing a Christian child for Passover purposes (Gifford and Seidman 120; Reizbaum *Judaic* 13). While the case was certainly known by Joyce, the reference is both anachronistic and inaccurate. In the Beilis case there was only one person accused of blood libel, not multiple Jews. Moreover, Joyce need not look abroad for accusations of blood libel. In January of 1904 Father John Creagh of Limerick,

become the center of controversy when a series of fiery anti-Semitic sermons set his congregation against the Jewish co-inhabitants of the town. Michael Davitt, already famous for his reporting work on a Russian Pogrom in Bessarabia, brought national attention to the event by accusing Creagh of spreading blood libel (Keogh 26, 32). Joyce was almost certainly aware of the case (Magalaner "Limerick" 1219). Bloom could have also had this on his mind, rather than a case several years in the future in a different country. Additionally, John McCourt suggests one prominent case in 1882 and another in Polna, Bohemia in 1899 that may have influenced Joyce (232). Importantly, it is not really relevant what the exact source for Joyce's reference to ritual murder might have been. Instead, the wide array of contemporaneous historical examples, speaks to a ubiquitous anti-Semitism, which was usually rejected as a fringe element, but was loud enough and vociferous enough to make itself heard.

[6] For example, Richard Wagner proposed that Jews were incapable of making any contribution to music and art, and even goes so far as to state that Jewishness is the "sick consciousness of our civilization" [Das üble gewissen unsere moderne civilization] (32). It is a thought echoed much later by Eliot who also believed that Jews were not interested in true art, but only commercial profitability. In the "Waste Land" the narrator tells of Philebus the Phoenician sailor who in death forgets the sound of gulls, the "deep see swells", but also "the profit and the loss." The Semitic Phoenician is only concerned with profit and loss, even in death.

[7] Throughout the novel, multiple references to Greeks and Arnold clearly mock the concept. In "Circe" the stage directions call for "*two Oxford dons with lawnmowers"* who are "*masked with Matthew Arnold's face*" (15.2513-14). A bit earlier, it had already been declared that, "jewgreek is greekjew" (15.2097-8). Gerty MacDowell is ironically described as "Greekly pefect" (13.89) even though she is crippled. He thereby undercuts Hellenic thought's presumed superiority. One of Joyce's most complex interpolations of Hellenic values occurs in Scylla and Charybdis. After having seen Bloom looking at the posterior of a female Greek statue to check if it has an anus, Mulligan mockingly calls him a "sheeny" (9.605) and an "Ikey Moses" (9.607). He then warns Stephen to watch out because Bloom is "Greeker than the Greeks" (9.614-5), implying that Bloom is a homosexual. It appears doubly contradictory that Bloom's fascination with the female nude makes him a homosexual, and that he is both Jewish and Greek. Mulligan arrives at this conclusion through some very tortured Hellenistic logic. As Bloom is Jewish he is concerned with the body and not the mind. One the one hand, this makes Bloom hypermasculine, but because women lived the life of the body it also makes him feminine. To Mulligan his ogling of the statue is not sexualization but identification. It thereby highlights his own femininity, which as a male makes him a homosexual. His homosexuality, in turn, also makes him a Greek in Mulligan's mind. Joyce pushes the logical consequences of Hellenism to their extreme and demonstrates that Bloom is Greek not despite being Jewish, but because he is Jewish. In this brief passage, the entire Hellenic versus Hebraic dichotomy collapses.

[8] While the mazurka is a Polish folk dance and not Jewish in origin, not only did Polish Jews identify with it, it was also occasionally identified with Jewishness (Friedmann 120; Rogovoy 47; Beregovskiĭ and Slobin 533). Furthermore, outside of Eastern Europe Poles were often associated with Jewishness, because of the large groups of Polish Jewish immigrants. Hence, it is not a stretch to suggest that Lenehan is mocking Bloom's Jewishness.

[9] Not surprisingly, when critics mention anti-Semitism in *Ulysses* it is invariably in reference to this particular episode. Rightly so of course, nowhere in the work are people more openly and violently anti-Semitic towards Bloom. By that same token, this episode is also emblematic of the dearth of scholarship on *Ulysses* and anti-Semitism. Seminal works on *Ulysses* acknowledge the anti-Semitism, but rarely go beyond the surface. Hugh Kenner goes so far as to efface it altogether. In Kenner's mind the Judeophobia is merely there as a consequence of the plot, the scene is, "an incident obviously prompted by the need for an encounter between the of book's Ulysses and some counterpart of Homer's Cyclops"

(96). He then goes on to argue that this is not really "anti-Semitism," as a Post-World War II reader would understand it. After all, for Kenner, "the Bloom of the book and his tormentors pre-date racial purity and death-camps, and they victimize him chiefly out of xenophobic passions" (103). His comments are tellingly wide of the mark, as this is the very moment when many of the racial assumptions about Jews are being reified into a comprehensive anti-Semitic ideology. Add to this, the Citizen's emphasis on physical fitness and national purity, and it is hard to see how this does not cast a shadow into the future of the twentieth century. More surprisingly, he makes it seem as if the anti-Semitism is merely a plot device that enables the Cyclops to attack Bloom. Considering that this is a plot device that has been building up over twelve chapters, it merits more attention than Kenner grants it. Kenner is not alone in his dereliction, Richard Ellmann is far from exhaustive when discussing the anti-Semitism. He claims that Joyce saw, "the Cyclops as a nationalist, " as if it makes no difference that Bloom is Jewish (*JJI* 370). This criticism is not to take Kenner and Ellmann to task for critical oversights, rather they are emblematic of a critical blind spot in Joyce scholarship.

[10] The inventor of the term, David Hayman explains, "I use the term 'arranger' to designate a figure who can be identified neither with the author nor with his narrators, but who exercises and increasing degree of overt control over his increasingly challenging materials" (*Mechanics of Meaning [1970]* 70). Kenner understands Hayman as arguing that "the Arranger" is a person. Stating that, "Like an author's ideal reader, this Arranger keeps remembering, savouring the choice verbal bits" (65). In a later rebuttal to Kenner, and others, Hayman more explicitly explains that he did not intend the Arranger as an actual person. Instead he argues, "Perhaps it would be best to see the arranger as a significant, felt absence in the text, an unstated but inescapable form of control" (*Mechanics of Meaning [1982]* 123). This force is not only responsible for the work's heteroglossia, but by the same token it also prevents the work from lapsing into chaos.

[11] Here slidder means slippery, but it is also a homonym for slither, as for example a snake. In the first sense, it Nameless is describes Bloom as slippery, and, in line with a common Anti-Semitic stereotypes, oily. Although, the second, serpentine, usage is a common trope of derision for any person stemming back to the snake in the Garden of Eden, it was a particularly popular term of derision for Jews (Gilman *Multiculturalism and the Jews* 91; Herzog 308). Sander Gilman explains that the metaphor had largely to do with fears over Jewish inauthenticity. No matter how much Jews assimilated they would always be tied to their "Oriental" roots. He cites one author who exclaims, "There seems to be something reptile in him [the Eastern Jew], something sinuous and crawling, something slimy and clammy, of which not even the educated Israelite is able to rid himself" (91).

[12] While he does so Garryowen, the Citizen's mangy dog starts smelling him, prompting Nameless to think, "I'm told those jewies does have a sort of a queer odour coming off them for dogs" (12.452-53). What Nameless is referencing here is the so called *foetor judaicus.* Davison suggests that Joyce got this from his reading of Fishberg (280). Still, he could equally well have gotten the idea from Drumont while in Paris. The French Anti-Semite, for reasons that are unclear, was particularly obsessed with the "Jewish stench," and the concept played an essential role in his anti-Semitic vocabulary (McClelland 108).

[13] While the argument might seem trivial, the Citizen's support for the revival of "ancient Gealic sports" is deeply tied to nationalist projects. In fact, within the physical culture movement lay the seeds for later eugenics projects that relied on a concept of "bodily nationalism" to further its sometimes fascist ends (Carden-Coyne 189). Consequently, the revival of certain types of Irish sports also meant preferencing a certain type of Irish body, namely the type of brawny muscularity the Citizen represented in his better days.

[14] The styles are respectively: Legal discourse (12.33), Translations of Irish Fairtales/Irish revival legendary(12.68), Theosophy (12.338), Stories from medieval romance (12.446), Medical Journal (12.468), Newspaper feature, (12.525), Theater advertisement (12.712), genteel-sentimental novel (12.785), children's primer (12.846), the minutes in the House of Commons (12.860), political advertisement (12.897), sports journalism (12.960), newspaper wedding reports (12.1266), the Apostle's creed (12.1354), newspaper descriptions of a medieval tapestry (12.1438), church news accounts of religious festivals (12.1676), newspaper accounts of a departure of a royal foreign visitor (12.1814), newspaper accounts of a natural disaster (12.1858).

[15] Davison suggestes that Joyce most likely saw these caricatures on anti-Dreyfusard postcards in Paris (96), there were any number of print sources that displayed these types of images. For example, there was also German "Judenspottkart/ Jew mockery postcard" called from "vom Geier zum Meier"/ "from Vulture to Meier" (1902) by the well-known publisher "Antisemitischen Buchhandlung Emil Keil," which depicted the evolution from vulture to Jew (Klein 134). Given Rudolph's regression from having "wings" on his nose to having talons, it is tempting to suggest that the card, or some version thereof, inspired Joyce.

[16] This rather surprising bit of information about Bloom's Mongolian ancestry has several possible sources. Bloom's Hungarian genealogy historically and tenuously links him to Mongolian blood. After all, the Mongols came as far West as modern Hungary. Ellmann suggests that Joyce read Fishberg on, "Mongolian Jews with Mongolian features" (*JJI* 408). Fishberg himself points out that scientists of his day believed that, "the Mongoloid Jews of to-day are cases of atavism" (118). The racial scientist and sexual psychologist Otto Weininger, who will be discussed in more detail later, could also have been a source. He believed that Jews shared an "anthropological relationship with negroes and Mongolians" (Weininger 303).

[17] While it is not clear to what extent Joyce read Weininger's highly influential anti-Semitic and anti-Feminine work *Sex and Character* (1906), there are enough parallels to suggest he was familiar with it (Reizbaum "Weininger" 208). The central contention of Weininger's work is that people exist in a, "permanent bisexual condition" (Weininger 7). As such, there are people who express a male or female character more pronouncedly, but not absolutely. He describes the feminine character as, "amoral, illogical, passive, animalistic" (Rosenfeld 215). More so, he finds these traits most pronounced in Jews, and contends that, "Judaism is saturated with feminity" (307). This assumption allows Weininger to explain the persistently inferior position of women and Jews in society, without considering other more complex mechanisms of racial and sexual exclusion. Jews and women, do not know how to hold onto property, do not have self-control, cannot form a state, and most damningly, lack a "free intelligible ego" (308). Weininger himself born Jewish, defensively claims that he is not an anti-Semite, and rather bizarrely that most anti-Semites are anti-Semitic because they are Jewish: "aggressive anti-Semite…nearly always display certain Jewish characters" (304). It is hard to see this as anything else than the stereotype of the feminine Jew recoded in pseudo-scientific language. From these basic assumptions Weininger deduced a comprehensive etiology of Jewish deviancy.

[18] Weininger argues that epilepsy is the disease of the false prophet and the criminal, though he offers no further evidence other than unsubstantiated claims that Luther, Mohammed, Caesar, and Napoleon were epileptic (325 – 6). Hence, epilepsy does not have pathological, but a devious connotation.

[19] Lisa Rado interestingly points out that Joyce's choice of *hypsos* may have meant to underscore the feminine version of this condition (44).

[20] The ambiguity of this passage has spawned a number of readings. For example, in a heavily gender based reading, Vicki Mahaffey argues that while the passage is abhorrent for its anti-Semitism from the perspective of the men, Harry Hughes, is "a cipher for all boy-men in their vulnerability to the wiles of

women" (263). Reizbaum argues that Stephen is "countering Bloom the Jew with the spectacularity of threat or danger" (*Judaic* 127). Meanwhile, Davison argues that while it is commonly assumed that Stephen, the Irish Catholic, is symbolic of the Harry Hughes, as a victim predestined, Hughes could also be representative of Bloom. Arguing that Stephen, "alludes to the psychology of the victim as not only informing Bloom's day, but having governed the older man's choices to remain both alienated and cuckolded" (234). While interesting in their own right, these analyses remain somewhat unsatisfactory and seem to ignore the context in which the offending passage is taking place.

[21] One of the main works on epistemological lacunae in *Ulysses* is Phillip Herring's *Joyce's Uncertainty Principle*. The work is more instructive in its flaws than its argumentation. Herring makes the basic contention that an "uncertainty principle" runs throughout Joyce's oeuvre starting as early as *Dubliners*. He argues that *gnomen* is a key phrase in Joyce's early work, even though he himself readily admits that, "there is no evidence that this was Joyce's intention" (x). He then argues that uncertainty is a trope of Modernism generally and that Joyce was largely inspired by Nietzsche, whom he promptly never deals with again in any elaborate detail. Later, he also argues that Joyce shared similarities with Martin Heidegger, Paul Valery, and Jean Paul Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*, which he admits did not appear until 1943, a year after Joyce's death (90). To add to the confusing list of theories, he mentions that Heisenberg's "uncertainty principle," from which he gets the title of the book, was not formulated until many years later (92). While these theories offer interesting parallels they do little to elucidate uncertainty in Joyce. Actually, throughout the work Herring is never really certain about uncertainty. He does, however, make the a monumental faux pas in the Joyce community by blatantly stating that he finds the indeterminacy of Bloom's Jewishness "unsolvable and not very interesting"(xii). For good reason, this is something for which a number of scholars have taken Herring to task.

CHAPTER FOUR

[1] Only Dos Passos's *U.S.A.* trilogy comes close to being an American modernist epic, but unlike the tales of Yoknapatawpha, Dos Passos expands his narrative by adding ever more characters, as opposed to creating a self-contained universe in the way Faulkner, Joyce, Proust, and Musil try to do.

[2] One of the catalysts for the rise of the Klan and the acceptability of anti-Semitism was the fear of Bolshevism. The anarchist bombing's of Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer's estate casts a long shadow into the decade. Although these happen in 1919, the bombings and the ensuing raids set the tone for the entire decade in terms of xenophobia, racism, conformism, and government observation (Hoyt 121; Schmidt 19). During this period, one of the easiest ways to undermine the legitimacy of any socially progressive political movement was to paint it red. This was done with immigrants generally (Curran 130), the Black Militancy movement (Kornweibel xii), and the women's movement (Nielsen 135). Perhaps the group that suffered most from this suspicion was the Jews, who were often associated with Communism (Bendersky 123) Still, once the Klan became a national organization they modified their plan of attack depending on where they lived. In Utah they targeted Mormons, Asian Americans on the Pacific Coast, and union radicals in the Northwest (21). Other groups they targeted included: bootleggers, gambling houses, and prostitution in Williamson County, Illinois (Angle 136); Sicilian immigrants in Louisiana (Baiamonte 17); Bolshevik Jewish German "beer brewers" in Cincinnati (Tolzmann 166)

[3] These fears were significantly different from those of the Palmer raids. The Palmer raids established communists as bomb throwing anarchists and union rabble-rousers. The communists, and by extension Jews, of the thirties were portrayed, more insidiously, as devious infiltrators sent to warp the minds of

honest down-on-their-luck Americans. Paradoxically, leftists also harbored anti-Semitic views. Even though a large number of leftists were Jewish, some believed that Jewish financiers had caused the financial crisis.

[4] As fascists groups tended to inflate their importance and membership, it is notoriously difficult to document how many there were, and critical opinions range from one hundred to about eight hundred groups in the early thirties (Beekman 100).

[5] Undoubtedly, the most visible exponent Fascism was William Dudley Pelley and his paramilitary Silver Legion. Though his organization never had more than fifteen thousand active members and about seventy-five thousand sympathizers, he became notorious for the sheer extremism of his views. He claimed, among other things, that Franklin Roosevelt wanted to turn America into his personal "Jewtopia," that he received divine messages, sometimes in Sanskrit, through clairaudience, that the Sahnhedrin had been controlling a massive Jewish conspiracy since Biblical times, that Moses was the "Stalin of his day," that all Jews needed to be put in concentration camps called "Beth Havens," and that Native Americans were the lost people of Atlantis and therefore knew intimately of Jewish Machinations (Beekman 63,86,90,120). Pelley's movement was particularly popular in the pacific northwest, California, and the South (Dinnerstein 112).

[6] A less radical and more prominent exponent of right-wing anti-Communism was radiovangelist Father Charles Coughlin. During his more extreme broadcasts, he blamed Jews for Russian Communism, defended the destruction of Jewish businesses during *Kristalnacht*, and argued that Jews were the cause of Germany's postwar troubles. His anti-Semitic radio broadcasts had three and a half million regular listeners and fifteen million more occasional listeners. In 1938, a survey revealed that one third of Americans agreed with his views (Dinnerstein 118; Dollinger 66).

[7] Faulkner thought both Pelley and Coughlin were threats to American democracy. He even mentions them directly in the typescript version of "Delta Autumn" in the same line as Hitler (Blotner *Faulkner; a biography* n. 151: 2).

[8] For instance, one author is so extreme as to suggest that the Klan is dangerous because it is adhering to Jewish doctrine, arguing that, "Evangelical Protestantism…is Jewish; and it is not attuned to the pagan culture of the Nordic." Therefore, caught in a belief system not commensurate with their racial nature, the Klan "exert themselves in an uncivilized way, [which] perhaps is the best explanation of the Ku Klux Klan Jew-baiting" (A. W 637). Paradoxically, the Klan is "uncivilized" because they are adhering to Jewish beliefs.

[9] The notable exception was, of course, the Leo Frank case. Case is the most horrific example of these anti-Semitic racial theories being put into practice. For decades to come, it was a warning to any Jew who transgressed Southern norms (Dinnerstein 184). Traditionally, the case was the quintessential example of the extent and viciousness of the anti-Semitism and racism in the South. More recent scholarships, contends that it was the exception that confirmed the rule.

[10] Faulkner's short story "Death Drag", has received little critical attention. This is perhaps because Faulkner himself did not hold the story in high regard. He recommended that, if need be, it could be taken out of the Portable Faulkner to make room for the "Appendix: Compson" (Towner and Carothers 108). Describing it as a story "That was just a tale, could have happened anywhere, could have been printed as happening anywhere" (108). Curiously though, the site of the story is marked on his map of Yoknapatawpha, and is therefore part of the county's lore (Portable np.). Still, the story is valuable for its demonstration of Faulkner's racial views. "Death Drag" tells the tale of three barnstormers who set upon a small town one day, presumably Jefferson. The main character is the war-beaten Jock, a former pilot. Jack and Ginsfarb, two Jews, accompany him. The story revolves largely around the power-

dynamic between Jock and Ginsfarb.[10] Jock is a down-on-his-luck pilot forced to use his skills to make a living. Conversely, Ginsfarb is an avaricious schemer who consistently tries to bilk the townspeople out of more and more money. He has already broken his leg once doing the "Death Drag", which involves Ginsfarb dropping on the hood of a car from the airplane using a ladder, waiting for the plane to circle around, grabbing the ladder again, and then climbing back up. In the climax of the story, the greedy Jew, Ginsfarb, is so set on getting paid that he refuses to let go of the ladder on his way down, thus risking his own life and that of the honorable Jock. The plane crashes into a barn and Ginsfarb miraculously survives, still worrying about his money. The portrait of Ginsfarb as a decrepit and money obsessed Jew appears quite openly anti-Semitic. In defense of Faulkner, Towner and Carothers argue that the "story not only presents the obvious popular prejudices, but it also subverts them" (108). They cite as their evidence the description Faulkner gives of the two Jews, Ginsfarb and Jack: "He [Jack] was handsome in a dull, quiet way; from his face, a man of infrequent speech. The spectators saw that he, like the limping man, was also a Jew. That is, they knew at once that two of the strangers were of a different race from themselves, without being able to say what the difference was" (188). That is to say, Jack's redeeming features undermine Faulkner's representation of a stereotypically degenerate Jew. Perhaps it is a clever subversion on Faulkner's part, but it also replicates the dualistic image of Jews circulating at the time. According to rabid anti-Semite Lothrop Stoddard there are actually two distinct type of Jews. The Mediterranean Jew is, "slenderly built, with a long head, well-cut features, and general 'harmonic' make-up, thereby suggesting that he springs from closely related racial stocks. Conversely, there are also Eastern European Jews, "The East European Jew, on the contrary, is apt to be short and thick-set, with a round head, coarse features, and general 'disharmonic' make-up, thus revealing a mixture of diverse bloods." (323-324). It is, of course, difficult to determine if Faulkner read this article. It was published in Forum, a well-known journal that also published Faulkner's work. Still, it is not unwarranted to assume that Faulkner was working within this racial framework. There is, after all, nothing redeeming about Ginsfarb. The closing lines of the story document how he has schemed the town's people out of money. Meanwhile, Jack, other than being handsome and the driver, plays an entirely marginal role in the story.

[11] Interestingly, even though "drummers" were stereotypically Jewish, their role was initially fulfilled by Confederate veterans Clark, Thomas. (Clark 161)

[12] Memphis had a Jewish population of around ten thousand, the average of the 1927 census (6,000) and the 1937 census (13,000)(H.S. LinfieldLinfield 244; Seligman, Ben and Swados, HarveySeligman and Swados 681) Using census data, we can assume that only 25% of these would have been males over 21. That is, males eligible for the professional class. At the time, Memphis's lawyer population was 430, which was .3% of the work force (U.S. Census 1519). If the Jewish community contributed proportionally, the same amount of lawyers there would have been exactly 9 Jewish lawyers in all of Memphis.

[13] It should be mentioned that Memphis did have a fairly prominent, and notoriously boorish, Jewish assistant District Attorney, Will Gerber, who in 1940 became Attorney General; an unusual feat because no other Jews held public office (Biles 35; Lewis 69). It is tempting to suggest that Faulkner might have had Gerber in mind when he wrote about the Memphis lawyer, but it is doubtful.

[14] Sally Padgett Wheeler has meticulously established the chronology of *Light in August* and establishes this as the day Joe Christmas is killed. While there is obviously no way to externally verify this it, it is possible to state with confidence that the events happened on a Friday in August of 1932. (Wheeler 36)

[15] Even if Christmas is read as a Christ-like figure as Daniel Joseph Singal does – he is thirty three when he dies, his initials are J.C., and is schooled by men who believe in the angry, wrathful God of the Torah

– which by necessity makes him Jewish symbolically, such a reading would clearly ignore the overwhelming focus on "negro blood" in the novel. (Singal 238)

[16] Joseph Blotner contends that Hiram is "a derisive term for a country man: bumpkin or yokel" (511). He does not provide any evidence for this reading, except that it appears to match the context. It would seem odd that a name for Jewish nobility would be used to describe someone from the country. To see it as an anti-Jewish insult, in particular because Christmas shows up with very little money makes more sense.

[17] True, it is possible to conclude that Joe's father was part black, and not Mexican as he claimed, based on the word of the circus owner who tells Eupheus Hines this information. It is not clear how the circus owner knows this, or why he would even go through the trouble of going back to town to tell Hines.

CHAPTER FIVE

[1] The establishment of the dual-Monarchy and the subsequent dissolution has been a much debated topic among historians of Central Europe. The current thinking is that the decline was far from inevitable (Cohen 242). Still, in all likelihood Musil followed the conventional thinking of his day that it was (Tihany 130-132).

[2] All translations have been taken from the most recent Sophie Wilkins editions. The original will be included in endnotes, but only discussed where there are serious issues of translation. "Fragte man darum einen Österreicher, was er sei, so konnte er natürlich nicht antworten: Ich bin einer aus dem im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreichen un Ländern, die es nicht gibt, - und er zog es schon aus diesem Grunde vor, zu sagen: Ich bin ein Pole, Tscheche, Italiener, Fiauler, Ladiner, Slowene, Kroate, Serve, Slowake, Ruthene oder Wallache, und das war der sogenannte Nationalismus" (MoE 451).

[3] Certainly, turn of the century Vienna with a "foreign," non-German, population of 60 percent was far more international than Paris, whose foreign population hovered around 6 percent (Spencer 104). This created a perception of Vienna as a "Stadt der Fremden" [city of strangers] that continued throughout the 1920s (Holmes and Silverman 9).

[4] This myth was so pervasive that in the 1921 plebiscites 93 percent of Salzburg and 98 percent of Tyrol were in favor of unification with Germany (Spencer 55).

[5] Interestingly, Marr's biographer argues that the text was not necessarily intended as a call for deportation, but this is what the overwhelming majority of people at the time understood from his work. (Zimmermann 78).

[6] Ironically, the French leveled the same charge against the Jews from their side.

[7] One unique feature of this new, more violent anti-Semitism was that it made use of the language of parisitology, which constructed the Jew "as a poison, a pestilence, a deadly bacillus, parasite, or beast of prey: all of these suggesting his complete separation from the rest of society and implying that his removal or elimination was vital to the health of the nation" (Field 409).

[8] Rosenberg's importance cannot be underestimated. Not only was he a founding father of National Socialism, he was also responsible for taking Hitler's scattered race hatred and turning it into a coherent political philosophy, and introduced him to the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* (Crooke 45; (Nicholls 346). One of the most disliked Nazi party members, he was also the party's 'philosopher' to whom Hitler entrusted leadership after the failed 1923 Beerhall putsch (Kershaw 225).

[9] It is important to note here that while there is certainly a relationship between the theory of anti-Semitism and the practice, this rhetoric did not inevitably incite violence against Jews. For example, while many Germans were either supported or were apathetic to anti-Semitic policies under the Nazi regime, most reacted with abhorrence to the pogrom of *Kristallnacht* (Crowe 129). Even high-ranking Nazi party members themselves protested when they accidentally witnessed the deportation of Jews (Mosse 203). To see the rise of anti-Semitic discourse inevitably resulting in the Holocaust is therefore too historically deterministic.

[10] Even though Proust also did not finish the *Recherche* he did have a master plan. In fact, Proust wrote the first, third, and last volume first. He then decided to fill out the middle. Despite being incomplete it is a much more coherent novel precisely because there is a clear beginning, middle, and an end. Schmid, Marion. (M. A. Schmid 66)

[11] "Es ist eine Welt von Eigenschaften ohne Mann entstanden, von Erlebnissen ohne den, der sie erlebt, und es sieht beinahe aus, als ob im Idealfall der Mensch überhaupt nichts mehr privat erleben werde und die freundliche Schwere der persönlichen Verantwortung sich in ein Formelsystem von möglichen Bedeutungen auflösen sole" (MoE 150). As case that can be made against the Wilkins translation here is that she translates "Idealfall der Mensch" as "ideally" when it should be closer to "in the ideal version of mankind generally nothing private should be experienced anymore."

[12] "Du kannst sagen, man braucht nicht aller Bücher zu lessen. Ich werde darauf erwirden: Man brauch auch im Krieg nicht jeden einzelnen Soldaten zu töten, und doch ist jeder notwendig!" (*MoE* 460).

[13] "Der Wunsch nach einer von aller Unordnung erlösenden Totalordnung."

[14] "ich hatte sie mir noch grausamer vorgestellt, als ich derlei Weiber sonst einschätze" (MoE 72)

[15] "Da sagen hier die Leute zu einem Eichhörnchen Eichkatzl"/ "In Hessen sagen sie dagegen Baumfuchs. Ein weitgewanderter Mensch weiβ so etwas" (*MoE* 240).

[16] "den die Welt hielt überall gegen ihn zusammen; kein Zauberwort kam gegen diese Verschwörung auf und keine Güte."

[17] "Die kicherenden Wieber waren vor allem gegen ihn verschworen" (*MoE* 72).

[18] "Pose auf und erklärte sich hönisch als 'theoretischen Anarchisten', der sich von den Sozialdemokraten jederzeit retten lassen könnte, wenn er von diesen ärgsten jüdischen Ausbeuteren des arbeitenden, unwissenden Volks etwas geschenkt nehmen wollte" (*MoE* 72).

[19] "Wenn er aber bei Gericht sagte, es seien die Freimaurer oder die Jesuiten oder die Sozialisten, die ihn auf diese Weise verfolgten, so verstand ihn kein Mensch" (*MoE* 238).

[20] "aber er war imstande, ebenso unumschränkt über Molekularphysik, Mystik oder Taubenschieβen zu plaudern." (*MoE* 189)

[21] "Seine Belesenheit und sein Gedächtnis hatten wirklich einen ungewöhnlichen Umfang; er vermochte Kenern die feinsten Stichworte ihres Wissengebietes zu bringen, kannte aber ebensogut jede wichtige Person aus dem englischen, dem französischen oder japanischen Adel und Wuβte auf Renn – und Golfplätzen nicht nur in Europa, sondern auch in Australien und Amerika Bescheid. So verlieβen selbst die Gemsjäger, Pferdebändiger und Stammlogenbesitzer der Hoftheater, die gekommen waren, um einen verrückten reichen Juden zu sehn (halt auch so was Neiches – hieβ das in ihrer Mundart), Diotimas haus mit einem achtungsvollen Kopfschütteln." (*MoE* 189)

[22] "Arnheim verkörpert eine Verbindung von Naivität und Arroganz, von philosophischer Halbbildung und gesellschaftlichem Erfolg, die er selbst nicht zu durchschauen vermag."

[23] "ein gallisch-keltisch-ostisch-thyreologisches Problem, verbunden mit dem lothringischen Kohlengruben und wieterhin dem der mexikanischen Ölfelder und dem Gegensatz zwischen Englis- und Latein-amerika." (*MoE* 329)

[24] "etwas überholt und an Gegenwartswert keinesweg einem Mann wie etwa Paul Arnheim gleichzustellen sei." (*MoE* 326).

[25] "In der ressentimentgeladenen Ablehnung des Juden Arnheim exemplifiziert und analysiert Musil die antisemitische Feindseligkeit einer Gesellschaft, die in ihrem rassistischen Verfolgungswahn schon wenige Jahre nach Erscheinen des Romans von der politisch-wirtschaftlichen Ab- und Ausgrenzung der Juden (wieder einmal) zu ihrer offenen Mißhandlung und schließlich physischen Vernichtung überging."

[26] "Nationalismus und Rassenideologie gebe, obgleich diese halb Europa in hysterische Gedanken verwickelten und sich gerade innerhalb der Fischelschen Mauern alles um sie drehte, als nicht vorhanden behandelt" (*MoE* 312)

[27] "die groβen Gebilde der Gnade, durch die das Verwirrte und Verzwergte des Lebens…klar und groβ wird, die den Lärm der Sinne verdrängen und die Stirn in den Strömen der Jenseitigkeit netzen" (*MWQ* 313).

[28] "worunter sie Kapitalismus und Sozialismus, Wissenschaft, Vernunft, Elternmacht und –anmaβung, Rechnen, Psychologie und Skepsis verstanden" (*MoE* 313).

[29] "zwischen rasseneignen und rassenfremden Personen mache" (*MoE* 478).

[30] "Sie kennen vielleicht nicht unsere verhetzte Jugend" (*MoE* 1011).

[31] "Erstens kommt es doch wirklich nicht auf ein bisserl Antisemitismus an, wenn die Leute schon einmal überhaupt Anti sind" (*MoE* 1012).

[32] "die schonungslose Unterdrückung aller Anderrassichen" (*MoE* 1018).

[33] "Sieh ihn dir an! Wofür würdest du ihn halten? Sieht er aus wie ein Arzt, wie ein Kaufmann, ein Maler oder ein Diplomat?" (*MoE* 64).

[34] "Ungemein viele Menschen fühlen sich heute in bedauerlichem Gegensatz stehhen zu ungemein viel anderen Menschen. Es ist ein Grundzug der Kultur, daβ der Mensch dem auβerhalb seines eigenen Kreises lebenden Menschen aufs tiefste miβstraut, also daβ nicht nur ein Germane einen Juden, sondern auch ein Fuβballspieler einen Klavierspieler für ein begreifliches und minderwertiges Wesen halt. Schlieβlich besteht ja das Ding nur durch seine Grenzen und dammit durch einen gewissermaβen feindseligen Akt gegen seine Umgebung; ohne den Papst, darum is es nicht von der hand zu weisen, daβ die tiefste Anlehnung des Menschen an seinen Mittmenschen in dessen Ablehnung besteht." (MoE 26)

[35] "man kann weder auf die Straβe treten, noch ein Glas Wasser trinken oder die Elektrische besteigen, ohne die ausgewogenen Hebel eines reisgen Apparats von Gesetzen und Beziehungen zu berühren, sie in Bewegung zu setzen oder sich von ihnen in der Ruhe seines Daseins erhalten zu lassen; man kennt die wenigsten von ihnen, die tief ins Innere greifen, während sie auf der anderen Seite sich in ein Netzwerk verlieren, dessen ganze Zusammensetzung überhaupt noch kein Mensch entwirrt hat" (*MoE* 156).

[36] "Er glaubte, in eine Maschine greaten zu sein, die ihn in unpersönliche, allgemeine Bestandteile zergliederte, ehe von seiner Schuld oder Unschuld auch nur die Rede war" (*MoE* 159).

[37] "nur als Signalement" – Wilkins description of Signalement as "aggregate of officially describable features" is rather cumbersome, but ultimately effective since there is no comparable word in English.

Another way definition is personal details, but this does not nearly come close to the dehumanization of "Signalement". (*MoE* 159).

[38] "Nun war es dieser aber ungewohnt, den Staat anders zu betrachten als ein Hotel, in dem man Anspruch auf höfliche Bedieunung hat" (157-58).

[39] "Nach seinem Gefühl war er groβ, seine Schultern waren breit, sein Brustkorb saβ wie ein gewölbtes Segel am Mast, und die Gelenke seines Körpers schlossen wie schmale Stahlglieder die Musklen ab, sobald er sich ägrerte, stritt oder Bonadea sich in ihm schmiegte; er war dagegen schmal, zart, dunkel und Weich wie eine im Wasser schwebende Meduse, sobald er ein Buch las, das ihn ergriff, oder von einem Atem der heimatlosen groβen Liebe gestreift wurde" (*MoE* 159).

[40] "Er war es gewohnt, sich aus natürlichen Trieb und ohne Eitelkeit für das Werkzeug zu einem nicht unbedeutenden Zweck zu halten, den er schon noch rechtzeitig zu erfahren gedachte" (*MoE* 151)

[41] "Gespenst, dem man ein Leintuch borgen möchte" (*MoE* 152).

[42] "Es geht durch den Menschen, der ihn aufnehmen möchte, hindurch und läβt nu rein wenig Erschüttering zurück" (*MoE* 152).

[43] "alle moralischen Ereignisse in einem Kraftfeld statt, dessen Konstellation sie mit sinn Belud" (*MoE* 250).

[44] "daβ jedes Kräftespiel mit der Zeit einem Mittelwert unde Mittelzustand, einem Ausgleich und einer Erstarrung Zustrebt" (*MoE* 251).

[45] "Verbrechen in Tugend und umgekehrt" (*MoE* 251).

[46] "ein bewuβter menschlicher Essayismus ungefähr die Aufgabe vorfände, diese fahrlässigen Bewustseinzustand der Welt in einem Willen zu verwandeln" (*MoE* 251).

[47] "Alles, was wir können, beruht darauf, daβ wir nich allzu streng sind und auf die höchste Erkenntnis warten; das Mittelalter hat das getan und sind unwissend geblieven" (*MoE* 484).

[48] "Es gibt Fortschritt immer nur in einem bestimmten Sinn. Und da unser Leben im Ganzen keinen Sinn hat, hat es im Ganzen auch keinen Fortschritt" (*MoE* 484).

[49] "Im Grunde war es das gleiche Gespräch wie das mit Diotima; nur das Äuβere war verschieden, aber dahinter hätte man aus dem einen in das andere fortfahren können" (*MoE* 489).

[50] "nicht so sprechen, wie man will" (*MoE* 495).

[51] "Die Leere der männlichen Rücksichlosigkeit strömte ihm durch die Augen" (*MoE* 495).

[52] "Wir wissen heute, daβ zwischen Staat, Nation, Kultur, Kunst, Arbeit Wechselbeziehungen besthene und daβ es ein Wahnsinn ist zu meinen, daβ irgend eines unabhängig vom andern bestehen könne"

CONCLUSION

[1] "legale Weise den deutschen Lebensraum von Juden zu säubern"

[2] "Rassisch besonders ungünstiges Erscheinungsbild des Mischlings 2. Grades, das ihn schon äuβerlich zu den Juden rechnet"

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