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THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT

A CASE STUDY OF EMERGING POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS, 1968-1972

by

DAVID LUCHINS

A dissertation submitted to the
Graduate Faculty in Political
Science in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
The City University of New York.

1977

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INTRODUCTION

For its first quarter century the United Nations agenda was dominated by questions of political order--of securing and maintaining international peace. For the last few years increased attention has been given to questions of international economic order--of how to best protect and enhance mankind's economic well-being.

The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment provides an excellent case study of the impact of both the more traditional political order factors and the emerging economic order considerations on an international issue. The Conference, which met in Stockholm, Sweden, in June of 1972, was the first concerted international effort to deal with the overall question of man's relationship with his natural environment. In addition, the four years of work that preceded the Conference represented one of the first systematic attempts to arrive at internationally acceptable definitions and priorities in the field of the human environment.

This dissertation will examine the political aspects of the Human Environment Conference, the alignments that this issue produced, and the significance of these alignments for contemporary international relations. Particular attention will be given to the political cleavage created

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by the fundamental differences in attitudes, priorities and needs between the developed nations of the "North" and the developing nations of the "South."

We will deal with the following questions:

1. What have been the decisive factors in shaping United Nations environmental politics? What role have political, economic, social, and environmental factors played in this issue?

2. What nations have played the leading roles in United Nations environmental deliberations?

3. What are the political alignments that have emerged during consideration of environmental issues at the United Nations and how do they differ from traditional United Nations alignments?

4. What do these political alignments suggest about the future of international relations on both theoretical and policy levels?

This paper seeks to answer these and related questions by means of a political analysis of the Environment Conference issue at the United Nations between the years 1968 and 1972. A case study approach with both longitudinal and cross-sectional components has been utilized.

The longitudinal component is comprised of the four and a half year period extending from May 1968 to December 1972. It is divided for our purposes into four segments, each of which will be considered in a separate chapter:

1. The early preparatory work leading up to the

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selection of the Conference Preparatory Committee in December 1969 (Chapter II)

2. The 1970-71 preparatory period (Chapter III)

3. The June 1972 Human Environment Conference (Chapter IV)

4. The post-Conference deliberations of the fall 1972 United Nations General Assembly session at which the Conference's report was considered (Chapter V)

Each period is considered independently and analyzed in depth in terms of its Environment Conference related issues, actors (both of a national and group character), and politics. In addition, the opening chapter seeks to define the political setting of the overall Environment Conference debate while the concluding chapter (Chapter VI) provides cross-sectional analysis of the entire Conference period as examined in the preceding chapters.

Our essential units of analysis are the individual national actors and groups of national actors that played a major role in the shaping and defining of United Nations environmental politics. We have endeavored to identify these key actors and to explain the considerations influencing their positions and votes on the various Environment Conference questions. Analysis of roll calls, content analysis of debate statements, and the examination of national and nation-group participation in Conference-related deliberations have been utilized for this purpose. Vote scaling and rank-order correlations have been used to help

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facilitate analysis of bloc voting and to ascertain the tenacity of individual national positions during each of the time periods under consideration.

The official records of the various United Nations bodies that examined the Environment Conference question provide the primary source for "hard data." In addition, we have interviewed members of the United Nations Environment Programme staff and several key individuals who were involved in the events under examination. These interviews were used in a supplementary fashion, as were the unofficial summary records of the Stockholm Conference's sessions that were made available by the Environment Programme office.

As for secondary sources, the case of international environmental politics, and particularly of concerted United Nations efforts in this area, is of such recent origin that there is little background literature in this field. Much of what is available is of a technical nature dealing with specific problems of industrial pollution and waste control, to the almost total exclusion of ostensibly "political" questions.[1] We have also examined literature dealing with United Nations coalition politics, the North-

---

[1] See, for example, the reports of the World Health Organization's Geneva "scientific groups" (United Nations Document E/4577, 29 February 1968), or the UNESCO "Man and his Biosphere" reports. See also Lyton Caldwell, In Defense of Earth: International Protection of the Biosphere (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1972), for a more recent example of this "technical" approach.

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South cleavage in international relations, the politics of international development questions, and background material relating to content analysis, legislative voting behavior, and voting pattern analysis.[2]

---

[2]The selected bibliography at the end of this study lists the most significant of these secondary sources as well as the major primary sources that were utilized.

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CHAPTER I

THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT: THE PROBLEM AND ITS PERSPECTIVES

The Problem of the Human Environment

Since its earliest days on this planet, the human species has modified its environment in an effort to make life more pleasant. This is hardly surprising, since every living thing modifies its natural surroundings to some degree. Nor is the human being's conscious effort to alter his environment peculiar to his species, since many animals reflect the same goal in their behavior.[1] What is unique about the human situation is the ability to exploit and manipulate the natural environment on a scale that dwarfs the impact of any other living organism.

All living things that we know of in the universe exist in the "biosphere"--the relatively narrow film of soil, water, and oxygen-rich air that surrounds the surface of the planet Earth. Within the biosphere these organisms and the soil, water, and air in which they flourish are intricately interrelated. It is here that the energy provided by sunlight interacts with the chemical materials of

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[1]Barbara Ward and René Dubos, Only One Earth: The Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p. 1.

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earth. The production of adequate oxygen, carbon dioxide, and food to sustain life on this planet are only three examples of the delicate "chains" that link numerous varieties of living things in helping each other to exist.

Man is a creature of the biosphere. He is a link in the food-chain, the oxygen-chain, and the numerous other life-sustaining "chains" without which he could not survive. Man is also a creature of a unique second world as well--the "technosphere"--the world of manmade tools, artifacts, and innovations.

Human history on this planet is the history of the continual growth of the technosphere and the corresponding growth of its impact upon the inherently fragile biosphere. In recent years, however, there has been growing concern that man's demands on the biosphere are threatening to overwhelm the delicate ecological balance that permits life to flourish on this planet. Earliest man's impact on the biosphere was minimal.[2] However, as man's technological skills began to develop, his interference with the environment expanded dramatically. The conquest of fire, smelting of metals, forging of tools, growth of urban settlements,

---

[2]See, for example, United Nations Document E/4458, 12 March 1968, p. 44:

> "His effects upon his environment were no greater than those of other wild animals. His dependence upon it was complete. He required oxygen and water derived from the atmosphere, energy from the sunlight, transformed by green plants into states suitable for human capture and assimilation. He was a predator upon certain other animals and prey of larger or more capable carnivores."

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and development of mathematics and sciences each had a profound effect on the biosphere. Each new innovation increased the total human impact on other organisms and on the natural elements with which human survival is linked in so many ways. New demands on the biosphere and its resources further altered the balance between various components of the environment.

For centuries, men made increasingly heavy demands on the environment with little concern as to their effects. Men, struggling to survive in the face of illness, hunger, cold, and heat, could hardly be expected to weigh the environmental impact of their every effort to improve their lives by moderating their surroundings. On the contrary, despite the recent emphasis on man's potential threat to his environment, men have tended for most of human history to perceive the elements of their environment as hostile forces to be conquered and tamed.[3]

With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, there was an unprecedented acceleration of the rate of technological impact that began to strain the biosphere's capacity. The introduction of steam engines, harnessing of electricity, creation of giant metropolitan areas, and increasing demand for raw materials all put stresses on the biosphere that led some observers to begin to question how much longer the waters would be able to cleanse, and the

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[3]Gerald Garvey, Energy, Ecology, Economy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p. 25.

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air and soil would be able to bear, the waste products of human progress. At the same time, the growing demands for natural resources began to highlight the finite nature of materials which previous generations had viewed as limitless.

The twentieth century, with its great technological growth, was the first era in human history in which man could not only distort the delicate life sustaining balance of the biosphere but had even acquired the ability to destroy his habitat. The harnessing of atomic and thermonuclear energy demonstrated this destructive capability in the most dramatic fashion. The spectre of nuclear devastation by explosion or death by radiation threatened not only mankind but virtually every form of life on earth.

Man's ability to destroy his environment was also demonstrated in less dramatic fashion. Modern industry began to produce chemical wastes that the oceans and air could not cleanse. Rivers became polluted to such a degree that their fish disappeared. Thick fogs of "smog" appeared over highly industrialized areas, bringing with them soaring death rates from respiratory diseases. Artificially created hydrocarbons used in pesticides in the temperate and tropical zones turned up only a few years later in the fatty tissue of penguins in Antarctica.[4] Phenomena such as these all began to serve notice on mankind that they could

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[4]United Nations Document E/4458, 12 March 1968, p. 46.

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not continue to treat the biosphere as a vast sewer without serious, if not deadly, consequences.

In response to these developments, a number of scholars began to examine the relationship of the various components of the human environment. This new scientific endeavor devoted to the study of interlinked environmental systems was named "ecology." Ecologists insisted on seeing man as only one component in a vast interrelated natural system, and some of them warned that, unless far more attention was paid to the consequences of tampering with the balance of the total human "ecosystem," the very survival of human life on this planet would soon be endangered.[5]

It was in response to these concerns that the United Nations agreed in 1968 to convene an international conference devoted to the overall human environment question. The proposed conference represented the first systematic effort to assess the totality of human impact on the biosphere and to develop a strategy for dealing with the strains created by this impact.

---

[5]See, for example, the previously cited United Nations report which warned that:

> "Despite [his technological progress] man remains basically an omnivorous animal dependent upon oxygen and water from the atmosphere and energy from sunlight transformed by green plants into states suitable for human capture and assimilation. Although in a position of dominance, he cannot for long modify conditions within the biosphere beyond the limits of tolerance for himself and the animals and plants upon which he still depends for life. Where he does so, he perishes" (ibid., p. 45).

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Previous United Nations Efforts

In a broad sense, virtually every United Nations undertaking in the economic and social fields has dealt, to some degree, with the fundamental questions of the quality, protection, and enhancement of the human environment. Even if we limit our definition of "environment," the United Nations has been involved with aspects of the environmental question since its formation. The first international scientific conference convened by the United Nations--the 1949 Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources--dealt with the problems of natural resource scarcity and utilization and with soil, forest, wildlife, and fishery conservation.[6]

The question of marine pollution has been discussed at length in United Nations forums and a number of international conventions have resulted from these efforts. The first such convention, limiting the discharge of oil from ships, was signed in 1954. Several other conventions resulted from the 1955 Rome Conference on the Conservation of Living Resources of the Sea. These dealt with such matters as ocean pollution by ships and pipelines, the dumping of radioactive waste at sea, rules of international fishery conservation, and measures to protect living organisms in off-shore areas being exploited for their natural

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[6]United Nations, Office of Public Information, New Challenge for the United Nations (New York: United Nations, 1971), p. 1.

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resources. Similar United Nations conferences have addressed questions of overpopulation, water pollution, the dangers of nuclear radiation, the application of science and technology, and the utilization of new energy sources.[7]

The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has been especially involved in environmental issues, and has had its own section on "ecology and conservation" since 1961. In 1968 UNESCO hosted an Intergovernmental Conference on the Scientific Basis for Rational Use and Conservation of the Resources of the Biosphere. This conference led to the creation of an ongoing "Man and the Biosphere" program to study the functioning of the biosphere and the changes produced by man's impact both on his own species and on the biosphere in general.[8]

Other United Nations agencies have also been involved in environmental studies and discussions. The World Health Organization has, since 1963, convened regular meetings in Geneva of "scientific groups" to evaluate aspects of marine, air, and soil pollution.[9] In addition, the Food and Agriculture Organization has prepared a number of comprehensive reports on the problems of pollution, and the World

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[7]Ibid., pp. 5-6. In particular, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation has, since its inception in 1955, played a major role in studying the dangers of nuclear radiation.

[8]Ibid., p. 9.

[9]United Nations Document E/4577/Add. 1, 29 February 1968, p. 1.

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Meteorological Organization has examined meteorological aspects of the interaction between man and his environment.[10]

Two Overriding Factors

The Stockholm Conference is unique because it represented an unprecedented international effort to deal with the human environment question and because of the technical, environmental, and political factors which shaped the Conference period.[11]

Two factors, however, are essential to an understanding of the Stockholm Conference and must accordingly be examined in depth. The first, "runaway growth," helps explain the sense of urgency of those who initially proposed the Conference. The second, the cleavage between the developed and developing nations, helps explain the political realities that so strongly altered the original Conference plans.

Runaway growth

After centuries of steady growth man's impact on the biosphere has, for the past few decades, been escalating at an unprecedented rate of acceleration. The resulting patterns of "runaway growth" in every area of human impact not

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[10]United Nations, Office of Public Information, New Challenge for the United Nations, p. 14.

[11]Whenever the term "Conference period" is used in this study it refers to the entire period under examination from May 1968 to December 1972.

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only helped create the serious study of ecology but provided the impetus for the growing school of "no growth" and even "reverse growth" ecologists.

In Barbara Ward's graphic phrasing, mankind is now living on the "hinge of history." The door to the future is opening, we are told, "on a crisis more sudden, more global, more inescapable and more bewildering than any ever encountered by the human species."[12] Indices of human development that have inched forward for centuries have shot upward during the past few decades and promise to continue accelerating at rates that must inevitably threaten the very stability of human existence.[13]

Human population required millions of years to reach the one billion mark at the beginning of the seventeenth century, but only three hundred years to achieve its second billion by 1900, and fifty years to record the third billion in 1950 (see chart 1.1).[14] Current estimates further predict that there will be well over four billion human beings on this planet before the end of the present decade and over six billion before the close of the century.

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[12]Ward and Dubos, Only One Earth, p. 6.


[13]Many ecologists maintain that this danger will be imminent in a matter of decades. See, for example, The Next Ninety Years, Proceedings of a Conference sponsored by the Office for Industrial Associates, held at the California Institute of Technology, March 1967.

[14]This chart and the two that follow are adapted from Ward and Dubos, Only One Earth, pp. 6-9.

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CHART 1.1

GROWTH IN WORLD POPULATION, A.D. 1-2000



SOURCE: United Nations data.

Progress in agriculture, the Industrial Revolution, and the advances of modern medicine, especially in the area of infant mortality, have helped make this growth possible.[15] One need not be a disciple of Malthus to ask at what point this planet, on which hundreds of millions of human beings are already undernourished, will no longer be able to continue supporting a human population that is growing at such a rapid rate.

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
[15]While most authorities agree that medical advances have helped fuel the contemporary upsurge in population, there have been some recent challenges to this hypothesis. See, for example, Roy Brown and Joe Wray, "The Starving Roots of Population Growth," Natural History, January 1974, p. 51. Brown and Wray present considerable evidence that lowering infant mortality rates actually lowers the rate of population growth because "parents will not stop having children until they believe that those they already have are going to survive."

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In terms of human impact on the environment, this enormous growth in population is even more decisive because of the fact that urban population growth has been accelerating at a rate several times faster than that of the total population during the twentieth century (see chart 1.2). Less than one-fifth of the world's population lived in urban centers of 20,000 inhabitants in 1900 as compared with over one-third in 1970, and, if current estimates are valid, over 50 percent by the year 2000.

CHART 1.2

GROWTH IN WORLDWIDE URBAN* AND RURAL POPULATION
1900-2000



SOURCE: United Nations data.

*Urban refers to towns of at least 20,000 inhabitants.

As urban growth rates soared, the metropolitan areas, under the pressure of huge human concentration in limited


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areas, poured wastes into their air, water, and soil at an unprecedented pace. Urban area pollution is nothing new. What is new is the degree to which it has accelerated as urban densities have increased during this century.

As man's population grew and his technological knowledge increased, his demands on the biosphere grew at even greater rates. One excellent indication of the scale of human impact on the environment is the consumption of man-made energy, the most basic indicator of technological man. Examination of human energy consumption in this century reveals a continuous rapid acceleration (see chart 1.3).

CHART 1.3

GROWTH IN WORLD ENERGY CONSUMPTION*, 1900-2000



SOURCE: United Nations data.

*As measured in millions of metric tons of coal equivalent.

More and more finite matter is being turned into energy with no clear indication of how much more strain the system

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can endure.

The full impact of this growth in human demands becomes even clearer if we examine the rates of growth during the past two decades (see tables 1.1 and 1.2). Half a billion people were added to the world's population during this time (for an average annual increase of .94 percent). At the same time, however, production of electrical energy had almost quadrupled (at an annual average rate of 16.9 percent), and the number of motor vehicles in use (with each one adding to the pollution of the air and consuming natural resources in order to function) had grown at almost as rapid a rate as electrical energy production. Both of the latter indices had grown over fifteen times as fast as the "runaway" rate of population growth during this same period. Similarly, demand for natural resources grew at rates five to ten times greater than that of the population.

Even this remarkable growth reflects, as we shall soon see, a world in which at least half of mankind "have hardly raised their claims on the planet above those of neolithic man."[16] The possibility that billions of human beings might someday make the same demands on the biosphere that are now made by citizens of the most highly developed nations has led some ecologists to predict that man would, in short order, "virtually deplete the earth of all high-grade mineral resources and would [have to live] off the

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[16]Ward and Dubos, Only One Earth, p. 11.

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TABLE 1.1

GROWTH IN WORLD POPULATION, ELECTRICAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION, AND MOTOR VEHICLE USAGE, 1953-70

	1953	1963	1970	Percentage Growth 1953-70	Average Annual Growth
Population (in millions)	3,100	3,300	3,600	16%	.94%
Electrical energy (in millions of kilowatt hours)	1,264,100	2,848,800	4,901,100	288%	16.9 %
Motor vehicles in use (in thousands)	82,540	154,890	293,920	256%	15.1 %

SOURCE: United Nations data

TABLE 1.2

GROWTH IN WORLD DEMAND FOR SELECTED MATERIALS, 1951-69

	Total Growth In Demand	Average Annual Growth		Total Growth In Demand	Average Annual Growth
Aluminum	259%	14.4%	Iron ore	139%	7.8%
Copper	95%	5.3%	Sulfur	119%	6.6%
Crude steel	139%	7.8%	Zinc	101%	5.6%
Fluorspar	196%	10.9%			

SOURCE: Wilfred Malenbaum, "World Resources for the Year 2000," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (July 1973):38.

leanest of earth substances: the waters of the sea and ordinary rock."[17]

The cleavage between the developed and the developing nations

A handful of developed nations clustered mainly in the northern half of the planet have enjoyed most of the benefits of the contemporary technological revolution, and are responsible for most of the technosphere's increasing infringement on a once stable biosphere. The gap between the developed nations of the North and the majority of mankind who live in the developing nations of the South has crystalized into a dominant cleavage in international political life. The fundamental differences in attitudes, priorities, and needs between the North and the South have had a profound effect on how they view the question of the human environment.

In a sense all human societies have been developing since their origins. The contemporary usage of the term "developing nation" reflects, rather, the acute contrasts between these nations and the handful of developed nations that have reaped the vast majority of the benefits flowing from the industrial, scientific, and technological revolu-

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[17]Harrison Brown in The Next Ninety Years, p. 16.

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tions of the past two centuries.[18]

For most of human history the great majority of people in every nation lived under the crush of continuous poverty. The suggestion that a majority of inhabitants of any given national community could gain access to even modest affluence was inconceivable.[19] Yet, today, in most of Europe, in Japan and in the European settler states of North America, Southern Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and Israel, the "poverty-cycle" has been shattered for a significant portion of the population.

This in no way implies that everyone in these countries is wealthy, or that no one is starving within their borders. What it does mean is that, in a handful of nations, desperate human poverty is now an exception, while for the majority of mankind it is still the rule.

The developed nations have broken out of the poverty cycle. They have entered the modern world of technological and scientific accomplishment. These nations are, in Barbara Ward's words, "a quite new kind of human society. A sort of mutation has occurred and [they] no longer share

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[18]It must be emphasized that the terms "developed" and "developing" refer only to economic and technological status. They are not indices of cultural or social evolution, nor are they yardsticks to the quality of moral life or "goodness" in a society. When a cultural or social factor is discussed in evaluating a nation's level of development, it is only because that factor is one, such as literacy, that has a direct bearing on economic or technological accomplishment.

[19]Barbara Ward, The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations (New York: W. W. Norton, 1962), p. 38.

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a continuous way of life with underdeveloped and emerging peoples . . ."[20] Perhaps even more significantly, the success of these "mutations" has become the envy of, and model for, the less affluent developing nations.

The developed nations were the first to experience the Industrial Revolution and they generally did so when their populations were stable, before this century's population explosion. On the other hand, the developing nations must attempt to enter the technological era with the added pressure of soaring population growth. In the developed nations, industrialization preceded and, indeed, often helped to generate, urbanization. In the developing nations, the population explosion has forced millions of rural inhabitants to flock to urban centers where there is neither adequate employment nor room for them.[21]

In most of the developed nations the existence of colonial empires, or of vast, relatively unpopulated land areas, provided cheap resources for the Industrial Revolution. Most of the developing nations were, until recently, parts of those very colonial empires. In a similar vein, the developed nations all had modern economic systems based on capital accumulation, a tradition of materialism, the willingness to apply scientific principles to daily life,

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[20]Ibid., p. 16.

[21]Ward and Dubos, Only One Earth, p. 47.

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and an emancipated and free merchant class.[22]

Not only have the developed nations become relatively wealthy, but they show every promise of becoming wealthier. These nations are enjoying continual economic and technological progress. They have burst out of the poverty cycle and into economic "orbit" while the rest of mankind has not even left the ground.[23] Moreover, the developed nations achieved this "takeoff" when their populations were stable, when international economic competition was limited, and when their status as colonial masters gave them virtual dominion over the rest of the planet and its resources.

The developing nations have been left in both relative and absolute poverty and show every indication of becoming poorer. Their population growth is twice as fast as that of the developed nations, their soil and climate is usually far more fragile, and they lack the traditions of materialism, capital accumulation, and the scientific method that helped transform the developed nations. In addition, the developing nations face massive illiteracy, economies that were often designed to suit the colonial

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[22]Ward, The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations, pp. 30-40. It is perhaps significant that the only non-European stock country to have unquestionably achieved developed status is Japan, a nation unique in the non-European world in that it possessed several of these characteristics of the developed nations. In addition, Japan never suffered under direct colonial exploitation, and had, at a critical period in its history, a powerful central leadership with the authority and means to impose a Western European model on an Asiatic people (ibid., p. 58).

[23]Ibid., p. 35.

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mother countries' particular needs, and the necessity to compete economically and technologically with those nations that have already achieved the revolution of modernization.

As a result of this situation, some observers feel that the two groups of nations may well be moving into situations of permanent growth and permanent poverty:

> The cultures which are now emerging and which can be firmly established by 1980 are nothing more or less than the permanently poor and the permanently rich. The developed countries are now in a positive feedback loop in which technology, material wealth, and standard of living can grow exponentially for many generations to come; the rich will get richer. Similarly, the poorness of the underdeveloped countries seems to me to be on the verge of entering a similar positive feedback loop, in which poorness itself leads to ever-deepening poorness.[24]

Whatever the future holds, the current gap between the developed nations and the developing nations is large enough to suggest that the world is well on the way to resembling Disraeli's England of "two nations--the nation of the rich and the nation of the poor."[25] Chart 1.4 contrasts the

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
[24]James Bonner in The Next Ninety Years, pp. 40-41.

[25]The 1973-74 rise in world petroleum prices has not yet, as some predicted at that time, radically altered this pattern. A few oil rich states have generated enormous revenues but none of them have yet earned "developed" status as Japan did earlier in this century. Nor have the developed nations been bankrupted as a result of the price rise. The major impact of the increased oil prices has been on those developing nations that lack oil deposits and must now allocate a much larger portion of their limited national revenues towards paying for petroleum. The desperate plight that many of these nations face and the relative prosperity enjoyed by the oil producing states have led some observers to divide the developing nations into a "Third World" and even more desperate "Fourth World" category.


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CHART 1.4


THE RICH NATIONS AND THE POOR NATIONS, 1969




Population




Gross National Product




Energy Consumption




Motor Vehicles




Telephones




Crude Steel Consumption




Iron Ore Consumption




Copper Consumption




Aluminum Consumption



Zinc Consumption



Fluorspar Consumption



Sulfur Consumption

SOURCES: Gross national product graph is based on World Bank data. Population, energy, motor vehicles, and telephone graphs are based on United Nations data. Other graphs are based on data in Malenbaum, "World Resources for the Year 2000," p. 38.

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nations of Europe, the European settler states (Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States of America) and Japan with the rest of mankind.[26] The former account for 30 percent of the world's population, yet they produce 85 percent of the total international gross product, account for 85 percent of the world's energy consumption, utilize nine out of every ten motor vehicles and telephones on the planet, and consume 90 percent or more of virtually every natural resource for which world-wide data are available.

Since the poor nations have over twice the population of the rich nations, the discrepancies reflected in chart 1.4 are over twice as large when computed on a per capita basis. Thus, the average per capita gross national product of the rich nations is almost fourteen times greater than that of the poor nations; their average energy consumption is over fourteen times greater; and their inhabitants enjoy the use of twenty-five times as many motor vehicles and telephones on a per capita basis as do the inhabitants of the poor nations.

Towards a Definition of Development

While chart 1.4 demonstrates that the nations of Europe and North America are "developed" when compared with

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[26]For the purposes of chart 1.4 Albania and Yugoslavia are considered poor nations despite their geographic status as European countries. This is in keeping with their undisputed classification as developing nations.

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the nations of Latin America and most of Africa and Asia, they do not, however, provide a definition that can be utilized to categorize a specific nation. No universally accepted standard exists to define a nation as "developed" or "developing."[27] The most popular definitions utilize per capita gross national product (GNP). In the early 1960s the international development agencies and several writers on the subject of development chose $500 a year as the borderline between "developed" and "developing" status.[28] This standard was widely accepted at that time, and some observers continue to utilize it as their basic definition.[29] Others, however, have raised the figure to $700 in recognition of inflation and overall world economic progress.[30] The international development agencies and the United Nations Statistical Office no longer consider GNP to be an exclusive gauge of development status. One reason for this is the high price that oil and certain mineral products now command on the world market. These prices inflate the GNP of oil and mineral rich states to a degree that it may no longer reflect these nations' overall con-

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[27]See Miguel de Almeida, "The Confrontation Between Problems of Development and Environment," International Conciliation 586 (January 1972):38, for a brief discussion of this question. See also Ward's sections cited in the next two footnotes.

[28]Ward, The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations, p. 38.

[29]Ward and Dubos, Only One Earth, p. 146.

[30]de Almeida, "The Confrontation Between Problems of Development and Environment," p. 38.

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ditions of development.[31]

Despite these problems, per capita gross national income remains a useful yardstick for defining a nation's development status. Table 1.3 shows, by continent, how the world's nations ranked in 1970, according to World Bank data.[32] Every nation in Europe and each of the European settler states and Japan enjoyed a per capita GNP above the $500 mark. In the rest of the world only the major oil producing states, mineral rich Gabon, Singapore, Cyprus, and a handful of Latin American nations had achieved this level. In addition, while the overwhelming majority of the European nations' and European settler states' GNPs were over $1,500, the GNPs of most African and Asian nations were under $200.

Using this World Bank data, the overall 1970 world per capita gross product can be calculated as being $880 per person. Examination of table 1.3 reveals that this

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[31]Interview with Irene Chainn Yi T. Tsou, United Nations Statistical Office, 7 September 1973.

[32]The European nations are divided for this table, in accordance with United Nations practice, into "Eastern" and "Western" Europe, while the European settler states and Japan are listed separately in reflection of political and economic realities. These states will hereafter be referred to as "other states" in the "developed" category. With the exception of Japan they do not caucus with the United Nations Afro-Asian or Latin American groups. Albania and Yugoslavia are listed in this table as Eastern European nations because this is their official status for purposes of selection to United Nations bodies. Beginning with table 1.6, however, they will be categorized as "others (developing)" and listed either as a separate group or as part of an "Asia and others (developing)" category.

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TABLE 1.3

PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY NATION, 1970

Per Capita GNP	Latin America	Africa	Asia and Oceania	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Others (Developed)[1]
Under $100		Burundi Chad Dahomey Ethiopia Lesotho Malawi Mali Niger Rwanda Somalia Upper Volta Zaire	Afghanistan Bhutan Burma Indonesia Nepal Yemen			
$100-$199	Bolivia Haiti	Botswana Cameroon Central African Republic Gambia Guinea Kenya Madagascar Mauritania Nigeria Sierra Leone Sudan Swaziland Tanzania	China India[2] Khmer[3] Laos Maldives North Vietnam Pakistan Sri Lanka[4] Yemen, PDR			

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		Togo Uganda			
$200-$299	Ecuador Honduras Paraguay	Egypt Equatorial Guinea Liberia Mauritius Morocco Senegal Tunisia	Jordan Philippines South Korea South Vietnam Syria Thailand		
$300-$399	Colombia Dominican Republic El Salvador Guatemala Guyana	Algeria Congo Ghana Ivory Coast	Iran Iraq Malaysia North Korea Oman Taiwan Turkey		
$400-$499	Brazil Nicaragua Peru	Zambia	Fiji Mongolia Saudi Arabia		
$500-$599	Barbados Costa Rica Cuba		Bahrain Lebanon		
$600-$699	Jamaica Mexico	Gabon		Portugal	Albania[5] Yugoslavia[5]
$700-$799	Chile Panama				Bulgaria

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TABLE 1.3--Continued

Per Capita GNP	Latin America	Africa	Asia and Oceania	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Others (Developed)[1]
$800-$899	Trinidad and Tobago Uruguay			Malta		South Africa
$900-$999	Venezuela		Cyprus Singapore		Romania	
$1000-$1249	Argentina			Greece Spain		
$1250-$1499			Qatar	Ireland	Poland	
$1500-$1749						
$1750-$1999				Italy	USSR	Israel Japan
$2000-$2499			United Arab Emirates	Austria Finland Iceland Netherlands United Kingdom	Czechoslo-vakia East Germany	
$2500-$2999				Belgium Luxembourg Norway West Germany		Australia New Zealand

$3000-$3499	Libya	Denmark France Switzerland	
$3500-$3999	Kuwait		Canada
$4000-$4999		Sweden	
Over $5000			United States

SOURCE: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, "World Bank Atlas," Washington, D.C., 1972.

[1]Includes the European settler states and Japan.

[2]Known as Cambodia prior to 1970.

[3]Known as Ceylon prior to 1971.

[4]Known as South Yemen prior to 1969.

[5]Classified as a developing nation for the purposes of this study.

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world "average" was exceeded by every European nation except for five Southern European or Balkan states, and by all of the European settler states and Japan (except for South Africa whose per capita statistics are misleading because of the large impoverished black majority). Most of these nations had GNPs that were over twice the world average. Conversely, almost all other nations were well below the $880 mark, with Argentina, four lightly populated Arab oil states, Singapore,[33] and Cyprus[34] providing the only exceptions.

Examination of additional development data reveals, in each case, a strikingly similar pattern. The first three tables in the Appendix show the comparative national rankings in terms of per capita energy consumption, and the number of motor vehicles and telephones per thousand inhabitants. As in the case of per capita gross national product, the gap between Europe, the European settler states, Japan, and the rest of the world is pronounced.

To more fully appreciate the discrepancy between the developed and the developing nations, we have calculated a "development index average." By assigning the value of 100

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[33]Singapore enjoys a relatively high per capita income because of its completely urban character. Even in the poorest of nations, cities have higher per capita income than rural areas whose economies are far more primitive (Ward and Dubos, Only One Earth, p. 147).

[34]Cyprus, a nation with a European (Greek) majority, has chosen to caucus with the Asian group at the United Nations and is classified as an Asian state by United Nations agencies (interview with Irene Tsou).

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to the world per capita averages for GNP (table 1.3), per capita energy consumption, motor vehicles per thousand inhabitants and telephones per thousand inhabitants (tables 1, 2, and 3 in the Appendix) it is possible to calculate each nation's per capita figure as it relates to the world average. (These figures appear in table 4 in the Appendix.) Each resulting national total can then be divided by four to produce the overall average for all four of our development indices.

The figures produced by this method are shown, in national rank order, in table 1.4. The United States leads the list with a 555, over five and a half times the world per capita for the four development indices in question. At the other extreme are Burundi and Rwanda, each of which utilizes or produces less than one fiftieth of the world average.

Table 1.4 demonstrates that thirty of the thirty-five nations that ranked above the world average were in the "Europe, European settler states, and Japan" category. The five exceptions were all lightly populated oil states: four in the Persian Gulf area and the Latin American island republic of Trinidad and Tobago. Furthermore, most of the Western European nations and European settler states enjoyed twice or three times the world average.

On the other hand, only five European nations (Portugal and four Balkan states) fell below the world average. Of these five states, even the nation with the lowest

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TABLE 1.4

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INDEX AVERAGES, 1970

Rank	Latin America	Africa	Asia and Oceania	Europe and Others (Developed)
1				United States 555
2				Canada 443
3				Sweden 421
4				Australia 338
5				Denmark 329
				New Zealand 329
7				Switzerland 324
8			Kuwait 319	
9				Luxembourg 312*
10				Norway 280
11				Belgium 273
12				United Kingdom 270
				West Germany 270
14				Iceland 268
15				France 260
16				Netherlands 259
17				Finland 230
18				East Germany 205
19				Japan 204
20				Czechoslovakia 200
21				Austria 197
22				Italy 180
23			Bahrain 172	
24				USSR 164*
25				Israel 150
26				Ireland 144
27			Qatar 143*	
28				Hungary 122*

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29 Trinidad and Tobago 120
31
32
33
34
35
36
37 Argentina 96
38
39 Venezuela 90
40
41 Uruguay 88
42 Libya 82
43
44 Barbados 79
45
46 Panama 64
47
48
49 Jamaica 55
50 Chile 54
51
52
53 Mexico 50
54 Cuba 41
55 Costa Rica 38 Gabon 38
Guyana 38
59
60
61 Brazil 31
Peru 31
64 Colombia 29
66
67 Zambia 26

Bulgaria 120*

United Arab Emirates 118*

Poland 117
Malta 111
Spain 107
South Africa 104
Romania 97*

Cyprus 94

Greece 89

Singapore 80

Portugal 65

Lebanon 58

Yugoslavia 56

Mongolia 52***

Albania 51**

North Korea 38***

Fiji 33
Taiwan 32
Saudi Arabia 31

Iran 29
Malaysia 27

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TABLE 1.4--Continued

Rank	Latin America	Africa	Asia and Oceania	Europe and Others (Developed)
68	Guatemala 25			
69			South Korea 24	
70	Nicaragua 23	Algeria 23	China 23**	
			Iraq 23	
74			Syria 22	
75		Mauritius 21	Oman 21**	
			Turkey 21	
78	Dominican Republic 20			
79		Congo 19*		
		Ivory Coast 19		
		Tunisia 19		
82	Ecuador 18	Swaziland 18*		
84	El Salvador 17	Liberia 17	Jordan 17	
87		Equatorial Guinea 16**		
		Morocco 16		
89	Honduras 15		Philippines 15	
	Paraguay 15			
92		Egypt 14	Yemen, PDR 14	
		Ghana 14		
		Senegal 14		
96	Bolivia 12		South Vietnam 12	
			Thailand 12	
99			Maldives 11***	
			North Vietnam 11***	
101		Kenya 10	Sri Lanka 10*	
		Sierra Leone 10		
104		Botswana 9		
		Cameroon 9		

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		Madagascar 9	
		Mauritania 9*	
108		Gambia 8	Bhutan 8***
			India 8
			Khmer 8
112		Central African Republic 7	
		Guinea 7	
		Sudan 7	
		Togo 7	
		Uganda 7	
117		Dahomey 6	Laos 6
		Lesotho 6*	
		Tanzania 6	
121		Nigeria 5	Indonesia 5
		Somalia 5	Pakistan 5
		Zaire 5	
126	Haiti 4	Ethiopia 4	Burma 4
		Malawi 4	
		Niger 4	
131		Chad 3	Afghanistan 3
		Mali 3	Nepal 3
		Upper Volta 3	Yemen 3
137		Burundi 2	
		Rwanda 2	

*Data reported for only three indices.

**Data reported for only two indices.

***Data only reported for GNP.

average (Albania) ranked higher than forty of the forty-one African nations, above most of the Asian states, and above over half of the Latin American nations.

This point is further illustrated by table 1.5 which examines how nations ranked on each of the four indices in relation to the particular world average in each case. Twenty-one nations--fifteen in Western Europe, four European settler states, Japan, and Kuwait--ranked above the world per capita average on all four indices. Ninety-four nations, only three of which were European (Albania, Portugal, and Yugoslavia), ranked below the world per capita average for all four indices.[35] Only twenty-three states fell between these extremes. Eight of these states, however, were only above the world average on one index and five others were states for which full data was lacking for several indices.

Examination of tables 1.4 and 1.5 raises several questions: Should all European states be labeled as "developed" when several of them (such as Albania, Portugal and Yugoslavia) rank not only below the world average, but below a number of Latin American nations as well? Should the oil states be considered developing nations when

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[35]A similar pattern emerges when nontechnical data are examined. See, for example, tables 5 and 6 in the Appendix which report national average life expectancy and illiteracy rate statistics. Once again, the European nations, European settler states, and Japan were well above the world average while the rest of the world was, with a handful of Latin American exceptions, well below this level.

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TABLE 1.5

NATIONAL RANK VIS-À-VIS THE WORLD PER CAPITA AVERAGE FOR FOUR SELECTED DEVELOPMENT INDICES*

	Latin America	Africa	
Above world average for all four indices			
Above world average for three indices			
Above world average for two indices	Venezuela		
Above world average for one index	Argentina Barbados Trinidad and Tobago Uruguay	Libya	
Not above world average for any index	Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Cuba Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Guyana Haiti Honduras Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru	Algeria Botswana** Burundi Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Congo** Dahomey Egypt Equatorial Guinea** Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea Ivory Coast Kenya Lesotho** Liberia	Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania** Mauritius Morocco Niger Nigeria Rwanda Senegal Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Swaziland** Tanzania Togo Tunisia Uganda** Upper Volta Zaire Zambia

*Per capita GNP; per capita electrical energy use; telephones per capita and motor vehicles per capita.

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TABLE 1.5--Continued

Asia and Oceania	Europe and Others (Developed)
Kuwait	Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, West Germany
Qatar**	Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Israel
Cyprus, United Arab Emirates**	Greece, Hungary**, Malta, Poland, Romania**, South Africa, Spain, USSR**
Bahrain, Singapore	Bulgaria**
Afghanistan, Bhutan**, Burma, China**, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Khmer, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives**, Mongolia**, Nepal, North Korea**, North Vietnam**, Oman**, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, South Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Yemen, Yemen, PDR	Albania**, Portugal, Yugoslavia

**Data are not available in all four categories for these nations.

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several of them ranked above the world average and above the rankings of several European nations and European settler states? Furthermore, how can these oil states and such nations as Argentina, Cyprus, Uruguay, and Singapore, which ranked relatively high on both tables, be lumped together with far poorer nations in one "developing nation" category?

To answer these question, it should be noted that the labels "developed nation" and "developing nation" do not merely reflect measurable technological accomplishment but are political terms as well. To some degree, the terms reflect a nation's perception of itself and of its alignment in a world of have and have-not nations.

In 1964, at the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, seventy-seven nations issued a "Joint Declaration of Developing Nations." This "Group of 77," which had grown to ninety-eight members by the end of 1972, provides us with a self-defined list of developing nations (see table 1.6). All of the Latin American states belonged to the Group of 77 by 1972 as did all of the African states (except for South Africa), and the Asian states with the exceptions of Israel, Japan, four Communist states,[36] Taiwan, and Turkey. The latter was in an anomalous situation as it was partially located in Europe and

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[36]Most Communist states have refused, for reasons that will be discussed later in this study, to identify with the Group of 77.

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TABLE 1.6

THE MEMBERS OF THE GROUP OF 77, DECEMBER 1972

Latin America	Africa		Asia and Oceania		Others (Developing)
Argentina	Algeria	Madagascar	Afghanistan	Oman	Yugoslavia
Barbados	Botswana	Malawi	Bahrain	Pakistan	
Bolivia	Burundi	Mali	Bhutan	Philippines	
Brazil	Cameroon	Mauritania	Burma	Qatar	
Chile	Central African Republic	Mauritius	Cyprus	Saudi Arabia	
Colombia		Morocco	Fiji	Singapore	
Costa Rica		Niger	India	South Korea*	
Cuba	Chad	Nigeria	Indonesia	South Vietnam*	
Dominican Republic	Congo	Rwanda	Iran	Sri Lanka	
Ecuador	Dahomey	Senegal	Iraq	Syria	
El Salvador	Egypt	Sierra Leone	Jordan	Thailand	
Guatemala	Equatorial Guinea	Somalia	Khmer	United Arab Emirates	
Guyana	Ethiopia	Sudan	Kuwait	Yemen	
Haiti	Gabon	Swaziland	Laos	Yemen, PDR	
Honduras	Gambia	Tanzania	Lebanon		
Jamaica	Ghana	Togo	Malaysia		
Mexico	Guinea	Tunisia	Maldives		
Nicaragua	Ivory Coast	Uganda	Nepal		
Panama	Kenya	Upper Volta			
Paraguay	Lesotho	Zaire			
Peru	Liberia	Zambia			
Trinidad and Tobago	Libya				
Uruguay					
Venezuela					

*Not a member of the United Nations.

was closely tied economically and politically to the Western European nations.[37] Similarly, such poor Southern European nations as Portugal did not belong to the Group of 77, because their economic and political ties were with the rest of Europe. Albania and Yugoslavia, which had long avoided overt identification with either European political bloc, were the only European nations which regularly identified themselves as developing nations.[38] Albania, however, does not belong to the Group of 77,[39] leaving charter member Yugoslavia as the Group's only European member at the end of 1972 (see table 1.7).[40]

Accordingly, we will define as "developed nations" the six European settler states, Japan, and all of Europe except for Yugoslavia and Albania. The "developing nation" label will be assigned to all of the nations belonging to the Group of 77 and to Albania, China, Mongolia, and Turkey in consideration of their rank on our development indices

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[37]The ambiguity of the Turkish position is underscored by the fact that Turkey attends the meetings of both the Asian and Western European United Nations caucus groups (James Barros, The United Nations: Past, Present and Future [New York: The Free Press, 1972], p. 87). The United Nations has, however, formally classified Turkey as a developing nation (interview with Irene Tsou).

[38]Interview with Irene Tsou.

[39]Albania's failure to join the Group of 77 is apparently linked to that nation's aversion towards joining any caucus group or alliance (ibid.).

[40]It should be noted, however, that since the conclusion of the period covered in this study two additional European nations, Malta (in 1973) and Romania (in 1974), have joined the Group of 77.

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TABLE 1.7

NATIONS NOT MEMBERS OF THE GROUP OF 77, DECEMBER 1972

Asia and Oceania	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Others (Developed)
China**	Austria	Albania**	Australia
Mongolia**	Belgium	Bulgaria	Canada
North Korea*,**	Denmark	Byelorussia	Israel
North Vietnam*,**	Finland	Czechoslovakia	Japan
Taiwan*,**	France	East Germany*	New Zealand
Turkey**	Greece	Hungary	South Africa
	Iceland	Poland	United States
	Ireland	Romania	
	Italy	Ukraine	
	Luxembourg	USSR	
	Malta		
	Netherlands		
	Norway		
	Portugal		
	Spain		
	Sweden		
	Switzerland*		
	United Kingdom		
	West Germany*		

*Not a member of the United Nations.

**Classified as a developing nation although not a member of the Group of 77.

and their classification as developing nations by United Nations agencies.[41]

The New Bipolarity and the Stockholm Conference

In the years following the Second World War, the Cold War was the dominant reality of international political life. Analysts spoke of a bipolar world--one divided into "East" and "West" groups of Communist and anti-Communist nations. Cold War considerations colored virtually every issue, affecting, and indeed often dominating, even nominally unrelated questions. However, the ascendency of growing numbers of new nations to United Nations membership has helped create a second primary international cleavage along the North-South axis.

In recent years, the growth of detente between the Communist and Western nations and the general fragmentation of both the Communist and Western groups have lessened the primacy of the East-West cleavage. At the same time, the increased militancy of the newly independent nations, especially at the United Nations, has helped deepen the North-South cleavage in the international community. This has helped to create a significant new set of political alignments. On certain issues, one may even speak again of a bipolar world divided between the developed nations of the North and the developing nations of the South.

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[41]See, for example, United Nations, Office of Public Information, United Nations Statistical Abstract for 1970 (New York: United Nations, 1971), p. 38.

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Even the term "nonaligned nation," which was originally coined to describe a position of neutrality in the Cold War, has become a virtual synonym for "developing nation." Thus, even pro-Soviet Cuba and as staunch an American ally as the Philippines are members of the Conference of Nonaligned Nations, while such neutral developed nations as Finland and Sweden must be content with observer status at Conference gatherings.[42]

The Southern coalition first appeared at the United Nations on questions of apartheid and colonialism. The reality of their common relative poverty soon made economic development another issue on which the Southern nations acted and voted together.[43] Since the South has enjoyed a numerical majority in the United Nations General Assembly since 1960, issues relating to apartheid, colonialism and economic development have become the Assembly's leading concerns.[44] The 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which was convened over the objections of the developed nations, represented the formalization of the Southern bloc in the creation of the already

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[42] New York Times, 3 September 1973, p. 7. At one such recent Conference the chairman described the assembled nations as the "poor peoples of the world," with "nonaligned" retaining not a trace of its old East-West meaning (ibid., 4 September 1973, p. 4).

[43] See chapter VI for a much more detailed discussion of the development of the Southern group.

[44] David Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 142.

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discussed Group of 77. The subsequent decision to institutionalize UNCTAD as a permanent United Nations body, is a further indication of the South's tenacity on development issues.

The developing nations, to be sure, are not a cohesive bloc on every issue in the sense that the Soviet bloc is. On East-West issues and even on such social issues as population control, the various developing nations often take sharply divergent positions. When, however, an issue is perceived as being related, even tangentially, to the questions of apartheid, colonialism, or development, the Southern bloc coalesces.[45]

This new international political reality had a profound effect on the human environment issue at the United Nations. The preparatory work for the Stockholm Conference may well be seen by future historians as a watershed event, containing as it did what may prove to be one of the United Nations last great East-West confrontations (over the question of East German participation at Stockholm), and one of its first great North-South confrontations (over the question of environmental priorities).

It was in the developed world of the North that ecology and the protection of the human environment first became significant issues. The developed nations called for the Stockholm Conference and dominated the early

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[45]Jack E. Vincent, "Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly," The American Political Science Review 65 (June 1971):474.

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planning for the Conference as they had dominated most previous United Nations efforts in the human environment field.[46]

The developing nations at first tended to ignore the growing attention being paid to questions of ecology and pollution as being particular problems of the affluent nations that were not of immediate concern to them. If anything, they were aspiring to the very level of development that was creating so many of the environmental problems in the developed world.[47]

For these developing nations, the fundamental environmental question remained the basic human dilemma of surviving in an often hostile environment. It was only when the developing nations began to perceive the proposed Environment Conference as a potential threat to their own development that they became interested in the Conference and attempted, as will be chronicled in the coming chapters, to reshape it in the image of their own priorities.

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[46]Between 1963 and 1965, for example, the United Nations affiliated World Health Organization convened five "scientific groups" in Geneva to discuss problems of air, soil, and water pollution. Analysis of the list of participants in these meetings reveals that only two of the fifty-two participants came from developing nations (United Nations Document E/4457/Add. 1, Appendix I, pp. i-vii).

[47]See, for example, de Almeida, "The Confrontation Between Problems of Development and Environment," p. 52.

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CHAPTER II

THE CALL TO STOCKHOLM, 1968-1969

The four and a half years of planning and preparation that preceded the Stockholm Conference may be divided, for our purposes, into two time periods:

1. The two years leading up to the creation of the Conference Preparatory Committee in December 1969

2. The two and a half years of deliberations between the creation of that Committee and the convening of the Human Environment Conference in June 1972

During the earlier period, the planning for the Conference centered around general themes as the specific issues that would later generate political cleavages were still not clearly defined. Throughout this period the Environment Conference proposal enjoyed a high level of international support. This "first flush of ecological ecumenism"[1] contributed to the near-unanimous support for every 1968-69 United Nations resolution dealing with the Conference.

During the latter two and a half years, as the emphasis of Conference preparatory work turned to specific

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[1] Anthony Wolff, "Cloudy Atmosphere Over Stockholm," World, 4 July 1972, p. 44.

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details, this earlier international consensus was strained by disputes over questions of participation, direction, and priorities. To understand these disputes and the political alignments they created, we must first examine the earlier period of apparent agreement, when many aspects of the later disagreements first appeared.

The Issues

The issues that developed during the preparatory work for the Human Environment Conference may be divided into three general categories:

Technical questions

When the original proposal was first under consideration, a number of nations, primarily in Western Europe, questioned the necessity of convening a Human Environment Conference. Their doubts centered around the expense and scope of the proposed Conference. Even after the proposal was accepted in principle by the United Nations, some of these nations continued to raise objections.

East-West questions

Members of both the Western group and the Soviet bloc supported the initial Conference proposal. During the preparatory process, however, a dispute developed concerning the participation of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) in the Conference. This issue became the dominant East-West question of the preparatory period.

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North-South questions

The initial planning for the Conference reflected the growing concern for environmental issues among the developed nations. The developing nations tended, at first, to ignore these issues and gave only perfunctory support to the Conference proposal. The initial preparatory input was accordingly overwhelmingly Northern in scope and emphasis. When the developing nations' aspirations were reflected in these early deliberations, it was usually in a description of the advantages they would gain by learning from the developed nations' environmental mistakes.

The Chronology of Events

On 13 December 1967 the United Nations General Assembly was discussing an October 1967 report of its Scientific Advisory Committee dealing with a proposal for a fourth United Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. This report mentioned that other topics of wide concern, such as environmental protection, might well lend themselves to consideration by similar international conferences.[2] During this General Assembly debate the Swedish Ambassador to the United Nations, Sverker Aström, noted the report's suggestion and called on the United Nations to examine the advisability of convening such a conference

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[2]United Nations Document A/6886, 2 November 1967, Annex I, p. 1.

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devoted to the human environment question.[3]

The Swedish suggestion became a formal proposal on 20 May 1968, when Ambassador Aström conveyed to Secretary-General U Thant his government's request that "the question of convening an international conference on the problems of human environment" be placed on the agenda of the July meeting of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in Geneva.[4] In a memorandum accompanying his letter, Ambassador Aström defined the "problems of human environment" as

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[3]Aström (Sweden), United Nations Document A/PV. 1629, 13 December 1967, p. 72.

[4]United Nations Document E/4466/Add. 1, 22 May 1968. The Charter of the United Nations envisioned the Economic and Social Council as a "principal organ" of the United Nations, involved with "international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters" (Article 62.1) with the power to convene "international conferences on matters falling within its competence" (Article 62.4). At the same time, the General Assembly was mandated to "initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of . . . promoting international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields" (Article 13.1). In light of this dual mandate, proposals such as the Swedish call for a Human Environment Conference have traditionally been sent to both bodies with the General Assembly usually acting upon the Council's recommendations (David Coyle, The United Nations [New York: Columbia University Press, 1962], p. 154). In addition, the General Assembly, as in the case of most parliamentary bodies, had a series of standing and special committees which were able to devote far more time and attention to any given issue than was available to the overall plenary. The fact that membership on standing committees was open to all General Assembly members helped insure that the Assembly would, in virtually every case, accept these committees' recommendations. Almost all of the General Assembly's committee deliberations concerning the Environment Conference took place in the Second Committee--a standing committee responsible for economic and financial matters. The Conference question was also discussed in the Third and Fifth Committees--the former responsible for social, humanitarian, and cultural matters, and the latter for budgetary affairs.

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those created by changes wrought by man on his natural environment, as well as those reflecting the impact of these changes on man himself. The first category included air and water pollution, waste disposal, the use of biocides, and soil erosion. The second, and more loosely defined category, included the "physical and psychological" impact of changes in the natural environment on human health, working, and living conditions.[5]

The Environment Conference proposal won widespread support at the July ECOSOC meeting, as reflected in the unanimous vote for a resolution submitted by Sweden and six other nations.[6] This resolution requested that the Secretary-General prepare a report for the fall General Assembly session outlining suggestions and recommendations concerning the human environment question in general, and the convening of the proposed Conference in particular.[7]

On 3 December 1968 the General Assembly devoted its morning and afternoon sessions to the discussion, and acceptance without objection, of a Conference mandating

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[5]United Nations Document E/4466/Add. 1, 22 May 1968, p. 3.

[6]United Nations ECOSOC Resolution 1346 (XLV), 31 July 1968. Sponsored by Argentina, Kuwait, Mexico, Morocco, Sweden, Turkey, and the United States.

[7]The Secretary-General's report was circulated as United Nations Document A/7291, 6 November 1968.

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resolution introduced by Sweden and fifty-one cosponsors.[8] Most of the participants in these deliberations dwelt on the dangers created by incessant human demands on the biosphere and the necessity to draw up plans for worldwide efforts to combat these dangers.

As United States Ambassador James Wiggins declared:

> For the first time, we are brought face to face with the stark facts that space upon this planet is finite, that the resources of this planet are exhaustible and not easily renewed. . . . We have not much time left in which to learn to proportion our population to available resources, and to become good enough trustees of our inherited wealth of air, water, earth, and forms of life so that our posterity may hope to survive in a condition better than bestial struggle.[9]

On 17 February 1969, Ambassador Aström formally notified Secretary-General U Thant of the Swedish government's offer to host the Environment Conference in Stockholm.[10] Several months later the Secretary-General released a detailed report examining the direction and emphasis that the proposed Conference might take.[11] This report, which was

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[8]United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2398 (XXIII), 3 December 1968. Sponsored by Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Denmark, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Guatemala, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Libya, Madagascar, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, and Zambia.

[9]Wiggins (United States), United Nations Document A/PV. 1733, 3 December 1968, p. 11.

[10]United Nations Document A/7514, 18 February 1969.

[11]United Nations Document E/4667, 26 May 1969.

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largely based on the work of the ECOSOC Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development,[12] became the cornerstone of United Nations Environment Conference-related discussions for the remainder of 1969.

A number of the Secretary-General's major recommendations were included in the Norwegian resolution that was adopted by the August 1969 ECOSOC meeting.[13] These included calling on the General Assembly to create a Conference Secretariat to be headed by a Conference Secretary-General and to appoint a Preparatory Committee to oversee the planning for the Conference.[14] The political issues that were to dominate the Conference preparatory period began to come into focus at this ECOSOC meeting, as both the developing nations' role at Stockholm and the question of East German participation were discussed.

At the fall 1969 General Assembly session, Sweden introduced a draft resolution, eventually cosponsored by fifty-six other nations, which incorporated the major points of that summer's ECOSOC resolution while avoiding

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[12]United Nations Document E/AC. 52/65, 1 May 1969.

[13]United Nations ECOSOC Resolution 1448 (XLVII), 6 August 1969.

[14]The Norwegian resolution also established June 1972 as the month in which the Human Environment Conference would be held. This had not been specified in any previous Conference-related resolution.

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the increasingly controversial East German question.[15] The General Assembly's Second Committee devoted five meetings to discussing the Swedish resolution and approved it by acclamation on 17 November.[16] It also agreed that representatives of twenty-seven nations would serve on the proposed Conference Preparatory Committee and that representation would, in accordance with prevailing custom, be by nomination of the various United Nations geographic membership groups.[17]

The General Assembly's plenary consideration of the

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[15]United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2581 (XXIV), 15 December 1969. Sponsored by Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Cameroon, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Congo (Brazzaville), Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sweden, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia, and Zaire.

[16]The Second Committee's report appears in United Nations Document A/7866, 13 December 1969. The Swedish resolution was also endorsed by the General Assembly's Third Committee (for social, humanitarian, and cultural affairs) and Fifth Committee (for budgetary affairs--which endorsed a $170,000 budget for the Preparatory Committee's 1970 work). The Third Committee's report is in United Nations Document A/C. 3/SR. 1720, 3 December 1969, and the Fourth Committee's report is in United Nations Document A/7784, 21 November 1969.

[17]On 12 December 1969 the Second Committee approved the nominees submitted by the geographic membership groups and instructed that they be listed in the previously approved Swedish draft resolution which the General Assembly was about to consider (United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1307, 24 December 1969, p. 2). The nations that were selected to serve on the Preparatory Committee are listed in table 2.3 below.

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Second Committee's report on 15 December was brief and uneventful. Only seven nations took part in the discussion and the Swedish resolution was accepted without objection. From the tone of the Second Committee's deliberations, as well as that of the General Assembly debate, the Human Environment Conference was not a controversial issue.

The Actors

United Nations issues can be divided into hardware (military and security questions) and software (human rights, development, and other socioeconomic questions) categories. Since the creation of the United Nations the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, have dominated deliberations dealing with hardware issues. In recent years, the developing nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America have increasingly taken the initiative on software issues.[18]

The numerical supremacy that the developing nations have enjoyed in the General Assembly since 1960 has helped assure software issues a priority on recent United Nations agendas. This new priority status is in marked contrast to the secondary consideration which these issues had been accorded during the earlier years of Northern dominance in the General Assembly.[19]

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[18] Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967, p. 142.

[19] Ibid.

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The Human Environment Conference was an exception to this pattern. Although the Conference proposal was unquestionably a software issue, the developing nations provided minimal input during the first two years of Conference preparations. At the same time, the superpowers also played a muted role in these initial deliberations. The United States, it has been argued, fully supported the Swedish proposal, but adopted a low profile in order to avoid inviting partisan Soviet attacks and the consequent politicization of the human environment issue.[20] As for the Soviet delegation, its initial interventions were limited to cursory support for the Conference proposal and occasional declarations of the pollution-fighting advantages of a centrally planned socialist system.[21] Not only did the American delegates fail to take exception to these remarks, but they appear to have taken a certain pride in pointing out how much more advanced the pollution problem was in the United States than anywhere else.[22] As one observer noted, the American attitude towards the Stockholm Conference "was as a therapeutic exercise in which the United States would own up to its environmental sins--in chorus with the rest of the industrialized countries--and

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[20]Interview with Don Lofton, United States Mission to the United Nations, 12 June 1973.

[21]See, for example, Mendelevich (USSR), United Nations Document A/PV. 1733, 3 December 1968, p. 76.

[22]See, for example, Wiggins (United States), ibid., pp. 12-13. See also footnote 56 below.

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make token tenders of good behavior in the future."[23]

The dominant impetus behind the early planning for the Human Environment Conference came from the Swedish delegation, and particularly from its chairman, Sverker Aström.

Sweden proposed the Human Environment Conference and drafted the 1968 ECOSOC resolution as well as both the 1968 and 1969 General Assembly Conference-related resolutions.[24] Ambassador Aström had a deep personal commitment to the ecology cause and considered the human environment question to be an overriding international priority. His zeal, the general popularity of the issue among the developed nations, and Sweden's political position as a Cold War neutral and ardent supporter of United Nations development projects, have all been credited with helping to win support for the proposal.[25]

Analysis of national participation in the 1968-69 ECOSOC and General Assembly Environment Conference-related deliberations provides an indication of the level of

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[23]Wolff, "Cloudy Atmosphere Over Stockholm," p. 44.

[24]In addition, Sweden drafted the 1969 ECOSOC resolution which Norway formally presented because Sweden was not an ECOSOC member that year (United Nations Document E/SR. 1629, 4 August 1969, p. 191).

[25]Interview with Patricia Rambach, The Sierra Club, New York, 14 August 1973. Aström's crucial role was also attested to by a number of delegations during the United Nations debates on the Conference proposal. See, for example, Caradon (United Kingdom) and Michelet (France), United Nations Document A/PV. 1733, 3 December 1968, pp. 31-32, 88-90.

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national interest in the Conference question. Table 2.1 records the participation in the 1968-69 ECOSOC debates of the twenty-seven nations that belonged to the Council in each of these years. Sweden, the prime mover behind the Conference proposal, had the most interventions at the 1968 session. Of the five other nations with three or more interventions during that year, four of them (Belgium, Congo [Brazzaville], France, and the United Kingdom) were expressing doubts about the Conference. Most of the other speakers briefly and perfunctorily endorsed the Conference proposal. The largest number of interventions (twenty-four of sixty-four) were made by Western European nations, while African Council members intervened significantly fewer times than any other group (six). Overall, over half of the interventions in the 1968 debate and almost two-thirds in the 1969 debate were by developed nations, although they represented only a third of the Council's membership.

ECOSOC deliberations may, however, be a poor indicator of national interest in the Environment Conference issue. The Council has a limited membership whose immediate task is to discuss the proposal before them. Many nations may have felt a responsibility to make at least a perfunctory comment about the proposed Conference while not feeling strongly about the proposal. Furthermore, verbatim records are not kept for ECOSOC sessions, making it more difficult to ascertain which statements were purely of a pro forma nature.

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TABLE 2.1

NATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN 1968-69 ECOSOC DEBATES DEALING WITH THE ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE
(Number of Times ECOSOC Members Spoke During Each Year's Debate)

Latin America	1968	1969	Africa	1968	1969	Asia	1968	1969
Argentina	3	1	Chad	1	0	India	1	1
Guatemala	1	0	Congo			Indonesia	*	1
Jamaica	*	1	(Brazzaville)	3	0	Iran	2	*
Mexico	1	1	Libya	1	0	Kuwait	1	0
Panama	1	*	Morocco	0	*	Pakistan	*	1
Uruguay	*	0	Sierra Leone	0	0	Philippines	2	*
Venezuela	1	*	Sudan	*	1	Turkey**	2	1
			Tanzania	0	0			
			Upper Volta	0	0			
Total	7	3	Total	5	1	Total	8	4

Western Europe	1968	1969	Eastern Europe	1968	1969	Others (Developed)	1968	1969
Belgium	3	1	Bulgaria	0	1	Japan***	2	1
France	3	3	Czechoslovakia	1	*	United States	1	2
Ireland	0	0	USSR	1	2			
Norway	*	3	Yugoslavia**	*	1			
Sweden	6	*						
United Kingdom	4	1						
Total	16	8	Total	2	4	Total	3	3

*Not an ECOSOC member during this year.

**Turkey and Yugoslavia are developing nations that were selected to ECOSOC from the Western European and Others and Eastern European groups, respectively.

***Japan, a developed nation, was selected to ECOSOC from the Asian group.

The extent of a nation's interest in an issue may be better determined by examining its participation in the deliberations of the United Nations General Assembly and its major committees. All United Nations members may take part in these debates, and the competing rush of issues limits the areas in which a nation can focus its attention.

One potentially useful indicator of a nation's priorities is the national policy statement traditionally delivered by each member during the opening General Debate in the General Assembly.[26] In 1968 only Canada and Sweden mentioned the proposed Environment Conference (by way of contrast, over ninety members mentioned apartheid).[27] Although over fifty United Nations members had cosponsored the 1968 Swedish proposal, only seven of them mentioned the proposal the next year during the 1969 General Debate.[28] Apparently, most United Nations members did not consider the Human Environment Conference to be a significant policy priority.

Table 7 in the Appendix lists the nations that participated in the 1968-69 General Assembly deliberations dealing with the Environment Conference. This list is summarized

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[26]Harold Nicholas, The United Nations as a Political Institution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 99-100.

[27]United Nations Documents A/PV. 1677-1707, 2-25 October 1968.

[28]Costa Rica, Denmark, Jamaica, Norway, Sweden, Turkey and the United States (table 7 in the Appendix).

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in table 2.2 which shows that Conference-related resolutions enjoyed broad support from every section of the globe, with 74 of the 127 United Nations members sponsoring at least one such resolution.

While a high proportion of developed nations both sponsored resolutions and spoke for them in the debates, the developing nations were far more likely to limit their involvement to the sponsorship of resolutions. Thus, in 1968, only five of the thirty-seven developing nations co-sponsoring the Swedish resolution actually participated in the General Assembly's plenary consideration of the resolution, as compared with ten of the fifteen sponsors from developed nations. The 1969 statistics are not quite as one-sided, but a similar pattern is discernible. The sponsorship of resolutions continued to be proportionally divided between developed and developing nations in a fashion that reflected the size of both groups' membership in the United Nations. At the same time, less than one-third of the developing nations took part in the debates concerning these resolutions as contrasted with the participation of over two-thirds of the developed nations.

A discussion of national participation in United Nations Environment Conference-related debates during the 1968-69 period should include an examination of the possible correlation between such participation and selection to the Conference Preparatory Committee in December of

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TABLE 2.2

NATIONS PARTICIPATING IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE-RELATED DELIBERATIONS, 1968-69
(Totals from Table 7 in the Appendix)

Nation Group	United Nations Members	Members Sponsoring	Members Speaking	Members Not Participating
Latin America	24	14	12	8
Africa	41	26	10	13
Asia	27	16	9	10
Others (developing)*	3	1	1	2
Total--developing	95	57	32	33
Western Europe	17	10	11	4
Eastern Europe	8	3	6	2
Others (developed)	7	4	5	2
Total--developed	32	17	22	8
Grand Total	127	74	54	41

*Includes Fiji, which was admitted to the United Nations in 1969. Beginning with this table whenever developed and developing nations are contrasted, the definitions arrived at in the first chapter will be utilized. Accordingly, China (Taiwan until October 1971) is listed as an Asian developing nation, and Albania, Fiji, and Yugoslavia are listed as Others (developing).

1969.[29] Table 2.3 lists the twenty-seven members of the Preparatory Committee and the aspects of the General Assembly deliberations in which they participated. In most cases the nations selected were those in their area that had participated the most in the earlier deliberations. For example, Costa Rica and Jamaica, the only Latin American nations to raise the Environment Conference issue during the General Debate, and Mauritius and Nigeria, the only African states to participate in the General Assembly plenary debates, were all selected. The only Committee member that had not participated in any of the previous Conference-related deliberations was Brazil, which is usually selected to all major United Nations committees in consideration of its status as Latin America's leading power.[30]

There were, however, a number of nations that actively participated in the earlier United Nations deliberations, but were bypassed when members were named to the Preparatory Committee. Examination of table 7 in the Appendix reveals that the following nations spoke at least

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[29]Preparatory Committee members were chosen by the five United Nations caucus groups that select members for the Security Council and other major United Nations bodies. These caucus groups are: Latin American, African, Asian, Western European and Others, and Eastern European.

[30]Brazil's position of primacy within the Latin American group is reflected in that nation having been named to six terms on the Security Council between 1945 and 1974--two more than any other nonpermanent Council member (Barros, The United Nations: Past, Present and Future, p. 35).

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TABLE 2.3

PARTICIPATION OF ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE MEMBERS IN PREVIOUS GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONFERENCE-RELATED DELIBERATIONS*

Latin America	Africa	Asia and Others (Developing)
Argentina 1,3,4,6 Brazil Costa Rica 5 Jamaica 1,4,5,6 Mexico 1,4,6	Egypt 7 Ghana 4,6 Guinea 4 Mauritius 4,9 Nigeria 1,3,4,6 Togo 4 Zambia 1,4,6	Cyprus 3,4 India 1,3,4,6,7 Iran 1,4,6,7 Singapore 1,4,6 Yugoslavia** 1,3,4
Western Europe	**Eastern Europe**	**Others (Developed)**
France 3,6,7 Italy 1,3,4,6,8 Netherlands 6,7 Sweden 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,9 United Kingdom 1,3,6,7,8	Czechoslovakia 4,6 USSR 3,6,7,8,9	Canada 1,2,3,4,6 Japan*** 4,6 United States 1,3,5,6,9

*Explanation of numbers following nations' names:

1. Cosponsored Swedish resolution, 1968
2. Mentioned Conference in General Debate, 1968
3. Participated in General Assembly plenary debate, 1968
4. Cosponsored Swedish resolution, 1969
5. Mentioned Conference in General Debate, 1969
6. Participated in Second Committee debate, 1969
7. Participated in Third Committee debate, 1969
8. Participated in Fifth Committee debate, 1969
9. Participated in General Assembly plenary debate, 1969

**Developing nation selected as an Eastern European state.

***Developed nation selected as an Asian state.

twice during the 1968-69 General Assembly preparatory deliberations but were not named to the Preparatory Committee: Australia, Austria, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Denmark, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, and Romania. In the case of the two Scandinavian nations, the naming of Sweden precluded their selection due to the principle of geographic distribution. Similarly, Austria, Australia, and China[31] were apparently excluded because the number of seats available to the "Western European and Others" group of nations was insufficient to satisfy the many members of that group that were interested in serving on the Committee.[32] In Eastern Europe, Romania's relatively independent position within the Soviet bloc may have contributed to the selection of the more loyal, and recently subjugated, Czechoslovakia.

The exclusion of the three Afro-Asian states is more difficult to explain. It should be noted, however, that the Congo and Pakistan were both ECOSOC members during 1969 and might have been passed over in order to give an opportunity to other nations that were not already on a major United Nations council or committee. Similar intragroup political considerations were doubtlessly involved in other

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[31]Taiwan had been excluded from the Asian caucus since the inception of the Afro-Asian group in 1951, and was accordingly placed (with similarly excluded Israel and South Africa) in the "Western European and Others" group (Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967, p. 25).

[32]Shaw (Australia), United Nations Document A/PV. 1834, 15 December 1969, pp. 23-25.

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aspects of the selection process for the Preparatory Committee. It might accordingly be a mistake to place undue emphasis on the apparent correlation between participation in the earlier Conference-related debates and selection to the Preparatory Committee.

The Politics of the Technical Questions

At the July 1968 ECOSOC session Sweden introduced a draft resolution calling on the General Assembly to consider convening a Human Environment Conference, and on the Secretary-General to prepare a report concerning the possible time, place, agenda, and cost of such a Conference.[33] At the first meeting discussing this resolution the French delegate noted that the already functioning United Nations Scientific Advisory Committee would be able to serve the same purpose as the proposed Conference.[34] Similar objections to the proposal were raised by the British delegate:

> Many, if not most of the various aspects of the general problem were already being studied by the specialist bodies, and his delegation was not convinced that joint consideration of the findings would justify the time, effort, and money that would be entailed for the United Nations and Member Governments.[35]

Belgium and Japan seconded the British and French reserva-

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[33]United Nations Document E/L. 1226, 26 July 1968.

[34]Laugier (France), United Nations Document E/SR. 1547, 19 July 1968, pp. 104-105. As was noted previously, verbatim records were not kept of ECOSOC meetings. This and all other quotes from ECOSOC deliberations are from official summary records.

[35]Allen (United Kingdom), ibid., p. 106.

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tions expressing the concern that the Conference might merely duplicate existing work while spending monies sorely needed for other United Nations projects.[36]

These objections were ignored by the other participants in the debate, who spoke of the need for the Conference and the contributions it would make to the international community. Undaunted by the Swedish proposal's broad support, Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom declared that they could not vote for the original resolution, as it prejudged the General Assembly's deliberations by calling for the convening of an Environment Conference. These three nations accordingly submitted a series of amendments to the Swedish resolution instructing the General Assembly to consider the Conference proposal as only one possible approach to the human environment question.[37]

The Swedes and their cosponsors responded to these amendments by revising the original resolution to emphasize the need for detailed Conference preparatory work, and to stress that the Conference was only one nonexclusive response to the environment question.[38] Satisifed that their major objections had been met, the Western Europeans withdrew their amendments, and they and Japan supported the

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[36]Forthomme (Belgium) and Yokota (Japan), ibid., p. 107.

[37]United Nations Document E/L. 1227, 25 July 1968.

[38]United Nations Document E/L. 1226/Rev. 1, 29 July 1968.

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revised resolution which passed unanimously.

Significantly enough, three of the four Western European nations (Sweden being the fourth) that participated in the ECOSOC deliberations raised objections to the Conference proposal. No non-European nation, except for highly developed Japan, expressed similar doubts. The objections of the Western European nations and Japan to the Conference may well have been motivated by the relatively large share that these nations contributed to the United Nations budget. The poorer nations may have seen little that they could gain from the Conference, but their share of United Nations expenses was so minute that they may not have been concerned about the proposal's cost. On the other hand, all four objecting nations' criticisms of the Conference proposal stressed the expenses that the Conference would create and the cheaper alternatives that were available. That budgetary considerations were a decisive factor in these nations' objections was further suggested by their willingness to support the Swedish resolution once it had been amended to allow the General Assembly to consider the less expensive alternatives to the Conference as well.

At the 1968 General Assembly session, the doubts that had been expressed at the ECOSOC session were largely forgotten, as seventeen of the eighteen participants in the plenary debate considering the Swedish resolution praised the proposal. Even the United Kingdom, which had ques-

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tioned the need for an Environment Conference during the ECOSOC session, now joined in supporting the Swedish initiative.[39]

Only the French continued to object to the Conference proposal, noting that the revised ECOSOC resolution had provided for the consideration of an Environment Conference as but one possible response to the international environmental question. The French delegate admitted, however, that the examination of alternatives to the Conference proposal did not reflect the "wish of the majority of the Assembly." France would accordingly "silence for the moment the procedural objection that it raised in the past" and reluctantly support the Swedish resolution.[40] With even the French reconciled to the resolution, it was accepted without objection. After the acceptance of the resolution, technical objections to the Conference proposal were largely limited to questions of finances and minor mechanical details.

The Secretary-General's May 1969 report presented a detailed plan for a two week "action oriented" Conference geared to generating both international publicity

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[39]Caradon (United Kingdom), United Nations Document A/PV. 1733, 3 December 1968, p. 31.

[40]Michelet (France), ibid., pp. 87-90. The French further reserved the right to closely scrutinize any specific forthcoming Conference-related proposals in an effort to limit the Conference's scope, size, and cost (p. 90).

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and policy recommendations.[41] The Conference would consider reports from eight commissions, four dealing with particular environmental problems, and four dealing with overall questions of environmental public planning, legislation, and governmental policy.[42]

At the summer 1969 ECOSOC meeting the Norwegian Conference-related resolution reflected the suggestions contained in the Secretary-General's report.[43] While most Council members endorsed this resolution, the French delegate declared that the two sets of commissions would invite duplication and waste, that the documentation plans were far too costly, and that the proposed Conference framework was overly cumbersome.[44] After the United Kingdom, a co-sponsor of the Norwegian resolution, agreed that additional

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[41] United Nations Document E/4667, 26 May 1969. See also p. 56 above.

[42] United Nations Document E/4667, 26 May 1969, pp. 38-39. The report also included a detailed Conference budget of almost two million dollars of which the largest portions went to background documentation for the Conference ($862,000), the proposed Conference Secretariat ($361,000), and fees for expert consultants ($240,000).

[43] The Norwegian resolution differed from the Secretary-General's proposal in only one major aspect. While the latter had suggested that Preparatory Committee members be environmental experts selected by the Secretary-General, the resolution called for their selection as national representatives. Each nation selected to serve on the Preparatory Committee would accordingly appoint the members of its delegation.

[44] Gros (France), United Nations Document E/SR. 1629, 4 August 1969, p. 190.

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savings could be achieved,[45] the other cosponsors revised their draft to emphasize the need for "all efforts . . . to reduce the costs of the Conference."[46]

The French, however, remained unsatisfied with the revised resolution and introduced an amendment calling on the Secretary-General to limit the scope of the Conference "by preparing a selective agenda, by simplifying the organizational structure and by limiting documentation to a reasonable volume."[47] After Norway and the United States both dismissed the amendment as unnecessary[48] it was defeated by a vote of 7 in favor, 14 against, with 3 abstentions.[49] The overall draft resolution was then accepted with even the French, despite the defeat of their amend-

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[45]Allen (United Kingdom), ibid., p. 191. The British delegate concluded his remarks by noting that:

> ". . . The conference should be short and to the point, and should not waste money. Many paragraphs of the draft resolution, however, described elaborate arrangements for the preparatory work which might lead to an undesirable and expensive increase in the volume of documentation. Full consultation with Governments and international organizations was admittedly essential, but the Secretariat must condense and simplify the documentation which it received."

[46]United Nations Document E/L. 1275/Rev. 1, 5 August 1969.

[47]United Nations Document E/SR. 1632, 6 August 1969, p. 219.

[48]Cappelen (Norway) and McDonald (United States), ibid.

[49]As in most ECOSOC votes, a recorded roll call vote was not requested. Guatemala was the only nation to publicly support the French proposal, while Upper Volta announced its intention of abstaining (Herrarte [Guatemala] and Quedraogo [Upper Volta], ibid., p. 220).

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ment, voting for it.[50]

The language of the French amendment suggests that France's objections were motivated by considerations beyond limiting the cost of the Conference. Since 1963, when the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union accepted the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, France had been under intense international pressure to stop testing nuclear devices in the atmosphere. The continuation of these tests had become a fundamental aspect of French foreign and defense policy, and a major item of international controversy. Perhaps the French efforts to limit the scope of the Environment Conference resulted from a desire to preclude any consideration of this controversial topic. The repeated French warnings at the 1969 General Assembly session against an "over-diffused" Conference agenda would appear to lend further credence to this hypothesis.[51]

In summary, technical objections to the Environment Conference came, with few exceptions, from three Western European countries (Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom)

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[50]One immediate effect of the revised resolution was the Secretary-General's announcement that he had reduced the proposed Conference budget by over 15 percent. The ECOSOC decision to have national representatives on the Preparatory Committee had already saved $74,000 (because their nations rather than the United Nations would pay their expenses) and the Secretary-General now saved an additional $250,000 by reducing the proposed Conference documentation (United Nations Document A/7707, 21 October 1969, p. 6).

[51]Couste (France), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1278, 17 November 1969, p. 20. See also chapter IV, p. 299 below.

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and Japan, were centered on the question of expenses, and were voiced prior to acceptance of the Conference proposal by the 1968 General Assembly. These objections may have reflected concern over the added financial burden that such a Conference would represent to these nations, in light of the relatively large share they contributed to the United Nations budget.

During 1969, France was the only country continuing to question the proposed Conference's cost and direction. Even the French objections, however, had been reduced to "warnings" by the end of the year when France joined in the unanimous General Assembly vote for the Swedish resolution.[52] The French placed as much emphasis on limiting the Conference agenda as they did on the financial aspects of the proposal, which suggests that the French were interested in avoiding Conference consideration of such potentially embarrassing topics as nuclear testing.

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[52]Several additional Conference-related technical matters were also raised at the 1969 General Assembly session. These included a request by the Republic of China that all Conference documentation be translated into Chinese (Cheng [China], United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1277, 14 November 1969, p. 17) and a Turkish proposal that regional seminars be convened to discuss the human environment problem (Aksin [Turkey], United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1278, 17 November 1969, p. 5). The Chinese request was granted in 1971 after the People's Republic of China replaced Taiwan in the United Nations. The Turkish proposal, which would later become a major aspect of the 1970-71 Conference preparatory period, was not responded to by any other debate participant. (It should be noted that Argentina had made a similar proposal at the summer 1969 ECOSOC session [de Goyeneche (Argentina), United Nations Document E/SR. 1629, 4 August 1969, p. 198].)

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The Swedes and other advocates of the Conference were apparently intent on creating and maintaining a wide, if not unanimous, international consensus in support of their proposal.[53] Thus, when two of the twenty-seven ECOSOC members at the 1969 session questioned the proposed Conference budget, the sponsors amended the draft resolution in an effort to assure unanimity. Similarly, the objections of the Western European nations and Japan at the 1968 ECOSOC session were calmed by a revision of the original resolution. The consensus that was strengthened by these compromises seems to have played a major role in securing French support for the overall Conference proposals. Despite its objections at the 1968 and 1969 ECOSOC and General Assembly sessions and the defeat of its amendment at the 1969 ECOSOC meeting, France, nevertheless, voted for every Conference-related resolution. On several of these occasions the French delegate made it clear that his country's vote was being cast only out of respect for the overwhelming international consensus in support of the proposed

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[53]This desire for unanimity on Conference-related matters is reflected in several of Ambassador Aström's General Assembly and ECOSOC interventions, such as his remarks before the 1968 General Assembly:

> "We hope that, as the problems are common to all mankind, and many of them can be solved only through common action, the decision that the General Assembly will take on this subject will be unanimous and lay the foundation for further efforts at the national and international levels" (United Nations Document A/PV. 1732, 3 December 1968, pp. 2-3).

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Conference.[54]

The Politics of the East-West Questions

From its inception, the Swedish proposal for an Environment Conference was supported by nations from both sides of the Iron Curtain. Although the Soviet Union, unlike the United States, did not formally cosponsor the Swedish resolution, it strongly supported the Conference proposal during the 1968 ECOSOC and General Assembly deliberations.[55]

The Environment Conference proposal was so devoid of apparent East-West ramifications that Britain's Lord Caradon was able to declare at the 1968 General Assembly plenary session that:

> When we look back on the twenty-third session of the Assembly in future years, we may remember it not for continued stalemate between East and West and North and South, but for a new initiative [the Environment Conference] in which we came together from the four corners of the world to support an international initiative of incalculable consequence.[56]

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[54]See, for example, Michelet (France), United Nations Document A/PV. 1733, 3 December 1968, pp. 88-90.

[55]Zakharov (USSR), United Nations Document E/SR. 1548, 19 July 1968, p. 110; and Mendelevich (USSR), United Nations Document A/PV. 1733, 3 December 1968, pp. 68-70.

[56]Caradon (United Kingdom), ibid., p. 31. The only overt reminder of the Cold War during the 1968 General Assembly consideration of the Conference proposal was provided by the repeated Soviet claims concerning the superiority of their economic system in combating pollution (see, for example, Mendelevich [USSR], ibid., p. 76). While the American delegate mentioned the Soviet Union's environmental problems (Wiggins [United States], pp. 14-15), he apparently did so in an effort to demonstrate the universality of the environmental problem rather than to redress Soviet chauvinism. Only once during the entire Conference

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It was only in the closing paragraphs of the Soviet delegate's General Assembly remarks that he raised the East German issue that would later threaten to polarize the preparatory process along East-West lines:

> Also, operative paragraph 3 [which called for consultations between the Secretary-General and United Nations member states] would in no way limit the possibilities of the Secretary-General, when preparing the report on the question of human environment, to take advantage, together with other sources of information, of the most valuable information and experience acquired in this field by one of the most highly developed States in the world, the German Democratic Republic, the first socialist State of German workers and peasants in history.[57]

Prior to 1968, only United Nations member states and nations belonging to United Nations specialized agencies were invited to take part in United Nations sponsored Conferences. This "Vienna formula" (named for the city where it was first promulgated) permitted states that were not United Nations members (such as South Korea, Switzerland, and West Germany) to participate in international conferences as long as they belonged to an United Nations affiliated specialized agency, such as the International Labor Organization or the World Health Organization. Under this formula, even the European ministates of Monaco, San Marino,

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preparatory period did a Western nation respond directly to these repeated Soviet claims. This was during the 1969 Second Committee deliberations when the British delegate prefaced his remarks by noting that he had "no intention of asserting the superiority of one socioeconomic system over another" (Allen [United Kingdom], United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1278, 17 November 1969, p. 18).

[57]Mendelevich [USSR], United Nations Document A/PV. 1733, 3 December 1968, pp. 78-80.

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and Vatican City were invited to United Nations sponsored conferences since they belonged to at least one international agency. The practical effect of the Vienna formula was to further isolate the Communist regimes of China, Germany, Korea, and Vietnam, since they did not belong to any United Nations affiliate.

It is unclear if the Soviet request for the Secretary-General to consult with East Germany represented a calculated decision to challenge the overall Vienna formula. Since the Asiatic Communist states were not mentioned during these deliberations, it could be that the Soviets felt that East Germany, as a developed nation with experience in pollution control, should be considered an exception to the Vienna formula. On the other hand, for the same reasons, East Germany might have been selected as the most effective test case for discrediting this formula. Significantly enough, the Soviets had not objected at the ECOSOC session when Turkey had amended the original Swedish draft resolution to insert the Vienna formula into the resolution.[58]

Whatever the Soviet intention was in raising the Vienna formula at this time, their intervention was ignored by the other participants in the General Assembly debate, as well as by the Secretary-General who limited his initial Conference-related correspondence to members of the United

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[58]United Nations Document E/SR. 1555, 30 July 1968, p. 153.

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Nations and its specialized agencies.[59]

The East German question first surfaced as a major topic of discussion at the 1969 ECOSOC session, where the Norwegian resolution utilized the Vienna formula in no less than three of its sixteen operative paragraphs:

1. Paragraph 6, calling upon the Secretary-General to "consult with Governments of States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency," during the preparatory process

2. Paragraph 7, inviting these nations to participate in the Conference preparatory work

3. Paragraph 11, inviting the same nations to attend the Stockholm Conference[60]

At the opening ECOSOC meeting the Norwegian delegate defended the use of this formula for determining Conference participation as one "which had many precedents in United Nations history."[61] The Western nations, apparently taking the Vienna formula for granted, offered no further defense of its utilization during the ECOSOC session.

While Yugoslavia made no mention of the East German question during the ECOSOC debate, the two other Eastern

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[59]United Nations Document E/4667, 26 May 1969, p. 3.

[60]United Nations ECOSOC Resolution 1448 (XLVII), 6 August 1969.

[61]Cappelen (Norway), United Nations Document E/SR. 1629, 4 August 1969, p. 189.

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European Council members, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, both took firm exception to the resolution's inclusion of the Vienna formula. The Soviets declared that "the exclusion of any country from such an important scientific and technical conference would cause great damage to all States."[62] The Soviets also argued that since pollution extended beyond national borders, the Conference would be effective only if all nations were prepared to accept its recommendations. The Bulgarian delegate repeated the Soviet arguments and contended that East Germany, in particular, should be invited to the Conference in consideration of its expertise in the field of environmental science.[63]

The nonaligned nations ignored the entire East German question,[64] with the exception of the Sudanese delegate who argued that "conferences dealing with purely scientific, technological or administrative matters should be open to participation by all the countries of the world, irrespective of ideology or political sentiment."[65] He then called

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[62]Krylov (USSR), ibid., p. 196.

[63]Guelev (Bulgaria), United Nations Document E/SR. 1630, 5 August 1969, p. 202.

[64]The Bulgarian delegate referred on 5 August to the Indonesian and Turkish calls for world-wide participation in the Conference as indicative of their opposition to the Vienna formula (ibid.). The summary record of the Indonesian and Turkish statements does not, however, lend credence to the Bulgarian interpretation (Muter [Indonesia] and Aksin [Turkey], United Nations Document E/SR. 1629, 4 August 1969, pp. 190 and 193).

[65]Ahmed (Sudan), United Nations Document E/SR. 1630, 5 August 1969, p. 201.

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on the sponsors of the draft resolution to amend their text to allow for universal participation in the Conference and its preparatory process. After the resolution's sponsors rejected this suggestion Sudan requested separate ECOSOC votes on paragraphs 6 and 7. Paragraph 6 was accepted by a vote of 18 in favor, 2 against, with 5 abstentions, and paragraph 7 by a vote of 19 in favor, 2 against, with 4 abstentions.[66]

A Soviet amendment to delete the Vienna formula from paragraph 11 was then defeated by a vote of 14 in favor, 5 against, with 6 abstentions (Bulgaria, Sudan, the USSR, and Yugoslavia identified themselves as voting for the amendment). Paragraph 11 was then adopted by a vote of 21 in favor, 2 against (apparently Bulgaria and the Soviet Union), with 2 abstentions, and the overall resolution was accepted by a vote of 23 to 0, with Bulgaria, Sudan, and the USSR abstaining.[67] The Vienna formula had prevailed by an overwhelming margin, but at the price of allowing a Cold War issue to enter into the Environment Conference preparatory debate.

The emergence of the East German question at the 1969 ECOSOC meeting represented the first major political argu-

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[66]Once again, recorded roll calls were not requested. The only nation to explain its vote on this entire series of Vienna formula votes was Libya, which declared its intention to abstain because of the issue's "political connotations" (Jerbi [Libya], United Nations Document E/SR. 1632, 6 August 1969, p. 220).

[67]Ibid.

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ment of the Conference preparatory period. The supporters of the Conference proposal responded in an effort to calm this issue before it disrupted the consensual support that the Conference had previously enjoyed. Sweden accordingly introduced a compromise resolution at the fall General Assembly session which won broad support from such disparate sources as Czechoslovakia and Poland on one hand, and Western alliance members Australia, Canada, Italy, and Japan, on the other.[68]

The Swedish resolution's language avoided the East German question by deleting all mention of "states" from the original ECOSOC resolution. Thus, paragraph 6 was amended to have it call for the Secretary-General to continue his Conference-related consultations, without specifying with whom he was to consult. At the same time, paragraph 7 invited the specialized agencies (but not their member nations) to participate in the preparatory process, and paragraph 11, which had mandated the actual invitations to the Conference, was completely deleted from the resolution.

In effect, the new resolution handed the East German question over to the proposed Conference Preparatory Committee.[69] The Vienna formula question was accordingly not

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[68]The draft resolution was circulated as United Nations Document A/C. 2/L. 1069, 10 November 1969. See footnote 15 above for a list of the nations that eventually cosponsored this resolution.

[69]Even as the Second Committee was completing its consideration of the compromise resolution the East Germans

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a substantive issue during the subsequent 1969 General Assembly committee deliberations. Even Czechoslovakia and Poland failed to raise the East German issue in their Second Committee statements.[70] It was similarly ignored by every Western and nonaligned Second and Third Committee debate participant. Only the Soviet Union gave more than passing attention to the East German question during these committees' deliberations.[71]

During the General Assembly plenary debate, at which the compromise resolution was accepted without objection,

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formally requested to be invited to the Environment Conference. This request was contained in a 14 November letter from East German foreign minister Otto Winzer to Liberia's Angie Brooks, the President of the 1969 General Assembly. At the Romanian government's behest the Winzer letter was made an official General Assembly document (United Nations Document A/7780, 20 November 1969) and was circulated to all member delegations. It is noteworthy that East Germany, the most loyal Soviet ally, chose to communicate to the United Nations through Romania, the Soviet bloc nation which displayed the greatest independence from Moscow. The selection of Romania may have been motivated by a desire to de-emphasize the Cold War aspects of the Vienna formula question. In addition, Romania enjoyed good relations with almost every United Nations member and, for this reason, might have been considered a better advocate for the East German question than the more loyal Soviet bloc nations.

[70]Lacko (Czechoslovakia), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1277, 14 November 1969, pp. 3-5; and Anastasescu (Romania), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1278, 17 November 1969, pp. 27-28. Two other Soviet bloc members alluded to the East German question by noting the need for "universal participation" at Stockholm (Borshchevsky [Byelorussia], United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1276, 13 November 1969, p. 11; and Stradowski [Poland], United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1278, 17 November 1969, p. 25).

[71]Zakharov (Soviet Union), ibid., p. 10 (Second Committee); and Yeydokeyev (Soviet Union), United Nations Document A/C. 3/SR. 1720, 3 December 1969, p. 13 (Third Committee).

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the Soviet bloc served notice that the East German question would eventually have to be reconciled in a decisive fashion. Bulgaria took the podium to warn that the "obstacles erected in the past in the path of the organization of this Conference, have not been altogether removed," particularly since the revised paragraph 6 did not clearly mandate consultations with nations such as East Germany.[72]

The Soviet representative was even more to the point:

> The Soviet delegation regards as completely unnatural any attempts to prevent the participation in preparations for and conduct of the Conference of a number of industrial countries of the world, particularly the German Democratic Republic.[73]

In summary, while the nations that raised technical objections to the Conference proposal appear to have been won over during the first two preparatory years, the East-West confrontation over East Germany was merely postponed for future consideration. Such a postponement was to the advantage of both parties to the dispute. The Soviets, despite their decisive defeat at the 1969 ECOSOC session, were given additional time to win support for their position. The Western nations, for their part, could point to the continued status quo on the Vienna formula question, while avoiding a divisive political battle.

As in the case of technical objections, Sweden and other Conference advocates demonstrated a willingness to

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[72]Tarabanov (Bulgaria), United Nations Document A/PV. 1834, 15 December 1969, p. 16.

[73]Tarassov (Soviet Union), ibid., p. 26.

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compromise on East-West questions in order to preserve international unanimity in support of the Conference initiative. The unhappiness of even a handful of nations over the inclusion of the Vienna formula in the 1969 ECOSOC resolution was sufficient cause for revising the resolution. Of course, the fact that one of the objecting nations was a superpower may have been a major factor in seeking to avoid a political confrontation.

The Politics of the North-South Questions

From its inception the proposal for a Human Environment Conference had stressed problems that were primarily of concern to industrialized societies. The first suggestion that the United Nations convene an Environment Conference had defined its mandate as being the examination of the "impact of new technologies on human relationships and on society."[74] This impact, and the recognition of the problems it had created, was most intense in the developed nations.

Developing nations accordingly had little reason to feel strongly about the proposed Conference. At the worst, it would deal with a "rich man's disease" of minimal concern to the poorer nations.[75] At the best, the efforts to

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[74]United Nations Document A/6886, 2 November 1967, Annex 1, p. 1.

[75]See, for example, Bernardo de Azevedo Brito, "The Meaning and Scope of the Stockholm Conference from the Perspective of the Developing Countries," paper presented to the Institute for International Cooperation at the Univer-

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cleanse industrial pollution and waste in the developed world might provide valuable lessons that the developing nations could apply to their own development plans.[76]

This perception of the human environment issue by the developing nations was reflected in their relative lack of involvement in the early planning for the Conference. While most of these nations joined the majority of the developed nations in cosponsoring Environment Conference-related resolutions, the former were significantly less involved in the debates concerning these resolutions. While over two-thirds of the developed nations participated in these debates during 1968-69, less than one-third of the developing nations did so.[77] Most of the vocal support for, as well as most of the objections to the Conference

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sity of Ottawa, 21 November 1972, p. 2:

> "The concern with the environment first saw the light as a clearly defined idea, in industrial societies. It was and it still is basically a 'rich man's disease', a malaise of developed societies that, once high levels of income are reached, start weighing the advantages on an idealized state of unpolluted nature. It does not matter that such a state never really existed, or that the main objective of civilization itself was to supersede such a state, more often than not incompatible with or at least highly unfavorable to adequate living conditions."

[76]See, for example, Ogbu (Nigeria), United Nations Document A/PV. 1732, 3 December 1968, p. 32:

> ". . . an urgent international effort to examine and analyse these [environmental] problems and pursue the means to their solution could prove of invaluable assistance to developing countries in forestalling, or at least avoiding, the whole plethora of problems which have up to now attended what I shall call 'classical' industrial and technological development."

[77]See table 2.2 above.

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proposal during the early preparatory period came from the developed nations.

The relationship between a nation's level of development and its degree of participation in Conference-related deliberations is further emphasized when the list of nations participating in these deliberations is correlated with the development index ratings that were developed in the first chapter.[78] When this is done, it is discovered that the developed nations that did not participate in the debates were generally the <u>least</u> developed members of their group, while the developing nations that did participate were generally the <u>most</u> developed nations of their group.[79]

TABLE 2.4

PERCENTAGE OF DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING NATIONS THAT SPOKE DURING UNITED NATIONS DELIBERATIONS DEALING WITH THE ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE, 1968-69
(As Ranked on Development Index, Table 8 in the Appendix)

	Developed Nations	Developing Nations	Total
Twenty highest ranked nations in each category	90% (18 of 20)	60% (12 of 20)	75%
Remainder in each category	30% (3 of 10)	27% (20 of 75)	27%
Total	70%	34%	

[78]The list of nations participating in Conference-related deliberations is found in table 7 in the Appendix and the development index rankings are found in table 1.4 above.

[79]See table 8 in the Appendix.

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Table 2.4 summarizes the result of this correlation.[80] Only two of the twenty highest ranked developed nations (Israel and Luxembourg) failed to participate in the Conference-related debates while only three of the ten lowest ranked developed nations participated. This latter rate of participation compares most unfavorably with the participation of twelve of the twenty highest ranked developing nations.[81] This correlation between a nation's level of development and its participation in Conference-related debates may help explain why the African group, which included the largest number of least developed nations, had the lowest level of participation in the 1968-69 debates

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[80]There is a slight variation between the numbers in table 2.4 and those previously reported in table 2.2. This discrepancy results from the absence of separate development data for two United Nations members--Byelorussia and Ukraine. These nations, one of which participated in the 1968-69 deliberations, were accordingly excluded from the correlation in table 2.2.

[81]The oil and mineral rich states of the developing world provided the one notable set of exceptions to this development-participation equation. Kuwait and Trinidad and Tobago, the only Southern nations to rank above the world per capita average on our development index, did not participate in the debates. Nor did relatively high ranked Algeria, Gabon, Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. These nations' nonparticipation may reflect the artificially high development ranking that their oil and mineral exports have helped them achieve. The actual level of technological development in most of these nations is still well below that of nations with similar development index rankings, but without oil or mineral wealth. Industrialization and pollution are still far from problems in most of these nations and the Environment Conference was apparently of little interest to them. It should be further noted that exclusion of these states from the rank order correlation in table 2.4 would produce a participation rate of 80 percent for the twenty highest ranked developing nations.

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(23 percent as compared with 31 percent for the Asian group and 50 percent for the Latin American group). Similarly, the Latin American group's higher rate of participation may be attributable to Latin America's relatively advanced level of development. (Significantly, ten of the twelve highest ranked Latin American nations and only two of the remaining twelve lowest ranked Latin American nations participated in these debates.) Likewise, the virtual non-participation of the Southern European nations and the almost total participation of the rest of Europe would appear to reflect the lesser degree of development that was prevalent in Southern Europe.[82]

This correlation between development status and involvement in the 1968-69 Conference-related debates is understandable in light of the then prevalent perception of the human environment problem as primarily a concern of highly developed industrialized nations. The initiators and supporters of the Conference proposal nevertheless

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[82]As was noted in the previous chapter (p. 44), the poorer nations of Southern Europe are considered part of the developed North, both because they consider themselves as part of the developed world as well as because of their cultural, historical, and economic ties to the rest of Europe. The more developed nations of Latin America and Asia are considered to be part of the developing South for much the same reason. Accordingly, the lack of participation by the poorer European nations and the relatively high level of participation by the richer Latin American and Asian states underscores the lack of a North-South political cleavage on the Conference issue during these years. Had such a cleavage existed, the pattern of participation in Conference-related deliberations would have reflected North-South cleavage lines rather than development status.

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stressed the advantages that the proposed Conference might offer the developing nations. This was apparently done in an effort to secure a large number of Southern sponsors and supporters for the Conference-related resolutions.[83]

Table 9 in the Appendix lists the nations that participated in the various United Nations deliberations concerning the Environment Conference during 1968-69, and the position, if any, that each participant took on the questions of development and the role of the developing nations in the proposed Conference. Virtually all such references to the development question can be placed in one of five categories:

1. The developing nations will benefit from the Conference by learning to avoid the mistakes that the developed nations have made

2. The developing nations will benefit from the

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[83]In the memorandum accompanying his original proposal, Ambassador Aström emphasized that the developing nations should not ignore the proposed Conference. While he admitted that "in some developing countries the problems involved may not yet have become as serious . . . as in the highly industrialized countries," he hastened to add that "they [environmental problems] are nowhere absent and will certainly grow ever more serious with widespread use of modern technology" (United Nations Document E/4466, Add. 1, 22 May 1968, p. 2). The 1968 ECOSOC resolution dealing with the Conference question made a similar point, noting that "due attention to problems of the human environment is essential for sound economic and social development" (United Nations ECOSOC Resolution 1346 [XLV], 31 July 1968). These efforts may have reflected the fact that, by 1968, a major United Nations initiative of exclusive concern to the developed nations might have faced great difficulty in winning approval from a General Assembly dominated by representatives of the developing nations (Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967, p. 142).

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Conference because some environmental problems, such as those caused by urbanization, are found in both developed and developing nations

3. The developing nations have unique environmental problems that the Conference must consider if it is to be beneficial to them

4. The Conference must consider methods to provide additional economic aid to developing nations so that they can cope with their unique environmental problems

5. Care must be taken to assure that international environmental measures considered by the Conference do not, inadvertently, penalize the developing nations

The first two categories shared the same basic premise: that the developing nations might well benefit from a thorough study of the Northern nations' environmental problems (either because the South had some of the same problems,[84] or because it might eventually suffer from them). The third category questioned the utility of dealing exclusively with Northern problems, and insisted that the developing nations had their own unique environmental problems. Few nations, however, were prepared to define these peculiar Southern problems during the first two preparatory years. The last two categories included two of the issues

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[84]The most extreme version of this view was presented by the Soviet bloc nations who insisted that "all these [environmental] problems arise in the same degree in the developed and in the developing countries" (Mendelevich [USSR], United Nations Document A/PV. 1733, 3 December 1968, p. 72).

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that would eventually contribute to the polarization of the Environment Conference issue along North-South lines. Proponents of these views were not satisfied with equal consideration of Southern and Northern environmental problems. They wanted special measures to enhance and protect the Southern nations' development efforts.

Table 9 in the Appendix categorizes national interventions during the 1968-69 Environment Conference-related deliberations insofar as they referred to the development question. Table 2.5 summarizes this table and reports the total number of interventions by either developing or developed nations that can be placed in each of the above defined five categories.

TABLE 2.5

POSITIONS TAKEN BY DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING NATIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT QUESTION DURING ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE-RELATED DELIBERATIONS, 1968-69

	Developed Nations	Developing Nations	Total
No mention of issue	36	26	62
Category one	13	13	26
Category two	6	11	17
Category three	2	10	12
Category four	0	4	4
Category five	1	3	4
Others	2	0	2
Total number of interventions	60	67	127

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The most obvious conclusion that can be drawn from this table is that over half the speeches dealing with the Conference proposal during this period made no mention of the development question. Not only did almost two-thirds of the developed nations' statements ignore this issue, but it was also ignored in 39 percent of the statements by developing nations (26 of 67). Furthermore, when the development question was raised, it was, in almost two-thirds of all cases (43 of 65), within the context of the first two categories. This was the case with over three-quarters of the statements by developed nations (19 of 24) and well over half of those by developing nations (24 of 41).

There appears to have been an inverse relationship between the number of nations that raised points belonging to a specific category, and the emphasis that category put on the developing nations' unique priorities. Category one, which only raised the possibility of future benefits to developing nations, was, even among Southern nations, the most popular category.[85] Category two, which promised

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[85]The wide acceptance of this approach was further reflected in its incorporation in Secretary-General U Thant's discussion of the Environment Conference in his report to the 1969 General Assembly:

> "The harmful effects of ill-considered policies are now of great concern in the industrialized parts of the world. The United Nations family of organizations, so active in the development of natural resources and in the industrialization of the developing countries, has a grave responsibility to encourage these countries and to prevent from the outset the undesirable consequences of a much desired and necessary development. The developing countries, fortunately, can avoid the dangers which the industrialized countries must now correct at

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immediate benefits to the developing nations from the discussion of certain Northern problems, was the next most popular classification. The third category, which insisted on the discussion of uniquely Southern problems, was raised by even fewer nations than the second one, but by three times as many nations as broached the more exclusively Southern arguments of categories four and five.[86] Moreover, even the latter nations tended to couch their remarks in general terms and did not specifically question the Conference proposals' emphasis on the problems of industrialized societies.[87]

During the entire 1968-69 period, a time when the North-South cleavage was increasingly apparent in United Nations software debates,[88] only one developing nation openly challenged the direction and scope of the proposed Conference from a Southern perspective. This lone challenge was provided by the Congolese delegation (from Congo [Brazzaville]) at the 1968 ECOSOC session. In the first of his three interventions at that session, the Congolese delegate, Mr. Ekondy-Akala, praised the Swedish proposal as

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a very great cost" (United Nations Document A/7601/Add. 1, 15 September 1969, p. 32).

[86]Category three's figures were inflated by the persistence of two nations, India and Turkey, which each raised the topic three times.

[87]See, for example, Brillantes (Philippines), United Nations Document E/SR. 1547, 19 July 1968, p. 107.

[88]See, for example, Pinto (Brazil), United Nations Document A/PV. 1755, 18 September 1969, pp. 8-14.

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being especially helpful to the developing nations. The Conference, he declared, would allow for a better understanding of the environmental problems faced by these nations, thus permitting development aid to be distributed in a more "rational" fashion.[89] While Ekondy-Akala endorsed the Swedish resolution, his firm emphasis on the need for increased development aid, and his references to the "debt" that the former colonial powers owed the developing nations, made it clear that he envisioned a radically different direction for the proposed Environment Conference.

Ekondy-Akala's intervention was ignored by the speakers that followed him. Apparently undaunted by this lack of response, he intervened a second time to suggest that the proposed "Human Environment Conference" be renamed the "Man and his Environment Conference." This new title, he explained, would reflect the question of development aid, which was needed if the inhabitants of the developing nations would ever have a decent environment in which to live.[90]

Four speakers, three of them from developing nations, responded to the Congolese proposal. All four found the suggestion unacceptable and unnecessary. The delegate from Chad, while admitting that problems of the human environment might currently be of secondary importance to the

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[89]Ekondy-Akala (Congo [Brazzaville]), United Nations Document E/SR. 1548, 19 July 1968, p. 109.

[90]Ekondy-Akala (Congo [Brazzaville]), United Nations Document E/SR. 1553, 26 July 1968, p. 142.

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developing nations, pointed out that they could learn a great deal at the Conference from the developed nations' errors.[91] The Turkish and Argentinian delegates similarly dismissed the Congolese proposal as being merely a matter of semantics, while the Belgian delegate noted that the developing nations already suffered from some of the identical problems as the developed nations (such as soil erosion).[92]

Neither Ekondy-Akala nor any of the speakers disagreeing with his proposal noted the subtle but highly signigicant shift in emphasis implicit in his choice of a Conference name. The title "Human Environment Conference" had stressed the Northern emphasis on the totality of the environment in which the human species lived. Ekondy-Akala's proposed title, "Man and his Environment," placed the primary emphasis on man and the securing of an adequate environment for his enjoyment. This man-centered view would later become the Southern counterweight to the insistence of Northern ecologists on considering the human species as only one part of a total planetary ecosystem.[93]

The Congolese position at ECOSOC must be viewed, in

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[91]Clamoungou (Chad), ibid., pp. 142-143.

[92]Bradley (Argentina), Forthomme (Belgium), and Benler (Turkey), ibid., pp. 143-144.

[93]The Congolese proposal was echoed by the African consultant to the pre-Conference report who insisted that the word "man" should always be capitalized in recognition of the central place enjoyed by the human species in the natural ecosystem (Ward and Dubos, Only One Earth, p. xii).

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retrospect, as an aberration rather than as the beginning of the North-South political cleavage which was later to develop around the Environment Conference issue. Firstly, the confrontation produced a limited response, with only four nations disagreeing with what would eventually be perceived as the Southern viewpoint on Environment Conference questions. Secondly, none of the developing nations raised this position during the ensuing 1968 General Assembly debate.

At that General Assembly debate Ambassador Aström's opening speech once again emphasized the category one approach--the lessons that the developing nations could learn from the Conference:

> One of the primary purposes [of the Conference] should be to enable the developing countries to avoid making the same mistakes which have made parts of the environment in the industrial countries unhealthy, unpleasant, and ugly. . . . projects of economic co-operation should be planned with due regard to these factors.[94]

The next two speakers, from Nigeria and Pakistan, stressed the second "benefits" category--the universal nature of the human environment problem.[95] Virtually every other speaker either ignored the development issue (as did the United States and six other nations) or mentioned the advantages the developing nations would gain by attending

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[94]Aström (Sweden), United Nations Document A/PV. 1732, 3 December 1968, pp. 13-15.

[95]Ogbu (Nigeria) and Shahi (Pakistan), ibid., pp. 31 and 36.

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the Conference.[96]

One of the strongest statements of the need for developing nations to participate in the Conference and in other international environmental efforts was presented by the Argentinian delegate: "without preservation of the environment, there can be no development . . . and the hopes of a better future will become more remote each day."[97] The Yugoslavian delegate went even further with the statement that:

> It would be erroneous and one-sided to assert that the problem of human environment chiefly relates to industrially developed nations and that the developing nations should concentrate their efforts primarily in the direction of development.[98]

These and similar statements by other Southern nations reflected the support that the Environment Conference proposal had won among developing nations despite its perception as an issue of concern primarily to Northern nations.[99]

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[96]See table 9 in the Appendix for a list of nations taking a position on the development question during this debate.

[97]Bradley (Argentina), United Nations Document A/PV. 1733, 3 December 1968, p. 6.

[98]Vratusa (Yugoslavia), ibid., p. 51.

[99]Only one nation, India, even mentioned that the developing nations had unique environmental problems. The Indian remarks, mentioning the problems of housing and health facilities in the developing nations, were the only harbinger of the direction to come in future United Nations debates. Even the Indian delegate stressed, however, that his primary concern was "to ensure that . . . development in various fields is planned in such a manner as to avoid environmental depredations" (D'Mello [India], ibid., p. 66).

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This almost exclusive emphasis on Northern environmental problems continued throughout the 1969 pre-Conference deliberations. The Secretary-General's detailed May 1969 report on the plans for the Conference reflected this emphasis. The report only mentioned the developing nations in order to list the advantages they might gain by learning from the developed nations' mistakes.[100] The three major Conference agenda items proposed by the Secretary-General in this report (problems of human settlement, environmental pollution, and information distribution) were all primarily concerns of the industrialized nations.

The development question was similarly ignored during the 1969 ECOSOC deliberations which were dominated by the dispute over the Vienna formula. The Norwegian resolution, unlike the previous year's ECOSOC resolution, did not even mention the developing nations or the benefits that they might gain from the Conference. Of the nine developed nations that took part in the Council debate, only France touched on the development question, and even then it was in order to question the primacy of the environmental question, rather than to raise any specific issue related to the developing nations.[101] Of the seven developing nations

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[100]United Nations Document E/4667, 26 May 1969, pp. 24, 25, 63, and 88. The only other mention of the developing nations in the report was an observation concerning the "marginal interest" that these nations had in securing grants to combat environmental problems (p. 47).

[101]In his critique of the Secretary-General's May report, the French delegate reminded the Council that "It

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that mentioned the development issue at this session, five did so in the context of the category one theme of "learning from the mistakes of the developed nations."[102] The two other speakers, the representatives of India and Kuwait, urged that the Conference give some attention to the developing nations' particular environmental problems, especially in their urban areas, in order to ensure that these nations would have an incentive to attend the Conference.[103]

During the summer and fall of 1969, a number of United Nations committees issued reports related to the planning for the Stockholm Conference. Of these reports, only one, that of the Committee on Housing, Building, and Planning of the Economic and Social Council, touched upon

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should not be forgotten that mankind had reached its present stage of development largely through overcoming the natural obstacles in its way or that man's action on nature was frequently beneficial" (Gros [France], United Nations Document E/SR. 1629, 4 August 1969, p. 190).

[102]See table 9 in the Appendix for a list of nations taking a position on the development question during this debate. It should be noted that an eighth developing nation, Turkey, also touched upon the development question during the ECOSOC deliberations but only in the most general fashion, while stressing its conviction that the Conference agenda would be "of concern to both developed and developing countries" (Aksin [Turkey], ibid., p. 193).

[103]Krishnan (India) and Khanachet (Kuwait), ibid., pp. 196 and 197. The Kuwaiti delegate also noted the need for the Conference to examine "problems of the human environment which predated industrialization and which might be unknown to the advanced countries." This statement is significant in that it represented one of the first efforts by a developing nation to suggest that some contemporary environmental problems are not by-products of industrial and technological impact.

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Southern problems. While the report stressed the severity of the human settlement problem in the developing nations,[104] it did not deal with this as a separate problem, but rather as an element of the overall urban settlement environmental question.[105]

The 1969 General Assembly session provided an excellent example of how muted the North-South connotations of the Environment Conference question were during the first two years of preparatory work. During that year's General Debate, a number of developing nations had bitterly denounced the developed nations' attitude and policies as they related to development questions. The Brazilian Foreign Minister, Magalhaes Pinto, delivered one of the strongest speeches of this type, deploring the "lack of understanding on the part of the developed nations" in areas of international trade, economic aid, and population planning.[106] No mention was made in his remarks, or in any of the similar speeches at the session, of the Environment Conference and its implications for the developing nations. What later would be seen as the inherent contradiction

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[104]In 1920, the report noted, only thirteen cities in developing areas had over half a million inhabitants. In 1960, 128 had attained this level of population, and by 1980, it was estimated that over 360 cities would be that large.

[105]United Nations Document E/C. 6/91, 25 June 1969, pp. 1-3.

[106]Pinto (Brazil), United Nations Document A/PV. 1755, 18 September 1969, pp. 8-11.

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between the priorities of development and environment were not yet apparent, even to those nations most avidly advocating a firm Southern perspective on other international issues.[107]

The primary emphasis during the 1969 General Assembly consideration of the Environment Conference proposal was, as has been noted, on constructing a compromise on the East German question.[108] When the development issue was raised during the General Debate,[109] during the Second or Third Committee's deliberations, and during the final General Assembly consideration of the compromise resolution, it was, in almost all cases, to repeat the familiar themes of the advantages the developing nations would gain through participation in the Conference.[110]

The "environmental ecumenism" of the 1968 deliberations seems to have been reawakened at the 1969 General Assembly session by the success of the compromise on the East German question. Thus, the Netherlands declared that "in the field of ecology all countries were developing

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[107] Interview with Bernardo de Azevedo Brito, Brazilian Mission to the United Nations, 14 September 1973.

[108] See pp. 84-86 above.

[109] Only Denmark raised this question during the General Debate (Hartling [Denmark], United Nations Document A/PV. 1771, 30 September 1969, pp. 10-11).

[110] See, for example, Aström (Sweden) and Ogbu (Nigeria), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1276, 13 November 1969, pp. 3 and 4.

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countries."[111] Chile, later to be one of the most vocal proponents of the Southern view on environmental issues, stated that "the problems of the human environment were as pressing as those of development for developing and developed countries alike."[112] In a similar vein, both Jamaica and Singapore took the floor to deny that pollution and related environmental problems were necessarily more severe in developed nations.[113]

Several nations did touch on the unique problems faced by developing nations, but in general terms and always in the context of endorsing the preparatory plans for the Environment Conference. For example, Upper Volta declared that "environment problems were very different in the developing countries,"[114] but did not describe any of these "very different" problems. The only two nations that gave specific examples, Honduras and Zambia, listed problems that were hardly unique to developing nations (such as flooding, traffic accidents, and urban squalor).[115]

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[111] Shouwenaar-Franssen (Netherlands), ibid., p. 8.

[112] Correa (Chile), ibid., p. 10.

[113] Johnson (Jamaica) and Koh (Singapore), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1278, 17 November 1969, pp. 4 and 26.

[114] Roamba (Upper Volta), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1277, 14 November 1969, p. 16.

[115] Lichilana (Zambia) and Bennaton (Honduras), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1278, 17 November 1969, pp. 2 and 3. Flooding was raised by Honduras and the other two problems by Zambia, which also stressed the need to study the "sociocultural" environmental problems of developing

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The meetings of the Second Committee also witnessed the first discussion of the danger that international environmental action might directly penalize the developing nations (category five). This fear was raised by the Iranian delegate who warned that:

> . . . the fight against pollution should on no account be interpreted as resistance to progress; the aim should be the rational exploitation of the planet with a view to a better life for all its inhabitants. In particular, the developing countries should in no case be penalized nor their progress checked.[116]

Not only did Iran continue to support the Conference and its preparatory plans, but the only nation to refer directly to the Iranian intervention was highly developed Japan which did so only to register its strong agreement.[117]

To summarize, there were no significant debates along North-South cleavage lines during the first two years of

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nations. This latter point was also raised by France, but within the framework of traditional pollution-oriented environmental concerns (Couste [France], p. 20). A handful of other speakers raised issues of concern to the developing nations. For example, Byelorussia, in an aside, asked that the question of national sovereignty over natural resources be on the Conference agenda (Borshchevsky [Byelorussia], United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1276, 13 November 1969, p. 12). Similarly, Nigeria asked that aid be given to the developing nations so that they could "participate actively in the work of the Conference at all stages" (Ogbu [Nigeria], p. 4). In addition, India and the Congo both urged that attention be given to the question of providing the developing nations with the skills they would need in order to cope with environmental problems (Sakesna [India], p. 15, and Lubaki [Congo (Brazzaville)], United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1278, 17 November 1969, p. 29).

[116]Hoveyda (Iran), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1276, 13 November 1969, p. 4.

[117]Abe (Japan), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1278, 17 November 1969, p. 13.

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preparatory planning for the Human Environment Conference. While many speakers from both developed and developing nations stressed the advantages that the developing nations would gain from the Stockholm Conference, very few of them touched on the specific problems that would, shortly thereafter, polarize the Conference preparatory work. Even when these problems were raised, their mention failed to trigger any significant confrontation along North-South lines. Thus, the interventions by the Congo at the 1968 ECOSOC session and by Iran at the 1969 General Assembly Second Committee debates were virtually ignored. The Congo was rebuked by several of its fellow developing nations, and the only nation to respond to Iran's remarks was developed Japan, which endorsed the Iranian position.

Overview

At the beginning of this chapter we defined three categories of problems that emerged during the preparatory work for the Stockholm Conference: technical objections, East-West questions, and North-South questions. During the first two years of planning for the Conference, discussion of the first category occurred mainly in 1968, and discussion of the second category mainly in 1969, while the third category failed to surface as a significant cleavage. A firm international consensus supporting the Conference proposal dominated this entire first preparatory period. This consensus seems to have helped assure the mild nature of

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the disputes that developed during 1968 and 1969.

During 1968, the year in which the concept of an International Human Environment Conference was first proposed, debated, and accepted, the major arguments surrounding the Conference proposal were those of a technical nature. These arguments, precipitated by the objections of several Western European nations and Japan to the scope and cost of the proposed Conference, were smoothed over by the time the General Assembly adopted the Conference resolution in December 1968. Only France continued to raise such objections, with particular emphasis on the cost of the Conference and the range of its proposed agenda. When the Economic and Social Council rejected the French efforts to limit the Conference's scope, France voted for the overall Conference-related resolutions both in ECOSOC and in the General Assembly.

During 1969, the second year under examination, the major Conference preparatory disputes concerned the Vienna formula for inviting nations to international conferences as it related to the question of East German participation at Stockholm. This East-West dispute was "won" by the Western powers at the 1969 ECOSOC session, but the subsequent refusal of the Soviet bloc to support the Conference-related resolution led to the drafting and acceptance of a compromise which postponed determination of the entire question. In both 1968 and 1969 consensus and compromise prevailed.

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The last set of issues, those of a North-South nature, did not emerge as an area of confrontation during the period under examination. The environmental crisis was primarily a concern of the developed nations and the early Conference planning closely reflected their concerns and priorities. Interest in the Conference came mainly from developed nations to the extent that there was an apparent correlation between a nation's level of development and its degree of participation in preparatory process deliberations.[118]

The questions of development and developing nations were thus not a major factor in the Conference preparatory debates during these years. Almost two-thirds of the developed nations that participated in the Conference-related debates ignored the development question and even most of the developing nations that discussed the development issue did so from a patently Northern perspective. Even those developing nations that discussed uniquely Southern problems did so in restrained language that failed to shake the overall international consensus on the Environment Conference question. The issues that would later threaten to split the Conference preparatory process along North-South lines were raised during these first two years, but invariably in the most general of terms that did not provoke debate.

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[118]See table 2.4 above.

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With technical objections to the Conference stilled, and the North-South cleavage not yet a factor,

> . . . the only impediment to the salvation of the biosphere at Stockholm was the wholly irrevelant, anachronistic, Cold War issue of whether or not, or under what convenient subterfuge, East Germany would be allowed to participate.[119]

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[119]Wolff, "Cloudy Atmosphere Over Stockholm," p. 44.

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CHAPTER III

THE PREPARATORY YEARS, 1970-1972

The Cold War and the resulting East-West bipolar cleavage was the paramount political reality of the first quarter century of United Nations politics. The events of the 1970-72 Environment Conference preparatory period suggest the degree to which the North-South tensions between the developed and developing nations had emerged by 1970 as a second dominant international political reality.

This ascendancy of North-South issues was not a sudden matter. Both the advent of superpower detente and the development of a strident Third World group at the United Nations had become apparent well before 1970.[1] During this earlier period, however, there had been a basic difference between the role that East-West and North-South tensions played in the international arena. While the former affected a wide range of international issues the latter were generally only a factor in the consideration of a number of clearly delineated issue areas in which the Southern nations were widely conceded a special interest, such as

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[1] Peter Willetts, "Cluster-Bloc Analysis and Statistical Inference," American Political Science Review 66 (June 1972):574-575.

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colonialism, apartheid, and development aid.[2]

During the 1970-72 period North-South considerations were extended to the Human Environment Conference--an issue area that had previously seemed unrelated to the concerns of the Southern nations. The developing nations took a united position on a broad range of Conference-related questions, while demanding that the Conference be redesigned to conform with their particular international priorities. The Southern nations scrutinized every aspect of the Conference proposal from the viewpoint of these priorities, much as the superpowers had once examined every United Nations issue from the perspective of potential Cold War advantage or disadvantage.[3] The success of the Southern nations in dealing with the Conference issue suggests that there will be other major international issues in the future which may invite similar reinterpretation.

At the conclusion of the 1968-69 preparatory period the Human Environment Conference had been widely perceived as an issue with minimal political ramifications. There was, of course, the matter of East German representation, but this was largely a tangential issue to which a compromise could conceivably be found without straining the vital international consensus that supported the Conference proposal.

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[2]Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967, p. 143.

[3]Vincent, "Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly," p. 471.

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During the 1970-72 preparatory period, however, the developing nations raised questions of a fundamental nature that resulted in the virtual transformation of the overall Conference proposal. Each reluctant concession by the developed nations was met by new demands by the developing nations, which led in turn to further Northern concessions. The seemingly apolitical Environment Conference proposal became the battleground for a series of highly politicized North-South confrontations. These confrontations, as well as the lingering East German question, raised political issues that were beyond the scope of the newly created Conference Preparatory Committee which had been assigned the primary responsibility for planning the Stockholm Conference.

The envisioned primacy of the Preparatory Committee had depended upon the maintenance of the international political consensus that had characterized the first two years of pre-Conference planning. The fundamental political issues that resulted from the collapse of that consensus were eventually reconciled, not in the Preparatory Committee, but at the General Assembly, and especially in the Assembly's Second Committee. Accordingly, the major focus of this chapter will be on the deliberations of these latter bodies.

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The Issues

Technical questions

During the 1968-69 preparatory period a number of nations had raised questions concerning the scope, format, and necessity of the Environment Conference. During the 1970-72 period, however, these technical questions were almost always raised in the context of East-West or North-South tensions and will accordingly be considered during our discussion of these two larger issue areas.

East-West questions

The 1969 compromise that had postponed any final decision on the East German question remained in effect throughout 1970 and during most of 1971. As long as this divisive issue was dormant, the earlier East-West consensus on matters relating to the Environment Conference remained intact.

The East German question could not, however, be postponed indefinitely, and the issue finally came to a head in the fall of 1971 with the Second Committee's endorsement of the Vienna formula and the General Assembly's subsequent rejection of a Soviet proposal to postpone the Conference for a year. The Soviet bloc responded to their defeat on this question by calling for East Germany's supporters to join in a boycott of the Stockholm proceedings.

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North-South questions

The North-South cleavage played a dominant role in the period under examination. The apathy that many Southern nations had earlier displayed towards the Environment Conference proposal rapidly dissipated when the tenor of the early preparatory work began to be perceived as representing a threat to their interests. Utilizing their numerical majority in the United Nations, the Southern nations succeeded in radically restructuring the agenda and priorities of the proposed Conference.

The Chronology of Events

The Preparatory Committee's first session was held in New York City from 10-20 March 1970. As its first order of business, the Committee unanimously elected Keith Johnson of Jamaica as its Chairman, and, with a careful eye on geographic balance, selected Vice-Chairmen from Czechoslovakia, Iran, and Zambia, and a Rapporteur from Sweden.[4]

The original Environment Conference proposal had stressed two goals: the generation of publicity and the

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[4]Rule 105 of the General Assembly's draft rules for special committees provided that such committees should have only one vice-chairman. The Preparatory Committee amended this rule, so as to allow "broader geographic distribution" through the designation of three vice-chairmen (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/PC/6, 6 April 1970, p. 3). This action foreshadowed the similar efforts by the developing nations to expand the number of Conference vice-presidents, as well as the Governing Council of the post-Conference United Nations Environment Programme, in an effort to enhance "geographic distribution" (see chapter IV, p. 238 and chapter V, p. 349 below).

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drafting of specific action proposals.[5] The Preparatory Committee decided, however, that the human environment question had received sufficient international publicity since the original proposal had been made in 1968. They accordingly resolved that the Conference's main efforts would be devoted to the formulation of specific proposals for concerted national and international action.[6]

In keeping with this action-oriented theme, the Committee called for the solicitation of national reports on environmental problems and the drafting for Conference approval of an International Declaration on the Human Environment. The Committee also proposed that three topics be on the agenda at Stockholm:

1. Environmental aspects of human settlements
2. Rational management of natural resources
3. Environmental degradation from pollution

At the close of the Preparatory Committee's first session Secretary-General U Thant announced the appointment of France's Jean Mussard as Acting Director of the Conference Secretariat. Mussard and his small staff (most of whom were on loan from United Nations specialized agencies) were to coordinate their activities with those of existing United Nations groups dealing with environmental questions.[7]

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[5]United Nations Document E/4466/Add. 1, 22 May 1968.

[6]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/PC/SR. 1, 2 June 1970, p. 4.

[7]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/PC/6, 6 April 1970, p. 25.

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At the July 1970 ECOSOC session Mussard reported on both the Preparatory Committee's first session and on the Conference Secretariat's work up to that date. Six nations, led by Norway, introduced a resolution endorsing the proposals of the Preparatory Committee and formalizing the call for a Declaration on the Human Environment.[8] This resolution was unanimously accepted after the sponsors accepted a Brazilian amendment that foreshadowed the later militancy of the developing nations on the human environment question.

Mussard's tenure as head of the Conference Secretariat came to an end on 16 November 1970 with the appointment of Canada's Maurice Strong as Conference Secretary-General. Strong's previous experience as head of the Canadian International Development Agency made him particularly well suited for this position at a time when the concerns of the developing nations were beginning to play an increasingly important role in the Conference preparatory process.[9]

These concerns were reflected in the otherwise proce-

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[8]United Nations ECOSOC Resolution 1536 (XLIX), 27 July 1970. Sponsored by Argentina, India, Japan, Kenya, Norway, and Yugoslavia.

[9]The selection of a development aid professional rather than an ecologist as Conference Secretary-General must be seen as a major concession to the fears of the developing nations that their particular needs might be overlooked by those planning the Stockholm Conference. Maurice Strong's record as director of the Canadian foreign aid program was accordingly emphasized by the Secretary-General in his statement announcing the appointment (United Nations Document A/8065/Add. 1, 13 November 1970, p. 1).

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dural resolution introduced by Sweden at the 1970 General Assembly session. While the resolution endorsed the Preparatory Committee's previous work, it requested that the Conference agenda be expanded to reflect the "economic and social aspects" of the human environment question that were of particular interest to the developing nations. This concession failed to satisfy a number of developing nations that introduced a last minute amendment calling on the Preparatory Committee to consider methods of providing economic aid to developing nations to help them deal with their unique environmental problems. After the Second Committee and General Assembly plenary both accepted this Southern amendment the revised Swedish resolution was adopted by a plenary vote of 86 to 0, with the Soviet bloc abstaining.[10]

The Preparatory Committee responded to the General Assembly's resolution at its second session (held in Geneva from 8-19 February 1971) by adding three new items to the Conference agenda:

4. International institutional implications of Conference proposals

5. Educational, informational, social, and cultural aspects of the human environment issue

6. Development and environment

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[10]The Soviet bloc's ostensible reason for abstaining was that some of the language in the Swedish resolution was repugnant to Marxist philosophy (see p. 181 below).

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The demand of the developing nations that additional attention be given to their particular environmental problems was further reflected in Conference Secretary-General Strong's announcement that the United Nations would sponsor five seminars devoted to the development and environment question during the spring and summer of 1971. Four of these seminars were to be under the auspices of the four United Nations regional economic commissions, while the fifth was to be an international gathering of experts in Founex, Switzerland during June of that year.[11]

The Preparatory Committee's second session also witnessed considerable progress in the more technical aspects of preparation for the Stockholm Conference. The Committee established ongoing working groups to prepare action proposals, to draft the proposed International Declaration on the Human Environment, and to prepare a number of draft international conventions dealing with aspects of the human environment question. These conventions were to be presented for national approval at the Stockholm Conference.[12]

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[11]United Nations Document A/8605/Add. 1, 13 November 1970, p. 1. The four regional seminars were held in Bangkok, Thailand (17-23 August), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (23-27 August), Mexico City (6-11 September), and Beirut, Lebanon (27 September-2 October) and were sponsored by the United Nations Economic Commissions for Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and the Economic and Social Office for the Middle East, respectively.

[12]Four draft conventions were eventually prepared: "On Conservation of the World Heritage," "On Conservation of Wetlands of International Importance," "On Conservation of Certain Islands for Science," and "On Export, Import and Transit of Certain Species of Wild Animals and Plants."

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Lastly, Conference Secretary-General Strong announced that he had commissioned Lady Barbara Ward Jackson and René Dubos to prepare a book length report on the human environment that would be ready for worldwide distribution prior to the Stockholm Conference.[13]

During the period between the Preparatory Committee's second and third sessions the most significant Conference-related event was the meeting of the development and environment experts at Founex from 4-12 June. The developing nations' priorities were discussed in detail at this meeting, as were their fears that some proposed international environmental actions might prove detrimental to achieving these priorities. The resulting Founex Report, reflecting the concerns of both the environmentalists of the North and the development planners of the South, was widely hailed as a "model for international environmental diplomacy."[14]

This spirit of compromise and consensus prevailed during the Preparatory Committee's third session (held in New York City from 13-24 September) at which the proposed rules of procedure for the Stockholm Conference were

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[13]Ward and Dubos, Only One Earth. In keeping with the new emphasis on the development aspects of the environment issue, the Secretary-General stressed Lady Jackson's experience as a professor of International Economic Development at Columbia University. Furthermore, her husband, Sir Robert Jackson was working for the United Nations Development Program after serving for several years as head of the Economic Development Program in Ghana.

[14]Wolff, "Cloudy Atmosphere Over Stockholm," p. 44.

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finalized, and the reports of the Committee's working groups, the Founex Conference, and the regional development and environment seminars were reviewed. The Committee, however, meticulously avoided taking a position on the still unresolved aspects of either the East German or the development and environment questions.

Both of these issues came to a head a few weeks later at the 1971 General Assembly session. In eleven meetings, between 29 November and 9 December, the Second Committee debated and accepted two resolutions which, upon their acceptance by the General Assembly, became the final United Nations positions on the preparatory period's two main political disputes. The first resolution (introduced by Sweden and thirty-three other nations)[15] was originally of a purely procedural nature but had been amended by the Western powers to include the Vienna formula for selecting Conference participants. The Second Committee accepted this Western amendment after rejecting a Soviet bloc sub-amendment to permit universal participation at Stockholm.

The second resolution (introduced by Brazil and eventually cosponsored by thirty-six other developing nations)

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[15]United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2850 (XXVI), 20 December 1971, originally circulated as draft resolution A/C. 2/L. 1195. Sponsored by Argentina, Austria, Canada, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Uruguay, and Zambia.

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marked the formal institutionalization of the Southern viewpoint in the Environment Conference preparatory process.[16] The resolution blamed the developed nations for most of the world's pollution and declared that these nations had a special responsibility to pay not only for cleaning up their own pollution, but for any environmental protection measures that the developing nations might have to take. In addition, the resolution cautioned that environmental safeguards in the developed world must not be allowed to impose hardships on the developing nations. The developed nations, led by Australia and the United Kingdom, introduced a series of amendments in an effort to moderate the tone and demands of the second resolution. After these amendments were all decisively defeated, the Second Committee approved the resolution by a vote that was almost exactly along North-South lines.

The General Assembly's plenary consideration of both resolutions was largely anticlimactic. The first resolution was accepted overwhelmingly after the defeat of both a Yugoslavian amendment to invite East Germany to Stockholm and a Soviet bloc amendment to postpone the Environment Conference until 1973. The second resolution was then accepted despite the opposition or abstention of most developed nations.

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[16] United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2849 (XXVI), 20 December 1971, originally circulated as draft resolution A/C. 2/L. 1185. See footnote 147 in this chapter for a listing of the nations cosponsoring this resolution.

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With the major preparatory disputes thus reconciled, the fourth session of the Preparatory Committee met in New York City from 6-10 March 1972. The Soviet bloc refused to attend this session, but over fifty other nations participated, either as Committee members or as observers. The Committee dealt with the final report of the working groups drafting the Action Plan and International Declaration on the Human Environment, as well as with several proposals for post-Conference United Nations environmental programs. These included proposals for the formation of a Conference follow-up committee, the establishment of a permanent United Nations Environment Agency, and the creation of a United Nations Environment Fund.[17]

The Actors

Comparison of the roles played by the significant actors during the 1968-69 and 1970-72 preparatory periods reveals three major changes:

1. As the North-South cleavage became the dominant factor during 1970-72, the developing nations became far more involved than they had been previously.

2. The superpowers, which had played subdued roles in the earlier preparatory period, were more involved during the 1970-72 period. The Soviet Union's involvement centered on the East German question, while that of the

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[17]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/PC/15, 14 February 1972, p. 23.

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United States was equally related to the North-South aspects of the preparatory debates.

3. Several new major actors emerged during the 1970-72 period. These included participants, such as the Conference Secretary-General, that had not existed during the 1968-69 period, as well as several nations that had not previously demonstrated a particular interest in the Conference. This second category included such developing nations as Brazil, Chile, Sri Lanka, and Yugoslavia, as well as such developed nations as Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Brazil played the most significant role of any of the newly involved actors. This nation, which had enjoyed one of the highest sustained economic growth rates in the world since 1960, had been intent on becoming the "Japan of South America."[18] This desire for rapid industrialization and development had been reflected in Brazil's becoming one of the leaders in United Nations deliberations dealing with development issues as well as one of the most vocal members of the Group of 77.

The priority that Brazil gave to development questions was further reflected in its initial lack of interest in the Environment Conference. The Conference was perceived as little more than a gathering to discuss the pollution abatement problems of the industrialized world--a

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[18] *Time*, 28 January 1974, p. 51.

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matter that Brazil deemed to be of minimal concern to a developing nation.[19] (It will be recalled that Brazil was the only nation appointed to the Conference Preparatory Committee that had not participated during the 1968-69 preparatory period Conference-related deliberations.)[20] It was apparently only when the Brazilian representatives began to see the Conference as a threat to their national development priorities that they became involved in the preparatory process.

During the 1970-72 period the Brazilian Ambassador, Miguel A. Ozorio de Almeida, became the dominant influence in the reshaping of the Conference proposal much as Sweden's Aström had been the leading influence during the earlier preparatory period. Ambassador de Almeida was the most frequent advocate for the majority viewpoint on Environment Conference-related issues during 1970-72, just as Aström had been during 1968-69. Both men articulated and initiated the positions that were later officially adopted as United Nations policy.[21]

In the previous chapter an effort was made to gauge

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[19]Brito, "The Meaning and Scope of the Stockholm Conference from the Perspective of the Developing Countries," p. 2.

[20]See table 2.3 above.

[21]The Swedes remained deeply involved in the procedural and technical aspects of Conference planning during 1970-72. They seem to have tried, however, to avoid getting involved in those areas of Conference planning that related to the North-South cleavage. This hesitation may have reflected Sweden's role as Conference host.

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national participation during the 1968-69 preparatory period by examining participation in both years' Conference-related ECOSOC and General Assembly debates. During the 1970-72 preparatory period the Conference Preparatory Committee provided a third forum in which national participation could be examined. Most Conference-related procedural work was centered in this Committee, while issues of a political nature were debated in the General Assembly's Second Committee.

The creation of the Preparatory Committee and the growth of the Second Committee's role[22] may help explain the sharp drop in participation during the 1970 and 1971 ECOSOC debates dealing with the Environment Conference (see table 10 in the Appendix). The total of twenty-eight national interventions during the 1970 and 1971 debates represents less than half of the sixty-four national interventions during 1968 and 1969, while total interventions decreased in each successive year from 1968 to 1971 (41 in 1968, 23 in 1969, 16 in 1970, and 12 in 1971).[23] Furthermore, despite the developing nations' increased interest in the Environment Conference question during the 1970-71

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[22]In 1968, for example, ECOSOC debated and approved the resolution later adopted by the General Assembly, but by 1969 this role had been preempted by the Second Committee.

[23]The 1971 ECOSOC session endorsed the ECOSOC Coordinating Committee's report without any significant debate. Accordingly, the Coordinating Committee's deliberations have been utilized for our 1971 data rather than that of the regular Council meeting.

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period, there was a slight drop in their rate of ECOSOC intervention during the same period (from 44 percent to 36 percent of Conference-related interventions).[24] This probably reflects the fact that the substantive political decisions that were of particular interest to these nations were being discussed at the General Assembly rather than at ECOSOC.

The decline in the level of national participation in the ECOSOC debates dealing with the Environment Conference contrasts with a significant growth in participation in the General Assembly debates. Table 3.1 summarizes table 11 in the Appendix which examines national participation in the 1970-71 General Assembly debates, while table 3.2 contrasts this data with that of the 1968-69 preparatory period. Although the number of nations sponsoring a Conference-related resolution was similar during both periods (75 in 1968-69 and 84 in 1970-71), a significantly larger number of nations spoke during the 1970-71 debates concerning these resolutions (54 in 1968-69 as compared with 72 in 1970-71). Most of the nations intervening for the first time during the 1970-71 debates were developing nations. Only one-third of the developing nations spoke during the 1968-69 preparatory debates, while 48 percent did so during the 1970-71 period. While the latter figure was still well below the developed nations' 81 percent level for the same

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[24] See table 10 in the Appendix.

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TABLE 3.1

NATIONS PARTICIPATING IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE-RELATED DELIBERATIONS, 1970-71
(Totals from Table 11 in the Appendix)

Nation Group	United Nations Members	Members Sponsoring	Members Speaking	Members Not Participating
Latin America	24	15	12	6
Africa	41	25	19	11
Asia	27	17	13	7
Others (developing)	3	1	2	1
Total--developing	95	58	46	25
Western Europe	17	13	14	3
Eastern Europe	8	8	6	0
Others (developed)	7	5	6	1
Total--developed	32	26	26	4
Grand Total*	127	84	72	29

*Does not include Bahrain, Bhutan, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates which were all admitted to the United Nations in the fall of 1971, and did not speak at any Conference-related session during that year's General Assembly session.

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TABLE 3.2

PERCENTAGE OF NATIONS IN EACH NATIONAL GROUP THAT PARTICIPATED IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE-RELATED DELIBERATIONS, 1968-71

Nation Group	Percentage of Group Sponsoring		Percentage of Group Speaking		Percentage of Group Not Participating	
	1968-69	1970-71	1968-69	1970-71	1968-69	1970-71
Latin America	58	63	50	50	33	25
Africa	63	61	24	46	32	27
Asia	59	63	33	48	37	26
Others (developing)	33	33	33	67	67	33
Total--developing	60	61	34	48	35	26
Western Europe	59	76	65	82	24	18
Eastern Europe	38	100	75	75	25	0
Others (developed)	57	71	71	86	29	14
Total--developed	53	81	69	81	25	13

period, it nevertheless represented almost two-thirds of the developing nations that had sponsored a Conference-related resolution. This is in sharp contrast to the 1968-69 period when less than half of the developing nations sponsoring such resolutions intervened during Conference-related debates.[25]

Not only were there more nations participating in the 1970-71 General Assembly debates, but the politicization of the Environment Conference issue had changed the very nature of these deliberations. During 1968-69 the Conference-related debates had been little more than a series of endorsements for the Conference proposal, with most delegates taking the floor merely to provide pro forma support for the Swedish Conference-related resolutions. No nation had even felt compelled to intervene more than once during the 1968-69 Second Committee discussions. In 1970-71, on the other hand, twenty-seven nations intervened two or more times during at least one of the two years' Second Committee deliberations.[26]

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[25]While almost all national groups were more involved in 1970-71 than they had been during 1968-69, the greatest increase was that of the African nations, whose rate of participation almost doubled. The African rate, which was by far the lowest during 1968-69, was higher than that of the Latin American or Asian states during 1971.

[26]It should be noted that the African nations provided an exception to this proliferation of multiple interventions. Only one African country, Ghana, took the floor more than once at either year's Second Committee meetings. This contrasts with multiple interventions by five Latin American nations, five Asian nations, Yugoslavia, nine Western European nations, three Eastern European nations, and three other developed nations (see table 11 in the Appendix).

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TABLE 3.3

PERCENTAGE OF NATIONS IN EACH NATIONAL GROUP THAT ATTENDED SESSIONS OF THE ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (Either as Committee Members or as Observers)

	Percentage at Each Preparatory Session				Percentage Attending at Least One Session
	1	2	3	4	
Latin America	33	33	58	46	67
Africa	22	10	29	32	44
Asia	26	26	30	35	44
Others (developing)	33	33	67	67	67
Total--developing	26	19	38	37	50
Western Europe	59	71	71	76	82
Eastern Europe	50	75	87	0	87
Others (developed)	86	71	71	100	100
Total--developed	63	72	78	63	88

Table 3.3 summarizes tables 12 and 13 in the Appendix which examine national participation in the third forum under consideration--the Conference Preparatory Committee. Examination of table 12 reveals that eighteen of the twenty-seven Preparatory Committee members attended all four Committee sessions. Two other members, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, attended the first three sessions but boycotted the fourth session because of the East German question. This session was also boycotted by Guinea which had missed the second session as well. As for the six other Committee members, Mauritius only attended the first

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session, while the other five nations attended the three sessions held in New York but missed the second session, which was held in Geneva.[27] In addition, fifty-one other United Nations members attended at least one Preparatory Committee session as observers. Thus, 78 of the 132 members of the United Nations attended at least one of the Preparatory Committee sessions. Eighty-eight percent of the developed nations[28] and 50 percent of the developing nations participated in at least one session (see table 3.3). These rates of participation are similar to the rates of 81 percent and 48 percent recorded during the 1970-71 General Assembly debates.[29]

Table 3.4 demonstrates that the developed nations were far more likely to have attended all four Committee

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[27]The African nations were conspicuously absent from the Geneva meeting, as only two of their seven Committee members attended this session. This may reflect the African nations' limited staff resources. (See, for example, Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967, pp. 14-15.)

[28]Only four developed nations failed to attend any of the Preparatory Committee's meetings: Byelorussia, Greece, Ireland, and Luxembourg.

[29]Further comparison of the data in table 3.3 and the data in table 12 in the Appendix reveals that more Latin American and Eastern European nations attended at least one Preparatory Committee session than spoke during the General Assembly's debates, while the Western European figures for both functions were identical. More African and Asian states took part in the General Assembly's deliberations, however, than attended the meetings of the Preparatory Committee. This may reflect these nations' lack of personnel trained in the technical aspects of the human environment question which played a major role in the Preparatory Committee's work but was not a significant factor during the General Assembly's debates.

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TABLE 3.4

PERCENTAGE OF NATIONS IN EACH NATIONAL GROUP THAT ATTENDED PREPARATORY COMMITTEE SESSIONS

Nation Group	Percentage Attending All Four Sessions	Percentage Attending Three Sessions	Percentage Attending Two Sessions	Percentage Attending One Session	Percentage Not Attending Any Sessions
Latin America	17	13	29	8	33
Africa	5	10	15	15	55
Asia	15	11	4	22	48
Others (developing)	33	0	33	0	33
Total--developing	12	9	16	14	49
Western Europe	53	12	12	6	18
Eastern Europe	0	38	50	0	13
Others (developed)	71	14	0	14	0
Total--developed	44	19	19	6	13

sessions than were the developing nations. Over half of the Western European nations and over two-thirds of the Others (developed) nations attended all four sessions, as did only 12 percent of the developing nations and a mere 5 percent of the African nations.[30]

Not only did the developed nations enjoy a higher rate of representation at the Preparatory Committee than the developing nations, but their delegations to these sessions were significantly larger. Two-thirds of the participants in the Preparatory Committee's deliberations came from developed nations.[31] At each of the first three sessions the six largest delegations were from developed nations, while the nine delegations with only one representative at a Committee session were all from developing nations. This disparity was primarily a result of the large number of advisors attached to delegations from the developed nations. These advisors were usually environmental scientists or officials assigned to enforcing national environmental standards. Sweden alone had more advisors (forty) at the first three preparatory sessions

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[30]It should be noted that the data for the Eastern European nations was affected by the Soviet bloc's boycott of the fourth Preparatory Committee session. Had the Eastern European nations attended that session, their overall rate of attendance would have resembled that of the other developed nations.

[31]See table 12 in the Appendix. These figures are for the number of representatives at the first three Preparatory Committee sessions because this data was not made available for the fourth Committee session.

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than all seventeen developing nations on the Committee.[32] Only two of these nations (Argentina and Brazil) had advisors assigned to their delegations at each of the first three Committee sessions, while seven of the ten delegations from developed nations had advisors at all three sessions. Overall, some 84 percent of the advisors attending Preparatory Committee sessions were from developed nations.

The small number of advisors on the developing nations' delegations may reflect both their lack of interest in the technical aspects of Conference preparatory work, as well as their minimal expertise in traditional environmental science. The presence of so many experts from the developed nations may well have further reinforced the Northern view of the human environment question which dominated the early Preparatory Committee sessions.[33]

The Politics of the East-West Questions

The only significant East-West confrontation during the 1970-72 preparatory period was over the Vienna formula issue and the related question of East German participation at Stockholm. The compromise that had been arrived at

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[32]One factor adding to the large number of advisors assigned to the Swedish delegation was the presence on that delegation of representatives from the three other Scandinavian nations and Iceland who were classified as "special advisors." See United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/PC/6, 6 April 1970, p. 34 for an example of this practice at the first Preparatory Committee session.

[33]See, for example, ibid., p. 27.

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during the 1969 General Assembly session remained in effect until late in 1971. In accordance with this compromise, the entire question of who would be invited to Stockholm was avoided in all Conference-related resolutions and preparatory documents. This situation left the status quo intact--a state of affairs advantageous to the advocates of the Vienna formula.

The Soviet bloc, nevertheless, did not appear eager to challenge this formula during most of the second preparatory period. This reluctance seems to have been a result of the expectation that developments in Europe would allow the East German question to be resolved without a confrontation. The West German policy of Ostpolitik, as well as the increasingly prevalent spirit of East-West detente, both lent credence to these expectations. One widely expected result of the negotiations between the two Germanys was that East Germany would be admitted to the United Nations, and would therefore no longer be barred from conferences governed by the Vienna formula.[34] It was only in the closing weeks of 1971 that the Soviet bloc apparently

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[34]United States, Department of State, United States Foreign Policy, 1969-1970, General Foreign Policy Series 254, Pubn. 8575 (1971), p. 14. It is ironic to note that had these European negotiations been completed only a few months earlier the entire Vienna formula confrontation might well have been avoided. Less than six months after the Stockholm Conference, East Germany was overwhelmingly selected to serve on the United Nations Environment Programme Governing Council--a body created by the very Conference that the Soviet bloc had boycotted over the question of East German participation.

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realized that the overall German question would not be reconciled in time and mounted what will probably be remembered as the last attack on the application of the Vienna formula.[35]

Table 3.5 lists the nations that spoke on behalf of universal participation in the Stockholm Conference during the entire 1968-71 period. This table highlights the geographic and ideological nature of the objections to the utilization of the Vienna formula. With the exception of Sudan's 1969 and 1971 ECOSOC interventions, every nation advocating East German participation prior to the 1971 General Assembly session was from Eastern Europe.[36]

The Soviet Union was by far the most persistent

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[35]North Korea was admitted to the World Health Organization in the fall of 1972, as was North Vietnam in the summer of 1974. These events left Rhodesia as the only nation barred from participation in United Nations conferences because of the Vienna formula. It is highly unlikely that any United Nations faction will launch a campaign whose only net result would be to enfranchise this "outlaw" regime (see, for example, Makeyev [USSR], United Nations Document A/PV. 2026, 20 December 1971, p. 41).

[36]The East German question was not discussed in the reports of any of the three Preparatory Committee sessions, nor in any of the meetings of the various technical committees that discussed the Conference question. Even when the report of the first Preparatory Committee session explicitly called upon the Secretary-General to consult with "member states," the Soviet bloc nations did not object. (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/PC/6, 6 April 1970, p. 19. See also United Nations Document A/8309, 2 May 1971, p. 1, where Secretary-General U Thant reported the absence of any Soviet objection to the Preparatory Committee's language. See, however, Makeyev [USSR], United Nations Document A/PV. 2026, 20 December 1971, p. 41, where the Soviet delegate declared that his nation objected to the utilization of the Vienna formula at all three Preparatory Committee sessions.)

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TABLE 3.5

NATIONS THAT ADVOCATED UNIVERSAL PARTICIPATION IN THE ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE, 1968-71*

Nations	1968	1969				1970				1971				Total Interventions
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	
Soviet Union	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x		x	x	11
Poland			x				x					x	x	4
Bulgaria		x			x							x		3
Byelorussia			x				x					x		3
Czechoslovakia							x					x	x	3
Hungary									x			x	x	3
Yugoslavia						x						x	x	3
Nigeria												x	x	2
Sudan		x							x					2

Nations with only one intervention: #6--Romania, #11--Jamaica, #12--Cuba, Egypt, India, Ghana, Mali, Ukraine, #13--Finland, Peru.

*Explanation of column headings:

1. General Assembly plenary debate
2. ECOSOC session
3. Second Committee meeting
4. Third Committee meeting
5. General Assembly plenary debate
6. ECOSOC session
7. Second Committee meeting
8. Letter to Secretary-General
9. ECOSOC Coordinating Committee
10. ECOSOC session
11. General Assembly General Debate
12. Second Committee meeting
13. General Assembly plenary debate

advocate of East German Conference participation, raising the subject on more occasions than the next three nations combined. The Soviets appear, however, to have raised the issue in an almost pro forma fashion during most of the 1970-72 period. Thus, when the 1970 ECOSOC draft resolution failed to specify the nations that would be invited to Stockholm, the Soviet bloc's response was considerably less forceful than it had been the previous year, when the Soviet bloc nations had voted against a similar ECOSOC resolution.[37] Bulgaria, one of the two Soviet bloc members on the Council, did not even participate in the 1970 debate, leaving the Soviet Union as the only nation to stress the Vienna formula question.[38]

While Acting Conference Director Mussard expressed his personal agreement with the Soviet position, the

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[37]See chapter II, p. 83 above.

[38]Krylov (USSR), United Nations Document E/SR. 1718, 27 July 1970, pp. 198-99. Yugoslavia also mentioned the need for universal participation in the Conference, but singled out the People's Republic of China, rather than East Germany, as the state that was being discriminated against by the application of the Vienna formula (Skataretika [Yugoslavia], ibid., p. 201). The citation of China rather than East Germany may have been influenced by Yugoslavia's desire to further identify with the non-European, nonwhite, developing nations. Credence is lent to this explanation by the fact that the People's Republic of China had long made it clear that it would not attend any international conference with the Republic of China, and would accordingly not have come to Stockholm as long as Taiwan was in the United Nations. East Germany, on the other hand, had petitioned to attend the Conference, but was not mentioned in the Yugoslavian statement. An additional reason for Yugoslavia's action may have been its desire to avoid embroiling itself in an East-West dispute at a time when it was helping to lead the Southern group in the overall General Assembly North-South debate.

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resolution's sponsors refused to accept a Soviet amendment mandating universal Conference participation.[39] The Soviets responded to this rebuff with the relatively mild request that a separate vote be taken on the paragraph of the overall resolution which called for the submission of national environmental reports without specifying the nations from which they were to be solicited. Significantly, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria abstained during the vote on this paragraph rather than vote against the language to which they had objected. Both Bulgaria and the Soviet Union then joined in the unanimous vote for the overall draft resolution. This Soviet support for the ECOSOC resolution, as well as their failure to bring their amendment to a vote, suggests that the primary objective of their intervention had been to keep their objections to the Vienna formula "on the record."[40]

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[39]United Nations Document E/SR. 1719, 27 July 1970, p. 204. The Western nations' failure to respond publicly to Mussard suggests that these nations also expected events in Europe to solve the East German question. This may also explain the reluctance of Western nations to reply to Soviet speeches about the East German question throughout this period.

[40]Discussion of the East German question was similarly subdued during the fall 1970 General Assembly session. The Soviet Union did not even take the floor during the four Second Committee meetings devoted to discussing the Environment Conference. Furthermore, three of the four Soviet bloc nations that intervened during these meetings (Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia and Romania) gave only the most passing of references to the need for universal participation, while the fourth (Poland--the only nation to mention East Germany by name) briefly raised the Vienna formula as the last of several topics under discussion (Lacko [Czechoslovakia], United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1350, 30 November 1970, p. 9; Bisztyga [Poland], United

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This moratorium on the East German question remained in effect through the first half of 1971. The Soviet bloc's involvement with the Vienna formula issue during this period was limited to a formal objection to the sending of a questionnaire concerning the proposed Declaration on the Human Environment.[41] The Preparatory Committee had authorized such questionnaires to "member states," but the Secretary-General had followed the Vienna formula and had sent them to members of the specialized agencies as well. In deference to the Soviet objections, the Secretary-General agreed not to publish reports from any non-United Nations members until after the Preparatory Committee had discussed the question at its September session. He also reminded the Soviets that the Vienna formula, as mandated by the original 1968 resolution calling for the Conference, was still in effect, and had not been revoked by any United Nations body.[42]

The Secretary-General's warning, as well as the lack of a dramatic breakthrough in the talks between the two German states, may have helped influence the Soviet bloc's

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Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1351, 27 November 1970, p. 6; Kovalenko [Byelorussia], p. 17; and Niculescu [Romania], p. 26).

[41]United Nations Document A/8308, 20 April, 1971.

[42]United Nations Document A/8309, 7 May 1971, p. 2. Although the Secretary-General asked the Preparatory Committee to consider the participation question at its third session (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/PC/11, 30 July 1971, p. 60) there is no mention in that session's official report of it having been discussed (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/PC/13, 30 September 1971).

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decision to reopen the East German question. At the July meeting of the ECOSOC Coordinating Committee the Hungarian and Soviet delegates stressed that securing an invitation for East Germany would be the Soviet bloc's major policy priority during the 1971 ECOSOC and General Assembly discussions of the Stockholm Conference.[43] When the French and British delegates both objected that this matter was inappropriate for ECOSOC but belonged rather on the agenda of the General Assembly, Hungary agreed in principle but urged that action be taken "as soon as possible" to settle the question.[44]

The stage was thus set for the climactic debate on the East German question at the fall 1971 General Assembly session. The dominant issue during the early weeks of this session was the question of Chinese representation. The Soviet bloc apparently decided not to press the East German question until the Chinese question, with its precedent for universal participation, was settled. Accordingly, while twenty-one nations, including two Soviet bloc nations, mentioned the Stockholm Conference during their General Debate

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[43]Krylov (USSR) and Palotas (Hungary), United Nations Document E/AC. 24/SR. 414, 9 July 1971, pp. 39 and 41.

[44]Fernard-Laurent (France), United Nations Document E/AC. 24/SR. 412, 8 July 1971, p. 20; Milton (United Kingdom), United Nations Document E/AC. 24/SR. 413, 8 July 1971, p. 27; and Palotas (Hungary), United Nations Document E/AC. 24/SR. 414, 9 July 1971, p. 41. The only other Council member to mention the Vienna formula question was Sudan, which reiterated its 1969 position favoring East German Conference participation (Hamid [Sudan], United Nations Document E/AC. 24/SR. 412, 9 July 1971, p. 17).

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policy statements, most discussed the issue solely from the perspective of the North-South cleavage.[45]

On 25 October the General Assembly voted to seat the representatives of the People's Republic of China. After this historic vote the Assembly turned its attention to other items on its agenda which included, as item 47, the Human Environment Conference. During the Second Committee's eleven meetings dealing with the Conference, debate centered on two draft resolutions--A/C. 2/L. 1185, which reflected the demands of the developing nations, and A/C. 2/L. 1195, which was a procedural resolution formalizing the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee.

Most of the interventions during the Second Committee's debates dealt exclusively with North-South questions, as did all but two of the twenty proposed amendments to the

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[45]Jamaica was the only nation to raise the Vienna formula question during the 1971 General Debate (Gallimore [Jamaica], United Nations Document A/PV. 1957, 7 October 1971, p. 47). Jamaica was also the only Western nation to consistently support East Germany during the 1971 Second Committee and General Assembly debates. This is particularly significant since the Jamaicans voted with the United States on that year's key "important question" Chinese representation vote and abstained on the final China vote (United States, Department of State, United States Participation in the United Nations--1971, International Organization and Conference Series 104, Pubn. 8675 [1972], pp. 55-56). The Jamaican delegate explained his nation's seemingly anomalous position on this question by declaring that "we cannot expect to have the world half polluted and half clean" (United Nations Document A/PV. 1957, 7 October 1971, p. 47). While this may indeed have been the major consideration behind the Jamaican position, the fact that Jamaican Keith Johnson served as Chairman of the Conference Preparatory Committee may also have been a factor. The Jamaicans may have felt a special responsibility to avoid politicization of the Conference issue.

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two draft resolutions. The two exceptions both dealt with the question of national participation in the Stockholm Conference that resolution A/C. 2/L. 1195 had simply ignored.[46] The Western powers and the Soviet bloc both sought to amend this resolution in such a fashion as to reflect their position on the Vienna formula and East German questions.

The Western nations were the first to act. On 2 December, at the Committee's sixth meeting debating the Conference-related resolution, they offered an amendment (A/C. 2/L. 1202) to add the Vienna formula language to resolution 1195: "The General Assembly requests the Secretary-General to invite States Members of the United Nations or members of specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency to participate in the Conference."[47] The Soviet bloc responded several days later with their own subamendment (A/C. 2/L. 1212) to the Western amendment. The proposal by the Soviet bloc would have added the words "and other interested states" after the words "International Atomic Energy Agency" in the Western amendment, thus

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[46]The resolution mandated Conference invitations to representatives of United Nations specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and intergovernmental and nongovernmental agencies. No mention was made of nation states in the invitation formula, a decision that the British delegate later said was made in order to "keep contentious issues" out of the original draft (McCarthy [United Kingdom], United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1427, 7 December 1971, p. 7).

[47]United Nations Document A/C. 2/L. 1202, 2 December 1971.

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permitting the Secretary-General to invite East Germany to Stockholm.[48]

The debate over the Soviet and Western drafts reflected traditional East-West cleavage lines.[49] The sixteen nations cosponsoring subamendment 1212 were all closely identified with the Soviet bloc. All eight Eastern European members of the bloc served as cosponsors, as did Cuba and Mongolia, the two non-European bloc members. The other sponsoring nations were Egypt, Guinea, India, Somalia, and Syria, all deeply dependent on Soviet economic and military aid, and Yugoslavia, an independent Communist nation with close ties to East Germany. All but four of the interventions on behalf of East Germany during the Second Committee's deliberations came from one of these sponsoring states.[50]

The nations supporting amendment A/C. 2/L. 1202 were equally identifiable with the Western bloc. Three sponsoring nations, France, the United Kingdom and the United

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[48]United Nations Document A/C. 2/L. 1212, 9 December 1971.

[49]See tables 3.6 and 3.7 above which demonstrate the degree of polarization that marked this issue.

[50]The four exceptions were all African states--Cameroon, Ghana, Mali, and Nigeria--that briefly endorsed the concept of universal participation in the Stockholm Conference. Of these four, only Nigeria mentioned East Germany by name (Aruede [Nigeria], United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1438, 15 December 1971, p. 13). It should also be noted that Ghana abstained on the actual Second Committee vote on subamendment A/C. 2/L. 1212 (p. 18).

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States, were the Western nations with residual responsibility for Germany and Berlin since the Second World War. Four other cosponsors, Australia, Belgium, Italy, and New Zealand, were military allies of the United Kingdom and the United States. The amendment's six other cosponsors--the Dominican Republic, Lesotho, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, and Zaire--were all major recipients of military or economic aid from the Western powers.[51] None of these six states took the floor, however, to speak on behalf of the amendment they were cosponsoring. Togo, a former German colony with close ties to West Germany, was the only nation that was not a member of a Western military alliance to speak on behalf of amendment A/C. 2/L. 1202.

The arguments of those supporting East Germany followed three general themes:

1. The universal nature of the environmental problem

Several speakers echoed the Yugoslavian contention that "Pollution of the human environment constitutes a serious threat to humanity as a whole and requires universal action on the part of all states."[52] The unique

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[51]The Dominican Republic had been a major recipient of American aid since 1965 (United States Foreign Policy, 1969-1970, p. 16). Lesotho and Swaziland were heavily dependent on British aid, while Niger and Rwanda, two of the world's poorest nations, received aid from France and Belgium, respectively, and Zaire was a major African recipient of aid from the United States (p. 140).

[52]Cabric (Yugoslavia), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1426, 6 December 1971, p. 4. Despite the arguments for universal participation at Stockholm the Second

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contributions that East Germany could make towards helping to meet this worldwide threat were attested to through frequent references to that nation's experience and success in dealing with environmental problems created by "industrial development and the scientific and technological revolution."[53]

2. The changing political realities in Europe and the United Nations

In light of the China vote and West Germany's opening to the East, the Vienna formula was characterized as an anachronism "unearthed from the archives of the Cold War."[54] While the Soviet bloc admitted that the German negotiations were not yet completed, they emphasized that the Stockholm invitation would be an ad hoc decision reflecting the progress already made. Furthermore, an invitation to East Germany might hasten further progress by increasing cooperation and contacts between the two

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Committee's debate of the Vienna formula question was almost entirely a debate over East German participation. While Cuba referred to North Korea and North Vietnam during its Second Committee intervention (Ferdanez [Cuba], United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1427, 7 December 1971, p. 6), neither of these nations had applied to attend the Stockholm Conference and no other speaker mentioned them.

[53]Lacko (Czechoslovakia), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1424, 6 December 1971, p. 14. Several speakers made reference to East Germany's environmental protection achievements as reported in a letter from the East German Foreign Minister to the United Nations General Assembly (United Nations Document A/C. 2/269, 11 October 1971).

[54]Ananichev (USSR), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1425, 6 December 1971, p. 16.

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Germanys.[55]

3. The threat of a Soviet bloc boycott

The Soviet Union threatened to boycott the Environment Conference if East Germany was not invited. The Soviets suggested that the Western nations' real goal in refusing to invite East Germany was to exclude the Socialist nations from the Conference by insisting on an invitation formula that they knew these nations could not accept.[56] As the debate progressed, the Soviets repeated this boycott threat several times, concluding their final intervention with the declaration that, should East Germany be barred from Stockholm, the Soviet bloc nations "might feel themselves obliged not to participate in the Conference."[57]

The Western nations countered these Soviet bloc arguments by stressing the "delicate political balance which had enabled progress to be made on the German question."[58] These nations insisted that not only did they not seek to discriminate against East Germany, but that they would

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[55]Lacko (Czechoslovakia), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1438, 15 December 1971, p. 8. See also Cabric (Yugoslavia), p. 12 and Karkoszka (Poland), p. 14.

[56]Ananichev (USSR), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1425, 6 December 1971, p. 16.

[57]Makeyev (USSR), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1438, 15 December 1971, p. 17.

[58]McCarthy (United Kingdom), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1427, 7 December 1971, p. 16.

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welcome East German "observers" or "experts" at the Environment Conference.[59] They would not, however, accept any United Nations action that might endanger the negotiations in which the two Germanys were currently involved.

In examining the position of the Western nations it must be remembered that the presence of two German states in the United Nations was one of the Western nations' main bargaining points in their ongoing negotiations with East Germany.[60] If the United Nations would, through unilateral action, create a "two Germanys" situation at an international conference, this key bargaining point would be lost.[61] Furthermore, it was feared that the tenuous domestic West German consensus behind the policy of Ostpolitik might collapse if the United Nations would take such precipitous action.[62] Lastly, the Western powers were unwilling to accept the premise that the General Assembly could change the international status of East Germany without the consent of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the three Western nations that had been responsible for German affairs since the end of the Second World War. These nations were particularly wary about surrendering any of their "residual rights" in German affairs before the

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[59]Ibid.

[60]United States Foreign Policy, 1969-1970, p. 14.

[61]See, for example, McCarthy (United Kingdom), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1438, 15 December 1971, p. 3.

[62]Interview with Patricia Rambach.

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potentially explosive four-power Berlin negotiations were completed.[63]

On 9 December the Second Committee voted to reject the Soviet bloc's subamendment by a recorded roll call vote of 34 in favor, 53 against, with 22 abstentions (see table 3.6). The Committee then accepted the Western powers' amendment by a nonrecorded vote of 64 in favor, 21 against, with 20 abstentions. The overall resolution (A/C. 2/L. 1195) was then adopted as amended by a similarly nonrecorded vote of 94 in favor, 8 against, with 7 abstentions.

Most of the thirty-four nations that supported East German participation on the first Second Committee vote were either members of the Soviet bloc, nations that were deeply dependent on Soviet military aid (Egypt, India, Iraq, Somalia, Syria), leftist regimes (Algeria, Central African Republic, Chile, Congo, Equatorial Guinea), or Soviet neighbors that might be especially sensitive to the superpower's policy priorities (Afghanistan and Finland). On the other hand, the nations voting against the subamendment included almost every member of the Western military alliance and most of Latin America. China and its ally Albania were the only Communist states absent for the vote,

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[63]McCarthy (United Kingdom), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1438, 15 December 1971, p. 13. The question of the authority of the Western powers over Berlin had long been a major source of Cold War tension. The negotiations concerning the city's status were sensitive enough to perhaps be endangered by the suggestion that the Western powers had relinquished some part of their "residual rights."

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while a number of Western allies (such as Brazil, Japan, and Norway) abstained on the roll call.

The nations supporting East German participation at Stockholm responded to their Second Committee defeat by introducing two amendments to the Committee report when it came before the General Assembly for final approval. The first amendment, A/L. 661, submitted by Mongolia and the European Soviet bloc states (except for Romania), sought to postpone the Environment Conference until 1973. The issue of "national participation" in the Conference was to be left to the 1972 General Assembly, in the unlikely possibility that negotiations between the two Germanys had not already rendered the entire question irrelevant. The second amendment, A/L. 665, was offered by five other supporters of East Germany (Algeria, India, Romania, Yemen-PDR, and Yugoslavia) in an effort to offer a less extreme alternative to amendment A/L. 661. The second amendment mandated universal Conference participation and was identical to the Soviet bloc's subamendment that had already been rejected by the Second Committee.

The General Assembly debated the amendments to the Second Committee's report on 20 December 1971. The Soviet bloc nations stressed that their proposal to postpone the Conference was being made only to avoid an historic injustice to East Germany at the very time when a "generation

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of tensions" was being reconciled in Central Europe.[64] The Yugoslavian delegate made a similar point and declared that the nations sponsoring amendment A/L. 665 would support the Soviet proposal if their own amendment was defeated.[65]

Three Western nations, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, spoke against both amendments. All three nations stressed the unprecedented nature of the concession they had made by agreeing to have East German experts at the Conference as observers.[66] They warned that any hasty United Nations recognition of East Germany might endanger the shaky detente between the Germanys. As for the threats by the Soviet bloc nations to boycott the Conference, Australia rejected them as an effort to coerce the United Nations into making concessions it might later come to regret.[67]

The four other speakers during the debate all deplored the suggestion that a major international conference be postponed on such short notice and for reasons so unrelated to its primary and vital concern. Sweden, the initiator of the Conference proposal, made the strongest

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[64]See, for example, Lacko (Czechoslovakia), and Makeyev (USSR), United Nations Document A/PV. 2026, 20 December 1971, pp. 26 and 46.

[65]Capric (Yugoslavia), ibid., p. 33. The Soviet bloc nations similarly announced that they would drop their amendment if the Yugoslavian draft was accepted (see, for example, Jurasz [Poland], p. 21).

[66]Zagorin (United States), McCarthy (United Kingdom), and Joseph (Australia), ibid., pp. 46-50, 51-52, and 56-63.

[67]Ibid., p. 58.

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remarks along these lines, declaring that any postponement would "deal a severe blow to the cause of international cooperation."[68]

At the end of the 20 December debate the General Assembly rejected amendment A/L. 665 by a recorded roll call vote of 43 in favor, 57 against, with 20 abstentions. While the proposal to invite East Germany had received nine more votes than it had in the Second Committee, it was still defeated by fourteen votes. After this vote the General Assembly defeated the Soviet bloc's amendment (calling for a postponement of the Environment Conference) by a recorded vote of 17 in favor, 70 against, with 29 abstentions. The overall Second Committee resolution (A/C. 2/L. 1195) was then accepted by the overwhelming roll call margin of 104 in favor, 9 against, with 7 abstentions.

Immediately after the vote the Soviet Union announced, as it had threatened to, that the "Socialist nations" would boycott the Stockholm Conference and would vote against any United Nations budgetary proposals that included funds for the Conference or for the Preparatory Committee.[69]

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[68]Rydbeck (Sweden), ibid., p. 36. The three other speakers were Arnoud (Argentina), Edremoda (Nigeria), and Rivero (Peru), pp. 55-56, 65-66, and 52-55.

[69]Makeyev (USSR), ibid., pp. 74-76. See also the earlier Soviet vote in the Fifth Committee against the proposed Conference budget in protest to the Second Committee's position on the East German question (United Nations Document A/C. 5/SR. 1486, 20 December 1971, p. 20).

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Table 3.6 records how each United Nations member voted on the four 1971 roll call votes involving the East German question: the Second Committee vote on Soviet bloc subamendment A/C. 2/L. 1212, 9 December 1971; the General Assembly plenary vote on Yugoslavian amendment A/L. 665, 20 December 1971; the General Assembly plenary vote on Soviet bloc amendment A/L. 661, 20 December 1971; and the final General Assembly plenary vote on overall resolution A/C. 2/L. 1195, 20 December 1971. These four roll call votes are represented in the column headings of table 3.6 by the numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. An "E" represents a vote in support of the Soviet (Eastern) position (voting in favor on the first three votes and against on the fourth), and a "W" a vote in opposition to that position (in support of the Western position, voting in favor on the fourth vote and against on the first three). An "A" means that a nation abstained on the vote in question, while an "O" means that it was absent for the vote.

The most significant conclusion to be drawn from table 3.6 is that most non-Communist nations supporting East German participation at Stockholm were not prepared to sacrifice, or even postpone, the Conference because that participation was denied. While over one-third of the General Assembly's members supported amendment A/L. 665, less than half that many voted for Conference-postponing amendment A/L. 661, and only nine nations voted against procedural resolution A/C. 2/L. 1195 (in protest to its

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TABLE 3.6

NATIONAL VOTES ON THE EAST GERMAN QUESTION
AT THE 1971 GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION*

Nation	Roll Call			
	1	2	3	4
Latin America				
Argentina	W	W	W	W
Barbados	W	O	O	O
Bolivia	W	W	W	W
Brazil	A	A	W	W
Chile	E	E	E	A
Colombia	O	W	W	W
Costa Rica	W	W	W	W
Cuba	E	E	E	A
Dominican Republic	W	W	W	W
Ecuador	O	W	A	W
El Salvador	A	A	W	W
Guatemala	W	W	W	W
Guyana	A	A	A	W
Haiti	W	W	W	W
Honduras	W	W	W	W
Jamaica	E	E	W	A
Mexico	E	A	W	W
Nicaragua	W	W	W	W
Panama	W	W	W	W
Paraguay	W	W	W	W
Peru	A	E	A	W
Trinidad and Tobago	W	W	W	W
Uruguay	W	W	W	W
Venezuela	W	W	W	W
Africa				
Algeria	E	E	E	W
Botswana	O	E	W	W
Burundi	A	E	A	W
Cameroon	E	A	A	W
Central African Republic	E	W	A	W
Chad	O	E	A	W
Congo	E	E	A	E
Dahomey	W	W	W	W
Egypt	E	E	A	W
Equatorial Guinea	E	E	A	W
Ethiopia	E	E	W	W
Gabon	O	A	W	W
Gambia	O	O	O	O
Ghana	A	A	W	W
Guinea	E	E	E	A
Ivory Coast	A	W	W	W
Kenya	A	A	W	W
Lesotho	W	W	W	W
Liberia	W	W	W	W
Libya	O	E	A	W
Madagascar	W	W	W	W
Malawi	W	W	W	W
Mali	E	E	E	W
Mauritania	O	E	A	W
Mauritius	O	O	O	O
Morocco	O	A	W	W
Niger	W	W	W	W
Nigeria	E	E	W	W
Rwanda	W	W	W	W
Senegal	W	W	W	W
Sierra Leone	W	O	O	O
Somalia	E	E	A	W
Sudan	E	E	O	W
Swaziland	W	W	W	W
Tanzania	O	E	A	W
Togo	W	W	W	W
Tunisia	A	A	A	W
Uganda	A	E	A	W
Upper Volta	W	A	A	W
Zaire	W	W	W	W
Zambia	W	W	W	W

*See p. 154 for explanation of roll call and symbols.

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TABLE 3.6--Continued

Nation	Roll Call			
	1	2	3	4
Asia				
Afghanistan	E	E	A	W
Bahrain	O	E	A	W
Bhutan	O	O	O	O
Burma	A	A	A	W
China	O	O	O	O
Cyprus	A	A	A	W
India	E	E	A	A
Indonesia	A	A	A	W
Iran	W	W	W	W
Iraq	E	E	A	W
Jordan	O	W	W	W
Khmer	O	O	O	O
Kuwait	E	E	A	W
Laos	W	A	A	W
Lebanon	A	A	W	W
Malaysia	W	W	W	W
Maldives	O	O	O	O
Mongolia	E	E	E	E
Nepal	A	A	A	W
Oman	O	O	O	O
Pakistan	W	W	W	W
Philippines	W	W	W	W
Qatar	O	O	O	O
Saudi Arabia	O	O	O	W
Singapore	A	A	A	W
Sri Lanka	E	E	E	W
Syria	E	E	A	W
Thailand	W	W	W	W
Turkey	W	W	W	W
United Arab Emirates	O	E	O	W
Yemen	E	E	O	W
Yemen, PDR	O	E	E	W
Others (developing)				
Albania	O	E	O	O
Fiji	A	O	O	O
Yugoslavia	E	E	E	A

Nation	Roll Call			
	1	2	3	4
Western Europe				
Austria	W	W	W	W
Belgium	W	W	W	W
Denmark	A	W	W	W
Finland	E	E	W	W
France	W	W	W	W
Greece	W	W	W	W
Iceland	A	W	W	W
Ireland	W	W	W	W
Italy	W	W	W	W
Luxembourg	W	W	W	W
Malta	W	W	W	W
Netherlands	W	W	W	W
Norway	A	W	W	W
Portugal	W	W	W	W
Spain	W	W	W	W
Sweden	A	A	W	W
United Kingdom	W	W	W	W
Eastern Europe				
Bulgaria	E	E	E	E
Byelorussia	E	E	E	E
Czechoslovakia	E	E	E	E
Hungary	E	E	E	E
Poland	E	E	E	E
Romania	E	E	E	A
Ukraine	E	E	E	E
USSR	E	E	E	E
Others (developed)				
Australia	W	W	W	W
Canada	W	W	W	W
Israel	W	W	W	W
Japan	A	A	W	W
New Zealand	W	W	W	W
South Africa	W	W	W	W
United States	W	W	W	W

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containing the Vienna formula language). A second observation regards the degree of attrition in the once totally cohesive Communist bloc. Only the hard core Eastern European Soviet bloc states and Mongolia sided with the Soviet Union on all four votes. The Communist regimes of Cuba, Romania, and Yugoslavia abstained on the fourth vote, while the newly admitted People's Republic of China missed all four votes and Albania only voted on amendment A/L. 665.

The greatest drop in support for the Soviet position occurred between the votes on amendment A/L. 665, which would have mandated an invitation to East Germany, and amendment A/L. 661, which would have postponed the Stockholm Conference for a year. Five nations that voted for the first amendment voted against the second amendment,[70] while seventeen other supporters of the former amendment (including such staunch Soviet allies as Egypt, India, Iraq, and Syria) abstained during the vote on the latter amendment. Furthermore, a number of Western nations, including Brazil, Japan, and Sweden that had abstained on the earlier East German votes, voted against the effort to postpone the Conference.[71]

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[70]Botswana, Ethiopia, Finland, Jamaica, and Nigeria. The four latter nations had shown a considerable interest in the Conference, and since they were not Communist regimes or heavily dependent on Soviet aid, they had no compelling reason to vote for postponement. Apparently, their commitment to the Conference overrode their desire to see East Germany participate.

[71]The cases of Sweden and Brazil are similar. Sweden, the initiator of the Conference proposal, had apparently abstained on the earlier votes in order to avoid taking a

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Table 3.7 demonstrates the degree of support that each United Nations member gave to the Soviet position on the East German question during the four 1971 roll calls. For each vote similar to the Soviet position, a nation received one positive "point," and for each vote opposed to the Soviet position one negative "point" was awarded. Only seven Eastern European states and Mongolia had perfect +4 records. On the other hand, forty-nine nations had perfect -4 records. This East-West polarization was most intense in Europe, where only the Scandinavian nations and the independent Communist states in the Southern Balkans had a rating between the two extremes.

Of the 110 United Nations members with either a positive or negative rating, 80 had negative "Western" ratings and only 30 nations had positive "Eastern" ratings. These thirty nations almost all had Communist or Marxist regimes, or enjoyed close economic and military ties with the Soviet bloc. Most of them regularly voted with the Soviet bloc on East-West issues. Twenty-nine of them, for example, sided with the supporters of the People's Republic of China on all three of the 1971 Chinese representation votes.[72] The

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political stand on an issue affecting the Conference it would be hosting. Brazil, although staunchly anti-Communist, had abstained on the earlier votes in order to avoid alienating developing nations whose votes it needed to maintain a united front on North-South issues. Neither nation considered postponement of the Conference to be a tolerable alternative (interview with Bernardo Brito).

[72] United States Participation in the United Nations--1971, pp. 56-57.

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TABLE 3.7

DEGREE OF NATIONAL SUPPORT FOR SOVIET POSITION ON EAST GERMAN QUESTION AT 1971 GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION

Nation Group	Level of Support			
	+4	+3	+2	+1
Latin America		Chile Cuba		Jamaica
Africa[1]		Congo Guinea	Algeria Mali	Egypt Equatorial Guinea Somalia Sudan[3]
Asia[2]	Mongolia		India Sri Lanka	Afghanistan Iraq Kuwait Syria Yemen[3] Yemen, PDR[3]
Others (Developing)		Yugoslavia		Albania[3]

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TABLE 3.7--Continued

Level of Support				
0	-1	-2	-3	-4
Peru	Barbados[5] Guyana Mexico	Brazil Ecuador[3] El Salvador	Colombia[3]	Argentina Bolivia Costa Rica Dominican Republic Guatemala Haiti Honduras Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Trinidad and Tobago Uruguay Venezuela
Burundi Cameroon Chad[3] Ethiopia Libya[3] Mauritania[3] Nigeria Tanzania[3] Uganda	Botswana[3] Central African Republic Gabon[3] Morocco[3] Sierra Leone[5] Tunisia	Ghana Kenya Upper Volta	Ivory Coast	Dahomey Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Niger Rwanda Senegal Swaziland Togo Zaire Zambia
Bahrain[3] United Arab Emirates[4]	Burma Cyprus Indonesia Nepal Saudi Arabia[5] Singapore	Laos Lebanon	Jordan[3]	Iran Malaysia Pakistan Philippines Thailand Turkey
Fiji[5]				

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TABLE 3.7--Continued

Nation Group	Level of Support			
	+4	+3	+2	+1
Western Europe				
Eastern Europe	Bulgaria Byelorussia Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland Ukraine USSR	Romania		
Others (developed)				

[1]Gambia and Mauritius were absent for all four votes.

[2]Bhutan, China, Khmer, Maldives, Oman, and Qatar were absent for all four votes.

[3]Absent for one vote.

[4]Absent for two votes.

[5]Absent for three votes.

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TABLE 3.7--Continued

Level of Support				
0	-1	-2	-3	-4
Finland		Sweden	Denmark Iceland Norway	Austria Belgium France Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Portugal Spain United Kingdom
		Japan		Australia Canada Israel New Zealand South Africa United States

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lone exception was Jamaica, a nation whose strong support for East Germany did not prevent it from voting with the West or abstaining on other East-West issues during 1971.[73]

The disparity between the sizes of the Eastern and Western groups on the East German issue suggests that when the Western powers were united they could still control United Nations votes on East-West questions. Both the success of the Western powers in the perennial Korean question vote[74] and the defeat of the United States position in the 1971 China vote (in which Britain, Canada, and France backed the People's Republic of China), lend credence to this viewpoint.

The Politics of the North-South Questions

The major Environment Conference-related political development of the 1970-71 period was the polarization of the preparatory process along North-South interest lines. During the 1968-69 preparatory period most developing nations had either ignored or perfunctorily endorsed the Conference proposal. During the 1970-71 period these same nations initiated and steadily escalated a series of demands that succeeded in restructuring and redirecting the Conference in the image of their unique political priorities.

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[73] See footnote 45 above, for a discussion of the Jamaican position on the East German question.

[74] This observation is based on the annual vote on disbanding the United Nations force in South Korea, an effort that failed at every General Assembly session between 1970 and 1975.

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The question of the relationship between development and environment was central to these new Southern oriented Conference priorities. While environmentalists in the developed nations had emphasized the perils of overindustrialization, the representatives of the developing nations now argued that most environmental problems came from underdevelopment, exploitation, racism, and the lack of adequate aid from the developed nations. International environmental action, they declared, must center not merely on cleansing the fouled habitat of the haves, but also on assuring an adequate human environment for the far more numerous have-nots. If the Stockholm Environment Conference would not be an "economic development conference" as well, it would be irrelevant to the needs of the developing nations.[75]

The linkage of the development and environment issues appears to have been responsible for the already noted significant upsurge of interest in the Conference on the part of many developing nations (see table 3.1 above). Examination of table 3.8 reveals that this pattern of increased involvement did not extend to the least developed Southern nations.[76] This finding is in particular contrast

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[75]de Almeida (Brazil), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1422, 1 December 1971, p. 13.

[76]The least developed Southern nations may have lacked the diplomatic resources to have as many priority international issues as the other, relatively more developed, Southern nations (Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967, pp. 17-18). This hypothesis is further

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TABLE 3.8

CORRELATION OF DEVELOPMENT INDEX RANKING AND PARTICIPATION IN PREPARATORY WORK FOR THE ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE

Rank on Development Index	Percentage of Nations Participating in Preparatory Debates*				Average Number of Preparatory Committee Sessions Attended**	
	Percentage of Developed Nations		Percentage of Developing Nations		Developed Nations	Developing Nations
	1968-69	1970-71	1968-69	1970-71		
In upper third	90	80	47	59	3.5	1.9
In middle third	90	100	26	44	3.6	.9
In lower third	30	70	27	33	1.5	.7

*Based on table 8 in the Appendix.

**Based on tables 12 and 13 in the Appendix.

to the marked increase in participation during this period on the part of the least developed Northern nations, which had previosuly shown little interest in the original Conference concern with questions of industrial pollution. Once the Conference issue acquired North-South political overtones, these nations achieved a level of participation equal to that of the other developed nations whose political interests they shared.

The increased involvement on the part of the least developed Northern nations was not reflected in their relatively low rate of participation in the sessions of the Preparatory Committee. This suggests that these nations were more interested in the political aspects of the Conference, dealt with in the United Nations debates, than in the technical and procedural details that dominated the agenda of the Preparatory Committee.

In the previous chapter five increasingly pro-Southern categories were delineated into which virtually all references to the development question could be placed.[77] During the 1968-69 period most discussions of the development issue fell into the first two categories, which stressed the benefits the developing nations would gain from an examination of Northern environmental problems.

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supported by the fact that most of these nations voted with the South on Conference-related roll calls, while not participating in any of the Conference-related debates.

[77]See chapter II, pp. 92-93 above.

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During the 1970-71 period the developing nations' emphasis gradually shifted to the increasingly pro-Southern positions reflected in categories three, four, and five. Each time the developed nations reluctantly acquiesced to a new Southern-inspired shift in emphasis, the more strident developing nations demanded and received acceptance of an even more pro-Southern position.

Table 3.9 contrasts the position taken by United Nations members on the development question during the 1968-69 and 1970-71 preparatory debates and demonstrates the degree of North-South polarization that prevailed during the latter period. The more pro-Southern a position was, the less likely it was to be embraced by a participant in the 1968-69 deliberations. During the 1970-71 period, however, over half of the statements by developing nations that mentioned the development question adopted one of the two most radical pro-Southern positions (categories four and five). Only nine Southern statements supported the once popular "benefits" approach during 1970-71, while only five Northern statements advocated a position that could be classified as belonging to categories four or five.

The first stirrings

In examining this North-South polarization the first question to be considered is not why the earlier consensus collapsed, but why it lasted as long as it did. Despite the considerable evidence that human environment and development priorities were often contradictory, the developing

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TABLE 3.9

POSITIONS TAKEN BY DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING NATIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT QUESTION DURING ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE-RELATED DELIBERATIONS, 1968-71
(Based on Table 9 in the Appendix)

	Developed Nations		Developing Nations		Total	
	1968-69	1970-71	1968-69	1970-71	1968-69	1970-71
No mention of issue	36	24	26	13	62	37
Category one	13	8	13	8	26	16
Category two	6	10	11	1	17	11
Category three	2	6	10	9	12	15
Category four	0	2	4	6	4	8
Category five	1	3	3	21	4	24
Others	2	10*	0	3	2	13
Total number of interventions	60	63	67	61	127	124

*Nine of these interventions were in response to category four and category five statements by developing nations.

nations had virtually ignored this aspect of the Conference question until the fall of 1970--over two years after the initial Conference proposal.

As early as the 1968 ECOSOC session the Congo had warned that environmental considerations might be used as an excuse to freeze the international status quo to the permanent disadvantage of the developing nations.[78] Not only did the other developing nations ignore the Congolese warning, but they failed to respond even when recommendation 19 of the Secretary-General's definitive 1968 report on the Conference proposal called for the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program to examine the environmental implications of all development proposals for which funding was being requested.[79]

The lack of response by the developing nations to this call for environmental strictures on development aid is all the more remarkable in light of the similarity between recommendation 19 and the 1970 promise by World Bank president Robert McNamara to scrutinize proposals for aid to development projects in the light of environmental considerations.[80] While the earlier proposal had been virtually ignored, the McNamara statement was met by a storm of protest at the United Nations and has been credited with

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[78]See chapter II, pp. 96-99 above.

[79]United Nations Document A/7291, 6 November 1968, p. 25.

[80]Cited by de Castro (Brazil), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1350, 30 November 1970, pp. 12-13.

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helping to arouse Southern suspicions of the entire Environment Conference initiative.[81]

The developing nations appear not to have paid careful attention to the early Conference-related proposals because of their assumption that the Conference would deal only with the problems of wealthy industrial lands. These nations apparently began to consider the implications of the Conference proposal only after the developed nations had urged them to become involved in the preparatory work for the Conference. The 1970-71 polarization between the developed and developing nations over the Environment Conference question can thus be viewed, in part, as a result of the efforts of the former nations to generate increased interest in the Conference on the part of the latter nations.

These efforts to arouse the interest of the developing nations in the proposed Conference first appeared on the official record during the first session of the Preparatory Committee in March 1970. While the Committee's report continued to define the Conference's goals in terms of the primarily Northern problems of pollution and industrialization,[82] it also recognized that many developing nations would have to be assured of some immediate tangible advantages if they were to be convinced to attend the Conference.[83]

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[81]Interview with Patricia Rambach.

[82]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/PC/6, 6 April 1970, pp. 6-8.

[83]Ibid., p. 7.

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In order to ensure this participation the Committee's report made several suggestions:

1. The Conference Secretariat should consult with the developing nations at all stages of planning for the Conference

2. Case studies should be solicited from the developing nations dealing with their special environmental problems

3. The proposed Declaration on the Human Environment should consider "environmental stresses caused by the difference in social and economic development between various parts of the world"

4. The Conference agenda should contain "an appropriate balance" between the environmental problems of developed and developing nations[84]

These proposals represented the first formal recognition of our category three approach to the development question--that the developing nations have their own unique environmental problems that the Conference must examine. It is significant that this new approach appears to have come, not in response to any particular complaint by the developing nations, but as a result of the desire of the Conference planners to increase the interest of these nations in the Conference.[85]

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[84]Ibid., pp. 6, 19, 22, and 23.

[85]Another example of the Conference planners taking the initiative in relation to the developing nations is provided by the June 1970 meeting of Conference Director

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The emphasis on securing the participation of the developing nations continued at the July 1970 ECOSOC session. The Norwegian draft resolution presented at the Council's first meeting (E/L. 1352) included a call for discussion of environmental problems unique to the developing nations (paragraph 5); for the solicitation of national reports from the developing nations (paragraph 8); and for United Nations aid to assist these nations in preparing for the Conference (paragraph 15). This emphasis contrasted with the previous ECOSOC resolutions that had not even mentioned the developing nations.

Mussard with the Executive Secretaries of the four non-European United Nations regional Economic Commissions. At this meeting he urged them to generate increased interest in the Environment Conference within their respective regions. Mussard assured the Secretaries that the Conference would be organized "in such a way that developing countries could derive maximum benefit from it" (United Nations Document, E/4859, 6 July 1970, p. 17). It was as a direct result of this request that the Environment Conference was placed on the agenda of the 1971 meetings of all four regional Commissions (p. 18). Similarly, the highly controversial issue of additional aid to the developing countries was first raised at this time by United Nations Secretary-General U Thant when he suggested that $65,000 in financial help be given to the developing nations in order to assist them in preparing for the Stockholm Conference (United Nations Document E/4828, 19 June 1970, p. 5). The inclusion of this aid request in the Secretary-General's proposed revised Conference budget may have reflected the need to win the support of the developing nations for the $444,600 increase in funds in the new budget for the Conference Secretariat and staff. As this represented a 33 percent increase in the entire Conference budget, it might well have resulted in protests by the developing nations if they had continued to perceive the Conference as being purely of interest to the developed nations. It might even be suggested that much of the early stress on the importance of the participation of the developing nations reflected the need to win continued budgetary support for the Conference in a General Assembly dominated by developing nations.

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Conference Director Mussard and the Norwegian delegate presenting the draft resolution were the first two speakers at the ECOSOC meeting. Both stressed the need to deal with the concerns of the developing nations within the framework of the existing Conference preparatory plans.[86] This approach was rejected by the next speaker, Ambassador de Arajo Castro of Brazil, who argued that "the work of the Preparatory Committee had been concentrated chiefly on the problems and preferences of the developed countries, without taking sufficient account of the needs and conditions of the developing countries." The Preparatory Committee, he declared, was asking the developing nations to consider "a policy of stagnation whereby, for the sake of preservation of the environment, certain regions would become nature reserves, intended to compensate for the pollution factors existing in the developed countries." He stressed that the Conference must not deal exclusively with the "dangers of rapid industrialization," but must also consider problems of trade, aid, and control over natural resources which threatened the already perilously inadequate quality of life in the developing nations. De Castro concluded his speech with a brief manifesto that would later become the cornerstone of the developing nations' position on the human environment issues: "Policies and programmes directed to the preservation of the human

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[86]Cappelen (Norway) and Mussard, United Nations Document E/SR. 1718, 27 July 1970, pp. 198 and 198-99.

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environment should be formulated in the light of development objectives."[87]

De Castro's remarks failed, despite their controversial character, to elicit any substantial support from the other Southern nations on the Council.[88] Three developed nations chose, however, to respond to the Brazilian critique. The Canadian delegate was the first to take the floor, reminding the developing nations that "it was inevitable that some environmental problems dealt with at the Conference would, at least for the time being, be of primary concern to the industrialized countries."[89] The French delegate then declared that the developing nations must bear in mind that misuse of their resources could endanger the total human environment.[90] The third speaker,

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[87]de Castro (Brazil), ibid., p. 199.

[88]Twelve of the seventeen developing nations serving on the Council did not even take the floor during the discussions concerning the Environment Conference. Of the four other members, two (Argentina and Jamaica) ignored the development issue in their remarks before the Council, and one (Tunisia) limited its mention of the issue to an expression of thanks to the Preparatory Committee for its interest in the developing nations' needs (Driss [Tunisia], United Nations Document E/SR. 1719, 27 July 1970, p. 203). Only the Yugoslavian delegate echoed some of the Brazilian criticism, expressing the fear that domestic environmental measures taken by some developed nations might increase the price that developing nations would have to pay these nations for their manufactured products (Skataretiko [Yugoslavia], United Nations Document E/SR. 1718, 27 July 1970, p. 201).

[89]Spencer (Canada), ibid., p. 200.

[90]Auger (France), ibid. The French delegate's opening comments seem almost unbelievable when read with the hindsight of post-Conference sensitivity to North-South aspects of the Environment question. He began his remarks

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the American delegate, took pains, however, to note that his delegation, unlike the Canadian and French, "endorsed" the Brazilian comments and agreed that the "Conference should not merely aim at preserving a primitive aspect of the world."[91]

At the Council's final meeting dealing with the Environment Conference Brazil's de Castro suggested an amendment to the draft resolution, which, after its prompt acceptance by the sponsors of the resolution, placed the Council on record as:

> agree[ing] with the Preparatory Committee that areas for immediate action should be identified prior to the 1972 Conference and that, to this end, work should be started at the second session, taking into account the various economic, social and other aspects involved.[92]

It is interesting to note that Brazil introduced such an incremental amendment after its earlier criticism had demanded a radical overhaul of the Conference's priorities. Perhaps the lack of response from the other developing

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by questioning the necessity for even holding the Stockholm Conference since the 1971 Conference in Prague of the Economic Commission for Europe would "cover the same problems." Astonishingly enough, none of the developing nations rose to challenge this suggestion that there was no difference between their environmental problems and those of Europe--the most highly developed continent.

[91]Olds (United States), ibid. This endorsement raises the question as to whether the American delegate understood the implications inherent in the Brazilian manifesto. Certainly the American position during the subsequent preparatory debates had a good deal more in common with the French and Canadian ECOSOC statements than it did with that of Brazil.

[92]United Nations Document E/SR. 1719, 27 July 1970, p. 204.

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nations had convinced the Brazilians that this relatively mild amendment was the best they could hope to have accepted at this time. Furthermore, the resolution, despite its apparent blandness, marked the formal ascendancy of our category three approach to the development question--the recognition that there were environmental problems unique to the developing nations. At the same time, the international consensus in support of the Conference remained very much intact, albeit with a slight shift in emphasis insofar as the development issue was concerned (from the first two benefits categories to the category three approach).[93]

The 1970 General Assembly session

The Environment Conference did not appear to be a controversial matter during the opening stages of the 1970 General Assembly session. Only three nations, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United States, mentioned the Conference during the Assembly's General Debate. Even these nations only raised the Conference question in order to briefly reiterate their support for the Conference in familiar terms.[94] The revised Conference budget was

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[93]These first three approaches to the development question were by no means mutually exclusive. The fact that the ECOSOC resolution had embraced the category three approach did not suggest that the other two approaches had been discredited.

[94]Caglayangil (Turkey), United Nations Document A/PV. 1849, 24 September 1970, p. 11; Yost (United States), United Nations Document A/PV. 1854, 30 September 1970, p. 5, and Luns (Netherlands), United Nations Document A/PV. 1855, 30 September 1970, p. 15.

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passed by the Assembly's Fifth Committee and by the General Assembly plenary without any significant debate.[95]

It was against this placid background of continued consensus that the Second Committee met in late November to discuss the Swedish procedural draft resolution (A/C. 2/L. 1133) approving the previous work of the Preparatory Committee and mandating two additional Committee sessions during 1971. Before the Second Committee's first meeting the Brazilian delegation requested that the proposed resolution be revised to recognize the particular needs of the developing nations as defined by that summer's amended ECOSOC resolution.[96] The resolution's sponsors acceded to the Brazilian request and revised their draft to declare that "environmental policies should be considered in the context of economic and social development, taking into account the special needs of development in developing countries."[97] In addition, the revised resolution mandated the Preparatory Committee to add new items to the proposed Conference agenda "relating to economic and social aspects . . . in order to safeguard and promote the interests of developing countries."[98] The fourteen cosponsors of the

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[95]United Nations Document A/8196, 4 December 1970, p. 2.

[96]See Rydbeck (Sweden), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1355, 30 November 1970, p. 14.

[97]United Nations Resolution A/C. 2/L. 1333/Rev. 1, 23 November 1970, eighth preambular paragraph.

[98]Ibid., fourth operative paragraph.

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revised resolution[99] were evenly divided between developed and developing nations and included such outspoken Southern spokesmen as India and Yugoslavia. Both the mention in the resolution of the developing nations' problems and the fact that these nations had made few previous Conference-related demands seemed to assure against any major cleavage along North-South lines.[100]

The first voice of disagreement to this consensus was raised, as it had been at that summer's ECOSOC session, by Brazil's Ambassador de Castro, who reiterated his conviction that "survival compatible with human dignity" was the fundamental environmental problem for the two-thirds of mankind living in developing nations.[101] The only solution to these environmental problems was massive development, and such development required increased financial aid from the developed nations. Not only, he continued, were the developed nations not prepared to volunteer such aid, but they were, under the guise of environmental protection measures, suggesting steps that would add additional burdens to the already suffering developing nations. In particular,

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[99]Argentina, Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, India, Iran, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, Sweden, Yugoslavia, and Zambia.

[100]Not only did the revised resolution reflect the developing nations' concerns, but newly appointed Conference Secretary-General Maurice Strong made it clear that he shared these concerns in his first public statement as Secretary-General (United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1350, 30 November 1970, p. 2).

[101]de Castro (Brazil), Ibid., p. 11.

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de Castro singled out the October announcement by World Bank President Robert McNamara that the World Bank had established a new office to examine "the environmental consequences of development projects proposed for financing."[102]

Only four months earlier the Brazilian challenge to the Environment Conference had been ignored by the other developing nations serving on ECOSOC. Now, however, a similar challenge was enthusiastically endorsed by a broad cross section of developing nations. These nations warned the Second Committee that "the protection of the human environment should in no case lead to any slowing down of development,"[103] and that "international legal norms relating to the human environment should not constitute an obstacle to economic development."[104]

The McNamara announcement appears to have been a crucial factor in this sudden change in the attitude of the developing nations, as it provided a clear indication of how international environmental standards might limit national development plans. Even the Philippines, which had been one of the Conference's most enthusiastic Southern supporters, now took the floor to declare that "the main reason for holding the Conference was to find ways and means of

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[102]Cited by de Castro (Brazil), ibid., p. 13.

[103]Hoveyda (Iran), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1351, 27 November 1970, p. 9.

[104]Mojsov (Yugoslavia), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1350, 30 November 1970, p. 16.

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contributing to the improvement of the human condition and of enabling two-thirds of mankind to rise above its present situation."[105]

Singapore was the only developing nation to challenge the Brazilian position, declaring that de Castro's fears were "absolutely unreasonable and without foundation." It was undeniable, the delegate from Singapore admitted, that there were injustices relating to international trade and development aid, "but how was [that] problem related to the environment?"[106] Singapore's unique position as an urban island-nation must be considered in examining this statement, as well as in understanding that nation's equally iconoclastic voting pattern on preparatory period Environment Conference-related North-South questions. Singapore, with the pollution problems of a modern big city, apparently shared many of the environmental concerns of the developed nations.

The developed nations, however, refrained from criticizing the Brazilian remarks. The continued advantages of consensual support for the revised resolution appears to have outweighed whatever qualms these may have had with the tenor of the Brazilian position.[107]

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[105]Fernandini (Philippines), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1352, 1 December 1970, p. 6.

[106]Koh (Singapore), ibid., p. 2.

[107]Even de Castro, while deploring the resolution's "moderation," had nonetheless declared that Brazil would support it (de Castro [Brazil], United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1350, 30 November 1970, p. 13).

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The international consensus in support of the Environment Conference collapsed, however, at the Second Committee's meeting on 27 November with the defection of two of the supporters of the revised draft resolution. The first defection came at the opening of the meeting when Czechoslovakia announced that it was withdrawing as a co-sponsor of the Swedish resolution. The Czech withdrawal was to protest the proposed resolution's call on the Conference to "promote action which will help maintain the ecological balance on which human survival depends." The Czech delegate insisted that the last four words in this phrase were contrary to the Marxist philosophic dictum that human survival depends on economic, not ecological, realities. Not only did Czechoslovakia withdraw as a sponsor of the resolution, but the entire Soviet bloc abstained on every vote involving the offensive language in both the Second Committee and the General Assembly.[108]

The second defection was that of five developing nations (Brazil, Ceylon, Chile, Nigeria, and Sudan) who introduced a last minute amendment to the draft resolution. The amendment, which was submitted without the customary

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[108]It should be noted that this allegedly philosophical objection provided the Soviet bloc with an excuse to avoid having to choose between the developed and developing nations. The fact that Czechoslovakia cosponsored the draft resolution for over two weeks despite the presence of the offensive wording lends credence to a skeptical interpretation of the Soviet bloc's motivation. See also footnote 119 below.

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consultations with the sponsors of the original draft,[109] called on the General Assembly to recommend:

> that the Preparatory Committee, in its global and comprehensive preparations for the Conference of 1972, consider, inter alia, the financing of possible action in this field with a view to ensuring that additional resources be provided to developing countries in the context of the protection of the environment.[110]

This request for additional development aid funds represented an escalation from our category three to our category four approach to the development issue. During the two and a half years of Conference-related deliberations, prior to the introduction of this amendment, over 90 percent of the developed nations and over 75 percent of the developing nations discussing the Environment Conference had taken a position that could be placed in one of our first three categories. After the amendment's introduction this consensus disappeared as over 80 percent of the developing nations relied on the militantly pro-Southern category four and five approaches during the last year of Conference-related deliberations (see table 3.9 above).

The consideration by the Second Committee of the developing nations' amendment found most United Nations members on predictable sides of the North-South cleavage. Chile and Ceylon defended their amendment as timely and necessary, while Sweden and the Netherlands deplored the

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[109]United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1355, 30 November 1970, p. 14.

[110]United Nations Document A/8195, 3 December 1970, p. 3.

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last minute introduction of such a significant new concept as financial aid. Brazil responded to this Northern argument by describing the amendment as a logical extension of the Conference's mandate to "search out the root causes of the environment problem" which, in the case of the developing nations, meant the active combatting of economic underdevelopment.[111] Even such developing nations as Argentina and Iraq, which felt that the amendment was being introduced at too late an hour, nevertheless defended the aid concept as an appropriate measure to be discussed at a later date.[112] With the lines thus drawn, the amendment passed by a vote of 28 in favor, 22 against, with 34 abstentions. While a recorded roll call was not taken, it is obvious that many developing nations chose to abstain on this first development issue vote. The large number of abstentions probably reflected the fact that the hasty submission of the amendment did not give delegations adequate time to consult with their governments.[113]

On 7 December the General Assembly considered the amended Second Committee resolution. Brazil requested a separate roll call vote on the paragraph dealing with the aid question so that each nation would be forced to take a

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[111]Brito (Brazil), Breckenridge (Ceylon), Cubillos (Chile), Ringnalda (Netherlands), and Rydbeck (Sweden), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1355, 30 November 1970, pp. 12, 13, 14, 14, and 15.

[112]Bradley (Argentina) and Ali (Iraq), ibid., pp. 13 and 15.

[113]Rydbeck (Sweden), ibid., p. 14.

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position on this issue. The Brazilian delegate took the floor to declare:

> This is not a simple vote. It is a major policy decision, on the basis of which the developing countries will be able to measure the degree of truth contained in the statement that environmental policies will be defined in the context of development.[114]

The General Assembly then adopted the Brazilian amendment by a recorded roll call vote of 58 in favor, 10 against, with 28 abstentions. This vote is recorded in table 3.10. Only one developed nation voted for the amendment, while no developing nation voted against it. The ten nations voting against the amendment included every major contributor to United Nations development funds with the exception of the Netherlands, which abstained.[115] Ten of the thirty-five highest ranking United Nations members on our development index voted against the amendment, twenty abstained, two were absent, and only Israel, Kuwait, and Uruguay supported it.

The North-South pattern in table 3.10 is so pronounced that an observation is in order in the case of each of the handful of exceptions to this pattern:

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[114]Brito (Brazil), United Nations Document A/PV. 1918, 7 December 1970, p. 3. The utilization of a recorded roll call also helped ensure the support of those developing nations that had abstained during the Second Committee vote, as they would find it highly embarrassing to go on record against additional financial aid from the developed nations.

[115]Interview with Bernardo Brito. While Switzerland and West Germany were also major contributors to these funds, they were not United Nations members at this time.

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TABLE 3.10

GENERAL ASSEMBLY PLENARY VOTE ON THE DEVELOPMENT AID QUESTION, 7 DECEMBER 1970

Nation Group	In Favor	Against	Abstaining	Absent
Latin America (14-0-2-8)	Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay		Argentina, Cuba	Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela
Africa (23-0-0-18)	Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zambia			Algeria, Botswana, Chad, Dahomey, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Zaire
Asia and Others (developing) (20-0-5-5)	Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Yemen, Yemen-PDR, Yugoslavia		Cambodia, China, Cyprus, Mongolia, Singapore	Albania, Fiji, Laos, Maldives, Nepal

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Total--developing	57	0	7	31
Western Europe (0-4-13-0)		Belgium, France, Luxembourg, United Kingdom	Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden	
Eastern Europe (0-0-8-0)			Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, USSR	
Others (developed) (1-6-0-0)	Israel	Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, United States		
Total--developed	1	10	21	0
Grand Total	58	10	28	31

1. Israel, the only developed nation to support the aid proposal, was apparently eager to win sympathy among the developing nations for its Middle East policies. Brazil, in particular, was a loyal friend of Israel and this vote, which meant so much to Brazil and so little to Israel, may have been seen as a convenient way to show appreciation to that country for its support.[116] It should also be noted that Israel, despite its developed status, continued to share many of the developing nations' qualms about environmental policies.[117]

2. While Cuba and Mongolia were developing nations they were also members of the Soviet bloc. Despite the ascendancy of the North-South cleavage at the United Nations and despite the occasional straying of Romania from the Soviet line, the rest of the Soviet bloc continued to vote as a group in 1970.[118] Cuba and Mongolia accordingly joined in abstaining on this roll call.[119]

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[116]Interview with a member of the Brazilian Mission to the United Nations who requested anonymity, 24 September 1973.

[117]See, for example, Israel, Parliament, "Findings of the Knesseth Committee for Ecology," 3 June 1970 (unpublished document).

[118]Vincent, "Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly," p. 474.

[119]The Soviets explained that they were abstaining because of their objection, in principle, to any suggestion that the Communist countries shared any joint responsibility with the former colonial powers in the matter of international aid. The Soviet bloc had even gone on record as rejecting "any attempt to assert in any way a division of the world into a 'rich North' and 'poor South'" since such a

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3. Cambodia's abstention may have reflected that nation's almost total dependence on American military and financial aid in the fall of 1970. Under these circumstances, it may have been difficult for Cambodia to support an amendment that the United States was voting against, especially since American support for Cambodia was a controversial domestic issue in the United States at this time.

4. The Republic of China (Taiwan), which also abstained, was never a member of the Group of 77, did not identify with the developing world, and was closely tied to the United States.

5. The three other nations that abstained, Argentina, Cyprus, and Singapore, were among the most highly developed Southern nations. (Argentina and Cyprus were the two highest ranking developing nations on our development index that were not oil powers, and Singapore ranked fourth).[120] Furthermore, Argentina and Cyprus were both European stock nations with many of the pollution problems of the developed world. Singapore, a city-nation with some of the world's worst urban pollution, had already demonstrated a tendency to be more Northern than the Northern states during the debate of the Second Committee.

6. While it is impossible to ascertain why the nations that missed the vote did so, it is interesting that

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division lumped together the capitalist and Communist states (United Nations Document A/8074, 21 September 1970, p. 7).

[120]See table 1.4 above.

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Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, two of the most developed Southern nations, were among those absent.

In summary, the roll call demonstrated the degree to which the tensions that had marked the United Nations development debates had spilled over into the consideration of the Environment Conference. The vote assured, moreover, that the linkage between the questions of development and environment would be a major item in any United Nations Environment Conference-related deliberations. Brazil and the other supporters of the amendment had succeeded in extending the existing North-South cleavage on development issues into the Conference preparatory process, in which international consensus had previously prevailed.

Immediately after the General Assembly's unanimous approval of the overall Swedish resolution (with only the Soviet bloc abstaining) several developed nations rose to denounce the aid paragraph as "inappropriate" and "premature." The United States, in particular, warned that its support for the total resolution "must not be construed as a commitment . . . to any subsequent action that [might] be taken on the substance of the [aid] paragraph."[121]

The emergence of the development issue as a central factor in the planning for the Stockholm Conference was reflected in the deliberations of the Preparatory Committee's February 1971 session in Geneva. In 1970 Secretary-

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[121]Pell (United States), United Nations Document A/PV. 1918, 7 December 1970, p. 5.

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General U Thant had opened the first Preparatory Committee session without even mentioning the developing nations, much less their unique problems or the tensions between development and environment. In 1971, however, these themes dominated the remarks of Conference Secretary-General Strong as he opened the second session:

> Environment is still seen by many [in the developing nations] as a rich man's problem, a disease they would be prepared to risk if it is a necessary accompaniment to the economic growth they want and urgently need. They are quite rightly concerned about how the preoccupation of the industrial nations with the environment will affect their priority task of satisfying the basic and immediate needs of their people for food, shelter, jobs, education and health care . . . They want to be more sure before jumping enthusiastically on the environmental band-wagon about just how it is likely to affect their own interests and their own priorities.[122]

Strong proposed a number of measures to allow these developing nations maximum input in the Conference preparatory process as well as in the Conference itself. These proposals were, with minor modifications, adopted by the Preparatory Committee:

1. The Conference agenda proposed by the previous year's Preparatory Committee session had consisted of three items of primary concern to the developed nations: human settlements, natural resource conservation, and pollution control. Strong proposed adding three new items to the Conference agenda dealing with the institutional, economic, and financial implications of environmental proposals in

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[122]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/PC/9, 26 February 1971, pp. 71-72.

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order to assure that the developing nations' interests were taken into consideration

2. A series of regional seminars would be held during the summer under the aegis of the United Nations regional Economic Commissions to explore the development and environment question. Prior to this announcement, only the European Economic Commission had planned to hold a meeting devoted to the human environment issue prior to the Stockholm Conference

3. Funds would be solicited from the developed nations for the purpose of aiding developing nations to prepare for the Stockholm Conference

4. A panel of experts in both the environment and development fields would meet in Founex Switzerland, from 4-12 June, in an effort to "sort out the conflicts between environmental protection and third-world economic and social priorities"[123]

The Founex Conference

While the McNamara announcement may have provided the Southern activists with evidence that their concerns were well founded, the Founex Conference provided them with seemingly conclusive proof that their worst fears had been correct. The resulting "Founex Report On Development and Environment" spelled out, in stark, precise, language, how inappropriate the environmental credo of the industrialized

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[123]Wolff, "Cloudy Atmosphere Over Stockholm," p. 44.

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nations was for the majority of mankind.[124] Brazil's Brito or de Castro could perhaps have been dismissed as biased observers when they had argued that the real environmental problems of the developing nations were those of poverty and underdevelopment. But here was a panel of twenty-seven technical experts (twelve of whom were from developed nations), meeting at the invitation of the Environment Conference Secretary-General, that reached virtually the same conclusions as the Brazilians.

The Founex Conference has been described as the single most significant event in the maturation and articulation of the Southern position on the human environment question.[125] At the 1970 General Assembly session the developing nations had escalated their position from our category three to our category four approach to the development question. At Founex, however, the dominant theme was that of category five--that steps must be taken to ensure that the developing nations would not be harmed by domestic Northern environmental measures.

Over half of the Founex Report's twenty-five recommendations dealt with this problem. These category five proposals included the following:

> It would be undesirable that rigid guidelines for project appraisal from an environmental viewpoint be laid down by . . . donors at this stage without

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[124]Patricia Rambach, ed., "Founex Report on Development and Environment," International Conciliation 586 (January 1972):7-36.

[125]Interview with Patricia Rambach.

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> adequate consultations with the developing countries . . . (recommendation 9)
>
> A comprehensive study should be made . . . of the major threats that may arise to the exports of the developing countries from the environmental concern of the developed countries . . . (recommendation 17)
>
> The developed countries should ensure that their growing environmental concern will not hurt the continued development of the developing countries and result in a . . . distortion of aid priorities, or adoption of more protectionist policies, or insistence on unrealistic environmental standards in the appraisal of development projects (recommendation 22)[126]

In addition, the Report strongly endorsed the category four concept of increased development aid from the developed nations

> to subsidize research on environmental problems . . . to compensate for major dislocations in the exports of the developing countries; and to finance restructuring of investment, production, or export patterns necessitated by the environmental concern of the developed countries (recommendation 23).

Despite its stress on "continued development [as] the only answer to many of the environmental problems of the developing countries," the Report conceded that "these countries cannot afford . . . to treat [their] environment as a free resource, as the presently developed countries too often did in the initial stages of economic progress." Accordingly, the Report declared that each developing nation must define its own minimal environmental standards "in light of [its] own cultural and social values and [its] own stage of economic development" (recommendation 3).[127]

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[126]Rambach, ed., "Founex Report on Development and Environment," pp. 34-36.

[127]Ibid., pp. 36, 27, and 34.

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The Report also suggested that the developing nations might yet reap some unexpected advantages from the developed nations' new interest in the environment. For example, it was noted that some of the industries that were currently concentrated in the highly polluted developed nations might be forced to relocate in the less industrialized developing nations. Similarly, increasingly harsh domestic antipollution standards might force the developed nations to curtail their production of synthetic products, thereby reopening markets for many of the natural resources of the developing nations.[128]

The Founex Report quickly became the definitive international statement on the question of development and environment. Spokesmen for both the developed and developing nations could find material in the document that bolstered their particular position. The 1971 meeting of the ECOSOC Coordinating Committee provides an excellent example of the role that the Founex Report played in subsequent Conference-related debates.[129] Virtually every speaker who mentioned the development issue praised the Report and most quoted from it in an effort to substantiate their particular point of view. Conference Secretary-General Strong, for example, declared that the Report had proven that human environment and development priorities

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[128]Ibid., p. 13.

[129]See footnote 23 above, this chapter, for an explanation of the role of the Coordinating Committee.

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could complement each other.[130] This theme was echoed by the representatives of several developed nations and was reflected in the declaration of the American delegate that "the preparations for the Conference were bringing out the interdependence between environmental protection and development; the two subjects went hand in hand and were not conflicting."[131]

The developing nations also utilized the Report, but they tended to emphasize its darker side. Thus, Brazil's delegate demanded that the Conference take measures to protect the developing nations from any economic hardship that might ensue from environmental measures taken by the developed nations.[132] The Brazilian also declared that, in light of the Founex findings, the first draft of the International Declaration on the Human Environment was outdated and would have to be rewritten. The Yugoslavian delegate raised the same point, lambasting the original draft as "restrictive, anti-development and conservationist."[133]

This reliance on the Founex Report was further reflected during the summer of 1971 in the reports of the

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[130]United Nations Document E/AC. 24/SR. 412, 9 August 1971, p. 9.

[131]Haugh (United States), ibid., p. 18. See also Hambro (Norway) and Fernand-Laurent (France), pp. 16 and 19.

[132]Brito (Brazil), ibid., p. 13.

[133]Cabric (Yugoslavia), ibid., p. 21. It should be noted that the term "conservation" had apparently become a pejorative term in the developing nations' lexicon by the summer of 1971.

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four regional seminars on development and environment and of the third session of the Preparatory Committee. The third session of the Preparatory Committee paid tribute to the Founex Report as a "positive and balanced approach to the relationship between development and environment,"[134] while avoiding making any specific recommendations relating to this particular issue.[135]

At the same time, the Report was subjected to varying interpretations and was utilized as a proof for every position taken on the development question. On the one hand, Conference Secretary-General Strong took an optimistic view in his report to the Preparatory Committee, declaring that the Founex Report "makes a case for common concern and common action" by both developed and developing nations.[136] At the same time, the deeply pessimistic report of the Latin American regional seminar based its conclusions on the "primordial difference" between the priorities and

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[134]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/PC. 13, 30 September 1971, p. 12.

[135]The Preparatory Committee did respond, however, to the developing nations' criticism of the proposed Declaration on the Human Environment by agreeing to have its drafting committee (the Intergovernmental Working Group) meet again in January 1972 after the "pertinent discussions and decisions" of the General Assembly (p. 41).

[136]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/PC. 11, 30 July 1971, p. 10. In a similar vein, the Conference Secretary-General was also able to report that five developed nations (Canada, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, and Sweden) had contributed towards both the expense of holding the four regional seminars and the direct Conference preparatory needs of several developing nations (p. 11).

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problems of the developed and developing nations.[137] This report was studded with strongly worded demands for increased aid, trade preferences, and a drastic reordering of international priorities to emphasize development.[138]

The 1971 General Assembly session

The success of the Founex Report in winning the approval of both developed and developing nations had led some observers to believe that "the rift between rich nations and poor [had been] patched over."[139] The opening weeks of the fall 1971 General Assembly session lent credence to this assumption as such radical developing nations as Brazil, Egypt, Chile, and Yugoslavia completely ignored the Environment Conference in their General Debate statements. Most of the nations that mentioned the Conference

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[137]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/PC. 11/Add. 2, 16 September 1971, p. 7.

[138]The reports of the African, Middle Eastern, and Asian regional seminars tended to lie somewhere between the optimistic Secretary-General's report and the pessimistic Latin American report. All three reports discussed the trade and aid problems, but they also all stressed the Founex Report's suggestion that rampant pollution in the developed world might force industries to relocate in the developing nations (pp. 2-7). The African report was by far the most optimistic in this respect--they even discussed the possibility that "global interest in environmental protection" would "reawaken the vision of one human family and even encourage and increase aid to poor nations in their efforts to improve and protect their part of the global household" (United Nations Document E/CN. 14/532, 11 October 1971, p. 8). This statement may have reflected the necessity to stress every conceivable advantage in order to promote interest in the Conference among the still generally apathetic African nations.

[139]Wolff, "Cloudy Atmosphere Over Stockholm," p. 44.

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did so either to declare their endorsement of the event, or to raise issues that were, more often than not, unrelated to the development question. Thus, Iceland and Norway spoke of the dangers of marine pollution, while Peru asked the Conference to examine the question of atmospheric nuclear testing.[140]

The placid nature of the General Debate has been explained by noting that the more militant developing nations were waiting to see how many of the Founex proposals would be incorporated in the annual Swedish draft resolution which would define the final mandate of the Preparatory Committee and the Environment Conference.[141]

Even those nations that raised the development question appear to have made a particular effort to stress accommodation and compromise. Thus, the delegates of such developed nations as Australia, Canada, and Japan spoke of the need to ensure that development would not suffer as a

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[140] Agústsson (Iceland) and Cappelen (Norway), United Nations Document A/PV. 1945, 29 September 1971, pp. 38 and 42; and Merrado Jarrin (Peru), United Nations Document A/PV. 1947, 30 September 1971, p. 16. The Peruvian statement represented the first formal effort to link the nuclear testing and Environment Conference issues--a linkage which would become a source of considerable controversy at Stockholm. Peru's special interest in this question apparently stemmed from its fears that the French nuclear tests in the South Pacific might affect the vital Peruvian Pacific Ocean fishing industry.

[141] Interview with Noel Brown, United Nations Environment Programme, 14 August 1973.

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result of environmental measures.[142] In a similar fashion, the remarks by the delegates of such developing nations as Argentina, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Turkey stressed the complementary nature of economic development and human environment priorities.[143] The development question was reconciled, as the East German question had been, during the eleven meetings of the Second Committee. The Committee

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[142]See, for example, the Canadian delegate's declaration that his nation "was still in the course of development" and thus possessed a "special understanding of the dilemma" faced by the developing nations (Sharp [Canada], United Nations Document A/PV. 1944, 29 September 1971, p. 23). For the other interventions see Aichi (Japan), United Nations Document A/PV. 1941, 27 September 1971, p. 36 and Bowen (Australia), United Nations Document A/PV. 1951, 4 October 1971, pp. 29-31. It should also be noted that Canada and Jamaica gave far more attention to the Environment Conference in their General Debate statements than did any other nations. This interest may reflect the influence of Conference Secretary-General Maurice Strong (a Canadian) and Preparatory Committee chairman Keith Johnson (a Jamaican) on their respective national delegations.

[143]Mohammed (Trinidad and Tobago), United Nations Document A/PV. 1947, 30 September 1971, pp. 82-83; De Pablo Pardo (Argentina), United Nations Document A/PV. 1948, 1 October 1971, pp. 27-28; Olcay (Turkey), United Nations Document A/PV. 1954, 6 October 1971, p. 68; and Gallimore (Jamaica), United Nations Document A/PV. 1957, 7 October 1971, pp. 47-49. The only mention of the controversial trade and aid questions during the 1971 General Debate was by the Thai delegate who briefly touched on these issues in his otherwise unexceptional Conference-related remarks (Khoman [Thailand], United Nations Document A/PV. 1946, 30 September 1971, p. 21). On the other extreme, the Congo--which had been the most outspoken developing nation during the 1968 ECOSOC debates--now took the Northern position that the Conference should examine such problems as "the pollution of the air and water by gases and industrial waters" and that the Congo "fully associates itself with such preoccupations, because it is a country with a great industrial future" (Cardosa [Congo], United Nations Document A/PV. 1942, 28 September 1971, p. 76).

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considered two draft resolutions, A/C. 2/L. 1185 and A/C. 2/L. 1195, which represented the final United Nations instructions to the Preparatory Committee.

Resolution A/C. 2/L. 1195, a procedural resolution introduced by Sweden and thirty-three other nations, devoted its sole nonprocedural section (paragraph 7) to the development question:

> . . . it is important for the Conference to take fully into account the interests of the developing countries and [for] Governments to give serious consideration to the views expressed [in] the Declaration . . . adopted by the Second Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 developing countries on 7 November 1971 at Lima.[144]

While none of the developing nations opposed this paragraph, several of them found it vague and inadequate.[145] Eventually the entire paragraph was dropped after Brazil threatened to amend it to explicitly endorse the Lima Declaration.[146]

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[144]The Lima Declaration had been adopted by consensus at the November 1971 meeting of the Group of 77 in Lima, Peru. The Environment Conference-related sections of the Declaration closely reflected the Founex Report (see, for example, Bartolome [Philippines], United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1425, 6 December 1971, p. 9).

[145]See, for example, Arnaud (Argentina), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1427, 7 December 1971, p. 10.

[146]The Brazilian amendment (A/C. 2/L. 1215) was withdrawn after Brazil accepted an oral Ghanese amendment to place the language of paragraph 7, as strengthened by the Brazilian amendment, in the text of resolution A/C. 2/L. 1185. This had the effect of leaving resolution A/C. 2/L. 1195 as a purely procedural document (United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1436, 13 December 1971, p. 13). In addition, the Brazilians may have welcomed the opportunity to separate the development and East German questions by removing all mention of the former issue from the resolution

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Resolution A/C. 2/L. 1185, entitled "Development and Environment," was introduced by Brazil and, after two revisions, had thirty-seven cosponsors by the time it came to a vote.[147] This unusually lengthy resolution contained twenty-one preambular and eleven operative paragraphs in which the mandates of the Preparatory Committee and the Conference Secretary-General were spelled out in painstaking detail. Resolution A/C. 2/L. 1185 demanded nothing less than the total redirection of the Stockholm Conference and the institutionalization of the Southern priorities of aid, trade, and development as the official Environment Conference credo.[148]

The preamble, echoing the Founex Report, declared that most environmental problems in the developing nations were "generated by the condition of underdevelopment" that

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dealing with the latter question. The only other section of resolution A/C. 2/L. 1195 that drew the particular attention of the developing nations was its call for the preparation of "draft conventions" to be circulated at Stockholm. At the insistence of Brazil, this term was replaced with the phrase "draft proposals" in order to avoid the impression that the Stockholm Conference would be producing binding international treaties (United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1438, 15 December 1971, pp. 9-10).

[147]Brazil, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Peru, Sudan, Upper Volta, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia were the original sponsors. They were later joined by Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Burundi, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, Yemen, and Zaire. Six of these nations had also cosponsored resolution A/C. 2/L. 1195: Argentina, Costa Rica, Guinea, Mexico, Nigeria, and Sudan.

[148]de Almeida (Brazil), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1422, 1 December 1971, p. 13.

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could be cured only by "industrial development based on advanced and adequate technologies." The developed nations had a responsibility to "provide additional technical assistance and financing" to the developing nations in order that they might undertake such development projects. As for the more traditional environmental concerns, the preamble declared that:

> pollution of worldwide import is being caused primarily by some highly developed countries, as a consequence of their own high level of improperly planned and inadequately co-ordinated industrial activities, and that, therefore, the main responsibility for the financing of corrective measures falls upon those countries.[149]

The main text of the resolution contained a number of specific recommendations designed to ensure that the Conference would take into full account the provisions embodied in the preamble. These included:[150]

Paragraph 3 - The proposals and Action Plan submitted to the Conference must respect each nations' right to define its own environmental priorities and exploit its natural resources in accordance with these priorities. Furthermore, no international "environmental policy should adversely affect the present or future development possibilities of the developing countries." In particular, the developed nations must not be allowed to transfer the burden of their environmental policies to developing nations through restrictions on trade.

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[149]United Nations Document A/C. 2/L. 1185/Rev. 1, 24 November 1971, p. 2.

[150]The single-spaced paragraphs that follow are summations of the considerably longer text. Only those phrases set off by quotation marks are copied verbatim from the actual resolution. For the full text of draft resolution A/C. 2/L. 1185 see United Nations Document A/8577, 13 December 1971, which contains the original language of the draft resolution as well as the text of all subsequent Second Committee revisions and amendments.

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Paragraph 4 - The Conference Action Plan should include programs to provide aid to the developing nations to deal with their particular environmental problems.

Paragraph 5 - The General Assembly should condemn "the production and use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons."

Paragraph 6 - United Nations members and international organizations were urged to introduce "programs of increased technical and financial assistance to the developing countries to help them improve their ecological conditions."

Paragraph 7 - International financial institutions should "soften" the terms of economic aid to the developing countries for projects which "in the exclusive judgement of these countries might be desirable . . . on environmental terms."

Paragraph 8 - The Secretary-General of the United Nations should submit a report to the Conference designing a "scheme of voluntary contributions which would provide additional financing from the developed [countries] to the developing countries for environmental purposes." These contributions were to be "calculated on a percentage basis" relative to the amount that each developed nation spent on domestic environmental measures.

Paragraph 10 - UNCTAD was to prepare a report on the possible effects on the developing countries of the environmental policies of the developed nations in terms of possible trade restrictions and losses in aid because of domestic Northern environmental measures.

With the exception of the call for banning nuclear weapons, the resolution closely reflected the category four and five approaches to the development question that had dominated the Founex Report. The resolution went beyond the Founex recommendations, however, in that it sought to mandate as official United Nations policy proposals that had only been suggested "for consideration" at Founex. In addition, the tone of a number of the draft's more radical proposals (such as paragraphs 7 and 8), as well as its harsh language concerning the motives of the developed

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nations, were far stronger than the fairly diplomatic language found in the Founex Report.[151]

The Second Committee's consideration of resolution A/C, 2/L. 1185 represented far more than simply a "last look at the preparations for the Stockholm Conference."[152] While the developing nations' numerical supremacy assured that the resolution would eventually be accepted, the debate was nevertheless significant in that it represented the most complete pre-Stockholm articulation of the radically divergent Northern and Southern environmental priorities. In defense of these divergent perceptions Brazil's Ambassador Miguel A. Ozorio de Almeida and the American delegate to the Second Committee Daniel Patrick Moynihan clashed in a virulent exchange that was marked by an absence of "the mollifying courtesies that are a rhetorical reflex around United Nations Plaza."[153]

Ambassador de Almeida set the tone of the debate in his lengthy remarks accompanying the formal introduction of resolution A/C. 2/L. 1185:

> If all the pollution generated by the developed countries could cease, there would be no pollution of world-wide significance; conversely, if all pollution

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[151] Both the resolution's harsh language as well as its call for "contributions" from the developed nations could be found, however, in the report of the previously noted Latin American regional seminar on development and environment (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/PC. 11/Add. 2, 16 September 1971, p. 11).

[152] de Almeida (Brazil), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1422, 1 December 1971, p. 11.

[153] Wolff, "Cloudy Atmosphere Over Stockholm," p. 46.

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> directly imputable to activities in the developing countries were to be stopped, the dangers of pollution would continue to exist in practically the same proportion as today.

The only form of pollution that provided an exception to these observations, he insisted, was that caused "by large numbers of human beings living in poverty." But, de Almeida declared, the developed nations were not interested in helping to cope with this particular form of pollution for "to be many and poor was offensive to the developed nations [and] most of these countries' suggestions were not concerned with helping to increase income but rather with helping to reduce numbers."[154] Ambassador de Almeida utilized the Club of Rome's just released international environmental report, "The Limits to Growth," to rally support for resolution A/C. 2/L. 1185, much as Brazil's de Castro had exploited World Bank President McNamara's announcement as a rallying point during the previous year's Second Committee debate. The report's call for a "global dynamic equilibrium" was pictured as a proposal for a deliberate policy of freezing the international economic status quo to the permanent disadvantage of the developing nations.[155] Ambassador de Almeida characterized this call for a "no growth" policy as nothing less than a

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[154]de Almeida (Brazil), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1422, 1 December 1971, p. 11.

[155]"Statement by the Representative of Brazil, H. E. Ambassador M. A. Ozorio de Almeida to the Second Committee," 2 December 1971, p. 12 (unpublished document made available by the press office of the Brazilian mission to the United Nations).

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> Calvinistic attitude that . . . the developed countries, through their development, had demonstrated their right to salvation and perpetuation, and that the more numerous under-developed peoples would therefore have to stop breeding and encroaching upon their enjoyment of nature and other natural resources.[156]

Brazil, de Almeida concluded, would not accept the draft Declaration and conventions that the Preparatory Committee had prepared because its work had been dominated by these Northern environmental views. Furthermore, it would not participate in the Environment Conference if economic development was not its highest priority. Resolution A/C. 2/L. 1185 was thus "the only possible perspective in which the developing nations were prepared to accept the exercise to be undertaken in Stockholm."[157]

Moynihan responded to de Almeida's critique by declaring that the Brazilian's fears were not only unfounded, but were totally irrelevant to the international human environment crisis which had precipitated the call to Stockholm. He even suggested that de Almeida was suffering from "paranoia" and warned that "there are limits to the degree to which such a style should be indulged, and just as surely there are limits to the good nature with which it will be endured."[158]

During the ensuing four day debate the Second Com-

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[156]de Almeida (Brazil), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1422, 1 December 1971, pp. 14-15.

[157]Ibid., p. 23.

[158]Moynihan (United States), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1423, 2 December 1971, p. 11.

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mittee split along North-South lines,with most of the developed nations endorsing the Moynihan position (with the exception of the Soviet bloc nations that were preoccupied with the East German question and the Scandinavian nations that chose to ignore the development issue).[159] Conversely, most developing nations rallied to the Brazilian position, displaying what one delegate hailed as "a fine spirit of solidarity."[160] Even India, which took strong exception to de Almeida's opposition to population control measures, declared that as "a developing country [it] would support [the Brazilian resolution] in principle."[161]

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[159]Perhaps the most remarkable Northern response to the Brazilian position was that of the Canadian delegate who quoted from that morning's New York Times to show that "prosperity had brought ecological problems to urban Brazil," and therefore that nation could now be expected to have a greater understanding of the environmental difficulties facing the developed countries (Rankin [Canada], United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1428, 7 December 1971, p. 3).

[160]Khanachet (Kuwait), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1423, 2 December 1971, p. 4.

[161]Mani (India), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1424, 6 December 1971, p. 13. The family planning question was an issue which cut across conventional North-South cleavage lines. While this would become apparent at the Stockholm Conference, the family planning dispute had already surfaced during the Second Committee's consideration of resolution A/C. 2/L. 1185, when such Catholic Latin American states as Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador joined with such sparsely populated African states as Ghana and Swaziland in urging that the item not be on the agenda of the Stockholm Conference. Their position was opposed by the heavily populated Asian states of India and Iran which viewed population control as a major environmental priority (Hoveyda [Iran], United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1424, 6 December 1971, p. 6 and Mani [India], United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1424, 6 December 1971, p. 17. See also de Almeida [Brazil], United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1422, 1 December 1971, p. 14; Benites [Ecuador], Santa Cruz

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Singapore was the only developing nation to declare its intention not to support the resolution, reiterating its view that "development did not necessarily alleviate environmental problems."[162] Singapore once again echoed the position of the developed nations and criticized the Brazilian resolution as an attempt to prejudge the Stockholm deliberations by mandating the Conference's final decisions.

On 8 December the Second Committee approved resolution A/C. 2/L. 1185 after considering sixteen separate proposed amendments. These amendments can be divided into three categories:

1. Three amendments by Kenya and one by Spain

These amendments were unrelated to the North-South debate. The Kenyan amendments, all of which were defeated, sought to shorten the preamble to the resolution by removing several allegedly "redundant" paragraphs.[163] The Spanish amendment, which was accepted unanimously, added a new paragraph to the resolution, dealing with the unique

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[Chile], and Asanti [Ghana], United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1424, 6 December 1971, pp. 6, 17, and 19; and Matsebula [Swaziland], United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1426, 6 December 1971, p. 10).

[162]Jayakumar (Singapore), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1427, 7 December 1971, p. 17.

[163]The Kenyan amendments were defeated by margins of 3-72-16; 2-71-21; and 5-65-22. These votes and those on the other moderating amendments were all taken by non-recorded roll call.

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environmental problems of coastal states.[164]

2. Nine amendments by the United Kingdom and Australia

These amendments sought to moderate the resolution to a degree that the developed nations could accept it, albeit reluctantly. These amendments, which were also endorsed by France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and the United States, sought to eliminate "accusatory and offensive" sections of the draft resolution as well as those sections that "prejudged" Conference decisions (see table 3.11).[165]

All nine Anglo-Australian amendments were rejected by the Second Committee. Most of the votes reflected the fact that there were some thirty developed nations in the United Nations and that only a handful of developing nations were prepared to join them in supporting any of the Anglo-Australian amendments.[166]

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[164]The Spanish paragraph was adopted by a vote of 84-0-8 and appears as paragraph 5c in the final draft resolution reported to the General Assembly (United Nations Document A/8577, 13 December 1971, p. 14).

[165]Darling (United Kingdom), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1435, 10 December 1971, p. 4.

[166]The only notable exceptions to this pattern were provided by the votes on the paragraph calling for a halt in germ and nuclear weapon testing and the paragraph mandating "soft loans" for developing nations. In both cases, a number of developed nations appear to have refused to support the ostensible Northern position. While the division of the developed nations on the nuclear testing question was a familiar one, the split on the "soft loans" issue was more unpredictable. Perhaps the Soviet bloc nations, which have traditionally refused to support the various international financial organizations affiliated with the United Nations, voted against the amendment in an effort to embarrass the Western developed nations.

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TABLE 3.11

THE ANGLO-AUSTRALIAN SECOND COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS TO RESOLUTION A/C. 2/L. 1185
(Also Endorsed by France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, and the United States)

Gist of Amendment	Additional Endorsing Nations		Second Committee Vote
	Developed	Developing	
1. Tone down preambular paragraph that declared "improper planning" was the cause of most pollution in the developed nations	Netherlands Spain	Ghana Kenya Philippines Tunisia	33-51-7
2. Delete preambular paragraph calling for additional aid to developing nations	Netherlands Spain	Philippines	23-53-13
3. Qualify with the words "whenever possible" the call for Conference documentation to reflect tone of resolution A/C. 2/L. 1185	Netherlands	Ghana Indonesia Kenya Philippines Tunisia	38-45-9
4. Qualify the demand that Conference decisions avoid causing harm to development plans	Netherlands	Ghana Indonesia Philippines	withdrawn
5. Moderate the call for additional aid to deal with the unique environmental problems of the developing nations	Netherlands Spain	Philippines Tunisia	26-55-12

6. Delete paragraph condemning nuclear, biological, and chemical testing	Sweden	Philippines	14-69-12
7. Delete paragraph mandating "soft loans" by international financial institutions		Ghana Philippines Tunisia	21-57-16
8. Tone down Environment Fund proposal to make it purely voluntary in nature, with development funding as only one facet of its work		Ghana Kenya Philippines Tunisia	34-46-13
9. Eliminate the call for an UNCTAD study of possible harm to developing nations caused by Northern domestic environmental policies	Netherlands	Ghana Tunisia	32-51-10

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3. A series of amendments by four moderate developing nations

These nations had also endorsed several of the unsuccessful Anglo-American amendments:

a. An Iranian amendment, virtually identical to the first Anglo-Australian amendment, which was rejected by a vote of 29 in favor, 53 against, with 7 abstentions.

b. An Iranian effort to moderate the preamble's condemnation of nuclear testing, which was soundly defeated by a vote of 20 in favor, 50 against, with 17 abstentions.

c. A Filipino rewording of the fourth Anglo-Australian amendment, replacing "wherever possible" with "as much as possible," which was rejected by a vote of 29 in favor, 58 against, with 6 abstentions.

d. An amendment by Ghana, Iran, and Tunisia which was the only moderating amendment approved by the Second Committee. The amendment, which deleted the proposed formula for taxing national contributions to the International Environment Fund relative to the rate of domestic environmental spending, was accepted by a vote of 37 in favor, 36 against, with 21 abstentions. The success of this amendment can apparently be attributed to the fact that the original formula was so unrealistic that it was even denounced by such a stalwart developing nation as Chile.[167]

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[167]Santa Cruz (Chile), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1424, 6 December 1971, p. 16. The Chileans later declared, however, that they had opposed this section because it was not extreme enough in that it attempted to replace "the obligations of membership laid down in the

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After the consideration of these amendments and the overwhelming acceptance of several paragraphs on which separate votes had been requested,[168] the Second Committee approved resolution A/C. 2/L. 1185 by a vote of 62 in favor, 4 against, with 31 abstentions. Examination of table 3.12, which records how each Second Committee member voted on this roll call, leads to several observations:

1. Much as Brazil had emerged from the 1970 Second Committee debate as the leading Southern advocate, the 1971 debate witnessed the emergence of Australia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States as the leading advocates for the Northern position.

2. At the same time, Ghana, Iran, the Philippines, and Tunisia emerged as moderates who attempted to produce a compromise resolution that both the developed and developing nations could support. These nations enjoyed close economic and political ties with the developed nations which may have helped shape their desire to seek a compromise.

3. Most of the handful of developing nations that had expressed reservations concerning the resolution nevertheless voted for it. The votes of Chile, India, and

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Charter [with] a system of voluntary contributions" (Santa Cruz, [Chile], United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1436, 13 December 1971, p. 19).

[168]The separate votes were on paragraphs 2, 3 (two votes), 7, and 8 (United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1436, 13 December 1971, pp. 21-23).

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TABLE 3.12

SECOND COMMITTEE VOTE ON RESOLUTION A/C. 2/L. 1185, 8 DECEMBER 1971
(Nations That Sponsored the Resolution Are Underlined)

Nation Group	In Favor	Against	Abstaining	Absent
Latin America (18-0-1-5)	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile*, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela*		Trinidad and Tobago	Barbados, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay
Africa (25-0-3-13)	Algeria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Dahomey, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Kenya*, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia*, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zaire, Zambia		Ghana*, Liberia, Sierra Leone	Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Lesotho, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Somalia, Tanzania
Asia and Others (developing) (18-0-2-15)	Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Cyprus, Fiji, India*, Indonesia*, Iran*, Iraq, Kuwait, Pakistan, Philippines*, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Yemen, Yugoslavia		Mongolia, Singapore*	Albania, Bahrain, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Nepal, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Yemen-PDR

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Total--developing	61	0	6	33
Western Europe (0-2-14-1)		Belgium, United Kingdom	Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden	Luxembourg
Eastern Europe (1-0-7-0)	Romania		Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, USSR	
Others (developed) (0-2-4-1)		Australia, United States	Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand	South Africa
Total--developed	1	4	25	2
Grand Total	62	4	31	35

*Developing nation that expressed reservations concerning the resolution during the Second Committee debate.

Venezuela had never been in doubt as they had stated their intent to vote for the overall resolution during the Second Committee's debate.[169] Most of the other developing nations that expressed reservations during the debate eventually voted for the resolution, with only Ghana and Singapore abstaining.[170] Ghana does not share Singapore's preoccupation with urban industrial pollution, and its position seems to have stemmed primarily from its desire to avoid a North-South confrontation over the Environment Conference issue.[171]

4. Ghana was joined in abstaining by two other West African nations, Liberia and Sierra Leone, which had not participated in the deliberations of the Second Committee. The Liberian delegate later explained that their abstentions stemmed from a desire to avoid a "polarization among member states."[172] The only other developing nations that abstained were Soviet bloc member Mongolia and Trinidad and

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[169]Mani (India) and Santa Cruz (Chile), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1424, 6 December 1971, pp. 13 and 17; and Molina Duarte (Venezuela), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1435, 10 December 1971, p. 3.

[170]The other developing nations that had expressed reservations about the resolution during the Second Committee meeting were Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Philippines, and Tunisia.

[171]See Asante (Ghana), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1435, 10 December 1971, p. 12 for an example of Ghana's desire to achieve a compromise that "all nations" could support, and her unwillingness to vote for a "divisive" resolution.

[172]Diggs (Liberia), United Nations Document A/PV. 2026, 20 December 1971, p. 74.

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Tobago, the highest ranking Latin American state on our development index.[173]

5. While Mongolia joined the Eastern European Soviet bloc states in abstaining, two other members of the Soviet bloc voted in favor of the resolution despite their abstentions during the previous year's Conference-related roll call. Cuba, which had just joined the Group of 77 in late 1971, and Romania, which had recently shown interest in joining the Group both appear to have opted for Southern solidarity over their earlier emphasis on Eastern solidarity.[174]

6. Although ten developed nations had voted against the far more innocuous Brazilian amendment during the 1970 General Assembly plenary session, only four of them now voted against resolution A/C. 2/L. 1185. The developed nations were apparently becoming resigned to the futility of opposing the developing nations on development and environment issues.

7. At the same time, however, there had been a discernible escalation of the level of North-South polarization

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[173] See table 1.4 above.

[174] Cuba and Romania had also refused to sign the September 1970 "Socialist Manifesto" (United Nations Document A/8074, 21 September 1970), which had denounced the attempt to lump developed Communist and capitalist nations together as equally responsible for the poverty and suffering of the developing nations. The other Communist nations referred to this Manifesto during both the 1970 and 1971 Second Committee debates by way of explaining their refusal to support the Southern position (see for example, Makeyev [USSR], United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1436, 13 December 1971, p. 24).

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on Environment Conference-related questions since the previous year's vote. Thus, Argentina, Cuba, and Cyprus, which had all abstained in 1970, now voted with the South; while Israel, which had been the only developed nation to support the 1970 resolution, now joined the other developed nations in abstaining.[175]

The General Assembly plenary debate of the Second Committee's report on 20 December focused on the East German question to the extent that resolution A/C. 2/L. 1185 was not even mentioned. This focus apparently reflected the degree to which the clear-cut North-South division during the Second Committee vote had assured the inevitable acceptance of the resolution. This acceptance came in a recorded roll call vote of 85 in favor, 2 against, with 34 abstentions (this vote is recorded in table 3.13).

The twelve day interval between the Second Committee and the General Assembly votes did not result in many shifts of position:

1. The nations that had been absent for the Second Committee vote but present for the General Assembly vote divided along North-South lines. The twenty-four developing nations that had missed the Second Committee vote all

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[175]See Hillel (Israel), ibid., which stressed that the Israeli abstention was in protest against their being excluded from the Middle Eastern regional development and environment seminar that had been held in Beirut in September 1971. Israel was apparently using its potential support for the developing nations' position as a political tool to win concessions in return--namely the concession of being allowed to participate in a regional United Nations seminar even if it was being held in an Arab country.

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TABLE 3.13

GENERAL ASSEMBLY PLENARY VOTE ON RESOLUTION A/C. 2/L. 1185, 20 DECEMBER 1971

Nation Group	In Favor	Against	Abstaining	Absent
Latin America (23-0-0-1)	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela			Barbados
Africa (35-0-3-3)	Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, Dahomey, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zaire, Zambia		Ghana, Liberia, Malawi	Gambia, Mauritius, Sierra Leone
Asia and Others (developing) (26-0-2-7)	Afghanistan, Bahrain, Burma, Ceylon, Cyprus, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Yemen-PDR, Yugoslavia		Mongolia, Singapore	Albania, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Maldives, Qatar

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Total--developing	84	0	5	11
Western Europe (0-1-16-0)		United Kingdom	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden	
Eastern Europe (1-0-7-0)	Romania		Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, USSR	
Others (developed) (0-1-6-0)		United States	Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa	
Total--developed	1	2	29	0
Grand Total	85	2	34	11

voted for the resolution at the General Assembly plenum, while the two developing nations that had missed the earlier vote now abstained.[176]

2. Australia and Belgium, which had both voted against the Second Committee resolution, abstained during the General Assembly vote.

3. Malawi, which had voted with the Southern group in the Second Committee, now abstained, while Trinidad and Tobago, which had previously abstained, now voted for the Brazilian resolution.

Table 3.14 measures the degree of support that each United Nations member gave to the Southern position on the development and environment question during the 1970-71 preparatory period. A rating of +1 was assigned for each roll call vote supportive of the Southern position as well as for the cosponsorship of either the Brazilian Second Committee amendment in 1970 or resolution A/C. 2/L. 1185 in 1971.[177] A rating of -1 was given for each vote in opposition to the Southern position as well as for sponsorship of

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[176]The developing nations were: Bahrain, Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Gabon, Guinea, Haiti, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Somalia, Tanzania, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen-PDR. The two developed nations were Luxembourg and South Africa. In addition, Fiji, which had voted for the resolution in the Second Committee, now abstained, while Sierra Leone, which had abstained in the Second Committee, was now absent.

[177]The three roll calls being examined are the 1970 General Assembly plenary vote on the Brazilian amendment (table 3.10) and the 1971 Second Committee (table 3.12) and General Assembly plenary (table 3.13) votes on resolution A/C. 2/L. 1185.

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TABLE 3.14

DEGREE OF NATIONAL SUPPORT FOR SOUTHERN POSITION IN UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE-RELATED DEBATES, 1970-71

Level of Support[1]	Latin America	Africa	Asia and Others (Developing)
+5	Brazil Chile	Nigeria	Ceylon
+4	Ecuador Mexico Peru Uruguay	Central African Republic Congo Egypt Mali Sudan[2] Upper Volta	Afghanistan Iraq Kuwait Saudi Arabia Syria Yugoslavia
+3	Colombia[2] Costa Rica[2] Dominican Republic El Salvador Guatemala[2] Guyana[2] Honduras Jamaica	Algeria[2] Burundi[2] Cameroon Libya Madagascar[2] Mauritania[2] Rwanda[2] Swaziland[2] Tanzania[2] Togo Uganda Zambia	Burma India Pakistan Thailand Turkey Yemen
+2.5	Argentina		
+2	Bolivia[2] Nicaragua[2] Panama[2] Paraguay[2] Venezuela[2]	Dahomey[2] Equatorial Guinea[2] Ethiopia[2] Gabon[2] Guinea[3] Ivory Coast[2] Kenya Lesotho[2] Morocco[2] Niger[3] Senegal[2] Tunisia[2] Zaire[2]	Indonesia Iran Jordan[2] Lebanon[2] Malaysia[2] Philippines Yemen, PDR[2]
+1.5	Cuba		Cyprus
+1	Barbados[3] Haiti[3]	Botswana[3] Chad[3] Mauritius[3] Somalia[3]	Bahrain[3] Fiji[3] Laos[3] Nepal[3] Oman[3] United Arab Emirates[3]

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TABLE 3.14--Continued

Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Others (Developed)

TABLE 3.14--Continued

Level of Support[1]	Latin America	Africa	Asia and Others (Developing)
+.5	Trinidad and Tobago[2]	Malawi[2] Sierra Leone	
0		Gambia[4]	Albania[4] Bhutan[4] China (PR)[4] Maldives[4] Qatar[4]
-.5			Cambodia[3] China (Taiwan)[3]
-1		Liberia	
-1.5			Mongolia Singapore
-2		Ghana[2]	
-2.5			
-3			
-4			

[1]See previous page for an explanation of these figures.

[2]Missed one vote.

[3]Missed two votes.

[4]Missed all three votes.

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TABLE 3.14--Continued

Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Others (Developed)
		Israel
Austria Denmark Finland Iceland Luxembourg[2] Malta Netherlands Norway Portugal Sweden	Bulgaria Byelorussia Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland Ukraine USSR	South Africa[2]
		Canada Japan New Zealand
Belgium Greece Ireland Italy Spain		
France		Australia
United Kingdom		United States

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any of the 1971 Second Committee amendments that sought to weaken resolution A/C. 2/L. 1185. Since an abstention represented a refusal to support the Southern position, a $-\frac{1}{2}$ was awarded for each abstention.[178]

Examination of table 3.14 suggests several final observations about the politics of the North-South question during the 1970-71 Conference preparatory period:

1. While the North-South question had not been a significant factor during the 1968-69 preparatory period, it was the source of intense polarization during 1970-71. Seventy of the seventy-nine developing nations that participated in at least two of the three roll call votes under examination had a pro-Southern rating of at least +2. Conversely, thirty of the thirty-two developed nations had a pro-Northern rating of at least -1.5.

2. As was previously observed, the "Northern" and "Southern" categories do not always follow strict geographic or economic lines. Thus, Romania appeared by late 1971 to be well on the way to joining Yugoslavia as a European nation that identified with the South, while developing Communist Mongolia continued to vote with the North.

3. The handful of other exceptions to the North-South pattern fall into two categories:

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[178]The purpose of table 3.14 was to isolate exceptions to the general North-South cleavage pattern rather than to measure the distance between the various groups. Accordingly, the use of half and whole numbers does not lessen the effectiveness of the table for our purposes.

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a. Nations that appear to have been torn between their ostensible membership in one group and their economic, cultural, political, or environmental ties with nations of the other group. Cuba, Cyprus, Israel, Malawi, Singapore, and Trinidad and Tobago were examples of this first category as were Mongolia and Romania.

b. The second category consisted of the three West African states of Ghana, Liberia, and Sierra Leone whose positions are much more difficult to understand. They do not have the urban environmental problems of Singapore or the relatively high development ranking of Cyprus and Trinidad and Tobago. Nor are they subject to the intense political pressures that can help explain the erratic voting patterns of Cuba, Malawi, Mongolia, Romania, and Israel.

4. China, which had entered the United Nations in the fall of 1971, missed both of the votes taken after its admission. The answer to the question of how China would react to the Environment Conference question was thus postponed until the Stockholm Conference.

5. Despite the intense North-South polarization, only a handful of nations in each group emerged as leaders. Only four developing nations had +5 ratings and only two developed nations had -4 ratings. Examination of the 1970-71 debates reveals that the nations with the most extreme North-South ratings were also the most frequent advocates of their group's position before the General

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Assembly and Second Committee. Thus, Brazil, Ceylon, Chile, Nigeria, and Yugoslavia were among the most consistent advocates for the South, while Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States were the most frequent speakers on behalf of the Northern position.[179]

Overview

During the 1970-71 preparatory period the international consensus supporting the proposed Human Environment Conference was severely tested by two major issues--the first a product of the more familiar East-West political cleavage, and the second a result of emerging North-South political tensions.

Our analysis of these two issue areas suggests the following observations:

1. The major developed powers appear to have been far more concerned with the essentially tangential East German question than with the development and environment question even though the latter challenged the very direction of the original Conference proposal. While this may reflect the relatively low priority that these nations assigned to the Environment Conference question, it may also reflect their lack of comprehension of the implications inherent in the developing nations' position. Thus, while the Western powers were quick to respond to any perceived challenge to the Vienna formula status quo, they

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[179]See table 11 in the Appendix.

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were silent in the face of the initial Brazilian presentations at both the 1970 ECOSOC and General Assembly sessions (the United States even went on record as endorsing the Brazilian ECOSOC position). In a similar fashion, the developed nations acquiesced without debate to the initial Brazilian amendments at both sessions, and refrained from criticizing the emerging Southern approach to environmental questions until late in the 1971 General Assembly session.[180] Even after the long and sometimes bitter 1971 Second Committee debate only four developed nations chose to vote against the final Southern-oriented resolution.

The developed nations were apparently prepared to tolerate a radical Southern restructuring of the Conference's priorities rather than to have the Conference lose its international consensual support. This deference to consensus did not, however, extend to the East German question where the threat of a Soviet bloc boycott did not deter the Western nations from insisting on the application of the Vienna formula.

2. The lesser priority that the developed powers assigned to the development and environment issue raises questions about the overwhelming support of the developing nations for the Southern position on questions related to this issue. Would as many developing nations have supported

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[180]Prior to Moynihan's first reply to de Almeida only Singapore had directly challenged the appropriateness of discussing development issues under the Environment Conference question rubric (p. 185 above).

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the 1970-71 Brazilian initiatives if the developed nations had been as strenuous in their opposition to these proposals as they had been during the discussion of the East German question? While this analogy between questions of the political status quo and the economic status quo may be inexact, the juxtaposition of these two issues raises questions that will be further discussed in our examination of the Stockholm Conference and the post-Conference United Nations General Assembly session.

3. While the major developed nations were preoccupied with the East German question, many of the developing nations that were their traditional allies on East-West issues were placing their emphasis on North-South questions and attempting to maintain a low profile on the East German issue. Although most of the developing nations still voted with either the Soviet bloc or the Western powers on the various roll calls related to the East German question, only a handful of these nations were willing to cosponsor amendments dealing with this question, and even fewer nations actually participated in the Second Committee or General Assembly plenary debates dealing with these amendments. The developing nations appear to have been especially eager to avoid the possible confusing of the East-West and North-South issues--thus Yugoslavia utilized China as a case in point against the application of the Vienna formula; Brazil abstained on the initial East German votes; and the developing nations withdrew paragraph 7 of resolu-

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tion A/C. 2/L. 1195 when it became apparent that the debate over East German participation at Stockholm would center around this resolution.[181]

4. Despite the intense polarization generated by the East German question only a handful of nations--almost all members of the Soviet bloc--were willing to vote to postpone the Environment Conference in an effort to reconcile the East German question. Even fewer nations were willing, after the attempt at postponement failed, to vote against the overall Conference mandating resolution. In this particular instance the interest generated by the North-South tensions may have aided the Western cause as the developing nations would be more unlikely to vote to postpone or cancel a conference that appeared to promise them significant benefits. Thus, such Southern-oriented Communist nations as Romania and Yugoslavia abstained on the Conference mandating vote while such nominal Eastern allies as Egypt, India, Somalia and Syria failed to support the Soviet call for postponement.

5. The interest of the developing nations in the Environment Conference was initially sought by the Conference planners in an effort to counter these nations' alleged apathy towards the Stockholm proposal. After the developing nations became interested in the Conference, however, their involvement was not with the technical and

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[181]See pp. 139, 151, and 200 above.

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scientific aspects of the Conference proposal where their increased involvement had been desired, but with the overall direction of the proposed Conference which the developed nations had taken for granted. Paradoxically, the developing nations' increased interest brought with it the demand that the Conference be revamped to such a degree that its original proponents might now have to reexamine their commitment to the proposal. That such reexamination did not begin during the 1970-71 period was apparently a testimony both to the skills of Conference Secretary-General Strong and to the relatively low priority that the developed nations assigned the Conference proposal.

6. The developing nations did not demonstrate the cohesive, disciplined bloc behavior that the East-West conflict had once produced at the United Nations, or that the developing nations demonstrated on clear-cut racial or colonial issues.[182] Not only did Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, and Singapore challenge the validity of the Brazilian demands, but many developing nations had been uninterested in the entire Environment Conference question until confronted by evidence that the Conference might harm their development goals. Thus, the 1970 McNamara statement, the Founex Conference, and the "Limits to Growth" report were all apparently essential to the mobilization of Southern support. Once mobilized, the developing nations did vote

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[182] A more detailed discussion of bloc and group voting is provided in chapter VI, pp. 454-458 below.

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with considerable cohesion as even most of the developing nations that publicly questioned aspects of the emerging Southern position nevertheless voted with their fellow Southern nations in apparent deference to Southern solidarity.

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CHAPTER IV

THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was formally opened by United Nations Secretary-General U Thant in Stockholm, Sweden, on the morning of 5 June 1972. Over 1200 delegates from 113 nations participated in the Conference, as did some 2000 observers from United Nations specialized agencies, regional economic commissions, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental agencies. The twelve day Conference, which met under the slogan "Only One Earth," represented the outcome of the more than four years of preparatory work that was examined in the previous chapters.

The General Assembly resolutions that had shaped the Conference mandate had established four general goals for the delegates meeting at Stockholm:

1. The adoption of a Declaration on the Human Environment

2. The consideration of a comprehensive set of recommendations for international environmental initiatives, which had been arranged in a multifaceted Action Plan

3. The creation of an Environment Fund to provide financing for environmental projects

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4. The establishment of an ongoing post-Stockholm United Nations environmental program

These four goals had remained virtually unchanged since 1969, even as the preparatory debates were dramatically recasting international environmental priorities to reflect the concerns and aspirations of the developing nations. The decisive pre-Stockholm ascendancy of this Southern viewpoint assured that the Conference would be concerned primarily with questions of nuance and tenor rather than with questions of priority and direction because most of the great issues had been resolved during the preparatory debates. Only in the few cases where the mandate of the Preparatory Committee was uncertain would the Conference have to deal with the type of fundamental issues that had characterized the preparatory period.

Nevertheless, the Environment Conference contained sufficient political uncertainties so to suggest that its deliberations would be far from routine:

1. How would the East-West and North-South cleavages be affected by the absence of the boycotting Soviet Union and the participation of the People's Republic of China in its first major United Nations Conference?

2. The developing nations had steadily escalated their demands during the preparatory period. If such escalation continued at Stockholm, would it reach a point where it might endanger the international consensus supporting the Conference?

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3. The Southern position on the Environment Conference issue had originally been shaped around mutually shared intense agreement on the development question. How would these nations react when confronted with such Conference-related questions as nuclear testing and population control on which there was no consensual Southern position?

The Issues

Technical questions

The Conference's only major technical question was produced by the Chinese demand that the draft Declaration on the Human Environment be returned to committee for redrafting. Although a compelling case could be made for considering this debate as a North-South issue, we will deal with it in the technical questions category because the debate that followed the Chinese request was cast in that context.

East-West questions

The Soviet boycott of the Stockholm Conference assured that traditional East-West tensions would not play a dominant role. The potential for East-West friction was further reduced by the Chinese efforts to be perceived as a Southern rather than as an Eastern power and by the American efforts to avoid a confrontation over such Cold War questions as the use of herbicides in Vietnam. Nevertheless, several East-West issues surfaced at Stockholm, albeit in a relatively muted fashion.

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North-South questions

The development and environment question had been largely reconciled during the 1970-71 preparatory period. At Stockholm, however, several new disputes emerged concerning more specific aspects of the human environment question. These included:

1. Questions of "social pollution"

2. The question of national sovereignty versus environmental responsibilities

3. The extent of national liability for environmental damage to other nations

4. Population control

5. Nuclear testing

6. The proposal for a World Housing Fund

These six issue areas, as well as the more general development and environment rubric, provide the framework within which the North-South debate at Stockholm will be analyzed.[1]

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[1]It must be noted that the political alignments created by several of these issues cut across the North-South cleavage lines that had emerged during the debates of the Preparatory Committee. Nevertheless, we will deal with these issues as North-South questions because they were debated within the framework of the overall North-South question. The Conference also discussed a handful of controversial political issues that were not argued within the context of the North-South or East-West questions. These included such topics as a proposed ten year ban on whaling and the environmental dangers created by supersonic aircraft (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, p. 85).

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The Chronology of Events

The opening Conference plenary session on the morning of 5 June was largely devoted to procedural matters: the ceremonial opening of the Conference by U Thant; an address by Conference Secretary-General Maurice Strong; the adoption of the rules of procedure and Conference agenda that the Preparatory Committee had proposed;[2] the election of Conference officials;[3] and the appointment of a small Credentials Committee[4] and three committees charged with considering the

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[2]The rules of procedure and proposed agenda are found in United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/1, 28 December 1971 and United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/3, 28 December 1971, respectively.

[3]The position of Conference President was awarded, in keeping with United Nations tradition, to the Chairman of the host nation's delegation, Ingemund Bengtsson of Sweden. Keith Johnson of Jamaica was, by previous agreement, elected Conference Rapporteur General in recognition of his service as Chairman of the Preparatory Committee. The only departure from tradition was provided by the insistence of the developing nations that there be twenty-seven Conference Vice-Presidents instead of the three that were mandated by both United Nations custom and the Conference's own draft rules of procedure. These rules were amended and twenty-six of the Vice-Presidents were selected at this opening session. The twenty-seventh Conference vice-presidency, which would regularly have been awarded to the chief Soviet delegate, was left vacant for the duration of the Conference (United Nations Document A/CONF.48/14, 3 July 1972, p. 77).

[4]The draft rules of procedure had provided for the Conference Credentials Committee to consist of the same nine nations that had served on the Credentials Committee of the 1971 General Assembly session: Australia, Colombia, France, Ireland, Liberia, Mongolia, Somalia, USSR, and the United States. Since Mongolia, Somalia, and the Soviet Union were boycotting the Conference, the first plenary session had to name three new Committee members with political leanings similar to the nations they were replacing. This concern appears to have been honored only from an East-West perspective as the three new Committee members, Sudan, Syria, and

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proposed Action Plan.[5] The final plans of the Preparatory Committee had envisioned a week long General Debate during which each nation participating in the Conference would have an opportunity to address itself to the human environment question. At the conclusion of the General Debate the Conference would consider the draft Declaration on the Human Environment as well as the reports of the three committees that had spent the week examining the draft Action Plan.

The Conference adhered closely to this agenda except for an apparently unforeseen dispute over the proposed Declaration on the Human Environment.[6] The Declaration, a statement of fundamental environmental principles, had undergone numerous redraftings in an effort to create a document that would command the broadest possible inter-

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Yugoslavia, were all Southern nations, while Mongolia and the Soviet Union had both sided with the North in the earlier Conference-related deliberations (table 3.14 above).

[5]Each Committee was assigned two of the six sections of the draft Action Plan:

First Committee--"Planning and Management of Human Settlements for Environmental Quality" (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/6, 23 December 1971) and "Educational, Informational, Social, and Cultural Aspects of Environmental Quality" (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/9, 21 December 1971).

Second Committee--"Environmental Aspects of Natural Resources Management" (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/7, 26 January 1972) and "Development and Environment" (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/10, 22 December 1971).

Third Committee--"Identification and Control of Pollutants of Broad International Significance" (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/8, 7 January 1972) and "International Organizational Implications of Action Proposals" (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/11, 10 January 1972).

[6]John G. Stoessinger, The United Nations and the Superpowers, 4th ed. (New York: Random House; 1977), pp. 199-200.

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national support. The final draft proposal borrowed heavily from the Founex Report and even several of the preparatory period's most outspoken developing nations had praised it as a balanced document.[7] The Chinese delegation, however, refused to accept the draft Declaration because the newly accredited People's Republic of China had not played any part in its preparation. The Chinese called for the submission of the draft Declaration to a new committee, similar to the three committees that were examining the Action Plan. Despite the concern of several delegations that the "delicate balance of the existing draft" might be damaged, the plenary agreed to create a new working group open to all nations participating in the Environment Conference.

The Conference's second week was devoted to the plenary consideration of the reports of the various committees that had examined the draft Declaration and Action Plan. A number of issues were sharply debated and three, the questions of population control, nuclear testing, and the establishment of a World Housing Fund, required roll call votes rather than the usual method of recording decision by con-

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[7]See, for example, Cavalcante (Brazil), summary record of second plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 6 June 1972, p. 6. (Unless otherwise noted all summary records of Conference deliberations cited in this chapter were made available by the United Nations Environment Programme office in New York.)

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sensus. In addition, there were a number of reservations to and abstentions from particular parts of the Declaration and Action Plan.[8]

Despite these areas of disagreement, the Conference produced a noteworthy degree of consensus and cooperation. Both the Declaration and the Action Plan were unprecedented in scope, detail, and design. The former represented the first truly international recognition of the urgent nature of the human environment problem, while the latter created the landmark Earthwatch program, the first international effort at systematic assessment and monitoring of global conditions as a basis for national measures to curb environmental abuse. The Action Plan also broke new ground in the fields of international environmental management and international environmental education. Most of the Action Plan proposals were not controversial. The Conference was able to accept 91 of the 109 draft recommendations without a single dissenting vote, reservation, or abstention.

It is true that the developing nations secured certain dramatic concessions from the developed nations as their price for attending the Conference. The developed nations, however, secured consessions from the developing nations that may have been even more significant. Only three years earlier most of the Southern nations had been uninterested

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[8]Most of these abstentions were by developed nations in response to specific proposals that would have mandated increased financial aid to the developing nations (see table 4.3 and footnote 110 below).

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in the entire question of the human environment. Now these same developing nations were participating in the Earthwatch program, submitting reports on environmental problems, and debating the merits of the Action Plan proposals.

For all the Southern emphasis that the developing nations had demanded before they would participate at Stockholm, the fact remains that hundreds of traditional environmental concepts and recommendations were included in the final Declaration and Action Plan. For all of its emphasis on development, aid, trade, and social issues, the Environment Conference still dealt with most of the concepts that ecologists in highly developed nations would have deemed appropriate to a discussion of the condition of the human environment. It was only in the limited number of cases in which the majority of the developing nations objected to a particular concept (such as economic no growth or population control) that it was not included in the Conference report.

Much of the credit for this spirit of accommodation and compromise must be accorded to Conference Secretary-General Maurice Strong who supervised the Conference proceedings, as well as the earlier preparatory work, with a keen sensitivity to the concerns and priorities of the developing nations, while continuing to emphasize the pressing nature of more traditional environmental problems.[9]

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[9]See, for example, the address by Strong at the first plenary session in which he declared that:

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Before its adjournment on 16 June the Conference had not only completed its work on the Declaration and Action Plan, but had also agreed to recommend to the General Assembly the creation of a permanent United Nations Environment Programme. This Programme would be supervised by a Secretariat and a fifty-four member Governing Council.[10]

The Actors

The Environment Conference produced a new set of political configurations and actors. Examination of these actors suggests five observations:

"The concept of 'no growth' could not be a viable policy for any society, but it was necessary to rethink the traditional concepts of the basic purposes of growth. The vast benefits which the new technological order have produced are undeniable, but man's activities have created serious imbalances. Not only each society, but the world as a whole must achieve a better balance among the major elements that determined the level and quality of life it could provide for its members--population and its distribution, available resources and their exploitation, and pressures placed on the life systems that sustain it" (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, p. 80).

[10]The proposed Governing Council had grown from twenty-seven to thirty-seven and then to forty-eight members before the Conference plenary, at the urging of the developing nations, agreed on fifty-four members (ibid., p. 110). In its closing hours, the Conference also passed resolutions creating an Environment Fund and calling for a Second Human Environment Conference which Canada and Mexico both offered to host (p. 85). The Conference also decided to designate 5 June, the day on which it had opened, as World Environment Day. This last proposal generated a surprising amount of dissent as the delegation of New Zealand objected that 6 June was already a national holiday in their country and Ethiopia and Libya argued for 16 June, the Conference's closing day. The resolution finally passed after three non-recorded roll call votes, including a 22-35-24 vote on the amendment by Ethiopia and Libya (p. 97).

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1. No individual national representative dominated the Conference proceedings to the degree that Sweden's Ambassador Aström and Brazil's Ambassador de Almeida had dominated the preparatory period. The only dominant individual at the Conference was Secretary-General Strong and he served primarily as a moderator and conciliator while Aström and de Almeida had been policy initiators.

2. The absence of the Soviet Union deprived the Conference of the American-Soviet tensions that had been a significant part of most postwar international conferences. At the same time, the United States played an unusually subdued role at the Conference for several reasons.

Firstly, the sixty-four member American delegation was divided between environmentalists who were advocates of limited-growth philosophies and representatives of industries that depended upon increased international development and natural resource exploitation (such as the petroleum industry).[11] This division, which reflected a domestic American disagreement over environmental priorities, forced the delegation to maintain an ambiguous position on many Conference questions.[12]

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[11]Stoessinger, The United Nations and the Superpowers, p. 193.

[12]See, for example, the General Debate remarks of Russell E. Train, the Chairman of the American Conference delegation:

> "The United States is convinced that nations can achieve economic growth and overcome the cause of poverty, and that such growth does not have to be paid for in the degradation of cities, the ruination of the countryside

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Secondly, the American delegation had apparently come to Stockholm with a number of policy priorities including the avoidance of excessive criticism of American Vietnam policies and the tabling of the draft convention on "Certain Islands for Science."[13] In order to achieve support for these goals, the American delegation may have decided to avoid antagonizing other delegations by refraining from taking controversial positions on issues of less immediate concern to American foreign and military policy.

Lastly, the overwhelming Southern majorities on Environment Conference-related votes at the 1971 General Assembly session appear to have convinced American policy makers of the inevitability of an Environment Conference dominated by the developing nations. They may accordingly have decided that the best approach towards such a Conference was to treat it as a minimal priority so as to facilitate the later disavowal of troublesome recommendations.[14]

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and the exhaustion of resources. And environmental quality and resource conservation do not have to be paid for in economic stagnation or inequity" (summary record of third plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 6 June 1972, p. 12).

[13]See footnote 43 below for a discussion of the apparent reasons for the American objections to the "Certain Islands for Science" draft convention.

[14]This plausible hypothesis was suggested by a Conference participant from a developing nation who insisted that his remarks be "off the record." The fact that the American delegation did not include a single Cabinet officer or senior Congressional leader lends credence to this theory, especially since such individuals are usually members of American delegations to major international conferences.

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3. The People's Republic of China made a concerted effort at Stockholm to establish itself as the leader of the developing nations.

In almost every Conference plenary and committee debate the Chinese enunciated the most radical Southern position. The final drafts of both the Declaration and Action Plan reflected Chinese thinking on such issues as national sovereignty and population control. The Chinese failed, however, in achieving their goal of undisputed Southern leadership. Only a handful of nations echoed the Chinese thesis that most worldwide pollution stemmed from the two superpowers' policies of "plunder, aggression, and war."[15] The Chinese effort to assert itself as the leader of the developing nations was further damaged by its highly unpopular position on the question of atmospheric nuclear testing.

4. A new group of developing nations emerged at the Stockholm Conference as a significant factor in international environmental policy making. During the preparatory process the most aggressive developing nations had placed almost exclusive emphasis on the primacy of development issues. At the Conference, however, several developing nations placed equal, if not greater emphasis on such social pollution questions as apartheid, neocolonialism, racism, and national sovereignty. The role of these "new

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[15]Tang Ke (China), remarks to tenth plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 10 June 1972, p. 4 (verbatim transcript made available by the United Nations Environment Programme office in New York).

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radicals"--Algeria, China, Guinea, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, and Zambia--will be examined in depth later in this chapter.

5. The emergence of the social pollution question and the Preparatory Committee's virtual acceptance of the Founex Report created a severe dilemma for the original "old radical" developing nations and especially for Brazil which had initiated the struggle for increasingly pro-Southern positions at every stage of the preparatory debates. The Brazilians not only supported the Preparatory Committee's final draft Declaration and Action Plan, but even joined the developed nations in opposing a number of the more radical Southern initiatives.[16]

The mellowing of the Brazilian position has been explained both in terms of Brazil's reliance on foreign aid from the United States and the apparent priority that Brazil placed on tabling an Action Plan section dealing with national responsibility for transnational water pollution.[17] There is, however, little evidence to support either of these hypotheses.[18] A far more likely explanation of the

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[16]See, for example, p. 283 below.

[17]The Brazilian concern with this recommendation appears to have been related to the Argentinian and Uruguayan contentions that Brazil was unduly polluting the Uruguay River and the Upper Rio de la Plata estuary.

[18]Both of these explanations were suggested in interviews with members of national delegations to the Stockholm Conference who insisted on anonymity. It is true that Brazil is the recipient of one of the largest American foreign aid

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Brazilian behavior is that Brazil and the other original old radicals were interested in the primacy of development goals and did not wish to see these goals diluted or confused by the introduction of the highly controversial social pollution question. The old radicals had succeeded in redirecting the proposed Conference priorities and were apparently not about to allow these priorities to be lost in a welter of new proposals and concerns.

In the two previous chapters an effort was made to gauge national participation in the various Conference preparatory forums. Analysis of this participation revealed that the developed nations were far more involved in the preparatory process than the developing nations. The gap between the two groups, however, was sharply narrowed during the closing months of the preparatory period.[19] This apparent increase in the interest of the developing nations in

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allotments, but this was equally true during the preparatory years when Brazil was the most outspoken Southern nation. Furthermore, it is hard to sustain the American aid explanation in light of Brazil's Conference vote in favor of the World Housing Fund, the only recorded Conference roll call on a proposal which the United States publicly opposed (p. 318 below).

[19]See table 11 in the Appendix. Further evidence for this finding is provided by analysis of the national sources of pre-Conference documentation (table 15 in the Appendix). Corresponding Consultants for the Conference's Only One Earth report were all appointed by early 1971 and over two-thirds of them came from developed nations. Furthermore, 26 of the 38 developed nations provided consultants as did only 31 of the 103 developing nations. However, national reports on the environment could be submitted until June 1972 and over two-thirds again as many developing nations (62) submitted reports than had provided Only One Earth consultants.

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the Environment Conference was reflected in their high rate of attendance and participation at Stockholm. Over three-quarters of the developing nations that attended the Stockholm Conference participated in the Conference General Debate (see table 4.1).[20] This is a significantly higher level of Southern participation than was recorded for any Conference-related forum at any stage of the preparatory process.[21]

Any examination of national participation at Stockholm must include an analysis of the twenty-eight invited nations that chose not to attend the Conference (table 4.1). These nations can be divided into two categories: those that were absent because of their participation in the Soviet boycott and those that failed to attend for any other reason. Fifteen nations can be placed in the first category: the Soviet Union and six other members of its Eastern European

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[20]The total numbers of developed and developing nations utilized in this table are different from those in the previous chapters. The reason for this discrepancy is that several states were invited to participate in the Stockholm Conference that were not United Nations members and had accordingly not participated in the deliberations that were chronicled in the previous chapters. The invited nonmembers (all members of at least one United Nations specialized agency) were: Bangladesh, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, South Korea, South Vietnam, Switzerland, the Vatican, and West Germany.

[21]See table 11 in the Appendix. It should also be noted that the Southern Conference participation figures would have been even higher except for the decision of the five Central American nations to save plenary time by delegating Guatemala to address the Conference on their collective behalf (Obiols-Gomez [Guatemala], summary record of twelfth plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 10 June 1972).

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TABLE 4.1

NATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

Nation Group	Attended Conference and Participated in General Debate	Attended Conference but did not Participate in General Debate	Invited to Conference but did not attend
Latin America (13-8-3)	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala*, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela	Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama	Barbados, Cuba, Paraguay
Africa (24-10-7)	Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia	Burundi, Chad, Congo, Dahomey, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger	Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Mali, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Upper Volta
Asia and Others (developing) (25-2-11)	Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Ceylon, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, South Vietnam, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Yemen, Yugoslavia	Cyprus, United Arab Emirates	Albania, Bhutan, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Maldives, Mongolia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Yemen-PDR
Total-- developing	62	20	21

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Western Europe (20-3-0)	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Vatican City, West Germany	Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino	
Eastern Europe (1-0-7)	Romania		Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, USSR
Others (developed) (6-1-0)	Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, United States	South Africa	
Total-- developed	27	4	7
Grand Total	89	24	28

*Guatemala spoke on behalf of all five Central American states.

bloc, [22] Albania, [23] Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Mongolia, Somalia, Upper Volta, and Yemen-PDR.[24] The motives of the thirteen other nations that failed to attend the Conference are more difficult to ascertain because none of these nations formally responded to the Conference invitation. The absence of Barbados and Saudi Arabia from Stockholm is especially difficult to understand since they had both previously endorsed the Conference proposal.[25]

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[22]Romania was the only member of the Soviet bloc that attended the Conference. This further demonstrated the already noted Romanian desire to identify with the Southern nations (chapter III, p. 217 above).

[23]Albania, unlike the other nations on this list, never formally declared its support for the boycott. Albania is, nevertheless, classified as a "boycotter" because of its 1971 support for East German participation, as well as on the basis of an interview with a United Nations Environment Programme staff member who requested anonymity.

[24]All fifteen of these nations had supported East Germany during the 1972 Second Committee and General Assembly debates. They had all voted for East German participation and eleven of them had supported the Soviet initiative to postpone the Conference for a year, until the German question was settled (Equatorial Guinea, Somalia and Upper Volta had abstained on the latter vote, which Albania was absent for). It is noteworthy that the six other nations that supported the final Soviet initiative--Algeria, Ceylon, Chile, Guinea, Romania, and Yugoslavia--nevertheless attended the Conference. All six of these nations had played an active role in the preparatory process and may have been less willing to miss the Conference than the boycotting nations that, with the exception of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, had been only peripherally involved.

[25]Barbados had even sent observers to the fourth session of the Preparatory Committee. The absence of Barbados from Stockholm has been explained as resulting from a scheduling conflict with a domestic environmental conference that was held in Barbados at the same time (interview with John Maynard, Counselor to the Barbados Mission to the United Nations, 28 August 1974). The Saudi Arabian Mission to the

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The Politics of the Technical Questions

The only procedural debate at the Stockholm Conference centered around the question of reopening the draft Declaration on the Human Environment. Two arguments, the first ideological and the second procedural, were put forward in support of the demand that the Declaration be sent back to Committee for redrafting.

The first argument, that the draft Declaration failed to recognize the dangers of social pollution, was presented by the Tanzanian delegate at the second plenary session:

> The problems of the human environment are dominated by the abominable practices of racial discrimination, injustice, and the degradation of human resources . . . If these central issues are avoided in the Conference, Tanzania will be greatly disappointed.[26]

The Tanzanian demand that the Conference reopen the draft Declaration received little support during the opening days of the General Debate (see table 4.2). Twenty-nine nations endorsed the Preparatory Committee's final draft, while only four joined Tanzania in proposing that the Declaration be rewritten. The supporters of the draft included Brazil and Yugoslavia, two of the preparatory period's most militant developing nations. Their support suggests

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United Nations, in response to repeated written and verbal requests for an interview, declared that "there is no environmental problem in our nation, so we did not attend" (telephone interview with Saudi Arabian Mission press official who requested anonymity, 14 August 1974).

[26]Chagula (Tanzania), summary record of second plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 6 June 1972, p. 12.

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the degree to which the Tanzanian objections had failed to produce a cleavage along traditional North-South lines.

TABLE 4.2

NATIONS TAKING A POSITION DURING THE ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE GENERAL DEBATE ON REOPENING THE DRAFT DECLARATION ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT

	Developed Nations	Developing Nations
Nations in favor of reopening the draft		Chile, China, Nepal, Pakistan, Tanzania
Nations against reopening the draft	Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malta, Netherlands, Romania, Spain, United Kingdom, United States, West Germany	Bahrain, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Liberia, Nigeria, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, Uruguay, Yugoslavia

The failure of the Tanzanian initiative did not deter the Chinese delegation from presenting its own proposal on the ostensibly procedural grounds that the Declaration was "unrepresentative" because it had been drafted prior to the seating of the People's Republic of China at the United Nations. This position was formally presented by the Chinese delegation at the Conference's seventh plenary session on 8 June, at which they introduced a resolution mandating the creation of a new Conference committee to redraft the Declaration in an effort to assure "full expression to the view of various countries."[27]

[27]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, p. 86.

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The Chinese resolution, as amended by Iran to provide for a working group open to all nations rather than a select committee, was quickly endorsed by nine of the ten other debate participants.[28] This support, however, was far from enthusiastic. Virtually every speaker noted that they were satisfied with the current draft Declaration, and were only supporting the Chinese resolution for the sake of Conference harmony. Canada, in particular, warned that "any delegation that disturbed the delicate balance of the existing draft would carry a heavy responsibility." Even the Canadian delegate agreed, however, that the Conference "could not deny the opportunity to the delegations which had not participated in the elaboration of the draft declaration, but wished to do so."[29] At the conclusion of this almost perfunctory debate, the Chinese resolution was accepted without objection.

It is not difficult to explain why the Chinese proposal met with a far more favorable reaction than did the earlier similar Tanzanian request. The Chinese resolution removed the most effective argument against the Tanzanian

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[28]The nations supporting the Chinese request were: Argentina, Canada, Iran, Italy, Norway (speaking on behalf of Denmark as well), Philippines (speaking on behalf of the Asian bloc), Sudan (speaking on behalf of the African bloc), Switzerland, Tunisia, and the United States. Singapore was the only nation to announce its objection to the initiative and its intention to abstain during any vote on the resolution.

[29]Davis (Canada), summary record of seventh plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 8 June 1972, p. 15.

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proposal--the concern that reopening the drafting of the Declaration might endanger the fragile consensus supporting the Conference. The certainty of a Chinese repudiation of the draft Declaration as "unrepresentative" was apparently deemed an even greater danger to this consensus. The very nations that had opposed reopening the Declaration in order to avoid the possibility of unnecessary controversy, had little choice but to agree to reopen the draft in the face of an even more certain controversy should they refuse.

A second reason for the acceptance of the Chinese resolution was the apparent deference afforded the Chinese delegation at Stockholm. Other nations appear to have been reluctant to reject the first major Chinese initiative at the first major conference attended by the People's Republic of China after a quarter century of international isolation.[30]

In summary, Tanzania was a relatively obscure nation demanding the reopening of the Declaration for highly controversial ideological reasons that threatened to divide the Conference. China, on the other hand, was a world power demanding that its delegation be given an opportunity to participate in the drafting of a major Conference document.

The Politics of the East-West Questions

The Soviet Union had pledged, after its 1971 General Assembly defeat, to organize a boycott of the Environment

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[30]Interview with Noel Brown, United Nations Environment Programme, 11 November 1973.

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Conference if East Germany was not invited. There is little evidence that this Soviet threat was taken seriously even after Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union had absented themselves from the March 1972 Preparatory Committee session.[31]

Even during the final weeks preceding the Conference there remained widespread hope that a face-saving compromise could be arranged that would ensure Soviet participation.[32] The Soviets and a hard core of East German supporters would not, however, be assuaged. During the last ten days of May, these nations announced their formal rejection of the invitations to what they characterized as a "discriminatory" Conference.[33]

There is reason to believe that the Soviet bloc was utilizing the Environment Conference issue as a means of securing concessions in the then ongoing negotiations between the two German States. They may have hoped that the Western European nations and the United States would agree

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[31]See, for example, the statement of Environment Conference Secretary-General Maurice Strong at the March 1972 Preparatory Committee session in which he expressed his confidence that the question of East German participation would be solved before the Stockholm Conference (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/PC/17, 15 March 1972, p. 11).

[32]It should be remembered that twenty-five of the forty-three nations that had supported the invitation to East Germany at the 1971 General Assembly session had, by the end of May, declared their intention to attend the Conference. With so many of East Germany's supporters in attendance the boycott would be, at best, a limited success (Wolff, "Cloudy Atmosphere Over Stockholm," p. 44).

[33]United Nations Document A/8688, 2 June 1972, p. 1.

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to a last minute invitation to East Germany in order to assure Soviet participation at Stockholm. Such an invitation would have been of great value to East Germany because it would have conferred upon it a measure of the international legitimacy that represented one of the most valuable Western negotiating points.[34]

The Western nations, however, remained steadfast in their refusal to invite East Germany to the Conference and in their insistence that the Environment Conference would be held whether or not the Soviet bloc attended. Universal participation was obviously not deemed so important a goal as to permit the loss of crucial bargaining strength in the ongoing intra-German negotiations. Apparently, East-West considerations were still a higher priority for both sides than was the Environment Conference.

It was ironically a tribute to the general tenacity of East-West tensions that they were so nonexistent at the Stockholm Conference. The flexibility that characterized the Northern response to the demands of the developing nations during the preparatory process was clearly not in evidence on the East German question. The contention that Stockholm marked the ascendancy of the North-South cleavage

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[34]See also chapter III, pp. 149-150 above. The final pre-Conference statements by the Soviet bloc nations lend credence to this hypothesis. As late as 2 June they were still declaring that an invitation to East Germany would end their boycott and ensure the success of the Conference (United Nations Document A/8688, 2 June 1972, p. 2).

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over the East-West cleavage in international relations is apparently premature. Both sides in the North-South dispute came to Stockholm; in the East-West dispute, one side simply stayed home.

Every effort was made at Stockholm, however, to ensure that the Soviets would be able to eventually support the final Conference recommendations.[35] Places were saved for Soviet bloc representatives on all major committees, and several speakers, including Conference Secretary-General Strong, deplored the conditions which had led to the boycott.[36] Even the Chinese, who delivered one of the General Debate's most controversial addresses, limited their comments on the East German issue to a statement of "regret that the German Democratic Republic is not represented at this Conference."[37]

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[35]Stoessinger, The United Nations and the Superpowers, pp. 192-193.

[36]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, p. 80. Thirteen nations mentioned the boycott in their General Debate statements: Algeria, Chile, China, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, Guinea, Libya, Romania, Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Togo, and West Germany. The first eleven nations had all supported East German participation during the 1971 Second Committee and General Assembly debates and now expressed their disappointment with East Germany's exclusion. Togo, a sponsor of the exclusion resolution, merely noted the boycott, while West Germany, whose negotiating position had helped assure the boycott, was far more conciliatory. The West Germans expressed hope "that all nations not present at the Conference would soon be represented" (Genscher [West Germany], summary record of ninth plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 9 June 1972, p. 9).

[37]Tang Ke (China), remarks to tenth plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 10 June 1972, p. 1.

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Despite their reticence on the East German question, the Chinese were the initiators of the two other East-West issues that were raised during the General Debate: the question of South Korean and South Vietnamese representation at Stockholm and the question of American military involvement in Vietnam.

The Chinese objections to the two Asiatic states were raised both at the otherwise uneventful meeting of the Conference Credentials Committee[38] and at the outset of the lengthy Chinese General Debate statement. China demanded that both states be expelled from the Conference on grounds that only North Korea could represent the Korean people and only North Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (the Viet Cong) could represent the Vietnamese people.[39] The Chinese position was virtually ignored by both the Credentials Committee members and the General Debate participants with only South Korea and South Vietnam responding to the charges. This lack of interest may be explained in part by the fact that the leftist and Communist states that would be most likely to support the Chinese position were the very nations that had championed the principle of "universal participation"

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[38]The only other credentials challenge at the Conference was filed by Pakistan in protest to the participation of Bangladesh (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, p. 120).

[39]Tang Ke (China), remarks to tenth plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, p. 1.

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during the East German debates. It would have been difficult for these nations to demand the explusion of two invited Conference participants for "political" reasons after having berated the Western powers for having excluded East Germany for similar reasons.[40]

The Chinese gave far more attention to the question of American military involvement in Vitenam. For one thing, this issue, unlike the East German, South Korean, or South Vietnamese representation questions, could be directly linked to an international environmental concern--the destruction of the physical environment of Vietnam. In addition, raising the issue at this time may have provided the Chinese with an opportunity to embarrass the absent Soviet Union, which was permitting a state visit by the President of the United States, despite the recent American decision to blockade Haiphong and Hanoi. Furthermore, the Vietnam War was perceived by many in the developing world as a North-South question rather than as an East-West issue. The Chinese initiative may accordingly have been welcomed by those nations which might have resented the introduction of a purely East-West issue.

The Chinese devoted almost a third of their General Debate statement to detailing their Vietnam-related charges.

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[40]The subsequent Chinese support for the final report of the Credentials Committee suggests that their initial objection to South Korea and South Vietnam may well have been primarily made "for the record" (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, Annex III, p. 2).

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The United States, they declared, had been "fanatically using toxic chemicals and poisonous gas continuously" in Vietnam. The "barbarous atrocities on the part of the United States [had] resulted in massive killing . . . as well as unprecedented and serious destruction of the human environment." In addition, the Chinese unveiled a sensational new allegation, declaring that the United States was deliberately bombing the dykes of North Vietnam's Red River in a calculated effort to "create a man-made flood catastrophe."[41]

The American delegation had, as has previously been noted, assigned its highest priority to keeping the volatile Vietnam War issue off the Conference agenda. Accordingly, neither the United States nor any of its allies responded publicly to the detailed Chinese charges which failed to become a major Conference issue.[42] Even more significantly, the Americans succeeded in blocking any Conference condemnation of the military use of herbicides and defoliants. Neither term was included in the final draft of either the Declaration or the Action Plan.

The United States delegation met with similar success in its efforts to table the draft convention on "Certain

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[41]Tang Ke (China), remarks to tenth plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 10 June 1972, p. 2.

[42]Only three nations, Algeria, Tanzania, and Zambia, echoed the Chinese criticism. To the chagrin of the American delegation, however, the Chinese charges were endorsed by Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme (Stoessinger, The United Nations and the Superpowers, p. 196).

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Islands for Science," which was viewed as possibly endangering the future of American military testing in the United Nations Pacific Trust Territory.[43] While the original recommendation of the Action Plan had called for national ratification of the proposed convention, the final draft limited itself to urging the Secretary-General to study "all possible procedures for protecting certain islands for science."[44] The United States was similarly responsible for the deletion of the draft Action Plan recommendation dealing with the question of oceanic radioactive waste disposal.[45]

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[43]The reasons for the American opposition were never openly stated, but they apparently centered on the draft's call for an "international environmental trust" to which signatory states could assign particular islands. The American military appears to have been concerned that the Pacific Trust Territory would be a prime candidate for inclusion in such a trust and would, if so included, be closed to American weapons testing and military installations. While the draft convention envisioned inclusion in the proposed trust as a voluntary undertaking, American policy makers were said to fear intense domestic political pressure to volunteer the Pacific Trust Territory if the "Certain Islands for Science" draft was adopted at Stockholm (New York Times, 9 June 1972, p. 8).

[44]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, p. 52 (recommendation 99).

[45]The section that was deleted called on all nations to register the discharge of significant quantities of radioactive materials into the oceans with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and to cooperate with the IAEA in the expansion of this registry to include all discharge of significant quantities of radioactive materials into the biosphere (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/8, 7 January 1972, p. 99). See United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, p. 46 (recommendation 87) for the language of the final recommendation.

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In summary, East-West issues were generally muted at Stockholm. Their greatest impact was not in what they added to the Conference, but in what they caused to be excluded: the boycotting Soviet bloc; the uninvited delegations of East Germany, North Korea, and North Vietnam; any mention of herbicides or defoliants; consideration of the draft convention on "Certain Islands for Science"; and the Action Plan section dealing with radioactive waste disposal at sea. It is noteworthy that each of these exclusions reflected a victory for the American policy position--a policy predominance that was not reflected in the Conference's consideration of North-South issues.

The Politics of the North-South Questions

Most of the North-South questions discussed at Stockholm can be placed into one of three categories:

1. The by now familiar demands of the old radical developing nations that the Conference recommendations stress the primacy of economic development, the need for increased development aid, and the danger of environmentally motivated trade restrictions.

2. The demands of the new radicals who insisted that the Conference agenda be expanded to include questions of social pollution, the inherent injustice of the international economic order, and the necessity for the developed nations to pay "reparations" to the developing nations for having ravaged the human environment.

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3. Five controversial questions on which the developing nations had failed to achieve consensus during the preparatory period: national sovereignty; national liability; population control; nuclear testing; and the proposal for a World Housing Fund.

Environmental priorities: the Founex agenda

It is a decisive measure of the success of the developing nations during the preparatory process that the development and environment question, which had dominated the 1970 and 1971 General Assembly Conference-related deliberations, was not a major item of contention at Stockholm. The Preparatory Committee's final draft Declaration and Action Plan recommendations were faithful enough to the General Assembly's Southern imposed mandate that the remaining development and environment questions were almost all of an incremental nature. The developing nations did not have to militate at Stockholm for consideration of the Founex agenda of development priorities because these priorities had already been largely adopted by the drafters of the final pre-Conference proposals.[46]

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[46]See, for example, the draft preamble to the Declaration on the Human Environment which declared that the primary goal of human technology was to "bring all peoples the benefits of development and the opportunity to enhance the quality of life" (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/4, 11 April 1972, p. 1). Nine of the twenty-three principles in the draft Declaration dealt with the development question. The Preparatory Committee emphasized the source of these recommendations by reprinting the Founex Report as annex to its report on the "development and environment" agenda item (United Nations Document A/CONF.48/10, 21 December 1971, Annex I, pp. 1-34).

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The Chinese demand to reopen the drafting of the Declaration on the Human Environment gave the developing nations an unexpected opportunity to further reinforce this institutionalization of the Founex agenda. Brazil accordingly submitted a new preambular paragraph that presented a succinct summary of the Southern position on the development and environment question.[47] The Brazilian paragraph was accepted without debate, as were several brief additions making reference to the necessity of development aid. In addition, two new principles were added to the Declaration: one calling for "adequate earnings for primary commodities and raw materials," and the other warning of the inadvisability of uniform environmental standards for both developed and developing nations.[48]

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[47] "In the developing countries most of the environmental problems are caused by under-development. Millions continue to live far below the minimum levels required for a decent human existence, deprived of adequate food and clothing, shelter and education, health and sanitation. Therefore, the developing countries must direct their efforts to development, bearing in mind their priorities and the need to safeguard and improve their environment. For the same purpose, the industrialized nations should make efforts to reduce the gap between themselves and the developing countries. In the industrialized countries, environmental problems are generally related to industrialization and technological development" (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, p. 2, fourth preambular paragraph).

[48] Ibid., pp. 5 and 7, principles 11 and 23. The other Founex agenda additions (to differentiate from those dealing with social issues) were found in the seventh preambular paragraph ("international cooperation is also needed in order to raise resources to support the developing countries in carrying out their responsibilities in this field"), and in Declaration principles 9 ("accelerated development through the transfer of substantial qualities of financial

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Table 4.3 summarizes the eight draft Action Plan recommendations that dealt with the development and environment question. Examination of this table demonstrates the nearly universal acceptance of the once controversial Southern position on this question.[49] The acquiescence of the developed nations to the Founex priorities suggests that their defeat at the 1971 General Assembly had convinced them of the futility of opposing the developing nations on these issues.[50] The Northern nations were accordingly more involved at Stockholm in the discussion of the social pollution questions and the other issues on which there had not been an overwhelming pre-Conference Southern consensus.

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aid" [p. 5]) and 20 ("environmental technologies should be made available to developing countries" [p. 6]).

[49]The Conference's Second Committee, charged with consideration of these Action Plan recommendations, made even fewer changes in these drafts than had been made in the sections of the reopened draft Declaration. As in the case of the Declaration the changes were largely incremental and reinforcing: five Kenyan amendments that sought to emphasize the primacy of developmental priorities, and amendments by such old radicals as Brazil, India, Nigeria, and Zaire that stressed the need for increased financial aid to the developing nations (ibid., pp. 101-104).

[50]The acceptance by the developed nations of these sections of the Declaration and Action Plan did not, however, imply any change in their national aid, trade, or development policies. See, for example, the official American "interpretation" of Declaration principle 12 which dealt with the question of international development aid: "The United States of America does not regard the text of this principle, or any other language contained in the Declaration, as requiring it to change its aid policies or increase the amounts thereof" (ibid., p. 118).

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TABLE 4.3

THE CONFERENCE ACTION PLAN RECOMMENDATIONS DEALING WITH THE DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT QUESTION

The Draft Recommendation	Conference Plenary Vote	Nations Publicly Opposing the Draft Recommendation
102. Called on regional organizations to provide technical assistance to developing nations to aid them in dealing with their environmental problems	77-0-2	
103. Called for the developed nations to provide the developing nations with "compensation" for any losses that the latter might suffer because of environmentally motivated trade restrictions imposed by the former	72-1-8	France Italy Japan Switzerland United Kingdom United States
104. Called for the identification of potential environmentally motivated threats to world trade and the development of international environmental standards for trade purposes	76-0-1	
105. Called on GATT and UNCTAD to report the appearance of any environmentally motivated trade barrier	acclamation	
106. Called for a study of the feasibility of phasing out synthetic production to reduce pollution and of relocating industries from developed nations in developing nations with less of a pollution problem	65-0-8	Italy United States

107. Called for a study of financing international environmental action	acclamation		
108. Called for making environmental technologies available to peoples of developing nations	80-0-1		
109. Declared that development aid must continue to flow to developing nations from the developed nations	71-0-7	Sweden United Kingdom United States	

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Environmental priorities: social pollution issues

The introduction at Stockholm of the social pollution issue reflected the emergence of a significant cleavage between the members of the once seemingly cohesive Southern group. The old radicals had dominated the Conference preparatory process by securing the support of almost all developing nations for their program of stressing economic development priorities. At Stockholm, however, the new radicals demanded a basic redirection of Southern priorities. While the former had spoken of pragmatic economic goals, the latter spoke of more ideologically oriented social welfare goals. While the former demanded "aid," the latter demanded "reparations." While the former emphasized the inherent pollution of poverty, the latter stressed the inherent pollution of injustice, racism, and colonial and neocolonial exploitation. While the old radicals demanded an enlarged place in the world economic system, the new radicals demanded the total restructuring of that system.[51]

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[51]Statements by representatives of the Philippines and the Sudan during the Conference's plenary consideration of the redrafted Declaration on the Human Environment provided an excellent example of these divergent priorities. The Philippines, a supporter of the old radical position during the preparatory period, stressed three "basic principles" that its delegation felt should be included in the Declaration: "a. the primacy of human over physical factors; b. the needs of developing countries and the necessity for them to have resources to cope with additional environmental concerns [because] poverty was the worst polluter; and c. nuclear weapons and stockpiles should be destroyed and nuclear warfare banned" (Benitez [Philippines], ibid., p. 114). The new radical Sudan promptly countered with its own list of basic principles: "[a.] rejection of

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Table 4.4 lists the nations that stressed economic and development priorities and those that stressed social pollution priorities in their Stockholm Conference General Debate statements. The membership of the former group continued to cut across ideological lines--including Communist Yugoslavia, Marxist Chile, conservative Brazil, and archenemies India and Pakistan. The new radicals, on the other hand, were generally highly outspoken, leftist nations that shared a common position on many other international issues.

TABLE 4.4

NATIONS TAKING A POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF ECONOMIC OR SOCIAL PRIORITIES DURING THE ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE GENERAL DEBATE

	Nations Stressing Economic Priorities	Nations Stressing Social Priorities
Latin America	Brazil, Chile	Ecuador
Africa	Ethiopia, Nigeria	Algeria, Guinea, Libya, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia
Asia	India, Pakistan	Ceylon, China, Syria
Others (developing)	Yugoslavia	

segregation, racism, apartheid, and expansionism; [b.] rejection of colonialism and foreign domination as having a strong adverse effect on the environment of the oppressed; [c.] emphasis on the fact that the terms of trade in primary produce has a direct connexion with the management of water, soils and other natural resources; [d.] emphasis on the sovereign right of every country to exploit its own natural resources; and [e.] strong condemnation of the development, testing and use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons as the most destructive of all environmental threats" (El Khalifa [Sudan], p. 115).

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China appears to have been a prime mover behind the emergence of the new radicals at Stockholm. This emergence may have represented a major Chinese foreign policy objective--the radicalization of the very terms of international political dialogue. The Chinese and the other new radicals were apparently more interested in establishing direction than in defining details. Despite the fervor of their rhetoric, these nations made few specific proposals. The new radicals were accordingly far more involved in the redrafting of the relatively general Declaration on the Human Environment, than in the consideration of specific Action Plan recommendations.[52]

The efforts of the new radicals resulted in several major changes in the draft Declaration:

1. The preamble of the Declaration was rewritten to acknowledge the significance of "intellectual, moral, social and spiritual growth" where previously only "economic" growth had been mentioned. Similarly, "social progress" was amended to the preamble's list of fundamental human goals.[53]

2. The first principle of the Declaration was

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[52]The various Conference committees made only two additions to the draft Action Plan that might be said to have social pollution connotations: the authorization of a study to "find out the connexion between the distribution of natural resources and people's welfare and the reasons for possible discrepancies" (ibid., p. 38, recommendation 62) and a call for international action to combat the problems of human malnutrition (p. 13, recommendation 13).

[53]Ibid., pp. 2-3.

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completely rewritten. While the original draft had placed an exclusive emphasis on economic issues,[54] the new principle stressed social pollution priorities:

> Man has a fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations. In this respect, policies promoting or perpetuating apartheid, racial segregation, discrimination, colonial and other forms of oppression and foreign domination stand condemned and must be eliminated.[55]

3. The term "social benefits" was added to a list of "economic and environmental" factors that should be considered by those involved with urban area and human settlement planning. This principle was further amended to include a demand for the abandonment of "projects which are designed for colonialist and racist domination" (such as the controversial Portuguese hydroelectric projects in Mozambique).[56]

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[54]The original draft had declared that: "Man has the fundamental right to adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality which permits a life of dignity and well-being and bears a solemn responsibility to protect and enhance the environment for future generations" (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/4, 11 April 197 , Annex 1, p. 4).

[55]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, p. 4 (principle 1).

[56]Ibid., p. 6 (principle 15). The emphasis on racism and colonialism in several of these proposals may help explain their success in securing approval. The new radicals appear to have been most successful when their proposals enjoyed a linkage with more traditional Southern issues.

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4. The term "economic development" was replaced several times by such phrases as "full human dimension" and "the common good of mankind."[57]

5. Principle 23 of the draft Declaration was amended to include a disavowal of any international environmental standard that might be "of unwarranted social cost for the developing nations."[58]

These changes marked the first international recognition of the validity of social factors in an examination of the human environment question. At Stockholm, the new radicals attempted to transform the Environment Conference into a social priorities conference much as the old radicals had previously demanded that it be transformed into a "development conference." Although the new radicals failed to win support for all of their positions, they succeeded in securing discussion of their priorities on the international environmental agenda.

The emergence of the new radicals at Stockholm may represent far more than the advent of an alternative approach to environmental priorities. Their attempts to politicize the Conference through the raising of ideologically charged issues suggest that the Southern bloc may yet lose its major unifying factor--the mutual recognition of

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[57]See, for example, the changes in principle 19 (ibid., p. 6).

[58]Ibid., p. 7 (principle 23).

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the primacy of development issues. With the gradual demise of the colonialism issue, the development question had become the common denominator among Southern nations--be it in UNCTAD, the United Nations, or international conferences. The Stockholm experience raises the possibility that the tensions between international economic pragmatists and international social welfare idealists may yet develop into a new political cleavage with unforeseen effects on the future cohesiveness of the Southern bloc.

The question of national sovereignty

The inviolate sovereignty of each nation state is a fundamental principle of the international system, reflected in every aspect of international law and institutionalized in both the Charter and practice of the United Nations. The question of international environmental standards infringing on national sovereignty was thus rarely a source of controversy during the Conference preparatory period. The broad international consensus in support of this principle was demonstrated by the reaction to Robert McNamara's ill-fated 1970 call for World Bank scrutinization of proposed development projects from an environmental perspective. No nation, developed or developing, chose to defend this proposal after Brazil attacked it as inimical to the national sovereignty concept.[59]

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[59]See chapter III, p. 179 above.

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Despite the lack of tension over the national sovereignty issue during the preparatory process, it nevertheless played a significant role in the Stockholm deliberations. On one hand, the old radicals worked to assure that the Conference recommendations would not be used as a pretext to thwart their economic growth. At the same time, the new radicals and several of the developed nations proposed a new definition of sovereignty with significant implications for the questions of national liability and compensation.[60]

The traditional sovereignty issue was first raised at Stockholm by the Brazilian delegate on the opening day of the General Debate: "international mechanisms should not affect the principle of national sovereignty. The United Nations is based on national states with undisputed sovereign rights and it should not try to super-impose the international views, but should coordinate and provide assistance always on request."[61]

This Brazilian concern, which was repeated by Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, and by several Asian and African nations, was reflected in a partial revision of the proposed Conference recommendations. The phrases "with the

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[60]This second aspect of the sovereignty issue is properly examined as a separate question, and will be so treated immediately after the discussion of the traditional sovereignty question.

[61]Cavalcante (Brazil), summary record of second plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 6 June 1972, p. 7.

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consent of the nations involved" or "with full regard for national sovereignty" were repeatedly inserted into the draft Action Plan by the various Conference committees.[62] Principle 24 of the draft Declaration on the Human Environment was similarly strongly reworded to stress national sovereignty and equality.[63]

None of these proposed changes met with any public opposition. Why then did the apparently uncontroversial sovereignty question become an issue at the Stockholm Conference to the degree that it was invoked in numerous national statements and resulted in over a dozen changes in the draft Declaration and Action Plan? There is some evidence that this issue was raised by nations that sought to use it to protect themselves from the new definition of sovereignty that was being postulated in connection with the national liability issue.[64]

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[62]See, for example, United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, pp. 24 (recommendation 37), 33 (recommendation 51b, and 42 (recommendation 79).

[63]The underlined portions were added to the final text of the principle by the Conference Working Group and did not appear in the Preparatory Committee's draft: "International matters concerning the protection and improvement of the environment should be handled in a co-operative spirit by all countries, big or small, on an equal footing. Co-operation through multilateral or bilateral arrangements or other appropriate means [these eight words replaced the words 'international agreements or otherwise'] is essential to effectively control, prevent, reduce and eliminate adverse environmental effects resulting from activities conducted in all spheres, in such a way that due account is taken of the sovereignty and interests of all States" (ibid., p. 7 [principle 24]).

[64]See, for example, the Brazilian remarks cited in

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The question of national liability

The Stockholm debate over the question of national liability for transnational environmental damage produced a fascinating and potentially highly significant set of political configurations. On one side, some of the most highly industrialized developed nations were joined by several of the old radicals, while, on the other side, a number of the new radicals shared common ground with several of the less industrialized developed nations. Both factions perceived the liability question as one that dealt with their fundamental sovereignty: the sovereign right to industrial expansion and resource exploitation as opposed to the sovereign right to be spared the effects of another nation's pollutants.

The fundamental cleavage on this question appears to have been between nations that were, on the whole, "exporters" of pollution and those that were, on the whole, "importers" of pollution. Thus, Austria, Canada, Luxembourg, Spain, and Sweden were all apparently concerned with the potential liability of their hyperpolluting neighbors, while such major pollutant producing nations as Japan, the United States, and West Germany appear to have been wary of any Conference action that might have re-

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footnote 61 above. See also, however, the Swedish call for a "new dimension to the concept of national sovereignty which would not involve relinquishment of national sovereignty but its use to further the common good" (Palme [Sweden], summary record of second plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 6 June 1972, p. 7).

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stricted their industrial flexibility. The members of the former group all urged the Conference to call for more stringent liability and reporting codes, while the latter nations were active in the private efforts to table or moderate those sections of the Conference report that dealt with the liability question.[65]

A similar trend can be found in the response of the developing nations to the liability question. Argentina and Uruguay, which were both sensitive to Brazilian pollution of the Rio de la Plata basin, were among the leaders in the efforts to strengthen the draft proposals dealing with liability.[66] At the same time, the new radicals'

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[65]The Austrian, Canadian, Luxembourgian, Spanish, and Swedish views were all included in their respective national statements during the Environment Conference's General Debate (David [Canada] and Palme [Sweden], summary record of second plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 6 June 1972, pp. 3 and 7; Loodloter [Austria], summary record of third plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 6 June 1972, p. 10; Lopez Rodo [Spain] and Krieps [Luxembourg], summary record of fifth plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 7 June 1972, pp. 1 and 12). The roles of Japan, the United States, and West Germany were reported by several Conference participants who were interviewed in the process of researching this dissertation.

[66]Argentina and Uruguay were also apparently concerned about alleged Brazilian plans to divert water from the upper Rio de la Plata system as part of the development plans for southern Brazil. This concern was reflected in the Argentinian efforts to have the Conference mandate the creation of International River Basin Commissions "to monitor pollutant discharge and similar environmental impact on rivers whose basins are shared by several nations" (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/4, 26 January 1972, p. 48). This proposal's call for prior notice for any national "water resource activities" that might affect another nation was strenuously opposed by Brazil. The Brazilian

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minimal industrial base allowed them to call for national culpability for transnational environmental damage with little fear that their domestic industries would be restricted by such regulations. Accordingly, Algeria, Ceylon, Libya, Syria, and Tanzania all echoed the Canadian demand for a Conference declaration that "thou shalt not pollute thy neighbor's environment."[67] On the other hand, such old radicals as Brazil and India, who were the leading producers of industrial pollutants in their areas, sided with the most highly industrialized developed nations in objecting to any such restrictions.[68]

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possession of the upstream Rio de la Plata basin meant that the proposal would require prior consultation on almost any major industrial project in much of southern Brazil. Argentina, on the other hand, contained the southernmost part of the basin and would theoretically be free from any national reporting or consultation since this was only required in cases where the action might have an adverse effect on another nation. (The South Atlantic would bear the brunt of any Argentinian action affecting the Rio de la Plata.) The final Conference recommendation (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, p. 33 [recommendation 51]) was far weaker than the original Argentinian proposal, despite that nation's efforts to strengthen it both in committee and at the Conference plenary session (pp. 99-100).

[67]Davis (Canada), summary record of second plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 6 June 1972, p. 3. See also Khogja (Algeria) and Chagula (Tanzania) in that document, pp. 10 and 12, and Al-Atrache (Syria), summary record of seventh plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 8 June 1972, p. 1; Elhemedi (Libya), summary record of eighth plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 9 June 1972, p. 10; and Koelmeyer (Ceylon), summary record of thirteenth plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 12 June 1972, p. 19.

[68]Cavalcante (Brazil), summary record of second plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, p. 7 and

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The original draft Declaration on the Human Environment had dealt with the liability question in three of its proposed principles:

1. Draft principle 18 which declared that nations should "ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction"

2. Draft principle 19 which called on all States to "co-operate to develop further the international law regarding liability and compensation" for transnational environmental damage

3. Draft principle 20 which dealt with the question of nations having to report actions which might adversely affect the environment beyond their national boundaries

The first two of these proposed principles did not request any particular action by any nation and were sufficiently uncontroversial that the Conference accepted them with only minor modifications.[69]

The Conference debate on the national liability issue accordingly centered on draft principle 20--the question of national reporting:

Subramaniam (India), summary record of third plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 6 June 1972, p. 5.

[69]These appeared as principles 21 and 22 in the final Declaration on the Human Environment (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, p. 7).

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> Relevant information must be supplied by States on activities or developments within their jurisdiction or under their control whenever they believe, or have reason to believe, that such information is needed to avoid the risk of significant adverse effects on the environment in areas beyond their national jurisdiction.[70]

The "pollution importing" nations considered this principle to be inadequate and to be so hedged with limiting conditional terms as to destroy the concept of national responsibility that had been promulgated in the two earlier principles.[71] In an effort to strengthen the proposal, eighteen Latin American and African nations moved to delete the conditional terms "they believe or have reason to believe," and "significant" from the draft principle.[72]

While this first group of nations sought to strengthen the national reporting principle, the most highly developed nations and several of the old radicals considered even the original draft paragraph to be unacceptable.

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[70]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/4, 11 April 1972, p. 5.

[71]See, for example, Davis (Canada), summary record of second plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 6 June 1972, p. 3.

[72]The sponsoring nations were: Algeria, Argentina, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Costa Rica, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Mauritania, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Uruguay, and Zambia. The absence of the Asian new radicals from the list of sponsors has not been adequately explained. Perhaps a deliberate effort was made to limit the sponsoring nations to the African and Latin American groups so as to avoid including China, which was deeply involved in the nuclear testing question at this time. The Chinese might have found it difficult to reconcile this proposed amendment with their position on nuclear testing.

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Although the United States, Japan, and India were all reportedly unhappy with the draft,[73] the actual motion to amend principle 20 was introduced, for obvious strategic reasons, by Brazil: "No State is obliged to supply information under conditions that, in its founded judgement, may jeopardize its national security, economic development or its national efforts to improve environment."[74] Brazil thus invoked the sovereignty argument in an effort to limit the effects of any Conference call for transnational environmental liability.

The Conference Working Group charged with redrafting the Declaration was unable to reconcile the Afro-Latin American and Brazilian positions. The factions supporting both amendments were sufficiently adamant as to threaten the desired unanimous support for the draft Declaration. In order to protect this all important international consensus, the Working Group accepted a Uruguayan proposal to refer the entire question of principle 20 to the 1972 United Nations General Assembly session without recommendation.[75] The national liability issue was the only question on the agenda of the Conference that was sent to the General Assembly without any specific recommendation.

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[73]Interview with members of national delegations to the United Nations Human Environment Conference who requested anonymity, 12 and 13 September 1974.

[74]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, p. 119.

[75]Ibid., Annex II, p. 1.

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It remains to be seen what effect the alignments created by the national liability issue will have on the cohesion of the developing nations on other environmental questions in particular and on the whole range of North-South cleavage issues in general. It appears unlikely that the new radicals and middle rank developed nations will find many other areas of common agreement in the future. The temporary alliance between the most highly developed industrial nations and the more developed old radicals would seem to be far more significant. National interest may well dictate that the haves and those aspiring to be haves in the near future work together to meet the challenge of the have-nots who would reconstruct the entire international system. At the minimum, it is clear that developing nations were no more likely than developed nations to sacrifice perceived national interest for the sake of hypothetical international responsibility. On the liability issue, as in most other matters, national ideological position would seem to have flowed from national perception of economic realities.[76]

Population control

Few international environmental issues were as controversial during the Conference preparatory period as the question of population control. On the one hand, many

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[76]See chapter VI, p. 486 below for a further discussion of this question.

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developed nations joined the heavily populated nations of Southern Asia in perceiving the defusing of the "population explosion" as a primary goal of any international environmental effort.[77] On the other hand, several of the less populated African nations joined the Catholic nations of Latin America and Southern Europe in opposing any Conference consideration of the population question. These nations dismissed the population control issue as being irrelevant, if not inimical, to their development priorities. The bluntest formulation of this position had been the characterization by Brazil's de Almeida of the population control issue as yet another Northern Calvinistic effort to freeze the international economic status quo to the permanent disadvantage of the developing nations.[78]

The Preparatory Committee responded to this seemingly irreconcilable cleavage by dealing with the population control question in only the most general fashion. In addition, every official mention of population control or

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[77]See, for example, the Indian statement during the 1971 Second Committee debate on that year's Swedish Conference-related resolution:

> " . . . pollution caused by population explosion was of the utmost concern to Asian countries and India in particular . . . the Preparatory Committee should address itself to finding an effective solution to the problem at its next meeting. Pollution was directly proportional to population . . . the United Nations should not fight shy of the problem of the population explosion" (Mani [India], United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1424, 6 December 1971, p. 11).

[78]de Almeida (Brazil), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1422, 1 December 1971, pp. 12-14.

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family planning was accompanied by assurances that each nation would be free to follow its individual policy on this sensitive question. This approach was reflected in the two paragraphs of the draft Declaration on the Human Environment that dealt with the population question:

> In our time also, the growth of population in certain areas, through both migration and unprecedented natural increase, has accelerated to rates which could frustrate all efforts to conquer poverty and underdevelopment and to maintain a decent human environment, whereas other areas have not yet reached population densities conducive to economic efficiency and the high productivity that will permit the rapid increase of standards of living [third draft preambular paragraph]
>
> Demographic policies, which are without prejudice to basic human rights and which are deemed appropriate by Governments concerned, should be applied in those regions where the rate of population growth of excessive population concentrations are likely to have adverse effects on the environment or development, or where low population density may prevent enhancement of the human environment and impede development [draft principle 13][79]

While the draft Declaration thus avoided siding with either faction in the population controversy, the more specific Action Plan recommendations virtually ignored the entire question. The fact that a World Population Conference had already been scheduled for Bucharest in August 1974 allowed the Preparatory Committee to defer all population-related recommendations to that forum. The only Action Plan paragraph dealing with the population question merely asked the Secretary-General of the United Nations to

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[79]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/4, 11 April 1972, pp. 1 and 4.

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ensure that "special attention" would be given to "population concerns as they relate to the environment" in the planning for the Bucharest conference.[80]

Table 4.5 lists the position taken by those Conference participants that mentioned the population control issue in their General Debate statements. Only Brazil and Sweden, the main architects of the Conference agenda, explicitly endorsed the draft Declaration's ambiguous proposals, while twelve other nations called for a stronger statement in support of international population control policies. The Ceylonese position was typical of those made by the nations advocating population control: "The explosive growth of population in developing countries exacerbates misery and weakens the efforts of government to lift their peoples out of poverty. Urgent action is necessary to reduce the birth rates in developing countries."[81]

While these nations demanded that the Conference strengthen the draft references to population control, three other nations, China, Colombia, and Gabon, challenged the entire concept of family planning as a valid international policy. These nations argued that, as the Colombian delegate declared, "it was pure fallacy to suggest that the

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[80]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/6, 23 December 1971, p. 33 (recommendation 154).

[81]Koelmeyer (Ceylon), summary record of thirteenth plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 12 June 1972, p. 19.

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TABLE 4.5

NATIONS THAT RAISED THE POPULATION CONTROL QUESTION DURING THE ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE GENERAL DEBATE

	Endorsed the Draft Declaration Proposals	Called for a Stronger Endorsement of Population Control	Called for a Weaker Endorsement of Population Control
Latin America	Brazil		Colombia
Africa		Cameroon, Ghana, Senegal	Gabon
Asia		Bangladesh, Ceylon, Fiji, India, Iran, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand	China
Western Europe	Sweden	Netherlands	

chief impact on the envrionment arose from the population increase in the poor countries."[82]

The Chinese, in particular, stressed the necessity of rewriting the draft Declaration's population-related preambular paragraph and proposed a new text to the Conference Working Group that was considering the Declaration:

> Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. It is people that propel social progress, create social wealth, develop science and technology and, through their hard work, continuously transform the human environment. Along with social progress and

[82]Borda (Colombia), summary record of twelfth plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 12 June 1972, p. 12. See also N'Dang (Gabon), p. 5, and Tang Ke (China), remarks to tenth plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 10 June 1972, p. 4.

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> the advance of production, science and technology, the capability of man to improve the environment increases with each passing day.[83]

The Chinese proposal so completely altered the import of the original text that the nations supporting a stronger family planning position refused to accept the new language unless it was preceded by a sentence endorsing population control programs in areas that desired them. The Chinese refused however to accept any modification that would mention family planning or population control.[84] It was not until the Conference's final hours that the Swedish delegation formulated an introductory sentence to the Chinese proposal that could be supported by all parties to the population control debate: "The natural growth of population continuously presents problems on the preservation of the environment and adequate policies and measures should be adopted, as appropriate, to face these problems."[85] The Swedish compromise, which the Conference plenary accepted by acclamation, represented a major victory for the Chinese position as it did not directly endorse family planning or population control policies.[86]

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[83]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, p. 3.

[84]Ibid., p. 113.

[85]Ibid., p. 117.

[86]The willingness with which the nations favoring family planning policies accepted this fairly one-sided compromise preambular paragraph may have been related to their satisfaction as having succeeded in altering the draft Action Plan to include an endorsement of such

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The Chinese emphasis at Stockholm on broad principles rather than specific proposals was reflected in their involvement with the redrafting of the Declaration and their relative lack of participation in the work of the Conference's First Committee which considered the "human settlements" section of the draft Action Plan.[87] It was in this Committee that the nations that sought a Conference endorsement of family planning policies centered their efforts by introducing a new draft recommendation:

> 1. It is recommended that the World Health Organization and other United Nations agencies should provide increased assistance to Governments which so request in the field of family planning programmes without delay
>
> 2. It is further recommended that the World Health Organization should promote and intensify research endeavour in the field of human reproduction, so that the serious consequences of population explosion on human environment can be prevented [draft recommendation 155][88]

The First Committee accepted this proposal by a nonrecorded vote of 23 in favor, 17 against, with 12 abstentions, setting the stage for a heated plenary session debate which encompassed the entire population control question.

The Committee considered several proposed amendments

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policies. Having achieved this latter success, they may have no longer considered the former issue to be significant and were accordingly willing to accept the Swedish proposal which was submitted after the plenary roll call on the population control section of the draft Action Plan (ibid., pp. 91-92).

[87]See this chapter, p. 239, footnote 5 above.

[88]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, p. 112.

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that sought to weaken the draft's advocacy of population control measures (table 4.6). After these amendments were all rejected the Argentinian delegate moved to delete the entire draft recommendation from the Action Plan.[89]

TABLE 4.6

AMENDMENTS OFFERED TO THE PROPOSED ACTION PLAN POPULATION CONTROL RECOMMENDATION DURING THE STOCKHOLM ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE PLENARY SESSION 13 JUNE 1972

Amendment	Nation Offering Amendment	Other Nations Endorsing Amendment	Plenary Vote
1. To delete second paragraph of recommendation	Romania		16-50-9
2. To replace "population explosion" with "overpopulation"	France	Belgium	22-28-24
3. To delete "in the field of human reproduction" and replace "population explosion" with "overpopulation"	Belgium		32-34-11
4. To replace "family planning" with "family health"	Central African Republic	Dahomey Ecuador	28-41-7
5. To delete the phrase "so that the serious . . . can be prevented"	Central African Republic	United Kingdom	23-40-8

[89]In the course of the plenary debate several nations endorsed or opposed the entire draft recommendation. India, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Uganda, and the United States endorsed the draft, while Argentina, Ethiopia, and the Vatican City spoke against it.

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This proposal was defeated by a recorded roll call vote of 12 in favor, 45 against, with 20 abstentions (table 4.7). Analysis of this vote and of the votes on the rejected amendments provides several observations:

1. The coalitions produced by the family planning issue cut across both North-South and old radical-new radical cleavage lines. Such old radicals as India, Nigeria, and Yugoslavia joined new radicals Uganda and Zambia and a majority of the developed nations in supporting the draft recommendation. At the same time, Brazil, the leading old radical, and several Northern nations opposed the recommendation. In addition, six developed nations and old radical Chile joined such new radicals as Algeria, Libya, and Syria in abstaining. National position on this issue must accordingly be explained by factors other than these familiar cleavages.

2. Two possible factors would appear to be population density and, to an even greater degree, national religious orientation. For example, the Philippines, the only Catholic nation in South Asia, was also the only heavily populated Asian nation that failed to support the recommendation. Similarly, the Protestant nations of Europe all voted for the draft recommendation, while most of their Catholic neighbors either abstained or voted to delete it. The European cleavage between Catholic and Protestant nations appears to have extended to their former African colonies as well. Seven of the eight former British posses-

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TABLE 4.7

THE ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE PLENARY ROLL CALL ON DELETING THE POPULATION CONTROL DRAFT ACTION PLAN RECOMMENDATION, 13 JUNE 1972

Nation Group	In Favor of Deletion	Against Deletion	Abstaining	Absent
Latin America (4-2-3-12)	Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela	Dominican Republic, Jamaica	Chile, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago	Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Uruguay
Africa (3-11-7-13)	Burundi, Ethiopia, Zaire	Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia	Algeria, Central African Republic, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Libya, Sudan, Togo	Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritania, Niger, Tanzania, Tunisia
Asia and Others (developing) (0-13-4-10)		Bahrain, Ceylon, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand, Yugoslavia	Iraq, Philippines, Syria, Turkey	Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, Cyprus, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Nepal, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
Total--developing	7	26	14	35

Western Europe (4-12-6-1)	Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Vatican City	Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, West Germany	Austria, France, Greece, Italy, Liechtenstein, Monaco	Malta
Eastern Europe (1-0-0-0)	Romania			
Others (developed) (0-7-0-0)		Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, United States		
Total-- devel-oped	5	19	6	1
Grand Total	12	45	20	36

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sions that participated in the roll call supported the draft recommendation, while only three of the eight participants that were former French colonies joined in this support. The Catholic position on family planning and population control may also help explain the unusual Latin American voting pattern, as only nine of the twenty-one Latin American Conference participants took part in the roll call.[90]

3. Only twelve nations voted to delete the draft recommendation, despite the intense controversy that it engendered. Of these twelve nations, eight were Catholic European or Latin American nations and three were African states that were strongly committed to policies of population expansion.[91] The twelfth vote was that of Romania, which was apparently trying to prevent the Conference from taking a position that might have endangered the 1974 Bucharest Population Conference by alienating those nations that opposed any international population control recommendations.

4. The twelve votes against the draft recommendation should not be viewed as the full strength of the forces that opposed international population control measures.

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[90]The Latin American nations also had a relatively low level of participation in the two other Conference roll calls with eleven participating in the Housing Fund vote and thirteen in the nuclear testing roll call. The 43 percent participation rate on the population control question was, however, their lowest on any Conference period roll call.

[91]Interview with Don Lofton, 12 June 1973.

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Such leading opponents of population control policies as China, Colombia, and Gabon were absent for the vote.[92] In addition, a larger number of nations had supported the plenary amendments to delete such phrases as "population explosion" or "family planning," but were apparently uninterested in forcing a Conference confrontation over the family planning issue. This may help explain the abstention or absence of many Catholic nations and sparsely populated African and Middle Eastern states on this roll call.

5. The twenty-eight nations that voted against the French amendment to replace the words "population explosion" with "overpopulation" represented a hard core of population control advocates who were apparently unwilling to accept even this minimal compromise. When this group is contrasted with the equally inflexible group of nations that opposed the draft recommendation, it becomes evident that it will be extremely difficult to achieve meaningful international consensus on the population control question. Draft recommendation 155 was, after all, hardly a radical proposal. It called for "research" and "assistance" on behalf of "governments which so request" such services in an

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[92]The Chinese absence requires an explanation in light of the strong position China had taken earlier on the population control question. This absence apparently resulted from the Chinese defeat on the just completed nuclear testing roll call, a defeat that led to China's declared intention to abstain on all later Conference votes (interview with Noel Brown, 13 September 1974).

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effort to meet "the serious consequences of population explosion." Even this apparently innocuous proposal was unacceptable to such significant international powers as Brazil, France, and Italy. When the refusal of these nations to support the recommendation is coupled with the influence of the Vatican, the Chinese position, and the apathy of many underpopulated nations, it becomes clear just how difficult it will be to construct a consensus on this issue. The differences between the tone of the Declaration preamble and that of the bitterly contested Action Plan recommendation demonstrate just how far the international community is from discovering an acceptable formula for bridging the cleavages created by this controversial issue.

Nuclear testing

The question of the effect of weapons on the human environment was not a central issue during the Conference preparatory period. This lack of attention apparently reflected the universal recognition of the right to utilize, possess, and test weapons as a fundamental aspect of national sovereignty. Even the advent of modern weapons of mass destruction had produced only partial efforts to create international weapons control standards--notably the accords prohibiting the use of biological and chemical weapons and the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. But even these measures had met with only limited success, as was evidenced by the Chinese and

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French refusal to halt atmospheric nuclear testing and the refusal of several potential nuclear powers to ratify the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.[93]

Faced with this precedent of limited international involvement in the weapons field, the Preparatory Committee had given only passing attention to the question of armaments and the environment. The draft Action Plan made no mention of arms, nuclear or conventional, while the draft Declaration on the Human Environment contained only two brief references to the damage inflicted on the environment by the use and testing of armaments:

> Meanwhile immense resources continue to be consumed in armaments and armed conflict, wasting and threatening still further the human environment [draft fourth preambular paragraph]
>
> Man and his environment must be spared the serious effects of further testing or use in hostilities of weapons, particularly those of mass destruction [draft principle 21][94]

Both proposals met with considerable opposition at Stockholm. The draft preambular paragraph was criticized by China for failing to differentiate between "just" and "unjust" wars.

At the same time, draft principle 21 was attacked as overly restrictive by both the Chinese and French and as

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[93]Stoessinger, The United Nations and the Superpowers, p. 169.

[94]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/4, 11 April 1972, Annex, p. 2.

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inadequate by those nations that wanted an explicit Conference condemnation of atmospheric nuclear testing.[95] Many of these latter complaints came from delegates whose nations bordered on the South Pacific and were particularly disturbed by the French decision to undertake a series of nuclear tests near Tahiti during the summer of 1972. These French tests have been credited for much of the unexpected attention that the nuclear testing question received at Stockholm.[96]

The widely divergent international views on the nuclear testing issue became apparent during the Conference General Debate. Five of the nine nations that mentioned the nuclear testing question during this debate endorsed draft principle 21 (Japan, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, and Vatican City), while three other speakers called for an even stronger Conference condemnation of such tests (Chile, Fiji, and New Zealand).[97] The ninth General Debate par-

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[95]See, for example, the statements cited in United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, pp. 106-107.

[96]United States, Department of State, United States Participation in the United Nations - 1972, International Organization and Conference Series 108, Pubn. 8731 (1973), p. 103.

[97]Oishi (Japan), summary record of second plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 6 June 1972, p. 4; de Riedmatten (Vatican City), summary record of fourth plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 7 June 1972, p. 7; Pautrat (Peru), summary record of the sixth plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 8 June 1972, p. 6; Murray (Mexico), Sanchez (Chile), and Benitez (Philippines), summary record of seventh plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 8 June 1972,

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ticipant was the Chinese delegate, who strongly denounced the proposed principle, declaring that his nation only tested and possessed nuclear weapons in an effort to counter the superpowers' policies of "nuclear monopoly, nuclear threats and nuclear blackmail."[98] The Chinese delegate declared that his nation's nuclear arms were the Third World's only guarantee against Soviet-American nuclear hegemony, and would continue to be developed until such time as the superpowers agreed to destroy their vast nuclear weapon stockpiles. Any Conference proposal that dealt with nuclear testing and failed to call for the elimination of these stockpiles was, he concluded, inimical to the cause of world peace and would be strongly opposed by China.[99]

The cleavages revealed during the General Debate foredoomed any Working Group consensus on draft principle 21.[100] Some delegations supported the Chinese and French in seeking the elimination of the paragraph, while

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pp. 3, 10, and 11; MacIntyre (New Zealand), summary record of eighth plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 9 June 1972, p. 3; and Singh (Fiji), summary record of twelfth plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 12 June 1972, p. 7.

[98]Tang Ke (China), remarks to tenth plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 10 June 1972, p. 7.

[99]Ibid., pp. 7-8.

[100]The Working Group had less problems with the draft preambular paragraph dealing with armaments, which was apparently deleted because of the concern generated by the Chinese charge that it indiscriminately lumped together "just" and "unjust" wars.

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others insisted on a more explicit condemnation of atmospheric testing, and still others wanted to see the proposal expanded to include underground nuclear testing, the stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons, and even the use of herbicides in Vietnam.[101] The Working Group was finally forced to leave principle 21 out of its final report and to recommend that the entire nuclear testing question be referred to the Conference plenary for consideration.[102]

At the plenary those nations that had wanted to see a firm Conference statement on the nuclear testing issue pressed for adoption of both the Declaration principle and a Conference resolution specifically condemning nuclear testing.[103] The Chinese were alone in opposing the new draft principle 26 that the advocates of principle 21 now offered in an effort to achieve a widely acceptable compromise:

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[101]Since there were no summary records of the Working Group's deliberations, these reported national views are based on interviews with members of national delegations and on positions which nations subsequently took at the Conference plenary debate.

[102]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, p. 113.

[103]This resolution will be examined at the conclusion of our discussion of the draft Declaration principle.

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> Man and his environment must be spared the effects of nuclear weapons and all other means of mass destruction. States must strive to reach prompt agreement, in the relevant international organs, on the elimination and complete destruction of such weapons.[104]

Both the elimination of any mention of "testing" and the addition of a call for the eventual "destruction" of nuclear weapon stockpiles were apparent concessions to the Chinese position. The Chinese refused to accept the new draft and countered with their own "compromise proposal."[105] All three of the main points in the Chinese draft--the elimination of all biological and chemical weapon stockpiles, the immediate destruction of nuclear weapon stockpiles, and an international agreement to never use nuclear weapons--were familiar Chinese proposals that had already been rejected by the other nuclear powers.

None of the other participants in the plenary debate supported the Chinese proposal. While Tanzania, Sudan, and Zambia joined India in regretting that the proposed principle 26 did not make explicit mention of chemical and

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[104] Ibid., Annex II, p. 1. The new principle was numbered "26" rather than "21" because the Working Group had renumbered the Declaration's principles when it had eliminated the original principle 21.

[105] The Chinese draft declared that:
"In order to protect mankind and the human environment it is imperative to firmly prohibit the use of and thoroughly destroy the inhuman biological and chemical weapons which seriously pollute and damage the environment; to completely prohibit and thoroughly destroy nuclear weapons and, as a first step, to reach an agreement by the nuclear States on the non-use of nuclear weapons at no time and in no circumstances [sic]" (ibid., p. 114).

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biological weapons, they nevertheless joined the other speakers (Canada, Egypt, Japan, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, and Yugoslavia) in endorsing the draft principle.[106]

The draft proposal was sufficiently vague on the question of atmosphere testing that even France was able to support it, effectively isolating China as the only Conference participant to refuse to endorse principle 26.[107] Faced with certain defeat, the Chinese did not press for a vote on principle 26, which was accepted by acclamation after the filing of a formal Chinese "reservation."[108]

The Chinese had come to Stockholm eager to establish themselves as the leaders of the developing nations in the North-South conflict. Their extreme isolation on the nuclear testing question badly damaged their position in the eyes of the other Southern nations.[109] There were, after all, only two significant national reservations to sections of the Declaration on the Human Environment: the South

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[106]Ibid., pp. 117-118. Only Peru and Sweden continued to call for an explicit mention of nuclear testing in the Declaration and they both did so while strongly endorsing principle 26 as an acceptable compromise.

[107]Both Japan and the United States, however, submitted "interpretations" of principle 26. The Japanese interpretation declared that the draft principle proscribed, albeit indirectly, atmospheric nuclear testing (ibid., p. 117). The United States, on the other hand, was concerned by the draft's call for the "elimination and complete destruction" of nuclear weapons and filed an interpretation to make clear its position that this was only binding as an "ultimate goal," to be attained through "adequately verifiable" agreements (p. 118).

[108]Ibid., p. 119.

[109]See p. 246 above.

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African reservation to the first principle's condemnation of apartheid and the Chinese reservation to principle 26.[110] As one student of the United Nations has noted:

> In the end, China's twin goals at Stockholm -- to seize the leadership of the Third World but simultaneously to protect her status as a growing nuclear power -- effectively cancelled each other out.[111]

Despite the attention generated by the Chinese opposition to principle 26, the major Conference debate over nuclear testing centered around the report of the Third Committee. It was during this Committee's consideration of the Preparatory Committee's report, "Identification and Control of Pollutants of Broad International Significance" (subject area three of the draft Action Plan), that New Zealand and Peru submitted a resolution calling for the Conference to condemn all nuclear tests, "especially those carried out in the atmosphere."[112]

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[110]Four additional national reservations were filed during the Working Group's consideration of the draft declaration: a reservation by Uruguay to principle 2 (which it felt should mandate the safeguarding of "total" rather than "representative" natural ecosystems); reservations by Portugal and the United States to principle 15 (which condemned "projects . . . designed for colonialist and racist domination"--a reference to the Portuguese hydroelectric projects in Mozambique); and a reservation by Turkey to principle 21 (which called on nations to avoid transnational environmental damage, but which was far weaker than the Turkish position). There were also a number of formal "interpretations" but an interpretation, unlike a reservation, implies the acceptance of the proposal in question.

[111]Stoessinger, The United Nations and the Superpowers, p. 196.

[112]The full text of this resolution is in United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, pp. 67-68. The Third Committee's proceedings were also the forum

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The utilization of a resolution, rather than an amendment to the Action Plan, apparently reflected the desire to attract international attention to the French tests in the South Pacific. The nuclear testing resolution, which the Third Committee accepted by a nonrecorded vote of 48 in favor, 2 against, with 14 abstentions, was the only nonprocedural resolution to be considered by the Environment Conference plenary.

Table 4.8 summarizes the Conference plenary debate on the nuclear testing resolution. South Korea was the only debate participant to unequivocally endorse the draft resolution, while six other participants endorsed the resolution but either felt it should have been explicitly limited to atmospheric testing or that it should have condemned all forms of nuclear testing. Several other nations shared these qualms and felt strongly enough about them that they declared their intention to either abstain or oppose the resolution. The United States, for example, was concerned that the resolution might be construed so as to provide grounds for challenging American underground nuclear tests. Belgium, Italy, and Gabon, on the other hand, all argued

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utilized by eight nations (Canada, Ecuador, Fiji, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, and the Philippines) bordering on the Pacific to issue a joint appeal to the French to abandon their plans for atmospheric testing in the South Pacific. Since this appeal was not submitted as a motion or resolution it was not voted upon, but was merely noted in the report of the Third Committee (p. 109).

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that the resolution was unfair in that it apparently permitted underground tests. Only China and France declared their unalterable opposition to any Conference condemnation of nuclear testing. The Chinese repeated their willingness to cease nuclear testing after the superpowers destroyed their nuclear weapon stockpiles. The French defended their tests as "never exceeding the level at which [they] might become dangerous to human health, or to the environment.[113]

TABLE 4.8

THE ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE PLENARY DEBATE ON THE NUCLEAR TESTING RESOLUTION
15 JUNE 1972

	Nations Supporting or Opposing the Resolution		
Attitude Towards Resolution	Declared Intention to Vote in Favor	Declared Intention to Abstain	Declared Intention to Vote Against
Resolution is adequate	South Korea		
Resolution should deal only with atmospheric testing	Argentina Australia Netherlands	United States	
Resolution should condemn all nuclear testing	Mexico Romania Tunisia	Belgium Italy	Gabon
Resolution is totally unacceptable			China France

[113]Ibid., p. 107.

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Table 4.9 records the plenary roll call vote on the nuclear testing resolution. The coalitions produced by this issue were, as in the case of the population control question, markedly different from those produced by the more familiar North-South or old radical-new radical cleavages.

1. None of the four nuclear powers attending the Conference supported the resolution. The abstention of the United Kingdom, the United States, and several major Western European states suggests that the draft resolution was less consensual than might be suggested by the fact that only three nations voted against it.

2. Tunisia was the only former French African colony at the Conference that supported the resolution (seven abstained, seven were absent, and Gabon voted against it). This contrasts with the support for the resolution by seven of the twelve former British African colonies, despite Britain's own abstention.[114]

3. Not only former French colonies, but states with

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[114]There is no evidence that former French colonies are generally more supportive of France on United Nations votes than British colonies are of the United Kingdom (see, for example, Eugene R. Wittkopf, "Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative Study," American Political Science Review 67 [September 1973]:883-885, for a discussion of this question). It is possible, however, that the priority that the French attached to the nuclear testing issue caused them to apply pressure for support on this particular vote. This would appear to support Wittkopf's hypothesis that most United Nations votes are simply not significant enough for developed nations to pressure aid recipients for their support (p. 869).

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TABLE 4.9

THE ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE PLENARY ROLL CALL ON THE NUCLEAR TESTING RESOLUTION
15 JUNE 1972

Nation Group	In Favor	Against	Abstaining	Absent
Latin America (11-0-2-8)	Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela		Dominican Republic, Guyana	Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua
Africa (13-1-10-10)	Botswana, Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia	Gabon	Central African Republic, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Senegal, Sudan, Togo	Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Guinea, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritania, Niger, Swaziland
Asia and Others (developing) (16-1-6-4)	Afghanistan, Ceylon, Fiji, India, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand, Yugoslavia	China	Bahrain, Cyprus, Indonesia, Jordan, Singapore, Syria	Bangladesh, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
Total--developing	40	2	18	22

Western Europe (11-1-9-2)	Austria, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Vatican City	France	Belgium, Greece, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, San Marino, Spain, United Kingdom, West Germany	Malta, Monaco
Eastern Europe (1-0-0-0)	Romania			
Others (developed) (4-0-2-1)	Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand		South Africa, United States	Israel
Total--developed	16	1	11	3
Grand Total	56	3	29	25

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close economic or military ties with France tended to abstain or to be absent on the vote. This was true of such major European states as Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain, and of such smaller French neighbors as Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, and Monaco. Ties with France may also help explain the positions of Libya, Morocco, and South Africa.

4. Nations with ties to China did not vote in a pattern similar to that of nations with historic or economic links to France. Such new radicals as Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia supported the resolution, as did Pakistan, which was a close Chinese ally.

5. While the Southern nations were divided over this issue, the Northern nations were even more severely split. Most neutral nations joined the bulk of the non-Common Market NATO members, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan in supporting the resolution, while four of France's five original Common Market partners joined the United Kingdom and the United States in abstaining.

6. Israel and South Africa had both refused to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and both failed to support the resolution. On the other hand, India, which had also refused to sign the treaty, voted for the resolution at a time when it was apparently already on the way to becoming the world's sixth nuclear weapons nation.

In summary, nuclear testing might never have become a major issue at Stockholm if Taiwan had continued to hold

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the Chinese United Nations seat and if the French had not decided to schedule nuclear testing in the South Pacific during the summer of 1972. It was, above all else, the Chinese intransigence on the nuclear weapons issue that precipitated the confrontation over principle 26, and the French tests that resulted in the introduction of the draft resolution condemning nuclear testing. Both the Chinese position and the French tests represented a break from the recognized international consensual position on nuclear testing and their repudiation by the Conference was really nothing more than a reaffirmation of a position already promulgated in the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

The Housing Fund proposal

The proposal to create a World Housing Fund was the only major Stockholm initiative that had not been considered during the Conference preparatory process. While the call for a Housing Fund may have been unexpected, the controversy that it precipitated reflected the familiar lines of the North-South cleavage which had been blurred at Stockholm by the consideration of such cross-cleavage issues as national liability, population control, nuclear testing, and social pollution priorities. The almost unanimous Southern support for the Housing Fund proposal demonstrated that these Stockholm intrabloc controversies had apparently not weakened the cohesion of the developing

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nations on traditional development issues. At the same time, the developed nations that had reluctantly acquiesced to the Southern position during the Conference preparatory period were now adamant in their refusal to accept the Housing Fund proposal.

It had been recognized since the beginning of the preparatory period that human impact on the environment was most intense in highly populated urban areas. The "planning and management of human settlements for environmental quality" had accordingly been one of three items on the first draft for a proposed Conference agenda.[115] The primary attention of the developing nations during the preparatory period was focused, however, on the newer development and environment agenda item to the general exclusion of the development aspect of the human settlements item. Accordingly, the evolution of the Environment Conference into a "development conference" had little discernible impact on the preparatory work for the human settlements agenda topic. The final Preparatory Committee report on human settlements devoted only 4 of its 131 paragraphs to the "special problems of less industrialized countries." Even these four paragraphs dealt primarily with the Northern concern for "planning and management for environmental quality."[116]

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[115]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/PC/6, 6 April 1970, p. 8.

[116]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/6, 23 December 1971, p. 23. This theme was similarly reflected in the only draft Action Plan recommendation dealing with

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It was only shortly before the Environment Conference convened that discussion of direct international financial assistance for human settlements in developing nations was first raised at the spring meeting of the Economic and Social Council. The Council referred the entire question to the Environment Conference with the suggestion that some of the resources of the proposed Environment Fund might be utilized to assist such housing projects.[117] The ECOSOC recommendation dealt peripherally with the human settlements question and did not consider the separate matter of housing per se as an international funding priority. At the Environment Conference, however, housing was to be singled out as a separate development priority demanding immediate international financial assistance.

The housing issue was first raised during the Conference General Debate by Helena Benitez of the Philippines, who declared that:

> A major problem in developing countries is housing. Twelve billion dollars a year would be needed to provide tolerable housing conditions to all people in different countries. International agencies have given insufficient attention to this field and their performance should improve. Within the Environment Fund, there should be a component for human settlements or

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human settlements in developing nations which called on development agencies to "give high priority to responding to requests of governments for assistance in the field of human settlements, notably in housing, transportation, water and sewage problems, the mobilization of human and financial resources and the improvement of transitional urban settlements" (p. 29 [recommendation 136]).

[117]United Nations Document E/SR.1521, 24 May 1972, p. 73.

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> housing and a world housing programme with regional centres to profit technical assistance.[118]

None of the subsequent General Debate speakers formally responded to the Filipino proposal which was rendered irrelevant by a successful Indian-Libyan initiative during the First Committee's consideration of the human settlements section of the draft Action Plan. The Filipino proposal had gone beyond the earlier ECOSOC recommendation by suggesting the creation of a separate "housing component" within the proposed Environment Fund. The Indian-Libyan draft superceded this proposal by mandating the creation of a World Housing Fund which would be entirely independent of the Environment Fund:

> It is further recommended that the Governments and the Secretary-General take immediate steps towards the establishment of an international fund or a financial institution whose primary operative objectives will be to assist in strengthening of national programmes in this field through the provision of seed capital and the extension of the necessary technical assistance to enable an effective mobilization of domestic resources for housing and the environmental improvement of human settlements.[119]

The fact that old radical India and new radical Libya joined in presenting this recommendation reflected the wide range of support enjoyed by the Housing Fund proposal. The Fund's supporters perceived it as a concrete example of an

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[118] Benitez (Philippines), summary record of seventh plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 8 June 1972, p. 11.

[119] United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, p. 90. This recommendation appears with minor changes as recommendation 17 of the final Conference Action Plan (p. 14).

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international environmental initiative that would assist the developing nations, enhance the human environment, and deal directly with "the basic environmental problem in developing countries"--the lack of adequate human living environment due to poverty and underdevelopment.[120]

The Housing Fund question produced the only Conference plenary debate that followed North-South cleavage lines. The developed nations had accepted the escalating demands of the developing nations throughout the preparatory period. They would not, however, accept the creation of a new single-purpose international fund above and beyond the proposed general-purpose Environment Fund. Even such Northern nations as Canada and Sweden, which had previously been sympathetic to the position of the developing nations,[121] joined Australia, Italy, United Kingdom, and the United States in denouncing the draft resolution as unnecessary and unwarranted.[122] The developed nations apparently agreed with the British contention that "housing

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[120]Ibid., p. 90.

[121]See, for example, Sharp (Canada), United Nations Document A/PV.1944, 29 September 1971, p. 23.

[122]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, pp. 93-94. The Italian delegation even offered a substitute draft recommendation which called upon international financial institutions (such as the World Bank) to grant increased financial aid for housing projects in developing nations (p. 94). The Italians failed, however, to ask for a vote on their proposal.

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problems could be solved only through genuine economic development, and international aid should be directed towards the promotion of such development."[123]

The developing nations were equally adamant in their support for the Housing Fund. The Central African Republic, Jamaica, Kenya, Philippines, Senegal, and Uganda all took the floor to support the Indian contention that "the most important objective of the Conference was to give hope to two thirds of humanity through environmental programmes. The need of developing countries was not expertise but resources, and the Conference should offer solutions, not diagnoses."[124]

Table 4.10 records the roll call vote by which the Conference plenary accepted the Indian-Libyan recommendation by a vote of 58 in favor, 15 against, with 13 abstentions.[125] Analysis of this table and comparison of the Housing Fund vote and the three North-South votes taken during the preparatory process (tables 3.10, 3.12, and 3.13 above) suggests the following observations:

1. The developing nations achieved their greatest cohesiveness on the World Housing Fund vote. Seven of the developing nations that attended the Stockholm Conference

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[123]Ibid.

[124]Ibid., p. 93.

[125]See, ibid., p. 95 which incorrectly gives the number of votes in favor of the recommendation as 50. Surprisingly enough, this error is not corrected in the official Corrigendum, United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14/Corr.1, 15 September 1972.

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TABLE 4.10

THE ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE PLENARY ROLL CALL ON THE WORLD HOUSING FUND PROPOSAL
14 JUNE 1972

Nation Group	In Favor	Against	Abstaining	Absent
Latin America (9-0-2-10)	Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela		Argentina, Dominican Republic	Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay
Africa (25-0-0-9)	Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Central African Republic, Dahomey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia			Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritania, Niger
Asia and Others (developing) (19-0-1-7)	Afghanistan, Bahrain, Ceylon, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Vietnam, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yugoslavia		South Korea	Bangladesh, China, Cyprus, Jordan, Nepal, Pakistan, Yemen

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Total--developing	53	0	3	26
Western Europe (3-11-8-1)	Finland, Iceland, San Marino	Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, West Germany	Austria, Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Vatican City	Malta
Eastern Europe (1-0-0-0)	Romania			
Others (developed) (1-4-2-0)	Israel	Australia, Canada, Japan, United States	New Zealand, South Africa	
Total--developed	5	15	10	1
Grand Total	58	15	13	27

had abstained on at least one of the three preparatory period North-South votes. Four of these nations--Ghana, Liberia, Singapore, and Trinidad and Tobago--now voted to support the Housing Fund, while two others--Cyprus and Malawi--were absent for this vote. Argentina was the only one of the seven nations to have previously abstained on a North-South vote to abstain on the Housing Fund roll call as well.

2. This overwhelming Southern support for the Housing Fund recommendation did not prevent three developing nations--Argentina, the Dominican Republic, and the Republic of Korea (South Korea)--from abstaining on this roll call. It is difficult to ascertain why these nations chose to refrain from supporting the proposal, especially since both Argentina and the Dominican Republic supported the Housing Fund proposal during the subsequent 1972 Second Committee and General Assembly debates.[126]

3. The developed nations continued to demonstrate less cohesiveness than the developing nations on North-South Environment Conference questions. Five Northern nations supported the Housing Fund proposal, fifteen were opposed, and ten abstained, while all but three of the fifty-six Southern nations participating in the roll call voted for the proposal.

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[126]United Nations Document A/8901, 29 November 1972, p. 18. The Republic of Korea was not a member of the United Nations and did not, accordingly, participate in these Assembly deliberations.

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4. There is an apparent correlation between the propensity of a developed nation to contribute to international development funds and its vote on the World Housing Fund question. The five developed nations that supported the proposition--Finland, Iceland, Israel, Romania, and San Marino--were all unlikely contributors to any such Fund. Conversely, the most generous supporters of international development funds--Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States and West Germany--all voted against the recommendation. In addition, the developed nations that abstained on the vote were generally smaller contributors to international development funds than those who voted against the proposal. Nations apparently voted for the Housing Fund proposal if the proposal would benefit them or at least cost them nothing, and tended to vote against the proposal if it appeared that it would cost them money.[127]

5. The strong support of the developing nations for the World Housing Fund proposal is reflected in the fact that their rate of national participation on this vote was considerably higher than that achieved during either of the

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[127]A number of abstaining states--Greece, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, and Vatican City--were not generally contributors to international funds, but nevertheless refrained from supporting the World Housing Fund proposal. The first four states were all highly conservative regimes which might have been reluctant to support a Third World initiative, while the Vatican might have been reluctant to become involved in an issue on which leading Catholic nations had taken opposing positions.

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two other Conference roll calls.[128] Nevertheless, twenty-six developing nations were absent for this vote. Of these nations, eighteen also missed the other two Conference roll calls indicating that there was no particular motive behind their absence on the Housing Fund vote.[129]

Overview

Examination of the Human Environment Conference from a political perspective suggests a number of conclusions:

1. The Stockholm recommendations were sufficiently multifaceted so as to permit each major group of Conference participants to feel that their particular policy priorities had been achieved. The traditional Northern environmentalists could point to the Earthwatch program. The old radical nations could take satisfaction in the virtual institutionalization of the Founex Report in the Conference Declaration and Action Plan, as well as in the unprecedented call for a World Housing Fund. The new radical nations

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[128] On nuclear testing and population control (tables 4.8 and 4.9).

[129] Two nations, Ivory Coast and Pakistan, were absent for the World Housing Fund roll call but participated in both of the other Conference roll calls. The six other nations--China, Cyprus, Jordan, Nepal, Panama, and Uruguay--participated in one of the other roll calls. The Chinese absence has been explained as a response to their defeat on the nuclear testing issue (Stoessinger, The United Nations and the Superpowers, p. 171). This, however, is highly unlikely since the plenary consideration of the Housing Fund question preceded the nuclear testing debate (the former was on 14 June and the latter on 15 June).

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could, at the same time, take credit for the Declaration's unprecedented condemnation of social pollution.

2. The international consensus that had supported the Conference proposal since its inception remained intact as evidenced by the unanimous support for all but a handful of the Conference's recommendations. Most Conference participants appear to have been willing to accept recommendations that they did not deem matters of priority in order to assure the recognition of their own particular priorities in other Conference recommendations. The developing nations supported a wide range of traditional environmental proposals, while the developed nations acquiesced to the Conference's endorsement of the Founex agenda of development, aid, and trade priorities. This informal trade-off helped bridge the North-South cleavage that had once threatened to destroy the international environmental consensus.

3. The debate over the Housing Fund proposal provide the only major exception to this North-South trade-off pattern. The developed nations had acquiesced throughout the preparatory process to steadily escalating Southern demands in an effort to preserve the international environmental consensus. The refusal of the Northern nations to support the call for creating a separate World Housing Fund represented the first break with this pattern.

4. The pattern of cleavage lines produced at Stockholm was far more complex than the North-South configuration

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that had dominated the preparatory process. The advent of the new radicals, the impact of Chinese participation in their first international Conference, and the raising of issues on which there was no Southern consensus (such as population control, national liability, and nuclear testing) might have been expected to challenge the overall cohesiveness of the developing nations. The overwhelming Southern support for the Housing Fund proposal demonstrated, however, that the developing nations were still able to overcome their differences and vote with near unanimity on a mutually perceived question of development priorities.

5. The only Conference issue on which the old radicals and new radicals were in direct disagreement was the question of national liability, an issue which also divided the developed nations. The cleavages created by this issue suggest that the more developed old radicals may yet discover that they have more in common with the developed nations than with the new radicals.

6. The success of the Chinese delegation was limited both by the reluctance of many developing nations to be "radicalized," and by the highly unpopular Chinese position on nuclear testing. While the Chinese were the most visible advocates of the new radical position, they placed their major emphasis on securing support for broad statements of principle rather than on specific proposals. It remains to be seen if this approach merely reflected the newness of

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Chinese international participation or if it represented a deliberate Chinese strategy.

7. The virtual nonexistence of the East-West dispute at Stockholm was, in reality, a tribute to the fundamental tenacity of that cleavage. Both the decision of the Soviet bloc to boycott Stockholm and the refusal of the Western nations to compromise the East German question reflected an apparent belief that East-West considerations were a more important priority than any accomplishments that might be achieved at Stockholm.

The tenacity of the East-West question, as well as the American success in keeping such matters as Vietnam off the Conference agenda, suggest that although North-South tensions may well have been the dominant international economic cleavage by 1972, East-West tensions continued to provide the significant international power cleavage. The absence of the Soviet bloc from Stockholm limited the opportunity to examine the interaction of these two cleavages--an interaction which will be examined in the next chapter, in the course of studying the General Assembly's consideration of the recommendations of the Human Environment Conference.

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CHAPTER V

RESPONDING TO STOCKHOLM: THE 1972 GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION

The final 1971 United Nations resolution dealing with the Human Environment Conference had instructed Secretary-General U Thant to report "the results of the Conference" to the 1972 General Assembly session.[1] These instructions were reflected both in the inclusion of the "United Nations Conference on the Human Environment" as item 47 on the agenda of the 1972 General Assembly session and in the distribution of the detailed Conference report to all Assembly delegations.[2]

The numerous recommendations of the Stockholm Conference can be divided into two categories insofar as they required the attention of the General Assembly:

1. Recommendations that required no further action but that, in U Thant's words, "the General Assembly [might] wish to take note of."[3] These included:

a. The Declaration on the Human Environment

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[1]United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2850 (XXVI), 20 December 1971, paragraph 8.

[2]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972. In addition, all delegations also received the briefer "Report of the Secretary-General on the Human Environment Conference" (United Nations Document A/8783, 26 September 1972).

[3]Ibid., p. 2.

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b. The more detailed Action Plan for the Human Environment

c. The resolution condemning atmospheric nuclear testing

2. Recommendations that required General Assembly action in order to take effect, as well as several questions that the Conference had referred to the General Assembly without recommendation:

a. The Conference resolution calling for the establishment of a United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the creation of a Governing Council and Secretariat to oversee and administer the Programme

b. The resolutions calling for the creation of an Environment Fund, the convening of a second Environment Conference, and the designation of 5 June as World Environment Day

c. The highly controversial Conference recommendation calling for the establishment of a World Housing Fund

d. The unresolved questions of the location of the headquarters of the proposed UNEP Secretariat and of liability for transnational environmental damage

The post-Conference General Assembly session is significant both for the actions taken in implementing the Conference recommendations, as well as for the answers that these actions may provide to several of the political questions that the Stockholm Conference had left unreconciled:

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1. How would the Soviet bloc react to the recommendations of a Conference that they had chosen to boycott and how would their reaction affect the General Assembly's consideration of the Stockholm recommendations?

2. Would the developing nations continue to escalate their demands as they had during the preparatory period? If they did, would the developed nations continue to acquiesce to these demands in order to maintain broad support for an international environmental effort?

3. How would the differences between the developing nations on several major environmental issues affect their overall unity on other Conference-related questions?

The Issues

Technical questions

Several technical questions were raised during the Second Committee's consideration of the resolution calling for the establishment of the UNEP Governing Council and Secretariat. Both the question of the number of nations serving on the Governing Council and the debate over the method of selecting the Executive Director of the Programme were bereft of any overt East-West or North-South connotations and are accordingly considered under this first issue area.

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East-West questions

The major Environment Conference-related East-West question at the 1972 General Assembly session was how the Soviet bloc would react to the Conference report in light of their Stockholm boycott. Both the Soviet decision to abstain on virtually every Conference-related question as well as the Chinese and American preoccupation with North-South issues helped assure that East-West questions would continue to have a minimal role in United Nations Environment Conference-related deliberations.

North-South questions

The involvement of the General Assembly with North-South questions was, for the most part, limited to issues on which the Environment Conference had failed to achieve a consensus. The Assembly endorsed the Conference's reaffirmation of the Founex agenda of development priorities and the Conference's position on nuclear testing, population control, and national sovereignty without any significant discussion. Far more attention was given to matters which were not resolved at Stockholm such as the demand of the new radicals for social pollution priorities, the question of national liability, the location of the proposed UNEP Secretariat, and the controversial call for the establishment of a World Housing Fund.

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The Chronology of Events

Although thirty-eight nations mentioned the Environment Conference during their national policy statements at the 1972 General Assembly General Debate, most of the Assembly's discussion of the Stockholm Conference took place in the Second Committee.[4] The Committee devoted seventeen meetings between 19 October and 10 November to the Environment Conference agenda item and considered more than twenty draft resolutions, of which eleven were eventually approved (see table 5.1).[5]

The General Assembly considered the report of the Second Committee at its 15 December plenary and accepted all eleven of the Committee's resolutions without debate (see table 5.2). In addition, the Assembly "took note" of the Environment Conference's report, specifically endorsing the Declaration on the Human Environment, the Action Plan, and the designation of 5 June as World Environment Day. The Assembly also unanimously accepted the nomination by Secretary-General U Thant of Conference Secretary-General Maurice Strong to a four year term as Executive Director of

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[4] See table 16 in the Appendix for a listing of the nations that mentioned the Environment Conference during their General Debate statements.

[5] The Second Committee meetings devoted to the Environment Conference were 1466-1474, 19, 20, 24, 25, and 26 October; 1478-1483, 2, 3, and 6 November; and 1487-1488, 10 November (the report of the Second Committee appears in United Nations Document A/8901, 27 November 1972).

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TABLE 5.1

ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE-RELATED RESOLUTIONS THAT WERE SUBMITTED TO THE 1972 GENERAL ASSEMBLY SECOND COMMITTEE

Category*	Draft Resolution	Description	Second Committee Vote
Technical questions	A/C. 2/L. 1228	Establishing the United Nations Environment Programme, the Programme Governing Council, and Secretariat	115-0-9
	A/C. 2/L. 1243	Expanding the Governing Council (amendment to A/C. 2/L. 1228)	72-36-21
	A/C. 2/L. 1229	Endorsing the Conference Declaration, Action Plan, and call for a World Environment Day	
	A/C. 2/L. 1229/Rev. 1	Adding a call for consideration of a second Environment Conference	103-0-12
North-South questions			
Environmental priorities	A/C. 2/L. 1234	Calling on UNEP activities to reflect the International Development Decade Strategy	103-0-13
	A/C. 2/L. 1236	Calling for increased development aid to deal with environmental problems	
	A/C. 2/L. 1236/Rev. 1	Moderating the call for increased aid	85-0-21
National liability	A/C. 2/L. 1227	Compromising the national liability question by providing for voluntary reporting	114-0-10
	A/C. 2/L. 1233	Attempting to strengthen A/C. 2/L. 1227 (withdrawn)	

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	A/C. 2/L. 1240	Reaffirming the national liability-related portions of the Conference Declaration	111-0-11
World Housing Fund Proposal	A/C. 2/L. 1230	Calling on the World Bank to consider housing aid as a priority	81-0-34
	A/C. 2/L. 1231	Creating the World Housing Fund	82-6-27
	A/C. 2/L. 1235	Calling for an International Exposition-Conference on Human Settlements	102-0-16
Locating the UNEP Secretariat	A/C. 2/L. 1246	Calling for the Secretariat to be located in a developing nation	
	A/C. 2/L. 1246/Rev. 1	Mandating the selection of Nairobi	93-0-31
	A/C. 2/L. 1247	Calling for wider geographic selection in the locating of United Nations agency headquarters (withdrawn)	
	A/C. 2/L. 1249	Postponing a decision on the location question until 1973 (withdrawn)	
	A/C. 2/L. 1250	Referring the question to the General Assembly plenum and mandating the utilization of a secret ballot	30-81-12
	A/C. 2/L. 1251	Postponing a decision on the location question until 1973, while mandating the locating of at least one United Nations agency headquarters in a developing nation	20-68-35
Others	A/C. 2/L. 1237	Accepting the Iranian offer to create an "international prize for the most important contribution in the field of the human environment"	97-0-11
	A/C. 2/L. 1241	Calling for the protection of the Arctic environment (withdrawn)	

*These categories are based on the headings and subheadings utilized in this chapter.

TABLE 5.2

GENERAL ASSEMBLY PLENARY ACTION ON THE
1972 SECOND COMMITTEE ENVIRONMENT
CONFERENCE-RELATED RESOLUTIONS
15 December 1972

Second Committee Resolution*	General Assembly Vote	General Assembly Resolution Number
I (A/C. 2/L. 1229/Rev. 1)	112-0-10	2994 (XXVII)
II (A/C. 2/L. 1227)	115-0-10	2995 (XXVII)
III (A/C. 2/L. 1240)	114**-0-10	2996 (XXVII)
IV (A/C. 2/L. 1228 as amended by A/C. 2/L. 1243)	116-0-10	2997 (XXVII)
V (A/C. 2/L. 1230)	96-0-29	2998 (XXVII)
VI (A/C. 2/L. 1231)	93-5-27	2999 (XXVII)
VII (A/C. 2/L. 1234)	117-0-10	3000 (XXVII)
VIII (A/C. 2/L. 1235)	114-0-13	3001 (XXVII)
IX (A/C. 2/L. 1236/Rev. 1)	110-0-16	3002 (XXVII)
X (A/C. 2/L. 1237)	116-0-10	3003 (XXVII)
XI (A/C. 2/L. 1246/Rev. 1)	128-0-0	3004 (XXVII)

*The original draft resolution number is reported in the parentheses that follow each Second Committee resolution number.

**The original plenary vote was announced as 112-0-10, but Iraq and Togo subsequently advised the Secretariat that their votes for the resolution had not been recorded (United Nations Document A/PV. 2112, 15 December 1972, p. 7).

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UNEP and elected the fifty-eight members of the Environment Programme Governing Council.[6]

The 1972 General Assembly session was, in retrospect, the most predictable phase in our study of the Environment Conference period. These deliberations contained few surprises, with the possible exception of the debates over the size of the Environment Programme Governing Council and the location of the Programme Secretariat. Even these disputes, however, had been foreshadowed at Stockholm.

The significance of the Assembly session was not in the introduction of fresh concepts or questions, but in the orderly, and indeed almost perfunctory fashion in which it ratified the decisions made at Stockholm, while reconciling the handful of issues that the Conference had left unsettled. If Stockholm marked the formal ascendancy of a new political alignment in international environmental affairs, then the 1972 General Assembly session marked the institutionalization of that alignment's accomplishments.

The overwhelming endorsement of the Stockholm recommendations by the General Assembly was a tribute to the carefully honed consensus that had been achieved at Stockholm and to the decisive advantages that the various Conference participants--including even those nations that failed

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[6]Twenty of these nations were chosen for three year terms, nineteen for two year terms, and nineteen for one year terms. The fifty-eight nations that were selected to serve on the Governing Council are listed in table 5.9 below.

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to attend the Conference--perceived in the maintenance of this consensus.[7]

The successful maintenance of this international environmental consensus in the face of widely divergent conceptions of international environmental realities was, once again, in large part due to the efforts of Conference Secretary-General Maurice Strong. Virtually every major participant in the Second Committee and General Assembly debates made a point to praise Strong's "drive, devotion, and dynamic leadership."[8] Strong's unanimous selection as UNEP Executive Director reflected the esteem with which he was held by the entire international community.

The Actors

Analysis of the leading national actors during the 1972 General Assembly discussion of the Environment Conference report suggests the following observations:

1. The superpowers continued to play a subdued role. The United States extended involvement in the debate over the location of the UNEP Secretariat was the only notable exception to the low profile that had characterized American participation during much of the preparatory period and at Stockholm. At the same time, the Soviet Union maintained the spirit of its Stockholm boycott by abstaining on virtually every Conference-related roll call. The often lengthy

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[7]See chapter IV, pp. 321-322 above.

[8]Odero-Jowi (Kenya), United Nations Document A/PV.2112, 15 December 1972, p. 106.

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Soviet statements in explanation of these abstentions revealed, however, a marked degree of dissatisfaction with the Conference's emphasis on Southern priorities.[9]

2. The Chinese delegation played a far more restrained role than at Stockholm, where it had made a concerted effort to dominate the Conference. The other Stockholm new radicals were similarly far less involved in the deliberations of the General Assembly than they had been during the Environment Conference.

3. The relative quiescence of the new radicals allowed the old radical developing nations that had dominated the latter part of the preparatory period to reassert their dominance of the Southern nations on Environment Conference-related issues. Brazil, Chile, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Pakistan, and the Philippines were all deeply involved in the Assembly proceedings.

4. The developed nations that had played major roles during the preparatory and Conference periods remained the most involved members of their group during the General Assembly session. Sweden continued to take the initiative in Conference-related procedural matters, while Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom were the most vigorous advocates of the Northern perspective.

5. Tunisia was the only new major actor to emerge during the General Assembly session. The Tunisian delega-

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[9]See, for example, Ananichev (USSR), United Nations Document A/C.2.SR.1481, 8 November 1972, p. 14.

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tion also provided the only significant exception to the pattern of Southern solidarity that characterized the Environment Conference-related debates at the 1972 General Assembly session. On issue after issue, Tunisia not only opposed the consensual Southern position, but took the initiative in attempting to secure compromises acceptable to the developed nations.

Table 16 in the Appendix records the total number of interventions as well as the number of Second Committee resolutions that were cosponsored by each United Nations member during the 1972 General Assembly session. Table 5.3 summarizes this data by national group, while table 5.4 contrasts the 1972 results with that of the 1968-69 and 1970-71 preparatory periods. Examination of these tables reveals the degree to which the partial transformation of the Environment Conference into a "development conference" was reflected in the rates of national participation in Conference-related deliberations. The percentage of developing nations intervening in Conference-related debates rose steadily from an average of 19 percent in 1968-69 to 24 percent in 1970, 40 percent in 1971, and 65 percent in 1972. While over a third of the developing nations had not participated in the 1968-69 preparatory period and a quarter had not participated in the 1970-71 period, only 5 of the 100 developing nations--Albania, Burma, Chad, Equatorial

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TABLE 5.3

NATIONS PARTICIPATING IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE-RELATED DELIBERATIONS, 1972
(Totals from Table 16 in the Appendix)

Nation Group	United Nations Members	Members Sponsoring	Members Speaking	Members Not Participating
Latin America	24	23	20	0
Africa	41	37	22	3
Asia	32	29	22	1
Others (developing)	3	2	1	1
Total--developing	100	91	65	5
Western Europe	17	11	14	3
Eastern Europe	8	1	8	0
Others (developed)	7	5	7	0
Total--developed	32	17	29	3
Grand Total	132	108	94	8

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TABLE 5.4

PERCENTAGE OF NATIONS IN EACH NATIONAL GROUP THAT PARTICIPATED IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE-RELATED DELIBERATIONS, 1968-72

Nation Group	Percentage of Group Sponsoring			Percentage of Group Speaking			Percentage of Group Not Participating		
	1968-69	1970-71	1972	1968-69	1970-71	1972	1968-69	1970-71	1972
Latin America	58	63	96	50	50	83	33	25	0
Africa	63	61	90	24	46	54	32	27	7
Asia	59	63	91	33	48	69	37	26	3
Others (developing)	33	33	67	33	67	33	67	33	33
Total--developing	60	61	91	34	48	65	35	26	5
Western Europe	59	76	65	65	82	82	24	18	18
Eastern Europe	38	100	13	75	75	100	25	0	0
Others (developed)	57	71	71	71	86	100	29	14	0
Total--developed	53	81	53	69	81	91	25	13	9

Guinea, and Ivory Coast--failed to either cosponsor a resolution or speak during the 1972 session.[10]

The degree to which the developing nations now controlled the initiative on Conference-related matters was further reflected in the drop in the proportion of developed nations that joined in cosponsoring resolutions during the 1972 session. While 81 percent of these nations had cosponsored Conference-related resolutions during the 1970-71 preparatory period, only 53 percent did so at the 1972 session. At the same time, the percentage of developing nations cosponsoring such resolutions rose from 61 percent during the former period to 91 percent during the post-Conference General Assembly session.[11]

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[10]There was a similar sustained growth in the number of developing nations mentioning the Environment Conference in their General Assembly General Debate policy statements: from none in 1968, to three in 1969, eleven in 1971, and twenty-eight in 1972. The last figure compares favorably with the ten developed nations that mentioned the Conference during the 1972 General Debate. This growth in the Southern level of participation at the 1972 General Assembly session was not accompanied by a lessening of Northern involvement. The developed nations continued to demonstrate the high level of participation that had characterized their performance throughout the preparatory period. Only three developed nations--Belgium, Luxembourg, and Portugal--failed to participate in the 1972 General Assembly deliberations, while the twenty-nine other developed nations were responsible for 142 interventions during the Second Committee debate (as compared to 163 interventions by the 53 developing nations that participated in these debates).

[11]This growth in the involvement of the developing nations was also reflected in the growing number of these nations that made multiple interventions during the 1972 Second Committee deliberations (see table 16 in the Appendix). Thirty-four developing nations intervened more

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The Politics of the Technical Questions

At the first meeting of the Second Committee that was devoted to the Environment Conference agenda item two resolutions were presented: draft resolution A/C.2 1.1229, which endorsed the Conference report and draft resolution A/C.2/L.1228, which established the Conference-mandated permanent United Nations environment agency. These resolutions were presented by Sweden, which had introduced every United Nations resolution dealing with the procedural aspects of the Environment Conference since the original call to Stockholm in 1968. Both resolutions enjoyed broad support. The only controversies that either generated were technical questions of tangential relation to the overall Environment Conference question.

Resolution A/C.2/1.1229 noted the Conference report "with satisfaction" and endorsed the Declaration on the Human Environment, the Action Plan for the Human Environment, the recommendations for national action, and the designation of 5 June as World Environment Day.[12] The wide range of nations that joined in cosponsoring the draft resolution--including old radicals Brazil and Iran, new

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than once during these deliberations, while there had only been eleven developing nations that did so during the 1971 Second Committee meeting.

[12]The resolution, which was introduced on 19 October, was revised the next day, at the behest of the Japanese delegation, to include a call for the 1973 General Assembly to consider the Conference's recommendation for a second Human Environment Conference.

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radicals Syria and Tanzania, and such developed nations as Canada, Japan, and the United States--assured its swift and overwhelming acceptance.[13] Over twenty nations took the floor to endorse the resolution,[14] which the Second Committee adopted on 2 November by a vote of 103 to 0, with 12 abstentions.[15]

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[13]There were thirty cosponsoring nations by the time draft resolution A/C.2/L.1229/Rev.1 came to a vote: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Ghana, Guatemala, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United States.

[14]New Zealand was the only nation that took exception to any of the resolution's proposals during the brief Second Committee debate. This objection, which had been raised at Stockholm as well (United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, p. 97), was to the designation of 5 June as World Environment Day, because 6 June, the traditional celebration of the Queen's birthday, was already a national holiday in New Zealand (Scott [New Zealand] United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1472, 27 October 1972, p. 15).

[15]Nine of the abstaining nations--Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukraine, and the Soviet Union--were members of the Soviet bloc that had declared their intention to abstain on all Conference-related votes to emphasize that they had not accepted the decisions of a Conference they had refused to attend. The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen abstained for similar reasons, while South Africa abstained to protest the condemnation of apartheid in the Declaration on the Human Environment. China also abstained in apparent protest to the Declaration's condemnation of atmospheric nuclear testing. It should be noted that the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen subsequently participated in every Second Committee Conference-related roll call vote, without any explanation as to why it was not adhering to its stated policy of abstaining. Repeated efforts to interview a representative of Yemen,PDR were unsuccessful.

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The second Swedish draft resolution (A/C.2/L.1228) provided for the creation of a fifty-four member UNEP Governing Council, an Environment Secretariat, an Environment Fund, and the designation of a UNEP Executive Director to be elected to a four year term by the General Assembly "on the nomination of the Secretary-General.[16] The resolution was not expected to be controversial,[17] as it was almost an exact replica of the resolution on "institutional and financial arrangements" that had been unanimously adopted at Stockholm.[18] The Second Committee became involved, however, in a lengthy debate concerning two technical aspects of the resolution: the legality of having the General Assembly elect the Executive Director of the Environment Programme and the composition and size of the proposed UNEP Governing Council.[19]

The first debate was precipitated by a letter from the Legal Counsel of the United Nations Secretariat advising that Article 101 of the United Nations Charter granted

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[16]The nineteen nations cosponsoring the resolution were: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Cyprus, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Iran, Kenya, Jamaica, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Swaziland, Sweden, Tanzania, Tunisia, and the United States.

[17]See, for example, Thorsson (Sweden), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1479, 7 November 1972, pp. 2-3.

[18]United Nations Document A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, pp. 61-65.

[19]The debate of the Second Committee over the composition of the Governing Council preceded its debate concerning the selection of the UNEP Executive Director, but we have considered them in reverse order for purposes of clarity.

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the Secretary-General the sole power to appoint United Nations staff.[20] Thus, the General Assembly would not be able to elect the Executive Director of UNEP as provided for in draft resolution A/C.2/L.1228.

The ensuing debate centered on the right of the Secretariat to interpret the Charter. The delegates of Barbados, Canada, Chile, Greece, Philippines, and the United Kingdom argued that the objections of the Legal Counsel had to be heeded and proposed that the resolution be reworded to provide for the General Assembly to "approve" rather than "elect" the Secretary-General's nominee.[21] This proposal was opposed by the delegates of such African and Asian nations as Iran, Kuwait, Liberia, and Tunisia who insisted that the unsolicited advisory opinion of the Legal Counsel was inappropriate, as the members of the United Nations were the final interpreters of the Charter and could therefore decide on any method of staff selection.[22]

The latter argument prevailed as both the Second Committee and the General Assembly approved the original formula for selecting the UNEP Executive Director without any

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[20]United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1479, 7 November 1972, p. 18.

[21]Waldron-Ramsey (Barbados) and McCarthy (United Kingdom), ibid; Santa Cruz (Chile), Caranicas (Greece), and Verceles (Philippines), p. 19; and Hardy (Canada), p. 20.

[22]Hoveyda (Iran) and Driss (Tunisia), ibid., p. 18 and Findley (Liberia), p. 20.

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further discussion. This brief debate highlighted the conflicting attitudes of the "old nations" and "new nations" toward international law and international organizations. The new nations of Africa and Asia appear to have been arguing that a majority of the General Assembly was the absolute and final arbitrator of the United Nations Charter, while the nations of Europe and Latin America appear to have been supporting the supremacy of legal precedents and formulations rather than the utilization of majority votes. The Latin American position appears to have reflected their longer experience as independent participants in international organizations, an experience which had apparently led to an acceptance of mores and norms to which the new nations of Africa and Asia had not been similarly conditioned.[23]

This cleavage between the Latin American and Afro-Asian nations was even more evident in the Second Committee's debate over the size and composition of the proposed UNEP Governing Council. The question of the composition and size of United Nations bodies has been fraught with political significance since the first General Assembly session, where the five permanent members of the Security

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[23]For example, the Philippines, a charter member of the United Nations, sided with three Northern nations and three Latin American states in defending the Legal Counsel's intervention. On the other hand, Liberia and Iran were similarly charter members of the United Nations but nevertheless took the Afro-Asian position in this debate.

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Council came to a "gentlemen's agreement" to assign the six nonpermanent Security Council seats and the eighteen ECOSOC seats on the basis of "geographic representation."[24] Latin America was to receive two of the Security Council seats, while the British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Western Europe were to receive one each. Similar proportions were to be utilized for the distribution of ECOSOC seats. By 1960, the growing number of new United Nations members had altered the allocation formula to the degree that the traditional British Commonwealth and Middle East seats had become Afro-Asian seats and the Eastern European seat was being rotated between that group and the Asian nations.[25] At the same time, the dozens of new members from Africa and Asia were demanding that the Security Council and ECOSOC be expanded to allow for additional representation from their areas.[26]

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[24]Sydney Bailey, The General Assembly of the United Nations, A Study of Procedure and Practice, Rev. ed. (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 159.

[25]Barros, The United Nations: Past, Present and Future, p. 35.

[26]Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967, pp. 136-147. Table 5.5 records the growth in United Nations membership by geographic area between 1945 and 1972. It will be noted that the percentage of Latin American members fell from 39 to 20 percent between 1945 and 1963, while the proportion of Afro-Asian members was rising from 22 to 50 percent. Nevertheless, the two groups had the same number of seats on United Nations representative bodies in 1963.

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The General Assembly responded to these pressures in December 1963 by passing an Afro-Asian amendment to the Charter of the United Nations, which expanded the Security Council from eleven to fifteen members and ECOSOC from eighteen to twenty-seven members. The amendment was accompanied by a resolution containing a new "gentlemen's agreement" reallocating the nonpermanent seats of the Security Council and ECOSOC so as to better reflect the 1963 membership distribution.[27]

The new allocation agreement went into effect in the fall of 1965 and was reflected in appointments to all United Nations bodies during the next six years, including the Preparatory Committee for the Human Environment Conference.[28] When the Preparatory Committee had first suggested the creation of a twenty-seven member Governing

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[27]The Security Council formula provided three seats for Africa, two each for Asia, Latin America, Western Europe and Others, and one for Eastern Europe. At the same time, the ECOSOC formula provided seven seats for Africa and Western Europe and Others, five for Asia and Latin America, and three for Eastern Europe (Barros, The United Nations: Past, Present and Future, p. 35).

[28]The allocation formulas for the nonpermanent Security Council seats and ECOSOC seats varied slightly, with the latter being more favorable to the Eastern European and Western European and Others groupings because the former was predicated upon the prior distribution of the five permanent seats--three of which went to Western European and Others nations and one to an Eastern European nation.

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Council to supervise the proposed UNEP, it was taken for granted that the 1963 formula would be followed in seat allocation.[29]

An apparent reason for the continued acceptance of the 1963 formula was that the proportion of United Nations members from each of the five geographic areas had remained fairly stable between 1965 and 1970 (see table 5.5). In the fall of 1971, however, five Asian nations were admitted to the United Nations (Bahrain, Bhutan, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates) raising the Asian percentage of the total membership from 22 to 25 percent, while causing a proportionate drop in the percentage of every other regional grouping. The net result of this increase in Asian membership was that these nations were now the most underrepresented group on United Nations bodies (see table 5.6). Furthermore, while the disproportionate share of European seats under the 1963 formula might be seen as reflecting international power realities, the fact that the twenty-four Latin American members enjoyed the same proportion of seats as the thirty-three Asian members was deemed particularly unjust by many Asian states.[30]

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[29]Even when the developing nations succeeded at Stockholm in expanding the proposed Governing Council from twenty-seven to forty-seven and finally to fifty-four members, the utilization of the 1963 allocation formula was never an issue (see chapter IV, p. 243 below).

[30]See, for example, Panyarachun (Thailand), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1479, 7 November 1972, p. 16.

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TABLE 5.5

UNITED NATIONS MEMBERSHIP BY GEOGRAPHIC CAUCUS GROUP, 1945-72

	Percentage of Total Membership						
	1945	1955	1960	1963	1965	1970	1972
Latin America	39	27	20	20	19	19	18
Africa	6	5	25	29	31	32	31
Asia	16	24	22	21	22	22	25
Western Europe and Others*	27	31	23	21	20	19	18
Eastern Europe**	12	13	10	9	8	8	8

*Includes the six European settler states and Turkey, but not Japan,which is included in the Asian caucus group.

**Includes Albania and Yugoslavia.

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TABLE 5.6

CONTRASTING THE 1963 SEAT ALLOCATION FORMULA WITH THE PROPORTION OF UNITED NATIONS MEMBERS IN EACH GEOGRAPHIC CAUCUS GROUP IN 1963 AND 1972

	Percentage of Seats Under the 1963 Formula	Percentage of Total Membership, 1963	Percentage of Total Membership, 1972
Latin America	18.5	20	18
Africa	26	29	31
Asia	18.5	21	25
Western Europe and Others	26	21	18
Eastern Europe	11	9	8

TABLE 5.7

THE IMPACT OF THE ASIAN AMENDMENT TO EXPAND THE UNEP GOVERNING COUNCIL

	Number and Percentage of Governing Council Seats	
	Based on the Original Draft Resolution	Based on the Asian Amendment
Latin America	10 (18.5%)	10 (17%)
Africa	14 (26%)	16 (28%)
Asia	10 (18.5%)	13 (23%)
Western Europe and Others	14 (26%)	13 (23%)
Eastern Europe	6 (11%)	6 (10%)

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The Conference mandate to create a new representative body (UNEP) provided the Asians with an opportunity to challenge the 1963 allocation formula.[31] This Asian effort to alter the United Nations seat distribution formula was led by Thailand, which intervened several times during the Second Committee's consideration of draft resolution A/C.2/L.1228.[32] The Thai effort was climaxed by the introduction of a draft amendment (A/C.2/L.1243), with twenty-four Asian cosponsors, that called for a Governing Council of fifty-eight rather than fifty-four nations.[33] The African and Asian group would each receive two of these seats, while Asia would gain a third new seat to be secured by taking a seat away from the Western Europe and Others

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[31]The Asian nations had already succeeded in securing a minor revision of the allocation formula at Stockholm during the election of the twenty-seven Environment Conference Vice-Presidents. While the Western Europe and Others group was entitled to seven Vice-Presidents under the 1963 formula, the selection of a Swede as Conference Chairman was counted against this number, allowing the Asian group to receive an additional Vice-President (United Nations Docu- A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, p. 77).

[32]Thailand's leading role resulted from its position as Chairman of the Asian caucus during November 1972.

[33]The resolution's cosponsors were: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bhutan, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Khmer, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Nepal, Oman, Qatar, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and Yemen-PDR. Ten members of the Asian group failed to cosponsor the amendment: Burma, China, Cyprus, Iran, Japan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

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group. The net result of the Asian proposal was to secure, for the first time, an Afro-Asian majority on a United Nations representative body (see table 5.7).[34]

The debate over the Thai amendment was brief and predictable. African and Asian nations, whose groups stood to gain seats, endorsed the proposal,[35] while European and North American nations, that would suffer a loss in their proportion of Council seats, objected.[36] The Latin American nations were in the most difficult position, forced to choose between their fellow developing nations and the modification of the advantageous 1963 formula. Only one Latin American nation, Chile, took part in the debate, and then only to declare its intention to abstain on any vote concerning the Asian amendment.[37]

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[34]The proposal, nevertheless, fell short of granting the African and Asian states their full proportionate share of seats. This enabled its supporters to describe the amendment as a "moderate" and "compromise" draft (see, for example, Panyarachun [Thailand], United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1479, 7 November 1972, p. 16).

[35]Pandey (Nepal), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1474, 30 October 1972, p. 5 and Diallo (Upper Volta), Chang (China), Odero-Jowi (Kenya), Sadek (Egypt), Akram (Pakistan), and Verceres (Philippines), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1479, 7 November 1972, pp. 10, 11, 13, 14, 14, and 15.

[36]Thorssen (Sweden), McCarthy (United Kingdom), Zagorin (United States), Caranicas (Greece), and Czarowski (Poland), ibid., pp. 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14 and Breitenstein (Finland), Ruiz-Morales (Spain), and van Gorkom (Netherlands), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1480, 7 November 1972, pp. 2, 3, and 4.

[37]Santa Cruz (Chile), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1479, 7 November 1972, p. 15.

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Table 5.8 records the roll call by which the Second Committee approved the Asian amendment by a vote of 72 in favor, 36 against, with 21 abstentions. Analysis of this table suggests the following observations:

1. More nations participated in this roll call--129-- than in any other Environment Conference-related vote during the entire 1968-72 period. The question of the 1963 allocation formula apparently generated greater interest than did any Conference issue.

2. The voting pattern cut across both East-West and North-South lines approximating, as expected, an Afro-Asian/European-Latin American cleavage. The former group demonstrated the power that it can wield through its majority status in the General Assembly. When the African and Asian nations are almost all voting, and voting as a bloc, they can produce an automatic majority, even without the support of a single Latin American state.

3. The Soviet bloc apparently felt strongly enough about protecting the slight advantage that Eastern Europe received from the 1963 formula that it waived its policy of abstaining on Environment Conference-related votes in order to oppose the Asian initiative. The Soviet Union explained this exception by referring to the Asian amendment as a "dangerous precedent" that transcended the Conference question.[38]

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[38]Makeyev (USSR), ibid., p. 23.

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TABLE 5.8

SECOND COMMITTEE VOTE ON EXPANDING THE UNEP GOVERNING COUNCIL
Amendment A/C. 2/L. 1243--2 November 1972

Nation Group	In Favor	Against	Abstaining	Absent
Latin America (0-12-12-0)		Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela	Barbados, Chile, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago	
Africa (37-0-1-3)	Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dahomey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zaire, Zambia		Nigeria	Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Mauritius
Asia and Others (developing) (32-0-3-0)	Albania, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bhutan, Burma, China, Cyprus, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Khmer, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives,		Iran, Mongolia, Turkey	

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	Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Yemen-PDR, Yugoslavia			
Total--developing	69	12	16	3
Western Europe (0-15-2-0)		Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom	Iceland, Malta	
Eastern Europe (0-7-1-0)		Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, USSR	Romania	
Others (developed) (3-2-2-0)	Australia, Israel, Japan	Canada, United States	New Zealand, South Africa	
Total--developed	3	24	5	0
Grand Total	72	36	21	3

4. Mongolia and Romania were the only Soviet bloc nations that failed to oppose the resolution. While the Romanian vote reflected that nation's increasingly independent foreign policy, the Mongolian vote was far more significant, as it represented the only recorded 1972 United Nations vote in which Mongolia did not vote the same way as the Soviet Union. Mongolia was a member of the United Nations Asian caucus group and may have refrained from voting against the Asian initiative in order to maintain its good standing in this group.

5. The affirmative votes of Fiji and Japan would appear to similarly reflect their membership in the Asian group. The Thai amendment was also supported by four states that were not members of this group:

a. Albania, which rarely took part in Second Committee votes, was apparently reflecting its position as a faithful ally of China.

b. Australia had complained during the selection of the Preparatory Committee that environmental concerns required a "geographic" rather than a "political" basis for seat selection.[39] The Australians accordingly supported the Afro-Asian position on the Governing Council question, while explaining that seats on the Security Council and ECOSOC were properly assigned on a "political" basis.

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[39]Shaw (Australia), United Nations Document A/PV.1834, 15 December 1969, pp. 23-25.

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Thus, application of the 1963 formula was appropriate for selection to these bodies.[40]

c. Israel, with no chance of being elected to the Governing Council, was apparently willing to support an initiative being introduced by Third World nations whose support it was courting on far more significant questions.

d. Yugoslavia was still considered a member of the Eastern European group for purposes of seat selection, but its close ties with the Afro-Asian group explained its support for their initiative.

6. Iran, Nigeria, and Turkey were the only members of the Afro-Asian group that abstained on the roll call. The Turkish abstention can be explained by the fact that Turkey caucused with both the Asian and Western European groups and had been selected to United Nations representative bodies as a European state.[41] Iran and Nigeria, however, were both exclusively members of the Afro-Asian group and, as neither nation issued an explanation for its vote, it is difficult to ascertain why they chose to abstain.

7. Despite the Afro-Asian success on the Governing Council question, the 1963 formula remained unchallenged for the selection of Security Council and ECOSOC seats. The fact that several new European and Latin American na-

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[40] Joseph (Australia), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1480, 7 November 1972, p. 3.

[41] See, for example, table 2.1 above, which reports that Turkey had a Western European and Others' seat at the 1969 ECOSOC session.

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tions joined the United Nations in 1973 and 1974 (partially redressing the imbalance created by the admission of the five new Asian states in 1971) may help explain the lack of a challenge to the formula during those General Assembly sessions.[42]

Examination of both the roll call vote and the Second Committee debate suggests that there was more involved than the question of an advantageous number of Council seats for a particular group of nations. The European and Latin American nations spoke of the consensual nature of the 1963 agreement, the importance of precedent, and the inappropriateness of settling such a weighty issue in the Second Committee where the "important question" two-thirds rule cannot be invoked.[43] The African and Asian nations stressed, on the other hand, the "inequity of disproportionate representation" and the importance of "geographic distribution," while declaring that previous "discriminatory" decisions were not to be considered binding.[44] As in

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[42]Any revision of the Security Council and ECOSOC seat allocation formulas would have required either the European and Latin American nations to lose seats, or a further expansion of these bodies, which would have necessitated an amendment to the Charter of the United Nations. It was far easier to add seats to a proposed body than to take either of these more difficult steps.

[43]See, for example, McCarthy (United Kingdom), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1479, 7 November 1972, pp. 12-13.

[44]See, for example, Panyarachun (Thailand), ibid., p. 16.

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the case of the selection of the Executive Director of UNEP, the central issue appears to have been the question of precedent versus majority rule in international organizations.

The acceptance of the Asian amendment cleared the way for the Second Committee to approve draft resolution A/C.2/L.1228 (the second Swedish resolution) by a margin of 115 to 0, with 9 Soviet bloc abstentions, and for the General Assembly plenary to accept both Swedish resolutions without debate (see table 5.2 above). The plenary also elected the fifty-eight members of the UNEP Governing Council (see table 5.9).[45]

In summary, technical questions at the post-Stockholm General Assembly session centered on procedural aspects of the permanent United Nations environmental machinery and had little connection with other Conference-related issues. The disputes over the method of selecting the Executive Director of UNEP and the distribution of Governing Council seats were both largely unrelated to the East-West and North-South cleavages that had been the primary source of

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[45]A minor dispute arose at this session over the distribution of the Governing Council's seats into three, two, and one year terms so that one-third of the Council could be replaced each year. The Asian states objected that the seat distribution formula prepared by the Secretariat was unfair because they would be receiving the largest proportion of one year terms (Mani [India] and Amerasinghe [Sri Lanka], United Nations Document A/PV.2112, 15 December 1972, pp. 86 and 87). These objections were withdrawn, however, after it was explained that lots had been drawn for the extra one year term (pp. 90-91).

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TABLE 5.9

THE FIRST MEMBERS OF THE UNEP GOVERNING COUNCIL, BY GEOGRAPHIC CAUCUS GROUP
(Elected 15 December 1972)

Nation Group	Elected to a Three Year Term	Elected to a Two Year Term	Elected to a One Year Term
Latin America	Chile Mexico Nicaragua Panama	Brazil Peru Venezuela	Argentina Guatemala Jamaica
Africa	Burundi Central African Republic Madagascar Nigeria Senegal Tanzania	Cameroon Kenya Malawi Somalia Tunisia	Gabon Ghana Morocco Sierra Leone Sudan
Asia	Iraq Jordan Pakistan Sri Lanka	India Iran Japan Kuwait	China Indonesia Lebanon Philippines Syria
Western Europe and Others	Australia Netherlands Turkey United Kingdom	Austria Iceland Italy United States West Germany	Canada France Spain Sweden
Eastern Europe	East Germany Poland	Romania USSR	Czechoslovakia Yugoslavia

political tension during the Conference preparatory period. The differences between the old members of Europe and Latin America on one hand, and the new members of Africa and Asia on the other, may yet develop into a cleavage with profound implications for the future of United Nations politics.[46]

The Politics of the East-West Questions

The East-West tensions that had been muted at Stockholm were, if anything, even less of a factor during the consideration by the General Assembly of the Conference's recommendations. While the Soviet bloc had boycotted Stockholm because of its defeat on the East German issue, neither this issue or any other East-West question played a significant role in the Assembly's deliberations.

There were at least four discernible reasons for the absence of any major East-West cleavages during the post-Conference Assembly session:

1. The securing of agreement between the two Germanys in the fall of 1972 meant that the Western powers no longer opposed East German participation in international organizations.[47] This new Western attitude towards

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[46]This is particularly true because most of the potential future members of the United Nations are from Africa and Asia, assuring the expansion of this group's General Assembly majority.

[47]The treaty between the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) was signed on 21 December 1972, and its successful completion had been apparent several weeks earlier (New York Times, 17 September 1972, p. 7).

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East Germany was apparent during the debates of the Second Committee when the delegates of twenty-eight nations, including such Western states as Australia and France, expressed regret at the exclusion of East Germany from Stockholm.[48] The degree to which the East German question was now viewed as an unfortunate issue which would be best quickly forgotten, was reflected in the absence of any defense of the Vienna formula, which had been mandated by a majority vote of the previous year's General Assembly.[49]

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[48]Rouge (France) and McIntyre (Australia), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1468, 24 October 1972, pp. 5 and 9. The twenty-six other speakers that mentioned the East German question were: Thorsson (Sweden), Hoveyda (Iran), and Fazoa (Brazil), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1466, 23 October 1972, pp. 8, 16 and 21; Ene (Romania), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1467, 25 October 1972, p. 8; Cubillas (Chile), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1468, 24 October 1972, p. 12; Lacko (Czechoslovakia), Debhi (Algeria), and Czarkowski (Poland), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1469, 27 October 1972, pp. 5, 10, and 15; Debrah (Ghana), Reyes (Philippines), and Pant (India), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1471, 30 October 1972, pp. 5, 9, and 10; Halasz (Hungary), Breitenstein (Finland), Rivero (Peru), Getmanets (Ukraine), Scott (New Zealand), and Chang (China), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1472, 27 October 1972, pp. 2, 3, 9, 12, 13, and 16;Todorov (Bulgaria), Palagin (Byelorussia), and Moreno (Cuba), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1473, 31 October 1972, pp. 3, 6, and 9; Johnson (Jamaica), Moutwolli (Syria), Gounaris (Greece), Aruede (Nigeria), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1474, 30 October 1972, pp. 5, 9, 14, and 17; Ananichev (USSR), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1479, 7 November 1972, p. 4; and Ochirbal (Mongolia), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1488, 15 November 1972, p. 3.

[49]See, for example, the statement of Conference Secretary-General Strong in United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1466, 23 October 1972, p. 2. The calming of the once controversial East German question was further demonstrated during the General Assembly plenary session at which East Germany was elected to a seat on the UNEP Governing Council. Not only did the Western powers not oppose

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The Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies similarly avoided public recriminations over the boycott question.[50]

2. The Soviet bloc appears to have decided to join the Western powers in minimizing the post-Conference impact of the Stockholm boycott. The Soviets not only refrained from opposing the Conference's recommendations, but they explained their abstention on most Conference-related votes as reflecting the fact that "the competent bodies of the USSR" were still studying the Conference report.[51] This restrained Soviet approach was in sharp contrast to their 1971 declarations in which they had threatened to extend their Conference boycott to include opposition to any Conference initiatives.[52]

3. The Soviet bloc and the Western developed nations appear to have had similar views on the North-South questions which dominated the post-Conference General

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the East German candidacy, but the United Kingdom called for its unanimous selection (McCarthy [United Kingdom], United Nations Document A/PV.2112, 15 December 1972, p. 21).

[50]The Cuban delegate provided the sole exception to this pattern with a virulent attack on the United States for its previous insistence on the utilization of the Vienna formula (Moreno [Cuba], United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1473, 31 October 1972, p. 2).

[51]See, for example, Ananichev (USSR), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1479, 7 November 1972, p. 4.

[52]See, for example, Makeyev (USSR), United Nations Document A/PV.2026, 20 December 1971, p. 76.

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Assembly session. The Soviets sided with the other Northern nations during the Second Committee's discussion of the Housing Fund question, the location of the UNEP Secretariat, and the size of the UNEP Governing Council.[53] The Soviet bloc nations even participated in the voting on several of these North-South questions, claiming that these were "procedural" rather than "substantive" questions, and were accordingly not subject to their policy of abstention.[54]

4. The alleged American use of "environmental warfare" in Vietnam had been one of the few sources of East-West tensions at Stockholm. This issue was far more subdued during the General Assembly's post-Stockholm deliberations because of the apparent success of the Vietnam peace negotiations. (The Second Committee's debates were held almost immediately after the American assurance that "peace is at hand.")[55]

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[53]See p. 354 above for the Governing Council debate and pp. 397 and 422 below for the two other issues.

[54]See, for example, the Soviet vote on the British call for a secret ballot during the Secretariat question debate (p. 425 below).

[55]Only two Soviet bloc nations, Bulgaria and Cuba, mentioned the Vietnam War during the Second Committee debate (Moreno [Cuba] and Todorov [Bulgaria], United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1473, 31 October 1972, pp. 2 and 6). The East-West cleavage was also reflected in the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Second Committee interventions, which noted the environmental advantages of socialism, and in the Chinese, Cuban, and Soviet objections to a draft resolution (A/C.2/L.1230) which referred to the Western-dominated World Bank (Palagin [Byelorussia], p. 9; Getmanets

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The Politics of the North-South Questions

The post-Conference General Assembly session was, for the most part, concerned with endorsing the Stockholm recommendations, while reconciling the handful of questions that the Conference had left unresolved. The Second Committee ignored such North-South issues as population control and nuclear testing that had been reconciled at Stockholm,[56] while devoting most of its attention to three specific questions--national liability, the World Housing Fund proposal, and the location of the UNEP Secretariat--on which the Conference had failed to achieve consensus.

[Ukraine], United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1472, 27 October 1972, p. 7; and Moreno [Cuba], Chang [China], and Lissov [USSR], United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1480, 7 November 1972, pp. 8, 8, and 13.

[56]Only three nations--Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and Liberia--even mentioned the population control issue during the 1972 General Assembly Conference-related deliberations (Moreno [Cuba], United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1473, 31 October 1972, p. 5; Lacko [Czechoslovakia], United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1469, 27 October 1972, p. 5; and Weeks [Liberia], United Nations Document A/PV.2051, 3 October 1972, p. 51). The Cuban and Czech delegates commended the Conference's treatment of this question, while the Liberian delegate expressed his disappointment that the Conference had not been firmer in support of population control policies. The nuclear testing question was similarly muted with only five nations mentioning it. Three of these nations--Fiji, Japan, and New Zealand--raised the question of the French atmospheric tests, while the other two--Bhutan and Guatemala--called for an end to all nuclear testing (Cakobau [Fiji], United Nations Document A/PV.2060, 11 October 1972, p. 50; Nakagawa [Japan], United Nations Document A/PV.2042, 27 September 1972, p. 16; Scott [New Zealand], United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1472, 27 October 1972, p. 14; Delpree Crespo [Guatemala], United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1469, 27 October 1972, p. 13; and Wangbi [Bhutan], United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1473, 31 October 1972, p. 14).

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The remainder of this chapter will examine these three issues as well as the General Assembly's treatment of the more general development versus environment (Founex agenda) and social pollution questions.

Environmental priorities: the Founex agenda

The Stockholm consensus in support of the Founex agenda remained intact during the 1972 General Assembly session.[57] Most nations appear to have been satisfied with the "delicate balance between development and environment priorities that had been achieved at Stockholm."[58] While many developing nations continued to stress the aid and trade aspects of the Founex recommendations,[59] and many developed nations continued to ignore the development and environment issue, there was little of the North-South rancor that had characterized the 1971 General Assembly's Environment Conference-related deliberations. Thus, the delegate from developed Australia declared that his nation would:

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[57]Table 17 in the Appendix records the positions taken on the development question by participants in the 1972 General Assembly General Debate.

[58]Anderson (Denmark), United Nations Document A/PV.2040, 27 September 1972, pp. 11-12. See also Moore (Ghana), pp. 73-76, which presents a strikingly similar tone.

[59]See, for example, the Indian General Debate statement which warned against allowing "the prevention of pollution [to become] an excuse for slowing down growth in the poorer countries" (Singh [India], United Nations Document A/PV.2051, 3 October 1972, pp. 34-35).

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> remain conscious of the fears among developing countries that preservation of the environment might come to assume priority within the United Nations over the continuing need for assistance for economic development. . . . protection of the environment and economic development must go hand in hand, and must not be regarded as mutually exclusive or competitive.[60]

Similarly, several developing nations echoed the observation of the Gambian delegate that:

> . . . the developing countries were at first wary of the alarm sounded by the industrialized countries over the serious environmental problems resulting from rapid and haphazard industrialization and urbanization, seeing it, perhaps wrongly, in terms of the rich having the leisure to tell the poor how to keep their gardens neat and trim. My Government has gradually come to the view, particularly after the Stockholm Conference . . . , that there is much value and merit in the argument of the environmentalist movement.[61]

This consensual support for the Founex priorities was further demonstrated by the overwhelming approval of the Second Committee and General Assembly plenary for two draft resolutions--A/C.2/L.1234 and A/C.2/L.1236--that mandated the UNEP Governing Council to follow these priorities.

Resolution A/C.2/L.1234, calling for all UNEP activities to reflect the International Development Strategy of the Second United Nations Development Decade, was introduced by Sudan on 23 October on behalf of fourteen other developing nations.[62] Table 5.10 records the roll call by

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[60]Bowen (Australia), United Nations Document A/PV.2042, 27 September 1972, pp. 59-60.

[61]Saho (Gambia), United Nations Document A/PV.2046, 29 September 1972, pp. 63-65.

[62]Algeria, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen,

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TABLE 5.10

SECOND COMMITTEE VOTE ON MANDATING UNEP TO CONSIDER SECOND DEVELOPMENT DECADE STRATEGY IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMMING
Resolution A/C. 2/L. 1234--3 November 1972

Nation Group	In Favor	Against	Abstaining	Absent
Latin America (20-0-1-3)	Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela		Cuba	Costa Rica, Panama, Paraguay
Africa (32-0-0-9)	Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Dahomey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Togo, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zaire, Zambia			Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Lesotho, Mauritius, Niger, Somalia
Asia and Others (developing) (30-0-1-4)	Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bhutan, Burma, China, Cyprus, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Khmer, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Nepal, Philippines, Qatar, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Yemen-PDR, Yugoslavia		Mongolia	Albania, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia

Total--developing	82	0	2	16
Western Europe (13-0-4-0)	Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom		Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway	
Eastern Europe (1-0-7-0)	Romania		Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, USSR	
Others (developed) (7-0-0-0)	Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, United States			
Total--developed	21	0	11	0
Grand Total	103	0	13	16

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which the Second Committee accepted the Sudanese resolution on 3 November by a vote of 103 to 0, with 13 abstentions. The four non-Soviet bloc nations that abstained (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Norway) appear to have done so because of their opposition to the General Assembly dictating UNEP policy before the Programme's Governing Council had a chance to examine the Conference report.[63]

While draft resolution A/C.2/L.1234 had been a fairly general endorsement of the Founex priorities, draft resolution A/C.2/L.1236 on development and environment was considerably more specific. As originally introduced by Pakistan (on behalf of six other developing nations),[64] the resolution:

1. Mandated the UNEP Environment Fund to grant "higher financial priority" to projects that would "constitute a necessary part of the process of accelerating the economic development of developing countries"

2. Called on ECOSOC to monitor the work of UNEP so as to "ensure that the development priorities of the developing countries are in no way adversely affected or distorted"

Yemen-PDR, and Yugoslavia. The role of Yemen-PDR as a co-sponsor is particularly interesting since that nation had earlier declared a policy of abstention on all Conference-related votes because of its participation in the Stockholm boycott (see footnote 15 above).

[63]United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1480, 7 November 1972, p. 7.

[64]Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Peru, Philippines, and the Sudan.

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3. Declared that "resources for environmental programmes both within and outside the United Nations system, must be additional to the present level and projected growth of resources" already earmarked for development aid[65]

The insistence of the resolution on priority for development projects and its call for "additionality" in the funding of environmental programs had already been included in the Founex recommendations and in the Stockholm Conference report.[66] The Brazilian delegation refused, however, to support the resolution until it had been revised to "recommend" rather than mandate "additionality", and to suggest "special consideration" rather than "higher financial priority" for development projects.[67] Brazil, which had previously been the most outspoken Southern nation, was now apparently motivated by the realization that any resolution dealing with the allocation of development funds would be far more meaningful if it had the support of at least some developed nations.[68] The sponsors of the resolution acquiesced to the Brazilian demand which met with

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[65]United Nations Document A/C.2/L.1236, 26 October 1972, pp. 1-2.

[66]Akram (Pakistan), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1478, 7 November 1972, p. 30.

[67]United Nations Document A/8901, 29 November 1972, p. 23.

[68]See, for example, Akram (Pakistan), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1478, 7 November 1972, p. 30.

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some success as the Netherlands joined in cosponsoring the revised resolution, and Australia and Sweden endorsed the draft, albeit with some reservations concerning the feasibility of the additionality concept.[69]

With only the United Kingdom and France publicly opposing the revised draft,[70] the Second Committee accepted it on 6 November, by a nonrecorded vote of 85 to 0, with 21 abstentions, after having taken a separate nonrecorded vote on the additionality paragraph of 74 in favor, 3 against, with 26 abstentions. The desire of the developing nations to avoid a confrontation over draft resolution A/C.2/L.1236 was reflected in their not requesting a roll call on either of these votes. This allowed those developed nations that chose to vote against the resolution to later support the concepts of development funding priorities and additionality without having to reverse a public position. This spirit of conciliation continued during the General Assembly plenary session where draft resolution A/C.2/L.1236 was accepted by a nonrecorded vote of 110 to 0, with 16 abstentions. Since nine Soviet bloc members abstained on all General Assembly Conference-related votes, at least seventeen of the twenty-four other developed nations apparently voted for the resolution. The

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[69]Joseph (Australia) and Granquist (Sweden), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1482, 8 November 1972, pp. 2 and 3.

[70]Darling (United Kingdom) and Rouge (France), ibid., pp. 3 and 5.

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Brazilian strategy appears to have succeeded in securing a measure of support from the very nations whose cooperation would be essential if resolution A/C.2/L.1236 was ever to be implemented.

The two Founex agenda-related resolutions were thus accepted with a minimum of controversy or debate. This was hardly surprising since these development priorities had already been accepted without any significant objection at Stockholm. Furthermore, the pragmatic willingness of the developing nations to moderate some of their more controversial demands contributed to the general lack of tension concerning these priorities.

Environmental priorities: social pollution issues

The social pollution issue had been raised at Stockholm by a group of developing nations who were convinced that the "pollution of poverty" was only a symptom of the more pervasive "pollution" of racism, colonialism, neocolonialism, and imperialism. These questions did not, however, play as significant a role in the post-Conference General Assembly session as they had at Stockholm.

A major reason for this relative muting of the social pollution question was the approach that the new radical nations had taken at Stockholm. While the old radicals had tended to be pragmatic and programmatic during the Confer-

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ence, the new radicals had placed their major emphasis on the establishment of an overall tone.[71] Since the post-Conference General Assembly session was primarily concerned with the programmatic implementation of particular Conference recommendations, the new radicals were less involved in this session than the old radicals. In addition, the Chinese, the most vocal of the Stockholm new radicals, had apparently decided to avoid extensive Conference-related involvement after their Stockholm defeat on the nuclear testing question.[72]

The absence of specific social pollution oriented programs and the apparent Chinese reluctance to become involved in the Conference-related debates did not prevent several nations from raising the social pollution theme during the post-Conference session. Thus, the Guyanan General Debate statement denounced the "pollution of racism" in Southern Africa, the "pollution of imperialism" in Southeast Asia, and the plight of the Palestinians who

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[71]See chapter IV, p. 272 above.

[72]See chapter IV, p. 296 above. The Chinese made only four brief interventions during the General Assembly's Conference-related deliberations: to endorse the Conference's work, to support the Asian effort to expand the UNEP Governing Council, to object to Taiwan's continued membership in the World Bank, and to endorse the Southern position on the question of locating the UNEP Secretariat (Chang [China], United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1472, 27 October 1972, p. 17; United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1479, 7 November 1972, p. 11; United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1480, 7 November 1972, p. 8; and United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1483, 9 November 1972, p. 5).

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suffered from the "deprivation of an environment of dignity."[73] The Libyan delegate similarly decried those "who pollute the life of man and defile it through racist and colonialist practices."[74]

These statements and those of the several other nations that mentioned social pollution issues were almost all made within the context of endorsing the Conference report. Even Tanzania, which had been among the most outspoken new radicals at Stockholm, now praised the Declaration on the Human Environment as having achieved "a necessary balance [on the issue of] human rights, economic development, and trade."[75]

Of the twelve nations that mentioned social pollution issues, only two--Chile and Trinidad and Tobago--criticized the accomplishments of the Conference in this area.[76] The Chilean objection appears to have been related to that nation's anti-American campaign at the 1972 General Assembly session and in particular to the tensions between the

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[73]Ramphal (Guyana), United Nations Document A/PV.2038, 25 September 1972, p. 48.

[74]Kikhia (Libya), United Nations Document A/PV.2059, 9 October 1972, p. 78. See also Maghur (Libya), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1471, 30 October 1972, p. 2.

[75]Salim (Tanzania), United Nations Document A/PV.2043, 27 September 1972, p. 33.

[76]The twelve nations raising social pollution issues were: Algeria, Chile, China, Cuba, Gambia, Guyana, Libya, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uganda.

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Chilean government and the American-owned International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. Thus, the Chileans denounced the "large United States consortiums" whose control over "more than 60 percent [of] the international telecommunications system" was seen as the primary reason for the worldwide media pollution of "hatred and violence [which was] responsible for the distribution in developing countries of ideas and ways of life not applicable to their cultures." These ideas, it was further argued, had already helped create "a climate of hatred and crime in the capitalist world" that, if left unchecked, would destroy the social environment of the developing nations as well.[77]

As strenuous as the Chilean remarks may have been, the objections of Trinidad and Tobago were even more strongly worded. The declaration of the delegate of Trinidad and Tobago that the "imperfections, gaps, and shortcomings" in the Conference report "worked to the detriment of the developing countries"[78] represented the strongest national condemnation of the Environment Conference at the 1972 General Assembly session. While such diverse nations

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[77]Cubillos (Chile), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1468, 24 October 1972, p. 13. The fact that Chile was now indicting the Conference for failing to examine an issue which even the Chileans had not mentioned at Stockholm, lends credence to the contention that this complaint must be viewed in the context of the strained Chilean-American relations at that time.

[78]Mohammed (Trinidad and Tobago), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1472, 27 October 1972, p. 18.

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as Brazil, China, Tanzania, and the United States had all praised the work of the Conference, the representative of Trinidad and Tobago declared that "the whole purpose of the Conference was the physical and economic improvement of the industrially advanced countries." These wealthy nations, it was alleged, were embarking on the "transfer of resources from [international] development aid to [domestic] environmental protection" which they had veiled at Stockholm in a "cloud of empty promises and hypocrisy."[79]

The strident Trinidadian statement was not referred to, however, by any other participant in the debates of the General Assembly or Second Committee. Even Trinidad and Tobago failed to raise these objections again, as it voted for all of the Second Committee's Conference-related resolutions.

The position of Trinidad and Tobago becomes all the more difficult to understand when contrasted with that nation's behavior during the Conference preparatory period when Trinidad and Tobago was one of the few developing nations that failed to mention the development and environment question, much less the social pollution issue.[80] In addition, Trinidad and Tobago had limited its public remarks at Stockholm to a discussion of the very industrial pollution questions it was now condemning the Conference

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[79]Ibid.

[80]See tables 9 and 14 in the Appendix.

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for overemphasizing.[81] No substantive reason has been found to explain this sudden shift in the position of Trinidad and Tobago.[82]

The Chilean and Trinidadian objections were, whatever their motivation, the only significant exceptions to the general post-Conference pattern of new radical docility. The latter nations were apparently satisfied that the Conference had recognized the significance of the social pollution issue and were now content to either ignore the Conference-related deliberations or to join with the other developing nations in supporting such efforts as the implementation of the Conference's economic priority proposals and the campaign to locate the UNEP Secretariat in Nairobi.

The question of national liability

The Stockholm Conference had been unable to reconcile the dispute between the "pollution exporting" and "pollution importing" nations concerning the question of compulsory national reporting of any domestic undertaking which might have "significant adverse effects" on another nation's environment.[83] It will be recalled that several of the most vocal pollution importing nations at Stockholm

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[81]Prevatt (Trinidad and Tobago), summary record of tenth plenary session of the Human Environment Conference, 10 June 1972, p. 13.

[82]Efforts to interview members of Trinidad and Tobago's United Nations delegation have been unsuccessful.

[83]See chapter IV, pp. 278-284.

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had been neighbors of Brazil that were concerned about the pollution and possible diversion of the waters of the Rio de la Plata basin. These nations had apparently made this question one of their primary 1972 General Assembly policy concerns as well, with Argentina, Bolivia, and Paraguay each devoting a major portion of their General Debate national policy statements to discussing the need to temper national sovereignty with a "system of exchange of information" in order to "respect the sovereign rights of other states."[84]

Even as the General Debate was underway, efforts were being made to secure a compromise on the national liability question. These efforts apparently originated with several Latin American nations which did not want to see the developing nations split at a time when their unity was needed on the Housing Fund and UNEP Secretariat location questions.[85] At the behest of these nations, the Argentinian

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[84]McLoughlin (Argentina), United Nations Document A/PV.2043, 27 September 1972, pp. 8-10. See also Gutierrez (Bolivia), United Nations Document A/PV.2055, 5 October 1972, p. 71 and Solano Lopez (Paraguay), United Nations Document A/PV.2062, 11 October 1972, pp. 11-12. As might be expected the two upriver Rio de la Plata basin states stressed the question of water diversion in their statements while downriver Argentina placed almost exclusive emphasis on the question of national liability for transnational water pollution.

[85]These conclusions are based both on the Canadian statement cited in the next footnote and on information provided by members of the Brazilian United Nations delegation who requested anonymity.

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and Brazilian United Nations delegations agreed to work together in an attempt to draft a compromise text.[86]

The Argentinian-Brazilian negotiations succeeded in producing a draft resolution (A/C.2/L.1227) which sought to balance the concerns of the pollution importers and pollution exporters by calling for a system of voluntary national reporting. The resolution endorsed the need for:

> official and public knowledge . . . of the technical data relating to the work to be carried out by States within their national jurisdiction with a view to avoiding significant harm that may occur in the human environment of the adjacent area.

At the same time, the resolution's next paragraph contained the proviso that:

> the technical data referred to in the preceding paragraph will be given and received in the best spirit of co-operation and good neighborliness, without this being construed as enabling each State to delay or impede the programmes and projects of exploration, exploitation and development of [the] natural resources of the States in whose territories such programmes and projects are carried out.[87]

Draft resolution A/C.2/L.1227 was introduced by Brazil on 16 October on behalf of a lengthy list of cosponsors which soon grew to fifty-five nations, including most of the nations that had taken a position on either side during the Stockholm national liability debate.[88]

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[86]Hardy (Canada), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1479, 7 November 1972, p. 5.

[87]United Nations Document A/8901, 29 November 1972, p. 4.

[88]The fifty-five cosponsors of draft resolution A/C.2/L.1227, by national grouping were (an asterisk

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Seventeen of the eighteen nations that had cosponsored the Conference amendment calling for strict national reporting now joined in cosponsoring the compromise resolution[89] as did Brazil, India, and Japan, which had opposed that amendment at Stockholm. Similarly, the United States, which had opposed the Conference amendment, now joined in endorsing the compromise text.

While the highly developed pollution exporting nations joined most of the developing nations in supporting the compromise resolution, several of the pollution importing developed nations took exception to it. Not only had these nations wanted to see a stronger "national reporting"

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follows those nations that participated in the actual Second Committee discussion of the resolution): Latin America (21)--Argentina,* Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil,* Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,* Haiti,* Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama,* Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela;* Africa (19)--Algeria, Cameroon, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana,* Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, and Tunisia;* Asia (8)--Cyprus, India,* Iran, Jordan, Malaysia,* Pakistan,* Syria, and Yemen; Others (developing)--Yugoslavia; Western Europe (5)--Austria, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Sweden; and Others (developed)--Japan. (In addition, nine nations that were not cosponsors of the resolution endorsed it during the Committee's deliberations: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uganda, United States, and Zambia.) The presence of twenty-one of the United Nations twenty-four Latin American members as cosponsors of the resolution further demonstrated the major role these states had in the preparation of the compromise draft.

[89]Burundi was the only Stockholm cosponsor which did not join in cosponsoring the compromise draft.

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requirement, but they were concerned that the new text might be construed so as to weaken the national liability principles that had been accepted at Stockholm. (These included Declaration principles 21 and 22 which called for caution in the planning and execution of projects with transnational environmental implications.) Canada and New Zealand, in particular, sought to modify draft resolution A/C.2/L.1227 through a series of amendments that would have strengthened the national reporting requirement while still allowing a nation the right to refuse to report specific information of its own choosing.[90] While such developed nations as Finland, Ireland, and Malta endorsed these amendments, they were withdrawn after Ghana, Guatemala, and Haiti denounced them as divisive.[91]

Having failed in these efforts to strengthen draft resolution A/C.2/L.1227, the Canadians helped introduce a new draft resolution, A/C.2/L.1240, which was presented as a "complement" to draft resolution A/C.2/L.1227.[92] The new

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[90]United Nations Document A/C.2/L.1233, 24 October 1972.

[91]Coradin (Haiti) and Crespo (Guatemala), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1469, 27 October 1972, pp. 12 and 14; Debrah (Ghana), Kingswell (Malta), and O'Riordan (Ireland), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1471, 27 October 1972, pp. 5, 14, and 14; and Breitenstein (Finland), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1472, 27 October 1972, p. 5.

[92]The resolution was cosponsored by pollution importers, Australia, Mexico, New Zealand, and Panama, and was endorsed by Iceland and the Netherlands. In addition, Honduras was erroneously listed as a cosponsor on the

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resolution, which reaffirmed that nothing in the original resolution should be construed as changing the intent of the Declaration on the Human Environment, was promptly approved by a nonrecorded vote of 111 to 0, with 11 abstentions. The Second Committee then approved draft resolution A/C.2/L.1227 by a similarly nonrecorded vote of 114 to 0, with 10 abstentions.[93]

In the previous chapter it was observed that the national liability issue had produced unusual political configurations by joining the most highly industrialized developed nations and the more industrialized developing nations in opposition to both the developed and developing pollution importing nations.[94] During the post-Conference General Assembly session this coalition of pollution exporters appears to have remained intact on the national

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original draft document (Gallardo-Moreno [Mexico], United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1478, 7 November 1972, p. 28).

[93]The plenary approval of both resolutions by the General Assembly on 15 December was similarly overwhelming with draft resolution A/C.2/L.1227 being accepted by a vote of 115 to 0, with 10 abstentions, and draft resolution A/C.2/L.1240 by a vote of 114 to 0, with 10 abstentions. The General Assembly plenary vote on resolution A/C.2/L.1240 was, at Canada's request, a recorded roll call vote--the only one taken during the plenary consideration of the Second Committee's Environment Conference-related resolutions. The Canadians were apparently motivated by a desire to have nations go "on the record" in support of the Stockholm national liability formula. The ten nations that abstained on the plenary roll call included the nine regularly abstaining Soviet bloc members and Mauritania, which gave no reason for doing so, and which had voted during the Second Committee's Conference-related roll calls.

[94]See chapter IV, p. 284 above.

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liability issue, while the pollution importers group split over the question of the compromise draft.

The fact that a consensus could be secured in support of the compromise draft is primarily a tribute to the cohesion of the developing nations on Conference-related questions. Argentina and other developing pollution importing nations were apparently willing to make concessions on even this controversial issue in order to maintain a united Southern front during the General Assembly's consideration of the Conference report. The Northern pollution importing nations, which had no such reason for making concessions, fought the compromise until it became obvious that they would have to endorse it as the price for safeguarding those aspects of the national liability issue that had been previously agreed to at Stockholm.

The Housing Fund proposal

The question of helping to secure adequate housing in the developing nations had first emerged as an international environmental issue at the Stockholm Conference. The developing nations attached such significance to this issue that, at their insistence, the 1972 General Assembly session considered several resolutions dealing with the housing question, while all other specific environmental programs were referred to the newly created UNEP Governing Council.[95]

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[95]The developing nations apparently perceived the

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Three resolutions dealing with the housing question were considered by the Second Committee during its morning and afternoon sessions on 3 November:

1. Draft resolution A/C.2/L.1230 introduced by Jamaica,[96] which called on international development agencies to give "high priority" to requests for housing aid, and on the World Bank to restructure its lending policies to favor nations with the greatest housing needs

2. Draft resolution A/C.2/L.1230, sponsored by the Philippines and eight other developing nations,[97] which endorsed the Stockholm Conference's controversial call for a World Housing Fund and mandated the Secretary-General to recommend to the 1973 General Assembly the steps to be followed in the establishment of such a fund

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housing question, and particularly the proposal to create a World Housing Fund, as their best opportunity to secure additional development aid in the struggle against the "pollution of poverty" (see, for example, Singh [India], United Nations Document, A/PV.2051, 3 October 1972, p. 36). In addition, most of the developed nations had refused to accept the concept of housing as a legitimate environmental priority during the Stockholm Conference. The developing nations were accordingly eager to secure the endorsement of the General Assembly for their position in order to give the developed nations a chance to reconsider their earlier objections (see, for example, Pant [India], United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1471, 30 October 1972, p. 10).

[96]While Jamaica introduced the resolution by itself it was eventually joined by four cosponsors: Guyana, Kenya, Trinidad and Tobago, and Upper Volta.

[97]Indonesia, Jamaica, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand, and Yemen.

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3. Draft resolution A/C.2/L.1235, introduced by Canada and thirteen other cosponsors,[98] which authorized the 1975 convening of an International Conference-Exposition on Human Settlements in Vancouver, British Columbia

During the Second Committee debate the developed nations refrained from directly criticizing the concept of housing as an environmental priority. They emphasized instead the advantages of having the UNEP Governing Council consider the entire Conference Action Plan as a whole without the interference of any specific General Assembly resolutions. Thus, the United States joined the United Kingdom in warning that:

> it would distort the pattern reached at Stockholm if the [Second] Committee took a vote on the draft resolutions which referred to specific points of the Action Plan. Accordingly these draft resolutions should simply be transmitted to the Governing Council for Environmental Programmes for consideration.[99]

The initial response to this Anglo-American proposal appeared to support the wisdom of avoiding a direct confrontation over the housing question. Iceland and Norway reluctantly agreed to send their draft resolution on Arctic pollution (A/C.2/L.1241) directly to the Governing Council. This strengthened the British contention that the Anglo-

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[98] Argentina, Australia, Cameroon, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Romania, Trinidad and Tobago, and Yugoslavia.

[99] McCarthy (United Kingdom) and Zagorin (United States), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1480, 7 November 1972, p. 7.

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American proposal was not directed at the housing question per se but was meant as a matter of general principle.[100] In addition, Denmark, France, Ireland, New Zealand, and Sweden endorsed the Anglo-American position.[101] While the support of these developing nations might have been expected, the proposal was also endorsed by India, one of the two original sponsors of the World Housing Fund proposal at Stockholm, whose delegate now argued that: "the General Assembly should not be called upon to act on specifics and that it would be better for the initiative to be taken by the Governing Council. Action at the current stage seems unnecessary and premature."[102]

The other developing nations were not prepared to follow the Indian example, as Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Zaire all supported the Chilean contention that "the General Assembly, as the supreme organ of the United Nations, was entitled to act on and set priorities for the crucial question of human settlements which so vitally affected the developing countries."[103] In addition,

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[100] McCarthy (United Kingdom), ibid.

[101] Rouge (France), Granquist (Sweden), Gates (New Zealand), and Isaksen (Denmark), ibid., pp. 9, 11, 12, and 14; and O'Riordan (Ireland), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1481, 8 November 1972, p. 9.

[102] Krishnan (India), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1480, 7 November 1972, p. 10.

[103] Santa Cruz (Chile), ibid., p. 10. See also Karunatilake (Sri Lanka), Ali (Pakistan), Rivero (Peru), Verceles (Philippines), and Lekonga (Zaire), pp. 12, 13, 13, 13, and 13.

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Canada, which had opposed the Housing Fund concept at Stockholm, now objected to the Anglo-American proposal because of its desire to have the General Assembly endorse the proposed Vancouver Conference-Exposition by adopting resolution A/C.2/L.1235.[104]

While the United Kingdom and the United States continued to argue for their proposal, the opposition of so many developing nations had the effect of polarizing the debate along the very North-South cleavage lines that the proposal had sought to avoid. Thus, the Jamaican delegate questioned the "morality" of the developed nations, while the Filipino representative accused the British of attempting to obviate the Stockholm Conference's endorsement of the World Housing Fund proposal. More significantly, the Indians withdrew their earlier support of the Anglo-American position, in order to avoid "a division of views" that might hamper the work of the Second Committee.[105]

Table 5.11 records the roll call vote on the Anglo-American motion to send all draft resolutions of a specific nature directly to the UNEP Governing Council. This proposal was defeated by a vote of 18 in favor, 76 against, with 19 abstentions. Examination of this table suggests several observations:

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[104] Hardy (Canada), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1481, 8 November 1971, p. 7.

[105] Bonnick (Jamaica), Krishnan (India), and Verceles (Philippines), ibid., pp. 6, 8, and 9.

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TABLE 5.11

SECOND COMMITTEE VOTE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MOTION TO SEND ALL SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL PROPOSALS DIRECTLY TO UNEP, 3 NOVEMBER 1972

Nation Group	In Favor	Against	Abstaining	Absent
Latin America (0-20-1-3)		Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela	Cuba	Haiti, Panama, Paraguay
Africa (0-30-2-9)		Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Dahomey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zaire, Zambia	Madagascar, Malawi	Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Lesotho, Mauritius, Niger, Somalia
Asia and Others (developing) (2-21-7-5)	Laos, Turkey	Afghanistan, Bahrain, China, Fiji, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Khmer, Kuwait, Malaysia, Maldives, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Yemen-PDR, Yugoslavia	Bhutan, Burma, Cyprus, India, Mongolia, Nepal, Qatar	Albania, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia

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Total--developing	2	71	10	17
Western Europe (12-2-2-1)	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom	Luxembourg, Netherlands	Portugal, Sweden	Iceland
Eastern Europe (0-1-6-1)		Romania	Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, USSR	Bulgaria
Others (developed) (4-2-1-0)	Australia, Japan, South Africa, United States	Canada, Israel	New Zealand	
Total--developed	16	5	9	2
Grand Total	18	76	19	19

1. Although the developing nations secured a decisive majority for their position, there was less Southern cohesion on this vote than on any of the four previous Environment Conference-related roll call votes on North-South questions.[106] Seventy-one of the eighty-three developing nations participating in this roll call voted with the Southern majority for a cohesion factor of .855, which contrasts with cohesion factors of .891, .910, and .944 on the three preparatory period North-South roll call votes and of .946 on the Environment Conference's sole North-South roll call.[107] While the abstentions of Cuba and Mongolia were predictable, the opposition of Laos and Turkey and the abstention of eight other developing nations represented an unprecedented degree of defection from the

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[106]The four earlier North-South votes were on the Brazilian amendment at the 1970 General Assembly plenary (table 3.10), the development and environment draft resolution at the 1971 Second Committee and General Assembly plenary (tables 3.12 and 3.13), and the World Housing Fund proposal at the Stockholm Conference (table 4.10).

[107]See Thomas Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 50-51, for a description of three types of intrabloc votes: "identical" (all vote the same way and none abstain); "solidarity" (all vote the same way except for one or more members that abstain); and "divided" (bloc members cast both "yes" and "no" votes on the same roll call). Our cohesion factors are based, as were Hovet's, on "identical" votes. See, however, Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal," American Political Science Review 57 (December 1963):902-917, for a critique of this method of analysis.

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level of cohesion achieved by the developing nations on the four previous votes.

2. The Anglo-American proposal not only failed to decisively split the Southern bloc, but it could not hold the support of a significant portion of the developed nations as well. Israel and Romania voted with the Southern nations as they had at Stockholm, while the Soviet bloc continued its post-Conference policy of abstaining on Environment Conference-related votes. In addition, Canada, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands voted against the Anglo-American motion despite their opposition to the World Housing Fund proposal. These votes were a result of their support for draft resolution A/C.2/L.1235 (the Vancouver Conference-Exposition proposal) which would have been sent directly to the Governing Council had the Anglo-American proposal been adopted.[108] Northern cohesion was further damaged by the abstentions of New Zealand, Portugal, and Sweden and the sudden absence of Iceland, which allegedly resented having been asked to table resolution A/C.2/L.1241 in order to enhance the credibility of the Anglo-American position.[109]

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[108]Hardy (Canada), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1481, 8 November 1972, p. 7.

[109]McCarthy (United Kingdom), ibid., p. 8. The fact that the delegate of Iceland participated in several roll call votes taken immediately after the vote on the Anglo-American proposal lends credence to the suggestion that Iceland's absence for the latter vote was a deliberate gesture (see, for example, ibid., p. 11).

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After the defeat of the Anglo-American proposal the Second Committee considered the three housing question-related resolutions. Before the vote on draft resolution A/C.2/L.1230, however, the resolution's sponsors accepted amendments by Egypt and Tunisia which sought to win additional support from developed nations by moderating the resolution's call for considering housing as a universal environmental priority.[110] The developing nations contended that draft resolution A/C.2/L.1230 was now sufficiently general in tone and content so that its passing reference to the Housing Fund proposal was not grounds for opposing the overall draft. The developed nations, they contended, would not be endorsing the Housing Fund proposal by sup-

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[110]The Egyptian amendment emphasized that housing was to be one of the World Bank's priorities, clarifying the original text which could have been construed as mandating it as the first priority (ibid., p. 4). Similarly, the Tunisian amendment stressed that nations could decide their own development priorities and need not accept the housing priority as a universally applicable principle (Driss [Tunisia], United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1480, 7 November 1972, p. 8). However, the resolution's sponsors refused requests by Austria and Australia that they remove all mention of the proposed Housing Fund from their draft, so that those Northern nations opposed to the Housing Fund concept might be able to support the draft (Joseph [Australia] and Mueller [Austria], pp. 9 and 12). The developing nations similarly defeated, by a vote of 4 in favor, 75 against, with 36 abstentions, a Greek amendment that would have limited draft resolution A/C.2/L.1230 to the World Bank by deleting the words "all development assistance agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme" from its text (p. 12).

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porting the resolution, but would only be recognizing the legitimacy of housing as an environmental priority.[111]

Table 5.12 records the roll call by which the Second Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.2/L.1230 by a vote of 81 to 0, with 34 abstentions. The vote reflected North-South cleavage lines with only a handful of largely predictable exceptions:

1. Four of the five developing nations that abstained on this roll call--Cuba, Khmer, Malawi, and Mongolia--had previously voted with the Northern nations on several occasions.[112] Burma, which had not attended the Stockholm Conference and accordingly abstained on most Second Committee Conference-related votes, provided the fifth abstention.

2. Only three developed nations supported the resolution, and two of these nations--Israel and Romania--had voted with the Southern bloc on most other Environment Conference-related votes. The third vote came from Malta, which had begun to side with the developing nations on many

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[111]See, for example, Odero-Jowi (Kenya), ibid., p. 10. It was apparently this desire to secure support from developed nations for at least the concept of housing as an environmental priority that explains why draft resolutions A/C.2/L.1230 and A/C.2/L.1231 were filed as separate resolutions despite the suggestions of such nations as Colombia that they be combined (Fonseca [Colombia], United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1474, 30 October 1972, p. 14).

[112]See table 3.14 above.

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TABLE 5.12

SECOND COMMITTEE VOTE ON HOUSING AS AN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUNDING PRIORITY
Resolution A/C. 2/L. 1230--3 November 1972

Nation Group	In Favor	Against	Abstaining	Absent
Latin America (21-0-1-2)	Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela		Cuba	Panama, Paraguay
Africa (31-0-1-9)	Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Dahomey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zaire, Zambia		Malawi	Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Lesotho, Mauritius, Niger, Somalia
Asia and Others (developing) (26-0-3-6)	Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bhutan, Cyprus, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Nepal, Philippines, Qatar, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Yemen-PDR, Yugoslavia		Burma, Khmer, Mongolia	Albania, China, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia

Total--developing	78	0	5	17
Western Europe (1-0-16-0)	Malta		Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom	
Eastern Europe (1-0-7-0)	Romania		Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, USSR	
Others (developed) (1-0-6-0)	Israel		Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, United States	
Total--developed	3	0	29	0
Grand Total	81	0	34	17

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issues by the fall of 1972, and would eventually apply for membership in the Group of 77 during 1973.[113]

3. China deliberately absented itself from this vote in protest to the resolution's mention of the World Bank, which continued to recognize the Republic of China, even after the 1971 General Assembly recognition of the People's Republic of China.[114]

The approval by the Second Committee of draft resolution A/C.2/L.1230 was followed by a brief debate on draft resolution A/C.2/L.1231, which mandated the creation of the World Housing Fund. Brazil, Malaysia, Philippines, and Upper Volta spoke for the resolution, while Australia, France, Italy, United Kingdom, and the United States repeated their objections both to the Housing Fund concept and to the General Assembly acting on any specific Conference-related proposals before the Governing Council had an opportunity to examine the Conference's report.[115] This Northern position was echoed by the Soviet Union which departed from its policy of not commenting on any Environment Conference recommendations, to declare that: "the

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[113] New York Times, 4 September 1973, p. 3.

[114] Chang (China), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1480, 7 November 1972, p. 8.

[115] Zagorin (United States), Joseph (Australia), Brito (Brazil), Verceles (Philippines), McCarthy (United Kingdom), Lim (Malaysia), Cuedraogo (Upper Volta), Rouge (France), and Cavalieri (Italy), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1481, 8 November 1972, pp. 11, 12, 12, 12, 12, 13, 13, 15, and 15.

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question of the construction of housing, while extremely important, was only distantly related to the problem of the environment and should preferably be the responsibility of a committee such as the Committee for Housing, Building and Planning."[116]

The only exception to this pattern of North-South polarization was provided by Tunisia, which introduced two amendments in an effort to secure Northern support for the draft resolution:

1. An amendment granting the Secretary-General a second year in which to prepare his report on the steps to be taken to create and operate the proposed World Housing Fund

2. A proposal that the Secretary-General consider the recommendations of the UNEP Governing Council in developing this report.[117]

While the sponsors of the draft resolution accepted the first Tunisian amendment, the second proposal was withdrawn at the request of several developing nations. The objecting nations noted the similarity of the Tunisian prosal to the rejected Anglo-American motion to have the

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[116]Ananichev (USSR), ibid., pp. 13-14. This Soviet statement represents the most direct Northern challenge to the Southern contention that the housing question represented an appropriate environmental priority.

[117]Driss (Tunisia), ibid., p. 12.

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Governing Council rather than the General Assembly examine all specific Stockholm proposals.[118]

Table 5.13 records the roll call by which the Second Committee accepted the World Housing Fund resolution by a vote of 82 in favor, 6 against, with 27 abstentions. Examination of this table suggests the following observations:

1. Six developed nations--Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, United Kingdom, and the United States--that had abstained on the more general draft resolution A/C.2/L.1230 now voted against draft resolution A/C.2/L.1231 to emphasize their unwillingness to support the proposed World Housing Fund.[119]

2. The Khmer Republic, which had abstained on draft resolution A/C.2/L.1230, now voted for draft resolution A.C.2/L.1231, while Lebanon, which had been absent for the earlier vote, supported the World Housing Fund proposal. There does not appear to be any significance to these

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[118]For the requests to the Tunisian delegation see Verceles (Philippines), Al-Hadad (Yemen), Cuedraogo (Upper Volta), and Kane (Mauritania), ibid., pp. 12, 12, 13, and 14. The Brazilian delegation also played a major role in securing support for the first Tunisian amendment (see, for example, Brito [Brazil], p. 13), continuing the Brazilian pattern of moderation and conciliation that marked the earlier Second Committee debate over draft resolution A/C.2/L.1236 (p. 370 above).

[119]See, for example, Zagorin (United States), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1481, 8 November 1972, pp. 11-12.

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TABLE 5.13

SECOND COMMITTEE VOTE ON THE WORLD HOUSING FUND PROPOSAL
Resolution A/C. 2/L. 1231--3 November 1972

Nation Group	In Favor	Against	Abstaining	Absent
Latin America (20-0-1-3)	Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela		Cuba	Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay
Africa (30-0-1-10)	Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Dahomey, Egypt, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zaire, Zambia		Malawi	Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Lesotho, Mauritius, Niger, Somalia
Asia and Others (developing) (29-0-2-4)	Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bhutan, China, Cyprus, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Khmer, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Nepal, Philippines, Qatar, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Yemen-PDR, Yugoslavia		Burma, Mongolia	Albania, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia

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Total--developing	79	0	4	17
Western Europe (1-5-11-0)	Malta	Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, United Kingdom	Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden	
Eastern Europe (1-0-7-0)	Romania		Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, USSR	
Others (developed) (1-1-5-0)	Israel	United States	Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa	
Total--developed	3	6	23	0
Grand Total	82	6	27	17

shifts or to the absence of Ecuador and Ethiopia, which had both voted for the earlier resolution.

3. The Chinese, who had boycotted the vote on the earlier resolution, now voted, as they had at Stockholm, in favor of the World Housing Fund proposal.

While the Second Committee split along North-South lines for the first two housing question resolutions, many developed nations joined the developing nations in supporting draft resolution A/C.2/L.1235, endorsing the proposed Vancouver Exposition-Conference. While the vote of 106 to 0, with 16 abstentions, was not recorded, the very margin of acceptance required the support of at least one-half of the developed nations.[120]

The endorsement of the three housing question resolutions by the Second Committee foreshadowed the even more decisive approval of all three resolutions by the General Assembly plenary on 15 December 1972. Draft resolution A/C.2/L.1230 was approved by a vote of 96 to 0, with 29 abstentions; draft resolution A/C.2/L.1231 by a margin of 93 to 5, with 27 abstentions; and draft resolution A/C.2/L.1235 by a margin of 114 to 0, with 13 abstentions. Analysis of these nonrecorded votes and their comparison

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[120] Only four Northern nations--France, Greece, United Kingdom, and the United States--declared their intention to abstain on this nonrecorded roll call (Rouge [France], Caranicas [Greece], Zagorin [United States], and McCarthy [United Kingdom], ibid., pp. 18, 19, 19, and 20).

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with the housing question-related votes at the Second Committee and Stockholm Conference suggests the following observations:

1. The housing question, and particularly the World Housing Fund resolution, produced the sharpest North-South voting cleavage of any Environment Conference-related issue. Only four developing nations--two of which were Soviet bloc members--abstained on the Housing Fund proposal vote in the Second Committee, while only three developed nations--all of whom regularly voted with the Southern group on a wide range of issues--supported the draft resolution. The respective cohesion factors of .952 (Southern) and .906 (Northern)[121] represented as high a coehsion factor as would be achieved by either group on any divided Environment Conference-related vote.[122]

2. The strong sense of solidarity among the developing nations continued, as it had throughout the Conference preparatory period, to play a major role in any issue which could be construed as having implications of a North-South nature. Thus, India abstained rather than vote for a procedural proposal it had earlier endorsed, and Tunisia with-

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[121]This Northern figure is for the roll call on draft resolution A.C.2/L.1230 as draft resolution A/C.2/L.1231 produced a much lower Northern cohesion factor because of the division between those nations that abstained and those that voted in opposition.

[122]While the two final Secretariat location roll call votes produced a slightly higher Southern cohesion factor of .957 (see table 6.1), the difference of .005 between these votes is so small so to be considered statistically insignificant.

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drew one half of its amendment to draft resolution A/C.2/L.1231 at the behest of other Southern nations.

3. While the Soviet bloc abstained during the Second Committee's housing question votes, the stated Soviet opposition to draft resolution A/C.2/L.1231 made it clear that the Soviets sided with their fellow Northern nations on this issue.

4. During the 1970 and 1971 General Assembly sessions many developed nations that had opposed the Southern Environment Conference-related initiatives during the deliberations of the Second Committee nevertheless acquiesced to these initiatives in an effort to preserve the international environmental consensus.[123] This pattern was apparently not repeated during the 1972 consideration of the housing question. The relatively large number of nations that failed to support the Housing Fund proposal suggests that many developed nations were far from reconciled to accepting housing as an environmental priority or to joining in the creation and upkeep of a World Housing Fund.[124]

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[123]See, for example, the position of the developed nations during the debate over the 1971 Brazilian resolution (chapter III, pp. 217 and 221 above).

[124]The conciliatory efforts of such nations as Brazil, India, and Tunisia during the meetings of the Second Committee apparently reflected their appreciation of the fact that the developed nations would be the ones expected to provide the funds for any World Housing Fund, regardless of who provided the votes to create it.

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The question of locating the UNEP Secretariat

The final Environment Conference-related debate of the Second Committee was over the location of the headquarters of the proposed UNEP Secretariat. This was the longest, most complex, and perhaps most symbolic debate of tne entire four and a half year period surrounding the Stockholm Conference. No other Conference-related question generated as many draft resolutions (five), required as many meetings of a United Nations body (four), or produced interventions by as many different nations (fifty-two). The decision of the Second Committee to locate the Secretariat in Nairobi, Kenya, may be seen as the final institutionalization of the insistence of the developing nations on having the environment question viewed from a Southern perspective. Furthermore, the debate over this decision unfolded in a pattern reminiscent of the pattern of several earlier Conference-related North-South debates:

1. Several developing nations claimed to discern North-South implications in an issue that had initially been perceived as free of any conventional "political" connotations

2. This claim was disputed by most developed nations and even by some developing nations until the latter dropped their opposition in response to pleas for Southern solidarity

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3. The developed nations then attempted to postpone a decision but were thwarted by the more numerous developing nations.

4. The developed nations reluctantly acquiesced to the demands of the developing nations to preserve support for an international environmental effort

It had been decided at Stockholm that any nation interested in hosting the UNEP Secretariat would have until 16 July (thirty days after the close of the Conference) to formally submit an offer to do so. Twelve nations made such offers within the prescribed time limit: Austria (Vienna), Cyprus (Nicosia), India (New Delhi), Kenya (Nairobi), Malta (Valetta), Mexico (Mexico City), Monaco, Spain (Madrid), Switzerland (Geneva), Uganda (Kampala), United Kingdom (London), and the United States (New York).[125] While Mexico later withdrew its offer and Spain asked to be considered only if Geneva and New York were ruled out,[126] nine of the ten other nations were interested enough that they responded to the detailed questionnaire that the Secretary-General sent out in an effort to assist the General Assembly in choosing the host nation.[127] The questionnaire's forty-five questions covered such mat-

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[125]United Nations Document A/8783/Add.1, 18 October 1972, p. 1.

[126]Ibid.

[127]Uganda was the only potential host country that failed to respond to the questionnaire (ibid., p. 2).

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ters as the availability of communications, computer, and translation facilities; the cost of office space; the financial contribution that the prospective host nation was prepared to make towards supporting the headquarters; and the number of governments and international agencies that had representatives in the proposed host city.[128]

The completed questionnaires were circulated on 18 October 1972 to all United Nations members with a suggestion by Secretary-General U Thant that a final decision on locating the Secretariat be postponed for one year's time, during which a detailed study would be undertaken of the various proposed locations. In the interim, the Secretariat would be situated on a temporary basis in Geneva, which already hosted numerous international and United Nations agencies. While the report made no other recommendations, it noted that Geneva, London, New York, and Vienna not only provided the widest range of available services at the lowest prices, but also offered superior computer and translation facilities and contained the largest number of foreign embassies and offices of international agencies.[129]

The Secretary-General's suggestion to postpone a decision on locating the Secretariat failed to deter most of

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[128]See ibid., Annex I, pp. 1-5 for the language of the questionnaire and Annex II, pp. 1-4 and Annex III, pp. 1-9 for the replies that were received and the Secretary-General's analysis of these replies.

[129]Ibid., Annex II, pp. 1-4.

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the prospective host nations from pressing for their immediate selection. Kenya and Malta both reiterated their invitation during the General Assembly General Debate, and Austria, India, and the United Kingdom presented their respective cases on the opening days of the Second Committee's Environment Conference-related discussions.[130] With only the United States supporting the Secretary-General's proposed postponement,[131] a Second Committee debate on the Secretariat question was assured.

The central issue of the Second Committee's debate was not which of the various national applications to accept, but rather whether to follow the traditional criteria of efficiency, frugality, and availability of facilities that had been reflected in the Secretary-General's questionnaire. The nations favoring a Northern location almost

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[130]Mungai (Kenya), United Nations Document A/PV.2039, 25 September 1972, p. 18; Kingswell (Malta), United Nations Document A/PV.2061, 10 October 1972, p. 103; Crowe (United Kingdom), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR/1468, 24 October 1972, p. 3; Jankowitsch (Austria), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1469, 27 October 1972, p. 4; and Pant (India), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1471, 30 October 1972, p. 12. Even Monaco and Switzerland, which were not members of the United Nations, had their advocates during the Second Committee debates, with France speaking on behalf of the former and the Nordic nations and Japan endorsing the latter (Ogiso [Japan], United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1468, 24 October 1972, p. 7; Breitenstein [Finland], United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1472, 27 October 1972, p. 5; and Rouge [France], United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1483, 9 November 1972, p. 7).

[131]Zagorin (United States), United Nations Document A C.2/SR.1482, 8 November 1972, p. 7.

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all stressed these considerations, while those supporting a Southern location dismissed these criteria as irrelevant. Thus, the advocates of Geneva, London, New York, and Vienna echoed the Iranian contention that:

> If the secretariat was to be small, the administrative expenditure low and operational efficiency high, the secretariat should be situated in a town where the United Nations already had the necessary facilities. Ease of communication between the secretariat and the specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations concerned was another factor. Again, the town selected should be one in which as many Member States as possible had adequate diplomatic representation.[132]

Those favoring locating the Secretariat in a developing nation emphasized, on the other hand, the necessity of arriving at a "purely political judgement" independent of any "technical or economic" considerations.[133] All such considerations, these nations argued, paled before the injustice created by the location of all existing United Nations agency headquarters in either Western Europe or North America. Not only did the Environment Programme Secretariat offer an opportunity to help rectify this imbalance, but the securing of an adequate environment was described as a topic of particular interest to the develop-

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[132]Hoveyda (Iran), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1466, 23 October 23, 1972, p. 22. See also Scott (New Zealand), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1472, 27 October 1972, p. 15.

[133]Odero-Jowi (Kenya), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1480, 7 November 1972, p. 5.

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ing nations and was an appropriate task for the first international Secretariat to be located in a developing nation.[134]

Table 5.14 records the positions taken by the participants in the Second Committee's Secretariat location debate. As might be expected, every developed nation that took a position stressed the traditional selection criteria. Even the Soviet Union accompanied its expected declaration of abstention with a strong statement on the need to consider the financial implications of any proposed location.[135] At the same time, only three developing nations advocated utilization of the traditional criteria: Colombia and Iran, which both spoke at the beginning of the debate before the emergence of a consensual Southern position; and Turkey, which enjoyed close economic and political ties with Western Europe and was not a member of the Group of 77.[136]

The other developing nations that participated in this debate were as adamant in their opposition to the traditional criteria as the developed nations were in advo-

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[134]Pant (India), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1471, 30 October 1972, p. 12.

[135]Lissov (USSR), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1483, 9 November 1972, p. 16.

[136]Hoveyda (Iran), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1486, 23 October 1972, p. 22; Fonseca (Colombia), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1474, 30 October 1972, p. 14; and Carem (Turkey), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1483, 9 November 1972, p. 13.

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TABLE 5.14

NATIONS THAT TOOK A POSITION ON THE SELECTION CRITERIA QUESTION DURING THE 1972 SECOND COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT LOCATION DEBATE

Nation Group	Advocated the Utilization of Traditional Selection Criteria	Opposed the Utilization of Traditional Selection Criteria	Participated in Debate but did not Mention the Selection Criteria Question
Latin America (1-5-2)	Colombia	Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Trinidad and Tobago	Argentina, Honduras
Africa (0-11-1)		Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia	Tunisia
Asia and Others (developing) (2-7-1)	Iran, Turkey	China, India, Kuwait, Malaysia, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka	Mongolia
Total--developing	3	23	4
Western Europe (11-0-0)	Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom		

Eastern Europe (2-0-4)	Poland, USSR		Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Hungary, Ukraine
Others (developed) (5-0-0)	Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, United States		
Total--developed	18	0	4
Grand Total	21	23	8

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cating their utilization. Once the Secretariat location question had been cast in North-South terms even the Philippines and Tunisia, which had admitted their preference for a Northern location, agreed to "join in a political decision reflecting the overwhelming sentiment of the developing countries."[137] With the Second Committee divided along North-South cleavage lines, the only continuing uncertainties were whether the developed nations would be albe to postpone the decision and, if they could not, which developing nation the Secretariat would be located in.

The second question was the first to be reconciled when thirty-seven developing nations joined on 6 November in introducing draft resolution A/C.2/L.1246/Rev.1 mandating the selection of Nairobi to assure that "the activities and Headquarters of Secretariats of United Nations bodies or agencies should be located having regard to equitable geographical distribution."[138] The failure of any

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[137]Verceles (Philippines), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1487, 14 November 1972, p. 7. See also Driss (Tunisia), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1483, 9 November 1972, p. 19.

[138]Thirty-one of the sponsoring nations were from Africa: Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Dahomey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia. The other six cosponsors were: Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Syria, and Yugoslavia. This resolution was a revision of the original A/C.2/L.1246 submitted several days before, which had mandated the selection of a Southern location without endorsing any specific site. It is possible that Kenya's African supporters had hoped to secure

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Latin American or non-Arab Asian nation to cosponsor the resolution suggests the degree to which the selection of Nairobi was the result of a primarily African initiative. The cosponsorship of thirty-one African nations ensured the eventual support of the entire forty-one nation African group, which in turn ensured the support of almost all of the seventy-five nation Afro-Asian group, the endorsement of the Group of 77,[139] and, given the cohesive nature of Southern solidarity, the eventual support of virtually every developing nation, including those that had previously supported New Delhi, Nicosia, or even a Northern location. By securing the support of the largest faction in the United Nations majority group on an issue on which this group would act in a highly cohesive fashion, Kenya virtually guaranteed the selection of Nairobi on any open recorded vote.

Before the Second Committee could vote on draft resolution A/C.2/L.1246/Rev.1, it had to first deal with several amendments and requests for rulings that sought to prevent, postpone, or modify the selection of Nairobi:

1. At the beginning of the Second Committee's debate Malta introduced a substitute draft resolution

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additional Asian and Latin American cosponsors by initially circulating a draft that did not name any particular location.

[139]See Findley (Liberia) and Karunatilake (Sri Lanka), ibid., p. 12, for a report that the Group of 77 had formally endorsed the selection of Nairobi.

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(A/C. 2/L. 1247), which would have replaced the phrase "equitable geographic distribution" with the words "wider geographic distribution," while not endorsing any particular proposed Secretariat site. The Maltese draft, which was apparently submitted in an effort to secure support for the candidacy of Valetta, was neither endorsed or mentioned by any other participant in the lengthy Second Committee debates. It was, accordingly, not surprising that Malta withdrew its draft, "in a spirit of solidarity with the developing world," just before the Second Committee began voting on the Secretariat location question.[140]

2. A number of developed nations insisted that any Second Committee or General Assembly votes on locating the Secretariat be conducted by secret ballot with an opportunity being provided to vote for any of the cities that had been previously proposed. This procedure, it was argued, not only represented the fairest method of selection, but had been previously utilized in several General Assembly votes of this nature.[141] While Austria, France, Spain, and the USSR all spoke in favor of this secret ballot multiple

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[140] Bellizzi (Malta), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1487, 14 November 1972, p. 9. This action provided additional evidence of the Maltese desire to be considered a Southern nation.

[141] See, for example, Ruiz-Morales (Spain), United Nations Document A/C. 2/SR. 1483, 9 November 1972, p. 12.

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choice method of selection, it was the United Kingdom that formally presented draft resolution A/C.2/L.1250 mandating its adoption.[142] The developing nations that responded to the British proposal strongly criticized it as an effort to divide their ranks. Even Tunisia, which had previously argued against the Kenyan initiative, now protested that "a secret ballot would prevent countries from demonstrating their independence by expressing themselves openly."[143] This aversion to the utilization of a secret ballot suggests that the highly cohesive Southern voting pattern on the Secretariat issue might have owed as much to the pressures of publicity as it did to the convergence of interests and ideologies.[144]

3. The Netherlands was joined by Finland and Sweden in offering a compromise to postpone the final decision on locating the Secretariat for one year while the Secretary-General would investigate the feasibility of relocating one or more existing United Nations agency headquarters in a developing nation (draft resolution A/C.2/L.1249). Perhaps, the Dutch suggested, the headquarters of UNCTAD would

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[142]United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1487, 14 November 1972, p. 3. See also Rouge (France), Ruiz-Morales (Spain), Lissov (USSR), and Jankowitsch (Austria), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1483, 9 November 1972, pp. 8, 12, 15, and 16.

[143]Driss (Tunisia), ibid., p. 19.

[144]There is considerable evidence that the pressures of Southern solidarity have, on occasion, caused nations to vote against their normative interest position (e.g., India on the birth control question).

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be more appropriate in a developing nation, while the UNEP headquarters could be located in a site that met the traditional selection criteria.[145]

While Denmark, Italy, Japan, and Turkey all endorsed the Dutch resolution,[146] the compromise was rejected by every Group of 77 member that participated in the debate. These nations, led by Kenya and Sri Lanka, contended that a clear Second Committee mandate existed for a "political decision" and that any effort to postpone such a decision ran counter to the best interests of the developing nations.[147] Faced with certain defeat, the three sponsoring nations withdrew their draft without permitting it to come to a vote.[148]

4. While the Dutch resolution had only spoken of "investigating the feasibility" of relocating an agency headquarters, the Tunisians offered a more sweeping compromise (draft resolution A/C.2/L.1251) mandating the locating of either an existing United Nations agency headquarters or the UNEP Secretariat in a developing nation by the end of 1973. The Tunisians argued that the question of locating

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[145] van Gorkom (Netherlands), ibid., p. 2.

146 Carem (Turkey), Cavaglieri (Italy), and Yokata (Japan), ibid., pp. 13, 17, and 17; and Isaksen (Denmark), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1487, 14 November 1972, p. 4.

[147] Odero-Jowi (Kenya) and Karunatilake (Sri Lanka), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1483, 9 November 1972, p. 5.

[148] van Gorkom (Netherlands), United Nations Document A.C.2/SR.1487, 14 November 1972, p. 9.

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an agency headquarters in a developing nation was a "problem of principle," while the question of which headquarters should be moved was a "practical problem."[149] The two problems, the Tunisian delegate declared, were not related and could be best reconciled if they were treated separately. The United Nations should currently address itself to the first problem while deferring a decision on the second question until the 1973 session.

This Tunisian effort at effecting a compromise between the developed and developing nations was in keeping with the similar Tunisian efforts during the earlier World Housing Fund debate.[150] The Tunisians had nevertheless indicated their readiness to vote for Nairobi if "political considerations" forced an immediate decision on the Secretariat question.[151] This reluctant endorsement of the consensual Southern position may help explain why the Tunisian proposal was spared the criticism that had greeted the earlier British and Dutch proposals.

5. While the Maltese, British, Dutch, and Tunisian resolutions had all attempted to modify the Kenyan resolution, several developed nations sought to invoke the rules of procedure of the General Assembly in an effort to prevent

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[149]Driss (Tunisia), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1483, 9 November 1972, p. 19.

[150]See p. 397 above.

[151]Driss (Tunisia), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1482, 8 November 1972, p. 10.

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any vote on the Secretariat question. These efforts involved General Assembly rule 155, which prohibited action on any resolution that required the expenditure of United Nations funds until the Secretary-General had submitted a "financial implications statement." No such statement had been filed for draft resolution A/C.2/L.1246/Rev.1 and even the report of the Secretary-General on prospective Secretariat locations had not included any financial estimates. The United States formally invoked rule 155 at the 6 November morning session with a demand that any further discussion of the Kenyan resolution be postponed until after a financial implications statement could be submitted.[152] Since the United Nations Controller's office had reported that such a statement would require between six and eight weeks to prepare,[153] the American request, which was endorsed by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom,[154] was tantamount to a demand that the Second Committee suspend any further 1972 discussions of the Secretariat location question.[155]

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[152] Zagorin (United States), ibid., p. 8.

[153] Ibid., p. 10.

[154] Lissov (USSR) and McCarthy (United Kingdom), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1483, 9 November 1972, pp. 16 and 17.

[155] The American delegation also warned that the United States Congress might be forced to reconsider the appropriation of funds for UNEP if the Second Committee were to disregard rule 155 (Zagorin [United States], United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1482, 8 November 1972, p. 8).

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The developing nations reacted bitterly to this great power initiative. Barbados and Kenya accused the developed nations of manipulating the rules of procedure of the General Assembly for "political reasons,"[156] particularly since the Second Committee had, only a day before, passed the Canadian-sponsored draft resolution calling for the Vancouver Exposition-Conference (A/C.2/L.1235) without requesting a financial implications statement.[157] Sri Lanka was even harsher, declaring that the developed nations were determined to locate the UNEP Secretariat in a Northern nation so as to assure their domination of the new program and their exploitation of the Environment Fund's resources.[158] Other developing nations such as Colombia and Liberia refrained from challenging the motives of the developed nations but still declared that a consensual United Nations majority could override any procedural technicality.[159] The developing nations were apparently demanding that rules of procedure written by developed nations for a Northern-dominated world must not be permitted

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[156]Waldron-Ramsey (Barbados) and Odero-Jowi (Kenya), ibid., p. 11.

[157]This apparent relaxation of rule 155 was permitted, the Canadian representative replied, only because Canada had agreed to underwrite any 1973 expenses that might result from the resolution (Hardy [Canada], ibid., p. 12).

[158]Karunatilake (Sri Lanka), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1483, 9 November 1972, p. 9.

[159]Gerlein (Colombia), ibid., p. 8 and Findley (Liberia), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1482, 9 November 1972, p. 12.

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to thwart the new United Nations majority of developing nations. These nations were saying that rules must reflect majority will to be credible. This attitude was perhaps best typified by the Chinese demand to know how "the Committee, on the pretext of not being informed of the financial implications, could go against the wishes of the majority which in the present case is clear."[160]

On the afternoon of 6 November the Secretary-General's office rendered the rule 155 question moot by announcing that a financial implications statement would be ready by the morning of 10 November. The time required for preparing this statement had shrunk from at least six weeks to less than four days in the course of a single day's debate. While the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States expressed amazement at this development, both nations were confident that the forthcoming financial implications statement would conclusively demonstrate the disadvantages of selecting Nairobi.[161]

The financial implications statement, which was distributed as promised on the morning of 10 November, appeared to justify the American and British position. Locating the UNEP Secretariat in Geneva, New York, or Vienna would, the report concluded, cost some $1,300,000 during 1973, while the selection of Nairobi would cost

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[160]Chang (China), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1483, 9 November 1972, p. 5.

[161]Kitchen (United States) and McCarthy (United Kingdom), ibid., pp. 22 and 23.

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aaproximately $2,300,000. Nairobi was thus not only the poorest remaining candidate in terms of communications, computer and translation facilities, and in terms of access to other United Nations agency headquarters and national embassies, but it would cost some 70 percent more than the leading Northern alternatives.

The developing nations were not deterred by the conclusions of the report. They continued to insist that the Second Committee's decision should be based on "political rather than financial considerations."[162] The financial implications statement was largely irrelevant insofar as "it was no longer acceptable to claim that reasons of efficiency and cost should preclude [the UNEP Secretariat] being situated in a developing country."[163]

With the distribution of the financial implications statement, the developed nations had no further technical grounds on which to object to the Second Committee's voting on the Secretariat question. Before it could vote on the selection of Nairobi, however, the Committee had to first dispose of the Tunisian amendment (A/C.2/L.1251) which sought to postpone the entire Secretariat location decision for a year, and the British amendment (A/C.2/L.1250) which mandated the utilization of a multiple-choice secret ballot.

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[162]Odero-Jowi (Kenya), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1487, 14 November 1972, p. 3. See also Kane (Mauritania) and Fall (Senegal), p. 5.

[163]Waldron-Ramsey (Barbados), ibid., p. 6.

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Both amendments were decisively defeated--the Tunisian by a vote of 20 in favor, 68 against, with 35 abstentions, and the British by a vote of 30 in favor, 81 against, with 12 abstentions.

Tables 5.15 and 5.16 record the roll calls on the Tunisian and British amendments and suggest the following conclusions:

1. While opposition to both amendments came exclusively from developing nations, there was considerably less North-South cohesion on the Tunisian amendment than on the British draft. Both the status of Tunisia as a developing nation and the highly controversial implications of the British call for a secret ballot may help explain this factor. Most of the Afro-Asian nations that abstained on the Tunisian amendment voted against the British draft (as did Tunisia itself), while most of the developed nations that abstained on the former amendment supported the latter proposal. The Tunisian amendment accordingly produced the lowest cohesion factors of any Conference period roll call vote--.500 for the developed nations and .747 for the developing nations--while the vote on the British amendment produced the far more normative cohesion factors of .844 and .890 respectively.

2. The Soviet Union voted for the British amendment despite its stated policy of abstaining on all Conference-related votes. The Soviets explained this exception by declaring the question of a secret ballot to be a purely

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TABLE 5.15

SECOND COMMITTEE VOTE ON POSTPONING A DECISION ON THE UNEP SECRETARIAT QUESTION UNTIL 1973
Resolution A/C. 2/L. 1251--10 November 1972

Nation Group	In Favor	Against	Abstaining	Absent
Latin America (1-18-4-1)	Honduras	Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela	Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Panama	Haiti
Africa (1-28-7-5)	Tunisia	Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Dahomey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zaire, Zambia	Algeria, Burundi, Congo, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Morocco	Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Mauritius, Somalia
Asia and Others (developing) (2-22-8-3)	Khmer, Turkey	Afghanistan, Albania, Bahrain, Bhutan, China, Cyprus, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Oman, Philippines, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Yemen-PDR, Yugoslavia	Burma, Fiji, Iran, Iraq, Malaysia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Singapore	Maldives, Nepal, Saudi Arabia
Total-- developing	4	68	19	9

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Western Europe (12-0-5-0)	Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden		Austria, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom	
Eastern Europe (0-0-8-0)			Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, USSR	
Others (developed) (4-0-3-0)	Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United States		Israel, Japan, South Africa	
Total--developed	16	0	16	0
Grand Total	20	68	35	9

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TABLE 5.16

SECOND COMMITTEE VOTE ON REQUIRING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO SETTLE THE UNEP SECRETARIAT QUESTION BY SECRET BALLOT
Resolution A/C. 2/L. 1250--10 November 1972

Nation Group	In Favor	Against	Abstaining	Absent
Latin America (1-19-2-2)	Costa Rica	Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela	Cuba, Dominican Republic	Haiti, Nicaragua
Africa (0-35-1-5)		Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dahomey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zaire, Zambia	Malawi	Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Mauritius, Somalia
Asia and Others (developing) (2-27-4-2)	Mongolia, Turkey	Afghanistan, Albania, Bahrain, Bhutan, Burma, China, Cyprus, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Khmer, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, United Arab	Fiji, Iran, Malaysia, Singapore	Maldives, Nepal

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		Emirates, Yemen, Yemen-PDR, Yugoslavia		
Total--developing	3	81	7	9
Western Europe (16-0-1-0)	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom		Malta	
Eastern Europe (5-0-3-0)	Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, USSR		Bulgaria, Byelorussia,* Romania	
Others (developed) (6-0-1-0)	Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, United States		Israel	
Total--developed	27	0	5	0
Grand Total	30	81	12	9

*Byelorussia later attempted to change its vote.

procedural issue which was not related to the Stockholm recommendations and was accordingly not subject to their boycott.[164] This Soviet decision appears to have been made at the last minute, as it was not foreshadowed by any Soviet Second Committee debate statement and was apparently not communicated to such Soviet bloc loyalists as Bulgaria and Byelorussia, which abstained when their names were called on the roll call as they had on the previous Conference-related votes. While Byelorussia "corrected" its vote at the next session of the Second Committee,[165] this nevertheless represents one of the few recorded United Nations votes in which the Soviet Union's three votes were not cast in unison.[166]

3. While this deviation of Bulgaria and Byelorussia from the Soviet position appears to have been the result of a misunderstanding, the abstentions of Cuba, Israel, Malta, and Romania on the vote concerning draft resolution A/C.2/L.1250 represented an apparently deliberate effort to avoid taking a position on the British amendment. Cuba apparently did not wish to oppose its fellow Group of 77 members on the secret ballot question, while Israel, Malta, and Romania were apparently not prepared to support the

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[164]Lissov (USSR), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1488, 15 November 1972, p. 3.

[165]Palagin (Byelorussia), ibid., p. 6.

[166]Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, p. 49.

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developing nations on this issue despite their support for the Southern position on many previous Environment Conference-related questions.[167]

4. Despite the strong North-South polarization on the British amendment, a number of non-Communist developing nations either abstained on the roll call or supported the Northern position. Of these nations, the Dominican Republic, Malawi, Singapore, and Turkey had previously voted with the developed nations on several Environment Conference-related votes, while Costa Rica, Fiji, Iran, and Malaysia had always previously voted with the South.[168] Fiji and Malaysia were to abstain, however, on all Second Committee Secretariat-related votes and Iran, the most outspoken Southern opponent of Nairobi's selection, was apparently unwilling to oppose a proposal that might modify or delay that selection.

5. The high priority which the developing nations assigned to the location of the UNEP Secretariat was reflected in the large number of nations which participated in both votes. Only on the technical question of allocat-

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[167]While Israel, Malta, and Romania had all sided with the Southern nations on development question votes, the British amendment raised procedural questions that were not easily perceived in development terms. In addition, the Southern position on this question ran counter to long established international practice which these nations were apparently not prepared to disregard.

[168]See tables 3.14, 4.10, 5.11, 5.12, and 5.13 above.

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ing seats on the UNEP Governing Council did as many nations participate in a Second Committee Environment Conference-related vote.

After the rejection of the Tunisian and British amendments, the Second Committee approved draft resolution A/C.2/L.1246/Rev.1 by a recorded roll call vote of 93 to 0, with 31 abstentions, after first approving the resolution's two operative paragraphs by a recorded roll call vote of 93 in favor, 1 against, with 30 abstentions. This additional vote had been requested by Cuba, which wished to show its solidarity with the Group of 77 by voting for Nairobi, but refused to vote for the overall draft resolution because of its reference to the Stockholm Conference which Cuba had boycotted.[169]

Table 5.17 records the Second Committee's two roll call votes on draft resolution A/C.2/L.1246/Rev.1. Analysis of this table and of the votes recorded in tables 5.15 and 5.16, as well as the subsequent unanimous (128-0-0) General Assembly endorsement of the resolution, suggests the following conclusions:

1. The developing nations achieved their highest Environment Conference-related level of roll call voting cohesion during the two votes on this resolution (.957). Only Mongolia, Fiji, and Malaysia abstained on both roll calls, while Malawi abstained on the first vote and Cuba

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[169]Moreno (Cuba), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1488, 15 November 1972, p. 2.

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TABLE 5.17

SECOND COMMITTEE VOTES ON LOCATING THE UNEP SECRETARIAT IN NAIROBI
Resolution A/C. 2/L. 1246/Rev. 1--10 November 1972

Roll Call on the Two Operative Paragraphs				
Nation Group	In Favor	Against	Abstaining	Absent
Latin America (23-0-0-1)	Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba*, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela			Haiti
Africa (35-0-1-5)	Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dahomey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zaire, Zambia		Malawi**	Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Mauritius, Somalia
Asia and Others (developing) (30-0-3-2)	Afghanistan, Albania, Bahrain, Bhutan, Burma, Chile, Cyprus, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Khmer, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Yemen-PDR, Yugoslavia		Fiji, Malaysia, Mongolia	Maldives, Nepal

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Total--developing	88	0	4	8
Western Europe (3-0-14-0)	Greece, Iceland, Malta		Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom	
Eastern Europe (1-0-7-0)	Romania		Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, USSR	
Others (developed) (1-1-5-0)	Israel	United States*	Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa	
Total--developed	5	1	26	0
Grand Total	93	1	30	8

*Abstained on overall roll call.

**Voted in favor on overall roll call.

abstained on the second. These four defections from the consensual Southern position contrast sharply with the ten developing nations that deviated from the Southern position on the earlier vote on the British amendment (table 5.16) and the twenty-three that did so for the roll call on the Tunisian amendment (table 5.15).

2. At the same time, the developed nations' cohesion voting factor of .844[170] reflected the overwhelming Northern dissatisfaction with the choice of Nairobi. Furthermore, three of the five developed nations that supported the Southern position--Israel, Malta, and Romania--were nations that had voted with the Southern position on most other Second Committee Conference-related roll calls.[171]

3. Despite this high level of dissatisfaction, the developed nations were apparently unwilling to endanger the international environmental consensus by openly opposing the selection of Nairobi. While twenty-seven of the thirty-two developed nations in the United Nations supported the British effort to prevent the choice of Nairobi by insisting on a multiple-choice secret ballot, only the United States was prepared to vote against either of the resolu-

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[170]This was the Northern cohesion factor for the second roll call. The first vote produced a slightly lower cohesion factor because of the decision of the United States to vote in opposition rather than abstain.

[171]The two other deviant Northern votes were cast by Greece and Iceland, neither of which participated in the Second Committee's Secretariat location debate or offered an explanation for their vote on this question.

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tions actually mandating the selection of the Kenyan city. Even the United States joined the rest of the developed nations--including the Soviet bloc--in supporting the resolution at the General Assembly plenary session.[172]

4. The decision to locate the UNEP Secretariat in Nairobi can be viewed as either the final institutionalization of the Southern priorities that had come to dominate United Nations environmental efforts, or as the result of UNEP being the first United Nations agency to be created after the emergence of an active Southern majority in the United Nations. To the first view, the decision to locate in Nairobi was the natural result of Stockholm, while to the second view, it was the natural result of the overall North-South political cleavage. Those two approaches are not, however, mutually exclusive as it is unlikely if the environmental priorities that dominated the Stockholm Conference would have ever emerged except in the context of the already existing general political ferment among the developing nations.

5. Whichever of the above approaches is adopted, the debate and votes on locating the Secretariat demonstrated once again the impact of Southern solidarity as a significant factor in United Nations coalition building. Once a

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[172]The Soviets explained this further exception to their stated policy of abstaining on all Environment Conference votes as having stemmed from their "full understanding of the concern of the developing nations in this matter" (Makeyev [Soviet Union], United Nations Document A/PV.2112, 15 December 1972, pp. 18-20).

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majority of the African nations could be convinced to support the selection of Nairobi, the subsequent support of the Afro-Asian bloc, the Group of 77, and the General Assembly was virtually inevitable. Even such developing nations as Colombia, Iran, Philippines, and Tunisia, which were strongly opposed to the choice of Nairobi, were unwilling to challenge this solidarity. Financial and administrative considerations, and even existing United Nations rules of procedure, were all considered irrelevant once a decisive number of developing nations had decided that the Secretariat question was a "political question" requiring a "political judgement."

6. The role of the African nations in forcing the Nairobi question is significant in that the early leadership of the developing nations at the United Nations had come primarily from such non-African nations as Argentina, Brazil, India, and Yugoslavia. This was particularly true on the environment issue in which the African nations had been by far the least involved group during the entire Conference preparatory period.[173] The Secretariat issue represents one of the first major nonracial, noncolonial issues on which a united African group took the initiative at the United Nations.

7. The Second Committee's debate was fraught with North-South implications that went well beyond the question

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[173]See, for example, tables 2.2 and 3.2.

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of international environmental policies. The question of the geographic distribution of agency headquarters, the British effort to secure a secret ballot, the insistence of the developing nations that the will of a General Assembly majority must nullify a standing rule of procedure, and the debate between the advocates of financial-legal considerations and those favoring exclusive reliance on political-majoritorian considerations all went to the heart of the North-South cleavage at the United Nations.

Overview

At the beginning of this chapter several questions were raised in anticipation of the examination of the 1972 General Assembly session. By way of conclusion these questions and several related observations will now be discussed:

How would the Soviet bloc react to the recommendations of a Conference that they had chosen to boycott, and how would their reaction affect the General Assembly's consideration of the Stockholm recommendations?

1. The general tone of the Soviet response to the Stockholm report was one of conciliation rather than confrontation. The Soviets not only refrained from making an issue out of their Conference boycott, but stressed that even their policy of abstaining on Conference-related votes did not preclude their eventual acceptance of the Conference's recommendations.

While the Soviets were accordingly contributing to the virtual absence of East-West Environment Conference-

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related tensions, they were far less reticent during several of the Second Committee's North-South debates. The Soviets argued against expanding the UNEP Governing Council, against locating the Secretariat in a developing nation, and in favor of the British call for a secret ballot on this latter question. Not only did the Soviets take a position in these debates, but they also participated in the Governing Council expansion and secret ballot question roll calls, arguing that these were procedural questions that were not included in their announced policy of abstention.

2. The absence of East-West Conference-related tensions and the apparent Northern orientation of the Soviet perspective during the Second Committee debates may help explain the several defections from the Soviet bloc's usual pattern of total cohesion. Not only Cuba and Romania, but even such hardcore bloc members as Bulgaria and Mongolia broke with the Soviet Union on at least one North-South Conference-related roll call. Perhaps the Soviets placed less emphasis on North-South issues, allowing their allies a relative flexibility on these questions that would never have been tolerated on traditional East-West issues.

Would the developing nations continue to escalate their demands as they had during the preparatory period? If they did, would the developed nations continue to acquiesce to these demands in order to maintain broad support for an international environmental effort?

3. The Conference-related deliberations of the General Assembly represented a period of consolidation and

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implementation rather than one of policy initiation. The developing nations accordingly had little opportunity to escalate their demands beyond those that had been previously articulated at Founex and Stockholm. The only new Southern initiative, the successful campaign to locate the Secretariat headquarters in Nairobi, does not appear to have generated as severe a stress in the North-South consensus as did the continuing questions of the World Housing Fund and additionality in aid from developed nations earmarked for environmental projects.[174]

Not only were there no other major Southern initiatives during this session, but a number of developing nations, including two of the most outspoken of the preparatory period's old radicals, made repeated efforts to moderate the Southern position in an effort to secure support from the developed nations. Brazil, India, and Tunisia were all active in suggesting concessions on such issues as additionality, the World Housing Fund, and the Secretariat location question. These nations appear to have been motivated by a desire to assure that the considerable Southern successes at Stockholm would be institutionalized as part of the overall international environment consensus rather than be perceived by the Northern nations as an

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[174]The unanimous plenary support of the developed nations for the selection of Nairobi may be contrasted with their continued massive nonsupport for the resolutions dealing with the World Housing Fund during the same plenary session (see tables 5.1 and 5.2 above).

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unwelcome creation of a partisan Southern majority.

4. The international consensus that had supported the Environment Conference proposal since its inception apparently survived both the aftereffects of the Soviet bloc's Stockholm boycott and the considerable tensions engendered by the North-South cleavage. The range of Conference recommendations were apparently sufficiently broad so as to allow each of the various segments of the international community to continue to perceive aspects of the Conference report as being of enough value to their interests so as to warrant their support for the total report.

How would the differences of the developing nations on several major environmental issues affect their overall unity on other Conference-related questions?

5. While the developing nations split along Afro-Asian and Latin American lines on the question of expanding the UNEP Governing Council, they retained a common Southern position on every other post-Stockholm Environment Conference-related question. In addition, the once controversial population control and nuclear testing questions were barely raised during the deliberations of the General Assembly and the previously unreconcilable national liability issue was compromised by the developing nations in an effort to assure a unified Southern position on the entire range of Conference-related recommendations. This emphasis on Southern solidarity was also reflected in the willingness of dissenting developing nations, such as

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Colombia, India, Iran, and Tunisia, to support in a roll call vote the very Southern position they had argued against only hours before.[175]

6. Table 5.18 provides a Guttman scale measurement of the seven 1972 Second Committee Environment Conference-related roll call votes on which there was a discernible North-South cleavage.[176] Analysis of this table reveals the considerable degree to which the developed and developing nations had become polarized on North-South Environment Conference-related questions by the fall of 1972:

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[175]While this was generally the case, there were several instances in which developing nations felt so strongly about a question that they abstained rather than vote with the consensual Southern position (see, for example, the Indian vote in table 5.11 above and the Iranian position in table 5.16).

[176]The seven roll calls examined in table 5.18 were the votes on: 1. The Tunisian effort to postpone a decision on the Secretariat question until the 1973 General Assembly session (see table 5.15); 2. The British call for the utilization of a secret ballot in selecting the location of the Secretariat (see table 5.16); 3. The Anglo-American proposal to send all specific action proposals directly to the UNEP Governing Council without any Second Committee or General Assembly recommendation (see table 5.11); 4. The draft resolution establishing the World Housing Fund (see table 5.13); 5. The operative paragraphs of the resolution placing the UNEP Secretariat in Nairobi (see table 5.17); 6. The resolution recognizing housing as an international development aid priority (see table 5.12); and 7. The final vote on the Nairobi-mandating resolution (see table 5.17). The three other roll calls during this period did not follow North-South cleavage lines and were accordingly not considered (these were the Second Committee votes on expanding the UNEP Governing Council [see table 5.8] and calling on UNEP to follow the International Development Decade strategy [see table 5.10]; and the plenary vote on one of the national liability resolutions [see footnote 93 above]).

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TABLE 5.18

GUTTMAN SCALING OF ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE-RELATED NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDED VOTES DURING 1972 SECOND COMMITTEE SESSION

Nation	Roll Call*						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Afghanistan	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Argentina	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Bahrain	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Barbados	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Bolivia	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Botswana	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Brazil	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Cameroon	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Chad	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Chile	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Colombia	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Dahomey	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Egypt	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
El Salvador	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Ghana	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Guyana	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Indonesia	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Jamaica	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Jordan	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Kenya	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Kuwait	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Liberia	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Libya	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Mali	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Mauritania	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Mexico	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Nigeria	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Peru	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Philippines	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Rwanda	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Senegal	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Sierra Leone	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Sri Lanka	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Sudan	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Swaziland	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Syria	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Tanzania	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Thailand	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Togo	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Trinidad and Tobago	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Uganda	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
United Arab Emirates	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Upper Volta	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Uruguay	S	S	S	S	S	S	S

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TABLE 5.18--Continued

Nation	Roll Call*						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Venezuela	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Yemen	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Yemen, PDR	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Yugoslavia	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Zaire	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Zambia	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Nicaragua	S	O	S	S	S	S	S
Ecuador	S	S	S	O	S	S	S
Ethiopia	S	S	S	O	S	S	S
China	S	S	S	S	S	O	S
Algeria	A	S	S	S	S	S	S
Burundi	A	S	S	S	S	S	S
Congo	A	S	S	S	S	S	S
Guatemala	A	S	S	S	S	S	S
Iraq	A	S	S	S	S	S	S
Ivory Coast	A	S	S	S	S	S	S
Morocco	A	S	S	S	S	S	S
Bhutan	S	S	A	S	S	S	S
Cyprus	S	S	A	S	S	S	S
India	S	S	A	S	S	S	S
Madagascar	S	S	A	S	S	S	S
Qatar	S	S	A	S	S	S	S
Lebanon	S	S	O	S	S	O	S
Albania	S	S	O	O	S	O	S
Central African Republic	S	S	O	O	S	O	S
Lesotho	S	S	O	O	S	O	S
Niger	S	S	O	O	S	O	S
Oman	S	S	O	O	S	O	S
Paraguay	S	S	O	O	S	O	S
Dominican Republic	A	A	S	S	S	S	S
Iran	A	A	S	S	S	S	S
Israel	A	A	S	S	S	S	S
Romania	A	A	S	S	S	S	S
Singapore	A	A	S	S	S	S	S
Honduras	N	S	S	S	S	S	S
Tunisia	N	S	S	S	S	S	S
Costa Rica	S	N	S	S	S	S	S
Khmer	N	S	S	S	S	A	S
Laos	S	S	N	S	S	S	S
Burma	A	S	A	A	S	A	S
Fiji	A	A	S	S	A	S	A
Malaysia	A	A	S	S	A	S	A
Maldives	O	O	S	S	O	S	O
Guinea	A	S	O	O	S	O	S
Pakistan	A	S	O	O	S	O	S
Panama	A	S	O	O	S	O	S
Saudi Arabia	O	S	O	O	S	O	S
Haiti	O	O	O	S	O	S	O

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TABLE 5.18--Continued

Nation	Roll Call*						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nepal	O	O	A	S	O	S	O
Equatorial Guinea	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Gabon	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Gambia	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Mauritius	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Somalia	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Malta	N	A	N	S	S	S	S
Turkey	N	N	N	S	S	S	S
Iceland	N	N	O	A	S	A	S
Greece	N	N	N	A	S	A	S
Cuba	A	A	A	A	S	A	A
Malawi	A	A	A	A	A	A	S
Byelorussia	A	A**	A	A	A	A	A
Canada	N	N	S	A	A	A	A
Luxembourg	N	N	S	A	A	A	A
Netherlands	N	N	S	A	A	A	A
Czechoslovakia	A	N	A	A	A	A	A
Hungary	A	N	A	A	A	A	A
Mongolia	A	N	A	A	A	A	A
Poland	A	N	A	A	A	A	A
Portugal	A	N	A	A	A	A	A
Ukraine	A	N	A	A	A	A	A
USSR	A	N	A	A	A	A	A
Bulgaria	A	A	O	A	A	A	A
New Zealand	N	N	A	A	A	A	A
Sweden	N	N	A	A	A	A	A
Austria	A	N	N	A	A	A	A
Japan	A	N	N	A	A	A	A
South Africa	A	N	N	A	A	A	A
Spain	A	N	N	A	A	A	A
Australia	N	N	N	A	A	A	A
Denmark	N	N	N	A	A	A	A
Finland	N	N	N	A	A	A	A
Norway	N	N	N	A	A	A	A
Ireland	A	N	N	N	A	A	A
United Kingdom	A	N	N	N	A	A	A
Belgium	N	N	N	N	A	A	A
France	N	N	N	N	A	A	A
Italy	N	N	N	N	A	A	A
United States	N	N	N	N	N	A	A

*See footnote 176 for a description of these seven roll calls.

**Byelorussia later attempted to change this vote to reflect the Northern position.

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a. Fifty nations took the Southern position on all seven roll calls and fourteen others supported this position on every vote for which they were present. While twenty-four developing nations chose to abstain on at least one North-South question, only seven of them voted with the North on as many as one vote and only Turkey, which is not a member of the Group of 77, did so more than once. This represents a significantly higher level of overall Southern cohesion that was demonstrated during either the preparatory period or at the Stockholm Conference.[177]

b. While the developed nations all chose to abstain on at least two roll calls rather than to vote against the Southern position, twenty-four of the thirty-two developed United Nations members failed to support the Southern position on any of the seven votes. Furthermore, the Canadian, Dutch, and Luxembourgian opposition to the Anglo-American motion to send all specific action proposals to the UNEP Governing Council was motivated by the very special considerations of the Vancouver Exposition-Conference question. Northern solidarity was at its highest Environment Conference period level during these post-Conference votes,albeit at a lower level of cohesion than was demonstrated by the developing nations.

c. It is a measure of the degree of North-South polarization that only twelve of the 132 United Nations members took both a Northern and a Southern position in the

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[177]See tables 3.14 and 4.10 above.

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course of these seven roll calls. Of these twelve nations, eight had either a decisive Northern (Canada, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) or Southern (Costa Rica, Honduras, Khmer, Laos, and Tunisia) voting pattern that deviated from this pattern for just one roll call. Only four nations--Iceland, Greece, Malta, and Turkey--produced voting patterns that are not easily definable as Northern or Southern in nature. The latter three of these nations find themselves geographically, economically, and culturally between the Northern and Southern groups--a confusing situation which was reflected in table 5.18 (as were the efforts of Israel and Romania to identify with the South, and the anomalous position of Cuba and Mongolia as developing nations that participated in the Soviet bloc's Conference boycott).

7. As has been noted previously, the most politically significant debates of the General Assembly's deliberations may have been those that were the least directly involved with the Conference report per se, but were rather concerned with procedural and technical questions stemming from the efforts to implement the report's recommendations. These included the debates over the question of expanding the UNEP Governing Council; the method of selecting the Programme's Executive Director; the necessity of filing a financial implications report before voting on a Secretariat location; the British effort to secure a secret ballot for this decision; the Anglo-American request that all

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specific proposals be considered by the UNEP Governing Council prior to any General Assembly discussion; and the question of whether political or traditional considerations should be utilized in designating a Secretariat location. While the first case was primarily that of an intra-Southern dispute, the other questions all found most developed nations arguing for traditional international norms, and the developing nations in almost total agreement that the majority had the inherent right to alter and waive these norms.[178]

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[178]See chapter VI, pp. 491-495 below, for a more detailed discussion of this question.

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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This dissertation has examined the five year period from the initial December 1967 call for a United Nations Conference on the Human Environment to the final action of the 1972 General Assembly on the recommendations of the Stockholm Conference. Four longitudinal components were considered: the 1968-69 preparatory period; the 1970-71 preparatory period; the Stockholm Conference; and the post-Conference 1972 General Assembly session. Each of these periods has been considered independently and analyzed from the perspective of international politics in general and United Nations political alignments in particular.

Each of the four previous chapters concluded with a brief overview in which the salient points of analysis were presented. This final chapter does not seek to summarize or reproduce these previously reported findings but rather attempts to provide a number of conclusions and to draw relevant policy and theoretical implications in the three separate, yet closely interrelated, areas of international environmental politics; United Nations political alignments; and the overall study and practice of international relations.

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Conclusions and Implications for the Study of International Environmental Politics

1. During the Conference preparatory period perception of national position in relation to the North-South cleavage replaced development status as the single most significant factor in shaping national policy on questions related to the Environment Conference.

The proposal for a Human Environment Conference was initially perceived as an "international initiative of incalculable consequence"[1] without any partisan political orientation. This apparently neutral preoccupation with the technical aspects of industrial pollution was, in reality, a highly political orientation that reflected an almost total concern with problems of particular interest to the developed nations. This Northern orientation was further reinforced by the historic tendency of these nations to equate their own interests with those of humanity in general. The developing nations were urged to support the proposed Environment Conference so that they might benefit from the past errors of the developed nations, or because they shared similar environmental problems, albeit to a far lesser degree. Both of these reasons suggested the universality of the human environment problem as defined from the Northern perspective and reinforced by the growing school

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[1]Caradon (United Kingdom), United Nations Document A/PV.1733, 3 December 1968, p. 31.

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of Northern ecologists who dominated the early work of the United Nations in the human environment field.[2]

During the first two years of Conference preparatory work (1968-69) there were no significant challenges to this Northern orientation.[3] There appears to have been an almost direct correlation between a nation's level of development and the degree of its participation in Conference-related deliberations.[4] The more developed Southern nations tended to participate in the Conference preparatory process to a far greater degree than the less developed Southern nations, while the less developed Northern nations played a similar minimal role in these deliberations.[5] National development status was apparently the primary factor in determining national position on Environment Conference-related questions during this period.

The major difference between the first and second preparatory period was the emergence of a unique Southern position on environmental questions: that enhancement of the human environment required active efforts to eliminate

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[2]See, for example, United Nations Document E/4457/Add.1, Appendix I, pp. i-vii, cited in chapter I, p. 49, footnote 46 above.

[3]The 1968 Congolese ECOSOC challenge to the Northern orientation of the original Conference proposal (chapter II, pp. 96-99 above) represented the only such objection by a developing nation and is perhaps best viewed as a solitary aberration that proves the general quality of the overall hypothesis.

[4]See tables 2.2 and 2.4 above.

[5]See table 8 in the Appendix.

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the "pollution of poverty." This development led to a significant increase in the involvement of the Southern nations in the Conference preparatory process. In addition, the more developed Southern nations and less developed Northern nations began to divide along North-South cleavage lines on Conference-related questions. A nation's perception of its position in the North-South cleavage had thus replaced development status as the primary factor in determining national attitude towards the Environment Conference question.

2. The major developed nations appear to have considered the Environment Conference question as a relatively low international priority (as did China after its defeat on the nuclear testing question). This left the middle tier Western developed nations and, after 1970, the developing nations, as the major supporters of the Conference initiative.

The Environment Conference appears not to have been an international priority for either superpower. Both the United States and the Soviet Union placed their major Conference-related energies into such peripheral issues as the question of East German representation at Stockholm, and the intensive American efforts to table several sections of the draft Action Plan and avoid any Conference discussion of the war in Vietnam. Both nations were apparently fully prepared to allow the Conference to be cancelled rather than to give in on the East German question.[6]

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[6]The Soviet willingness to sacrifice the Environment Conference was manifest in their boycott of Stockholm, their efforts to postpone the Conference until the East

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In addition, the Chinese reacted to their Conference defeat on the nuclear testing question by virtually withdrawing from all other Conference-related debates both at Stockholm and at the subsequent General Assembly session. Any future international environmental effort would do well to avoid becoming embroiled in such superpower priority issues.

Several other developed powers--France, Japan, and the United Kingdom--were initially highly skeptical of the Environment Conference proposal, while such middle tier developed nations as Sweden, Canada, Netherlands, and Norway provided the early major support for the original Conference proposal. It was these latter nations, and the more recently involved developing nations, that provided the essential leadership during the Conference period.

3. Political leadership on United Nations environmental issues--once the exclusive domain of the Northern nations-- was increasingly shared with the Southern nations. These two groups succeeded in maintaining and reshaping the international environmental consensus, which might not have otherwise survived the severe political strains of the Conference period.

The international environmental consensus survived throughout the period under examination for several reasons.

German question could be reconciled to their satisfaction, and their 1971 General Assembly vote against the final Conference mandating resolution (A/C.2/L.1195). While the American position was somewhat less emphatic, their refusal to give in on the Vienna formula question and their willingness to hold the Stockholm Conference without the Soviet bloc suggest that the United States assigned greater significance to the East German question than to the question of the success of the Environment Conference.

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Firstly, the very definition of the human environment problem was broad enough so that consensus could be maintained through expanding the agenda of the Conference to include such Southern priorities as development and housing aid, and even the combating of social pollution. Secondly, issues that threatened to destroy this consensus were compromised, as in the case of the national liability and population control issues. Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, the developing nations had, by transforming the Environment Conference into a "development conference," assured a General Assembly majority for any Conference-related measure that was not deemed inimical to their collective national interest. Even many traditional ecological proposals were accepted as part of a total package which the developing nations now perceived as a Southern priority. These nations apparently agreed to recognize the validity of numerous specific Northern-oriented environmental concerns in return for the formal institutionalization of the overall Southern environmental perspective.

The involvement of the developing nations may have transformed the international environment consensus--but it also ensured its viability. Had the developing nations not become involved in this fashion, it is questionable if the middle tier developed nations would have possessed sufficient political influence to have kept the Conference consensus alive in the face of the Soviet bloc boycott and the bitter debates over such issues as national liability,

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population control, and nuclear testing. While this coalition of interests was strained by such events as the proposal to create a World Housing Fund, it appears to have survived the Conference period because of the perception by both nation groups that the Conference proposals would, on the whole, be beneficial to their particular interests.

4. The Conference experience suggests that international environmental efforts must emphasize improving the quality of human life if they are to maintain an effective international constituency.

The environmental movement began in the developed nations as an effort to curb the excessive impact of the human species on an inherently fragile biosphere. The movement's early emphasis was on protecting the human environment and many of its leading spokesmen even advocated the necessity of moderating the infringement of human technology by the adoptation of international limited growth or no growth philosophies.[7] In addition, the new science of ecology insisted on viewing the human being as only one link in the vast biospheric panoply--and as a selfish, inconsiderate, polluting link at that.

This concern for an overall ecological balance was in sharp contrast to the prevalent attitude in the developing nations where man and the enhancement of the quality of human life was the central question of human existence.

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[7]See, for example, the essays by James Bonner, Harrison Brown, and Thayer Scudder in The Next Ninety Years.

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There was, accordingly, a great deal more than semantic significance in the 1968 Congolese suggestion that the Human Environment Conference be renamed the "Man and his Environment" Conference.[8] To these nations the Northern ecological movement was, at best, the response to a "rich man's disease"[9] and, at worst, an effort to "exterminate mankind . . . in the name of ecological equilibrium."[10]

Any future international environmental efforts will have to stress the new Southern-oriented aspects of enhancing the human condition if it hopes to gain any significant support from the developing countries. The developing nations must be assured and reassured that their particular priorities are being given every consideration. In this regard, such largely symbolic actions as locating the UNEP Secretariat in Nairobi are essential to the maintenance of the international environmental consensus. The Environment Conference experience further suggests that this strategy of stressing development benefits will help produce Southern support for many technical aspects of the original Northern-oriented environmental agenda as well.

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[8]Ekondy-Akala (Congo [Brazzaville]), United Nations Document E/SR.1553, 26 July 1968, p. 142. See also chapter II, p. 98, footnote 93 above.

[9]Brito, "The Meaning and Scope of the Stockholm Conference from the Perspective of the Developing Countries," p. 2.

[10]de Almeida, "The Confrontation Between Problems of Development and Environment," p. 43.

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In summation, the role of the United Nations in forging an international environmental consensus may be said to be two-fold. On the one hand, the developing nations joined, for the first time, in a systematic worldwide effort to monitor and combat the ravages of contemporary technology. On the other hand, the original advocates of an international environmental effort were shown that any such effort would have to be truly international, reflecting the realities, priorities, and needs of all mankind, rather than just those of a privileged third of humanity who lived in the developed Northern nations.

Conclusions and Implications for the Study of United Nations Political Alignments

Caucus groups, blocs, and common interest groups have played a major role in the United Nations since the earliest days of the organization.[11] While there is some dispute as to whether the framers of the United Nations Charter envisioned the function that these groups would come to serve in the General Assembly,[12] it is agreed that their

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[11]See, for example, Margaret Ball, "Bloc Voting in the General Assembly," International Organization 5 (February 1951):3.

[12]Ms. Ball declared that "The specter of bloc voting has haunted the United Nations since the Charter was first debated at San Francisco" (ibid.). Thomas Hovet contended, however, that "in the planning stages of the United Nations (including the San Francisco Conference) there seems to have been no consideration of the consequent likelihood of the formation of blocs and groups" (Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, p. 2).

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role was formally institutionalized by the 1946 "gentlemen's agreement" granting them the responsibility to select candidates for the Security Council and ECOSOC.[13]

By the early 1950's political scientists were demonstrating that "voting in the General Assembly of the United Nations tends to fall into patterns which reappear over time."[14] Examination of these patterns further suggested that caucus group membership was the most significant, and in the case of the Soviet bloc the only significant, variable for predicting national voting behavior.[15]

The contemporary study of United Nations political alignments begins with Thomas Hovet's seminal 1960 study, Bloc Politics in the United Nations. Hovet examined the voting records of the General Assembly and its five major committees for each of the United Nations first sixteen

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[13]Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967, p. 22. Kay supported Ball's contention that the caucus groups stem from the San Francisco Conference and made possible the subsequent "gentlemen's agreement." Hovet, however, suggested that it was this agreement that first gave impetus to the creation of the various blocs and groups (Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, p. 6). See also chapter V, p. 345 above for a description and discussion of the 1946 "gentlemen's agreement."

[14]Vincent, "Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly," p. 474. Virtually all studies of United Nations political alignments examine the General Assembly because it is the only United Nations body containing all of the members of the organization.

[15]Ball, "Bloc Voting in the General Assembly," p. 3. See also the statements of the delegate of Canada at the 1956 General Assembly and delegate of New Zealand at the 1947 General Assembly quoted in Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, p. 9, for examples of the widespread early

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sessions in an effort to ascertain "how cohesive the various groups that meet behind the scenes in caucus actually are in their roll call voting."[16]

Hovet's study differentiated between "blocs"--"the members of which are bound in their votes in the General Assembly by the caucus decision"--and "groups"--whose consultations and shared interests may result in similar voting patterns but do not reach decisions that are binding on their members.[17] He then constructed voting cohesion

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recognition of the role of group membership in predicting voting behavior.

[16]Willetts, "Cluster-Bloc Analysis and Statistical Inference," p. 569.

[17]Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, p. 30. Hovet differentiated among five types of caucus groups: 1. "caucusing groups," which meet regularly to discuss questions before the General Assembly; 2. "geographical distribution groups," which elect members to other United Nations bodies and less-than-full membership committees; 3. "regional groups," which operate independently of the United Nations framework; 4. "common interest groups," which are not bound together in any formal fashion but share a common outlook on certain types of General Assembly issues; and 5. "temporary groups," that come together at specific times in the history of the United Nations to achieve a particular purpose (pp. 31-45). Hovet's major emphasis was on the Soviet bloc and the eight caucusing groups that existed in 1959 (Asian-African, Arab, African, Benelux, Commonwealth, Latin American, Scandinavian, and Western European). He spent considerably less time on the traditional geographic distribution groups, the twenty-one regional groups (such as the Baghdad Pact, the Arab League, NATO, and the Warsaw Pact), and the seven suggested common interest groups (Moslem states, Arab states, the three major Western powers, Trust administrators, colonial powers, anticolonial states, and underdeveloped countries). Lastly he lists the Spanish speaking nations during the 1946-48 General Assembly debates over adding that language to the United Nations working languages, the sixteen nations that sent troops to Korea during the Korean War, and the four

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indices for each of the General Assembly's several caucus groups. The analysis of these indices led him to conclude that, while the Soviet-dominated nations of Eastern Europe were the only "true bloc" in the United Nations,[18] group membership, nevertheless, represented a significant factor in determining national voting behavior for almost all United Nations members.[19]

While Hovet examined the votes of predefined groups of nations in order to ascertain their particular voting patterns, most later students of United Nations political alignments have adopted the opposite methodological approach of empirically determining the membership of voting blocs through the examination of roll call records. Four such methods of analysis have been utilized: Guttman scaling, cluster-bloc analysis, factor analysis, and complete analysis.[20]

Southeast Asian states of Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan during the Suez crisis of 1956 as examples of temporary groups.

[18]Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, p. 31. Others, however, dispute this narrow definition of the term "bloc." See, for example, Nicholas, The United Nations as a Political Institution, p. 94, which utilizes the term for all caucus groups. See also Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal," pp. 902-904, for a discussion of the utilization of the terms "caucus group" and "bloc."

[19]Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, pp. 112-119.

[20]See Willetts, "Cluster-Bloc Analysis and Statistical Inference," p. 569 for a description of these four methods of analysis and examples of the available literature utilizing three of these methods (the fourth, cluster-

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For the purposes of this study we have utilized voter cohesion indices and, wherever applicable, Guttman scaling.[21] Both the small number of Environment Conference-related roll calls and the fact that we were primarily interested in the voting patterns of previously determined Northern and Southern groups militated against the utilization of the other forms of analysis.[22] Reviewing our study in the light of the previous work done in the area of United Nations political alignments suggests the following conclusions and implications:

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bloc analysis, was the subject of Willett's article). These included: Leroy Rieselbach, "Quantitative Techniques for Studying Voting Behavior in the United Nations General Assembly," International Organization 14 (Spring 1960): 291-306 (Guttman scaling); Bruce Russett, "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations" American Political Science Review 60 (June 1966):327-339 (factor analysis); and Keith Hope, "Complete Analysis: A Method of Interpreting Multivariate Data," Journal of Market Research Society (United Kingdom) 2 (1969):267-284 (complete analysis).

[21]Guttman scaling was utilized in the overview of the fifth chapter (see table 5.18) and, in a modified fashion, during the examination of the 1971 General Assembly East German and development and environment debates (see tables 3.5, 3.6, and 3.14).

[22]See Willetts and the other sources cited in footnote 20 above which suggest that cluster-bloc analysis, complete analysis, and factor analysis all require a large number of available votes in order to develop and define group membership. The Environment Conference case, accordingly, required the utilization of predefined groups as the entire 1968-72 period only yielded eleven divided roll call votes on Conference-related North-South questions (see table 6.1).

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1. Most United Nations political alignment literature had stressed the central role of geographic and ideological groupings.[23] The Environment Conference issue demonstrated the emergence of the Group of 77 as a powerful economic interest group with a highly cohesive voting pattern on North-South questions.

Most early analysis of United Nations political alignments examined the voting behavior of "groups of states united by geography, history, race or ideology."[24] The Cold War, the role of geographic groups in the selection of members to other United Nations bodies, and the geographic continuity and relatively high ideological homogeneity of the early General Assembly caucus groups all contributed to this emphasis.[25]

Hovet, for example, centered on geographic, caucus group, and regional groupings in his 1960 study, while noting that he shared the opinion of those "observers who indicate the influence of 'common interest groups' on cer-

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[23]Even Kay, whose work represents the seminal study of Southern attitudes and aspirations in the United Nations, placed his major emphasis on new nations, thus excluding most of Latin America and failing to examine the crucial role of such old nations as Brazil, Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia in the leadership of the Southern group.

[24]Nicholas, The United Nations as a Political Institution, p. 117.

[25]Hovet accordingly treated the British Commonwealth caucus group, which represented the most flagrant exception to these geographic and ideological norms, as an anomaly (Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, p. 34).

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tain types of issues."[26] Among Hovet's seven "common interest groups" were "anti-colonial states" and "under-developed countries," but he does not examine the voting patterns of these two groups.[27] There was, furthermore, little correlation between the nations that Hovet assigned to these two groups and the Southern group that was later to emerge. His "anti-colonial states" included the members of the Soviet bloc and most African and Asian members, but excluded the entire Latin American group.[28] Similarly, the "under-developed countries" category contained such later Northern nations as Austria, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Japan, and Spain that were selected based on "discussion with members of delegations" rather than any particular definition of development or examination of voting records.[29]

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[26]Ibid., p. 44.

[27]See ibid., p. 101, where Hovet briefly summarized the voting behavior of three of his common interest groups without even mentioning the "anti-colonial states" and "under-developed countries" groupings.

[28]Hovet's exclusion of the Latin American states is understandable since most of the early debates on the colonialism question had a heavy East-West undertone, with the Soviets supporting the new nations of Africa and Asia, and the Latin Americans siding with the Western powers (David Kay, "The United Nations and Decolonization," in The United Nations: Past, Present and Future, James Barros, ed. [New York: The Free Press, 1972], p. 151).

[29]Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, p. 45. See also, the similar definition of these groups in Bailey, The General Assembly of the United Nations: A Study of Procedure and Practice, pp. 37-39.

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By 1965, however, the North-South cleavage had emerged to the degree that Alker and Russett were able to divide United Nations questions into "East-West" and "North-South" issues.[30] Nevertheless, while they spoke of an "Eastern bloc" and a "Western community," Alker and Russett never examined the North or the South as similar overall groupings.[31] "North" and "South" were points on an axis used to measure votes on supranationalism, self-determination, and colonialism questions that did not have an overt East-West coloration.[32] They were descriptive

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[30]Howard Alker and Bruce Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 1-5. See also Vincent, "Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly," p. 475, which credits Alker and Russett with popularizing the East-West/North-South mode of analysis.

[31]See, for example, Alker and Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly, pp. 82-85.

[32]At no point in their study did Alker and Russett define precisely what they meant as a North-South issue. The examples that they utilized suggest the above definition, as does their specific citing of the supranationalism, self-determination, and colonialism issues (Alker and Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly, p. 37). There is, however, considerable evidence that the intense involvement of the Soviet Union in an issue led the authors to categorize it as an "East-West" rather than a "North-South" question. For example, the question of the treatment of Indians in South Africa in 1947 was deemed an East-West issue because of the Soviet support for this initiative. See also, p. 256 for their definition of East-West colonial issues as those in which the Soviet Union had become deeply involved. Alker and Russett accordingly classified the vast majority of interpretable United Nations votes as East-West issues (67 percent in 1960, as compared to only 13 percent for North-South issues [p. 283]). See also Howard Alker, "Supernationalism in the United Nations," in International Politics and Foreign Policy, James Rosenau, ed. (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 697-710, which deals

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terms for the analysis of issues as contrasted to the "East" and "West" that were seen as definable nation groupings.

This emphasis on the East-West cleavage was understandable in the context of the inherently bipolar world that dominated international political analysis at that time (the early 1960's).[33] Alker and Russett joined Hovet in viewing the African states as occupying a "middle point" in the East-West controversy and predicted the emergence of "an Africa that is apathetic toward many aspects of world conflict and is able to maintain a middle and fairly unified position between the two camps."[34] The African preoccupation with the colonialism and racism issues was primarily significant in that "the elimination of colonialism, when it comes, may occur with such racial violence as to deepen yet further the East-West gulf and throw the Africans irrevocably away from the middle."[35]

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with several supernationalism issues from an East-West perspective.

[33]See, for example, Morton Kaplan, "Bipolarity in a Revolutionary Age," in Revolution in World Politics, Morton Kaplan, ed. (New York: Wiley, 1962) and Talcott Parsons, "Polarization and the Problem of International Order," in Preventing World War Three, Morton Deutsch, ed. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963).

[34]Alker and Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly, p. 273. See also, Thomas Hovet, Africa in the United Nations (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1963), pp. 216-219.

[35]Alker and Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly, p. 273. While Alker and Russett mentioned the

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It was during this same time, however, that the Southern nations first began to coalesce as an economic interest group and became the first common interest group to achieve caucus group, if not bloc status, in the General Assembly. In 1961 twenty-seven Latin American, African, and Asian members cosponsored a resolution calling for a United Nations Conference dealing with questions of trade and economic development.[36]

The three year struggle to create UNCTAD and institutionalize "economic development as a right owed by the industrialized countries to the underdeveloped ones" has been cited as the central event in the creation of the Southern political alignment.[37] This issue united the developing nations to be an unprecedented degree while, unlike the colonialism and racism issues, it could not be co-opted by the Soviet bloc, which now found itself in opposition. The developing nations discovered that, in the words of a delegate from Mali: "A new outlook had emerged . . . whereby the developing countries had been able to submerge their

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possibility that "issues involving rich-poor relations" might come to the fore in the United Nations, they suggested that the Latin American nations would be in the "middle" between the rich nations of Europe and the poor nations of Africa, and perhaps Asia (p. 274).

[36]Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967, p. 96.

[37]Ibid., p. 99.

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own special interests and come to an understanding on underdevelopment, which was their most important denominator."[38]

The creation of UNCTAD and the concomitant establishment of the Group of 77 gave the developing nations their own caucus group, which coalesced with a high level of cohesion on questions of aid, trade, and development (as well as on the racism, colonialism, and apartheid questions).[39] Emergence of an "economic interest group" had not been presaged in earlier United Nations political alignment literature. Its growth was so rapid, however, that by the 1966 General Assembly session the "economic development" variable was said to have become the single best predictor of national voting behavior.[40] This is a tribute both to the cohesion of the Group of 77 on economic development issues and to their success in greatly increasing the number of such items on the agenda of the General Assembly.[41] The unity of the Southern nations on development issues led, moreover, to increased cohesion on other issues and to the emergence of the North-South issue area as a significant

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[38]United Nations Document TC/B/SR.6, 14 April 1965, p. 16, cited in "Issues before the 20th General Assembly," International Conciliation 554 (Summer 1965):113.

[39]Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967, pp. 99-100.

[40]Vincent, "Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly," p. 471.

[41]Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967, p. 187.

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United Nations cleavage.[42] The Environment Conference issue provided an excellent example of the impact of this cleavage and of the emerging Southern priorities on an international political issue.

Table 6.1 demonstrates that the developing nations generated an average cohesion factor of .908 on the eleven Environment Conference roll calls on which there was a North-South division.[43] This represents a higher level of voting cohesion than Hovet discovered for all but 4 of the 110 sets of General Assembly votes that he examined.[44]

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[42]Willetts, "Cluster-Bloc Analysis and Statistical Inference," pp. 574-575.

[43]The first two columns in table 6.1 report cohesion factor figures while the third and fourth columns report solidarity factor figures. The former is arrived at by measuring the percentage of nations present for a vote in a group that cast their votes in an identical fashion. The calculation of a solidarity voting factor differs in that this measure is arrived at by ascertaining the percentage of group members present for a vote that did not vote against the majority position within the group. In short, solidarity voting analysis considers an abstention as supportive of the majority position while cohesion voting analysis considers it a deviation (see Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, pp. 14-16, from which these methods of analysis are taken). For our purposes, a divided North-South vote has been defined as any vote on which a majority of the Northern nations cast their votes in a fashion (in favor, against, or abstain) that was different than the way in which a majority of the Southern nations voted. In addition to these eleven divided roll call votes there were eight other Conference-related roll calls--one on a North-South question, four on the East German question, and three on other issues. Table 18 in the Appendix reports the Northern and Southern cohesion and solidarity factor for these votes.

[44]The four exceptions were provided by the Western European and African groups on the "development of international law" set of issues (Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, pp. 176 and 188) and by the African group

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TABLE 6.1

NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN COHESION AND SOLIDARITY VOTING FACTORS ON NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDED VOTES RELATED TO THE ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE, 1968-72

Year and Forum*	Vote	Table in Text	Northern Cohesion Factor	Southern Cohesion Factor	Northern Solidarity Factor	Southern Solidarity Factor
1. 1970, GA	Brazilian development aid amendment	3.10	.656	.891	.969	1.000
2. 1971, SC	Draft resolution A/C. 2/L. 1185	3.12	.833	.910	.967	1.000
3. 1971, GA	Draft resolution A/C. 2/L. 1185	3.13	.906	.944	.969	1.000
4. 1972, EC	World Housing Fund proposal	4.10	.500	.946	.833	1.000
5. 1972, SC	Motion to send specific proposals directly to UNEP	5.11	.533	.855	.833	.976
6. 1972, SC	Draft resolution A/C. 2/L. 1230	5.12	.906	.940	1.000	1.000
7. 1972, SC	Draft resolution A/C. 2/L. 1231	5.13	.719	.952	.906	1.000

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8.	1972, SC	Draft resolution A/C. 2/L. 1251	5.15	.500	.747	1.000	.956
9.	1972, SC	Draft resolution A/C. 2/L. 1250	5.16	.844	.890	1.000	.967
10.	1972, SC	Operative paragraphs, draft resolution A/C. 2/L. 1246/Rev. 1	5.17	.813	.957	.969	1.000
11.	1972, SC	Overall vote on draft resolution A/C. 2/L. 1246/Rev. 1	5.17	.844	.957	1.000	1.000
	Average Factor			.732	.908	.950	.991

*EC=Environment Conference
GA=General Assembly plenary
SC=Second Committee

This finding strongly substantiates the existence of a highly cohesive Southern common interest group.

2. The Environment Conference question represents a valuable case study of how the Southern nations responded to and gained considerable control over an initially Northern-dominated issue. At the same time, these nations succeeded in reinterpreting the issue areas subject to the tensions of the North-South political cleavage. This suggests that any future international initiative that can even remotely be connected with the development question will have to place considerable emphasis on the Southern perspective if it is to be successful.

The Environment Conference proposal was one of the first new international initiatives to be offered at the United Nations after the emergence of a cohesive Southern interest group in the mid-1960s. It accordingly provided an excellent case study of the impact of the North-South cleavage on a new international issue. At the same time, the restructuring of the Conference proposal represented a major reinterpretation of the traditional North-South issue areas, which had previously been limited to universally perceived questions of race, colonialism, trade, and economic development.[45] The developing nations appear to have served notice during these Conference-related deliberations that they would be the exclusive interpreters of the parameters of their interests, and would insist on examin-

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on the "economic, social and humanitarian cooperation" and "recommendations that states appropriate funds or supply information" sets of issues (pp. 188-189).

[45]Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967, pp. 94-99.

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ing any future international initiatives from the perspective of these interests.[46]

The pattern by which the Southern group became involved in the Environment Conference issue is also significant. It will be recalled that the first vote on a Conference-related North-South question (the Brazilian amendment at the 1970 Second Committee meeting) was a relatively close 28 in favor, 22 against, with 34 abstentions.[47] This suggested that a considerable number of developing nations had not yet decided if the Environment Conference was a legitimate North-South issue. The passage of the Brazilian amendment was apparently seen as signalling the appropriateness of viewing the Environment Conference question from a North-South perspective, since all future similar Conference-related questions enjoyed overwhelming Southern support (see table 6.1).

Once established, this pattern repeated itself throughout the Environment Conference period. First, a group of nations--or at times only one nation--declared

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[46]At the same time, it should be remembered that the developing nations did not oppose the Environment Conference initiative until they perceived it to be a danger to their collective interests. Hence, a previously suggested paradox: the Environment Conference could not have succeeded without the interest of the developing nations, yet the very efforts to arouse these interests may have helped assure their opposition to the original Conference proposal by alerting them to its potential implications for their priorities (see also chapter III, pp. 191-192, footnote 85 above).

[47]See chapter III, p. 183 above.

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that a specific concept was an appropriate Southern interest. Then other developing nations rushed to support the new concept. Finally, as soon as a critical mass of developing nations joined in supporting the initiative, it was assured of the support of virtually all the members of the Group of 77. Even developing nations that strongly disagreed with specific proposals supported them in the end because of their professed solidarity with their fellow developing nations.[48]

This pattern of redefining and redirecting a United Nations initiative in the image of Southern priorities would appear to suggest a model for the possible restructuring of future political initiatives. The Southern group may well be prepared to demand that any new initiative become a development initiative before they support it, just as the Environment Conference was forced to become a "development conference."

3. While the developed nations had not formally organized along the lines of the Group of 77, their votes on North-South questions demonstrated a fairly high level of cohesion during the Environment Conference period. This pattern suggested the existence of an informal Northern common interest group on a wide range of North-South issues.

Analysis of table 6.1 reveals that the developed nations produced consistently lower cohesion factors than the developing nations. This was, however, primarily because of the Northern division into nations that voted against

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[48]See, for example, the Iranian and Tunisian position on the Secretariat location question (chapter V, pp. 408, 417, and 434 above).

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the Southern initiative and nations that abstained on each of the votes in question. If Hovet's concept of solidarity voting is utilized to measure the degree of refusal to support majoritarian Southern positions, an average Northern solidarity voting factor of .950 is produced (see table 6.1, columns three and four). This represents a higher level of solidarity voting than Hovet reported for 75 of the 110 sets of non-Soviet-bloc group votes that he examined.[49] This finding contrasts with the traditional United Nations political alignment literature, which did not consider the Northern nations as a single political grouping.[50] It was only after the developing nations joined together to create UNCTAD and began to articulate demands for a restructuring of international patterns of trade and development aid, that the pattern of fairly unified Northern opposition to a cohesively exclusive Southern initiative became apparent.[51] It should also be noted that

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[49]Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, pp. 176-188.

[50]Even Alker and Russett, who reported a clear cut North-South pattern on selected issues as early as the 1946 General Assembly session (Alker and Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly, pp. 50-51), still refrained from speaking of the "North" in the sense of a single community of political interest.

[51]Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967, pp. 98-99. Kay's earliest example of North-South polarization was the June 1963 General Assembly vote in which the developing nations joined together, against strenuous Northern objections, to pass a series of resolutions that reduced their contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations by as much as 55 percent (p. 120).

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the Northern nations have been primarily involved in the passive politics of defending aspects of the international economic status quo, while the Southern nations have been making active demands for a change in this status quo. The voting pattern of the Northern nations has generally been, as in the case of the Environment Conference, in response to Southern initiatives and does not reflect coordinated action of the type undertaken by the Group of 77.

4. The Environment Conference apparently failed to produce the neutral or third force group of nations that had traditionally marked United Nations East-West voting patterns. This finding is highly significant in that it suggests the degree of polarization produced by the North-South cleavage.

Table 6.2 provides a breakdown of national voting behavior on the eleven Environment Conference-related roll call votes which divided along North-South lines. The table demonstrates the degree to which the General Assembly had polarized on Environment Conference-related North-South questions. Sixty-three of the 100 United Nations members that were classified as developing nations voted with the Southern position on every roll call for which they were present, while only seven of these nations voted with the Northern position on even one roll call. At the same time, only eight of the thirty-two developed nations voted with the Southern position on as many as one roll call.[52] Only 13

[52]The lower level of cohesion achieved by the Northern nations is reflected in the fact that even the United States, the most Northern of the developed nations, chose to abstain on two of the eleven roll calls.

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TABLE 6.2

NATIONAL VOTING PATTERNS FOR THE ELEVEN NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDED VOTES RELATED TO THE ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE
(Developed Nations are Underlined)

Nation	Southern Votes	Northern Votes	Abstentions	Absences
Afghanistan, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Uganda, Yugoslavia, Zambia	11	0	0	0
Cameroon, Dahomey, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Mali, Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zaire	10	0	0	1
India, Iraq, Madagascar	10	0	1	0
Tunisia	10	1	0	0
Bahrain*, Bolivia, Botswana, Colombia, Ethiopia, Jordan, Mauritania, Rwanda, United Arab Emirates*, Yemen-PDR	9	0	0	2
Algeria, Burundi, Congo, Morocco, Trinidad and Tobago	9	0	1	1
Argentina, Iran, Liberia	9	0	2	0
Honduras	9	1	0	1
Barbados, Central African Republic, Chad, Lebanon, Nicaragua	8	0	0	3

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TABLE 6.2--Continued

Nation	Southern Votes	Northern Votes	Abstentions	Absences
Guatemala, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone	8	0	1	2
Cyprus, Ghana	8	0	2	1
Dominican Republic, Romania	8	0	3	0
Costa Rica	8	1	0	2
Turkey	8	3	0	0
Israel	7	0	4	0
Laos	7	1	0	3
China**, Lesotho, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia	6	0	0	5
Bhutan*, Pakistan, Qatar*	6	0	1	4
Burma, Malaysia	6	0	4	1
Singapore	6	0	5	0
Niger, Oman*	5	0	0	6
Panama	5	0	1	5
Fiji	5	0	2	4
Khmer	5	1	2	3
Albania	4	0	0	7
Guinea	4	0	1	6
Gabon, Haiti, Maldives	3	0	0	8
Nepal	3	0	1	7
Cuba	3	0	7	1
Iceland	3	2	5	1
Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius	2	0	0	9
Malawi	2	0	7	2
Malta	2	4	4	1
Greece	2	3	6	0
Somalia	1	0	0	10
Netherlands	1	2	8	0

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TABLE 6.2--Continued

Nation	Southern Votes	Northern Votes	Abstentions	Absences
Finland	1	3	7	0
Luxembourg	1	4	5	1
Canada	1	4	6	0
Gambia	0	0	0	11
Bulgaria	0	0	9	2
Byelorussia***	0	0	10	1
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukraine, USSR	0	1	9	1
Portugal	0	1	10	0
Austria, Spain	0	2	9	0
South Africa	0	3	7	1
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden	0	3	8	0
Denmark, Ireland, Japan	0	4	7	0
Italy	0	5	6	0
Australia, Belgium, France	0	6	5	0
United Kingdom	0	7	4	0
United States	0	9	2	0

*Was not a United Nations member during the 1970 General Assembly vote.

**People's Republic of China. The Republic of China abstained on the 1970 General Assembly vote--the only Environment Conference-related vote prior to its expulsion from the United Nations.

***Byelorussia attempted to change one vote from an abstention to a Northern position after the results had already been announced (p. 427 above).

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of the United Nations 132 members voted with both the Northern and Southern positions during these eleven votes. Furthermore, only four nations--Greece, Iceland, Malta, and Turkey--cast more than one such deviant vote.

This pattern of extreme polarization suggests the creation of two highly cohesive groups, with few nations being excluded from either group. Even at the height of the Cold War, there were a number of neutral nations which chose not to identify with either the Eastern or Western group of nations.[53] The Environment Conference experience suggests that there may be no comparable group of neutral third force nations on North-South issues.[54]

5. Our predefined Northern and Southern groups can now be revised to reflect the results of the Conference period roll calls. These minor revisions demonstrate the role that factors other than development status can occasionally play in determining a nation's position visa via the North-South political cleavage.

The high cohesion factors that were produced by Environment Conference issues would have been even higher if we had utilized the approach of empirically defining the

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[53]Alker and Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly, p. 7.

[54]It should also be noted that the degree of polarization between the Northern and Southern groups grew as the Environment Conference period progressed and the Conference question was apparently more widely perceived as a North-South issue. Nations such as Argentina, Ghana, Iran, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Singapore that abstained on the earliest Conference-related North-South votes (see table 3.14) were consistent supporters of the Southern position during the 1972 post-Conference General Assembly session roll calls (table 5.18).

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Northern or Southern classification based on roll call behavior.[55] For example, Romania and Israel have been classified throughout this report, in keeping with the standard United Nations practice, as developed nations. The former, however, increasingly sided with the Group of 77 by 1971,[56] and the latter was attempting to be perceived as a Southern nation in an effort to win support for its position in the Middle East controversy.[57] Similarly, developing Mongolia was among the most loyal members of the Soviet bloc and consistently voted with the Northern nations, while Cuba--despite its 1971 decision to join the Group of 77--participated in the Soviet bloc boycott of the Stockholm Conference and the post-Stockholm Conference-related General Assembly roll call. This self-perception aspect of group membership was further reflected in the ambiguous voting patterns of such nations as Greece, Iceland, Malta, and Turkey.[58]

If the Northern and Southern groups were to be redefined on the basis of national voting patterns during the Environment Conference period, Israel and Romania would be added to the Southern group and Mongolia and possibly Cuba

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[55]See p. 458, footnote 22 above, for an explanation of why these methods of analysis could not be utilized.

[56]See chapter III, p. 217, footnote 174 above.

[57]See chapter III, p. 187 above.

[58]See chapter V, p. 444 above, for a further discussion of these nations' voting behavior.

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would be added to the Northern group. Of the four nations that would present a classification problem because they cast more than one vote for both the Northern and Southern positions, Greece and Iceland sided with the Northern nations in most cases, while Malta and Turkey voted with the North on questions of procedure and with the South on questions of substance.[59] All four of these nations were historically part of the North, but had many of the economic and development characteristics of the Southern nations.[60]

6. Despite its high cohesion on Conference-related roll calls, the Southern group remained an inherently fragile coalition subject to at least three types of cross pressures: extrabloc considerations or affiliations; the intrabloc division between the old radical and new radical nations; and the differences between the old nations of Latin America and the new nations of Africa and Asia.[61]

a. Cross-cleavages created by extrabloc considerations or affiliations

While the voting cohesion of the Southern nations on

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[59]Turkey voted with the North on the three 1972 Second Committee motions that sought to modify or table Southern initiatives on procedural grounds, while it voted with the South on the eight other roll calls (see tables 5.18 and 6.2). Malta similarly voted with the Northern group on two of the three procedural votes and either voted with the South (on the five nonprocedural 1972 votes) or abstained (on the third procedural and three preparatory period votes). Since neither nation belonged to the Group of 77 they may have enjoyed a flexibility that members of the caucus group may have lacked.

[60]See table 1.4.

[61]Similar cross pressures were apparent among the developed nations on such issues as population control, national liability, and nuclear testing (see, for example, pp. 278-279, 292, and 310 above).

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certain Conference-related issues approached that of a Hovetian bloc, such patterns should apparently be expected only when countervailing considerations are sufficiently insignificant so as to allow most developing nations to view the issue in question from the exclusive perspective of development priorities. The votes on the nuclear testing and East German questions both demonstrated the fragmenting influence that external political affiliations can exercise on Southern cohesion. In addition, while the population control and national liability issues were both compromised, their examples further demonstrated the fragmenting potential of such considerations as population density, cultural or religious orientation, and status as a pollution exporting or pollution importing nation.

b. The intrabloc division between the old radical and new radical nations

While this cleavage was primarily a question of philosophy rather than of policy, it may yet portend the creation of a significant division among the developing nations. The pragmatic post-Conference willingness of such nations as Brazil, India, Iran, and Tunisia to moderate Southern demands in order to achieve accommodation with the developed nations suggests that the major interest of these nations was in policy redirection rather than the more extreme social reordering that the new radicals had demanded at Stockholm.[62] The possibility exists that the Northern

[62]See chapter V, p. 437 above.

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nations may yet be able to wean the more industrialized developing nations away from the Southern group through compromise on questions of economic policy, while winning their support for the maintenance of the current international economic infrastructure.[63]

c. Differences between the old nations of Latin America and the new nations of Asia and Africa

The 1972 Second Committee debate over the composition of the UNEP Governing Council[64] suggests the potential for divisiveness between these two groups of nations that first came together in response to a shared perception of the development priority.[65] The fact that the Latin American nations have almost all experienced over a century of political socialization through participation in the international community may help explain the differences in perception and approach between these nations and the newly independent African and Asian nations.[66]

The dispute over the UNEP Governing Council was significant in that it suggested that the African and Asian nations are prepared to utilize their majority status in

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[63]See, for example, the national liability compromise at the 1972 post-Conference General Assembly session (chapter V, pp. 377-383 above).

[64]See chapter V, pp. 344-358 above.

[65]Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967, p. 99.

[66]See pp. 491-494 below for a further discussion of this observation and for examples of this cleavage during the Conference period.

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the General Assembly to secure their priorities even when these priorities will harm the interests of their fellow developing nations from Latin America. At the same time, the fact that half of the Latin American members of the General Assembly abstained on this vote strongly suggests that a significant number of these states were unwilling to allow their intrabloc differences to interfere with their sense of Southern solidarity.[67] This vote and the success of the Southern nations in compromising most other Conference period intrabloc differences would appear to demonstrate the effective power of the shared perceived advantages of Southern unity on the Environment Conference issue.

7. The East-West cleavage remained a significant international political factor as both the Soviet Union and the United States generated considerable support on questions that were generally perceived as being of an exclusive East-West nature. At the same time, both the Eastern and Western groups were less cohesive on those East-West issues that had North-South cross-cleavage connotations. This lack of cohesion was also reflected in the refusal of many Soviet allies to support the Soviet boycott of the Stockholm Conference and in the reluctance of several leading Western nations to become involved in the East German controversy.

The tenacity of the East-West cleavage was reflected in the large number of nations that voted with either the Western powers or the Soviet Union on the East German question. Only twenty nations abstained on the key 1971 General Assembly vote on this issue, while both the traditional Western and Eastern voting groups demonstrated high

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[67]See table 5.8.

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levels of cohesion. These cohesion levels did not carry over, however, to the subsequent General Assembly vote on the Soviet initiatives to postpone or cancel the Conference because of East Germany's exclusion.[68] These initiatives were apparently not viewed solely as East-West questions, affecting as they did the actual convening of a Conference that had become a Southern priority. Many nations that were prepared to support the Soviet position in an East-West context were apparently not willing to do so when this position ran counter to their perception of their national interest as developing nations. Thus, every Group of 77 member supporting East Germany that had been involved in the preparatory work for Stockholm attended the Conference.[69]

Despite the high degree of voting support for the Eastern and Western position on the East German question, most nations were apparently reluctant to become otherwise involved with this issue. The fact that few nations were willing to cosponsor the various resolutions related to the East German question, or to take part in the Second Committee or General Assembly debates discussing these resolutions, suggests that most nations approached the East German question as a political obligation rather than a

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[68]See table 3.5.

[69]This observation is based on contrasting tables 1.6 (the Group of 77), 3.5 (national position on the East German question), and 4.1 (national attendance at Stockholm).

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self-perceived priority. The Southern nations, in particular, appear to have tried to avoid becoming embroiled in the East German debate as demonstrated by the abstention of staunchly Western Brazil on the vote that excluded East Germany from Stockholm and the minimal debate participation of such ostensible East German supporters as India and Yugoslavia.[70] In similar fashion, such key Northern Conference supporters as Sweden and Japan abstained on the initial East German vote--apparently because of their reluctance to consider this question as a greater priority than the Stockholm Conference.

8. The East German vote also suggests that the success of the Southern nations in reshaping the Environment Conference proposal may partially reflect the low priority that the major developed nations assigned to the Conference question. While American and Soviet foreign aid may have been relevant to votes on the East German question, it appears to have been irrelevant to national voting behavior on Conference-related North-South questions.

The ability of both the Western powers and the Soviet Union to rally significant political support on the initial East German votes may be seen as indicative of the importance that these nations attached to this question. There is evidence that the major powers can generate support on selected United Nations votes through the application of pressures on nations that are recipients of their foreign aid.[71] Such pressures cannot, however, be utilized on each

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[70]See also chapter III, pp. 143-148 above.

[71]See, for example, Robert Keohane, "Political Influence in the General Assembly," International Conciliation 557 (March 1966):42-64; Edward Mason, Foreign Aid and Foreign

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and every vote because "most decisions of the General Assembly . . . are not important enough to the [donor nation's] interests for it to threaten convincingly to alter the level of aid or support that it is giving, or to exercise other forms of pressure . . . for the sake of gaining a few votes in the United Nations."[72]

The East German vote was apparently the only Conference-related issue on which there was a discernible correlation between foreign aid and voting behavior.[73] The developed nations do not appear to have considered the other Conference-related votes as matters of high political priority.[74] This attitude may have allowed the developing nations to vote against the Northern position on North-South questions with greater impunity than might have been expected had the developed nations, and particularly the

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Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1964); Samuel J. Bernstein and Eugene J. Alpert, "Foreign Aid and Voting Behavior in the United Nations: The Admission of Communist China," Orbis 25 (Fall 1972):963-978; and Wittkopf, "Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative Study," pp. 868-883. See also chapter IV, p. 307, footnote 114 above.

[72]Keohane, "Political Influence in the General Assembly," pp. 17-18. See also Jack Plano and Robert Riggs, Forging World Order (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 154 for a similar observation.

[73]See chapter III, pp. 145-146, especially p. 146, footnote 51.

[74]See also Alker and Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly, pp. 268-269, which reported evidence that levels of foreign aid allocation were more significant for explaining East-West votes than North-South votes.

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superpowers, deemed these questions essential to their national interest.

Conclusions and Implications for the Overall Study and Practice of International Politics

The two previous sections included several observations that were not only related to the specific case of international environmental politics or the study of United Nations political alignments, but to the overall study of international politics, as well. While several of these observations have already been examined in this chapter, the Environment Conference case study can also be viewed as yielding several additional implications for the general study of international politics:[75]

1. The North-South cleavage is fundamentally an interest cleavage with national and group ideologies apparently being shaped by shared perceptions of national priorities. The power of these shared perceptions represents one of the greatest strengths, as well as one of the potential weaknesses, of the Southern common interest group. The Northern nations' best chance of dividing the Southern group would accordingly be to appeal to the particular interests of subgroups.

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[75]Previously examined observations included the discussion of the question of United Nations alignments in the post-bipolar world, with special emphasis on the North-South cleavage (pp. 462-470 above); an examination of the response of various nations and nation groups to both North-South and East-West Conference-related questions and to cases in which both sets of cleavages interfaced (pp. 472-478 above); an analysis of the impact of various intragroup and extragroup cross pressures on the cohesiveness of both the Northern and Southern common interest groups (pp. 478-484 above); and a discussion of the significance of the success of the developing nations in reshaping the Environment Conference proposal in the image of their particular national priorities (pp. 468-470 above).

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The Environment Conference case demonstrates the degree to which perception of national interest shapes national ideology in international politics.[76] A nation's decision to vote with the Northern or Southern group appears to have been primarily based on its perception of national interest.[77] A nation's position in the old radical-new radical dispute, or the national liability debate, or even the decision of East Germany's Southern supporters to attend the Stockholm Conference, can similarly be seen as reflecting the significance of national interest perception.[78]

This consideration was also reflected in the initial apathy of the developing nations towards the Conference proposal and their increased involvement first in response to the widely perceived threat of the McNamara and "Limits to Growth" proposals and later in response to the Founex-inspired promises of development benefits. In similar fashion, the Conference-related behavior of both the less

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[76]The seminal work in this area is by Hans Morgenthau. See, for example, his Dilemmas of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 58-86; Scientific Man Versus Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), pp. 153-167; and Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 4-11. This question is also discussed in John Stoessinger, The Might of Nations (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 28-32 and in Raymond Aron, Peace and War (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 91-92.

[77]See p. 448 and pp. 476-478 above.

[78]See chapter IV, p. 252, footnote 24 above.

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developed Northern nations and the more developed Southern nations changed when their perception of the Conference proposal shifted from that of an international ecological issue to that of a North-South question.[79]

This finding is particularly significant because the Conference period Northern and Southern groups were common interest groups whose high level of voting cohesion depended to a great extent on their shared perception of mutual advantage in such behavior. Thus, such overpopulated nations as India and Pakistan supported the developing nations' position on population control,[80] and such less developed Northern nations as Greece and Portugal supported the position of the developed nations on most Conference-related questions because of the apparent perception that voting with their respective group would, in the long run, prove advantageous.[81] Similarly, nations such as Iran and Tunisia, consistently voted with the Southern group despite their public opposition to aspects of the Secretariat location and World Housing Fund proposals.[82]

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[79]See p. 448 above.

[80]See chapter III, pp. 207 above.

[81]See chapter I, p. 42 and this chapter, p. 478 above.

[82]See chapter V, pp. 438-439 above. Another example of the role of national interest in shaping national voting behavior was provided by the votes of the developed nations on the World Housing Fund proposal. Those nations that were usually expected to support such funds tended to vote <u>against</u> this proposal both at Stockholm and in the Second Committee, while those developed nations that are not major

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The role of self-perceived national interest in defining national position on North-South issues suggests that the developed nations may, on certain issues, be able to convince some developing nations of the potential advantage of deserting the Southern group. The success of the pollution exporting nations in achieving a highly favorable compromise on the national liability issue may provide an example of how the Southern nations can be divided on future issues.[83] This strategy should be particularly effective with issues that do not lend themselves to compromise as readily as the Environment Conference question. At the minimum, the Northern nations would appear to have a better chance with this approach than with the raising of procedural and technical points which represented their main strategy at the post-Conference General Assembly session.[84]

2. The Conference period also provided a study in the politics of international consensus and compromise. The Conference recommendations were sufficiently multifaceted so that each of the various groups involved in the Conference process could be satisfied that a sufficient number of their priorities had been met so as to allow them to support the entire series of proposals. Supporters of future international initiatives would do well to try to create a similar trade-off situation, particularly when the support of the developing nations must be secured.

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donors to such funds tended to abstain on these votes (see chapter IV, p. 320 and chapter V, p. 398 above).

[83]See chapter V, pp. 382-383 above.

[84]This approach not only failed to divide the developing nations but appears to have helped secure a high level of Southern cohesiveness by assuring polarization along North-South cleavage lines (see, for example, chapter V, p. 387 above).

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Since the inception of the Environment Conference proposal its supporters had perceived the construction of an international environmental consensus as fundamental to the eventual success of the Conference. They accordingly modified their proposal during the 1968 and 1969 preparatory period so as to meet even the mildest technical or procedural objections.[85] This willingness to compromise continued throughout the 1970-71 preparatory period, as the Conference's Northern supporters accepted the demands of the Southern nations and acquiesced to the reshaping of the entire Conference proposal.

This pattern remained in effect through the post-Conference General Assembly session, where several of the previously most vocal Southern nations advocated policy compromises in an apparent effort to preserve the redefined international environmental consensus.[86] Only the East German question could not be reconciled through this pattern of compromise and informal trade-offs. This suggests that the North-South cleavage was not as insurmountable as the East-West cleavage and may yet be bridged on many issues through the utilization of political consensus and compromise.

The Environment Conference may not, however, provide an effective model for future international issues. The human environment question was sufficiently broad so that

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[85] See, for example, chapter II, pp. 76-77 above.

[86] See, for example, chapter V, p. 437 above.

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different groups of nations could have their own sets of responses and priorities that were not, in many cases, mutually exclusive. The developing nations could accept the Northern-oriented Earthwatch program, while the new radicals, and even the developed nations, could support the bulk of the Founex priorities. Similarly, the old radicals could accept the denunciation of social pollution while the Northern nations could reluctantly accept the concept of a World Housing Fund and the locating of the UNEP Secretariat in Nairobi.[87] At the best, each group could see the other group's priorities as part of a pluralistic international environmental ethic. At the worst, they could be seen as a satisfactory price to pay for the inclusion of their own particular priorities in the final program. The Environment Conference was thus, for the most part, a nonconstant sum game situation, while many other international issues are, as the East German question demonstrated, zero-sum games.[88]

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[87]While the United States and several other Northern nations were decidedly unhappy with these developments, they continued to support the overall Conference concept (see, for example, United States, Department of State, United States Participation in the United Nations--1972, International Organization and Conference Series 108, Pubn. 8731 [1973], pp. 102-105).

[88]See Thomas Schelling, "What is Game Theory?" in Contemporary Political Analysis, James Charlesworth, ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 246-258 for an explanation and description of zero-sum (one party must win and one must lose) and nonconstant sum games (every participant can be a winner or a loser).

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3. The question of the continued appropriateness of traditional international definitions and procedures recurred throughout the Conference period. This question represents one of the basic conceptual underpinnings of the contemporary North-South cleavage. The Northern nations would appear to have little choice but to concede this question in cases subject to General Assembly vote, particularly since the developing nations appear unlikely to compromise on this range of questions.

For several centuries the sovereign states of Europe represented the sum total of the organized international community. This historic reality is reflected in the conceptual and procedural framework within which the international community functions, a framework that has been largely defined through European precedent and experience. In recent years some non-Europeans have begun to perceive these "norms of international behavior," and even the concept of international law, as little more than an extension of the efforts of the developed nations to freeze the international status quo to their permanent advantage.[89]

The developing nations have insisted that each international organization can define its own rules, procedures, and principles by majority vote, and that such a majority possesses the inherent power to alter or waive any previously established procedure or definition.[90] The developed nations, which were accustomed to viewing these rules and procedures as nonpartisan, were critical of the developing

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[89]See, for example, Driss (Tunisia), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1479, 7 November 1972, p. 18.

[90]See, for example, Gerlein (Colombia), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1483, 9 November 1972, p. 8.

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nations for utilizing majority status to "politicize" previously "apolitical" aspects of international comity.[91]

The Human Environment Conference issue represented an excellent example of this basic disagreement in perception and attitude. The developed nations viewed their definition of the human environment question as being universally applicable and thoroughly apolitical.[92] The developing nations came, however, to perceive this definition as being intrinsicly biased against their interests and insisted that a majority of the General Assembly should be the final judge of international definitions and policy.[93]

This dichotomy continued throughout the preparatory period. The Brazilian objections to the original Conference agenda at the 1970 ECOSOC and General Assembly sessions, the 1971 General Assembly debate over the development and environment question, and particularly the bitter de Almeida-Moynihan exchanges during that debate all reflected this central question.

This divergence in Northern and Southern attitudes was not only reflected in the Stockholm debate over the creation of a World Housing Fund, but was a major theme

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[91]See, for example, McCarthy (United Kingdom), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1479, 7 November 1972, p. 18.

[92]See p. 446 above for a more detailed discussion of this point.

[93]See, for example, Hoveyda (Iran), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1479, 7 November 1972, p. 18. See also Odero-Jowi (Kenya), United Nations Document A/C.2/SR.1487, 14 November 1972, p. 3.

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in such post-Conference deliberation as the debates concerning the expansion of the UNEP Governing Council; the method of selection of the UNEP Executive Director; the need to file a financial implications report before voting on a Secretariat location; the effort to secure a secret ballot for this decision; the request to send all specific programmatic proposals to the UNEP Governing Council prior to any General Assembly consideration; and the question of utilizing political or traditional considerations in selecting a Secretariat location.[94]

It was on these post-Conference procedural questions that the developed and developing nations achieved both their highest degree of Conference period cohesion as well as their highest level of polarization.[95] Developed nations such as Greece, Iceland, and Malta that supported several other Southern proposals sided with their fellow Northern nations on these questions, as did Turkey, whose lack of membership in the Group of 77 did not prevent it from supporting every other post-Conference Southern initiative.[96]

These deliberations represented considerably more

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[94]See also chapter V, pp. 444-445 above.

[95]See table 6.1.

[96]See table 5.18. The Soviet bloc similarly made an exception to its stated policy of abstaining on all post-Stockholm Conference-related roll calls in order to vote with the North on this question.

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than a dispute over procedure or definition. They can be seen as indicative of a fundamental difference in attitude between the developed and developing nations concerning the legitimacy of the very structure and framework within which the international community operates. Events since the Environment Conference period provide evidence that this cleavage between advocates of majoritarian and traditional procedural politics is destined to play a major role in international politics for many years to come. The suspension of South Africa by the 1974 General Assembly, the 1974 decision to bar Israel from the European regional group of UNESCO, and the debates over granting formal international recognition to such guerrilla movements as Frelimo, the Khmer Rouge, and the Palestine Liberation Organization all reflected the impact and utility of this issue.

The Human Environment Conference question should be seen as only one chapter in a far reaching dialogue concerning the structure, priorities, and functions of international political life. The success of the developing nations in reshaping the Conference agenda may represent far more than an isolated case study in the politics of international environmental protection. It should rather be viewed as a function of the ongoing efforts by the Southern nations to achieve a new international order more favorable to their aspirations.

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The construction of such an order will require the redefining and redirecting of many long accepted international procedures and definitions. The Human Environment Conference case would appear to suggest that the Northern nations would be well advised to compromise those international procedural and technical traditions that the Southern nations find particularly distasteful. The Conference case demonstrates that there can be ample opportunities for North-South cooperation on substantive matters once these procedural and rhetorical problems are settled to the satisfaction of the developing nations.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 1

PER CAPITA NATIONAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION, 1970

Per Capita Kilowatts	Latin America	Africa	Asia and Oceania	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Others (Developed)[1]
Under 50	Haiti	Burundi Chad Dahomey Ethiopia Malawi Mali Niger Nigeria Rwanda Upper Volta Zaire	Afghanistan Nepal Oman Yemen			
50-99	El Salvador	Cameroon Central African Republic Gambia Guinea Madagascar Mauritania Tanzania Togo Uganda Zambia	Burma Khmer[2] Laos Pakistan			

100-249	Bolivia Dominican Republic Guatemala Honduras Paraguay	Congo Equatorial Guinea Ghana Ivory Coast Kenya Mauritius Morocco Senegal Somalia Sudan Tunisia	India Indonesia Jordan Sri Lanka[3] Thailand		
250-499	Brazil Costa Rica Ecuador Nicaragua	Algeria Egypt Liberia Sierra Leone	Fiji Malaysia Philippines South Vietnam Syria Turkey Yemen. PDR[4]		
500-999	Barbados Colombia Peru Uruguay	Gabon Libya	China Iran Iraq Lebanon Saudi Arabia Singapore South Korea Taiwan United Arab Emirates	Malta Portugal	Albania[5]

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TABLE 1--Continued

Per Capita Kilowatts	Latin America	Africa	Asia and Oceania	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Others (Developed)[1]
1,000-1,999	Argentina Chile Cuba Guyana Jamaica Mexico		Cyprus Qatar	Greece Spain	Yugoslavia[5]	
2,000-2,999	Panama Venezuela			Ireland Italy	Romania	Israel New Zealand South Africa
3,000-3,999				Austria France Switzerland	Hungary	Japan
4,000-4,999	Trinidad and Tobago			Finland Iceland Norway	Bulgaria Poland USSR	
5,000-9,999			Bahrain Kuwait	Belgium Denmark Netherlands Sweden United Kingdom West Germany	Czechoslo-vakia East Germany	Australia Canada

over 10,000	United States

SOURCE: United Nations Statistical Abstract, 1971. Data unavailable for Botswana, Bhutan, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Swaziland.

[1]Includes the European settler states and Japan.

[2]Known as Cambodia prior to 1970.

[3]Known as Ceylon prior to 1971.

[4]Known as South Yemen prior to 1969.

[5]Classified as a developing nation for the purposes of this study.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 2

PER CAPITA MOTOR VEHICLES IN USE BY NATION, 1969

Vehicles Per Thousand Inhabitants	Latin America	Africa	Asia and Oceania	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Others (Developed)
Under 10	Haiti Bolivia Ecuador	Botswana Burundi Central African Republic Chad Dahomey Egypt Ethiopia Ghana Guinea Lesotho Malawi Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Rwanda Somalia Sudan Tanzania Togo Uganda Upper Volta Zaire	Afghanistan Burma India Indonesia Japan Khmer Laos Nepal Pakistan South Korea South Vietnam Syria Taiwan Thailand Turkey Yemen Yemen, PDR			

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10-19	Colombia Cuba Dominican Republic El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Paraguay	Algeria Cameroon Gambia Ivory Coast Kenya Madagascar Morocco Senegal Sierra Leone Swaziland Tunisia Zambia	Iran Iraq Jordan Philippines Saudi Arabia Sri Lanka			
20-20	Brazil Chile Peru	Gabon Liberia Mauritius	Fiji Malaysia		Poland	
30-39	Costa Rica Guyana Mexico Panama			Greece	Yugoslavia	
40-49	Jamaica					
50-74	Barbados Venezuela	Libya	Bahrain Lebanon	Portugal	Czecho-slovakia Hungary	Israel

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TABLE 2--Continued

Vehicles Per Thousand Inhabitants	Latin America	Africa	Asia and Oceania	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Others (Developed)
75-100	Argentina Trinidad and Tobago Uruguay		Singapore	Spain	East Germany	South Africa
100-149			Cyprus	Ireland		Japan
150-199				Austria Finland Italy Malta Netherlands Norway		
200-249			Kuwait	Belgium Iceland Luxembourg Switzerland United Kingdom West Germany		
250-299				Denmark France Sweden		

300-399	Australia Canada New Zealand
over 500	United States

SOURCE: United Nations Statistical Abstract, 1971. Data unavailable for Albania, Bhutan, Bulgaria, China, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Maldives, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, Oman, Qatar, Romania, United Arab Emirates, and the USSR.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 3

PER CAPITA TELEPHONES BY NATION, 1969

Telephones Per Thousand Inhabitants	Latin America	Africa	Asia and Oceania	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Others (Developed)
Less than 1	Haiti	Burundi Cameroon Chad Mali Niger Rwanda Upper Volta	Afghanistan Burma Khmer Laos Nepal Yemen			
1-4.9	Honduras	Central African Republic Dahomey Ethiopia Gambia Guinea Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Morocco Nigeria Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan	India Indonesia Pakistan South Vietnam Sri Lanka Thailand			

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		Togo Tanzania Uganda Zaire		
5-9.9	Bolivia Paraguay	Botswana Ghana Ivory Coast Kenya Senegal	Philippines Saudi Arabia Yemen, PDR	
10-19	Brazil Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Guyana Nicaragua Peru	Algeria Congo Egypt Gabon Libya Swaziland Tunisia Zambia	Iran Iraq Jordan Malaysia Mongolia Syria Turkey	
20-29	Colombia Mexico	Mauritius	South Korea Taiwan	
30-49	Costa Rica Chile Cuba Guatemala Jamaica Panama Trinidad and Tobago Venezuela		Fiji	Romania Yugoslavia

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TABLE 3--Continued

Telephones Per Thousand Inhabitants	Latin America	Africa	Asia and Oceania	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Others (Developed)
50-99	Argentina Uruguay		Bahrain Cyprus Kuwait Lebanon Singapore United Arab Emirates	Portugal	Bulgaria Hungary Poland USSR	South Africa
100-149	Barbados		Qatar	Greece Ireland Malta Spain	Czechoslo-vakia East Germany	
150-199				Austria France Italy		Israel
200-299				Belgium Finland Netherlands Norway United Kingdom West Germany		Japan

300-399	Denmark Iceland Luxembourg Switzerland	Australia
400-499		Canada New Zealand
over 500	Sweden	United States

SOURCE: United Nations Statistical Abstract. 1971. Data unavailable for Albania, Bhutan, China, Equatorial Guinea, Maldives, Mauritania, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, Oman, and Uganda.

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APPENDIX TABLE 4

NATIONAL PER CAPITA RANKINGS ON FOUR DEVELOPMENT INDICES
(100=World Per Capita Average for Each Index)

Rank*	Nation	GNP	Energy Consumption	Motor Vehicles	Tele-phones
1.	United States	541	523	531	624
2.	Sweden	459	334	306	583
3.	Kuwait	427	517	233	100
4.	Canada	420	480	400	473
5.	Switzerland	377	178	216	524
6.	Denmark	362	314	272	368
7.	France	352	201	300	187
8.	West Germany	333	271	233	245
9.	Luxembourg	328	n.a.	252	357
10.	Norway	325	259	217	320
11.	Australia	320	287	351	394
12.	Belgium	309	314	239	230
13.	New Zealand	307	140	388	480
14.	East Germany	283	313	91	134
15.	Netherlands	276	269	208	283
16.	Finland	258	220	169	271
16.	United Arab Emirates	258	43	n.a.	54
16.	United Kingdom	258	284	248	290
19.	Czechoslovakia	253	334	62	150
20.	Iceland	247	222	227	377
21.	Austria	228	181	168	210
22.	Israel	223	121	70	187
23.	Japan	219	170	153	273
24.	USSR	203	236	n.a.	54
25.	Libya	201	34	72	21
26.	Italy	200	142	191	186
27.	Qatar	197	100	n.a.	132
28.	Hungary	182	166	53	87
29.	Poland	159	224	21	62
30.	Ireland	155	158	150	113
31.	Argentina	132	90	86	76
32.	Greece	124	67	35	130
33.	Spain	116	80	84	147
34.	Venezuela	114	132	73	40
35.	Cyprus	110	77	110	77
36.	Romania	106	149	n.a.	35
37.	Singapore	105	43	83	86
38.	Trinidad and Tobago	98	248	82	52
39.	Uruguay	93	100	80	79
40.	Malta	92	51	166	136
41.	Bulgaria	86	213	n.a.	60
41.	South Africa	86	147	100	81
43.	Panama	83	87	39	47
44.	Chile	82	64	30	38
45.	Jamaica	76	60	45	37

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TABLE 4--Continued

Rank*	Nation	GNP	Energy Consumption	Motor Vehicles	Tele-phones
46.	Mexico	76	64	32	29
47.	Portugal	75	36	64	85
48.	Yugoslavia	74	76	35	39
49.	Gabon	72	43	21	15
50.	Albania	68	33	n.a.	n.a.
51.	Lebanon	67	38	53	74
52.	Barbados	65	50	64	133
53.	Costa Rica	64	18	32	36
54.	Bahrain	63	509	55	60
55.	Cuba	60	55	12	35
56.	Mongolia	52	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
57.	Peru	51	32	25	14
58.	Saudi Arabia	50	51	15	6
59.	Fiji	49	25	24	35
59.	Nicaragua	49	20	19	15
61.	Brazil	48	25	29	21
62.	Zambia	46	29	17	13
63.	Taiwan	44	49	6	30
64.	Iran	43	50	11	12
64.	Malaysia	43	24	22	20
66.	Guyana	42	58	33	20
67.	Guatemala	41	12	11	37
68.	Dominican Republic	40	12	13	11
68.	Oman	40	2	n.a.	n.a.
70.	Colombia	39	31	16	29
71.	North Korea	38	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
72.	Iraq	37	32	10	13
73.	Ghana	35	4	7	5
73.	Ivory Coast	35	12	19	8
73.	Turkey	35	26	7	17
76.	Algeria	34	25	18	14
76.	Congo	34	11	n.a.	11
76.	El Salvador	34	4	16	11
79.	Ecuador	33	16	9	17
79.	Syria	33	26	7	20
81.	Honduras	32	13	11	5
82.	Paraguay	30	8	10	10
83.	Jordan	28	16	9	15
83.	South Korea	28	42	3	23
83.	Tunisia	28	13	20	15
86.	Liberia	27	16	21	5
86.	Mauritius	27	10	21	23
88.	Morocco	26	10	16	12
88.	Senegal	26	8	16	7
90.	Egypt	24	14	5	12
90.	Equatorial Guinea	24	8	n.a.	n.a.
90.	Philippines	24	15	13	9
93.	Thailand	23	13	7	4

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TABLE 4--Continued

Rank*	Nation	GNP	Energy Consumption	Motor Vehicles	Tele-phones
93.	South Vietnam	23	16	5	2
95.	Sierra Leone	22	5	11	3
96.	Bolivia	20	11	9	9
96.	Cameroon	20	5	11	0.9
96.	Swaziland	20	n.a.	20	13
99.	China	18	28	n.a.	n.a.
100.	Kenya	17	8	10	7
101.	Central African Republic	16	1	8	2
101.	Mauritania	16	5	8	n.a.
101.	Togo	16	3	5	3
104.	Khmer	15	3	5	0.9
104.	Madagascar	15	4	12	4
104.	Uganda	15	4	4	3
107.	Gambia	14	3	11	5
107.	Guinea	14	5	5	2
107.	Laos	14	3	5	0.8
107.	Nigeria	14	2	1	2
107.	Sudan	14	6	3	3
107.	Yemen, PDR	14	24	9	7
113.	Botswana	13	n.a.	7	6
113.	Sri Lanka	13	8	12	5
113.	India	13	16	2	2
116.	Haiti	11	2	3	0.9
116.	Maldives	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
116.	Pakistan	11	5	1	2
116.	Tanzania	11	4	5	2
116.	North Vietnam	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
121.	Dahomey	10	2	8	2
121.	Lesotho	10	n.a.	5	2
121.	Niger	10	1	2	0.8
121.	Zaire	10	4	5	2
125.	Afghanistan	9	1	3	0.7
125.	Burma	9	3	2	0.8
125.	Chad	9	1	2	0.1
125.	Ethiopia	9	2	2	2
125.	Indonesia	9	6	3	2
125.	Malawi	9	2	4	2
125.	Nepal	9	0.7	1	0.3
125.	Yemen	9	0.6	1	0.4
133.	Bhutan	8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
133.	Mali	8	1	2	1
133.	Somalia	8	2	7	2
136.	Burundi	7	0.5	1	0.8
136.	Rwanda	7	0.5	1	0.3
136.	Upper Volta	7	0.6	2	0.5

*Nations listed in order of GNP ranking.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 5

AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH BY NATION, 1970

Life Expectancy In Years	Latin America	Africa	Asia and Oceania	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Others (Developed)
Under 30		Guinea				
30-35		Burundi Central African Republic Chad Gabon Togo Upper Volta				
35-40		Cameroon Dahomey Ethiopia Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Nigeria Somalia Tanzania Zaire	Afghanistan			
40-45	Haiti	Botswana Congo Equatorial Guinea	India Khmer Nepal Saudi Arabia			

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		Gambia	Yemen	
		Ivory Coast	Yemen, PDR	
		Lesotho		
		Mauritania		
		Niger		
		Rwanda		
		Senegal		
		Sierra Leone		
		Swaziland		
		Uganda		
		Zambia		
45-50	Bolivia	Ghana	Burma	South Africa
	Colombia	Kenya	Indonesia	
	Guatemala	Sudan	Laos	
	Honduras			
	Nicaragua			
50-55	Ecuador	Algeria	China	
	Peru	Egypt	Iran	
		Libya	Iraq	
		Morocco	Jordan	
		Tunisia	Malaysia	
			North Vietnam	
			Pakistan	
			Philippines	
			South Korea	
			South Vietnam	
			Syria	
			Thailand	
			Turkey	

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TABLE 5--Continued

Life Expectancy In Years	Latin America	Africa	Asia and Oceania	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Others (Developed)
55-60	Dominican Republic Chile El Salvador Guyana Panama Paraguay	Mauritius	Mongolia North Korea			
60-65	Brazil Costa Rica Jamaica Mexico Trinidad and Tobago		Cyprus Kuwait Lebanon Sri Lanka	Portugal	Romania	
65-70	Argentina Barbados Cuba Uruguay Venezuela		Fiji Singapore Taiwan	Austria Finland Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Spain	Albania Hungary Poland Yugoslavia	
over 70				Belgium Denmark France Iceland Netherlands	Bulgaria Czechoslo-vakia East Germany	Australia Canada Israel Japan New Zealand

Norway	USSR	United States
Sweden		
Switzerland		
United Kingdom		
West Germany		

SOURCE: United Nations Statistical Abstract, 1971. Data unavailable for Bahrain, Bhutan, Maldives, Oman, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 6

ESTIMATED ILLITERACY RATES BY NATION, 1970

Rate of Illiteracy	Latin America	Africa	Asia and Oceania	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Others (Developed)
Over 90%	Haiti	Burundi Chad Dahomey Ethiopia Equatorial Guinea Gambia Liberia Mali Mauritania Niger Rwanda Senegal Sierra Leone Somalia Togo Upper Volta	Afghanistan Bhutan Yemen Yemen, PDR			
75%-89%		Algeria Botswana Cameroon Central African Republic Congo	Iran Iraq Laos Nepal Pakistan Saudi Arabia			

		Gabon Ghana Guinea Ivory Coast Kenya Malawi Morocco Nigeria Sudan Tanzania Uganda Zambia				
50%-74%	Bolivia El Salvador Guatemala Honduras	Egypt Lesotho Libya Madagascar Swaziland Tunisia	China India Indonesia Jordan Kuwait Malaysia Oman Syria Turkey			South Africa
25%-49%	Brazil Colombia Dominican Republic Ecuador Nicaragua Paraguay Peru	Mauritius Zaire	Burma Khmer Maldives North Vietnam Philippines Singapore South Vietnam Thailand	Portugal	Albania	

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TABLE 6--Continued

Rate of Illiteracy	Latin America	Africa	Asia and Oceania	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Others (Developed)
10%-24%	Chile Costa Rica Cuba Guyana Jamaica Mexico Panama Trinidad and Tobago Venezuela		Cyprus Lebanon Mongolia North Korea South Korea Sri Lanka Taiwan	Greece Malta Spain	Bulgaria Romania Yugoslavia	
5%-9%	Argentina Uruguay			Italy	Poland	Israel
Under 5%	Barbados			Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Iceland Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom	Czechoslovakia East Germany Hungary USSR	Australia Canada Japan New Zealand United States

West
Germany

SOURCE: United Nations Statistical Abstract, 1971. No data available for Bahrain, Fiji, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 7

NATIONS PARTICIPATING IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE-RELATED DELIBERATIONS, 1968-69

	Participation**								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Latin America									
Argentina	*		*	*		*			
Barbados				*		*			
Chile				*		*			
Colombia	*								
Costa Rica					*				
Ecuador	*			*		*			
Guatemala	*								*
Guyana				*					
Honduras						*			
Jamaica	*			*	*	*			
Mexico	*			*		*			
Nicaragua				*					
Panama	*			*		*			
Trinidad and Tobago				*					
Uruguay	*		*			*			
Venezuela	*					*			
Total	9	0	2	10	2	10	0	0	1
Africa									
Algeria	*			*					
Burundi								*	
Cameroon				*					
Congo(Brazzaville)	*			*		*		*	
Egypt							*		
Ethiopia	*			*		*			

	Participation**								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
China						*		*	
Cyprus			*	*					
India	*		*	*		*	*		
Indonesia	*					*			
Iran	*			*		*	*		
Iraq				*					
Kuwait	*								
Malaysia				*					
Nepal	*								
Pakistan	*		*	*			*		
Philippines	*			*		*	*		
Singapore	*			*		*			
Syria	*			*					
Thailand	*			*					
Turkey	*				*	*			
Yugoslavia	*		*	*					
Total	13	0	4	13	1	7	4	1	0
Total--developing	38	0	7	46	3	24	5	4	2
Western Europe									
Austria	*		*	*		*			
Belgium						*			
Denmark	*		*		*				
Finland	*			*		*			
France			*			*	*		
Iceland	*					*			

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Ghana			*		*				
Guinea			*						
Ivory Coast	*		*						
Kenya	*		*						
Liberia			*						
Libya	*								
Madagascar	*		*						
Mali			*						
Mauritania			*						
Mauritius			*						*
Morocco	*		*						
Nigeria	*	*	*		*				
Rwanda	*								
Senegal	*		*						
Sierra Leone	*		*						
Somalia	*		*						
Sudan	*								
Tanzania	*		*						
Togo			*						
Uganda			*		*				
Upper Volta			*		*		*		
Zambia	*		*		*				
Total	16	0	1	23	0	7	1	3	1
Asia and Others (developing)									
Afghanistan	*		*						
Ceylon			*						
Ireland	*								
Italy	*		*	*		*		*	
Malta	*			*					
Netherlands						*	*		
Norway	*		*		*				
Sweden	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		*
United Kingdom	*		*			*	*	*	
Total	10	1	7	5	3	9	4	2	1
Eastern Europe									
Bulgaria									*
Byelorussia						*			
Czechoslovakia				*		*			
Poland				*		*			
Romania	*		*	*		*			
USSR			*			*	*	*	*
Total	1	0	2	3	0	5	1	1	2
Others (developed)									
Australia	*			*		*	*	*	*
Canada	*	*	*	*		*			
Japan				*		*			
New Zealand						*			
United States	*		*		*	*			*
Total	3	1	2	3	1	5	1	1	2
Total--developed	14	2	11	11	4	19	6	4	5
Grand Total	52	2	18	57	7	43	11	8	7

**Explanation of column headings:

1968

1. Cosponsored Swedish resolution
2. General Assembly General Debate
3. General Assembly plenary debate

1969

4. Cosponsored Swedish resolution
5. General Assembly General Debate
6. Second Committee
7. Third Committee
8. Fifth Committee
9. General Assembly plenary debate

APPENDIX

TABLE 8

CORRELATION OF NATIONAL RANK ON DEVELOPMENT INDEX AND PARTICIPATION IN 1968-69 AND 1970-71 ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE-RELATED DELIBERATIONS

Rank on Index	Nation	Participated in 1968-69 Deliberations	Participated in 1970-71 Deliberations
	Developed Nations[1]		
1.	United States	*	*
2.	Canada	*	*
3.	Sweden	*	*
4.	Australia	*	*
5.	Denmark	*	*
	New Zealand	*	*
7.	Luxembourg		
8.	Norway	*	*
9.	Belgium	*	
10.	United Kingdom	*	*
11.	Iceland	*	*
12.	France	*	*
13.	Netherlands	*	*
14.	Finland	*	*
15.	Japan	*	*
16.	Czechoslovakia	*	*
17.	Austria	*	*
18.	Italy	*	*
19.	USSR	*	*
20.	Israel		*
21.	Ireland		*
22.	Hungary		*
23.	Bulgaria	*	
24.	Poland	*	*
25.	Malta		*
26.	Spain		*
27.	South Africa		
28.	Romania	*	*
29.	Greece		*
30.	Portugal		
	Developing Nations[2]		
1.	Kuwait		
2.	Trinidad and Tobago		*
3.	Argentina	*	*
4.	Cyprus	*	*
5.	Venezuela	*	*
6.	Uruguay	*	*
7.	Libya		*
8.	Singapore	*	*
9.	Barbados	*	
10.	Panama	*	

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TABLE 8--Continued

Rank on Index	Nation	Participated in 1968-69 Deliberations	Participated in 1970-71 Deliberations
11.	Lebanon		
12.	Yugoslavia	*	*
13.	Jamaica	*	*
14.	Chile	*	*
15.	Mongolia		
16.	Albania		
17.	Mexico	*	*
18.	Cuba		*
19.	Costa Rica	*	*
	Gabon		
	Guyana		
22.	Fiji		
23.	Taiwan[3]	*	*
24.	Brazil		*
	Peru		*
	Saudi Arabia		
27.	Colombia		
	Iran	*	*
29.	Malaysia		*
30.	Zambia	*	
31.	Guatemala		
32.	Algeria		*
	Iraq		*
	Nicaragua	*	
35.	Syria		
36.	Mauritius	*	
	Turkey	*	*
38.	Dominican Republic		
39.	Congo (Brazzaville)	*	*
	Ivory Coast		
	Tunisia		*
42.	Ecuador	*	*
	Swaziland		*
44.	El Salvador		
	Jordan		
	Liberia		*
47.	Equatorial Guinea		
	Morocco		
49.	Honduras	*	
	Paraguay		
	Philippines	*	*
52.	Egypt	*	*
	Ghana	*	*
	Senegal		
	Yemen, PDR		
56.	Bolivia		
	Thailand		*
58.	Maldives		

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TABLE 8--Continued

Rank in Index	Nation	Participated in 1968-69 Deliberations	Participated in 1970-71 Deliberations
59.	Kenya		*
	Sierra Leone		
	Sri Lanka		*
62.	Botswana		
	Cameroon		*
	Madagascar		*
	Mauritania		
66.	Gambia		
	India	*	*
	Khmer		
69.	Central African Republic		
	Guinea		
	Sudan		*
	Togo		*
	Uganda	*	
74.	Dahomey		
	Laos		
	Lesotho		
	Tanzania		*
78.	Indonesia	*	*
	Nigeria	*	*
	Pakistan	*	*
	Somalia		
	Zaire		
83.	Burma		
	Ethiopia	*	*
	Haiti		
	Malawi		
	Niger		
88.	Afghanistan		
	Chad		
	Mali		*
	Nepal		
	Upper Volta	*	*
	Yemen		
94.	Burundi	*	
	Rwanda		

[1]Does not include Byelorussia or Ukraine, as no separate development data are available for these two Soviet republics.

[2]Does not include Bahrain, Bhutan, Oman, Qatar, or the United Arab Emirates, which were all admitted to the United Nations in late 1971.

[3]The Republic of China, which held the Chinese seat in the United Nations until late 1971.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 9

POSITIONS TAKEN BY DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING NATIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT QUESTION DURING ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE-RELATED DELIBERATIONS, 1968-69

Forum	Type of Nation	No Mention of Issue	Category One
1968 ECOSOC session	Developed	Belgium Czechoslovakia France Japan United Kingdom United States USSR	Sweden
	Developing	India Iran Kuwait Libya Mexico Panama Venezuela	Chad
1968 General Assembly plenary debate	Developed	Denmark France Romania United Kingdom United States	Austria Canada Sweden
	Developing	Cyprus Uruguay	Argentina India** Yugoslavia
1969 ECOSOC session	Developed	Belgium Bulgaria Japan Norway United Kingdom United States USSR	
	Developing	Indonesia Pakistan	Argentina Jamaica Mexico Sudan Yugoslavia

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TABLE 9--Continued

Category Two	Category Three	Category Four	Category Five	Others
Argentina Guatemala	Turkey	Congo	Philippines	
Italy USSR				
Nigeria Pakistan	India**			
	France**			France**
	India Kuwait Turkey			

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TABLE 9--Continued

Forum	Type of Nation	No Mention of Issue	Category One
1969 General Debate	Developed	Norway Sweden United States	Denmark
	Developing	Costa Rica Jamaica Turkey	
1969 Second Committee meeting	Developed	Belgium Byelorussia Italy Romania United Kingdom United States USSR	Australia** Austria Canada Czechoslovakia Finland Netherlands Sweden
	Developing	Argentina Barbados Ethiopia Mexico Panama Uganda Uruguay Venezuela	Ecuador Nigeria**
1969 Third Committee meeting	Developed	Australia Netherlands Sweden USSR	
	Developing	Cyprus Pakistan Philippines	Egypt** India
1969 General Assembly plenary debate	Developed	Australia United States USSR	Sweden
	Developing	Mauritius	

*See chapter II, pp. 92-93 above for a description of the five categories.

**Took more than one position during intervention.

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TABLE 9--Continued

Category Two	Category Three	Category Four	Category Five	Others
Australia** Iceland New Zealand	France		Japan	Byelorussia
Chile Ghana Indonesia Jamaica Philippines Singapore	Honduras India** Turkey Upper Volta Zambia	Congo India** Nigeria**	Iran	
		Egypt**	Iran	
Bulgaria				
Chile				

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APPENDIX

TABLE 10

NATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN 1970-71 ECOSOC DEBATES DEALING WITH THE ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE
(Number of Times ECOSOC Members Spoke During Each Year's Debate)

Latin America	1970	1971	Africa	1970	1971	Asia	1970	1971
Argentina	0	*	Chad	0	*	Ceylon	0	0
Brazil	2	1	Congo	0	*	India	0	*
Haiti	*	0	Ghana	0	0	Indonesia	0	1
Jamaica	1	0	Kenya	0	1	Lebanon	*	0
Peru	0	0	Madagascar	*	0	Malaysia	*	0
Uruguay	0	0	Niger	*	0	Pakistan	0	1
			Sudan	0	1			
			Tunisia	2	0			
			Upper Volta	0	*			
			Zaire	*	0			
Total	3	1	Total	2	2	Total	0	2

Western Europe	1970	1971	Eastern Europe	1970	1971	Others (Developed)	1970	1971
France	2	0	Bulgaria	0	*	Japan***	1	*
Greece	0	0	Hungary	*	0	New Zealand	*	1
Ireland	0	*	USSR	2	1	United States	1	1
Italy	0	1	Yugoslavia**	1	1			
Norway	2	1						
United Kingdom	2	1						
Total	6	3	Total	3	2	Total	2	2

*Not an ECOSOC member during this year.

**Yugoslavia, a developing nation, was selected to ECOSOC from the Eastern European group.

***Japan, a developed nation, was selected to ECOSOC from the Asian group.

APPENDIX TABLE 11

NATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE-RELATED DELIBERATIONS, 1970-71

	Participation[1]								
	1970						1971		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Latin America									
Argentina		*	3		*	*	2		*
Brazil		*	2	*		*	5		
Chile		*	3			*	2		
Colombia						*			
Costa Rica						*	1		
Cuba						*	2	*	
Dominican Republic						*			
Ecuador						*	1		
Guatemala						*			
Guyana						*			
Jamaica					*				
Mexico		*	1			*			
Nicaragua						*			
Panama						*			
Peru					*	*			*
Trinidad and Tobago					*				
Uruguay					*	*			
Venezuela							2		
Total	0	4	9	1	5	15	15	1	2
Africa									
Algeria						*		*	
Burundi						*			
Cameroon							1		
Central African Republic						*			
Congo					*	*			
Dahomey						*			
Egypt			1			*	1		
Ethiopia						*	1		
Ghana			1			*	2		
Guinea						*			
Ivory Coast						*			
Kenya					*		1		
Lesotho						*			
Liberia									*
Libya			1						
Madagascar			1			*	1		
Mali						*	1		
Mauritius						*			
Niger						*			
Nigeria		*	1		*	*	1		
Rwanda						*			
Somalia						*			

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TABLE 11--Continued

	Participation[1]								
	1970					1971			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Sudan		*	1			*	1		
Swaziland						*	1		
Tanzania						*		*	
Togo						*	1		
Tunisia							1		
Upper Volta						*	1		
Zaire						*			
Zambia		*				*			
Total	0	3	6	0	3	25	14	2	1
Asia and Others (developing)									
Afghanistan						*			
Ceylon		*	1			*			
China			1						
Cyprus		*	2						
Fiji							1		
India		*	1			*	3		
Indonesia						*	1		
Iran		*	1			*	2		
Iraq			1		*	*			
Kuwait						*			
Malaysia			1			*			
Mongolia						*			
Nepal						*			
Pakistan			1						
Philippines		*	1			*	2		
Saudi Arabia		*				*			
Singapore			1			*	2		
Syria						*			
Thailand					*				
Turkey	*				*	*			
Yemen						*			
Yugoslavia		*	1			*	3		
Total	1	7	12	0	3	17	14	0	0
Total--developing	1	14	27	1	11	57	43	3	3
Western Europe									
Austria			1			*			
Denmark			1			*	2		
Finland			1		*	*			*
France			1			*	3	*	*
Greece		*	2				2		
Iceland			1		*	*	2		
Ireland						*	1		
Italy			1			*	3	*	
Malta			1						

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TABLE 11--Continued

	Participation[1]								
	1970					1971			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Netherlands	*	*	2		*	*	2		
Norway					*	*		*	*
Spain		*					2		
Sweden		*	4	*		*	4	*	*
United Kingdom						*	4		*
Total	1	4	15	1	4	11	25	4	5
Eastern Europe									
Bulgaria						*			
Byelorussia			1			*			
Czechoslovakia		*	2		*	*	2		*
Hungary						*		*	*
Poland			1		*	*	2	*	*
Romania			1			*			
Ukraine						*			
USSR						*	3	*	*
Total	0	1	5	0	2	8	7	3	4
Others (developed)									
Australia		*	1		*	*	3	*	*
Canada		*	1		*	*	2		
Israel							1		
Japan		*			*	*	1		
New Zealand		*	1						
United States			1	*	*	*	3		*
Total	0	4	4	1	4	4	10	1	2
Total--developed	1	9	24	2	10	23	42	8	11

[1]Explanation of column headings:

1970

1. General Assembly General Debate
2. Cosponsored a Conference-related resolution
3. Number of interventions during Second Committee debate
4. General Assembly plenary debate

1971

5. General Assembly General Debate
6. Cosponsored a Conference-related resolution
7. Number of interventions during Second Committee debate
8. Fifth Committee
9. General Assembly plenary debate

[2]Republic of China. People's Republic of China did not participate in any Conference-related deliberations after taking its seat in November of 1971.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 12

NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES ON DELEGATIONS OF ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE MEMBERS AT EACH COMMITTEE SESSION

	Delegates				Advisors			Total Participants		
	1	2	3	4*	1	2	3	1	2	3
Latin America										
Argentina	2	2	2	a**	1	3	3	3	5	5
Brazil	4	2	3	a	2	1	1	6	3	4
Costa Rica	4	0	3	a	0	0	0	4	0	3
Jamaica	2	3	3	a	0	0	2	2	3	5
Mexico	1	3	4	a	0	0	0	1	3	4
Total	13	10	15		3	4	6	16	14	21
Africa										
Egypt	2	2	2	a	0	1	0	2	3	2
Ghana	3	0	1	a	0	0	0	3	0	1
Guinea	1	0	1		0	0	0	1	0	1
Mauritius	1	0	0		0	0	0	1	0	0
Nigeria	4	0	3	a	1	0	0	5	0	3
Togo	1	0	3	a	0	0	0	1	0	3
Zambia	2	1	1	a	0	0	0	2	1	1
Total	14	3	11		1	1	0	15	4	11
Asia and Others (developing)										
Cyprus	3	0	3	a	0	0	0	3	0	3
India	3	3	5	a	2	0	1	5	3	6
Iran	1	3	3	a	0	5	4	1	8	7
Singapore	3	2	2	a	0	0	0	3	2	2

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Yugoslavia	2	3	2	a	1	0	1	3	3	3
Total	12	11	15		3	5	6	15	16	21
Total--developing	39	24	41		7	10	12	46	34	53
Western Europe										
France	2	1	3	a	3	3	0	5	4	3
Italy	2	2	2	a	2	5	4	4	7	6
Netherlands	1	1	1	a	4	2	7	5	3	8
Sweden	2	2	2	a	11	18	11	13	20	13
United Kingdom	3	2	10	a	1	3	3	4	5	13
Total	10	8	18		21	31	25	31	39	43
Eastern Europe										
Czechoslovakia	3	3	4		0	1	0	3	4	4
USSR	6	3	3		0	6	7	6	9	10
Total	9	6	7		0	7	7	9	13	14
Others (developed)										
Canada	2	2	6	a	8	10	1	10	12	7
Japan	3	2	5	a	6	7	10	9	9	15
United States	2	2	2	a	6	7	6	8	9	8
Total	7	6	13		20	24	17	27	30	30
Total--developed	26	20	38		41	62	49	67	82	87

*The number of delegates or advisors attending the fourth session was not recorded.

**a=attended session.

APPENDIX

TABLE 13

NATIONS SENDING OBSERVERS TO MEETINGS OF EACH SESSION OF THE ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

	Committee Session			
	1	2	3	4
Latin America				
Barbados			*	
Chile		*	*	
Colombia		*	*	*
Ecuador	*			*
Guatemala	*		*	
Nicaragua			*	
Panama		*	*	*
Peru			*	*
Trinidad and Tobago		*	*	
Uruguay			*	*
Venezuela	*			*
Total	3	4	9	6
Africa				
Algeria			*	*
Burundi				*
Cameroon	*		*	*
Ivory Coast				*
Kenya			*	*
Liberia			*	*
Libya	*			
Malawi			*	*
Morocco		*		
Sudan			*	*
Tunisia		*		
Total	2	2	6	8
Asia and Others (developing)				
Ceylon				*
China[1]				*
Fiji			*	*
Indonesia			*	
Khmer				*
Kuwait	*			
Mongolia		*	*	
Pakistan	*	*		*
Philippines	*	*	*	*
Turkey		*	*	*
Yemen				*
Total	3	4	5	8
Total--developing	8	10	20	22
Western Europe				
Austria	*	*	*	*
Belgium	*	*	*	*
Denmark	*	*	*	*
Finland	*	*	*	*
Iceland		*	*	*
Malta		*		
Norway		*	*	*
Portugal			*	*
Spain	*			*
Total	5	7	7	8
Eastern Europe				
Bulgaria	*	*	*	
Hungary		*	*	
Poland		*	*	
Romania		*	*	
Ukraine	*		*	
Total	2	4	5	0
Others (developed)				
Australia	*	*	*	*
Israel	*		*	*
New Zealand	*	*	*	*
South Africa				*
Total	3	2	3	4
Total--developed	10	13	15	12

[1]People's Republic of China. The Republic of China, which held the Chinese seat during the first three Preparatory Committee sessions, did not attend any Committee sessions.

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APPENDIX TABLE 14

POSITIONS TAKEN BY DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING NATIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT QUESTION DURING ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE-RELATED DELIBERATIONS, 1970-71[1]

Forum	Type of Nation	No Mention of Issue	Category One
1970 ECOSOC session	Developed	Norway USSR	
	Developing	Argentina Jamaica	
1970 General Debate	Developed	United States	
	Developing	Turkey	
1970 Second Committee meeting	Developed	Byelorussia Czechoslovakia Iceland Poland Romania Spain	Canada Finland Italy Malta Sweden
	Developing	Libya Madagascar Sudan	China[3] Cyprus Ghana Malaysia Nigeria Singapore
1971 ECOSOC Coordinating Committee	Developed	France USSR	
	Developing		Kenya

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TABLE 14--Continued

Category Two	Category Three	Category Four	Category Five	Others
	Canada			France[2] United States[2]
		Tunisia	Brazil Yugoslavia	
	Netherlands			
Australia Denmark New Zealand United States	France Netherlands			
	Argentina India Pakistan Philippines Yugoslavia	Chile Egypt	Brazil Iran	Ceylon
Hungary Italy United Kingdom United States				Norway[2]
	Pakistan		Brazil Indonesia Yugoslavia	

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TABLE 14--Continued

Forum	Type of Nation	No Mention of Issue	Category One
1971 General Debate	Developed	Australia Czechoslovakia Iceland Netherlands Norway Poland	
	Developing	Argentina Congo Kenya Nigeria Uruguay	
1971 Second Committee meeting	Developed	Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland Spain Ukraine USSR	Greece Japan Norway
	Developing	Kenya Tunisia	Costa Rica Singapore[4]

[1]See chapter II, pp. 92-93 above for a description of the five categories.

[2]Intervened in order to denounce categories four or five.

[3]Republic of China.

[4]Took more than one position during intervention.

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TABLE 14--Continued

Category Two	Category Three	Category Four	Category Five	Others
Canada				Finland[2] Japan[2]
Jamaica	Trinidad and Tobago Turkey		Thailand	Iraq Peru
Israel[4]	Denmark Sweden	Iceland Norway	Byelorussia France Netherlands	Australia[2] Canada[2] Israel[4] United Kingdom[2] United States[2]
	Madagascar	Singapore[4] Swaziland Yemen	Argentina Brazil Chile Cuba Ecuador Egypt Ghana India Iran Kuwait Philippines Venezuela Yugoslavia	

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APPENDIX

TABLE 15

NATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN THE PREPARATION OF ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE DOCUMENTATION

	Latin America	Africa	Asia and Others (developing)	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Others (developed)
Number of Corresponding Consultants contributing to Only One Earth Report						
	Argentina 2 Barbados 1 Brazil 3 Chile 2 Colombia 1 Guatemala 1 Mexico 2 Trinidad and Tobago 1 Uruguay 1 Venezuela 1	Cameroon 1 Egypt 3 Ethiopia 1 Ghana 2 Kenya 1 Niger 1 Nigeria 2 Senegal 1 Tanzania 1	Ceylon 1 Cyprus 1 India 3 Indonesia 3 Iran 1 Iraq 1 Lebanon 1 Malaysia 1 Pakistan 1 Philippines 2 Singapore 1 Thailand 1	Austria 1 Belgium 3 Denmark 2 Finland 1 France 7 Greece 1 Italy 4 Malta 1 Netherlands 4 Norway 2 Sweden 7 Switzerland 2 United Kingdom 12 West Germany 5	Bulgaria 3 East Germany 3 Hungary 2 Poland 2 Romania 2 USSR 6	Australia 3 Canada 5 Israel 1 Japan 7 New Zealand 1 United States 20
Total	15 from 10 nations	13 from 9 nations	17 from 12 nations	52 from 14 nations	18 from 6 nations	37 from 6 nations
	Total--developing 45 from 31 nations			Total--developed 107 from 26 nations		
Number of Nations Submitting Reports to the Environment Conference						

Submitting an official national report	18 of 24 nations	24 of 41 nations	20 of 38 nations[1]	20 of 23 nations[2]	5 of 8 nations	6 of 7 nations
Submitting case studies	0	2	3	7	1	5
Submitting other Conference documentation	1	3	0	7	2	5

[1]Includes Bangladesh, South Korea, and South Vietnam that were not United Nations members.

[2]Includes Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, Switzerland, Vatican City, and West Germany that were not United Nations members.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 16

NATIONS PARTICIPATING IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE-RELATED DELIBERATIONS, 1972

	Participation[1]				
	1	2	3	4	5
Latin America					
Argentina	*	4	4		*
Barbados		1	4		
Bolivia	*	1	1		
Brazil		4	7		*
Chile		1	8		*
Colombia		1	2		
Costa Rica		1			
Cuba			12	*	
Dominican Republic		1			
Ecuador	*	1	1		
El Salvador		1			
Guatemala	*	3	1		*
Guyana	*	2			
Haiti		1	1		
Honduras	*	1	2		
Jamaica		6	4		*
Mexico		3	7	*	*
Nicaragua		1			*
Panama		2	1		*
Paraguay	*	1			
Peru		3	2		*
Trinidad and Tobago		3	1		
Uruguay	*	1	1		
Venezuela		1	1		*
Sierra Leone			1		*
Somalia		1			*
Sudan		4	2		*
Swaziland		3			
Tanzania	*	4			*
Togo	*	1			
Tunisia		6	11	*	*
Uganda		1	2		
Upper Volta		1	2		
Zaire	*	1	3		
Zambia	*	1	1		
Total	11	84 from 37	50	2	16
Asia and Others (developing)					
Afghanistan		1	2		
Albania					
Bahrain		1			
Bhutan		1	1		
Burma					
China		1	3		*
Cyprus	*	3			
Fiji	*	1			

Total	8	44 from 23	60	2	10
Africa					
Algeria		3	1		
Botswana		1			
Burundi		1			*
Cameroon	*	2			*
Central African Republic		1			*
Chad					
Congo		2			
Dahomey		1			
Egypt		4	2		
Equatorial Guinea					
Ethiopia		3			
Gabon	*	1			*
Gambia	*	1			
Ghana	*	4	5		*
Guinea		2			
Ivory Coast					
Kenya	*	6	10	*	*
Lesotho		1			
Liberia	*	1	2		
Libya	*	5	1		
Madagascar		2			*
Malawi		1			*
Mali		2	1		
Mauritania		2	2		
Mauritius		1			
Morocco		2			*
Niger		1			
Nigeria		8	2		*
Rwanda		2			
Senegal		1	2		*
India	*	2	3	*	*
Indonesia	*	4			*
Iran	*	4	3		*
Iraq		2			*
Jordan		4	1		*
Khmer		1			
Kuwait		3	3		*
Laos		1			
Lebanon	*	2			*
Malaysia		3	2		
Maldives		1			
Mongolia			1		
Nepal	*	1	1		
Oman		1	1		
Pakistan	*	5	6		*
Philippines		6	9		*
Qatar		2			
Saudi Arabia			1		
Singapore		2			
Sri Lanka		1	6	*	*
Syria		5	1		*
Thailand		2	4		
Turkey		2	3		*[2]
United Arab Emirates		1			
Yemen	*	4	2		
Yemen, PDR		2			
Yugoslavia		4			*[3]
Total	9	73 from 31	53	2	14
Total--developing	28	201 from 91	163	6	40

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TABLE 16--Continued

	Participation[1]				
	1	2	3	4	5
Western Europe					
Austria		2	4	*	*
Belgium					
Denmark	*	1	2		
Finland		1	4		
France			7		*
Greece		2	6		
Iceland		2	3		*
Ireland			3		
Italy		2	2		*
Luxembourg					
Malta	*	2	3		
Netherlands	*	4	6		*
Norway		2	3		
Portugal					
Spain	*	1	4		*
Sweden	*	5	9	*	*
United Kingdom			18	*	*
Total	5	24 from 11	74	3	9[4]
Eastern Europe					
Bulgaria			3		
Byelorussia			2		
Czechoslovakia			2		*
Hungary			3		
Poland			6		*
Romania		1	1		*
Ukraine			3		
USSR			11	*	*
Total	0	1 from 1	31	1	5[5]
Others (developed)					
Australia	*	3	9		*
Canada	*	5	8		*
Israel			1		
Japan[6]	*	2	4		*
New Zealand	*	3	4		
South Africa			1		
United States	*	2	10		*
Total	5	15 from 5	37	0	4
Total--developed	10	40 from 17	142	4	18

[1]Explanation of column headings:
1. General Assembly General Debate
2. Number of draft resolutions cosponsored
3. Number of interventions during Second Committee debate
4. General Assembly plenary debate
5. Elected to serve on UNEP Governing Council

[2]Selected to UNEP Governing Council as a Western European nation.

[3]Selected to UNEP Governing Council as an Eastern European nation.

[4]Includes West Germany.

[5]Includes East Germany.

[6]Selected to UNEP Governing Council as an Asian nation.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 17

POSITIONS TAKEN BY DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING NATIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT QUESTION DURING ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE-RELATED DELIBERATIONS, 1972 GENERAL ASSEMBLY GENERAL DEBATE[1]

Type of Nation	No Mention of Issue	Category One	Category Two	Category Three	Category Four	Category Five	New Radical Position
Developed	Canada New Zealand United States	Denmark		Japan Sweden	Australia Malta		
Developing	Honduras Iran Spain	Bolivia	Indonesia Zaire	Liberia Uganda	Argentina Cameroon Cyprus Fiji Gabon Gambia Ghana[2] Guatemala Kenya[2] Lebanon Pakistan Togo Uruguay	Ecuador Ghana[2] Kenya[2]	Guyana Libya Tanzania

[1]See chapter II, pp. 92-93 above for a description of the five categories.

[2]Took more than one position during intervention.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 18

NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN COHESION AND SOLIDARITY VOTING FACTORS ON UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE-RELATED ROLL CALL VOTES THAT WERE NOT DIVIDED ALONG NORTH-SOUTH CLEAVAGE LINES, 1968-72

Year and Forum*		Table in Text	Northern Cohesion Factor	Southern Cohesion Factor	Northern Solidarity Factor	Southern Solidarity Factor
	Undivided North-South Votes**					
1. 1972, SC	Draft resolution A/C. 2/L. 1234	5.10	.656	.976	1.000	1.000
	East-West Questions					
2. 1971, SC	Subamendment A/C. 2/L. 1212	3.6	.563	.455	.719	.675
3. 1971, GA	To invite East Germany	3.6	.656	.410	.719	.614
4. 1971, GA	To postpone Conference	3.6	.750	.548	.750	.893
5. 1971, GA	Draft resolution A/C. 2/L. 1195	3.6	.750	.909	.781	.977
	Other Questions					
6. 1972, EC	Population control**	4.7	.633	.553	.833	.851
7. 1972, EC	Nuclear testing**	4.9	.571	.667	.964	.700
8. 1972, SC	To expand UNEP Governing Council	5.8	.750	.711	.906	.876

*EC=Environment Conference
GA=General Assembly plenary
SC=Second Committee

**Northern and Southern majorities both voted the same way on these issues.

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