

“of all that ever anywhere wherever was”: The all-inclusive Joycean Memory in
Dubliners, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, Ulysses and Finnegans Wake

by

MARGARET M. MCDERMOTT

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in English
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2005

UMI Number: 3187439



UMI Microform 3187439

Copyright 2005 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the
Graduate Faculty in English in satisfaction of the
dissertation requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

September 9, 2005
Date

Professor Edmund L. Epstein
Chair of Examining Committee

September 9, 2005
Date

Professor Steven Kruger
Executive Officer

Professor Edmund L. Epstein

Professor David J. Gordon

Professor Gerhard Joseph
Supervisory Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Abstract

“of all that ever anywhere wherever was”: The all-inclusive Joycean Memory in *Dubliners*, *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*

by

Margaret M. McDermott

Adviser: Professor Edmund L. Epstein

My dissertation focuses on the evolution of Great Memory in the writings of James Joyce, from his early short stories, *Dubliners*, through its most developed form in *Finnegans Wake*. In Chapter 1, I have built a referential framework drawing on works in mental science, Theosophy, and Eastern and Western philosophy to illuminate Joyce’s ideas about time, space, autobiographical and Great memory, and human identity. *Dubliners*, the focus of my second chapter, represents Joyce’s first extensive experimentation with his ideas about autobiographical and Great memory, and their application within a character’s mindscape. The subject of my third chapter is Stephen Dedalus’ development into manhood, and his attempt to become artistic creator in relation to Joyce’s formulation of Stephen’s autobiographical and transpersonal memory in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. Chapter 4 is comprised of a close reading of the “Proteus” chapter of *Ulysses*, in which I trace how Stephen’s contemplation of the primal matter of the universe is crucial to Joyce’s construction of Great Memory in *Ulysses*. Joyce’s simulation of Leopold Bloom’s metempsychotic experiences, the traces of other lives remembered, as they relate to the recomposition of the past through the merging of archetypal identities in his character’s interior monologue, are the focus of my fifth chapter. In my sixth chapter, I treat Joyce’s presentation of primal patterning through HCE’s unconscious, and his fictive recreation of

the Akasic Records, the Akasic mound of Wakean memory, which contains the “countlessness of livestories” of the human past. I discuss these patterns in relation to the “Willingdone” and “Pranquean” fables, which articulate Joyce’s two major recurring themes, the respective disestablishment and establishment of family life, which is the nucleus of all Joyce’s texts. Finally, in my last chapter, I explore Joyce’s paradigmatic patterning of establishment and disestablishment by means of his psychic presentation of the power shift in the Earwicker family, when Shaun assumes the mantle of fatherhood from HCE through his incorporation into the Akasic mound in Book III of the Wake. I also treat the patterns as they concern Joyce’s recomposition of the memory of Irish history.

Acknowledgments

First, and foremost, I want to thank Professor Edmund L. Epstein, my dissertation director, for his advice, encouragement, and generosity of time. His knowledge of James Joyce, especially *Finnegans Wake*, is unsurpassed. I also want to thank the other members of my committee, Professor David J. Gordon and Professor Gerhard Joseph. I am indebted to Professor Gordon for his expertise on Sigmund Freud, and to Professor Joseph for introducing me to Antonio Damasio's theory of consciousness.

A special note of thanks is extended to Ms. Margaret Gough and Ms. Gladys DuClerc at Mercy College's Bronx Campus library for their tireless effort in helping me obtain research materials. Also, I am especially grateful to Mr. Ted Hahn for his help with computer support.

I appreciate the encouragement from my colleagues at Mercy College, especially Dr. Frances Biscoglio, Mr. Fred Akamine, Ms. Nadia Ramjit, Dr. Sean Dugan, and Professor Eileen McMahan.

This dissertation is dedicated to my sister, Sarah McDermott, and to the memory of my late grandparents, John and Sarah Shea, late aunts, Marie and Peggy Shea, and late parents, Bernard and Helen McDermott.

Table of Contents

Introduction		1 - 4
Chapter 1	“...that great memory...more generous than our memory”: the evolution and contextualization of Joycean memory	5 - 30
Chapter 2	The “journey westward” into the swooning soul: Joyce’s evolution of mnemonic identity in <i>Dubliners</i>	31 - 62
Chapter 3	“His soul had arisen from the grave of boyhood, spurning her graveclothes”: Stephen’s formulation of memory and the crisis of maturation into adulthood, in <i>A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man</i>	63 - 84
Chapter 4	“I,...am I by memory because under everchanging forms”: Dedalian memory in <i>Ulysses</i>	85 - 107
Chapter 5	“Past was is today”: metempsychosis in Mecklenburgh Street: The “Circe” chapter of <i>Ulysses</i>	108 - 133
Chapter 6	“Phall if you but will, rise you must”: the metempsychotic assemblage of memory in <i>Finnegans Wake</i>	134 - 159
Chapter 7	“When you sell get my price!”: channels to the vein of suffering in Irish history	160 - 184
Conclusion		185 - 192
Works Cited		193 - 199

Introduction

James Joyce's books contain abundant individual "autobiographical" memories¹ of his own life and of the numerous books he read— books of Theosophy, works of Jung, Freud, and William James. However, his works develop and dramatize a non-naturalistic theory of memory that could be identified as the Great Memory of the world, the *Spiritus Mundi*. The Great Memory resembles the Akasic Records described by the Theosophists, which in turn derived from Sanskrit theology and psychology. This topic has not been treated extensively before in an analysis of Joyce's writing.

The generalized memory resembles the Collective Unconscious of Jung, and underlies the treatment by Joyce of the metempsychotic processes which give generalized texture to each individual character in his works. For example, in the cemetery scene in *Ulysses*, Leopold Bloom nervously attempts to joke away his uneasiness in the presence of death. He tries several times, by jocular asides to himself, to suppress his feeling that he is in the solemn presence of the Eternal. However, at one point the phrases "Pennyworth of powder in a skull" (6. 681) and "Troy measure" (6. 682) pop into his interior monologue. There seems to be no relevance in these phrases to Bloom's life. In reality, the Troy measure is the well-known unit of measure or weight derived from the French city of Troyes;

¹ I refer to Antonio Damasio's study of the construction of the self entailing "the consistent reactivation and display of selected sets of autobiographical memories" (1999:196).

gold is usually measured in Troy ounces. “Pennyweight of powder in a skull”: grams of dust are certainly not measured in gold ounces. Here the word “Troy” provides an associative link to the ancient, famed city that now lies in dust. Of course, there is no rational connection between what Bloom is experiencing in the cemetery and the Trojan war. However, Joyce is here creating the illusion of a metempsychotic link between the individual life of Leopold Bloom and his great ancestor Odysseus, a link which is established for a moment and then fades. What is distinctive about Bloom’s experience is Joyce’s act of decentering Bloom’s individual memory in favor of the Great Memory. Joyce’s use here of the Great Memory is a textual construct which dissolves the barrier between past and present.

Another moment outside of the quotidian occurs in the same scene, when Paddy Dignam’s body is finally lowered into the earth. At this moment, when the fact of death is established unequivocally, Bloom suddenly thinks, “If we were all suddenly somebody else”(6. 836). Again, there is no apparent reason for this cryptic bit of interior monologue. Here again a phrase from the *Spiritus Mundi* may have suddenly emerged into Bloom’s awed mind. Again, he is not only the natural Dubliner Leopold Bloom of June 16, 1904; he is a crystal prism through which, by metempsychosis, his aboriginal personality shines out over centuries.

Finnegans Wake, the greatest experimental text of the early twentieth century, presents readers with the dilemma of inaccessibility if approached with the presupposition that it contains an explicit linear narrative structure. Rather, the assumed communicative grammar is decentered in favor of a linguistic space-time continuum reflecting the gradual evolution of human life; hence, it reflects the evolution of human consciousness. In *Finnegans Wake*, the text itself becomes the crystal prism through which is conveyed simulation of metempsychotic linkage between past and present. In the *Wake*, unlike

Ulysses, individual representation is diminished in favor of alternate modes of psychic presentation.

Human consciousness contributes to an understanding of the condition of individual selfhood, an identity sustained by and recognized through individual memory. However, in the *Wake*, the quasi-individualized consciousness of HCE is only manifested in fleeting snatches, and is overlaid and superseded by an encyclopedic panorama of historical and mythic content. Harry Levin was correct in his assessment that the dreaming HCE's memory could not contain all the contents presented if we read in the narrow sense that consciousness contains just "autobiographical memory." However, as Edmund Wilson, Richard Ellmann, James Atherton, Clive Hart, and others have noted, HCE's all-inclusive dream state represents the collective memory of human history and prehistory.

What is distinctive about the use of memory in Joyce is his recomposition of identity through a parapsychological concept adumbrated in his work through gradations. In *Finnegans Wake* the use of non-naturalistic memory becomes the sustaining element of textual constructs, the interpretative channel for original identity, and the collapsing of social, historical, and cultural discontinuities between the past and present.

In *Finnegans Wake*, the summation of Joyce's work on memory, autobiographical memory is superseded in favor of the Great Memory, the transindividual and transhistorical bond in establishing the similarity and generalized texture of all human existence. In the *Wake*, all events and characters mingle. All the events in the *Wake* rise to the surface of textual consciousness randomly, not to confuse but to illustrate the interconnection of past with present manifested through the sustained metempsychotic link of HCE, the collective representative of mankind, to the Great Memory and to the Akasic Records.

I intend to explore the evolution of this Great Memory in the writings of James

Joyce, from his early short stories, *Dubliners*, through his *bildungsroman* *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, through *Ulysses*, and finally in its most developed form in *Finnegans Wake*, the book in which “everybody is somebody else,” as revealed by the Great Memory in sleep. I approach my topic through mental science as it pertains to Joyce’s textual formulations, and his own developing idea of transpersonal memory.

Chapter 1 “...that great memory...more generous than our memory”: the evolution and contextualization of Joycean memory

All James Joyce’s works focus on the same recurring narrative — a character’s genesis within both a personal and proto-familial structure. Obviously, in the “real” world, as in the fictive, a character’s individual and aboriginal formation would not be possible without consciousness, the most defining yet elusive faculty of human existence, and without consciousness’ concomitant — memory. Joyce’s conception of character is predicated upon the textually progressive simulation of interiority, wherein he intentionally attempts to synthesize to the point of negation authorial or narrative presence. This synthesis is most explicitly encountered in *Finnegans Wake* where the stinking site of the geomythic burial mound in Book I, chapter i serves a twofold purpose: as a substitution for traditional presentation of narrative voice, and as an attempt to concretize collective memory textually through a universalized referential base whose upsurges of prehistorical and historical experience are reiterated through the ur-story of HCE, ALP, and their progeny.

In the “Proteus” chapter of *Ulysses*, Stephen by his perception on Sandymount Strand contemplates his existence “a stride at a time” through the inescapable conditions of time and space. In “Proteus,” Stephen’s fictive existence is captured through narrative, which presupposes a time and place in which the story of his life occurs perceived through the consciousness of Joyce’s readers. Stephen’s philosophical concerns become his readers’ concerns; the entire corpus of Joyce’s work focuses on his characters’ interiority set against their perceptual interaction with objective reality.

In this chapter, I construct a conceptual framework drawn from philosophical and psychological discourses about what we “understand” as consciousness, the unconscious and our selfhood as they exemplify Joyce’s textual treatment of his characters’ personal

memories, and the effect of Great or collective memory. I analyze the topics of space, time, and the formulation of memory, to illustrate how Joyce constructs a transparent simulation of conscious and unconscious processes, which also incorporates his ideas about temporality, mentation, and human identity. These ideas were treated in two of Joyce's early essays, and remained unchanged throughout the entire corpus of his work. Joyce's presentation of memory is simultaneously a search for common human definition. *Dubliners*, *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, and *Ulysses* illustrate the sustained presentation of "natural memory," that is, naturalistically treated recollection, while incorporating only intermittent upsurges of Great Memory. It is not until *Finnegans Wake*, where the veil of naturalistic representation is lifted, that Joyce presents an exclusive treatment of Great Memory, in which all patterns of human existence are contained and cohere. Joyce's "delaying of narrative" in the *Wake* is crucial to an understanding of Joyce's representation of textual memory. Joyce constructs a textual unconscious that is interlinked with the modern treatment of narratology, and with the concept of the "sliding subject," since Joyce's presentation of the disembodied subject, or HCE's psychic life shifts through the fluid temporal parameters of his mind, which encompass the historical and prehistorical past.

Joyce's literary simulation of the genesis of memory presupposes human character as a cognitive center or register of recollected experience. In both *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* and *Finnegans Wake*, Joyce concentrates on the evolution of consciousness. For instance, in *A Portrait*, the story of the "moocow" simulates as a text the child Stephen's first self-referential cognitive and perceptual experience or the awakening of his conscious awareness of internal and external reality. But what do we understand as consciousness?

Antonio Damasio's neuropsychological account of the formation of consciousness postulates a cognitive awareness of "selfhood," which acts in conjunction with our perceptual encounter with the world.

Joyce's idea of autobiographical memory is illuminated by the recent work of Antonio Damasio, since both establish an interrelational base to consciousness by conjoining the process of ideation with each recipient's uniqueness of experiential awareness. For instance, in *Ulysses* Joyce distinctively delineates Stephen Dedalus' and Molly and Leopold Bloom's interiority by giving each character a uniquely subjective response, which for readers is unmistakably identifiable, so that a random, isolated passage of interior monologue is immediately recognizable as the interior monologue of a particular character. Furthermore, Damasio's likening the process of ideation with cinematic presentation can be compared to Joyce's use of the movie projector trope, one of a number of designators in the *Wake*, to express the gradual shift from spatial to temporal sequencing.

The Joycean character's individuation is conveyed by elements of autobiographical memory. However, Joyce's textual recreation of ideation, which captures a character's self-referentiality in relation to perceptual experience, parallels Damasio's hypothetical model of extended consciousness. At the outset of his study, Damasio introduces the two most fundamental "problems" regarding what we are to understand as comprising consciousness. The first is the brain's ability to ideate, while the second concurrently gives rise to a cognitive realization of selfhood:

The neurobiology of consciousness faces two problems: the problem of how the movie-in-the-brain is generated, and the problem of how the brain also generates the sense that there is an owner and observer for that movie. The two problems are so intimately related that the latter is nested within the former.
(1999: 11)

For Damasio, the construction of consciousness makes possible subjective awareness and the human capacity for identity formation. He constructs a three-fold system consisting of the “proto-self,” “core consciousness,” and “extended consciousness.” “Core consciousness” and “extended consciousness” are related:

The sense of self which emerges in core consciousness is the *core self*, a transient entity, ceaselessly re-created for each and every object with which the brain interacts. Our traditional notion of self, however, is linked to the idea of identity and corresponds to a nontransient collection of unique facts and ways of being which characterize a person. My term for that entity is the *autobiographical self*. The autobiographical self depends on systematized memories of situations in which core consciousness was involved in the knowing of the most invariant characteristics of an organism’s life.... (1999: 17)

In this theoretical system, the “proto-self” is the “nonconscious,” non-perceptive, and nonverbal “mapping” capacity of the “neural patterns” in the multidimensional regions of an individual’s brain (Damasio 1999: 154). It “is reconstructed live at each instant... and ...is a current representation of the state of the organism” (Damasio 1999: 173).

This neurological construct makes possible the inception of core-consciousness, “which is the source of the sense of self in the act of knowing” (Damasio 1999: 169). It emerges from the proto-self, and it “*occurs when the brain’s representation devices generate an imaged, nonverbal account of how the organism’s own state is affected by the organism’s processing of an object, and when this process enhances the image of the causative object, thus placing it saliently in a spatial and temporal context* [Damasio’s italics]” (1999: 169). At the level of the proto-self, there is no memory retention, because “core-consciousness” is here “condemned to sisyphal transiency” (Damasio 1999: 173). Memory retention becomes possible with the positioning of self in a temporal relational capacity. Autobiographical memory is here manifested through “extended consciousness.” It

is an internal and external register of self-awareness and contains the retrospective and prospective capability (Damasio 1999: 196) so vital in comprehending living experience:

[I]n extended consciousness, the sense of self arises in the consistent, reiterated display of some of our own personal memories, *the objects of our personal past* [Damasio's italics], those that can easily substantiate our identity, moment by moment, and our personhood. (1999: 196)

For Joyce and Damasio, the self's recognition of a temporal dimension relies on the extended consciousness' capacity for memory. In Joyce's essay "James Clarence Mangan," Joyce views beauty occurring "when the imagination contemplates intensely *the truth of its own being* or the visible world" (83) [emphasis added]. The contemplation of our sense of identity and our experiential existence are "realities" for Joyce, which "alone give and sustain life" (1902: 83). These "realities" are only possible through our capacity for natural memory as we exist in time. This is why interiority predominates in all his work.

My discussion of Joycean memory involves an epistemological exploration of how an individual references time. In *The Principles of Psychology*, William James, citing James Mill, posits that the conception of time would be non-existent without memory. Memory makes possible the acquisition of experience (1890: 1: 571), which positions man in a time-relational existence. In this experiential existence, we are aware of time's passage through diurnal measure, physical growth and decline, and seasonal change. The Joycean character is anchored in his chronological existence and apprehends this aspect of time's forward movement: the young boy in "Araby" anxiously awaits his uncle's return home so that he can get money to go to the bazaar before closing time. In *A Portrait* as the seasons progress, Stephen is aware of his growth, physiologically and intellectually. The early chapters of *Ulysses* find Leopold Bloom obsessively apprehensive of 4:00 p.m., the hour which marks

Molly's assignation and infidelity with Blazes Boylan. In Joyce's most non-chronological work, *Finnegans Wake*, the aging, impotent Earwicker fruitlessly tries to inhibit his maturing progeny's growth until he is finally overthrown, as Epstein has established:

Through *Finnegans Wake*, HCE is haunted by a vision of three soldiers and two girls who are doing something in a wood. They seem to be his children under light disguise—his two sons Shem and Shaun (plus a third who is an amalgamation of the two), and his daughter Issy (and her mirror image). He is sure that the children are plotting to overthrow him, and he keeps trying to destroy them or, at least, to render them impotent. (1971:13)

Yet this external component of time is but one aspect of our experience of it. One's apprehension of time's non-sequential aspect is manifested durationally, that is the inward register, which makes possible the accruing of experience contained in memory, and is interconnected with the processes of consciousness. William James in *The Principles of Psychology* conceptualizes consciousness not as compartmentalized, mutually exclusive "units" of ideation, but as a "*stream*" which "flows" (1890:1:233). Hence, this conceptualization makes possible the mind's capacity for "retrospection" and "prospection," wherein an individual's perspective of time is realized through an awareness of the gradual diminishing of former perceptions concomitant with the continuous introduction of new perceptual realities (1890: 1:571), which "are the germs of memory and expectation" (1890: 1:571). As the "Proteus" chapter of *Ulysses* makes clear, Joyce holds, with James, that our consciousness of objective reality is made possible through our sensation and then perception of it, which in turn leads to the formation of natural or private memory. This perceptual encounter is the key to our introspective awareness of time. Furthermore, James states that an awareness of the past can only be possible in the present (1890: 1:591-592) or (citing E.R. Clay's designation), the "*specious present*" (1890: 1:573). In the "*specious present*," time is

perceived as a “duration” with a backward and forward aspect (1890: 1:574). This “duration” makes possible our “*direct experiences*” of the time sense (1890: 1:600), or our “intuition of time” (1890: 1:603), and is crucial to Joyce’s construction of his characters’ interiority.

Kumar’s study of the impact of Bergson’s time theories on modern novelistic presentation of a character’s “stream of consciousness” includes a pertinent discussion concerning Joyce’s method of interior formation of character in relation to Bergson’s conceptualizations about how individuals mentally experience time. Kumar views Joyce as a “time” novelist, and sees Bergson’s influence on Joyce in the areas of “*durée, mémoire par excellence* and intuition” (104). For Joyce and Bergson, the present is “specious” in duration; it is indeterminable introspectively. As Bergson states, it is conceived outside the frame of duration as “a mathematical instant” (1896: 176), or within the frame as “an ideal present— a pure conception, the indivisible limit which separates past from future” (1896: 176). Bergson theorizes that in “duration,” the present is perceptually coexistent within the past and future: “The psychical state, then, that I call ‘my present,’ must be both a perception of the immediate past and a determination of the immediate future” (1896: 177).

For Joyce, the present is the means by which a vista opens into the world of the past, through its images and perceptions: “Hold to the now, the here, through which all future plunges to the past” (*Ulysses* 9.89). In present time, human beings look to the past to formulate their own self-images. In the present, however, we incorporate past selves into one cohesive image of ourselves. Joyce makes it evident that we are who we are, personally and collectively, through the means of reflection on our previous lived moments.

The durational aspect of consciousness is distinguished from chronological register.

Irreversible measurable time collapses in favor of the mind's capacity to return to sites of past lived experience. Just as transitoriness makes individuals aware of time, memory epitomizes man's dualistic nature, for return in time is possible only mentally, not physically. Hence, for Bergson, time in the mind is not to be understood in mathematical terms or in "quantitative" measurement, but rather in its "qualitative" aspect. This is what distinguishes time from space. In duration, time and space are not co-relational, but mutually exclusive. Bergson illustrates how mental apprehension of time and space differ using the "pendulum" analogy. The "recollection" of former and current "oscillation" movements merge in consciousness. This subsumption of past and present operates "like the notes of a tune [creating] ...a continuous or qualitative multiplicity with no resemblance to number" (1888: 105). This is Bergson's conceptualization of "pure duration," for the notes are qualitatively perceived in degrees of sensation, or "intensive magnitudes," rather than in a juxtaposed line of succession, which would invoke "quantitative" or spatial mentation (1888: 105).

The interrelation and mutual exclusiveness of the temporal and spatial dimensions is a Joycean concern also. In *Finnegans Wake*, Joyce parodistically presents the space-time dilemma in the realms of mental science and physics. Joyce's Professor Jones, "so eminent a spatialist" (149.18-19), suggestive of Wyndham Lewis (M)² tackles "the sophology of Bitchson" (149.20), or Bergson and the "theorics of Winestain" (149.28) or Einstein who are two time-dominated theorists. From his spatialist "blinkpoint" (149. 18), Professor Jones refutes the "dime-cash problem" (149.17) of Bitchson/Bergson, who is motivated "by a purely dime-dime urge" (149.21). The "dime-dime urge" suggests Bergson's devaluating

² M refers to Roland McHugh, *Annotations to "Finnegans Wake."*

space in favor of time in his theories concerning duration and memory. Joyce's "blinkpoint" can be illuminated by examining Derrida's idea of the painter experiencing a "gap" in, or "absence" from, his subject, when he has to rely on his memory when daubing the canvas (1990: 48). Professor Jones' argument is flawed, since he too must rely on time-dominated memory, since his own space-dominated world is momentarily obscured. Like Bergson, Winestain/ Einstein is also under attack by Jones for his "chance ridiculisation of the whoo-who and where's hairs theoric" (149.27-28) or creation of spacetime, inclusive of an ad hominem attack on his choice of coiffure.

In "Proteus," Stephen experiments with sense modalities, and transverses the beach: "A very short space of time through very short times of space" (3.11-12). Two concepts enter his interior monologue: "*Nacheinander*" and "*Nebeneinander*." The former designates sequentiality, and the latter designates a juxtaposed relationship in space through sensual apprehension. Gifford and Seidman gloss the terms in reference to Lessing's *Laocoön* (45); in *Laocoön*, Lessing attempted, as Joseph Frank states, "to define the unalterable laws of aesthetic perception"(4). Lessing defines time and space in relation to the differentiation occurring during perceptual apprehension of aesthetic mediums. Frank presents Lessing's argument:

Form in the plastic arts, according to Lessing, is necessarily spatial because the visible aspect of objects can best be presented juxtaposed in an instant of time. Literature, on the other hand, makes use of language, composed of a succession of words proceeding through time; and it follows that literary form, to harmonize with the essential quality of its medium, must be based primarily on some form of narrative sequence.
(6)

However, for Joyce, spatial apprehension can be a concomitant to narrative. Stephen

momentarily differentiates between the two media, while Joyce, through the construction of his texts, shows that they need not be mutually exclusive. Frank sees in *Ulysses* the reconciliation of the spatial and temporal through Joyce's method of gradually introducing increments of fragmentary presentation:

The reader is intended to acquire this sense ['Dublin as a totality'] as he progresses through the novel, connecting allusions and references spatially and gradually becoming aware of the pattern of relationships.... Joyce, in his unbelievably laborious fragmentation of narrative structure, proceeded on the assumption that a unified spatial apprehension of his work would ultimately be possible. (18-19)

Stephen's experiment with temporality and spatiality also suggests a Newtonian perspective:

In Newton's model, time and space were a background in which events took place but which weren't affected by them. Time was separate from space and was considered to be a single line, or railroad track, that was infinite in both directions....Time itself was considered eternal, in the sense that it had existed, and would exist, forever. (Hawking 2001:32)

In theoretical physics, Newton's view is modified by Einstein, who created "spacetime." In *Finnegans Wake*, Professor Jones, in contradicting the temporalists, contradicts himself in his opening of "The Mookse and Gripes" fable. As a spatialist, Professor Jones would not say "once upon a time," but rather begins, "Eins within a space and a wearywide space it wast ere wohned a Mookse"(152.18-19). This is more than a parody of the opening of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. Ironically, Joyce has Jones invoke Einstein ("Eins") who combined space and time. In addition, Joyce indicates that by relating a fable, no matter what substitution of terminology is used, time even though unmentioned is still a premise of

narrative.

The laws of science governing time and space are applicable to Joyce's technique in the *Wake*. Hawking explains how in theoretical physics the notion of "[i]maginary time is indistinguishable from direction in space" (1988: 143), and therefore, no major distinction exists "between the forward and backward directions of imaginary time" (1988: 143-144). Joyce employs "imaginary time" in the first book of the *Wake*, since by reversing narrative time through the backward motion of the river, he brings us onto the spatial plane and to the source of memory, conveyed by a giant mound.

William James discusses the similarity of our mental construction of time and of space, and dismisses the common opinion that our spatial sense precedes our temporal sense (1890: 1:594). However, Joyce follows the common line in his unique spatial/temporal construction in *Finnegans Wake*. Although the *Wake* is to be understood as cyclical with no beginning or end, in this never-ending cycle space always precedes time because the river's backward motion always signifies that time is stopped, or has not begun. Joyce mimics the precedence of spatiality structurally; in Jakobsonian terminology Joyce employs a paradigmatic or vertical linguistic relationship wherein words are relevant but cannot be understood sequentially or syntagmatically (which presupposes a temporal syntax). Hence, in Book I of the *Wake*, it is not until the eighth chapter, when the river's tidal current reverses, that time begins. Memory, although occurring in time, is paradoxically atemporal since it is paradigmatic, a vertical descent into the past. Joyce signifies this in Book I, chapter i of the *Wake* where in his geomythic terrain we begin an asyntactical descent into the Vice King's stinking burial mound, the site of all history and prehistory, an Akasic ash-heap (17. 26-30). Moreover, Joyce's delaying of narrative in the *Wake* is crucial to an

understanding of his representation of textual memory, and construction of HCE's psychic representation. Joyce's textual unconscious has an affinity with the modern treatment of the evasive essence of the soul— the “sliding subject” — through his assemblage of the multifarious disembodied entities present in HCE's collective memory, and especially in Book III, where Shaun, through a psychic crossover, becomes HCE.

The construction and reconstruction of memory are dependent on encoding and retrieval processes. Since in autobiographical memory the sensory perceptions are open to a myriad of experiences, the question arises concerning what determines retention during the encoding process. For William James, our level of attention determines the degree of the impression (1890:1: 630) that leads to the formation of natural memory. In her survey of memory types vis à vis “encoding,” or the process by which perceptual experience is transformed into memory (1,226), Regina Pally cites two factors relevant to the “encoding process” in terms of greatest retention: “novelty of information” and “emotionally arousing information” (1,227). Memory is the foundation of growth, and the memories of childhood and early adulthood are the most vividly remembered because this experience that is mentally incorporated is new. Retrieval can occur voluntarily or involuntarily. The emotional context is an important factor, not only in implantation, but in retrieval. As James asserts, memory once infused is evoked in present time through “association” via the channels of sensation or cues (1890:1:614-616), which become the catalysts for its emergence. The approximation of sensory context in the present creates the condition for involuntary recall. Bergson makes a clear distinction between, “spontaneous,” involuntary memory and “learnt,” voluntary memory:

Spontaneous recollection is perfect from the outset; time can add nothing to its image without disfiguring it; it retains in memory its place and date. On the contrary, a learnt recollection passes out of time in the measure that the lesson is better known; it becomes more and more impersonal, more and more foreign to our past life. (1896: 95)

Voluntary memory is habitual, and lacks the uniqueness of involuntary memory. For Joyce, the simulation of these involuntary, “perfect” upsurges of his characters’ personal and collective pasts is crucial in establishing individual and aboriginal identity.

Joyce’s literary treatment of memory has affinities with Jung and Freud’s psychoanalytical theories of mind. The transvaluation of the rational Cartesian consciousness in favor of the unconscious in the early twentieth century led to the exploration, in both literature and psychoanalysis, of psychic conflict manifested in a bifurcated self, repression, distortion, parapraxis, the dream state, and the collective unconscious— all interconnected processes of memory.

For instance, by the use of “hallucination” in the “Circe” chapter of *Ulysses*, Joyce shows that collectively individuals are formed by shared experiences and memories of which they are not conscious in daily life. Through the phantoms emerging from Leopold Bloom’s memory, Joyce shows all of Bloom’s experiences. However, all the patterns ultimately merge. The amalgamation of Bloom’s identities anticipates the technique of the *Wake*, where “everybody is somebody else” through the psychic linkage of memory. In “Circe,” the contents of Bloom’s private memories are distorted and projected into a phantasmagoric stream where his identity is blurred. Bloom’s lapse out of consciousness into fantasy in this chapter reflects a reenactment of the collective patterns of mankind, and is analogous to Jung’s conception that the archetypal expressions of the collective unconscious are

manifested in fantasy.

In contradistinction to Joyce and Jung, Freud's work reflects only a passing interest in Collective Memory. However, his idea about repression, wherein memories become buried, illustrates an aspect of autobiographical memory that might have interested Joyce. The recognition of individual identity originates in the individual's representation of self in consciousness and memory. However, the stability of the self was called into question by Freud, among others. Freud delineated and systematized through an exclusive psychological vocabulary another aspect of mental process — the “unconscious,” that must be taken into account in identity-formation. According to Freud, unconscious repression is inordinate, and conflict is created in the attempt to establish a cohesive sense of self. This conflict is the source of irrational drives and distorted ideation. Freud's conceptualization of the unconscious is formulated in *The Interpretation of Dreams* and elsewhere in relation to the latent and manifest processes in its articulation in dreams. For Freud, “*The interpretation of dreams is the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind*” (1900-01:5:608). In this work, Freud explicitly posits that dreams, the products mostly of the unconscious, are almost exclusively the products of natural memory: “All the material making up the content of a dream is in some way derived from experience, that is to say, has been reproduced or remembered in the dream—so much at least we may regard as an undisputed fact” (1900-1901:4:11). However, in his section on “Typical Dreams,” Freud does allow for a collective unconscious. Certain material from the unconscious, however distorted, is able to circumvent the sensory repression process and become recognizable in consciousness.

Through his analysis of dreams, Freud posits that the unconscious is unequivocally

“psychical” and manifests itself through two mutually exclusive systems: the impenetrable unconscious, which is never able to be accessed by consciousness, and the preconscious, which under conditions of “excitation” is able to penetrate consciousness (1900-1901:5:614-615). The surfacing of buried autobiographical memory from the preconscious is prevalent in the Joycean character. In *Ulysses*, both Stephen Dedalus and Leopold Bloom experience sporadic psychic eruptions of their past autobiographical memory. Moreover, the uncovering of buried memory is intrinsic to the textual patterns established in the “Proteus” chapter of *Ulysses*, and are carried over to *Finnegans Wake* through the tropes of dreaming and digging. Freud compared his technique of resurrecting repressed memory to the archaeologist’s; his analogy is applicable to Joyce. In the “Proteus” chapter of *Ulysses*, a dog digs in the sand, and his instinctual action parallels Stephen’s digging into his memory. In the *Wake*, the hen and the Four Old Men dig into the Akasic mound and discover at its center the dreaming HCE.

In an essay called “The Unconscious,” Freud’s main premise for accepting the idea of the unconscious resides in inexplicable “gaps” of consciousness--parapraxes, “Freudian slips.” The “gaps” that occur in consciousness are inexplicable unless they are understood as emanating from the unconscious. Freud categorizes a number of “psychical acts” such as “parapraxes,” “dreams,” alien “ideas,” and “intellectual conclusions” as non-relational and incomprehensible if interpreted through consciousness alone (1915:14:166-167).

Joyce introduces these seemingly mental anomalies into his characters’ interior monologues. For instance, in *Ulysses* Leopold Bloom is only too aware of his wife’s propensity for infidelity. His insecurity is apparent in a Freudian slip in the “Cyclops” chapter. During the conversation about the “insurance” for Paddy Dignam’s widow, the

inadvertent “slip” occurs:

- Well, that’s a point, says Bloom, for the wife’s admirers.
- Whose admirers? says Joe.
- The wife’s advisers, I mean, says Bloom. (12. 767-769)

For Freud, the unconscious is also the repressed reservoir of natural memory. His justification for accepting the existence of the unconscious resides in its ability to be conceptualized as a storehouse for “latent memories,” since only limited amounts of “conscious knowledge” can be made available and processed at any given moment by the conscious mind (1915:14:167). Moreover, unlike consciousness, the workings of the unconscious are not dependent on time: “The processes of the system Ucs. [unconscious] are *timeless*; i.e. they are not ordered temporally, are not altered by the passage of time; they have no reference to time at all” (1915:14:187). Freud believed only in a “personal unconscious,” an individual realm of inaccessible motivation.

However, he does describe instances of memory which might be conceived of as “parapsychological” in character — the *déjà vu* experience:

We must also include in the category of the miraculous and the ‘uncanny’ the peculiar feeling we have, in certain moments and situations, of having had exactly the same experience once before or of having once before been in the same place, though our efforts never succeed in clearly remembering the previous occasion that announces itself in this way.... I know that the subject would merit the most exhaustive treatment. (1901: 6:265,266)

Years later, in a commemorative letter to Romain Rolland, Freud returns to the subject in reference to his own “disturbance of memory” or “derealization.” In this letter, he dismisses the *déjà vu* experience and other similar phenomena as “illusions in which we seek to accept something as belonging to our ego, just as in the derealizations we are anxious to keep

something out of us (1936: 22:245).

However, the “subject” of extrapersonal memory did receive “exhaustive treatment” by Freud’s younger contemporary, Carl Jung. Like Freud, Jung acknowledges we do have a personal unconscious, but unlike Freud’s skeptical allowance he posits with certainty that we also have a collective unconscious:

The collective unconscious is a part of the psyche which can be negatively distinguished from a personal unconscious by the fact that it does not, like the latter, owe its existence to personal experience and consequently is not a personal acquisition. While the personal unconscious is made up essentially of contents which have at one time been conscious but which have disappeared from consciousness through having been forgotten or repressed, the contents of the collective unconscious have never been in consciousness, and therefore have never been individually acquired, but owe their existence exclusively to heredity. Whereas the personal unconscious consists for the most part of *complexes*, the content of the collective unconscious is made up essentially of *archetypes*. (1936-1937: 42)

Jung here posits through his “second psychic system” an innate reservoir for archetypal articulation containing universal images and symbols. Jung’s conception of the archetype attempts to account for the commonality of human existence, and reinvests mythic expression with psychic parallels:

From the unconscious there emanate determining influences which, independently of tradition, guarantee in every single individual a similarity and even a sameness of experience, and also of the way it is represented imaginatively. One of the main proofs of this is the almost universal parallelism between mythological motifs, which, on account of their quality as primordial images, I have called *archetypes*. (1936: 58)

Jung’s conceptualization of a universalizing agent of mind manifesting itself through archetypal articulation suggests Joyce’s formulation of recurrent psychic patterns in his

characters' streams of consciousness.

Sheldon Brivic reads Joyce through a Freudian and Jungian subtext, especially in relation to Jung's Collective Unconscious and its corollaries, including metempsychosis (178) and mind overlap (170). In *Ulysses*, Joyce according to Brivic employs Jungian "overlap" through upsurges of ideation in the mindscapes of both Stephen and Leopold Bloom. In Book III of the *Wake*, the Freudian Oedipal power shift is signaled through a shared metempsychotic conjoining of HCE and Shaun's collective ideation, which is followed by the psychic succession of the father by the son.

Others have approached the topic of transindividual memory. In *Principles of Psychology*, William James focuses on a naturalistic study of mental life. Like Jung, James recognizes the sense of pre-existent memory common to all humanity (1890:1:635). This "anima mundi thinking" (1890:1:328) is metaphysically plausible but is unexplainable in empirical terms. In *Varieties of Religious Experience* he discusses the idea of a "wider self" (1902: 515), and in his "Confidences of a Psychological Researcher" he posits a "cosmic consciousness" (1909: 374).

While for Jung, "[t]he main source" of archetypal expression is in dreams, it can also manifest itself through an "active imagination" (1936-1937: 48,49). Nietzsche in *Human, All Too Human* foreshadows Jung in his idea that the dream state has a propensity for interconnecting individuals with the thought processes of earlier eras (19-20). Like Jung and Nietzsche, Joyce too recognizes the dream state as a psychic segue into the racial past. Joyce, in both *Ulysses* and the *Wake*, employs the dream as a cognate of transpersonal reality.

Yeats, in his quest for a universalizing system to articulate artistic expression,

recognized the existence of “great,” or collective memory . In his esoteric essay “Magic,” he views transindividual and transhistorical mentation as the concomitants of “great memory”:

- (1) That the borders of our mind are ever shifting, and that many minds can flow into one another, as it were, and create or reveal a single mind, a single energy.
- (2) That the borders of our memories are as shifting, and that our memories are a part of one great memory, the memory of Nature herself.
- (3) That this great mind and great memory can be evoked by symbols. (28)

Yeats’ three tenets establish his belief in the existence of a collective unconscious. Joyce too taps into the “great memory” for artistic purpose to illustrate the unchanging patterns in human life.

Joyce’s interest in Collective Memory was, like Jung’s, stimulated by what he knew of Protagoras, Plato, the Bhagavad Gita, and the Vedas. The concept of a Great or collective memory can be traced to ancient Western and Eastern sources, most of them available to Joyce. The idea of an extrapersonal memory is traced to the ancient belief in metempsychosis, or the “transmigration of the soul” (OED 1,782). Herodotus credits the Egyptians with establishing the belief: “they were also the first people to put forward the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and to maintain that after death it enters another creature at the moment of that creature’s birth.... This theory has been adopted by certain Greek writers, some earlier, some later, who have put it forward as their own” (II, 123). The inception of the Great Memory into Greek thought has been credited to the Presocratic philosopher Pythagoras, by Porphyry:

But it became very well known to everyone that he [Pythagoras] said, first, that the soul is immortal; then, that it changes into other kinds of animals; and further, that at certain periods whatever has happened happens again, there being nothing absolutely new; and that all living things should

be considered as belonging to the same kind. Pythagoras seems to have been the first to introduce these doctrines into Greece. (qtd. in Barnes, 86)

Interconnected with metempsychosis is the notion of “eternal recurrence,” or “whatever has happened happens again” (Barnes, 86). Barnes’ overview of the early Greek philosophers includes a discussion of Greek thought in relation to the indestructibility of existence. Barnes comments that “eternal recurrence” was a popular tenet among Pythagoras’ followers (88). For the Pythagoreans cyclical redundancy is not limited to the natural world, but manifests itself in individuals’ lives, “But if we are to believe the Pythagoreans and hold that things the same in number recur— that you will be sitting here and I shall talk to you, holding this stick, and so on for everything else— then it is plausible that the same time too recurs” (qtd. in Barnes, 88).

The concepts of innate memory and metempsychosis are referred to in the dialogues of Plato. In “Meno,” Socrates advances the idea of metempsychosis and innate memory: “Thus the soul, since it is immortal and has been born many times, and has seen all things both here and in the other world, has learned everything that is” (81,d). When in “Phaedo,” Cebes raised the possibility of complete annihilation in death, Socrates retorts in defense of pre-existence:

There is an old legend which we still remember, to the effect that they[‘the souls of the departed’] *do* exist there[‘in another world’], after leaving here, and that they return again to this world and come into being from the dead. If this is so— that the living come into being again from the dead— does it not follow that our souls exist in the other world? (70, d)

In “Timaeus,” the interconnection of all creation, astronomically as well as terrestrially through God’s infusion of “soul,” is advanced: “The soul, interfused everywhere from the

center to the circumference of heaven, of which also she is the external envelopment, herself turning in herself, began a divine beginning of never-ceasing and rational life enduring throughout all time” (36,e).

In the literature of the East, collective memory plays an extremely important role. Krishna’s words to Arjuna in The Bhagavad Gita underscore an individual’s interconnection with the Eternal through metempsychosis, or *sams_ra*:

12. Because we have been for all time: I, and thou, and those kings of men. And we all shall be for all time, we all for ever and ever.

13. As the Spirit of our mortal body wanders on in childhood, and youth and old age, the Spirit wanders on to a new body: of this the sage has no doubts. (Mascaró 1962: 49)

In the Upanishads, the process of metempsychosis is described analogously through naturalistic imagery, “Even as a caterpillar, when coming to the end of a blade of grass, reaches out to another blade of grass and draws itself over to it, in the same way the Soul, leaving the body and unwisdom behind, reaches out to another body and draws itself over to it” (Mascaró 1965:139). As in Eastern philosophy, Joyce also employs the correspondence between elemental nature and man to underscore the immutability of human existence.

Zimmer sees the instinctual life force within all individuals as the essence of metempsychosis or reincarnation: “And such a will to live is strong enough, according to the Indian theory of rebirth, to carry an individual across the gulf of death into a new incarnation, compelling him to reach out again for a new body, another mask, another costume, in which to carry on” (299). Unless Nirvana, a state of perfection, is reached, the cycle is continuous: “The soul is born and unfolds in a body, with dreams and desires and the food of life. And then it is reborn in new bodies, in accordance with its former works” (Mascaró 1965: 94).

Zimmer explains that in metempsychosis the vestiges of former existences endure throughout the reincarnational cycle: the “inner subtle body”: “departs from the sheath of the gross body at the time of death, and then determines the nature of the new existence; for within it are left the traces— like scars or furrows— of all the perceptions, acts, desires, and movements of will of the past, all the propensities and trends, the heritage of habits and inclinations...” (324).

As in Platonic philosophy, so the Upanishads, the idea of macrocosmic and microcosmic linkage is posited. As Visnu brings forth Brahman from the bud of the lotus in his navel, he makes possible the connection between Brahman/Oversoul and atman/brahman, the vestige of Brahman contained within each individual:

In the center of the castle of Brahman, our own body, there is a small shrine in the form of a lotus-flower, and within can be found a small space....

The little space within the heart is as great as this vast universe. The heavens and the earth are there, and the sun, and the moon, and the stars; fire and lightning and winds are there; and all that now is and all that is not: for the whole universe is in Him and He dwells within our heart. (Mascaró 1965:120)

Zimmer credits the “creative philosophers of the period of the Upanishads” (355) with discerning “the interior world, the inward universe of man himself”(356). The transpersonal dimension, the atman, suggests a source or origin that is manifested in transient upsurges of extra-personal recollection, construed in Eastern doctrine as metempsychosis.

The Indian concept of *ākāśa* is an essential part of the system of transindividual memory. Joseph Campbell comments that “the Indian opened his cosmology with space (*ākāśa*), and produced from that a universe no one had ever seen”(1962: 233). The idea of space or *ākāśa* “is regarded as an all-comprehending container, enclosing not only the

universe (*loka*), but also the non-universe (*aloka*)” (Zimmer , 270). *Ākāśa* is conceived of as an all-inclusive “container,” and is reflected in the Theosophical conception of the Akasic Records. Essentially derived from Hindu philosophy and Theosophical lore, the Akasic Records contains a register of the past of everything. All actions, whether consciously or unconsciously perceived, end up in the great Akasic repository, which contains the remembrance of the past of all creation.

The esoteric understanding is that *ākāśa* is the “life principle” and its source (Blavatsky, 1:139) stems from ancient Hindu texts. “The language of the *Vedas* shows that the Hindus of fifty centuries ago ascribed to it the same properties as do the Thibetan lamas of the present day; that they regarded it as the source of life, the reservoir of all energy; and the propeller of every change of matter” (Blavatsky, 1: xxvii). Blavatsky, in her treatment of the “universal spirit” in relation to magnetism and “clairvoyance,” describes the Theosophical conception of the Akasic Records: “It keeps an unmutated record of all that was, that is, or ever will be. The minutest acts of our lives are imprinted on it, and even our thoughts rest photographed on its eternal tablets.... It is, in short, the MEMORY of GOD!” (1:178).

Metempsychotic tapping into Great Memory, or its Theosophical version the Akasic Records, was a decisive factor in Joyce’s treatment of personalities and psychic patterns of his characters, not only in *Ulysses*, but in all his fiction. Natural memory intermittently creates cohesion but overwhelmingly induces a sense of discontinuity, whereas the Great Memory signifies unbroken connection with a larger frame of reference, and a permanent trace is revealed through his characters’ aboriginal identity. Joyce, in *Ulysses*, explicitly introduces the Akasic Records: “Akasic records of all that ever anywhere wherever was”

(7.882-883), and in a more abbreviated fragmentary thought simply as “Akasic records” (7.928). Stuart Gilbert contended that in *Ulysses* the Akasa represented “the indestructibility of thought,” and that this concept is structurally incorporated into the text of *Ulysses* (189). Ellmann observed that Joyce was acquainted with Theosophical ideology concerning “cycles” and “reincarnation” (1982:99). Rickard extensively cites the incorporation of Theosophical ideas in Joyce’s work and extensively discusses the significance of Akasic memory in relation to *Ulysses* (104). Epstein has established that the “mound” in *Finnegans Wake* is the textual site which contains all Irish history, a reservoir of Celtic memory, through its excavation by the Four Old Men (1974: 26-27). In the *Wake*, for Joyce, the Akasic Records is interchangeable with the mound: Mutt and Jute discover that the mound is the Akasic Records (17. 26-30) because it is the receptacle of the all-inclusive story of life. Although there are many conceptualizations of cosmic consciousness in Eastern and Western sources, Joyce in the *Wake* posits that the Akasic Records and the mound are interchangeable. HCE evolves from the proto-landscape suggesting that man and mound are one — that is to say, man contains the innate memory of the history of existence.

My thesis expands on Epstein, Ellmann, Gilbert, and Rickard’s idea that the Akasic Records is significant to Joyce’s overall literary treatment of transpersonal memory.

Leopold and Molly Bloom’s conversation about metempsychosis in the “Calypso” chapter of *Ulysses* explains the concept of racial memory, for the metempsychotic process involves not a literal reincarnation of souls, but involuntary upthrusts of vestiges of our racial past which are contained in our unconscious. This is not naturalistic memory; this is the Great Memory of the World.

Joyce was influenced by all these sources for his ideas concerning non-personal memory. Obviously, all Joyce's texts are permeated with his characters' personal memories as they are gradually revealed and impact on their psyches. However, he viewed memory in the context of a larger pattern, one which is transhuman and tranhistorical. For Joyce, the self is defined through its aboriginal personality and revealed by its participation in The Great Memory of the World, a memory that subsumes all time. The Great Memory links all individuals and their patterns of behavior to one another, and from it, symbols and recurrent mythic and ritualized actions are derived. The existence of these recurrent patterns illustrate a commonality to life which transcends personal experience or natural memory. These patterns are the organizing principle of life.

Joyce's characters do not consciously approach the patterns of racial memory; rather, it manifests itself in the momentary flash of aboriginal identity in the mind. In his early autobiographical essay "A Portrait of the Artist" Joyce holds that life gives human beings "a fluid successions of presents" (60). In *Finnegans Wake*, ALP in her manifestation as river symbolizes time and what it gives us, the beauty of life experienced through temporal existence. Joyce's ideas from this early essay remained unchanged and are incorporated in all his texts, and this is why he has ALP give us what we are given by life—a succession of gifts, or "presents" realized through our experiential interactions with the world. Time is understood only through human activity. Yet Joyce was aware that in time individual identity and experience keep changing, although general patterns in human behavior remain unchanged. For Joyce, the patterns in human existence transcend time. These patterns, "the permanent reality under unchanging form," are evidenced in his works both externally through ritualistic action and metempsychotically through participation in "that great memory

which is greater and more generous than our memory, [where] no life, no moment of exaltation is ever lost" (1902: 83).

Chapter 2 The “journey westward” into the swooning soul: Joyce’s evolution of mnemonic identity in *Dubliners*

Dubliners, especially the story “The Dead,” is the foundation for Joyce’s treatment of both autobiographical and Great Memory. Through a character’s perceptual encounter with “objective reality,” Joyce evokes buried memories to connect past with present in an attempt to establish moments of cohesive identity. Moreover, Joyce here advances the idea that only by examination of the past can a character’s personal and collective identity be defined. In *Dubliners*, he counterpoints autobiographical memory, which when juxtaposed with some of his characters’ seemingly vacuous present situations induces psychic dislocation resulting in depression and fragmentation with Great Memory, for Joyce, the cohesive unifier which lends significance to the patterning in human existence.

James Joyce’s first formulations of the Great Memory are introduced through the metempsychotic encounters of the characters in *Dubliners*. Little Chandler in “A Little Cloud” is enveloped in the “late autumn sunset,” which “cast a shower of kindly golden dust” on generalized Irish humanity, and which opens up a metempsychotic link with the collective sadness of life. In “The Dead,” Gabriel Conroy’s experience with the falling snow induces a psychic connection: at the end of the of “The Dead” his solipsistic individualism is lost, and his individual memory merges with the Great Memory, the Akasic Records.

James Joyce’s essay of 1902, “James Clarence Mangan,” delineates his conception of “Great Memory” through a comparison with autobiographical memory. For Joyce, Great Memory “is greater and more generous than our memory, [where] no life, no moment of exaltation is ever lost” (83). Joyce suggests that Great Memory supplements autobiographical memory, because, unlike the sometimes limiting subjectivity and

fragmentary propensity associated with autobiographical memory in his characters' recollections, Great Memory is non-exclusionary and capable of establishing shared human experience through its commonality to all individuals and all times. Furthermore, unlike autobiographical memory's restricting capacity for only evoking recollected personal experience, Great Memory is an all-inclusive reservoir of life akin to the cosmic consciousness in ancient Eastern and Western sources, the Jungian "collective unconscious" and the Theosophical Akasic Records. In *Ulysses*, Stephen defines the Akasic Records as containing "all that ever anywhere wherever was" (7.883), which reflects Joyce's idea that through transpersonal memory nothing "is ever lost." Hence, the collective memory trace is innate, not learned. Fictively, access to Great Memory occurs through a character's perceptual encounter with numinous images or symbols. In "The Dead" and "A Little Cloud," snow and waning sunlight act as numinous symbolic triggers psychically immersing the character into the never-ending cycle of life experience.

The incorporation of both Great Memory and autobiographical memory is implicit in Joyce's construction of his characters' psychic states beginning in *Dubliners*. In *Dubliners* his characters' autobiographical memories are counterbalanced by the inclusion of Great Memory, the psychic unification structure wherein integration with archetypal or aboriginal identity is momentarily achieved when the individual relates to the entire human past. In Jungian terms, this total integration process makes possible the "redemptive self-imagó."

In *Dubliners*, psychological dislocation is brought about through a character's autobiographical memory, "the reiterated display" of shattering personal inadequacies. En masse, the Irish nation manifests its dislocation when its long, tragic history of political and historical disenfranchisement appears as empty rituals severed from their vital sources of

meaning, the grandeur of Ireland's past. Given the context and questionable political agenda of the characters in "Ivy Day in the Committee Room," the wearing of "a sprig of ivy" in the lapel to commemorate Charles Stewart Parnell on the 6th of October does not evoke powerful memories of Ireland's liberation through Home Rule, but rather suggests betrayal and the futility of Ireland's future.

For Joyce, Parnell's demise, his betrayal at the hands of the Roman Catholic clergy and a capricious citizenry is not limited to a historical spot of time in nineteenth-century Ireland. Rather, Parnell is the Joycean universal scapegoat because through his rise and fall, albeit political, he incorporates and mirrors the archetypal patterning of the victim. Joyce in "Ivy Day in the Committee Room" explicitly likens him to Christ in Mr. Hynes' poetic tribute to Ireland's "*Uncrowned King*" through the symbol of the Judas "kiss":

*Shame on the coward caitiff hands
That smote their Lord or with a kiss
Betrayed him to the rabble-rout
Of fawning priests— no friends of his. (134)*

Moreover, the paradigm of the fall, whether it be Mr. Kernan's tumble down the pub stairs, in "Grace," Stephen's imagining his lapse into sin as analogous to Lucifer's expulsion from the heights of heaven into the depths of hell in *A Portrait*, Bloom's stumbling on the brothel steps in "Circe," or HCE's decline of paternal power in the *Wake*, all represent in the Joycean canon a proto pattern inherent in human life.

At the end of "The Dead," Gabriel's visual perception of the snow at first induces an idealized vision of the interred Michael Furey, which, in turn, leads to an awareness of humankind's common lot, mortality. Gabriel's limiting individuality diminishes as his thoughts turn outward to the snowy night. Here his subjective self-enclosure is overcome,

and there is an implicit suggestion of salvation and self-renewal accompanying this gesture. Gabriel experiences that crucial moment in Joyce's fiction, the epiphany, a moment when self is transcended and whereby it participates in a greater reality. The snow "develops into a symbol of warmth, of expanded consciousness; it stands for Gabriel's escape from his own ego into the larger world of humanity, including 'all the living and the dead' " (Tate, 394). Tate's interpretation of Gabriel's "expanded consciousness" as transforming from a self-isolating subjectivity into an inclusive link with "all the living and the dead" evokes Gabriel's participation in Great Memory, a psychic investiture that connects individuals with timeless collective experience.

Renewal always begins from within through man's spiritual dimension, an immersion in the Great Memory. Gabriel undergoes a mental crucifixion as he suffers through Gretta's recounting her memory of Michael Furey. This is perhaps why "through Gabriel's mind runs the imagery of Calvary"(Ellmann 1982: 249). Joyce symbolically combines the cemetery's memorial accouterments and landscape with Gabriel's emotive condition to suggest his participation in the archetypal suffering of Christ. Gabriel imagines the snow as

falling on every part of the dark central plain, on the treeless hills, falling softly upon the Bog of Allen and, farther westward, softly falling into the dark mutinous Shannon waves. It was falling, too, upon every part of the lonely churchyard on the hill where Michael Furey lay buried. It lay thickly drifted on the crooked crosses and headstones, on the spears of the little gate, on the barren thorns. His soul swooned slowly as he heard the snow falling faintly through the universe and faintly falling, like the descent of their last end, upon all the living and the dead. (223-224)

Calvary is the supreme symbol of sacrifice for others, a creative nodal center in the Great Memory. Gabriel has experienced his own Calvary in the grips of depression, but then it is

only through Calvary that salvation is possible. Gabriel's mental redirection outward can only be achieved by realizing the human condition is fraught with great suffering and self-sacrifice.

The "late autumn sunset," in "A Little Cloud," like the snow in "The Dead," serves as a numinous catalyst for Little Chandler's psychic entry into "the burden of wisdom which the ages had bequeathed to him" (71). Sun, like snow, as archetypal symbol is invested with transpersonal connectiveness:

The glow of a late autumn sunset covered the grass plots and walks. It cast a shower of kindly golden dust on the untidy nurses and decrepit old men who drowsed on the benches; it flickered upon all the moving figures— on the children who ran screaming along the gravel paths and on everyone who passed through the garden. (71)

Little Chandler's experience here can be elucidated by an understanding of Visnu's role in the *Vedas*, which also foreshadows ALP's encounter with the sun in Book IV of *Finnegans Wake*, the book of sunlight, and of ontological origin and return. Klostermaier explains that one of the manifestations of Visnu is solar: "The *Brhaddevat* treats the name Visnu as one of the names of the Sun....The same work derives the etymology of Visnu from the root *vis* (following the *Nirukta*) and explains Visnu as 'pervasion' applied to the Sun 'who is everything and is contained in everything'"(24). In the "Soft morning, city" section of *Finnegans Wake*, Visnu/Sun pervades elementally from without, rising with ALP in her hydrologic manifestation as "leafy speafing," the autumnal river tidally returning to the sea. It also evokes psychically from within as the catalyst for ur- woman's dying memory of HCE, her husband, the source and primal perpetuator of life as she looks into the face of the rising sun, "Rise up, man of the hooths, you have slept so long! Or is it only so mesleems? On

your pondered palm. Reclined from cape to pede” (619.25-27).

Both Kenner and Tindall comment on the vacuous and debased ritualistic performance experienced in *Dubliners*. In *Dubliners* these rituals are the external objectifications of cultural memory, but are dissociated from their universal significance and contribute to a character’s psychic rupture, which in turn leads to discontent and depression. For Kenner, “[t]he sisters Morkan are custodians of a ritual order, comprising every component of the culture of eighteenth-century Dublin, in whose vitality it is now impossible to feel much faith” (1956: 63). Tindall demonstrates through his interpretation of Father Flynn’s instructorship of the young boy in “The Sisters” the questionable integrity of the version of sacred ritual transmitted to a boy from a priest who “went mad” (1959 :14).

For Joyce, rituals are the objective expressions representing the commonality of all human life. Although his characters are dissociated from rituals once core functions in the past, they are still unconscious participants in a timeless order since a ritual is a repeated pattern, and once established as a pattern it is outside time. Participation in ritualistic behavior is not limited to adults; rather, they are an endemic part of childhood. Eckley, in her study of Joyce’s usage of children’s games in *Finnegans Wake*, discusses their relevance for Joyce since they implicitly contain an adult subtext:

Joyce, in alluding and referring to nursery rhymes, folktales and fairy tales, and children’s games, valued them for their reflection of adult themes, for their retention of ancient beliefs and rituals, and for their eloquence about human psychology. Partly through the learning of these games, the Earwicker children display a knowledge of sex, which avoids making a parental disaster of their assumed childish innocence only because the parents have no part in it. (128)

Through the poignant proto-narrative of the children playing before the Earwicker pub in

“The Mime of Mick, Nick and the Maggies” section of the *Wake* Joyce incorporates the game’s deeper significance since he opens a portal into adulthood through the rainbow girls’ dance. The rhythmic backward and forward motion of the dance symbolizes a transition from childhood past to future adulthood and then back again which merges the generality of these stages of life. The rainbow girls’ dance into the future illustrates what life will be like for them, an adulthood rife with misery, isolation, and alcoholism:

The grocer’s bawd she slips her hand in the haricot bag, the lady in waiting sips her sup from the paraffin can, Mrs. Wildhare Quickdoctor helts her skelts up the casuaway the flasht instinct she herds if a tinkle of tunder, the widow Megrievy she knits cats’ cradles, this bountiful actress leashes a harrier under her tongue, and here’s the girl who she’s kneeled in coldfashion and she’s told her priest (spt!) she’s pot on a chap (chp!) And this lass not least, this rickissime woman, who she writes foot fortunes money times over in the nursery dust with her capital thumb. Buzz. All runaway sheep bound back bopeep, trailing their teenes behind them. And these ways wend they. And those ways went they. (227.3-13)

Joyce’s merging of childhood ritualistic game with future adult experience has its antecedent in the stories focused on childhood in *Dubliners*. In “Araby,” as in the *Wake*, the children play under a “violet” twilight sky (30), which symbolically counterpoints temporal transition from day to night, with childhood passage into adulthood. Just as Shem is unable to guess “heliotrope,” a color of the rainbow signifying for Joyce the fallen colorful world of human existence, the young narrator is unable to identify his first stirring of sexual desire precipitated by Mangan’s sister, because he is still so immersed in the naiveté of childhood. He furtively watches her: “Every morning I lay on the floor in the front parlour watching her door. The blind was pulled down to within an inch of the sash so that I could not be seen” (30), until she becomes suffused in his memory: “[h]er image accompanied me even in

places the most hostile to romance” (31). His intellectual memory is still limited to ideations of love only in the idealized context of children’s romances, but his passage from childhood entails his entry into the universal physiological aspect to love which he does not understand, and which like Stephen in *A Portrait*, he cannot control: “All my senses seemed to desire to veil themselves and, feeling that I was about to slip from them, I pressed the palms of my hands together until they trembled, murmuring: *O love! O love!* many times” (31). So too, in “An Encounter,” Joyce juxtaposes the world of childhood games: “Every evening after school we met in his back garden and arranged Indian battles” (19) with mankind’s propensity for natural evil with the young boy’s exposure to adult perversity, through his “encounter” with the “old josses.”

Joyce begins *Dubliners* with his stories featuring the youngest members of the Dublin community. Through his presentation of recollected childhood experience, Joyce immediately establishes a generalized identity to boyhood because in “The Sisters,” “An Encounter,” and “Araby” few physical details are recounted about the child protagonists, and they remain nameless. The suppression of a character’s physical descriptives becomes a Joycean character’s signature in his later works. Childhood memories are universally acknowledged as the most formative and incisive. Hence, this is why Mr. Cotter in “The Sisters” informs the young boy’s aunt and uncle that children’s “minds are so impressionable” (11) reflecting what he deems is the unhealthy relationship between their nephew and Father Flynn. For the adult, these memories are the most nostalgic.

Joyce constructs his characters inwardly through artistic simulation of a character’s “extended consciousness” (Damasio’s terminology) in order to reveal inner identity. By means of a character’s extended consciousness, Joyce is able to create an autobiographical

past incorporating a wealth of factors. Damasio's description of autobiographical memory is applicable to Joyce's technique:

The repository of records in autobiographical memory contains the memories that constitute identity along with the memories that help define our personhood. What we usually describe as a 'personality' depends on multiple contributions. One important contribution comes from 'traits,' whose ensemble is often referred to as 'temperament,' and which are already detectable around the time of birth. Some of those traits are genetically transmitted and some are shaped by early developmental factors. Another important contribution comes from the unique interactions that a growing, living organism engages in a particular environment, physically, humanly, and culturally speaking. This latter contribution— which is made under the continuous shadow of the former— is recorded in autobiographical memory and is the footing for autobiographical self and personhood. (1999: 222)

Damasio posits a neurological basis of autobiographical memory; that is, the "neural counterpart" to the genetic and environmental factor contributes to the formation of identity:

We can imagine the neural counterpart to this complicated process as consisting of the creation of dispositional records on the basis of which the brain can evoke, given the appropriate stimulus, a collection of fairly simultaneous responses ranging from emotions to intellectual facts. Using the convergence- zone framework, we can imagine that these responses are controlled by records in particular brain sites which direct the playing out of the responses in a variety of [brain] structures. (1999: 223)

Joyce's citizens occupy their own fictive presents in turn-of-the-century Dublin. Here, autobiographical memory operates on a quotidian level permitting the semblance of realism. Damasio comments:

To be sure, certain sets of autobiographical memories are simply and consistently reactivated moment by moment, and these memories deliver to our extended consciousness the facts of our physical, mental, and demographic identity; the facts of our recent provenance (where we were just before, a few minutes and hours ago, the day before) and the facts of

our intended immediate future (what we must accomplish over the next minutes and hours, where we are headed tonight and tomorrow. (1999: 227)

Joyce does not present an array of memories of his characters' entire lives, but carefully selects and focuses on the ones which are crucial to an understanding of their fictive existence. In life, much of our autobiographical memory is inactive or buried; Joyce introduces perceptual cues in his narratives to reactivate past memories, which induces in characters an emotional reverberation consonant with the sentiment experienced in the past. In *Dubliners*, the emotion evoked is almost always sadness, which in the stories appears in the lamentable comments of the characters. This reactivation of buried memory, and its register through a character's emotional response, parallels Damasio's theory of how autobiographical memory works:

Certain contents of autobiographical memory, however, remain submerged for long periods of time and may always remain so. It is easy to imagine, given that memories are not stored in facsimile fashion and must undergo a complex process of reconstruction during retrieval, that the memories of some autobiographical events may not be fully reconstructed, may be reconstructed in ways that differ from the original, or may never again see the light of consciousness. Instead, they may promote the retrieval of other memories which do become conscious in the form of other concrete facts or as concrete emotional states. In the extended consciousness of that moment, the facts so retrieved may be unexplainable because of their apparent lack of connection with the contents of consciousness that command center stage then. (1999: 227)

A reader would expect that in "The Dead" the contents of consciousness that "command center stage" from both Gabriel and Gretta Conroy would be the gaiety of a festive holiday gathering with family and friends; however, this memory scene is displaced by Gretta's memories of a long-dead seventeen-year old boy. Similarly, in "A Painful

Case,” Mr. James Duffy’s habitual and solitary dinner in “George’s Street,” where menu and impersonal newspaper accounts should be his “center stage,” are effaced in favor of a former “bond,” which leads ultimately “to sorrow,” his long-severed relationship with the late Mrs. Emily Sinico. The retreat of present meditations before past upsurges of recollection of the past also evokes Bergson’s assertion: “If there be memory, that is, the survival of past images, these images must constantly mingle with our perception of the present, and may even take its place” (1896: 70).

The emotional response of the Joycean character is predicated on natural, individual memory. However, this memory is not excluded from cognitive processes but interlinked with it. In memory, there is no “dissociation of sensibility”; rather, thought and emotion act in tandem. In the Joycean mental universe, recollected mental image and tear converge: Gretta’s “choking sobs,” and the “generous tears” that “filled Gabriel’s eyes,” appear much later in Joyce’s work as the collective “leap-*tear*” in Book I, chapter vi of *Finnegans Wake*, where the archetypal daughter, Issy, transforms into Nuvoletta, the cloud condensed into one drop. Falling earthward she combines with her mother, ALP—the river as time—to bring rain, or interpreted symbolically, sorrow to mankind. These teardrops are Virgilian *lacrima rerum* as man mourns the passage of time, a mourning only possible through the cognitive process of memory:

She climbed over the bannistars; she gave a chily cloudy cry: *Nuée! Nuée!* A lightdress fluttered. She was gone. And into the river that had been a stream (for a thousand of tears had gone eon her and come on her and she was stout and struck on dancing and her muddied name was Missisliffi) there fell a tear, a singult tear, the loveliest of all tears (I mean for those crylove fables fans who are ‘keen’ on the pretty-pretty commonface sort of thing you meet by hopeharrods) for it was a leap-*tear*. But the river tripped on her by and by, lapping as though her heart was brook: *Why, why, why! Weh, O weh!*

I'se so silly to be flowing but I no canna stay! (159: 8-18)

Here, the individual memory of childhood sorrow — Issy in the quasi-narrative falls through the banister and begins to transform into a teardrop— is subsumed into the collective memory of universal childhood frailties, and includes all children's participation in the Fall into transiency, hence mortality from the star-studded heaven of eternity through the suggestion of the cosmic infusion in the word "bannistars."

In all of his works, Joyce's emotional configuration of his characters undergoing upsurges of memory can be illuminated by Bergson and James, and by Damasio's neurological conjecture that "[f]eelings are just as mental as the objects or events that trigger the emotions" (2003: 65). Damasio builds on Spinoza's idea that "feelings [are] the foundational component of our minds" (2003: 79). Damasio's neurobiological account advances Spinoza's premise:

In brief, the essential content of feelings is the mapping of a particular body state; the substrate of feelings is the set of neural patterns that map the body state and from which a mental image of the body state can emerge. A feeling in essence is an idea— an idea of the body and, even more particularly, an idea of a certain aspect of the body, its interior, in certain circumstances. A feeling of emotion is an idea of the body when it is perturbed by the emoting process. (2003: 88)

Bergson's philosophical understanding of "perception" and "recollection" is that they function as interconnecting mixed states transpiring durationally: "These two acts, perception and recollection, always interpenetrate each other, [and] are always exchanging something of their substance as by a process of endosmosis" (1896: 72). Damasio theorizes that the body, as matter, acts as an agent of representation of consciousness:

Feeling, in the pure and narrow sense of the word, was *the idea of the body being in a certain way* [Damasio's italics]. In this definition you can substitute idea for 'thought' or 'perception.' Once you looked beyond the object that caused the feeling and the thoughts and mode of thinking consequent to it, the core of the feeling came into focus. Its contents consisted of representing a particular state of the body. (2003: 85)

For Damasio, “[f]eelings are perceptions [and] [t]hey translate the ongoing life state in the language of the mind” (2003: 85). Hence, the interrelationship of “feelings” and consciousness evolves through consciousness’ ability to formulate “metarepresentations” through attention levels activated by a given perceptual focus:

[Perception] results from constructing metarepresentations of our own mental process, a high-level operation in which a part of the mind represents another part of the mind. This allows us to register the fact that our thoughts slow down or speed up as more or less attention is devoted to them; or the fact that thoughts depict objects and events at close range or at a distance. (2003: 86)

Damasio’s theory of “metarepresentations” resembles Freud and William James’ ideas concerning memory formation. Damasio’s conceptualization of “metarepresentations,” albeit anchored in an evolutionary biological base, suggests an affinity with Freud’s concept of the “ideational representative.”

Human levels of attention are a decisive factor in memory formation and retrieval. William James recognized that our attention level determines the degree of the impression that leads to natural memory, “The *attention* which we lend to an experience is proportional to its vivid or interesting character; and it is a notorious fact that what interests us most vividly at the time is, other things equal, what we remember best” (1890:1: 630). Once experience becomes a memory trace— that is, is permanently stored— reactivation can occur without warning depending on perceptions.

In “The Dead,” what Gretta remembers “best,” her past relationship with Michael Furey, is evoked by music. Gretta’s perceptual encounter with *The Lass of Aughrim* creates an instance of echoic memory. Gabriel observes Gretta’s change in mood; to him, in the hotel bedroom, she seems silent and “abstracted.” Her state is the result of the interconnection of music, mood, and memory. The song evokes her memory of “loss,” loss of youthful selfless and passionate love. Although any sensuous stimulus can trigger memory, music has evoked mankind’s emotional states in unknown ways. Giomo’s study regarding the differentiae pertaining to the affective qualities of music vis à vis mood is relevant to a reader’s interpretation of Gretta’s reaction to the song:

Over the last 26 centuries, philosophers have recorded their struggles with defining the relationship between music and affective meaning. A survey of these writings shows three basic viewpoints to emerge. The first, as expressed in Plato’s work, *The Republic* (Jowett translation, 1928), holds the position that mood states are somehow embodied within the musical work, and are capable of affecting the character of its listeners. One might argue that this stance anthropomorphises music in granting it literal character and affective power. The second position, taken to its most extreme by Tolstoy (1898/1979), posits that it is the composer who communicates his or her emotional state through the musical work, making the musical work a kind of second language. The problem with this idea, as Langer (1957) argued, is that music lacks fixed denotation as in a dictionary; Lee (1918) similarly demonstrated that music may mean very different things to different people. The third position, best described by Meyer (1973), sets forth the idea that it is the listener who imposes affective meaning to musical forms, based on cultural conditioning and experience. (Giomo, 142)

It is “the third position,” the evocation of personal memory, which most readily fits Gretta’s situation. Meyer disabuses us of the idea of “determinism” in a musical composition. “Determinism is a mistaken notion applied to works of art not only because implications are plural, but also because, within the style he employs, the composer may at

any particular point in a piece be absolutely arbitrary” (Meyer, 20). Rather, for Meyer, the music induces an “affective” effect upon the recipient: “there are reasonable grounds for believing that the musical processes and structures explicitly conceptualized in criticism are those which evoke effective responses in sensitive and experienced listeners” (6).

While Bartell D’Arcy is singing *The Lass of Aughrim*, Gabriel notices that his wife “was leaning on the banisters, listening to something” (209). The music provides the sensuous trigger which transports her back to her girlhood past, an involuntary memory: “about a person long ago who used to sing that song” (218) — Michael Furey. She too realizes the sense of “loss” in her life. The past is gone, and human memory is always bittersweet, since human beings are dualistically split between the physical and spiritual. One can never physically return and actually relive past lives. Here is the great frustration, the absolute and dire longing for what never can be physically recaptured. The sudden shift into her depressive and introspective mood is brought about by remembered emotion through music. In short, she is transported to her past, and the mood does not lift when the music stops. The tune is carried mentally, albeit inaudibly, for what remains of the night. The enthusiastic partygoer becomes somber and reflective since the emotion is not easily dispelled.

Aesthetically, Joyce focuses on the power of memory both to alter and to create psychic disturbances. Bergson distinguishes between two kinds of memory. Reactivation of habitual memory is necessary for the quotidian functioning of human existence, and this type of memory Bergson categorized as voluntary or “repetitive.” Bergson disparaged this type of memory because, by the fact of its repetitiveness, “it becomes more and more impersonal, more and more foreign to our past life” (1896: 95). Conversely, the resurgence of the buried

past through involuntary memory “is fugitive” and rare: “Spontaneous recollection is perfect from the outset; time can add nothing to its image without disfiguring it; it retains in memory its place and date” (1896: 95). Bergson intimates that the impact of this type of memory for an individual is supernatural: “Then, when a memory reappears in consciousness, it produces on us the effect of a ghost whose mysterious apparition must be explained by special causes”(1896: 186-187).

The haunting quality we assign to memory was not unknown to James Joyce. As Ellmann observes, “[t]hat the dead do not stay buried is, in fact, a theme of Joyce from the beginning to the end of his work: Finnegan is not the only corpse to be resurrected” (1982: 244). In *Dubliners*, Joyce introduces these disorienting “ghosts,” so unique in their rarity, which invade a character’s consciousness through Gretta’s memory of Michael Furey in “The Dead,” and Mr. Duffy’s memory of Mrs. Sinico in “A Painful Case.” The latter’s reappearance into Mr. Duffy’s memory through the perfunctory newspaper account so infuses his mind that when he revisits “the Park,” the site where four years ago he had severed their relationship “[a]t moments he seemed to feel her voice touch his ear, her hand touch his” (117). Mr. Duffy’s entry into Phoenix Park where his last meeting with Mrs. Sinico occurred suggests the importance of place for him as a further associational cue, and accounts for the sustained duration of his memory. The symbolic significance of “the Park” is evident: the phoenix is the cryptozoological bird of resurrection; here the park becomes the scene of the resurrection of Mr. Duffy’s autobiographical past. His physical revisitation of the park dovetails with his mental return, and becomes the “*nostosphilia*” of consciousness. Michael Wood describes the importance that places have in relation to memory since they represent “association-saturated spots” (35). Wood recounts the

experience of the World War I poet Patrick Shaw-Stewart when encountering the site of Troy and its surrounding regions: “Patrick Shaw-Stewart, who reread the *Iliad* on the way to Gallipoli, felt a dreadful sense of *déjà vu* at the sight of Imbros, of Troy and these ‘association -saturated spots’” (35). However, the young World War I poet’s experience entails the reactivation of idealized intellectual memory, whereas Mr. Duffy’s is overwhelmingly personal, which are both components of autobiographical memory.

Yet Joyce does not confine his characters’ transient upsurges of remembrance to autobiographical memory alone. While in the park, Mr. Duffy sees the “furtive” couples participating in carnal life. We are told that the idea of the “outcast” enters his consciousness: “he felt that he had been outcast from life’s feast” (117). Here, Joyce is indirectly experimenting with the idea of collective memory. The exiled Mr. Duffy is associated with all outcasts who are denied full participation in life because of a transgression in their conduct. Mr. Duffy becomes the mental predecessor of HCE in *Finnegans Wake*, the outcast who is specifically linked to other mythological and historical outcasts through metempsychotic linkage with collective memory. Overall, Joyce’s experiment with generalized memory in *Dubliners* adumbrates his more sophisticated treatment of metempsychotic linkage in *Ulysses*, most especially in the “underground” chapters: “Proteus,” “Hades,” and “Circe,” and in the *Wake*.

In *Dubliners*, Joyce’s simulation of Great Memory accessed through a character’s metempsychotic upsurges is not arbitrary. Ellmann, in his analysis of “The Dead,” explains the vital function of the Great Memory:

The final purport of the story [“The Dead”], the mutual dependency of living and dead, is something that he [Joyce] meditated a good deal from his early youth. He had expressed it first in his essay on Mangan in 1902, when he spoke already

of the union in the great memory of death along with life, even then he had begun to learn like Gabriel that we are all Romes, our new edifices reared beside, and even joined with, ancient monuments. In *Dubliners* she developed this idea. The interrelationship of dead and living is the theme of the first story in *Dubliners* as well as of the last; it is also the theme of 'A Painful Case,' but an even closer parallel to 'The Dead' is the story, 'Ivy Day in the Committee Room.' This was in one sense an answer to his university friends who mocked his remark that death is the most beautiful form of life by saying that absence is the highest form of presence. (1982: 252)

The evocation of Great Memory from a character's unconscious underlies Joyce's idea of the generalized patterns common to all human existence. As Ellmann observes, this universalizing tendency is explicit in Joyce's compositional structure: "In *Dubliners*, he saw the city itself as a person, with four stages of life to be represented...." (1982: 208). This foreshadows Joyce's hypostatizing HCE in Book I chapter i of *Finnegans Wake* where HCE's gigantic shape becomes one with the landscape:

Yet may we not see still the brontoichthyan form outlined aslumbered, even in our own nighttime by the sedge of the troutling stream that Bronto loved and Brunto had a lean on....The cranic head on him, caster of his reasons, peer yuthner in yondmist. Whooth? His clay feet, swarded in verdigrass, stick up starck where he last fellonem, by the mund of the magazine wall. (7 .20-22, 29-32)

The interrelationship of the dead and the living in Joyce's work is only possible through a character's psychic engagement during moments of personal and collective memory. Father Flynn, Mrs. Sinico, Charles Stewart Parnell, and Michael Furey, from the standpoint of a purely temporal dimension, are irrecoverably gone. The corporal past is synonymous with dissolution and extinction. That individuals die and civilizations fall is the subtext of all Joyce's work, especially *Finnegans Wake*. Yet, the timeless dimension of the mind preserves and connects the past with the present. Materialistic absence is countered by

psychic presence through Joyce's simulation of autobiographical and collective memory scenes.

This absence/presence paradox is intrinsic to Joyce's treatment of memory. Moreover, Joyce's decentering of "presence" in favor of "absence," his embracing of the disembodied past, can be interpreted through Derrida's understanding of memory in "Plato's Pharmacy": The notion of privileging speech, which denotes "presence," in favor of writing, which denotes "absence," advances what is really an arbitrary "binary system" (1972: 68). Although the physical presence of voice is displaced by the written word, textually, Joyce is constructing an indelible memory of all voices at all times by his inclusion of Great Memory into the mindscapes of his characters. Ultimately, *Finnegans Wake*, for Joyce, is the permanent record of the memory of mankind. The mound, as Mutt and Jute determine, is the Akasic Records containing the "[c]ountlessness of livestories...flick as flowflakes" (17. 26-28). The *Wake* itself is a transcription from the Akasa, "netherfallen by this plague" (17. 27), that is, concretized through the text's pages.

Moreover, Damasio's theory of "metarepresentations" also suggests that "a part of the mind" representing present experience dovetails or overlaps with another "part of the mind" that is simultaneously representing past experience induced through current perceptual encounter, and thereby influences mood. The idea of two sites of ideation, one containing current and the other containing past experience, connecting thought through the catalyst of common perceptual register is analogous to Shattuck's interpretation of the operation of memory retrieval in Proust and in Joyce as well.

As in Proust, Joyce's construction of characters' reactivation of past experiences is dependent on their encountering objective reality through sense perception acting as the

conduit to thought, or the recollection of previous experience which approximates the present feeling. The chronological barrier of measurable time in the “specious present” collapses under the internal merger of present with past experience.

Shattuck’s analysis of Proust’s literary evocation of memory focuses on the comparative relationship between the workings of human visual perception, and what he adduces to be a similar mental action that occurs during moments of involuntary memory retrieval. This “stereoscopic” technique elucidates Joyce’s method of evoking his characters’ mental pasts. Shattuck illustrates how Marcel’s imagistic perception in the present makes possible the process of involuntary memory through an analogous process occurring in “optics,” that is, “[t]he binocular nature of human vision”(117). Depth perception is not possible through “a single image” but is only achieved through a comparative relationship:

Depth, or what is in optics called penetration effect, cannot be found in a single image. The visible world reaches us through a continuous double take based on the stereoscopic principle. Two slightly different versions of the same ‘object’ from our two eyes are combined subjectively with the effect of relief. The binocular nature of human vision is achieved through some of the most delicate adjustments of which our organism is capable.

To perceive depth properly, our eyes are set apart in our heads by a distance that is proportional to our size and our need to judge the distance of objects in our environment. Two eyes separated by several yards or several miles would not serve us effectively, for our minds would not be able to assimilate and collate two views of the world so different from each other. The interval between our human eyes permits us to register depths in space on our scale and instantaneously. (Shattuck, 117-118)

Shattuck describes the same process occurring in involuntary memory retrieval, wherein perception activates consciousness’ ability to register imagistic similarity between present and past experience:

Plato, Bergson, and Proust assemble in the vicinity of the philosophical conviction that a single direct sense perception does not suffice to furnish right knowledge. Though they describe contrasting ways in which sense perceptions combine into pairs and patterns, none of them describes association taking place without the individual's interests and volition playing a crucial role. Recognition, recollection, binocular vision, stereo reception in time— all these modes characterize our mental processes. A wholly unique sensation remains incomplete and alien until associated with another or others. (116)

This conjoining of prior and present sensation to create an associational mental register is suggestive of Eveline's experience of the "street organ" in Joyce's story, "Eveline." Eveline, the indecisive adolescent, who is conflicted over escaping from her abusive, alcoholic father for an uncertain life in "Buenos Ayres" with Frank is ruminating over her decision while sitting "by the window"(39). Her meditation is interrupted by the aural perceptual trigger of "[t]he organ-player" playing the same "melancholy air of Italy" (40) as on the night of her mother's death, which evokes her involuntary memory: "Strange that it should come that very night to remind her of the promise to her mother, her promise to keep the home together as long as she could. She remembered the last night of her mother's illness; she was again in the close dark room at the other side of the hall and outside she heard a melancholy air of Italy" (40). Without the superimposing of past sensation with the present one mental time travel would be impossible, and the present would remain ever disassociational, identity without a context.

However, Shattuck does not confine memory retrieval just to an analogous affinity with optics. He sees a similar program occurring both in Minkowskian geometry and in Einstein's relativity principle:

Proust wrote out of an inner vision increasingly trained on time. As boldly as Minkowskian geometry, his enormous

novel revolutionizes our sense of ‘here’ and ‘now.’ The allusion to Minkowsky, who succeeded in graphing the space-time principle of Einstein’s special relativity, has more than casual pertinence. Relativity tells us that no object *by itself* [Shattuck’s italics throughout] has either definable location or measurable velocity. *Two* objects are required to yield a relative reading, and there is no universal grid like the ether to give an absolute figure. An object can be described as located somewhere and as having a certain motion only in reference to what is around it. And so it is also with memories or experiences. One alone will disappear under our scrutiny, like a star or a dial stared at too long. Physiologically and psychologically and metaphysically, ‘to see’ means to see *with* or *against* or *beside* something. The school of Gestalt psychology has long developed this simple truth of the relativity of perception: we grasp things juxtaposed in clusters, framed by one another. It is all too easy to make irresponsible comparisons between Proust and Einstein.... But here we can see the particular respect in which Proust’s treatment of memory, as always multiple, implies a relativity principle in consciousness itself based on an optics of time. (118)

Shattuck argues that for Proust the “resurrection” of the past in its pristine form transpires through the involuntary upsurge, the privileged moment, where past and present conjoin through a dual imagistic connection. Shattuck focuses on what is for him the seminal passage in Proust where “three successive resurrections” illustrate “the interplay of two images and the optics of time” (123) to support his argument:

[A] sensation— the sound of the spoon and the hammer, a similar unevenness of two paving stones— flashes back and forth [*miroiter*] between the past (which made it possible for imagination to take pleasure in it) and the present (where the physical stimulus of the sound and the contact with the stones contributed to the dreams of the imagination something they usually lack, the idea of existence), and this subterfuge made it possible for my being to grasp, to isolate, to immobilize for the duration of a lightning flash what it normally never apprehends, namely, a fragment of time in its pure state. (qtd. in Shattuck, 124)

Shattuck’s interpretation of the “stereoscopic” effect of memory wherein Proust

“transposes our depth perception from space into time” (118) and creates a “parallax view,” the temporal “displacement” that permits a “depth” to our past, can be applied to Joyce’s simulation of involuntary memory as well. Joyce too constructs a perceptual imagistic trigger in “present” fictive time that contains the semblance of a character’s past experience. For instance, in “The Dead,” Gretta’s “parallax view” is occasioned by a song. Her mental “displacement” into the “depth” of her past is created by the convergence of Bartell D’Arcy’s rendition of *The Lass of Aughrim* on this January night, and another singer of the same song, Michael Furey, from her girlhood days in Galway. Only with a similar base of reference stored in memory is stereoscopic psychic vision possible. Although Gretta’s response to the song is overwhelmingly connected to her personal past, she shares in the universal human reaction to loss— suffering— brought upon her by the music. Unconsciously, there may exist a liminal engagement with the archetypal structures intrinsic to melody. Meyer makes a distinction “between learned and innate patternings”(214). He suggests that “[a]rchetypal patterns and traditional schemata are the classes— ‘the rules of the game,’ in Koestler’s phrase— in terms of which particular musical events are perceived and comprehended. No melody, however original and inventive, is an exception to this principle”(213).

Ultimately, for Joyce’s Dubliners, who are so steeped in memory, once past experience is evoked, the sense of loss enters consciousness, which inevitably produces feelings of sadness. Damasio describes the prolongation of such a depressive state: “Sadness, for example, is accompanied by low rates of image production and hyperattentiveness to images, rather than by rapid image change and short attention span that goes with high happiness” (2003: 85). The characters in *Dubliners* do not experience “high happiness”; their memories accentuate a present devoid of meaningful engagement with life.

Therefore, a major tone in *Dubliners* is a mood of depression precipitated by the memory of what has been lost, or what might have been set against a present devoid of meaning and then manifested personally, culturally, and spiritually. The depressive spirit is at the core of each character's psychic discontinuity. Its mental causation is disparate yet elusive; its symptoms are dissatisfaction, disconnection, and despair; its consequences can be profound. Depression is a sobering leveler which exempts no age group, class, culture, or gender. However, concomitant with the condition is the cure, whether through a long process or by transcendent epiphanic moments. Since all forms of depression posit deprivation as a causative factor, renewal comes through awareness, redirection, and reinvestment of both the individual and collective psyche beyond the solipsistically enclosed core of selfhood.

Dubliners presents readers with a cross section of mixed- status citizenry, children and adults, male and female, whose recollections of their own pasts create discontinuities, precipitating depression. This depressive sensibility is projected outwardly and distorts an already gray and dreary Dublin environment. In "The Sisters," the young boy's distorted memories of the late Father Flynn are just as poignant as James Duffy's in "A Painful Case": his realization "he was outcast from life's feast" proceeds directly from his relationship with Emily Sinico. We can assume that Mrs. Sinico's decline into alcoholism, as evidenced by her daughter's testimony at the inquest about the time of the condition's onset, was brought about through the loss of Mr. Duffy's companionship— possibly the only vital connection with another she had in her life. Little Chandler's present dissatisfaction is set against the memories of earlier missed opportunities in "A Little Cloud." In "Eveline," Eveline, in late adolescence should be severing familial ties by pursuing a future for herself as a progression

toward adult participation in life in the spirit of Issy, the rebellious archetypal daughter of *Finnegans Wake*. However, she is chained to a retrogressive deathbed bond. Her memory of her dying mother's end can be seen as exhibiting an inversion of the Freudian "primal scene" where mother-in-bed is not associated with the creative sexual act, but represents "de-creation" into the process of decomposition and death, an association which anticipates Stephen's similar memories of the dying May Dedalus with the "womb" and "tomb" tropes in *Ulysses*.

Hence, in *Dubliners*, depression is a result of a character's autobiographical memory juxtaposed with his current circumstances. Neither rural nor urban cultural origins prevent a character experiencing depression. In "The Dead," both Gretta and Gabriel Conroy, a rural woman and an urban man, on an evening covered with snow, counterpoint an idealized past with a lamentable present. By dramatizing his characters' depressive states, Joyce emphasizes some of the shortcomings of autobiographical memory; this type of memory is overwhelmingly subjective, and therefore at times can be narcissistic. For Joyce, looking inward must also entail a connection with the deeply ingrained universal patterns reflected through the spontaneous upthrusts of Great Memory. For Joyce, the inadequacy of autobiographical memory is supplemented through the context of universals which are patterns repeated an infinite number of times, and which are the timeless connectives of human existence. Great Memory, like Shattuck's "stereoscopic" effect of memory during the retrieval process, can only be understood relationally; the "meaning" of human existence, of human identity, for Joyce must be approached by viewing a character's personal past in relation to collective past experience.

The psychic dislocation of Joyce's characters, and its manifestation through the

depressive state, is derived from loss. The searing mental vacuity of his Dubliners is elucidated by Freud's description of psychic disruption in "Mourning and Melancholia." In this text, Freud explores the affinities between an individual's psychic state after the death of a "loved object." The psyche too experiences "loss," not necessarily originating in the death of a loved one, but one which is either determinate, or indeterminate, hence ineffable. Gabriel Conroy experiences ego-shattering insight through his experience of revenant rivalry.

The foci of Gabriel's depressive state are Michael Furey, the revenant himself, whose own frustrated desire manifested itself through the "death wish" which precipitates his early death, and Gretta, Gabriel's wife, whose mood alters drastically after undergoing a moment of involuntary memory, and who was temporally displaced into the memory of her past, a past suffused in sacrificial love.

The sad atmosphere in *Dubliners* has been described classically by Freud:

Reality-testing has shown that the loved object no longer exists, and it proceeds to demand that all libido shall be withdrawn from its attachments to that object. This demand arouses understandable opposition—it is a matter of general observation that people never willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, indeed, when a substitute is already beckoning to them. This opposition can be so intense that a turning away from reality takes place and a clinging to the object through the medium of a hallucinatory wishful psychosis. Normally, respect for reality gains the day. Nevertheless its orders cannot be obeyed at once. They are carried out bit by bit, at great expense of time and cathectic energy, and in the meantime the existence of the lost object is psychically prolonged. Each single one of the memories and expectations in which the libido is bound to the object is brought up and hyper-cathected, and detachment of the libido is accomplished in respect of it. (1917 [1915]: 14: 244-245)

Freud recognizes the same conflicted mental process occurring in a related condition, melancholia:

[I]t is evident that melancholia too may be the reaction to the loss of a loved object. Where the exciting causes are different one can recognize that there is a loss of a more ideal kind. The object has not perhaps actually died, but has been lost as an object of love (e.g. in the case of a betrothed girl who has been jilted). In yet other cases one feels justified in maintaining the belief that a loss of this kind has occurred, but one cannot see clearly what it is that has been lost, and it is all the more reasonable to suppose that the patient cannot consciously perceive what he has lost either.... In mourning we found that the inhibition and loss of interest are fully accounted for by the work of mourning in which the ego is absorbed. In melancholia, the unknown loss will result in a similar internal work and will therefore be responsible for the melancholic inhibition. The difference is that the inhibition of the melancholic seems puzzling to us because we cannot see what it is that is absorbing him so entirely. (1917 [1915]: 14:245-246)

Both of these psychic states posit “loss” as the contributing and seminal factor inciting the conditions. We can distinguish between the sense of “loss” induced by a character’s “mourning” the death of a loved one in the case of Gretta Conroy, or Mr. Duffy, and the “melancholia” that overwhelms Gabriel Conroy due to “loss,” but one that is devoid of death. It is this sense of “loss,” aesthetically transformed by Joyce, which becomes the premise of his characters’ psychic traumas. This sense of loss can only be recognized through a character’s awareness of a vacuous present set against his past autobiographical memory field.

Depression as described by Freud was, like the snow, “general in Ireland.” There are many personal and environmental factors that make it so. “The Dead” is the story of a middle-aged man, Gabriel Conroy, whose sudden perception of his wife Gretta’s emotional life reveals that she has treasured up the short-lived romance she had had years ago with Michael Furey. She has prized the memory of Michael Furey during her married life with her husband. Gretta’s pronouncement about the Connacht boy becomes the catalyst for

Gabriel's depression. Henceforth for him, we infer time and rationality collapse; the mood of the moment dominates and utterly controls his being.

Through Gabriel, Joyce captures and explores loss, so prevalent as a feature of autobiographical memory, not in an exhaustive clinical case history exposition, inclusive of every detail of a person's life, but artistically in an evening through the telescoping device of aesthetic or imaginative time compression. In his story, he isolates and highlights his characters' emotive life.

Personally and culturally, Gabriel is a prime candidate for depression; hence, the determinate causes for his condition are both environmental and reactive. He is in middle age, which is a crossroad in existence, when individuals either suddenly or slowly realizes that all that has happened is irreplaceably gone with the passing years— youth with its boundless possibilities and its loved ones. On that snowy January night at the party of his elderly aunts Kate and Julia, this slowly overwhelms Gabriel. Gabriel, in part of his after-dinner speech, draws on memory:

[T]here are always in gatherings such as this sadder thoughts that will recur to our minds: thoughts of the past, of youth, of changes, of absent faces that we miss here tonight. Our path through life is strewn with many such sad memories: and were we to brood upon them always we could not find the heart to go on bravely with our work among the living. (204)

Gabriel is Julia and Kate's "favorite nephew, the son of their dead elder sister, Ellen" (179), one of the "absent faces" at the table. Later in the evening Gabriel projects another face which is soon to be missing:

Poor Aunt Julia! She, too, would soon be a shade....He had caught that haggard look upon her face for a moment when she was singing *Arrayed for the Bridal*. Soon, perhaps, he would be sitting in that same drawing room, dressed in black, his silk hat on his knees. The blinds would be drawn down

and Aunt Kate would be sitting beside him, crying and blowing her nose and telling him how Julia had died. (222-223)

Missing too from Gabriel's mood is the sustained belief in the vitality of his own marriage. He wishes he could make Gretta "forget the years of their dull existence together and remember only their moments of ecstasy. For the years, he felt, had not quenched his soul or hers. Their children, his writing, her household cares had not quenched all their souls' tender fire" (214). The passage of time, and what has been lost, permeate Gabriel's spirit so completely that even though at one point in his speech he explicitly announces: "I will not linger on the past" (204), this is what he has been doing throughout the evening and will continue to do, however unintentionally and unconsciously. His aunts' holiday-party festivities are occluded in Gabriel by death, sorrow, loss, and psychic dislocation.

One's cultural milieu can be an agent of psychological oppression. That Gabriel is alienated from his own country is apparent through his encounter with, or "cross examination" by, Miss Ivors. Gabriel is a resident of turn of the century Ireland, where collective psychic wholeness and health is precluded by British occupation and occupation's concomitants—dehumanization and degradation of the native Irish population. Miss Ivors' nationalistic views, and her involvement in the Celtic Revival, a movement to reinvigorate Ireland and connect Ireland to her vital past, are evident when she presses Gabriel to vacation in "your own land," and urges him "to keep in touch with— Irish" his "own language." Gabriel, however, prefers to form an artificial "Continental" identity of his own construct, more fitting to his self- image of university graduate, teacher, and writer. Moreover, his exasperated reply to her prodding "I'm sick of my own country, sick of it!" (189) is

revealing; it suggests his boredom and dissatisfaction, perhaps not entirely with Ireland, but with himself. Later in the evening at the hotel, when the full force of Gabriel's depression sets in with its corresponding symptoms, one of the key reasons for its power will be self-dissatisfaction augmented by his intensive self-scrutiny.

Freud located the origin of depression, melancholia, in "loss." In the final pages of "The Dead," Gabriel experiences shattering "loss" — the realization that he is not the love of Gretta's life, that there was a more engaging predecessor — and through this, the "loss" of self-identification. Gabriel is a man who is really selfish, and who has little awareness of, or sympathy for, the feelings of his wife. He dismissed Gretta's enthusiastic pleading that they visit Galway, her childhood home: "'You can go if you like', said Gabriel coldly" (191). Furthermore, he is utterly oblivious to his wife's abrupt change of mood when she is on the stair listening to Bartell D'Arcy sing *The Lass of Aughrim* (210), or when they are journeying to the hotel (214-15).

Finally, in the darkened hotel room, Gabriel wants to satisfy his own aroused desire. However, he will make the unexpected discovery of what is behind his wife's unresponsiveness. It is now that she reveals that the song evoked the memory of Michael Furey, the boy with "the big dark eyes" who, though ill, selflessly braved the rain to see her before she left her "grandmother's house," and who she movingly tells Gabriel "'died for me'" (220). Gabriel now enters the darkest of depressions.

Before renewal, psychic suffering runs its course. Gabriel exhibits the symptoms of depression writ large: sadness, loss of self-esteem, and tragically the wish for death. During Gretta's revelation:

[a] shameful consciousness of his own person assailed him.
He saw himself as a ludicrous figure, acting as a pennyboy for

his aunts, a nervous well-meaning sentimentalist, orating to vulgarians and idealising his own clownish lusts, the pitiable fatuous fellow he had caught a glimpse of in the mirror. Instinctively he turned his back more to the light lest she might see the shame that burned upon his forehead. (219-220)

His lacerating self-degradation is reflective of his loss of “self-esteem,” which Freud stated is the distinguishing factor between depression experienced during mourning, and depression when loss of a loved one is not the contributing factor:

The melancholic displays something else besides which is lacking in mourning— an extraordinary diminution in his self-regard, an impoverishment of his ego on a grand scale. In mourning it is the world which has become poor and empty; in melancholy it is the ego itself. The patient represents his ego to us as worthless, incapable of any achievement, and morally despicable; he reproaches himself, vilifies himself and expects to be cast out and punished. (1917 [1915]:14:246)

Gabriel’s unbearable sorrow is intermingled with the longing for death:

Generous tears filled Gabriel’s eyes. He had never felt like that himself towards any woman but he knew that such a feeling must be love. The tears gathered more thickly in his eyes and in the partial darkness he imagined he saw the form of a young man standing under a dripping tree. Other forms were near. His soul had approached that region where dwell the vast hosts of the dead....His own identity was fading out into a grey impalpable world: the solid world itself which these dead had one time reared and lived in was dissolving and dwindling. (223)

His fixation on Michael manifests itself as vying with a long dead youth, a conflict in which he is the self-professed loser.

Michael Furey, the Conroy’s intrusive “shade,” is only known through Gretta’s memory and Gabriel’s irrational and exaggerated response. He is the great romantic hero

whose actions Gabriel affirmatively, yet jealously, condones: “Better pass boldly into that other world, in the full glory of some passion, than fade and wither dismally with age” (223).

However psychically traumatic the evening’s experience has been for him, it will eventually prove salvational, as Daiches suggests: “Joyce is attempting to show the change from a wholly egocentric point of view, where you regard the world as revolving round yourself to a point of view where your own personality is eliminated and you can stand back and look disinterestedly on your self and on the world...” (qtd. in Magalaner and Kain, 98).

Dubliners represents an introduction to Joyce’s later fiction because it is the foundation for his experimentation with fictive characters’ interiority and memory. *In Dubliners*, Joyce grounds his characters’ mental contexts in both their autobiographical and transpersonal memories to establish that there is both a personal and common identity in human life.

Chapter 3 “His soul had arisen from the grave of boyhood, spurning her graveclothes”: Stephen’s formulation of memory and the crisis of maturation into adulthood, in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*

James Joyce begins *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* by simulating Stephen Dedalus’ autobiographical memory of his first realization of consciousness — the birth of the self — through his father’s recounting the “moocow” story. Stephen’s recollection entails not only the content of the story itself, but also his perceptual register of the teller, his father, which encodes the memory trance and makes later recollection possible, “His father looked at him through a glass. He had a hairy face” (3). It is significant that the child Stephen’s first memory is one of story, since narrative signifies a temporal context, and memory is only possible in and through time. It is also significant that Stephen’s memory is of his father, for fatherhood represents not only the progression of physical generation, hence human continuity, which incorporates the historical sense, but a “mystical estate,” which Epstein describes along with “sonhood” as consisting of “general attitudes” or “types” (1971: 22). Furthermore, by interpreting Stephen’s perception through a cultural context, Epstein sees Simon Dedalus’ “hairy face” as symbolizing adulthood:

[T]o a child the hairiness of an adult male would seem the sign of his maturity. In many societies, ancient and modern, the growth of facial hair was held to be the mark of physical and moral maturity. The father with the hairy face at the beginning of *A Portrait* is, at the very least, a mature male, whose appearance contains a covert reference to Joyce’s theory of the development of personality; it is a mature, ‘perfected’ organism that has produced its ‘image,’ to which it is telling stories. (1971: 27)

Later, as a schoolboy at Clongowes, Stephen attempts his definition of self through a spatial paradigm: in his “geography” text, he lists an all encompassing schema positing

himself relationally to the universe:

Stephen Dedalus
 Class of Elements
 Clongowes Wood College
 Sallins
 County Kildare
 Ireland
 Europe
 The World
 The Universe. (15)

Upon self-reflection, and in appropriate child-like language, Stephen questions the meaning of individual existence in relation to the larger, timeless cosmic whole:

Then he read the flyleaf from the bottom to the top till he came to his own name. That was he, and he read down the page again. What was after the universe? Nothing. But was there anything round the universe to show where it stopped before the nothing place began? (16)

The answer to Stephen's question can be found in Joyce's 1904 essay "A Portrait of the Artist," the genesis of *Stephen Hero* and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, in which his views on the nature of memory are enunciated, and which find their way into *A Portrait*. Scholes and Kain regard the essay as Joyce's "manifesto" (58), and Ellmann views it as the groundwork for "Joyce's later view of consciousness" (1982: 145), through Joyce's interpreting the fluidity of "personality as a river" (1982: 145). For Joyce, self-contextualization is premised both on one's personal and one's racial past. Stephen's ultimate relation to the universe resides within, as he will discover, through the timeless aspect of memory. Physical and artistic maturation are only possible for the solipsistic Stephen if he is able to "liberate" himself from the "individuating rhythm" of self-experience and connect with "some process of the mind as yet untabulated" (1904: 60).

The carefully tabulated list of the schoolboy, with its explicit suggestion of

geographical and astronomical spatiality, becomes a blueprint for experience for the maturing artist in the “Proteus” chapter of *Ulysses*; Sandymount Strand becomes for him the essence of universals. In the third chapter, Stephen, retains the same child-like fear of annihilation while mimicking blindness, “No. Jesus! If I fell over a cliff that beetles o’er his base, fell through the *Nebeneinander* ineluctably!” (3.14-15). He gradually recognizes the temporal and transcendent dimensions to existence and in this later chapter realizes as a young man that “the nothing place” of childhood can be ontologically defined as the conscious and unconscious human mind.

At the beginning of the original “A Portrait of the Artist” essay, Joyce cautions against the human tendency to view the past as static, and gone forever through the chronological divide of physical maturation. On the surface, only resemblance between the infant and adolescent is obscured by the passage of time if observed through the physical agents of “beard and inches” (1904: 60). Rather, Joyce encourages us to look beyond the physical implications of time, as did Blake, Yeats, and the Theosophists, among others, and to see the past always surging forth into the present through memory. However, Joyce does not here focus on autobiographical memory; later, in the essay, he explicitly introduces the idea of an extrapersonal memory, a generalized memory, manifested through a metempsychotic tapping into the collective unconscious. The young unnamed artist turns to the works of “the hierarchs” after his declaration that he is leaving “the Church” (1904: 63). Instead of suggesting that the works have become new experience retained through his intellectual memory, Joyce has the young artist state that his “soul” or mind was reconnecting with the distant past: “His heaven was suddenly illuminated by a horde of stars, the signatures of all nature, the soul remembering ancient...days” (1904: 63). This

metempsychotic connection finds its way into *A Portrait*, where Joyce does not state but simulates transpersonal memory as part of his construction of Stephen's interiority, and shows that the generalized patterns of human existence and development are innate and timeless. Stephen is only one of many young men throughout time who have tried to form an identity.

A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, a rite-of-passage novel, traces Stephen Dedalus' movement from childhood to young adulthood. Yet Joyce is unique in his approach to the development of Stephen. Joyce told his brother Stanislaus that the "pattern" of the novel "is that we are what we were" (Ellmann 1982: 295), a statement that entails the indelibility of past experience.

In the 1904 essay, Joyce presents three important elements: emotion, isolation, and sensory stimuli, which lead to viable artistic creation, human experience only made possible by and through the memory of a perceiving consciousness. Joyce states that the subject of his artist's "portrait" resides in "the curve of an emotion" (1904: 60), in that the material for the creative impulse originates in the interior life of an individual. Emotion is one of the necessary conditions in conjunction with sensory stimuli that coalesce in a mood which unlocks both autobiographical and collective memory in the Joycean character's mindscape. Paradoxically, the generalized texture of all human life is not recognized by the young artist in the society of men but in isolated moments in communion with the sensory attraction of the natural world. The artist, in contemplating the best disposition for creativity, rejects "the social monster," and "shyly welcomed" solitude, which allows an implicit metempsychotic connection with the "intimations of mortality" of all living things:

An impulse had led him forth in the dark season to silent and lonely places where the mists hung streamerwise among the

trees; and as he had passed there amid the subduing night, in the secret fall of leaves, the fragrant rain, the mesh of vapours moon-transpierced, he had imagined an admonition of the frailty of all things./In summer it had led him seaward. Wandering over the arid, grassy hills or along the strand,... avowedly in quest of shellfish, he had grown almost impatient of the day. (1904: 64)

Shades of day and season, sere land and seascapes, sound, odor, temperature— all impact the senses, and “[s]ceptically, cynically, mystically” the artist becomes “conscious of the beauty of mortal conditions” (1904: 65). This interconnection of objective and subjective reality facilitates transpersonal consciousness for the artist, and adumbrates Joyce’s later textual construction in *A Portrait* and in his other works, where individuality is co-functional with archetypal identity formulated through access to the racial past.

A transpersonal experience of transcendence occurs in Joyce’s novel, *A Portrait*. Here it is not Nature that is the catalyst, but Stephen’s brothers and sisters. Facing eviction, and amid the squalor of continuing social decline, Joyce’s arrangement of imagistic detail precipitates Stephen’s immersion into collective memory. The Dedalus children’s singing “melody after melody, glee after glee” becomes transformed in Stephen’s interior monologue into the collective voice of all childhood awaiting the precarious movement from a state of innocence into the inescapable state of experience auguring sorrow:

He heard the choir of voices in the kitchen echoed and multiplied through an endless reverberation of the choirs of endless generations of children, and heard in all the echoes an echo also of the recurring note of weariness and pain. All seemed weary of life even before entering upon it. (222)

To reinforce the importance of Stephen’s psychic experience, Joyce adds a coda immediately following the episode by having Stephen’s intellectual memory serve as a commentary:

And he remembered that Newman had heard this note also in the broken lines of Virgil ‘giving utterance, like the voice of

Nature herself, to that pain and weariness yet hope of better things which has been the experience of her children in every time.' (222-223)

In *A Portrait*, Stephen's attraction to the possibilities of myriad experiential existence with its "hope of better things" is the motivation behind his renunciation of a religious vocation, for what he believes is the retrogressive life of a priest. It also signifies a renunciation of the "proud claim" of individuality when Stephen imagines his future clerical identity, "The Reverend Stephen Dedalus, S.J." (219). After Stephen has made his decision, psychologically and spiritually adrift, he wanders the streets of Dublin. His interior monologue becomes infused, momentarily and unexpectedly, with the past history of Dublin through Joyce's imagistic technique of introducing the "slender masts" of the ships upon the "slowflowing Liffey," so that there is a visual register, that also encompasses "the dim fabric of the city" in the distance. Through the "haze" of atmosphere and time, Stephen's individual identity is effaced; he becomes the archetypal Irishman, the native of a conquered city:

Like a scene on some vague arras, old as man's weariness, the image of the seventh city of Christendom was visible to him across the timeless air, no older nor more weary nor less patient of subjection than in the days of the thingmote. (227)

Again, Joyce has Stephen ruminate on the experience; his character ostensibly posits the psychic interconnection of the past with the present, "So timeless seemed the gray warm air, so fluid and impersonal his own mood, that all ages were as one to him" (229). Epstein views Stephen's experience as the "genesis" of Joyce's future work:

Stephen contemplates Dublin through the haze. The modern city lies before him, but his thoughts pierce through; as we later discover, 'the ghost of the ancient kingdom of the Danes had looked forth through the vesture of the hazewrapped city' It is a moment of 'metempsychosis,' a state which is

to claim more and more of Joyce's attention as he strives to break free of the temporal order; in *Finnegans Wake* manipulation of temporal simultaneity becomes his first principle of creation. (1971: 93-94)

The memory of Ireland's long tragic history plays a prominent part in Joyce's characters' mindstreams, and Stephen's introduction to his race's legacy is especially traumatic in the powerful "Christmas dinner" episode in *A Portrait*. The episode encapsulates how Ireland's long struggle for independence has been repeatedly thwarted by the Roman Catholic Church, and its people's own self-betrayal. James Fairhall, in his study of the impact of history on Joyce's work, discusses how the "emphasis falls on the Church's intervention in the Nationalists' internecine struggle over Parnell" (126), and how "the idea of betrayal, in connection with Irish nationalism, predates the Parnell myth" (128). The themes of Church interference with Irish rule and betrayal provide much of the energy of the Christmas day dinner scene. This conflict becomes part of the transhistorical memory in *Finnegans Wake*, where it is subsumed into one of the many archetypal fraternal conflicts. Shaun uses the "Mookse and Gripes" fable to explain his animosity toward his brother Shem in the ur-family story. Joyce incorporates into this episode the story of the first English pope, Hadrian IV (Nicholas Breakspear), whose bull *Laudabiliter*, together with the treachery of King Dermot McMurrugh of Leinster, was instrumental in Henry II's invasion of Ireland:

Adrian (that was the Mookse now's assumptinome) stuccstill phiz-à-phiz to the Gripes in an accessit of aurignacian...with his unfallable encyclicling...walked...with his frisherman's blague. (153: 20-21,26,28, 29)

In *A Portrait*, while formulating Stephen's autobiographical memory, Joyce demonstrates how Stephen would not be Stephen without his own personal, cultural, and

historical memories. These memories are crucial in constructing a unique identity for Stephen, both as a young man and potential artist. Joyce's textual encoding of memory in his character's psyche parallels the storage and retrieval processes understood in psychology. William James defines the importance of attention and emotion in creating memory (1890: 1: 630), and Regina Pally discusses the "encoding" process, by which perceptual experience is transformed into memory (1,226). Pally moreover, citing Tulving and others, includes "[n]ovelty of information" (1,227) as another major factor in memory storage. The desire to know is the strongest drive in childhood, and this desire to know impacts on later psychic development and self-identity. Memory is the foundation of growth, and the memories of childhood tend to be the most vivid and easily remembered.

The "Christmas day dinner" section of *A Portrait*, begins with a child's view of a festive family gathering: "A great fire, banked high and red, flamed in the grate and under the ivy twined branches of the chandelier the Christmas table was spread" (32). However, the holiday soon becomes the setting for a violent political argument centered on Parnell's downfall, and with it the hope for Home Rule for Ireland. Young Stephen is swept up into the argument by adult concern about what he will "remember":

— O, he'll remember all this when he grows up, said Dante hotly— the language he heard against God and religion and priests in his own home.

— Let him remember too, cried Mr. Casey to her from across the table, the language with which the priests and the priests' pawns broke Parnell's heart and hounded him into his grave. Let him remember that too when he grows up.

— Sons of bitches! cried Mr. Dedalus. When he was down they turned on him to betray him and rend him like rats in a sewer. Low-lived dogs! And they look it! By Christ, they look it! (41)

Earlier at Clongowes, Stephen was "pained...that he did not know well what politics

meant”(17); his views of religion were limited to “prayers in the chapel and then bed” (17). However, here he receives a precocious induction into the political history of his country, which will be ever more associated with betrayal, and a rude awakening that God’s representatives, some of whom are his Jesuit masters are “[s]ons of bitches.”

Throughout the altercation, the psychological components of memory-encoding— situational novelty, attentiveness, perceptual register, and emotional awareness— are employed by Joyce, so that Stephen’s memory is unequivocally recorded in his consciousness; it will then be rescripted into many forms in Stephen’s later interior monologues. The novelty of the Christmas-day occasion is established indelibly in his mind as a rite-of-passage for the child, for he is now old enough to share the Christmas table with the adults: “It was his first Christmas dinner and he thought of his little brothers and sisters who were waiting in the nursery, as he had often waited, till the pudding came” (36). Stephen is keenly observant of his surroundings—food, warmth, color, family, human voices—which serve as the sensory catalysts that make up perception:

...and the warm heavy smell of turkey and ham and celery rose from the plates and dishes and the great fire was banked high and red in the grate and the green ivy and red holly made you feel so happy and when dinner was ended the big plum pudding would be carried in, studded with peeled almonds and sprigs of holly, with bluish fire running around it and a little green flag flying from the top. (35-36)

The emotions of happiness and serenity are subverted and transformed into terror and sadness by the end of the dinner, “Stephen, raising his terror-stricken face, saw that his father’s eyes were full of tears” (50). Stephen has now learned “what politics meant,” for his memory has been infused with the associations of treachery and turmoil— Ireland’s situation writ large.

Parnell's betrayal attains archetypal significance as Joyce rescripts it again and again as a center of memory in Stephen and Leopold Bloom's interior monologues in *Ulysses* and the *Wake*, where the mound, the literary concretization of the Akasic Records, represents the source of all history and prehistory. Parnell's significance to the Joycean corpus can be gleaned from Joyce's 1912 essay, "The Shade of Parnell":

He was deposed in obedience to Gladstone's orders. Of his 83 representatives only 8 remained faithful to him. The high and low clergy entered the lists to finish him off. The Irish press emptied on him and the woman he loved the vials of their envy. The citizens of Castlecomer threw quicklime in his eyes. He went from county to county, from city to city, 'like a hunted deer', a spectral figure with the signs of death on his forehead. Within a year he died of a broken heart at the age of 45.

...The melancholy which invaded his mind was perhaps the profound conviction that, in his hour of need, one of the disciples who dipped his hand in the same bowl with him would betray him. That he fought to the very end with this desolate certainty in mind is his greatest claim to nobility.

In his final desperate appeal to his countrymen, he begged them not to throw him as a sop to the English wolves howling around them. It redounds to their honour that they did not fail this appeal. They did not throw him to the English wolves; they tore him to pieces themselves. (227-228)

Joyce's formulation of Stephen's autobiographical memory in *A Portrait* parallels Damasio's conceptualization of the formation of consciousness, as I discussed in Chapter 1, especially Damasio's hypothesis about the psychological establishment and recognition of a selfhood that makes an awareness of autobiographical memory unique for each individual. Hence, Joyce makes it clear when fashioning Stephen's interiority that Stephen provides the subjective register of his experiences, through his character's acute perceptual awareness. Since Joyce situates Stephen's memories around central childhood experiences, Stephen's

memories are both generic and subjective.

Stephen's individual recollections are especially apparent later, during his psychosexual awakening. On his trip to Cork with his father, Simon Dedalus, father and son visit the "anatomy theatre" of Simon's college where "[o]n the desk he [Stephen] read the word *fetus* cut several times in the dark stained wood" (119). Stephen's subjectivity is never in doubt, for Joyce immediately presents his reaction, "His monstrous reveries came thronging into his memory. They too had sprung up before him, suddenly and furiously, out of mere words" (120). Stephen's choice of the descriptive and interpretive adjective "monstrous" reflects his uniquely sensitive and conflicted nature: the Catholic Stephen is trying to prevent his soul from becoming as stained as 'the dark stained wood' of the desk.

However, Stephen's search for identity is not achieved through "natural" memory alone. There is an implicit subtext in the formation of Stephen's identity. Ellmann has established that the novel is about "the gestation of the soul" (1982: 297). This appraisal introduces a metaphysical dimension to the protagonist's development and suggests his participation in a greater reality.

In *A Portrait*, Joyce approaches the transcendent through the temporal and post-temporal existence of the soul. Joyce prefaced his novel with a quotation from Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, and generations of critics have analyzed its significance in terms of the Daedalian symbolic relevance to Stephen's flight to escape the nets of family, country, and Church. Joseph Campbell also sees the importance of the Daedalian archetype to the young artist's plight, but he suggests an additional level of significance in Joyce's choice of Ovid as his thematic textual predecessor:

There is a wonderful scene in the fifteenth book of *Metamorphoses*, where Ovid is talking to Pythagoras, a sage living in isolation who gives the theme of the book: namely, that the one animating power is moving from one form to another, showing itself in the animal world, the plant world, the human world, the divine world. *Nothing dies*. The spirit simply appears in various forms— these metamorphoses take place [my emphasis]. (Campbell 1993: 14)

The “spirit,” or soul “appears in various forms” in Joyce’s corpus, but in *A Portrait* Joyce focuses on its manifestation through moments of collective involuntary memory, in its importance to artistic creation, and in its role in Roman Catholic teleological theology. The soul’s most prominent treatment occurs through the adolescent Stephen’s sexual awakening, where his dualistic nature becomes most apparent:

He was in mortal sin. Even once was a mortal sin. It could happen in an instant. But how so quickly? By seeing or by thinking of seeing. The eyes see the thing, without having wished first to see. Then in an instant it happens. But does that part of the body understand or what? The serpent, the most subtle beast of the field. It must understand when it desires in one instant and then prolongs its own desire instant after instant, sinfully. It feels and understands and desires. What a horrible thing! Who made it to be like that, a bestial part of the body able to understand bestially and desire bestially? Was that then he or an inhuman thing moved by a lower soul? His soul sickened at the thought of a torpid snaky life feeding itself out of the tender marrow of his life and fattening upon the slime of lust. O why was that so? O why?
(189)

Stephen’s revulsion at his own erection, at the involuntary display of the physiological potentiality of the creative impulse, which symbolizes his incipient participation in the archetypal patterns of fatherhood, has been inculcated in large part by his Jesuit masters, and which serves as a factor in his adolescent psychological retrogression. The retreat master, Father Arnall, serves as the mnemonic catalyst, for he evokes Stephen’s childhood at

Clongowes, and memories which inhibit his soul's growth: "His soul, as these memories came back to him, became again a child's soul" (145).

These memories are linked to what John Rickard sees as Stephen's attempt to escape from "the authority of memory" of his personal past (1997: 22). For Rickard, "The schoolroom reappears frequently as an important setting in Joyce's prose—a place where the authority and power of the master exerts itself over the often rebellious, sometimes cowed, student. Schoolrooms often function for Joyce as sites of repression, indoctrination, punishment, and resistance" (1997:18). These "sites" reinvoke corporal as well as psychological intimidation as evidenced in Father Dolan's pandybatting of the young Stephen, and Father Arnall's sermon picturing the damnation of the soul (1997: 18-19).

The hell-fire sermon provides powerful elements in Stephen's memory. Chapter III of *A Portrait* is foregrounded in eternity, because it is overwhelmingly focused on the Roman Catholic conception of the afterlife. During the retreat at Belvedere College in honor of Saint Francis Xavier, "one of the greatest sons of Catholic Spain" (146), for the young and impressionable Stephen, the demarcation of the temporal and transcendent realms are outlined by Father Arnall: "Time was to sin and enjoy, time was to scoff at God and at the warnings of His holy church, time was to defy His majesty, to disobey His commands, to hoodwink one's fellow men, to commit sin after sin, and to hide one's corruptions from the sight of men" (151). Adjudication of the soul's final post-mortem destiny depends on the degree of renunciation of the world, and its relegation to hell, purgatory, or heaven, with emphasis here on the infernal region.

Stephen has yet to understand fully "why that was so," or what sexual appetite has to

do with a strict theological bifurcation of the flesh and spirit: “What did it avail to pray when he knew that his soul lusted after its own destruction?” (138). The tension is exacerbated by Stephen’s sensitivity to the sensuous world, the temporal world of both good and evil, which ALP in *Finnegans Wake* makes possible: “Since ALP symbolizes, among other things, the flow of time and experience..., her proxenetical activity would be more than sexual. This activity could be interpreted as the presentation by experience of the facts of the phenomenal world to the senses” (Epstein 1971: 32). Moreover, as Epstein, Ellmann, Kenner and others have observed, Joyce’s portrayal of Stephen’s formation in *A Portrait* is steeped in his character’s imagistic sensitivity through his sensual encounters, and their concomitant associative parental memories such as the significance of the hot and cold lavatory water cocks, the slippers, and the oilsheet.

Stephen’s heightened sensitivity is especially apparent through his reaction to the “hell-fire sermon.” The focus of the sermon is not on Saint Paul’s theory of the soul’s extinction or annihilation—“the wages of sin is death” (Romans, VI, 23) — but rather on everlasting torment and absence of God’s mercy— “ever to suffer, never to enjoy; ever to be damned, never to be saved; ever, never; ever, never” (180). James R. Thrane by a comparative analysis has established Joyce’s indebtedness to the Italian Jesuit, Giovanni Pietro Pinamonti’s “tract,” *Hell Opened to Christians, To Caution Them from Entering into It* in its English translation (173). Thrane also discusses its influence on Father John Joseph Furniss, whose own series of books, especially *The Sight of Hell*, targeting a young population, caused great controversy. Significantly, Thrane discusses the concreteness of Furniss’ approach, which can also be applied to Joyce presentation of Arnall’s method, “‘Children, ‘he declared,’ cannot reason, you must make them understand through their

feelings and imagination” (qtd. in Thrane, 194).

Father Arnall’s Hell is no abstraction; rather, it is filled with vivid and revolting images and concrete conceptualizations which are encoded, and become structural elements in Stephen’s memory. The sermon is rescripted in Stephen’s unconscious and invades his dreamscape: “They moved in slow circles, circling closer and closer to enclose, to enclose, soft language issuing from their lips, their long swishing tails besmeared with stale shite, thrusting upwards their terrific faces” (187). Stephen’s purgative vomiting and subsequent redemptive actions are attempts to save his soul from the same fate as these “[g]oatish creatures with human faces” (186).

However, confession (194-197), and mortification of the senses—“Each of his senses was brought under a rigorous discipline” (204) cannot counter physical and psychological desire:

This idea of surrender had a perilous attraction for his mind now that he felt his soul beset once again by the insistent voices of the flesh which began to murmur to him again during his prayers and meditations. It gave him an intense sense of power to know that he could by a single act of consent, in a moment of thought, undo all that he had done. (206)

Stephen’s obsessive vision of his soul’s possible destination precludes, at this point, the soul’s creative and universalizing propensity. It also makes difficult an awareness that evil is an intrinsic and inescapable part of human existence, archetypal in scope, if viewed not only through the legacy of Original Sin, as the older Stephen does in the “Proteus” chapter of *Ulysses*, but also through Jung’s conception of the “Shadow,” the evil double inherent in all individuals, which in *Finnegans Wake* is represented in the composite son, Shaun and Shem.

Joyce’s Hell, with its attendant evil, is Roman Catholic in origin, but its landscape,

anthropomorphic features, and post-mortem continuance had its origin in the chthonic Hades of Greek mythology and Homer's *Odyssey*. This chthonic region symbolically corresponds to the unconscious, conceptually regarded as the dark and unknown part of the mind where repressed personal and collective memories lie buried. As Jeffrey Burton Russell, in his historical study of evil observes, evil can be interpreted from a Jungian perspective as "the Shadow": "For Jung, the Devil is much more than Freud's expression of individual repressions; he is a reflection of the autonomous, timeless, and universal collective unconscious.... Jung associated the Devil with particular archetypes, especially what he called 'the Shadow'" (246). Russell explains that what Jung understands as "the Shadow" is the necessary opposition between good and evil, which is an ontological part of reality (246), but its destructive force can be countered: "if it is integrated, its energy can be turned toward the greater good" (247).

Jung's concept of "the Shadow" informs Joyce's treatment of the soul because Stephen's interior development depends on his integrating and accepting all aspects of life if he is to participate in the universal paradigms common to all men. Stephen perceives himself as incorporating a dual role—Luciferian rebel and Christ-like martyr. The dynamic of evil, principally expressed through carnal nature, for Stephen will entail a psycho-sexual integration, which Joyce attempts to show through the later bird girl incident on the beach. Joyce with his theory of the soul's role in artistic creativity shows the beauty of the fallen world becoming the impetus for the creative actuality of the individual.

Moreover, Stephen's dualistic dilemma can be glossed through Joyce's universal treatment of the inception of carnal knowledge in a section of *Finnegans Wake*—"The Mime of Mick, Nick and the Maggies." Through the innocence of a child's game, dichotomy is

introduced:

In staging the game of ‘Angels and Devils or colours,’ Joyce added an element of sexual allure; for, just as children’s kissing and courting and marrying games provide an introduction to sex, so the color that the Inquirer in Joyce’s game must guess is specifically the color of the Minder’s drawer’s, and these colors are those of flowers and worn by all the Floras. (Eckley, 133)

The brothers Shaun and Shem like their nominal angelic forebears, epitomize this dualistic struggle, and they eventually represent one entity, the upper and lower halves of the body: “Shem has to guess the color, heliotrope, but since he is a creature of darkness (lower half of body hidden in clothes, and the devil, as well), he cannot guess a color which means ‘sun-turning’” (Epstein:1990, 2000, no pagination). In this section, Shem does obtain “black or sexual magic,” through his first ejaculation, which Joyce’s allusion to Stéphane Mallarmé’s “The Afternoon of a Faun” makes obvious, “While all the fauns’ flares widens wild to see a floral’s school” (250. 32-33).

In *A Portrait*, Stephen is able to integrate the spiritual and sensual when he encounters the wading “bird girl” on the beach. His prior metempsychotic experience (227), where the past and present of his native city merge enabling him momentarily to realize his collective identity serves as a segue for his discovery of his identity as artist. Through the mocking “banter” of his friends, Shuley, Ennis, and Connolly “— Stephanos Dedalos! Bous Stephanoumenos! Bous Stephaneforos!” (229) — the significance of his surname is impressed on his mind, and his mythic vocational father enters his interior monologue. “Now, at the name of the fabulous artificer, he seemed to hear the noise of dim waves and to see a winged form flying above the waves and slowly climbing the air” (229). This epiphany of the “hawklike man” momentarily unifies his psyche and permits him to understand who he

is.

Ellmann regards Stephen's discernment of identity here as transpersonal, "Increasingly Stephen denies his actual family in Dublin so as to assume kinship with his eponymous family in Greece. To mature is to become archetypal, to recognize one's place in the roll of entrepreneurs of the spirit" (1981: 16). So too, the "hawklike man" represents Stephen's advent into the generalized cycle of reproductivity, hence creativity; the bird, through its propensity for its "heightening" in flight, suggests a "phallic symbol" (Cirlot, 27). Ascent and descent, are the perpetual natural rhythms of life and of civilizations for Joyce in *Finnegans Wake*. Finally, the introduction of Daedalus into Stephen's associative mindscape signifies his interior liberation: "His soul had arisen from the grave of boyhood, spurning her graveclothes" (231).

Stephen's realization that the soul's growth is dependent on its incorporation of the sensuous world is suggested through his description of the "bird girl." The wading girl symbolically transects earth and sky through Stephen's associations:

Her long slender bare legs were delicate as a crane's and pure save where an emerald trail of seaweed had fashioned itself as a sign upon the flesh. Her thighs, fuller and soft-hued as ivory, were bared almost to the hips where the white fringes of her drawers were like feathering of soft white down. Her slate-blue skirts were kilted boldly about her waist and dovetailed behind her. Her bosom was as a bird's, soft and slight, slight and soft as the breast of some dark-plumaged dove. But her long fair hair was girlish — and girlish, and touched with the wonder of mortal beauty, her face. (233)

Both Eastern and Western tradition equate birds with representations of the soul (Cirlot, 26-28). This eternal aspect is symbolized through the girl's bird-like features. Yet, she is more than just spiritualized; she encapsulates the fusion of the transitory with the

timeless, since her “beauty” is “mortal.” Joyce’s emphasis in *A Portrait* on Stephen’s preoccupation with his soul is vital to his textual establishment of a transcendent conduit in linking his character’s interiority with the recurring mythic and transhistorical patterns of mentation.

One of Joyce’s framing methodologies for Stephen’s realization of the creative potentiality of the soul is provided by Aristotle’s *De Anima*, a French translation of which he read in Paris. Just as the first page of *A Portrait* reflects the Aristotelian patterns of growth through the stages of son and father, physiological paradigms representing the rise to reproduction and the descent toward death in the never-ending life cycle, so too, Aristotle’s idea in *De Anima* of the soul as being the forming and actualizing principle for the potentiality of body/matter informs Stephen’s problem of continuity and discontinuity in human development. For Aristotle, soul is an investiture which is universal to all animate life. It acts in tandem with the body: “It must then be the case that soul is substance as the *form* of a natural body which potentially has life, and since this substance is actuality, soul will be the actuality of such a body” (157). Aristotle posits that the seat of soul is located in the mind, and although each soul is distinct to its respective body, he does not preclude its immortality by positing knowledge as an a priori condition of its imperishability, “And since knowledge is in the individual case prior in origin, soul is the *first* actuality of a natural body which potentially has life” (157). All individuals intuit a form which partakes in a priori knowledge, but this is only possible through body acting as preceptor, or, in other words, “thought through my eyes” as Stephen’s Aristotelian contemplation suggests in the “Proteus” chapter of *Ulysses*. In addition, a priori knowledge, expressed through a character’s interior monologue in memory, is the main expression of transcendence in Joyce’s work, for it

interlinks the past and the present, or as Stephen's diary entry of April 6th states, "The past is consumed in the present..." (344).

That matter and soul are mutually dependent is the center of Stephen's aesthetic theory in *A Portrait*, for it is the beauty of the fallen world that makes artistic creation possible:

To speak of these things and to try to understand their nature and, having understood it, to try slowly and humbly and constantly to express, to press out again, from the gross earth or what it brings forth, from sound and shape and color which are the prison gates of our soul, an image of the beauty we have come to understand— that is art. (282)

All Joyce's works posit textually that no matter how illusory, the fallen world is mankind's world: this world of "color," and "sound," and "shape" coexists with the "white light of eternity." Symbolically, this is evident as the eternal light of the sun rises before the earth-bound Molly in *Ulysses*, and before the temporal river-mother, ALP, in *Finnegans Wake*. [▲] is a textual memory of the past. In *Stephen Hero*, Stephen discovers this as he tries to penetrate the meaning of the creative experience:

He doubled backwards into the past of humanity and caught glimpses of emergent art as one might have a vision of the pleisiosauros emerging from his ocean of slime. He seemed almost to hear the simple cries of fear and joy and wonder which are antecedent to all song, the savage rhythms of men pulling at the oar,>> to see the rude scrawls and the portable gods of men whose legacy Leonardo and Michelangelo inherit. And over all this chaos of history and legend, of fact and supposition, he strove to draw out a line of order, to reduce the abysses of the past to order by a diagram. (33)

Here, Stephen's experience of the memory of the evolution of life and human history indicates that art is not the recreation of dead objects or static non-referential words on a page in space, but a vitalizing medium evoking a living simultaneity between past and present

understood through the unchanging core, which is the human condition. The resurgence of the presence of the past in human memory transcends time, and it is only through memory that artistic recreation is conceivable. Stephen, in *A Portrait*, ruminates on “Thoth, the god of writers” (307). Stephen’s description of the god “bearing on his narrow ibis head the cusped moon” (307) intimates by association that animal nature and the celestial are conjoined, as they are in art. For readers, it too suggests Derrida’s interpretation of Thoth as symbolizing the absence/presence dichotomy in relation to speech and writing (1972: 91) in “Pato’s Pharmacy,” and is applicable to Joyce’s treatment of memory.

Derrida focuses on the importance of memory in both speech and writing. However, he distinguishes between the operation of memory used in the two communicative modes through the subject experience. Speech was always paramount in philosophic tradition because it designates presence, which is intrinsic to the speech act, whereas writing denotes the absence of the living voice (Derrida 1972: 68). Joyce decenters speech in favor of the written word, but paradoxically retains the presence of the subject. He objectifies a character’s interiority by negating the mediation of the author, or as Stephen in *A Portrait* regards it, “The artist, like the God of the creation, remains within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails” (294). The artist is thereby able to reinvest the “presence” of the transhistorical past. The mind of one of the writer’s characters becomes the crystal prism for the emergence of this presence; collectively, the past itself becomes the subject articulating itself on a pre-linguistic level through archetypal symbols and common patterns of mentation manifested through memory. Memory unites and incorporates all aspects of being because it transcends them.

By presenting Stephen's interiority in *A Portrait*, Joyce is able to objectify the development of his character's autobiographical memory in a text. This memory is distinctively Stephen's, because he is the subjective register psychologically encoding the impressionistic reception of the phenomena of the world around him through his evolving consciousness. However, Joyce establishes an extrapersonal dimension to Stephen's stream of consciousness in the novel through metempsychotic continuance, the psychic link to Great Memory, which infuses a universal texture to individual existence. Stuart Gilbert notes the "allusion" to metempsychosis (34) in Stephen's next-to-last diary entry, "I go to encounter for the millionth time the reality of experience" (347). This transcendent vestige of mind, combined with Joyce's paralleling Stephen's physical maturation with the growth of his soul, the designator of the eternal, suggests that "nothing dies." The universal and eternal are rescripted again and again in the particular or individual, here and in *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*. At the end of *A Portrait*, as Stephen prepares to leave home for the enticing "white arms of [the] roads," he imagines hearing the collective voice of all the young men, generation upon generation, who embark on life calling out to him, "We are your kinsmen. And the air is thick with their company as they call to me, their kinsman, making ready to go, shaking the wings of their exultant and terrible youth" (347). Stephen too becomes one of these young men, and in so doing he begins to "forge" an identity. His effort in forming a unified sensibility is left unfinished in *A Portrait*. Later, in *Ulysses*, Stephen realizes that memory is the key to psychological cohesion, hence identity, because it joins individuals to the past, to the immutable and common patterns which give meaning to human existence.

Chapter 4 “I,... am I by memory because under everchanging forms”:
Dedalian memory in *Ulysses*

In the “Proteus” chapter of *Ulysses*, Stephen’s contemplation of the primal material of the universe— its relation to space, time, and the source of mankind’s origin— is crucial to Joyce’s construction of Great Memory in *Ulysses*, and is central to an understanding of his structural and thematic purpose later in *Finnegans Wake*. The actions and mindscapes of his characters in *Ulysses* are intended to be viewed in a larger pattern outside of the self. In *Ulysses*, private memory and the Great Memory are not mutually exclusive but co-functional. Great Memory signifies unbroken connection with a larger frame of reference, a permanent trace.

The third section of the “Telemachiad” is Stephen Dedalus’ renunciation of a fixed and linear view of history, and therefore of time, as espoused by Mr. Deasy in his traditional Christian wisdom of the preceding chapter: “All human history moves towards one great goal, the manifestation of God” (2. 380-381). Stephen’s contemplation of the historical and transhistorical past in “Proteus” can only be comprehended by considering his ideas in the “Nestor” chapter, for, as Epstein contends, “The ‘Nestor’ chapter provides essential material for the understanding of Joyce’s matured concept of the flow of time interpreted in general human terms”(1974:17-18). The second chapter is appropriately set in a school environment signifying the transmission of human memory, or knowledge, generationally, and is the catalyst for Stephen’s engagement with the problems of his personal and cultural past. William Blake and Mr. Deasy’s apocalyptic versions of history frame the episode as Stephen probes into the illusory nature of history.

The inability of Cochrane to answer Stephen’s question during the Roman history lesson on Pyrrhus provides a key interval to allow Joyce to introduce fragments of William

Blake's poetry into Stephen's interior monologue:

Fabled by the daughters of memory. And yet it was in some way if not as memory fabled it. A phrase, then, of impatience, thud of Blake's wings of excess. I hear the ruin of all space, shattered glass and toppling masonry, and time one livid final flame. What's left us then? (2.7-10)

"What's left us" after linear time's chaotic succession and apocalyptic destruction is Stephen's later pronouncement in the chapter that "[h]istory,...is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake" (2.377). Moreover, the idea that history is "fabled" connotes, as Tindall comments, that "its materials [are] fictive and uncertain....Confined to time and space, history is impermanent and unreliable" (1959:141). Time's forward motion is a constraint that imposes a static fixity to past experience, and seems to preclude any form of its living reenactment in the present.

In addition, Joyce, drawing on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and *Poetics* (Gifford and Seidman, 31), develops the idea of the sense of the randomness to historical events:

Had Pyrrhus not fallen by a beldam's hand in Argos or Julius Caesar not been knifed to death. They are not to be thought away. Time has branded them and fettered they are lodged in the room of the infinite possibilities they have ousted. But can those have been possible seeing that they never were? Or was that only possible which came to pass? Weave, weaver of the wind. (2.48-53)

Hence, time makes "actual" only one convergence of an event from among the disparate and unlimited possibilities that might have taken place. This randomness seems to negate patterning. However, patterning is imposed through the consciousness and unconscious investiture of the ordering propensity of the human mind, which discerns archetypes, and which collapses temporal linearity by the melding of the sense of the past into the present.

Joyce's presentation of the arbitrariness of history extends to what version the "weaver" provides in any "gorescarred book." Stephen is a subject of England, and hence subjected to England's ruling master narrative of Irish history. According to Epstein, Mr. Deasy, the Unionist and anti-Semite, provides an erroneous and bigoted view of history, and his teleological theology is undercut by Stephen's all-inclusive view of Judaism as representing a timeless "people" who "bear the prophetic vision of history" (1974: 25).

There are modern theories of histories that elucidate Joyce's treatment of memory. James A. Hansen provides a pertinent interpretation on Joyce's approach to history in relation to Walter Benjamin's theories. Hansen sees a similarity between Benjamin and Joyce in terms of their revisionist approach to history, the metempsychotic intrusion of a living past, and their reliance on the Judaic conception of time. Both authors search for "an appropriate paradigm for rereading the past" (86). Hansen discusses how Benjamin subverts the master narrative "through a complex process of montage, gloss, commentary, and juxtaposition" (86), which does not, however, represent "the destruction of the narrative" (86), but is "rather a radical form of recovery" (86-87).

Benjamin's technique is applicable to Joyce's method in both *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*. This "radical form of recovery" compensates for a "weak Messianic power" as understood through "chronological and progressive notions of history" (Hansen 87). Especially relevant to Joyce's conception and literary application of collective memory retrieval is Hansen's inclusion of Andrew Benjamin's comments about Walter Benjamin's theory of history as a living resurgence: "Messianism becomes a figure for the 'afterlife' of a repressed or forgotten event; it is the phantasmal reincarnation of a past event, a moment of metempsychosis that we experience in the present" (qtd. in Hansen 87). What is also

significant in Hansen's comparative analysis is his discussion of Benjamin's conception of "the *Jetztzeit*, or Now-Moment" (87) because, as in Joyce's rendering of memory, it reinvests the seemingly "fugitive and discontinuous" historical event with a sense of presence (87). Benjamin's reexperiencing of history as the "Now" is linked to what Hansen explains is the Judaic non-teleological approach to time (98): "This Judaic notion of history signifies the presence of the past through collective re-membering— an act that occurs in the Now-Moment— rather than through chronological record" (98). Joyce too, marginalizes linearity in favor of a cyclic view expressed through his characters' universalizing memories telescoping of time. For Hansen, Joyce's Bloom signifies Judaic time (98), and is "a representative of the fragmented ontology of an eternally re-figured history..." (103).

It is in the "Nestor" chapter that Joyce introduces his archaeological trope symbolizing the retrieval of both voluntary and involuntary memory through Stephen's struggle with personal history. The riddle of "The fox burying his grandmother under a hollybush" (2.115) is the riddle of memory in Joyce's work rescripted through "Tatters the mongrel" in the "Proteus" chapter, Bloom's encounter with the "retriever" in "Circe," and, in *Finnegans Wake*, the hen digging up the letter from the Akasic mound, the same mound the Four Old Men dig into to search for the source of Irish history.

However, in the "Aeolus" chapter of *Ulysses* Joyce explicitly introduces metempsychosis, and its source, the Akasic Records, the Theosophical version of The Great Memory: "Akasic records of all that ever anywhere wherever was" (7.882-83), and in more abbreviated fragmentary thought, simply as "Akasic records" (7.928). Joyce dramatizes metempsychosis and Akasa in the mindscape of his characters to illustrate his application of

aboriginal personality. Metempsychosis, the vestiges of other lives remembered, is memory that is not part of individual aggregated experience, but rather innate and referential only through an individual's collective experience; that is why the title of the novel is *Ulysses*, not *Leopold Bloom*. Metempsychosis and its related concept, the Akasic Records, are manifested in *Ulysses* through a character's transindividual and transhistorical psychic patterns and ritualistic actions. Essentially derived from Hindu philosophy and Theosophical lore, the Akasic Records contains a register of the past of everything that ever occurred. All physical and mental processes become part of memory. All actions, whether consciously or unconsciously undertaken, end up in the great Akasic repository, which contains the remembrance of the past of all creation and created things.

Although Joyce dissociated himself from the Theosophical movement, he was, as Ellmann indicates, intrigued by many elements of esoteric doctrine, and “was genuinely interested in such Theosophical themes as cycles, reincarnation, the succession of the gods, and the eternal mother-faith that underlies all transitory religions” (1982: 99). Moreover, Stuart Gilbert in his early treatment of *Ulysses* briefly discusses the relevance of the Akasic Records in relation to the structural implications to the text, and parenthetically states that “this theory of the indestructibility of thought, has an important place” (189) in *Ulysses*.

Like the Akasic Records, Ulyssean metempsychotic memory is indelibly registered and never lost. John S. Rickard's study, which focuses on the relevance of memory in *Ulysses*, includes a discussion of the Akasic Records in relation to Joyce's textual purpose. Rickard comments that

[j]ust as no events or thoughts escape the mind but rather 'abide there and wait,' Joyce's text in *Ulysses* represents a memory that—like the Theosophical Akasa—retains all that has happened in the course of the novel as well as [having]

wider cultural associations. This ‘remembered’ material is not static, however, but forms part of a textual dynamic. (1999: 127)

My thesis builds on the idea encountered in both Rickard and Gilbert that the Akasic Records is significant to Joyce’s construction of transpersonal memory.

In Joyce’s characters, there is a relationship between the flux of contemporary memories and their relationship with the Great Memory; contemporary memories are presented in the context of timeless patterns which, for Joyce, are attendant to a character’s archetypal psychic life. Leopold Bloom, the modern “everyman,” like his precursor, Odysseus, desires *nostos* — return to home. However, Bloom’s return from the exile of the marriage bed is more than geographic, more than a physical arrival back to 7 Eccles Street. Home for Bloom is carnal union with his wife Molly after an eleven year disruption of marital relations. In the “Lestrygonians” chapter of *Ulysses*, Joyce overlaps the psychic archetypal homing instinct with Bloom’s nostalgic personal memory of remembered coupling on the Hill of Howth. Here, in Davy Byrne’s pub, cued by the wine’s relation to the sun — the “secret touch telling me memory” (8.898-899) — Bloom psychically returns to the homeland, Molly: “Ravished over her I lay, full lips full open, kissed her mouth. Yum. Softly she gave me in my mouth the seedcake warm and chewed” (8.906-907).

Therefore, Joyce’s use of the Homeric *Odyssey* has an intimate relationship to the Akasic Records and to metempsychosis. The mythic paradigm for *Ulysses* must be interpreted through its archetypal expression manifested in his characters’ interior monologues — the fictive representations of subjective and racial memory. Personal memories are too fleeting and confused to express the true continuities of history. In his review of *Ulysses* T.S. Eliot commented on the significance of Joyce’s “mythic method” —

his “manipulating a continuous parallel between contemporaneity and antiquity” (177). Eliot likens Joyce’s technique to Yeats’ in that both authors were trying to lend psychological cohesion and meaning to a seemingly irrecoverable past in the face of a modern world subjectively isolated and fragmented: “It is simply a way of controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape and a significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history” (177). Hence, in the “Proteus” chapter, Stephen-Telemachus, son, is also Stephen-Menelaus, seeker of answers, wrestling with the Protean elements in time and in himself. Stephen’s concerns in this chapter are with his problems of identity, time, paternity, fear, alienation, guilt, continuity and creativity. Here, in this Protean seascape, Stephen contemplates the flux and change in the primal material universe over time, and, as S.L. Goldberg observes, the possibility of moving beyond his “egocentric” subjectivity through “irony” and “detachment” because “he is seeking his self among its temporal manifestations” (158).

The hypersensitive Stephen Dedalus’ fundamental problem is alienation: he is isolated from the source and meaning of life; his memories are chaotic, and within himself there is no consistency. Who is “Stephen”? He is the wavering image in Buck Mulligan’s cracked mirror: “Who chose this face for me? This dogsbody to rid of vermin. It asks me too” (1.136-137). Stephen’s distorted reflection suggests an inversion of the Lacanian psychologically fragmented “mirror image” (4), for he sees not the deceptive image of cohesion, but conversely, the bifurcated image of subjective uncertainty. His interior musings here in the “Telemachus” chapter adumbrate his more extensive search for origins in “Proteus.” Moreover, Stephen is a role-playing Hamlet, and an aesthete snob rather than an artist—the “dreadful bard”(1.134), as Buck Mulligan refers to him, who has “grown out of

Wilde and paradoxes” (1.554). He is ridden with guilt over his mother’s death — “Agenbite of inwit. Conscience” (1.481-482) — and converts the the sea into his own private symbol of his mother’s death. The sea has become for him an element of death rather than of life. The sea is a bowl of bitter waters — it is his dying mother’s white china bowl holding “ her green sluggish bile”(1.108-109).

Buck Mulligan’s feminization of the sea through his reference to Swinburne’s “The Triumph of Time” — “our great sweet mother”(1. 80) — becomes the mnemonic locus for Stephen’s chain of associations linking the sea to his mother, “Isn’t the sea what Algy calls it: a great sweet mother?” (1.77-78). The maternal sea imagistically activates Stephen’s autobiographical memories of May Dedalus, which “beset his brooding brain” (1.265-266). It also induces his recollection of his dream, which resurrected a haunting and ghoulish image of his mother (1.270-273, 278). The sea, universally symbolic of fluidity and potential of life, hence the female principle, is inverted for Stephen into a private symbol of death. Furthermore, the allusion to the poem in which the decadent Swinburne desires to inseminate the “great sweet mother,” thereby transgressing the primal incestuous taboo, suggests that Stephen’s aversion to water, hence life, is psycho-sexual in nature. However, Buck’s descriptive terms, “The scrotumtightening sea. *Epi oinopa ponton....Thalatta! Thalatta!*” (1.78, 80), equating the sea with male physiological experience, and the male world of seafaring and battle, foreshadows the emergence into Stephen’s psyche of the sea as the male principle in the “Proteus” chapter.

All creation is in a state of flux and change— above, through scudding clouds and sunlight, and below, through tidal change and shifting mudflats, and within, through impressionistic awareness— in the “Proteus” chapter of *Ulysses*, which was James Joyce’s

“own preference” (Budgen, 48) of episodes in the book. Memories reflect the flux all too well; there is no coherence. Stephen looks around the world of the Protean seashore and inquires into the meaning of reality, vainly seeking permanence in the most mutable of environments. His own self-discontinuity is reflected through the myriad impressions which ebb and flow within his stream of consciousness, and his own symbolic adaptation of the sea. This constant internal change is induced by Stephen’s imagistic encounter.

Time induces change moment by moment, so that nothing remains the same. From this perspective the self is ever-changing. William James’ premise in *Principles of Psychology* is that “no state once gone through can recur and be identical with what it was before” (1890:1:229), for he finds “no proof that the same bodily sensation is ever got by us twice” (1890:1:225). James’ argument follows the famous paradigm of the Greek philosopher Heraclitus, “that we never descend twice into the same stream” (1890:1: 227), because by analogy James applies Heraclitus’ dictum to the human “river of elementary feeling” (1890:1:227). The underlying conjecture for James concerns time, for time is “remoulding” our “experiences” (1890:1:228).

However, Joyce has Stephen surmount time’s impressionistic assault through his exploration of the permanence of memory, by recognizing the inherent patterns in human life, and through his empirical and idealist exchange with the objective world. Paradoxically, through both time and endless subjective flux, continuity of being occurs through both personal and collective memory. The opening sentence of “Proteus,” “Ineluctable modality of the visible: at least that if no more, thought through my eyes” (3.1-2), signals Stephen’s experiment with visual perception on the beach, the spatial environment. Yet, as the chapter progresses, there is another type of vision introduced by Joyce, one that is related to that of

Proust. Shattuck's analogy of "binocular vision" in relation to Proust's "optics of time" pertains to Joyce's treatment of memory, for Shattuck shows how Proust transposed vision's sense of "depth," a concomitant of space, into a temporal dimension by memory's "stereoscopic" "realignment" of past with present (118); hence, for Stephen and for Joyce's other characters the parameters of space and time are always collapsing and conflating in memory.

Earlier in the "Telemachus" chapter the image of the sea, "our great sweet mother" (1.80) is the imagistic memory cue for Stephen's revisitation of his mother's end: "The ring of bay and skyline held a dull green mass of liquid. A bowl of white china had stood beside her deathbed holding the green sluggish bile which she had torn up from her rotting liver by fits of loud groaning vomiting" (1.107-110). The past is ever present in Stephen's mind through the "stereoscopic" propensity of memory.

The Protean tide of the chapter flowing inwardly and outwardly and bringing with it the "seaspawn and seawrack" of burgeoning life and the refuse of past existence corresponds to the internal processes of Stephen's consciousness and memory. Stephen is the sole center of consciousness in the "Proteus" chapter. Through his perception of the seascape, he is able to form a picture of the world in his mind. The interaction of objective and subjective reality resembles the combination of sight and sound in the projection of a sound film, what Damasio refers to as the "movie-in-the-brain" (1999: 9). Joyce actually employs the movie projector in *Finnegans Wake* as an analogue to the continuous representations of the Protean world in the unconscious and unconscious mind.

Stephen in "Proteus" attempts to read the movement of the sea, to read "the coloured signs," the "snotgreen," the "bluesilver," and "rust" (3.3). However, Stephen is looking for

coherence, for Boehmean signatures, for corresponding “spiritual identities” (Gifford and Seidman, 44) to make sense of the ineluctable modality of the visual and the audible. Stephen begins by thinking about color. The “diaphane,” the transparent, is only the surface of the essence or the quiddity of things. Color makes objects visible, but color is not a part of the real object. However, how can we become aware of quiddity if we do not look at color? The answer is Aristotelian reality— Stephen bumps against it. “Then he was aware of them bodies before of them coloured. How? By knocking his sponce against them, sure” (3. 4-6). To avoid incoherence, the roiled texture of surface memories, Stephen must escape the Berkeleyan limiting world of the perceiving self. For Stephen, the world is a text for him to be read. He closes his eyes and closes off the visual experience. “[A]diaphane” defines real essence; hence, he must suspend the visual. “Stephen closed his eyes to hear his boots crush crackling wrack and shells” (3.10-11). He walks through “[a] very short space of time through very short times of space” (3. 11-12).

Stephen then considers time and space in his search for continuity and coherence. Time is the *Nacheinander*, the audible— one thing after the other. Space is the *Nebeneinander*, the visible— things next to each other. “[Y]ou see. I hear” (3.23). Time and Space are with him in his self-imposed blindness. “But he had a moment, his eyes closed, of wondering whether everything might vanish in that dark interlude. One cannot really trust the world of matter” (Burgess 101). “Open your eyes now. I will. One moment. Has all vanished since? If I open and am for ever in the black adiaphne. *Basta!* I will see if I can see” (3.25-26). Then Stephen sees. He has progressed beyond subjectivity into an ineluctable belief in coherence, in the true continuity of the perceived world. Here, the material world is apprehended objectively. The real world, existing independently, has been

there all the time: “See now. There all the time without you: and ever shall be, world without end” (3.27-28).

Next, Stephen searches for memories that go beyond and before individual memory. Aware of objective reality, Stephen now ponders creation. He sees two midwives and associates them with the source of his own creation. Searching for aboriginal images, Stephen imagines gazing into his navel in quest of the origins of life to explain who he is. Here Joyce suggests that we contain both a personal and an aboriginal identity, “The cords of all link back, strandentwining cable of all flesh” (3.37). This symbolizes an unbroken connection with the past, with ancient memories, that join all individuals in a universalizing experience across time. Stephen’s humorous attempt at opening a channel of communication with “Edenville” through a dial up “Aleph, alpha: nought, nought, one” (3.39-40) really represents that the meaning and patterns in life have significance only through the context of the human past. Stephen attempts to reconnect back to the first moment of creation— “[c]reation from nothing” (3.35). Here, Joyce intimates that individuals bear a psychic relation to the human race’s distant history and primal patterning, for if we could remember the origin of mankind’s origin and development we would have a greater awareness of what it means to be human.

Joyce favors generic rather than individualistic representation of character because, as Epstein states, Joyce believed that

[t]he fundamental events in a man’s life are basically the same as those in any other man’s life; the fundamental events in a woman’s life are basically the same as those in any other woman’s life. A human life that is not cut short or otherwise aborted (morally or physically) follows the same pattern as those of the lives of other representatives of the species. (Epstein 1982: 74)

Joyce answers the question “What is identity if imagistic mentation and physical maturation are continuously changing?” by asserting that although it is a temporal imperative that individuals do change and die, the common patterns in human life continue. Once a pattern is established, it then resides outside of time. Thus, it is through patterning that Stephen in “Proteus” searches for “the permanent reality under unchanging forms.” For Joyce, this is only possible in momentary flashes of psychic transcendence wherein the depths of personality are revealed.

Stephen’s search here is not limited to maternal origins; now his associative memory drifts to “Adam Kadmon” (3.41), the Adam of the Kabbala, whose stature both literally and metaphorically diminished through the Fall into Original Sin. It is through this evocation of postlapsarian legacy that Stephen’s thoughts turn to the creation of Stephen Dedalus: “Wombed in sin darkness I was too, made not begotten. By them, the man with my voice and my eyes and a ghostwoman with ashes on her breath. They clasped and sundered, did the coupler’s will” (3.45-47). Stephen recalls that the Church considers the sexual union a transmitter of Original Sin. When we are born, we bear the guilt for the coupling of our parents, a guilt that originates in the human race’s first parents, Adam and Eve. Stephen here is developmentally arrested by an inherited aversion to sex and sexual guilt, and his mentation represents a regression to his adolescent sexual awakening in *A Portrait*. However, despite his fear, Stephen is obsessed with the mysteries of paternity— “the man with my voice and my eyes.” He turns from his personal difficulties to the spiritual, generalizing the issue to the question of the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son: “From before the ages He willed me and now may not will me away or ever. *A lex eterna* stays about Him. Is that then the divine substance wherein Father and Son are

consubstantial?” (3.47-50).

For Stephen, this consubstantial father is a generalized being and is accessed through collective memory. Later, in the “Scylla and Charybdis” chapter, where Stephen offers his disquisition on fatherhood vis à vis Shakespeare, he concludes that although individuals are subject to physical mutability— “Five months. Molecules all change” (9.205) — “the permanent reality under unchanging forms” is only achieved through memory, “I,...am I by memory because under everchanging forms” (9.208-209). Gilbert interprets his revelation as a recognition “of the continuity of his self under the modality of temporal forms” (38). However, Gilbert does not limit his interpretation to Stephen’s autobiographical memory, but includes an extrapersonal dimension by referencing the incomplete statement to a Theosophist writer, A. P. Sinnett, and his theory of reincarnation (38). According to Sinnett, transpersonal identity is more permanently established than individual identity:

For many people it will perhaps remain irrational to say that any person now living, with his recollections bounded by the years of his childhood, is the same individual as some one of quite a different nationality and epoch who lived thousands of years ago, or the same that will reappear after a similar lapse of time under some entirely new conditions in the future. But the feeling ‘I am I’ is the same through the three lives and through all the hundreds; for that feeling is more deeply seated than the feeling ‘I am John Smith.... (qtd. in Gilbert, 35)

However, Stephen’s evocation of collective images of paternity fail to soothe him. He feels a deep sense of desolation in having failed to trace his own cultural and personal origins. As he walks along the strand, he sees that he is headed in the direction of his Aunt Sara and Uncle Richie’s house. Stephen debates whether or not to go there. His personal memories are stirred as he recalls an earlier visit. He thinks of Uncle Richie and how he

represents Dublin life: drunkenness, ineffectuality, paralysis, decay. Then Stephen rejects all of this and, feeling an acute sense of failure, turns away from his personal family and surroundings. Thus detached from family, Stephen is able to realize that his family dwells in “[h]ouses of decay, mine, his and all” (3.105).

Then Stephen begins mockingly to recall his own impoverished and verminous, guilt-ridden self. His self-scrutiny is searing. Stephen mocks his childish boasting to the Clongowes gentry, and his prayers to the Blessed Virgin mixed with his lust for women, “What else were they invented for?” (3.135). Above all, he taunts himself with his vain and pointless intellectual and artistic ambitions, “Reading two pages apiece of seven books every night” (3.136); planning books “with letters for titles” (3.139); realizing the “deeply deep” epiphanies “on green oval leaves”(3.141). Stephen realizes he is disconnected from his past, and feels he has imposed unrealizable goals on himself. The passing of years makes apparent to him the gulf between what is and what he might have been. What Stephen seeks—unity—can only be achieved through archetypal tapping into Great Memory. The timeless and universal elevation of Christ in the Host enters Stephen’s interior monologue. There is a reflection on Christ’s hypostatic nature, “as Stephen speculates, no matter how many elevations of the host are celebrated simultaneously, there is still only one body of Christ”(Gifford and Seidman, 50).

Stephen then moves from the “grainy sand” to the “sandflats.” “Broken hoops,” “a maze of dark cunning nets,” “chalkscrawled backdoors,” and “a dryingline with two crucified shirts” (3.155-157) are translated into bitter private associational symbols. The objects, when psychologically interpreted, represent his repressed unconscious insecurities, and they parallel not only his own condition but Ireland’s as well— all stuck “in the cakey

sand dough” (3.153) of unproductivity. Stephen muses on his failed Paris experiences: “Paris rawly waking, crude sunlight on her lemon streets” (3.209). Stephen thinks of the wild geese, of Kevin Egan, “Loveless, landless, wifeless” (3.253). “They have forgotten Kevin Egan, not he them. Remembering thee, O Sion” (3. 263-264). Stephen too, is the forgotten son, exiled physically and psychologically.

Stephen ventures closer to the sea. The hydrophobic Stephen is alarmed by the harping sea wind, and by his feet sinking slowly in the quaking soil. “Turn back” (3.269). Stephen retreats. Like Hamlet, he will watch the tide— “Elsinore’s tempting flood” (3.281). Although the sea is linked in Stephen’s personal memory to his mother, and therefore death, the sea is also a symbol of father, the father that destroyed Icarus, and which therefore destroyed the creative possibilities of life for the new son. Then Stephen ventures closer to the sea. He ruminates on Haines’ dream, “the panthersahib and his pointer” (3. 277-278), which foreshadows Bloom, the exemplar of fatherhood, and the retriever in the “Circe” chapter. Moreover, his introjection of “[m]y soul walks with me, form of forms” (3.279-280) suggests his gradual understanding that identity is achieved from within, not without, from collective memory, not from chaotic Protean forms. Stephen climbs and sits “on a stool of rock” (3. 284). For Stephen, “These heavy sands are language tide and wind have silted here” (3.288-289). They are private symbols, and he is still trapped in an individualistic world. Looking seaward, Stephen thinks of a recently drowned man. Would he have tried to save him— yes or no? “The truth, spit it out. I would want to. I would try. I am not a strong swimmer. Water cold soft” (3.323-324). However, the personal memory now becomes a collective one: the death of one person is the death of all. The death of the man becomes the death of the mother: “I could not save her. Waters: bitter death: lost” (3.329-

330). In miniature, the textual patterns in “Proteus” are carried over to *Finnegans Wake* through the tropes of dreaming and digging. In “Proteus” a dog digs in the sand, and his instinctual action parallels Stephen’s digging into his memory; in the *Wake*, the Four Old Men dig into the Akasic mound and discover at its center the dreaming HCE, the hero of the *Wake*.

Before the key figure of “Proteus,” the dog Tatters, enters Stephen’s Protean realm, Stephen has already seen the bloated carcass of a dead dog, thereby reinforcing the theme of death. As Tatters ambles along, “[t]he carcass lay on his path. He stopped, sniffed, stalked round it”(3.348-349). Tatters’ actions epitomize the processes inherent in memory retrieval, and he represents many aspects of Stephen’s dilemma. At the same time he prefigures certain aspects of Stephen’s salvation. J. C. Cooper states one of the traditional attributes of the dog is “[a] keeper of boundaries between this world and the next” (52) or as a “psychopomp,” (53) a leader of the dead to judgment. “Ah, poor dogsbody! Here lies poor dogsbody’s body”(3.351-352). This thought sums up Stephen’s self-scrutiny. He is afraid of the uninhibited and energetic live dog. Stephen’s view of himself is not as a young artist god, but a young dog like the dead dog. The artist, like Tatters, embraces life, and is not afraid to investigate death. Neither is the dog afraid to live: “his forepaws dabbled and delved. Something he buried there, his grandmother” (3.360-361). Stephen associates Tatters’ action with his riddle in “Nestor,” of the fox burying his grandmother under a hollybush. It is symbolic of what Stephen constantly attempts — he tries to bury the memory of his mother, yet he always digs her up. Her ghost haunts him; his intense guilt has not been assuaged.

For Joyce, Tatters “is the mummer among beasts— the Protean animal” (Budgen,

53). For Stephen, he is a mimic of all animals: “Suddenly he made off like a bounding hare, ears flung back, chasing the shadow of a lowskimming gull” (3.333-335). He is a buck, trippant, proper unattired, a wolf’s redpanting tongue; a calf’s gallop (3. 337, 346, 347-348). Stephen will also imitate. His mimicry will be one of three significant gestures, or “creative acts” (Tindall 1959: 147)— signifying participation in ritualistic experience. Tatters’ urination anticipates Stephen’s: “Along by the edge of the mole he lolloped, dawdled, smelt a rock and from under a cocked hindleg pissd against it. He trotted forward and, lifting again his hindleg, pissed quick short at an unsmelt rock” (3.356-359).

Tatters, like collective memory, subsumes all experience. Tatters is the “Protean animal,” since he is all animals. This concept anticipates another important development for Stephen. Stephen associates the dog with a pard, a panther, “all-beast,” in Greek. This is significant for two reasons. It anticipates Bloom: the panther is symbolic of Christ, and Bloom is linked symbolically with the Christ-like man. Stephen recalls Haines’ nightmare about a panther. Stephen too had a dream which is evocative not only of his later encounter with Bloom, but the mind’s participation in collective memory through Jungian “synchronicity.”

Here Stephen’s dream of an Eastern scene provides him with an entry into the Great Memory, and a temporary exit from individual chaotic memories. Access to the Collective Unconscious or Great Memory is understood only indirectly through dream and meditative states, hallucinatory occurrences, which reveal universal symbols or archetypes. Stephen’s dream of a man from the East suggests that Great Memory is not only transcendent but transindividual. Yeats, in his essay “Magic,” views psychic overlap in which “many minds can flow into one another” (28) as an attendant of the Great Memory. The idea of a shared

mental content among individuals is not just a theory unique to Yeats; it is also found in Jung's notions about the Collective Unconscious. William Walcott interprets Stephen's dream of Haroun al Raschid in relation to Jung's concept of synchronicity (37). He rebuts McCarroll's position that Stephen's dream is an "aesthetic" device (37); rather, Walcott sees Joyce consciously employing transindividual mentation, psychic "overlapping," as essential to "the development of the relationship" (43) between Stephen and Bloom, because their "relationship... takes place beneath the level of consciousness, that is, unconsciously" (43). Walcott traces the similarities in Stephen's dream with Bloom in light of Jung's theories of "*participation mystique*" and "synchronicity":

Borrowing from the anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Jung termed this kind of relationship [Stephen and Bloom's] *participation mystique*. By this he meant the occurrence of almost identical thoughts, or feelings, or images to two or more people simultaneously. Among pre-logical, primitive people, Levy-Bruhl observed *participation mystique* as virtually symbiotic thinking and feeling within a group or tribe....[T]here is the sharing of two people of an underground 'stream of consciousness' (the collective unconscious to use Jung's term), thereby experiencing similar images or representations, but in no way losing their individualities by the merging of personalities....Put another way, it is possible for two people to share the same unconscious contents (for example, archetypes). If this occurs simultaneously, one says a synchronicity has taken place. (43-44)

The collective symbols in Stephen's dream are prophetic:

Street of harlots. Remember. Haroun al Raschid. I am almosting it. That man led me, spoke. I was not afraid. The melon he had he held against my face. Smiled: creamfruit smell. That was the rule, said. In. Come. Red carpet spread. You will see who. (3.366-369)

The Eastern man prefigures Bloom. Throughout *Ulysses* there are multifarious associations

of Bloom with the East, especially in the “Lotus Eaters” chapter. At the end of the “Circe” chapter, Bloom picks Stephen up in a street in Dublin’s red light district representing the dream’s message of adult leadership being proffered to wayward youth. The red carpet signifies Bloom gesture of hospitality and welcome when he takes Stephen home with him to 7 Eccles Street in the “Ithaca” chapter. The melon held against Stephen’s face is the creamfruit of life— Molly. The melon is associated with her rump— or sexual love. It is also associated with salvation, for Stephen must achieve the necessary psycho-sexual intergration to become a complete man. The pattern of this dream, when realized will lead Stephen to self-discovery.

Then three significant gestures are made by Stephen: his urinating, his writing a fragment of a poem, and his placing dry snot on a rock. Stephen urinates: “ In long lassoes from the Cock lake the water flowed full, covering greengoldenly lagoons of sand, rising, flowing. My ashplant will float away. I shall wait. No, they will pass on, passing, chafing against low rocks, swirling, passing. Better get this job over quick” (3.453-456). This incident has meaning as an act of contemplation rather than that of elimination. It is a simple ritual, part of a general life process— part of the outer world of experience which makes up general memory. This urination foreshadows the communal ritual performed by Bloom and Stephen together in the “Ithaca” chapter.

Stephen’s attempt to write a poem provides another step toward Bloom and experience. Here we have an apprehension by Stephen of his true self as artist. His poem is inspired by Stephen’s sight of the two cockle pickers: “Shouldering their bags they trudged, the red Egyptians” (3.370). Stephen is intent on watching the woman not the man. With the spoils on her back; sand and shellgrit crusting her bare feet; her hair trailing about her

windrawn face, she follows with woman steps “[b]ehind her lord, his helpmate” (3.374-375). He thinks of her in other terms — “When night hides her body’s flaws calling under her brown shawl from an archway where dogs have mired” (3.375-376). She is the cockle-picker; however, archetypically understood, she is fused into all women and their common patterns of life — “Bridebed, childbed, bed of death, ghostcandle” (3.396).

“Ghostcandle” triggers another memory: “He comes, pale vampire, through storm his eyes, his bat sails bloodying the sea, mouth to her mouth’s kiss” (3.397-398). Here the sexuality of women is merged into a greater theme and a greater fear— all women and mother are fused into death. The memory of Stephen’s mother’s deathbed is so traumatically prevalent in Stephen’s mind that it is displaced into the poetic fragment. The vampire is an apt symbol of the dead becoming undead, paralleling artistic memory’s capacity to bring forth in the present what had been buried in the irrecoverable temporal past. The living and the dead are conjoined through memory’s return.

The vampire trope also suggest a psycho-sexual component, because vampirism is associated with a penetration symbolic of the sexual act. The fragment for Ellmann is “death coming to kiss a girl” (1972: 25). Moreover, Ellmann interprets the entire “Proteus” chapter in terms of a polar thematic, of “generation and corruption” (1972: 25). In time, the womb is always the precursor of the tomb. Stephen, using art as an intercessor, confronts the memory of his mother, and sexuality. His mouth to her mouth signifies male-female union, a necessary confrontation. For the first time, Stephen’s allows his fears to be expressed in poetry: “His lips lipped and mouthed fleshless lips of air: mouth to her moomb. Oomb, allwombing tomb” (3. 401-402). An understanding of death is essential to an understanding of life because this is the universal life cycle in which all individuals partake. This poetic

fragment is also part of a ritual of communication, since all art presupposes an audience. In his fragment Stephen pinpoints his anxiety in an effort to eradicate it, just as in legend the vampire is killed, “Put a pin in that chap’ (3.399). For a moment, Stephen releases his mother and all women as mediums of death with the moving words: “Touch me. Soft eyes. Soft soft soft hand . I am lonely here. O, touch me soon, now. What is that word known to all men? I am quiet here alone. Sad too. Touch, touch me” (3.434-436). Stephen is now quiet, although still lonely, still sad. However, the word “touch” may possibly lead him to “that word known to all men”; the word is love, as Ellmann has so firmly established.

The usurpation by Buck Mulligan of Stephen’s handkerchief at the end of “Telemachus” leads to the last symbolic gesture in “Proteus.” Lacking the handkerchief, Stephen “laid the dry snot picked from his nostril on a ledge of rock, carefully” (3.500-501). Like the urination, this is not just subjective physicality, but it is also primitively communal: “For the rest let look who will” (3.501). There is again a recognition of the other: “Perhaps there is someone” (3.502). The public placement of the nasal detritus corresponds to Joyce’s inner vision of artistic creation espoused in *Finnegans Wake*. There Joyce interprets his own writing career through Shem. Shem’s material for his art— “highly prosy, crap in his hand” (185.17-18), his excretory matter— is produced from “the bowels of his misery” (185.33). Joyce always writes about himself while using other people and the furniture of the world. Ultimately all his works came from within, from his personal memory and imagination. Like Shem the Penman, Joyce is “self exiled in upon his ego” (184.6-7), but ultimately he evokes general memory.

For Stephen, the sea has been associated exclusively with his mother or womankind, especially her negative aspects of sexual corruption and death— the two elements Ellmann

sees as pervading the chapter (1972:24). Now the sea transgresses gender in Stephen's former rigid psychological boundaries, for it is no longer seen as simply female, "Five fathoms out there. Full fathom five thy father lies" (3.470). Here we have "Old Father Ocean" (3.483), the male element, the destroyer of Icarus. Stephen's horror of the drowned bather disappears. Death at sea becomes the "mildest of all deaths known to man" (3.482-483). He now recognizes the generalized male element as a necessary progression toward self-identity. This all-incorporating sea in which "the sexes interfuse" (Ellmann 1972: 26) anticipates Leopold Bloom's hallucinatory transformation of gender in the "Circe" chapter (15. 1810), and ALP and HCE's merger in their elemental aspects as river and ocean (628.4) in *Finnegans Wake*.

However, Stephen has not yet completely broken through the fragmented personal present. He still has to wrestle with experience since he has linked the sea with father but not with life. The final symbol of "Proteus" shows that Stephen has advanced somewhat in his wrestling with his protean self. The threemaster ship (3.504) which ends the "Proteus" chapter suggests a coming home— Stephen with Bloom and Molly — and a fruitful merger of private and general memory.

Chapter 5 “Past was is today”: metempsychosis in Mecklenburgh Street:
The “Circe” chapter of *Ulysses*

Chronologically, the “Circe” chapter is set at the hours around midnight, a turning point when a new day starts. Midnight is usually when time disappears in sleep—an area where there is a mental dissolve into a cognate reality. This chapter of *Ulysses* exhibits Joyce’s conception that individuals are formed by shared experiences and memories they are not conscious of in daily life. Through Leopold Bloom’s memory, Joyce shows different combinations of experience, but all of the patterns ultimately form a portrait of Bloom. The merging of Bloom’s identities anticipates the technique of the *Wake*, where “everybody is somebody else” through the psychic linkage of memory. The hallucinatory quality of Bloom’s reveries approximates the dream-like state. The mind is outside time; conscious monitors are down. The contents of Bloom’s private memories are distorted and projected into a phantasmagoric stream where his memories converge into one another and his identity is blurred. Bloom’s lapse out of consciousness into fantasy reflects a reenactment of the collective patterns of mankind, and anticipates HCE’s all-inclusive memory in *Finnegans Wake*. This reflects Jung’s conception that the archetypal expressions of the collective unconscious are manifested in dreams and fantasy (1936-1937:48-49).

Joyce introduces “*l’homme primigène*” (15. 2160), the Darwinian missing link, into Bloom’s reveries. Here Joyce implicitly suggests an emphasis on origins: just as Charles Darwin’s evolutionary system attempts to trace anthropomorphic origins empirically, Joyce textually explores the missing link between conscious and unconscious process—metempsychosis, the missing link to the formation of cohesive identity. However, total formation of “plastic memory,” “the total memory of the soul’s metempsychosis” (Gifford and Seidman, 430) is not represented until *Finnegans Wake*. In “Circe,” Paddy Dignam

answers the question of how the dead are resurrected and live on in the present, “By metempsychosis. Spooks” (15.1226). We also experience metempsychotic slippage through Bloom’s grandfather, Virag, when in their exchange Virag comments, “[A]s we said in old Rome and ancient Greece” (15.2372). Clearly, the use of the first person plural “we” indicates a transhistorical shift into the past. Metempsychotic linkage is also asexual, since Bloom incorporates androgynous memories in his transformation into a woman.

Joyce’s explorations in “Circe” resemble concepts of the unconscious associated with Freud, Nietzsche, and Jung. Joyce’s treatment of the unconscious processes resembles Freud’s conception of the unconscious as the storehouse of repressed memory, and the interpreter shifting between latent and manifest content in dreams. In addition, Nietzsche’s idea about the dream state’s propensity for interconnecting with the thought processes of earlier eras informs Joyce’s construction of Bloom’s interior monologue.

The “Circe” chapter of *Ulysses* presents the reenactment of the nightmare of mankind’s universal internal history, filtered through the mindscapes of Leopold Bloom and Stephen Dedalus. The chapter incorporates both the Jungian conception of the archetype expressed in dream and fantasy, and the Freudian personal unconscious, where repressed memories too painful to acknowledge are housed. Joyce wrote a major portion of *Ulysses* in Zurich during World War I, and his proximity to one of the centers of psychoanalytic inquiry suggests his approach in this chapter by having his novelistic subject’s rational function displaced to the periphery of human experience. In “Circe,” man is not the Aristotelian “rational animal”; rather, Joyce decenters the traditional positing of reason as the primary faculty of knowing or understanding. Here, Joyce’s presentation of memory challenges the British empirical tradition associated with Locke’s concept of the mind as a *tabula rasa*,

where ideas are derived exclusively from sensory experience, and that subordinates memory to a decay of that immediate experience. Joyce's introduction of involuntary metempsychotic upsurges in Bloom's interior monologue suggests that memory is not to be conceived solely as a decay of experience, but especially in its collective aspect, as the origin and vitalizing pattern common to all human experience.

In the "Nestor" chapter, Joyce expresses the idea of the randomness of external history. Stephen muses on the "infinite possibilities" ultimately "ousted" by chronological time, and history's apocalyptic overtones is applied by Joyce to an individual's internal history manifested in the randomness of the unconscious. In "Circe," Joyce signifies the indeterminate nature of unconscious processes through the whirling Hobgoblin's symbolic action, "He crouches juggling. Tiny roulette planets fly from his hands" (15. 2161-2162). The comic macrocosmic mishap mirrors the mind of man, for just as the juggler loses control of astronomical symmetry on the Last Day, signifying chaos, so too in the Circean world of the brothel, man is not in control of his rational faculties. We are now in the realm of psychic randomness, which is the opposite of moral choice.

Furthermore, the Hobgoblin's bodily contortion, when he "thrusts his lipless face through the fork of his thighs" (15. 2158-2159), and thereby unites the upper and lower halves, represents a psycho-sexual integration, lacking in both Stephen and Bloom, and, for Joyce, a fusion of the Cartesian mind/body dichotomy. The Hobgoblin's gesture of unification suggests his completion on the evolutionary scale into the primal man, "*l'homme primigène*" (15. 2160). The evolutionary foundation is posited in this chapter through Joyce's interplay of theriomorphic transformations manifested in Bloom's mental projections. Counterbalancing the physical development of man, Joyce incorporates metempsychotic

upsurges which link Bloom's mental patterning to their origin in Great Memory. For Joyce mind and body are always interconnected: the physicality of the human condition is the vector for transpersonal experience.

The linear view of history, which anticipates an apocalyptic end, is countered by a new dispensation rendered by Joyce through the second coming of Elijah, albeit in blackface. Elijah's sermon articulated in black dialect is more than a parody of an End of the World minstrel show. Using the trope of a performer, Joyce counters the teleological version of time and introduces the cyclical view of eternal recurrence manifested through collective memory that makes possible the train of thought that conjoins time and eternity:

Join on right here. Book through to eternity junction, the nonstop run. Just one word more. Are you a god or a doggone clod? If the second advent came to Coney Island are we ready? Florry Christ, Stephen Christ, Zoe Christ, Bloom Christ, Kitty Christ, Lynch Christ, it's up to you to sense that cosmic force. Have we cold feet about the cosmos? No. Be on the side of the angels. Be a prism. You have that something within, the higher self. You can rub shoulders with a Jesus, a Gautama, an Ingersoll. (15. 2192-2199)

Bloom's mind becomes the crystal prism reflecting the collective experience of mankind. His role as Christ, as the Messiah and scapegoat enrobed "in a seamless garment marked I. H. S." (15. 1935), is subsumed in Joyce's construction of his mental patterning. However, Bloom's messianic investiture is not to be interpreted through Christianity alone, as the inquisitive "Voice" and Bloom's ambiguous reply suggest:

A VOICE
Bloom, are you the Messiah ben Joseph or ben David?
BLOOM
(*darkly*) You have said it. (15. 1833-1836)

Bloom's identity as a Jew is symbolically significant in advancing Joyce's idea of

archetypal recurrence. Hansen posits that Bloom represents the cyclical and living memory of a people as espoused by Judaism, in contradistinction to the linear version of time inherent in Christianity (98). Hansen's explanation of the importance of *Zakhor*, "the Hebrew word signifying God's command: 'Remember'" (98), rests upon his discussion of the distinction between the Jewish and Christian dialectic regarding the transmission of scripture, or textual memory. This insight informs Joyce's construction of Bloom's mindscape as the vital link connecting the present to a living past. The relevance of Bloom's Hebraic lineage to Joyce's presentation of shared memory is apparent through an understanding of scriptural "inheritance":

But the inheritance of the Jew, unlike the teleological narrative inherited by the Christian, operates through the functioning of *Zakhor*, through the being-in-the-moment of memory. As opposed to Christological narrative *chronos*, this notion of time and memory allows for an inheritance that remains dispersed rather than fully gathered together, dialogic rather than monologic, social rather than solipsistic; it is a historiography of the *Jetztzeit*. In the rabbinic tradition of Torah, memory works as an open-ended dialogue with the living past. (Hansen, 100)

Furthermore, as ruler of "the new Bloomusalem in the Nova Hibernia of the future" (15. 1544-1545), Bloom mentally envisions taking the oath of office, not on the Christian Bible, but instead by "placing his right hand on his testicles" (15. 1484). This gesture signifies his subliminal connection with the patriarchal fathers of the Old Testament; Gifford and Seidman refer this action to the "oath-taking" of Abraham, which represents "the sacred nature of man's reproductive capacities" (473).

Bloom himself, in the "Nausicaa" chapter of *Ulysses*, consciously adheres to the idea of the cyclical pattern of time, "The year returns. History repeats itself" (13. 1092-1093), and

to its concomitant, the eternal patterning inherent to the human condition, generation upon generation. His memory of Molly and their courtship ritual on the Hill of Howth leads him to conclude that individuals change, but the patterns in their lives do not: “All that old hill has seen. Names change: that’s all” (13. 1099-1100). Bloom understands that a physical return to Howth is vacuous, because its temporal significance in the past cannot be regained in this way, “Take the train there tomorrow. No. Returning not the same” (13. 1103-1104). Brivic sees Bloom deriving “comfort” here from cyclical recurrence (158). On a subliminal level, Joyce introduces “Metempsychosis” (13. 1118) into this section of Bloom’s memory cluster, for as the “[c]ircus horse walk[s] in a ring” (13. 1111-1112), Bloom’s collective unconscious provides the recurrent arena for transpersonal experience.

However, Joyce does not limit Bloom’s relation to the past to an exclusively Hebraic framework. Brivic analyzes Bloom’s relation to time through Joyce’s reliance on a Jungian and Eastern context. Brivic gives an overview of instances in *Ulysses* concerning Bloom’s obsessive relationship with “his watch,” or chronological time (156-158), synonymous with the material world, and he concludes that Bloom’s desire is a cause of temporality:

Bloom’s logos of lust, by causing movement and change, causes time; and therefore time, as a function of matter, is a function of desire. This is why the state of Bloom’s watch is so intimately related to his emotional life. The idea that time is caused by desire is a standard concept in occultism, mysticism and Eastern thought, where it usually supports the idea that he who can overcome desire can transcend time. Bloom, however, is absorbed in the field of matter and time, driven by desire and anxious to keep his watch wound. (158)

In addition, Brivic cites Bloom’s own paralleling of the magnetic principle in physics to the attraction between the sexes (156-158), and sees a similarity between Joyce and Jung regarding their conception of “magnetism or desire”: “The force behind the universe is the

natural phenomenon of magnetism or desire. [Joyce's] view resembles that of Jung, who accepted extrasensory phenomena and occultism because he believed the physical universe to be controlled at least partly by unconscious archetypal mental forces...." (158).

The metempsychotic upsurges that occur in Bloom's interior monologue advance Joyce's idea of shared memory artistically applied through his interiorization of the mythic method. Myth connects past and present, and conveys an individual's archetypal participation in the recurring patterns of human behavior over time. The psychic reemergence and incorporation of these common patterns forms his characters' mental fabric. Bloom's construction, for Joyce, is more than that of an individual Dubliner of 1904; rather, as he told Budgen, Bloom is to be modeled on "the complete man," Ulysses, "Ulysses is son to Laertes, but he is father to Telemachus, husband to Penelope, lover of Calypso, companion in arms of the Greek warriors around Troy and King of Ithaca. He was subjected to many trials, but with wisdom and courage came through them all" (Budgen, 16). Bloom is "modeled" on Ulysses, but through psychic presentation he also becomes the primal everyman foreshadowing HCE in *Finnegans Wake*. Throughout *Ulysses*, Bloom in his multifarious roles as son, father, husband scapegoat, savior, mother, and specifically in "Circe," hermaphrodite, as "Dr. Mulligan" establishes (15. 1775-1776), reflects patterns common to all mythic and historic personages.

The introduction of the hermaphrodite into Bloom's conception of himself during this hallucinatory reverie elucidates Joyce's symbolic conclusions regarding the sexes, if viewed in relation to Aristophanes' famous mythological parable of sexual desire and the impetus toward creation in Plato's "Symposium." Aristophanes uses the trope of the hermaphrodite as an analogue for "our innate love for one another" (191,d). Severed by Zeus to inhibit the

hermaphrodite's supersession, the two halves are ever seeking a conjoining, which according to Aristophanes explains human nature's attempt "to make two into one, and to bridge the gulf between one human being and another" (191, d). This desire for unity of being is central to the Joycean character, and it is symbolically manifested through his use of elemental nature. Joyce assigns the same lineage for the male and female as Aristophanes. The male's origin is traced to the sun, as the female's to the earth. In the final chapter of *Ulysses*, and in the "Soft morning, city" section of *Finnegans Wake*, human memory and nature fuse. Joyce here is suggesting the vast interconnection of cyclical nature with the memory of human life.

This is why in *Ulysses* on 17 June the earthy Molly Bloom directly faces the rising sun, the male principle, as her past recollections flow and conclude with her first recollection of her union with Bloom under the sun on the Hill of Howth: "I put my arms around him yes and drew him down to me so he could feel my breasts all perfume yes and his heart was going like mad and yes I said yes I will Yes" (18.1606-1609).

So too in *Finnegans Wake* when ALP in her merged aspects as autumnal river and dying old woman — "Lsp! I am leafy speafing" (619.20) — the river woman, lisps aloud her confused, moribund memories of HCE, "Us then....[M]ememormee!" (628. 13-14). As the sun rises, her failing vision and mind conflate the blazing sun with her husband, as she commands, "Rise up now and aruse! Norvena's over" (619.28-29). Joyce's allusion here in the *Wake* to Newman's sermon "The Second Spring" reinforces the idea about the commonality of the cyclical quality of life and nature, where rejuvenation is always a concomitant of death. Newman asserts:

The sun sinks to rise again; the day is swallowed up in the gloom of the night, to be born out of it, as fresh as if it had

never been quenched. Spring passes into summer, and through summer and autumn into winter, only the more surely, by its own ultimate return, to triumph over that grave, toward which it resolutely hastened from its first hour. We mourn over the blossoms of May, because they are to wither; but we know, withal, that May is one day to have its revenge upon November....” (13-14)

Joyce’s characters’ archetypal mental structures are counterbalanced by their own personal memories. Joyce’s synthesis of the archetypal and individual formation of character is suggested through Stephen’s disquisition of predetermined patterning and the recurrence of universal types in his theory of Shakespeare’s creative process in “Scylla and Charybdis.”:

— As we, or mother Dana, weave and unweave our bodies, Stephen said, from day to day, their molecules shuttled to and fro, so does the artist weave and unweave his image. And as the mole on my right breast is where it was when I was born, though all my body has been woven of new stuff time after time, so through the ghost of the unquiet father the image of the unliving son looks forth. In the intense instant of imagination, when the mind, Shelley says, is a fading coal, that which I was is that which I am and that which in possibility I may come to be. So in the future, the sister of the past, I may see myself as I sit here now but by reflection from that which then I shall be. (9. 376-385)

Stephen further theorizes that the stability of selfhood set against time and the Aristotelian “possibilities of the possible as possible” (9. 349-350) are unified through predetermined patterning inherent in life experience: “Every life is many days, day after day. We walk through ourselves, meeting robbers, ghosts, giants, old men, young men, wives, widows, brothers-in-law, but always meeting ourselves”(9. 1044-1046). Shakespeare is ever present in all his characters; he is not to be interpreted as being specifically incorporated into one. Stephen’s hypothesis concerning Shakespeare elucidates Joyce’s idea about identity. For

Joyce, a character's propensity for participation in collective memory introduces a generalized tincture to individual existence.

Bloom's ruminates on Molly and his own sonless state in "Nausicaa": "Curious she an only child, I an only child. So it returns. Think you're escaping and run into yourself" (13.1109-1110). Bloom's thoughts here parallel Stephen's thoughts concerning Shakespeare's ubiquity in his formation of character, and Stephen's own conception of the synthesis of collective identity over time. Whether manifested as walking or running, Bloom and Stephen's shared thought about the multifaceted quality of human identity is not coincidence. Rather, it exemplifies Jung's idea of "*participation mystique*," which Brivic defines as "the overlapping of mental content without communication, which implies a collective unconscious" (170). Tindall sees in the "Circe" chapter the predominance of "mind-sharing" and Joyce's reliance on the "collective unconscious" (1959: 209). Bloom and Stephen's sharing of "mental content" also correlates to Yeats' idea, with its origin in Theosophical tradition, that the subjective mind is not a fixed system, but is dynamic: "the borders of our mind are ever shifting" (28), and hence capable of reception and transference of ideation from one individual to another: "many minds can flow into one another" (28). Yeats, like Jung, believed this capacity for shared psychic experience indicated a source of origin in "a single mind,[or] a single energy" (28). Brivic's explanation of the Jungian idea of "synchronicity," the simultaneous upsurge of the same unarticulated thought experienced between or among individuals, illustrates Joyce's presentation of transpersonal psychic process in relation to eternal recurrence, "The unconscious forms of the archetypes generate the meaning which causes synchronicity. Acausal acts are 'creative' because they are 'the continuous creation of a pattern that exists from all eternity....' These acts reach outside time

to relate to eternity.” (169). Brivic asserts that Joyce employs “archetypal thinking” in order that “his characters” are understood through the “contexts of patterns shared by different civilizations and eras” (170).

The simulation of “*participation mystique*” in Joyce’s characters’ mindscapes is prominently evidenced through Bloom and Stephen’s dream of the East, as both Walcott and Brivic have noted. Walcott’s analysis of their dreams is written as a rebuttal to McCarroll’s position that dreams are employed by Joyce as an “aesthetic” device. Rather, Walcott, as a “Jungian analyst,” interprets the “psychic overlap” as indicative of Joyce’s employment of “Jung’s theory of *synchronicity*” [Walcott’s italics] (37). Dreams of the East link Bloom and Stephen in “a relationship that takes place beneath the level of consciousness” (Walcott, 43). Walcott correlates and interprets the symbolic dimension of Bloom, Stephen, and Molly’s dreams to advance the idea that, although the dreams are not “identical,” they do possess a “common motif” (38). The east psychologically unifies all three characters (45). In Stephen’s remembrance of his Haroun al Raschid dream, if psychological union was not apparent at first, Joyce was adumbrating “an encounter within the collective unconscious” (46). Moreover, it is significant that in the two most introspective chapters in the book for Stephen and Bloom, “Proteus” and “Circe,” a dog figures prominently as a catalyst in their psychic mindscapes. Just as the dog Tatters’ instinctual digging action is analogous to Stephen’s excavating his memory, so to the “retriever” Bloom encounters on his advent into nighttown (15. 247) represents Bloom’s recovery of his personal and collective past through memory.

Joyce introduces metempsychosis in the “Calypso” chapter of *Ulysses* comically. Molly Bloom’s inquisition of her husband about the meaning of metempsychosis in her not

“smutty” enough novel, *Ruby: the Pride of the Ring*, adumbrates Joyce’s treatment of the resurgence of collective memory in the “Circe” chapter. Mary Power has established that in the real novel that is Joyce’s source the word “metempsychosis” does not appear. Power contends that his inclusion of the novel is thematically appropriate:

Joyce’s most striking addition is the word ‘metempsychosis.’ To the very best of my knowledge it does not appear in *Ruby*. The point is that it well could have, for it provides a description of the whole thematic process of the novel. Amye Reade anticipates Joyce’s interest in changes of state. This is demonstrated in the clergyman’s discourse on the grasshopper and the caterpillar. She is also interested in the transmigration of souls on some level. (121)

Readers are aware they are presented with the fictive Dublin of 16 June 1904, where creative liberties abound. Appropriately, the exchange occurs in the Blooms’ bedroom, with Molly lying abed with the “Easter number” of *Photo Bits* depicting *The Bath of the Nymph*” above her. Joyce is not here positing a dichotomy of flesh and spirit by contextualizing a transcendent concept amid the physical conjugal realm; rather, just as in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, he is suggesting a conjoining wherein only through corporeality can the transcendent be reached. The Easter issue of *Photo Bits* is significant; Easter represents both a physical and spiritual return of Christ from the dead. Bloom in “Circe” will encounter through the prism of his mind a resurrection of his buried personal life and aboriginal existence in random upsurges of memory, and archetypically he is transformed into the “Messiah” through universal psychic patterning. Bloom searches for *Ruby: the Pride of the Ring* among the signifying articles of female physicality: “soiled drawers,” “twisted grey garter,” “stockings,” and “petticoat”(4. 321-323, 325). It is finally located under the bed adjoining the most representative object of man’s physical nature, “sprawled against the

bulge of the orangekeyed chamberpot” (4. 329-330). Here, Joyce literally and metaphorically has the carnal and incorporeal transect. Furthermore, Bloom’s physical underground search in the bedroom anticipates another subsurface search: the vertical descent into his personal and collective memory in “Circe.”

The thematic content of Molly’s reading material characterized by the “Fierce Italian with carriagewhip” (4. 346-347) set in a circus environment inhabited by “[d]oped animals” (4.349) as Bloom imagines them, suggests Joyce’s usage of the animal trope and the preponderance of animals in “Circe.” Joyce is not just using the animal as correlative to man’s libidinous nature when exposed to raw female sexuality in the uninhibited and intoxicating world of Bella Cohen’s brothel, but he is also counterpointing man’s animal evolutionary beginnings by means of a Darwinian framework with man’s psychic origins manifested in Bloom’s metempsychotic upsurges of universal memory. Joyce postulates a transcendent origin to psychic life to explain the recurrent and universal patterning inherent in memory. Just as evolutionary theory posits biological life originating from a unicellular organism and evolving into multicellular diversity (Gould, 180-181), Joyce parallels the theory of anthropogenesis with the idea that a segment of an individual’s memory has a universal source, and concomitant with an individual’s diversity of personal memory is the missing link, metempsychosis, which re-connects us to our psychic origin, collective or Great Memory, the bridge to the transpersonal.

Just as Stephen tries to pin down the vampire symbolic of the life-draining memory of his mother in the “Proteus” chapter, Molly Bloom literally pins down meaning with her “hairpin,” a symbol of fertility, hence, corporeality. The text’s written letters attempt to signify the transcendent:

— ...There's a word I wanted to ask you.

...

— Met him what? he asked.

— Here, she said. What does that mean?

He leaned downward and read near her polished thumbnail.

— Metempsychosis?

— Yes. Who's he when he's at home?

— Metempsychosis, he said, frowning. It's Greek: from the Greek. That means the transmigration of souls.

— O, rocks! she said. Tell us in plain words. (4. 331-332, 336-343)

Bloom attempts to “tell” her “in plain words” through the synonymous idea of reincarnation:

— Some people believe, he said, that we go on living in another body after death, that we lived before. They call it reincarnation. That we all lived before on the earth thousands of years ago or some other planet. They say we have forgotten it. Some say they remember their past lives. (4. 362-365)

He then searches for a concrete “example” to make her understand because the abstract can only be ideated through concrete pictorial representation in the mind's eye:

— Metempsychosis, he said, is what the ancient Greeks called it. They used to believe you could be changed into an animal or a tree, for instance. What they called nymphs, for example. (4. 375-377)

This is why Joyce in “Circe” objectifies his characters' interior monologues, and hence their memories. He is simulating an individual's ideation, what Damasio through the analogy of cinematography refers to as the ““movie-in-the-brain”” (1999: 9). Later, in *Finnegans Wake*, Joyce introduces the trope of the movie projector to represent the advent of time, which makes possible human experience and the foundation of memory. In *Ulysses*, the mental ocular spectrum, a solely subjective experience, is projected outward onto the

spatial environs of the brothel. We are outside chronological time through the characters' durational objectification. Tindall observes the dislocation of clock time when, "Asked a question, Bloom dreams for twenty pages before coming back to answer it. No more than a moment of time by the clock has passed"(1959: 206).

There are seven characters in the brothel: Leopold Bloom, Stephen Dedalus, Vincent Lynch, the Madame Bella Cohen, and the three prostitutes, Kitty, Zoe, and Florry. All the other personages are segments of the memories of Bloom, and to a lesser extent, Stephen. Bloom's subjectivity is effaced as the entities merge, representing Joyce's idea that human life is composed of a general texture. Memory is the conduit between past and present, and bridges the problem inherent in time and change. For Joyce, the unconscious is understood through its requisite, memory, the reservoir encompassing the panoramic vision of human experience.

Furthermore, Joyce's pictorial presentation of the unconscious corresponds to the theoretical depiction of evolutionary life represented in graphic form. Gould, although critical of the limited perspective and non-inclusive context of evolutionary schemas, comments on the establishment of "the iconographic tradition":

The first adequate reconstructions of fossil vertebrates date only from Cuvier's time, in the early nineteenth century. Thus the iconographic tradition of drawing successive scenes to illustrate the pageant of life through time is not even two centuries old. We all know these series of paintings— from a first scene of trilobites in the Cambrian sea, through lots of dinosaurs in the middle, to a last picture of Cro-Magnon ancestors busy decorating a cave in France. We have viewed these sequences on the walls of natural history museums, and in coffee-table books about the history of life. (9)

Joyce's technique in "Circe," and later in *Finnegans Wake*, is to concretize unconscious

processes in order to illustrate “the pageant” of mental life. The pre-verbal unconscious, which for Joyce is the nucleus of human identity, is textually articulated through pictographic modes. This is why later in the *Wake*, the “Willingdone Museyroom” fable contains the paradigm of universal generational struggle of parent and child set in the context of national battle. The implication of the coined Joycean *Wake* word “musey” suggests both a museum, a spatial, artificial construct to view the past, and to muse, the internal ideational propensity of the mind to pictorially represent through the recollection process.

“Ten shillings a maidenhead” (15. 359) hawks “The Bawd” in Dublin’s red light district, the spatial locale of Bella Cohen’s brothel. The most carnal of settings for Joyce paradoxically becomes the catalyst for an exploration of the unconscious minds of his characters. The time is midnight, where night ends and a new day begins. Bloom’s physical wanderings through the city of Dublin are almost at an end, but now his psychic wanderings predominate as he reenacts the universal patterns through his unconscious. Tindall characterizes Joyce’ method through a psychological framework:

These waking dreams, projected from the subliminal self, consist of commonly buried memories, desires, and fears. Their emergence from the underworld of the mind is encouraged here by fatigue, which weakens conscious resistance to such intrusions, and by guilt. So moved and licensed, the unconscious takes charge of the conscious mind as in a dreamer’s bed or in a madhouse. (1959: 206)

Both Bloom and Stephen are at their lowest point of resistance; Bloom is physically spent from his wandering around Dublin all day, and from his ejaculation in “Nausicaa,” and is psychologically drained from his obsession with Molly and Boylan’s adulterous encounter. Stephen is drunk. In this highly charged carnal environment, the forthcoming emissions are cerebral, not physiological.

Bella Cohen's occupation suggests her role as the modern counterpart of Circe, the enchanting seductress, who in Homer's *Odyssey* literally transforms men into swine. Both Bella and Circe are subsumed into the archetypal pattern of the female's alluring sexual essence and otherness, the barrier or gulf that Bloom bridges through his psychic hermaphroditic crossover. Circe symbolizes the bifurcation of the rational and irrational nature of man. The split is implicitly suggested symbolically through the blackface Elijah's admission to Florry that he has seen her vaginal parts and buttocks, "Miss Florry, just now as I done seed you" (15. 2221-2222). The use of black dialect in articulating the word "seed" creates the ambiguity of viewing and of seminal discharge, the satiation of libidinous desire. Circe's aspect as sorceress suggests man's animalistic descent and dehumanization. The transformative power of the female essence on man leading to sexual abandon is not limited to the Greek antecedent, for it also has its affinities with the "Germanic," as Tindall comments, who views the "chapter" as "a kind of witches' Sabbath, a '*Walpurgisnacht*,' as Joyce himself agreed" (1959: 204-205). Ellmann specifically links the episode with Goethe's *Faust*. He cites a remark Joyce made to his brother Stanislaus that "Ulysses would depict an Irish Faust" (1982: 265). In addition, Ellmann discusses common elements in both works: "Goethe's Brocken and Cohen's brothel have much in common, as Joyce would acknowledge to Stuart Gilbert; the surrealistic atmosphere, the shape-changes, the mixture of pagan Helen in the classical *Walpurgisnacht* with blasphemous Christian elements (the *Dies Irae*) also link the two" (1982: 265).

The surrealistic opening of the "Circe" chapter with its distorted description of the tram "skeleton tracks," of children who are envisioned as "stunted men and women" and of the unappetizing "coral and copper" ice or ice cream flavors, anticipates Bloom's altered

mental state. The recurrence from the “Hades” chapter of “will-o’-the-wisps” into Bloom’s interior monologue is significant in its linkage with the mound or mountain. The personal symbol of Howth, which haunts Bloom’s autobiographical memory, converges with the universal significance of the mountain. The marsh gas that confuses unsuspecting individuals is interpreted allusively by Gifford and Seidman, because “[i]n Goethe’s *Faust* (I.xxii), a will-o’-the-wisp lights the way up the ‘magic-mad’ mountain as Faust and Mephistopheles make their way toward the Walpurgisnacht (Witches’ Sabbath) assembly” (452). *Walpurgisnacht* is celebrated on the eve of Mayday, and Mayday is a fertility ritual commemorated in springtime, with suggestions of rebirth through the phallic maypole. Sex is a ritual Bloom has been deprived of for eleven years of his marriage. These directional markers call attention to the spatial site of uninhibited abandon, the Brocken, the mound or mountain in Germany. “The mound can take on the symbolism of the mountain as an omphalos” (Cooper, 109), a center or, as Stephen imagines the omphalos in “Proteus,” the point of origin of all creation. Although allusively understood here, the mound becomes of paramount significance in *Finnegans Wake*, for it becomes the concretized site of universal memory, the Akasic Records. Here, implicitly, and later explicitly in the *Wake*, the mountain is an important symbol for Joyce. The mountain is the symbol of physical and transcendent convergence, for it is “the meeting place in the clouds of heaven and earth..., [and] mountain tops represent the state of full consciousness” (Cooper, 110). Bloom attained “the state of full consciousness” on Howth, and Bloom’s recurring autobiographical memory is subsumed into the archetypal schema of the mountain.

The interrelation of the living and the dead is adumbrated in the book’s physical underground, Glasnevin cemetery in “Hades.” The antinomies of life and death are

conjoined in Bloom's mindscape in "Hades." Bloom luridly thinks of "[l]ove among the tombstones.... In the midst of death we are in life. Both ends meet" (6. 758, 759-760). The cemetery might be a place to pick up "a young widow" (6. 758). In addition, the procreative properties of the cemetery caretaker, "[e]ight children he has anyway" (6. 762) serves as a bitter reminder of the extinction of the male Bloom line. Bloom has never come to terms with the death of his son, who died when he was eleven days old: "If little Rudy had lived" (6. 75). The merger of father and son enters Bloom's interior monologue, "My son. Me in his eyes" (6. 76). Conversely, thoughts of death lead to Bloom's thinking about his son's conception: "Must have been that morning in Raymond terrace she was at the window watching the two dogs at it by the wall of the cease to do evil. And the sergeant grinning up. She had that cream gown on with the rip she never stitched. Give us a touch, Poldy. God, I'm dying for it. How life begins" (6. 77-81). Later, at the cemetery, Bloom contemplates how life possibly ends. In his skewed pseudo-scientific logic he reflects on how life and death sustain each other while thinking about different methods of internment, "It's the blood sinking in the earth gives new life" (6. 771). In a more Darwinian cast of mind he observes, "[a]n obese grey rat... [who] knows the ropes" (6.973, 974) — all life is food in predatory nature: "One of those chaps would make short work of a fellow" (6. 980). However, the evolutionary dependency of the living and the dead is offset by Joyce's incorporation of his ideas about transpersonal memory. His early story "The Dead" exemplifies, in Gabriel's image of Michael Furey, the interconnection of death and life. In Joyce's last work, *Finnegans Wake*, the prehistoric burial mound of the Vice King is not an obsolete necrotic depository, but through its layers of meaning becomes the textual nexus, the Akasic Records, as it spews up the living memory of all human experience.

The Protestant ritual of the burial of the dead is a catalyst for Bloom's scornful meditation on physical resurrection: "The resurrection and the life. Once you are dead you are dead. That last day idea. Knocking them all up out of their graves. Come forth, Lazarus! And he came fifth and lost the job. Get up! Last day! Then every fellow mousing around for his liver and his lights and the rest of his traps" (6. 677-680). The ambiguity of final physical extinction is comically introduced through a variety of safety devices. Bloom thinks of a remedy in case the dead are not dead, "They ought to have some law to pierce the heart and make sure or an electric clock or a telephone in the coffin and some kind of a canvas airhole" (6. 867-869). Death is trans-species, "Dead animals even sadder. Silly-Milly burying the little dead bird in the kitchen matchbox, a daisychain and bits of broken chainies on the grave" (6: 951-953). As "[t]he clay fell softer" (6. 872) on the physical remains of Paddy Dignam, Bloom muses on the finality of death and its extinction, "Begin to be forgotten. Out of sight, out of mind" (6. 872). The irony of Bloom's silent reflection is apparent in the "Circe" chapter where the dead are "out of sight" but resurrected unconsciously in memory, the psychic underground.

At one point in "Circe," the phrase "Past was is today" (15. 2409) pops into Bloom's interior monologue. Throughout *Ulysses* Bloom has been stirred by memory. He is poignantly aware that he is cut off from the past, a time in his life when he was vitally alive, and this leads to an identity crisis, "I was happier then. Or was that I ? Or am I now I? Twentyeight I was. She twentythree. When we left Lombard street west something changed. Could never like it again after Rudy" (8. 608-610). In "Lestrygonians," Bloom experiences an autobiographical involuntary memory of Molly and himself on the Hill of Howth, a time in the past when he was vitally alive. Then he was a participant in the rhythm of life, hence

creativity. His participation in the ritualistic sexual act defined him as lover, husband, and potential father. Then he was conscious of the deepest region of selfhood because ritual involvement for Joyce represents participation in shared memory. Bloom is now alienated from that role. The memory is set in the chapter that focuses on another expression of ritual, eating. The chewing and regurgitation of the cannibalistic Dubliners — “A man spitting back on his plate: halfmasticated gristle: gums: no teeth to chewchewchew it” (8: 659-660), an episode where the meaning of communal sharing of food is negated in favor of narcissistic gluttony — parallels Bloom’s chewing and regurgitation of troubles and anxieties since he is cut off from meaningful experience.

Bloom’s dilemma is summed up in “Oxen of the Sun” by the omniscient narrator, who juxtaposes Bloom’s temporal condition through the rhetorical question, “What is the age of the soul of man?” (14.1038). The narrator telescopes Bloom’s life from adolescence through his first sexual encounter: “No longer is Leopold, as he sits there, ruminating, chewing the cud of reminiscence, that staid agent of publicity and holder of a modest substance in the funds. A score of years are blown away. He is young Leopold. There, as in a retrospective arrangement, a mirror within a mirror (hey, presto!), he beholdeth himself” (14. 1041-1045). The mirror is memory, and it reflects Bloom’s rite of passage from high-school boy into first job. However, the mirror clouds, symbolizing Bloom’s failure at paternity: “But hey, presto, the mirror is breathed on and the young knighterrant recedes, shrivels, dwindles to a tiny speck within the mist” (14. 1060-1062), because “[n]o son of thy loins is by thee. There is none now to be for Leopold, what Leopold was for Rudolph” (14. 1076-1077). For Bloom, “Name and memory solace thee not” (14. 1074) if taken in the context of his individual situation. However, set against the expansive range of the human

past, “The voices blend and fuse in clouded silence: silence that is the infinite of space: and swiftly, silently the soul is wafted over regions of cycles of generations that have lived” (14. 1078-1080) Bloom’s identity is not to be so personally defined.

There is another identity that Bloom shares, which is all-inclusive, and accessed through metempsychosis, “And lo, wonder of metempsychosis, it is she, the everlasting bride, harbinger of the daystar, the bride, ever virgin” (14. 1099-1101). Joyce’s likening of metempsychosis to a virgin bride suggests not only a mental consummation with the past through memory, but in its role as forerunner to Venus, “the daystar,” Joyce intimates that the past is contained in the present, for later, in “Circe,” the concept and the goddess are conjoined in Bloom’s mindscape as “Venus Metempsychosis” (15. 1706).

Joyce also links metempsychosis with another concept in *Ulysses*, “parallax.” The word “parallax” surfaces twice in Bloom’s mindscape in the “Circe” chapter (15. 1656 and 15. 2334), but first appears in his interior monologue in the “Lestrygonians” episode there, understood in the context of Shattuck’s idea of the “stereoscopic” effect of memory, it becomes apparent that Joyce is transposing a spatial trope into both a temporal/atemporal one. In “Lestrygonians,” the visual stimulus of the “[t]imeball on the ballastoffice” (8.109) precipitates Bloom’s thoughts about “parallax,” a concept he “never exactly understood” (8. 110-111). Bloom’s search for the word’s meaning through its etymological source — “it’s Greek: parallel, parallax” (8. 111-112) — immediately triggers his own memory of Molly’s mispronunciation of the word “metempsychosis,” “[m]et him pike hoses” (8. 112). Joyce’s juxtaposing of the two concepts represents a shift in perspective from a physical plane to a metaphysical one which occurs in time through the memory process. Shattuck asserts that human perception of space requires two disparate angles of vision applied to mental vision,

or memory, wherein an image from an individual's past emerges by means of a similar imagistic encounter in the present to create memory (116-118). This concept elucidates Joyce's fictive technique of memory retrieval.

The resurrection of Bloom's family dead occurs most trenchantly in "Circe," where Bloom has hallucinatory psychic encounters with his grandfather, father, and son, all dead. The main archetypal theme of paternity is explored through Bloom's cognitive structures, just as later in *Finnegans Wake* fatherhood is understood as a psychic crossover, decentering it as a solely physiological event. Bloom's exchange with his grandfather, "Granpapachi," advances Joyce's ideas on the interconnection of the memory process, life and art. At one point in the brothel the light of the gasjet burns blue physically enveloping Zoe's flesh (15. 2301), and auguring the appearance of a ghost. The ghost that comes to haunt Bloom is the ghost of the memory of his Hungarian grandfather, Virag Lipoti. Virag seems to represent the Freudian id or instinctual center of desire, as is indicated by his remarks concerning his grandson's libidinous fetish: "Inadvertently her backview revealed the fact that she is not wearing those rather intimate garments of which you are a particular devotee" (15. 2314-2316), and "Correct me but I always understood that the act so performed by skittish humans with glimpses of lingerie appealed to you in virtue of its exhibitionisticity" (15. 2323-2325).

Epstein interprets Virag's manifestation as crucial to an understanding of the "general male personality" (1982: 77). He sees Virag as representing Bloom's deepest motivating core—"desire"—since his appearance in Bloom's mindscape follows Bloom's glimpse of Zoe's buttocks. The erotic catalyst "produces a violent reaction inside of Bloom's soul—his soul splits in two. His deepest drives, his basic energy, emerges as Virag" (1982: 77). Yet,

Virag represents more than a revelation of repressed desire.

Virag's descent down "the chimneyflue"(15.2305) symbolizes a supernatural visitation, as opposed to human ingress through "the earthly gateway or door" (Cooper, 35). Virag's symbolic headgear — "On his head is perched an Egyptian pshent. Two quills project over his ears" (15. 2309-2310) — suggests more than the "double crown of Egypt" (Gifford and Seidman, 492). The ancient Egyptian context and the mnemonic revenant suggest the Egyptian belief that one confers immortality by saying a designation of the departed, "Granpapachi" (15. 2318). The inclusion of the ancient writing apparatus evokes Thoth, the Egyptian god of memory and art. Joyce here is advancing the idea that poetic language comes from "below the waist" because it is instinctual. Epstein cites examples of Virag's spontaneous verbiage (1982: 77), and concludes that "[t]he Id and Parole have the same source" (1982: 79), which is suggested by the combination of Virag's angry rantings and his association with "Thoth" (1982: 80). Epstein concludes, "It seems clear that for Joyce, rage, sexual drive and language come from the same part of the soul" (1982: 80). Moreover, Joyce informed Budgen that "[t]he seat of affections lies lower down, I think" (13). Sex and the emotions are the source of art; without these two vitalizing elements, art becomes a dead official document like the "parchment" Virag carries. Since for Joyce sex and art are interconnected, this ancient writing material suggests an evolution into another object, the condom, which prevents the creation of life. This is the point of Joyce's depiction of the creative process through his exemplum of the artist, Shem the Penman, in *Finnegans Wake*. For Joyce, "root language" is self-generated as he suggests through Shem's utilizing his own excrement as ink (185. 28-30), and his body as a writing tablet (185. 35-36) to produce the "cyclewheeling history" (186. 2) of the human race.

Bloom's advent into Nighttown signifies a moral transgression for him, and this precipitates the upsurge of the father-figure who in Freudian terms becomes the admonishing superego evoking feelings of guilt. Rudolph, Bloom's father, arises from Bloom's personal unconscious to chide his son about associating with a "drunken goy"(15.253) and his abandonment of the faith of his fathers: "Are you not my dear son Leopold who left the house of his father and left the god of his fathers Abraham and Jacob"(15. 261-262). The appearance of Rudolph with his "feeble vulture talons" (15. 259-260), and his intimidating questions, evokes the primal Oedipal struggle which later dominates the *Wake*. Here, and later in the *Wake*, the archetypal father debases the son in an attempt to prevent the son's ascendancy into his role and psychologically stifling the son's maturity. Bloom's feelings of remorse here reach monumental proportions, and through Joyce's representation of Bloom's psychic landscape he becomes, like HCE, the collective scapegoat put on trial: "Gentlemen of the jury, let me explain. A pure mare's nest, I am a man misunderstood. I am being made a scapegoat of. I am a respectable married man, without a stain on my character" (15. 775-777).

Bloom's "stain" is the collective stain of original sin. His sexual fantasies and proclivities are embarrassingly exposed through the revealing testimony of Mary Driscoll, Mrs. Bellingham, and Mrs. Yelverton Barry. All sins are one sin: he is categorized with Judas Iscariot and Jack the Ripper. "The Crier" announces his catalogue of crimes: "Whereas, Leopold Bloom of no fixed abode is a wellknown dynamitard, forger, bigamist, bawd and cuckold and a public nuisance to the citizens of Dublin and whereas at this commission of assizes the most honourable..." (15. 1158-1161). Bloom, like HCE, is guilty of all crimes and is sentenced to death, like the innocent Croppy Boy of Irish history.

Bloom assumes the psychological mantle of fatherhood at the end of the “Circe” chapter. His assisting Stephen, the helpless and prone son, triggers a vision of what Rudy would look like at eleven years old if he had lived. Here, Bloom’s role as protective father subsumes the position of archetypal inhibitor. This encounter in miniature foreshadows HCE’s attempt to prevent the maturing of the son. However, here as in the *Wake*, for Joyce, the son must eventually triumph because generation must supplant generation in the cycle of life. This is why there is built into Bloom’s hallucinatory framework the symbolic subtext of the son as posterity, to which Stanislaus Joyce’s letter to his brother refers: “The close [of the “Circe” chapter] however, with dream figure of Bloom’s young son and the suggestion that children are the real lambs who take away just these sins of the world is so unexpected and so unexpectedly tender, that one reader at least could not read it unmoved” (III, 105).

Joyce’s experimentation with the disembodiment of Bloom in favor of focusing on the transparent mental presentation of character in the “Circe” chapter of *Ulysses* leads straight to his sustained presentation of collective memory in *Finnegans Wake*.

Chapter 6 “Phall if you but will, rise you must”: the metempsychotic assemblage of memory in *Finnegans Wake*

Finnegans Wake epitomizes Joyce’s unique assemblage of memory, and his generalization of individual memory in the memory of all mankind. The “mound” and the “museyroom” of Book I, chapter i are pivotal to his conception concerning generalized memory and the cyclical patterning manifested through the *Wake*. The *Wake* has no chronology, because Joyce is mimicking memory, which is outside of time: in the *Wake*, all time becomes simultaneous through the memory of human experience. HCE is the archetypal everyman. His sleeping memory contains all the patterns of past human activity, and is the metempsychotic link to all history and prehistory. Joyce believed in general recurring cycles, and through the *Wake* Joyce solves the problem of the definition of human identity: people change, but the patterns in their lives do not. The patterns exist outside of time, and the *Wake* grows out of this repetition. Joyce’s structural incorporation of Giambattista Vico’s cyclical view of history and Aristotle’s conception of the regenerative/degenerative cycle reinforce his idea of the general tincture common to human life.

Unlike the other works of Joyce, *Finnegans Wake* is not about individual memory; rather, it represents a permanent record of the general memory of mankind. The mound, as Joyce’s Mutt and Jute determine, is the Akasic Records itself, and contains “[c]ountlessness of livestories...flick as flowflakes” (17. 26, 27-28). The *Wake* itself is a transcription from the Akasa, concretized through the text’s pages. The *Wake* sums up all Joyce’s work on memory; it contains a sustained treatment of the metempsychotic upsurges of generalized memory that leads to the formation of our aboriginal personality. Joyce’s text goes beyond

an ordinary description of memory; it forms a permanent record and concretizes memory through the mound.

Through Joyce's polysemantic experiment of word play or word incorporation, he is not only experimenting with the extreme possibilities and implications of language to fill a word with as many meanings as possible, but also through a given word he is mixing past and present through the vehicle of language to induce the collective memory experience of the human race, a memory, like the words on a page, which is not subject to the disintegration of time. Joyce's handling of the memory process in the *Wake* corresponds to his approach to language with its limitless possibilities. Both Harry Levin (187) and James Atherton (126) identify Lewis Carroll's influence in Joyce's adaption of the "portmanteau word." Furthermore, Atherton observes that Joyce "seems to have aimed at packing as many meanings as possible into every single word" (126).

The mind possesses a great degree of reflexivity, like the river in the *Wake*, venturing into the timeless realm of memory and returning to the temporal world. It must be remembered that *Finnegans Wake* as a whole is the timeless summary of the plot of human existence, a plot which has no beginning or ending because all is ever cyclically recurring, and because we know on the opening page this is not the first run of the river, nor will it be its last. However, we also know that in Book I ur-time or elemental time will give way to the river's tidal change in Book II, when chronological time begins. The homing instinct of the river to return to the ocean finds its counterpart in the homing instinct in the mind of man through memory. Through ALP and HCE, Joyce is linking the mental fabric of the human race in all its various manifestations across time and eternity. Wakean memory is both primal and all-inclusive.

Damasio has likened the formation of consciousness and its concomitant ideation, to “the movie-in-the brain” (1999: 9) *Finnegans Wake* is a modernist text because Joyce presents the inception of time and memory through the twentieth-century art of cinematography. Joyce counterpoints the advent of HCE’s dreaming pictorial mindscape when textual time begins with the movie-projector trope. Stephen Dedalus in the “Proteus” chapter of *Ulysses* is the central receptor and mental reconstructor of the Protean seascape; he has put together the picture of the world in his head. Here he foreshadows HCE, the collective cognitive center of the *Wake*. “And roll away the reel world, the reel world, the reel world,” (64. 25-26) is a Wakean movie directive for artificial recreation to begin, but is applicable to the spontaneous process of memory inception. “[A] fadograph of a yestern scene” (7.15), a still photograph, when digitally projected at a fast enough rate of speed recreates the image as the moving artificial world of film, just as the real world is pictographically present in the mind’s eye, since human consciousness occurs in and through forward moving time. Hence, the projector, becomes one of the indicators of the movement from the spatial plane to the advent of temporality in the *Wake*, “-- Quoiquoiquoiquoiquoiquoiquo!” (195. 6), for the proto-narrative of the family, which incorporates all human experience, is only possible in time. Here, Joyce is simulating the sound of the projector, indicating that time is beginning, but here its slow rate of speed still fails to sustain persistence of vision, and is not yet able to recreate the world. This is why the ur-narrative of the family does not begin until Book II, until the inception of time.

Moreover, since collective memory, although timeless, occurs paradoxically in and through time, Joyce conflates his artificial and natural tropes signaling the beginning of time in the JUSTIUS and MERCIUS exchange, which as Epstein notes resembles the medieval

dialogues where Justice and Mercy debate before the Virgin Mary for the soul of man, and in which Joyce incorporates “a comic dialogue” between the top and bottom halves of the dualistic Shem/Shaun body (1982: 91). JUSTIUS comes to his brother as death-bed priest to shrive him, inquiring when it was “since your last wetbed confession?” (188.1), so that he confess his “shemerics” (187. 35-36), or memories. Epstein sees this fraternal interchange as seminal to Joyce’s shift from space to time:

The sustained invective of the Shem chapter sets Time flowing in the *Wake*. What looks first like a mere extension of the last two questions in I. vi turns into the transition to the Anna Livia chapter (I. viii), which itself begins the flow of narrative time, moving from dusk to dawn in Books II and III. The Shem chapter is therefore the point in the *Wake* in which paradigm becomes syntagma, where structure becomes system. If Shaun and Shem do indeed represent the top and bottom halves of the body, the narrative text of the *Wake* begins to flow when the body of man is united as Justius and Mercius. Maturity is the precondition for male creativity, and the acceptance of the organs of outflow by the greedy avaricious brain is the precondition for maturity. (1982: 91-92)

JUSTIUS/ Shaun turns the world into a series of spatially static imagery with his “deathbone”: “He points the deathbone and the quick are still” (193.29), but it is MERCIUS/ Shem who “lifts the lifewand and the dumb speak” (195. 5), for he is the one who summons their mother Time: “it is to you...to me...to me...our turfbrown mummy is acoming” (194. 12,13, 17, 22). The gush of words among the elisions signifies that MERCIUS has now turned the tide. Anna Livia now reverses course, and flows downstream; their mother is coming, in all senses of the word. Joyce merges the sounds of the “babbling, bubbling, chattering...Anna Livia”(195.1-2,4) with the projector’s “— Quoiquoiquoiquoiquoiquoiquo!” (195.6) as an aural coda announcing the beginning of

time.

Finnegans Wake abounds with elementals: water in the form of river, ocean, and rain, thunder, rainbow, sun, clouds, earth, mound, rock or stone, trees, and the ubiquitous wildflowers. These are the building blocks of life, shared memory, and Joyce's text. They are the spatial and temporal groundings of both human and textual memory, for they serve as the permanent backdrop for the field of recurring human experience: "[s]ince the days of Roamaloose and Rehmoose... the races have come and gone and Thyme, that chef of seasoners, has made his usual astewte use of endadjustables and whatnot willbe isnor was, those danceadeils and cancanzanies have come stimmering down for our begayment" (236. 19, 26-30). This Wakean adaptation from the nineteenth-century French writer Edgar Quinet is a sentence Joyce frequently uses "about the immortality of wild flowers" (63), as Atherton in his source study of the *Wake* informs readers. Nature infiltrates the mindscape as the perennial field of ideation, so that it becomes part of memory. Moreover, these elementals are archetypal symbols, as well as a preamble to Joyce's technique of the transmogrifying interchange between nature and perceiving subject as a center of cognition. In the saturated spatial plane, the rainbow, the celestial sign of the receding waters, appears— "the regginbrow was to be seen ringsome on the aquaface" (3. 14), and with it the prominent delineation of the Hill of Howth, which becomes transformed into the supine form of primal fallen man, Adam, "Of the first was he to bare arms and a name" (5. 5) elucidated through Finnegan and Humpty Dumpty, "humptyhillhead" (3. 20). For Joyce, the rainbow is the symbol of fallen man because it signifies the visual world of color, which is the postlapsarian legacy.

The merger of man and landscape is further suggested through the giant, who is gradually formed from the flooded landscape, “the brontoichthyan form outlined aslumbered, even in our own nighttime by the sedge of the troutling stream” (7. 20-22). This merger is paramount to Joyce’s presentation of shared memory in the *Wake*, first because of the giant’s proximity to the mound— “His clay feet, swarded in verdigrass, stick up starck where he last fellonem, by the mund of the magazine wall” (7. 30-32) — and then by his incorporation into the mound — “a proudseye view is enjoyable of our moundling’s mass, now Wallinstone national museum” (7-8. 36, 1-2). Here Joyce conceptually shows how man contains the mound which, as Mutt and Jute have established, is the Akasic Records, the collective storehouse of the memory of life. The Akasic Records is synonymous with Joyce’s early idea about Great Memory, shared memory, first advanced in his essay on “Mangan,” where “no life, no moment of exaltation is ever lost” (83). Inside the “mund” or mound is the “Wallinstone national museum” (8. 1-2), which advances Joyce’s concept about the general tincture given to human life, wherein the patterns and rituals recur cyclically and generationally. As we penetrate the Akasic mound, the mind’s propensity as a container of collective memory, with its “[c]ountlessness of livestories” (17. 26-27), we encounter the “museyroom” fable about Willingdone,” or Wellington, archetypal father being endlessly defeated by the son, Napoleon, or “Lipoleum [who] wins this Waterloo” (Tindall 1969: 38). Here we hear the whole story of the *Wake* in variegated form.

Although there are myriad allusions to mythic and historical personages in the *Wake*, Joyce never really changes the subject: “(There extand by now one thousand and one stories, all told, of the same)” (5. 28-29). Rather, he tells the same story over and over again, about the delineation of family life, whether in a mythic, historical, or private domestic context.

Atherton interprets Joyce's universalizing schema vis à vis Joyce's introduction of "new characters" as manifestations of reincarnation:

The book itself is written in cyclic form not because it has no beginning and end— there is an obvious development as the book progresses and the hours of its night move towards dawn— but because when it has finished it all has to begin all over again in accordance with Vico's theory. What seem to be new characters in different parts of the book are better thought of as reincarnations. This is what Joyce meant by his reference to metempsychosis. (18)

General categories are given real and concrete existence through their repetitious interplay as they emerge through the sustained metempsychotic upsurge of HCE's dreaming mindscape.

Since memory is transparent to the perceiving mind, Joyce simulates this quality through his sustained objectification of the memory of the human race, albeit in syntactical displacement, which mimics the phantasmagorical disorientation of dream, or, in Freudian terms, the dreamwork. The antecedent of this memory-objectification technique is found in Bloom's psychic experience in the "Circe" chapter of *Ulysses*. Another textual antecedent in *Ulysses* which is incorporated into the *Wake* is that the text is not to be understood as a continuous narrative, because memory is not a constant narrative; rather, it mimics memory by means of its random upsurges of seemingly chaotic syntax, and it follows no linear chronology. Hence, the *Wake* corresponds to "durational" time. Memory is outside chronological time. Joyce, unlike William James (1890:1: 594), presupposes that space always precedes time, so in his cyclical Wakean world, space, the backdrop but not the impetus for memory, is presented in conjunction with the initial backward flow of the river which signals that chronological time has not begun. Since human experience can only be performed in and through time, the narrative of mankind lies in abeyance in the spatial

textual plane, static and without human chronology.

The landscape's features, mired in a non-relational syntactic limbo, can be interpreted through Damasio's conceptualization of the inception or formation of an individual's proto-consciousness, in which, devoid of a perceiving subject to impose ownership of and give meaning to experience, relevance and retention are non-existent (1999: 173). In addition, the primal Wakean landscape corresponds to scientific conceptualizations of geologic time as related by Gould. Joyce through spatial juxtaposition is referencing biblical and evolutionary genesis:

But paleontologists then discovered 'deep time,' in John McPhee's felicitous phrase. The earth is billions of years old, receding as far into time as the visible universe extends into space....[H]uman existence only fills the last micromoment of planetary time— an inch or two of the cosmic mile, a minute or two in the cosmic year. (Gould, 18)

Joyce is also paralleling the development of consciousness as well in this process. The pre-cognitive echoes anticipate the pre-verbal echoes of the introduction of the Viconian thunder words. The foundation of language, as ALP, the elemental riverbed, recedes, leaving behind the alphabet, the written transmission of memory, as Mutt and Jute “[s]toop” down and discover:

if you are abcedminded to this claybook, what curios of signs (please stoop), in this allaphbed! Can you rede (since We and Thou had it out already) its world? It is the same told of all. Many. Miscegenations on miscegenations. Tieckle. They lived und laughed ant loved end left. (18. 17-21)

The “allaphbed” is employed in Book I to relate the creation of family life through the “Prankquean” fable. *Finnegans Wake*, through the medium of language enables Joyce to tell “the same told of all,” the story of the human family.

In one of the earliest analyses of *Finnegans Wake*, Edmund Wilson identified the difficulty for readers of a communicative framework controlled by a dreamscape devoid of “any objective data until the next to the last chapter” (198). However, *Finnegans Wake* is a postmodern text, because Joyce reinvented everything, and especially delayed a narrative grounding; therefore, conventional approaches must be suspended in Book I in favor of archaeological, psychological, and linguistic schemas. Epstein has established that Book I is an exclusively spatial medium:

Book I is a Space book; Books II and III are Time books, the books which actually contain what could be called a narrative in time. Therefore Book I, as a Space book, is really only an overflight, as it were, over a landscape in which nothing is as yet happening. In this landscape we see scattered before us the elements of the books without action taking place. This landscape is very simple: a river winding through a plane; a large tree on one side of the river and a large stone on the other (Shem and Shaun); a peninsula in the distance, capped with a Gibraltar-like tumulus—the grave barrow of the Vice King, fallen Adam himself. (1990, 2000: section II)

Freud likened the process of memory retrieval to an archaeological dig, because in both fields an exploration of the past entails a descent. Because the *Wake* is a memory text, and Book I transpires through a spatial plane, syntactic arrangement is here devoid of meaning unless interpreted through Jakobson’s linguistic method: readers must interpret through a “paradigmatic” rather than through a “syntagmatic” context (74-76, 82-84), because Joyce vertically manipulates syntax to produce objects not in time. The words are relevant as signifiers if understood in the context of a vertical frame using one’s own reconstructive context by the process of adding associational replacements.

Foucault’s study excavating the diverse ways of approaching knowledge, and arriving at “meaning,” is here relevant to an understanding of the Joycean method of approaching

collective memory. An applicable corollary interpretation to Joyce's technique is Foucault's analysis "of a passage in Borges" which "quotes a 'certain Chinese encyclopaedia'" focusing on a classification schema:

[I]t is written that 'animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) *et cetera*, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies.' (xv)

Foucault sees the "unusual juxtapositions" or the "proximity of extremes" leading to a non-relational quagmire joined only through an "alphabetical series," or an "act of enumeration"(xvi). The animal taxonomy's admixture of "fabulous" and mundane, swine and canine, living and dead, overlap with ownership, behavioral description and a bird's-eye view analogy. For Foucault, this represents "disorder" — "the linking together of things that are inappropriate" (xvii), because Borges has excised the "site" of an explanatory context.

Borges' method parallels Joyce's in the *Wake*, and can be defined through Foucault's conception of Borges' technique as a "*heterotopia*":

Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this *and* that, because they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy 'syntax' in advance, and not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax which causes words and things (next to and also opposite one another) to 'hold together'....[H]eterotopias (such as those to be found so often in Borges) desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contest the very possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths and sterilize the lyricism of our sentences. (xviii)

The "heterotopia" principle is applicable to the *Wake*: the destruction of conventional approaches to syntax occurs, and is appropriate in a book whose major themes are cyclical

creation and destruction, establishment and disestablishment, rise and fall, inclusive of both civilizations and individual lives. Joyce transforms, and thereby creates, his unconventional syntactical grammatology. He suspends relational syntax and explanatory contexts here because readers are confronting a “Space Book.” The temporal elements, as we are used to experiencing them, are inert. The traditional categorizations of space and time, as Stephen in the “Proteus” chapter of *Ulysses* through Lessing defines them, negates the possibility of a narrative structure for Book I of the *Wake*, because narrative presupposes a succession of forward moving words in time. Epstein’s analogy of a reader’s experience of Book I as an “overflight” necessitates that we must begin our textual journey vertically, in order to penetrate the surface and subsurface of the words on the page, which lie as Joyce positioned them, in situ, and glean meaning through their original location in the past.

Kenner, in his study of Joyce’s stylistic techniques, delineates the author’s construction of a character’s vocal expression, and its unique infusion into the narrator’s voice. He understands the narratology as designed to fit a character’s idiosyncratic sensibility and expressive discourse describing this Joycean method as “the Uncle Charles Principle” wherein “*the narrative idiom need not be the narrator’s*” (1978: 18). In applying “the Uncle Charles Principle” to *Finnegans Wake*, the “idiom” communicated is the variegated collective discourse of the past of the human race filtered through HCE’s dreaming mindscape. Joyce is conveying history and prehistory through the sustained metempsychotic upsurges in HCE’s unconscious, and its textual antecedent and site of all origin and memory, the Akasic mound, which first appears spatially and atemporally in Book I. Human proto-memory is the surrogate for the Akasic racial unconscious in the *Wake*. The interpretive “idiom,” like the presentational one, is experimental, and readers should not

expect a standard communicative context grounded in traditional modes of narration. Joyce's textual mind and its expressive schemas have a logic of their own. To understand how we consciously understand is a core question of epistemology, and a question Joyce implicitly poses to readers of *Finnegans Wake*. Insight into decoding meaning is found in the postscript of a letter³ Joyce wrote to his grandson, Stephen Joyce: "The devil mostly speaks a language of his own called Bellsybabble which he makes up himself as he goes along but when he is very angry he can speak quite bad French very well though some who have heard him say that he has a strong Dublin accent" (1. 387-388). This passage in miniature helps elucidate Joyce's expressive method in the *Wake*, because in it Joyce posits the devil's speech as self-referential and thereby containing an internal logic all its own, but not divorced from an external narrative voice. More appropriately, to borrow Hayman's concept from his critique on *Ulysses*, he is an "arranger" (122-123). To understand the internal structuring of the *Wake*, the appropriate frames borrowed from psychoanalysis and sociolinguistics must be applied.

Since in *Finnegans Wake* Joyce is simulating the sustained presentation of the unconscious, meaning is transmitted but is not immediately apparent to readers. Joyce's presentational method in the *Wake* is illuminated by Ribeiro's sociolinguistic study of "atypical framings" (12) employed by a woman in "psychotic crisis" (12). Her analysis focuses on two interviews between "a patient and a doctor," one when the woman was in crisis, and the other when she "recovered" (12). Like Joyce, Ribeiro has us rethink expected communicative practices, for she posits that "[p]sychotic talk...may have a coherence of its

³ The letter itself contains the story of the Eternal Trickster being outwitted by human ingenuity, and it was later published posthumously as the children's book, *The Cat and the Devil*.

own” (12), and can only be interpreted linguistically (14). Moreover, she cites “textbook” symptomologies of language behaviors commonly found in psychotic discourse which Joyce seems to mimic in the *Wake*, such as “derailment” (albeit Joyce uses pseudo-derailment since he never changes the subject), “tangentiality,” “distractible speech,” “clanging,” and “pressure of speech” (14). Her argument here is pertinent to Joyce, because his inner textual logic resembles the idiosyncratic linguistic framings he was exposed to as his daughter Lucia declined into mental illness. Joyce was composing the *Wake* during Lucia’s bouts of schizophrenia, and Ellmann informs us that “Joyce had a remarkable capacity to follow her swift jumps of thought which baffled other people completely” (1982: 650). The interface between text and reader in the *Wake* parallels the “turn taking” (13) of the interview. Ribeiro delineates the two components of “discourse” necessary for comprehension:

Frame and topic represent two ways of segmenting discourse— two different, but interrelated, principles of discourse and social organization....[W]hile topics are dependent on participants’ prior and shared knowledge, framings are continuously being created (and recreated) in interaction. While topics address the discourse question ‘What is talk about?’ framings establish a metamessage as ‘how this talk must be understood.’ (50)

The “metamessage” is the unique self-referential language code. In the *Wake*, Joyce constructs an overlap of stylistic layering of mythic and historical discourse to convey the simultaneous patterning in collective thought. In addition, the postmodern idea of a text’s shifting subject seems applicable to the *Wake*, given the multifarious personages Joyce incorporates into his text. However, Joyce never digresses from his subject, a family’s establishment and disestablishment. Since Epstein has established that there are only two characters HCE and ALP, all the others being their manifestations in different forms,

paradoxically the subject really never is “decentered” in favor of differing perspective. Schwab, in her chapter on the *Wake*, sees subjectivity grounded in Joyce’s innovative use of language (105), and interprets Joyce’s “[t]ransgressions of the boundaries of subjectivity” (104) vis à vis his technique of de-individualization of character:

Any equation with familiar models of decentered subjectivity appears reductive in relation to characters who only emerge temporarily out of linguistic shapes in order to redissolve into new mutations and permutations. Thus released from allegiance to individual characters or voices, the *Wake* oscillates between the extreme notions of a universal consciousness and a speech without a subject. (104)

The first six chapters of Book I of the *Wake* are spatial, therefore paradigmatic. Then time begins, and with it the advent of a syntagmatic structure. Joyce’s presentation of time in the *Wake* is elucidated through his early essay, “A Portrait of the Artist,” which epitomizes his unchanging views on time in relation to human life. Past time, for both the young and the mature Joyce, is not static, but “implies a fluid succession of presents” (1904: 60). His early theorizing about time in this essay is later exemplified through his presentation of ALP as the river of time in the *Wake*. That is why even though in Book IV of the *Wake* with the advent of morning, the “[p]ast now pulls” (594. 26). That is, the past’s unsuccessful attempt to hold back the day is ineffectual because dawn, or the temporal cycle, is ever creating what will be new “pasts,” memories for mankind, “Scatter brand to the reneweller of the sky.... through dimdom done till light kindling light has led we hopas but hunt me the journeyon” (594. 1, 6-7).

The Wakean elemental world of continuous seasonal and diurnal generation and degeneration converges with the human cycle of growth and decline: “Phall if you but will, rise you must” (4. 15-16). ALP, the river of time, incessantly flows in a backward and

forward motion, upstream and downstream mimicking the human sexual rhythm. With each turn of the tide, (“*At Island Bridge she met her tide*”) (103. 1), she reaches orgasmic climax signaling her conjoining in the creative sexual act. However, the entire structural and thematic schemata of the *Wake*, the rise and fall of existence, is grounded in the Aristotelian rhythm appropriate to male sexuality, to male tumescence and detumescence, the rise up toward reproduction and the descent toward death in aging impotence. Joyce is here tracing the pattern of life, a pattern because it is outside time, yet emerging generation upon generation.

HCE and ALP move toward extinction, because as Epstein comments, “ALP symbolizes, among other things, the flow of time and experience” (1971: 32), and the passing years always bring death, “*We’re all up to the years in hues and cribies*” (103.5). Epstein also reminds us that ALP, as time, bears the blame for “the Fall” (1971: 32) auguring mortality, yet time provides the perceptive arena of “the sights and sounds, of the phenomenal world” (1971: 32). HCE’s super sensitivity to time, synonymous with his vanishing power, is epitomized on the “Ides- of April morning” (35. 3) in HCE’s meeting “a cad with a pipe” (35. 11) in Phoenix Park. The cad’s inquiry of “how much a clock it was” (35. 18) causes HCE to blurt out his voyeuristic crime concerning the two micturating females in the park “ages and ages after the alleged misdemeanour” (35. 5-6) occurred. Joyce establishes the pattern of primal crime committed in time, like all crime, which occurs due to HCE’s “first assumption of his mirthday suit” (35. 4), or original sin, since as archetypal man he is an avatar of Adam.

However, HCE and ALP move toward rebirth through their children. HCE’s regeneration occurs metempsychotically through his offspring, Shaun, in Book III of the

Wake. This idea is reiterated throughout the *Wake*; it is behind the ancient philosophical problem of the *Ax*, which linguistically incorporates the sense of paternal continuity: “with Pa’s new heft and Papa’s new helve he’s Papapa’s old cutlass Papapapa left us; when youngheaded old shouldered and middlishneck aged about” (136. 24-26). Moreover, the question of continuity is expressed within question number 9 in Book I, chapter vi, as Shem quizzes his brother Shaun about what is seen while nightly lying in bed contemplating the universe, within and without: “the reverberration of knotcracking awes, the reconjungation of nodebinding ayes, the redissolusingness of mindmouldered ease” (143. 12-14). These become like the recurrent diurnal patterning of “Nox” (143. 17) and “lucan’ dawn” (143. 17) and generic recombination, “but Heng’s got a bit of Horsa’s nose” (143. 22-23) infinitely repeated, or in Wakean terms, “shakeagain” (143. 21).

Moreover, as Epstein has established, before the son supersedes the father, he must circumvent the father’s attempt to retard his growth, and mature into a fully psycho-sexually integrated adult: “he[the father] attempts to halt the process of maturity by freezing or paralyzing the son in some way. The son, in his turn, resists the attack of the father, and, in a sense counterattacks by developing, since the son cannot truly create until he is fully matured...” (1971: 11). The archetypal family’s children must always win, or all life would cease to exist. The son’s maturation process gradually evolves in the *Wake* by means of the fraternal tension of HCE’s male progeny, Shaun and Shem. Epstein has posited that these personages represent for Joyce the dual halves of the male : “Shaun is the top half of the male body, and Shem is the bottom half. Shaun’s embarrassment is the embarrassment of any decent top half when confronted by the unbridled and indecent behavior of his bottom half” (1982: 84).

The son's psycho-sexual integration is the necessary prelude to conquest over the father, and the process is exhibited in many forms throughout the *Wake*. It is first portrayed in the "Prankquean" fable by means of the symbolic crossover of the Jarl van Hooter's twin, polar opposite sons, Tristopher and Hilary. This fable, and the "Willingdone Museyroom" fable, which depicts the father's destruction by the son(s), contain the core paradigms of human life. They serve as Joyce's templates of collective memory, and are textually situated in the Akasic mound.

In Book I of the *Wake*, Joyce introduces two fables, the "Willingdone Museyroom" and the "Prankquean," that impart the whole story of the establishment and disestablishment of the family, and which articulate the two major patterns that recur and define the commonality of human identity. The fables parallel the mythic themes of Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, the visceral journey into conflict and then the longing for home. These are expressed, in Wakean terminology, as "Gricks may rise and Troysirs fall (there being two sights for ever a picture) for in the byways of high improvidence that's what makes life-work leaving and the world's a cell for citters to cit in" (11-12. 35-36, 1-2). The battle between the Willingdone and the lipoleums is as filled with male blood- thirstiness as that transpiring on the plains of Troy. However, here Joyce's wanderer in search of home is not the briny male Odysseus, but the pirate queen, Grace O'Malley.

The "Museyroom" fable is paradigmatic of Joyce's views concerning time and history. In *Finnegans Wake*, the temporal elements of past and present are all interspersed in the "commodius vicus of recirculation" (3. 2) because the patterns in life, in generational growth, and in the *Wake* itself, reemerge continuously in a never-ending cycle. History and

prehistory have been dispersed through time, and must be reconstructed from ruin. Ruin produces a separation of the past from the present. Rose and O'Hanlon, in their explication of the *Wake* see in the "Wallinstone national museum...the collected debris of all wars" (9). Ultimately for Joyce, real history can only be recaptured through its reiteration of patterns. This is why in the *Wake*, as in collective memory, there is no periodization, for each age is embedded in the other.

The "Willingdone Museyroom" fable is contained within the Wakean Akasic mound: "a proudseye view is enjoyable of our moundling's mass, now Wallinstone national museum" (7-8. 36, 1-2). The trope represents for Joyce the origin and reservoir of what Stephen Dedalus referred to in *Ulysses* as "of all that ever anywhere wherever was" (7. 883). Joyce has established that man and mound are one; that is, man contains collective memory by means of his conjoined infusion in the primal landscape. Because the fable is an emanation from the pre-verbal unconscious, it is presented in paradigmatic form simulating pictorial ideation.

A museum is an artificial attempt to represent the past, and Joyce conjoins this idea semantically with memory's ability to recall the past through random ideations in his composite word "museyroom." Here, there is no tour guide or identifying plates under the exhibits; rather, both museum and memory share a pictographic method of communication to convey the past devoid of any controlling context except for a repetitious demonstrative directional marker, the word "This," pre-echoing what is to come in time, textually, historically, and generationally. Here also, the Wellington and Napoleon conflict is given archetypal significance, because for Joyce it traces the basic and most innate patterns of human existence, generational decline, and usurpation, wherein the father is defeated. That

strife parallels the Aristotelian rhythm of life, is first suggested in the earlier reference to “penisolate war” (3. 6), which not only adumbrates the Battle of Waterloo by means of an earlier military engagement of Wellington, but also contains an association with the penis (Tindall 1969: 31). Wellington’s antagonist, Napoleon, perhaps because of his notorious diminutive size becomes the son, or “lipoleums” in this section, and therefore, the ultimate victor in Joyce’s fable, because they eventually grow up.

In this episode there is a pseudo-historical rendition of the HCE and Shem/Shawn conflict. By blurring the historical individual identity of the two major adversaries at Waterloo Joyce is advancing the congruity of universal patterns. Entrance into “the museomound [is] free” (8.5) for “Penetrators” (8.5), because sexual maturity and entrance into the past by means of memory are unconditional givens of human identity. The universal entry into and exit from life — “Mind your hats goan in!” (8. 9) and “Mind your boots goan out!” (10. 22-23) — symbolically articulate the collective memory of life in Joyce’s fable by reinforcing the commonality of the two basic poles of the human condition, with their ultimate contribution to mortality, suffering, “goan” (groan). Moreover, “Kathe,” the “janitrix” holds the “passkey” (8. 8) to the memory of life, because as woman she is a manifestation of ALP, who brings time, the precondition for human existence.

Cheng’s essay focusing on Wellington’s imperialistic conquest of India in relation to Joyce’s inclusion of the “hinndoo seeboy” (“Hindoo sepoy”) in the fable further elucidates Joyce’s choice of Wellington as exemplar of the father figure and oppressor. Cheng views Joyce’s depiction of Wellington as representative of “an archetypal patriarch and wielder of Authority and power...” (258), both militaristically and phallically. Cheng interprets the “lipoleums” as an archetypal composite of the “Irish,” “American,” and “Hindu” people,

whose response to Britain's imperialistic subjugation is "insurrection" (264). Moreover, his study calls attention to Joyce's use of two important symbols of power, the telescope and the horse. Cheng believes Joyce was familiar with the anecdote concerning Peel's amended portrait of Wellington, substituting the telescope for the watch to be held in his hand (259). Wellington insisted: "That will never do. I was *not* 'waiting' for the Prussians at Waterloo. Put a telescope in my hand, if you please" (qtd. In Cheng, 259). This led Joyce to incorporate the more thematically appropriate phallic "tallowscoop" into the fable. If Joyce knew the story, as Cheng supposes, the change was serendipitous for Joyce, since a time piece would have no relevance in his spatial plane where time has yet to occur.

The other major authoritarian symbol Cheng sees as imperialistically significant is Joyce's inclusion of Wellington's bay horse, Copenhagen, which Joyce turns into a white horse: "Wellington on his white horse is only the most prominent and frequent of many references in *Finnegans Wake* to rulers on white horses (including Napoleon on his white charger Marengo), all figures denoting imperial and colonial rule" (259). For Joyce, however, the horse is more than a symbol of colonial authority. His equine cousin, the prolix donkey, is Shaun's malicious inquisitor in Book III, chapter i of the *Wake*. Animals play a key role in Joyce's fiction, as evidenced in the *Wake's* hen digging up or "scratching" (111. 7) the "litter" (letter), of the memory of life from the mound, symbolically paralleling the human descent into the past by means of memory, which was foreshadowed by "Tatters" similar digging in the sand in the "Proteus" chapter of *Ulysses*. Moreover, the reiteration of the word "Tip" throughout the fable, which Tindall has identified as "a dump" (1969: 36), or a mound where garbage is thrown suggests that it is the same as the hen's midden. For Joyce, it is the Akasic mound containing the detritus of the past preserved through racial

memory.

So too, the theriomorphic hallucinations of Bloom, with their implicit Darwinian subtext, in the “Circe” chapter of *Ulysses* counterpoint the Joycean evolution of unconscious and conscious thought. In the *Wake*, cinematography and its derivative ancestor photography represent the evolution and inception of time and consciousness, but not without the inclusion of an animal trope, albeit in photographic form. Joyce uses the “negative of a horse” (111. 27) as an analogue to describe what the “missive”(111. 31) or contents of the Akasic mound look like, “if a negative of a horse happens to melt enough while drying, well, what you do get is, well, a positively grotesquely distorted macromass of all sorts of horsehappy values and masses of meltwhile horse” (111. 27-30). What Joyce is suggesting is that just as the photographic negative develops into the positive representation of the “horse” delineating its “values,” so too the inchoate “macromass” of the Akasic mound develops signification in the *Wake* with the start of time, the delineator of the world of light and color, which are the perceptual agents of human experience and therefore memory.

Moreover, just as in Aesop’s fables, where animals are not only symbols but substitutes for humans, here, in Joyce’s fable Willingdone’s “white harse, the Cokenhape” (8. 17), serves the same Aesopian function. As equine symbol, “Cokenhape” represents “both a life and death symbol,” “the swiftness of thought,” “the swift passage of life.” “masculine virility and fertility” (Cooper, 85), and of significance later in Book III of the *Wake* for Shaun, “a white horse, is to be the last incarnation or vehicle of Vishnu...” (Cooper, 86). “Cokenhape,” like Tatters, is for Joyce another protean animal, for he reappears without his rider as a substitute for HCE, as Epstein established: “In the Butt and Taff episode (*FW* 337-55) the Willingdone situation is presented in the form of a horserace” (1971: 14). Epstein

interprets the “horserace” in relation to the fable as just one of many “recurrences,” albeit in equine form, of the father’s universal, but fruitless struggle, to keep the sons from superseding him:

The physical order is the same here as in the Museyroom scene: the father, ‘Immensipater,’ runs before the three sons, while the two daughters are capering immodestly before him (‘showing a clean pair of hids’). ‘Emancipator, the Creman hunter’ (later called ‘Immensipater’), and ‘Major Hermyn C. Entwistle’ are all HCE in various presentations....The ‘three buy geldings’ of ‘Mr Whytehayte,’ the ‘white-hot’ HCE, are Shem the Penman, Shaun the Post (‘Bailey Beacon’ refers to his belt lamp), and the murderous *tertium quid*, the ‘dooforhim seeboy’ of the Willingdone episode, whose name ‘Ratatuohy’ suggests, among other things, a rattle of machine-gun fire. The two temptresses are easily identifiable as Issy and her mirror image. Here the three soldiers are ‘geldings,’ that is, they are rendered helpless by the presence of Immensipater who has cornered all the sexuality in the situation....Here again is suggested the fear of the father that the sexual maturing of his sons will constitute a deadly threat to his monopoly of creation....(1971: 14-15)

For Joyce, the theme of cyclical devolution and evolution crosses species. His use of the horse in blurring the distinction between man and animal may have been suggested by an anecdote concerning a wax reproduction of Wellington and Copenhagen. McCarthy, in his study of the many riddles Joyce employs in the *Wake*, cites the word superimposition of “white horse” and “wide arse” as originating in “the story of the young girl, who while touring a wax museum, was told ‘This is the Duke of Wellington and his horse’ and replied ‘Which is the Duke and which is the horse?’” (58). The guide responded, “You pays your money, and you takes your choice!”

For Joyce, the paradigmatic father assents to his own destruction because the human life cycle dictates that the aging process is inevitable. As procreator the father produces a

future generation of usurping enemies. Joyce represents the disestablishment pattern through a confluence of battlefield and sexual imagery strewn in situ like in an archaeological site about his spatial plane awaiting context by means of mnemonic discovery. “Shimar Shin,” the murderous “hinndoo seeboy” (10. 14-15), collectively symbolizes all children who fight through the years to attain what they see as designating adulthood. The hindoo seeboy and his two lipoleum brothers/compatriots are surreptitiously lying in wait to ambush Willingdone: “This is the three lipoleum boyne grouching down in the living detch” (8. 21-22). They symbolize through a child’s eye the long passage of childhood. Willingdone’s capture of the lipoleums’ “threefoiled hat” (10. 8), and his gesture of disrespect, “hanking the half of the hat of lipoleums up the tail on the buckside of his big white harse” (10. 10-11), suggesting dominance and control, precipitate his downfall. Fatherhood is short-lived because the children must always win. They must grow up, or life ceases to exist. This is why in the fable “the dooforhim seeboy blow the whole of the half of the hat of lipoleums off of the top of the tail on the back of his big wide harse” (10. 19-21).

Willingdone’s destruction is also inevitable because, as man and father, he participates in the Wakean primal crime by watching through his “tallowscoop” (8. 35) equipped with “[s]excaliber hrosspower” (8. 36) the immodestly revealing “jinnies” urinate: “This is the jinnies with their legahorns feinting to read in their handmade’s book of strategy while making their war undisides the Willingdone. The jinnies is a cooin her hand and the jinnies is a ravin her hair and the Willingdone git the band up” (8. 31-34). He, in turn, is watched by the lipoleums: “And the lipoleums is gonn boycottoncrezy onto the one Willingdone” (9. 8-9). Willindone’s erection, “git the band up,” signals the Aristotelian psycho-physiological cycle, since the rise to reproduction is always followed by the descent

toward death. Hence, the Willingdone fable of disestablishment evokes the Hegelian dialectic, since it contains the seed of its own destruction, which reflects the never-ending cycle of birth and death.

Joyce's other fable, the "Prankquean," articulates the universal establishment of the family through the historical incident involving the Earl of Howth's denial of hospitality to the Irish pirate queen, Grace O'Malley, an equal of Queen Elizabeth of England. The Prankquean etymologically combines her authority as "a queen" and her role as a loose woman, a "quean," since her function in the fable is to arouse the dormant Jarl van Hooter into his creative role as father, just as Vishnu's consort aroused him from sleep making possible the creation of the universe, "and all the livvy-long night, the delldale dalppling night, the night of bluerybells, her flittaflute in tricky trochees (O carina! O carina!) wake him" (7. 1-3). Hence, the Prankquean too is the first cause, precipitating universal creation.

The Prankquean's micturition, like the jinnies's, symbolizes her attempt at sexual arousal in an effort to ignite the Jarl's ardor. Her effort at entry into his castle and his subsequent refusal are not without consequences:

And the prankquean pulled a rosy one and made her wit
foreinst the dour. And she lit up and fireland was ablaze.
And spoke she to the dour in her petty perusienne: Mark the
Wans, why do I am alook alike a poss of porterpease? And
that was how the skirtmisshes began. But the dour
handworded her grace in dootch nossow: Shut! So her grace
o'malice kidsnapped up the jiminy Tristopher and into the
shandy westerness she rain, rain, rain. (21. 15-22)

Her kidnapping of the "jiminy" Tristopher in retaliation for not being admitted to the Jarl's castle is replicated by her snatching of his twin, Hilary: "So her madesty a forethought set down a jiminy and took up a jiminy" (22. 7-8) signifies Joyce's idea that life situations may appear to be different, yet paradoxically are basically the same. Moreover, the respective

kidnappings of the duo in the fable symbolize a psychic crossover for the polar pair. Both are schooled by “her four owlers masters” (21. 28-29), or, in other words, “her four larksical monitrix” (22. 15-16), and experience the necessary transformation into his diametrically opposed opposite. Tristopher, the sad twin, as his name suggests is “convorted” (21. 29-30) by the administration of the physical stimuli for inducing laughter, tickles: “for to tauch him his tickles” (21. 29). Hilary, the happy twin, is “provorted” (22. 16) (converted) into sorrow, “to touch him his tears” (22. 16) through “the nail” (22. 15), the symbolic nail of the Crucifixion, hence archetypal Christian suffering, for “he became a tristian” (22. 17). Here Joyce indicates that fraternal fusion is complete through the combination of the brothers’ names, and by Hilary’s conversion as a “tristian” (Christian) into a religion whose foundation is based on the mystery of the Father and the Son anticipates a future crossover wherein the Son becomes the Father. For both twins the experience of physicality is the catalyst for emotional cohesion.

McCarthy interprets the fable “as an emblem for the eternal male-female struggle that characterizes human life” (106). The Jarl must ultimately acquiesce to the Prankquean because the continuance of life resides in the family, as reference to their biblical avatars suggests, “when Adam was delvin and his madameen spinning” (21. 6). The Jarl is primal man, and as such his association with Adam is indicated by his multi-colored garments, “like a rudd yellan gruebleen orangeman in his violet indigation” (23. 1-2) which parallel the colors of a rainbow’s spectrum— the rainbow, as Epstein has illustrated, is Joyce’s symbol for fallen man. Furthermore, the Jarl’s transgression is his denying the life-affirming woman, the Prankquean’s request for sustenance: “why do I am alook alike a poss of porterpease?” (21. 18-19). His redemption is appropriately framed through communal ritual, “[a]nd they all

drank free” (23. 7-8), because rituals are the outward expressions of the fundamental commonalities of life.

The spatial plane of Book I in *Finnegans Wake* enables Joyce to posit textually that human memory and Great Memory conflate by means of his imagistic overlapping of primal man and Akasic mound, which ultimately are interchangeable. Both the “Museyroom” and “Prankquean” fables emerge from the reservoir of collective thought, and depict the most basic and recurrent patterns of human life, the development and decline of the family structure. Both fables prepare readers for Book III, where by means of metempsychosis the son, Shaun, becomes the new proto- father, HCE. Shaun has achieved maturation, and HCE is both vanquished and resurrected in his son. Shaun in his various transformations signifies a recurrent psychic link to the past. The Four Old Men discover this as they probe the Akasic mound, which bursts forth with the symbolic lava flow of the collective memory of Irish history. It is memory fraught with the searing pain of Ireland’s tragic past.

Chapter 7 “When you sell get my price!”: channels to the vein of suffering in Irish history

The theme of memory, individual and collective, is vital in the enormously complex structures in *Finnegans Wake*. In this chapter, I treat the psychic patterns in the *Wake* as they relate to the memories of Irish history, the terrible records of a history which is “a nightmare,” as Stephen says several times in *Ulysses*. The *Wake* contains all the memory of Irish history, from the Viking invasions to the Irish Civil War. Joyce refocuses the memory of Irish history, the stream of lava that flows from the Akasic mound, a history which is not to be seen as records of battles, but in terms of the human cost of blood and pain and betrayal. For Joyce, every pattern repeats itself an infinite number of times, and therefore the mythic and historical past is manifested by means of the father-son supersession paradigm. This section also deals with other upsurges of Irish historical memory and primal history, and demonstrates how for Joyce the *Wake* itself becomes the Akasa, textually concretized, as it was first formalized in Book I.

In Book III of the *Wake*, a power shift occurs in the archetypal family through the psychic crossover between father and son. In this book, Shaun has achieved an uneasy maturity, and HCE is both vanquished and resurrected in his son. Shaun in his transformation into Yawn falls, like his father before him. Shaun now becomes the Hill of Howth, Adam Kadmon, and Vishnu. Shaun’s transformations are crucial in formulating Joyce’s recurrent psychic link to the past. Shaun as the Kabbalistic Adam Kadmon becomes through memory a microcosmic link to the macrocosmic aboriginal Adam, for after the Fall he retained his connection to eternity through memory.

The textual site of collective memory in the *Wake* is established by Joyce through the “Mutt and Jute” episode of Book I. Shared memory, or any other type of human memory,

would be impossible without a conscious receptor. Hence, Joyce interconnects collective memory with the Viconian conception of the post-diluvian origin of language, the lexical signs and metaphors by which expression of memory is objectively articulated. Vico theorizes that, after the Flood, the meteorological conditions made possible both an apprehension of the Divine and the human inception of language:

As was inevitable when such a violent phenomenon filled the sky for the first time, the heavens now produced the most frightening thunderclaps and lightning bolts. At this time, a few giants, who must have been the most robust, were living scattered through the forests of the mountain heights, which is where the most robust animals have their lairs. Suddenly frightened and thunderstruck by this inexplicably great phenomenon, they raised their eyes and observed the heavens. In this state, such people by nature possessed only robust physical strength and expressed their violent passions by shouting or grunting. So they imagined the heavens as a great living body, and in this manifestation, they called the sky Jupiter....And they thought that Jupiter, the first god of the so-called greater clans, was trying to speak to them through the whistling of his bolts and the crashing of thunder.

...They believed that Jupiter commanded by signs, that these signs were physical words, and that Nature was Jupiter's language. (146, 147)

Vico envisions a time when primitive man's expressive capacity was so rooted in the natural landscape and skyscape that it was pristine, devoid of the encumbrances of later self-conscious cerebral scrutiny: "We are likewise incapable of entering into the vast imaginative powers of the earliest people. Their minds were in no way abstract, refined, or intellectualized; rather, they were completely sunk in their senses, numbed by their passions, and buried in their bodies" (147). Vico's conception of the mythopoeic quality of language when man experienced a unity of being and was one with nature, informs Joyce's idea about Shem's creative source originating in his physical nature. Shaun must accept his own

physical nature in order to achieve psycho-sexual cohesion, as Epstein has established — for Joyce the “sexual drive and language” are derived from the same source (1982: 80).

The Viconian subtext is an appropriate frame for the *Wake*, because Vico interjects a transcendent catalyst into his theory of proto-verbal communication, just as Joyce utilizes a transcendent concept, the Akasic Records, to communicate textually the memory of mankind’s history and prehistory. The Akasic mound that Mutt and Jute probe is the source for the prehistoric glacial “icefloe” (17. 22) as well as the historic establishment of civilization, “citie by law” (17. 21). In addition, the Viconian language frame is an apt choice, because Finn, one of the Celtic avatars of HCE, is a giant, and the Viconian giants live on “the mountain heights”— the Joycean trope for the convergence of temporal and atemporal reality.

By means of the “Mutt and Jute” episode, Joyce incorporates the Viconian subtext, and adumbrates the basis for the metempsychotic crossover of Shaun into HCE in Book III, where Shaun is by psychic means transformed into HCE, and hence he also becomes both man and mound. Tindall interprets the Mutt and Jute exchange as “[t]he first of many recurrent conflicts between...(Shem... and Shaun)” (1969: 43); the conflictive pair also foreshadow the numerous fraternal crossovers in the *Wake*— the crossover that signals the son has achieved the necessary psycho-sexual integration and is ready to become the father.

Here, the crossover is exemplified phonetically by the transposition of a consonant in Jute’s name: “You phonio saxo? Nnnn. Clear all so! ’Tis a Jute. Let us swop hats and excheck a few strong verbs weak oach eather yapyazzard abast the bloody creeks” (16. 7-9). The mute becomes Jute, but the transposition does not negate Jute’s significance as representative of the Viconian inarticulate giant-men who mimic the sound of the thunder,

the voice of the Divine: “Oye am thonthorstrok, thing mud” (18. 16). Since Mutt alludes to Brian Boru’s defeat of the Danes at the Battle of Clontarf, as Rose and O’Hanlon note (17), it is significant that Joyce’s compound word “thonthorstrok” incorporates the Norse god of thunder with the Viconian theory of the origin of language; the episode provides a segue into the Akasic mound’s eruption in Book III, when the searing memory of Irish history is articulated by the speech of the Four Old Men.

The linguistic symbiotic relationship of Mutt and Jute is not one of polar opposition, since Jute’s inquiry of Mutt reveals that Mutt too is representative of the development of proto-language. Joyce designates Mutt’s gradual induction into pronunciation as a stutter:

Jute. — But you are not jeffmute?
 Mutt. — Noho. Only an utterer.
 Jute. — Whoa? Whoat is the mutter with you?
 Mutt. — I became a stun a stummer. (16. 14-17)

As stutterer, Mutt becomes one with HCE; for in “The Ballad of Persse o’Reilly,” HCE’s exposure in the Park by the Cad is rendered in satiric song, where his transgression is magnified into Fallen Man’s, and his guilt is symbolized through his Italianate stutter, “*Balbaccio, balbuccio!*” (45. 27), (M). As “utterer,” Mutt becomes the one who concretizes shared memory through language as his quite abbreviated encapsulation of Irish history from Brian Boru to Parnell suggests: “Has? Has at? Hasatency? Urp, Boo hooru! Booru Usurp! I trumple from rath in mine mines when I rimimirim!” (16. 26-28). Since the *Wake* itself simulates the all-inclusive memory of the Akasic Records, concretized by means of language, it is fitting that Mutt’s historical overview contains an allusion to Joyce himself, since Joyce began life in Rathgar (Ellmann, 1982: 24), and as a self-exiled Irishman records the history of his race, “rimimirim,” remember him, also continues rhyme from memory, “mines” (mind, hence memory).

After Mutt and Jute's discovery of the mound, "the wholeborrow of rubbages on to soil here" (17. 4-5), which is Joyce's textual equivalent of the Akasic Records, it is Mutt who voices what it contains—the reservoir of life:

Countlessness of livestories have netherfallen by this plage,
flick as flowflakes, litters from aloft, like a waast wizzard all
of whirlworlds. Now are all tombed to the mound, isges to
isges, erde from erde. Pride, O pride, thy prize!" (17. 26-30)

The Akasic mound contains not only the past of all human experience, "lifestories," but by means of Joyce's semantic combinations, the past of all elemental life as well, for mankind's past is as encompassing in the mound as the "flowflakes" (snowflakes) are representative of Nature's varied manifestations. The original Akasic Records holds all, even the sound of breath — man's and Nature's "whirlworlds," the wind or *pneuma*, the spirit of life. Here, in the spatial plane of Book I, the "lifestories" of past ages are "tombed;" it is not until time begins in Book II, and with it the inception of HCE's conscious and unconscious mind, that the collective memory trace from the Akasic Records can infiltrate. Man's identity can only be understood through the framework of past and present time, since vacuous space is non-relational without a time schema.

Joyce's purpose in incorporating the inception of language in the same section that he introduces the Akasic mound is to demonstrate that without language the communicative bridge between past and present, shared memory, would remain dormant, or "tombed." It would be a "thanacestross" (18. 3), a death mound cut off from the vital past of one's ancestors. Jute's reply to Mutt's description of the mound, "'Stench!" (17. 31) does not signify the putrefaction of the finality of death, the irrecoverable past; rather, his exclamation denotes the "(Year! Year! And laughtears!)" (15. 8-9), the laughter and suffering endemic to and inescapable from the human condition in time. Mutt's epiphany mirrors the similar

finding of the Four Old Men in Book III, who also probe the mound and unleash the suffering throughout Irish history, as they transpire in time, the temporal mode of the book. Moreover, the “astoneaged” (18.15) Mutt and Jute become “abcedminded, to this claybook” (18. 17), that is, literate, able to concretize and give permanence to shared memory experienced through the “claybook” or the earth through the signs of the alphabet. Here Joyce is positing that the transmission of the Akasic Records, the past, filtered through the mind of man in the memory trace can only be given permanence through letters, epitomized by his *Wake*.

Joyce conjoins mound and man to emphasize their interchangeability, or man’s propensity as receptor of collective memory by means of Mutt’s comment to Jute, “you skull see” (17. 18), which prefaces his description of the mound. The “skull” houses the human reservoir of shared memory, which for Joyce is not separable from the transcendent mound.

The Akasic mound, like memory, is atemporal because it contains the repetitive patterns in human life and Nature, the patterns which survive the deterioration of time: “This ourth of years is not save brickdust and being humus the same roturns” (18. 4-5). Here, Joyce is advancing the idea that time, or the “years,” extinguishes individual identity and existence, but the patterns in human life remain unchanged, thereby giving each life a generalized tincture. This is why in the *Wake*, as Epstein contends (1982: 74), HCE and ALP are not individualized, but rather protean encapsulations of generalized man and woman. For Joyce, it is through the collective memory trace that “the same roturns” (returns), because the past is psychically resurrected in the present by means of memory. Atherton suggests (63) this mental eternal recurrence corresponds to the recurring patterns in Nature exemplified in the *Wake* by Quinet’s flora, the “cornflowers” (14.36) which “have quadrilled across the

centuries” (15. 9-10) epitomizing “immortality,” that is, Nature’s seeming permanence in the face of time. It is the “brickdust,” the artistic edifices which are created by human endeavor, that “rotturns,” for the *Wake* itself repeats the panorama of the past of human experience through the paradigmatic primal man, HCE.

It is in the past man searches not only for his common identity, but also for his origin, as Stephen’s explorations on Sandymount Strand make clear in the “Proteus” chapter of *Ulysses*. The *omphalos* (umbilicus) is Joyce’s communicative trope connecting past to present. In the *Wake*, it reappears in the Akasic mound signifying linkage with the transcendent first cause, which precipitates all existence. Here, Joyce suggests that the first cause is Mind or racial memory accessed by means of mental illumination by the reference to “Head-in-Clouds” (18. 23), or Buddha’s (M) enlightenment: “But with a rush out of his navel reaching the reredos of Ramasbatham” (18. 28-29).

In Book III of the *Wake*, Shaun the Postman is another Joycean time traveler, for like Stephen, he too begins his backward journey into the past psychically as a means of achieving cohesive identity. Specifically, it is in Book III, chapter iii of the *Wake* that the twice fallen Shaun, transposed into Yawn, and on the brink of becoming the archetypal father, assumes the supine position of HCE, symbolizing his merger with the father, and therefore, his own conversion into the mound as the Four Old Men detect: “This same prehistoric barrow ’tis, the orangery” (477. 36). Transtemporal connection with Shaun’s “Edenville,” or source of origin, as the Four Old Men discover, is represented by the umbilical attachment to Vishnu, that is, Brahman, the creative source of life: “His bellyvoid of nebuloise with his neverstop navel” (475. 13-14). Hence, the common denominator of human existence physically linking one generation to another, the navel cord, is textually

reinvested by Joyce with transcendent overtones: it links Shaun after his crossover into HCE with one of his seminal avatars, Vishnu.

Joyce establishes that the Akasic mound, as well as being interchangeable with the mind of man, is also synonymous with the Wakean midden, or rubbish heap, because both contain the detritus of the past, the deterioration augmented by the passage of time:

What a mnice old mness it all mnakes! A middenhide hoard of objects! Olives, beets, kimmells, dollies, alfrids, beatties, cormacks and daltons. Owlets' eegs (O stoop to please!) are here, creakish from age and all now quite epsilene, and oldwolldy wobblewers, haudworth a wipe o grass. Sss! See the snake wurrums everyside! Our durlbin is sworming in sneaks. They came to our island from triangular Toucheaterre beyond the wet prairie rared up in the midst of the cargon of prohibitive pomefructs but along landed Paddy Wippingham and the his garbagecans cotched the creeps of them pricker than our whosethere outofman could quick up her whatsthats.
(19. 7-18)

Joyce's "heterotopia" of "objects" is syntactically askew because we are still in his space book. However, they are symbolically and mnemonically relational, since the midden/mound contains the beginning series of alphabetical lexical signs conveyed through aural metaphors, and the beginning of evolutionary life represented by the "eegs" (eggs). Joyce's inclusion of the "sneaks" (snakes) in the midden/mound is seminal, because their appearance is followed by an inert narrative coda. Here, in space, the "sneaks" (snakes), with their relevance to Irish history contextually suspended, await activation through narrative, which is only possible in time. Therefore, they lie dormant until the arrival of Wakean textual time, signaling that the Akasic mound is also the reservoir of narrative history.

Joyce now advances the notion that the mound is the storehouse of the stories of mankind. This section adumbrates the appearance of the *Wake* itself in the mound, as the

“letter” excavated from the midden by the hen (111. 5-9). Moreover, it is fitting that the narrative coda entails the story of the expulsion of the “sneaks” from Ireland by the arrival of Saint Patrick, or in Wakean terminology, “Paddy Wippingham,” whose mission was to convert the pagan Irish. In Book III, the Akasic mound’s eruption spews forth the bloody history of Ireland, a history entrenched in religious persecution.

It is also appropriate that the narrative concerns Saint Patrick, because in the *Wake* itself he becomes the champion of artists by his defense of the visible world against the Platonic Druid: “all too many much illusiones through photoprismic velamina of hueful panepiphanal world spectacurum of Lord Joss, the of which zoantholitic furniture, from mineral through vegetal to animal, not appear to full up together fallen man than under but one photoreflexion of the several iridals gradationes of solar light” (611. 12-17). The idealist position of Plato and Berleley that the world as we comprehend it is mere illusion, “too many much illusiones,” is undermined in this passage by Joyce’s inclusion of the solidifying taxonomic divisions, “mineral through vegetal to animal” — the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms, which are the concrete investitures of objective reality. The “furniture” of the world made possible by the sun, “solar light,” is the world, the subject that, Joyce spent all his life describing. Joyce makes his position clear in his letter to Frank Budgen: “Much more is intended in the colloquy between Berkeley the arch druid and his pidgin speech and Patrick the [?] and his Nippon English. It is also the defense and indictment of the book itself, B’s theory of colours and Patrick’s practical solution of the problem” (1. 406-407).

Joyce specifically connects the midden with the *Wake* by means of the action of the hen. When Belinda the hen digging on the same midden unearths its contents, one of the

most significant findings is the “letter”:

The bird in the case was Belinda of the Dorans, a more than quinquagintarian...and what she was scratching at the hour of klokking twelve looked for all this zogzag world like a goodish-sized sheet of letterpaper originating by transhipment from Boston (Mass.)...The stain, and that a teastain (the overcautelousness of the masterbilker here, as usual, signing the page away), marked it off on the spout of the moment as a genuine relique of ancient Irish pleasant pottery.... (111. 5-6, 7-9, 20-23)

The “letter” represents all transmitted texts, and hence the *Wake* itself; as Atherton states, “The letter stands as a symbol for all attempts at written communication including all other letters, all the world’s literature, *The Book of Kells*, all manuscripts, all the sacred books of the world, and also *Finnegans Wake* itself” (62-63). The letter is the *Wake* by which Joyce concretizes the past through the permanence of art. The *Wake* simulates the Akasic Records because it is all-inclusive and indelible, like the investiture of the memory trace evoked in shared memory. The characters are emitted from the textual memory in all their varied manifestations counterpointing the unconscious processes which are released during memory retrieval. The characters are one with the *Wake*; the sound of the river Liffey, or Anna Livia Plurabelle, contains the song about her husband, Haveth Childers Everywhere (201). This song is transcribed by Shem the Penman, who is, as Epstein has established, the lower part of the male body, and as such represents the creative principle. The song is transmitted by Shaun the Postman, the upper part of the body who makes objective communication possible by mouth and hand delivery, “I lerryn Anna Livia’s cushingloo, that was writ by one and rede by two and trouved by a poule in the parco!” (200-201. 36, 1-2).

The early fraternal crossover of Hilary and Tristopher in the “Prankquean” fable is repeated again and again in the *Wake*. It is repeated in the “Mookse and Gripes” fable

elementally through their transformation into the tree and stone, and quasi-naturalistically through the brothers' geometry lesson in Book II, chapter ii. It is a necessary prelude to Book III, iii, in which Shaun becomes the father not by any physical indicator of "beard and inches" (1904: 60), but psychically, after his psycho-sexual integration, and mirrored through the metempsychotic upsurges of HCE's collective memory. Its textual counterpart is the Akasic mound, where Shaun is incorporated into the archetypal schema of primal father. Here Joyce objectifies the inwardness of existence to show how the psychic patterns link past and present generations and are unchanging.

The Mookse and the Gripes, positioned on opposite sides of the river, further symbolize the fraternal chasm that exists in the *Wake* conveyed by the Cartesian mind-body dichotomy. Epstein interprets the Mookse as an incomplete male creature, and the Gripes as his "genitals," which are "hanging downward from a limb" (1982: 89). In the spatial mode, Joyce posits that integration is only possible in time. This is why the maternal "woman," ALP in her aspect as the river of time, carries the two away: "Then there came down to the thither bank a woman of no appearance... and she gathered up his hoariness the Mookse.... And there came down to the hither bank a woman to all important...she plucked down the Gripes, torn panicky autotone, in angeu from his limb and cariad away its beotitubes with her..." (158. 25-27, 31-32, 34-36). ALP combines them by changing them into a tree and a stone, "And there were left now an only elmtree and but a stone" (159. 3-4), which represents not only anatomical union, but elemental counterbalancing, for the tree is rooted in the earth, and after temporal decomposition becomes fossilized coal, or stone.

In Book II, ii, Shem and Shaun cross over during the exercise in Euclidian geometry, wherein Shaun is invested with carnal knowledge, leaving behind the universal innocence of

childhood, while gaining the inevitable and inescapable compensatory knowledge that signifies the pathway to adulthood. Hence, this section becomes the segue into the transference of Shaun into HCE in Book III, iii. In the temporal mode of Joyce's quasi-naturalistic "Night Lessons" section of Book II, ii, the anatomical lesson learned is not one of male disarticulation; rather, it entails Shaun's initiation into knowledge of female sexuality.

Appropriately, since the focus is a homework lesson, Shem and Shaun, the ur-fraternal pair in the *Wake*, are presented as being diametrically opposed. Joyce assigns Shem and Shaun the respective left and right hand margins of his text as he explained in his letter to Budgen: "the technique here is a reproduction of a schoolboy's (and schoolgirl's) old classbook complete with marginalia by the twins, who change sides at half time, footnotes by the girl (who doesn't), a Euclid diagram, funny drawings etc. It was like that in the Ur of the Chaldees too, I daresay" (1. 406). Through Shem and Shaun's actual textual incorporation, Joyce has Shem demonstrate, "Quef!" (298. 5), or "Q.E.D." (Tindall 1969: 181), the actual crossover during the study of the symbolic geometry lesson wherein Joyce proves the twins are "a daintical pair of accomplashes!" (295. 26-27). Here the Cartesian mind-body dichotomy is overcome in Joyce's temporal book by Cartesian spatial measure through Shaun's drawing of a line in space "— you must, how, in undivided reawliity draw the line somewhawre" (292. 31-32).

The transposition signals the merger of the brothers, because both sides of an equilateral triangle correspond, so changing sides does not matter since the equation is the same — both are equal. In addition, Shem's problem-solving help given to his mathematically challenged brother is only to dupe him into drawing two interconnecting equilateral triangles because they resemble the mother's genitals if viewed from below (293).

This figuration symbolizes ALP, who is the “delta of [the] river” (M 293). Hence, ALP is the river, textually and temporally: “A is for Anna like L is for liv. Aha hahah, Ante Ann you’re apt to ape aunty annalive! Dawn gives rise. Lo, lo, lives, love! Eve take fall” (293. 18-21). With this guilty knowledge, Shaun is on the way to becoming the archetypal father in Book III, iii of the *Wake*. Shaun has been integrated into knowledge, and initiated into adult matters by his brother. The influence of carnal knowledge — for which Shaun thanks Shem, “Thanks eversore much, Pointcarried!” (304. 5) — is acquired in time, whose representative in the *Wake* is ALP.

Shaun’s gratitude is extended a second time, but this time in a transcendent context: “As I was saying, while retorting thanks, you make me a reborn of the cards” (304. 26-28). Joyce’s inclusion of the idea of rebirth here is established in conjunction with his references to Yeats’ *A Vision* (M): “When I’m dreaming back like that I begins to see we’re only all telescopes” (295. 10-12). A reference to the Theosophist Daniel Dunlop (M) — “dunloop” (295. 32) — foreshadows the metempsychotic channeling that occurs between Shaun and HCE auguring the rebirth of son into father as the contents of the Akasic mound are revealed in Book III, iii. For Joyce our minds are “all telescopes” psychically viewing the past through the indelible collective memory trace.

Like Molly in *Ulysses*, HCE sleeps through most of the Wakean night. However, his sleep is uneasy. Someone haunts his dreams: “And as I was jogging along in a dream as dozing I was dawdling, arrah, methought broadtone was heard and the creepers and the gliders and flivvers of the earth breath and the dancetongues of the woodfires and the hummers in their ground all vociferated echoating: Shaun! Shaun! Post the post!” (404. 3-7). This quasi-naturalistic frame of the sleeping dreamer permits Joyce to depict the psychic

patterns wherein the son becomes the father representing the power shift in the archetypal family. Just like the “Circe” chapter in *Ulysses*, Book III of the *Wake* begins at midnight: “Tolv two elf kater ten (it can’t be sax” (403. 2) and “I heard at zero hour as ’twere the peal of vixen’s laughter among midnight’s chimes from out the belfry of the cute old speckled church tolling” (403. 19-22). These time references signal a transition into a cognate reality, sleep, where the darkness of the night mirrors the dark recesses of the unconscious. HCE’s somnambulistic uneasiness is a psychic remnant from Book II and a presentiment of what is to occur.

HCE’s uneasiness is suggested in Book II, iii, as his unconscious universal fears slowly filter to the surface: “and all he bares sobsconscious inklings shadowed on soulskin” (377. 27-28), as induced by Joyce’s overlaying of the radio and television broadcasts.

HCE, in his quasi-naturalistic role as publican, turns on first the radio:

[the] high fidelity daidialler, as modern as tomorrow afternoon...equipped with supershielded umbrella antennas for distance getting and connected by the magnetic links of a Bellini-Tosti coupling system with a vitaltone speaker, capable of capturing skybuddies, harbour craft emittences, key clickings, vaticum cleaners...the howle harnshack and wobble down in an eliminium sounds pound so as to serve him up a melegoturny marygoraumd, eelectrically filtered for allirish earths and ohmes. (309-310. 14-15, 17-21, 22-24, 1)

HCE’s commonplace gesture of tuning into the “eelectrically” (eclectic) “filtered” voices, turning on the radio, counterpoints the Four Old Men’s “starchamber quiry” (475. 18-19) into the Akasic mound, which resembles tapping into a radio, albeit a transcendent one, because they unleash the voices of the past of all Irish history. HCE’s pub also contains a television: “With her banbax hoist from holder, zig for zag through pool and polder, cheap, cheap, cheap and Laughing Jack, all augurs scorenning, see the Bolche your pictures motion

and Kitzy Kleinsuessmein eloping for that holm in Finn's Hotel" (330. 21-24). Joyce's inclusion of the television in his time book signifies the persistence of vision of human consciousness, and mirrors "the movie-in-the-brain," the ideation process, the core of memory. Joyce in a letter to Miss Weaver discusses the similarity of the two modes: "whenever I am obliged to lie with my eyes closed I see a cinematograph going on and on and it brings back to my memory things I had almost forgotten" (1. 216).

The broadcasted stories contain the ancient collective memories of family life, which for Joyce are ones of establishment and disestablishment. Some parts of the text describe the establishment of the family: the "Norweeger's capstan" (311. 9) and the "toyley" (311. 6), "Kersse" (311. 7), or, the "Norwegian captain and the tailor Kersse." Other parts, such as "Bud Budderly.... The man that shunned the rucks on Gereland" (337. 32, 33-34), or "Buckley and the Russian General" and "Emancipator" (342. 19), augur the demise of HCE. The broadcasts are symbolic of his uneasy fears about his children destroying him (373-380). In one instance, Joyce has HCE's fall from power represented through the Passion archetype: "And, hike, here's the hearse and four horses with the interprovincial crucifixioners throwing lots inside to know whose to be their gosson and whereas to brake the news to morhor" (377. 23-25).

Since in the Christian schema the Passion always precedes the resurrection, this is a seminal inclusion, a major theme in the *Wake*. Joyce uses the Christian trope as a transitioning for Shaun, "[m]y heaviest crux" (409. 17-18), to be reborn as the father, since the mystery of the Church is based upon the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son. In the *Wake*, Joyce answers the question Stephen posed in the "Proteus" chapter: "Is that then the divine substance wherein Father and Son are consubstantial?" (3. 49-50), not through a

theological argument, but by means of the textual simulation of metempsychotic upsurges of avatars and archetypes that surface representing the indelible trace of aboriginal existence inherent in collective memory. This is why for Joyce the Great Memory “is greater and more generous than our memory, [where] no life, no moment of exaltation is ever lost” (1902: 83). Hence, both HCE and Shaun psychically contain Christ as avatar. In a letter to Miss Weaver, Joyce explicitly outlines his technique of utilizing the Stations of the Cross, which by association represent Shaun as a Christ-figure: “Shawn... is a description of a postman travelling backwards in the night through the events already narrated. It is written in the form of a *via crucis* of 14 stations but in reality it is only a barrel rolling down the river Liffey” (1. 214).

Joyce again relies on an animate trope, the fish, with its Christian enhanced symbolism as representing Christ: “And thanking the fish, in core of them” (377. 30), in conjunction with the nominally symbolic Four Old Men as gospels: “Mr Justician Matthews and Mr Justician Marks and Mr Justician Luk de Luc and Mr Justinian Johnston-Johnson” (377. 31-33), where they posit the consubstantial relationship between father and son. Later, the Four Old Men discover Shaun as the new father in the Akasic mound, and Joyce specifically links the fish trope with Shaun when the four are unsuccessful in catching him: “As sanctioned for his salmenbog by the Councillors-om-Trent” (531. 2-3). In addition, Joyce uses Christ’s attendant animal, the donkey, in association with Shaun, albeit in an adversarial relationship, “but I, poor ass, am but as their fourpart tinckler’s dunkey” (405. 6-7) as Shaun awaits his new role.

It is in the third book of the *Wake*, that Shaun is psychically transformed into HCE, that is, a husband and father. Joyce renders the power shift in the family through the

collective psyche of mound and man. Shaun is Joyce's symbolic postman delivering mail, or the "letter" at night. His "backward" movement corresponds to the way memory is retrieved, because memory is always accessed by a backward descent into the past. Hence, the message he delivers is mnemonic. Like Jung and Nietzsche, Joyce suggests that it is through dream, one pathway into the collective unconscious, that individuals are able to reconnect with mythic patterns. In Book III, chapter i, Shaun emerges from the "allmurk" (404. 10) darkness of HCE's unconscious against the backdrop of the aging couple, HCE and ALP, lying in bed in the "gleam darkling" (404. 1), or gleaming darkness of the night. HCE's dreamscape is likened to, "[w]hite fogbow spans. The arch embattled" (403. 6), indicating that this is not Joyce's rainbow inspired world of color, of fallen man, for the "arch" of the rainbow is "embattled" by the "fogbow" the concealed realm of the transcendent revealed in dream, where the temporal and eternal transect. Amid the "high voice" (404. 8) calling to him in the wood, "vociferated echoing : Shaun! Shaun!" (404. 7), he appears with "his belted lamp" (404. 13) like "a will of a wisp" (404. 15).

Nature and mankind are dissociated due to human consciousness and man's transient condition. Nature represents the primal power of incessant generation, eternal fecundity. Joyce depicts this adversarial relationship by means of HCE's dreamscape, since his waning physical powers, inescapable with the universal aging process, are translated into fear of Nature's evil: "He has becco of wild hindigan. Ho, he hath hornhide!" (403. 13-14). The threatening "becco," beak, shows that we are observing a "dreamwork" in progress, one which underscores HCE's psychic trepidation.

Shaun's emergence from the woods, HCE's enemy territory, in conjunction with "his belted lamp" analogically rendered as "a will of a wisp," or a will-o'-the-wisp, links Shaun

symbolically with Joyce's seminal symbol, the mountain or mound, the site of HCE's supersession in the *Wake*. In the "Circe" chapter of *Ulysses*, a "will-o'-the-wisp" (15. 3) is the Goethean trope which lights the way to the *Walpurgisnacht* on the mountain, the rite which celebrates sexual abandon in spring, the season designating rebirth. It appears in the *Wake*, as "Wallpurgies!" (530. 31) after Shaun's transformation, further indicating the universality of the Joycean trope. The mountain or mound is Joyce's symbol of physical and transcendent juncture. Shaun's transformation into Joyce's all-revealing Akasic mound occurs metempsychotically, by means of the various manifestations of primal avatars translated into the language of symbol that erupt endlessly from the universe's memory, which is one and the same as Shaun's — he contains: "the map of the souls' groupography" (476. 33).

Shaun repeats the HCE paradigm of fallen man in collective memory. He falls into the river twice; first he "falls, with corks, staves and treeleaves and more bubbles to his keelrow" (427. 2-3), but his next fall precipitates a resurrection, "But, boy, you did your strong nine furlong mile in slick and slapstick record time and a farfetched deed it was in troth, champion docile, with your high bouncing gait of going and your feat of passage will be contested with you and through you, for centuries to come" (473. 12-16). This fall is cloaked in futuristic language, suggesting not only that it will be memorable "for centuries to come," but memorable because it anticipates an immediate rise: "The phaynix rose a sun before Erebia sank" (473. 16). As "Jaunty Jaun" (429.1), in his role as deconstructionalistic chaplain, Shaun is chromatically linked to the sun (*jaune* = yellow in French), so Joyce's analogy of him with the "phaynix" or phoenix is fitting, since both mythic bird and sun perpetually rise and fall. Later, as the Four Old Men observe, Shaun, theologically and

elementally is subsumed into the sun: “— Dawncing the kniejjinsky choreopiscopally like an easter sun round the colander” (513. 11-12). Here, Shaun as the sun will rise in the east as ALP’s new husband: “The west shall shake the east awake. Walk while ye have the night for morn, lightbreakfastbringer, morroweth whereon every past shall full fost sleep” (473. 22-24), “continuator” of the recurrent pattern which sustains life.

Shaun’s third fall as “Yawn” is the most significant, because it encapsulates Joyce’s theories about the microcosm and shared universal memory, “Lowly, longly, a wail went forth. Pure Yawn lay low. On the mead of the hillock lay, heartsoul dormant mid shadowed landshape, brief wallet to his side, and arm loose, by his staff of citron briar, tradition stick-pass-on. His dream monologue was over, of cause, but his drama parapolylogic had yet to be, affact” (474. 1-5) As fallen man from the east, Shaun corresponds to Adam Kadmon of Kabbalistic tradition. “Kadmon” means “from the east” in Hebrew. God made Adam and the universe in the form of man, simultaneously, but after the fall Adam diminished into human size. The only marginal connection that remained between macrocosm and microcosm is memory. The vestige of the macrocosm, or the core of the universe must be revealed from within each human being. Shaun, in his transformation into Yawn, becomes the Hill of Howth, or the Akasic mound, and as such contains the memory of the history of the universe.

Shaun contains this universe as the Four Old Men learn:

There would he lay till they would him descry, spancellor
 down upon a blossomy bed, at one foule stretch, amongst the
 daffydowndillies, the flowers of narcosis fourfettering his
 footlights, a halohedge of wild spuds hovering over him,
 epicures waltzing with gardenfillers, puritan shoots advancing
 to Aran chiefs. Phopho!! The meteor pulp of him, the

seamless rainbowpeel. Aggala!!!! His bellyvoid of nebulose

with his neverstop navel. Paloola!!!!!! And his veins shooting melanite phosphor, his creamtostard cometshair and his asteroid knuckles, ribs and members.... (475. 7-16)

Shaun contains the astronomical wonders of the heavens: the Four Old Men, awestruck, see all the stars in him. This correspondence between macrocosm and microcosm was suggested in Shaun's role as "fargazer" (143. 26), during Shem's quiz, I, vi, about what Shaun sees in bed while contemplating the universe, within and without. Shaun's answer that the patterns in man and the universe repeat an infinite number of times applies here as well through the archetypal paradigms.

Shaun also has a share in the Vishnu avatar: "his bellyvoid of nebuloze with his neverstop navel" (475. 13-14) like his father before him. Vishnu created the universe, and as creator he symbolizes the generating life force, the physical aspect of fatherhood. Moreover, Hart interprets Shaun's relationship to Vishnu as phallic-centered: "Shaun's navel, like that of Vishnu, is as much a center of generation as is Shem's lifewand, and becomes confused with his phallus throughout III. 3. The lascivious and perverted Four are in fact involved in producing an erection from the lethargic Shaun..." (138). Joyce textually simulates the primal inchoate first day (502), followed by the creation of the biblical ur-couple: "Now do you know the wellknown kikkn midden where the illassorted first couple first met with each other?" (503. 8-9), to indicate that the Akasic mound contains the memory of the origin of all life.

Shaun/Yawn eventually merges with his father, and it is revealed that he is his father HCE, all over again. At the core of the mound is HCE, with all his guilt, although mistakenly convinced of his innocence: "I am as cleanliving as could be and that my game was a fair average since I perpetually kept my ouija ouija wicket up. On my verawife I never

was nor can afford to be guilty of crim crig con of malfeasance trespass against parson with the person of a youthful gigirl frifrif friend...” (532.16-20). Hence, HCE is at the heart of Shaun, and he is resurrected in his son by their shared participation in Great Memory. The shift of power in the family occurs metempsychotically, and the voice of the past lives on through shared memory.

There is a complex attempt at opening a line of communication into Ireland’s past, by disembodied voice, “as the lofty marconimasts from Clifden sough open tireless secrets (mauveport! mauveport!) to Nova Scotia’s listing sisterwands. Tubetube!” (407. 20-22). Marconi’s (M) telegraph anticipates the transcendent channeling into the Akasic mound. Shaun has been transformed into the psychic link to Ireland’s past. Shaun/Yawn incorporates the panorama of the history of Ireland from its mythological inception in ancient times: “One half of him in Conn’s half but the whole of him nevertheless in Owenmore’s five quarters” (475. 6-7). Using the Akasic-mound trope, which Joyce has established as synonymous with man’s collective memory, Joyce channels the voices of Ireland’s past into the present analogically, using the sudden eruption of the projectile stream of lava to correspond to the unexpected ascent of involuntary collective memory into an individual’s field of ideation. Hence, textually and mentally, Ireland’s prehistory and history become a living vital articulation of the past of human experience: “ — History as her is harped” (486. 6). Epstein, in his analysis of Joyce’s views about history, shows that Joyce was not interested in presenting academic history disconnected from the tears and blood and pain of the human condition:

In Book III, chapter 3, the Four Old Men hold an inquiry on (literally) fallen Man. Fallen Yawn contains all the past of Ireland and of the world within him, but all the Four Old Men can do is to ask feeble questions to which they receive

doubtful and evasive answers. Occasionally they get much more than they bargain for: at one point all the anguish of Irish history bursts out at them, raw and flaming, like a stream of lava accidentally released by careless miners (*FW*, 499-501). The screams of terror of Irish peasants run down and slaughtered by Cromwell and the yeomen, the terrible sincerity of Swift's, Parnell's, Tristan's cries from beyond the grave that they were true and betrayed, the call to Patrick from the people of Ireland and the cry of his heart in response, all of these seem to be random noise to the four worthless old pedants, and they tune it out, anxious only to get the bare facts. (1974: 26-27)

Through the outburst of the dreadful collective memory of Irish history, Joyce consolidates the fraternal conflict between Shem and Shaun into the Irish Civil War, which eventually led to partial independence (M): "dear dogmestic Shaun, as we point out how you have while away painted our town a wearing greenridinghued" (411. 23-24), with the pattern being repeated an infinite number of times: "And I am afraid it wouldn't be my first coat's wasting" (411. 30-31). The repressive paternal archetype manifested in the *Wake* by HCE is transformed into Ireland's nationalistic struggle against Viking and English invaders who inhibit Ireland's establishment of nationhood. So too in the Akasic mound does the Joycean archetypal animal reappear. The dog in the "Proteus" chapter of *Ulysses*, Tatters, has a Celtic mythic canine predecessor, "Bran," Finn MacCool's dog, who emerges from the mound of memory in a similar watery context: "— I ahear of a hopper behidin the door slappin his feet in a pool of bran" (486. 30-31). Perhaps Joyce is suggesting here that this mythic canine "behidin the door," hiding behind the "door" of memory, is urinating on the same "protean" beach as the "mongrel" Tatters did, beside the eternal recurring waves of Father Ocean, the "polyfizzyboisterous seas" (547. 24-25).

For Joyce, much of the memory of history, and especially the history of Ireland, is

poignant suffering; the reply from the mound indicates “Name yur historical grouns” (477. 35) or groans, as the Four Old Men begin their excavation into the Akasic mound. Later, one of the four thinks he detects a sound buried within the recesses of the mound, “Was that a groan” (499. 28). The “groan” resonating from the depths of the memory mound “— *Tris tris a ni ma mea!*” (499. 30) are the words of Christ as they appear according to Matthew’s Gospel — “my soul is sad even unto death” (M 499), when Christ predicted the betrayal by his disciples in the Garden of Gethsemane. The words are appropriately placed, since Joyce by means of the mound in this section is telescoping the Gethsemane of the Irish people, and one of its great leaders in particular, Charles Stewart Parnell.

For Joyce, Parnell’s political career is subsumed in Gethsemane, in the Christ archetype. In Joyce’s early essay “The Shade of Parnell,” he specifically makes the association: “The melancholy which invaded his mind was perhaps the profound conviction that, in his hour of need, one of the disciples who dipped his hand in the same bowl with him would betray him. That he fought to the very end with this desolate certainty in mind is his greatest claim to nobility” (1912: 228). Parnell’s public career follows the Christ paradigm, because like Christ, he was betrayed, and the voice of public opinion turned against him resulting in his ignominious end. Fairhall succinctly sums up Parnell’s fall:

The uncontested verdict against him and Mrs. O’Shea in her husband’s divorce suit aroused the puritanism of the English Protestant Dissenters.... In response to their pressure, the inconstant Gladstone demanded Parnell’s resignation as the price of another Home Rule Bill. The vast cowardly majority of the Irish Party turned on their leader. The Church, living up to its long history of sabotaging the nationalist cause, joined Parnell’s betrayers in waging electoral war against him and driving him into his grave. (127-128)

The Gethsemane of Irish memory resounds from the mound with the voice of the past

naming the first of Ireland's invaders, the Vikings, or " — Dovegall" (500. 4), the Danes (M). It wails of the English atrocities of Oliver Cromwell:

— ... Cromwell to victory!
 — We'll gore them and gash them and gun them and gloat on
 them. (500. 6-8)

The voice of collective memory reveals England's brutality, degradation and religious persecution of the Irish: " — Slog slagt and slughter! Rape the daughter! Choke the pope!" (500. 17-18). It succinctly epitomizes the sorrow and human cost, " — O, widows and orphans" (500. 10). It contains eighteenth century Ireland's literary English champion, Jonathan Swift, " — Pipette dear! Us! Us! Me! Me!" (500. 23). Joyce himself, and his fictionalized counterpart Stephen Dedalus, as indecisive apostates can also be heard, " — O! Mother of my tears! Believe for me! Fold thy son!" (500. 33). The stokes of the whip resonate as the bloodthirsty "yeomen" (500. 10) disembowel the young Irish rebel, the "Croppoy Boy" of the 1798 Rebellion (Gifford and Seidman, 293). And since Joyce implied in his short stories, "Ivy Day in the Committee Room" and "The Dead," that absence is the greatest form of presence, one hears the whipping tongues who betrayed Ireland's "uncrowned king," Parnell, set against his lone, but loyal voice, " — When you sell get my price!" (500. 30), the "price" being Home Rule for Ireland. The memory of the deepest emotions of the bloodsoaked history of Ireland comes out in this powerful section.

Finnegans Wake is the sustained epiphany of the unity of the collective being of the human race. James Joyce concretizes the collective mental field of vision by means of the Akasic mound, which is interchangeable with human and Wakean shared memory. It is through the metempsychotic upsurges of the timeless patterns of existence that Joyce renders

the power shift in the primal family, as Shaun psychically transforms into HCE. Moreover, Joyce resurrects the history of Ireland from the memory mound to prove that the collective memory of the past is not static but comes dynamically alive in the present through *Finnegans Wake*.

Conclusion

In *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, Stephen Dedalus' diary entry for April the 6th reads in part: "The past is consumed in the present and the present is living only because it brings forth the future" (344). This sentence epitomizes the young artist's creator's conception of time and memory: temporal and atemporal reference expressed through an objectification of a character's interiority, the core of selfhood and establisher of identity, dominate Joyce's works. The memory that infuses the Joycean character is both autobiographical and transpersonal; its field of ideation is not limited to just individualized experience accrued from one's personal past, but incorporates the panorama of the history and prehistory of the human race. For Joyce, essence precedes existence, and the essence of human life is manifested by means of the vestige of shared memory. Fictively, Joyce creates the illusion of a metempsychotic link in his character's mindscape to suggest the mingling of identities to unite the past and present by means of psychic patterning. This mindscape is the crystal prism. It is, for Joyce, the spectrum of individual and aboriginal identity.

First, in order to explore Joyce's construction of a character's conscious and unconscious processes, I have built a referential framework drawing on works in mental science, Theosophy, and Eastern and Western philosophy to illuminate Joyce's ideas about time, space, autobiographical and Great memory, and human identity. Joyce's fictive formation of consciousness parallels Damasio's neuropsychological hypothesis, in that both focus on the uniqueness of the individual receptor's experiential intake of perceptual reality in relation to the ideational process. Without subjective awareness and retention through autobiographical memory, which is possible only by means of a time sense, perceptual experience would be non-relational. In addition, both Joyce and Damasio analogically view

the ideation process through cinematography, which in *Finnegans Wake* becomes a key indicator of the beginning of time through the movie projector. Therefore, HCE apprehends experience only in and through the temporal sense.

Joyce's objectification of a character's interior monologue has affinities to William James' conceptualization of consciousness, since James views consciousness, not as a static entity, but as a "stream" due to its capacity to comprehend the temporal distinction of past and future while existing in the capricious present. All Joyce's characters are immersed in a "sentient environment," — which provides the building blocks of autobiographical memory. James asserts the importance of sensation, because it is this register of objective reality that leads to our perceptual awareness of the objective world, and enables us to encode data in memory, making later retrieval possible.

Joyce's presentation of a character's experience of time, chronological and durational, and his exploration of consciousness' perceptual differentiation of spatial and temporal register are elucidated by Bergson's theories concerning duration — that is, the collapse of chronological awareness when experiencing the seeming timeless quality of involuntary memory in reinvoking the past by means of our "intuition" of time. Bergson's distinction between habitual memory and involuntary memory informs Joyce's treatment of a character's quotidian existence in Ireland and his involuntary memory, the catalyst for the release of buried memory, the gateway into a character's unconscious.

Joyce's simulation of unconscious processes within his characters' mindstreams resembles Freud and Jung's conceptualizations about the working of the unconscious. Freud's ideas about the unconscious as a decisive factor in identity formation, and his theories about repression and its various manifestations of expression in dream and in

conscious life, reflect Joyce's fictive exploration of the effect of the unconscious in delineating a character's buried life and identity. Joyce's treatment of transpersonal memory parallels Jung's theorization about Collective Memory, and its articulation by means of archetypal patterning and symbolic expression. Joyce, like Jung, posits both a personal and collective unconscious.

Joyce's ideas about "Great Memory" or transpersonal memory are also found in Theosophy, and in Western and Eastern philosophy. Yeats' Theosophical conception of the "Great Memory" and an individual's ability to participate psychically in shared memory is intrinsic to Joyce's construction of a character's aboriginal identity; Madame Blavatsky's discussion of the Akasic Records, as the reservoir of the past of everything, is crucial to an understanding of Joyce's treatment of collective memory, especially in *Finnegans Wake*. Joyce's use of innate memory and metempsychosis resembles Pythagoras and Plato's ideas about the immortality of the soul or mind. These ideas are also prevalent in Eastern philosophy, and their analogical expression through the processes of Nature might have influenced Joyce's portrayal of this abstract concept, especially in the *Wake*.

Dubliners represents Joyce's first extensive experimentation with ideas about autobiographical memory and Great Memory, and their interplay within a character's mindscape. By means of a character's interiority, Joyce posits that identity can only be understood in the context of a character's autobiographical and collective past accessed through personal and shared memory. Joyce's early essay "James Clarence Mangan" provides a seminal interpretative schema, for it elucidates his views about "Great Memory" as being all-inclusive, in distinction to autobiographical memory, which is personal and subjective and therefore limiting. For most of the characters leading a drab Dublin existence

in their fictive present, autobiographical memory of what once was induces feelings of sadness, as Freud discussed in his work on the effects of loss leading to melancholia. However, Joyce by his incorporation of moments of transpersonal involuntary memory in his characters' interior monologues advances his view that his characters unconsciously participate in psychic proto-patterns fundamental to human existence. These psychic patterns become the defining context of identity in *Dubliners* and in his later works. Outwardly, the characters participate in ritual, which are, however, devoid of the vital meaning they once held in the past. Nevertheless, for Joyce, they symbolize the connective links to the entire human past, for they are patterns and therefore outside time. Moreover, in his first three stories, which are about childhood recollection in *Dubliners*, Joyce establishes a generalized texture to universalize childhood experience by having his protagonists remain nameless, and by his limiting use of personal detail, which adumbrates his emphasis on the commonality of human life.

Dubliners is the groundwork for Joyce's formulation of memory. Joyce simulates the reactivation of buried memory, both autobiographical and transpersonal, by means of symbolic and imagistic perceptual cues, such as in "The Dead" when Gretta hears the song which is the catalyst for her involuntary memory of Michael Furey. Joyce's method of merging past time in the character's present memory field, and thereby creating the illusion of past experience recovered, parallels Damasio's theory of "metarepresentations" and Shattuck's view about the "stereoscopic" effect of memory, where the past and present coalesce by means of the similarity of the imagistic impression.

Stephen Dedalus develops into manhood in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, and attempts to become an artistic creator. Here Joyce formulates Stephen's

autobiographical and transpersonal memory. I have treated Joyce's construction of Stephen's autobiographical memory in relation to Damasio's study of consciousness, especially Damasio's conception about the importance of selfhood that makes autobiographical memory possible. I interpret Stephen's search for identity through Joyce's early essay, "A Portrait of the Artist," which adumbrates Joyce's treatment of temporal and transcendent reality as they impact the psychic growth of Stephen as man and budding artist in the novel. Joyce fictively encodes autobiographical memory into Stephen's mindstream through the character's sensitivity to and experience of the sensual world. This encoding conjoined with Joyce's incorporation of an a priori innate memory trace into Stephen's interior monologue makes possible the later retrieval of personal and generic memories.

In addition to the upthrusts of involuntary shared memory occurring in Stephen's mindscape, Joyce posits a transcendent dimension to existence by paralleling Stephen's physical growth with the development of his soul. This introduces a metaphysical dimension to the protagonist's formation, and suggests his participation in a greater reality. The soul is a decisive factor for Stephen in establishing his theory of artistic creation, and surmounting its theological implications as being in conflict to the physical by his ultimately seeing it, not as an obstacle to physical existence, but as necessary means toward integration into life.

In *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, Stephen's attempt at establishing a unified sensibility proves futile. Joyce, in *Ulysses*, explicitly introduces the concept of the Akasic Records. My thesis advances the views of Gilbert and Rickard that the Akasic Records is seminal to Joyce's construction of shared memory. In *Ulysses*, Stephen realizes that memory is the key to psychological cohesion because it links individuals to the past, to the immutable and common patterns which give meaning to human existence. Hence, I have provided a

close reading of the “Proteus” chapter of *Ulysses*, in which I trace how Stephen’s contemplation of the primal material of the universe — its relation to space, time, and source of mankind’s origin, is crucial to Joyce’s construction of Great Memory in *Ulysses*. Joyce viewed history as a cyclical principle, as opposed to a linear one as defined by the old schoolmaster in the “Nestor” chapter. Stephen’s external actions on the beach and the objectification of his psychic processes reflects Joyce’s idea that generalized patterns are common to all human experience, and are manifested objectively by means of ritual, and expressed psychically through archetypal and symbolic expression.

Joyce simulates Leopold Bloom’s metempsychotic experiences, the traces of other lives remembered, as they relate to the recomposition of the past through the merging of archetypal identities in his character’s interior monologue, in many parts of *Ulysses*. In the “Circe” chapter, Joyce decenters Bloom’s rational processes in favor of objectifying the unconscious reenactment of the collective patterns inherent to shared memory. Joyce’s technique here adumbrates the sustained presentation of HCE’s unconscious in the *Wake*. Joyce explicitly introduces in “Circe” a Darwinian context to counterpoint his incorporation of a transcendent search for origin by means of metempsychosis, the missing link between the conscious and unconscious mind. Bloom’s wild and free “hallucinations” in “Circe” are to be understood as the archetypal resurgence of his generic identity. Joyce’s technique of mimicking the pictorial mode of ideation of Bloom’s unconscious, and thereby concretizing it textually, anticipates his method in the *Wake*, where by means of the Akasic-mound trope, interchangeable with HCE’s collective unconscious, Joyce substantiates the illusive and seemingly irrecoverable past.

Finnegans Wake is the summation of Joyce’s work on memory. The metempsychotic

upsurges of HCE's racial memory, and their source in the Akasic mound trope mirror the evolution and devolution of life endemic to all existence. Joyce presents primal patterning through HCE's unconscious, and his fictive recreation of the Akasic Records, the Akasic mound of Wakean memory, which contains the "countlessness of livestories" of the human past. The "Willingdone" and "Prankquean" fables articulate Joyce's two major recurring themes, the respective disestablishment and establishment of family life, which is the nucleus of all the Joyce's texts, and the recurring story of all human life. I have analyzed Joyce's spatial and temporal structuring of the *Wake* as the two modalities relate to the formation of proto-consciousness and the processes of ideation and memory retrieval.

In *Finnegans Wake*, Joyce recomposes human identity by abandoning an "individuating rhythm" in exchange for "some process of mind" now tabulated by his indelible transcription of Great Memory. I have explored Joyce's paradigmatic patterning of establishment and disestablishment by means of his psychic presentation of the power shift in the family, when Shaun assumes the mantle of fatherhood from HCE through his textual incorporation into the Akasic mound in Book III of the *Wake*. I have also treated the patterns as they concern Joyce's recomposition of the memory of Irish history. Moreover, the *Wake* itself becomes the Akasa, as textually concretized.

Joyce's philosophy of human existence, simply the rise and fall of generations, is best expressed in the *Wake* by Muta:

So that when we shall have acquired unification we shall pass on to diversity and when we shall have passed on to diversity we shall have acquired the instinct of combat and when we shall have acquired the instinct of combat we shall pass back to the spirit of appeasement? (610. 23-27)

These words encapsulate what transpires in the *Wake*, and in all of Joyce's fiction: the "diversity" of individual existence over the ages is forever counterbalanced by the legacy of "unification," that is, the timeless commonalities of all human life expressed by the recurring patterns of conflict and harmony.

Works Cited

Primary Sources:

- Joyce, James. "James Clarence Mangan." (1902). In *The Critical Writings of James Joyce*. (1989). 73-83.
- . "A Portrait of the Artist." (1904). In *The Workshop of Daedalus: James Joyce and the Raw Materials for "A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man."* Eds. Robert Scholes and Richard M. Kain. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965.
- . "The Shade of Parnell." (1912). In *The Critical Writings of James Joyce*. (1989). 223-228.
- . *Dubliners*. 1914. Eds. Robert Scholes and A. Walton Litz. New York: Penguin, 1996.
- . *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. 1916. New York: Random House, 1996.
- . *Ulysses*. 1922. Ed. Hans Walter Gabler with Wolfhard Steppe and Claus Melchior. New York: Random House, 1986.
- . *Finnegans Wake*. 1939. New York: Penguin, 1976.
- . *Stephen Hero*. 1944. Ed. Theodore Spencer. New York: New Directions, 1963.
- Gilbert, Stuart, and Richard Ellmann, eds. *Letters*. New York: Viking Press, 1957-66. 3 vols.
- Mason, Ellsworth, and Richard Ellmann, eds. *The Critical Writings of James Joyce*. 1959. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989.

Secondary Sources:

- Aristotle. *De Anima (On The Soul)*. Trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred. New York: Penguin, 1986.
- Atherton, James S. *The Books at the Wake: A Study of Literary Allusion in James Joyce's "Finnegans Wake."* New York: Viking, 1960.
- Barnes, Jonathan. *Early Greek Philosophy*. New York: Penguin, 1987.
- Bergson, Henri. *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*. Trans. F. L. Pogson. 1889. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1921.

- . *Matter and Memory*. Trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer. 1896. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962.
- Blavatsky, Helena Petrovna. *Isis Unveiled: A Master-Key to the Mysteries of Ancient and Modern Science and Theology*. 1877. Pasadena: Theosophical University Press, 1998. 2 vols.
- Brivic, Sheldon. *Joyce Between Freud and Jung*. Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1980.
- Budgen, Frank. *James Joyce and the Making of "Ulysses."* 1934. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1960.
- Burgess, Anthony. *Re Joyce*. 1965. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1968.
- Campbell, Joseph. *The Masks of God: Oriental Mythology*. 1962. New York: Arkana, 1991.
- . *Mythic Worlds, Modern Words: On the Art of James Joyce*. Ed. Edmund L. Epstein. New York: Harper Collins, 1993.
- Cheng, Vincent J. "The General and the Sepoy: Imperialism and Power in the Museyroom." In *Critical Essays on James Joyce's "Finnegans Wake."* Ed. Patrick A. McCarthy. New York: G. K. Hall & Co., 1992. 258-268.
- Cirlot, J. E. *A Dictionary of Symbols*. 2nd ed. Trans. Jack Sage. New York: Philosophical Library, 1983.
- Cooper, J. C. *An Illustrated Encyclopaedia of Traditional Symbols*. 1978. New York: Thames and Hudson Inc., 1993.
- Damasio, Antonio R. *The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness*. New York: Harcourt, Inc., 1999.
- . *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain*. New York: Harcourt Inc., 2003.
- Derrida, Jacques. "Plato's Pharmacy." In *Dissemination*. 1972. Trans. Barbara Johnson. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981.
- . *Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins*. 1990. Trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993.
- Eckley, Grace. *Children's Lore in "Finnegans Wake."* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985.
- Eliot, T.S. "Ulysses, Order, and Myth." 1923. In *Selected Prose of T. S. Eliot*. Ed. Frank

- Kermode. London: Faber, 1975. 175-78.
- Ellmann, Richard. *Ulysses on the Liffey*. 1972. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
- . *The Consciousness of Joyce*. 1977. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.
- . *James Joyce*. Rev. ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.
- Epstein, Edmund L. *The Ordeal of Stephen Dedalus: the Conflict of the Generations in James Joyce's "A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man."* Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971.
- . "Nestor." In *James Joyce's "Ulysses": Critical Essays*. Eds. Clive Hart and David Hayman. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. 17-28.
- . "James Joyce and the Body." In *A Starchamber Quiry: A James Joyce Centennial Volume 1882-1982*. New York: Methuen, 1982. 71-106.
- . "Outline of *Finnegans Wake*." [class handout] 1990, 2000.
- Fairhall, James. *James Joyce and the Question of History*. 1993. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Foucault, Michel. *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*. 1966. New York: Random House, Inc., 1994.
- Frank, Joseph. *The Widening Gyre: Crisis and Mastery in Modern Literature*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1963.
- Freud, Sigmund. *The Interpretation of Dreams*. (1900-1901). In Strachey, Vols. IV and V.
- . *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*. (1901). In Strachey, Vol VI.
- . "The Unconscious." in *Papers on Metapsychology*. (1915). In Strachey, Vol. XIV, 159-215.
- . "Mourning and Melancholia." (1917[1915]). In Strachey, Vol. XIV, 237-258.
- . "A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis." (1936). In Strachey, Vol. XXII, 238-248.
- Gilbert, Stuart. *James Joyce's "Ulysses": A Study*. 1930. New York: Random House, 1955.
- Gifford, Don, with Robert J. Seidman. *"Ulysses" Annotated: Notes for James Joyce's "Ulysses."* 1974. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.

- Giomo, Carla J. "An Experimental Study of Children's Sensitivity to Mood in Music." *Psychology of Music* 21 (1993): 141-162.
- Goldberg, S. L. *The Classical Temper: A Study of James Joyce's "Ulysses."* New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1961.
- Gould, Stephen Jay. *Full House: The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin.* New York: Three Rivers Press, 1997.
- Hansen, James A. "The Uncreating Conscience: Memory and Apparitions in Joyce and Benjamin." *Mosaic; a Journal for the Interdisciplinary Study of Literature*. 34 (Dec 2001): 85-106.
- Hart, Clive. *Structure and Motif in "Finnegans Wake."* Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1962.
- Hawking, Stephen W. *A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes.* Toronto: Bantam Books, 1988
- . *The Universe in a Nutshell.* New York: Bantam Books, 2001.
- Hayman, David. "*Ulysses*": *The Mechanics of Meaning.* 1970. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1982.
- Herodotus. *The Histories.* Trans. Aubrey de Sélincourt. 1954. New York: Penguin, 1976.
- Jakobson, Roman, and Morris Halle. *Fundamentals of Language.* 1956. Paris: Mouton, 1971.
- James, William. *The Principles of Psychology.* (1890). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1981. 3 vols.
- . *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study In Human Nature.* (1902). Ed. Martin E. Marty. New York: Penguin, 1985.
- . "Confidences of a Psychical Researcher." (1909). In *Essays in Psychical Research.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. 361-375.
- Jung, Carl G. "The Concept of the Collective Unconscious." (1936/37). *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious.* 2nd ed. Trans. R. F. C. Hull. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. 42-53.
- . "Concerning the Archetypes, with Special Reference to the Anima Concept." (1936). *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious.* 2nd ed. Trans. R.F.C. Hull. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. 54-72.

- Kenner, Hugh. *Dublin's Joyce*. 1956. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.
- . *Joyce's Voices*. 1978. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979.
- Klostermaier, Klaus K. *Hindu Writings: A Short Introduction to the Major Sources*. Boston: Oneworld Publications, 2000.
- Kumar, Shiv K. *Bergson and the Stream of Consciousness Novel*. 1963. New York: New York University Press, 1970.
- Lacan, Jacques. "The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience." (1949). In *Écrits: A Selection*. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1977. 1-7.
- Levin, Harry. *James Joyce: A Critical Introduction*. 1941. New York: New Directions Press, 1960.
- Magalaner, Marvin, and Richard M. Kain. *Joyce: The Man, the Work, the Reputation*. 1956. New York: New York University Press, 1969.
- Mascaró, Juan (trans.). *The Bhagavad Gita*. 1962. New York: Penguin, 1987.
- . *The Upanishads*. 1965. New York: Penguin, 1987.
- McCarthy, Patrick A. *The Riddles of Finnegans Wake*. Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1980.
- McHugh, Roland. *Annotations to "Finnegans Wake"*. 1980. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.
- Meyer, Leonard B. *Explaining Music: Essays and Explorations*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973.
- Newman, John Henry Cardinal. "The Second Spring." (1852). In *Favorite Newman Sermons*. Ed. Daniel M. O'Connell, S.J. New York: The America Press, 1946.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Human, All-too Human. A Book for Free Spirits*. 1878. Trans. R.J. Hollingdale. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Pally, Regina. "Memory: Brain Systems that Link Past, Present and Future." *Institute Journal of Psycho-Analysis*. (1997) 78, 1223-1234.
- Plato. "Meno." In *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*. 1961. Eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Trans. W. K. C. Guthrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.

- . "Phaedo." In *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*. 1961. Eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Trans. Hugh Tredennick. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.
- . "Symposium." In *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*. 1961. Eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Trans. Michael Joyce. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.
- . "Timaeus." In *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*. 1961. Eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.
- Power, Mary. "The Discovery of Ruby." *James Joyce Quarterly*. 2 (Winter 1981) 115-121.
- Ribeiro, Branca Telles. *Coherence in Psychotic Discourse*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Rickard, John S. "Stephen Dedalus Among School Children: The Schoolroom and the Riddle of Authority in *Ulysses*." *Studies in the Literary Imagination*. 30 (Fall 1997): 17-36.
- . *Joyce's Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of "Ulysses"*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1999.
- Rose, Danis, and John O'Hanlon. *Understanding "Finnegans Wake": A Guide to the Narrative of James Joyce's Masterpiece*. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1982.
- Russell, Jeffrey Burton. *The Prince of Darkness: Radical Evil and the Power of Good in History*. 1988. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992.
- Schwab, Gabriele. *Subjects without Selves: Transitional Texts in Modern Fiction*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.
- Shattuck, Roger. *Proust's Way: A Field Guide To In Search of Lost Time*. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 2000.
- Strachey, James. (Ed.) *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*. 1957. London: Hogarth Press, 1978.
- Tate, Allen. "The Dead." In *James Joyce: Dubliners*. Eds. Robert Scholes and A. Walton Litz. New York: Penguin, 1996. 389-394.
- Thrane, James R. "Joyce's Sermon on Hell: Its Source and Its Backgrounds." *Modern Philology* 57.3 (Feb., 1960) : 172-198.
- Tindall, William York. *A Reader's Guide to James Joyce*. 1959. New York: Farrar, Straus

and Giroux, 1977.

---. *A Reader's Guide to "Finnegans Wake."* New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1969.

Vico, Giambattista. *New Science: Principles of the New Science Concerning the Common Nature of Nations.* (1774). 3rd ed. Trans. David Marsh. New York: Penguin, 2001.

Walcott, William. "Notes By a Jungian Analyst on the Dreams in *Ulysses*." *James Joyce Quarterly.* 9 (Fall 1971): 37-48.

Wilson, Edmund. *The Wound and the Bow: Seven Studies in Literature.* 1929. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1978.

Wood, Michael. *In Search of the Trojan War.* New York: Facts On File Publications, 1985.

Yeats, William Butler. "Magic." *Essays and Introductions.* (1903). New York: Collier Books, 1977.

Zimmer, Heinrich. *Philosophies of India.* 1951. Ed. Joseph Campbell. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974.