BECOMING JAPANESE:

CONTESTED MEANINGS OF RACE AND NATIONALITY

IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN

by

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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2010

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the
Graduate Faculty in Sociology in satisfaction of the
dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

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I examine the "final" phase of assimilation of Koreans born and raised in Japan (*zainichi* Koreans), an invisible racial minority fully acculturated yet kept in legal limbo for decades, in a society where immigration and naturalization continue to be exceptional. How do *zainichi* Koreans represent themselves and participate in Japanese civic life? By specifically focusing on the dilemma of becoming Japanese among the former colonial subjects and their descendents, I explore both the permeability and impermeability of Japanese collective identity.

Based on 1) in-depth interviews with *zainichi* Koreans, regardless of nationality, legal statuses and levels of collective consciousness, or *zainichi* literacy, 2) participant observations in different groups and events, and 3) secondary analyses of official statistics as well as opinion pieces and autobiographies authored by *zainichi* Koreans for the Japanese print media, I examine shifting *zainichi* representations and debates over civic participation. I

trace prominent shifts in their interpretations of the collective past and ideas about collective identity, citizenship and civic participation. I also provide an ethnographic account of everyday experiences among intermarried couples, naturalized individuals and local activist groups, covertly and overtly expressing Korean heritage and the political agenda in predominantly Japanese environment where Korean lineage is not a cost-free symbolic ethnicity. These all attest to unstated assumptions about what it means to be authentic members of Japanese society or who has the right to dissent in the revisionist currents of Japanese collective and historical identity.

Diverse expressions of *zainichi* Korean identities, whether losing their perceived genealogical connection with Korean roots, passing but expressing their Korean heritage exclusively in a private domain, or claiming proactive Korean identity that is perceived as foreign, complementarily reproduce Japanese societal homogeneity. Paradoxically, active claimants of collective Korean identities, with or without Japanese nationality, tend to participate more actively in Japanese civil society than those without explicit Korean identity claims. *Zainichi* Koreans resist and accommodate the process of becoming Japanese, while continuing to fulfill discursive and political needs of the Japanese majority.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation, in a way, began as part of my childhood wonder. Why aren't I a Japanese like everybody else, although I was born and raised in Japan and Japanese is my native language? Even my parents were born and raised in Japan and Japanese is their native language as well. In embarking a project where the researcher steps back in the native land, which is a more challenging task than it appears despite the fluency of the language and the familiarity with the local system, I thank all my committee members, Professors Stephen Steinberg, Phil Kasinitz, and Sharon Zukin, whose intellectual and moral supports made this project for an unintended, long duration of time possible, and Professor Sonia Ryang for joining in the committee as an outside member despite the extremely high volume of responsibilities she has for her institution and students.

Steve's critical analyses of American race relations always stimulate my interests in this topic. I owe Steve this dissertation's title from the initial proposal writing phase. My original intension was to focus exclusively on Korean minority population who hold Japanese nationality. From the onset of the fieldwork when I experienced the snowball sample that did not roll at all, I dived into as diverse occasions and groups as possible, traveling back and forth between Tokyo and Osaka. Although I ended up interviewing Koreans in Japan regardless of nationality and legal status, whomever was willing to share his/her thoughts with me, I soon realized that diverse ways of which *zainichi* Koreans identify and represent themselves tell us nothing more about Japanese society, people and culture. As if taking a Durkheimian approach of examining the implicit collective conscience by focusing on the population deviated from the norm, my study about *zainichi* Koreans is about Japanese collective conscience. In addition, I soon came to realize that it is not nationality and legal statuses but the extent they express Korean lineage in public through name usage and civic engagements that differentiate diverse *zainichi* Korean experiences most strikingly. Hence the original title as conceived held well until the end of this project despite its significant shifts in focal points. Steve's close reading and comments of earlier drafts were of immense help. Also, I clearly recall Phil's suggestion to take up Koreans in Japan instead of the first dissertation proposal topic I drafted. Without him, I would not have dealt with this still overwhelming but rewarding topic. The research process overlaps with the process of my self becoming a *zainichi* Korean. Sharon inspires me to consider "authenticity" and methodological issues in urban ethnography. I will miss her casual greeting, "where is your dissertation!?" in the Department hallway. Her advice helped me juggle with other life responsibilities I have been going through in the dissertation writing phase. In the early 1990s, I was one of the fortunate audience in a *kenkyūkai* (semi-formal study group) in Tokyo where Sonia presented her study analyzing the ideological reproduction mechanism of pro-North Korean community within Japan. At that time, I had a slightest idea that I would write a dissertation on *zainichi* Koreans. But since, I was thinking about exploring the reproduction of a minority population in a broader, more diffuse context. My dissertation is only a partial, limited attempt to disentangle this complex social process.

I would like to thank all my informants for sharing their experience, and the Toyota Foundation (2000–2001; Grant D00-A-509) and the Matsushita International Foundation (1999–2000; Grant 98–678) for generous funding that made my fieldtrips to Japan possible.

The Social Science Research Council's Japan Program dissertation workshop provided me not only with theoretical and methodological insights but also with the opportunities to meet with numerous young scholars conducting research projects. I thank Jennifer Winther. The Toyota Foundation's workshop held in Yuson, South Korea, was another stimulating and encouraging occasion. I thank Shiro Honda and the workshop preparation committee. I also appreciate the Center for Philanthropy and Civil Society for the grant and the year-long seminar. The workshop on Korean diaspora in Japan, organized by Sonia Ryang and John Lie and held at UC Berkeley was one of the most invaluable external supports I received. The City University of New York Graduate Center awarded me with three different fellowships throughout my graduate work. Although I cannot list individual names of *zainichi* Korean informants and organizations who and which kindly let me hang around with them, I met so many *zainichi* Koreans whom I respect immensely; each individual's creative fulfillment of the fact that they all happened to be born as *zainichi* was often beyond my limited expressions when I analyzed the interview data. During my fieldwork in Japan, before and after, I appreciate the following individuals' moral and intellectual supports: Professors Yasunori Fukuoka, Chikako Kashiwazaki, Myungsoo Kim, Ichiro Kuraishi, Hirohisa Takenoshita, Yuki Senda, Masaaki Nakashima, Keizo Yamawaki, Takeshi Ishida, Hidenori Mashiko, Inja Lee, James Raeside, Peter Evans, Sachiko Takita, late Kiyomi Tomita, and late Yong-dal Kim. Miyuki Hashimoto, Sachiko Otsuka, Manami Tada, Satomi Ono, Toyohito Tanaka, and late Shin'ichi Kurimoto helped me locate Japanese articles and other sources of inspiration.

At various conference and workshop occasions, I appreciate comments from Professors John Lie, Norma Field, Mariko Tamanoi, Erin Aeran Chung, Tessa Moriss-Suzuki, Haeng-ja Sachiko Chung, Taku Suzuki, Keiko Suzuki, Tomomi Yamaguchi, Brett de Bary and Melissa Wender across the institutional boundaries. I am, however, the one who is solely responsible for all the limits of the presentation and interpretation of the material below. I also thank Akemi Nakamura, Yuko Okubo, Bethany Grenald, Millian Kang and Yuko Shibata for their friendly support. At the CUNY Graduate Center and within the CUNY system, I appreciate the intellectual support and professional advice from Professors Pyong Gap Min, Paul Attewell, Mehdi Bozorgmehr, Peter Kwong, Mary Soliday, Barbara Brooks, Lotti Silver, and Noriko Watanabe. Within the Graduate Center community, I thank Rati Kashyap, Urania Willis, Linda Perrotta, Dolores Buonasora, Smyrna Hernandez, Liang Lin, Dawn Campbell. I also thank Jennifer Parker-Talwar, Jack Levinson, Dae Young Kim, Masami Tamagawa, Nancy Lopez, Courtney Guthreau, Yoshio Shibata, Akiko Okada, Noriko Matsumoto, Hyun Sook Kim, Yoko Suzuki, Yoko Ikeda, Masako Kato, Akemi Nishida, Keisuke Jinno and the Japan Study Group for collegial friendship throughout my graduate work at the Graduate Center. Donna Ellaby, Michael Farren, Yuki Terazawa, Saeyoung Park, Rumiko Sakai, Eun-ja Lee, Bill Reimer, Susan Hoecker-Drysdale, David Ragavan, Avis Anderson, Alan Anderson, Mary Jack, Nava Lehrer, Audrey Blumberg also helped me come this far.

Earlier versions of different segments of Chapter 2 were presented at the Annual Meeting of American Anthropological Association (November 1998), at the Annual Meeting of Japanese Sociological Association (October 1999), the Toyota Foundation Yuson workshop (February 2002) and at the Society for East Asian Anthropology Conference, UC Berkeley (November 2004). Earlier versions of the first section of Chapter 3 were presented

at the Annual Japan Conference of Asian Studies (June 1999) and at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies (March 2000). Those of the second section were presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association (August 2001) and at the East Asia Graduate Student Workshop, "Gender, Colonialism, and Visual Representation" at Cornell University (March 2004). Earlier versions of Chapter 4 were presented at the Korean Diaspora Workshop in UC Berkeley (2005) and at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association (August 2006). This chapter, although slightly modified here, was originally published as a chapter of Sonia Ryang and John Lie's edited volume, *Diaspora without Homeland: Being Koreans in Japan* (University of California Press, 2009). I thank Nathan McBrien of University of California Press for permitting me to include this chapter. Earlier versions of Chapter 5's different parts were presented at the Civil Society Seminar, Center for Philanthropy and Civil Society (CPCS), City University of New York Graduate Center (February 2006), at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies (April 2006), at the East Rock Institute's Korean diaspora panel, a pre-conference event of the Annual Meeting for the Association for Asian Studies (March 2007) and at the Annual Meeting of Eastern Sociological Society (March 2007). An earlier version of the first section of Chapter 6 was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Pacific Sociological Association (April 2004). An earlier version of Chapter 7 was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies (March 2009).

Unless otherwise stated, the quotes from Japanese texts are my translation. Japanese words and names were transliterated based on the revised Hepburn method. The macron for well-known places such as Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto is omitted. The names of Japanese and *zainichi* Korean scholars who publish predominantly in Japanese as well as the pseudonyms of *zainichi* Korean respondents are shown the last name first followed by the given name, according to East Asian practices. I did not follow this as for the Japanese and Korean authors with English publications.

I thank Don Cameron and Robert Sauté very much for their powerful and effective editorial supports. I owe Kinko Abe, Yoshiko Matsui, Yasue Takeuchi, and Kyoko Suzuki for my much earlier interests in human society in general. Last but not least, my family and extended family members in New York, Rhode Island and Tokyo who encouraged me immensely for this enduring process which indeed appeared never-ending. Especially Rob, Rie and Aya shed so much bright light in my despair and grumpiness when I was writing. Rob provided me with witty humor and precious release time from the household management and childrearing responsibilities. I really appreciate it. Did I really finish the dissertation? Yes, but *we* all did it together.

Dedicated with gratitude to my parents,

and to their six grandchildren, Japanese or American,

who have only one name and nationality since born

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INTRODUCTION

Becoming Japanese: Paradox of Social Membership

The process of assimilation…can never be fully implemented until the Japanese majority fully accepts the Korean minority as members of Japanese society.
——Richard H. Mitchell (1967: 160).

For the foreseeable future, Koreans will continue to live in Japan in large numbers. For them, the major questions will be the degree to which they wish to assimilate to Japanese society, the degree to which Japanese society will permit such assimilation, and the means by which they will maintain a positive sense of Korean identity.
——Helen Hardacre (1984: 2).

[T]he prospects for their future identity formation depends on how well Japanese society can accommodate persons of non-Japanese origin on the one hand and how much Koreans in Japan can negotiate their ethnic heritage and the extent of [their] acculturation in the host society.
——Sonia Ryang (2003-4: 35).

As long as Japanese society and the "zainichi" [Koreans] both need a category called "zainichi," "zainichi" continue to exist no matter how well they are acculturated or assimilated in terms of nationality. It might be as an object of discrimination, as a position from which people criticize the Japanese society, or as an opportunistic base of the collective demand for social rights.
——Oguma Eiji (2008: 780-781).

In January 2003, Takanohana, a Japanese sumo wrestler with the title of *yokozuna*, grand champion, whose father was also a well-known sumo wrestler, announced his retirement. A tabloid newspaper immediately reported the story as if it were a crisis in the Japanese national sport (*kokugi*). Most wrestlers occupying the highest rank, *yokozuna*, and the second highest, *ōzeki*, were of foreign origin, as were many other promising wrestlers. The article resonated because Asashōryū from Mongolia, an *ōzeki* who had won the championship in the first tournament of the year, had just been nominated for promotion to *yokozuna*. Denying he was arguing from a racial angle, the anonymous author, located sumo as an ancient Japanese martial art and national sport, and deplored that Japanese fans were about to lose the simple

pleasure of cheering a wrestler from their hometown. He argued seeing Japanese wrestlers thrown by much larger foreign wrestlers would diminish the sport's excitement.[1] The remaining *yokozuna*s, Akebono and Musashimaru, were from Hawaii. Both naturalized and acquired Japanese nationality in 1996, and became full-fledged Japanese citizens. And yet, they are "foreign" sumo wrestlers (*gaikokujin rikishi*) forever with foreign bodies.

The same tabloid presented an article of similar tone in 2009 when the controversial Mongolian Asashoryū of the highest *yokozuna* rank bested the other Mongolian *yokozuna*, Hakuō. Rather than celebrating his recovery from (allegedly faked) injuries and mental breakdown, the article deplored that no Japanese wrestlers had the strength to beat the Mongolian *yokozuna*s.[2] The Japanese mass media had been bashing Asashōryū the last several years because he behaved so un-Japanese-like, lacking grace, dignity and the commitment required of his rank. Frequently reported were his negligence of local tours and customs surrounding sumo. His aggressive and unconventional sumo tactics and incessant challenges to the comportment expected of highly rank sumo wrestlers, the bearers of tradition, were associated with his foreignness.[3]

Aside from the fact that the globalization of sumo was irreversible, the *New York Times* reporter Norimitsu Onishi (2003) summarized what was behind the national angst—Japanese fear that foreigners were defiling tradition; sumo, after all, is closely associated with Shintoism.[4] Onishi (2003) introduced a Bulgarian sumo wrestler who had something Japanese youth had lost growing up in economically prosperous Japan—effort, perseverance and commitment to duties. Unlikely to acquire Shinto-inspired authenticity, the Bulgarian's stick-to-itiveness were good old "Japanese," actually universal values, acquirable qualities. Yet, the tabloid bemoaned the loss of culture which it conflated with race.

The persistent and rather groundless argument about what it means to be authentically Japanese continues to be debated in 21st century Japan. Japanese nationality can be acquired by naturalization, but most typically it is conferred at birth through either parent's Japanese nationality. The globalized Japanese "national" sport sumo illustrates highly obscure conditions which distinguish between Japaneseness and foreignness. On the one hand, foreign sumo wrestlers are forever foreign regardless of their willingness to naturalize or their mastery of Japanese language, tradition, and culture. On the other hand, some foreign wresters' origins are obliterated. The above 2003 tabloid piece discusses several wrestlers of diverse backgrounds, Georgian, Bulgarian, and Czech, but it neglects the provenance of sumo wrestlers of Korean descent.[5] Is it because Koreans, especially those born in Japan, are not foreign enough in demeanor or appearance? Is it because they are treated equally as Japanese? Is it because a Korean background is supposed to be kept in the closet and suppressed in public discourse?[6]

Popular media concerns about the future of the national sport illustrate two dimensions of ambivalence over the definitions of Japaneseness and foreignness. First, Japanese nationality, i.e. Japanese legal membership, may insufficiently erase foreignness for some participants in the sacred national sport. Naturalized or not, foreign sumo wrestlers are foreign. Second, by omitting references, there exists an awkwardness attached to the foreignness of Koreans in Japan. When negative sentiments about Koreans are omnipresent, refusing to allude to Koreanness signifies acceptance. At least, visually, Koreans born in Japan do not stand out in Japan's landscape. Foreignness, in the average Japanese mind, has to do with clearer phenotypical and cultural differences. Aren't Koreans simply Japanese if they speak Japanese and grow up immersed in Japanese culture?

Japan is by no means the homogeneous society that is commonly imagined,[7] although the vast majority of residents in Japan have Japanese nationality. Japan's population includes invisible minorities (at least in physiognomy) such as indigenous people pushed out to the northern island of Hokkaido (Ainu), social outcasts reminiscent of the feudal status system (*Burakumin*, literally, hamlet dwellers), people whose inclusion into the Japanese nation state had been more recent (Okinawans who had their own kingdom but were subject to U.S. rule from the end of World War II until 1972), and migrants from former Japanese colonies and their descendants (Koreans and Taiwanese). Visible minorities have been part of the Japanese landscape since the boom days of the Japanese economy in the 1980s. "Newcomer" immigrants arrived from Asian and middle-Eastern countries such as Pakistan, Iran, the Philippines, China and South Korea. The revised immigration policy of the early 1990s triggered an influx of *nikkei*, either Spanish speaking Japanese-Peruvians or Portuguese speaking Japanese-Brazilian return migrants, many of whom were descendents of inter-racial marriages.[8] In addition, U.S. military bases are the focal points around which phenotypically different Amerasians reside. English-speaking communities of bohemian sojourners and multinational corporate elites congregate in large cities. Cross-national and interracial marriages occur, producing generations of Japanese public figures of mixed ancestry.

This dissertation examines the contemporary boundary between Japaneseness and Koreanness in Japan. Specifically, I will focus on identity negotiation and civic participation among Koreans born and raised in Japan. For the Korean minority in Japan, what does it means to become "Japanese"? By examining the ways in which they identify and represent themselves in everyday life and participate in civic life, I explore the dilemma of Koreans becoming Japanese. By becoming Japanese, I do not restrict this exploration to naturalization

but the whole process of becoming part of society, even if only conditionally. This study of the Korean minority population in Japan, hereafter *zainichi* Koreans, seeks to understand Japanese collective identity. It is not about *zainichi* Koreans, but about Japanese society through the lenses of *zainichi* Koreans.

Zainichi Koreans refer to migrants from colonial Korea and their descendents who live in Japan. Reflecting the demographic transformation, as I will discuss later, I include the naturalized Japanese and those who are born Japanese with Korean and Japanese parentage. *Zainichi* Korean interviewees and informants have diverse subjective identifications. It is important to note that nationality per se does not determine the ways in which they relate to *zainichi* Korean issues. On the one hand, whether one is *zainichi* Korean or not continues depending on one's lineage (not necessarily Korean nationality). On the other hand, some, including activists, argue that one is not born *zainichi* Korean but becomes *zainichi* Korean; one has to possess self-conscious and collective-conscious as a *zainichi* to become *zainichi*. What follows are the stories of *zainichi* Koreans with a range of subjective identifications with their collective pasts, regardless of nationality or legal status.

The boundary between Japaneseness and Koreanness is particularly intriguing in that the presence of Koreans in Japan and the transition of their legal status and social reception encapsulate the entire processes of Japan's modernity and postmodernity, as well as its shifting national identities and segmented political identities. As "the live witnesses of Japan's policies on resident foreigners" (Tanaka 2007: 17), *zainichi* Koreans also embody the symbolic and commonly-understood boundaries of shifting Japanese societal membership, legal or authentic, in the geopolitical transition of East Asia. Although they are invisible in most aspects of everyday life, *zainichi* Koreans, through inter-generational residence in Japan,

are becoming part of Japan. Simultaneously, *zainichi* Korean diversity reflects complexities and the segmented reality of what Japan is and what it means to be Japanese.

Zainichi Korean "Communities" in Japan

There are several points that require clarification. First, *zainichi* Koreans have never formed a unified, single community. They form clusters of communities that reflect politics, regions of origin and current residence, gender, socioeconomic attainment, ability to pass as Japanese, social networks, and organizational commitment. *Zainichi* Korean extended kinship can include spouses from South Korea who have arrived relatively recently or "illegal" migrant relatives who joined families after 1945. The distinction between the old-comer pre-war migrants and their descendents and the new-comers is hard to draw (Kajita 1994: 225; Morris-Suzuki 2006; Ryang 2002). Referring to *zainichi* Koreans, some researchers include those who arrived in (often returned to) Japan during the immediate post-war period until the end of the Korean War (e.g. Tani 2002: 34).

The Korean presence in Japan is the consequences of Japan's colonization of the Korean peninsula (1910-1945). Before the colonization of the Peninsula, only 790 Koreans resided in Japan in 1909. At the peak of labor mobilization during the WWII over 2 million Koreans lived in Japan. Three quarters of the Japanese Korean population returned to the Peninsula in the post WWII era. Approximately 500,000 remained, supplemented by a stream of illegal migrants who came up until the late-1970s (Morris-Suzuki 2006). The most recent Alien Registration statistics show approximately 420,000 special permanent resident Koreans (those with the legal status associated with colonial migration) (see Chapter 1).

Despite their rural origins in areas of southern Korea, they settled historically in urban areas such as the Osaka and Tokyo metropolitan areas to work as factory and construction laborers. Korean residents live in all of Japan's 47 prefectures, but Osaka-*fu* has been the largest Korean population center.[9] Prior to the 1960s, Koreans frequently clustered in specific neighborhoods or shanty towns, typically on riverbanks. With Japan's rapid economic growth in the 1960s and the 1970s, those shanty towns disappeared (Lie 2008).[10]

Zainichi Korean Relationships with the Japanese State and Society

A second point requiring clarification is the nationality/citizenship granting principle. Japanese nationality laws adhere to the principle of *jus sanguinis*. *Zainichi* Koreans remain foreigners, either South Korean or stateless Koreans (see Chapter 1), unless they naturalize or one of their parents is Japanese (including those naturalized). Until the 1985 Nationality Law Amendment, Japanese nationality was granted only when the father had Japanese nationality at the child's birth. Naturalization is granted at the ultimate authority and discretion by the Minister of Justice. Naturalization requires meticulous and extensive documentation and is processed by local Bureaus of Justice.

The oath is simple: to observe laws and become a good citizen. Japanese passports have a simplified chrysanthemum-shaped mark in the middle which signifies the Japanese Emperor System. The national symbols—flags, seals and anthem of the Japanese Empire—continue to be widely used, never having been remodeled for post-war democratic Japan. Japanese nationals continue to be the symbolic children of the Emperor, who himself is the symbol of Japanese national integrity. The analogy of the state to the family and blood

relatives is solidly grounded in national sentiment. In the context of a remarkable continuity of pre- and post-1945 Japan (Dower 1993), naturalized Japanese are "adopted" children.

A third contextual background to this study is the ambivalence Japanese have shown towards Koreans throughout the post-1945 period (Tei 1995: 228). Despite Korea's proximity to Japan and its historically long-standing relationship, contemporary Japan's relationship with the Korean peninsula has been fraught with tension. During most of the post-colonial period, South Korea had been known as "the nearest and farthest nation" [*chikakute tōi kuni*] under its military dictatorship regime. The dictatorship image is now monopolized by North Korea (Tei 1995: 127), which has never had formal diplomatic relations. The image of South Korea has shifted, though. North Korea's communist monarchy is now perceived as the most dangerous and unpredictable security threat in the post-Cold War era. In contrast, in the late 1990s and 2000s, South Korea's dictatorship became part of its past, and the density of popular cultural exchanges between Japan and South Korea has been unprecedented. Presently, Japan's entertainment news includes constant updates about South Korean pop-culture icons.[11]

Simultaneously, there exist negative portrayals of the Peninsula related to politically sensitive matters: North Korea's abductions of Japanese, its nuclear development and missile experiments or South Korean professional pickpocket gangs active in Japan, territorial disputes between Japan and South Korea over the sovereignty of Takeshima/Dokto, both Korea's opposition to the description of colonization in Japan's history textbook censorship and to Japan's prominent public figures' official visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine[12] to name a few. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' official website includes briefs of foreign countries, according to which there are 600,000 North Koreans in Japan (including

South Koreans) and there are 600,000 South Koreans in Japan (including North Koreans). The exact breakdown is simply unpublished because North Korean is not a nationality for Japanese administrators: Koreans are just Koreans. In fact, in popular opinion surveys in post-imperial Japan, Koreans are one of least popular foreign groups among Japanese.[13]

The last but not least significant issue is that Japanese and Koreans both base their national consciousness on shared lineage and culture. They both constitute "modern peoplehoods," categories based on race, ethnicity or nationality, bred in contact with or in negation to Others (Lie 2004a). Various state apparatuses have concocted these consciousnesses into modern nation states (Lie 2004a, 2008). Strikingly similar are the ways in which both Japanese and Korean nations are imagined. Authentic Japaneseness is racially constructed (Yoshino 1992), as is authentic Koreanness (Kendall 1999; Lie 2001b; Pai 2000). Both Japanese and Korean legal systems fail to distinguish citizenship from nationality and assumptions of homogeneity remain persistent. Their legal, social, and cultural dimensions of nationality cannot be separated from one another. Membership and its derivative cultural traits are deduced from blood and lineage. The contour of an authentic membership preexists in the abstract and is considered as given, natural, and clear-cut (Balibar 1992; Lie 2004a). The meaning of Japaneseness has always been in flux, despite the concerted efforts of all social strata to deny this (Oguma 1997[1995]). At the same time, the meaning of Koreanness among *zainichi* Koreans has also been in flux (K. Yun 1992). Within the Japanese cultural context, what constitutes Japaneseness and what constitutes Koreanness are constantly invented and re-invented.

Vacillating between essential Japaneseness and essential Koreanness, between abstract and fixed identities and representations, becoming Japanese is not a signature case of

immigrant incorporation into the host society through a straight-line assimilation path. Indigenous Ainu and Okinawans are now more or less Japanese despite being incorporated into the state only during the 19th century. Whether Japaneseness expands to include ex-Koreans, ex-Chinese, ex-Pakistani, or anybody of non-Japanese origin deserves close observation. This dissertation illustrates that nationality (legal membership), race (imagined authentic lineage), and ethnicity (imagined authentic culture), once inseparable in the assumed definition of Japaneseness, do not necessarily transform the essentialist formation of Japaneseness.

Japaneseness (and Koreanness): Fictive but Real

Japaneseness is fictive like any other racial, ethnic, or cultural abstraction. Nevertheless, even as an imagined entity, it can easily be reified through both tangible and intangible clues. The 1995 International Social Survey Program's national identity data shows Japanese respondents who consider themselves ethnic Japanese prioritize ascribed components rather than achievable components (Tanabe 2001: 403). Reflecting nationalism and racism's complementary relationship (Balibar 1992: 54), an analysis of Japanese cultural nationalism highlights that Japaneseness is a racial construct (Yoshino 1992: 24-32; see also, Fukuoka 1993; Sugimoto 2003).[14]

Numerous scholastic publications in the past two decades have empirically challenged the assumption of Japanese homogeneity and essentially defined Japaneseness (Fukuoka 1993; Komai 1993; Komai and Sasaki 2001; Ishida 2000; Lie 2001a; Maŝiko 1996, 1997; Morris-Suzuki 1997; Oguma 1997[1995], 1998; Ōnuma 1986; Sugimoto 2003; Tanaka 1993; Weiner 1997). Yet, the Japanese homogeneity assumption is not a myth (not

necessarily because the demographic presence of minority populations denies it), but rather a socially constructed reality produced and reproduced because the meaning of homogeneity shifts over time. The assumption of homogeneity is argued to have no logical or scientific grounds; precisely because of its emptiness this "civic religion" or cultural nationalism asserting Japanese as distinct race and unique culture survives and revives (Befu 2001; Lie 2001a; Yoshino 1992).

What does it mean to become Japanese in a society where immigration and naturalization are rare exceptions? This study attempts to analyze the mechanisms whereby one prominent arena of Japanese cultural hegemony, i.e., the construction of Japaneseness, is simultaneously reproduced and challenged by the minority population in fluid political, economic, and social circumstances. Building on the literature tracing how the explicit and implicit definitions and boundaries of Japaneseness are contingent upon historical circumstances at a given time period, it is important to clarify the detailed processes that entrench this fiction in everyday life. What people believe is real, as W. I. Thomas and social constructivists pinpoint. When different groups possess unequal power, the less powerful find their identity choices and ability to express themselves constrained. Typically, the powerful remain unaware.

The aim of this study is to analyze the ways in which minority group members accommodate the cultural hegemony of the majority group especially in defining Japaneseness. Depending on context and inter-personal relations, *zainichi* Koreans distinguish between the explicit and implicit constraints, for example, legal membership and social membership. I will treat the choice of nationality, identity expression, and self-representations among *zainichi* Koreans as arenas where collective identity, group

boundaries, and subjective identification are all contested. Rather than focusing on legal and technical dimensions of nationality that define individual's rights and obligations to a nation, I will examine the social implications of nationality that demarcate social memberships and some alleged cultural distinctiveness.

My focus on *zainichi* Korean, among other possible ethno-national groups, has two primary reasons. First, the contemporary Japanese of non-Japanese origin are predominantly Japanese of colonial Korean descent. Koreans—whether they appear in alien registration statistics or are statistically blended into the Japanese majority once naturalized—were for most of the post-WWII era the country's largest foreign group. Second, what it means to be of Korean descent continues to be socially and historically colored by the prejudice and stigma associated with being a former colonial subject (Creighton 1997; Lee and De Vos 1981; Weiner 1989). Over the past few decades, as Japan-born Koreans become indistinguishable in many aspects of social life from the majority population, the level and intensity of prejudice and discrimination have become attenuated (Lie 2008). However, their lack of recognition within Japanese society has left numerous traces in inter- and intra-group experiences whether Koreans actively share their group saga (Ryang 2009). Korean minority members, including second and subsequent generations, continue to identify and be identified as *zainichi*,[15] which means "(temporarily) present in Japan" despite their permanent residency and high level of acculturation. They are almost Japanese, but not just Japanese. That the construction of Japaneseness historically required the construction of Koreanness as Other and vice versa in the formative period of nationalism both in Japan and Korea complicates the picture of a sheer amalgamation of one population group (Lie 2008: 3, 172, 192).

The Invisible Race Question: Between Reified Categories

Zainichi Koreans are less than one percent of the Japanese population. Nonetheless, this group has drawn much scholastic attention. A plethora of studies address contemporary *zainichi* Korean issues, including a number of studies that see *zainichi* literary work as a successor to Japanese fiction (Caron 1997; Chapman 2008; Chung 2003; Field 1993; Fukuoka 1993; Fukuoka and M. Kim 1997; Harajiri 1989, 1998; Iida 2002; F. Kim 2004; M. Kim 2003; T. Kim 1999; Kubo 1999; Kuraishi 2000; Lee and De Vos 1981; Lie 2008; Park 1999; Ryang 1997, 2000, 2009; Sasaki 2006; Tani 2002; Tai 2004, 2006; Wender 2005; Yoneyama 2000).

Relatively thorough investigations have been made on identity crises among *zainichi* Koreans, and these studies often treat repressed expressions of Korean heritage in public as highly problematic (Harajiri 1989; 1998; I. Kim 1978; Kobayashi 1980; Fukuoka 1993). The discourse of identity crises drawn from inauthentic membership is counterchallenged by the discourse of blurred boundaries and universal humanity. The underlying assumption in the studies of identity crises is that an individual ought to have one clear-cut ethnic identity. Split or dual ethnic identities are pathological, echoing Robert Park's conceptualization that in the process of assimilation belonging to two different worlds produces a marginal man, a man burdened by a moral dichotomy and conflict that accompany "spiritual instability, intensified self-consciousness, restlessness, and malaise" (Park 1967[1928]: 206). One way of understanding Park is to consider that the Japanese or Japanized self is problematic, false and confused, whereas the Korean or Koreanized self is regarded as true and resolved. But as I will argue, a highly nationalistic reconstruction of self has its own limitations, reproducing the system and structure of exclusion (Balibar 1992: 46). This study finds resistance to an

imposed identity of any kind has been the thematic bottom line for many *zainichi* Koreans, whether explicitly stated or as I have found in the interview data implicit (Fukuoka 1993; Harajiri 1998; Ijichi 1994; Jung 1996; Kuraishi 1996, 2000; T. Kim 1999; Sung 1997; Ryang and Lie 2009; Takenoshita 2000; Tani 2002).

Understanding invisible racialization

This dissertation, drawing on interdisciplinary approaches, contributes to the field of the sociology of race relations at three different levels. First, as a case study, it deepens the knowledge of the most invisible group among the various invisible minorities in Japan by focusing more on Japanese nationality holders and the children of intermarriage who are typically outside the reach of *zainichi* Korean organizational networks. Although Fukuoka (1993) and Harajiri (1989, 1998) tangentially touch on the topic, the ambiguities of the social membership of the naturalized Japanese of Korean ancestry have hampered a systematic, methodologically rigorous approach. As has been discussed earlier, the statistics of naturalization are not published except as aggregate numbers. More recently, increasing scholastic attention has been paid to Japanese nationality holders among *zainichi* Koreans and other nationals, although these works are concerned with overall Japanese immigration policy and the extent to which Japan attains a plural civil society embracing immigrants and their descendents (Asakawa 2003; Kashiwazaki 2000b; Komai and Sasaki 2001; Sasaki 2006; Tai 2004). The reproduction and transformation of Japaneseness has escaped close examination because many researchers are attracted to exotic aspects of *zainichi* Korean lives.

Concerned and organizationally active *zainichi* Koreans and those who write in mainstream Japanese media or in organizational newsletters, have accumulated narratives of

traumatic experience and psychological dilemma which they or their subjects have overcome through identity search and reconciliation. Identity changes over time and the most dramatic moments of change are valued. A typical narrative asserts that Korean identity must be claimed and emphasized regardless of nationality in multiethnic Japan. Exceptional cases of outspoken identity claims as minority members overpower researchers' findings, reproducing group boundaries in an exclusive way.

What is going on is a categorization and recategorization of Japaneseness vs. foreignness; hyphenated Japanese or other alternatives remain beyond the imagination of the majority (Tusneyoshi 2004: 76, 78). I will resist the interpretation of sustained ethnicity because ethnic retention is fundamentally an "epistemology of wishful thinking" (Steinberg 2006). While I also (had to) draw on many observations on published discourses and commentaries by better-connected *zainichi* intellectuals and activists, I will explore a tricky borderline between self-exoticism and implicit functions of multiculturalism as part of hidden curricula of a stronger national integration.

Marginality management

Second, at a theoretical level, this dissertation explains the ways in which people accommodate marginality when the meanings of both marginality and mainstream are in flux at the phase of post-institutionalized yet symbolic racism. Marginality associated with Korean lineage is increasingly considered as a symbol of globalization at home rather than a negative attribute. Simultaneously, Japanese version of "racism without races" (Balibar 1991: 21) or "new racism" (Winant 2001: 252) bursts into Japanese cyberspace. Based on the incorporation processes of resident foreigners among European nation-states, Lee Kwang-il

(1995: 60) argues that granting various rights, especially in terms of social citizenship, to those who have not yet been recognized will result in a reactive social closure because democratic rights have been granted historically only among fully-recognized homogeneously constituted members of nation-states. Between the 1980s (when *zainichi* Koreans began receiving their share of re-distributed social wealth through various welfare and social services) and the 1990s (when some *zainichi* Koreans re-directed their movement objective toward local suffrage), the backlash against *zainichi* Koreans, long simmering but sporadically appearing, emerged in a more coherent and organized way.

Japan-born z*ainichi* Koreans of the post-fingerprinting generation represent a condition that John Lie (2004: 258) calls "a paradox of oppression," by which he means "the partially assimilated who most profoundly experience racism." The phase of symbolic racism—when the conditions of discrimination are attenuated and benign compared with the phase of structural racism—coincide with more active protests, reflecting a belated recognition of racism (Lie 2004: 259). *Zainichi* Koreans are precisely at this phase, where the binary of the oppressor vs. the oppressed no longer makes sense. A systematic formulation of the feelings of inauthenticity, alienation, exclusion, marginality, and misfortune is an enormously complex task now without a clear-cut enemy. Recognition of *zainichi* Koreans within Japanese society, which appeared to have advanced so much during the 1970s and the 1980s, might be of a skewed kind; recognition only within Japan's subpopulation or local communities, while at the national polity level, *zainichi* Korean advancement of rights can be assessed only within the level of constant concession (Pharr 1990).

Some local communities with progressive municipal policies created multi-ethnic policies and activities, guided by principles of educational and multi-cultural community-

building during the 1980s and the 1990s. Yet, assimilation and integration of *zainichi* Koreans had never proceeded smoothly. A combination of diversity and sheer numbers of foreign residents prompted some municipalities to respond to the needs of residents, Japanese and foreigners alike. Other municipalities saw no urgent need to alter existing policies or their implementation.

Because I empirically observe the meanings attached to an invisible race, and treat the "racialized" Korean category as a myriad of positionalities, this study has relevance to race relations in other societies. Race is a social construct or formation, embedded in hierarchical social relations and a process that involves contestations over its meanings (Banton 1983; Omi and Winant 1993). The concept of ethnicity as positionalities (Hall 1990) and practice (Bentley 1987), and the theories on the reproduction of social structures (Bourdieu 1984) provide excellent analytical tools to examine race as a social category that penetrates people's cognition, practices and social relations. Theorists such as Stuart Hall, Paul Gilroy, Michael Omi and Howard Winant, who elaborate the concepts of positionalities and politics of representation, have recently undermined the pathological notion of marginality. A politics of representation studied by Hall (1996[1989]) and Gilroy (1987, 1993) entails the rejection of essential blackness as something given. The essential black category is in fact potentially repressive, in that it imposes a set of fixed transcendental racial categories and de-emphasizes the immense diversity and differentiation of the historical and cultural experience of black subjects. The construction of impassable symbolic boundaries such as race fixes and naturalizes the difference between "belongingness" and "otherness" (Hall 1996[1989]: 445). The discourse of antiracism thus tends to be merely a strategy to reverse the negative, colonial, stereotypical representation, which ironically creates an antithetical category that is

equally repressive. Alternatively, a renewed contestation over the meanings of race is the struggle around positionalities— crisscrossing such categories as class, gender, and ethnicity. In sum, the shift Hall observes is toward the recognition of particular "positionalities"—particular locations in history, social structure, and culture.

The differences between ethnic relations and racial relations are important when *zainichi* representations within the Japanese society are analyzed. The literature on ethnicity and ethnic relations has long agreed upon the fluid and reactive nature of ethnicity (Eller and Coughlan 1993; Okamura 1981; Yancey et al. 1976; Yinger 1985). Ethnicity has resilience precisely because of its selective, adaptive, and expressive nature in practice (Gans 1979). However, a seeming revival of ethnic groups and ethnic cultures occurs to the extent that the larger society allows such expressions (Yancey et al. 1976; Steinberg 1989[1981]). As Waters points out in the case of the US, racial labeling outweighs ethnicity among non-white ethnic groups: ethnicity is not a voluntary, symbolic expression for [visible] racial minorities (1990:155-168; see also Banton 1983:135-137; Omi and Winant 1986:64ff). Thus, race plays a repressive dynamic in voluntary group affiliation.

Race and ethnicity are both socially constructed. Ethnicity—or "ethnicities," when expressing intra-group heterogeneity (Hall 1996 [1989]: 445)—is an increasingly preferred term because of the "biological unity" of human beings (Lie 2001: 2). In everyday language, race is mistaken for biological distinctions and ethnicity for culture, with individuals accepting both concepts predominantly based on their parental lineage. In the United States, race is generally an imposed label attached to stigmatized lineages, whereas ethnicity is an expressive identification (Sanjek 1994; Song 2001; Waters 1999). Modern Japan provides a case where race can also be the basis of ideological supremacy (Yoshino 1992), even if it is

often a residual category, materialized by the presence of allegedly inferior others (Weiner 1997). Because racialization is based on invisible phenotype differences and permeates everyday assumptions of ordinary people, recent critiques of any categorical take of human groupings on the basis of race, ethnicity and nation (Brubaker 2009; Gilroy 2000; Lie 2004a) do not address the immanent mechanism of categorical reproduction.

Double consciousness

The concept of double consciousness helps clarify the dilemma of minority intellectuals. W.E.B. Du Bois wrote about blacks in the United States at the turn of the twentieth century:

> [T]he Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second sight in this American world—a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of the others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder (1961 [1903]: 16-17).

Double consciousness refers to the awareness of being a part of a sub-group which is not fully an integral part of the society. Paul Gilroy (1993) expands the conceptual relevance of double consciousness by relating it to diasporic, global and universal contexts—to "a dream of global co-operation among peoples of color." His reading of Du Bois is useful for understanding the writings of *zainichi* Korean intellectuals because he sees double consciousness as emergent in "the unhappy symbiosis between three modes of thinking, being and seeing"—namely, 1) racial particularism, 2) nationalist rather than separatist identity in relation to the larger society, and 3) diasporic identity that is "sometimes global

and occasionally universalist". In other words, the ideas encompass both the specific and the general (1993: 126-27).

The double consciousness of *zainichi* Koreans potentially challenges the definition and boundaries of authentic membership in Japanese society. However, minority intellectuals do not always play this role. Koreans' ambivalent relationship to Japan—being deeply integrated in Japan but not full-fledged, enfranchised members of the Japanese nation state—does not allow any other choice than working with majority assumptions and seeking to secure their rights ranging from survival to recognition. At least politically, the Korean minority population without Japanese nationality (citizenship) is structurally dependent on the majority population. The difficulties for *zainichi* Korean intellectuals are embedded in their double role, serving both their own group and the mainstream. In parallel, educators—whether *zainichi* Korean or Japanese—who grapple with Korean minority empowerment, are constrained by and dependent on Japanese local and national educational priorities (Tsuneyoshi 2004).

Or consider Ryangs' study of the Chongryun Korean community (1993; 1997). Korean language learning at the pro-DPRK Chongryun-affiliated Korean schools is based on the memorization of phrasal expressions. So far as communication takes place in Chongryun-style Korean, voices of dissent are not easily expressed. It is via the Japanese language that Chongryun Koreans—women in particular—can utter subversive expressions. It is ironic that Japanese, a legacy of colonial rule, is the medium of challenge (Ryang 1998).

The post-1945 Japanese government has been reluctant to adopt proactive assimilation policies. Yet, racial ideologies are internalized because the social structures that

bind people more are likely to result from voluntary cohesion to a set of ideas and social affinities. This study relies on describing diffuse ideological processes that take place in broader social settings beyond the confinements of *zainichi* Korean communities.

Survivors' tales

Third, at an epistemological level, this dissertation pays attention to precisely where "silence" and outspoken activism on race exist in Japan; who refuses to speak and who can (or is willing to) speak out for what purposes (Spivak 1988; Chow 1992). Recent *zainichi* Korean studies focusing on intellectuals or activists capture the overall contours and transitions of *zainichi* Korean communities (Chapman 2008; Lie 2008; Wender 2005).[16] Instead of focusing on the narrowly defined realm of cultural reproduction where voices are limited, I attempt to capture how ordinary people practice and construct their racial identity in everyday life.

Why racial?

Why are contestations over Japaneseness racial rather than ethnic? If *zainichi* Koreans are culturally assimilated and have improved their standing in Japanese society, isn't it a matter of symbolic ethnicity—a touch of personal expressions on selected occasions? Because of the dominance of passing during the post-war period, *zainichi* Koreans remain highly invisible in everyday life. Unlike post-racial theorists, I argue that *zainichi* Korean negotiations over their relationship to the mainstream Japanese society represent the persistence of categorical thinking. The emergent post-*zainichi* generation (Lie 2008: 141), especially those with Japanese nationality, might redraw a positional distinction between *zainichi* Koreans and the Japanese. However, this move also operates within the framework of Japanese hegemony.

I will show the limits of symbolic or part-time ethnicity in the Japanese context. Dormant ethnicity and proactive ethnic identity expressions that converge with the image of exotic foreigners contribute to the reproduction of the hegemonic view of authentic Japaneseness. Invisible race is persistent in multiplicities of meanings attached to optional representations. Recent popular and academic discourses claim that race/racism as a frame of social inequalities or of everyday encounters is obsolete, inappropriate, and politically incorrect. The denial of race as a category—ethnicity is overarching and a handy concept—is part of intellectual currents that challenge any categorical thinking based on the multi-dimensionality of reality and history and reflect objective, scientific truths' subjective biases of a given time period. On the other hand, there exists no powerful alternative to interfere with the categorical assumptions people actually hold.

Institutionalization of Invisible Race: Family Registry and its Enduring Legacy

Invisible races are institutionalized and documented in the family registry system (*koseki seido*) established in 1870. The family registry (*koseki*) is the proof of Japanese identity as part of a family unit. Interracial and cross-national marriages have never been subject to formal legal sanctions in modern Japan (Kamoto 2000; Takeshita 2000). Nevertheless, individual choices regarding marriage or romance have been contingent upon social mores or self-imposed behavioral codes. In pre-1945 Japan, institutionalized rigid status hierarchies self-regulated the marriage market. The dominance of love marriages in contemporary Japan since the 1960s seems to support the idea that romance and marriage is fundamentally a matter of individual choice, not a matter of mutually beneficial liaisons between families (Ryang 2006: 74). However, when race is materialized in lineage in the modern family

registry system, self-regulation works in tandem with desire. The reproduction of a respectable family constitutes but one, if frequently unacknowledged, aspect of romantic love (Fujino 1999).

Legal marriage and the way birth and kinship are recorded and structured are key institutions for the reproduction of the nation-state, its population and culture (Stevens 1999). Since the onset of the modern Japanese nation-state, changes in household composition such as marriage and divorce, birth and death have been recorded in family registries which are the basis of Japanese nationality.[17] The principle of *jus sanguinis* is not the critical idea on which to define lineage-based membership. What I want to hone in on is the institutionalization of Japanese nationality not in a purely legalistic sense but in its quotidian, even moral, aspects through tangible record-keeping. It is necessary to consider how Japanese state membership is legally and symbolically defined by the family registry, *koseki*, which in combination with residency records, *jūminhyō*, embodies citizenship. Family registry, just a document in its function, has had vigilant effects in maintaining social boundaries.

The municipal bureaus where an individual's permanent residence is located keep the original record of family registry. The original family registry is altered each time any demographic change occurs within a family unit—birth or adoption, marriage and divorce and eventually death. When required, an individual obtains either of the two available kinds of official transcripts, a transcript of an entire family register (*tōhon*) or a transcript of an individual's entries (*shōhon*). Resident foreigners submit a copy of alien registration record in a situation where a copy of family registry or resident registration is required. Family registry bears foremost social significance when it comes to marriage. Although everyday

life goes on without bothering family registry records, marriages typically involve a bureaucratic transaction in which the newly-wed wife's existence is entered onto the groom's family registry which the groom's record is separated from his father's upon marriage. With the names of both wife's and husband's parents recorded, a lineage inquiry is possible for all the involved parties (Fuji 1998).

The sense in which lineage props up the imagined community is illustrated by its relatively recent invention. It was only in 1870, the beginning of modern family registry, that most Japanese commoners were allowed to use family names (Harada 1975: 182). This "tradition" of family consciousness diffused so well that within several decades formal and informal guidelines were developed for background checks on a prospective marriage partner and his or her family (Fujino 1999). *Mimoto chōsa*—or a check of lineage, family background, and behavior prior to marrying has been a thriving business in post-war Japan (Hayashida 1975; Tsuyuki 1986). In order to prevent discrimination upon employment or marriage against *burakumin*, Jinshin Koseki was officially sealed from public viewing under the control of the Ministry of Justice in 1968. Not surprisingly, a parallel registry soon came into existence, first on clandestinely circulated paper lists (Tsuyuki 1986: 185-186, 189) and later on internet bulletin boards.

Naturalized Japanese of colonial Korean descent often share a desire for an impeccable family registry record; even better to have one indistinguishable from ordinary Japanese record (Y. Kim 1990). Increasing concerns for privacy have ostensibly made unauthorized access to them more difficult, but their misuse by legal professionals and alleged proxies continues. Unauthorized background checks have made the coming out option more attractive.[18]Given these mechanisms of materializing invisible racial boundaries,

Japanese marriages to Koreans, regardless of official legal status need not be sanctioned formally.

Japanese Civil Society

Japanese society has putatively enjoyed democracy since the enactment of its Constitution during the US occupation. It has sustained a flourishing civil society—for which it could be argued the family has been an especially powerful denominator. This is because the family is often portrayed as the primary organizational principle in the Japanese social system; the Japanese corporation, whose market strength soared during the postwar era, is often described as a quasi-family and even the modern Japanese nation has been described using familial analogies (Rohlen 1974; Takezawa 1995; Weiner 1997). If one accepts Robert Putnam's argument that the intensity of civil society is a key indicator of a thriving democracy, then Japan with intensive organizational networks of family, neighborhood associations (*chōnaikai*), workplace and business associations, unions, PTAs, school alumni associations, club and circle activities, and local study groups, must be truly democratic (Putnam 1995). Robert Pekkanen's account of Japanese civil society (2006), though, points out contradictory structures. While advocate groups sprout in localities everywhere, there is a surprising absence of nationally representative and networked organizations. Locally-based advocates hardly influence the national politics.[19]

Many observers of Japanese society note the historically continuous presence of an iron cage. In this line of argument, Japan's post-war democracy has not been unconditionally celebrated. Historian John Dower (1993) delineated the continuity between the totalitarian war mobilization system and post-war Japanese society and institutions. Sociologist Yoshio

Sugimoto (2003) characterizes the Japanese society as being “friendly authoritarianism” and illustrates the ways state ideology penetrates people’s behavior in a very subtle way. In a similar vein, Anne Allison (1998), the anthropologist, applied Louis Althusser’s concept of ideological state apparatus to analyze how family and school are effective agents of the dominant ideology.

In the post-war period Japan experienced political liberalization and a decrease in economic inequality, but the gains in these spheres were undermined by a civic religion of Japanese homogeneity and uniqueness (Befu 2001). The pre-war special police and National Security Law were abolished, and the constitution guaranteed freedom of speech and assembly. Economic growth and lifetime employment for large sectors of the male working class narrowed the status gap between classes and created a society in which an overwhelming majority considered themselves middle class (*ichioku sō-chūryū*). Yet, despite and precisely because of this horizontal leveling, Japan’s civic religion, as represented by *Nihonjinron* [Treatises of Japaneseness], provided an ideological canon for social exclusion (Lie 2001; Befu 2001). As Lie and others point out, this pure and abstract sense of Japaneseness was predominantly a post-World War II discourse (Lie 2001; Oguma 1995; Yoshino 1992).

Civil society is often thought to create the conditions for a more democratic polity because it increases members’ social capital, thus promoting effective and representative self-governance. The non-governmental sphere, private organizations and associations, media and opinion forums, all contribute to this realization of democracy. Yet a “dark side” of civil society looms large in this age of uncertainty and backlash politics. The dark side of civil society—the negative potential of civil society and civic participation to replicate

authoritarian values and capacities—is deeply embedded in civil society itself. It is an arena in which political and economic ambitions for upward mobility can be played out.[20]

How and to what ends civil society operates is important to *zainichi* Koreans. For *zainichi* Koreans many of whom do not possess voting rights, civil society has been the only civic participatory channel to which they have been allowed entry. Their participation in Japanese local government and state functions has been restricted, open to Japanese nationality holders only. Erin Chung (2003) argues that despite the lack of legal citizenship *zainichi* Koreans have long been practicing citizenship as local residents, but the discourse of Japanese civic participation is increasingly contentious among *zainichi* Koreans.

Method

The primary method adopted in this study is ethnographic research, which includes in-depth interviews and participant observations, because *zainichi* Koreans' interpretations of the meanings of their membership are in question. *Zainichi* Koreans provide a rich ethnographic field for the exploration of how racial identities are produced as everyday accomplishments. The variety of contemplations over *zainichi* Korean heritage, cultural representation, and civic participation express how social structures, social memberships, and identities are constructed in individual interpretations and interpersonal relations. The data on the subtlety of an individual's code switching between passing-as-Japanese mode and Korean mode, on the rationales an individual uses to justify choices and positions, and on how individuals socially represent themselves can best be collected by ethnography (Alasuutari 1996; Burawoy 1991).

I have supplemented ethnographic data with available publications, both mainstream and community-based, as well as official statistics and other resources accumulated in previous bodies of research. I conducted a discourse analysis of Japanese language texts—academic articles, popular journal articles, fiction and non-fiction—to trace the historical transformation of the ways in which the themes of search for identity and homeland were inscribed, invented and re-invented (Sollars 1989). The authors of the analyzed texts included both naturalized *zainichi* and *zainichi*-Koreans. Contextual readings of diverse sources were helpful to identify what has changed and what has not. Secondary sources have been used as illustrations as well as crucial information sources. Several key sources are compared, paying attention to the target audience, the timing of publication, the author's known position in the print market, and other broader contexts.

Second, I analyzed the agenda and causes of the organizations of diverse local activist groups through participant observation and in-depth interviews both with core and former members. Between 1999 and Fall, 2002, I attended meetings and sponsored events of three local-based groups in the Kansai region;[21] Param no kai (a self-help group of Korean minority and other minority backgrounds such as transsexuals, and the handicapped who share life stories)(it denies it is an activist group),[22] Han-madang (a local community based Korean culture group which was originally inspired by the 1980s South Korean democracy movement; members included Japanese, Japanese citizens of Korean ancestry, and Koreans), and the Ōmi Toraijin Club (a prefecture based voluntary association for people of Korean ancestry and Japanese who are interested in Korea). These three groups pursued alternatives to existing organization. They marked the moments of simultaneous construction of Koreanness and Japaneseness and their transitions (Chapter 6). By the late 2000s, advancing

communication technology made it possible for me to collect additional data on an anti-*zainichi* Korean organization (Chapter 7), observing from New York the simultaneous internet broadcast of a meeting held in Tokyo.

Third, I conducted 90 interviews with *zainichi* Koreans: 45 Japanese nationality holders (naturalized Japanese and progeny of intermarriage whose nationality is Japanese) and 45 Koreans (South Korean and stateless Korean). All these interview schedules were set up from different entry points. Among Japanese nationality holders, some were more engaged in *zainichi* matters and identity issues than others. Likewise, South Korean and stateless Korean informants included those who actively maintained their Korean nationality, those who passively maintained their Korean nationality, those who were in the process of naturalization, and those who were seriously considering naturalization at the time of interview. Interviews were semi-structured, recorded and transcribed, all conducted in both interviewer and interviewee's native language, Japanese. I used a revised interview format which Fukuoka Yasunori (1993) used to accumulate his large qualitative data sets during late 1980s and the early 1990s, which Fukuoka shared with me. The interview is fundamentally a life-history focused sprinkled with diverse thematic issues. Interviews ranged from barely an hour to more than four hours. The vast majority attained post-secondary education. More than two-thirds of the respondents hold 4-year-college or higher degrees, which reflects a close connection between the ethnic identity search and upward social mobility elsewhere.

Throughout the fieldwork, I traveled between the Kantō region (Tokyo and its vicinity) and the Kansai region (Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe and its vicinity). Some interviews were conducted in the Tōkai region (Nagoya and its vicinity). Because I am originally from Tokyo, I was somewhat of an outsider in areas beyond the Kanto region. In terms of Korean

empowerment education, the Kansai region is a better site than Kanto, which has one notable multiculturalism-oriented exception in Kawasaki. Two thirds of my informants were based in the Kansai region.

There are several limitations to in-depth interview data. First, individuals frequently avoid the uncomfortable subjects of prejudice and discrimination thus limiting sociological research (Suh 1997: 23). Fukuoka Yasunori (1993; Fukuoka et al. 1991) documents many interviewees claim they were never personally discriminated against, while they later in the same interview session they revealed personal experiences which were the results of prejudice and discrimination. In diverse interviews, I also noticed that many interviewees would cope with clearly stressful and uncomfortable situations very well, albeit in an apathetic way. To illustrate, a *zainichi* Korean university student told me that his Japanese girl friend's father explicitly said to him, "you can go out with my daughter, so long as you don't marry each other." I thought this was rather an offensive situation. So I asked, "What did you think of that?" Instead of feeling angry, "I was just sad," he said. Personal narratives inherently echo one's available vocabularies and frames to process one's experience.

Second, in the case of many *zainichi* Korean interviewees, my snowball sample did not roll at all, especially among the naturalized. Among 90 informants, I had only four introductions. It was partly because I tried as many different contacts as possible without relying on existing organizational networks. And it was partly because I was unable to push harder, fully understanding that some people really do not want to discuss *zainichi* matters. I realized that the inter-generational relationships within a family were occasionally disrupted, which suggests that the role of family might be an overrated mechanism of ethnic transmission. My initial focus was exclusively on naturalized *zainichi* Japanese of colonial

Korean descent and the progeny of intermarriage. I soon realized that nationality per se does not distinguish much among *zainichi* Koreans in terms of politics, identity, and other issues. Regardless of nationality, I learned that siblings or close cousins were rarely available for interviews; informants almost always told me that they rarely spoke about *zainichi* matters with family members. Z*ainichi* Koreans assume their family members were unwilling to be interviewed. Contacting people while using the Korean pronunciation of my own name, occasionally evoked unexpected reactions (see Chapters 2 and 4).

In order to expand the pool of respondents, I attended events where I thought Koreans who had been in Japan for several generations would gather. They ranged from politically conscious study groups to social outings which connect Koreans living in Japan. In some events, I saw more Japanese researchers and journalists than *zainichi* Koreans. What worked best in the late 1990s was the then burgeoning internet connection. Based on comments posted on an internet mailing list, I established contacts with 14 individuals.[23]Friends and acquaintances supplied other informants.

Studies focusing on *zainichi* Korean activism predominantly reflect researchers' pro-democracy, pro-alternative, and critical wishful thinking biases. They envision Japan as an emergent multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society (Chung 2003; Fukuoka 1991, 1993; Kashiwazaki 2000b, Sasaki 2003, Tai 2004, 2006; Tanaka 1993). Fukuoka's (1991, 1993) pioneering study of *zainichi* Korean youth identities is sympathetic toward particular causes such as Mintōren (see Chapter 1) and the *Zainichi* South Korean Youth Organization. The Mintōren movement, from its outset, embraced an ideal in which both Japanese and *zainichi* Koreans could live together and respect human and minority rights (Fukuoka 1993; J. Pak and Ueno 2008; Tanaka 1993). Erin Chung's work (2000, 2003) relies on a close rapport

with activists from two branches of Mintōren and a Tokyo-based alternative group headed by the charismatic Kim Gyuil.[24] These activists' visions add empirical evidence to her major claim that *zainichi* Koreans actively practice citizenship as foreign residents without legal citizenship.

The narratives of a handful of outspoken *zainichi* individuals who are willing to be interviewed by journalists and scholars and who also have written about their experiences, significantly shape researchers' stories not only about *zainichi* Korean civic participation but also about *zainichi* (Chapman 2007; Nakamura 2003; Pak and Ueno 2006; Shin and Tsutsui 2008; Tsutsui and Shin 2007). Based on an examination of the vocabularies used in *zainichi* Korean social activists' recollections, researchers agree that they have used global human rights norms as a resource for minority rights. This has been in keeping with the Japanese majority's awareness post-1980 of their perception in international communities (Chung 2003; Shin and Tsutsui 2008; Tsutsui and Shin 2007).

Throughout my fieldwork, I made a conscious effort to avoid accounts of socially outspoken *zainichi* Koreans. Not surprisingly, my politically-inactive interviewees, Korean by nationality or not, were unaware of the currents of *zainichi* activism introduced and celebrated in academic and journalistic sources. The presentation of the political and community activities of two local groups in Chapter 6 seems to go against my initial plan to focus primarily on *zainichi* Koreans detached from any *zainichi* organizations. I describe two local groups giving voice to rank and filers, those who were organizationally marginal, as well as former members. As I illustrate in Chapter 4, there exists an immense gap between *zainichi* Koreans whose identity remains strictly personal and those whose consciousness goes beyond the personal. Chapter 5 sheds some light on the circumstances in which

identities cease to be personal and compartmentalized. In Chapter 6, I will further explore the borders between the personal and the collective in detailed analyses of the formation and continuation of community-based activities.

From a range of angles, the chapters below address the limits of hyphenated ethnicity and the shifting yet persistent invisible racial boundaries which leave the dominant view of authentic Japaneseness unchallenged. Chapter 1 thematically summarizes the *zainichi* Korean historical background and the present contour of social conditions. Chapter 2 focuses on intermarriage between Japanese and *zainichi* Koreans, exploring the shifting invisible racial boundaries. A closer look at the available demographic data shows gendered aspects of intermarriages as well as Koreans' persistently endogamous tendency in Japan (Appendix 2). Based on in-depth interviews with intermarried individuals, and applying the concept of racial literacy, I examine a gradation of approaches to how *zainichi* literacy is practiced at home. Negotiating dual heritage is indeed complex when two groups are in asymmetric power relations combined with intra-family gender issues as well.

Chapter 3 goes beyond the family and examines broader school- and community-level approaches by examining the shifting contents of the inscription of Koreanness in the past three decades and resultant transformations in *zainichi* Korean pedagogy. What is behind the shift from the national to the ethnic is the relationship between the questions of class and gender in dealing with *zainichi* Korean double consciousness. The dominant accommodative and realistic approaches cater to the needs of not only *zainichi* Koreans but also the Japanese mainstream.

Chapter 4 reveals an immense gap of perception between individuals and intellectuals. I focus on the ways in which naturalized Japanese of colonial Korean descent, the most structurally assimilated subgroup of *zainichi* Koreans, contends with *zainichi* Korean heritage. I use the slightly awkward expression "Japanese of colonial Korean descent" to refer to naturalized Koreans, as there is no better explanatory term. It also helps distinguish them from those Japanese whose family is of precolonial Korean origin, for example, the descendants of the Korean artisans brought to Japan by Toyotomi Hideyoshi in the sixteenth century. While it is commonly agreed that assimilation does not immediately mean the end of an ethnic identity, I will illustrate how in reality it is difficult to go beyond the private sphere, expressing Korean roots and *zainichi* Korean routes.[25]

Chapters 2, 3, and 4 address the search for personal and collective identity, whereas Chapter 5, 6, and 7 explore into *zainichi* Korean civic engagement. Chapter 5 explores a spectrum of approaches to how *zainichi* Koreans, specifically after naturalization, cope with contentious domestic and international issues debated in Japan. I argue that the ways in which *zainichi* Koreans are assimilated are politically segmented.

Chapter 6 explores two local activist groups' contrasting operations, both pointing to the limits of multiculturalism. I find that the greater a group identifies with a *zainichi* Korean identity, the more likely that group will pursue civic engagement in Japanese politics. A detailed examination of the ways in which each group operates reveals multiple meanings attached to organizational causes. Chapter 7 details with an ongoing debate over who has rights to dissent in contemporary Japan. A recent current of *zainichi* bashing by naturalized *zainichi* Korean intellectuals vehemently criticizes South Korean and stateless Korean *zainichi* Koreans as spoiled, privileged foreigners. Such *zainichi* bashing and the reaction to

it from inside and outside the *zainichi* Korean community shows authentic Japanese membership's conditional expansion is limited to those who accommodate well or over-conform.

The Conclusion provides a brief summary of findings regarding the conflicted nature of becoming Japanese, focusing on the multiple meanings attached to *zainichi* Korean representations which challenge and contribute to the reproduction of the majority perspective. While throughout the text I focus on *zainichi* Koreans, I deliberately leave out the term *zainichi* Koreans in the title. What follows is ultimately about Japan and Japanese society.

Endonotes:

[1] *Yūkan Fuji.* 1/21/03. "Shinkoku! Takanohana sari kokugi hōkai no kiki." [It's serious! The crisis of the national sport after Takanohana].

[2] *Yūkan Fuji.* 1/26/09. "Asashōryū V wa iikeredo honto ni iino, sumō-kai." [Asashōryū's victory is fine, but is the sumo world really all right?]

[3] The sumo nobility of Hanada family which once had two *yokozuna,*Takanohana and his elder brother Wakanohana, provided flashy headlines in Japanese scandal-savvy papers and journals in the past decade. Nonetheless, born Japanese, their scandals were never associated with lack of Japaneseness.

[4] Shinto is the indigenous and ancient animistic belief system which was once adopted as a centripetal ideological force of an emergent nation state for over a century. Although Showa Emperor Hirohito himself declared that he was a human in 1946, the 1947 constitutional definition of the Emperor is the symbol of the state integrity, the Imperial family members conduct a series of the most significant Shinto rituals as the direct descendent of Amaterasu, the mythical goddess who founded Japan. In Shinto, people can be purified, not converted. Shinto is so naturally and quintessentially Japanese beyond tourist introduction to Japanese society.

[5] See Lie (2001:63-64), on sumo and its relatively recent elevation to "national sport" and the presence of non-Japanese wrestlers.

[6] See I. Kim (1978: 162-163) for late *yokozuna* Tamanoumi's case. His father was "dead" as reported in public, but he, Korean, was alive.

[7] For the reproduction of the homogeneity assumption of Japanese society among Japanese themselves, Japanologists, and even Japanese-American sociologists, see Lie 2001: 1-2.

[8] The criteria of Japanese lineage changed and became more lenient over time for Nikkei visas (Kajita 1994: 167-168). Kajita (1994) assesses that the influx of Nikkei reconfirmed blood lineage's significance in defining Japanese ethnicity (170).

[9] Taking a Korean migration historical mid-point of the 1960 statistics, of 596,755 Koreans in Japan, 139,763 (23.4 percent) reside in Osaka-*fu*, 62,745 (10.5 percent) in Tokyo-*to*, 56,254 (9.4 percent) in Hyogo-*ken*, 41,295 (6.9 percent) in Aichi-ken, 39,541 (6.6 percent) in Kyoto-fu, 31,587 (5.3 percent) in Fukuoka-ken, and 24,441 (4.1 percent). These top seven prefectures have approximately two thirds of Korean residents in Japan (Morita 1996: 36-37) .

[10] Korean residential segregation has never been as intense as racial segregation in the US. In Momodani 3-chome of Ikuno-ward of Osaka City (historically known as Ikaino, the most Korean concentrated area), 43.5 percent, or 4 out of 10 residents are Korean and 6 are Japanese in 1995 (Inatsuki 2002: 689).

[11] The irony of this boom is that it is simply building on the past indifference and ignorance about Korea, accepting its image only as modern yet somewhat nostalgic (Hayashi 2005: 133, 140).

[12] While the Japan's Constitution clarifies the separation of the state and religion, high-ranking government officials pay an official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. The Shrine's function had been to reward the death of Japanese military by apotheosis. The controversy is around the constitutional separation of the state and religion as well as the deification of class-A war criminals. See Fujitani (1996: 121-125) and Field (1993: Ch.2).

[13] In a 2006 survey, South Korea ranked the fifth from the bottom among 20 countries with a larger standard deviation, which means opinions are divided (Tanabe 2008: 377). North Korea is not included in this survey. A survey during the 1960s show Koreans ranked the second lowest among 13 groups (Wagatsuma and Yoneyama 1967: 119). See also Tei (1995: 2-6) referring to earlier surveys during the immediate post-war period.

[14] See also Hayashida 1975, Burkhardt 1983.

[15] The nomenclature of Korean minority in Japanese language is a political and polemical issue, reflecting the political division of the Korean peninsula (Miyauchi 1999; Yoon 1991b [1990]. *Zainichi* is often used to describe *zainichi* Koreans. Korean part is omitted to avoid the term *chōsen-jin* (which means people from Korean peninsula, but is often misunderstood as North Koreans) or *kankoku-jin* (which means South Koreans).

[16] As has been noted earlier, from the period of colonial rule when Koreans were aggregations of home-village-connected temporary labor migrants and elite international students, *zainichi* Koreans never represent themselves a single, uniform voice.

[17] In her examination of the precedents of cross-national marriages, Kamoto Itsuko (2001) outlines the dual system of the Japanese nationality in international relations and the Japanese nationality in internal administrative relations from the onset of the family registry. The definition of the Japanese people through family registry was legal-administratively implemented several decades before the promulgations of the Meiji Imperial Constitution (1889) and the Civil Codes (1890) (Kamoto 2001: 84-85).

[18] An infamous example of a breach of privacy was the case of the late Arai Shōkei, the first Korean-Japanese congressman whose political career ended by Arai's suicide following a financial scandal. His first election campaign ended unsuccessfully when was his opponent's secretary, relying on an illegal background check, who put up black stickers accusing him of being an "ex-North Korean" (I. Park 1999: 183-184). Although he distanced from any domestic and international problems associated with *zainichi* Koreans and the Korean peninsula, his background as a naturalized Japanese, turned him a drifter within complex party faction politics (I. Park 1999: 195, 201). Earlier in the 1970s, Nara Prefecture's Sakurai City municipal election had a similar interference against Kawamoto Yoshio, who won the seat at his second try (I. Kim 1978: 139).

[19] See the examples of local advocate groups in Chapter 5 which are underrepresented in the national political discourse.

[20] I benefited from a discussion led by Corey Robin on this topic at the 2005-2006 workshop sponsored by the Center for Philanthropy and Civil Society, CUNY Graduate Center.

[21] At an initial planning stage of this project, I was trying to compare and contrast the Seiwa Club and Torimodosu-kai. I was not able to obtain a rapport from the Seiwa Club despite several attempts. Komai Hiroshi and Sasaki Teru successfully managed to use their contact lists to administer a survey (Sasaki 2003).

[22] Paramu-no-kai discontinued their monthly meetings around 2000 (personal communication).

[23] The use of mailing list specifically for *zainichi* Korean issues probably no longer works after the anti-*zainichi* Korean movement was organized in the mid-2000s (see Chapter 6).

[24] For researchers, there clearly exist sporadic, local hot spots as field work sites, such as Takatsuki Mukuge Society and Kawasaki's Fureai-kan. Kim Gyuil's group's 2000 and 2001 symposiums I attended provided me with ample opportunities to mingle with Ph.D. candidates and university faculty who were interested in *zainichi* Koreans.

[25] Paul Gilroy's use of roots and routes (1993)—"roots" meaning origins, lineage, or place, to which the imported Japanese word, *rūtsu*, refers. Canonical thinking on diaspora, epitomized in this catchy homonymic phrase, includes an unclear point of reference. For Clifford, "routes/roots" refers to an argument that "specific histories, tactics, everyday practices of dwelling and traveling: traveling-in-dwelling and dwelling-in-traveling" must be considered in comparative cultural studies (Clifford 1997: 36). Gilroy's use carries a slightly different meaning. The term "roots" for Gilroy means cultural and ethnic roots, or origin, while the notion of settling down, which is Clifford's roots as dwelling, is specified as "rootedness" (Gilroy 1993: 111–112). In Gilroy's writing, the term "roots" implies authentic and thus sufficient background and location (cf. Gilroy 1993: 116–117). However, "routes" implies travel, migration, displacement, and movement in general, and as such is the same

use as Clifford's (Gilroy 1993: Chs. 3, 4). A lack of roots, according to Gilroy, becomes a problem only after *national* consciousness emerges in the black diaspora (1993: 112). For Gilroy ethnicity is "an infinite process of identity construction" (1993: 223) and therefore a lack of roots need not entail negative consequences. Gilroy is skeptical of nationalist movements and their derivative desires for rootedness and meaningfulness attached to the search of authentic ethnic roots. Particular types of racism, which alienate blacks from collective history and culture, dangerously transform identity politics into a romanticized worship of authentic culture associated only with a place of origin traceable through lineage.

CHAPTER ONE

From Japanese Imperial Subjects to Resident Foreigners and Naturalized Japanese: *Zainichi* Koreans, Then and Now

The history of Koreans in Japan testifies to the tight linkage of rights and citizenship.
———Sonia Ryang (2009: 16).

In this chapter, I will outline a series of historical events that have taken place over the past hundred years, the legacy of which continue to affect both Japanese and *zainichi* Koreans in the present day. I will explore the context of Korean migration to Japan, issues surrounding the legal status of this population and its descendants, and the development of organizational and non-organizational politics among *zainichi*. In addition, I will examine several indicators of cultural and structural assimilation, such as intergenerational social mobility, naturalization, and intermarriage.

The first of these historical events was Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910. Koreans became Japanese imperial subjects, at least on a symbolic level, and remained so until Japan's defeat in 1945, this status not formally rescinded until the end of Allied occupation in 1952. The second major event was the liberation of the Korean Peninsula in 1945 by the Allied Powers and the occupation of its northern and southern parts by opposing forces. This led to the establishment of two Korean nation-states in 1948 and later to the Korean War (1950-53). The third significant historical development that I will consider here is the series of steps by which ambiguities in the status of former Japanese nationals of colonial origin and their descendants have been addressed by legislation enacted in 1965, 1982 and 1991.[1]

Zainichi Koreans have now entered a new phase, having experienced improvements in their social, political, and legal conditions in Japan during the 1980s and 1990s. The binary framework, featuring Koreans as the oppressed and Japanese as the oppressors, is no longer convincing in the context of everyday life, either to *zainichi* Koreans or Japanese. Forms of discrimination have become subtler and less institutionalized, particularly since the establishment of a stabilized legal status for former colonial subjects and their descendents in 1991. Further, intergenerational social mobility, increased intermarriages with Japanese, and comprehensive linguistic and cultural assimilation among Japan-born generations have transformed the basis of collective *zainichi* identities, and it is debatable whether they continue to exist at all.

A notable paradigm shift in *zainichi* Korean historiography during the 1990s pertains to the transition from a discourse of forced labor migration to one of voluntary immigration. Within the broader narrative of the comparative history of international labor migration, z*ainichi* Koreans can be considered as the descendants of forced labor migration (Potts 1990: 152). Within Japan, a canonical and controversial text by Pak Kyong-shik (1995 [1965])[2] had a considerable influence on the process of collective identity formation; several *zainichi* Korean activists I interviewed mentioned how their reading of Pak's *Chōsenjin kyōseirenkō no kiroku* [The Record of Korean Forced Migration] reframed the feelings they had held since childhood of being ashamed and embarrassed to have been born *zainichi.* The idea that *zainichi* Koreans were living in Japan involuntarily, contextualized within the broader historical dynamics by Pak's monograph, encouraged activists to redefine *zainichi* identity through voicing their dissent and demanding recognition.

By the mid-1990s, however, both Japanese and *zainichi* Korean scholars had agreed that prewar Korean migrants represented a case of immigration rather than one of individuals being uprooted against their will. Colonial migrants turned out to be a more selective subgroup; they were more innovative, better connected, better educated, and more highly skilled as an urban labor force than those who remained in rural areas of colonial Korea. Some early migrants were even politically conscious. Those who remained in Japan after WWII are predominantly the children of those migrants, not the offspring of those who migrated as part of a conscripted wartime labor force (Ha 1997; G. Kim 1998; Tonomura 1998; Tei 2001).[3] The context of their migration is not, therefore, as one-dimensional and tragic as was previously imagined (Lie 2008).

John Ogbu (1991: 17-28) has developed a framework to explain why certain minority migrant groups adapt and perform better than others, either educationally or in their occupational endeavors, in their destination countries. In the context of this framework, *zainichi* Koreans represent an ideal-typical case of a group that considers itself ill fated due to having been forced to migrate against its will. Academic performance by members of this population plummets due to perceptions that they will be excluded from a range of occupational choices and prevented from following a normative course of upward social mobility in the host society. In response to such perceptions, *zainichi* Korean youths develop an oppositional culture that deemphasizes academic success. Korean Americans, by contrast, are known for their high levels of academic achievement. This is because, as voluntary migrants driven by a desire for upward mobility and economic advancement, they conform to the values of the dominant society much more eagerly than is the case for involuntary migrant minority groups.[4] Oppositional cultural frames of reference held by these groups

translate into negative consequences in the context of their social integration (Ogbu 1991: 26).[5]

Which generation marks the transition from voluntary minority status to involuntary minority status depends on racial and inter-ethnic relations in the host society. The second generation of voluntary migrants (i.e. the first to be born in the host society) becomes the first generation of an involuntary minority group if it perceives that its path to upward mobility is compromised.[6] However, second and third generations also reinterpret their collective history, responding to larger societal and political conditions. Not isolated from global neo-liberal trends (A. Song 2006), recent historical studies of *zainichi* Koreans have emphasized their agency—the active choices made by their ancestors and their resilience in adapting to their new environments—taking both push and pull factors into account (Ha 1997; Lie 2008; Tonomura 1998). Other commentators reject the discourse of *zainichi* Korean victimhood, viewing it as a product of a flawed ideological standpoint held by certain *zainichi* and progressive Japanese intellectuals and grassroots activists (Asakawa 2006; Tei 2004d) (see Chapter 5).

This chapter is descriptive in nature, rather than analytical or diagnostic. The debate about whether *zainichi* Koreans were forced to move to Japan as part of a conscripted labor force or chose to migrate voluntarily is a pointless one, for three reasons. First, historical narratives, especially those with overt or covert nationalist agendas, always project the issues and political interests of the period in which they are enunciated (Dennehy 2002; Lie 2008). Second, the line between voluntary and involuntary migration is difficult to draw, as individuals are often unaware of larger historical forces and what may appear as voluntary choices may be the result of having no other choice (Mills 1956). Third, the accumulated

body of life history narratives of the *zainichi* Korean migrant generations highlights tales of survival and individual achievement in the face of structural constraints, highlighting examples of individuals and groups that have chosen to remain in Japan and pursued satisfying life-paths there (cf. Kang and Oguma 2008).

Zainichi Koreans: From Colonial Migrants/Imperial Subjects to Resident Aliens

The presence of a Korean minority in Japan is a legacy of Japan's imperial past, and can be considered a product of both "push" and "pull" factors (Weiner 1989: 30, 74). The "push" factor here was Japan's colonial rule of Korea (1910-1945), which triggered accelerated and highly disruptive transformations of Korean society, while the "pull" factor was increased demand for labor from within the domestic Japanese market. Japan's encroachment onto the Korean Peninsula started with the 1876 Kang-hwa Treaty.[7] This was a typical example of an unequal treaty, homologous to the treaties imposed by the hegemonic Western powers on Japan during the decade preceding the Meiji Restoration of 1868, when it began its history as a modern imperial nation state facing its own threat of being colonized.[8] Following its settlement of the border with Russia (1875), its incorporation of Okinawa and nearby islands (1879), and the rapid westernization of its state apparatuses, including the military, the Japanese Empire successively defeated China (1895) and Russia (1905) in wars fought, at least in part, over interests on the Korean peninsula. Within three decades, Japan had transformed itself into an industrialized and expansionist colonial power. The above victories paved the way for further territorial expansion, with Taiwan (Formosa) acquired from the Qing Dynasty China in 1895 and the southern half of Sakhalin acquired from Russia in 1905.

By the late 19th century, Japanese encroachment onto the peninsula was already triggering some population movements, with Koreans being hired sporadically as contracted miners in northern parts of the Japanese island of Kyūshū (Yamawaki 1994: 74).[9] Reform efforts by Korea's Yi Dynasty ended in failure, Korea becoming a protectorate of Japan in 1905 before full annexation in 1910.[10] The period of colonization lasted until Japan's defeat in WWII in August 1945. This period witnessed continued expansion in the Korean population in Japan as well as Japanese migration to Korea. Social and economic conditions in Japan, which was facing its own population problems, triggered large-scale population movements in multiple directions.[11]

It must be remembered, however, that the colonization of Korea took place during a time when Koreans had established neither a modern nation state nor a national consciousness (Ōnuma 2004a: 182; Lie 2008: 170; Ryang 1990). Regional and status-based identity was much stronger.[12]Being imperial subjects yet originated in colonies, Koreans and Taiwanese, as *gaichi-jin* ("outlanders"), were formerly ranked lower than *naichi-jin* (those from Japan proper) (Ōnuma 2004a: 184-185; Lie 2008: 8; Yamawaki 1994: 10). Koreans were kept under strict control and continuously perceived as a potential threat to national security throughout the colonial period, seen as being associated not only with the Korean (nationalist) independence movement but also with the (class-based) labor movement (Nishinarita 1997: 142, 347; Weiner 1989: 111, 121). Korean migrant workers, legally Japanese but retaining their inferior status as *gaichi-jin*, were de facto foreign workers in the contemporary sense, accepted only as an inexpensive, flexible and dispensable labor force (Yamawaki 1994: 10, 15). This group continued to work in Japan on a voluntary basis until the period of total war mobilization (1939-1945) (J. Kang 1996: 208; Suh 1989: 8).

Migration as Japanese imperial subjects: 1910-1945

Changes in the Korean population in Japan reflect changes in Japanese colonial practices based on Japanese national interests. In 1909, the year prior to annexation, there were only 790 Koreans in Japan, primarily diplomats and students (Yamawaki 1994: 15). By 1944, this figure had risen to 1,936,843 (Ministry of Internal Affairs in Morita 1996: 33), further rising to 2,206,541 by August 1945 (Nishinarita 1997: 42).[13]During the 1910s and 1920s, migration to Japan was considered a temporary affair to be followed by an eventual return to Korea. Once migration to the metropolis had begun, however, it became a "self-perpetuating" process (Weiner 1989: 53) involving chain migration reuniting families and relatives. Korean neighborhoods in Japan expanded, leading to an extension of village-based family and clan networks. After large-scale wartime labor conscription and a mass exodus immediately after WWII, the Koreans who remained, approximately 535,000 in number, became minority resident foreigners in 1952, the year they lost their Japanese nationality (Nishinarita 1997: 347).

Zainichi Korean scholars divide Korean colonial migration into four phases (J. Kang 1996; Y. Suh 1987; K. Suh 1989).[14]The first decade of colonization set the stage for future large-scale Korean emigration. The colonial administration's Land Survey (1910-1918) transformed Korean land ownership, with areas of land belonging to small- and medium-scale independent farmers unfamiliar with ownership registration procedures as well as areas of common-use public land confiscated as Japanese state property or claimed by Japanese landowners (J. Kang 1996: 188-189; K. Suh 1989: 6; Yamabe 1971: 37-38). This process resulted in peasants who had been forced from their lands becoming wage laborers. Korean migrants to Japan were predominantly from the southern provinces of Kyeongsang and

Cheolla (including Cheju Island).[15]Large-scale confiscation of land was more prevalent in these areas, further contributing to the impoverishment of peasants (Nishinarita 1997: 16-17). A systematic recruitment of Korean labor began around 1917 at the peak of the WWI-related economic boom (Nishinarita 1997: 83), with the Korean migrant population increasing by 30,000 during the 1910s (K. Suh 1989: 5).

During the second phase of migration in the 1920s, economic conditions for Korean peasants deteriorated further due to Japan's interest in exploiting Korea as a source of rice for the Japanese mainland; Korean agriculture became monocultural and the price of rice as a commodity was kept low (J. Kang 1996: 196). The world economic crisis of the late 1920s left demand for cheap labor within Japan intact. Despite stricter regulation of Korean migration to the Japanese mainland after 1925—Koreans crossing the straits now had to present proof of employment, evidence of sponsorship, and permission from the local police in their hometown—the Korean population in Japan reached 300,000 (K. Suh 1989: 6, 8) during this second decade of colonization. Japanese held deeply prejudiced and discriminatory views toward Koreans during this period as a result of officially sanctioned regulations concerning colonial subjects. Koreans were seen as "malcontents" (Weiner 1989: 203), as symbolized in the massacre of over 6,000[16]of their number immediately following the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923 (J. Kang 1996: 200-201).

The 1931 Manchurian Incident marked the beginning of Japan's fifteen-year war with China. Demands for labor came to be closely associated with Japan's war efforts, which culminated in the Pacific War of 1941-1945. Between 1931 and 1938, the third phase of Korean migration to Japan, Korean labor migration accelerated further, adding another 500,000 to the Korean population in Japan (K. Suh 1989: 8). A 1932 Osaka survey shows

that 95 percent of Koreans who had migrated to Japan had done so due to difficulties associated with their livelihood in Korea (Nakatsuka 1991: 104). Wages in Japan were about fifty percent higher than those in Korea (Weiner 1989: 66), although Koreans in Japan received, on average, only two-thirds the amount that their Japanese counterparts were being paid. This was the case across a range of industries (Weiner 1989: 80).[17]Between the late 1920s and the 1930s, the gender ratio of Korean migrants became more balanced as a result of the migration of wives and children, marking a transition from sojourn-oriented circular migration to permanent settlement (Nishinarita 1997: 52, 54).

The subsequent fourth phase of Korean migration is characterized by forced (conscripted) labor migration. Between 1939 and 1945, intensive Korean labor migration supplemented drastic shortages in Japan's domestic labor force due to an escalation in war efforts. Contracted and conscripted labor forces were shipped over to Japan and deployed in the construction, mining and military sectors under de facto slave conditions using quasi-military surveillance techniques and a system of forcibly deferred remuneration, wages being placed in corporate accounts to reduce the potential for abscondment (J. Kang 1996: 209; Nishinarita 1997: 227). This final, six-year phase saw the Korean population in Japan rise by more than a million.[18]

Aliens who remained: 1945-Present

The first decade of the postwar period was indeed a "decade of turmoil" (Ryang 1997: 78) for Koreans in Japan, as they faced mass repatriation, changes in legal status, struggles between nationalist and leftist forces, and economic hardship. Following its defeat in August 1945, Japan relinquished all of its colonies, as well as control of Manchuria, and Allied

forces occupied Japan until the 1951 Peace Treaty of San Francisco took effect in April 1952. During this interim period, the treatment of former colonial subjects, defined as “liberated nationals” (Lee and De Vos 1981: 137), became a contentious issue. As Japanese, some Koreans were executed as B- and C-class war criminals; others were disqualified from receiving the more generous rations that given to foreigners. As foreigners, however, Koreans were also kept under surveillance as a potential security threat (Nishinarita 1997: 315-316; Ryang 1997: 81; K. Suh 1989: 48) and barred from re-entry to Japan (Morris-Suzuki 2006).

In retrospect, as Japan was reborn as a democratic nation during the Occupation, developments did not always favor the socially weak. As Cold War tensions intensified, the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) headed by the US prioritized political and economic stability, resulting in a reshaping of Occupation policy. The general strike of 1947 was banned, communists were purged, and large business conglomerates were allowed to reorganize (Dower 1999: Ch. 8). The need to absorb Japanese returnees from the colonies who lacked food, clothing, housing and employment led to a postwar economic crisis so intense that Japan’s labor movement swung into full action as soon as reforms guaranteeing freedom of speech and assembly were introduced. The potential for Japan to become a communist nation was very real, both in the eyes of the SCAP and the Japanese establishment. For the SCAP to maintain social order in accordance with American political interests, and for the Japanese government to preserve the national polity and the emperor system, a so-called “oxymoronic democracy” was established that amounted to a considerable reinstatement of the pre-war political and economic system. This shift in US occupation policy laid the foundations for several contradictions in contemporary Japanese

politics. These include the nation's possession of a de facto military, known officially as the Self Defense Forces, despite the ban on maintaining military forces included in the country's 1947 Constitution, and the obscuring of wartime responsibilities as they relate to the Emperor and the Japanese State, an issue that has contributed to continuing debates about the symbolism and use of the Japanese national flag and anthem, for example (Dower 1993; 1999).

In this broader political environment, left-leaning Koreans had to be carefully monitored and controlled (C. Kim 1997: 144; I. Kim 1991: 130; Ryang 1997: 80-81, 86-87). Throughout the late 1940s, the leading Korean organization, the League of Koreans (Choryun [Chōren]), maintained strong connections with the Japanese Communist Party. Facing political and economic turbulence, the Japanese government swiftly revived the pre-war policy of regulating Koreans, firstly suspending the voting rights of Korean men in December 1945, four months prior to the first postwar general election. Koreans—the vast majority of whom lost their jobs at the end of the war—featured prominently in black marketeering and involvement in lawless acts during this period, claiming that, as liberated nationals, they were not subject to Japanese law. Such claims significantly affected the postwar views of Koreans held by Japanese, and contributed to the subsequent regulation of Koreans in Japan (Katō 1983: 46-48, 58). Along with their alleged criminality and their assumed role as a national security threat, Koreans "served as a convenient scapegoat for the problems afflicting Japanese society, ranging from the defeat itself to economic hardship" (Lie 2008: 37). Through the very last Imperial Ordinance, issued on May 2nd, 1947, just one day prior to the enactment of the new Constitution, former colonial subjects were transformed into "aliens regarded as such for the time being" (Nishinarita 1997: 326).

Henceforth, they were required to carry an alien registration certificate at all times, and have it ready to present to authorities upon demand. The nationality of all Koreans was then registered as "*chōsen*."[19]The alien registration system was also intended to help with the deportation of "illegal" immigrants, who were mostly return migrants to Japan (Morris-Suzuki 2006: 127-129).

While migrants who had been part of the conscripted labor force were repatriated at whatever cost and by whatever means as soon as the war ended, [20]various factors led to a cessation in the flow of repatriation. Prior to the SCAP's planned repatriation of 1946, 1,400,000 Koreans had already left Japan. 400,000 by privately chartered means of transportation and the remaining million traveling on ships that had brought Japanese returnees back from Korea and Manchuria (Mun 2007: 87-88). Repatriation trips, particularly ones involving chartered transportation, were expensive. When the cost of domestic transportation to ports in Honshū and Kyūshū located opposite Korea were also factored in, such journeys lay beyond the means of many Koreans. Despite the repatriation process becoming more organized by 1946 due to efforts made by the SCAP, the scale of repatriation dwindled sharply. It is also important to note the restrictions that were placed on the amount of property Koreans were allowed to take out of Japan. Korean repatriates were allowed to take only 1,000 yen, or objects of an equivalent value (Lee and De Vos 1981: 59), hardly enough to survive for one month in Korea, which was then going through a period of severe inflation (Morris-Suzuki 2006: 127; Nishinarita 1997: 319).[21]The amount of luggage that could be carried was also restricted to clothing and possessions "of value only to the owner" and goods "limited to the amount each person can carry at one time." The limit was later changed to 250 pounds (Lee and De Vos 1981: 59). Coming on top of reports of epidemic

and chaos in their homeland, these restrictions would have discouraged many families living in Japan from moving back to Korea. Moreover, the Korean peninsula was in a worse shape than Japan, not only economically but also politically, and tensions were soon to lead to the outbreak of the Korean War (1950-1953), devastating the entire peninsula (Nishinarita 1997: 319).

Others had personal circumstances for not returning to Korea, including those who had married Japanese. A high level of linguistic and cultural assimilation[22] was already in progress. Some also preferred life in Japan, the lure of modernity still present among the ashes, to a more conventional and restricted lifestyle back in Korea (Lie 2008: 9-11). By 1948, when the political division of the Korean peninsula became official with the foundation of the Republic of Korea (the ROK or South Korea, the US-occupied area) in August and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (the DPRK or North Korea, the Soviet-occupied area) in September, the number of registered Koreans in Japan had shrunk to approximately 600,000 (Y. Kim 1996: 176) from the estimated two million or more in 1945.

Homeland-oriented Korean community leaders became politically divided immediately after liberation from Japanese rule (Lee and De Vos 1981: 61-62), while the large number of people struggling in poverty formed a solid left-leaning population base. The SCAP, alarmed by the Chinese civil war,[23] curtailed the activities of budding Korean schools across Japan in 1948 (Inokuchi 2000: 151-152), and did not interfere at all when Japan's Ministry of Justice ordered the Korean League to be dissolved in 1949 (Ryang 1997: 82).

Aliens in legal limbo

The already established double standard, whereby Koreans were treated as resident aliens requiring registration and denied re-entry to Japan once repatriated despite their possessing Japanese nationality in other regards, eventually came to an end, albeit it in an roundabout way (Ōnuma 2004: 242, 307-310; Ryang 1997: 120). In April 1952, Japan fully recovered its sovereignty. The bureau chief of the Ministry of Justice's civil administration (*minji kyokuchō*) issued Memorandum No. 438, titled: "On the nationality and family registry administration of Koreans, Taiwanese and so on, following the enactment of the Peace Treaty," nullifying the Japanese nationality of former colonial subjects subsequent to Japan's renunciation of its territorial control over Taiwan, Korea and southern Sakhalin. This memorandum was applied also to those who already resided in Japan.[24]Law No. 126 of 1952[25] was enacted to handle the legal status of former colonial subjects, who had already entered Japan and been residing there without passports or legal status. Koreans who entered Japan before September 1st of 1945 and were living in Japan as of April 28th of 1952, in addition to those born there during this period, were able to stay in Japan without a specific category of legal status under the 1951 Immigration Control Law[26]until their legal status could be determined through further legislation (Article 4, Paragraph 2, with *zainichi* Koreans henceforth referred to as category 126-4-2 aliens for administrative purposes) (Lee and De Vos 1981: 141; Ōnuma 2004a: 234). This ad hoc solution established a system in which the later the generation and the closer the connection of to Japan, whether as place of birth or of residence, the less secure the legal status; the residency status of the children of the aforementioned 126-4-2 aliens was to be reviewed every three years, and the grandchildren at intervals shorter than three years.[27]This state of affairs continued until 1991, when a special resident category [28]was established. Along the way, changes were enacted in

1965 and 1982 that aimed at clarifying the status of Koreans in Japan, and these are further discussed below.

Memorandum No. 438, which is an administrative guideline and not a law, is the sole basis for the post-1952 exclusion of *zainichi* Koreans from access to social welfare as well as employment and other opportunities in Japanese society. The most symbolic example must be the exclusion of *zainichi* Koreans from access to state compensation for those killed or injured during the war. This stands in contrast with the penalization and execution of Korean B-and C-class war criminals (Fukuoka 1993: 37-38; Lie 2008: 37). Jung Yaeng-hae (2003)[29] argues that Laws 125 to 127, enacted soon after Japan had regained its sovereignty, contained noticeably exclusionist intentions. Law No. 125, the Alien Registration Law, in addition to the aforementioned Law No. 126, completed the system by which Koreans in Japan were treated as foreigners. Law No.127 then laid the foundations for Japanese war-related compensation to be paid exclusively to holders of Japanese nationality. The alien status of *zainichi* Koreans enabled the Japanese government to deal with its wartime responsibilities and related matters of compensation at its convenience (Jung 2003: 136).

Divided homeland, divided organizations: Mindan and Chongryun

The political division of the Korean peninsula and the different relationship each of the two Korean states had with Japan resulted in a dual community structure dominated by two major organizations—the pro-Seoul Mindan (Zai Nihon Daikanminkoku kyoryū mindan, later Zai Nihon Kankoku-mindan, the Korean Residents Union in Japan[30]) (1946-) and the pro-Pyongyang Chongryun [Sōren] (Jaeilbon Chosŏnin chong ryŏnhaphoe/Zai Nihon Chōsenjin sōrengōkai, the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan)[31] (1955-). Unlike its

forerunner, Choryun (Zainichi Chōsenjin renmei, the League of Koreans 1945-1949), which was known for its support for the Japanese Communist Party, Chongryun established a principle of non-interference with respect to Japanese domestic political matters. During the first two decades after the war, both organizations prioritized homeland-oriented politics over the interests of *zainichi* Koreans living in Japan. By the mid-1960s, the leaders of Mindan were in close contact with the ROK regime and those of Chongryun with that of the DPRK (C. Kim 2004a: 163-164). As a reaction to Japan's thirty-five-year colonial rule, politically active Koreans in Japan aligned themselves with organizations that treated Korea as one independent country—supporting the regime in Pyongyang, the one in Seoul, or the idea of an imagined reunified entity. Thus began the consolidation of diasporic nationalist sentiment, paralleling the transformation of Japanese society into the type of homogeneous entity peculiar to periods of rapid economic growth.[32]

None of the four concerned parties (Japan, the two Koreas, and the Koreans in Japan) in any way challenged the legal limbo that followed the nullification of resident Koreans' Japanese nationality, at least at the level of their political leadership. The superficial confluence of interests among these parties left this unusual, unilateral transformation in status, from colonial subjects into resident aliens, uncontested (Kashiwazaki 2000a; Ōnuma 2004a). While Chongryun and Mindan activists viewed Japan as a place of temporary residence only, the Japanese government wished to maintain its convenient system of regulation and control, and both of the incipient Korean governments aimed to boost their nationalist claims for legitimacy by incorporating overseas Koreans, all justifying the post-1952 alien status of Koreans in Japan (Ōnuma 2004a: 6-7). A rare case of litigation (1969-1980), in which Sō Tokai (1915-2002)[33]demanded confirmation of his Japanese nationality,

for example, never received any support from *zainichi* Korean organizations (K. Chong 1973: 79; Kin 2008: 95, 104).

Reaction to colonial rule produced a considerable amount of anti-Japan sentiment among many Koreans in Japan. Strong homeland-oriented feelings climaxed in the second postwar wave of repatriations. Supported by organizational campaigns that praised North Korea as a "paradise on earth," news of labor shortages in North Korea combined with worries about an uncertain future in Japan—the unstable legal status of the children and grandchildren of Category 126-2-6 aliens epitomized the limited opportunities in Japan—prompted many to participate in a large-scale repatriation to North Korea. This project followed an agreement reached by the North Korean Red Cross and the Japanese Red Cross in 1959 (Ryang 1997: 113-114). Between 1959 and 1984, approximately 90,000 individuals (including 6,000 Japanese spouses), took the one-way trip to the DPRK. This was despite the fact that the majority of *zainichi* Koreans originated in the southern provinces of the peninsula, which formed part of contemporary South Korea. When compared with the total figure for the twenty-five-year period, the headcount of 70,000 repatriates in 1960 and 1961 alone (Morris-Suzuki 2005: 357), shows how quickly repatriation dreams faded once the gap between the hardships suffered by repatriates and the comforts of their previous lives in economically booming Japan became apparent (C. Kim 1997: 203). Although the repatriation project to North Korea resulted in many families becoming separated, in addition to other tragedies, such was the lure of the Korean homeland, even the northern half of the peninsula none of the repatriates had ever been to or seen before. Japan, even though it was the country of birth or long-term residence for many, seemed a place without any future prospects for Koreans.

The later evolvement of solutions to issues surrounding the legal status of *zainichi* Koreans created some noteworthy contradictions, the legacies of which linger on in contemporary Japan. The purpose of the controversial 1965 Normalization Treaty between Japan and South Korea was not only to establish formal diplomatic relations, but also to achieve settlement of all war-related compensatory reparations. The Japanese government's stance thereafter has been to argue that *zainichi* Koreans should claim any individual damages for suffering experienced during WWII from the ROK government. Disputes over eligibility for the national pension plan or the military pension among *zainichi* Koreans are therefore the responsibility of the ROK, not Japan. Japan's position, regarding the 1965 Treaty as the final solution to issues concerned with its responsibilities to Korea in relation to the war and its colonial rule, hinders reconciliation between *zainichi* Koreans and Japanese (Lie 2008: 154). The treaty was opposed not only by concerned *zainichi* Koreans and Chongryun [Sōren], but also by South Koreans in South Korea. This was because the compensation offered by the Japanese government included a financial aid package that primarily benefited Japanese businesses and the Korean establishment, and also because Japan refused to apologize for its colonization of Korea (C. Kim 2004a: 165-166; K. Suh 1989: 53-54).

Following the Normalization Treaty, only those who confirmed that they were in possession of South Korean nationality were granted a more stable form of "treaty-based permanent residency" (*kyōtei eijū*). By the deadline for applications, more than half of *zainichi* Koreans (350,000 out of 610,000) had declared their allegiance to South Korea (C. Kim 2004a: 167). This relatively stable form of permanent residency was, however, still in line with other ad hoc measures to deal with *zainichi* Koreans. According to this category of

residency, Koreans born in Japan before 1966 were considered to constitute the "first-generation," the legal status of their grandchildren scheduled to be discussed twenty-five years later, in 1991. Both governments had the wishful thinking that the vast majority would become naturalized by then, and that no pending legal issues would remain (Sunobe, Ōnuma and K. Kim 1990: 7).

Despite the relative stability and convenience of this treaty-based form of permanent residency, which granted the right to visit (and even live in) South Korea (where the vast majority of *zainichi* Koreans came from), and allowed holders access to Japan's national health insurance scheme,[34] it is noteworthy that, as of 1970, nearly half *zainichi* Koreans continued to be registered as "stateless" Korean. Many registered as nationals of "*chōsen*," either as a symbol of their perceived status as overseas nationals of the DPRK, or as a statement of their commitment to a unified Korea. Others, busy in their everyday lives, were simply completely unaware of this administrative procedure, and did nothing. Beginning with the 1965 Treaty, the Japanese government treated "South Korean" (*Kankoku-seki*; *Kankoku-jin*) as a nationality, while those who had registered as nationals of "Chōsen" remained stateless (I. Kim 1991: 136).

The 1982 system: Advancement brought by international conventions

The legal status of stateless *zainichi* Korean was eventually stabilized following Japan's ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1979) and the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1981): the category of "exceptional permanent residence" (*tokurei eijū*) established in 1982 unified the legal statuses of the 126-

2-6 aliens and their children and grandchildren who did not have treaty-based permanent residency, and enabled them to travel abroad with a passport-sized re-entry permit to Japan as stateless individuals. This solution was also an ad hoc one. The grandchildren and great grandchildren born after the deadline for applications (the end of 1986) were ineligible for exceptional permanent residency, and exceptional permanent residents continued to be subject to forced repatriation clauses (I. Kim 1991: 143-144; Ryang 1997: 125). Within the first three months of the application period for exceptional permanent residency, beginning in January 1982, one third of those eligible, 90,000 out of an approximate population of 280,000, lodged applications, signaling a change in attitudes among Chongryun-affiliated Koreans, for whom Japan was no longer merely a site of temporary residence (Chōsenkenkyū Henshūbu 1982: 13). In 1990, the year prior to the creation of the category of special permanent resident, there were 268,000 exceptional permanent residents (Ryang 1997: 125), although legal status alone does provide any indication of the actual size of either the pro-ROK or pro-DPRK communities in Japan (Miyata 1977: 245).[35]

Japan's ratification of the above international treaties obliged the Japanese government to conform to the principle of equality between citizens and foreigners (*naigaijin byōdō*). This enabled *zainichi* Koreans, both those holding treaty-based permanent resident status and those with exceptional permanent resident status, to receive welfare packages in which used to be the exclusive privilege of Japanese nationals, beginning in 1982. Aged and handicapped *zainichi* Koreans and naturalized Japanese, however, remain excluded from the national pension and disability schemes (Tanaka 1993: 150-154; Yamamoto 1995: 14). From the 1970s on, *zainichi* Korean organizations and individuals began voicing demands for equal treatment to the Japanese in relation to access to public housing, public loans and local

government child-rearing subsidies (Sakanaka 1999 [1975]: 149). Generally speaking, the 1982 reforms removed the nationality barrier with respect to access to various public services, although much confusion remains in the actual administration of services due to lingering assumptions among both *zainichi* Koreans and Japanese that only Japanese nationality holders are eligible to apply for welfare.

The expanding middle-class provides social movements with articulate activists (Lie 2008). These apparent improvements in legal status and access to social citizenship, along with higher education levels, living standards, and attachment to local Japanese communities among Japan-born generations, combined to make the 1980s the peak years of the *zainichi* Korean protest movement, the focus of which was the fingerprinting requirement contained in the Alien Registration Law. Japanese immigration administrator Sakanaka Hidenori (1999: 63) observes that emergent movement at the time reflected younger-generation *zainichi* Koreans' lack of awareness of being foreigners in a society to which they were so well acclimatized.

The 1991 special permanent residency: The end of zainichi *problems and collective consciousness?*

In November 1991, based on the agreement between the foreign ministers of Japan and South Korea, special permanent residency was included as an exceptional addendum to Japan's Immigration Control Law (Law No. 71 of 1951) (Kanpō 1991). Special permanent residency, *hōtei tokubetsu eijū*, is a legal status exclusively for ex-Japanese nationals who were residing in Japan and lost their Japanese nationality in 1952 and their descendants (Article 2 and 3). Treaty-based and exceptional residency categories were combined into one new form of legal status. The descendants of special permanent residents will be granted this status upon their

birth in Japan for an infinite number of generations to come.[36]In addition to gaining legal stability across future generations, special permanent residents also receive more preferential treatment than general permanent residents; their re-entry permits have a longer period of validity (four years)[37]and the forced deportation clause is more strictly and narrowly executed than in the case of general permanent residents.

The diplomatic agreement in 1991 resulted in the creation of a category of preferentially treated foreign residents eligible for nearly all of the welfare packages the Japanese government provides, except for the military pension. Another noteworthy change was the abolishment of the fingerprinting requirement through an amendment to the Alien Registration Law in 1993. Although this 1991 solution to issues surrounding the legal status of *zainichi* Korean solution is viewed positively as the product of various streams of activism during the preceding decade, it has ironically ended up dragging *zainichi* Korean nationality problems into the 21st century and created a new basis for backlashes against *zainichi* Koreans (see Chapter 6).

Each step in the stabilization of *zainichi* Korean legal status has had paradoxical consequences for each of the organizations representing the interests of *zainichi* Koreans in Japan. During the 1960s, Chongryun was “the shining star among *zainichi* Koreans” (C. Kim 2004a: 190), in stark contrast to Mindan, then kept under the control of Pak Chung Hee’s military dictatorship, which succeeded Rhee Syngman’s corrupted dictatorship. Despite many *zainichi* Koreans claiming allegiance with the ROK in order to secure permanent residency status based on the 1965 treaty, Mindan was virtually an overpriced passport agency, never succeeding in attracting strong commitment from its members (Lie 2008: 70). Exactly like the function Korean churches have for the Korean American immigrant

generation in providing their members with titles and honor (Min 1992), Mindan provided the self-employed with numerous honorary titles. While there were outstanding Mindan leaders who were committed to *zainichi* Korean causes and devoted considerable time and energy to them, many members maintained only a loose association with the organization. This was primarily because of issues related to their passports—for those living far away from Korean consulate generals in Tokyo and Osaka,[38]local Mindan branches offer a convenient alternative when dealing with such issues—and because of their interest in using its organizational network to find suitable *zainichi* Korean spouses for their children.[39]

Even among *zainichi* Koreans in the Chongryun community, which is better organized than the loose-knit Mindan community, with an integrated education system and a diverse range of interests, extending from banks and trading firms to publishing houses and even a dance theater company, there was an inverse relationship between stability of legal status and strength of Chongryun identity; its organizational identity was far more stable when the legal status of its members was unstable (Ryang 1997: 127). While the Mindan leadership has been constantly opportunistic in its responses to circumstances in the ROK and Japan (C. Kim 2004b: 192-193), Chongryun has maintained its consistent stance that *zainichi* Koreans should not interfere in Japanese politics and should abide by Japanese law. During the 1980s, when the movement protesting the fingerprint requirement for alien registration was spreading, Chongryun remained uninvolved as an organization (Ryang 197: 117). When Japan-born generation Koreans began seeking opportunities in large-scale Japanese firms and the public sector, beginning in the 1970s, Chongryun blamed such demands for creating an image of Koreans as driven mainly by self-interest, anachronistically evoking Korean collaborators during Japanese colonial rule (C. Kim 2004b: 189-190). One

of the causes of *zainichi* Korean activists since 1991 has been local suffrage for resident foreigners, a cause that has been endorsed by Mindan since the 1990s,[40]while Chongryun continues to oppose such claims. Chongryun's party platforms have remained fundamentally unchanged since its foundation (C. Kim 2004b: 191), while many adaptations have been made to cater to *zainichi* Koreans' weakened ties with and interest in homeland matters, including the revision of educational curricula (Ryang 1997: 51-54). Based on internal documents, Kim Chanjong (C. Kim 2004b: 190) estimates that total student enrollment at all Chongryun Korean schools declined from 31,200 in 1975 to less than 10,000 in 2004,[41] which Kim regards as a sign of Chongryun's diminishing organizational clout.

While the complicated state of *zainich*i Korean politics has reflected not only differing political orientations but also class, regional (both in Korea and in Japan), and generational differences, overall socio-economic conditions and the social and political structures of the broader Japanese society have been associated with critical turns in *zainichi* Korean identity, as seen in their narratives concerning identity, history and politics (Chapman 2008; Dennehy 2002; Lie 2008; Mun 2007; Wender 2005). At least, it is certain that their legal status was altered several times without their volition during the twentieth century. However, the past three decades have witnessed increasingly frequently discussions concerning the diversities of their historical experiences. In other words, throughout the period of their existence in Japan, *zainichi* Koreans have never constituted a uniformly oppressed and deprived population that is lacking in agency.

Social Mobility

As *zainichi* Korean history began to be revisited, a departure was made from the one-dimensional meta-narrative of impoverished peasant outmigration and a stigmatized group languishing on the lowest rung of the social in conditions of near slavery. During the 1920s and 1930s, the period when sizeable *zainichi* Korean communities were founded in Japan, Korean migrants indicated similar characteristics to immigrant populations elsewhere, i.e. those struggling the hardest to survive were not able to migrate at all. Able to cover their travel expenses and secure better networks of connections, medium-scale farmers with some employment experience in miscellaneous urban sectors found it relatively simple to migrate (Mun 2007: 23; Nishinarita 1997: 35). Their level of educational attainment was relatively higher and their rate of illiteracy lower than their counterparts in colonial Korea (G. Kim 1996: 472). By limiting their day-to-day expenses, some were able to transfer much of their earnings back home, while others established businesses in Japan catering to the needs of other Koreans (Ha 1997: 30-31, 182; Tonomura 1998: 633, 644).

Throughout the prewar and postwar periods and even during the 1960s, when Japan continued to experience rapid economic growth, Koreans held meager positions on Japan's occupational ladder. However there was a gradual increase in the number engaging in commerce during the postwar era, accompanied by a similar gradual increase in the number entering the professional and managerial classes. In 1920, 55.2 percent of *zainichi* Koreans were industrial workers and 15.7 percent miners. Only five percent were engaged in commerce. In 1930, 53.1 percent were industrial workers, 6.3 percent miners and 10.3 percent involved in commerce. In 1940, 15.8 percent of Korean workers were in commerce, while the proportions involved in mining and industrial work remained high (13.1 percent and 51.9 percent respectively) (Morita 1996: 127). In 1964, according to responses given

when reporting for alien registration, 48.5 percent of employed Koreans were construction workers, industrial workers, or unskilled laborers. 21.3 percent were in sales, and five percent were in professional and managerial occupations (Morita 1996: 128). According to the 1984 survey of Kanagawa Prefecture (Kinbara et al. 1986: 307), 14.9 percent Koreans were currently or previously employed in professional or managerial occupations.[42] Compared with the national figure for 1964, the proportion in professional and managerial occupations had nearly tripled.[43]

One of the critical resources assisting *zainichi* Koreans in achieving upward mobility is the social capital gained from their ethnic network—family, relatives and friends. Based on a 1995 survey of South Korean males aged twenty or older, Myungsoo Kim (2003: 8-9) demonstrates that there is no statistically significant difference in major status indicators (mean number of years of education, comparative prestige of various occupations, and income) between Korean respondents to the survey and Japanese males participating in a comparable national survey. However, the rate of self-employment among Koreans is more than double that of the Japanese (52.1 percent vs. 23.2 percent) (M. Kim 2003: 9). Kim's analysis exposes a clear deviation in the Korean pattern of status attainment pattern from the Japanese one, in that, unlike their Japanese counterparts, years of education do not translate into rewarding first jobs (M. Kim 2003: 12). Koreans mobilize their informal networks in order to minimize the effects of disadvantages they experience in the Japanese labor market (M. Kim 2003: 13-14). An earlier survey in Osaka in 1980 shows that *zainichi* Koreans rarely find jobs through an open application process, such as via a newspaper advertisement. Instead, they find jobs through families, friends and acquaintances, become self-employed or start working in family businesses (Zainichi Kōrai rōdōsha renmei 1992: 102). Prewar

occupational status mobility clearly took place within the confines of an ethnic enclave economy. However, because of the dominance of small businesses, many of which did not survive the economic chaos of the immediate postwar period, prewar Korean "success" did not end up fixing in place an intra-ethnic class structure (Tonomura 1998: 648-649). Postwar Koreans engage in businesses that cater to Japanese beyond their ethnic enclave although these are typically limited to operations on the fringes of mainstream society, such as the running recycling businesses, *pachinko* pinball parlors or Korean restaurants (Lie 2008: 72-73; Tonomura 1998: 650).

Zainichi Korean Civil Rights

During the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, *zainichi* Koreans were excluded from employment in large Japanese companies where employees enjoyed the benefits of lifetime employment and corporate welfare until Japan entered its prolonged recession in the early 1990s. Nonetheless, the trickle-down effect of Japan's rapid economic growth led to an improvement in *zainichi* Korean standards of living. Upward mobility, in terms of higher incomes and a better education for younger generations, albeit via a different path from that taken by mainstream Japanese, transformed *zainichi* Korean identities and affected the nature and content of its activism (Lie 2008; Mun 2007). From the early 1970s on, Japan-born generations began raising their voices in dissent, demanding equal treatment in employment opportunities as well as recognition and respect as minority members of society. In 1964, 68.1 percent of alien-registered Koreans were born in Japan (Morita 1996: 127). A decade later, in 1974, the last year that the Ministry of Justice published a breakdown of alien registration records according to place of birth, 76 percent were born in Japan (Y. Kim 1996: 183). As Japan-

born *zainichi* Koreans reached adulthood with better educational opportunities, some began to wonder why their occupational choices were so restricted when compared with their Japanese classmates. Discriminatory employment practices in public and private sectors were challenged one after another. Framed within the logic of universal human rights and the ideal of the plural society, calls for reform were also supported by Japanese scholars and activists.

A symbolic turning point in *zainichi* Korean activism was the four-year litigation battle, Pak Jeong-seok vs. Hitachi Software (1970-1974), which led to an acknowledgement of wrongdoing by a Japanese employer that had discriminated on the basis of nationality. Hitachi Software cancelled Pak's job offer after discovering that he had fraudulently entered his name and permanent address on his application. Pak's application included his Japanese alias, Arai Shōji, and only his current address in Japan, out of fear of immediate rejection should his Korean background become known. A young man's simple desire for stable employment, albeit through an unprecedented legal challenge and victory, stimulated young *zainichi* Koreans to seek opportunities within Japanese society.[44]

Other challenges to the requirement for Japanese nationality in employment practices—whether explicit or implicit—have targeted professional occupations in the legal sector (lawyers and patent lawyers, 1977 and 1983 respectively), the education sector (full-time and tenured faculty positions at national and public universities, 1982, as well as public school teachers), and the health sector (nurses, public health nurses and midwives in public sectors, 1986),[45] in addition to non-professional positions, such as entry-level administrative clerks at municipality offices,[46] Japan Post mail delivery staff (1984), and Nippon Telephone Telegram Public Corporation employees (1978)[47] (Y. Suh 1987: 283-292). Some cases were resolved through collective and collaborative negotiation, while some individual cases were

supported by local activists and committed intellectuals. Other cases led to desperate and determined negotiations by the individuals concerned, without any obvious support from activist groups.

In addition to the symbolic meaning of Pak's litigation victory against Hitachi Software, which made younger generation *zainichi* Koreans aware of the gradual opening-up of opportunities for employment in the Japanese private sector, Pak's case was a critical turning point in the history of *zainichi* Korean activism. It gave birth to a grassroots movement emphasizing the reality of *zainichi* Korean life in Japan and encouraging collaboration with sympathetic Japanese. Such moves triggered further struggles for civil rights by *zainichi* Koreans in the 1980s. In 1974, following the dissolution of Pak's litigation support team, Minzoku sabetsu to tatakau renraku kyōgi kaigi [the National Council for Combating Discrimination against Ethnic Peoples in Japan; hereafter Mintōren] held its first annual meeting. Absorbing the progressive generation who had experienced the student activism of the 1960s, both *zainichi* Koreans and Japanese collaborated in a protest movement that challenged discrimination against *zainichi* Koreans and other forms of discriminatory practice. From the outset, Mintōren prioritized everyday life in Japan and distanced itself from the homeland-related organizational division between the leadership of Mindan and Chongryun (Yang 1987: 71; Y. Suh 1987: 283).

The demand for stable employment opportunities, including public sector employment, was a critical one. The positions of clerical civil servant and public school teacher were those under debate, as they both required applicants to possess Japanese nationality. However, both cases were resolved in an ad hoc manner, with the distinction between Japanese nationality holders and foreigners maintained. There exists no explicit

litigation prohibiting foreign nationals from employment in the public or semi-public sectors. What restricts public- and semi-public sector employment to Japanese nationality holders is the answer given by the director of the First Department of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau in response to an inquiry by a section chief in March 1953, the so-called Takatsuji response. As the response states, "Although there exists no explicit legal statement, Japanese nationality is required to hold a position which involves the execution of public authority and national decision making as a matter of natural legal principle (*tōzen no hōri*) regarding civil servants" (Mizuno 2006: 9).

Prior to this so-called Takatsuji response, a clandestine solution was found to resolve the problem of nationality among public servants. In March 1952, about six weeks prior to the nullification of Koreans' Japanese nationality, the director of the Legal Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice issued a memorandum to the bureau chief in each district concerning the prompt processing of internal paperwork relating to cases of naturalized civil servants. Attached to the memorandum was an internal circular requesting the relevant department to encourage Koreans and Taiwanese public servants to naturalize due to "the possibility of disqualification following the loss of Japanese nationality" (Y. Kim 1990: 10-11). Fifty-one Koreans and seventeen Taiwanese civil servants subsequently became naturalized through an exceptionally speedy and simplified procedure; their naturalization was announced on the day that the Peace Treaty was enacted (Y. Kim 1990: 12).

The actual application of the "*tōzen no hōri*" (the natural legal principle; as such, no explicit specification in existing laws was required) to teaching positions at public and national institutions contained some loopholes, due to varied interpretations of what constituted the execution of public authority and involvement in public decision-making.

Before the enactment of the legislation concerning public and national university faculty positions in 1986, the precedents already existed of Koreans and other foreigners being hired by national and public universities, employees of which were all considered to have the status of national or municipal civil servants (Y. Suh 1987: 90-91). Rejecting the prewar notion of totalitarian education, its postwar successor was supposed to be independent from the machinations of government, an ideal that supported by teachers' unions. Paradoxically, this situation began to change in the 1980s (Y. Suh 1987: 91).

Employment practices in the state higher education sector were already obscure enough. But nothing illustrates shifting interpretations of the Japanese nationality requirement as it relates to public sector employment better than the hiring practices for primary and secondary public school teachers in the 1980s, the peak decade of the *zainichi* Korean struggle for civil rights. In 1950, the Osaka Prefectural Board of Education hired a Korean teacher. The boards which contained a relatively large number of foreign residents did not explicitly prohibit the hiring of resident foreigners. In 1982, a session of the Diet session sought an answer to the question of whether or not the mission of public school teachers involved the execution of public authority, concluding that this matter was dependent on the discretion of each municipality's board of education. By this time, about forty foreign teachers had been hired by state primary and secondary schools nationwide (Y. Suh 1987: 91). Later in the same year, just before the passing of the law concerning national and public university faculty positions, however, the Ministry of Education provided a reactionary guideline specifying that state elementary and middle school (compulsory education levels) teachers as well as high school teachers should be Japanese nationals (Y. Suh 1987: 91). As of 1982, seventeen out of forty-seven prefectures' boards of education did

not include a Japanese nationality clause for applicants seeking to take the local public school teacher hiring examination (Y. Suh 1987: 94). During a 1985 Diet question-and-answer session, the Ministry of Education clarified that a total of thirty-one public school teachers were Korean (either South Korean or stateless Korean) (C. Kim 1987: 20).[48]

The 1984 cancellation of the hiring of Yang Hong-ja [Ryō Hiroko, as she prefers to be called (C. Kim 1987: 174)] as a public school teacher (*kyōyu*) in Nagano Prefecture according to guidance received from the Ministry of Education took place in the midst of this reactionary environment, and attracted considerable attention from the media. Eighteen organizations, including several teachers' unions, expressed support for her case (C. Kim 1987: 168). Eventually, she was hired as a full-time "instructor" (*jōkin "kōshi"*) with more restricted salary and promotion opportunities than those enjoyed by regular teachers (*kyōyu*). While her supporters recommended that she not to accept the offer of employment as an "instructor," fearing that her case would set an undesirable precedent, she opted to work at school in that capacity rather than going through years of litigation (C. Kim 1987: 175-176).

The contentious issue of the hiring of resident foreigners by Japanese state schools led to a concession being made in the same 1991 negotiations between Japan and South Korea in 1991 that dealt with the legal status of *zainichi* Koreans. A memorandum was issued to each local board of education, stating that applicants without Japanese nationality were eligible to take the examination set by that prefecture's education board. Upon passing the examination, the memorandum continued, those without Japanese nationality were to be hired as "instructors." The teaching responsibilities of instructors are no different from those of teachers. However, they do not participate in the process by which the principal makes decisions related to management of the school, merely providing assistance in accordance

with their immediate supervisors' instructions. The position of full-time instructor, however, is a tenured one, and differences in salary with regular teachers "should be as small as possible" (Ono 1991: 18-19). As a result, *zainichi* Koreans without Japanese nationality can apply to a broad range of prefectures, so long as they understand that they will never be promoted to the level of educational administrator. The *tōzen no hōri* has remained intact. When the national interest is considered, public schools are, after all, an integral part of the national decision-making process. Those interested in promotion as school administrators have a chance only if they become naturalized.

In sum, *zainichi* Koreans have advanced their positions and expanded their opportunities. However, a die-hard distinction between Japanese nationality holders and resident foreigners continues to exist. The past three decades have seen improvements in legal status and growth in employment opportunities, but these changes have come about through temporary solutions and concessions made to appease domestic and international pressure. The former immigration bureaucrat Sakanaka Hidenori (1999: 23) assesses that, on the level of policy, problems related to the *zainichi* Korean population were resolved in 1991 and 1993. He concludes that "[f]or Japan-born *zainichi* Koreans who continue to live in Japan forever and are ethnically and culturally so close to the Japanese, the ultimately desirable and complete legal status which enables them to enjoy full political participation is Japanese nationality" (Sakanaka 1999: 90). The issue of local suffrage for resident foreigners is a polemic one, even among members of the Democratic Party, which ousted the ruling Liberal Democrats in 2009, bringing to an end the latter's five-decade-long rule. The contested arena of Japanese societal membership continues to be a matter of formal legal membership understood in terms of nationality rather on country of residence.

By removing the most palpable legal and symbolic obstacles faced by *zainichi* Koreans, creating the category of special permanent resident in 1991 and abolishing the fingerprint requirement for alien registration, the Japanese government dealt *zainichi* Korean activists a fatal blow. *Zainichi* Koreans lost what had been the centripetal focal points of a collective movement. Supported by Japanese grassroots activists and intellectuals, protests by *zainichi* Koreans certainly succeeded in stimulating domestic and international pressures on the Japanese government to make concessions. Based on an examination of initiatives by selected local governments to reform policies toward resident foreigners that were adopted in advance of the national government, Kajita Takamichi (2001: 4) evaluates the coalition between local governments and politically sensitive Japanese, arguing that "oppositional complementarity" (an agreement of interests resulting from the rivalry between central government and local governments as well as the rivalry between conservatives and the progressives) has contributed to solutions at policy levels. These transformations in the early 1990s led to a dispersal of the grassroots-oriented *zainichi* Korean movements (Yamawaki 2001: 310); an organization called the Human Rights Association for Koreans in Japan (Zainichi Korian jinken kyōkai)[49] split off from Mintōren in 1995, bringing to an end the federal style of leadership that had characterized the organization since 1974.[50]

***Zainichi* Koreans Today: The Statistically Unknown**

The statistical contours of the *zainichi* Korean population are obscured in Japanese statistical data. Naturalizations and intermarriages further complicate the grasp of accurate demographic trends. One way to narrowly but accurately define the *zainichi* Korean population as the descendants of colonial Korean migrants is to combine data related to

nationality and legal status found in the alien registration statistics collected by the Ministry of Justice.

Alien-registered foreign residents

According to the 2007 figures, 593,489 Koreans live in Japan as registered alien foreigners (permanent residents and long-term visa holders). This figure includes more recently arrived migrants and the wives of Japanese citizens, as well as general permanent residents from South Korea. According to the narrowest definition, based on a combination of data related to nationality and legal status in the alien registration statistics, the population of *zainichi* Koreans is 426,207, a figure which accounts for 71.8 percent all alien-registered Koreans in Japan (MOJ 2008);[51] Ninety-nine percent of special permanent residents are either South Korean (*kankoku-seki*) or stateless Koreans (*chōsen-seki*), the breakdown of which the Ministry of Justice does not publish. Nevertheless, these two kinds of administrative category, *kankoku* and *chōsen*, certainly had long-standing effects in the context of political labeling among *zainichi* Koreans and Japanese as well; "*chōsen*" is an abridged name for the DPRK, meaning that those nationality is registered as "*chōsen*" are assumed to consider themselves, in a certain sense, nationals of the DPRK. "*Chōsen*" is not, however, considered as a nationality, due to the lack of diplomatic relations between the DPRK and Japan. "Kankoku" stands for the abridged name of the ROK. Unlike the DPRK, the ROK has been officially acknowledged by Japan since the aforementioned Normalization Treaty of 1965, making "*kankoku*" a nationality (Y. Kim 1994: 56). For the two Korean states vying for legitimacy, all Koreans in Japan are overseas nationals of each Korean state, regardless of their geographical origin (Y. Kim 1994: 44). Reflecting the tensions between Japan and the DPRK and the declining influence of Chongryun, the number of stateless Koreans is in steep decline,

with many either opting for South Korean or Japanese nationality.[52]The number of special permanent resident Koreans has also been in a constant state of decline since the beginning of the administration of this form of legal status, falling at the rate of approximately 10,000 per annum, mostly as a result of naturalization and natural attrition through death.

For an advanced industrialized society, Japan remains exceptionally homogeneous in terms of its demographic profile. Koreans constituted the largest foreign presence until 2007, when the Chinese (including Taiwanese who were also former Japanese nationals, and their descendants) slightly outnumbered them for the first time. According to the 2007 figures, Japan has 606,889 Chinese residents, including 2,986 special permanent residents. Other sizable foreign populations include Brazilians (mostly of Japanese ancestry because of preferential visa status) (393,842) and nationals of the Philippines (202,592). The total number of legal aliens in Japan is 2,152,973, a number that has been constantly increasing despite Japan's sluggish economy during the past two decades. However, the number of Japanese living in Japan in 2008 is over 127 million (MOJ 2008), and therefore only 1.7 percent of Japan's total population is non-Japanese.

Naturalized Japanese: Statistically lost in the majority

Beyond the headcount of registered aliens, the overall contours of *zainichi* Korean demography are statistically unknown. Once *zainichi* Koreans become naturalized, they are aggregated as Japanese—no census data is available to make comparisons between the basic demographics and socioeconomic characteristics of the Japanese and Korean-Japanese populations. Even among Koreans who are registered aliens, the Ministry of Justice aggregates data for South Koreans and stateless Koreans. The last available alien registration

data that provided such detailed information as place of birth is that for 1974, as has been mentioned before. Existing survey data are often incomplete, partly due to government restrictions on access, but also resulting from the *zainichi* Korean organizational split (Fukuoka and Kim 1997).

An accumulated total of 320,071 Koreans became naturalized between 1952 and 2008 (Sasaki 2006: 69; MOJ 2009 for recent updates). For the 1950s (1952-59), the 1960s, the 1970s, the 1980s, the 1990s and the 2000s (-2008), the approximate annual average of Koreans becoming naturalized during the 1950s (1952-59) was 2,000. This figure rose to 3400 in the 1960s, 4700 in the 1970s, 5400 in the 1980s, 8400 in the 1990s, and 10,800 in the first decade of the 21st century (up to 2008). It is noteworthy that in 1992, shortly after the implementation of the most stable form of legal status for *zainichi* Koreans, the number of naturalizations leapt to 7,244 from 5,665 the previous year, and there have been gradual increases in subsequent up to the level of approximately 10,000 per year.

The criteria for naturalization, as specified in Nationality Law Article 5 are as follows. Applicants should: 1) have been continuously resident in Japan for more than five years; 2) be over twenty years of age (children cannot become naturalized unless their parent has done so); 3) have a record of law-abiding conduct; 4) have the financial ability to support themselves and their families; 5) renounce their former nationality; 6) not have the intention of overthrowing the Japanese government (Asakawa 2003: 38-39).[53] The ultimate decision depends on the judgment of the officer concerned who, via several supervisory bureaucratic levels, ultimately reports to the Minister of Justice. Certain criteria are less rigidly applied to special permanent residents, according to a "nationality guidance counselor" (*kokuseki sōdan'in*) I met at a Nationality Counseling Session held in late 1999. The Bureau of Justice

[*Hōmukyoku*] has not published much relevant information or detailed statistics since the 1970s regarding naturalization (Y. Kim 1990). There is no way of accurately guessing the rejection rate; as applicants attend compulsory "nationality counseling" sessions prior to filing their applications, those with little prospects would not reach the step of actually submitting their application form and required supporting documents.

Diversification among Japanese nationals is steadily progressing, although it is impossible to accurately verify from available statistics. Recently, naturalization has added approximately 15,000 "new" Japanese of diverse ethnic origin—still predominantly Korean—each year. Eight out of ten of those naturalized between 1952 and 2008 are of Korean descent. However, more than eighty percent adopt Japanese-sounding names (Asakawa, as of 2000, personal communication). A large number of documents is required in the naturalization process, including birth certificates, papers officially proving the relationship between family members (such as certified copies and translations of South Korean family registry entries), school records, proof of income and tax payment (including a list of assets and proof of ownership), an essay explaining the reason for naturalization, and others (Asakawa 1999, Kim 1990).

Intermarriage

Intermarriage plays a significant role in the decision of many individuals to become naturalized. The majority of *zainichi* Korean marriages are with Japanese nationality holders, and their children are regarded as Japanese unless the parents take the proactive measure of renouncing their children's Japanese nationality, a rare event, occurring less than two hundred times each year. While Chapter 2 discusses in details statistical trends related to

intermarriage, it is beyond doubt that there has been a steady increase in intermarriages between Japanese and Koreans (based not on statistical data related to ethnicity, but nationality alone).

Homogamy, according to multiple social status criteria, constitutes part of the mechanism of voluntary reproduction of social norms. The prewar Japanese family as a social institution had already established a norm prioritizing status-homogamous marriage by the beginning of the 20th century (Takeshita 2000: 52-53), and Japanese laws therefore never formally sanctioned interracial marriage per se, as was the case in the US. Japan's annexation of Korea involved a gesture of amicable integration, with three marriages taking place between members of the Korean royal family, considered part of the Japanese imperial family following annexation, and members of the Japanese imperial family, as well as high-ranking members of the nobility (Takeshita 2000: 55).[54] The wartime ideology of "*naisen ittai*"—of Japan proper and Korea constituting one entity—officially promoted intermarriage. In reality, however, there was strong opposition to this type of union, not only among eugenics scholars but also from ordinary men and women within the prewar household system, which negatively sanctioned undesirable conjugality (Fujino 1999: 87-90; Oguma 1998b; Takeshita 2000: Ch.3). Intermarriages between commoner Koreans and Japanese during the period of Japanese colonial rule were exceptional cases of love marriage in pre-1945 Japan. Statistics for marriages between Koreans and Japanese are available for the years 1938 to 1942, which witnessed an increasing number of intermarriages (Takeshita 2000: 62). In 1942, 1,695 marriages were between Koreans and 1,418 marriages were between Japanese and Koreans, the majority of which (90.5 percent) involved unions between Korean men and Japanese women (computed from Takeshita ibid.; Morita 1996: 76). These figures partly

reflect the wartime shortage of Japanese men of marriageable age and the prevalence of migrant Korean male workers. In 27.5 percent of the cases of intermarriage between Japanese and Koreans in 1942, Koreans entered into Japanese family registries; Korean women did so automatically, Korean grooms through being adopted into Japanese families.

The aforementioned Memorandum No. 438 included the issue of nationality in the case of intermarried families; the definition of Japanese nationality prioritized the continuity of the Japanese household system following the patrilineal principle reflected in the 1950 Nationality Law. Korean wives and adopted Korean sons-in-law of Japanese nationals were determined to be holding Japanese nationality with no additional procedure required, while Japanese wives married to Koreans[55] lost their Japanese nationality upon the enactment of the treaty (Ōnuma 2004a: 33-34; Takeshita 2000: 70).[56]

Although there has been a social and psychological distance between Japanese and Koreans throughout the past three decades, continuing even to the present day,[57]there has been a gradual and constant increase in the number of Korean marriages to Japanese. Taking marriage as a unit of analysis, 66.9 percent of all Korean marriages reported in Japan in 1955 were with fellow Koreans. In 1965, the proportion had fallen to 64.7 percent. By 1974, homogamous marriages between Koreans accounted for less than half of the total—49.8 percent—the proportion falling to only one in four by 1987 (Y. Kim 1996: 179). In 2006, only 8.9 percent of Korean marriages in Japan are homogamous (MOHLW 2007: Table 6). If we take the individual as a unit of analysis and consider the increase in individual Korean marriages to Japanese, 18.3 percent of Koreans married Japanese in 1955, the proportion increasing to 20.1 percent in 1960. One in four Koreans (25.7 percent) married Japanese in 1969, the proportion rising to half (50.7 percent) by 1984 and more than two-thirds

(recalculated from ibid.) by 1993. In 2006, 81.2 percent of Korean individuals married Japanese (recalculated from MOHLW 2007: Table 6) (see also Appendix 2).

Although the statistics aggregated as "Japanese" include naturalized Japanese and it is therefore possible that they present a picture of steadily decreasing Korean homogamy that is not entirely accurate, it is noteworthy that Korean homogamy defined by nationality is rather unusual—accounting for only 8.9 percent of Korean marriages (16.4 percent when taking the individual as unit of analysis). The population size of South Korean or stateless Korean *zainichi* has steadily declined, because the nationality of the children's generation will be virtually all Japanese if one parent is Japanese, and because the proportions of homogamy over the past decade had been constantly low.

From the Japanese standpoint, however, only 1.1 percent of Japanese marriages in 2006 were with Koreans, taking the individual as the unit of analysis, and only 0.6 percent of Japanese who reported marriage in 2006 married Koreans. While there has been a steady increase in Japanese intermarriages, it is safe to assume that it is rather a rare event in Japanese society—96.8 percent of Japanese individuals marry fellow Japanese.[58]

Despite there being ample evidence of the presence of residents of diverse ethno-racial backgrounds, most members of Japanese society today continue to take Japaneseness for granted, feeling no urgent need even to be aware that they are Japanese most of the time. The conflated vision of nationality, race, ethnicity, language, culture, and history—as all being inherent and natural—does not contradict with reality of everyday life for mainstream Japanese. Combining all of the minorities, regardless of nationality, one of the estimates of minority population in Japan is some four percent (Sugimoto 2003: 185). A population

profile that includes the vast majority as Japanese "proper" (or Japanese mainlanders in the context of the pre-WWII Japanese Empire) alludes to a social environment and public space that has difficulty in acknowledging the potential or the room for hyphenated Japanese. The minority population can still be "statistically" negligible enough for those with no interest in minority issues or precise statistics to consider it non-existent.[59]

Deterrents to Full Integration: the Paradox of Naturalization

It is noteworthy that more than 400,000 *zainichi* Koreans continue to maintain South Korean or stateless Korean legal status despite having, in many cases, lost or never acquired Korean language skills, having few or no close connections with the Korean Peninsula, and commonly following the practice of avoiding using their Korean names in public. If naturalization guarantees fully-fledged social membership in Japan, why do only a limited proportion of *zainichi* Koreans become naturalized each year? Even when recent figures are considered, admittedly showing an increase in annual numbers, figures do not exceed two percent for the narrowly defined category of special permanent resident *zainichi* Koreans. The accumulated total number of naturalized Japanese of Korean origin, 320,000 (see above), has not exceeded the number of *zainichi* Koreans the resident alien status at any time during the five decades or more that have passed since their loss of Japanese nationality.

Earlier surveys show mixed results regarding the desire among younger *zainichi* Koreans to obtain Japanese nationality. According to a 1980 survey administered to Korean children attending Japanese schools in Fukuoka City,[60]47.5 percent were willing to become naturalized, with girls showing a greater willingness than boys (63.4 percent, as opposed to 50 percent of boys; figures were recalculated to exclude those who gave no response). Two-

thirds (66.7 percent; recalculated) of middle-school students, aged either twelve or fifteen, were willing to become naturalized. The same 1980 survey administered in Osaka to those attending South Korean schools[61] showed contrasting results, with only 12.9 percent of boys and 12.6 percent of girls willing to become naturalized (recalculated). Among middle school students, only 9.7 percent showed a willingness to become naturalized (Shin and Gondō 1982: 60; percentage recalculated). The survey team infers a relationship between their responses and their educational local community environments. Does ethnic social capital constitute a key factor when individuals are deciding whether or not to retain their legal status as Koreans?

So far as the results of another survey show, desire for naturalization is not affected either by pragmatic concerns or by strong attachment to ethnic ties. This survey, conducted in 1993, found that twelve percent of the South Korean youth respondents[62]wanted to become naturalized, a further fifteen percent claiming that they would become naturalized if possible, 29.4 percent responding that they did not care, 15.9 percent answering that they would rather not become naturalized and 27.7 percent saying that they would never do so (Fukuoka and Kim 1997: 94). There were no significant differences according to education level, gender or age (respondents being aged between 18 and 30). Other factors, such as parents' level of Korean consciousness, amount of participation in Korean organizations, and degree of exposure to Korean consciousness education, had only a moderate impact on attitudes toward naturalization. Agreement with the idea that nationality and ethnicity are interrelated and negative images regarding Korea did, however, have some statistically significant impact (Fukuoka and Kim 1997: 96).

The decision whether or not to become naturalized is a voluntary and personal one, but fundamentally involves a significant social aspect. According to a 2000 survey on

naturalized Japanese, 39.4 percent of ex-Koreans had become naturalized for the sake of their children (Komai and Sasaki 2001: 47). Naturalization benefits applicants, because obtaining Japanese nationality allows individuals to function, at least on an official level, as full members of Japanese society. Quite often, however, individuals explain their motivations by making reference to the benefits accorded to those around them—such as their children or their Japanese spouses and in-laws.

The Japanese term used to refer to naturalization, *kika,* contains a fundamental association with the Japanese nation-state about which some *zainichi* Koreans feel awkward. The Chinese characters constituting the term *kika* mean, respectively, "return" and "transform." The etymology of the term, adapted from ancient Chinese literature, conveys a notion of a shift in moral allegiance; it is a de facto conversion. While the increasing popularity of the alternative term " acquisition of Japanese nationality" (*nihon kokuseki shutoku*) introduces the nuance of an active choice into this process, the ultimate decision remains in the hands of the Minister of Justice.

Given that past changes in nationality and legal status took place in a rather unilateral manner or were agreed upon in exchange for the provision of South Korean passports and the right to visit their hometowns in South Korea, overall distrust of all state-level institutions as well as a lack of interest in national politics might be the reason for the prevalence of "passive" decisions to become naturalized, the benefits accorded children or spouses used as an excuse. In other words, maintaining Korean legal status, be whether South Korean or stateless Korean, is not a token of attachment to anything Korean, but an example of passive resistance: not taking any action while the current system of naturalization is in operation, a

system which reflects Japan's official stance of postponing its embrace of a national identity as an immigrant nation.

Invisible racial markers: Names and documents

Naturalization, for many *zainichi* Koreans, means a change in legal name; their Japanese-style alias most typically becomes their real name. For *zainichi* Koreans, linguistically assimilated through having been born and educated in Japan as well as having been exposed to its popular culture, their Japanese-style or Japanese-pronounced names[63]are the ones they grew up with, and the ones that close family members continue to use when addressing them. The aforementioned 1993 survey of *zainichi* South Korean youth shows that eighty-six percent of respondents have rarely or never been called by their Korean names by their family members (Fukuoka and M. Kim 1997: 79). Only 6.4 percent use Korean names exclusively when interacting with Japanese (Fukuoka and M. Kim 1997: 78). According to the 1984 Kanagawa Prefecture survey, only 3.6 percent of *zainichi* Koreans use their Korean names exclusively; the vast majority use different names in different settings (Kinbara et al. 1985: 341, recalculated). Therefore, it is not surprising at all to find that only seven percent of the South Korean youths agreed or strongly agreed with the idea of becoming naturalized while retaining their Korean-style names (Fukuoka and Kim 1997: 98).

The earlier naturalization process required the adoption of Japanese-style names that were made up of Chinese characters chosen from the government specified list of characters for everyday use (*jōyō kanji*) and for use in names (*jinmei kanji*)[64] (Y. Kim 1990: 47). The application form used during this period even included the specific instruction to "please choose an appropriate name for a Japanese" (Y. Kim 1990: 48, 188). Kim Yong-dal (1990:

48-51) documents several administrative inquiries and responses during the 1970s, according to which choices of names that were unlikely ones for Japanese produced conditional footnotes in the application package of the individuals concerned and may have had adverse effects on their applications.

Flexibility in relation to choice of name was finally introduced into the naturalization procedure in the 1980s. An internal circular in 1983 noted that the applicant's choice of name after naturalization needed to be respected (Y. Suh 1987: 292). Following the amendment to the Nationality Law in 1984 granting Japanese nationality through maternal lineage, the unofficial but de facto enforcement of the adoption of Japanese-style names came to an end.[65]

The use of Japanese-style names among *zainichi* Koreans lets them pass as Japanese, but reinforces their feelings of unfamiliarity with their own legal names. Some feel embarrassed by their "real" names. The embarrassment caused by Korean names explicitly entered on official documents, such as driver's license, passports and so on, or the omission of their names from their Japanese spouse and children's residency records due to their not possessing Japanese nationality, triggers a motivation to naturalize for some *zainichi* Koreans. Desire to replace their Korean names with Japanese may have been historically more persistent among those less connected with *zainichi* Korean communities and with no chance of receiving a Korean minority empowerment education (I. Kim 1978; C. Kim 1977). As William Weatherall observed in the 1970s, "most who naturalized are inclined to want to give up their ethnic names and to establish a so-called Japanese name" (Lee and De Vos 1981: 293). According to a survey administered in 2001, among *zainichi* Koreans who had become naturalized, 83.3 percent adopted different names after naturalization, meaning that

they no longer used their Korean names (Asakawa 2003: 100, percentage calculation my own).[66]One of the respondents in Asakawa's survey, a female in her twenties, wrote in 2001:

> I was informed that I was a foreigner when I was in high school [at the first alien registration in person at age 16]. I was so shocked. I had been living as a Japanese, but in fact, I wasn't. Since I have been using a Japanese alias, I learned my real name for the first time. None of my friends knew it. Because my driver's license had my real name and nationality, I had never shown it to any of my friends. After naturalization, my [Japanese] name and [Japanese] nationality were just added with a pen [on the back of the license] and I had to wait until the next renewal [to have a license with my Japanese name and nationality]. So I deliberately damaged my license and had it renewed. Now I have my Japanese name and Japanese [permanent] address [on the license], I felt like I became Japanese—finally (Asakawa 2003: 102-103, parentheses mine).

Because of phenotype similarities, Korean use of Japanese names has earlier precedents from the prewar years. According to Kim Il-myeon (1978), the use of Japanese aliases among Koreans in Japan had its origins in the campaign that vilified Koreans as "malcontents"; during the 1920s, Koreans began using Japanese names when renting accommodation or seeking employment in order to avoid excessive police surveillance or immediate rejection (I. Kim 1978: 41-42). In the 1930s, the vast majority of Korean migrant workers used Japanese aliases as they were easier for the Japanese majority to remember and use; Korean names evoked associations with independent-movement activists, and they consequently followed the practices of other Koreans (I. Kim 1978: 43). Japanese names were used to minimize the potential for outright social rejection at work and school and when seeking a place to live. This practice continued among *zainichi* Koreans before and after 1945, quite separate from the institutionalization of the practice discussed below.

In 1940, Korean adoption of Japanese names was institutionalized according to

Japanese colonial policy. It aimed to transform the Korean kinship structure, completing the process by which Koreans were converted into Japanese imperial subjects prior to subjecting them to mandatory conscription into the Japanese imperial military the following year. The modern Japanese family system instilled loyalty to the Emperor (Mizuno 2008: 216). This process was introduced as finally "allowing" Koreans to have Japanese-style family names and Japanese-style given names.[67] It was styled as a voluntary option, despite amounting to a de facto order, involving various forms of negative sanction (I. Kim 1978: 59-61; Mizuno 2008: 88-96, 230). As there were often inconsistencies in choice of name between those in Japan and their relatives in Korea, it was possible for *zainichi* Koreans to have several different versions of their Japanese name in addition to one based on their ancestral Korean family name (I. Kim 1978: 55).

Zainichi Koreans born and brought up in Japan are given Japanese names at birth unless their parents have a reasonable level of Korean consciousness. Not surprisingly, naming practices reflect the penetrating cultural influences of the host society. Many Japanese-speaking *zainichi* Korean parents choose names for their children based on the Japanese pronunciation of the Chinese characters used to write them. Japan-born generations take the use of Japanese names for granted through everyday use. As such, they end up finding their Korean "real" names unreal and unfamiliar, as their native language is Japanese and because they are surrounded by Japanese and Koreans with Japanese-style names. Recent *zainichi* Korean advocates of naturalization emphasize this gap between everyday life and formal belonging to a nation so unfamiliar and polemical, as well as arguing that individuals should not necessarily have to advertise their Korean background if they do not wish to (Tei 1993, 2001, 2004a; S. Lee 1997-1998). Others advocate the proactive expression

of “the acquisition of nationality as rights” while expressing their Korean name and identity (K. Lee in Sasaki and Kakuritsukyō 2006). Some claim that, regardless of nationality, Korean-pronounced names need to be passed on, while others take a more flexible approach to name choices (Kashiwazaki 2001b; Yi 2008). Apart from Korean-pronounced Korean names, a variety of other choices are possible, although these are practiced by only limited numbers of *zainichi* Koreans—including combining a Korean-pronounced Korean surname with a Japanese-pronounced Japanese given name; using a full Korean-style name that is pronounced in a Japanese way, following the unconventional practice of using a hyphenated last name that combines the surnames of their Korean and Japanese parents, and so on.

While Korean organizations and Korean empowerment education have mounted concerted campaigns to foster Korean pride,[68] it is certain that invisibility and anonymity frees *zainichi* Koreans from the burden of explaining and justifying why speak only Japanese despite being Korean. The above example of deliberately damaging a driver’s license is probably an excessive case; many of those who have become naturalized do not care that much about trying to cover up their Korean origins. But precisely because of their phenotypical invisibility, some *zainichi* Koreans desire to complete pass as Japanese. The most formal Japanese identification paper for domestic use is the family registry record (*koseki tōhon*). The family registry of the naturalized individual contains a footnote referring to their naturalization as well as their former Korean nationality and name. This can be erased through a change in permanent address (although the record remains and is traceable). The Korean names of their parents, however, remain in family registry records until the next generation, when the children get married and create an independent family registry. Therefore, during the 1970s, when there was much stronger prejudice and discrimination

against *zainichi* Koreans, Japanese aliases were commonly entered for parents' names upon the request of those becoming naturalized and at the discretion of the administrator involved (Y. Kim 1990: 53-54).[69]Because individuals are rarely required to submit their family registry records, it is possible, to a certain extent, to erase evidence of Korean ancestry. It is only exposed when efforts are made to trace the history of family registry records, a process that is neither easy nor completely impossible (see Chapter 2).

Korean Minority Empowerment through Education

The conditions surrounding *zainichi* Korean education are also unknown, at least from a statistical perspective. There exist no reliable official, national-level statistics about the proportion of *zainichi* Korean children attending Japanese schools or related trends, for example. Many descriptions of *zainichi* Koreans only note that the vast majority of them attend Japanese schools. There is no way of knowing what percentage of *zainichi* Korean children have had the chance to be exposed to full-time or part-time Korean education at all. Again, those with Japanese nationality are buried among the figures for the majority Japanese, statistically speaking. Acknowledging these limitations, the final section of this chapter touches on Korean minority education (see also Chapter 3).

Both *zainichi* Koreans and concerned Japanese have responded to the plight of the *zainichi* Korean minority throughout the post-1945 period. All of the full-time Korean educational institutions (primary, secondary, and post-secondary) within Japan have their origins in the Korean emancipation, because Korean language education, both in Japan and on the peninsula, was banned during the last phase of Japanese colonial rule as part of a policy aimed at transforming Korean colonial subjects into Japanese imperial subjects.

Precisely because of its post-1945 origins, formal schooling for Korean children in Japan has been influenced, on an ideological level, by the division of the peninsula into two Korean nations. Inspired by the achievement of Korean liberation, the incipient Korean education system in Japan was aimed at reversing the trend toward acculturation in Japan among those generations who had been born in Japan or migrated there at a young age.

Education is one of the most important fields in which the collective identity and politics of minority populations is contested. The post-1945 period witnessed the development of two primary options for Korean minority empowerment education, full-time and part-time, although availability has varied according to levels of commitment among parents and local communities. As American immigrant experiences attest, retention of the language of foreign-born parents is challenged by the dominance of the host society's language, primarily through schooling, and regardless of the size of the migrant population or the extent of residential segregation (Alba and Nee 2003). There are three main reasons for historically accelerated linguistic assimilation among *zainichi* Koreans. First, the prewar colonial language policy drastically reduced the number of hours devoted to Korean language education, especially after 1938, with schooling in Korean eventually banned between 1941 and 1945, even on the peninsula (Rhee 1992: 91). Second, Japanese and Korean share a considerable amount of grammatical proximity. The vowels, consonants and writing systems of each language are different, but the sentence structures of both are remarkably similar, and both also share large sets of vocabulary written in Chinese characters that have their origins in ancient China. Last but not least, many predominantly working-class Korean migrant parents were not able to devote time and energy to ensuring retention of Korean language among their children, who were born in Japan and attended school there (e.g. S. Ko 1986).

Table 1-1 shows the type and availability of Korean empowerment education. Opportunities for curricular or extra-curricular activities for Korean children depend on the education policies in their local municipalities and, informally, on the degree of interest or commitment on the part of Japanese teachers. Korean classes or clubs are by no means readily available throughout Japan or even throughout the city of Osaka, which has the highest concentration of resident Koreans. Teachers and parents interested in Korean minority education often have difficulty gaining support for their language and culture programs, even from *zainichi* Koreans (Inatomi 1988; Zenchōkyō and Zengaikyō reports 1996-2002).

Post-emancipation Korean education began in an environment where there was a dire need to retrieve (and often invent) Korean language and history. The private venues that were sprouting up were soon organized by the League of Koreans, which had built 541 elementary schools, seven junior high schools and eight high schools by October 1947 (Inokuchi 2000: 149). However, Cold War politics complicated the process of establishing institutionalized education for Korean children in Japan. After the 1948 protest against the closure of Korean schools, driven by a belief that Korean schools were a security threat due to their alleged left-leaning pedagogy, some Korean schools were absorbed as part of Japanese public schools, although this practice was terminated after 1952, when Koreans their lost Japanese nationality. In some rare cases, such as in Osaka, part-time extra-curricular programs in Japanese public schools have taken their place (C. Ko 1996: 97-98). This interruption in Korean schooling eventually gave rise to two parallel full-time schooling systems: one made up of predominantly pro-DPRK schools, not accredited as part of the Japanese education system; and the other made up of much smaller scale pro-ROK schools, some of which are

accredited and others not. Some educators resisted the introduction of the Korean political division into the realm of Korean children's education in Japan—the Kenkoku School in Osaka, for example, though later becoming pro-ROK, used to be politically independent of either Korean state (e.g. "Yi Kyeong-tae no ayumi" kankō iinkai 1999). Eventually, Korean formal schooling came to be primarily administered by Chongryun, with its distinctive curriculum.

Part-time options include special curricula within the context of Japanese public school education, in addition to programs offered by local activist groups or NPOs, such as the weekend classes operated by the Korean YMCA or the summer vacation workshops and lecture series run by the Korean Scholarship Foundation. In the Kansai region, and primarily in the cities of Osaka, Kyoto and Kobe, the legacy of *burakumin* empowerment education and the efforts of concerned teachers have given rise to the development of part-time, extra-curricular programs for Korean minority children, albeit operating within intense budgetary constraints. In Osaka, there are two different types of operation—a memorandum-based one and another known as the "1972 type" (Hester 2000: 178-179).[70] This administrative complexity, a division in support between different Japanese teachers' unions (pro-Socialist vs. pro-Communist), in addition to the existence of a variety of different organizations dealing with Korean education, hindered the development of a strong nationwide platform for education-related lobbying within the Japanese public and private school systems (Y. Chong, personal communication).

Transformation in Korean schooling

How do contemporary Korean full-time schools address their educational goals? The educational goals of Korean schools are highly accommodative in a Japanese education "market" that is saturated due to declining birth rates.[71] The vast majority of full-time Korean schools in Japan is affiliated with Chongryun[72] and classified as "vocational schools" under Japan's Education Act. Three out of four pro-Seoul schools have compromised in relation to their language of instruction, and are approved as accredited private schools under the same law, along with three schools in the Kansai region identifying themselves as international schools. Principal conditions for being accepted as accredited schools *(ichijōkō)* include using Japanese as the language of instruction, adopting textbooks that have been censored and approved by the Ministry of Education, and following educational guidelines and employment practices that have also been approved by the Ministry of Education.[73]

Private schools need to be competitive in order to secure enrollments and survive. I obtained the application packages of three Kansai-based pro-Seoul Korean elementary and secondary schools as well as those of several Chongryun-affiliated elementary schools for the academic year 1999-2000. Not surprisingly, the fliers and catalogues of the full-time Korean schools, regardless of their organizational or political connections, emphasized catchy phrases such as "*kokusaijin no ikusei*" ("nurture internationalists"). The emphasis is on multi-lingual competence—not only in Korean and Japanese but also English—as important for the future survival of children in a global labor market. At the time of my first school visits in the fall of 1999 and the fall of 2000, using the occasion of open days, similar explanations were reproduced. A more intensive English curriculum than that found in the Japanese public school system was actively marketed.

The content and emphasis of part-time options for Korean minority education also

shifted during the 1990s, influenced by the emphasis in dominant Japanese educational practices on "education for international understanding" (*kokusai rikai kyōiku*). The original critical commitment to democracy and human rights was transformed; the emphasis on teamwork and effort was retained, but with the addition of exotic and fun elements (see Chapters 3 and 6). The value of particular programs is increasingly seen as being related to whether or not they contribute to the fulfillment or reinforcement of basic pedagogical needs, as outlined by the Ministry of Education and local boards of education. More critical progressive concerns, such as those initially addressed by *burakumin* liberation education, with its emphasis on human rights, peace and democracy and its catchphrase of "No more sending our pupils to the battlefields!" (Inatomi 1988) are gradually being replaced by the face-value celebration of the lifestyle and culture of other countries.

Where do *zainichi* Koreans fit into this picture? Both the self-exoticized foreign minority and those opting to join the silent majority as (almost-) Japanese have been able to find their educational niche in the current Korean empowerment education environment, be it in a full-time or part-time context. The preservation or revival of ethno-national differences through full-time and part-time Korean schooling is thus paradoxically accommodative. The reproduction of more foreign-like foreigners, even with high levels of English (though not necessarily Korean) proficiency is compatible with the contemporary images of both Korea and Japan. The imaginary starting point is a standard national language and culture which does not takes local or ethnic variations into account. *Zainichi* Koreans do not fit well into the framework of a nation state, either Japan or Korea.

The present condition of *zainichi* Koreans cannot be isolated from the historical background I have thematically outlined above. A series of ad hoc solutions to issues concerned with legal status have been complicated by domestic and international politics, the development of a collective awareness (albeit not fully-shared among *zainichi* Koreans), intergenerational status mobility, and the advancement of structural integration. These are also some of the many axes lying behind the paradoxes, debates, and accommodations that I will explore in the following chapters.

Endnotes:

[1] They are the 1965 South Korean treaty-based permanent residency, the 1982 exceptional permanent residency for stateless Koreans, and the 1991 special permanent residency which consolidated the preceding multiple forms of legal status for *zainichi* Koreans and granted the most stable resident status as foreigners. See below.

[2] The 1995 copy of Pak's monograph I have is the fifty-first printing. It is still in print at the time of writing, in contrast with the many *zainichi* Korean related monographs that go out of print after the first edition.

[3] Some arguments are extremely politically charged. See Tei 2001, for example.

[4] There is a plethora of literature, however, challenging the Asian- or Korean-American model minority thesis as it relates to academic achievement and social integration (e.g. Kao 1995; Lie 2008; Sue and Okazaki 1990; Song 2003).

[5] Recent studies are more skeptical of such a simplified comparison between *zainichi* Koreans and Korean Americans. See Lie (2008), for example.

[6] See Waters (1999) for identity choice matters among the children of immigrants of color.

[7] Peter Duus argues that, at this stage, Japan did not yet have a long-term interest in Korea, although it certainly was the beginning of the long, complex process by which Japan realized Korea as a primary strategic interest in Asia (1995: 49).

[8] In general, Asian nations were incorporated at a later phase than African or Latin American ones into the Euro-centered economic, political and social order, which introduced and reproduced race-based hierarchies (Winant 2001: 317).

[9] The 1899 ordinance prohibited Chinese workers but accepted Korean workers; at the time, China still seen as a military threat, while Korea was under unequal treaty terms unfavorable to Koreans (Yamawaki 1994: 45, 47).

[10] Japan's territorial expansion was the result of its successful establishment of a modern military within just three decades and its victories in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), both of which were partly fought over interests in the Korean peninsula.

[11] The population flow was not restricted to migration of Koreans and Taiwanese between the periphery and the center. Japanese also emigrated, both to the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria, for example. In 1930, there were 500,000 Japanese in Korea and 230,000 in Taiwan. In 1940, there were 690,000 Japanese in Korea and 1,070,000 in Manchuria (Yamawaki 1994: 282). Japanese also migrated to regions lying outside the empire as well. Earlier, in 1900, there were already 90,000 Japanese in the US (two thirds of whom were in Hawaii) (Yamawaki ibid.). Between 1924 and 1935, over 140,000 Japanese migrated to Brazil (Lesser 2003: 7). Koreans were also displaced to Northern China and the Russian Far East prior to 1910; the Russian Maritime Region had 80,000 Koreans by the time of the Russian Revolution (Mun 2007: 22), who later suffered forced migration to Central Asian regions during WWII.

[12] The emergence of Korean nationalism is often assumed to have taken place as early as the mid-19th century among historians whose writings reflect their own nationalistic moral judgments (Ryang 1990). However, within a decade of annexation, the 1919 Independence Movement had spread across Korea, altering the course of colonial rule from military rule to "cultural rule." The contents of most colonial policies remained the same (Weiner 1986: 35).

[13] *Zainichi* historians estimate the number to be over 2.3 million (Kang 2002: 734; Suh 1988: 7).

[14] Another common system of periodization is based on the ways in which Japan regulated Korean migration (with dividing lines in 1925 and 1939), see Michael Weiner (1994).

[15] Eighty-eight percent of Koreans in Japan were from these provinces, as of 1938 (Y. Kim 1996: 183).

[16] The actual figure remains the subject of controversy, ranging from the official figure of 231 to an estimate of over 6,000 in multiple sources (Weiner 1989: 181).

[17] According to an Osaka City report in 1924, the wage gaps between Japanese and Koreans ranged from eleven percent (laundry workers) to seventy-five percent (dye workers). The figure for cotton spinning was forty-two percent, and for miners, nineteen percent (Weiner 1989: 82).

[18] Michael Weiner (1994) divides colonial Korean immigration into the period prior to restrictions being introduced (i.e. pre-1925), the period following their introduction, and the period of wartime mobilization. Suh, Kang and Weiner do not make reference to the invisible postwar flow of illegal immigrants. See Morris-Suzuki (2006) for the misconceived break between the "oldcomers" of the prewar period and the newcomers of the late 1980s; Japan also had a constant stream of illegal immigrants during the 1960s and 70s.

[19] The independent Korean state was not yet founded and the peninsula was under the divided control of the Allies, with areas controlled by the Soviet Union and the US divided along the 38th parallel. Chōsen is a generic term referring to things associated with the Korean Peninsula (*Chōsen-hantō*), people (*Chōsen-jin*) and language (*Chōsen-go*). Further, it has derogatory connotations in Japanese when spelled out in phonetic *katakana* characters—a legacy of the colonial status hierarchy.

[20] A 1984 survey conducted in Kanagawa Prefecture shows that among the migrant generation, 16.7 percent came to Japan in 1929 or earlier, 27.5 percent arrived in 1938 or earlier and 36.8 percent migrated between 1939 and 1945 (Kinbara et al. 1986: 295). Although arrival between 1939 and 1945 did not necessarily mean that they had migrated as part of a conscripted labor force, the Kanagawa data show that it is also problematic to conclude that earlier migrants who had established a solid livelihood in the country still remained in Japan.

The Kanagawa survey's response rate is 48 percent. Excluding undeliverable questionnaires, the final rate is 51.9 percent (Kinbara et al. 1986: 4, the final rate is my calculation). Using the equal interval method, the sample was extracted from alien registration records for Kanagawa Prefecture, which offers the most accurate name list for legal foreign residents.

[21] According to Lee and De Vos (1981:59), "[w]ith that amount, one could scarcely buy more than a few cartons of cigarettes in Korea." Financial regulation was modified to involve bank documents and checks on the amount of savings they had in Japan. This meant nothing, however, since "all financial transaction between Korean and Japan had been suspended for an indefinite period" (Lee and De Vos ibid.).

[22] All instruction at schools in Korea was conducted in Japanese between 1938-1945, following the implementation of Japan's standard curriculum, which included duties and commitments to the Emperor (Suh: 34).

[23] The People's Republic of China (PRC) was to be established soon, in 1949.

[24] Diplomatically, Japan had not yet recognized even the ROK (South Korea). The San Francisco Peace Treaty included neither Korean nation as signatories.

[25] It refers to the "Disposition of the Laws and Orders Related to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration." (Lee, De Vos 1981: 400).

[26] Japan's Immigration Control Law was modeled after US immigration law, whereby most citizenship matters are highly simplified because of the *jus soli* principle. Ōnuma argues that the application of US-style regulations to Japan's *jus sanguinis* Nationality Law created a legal limbo for Koreans born in Japan after April 28, 1952 (Ōnuma 2004a: 12-13).

[27] They are known as 4-1-16-2 aliens and 4-1-16-3 aliens respectively. As of 1974, there were 149,076 126-2-6 Koreans, 121,217 4-16-2 Koreans, 21,700 4-16-3 Koreans, 342,366 treaty-based resident Koreans, and 4-1-14 (general permanent resident) Koreans (Ministry of Justice 1976 in Kato 1979: 44-45).

[28] Even as the most stable legal status for foreign residents, there is a potential for *zainichi* Korean offenders to be forcibly repatriated to South Korea.

[29] The transliteration of her name is based on her English article (2004).

[30] Their official English name. See http://www.mindan.org/link/index.htm. The founding name was "Zai Nihon Chōsen Kyoryū Mindan."

[31] See Ryang 2007: 2. See also http://www.chongryon.com.

[32] The orientations of these two mutually antagonistic organizations, both of which prioritized homeland-related matters, played a significant role in delaying the emergence of a *zainichi* Korean civil rights movement. It was not until the late 1990s that they made noticeable gestures aimed at mutual reconciliation at an organizational level.

[33] So Tokai himself preferred his Japanese-pronounced name (K. Chong 1973: 75).

[34] According to a report reflecting the conditions during the 1970s, the actual implementation of this scheme in relation to resident foreigners varied depending on the discretion of each municipality (Mindan Chūō 1978: 289).

[35] Divisions between those affiliated to either Mindan or Chongryun are often obscured, and one family can contain members associated with different organizations. In rural areas, in particular, *zainichi* Korean businesses may maintain relations with both organizations for networking benefits (Miyata 1977: 141).

[36] Naturalization and intermarriage lead to a steady decrease in the special permanent resident population; it is projected that the population of *zainichi* Koreans defined by special permanent residency will shrink from approximately 10,000 to zero by the 2040s. See the following section.

[37] It is extendable for one more year at Japanese embassies and consulates overseas, although extension is not fully guaranteed as a right and depends on the discretion of each Japanese embassy or consulate.

[38] The issuing of South Korean passports to *zainichi* Koreans used to be monopolized by local Mindan branches. It was only after the 1990s that consulate general offices begun issuing passports directly to *zainichi* South Koreans.

[39] Although the vast majority of Koreans in Japan marry Japanese nationals (see Chapter 2), *zainichi* Korean parents become desperate when their children delay marriage or show no interest in marriage, which is a characteristic of contemporary Japanese demography.

[40] Others are more interested in acquiring Japanese citizenship as a right by means other than naturalization, which still requires a permit from the Minister of Justice.

[41] Chongryun-affiliated Korean schools are not accredited as formal academic institutions as specified in Japan's Schooling and Education Law, and there are considerable institutional disadvantages for graduates in gaining access to Japanese institutions of higher education, particularly national universities. Many parents choose Japanese schools for pragmatic reasons. See Chapter 2.

[42] This percentage is my calculation, excluding cases of "no response" from the cross tabulation, "Occupation by Nationality."

[43] In recent years, there have been no published official statistics regarding the occupations held by *zainichi* Koreans, despite those registering as aliens being required to state their occupations.

[44] Pak's was initially criticized by other *zainichi* Koreans for his perceived lack of Korean identity (Choe 2008: 36, 47; Yang 1987: 70-71). Pak's coincidental encounter on the street with Japanese college students distributing political fliers led to the formation of his litigation support group, which was later joined by other local activists, many of whom were Korean and Japanese Christians.

[45] Lee Setsuko (Chol-ja), at the time a college student, made inquiries to several related administrative offices, resulting in the issuing of a memorandum that touched exclusively on these three professions (Suh 1987: 261; Chong 1997: 83).

[46] Practices concerned with the implementation and abolition of the nationality clause differ, dependent on the municipality.

[47] NTT was split up into regional entities and privatized in 1985.

[48] Each prefecture's board of education is careful not to publish the figure so as to avoid attracting attention and interference from the Ministry of Education (Y. Suh 1987:95).

[49] Its official website is http://koreanshr.jp/history.html. There is a different organization with a similar name, Zainichi Chōsenjin Jinken Kyōkai (The Association of Korean Human Rights in Japan, affiliated with Chongryun).

[50] Mintōren, which played a significant role in the protests during the 1970s and the 1980s, is probably well known only among concerned *zainichi* Koreans; only 4.9 percent of *zainichi* South Korean youth—assumed to belong to an apolitical generation—have heard of Mintōren (Fukuoka and M. Kim 1997: 204). During my fieldwork, I encountered some former Mintōren activists that had been absorbed into local Mindan branches the organizational leadership of which was in the hands of a similar age-cohort to former Mintōren activists who were in their twenties during the 1980s. Following the fall of the military dictatorship in South Korea, membership of Mindan and South Korean nationality became somewhat acceptable alternatives for the politically concerned, particularly from the mid-1990s on (cf. H. Lee 1998; S. Kim 1998).

[51] MOJ publishes the latest statistics in June, based on the figures from December of the previous year.

[52] Alien registration statistics do not include a breakdown between South Koreans and stateless Koreans. Kim Yong-dal obtained a breakdown of seventy-eight percent South Korean and twenty-two percent stateless Korean from the Ministry of Justice (Tani 1995: 158). One estimate in 2003 indicates five sixths are South Koreans (C. Kim 2004: 192).

[53] Reading and writing proficiency in Japanese (approximate to third grade level) is also required (Maeda 2001: 57).

[54] Two marriages resulted in divorce in the 1950s (Takeshita 2000: 78).

[55] The then Korean kinship system only rarely permitted adoption, and only by members of one's paternal extended family; it was possible for Japanese sons and daughters-in-law to be adopted by Korean families, but such cases were virtually non-existent.

[56] A notable exception to this household-centered definition of legal Japaneseness following Japan's defeat, involved repatriation from Sakhalin during the immediate postwar period and the period following the normalization of Soviet-Japan diplomatic relationship. Korean husbands of Japanese wives were allowed to repatriate despite their lack of Japanese nationality because of their wives' Japanese lineage (Ōnuma 1992: 49-50).

[57] Measuring attitudes regarding the hypothetical marriage of an immediate family member to a Korean using a typical social distance scale, Komai Hiroshi found approval ratings of thirteen percent (Tokyo, 1974), fourteen percent (Naha, 1986), and seventeen percent (Sapporo, 1987) agree (Komai 1993: 329-330, Table 6-1). An older survey by Wagatsuma and Yonemaya during the 1960s shows a much lower result of 4.4 percent (Wagatsuma and Yoneyama 1967: 133). While the samples are not comparable in relation to population, a narrowing of social distance across time can be observed.

[58] There is considerable variation across prefectures, reflecting the urban concentration of the foreign population.

[59] The largest scale decennial social survey (Stratification and Social Mobility, SSM) does not even include a question on ethnicity (Lie 2001: 170). The size of the *burakumin* population remains controversial, both because data is collected on the basis of residence in *buraku* communities (leading to the exclusion of those who have left their community of origin) and because the designation of *buraku* community status in state policy is in dispute (Sugimoto 1997:174). Naturalized Japanese citizens are statistically treated as Japanese and the existence of this group is obscured in census and other demographic data.

[60] Ages ranged from six to eighteen (including elementary, middle and high school students). The sample size was ninety-nine, and the survey was administered as a face to face interview owing to the small number of Korean children enrolled at each school (Shin and Gondō 1982).

[61] The Osaka survey had a higher response rate and a larger sample size (n=395) (Shin and Gondō 1982).

[62] The children of migrants who have South Korean nationality and are living in Japan.

[63] Names are assigned Chinese characters for both meaning and sound. Hence, it is possible to switch between Japanese and Korean names just through varying one's choice of pronunciation.

[64] The adoption of Chinese characters from the government-specified tables restricts the choices of name for some Japanese parents, sometimes resulting in litigation battles. See Watanabe (2007).

[65] The Tokyo Bureau of Justice's naturalization guide is a small blue booklet of forty-one pages (n.d.) The copy that I obtained in 1999 includes an example of the application form, with three name columns and a sample entry by a hypothetical Korean male applicant; name: Kin Eikon (Sino-Japanese pronunciation), alias: Ōte Jirō, and name after naturalization: Ōte Jirō. Whether this example is based on a typical case or constitutes the most desirable type of case from an administrative viewpoint, it may have the latent effect of leading applicants to believe that it is the

normal practice to adopting one's Japanese alias as one's name after naturalization. A similar example is included on the Ministry of Justice website: the Korean male applicant, Kin Ryūsaku, also known as Sekiguchi Ryūsaku or Sekiguchi Ichirō, writes Sekiguchi Ichirō in the column for the name to be used after naturalization. http://www.moj.go.jp/ONLINE/NATIONALITY/6-2-1.html. Accessed 8/20/09.

Applicants are instructed to leave the section of the form requesting date of application blank, implying that some cases require time until the actual submission of the form. The male nationality counselor in his fifties that I talked with was generally polite and friendly, but I noted that he made several mildly offensive remarks about the fact that I was neither working full-time nor married with children at the age of thirty-five.

[66] The wording of the question is unclear.

[67] Denying Japanese colonial deprivation of Korean names, the Japanese conservative argues that this was a voluntary process, and that it followed from ardent demands made by the Koreans themselves.

[68] Since the 1970s, and particularly in the regions of a sizeable Korean population, conscious efforts have been made to record the history of *zainichi* Koreans and their contributions to local and national Japanese communities through the publication of numerous stories of local Korean life as well as organizational histories (Kawasaki Nettowāku 2009; Kōtō Zainichi 1995; Mindan Nagano 1998). Other publications, filled with the life histories and anecdotes of prominent *zainichi* Koreans, have specifically targeted younger or lay audiences (I. Pak 2005; LAZAK 2008; Mindan Sakusei Iinkai 2006; Oguma and S. Kang 2008; Ryōchikai 1997).

[69] Kim Yong-dal (1990: 54), who criticized the naturalization process as a policy of assimilation, cynically described this practice as the "after care of naturalization."

[70] Memorandum-based classes were the legacy of the forced closure of Korean schools by the SCAP in 1948, pedagogically rooted in post-war Korean nationalism. The 1972 type was the result of collective negotiation between the Osaka City Board of Education and committed teachers and students who were inspired by *buraku* liberation education. The negotiation was unsuccessful, but the volunteer *zainichi* Korean teachers initiated the program (C. Ko 1996: 123-129).

[71] Japan's total fertility rate was 1.26, as of 2005. Recently, baby-boomer's grandchildren are born and slightly improved to 1.37 in 2008 (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 2008) (http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/nw/jinkou/geppo/nengai08/kekka2.html#k2-2, accessed Mar. 20, 2010). The Korean minority has experienced a similar demographic trend with respect to cohort distribution as the Japanese, and school enrollments are in a state of continuous decline.

[72] As of March 2002, there are 123 Chongryun affiliated schools (excluding kindergartens) throughout Japan (one university, twelve high schools, forty-three middle schools, and sixty-seven elementary schools) (Pak 2002: 215). In April 1988, there were 152 schools (one university, twelve high schools, fifty-six middle schools, and eighty-three elementary schools) (Pyon and Chon 1988: 14).

[73] Reorganized in 2001 into the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.

CHAPTER TWO

When Invisible Race Disappears: Intermarriage and the Limits of Symbolic Ethnicity

To (re)produce a people—as a collective subject—requires a vigilant, conscious, and conscientious retelling in performance […].
——Katya Gibel Azoulay (1997: 180).

[…]
Six years ago, when I learned of my mother's roots
My two elder sisters were there
The second sister was crying,
"I am Japanese, no matter what," she said.
The difficulties of life
The difficulties of living with dignity
An ethno-national identity taken for granted
Shattered into pieces with tears then
Looking back, I never met my mother's relatives
It felt strange to me even as a child
But who could have imagined
The southern part of the Korean Peninsula
The volcanic island from which she had descended
[…]
Why my parents had never said anything until then
That's how difficult it is to live
The history of the *zainichi* is a history of "concealing"
The history of the *zainichi* is a history of "being told to conceal"
A history of being told to be like the Japanese
A history of realizing oneself to be very Japanese
Within the frame of "Japan"
Years of being questioned what that should be

——Harada Yoshihiro (2004: 10-12), part of the prose poem, "Saishūdō [Chejudo] e" [To Chejudo]

The increasing intermarriages between second- and third- generation Koreans and Japanese are a major problem in the *zainichi* Korean [*chōsen-jin*] community. If intermarriages continue to increase at the present pace, the *zainichi* Korean community will break apart. The collapse of the *zainichi* Korean community will not be the result of the fundamental solution of the *zainichi* Korean problem. Rather, the community will fall apart without resolving prejudice and discrimination against *zainichi* Koreans.
——Kim Chan-jong (1977: 160).

Does the frequency of marriages between Japanese and Koreans indicate the disappearance of invisible racial boundaries? Compared with more striking examples of interracial marriage (hereafter referred to as 'intermarriages'), such as those between blacks and whites, can the fact that eighty percent of Koreans marry Japanese be considered evidence that *zainichi* Koreans are a well-integrated ethnic group? In this chapter, based on in-depth interview data, I will explore how the invisible racial boundaries between *zainichi* Koreans and Japanese are challenged and reproduced. How does an invisible race disappear and reappear in an inherently gendered family context? How is the dual heritage within one family negotiated and practiced among intermarried couples? Unless otherwise noted, I will discuss intermarriages between Japanese and Japanese native *zainichi* Koreans.[1] This is intermarriage in terms of ethnicity or nationality, not in terms of linguistic difference.

Interpretations of intermarriage rates often call attention to how a certain racial or ethnic group's reception in larger society changes over time. Marriage provides a lasting primary social relation and intermarriage has thus been considered as a final stage of assimilation (Alba and Nee 2003; Kalmjin 1998; Lee and Yamanaka 1990; Rosenfeld 2002). The hypothetical intermarriage of a member of one's family, as found in the Bogardus scale, is a typical example found in social surveys measuring intergroup distance.

More recently, many researchers have been questioning such linear models of incorporation, primarily from the standpoint of identity and the categorization of the children of intermarriages (Azoulay 1997; DaCosta 2007; Lee and Bean 2004; Rockquemore 2002; Sanjek 1994; Spickard 1989; Telles and Sue 2009; Waters 1990,

1999, 2000; Waters and Perlmann 2004), but also from the more mundane aspect of intra-family negotiations relating to genealogical imagination and cultural practice as well as expressions of such to surrounding people (Luke and Luke 1998; Root 1992; Song 2009; Takenoshita 2000; Tyler 2005; Twine 1999, 2004).[2]

Marriage and family reproduction is indeed a critical point of reference in examining inter-group relations. The increase in cases of intermarriage—a solid, observable indicator beyond the measurement of attitudes toward intermarriage held by one's family members in conventional social distance scales—per se does not provide us with sufficient evidence to conclude that invisible racial boundaries have either disappeared or been reinforced. On the one hand, what the accumulated research results suggest is that the occurrence of intermarriage itself "does not ensure wholesale social acceptance" (Song 2009: 343), since "intermarriage may, in reality, be a degree of integration which engenders deep ambivalence and concern for some sectors of society, including minority groups themselves" (Song 2009: 342). Intimate family relations can be very tricky, especially among those whose collective sense of belonging is associated with different social statuses and culturally hegemonic influences.

On the other hand, the tendency among researchers to emphasize conflicts and problems over amicable relations ironically reproduces these very categorical perceptions and group boundaries. According to John Lie (2004b), sociological and social-psychological theories have conventionally maintained that group boundaries become less significant as contact between different groups becomes more frequent and intimate, although other factors may also play a role here, such as the effects of individual personalities, the existence of shared goals, equal status in status indicators other than

ethnic or racial belonging, prevailing societal norms, institutionalized sanctions, and so on. The conflict thesis, in contrast, suggests conflict and discord are prevalent features in inter-ethnic and racial relations (Lie 2004b: 301-2). However, "peoplehood" consciousness, be it among ethnic, racial or national groups, as Lie (2004a, 2004b) argues, is only one of the consequences, neither a cause nor a pre-existing condition. Therefore, the causes of inter-ethnic and racial conflict can never be attributed wholly to essentialized group differences. Intermarriages need to be analyzed alongside a variety of factors in a particular historical and local context.

An examination of intermarriage needs to move its focus beyond the mere measurement of the number of incidences, given that marriage is not simply a singular event but an extended status, and also given the increasing frequency of cohabitation without resort to legal marriage (Takenoshita 2000; Waters and Perlmann 2004). In addition, relying exclusively on marriage reports and aggregation by nationality alone renders the Japanese statistics imperfect in grasping *zainichi* Korean demographics. Recall that there are no statistics relating to cohabiting *zainichi* Korean and Japanese intermarriages for Japanese family registry's sake. Cohabitation alone does not leave any visible trace of intermarriage on Japanese family registry. Until the amendment of the Nationality Law in 1984, the children of a Korean father and a Japanese mother were granted Japanese nationality only if the marriage is illicit. Naturalized *zainichi* Koreans also lose their demographic profile in official statistics. There also is no equivalent of the US Census's PUMS data, without which it is impossible to conduct a complex analysis incorporating other factors as socioeconomic status indicators. Therefore, whether intermarriage between *zainichi* Koreans and Japanese might be classed as homogamy or a

Mertonian status exchange, with one party marrying up or down, can never be grasped in statistical analyses. Neither can these inform us about the considerable diversity found among the profiles of Japanese spouses, in terms of their ways of thinking, political leanings, and other personal preferences. These limits in vital statistics necessitate an examination of additional ethnographic data.

Intimate relationships and intermarriage with the Japanese have been a major concern among *zainichi* Koreans, regardless of their distance from *zainichi* Korean community organizations. It has always been a problematic issue, or at least perceived as such. Even among the third generation in the middle of the affluent 1980s, one of the key moral lessons received from parents, grandparents and relatives was that one should ideally marry a fellow *zainichi* Korean. This was despite the fact many would only rarely have contact with other *zainichi* Koreans at school, at work or on the street, as Kyō Nobuko explains to a primarily Japanese audience (Kyō 1987: 25-34).[3]

More recently, marriages between two Koreans have been more likely to break up than those between Korean and Japanese cross-national couples. Based on statistical data released by the Japanese government, Jung Yeong-hae (2004: 61, 63-64) argues that approximately half of Korean-Japanese intermarriages end in divorce.[4] Korean−Korean divorces, however, occur more frequently than Korean-Korean marriages within the same year of 2002. If Korean−Korean divorces are more frequent than Korean−Japanese divorces while Korean−Korean marriages are much less frequent than Korean−Japanese intermarriages, then the prevalent unhappy prognosis about *zainichi* Korean and Japanese intermarriages can be considered totally groundless. The ideologies behind the reproduction of the *zainichi* communities may simply be *zainichi* Korean responses to

racism, providing them with a protective shield against potential or anticipated disadvantages in the Japanese marriage market. Nonetheless, *zainichi* Korean intellectuals have documented unhappy terminations of intermarriage or intimacy only with Japanese.[5]

Korean–Japanese intermarriages have been the most prevalent form of Japanese cross-national marriages registered in Japan in the post-war era. Nevertheless, many researchers have shown greater interest in more visible or perhaps exotic forms of interracial liaisons, such as those with European- or African-Americans, or with more recently-arrived Filipinos, Chinese, and Iranians (Ishii 1995; Piper 1997; Suzuki 2003; Takeshita 2000; Williams 1993). Korean–Japanese intermarriages, invisible interracial intermarriages, have received only sporadic attention, often being discussed as an auxiliary topic or included in background information (Fukuoka 1993; I. Kim 1978). Exceptions include noteworthy contributions by the sociologically trained Takenoshita (2000) and photojournalists Yamanaka et al. (1999).[6] In terms of approaches to the issue, many empirical studies have focused on pathological aspects of the identities of mixed-race children in Japan from clinical psychological perspectives (Burkhardt 1983; Murphy-Shigematsu 2003; Wagatsuma 1973).

Studies of inter-caste marriages involving the *burakumin* minority allow for some intriguing comparisons with Japanese–Korean intermarriages. For example, Fujino (1999) discusses the Japanese avoidance of exogamy with *burakumin* in the context of interracial relations as a modern phenomenon. Other researchers, however, analyze non-*burakumin*−*burakumin* marriages in status terms, rather than in terms of race relations (Hayashida 1975; Mizumura 2000). Davis (2000) points out that the criteria for

membership of the *burakumin* group are becoming increasingly obscured, and that the logic behind *burakumin* activism, which claims equality on the basis of their being Japanese, stands in contradiction with their frequent treatment by observers outside Japan as an example of an ethnically diverse population within Japan.

This chapter builds on the idea of intermarriage as a voluntary and private matter as well as an involuntary and public matter that encompasses racialized inter-group relations (Ong 1999; Ryang 2006; Stevens 1999).[7] Contemporary marriages between Koreans born in Japan and Japanese highlight mundane, everyday and accommodative visions of collective boundaries, clarifying or obscuring racial categories as being socially and historically constructed. Such marriages involve two historically hierarchical and contentious collectivities; their children have a dual legacy of being descended from colonized and the colonizing groups, regardless of whether or not the intermarried couples and their children are themselves aware of the implications. Arbitrarily racialized perspectives of Koreanness and Japaneseness (the fact that Japanese accounts for the overwhelming majority of the population and the fact that Japanese culture enjoys hegemonic status in Japan) may result in the prioritization of one heritage over the other. In other words, because inter-group relations have been overwhelmingly asymmetrical, the practice of ethno-racial collective identities is highly contingent upon various societal contexts.

According to my secondary analysis of *Japanese Vital Statistics Special Reports*, in which I examine cross-national intermarriage in Japan (Appendix 2), recent high percentages of intermarriage reveal a different picture when compared with different nationality groups within Japan, and when different types of measurement are used that

are less influenced by differences in majority and minority population sizes. Taking the individual as the unit of analysis, one out of five Koreans who married in Japan in 1965 married Japanese. In 1985, 55.7 percent married Japanese, whereas 43.6 percent married fellow Koreans. In the 2000s, on average eight out of ten Korean marry Japanese, while there has also been an increase in marriages to other nationality holders, albeit in smaller proportions. 16.4 percent of Koreans married fellow Koreans in 2006. Apart from the early postwar years, a higher percentage of Korean women have married Japanese than is the case for Korean men. My analysis of odds ratios by nationality (Appendix 2) shows that Koreans are much more homogamous than the Japanese. In other words, between the years 1965 to 2006, choices of marriage partner by Koreans continued to be restricted relative to Japanese and Chinese. In Japan, Chinese are more readily accepted as foreign spouses than Koreans.

This chapter analyzes the ways in which ethnicity is negotiated and practiced in everyday life among Korean and Japanese intermarried families. Using in-depth interviews specifically focusing on the ways couples manage the dual heritage of their families, I will illustrate the contradictory ways in which intermarried *zainichi* Koreans negotiate and resist imposed categorizations, challenging the dominant but implicit ideas of Japaneseness and Koreanness as conflations of nationality, lineage, and culture.

Family Matters: Dual Heritage, Symbolic Ethnicity and Racial Literacy

Let me begin with an overview of contemporaneous “international” marriages between *zainichi* Koreans and Japanese, using two explorative projects of the 1990s, one journalistic (Yamanaka et al. 1998) and the other academic (Takenoshita 2000). From

March 1993, one *zainichi* Korean and three Japanese photographers began interviewing and photographing *zainichi* Korean and Japanese intermarried couples across Japan, holding a gallery exhibition and panel discussion in 1995, after which the photographers revisited the featured families. A collection of photos from the project was published in 1998 (Yamanaka et al. 1998: 182-183).[8]

Yamanaka and his associates' unstructured interviews have several major themes: 1) how each couple met and became married, overcoming differences in nationality; 2) what they consider to be the main issues in their intermarriage; 3) how they deal with the transmission of a dual heritage to their children. The shared assumption between the interviewers/photographers and the interviewed/photographed couples is that either or both sets of parents (and typically the parents of the Japanese spouse) would object to their marriage.[9] The presentations, featuring the couples at home in mundane and local contexts, demonstrate the many similarities they share with other families in Japan, although there is a sprinkling of notable ethnic Korean ethnic elements. Their presentations are considered worthy of being exhibited by the photographers precisely because of their ordinariness. This ordinariness is precious, because of the assumption of hardship and drama attached to intermarriage. In some cases, interviewees even exhibited bewilderment at not being able to provide the interviewers/photographers with expected tales of dramatic incidents.

Takenoshita Hirohisa's study of *zainichi* and Japanese intermarriages (2000) questions intermarriage as an indicator of a lasting and equal relationship between two groups. *Zainichi* Korean and Japanese intermarriages involve two mutually exclusive, contrasting categories of Koreanness and Japaneseness, in that each defines the in-group

by alternatively defining outsiders. *Zainichi* Koreans affirm their own Koreanness through the intra-family dynamics of ethnic representation (Takenoshita 2000: 30-34).[10] In some cases, intermarriage does not mean an instant erasure of *zainichi* Korean heritage, with the notable exception of the experiences of the concerned in terms of the politics of representation.

As these projects suggest, there are several shared issues relating to the ways in which *zainichi* Korean and Japanese intermarried couples are observed and interpreted. First, differences in categorical belonging, i.e. *zainichi* vs. Japanese, affect how easily individual personality differences can be labeled as cultural differences. In many cases, the cultural differences between a wife and husband are subtle, reflecting *zainichi* Korean linguistic and cultural assimilation. However, depending on the context, these subtle differences are perceived as stark contrasts. Their categorical belongings may accentuate differences that may otherwise have been ignored or overlooked. Individual personalities can easily be attributed to group membership ascribed by birth. The line between the personal and the collective is hard to draw in mundane perceptions.

Second, Japanese cultural influences overwhelm each couple's attempts to transmit its Koreanness in order to communicate its *zainichi* background. It must be noted, however, that the content of this Koreanness varies tremendously from family to family, nevertheless sharing several common elements (including the use or display of little Korean ornaments, food, ethnic costume, maps, alphabet tables, and the like). Third, difficulties attached to marriages between *zainichi* Koreans and Japanese are widely shared and affirmed as anecdotes or urban legends among *zainichi* Koreans, despite the frequency of intermarriage and the fact that their own intermarriage may be a happy one.

A good working relationship continues to be perceived as the result of a combination of luck and effort, leaving intact the legend of hardship attached to relationships between *zainichi* Koreans and Japanese.

The concept of *zainichi* literacy is adapted from the concept of "racial literacy" in France Winddance Twine's analysis of the rearing of black children by intermarried couples in Britain (1998; 2004). What Twine (1998; 2004) focuses on is the way in which white parents, especially mothers, of biracial children deal with childrearing in a white-hegemonic society. She examines the practices of racially literate, "racially cognizant" white parents "who identified racism as a serious problem for their children and had concluded that it is either undesirable or impossible for their children to manage 'everyday racisms' if they are not taught how to identify and respond to racial hierarchies and resist racisms" (Twine 2004: 881-882). Precisely because of the lack of a shared position with their children, white mothers take proactive and more sophisticated strategies than do black mothers (Twine 1999: 205). Twine introduces three practices of racial literacy; 1) anti-racist home schooling, i.e. informal teaching providing children with vocabularies and an alternative history that is not taught at school; 2) supplementary schooling, i.e. enrollment in community-based programs for racial minority children and residence in racially mixed communities; 3) black lenses, i.e. decors and props to help children identify with the black diaspora (Twine 2004).

Among *zainichi* Korean and Japanese parents who are *zainichi* literate or aware of discrimination and exclusion on the basis of family lineage, whether intermarried or not, or all the more so because of intermarriage, various efforts are made to inculcate *zainichi* literacy, ranging from private conversations to more drastic measures.[11] *Zainichi* literacy

is often more proactive than symbolic ethnicity (Gans 1979). Beyond nostalgic cultural reproduction in private homes which heavily relies on a gendered division of labor (Pleck 2000), some concerned intermarried couples seek concrete, tangible tokens of their *zainichi* Korean heritage, including even colonial subjugation, discrimination and the complex and stigma attached to Koreanness, by actively choosing a disadvantaged nationality and/or legal status. The exclusive use of Korean names is another proactive strategy to define a child's identity as a full-time *zainichi* Korean.

In addition to the limitations of snowball sampling, as mentioned in the Introduction, my presentation of the following case studies includes only a partial view of the life courses, concentrating on issues related to marriage and childrearing. Firstly, and most critically, I interviewed only one individual (either one or both parents are Korean regardless of his or her nationality) from each intermarried couple, their views representing only a one-sided account of their family of origin or destination. This one-sidedness, however, assures the freely expressed disclosure of their interpretation of certain conflicting situations from the *zainichi* Korean side, both the interviewees and the interviewer being *zainichi* Koreans.

Secondly, it proved impossible to reach Koreans who had not "come out" as Koreans at all. As a result, those who were willing to take some time out for my interview tended to have a greater amount of *zainichi* literacy, by which I mean not linguistic, historical or cultural knowledge about the Korean peninsula, but an active, working knowledge of what it means to be a Korean living in Japan and possession of a certain set of counter-racism measures.

Thirdly, while I exchanged further correspondence with some respondents following the interviews, each case mainly reflects the respondent's interpretations of various events around the time I interviewed them. It is possible that, in some cases, both interviewer and interviewee came to view certain issues in a different light later on. Fourthly, interviews with those with children or with full-time work are generally shorter than others discussed in other chapters, due to time constraints, although the content of some interviews was supplemented by subsequent phone or email contact in some cases. Fifthly, cases are restricted to *zainichi* Koreans who have already intermarried, meaning that they face little or no opposition from their family members or prospective Japanese in-laws, and have sufficient levels of commitment to their relationship to move forward. Those who had given up on their marriages or relationships following family opposition are not discussed here.

Table 2-1 shows background profiles of the selected interviewees for the case studies, including nationality and name usage patterns for both self and children. Individual names are assigned pseudonyms that reflect the everyday name usage patterns of the individuals concerned, whether in Korean or Japanese style. Some cases are presented here with Japanese names, but these individuals, too, are *zainichi* Koreans with a varying degree of *zainichi* literacy. To minimize the effects of differences in experience according to cohort and generation, all of the cases introduced here are of individuals aged between their mid-thirties and early-forties (born between 1959 and 1970) with children at the time they were interviewed. Five women and five men are included in the table, from diverse family backgrounds. They also have different levels of *zainichi* literacy, and this is partially indicated in their responses to questions about the

availability of *zainichi* Korean empowerment education when the respondents were growing up. This simplified table of cases shows a dominance of Japanese names and Japanese nationality holders among the children of interviewees, except for a committed few.

Cases of Korean women married to Japanese husbands here have a higher educational attainment overall than their male counterparts, which is not an accurate reflection of the general situation in *zainichi* Korean communities. Fukuoka and Kim's 1993 survey of South Korean youths (1997) found that only seven percent of female respondents had graduated from a four-year college, as opposed to twenty-three percent of males (Fukuoka and Kim 1997: 12-13). In the final section, in order to explore intergenerational negotiations of *zainichi*-Japanese relations, I will also discuss a case of two intermarriages in two generations within one family—a Japanese man's marriage to a Korean woman and their son's marriage to a Japanese woman.

When Race Disappears: Embracing Exogamy and Voluntary Mores

Intermarriages mark an obscuring of racial boundaries and involve interpersonal, interfamilial and interracial negotiations, but *zainichi* Korean and Japanese couples are often invisible due to the *zainichi* spouse having become naturalized and the self-regulated suppression of ethnic signs. Among the cases used in this section, opposition by Japanese relatives occurred among those *zainichi* Koreans who retained their legal status as South Korean or stateless Korean. Kim Il-myeon has discussed the situation in the 1970s (1978), when conjugal relationships between Japanese and naturalized Koreans were rejected by both the Japanese and *zainichi* Korean families. This is no longer the

case. Nonetheless, the fact that the Seiwa Club (see Introduction), a voluntary association for naturalized Japanese of colonial Korean descent, still maintained wedding arrangement for its members' children as its major enterprise when I visited its Osaka branch twice in 1999,[12]indicates the continuing assumption among naturalized parents that their children will suffer disadvantages in the ordinary Japanese marriage market. It continues to be unthinkable for a *zainichi* Korean to have an arranged marriage with a Japanese.

Family opposition based on nationality difference is often compromised by naturalization or restricted social relationships.[13]The Japanese and Korean in-laws rarely get together, although this falls within the accepted norms of urban nuclear family units in contemporary Japan. Wedding receptions are often ethnically ambiguous, without any hint of Koreanness. This ambiguity is often a choice made by the *zainichi* side, without any coercion by the Japanese in-laws. One case involved two different sets of ceremony, one in Japanese and the other in Korean, with completely different sets of guests; Korean-style weddings are strictly confined to private, family settings. A small number of the couples interviewed challenge the notion of marriage as a liaison between two families and a symbol of the legacy of the oppressive family system, refusing to legally marry or hold any kind of ceremony or reception.

After her husband had spent one year persuading his parents, Takahashi Minako's marriage in the late 1980s was finally approved by her Japanese-in-laws on condition that she got naturalized before officially reporting the marriage. In so doing, the record of the marriage in the family registry would be less obvious, and it would appear as a marriage between two Japanese. If Minako retained her South Korean nationality, column for

"mother" in the family registry of their future children would be left blank. The presence of a foreign mother included in a footnote in the Japanese family registry. Minako's father was furious. She recalled the lines she remembered him saying: "That's just a matter of a piece of paper! Don't marry him if his parents judge one's personality on the basis of documents!" Minako's mother-in-law had known Minako as one of her son's Japanese friends who went to school with him, and had kept saying that he should marry someone like Minako until she heard that Minako was Korean. "So it [her mother-in-law's opposition] is not a matter of my personality. Only my nationality was the problem," Minako explained. Her father compromised in the end. For her in-laws, Minako's naturalization was an "absolutely necessary condition" for them to approve the marriage:

> Somehow to them, Koreans with Japanese nationality are more acceptable than [South] Koreans with [South] Korean nationality. I thought it was an odd logic—[South] Koreans are [South] Koreans anyway, right? Well, they are nice enough to me and to my parents after all [but Minako's mother-in-law declared that they are only acquainted with Minako's parents and that they stay away from the other relatives]. We could probably have been Japanese enough in speech or mannerisms or whatsoever, perhaps. We are just humans and the difference in nationality does not really matter. My husband's relatives won't say anything about it, although they may have not been informed of it at all. Nobody says anything, at least in front of me. Maybe [it is] a matter of my personality—I am optimistic (personal interview July 21, 1998).

Minako estimated that naturalization would take about a year, and had arranged the wedding ceremony a year later than her engagement. Her naturalization took a year and a half.[14] They had the ceremony as planned, and waited for the official marriage

report until Minako's naturalization was granted. She chuckled and said, "So, our marriage was illegitimate for six months!"

Naturalized as an individual, the final process of naturalization creates a family registry with one individual who is also the head of the household. She changed her permanent address once. The footnote entry for her naturalization was erased. Minako is not the kind of person who desperately conceals her Korean lineage, but she followed this process of erasing the footnote entry noting her naturalization without question. Minako's parents' Korean names are the only trace of her Korean lineage, and they will not appear in her children's family registry after they have created their own independent family registry.

Minako's family, especially her mother, handled the wedding ceremony and reception with care. *Zainichi* Korean relatives wore either rented formal black kimonos or western clothes, and the guest name cards placed on the table all used Japanese aliases. Minako thought about wearing Korean dress, but her mother told her not to. Minako recalled, "They didn't have to go that far, but my mother decided to do everything in [a] seemingly Japanese [way], saying 'if the in-laws are originally from Kyūshū, they must be conservative!' Isn't it funny?" The couple carried different passports on their honeymoon trip to Hawaii—the only overseas trip she made with her South Korean passport, which she decided to hold on to as a treasured keepsake.

The superficial erasure of recognizable Koreanness was just an extension of well-practiced *zainichi* Korean modes of passing as Japanese. Minako's family had never been "straitjacket nationalist" or ethnically conscious at all. Unlike other *zainichi* parents,

Minako's parents did not push their children academically, although they sent all of them to post-secondary two- or four-year colleges; they are satisfied with moderate social standing and average life styles, and do not aspire to overly ambitious careers or improvements in their social circumstances. Naturalization was not the real issue for Minako's father, as the entire family later became naturalized around the same time, her younger brother who already married his Japanese girlfriend also becoming naturalized, but after the birth of their first child.

At first, Nakahara Yumi also experienced opposition to her marriage from her intended husband's family, but they agreed after a while. When her parents-in-law and brother-in-law heard of their marriage plan for the first time, they exclaimed that marriage should not be determined out of "sympathy." Fed up with such predictable reactions on the part of her boyfriend's family, Yumi decided to take a break from everything—the relationship and her clerical position at a small firm—and spent six months in Seoul learning Korean with the hope that it might be useful around the time of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. In the meanwhile, her old Japanese boyfriend was defiant and persistent enough to persuade his parents. He was then in his late thirties, which was "outrageously late to remain single according to the standards of a rural community," as Yumi explained, so that the in-laws relatively quickly reached the conclusion that their son was better married now to a Korean than not at all. Yumi's husband used to take long overseas trips to South East Asian countries after working odd jobs. Now he seemed to be finally "settling down" in full-time employment with marriage in mind, and his parents did not want to upset their son's return to a conventional life course.

Yumi filed her application for naturalization when she was pregnant with her first child, which nobody coerced her to do. Her husband did not care much about formality; how his family registry looked like did not matter to him at all. But Yumi thought that something "inconvenient" might happen if her child's family registry had a missing entry, and Yumi would rather avoid such an outcome. Her application was processed very promptly. Her naturalization in 1988 took only seven months to be approved. According to hearsay stories among Yumi's relatives, this was an example of exceptionally speedy handling on the part of her local Bureau of Justice. Yumi recalls, "All my [*zainichi*] family members thought I was lucky. They even wondered if there would be any pregnancy discount!" Was it because her nationality counselor[15]also thought that naturalization should be granted prior to the birth of Yumi's child so that the family registry would look more normal? There is no way of knowing.

Yumi's relationship with her in-laws benefits from the comfort of distance, which eliminates sources of mundane, trivial conflict. Yumi's parents exchange habitual seasonal gifts (*o-chūgen* and *o-seibo*) with Yumi's in-laws twice a year showing mutual respect and care. To the displeasure of Yumi's parents, the couple did not have any ceremony, and did not have formal wedding pictures taken either. Yumi's husband has consistently disliked any kind of formality, which has probably helped their intermarriage work out better, but his "too casual" approach to important life matters is a sign of a lack of seriousness in life to Yumi's parents:

> My parents kept complaining for a while about their first visit to our apartment. Because I was cooking lunch for all of us, my husband went to meet them at the train station. He showed up with both his hands in his pockets, and he was wearing his leather shoes as slip-ons with the backs underfoot. Just casual jeans

> and an unironed shirt. That kind of informality doesn't mean much to me but really annoyed my parents (personal interview, April 2, 2000).

Korean intergenerational mores concerned with paying respect or showing deference to elders are allegedly stricter than those of Japanese; sons are not allowed to smoke in front of their parents, and so on (Fukuoka 1993). Yumi's parents must have been sensitive to any lack of respect for their daughter, concerned with her marriage to a Japanese who they feared might look down on Koreans. Informality could be easily misunderstood as lack of respect.

Chung Soo-min has a strong commitment to *zainichi* causes and uses her Korean-pronounced name on all occasions. She retains her legal status as a stateless Korean. When Soo-min and her Japanese boyfriend decided to get married, Soo-min's family did not object; her brother had already married a Japanese woman several years earlier. But her Japanese partner's family was strongly opposed. Soo-min's partner ended up completely losing touch with his parents for three years. After their children were born, the presence of the grandchildren softened his parents' attitude. Although they now visit each other once every two months or so, her father-in-law never addresses Soo-min by her Korean name:

> He just uses eye-contact, or calls my attention, saying "hi, there," or just "hey." When I am not around, my husband said that he always asks "how is she [*kanojo*] doing?" "If she likes this [food], you can take some home with you for her." And so on and so on. But never mentions my name. He has a rather reserved and shy personality. I can tell he kind of likes and accepts me now as his son's partner. The funny thing, though, is that, by contrast, his mother brags about her son's "international" marriage. You know, for quite a few Japanese people, it's "in" to be "international." She likes overseas travel and takes English conversation

> lessons. They are fine now with us. So, it may take time, but because we all are humans anyway, we can understand each other, or at least we can try (personal interview, December 15, 2000).

Soo-min used to be called Setsuko, even by her own parents, and was named after the legendary Japanese actress Hara Setsuko. This was "too Japanese!" for her. She began using her Korean-style name, which was totally different from her officially registered name, when she was in college as she searched for her own identity, and now she humorously says, "I would never tell my father-in-law my real name! I can see he would then start calling me 'Setsuko-san' all the time!"

Soo-min's marriage to her Japanese partner is a de facto one, the couple challenging the ideology attached to legal marriage and the family registry system; the family registry of her husband has no formal record of a conjugal relationship with a Korean family. Soo-min, Yumi and their husbands' parents' generation is known for sharing an ideology of family reproduction—a residual effect of Japanese state population policy (Ryang 2006). More recently, Japanese demographic trends show alarmingly low total fertility rates owing to delayed marriage and childbirth as well as the chronic shortage of stable employment in a time of recession. The belief of parents that it is better to be married—either legally or de facto—than never lowers the hurdle for intermarriage, especially if parents are concerned at their children's non-conventional lifestyles, whether in the context of political leanings or employment.

Kamei Akinobu's parents chose not to report their marriage. This was not purely to safeguard Akinobu's Japanese nationality in the days of the patrilineal Japanese Nationality Law. Akinobu's *zainichi* father, who was more than twenty years older than

his Japanese mother, was legally married to another woman. Akinobu's family registry has a blank in the column for "father"; he does not even know his *zainichi* father's "real" full name, since his father used several different Japanese names in everyday life. There are negative social implications if one is registered as an illegitimate child (Burkhardt 1983). However, in Akinobu's case, there is no hint of his Korean lineage, at least as far as legal documents are concerned. Akinobu, thus, never experienced the likely dilemma of *zainichi* Koreans who have legal status on paper as foreigners and two names while being acculturated as Japanese in every other way. Nonetheless, he was well connected in local *zainichi* activist circles, not only because he was living in a Korean neighborhood, but also because the activists had persuaded his father to let Akinobu attend local *zainichi* Korean after-school activities. Akinobu remained part of this local group for a considerable length of time because of the friendships he had built up there, not because of *zainichi* causes per se. When I interviewed him, however, he had basically cut off all of his connections with *zainichi* activism.

When Akinobu married his Japanese girlfriend:

> There weren't any problems at all, beyond my competence in surviving in this world. Plus, unless I explain, I am Japanese, no matter what perspective others [use to] view me. I told them [his prospective Japanese in-laws] my father is originally from South Korea. There is no opposition because of that. They are nice folks, living in the countryside. I may have just been lucky. Those country folks were not so narrow-minded (personal interview November 19, 2000).

His theory is that every parent who worries about their children has something to say, no matter whom it is they introduce as a potential spouse, and that Japanese avoidance of Koreans as spouses has always been overstated:

> [That] a Korean and a Japanese cannot marry because one or both families are against it, is nonsense. You can just elope! I don't like people who mumble [about] how their relationships got screwed up because of family opposition.

I asked him if there was not any strong opposition in his case because his partial Korean heritage is impossible to determine outright from legal documents. He was not certain.

Neither Kanemoto Yoshiki nor Lee Kimi experienced any severe hurdles in getting married, although Kimi's father, who had high expectations of his daughter, was disappointed with her early marriage, also to a Japanese. He did not come to their wedding ceremony. Just coincidentally, the Japanese spouses of both Yoshiki and Kimi are originally from islands off the Japanese mainland. Yoshiki explained to me, "my wife's parents did not have the slightest idea what *zainichi* Koreans were like. Rather than ignorance being bliss, I wonder if they also think that they are not exactly so-called Japanese either, at least historically, you know. So they may have been more tolerant than stereotypical Japanese parents." Kimi does not see things this way in her case:

> They just leave us as we like. We are both busy working in Tokyo, building up our professional careers. They do not interfere at all. They may have some unique customs [not held by] [……] the Japanese mainlanders perhaps, but I really don't know too much. We don't marry and not marry just because of someone's nationality or [the fact that they] belong to a group. We got together as individuals (personal interview, October 27, 1998).

But Kimi also mentioned that she was lucky to have in-laws who did not reject her outright because of her *zainichi* Korean status. Kimi works for a company where it is extremely difficult even for Japanese in the prestigious four-year college graduate to gain job offers. At first, she felt the company was trying to figure out what to do with her; as a

zainichi Korean employee on a professional track, she was an unprecedented case. Outstanding and outperforming individuals are universally and inherently transnational; nationality does not matter when getting a job or getting married. The intermarried *zainichi* Koreans that I interviewed are homogamous in terms of their educational attainment, sharing priorities in life with their spouses and making minor adjustments to keep their marriage going.

Regardless of the extent of opposition by in-laws on either side, the entry of a record of intermarriage into a Japanese family registry continues to be a subject of concern. Therefore, where *zainichi* Koreans have Korean legal status, they sometimes become naturalized prior to the official reporting of their marriage or the birth of their first child, either upon the request of their Japanese in-laws or out of their own volition. Those who challenge the family registry system, through which Japanese legal marriage is recorded, also share the obsession of some Japanese with maintaining impeccable family registry records that have no recorded trace of intermarriages with Koreans. A couple's subversive intentions in choosing a common-law marriage paradoxically complement the Japanese desire to maintain an impeccable family registry record.

It is not always clear that an embrace of exogamy with a racialized Korean is the result of an attitude free of discrimination; intermarriages are often endogamous according to other criteria, except for family lineage. Nonetheless, the achievement of peaceful relations with Japanese in-laws or gradual acceptance by them at the very least renders invisible racial boundaries dormant. Minor opposition or interference is interpreted as a product of individual personality traits or regional cultural norms, or explained through reference to widely held beliefs that all parents may at first find fault

with the qualifications of their child's prospective spouse, even among the Japanese. It is hardly recognized at a level that involves group boundaries or historically blatant racism in narratives associated with *zainichi* Korean intermarriage. Unlike cultural differences (see the following section), institutionalized differences such as racialized group boundaries are likely to be discussed in terms of individual relationships.

When Even Symbolic Ethnicity Disappears: Cultural Reproduction and Gender

As I will discuss in the second section of the following chapter, cultural reproduction and nostalgia within ethnic groups tends to fall heavily on women's shoulders, whether it be through the medium of food, fashion, or festivals. For those who grew up without knowing any Koreans other than their family members and who never had the chance to receive any formal or informal Korean education, what they perceive can rarely be recognized as something that is Korean. Koreanness as symbolic ethnicity is, in fact, difficult to imagine, unless there are some tacit clues provided.

Haruyama Kazuhiko was naturalized when he was in middle school. He "felt relieved, honestly, at not being a Korean any longer." When I interviewed him as a father of three young children, he claimed that he was "(South) Korean-Japanese" *(Kankoku-kei nihon-jin),* and earnestly expressed his wish to explain his Korean roots to his children. He felt it necessary for him to learn about them (i.e. his roots), adding that it was only recently that he had come to feel such a need, after getting acquainted with a local *zainichi* of his age. Kazuhiko likes his *zainichi* friend, whom Kazuhiko thinks shares his awkward feelings about living in Japan as a "paper foreigner." He agreed to see me

because I contacted him around the time he had just started thinking about *zainichi* issues.

It was after getting married to a Japanese that he realized some of the home cooking he had enjoyed while growing up was not Japanese but Korean. “The boiled vegetables, like spinach or bean sprouts tossed with sesame oil and seasoning. I did not realize until recently that that’s Korean.” His wife’s cooking is not Korean, but Japanese. Until his marriage, he thought that his mother’s food preparation had become completely Japanized. His marriage to a Japanese made him discover his Korean background. The fact that Kazuhiko’s wife has a different cooking style is not an issue for him at all. He does not have a craving for Korean food either, largely because his parents live only fifteen minutes away by car and they often visit each other.

Kazuhiko’s family is particular about the observation of Korean rituals at home. He and his wife feel annoyed at the presence of Kazuhiko’s aunt (his father’s eldest sister), who ensures that family rituals are conducted in what she considers to be an authentic way.

KH: At first, she [my wife] enjoyed something different. She dressed up in Korean clothing at our family wedding ritual after the reception party at which I wore a tuxedo and she wore a (western-style) wedding dress. But when it comes to more regular annual rituals [ancestor worship rituals called *chesa*], my aunt expects us to follow the style [i.e. the correct format], because I am the first son of the first son.

YL: Does your wife come to those annual gatherings?

KH: Yes, she does. But she is not deeply involved with them, just helping out with some food preparation (personal interview, February 2, 2000).

His children have only Japanese nationality, and their names do not in any way communicate their Korean roots on their father's side. Occasionally, he encounters moments when his wife acts like a representative of "the" Japanese culture and customs, while he thinks that what she knows and embodies represents merely one set of local customs:

> When she deals with traditions or customs [he later elaborated what he meant was mostly the rites of passage for children], she always says, 'In Japan,' and so on and so on. I have no idea what is so special about [Japan]. But things are different. I have no idea. I feel a bit resentful. Trivial things. I cannot recall what those things at issue were. But, for the first time, I realized that even though I was born and raised here like everyone else, there are things I would never have known unless I had married a Japanese. Those instances make me think that I am not really a Japanese. She is Japanese and I am not, though we both live and grew up in the same place.

Kazuhiko is ambivalent about his *zainichi* heritage, which provides him a privileged status as the first son of the first son. Among his siblings, he is the one who is expected to succeed his father's business at some point. At the same time, he has already established a pattern of selectively and carefully dealing with his dormant *zainichi* Korean identity, saying "It does not matter at all, even if someone is a Korean, does it? And I could not explain what it means to be a Korean in Japan. Besides, my parents became naturalized when I was in middle school and I grew up as a Japanese. […] I am proud of my roots, but I never tell [i.e. disclose] my Korean roots to my friends." So, while he is not exactly sure what to do in family rituals and relies on other family members to continue family ancestral rituals, he wishes to continue practicing Korean culture in private. He is proudly *zainichi* Korean, although he never discloses this fact to his friends. Kazuhiko takes for

granted that childrearing is predominantly the job of the mother, so he almost always defers to his wife, letting her do things as she pleases. He wonders whether what she does is a local variation or "the" Japanese standard, and he thinks he grew up like a Japanese. His wife's matter-of-fact use of her Japanese lineage to claim instant authority on all things Japanese occasionally alienates him.

Kazuhiko's case illustrates how a family's domestic practice of its Koreanness interacts with gendered social roles in reproducing Koreanness "in the closet," as it were. The only Korean tradition the family observes, ancestor worship ceremonies commemorating the dead, is a legacy of its Korean roots, but those annual ceremonies do not involve non-family members. It represents highly gendered aspects of Korean Confucian tradition. Ethnic family rituals cannot be completed without the contributions made by female labor in preparing the immense amount of food required (Pleck 2000). To Kazuhiko, this is "just … food preparation," although cooking for a large family gathering is a far more complicated matter than it appears. For Kazuhiko, positive feelings about being *zainichi* Korean involve this familial ritual in which he, as the first son of the first son, receives special attention among members of the clan. He does not express any empathy towards the burden his mother and his Japanese wife bear in this ritualistic ordeal. Maternal reliance on cultural reproduction possibly adds complexity to an intermarried couple's negotiation of its dual heritage.

When Symbolic Ethnicity Appears: Ambiguous Boundaries and *Zainichi* Literacy

Takenoshita (2000) points out that intermarriage between Japanese and *zainichi* Koreans cannot be taken as involving a problem-free, lasting and equal relationship. The

differences between the two groups are not clear, because of cultural assimilation among Japan-born *zainichi* Koreans. Nonetheless, constructions of both Japaneseness and Koreanness retain significant traces of historic experiences as colonizer and colonized (Lie 2008: 3, 170-171; Takenoshita 2000: 30). This Japanese and Korean binary, reinforced by definitions of group membership vis-à-vis the other, renders cultural negotiation by intermarried couples complicated.

Zainichi Korean background, both when externally labeled or when internally identified, is a matter of lineage. In everyday life, it is invisible. Intermarried *zainichi* Koreans practice *zainichi* literacy education at home in both passive and proactive ways. These range from letting things unfold naturally and explaining their children's partial Korean lineage only if asked, providing children with props such as dolls, maps, books, furniture and the like in order to invoke the family's association with Korea, or, in the most drastic cases, to launching their children's social lives as *zainichi* Koreans through the use of Korean names and/or maintenance of Korean nationality.

In the case just introduced above, Kazuhiko had no clue as to what exactly he would do in order to pass on his family's roots to his children at the time of our interview, partly because his children were still very young:

YL: When and how are you going to explain your family's Korean roots to your children?
KH: Well, I don't know, I have no idea. Maybe I won't tell them unless they ask me. Yeah, when they ask me, I will try to explain it.
YL: What are you going to do if they never ask?
KH: That's fine, too. Unlike myself, I mean, when I was born, I was a Korean as a matter of fact, but the story is different for my children. They are Japanese from the moment of [their] birth.
YL: So you are not exactly Japanese, but your children are.

KH: Yes. Besides, their mother is Japanese.

He is not troubled by the thought of raising his children as ordinary Japanese. Kazuhiko cannot remember well when he "came out" to his Japanese wife, but he recalls that he told her parents that he was naturalized relatively early in their courtship. His constant stance is that he neither hides nor advertises that he was a South Korean. But he never tells Japanese that he is an "ex-*zainichi*-Korean," which he occasionally identified himself as while we were talking. Vis-à-vis his Japanese wife, Kazuhiko is *zainichi* when he is not seen as being Japanese. While he expressed his pride in being a *zainichi* Korean shortly before the above conversation, he does not know his grandfather's Korean last name, and has never asked his parents for details. Names, places of clan origin (which used to be a part of the Korean custom of absolute patrilineal clan exogamy), and facts surrounding migration to Japan all fade away so quickly. Kazuhiko selectively prioritizes maternal lineage in order to prove his children's Japaneseness. In another context, he expressed his responsibility for maintaining Korean ancestor worship rituals, in which, as mentioned above, he was an authority figure as the first son.

Yumi also chooses a passive and flexible approach when dealing with *zainichi* matters in relation to her children, who were born in the late 1980s around the time South Korea was about to experience rapid growth in its global economic standing. Except for several snapshots of her child as a toddler in a brightly colored traditional Korean costume, Yumi has not communicated with her children at all about her own *zainichi* background. Yumi once participated in a three-week summer trip to South Korea organized by Mindan. She made several good friends there, with whom she still keeps in touch. Recall that Yumi even went to South Korea to study the Korean language prior to

her marriage. Once settled down and overwhelmed with the unfamiliar tasks related to childrearing, Yumi put aside the questions she had about her *zainichi* identity.

Yumi explains, “I wanted my children to come to realize naturally the slight differences between their [Korean] grandparents in Tokyo and their [Japanese] grandparents in Kagoshima as she grew up. They can absorb the differences little by little, not through an explicit explanation.” So, Yumi has never actively intervened in the process of her children growing up as ordinary Japanese. When Yumi’s children were both in middle school, one of Yumi’s sisters got married and wore a traditional Korean garment at the wedding party, which was attended by Yumi’s family. Yumi’s mother, a second-generation *zainichi* Korean, was concerned about this situation, wondering if the grandchildren, who were going through their difficult years of adolescence, would be “shocked” at the news that their mother was *zainichi* Korean, even though she had become naturalized fourteen years earlier. “My mother insisted that my children would have no need to bother with those things [being *zainichi* Korean] because they are Japanese,” Yumi said. For Yumi’s mother’s generation, being a Korean in an isolated setting had far worse implications than being identified as a Korean now. In recent times, at least images of South Korea are more favorable than they were during Yumi’s mother’s childhood. Here, a *zainichi* Korean mother ambiguously explains her Korean roots and a *zainichi* Korean grandmother discourages to some extent the transmission of the family’s Korean heritage. They do not actively provide their children or grandchildren with *zainichi* literacy. Having Korean lineage, or even a command of the Korean language in Yumi’s case, does not guarantee a capacity to transmit anything to do with Koreanness or being *zainichi* Korean.

Yoshiki and his Japanese wife have also postponed discussing "when and how" to inform their children of his *zainichi* Korean background. He once told his eldest child that he is a Korean, but "he did not understand it. He did not pay attention either." Yoshiki also dresses his children up in Korean attire, but "they still have no idea what that is all about." Yoshiki has a local *zainichi* Korean network and brings his children along to his *zainichi* friends' Korean barbecue parties in summer where children meet people with Korean names speaking in Japanese. The approach is indirect.

Minako is willing to share her *zainichi* Korean background with her children, and she has actually told them, although they are so young and have no idea what a nation is. Minako's own identity was stabilized by her intermarriage, although it involved naturalization prior to marriage, following the demands of her in-laws. When I asked Minako if she mentioned her Korean roots to the people she had gotten to know after her naturalization, she said, "Yes," albeit after a pause of several seconds. Minako once casually mentioned to her children, aged three and five, that she was a Korean and that "Daddy" was a Japanese, and she recalls that, "At this stage, they don't seem to understand what it is all about. As they grow up, I'll occasionally fill in [the details]." She added that meeting her husband had been "quite a big turning point, I think," adding that, "He accepts me for what I am, including my Korean roots. Otherwise, I would not have been able to mention my Korean roots to someone as matter-of-factly."

Thirty-three years old at the time of the interview, Minako led an extremely busy life, standing up and walking around all day in her full-time job as a physiotherapist, while taking care of her two toddlers at home. While she had told her children that she was *zainichi* Korean with Japanese nationality, she confided that she did not have time to

do anything else, her everyday life moving at a very fast pace. Rare occasions when she is able to stop and think include some occasions for celebration outside the routines of everyday life, such as her children's rites of passage. These always end up being marked according to a simplified format, although she tries to incorporate both Japanese and Korean styles. When asked her current priority in everyday life, she replied, "Oh! How to make both ends meet! Definitely!" Minako was apologetic about me having to visit her apartment, which was located a good two hours from Tokyo's business district. Despite my protests, she cheerfully and efficiently fixed a light lunch for herself, her sons and me. As we talked, her five-year old son ran around, asking her to play a video tape for him. Everything was magically efficient, but hectic, because of Minako's full-time job. There was little room to teach about *zainichi* Koreans or about Korean culture, both of which require considerable reactivation and reinvention as knowledge and cultural repertoire.

Thirty-five year-old Kimi has a high level of *zainichi* literacy because of her politically conscious father. Kimi has only ever used her Korean family name but pronounces it in Japanese fashion, while her family name itself clearly communicates her Korean background. The Chinese characters used to write the name her father chose for her can be pronounced the same way in Korean and in Japanese. Kimi's father, who moved to Japan as a very young child, is a stateless Korean, and her mother is Japanese. Almost all of her father's relatives are in South Korea, and her family has a closer connection to its Japanese relatives. Kimi's husband is Japanese and her son is legally Japanese by birth.

When I asked if I could interview her, she was not so eager, explaining that she had never been politically active or concerned with *zainichi* Korean issues. Nevertheless,

she is strongly influenced by her father, who rejects both Korean governments and the *zainichi* organizations that reflect the political division of the homeland. She simply knows more than the average *zainichi* Korean about the *zainichi*. Knowledge is not always praxis. For Kimi, stateless Korean status is a knot that connects her and her father; she has never thought about naturalization. Rather than imagining a national entity and a derived national identity, nationality stands for her father's beliefs. Kimi has never thought of changing her family name upon marriage either. Legally, being a foreigner, albeit a stateless one, Kimi is officially allowed to maintain her family name after marriage. Had she been a Japanese, she would have had to adopt her husband's name as her legal surname, since Japanese legislators have kept postponing the legally recognized use of separate surnames by married couples over the past two decades. Her six-year old son has only Japanese nationality and has her husband's surname. Kimi and her husband both agreed upon this decision, while she is trying to teach him that his grandfather is Korean and that she herself is Korean as well.

When her son started kindergarten, the idea of him being Japanese came to him. He asked, "Mommy and Daddy are both Japanese, right?" Kimi said, "No, I'm not Japanese. I'm Korean." Her son began crying, "Why are you saying such a thing?" because, according to Kimi, he still did not understand why people who look the same and speak the same language cannot be Japanese, and he felt as though an important link between himself and Kimi was being denied to them. So, she showed him a map and explained, and since then has tried to explain the situation from time to time. Maps, as Benedict Anderson (1991) juxtaposed with other devices of national imagination, allow the visualization of differences even without cultural substance. Now he seems to

understand the relationship between Japan and the two Koreas in map images. Despite Kimi's persistent use of her Korean name, she recently realized that she had begun to use her husband's name more often in the neighborhood and at kindergarten, largely because she is recognized as the mother of her son, who has a Japanese family name. Depending on the circumstances, she is socially recognized by her husband's Japanese family name as a wife and mother.

Acquired *zainichi* racial literacy does not guarantee intergenerational transmission. Akinobu's long, albeit intermittent, relationship with a local *zainichi* activist group enriched his racial literacy as a *zainichi*, which ironically saturated his desire for being connected with other *zainichi*. Even when Akinobu encounters or overhears racial remarks against Koreans (no one doubts his Korean lineage), which he does quite often, he just refuses to pay attention, "I stop bothering [about] these things. If you get oversensitive, it makes your life unnecessarily complicated." He still receives some mail addressed to his father's Korean name, which Akinobu occasionally used with *zainichi* Koreans. He wished to use his father's Korean last name when he changed workplace, and consulted with his supervisor in this regard. Eventually, Akinobu's legal name had to be used, and he did not pursue the matter further. Unlike the members of Torimodosu-kai (Introduction, Chapter 5), he did not feel the necessity to substantiate his change of name—he is skeptical, arguing that, "which name has to be used or recognized or whatever all assumes [a particular] audience. I don't like any action which assumes an audience." He even detests the hip label *daburu* ("double"), used instead of *hāfu* ("half") to describe children of dual heritage, claiming that, "*zainichi* movements began including those people [doubles] just because otherwise there wouldn't be enough people!"

Akinobu's children have taken on his Japanese mother's last name and their family registry records show no documented connection with Akinobu's Korean father.

When I asked if he would provide his children with any opportunity to learn about *zainichi* Koreans or to get acquainted with other *zainichi* Koreans, he immediately responded, "I'm not interested in trying to impose anything on my children. Anything imposed, children will hate it. Besides, I don't find any point in getting together just because of *zainichi* Korean background, no matter what." Because he had been involved with *zainichi* Korean study groups, he was disappointed with *zainichi* organizations, noting the egos of *zainichi* activists and the way that their agendas shifted according to changing circumstances, particularly after Mintōren's split (See Chapter 1).[16]

Takai Kenji was born to a second-generation *zainichi* Korean father who became naturalized when he was young and before he married Kenji's Japanese mother. Kenji's parents opted to divorce when Kenji was in grade school, and Kenji's Japanese mother raised him. His father covered up the traces of his former Korean nationality by a series of changes in his permanent address. As an adult, Kenji traced back through his father's family registry; it took considerable effort to finally locate the record of his father's naturalization. Prior to her marriage, Kenji's mother was not informed of her prospective spouse's [Kenji's father's] *zainichi* Korean background at all. She learned he was a naturalized Japanese several years after the marriage. She was shocked, not by the fact that her husband was a Korean, but by the fact that he was not able to tell her this fundamental fact, wondering if her husband did not trust anyone, not even his wife. Later, his Japanese mother provided Kenji with novels that dealt with racism and discrimination.

Kenji recalls, “I was quite politically active when I was in college; I happened to live in a dormitory where quite a lot of student radicals lived. I sometimes try to tell my friends that my father is *zainichi* Korean. But it was really after my late twenties that I was able to deal with my father’s Korean roots in a less uptight way” (personal interview, September 16, 1999). He adds, “I think people can run away from their roots if it burdens them and if they want to. Not everybody is strong. Everybody has different timing for coming to terms with things in life” and smiled, indirectly criticizing the prevailingly one-sided pressure *zainichi* Koreans receive from well-intended progressive Japanese as well as from *zainichi* Korean activists to “come out” socially and use Korean-pronounced names all the time (Ryang 2009: 13-14). Kenji shares his father’s story when he wants to get closer to people he meets, “but the funny thing is that people then start responding as if I am more Korean” by bringing up topics concerning the Korean Peninsula, out of good intentions. Kenji, though, feels awkward in such occasions; he does not care much about the Korean Peninsula. Because both Kenji and his Japanese partner reject the ideology behind the family registry, they have not reported their marriage, just like Soo-min and her partner.

Kenji attempts to use some deliberate clues when opening a conversation about his genealogical history (as imagined because his *zainichi* father’s viewpoint is missing) with his children. Kenji and his Japanese partner, despite both being politically conscious and critical of the status quo, display their wedding photo in the living room, both dressed up in traditional Korean wedding attire. It is neither name nor nationality, but stories and minimal props to solicit them that Kenji and his wife have prepared for their children’s development of *zainichi* literacy.

Soo-min and her Japanese partner opted for a common-law liaison for a more proactive reason; they wanted to pass on Soo-min's stateless Korean legal status to their children: "My husband had the idea that if there is a relationship between discriminator and discriminated, one should take the position of the discriminated first. This is very difficult to reverse." Rather than providing her children with an escape hatch through her husband's Japanese name and nationality, for Soo-min and her Japanese partner, it was more desirable to begin with the position of the minority, all the more so because of the more precarious nature of legal status as a stateless Korean. Soo-min continues, "they will be Japanese in many ways, no matter what, as long as we live in Japan. Overemphasizing Koreanness fully at home, balances it to barely half and half." When her first child reached school age, the couple seriously considered the option of sending him to a Chongryun school, but they chose a local public school:

> Becoming bilingual, surrounded by *zainichi* Korean kids, was indeed appealing. We really thought about it seriously. But, after all, my partner is Japanese. Around that time, we had just reestablished the relationship with his parents. They were very nice to the children, trying to do many things for them, and the children love their grandparents. I did not want to sever the tie again by sending their grandchildren to a pro-North Korean school.

Soo-min's family relocated to the Korean-concentrated neighborhood where Soo-min herself had grown up. The zoned elementary school there has special weekly sessions for *zainichi* Korean children [*minzoku gakkyū*], available only in a limited number of municipalities. Soo-min explains:

> I wanted to avoid any environment in which my children feel isolated because they are different. Before they can handle adversaries, I don't want my children crushed and pressured at a young age during elementary school. I think we made

> the right decision. They did not perceive that they are different and out of place. That was really good. Because we prioritize [our] Korean identity, even if my children have a Japanese father, what we had to make sure was: if the wind blows against my children, it should be as warm as possible.

Soo-min's children always participate in a local annual festival that celebrates multiculturalism, where they perform on Korean drums. It is an "obligation, as long as they are part of our family." When I met her again two years later, her elder son had passed a competitive entrance examination and entered a six-year secondary school outside the community. Now, most of his time was taken up with extra-curricular activities and other interests, and he no longer participated in the festival, but "I think we have laid the foundations. The rest, he'll think and choose on his own."

Kim Jung-hee, a *zainichi* Korean with South Korean nationality, was exposed to *zainichi* Korean activism while at college. As a result, she has a considerable degree of *zainichi* literacy. I visited her when she was seriously considering renouncing her child's Japanese nationality, for the similar reason of wanting to avoid the taken-for-granted identity attached to legal Japanese status and a Japanese name.

Jung-hee and her Japanese partner did not formally register their marriage either. Jung-hee's partner acknowledged his paternal relationship to their son prior to his birth, and he has both Japanese and South Korean nationalities. If a marriage is not reported, children with a South Korean mother acquire her South Korean nationality. This was even the case before the 1998 amendment to South Korean Nationality Law, which made matrilineal nationality transmission possible. Her partner's parents accept her as their son's spouse, although they were quite shocked at first. The fact that they had a common-

law marriage means that there has been no change in Jung-hee's husband's family registry. Jung-hee thinks, "They may have been relieved that nothing happened to their son's family registry." Their child has his own independent family registry.

She is well-connected because of her college-day activism. Jung-hee has developed a solid but flexible identity as a *zainichi* Korean, although she also realized the problems caused by extremely nationalistic demonstrations of commitment among some *zainichi* Korean student activism, as well becoming aware of male chauvinism among their ranks.

Jung-hee, her partner and their child live in a local community that has no significant *zainichi* Korean population. In such an environment, with its limited opportunities for the development of *zainichi* literacy, Jung-hee began thinking about raising the child first and foremost as a *zainichi* Korean. Renouncing the child's Japanese nationality would force her son to think about what it meant to be a minority in Japanese society as he grew up, Jung-hee thinks. Her partner tries to understand her concerns, "But I just cannot tell my partner's [Japanese] parents. It will be too much for them!" (personal interview, December 20, 1998).

Parents of children with dual nationalities have, in rare cases (approximately 150 per year), chosen to reject their children's Japanese nationality so as to symbolically set them apart from the Japanese majority (Ministry of Justice 2003b). It is rather an extreme measure to opt for inconvenience. For Jung-hee, it is not Korean nationalism that is involved when it comes to South Korean nationality, but the fact that it represents a set of alternative values, not being caught up in the convenience of being Japanese in Japan.

Name and nationality are the most concrete tokens of *zainichi* Koreanness precisely because their substance indeed varies. For some, it is about maintaining a critical spirit, or about familiarity with history, while for others, doing (not being) *zainichi* Korean means facing up to and challenging discrimination rather than circumventing it though passing oneself as Japanese. Names are external expressions of their *zainichi* Korean background, although some use Korean-pronounced names and others use names that combine a Japanese-pronounced Korean family name with a Japanese given name.

Regardless of the approach to dealing with *zainichi* literacy that *zainichi* Korean parents choose, whether through props or through more drastic options involving name and nationality, *zainichi* Korean spouses and their Japanese partners must reach a consensus on how to implement such choices everyday life and to what extent. Kim Shin-sam even had to undergo a series of litigation battles with his Japanese ex-wife over how to raise their child—as *zainichi* Korean or as Japanese. Kim himself followed a rocky road in his own pursuit of *zainichi* Korean literacy as well. When I interviewed him in November 1999, he had achieved a farsighted perspective on what he had gone through during the previous decade. Although the issue of how to raise his child was complicated by the custody battle with his wife and former in-laws, what ruined his marriage was nothing more than blatant racism. He had struggled to leave some imprint on his child about what it meant to be a *zainichi* Korean, while his ex-wife and her family kept trying to erase anything connected with Korean culture in order to raise his child as Japanese. Let me return to Shin-sam's case in the following section.

When Race Reappears: Racism within the Family

Racism within families most likely takes the form of verbal abuse. "*Chōsen kaere!*" ["Koreans, go back [to Korea]"] is the equivalent of a racial slur; *chōsen* here not being used as a generic geographic term, but with clearly derogatory connotations. Used by a Japanese, there might be an intention to discriminate, or it might just be a slip. But at the very least, when heard, it is not forgotten.

Yoshiki recalled that his wife once used this phrase on him long before they got married. He could not remember exactly what had caused the quarrel. But he remembered the fact that his wife had used the term, although it had only been on one occasion about ten years earlier. How this term is received may vary, depending on the overall resilience that a *zainichi* individual may have at a particular time. Yoshiki also told me:

> My wife understands the circumstances of the *zainichi* through my experience. And she and her parents are fine with intermarriage with *zainichi* Koreans. Her dilemma, and I think she is aware of it, is that she cannot tell [anyone] that I am a *zainichi* Korean, beyond her immediate family and very close friends.

At work, Yoshiki himself uses his Japanese-style name, although to some sensitive individuals his last name hints at his *zainichi* Korean background. He also does not advertise it. To Yoshiki, it is "a [psychological] complex." To Yoshiki's wife, according to Yoshiki, "there is something. She cannot tell everybody that she married a Korean." Both Yoshiki and his wife do not disclose their intermarriage. Controlling information about lineage is a psychological complex for Yoshiki. For his Japanese wife, according to Yoshiki, it may be "something" that is covert and internalized racism.

Long-lasting marriage can lead to unexpected turns of event. Even in the twenty-first century, it is possible for race-based scapegoating to further damage domestic relations that are already suffering during times of recession. Yumi's sixteen-year long marriage ended in divorce in 2004 after the three years of immense stress. In 2001, Yumi's husband, then in his fifties, became the target of a corporate "re-structuring" following a prolonged period of recession that had lasted more than a decade, and was laid off. Further, his major assignment during his last year at the company he had been employed at for more than eighteen years involved laying off other employees. During this stressful assignment, his alcohol consumption tripled from an already excessive amount. He had established a habit of drinking six cans of beer every evening by his early thirties. While Yumi's husband took pride in his career path, the fact that he was aged over fifty, in addition to his lack of English fluency, shattered his hopes for alternative employment, denying him the satisfaction he needed for his work-centered identity. Years back, despite her credentials as a graduate of a four-year college and her command of English and even Korean, Yumi had worked as a cashier at a local convenient store when she resumed working part-time after seven years of a blank as a full-time homemaker; any disruption in their full-time employment deprives many women of a second chance in the job market after childrearing in Japan. Compared with the resilience of women in accepting any job, partly because of much lower expectations, adjustment by men after experiences of unemployment is not easy. Her husband was not able to reorient his life at all. His unemployment insurance payments had come to an end and he had begun living off the family's savings. The endless verbal abuse escalated.

Each time Yumi came home from her meagerly paid part-time job, her husband, already drunk with no hopeful news about potential employment, began boasting about his past achievements and retelling other stories she had heard again and again. The couple sought clinical support so that he could receive treatment for his alcoholism and depression. Yumi's husband began blaming her, attributing his downfall and bad luck to his having married her. The way Yumi raised the children, the way she cooked and cleaned, the way she talked, the way she walked, and the way she breathed—anything and everything annoyed him. Yumi's husband was hospitalized several times because of his alcoholism and depression. Nothing worked.

Later, her husband expressed his serious wish for their children to work full-time after completing their compulsory middle-school education, despite the fact that both Yumi and her husband had graduated from four-year colleges themselves. Then came the moment when her husband yelled at her, calling out, "You! Korean whore!" Yumi wrote to me, "My mind went blank. What have I been doing all my life? What were all those years I spent with him about? That's the way he had been seeing me." This momentary racial slur also made Yumi think, "Finally, it came," as if she had been anticipating this turn of events.

At the time the couple signed and sealed their divorce papers, Yumi's husband was not able to sign and seal in the designated column on the form, his hands too shaky due to his alcoholism. His brother held his hand and sealed on his behalf. Despite her marriage coming to an end with all of these extremely intense ordeals, all of Yumi's in-laws, who had vehemently opposed their wedding at first, expressed to her their sincere

apologies, thanking her and providing her with moral support. “My mother-in-law cried and apologized for raising such a spoiled son,” she recalled.

Shin-sam’s intermarriage collapsed at the very outset. He and his Japanese girlfriend had decided to get married when she became pregnant. However, her parents panicked, her mother reacting particularly badly, attempting suicide and even physically attacking him when he visited them. His girlfriend’s family was well established in the local area, her father owning a business that was a subcontractor for a major manufacturing firm. Her parents, and her mother in particular, were not able to accept a prospective Korean son-in-law. Although Shin-sam outlined the series of dramatic events as if it had happened to somebody else decades ago, the fact that he had spent his entire thirties on this ordeal, resulting in a complex series of litigation battles,[17] was painful just to imagine.

His *zainichi* literacy is a result of his troubled intermarriage. Shin-sam grew up using a Japanese alias, and was perceived socially as just another ordinary Japanese. However, he had to make considerable efforts to avoid giving off hints of his being a Korean. Shin-sam’s “coming-out” as a *zainichi* Korean to his girlfriend passed uneventfully. He also explained this to her parents. They listened, but did not immediately reject him. But their decision to marry completely changed the attitudes of his girlfriend’s family, especially those of mother and, eventually, of his girlfriend herself. They were only willing to accept him if he thoroughly erased his Korean roots. This would involve him becoming naturalized, cutting off ties with his *zainichi* family, and the couple rearing their child as Japanese. These demands all made Shin-sam wonder if this was the way things were supposed to be.

Concerned about his child living with his ex-wife's Japanese family, including his extremely bigoted former mother-in-law, Shin-sam took drastic measures to clarify his child's Korean roots, renouncing the child's Japanese nationality and adopting a Korean last name and Korean legal status for the child, these being some of the few options available to Shin-sam in order to ensure *zainichi* literacy for the child under the heavy influence of his former Japanese in-laws. The subsequent denial and challenge mounted by the Japanese side of the family complicated Shin-sam's simple desire to pass on his acquired *zainichi* identity to his child. After spending most of our time talking about diverse issues related to *zainichi* Korean and Japanese politics and what Japan meant to him, he said, "I did everything I could do. Despite all of this, my kid is growing up [to be] a very good kid."

Invisible race reappears occasionally after intimate relationships have been formed or marriages formalized. An embrace of intermarriage on the part of a Japanese family does not necessarily mean the disappearance of the historically constructed asymmetric relationship between *zainichi* Koreans and Japanese. Those who feel their Korean background has become racialized in a contentious manner, such as Shin-sam, however, live a multi-dimensional life. Such *zainichi* Koreans have Japanese friends to share their plight. In his long, divorce-related litigation battle and his efforts to leave some imprint on his son of his *zainichi* heritage, Shin-sam was supported, in large part, by Japanese friends who share with him a critical set of interests, including a desire to combat racial discrimination. It is not, after all, solely a matter of binary and extremely polarized power dynamics. *Zainichi* Koreans know that not all Japanese are racist.

Symbolic Ethnicity, Racial Literacy and Beyond

In this chapter, I explored intermarriages, some peaceful and others not, between *zainichi* Koreans and Japanese. Such intermarriages need to be examined beyond polarized assessments that view them either as symbols of integration or as tragic urban legends. An exploration of mundane practices and the meanings attached to both intentional and routine choices allows us to clarify the process whereby each couple negotiates symbolic ethnic representations, among other issues, as seen from the perspective of *zainichi* spouses.

As time goes by, people's minds change and the burden of history inflicts less intense pressure[18](see Appendix 3 for an examination of intergenerational intermarriage within one family). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, intermarriages between *zainichi* Koreans and Japanese may typically be considered in a de facto sense as homogamous in terms of linguistic and class differences as well as with respect to levels of critical consciousness, continuing to constitute exogamy only in terms of lineage.[19] Nonetheless, the unproblematic approval by Japanese parents of their child's intermarriage with a *zainichi* Korean is still viewed as a lucky, happy-ending, fairytale-like surprise.[20]

Full acceptance of a certain group in a particular country cannot be automatically inferred from the fact that intermarriages take place there. Erasure of one's lineage is not impossible for groups that are racialized yet invisible. But are these statements made because of the tendency among researchers and ordinary *zainichi* Koreans to emphasize and observe conflict more than reconciliation? Is my analysis reproducing typical

polarized stereotypes of what are seen as inevitably antagonistic relationships between *zainichi* Koreans and Japanese by treating categorical membership as an independent variable?

For some *zainichi* Koreans, close contact with Japanese in conjugal relationships accentuates their self-awareness, at least as this relates to their not being authentic Japanese. A categorical sense of belonging among *zainichi* Koreans is not just ascribed by birth, but acquired relationally though interaction with the Japanese majority. And one thing for certain is that the consequences of categorical membership are always real, with a lasting impact on an individual's life.

The question that remains is: Are *zainichi* Koreans accepted as spouses because they are not drastically different from Japanese in appearance, language, ways of thinking, and socioeconomic status after generations of living in Japan? Once a *zainichi* partner has become naturalized, his or her intermarriage with a Japanese becomes invisible, even in the context of legal documents such as the family registry, which has functioned for so long as a visible boundary marker of invisible races. Only through exhaustive research can the presence of Korean lineage be unearthed. Specifically with respect to the desire to maintain impeccable family registry records, preferences for homogamy remain on documents. Marriages to naturalized *zainichi* Koreans do not clearly leave the trace of intermarriage and unreported intermarriages challenge the family registry system, but do not appear in records at all. At a glance, such marriages are indistinguishable from homogamous ones and they are only covertly exogamous, especially given that the practice of symbolic ethnicity is restricted to the private domain.

If similarity is the basis of acceptance as a marriage partner, as in the case of the sociological assumption that individual choices are socially embedded, the simple prevalence of intermarriages neither challenges the hegemonic dominance of Japaneseness at all nor constitutes a sign of diminishing levels of bigotry. Symbolic ethnicity practiced at home will not upset the overwhelmingly ethnic Japanese composition of Japanese society either. Herbert Gans's concept of symbolic ethnicity is primarily a matter concerned with the post-integration phase, when possession of a particular ethnicity or lineage has almost become cost-free. *Zainichi* Korean intermarriages with Japanese continue to take place within the overwhelming hegemony of Japaneseness. Therefore, in intermarried homes, *zainichi* ethnicity does not so much amount to nostalgic longing for something as act as a reference that is selectively activated for pleasure and fun. To this day, it continues to carry the very real consequences of a historical, colonial and racial hierarchy.

Those who choose Korean (last) names and legal status as foreigners for their children, making everyday life more challenging for them than if they had Japanese names and Japanese nationality and appeared to be ordinary Japanese, are thus the ones most strongly resisting the disappearance of ethnicity and the associated legacy of belonging to a racialized group. They resist disappearance without proper recognition. They are critically aware that marrying Japanese does not mean the end of problems for *zainichi* Koreans. As such, their actions constitute a true beginning in challenging Japanese supremacy, so ubiquitous in everyday life. Simultaneously, they challenge the national scheme of reproduction that is based on the notion of one family, one name and one nationality. Such strong forms of resistance are often triggered by perceptions of

discrimination and racism directed against *zainichi* Koreans. Racialized boundaries also reemerge when relationships turns sour, even in the twenty-first century, demonstrating how little group boundaries between *zainichi* Koreans and the Japanese have weakened.

This chapter has illustrated that the family cannot be taken for granted as an agent of intergenerational cultural transmission among members of minority groups in positions of asymmetric hegemonic influence in relation to the Japanese majority. Historically hierarchical relationships involve disruption, interference, and intervention in intergenerational family relations.[21] The story continues after intermarriage.

The ways people act, choose to represent themselves, and deal with their dual-heritage children echo how *zainichi* Koreans move back and forth between racial minority status and ethnic minority status in constructing die-hard self-images of authentic membership in relation to a particular society. The cases introduced in this chapter illustrate the mundane forms of negotiation involved in being Korean or partially Korean (by law or blood), living in Japan and surrounded by Japanese people and culture. These forms of negotiation take place within the given legal system and in relation to ongoing contestations of meanings attached to particular social categories.

My informants have diverse identities—for some, their *zainichi* Korean identity is more important to them than for others, while each individual experiences considerable fluctuation in their level of interest when it comes to their search for identity. Quite a few opt to pass themselves as Japanese in everyday situations. They have different levels of commitment to the issue of *zainichi* Korean counter-racist literacy. No matter how empty the content of *zainichi* Korean identity may be, except for the issue of lineage, lacking a

solid *zainichi* Korean identity does not automatically result in conformity to a linear path toward assimilation as mainstream Japanese. Many have coped with subtle feelings of being inauthentic Japanese as they grew up. Although they may maintain differentiated expressions of identity, these are typically of a covert nature and confined to the private sphere, constituting one element of their negotiations with racial boundaries that seem to be disappearing, only to reappear at expected and unexpected moments.

Even those who try to be emphasize *zainichi* literacy through the proactive choice of a Korean name and Korean nationality and by not legalizing their marriage face numerous challenges in the predominantly Japanese environment that surrounds them. As Soo-min's case illustrates, *zainichi* Korean and Japanese partners share their political views in order to coordinate how to provide their children with *zainichi* literacy.[22] But they have no control after their children have left their local community. A genealogical story about one's *zainichi* Korean background often invokes an unintended message. Foreignness overtakes Japaneseness.

Intermarriages between *zainichi* Koreans and Japanese entail what Nobue Suzuki has described as "muddy realities" (2004: 501). She found that Filipinas who married Japanese adopted a strategy of imagining "America," and drew on their competence in English to negotiate better terms in their relationships with their husbands (Suzuki 2004: 496ff). Such strategies may not be available to many *zainichi* Korean spouses in their relationships; many of them are monolingual native speakers of Japanese who lack substantial knowledge of Korean culture. The cultural props and reinvented stories adopted by *zainichi* Koreans tend to accentuate foreignness. And this accentuated foreignness does not fundamentally alter what Japaneseness is all about, even though

their intermingled existence itself indeed empirically challenges hegemonic views of who Japanese are. Diverse approaches and forms of resistance have the overall effect of leaving assumptions concerned with ordinary Japaneseness intact.

Marriage and family are complex "social" phenomena, despite appearing to be natural and taken for granted as a matter of personal choice in the private domain. As Jacqueline Stevens (1999) argues, marriage and the family are deployed by nation states as ideological apparatuses for the reproduction of the nation, with natural birth and legal marriage remaining core mechanisms for reproducing "citizenship," whether the particular state in question adopts the principle of *jus soli* or *jus sanguinis*. In a nation where the concept of citizenship is synonymous with nationality, legal citizenship is only a matter of nationality, whereas in Japan citizenship as authentic social membership is an implicit combination of nationality, lineage, and culture (Fukuoka 1993). In each dimension, marriage and family appear to be almost automatic, unquestioned, natural agents of transmission. However, a closer look at the everyday experiences of intermarried *zainichi* Korean and Japanese couples indicates that the social reproduction of dual heritage families can never be assumed as automatic, natural, or based on free choice, where the two parties remain asymmetrically situated in terms of cultural hegemony.

Intermarriage is a socially contested arena for reproducing imagined social categories. In intermarriages between *zainichi* Korean and the Japanese, invisible race categories disappear and reappear in everyday life, in seemingly voluntary and personal choices between different means of introducing *zainichi* literacy to their children. None of these alternatives can be independent of hegemonic cultural constraints. Choices of

name and nationality, in particular, can either communicate or camouflage deviations from conventional notions of Japaneseness. Although individuals challenge assumptions that notions of Japaneseness and Koreanness categorically conflate race, ethnicity, nationality, and assumed cultural competence, there are certainly social forces in relation to which individuals both resist and make compromises at the same time. Such negotiations have become especially challenging following the transition to symbolic racism that took place during the 1990s.

Endnotes

[1] Intermarriages between Japanese and members of the migrant generation or more recently arrived South Koreans born in South Korea are beyond the scope of my research.

[2] For example, although intermarriage rates between blacks and whites are increasing in the United States, the legacy of the "one-drop" rules has increased the discrepancies between subjective and objective senses of belonging and membership in society (Azoulay 1997; Davis 1990; DaCosta 2007). The racial identities of children of color and mixed race cannot be voluntarily chosen as freely as in the case of children of interethnic marriages between whites, especially when a partially black ancestry is involved (Davis 1990; Lee and Bean 2004; Sanjek 1994; Spikard 1989; Waters 2000). Increasingly many individuals have expressed dissents in relation to this state of affairs, as seen in the emergence of multiracial identities (Root 1992; DaCosta 2007).

[3] For the more ethnically contained Chongryun community and its members, see Ryang 2008: Ch. 2.

[4] Jung's treatment of vital statistics is not strictly demographic. The conventional divorce rate should be assessed in terms of number of occurrences per one thousand individuals. However, she simply divided the number of marriages by that of divorces in the same year, showing that Japanese-Japanese couples have much lower divorce rates than Korean-Korean couples or Korean-Japanese couples (again, this rate is just a ratio of occurrence, and should not be taken as the likelihood of a couple getting divorced). Despite her crude treatment of demographic data, she draws our attention to an intriguing result.

[5] Describing marriage patterns among Korean youths born in Japan during the mid-1970s, Kim Il-myeon, a *zainichi* Korean writer, attributed the increasing number of intermarriages with

Japanese to assimilation, which was for him a deplorable by-product of the colonial mentality. Kim Il-myeon (1979) published a story based on his first marriage to a Japanese who had passed away at a young age. This quoted passage, though, does not reflect what he writes in his memoir. The most challenging issue concerning his marriage was in fact his inability to make a decent living while aspiring to study further. Illuminative examples introduced in his text included pessimistic accounts of situations in which Koreans marrying Japanese had to desperately conceal or even fully reject their Korean heritage. He anecdotally summarized the likely outcome of a Korean-Japanese intermarriage as follows:

> The couple got married out of mutual love and respect. However, a trivial counter-breeze in [their] married life would turn to stormy conditions, and the couple's quarrels would often end with a derogatory remark by the Japanese spouse about his or her spouse being a Korean [*Chōsen-jin*]. This [racial] remark would eventually split the couple. People often say: "As long as the two love each other … [romance has no national boundary]." That is not always the case; romantic love does not last forever. There exist situations in which love is not the ultimate solution. Korean parents are aware of the inside and outside of such circumstances and it is not surprising that they are worried about the future of their intermarrying children (I. Kim 1978: 193-194).

This passage appeared in Kim's oft-cited treatise on the *zainichi* Korean use of Japanese aliases originally written for Chongryun publications. The interests of *zainichi* Korean organizations in preventing assimilation produce dogmatic preaching, especially if Korean−Korean marriages are likely to break apart anyway. Kim Chan-jong, another z*ainichi* Korean writing around the same time as Kim Il-myeon, explored the causes of Korean−Japanese divorces: "What caused a divorce cannot be singled out. It could be the young couple's weak household economy, irreconcilable discrepancies of personalities, or utterly personal circumstances. However, I wonder if a mutual and lingering awareness that one spouse is a Korean may have eventually bothered the couple themselves" (C. Kim 1977: 154). He then introduces the case of a *zainichi* Korean acquaintance who attributed her divorce to economic hardship—her Japanese husband's loss of job and unwillingness to work when they had just had a baby. Asked about their quarrels over household finances, the woman related an incessant series of racial slurs such as "Korean women have a strong temper" or "Koreans are importunate" (C. Kim 1977: 156). Both Kims recorded hearsay as part of an anti-assimilation campaign.

[6] Takeshita Shūko's study (2000: Ch.3) of intermarriage focuses on pre-war intermarriage between Japanese and Koreans as well as Japanese wives who remained in Korea after 1945.

[7] See also Ryang (2006) for the context of modern Japan. Ryang (2006) argues that love, broadly defined as an institution as well as a concept, is a powerful state apparatus, which involves the (ideological and physical) control of citizen subjects via "governmentality" (individuals voluntarily monitor, regulate and discipline their acts).

[8] The couples that agreed to appear in the photographs are by no means representative intermarried couples, in that they were exceptionally willing to share their private lives, openly acknowledging their intermarriages. The four photographers originally planned to photograph one hundred couples, or twenty-five couples each, but they encountered many refusals, mainly due to unwillingness among prospective participants to openly acknowledge their *zainichi* Korean and Japanese intermarriages. Some refused outright on the phone, while others were willing to share their stories but unwilling to be photographed. They published a range of scenes from the homes

of twenty families, including artifacts, and there were four to six couples per photographer in the end. Inferring from the interview transcripts, the families were located through *zainichi* Korean networks, including *zainichi* Korean organizations, college activists and local activist groups, as well as personal acquaintances of the photographers and interviewees. Although the photographers focused on the everyday lives of intermarried couples who were not famous at all but ordinary people, a group lying beyond the interests of the mass media (Yamanaka et al. 1998: 183), the couples included in the photographic collection still fall within the range of better-connected *zainichi* Koreans because of the processes used in locating families who were willing to cooperate.

[9] Based on the transcripts (Yamanaka et al. 1998) of the interviews with the twenty families, I can provide the following breakdown of the couples' experience and choices. The twenty families are diverse in nature; nine families have Japanese wives and *zainichi* husband, while eleven have *zainichi* Korean wives and Japanese husbands. Couples met at their work as colleagues, worked together as volunteers, met through friends, through activist or leisure activities, went to school together, or met while traveling; for these couples, romance began in ways not strikingly different from those found among contemporary Japanese couples. There were absolutely no cases of arranged marriage between Japanese and *zainichi* Koreans. This is despite the fact this form of marriage is still found among Japanese and among *zainichi* Koreans, although arrangement marriages have become less common. They frequently describe their "international marriage" or their families as no different from other marriages or families—just relationships between one man and one woman and between parents and children.

Four of the couples chose common-law marriage, primarily because they object the family registry system. The transmission of stateless Korean status to their children can be secured by getting marriage without reporting the fact; Japanese nationality is the only option if the marriage is legal due to the Japanese administrative treatment of registered stateless Korean status (*chōsen-seki*) not as a nationality but as a code or classification (*fugō*) on documents. Until the 1998 amendment to the South Korean Nationality Law, South Korean mothers who married non-South Koreans were not able to pass on South Korean nationality to their children. As I will discuss later, some intermarried parents, albeit in small numbers, choose to raise their children as minority members of Japanese society so that the children have more challenges as they grow up. After they grow up, the children themselves will decide whether or not to become naturalized.

Five of the couples do not yet have any children. Out of the twenty children, eight have Japanese nationality only, five have dual citizenship, and seven have only South Korean nationality. South Korean nationality law is stricter than Japanese nationality law, and individuals with dual nationality are forced to choose between one or the other when they reach the age of twenty-two; those with dual citizenship will eventually lose their South Korean nationality. (Although the Japanese government also advocates nationality choice at the age of twenty-two, it does not have any legal sanction. So long as individuals are entered into the family registry, they can claim Japanese citizenship and passports.)

Ten out of the twenty couples experienced family opposition, predominantly on the part of the Japanese side of the family. Two Japanese wives had acquired South Korean nationality to appease their South Korean parents rather out of any patriarchal desire. In cases where couples had married against the wishes of the Japanese side, the Japanese parents compromised, although in some cases they attempted to interfere in the couple's childrearing practices—in relation to naming and choice of nationality, for example. Some mentioned that the couple dines with the Japanese parents without having any relationship at all with members of the extended family. Some opposing Japanese parents did not come to their child's wedding reception. One Japanese parent said, "if some people [relatives, neighbors or friends] say something about your nationality, I won't see those people ever again," which deeply moved the *zainichi* Korean bride concerned

(Yamanaka et al. 1998: 79). Where there was no opposition, especially on the part of the Japanese parents, the couple often wondered whether this was because the parents lived in the countryside where *zainichi* Koreans and foreigners rarely lived, meaning that they had no idea about who *zainichi* Koreans were.

[10] Examining two of the couples (each with a *zainichi* Korean wife and a Japanese husband), he explored the politics of representation that resists or reinforces binary categorization. One of the couples gave their first child an explicitly non-Japanese first name, despite the child's nationality being Japanese. In so doing, the couple attempts to deconstruct both Japaneseness and Koreanness (Takenoshita 2000: 33-34). The other case is one of family conflict. The Japanese husband's inability to learn about and cooperate with his wife's Korean ancestry worship symbolized the husband's inability to empathize with her *zainichi* upbringing. The frustration his wife felt in response strengthened her identity as a Korean (Takenoshita 2000: 35). Katya Gibel Azoulay (1997: 3) points out similar ambiguities in defining amorphous whiteness and corollary blackness, both white and black identities being built on a "biologization of ideology."

[11] Whereas Twine's focus is on the practices of racial-majority parents, mine is more on the accounts provided by *zainichi* Korean spouses, i.e. *zainichi* literacy as practiced by parents belonging to an invisible racial minority.

[12] I was only allowed to talk with their *zainichi* South Korean receptionist, who also performed administrative tasks for the organization and exclusively used her Japanese name. She kindly gave me copies of their newsletters and leaflets. My plan to interview members at a later date did not work out.

[13] See Tanaka (2000) for Pak Shil (Chapter 6) and his wife Kiyoko's thirty-year-long marriage. Kiyoko, born to an old and established family, was disowned prior to her marriage to Pak, who also had to become naturalized. By agreeing to become naturalized, Pak sought to pacify Kiyoko's parents, who had even gone so far as to attempt suicide in order to force them to abort their marriage plans. No members of Kiyoko's family attended their wedding ceremony in July 1970.

[14] More recently, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it required approximately six months on average for my informants if they were special permanent residents.

[15] The application for naturalization is handled through a particular "nationality counselor" each applicant is assigned at the local Bureau of Justice. Aforementioned Minako's case took long partly because the counselor in charge was transferred elsewhere.

[16] Disillusioned, Akinobu commented, "They lack coherence. All [of them] are so driven by self-interest."

[17] Shin-sam's wife returned to her parents with the child in several months. After failed divorce mediation sessions at a local family court, a divorce suit was filed by his wife based on fabricated accounts filled with racial stereotypes. Shin-sam counter-filed a suit supported by several Japanese friends. The court made a decision that the cause of their divorce was racial harassment on the part of Shin-sam's mother-in-law based on Shin-sam's Korean background; his former in-law's family was ordered to pay compensation for psychological damage to Shin-sam and his mother. He won the parental authority with respect to his child, while his former wife

retained custody. He was granted the right to meet the child twice a month, although his former in-laws often cancelled such meetings at the last minute, offering various excuses. Shin-sam was deeply concerned with the thought of his child growing up in home of his former Japanese in-laws, being instilled with racist sentiment against Koreans. Based on his parental authority, he filed for a change in the child's last name to Kim as well as a renunciation of the child's Japanese nationality. These actions enraged his ex-wife and her family, who filed another suit to challenge Shin-sam's parental authority. He was refused in his attempt to complete alien registration procedures for his child with the reason that they did not live together. Challenging this refusal, Shin-sam chose to commence administrative litigation.

[18] A Japanese woman who left her Korean boyfriend says in the 1970s, "Historical facts are too heavy for an individual to ward off" (Y. Kim 1975: 10-23 in Lee and De Vos 1981: 332). Intermarried couples do not respond pessimistically to relationships between *zainichi* Koreans and Japanese.

[19] Even *zainichi* Korean in-laws-to-be are all born in Japan, unlike marriages in the 1960s and the 1970s, when many of the parents had been born in Korea or experienced reactive postcolonial Korean diasporic nationalism during the immediate post-war years.

[20] I talked with Minako on the phone a year after our first meeting. Her younger sister had just got married to a Japanese. When her sister's boyfriend asked if it was all right for him to marry a Korean, his parents said that it did not matter at all and it was out of date to even ask such a question. When finishing the story, Minako said in an excited tone, "Don't you think it is such a heart-warming story? I could not believe it. All of the members of our family were so surprised."

[21] Handling the issue of *zainichi* literacy is equally challenging for *zainichi* Korean endogamous couples. A *zainichi* mother whose daughter uses a Korean-pronounced name, has become the target of constant racial mockery at school and has already learned to ignore the bigot without telling anyone, claims: "I don't want this society to make only a seven-year-old child so strong" (Hongja Lee 1998: 12).

[22] Tomimodosu-kai's Yun Choja (see Chapter 4) is a public school teacher who is also a known activist. Her marriage to her Japanese husband is not legal as they are critics of the Japanese (and Korean) family registry system, which the couple considers help perpetuate gender and racial discrimination by establishing the notion of *ie* ("house" or "clan"), distinguishing between children according to order of birth and making a further distinction between legitimate and illegitimate births. The inability of foreigners to provide family registry records was a long-standing basis for discrimination in the context of employment. What is unique about Choja's commitment is that she herself is half-Korean and her children are quarter-Korean. Choja is a Japanese national, and so are her children. Choja is one of the pioneers who succeeded in family court litigation to regain their Korean names while maintaining Japanese nationality. She changed her family name from her mother's Japanese name to her father's lost Korean name, and her continuous public use of that name eventually led the court to approve the official name change. Her children are all in her family registry, and thus carry only their Korean names. One of the reasons for Choja's Japanese children using only their Korean names is to make them clearly aware of their heritage by taking on the name of Choja's deceased father that he never openly used. The couple let their children have as many opportunities as possible to keep in touch with Korean culture. Her children call her *eomeoni* ("mother" in Korean). They live in a local community that has a large population of *zainichi* Koreans.

When entering elementary school, her daughter asked her father if she had a Japanese name. She vividly recollects, "My husband simply said, 'No,' and that was it. But when we went shopping to buy her *randoseru* [school bag], I said to her, 'Look, there are even pink ones. The brown ones seem nice too, don't they?' She said, 'I will take on my [Korean] name, but let me have the same one [i.e. bag] as everybody else (…). Buy me a red one, please." Most boys had black bags, while girls carried red ones until the 1990s. In the 2000s, pink bags are the most popular among girls and navy blue ones among boys. Many commonly-held assumptions and practices change over time. However, it is not only the standardized Japanese institutional trajectory from school to workplace, but also the effects of subconscious concerns during childhood and teenage years to be more or less the same as everybody else, which make efforts by some parents to instill *zainichi* literacy challenging. I heard this anecdote directly from Choja when I met her in December 1999, although the story also appears in Yamanaka et al. (1998: 129).

CHAPTER THREE

Zainichi Korean Representations: Logic and Practice

> [Q]uestions of identity are always questions about representation. They are always questions about the invention, not simply the discovery of tradition. They are always exercises in selective memory and they almost always involve the silencing of something in order to allow something else to speak.
> ———Stuart Hall (1995: 5)

In this chapter, I will examine the shifting contents of Koreanness, both in relation to logic and practice. Examining different ways in which (lost) Koreanness is invented and represented in the Japanese print media and public space, I will trace processes in collective identity construction that reflect what DuBois (1961 [1903]) called double-consciousness (See Introduction). Intellectuals from the Korean minority address both this minority and the Japanese, each element of this dual audience sharing an inherently complex symbolic relationship with the other. The consciousness of the Korean minority audience is constantly reflected through the internalized lens of an imagined reaction from the Japanese mainstream. Representing Koreanness involves satisfying a dual audience, making authentic Korean representation in Japan simultaneously exotic and consumable.

In the first section of this chapter, I will contrast different examples of writing by *zainichi* Koreans on the subject of *zainichi* Korean education over a period of three decades (from the 1970s until the 1990s). Abstract ideas held by *zainichi* Korean intellectuals about Koreanness and its related pedagogy change over time, oscillating between an essentialized, homeland-oriented Koreanness and a universal, humanity-oriented category which is free of labels and emphasizes individualism. Among shifting ideas of what it means to be *zainichi* Korean, a de-emphasis on Koreanness is often expressed in tandem with a prioritization of

pragmatic adaptations to social conditions, with specific reference to the importance of, and desire for, upward mobility. An examination of the ambiguously defined term, *minzoku*, will help explain an important mechanism by which invisible racial categories survive and thrive across constantly changing social milieu. However, as I describe in the second section of this chapter, actual educational practices require tangible clues associated with abstract ideals. Such pursuits of tangibility—be they through language, costume, music, dance or food, paradoxically illustrate the way expectations defined by the Japanese majority seep into apolitical cultural niches in both the logic and practice of Korean minority empowerment education.

1. Defining the *Zainichi* Ideal: the Logic of Minority Empowerment

During the past three decades, discrimination against *zainichi* Koreans has shifted from institutionalized forms of exclusion to symbolic forms of expression (see Introduction). How have the collective identities of *zainichi* Koreans been transformed in response? Examining how Japan-born generations of *zainichi* Koreans from different social and ideological standpoints define ideal Koreanness, and tracing notable shifts in the discourse of Korean minority empowerment education, I will show how the formulation and revision of—the departure from and return to—Korean identity within Japan converge among racial, ethnic, and class categories.

In recent years, many researchers have become increasingly attentive to the multiplicity and flexibility of meanings that constitute specific collective identities (Glenn 2003; Hobsbawm 1983; Hall 1996 [1989]; Jung 1996; T. Kim 1999; Okamura 1981; Omi

and Winant 1986; Sollars 1989; Song 2003). Even so, there is no way of denying the role of an identity politics based on a selective accentuation of culture, what Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has called "strategic essentialism" in minority empowerment, especially at its outset (Ang 2001:26; Chapman 2008: 9-10; T. Kim 1999: 132, 148-149). By idealizing positive characteristics that are often drawn from re-invented tradition, strategic essentialism challenges the subjugating social and cultural meanings attached to minority status (T. Kim 1999).

Recent literature on *zainichi* Koreans has been influenced by Stuart Hall's work on potential directions for the minority politics of representation, and emphasizes intra-group diversity and cleavage. Criticizing the search for *the* authentic collective identity in earlier currents of *zainichi* Korean activism, researchers increasingly focused on collective identit*ies* that reflect a variety of positionalities (Jung 1996; Harajiri 1998; T. Kim 1999). However, diversity in the content and context of collective representation often converges in a process of labeling that is ultimately based on racial characteristics—an imposed constellation of images and substance. As a result, *zainichi* Koreans may have no alternative but to intentionally adapt the content and expression of their collective identities in a way that actually ends up fulfilling the expectations of the Japanese majority and perpetuating stereotypes of stark cultural differences attached to foreignness.[1]

In this chapter, I trace how various sets of ideas expressed by *zainichi* Koreans have developed over time, specifically those related to how *zainichi* Korean children should be educated. Discourses of education epitomize ideals about how to produce and maintain both collective and individual identities. These self-portraits of ideal Koreanness often form the starting point for the development of pedagogical practice. Korean minority empowerment

education is an operationalization of Koreanness—in itself, by itself and for itself—transforming an abstract ideal into observable practice in both formal and informal educational settings.

Throughout the post-colonial period, one fundamental concern of Korean minority education has been the question of the Korean subject (*minzoku-teki shutaisei no mondai*). This question—how to reconstruct once-colonized Koreans into autonomous human beings with pride and dignity—is related to the further issue of how to emancipate this population from their subjugated position in the Japanese social environment (S. Kim 1986; K. Yun 1992). It is not surprising that the past few decades has seen the meaning of education for Koreans living in Japan change according to shifts in political, economic, and social circumstances. I will illustrate the shifting visions of Koreanness from the 1970s up until the 1990s, paying special attention to the controversial term *minzoku* that implies an effective conflation between nation and ethnicity. I focus on these three decades due to the drastic transformation of identity politics witnessed during this period (Chapman 2008; Lie 2008).

I will analyze essays by *zainichi* Korean intellectuals published in books that they intended for a broader audience. Book publication was the primary intellectual medium during the 1970s, the 1980s and the early 1990s. Some authors introduced here hold diverse positions within different *zainichi* Korean communities. Some are more prolific than others. However, important to note is that they are minority intellectuals active in Japanese print market. I will specifically focus on essay segments which discuss Korean education, language and history.

My coding of a Japanese publication, *Korean Who's Who in Contemporary Korea* (1993) shows that *zainichi* Korean authors who publish in Japanese can be classified into one or more of the following types, depending on their access to the Japanese print market: 1) creative writers that are read in broader literary circles; 2) academics, 3) professional journalists active in both mainstream and ethnic media, 4) political activists or representatives of political organizations, and 5) individuals with the means to publish independently (this output often including their own autobiographies).

Zainichi Korean writers at first commonly argue that Japan-born generations ought to be educated as Koreans living in Japan, informally at home and formally at school (either in full- or part-time education). The tone of their arguments shifts as they recognize changes over time on the parts of both *zainichi* Koreans themselves and the Japanese.

I follow Antonio Gramsci's (1992 [1957]) definition of "intellectual," with its emphasis not on any specific training an individual may have undertaken but by his or her role questioning established beliefs.[2] I regard all of the writers I analyze here as intellectuals because of the ways in which they disseminate their ideas. The function of the *zainichi* intellectual here is defined by their public challenging of the ideologies of conventional academics and political leaders. Simultaneously, however, these critiques reflect the context in which they were produced, during an era in which Japan experienced not only growth in its economy but also in its grassroots political scene. More recently, the discursive niches of *zainichi* intellectuals have been transformed into polemical ones (see Chapter 4).

Divided Korean Nations: Generations in Japan, Writing in Japanese

Ideas about Korean education have changed over time. The period from the late 1960s was marked by the realization that the idea of an eventual return by *zainichi* Koreans to either of the two Korean nations was both unrealistic and unappealing.[3] As a result, the fact that *zainichi* Koreans were beginning to write in Japanese rather than Korean ceased to be a topic for debate and criticism,[4] especially as Japanese was already the first language for a growing number of Koreans.

In the post-colonial period, the focus of resident Korean intellectuals was on the development of organizations to serve the Korean cause: "the fatherland within Japan." This is clear in the broad efforts that were made to systematize knowledge of Korean history (K. Yun 1992: 9). Throughout the turbulent years of the late 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s, the vast majority of *zainichi* Korean intellectuals, whether academics, journalists, or novelists, were committed to leftist ideals. Many supported North Korea's democratic socialism and the organization that represented its interests in Japan, Chongryun [hereafter referred to as Sōren, reflecting the dominance of Japanese-pronounced references to the organization].[5] However, when the DPRK and Sōren started excluding dissidents, many left the organization, especially during the mid-1960s (J. Kang 1996, J. Ri 2000, H. Lee 2002; K. Yun 1992, C. Kim 2004). There were heated debates on political causes (S. Yang 1999), further disillusionment setting in when the DPRK established hereditary succession in relation to its political leadership.

Aside from disputes between those adopting pro-Pyongyang and pro-Seoul positions, *zainichi* Korean intellectuals criticize each other on a diverse range of grounds. For example, the award-winning novelist Lee Hoe-song (also known as Ri Kaisei) denounces the role played by intellectuals that are affiliated with particular organizations (H. Lee 2002),

publicly complaining about "[fellow writer] Kim Seok-pom's tirade" against him (Lee 2002). Lee himself is the target of criticism by essayist Song Mija (1995). While admitting to her high expectations of Lee as a fellow Korean *nisei,* born in Japan to migrant parents, she argues that Lee tends to try and meet the expectations held of him by Japanese society. Lee's novels, which are based on personal experience, variously include tales depicting a patriotic young boy (*kōkoku shōnen*) in the Japanese Empire, his betrayal and traumatic repatriation from Sakhalin to Japan as a "Japanese" family member, a period as a committed Sōren activist, and his decision to quit Sōren to advocate democratization in South Korea and elsewhere. Song's claims about Lee apply generally to a number of Korean novelists writing in Japanese.[6] Changes in the surrounding political and social climate mean that any *zainichi* writer can be viewed as opportunistic.

Although starting from strikingly different analytical stances, Asakawa Akihiro (2008) and John Lie (2008) both affirm the die-hard presence of *zainichi* ideologies, reproduced according to the needs of both *zainichi* Koreans and the Japanese (Oguma 2008). Lee Sunae (2000) argues that there are recurrent themes within *zainichi* Korean discourse, such as the main "slogan" used during the 1960s, "to establish Korean subjectivity" (*minzoku-teki shutaisei no kakuritsu*) (S. Lee 2000: 99). An important concern during this period was how to transform *zainichi* identity from a half-Japanese or quasi-Japanese one into an authentically Korean one (S. Lee 2000: 99, 137). The diasporic role of *zainichi* Korean intellectuals is equally emphasized in Korean nationalist claims, as well as in claims of hybrid identity (Chapman 2008). While many intellectuals argue that expatriate status helps establish "objective" standpoints, Lee Sunae criticizes the lack of "accumulation" [cumulative knowledge] in arguments made by third-generation commentators since the

1980s (S. Lee 2000: 48, 99). The roles of minority intellectuals in the formation of collective identity have always included political statements. Those consistently making arguments in which they identify with the Korean diaspora and any conditions associated with oppression are taken as "ideologues," while any flexible shifts made in their positions are viewed as opportunistic. Minority intellectuals suffer from the dilemma that any claim they make can easily be dismissed as inauthentic.

Double-Consciousness and the Minority Intellectual

What, then, are the implications of *zainichi* Koreans writing in the language of the Japanese majority? During the past three decades, there has been a shift among *zainichi* Korean intellectuals from those who were born in Korea or migrated to Japan at a very young age to those born in Japan and whose parents' memories of Korea are considerably weaker. Writing in Japanese, their audience includes both fellow Koreans for whom Japanese is a first language and concerned Japanese. Appealing to the Japanese majority, Korean writers have established familiar ways of representing themselves. It became problematic to both emphasize and de-emphasize Koreanness, due the lack in equal symbolic power when representing and labeling each group vis-à-vis the Japanese mainstream (Harajiri 1998; T. Kim 1999; I. Pak 1999).

By the 1970s, the use of the Japanese language by *zainichi* writers had become accepted (S. Kim 1976, 1981). Kim Soek-pom argues, however, that the use of Japanese can be considered "violent" for two reasons. First, historically, as the language of the colonizer, it calls up the past, and the separation of Koreans from their own language. And second, socially, the use of Japanese symbolizes the subjugation of Koreans in Japan (S. Kim 1976).

Kim Seok-pom reconciles his own use of Japanese by abandoning the category of "Korean" and emphasizing "universally human characteristics" in literature which, he argues, can be expressed in any language (S. Kim 1976: 26).

For Koreans born in Japan, Koreanness must be proactively attained (M. Kim 1995) because, to them, cultural differences between themselves and the Japanese are not so salient. On the one hand, seeking and reacquiring cultural differences, and making both majority Japanese and minority Koreans aware of differences in their respective historical experiences, requires the presence of a clearly demarcated notion of Koreanness as a membership category. An emphasis on, and acceptance of, difference is strongly believed to be the path Japan must take in order to become a pluralist society.

On the other hand, a de-emphasis on Koreanness per se is in part the result of an increased level of *zainichi* participation in society and improved social, economic, and political opportunities for them in Japan (Lie 2008; Ryang 2000). Representation of the Korean minority, whether emphasizing differences or similarities, does not always have intended consequences. Depending on the context, Koreans may be portrayed by the Japanese as an oppressed group, as almost Japanese, as honorary Japanese when upwardly mobile, as second-class Japanese when not, as exotic but tolerated foreigners, or even as a group that is disloyal and dangerous to society.

Contested Meanings of *Zainichi*

The multiplicity of meanings attached to being *zainichi* Korean is well illustrated in the proliferation of collective names used to describe this group, and in the popularity of specific

terms during any given period. Attempts by minority groups to redefine themselves by challenging negative images, and attempts to be polite, politically correct, or avoid accusation, transform the language. Resident Koreans are referred to using an endless variety of terms, such as *zainichi chōsenjin*, *zainichi kankokujin*, *zainichi kankoku chōsenjin*, *zainichi kanjin*, *zainichi kan-chōsenjin*, *zainichi korian*, or simply *zainichi*. Other terms are also used among *zainichi* Koreans themselves, such as (*zainichi*-) *dōhō* (*tonbō*), or *kyōhō* (*kyoppo*). As mentioned in the Introduction, the proliferation of terms used to refer to *zainichi* Koreans is relevant to the two nations on the peninsula vying for authenticity, as well as in the colonial context, in which the very term Korean can be derogatory in Japanese. For some, the term *chōsen* connotes the Korean peninsula before division, and *chōsenjin* refers to the people who originated there. For others, *chōsen* indicates North Korea (the DPRK), and *chōsenjin* means those who support and are affiliated with North Korea or Sōren. On the other hand, the term *kankoku* and *kankokujin* are used to indicate South Korea (the ROK) and its nationals. Some Japanese and Koreans refrain from using the terms *chosen* and *chōsenjin*, instead using the more euphemistic *kankoku* and *kankokujin* (K. Yun 1992).[7] The popular term in the 1980s and early 1990s, *zainichi kankoku-chōsenjin*, attempts to encompass both Koreas without taking political sides (Suzuki 1998). Given that not all South Koreans are pro-Seoul and not all stateless Koreans are pro-Pyongyang, this linked use is misleading.

The term *zainichi*, used without qualification, is increasingly popular, because it is seen to avoid differences in nationality or political leanings among *zainichi* Koreans. This term has come into greater use with the growing number of Japan-born Koreans. Even though the literal meaning of *zainichi* is “temporary stationing,” the term has been increasingly used since the late 1970s to indicate a distinct and permanent group in Japan that

is neither Japanese nor Korean.[8] According to second-generation *zainichi* historian Yun Keun-cha (1992:3), the term connotes ideologies that reflect an overly politicized existence and does not really address the needs of resident Koreans. *Zainichi* cannot avoid being political, as their historical experience is filled with contradictions inherent in the relationships between nation states and individuals, and their historical starting point as *zainichi* lies precisely in their status as former colonial subjects. They are thus an integral part of the third world because of its colonial origin (K. Yun 1992: 5). The political implication is that simply being born in Japan to a *zainichi* family is not enough, and that *zainichi* Koreans need to be educated as such.

Minzoku and the Conflation of Nation, Race and Ethnicity

In Japanese writing, the term *minzoku* is used without distinguishing between nation, ethnicity, race, and folk, and the choice of English translation varies depending on the concerns of particular researchers. Recall that Japanese national identity depends on an imaginary racial construct based on lineage (Yoshino 1992: 24-27). So too does Korean national identity (K. Yun 1992: 166-167). Both Japanese and Koreans assume the existence of an encompassing notion in which “Japanese” or “Korean” can refer to nationality, race, ethnicity or cultural identity, or language. Norma Field translates *minzoku* as “folk,” while others emphasize its racial (Lee and De Vos 1981; Weiner 1989) or ethnic dimensions (Fukuoka and Kim 1997; Kim 2003). Bearing in mind the question raised by Armstrong (1989) concerning the conditions under which the Korean population in Japan came to be conceived of as a distinct and inferior race, ethnic group, and nation, the contexts in which the term *minzoku* are used need to be clarified by examining in what circumstances Koreans

are treated as racially or ethnically distinct. The distinctions between ethnic and/or racial relations are important when considering representations of *zainichi* within Japanese society. If race is repressive while ethnicity is expressive in the context of the relationship between majority and minority groups, it is also important to note that the term "ethnicity" has a more euphemistic and less contentious tone than "race" (Banton 1983; Sanjek 1994; Winant 2001; Steinberg 2006).

For *zainichi* Koreans, who are invisible unless they use Korean names, *minzoku* can mean either nationality or ethnicity, depending on the agenda of the author. While acknowledging that differences between race and ethnicity are useful and applicable when exploring social relations in Japanese contexts, I alternatively use the concepts of nation and ethnicity, starting out from the perspective of *zainichi* Koreans. The differences between race and ethnicity derive more from the Japanese majority's handling of the Korean minority, which binds *zainichi* Korean into a process of juggling a double consciousness. The contrast between *minzoku* as national and *minzoku* as ethnic also reflects the reality that *zainichi* Koreans rarely talk about themselves in racial terms. It is a matter of national consciousness. This is why a major element of minority education aimed at Korean consciousness-raising involves the acquisition of Korean language, history, and culture as well as the visual recognition of the mapped out boundaries of sovereign states—a formula for imagining modern nation-state consciousness (Anderson 1991). How, then, has Koreanness been constructed? Is Koreanness a form of national and/or ethnic identity and identification? In which contexts is Koreanness national and/or ethnic? In the following section, I will examine the implications of this distinction between the national and the ethnic in discussions about the term *minzoku*, a term that often implies just being Korean.

Inscribing *Zainichi*: Korean Writers, Japanese Writing

The texts I discuss below address Korean educational issues, issues that are almost always addressed in connection with broader arguments about what it means to be Korean, born and raised in Japan, and how to challenge discrimination (while terms such as racism or counter-racist struggles are rarely used). Two common themes in discussions of education are the history of Koreans and the Korean Nation, and practices related to the use of language and names. My focus here is on the role of language, because the emphasis on Korean literacy marks the mixed beginning of strategic-essentialism in post-colonial *zainichi* Korean identity and an expression of remote nationalism. Recurrent themes, not necessarily representing the experience of a particular cohort, are an essentialist and nationalistic emphasis on acquisition, especially in relation to the Korean language, accommodative and pragmatic meanings attached to Korean language and culture (post-1980s), and the alternative de-emphasisizing of pragmatic values.

Strategic and essentialist nationalism: Korean language and Korean thinking

Despite theoretical challenges to essentialism, *zainichi* Koreans paint for themselves a nationalistic self-portrait, partly as a response to their colonial legacy. Here, I examine the work of Kim Chan-jong and Ko Yon-i, both Sōren-affiliated intellectuals at the time that the texts under consideration were published.[9] Earlier essays by Kim Chan-jong (b.1937) echo the idea of an essential Koreanness based on a solid link with the peninsula. A graduate of Korea University, the only institution of higher education in Japan officially affiliated with the DPRK (though not recognized under Japanese education law as a college), he has been constantly productive from the 1970s until the present day as a non-fiction writer, journalist

and lay historian. He has made extensive contributions to *zainichi* Korean labor history and the history of early Korean community formation, conducting interviews with first-generation Koreans and undertaking archival research (C. Kim 1977, 1979, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1994, 1997, 2004, 2007).

Kim Chan-jong's *Sokoku o shiranai sedai* [Generations that Do Not Know the Fatherland] (1977) concerns second- and third-generation Koreans, and contains an appendix with demographic information extracted from Japanese immigration statistics.[10] The essay is an illustration of constructed utopian nationalism, and begins with an anecdote of his young daughter's pride in being Korean. He compares his own Korean awareness as a young child with that of his daughter, who has benefited from the overseas schooling system of an independent Korean nation (the DPRK). His earlier Korean identity, he describes, was utterly deformed by an education aimed at turning children into Japanese imperial subjects while Korea was under Japanese colonial rule.[11] Kim Chan-jong identifies with many Korean intellectuals who, as the war ended, experienced a radical ideological shift from Japanese imperial subject trained to be ready to die for the Emperor to leftist Korean activist.

For Kim Chan-jong, Korean education is broadly defined as an education that helps establish Korean pride and overcome the "nihilism" of living in Japan. There are several components that nurture Korean pride: the use of a Korean name, learning Korean history (both the history of the Korean peninsula and the history of *zainichi* forced migration), and learning the Korean language. His writing is sprinkled with references to the benefits of learning the language. Although he mentions elsewhere the variations of vernacular Korean—because standard Korean was rarely the language of most first-generation Korean

migrants (C. Kim 1983)—he connects his understanding of the essence of Koreanness with the language:

> The problem that an increasing large number of second- and third-generation Koreans do not understand and speak Korean, the national language [*kokugo*], is closely related not only to the lack of Korean fluency as a means of communication but also to the problem that, as a part of the Korean nation [*minzoku*], something more fundamental, i.e. normal Korean consciousness [*minzoku ishiki*], is being lost.
>
> The role of the national language [*kokugo*] can be decisive in the formation of a normal Korean consciousness.
>
> The language, the language of a nation [*minzoku*] is a matter [concerned with] expressing 'national feelings' and […] 'the soul of a nation.' Therefore, it's impossible to consider the process of national consciousness formation without considering language issues. The Korean language that has been handed down throughout the development of the Korean nation from its origins is the Korean culture, the Korean feeling, and the Korean mind. Thus, […] Koreanness, i.e. being an integral part of the Korean nation, must be proven and supported through the language. The Korean language was born with the […] Korean people [*minzoku*], and the unification of the Korean people was possible because of the shared language and historical communal solidarity (C. Kim 1977: 69-70).

I have translated this passage, rendering the term *minzoku* either as "Korean" or "national." This is because the author follows the typical formula of imagining a modern nation-state and the establishment of an authentic people, language, and history, which are all authentic Korean. Kim Chan-jong then introduces some episodes showing how the acquisition of Korean language, no matter how incomplete, fosters communication across generations, and emphasizes that the language makes it possible for Koreans to establish true communication that confirms their common blood and emotions. He concludes that "the effort to master the language is the process whereby second- and third- generations Koreans retrieve and solidify [their] Korean consciousness," and therefore, "generations that do not know the fatherland

have the obligation to preserve, foster, develop and protect the Korean language, i.e. the reasons for Koreans being Koreans, as our precursors did, to resist the oppression of the Japanese government" (Kim 1977: 107).

Throughout the 1980s, Kim Chan-jong maintains his position that language is the essence of Koreanness. However, he does not overlook the influence of Japanese on Korean usage among *zainichi* Koreans. The pronunciation of the Korean language among *zainichi* is influenced by local Japanese dialects, and awkward expressions based on a literal translation of Japanese are common. Korean vocabulary (especially adjectives and adverbs) and variations in locution are very limited (C. Kim 1977). He suggests that the Japanized Korean language reflects the fact that younger generations think in Japanese and points to the fact that *zainichi* Koreans increasingly cannot think in Korean and, therefore, in his opinion, cannot think as Koreans (C. Kim 1977: 85-86). Linguistic hybridity is regarded not as an asset, but a liability.[12]

Some intellectuals maintain their organizational affiliation with Sōren, while others have severed the relationship, reflecting disillusionment with the DPRK regime, particularly since the mid-1980s. Later, in the 1990s, Kim Chan-jong notably shifts his focus toward ethnic rather than national concerns.[13]Other writers continue to maintain an idealized link with the peninsula. Ko Yon-i (b. 1942), discussed further below, retains a connection with Sōren, while Kim Chan-jong writes about Sōren critically in the 2000s. Although Ko did not undertake formal pro-DPRK Korean schooling, he is a professor of French at Korea University and publishes in Sōren's Japanese language media.

Ko Yon-i retained an essentialist notion of Koreanness throughout the 1990s, describing it as utopian nationalism connected with the third world movement. Ko explains his rationale for identifying with one of the two Korean nations:[14]

> [I]t is not because I was born there. It is neither because I am a communist nor because I am [being] coerced. It is because I am Korean [*minzoku*], and because I understand that this is so [the way it should be]. In other words, practically speaking, I can make a judgment on which nation is more essentially Korean (Y. Ko 1998: 85).

More than twenty years after Kim Chan-jong's writings on these issues, Ko (1998) criticizes any approach that emphasizes presence in Japan (*zainichi*). He argues that, regardless of location or residence, Korean subjectivity can be attained only through the unification of the Korean nation. Ko argues that Koreans who emphasize the fact that they continue to live in Japan are merely trapped by their circumstances:

> *Zainichi* advocates consider the potential [options] for Koreans to continue living in Japan as follows. *Zainichi*-Koreans [*chōsenjin*] need to be re-conceptualized as Japanese residents, as Japanese citizens, or as pure individuals with their own originality and uniqueness.
>
> However, all of these concepts are based on Japanese circumstances, forms and styles, and even dress codes. An overly Japanized version of Koreanness is thus constructed. The starting point is in Japan, and Koreanness is obliterated somewhere, considered as supplementary to Japan. The reason is simple. Circumscribed in the Japanese context, *zainichi* advocates merely lack dynamism in [their] approach as Korean subjects. Therefore, their arguments concern only *zainichi*, and Korean-ness [*chōsenjin-ron*] is erased from their thoughts (Y. Ko 1998: 97).

Given that permanent residence in Japan has been a social and legal fact since the late 1960s, and that the vast majority of *zainichi* were born in Japan, the discursive need for

these ideas in the late 1990s can be viewed as driven by a need to justify the existence of Sōren's institutionalized Korean education system:

> [The main purpose of] Korean education [*minzoku-kyōiku*] is to preserve the Korean language [*chōsen-go*]. By preserving the Korean language, we preserve our Koreanness [*minzoku-sei*], for language is the soul of a nation. Without Korean education, 700,000 Koreans are certain to be Japanized, transformed into *yamato*.[15] This means the perpetuation of their colonial conditions as oppressed people. […..] The fact that we maintain Korean schools [*minzoku-gakkō*] per se is important, and has very positive influences on Koreans [*chōsen-jin*] outside the Korean education system (Ko 1998: 240-241).

Here Ko identifies the mission of Korean education to be Korean language education. This is not only about cultivating genuine Koreanness, but also the basis for proactive resistance to Japanization. The Korean language becomes symbolically important in Japan (far more perhaps than on the peninsula). Precisely because Koreans are in Japan, the Korean language is considered important (and even more symbolically important than for Koreans in Korea). Cultivating a strong attachment to the peninsula, or to one Korean nation, provides the uprooted population with a tangible basis for constructing Koreanness. For the Korean diasporic nationalist of the 1990s, the revival of the symbolic power of the Korean language, however, indicates a persistent drive for strategic and essentialist resistance.

Pragmatic integrationists: Koreanness as useful ethnicity

Since the mid-1980s, highly pragmatic approaches to Korean education, and language education in particular, have gained popularity. Korean language acquisition by *zainichi* has been encouraged, in large part, for its role in assisting the development of business opportunities through growing connections with South Korea (in tourism and trade and in

relation to new South Korean migrants). Younger Japanese have also become interested in [South] Korea as part of Asia, an exotic and energetic place that represents some of the nostalgic values Japan has lost. In this section, I analyze writers who are less confined by the geographical limits of the national borders of Japan and the Korean peninsula, such as Song Mija, Kim Yang-ki, and Ri Ki-nam, and the Mintōren activist, Yang Tae-ho, who seek to valorize the importance of Korean identity as irrelevant to any sense of national identity.

Second-generation mother[16]Song Mija (b. 1949), who herself experienced confusion in her search for identity upon entering college, has published a series of essays based on her everyday experience raising her four children in the journal *Chōsen Kenkyū* [Korean Studies]. Song's mother grew up in poverty, and sought material wellbeing for her family. Now Song seeks a departure from the legacy of Korean migrant struggles, and declares, "I want my daughters to grow up free from the spell of 'Korea [*Chōsen*]'" (Son 1986: 7).[17]For that purpose, the program she has in mind involves teaching them [South] Korean language and songs, and [teaching them] to talk about Korea, even a visit to [South] Korea, but only when it is appropriate for them (Song 1986: 3-7). Travel to South Korea as part of one's education was uncommon during the 1970s. The arrest of the *zainichi* Suh brothers, who went to South Korea to study, for allegedly being involved in pro-North Korean espionage activities, remained a vivid memory for *zainichi* Koreans. Further, South Korea used to be one of the most popular destinations for sex tourism from Japan during the 1970s, South Korean policy makers even acknowledging this as an opportunity to earn foreign currency (Lie 1993). From the mid-1980s, Seoul, host city of the 1988 Olympics, Seoul has attracted different kinds of travelers from Japan. Travel to South Korea has also become increasingly common and simple for *zainichi* Koreans with South Korean passports. Such travel, for

business or pleasure, is not restricted to movement between Japan and South Korea by *zainichi* South Koreans. Travel further afield, to other parts of Asia and the United States, for example, has fostered cosmopolitanism among middle-class *zainichi.* It has revived essentialized statements about Koreanness and Korean education, but with a more pragmatic orientation that attempts to "break the spell of Korea" (Song 1983) and change the meaning of education for *zainichi* Korean children.

This pragmatic orientation still relies on an essentialist notion of Koreanness, even though it aims at a form of cultural identification that is not at odds with the Japanese or others. For example, Ri Ki-nam (b.1956)[18]argued in 1989 that language and nation were inseparable, but in the context of the new, cosmopolitan environment. Ri was a business consultant who went through the Japanese school system to university level, later earning a graduate degree in the United States. According to Ri, "The [national] language is the culmination of the national spirit" and thus, "the language is inseparable from the nation" (K. Ri 1989:16). His passages on the Korean language consist of familiar nationalist arguments:

> What makes us feel the fatherland and realize our nationality is the national language, i.e. the fatherland's language, customs and scenery.
> Then, what does the fatherland and the home mean to us, *zainichi* [South] Koreans [*zainichi kankokujin*]? Having never grown up in [South] Korea [*kankoku*], being unfamiliar with the [South] Korean climate and soil, having lost the mother tongue that differentiates us from other nationals, we are connected to our fatherland strongly by Korean "blood." [….] Blood is the crystallization of the past that makes us present here, as well as the starting point toward perpetual continuity in the future (K. Ri 1989: 72-3).

For Ri, however, the ultimate aim is different from that found in nationalist arguments about language. As the ultimate link with [South] Korea, he even uses the most essentialist

metaphor, that of blood. His core argument, however, is that by regaining pride in Korean roots through various means, including through the use of Korean names, and through efforts to become "respectable" individuals, *zainichi* Koreans will be able to act as a connecting force between different cultures. They are able to be intermediaries between different peoples and places because they have a global perspective. So, starting from an essentialist collective standpoint, Ri's approach is actually accommodating and highly individualistic, his solution to the Korean question ultimately involving upward mobility.

The expression of such individualist approaches by *zainichi* writers is an illustration of the upward mobility achieved by highly educated, competitive, entrepreneurial, and mostly male *zainichi* in the booming Japanese economy of the 1980s. Yet the self-determination of *zainichi* Koreans is still couched in terms of their collective identity. In Kim Yang-ki's first book for a *zainichi* audience, *Between Korea and Japan: Transcend*[*ing*] *Dualism in Search of a New Identity* (1986),[19] he posits *zainichi* dualism as something positive, creative and original. Kim Yang-ki is a trilingual ethnologist, the first publicized case of a *zainichi* Korean becoming a professor at a public university subsequent to the 1983 legislation (see Introduction). The dualism he discusses echoes Du Bois's double consciousness, although Kim does not seem to have discovered Du Bois's writings. Kim Yang-ki's book begins as follows:

> I inhabit abnormal space every day. While I am in Japan, [South] Korea [*kankoku*], my fatherland, is at work in my mind, whereas Japan, my permanent residency, is activated whenever I am in [South] Korea. [South] Korea as my fatherland, and Japan as my [place of] permanent residency: [Both] live together inside me, smiling, laughing, crying, getting angry, and playing out a drama of conflict. I need both [in order] to exist the way I am [i.e. be who I am]. Had I been born in either [of these two countries] […], and lived there as her national, I wouldn't have come to exist in such an abnormal space [of mental dualism] (Y. Kim 1986: i).

This mental dualism is a cultural phenomenon peculiar to second-generation *zainichi*, and it is precisely this dualism that he argues should be made use of as an intellectual asset for the future of *zainichi* Koreans. The creation and construction of a unique culture based on *zainichi* dualism has enough power to potentially allow *zainichi* Koreans to transcend their unfortunate history (Y. Kim 1986: ii-iii). For Kim Yang-ki, exactly as it is for Song Mija, breaking the "spell" is a fundamental element of his advice for younger generations. A spell invokes something coerced, negative and restrictive, so breaking it will be of absolutely positive value in the development of Koreanness.

The notion of *zainichi* dualism is inherently accommodationist. Arguing that their plural perspective gives *zainichi* [South] Koreans an advantage in an era of globalization, Kim Yang-ki points to the recruitment of resident Koreans bilingual in Korean and Japanese and the increase in job opportunities available to them. The lesson for future generations, he argues, is to be competitive. Moreover, it is necessary to aim at surpassing the average Japanese rather than simply complaining about discrimination (Y. Kim 1986: 48). This position has been widely criticized as implying that discrimination can be escaped only by those few at the top of the academic ladder or with the financial means to do so (editor's endnote, Y. Kim 1986: 51).

The banal use of the term *kokusaika* ("internationalization") in the Japanese mass media to describe the influx of Koreans and other foreign newcomers starting in the 1980s sheds light on another meaning of Korean language learning. Korean can now be portrayed merely as an interesting foreign language to learn, as argued by Lee Seijaku (see Chapter 5).

Studying Korean just for fun is a far cry from the argument that language acquisition is about retrieving the lost essence of one's identity and culture, as argued above by Kim Chan-jong, Ko Yong-ui and Ri Ki-nam.

Relying on universalistic ideas about individual achievement and culture, even though they are constrained by the broader context of Japanese society, the writings of Song Mija, Ri Ki-nam and Kim Yang-ki represent a departure from the category of "Korean." The writings of Yang Tae-ho, explored below, represent a departure from categorization itself by challenging the existing social system, yet from a reformist perspective. Yang, a Mintōren activist (see Introduction), pursues common interests with the Japanese under the slogan "living together." He seeks an approach sensitive to *zainichi* circumstances, but attempts to depart from earlier nationalist approaches that prioritized abstract ideas of Koreanness:

> Although people often say that they are against assimilation, that they instill the Korean [*minzoku*] soul [in their children], or make them take pride in their Koreanness [*minzoku*], what precisely do they mean? Has pure Koreanness [*chōsen*], or a stable and eternal Korean spirit [*minzokusei*] ever existed? We have not inherited much language or many customs. And quite a lot of [our] eating habits cannot help being Japanized.
>
> Take the language, for instance. Although the Korean language is supposed to represent Koreanness [*minzoku-sei*], well, in reality, most people just pick up a few words and expressions. Nevertheless, if the language is put as the top priority in Korean children's education in Japan [*minzoku kyōiku*], it will discourage them [*zainichi* Koreans] rather than encourage them. It is nothing more than a pain if they are pressured toward mastery of something that cannot be mastered (1984: 6-7).
>
> Why is it so? I believe the reason lies in confusing the objective and the means. Learning the language is merely the means, not the ultimate objective. [….] The aim of Korean children's education lies in [them] finding how they can live as humans with a sense of pride. Years ago, children might have opened their minds and regained their lost pride upon touching [i.e. making contact with] "Koreanness" [*minzoku*]. However, it is now quite likely that children [will] close their minds if they are pushed toward "Koreanness."

> […..] Depicting Koreanness [*minzoku-sei*] in its pure, complete, and abstract form and trying to attain that sort of Koreanness can be of value, but it would not be an exaggeration to call it a waste of effort. Rather, what is more needed is the teaching of "diligence" and "sincerity"—core values for human beings everywhere.

This passage illustrates a significant change in the meaning of education for Koreans, it becoming, over the generations, nothing more than universal human education. That "diligence" and "sincerity" are invoked indicates the need for such convenient abstractions that may be applied to, while being independent of, any political or national position.

Yang criticizes the equation of Korean education with national consciousness (whether pro-South or pro-North), instead seeking out the potential for a kind of Korean people's education. The significance for children of a Korean education (in which Korean names are used and the Korean language learned) is as a form of insurance for survival in the dual world that they inhabit. At the same time, it integrates resident Koreans with their own community and with Japanese society. Nevertheless, Yang's vision of a universal moral education is so general in its conceptualization that it appeals to those adopting individualistic and accommodative approaches toward upward mobility.[20] This type of "generality" is also increasingly useful to *zainichi* Korean communities for which collective identity and individual membership are no longer self-evident. This is the case, for example, for the growing number of children with Korean parentage who do not necessarily have either a Korean name or even Korean nationality.

Even writers long known for being highly nationalistic in the past have embraced this kind of vision, because it reflects the present conditions of *zainichi* Korean communities. Expanding his focus to overseas Koreans in China, Russia, and the U.S., Kim Chan-jong

(1994) concludes, “As time passes by, it is increasingly commonly recognized that in order to construct a society in a foreign country where Koreans and other ethnic groups live together, it is necessary to construct a Koreanness particular to and adaptable to each place” (C. Kim 1994: 248). In other words, there is no essence of Koreanness; the contours of Koreanness changing in myriad ways, reflecting changes in the host societies. Opinions about the education of Korean children in Japan also vary in this way. While a nationalistic, essentialist Koreanness no longer forms the basis of most arguments about collective identity and the role of education; such an approach does survive locally at the level of strategic practice in Korean minority education (T. Kim 1999).

Pragmatic ideas about Koreanness have largely supplanted an essentialized notion of Koreanness. Now the concern is more with the social advancement of Koreans, with reduced emphasis on the legacy of being Korean in Japan. While the writings of Yang Tae-ho, among others, see the limitations of an essentialized Koreanness, his agenda is pragmatic, in that it seeks advancement within a given social structure.

Search for alternatives to accommodation

Kim Shi-jong (b. 1929), a Korean-born poet-cum-critic, spoke out much earlier in a critical manner in relation to Korean education, and offers an alternative approach to the education of Koreans in Japan that does not merely embrace the Japanese majority. Kim Shi-jong was involved with Korean language education at a Japanese evening high school for working students during the 1970s and 1980s. He is critical of state-conscious Korean education and the ideological division between pro-North and pro-South Korean schools, as reflected in their respective curricula. North Korean schools overemphasize Kim Il Sung’s

glorious resistance to Japanese imperialism, while South Korean schools have an anti-communist agenda (S. Kim 1986: 421). In either case, the purpose of Korean education is to cultivate the consciousness of students as Korean nationals, whichever Korean nationality it is based upon.

Kim Shi-jong makes two major points in his critique of education for Korean children. First, as one of the early advocates of *zainichi* education rather than Korean national education, his clear emphasis is on the *zainichi* themselves benefiting rather than on educating them according to a highly abstracted notion of Koreanness associated with one of the two Korean nation-states. Second, the education of Korean children needs a grounded approach that is based on the realities of everyday life while seeking alternative values.

The major reason he considers it meaningful to learn Korean is not because it is useful, but precisely because it is of no use (S. Kim 1986 [1975]: 355). Emphasizing the utility of particular elements is merely a mechanism whereby a set of dominant social values is reproduced. He criticizes the unquestioned introduction of Korean high culture into Korean education, for ideas about the glory of ancient Korean civilization and art are far too detached from the everyday realities of most *zainichi* (S. Kim 1986: 416).[21] He explained his alternative vision in a 1977 lecture:

> [On the Japanese school's efforts to open up job opportunities to resident Koreans] It is surely a startling achievement to make large Japanese firms open their doors. However, obtaining good jobs does not necessarily guarantee Koreans [*Chōsen-jin*] autonomous lives. […..] Good job openings should be there after children have established themselves securely enough to [be able to] independently choose from the options, including that of saying no. Otherwise, good jobs merely strengthen orientations toward upward mobility.

> Koreans survived when there was no grass-roots activism. Korean parents have been incredibly tough and resilient [despite their suffering]. Encouraging students to get cleaner and better jobs might foster feelings of despising their parents' lives. If it is a student's dream to obtain a good job, s/he might reject his/her parents' existence, which [involved] striving during days when there were only unpleasant jobs, all the family members having to work as manual laborers, and brewing illegal liquor, collecting leftovers to raise smelly pigs, selling second hand scrap iron. Aren't the students who wish to cast off and reject their parents the ones who are struggling for better jobs? […..]
>
> What *zainichi* Korean education should be for is creating generations that can appreciate and accept their parents' paths in life with pride. *Zainichi* Korean education is not a matter [where] Koreans plead and respectable workplaces open their doors because Koreans hope to work there. […] Even if the doors to good jobs remain closed to Koreans, Korean youth have to survive anyway. I am convinced that true education is for those children who can laugh with their parents in spite of all the adversity [they may be suffering], and that makes children proud of their parents (S. Kim 1986: 414-415).

What Kim Shi-jong argues has contemporary relevance at a time when the Japanese majority has increasingly abandoned its dreams of upward mobility and its middle-class illusions in a protracted economic recession that has dragged on since the early 1990s. Because his audience is primarily made up of Japanese educators, he connects his argument with the problems Japanese are having in reestablishing their own subjectivity.

While Kim Shi-jong offers an alternative vision, his emphasis on human nature parallels the pragmatic and reformist ideas of Yang Tae-ho. Kim's alternative educational view has not been persuasive for some *zainichi* Korean activists who seek wider employment opportunities, and who consider Yang's pragmatic agenda an approach that does not necessarily refrain from criticizing the status quo.[22]

A Departure from Categorical Koreanness

The above examination of the discourse on *zainichi* ideals through education indicates problems and contradictions that allow no clear-cut distinction between essentialist and anti-essentialist, national and ethnic, or pro-Seoul and pro-Pyongyang standpoints. Firstly, the recurrent theme of establishing Korean subjectivity on a nationalistic basis has been viewed as presenting a Third World approach, both by Ko Yon-i and by Kim Chan-jong in his early writings. Secondly, discomfort with all of the collective approaches has produced critiques of essentialist notions. Both the pragmatic approaches expressed by Yang Tae-ho and the alternatives proposed by Kim Shi-jong illustrate this line of thinking. Thirdly, the pragmatic approaches that have emerged as critiques of essentialism are themselves drawn from highly essentialist standpoints, as is the case with Kim Yang-ki and Ri Ki-nam. Fourthly, in order to address the obscured nature of Korean community membership and the increasingly invisible nature of racism against Koreans, a universal agenda based on concepts such as human dignity and human rights is offered. This departure from the "Korean" category possibly marks the transformation of Korean national education into Korean ethnic education. Fifthly, a universal agenda can end up being accommodative in relation to the larger society in question, despite its critical intentions. And finally, there is the issue of the political division of the Korean homeland, the resulting ideological polarization reflected in the differing content of material taught at pro-North and pro-South schools for the Korean minority in Japan. This is partly a result of the general social functions of education and schooling—the reproduction of national subjects and a labor force from the onset of modern education—which come into conflict with the ideal of emancipating individuals through knowledge. Education both challenges and contributes to differentiated access and control in society at large (cf. Bowles and Gintis 1976).

The priorities of education aimed at empowering the Korean minority change over time. Has there been a systematic transition from a Korean national education to a Korean ethnic education over the past three decades? There is certainly a moment that marks the arrival of a predominantly ethnic agenda. Nevertheless, the answer is no. If the term "ethnic" connotes the symbolic and expressive nature of identification (Sanjek 1994), turning to this term means that this pragmatic approach does not conflict with majority-Japanese society but maintains the potential tensions contained within ideas of the national. However, the distinction between "national" and "ethnic" has always been elusive. Even the most nationalistic pro-DPRK organization has accommodated the Japanese political and economical system (S. Ryang 1997). Even among the nationalists, the strategic choices have always been accommodative.

The denial of a Korean national education often means a retreat to the notion of an essential or, at least, fundamental, cultural Koreanness. In his overview and critique of Korean children's education over the past fifty years, Yang Yong-hu (1995) distinguishes between Korean ethnic education and Korean national education. According to Yang (1995), the problem with Korean national education is precisely that the two national education systems have contributed to the perpetuation of the division of Korean people. Nevertheless, he maintains that it is natural for Korean parents to pass on the Korean language and culture, and that these processes themselves have supreme value. There are similarities between *zainichi* Korean intellectuals in Japan and black intellectuals in the United States in the way that they often reproduce earlier conflicts and contradictions (Cruse 1984[1967]).

The ways in which resident Koreans have imagined Koreanness through their ideas of education clearly indicate that there is no essential Koreanness. Even the many authors

who maintain a belief in Koreanness—constructed through blood, language, history, culture, name, and so on—always reflect larger societal and historical contexts in the strategies of collective identity formation they propose as the basis of educational efforts. Reflecting circumstances in which the presence of Koreans is increasingly obscured through naturalization and intermarriage, some nevertheless value a minority education that emphasizes links with the remote fatherland, whether imagined or known.

In the transition from national to ethnic education, a coherent or comprehensive goal is never apparent, although there is increasing evidence of a pragmatic kind of Koreanness, especially in regard to language teaching. The Korean language may be mastered as a useful skill to possess in the job market or simply studied as a hobby, a part-time, personal expression of group membership. A pragmatic, ethnicized Koreanness best suited to individual self-fulfillment in the context of life in Japan has won out over a highly contentious politicized Koreanness that aimed to raise consciousness about the colonial past and resist unconditional Japanization. However, over the years, even this nationalist construction of Koreanness has been inscribed in ways that did not question the existing economic and political system of Japanese society. As Koreanness has become increasingly invisible in Japan, rhetoric that prioritizes universal human values rather than uniquely Korean ones has become more compelling. *Zainichi* Korean intellectuals find themselves at a crossroads as growing rates of naturalization and intermarriage further dissolve the outlines of Korean identity and lineage-related myths (Y. Kim 1998). Increasingly, many *zainichi* seek personal self-fulfillment beyond membership in a minority group, allowing them to be Korean without raising the issue of their controversial historical legacy. This individualist orientation is taken up positively in the Japanese press, precisely because it does not involve

political content with which the average Japanese (and even many *zainichi* themselves) would rather not be confronted (Ryang forthcoming; K. Yun 1992).

Being a resident Korean in Japan involves an inherently political form of existence, the above-mentioned double consciousness marking out parameters that straddle Japan and the two nations occupying the divided Korean Peninsula (K. Yun 1992). Efforts to define an ideal Korean-ness have oscillated between universal and specific Korean categories, involving, respectively, an escape from and retreat to essentialism. These two seemingly variant orientations might converge in what Kim Tae-young (1999) describes as the two-sided strategic use of Koreanness, both as a means of emancipation and as a constraint. Koreans living in Japan continue to struggle within and beyond the constraints placed upon them by their categorization as *zainichi*.

In the passages I have quoted in this chapter, the term *minzoku* specifically refers to what it means to be Korean in Japan, while the focus has shifted from the national to the ethnic—although the distinction is not always clear-cut. At the beginning of this chapter, I raised the issue of making the problematic distinction between the racial and the ethnic. The mechanisms of exclusion were preserved as Korean intellectuals emphasized the significance of Korean minority education as being found in raising Korean consciousness and, thus, pride in being Korean. The shift to the ethnic clearly toned down the orientation of Korean minority education, in terms of its anti-racist struggle, problematizing existing social relations through a rather utopian set of ideas, as pointed out by Kim Shi-jong. Behind the shift from the national to the ethnic lie class-related problems that are inherently contradictory to any pedagogical practice associated with formal schooling. A critical and resistant stance ironically reproduces the disadvantages attached to a minority background

(Willis 1977).

In sum, while the pragmatic ethnicization of Koreanness segments collective identity to the point where it is difficult or impossible to mobilize, a decreasing reliance on a historically specific Korean category in identity politics is also evident. The term *zainichi korian* [the Japanese transliteration of the English word, Korean] gained popularity during the 1990s (Suzuki 1998). Recently published Japanese material opts for this use of *korian,* written in *katakana*[23] (the Japanese phonetic alphabet used to transliterate words of foreign origin, foreign names, and mimetic and onomatopoeic words). Z*ainichi* Koreans, with their awkward position in a Japanese society still haunted by the myth of homogeneity, are now considered somewhat "cool" by Japanese urban youth, who envy people different from themselves (Suzuki 1998). When written in *katakana*, the term *korian* dilutes the political aspect of *zainichi* existence, rooted as it is in a history of colonization and subsequent migration, imbuing it with apolitical, harmless, exotic, and fun elements, rather like in the contemporary Japanese concept of ethnic (*esunikku*) cuisine.

Through the use of a universal human category that links Korean problems to basic human rights issues, Koreanness—either national or ethnic—has receded in the politics of representation. Koreanness thrives now only in a tamed way that does not conflict with Japanese social and political institutions. Food, fashion, and festivals are much more attractive, both to Koreans and Japanese, than language study and other kinds of formal schooling aimed at raising consciousness about living in Japan. Both Koreans and Japanese dress up in *chima* and *chogori* (traditional Korean clothes), and play the *janggo* (Korean drum) to *nong-ak* (rural Korean music) rhythms in a niche of consumable exoticism. What both Japanese and Koreans can share is a taste of ethnic spice, but nothing more than that.

2. The Korean Fan Dance for Fun?: Minority Empowerment in Practice

The above discussion included an examination of tensions between the content and agenda of Korean empowerment education. Pragmatic solutions to these tensions include those based on empowerment through class mobility and those emphasizing empowerment through emancipation from oppression. A pragmatic solution that does not challenge the status quo is likely to reproduce class-based inequalities, while minority empowerment is realized in an emphasis on individual success. In closing this chapter, I will focus on a practice which makes ethnic Koreanness a new kind of exotic consumable; notable is a striking affinity with existing gender roles within formal educational settings that discipline students as future members of the labor force.

Attempting to expand my potential pool of interviewees, I attended a variety of public events and festivals that celebrated Korean Otherness between 1999 and 2002: annual school fairs, festivals organized by local activist groups to celebrate diversity and multiculturalism, and promotional events to foster cultural exchanges between South Korea and Japan. Most typically, these events took place in school buildings, open-air parks, and community centers. When I look at the photographs I took at these events, I realize that a common practice at all these events was the performance of Korean dances by primary and secondary school students, especially all-girl troupes using the traditional large, colorful fans and co-ed ensembles playing Korean drums. Whether in Tokyo or Osaka, Kawasaki or Kobe, these reproduced scenes of folkloric authenticity provided picture-perfect moments, and I wondered about their ubiquity and what these representations meant.[24]

The fan dance, *puchaechum*, is a popular representation of Koreanness, or Korean femininity in particular, be it in South Korean tourism, in Korean culture clubs at Japanese schools with significant *zainichi* Korean student populations, as part of the Japanese public elementary school education for Korean children, at pro-South Korean private schools, in extra-curricular activities at pro-North Korean schools, or at local Korean or multi-ethnic festivals. Dance and music are popular genres at the annual cultural festival sponsored by the Korean Scholarship Foundation,[25]which played a significant role in having dance and music incorporated into Korean minority empowerment education in the 1970s. The fan dance is a symbolic icon of Korean minority empowerment, featuring in the cover pages of publications and so forth (e.g. I. Park 1999; Osaka-fu minzoku kōshi kai 2000). On stage, young girls or women dressed in colorful, matching Korean dresses, dance in a team with big smiles or expressions of nervous concentration as amateur dancers. Co-ed *nong-ak* represents a revival of folklore, but with multiple meanings attached. To some, it is a symbol of resistance to authority, because of its origin in agrarian villages. To others, it is simply thrilling and exciting, because of its acrobatic elements (see also Chapter 6). Some older-generation Koreans shun these forms of performing art, viewing them as lower class. On many occasions, visual consumption of these performances involves multiple meanings.

In this section, I will show how folkloric Korean fan dancing and percussion performances both affirm the collective pride of the Korean minority in Japan while, at the same time, subvert the anti-racist intentions of these cultural displays. Establishing a collective consciousness always involves interaction or dialogue with other groups. Again, the concept of double consciousness captures the challenge of a minority group's collective and internalized forms of awareness. Collective self-definition among minority groups is

contingent on labeling by the dominant group, and I draw here on Fujitani's examination (1996) of the historical formation of the modern Japanese monarchy through the invention of national pageantry. Also, I combine Foucauldian ideas related to the physical disciplining of national subjects with McClintock's (1995) argument that nationalism relies on gender and racial differences in visible and tangible ways.

Images of men and women in ethnic attire performing folk arts evoke collective sentiments of pride. But for those images to convey pride there has to be an understanding that these individuals share common, perhaps innate characteristics. Local culture, in this way, becomes ethno-national and, in some cases, even racial vis-à-vis the external gaze of national and international politics. Folk arts provide a cultural arena in which ethno-racial nationalism flourishes. Moreover, folk arts can be revived, adapted, and sold in markets for domestic and international tourism: folk arts are a form of nostalgia that feeds the commodification of ethnicity (Enloe 1989; Kondo 1997; Robertson 1997; Wu 1997).

Over the past few decades, scholars have used interdisciplinary approaches to challenge static, fixed, and binary social categories. Taken as being socially constructed, race, ethnicity, and gender—still understood often as ascribed categories—are formative and constitutive of everyday knowledge. Yet their boundaries and meanings have always been shifting and contested (Butler 1990; Glenn 1999; Kondo 1997; Hall 1992; Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992). For example, Evelyn Nakano Glenn (1999) proposes an interactive framework of race and gender: as analytic concepts, race and gender "are *relational* concepts whose construction involves *both representational and social structural processes* in which *power* is a constitutive element" (Glenn 1999: 9, original emphasis). With this interactive framework in mind, I would like to examine the affinity between the search for authentic identities,

cultural representations, and the processes of gendering and racializing collective identity that are formed through cultural practices and performances in school settings.

I focus on the popular repertories of Korean student performance, as they illustrate a process through which efforts to reconstruct authentic ethno-racial identities are complicated by a number of social forces. I argue that intra-ethnic cultural representation depends on and reproduces traditional gender roles. Further, inter-ethnically, the dominant group treats and consumes minority representation in feminized ways. I have found that Korean fan dances and percussion performances in the Japanese socio-political and economic milieu serve the purpose of collective consciousness-raising while at the same time providing objects for cultural consumption. The folkloric images presented by these performances are steeped in a nostalgic understanding of the past, which neither contradicts nor threatens existing ideologies (Iwabuchi 2002; Robertson 1997). Moreover, these folk art performances are spectacles and pageants (Fujitani 1996), both of which accentuate processes of gendering and racialization, though obviously not by intention.

The popularity of Korean fan dances operates on two levels. One level involves the reproduction of gendered patterns of aesthetics (cf. Bourdieu 1984): the application of cosmetics, the wearing of frilly dresses and costumes, and the stylized enactment of traditional gender roles. At another level, the performances are a form of “autoexoticization,” a term coined by Savigliano (Kondo 1997), and reflect an understanding of Korean identity that ironically conforms to Japanese ideas about Koreans as quaint and folkloric—in short, as feminine.

I will begin with a description of the transformation of meanings attached to the

Korean fan dance. Specifically, I will examine the performative aspects at school events where Koreanness is visualized and practiced in gender-specific ways. These events occur in multiple educational settings, but my focus here is on Japanese schools in which Koreans are enrolled and minority education programs are offered. Japanese schools have a Japanese audience—teachers, students and their parents, the presence of which definitely shapes the *zainichi* Korean performance of otherness.[26]

Education as a Site of Racial Literacy and Strategic Essentialism

The major objective of Korean minority education is to empower students by introducing "racial literacy" (Twine 1999: 98) in an institutionalized context. By instilling Korean consciousness and pride through retrieving language and cultural heritage, Korean minority education aims to provide a countermeasure to Japanese cultural hegemony. While some attention is devoted to the history of Korea under Japanese colonialism, it is the positive meanings of Korean heritage that are emphasized. This is done primarily through the knowledge and practice of Korean culture transformed into a folk culture through the performance of traditional music and dance.

The immediate goal of traditional performance is to make the unconscious conscious, the invisible visible. Differentiating themselves and making themselves visible, *zainichi* Koreans must rely on tangible clues to imagine Koreanness. Teachers, especially at the elementary school level, employ a variety of practices, such as using distinctively Korean family names and greetings, in addition to maps, food, arts, toys and games—anything visibly and tangibly different but familiar enough (Hester 2000; Osaka-Fu Minzoku Kōshi Kai 2000). These practices allow *zainichi* Koreans who neither speak Korean nor know much

about the culture to acquire tangible Koreanness. With these practices, *zainichi* Koreans can selectively transform their ascribed social category from a stigmatized kind of foreignness to a category that is foreign enough to allow them to differentiate themselves from the Japanese. This acquired foreignness fosters a multi-ethnic societal vision that is also appealing to the Japanese majority. Although *zainichi* Koreans resist, at the same time, any imposed, essentialized form of Koreanness (T. Kim 1999), the form of presentation should not be too alien to the audience and the performers themselves.

Do these selective practices of essentialization produce other forms of oppression? As McClintock (1996:353-374) points out, nationalism has become a "commodity spectacle," performed in collectivity, with gender and analogies of domestic relations effectively mobilized in the process. Therefore, strategic challenges to racist ideas of difference take the form of a kind of cultural nationalism through these selective practices, in which a conventionally gendered imagination is also always at work. Strategies to combat Japanese racism for Koreans in school settings may thus share such elements of the gendered commodity spectacle, in that they are constructing a collective identity that relies on visualization of a Koreanness that is, at the same time, ethno-racial and national. Nevertheless, such claims for and affirmations of *zainichi* Korean identity assume the existence of a relatively "safe" form—camouflaged as folklore, the mark of ethnic difference is not extended into everyday life.[27] The exceptions are *zainichi* Koreans who adopt Korean-sounding names which always signal their Otherness.

In one respect, my analysis is limited by the fact that, in truth, the average *zainichi* Korean student in Japanese schools learns little about Korea and nothing about Koreans in Japan; the availability of Korean empowerment education is limited geographically, but also

in terms of the interests of students and their parents. My analysis here is based largely on my field observations of diverse Korean cultural events and interviews I have conducted with teachers (both Japanese and Korean) and parents (mostly mothers). I also draw on published teachers' reports and student essays. Students' voices are represented here by essays selected by teachers. Many of those I read express eloquently the moral expectations of the standard curriculum and of their teachers.

The Korean Fan Dance: Its Appropriation

How have Korean performing folk arts been incorporated into the curricula of Japanese schools with Korean students? Both *nong-ak* and the *puchaechum* were revived and reinterpreted forms of folk culture imported from South Korea. Historically, these performative genres were identified with the lower classes, *nong-ak* originating in peasant harvest celebrations and *puchaechum* in shamanic dance. In the late 1960s and 1970s, traditional culture was revived and adapted in South Korea through two simultaneous movements. On the one hand, the South Korean government sponsored traditional cultural events and art forms in the hope of activating the forces of invented tradition to promote collective national sentiments. On the other hand and at the same time, South Korean student activists and intellectuals appropriated traditional popular culture to express dissent, as well as critical consciousness and solidarity among the oppressed. Intellectuals and students appropriated Korean folk culture as a symbol of hope for Korean unification and resistance against the then military government in South Korea (Lee 2003: 561-568; Sim 1995). *Zainichi* Korean activists selectively imported elements of invented and nationalized folk culture to Japan. Therefore, it is true to say that the Korean cultural repertoires and spectacles

seen at annual *zainichi* Korean festivals[28] have not been transmitted directly from parents or grandparents to the younger generations engaged in such performances (Iida 2002: 312-313).

The growth in popularity of certain forms of *nong-ak* (in the contemporary forms of *samulnori* and *p'ungmulnori*) was helped along by the worldwide acclaim accorded Kim Duk-soo's performance group, Samulnori. On one occasion in the Osaka area, when I had hoped to observe extra-curricular activities for Korean students, all the sessions were canceled because it turned out that a performance by Kim Duk-soo was taking place and all the teachers involved had gone to see it! *Nong-ak* is visually spectacular, the *p'ung-mulnori* accompanied by acrobatics in a lively blend of percussion and dance, the swift movements of the drummers' heads with lengthy streamers attached to their hats creating a swirling pattern much like that formed by rhythmic gymnastics with ribbons. As such, audiences can readily enjoy these performances without the need for any specialized knowledge.

The meaning of the Korean fan dance has undergone several transformations, not only in Korea but also in Japan. It is an invented tradition. Adapted from shamanic dance, which used a fan, it has been transformed into a precisely choreographed ensemble in which each dancer carries two large fans and the group gracefully forms shapes, such as those of a flower or wave (King 1983; Han 1983). Despite its relatively recent origins, the dance has become very popular, and colorful photos of smiling troupes of young women in traditional costume often appear on the pages of tourist guidebooks about South Korea. Much like *nong-ak*, the stylized pageantry of *puchaechum* seems not to require prior knowledge to be enjoyed. According to the Korean dance instructors I interviewed, one reason *puchaechum* is so popular is because it is widely enjoyed by audiences otherwise unfamiliar with Korean dance forms, either traditional or modern.

In Japan, *puchaechum* has become a symbol of Korean pride and of a tolerant, multi-ethnic Japan. One dance instructor involved in Korean children's education recalled to me that, "During the late 1970s, the image of Korea and anything to do with Korea was quite negative and touchy." The Korean fan dance, which really has no historical meaning, was "so breathtakingly beautiful and just splendid [that] it was encouraging to many Koreans, who became aware that Korean culture had such beauty, something they could be proud of" (personal interview July 21, 2001). On the other hand, a Korean high school language instructor who has performed *puchaechum* every year since the late 1990s declared that it was an ancient dance performed by ladies at court. She added that the performance itself was about female beauty, and that "students enjoy it precisely because it is exotic" (personal correspondence July 25, 2001). What was created as a symbol of resistance to the anti-democratic government has turned into a major symbol of South Korea and a tourist attraction in its own right. In Japan, what was a symbol of resistance to Japanization and racism has morphed into a palatable form of cultural difference and, for many Japanese and Koreans alike, a source of sheer exotic pleasure.

Six factors explain the spread of the Korean fan dance as a staple of minority education. First, the introduction of the Korean fan dance and other forms of Korean culture coincided with changes in the content of education for Korean children in Japan. As noted above, since the 1970s, there has been a growing emphasis on fun elements as opposed to academic areas such as Korean grammar, the history of colonization and what it means to be a Korean born in Japan (Nakagawa Elementary School 2000; Kitatatsumi Elementary School 1999). This soft turn has been accompanied by the use of appealing visual spectacles on school stages.

Second, and related to this visual appeal, a great deal of time is devoted to rehearsal (one to two months), and student performances are often impressive. Although neither the performers nor audiences need expertise to enjoy the dances, one Korean dance instructor told me she considers the dance "more technically and spiritually challenging than it appears" (personal interview, July 21, 2001). Masterly *puchaechum* performers dance so swiftly that their skirts swirl up, exposing their ankles. Younger children dance at a much slower tempo, but even if a performance contains only basic choreographed choral patterns, it is presentable to an audience.

Third, resources for Korean minority education have been extremely limited. It is only recently that some local governments have started to allocate budgets for such programs, though they are still not well funded. Therefore, information, materials, and instructors are all shared and exchanged, and classes are dependent on the energy and commitment of a limited number of teachers. Further, one dance instructor explained to me that given the limited resources and in the context of Japan's structured educational system, it is impossible to create original performances. A familiar repertory has been established within these constraints.

Fourth, the performative form, however, is appropriate to the physical spaces and public occasions in which it takes place. Group musical and dance performances fit neatly into Japanese school activities and culture in general. Group performances of all sorts are marked on the calendars of elementary, middle, and high schools across Japan.

Fifth, there is also an ideological fit with the standard curriculum, students writing essays that reflect familiar narratives involving tough training, minor mistakes but overall

success on the stage, and euphoric feelings following successful achievement (Kitatatsumi Elementary School 1999; Nakagawa Elementary School 2000). Rather than publicly performing something Korean or receiving public recognition for being Korean, the performers' feedback is an accommodative success story which indicates industriousness and the ability to handle pressure. In other words, Korean dance provides an effective kind of preparation for students as good, reliable workers in existing modes of production.

Finally, and most importantly, Korean minority education is dependent on the conventional division of gender roles outside school. Female students are excited to wear the colorful dresses, hair accessories, and make-up that are part of performing. These activities are fun because they satisfy already gendered self-consciousness among the young. For some *zainichi* Korean girls, there is pressure from other [Japanese] students, who presume that performing the fan dance is a natural and desirable activity for them. This pressure, however, is becoming less salient as opportunities for Japanese students to participate in *puchaechum* performances increase, as regularly reported in Zenchōkyō documents (1996-2002).[29]

The majority of instructors of Korean performing arts are female and part-time, largely because of resource constraints. Men, who are supposed to be the major breadwinners, are hardly capable of pursuing Korean performing arts as a career. The domestic division of labor creates considerable pressure. My interviews with members of Korean Parent Teacher Associations show that mothers who support Korean club activities and cultural performances must first demonstrate their ability to fulfill their domestic responsibilities before participating in any evening meetings and other activities outside the home. At a symbolic level, conventional female attributes, such as looking pretty and elegant, are affirmed in the racialized niche of the fan dance. In this way, Korean women reproduce this

soft cultural tradition as housewives and mothers devoted to their children's education. Women are in fact necessary to support the Korean minority education agenda and, in so doing, the existing gendered division of labor remains intact in anti-racist activities aimed at encouraging Korean pride.

The Formation of Apolitical Ethnicity

I have argued that the appropriation of the *puchaechum* illustrates how the use of an imagined cultural Koreanness to challenge Japanese racism and express a multi-ethnic vision of Japan has had the ironic unintended consequence of enforcing conventional and exploitative gender relations. Ethno-racial and national minority representations, when performed as feminized images, present self-exoticized spectacles that are tame but border on the erotic and the exotic. Thus, challenges to the existing social order blunt the intended effect of Korean women and girls in Korean costume. What might be understood as a transgression of Japanese public space and a challenge to Japanese cultural hegemony through Korean cultural representations actually reproduces subordinate gendered and racial roles. An Osaka Prefecture Council member who attended a local high school's commencement ceremony told a local newspaper that because of the presence of students in Korean, Vietnamese, and Chinese dress, "I felt like I had come to a cabaret [hostess] club!" (*Mainichi Shinbun* March 8, 2003). That an intended expression of ethnic pride can be so easily (and publicly) associated with sexual commodification suggests an immense gap between meanings attached by performers and audience. Ironically, this prefectural council member's remark echoes the stereotypical Western image of Japanese women as geishas carefully adorned in make-up and kimonos. Some Japanese observers' imagery of Korean

dress overlaps with ideas regarding *kisaeng*, professional entertainers in Korean costume who were a staple of Japanese sex tourism in South Korea in the 1970s (Lie 1995). In this way, even in contemporary Japan, Korean minority women dressed in Korean costume can visually evoke sex industry workers in male colonial imaginations. Even the male performers of *nong-ak* are often consumed as feminized images insofar as this presumably traditional performance is seen as quaint and feminine.

There is a symbiotic relationship between ideal visual images of the Japanese man and the Korean woman in Japan. The gendered construction of Korean Otherness, rendered simply in the spectacle of traditional performance, also reproduces the rigid notion of a male-centered Japanese mainstream. The class-subversive meaning of folk dances is easily incorporated by the visual expectations of Japanese viewers, promoted and enforced further by saturated color tourist photographs depicting the gendered quaintness of Koreans in Japan and the quaintness of South Korea as holiday destination. For both the Korean minority and Japanese audiences, fan dances are fun, even if they also mean expressing the possibility of a new and changing Japan. Dorinne Kondo (1997) observes potential subversion, even in self-exoticizing cultural commodification, in high fashion and theater. In the rather less glamorous settings of school auditoriums and gyms, I observed the same limits to post-colonial subversion in the performance of a new cultural Koreanness.

This chapter explored the influences of class and gender in the unintentional reproduction of the relationship between majority and minority in pedagogical theories and practices. The original intention of resistance can be obscured in the multiplicities of meanings attached by

educational practitioners, performers, and audiences using available and familiar sets of internalized ideas within everyday constraints. The following chapter turns the focus toward individual narratives that illustrate the gaps between the theoretical premises associated with the catchy term "diaspora" and individual perceptions of the realities of obscured *zainichi* and Japanese boundaries.

Endnotes:

[1] Kuraishi (2007) shows how *zainichi* narratives in life history research contain the wordings of the other, i.e. the Japanese majority, although his focus is not on the process of collective identity formation.

[2] I am grateful to Masami Tamagawa for drawing my attention to Gramscian theory of "deputy intellectuals."

[3] As for the repatriate movement to the DPRK, see Introduction.

[4] The Sōren (see footnote 4) initially accused Koreans who wrote in Japanese of nihilism "contaminated by bourgeois thoughts" (Yang 1999: 31-32). The debate was mainly over literary writing. See also S. Kim (1976, 1981).

[5] Ryang (1997) uses the terms Chongryun and Chongryun-Koreans to refer respectively to the organization, *Chaeilbon choseonin chong ryeonhaphoe,* and to those affiliated with it. In Japanese, the abbreviation Chōsōren is commonly used. Because I focus on Japanese language texts, I use the Japanese name, Sōren, which is also used among Japanese-speaking Koreans. The organization itself was established in 1955, its focus quickly shifting to Korean affairs rather than on Japanese domestic affairs (Ryang 1997). See Introduction.

[6] One of several intellectuals of non-Sōren origin, Tei Taikin (2001: 174), the principal proponent of the idea that South Koreans in Japan should acquire Japanese nationality, denies Kang Sang-jung's "standard" comment that *zainichi* have not been fully emancipated because of the divided Korean homeland as "anachronistic" and even "paranoiac."

[7] *Chōsen* or *chōsenjin* are derogatory words for some Japanese. The word *chōsen* indicates the geographic area of the Korean peninsula, while it is derogatory when spelled in the Japanese phonetic *katakana* alphabet. The deliberate use of the derogatory term to challenge the existing symbolic order has rarely been made explicit.

[8] See Field (1993: 645-648) on the "Third Way" debates among Korean intellectuals about the permanent nature of Japan's Korean community.

[9] Kim Chanjong is no longer part of Sōren; he criticizes its organizational stances in the 2000s.

[10] The copy I obtained is already the third reprint in five years, quite a success for this kind of publication.

[11] Kim was born in 1937; his elementary school education began around the time of Japan's defeat in 1945.

[12] Ryang (1997) claims this "poverty of language" (lack of spontaneous, flexible everyday expressions) contributes to the ideological reproduction of the *Chongryun* [Sōren] Korean community.

[13] In a municipally funded event to promote multiculturalism in Yokohama City that I attended in July 1999, Kim introduced himself as "born and brought up in Japan, so I am almost like a Japanese," to his audience, who were supposed to be mostly Japanese. There was no longer a match between his didactic essays of the 1970s and early 1980s and his soft-spoken tone and flexible attitude about being *zainichi* Koreans. He is no longer a Sōren journalist and declares, in 2004, that as an organization, "Sōren is falling apart with a creaking sound" (C. Kim 2004: 201).

[14] Because of Ko's position at Korea University, one may presume that he supports North Korea (at least officially).

[15] *Yamato* is a term used to refer to mainstream Japanese (at least those who never question their Japaneseness and believe themselves to be *Yamato-minzoku*).

[16] One limitation of this project is that women writers are under-represented. I do not regard this as a significant omission for my purposes, however, because women authors treating these issues do not commonly address women's issues or feminism. See Ryang (forthcoming) for the problematic relationship between *zainichi* authors and other political identities.

[17] This position is reflected in *Chōsen Kenkyū*, the journal in which Song published her first essays. The journals were renamed in the late 1980s *Gendai Koria* (Korea in *katakana).* Ōnuma et al. (1986) point out the editorial shift which, since the 1990s, led to a focus on the "problems" of North Korea, critiques of *zainichi* activists claiming the right to vote, and critiques of *zainichi* who are committed to maintaining their Korean nationalities.

[18] Ri Ki-nam is one of many *zainichi* authors who have published only one book on the topic, whether as a rite of passage, an autobiographic account of a search for identity or a nostalgic reflection on the past at a later stage in life. I ran across his book at a local library in Tokyo and in the East Asia stack at Columbia University. This volume has long been out of print.

[19] The publisher's English translated title.

[20] Commenting on Kyō Nobuko's essay, *An Utterly Ordinary Korean* (1986), Field (1993: 650) points out that upward mobility through top educational credentials does not necessarily indicate assimilation into Japanese society, but an attainment of highly universalistic norms in an age of

advanced capitalism. Lee Sun-ae (2000: 156) dismisses such critiques of Kyō's essays, arguing that "by ordinary, she meant an organizationally or politically uncommitted individual," and considers the debut of third-generation Kyō as evidence of the barrenness of second-generation Korean discourses (158).

[21] His remarks allude to the formation of a subaltern class consciousness (Spivak 1988).

[22] This was expressed to me in an interview with a Korean activist in the Kansai region (November 1999). A Japanese intellectual was offended by my literal appreciation of Kim Shijong's critical approach, because some of Kim's arguments became the basis for personal interrogation and imposed self-criticism associated with unacceptable bourgeois tendencies.

[23] For example, Kim Yong-dal (1998) uses the term *zainichi korian* when he refers to "doubles" (children of Japanese-Korean intermarriage) and Japanese nationals of Korean ancestry.

[24] Yang Yonghi's documentary "Swaying Spirit" (1996) records practices used in Korean empowerment education at Amagasaki High School by the charismatic teacher, Fujiwara Shirō. A scene featuring a fan dance practice session and footage of the subsequent performance provide the viewer with visual clues of how Korean cultural heritage is incorporated into an extra-curricular activity.

[25] The Korean Scholarship Foundation (1941-; re-established in 1957-) provides *zainichi* Korean high school and college students, so long as they are South Korean or stateless Koreans, with scholarships and additional study opportunities to learn and think about being *zainichi* Koreans. South Korean international students can also apply, although *zainichi* Koreans with Japanese nationality are, by principle, ineligible to apply (personal interview August 15, 2008).

[26] As for the diverse venues of Korean empowerment education, see Chapter 1 and Table 1-1.

[27] I thank Stephen Steinberg for this point.

[28] The forerunner for local *zainichi* Korean cultural events was Ikuno Minzoku Bunkasai (Ikuno Korean [Ethnic] Cultural Festival), first held in 1982. In 2001, on its 20th anniversary, it was announced that this would be the final festival, with the claim that the festival had fulfilled its mission. Other local festivals, such as Higashi Kujō Madang (1993-), Itami (1996-), Takarazuka Minzoku Matsuri (1997-) and Higashi Harima (1998-), are modeled after Ikuno's format. Some events receive small subsidies from local municipalities, but they are largely dependent on the commitment of organizers and volunteers.

[29] Zenkoku Chōsenjin kyōiku kenkyū shingikai. A national federation of educators engaged in Korean empowerment education.

CHAPTER FOUR

Reinventing Korean Roots and *Zainichi* Routes: Diaspora, Assimilation and Race

[C]ultural assimilation is not only and not always an official policy forced and imposed by host countries upon their non-native minorities; there is also among many members of minority populations themselves a certain *desire* to assimilate, a longing for fitting in rather than standing out, even though this desire is often at the same time contradicted by an incapability or refusal to adjust and adapt.
——Ien Ang (Ang 2001: 28, original emphasis).

Is the Personal Diasporic?

Responding to my e-mail thanking her for an interview, Mika,[1] a fourth-generation self-identified "ex-*zainichi*" [*moto zainichi*], a naturalized Japanese of colonial Korean descent, wrote:

> On my way home, on the train, I realized one thing that I could not instantly come up with an answer to; you asked me when or on what occasions I would feel I am a Japanese. Now I know what it is. When I run into ultra-thick *zainichi* [*monosugoku koi, baribari no zainichi*] such as the outspoken people on the mailing list,[2] I truly feel I am nothing more than Japanese.

Mika realizes her Japaneseness reflectively, in the presence of relatively "thick" *zainichi*. Perhaps one of the privileges of being "ordinary Japanese" in Japan, rather than Korean-Japanese or Chinese-Japanese (although such hyphenations are not widely used in Japanese), is that authentic Japaneseness is so taken for granted that there is no need to pause and reflect on it. Most of the time, Mika's identification with her Japanese nationality is something beyond her everyday concerns. Her Japaneseness can be defined absolutely by nationality but is only visible in relation to her strongly non-Japanese identified acquaintances.

Mika's otherwise forgotten *zainichi* background loomed large when she entered the marriage market. She and her family, although they had completely lost touch with *zainichi* organizations, reactivated those networks because of a tacit fear that Japanese suitors would exclude her based on her Korean lineage. Mika's parents assumed that being an ex-*zainichi* might affect Mika's marriage prospects among ordinary Japanese. But when they interacted with *zainichi*, Mika and her mother realized they were in limbo. On the one hand, "thick" *zainichi* were "too much"; they embraced their Koreanness too clearly, and hence (paradoxically) they were unconcerned about their Koreanness. On the other hand, Mika's family hesitated to identify fully with the so-called ordinary Japanese world, especially when it came to marriage, even though their Korean ethnic practices were minimal. Mika's case alludes to a persistent colorless color line between Japanese and *zainichi*; mutual repugnance results from phenotypically identical characteristics.

Mika's awakening to an otherwise dormant ex-*zainichi* identity is indicative of the ambivalent relationship between diaspora and assimilation. It is complicated in the Japanese context by questions of race, ethnicity, and nationality. In Japan, race, ethnicity, and nationality (each conflated with culture and lineage) are congruent with being a native of Japan and a native speaker of Japanese. The unthinking use of Japaneseness, be it racially, ethnically, or in the sense of nationality, relies on an implicit consensus about authentic Japaneseness; lineage trumps nationality, linguistic competence, or place of birth and upbringing (Fukuoka 2000: xxix, xxxvi; Morris-Suzuki 1998: 104–107; Weiner 1997: xiv; Yoshino 1992: 26–27). The supralegal definition of Japaneseness based on lineage continues to affect the identities of naturalized Japanese of colonial Korean descent. Throughout this chapter, I treat authentic Japaneseness, which is undefined in everyday language, as an

implicit and invisible racial construct materialized through lineage. Regardless of cultural assimilation or the attainment of socioeconomic status, the invisible race question seems to be intertwined with the diasporic condition, in that colonial Korean lineage is perceived as a basis for exclusion, whether real or imagined.

After generations of residence in Japan, Mika's ethnic homeland is lost. She cannot claim a singular authenticity, which is, after all, a luxury that only people with a secure homeland can afford. Japan is a conditional, step-homeland for Mika and her family, although they are no longer legally stateless. A claim to authenticity and secure homeland is precarious when invisible racial boundaries exist. Mika's case suggests a persistent boundary between authentic and inauthentic belonging to Japan's imagined national community, a community based on the idea that nationality = lineage = race. But what is Mika's relationship to the Korean diaspora? Are culturally and legally-structurally assimilated *zainichi* detached from the collective diasporic consciousness of the more mainstream ethnic Koreans? Does the invisible racial boundary join them to the Korean diaspora, if only part-time?

The problematic intersection between the personal and the diasporic calls for a close look at everyday *zainichi* life, which is remote from the discourses of diasporic intellectuals and ethno-political organizations. To what extent can the personal be diasporic? This chapter explores how naturalized Japanese of colonial Korean descent reinvent and express their *zainichi* background—roots and routes—and in so doing how they constitute an invisible and apolitical diaspora in contemporary Japan. In analyzing the cases of *zainichi* who, or whose parents, chose to become legally Japanese and official members of the Japanese nation-state

and who neither express collective diasporic consciousness nor affiliate with *zainichi* institutions, I will examine the possibilities and limits of invisible diasporic identity formation. I argue that naturalized Japanese of colonial Korean descent can still be invisibly diasporic, despite their detachment from collective memories of displacement because of the understated, imagined persistence of symbolic racism.

In the following, I first give an overview of the relationships among assimilation, invisible race, and diaspora, as well as the visible and invisible aspects of assimilated/naturalized *zainichi*. Then I present and interpret six individual cases of naturalized Japanese of colonial Korean descent who consider themselves ex-*zainichi* and examine the ways in which they understand, express, and communicate their *zainichi* background. Applying recent critiques of the concept of diaspora, in the final section I return to the question: is the personal diasporic?

Assimilation, Invisible Race, and Diaspora: Is the Racialized Diasporic?

As assimilation, cultural and structural, proceeds over generations through naturalization and intermarriage, the question arises: to what extent are *zainichi* diasporic? Can they retain diasporic identities without collective consciousness, especially after they have attained a seemingly post-stateless[3] condition through naturalization?

Being a stateless minority group that is structurally and symbolically excluded from an imagined national community facilitates the formation and reproduction of diasporic orientations (Clifford 1997; Safran 2004; Siu 2001; Tölölyan 1996). Conditions of statelessness, or of belonging to more than one nation-state, however, are by no means the

early-twenty-first century's global standard (Friedman 2002). An individual (and his or her family) who belongs to and identifies with one nation is the modern norm; naturalization is the legal expression of that norm. A considerable number of *zainichi* legally possess sole membership in the Japanese nation. Approximately 10,000 Koreans naturalize each year (Japan Ministry of Justice 2007). An instrumental approach to naturalization, or *kika*, as an actively selected option is gaining in popularity (Asakawa 2003, Tei 2001). Naturalization—a structural form of assimilation through the acquisition of full legal membership—is pragmatic in that it guarantees comprehensive legal membership in a national community. Legal inclusion, however, does not automatically produce full social acceptance.

Behind the questions of authentic membership and unconditional belonging is the common use of nationality rather than citizenship in everyday Japanese language. Nationality is determined by parental lineage in the Japanese Nationality Law. Naturalization is a complex adoption procedure to become a formal member of the Japanese national community. For *zainichi*—whether second, third, or fourth generation—lacking a Japanese national parent, naturalization is the only way to acquire nationality. Nationality itself continues to be taken as a matter of fate, while citizenship connotes something optional and variable in everyday Japanese language (Lie 2001: 144). The sense of nationality as fate, transmitted through parental lineage, invokes race rather than ethnicity. The acquired fact of Japanese nationality, therefore, tends to be regarded as strictly a private matter. When *zainichi* adopt Japanese names upon naturalization, as many do, they often lose the only public mark of their non-Japanese origin.

Jeffrey Alexander (2001) argues: "With assimilation [. . .] the split between private

and public remains in place; indeed, because the polluted qualities of stigmatized group membership are even more firmly restricted to the private sphere, this split becomes sharper and more unyielding" (Alexander 2001: 244). In segregated communities, it is possible to maintain a Korean lifestyle (invented or reinvented) in the public sphere or at private, family occasions, but for the Japan-born Korean with a Japanese alias, any public display will be undoubtedly seen as Japanese.

Because naturalized Japanese are no longer legally stateless, these "step-Japanese," or "new" Japanese, do not belong to any politically committed, organized, or visibly diasporic community. They are caught in what John Lie calls "a paradox of oppression" in which the partially assimilated feel racism most astutely (2004: 258). The diasporically conscious bear the burden of symbolic racism precisely because the structural basis of racism seems to have diminished (Lie 2004: 256–257). Yet the possibilities and limits of diasporic identity matter theoretically and empirically to those who are situated outside of the conventional contours of a diasporic community. As was the case with Mika's concerns about the marriage market, they encounter symbolic exclusion that raises questions about their full incorporation in the Japanese nation-state. Subconscious fear of social exclusion in marriage and intimate relationships makes Japanese nationality among the naturalized a conditional, legal token of membership rather than an all-inclusive, unquestioned location, identity, and sense of national belonging.

Is this fear a necessary and sufficient condition for diasporic consciousness? In the introduction to this volume, Sonia Ryang identifies two models of diaspora: the classical model (which she associates with phylogeny) and the cultural studies (ontogeny) model.

Individuals such as Mika, of Japan-born generations, have much closer ties to the home (i.e., Japan) than to the lost homeland (Korea), especially because they now hold Japanese nationality through naturalization. Their form of diaspora is ontogenetic, based on an appropriated sense of identity, as opposed to the classical/phylogenetic model of diaspora, which is based on collective memory and consciousness. Ryang is correct to question, however, whether post-stateless *zainichi* are part of the Korean diaspora remains a theoretical and empirical question.

The uprooted are rendered diasporic not only through the search for the lost homeland but also by the process of making the hostland experience meaningful. James Clifford, a proponent of the cultural studies model of diaspora,[4] proposes a "decentered" model which emphasizes "a shared, on-going history of displacement, suffering, adaptation, or resistance" (Clifford 1997: 249–250), pointing out the limitations of a "centered" model which prioritizes the close and ongoing relationship with the homeland.

A "shared" history continues to be significant even in Clifford's decentered model. The decentered model's emphasis on the subjective realm of diasporic consciousness (as in collective memories) still indicates the juncture and disjuncture between diasporic individuals, the host society, and the diasporic community. It renders problematic the diasporic consciousness of individuals who do *not* share a history of displacement, suffering, adaptation, and resistance.

The *zainichi* case challenges both centered and decentered models of diaspora. Memories certainly connect personal experience to a collective past. However, this process cannot be taken for granted just because of shared lineage. Fukuoka Yasunori (1991: 220), in

his life-course research on *zainichi* youths, found that grandchildren have heard little about their grandparents' migration or how preceding generations lived. Shared *zainichi* history is often of little importance to *zainichi* individuals, especially among those who do not maintain active *zainichi* networks. The formation of collective identity is difficult because *zainichi* are politically and ideologically diverse; the vast majority were born in Japan, educated only in Japanese schools, have few ties to other *zainichi,* and pass as Japanese using a Japanese alias (Fukuoka 2000; Kim 1978)—this last being a tactic that phenotypically invisible minority groups can adopt.

The extent to which structurally and culturally assimilated populations can remain diasporic depends not only on the social structures of the host society and the intra-ethnic community but also on their interpretations of exterior circumstances, present, past and future. Assimilated groups' precarious positions in the host society sustain diaspora as collective consciousness (Clifford 1997: 250–251). Is ignorance bliss? Does a lack of a collective sense of displacement and violent loss mean that Japanese of colonial Korean descent are no longer diasporic? What impact does structural prejudice have on the lives of *zainichi,* and how does it affect the meanings they attach to their existence in Japan?

Visible and Invisible Diasporas

While researchers address the presence and diverse identities of *zainichi* as part of the twentieth-century Korean diaspora (Ryang 1997; Sasaki 2003; Suzuki 2003),[5] it is important to note that some *zainichi* communities are more visible than others. *Zainichi* in general are phenotypically invisible (i.e., indistinguishable from the Japanese) yet racialized owing to

their colonial legacy (Weiner 1997). Highly visible, organized *zainichi* communities, regardless of the content and the intensity of their political commitments, have provided rich and distinct subject matter for researchers across diverse disciplines and approaches. The studies have paid more attention to organized *zainichi* perspectives not only because of their accessibility but also because these communities themselves focus on their differences. For researchers, differences are always more appealing than similarities because they illustrate diversity and challenge the assumptions of a monoethnic Japan and essentialism in general. The challenge is that difference perpetuates foreignness, imagined or real. The visible Korean minority can be used simultaneously to endorse the claims of both multiethnic and monoethnic Japan. The presence of a Korean minority, through its difference, highlights the idea that Japan is constituted by ethnic Japanese. Distinct and visible *zainichi*, along with other groups, on the other hand, legitimates the ideal of ethnic diversity in Japan.

An increasing number of scholars have become attentive to invisible sub-populations among *zainichi* often searching for alternative policies regarding naturalization.[6] Chikako Kashiwazaki (2000b), Kuraishi Ichirō (2000a), Mitsushi Sugihara (1993) and Eika Tai (2004) describe notable moves among Japanese of Korean descent who contest authentic and nation-bound Japaneseness, as well as Koreanness, by asserting Koreanness while maintaining Japanese nationality. These studies challenge the stereotypical portrait of Japanese of Korean descent who assimilate and reject their Korean ancestry in order to join the Japanese mainstream (e.g., Fukuoka 2000: 54–55).

Nevertheless, these studies infrequently incorporate the perspectives of organizationally inactive individuals. They focus on groups such as *Minzokumei o*

torimodosu kai (Association for Reclaiming Ethnic Names, hereafter Torimodosu-kai) and *Paramu no kai* (Wind Society)(See Chapter 5).[7] The activities of these groups are not well known among *zainichi*. Members of these groups selectively identify or reinvent Koreanness, which allows them to be fit neatly within a pluralist frame. Their voices thus find their way into mainstream academic discourse. Although some studies include the voices of unorganized Japanese of Korean descent (e.g., Fukuoka 2000; Sasaki 2003), those who express commitment one way or another to ethnic politics and organized ethnic movements are given more frequent representation.

By examining the invisible diaspora, this chapter questions an ideal-typical distinction between the ethnic and the diasporic, exploring the convergence between the racial and the diasporic. According to Tölölyan (1996: 14), diasporic peoples maintain intensive communal commitment to and connection with the homeland and other dispersed co-ethnic communities, rather than having merely sporadic, individual commitments. A diasporic population, however, is not always unified in terms of political commitment (as Tölölyan himself argues); individual and sporadic commitments may be more ethnic than diasporic. How individuals and groups understand themselves depends on the ways in which host societies receive them and the ways in which they interpret such conditions (Clifford 1997; Safran 2004). Naturalized Japanese of Korean descent do not always identify themselves as part of Korean diasporic politics. Nonetheless, is it possible that they engage in everyday resistance and challenge the hegemony of the Japanese legal system and social norms, which together define authentic membership in the Japanese nation-state? The following section introduces six cases of Japanese of colonial Korean descent.

Naturalized Japanese of Colonial Korean Descent: Six Cases

During my intermittent fieldtrips both to the Kantō and Kansai regions between 1998 and 2002, I interviewed 90 *zainichi* (45 Japanese and 45 non-Japanese). I also participated in events organized by different groups. I attempted to contact respondents through a snowball sample with diversified entry points. My snowball did not roll; although I asked interviewees to introduce me to someone, I rarely established another meeting, which was especially the case with Japanese nationals of Korean (or part-Korean) descent. I tried to reach organizationally inactive individuals as much as possible and did not use homeland, state-based organizational channels (e.g., Chongryun or Mindan). Each interview took approximately two-and-a-half to three hours. The interviews were conducted in Japanese, audiotaped, and transcribed. Some interviews had follow-up correspondence. I selected the following six cases based on gender (three male and three female) and different patterns of name use. I conducted the interviews with these six informants in 1999 and 2000. The translations into English are mine.

All six people have Japanese nationality. Four of them naturalized as minors because of their parents' naturalization. One followed her husband's decision. One chose independently to naturalize. The interviewees' ages ranged between 22 and 41 at the time of the interview, and they are all 2.5 or later generations. Their class backgrounds and educational attainment vary. None of them received full-time Korean schooling, but some had limited exposure to *zainichi* empowerment education within or outside school. None actively associate with *zainichi* or Korean diasporic politics. They are not actively engaged in local or state Japanese politics. None are active in conventional *zainichi* expatriate

organizational politics, whether the pro-Pyongyang Chongryun or the pro-Seoul Mindan. While they all experience some moments in which their membership in Japanese society is marked as inconsistent and contingent, even precarious, the ways they cope with their *zainichi* background vary.

Following a brief description of the profiles of the six cases, I first discuss their responses across different (yet overlapping) themes, specifically focusing on their expressions of Korean roots in name usage. Name usage is the most intriguing point of reference, in that *zainichi*, regardless of nationality, can control the extent of their visibility by employing certain names in everyday use. Each case illustrates examples of minority "cultural logic" (cf. Ong 1999), indicating ways in which minority members accommodate and resist mainstream norms and racial stratification.

Second, I will introduce an illuminating case of the intergenerational transmission of *zainichi* routes, i.e., a family history of migration. In so doing, I point to a cleavage between a personalized immigrant family saga and the collective memory of diaspora; individual narratives of creating or reinventing *zainichi* routes can become isolated from any collective aspect of the group's past—be it suffering or resistance. Following a discussion of their fundamentally apolitical stances while indicating some critical awareness of the status quo, I shall return to the question of what makes invisible diasporas diasporic.

Chō Akio (b. 1963, third generation) was naturalized two months before our interview. In his family, he is the only one—so far—who has been naturalized. Akio works for a research institute while pursuing a professional degree. He naturalized primarily because "[i]t was so unnatural—I was born here, Japanese is my first language, and I don't know anything

about Korea, and I am legally (South) Korean? Don't you think that's very strange?" He is not involved in *zainichi* politics or activism and had never heard of Torimodosu-kai (Chapter 5) whose members successfully sued in family court for the retrieval of their Korean (and Korean-pronounced) names, names that the Japanese legal system had replaced when Koreans became naturalized. His sole experience with *zainichi* empowerment education was compulsory participation in a series of seminars and lectures sponsored by a politically neutral Korean organization so he could receive college and graduate school stipends. When he naturalized, he chose his Korean last name, pronounced *Chō* in Japanese—*Chang* in Korean—and his Japanese-pronounced given name over the Korean-pronounced Myeong-Nam. It was simply the matter of continuity; Akio switched from his family's Japanese-style name, Nagata, to his Korean legal name, Chō, but using the Japanese pronunciation, when he entered university. Akio's undergraduate institution had a policy to use *zainichi* students' Korean names instead of Japanese-style names. Had his university not forced him to do so, he never would have activated his Korean last name, he admits. His name change was a result of institutional reinforcement rather than individual choice.

Pak Fumiko (b. 1963, 2.5 generation, father born in Korea) was naturalized with her parents and siblings when she was a high-school senior. Fumiko and her family naturalized primarily to enable Fumiko's elder brother to find employment more easily after high school, although the naturalization procedure took longer than anticipated (they had to file twice in ten years; the first application was rejected). Although her father's siblings were active in the pro–North Korean Chongryun, Fumiko's family switched allegiance to South Korea following the 1965 Normalization Treaty (which guaranteed permanent residency among South Koreans, as detailed in the introduction to this volume). By the time the family

naturalized, her parents were too old to enroll in the national pension plan. Fumiko supports her parents fully by working as a contract-based office clerk. About five years before I met her, she began using her Korean family name, Pak, in private, sending all her friends a postcard explaining the change. On choosing her name Pak (Korean; Boku in Japanese) Fumiko (Japanese; Moon-Ja in Korean), she explains: "I don't speak the language [Korean] so I liked my given name pronounced in Japanese." At her workplace, where her yearly contract-based employment is without guarantee of renewal, she uses her Japanese-style family name Kimura, now her legal name. She never used her Korean name when she was legally Korean. She switched her last name back to Korean in her private life to be explicit about her *zainichi* background. She wanted acquaintances, especially those who might become close or intimate, to know her background from the onset. Although she and her parents were never active in Korean organizations, Fumiko read widely on the topic during her twenties.

Saitō Dae-Won (b. 1974, fourth generation) naturalized when he was a high school freshman with his parents and siblings. It was primarily to aid his elder brother's employment opportunities that his parents decided to naturalize. His brother, a graduate of a reputable four-year college, received an offer from a major Japanese firm before the family's naturalization application was approved: "So, in the end, our family's naturalization wasn't necessary after all. But for his future promotion or other opportunities, perhaps it was not a bad move. I myself do not care whether I have Japanese nationality or not. But I wish I had a choice—I did not have any reason to oppose it, and I did not have any knowledge to go for it either." The last name Saitō was chosen upon naturalization because it was more authentically Japanese than their former Japanese-style alias, which signaled the family's

Korean origin. Some of his relative used to call him Dae-Won as a child, but his mother called him Hiro-kun. Dae-Won went to a high school that had a constant enrollment of *zainichi* students, and a committed Japanese teacher encouraged *zainichi* students to switch to Korean names. After completing a vocational school where he used his Korean name, Kang Dae-Won, rather than his legal (Japanese) name, and after working at several odd jobs, Dae-Won now works for a medium-sized Japanese company as a sales representative. His business card displays his legal Japanese name, Saitō Hiromoto, although he continues to use Dae-Won as a nickname.

Kuremoto Nami (b. 1958, 2.5 generation, father born in Korea) naturalized with her husband and children about five years before I interviewed her. Among those I describe here, she is the only person married and with children. She had been a full-time homemaker but had just started working part-time at the time of the interview. She worked to save for her children's education and perhaps to travel. Her husband, a third-generation *zainichi*, works for a large computer technology firm, having receiving a college degree from a prestigious institution, and makes a comfortable living. They live in a suburban detached house. Her father was strict and never allowed her or her sisters to attend coed schools. Trips and sleepovers were out of the question. He considered marrying his daughters to fellow Koreans as his supreme mission. So, Nami wants her children to travel outside of Japan. Her husband considered naturalization first, after his work began to involve overseas business trips. He was using his Japanese-style name at work and elsewhere, and he felt it inconvenient to carry a passport with his legal Korean name. They decided to keep her husband's Japanese-style name as their legal name after naturalization. Nami, who attended several Mindan-organized events, including a trip to South Korea, a rare event her father let her participate in, thought:

"Kuremoto, to me, is apparently Korean! But my husband was not so aware of that."

Sokuhō Ikkyō (b. 1978, 2.5 generation, mother is not *zainichi* but a recent immigrant from South Korea where his father met her when he studied there) was born a Japanese national; his parents naturalized before he was born. His father, a Buddhist priest, created a new family name when the family naturalized. Ikkyō was a college junior when I interviewed him. He heard that both his grandfather and his parents naturalized for their children and grandchildren so that their life chances would not be affected by nationality differences. Ikkyō fully agrees with their idea. His first and last names are uncommon among Japanese, but his position as a son of a Buddhist priest, a follower of tradition, makes him appear more Japanese than the Japanese; his mother, whose Japanese is impressively accentless for a nonnative speaker, is a Korean from South Korea. Ikkyō's father leads two temples in separate locations: one is rural, passed on from his master, and serves the local Japanese, and the other is urban, serving *zainichi*. Although Ikkyō has used only one name from birth, he switches between a Japanese and *zainichi* persona, depending on the context. When Ikkyō participated in a Mindan-organized summer school for *zainichi* students visiting South Korea, a very rare occasion for him to get in touch with a *zainichi* organization, he asked the organizer to change his name badge to his family's Korean name, Ko, because he did not want to stand out from other *zainichi* members with Korean names.

Yamagami Mika (b. 1974, fourth generation), [already introduced at the beginning of this chapter,] said she was not sure whether her parents naturalized before or after she was born. She has never seen her family registry. Even if she had seen it, the details of naturalization might have been unclear without tracing the records. She never heard the

details of why her parents naturalized and why her great-grandparents came to Japan. She graduated from a prestigious women's college and was working as a contract-based administrative assistant in a large Japanese company at the time of the interview. When the bubble economy burst, her age cohort, especially women, experienced difficulty finding employment. She describes herself as a *nanchatte* (fake) *zainichi*,[8] by which she means: "Well, I happen to be a *zainichi*, but not exactly—I do not know anything about it, sorry!" Mika's parents put her on the *zainichi* marriage market for a while, hoping to find someone of *zainichi* background with Japanese nationality. That was Mika's only contact with other *zainichi*, although one of her high-school classmates is a *zainichi* who used her Korean name. Mika learned that she is a fourth-generation *zainichi* when she was putting together materials to arrange her marriage. It was then that she first heard her parents' Korean last names and place of origin (she could not recall her father's Korean family name, but she remembered her mother's because it sounded "just funny"). Both Mika and her parents opted out of the *zainichi* marriage market when they realized that the families of *zainichi* men rarely exchanged photographs and the background information letter [*tsurigaki*] about family members, education, employment, hobbies, and the like. The lack of reciprocity made Mika and her parents feel prospects were bleak for meeting another *zainichi* who would treat her with fairness and respect.

Zainichi Signaling: Reinventing Korean Roots in Name Usage

For Japan-born Koreans educated in the Japanese school system, names are the only marker signaling their Korean origin. Leonard Plotnicov and Myrna Silverman define "ethnic signaling" as "the effort people make to find and express shared social and cultural attributes

in order to enhance the basis for their relationship" (1978: 407). Korean signaling in Japan, however, is aimed at the Japanese majority, rather than at fellow *zainichi*. Whereas *zainichi* use of Japanese aliases allows them to blend in with the Japanese in everyday social encounters, *zainichi* use of Korean names in Japanese public spaces and conversations has the opposite effect, allowing them to stand out, with or without possible disruptions in social exchanges (see also the introduction to this volume). Some (not all) Japanese of Korean descent would rather express their ethnic Korean roots to selective audiences only, precisely because they are now officially Japanese, and, therefore, their national affiliation to the Japanese state is no longer questionable. Akio, Fumiko, and Dae-Won use this strategy, but Akio is the only person who has a legal last name signaling non-Japanese origin (Nami's last name, Kuremoto, may signal Koreanness as well, but not to everybody). Akio vividly recalled at the beginning of our interview:

> When I was granted Japanese nationality, I went to pick up the certificate; you have to go to the local bureau of the Ministry of Justice in person. There were about thirty people who were there to receive the naturalization certificate. Whenever a person's name was called, he or she would stand up and proceed to receive the paper with a bow and the bureaucrat handing the form would say "Congratulations." When my name was called—"*Chō-san, Chō Akio san!*"—every single person in the room turned around to see me! I was the only one whose family name didn't sound Japanese.

Seen from a more conventional majority point of view, having an unusual name is a nuisance in any society. Akio thinks had he been in business, he would have chosen a Japanese-sounding name. He is a researcher and consultant; expressions of individuality are more likely to be accepted. But he is reminded of his different status in everyday life. For

example, each time he mentions his name on the phone, he has to repeat it, spelling it several times. He is often told how well he speaks Japanese. Regardless, Akio thinks: “It’s easier to communicate my background at the beginning [of social encounters]. At least, my name gives people a chance to ask me if I am a Korean or some kind of foreigner, although some people don’t ask about it at all.”

Even for Akio, whose legal last name is Korean, it is difficult to be consistent in everyday life. For example, his landlord asked him not to put Chō on his apartment’s mailbox: “I guess he did not want other tenants to be aware that he rents his apartment to a Korean.” His landlord would not allow the mailbox to be blank, so he used his Japanese-style name Nagata, which he had not used since entering college. He did not insist, being overwhelmed by other routine matters in his life: “I could have argued with him, or looked for another apartment. But I was in a rush and it was too much trouble. The landlord lives right next to me, and I run into him so often. I don’t want to have an issue with him.”

He is not married and thinks it more likely that he will meet a Japanese woman. He is not sure what he will do if his future spouse rejects his family name when naming their child. The option of his future children using his Japanese mother’s last name, against almost universal patrilineal naming conventions, would mean that he might be the last generation to use his once-lost-then-retrieved Korean name.

Among those whose legal names are Japanese-style, situational uses of Korean names are not solely based on personal preference. Both Fumiko and Dae-Won use their Korean names in their personal lives (Fumiko her Korean family name, and Dae-Won his Korean given name as a nickname). Both Fumiko and Dae-Won want their friends to know them well,

and they prefer names that communicate their *zainichi* background. Fumiko feels strongly the need to clarify her Korean lineage. She experienced a stressful end to her relationship with a Japanese boyfriend, who, owing to her Japanese name, did not know her *zainichi* background:

> When I told him that I naturalized, he did not really understand what it meant. Even after he talked to his parents about me, he still did not get it. His parents were not happy about their son dating a *zainichi.* It was not surprising at all to me, but it was new to him. We never talked about marriage—we were both young. So I explained to him, "Many *zainichi* marry Japanese nowadays, but not every couple is celebrated by both families." But still he didn't understand what it really meant. He was not interested in understanding the situation. On the other hand, he did not assure me that it didn't matter to him. In the end, he just said, "Well you'd better not speak up about it [having *zainichi* background]." I thought he was hopeless. Anyway, I thought it would be easier to let anyone I would be going out with know from the very beginning that I am *zainichi.*

Conversely, Dae-Won's experience is related to his connection with *zainichi* empowerment education and *zainichi* informal networks. He has been using his Korean name since he met a concerned Japanese high-school teacher who encouraged *zainichi* students to use Korean names at school. Dae-Won has many *zainichi* friends and acquaintances, and he is accustomed to be called by his Korean first name. He does not actively bring up his naturalization in front of his *zainichi* acquaintances.

Both Fumiko and Dae-Won chose not to use their Korean names at work. The paperwork involving taxes, pension plans, and health insurance conventionally uses legal names. In addition, the content of their work (Dae-Won's sales work requires a name easy to remember) or the form of employment (Fumiko works on temporary contract, afraid of

introducing any factors that might affect her contract renewal)[9] influenced their name choice at work.

Akio, Fumiko, and Dae-Won are exceptional; the vast majority of *zainichi*, naturalized or not, use Japanese-style names. Even after the Ministry of Justice's naturalization guidelines ceased recommending Japanese-style names, choosing an ethnically signaling name has been uncommon among East Asians, as is illustrated by Akio's experience upon picking up his naturalization certificate.

When family names do not communicate Korean roots, mundane situations and random social encounters often raise the issue of when, how, and to whom to explain Korean roots. In Nami's case, she followed her husband's naming decision. Their Japanese name could possibly signal their *zainichi* origin to those who know *zainichi* names and typical aliases well. However, "in person, people never ask if we are Korean," and Nami dares not advertise her and her husband's Korean roots and naturalization to her neighbors or recent acquaintances. From early childhood, Nami revealed her Korean roots only to very close friends, even though many local Japanese knew the family's Korean origin because her father used to run a Korean barbecue restaurant. She never thought of marrying a Japanese man: "I thought, it's impossible because all the family and relatives would be against it." Because her parents insisted that she and her sisters not go out with Japanese men, she never dated any and so never faced the problem of revealing her background in an intimate relationship. Even with her rather unusual Japanese last name, Nami and her husband's Korean roots are in the closet. Many *zainichi*, like Nami, lack painful memories of being discriminated against, such as being bullied at school. Fear of discrimination, however, has framed their subconscious

concealment of *zainichi* roots (Fukuoka 2000). Japanese neighbors and friends would never ask them if they are *zainichi*, either, because, according to Nami, "it is something you cannot bring up in person."

Ikkyō and Mika, though much younger, have a similar approach to revealing their Korean roots. They tell only those who are very close to them, and even in some fairly close long-term friendships they have yet to bare their Korean roots. If Mika and Ikkyō hear prejudiced utterances from friends who think they are Japanese, they neither embarrass them nor point out their prejudice. But such individuals will have failed Mika and Ikkyō's trustworthiness test, and they will never come out to them unless they have to.

Ikkyō is very outgoing and has maintained close friendships with his middle-school classmates. Some of them are his best friends. I asked if they all knew of his *zainichi* background. He told me that one of his best friends did not know, or, at least, Ikkyō had never mentioned his Korean roots to him. While he told me, at first, that he did not have an opportunity to say anything, Ikkyō later recalled his friend's utterance of a racial slur against Koreans. Ikkyō defended his friend, stating that he did not mean anything serious because he simply did not know anything about *zainichi*. Whenever Ikkyō starts dating someone, most often Japanese-Japanese, he explains:

> At least, I will wait for several months, figuring that if the relationship works out, then I will tell her that I am originally a [South] Korean. [Why?] Well, my family name is [Japanese-sounding] Sokuhō and I am a son of a Buddhist priest running a temple, and she would definitely think I am absolutely Japanese from a family of respectable, proper lineage [*yuisho tadashii ie*]; then I would feel as if I am lying. So I would tell [my Korean roots] at some point, but not right at the moment I meet someone.

While outspoken and proud of his Korean roots and his father's philosophy, being part of a *zainichi* family is a deviation from his image of a respectable Japanese family. His legal Japaneseness does not mean authentic Japaneseness, especially when it comes to a steady relationship.

Mika recently had a female-bonding dinner with three Japanese friends (two of whom knew Mika's *zainichi* background) to celebrate one of the women's having recently found a boyfriend; they called the dinner a victory celebration [*shukushōkai*], a deliberately ironic use of wartime terminology. When her friend mentioned her new boyfriend's name, the one who did not know Mika's *zainichi* family background said, "What an unusual name! What if he is a Korean?" and laughed, pretending that her comment was just a joke. Mika recalled: "You should have been there, Youngmi-san. Two of my friends who know I am *zainichi* totally froze! We, kind of, had eye contact, my friends not knowing what to do. The rest of dinner went on as if nothing had happened and nobody brought up anything not to embarrass the one who really didn't mean to say anything possibly offensive."

Ikkyō's and Mika's handling of their Korean roots illustrates well the reality that belies the official high proportion of cross-national marriage statistics. Lineage, not legal nationality, still matters in committed relationships and marriage, even among Japanese of colonial Korean descent who have assimilated culturally, socioeconomically and legally, and who have outgoing, fun-loving personalities. There are some moments when their otherwise comfortable lives become complicated [*yayakoshii*], in Mika's word.

The name usage of these six individuals indicates the presence of external pressures

(both direct and indirect) either to pass or to differentiate. The expression of Korean roots is far from tension-free or constant because the messages conveyed by name choices pinpoint the moments of inclusion and exclusion (or the fear of exclusion). Even carefree young people like Ikkyō and Mika, who are often interested in settling down in a committed relationship, are very careful and strategic in communicating their roots, especially having encountered racist remarks.

The Japanese Horatio Alger Story: Reinventing *Zainichi* Routes

As generations are born and age, details of families' *zainichi* routes, the trajectory and context of migration, tend to be lost. Moreover, more than *zainichi* routes, Korean roots have often been completely sealed. Some learn their (partial) Korean background as adults. Some parents were naturalized before their children were born, or one of the parents was naturalized before getting married to a Japanese. In those cases, the smooth transmission of Korean roots and *zainichi* routes is unlikely. Where the roots are known to children, they themselves may refrain from asking their parents the details, and if the parents are not getting along or the parent-child relation is full of tension, the overall lack of conversation inside the family may contribute to the obliteration of roots and routes.

Among the cases I have been discussing, Nami is the only one who has children and has been concerned with explaining her family's naturalization. For her, the emphasis was on how to put it in a positive light. Three years before I met Nami, she revealed to her children their Korean roots, remembering in vivid details how it went. The following is her account, which is worth quoting at length:

My husband and I had talked about telling the children [about their Korean origin] at some point, but we had never discussed in detail when or how to do that. It was in the middle of summer vacation. The oldest was in the sixth grade. All the children were at home during the day with me. It just came to me that I should explain [that the family naturalized] to the oldest one because he was to attend middle school in the following spring and he would start thinking about many complex things as he was reaching puberty. It just came to me out of the blue. So I called all the children. The middle one was in the third grade and the youngest was still at kindergarten, and I thought the younger ones might not fully understand it. I wasn't sure how to begin—I tried not to be overly serious; I tried to be casual and natural, just one of these things. They were all eating ice cream as they heard me talk. I first thought about explaining to each child when he was old enough to understand abstract things, but I also felt it strange to call up each child at a different time. The first one has a rather sensitive personality, and I also thought the explanation should be put in a way so that he was not shocked to hear of the family's roots. I first took out my passport and my husband's, showing them I said, "These are passports we used when we all went to Hawai'i, remember? You can also have passports but you were all very young so you are all listed in Mommy's passport, here you see your names. When we go abroad, we use the passports to prove that we are all Japanese. Here you see, it says, 'Japan.'" And next, I told them the story of one of the Doraemon[10] movies. Among different Doraemon movie episodes, there is the one called, *Nippontanjō* [The birth of Japan]. It explains that long time ago, the islands of Japan were geographically connected with China and Korea [*kankoku;* South Korea], and the story is situated in the prehistoric era. It says we all might share the same ancestry or something like that. A long time ago, everything [Japan, China and Korea] was connected and there was no border. . . . Then, I asked the children if they have noticed something different when we all visit the grandparents during summer vacation and New Year holidays. "Then we eat together and you play with your cousins, right? Have you noticed something a bit different, say, from your friends' house?" And the children all said, "Mmm, no idea." So I asked them, "What about the language Grandpa speaks? What about food?" And the middle one said, "I got it!" So I thought she would bring up *kimchi* or something like that. But she said, "Grandpa at Mommy's runs a pancake house, but Grandpa at Daddy's doesn't do anything!" I thought, "Ugh!" but I said, "That's true, well, but didn't you notice Grandpa sometimes speaks another language than Japanese?" Well, my father used to speak Korean a lot, but he now only uses some words sporadically. So it was not surprising that the children did not notice anything at all. . . . Then I brought back the story to

> the passport. “You see, these are Japanese passports so we are all Japanese,” I pointed. I went on, “But Grandpa and Grandma are [South] Koreans. Mommy and Daddy were also [South] Koreans at first. But Grandma, Mommy and Daddy were all born in Japan, and Grandpa used to live in Korea when he was very young but he has been living in Japan, running restaurants, you see?” Then, I went back to the Doraemon story, “As you saw in the Doraemon movie, likewise, South Korea, Grandpa’s country, and Japan used to be the same country. After the war was over, the two countries became separate again, but Grandpa used to be in South Korea and it’s true that he is South Korean.” I skipped the complicated part, but I told them like that.

Nami asked if they all understood the story and asked the oldest child if he was “shocked.” The children said they more or less understood, and the oldest one said he was not shocked. Nami was worried that the children already had negative images about (South) Korea. She assured her children that they did not have to feel negative about (South) Korea no matter what was reported on the TV news. She reminded her children of their grandfather’s achievements: “Grandpa came to Japan all by himself and built up that big restaurant. Not every Japanese could have done that, even with a college degree. He deserves respect. He came to Japan to study, but was cheated and ended up working in a coal mine in Hokkaido. He is a self-made man and truly extraordinary.”

Nami’s message to her children is that having Korean roots is something to be proud of, to feel good about. However, she added a cautionary note at the end of the long conversation with her children: “‘But you don’t have to tell your friends that you are Korean,’ I told them. Because bullying was really a major problem at school, I was worried about it. So I told them not to tell their friends directly.” Because the transmission of Korean roots and *zainichi* routes had to be a positive and easy-to-swallow story, the resulting narrative was consciously selective, especially about Japan’s colonization of Korea. The

problematic beginning of the individual migration history—Nami's father being deceived about being able to study in Japan, eventually being sent to a coal mine in Hokkaido—is obscured in the classic and universal immigrant legend of a man self-made through efforts and perseverance. Nami reinvented *zainichi* routes in a Japanese Horatio Alger story, a story of an immigrant's personal achievement against all odds.

The experiences of Japanese nationals of colonial Korean descent I have examined point to everyday challenges in expressing and communicating Korean roots and *zainichi* routes. Having Korean roots is still exceptional in Japanese society, where ever-increasing registered foreign residents still constituted only 1.69 percent of the population in 2007 (Japan Ministry of Justice 2008: 1) and the annual average cases of granted naturalization between 1998 and 2007 was only 15,400 out of 127 million Japanese (computed from Japan Ministry of Justice 2007). The lure of blending in without challenging or subverting the Japanese national landscape might surpass the urge to exercise multiple belongings, except in very personal narratives. Assimilation while maintaining diasporic identity (Siu 2001) in this way becomes a challenge to ordinary Japanese of colonial Korean descent.

Nonetheless, one important factor in deciding whether to reveal one's Korean background or to use a Korean name is racism or the fear of racism, no matter how benign this Japanese brand of racism may seem. What made Fumiko decide to use her Korean name to reveal her Korean roots was related to the everyday concern of finding a potential spouse: lineage matters.

An Apolitical Truce of Mind: Personalized Invisible Diasporic Consciousness

Signaling Korean roots by name usage—which implies being socially a full-time Korean—itself does not automatically result in politically meaningful *zainichi* networking. For example, Akio, whose legal name is Korean (albeit with a Japanese pronunciation), has some *zainichi* acquaintances, but he has no interest in politics, whether local, national, or global, either Korean or Japanese. He is not particularly interested in getting to know other *zainichi*, either. His name is a matter of individual choice, and he does not attach any significant sociopolitical meaning to it—such as becoming a role model for other *zainichi*. Without imagining oneself to be part of the *zainichi* community, be it on the national, ethnic, or expatriate level, how can an individual like Akio be diasporic?

Ikkyō appreciates the opportunity he had during the Mindan student tour to South Korea to get to know people outside his neighborhood and school. He maintains friendships with his *zainichi* middle-school classmates and those whom he got to know on the tour. He, however, declines frequent invitations to recreational events organized by Mindan's youth organization, commenting: "I would say to myself, 'Don't you guys have anyone but [South] Korean friends!?'"Akio and Ikkyō are not the only ones uninterested in expanding their *zainichi* network. In this section, I discuss what I see as apolitical, unorganized diasporic consciousness.

Until very recently, Mika did not learn about her family's Korean name, which she could not even recall when I asked her; she has no way of and no interest in socially signaling her Korean roots with her name. She describes herself as totally apolitical; being *zainichi* is something complicated [*yayakoshii*], and she is not interested in dealing with it.

Neither interested in Japanese national or local politics, she rarely votes in elections, unlike some naturalized Japanese who would never miss voting because voting rights are restricted to and the privilege of Japanese nationals. She told me after the interview that she had fun meeting with me, although she was reluctant at first to talk with me, a *zainichi* with a Korean-pronounced name, who approached her through an acquaintance's introduction. She said she had imagined someone who was stern and would preach to her about *zainichi* matters.

Even the self-proclaimed apolitical Mika has some empathy toward Korean issues. She sent me an e-mail several months later:

> Have you seen [on TV] a recent reunion of Korean families who were separated in South and North [Korea]? When I saw the news on TV, the families holding each other crying, I was so moved and almost about to cry. But then, my grandmother (second generation) who was at the dinner table with us, said to the TV screen, "overreacting! [*Qgesana!*]" and she burst into laughter "*gahahaha* . . ." at which I was so surprised that my tears dried up instantly! Well, I knew she had rather an unemotional nature to begin with, but I was shocked how detached she was.

Diasporic identification with Korean homeland matters can be blown up by the sanction of close family members who are emotionally less attached. A scene of a naturally moving moment of family reunification marks how unnatural any emotional association with the lost homeland can become. Mika's everyday life goes on without a fully activated diasporic identity, although here and there she faces some awkward moments associated with her ex-*zainichi* status, which would clearly make her identity different from her Japanese-Japanese friends.

Like Mika, Nami is at a distance from "difficult things" (her words). Her suburban motherhood requires her engagement in the Parent Teacher Association at her children's schools. While other mothers make up excuses not to attend the meetings, Nami attends meetings involving a larger unit of several school districts. At one event—a lecture and roundtable discussion for teachers and parents about the *dōwa* problem[11]—Nami broke out of her routine: "I usually do not say anything at the meetings. But at that time, only once, I spoke out that everybody was taking in the abstract. I said, 'Only those who experienced being discriminated against can understand the pain of being discriminated against.' I didn't say anything about my *zainichi* background at all. I could have, but I didn't. But I just could not stop expressing my opinion there."

Nami's comment there is connected with her personal experience as a *zainichi*. But her expression was not in the first person and was abstract enough that her speaking up did not bring attention to her own circumstance. Although Nami's breaking the silence here did not lead to any political awakening, as with Mika, Nami's overall lack of consciousness of any national or diasporic (Japanese, Korean, or Korean expatriate) political causes does not necessarily mean that her identity is identical with that of an average Japanese.

The people I have introduced in this chapter indicate a variety of ways in which naturalized Japanese of Korean descent reinvent and renegotiate their *zainichi* origins and their reasons for existence in Japan. It is intriguing to me that these nonorganized individuals take up with *zainichi* roots and routes typically when they are aware of or concerned with potential exclusion on the basis of family lineage. Such fear of exclusion is not framed as racism in their minds. This underdeveloped consciousness about racism among naturalized

Japanese of Korean descent, or *zainichi* passing as Japanese, is imprinted through the accumulated small conversational and interactive episodes with Japanese-Japanese who do not necessarily have clearly malicious intentions.

Ien Ang, a Peranakan Chinese (of premodern migrant Chinese origin in Indonesia) who was born in Indonesia, grew up in the Netherlands, and resides in Australia, questions her imposed Chineseness, declaring: "[I]f I am inescapably Chinese by *descent,* I am only sometimes Chinese by *consent.* When and how is a matter of politics" (Ang 2001: 36, original emphasis). Imposed identities, however, often restrict the kind and nature of politics involved. Becoming Korean or *zainichi* by consent seems not really an option, if we consider how the reinvented roots and routes are the product of socially constraining milieus in the guise of sheer personal options and individual circumstances. The reinvention of Korean roots and *zainichi* routes is challenged by the mundane and individual. Nevertheless, as we have glimpsed, the mundanity of these individuals is overcast by a shadow of diasporic displacement, overtly or covertly.

The six individuals I have discussed do not imagine themselves part of the *zainichi* diaspora. Korean roots are something to be proud of, or even fun, as Dae-Won and Ikkyō mentioned several times during the interview. *Zainichi* routes are contained in accommodative, optimistic, and persuasive stories, as when Nami reinvented her multigenerational family experience. Her father's rise from humble beginnings, overcoming numerous hurdles including once blatant racism against Koreans, is an exemplary immigrant success story. These six stories illustrate ambivalent and awkward moments, which distinguish our protagonists from their friends whose Japanese lineage confers on them an

unconditional, authentic Japanese identity, a secure patria that is literally a “home land.” These interviewees, all Japanese by nationality, have not found a secure “home land” in their country of birth and residence over generations. Despite rarely identifying with their *zainichi* background, they are aware of subtle exclusion from the authentic national community. Their apolitical stance embraces ambiguities and burgeoning, unshaped, and isolated political discontent.

Assimilation, Race, and Diaspora Revisited

Particular subgroups—minority intellectuals, especially—can more freely exercise their identity options than others (Tölölyan 1996: 16–17). The identity options for Akio, Fumiko, Nami, Dae-Won, Ikkyō, and Mika are optional in their minds, but their choices are influenced by their own mindsets, which subconsciously maintain a fear of exclusion on the basis of lineage in the contemporary Japanese context. The race question is frequently mentioned in diaspora literature in combination with various sources of oppression such as gender, sexuality, disability, and class. Race remains a significant source of discrimination in ordinary people’s everyday life, whether in blatant, institutional forms or benign, symbolic ones (Winant 2001). Race, however, whether represented as phenotypical difference or encoded as lineage, seems to be losing its force as a source of alienation in the host society.[12]

Miri Song suggests that identity choices and claims have structural and cultural, obvious and subtle restraints: “Individuals can be creative about the ways they negotiate their identities, although this creativity is bounded by their resources and their location in specific social and historical times and places” (Song 2003: 55). Theorizing globalization and

diaspora carries liberating tones, but it pays little attention to the factors that restrict people's experiences of identity and consciousness, factors that are more often than not bound to localities within the nation-state (Song 2003: 118).[13]

No matter what alternative identity claims are made, whether we prefer diaspora, hybridity, or transnationality over ethnic, national or racial identities, there always exists double-edgedness (i.e., contradictory elements of emancipation and oppression) and the threat of reification; the logic of inclusion and exclusion reproduces itself (Siu 2001, Ang 2003). Diasporic identity is no more unconditional in hierarchically structured ethnic groups than racialized identity in plural societies (Song 2003).

Diaspora, as a theoretical tool, challenges conventional teleological explanations of the trajectory of migrant groups, pointing out that tamed ethnicities thrive as do racialized hierarchical intergroup relations. Assimilation tends to be regarded as an inappropriate frame of reference, whereas identity politics has gained significance (Ang 2001: 9–11). No linear passage exists; racialized groups in the West can never be treated as authentic (Ang 2001: 9) and certain racialized groups, regardless of visibility, are considered unassimilable. In addition to such a response by the host society, immigrants themselves accommodate constraints. The intergenerational, gradual-incorporation model does not explain some racialized groups' strategic resistance to assimilation into dominant societal values in the United States (Alba and Nee 2003; Ong 1999; Waters 1999).

Assimilation, or adaptation of ethnicity behind the public display, is contingent on the negotiation of immigrant groups with host social structures and particular historical contexts (Alexander 2001) as well as those of the homeland (Ong 1999). Other groups, if they are

racially invisible, practice part-time, symbolic ethnicity, although even in an officially plural society ethnicity is possible only in a contained way (Ang 2001, Song 2003, Steinberg 1989). Naturalized Japanese of colonial descent may or may not reactivate their ethnic culture and network. But the turning point is not leisure but necessity when handling their concern for being excluded just because of otherwise almost obliterated lineage.

On the one hand, assimilation is inevitable not only because it is imposed but also because many individuals find it an attractive option. Both identification with diaspora and assimilation into the host society have certain appeal (Ang 2001: 28). Naturalization is a form of legal structural assimilation, cumbersome but convenient enough for surviving the "either-or" pressure on identity. On the other hand, active, wholehearted associations with Japanese society are alien to many Japanese individuals of colonial Korean descent because of a desire to be free of societal expectations attached to their Korean background or legal membership in Japan. Akio, Fumiko and Dae-Won's personal resistance is symbolized in their Korean-signaling name use. Even Nami, Ikkyō, and Mika, who seem more accommodative, address moments of invisible diaspora in the context of their fear of exclusion.

I have explored in this chapter the everyday challenge of maintaining invisible and personalized diasporic consciousness faced by those unconnected to organized and self-conscious, collective politics. Individual cases point to the obscured boundaries between diaspora in itself and diaspora for itself. The personal and invisible diaspora cannot be denied outright as totally assimilated (and thus nondiasporic). The apolitical *zainichi*, regardless of their legal inclusion in the Japanese nation-state, still face racism. They bear the social costs

attached to *zainichi*ness, even if they identify themselves only as ex-*zainichi.*

Of course, in the context of, say, the United States, national citizens may be able to claim more easily their diasporic origin and reality in that citizenship is not granted on the basis of the singularity of ethnicity and lineage. In Japan, however, the treatment of naturalized Koreans, despite their membership in Japan's national citizenry, is impregnated with nonacceptance and singling-out, involving racialization of both positive and negative lineage cults. In this way, naturalized former *zainichi* are classified as outside of both the Japanese national community and the conventional Korean diasporic communities in Japan. Their ongoing reality, however, inevitably and incessantly demands of them the choice or strategic disposal of their non-Japanese origin, in an identical way in which the ontology of diaspora is accentuated with the added sense of the loss of home.

Zainichi might identify with Koreanness beyond the confinement of nation-state boundaries even after they have acquired Japanese nationality and even though they stay away from politics and organizational commitment. Such expressions of *zainichi* diasporic identity are hampered and fostered simultaneously by the contemporary geopolitics of Japan and the neighboring Koreas, as well as many other intra- and intergroup factors. When the interests of nation states are in competition, *zainichi* are not considered a neutral party and Koreanness is not an apolitical, cost-free ethnicity or identity-marker in Japan.

So is the personal diasporic? It depends. The personal is not visibly diasporic. The classic model emphasizes communal and constant commitment to homeland issues. It distinguishes the diasporic from the ethnic (Tölölyan 1996: 14). But if the expressions of Korean roots and *zainichi* routes are individualized and compartmentalized in private life, the

distinction does not hold. Implicit fear of racism, for example, is fairly common among our six informants, although it remains remote from the political consciousness that a broader, structural arrangement affects personal troubles. The personal, however, can be invisibly diasporic. It is without clear collective and/or political consciousness. Moments of exclusion based on lineage, which make the naturalized aware of her or his inauthenticity, however, discourage active, wholehearted, and unconditional identification as Japanese.

Is, then, the diasporic racialized? Racialization in the contemporary Japanese context is the process of exclusion on the basis of imagined family lineage, which takes the form of subtle, invisible, and symbolic racism. The "paradox of oppression" (Lie 2003) indicates that symbolic racism generates intensifying protests. Racism against *zainichi* is now far more symbolic than during the colonial days, when *zainichi* themselves were more visible in language and other aspects despite their common phenotypes with ethnic Japanese. Naturalized Japanese of Korean descent have no structural barriers to block their holding public office or participation in electoral politics. They resist the arbitrarily drawn boundaries between the Japanese and the Korean. However, the segment of *zainichi* whose exposure to racism is the most symbolic because of their Japanese nationality remains silent. The unanswered question is, *for whom* is the personal diasporic? The cleavage between unorganized, atomized individuals and the proponents and critiques of diaspora is getting wider and deeper.

Endnotes:

[1] The names of interviewees have been changed to protect their privacy. Following their preferences, I have assigned them Korean- or Japanese-pronounced pseudonyms, where appropriate.

[2] Here Mika refers to a *zainichi* e-mail discussion group, which she joined briefly.

[3] My use of the term "post-stateless" derives from an intention to question a notion of *zainichi* statelessness that is too closely associated with legal status. Simultaneously, I am skeptical of a rather celebrated stateless condition linked with the obscuring of national boundaries by globalization and transnationalism (see, for example, the critiques in Ang 2001 and 2003; Foner 2001; Friedman 2002; Lie 2005; and Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). Although naturalized Japanese of Korean descent are post-stateless in a legal sense, they are still within the confinement of the nation-state.

[4] Clifford defines the attributes of diaspora, following William Safran, as "a history of dispersal, myths/memories of the homeland, alienation in the host (bad host?) country, desire for eventual return, ongoing support of the homeland, and a collective identity importantly defined by this relationship" (Clifford 1997: 247). For Clifford, Safran's model is based on the strong identification with (the return to) the homeland (the classic/phylogeny model in Ryang's typology) and thus "centered" and teleological. See also Agnew (2005: 3–4) for the emphasis on shared history, both of displacement and suffering, and of adaptation and resistance.

[5] Suzuki, in her study comparing the Korean diaspora in Japan and the United States, claims: "The focus on two diasporic groups, which are supposed to share a common cultural and ethnic origin, allows me to control the effect of culture, and to investigate how other factors, especially external factors affected their adaptation patterns" (2003: 309–310). I find the view to see "cultural and ethnic origin" as an essentialized component of diasporic groups, as does Suzuki, problematic. Sasaki (2003: ch. 8) has an interesting exploration of Chinese migrants to Japan via South Korea, although his conceptualization of diasporic seems overdependent on physical displacement.

[6] See Asakawa (2003), Harajiri (1998), Kashiwazaki (2000), Kuraishi (2000a), Sasaki (2003), Sugihara (1993), Takenoshita (2000) and Tai (2000, 2004).

[7] Neither group currently exists. *Minzokumei o torimodosu kai* dissolved in 1994, and *Paramu no kai* discontinued their monthly meetings around 2000 (personal communication).

[8] In Sagisawa Megumu's short story *Kokyō no haru* (Spring at home), the *zainichi* South Korean protagonist Kang-I-Sa describes his past as *nanchatte nihonjin* (pretended Japanese). Kang (last name) Kang-I-Sa (first name) was formerly known as Kyōyama Eiji, his Japanese alias. However, the first character of his Japanese family name, Kyōyama, reveals Koreanness, and his family's pretended Japaneseness is thus dubious (Sagisawa 2004: 118). Kang-I-Sa's father, a native speaker of Japanese, named him based on the Japanese pronunciation of Chinese characters and resulted in a very unthinkable, strange Korean name, when the characters are pronounced in Korean. He then preferred his Korean name precisely because of this unusualness. His Korean name reflects his *zainichi*, neither Korean nor Japanese, identity. Although Mika had not read Sagisawa's work and her description of being a *nanchatte zainichi* is coincidental, her use of *nanchatte zainichi* and Sagisawa's protagonist's use of *nanchatte nihonjin* share a blurring but unbreakable gap between the authentic and the quotidian meanings attached to a group category.

[9] Whether or not the employer prefers her Japanese name use is uncertain, for Fumiko never

tried bringing up the issue at contract renewal meetings.

[10] Doraemon is an animated character popular in Japan.

[11] *Dōwa* is a bureaucratic euphemism referring to the issues of the Burakumin, Japan's outcaste minority.

[12] Gilroy (2000: 6), in keeping with his vehement critique of "ethnic absolutism," proposes abandoning "race thinking." Racial categories are inadequate if too strong an association with phenotype or color persists. My concern with the race question is its invisibility when racial concepts are materialized in lineage.

[13] Diaspora and diasporic identity formations have been critiqued along several dimensions in terms of, first, directions of migratory movement and political commitment, second, double-edged implications, and, finally, identity options. See Siu (2001), Ang (2001, 2003), and Song (2003) for each dimension.

CHAPTER FIVE

Contested Meanings of Citizenship: Structural Assimilation and Beyond

The farther the Negro gets from his historical antecedents in time, the more tenuous become his conceptual ties, the emptier his social conceptions, the more superficial his visions.
———Harold Cruse (1984 [1967]: 565)

This chapter examines how membership in Japanese society is articulated in opinion pieces written by *zainichi* Korean intellectuals, and how they express their different orientations. The first half of this chapter examines several such pieces, contrasting the diverse arguments made by *zainichi* Koreans who have Japanese nationality or are in the process of becoming naturalized. Ideas of citizenship and civic participation continue to be debated, beyond legal and technical definitions of who is and who is not an authentic member of Japanese society. In everyday Japanese, there is conflation between the concepts of citizenship (*shiminken*) and nationality (*kokuseki*), and a convergence between notions of legal state membership and ethno-racial identity.[1]The prevalent interpretation of nationality among the Japanese views it as somewhat permanent (Lie 2001: 144-145). However, in the Constitution, and almost everywhere else—in statements by policy makers and in the mass media, for example—citizens are not referred to as *shimin* (literally "city people"), a term with connotations of grassroots politics, but rather as *kokumin* (literally "national people"). The terms *kokumin* and *kokuseki* no longer have connotations of *shinmin* (imperial subjects), but still denote "national subjects" when used in the context of polemic issues evoking questions of loyalty. As I will examine later, the term *shimin* itself is the object of mockery by the conservative media, suspicious of the left-wing, progressive inclinations implied by its grassroots connotations.

Strikingly contrasting political claims by minority voices fulfill the discursive needs of the Japanese mass media. Some argue for civic participation from a grassroots activist standpoint, incorporating a critical awareness of Japan's past as colonizer and aggressor and a realization that post-war democracy has conversely led to regressive moves toward greater levels of control over national subjects. They claim an inclusive definition of formal civic participation that allows resident foreigners to work as civil servants and at least participate in local electoral politics. Others adopt a restrictive definition of formal civic participation that defines official Japanese societal membership as being limited to holders of Japanese nationality.[2]

In the first section of this chapter, I will illustrate the ways in which *zainichi* Korean intellectuals debate Japanese societal membership through the rhetorical postures of strong dissent or hyper-conformity. In the second section, based on a series of in-depth interviews that I conducted, I incorporate the voices of less visible Korean-Japanese who distance themselves from debates in public fora. While I just used the term "Korean-Japanese," the term is contentious enough to challenge common sense, unstated assumptions about Japaneseness. Is becoming Korean-Japanese possible? Who becomes a hyphenated ethnic group in contemporary Japan? Despite the presence of *zainichi* Korean celebrities and South Korean pop stars in Japanese popular culture and the visible presence of *zainichi* Korean communities with cultural practices which are distinctively and sufficiently foreign (see Chapter 3), the vast majority of naturalized Japanese express their Korean lineage, and practice Korean customs only in their private lives (see Chapter 4).

Extracting outstanding examples of each type of claim, based on published materials as well as data drawn from my in-depth interviews, I will examine the contrasting approaches

taken by naturalized Japanese of colonial Korean descent: 1) the apolitical non-ethnic individual approach; 2) the politically compromised Korean-Japanese (*koria-kei nihonjin*) approach; and 3) the politically uncompromising legally-Japanese Korean (*nihonseki chōsenjin*) approach. I will explore to what extent it is possible to become Japanese without Japanese lineage while selectively accentuating one's Korean heritage. Assessing the potential for a socially acknowledged hyphenated Japaneseness, I will argue that seemingly different identity claims expressed by naturalized Japanese display a noteworthy level of convergence with existing yet understated ideological assumptions about what constitutes authentic Japaneseness. Whether by fulfilling discursive niches in Japanese society as minority members, or by expressing their Korean heritage to varying degrees as Japanese, the ways in which *zainichi* Koreans locate themselves in arenas of political debate reflect the reality of their segmented assimilation[3]into the Japanese system as part of the establishment, whether as a voiceless and apathetic mass, or as vocal critics of the status quo. Contemporary Japan is by no means a unified entity, either in terms of ideology or identity, incorporating conflicting ideals related to where Japan's democracy and national identity should lead. *Zainichi* Koreans must ask themselves: "Which Japan are we becoming part of?"

1. Emergent Discursive Niches: *Zainichi* Critiques vs. *Zainichi* Conformists

In this section, I will explore the politics of the Korean community as a case of politically segmented assimilation increasingly tied to tensions between progressive versus "backlash" politics in contemporary Japan. I will how examine how *zainichi* Korean intellectuals express their membership of, and loyalty towards, Japanese society. How to define authentic

Japanese societal membership and how to interpret the Japanese colonial rule of Korea and seek appropriate redress are issues dividing opinion among concerned *zainichi* Koreans. Several prominent *zainichi* spokespersons sympathizing with Japanese neo-nationalists have emerged since the 1990s, when a revisionist historiography movement represented by *Atarashii rekishi o tsukuru kai* (the New History Construction Society, Tsukuru-kai) was gaining extensive media exposure. These individuals stand in opposition to outspoken and media-savvy *zainichi* intellectuals sharing the progressive political stance held by critically-minded Japanese intellectuals and grassroots activists. *Zainichi* public opinion as expressed by *zainichi* intellectuals has been appropriated by the politically differentiated Japanese print-media. *Zainichi* writers add to discourses supporting contrasting ideological claims, ranging from the critical and progressive to the ultra-accommodative.

Responding to different audiences, *zainichi* Korean intellectuals define Japanese societal membership in polarized ways. Some argue for a universal citizenship based on basic human rights, challenging the existing nationality-based form of Japanese civic participation. They demand that local suffrage, the right to work and the right to be promoted in the civil service be granted to resident foreigners. Others argue that the Japanese nationality requirement should be maintained in relation to suffrage and the civil service, and that foreign residents should become naturalized if they wish to gain these rights. Others adopt a compromise position, claiming that the naturalization procedure should be simplified for former colonial subjects. This is seen as a practical solution to the dissonance between subjective feelings of belonging and the legal boundaries of citizenship, especially among Japan-born *zainichi*. For both its *zainichi* Korean and Japanese proponents, acquiring Japanese nationality is the quickest and most conclusive method of resolving issues involving

civic participation rights, from suffrage to public sector employment. Each of these claims—whether advocating universal societal membership regardless of nationality or limiting such membership to those holding Japanese nationality—is supported by elements within the politically diverse Japanese majority. Although *zainichi* Korean intellectuals all share a standpoint as members of a minority, their opinions have been appropriated to serve different political causes within the Japanese mainstream. Comparing recent opinion pieces published in journals or as autobiographies during the past decade, I will analyze how each medium selectively portrays the voices of *zainichi* intellectuals in ways that are complementary to its overall political tone.

Perspectives on History and Civic Participation: Korean-Japanese and Legally-Japanese Koreans

In this section, I will discuss contrasting orientations among Japanese of colonial Korean descent, both Korean-Japanese [*Kankoku-kei-nihonjin*][4] and legally Japanese Koreans [*Nihon-seki-chōsenjin*]. The Korean-Japanese approach is a highly accommodative take on citizenship when compared with the alternative vision of the legally-Japanese Korean approach. The authors of the autobiographical essays I refer to here, especially those who identify themselves as Korean-Japanese (or even just as a human), reject the expected roles attached to minority membership. The most salient difference between the two approaches is found in the extent to which each accepts a collective *zainichi* Korean legacy. While both approaches seek full acceptance and recognition of *zainichi* background in Japanese society, the Korean-Japanese approach is generally more willing to compromise than the legally-Japanese *zainichi* Korean one, the latter demonstrating a consistent level of critical awareness. Kaneko Hiroshi's autobiographical essay (1996) and Lee Seijaku's essays

(1997-1998), both of which explore the authors' thoughts and provide real-time accounts of their experiences when applying for Japanese nationality, illustrate an accommodative perspective to Japanese citizenship. The legally-Japanese Korean approach emphasizes the importance of clarifying one's Korean roots by always using Korean names in all social occasions—at work, in private, and on legal documents. The most outspoken proponents of this approach were the core members of *Minzokumei o torimodosu kai* (The Association for Bringing Back Ethnic Names, hereafter Torimodosu-kai) (1985-1994),[5]as seen in accounts by Pak Shil and Yun Choja (Torimodosu kai 1990). I will introduce the case of Chong Yang-i, another core member of Torimodosu kai, in the final section of this chapter.

a. The Korean-Japanese Perspective

The approaches taken by Kaneko and Lee focus on several issues: the reasons for naturalization; rights to dissent; and the intertwined issues of civic responsibilities and public announcement of ethnic origins. While the latter two issues—civic responsibilities and whether or not to be open about one's Korean roots—should belong to distinct realms, they converge in a peculiar way among Korean-Japanese.

Reasons for naturalization: Mobility and positioning with respect to issues relating to Japan's wartime responsibility

Tokyo-born Kaneko (b. 1929) is a successful entrepreneur who is now retired and living in the northern Kantō region.[6] He decided to acquire Japanese nationality in 1978 because he thought naturalization was "the best way to live with Japanese people in Japan" (1996: 98). Kaneko later confides in his book:

> I became naturalized before my three children graduated from college. Frankly

> speaking, I did it for my children. My children were born in Japan and received a Japanese education. Immersed in this nation's culture, they have been living like other Japanese children, and will not live in South Korea in the future. So, it would be better for their future [for me] to become naturalized. They did not choose to be born, so I, as their parent, considered choosing the best option for them. Both my wife and I hardly know any Korean customs, and as parents cannot teach them anything about South Korea (the language, culture and history). Overall, my children are nothing more than Japanese (Kaneko 1996: 113).

One clear motivation here is to dissolve the mismatch between acquired culture and ascribed legal membership. The most articulate proponents of this perspective include the intellectuals Tei Taikin and Asakawa Akihiro, discussed later in this chapter.

Unlike Kaneko's generation, which is aware of the disadvantages suffered in the job and marriage markets by those without Japanese nationality,[7] Lee Seijaku belongs to a generation for whom discrimination against *zainichi* Koreans is not so obvious or pernicious. Lee (b. 1965) is a "2.5-generation" (her father was born in Korea and her mother in Japan) *zainichi* (South) Korean freelance writer[8]who writes primarily about her personal experiences while completing her graduate school education.[9]

Lee does not connect her interest in naturalization with pragmatic concerns such as improving job opportunities, for example. Rather, her comments, like those of Kaneko, suggest a strong desire to remove a mismatch between acquired culture, psychological belonging, and legal status. Lee felt she had finally returned home to a place where she could relax when she returned to Japan from a family trip to South Korea (1997: 200-201). Her trips to Malaysia and China, where she experienced anti-Japanese sentiment related to issues of wartime responsibility, were critical to her decision. Her experiences made her think: "As a person who does not have Japanese nationality but considers herself to be Japanese, what

responsibility do I have?" (S. Lee 1997: 204). Although it is unclear why she should feel responsible for the acts Japan committed against Asian nations during the war or why she should feel the need to have Japanese nationality to support Japanese positions in contentious international politics, she claims that issues related to the nation's wartime responsibility played a critical role in ultimately convincing her to apply for Japanese nationality.

Who can be critical of Japanese society? Who has the right to dissent?

In her essay series, "A passage to Japanese nationality acquisition," (1997-1998), Lee writes: "Although I cannot overlook topics related to the Korean peninsula, Japan is my fatherland [*sokoku*]" (S. Lee 1997-1998 Essay 2: 56). However, more important to her than identifying Japan as her fatherland is being "responsible" as a member of Japanese society for the historic liabilities accumulated by the Japanese nation. She expresses discomfort in being expected to display a certain political stance because of her *zainichi* Korean background. She argues:

> Strangely enough, it appears less acceptable to the Japanese for minority members to say "I like Japan" or "I will become naturalized in order to become Japanese" than to say "I experienced discrimination" or "naturalization is not for me." Nevertheless, *zainichi* [Koreans] should respect their autonomy [*shutai-sei*] and exclaim: "There certainly exists an unfortunate historical past [between Japan and Korea], but I still like Japan." Otherwise, the opinions of a small number of Japanese and *zainichi* would stand out, creating a distorted image of *zainichi* and bringing about an unhappy relationship between Japanese and *zainichi*. A *zainichi* without Japanese nationality means that such a *zainichi* is exempted from bearing responsibilities borne by Japan [or for any issues Japan is involved in]. If a *zainichi*, from such a vantage point, repeats "I do not like Japan," then nobody will take her seriously (S. Lee 1997-1998 Essay 2: 58-59).

In other words, according to Lee, Japanese nationals can express discontent because they

bear collective responsibility as Japanese, while *zainichi* Koreans should refrain from comment because of the dubious locus of responsibility for the fate of the Japanese collectivity.

Kaneko posits a strikingly similar standpoint regarding whether or not *zainichi* Koreans are entitled to be critical of Japanese society. Concerning Japan and Korea's past roles of colonizer and colonized respectively, Kaneko expresses the opinion that Koreans (including Koreans in Korea) should forget about the past altogether:

> What does [Japan's] apology or recognition of past deeds do? Does it bring about anything constructive? [Koreans] should be tolerant and forget everything [that took place in the past] and orient themselves towards the present and the future. Being bothered with what has already happened in the past does not solve any problem. In retrospect, I think the unfortunate relations between Japan and Korea were nobody's fault; it was just one of the historical circumstances of the past (Kaneko 1996:122).

Concerning racism in Japanese society, he continues:

> Even if society is not fair, I have come to realize [after reading a book about discarding pride and vanity] that nothing much changes, even if an individual complains. I realized that complaints only lead to dissatisfaction. Before complaining, you need to put in the maximum effort according to your conscience. Even if the result is not [an] immediately successful [one], I will always be satisfied [because I did my best]" (Kaneko 1996: 125-126).

Both Kaneko and Lee argue against *zainichi* claims that they were victims of colonization and discrimination.[10] Kaneko advocates being constructive by obliterating history and relying on individual effort to overcome discrimination, while Lee's claim is similar in tone, in that she is very careful about criticizing Japanese society or people. In Lee's essay, she recalls that, as a child, her parents told her not to speak ill of Japan and the Japanese people because they were foreigners (S. Lee 1997-1998 Essay 1: 61). She adds:

> But I was born and grew up in Japan, [and] received an education identical to that of the Japanese majority. Japanese is my mother tongue, and I fully belong to the Japanese cultural sphere. So, dear readers, please keep in mind that I am not criticizing the Japanese people from the standpoint of a mere foreigner if I say something critical (S. Lee 1997-1998 Essay 1: 61-62).[11]

Lee expresses her disagreement with some *zainichi* spokespersons that "take advantage of their minority status" and say anything they want to (S. Lee 1997-1998 Essay 3: 69):

> Since I began using my Korean name, "Lee Seijaku," and clarified my position as a *zainichi* when I entered college, I was forced to occupy a chair [used in a figurative sense here, meaning a rhetorical position] in the role of [a member of] the "oppressed *zainichi*." [...] I soon realized that the minority-position chair [i.e. position] had become an indulgence, making anything pardonable. Since then, I have stopped sitting there. Even if I acquire Japanese nationality, I will remain a minority [member of society]. However, at that time, I will no longer be a guest and I can freely discuss anything with other people at the round table." (S. Lee 1997-1998 Essay 3: 70).

Lee perceives legal foreigners as having to be careful what they say, while legal Japanese are allowed to honestly express what they really think. At the very least, she wants to distance herself from the people she perceives as pessimistic *zainichi* Koreans who dutifully play the role of victim. She rejects the expectation of minority victimhood and declares her position as a Japanese intending to acquire Japanese nationality.

Impeccable civic participation prior to the expression of Korean roots:
To tell or not to tell, that remains the question

Kaneko's description of civic participation as a Korean-Japanese is consistent with his emphasis on individual effort. Regarding his way of life as a Korean-Japanese or "new" Japanese, Kaneko writes: "I should try to be at least 150 percent more respectable than

ordinary [Japanese] people" (Kaneko 1996: 133). He elaborates:

> [R]ather than asking favors from Japan and the Japanese people, we should discuss what we can do for Japan and practice it. […] Needless to mention, we should pay taxes more willingly than anyone else, we should cooperate with the society as citizens through local volunteer activities, etc. […] Having achieved a life path that is 150 percent more respectable, we can be qualified for the first time to transmit our roots, talk about them, and perform the role of mediator between South Korea and Japan (Kaneko 1996: 134).

For Kaneko, respectable civic participation is a prerequisite for expressing one's Korean roots. However, having already mentioned that he and his wife hardly know anything about South Korea or its culture and history, by the time they are qualified to transmit their Korean heritage or culture—invented or not—there will no longer be anything left to transmit, other than generic survival tips related to virtue and effort. Against such a backdrop, Korean heritage will end up being reinvented as variations on the recurrent theme of a Japanese Horatio Alger, the legendary case of a self-made man.[12]

When and how do *zainichi* reveal their Korean background? Korean ethnic origin still reminds the Japanese of the connection between *zainichi* and the two nations on the Korean Peninsula, no matter how geographically or psychologically distanced *zainichi* themselves are from their divided homeland.[13]Expressions of Korean roots often lead to questions of loyalty. In cases such as those of Kaneko and Lee, explanations of *zainichi* Korean roots become ambiguous. "When I meet anyone for the first time, I explain that I am a naturalized Japanese. It's because I would like to be as honest as possible in deepening acquaintanceships," writes Kaneko (1996: 127). He also expresses his sense of continuity with the past in being proud of his Korean roots: "[that I chose to become naturalized] does not mean either that I obliterate Korea, my roots, or that I renounce my pride as a Korean"

(Kaneko 1996: 98). Nevertheless, pride in being a Korean does not erase worries about making his Korean origins public:

> It has been eighteen years since I became naturalized. While my children and grandchildren live a quiet life as utterly [average, ordinary] Japanese, I feel nervous about publishing this book, as if I am waking up a sleeping child. […] By writing a book about my roots and life, I cannot stop worrying about whether my children and grandchildren will be bullied, […] probably just a needless fear (Kaneko 1996: 184).

In a similar vein, Lee takes the position that no one needs to retain his or her Korean name, keep Korean customs and traditions, or explain his or her Korean ethnic origins (Lee 1997-1998 Essay 2: 53-54):

> An individual's roots, no matter what they are, do not matter to his or her neighbors or colleagues, do they? Whether or not his or her work is reliable, or whether or not he or she observe the rules of the neighborhood and workplace do matter, and so long as he or she does not have any problems with any of these, why should anyone take issue with his or her roots? Roots are something neither [to be] concealed nor declared (S. Lee 1997-1998 Essay 9: 53).

Based on her experience switching between her Japanese and Korean names, Lee asserts that Japanese show different attitudes if they think they have encountered a non-Japanese. Lee confides:

> Honestly, I am exhausted from being handled with care by the Japanese, and making extra efforts for them in making my position understood. […] I decided to use a Japanese-style name after naturalization. It is strange for Japanese to require that other Japanese interact with them with extra caution and care. Besides, I do not want to explain my nationality each time I introduce myself. […] I don't want other Japanese to handle me with care, even after I have acquired Japanese nationality (S. Lee 1997-1998 Essay 9: 54).

Expressing one's Korean roots is apparently a burden if one is to live the ordinary life of a

"color-free" individual. Despite Kaneko and Lee's vindications of their positions as Korean-Japanese, what they have chosen to be is (Korean-) Japanese, a hyphenated designation nevertheless carefully placed within parentheses. Lee chose a Japanese name, quite a common one, which she had never used but likes very much; she did not clarify her Japanese name in the essay. The years she had spent since college using her Korean name had been enough of a burden to her to make her wish to return to being just an ordinary person, unnoticed yet responsible for Japanese society's past and present. When choosing a Japanese name, Kaneko retained the Chinese character for his Korean last name, Kim. Nevertheless, his Korean origins remain ambiguous to a casual observer, as Kaneko is not an uncommon Japanese surname.[14]

b. The Legally Japanese Korean [*Nihon-seki chōsenjin*] Perspective

It is still rare for a Korean to legally register a Korean-style name after naturalization, as advocated by the core members of Torimodosu kai. Nevertheless, the emergence of a group of Koreans challenging the dominant practice of using Japanese-style names has been reported in the Japanese national press and been the focus of widespread discussion (Kashiwazaki 2000; Soo-im Lee 2007a, 2007b; Tanaka 1993; K. Yun 1992; Tai 2003; Sugihara 1993). The above movement was indirectly succeeded by *Paramu no kai* (The Wind Society) (1995-2000), more of a self-help group than a grassroots activist organization, whose members take a more flexible approach to the use of Korean names in public.[15]

For members of Torimodosu kai (and, to a lesser extent, Paramu no kai), being *zainichi* begins, critically, with moving beyond liberation at the individual level. Reconstituting one's individual life history often involves a Copernican shift, the

once-unbearable shame of being *zainichi* transformed into a source of determination and commitment to the achievement of broader causes. The realization that there is a collective *zainichi* past, i.e. the awakening of a *zainichi* Korean consciousness, thus becomes a significant starting-point for the expression of their concerns and a basis for civic engagement within the wider society. Torimodosu kai members came to think about officially bringing back their Korean names following the realization that *zainichi* history had been suppressed to the point of total obliteration. Until the mid-1980s, authorities administrating naturalization procedures almost universally recommended the adoption of Japanese-style names, supposedly for the sake of the children. The argument was that use of such names could help the children blend into Japanese society, the general thinking being that Japanese nationality and the adoption of Japanese style names were inseparable. Torimodosu kai challenged this friendly gesture, arguing that it reproduced discrimination against *zainichi* Koreans.

Although individual circumstances differ,[16]the autobiographies of Torimodosu kai members share a common theme of metamorphosis.[17]As young children, they all used Japanese-style names and passed as Japanese, were embarrassed and ashamed of being Korean, and feared their Korean backgrounds would be exposed by chance. As they learned about *zainichi* Korean history and the suffering of earlier generations, they came to realize a pressing need to rebalance their distorted self-images and repair their self-esteem.[18]

The context in which the parents or grandparents of *zainichi* Korean migrated to Japan plays a significant role in the development of their sense of being *zainichi*, even though the experiences of preceding generations were once hard to understand and empathize with. Pak Shil of Torimodosu kai writes:

> I realized I had made a grave mistake after my naturalization was granted. When marrying my [Japanese] fiancée, I was worried that her parents might kill themselves [because they were so opposed to the idea of their daughter marrying a Korean. Her mother indeed attempted suicide]. But what about my mother? The Japanese Empire forced her to come to Japan, she lost her husband in her mid-forties, and she raised seven children by herself. But all her children began to treat her with disrespect [because of her apparent Koreanness] as they grew up and married Japanese, the people who had completely transformed the colonized Korean people's lives, and they became naturalized, one after another. My mother did not say anything. She just kept working as a day laborer without saying anything. Although her calm face did not tell how she really felt, she must have felt resentment beyond words. I betrayed my precious mother (Torimodosu kai 1990: 14).

Recalling her father, who kept his Korean roots hidden, Yun Choja, another core member of Torimodosu kai member, expresses her regret at "not being able to understand my father's suffering and pain, and I just blamed my father for not being strong enough" (Torimodosu kai 1994: 32). These memories of how families lived as *zainichi* powerfully transformed individual cases of suffering into collective *zainichi* suffering.

Civic participation beyond the personal

The legally Japanese Korean approach entails a wide spectrum of civic participation. The critical perspective employed by activist networks using this approach to examine the structure and ideology of Japanese society helps them challenge contradictions in institutional practices that the average Japanese citizen would neither question nor challenge. Torimodosu-kai later initiated a court battle against the government, demanding that the government return the records of all fingerprints collected from each naturalized individual. Following a ruling by the Kyoto District Court, the government agreed to discard all the fingerprint records of naturalized Japanese (Torimodosu-kai 1994: 362-366). The members also challenged the convention relating to the transliteration of their names when applying

for Japanese passports. They argued that Korean-style names should be transliterated based on Korean pronunciation, such as Pak Shil, instead of on a revised, Japanese-style Hepburn transliteration, Paku Shiru. Torimodosu kai member Chong Yang-i and his family challenged the family registry system as a form of institutionalized patriarchy and discrimination against the children of unmarried couples (see the final section of this chapter). Pak testified for the plaintiffs during the late 1980s when his fellow grassroots activists filed a lawsuit against state enforcement of the use of the polemical national flag and anthem in school ceremonies.[19]

While these individuals express their Korean identity as legally Japanese Koreans, they are very conscious and committed Japanese citizens, fully participating in civic society. Their grassroots civic participation stretches across Japanese and *zainichi* Korean politics, to a lesser extent even involving the politics of the Korean peninsula. In parallel with their activities in Torimodosu-kai, Pak and his Kyoto-based comrades (both *zainichi* Koreans and Japanese) were simultaneously concerned with democratization and the people's culture (*minjung munhwa*) movement in South Korea during the 1980s (not only in support of class emancipation, but also in pursuit of Korean unification) (see Chapter 6). Members participated in *zainichi* Korean and progressive Japanese grassroots activism before the founding of Torimodosu-kai. After Torimodosu-kai was dissolved, the core legally Japanese Korean ex-members pursued overlapping but independent political and cultural agendas, both locally and globally.[20]

Maintaining commitment to a particular cause is not solely a matter of self-satisfaction or self-realization. Yun Choja clarifies (Torimodosu-kai 1994) four objectives in Torimodosu-kai's attempt to restoring Korean names (on Japanese family

registry):

1) as part of our anti-racism struggle, challenging a society in which Koreans cannot use Korean names for fear of prejudice and discrimination;

2) as a breakthrough in transforming the homogeneous illusion of Japanese society, opposing the foreign resident policy that allows only assimilation or exclusion, through the use of legally-recognized Korean names among Japanese nationals;

3) so that the increasing population of naturalized Japanese and Japanese with multiple ancestries may live life with pride;

4) to be true to my life as I wish to live [it] (Torimodosu-kai 1994: 4).

Historical life experiences are inseparable from collective historical suffering, and this linkage between the personal, social, historical, and political is inseparable from deep-seated feelings of emotional pain and resentment. The legally Korean approach is only adopted by a limited group of naturalized Japanese of *zainichi* Korean background. As I illustrated when citing Lee's essays in the previous section, for *zainichi* Koreans, constrained by imposed choices of politics and identity, the legally-Japanese Korean approach still reminds them of the legacy of the homeland-oriented nationalist approach (see Chapter 3).

The above discussion has explored two contrasting visions for *zainichi* Korean participation in Japanese society as Japanese citizens, presenting accommodative and alternative approaches to the process of becoming Japanese. Both approaches have emerged in response to the so-called homogeneous nature of Japanese society, a collectivity that is, in reality, quite ideologically diverse. In terms of civic consciousness, Japanese nationals of colonial Korean descent have developed different ideals of Japanese nationhood and citizenship based on the different paths they have taken toward assimilation, each set of ideals supported by different elements of an ideologically diverse Japanese population.

"Professional" Citizen-Bashing: *Zainichi* Korean Niches in Tabloid Journalism

The polarization of *zainichi* opinion with respect to political or polemical issues can be seen in the emergence of particular niches in the Japanese print market, in particular those that might be termed "the oppressed *zainichi"* and "the grateful *zainichi."* In both cases, belonging to the appropriate niche may strengthen the appeal of any claims made by a particular individual or group. The discomfort experienced by Lee Seijaku, as described above, when forced by her Japanese colleagues to represent the standpoint of the oppressed *zainichi,* can be complementary to cases of the opposite stance. Lee, a woman belonging to the *zainichi* Korean minority, can write what other Japanese would not dare to write for fear of being accused of being sexist, racist, or nationalist. In this section, I will examine the discourse of denied victimhood, articulated not by Lee, who has ceased her writing activities, but by two ambitious and prolific *zainichi* male scholars.

Opinion pieces[21]by Tei Taikin and Asakawa Akihiro well illustrate an emergent backlash against the New Left and *zainichi* coalition, which has even descended to name-calling tactics (see Chapter 7). Tei (b. 1948), a second-generation *zainichi* born to a Korean father and Japanese mother, is a professor at Tokyo Metropolitan University, where he teaches the sociology of race relations, despite having never formally trained as a sociologist. After receiving an MA in Ethnic Studies from UCLA and spending fifteen years in South Korea, where he taught the Japanese language and married a South Korean (not a *zainichi* Korean), he obtained a position at Tokyo Metropolitan University and returned to Japan. He began writing prolifically in the print media for a general readership, advocating *zainichi* acquisition of Japanese nationality as the best and most realistic solution to the mismatch between identity and belonging, which he views as the immediate source of

contemporary *zainichi* suffering. He has written prolifically, particularly since the 1990s, his earlier pieces sharing consistency with the arguments he continues to make today.[22] Asakawa Akihiro (b. 1974), a third-generation *zainichi* who became naturalized while a graduate student, has been a full-time lecturer (equivalent to the rank of assistant professor at a US university) at Nagoya University[23]since 2005, the very year he started aggressively writing opinion pieces in conservative publications such as *Shokun!* and *Seiron*.[24]Asakawa is a promising academic in the sense that he acquired a position in a prestigious institution at a young age prior to receiving his degree.[25]

Tei and Asakawa opt for a provocative writing style,[26]and criticize *zainichi* and Japanese intellectuals and activists.[27]Their opinion pieces are frequently sprinkled with terms such as: "distortion" (*yugami*, or *waikyoku*) "misleading" (*misurīdo*, a direct loan-word from English), "irresponsible" (*musekinin*), "privileged mind" (*tokken ishiki*), and "deceptiveness"(*giman-sei*). Both Tei and Asakawa mention *zainichi* Korean engagement in black market trading immediately following the end of World War II (Asakawa 2005c: 314-316; Tei 2004a: 210-211), and consider the "privileged mentality," through which *zainichi* Koreans employ their minority status to maximize their material gain, to have its origins in this period.

Tei and Asakawa share the position that *zainichi* Koreans should acquire Japanese nationality rather than becoming involved in protest movements that advocate wider civic participation by *zainichi* as legal foreigners. They argue that by not becoming naturalized, *zainichi* Koreans remain nothing more than ideologues from a "spoilt minority," demanding privileges and preferential treatment while being exempted from obligations and responsibilities. Although Tei and Asakawa have never co-authored any pieces, they regularly

cite each other's work, both writing actively for conservative monthlies, and share common enemies, i.e. progressive-minded *zainichi* Korean with prominent public profiles, Japanese and Western intellectuals, and lesser-known *zainichi* and Japanese grassroots activists. They are also both committed critics of Sōren.[28]Tei and Asakawa's criticisms are primarily based on three interrelated grounds: 1) *zainichi* historiography; 2) *zainichi* victimology; and 3) the tactics used by the *zainichi* movement.

a. *Problematic* zainichi *historiography*

The myth of forced migration

Tei raises polemical issues related to *zainichi* in his monographs, *The End of Zainichi South Koreans* [Zainichi Korian no shūen] (2001) and *The Myth of Zainichi Forced Migration* [Zainichi kyōseirenkō no shinwa] (2004d), both published as *shinsho*[29]volumes by the same conservative publisher Bungeishunjūsha that publishes such monthlies as *Bungeishunjū* and *Shokun!*[30]The yellow, attention-grabbing banner attached to the cover of the latter book (2004d) embodies its provocative style and content: "Didn't many of them choose to cross the [Tsushima] Straits?"[31]The table of contents includes the names of specific individuals, mostly from the academic world, singled out for criticism by the author. The volume does not systematically revisit historical events. Instead, it constitutes a revisionist historical interpretation without historical methodology. Largely based on oral accounts by moderately successful Mindan-affiliated first-generation survivors, it argues that the *zainichi* Korean community in Japan is the product of voluntary migration. Tei (2004d: 123-124) questions the quality of Pak Kyong-shik's influential text (Chapter 1), seeing it as "ideologically motivated" to prevent the conclusion of the treaty normalizing relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Through excessive citation of Kim Yong-dal's critique

of Pak's work (2003: 124-128 in Tei 2004d: 139-144), Tei disqualifies Pak's statistics as distorted and unreliable (Tei 2004d: 139-144), attributing his distorted interpretation and selective presentation to ideological bias. In addition, Tei argues that *zainichi* intellectuals tend not to be explicit about the fact that the conscripted labor force and the ancestors of present-day *zainichi* Korean ancestors are disparate groups, due to the repatriation immediately following WWII. He sees this as an intentional tactic, as they are aware that the historiography of forced migration is useful in promoting their causes, whether in the context of ideological maneuverings in favor of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) or the *zainichi* civil rights movement of the 1980s (see below, Tei 2004b: 33, 160-161).

One-sided invalidation of Japanese nationality

Asakawa challenges arguments suggesting that *zainichi* Koreans were "stripped" of their nationality in 1952 (Asakawa 2005d), disputing claims by Ōnuma Yasuaki (2004a [1979-1980]) and Tanaka Hiroshi (1993) in this regard. He also criticizes Japanese academics such as Tanaka[32]and Ōnuma[33]for allegedly disseminating a "wrong" perspective regarding this issue. Overemphasizing the role of particular states, Japan and the ROK, during the immediate post-WWII period, his analyses highlight consistent benevolence shown by the Japanese government. He further claims that the invalidation of the Japanese nationality of former colonial subjects followed an initiative by the South Korean government (Asakawa 2005d). Why Asakawa associates the stance of the South Korean government, at the time a diplomatically unacknowledged polity for the Japanese government, with the Japanese government's decision regarding the treatment of Japanese nationality holders of colonial origin, is unclear. When the Japanese government took its first action to disfranchise former

colonial subjects residing in Japan as early as December 1945, the last Imperial ordinance stating that former colonial subjects should be "regarded as foreigners for the time being," the Korean peninsula was occupied by the USSR and the US, and already divided along the 38th degree parallel. According to Asakawa, despite the South Korean government's position that Koreans in Japan were South Korean nationals and that the protection of South Koreans in Japan should not be the responsibility of the Japanese government, the latter was so generous that it continued to provide a "living protection" (*seikatsu hogo*) welfare allowance to *zainichi* Koreans. Whether or not living protection allowances are granted is a matter for "local" governments to decide, however, often independently of national guidelines.

Repatriation to the DPRK: Not the fault of the Japanese Government

As for historical events resulting in negative consequences, Asakawa underplays the role of the Japanese state. Asakawa attacks the Australian scholar Tessa Morris-Suzuki for focusing on the role played by the Japanese state in the project repatriating *zainichi* Koreans to North Korea (1959-1984; 1960 and 1961 were the peak years, see Chapter 1). Asakawa's contribution to a featured series called "Look! What an astonishing distortion of history!" also directs criticism at the Asahi Shinbun[34] newspaper, referring to "endless quibbles presented in order to reduce the responsibility of Asahi Shinbun and Chōsen Sōren, the very parties who promoted the repatriation [to North Korea]" (Asakawa 2005e).

b. *Zainichi victimology*

Tei (2004d) focuses on the appropriated use of the aforementioned Pak's forced migration thesis two decades later during the 1980s. This was at the peak of the *zainichi* Korean civil rights movement, as represented by the anti-fingerprint movement and other protest activities.

Tei argues that in the 1980s, when the discourses of co-existence and multiculturalism had gained popularity, both concerned Japanese and *zainichi* Koreans shared the perspective that *zainichi* Koreans had been and continued to be the victims of an oppressive and exclusive Japanese system. According to Tei (2004d), despite the forced labor migration thesis having been concocted by pro-North Korean *zainichi* Koreans during the 1960s, when Pak's work was first published, the myth fed the political needs of *zainichi* Koreans and the Japanese who supported their causes. Tei believes that this portrayal of *zainichi* Koreans as victims (and specifically victims of colonization) blocks both Japanese and *zainichi* Koreans from constructing a future-oriented relationship.

Tei ruthlessly claims that a victim mentality among *zainichi* Koreans reflects mutual dependence between left-leaning Japanese and *zainichi* Koreans dutifully performing the role of victims. Being *zainichi* connotes a dubious existence, Tei argues (2004a: 212). He sums up the transformation of meanings attached to *zainichi* background:

> Being Korean [*Korian* in *katakana*] once meant a handicap in life. Now it means a "loan" to society, people say. Being *zainichi* in the older days was linked to circumstances where adversity bore certain effects; being born to a Korean meant a shortcut to poverty and crime. But at the same time, it meant a challenge to overcome, disciplining *zainichi*. Now what? Being merely a *zainichi* provides an individual with protection and shields. But the self will be spoilt.
>
> I occasionally see young men who find the foundation and motivation for their existence in being *zainichi*, victimized. I truly hope such an attitude is temporary. … (Tei 2004a: 212.)

For Tei, blaming the system without making an effort is intolerable. Tei pushes Kim Yang-ki's pragmatic integrationist position (Chapter 3) even further, becoming a proponent of ultra-conformist, conservative, and individualistic solutions to *zainichi* incorporation into

the Japanese mainstream.[35]*Zainichi* Koreans have to focus more on individual and collective social mobility, than on social critiques. Over-conformity is the expected minority behavioral norm. The entire logic parallels the trajectory of American discourses of race, with recurrent themes of individual responsibility in relation to the attainment of socioeconomic status (Steinberg 1995).

c. *Problematic tactics of* zainichi *movements based on victimology*

The *zainichi* civil rights movement—claiming rights for *zainichi* as resident foreigners—and romantic identification with Korean diasporic causes are other sites of contestation in Tei and Asakawa's writings. Before his return to Japan, Tei was already skeptical of *zainichi* Korean grassroots activism that claimed rights for resident foreigners that were nearly equivalent to those enjoyed by Japanese citizens, and also of progressive Japanese sympathizers such as Ōnuma Yasuaki (Tei 1986; 1990). Ōnuma had supported *zainichi* grassroots activism during the 1970s and 1980s, demanding the recognition of differences and equal rights.[36]For Tei, Ōnuma's stance would perpetuate *zainichi* differences, entrenching the view that they were foreigners, deepening the gap between their natural feelings of belonging in Japan as a result of having been born there and their legal status, encouraging a spoilt mentality, and permanently stranding their social and political standing in an in-between space. He even goes so far as to claim that the support given by some Japanese for *zainichi* anti-discrimination campaigns amounts to nothing more than "sweet poison" in the long run (Tei 1986). Tei (2004d: 54) criticizes the expression "legally-Japanese Koreans" used by Torimodosu kai, arguing that it merely indicates that the group's primary concern is with Japan's past role as aggressor, rather than on helping to construct a multi-ethnic future for Japan.

By contrast, Tei's sister, Chong Hyanggyun,[37]represents the grassroots critique of *zainichi* civic participation in Japanese society without Japanese nationality: She fought a long litigation battle with the Tokyo Metropolitan Government over the right to take a promotion exam without becoming naturalized. She lost in 2005 when the Supreme Court overturned an earlier ruling by the Tokyo High Court—a typical pattern in Japan, where the decisions of lower court decisions are usually overturned by the Supreme Court in favor of the government position (Chong 2006) (See Chapter 7). Shortly after the Supreme Court decision, Tei published a critique of his own sister's approach and her grassroots Japanese (and *zainichi*) supporters in the conservative monthly *Shokun!* (2005). That he had to publicly reprimand his sister[38]indicates the precarious position of *zainichi* Korean intellectuals in the Japanese print media market. What might otherwise have been an entirely private matter between elder brother and younger sister had to be dealt with in public.

Asakawa concludes, in response to Kang Sangjung's comment on the court ruling, intentionally borrowing Kang's phrasing:

> However, such individuals as the plaintiff and Kang [Sangjung], who refuse to become naturalized by any means and reject Japanese society, despite having been born and grown up in Japan, cause Japanese society to deteriorate. And they do not appear to be aware that their existence itself "contributes" to "the deterioration of Japanese society." … Their own thought patterns that neglect the naturalization option, an ultimate solution to all their problems, "need to be reformed immediately" (Asakawa 2005c: 318).

Both Tei and Asakawa merely wish to discard certain Japanese expectations of *zainichi* Koreans performing the role of victims, as Lee Seijaku expressed in the late 1990s. However, representations of *zainichi* as victims and consideration of the naturalization option are logically disparate matters. Nevertheless, fully quoting from and adapting plaintiff Chong

Hyanggyun's statement, Asakawa declares his resolution: "The author [Asakawa] is determined to keep criticizing 'thoroughly [and] without hesitation' the actions of a sect of *zainichi* bigots that only 'reproduces negative images [of Japan]'"[39](Asakawa 2005c: 318). He also criticizes Suh Kyong-shik and Kang Sang-jung for their "unrealistic commitment" to diasporic homeland politics and their "exaggeration" of historical *zainichi* suffering (Asakawa 2005d).

The most prominent straw figure used by Tei and Asakawa is Kang Sangjung,[40]a second-generation *zainichi* Korean (b. 1950) who became the first *zainichi* Korean professor at the University of Tokyo, the most prestigious academic institution in Japan. He has a very high exposure in the electronic and print mass media, and is undoubtedly one of the most outspoken contemporary *zainichi* Korean intellectuals. Kang himself can be considered a cultural commodity. The cover of a hardback version of his autobiography (2004) features a close-up portrait of his face and the word *zainichi* on a rather simple, white background, giving the impression that he is a good-looking, serious, gentlemanly and calm individual. Whether marketed as such or not, Kang Sangjung continues to shine as a brand and cultural icon. His autobiography was followed up in 2008 with the best-selling *Nayamu chikara* [The Power of Suffering], which brings his reading of Max Weber, Natsume Sōseki and others to bear on a number of contemporary issues.[41]

Tei (2001: 174) blames Kang for being unrealistically committed to causes on the Korean peninsula, viewing the latter's "standard" comment that *zainichi* have not been fully emancipated because their Korean homeland remains divided as "anachronistic" and even "paranoiac." He considers the views held by Kang and other resident Korean intellectuals regarding the politics of both Korean states as one-sidedly romanticized visions peculiar to

those who have never lived in South Korea (Tei 2001: 173-174). More recently, Tei's critique of Kang has become even more personal in tone, giving the impression that not only the latter's perspective, but his entire presence, has become personally unbearable to him:

> Perhaps Kang Sangjung's comments leave many Japanese with the impression of a kind of dubiousness. I think that is fine. Kang Sangjung's opinions are, in fact, horribly deceptive. But he has an almost priest-like, quiet, calmed-down manner of speaking which covers up his deceptiveness well. Let another *zainichi* with a more wild impression say exactly the same thing. People would realize how self-centered his [Kang's] stance is.
>
> While I just described Kang's commentaries as priest-like, it is noteworthy that his manner of speaking possesses a self-indulgent character. Self-indulgent people often deceive themselves before they deceive others (Tei 2004d:191).

The above comment is published in an academic book, not posted on an internet bulletin board. According to Tei, it is not only the content of Kang's commentaries, but also his very manner of speaking that needs to be criticized.[42]

Asakawa groups *zainichi* intellectuals such as Kang and Suh Kyong-shik[43]into a category of "*zainichi* ideologues" who conspire with Japanese "professional citizens," Kang being the most prominent figure among such ideologues (Asakawa 2005a; 2005c; 2005e). Opinion pieces by Asakawa that have appeared in *Shokun!* include an article devoted to trenchant criticism of Kang, "Kang Sangjung: A 'professional citizen' who uses '*zainichi*' as an 'unlimited exemption from responsibility card.'"[44](Asakawa 2005a) and "Is 'Pacchigi!' a propaganda movie for *Chōsen Sōren*?: The concealed real intentions of director Izutsu behind a sentimental song [featuring] the Imjin River and exaggerated visual images of *zainichi*," (Asakawa 2005b), the latter targeting romantic descriptions of Sōren by certain progressive Japanese. Any *zainichi* figure with a public profile who acts as a victim of Japan's imperial

past and a target of present-day discrimination, and any Japanese figure who shows concern for Japanese wartime responsibilities and does not criticize Sōren becomes a necessary target of Asakawa's criticism.

Tei and Asakawa openly claim that *zainichi* Koreans have merely received what they deserved, whether as the targets of alien registration controls or legal discrimination as a result of their black marketeering in the immediate postwar period and stubborn attitudes toward changing their nationality. Their claims share an affinity with neo-nationalist revisionist historiography, which considers that Japan's prewar acts of colonization and aggression in Asia were based on positive, respectable, and justifiable policies and that recurrent reactions by South Korea and China in relation to issues related to Japan's wartime responsibility, such as textbook censorship and official worship at Yasukuni Shrine (where class-A war criminals as well as all the war dead are deified), are nothing more than apocalyptic nonsense. They share space in the same volumes of the same monthlies, and please the same audience. As they would argue, it is the Japanese who are the real victims of a *zainichi* Korean mentality that takes minority privileges for granted (see Chapter 7).

According to Asakawa's logic, it is the fault of the *zainichi* themselves that they have not become naturalized, although even he might agree that the naturalization procedure itself needs to be reformed. This type of argument complements those of Japanese who make statements such as: "If you complain, you should go back to Korea" or: "If you want to enjoy the rights held by those with Japanese nationality, just become naturalized, period" (see Chapter 7). Such comments are often found on internet bulletin boards filled with examples of hate speech. Certainly, the Japanese government has never denied *zainichi* Koreans Japanese nationality, as there has been a system of naturalization since 1952. Asakawa and

Tei overlook the historical context: at least up until the mid-1980s, the naturalization procedure and system was far more exclusive and byzantine than it is today. In addition, it is the second generation that may feel more "forced" to be in Japan than the first, as it was their parents' choice to migrate, not theirs.

I have discussed some of the peculiar niches occupied by *zainichi* Koreans in the Japanese print media. The polarized way in which the writings of *zainichi* Korean intellectuals are consumed in the Japanese mass media provides ammunition for both progressive grassroots democracy and neo-nationalist backlash politics. Some *zainichi* intellectuals, especially among those who actively choose to identify themselves as Japanese nationals through having become naturalized, writing for the conservative media, have clearly waived the right to dissent, choosing to participate in the imagined national community retroactively.

The dominant national narrative of Japan's imperial past lives again in a nation in which *zainichi* Koreans cannot have a place as nationals rather than as members of an ethnic minority because of the presence of the two Korean nation-states. *Zainichi* Koreans cannot become a pure ethnic group, in that the polemical nation-states in question are located right next-door to Japan. Further, political, diplomatic, and even military tensions significantly affect how Japanese view *zainichi* Koreans, whether or not individuals identify as *zainichi*, and whether or not individuals are disengaged from the ex-homeland. The statement "My grandparents are from Korea" bears a more precarious implication than saying "My grandparents are from Okinawa," a place that ceased to exist as an independent entity upon its full absorption into the modern Japanese nation-state. Asakawa and Tei both consider the

adoption of Japanese nationality as suiting the interests of both Japanese and *zainichi* Koreans, as this option permits *zainichi* to officially (and finally) terminate an unwanted relationship with the Korean states, a relationship that has been the source of security concerns and diplomatic tensions throughout the postwar era. However, as will be discussed below, their comments are nothing more than the product of the shifting landscape of Japanese civil society.

The dark side of this society has not only produced an upwardly mobile group of minority collaborators with the establishment (collaborators always being found during and after colonial rule), but has also turned social critiques presented from the standpoint of minority members into bad jokes, writers claiming a pretence of journalistic objectivity while descending to vulgar name-calling on the pages of conservative monthlies. With their *zainichi* minority backgrounds, Asakawa and Tei, and also, to a lesser extent, Lee Seijaku and Kaneko Hiroshi, can express what average Japanese intellectuals dare not because of concerns with political correctness.[45]Are these *zainichi* individuals, who are trying to escape from *zainichi* labeling or from the expectation that they will act as victims, contemporary collaborators with emergent Japanese neo-nationalists? Ruling Korea would have been impossible for the Japanese Empire without the existence of native Korean collaborators. As in the case of Jewish collaborators during the Holocaust, “careerism” was one of the motivations (Arendt 1963), and some colonial Koreans gained upward mobility in the Japanese colonial system (Cumings 1997). The Japanese print media continues to seek out both progressives and “accommodators” who belong to the right categories, catering to their politically diverse audiences. However, the current state of tabloid journalism as it involves *zainichi* intellectuals is probably helping to nurture Japanese subjecthood, rather than

Japanese citizenship.

The increasing media visibility of *zainichi* Korean individuals with Japanese nationality, such as Tei Taikin and Asakawa Akihiro,[46]reflects the conditions of Japanese civic society that distinguish who belongs and who does not. Torimodosu kai members who have celebrity status among grassroots activists—whether Japanese or *zainichi* Koreans—are still quite unknown to many *zainichi* Koreans and Japanese, despite the reporting of their activism in newspapers with large circulations. While politically segmented assimilation proceeds, the voice of accommodative, restricted membership in Japanese society—that of hardworking Japanese nationality holders who do not express dissent—has become louder than ever in the past decade. The dark side of civil society looms large at a historical time when neo-nationalist, conservative discourses are increasingly rampant.

2. Limits of Hyphenated Japaneseness: Lineage, Culture and Identity among Japanese of Colonial Korean Descent

There has been a plethora of studies debunking Japan's myth of homogeneity—that Japan is multiethnic as a matter of historical and demographic fact. However, the profiles of various non-mainstream-Yamato Japanese ethnic groups, whether long-time residents or newcomers, people from colonized nations or immigrants, might give a false impression regarding everyday inter-group relations in contemporary Japan; diversity itself does not mean equal representation in political, social and cultural domains. Although the number of registered aliens in Japan is increasing every year, they still account for a mere one percent of the entire population. Many ethnic groups in Japan are phenotypically and linguistically invisible. The

major concern of this section is to consider the impact of this invisibility and extreme numeric minority status on claims relating to minority identity, keeping in mind comparisons with the situation in mass-migration based societies.

While social scientists have addressed racial and ethnic identities as matters of voluntary identification or involuntary labeling primarily based on the intergenerational incorporation of immigrants in mass-migration-based societies (Song 2001), allegedly diverse immigration-based societies continue to embrace and reproduce ongoing forms of subjugation and repression. Even more problematic is the incorporation of outsiders excluded from origin myths at the onset of the modern nation-state (Anderson 1991).

Questions of authentic membership have persisted, especially during the post-colonial period, when inter-ethnic relations were supposed to have become more egalitarian. It is paradoxical indeed that it was in post-war, peace-loving, democratic Japan that the discourse of a mono-ethnic and mono-cultural Japan emerged, as shown by sociologist Oguma Eiji (1996)[47]. The logic that Japan is a nation of ethnic Japanese created by ethnic Japanese for ethnic Japanese has ironically prevented the hyphenated Japanese, either as concept or phrase, from becoming part of everyday language. This is despite the fact that quite significant cumulative numbers of Koreans, Chinese, and individuals from other backgrounds have become naturalized and pledged allegiance to the Japanese nation-state since the end of U.S. occupation in 1952 (Y. Kim 1990; Asakawa 2003).

Regardless of the extent to which the foundations of a nation are multi-ethnic and multi-cultural, each ethnic group does not have equal symbolic access to the nation's mainstream. Canada has long been known as a vertical mosaic, and even the American model

of the melting pot has long been based on a racial status hierarchy. In the United States, where the vast majority of the population can trace its ancestry to immigration, hyphenated Americans are a relatively recent historical phenomenon, with some groups experiencing dilemmas in becoming American. Asian-Americans, for example, continue to be considered as permanent foreigners (Tuan 1998). In Japan, where Koreanness is historically stigmatized as a result of the colonial-era racial hierarchy, is it possible to become Korean-Japanese? Who becomes a hyphenated ethnic group in contemporary Japan, and what strategies do non-Japanese individuals adopt to claim their place and reconcile their presence in society? Largely drawing from in-depth interview data, this section will introduce several prominent voices making identity-based claims. Here, I will explore to what extent it is possible to become Japanese without having Japanese lineage, and while still selectively accentuating one's Korean heritage.

Dormant and Proactive Koreanness

Focusing on how challenging it is to be socially recognized as Japanese with a Korean heritage, and from a different angle taken in Chapter 4, I will juxtapose the experiences of those who do not publish their opinions with those who speak up in public fora. The relationship of particular individuals with the Japanese who surround them leads to differentiation in the ways in which they express their identities.[48] Naturalized Japanese of colonial Korean descent possibly practice different approaches to identity-related claims depending on the extent to which they express their Korean background in social contexts. These can be divided into: 1) the non-ethnic individual approach; 2) the Korean-Japanese (*koria-kei nihonjin*) approach; and 3) the legally-Japanese Korean (*nihonseki chōsenjin*)

approach. The second and third types of approach were explored in the first section of this chapter, using published autobiographical accounts.

In the first two approaches, the non-ethnic individual approach and the Korean-Japanese approach, Koreanness is usually dormant, occupying a somewhat insignificant and oblivious space in the everyday concerns of particular individuals. The non-ethnic individual approach represents a tendency to emphasize individuality and detachment from belonging to any national group. Although all three approaches can be viewed as potentially embracing universal humanity—mutual respect and equal rights, regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, class, belief, or health status—each works as a convenient shield for denying or obscuring one's Korean background, thereby avoiding potential social costs. The Korean-Japanese approach embraces a selectively adapted Koreanness and does not openly challenge Japanese institutions and mainstream ideas. The legally-Japanese Korean approach, by contrast, represents the most proactive means of expressing and emphasizing one's Koreanness while maintaining one's legal Japaneseness through active commitment in grassroots activism, i.e. neither one's Koreanness nor one's Japaneseness are taken for granted, and both are constantly critiqued.

This section focuses primarily on the non-ethnic individual approach and the legally-Korean approach, which involve contrasting perspectives and practices. Following a description of three individual cases, I will discuss the significance of visibility in sustaining hyphenated identities. Assessing the potential for a socially acknowledged hyphenated Japaneseness, I will argue that the diverse range of identity-related claims expressed by naturalized Japanese exhibit noteworthy convergence with existing yet understated ideological assumptions about what constitutes authentic Japaneseness.

(Korean-) Japanese and Legally-Japanese Koreans: Individual Cases

I will introduce three cases of naturalized Japanese[49]—Kimoto Shizuko (b. 1945, second-generation), Takano Masahide (b. 1972, generation unknown) and Chong Yang-i (b. 1956, third-generation).[50]These individuals have diverse backgrounds. Shizuko became naturalized with her husband and children in 1998 when she was fifty-three years old.[51] Masahide was born a Japanese citizen. Masahide's grandfather became naturalized even before his father got married. Yang-i legally became Japanese at the age of fifteen, when his parents became naturalized. While I am least interested in classifying individual cases into fixed categories, the first two cases illustrate the non-ethnic individual approach. Despite differences in age, gender, upbringing, education and occupation, both Shizuko and Masahide express strikingly similar degrees of ambiguity about being *zainichi* Korean. By contrast, the final case represents the legally-Japanese Korean approach, in that Yang-i actively chooses to identify himself primarily as Korean.

Kimoto Shizuko: "Finally!"

Shizuko, in her mid-fifties when interviewed, owns a comfortable three-story house that makes the best use of a narrow strip of land in one of Osaka's industrial neighborhoods. In terms of educational attainment (graduation from middle-school) and occupation (helping out with clerical work in her husband's painting business), Shizuko is part of the working class, but enjoys substantial material comforts. On a rainy winter afternoon, she picked me up from the nearest train station in the family's Mercedes-Benz. Her youngest daughter had spent several years in California, and because she already knew that I had spent many years in the United States, she began talking about her. She humorously complained, "You know what,

when she was in the U.S., she was complaining all the time that she did not have enough money, so we kept sending her money. When she returned and opened her suitcase, it was full of Gucci products!! No wonder she had no money! Can you believe that!?" (personal interview, February 26, 2000).

Shizuko is now very relieved that she has finally become a Japanese citizen. She expressed her feelings as: "Finally!" The family members had all gone to vote together, in a festive mood, upon received their voting instructions for the first time. The majority of Shizuko's family members, including her siblings' families, have become naturalized. The process was like a chain-reaction among her relatives, each family exchanging mundane details about the way in which their applications were handled, the experience of each individual varying considerably dependent on the contact officer who provided guidance and instruction in each case. Shizuko was surprised to hear that I had not become naturalized, stating: "I can't believe it! You'd better do it soon."

Although Shizuko's husband had always wanted to become naturalized, the family had kept procrastinating. This was partly due to the cumbersome procedure involved, requiring numerous official documents, and partly due to objections by Shizuko's mother-in-law, who "kept telling my husband he should be proud to be Korean." More than anything, Shizuko was so busy, taking care of her children, running around managing bill collection for her husband's business, and heading the women's section of their neighborhood association, that she could not imagine contacting different municipalities and offices to collect all the required original documents.

Moreover, in Shizuko's family's case, a complex family relationship required some

adjustments to be made regarding documentation prior to the application being made, leading to a further delay in the submission of their application. Shizuko's first two children are from her previous relationship with a Japanese man. At the time of Shizuko's arranged marriage to her *zainichi* Korean husband, he also had an estranged relationship with a Japanese woman, and he submitted a legal document acknowledging paternity in relation to Shizuko's daughters so they could become a legal part of the new stepfamily. He could have just adopted them, but they were not aware of this option at the time of their marriage. They first had to fix the false paternity of the children from Shizuko's previous relationship through family court proceedings, which they misunderstood to be a far more complicated process than simply involving the submission of a document. The process of naturalization, however, revealed to the younger children that their elder siblings had a different father.

What struck me the most about Shizuko's story was how, at the beginning of the interview, she completely forgot about her first marriage to a Japanese man. They were unable to legalize this marriage because her husband's mother "was very conservative" and against her son marrying a Korean, despite the fact that they had two children. When we were talking about her parents, she recalled how strict her father was and how well her mother managed the family members' needs, and she associated her upbringing with good old-fashioned Korean virtues. Shizuko mentioned that her parents saw to it that all of their children, three daughters and four sons, followed their parents' wishes and entered into arranged marriages. "We somehow thought our parents were absolutely right when choosing good marriage partners for us," she explained. I exclaimed, "None of you resisted?" Shizuko, then, firmly said, "No. That was the way things used to be." It was when we started talking about their naturalization process that she recalled that her first marriage was not an arranged

one, exclaiming: “Oh! There was! There was one who resisted!” referring to herself, laughing. Throughout the interview, she occasionally mentioned that she had never been discriminated against because of her Korean background. However, the fact that her first marriage could not be registered because of her Japanese partner’s “conservative” mother is certainly an example of discrimination. Shizuko, nonetheless, did not associate her personal experience with prejudice or discrimination.

Shizuko and her family’s Korean background is a matter of privacy and confidentiality. She and her children have never used their Korean names in public. This is in spite of the fact that some Osaka school districts, including their own, are progressive in dealing with the education of *burakumin* and Korean children, *zainichi* Korean parents receiving notes encouraging their children to use Korean names instead of Japanese ones. Shizuko has always resisted such encouragement, even going to her children’s school before their classroom teachers were assigned and specifying that their Japanese names be used in enrollment records and graduation diplomas.

She does not advertise that she is Korean (or that, legally, she used to be South Korean), while claiming that: “I don’t deny, if someone asks. One of the neighbors is pretty open [about their Korean background], like in speaking the language, and she once asked me, ‘your [Japanese] name, Kimoto sounds like [a common Japanese name among *zainichi* Koreans]… are you?’ So I said, ‘Yes, we [are Koreans] too.’ I wouldn’t deny it if someone who is like us asked.” Throughout our discussion of these topics, it was rare for Shizuko to explicitly use the terms “Korean” or “*zainichi*.” Instead, she always used pronouns, or phrased things so she didn’t have to use these words. Masahide, who I will discuss below, also avoided the terms “Koreans” or “*zainichi* Koreans,” instead referring to “the people

from there" or "the people over there" (*mukō no hito* or *acchi no hito*). Such indirect references to anything to do with Korea happened whether we were in private settings (homes) or in semi-public settings (coffee shops and restaurants), while proactive *zainichi* Koreans like Yang-i did not hesitate in mentioning Korean-related words at all.

Shizuko does not identify as a Korean at all, and some elements of Koreanness are practiced only at home among close family members. Shizuko dutifully continues to observe Korean *chesa* rituals related to the ancestral worship of her husband's family three times a year (the anniversary of the father's death, at New Year and during *o-bon*, the summertime holiday celebrating the return of ancestral spirits in the Japanese calendar) because her mother instilled in her the importance of respecting the ancestors for the health and good fortune of the family.

Takano Masahide: Benign Recognition of Transcontinental Heritage

Two weeks before I left for the United States, Masahide came to my farewell party,[52] which was organized by my online *zainichi* friends and announced through our mailing list. People I had never met also came, a farewell being just an excuse for a party, and everyone was welcome. Masahide had never attended any previous meetings; he had just joined the mailing list. He came to the offline meeting alone, it being held around the time he was thinking about his roots and identity. Masahide introduced himself, explaining that his family, which had its origins in China, had become naturalized before he was born. We agreed to meet one week later. Having a studious personality, Masahide requested that I email him a list of questions before we met so he could get ready.

Masahide is part of an upwardly mobile immigrant family, having obtained a degree

from a reputable university and landed a job at a large-scale Japanese manufacturing firm. His generation was the last one to enter the job market before the Japanese economy entered its "lost decade" of chronic recession and the job market for college graduates began to dry up. His grandfather ran a money-lending business, and Masahide's recollections of his hometown center around his grandfather's "huge" house. Although neither of Masahide's parents attended college, Masahide chose to major in accounting and finance at college, based on pragmatism rather than interest, and now works in the accounting division of his firm.

Masahide was not able to recall exactly when he realized he had non-Japanese ancestry. He explained:

> When my relatives get together on New Year's Day or at our annual *bon* festival, they do something—you know, men go first and bow in front of the family's grave. What do you call it? The stuff people over there do. The house I grew up in had a large Buddhist altar,[53] and men and boys went and bowed first. These customs are different from those of the Japanese, you know. So I knew my [Korean] roots as a child (personal interview April 23, 2000).

Zainichi Korean families, regardless of nationality, often experience moments of revelation that interrupt their belief that they are average Japanese.[54] While being legally Japanese, Masahide's Koreannness, by contrast, has always simply been a matter of fact for him, and he has not experienced any such moments of revelation.

Masahide's detailed explanation of his background placed particular emphasis on his family's Chinese ancestry, although many Korean family names can be traced back to ancient Chinese roots, as Chinese-style names were considered to be sophisticated and cultured. Some records of ancestry lineage boast an ancient connection with Chinese royalty in order

to give the family a mythical authenticity. Masahide does not know if his family migrated from China to Korea during the past century. He only knows that: “There was some kind of commotion in China and they fled to Korea. I wish I knew which commotion or war. Then I could specify the timing.” This saga, involving Chinese roots and two migrations (to Korea and then to Japan), has appealed to Masahide, sounding more dramatic than the typical story of migration from an impoverished colony to the metropolis due to an industrial labor shortage.

Although he finds his family history fascinating and “would like to learn more and ask my parents more about it,” he adds that “when I go home once or twice a year, we just end up catching up with: ‘how’s work?’ and stuff like that.” It was only after he went to study German in Germany during his junior year of college that he finally became ready to discuss his family’s roots with others. Masahide attributes his unwillingness to discuss anything to do with his Korean roots in his earlier years to a desire to fit in as a teenager: “I didn’t like being different from others.” He did begin to discuss his family roots with others, but only when asked. When Masahide came to meet other *zainichi* Koreans at the mailing list party, he felt a connection with others, due to “sharing similar circumstances and having similar thoughts.” However, given that his legal name, the name he uses in daily life, is Japanese, and that he has native Japanese fluency, it is very unlikely that in his daily life anyone would question his family’s non-Japanese origins.

He never discusses the issue with Japanese people, even when, on one occasion, someone expressed prejudiced ideas against Koreans and Chinese. At that time, he “carefully navigated the topic of conversation away from those issues.” The company he works for hires Chinese students who have graduated from Japanese universities, and he exchanges business

correspondence with the company's branch offices across Asia. But that does not necessarily introduce opportunities for Masahide to explain his family roots to his colleagues. Masahide recalled one recent episode:

> A section of the company was reorganized, and we decided to rearrange the positions of each staff member's desk as well. So, I took off my necktie and opened the top button of my shirt and moved things around, and one of my colleagues pointed out: "Wow, Taka-*chan*,[55] you look so Chinese! And I felt like… my heart almost popped out of my throat (*gikutto shita*). [Did you say: "Yes I am!"?] No, I didn't say anything. Anyway, the whole situation was so hectic that day [that] there was no time to go into detail. So I just said: "do I?" and kept moving things around.

Masahide had no idea why his colleague thought he looked Chinese, wondering if, with no tie, he looked like a laborer in a Maoist suit. Masahide would prefer to deal with his family history in a more relaxed environment, with ample time to explain it to other people.

Masahide recently broke up with his Japanese girlfriend, a college sweetheart whom he had dated for over three years. Masahide did not tell her of his family's Chinese and Korean roots, claiming that, as in all other friendships and relationships, he does not either mention or explain it unless asked. As the relationship became longer and the couple became more committed to each other, Masahide felt he would be insincere if he did not tell her. So, during the third year of their relationship, he finally told his girlfriend that his family was originally from China via Korea, although his nationality was Japanese. Both he and his girlfriend were reaching the suitable age for getting married and starting a family. He thought his family origins would not matter at all, although, for him, it was critical information that he needed to share with her prior to both of them considering a more committed relationship. His girlfriend's reacted with an indifferent: "Oh, is that so?" She had no further questions and

showed no further interest. But less than a year after Masahide "came out" to her, his girlfriend left him, and Masahide wondered if his family background could have in fact mattered to her or her family. At the time of the interview, Masahide was thinking about marrying someone in similar circumstances to his own, i.e. of *zainichi* Korean background with Japanese nationality.

Despite differences in generation and socioeconomic background, both Shizuko and Masahide share similar perspectives in relation to the expression of their Korean roots—it is a private matter, not worth advertizing. They are aware that they are Japanese of Korean descent, but in the larger societal context act as "average Japanese." Despite Shizuko's immediate experience of being discriminated against at the time of her first marriage, she did not interpret it as such in her recollections. Masahide knew that his grandmother had experienced discrimination, but considered it as an incident belonging to the past. Explaining to me the ambiguous way in which his relationship with his Japanese girlfriend ended, he claimed that: "we split not because we did not like each other any more, but because, given where the relationship *should* have been leading to at that point, it just didn't seem like that was where it was heading." With his college education and employment in a Japanese firm, he has followed the life course of an average Japanese. But he was not sure if he was considered as an ordinary Japanese. There was no way of knowing. Faced with his girlfriend's rejection, Masahide chose not to argue, instead just accepting her decision.

Chong Yang-i: "Guts, a Fighting Spirit and Physical Strength"

Yang-i [pronounced Yan'ee] is a high school teacher in the Osaka public school system, teaching the Korean language at an evening high school. Chong's abridged autobiography

was published by Torimodosu kai (1990, 1994). Because of his activism, his case has been featured in several major daily newspapers. I visited the school where he taught and interviewed him in 1999. Evening high schools used to be primarily for students who had to work during the day. These days, they are considered an alternative for the academically challenged or those who have dropped out of the school system before completing their compulsory education. Yang-i is also a committed amateur athlete who competes in long-distance canoeing and triathlon races.

When his parents became naturalized in order to assist his brother's career, Yang-i was still in high school and had no choice as a minor: the naturalization procedure normally involves either an entire family unit—adult parents and children under twenty—or an individual who is over twenty years old. His brother became a medical doctor. The medical profession is an example of an occupation where nationality does not matter, qualification being based on passing a national board examination. Nevertheless, his brother's middle school teacher recommended that he apply for a lower-ranked public high school because, according to the teacher, the top-ranked high school in the area where they lived had never admitted Koreans, no matter how academically competitive they were. This type of institutionalized discrimination based on nationality was prevalent until the 1980s.

Yang-i later legally changed his name from the Japanese-style name his family had adopted upon naturalization back to his Korean name, with its Korean pronunciation. Japanese passports normally adopt the revised Hepburn method to transliterate Japanese names; according to this system, his name would have been romanized as Chon Yan-i.[56]He provided evidence that his name was being used, with its Korean spelling and pronunciation, as Chong Yang-i, and succeeded in having his name transliterated the way he wanted it on his

passport. Such irregularities in the handling of transliteration are relatively unknown, and some naturalized Japanese are displeased at the lack of consistency in relation to the spelling of names when Japanese nationality is granted, but they rarely bother to demand change.[57]Those, like Yang-i, who challenge the automatic procedure are rather exceptional. Fighting against red tape requires commitment and determination.

His elder brother never thought of changing his name back to his Korean one, and continues to "pass" as a Japanese. This constitutes quite a contrast, considering Yang-i's history of actively challenging the system. Yang-i's brother complained when Yang-i's story was featured in major daily papers during the latter's litigation battle to restore his Korean name. Yang-i's former Japanese name also appeared in the articles. That name is a possible Japanese name, but because of its unusual combination of Chinese characters, it is not a common one, so Yang-i's brother was afraid that someone would realize his own Korean roots. Yang-i's niece grew up without any knowledge of the family's Korean lineage. Yang-i's parents, who "were unnecessarily considerate," began inviting Yang-i's family and that of his brother on different days to celebrate New Year, an occasion for which extended family members get together. While Yang-i's children were taught to address his parents (despite his wife being Japanese-Japanese) as *aboji* and *omoni* in Korean, Yang-i's brother's children were growing up believing that they were one hundred percent Japanese, which they legally are; Yang-i's sister-in-law is also Japanese-Japanese.

Recently, Yang-i's teenage niece discovered her father's family's roots when she noticed her uncle's Korean name posted on a construction plan notice outside his half-built house. Yang-i's brother had provided a no-interest family loan to Yang-i for the house and, as the lender, had decided to drive by on a weekend to check out how construction was going,

without anticipating such a discovery by his daughter. Yang-i told me of this recent incident, describing it as a "funny" story (*kessaku na hanashi*).

Towards the end of the interview, I asked Yang-i why he and his brother had taken such drastically different paths, respectively embracing and playing down their Korean roots. Yang-i immediately responded that: "he didn't have the guts! (*aitsu wa konjō ga nakattanya!*)" (personal interview, September 16, 1999). Maintaining one's Korean ethnicity in Japanese public domains through the use of one's Korean name is not so easy. Yang-i half-jokingly said that maintaining his Koreanness was a matter of sheer "guts and fighting spirit" (*konjō to kiai*). His use of this phrase was ironic, because the expression "guts and fighting spirit" has commonly been used to describe so-called authentic *Japanese* spirituality in popular discourses on Japaneseness. He laughed, and further added: "plus, physical strength!" (*tairyoku*), reflecting his fitness-conscious life-style—he commutes to work and back by bicycle every day, rain or shine, the round-trip taking him more than two hours.

Yang-i's children, who are Japanese, have adopted Yang-i's Korean family name. However, because Yang-i and his wife chose not to register their marriage as part of their resistance to the family registry system, Yang-i's children only have the residency record (*jūminhyō*), which is subject to local jurisdiction. The children are not recorded in the family registry because their forms to report their child's birth[58]were rejected due to the mismatch between the last names of children and mother. The family registry requires all family members to have the same family name. The family registry is a matter of national jurisdiction—overseen by the Ministry of Justice—and rules and regulations are more strictly applied. But even obtaining the residence record alone was not easy, requiring a series of negotiations with local government authorities. Yang-i's children's case constitutes a very

rare example of a municipality agreeing to accept residency records without the corresponding family registry records. Although Yang-i wants to take his children to South Korea, "I cannot, because the children do not have passports, which are absolutely based on the family registry."[59]

Yang-i considers himself to be Korean (*chōsen-jin*[60]). Broadly, he thinks any person who lives in Japan is Japanese, yet he explicitly says that discrimination forced him to consider himself not to be Japanese, and he chose to raise his children as Koreans, although his partner is Japanese and the entire family is legally Japanese.

Accommodated or Nationalized Others: Life after Structural Assimilation

What these illustrative cases suggest is that hyphenated identities in contemporary Japan are not options readily available to any individual born with Korean lineage, regardless of the extent to which they adhere to traditional customs in private settings. Yang-i has opted to declare his Korean lineage on a full-time basis through using his Korean name, now also his legal name. Nevertheless, a more common practice, adopted by the vast majority of Japanese of colonial Korean descent, involves simply continuing to use one's already adopted or ascribed Japanese name in everyday life. While Yang-i immediately associates questions related to his identity with discrimination, Shizuko and Masahide hardly imagine any collective experience of systematic exclusion from unconditional Japanese membership, despite having both experienced direct and indirect forms of discrimination. In short, (Korean-) Japanese such as Shizuko and Masahide would rather leave their Korean lineage socially unacknowledged. In Japanese public space, they are Japanese, not Korean-Japanese. Although legally Japanese, Yang-i's full-time Korean identity demands acknowledgement of

his ethnic minority status in Japan. However, such an identity is only possible when he emphasizes and prioritizes his Koreanness, grounded as it is on nothing more than his lineage. A family's knowledge of its Korean lineage does not automatically translate into an emergent Korean-Japanese identity; a hyphenated Japanese identity requires social expression and recognition. But Yang-i's multicultural and critical commitment overlaps with the claims of nationalized others; his Japaneseness must be deemphasized.

In the United States, race as phenotypic difference restricts identity options among visible members of minority populations (Song 2001; Waters 1999). Whether identity is viewed as a form of part-time festive nostalgia or as a full-time, hard-to-negotiate label, both depend on the use of racial markers to highlight and signify expected differences between particular groups. In contemporary Japan, the invisibility of many minority groups implies that ethnicity is only possible on the level of esoteric practices restricted to the private sphere, unless substantial and persistent efforts are made to bring it to public attention and prominence. In a mundane context, who is able to strive that hard? And when one makes such efforts, with "guts and a fighting spirit," as illustrated in Yang-i's case, he or she is socially recognized and self-identified as Korean, not Korean-Japanese. Accommodative cases, such as those of Shizuko and Masahide, illustrate the power of self-discipline among victims of discrimination and stigmatization. Their controlled disclosure of their Korean heritage is rationalized according to the logic that the origin of one's family is strictly a private matter. But the social costs assumed to be associated with membership of a historically stigmatized group are avoided, without any perception of discrimination. Growing up in Japan without institutional settings in which Koreanness is publicly displayed means being constantly surrounded by the gaze and viewpoints of the Japanese majority.

Japanese of colonial Korean descent are highly disciplined regarding the when, where and how of "coming out." Their disciplined demeanor does not betray or challenge the self-portrait of Japanese society, whose primary constituents are not Japanese of colonial or ethnic origins at all.

Lineage and culture do not automatically create hyphenated identities, unless they bear collective significance. Whether one conceals or expresses one's Korean roots, the different identity claims made by naturalized Japanese of colonial Korean descent end up reproducing the assumption that the concept of Korean-Japanese is an oxymoron. Curiously, this oxymoron also illustrates the politically segmented reality of *zainichi* Korean assimilation, as has been explored above in the explorations of minority discursive niches in contemporary Japan. Expressions of ethnicity are inseparable from the polarized reality of civic participation in politically segmented contemporary Japan. The nature and extent of political commitment among *zainichi* Koreans in Japanese civil society depends on their level of critical awareness. This is not only based on their personal experiences per se, but also on the interpretations they make that render personal experiences identifiable with collective experiences. The following chapter delves into the relationship between civic participation and collective identity.

Endnotes:

[1] A similar equation exists among Koreans. See Introduction.

[2] Here again, I avoid the term "Japanese citizenship," for the same reason as above.

[3] I adapted the idea of politically segmented assimilation from the theory of segmented assimilation. Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou (1993) and Herbert Gans (1992) proposed this theory based on their research into the experiences of the second-generation offspring of immigrants who had moved to the United States after 1965. Portes and Zhou's original formulation pertained primarily to the economic realm of immigrant incorporation into the mainstream. Different groups have different patterns of adaptation (more specifically, different patterns of inter-generational socio-economic mobility), depending on which "America" different immigrant groups assimilate into. This view is based on the American experience, in which race and class are conflated with culture. Mollenkopf, Kasinitz, and Waters (2001) question what they view as the overly pessimistic and deterministic prognosis of this theory.

[4] In the Japanese language, Japanese of Korean descent can be referred to as either *kankoku-kei, koria-kei* or *chōsen-kei nihonjin* (depending on the term the speaker is using to refer to Korea). Alternatively, they may use the transliterated English expression *korian japanīzu*.

[5] Although Torimodosu-kai had already been "constructively dissolved" by the time I began my fieldwork, I was able to interview its core members and administrative staff. After the dissolution of Torimodosu-kai, Kyoto-based group Paramu no kai (1995-2000) adopted an agenda that primarily addressed the diverse needs of individuals that were Japanese of Korean descent. (See Kashiwazaki (2000) for both groups' orientations. Also see Yasuda (1996) for a general description of the groups and Kuraishi (2000, Ch.6) for detailed analyses of the narratives at Paramu no kai meetings). In addition to secondary sources, this section is based on my interviews with members of Torimodosu-kai and Paramu no kai and participant observation of Paramu no kai meetings.

[6] Kaneko returned to the Korean Peninsula with his mother when he was two, smuggling himself back to Japan in 1948 in order to join his father, who had started another family with another woman. He left college before graduation because of pessimistic job prospects; major companies very rarely hired Koreans in the Japanese four-year college graduate labor market. So he joined his father's business, and the company became a successful general contracting firm, overcoming several crises.

[7] Kaneko argues that any handicap is positive in the long run, because overcoming a handicap is more rewarding then having no challenge. Overall, making an extra effort as an individual solves the problem of having ascribed status of membership in a stigmatized group.

[8] Since the tentative winding-up of her essay series on naturalization for *Gendai Koria*, I have been unable to locate any material published more recently. Lee discontinued her series, but expected to resume it the following year in order to report further on the naturalization process she had undertaken, which had been interrupted by her move and change of job. To my knowledge, she has not yet resumed this series of essays.

[9] Lee Seijaku abruptly vanished from *zainichi* Korean discourse in the print media after tentatively concluding her essay series, "A passage to Japanese nationality acquisition" in 1998.

[10] It is also the mission of Tei and Asakawa to rectify representations of *zainichi* as victims, because they feel such portrayals are counterproductive. See below.

[11] The readers of *Gendai Koria* would be interested in claims such as: "Those who discuss the Japanese Imperial Army's mobilization of 'comfort women' lack historical evidence" (Advertisement for a book by the chief editor of *Gendai Koria*, Nishioka Chikara, in Essay 4: 65).

[12] Also see Kuremoto Nami's case in Chapter 3.

[13] The Japanese government officially regards the DPRK as its most dangerous security threat, and the ROK remains ambivalent about Japan; mixed in with images of economic success and the popular culture icons exported to Japan are the territorial dispute over the tiny island of Takeshima and the debate over descriptions of Japan's colonization and the mobilization of Korean labor during WWII in Japanese history textbooks.

[14] The name Kaneko contains less explicit implications of Korean roots than the names Kanemoto or Kaneyama.

[15] It was not a major concern for the members of Paramu no kai whether or not one used his or her Korean-style name, pronounced in the Korean way, in everyday life and on official documents. They advocated expressing being both Korean and Japanese through the sharing of individual life histories. Thus, Yasuda Naoto, a prominent member of Paramu no kai, considers that it was not a political movement with a particular objective. Paramu no kai was an attempt to cut off the argument about what it means to be *zainichi* from the conflict between two national collectivities (personal interview, September 16, 1999). Paramu no kai starkly contrasted with Torimodosu-kai, in that the individuals attending its meetings did not share a particular objective, goal or identity. They would refuse any typology, as found in comparisons between a Korean-Japanese approach and a legally-Japanese Korean approach.

[16] For example, Pak (b. 1944, second-generation) became naturalized on his own in order to assuage his Japanese fiancée's parents' objections to their marriage—the fiancée's mother had attempted suicide. In those days, Pak had no alternative but to choose a Japanese-style name in order for his naturalization to be approved. Chong (b. 1956, third-generation) became naturalized because his parents had done so. Yun (b. 1951), whose mother was Japanese and whose father had been born in Korea and migrated to Japan when he was two, gained Japanese nationality upon his birth. This was because her parents had not reported their marriage, leading to Yun automatically becoming a Japanese national, in the period prior to the aforementioned Nationality Law Amendment.

[17] The life history narratives of other *zainichi* Korean activists' share the common trait of including a series of crucial turning points. See Kuraishi (2007: 55, 220) for a set of expected narratives among both interviewers and interviewees.

[18] Younger Paramu no kai members did not particularly share a historical consciousness of being *zainichi*. Yet, they also faced rejection from the Korean community in Japan because of having Japanese nationality and/or partial Japanese family lineage while nevertheless not identifying with the Japanese majority. They felt constrained in expressing their identities, not an uncommon experience among *zainichi* individuals detached from *zainichi* organizations.

[19] The Hinomaru (rising sun) flag and Kimigayo (your reign) anthem have historically symbolized the prewar, expansionist nation-state. Because of their association with millions of deaths during the war, these are contested de facto national symbols (Field 1993: Ch.1; Tanaka 2000) (See Chapter 6).

[20] As I will discuss later, grassroots activists' very commitment became the object of mockery among some accommodative *zainichi* Korean opinion makers. Torimodosu-kai members were not directly attacked, however, probably because of their level of commitment to their local areas and rather restricted appearance in the mass media.

[21] The writings of Tei and Asakawa are also examined by Lie (2008), using slightly different source materials.

[22] Consistent with his well-known argument that *zainichi* Koreans should obtain Japanese nationality, Tei became naturalized in 2004, writing a series of essays about his naturalization (2004a, 2004b, 2004c) in the moderately conservative monthly, *Chuōkōron*. The timing of Tei's naturalization was mostly for his son's convenience (although, of course, his son did not have a voice in Tei's writings, and readers were informed only of the father's reasoning). While his wife, a South Korean from Korea, lives and works in Seoul, his son moved to Japan when he was nine, "quickly became fluent in Japanese, distanced himself from his hometown [Korean] society and culture, and to me, has been a Japanese son for long enough, so Japanese nationality is a better match for him. If possible, I thought it would be better [for him to become naturalized] before he graduates from high school, so I filed the application last summer. I thought it would take a year or so, but it was granted much quicker than I thought" (2004a: 208). Tei implies that the entire naturalization procedure ended up being not so cumbersome, instead quite fair and reasonable, even though he had to adopt a name other than his last name Tei (2004a: 209-210).

[23] Nagoya University is one of the seven former Imperial universities, and a more prestigious national university than national universities established after WWII.

[24] While he was a graduate student, he mainly wrote for university-based review-free academic journals. Asakawa's homepage provides pdf-files of his articles, except for his *zainichi*-related opinion pieces. When I started working on this project in November, 2005, they were downloadable, but are no longer available. The articles are published in a monograph (Asakawa 2006).

[25] He received his Ph.D. in the same year that he began working at Nagoya University, but from his employer, not from his graduate school, which is unusual.

[26] Tei and Asakawa's name-calling tactics challenge the convention of depersonalized academic exchanges. Tei's critique of the aforementioned Shin Sugo is sexist. Citing the non-fiction writer Sataka Shin's interview with Shin Sugo, Tei denies the credibility of Shin's comments, viewing them as "spontaneous and improvising," "sprinkled with errors and lack of knowledge," (Tei 2004d: 193) and judging her comments to be "OK at a bar, but not on the pages of [the academic and prestigious journal] *Sekai"* (Tei 2001: 187). Paralleling his criticism of Kang's priest-like way of speaking, Tei portrays Shin as a shaman or a possessed spirit (Tei 2004: 196). Tei's critique of Kang Sangjung and Shin Sugo is made in the context of responding to the controversial criminal case of Kim Hiro. According to Tei, regardless of the context in which their comments are made, *zainichi* Koreans who blame the system, and the Japanese media that legitimize the social critique of *zainichi* commentaries for the sake of authenticity, deserve denunciation.

[27] However, only the popular public intellectuals who appear on TV are under attack. Jung Yeong-hae, a critical feminist *zainichi* sociologist whose activities remain primarily on campus, is exempted from their public attacks.

[28] *Chōsen sōren* is the Japanese name of the pro-Pyongyang *zainichi* Korean organization *Chongryun*. See Introduction.

[29] The *Shinsho* series includes academic paperbacks published by major publishing houses for

a mass-market readership, priced at about $6 a copy.

[30] The former is conservative and the latter nationalist. See Appendix 2.

[31] The back cover includes a synopsis, as well as other titles from *Bunshun Shinsho* by writers with conservative tones and topics, such as "Where Takeshima belongs," addressing a favorite topic among conservatives, a territorial dispute between Japan and South Korea.

[32] Tanaka has been at Ryūkoku University since his age-enforced retirement from Hitotsubashi University, a competitive national university specializing in the social sciences.

[33] Ōnuma is Professor of Law at Tokyo University, the most prestigious department of the most prestigious university in Japan.

[34] A major national newspaper known for its relatively progressive tone, leading it to become the target of criticism on the internet (see Appendix 2 and Chapter 7).

[35] Tei (2004d) criticizes Norma Field, the University of Chicago-based scholar of Japanese literature, on her alleged emphasis on *zainichi* victimhood (Field 1993). Norma Field's article has been translated into Japanese and published in Japan. What Field discusses is the exact opposite of Tei's individualistic solution, pointing out how the overcoming of oppression by a minority leads to the production of another form of oppression, and exploring the potential for alternative discourses.

[36] Ōnuma's monograph, *Beyond the myth of the homogeneous society:* Zainichi *Koreans and the Japanese immigration control system* [*Tan'itsu minzoku shakai no shinwa o koete: Zainichi kankoku/chosenjin to shutsunyūgokukanri taisei*] (1986), clarifies the systematic injustices suffered by *zainichi* Koreans during the post-WWII period.

[37] Tei Taikin uses the Sino-Japanese pronunciation of his name, while his sister uses the Sino-Korean version. The aforementioned 1986 piece by Tei also expresses skepticism about his sister's participation in the campaign against the fingerprinting requirement for alien registration. See Chapter 6 for the aftermath of Chong Hyanggyun's court case.

[38] Articles recently published by Tei in *Shokun!* are: "My ethnic experience: An escape from a *zainichi* Korean organization—my young days as a second-generation *zainichi* under the influence of my Korean father and committed *zainichi* Korean activist brother" (2005a) and "Is the Tokyo metropolitan government's refusal to allow foreigners to take promotion exams a [form of] 'discrimination'? A distorted *zainichi* 'idol': A question for grassroots activists who praise my sister, who persistently refuses to become Korean Japanese" (2005b). The titles of these articles alone are sufficient to highlight Tei's pattern of constantly critiquing organized and grassroots *zainichi* Koreans who attach specific meanings to the historical context of colonization.

[39] I have no idea why Kang and others are *zainichi* ideologues, while Asakawa himself is not.

[40] Kang Sangjung never responded to his labeling by Tei and Asakawa as a *zainichi* ideologue, probably because he is fully aware of the cost of media exposure. In a published dialogue with Mori Tatsuya about Kang and Mori's co-authored book, *Sensō no seiki o koete* [Beyond the Century of War], Kang says:

> These days, I feel like I am talking with people from another planet when I am engaged in

> discussions… Recently, I have had so much in common with some foreigners (*gaikokujin*) that they are not aliens [*eirian*, transliterated in *katakana* characters] to me at all, whereas some who say they belong to the same nation as me (*dōkokujin dato iinagara*), are 'aliens' to me. There are increasingly many 'aliens' for me. Perhaps the sensibilities and fundamental way people are involved in the world have changed a lot, I do not know yet (*Shūkan Dokushojin* [Readers Weekly] 2005 1/28 (No. 2572): 2).

I am thankful to Nakashima Masaaki for drawing my attention to this piece.

[41] His popularity continues, and he hosts the Sunday Art Museum show, broadcast on the national NHK network.

[42] A brief but excellent illustration of on-air commentaries by Kang and other *zainichi* Koreans can be found in a special program aired on the national NHK network in 2000 on the changing circumstances surrounding *zainichi* Koreans. The last show in a series of half-hour programs introduces four *zainichi* guest speakers, opening with highlights of their remarks. The program was aired several months after the meeting in June 2000 between the two Kims, South Korean President Kim Daejung and North Korean President Kim Jong-il. This was two years before Kim Jong-il admitted his agents' abduction of ordinary Japanese people in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and thus all the speakers' tones are relatively optimistic. Kang Sangjung argues: "We are finally standing on our own two feet. Now we can stand on our own at a time when Korean power, in the pursuit of self-realization in culture, sports and other fields, is gradually emergent …" There are three other *zainichi* guest speakers. Park Il, a professor of economics, argues that: "The problem is about our younger generations maintaining ties with the Korean homeland; nobody moves because of conventional patriotism any longer, what matters is whether or not it makes a profit as a business," showing a very pragmatic take on the causes of the *zainichi* diaspora. Lee Bong-woo, a film producer, comments that: "…the *zainichi* presence in Japan—well, we happen to be called *zainichi*—is no longer a taboo or anything like that, but a jewel of Japanese culture." Shin Sugo, a human resources consultant, another one of Tei's straw figures, is the last to appear, addressing to Japanese public: "Right next to you, both you and I are living. And it is *you* who hold onto these people's lives and rights. Rather than the faraway fatherland, I would like to walk with *you*, that's how I think" (original emphasis in speech).

[43] Suh is influential in imagining *zainichi* Koreans as part of a diaspora. His brothers were arrested in South Korea while attending college there for the alleged political crime of collaborating with communists (i.e. North Korea).

[44] The Japanese term used here is *mensekifu*, which reminds people of the historical term *menzaifu* ("indulgence") that was rejected by Martin Luther's Reformation movement. This piece is part of a special feature: "Good men and good women of the world of opinion: Thorough critiques of the 'respectable' arguments of opinion leaders who frequently appear in newspapers and on television." Individuals criticized in this series of articles include Ueno Chizuko, a prominent feminist scholar, and Kōyama Rika, a progressive psychiatrist.

[45] John Lie views Asakawa and Tei as representing examples of more "reconciled" *zainichi* Korean intellectuals, rather than as "neocons." (2008: Ch.5).

[46] Asakawa also publishes for a more academic audience, his works including an oft-cited survey-based research piece regarding naturalized Koreans (2003) and another providing a historical documentation of Japan's naturalization procedure (2007). He considers his *zainichi* critique work as

a way of contributing to a wider audience rather than remaining concealed in an ivory tower (Asakawa 2006: 186).

[47] John Lie (2001, 2008) develops a similar argument, more concerned with which systems enabled Japan to enjoy an extended period of high economic high growth.

[48] Fukuoka Yasunori's (1993: 88-98) analysis of identity among *zainichi* Korean youth proposes a quadrant model along two axes: 1) the extent to which one considers the history of oppressed Koreans in Japan significant, and; 2) the extent to which one feels attachment to Japan as one's place of birth. Adapting his model, Sasaki Teru (2006: 111-112) also uses a quadrant model to examine naturalized Japanese. Sasaki's two axes are: 1) the personal significance of one's [Korean] roots, and; 2) one's [level of] identification with Japanese. Fukuoka and Sasaki's nearly identical models primarily focus on subjective identifications. How others perceive them needs to be taken into account.

[49] The presentation of these case studies is not intended to generalize the results; they provide illustrative insights into experiences.

[50] Except for Yang-i, whose abridged life history is in print due to his grass-roots activism, the names have been altered to protect the privacy of interviewees. The direct quotes in this section are the respondents' own words, taken from my transcribed interviews with them.

[51] Among Shizuko's four children, the eldest (daughter), already married to a Japanese-Japanese, became naturalized at the same time as Shizuko, applying independently for naturalization. Shizuko's youngest child was studying in the US at the time of the family's naturalization, and she had just filed the application at the time of my interview with Shizuko.

[52] The party was held at an eclectic Asian ethnic food restaurant in Tokyo, which turned out to be owned by a Japanese and *zainichi* Korean couple. The entire restaurant, with approximately twenty seats, was reserved for our group. The *zainichi* Korean wife and co-owner talked to us after overhearing the word "*zainichi*" in our conversations.

[53] In Korean ancestry worship, the Japanese-style Buddhist altar is not usually present.

[54] See Fukuoka (2001).

[55] *Chan* is a diminutive form used among friends and when addressing or talking about young children (especially girls). Taka-*chan* follows a common pattern of nicknaming in Japanese, combining first two sounds of either first or last name.

[56] The first passport issued to him after his legal name change contained the Japanese pronunciation of his name, Tei, Ryōji, which he immediately protested against.

[57] See Oshima 1998, for a case of a naturalized Japanese from India.

[58] In Japan, it is parents' responsibility to have the child officially recognized to exist by reporting. In the U.S., most typically, hospitals handle all the paperwork.

[59] Japanese passport applications require an official transcript of one's family registry.

[60] While the term *kankoku-jin* is used in reference to South Koreans, *chōsen-jin* is a more historic term, used to refer in a generic way to Korean peninsular origins, and often used in a derogatory way in contemporary Japanese. Many Korean activists actively choose this derogatory term as a tool of resistance.

CHAPTER SIX

From Identity to Social Transformation: Case Studies of Two Activist Organizations

People	*Ningen*
Roughly-cut are more likely	*Arakezuri no hō ga*
To get screwed up	*Son o suru*
It's better	*Subesube*
To have a smooth surface	*Shite-ita hō ga yoi*
But that	*Demo sore ja*
Will not make this society	*Kono yononaka*
A better place at all	*Zenzen yoku naranai*

[….]

——Oka, Masafumi (1985 [1976]: 123),[1] untitled.

This chapter explores how close relationships between personal goals and organizational aims lead to critical forms of civic engagement in which individual thoughts are translated into collective, community-based actions. I ask whether this process can be understood as one through which the individuals concerned truly become Japanese. As in the case of Japanese becoming Japanese-Americans through their movement to gain redress for their treatment during WWII, as explored by Yasuko Takezawa (1995), we can ask whether local groups encompassing both *zainichi* Koreans and their Japanese neighbors represent emergent moments in which *zainichi* Koreans become Korean-Japanese or (Korean) Japanese? Continuing my exploration of the boundaries between the personal and the collective from the previous two chapters, I will examine the foundation and continuing activities of two different local, community-based groups. The identity of the first, Han-madang, which originally thrived in an environment characterized by the constant critique of Japan's aggressive past as a nation of colonizers and military expansionists, has shifted over time, as the original members grew older and the needs of the surrounding community changed. The

other group, the Ōmi-toraijin Club, continues to send out mixed messages.

There were many methodological and coincidental rationales for my choice of which local streams of activism to explore in this chapter. First, there are similarities in the foundation stories of each group, both exhibiting an overlap between the personal and the collective. I came to know of the activities of these groups not through publicity in the national media, but through my respondents, who had become acquainted with the organizers of each group before finding out about the groups themselves. Charismatic leaders—Pak Shil in the case of Han-madang and Ha Byeong-jun in the case of the Ōmi-toraijin Club (OTC)—have played pivotal roles in relation to the establishment and continued activities of both groups. Second, my fieldwork coincided with significant turning points in the development of both groups. Han-madang was facing the issue of changing life circumstances among its members, as well as the changing political needs of the community. The other group, the Ōmi Toraijin Club, had just established a non-profit organization. These moments illustrate the making and unmaking of critical civic engagement with borderless, global visions in a particular local context. Increasingly global norms and standards, as expressed in United Nations conventions, have assisted in past *zainichi* Korean identity-related claims by providing key vocabularies that could be used to frame issues (Shin and Tsutsui 2007). Both groups were initially established in the context of personal searches for identity, rather than as the product of ideological aspirations and praxis. Both responded to the transformation of *zainichi* Korean identity in changing Japanese societal and political milieus. While retaining the framework of the international human rights discourse and syncopating with the forces of political-organizational globalization, both groups deliberately restricted their commitments to their local areas—whether neighborhood or prefecture.

1. An Imported People's Culture Movement in Transition: Fifteen Years of Han-madang

In this section, I will analyze transformations in a left-wing pro-democracy cultural movement based in the *zainichi* Korean community of Higashi-Kujō neighborhood, Kyoto, over a period of fifteen years. Based on participant observation of weekly meetings and performances, as well as interviews with members and ex-members, this section investigates how Han-madang has changed its cultural repertoire in response to changes in the local educational and political milieu, as well as in the personal circumstances of its members.

Han-madang grew out of the inspiration drawn by its original members from the *minjung mungwha* [people's culture] movement that originated as a current of South Korea's democratization movement in the 1970s and 1980s. It began as a group that performed *madang* plays, which involved interaction between performers and audience in order to increase the latter's awareness of the everyday oppression it was suffering. The emphasis of the group's activities gradually shifted toward Korean percussion performances, this transformation coinciding with the changing family commitments of members and the arrival of a political environment in which anti-Korean discrimination had become subtler and less visible. At the same time, the focus of the local Kyoto education board shifted from the politically contested issues of human rights and minority empowerment to an anodyne policy of teaching international understanding. The shift to drum-based performances also coincided with this emphasis on the celebration of cultural diversity. Han-madang navigated the contradictions between a critical consciousness of race and class oppression and the consumption of ethnicity that bordered on self-exoticism. Its experience illustrates the limits of ethnicity within the contemporary Japanese politics of representation.

Democracy in Japan has often been described as being underdeveloped. Sugimoto (1997) views its civic principles as "friendly authoritarianism"; citizens in Japan are stereotypically described as apolitical and accommodative. Movements in search of full political participation, i.e. "citizenship movement[s]" (Jasper 1997) among racial or ethnic minority members, appear non-existent, partly because the vast majority of the population presumably considers itself a homogeneous race, and society has no immediate need to address the demands of racial or ethnic minorities. Even social scientists tend to consider various minority populations as statistically negligible; precise statistics are thus unavailable (Lie 2001: 170; Sugimoto 2003: 185). In addition, protest movements in Japan have strategically resorted to litigation battles (Upham 1987). Susan Pharr (1990: 34) argues that of the four types of protest movement—class-based, issue-based (such as those concerned with pollution or land use), value-based (such as those involving new religions and right-wing groups) and status-based (such as those advocating the rights of women, ethnic minorities, or the handicapped)—it is struggles undertaken by status-based movements that have the weakest claims to legitimacy in Japan. Reflecting the tendency among researchers to focus on social movements with liberal ideologies, objectives that challenge state policy, and successful outcomes (Edelman 2001; Polleta and Jasper 2001), local based movements interested in cultural expression have received less attention.

Madang plays that encourage audience participation clearly constitute an effective and innovative strategy by a citizenship movement representing an oppressed group that also aims to encourage the broader population toward greater democratization. In Japan, as movements advocating civil rights for *zainichi* Koreans have met with increasing success, Han-madang has shifted the emphasis of its cultural production from overtly political

madang plays to apolitical Korean percussion performances. This shift opens a window onto Han-madang as a cultural citizenship movement, illustrating how changes in the life circumstances of members have interacted with larger social forces to produce a changing cultural repertoire.

Meeting Han-madang

I met Mr. Pak Shil,[2] founder of Han-madang, for the first time in late November, 1999. I had not previously thought of contacting Mr. Pak, a core member of Torimodosu-kai (the Group for Reclaiming Ethnic Names, 1985-1994, See Chapter 5). A naturalized Japanese of colonial Korean descent, he was the first such person to legally restore his original Korean name.

Journalists have featured Mr. Pak in interviews and TV documentaries, and he has also appeared in Torimodosu-kai publications, particularly from the late 1980s on. More recently, Tanaka Nobunao (2000) has written monograph-length stories about Mr. Pak's family that appeared in serial-form in a progressive journal. I was reluctant to interview him in person and merely reproduce the narrative he had already expressed elsewhere. Korean-Japanese activists have numerous opportunities to be interviewed by journalists and scholars. Activists, journalists, and scholars often collaborate to mutual benefit—offering publicity, expanding the space in which journalists can express dissent, and allowing scholars increased opportunities to apply their skills to political issues and ideas.

Mr. Pak became naturalized in order to placate his Japanese fiancée's parents, who strongly opposed the idea of him marrying their daughter because of his Korean background. His mother-in-law had even expressed her opposition through several suicide attempts. Upon

becoming naturalized, he conformed to Ministry of Justice recommendations and officially adopted a Japanese-style name, Arai Minoru. However, he soon realized that there was nothing to be ashamed of his Korean heritage or passing his Korean family name on to his children so as to make them aware of their Korean ancestry. Discrimination [*sabetsu*][3] was what was wrong here, he realized.

A *zainichi* Korean informant advised me at the end of an interview that I would miss out on something important unless I met Mr. Pak. "He is truly genuine [*honmono*], Youngmi-*san*. You *must* meet him. Drop my name, here is the phone number." The following morning, I called him. Despite his busy schedule and the fact that he did not know me or realize why I wanted to meet him, he agreed to spare me an hour of his time.

I interviewed Mr. Pak at a coffee shop near his workplace, in the vicinity of JR Kyoto Station. After Torimodosu-kai had wound down its decade-long activities in 1994, he had primarily pursued his interest in the "people's culture movement," not only for the benefit of his fellow *zainichi* Koreans, but also for other oppressed groups in Japanese society, including the physically handicapped and the *burakumin* (a historically marginalized and persecuted status group) in Higashi-Kujō. Thus, an unexpected phase of my fieldwork began. Although I was not explicitly invited to come to the meeting during my interview with Mr. Pak, the then Han-madang homepage welcomed everybody so I became a self-invited participant-observer. I started attending Han-madang's weekly meetings, even receiving lessons on how to play the *janggo*, the Korean hourglass drum.

During the period that I attended the group's meetings, between November 1999 and April 2000, Han-madang had fourteen active members (six male and eight female), ranging

in age from their mid-twenties to their mid-sixties.[4] In 2002, I interviewed one former member in Tokyo. Also in 2002, I visited the Tenth Higashi Kujō Madang Festival, using this opportunity to conduct additional interviews with another former member and one Japanese member. I have maintained correspondence with Mr. Pak once a year since my last visit to Higashi Kujō.

Han-madang means "one communal open space" (the term *han*[5] also being associated with feelings of longing for the unification of Korea). Its diverse membership, which includes men and women, young and old, *zainichi* Koreans and Japanese, and people with and without handicaps, gathers in one place for its meetings and activities. During the period of my visits, its members included naturalized Japanese with legally registered Korean ethnic names,[6] naturalized Japanese with Japanese-style legal names using Korean first names at Han-madang meetings, *zainichi* Koreans using Korean names and raising children of dual heritage, a Japanese whose father was *zainichi* Korean and who used her Korean name at Han-madang meetings, and a *zainichi* Korean who used her Korean name only at these meetings. Members also included a Japanese of *burakumin* background, and a Japanese with a registered handicap.

Members had a variety of educational backgrounds. There was a *zainichi* Korean who had been educated at a pro-DPRK Korean school, and a member of dual Korean and Japanese heritage who had attended a pro-ROK Korean middle school in order to avoid Japanese public schooling at the height of the Hinomaru-Kimigayo[7] controversy. Most members of Korean background had never attended Korean schools. More than two-thirds of the active members had graduated from college. Older members had experienced New Left and grassroots activism during their college days. In addition, they had clear memories of the

South Korean democratization movement, including the violent suppression of demonstrations in Kwang-ju by the military in 1980.

The group's core collective identity was a pro-democracy one, claiming no explicit orientation to the Left, although older members were of the generation involved in turbulent student activism. Kyoto, the ancient capital of Japan, has an unorthodox political history. It is one of the strongest bases of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), and although recent mayors have not come from this party, local politics has been under the majority control of forces other than the conservative Liberal Democrats who ruled Japan for much of the postwar era. Student activism thrived longer at Kyoto-based universities, such as Dōshisha and Ritsumeikan, than in other areas of Japan; the Japanese spouse of one member of Han-madang chose to attend Dōshisha precisely because student activism still existed there.

Overall, Han-madang members and their significant others with Japanese nationality had opted to pursue modest standards of living, choosing to work in the non-profit or public sectors despite their college credentials. Although underpaid, the generous benefit packages and reasonable work hours offered by their public-sector jobs allowed them to enjoy continued participation in Han-madang activities. In reality, however, almost everyone was juggling work and family commitments alongside their involvement in Han-madang activities. In 1999 and 2000, the group counted no student members, although many of the members at that time had joined when they were students. 2002 saw the arrival of the group's newest and youngest member,[8] a high school student who had grown up in Higashi Kujō and enjoyed close connections with Han-madang members from her early childhood. Her mother performed a critical role in the staging of the Madang play at the 10th Higashi Kujō Madang Festival in 2002.

Han-madang had a strong local commitment to the Higashi-Kujō area, a well-known Korean neighborhood—although the majority of residents are Japanese—where the group has its headquarters. Current members all live in Kyoto City—Kyoto also being the name of the prefecture in which the city is located—mostly in the Higashi-Kujō neighborhood. Many Koreans and *burakumin* live in the area, which is also located adjacent to one of the three largest *buraku* districts in Japan. A majority of Han-madang members also work in Higashi-Kujō. During the bubble economy of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the area's proximity to JR Kyoto Station, a major traffic hub, led to the construction of many new apartments and houses. The edges of Higashi-Kujō are traced by a number of major roads, by the Kamo and Takase Rivers, and by railroad tracks belonging to JR. A large chemical factory is also located nearby. Houses are small, some very old, and the area has a cluster of scrap metal yards. When I was staying at the Madang Center,[9] where Han-madang is based, a third-generation *zainichi* Korean acquaintance of mine who grew up in a Kyoto suburb strongly discouraged me from walking there from JR Kyoto Station at night, claiming that the neighborhood was too dangerous. While the working class neighborhood was cluttered with rusting piles of scrap metal, day laborer accommodation, and subsidized apartments, labeling Higashi-Kujō as "dangerous" was the product of outsider prejudice, tainted with traces of racial and class discrimination.

The Madang Center building has a large mural on its façade that was painted by a student from South Korea in 1996 when the Center was remodeled. It includes the words "Han-madang" in both Korean and Japanese lettering. The building is shared with Higashi-Kujō Shimin Bunko [Citizens' Library], a local meeting place for labor activists. Han-madang's office and the space used for its meetings (and practice sessions) are on the ground

floor. There are lockers in front of the entrance to the practice space, used by members to store the Korean style ballet-like shoes they use for *p'ungmul* performances as well as their personal drumsticks. Each locker has a name-tag written in the Korean alphabet; some lockers display colorful *puri-kura* stickers[10] featuring photographs of the locker's owner and other members. Right next to the front door is a trash bin for recyclables, around which younger members smoke – the indoor space is non-smoking. Older members, including Mr. Pak, do not smoke, and he often commented, "Smoking is no good." The doorway to the building leads out to a six-meter footbridge over the Takase River, over the sides of which local residents hang their oversized laundry and futon mattresses and blankets to air. During the off-season, i.e. when they are not preparing for the Higashi-Kujō Madang Festival in November, Han-madang members teach local children and adults how to play Korean drums.

The dividing-line between "noise" and "music" is unclear when it comes to the music of Others. Korean drums make loud sounds, especially the high-pitch *kkwaenggwari*, a portable tin gong, which leads the tempo and rhythms of the other drums in the ensemble. It is a perfect tool for mass demonstrations. When Han-madang remodeled its practice space, it added curtains and several types of soundproofing device to the walls. In general, neighbors accept the one to two hours of drum practice that occurs several times a week. But when Han-madang members, as part of a larger local unit representing the Higashi-Kujō Madang Festival, participated in the Kyoto Festival parade (a relatively new festival, started in 1993), quieter units in the parade from the neighboring areas complained that the *p'ungmul* was noisy. In Higashi-Kujō, however, Korean drums have gained a form of cultural citizenship.

The members hold weekly meetings on Thursdays, between 6:30 and around 9 o'clock. The first half of each meeting is typically devoted to Korean drum practice, and the

second half to administrative matters, such as collecting membership dues, exchanging information (distributing fliers for political meetings and events, for example), organizing members for particular outside events, deciding the content of the next performance, and so on.

The atmosphere is open, with local children and mothers with connections to members dropping by. The workplaces of many members are located in the neighborhood. Two members work at a local Catholic nursery school, another at a local nursing home, and another as the superintendent of a local government-subsidized housing unit. Mr. Pak, who is a musician, gives piano lessons in his studio, a wooden tenement where his grandmother used to live. People drop by for different reasons, expecting to find Mr. Pak and other members there on Thursday evenings. Members occasionally go out to local pubs to eat and drink after meetings, although the group's seasonal parties, such as its year-end party, take place at the Madang Center itself. These local connections, however, are matters of shared political concern rather than based on geographical proximity.

From *Madang-guk* to *Madan-geki*

Han-madang made its debut in 1986 as a company performing *madan-geki*, an interactive theatrical genre imported from South Korea where actors and audience share in the process of performing and articulating contemporary social problems. Their debut performance was of the play"*Teji-pulri*"[11] The play was translated from Korean into Japanese (the songs retaining many of their Korean phrases) and performed over two days at the Kyoto Buraku Liberation Center[12] (Han-madang n.d.; Han-madang 1986). Han-madang originally consisted of young people involved in activist groups based in Higashi-Kujō. These included the

Sākuru Zaeil ("*Zainichi* Circle"),[13] a group that studied about Koreans in Japan and counted among its ranks Mr. Pak and other core members of Han-madang. In addition, members of an independent Korean language program based at Kyoto University also participated. Its Korean instructor, Ryang Min-ki [Mingi], played a key role in introducing *madang-guk* to *zainichi* Koreans (Ryōchi Kai 1997: 82) through his translation of scripts and articles from South Korea, and Han-madang members referred to him respectfully as "Ryang-*seonsaeng-nim"* ("Teacher Ryang").[14]

Madang-guk was inseparable from South Korean student and labor activism under the military regimes that ruled the country from the 1960s until the 1980s. *Madang-guk* is "an open, theatrical performance, i.e. the actors and audience create the performance together, and the audience can become the protagonist" (Im 1980 in Ryang 1988: xi). As for its forms and styles of expression, *madang-guk* appropriates various forms of performing folk art, such as mask-dance drama, *nong-ak* (farmers' music), and shamanistic rituals from different regions. It often begins with a shamanistic ritual, the *kut*, and ends with epilogues in which both actors and audience join together, whether dancing and singing, engaging in debate, or hitting the streets for a demonstration. As *madang-guk* increased in popularity as an expression of dissent, it emphasized rituals of collective ecstasy (Choi 1995a: 115). An ethnographic account of student demonstrations and election forums from the late 1980s describes how shamanistic *kut* rituals associated with *madang-guk* often preceded these events (Tangherlini 1998).

Building on the assertion that cultural production should be in the hands of the people (as argued by the proponents of the *minjung munwha* or "people's culture" movement), *madang-guk* is, first of all, "a subjective play, which builds on the spirit, content, and style of

Korean traditional folk performances and plays and reconstructs them creatively in contemporary contexts, breaking through colonial historical perspectives" (Ch'ae and Im 1982 in M. Ryang 1988: xii-xiii). Second, it also aims at "establishing paths for self-expression based on one's own production, supply, and reassurance, while resolving the gap between the mass-media production of culture and the mass consumer; it is a direct production of culture, created by the people for the people themselves for the good of the people" (ibid.). Third, "Rather than being a play as [a form of] leisure for nihilistic high culture consumers, it is a play [that acts] as live ammunition, with which alienated people [can] regain [their] strength to live. This human-centered art form would resolve the cultural gap across regions and classes" (ibid.). Ironically, however, this theorization of *madang-guk* appeals almost exclusively to intellectuals. Not surprisingly, Im Chint'aek, a central figure in *madang-guk* production, is from South Korea's elitist Seoul National University.

Madang-guk is anti-establishment, emerging from the era of pro-democracy struggles. The plays are democratic, both in an analogical and direct sense, in their form, style, and content, in that the audience participates in improvised dialogues with the actors. Specifically, as Chungmoo Choi (1995: 254) asserts, *madang-guk* "signifies a form of resistance to the capitalistic mode of production that is governed by the international market and by the symbolic struggle of the people against the dehumanizing capitalistic force." Broadly, it also signifies multiple structural sources of oppressions—be they capitalism, colonialism, imperialism, or neo-colonialism.

Social and nationalist movements in South Korea are often unification movements (Abelmann 1993: 140). People's subjectivity, when restored in the form of cultural production, can broadly address Korean national subjectivity. *Madang-guk*'s dramatic

moments have been effectively used for consciousness-raising among the oppressed, especially when collective catharsis is attained, i.e. when the fundamental causes of people's suffering are exposed and the excitement of uncovering them is shared among actors and audience (Chong 1985 in M. Ryang 1988: 220).

When *madang-guk* was introduced as *madan-geki*, i.e., as a form imported to Japan, it retained its essential nationalist Korean characteristics that addressed the issue of restoring subjectivity—both collective and individual. Disturbed and distressed by the Kwangju Massacre of 1980, Ryang-*seonsaeng-nim* translated "For a New Theater," Im Chint'aek's 1980 treatise on *madang-guk*, in the fall of 1980, and it appeared in the University of Kyoto Daily [Kyoto Daigaku Shinbun]. The article caught the attention of a small publisher, who issued an anthology of translated articles and play scripts, "*Kamen-geki to madan-geki*" [Mask Plays and Madang Plays] in 1981 (M. Ryang 1988: 259). In the context of Koreans in Japan, he argues that: "As long as the life and reality of Koreans in Japan are inseparable from the reality of Koreans in the Korean homeland, *madan-geki* will be based on unique cultural styles which derive from shared Korean national sentiments, and will enhance its effectiveness" (M. Ryang 1988: 260).

In keeping with the strong commitment to nationalist sentiment expressed in *madang-guk*, the early days of Han-madang were marked by a heated debate about whether "Japanese" should be allowed to perform it. Recall that Han-madang included both Korean and Japanese members. Mr. Pak, in his presentation for Kyoto City's "Human Rights Lecture Series" (2001) noted:

> When we were practicing for Han-madang's debut *madan-geki* performance, one third-generation Korean woman said to a Japanese woman, "You! Take off [that]

> Korean dress. You [Japanese] would never understand how we [Koreans] feel when we are in Korean dress." That Korean woman had grown up using a Japanese name, hiding her Korean background, and had never had a chance to or dared to wear a Korean dress. But finally, she had restored her true self, using her Korean name, wearing a Korean dress and playing the Korean drum. Of course, the Japanese majority would never really understand that feeling. I was saddened to witness that incident. Koreans do not have an exclusive hold on Korean culture.

Returning to the South Korean context: commentators have suggested several inherent contradictions in *madang-guk*'s expressive power. First, despite *madang-guk*'s style and its ability to produce collective catharsis and consciousness-raising, it may not immediately lead to political dissent. In fact, the catharsis of shamanistic exorcism may temporarily relieve people's resentment, reducing the explosive potential for social change (Choi 1995a: 117). Korean shamanism, prior to its appropriation by dissenters, had long contributed to the maintenance of an "oppressive Confucian hegemony" and the established order (Tanghelini 1998: 132).

Second, regarding the structure in which *madang-guk* operates, while the *minjung* culture movement bridged the gap between elite and oppressed to an unprecedented extent (Choi 1995a: 117), it has tended to reproduce class cleavages. As implied in its elite theorization, intellectuals have romanticized *madang-guk* (Lee 2003: 564), and for the intellectuals and activists reaching out to the estranged masses continues to be a challenge.

***Hansei-kai* (*Sōkatsu*) [Annual Meeting for Summarizing and Reflection]**

In February 2000, Han-madang held an extended session to discuss the direction of the group's activities. The meeting, described as a *hansei-kai* or *sōkatsu* (Japanese terms with no

English equivalent, used to refer respectively to meetings held in order to reflect on past events, and general meetings), had a strict and purposeful tone, the terms themselves associated with the legacy of student activism in Japan. Members looked back on their activities during 1999, discussing both achievements and failures.

The major theme of the meeting was the decrease in the number of *madan-geki* performances in recent years, members offering their opinions about this trend and suggesting ways to turn it around. The agenda for the meeting, which took the form of a hand-out, began with a statement outlining Han-madang's two main objectives; 1) "to create a *minshū bunka* movement in Japan (echoing Ryang-*seonsaeng-nim*'s wishes)"; and 2) "to launch a local cultural festival in Higashi-Kujō (echoing Mr. Pak's wishes)."

Yamada-*san,* a *madan-geki* expert in the group who had performed Kim Chi-ha's plays[15] in an amateur company prior to joining Han-madang, analyzed the situation from two angles. Firstly, members that were experienced performers of *madan-geki* had less available time due to their personal circumstances, which included relocation and child-rearing responsibilities. This was a matter of "biographical availabilities" (McAdams 1988), involving the relationship between participants' stages of life and the amount of time and energy they could commit to the movements to which they belonged. Secondly, and more fundamentally, it had been increasingly difficult to find a theme for *madan-geki* performances, as forms of discrimination had become less immediate and less tangible. Yamada-*san* mentioned that the problem now was not, strictly speaking, associated with human rights and discrimination. Han-madang could not re-articulate material and themes for *madan-geki* scripts, and members no longer had large amounts of time to collaborate and create original performances.

Younger members also shared their critical feelings about the reduction in the frequency of *madan-geki* performances by Han-madang. Mi-sook agreed with the argument that many potential *madan-geki* themes involved intangible aspects of life that were difficult to articulate on the stage. However, she asserted that, in such circumstances, what Han-madang should do was participate in school performances and support the Higashi-Kujō Madang Festival. There, Han-madang played an important role in many of the programs, supplying Korean drum instructors as well as offering advice and direction for *madang* plays. It also participated in the symbolic event that marked the climax of the festival, "Wadaiko-*samul*,"[16] an intensive Korean percussion performance that involved collaboration with a traditional Japanese percussion group. While younger members, one after another, continued expressing their regrets about Han-madang not performing *madan-geki* as independent performances, they unanimously welcomed the above collaboration they had with the Japanese drum ensemble that performed in the Higashi-Kujō Madang Festival. Mr. Pak also held this collaboration in high regard, as the manufacturing of Japanese drums had been historically one of the major *buraku* industries, symbolizing other forms of oppression and contradiction within Japanese society. Mi-sook also noted that Han-madang could also make itself known through its school performances, but was also uncertain whether she had the time and energy to commit to staging *madan-geki*.

Everyday work and family life were priorities for married members. Dae-i, an official Han-madang representative who had taken up a new job and relocated his family to Kyoto in order to participate in the group, pointed out that activism could be pursued only after activists and their families had succeeded in making a living. He later explained to me, "Whether or not I emphasize my Korean identity at work matters only after I prove to myself

that I can perform my job impeccably." To justify his commitment to Han-madang, he thinks he needs to be a perfect worker. After working as a white-collar employee in real estate, at the time of the *hansei-kai* he was about to begin his new job as a bus driver working for Kyoto City. While he had taken on his new job in part to facilitate his commute to Han-madang activities, and while his wife's family also lived in Kyoto, his self-imposed pressure to become an impeccable worker illustrates the burden activists face when making claims on society, holding themselves up to higher standards and feeling obliged to be good workers and good parents.

Furuhata-*san,* an original member who had returned to Han-madang meetings and school performances in recent years, argued that school performances by Han-madang were more likely to be interpreted as part of an education fostering "International Understanding" rather than as a vehicle for raising awareness of "Human Rights," as had been the case in the past. His argument reflected his life experience. A Japanese who identified with his own working class origins and advocated critical thinking, he was employed at a high-school teaching social studies, a polemical subject in Japanese schooling that addresses Japan's wartime responsibilities. Facing the need to introduce other cultures, primarily through the use of fun elements, such as food, music and traditional games, Furuhata-*san* asked why it was necessary for Han-madang to perform if the educational goal was just to introduce other cultures? Younger members expressed their opinion that these were concerns for the education authorities and not for Han-madang. However, they also agreed that there were affective as well as instrumental justifications for their school performances, which they considered vehicles for self-expression. Even if they focused only on the fun aspects, leaving aside serious matters such as historical and contemporary problems associated with colonial

rule and racism, younger members considered this better than nothing—interesting audiences in Korean culture was a good beginning.

In concluding the meeting, however, members restated their belief that the priority was to stage original *madan-geki* performances, initiating plans to perform five months later at the Madang Center. *Madan-geki* had been performed at the Higashi-Kujō Madang Festival since its launch in 1993. Han-madang members, depending on the year, had supported *madan-geki* performances at the Higashi-Kujō Madang Festival as individuals rather than as Han-madang members. At the end of the meeting, members agreed to make efforts to collaborate on a script and stage a performance in July 2000.

At the regular meeting and practice session the following week, members received two original *madan-geki* scripts. The major theme of one of them was the generation gap between older and younger Koreans in Japan. Ryang-*seonsaeng-nim's* daughter, a member since the mid-1990s, contributed another draft script, which touched on the relationship between humans and water as well as the theme of Korean unification. Once they had agreed on staging an original *madan-geki* performance, everything moved swiftly, with members first reading the scripts aloud, and then acting out the plays a week later. However, when I returned to the field in the fall of 2000, I found that the original *madan-geki* performance they had planned to stage in July 2000 had never taken place. Han-madang members had instead given up their plans and gone to the aid of the organizers of the Higashi-Kujō Madang Festival, who needed to draw upon the experience of the group's core members for other roles.

Gakkō Kōen **(School Performance): Performing "International Understanding"**

On Saturday, December 16, 2000, Han-madang completed two school performances, one at a select public high school and the other at a neighborhood elementary school. These two performances illustrated how Han-madang was able to incorporate "fun" in representing another culture.

At the high school, Han-madang members started their performance as they entered the school's gymnasium, where an audience of tenth graders sat in a haphazard fashion on a cold wooden floor. Accompanied by a large banner in Korean script that read, "*minjung munhwa pae han-madang*" [People's Culture Unit Han-madang], members approached students as they played Korean drums. Han-madang was introduced as a Kyoto-based group of Koreans and Japanese that performed Korean traditional music and plays. After offering greetings and receiving applause, Mi-sook translated the group's name as "one open space," and moved on to an introductory explanation of the genre of Korean farmer's music known as *nong-ak,* which originated in communal harvest celebrations. The core program of the performance included a song that introduced the Korean alphabet and an introduction to forms of traditional outdoor games. Students were also able to try their hands at Korean drumming. The event finished with a *samul* performance by a seated percussion ensemble using four different Korean drums.

As noted above, one of the songs, the *"Ka-na-ta-ra"* song, was about the fun of learning the Korean alphabet. Ten volunteers from the audience displayed large poster boards with Korean vowels that they had to match to words in the song; when the tempo increased, their up-and-down motions made the audience laugh. Mi-sook explained that the alphabet was phonetic, and introduced a simple vocabulary made only of vowels, such as *oi* ("cucumber"). This was followed by a demonstration of the *noltigi*, a Korean see-saw which

uses a board and sand bags and has no fixed center, accompanied by an explanation that upper class Korean women had previously used it to peer illicitly over the walls of their compounds for a view of the outside world. A few male students tried the *noltigi*, occasionally provoking roars of laughter.

After the members had quickly put away the *noltigi* board, five students sat down at the front with the performers and had a *janggo* lesson, which came with an explanation of *je* and *gun*, the different types of drumstick for each hand. As was the case with Han-madang's own practice sessions, the lesson was launched with the Korean count, *"Shī-ja!"* The performance ended with Han-madang's standard rendering of the *samul*, which the members had performed so many times that they were able to fully relax and enjoy themselves.

The performance at the high school terminated exactly on time at 9:50am. The next performance, at an elementary school, would start at 11:30. The members dismantled their large equipment, put everything in a van, and drove off. At the elementary school, the entire school—from grade one to six—attended. The core program was the same as that which had just been performed for the high-school students, except for the addition of one song, *"Ap'-euro"* ("Forward"), about the children of the world getting along and moving forward, and the omission of the section on Korean drums. As in the *"Ka-na-ta-ra"* song, *"Ap'-euro"* included bilingual features—Korean refrains, and Japanese words played first with Korean words following. Both songs, in major scales, sounded happy and optimistic, had easy-to-remember tunes and were accompanied by sing-along gestures.

While most of the high school students remained alert during Han-madang's performance, one group hardly paid any attention, and talked constantly. The elementary

school students, by contrast, remained engaged throughout Han-madang's performance. While changing back into their street clothes, members half-jokingly commented on this contrast with remarks such as, "Cast the iron while it is hot!" and "Well, at high-school age, no matter what adults do, everything is boring."

Changing Life Stages, Societal Milieus, and Forms of Expression

Madang-guk and the people's culture movement in South Korea stagnated in South Korea as democracy took firm hold there in the 1990s (Choi 1995a; 1995b: 259-260). Han-madang faced a similar decline in social activism in Japan. Han-madang performed *madan-geki* on fewer occasions as the various organizations that it was allied to lost their immediate political causes.

In this section, I will explore several factors that influenced shifts in Han-madang's expressional repertoire over its fifteen years of activity. As Han-madang members had come to understand, present forms of oppression were subtle and obscure, making it difficult to appeal to the urgent democratic themes that were a feature of its original *madan-geki* performances. On a personal level, as their home and work commitments increased, members found less time available to devote to practice sessions and performances, this state of affairs also affecting the content of Han-madang's activism.

A chapter of history closed when the government announced the end of fingerprinting requirements for alien registration and created a category for special permanent residents in 1991 (the actual enactment of the revised Alien Registration Law was in 1993, see Chapter 1). However, some Koreans and Japanese continued to oppose the law that requires foreigners to

carry alien registration cards.

In 1987, Han-madang presented "*Sonkarak*" ("Fingers"), a *madan-geki* written by several of its members. It raised important issues related to the experiences of Koreans in Japan. Scenes from the play included depictions of an illiterate old woman's difficulties in being fingerprinted, a sixteen-year-old girl's refusal to be fingerprinted—and her family's reactions—and her grandfather's experiences under colonialism. In addition, the *madan-geki* featured exchanges between officers in the Ministry of Justice concerning anti-fingerprint protests.

The final scene ended on an ironic note. A high ranking officer who was planning to celebrate his daughter's birthday in the near future became angry when a source connected with the Recruit Company, a firm accused of bribing politicians, revealed his daughter's wishes for her birthday gift. He blurted out, "That's an invasion of my privacy!" Because the anti-fingerprinting campaign was framed as the ultimate violation of privacy and human rights, this officer's consciousness about privacy traps him into a contradictory position. The epilogue was immediately followed by a period of chanting, as might occur during a political demonstration. Because the political problem addressed was a specific one, the play was effective in establishing a bond with the audience, i.e., with Koreans and Japanese who opposed fingerprinting. Yet, the play's message had little more than historical relevance for the post-fingerprinting generations.

In 1999, the Lower and Upper Houses of the Diet passed a controversial law related to the national anthem and flag. The lyrics of Kimigayo celebrate the Emperor's long life and the Hinomaru flag symbolizes the Japanese Empire. At the core of this debate regarding the

national anthem and flag are fundamental questions about Japan's responsibilities in relation to a war fought in the name of its Emperor that resulted in unprecedented civilian sacrifice. Post-war Japan never adopted alternative national symbols, and the controversy rages on. Although no clauses in the *Hinomaru-Kimigayo* legislation [*Kokki kokka seiteihō*] of 1999 included formal sanctions, educators, whether or not they were union members, were liable to official sanction according to local education board policy if they refused to stand while Kimigayo was playing. The use of the Hinomaru and Kimigayo song during formal ceremonial occasions at public schools was never standardized; the decision was left up to school administrators.[17]

Gradual reinforcement on the part of the state, through the Ministry of Education, began in the mid-1980s, the catchphrase of the era ironically being "internationalization" (*kokusaika*). Kyoto City public schools were the scenes of turbulent dissent during the late 1980s, with only three percent of elementary schools including the singing of Kimigayo during their commencement ceremonies in 1985. A year later, the proportion rose to 59 percent, and in 1992, to 86 percent (Tanaka 2000: 164-165; 244). Many local residents rallied against the Kimigayo (and the Hinomaru) in Kyoto during the late 1980s. Despite negotiations between Mr. Pak and other parents and the school their children were attending aimed at stopping the singing of Kimigayo during the commencement ceremony, the school reversed its decision at the last minute and played Kimigayo. Mr. Pak and his children left in the middle of the ceremony. Later that year, Mr. Pak composed a symphony entitled: *"Kutsujoku no 1987-nen* ("1987: The Year of Humiliation") which he decided never to perform (Tanaka 2000: 23-24). Han-madang's original *madan-geki, "Kimi ga utawanai nara boku mo utawanai"* ("If You Don't Sing, I Won't") (1987) was a timely production.

The play centered around exchanges between the exaggeratedly bureaucratic female principal of Dai-Tō-A Elementary School (the school's name recalling *Dai-Tō-A-Kyōei-Ken*, the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japan's pre-WWII area of expansion), named Hinomaru Kimiyo (her name mimicking Hinomaru and Kimigayo), and dissenting parents and students. The play ended deliberately without a conclusion, in order to provide an opening for a discussion among the audience.

The issue of the level of commitment to Han-madang raised at its *hansei-kai* meeting must be seen through the lens of gender relations. Two female members who had previously been actively involved in the group found regular attendance at meetings difficult, even if it were only once a week. Both married in the early 1990s and were now raising teenagers. When their children were small, they were able to bring them to meetings. Once they became adolescents, their mothers felt the need to be available for them as they began to face the problems typical of teenagers. Hwa-mi, one of the founding members, implied that there was a moral obligation to avoid evening meetings as much as possible, "If you are a family of four, and if someone is missing, something feels strange. And while nobody explicitly says anything about it, the rest of the family puts in a lot of effort to replace the missing one. And my work at the nursing home involves several evening shifts anyway. But when I agree to participate in a school performance, I make it to the meeting to prepare for the performance."

An ex-member claims that personal circumstances may be an excuse for members' decreased interest in its activities. He joined Han-madang when it was active in staging *madan-geki* performances. Although he half-jokingly explained to me that he had been the Han-madang "entertainment section chief,"[18] this being the reason he still came to Han-madang's annual barbeque party in April, he explained how ecstatic he was to perform in a

play, even if he just appeared as the rear legs of a tiger. Self-employed and married with three children, it was difficult for him to keep coming to the regular meetings, but he added, "There is no such thing as an excuse like 'I have no time.' You just manage your schedule when you are doing something you really, really want to do, you know." This ex-member considered the main reason for his withdrawal from Han-madang to be the group's level of commitment to the Higashi-Kujō neighborhood. He was neither from the area nor worked in the area, and explained, "I have never been to the Higashi-Kujō Madang Festival so far. At present, Han-madang is too committed to that festival—November 3rd is holy Christmas now." As for difficulties experienced by female members in continuing their participation once they had moved onto the child-rearing stage of life, he said, "I think perhaps their politically liberal husbands are not really excited about the idea that their wives, the mothers of their children, are out, leaving the children alone at home. Had the husbands cooperated more, the story would have been different." He added that he was a typical husband and father whose only household task was to take out the trash, even though his wife worked full-time.

Second, the challenges presented by interlocking forms of oppression complicated the conundrums of resistance and accommodation. Gender-related discrimination tended to be relegated to a lower priority than racism, colonialism, global capitalism, or other forms of oppression. Han-madang's internal division of labor is rather conventional. Its chair has always been a male. The first chair left the group a year and a half after its establishment to start a job in Tokyo. When I met him in Tokyo in 2002, he asserted that he had become the chair because he was male, Korean, and a student. In other words, he was categorically appropriate. In recent years, Mi-sook has been in charge of accounting. It might be because

her work as a medical clerk is closest in content to accounting, but her accounting role fits well with a conventional division of labor that is also found in co-educational university clubs, for example.

An insensitivity regarding roles and forms of expression occurs in the group, although this is not, I believe, intentional. To illustrate, when the script of "*Teji-pulri*" was translated and introduced to the group, some vulgar jokes remained in the text. "*Teji-pulri*" is a critique of the Korean state and its farming policy that borrows from dependency theory. In a scene set in a farmer's market, a fan seller exclaims, "Get the fan with the bent head to fan the armpit odor of the unmarried daughter who is over thirty! Get the Taeguk fan of the Independent Army that smashed the balls of Japanese men! [….] What about a democratic fan to blow away tear-gas when you demonstrate? […]" (Han-madang 1986). References to the Taeguk fan and democracy are respectively associated with anti-colonial and pro-democracy messages, while the reference to the woman is gratuitously sexist. In the Hinomaru-Kimigayo protest play *"Kimiga utawanai nara boku mo utawanai"* (Han-madang 1987), the profile of the character of school principal exaggerates the stereotypical image of a woman on a fixed career path, i.e. skinny with glasses, hysterical and irrational. In embodying an inflexible, bureaucratic person who does not think but just hysterically repeats what the superior institutions decide, it must be asked why this figure was portrayed as a stereotypical professional female?

Changes in social movements, the Mertonian role stain faced by women in the group—expected to embrace a non-oppressive ideology of anti-racism and anti-colonialism yet still uphold traditional gender roles related to family reproduction—and transformations in members' life trajectories, such as full-time entry into the labor force, marriage, and child-

rearing, affected Han-madang's mission of achieving political change through culture.

Furthermore, contradictions revolving around the limits of ethnicity in contemporary Japan and the appropriation of folk cultures, as reflected in tensions inherent in the performance of *madang* plays and the people's culture movement, influenced Han-madang's cultural production. Much as Korean folk cultures in South Korea were appropriated differently by anti-establishment movements and the state (Lee 2003: 562-563; Tanghelini 1998; Laurell 1999), those who took up Korean folk cultures in Japan to express dissent and restore their own subjectivity faced the problem of resisting the Japanese majority's desire to exoticize a culture it considered irrelevant to Japan's colonial legacy. The opportunity to present Han-madang's political project as one of "cultural exchange" was alluring. It responded to the problem of shrinking audiences for the type of political theater that *madan-geki* was meant to embody. It required less commitment from members whose lives were increasingly taken up with other responsibilities. It displaced potential conflicts over a sincerely held ideology of liberation and the traditional roles often assumed by women.

Some of the younger members felt that the school performances gave them opportunities to express themselves. They were generally unconcerned whether their performances were part of studies related to human rights or "international understanding." Likewise, the group's inability to perform its original *madan-geki* in Higashi-Kujō and build on efforts to create a cultural movement for the people—not only for *zainichi* Koreans, but also for the oppressed, in general—reinforced the allure of the dominant view of Korean culture as exotic.

Moreover, Han-madang, without *madan-geki* or with only a tamed version of it,

provides an example of how multiple meanings attached to appropriated folk arts can reproduce parallel but contradictory meanings. Han-madang's attempts to create its own forms of expression in a group that includes *zainichi* Koreans and Japanese of diverse backgrounds have been criticized by Korean folk culture groups in Japan that are comprised exclusively of *zainichi* Koreans who have studied Korean music and dance in South Korea. Yet those groups have tended to reify "authentic" Korean techniques. While Han-madang has performed in South Korea and participated in a Korean drum workshop there, at the time of my fieldwork, none of the members had undertaken intensive Korean drumming instruction there. Mr. Pak's son, an active member since middle school, found a vehicle for self-expression in the art of Korean drumming. His level of competence on the *janggo* and *kkwaenggwari* was impressive. Yet, he complained about the obsession with credentials among Korean drum performers in Japan, explaining, "The moment you see each other, the first greeting is [related to] who your teacher is! There is a lot of bragging about how many years they spent in South Korea and studied under Living Human Treasure So and So." This is an ironic consequence of the pursuit of the form itself, i.e. interest in technical advancement. State-sponsored accreditation systems related to folk arts that were invented during the military regime of the 1960s (Lee 2003:561; Tangherlini 1998: 139) are broadly valued by *zainichi* Koreans. While Han-madang does not seek such credentials as performers of Korean folk art, critics dismiss them, saying, "They are Japanese!" implying that they are not authentic enough. Nevertheless, the group's core activities have gradually shifted toward Korean percussion performances. To outsiders, they increasingly appear the same as those who perform *p'ungmul* at South Korean-sponsored tourism sites, such as the Korean Folk Village theme park on the outskirts of Seoul. Their strong local commitment and critical

ideology were becoming invisible.

The transformation of their core activities corresponded with changes outside and inside the group. The original core members had to balance child rearing and political commitments. They also confronted a political environment in which anti-Korean discrimination had become subtler in nature. At the same time, as noted above, the focus of the local Kyoto education board had shifted from the politically contested issue of human rights to an anodyne policy of teaching international understanding. The shift to drum-based performances coincided with this emphasis on the celebration of cultural diversity.

Han-madang had to navigate the contradictions between a critical consciousness of race and class oppression and a form of consumption of ethnicity that bordered on self-exoticism. The trajectory of what is, in effect, an imported people's culture movement continues to unfold, as a course is charted between its original role in a movement pursuing anti-oppression causes and a modified role as Korean cultural performers. Changes in the personal circumstances of individuals, combined with other social constraints and contradictions, interfere with commitments to organizational activities in local communities. While spirit remains a critical element, it is expressed in more benign forms than those used during the early role of the group an agent in the struggle against oppression.

2. Launching the Ōmi Toraijin Club: Civic Responsibility in a Local Community

I came to understand that the initial activities of the Ōmi Toraijin Club (hereafter OTC) were similar to those of Han-madang. But although both were committed to their local areas, they turned out to have strikingly different organizational stances. It was one of my naturalized

Japanese informants who introduced me to the OTC, a new, locally based *zainichi* Korean organization. He was thrilled to hear the heated opinions exchanged at the organization's preparatory committee meetings, recalling, "Youngmi-*san,* they are all middle-aged guys [*ossan*[19]], but the way they exchange their ideas is much more youthful than [that of] cynical college students. I truly think something interesting is going on there. You should definitely meet Ha-*san,* the president of the club." In this way, my first encounter with the OTC was as unplanned as my first meeting with Han-madang. I also had two other *zainichi* acquaintances living in the area who were involved in the OTC. I contacted the OTC's office, which was located within the company headquarters of its president, and managed to obtain an invitation to attend its inaugural meeting. I interviewed the president, Mr. Ha Byeong-jun, twice, shortly after the OTC's inauguration event in April, 2000 and again after its first annual meeting [*nenji sōkai*]. I also conducted formal and informal interviews with several OTC members.

The name of the Ōmi-toraijin Club includes both ancient and recent connotations. Ōmi is the historical name of contemporary Shiga Prefecture, the prefecture adjacent to Kyoto. *Torai-jin* refers to the pre-eighth century migrants who crossed the Sea of Japan from Korea to settle in Japan. It is different from the term *kika-jin* ("naturalized people") more commonly used to refer to these ancient migrants, and is a reinvented source of pride among *zainichi* Koreans. The term *torai* is also a pun on the English verb "try," representing the group's adventurous spirit. The name is completed with a combination of Chinese characters that sounds similar to the English word "club" and means "fun" or "leisure" in Japanese. The OTC, an organization looking to encourage *zainichi* Koreans to participate proactively and responsibly in Japanese society, combines the old-fashioned and the new in its apolitical

name. The group's primary objective is to oppose discrimination, but the group's ambiguous choice of name refutes any contentious or political image. As Mr. Ha explained in his speech at the group's inauguration ceremony:

> Our nationality varies with each organization or network. We lack mutual communication and keep a distance from each other, despite all of us sharing a common problem—how we should relate to Japanese society and what roles we should perform in Japanese society. Isn't there any way for us to get together, regardless of our nationalities, just as Korean permanent residents? And as long as we live in Japan permanently, isn't there something we can do to leave our mark on Japanese society?

Preparatory Study Groups: Choosing an Organizational Identity

The statement issued at the group's preparatory meeting declared its difference from existing *zainichi* organizations such as Mindan, Sōren [Chongryun] and Mintōren. First of all, the organization is open to a diverse body of *zainichi* individuals, including naturalized Japanese. Mr. Ha viewed the lack of unified fora for exchanging opinions among *zainichi* as problematic. Organizational division for its own sake was futile. Each of the above organizations specified at its outset the nationality and legal status of its target membership—Mindan being exclusively for South Koreans and Sōren for stateless Koreans who supported North Korea.[20] At the time of OTC's inauguration, Mindan had recently begun to accept naturalized Japanese as "associate members" (*junkaiin*). Mr. Ha was critical of this move, arguing that "that's just a superficial move. Mindan has no solid policy. They simply keep making accommodations [in response] to the ways things are changing." The OTC, however, also accepted non-*zainichi* Japanese members as associate members. Later that same year, the OTC dropped the idea of distinguishing between full and associate members based on

whether one was *zainichi* or not. After all, such distinctions perpetuated the distance between *zainichi* and Japanese. What mattered more to Mr. Ha was commitment to the ideals and objectives of the OTC. According to him, this change had come about after a Japanese applicant insisted he was a 44th-generation *zainichi* descendant of ancient migrant settlers from the Korean Peninsula. Emphasizing the ancient historical connection between the Japanese archipelago and the Korean Peninsula, the OTC abolished membership qualifications, although it still retained the category of associate member in the club's statutes.

Prior to the OTC's first administrative meeting, Mr. Ha and others held many preparatory meetings and *zainichi* history study groups, where they compiled guidebooks and textbooks outlining the objectives of the nascent OTC. The back cover of the guidebook includes a phrase written in calligraphic font that has almost religious overtones: "Turning One's Limited Life into a More Fulfilling and Fruitful One." The opening page includes a copy of a hand-written message by the well-known Japanese journalist, Tawara Sōichiro. In his unique calligraphic style, he writes, "Every human is weak and easily hurt. If someone does not want to be hurt, naturally, he must not hurt others. If it is a crime to physically hurt others, hurting others' minds is also a crime." Inside the back cover of the guidebook is the following statement, also written in large calligraphic font: "From 'Demands' to 'Participation,' and towards 'Co-existence [Living Together]' based on 'Mutual Understanding': If we keep praying, never forgetting the ideals we started out with, they [will] all come to be realized and blossom." In this way, the guidebook opens with a generic statement expressing the natural human desire for a meaningful, fulfilling life and closes with a statement that indirectly criticizes the existing direction of activism and encourages a moderate level of organizational commitment in order to realize the group's mission

statement. Also included in the book are the organization's prospectus, its statutes (Articles 1-10 out of 35), and several newspaper and *zainichi* journal articles introducing the OTC or discussing the role of NGOs. The "textbook" is an excerpt from Sakanaka Hidenori's paper, "Policies Dealing with Foreigners in the 21st Century: Immigration Control and Japan's Choices in the Era of Population Decline" (2000). At the time, Sakanaka was Nagoya Bureau Chief for Japanese Bureau of Immigration. He was a reviled figure among *zainichi* community leaders in the late 1970s, in his early career as a bureaucrat realistically predicting *zainichi* Korean assimilation into Japanese society. Some *zainichi* activists approached him in the mid-1990s, realizing that, whether *zainichi* activists liked it or not, what he had predicted twenty years earlier had turned out to be more or less correct (Tai 2004: 360-363). At the annual meeting of the OTC held six months after its inauguration, one of its members asked why they had to use a text written by a Japanese expert when there were many publications available written by *zainichi* Koreans themselves. This question reflects the memories held by some *zainichi* of anti-Sakanaka, or, more genuinely, anti-Japanese sentiment, and is in keeping with a historical emphasis on the ethnicity of an author rather than on his or her arguments. Mr. Ha handled the challenge by expressing his opinion that more information and references should be shared and that the OTC office always welcomed a variety of viewpoints.

The OTC contrasted its unique membership and goals with those of previous *zainichi* organizations. Unlike other organizations that operated on a nationwide scale, its commitment was to Shiga Prefecture. Further, by stating the commitment of its members to Japanese society as permanent residents, the OTC distanced itself from organizations that were oriented towards the Korean homeland. Article 3 of the OTC statutes explains the two

major objectives of the organization:

1. To promote the realization of a free, fair and open society in which permanent resident Koreans (*eijyū korian*) —[those] who migrated to Japan *as Japanese nationals* [*nihon kokumin no ichiin toshite*] during Japan's colonization [of Korea] and continued residing in Japan after WWII, and their descendants—can live proudly, without hiding their roots. [Emphasis added.]

2. To promote the constitution of "an inclusive and diverse multicultural society of coexistence," appropriate for 21st century Japan, which aspires to become a leader of the global community, promoting world peace.

Ironically, the OTC's commitment to future Japanese society emphasizes the historic status of *zainichi* Koreans as constituents of the former Japanese Empire, evoking the homologous function of the pre-war *Kyōwa-kai* (1938-1944). All wartime Korean residents in Japan had to join the Kyōwa-kai and carry a membership booklet. Kyōwa-kai's primary function was to keep Korean residents in Japan under surveillance. It was, fundamentally, a pro-assimilation, patriotic organization promoting loyalty to the Emperor (Nishinarita 1997: 214, 216-218).

The Resourceful Leader

The OTC inauguration marked a personal turning point for Mr. Ha. About to turn fifty, he began exploring new activities that would allow him to pursue a life that was both personally and socially meaningful, and that would help to form the basis of his "life work" [*raifu wāku*]. The small real estate business he had started at the age of twenty-four was doing well, and his children were almost grown up. He had joined a local Junior Chamber of Commerce—a well-established and prestigious association for local business owners—and spent fourteen years there until reaching the age of forty, becoming its chief director at the age of thirty-six.

As he had worked primarily with Japanese and local government bodies, it was rumored in a local *zainichi* Korean network that he must have become naturalized. In reality, he had never done so and had no intention of doing so in future. After he "graduated from" his activities at the Junior Chamber of Commerce (members automatically leave upon reaching the age of forty and move to the Chamber of Commerce), he became active in the local Mindan as vice president of the branch, primarily working with South Koreans this time. In retrospect, Mr. Ha valued his experience at the local Junior Chamber of Commerce, particularly as it offered him the opportunity to run an organization and establish connections with various levels of mainstream institutions, such as municipal governments.

Mr. Ha grew up as the youngest of six siblings, recalling, "I think I was kind of spoiled, since I was the youngest, playing soccer all the time." He rejected his father's idea of attending college and left for Tokyo, taking up odd jobs for a while. Eventually, he returned to his hometown, settling down and starting a business, for which his father and his elder brother initially provided considerable support. His real estate and "leisure" businesses[21] were now doing well enough for him to run his operations from a modern eight-story building with magnificent views of Biwako, Japan's largest lake.

The OTC shares the same address as Mr. Ha's business. During our interview, he frequently picked up his phone and asked his secretary or administrative assistant to bring him files, green tea, or coffee. Someone always showed up immediately with the requested items. This was a very efficiently run office for a non-profit or grassroots activist group; such groups typically suffer from chronic understaffing and are forced to operate from cramped and overcrowded offices. In 2006, the OTC opened a museum, *Toraijin Rekishikan* [The Migrants' Historical Pavilion], dedicated to "an accurate and objective understanding of East

Asian history." Given the scarcity of real estate available at a reasonable rent in Japan, opening a museum would have been unimaginable without Mr. Ha's access to unutilized properties.

Mr. Ha is not only endowed with resources that enable the smooth operation of an organization, but also with charisma. He would stand out in any group of men of his generation. He seems to have nothing in common with the commonly derided stereotypes of Japanese middle-aged men; he is tall, fit, and has naturally flowing hair, with a dash of gray. He dresses for meetings in impeccable business attire. Two relatively young OTC members with whom I casually spoke on various occasions declared that Mr. Ha was smart and stylish [*kakkoii*]. But his style was not a matter of superficial attractiveness. In another person, such an appearance could easily come across as aloof. Not for Mr. Ha. He was friendly and occasionally humorous. He spoke softly, but with enthusiasm and eloquence. He spoke mostly in standard Japanese during our interviews, but with a warmly resonating Kansai accent. His friendly, outgoing, magnetic yet down-to-earth personality undoubtedly was a contributing factor in OTC attracting sixty members during its inaugural year.

Corporate Style

OTC meetings and operations are imbued with enterprise culture. Prior to its inauguration, it used terms consistent with the launch of a new corporation. First, there was a founders' meeting (*hokki'nin kai*), followed by the official and public transformation of founders (*hokki'nin*) into board members (*yakuin*). The OTC disclosed its organizational chart to auditors, clarifying the executive powers of each committee and sub-division. The inauguration and administrative meetings adopted formal styles, much like those of

shareholder meetings. Unlike Han-madang's casual meeting style, members sitting on the floor in a circle without any time constraints, the OTC held its meetings in conference spaces with desks, chairs, and microphones. Since conference spaces are leased for fixed periods of time, meetings had minute-by-minute schedules, and question-and-answer sessions were often cut short "due to time constraints." The inaugural and annual meetings began with the nomination and appointment of a chairperson; the existence of a quorum was determined; motions were formally introduced; and resolutions voted upon. At the inaugural meeting, founders and longstanding allies of Mr. Ha became board members.

The organizational management trims away sources of dissent in advance. Becoming an OTC member is not just a matter of filling out the application form and paying one's membership dues. A prospective member has to have a meeting with an administrator beforehand to confirm that he or she understands the objectives of the OTC. Following an explanation about the OTC, only those who agree with its objectives and show interest in active participation are encouraged to sign up. At the annual meeting, a member raised a question about this closed and opaque membership application process. Mr. Ha admits that the personal interviews are necessary, because there is a chance that some people who only work for the interests of particular organizations might disturb the OTC in its primary mission to bridge the divides between *zainichi* Koreans with different nationalities and different levels and kinds of political commitment. Although membership has expanded by word of mouth, Mr. Ha is not interested in expanding the group's membership; the larger the membership, the more difficult and complicated the management. Among the fifty-seven members as of November 2000, approximately half were involved in more than nominal ways, according to Mr. Ha.

Among the members, different ways of thinking coexist, especially regarding matters involving the Korean homeland and historical legacies. Some members are particularly patriotic, demanding closer links with the homeland, while others, including Mr. Ha himself, emphasize and prioritize commitment to Japanese society. Mr. Ha tries to talk to homeland-oriented members, but he approaches the matter flexibly, in a patient and covert manner, so as not to offend certain groups of people. Other people, notably the Japanese participants, expressed some hesitation at being part of the OTC when older-generation participants overtly blamed the Japanese for past events. Mr. Ha once had to act as a peacemaker between a *zainichi* member who expressed his hatred of Japanese at a meeting and the Japanese members who were present. The Japanese members worked for the local municipal bureau promoting international exchange, and Mr. Ha strongly supported their involvement in the OTC. Mr. Ha reminded the *zainichi* member of the group's objectives and took the opportunity to talk personally to the Japanese members. He brought up the OTC statute with both sides, assuring them that the primary commitment of the group was to Japanese society, and that its purpose was not to engage in nostalgic longing for the Korean homeland. The Japanese members remained in the OTC, responding to Mr. Ha's assurances that their presence constituted an invaluable contribution to the organization. On the one hand, the Japanese members showed considerable empathy towards those *zainichi* who had endured suffering in the past at the hands of the Japanese. On the other hand, they felt they would not be able to socialize with other OTC members if they were constantly being reprimanded for events in Japan's past. I even overheard a Japanese participant muttering, "Why don't we plan something fun?" In order to fulfill the OTC's objectives, Japanese members are welcomed, valued and handled with extra care, so that they, with their good intentions and

genuine interest, do not feel that they are being reprimanded in the group.

Evolutionary or Atavistic?: Symbolic Gestures of Mutual (Mis)Understanding

The inauguration meeting, commemorative lectures and subsequent reception took place in a recently built public meeting complex that includes concert halls, party areas, and even hotel rooms upstairs. It has a nice view, and is located next to Lake Biwa. Operated by a large public sector employee union, rental fees are relatively affordable.

The inaugural event included a series of mixed messages. At the party following the meeting, a line-up of distinguished guests delivered congratulatory messages. The first speaker was the governor of Shiga Prefecture, who expressed gratitude at having been invited, and offered the group his congratulations. His Korean greeting, "*yeoreobun, chuk'ha hamnida*," recognizable even to the monolingual Japanese-speaking *zainichi* audience, generated enthusiastic applause. The governor then recalled his honeymoon trip to Pusan and Seoul thirty years earlier. As he remembered, "Many people asked why we were going to such [unusual or strange] places [*sonna tokoro*]. South Korea is the closest country to Japan. I thought it was important to be aware that Japanese culture learned many things from China and the Korean Peninsula. Besides, it was much closer than Okinawa and we could vacation far more luxuriously than if we had gone to Okinawa."[22]His innocent recollection shows that South Korea was a developing country at that time, and a destination where the Japanese yen had strong purchasing power. The governor continued, "Well, I will not be able to do anything particular for the OTC as governor, but I am convinced that Japan's longstanding and close connection with the Korean Peninsula was damaged by an instant of misfortune, which left many misunderstandings. We have to overcome this misfortune as soon as

possible. […]" The thirty-five years of colonization was an "instant" when considered on the scale of two millennia, but nearly half of the average Japanese life span. He touched on some local traces left by ancient migrants from the peninsula in the prefecture, closing his address by saying, "Once again, although this is a phrase I am not accustomed to, *chuk'ha hamnida*!"

The next address was by the Mayor of Ōtsu City. He began his speech by saying, "Well, I am honored to be present at the inauguration meeting of the Ōmi Toraijin Club. Rather than [offering] congratulations here, I would like to mention how I fondly recall my youth today—I was working for the Manchurian government in 1940. At that time, it was [operating] under the slogan of *gozoku kyōwa* [five races in harmony—Japanese, Chinese, Manchurians, Mongolians, Koreans] and we all worked together for the Manchurian government [a puppet regime of the Japanese Empire]. There were Korean *[kankokujin]* staff, Chinese, as well as Mongolians. […]" One of those present, who had been a Mintōren activist in his youth and was seated at my table, looked up in the air and smiled archly, later commenting that he would have stood up to say something if he had been younger. The nostalgic invocation of a prewar, multi-ethnic empire was contextually inappropriate in front of predominantly *zainichi* audience. However, both *zainichi* Koreans and Japanese emphasized the brevity of this unfortunate period in Japan-Korea relations. Following a speech by the chairperson of the local branch of the Japan-Korea Friendship Society, the last speaker, a *zainichi* food historian, claimed that *zainichi* Koreans should not dwell on their status as victims but highlight how they can contribute to Japanese society. The event reached its climax in a festive mood, with some of the Japanese politicians present, including the governor, dressing up in Korean costume and dancing with *zainichi* Koreans.

Although the OTC was successful in its attempt at creating an evolutionary forum

that bridges the gap between existing national *zainichi* Korean organizations, there was dissonance between *zainichi* members who demanded recognition of their presence in Japan and of Japanese colonial history on one hand and the Japanese members and sympathizers on the other who thought that understanding the past should not interfere with enjoyment of future-oriented and fun activities. The ironic form of atavism that brings both parties together has a two-fold aspect, comprising an understanding of the colonial past as negligibly brief and an agreement that *zainichi* Koreans should give priority to their place in Japanese society. The OTC's objectives—opposing discrimination, promoting a "correct" understanding of history, and fulfilling its responsibilities in relation to local communities—can be viewed as a revival of the responsibilities of colonial Koreans as part of the Japanese Empire. Behind the OTC's commitment to Japanese society in an era when Japan aspires to exercise its leadership in a globalized world can be found a contemporary version of devoted colonial subject-hood, paralleling aspects of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere of the early 1940s.

One of the OTC members I met three weeks after the general assembly said to me, "Each time I go to the [OTC] meeting and go out drinking afterwards, I end up spending 10,000 yen on average [approximately $100]. Take that informal exchange over drinks at a pub after the meeting—there was not much to eat, but the men had to pay 5,000 yen each. Don't you think that kind of participation cost would weed out people who are not economically in good shape?" The annual membership fee is 12,000 yen. This is an average rate for membership of a voluntary association. OTC activities unavoidably depend on small, committed groups of well-off men—predominantly self-employed, with some flexibility in their work schedules.

To achieve a Japanese society free of prejudice and discrimination against Koreans, the OTC has sought to create several multicultural public spaces of varying scales. The eight years since the group's launch have witnessed the staging of several *jigyō* ("enterprises"), as the OTC calls them, on a regular basis. The Humanity Forum, organized once a year, features several keynote speakers and discussion sessions, followed by Korean and Japanese cultural performances. The OTC *madang* ("meeting place"), held bimonthly, is a small study group focusing on historical as well as current events affecting *zainichi* Koreans. An annual multicultural festival has been held since 2004, featuring a variety of "fun" elements, including foreign cultural performances and food stands (Ha n.d.; the OTC homepage). As mentioned earlier, the OTC opened a small museum in 2006. Under Mr. Ha's charismatic leadership and a business-like organizational format, the OTC has maintained its original goals for nearly a decade.

Different Expressions of Civic Responsibilities

Han-madang is a small-scale, informal, family-like type of association, while the OTC is a larger-scale, corporate-style body. The organizational identities of these two voluntary associations are not associated with any particular social movement, and neither has explicit policy goals. Rather, both operate as expressive lifestyle movements connected to identity politics (Jasper 1997). Han-madang's primary objective in practicing a people's culture movement, however, originated in a critical political consciousness inspired by the New Left. Therefore, the various ways in which Han-madang supports and connects with streams of dissenting voices, even on an individual basis, represent a fundamental questioning of the

status quo, a status quo in which the members of social minority groups are silenced. Expressing dissent or raising their voices is one way for minority members to fulfill their civic responsibilities. However, the shift in the group's public role, from performing *madan-geki* in order to raise critical consciousness to introducing music, dance and Korean culture—exotic and essentialized enough for consumption by the Japanese mainstream at festivals held in public spaces—indicates the possibilities and limits of expressing dissent.

The OTC, on the other hand, works closely with the existing local establishment, and its formal stance is accommodative. During my interview, Mr. Ha distanced himself and his organization from conventional models of the *zainichi* Korean movement in which the primary objectives included filing complaints and demanding justice for historic victimization. He distanced the OTC from human rights-based "pressure organizations" (*atsuryoku dantai*) that originated from the "denunciation" strategies of the *burakumin* liberation movement of the 1960s and 1970s (Upham 1987; Davis 2000). A recurrent theme of the addresses by keynote speakers at the inauguration event was a departure from *zainichi* victimology (*higaisha ishiki*). The OTC's approach to civic responsibility involves not only making demands on society, but also participation by its members in that society as good citizens deserving of respect. Its fundamental concerns, to work against discrimination and promote the proper recognition of historic and contemporary Korean contributions to Japanese society, are very mildly and diplomatically expressed, so as not to provoke the Japanese public.

Han-madang and the OTC both illustrate cases of hope and despair, and resistance and accommodation, in the roles of voluntary associations in democratic societies. While both organizations genuinely satisfy individual desires for a meaningful life, reflecting the

process by which their core members negotiated their *zainichi* Korean identities in earlier phases of their lives, they have pursued different forms of expression as active participants in Japanese society, sometimes even in restricted, misunderstood, essentialized or atavistic ways. They both contribute to the intensification of associational life (Warren 2001), providing diversified opinion fora.

Nonetheless, forms of expression deployed by both associations can be misunderstood, consumed as superficial displays of diversity or as examples of quasi-tourism: of being abroad while remaining at home. The OTC's ideal of contributing to Japan's global leadership paradoxically can seen as homologous to the active participation of upwardly mobile, ambitious Korean colonial subjects in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere of the late 1930s and early 1940s. Without fulfilling one's civic responsibilities, no demands should be made. Eager expressions of willingness to constructively contribute to Japanese society often result in accommodative displays of loyalty, or at least of natural attachment as natives of Japan for generations, whose ancestors were "Japanese" when they migrated.

The OTC de-emphasized the status of *zainichi* as victimized colonial subjects and foreigners with severely limited life options, considering this as a pragmatic compromise to make in order to realize its future- and Japan-oriented agenda beyond the politics of accusation and complaint. By contrast, Han-madang's core members remember oppression suffered, both in the past and the present. Those memories anchored their compromised presentations of exotic ethnic culture. Younger *zainichi* members of Han-madang, including those with Japanese nationality, responded to my ambiguous question of what Japan represented to them with the simple phrase: "The Emperor System." Whether divine or

human, the symbolic power of this system claimed many lives during the first half of the twentieth century. It continues to signify a fundamental contradiction in contemporary Japanese society, associated as it is with the unfulfilled responsibilities of war and colonialism. Its survival keeps *zainichi* Koreans as perpetual outsiders, because they have no claims in relation to Japan as victims. For some *zainichi* Koreans, Han-madang is Japanese, because its membership includes both naturalized Japanese and the children of interracial couples. For others, it is multicultural, yet still Korean. Even though its broader audience considers it to be exotic foreigners, Han-madang represents resistance to forces oppressing *zainichi* Koreanness, this organizational *raison d'être* having remained unchanged for fifteen years. Nonetheless, the group has solid roots in local communities and among progressive Japanese activists.[23] Han-madang's orientation is based on a shared and well-acknowledged awareness of the flaws at the heart of Japan as a historical and contemporary entity.

Founding members of the OTC share concerns about past legacies, emphasizing the need to disseminate "correct historical knowledge" (*tadashii rekishi ninshiki*). By focusing on a longer historical perspective, their colonial past can be compressed into the blink of an eye. In the context of written Japanese national history, which stretches back to the eighth century, the numerous instances of Korean migration, in addition to the thirty-five years of colonial rule and forty years of postwar legal limbo, are insignificant. Adopting the approach of a mainstream NGO, the OTC's collaboration with local politicians and the "international exchange" sections of local governments is important. Grievance politics has moved backstage.

Are these the processes by which *zainichi* Koreans are becoming Japanese? Curiously, the more one identifies as *zainichi* Korean, the more likely one is to become an active

participant in Japanese society. Expressing one's identity as *zainichi* Korean, whether one is committed to critical grassroots activism or involved in accommodative associations, can mean becoming more committed to Japanese society than the Japanese-Japanese in Japan are. Echoing the findings of the previous chapter, it is beyond doubt that the more conscious *zainichi* Koreans become of their identity, the more actively they engage in Japanese civil society. How each individual expresses their identity and their politics, however, is definitely defined and limited by the constraints of everyday life.

Endnotes:

[1] Oka Masafumi (1962-1975) was the only child of *zainichi* Korean writer Ko Sa-myong and high school teacher Oka Yuriko. He was twelve years old when he committed suicide. His poems were published posthumously.

[2] Except for Mr. Pak Shil and Mr. Ryang Min-ki, whose narratives have been published, all present and former members with Korean backgrounds have been given pseudonyms that use either Korean or Japanese pronunciation, depending on the preference of each individual. The names of Japanese members have also been altered. To distinguish between the people's culture movements in South Korea and Japan, they are referred to respectively as the *minjung munwha* and *minshū bunka* movements. *Madang* plays are also referred to as *madang-guk* in the South Korean context and *madan-geki* in the Japanese context. Translations of the minutes of Han-madang meetings and *madan-geki* scripts from Japanese into English are mine.

[3] See Chapter 4 for more on Mr. Pak's experience.

[4] In 2002, another member joined, a Japanese from Higashi-Kujō who had just entered high school.

[5] The Korean word of *han* could mean "one," or "Korean" (as in *hanguk),* as well as referring to the feelings of resentment. The assigned Chinese characters are different but the sound is identical.

[6] Mr. Pak and his grown-up children with their dual heritage.

[7] The national flag and anthem, which I explore further below.

[8] I have not interviewed her yet because of her young age; I chose not to interview children (Chapter 3).

[9] In April 2000, I stayed at the Madang Center for two weeks, sleeping on the floor with *futon*. Mr. Pak and Mr. Yamada arranged the deal for me to save my research expenses.

[10] *Puri-kura* ("Print Club") is an instant photo sticker. For several 100-yen coins, one can get a set of stickers of one's photo image with a choice of different background characters and patterns from any number of self-serve kiosks located in the streets of Japanese cities and towns.

[11] Pig Exorcism—*pulri* is a noun form of the verb *pulda*, which means to clarify the causes of resentment or disaster (M. Ryang 1988: xvi); it premiered in South Korea in 1980. Here, I have transliterated the Korean words into Japanese pronunciation.

[12] A base for anti-*burakumin* discrimination movements.

[13] Circle is *sseukkeol* in Korean and *sākuru* in Japanese. The group intentionally mixes Japanese-pronounced and Korean-pronounced words.

[14] *Seonsaeng-nim* is an honorific form used to address a teacher or master in Korean.

[15] An influential *madang-guk* playwright imprisoned in South Korea for his political views during the era of military rule. Yamada-*san,* a Japanese, had experienced racism because of his background as a member of the historically marginalized *buraku* population, and this was one of many reasons he was interested in Kim Chi-ha's plays.

[16] *Wadaiko* is a generic term of Japanese drums of different sizes.

[17] I attended a public elementary school in Tokyo in the 1970s, when the metropolitan governor was the progressive Minobe Ryōkichi, who enjoyed a long term in office. The Hinomaru and Kimigayo were not included in school ceremonies at this time.

[18] He was once scolded by Yamada-*san* for his lack of seriousness.

[19] *Ossan* is a more colloquial version of *ojisan* [middle-aged man or men].

[20] In reality, community supporters include South Koreans and holders of Japanese nationality (Japanese spouses and children of intermarriage).

[21] One of his staff members, who had been active in the Mintōren movement when he was young, explained to me that another reason Mr. Ha was doing well was because of his *pachinko* business. (*Pachinko* is a form of pinball that is very popular in Japan, and the business of operating the parlors where it is played has long been a niche among ethnic Koreans). He is in charge of the administration of Mr. Ha's *pachinko* business, as well as various administrative tasks involved in the running of the OTC. The *pachinko* element of Mr. Ha's business interests is not highlighted, probably because of its tainted image; officially, the core areas of his business are real estate development and management.

[22] Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972.

[23] During my visit to Han-madang in April 2000, I met a local Japanese activist based in Higashi-Kujō who was extremely critical of Japan's wartime legacy. At the peak of the cherry blossom season, during which time both Japanese and *zainichi* Koreans enjoy drinking and eating outdoors under blooming cherry trees, he said, "Cherry-blossoms remind me of war. You know, in wartime Japan, life was compared to cherry blossoms. The flower petals just fall apart at the peak of their beauty without wilting. That was the celebrated spirit of the suicide pilots. The cherry blossom is reminiscent of bloody memories."

CHAPTER SEVEN

"Overprivileged Complainers": The Cyberspace Backlash against the *Zainichi*

This chapter focuses on public perceptions that Korean special permanent residents (*tokubetsu eijūsha*, established in November, 1991) are "over-privileged complainers." Despite that these former Japanese colonial subjects, who remained in Japan after the Second World War, have spent decades suspended in a form of legal limbo, a recent wave of anti-Korean discourse (*kenkanryū*), nurtured by internet opinion bulletin boards and blogs, has argued that special permanent resident Koreans are over-privileged. By exploring contemporary debates over naturalization among *zainichi* Koreans, and the phenomenon of special permanent resident-bashing in particular, I will document how this tendency represents a shift away from an inclusive model of denizenship based on residency and universal human rights—an ideal for which activists strove during the 1980s—towards a more exclusive and strict nationality-based model corresponding to the political needs of a wide spectrum of Japanese political actors, ranging from conservative to progressive in their leanings.

Such debates over nationality are increasingly relevant, not only for public office incumbents, but also in the context of broader civic participation in public opinion fora. In tandem with an emergent generation of Korean-Japanese revisionist self-critiques, critical comments about Japanese society have provoked backlashes when uttered by those not in possession of Japanese nationality. This type of reaction, based on a combination of personal opinion and legal interpretation, has flourished in recent times, particularly in cyberspace. The cases examined in this chapter will provide some counter-examples to theories of global

and social citizenship based on universal human rights and the lifestyle politics prevalent in contemporary literature relating to social movements.

Japanese Citizens = Japanese Nationality Holders: Supreme Court Rulings

Nearly a decade into the 21st century, two Japanese Supreme Court rulings epitomize the contemporary consensus regarding Japanese citizenship. They affirm and limit the privilege of full civic participation to Japanese nationality holders. Japanese nationality is granted at birth to children with at least one parent who is a Japanese national or in rare cases where the nationality of the child's parents is unknown.

In the case of a child born out of wedlock to a foreign mother, Japanese nationality would only be granted if the father acknowledged paternity prior to the child's birth. Prior to the 2008 ruling and the Nationality Law amendment, if the father acknowledged paternity after the child's birth, the foreign mother and the Japanese father were obliged to marry in order for their child to be granted Japanese nationality. According to the court, "Nationality acquisition has significance [in cases] where this is required for individuals to obtain the protection of basic human rights." (Mainichi Shinbun 2008a). The assumption underlying this decision is that there is an absolute disadvantage in possessing foreign nationality, regardless of residential status, and that granting Japanese nationality would rectify any injustice.

Earlier, in 2005, the Supreme Court overturned the 1997 ruling by the Tokyo High Court that Chong Hyang-gyun, a public health nurse employed by Tokyo Metropolitan Government, could take a promotion examination despite lacking Japanese nationality. The

Supreme Court ruled that supervisory positions might involve the execution of power in relation to the public, and that applicants consequently needed to have Japanese nationality. This nationality requirement in the civil service was not based on any clear statement in this regard in any existing Japanese law, but the court nevertheless affirmed this practice, based on natural legal principles (*tōzen no hōri*), a matter of course not even requiring legislative clarification. Following this Supreme Court ruling, the only avenue open to Chong involved acquisition of Japanese nationality through naturalization. Several critics, including her brother who is an academic, have suggested that the entire issue did not warrant a legal battle (See Chapter 5).

At the peak of activity by *zainichi* Korean social movements during the 1980s, as represented in the anti-fingerprint movement, the legal status of *zainichi* Koreans evolved through a series of ad hoc measures. Several streams of local activism sought to establish a form of denizenship, or civil rights for local residents based on universal human rights. Since the 1991 establishment of special permanent resident status for ex-Japanese nationals from the nation's former colonies and their descendants, distinctions between Japanese nationals and foreign special permanent residents became negligible, except in relation to local and national electoral politics and employment in the civil service. As resident foreigners, they needed to obtain re-entry permits when going abroad for a maximum duration of four years[1], however upon arrival at immigration control in Japan after returning from overseas, special permanent residents were processed in the "Japanese" channel.

There remain two major points of debate: the civil service and local suffrage. Local municipalities have opened civil service positions to foreigners. This opening, however, has not been based on a systematic change in regulations. By the 1980s, *zainichi* Koreans were

beginning to be employed as civil servants, mostly as professionals, such as medical doctors and nurses working for public hospitals. Following local protests and negotiations, by 2005, eleven prefectures and most large cities had opened their doors to resident foreigners for employment in low-level bureaucratic positions, such cases often featured in national newspaper articles or television documentaries. Kawasaki City, one of only a few multi-ethnic pockets in Japan, abolished the nationality clause for civil service position applicants in 1996 (Kato 2008: 23). This measure, the Kawasaki model, specifies the eligibility of resident-foreigner applicants for each position. Some activists, however, have criticized this model as being no different than widely-practiced natural legal principles, as it draws a line between positions requiring the exercise of governmental authority, i.e. the use of power in relation to the public, and those that do not (Chong 2006: 53; Pak et al. 2008: 155-160).

The other contentious issue involving *zainichi* Koreans in the years following the 1980s finger print-related civil rights campaign and the introduction of special permanent resident status has been local suffrage. From the late 1990s, calls for local suffrage, especially those made by Mindan, have attracted criticism, both from Japanese and from *zainichi* Koreans themselves. For many critics on the left and right, a more rational solution would involve the simplification of the process for acquiring Japanese nationality, or even the retroactive reactivation of Japanese nationality invalidated in 1952 (Ōnuma 2004b; Aoyagi in Sasaki 2006). Once local suffrage was granted, it would be natural to demand national suffrage (Ōnuma 2004b). Others have described suffrage for foreign residents as tantamount to the liquidation of the Japanese nation (Takubo 2000).

Little movement has taken place regarding the treatment of *zainichi* Koreans by Japanese legislators (except in relation to employment in the civil service and local suffrage)

since the 1995 Supreme Court ruling clarifying that the granting of suffrage to permanent resident foreigners in local elections was not unconstitutional per se. During the LDP-Komeitō coalition at the turn of the century, local suffrage for permanent resident foreigners appeared a realistic objective, given the large number of *zainichi* Koreans who were members of the Sōka Gakkai religious movement (traditional supporters of the Kōmeitō). However, in 2000, a counter proposal aimed at easing the naturalization procedure instead gained prominence in national assembly legislature study groups. As of 2009, neither a proposal for local suffrage nor one aimed at simplifying the naturalization procedure[2] had been submitted to a formal session of the Diet for discussion.[3]

Further, Japan has not initiated any fundamental legal or structural changes to proactively address its low birth rate or rapidly aging society. A temporary solution arranged with Indonesia and the Philippines, where elderly care "trainees" are accepted temporarily and obliged to return to their home countries after five years if they fail a national qualification examination, is another illustration of an overall unwillingness to alter the collective Japanese national identity into one of an immigrant nation.

Patriotic devotion during a time of state emergency often leads to an expansion of citizenship, in legal or social contexts, or both. This was never the case with Koreans in relation to the legacy of the defeated Japanese Empire. In the US, numerous veteran benefits contributed to social mobility by certain groups during the postwar period, allowing Jewish Americans, for example, to become "white" (Brodkin 1999). Koreans, both in Japan and on the peninsula, bore the burden of a war fought in the name of the Japanese emperor as inexpensive or conscripted laborers, or even as part of the Imperial Japanese Military. They were treated as imperial subjects, and intensely indoctrinated as such during the final decade

of colonial rule. Since 1952, post-war state compensation for Japanese civilians has systematically excluded *zainichi* Koreans for not being Japanese. Left in legal limbo for many decades, *zainichi* Koreans still need to either have one parent with Japanese nationality or undergo a formal naturalization process in order to become full citizens. This is despite that many among them, particularly fourth- and fifth-generation *zainichi,* exhibit high degrees of cultural and linguistic assimilation. Naturalization guarantees the state the arbitrary right of refusal, although recent years have seen a streamlining of the naturalization process for special permanent residents. It remains the case that the easiest and most secure way of acquiring Japanese nationality is to have a blood parent with Japanese nationality.

There has been a notable change on the formal political scene. Haku Shinkun of the Democratic Party is the first Korean-Japanese with a clearly identifiable Korean name elected to the national assembly (as a member of the slightly less influential House of Councilors).[4] He pronounces his name using the Japanese reading of the Chinese characters used to write it, unlike some *zainichi* Koreans who insist on maintaining Korean-style pronunciation. His public profile is thus a compromised one, not so rigidly *zainichi* Korean. In this regard, Shin Sugo[5] expresses her concern that: "He often criticizes North Korea exactly in the way the Japanese public would love to hear on TV; he will be accepted in this society. If he asks for a humanitarian aid package for North Korean children, for example, [however,] his political career might face challenges" (Shin's interview in Shirai 2007: 144).

There has been a decline in the practice of citizenship by *zainichi* Koreans as *de facto* foreign residents (E. Chung 2004) following the stabilization of their legal status as special permanent residents. Both from inside and outside the community, political demands and criticisms have become increasingly contingent on whether or not one has formal citizenship,

i.e. Japanese nationality. And with Japanese citizenship, in the formal domain of Japanese politics, there are things that Korean Japanese candidates can and cannot say in public, being more susceptible to criticism on politically delicate topics. Simultaneously, a strong and persistent body of opinion has been clinging to the distinction (and differentiation) between nationals and non-nationals, rather than on the notion of granting denizenship based on universal human rights. There has been little serious discussion of applying the *jus soli* principle to the issue of Japanese nationality acquisition as an ultimate solution to the uncertain status of *zainichi* and foreign workers who have settled in Japan.[6] Anyone who happens to have been born and grown up in Japan can be a native speaker of Japanese, but is not always Japanese in a full-fledged sense.

How does Japanese legal citizenship (nationality) shape the parameters for being considered a deserving, authentic member of contemporary Japanese society? I will introduce three instances that go to the heart of the debate about authentic membership—the issue of who has the right to criticize the society he or she belongs to. The first case is that of Chong Hyang-gyun, and does not relate to the aforementioned court case per se, but its aftermath. She was the target of numerous criticisms, including published commentaries by her own brother and other academic commentators. Ardent internet surfers and bloggers were aghast at her litigation battle and her comments following the Supreme Court ruling. The second case is that of a civic organization, *Zainichi tokken o yurusanai shimin no kai* [The citizens' group who do not accept *zainichi* privileges][7] (hereafter Zaitokukai). Finally, I will discuss the agenda of the Council for the Establishment of the Right of *Zainichi* Koreans to Acquire Japanese Nationality [*Zainichi Korian no nihonkokuseki shutokuken kakurutsu kyōgikai*, hereafter Kakuritsukyō] and the doomed attempt by its leader, Lee Kyungjye, to enter formal

electoral politics. These three cases, congruent to each other, suggest a persistent linkage between authentic membership and critical civic engagement: is legal inclusion a precondition for expressing dissent?

If You Complain, Just Leave: Recurrent Reactions

The press conference given by Chong Hyanggyun with her lawyers and supporters following the 2005 Supreme Court ruling that overturned her victory in the Tokyo High Court against the Tokyo Metropolitan Government provoked strong reactions.[8] She basically commented on the deplorable condition of justice in contemporary Japan, and remarked that she felt like laughing rather than crying. She further commented, "I would like to say to people around the world, 'Don't come to Japan. Here, you will be treated like a robot, not a human.'" As soon as news and footage of her press conference were released nationwide, 6,000 hate email messages flooded in[9] with "impressive speed and energy" (Chong 2006: 35). Chong (2006) introduces one example, which I quote here in full length, to show the parallels with the sporadic and organized outbursts of anti-Korean sentiment in the 2000s:

> I am Y, a Tokyo resident.
>
> As a taxpayer, I strongly protest Chong Hyanggyun, the public health nurse and section chief of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Public Health Center. I saw you denounce the Japanese state—hardly acceptable behavior for a public servant and an adult—as reported on today's TV news etc, because you lost your case in the Supreme Court, which had determined that you as a foreigner could not take the managerial promotion examination for public servants.

- A regrettable court decision [making me feel] too sorry to cry
- No tears came; rather, I burst into laughter
- Hard to believe and I was not able to imagine how awful it [the Japanese system] could be

- They avoid a constitutional judgment; I would like to say to the world, “Never come to Japan!”
- I would like to say to foreign nationals, “It’s better not to work in Japan”
- Working in Japan means becoming a robot
- You would never be treated as humans
- This is a pitiful country which is too pitiful to cry [about] but [rather] to laugh [at]

You uttered such violent and thoughtless remarks and hurt the feelings of the Japanese people and the people of nations on friendly terms with Japan.

Just because things do not work out as you wish, you blasphemously challenge the Japanese legal system and insult the Japanese, which I will never forgive you for.

Zainichi Korean people have committed so many violent crimes, manipulative activities which inculcate Japanese people with feelings of guilt regarding the fabricated forced labor migration [policy], threatening of the media by Mindan and Sōren, and the repetitive and meaningless [series of] litigation [cases] like this and violent and appalling remarks following them… the list is endless. Particularly noteworthy this time is that you are a public servant working for the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and that you are in a position to protect the lives of Japanese people as a public health nurse.

It would be dreadfully concerning if an insane person like you continued working in the field of public health.

Someone who can shamelessly utter such nonsense and libel in public without hesitation should not receive a payroll from taxpayer funds. It is appalling that someone like that leads a section in an office which should concern Japanese people’s health.

Resign from your position as soon as possible and immediately leave this “awful” country, as you call it.

We Japanese do not want someone like you, [one of] a handful of insane foreign elements of an anti-Japanese sect, stepping on the land and breathing the air of this beautiful Japan.

Get out of Japan soon, you, a disqualified public servant, a disqualified public nurse, and a disqualified human, and never step back on the land of Japan.

> It is well known that *zainichi* Koreans are most discriminated against in South and North Korea.
>
> You'd better go back to such a lovable mother nation and suffer from discrimination of the severest kind.
>
> There exists no nation on earth that lets you have things done in whichever way you want if you only selfishly scream [loud enough]. Perhaps Japan might have been the only place if I had to name one.
>
> But that's over.
>
> You let good-natured Japanese people know that Koreans, especially *zainichi* Koreans, are a vicious kind of people who are childish, vulgar, dangerous, and irredeemable. (Chong 2006: 32-34)

The message here is constant and simple: You are a foreigner who lives here in someone else's country. If you do not like the way things work here, just leave. The entire text displays rampant bigotry against *zainichi* Koreans, as if *zainichi* Korean claims are irrational and the Japanese system is without fault. By bringing up discrimination against *zainichi* Koreans on the Korean peninsula, the plight of *zainichi* Koreans in Japan is seen as trivial.

Being an authentic Japanese, according to the writer of this e-mail, means conforming to state authority; to many anonymous individual Japanese, challenging the state is beyond their imagination. Showing dissent is fundamentally an alien act. When Nakaya Yasuko, a Japanese, challenged the Self Defense Forces and the state in court over her deceased husbands' apotheosis at the Yasukuni Shrine, based on the constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of belief and the separation of state and religion, she received a similar reaction. Some threateningly urged her to leave the country, questioning her qualification as a

Japanese (Field 1993: 134-136, 155). It is common for expressions of dissent to be met with antagonistic, often patriotic reactions. During the 1980s, z*ainichi* Koreans who refused to be fingerprinted when renewing their alien registrations received hate mail and even death threats (Choe 1996: 203; Minzokusabetsu 1985).

Among the lay critics reacting against Chong's comments, a self-claimed *zainichi* Korean expresses a strikingly similar view. Arai Kazuma is a self-claimed third-generation *zainichi* Korean blogger who was eventually naturalized and became vice president of Zaitokukai (see the following section) but later left the group. In an entry in his blog[10] immediately after Chong's infamous press conference entitled "A Reasonable Court Decision," Arai shows complete agreement with an editorial carried by the conservative newspaper Sankei Shinbun, echoing its argument that the ruling was not a case of discrimination but simply a decision based on nationality. Arai writes:

> First of all, as an honest feeling, I'd say "Well done, Supreme Court!" I hope this will become a good precedent. But I feel a bit concerned that the High Court favored the plaintiff's claim. We also have to be careful with the way the mass media reported the court's decision. NEWS 23[11] shamelessly reported the story with an [emotion-provoking] "please cry" tone, airing the standpoint of the *zainichi* side, replacing the idea of internationalization in order to sell out the nation.
>
> Of course, discrimination should not be allowed. But is it really discrimination that a foreigner not be allowed to execute governmental authority in relation to the public? […] They conceal the real issue to be discussed, instead just pushing the claim that *zainichi* [South] Koreans should have rights as a matter of course.
>
> The plaintiff side's claim that it is unacceptable, that there are no rights and that rights should be granted, is completely out of question. Is anything right with the magic phrase internationalization? Are you really looking around the world, or just taking a look at the fatherland? Are foreigners in South Korea able to perform public service [i.e. work in the public service]?

> And the ultimatum is [found in] her comments at the press conference.
>
> "I would like to say to the world, "Don't come to Japan!" I would like to tell foreigners not to work in Japan. Working in Japan means you become a robot. [You will] never be treated as humans. This is such a pitiful nation—too pitiful to cry [about], just to laugh [at]."
>
> Even though she was upset at her defeat, her comments totally disrespect the Constitution and Japan. If you say such things, there is no way of saying [anything] back if someone says "Then, you leave." Aren't I wrong? If you think Japan is pitiful, then just leave. You have a fatherland called South Korea.
>
> She completely ruined the impression that she is very hardworking and popular. The press conference was just so disgraceful.
>
> Honestly, my exposure to *zainichi* Korean claims for rights had been [limited to] just sporadic glances at newspapers, and it was almost the first time I had heard their real voices on television. I was saddened that there is nothing you can do about the worsening of the image of *zainichi* Koreans.
>
> Just cut it out! (Arai 2006: 39-41; originally posted January 26, 2005; the inserted notes are mine)

Arai's message is as simple as that of the letter sent to Chong: ideas of denizenship must be rejected. Foreigners are foreigners. Foreign dissenters should leave.

Arai's blog is now permanently closed,[12] although his book is still available, with its red banner on top of a white cover evoking the national flag, Hinomaru: "All *zainichi* should read! A popular blog by an ex-third-generation (second-generation Japan-born) *zainichi* Korean and a Korean-Japanese, finally available as a book! Dear *zainichi*, don't forget that you are foreigners. No more indulgence allowed."

Arai's perspective and those of the numerous writers of hate mail sent to Chong are nothing new—such views have been held for several decades. The majority of the public

does not write directly to dissenters and express counter-opinions. However, cyberspace has facilitated the organization of sporadic expressions of anti-Korean sentiment. By the end of 2006, Zaitokukai had emerged as a child of internet technology, a protest group particularly targeting one specific ethno-national group, *zainichi* Koreans holding special permanent resident status.

Zaitokukai: An Organized Expression of Special Permanent Resident-Bashing

Zaitokukai is a group that would be inconceivable without the internet—visual images and film clips of its activities and speeches are readily available through various internet websites, including YouTube. According to its official website,[13]as of March 2009, Zaitokukai had about 5,000 members, over 86 percent of whom were male.[14]There is no annual membership fee, and one is able to join simply by filling out an application form and clicking one's mouse. Operational costs are covered primarily by donations, in addition to some "enterprise proceeds."[15] The group's annual budget is approximately two million yen (more than $20,000). Its official web site includes the group's agenda, activity updates (including audiovisuals), and some comic strips contributed by Yamano Sharin, the author of *Manga Kenkanryū* (see below). There are downloadable fliers to be used for disseminating and raising critical consciousness about "*zainichi* privileges."

The popularization of the key idea of "*zainichi* privileges (*zainichi tokken*)" as an alarming threat to the Japanese state can undoubtedly be largely ascribed to the power and influence of the internet and comic books.[16] Special permanent resident-bashing traces its popularity to a chapter on *zainichi* privileges found in Yamano Sharin's comic book, *Kenkanryū II* [Anti-Korean Wave, II] (2006).[17] This was followed by the publication of a

"mook" (a combined book and magazine) edited by Nomura Hataru et al., *Kenkanryū no shinjitsu!: Za Zainichi Tokken* [The truth of the anti-Korean wave: the *zainichi* privileges] (2006). This publication intends to validate the content of the comic book with allegedly factual journalistic and academic accounts. It also includes the denunciation of a handful of "*zainichi* ideologues" who take full advantage of their minority status (also see Chapter 5).

Zainichi Korean-bashing is retroactive. The starting point involves denial of the commonly held perception that *zainichi* Koreans are the victims of a forced migration policy and the Japanese government's subsequent one-sided invalidation of the Japanese nationality of former colonial subjects. However, by the end of the 1990s, the mainstream academic perspective no longer supported the forced migration argument. Indeed, the issue of origin no longer figured at all. The individual life stories collected by Fukuoka et al. (Fukuoka et al. 1991) and a study by Ha Myungseung (1997) note that *zainichi* Koreans are mostly descended from voluntary migrant workers who migrated before the total mobilization phase, while Tei Taikin (see Chapter 5) devotes his energies to refuting Pak Kyung-shik's monograph, *The Record of Korean Forced Migration* (see Chapter 1).[18]

Special permanent residents in Japan are not limited to stateless Koreans and those holding South Korean nationality. However, Zaitokukai's stance is directed exclusively at *zainichi* Koreans. While the group emphasizes that it is not made up of xenophobic exclusionists, it is involved in organized and rationalized expressions of racism and nationalism specifically ignited by the presence of privileged foreigners.[19]Japan is for the Japanese. Those who squat in someone else's country should not claim any rights or social reforms.

The front page of their downloadable flier begins with the phrase, “Do you know the *zainichi* privileges?” Four of them are then listed: 1) the legal status itself of special permanent residents; 2) North Korean schools receiving subsidies from municipalities; 3) preferential treatment in the distribution of minimum life protection allowances [*seikatsu hogo*]; and 4) the legal use of Japanese aliases, facilitating their illegal conduct (Zaitokukai n.d.).[20]

First and most important is the argument that “Despite the fact that they are foreigners, they are guaranteed to an everyday life that is no different from the Japanese.” Special permanent residency status has been in effect since November 1991, unifying under one category more than three different forms of legal status for *zainichi* Koreans who had migrated to Japan during the colonial period and those whose ancestors had done so. No more than fifteen years had passed before *zainichi* privileges began to come under sustained attack in the mid-2000s. Given that *zainichi* Korean men lost suffrage in December 1945, the benefits accorded by this residency status have been enjoyed for less than one-quarter of the period of post-war *zainichi* Korean history. At its annual meeting in 2009, one of the executive committee members of Zaitokukai noted that the following year, 2010, would mark the centenary of the annexation of Korea, and claimed to be so impressed with “how the Japanese people have been able to stand the Koreans for such a long time.” For most of this hundred-year-long period, they have either been colonial subjects, second-class citizens or invisible foreigners in legal limbo. Zaitokukai’s claims suggest that *zainichi* Koreans have been enjoying stable legal status from the onset of colonial rule.

Second on the list is the issue of [North] Korean schools receiving subsidies from municipalities to promote “anti-Japanese” education. In most cases, these subsidies are a

meager amount when compared with the subsidies provided to public and private schools under the Japanese School Education Act. Further, the municipal subsidies are a historically recent phenomena—most of them dating back no further than the 1980s, when Japan signed the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1981. The governor of Tokyo Prefecture decided to allocate some subsidies to foreign schools in 1970, and the practice gradually spread to other municipalities. It is only since 1997, when Aichi Prefecture initiated subsidies to foreign schools, that Korean schools in all of the twenty-nine prefectures where they are located have received local subsidies (Tanaka 2002: 183). In addition, during the 1990s, North Korean schools adopted a revised curriculum focusing more on life in Japan (Ryang 1997; Urihakkyo o tsuzurukai 2001).

Third on the list is "preferential treatment" in the distribution of minimum life protection allowances [*seikatsu hogo*]. Basically, Zaitokukai claims that seventy percent of recipients are *zainichi* Koreans, leading to the neglect of truly needy Japanese nationals. This is simply a result of the fact that there is a preponderance of low income-earners among the minority population, combined with the fact that these individuals were ineligible for the national pension plan up until the early 1980s. And, of course, nowhere does the Zaitokukai mention the fact that *zainichi* Koreans have been paying local and national taxes all along, even at a time when their legal status was insecure. It is not because they are Korean that they are preferentially treated in the Japanese welfare system. It is partly because *zainichi* Koreans, as non-nationals, are situated outside the existing class system (Ryang 2008).

The last of the four major privileges on the list involves the legal use of Japanese-style aliases. Zaitokukai argues that when *zainichi* Koreans commits crimes, their names are reported in Japanese style, this media practice allegedly promoting their criminal tendencies.

Aside from the fact that associating *zainichi* membership with criminality is nothing more than a blatant expression of bigotry, this claim simply has no basis in truth. For the past forty years, in cases where a *zainichi* Korean was the victim of a crime, the Japanese name he or she used in everyday life was reported; for an offender, only his or her Korean name was reported. The more recent form of reporting is used in order to identify both name and nationality. Instead of conducting a systematic examination of crimes committed by foreigners or *zainichi* Koreans, Zaitokukai bases its argument on the reporting of one particular case by the newspaper Asahi Shinbun and TBS television's NEWS 23 program (Nomura et al. 2006: 16-17; 66-68). This protest against the use of Japanese aliases may even be viewed more as an attack on the Asahi Shinbun and Chikushi Tetsuya, the host of NEWS 23, than on all *zainichi* Koreans for allegedly enjoying the privilege of using aliases.

Zaitokukai denies that it is a racist organization, arguing that its claims are based on common sense. Its founding statement stresses, for example, the inequalities in the treatment of *zainichi* (special permanent residents) and other foreigners in cases of forced deportation. When compared with foreigners holding other forms of legal status, special permanent residents who have committed felonies are rarely subjected to forced deportation (Zaitokukai 2006). Zaitokukai excoriates the Japanese government for violating the principle of equality before the law. According to its arguments, the Japanese government and Japanese people have been affected by feelings of guilt instilled during the period of Allied occupation, providing the *zainichi* with opportunities to claim preferential treatment, despite their foreign status, based on false claims of historical victimization. This undermines the sovereignty of the state, and must be immediately halted (Zaitokukai 2006).[21] It can be seen, therefore, that

Zaitokukai's stance is no different from that of any other conventional ultra-right group, the power of its message enhanced by its use of advanced communication technologies.[22]

Zaitokukai president, Sakurai Makoto, is clearly a member of the younger generation of Japanese males, dissatisfied with the status quo of Japanese society and verbally armed with the arguments of the historical revisionist movement of the 1990s. He is committed enough to spend considerable amounts of his time sitting in front of his computer, updating his blog entries and posting various comments on numerous websites. Sakurai has been president of the organization since its establishment. As is the case with many an organization run by an influential leader during its start-up phase, the group is basically his. Before launching the organization, Sakurai Makoto [itself possibly a pseudonym] had rather a vague profile. As Doronpa, a computer username [*handoru nēmu*], he enjoyed a degree of fame in internet circles as a sharp and bitter commentator on Korean and Chinese issues as leader of the East Asian Problems Study Group, as well as running the blog known as "The Wonderland: South Korea" (Arai 2006: 216). Sakurai even opposes the idea that *zainichi* Koreans can be naturalized, instead advocating the idea of mass expatriation (Arai 2006: 137-138). Going beyond the domain of cyberspace, he also appears on television debates, and actively walks around the city carrying a megaphone—a rather obese figure in a white shirt and gray business suit with suspenders. He continues to enjoy a charismatic image among Zaitokukai followers.[23]

On Saturday January 10th, 2009, Zaitokukai held its annual meeting in a publicly owned multi-purpose hall with a capacity of 750 people. An internet simulcast of proceedings was provided via a Japanese web-movie site, www.stickam.jp. The entire meeting lasted more than four hours, scheduled to run from 2:30pm until 6:30pm JST. I

tuned in between 12:30am and 4:30am early Saturday morning in New York City. According to an announcement made by administrative staff in charge of the web broadcast, approximately one hundred people showed up at the hall. Considering the capacity of the hall and given the camera angle used, a noticeably large number of the seats were empty, with people seated here and there in rows visible to the camera. Each of the speeches by members of the executive board contained numerous racial slurs—typically references to sly Koreans intent on deceiving innocent Japanese. The web broadcast was accompanied by chat postings by viewers, these comments also riddled with racial slurs. There were occasional disputes between a few viewers of differing perspectives, all greeted with hostile ignorance by the others. By the ten-minute mark, over eighty computer users had logged on to this live broadcast, the number passing one hundred by the half-hour mark. Chat postings not only included derogatory remarks about Koreans, but also regarding Chinese and *burakumin*, in addition to criticisms of members of the Japanese Teachers Union and SGI (Sōka Gakkai International).

The meeting was divided into two sessions. The first session included an introduction of the executive committee members and an address by the president outlining the organization's "annual doctrine" (*nentō kyōsho enzetsu*). This was followed by an activity report by each section and a presentation by a guest speaker. Sakurai spoke in high-pitched tones, eloquently presenting an overview of the group's protest activities in 2008 and his plans for expanding similar types of activity. His prime message involved emphasizing the importance of speaking out against things that were clearly wrong and of making as simple and powerful an appeal as possible to what he saw as common sense. The priority for the group in 2009, he argued, would be strengthening its campaign against local municipalities,

as uncoordinated decisions by local administrators were largely to blame for the acceleration of *zainichi* privileges. Compared with Sakurai's emotive and substantial address, the speeches by some of the local division chiefs that followed revealed a degree of awkwardness, and some of them could be seen groping for where to begin. Their presentations included frequent references to stereotypes and expressions of racial prejudice and hatred rather than explanations of what each local unit had actually achieved during the past year and what its plans were for the year to come.

Extra time created by the delayed arrival of the guest speaker, a young Tokyo metropolitan government council member, led to a special unscheduled "free discussion" session between the president and one of his executive members. The spontaneous and provisional nature of this exchange meant that it was freed from the bounds of political correctness. Sakurai spoke at length without pausing, arguing that: "There are some scary *zainichi*—about 26,000 yakuza members. But other than that, the vast majority are ordinary people and they are not scary at all. No matter how consolidated the voices of *zainichi* Koreans are, there is no comparison with the one hundred million Japanese. If we were to seriously act together, it would be so easy to kick them all out by force." "Listen, everyone! Doing *zainichi* [literal translation] is a business. There is no other business as delicious as *zainichi* business. If I were granted such privileges, I would love to become a *zainichi* myself!" Sakurai then went on to express his views on the wartime Korean comfort women [conscripted/kidnapped sex slaves]: "They are basically all prostitutes, simply doing business. If we take what Koreans say—they are sheer liars—too seriously, and compensate [them], all the Korean sex workers who smuggle themselves in here now to make money will begin saying, 'we were forced to come! We are victims!' in several decades when they have

become old and poor. We cannot take that kind of nonsense." Sakurai's views can be seen as an extension of arguments by the revisionist history group of the 1990s in response to claims by former comfort women (Suh 2002). Even if the audience was rather small, one hundred on-site and another hundred more participating via the internet, these are sentiments often expressed by Japanese with common levels of misunderstanding regarding *zainichi* Koreans and filled with prejudices usually expressed rather informally on an individual basis. *Zainichi* Koreans who pass as Japanese have numerous chances to encounter such views, even if they do not feel that they have been personally discriminated against, as many in-depth interviews have shown (Fukuoka et al. 1991). In Zaitokukai meetings, all of this is expressed in public, on stage, in an organized, institutionalized setting—a flood of politically incorrect remarks exchanged in a festive atmosphere.

Compared with the first session discussed above, the second session of the 2009 annual meeting had a more relaxed and leisurely agenda. It had a smaller audience, about fifty on-site, and forty online, rising to eighty at the beginning of a performance by hip hop group AreiRaise (see below). The program started with a musical performance by a rhythm and blues duo, RUA, followed by a series of open speeches. The speakers, who had signed up to speak at the registration session prior to the meeting, expressed a stream of extreme and paranoid opinions. For example, one of the male speakers shouted that: "The Japanese are basically farmers and the foreigners are hunters. They will trap us! Japanese women! Do not have intercourse with gorillas and blacks [*kuronbo*, a derogatory term]." One fragile elderly woman spoke up about her problem of being stalked by SGI members, and claimed that SGI used special electrical waves to brainwash people. Surprisingly, the comments posted on the internet while they were speaking were very sympathetic and supportive. It appears that a

community exists sharing a common belief and ideology, members tolerant toward each other, and intolerant only toward *zainichi* Koreans and progressive (ultra-left, in their terms) intellectuals.

The patriotic hip-hop group AreiRaise[24] provided further musical entertainment, accompanied by guest female vocalist Saori, who used to serve in the Japanese Self Defense Forces. AreiRaise's performance began with Kimigayo, the problematic national anthem, which literally extols long life for the Emperor.[25] AreiRaise's lyrics constantly extolled the significance of loving the nation and romanticized fallen war heroes. This group has some ardent followers who logged onto this broadcast for the sake of this live performance, posting comments such as: "This is so moving!" "Oh no, I'm crying," "Gosh, they are so cool" and the like. Meanwhile, they sang: "It's not the right, it's not the left, I just want to love the nation!"

The entire event closed with another ten-minute speech by Sakurai, who declared that: "we are neither exclusivist nor xenophobic, we simply speak out on something that is common sense. Spend the Japanese taxpayer's money for [the benefit of] the Japanese! Don't provide special privileges to a particular racial group! Now is the time to pay off the price of the past sixty years!" The simulcast finally ended around 6:45pm Tokyo time.

Aside from including vulgar expressions of racism, the above cases of special permanent resident-bashing share a common logic: that special permanent residents are spoilt complainers who keep demanding rights as compensation for what Zaitokukai views as fabricated injustices suffered in the past. Direct protest activities by the organization have included street demonstrations in front of particular municipal bureaus that distribute special

allowances to *zainichi* seniors without pensions and at the Tokyo immigration bureau in protest at a special exception allowing the over-staying Filipino Calderon family to remain in Japan. The group has also held a protest against Chinese oppression in Tibet, sent an "expedition" [*ensei*] to an area in Kyoto's Uji City[26] with a large Korean population, and been involved in other organized activities, as well as sending formal letters of protest to various municipalities.

Curiously, the group's activities are not always immediately directed against *zainichi* Koreans themselves. Zaitokukai members are genuinely anti-progressive, opposing those they view as the "ultra-left." Some campaigns seem to be based less on a set of firm beliefs than on a desire simply to challenge progressives and liberals. They demonstrate in relation to the Tibet issue, not due to humanitarian concerns, but because they are anti-China. As discussed above, the name Zaitokukai was based on a desire among its members to protest the privileged status enjoyed by *zainichi* Korean special permanent residents despite their status as foreigners. However, as argued by one of the members who spoke up at the annual meeting, what its members are really protesting is the inability of the Japanese government—at national and municipal levels—and the establishment to counter the rise of denizenship and limit the influence of Japanese progressive intellectuals in certain quarters of the mass media. *Zainichi* Koreans themselves are, in fact, mostly ignored, except as the occasional targets of racist remarks. According to those on the stage, older generation participants at the Zaitokukai meeting discussed above were more concerned with Japan having started out on the wrong track in the post-war period, with an imposed constitution which threatened the continuity of the divine Japanese state and the Emperor system.

Despite its name, the real enemies of Zaitokukai are not the *zainichi* Koreans themselves, although blatant racial prejudice clearly exists in relation to anything involving Koreans—be they from the South, the North, or *zainichi*. Curiously, their visible targets are a handful of outspoken *zainichi* Koreans whose opinions and claims share affinities with those of Japanese progressive intellectuals; the vast majority of Koreans, including those who have become naturalized, are left alone in their virulent verbal attacks. The recent departure from Zaitokukai of Arai Kazuma, who has recently been posting anti-Zaitokukai blogs, was prompted by Arai's discomfort at Sakurai's argument that all *zainichi* Koreans should be deported (Arai 2006: 137-141).

Apolitical *zainichi* Koreans, though not targeted directly by Zaitokukai's protest activities, cannot remain immune from the organization's presence. Regardless of their nationality or politics, *zainichi* Koreans collectively constitute an explicitly stated enemy that the group makes constant reference to in order to consolidate its mission, its members harboring views that are broadly anti-Korean, anti-progressive, and deeply dissatisfied with the postwar political climate in Japan.

Foreigners should be foreigners, the group argues. This claim, however, is congruent with another stream of opinion that argues that foreigners should be Japanese citizens as holders of Japanese nationality. An earlier emergent argument goes that *zainichi* Korean should participate in Japanese society with a full commitment as Japanese citizens (Tei 1993; Takubo 2000; Sasaki 2006). According to this type of argument, naturalization is proactively defined as involving the acquisition of Japanese nationality (Sasaki 2006) or as taking place within the framework of the existing naturalization procedure, a relatively simple matter for Japan-born generations (Momochi in Takubo 2000: 179).

Kakuritsukyō: The Other Side of the Backlash

Zaitokukai and the Kakuritsukyō movement can be viewed as two sides of the same coin. Originating in the late 1990s, when *zainichi* activists were exploring ways of moving on to their next phase of activism following the anti-fingerprint and pro-human rights movements of the 1980s,[27] Kakuritsukyō's core members are primarily former Mintōren activists and concerned individuals from various generations, including scholars. Lee Kyung-jye, who has long played a dominant role as an activist in Takatsuki City, directs the group's initiatives, while also chairing a multicultural educational NGO.

The goal of Kakuritsukyō is the realization of Japanese nationality acquisition through unilateral filing. Unlike naturalization which requires a variety of documents (see Chapter 1), it is one-sided declaration of *zainichi* Koreans' interest in holding Japanese nationality, just as a matter of filing a simple form filled out required information which automatically let *zainichi* Koreans acquire Japanese nationality. It is an unconditional approval that Kakuritsukyō seeks. Emphasis is placed on the idea that Japanese nationality is one of the rights to which *zainichi* Koreans are entitled, whereas naturalization fundamentally involves permission rather than rights.[28] Kakuritsukyō insists that its agenda does not adversely affect demands for local suffrage (Sasaki 2006).

Its inaugural meeting, held in February 2004, featured a guest presentation by Sakurai Yoshiko, a journalist known to hold rather conservative views, entitled "Dear *zainichi* Korean friends." Tsurunen Marutei, the Norwegian Japanese national assembly member, Sakanaka Hidenori, a renowned immigration bureaucrat who enraged nationalist *zainichi* Korean activists in the 1970s because of his anticipation of *zainichi* Korean assimilation into

Japanese society (see Chapter 6), and Tei Taikin, one of the early proponents of the acquisition of Japanese nationality by *zainichi* [South] Koreans (Tei 1993) (see Chapter 5) also gave speeches on the same day. In addition to its regular study group meetings, Kakuritsukyō holds annual meetings in Nagata-chō, lobbying National Diet members (Sasaki 2006). It adopts a pragmatic and realistic approach in targeting changes in policy, Ōnuma Yasuaki arguing that this is what *zainichi* Korean activists should have done decades ago (Ōnuma 2004b).

Lee Kyung-jye describes his own uneasiness when explaining to his children why their nationality is South Korean, not Japanese. He points out the meaningless rigidity in the idea that nationality be reduced to the token status of Korean ethnic identity. Lee writes:

> Let's take off these tight clothes called ethno-national identity [*minzoku*]. The time has come for us all to change into brand-new "Korean-Japanese" [*Koria-kei nihonjin*] clothes. Then, we [can] send Korean-Japanese national assembly representatives, one after another, actively participating in (national) politics and claiming the ideals of the multi-ethnic society and multiculturalism. In several decades, we might even have a Korean-Japanese prime minister. If we have many Korean-Japanese who stand out in various fields, we can be agitators [lit. "a bee sting"] in this mono-ethno-national society. And if the poison circulates throughout the system, the Emperor system will become inflamed [in debate]. More than anything, I will no longer have to talk my way out in response to my children's questions. How nice. I would like to pass on this kind of straightforwardness to our younger generations (K. Lee in Sasaki 2006: 37-38).

Kakuritsukyō has seen some interesting twists and turns. Lee Kyungjye, leader of the organization, was no longer able to wait until the passing of legislation allowing special permanent residents to acquire Japanese nationality just through filing a form. He was naturalized in 2006 with a tilt at electoral politics in mind, running in the Osaka Prefectural

Assembly elections of April 2007 as a representative of his native city of Takatsuki and the adjacent Mishima County. He had no party endorsement.

His core thinking, as expressed in the above quotes, has remained constant since the late 1990s. In 2001, he expressed his casual, straightforward feelings at one of his presentations held at the Kyoto YWCA. Partial excerpts remain on the internet, although those originally posted on his Takatsuki-based Mukuge Society website were later deleted by the group. Mukuge was one of the multicultural-policy-oriented *zainichi* Korean and Japanese local activist groups as part of Mintōren (see Chapter 1) since the 1970s and Lee virtually grew up with Mukuge as a full-time activist.[29] The entry for Lee on Wikipedia Japan includes a remark made by him which could have been a satirical joke, a footnote mentioning that the original text has already been deleted from the website of the organization to which he belongs. Nevertheless, his comment has provoked strong responses, primarily from patriotic elements wings of the internet community, retroactively following the announcement of his candidacy as a Korean-Japanese, Lee Kyung-jye. The verbal slip in question was a rather misleading comment in which he suggested that if many more foreigners participated in Japanese politics as Japanese, the Emperor system would fall apart in future, which would be a good thing. Lee made this comment during a post-presentation question-and-answer session on the relationship between the Emperor system and the presence of “foreign-Japanese”. This remark, however, led to him being labeled in cyberspace as dangerously subversive to the Japanese nation.[30]

He received 2,543 votes in the elections, the lowest count among the six candidates and below the minimum 3,000 votes legally required for a candidate to replace a deceased or disqualified candidate during his or her term of office. This result prompted numerous

comments and blog entries, such as: “Good heavens!” “Does that mean that one percent of Takatsuki residents are traitors?” “[I] cannot stand [the fact that] there are over 2000 Korean-Japanese residents there!” “He got what he deserved—he insulted Japan.”

Lee himself mentioned the difficulties he had faced without party endorsement, which usually involves the provision of experienced know-how as well as the sharing of supporters’ name-lists.[31] During the campaign, Lee and his aides were concerned about whether or not particular actions they took were in line with the Public Office Election Law (K. Lee n.d.). Is it acceptable to publish one’s intention to run in a newsletter for supporters before the public announcement of election is made? Can one stand at a train station greeting voters before it has been publicly announced that one is to run as a candidate? Participation in the formal political process requires in-depth know-how.

In his review of his unsuccessful campaign, he suggests that the reaction of Takatsuki area constituents must have been one of “bewilderment.” Optimistically assessing his one-percent support rate among voters as an indication of a one-percent multicultural tolerance rate in the electorate, he notes his hopes for higher figures in the years to come (K. Lee n.d.). Although his loss had been expected as he was the only new candidate, it cannot be denied that the verbal slip he had made more than five years earlier worked against him and that its impact could not be underestimated.

The polarization of political viewpoints and interpretations in recent years can be seen in the emergence of Zaitokukai-style criticism of privileges enjoyed by permanent residents on the one hand and the growth in Kakuritsukyō-style *zainichi* Korean activism on the other. Both Zaitokukai and Kakuritsukyō have reached their respective conclusions via different

paths, both arguing that full membership in Japanese society means nothing more than having Japanese nationality instead of having an exceptionally stable legal status as a foreigner. Lee Kyungjye's case further suggests that while the notion of the Korean-Japanese is not an impossible one, any comments publicly challenging the Emperor system or the expression of extremist opinions can be politically fatal (or more detrimental to them than if they had been uttered by a Japanese born to Japanese parents with an ancestry traceable back to the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the birth of modern Japan).

In 2002, Lee Kyungjye and some *zainichi* Korean Kakuritsukyō members issued a statement expressing their deepest sympathy for those kidnapped by North Korean agents in the late 1970s and early 1980s and their families, demanding an urgent and full investigation, and urging that a solution be found and compensation provided. They also held some meetings featuring guest presentations by family members of the victims. This type of action illustrates the commitment by Lee and his close associates to stand somewhat on the side of the Japanese instead of maintaining embarrassed silence over extreme actions taken by the North Koreans. Lee explained to me earlier, in 2000,[32] that *zainichi* Koreans should also bear responsibility for collective Japanese historical wrongs, otherwise, "*zainichi* Koreans are just achieving the least [amount of] responsibility for both Japan and Korea. Lee's long-standing commitment to numerous projects, including local multicultural education, and his practice of taking the side of the Japanese, even on issues for which Japan is being blamed, have not made any difference to his electability or political reputation.[33]

Good Citizens = Good Subjects?: Citizenship, residency and censorship

The verbal bashing of *zainichi* Koreans and special permanent residents, whether on an individual or organized level, could not have achieved such prominence without the internet. Starting with a series of popular comic books with origins in anti-Korean websites, various forms of interaction, from individual blogs to bulletin boards, ultimately coalesced into organized structures such as Zaitokukai. Bickering and backbiting in cyberspace by individuals hiding their identities behind online pseudonyms can be largely dismissed as the rantings of those holding minority or extreme opinions. Nevertheless, bloggers can go online with just one click and easily arrange meetings off-line too. With a claimed 5,000 members and an agenda specifically criticizing *zainichi* Koreans, the power and influence of Zaitokukai cannot be easily dismissed.

Mark Warren (2001) and James Jasper (1997) optimistically assess the positive impact of associational density and social protest on democracy. Warren and Jasper suggest that even extreme views and extreme groups—whether fundamentalist, ultra-right, racist or xenophobic in nature—may have positive functions and effects. Extremists provoke active counter-arguments, activating the discussion of a diverse range of opinions. This may not always be the case, as certain modes of communication now in use exhibit tendencies towards isolation and compartmentalization. In this environment, it is possible for information to be collected in a more skewed and less balanced manner. Further, communication on the internet often displays an alarming lack of civility. Certain remarks or entries provoke an endless succession of emotional comments by users, each such comment retroactively censoring who can say what.

Naturalized Japanese sign an oath of allegiance that states: “I pledge that I shall become a good Japanese citizen, obeying the law [*hō o junshu shi zenryō naru nihonkokumin*

ni narukoto o chikaimasu].” Compared with American naturalization, where new citizens are specifically asked to be ready to take up arms to defend the United States, for example, this statement—the only required oath—is vague. Nevertheless, expectations of a considerable degree of compliance and conformity cannot be denied simply because they are not written down. In many societies, good citizenship is tantamount to being a good subject. There are also numerous everyday, informal sanctions in the workplace.

Takubo Tadae, an academic and former journalist, comments in a roundtable discussion in 2000 that: “After all, special permanent residents have a status that Japan does not consider as full member[ship]. If *zainichi* [South] Koreans’ sense of belonging is to Japan, it’s better to formally switch [their] belonging [i.e. identity] to Japan. If they are discriminated against after becoming full members, that’s the right moment when they can loudly blame Japan” (Takubo 2001: 199-200). On the one hand, the acquisition of Japanese nationality is assumed to resolve any potential discriminatory practices. On the other hand, Takubo’s view apparently prioritizes formal membership (i.e. citizenship) as a prerequisite for protesting any discriminatory practices.[34]

This chapter has introduced cases of special permanent resident-bashing and also explored parallel moves aimed at achieving fuller inclusion for them in Japanese society. Starting out with different ideological origins and political orientations, both streams of opinion have ended up reaching the same conclusion: that full membership of Japanese society is possible only with formal membership proven by nationality.

The stumbling start made by Lee Kyungjye when launching his formal political career, and the backstabbing he has suffered via the internet, imply that even with Japanese

nationality, ostensibly a symbol of full membership of society, "foreign-Japanese" or Korean-Japanese in particular continue to find themselves the objects of closer scrutiny than the average Japanese. Naturalization involves no formal requirement for an individual to suppress any dissenting or critical views they may hold, however everyday life provides numerous occasions when self-censorship may come into play. Challenging the state might result in an individual being called a foreigner or asked to "quit being Japanese," for example.

A foreign minority making its voice heard in a local community leads to remarks such as: "things get complicated [because of foreigners]. Japanese would understand how things work" (Hyun 2008: 120-124). Residents, no matter how permanent their status may be, are beyond the scope of constitutionally guaranteed human rights. Therefore, after sixty years and many generations of residence in Japan, *zainichi* Koreans have reached the point where they are forced to acknowledge, if not accept, the following state of affairs: without Japanese nationality, minority voices have no recognition; even with Japanese nationality, there are things that should not be expressed in public.

Endnotes:

[1] It is extendable overseas for another year, depending on the discretion of local Japanese Consulates.

[2] The naturalization procedure itself is cumbersome, requiring the processing of numerous official documents. Even the efficient Japanese bureaucracy can process only about 15,000 naturalizations a year (15,440 to be precise—7,412 Koreans, 4,322 Chinese and holders of other nationalities in 2008; MOJ 2009).

[3] The securing of a majority in both houses by the Democratic Party following the 2009 election may lead to the introduction of a bill aimed at granting local suffrage to foreigners who are permanent residents. The debate continues. It is important to note here that an organization called

Gaikokujin sanseiken ni hantaisuru kai zenkoku kyōgikai [the National Federation of Organizations Opposing Local Suffrage for Foreigners] was formed in 2004 (http://www.geocities.jp/sanseiken_hantai/).

[4] His mother is Japanese, and he has a gentlemanly appearance and softly spoken demeanor, much like Kang Sang-jung, the popular commentator-cum-scholar (see Ch. 6).

[5] Shin Sugo is an outspoken *zainichi* critic. As a result, she is a regular target for *zainichi* privilege discourse, seen as one of a number of *zainichi* ideologues with interests in preserving their positions as public figures by perpetuating the idea of the continued existence of *zainichi* as a victimized group in society (Asakawa in Nomura et al. 2006: 141-142; Takeshima in Nomura et al, 2006: 50-52; see also Ch. 5).

[6] Kakuritsukyō—see below—considers that it would take a considerable amount of time to obtain the consensus needed to effect such drastic change (Sasaki 2006: 25).

[7] My translation. The group does not have an English website, since its obvious target audience is Japanese.

[8] Not all *zainichi* grassroots activists supported her case. Chong bitterly recalls a remark by a well-known activist: "Challenging natural legal principles [=the nationality clause]? That's exactly [equivalent to] challenging discrimination in Japanese people's minds. It's too difficult. You'd better get married and be happy." (Chong 2006: 42).

[9] Chong was the target of criticism from the media and other quarters following previous legal decisions as well. In the late 1990s, internet bulletin boards had a much narrower audience.

[10] Arai's blog, *Zainichi Korian za sādo* (*Zainichi* Korean the third), entries from which were later published in book form (Arai 2006). According to the publisher's biography of the author, the site was so popular that it recorded four million hits in two years.

[11] News 23 is a show that was previously anchored by the late Chikushi Tetsuya, a figure often blamed for disseminating a guilt-ridden perspective on Japan's past. Following his death in 2008, *Yahoo! News* reports of his death prompted numerous celebratory comments.

[12] Arai appeared in public at the inaugural meeting of Zaitokukai in January 2007 as vice president. However, Zaitokukai announced his resignation in December 2007, including a personal comment by Arai himself. Since then, he was completely absent from the virtual community until April 2009, when he briefly resurfaced with a completely different standpoint, again withdrawing from cyberspace a month or so later.

[13] Its homepage makes effective use of visual imagery featuring the cherry blossom, a symbolic icon of Japaneseness evoking the fate of the wartime suicide pilots who unhesitatingly chose to end their lives in "full bloom."

[14] When I checked the Zaitokukai website on December 28, 2008, there were 4,517 members. As of March 17, 2009, membership had expanded to 4,976.

[15] There is no explanation of what exactly this organization does. Probably one source of revenue is registration fees for its conferences and public lectures.

[16] Before the publication of the *Kenkanryū* comic series, conservative critics expressed the same kind of opinion, using the term "*zainichi tokken"* and denying that the *zainichi* Korean presence in Japan was the result of forced migration. See Momochi in Takubo 2000: 179-181.

[17] Yamano's comic strips originally appeared on a website in 2002 (Itagaki 2008: 100). According to its publisher, as of February 2006, Manga Kenkanryū had sold 450,000 copies (Itagaki 2008: 99). According to the publisher's advertizing banner for the Manga Kenkanryū series, nine million copies had been sold if all subsequent volumes were combined.

[18] A line cannot easily be drawn between cases of voluntary and involuntary migration, especially in the context of colonial Korea; many simply did not have any other choice than to migrate.

[19] Anthropologist Itagaki Ryūta (2008: 102-103) views anti-Korean discourse as an essentialized national sentiment that combines racism and nationalism. Itagaki argues that the anti-Korean wave as a form of popular discourse is primarily directed against Koreans as former colonial subjects; it is not necessarily about contemporary South or North Koreans on the Korean Peninsula. The comic strips intentionally exaggerate racial stereotypes, Koreans depicted with much narrower eyes than the Japanese and always screaming. Koreans (*zainichi chōsenjin)* are compared with unwelcome squatters in Japanese houses. Naturalized Japanese of Korean descent are not authentic family members; they must be monitored so that they act in accordance with Japanese national interests (Itagaki 2008: 103-104).

[20] For a detailed critique of claims made by the anti-Korean wave which converge with those of Zaitokukai, see Pak et al. (eds.) *Manga Kenkanryū no koko ga detarame* (2006).

[21] The full text of its inauguration statement is as follows:

> Although the term *zainichi* originally refers to *zainichi* foreigners [foreigners in Japan], it is used *exclusively for* zainichi *Koreans* in contemporary Japan. Only this shows how peculiar their existence is. They are foreigners, neither immigrants nor refugees. They exist in Japan as those who have *special privileges called* tokubetsu eijyūken, tokuei [special permanent residency status]. And this special privilege, *tokuei*, unconditionally grants them permanent residency, *allowing them to be parasites in Japan for ten or one hundred generations, for as long as the Japanese nation exists*.
>
> Needless to say, apart from *zainichi,* foreigners staying in Japan without such privileges usually must be issued with the appropriate visas for limited periods of stay. When the visa expires, the foreigner must choose between visa renewal and departure. However, other than these two options, there are approximately two hundred thousand foreigners who have overstayed [their visas], of which twenty percent, or 40, 000, are South Koreans.
>
> "The exceptional law concerning the legal status of former Japanese nationals and their descendants who lost Japanese nationality following the enactment of the San Francisco Peace Treaty"—a law based on a diplomatic memorandum by Japan and South Korea providing *tokuei* with legal status—specifies the conditions for the deportation of *zainichi,* as [is the case for individuals] when they receive prison sentences with forced labor of seven or more years. *Since 1970, there has been no single case of forced deportation of* zainichi,

according to our research as of today, despite many *zainichi having committed crimes* and receiving punishment equal to or more severe than that mentioned above.

If you take a look at the treatment of other *foreigners*, the Heisei 13 (2001) amendment to the immigration law states that: "As part of a deterrent against crime by foreigners, it is possible that foreigners can be forcefully deported if they are convicted of any penal law violation and sentenced to even less than one year imprisonment (including probation)." *It is strictly enforced*, responding to an increase in crimes committed by foreigners.

The present state of affairs where non-*zainichi* foreigners are discriminated against is the responsibility of the Japanese government that drafts and enacts laws. But why is it that the government violates the principle of equality under the law and commits nearly suicidal acts for a nation under the rule of law?

During the postwar period, *zainichi* Koreans have demanded various privileges from the Japanese government, claiming that they are the victims and descendants of the atrocious conscripted labor migration policy of the colonial [administration] over [a period of] thirty-six years.

If you take a look at the real migration history, *the vast majority of them are basically just voluntary migrant workers* [whose transfer to Japan was] *arranged by private and government agencies prior to the total mobilization period during the war*. In addition, during the immediate postwar period, they also include those who came as illegal immigrants after incidents such as the Cheju 4.3. Massacre by Rhee Syngman, [those who came] during the confusion of the immediate postwar [period] and the Korean War, and *those criminals who illegally purchased alien registration from Korean returnees from Japan and faked their identities*.

Certainly, Koreans did exist who came to Japan as part of military conscription (only from May 1944) and conscripted military labor (only from September 1944). But the vast majority of them returned to the peninsula, either as part of the repatriation project by the GHQ [the General Head Quarters; SCAP/the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan] and the repatriation project by the Red Cross to North Korea. *Those who remained in Japan are merely foreigners who chose to do so by rejecting these repatriation projects*.

These historical processes of migration help us understand clearly that *it is a nonsense fabrication that the first generation* zainichi *are victims or that the second and third generation* zainichi *are the descendants of these victims*.

However, because of the WGIP [War Guilt Information Program] initiated by the GHQ [the SCAP] and its effects—the prevailing ultra-left thinking—Japanese nationals are obliged to feel guilty for crimes they never committed, which is completely unnecessary.

More than sixty years have passed since the end of the World War II, [and] the impact of the WGIP [War Guilt Information Program] has cast a dark shadow over the Japanese psyche. The administration and mass media, the very missions of which should involve responsibility for [investigating] these problems, *began treating the* zainichi *problem as a human rights issue, and established a stance that it should be left untouched as a taboo*.

> These are the circumstances in which the preferential treatment of *zainichi* is [i.e. has become] rampant, and the *zainichi* problem continues to exist.
>
> It is not only *tokuei*, but also other privileges already acquired, such as [the right to use] Japanese aliases and [access to] the minimum life support allowance, as well as demands for local suffrage and the pension that *zainichi* impudently continue to make at an accelerated [rate] and to an impermissible degree.
>
> The *zainichi* privilege problem can trace its origins to a paranoiac fancy: "The perpetrator's historical perspective which regards Japan as an absolute villain," resulting from the prevalence of ultra-left thinking with a masochistic conception of history during the six decades of the postwar period.
>
> *Ultra-left thinking* that argues that: "Because Japan is completely wrong, let's listen to what the *zainichi* say"*—which seems utterly insane—*must be removed, and history should be calmly looked back upon. We must inform the Japanese people of the fact that no single reason exists in the past [i.e. no single historical justification] for Japan to apologize to Korea.
>
> We believe that when the Japanese people can get over their unnecessary feelings of guilt, we will take the first step toward the ultimate solution of the Korean problem or the *zainichi* privilege problem.
>
> The Zaitokukai advances people's understanding of the past, explaining as plainly as possible and to as many people as possible.
>
> We also *broadly inform the general public of* zainichi *privileges, their background, and the alarming way in which the* zainichi *are a threat to Japanese society*.
>
> First, it is important to change the awareness of our Japanese nationals. Our objective is to disseminate the correct [version of] history and [the truth regarding] the contemporary crime-ridden circumstances of the *zainichi*, and to ask ourselves [the Japanese] to clarify our determination to solve the Korean problem and the [problem of] *zainichi* privileges.
>
> Our very voices will move the politicians who have left these problems untouched, and move the administrative offices in charge.
>
> It is necessary for us to be determined to immediately resolve the *zainichi* problems that exist in Japanese society without leaving them or passing them over to our next generation.
>
> We truly hope you would agree with our group's objective and activities, as many [of them] as possible, say NO to *zainichi* Koreans who enjoy the privileges as if this is perfectly normal, and announce our firm resolution as Japanese nationals.
>
> Sakurai Makoto
> December 5, Heisei 18 [2006]
> [Original emphasis; the notes in large parentheses are mine]

The statement, while trying as much as possible to maintain a simple, straightforward tone, is sprinkled with references to historical details, such as the massacre on Cheju Island, which neither the

average Japanese nor the average *zainichi* Korean would have heard of. The statement also highlights the criminal tendencies *zainichi* Koreans possess that are all covered up by the privileges they enjoy. It even registers some universal humanitarian concerns, demanding equality of treatment for foreigners in Japan. They blame the SCAP, namely the US, for shaping the postwar Japanese mindset, whether it is responsible or not. But by dropping the alphabetized name of a program, the WGIP, that does not have a full name, the statement gives the impression that it is a well-researched, trustworthy piece of writing.

[22] This is instead of using vehicles mounted with loudspeakers spouting loud propaganda messages and pre-war military songs, not an uncommon sight in large Japanese cities. More recently, however, it has been promoting its causes using loudspeakers, blocking exhibitions and symposiums on Japanese military comfort women (sex slaves) as well as pro-DPRK Korean schools and so on.

[23] According to anthropologist Tomomi Yamaguchi, Zaitokukai established a female-initiated group called Soyokaze (soft breeze) in 2009, working on the same agenda. At its meeting, it sold character-based goods, such as “Makoto-chan stickers” (personal communication January 18, 2010).

[24] Written without a space between the parts, and pronounced “ērei raizu.” “Eirei” (英霊) refers to the souls of fallen war heroes, while “raise” (来世) means life after death.

[25] Attempting to appease voices raised in objection, the government explains that it is a song praising popular sovereignty (see Chapter 6).

[26] The city of Uji’s “Utoro” neighborhood became known for a debate relating to illegal occupancy and shifting ownership of land during the land speculation boom. It was finally settled in favor of the current land owner in a Supreme Court ruling in 2000. The NGOs, residents and the landowner agreed that half of the land in question should be sold to the residents consisted of 65 households (LAZAK 2008: 136-137, the exact size of the land to be sold is not specified in this source).

[27] The results of these movements show strategies of concession used in the resolution of conflicts involving Japanese institutions (Pharr 1990).

[28] Kakuritsukyō’s uncompromising stance includes a call for the expansion of the standardized table of Chinese characters that may be used for names to include Korean surnames that are not currently listed. This would further extend the efforts of initiatives aimed at Korean empowerment in education practices through the use of “real” (Korean) names.

[29] Many researchers focus on this group. See Tai 2006, Fukuoka 1993, T.Kim 1999 to name a few.

[30] Had he been threatening to the Japanese nation, his naturalization would not have been granted at all.

[31] See Sōda Kazuhiro’s documentary film, “Campaign” (2006) for an excellent illustration of how electoral politics works in Japan.

[32] He had already expressed his interest in local politics, though at the time as a permanent resident. Nevertheless, he was talking in a context where local suffrage was soon to be granted to

permanent resident foreigners. He suggested that I run for a seat in the Setagaya Ward assembly in Tokyo, representing the area where I grew up.

[33] Arai Shōkei, the first postwar Korean-Japanese Lower House Diet member, committed suicide in the midst of a financial scandal. Scandals are more damaging to politicians of foreign origin, no matter how Japanese they are in terms of their commitment (I. Pak 1999).

[34] Ren Hō, a Taiwanese-Japanese assemblywoman, was in charge of a Democrat Party administration audit of redundant budget allocations, and proposed reducing the budget allocation for computer technology development. Hiranuma Takeo, the former Minister of Economy and Industry (Liberal Democrat Party) later commented at a fundraising party that: “I’m afraid to say, but she is not originally a Japanese. An ex-campaign girl who was naturalized and became a national assembly member and says such things. Is that kind of politics all right?” Ren Hō’s mother is Japanese and she acquired Japanese nationality following the 1984 amendment to the Nationality Law (Ishikawa 2010).

CONCLUSION

Future without Past?: Integration without Recognition

Racism is always nationally specific. It invariably becomes enmeshed with searches for national identity and cohesion that vary with the historical experience of each country.
——George M. Frederickson (2000: 75)

Now what I think is that identity [*aidentitī*] is something that cannot be shaped in a way you like [*jibun no jiyū ni naranai mono*] after all. As you live everyday life, it just comes to you. To establish one's identity is such an odd idea because an identity is something you cannot do anything about, but just accept.
——Takeda Seiji "On my three names" (1990: 51)[1]

[R]ace, ethnicity and nation are ways of making sense of the world. They are ways of understanding and identifying oneself, interpreting one's problems and predicaments, and identifying one's interest. They are ways—both institutionalized and informal—of recognizing, identifying, and classifying other people, of construing sameness and differences, and of "coding" and making sense of their actions. They are templates for representing and organizing social knowledge, frames for articulating social comparisons and explanations, and filters that govern what is noticed or unnoticed. Race, ethnicity and nationality exist and are reproduced from day to day in and through such perceptions, interpretations, representations, classifications, categorizations, and identifications.
——Rogers Brubaker (2009: 34)

Zainichi Korean cultural assimilation and structural integration have advanced to a remarkable extent during the post-colonial decades. They have become part of Japanese society with considerable evidence and gestures of recognition and reconciliation (Lie 2008). Nonetheless, why is it that *zainichi* Koreans do not proactively acquire Japanese nationality? Why is it that they express doubts about their authenticity as members of Japanese society? This dissertation has outlined several contentious aspects of that the process *zainichi* Koreans face in becoming "Japanese": history, intermarriage, education, diasporic identity, citizenship, and politics. This concluding chapter summarizes major findings and implications for further inquiry.

Reproducing Mono-ethnic Japaneseness

As misfits in the scheme of modern nation-states, *zainichi* Koreans challenge the interchangeability of race, ethnicity, nationality, and shared culture and history in the inexplicit but widely-shared definitions of Japaneseness and Koreanness. Because of phenotype invisibility and a small population size, blending into the majority leads them to a considerable anonymous individuality which simply reproduces Japanese hegemony and alleged homogeneity. The predominant forms of expressing their Koreanness as a private, part-time activity, such as observing Korean ancestor worship or transmitting genealogical history within the family, while maintaining a "Japanese" face, does little to increase multi-cultural visibility.

Those who resist the overwhelming tide of Japanization engage themselves in a search for obvious expressions of *zainichi* Korean history and culture through public use of Korean names and importation of [South] Korean national culture. Some pursue visible, full-time Koreanness, by embracing Korean-pronounced names, Korean legal statuses, or folk dance and music in traditional attire. These representations are acquired through a selective adaptation and valuation; they are important for their symbolism rather than passed down from their families. However, this visualization of Koreanness bears a hidden curriculum of remote nationalism, invoking ahistorical and apolitical Koreanness as forever foreign. Koreanness is consumable only if it is exotic. Visible Koreanness reproduces Japanese hegemony and homogeneity.

Aside from a lack of voting rights and restrictions on become high-level public servants, there are no differences in everyday interactions with the Japanese majority,

between *zainichi* Koreans who use a Japanese alias and pass as Japanese, and *zainichi* Koreans who are naturalized or whose parents were naturalized and who have a Japanese name. They both consider their *zainichi* Korean roots as a private, family circumstance that is not worth advertising. Passing as Japanese is one aspect of everyday life, as if it were one of mores and etiquettes to avoid complicated or interrupted reactions, or as if the stigma attached to Japan's colonial racial hierarchy had never been a relevant issue. It is simply difficult to embrace a membership in a less prestigious social group.

Zainichi Koreans have long lost a common political platform to negotiate terms with the Japanese state authority and society, the intra-community political leadership had committed primarily to divided homeland politics. The alternative in the 1980s to traditional *zainichi* politics, civil rights activism, has faced criticism from *zainichi* Koreans themselves and sympathetic Japanese collaborators for its overemphasis on *zainichi* Korean victim-hood among both.

Japaneseness among *zainichi* Koreans is something they cannot comfortably identify with, no matter how Japanese they are. Lineage continues to provide *zainichi* Koreans with conditional membership. Frequent intermarriage grants the following generation Japanese nationality through one legal Japanese parent. What makes these children of intermarriage conditionally Japanese, is not a matter of lineage in defining categorical membership because it can be so powerfully but tangibly imagined. What about the question of historically-formulated collective identity? I will return to it in the final section.

Unavailable Identity Option

Why is the recurrent theme of *zainichi* Korean alienation, *zainichi* Koreans as forever foreign, so salient? Former colonial subjects die hard, despite the numerous indicators of structural assimilation and recognition as part of Japanese society. One possible explanation is *zainichi* Koreans' self-reproduction of their minority status. Having internalized the values and norms attached to homogeneously-imagined Japan, *zainichi* Koreans oscillate between representations of the self and collective identity. They interact with the majority population either with an exaggerated self-exoticism or as anonymous members of the Japanese majority. Those who do not advertise their *zainichi* Korean backgrounds are at least partially aware of their different lineage and separated from the shared discourse of Japanese national history. Individual *zainichi* Korean identities are multi-faceted, constantly negotiating a doubly-conscious minority self and the majority's viewpoints. The self is always in flux; it is wrong to assume there is a core, stable, solid and true self.

Within the double-conscious frame of mind, it would be ironic for minority members to imagine the majority's viewpoint. On the one hand, it is possible that those minority assumptions lag behind constantly changing majority viewpoints. Explicitly and implicitly, *zainichi* Koreans grow up being exposed to "urban legends" of limited occupational choices and upward mobility, and tragic love marriage with Japanese. Opportunities have widened, albeit gradually.

On the other hand, the increasingly dominant argument that *zainichi* Koreans have chosen to stay in Japan (and hence they are not in a position to challenge the system) has not increased opportunities or choices retroactively. Recent *zainichi* discourses have greatly overlapped with an emerging Japanese conservative backlash. These trends are a reflection of

a neo-liberal agenda; minorities are neither allowed to blame the system nor discuss historically-laden discrimination and oppression.

When he publishes his essays as a literary critic, *zainichi* Korean Takeda Seiji chose this pen name, Takeda Seiji, after his favorite Japanese novel. On this choice, he recalls that he did not intend to comment on anything as a member of the Korean community representing the Korean people. In contrast, most *zainichi* Korean writers grab the opportunity to actively use their "real names." He anticipated criticism that using the last name Takeda would be concealing his Korean roots, evading discrimination, and promoting assimilation (Takeda 1990: 50-51). His brief essay written nearly two decades ago still vividly captures what is at stake now. As has often been pointed out, minority members do not have a choice of identities—they are expected to represent the oppressed and to be strong enough to challenge mundane prejudice. It is morally wrong to remain on the side of the majority (Song 2003). Or so researchers expect. Depending on the larger societal context in the eras of celebrated self-sufficiency, they otherwise represent the model minority of super-conformity and devoted loyalty to the state.

In a race-conscious society, interracial individuals are challenged by the societal expectation of a "coherence between self-identification (a public presentation) and self-identity (how one conceptualizes oneself) vis-à-vis the race of one's parents" (Zack 1993: 52 in Azoulay 1997: 2). In a covertly race-unconscious society such as Japan, it is also the case. The incoherence between self identification and self-identity is limited not only among those with dual heritage; *zainichi* Koreans, in anonymous first-time encounters, constantly possess a gap between a public presentation and self-identity. Without exchanging names or other personal information, they are taken as ordinary Japanese. This happens in anonymous

encounters even among those who publicly display Koreanness by using their Korean names or in other ways. *Zainichi* Koreans with public identity displays continue to be the unsettling existence for the Japanese status quo and commonly-held assumptions about Japanese society. Katya Azoulay (1997: 188) argues, "[T]o be biracial—a cognitive and physical process of *being* in the world—in, and as a result of, a race conscious society, is *to be* an interruption, to *represent* a contestation, and to *undermine* the authority of classification" (original emphasis). *Zainichi* Koreans, with or without Japanese lineage, with or without Japanese nationality, continue to exist as an unsettling social category, whether each individual *zainichi* Korean likes it or not.

Paradox of Political Participation and Legacy of Careerism

Paradoxically put, the more Korean, the more active a Japanese citizen. Regardless of one's nationality, or lack, South Korean, stateless Korean, Korean-Japanese (or alternatively claimed legally-Japanese Koreans), those who have sought their *zainichi* Korean identity often reconciled it as an eclectic position of neither Japanese nor Korean but *zainchi*. As they critique the frame-work of a nation-state, they express their dissent with a higher level of political engagement, even if it is not in the form of electoral politics. Whereas Erin Chung (2003) showed the strategic effectiveness of *zainichi* Korean political identity for resident foreigners, naturalized Japanese of colonial Korean descent, exemplified by former Torimodosu-kai members, show a high level of civic participation. They are critically aware of *zainichi* Korean history. They have become part of a progressive political wing within Japanese society. Reflecting the political diversity within Japan, some *zainichi* Koreans endorse conservative politics. Neo-conservatives notably claim an explicit orientation to the

"future." Others remain politically-opportunistic actors, adopting accommodative strategies. The latter two moves show a commitment to careerism, a homologous mechanism in colonial Korea that was used among Koreans to get ahead within the colonial administration. *Zainichi* Korean discourses have a better reception when they endorse the ideals of Japanese progressives or when they vocalize what Japanese themselves are not allowed to comment on because of political correctness. They operate in polarized extremes, their double consciousness operating within the need of the Japanese print market and political discursive needs.

Limits of Symbolic Ethnicity and Multicultural Representations

For Herbert Gans (1979: 9) "[Symbolic ethnicity] is characterized by a nostalgic allegiance to the culture of the immigrant generation, or that of the old country; a love for and a pride in a tradition that can be felt *without having to be incorporated in everyday behavior*" (emphasis mine). In contrast, among diverse efforts to transmit *zainichi* literacy, how *zainichi* Koreanness can be incorporated *in everyday behavior* is a primary concern. Koreanness is not yet socially cost-free. Incorporating ethnicity in everyday life for concerned *zainichi* Koreans must be practiced so that it challenges the alleged costs of Koreanness. However, a range of subtle adjustment occurs in this process as my ethnographic data illustrate. Only the cultural practices which do not interfere with the dominant societal values and norms survive. As Stephen Steinberg (1989; 2006) has documented, ethnicity is transmittable across generations in host societies, only in a tamed, adapted, and compromised way.

Zainichi literacy—a deliberate accentuation of foreignness in everyday life, most radically with everyday use of a Korean-style name—goes beyond symbolic ethnicity.

Within the framework of anti-discrimination strategies, celebrating occasional expressions of ethnicity is perceived as ineffective. Being Korean in Japan is fundamentally different from being Italian-American in the United States. Becoming Japanese remains a more problematic process than becoming American.

Assimilation advances relationally with the willingness of the host society to accept immigrant groups. Some *zainichi* Koreans resist assimilation without recognition. If *zainichi* Koreans without *zainichi* Korean literacy or collective consciousness passively maintain Korean nationality, can they be seen as passively resisting full-fledged membership in Japanese society? Are they inauthentically Japanese? Or are they simply evading the rights and obligations that accompany citizenship as Ten Taikin argues (1993; 1999; 2006)?

Future without Past: Japanese National Identity and Never-Reconciled History

Within the context of an ideologically diverse Japanese society, lies the issue of history and national identity that has never been reconciled. From the moment "all persons" was translated into "*kokumin*" (Japanese nationals) in the American-proposed constitution (Dower 1999: 394),[2] *zainichi* Koreans have been kept outside the frame of participatory democracy and constitutionally-guaranteed human rights and equality. Japan's post-war political system has maintained several contradictions, ranging from the US imposition—despite Japanese Constitution Article Nine renouncing war and the possession of a military—of the so-called Self-Defense Force, to the reconstruction of imperial democracy which acquitted the Showa Emperor Hirohito of war responsibility (both acts reflected American political interests during the Cold War) (Dower 1999). It is a democracy building on the pre-war Japanese Empire.

Researchers argue Japan's self-image of homogeneity emerged around the period of high post-war economic growth (Oguma 1997; Lie 2000). However, what an examination of *zainichi* Korean identity and representation struggles attests to is how the core national identity of Japan did not change dramatically. The imperial order of Asian races, Emperor on the pinnacle, the Japanese establishment, the Japanese mass, and significantly lower ranked other Asians, has been remarkably well preserved for the past six decades. *Zainichi* Koreans have always been outside the Japanese national discourse that has emphasized the remarkable achievement in the 19th century of rapid modernization and industrialization. Their participation has always been marginal. When the Japanese nation expressed a catharsis over the civilian victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Koreans were forced outside the Peace Memorial Park to commemorate the atomic bomb victims (Yoneyama 1999). Korean soldiers who had been conscripted never received compensation for death or injury from the Japanese government. Only in 1998, did they received an insignificant "sympathy money" (*mimaikin*) for their injuries or lost lives, compared with the pension they would have received had they been Japanese. Conservative critics argue that Korean veterans should be compensated by the South Korean government because of the 1965 Normalization Treaty. *Zainichi* Koreans are under attack for their politics of victim-hood, an irony given Japanese discourse of national victimhood over the previous war (1931-1945). In addition, there are endless examples of Japanese politicians claiming that Japan's colonization of Korea was beneficial to Korea, igniting international reactions.

Japan faces population decline yet can institute only ad hoc measures related to immigrant labor. It continues to maintain the principle of *jus sanguinis*, refusing to confront the problem of the second- and third-generation immigrant desire for full incorporation into

society. The Korean minority, exposed to overt and covert hostility, reproduces hegemonic Japaneseness, either by becoming part of a silent majority suppressing its *zainichi* Korean identity, or by becoming visible, exotic foreigners. *Zainichi* Koreans are well blended through intermarriage, although race mixture itself does not mean a decline of racism, discrimination or inequality (Telles and Sue 2009: 129). Hyphenated Japaneseness stubbornly remains an oxymoron.

Recent critiques of the concept of race, ethnicity and nation from social constructivist perspectives and critiques of essential, binary constructions are far cries from what individuals perceive and experience through categorizations, wanted and unwanted. Who cares about identities? Who needs them? These stances are not universally available—some people, owing to particular frames of racism within a nation, have more freedom in identity choices than others (Fredrickson 2000; Sanjek 1994; Waters 1999).

It is not only a matter of a lack of authentic lineage that the process and consequence of *zainichi* Koreans becoming Japanese is problematic. Japan's collective, national identity discourse, like that of any other nation, justifies its historical past, including colonization and war. *Zainichi* Koreans fall outside of the positive narrative of aggression. A future without a past turns symbolic and embracing gestures of the celebration of multicultural identity and hybrid culture hollow.

It is impossible to assess whether so much has changed or so little has changed. Institutional barriers might have been torn down decades ago. If forms of racism and discrimination are more subtle, are the groups historically subjected to injustice all redeemed? Or am I exaggerating minor problems from the bad habit of sociologists who

focus on conflicts over reconciliation? Often forgotten, despite its simple matter-of-fact truth, is that each individual has only one life; a door closed at a particular time has more enduring legacies in his/her descendents. One individual's life chance at one life stage can never be compensated for retroactively. My particular standing within *zainichi* Korean communities and cohort-specific experience allowed me more access to certain groups and types of *zainichi* Koreans than others. What was presented above is merely one possible look of much deeper and complex phenomenon. The stories continue to unfold.

Endnotes:

[1] Takeda Seiji, the literary critic who teaches at prestigious Waseda University, is a second generation *zainichi* Korean. Takeda is also known as Kang Soo-cha in which name he used to teach *zainichi* Korean issues at progressive Wakō University. In this essay, he admits he ended up using three names. Each one is his, but he also admits none of them is truly his. "That's fine. I don't find it particularly inconvenient in life."

[2] Dower (1999: 394) remarks that this was done in a "blatantly racist manner."

TABLES

Table 1-1: Lines of Schooling Opportunities of Korean [Culture/Empowerment] Classes for Korean Minority Students

Setting	Full-Time or Part-Time	Type	Example & Locations (prefectures)	Primary	Secondary	Post-Secondary
Official Schooling	Full-Time	Pro-North Korean Schools	Major prefectures with sizeable Korean communities	○	○	○
		Pro-South Korean Schools**	Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto	○	○	
	Part-Time	**Japanese Public School System**	Osaka, Hyogo, Kyoto, Nara, Hiroshima, Fukuoka, Kanagawa etc.	Δ	Δ	
		Japanese Private Schools		Δ	Δ	
Outside Schooling	Extra-curricular, Inter-school basis	**Minimally Funded by Municipalities in Relatively Korean Concentrated Regions**	Mukuge (Takatsuki, Osaka), Tokkabi (Yao, Osaka), Kobukuson*** (Arakawa, Tokyo), Fureai-Kan (Kawasaki, Kanagawa)	○	○	Δ
		Independent	Korean YMCA (Tokyo, Osaka)	○	○	Δ
		Political Organization	College-based activisms Non-college based activisms			○

* There are cases where Korean parents enroll their children in English-speaking international schools [vocational school line]. This is rather an alternative for the affluent.
** Tokyo Kankoku Gakuen is the only non-accredited institution among the pro-South Korean schools. Kyoto Kankoku Gakuen became Kyoto International School from the academic year 2004, obtained Japanese schooling credentials.
*** The activities were discontinued after 2001.

Table 2-1: Profile of Selected Interviewees

Name in everyday use*	Sex	Region	Born	Genera-tion	Educational Attainment	Occupation	Korean Schooling	Nationality**					Children's names***
								Self	Father	Mother	Spouse	Children	
CHUNG Soo-min	F	Kansai	1960	3rd	4-year college graduate	Employee, education	Extra curricular class	C	C	C	J	C****	K
LEE Kimi	F	Kantō	1962	2nd	4-year college graduate	Professional	None	C	C	J	J	J	J
KIM Jung-hee	F	Kantō	1963	3rd	4-year college graduate	Professional	None, college activism	H	H	H	J	J/H -> H?	J
TAKAHASHI Minako	F	Kantō	1964	3rd	2-year college graduate	Employee, private sector	None	H -> J	H	H	J	J	J
NAKAHARA Yumi	F	Kantō	1960	3rd	4-year college graduate	Part-time worker, private sector	KSL programs in S. Korea	H -> J	H	H	J	J	J
KIM Shin-sam	M	Tōkai	1959	2nd	Some junior college	Employee, NGO	None	C	C	C	J	J/C ->C	J ->K
KANEMOTO Yoshiki	M	Kansai	1963	3rd	High school graduate	Self-employed	Summer schools	C	C	C	J	J	J
HARUYAMA Kazuhiko	M	Tōkai	1965	3rd	Occupational school after high school graduation	Self-employed	None	H -> J	H -> J	H -> J	J	J	J
KAMEI Akinobu	M	Kansai	1970	2nd	High school graduate	Employee, public sector	Local children's group	J****	H	J	J	J	J
TAKAI Kenji	M	Kansai	1964	3rd	4-year college graduate	Professional	None, college activism	J	H -> J	J	J	J****	J

* Pseudonyms assigned reflecting name usage patterns (Japanese or Korean pronounced).

** C for Chōsen, H for South Korean, J for Japanese. Arrows indicate nationality change. J/H or J/C indicates dual nationality.

*** J for names likely to be taken Japanese, K for names likely to be taken Korean or non-Japanese.

**** Parents' marriage not officially reported.

APPENDIX 1

Zainichi Korean Timetable of Major Events: 1850s-2000s

Year	Korean Peninsula	Koreans in Japan	Japan	US Asia Policy and Race Relations; Other World Affairs
1850s	(Yi Dynasty: 1392-1910)		(Tokugawa Shogun administration: 1603-1867)	(United States of America: 1776-)
1853			US Commodore Perry arrives in Japan	
1854			US-Japan Friendship Treaty	
1858			Shimoda (Japan-US Trade and Commerce)Treaty; Treaties with England, France, Netherlands, Russia (Unequal Treaties for the Japanese);	
1861-1865				American Civil War: Emancipation Proclamation (1862)
1865	Russia demanded opening of Korean ports			13th Amendment
1866	Persecution of Christians; French Navy attacks Kang-hwa			
1868			Meiji Restoration; Japanese Empire; Division of Shintoism and Buddhism	
1870	US Navy arrived and demanded trade		Commoners allowed to use surnames	
1872	Hostile fire against US Navy at Kang-wha		Jinshin *koseki* (family registration system)	
1873			The "Subdue Korea" debate; Mandatory conscription	
1875			The northern border confirmed with Russia (the Chishima-Sakhalin exchange)	

1876	**Kang-wha (Japan-Korean Trade and Commerce) Treaty** (Unequal Treaty for Koreans); Japanese encroachment of Korean peninsula advances following this treaty			
1879			Annexation of Okinawa	
1882	Treaty with US, England, Germany; Japanese Consulate burned down			Chinese Exclusion Act
1884	Treaty with Russia			
1886	Treaty with France			
1889			Meiji Imperial Constitution	
1890			The Imperial Rescript on Education	
1892	Treaty with Austria			
1894-1895	Sino-Japanese War over Korean interests			
1894-1896	Kabo Reform (modeled after Meiji Restoration; unsuccessful)			
1895	Assassination of pro-Russian Queen Min of Korea by Japanese villains		Acquisition of Taiwan	
1896				Plessy v. Ferguson (endorsing racial segregation)
1898				Annexation of Hawaii; Acquisition of the Philippines and Guam
late 1890s		Korean contract labors in Japanese mines		
1903				Du Bois publishes *The Souls of Black Folk*
1904-1905	Russo-Japanese War over Korean interests			

1905	Korea becomes Japan's protectorate; Japan's acquisition of southern half of Sakhalin			
1906		Founding of Korean YMCA in Tokyo		
1907	Failed attempt to appeal to Hague Peace Convention regarding Korean sovereignty		US-Japan Gentlemen's Agreement to curtail Japanese immigration to US	
1909		790 Koreans reside in Japan		Foundation of NAACP
1910	**Japan's annexation of Korea**			
1910-1918	Land Survey			
1911		2,527 Koreans reside in Japan	Treaty revision with US and other Western nations	
1914-1918	WWI; Economy booms, labor shortage			
1917				Russian Revolution
1918		22,262 Koreans reside in Japan		Wilsonian Doctrine of Self-determination
1919	3.1. Independence Movement; restricted Korean migration to Japan (-1922)			
1920s			Peak of Japanese immigration to Brazil	
1923		Great Kanto Earthquake (Massacre of 6,000 Koreans)		League of Nations
1924		120,238 Koreans reside in Japan		Johnson-Reed Act (immigration quota system based on 1890 census)
1925	National Security Act (restricted freedom of speech and assembly); Restricted Korean migration to Japan			
1927-1929	Great Depression			
1931		318,212 Koreans reside in Japan	Manchurian Incident	
1932		390,543 Koreans reside in Japan	Foundation of Japanese puppet state Manchukuo	
1933-1936				The New Deal
1934	537,576 Koreans reside in Japan; Restricted Korean migration to Japan; promoted migration to Manchuria instead			

1937	Voluntary conscription of Koreans into Japanese military		Japan-Germany-Italy Defense Agreement; Japan invades China	
1938	Total Mobilization Act			
	Korean Education Ordinance; adoption of identical education curriculum as in Japan proper			
1939	Forced worship of Japanese shrines			
		961,591 Koreans reside in Japan		
1940	Koreans "allowed" (ordered) to adopt Japanese-style names			
1941		Korean Scholarship Foundation		
1941-1945	The Pacific War			
1941-1944				Internment of Japanese Americans on the West Coast
1941-1945	Korean labor conscription (forced labor migration); 1,936,843 Koreans reside in Japan in 1944			
1945	**Korean Emancipation**		WWII ends in defeat	WWII ends in victory
	US and USSR occupation	**U.S. Occupation of Japan (1945-1952)**		
		Founding of League of Koreans; Japan suspends Korean male voting rights in Japan		United Nations
1945-1946	Large-scale Korean repatriation			
1946		Foundation of Mindan	Emperor Hirohito denies his divinity	
1947		Alien registration ordinance (issued as last Imperial Ordinance)	Japanese Constitution; SCAP bans general strike	
1948	Establishment of ROK (Rhee Syng Man) and DPRK (Kim Il Sung)	Korean education crisis	SCAP prioritizes Japanese economic recovery	
1949		League of Koreans ordered to dissolve		
1950			Red purge; Police Reserve Unit (later Self Defense Force)	

1950-1953	Korean War		Economy booms	
1952		**Nullification of Japanese nationality**; 535,065 alien registered Koreans reside in Japan	Japan's independence: Enactment of San Francisco Peace Treaty	
				McCarran-Walter Act (terminates ban on naturalization of non-whites)
1954				Brown vs. Board of Education ("separate but equal" ruled unconstitutional)
1955		Alien registration require fingerprint; Foundation of Chongryun	Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) rules	Montgomery bus boycott
1956			Japan joins the UN	
1958		Komatsugawa incident		
1959-60	Peak of repatriation to DPRK			
1960	Resignation of ROK dictator Rhee Syngman	581,257 Korean alien registration	Anti-Japan US Security Treaty demonstrations	Independence of African nations
1961	ROK military coup d'état, followed by Pak Chung Hee military dictatorship			Freedom rides to end segregation in South
1964			Tokyo Olympic Games	Civil Rights Act of 1964
1965	**Japan-ROK Normalization Treaty; Treaty-based permanent residency**			Vietnam War (-1975); Hart-Celler Act (abolishing quota system)
1967				Loving v. Virginia (anti-miscegenation laws ruled unconstitutional)
1968	Student activism and protest movements			
		Kim Hiro incident; Progressive Tokyo Governor approved Korea College (specialized school; not an accredited college)	Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands Returned to Japan	Maltin Luther King Jr. assassinated

1970-1974		Pak Jong-sok v. Hitachi Software		
1971	Arrest of *zainichi* Korean Suh brothers in Seoul			
1972	ROK DPRK Red Cross meeting discusses prospect of Korean unification		Okinawa returned from US; diplomatic relation with PROC established	Nixon visited PROC
1973	KCIA kidnaps Kim Dae Jung (ROK presidential candidate) from Tokyo			
1974	*Zainichi* Korean Mun Sae-gwang's attempted assassination of ROK president Pak		Oil shock; End of high growth period	
1976		Kim Kyung-duk's appeal to become a lawyer without naturalization		Restriction of health care professional immigrants
1977		Abolishment of Japanese nationality requirement to apply for public-subsidized housing and public housing loans	Ratification of UN Human Rights Convention	
1979	ROK dictator Pak Chung Hee assassinated			US establishes formal diplomatic relation with PROC
1980s			US-Japan trade war	
		Anti-fingerprint movement	Economy booms	Reaganomics
			Increasing "new comers"	
1980	Kwangju Uprising (ROK); ROK military regime continue	664,536 Koreans reside in Japan		
1981			Ratification of UN Refugee Convention	
1982		**Exceptional permanent residency for stateless Koreans; national pension plan became available to non-Japanese**		
1983		First Ikuno Minzoku Bunkasai (Ikuno Korean Cultural Festival)(-2002)		
1984		**Japanese Nationality Law Amendment; More *zainichi* Koreans acquire Japanese nationality by birth**		

1986			Equal Employment Opportunity Act (female employment)	
1988	Seoul Olympic Games			Redress for Japanese American internment during WWII
1989		Alien registration refuzeniks pardoned at Emperor's death	Emperor Hirohito dies	Berlin Wall falls
1990s		Chronic recession; Rise of revisionist history movement		
1990				German unification
1991	**Japan-ROK diplomatic talk; special permanent residency**			USSR collapses; Russian CIS
	Both ROK and DPRK join in the UN			End of South African apartheid
1992	ROK establishes diplomatic relation with PROC	585,170 special permanent resident Koreans		
1993	Kim Young-sam regime (ROK), civilian control	Alien registration fingerprint requirement abolished (special permanent residents); First Higashi Kujō Madang		
1994	Kim Il-Sung (DPRK) dies	Chung Hyanggyun filed litigation over Japanese nationality requirement to take promotion exam in civil service		California: Proposition 187 (ruled unconstitutional in 1997)
mid-1990s		Increased naturalization (approx. 10,000 naturalize each year)	Kobayashi Yoshinori's revisionist history comics series becomes a best seller	
1997		Chung Hyanggyun case’s victory at Tokyo High Court		
1999		Japanese National Defense Guideline Act; Japanese National Flag and Anthem Act		
2000	ROK and DPRK summit; Kim Dae Jung (ROK) awarded Nobel Peace Prize			
		Local suffrage demand counter-proposed by simplified naturalization procedure; both legislations pending		

2001	ROK protest of Japanese revisionist history textbook approval	495,986 special permanent resident Koreans	Revisionist history textbook passed Ministry of Education censorship	War on terrorism
2002	**Japan-ROK World Cup Soccer Games; South Korean pop-culture boom; DPRK admits kidnapping Japanese citizens in the 1970s and the 1980s**			
2003-2004		Japanese national emergency related legislation (10 acts)		
2005		Yamano Sharin published *Manga Kenkanryū* (Comic: Anti-Korean Wave); Chung Hyanggyun lost in Supreme Court		
2006		Anti-*zainichi* Korean sentiment takes an organizational form		
2009			End of the LDP rule	Obama administration
2010		The debate continues over local suffrage for foreign permanent residents		

APPENDIX 2

Trends in Intermarriages (Cross-national Marriages), 1965 - 2006

Official statistics are not a revelation of truth. Inter-group marriage statistics can be misleading if group sizes are markedly different within a specific boundary such as a nation-state: small groups will exhibit higher intermarriage rates than large group (Kalmjin 1998). Given the small population size of Koreans in Japan, roughly one percent of the population, intermarriage statistics require a secondary analysis to assess patterns.

One problem is that nationality is recorded as a legal designation rather than a social or cultural category. As a result, *zainichi* Koreans who have naturalized are counted as Japanese. In comparison to Japanese nationals, Korean marriage patterns are more likely to exhibit endogamy in terms of national origin. Although *zainichi* Koreans can pass as Japanese, socialize at school, and participate in informal networks with Japanese, for example, they still are relatively homogamous. This tendency results less from segregation than voluntary decisions that reflect commonly-held assumptions about the misfortune of intermarriage.

In this section, I will analyze vital statistics published by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW).[1] One limitation of these official statistics is that spouses are sorted by legal nationality and thus one cannot differentiate between Japanese, naturalized Japanese of Korean descent, Japanese-native Koreans, or recent Korean migrants, for example.[2] Nevertheless, the published data point to an increasing number of Japanese marriages to foreign nationals. Since the calculation of proportions by subgroups is influenced by the differences of group sizes (Kalmijn 1998: 405), I calculated odds ratio. I

record the odds rations in roughly 5 year intervals from 1965 to 2006, the most recent available figures.[3] I use odds ratios rather than percentages because with Japanese nationals dwarfing other nationals percentages do not easily capture true differences in intermarriage. The endogamy odds ratio is the odds that, for example, a Korean male marries a Korean female rather than a non-Korean female (the number of Korean-Korean couples divided by the number of non-Korean wife and Korean husband couples), divided by the odds that a non-Korean male marries Korean female (the number of non-Korean husband and Korean wife couples divided by the number of couples both wife and husband are non-Korean).[4] Odds ratios greater than one mean that marriages are more endogamous than expected and that the greater the number, the more endogamous the group is (Kalmijn 1998: 405). For consistencies, the odds ratio for endogamy is computed for each four nationality group of which information is constantly available between 1965 and 2006, Japanese, Korean, Chinese and American. The rest of other nationality holders is aggregated in the category of "other."

Table A-1a (1965-2000, every five years) and A-1b (2001-2006) includes marriage tables adapted from the *Vital Statistics of Japan: Special Report*, from which the percentage of intermarriage and homogamy (Table A-2a and A-2b) and the odds ratios (Table A-3) are computed.[5] Notable is the overall decline of the marriage age population, especially after the baby-boomer generations' marriage-rush ends in the mid-1970s. In terms of Korean marriage patterns, Korean inmarriages steadily declined from about 3,600 during the period 1965 to 1975 to less than a thousand in 2006. Throughout the years for which we have data, married Japanese men and women more or less balance. The number of married Korean females and males began to diverge around 1980 when the number of Korean females who married

outnumbered Korean married men. Chinese in Japan have experienced a similar trend but starting earlier in the 1970s. In terms of annual frequencies, Japanese men are much more likely to marry other Asian women when they outmarry, while Japanese women are more likely to outmarry with American men. Whether these pattern evidence "global hypergamy," i.e. women marrying up (by national categorical belonging) in terms of the hierarchical global political and economic order (Constable 2004) or a paradoxical escape from rigid gendered relations for Japanese women whose Western husbands expect more conventional gender roles (Kelsky 2001), intermarriage patterns cannot be analyzed without taking gender into account.

Table A-2a shows a trend of Korean-Japanese and Korean − Korean individual marriages. By taking the individual as the unit of analysis, this table includes highlights that Korean − Korean marriages include two Korean individuals per marriage. In 1965, 21 percent of Korean individuals who married in Japan married Japanese, whereas 78.5 percent married Koreans. Intermarriage with Japanese gradually increased so that by the mid-1980s a majority of Koreans were marrying Japanese. In 1985, 55.7 percent of Koreans who married married Japanese. In the 2000s, on average, eight in ten Koreans married Japanese; marriages to other nationals increased, albeit in small proportions. In 2006, 16.4 percent of Koreans married Koreans.

Table A-2b shows intermarriage rates by nationality and gender. In 2006, seven in ten Korean men married Japanese women. The Korean women, in contrast, had an intermarriage rate with Japanese men of 86 percent. For the 2000s, Korean women had a consistent rate of marriage to Japanese men of approximately 85 percent. During the same period, there has

been a consistent gap of about 15 percentage points between Korean men's and women's intermarriage rates with Japanese.

In examining Japanese intermarriage patterns it is notable that despite the increased number of intermarriages, the vast majority of Japanese marry Japanese. Recently, however, one in a hundred Japanese men who marry each year marry a Chinese woman.[6] A majority of American men who married in Japan marry Japanese women, while American women are far less likely to marry Japanese. Starting in 1970, there was a higher proportion of Chinese women who married Japanese men than Korean women marrying Japanese. For Japanese men, Chinese women are more likely marriage partners than Korean women in spite of a larger pool of Korean women.

Whereas intermarriage patterns measured by proportions of intermarriage incidents show that groups with smaller population sizes tend to have exogamous tendencies, the odds ratio is unaffected by each group's population size (Kalmijn 1998: 405; Lieberson and Waters 1988 in Rosenfeld 2002: 156). Table A-3 presents odds ratio trends for endogamy by nationality for the same time period.[7]

In this measurement which controls group-size differences, Japanese nationals turn out over the past three decades to be the *least* endogamous group. Japanese out-marry the most, relative to other groups. Compared with data from more than three decades ago, all the groups evidenced a decline in the odds ratio significantly. As years pass by, each group gets less endogamous. For example, the Korean odds ratio was more than 3,500 in 1965 but declined to 40 in 2006.[8] However, in each year on the table except in 1965, Koreans have the

second highest odds ratio following Americans. Koreans have more endogamous tendencies than Japanese and Chinese.

These results imply that the Korean marriage market is far more constrained by nationality than those of the Japanese and Chinese. Tables A-2a and A-2b show that such high intermarriage rates indicate decreased social distances between the Japanese majority and foreign nationals in Japan. Yet, in examining the odds ratios for Korean intermarriage as compared to other nationalities in Japan, what is clear is that Koreans remain less likely to outmarry than any other major nationality in Japan. Marriage incident measures may point to the beginnings of close encounters, but unraveling the story of intergroup relations must move beyond statistics.

Table A-1a: Marriage Incidences by Nationality, 1965-2000, Every 5 Years

1965		Female					
		Japanese	Korean	Chinese	American	Other	Total
Male	Japanese	950,696	843	121	64	39	951,763
	Korean	1,128	3,681	3	0	0	4,812
	Chinese	158	1	130	1	0	290
	American	1,592	33	8	163	14	1,810
	Other	211	4	1	1	10	227
	Total	953,785	4,562	263	229	63	958,902

1970		Female					
		Japanese	Korean	Chinese	American	Other	Total
Male	Japanese	1,023,859	1,536	280	75	217	1,025,967
	Korean	1,386	3,879	6	0	38	5,309
	Chinese	195	3	89	1	1	289
	American	1,571	18	7	349	31	1,976
	Other	286	26	2	10	87	411
	Total	1,027,297	5,462	384	435	374	1,033,952

1975		Female					
		Japanese	Korean	Chinese	American	Other	Total
Male	Japanese	935,583	1,994	574	152	502	938,805
	Korean	1,554	3,618	7	1	27	5,207
	Chinese	243	5	127	2	5	382
	American	631	4	6	286	38	965
	Other	395	39	12	12	159	617
	Total	938,406	5,660	726	453	731	945,976

1980		Female					
		Japanese	Korean	Chinese	American	Other	Total
Male	Japanese	767,441	2,458	912	178	838	771,827
	Korean	1,651	3,061	9	1	42	4,764
	Chinese	194	4	91	2	8	299
	American	625	5	7	433	39	1,109
	Other	405	24	5	11	180	625
	Total	770,316	5,552	1,024	625	1,107	778,624

(Continued)

1985		Female					
		Japanese	Korean	Chinese	American	Other	Total
Male	Japanese	723,669	3,622	1,766	254	2,096	731,407
	Korean	2,525	2,404	12	2	23	4,966
	Chinese	380	13	116	0	7	516
	American	876	12	5	281	61	1,235
	Other	662	14	7	16	179	878
	Total	728,112	6,065	1,906	553	2,366	739,002

1990		Female					
		Japanese	Korean	Chinese	American	Other	Total
Male	Japanese	696,512	8,940	3,614	260	7,212	716,538
	Korean	2,721	2,195	19	4	23	4,962
	Chinese	708	11	385	5	11	1,120
	American	1,091	10	22	320	73	1,516
	Other	1,080	11	30	25	445	1,591
	Total	702,112	11,167	4,070	614	7,764	725,727

1995		Female					
		Japanese	Korean	Chinese	American	Other	Total
Male	Japanese	764,161	4,521	5,174	198	10,894	784,948
	Korean	2,842	1,485	35	4	17	4,383
	Chinese	769	11	252	3	17	1,052
	American	1,303	12	24	314	50	1,703
	Other	2,026	26	31	28	1,126	3,237
	Total	771,101	6,055	5,516	547	12,104	795,323

2000		Female					
		Japanese	Korean	Chinese	American	Other	Total
Male	Japanese	761,875	6,214	9,884	202	12,026	790,201
	Korean	2,509	1,151	49	0	34	3,743
	Chinese	878	23	193	3	13	1,110
	American	1,483	12	5	266	103	1,869
	Other	3,067	24	43	26	1,383	4,543
	Total	769,812	7,424	10,174	497	13,559	801,466

Source: See the end of Table 1-2.

Table A-1b: Marriage Incidences by Nationality, 2001-2006

2001		Female					
		Japanese	Korean	Chinese	American	Other	Total
Male	Japanese	760,272	6,188	13,936	175	11,673	792,244
	Korean	2,477	1,019	47	1	30	3,574
	Chinese	793	16	267	3	9	1,088
	American	1,416	11	18	284	101	1,830
	Other	3,069	41	25	21	1,395	4,551
	Total	768,027	7,275	14,293	484	13,208	803,287

2002		Female					
		Japanese	Korean	Chinese	American	Other	Total
Male	Japanese	721,452	5,353	10,750	163	11,691	749,409
	Korean	2,379	943	47	0	38	3,407
	Chinese	814	24	251	1	18	1,108
	American	1,488	17	19	349	138	2,011
	Other	3,241	46	47	21	1,213	4,568
	Total	729,374	6,383	11,114	534	13,098	760,503

2003		Female					
		Japanese	Korean	Chinese	American	Other	Total
Male	Japanese	704,152	5,318	10,242	156	12,165	732,033
	Korean	2,235	924	63	4	40	3,266
	Chinese	890	18	265	2	22	1,197
	American	1,529	21	25	335	148	2,058
	Other	3,504	39	55	35	1,527	5,160
	Total	712,310	6,320	10,650	532	13,902	743,714

(Table A-1b Continued)

2004		Female					
		Japanese	Korean	Chinese	American	Other	Total
Male	Japanese	680,906	5,730	11,915	179	13,083	711,813
	Korean	2,293	949	71	0	45	3,358
	Chinese	1,104	29	269	2	16	1,420
	American	1,500	20	28	313	195	2,056
	Other	3,707	50	57	23	1,656	5,493
	Total	689,510	6,778	12,340	517	14,995	724,140

2005		Female					
		Japanese	Korean	Chinese	American	Other	Total
Male	Japanese	672,784	6,066	11,644	177	15,229	705,900
	Korean	2,087	866	78	1	53	3,085
	Chinese	1,015	24	276	2	27	1,344
	American	1,551	20	30	305	183	2,089
	Other	3,712	43	56	32	1,841	5,684
	Total	681,149	7,019	12,084	517	17,333	718,102

2006		Female					
		Japanese	Korean	Chinese	American	Other	Total
Male	Japanese	686,270	6,041	12,131	215	17,606	722,263
	Korean	2,335	845	84	3	53	3,320
	Chinese	1,084	35	363	1	24	1,507
	American	1,474	26	23	315	161	1,999
	Other	3,815	42	66	25	2,095	6,043
	Total	694,978	6,989	12,667	559	19,939	735,132

Source: 1965-2001 figures, adapted from Table 6. Marriages by Nationality, 1965-2001 Vital Statistics of Japan, Special Report Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2003; 2002 figures, adapted from Table 9-18, Vol.1 and Appendix Table, Vol.2 of Vital Statistics of Japan Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2004. 2003 figures, adapted from Table 9-18, Vol.1 and Appendix Table, Vol.2 of Vital Statistics of Japan Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2005. 2004-2006 figures, adapted from Tables 2WG Appendix: Foreigners in Japan: Marriage and Divorce and 1G Marriage by wife and husband's nationalities of respective years.

Table A-2a: Annual Percentages of Japanese-Korean and Korean-Korean Individuals Married, 1965-2000 (Every 5 Years), 2001-2006 (Annual)

Year	K-J married individuals	K-K married individuals
1965	21.0	78.5
1970	27.1	72.0
1975	32.6	66.6
1980	39.8	59.3
1985	55.7	43.6
1990	72.3	27.2
1995	70.5	28.5
2000	78.1	20.6
2001	79.8	18.8
2002	79.0	19.3
2003	78.8	19.3
2004	79.2	18.7
2005	80.7	17.1
2006	81.2	16.4

Source: Table A-1a, Table A-1b. Marriages reported in Japan only. The first column is the total of Japanese male and Korean female marriages and Japanese female and Korean male marriages divided by the total of Korean female marriages and Korean male marriages (which counts Korean-Korean marriages which involve two Korean individuals). The second column is doubled cases of Korean-Korean marriages divided by the total of Korean female marriages and Korean male marriages (which counts Korean-Korean marriages which involve two Korean individuals). The total is less than 100 percent because marriages to Chinese, American and others are included.

Table A-2b: Reported Intermarriages by Gender and Selected Nationality (Percentages), 1965-2000 (Every 5 Years), 2001-2006 (Annual)

	Intermarriages between Japanese and Korean				Intermarriages between Japanese and Chinese				Intermarriages between Japanese and American			
	Japanese		Korean		Japanese		Chinese		Japanese		American	
Year	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
1965	0.09	0.12	23.44	18.48	0.01	0.02	54.48	46.01	0.00	0.17	87.96	27.95
1970	0.15	0.13	26.11	28.12	0.03	0.02	67.47	72.92	0.00	0.15	79.50	17.24
1975	0.21	0.17	29.84	35.23	0.06	0.03	63.61	79.06	0.02	0.07	65.39	33.55
1980	0.32	0.21	34.66	44.27	0.12	0.03	64.88	89.06	0.02	0.08	56.36	28.48
1985	0.50	0.35	50.85	59.72	0.24	0.05	73.64	92.65	0.03	0.12	70.93	45.93
1990	1.25	0.39	54.84	80.06	0.50	0.10	63.21	88.80	0.04	0.16	71.97	42.35
1995	0.58	0.37	64.84	74.67	0.66	0.10	73.10	93.80	0.03	0.17	76.51	36.12
2000	0.79	0.33	67.03	83.70	1.25	0.11	79.10	97.15	0.03	0.19	79.35	40.64
2001	0.78	0.32	69.31	85.06	1.76	0.10	72.89	97.50	0.02	0.18	77.38	36.16
2002	0.71	0.33	69.83	83.86	1.43	0.11	73.47	96.72	0.02	0.20	73.99	30.52
2003	0.73	0.31	68.43	84.15	1.40	0.12	74.35	96.17	0.02	0.21	74.30	29.32
2004	0.80	0.33	68.28	84.54	1.67	0.16	77.75	96.56	0.03	0.22	72.96	34.62
2005	0.86	0.31	67.65	86.42	1.65	0.15	75.52	96.36	0.03	0.23	74.25	34.24
2006	0.84	0.34	70.33	86.44	1.68	0.16	71.93	95.77	0.03	0.21	73.74	38.46

Source: Computed from marriage tables (Tables 1-1a and 1-1b). The figures in the table read, for example, that among all Japanese married men who reported their marriage in Japan in 1965, 0.09 percent married Korean women. Note that by breaking down by gender, numbers of marriages and individuals match. Therefore it also reads that among all Korean women's marriages reported in Japan in 2006, 86 percent were with Japanese men—marriages between Japanese men and Korean women divided by total marriages of Korean women.

Table A-3: Trends in Endogamy Odds Ratios of Intermarriage Incidences by Nationality, 1965-2000 (Every 5 Years), 2001-2006 (Annual)

Year	Japanese	Korean	Chinese	American	Other
1965	1,168.19	3,521.40	5,855.37	1,435.07	833.51
1970	642.38	1,759.94	1,558.81	2,573.79	966.71
1975	447.23	1,046.71	785.71	2,383.09	573.42
1980	238.70	556.59	364.53	2,593.23	339.07
1985	66.35	187.20	119.35	798.63	86.17
1990	22.29	62.93	102.48	658.81	38.03
1995	18.20	88.17	47.21	769.76	37.95
2000	11.28	56.03	16.67	574.22	28.21
2001	10.08	50.38	18.27	735.95	29.44
2002	10.33	52.88	20.18	860.73	22.63
2003	10.91	53.74	20.05	731.78	24.66
2004	9.53	48.32	13.76	635.45	22.82
2005	9.32	44.96	15.43	577.25	21.55
2006	9.11	40.32	18.60	561.84	21.15

Source: Table 1-1a and 1-1b. Marriages reported in Japan only. An odds ratio higher than one means tendency nationality is more likely to in-marry than not. The higher the number the more endogamous the group is.

Endnotes:

[1] Final counts of vital statistics are published with a two-year lag with data available to the public through a link from the MHLW website.

[2] Mary Waters (2000: 1737) advocates that U. S. Census data on race and ancestry should be collected so that the degree to which all Americans attain equality can be monitored. Similarly, unless Japanese census authorities track ancestry information there it will be impossible to evaluate the degree of integration of multiethnic or multiracial Japanese into the society.

[3] I have not used the intermarriage index Z, a better measure that takes the total population size into account – not everyone marries – (Kalmijn 1998: 405) because data for Japanese residency are unreliable over the span of years for which there are data on marriages.

[4] Each group's men and women produce equivalent results (Kalmijn 1998: 405). The odds ratio for Korean females is for Korean females marrying Korean males rather than non-Korean males (the number of Korean-Korean couples divided by the number of non-Korean husband and Korean wife couples), divided by the odds that a non-Korean female marries Korean male (the number of non-Korean wife and Korean husband couples divided by the number of couples both wife and husband are non-Korean).

[5] Between 1965 and 1991, marriage data involving foreigners distinguishes between five nationalities: Japanese, Korean (aggregating South Korean nationals and stateless Koreans), Chinese (aggregating stateless Taiwanese and the People's Republic of China nationals), American, and all others in one category. From 1992 on, in addition to these five groups, the more detailed information became available, distinguishing those from the Philippines, Thailand, Britain, Brazil, Peru, and all remaining others. It is strictly by nationality; Americans can be of any racial or ethnic group. Japanese can be Korean-Japanese and Chinese-Japanese, although naturalized Japanese and their descendents are still much less than one percent of the entire Japanese population.

[6] Recent increases in Japanese male intermarriages are noteworthy. Many cross-national liaisons involve women from other Asian nations, especially the Philippines, which is beyond the scope of my study. See Piper 1997; Suzuki 2003; Sellek, 2001: Ch.7.

[7] According to Rosenfeld's analysis of the 1990 census (2002: 156), Black American (age 20-29) had an endogamy odds ratio as high as 5,533.24, whereas that of German Americans is 4.03.

APPENDIX 3

The Furudate Family's Long Journey of Reconciliation: Two Generations of Intermarriage

My visit to the Furudate family took place twice, on April 3, 1999, when I visitied Atsushi, the progeny of an intermarriage, and on April 7, 1999 when I visited Atsushi's *zainichi* Korean mother Kyōko. The Furudates resided in an upscale suburb, in a stylish house, designed as a two-family, three-generation dwelling. On the first floor, Kyōko and her husband Shun'ichi were the first generation, and occupying the second and the third floor were Atsushi, his wife, and their children. Each family unit had a separate entrance, as well as a door allowing inside access to the other unit. When I was interviewing Atsushi, Kyōko occasionally dropped by and joined in the conversation, and when I was interviewing Kyōko, Atsushi did the same. After Kyōko's interview which stretched over four hours, Kyōko kindly invited me for the family dinner, where I had a chance to converse with Shuni'chi, who was kind and gentlemanly and the quietest of the family members. The family is well off; it was the only household I visited with a commuting maid who runs errands and cooks for Kyōko and Shun'ichi, both age 77 at the time of the interview. Kyōko, unlike most Japanese housewives who in the post-1945 nuclear family era reigned over the kitchen, was naturally comfortable with extra hands at home.

Furudate Kyōko (b. 1922) grew up in war-time Japan. Her parents managed to make some money, feeding fellow Koreans near a mining town. Her son, Atsushi (b. 1948), who had occasion to hear his mother's family history because he was close to her, which "my [Japanese] wife says is very Korean," explained, "they [Kyōko's parents] had a restaurant, but they must have been doing something like serving some alcohol and

food, served by young girls. There might have been even prostitutions involved I suspect." Kyōko's family took several trips to Korea so Kyōko's early childhood memories included landscapes from Japan and Korea. Kyōko was born in Pusan and moved to Japan when she was one or two years old; she identifies herself as a second-generation, "I fully grew up in Japan. Everything familiar was Japanese. Maybe because my father made some money and he thought things Japanese were more sophisticated."

Kyōko was exceptionally well educated as a Korean woman of her generation. In pre-war Japan, and especially among the daughters of Korean migrants, she was the rare girl to attend girls' high school (*kōtō jyogakkō*, the equivalent of the contemporary lower division of college, "a graduate of which was qualified to become a wife of the college-graduate elite" in Atsushi's explanation). She further went to Tokyo to attend a specialized school after her high school graduation.

Kyōko was well assimilated. Although she could pass as a Japanese from a respectable family, she felt inklings of inauthenticity in her teens. She would wear a kimono, "but she never learned the intricacies associated with wearing a kimono because her mother didn't know anything about them; she's from Korea. I recall an incident when one of my friends at school quietly pointed out that the kimono I was wearing was inappropriate for the season. It was not the right material. No one in my family knew those things." Atsushi shared an anecdote that his mother smuggled herself to Korea, pretending she was Japanese. Koreans had to carry permits to travel between Korea and Japan. She went there without permission. Atsushi recalls, "She looked like a good Japanese family's daughter or something, dressed up in a neat kimono, entered matter-of-factly a first-class, Japanese-only cabin. No one bothered her."

Once, returning from a visit to Tokyo, she traveled a long distance alone in a war-time crowded train. When she left her seat to go to the bathroom at a train stop, she expected she would lose her seat. She was surprised to find her seat was reserved by a Japanese military officer's cap. That was how Kyōko met her husband Shun'ichi. Both the same age, they talked for hours on a long train ride, which was often disrupted by energy shortage. Shun'ichi, originally from a rural area, academically excelled and attended a technical high school (the contemporary equivalent of a technical college) which was beyond the reach of other children from his village. During the war, he was drafted into a military technology unit instead of being sent to the front in China, South East Asia, or the Pacific islands. In pre-1945 Japan, there existed no co-ed secondary or post-secondary education and the most prestigious universities across Japan never admitted female students; for Shun'ichi it was love at first sight.

The couple married in 1945, several months before the war ended. Shun'ichi's relatives and the supervisors of his military unit vehemently objected. However, at that time, Kyōko was legally Japanese of Korean origin and Japanese colonial policy was *naisenittai*, Japan and Korea as one, and for a limited time period, Korean − Japanese intermarriages were officially promoted despite commoners' reluctance (Takeshita 2000: 56). The army was not exactly in a position to forbid Shun'ichi from marrying a Korean. Shun'ichi and Kyōko were so determined. Eventually, to overcome Shun'ichi's relatives' objections, Kyōko was formally adopted by her old school principal's relative and thus becoming officially recognized as Japanese-Japanese (not Japanese of Korean origin) before she married. As a result the Furudate family registry has no single trace of Korean lineage. Her parents' names were her Japanese adopted parents' names. Her status as an

"adopted daughter" is traceable but only by taking the extra step of obtaining Kyōko's adopted parents' family registry.

After the war and discharge from the army, the couple settled down in a rural area where Shun'ichi obtained a job in a small manufacturing firm. In 1952, when Koreans lost Japanese nationality (see Chapter 1), Kyōko was already in her husband's Japanese family registry; she retained Japanese nationality. Later with the rising tide of Japanese prosperity, Shun'ichi's firm expanded. When he was transferred to supervise their Tokyo branch which later became their headquarters, the family moved to a Tokyo suburb, and Atsushi noticed a change in his mother. She began going out frequently, establishing contacts with a wide range of people with whom she shared her interests. Atsushi's awareness of his mother's different roots coincided with the family's relocation to an urban residential community.

His father was frequently away from home as was typical of hard-working businessmen of the era. Atsushi and Kyōko began a unique journey as Japanese. Kyōko were connected with Japanese and *zainichi* Korean literary circles. In the late 1960s and the early 70s when Atsushi reached adulthood, they began attending meetings involving *zainichi* Korean issues together. Since both of them are legally Japanese and had only Japanese family names, they were aware of their own marginal position among *zainichi* Koreans. They never took prominent positions representing *zainichi* Koreans. They never joined *zainichi* Korean organizations; until the 1990s, both Mindan and Sōren restricted membership to those with Korean legal statuses. However, Kyōko were unable to ignore issues affecting *zainichi* Koreans, recalling "I just couldn't close my eyes. *Zainichi* problems are my own problems."

Even as a child, Atsushi recognized that his parents disagreed about various issues. Kyōko after moving to the Tokyo area, began questioning the way she suppressed her Korean identity especially after her marriage. Her trouble escalated into a nervous breakdown. Shun'ichi, on the other hand, was unable to understand her problems. Atsushi said, "for my father, he must have thought, 'what's wrong raising Japanese as a Japanese?' and 'now she is Japanese and why does she have a problem living as a Japanese?'" Atsushi heard from both Kyōko and Shun'ichi that Kyōko was Korean when he was ten years old. Atsushi grew up without knowing poverty—the family was quite well off because of Shun'ichi's successful career path within the firm. He associated Koreanness with a notorious ghetto on the local riverbank. Atsushi recounted the story as if it were someone else's: "I must have felt some kind of complex, like I was pretending that I was an ordinary Japanese." He smiled and added, "I'm now retired from my identity question."

Atsushi married in 1979. He was shy about relating details of his courtship; he told me stories about themselves from the period after they decided to get married. Atsushi never mentioned his wife's name; she occasionally passed through during the interview with Atsushi, and I heard her skillfully practice the piano. She is the pianist for a local chorus group. When Atsushi and his wife decided to marry, it was several years into Atsushi's active participation in *zainichi*-related meetings. She told her parents who lived in the Tōkai Region—known for its relatively conservative culture as well as a notable *zainichi* Korean presence—about Atsushi, and they vehemently objected to their marriage despite that Atsushi's father is Japanese with respectable standing and the family's Japanese nationality. Around that time Atsushi was working as a freelancer

while attending graduate school, “that I did not have a stable job at that time was one thing. But that was probably only about thirty percent [of the reasons for their opposition]; the remaining seventy percent was about my Korean lineage. I thought I happened to choose a daughter of a family required a special handling.” In the end, Atsushi’s in-laws, afraid their daughter would remain single beyond their conservative norms, agreed. Once they had resigned themselves to the marriage, everything was just fine. At the wedding reception, where everything—food and clothing—was Western-style and ethnically ambiguous, he made a speech touching on his thoughts about his dual heritage. Many guests positively commented about his speech after the party.

Kyōko’s parents and siblings returned to Korea immediately after 1945. For ten years, because of the Korean War and her relocation, Kyōko lost touch with her original family. She reestablished contact only with her sibling. Atsushi and the family went to South Korea in 1988. At the time, Atsushi’s first son was in the first grade. Both Kyōko and Atsushi recalled that he told a neighborhood friend that the family went “overseas,” not to South Korea. Both wondered if she/he was embarrassed to have a connection with South Korea. Atsushi visits his relatives alone every year and Korean relatives visit once every few years. Atsushi brought his sons with him when each turned fifteen as a “*genpuku* trip” (*genpuku* is coming of age among the feudal warrior class) in Atushi’s words. Other than that, Atsushi explained that his children are Japanese as a matter of course, needing no explanation. They do not think much about their identities, which, according to Atsushi, is “not surprising at all.” Kyōko playfully added, “but it’s nice for the children to have a little bit of a troubling ‘shadow,’ good for their humanity.”

Atsushi later emailed me, sharing the greetings that Shun'ichi wrote in 1995 and sent to relatives, friends, and business acquaintances for his and Kyōko's golden wedding anniversary:

> We hope you and your family are doing very well, although we have not been in touch for a while.
>
> We just celebrated our Golden anniversary.
>
> As you all know, we married just before the defeat of the Pacific War. At that time, I was in military service as a technical officer. Kyōko was an ex-Korean, for Korea then was annexed to the Japanese Empire. It was the birth of a couple, an odd, international marriage.
>
> We were just 23 years-old. We were very young and optimistically aspired that there should be no problems at all if we as humans understood one another and kept going along on a sincere passage.
>
> After the War, Japan and South Korea became independent nations. Even as global, political, and economic circumstances have changed drastically, we have overcome our complex surrounding and shared our lives together.
>
> In 1948, I joined XYZ Chemical as an engineer, which was one of our most fortunate, life-changing events. It has been our tremendous pleasure to have been acquainted with and enjoyed trustworthy friendship and mutual respect with many classmates, teachers, engineers, and the joint-company staffs in Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, the United States and China.
>
> Looking back over 50 years, we are very proud of and satisfied with the fact that we as humans have been able to walk through a fulfilling, happy life.
>
> Taking a look at the world today, numerous tragedies of racial, ethnic and national conflicts still exist. There are many causes, but most fundamentally, they result from a lack of proper recognition of the historical past, prejudice and discrimination based on a sheer bigotry.
>
> For human beings in the world, the most important thing is that human dignity is mutually recognized and respected. That's the lesson and the attitude toward life our 50 years of marriage has brought us.
>
> We are 73 years old. Fortunately, we are in good health, living with our son Atsushi, and his wife Keiko and their three children. Everyday is cheerful but peaceful. That's very fortunate, for which we are very thankful.

> We would like to thank everybody from the bottom of our hearts.
>
> Enclosed is our recent family picture, instead of seeing you in person.
>
> Furudate Kyōko and Shun'ichi
> July, 1995

Atsushi thinks it was a nice overview of his parents' marriage, which experienced frequent difficulties. I was deeply moved by the couple's long journey. I felt grateful for Atsushi and Kyōko's willingness to share this special letter. I also wondered if their willingness to share their stories and experiences with me suggests how rare it is for them to share the stories in mundane life context. Except for close friends and relatives, the stories may be unlilely to be shared. They only seem to be a well-doing "Japanese" family in names, appearances and even legal documents.

Atsushi is highly critical of the Japanese status quo and rejects the expectation that he should follow in his father's footsteps and become another devoted salary-worker. Although Atsushi himself belongs to the generation of the most active student movement, he was never drawn to radicalism. However, he chose to work as a freelance writer and refuses work which goes against his politics. Therefore, in terms of income and career opportunities, he has prioritized his feelings for justice. Atsushi recalls that "I should have explored more about what I *do* than about what I *am*. I've been living off my parents' assets." Shun'ichi's eventually rose to be president and chairman of the company he joined as an engineer. Atsushi thinks his father was trying to prove himself to the people who said something about his marriage. In contrast, Atsushi rejected and resisted the typical Japanese career path. Nonetheless, even Atsushi almost never touches on his otherwise unknown dual heritage. He has shared it with his close friends who initially

responded to his “coming-out” with amazement but eventually settled on indifference. They had little interest in Atsushi’s inner struggle that might not exactly be an ordinary Japanese.

The Furudate Family members are close to each other, communicating exceptionally well in reconciliation their “genealogical imagination” (Tyler 2005). However, without little clues and opportunities to express their family history of intermarriage, the family hardly disrupts commonly-held assumptions about ordinary Japaneseness or ordinary *zainichi* Koreanness. They are part of mainstream contemporary Japan, which paradoxically may facilitate their expression of *zainichi* Korean heritage. But the opportunity to do so is limited to the personal realm no matter how close a relationship they sustain with Japanese-speaking relatives in South Korea and no matter how consistent Atsushi’s personal resistance to the conservative establishment—be it ordinary Japanese or capitalist—is.

APPENDIX 4

The Japanese Opinion-media Landscape

The distinction between progressive and conservative politics is somewhat arbitrary but mutually dependent, like any binary categorical distinction. The right-left cleavage applies not only to the positioning of the contemporary establishment but also to the interpretation of the imagined collective past. With the revival of neo-nationalist conservative historiography, how to interpret Japanese war responsibility and address diplomatic protests by neighboring Asian states, especially South Korea and China, has been a litmus test for the right and the left. For conservative critics, *shimin-undō,* or grassroots activism, represents groups of masochistic traitors who threaten national security concerns and the integrity of national pride and identity. For the left, which is generally sympathetic to anti-war causes, a proper recognition of Japan's aggressive past and war responsibilities is a major concern in an internationalist agenda that prizes amicable relationships and coalition-building with foreign grassroots activists.

The contemporary Japanese media landscape provides a critical backdrop for an examination of diverse opinions about *zainichi* civic participation. Several aspects of the Japanese media are worth noting. First, Japan has very high rates of newspaper circulation, and newspapers represent particular perspectives across the full range of political views. Among major papers, *Yomiuri* (with the largest circulation) is relatively conservative, while *Asahi* (the second largest circulation)[1] and *Mainichi* are relatively progressive in tone (but are by no means leftist, unlike the Japan Communist Party's official paper *Akahata*, The Red Flag). *Sankei*, the most conservative of the national papers, is part of the Fuji-Sankei

communications group that includes Fuji Television, which is roughly the Japanese counterpart to Fox TV in the US. Fuji Sankei owes its origins to prominent business concerns about the spread of left-leaning opinions in the media during the immediate postwar period.

Fuji-Sankei's publishing house, Fusōsha, has published a line of controversial social studies textbooks authored by the New History Group, a neo-nationalist movement that disseminates the revisionist historiography called the "liberal conception of history" (*jiyūshugi shikan*). The liberal here means "conservative". The ideals of post-war democracy are anathema to this publishing house, and it is trying to bring back the patriotic, collective moral teachings of Imperial Japan, as well as expounding a pro-imperial Japan version of history. When the Ministry of Education and Science approved Fusōsha's history textbooks for the first time,[2] Japanese grassroots groups as well as the South Korean and Chinese governments protested. Japanese textbook selection often causes diplomatic tensions over their interpretations of pre-war aggression and the Japanese colonization of Asian nations . From the official Japanese standpoint Japanese pre-war military policies in Asia should be referred to as "advancement," not "invasion."

The print-media frequently addresses national and local politics and other issues—including the historical reinterpretation of Japan's colonial policies, Japan's defeat in WWII, and the Japanese national identity question. In addition, there are monthly opinion magazines whose intended audience is the educated and concerned.[3] Many weekly magazines are aimed at white-collar commuters, with sensational headlines decorating the interiors of trains and buses. Such papers are meant for quick consumption, with large, colorful scandals their focus (many weekly magazines end up being sued as a result) (Gamble and Watanabe 2004). Among several authors I discuss in Chapter 5, Tei Taikin and Asakawa Akihiro (both

Japanese of colonial Korean descent and self-identified *zainichi* backgrounds) vehemently criticize other Korean authors on the pages of relatively conservative monthly opinion magazines.

To illustrate, the November 2005 issue of the conservative, nationalist opinion monthlies *Shokun!* [Gentlemen!] (founded in 1969, and with a 2005 circulation of 81,667) and *Seiron* [Fair Argument] (founded 1974, 2005 circulation of 92,271),[4]prominently featured Prime Minister Koizumi's landslide victory. Both journals devoted considerate space to re-interpreting Japan's war (basically both journals consider the Pacific War to have been inevitable and justifiable.), criticizing China and Korea's nationalist historiography, as well as bashing the progressive *Asahi Shinbun*. One of the articles complains about how corrupt contemporary schooling is because sex education is introduced too early. These journals include crude slanders, but nonetheless, they have a pretentiously cultured, objective and scientific tone, which is in contrast to the sensationalistic air of the weekly tabloid journals. The name calling in monthly journals is not necessarily benign, though. The tables of contents of *Shokun!* and *Seiron* are full of the portrait photographs of media-exposed individuals under scrutiny. These journals provide opportunities for some *zainichi* opinion makers.

Other print media, independent publishers and specialized journals, I draw on here published autobiographies by *zainichi* Koreans which are the major focus of Chapter 5. In many of these writings, personal experiences and impressions are discussed with collective implications (Ryang forthcoming).

Endnotes:

[1] As for *Yomiuri* and *Asahi*'s contrasting editorials, see Yomiuri shinbun ronsetsu iinkai (2008).

[2] All Japanese textbooks practice de facto censorship, and each local board of education is responsible for selecting the textbooks used in their public schools.

[3] In the late 2000s, many monthlies folded because of internet competition and decreasing circulation . *Asahi Shinbun*'s *Ronza* stopped publishing after the October 2008 volume (http://publications.asahi.com/ecs/28) and Bungeishunjusha's *Shokun!* discontinued after the June 2009 volume (http://www.bunshun.c9.jp/mag/shokun).

[4] The 2005 circulation figures are from *Shadan Hōjin Nihon Zasshi Kyōkai* (The Japanese Magazine Publishers Association) (retrieved March 22, 2005 from www.j-magazine.pr.jp/FIPPJ/F/busuuA.htm). The readership of *Shokun!* is available from the same website. They are predominantly male (92.6 percent), middle-age or above (24.4 percent in their forties, 31.5 percent in their fifties and 20 percent over 60), white-collar (43.7 percent CEO, managerial, professional), married (79.1 percent), educated (66.4 percent completed college or graduate school), and financially well off (47.3 percent earn more than 10 million yen annually and 59.6 percent own a detached house).

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