

# **Community Policing & Counter Terrorism:**

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## **Community Policing Philosophy as a Tool for Local Law Enforcement to Counter Terrorist Activities**

By: Charles Andrew Lieberman

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Criminal Justice in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Professor Maria (Maki) Haberfeld

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Date \_\_\_\_\_ Chair of Examining Committee

---

Professor Karen Terry

---

Date \_\_\_\_\_ Executive Officer

Professor Maria (Maki) Haberfeld

---

Professor Barry Spunt

---

Professor Larry Sullivan

---

Supervisory Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

## **Abstract**

Community Policing & Counter Terrorism: Community Policing Philosophy  
as a Tool for Local Law Enforcement to Counter Terrorist Activities

by

Charles Andrew Lieberman

Advisor: Professor Maria (Maki) Haberfeld

The phenomenon of terrorism has become an issue of great concern to society and the response of governments has varied throughout the world. For the purpose of this study, an act of terrorism will be operationalized as the use of force by non-state actors against a civilian population in an attempt to coerce a target audience to implement a political, economic, religious or ideological change. The United States (US) government has utilized a number of federal organizations, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency, to investigate and prevent acts of terrorism both domestically and internationally. Although many local law enforcement agencies have received increased funding to address the phenomenon of terrorism, there has been limited research conducted to ascertain the changes implemented and the effectiveness of new programs and training. The state of preparedness of local law enforcement agencies in their proactive efforts to counter terrorism is shrouded in the dark. There has been practically no research in the area of mobilization of local communities in intelligence gathering and other proactive tools to counter terrorist activities. The local law enforcement response to the phenomenon of terrorism remains unknown for an overwhelming majority of departments in the US.

The goal of this research study is to assess the feasibility of implementation of some of the most basic tenets of the community oriented policing philosophy in mobilization of the communities by local law enforcement agencies in their effort to become proactive in the fight against local and global terrorist threat. Through utilization of a number of focus groups in the Northeast region of the US the researcher measures and assesses the attitudes and perspectives of both law enforcement and non-law enforcement towards the possibility of engagement of community members in a proactive effort to counter terrorism on a local level. The focus on the local level is supported in part by recent academic studies that have found, in the case of actors involved with the commission of terrorist attacks in the US, the existence of spatial relationships among residence of actor, preparatory activities, and target selection. The research found support for community policing in proactive counter-terrorism.

*Fighting terrorism is like being a goalkeeper. You can make a hundred brilliant saves but the only shot that people remember is the one that gets past you (Paul Wilkinson).*

## **Dedication**

To my loving wife Lina and our son Gabriel, without whom I wouldn't have had the desire to strive to become a better man, thank you for providing me with the strength to persevere.

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# Chapter 1: Introduction

In order to address the phenomenon of terrorism in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, we must think globally and act locally. The state of preparedness of United States (US) local law enforcement agencies in their proactive efforts to counter terrorism is shrouded in the dark. An act of terrorism is operationalized by the author as the use of force by non-state actors against a civilian population in an attempt to coerce a target audience to implement a political, economic, religious or ideological change. This operationalization of terrorism is consistent with the recent FBI report, *Terrorism 2002-2005*, although the operationalization of terrorism excludes acts committed by state actors, also known as state terrorism.

*There is no single, universally accepted, definition of terrorism. Terrorism is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85).<sup>1</sup>*

Due to the dearth of research in the area of mobilization of local communities in intelligence gathering and other proactive tools to counter terrorist activities, the overwhelming majority of US local law enforcement’s response to the phenomenon of terrorism remains unknown. The goal of this exploratory study is to assess the feasibility of implementation of some of the most basic tenets of the community oriented policing philosophy in mobilization of the communities by local law enforcement agencies in their effort and strive to become proactive in the fight against local and global terrorist threat. Through utilization of focus groups in the Northeast region of the US, the author measures and assesses the attitudes and perspectives of local law enforcement and non-law enforcement towards the possibility of engagement of the local community in a proactive effort to counter terrorism.

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<sup>1</sup> US DOJ: *Terrorism 2002-2005*. [http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terrorism2002\\_2005.pdf](http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terrorism2002_2005.pdf)

The author examined the relevant literature on terrorism, including the threat, definition, databases, the relationship between humiliation and terrorism, the war on terrorism, empirical research, and the gaps in the literature. The empirical research includes recent studies involving the temporal and spatial analyses of planning, preparation and execution of terrorist attacks in the US.<sup>2</sup> Terrorism is operationalized, utilizing a combination of philosophy, logic, and academic and legal literature as foundations, with a focus on international discussions involving the United Nations. In addition, the author provides an overview of community policing, including its history, future and modern applications. Furthermore, the author provides recent literature on.

The research, which utilizes methodological triangulation, a combination of qualitative and quantitative measures, is designed to determine whether there is evidence to support the implementation of community policing in proactive counter-terrorism tactics. The quantitative component of the research involves collecting data via questionnaires and exit surveys. The questionnaires, which were provided to participants prior to the start of the focus groups, ensured that each volunteer was appropriate for the focus group and provided demographic information for each of the participants. The exit surveys, which were provided to the participants subsequent to the completion of the focus group, collected data relating to the research hypotheses. The qualitative component of the research involves conducting and analyzing a number of focus groups. The vignettes provided through these focus groups are used in conjunction with the questionnaires and survey to obtain a more definitive perspective of local law enforcement and community participants. While the findings may not be generalizable to the greater population in the US, this exploratory study will provide a foundation for future research examining community policing and counter-terrorism tactics.

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<sup>2</sup> Smith, Damphousse & Roberts, 2006; Smith, Cothren, Roberts & Damphousse, 2008

## Chapter 2: Literature Review

### Threat of Terrorism

How real is the threat of terrorism? In most western democratic countries, acts of terrorism are ultra-low frequency events when compared with other criminal activities or other more common causes of injury and death, such as vehicular accidents. The issue with terrorism and its potential risk to modern society is the increasing level of lethality. Although the number of terrorist attacks in Western countries may have decreased over the past decades, the lethality of the attacks has increased substantially. This recent trend in conjunction with the technological advances and availability of materials necessary to develop and employ a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) have led many countries to allocate much greater resources to the phenomenon than the frequency of such events would warrant. Recent events, such as the arrest of three individuals in possession of enough enriched uranium to build a radiological or dirty bomb, provide the evidence necessary to believe that there is a reasonable probability that a non-state actor will be able to obtain material necessary to develop a WMD.<sup>3</sup>

In addition, actions by organizations, such as the sarin subway attack in Tokyo by Aum Shinrikyo,<sup>4</sup> that utilize WMD's and statements by organizations, such as the fatwa by Al Qaeda, advocating the use of WMD's and their attempts to obtain WMD's, provide a basis for a concern

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<sup>3</sup> BBC News: Slovak raid nets bomb uranium. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7119172.stm>; BBC News: Arrests in Slovak nuclear plot – “Police in Slovakia and Hungary have arrested three people for allegedly trying to sell 1kg (2.2lb) of radioactive material, officials said... International agencies have repeatedly warned of the risk of radioactive material from the former Soviet Union passing into the hands of criminals or terrorists. A police raid in the Czech Republic in 1994 uncovered an attempt to sell 2.73kg (96 ounces) of enriched uranium illegally. Police in the same year confiscated 2.97kg (105 ounces) of enriched uranium intended for illegal sale in the Russian city of St Petersburg.” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7117758.stm>

<sup>4</sup> Council on Foreign Relations (<http://www.cfr.org/publication/9238/>)

for future acts.<sup>5</sup> A report by Salam and Hansell (2005) concludes that although Al Qaeda and its affiliates may be far from developing WMD's, all evidence from Western sources and from Al Qaeda websites indicate the aggressive pursuit of such capabilities.<sup>6</sup> According to experts, including two senior research fellows from the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)<sup>7</sup>, there is currently little threat of a non-state actor successfully building a nuclear weapon, even a rudimentary gun-type device.<sup>8</sup> However, there is a real threat of a non-state actor building and using a radiological device or dirty bomb. Furthermore, according to some experts, the use of a radiological dispersion device (RDD) or dirty bomb by a non-state actor in a terrorist attack is inevitable.<sup>9</sup>

A US Senate subcommittee staff report<sup>10</sup> discussing the vulnerability of the US to a dirty bomb concluded that terrorists are interested in using a RDD to wreak havoc in this country. Some examples include the discovery in Al Qaeda facilities that contain information on the use and impact of an RDD. The vulnerability to this type of attack are magnified by the GAO report that describes the ease with which they were able to obtain and subsequently counterfeit a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license that enabled the purchase of sufficient materials necessary to build an RDD. An article in Time discusses a plot to use the radioactive materials

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<sup>5</sup> Washingtonpost.com: *Portents of a Nuclear Al-Qaeda*. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/17/AR2007101702114.html>

<sup>6</sup> Salam & Hansell, 2005, pp. 643-44.

<sup>7</sup> Council on Foreign Relations: <http://www.cfr.org/>

<sup>8</sup> Federation of American Scientists; <http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/design.htm>; "Gun-assembled weapons using highly enriched uranium are considered the easiest of all nuclear devices to construct and the most foolproof."

<sup>9</sup> Panel Session I; "Nuclear Terrorism: Looses Nukes and Dirty Bombs"; J. Borgardt, C. Ferguson & M. Levi; "Nuclear Weapons After Bush: Prospects for Abolition" conference; January 16<sup>th</sup>, 2008; John Jay College for Criminal Justice, Center on Terrorism.

<sup>10</sup> US Senate, 2007

in smoke detectors to build a device that would cause widespread panic that was uncovered by British authorities.<sup>11</sup>

While many experts agree that the probability that a non-state actor may not have the resources necessary to build a functional nuclear weapon, the threat of obtaining a nuclear device from a country that has the resources may also be perceived as a threat. For example, the security of nuclear weapons in Russia, the former Soviet Union, is problematic. As Wolf (2003) states: “Reports of Russian nuclear materials for sale on the black market, when combined with evidence of weaknesses in the security systems have raised concerns about the possible theft or diversion of nuclear materials from these facilities.”<sup>12</sup> In Pakistan there is a significant population of Islamic fundamentalists that may have influence both in the military and the government. In addition, the scientist responsible for the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, was implicated in transferring nuclear technology to Libya, Iran and North Korea.<sup>13</sup>

The threat of terrorism is a major source of concern of police officers, regarding international as well as domestic terrorists. Although much of the focus on terrorism has been on international actors, such as Al Qaeda, the domestic threat, as shown by individuals such as Timothy McVeigh, is real and significant. In the US, domestic terrorism attacks outnumber international attacks by a ratio of 7:1.<sup>14</sup> With regard to the potential of violence due to interaction between police and domestic terrorists, at least 65 domestic far-right extremists died

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<sup>11</sup> Time, 10/03/2004. *London's Dirty Bomb Plot*. <http://www.time.com/time/nation>

<sup>12</sup> Wolf, 2003

<sup>13</sup> New York Times: A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network. “Dr. Khan assembled a far-reaching organization of scientists, engineers and business executives who operated on murky boundaries between the legal and the illegal, sometimes underground but often in plain view, unencumbered by international agreements that prohibit trafficking in nuclear technology.”

<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F00E1D6133AF931A25751C0A9629C8B63>

<sup>14</sup> LaFree, Dugan, Fogg & Scott, 2006

as a result of confrontations with police. In addition, the far-right was responsible for the deaths of over 20 law enforcement officers, four of which occurred in 2007.<sup>15</sup>

An important issue in relation to the threat of terrorism is the perception of the threat by the public. Since the attacks on September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001, the perceived threat of terrorism has increased substantially in the US. A 2004 Harris Interactive poll of 3,378 people indicated that 11% of the public believes another major attack is ‘very’ likely in the next 12 months, and 62% of US residents thought another terrorist attack at some point in the future is either ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ likely.<sup>16</sup> A 2004 Harris survey of 197 senior executives of large corporations (over \$1 billion in revenue) found that 55% of corporate executives view terrorism as a major concern, second only to the compromise of corporate information systems.<sup>17</sup> In September 2007, Zogby International conducted a poll concerning the threat of international terrorism, whose findings include the following: 91% of US residents believe that terrorists will attack the US again on American soil; 47% believe that attack will happen within the next five years; 20% of US residents anticipate the attack will be against a US food or water source; 17% expect the attack to be by biological (disease or poison); 16% expected the use of a car bomb in a crowded area or mall.<sup>18</sup> Based on these polls, in addition to the continuing discourse among law enforcement, the media, and academicians, there is significant attention toward the threat of terrorism, both among government agents and the public.

While terrorism remains one of the greatest threats to modern society, the ability of law enforcement agencies to respond to the threat continues to be problematic despite major

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<sup>15</sup> Freilich & Chermak, 2007

<sup>16</sup> Harris Interactive, 2004 – <http://www.harrisinteractive.com/>

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Zogby International, 2007 – <http://www.zogby.com/search/ReadNews.dbm?ID=1355>

increases in funding and resources for counter-terrorism (CT). A May 2007 US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, which examined law enforcement efforts to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt and prosecute terrorists, found that:

*most [Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs)], with the exception of the FBI, have not been given clear guidance, they lacked clearly defined roles and responsibilities on helping foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In one country we visited, the lack of clear roles and responsibilities between two U.S. LEAs may have compromised several joint operations intended to identify and disrupt potential terrorist activities, according to the U.S. and foreign nation LEAs. In addition, we found LEAs generally lacked guidance on using resources to assist foreign nations in addressing terrorist vulnerabilities and generally lacked performance monitoring systems and formal structures for sharing information and collaborating. We also found that, because comprehensive needs assessments were not conducted, LEAs may not be tailoring their full range of training and assistance to address key terrorism vulnerabilities in foreign countries.*<sup>19</sup>

While the US has, in recent years, attempted to secure its borders and ports, including ports in foreign countries, through the addition of equipment to detect radiation, its success is questionable, at best. A March 2006 GAO report, which examined US efforts to deploy radiation detection equipment in the US and foreign countries, found that:

*Regarding deployment of radiation detection equipment in foreign countries, [Department of Energy (DOE)], [Department of Defense (DOD)], and State have spent a total of about \$178 million since fiscal year 1994 to provide assistance to 36 countries. For example, DOE's Second Line of Defense program has installed equipment at 83 sites, mostly in Russia, at a cost of about \$130 million. However, DOE, DOD, and State face challenges that could compromise their programs' effectiveness, including (1) corruption of foreign border security officials, (2) technical limitations of some equipment at foreign sites, (3) problems with maintenance of some*

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<sup>19</sup> GAO. Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directive to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists. <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07697.pdf>

*handheld equipment, and (4) the lack of infrastructure and harsh environmental conditions at some border sites.*<sup>20</sup>

Among the many GAO reports that relate to the phenomenon of terrorism and the ability of various government agencies, both local and federal, to respond to the threat, a June 2008 report depicts the problems associated with the local response to the release of hazardous materials, such as through the use of WMD's.

*While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other agencies have taken steps to improve homeland defense, local first responders still do not have tools to accurately identify right away what, when, where, and how much chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) materials are released in U.S. urban areas, accidentally or by terrorists. Equipment local first responders use to detect radiological and nuclear material cannot predict the dispersion of these materials in the atmosphere. No agency has the mission to develop, certify, and test equipment first responders can use for detecting radiological materials in the atmosphere. According to DHS, chemical detectors are marginally able to detect an immediately dangerous concentration of chemical warfare agents. Handheld detection devices for biological agents are not reliable or effective.*<sup>21</sup>

The costs of a successful terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass destruction could be enormous to the target location and the entire world. According to a report in the RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) Journal, the following are estimates of the economic costs of terrorism: the direct and indirect costs of the 9/11 attacks – \$83 billion; costs of 143,000 jobs lost in New York City – \$2.8 billion; losses incurred by the insurance industry – \$58 billion; cost of complying with maritime security mandates introduced by the US – \$8 billion; cost of security measures for US railroad industry – \$1.7 billion; cost of securing commercial aircraft – \$4.8 billion. The costs may, on the surface appear to be staggering, but these costs are substantially

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<sup>20</sup> <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06558t.pdf>

<sup>21</sup> GAO. *Homeland Security: First Responder's Ability to Detect and Model Hazardous Releases in Urban Areas is Significantly Limited.* <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08180.pdf>

mitigated when compared with the estimated \$1 trillion cost to the global economy if a weapon of mass destruction is utilized.<sup>22</sup>

Given the low frequency of terrorism and the fact that most local law enforcement agencies have multiple responsibilities, many law enforcement agencies are severely limited in their ability to have personnel assigned full time to CT duties. Most local law enforcement agencies will be hard pressed to justify shifting personnel from more traditional assignments when communities are more concerned by local issues that have a greater probability of impacting them in the near future. In comparison to other serious criminal activity, communities in the US have rarely been subjected to successful terrorist attacks.

A 2007 report by the National Intelligence Council (NIC), which judged that the terrorist threat to the US is in a heightened threat environment, assessed that globalization and technological advances will continue to enable individuals to mobilize resources without requiring a centralized organization, training camp or leader. The cost of executing an attack is relatively low. With the exception of the 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda spent less than \$50,000 on many of its terrorist attacks, including the 1998 twin US embassy bombings and the October 2002 twin nightclub bombings in Bali, Indonesia, each of which had a death tolls over 200. The March 11<sup>th</sup>, 2003 Madrid train attacks, which involved the near simultaneous detonation of 10 devices on trains killing nearly 200, are estimated to have cost about \$10,000.<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, the NIC report concluded that detection of terrorist plotting will “require greater understanding

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<sup>22</sup> RFID Journal: *Counting the Cost of terrorism* (April 1, 2005). <http://www.rfidjournal.com/>

<sup>23</sup> The Age: *UN calculates the cost of terrorism*. <http://www.theage.com.au/>

of how suspect activities at the local level relate to strategic threat information and how best to identify indicators of terrorist activity in the midst of legitimate interactions.”<sup>24</sup>

Although larger agencies have developed or increased resources for counter-terrorism, the greatest potential for identifying individuals or groups involved in planning a terrorist attack lies with local law enforcement agents through communication with the communities they serve. Community policing may be the greatest asset to decreasing the threat posed by the phenomenon of terrorism in the new millennium. By increasing the cooperation and communication between the community and the police, the ability of individuals planning a terrorist attack to maintain the covert nature required for success can be significantly impacted. The plans of a terrorist must remain hidden from law enforcement in order to be able to be successful in carrying out an operation. Effective community policing can serve to promote intelligence gathering and identification of individuals and groups planning terrorist attacks. As found in the Smith, Damphousse & Roberts (2006) study, a significant proportion of individuals planning an attack both reside and engage in preparatory acts in relatively close proximity to the location of the planned attack, therefore it is likely that the individuals will come into contact with members of the community and local law enforcement prior to an attack.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> US National Intelligence Council ([http://www.dni.gov/press\\_releases/20070717\\_release.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf))

<sup>25</sup> Smith, Damphousse & Roberts, 2006

## Terrorism Definitions

What is terrorism? Terrorism is at least as old as the Common Era, with the oldest known historical terrorist group, *the Sicarii*,<sup>26</sup> a religious sect that consisted of men of lower order in the Zealot struggle in Palestine, dating back to the first century. The definition of terrorism is a major component of any policy related to combating terrorism, but terrorism has not been clearly and concisely defined, either on a national or international level. There has not yet been, nor is there ever likely to be, an academic consensus on the definition, which creates a major limitation for the consistent operationalization of terrorism. Neither is there a consensus among nation states on the definition of terrorism.

Academic definitions of terrorism have varied throughout the years. Schmid and Jongman (2005) cited 15 different academic definitions and identified common elements associated with terrorism through the analysis of 109 academics' definitions of terrorism. The results of their study identified 22 elements and their corresponding frequencies. The five elements with the highest frequencies were violence or force at 83.5%, political at 65%, fear, with terror emphasized at 51%, threat at 47% and (psychological) effects and (anticipated) reactions at 41.5%.<sup>27</sup> Governmental definitions of terrorism change over time, as Schmid and Jongman (2005) cite at least ten examples of the varied academic definitions and legal definitions of terrorism in the US throughout the 1980's.<sup>28</sup>

Hoffman's (1998) extensive discussion of the definition of terrorism, examining both academic and governmental definitions, provides an overview of the problematic nature of

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<sup>26</sup> Barghothi, 1996

<sup>27</sup> Schmid & Jongman, 2005, Table 1.2 Frequencies of Definitional Elements in 109 Definitions, pp. 5-6.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, pp. 32-37.

defining terrorism, including definitions provided by the Department of Defense (DOD), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the US State Department, which uses the US Code Title 22, Chapter 38, section 2656f, subdivision d (2), which states the term ‘terrorism’ means “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”<sup>29</sup> One problem with the US definition of terrorism is that it involves attacks upon noncombatants, which is much too broad a concept. This definition allows the US to declare almost any violent act by subnational groups or clandestine agents as terrorism, as a noncombatant target could be inclusive of military. This reinforces the concept that some definitions of terrorism are designed to limit the ability of non-governmental groups to react to oppression, maintaining the power of the strong over the weak, the power of the oppressor over the oppressed.

The United Nations (UN), despite having discussed terrorism for decades, has not yet published a working definition of terrorism, despite having passed numerous resolutions in relation to terrorism. On March 10<sup>th</sup>, 2005, The Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, gave a speech in which he detailed the five basic pillars of what he termed as a “principled, comprehensive strategy” to fight terrorism globally: Dissuade disaffected groups from choosing terrorism as a tactic to achieve their goals; Deny terrorists the means to carry out their attacks; Deter states from supporting terrorists; Develop state capacity to prevent terrorism; Defend human rights in the struggle against terrorism.<sup>30</sup> The Secretary General failed to mention a sixth ‘D’, Define, without which the aforementioned D’s lack clarity.

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<sup>29</sup> Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute. <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/>

<sup>30</sup> United Nations Information Service in Vienna, *Secretary-General Kofi Annan Launches Global Strategy against Terrorism in Madrid*. <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2005/unisinf64.html>

Subsequent to the incident at the 1972 Munich Olympics, in which 11 Israeli athletes were killed by Palestinian hostage takers, the UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim proposed the UN take practical steps to address the issue of terrorism. “While a majority of the UN member states supported the Secretary-General, a disputatious minority – including many Arab States and various African and Asian countries – derailed the discussion, arguing (much as Arafat would do two years later in his own address to the General Assembly) that ‘people who struggle to liberate themselves from foreign oppression and exploitation have the right to use all methods at their disposal, including force’.”<sup>31</sup> There were two primary arguments employed by the ‘disputatious minority’ member states. The first argument was that the acting government would always call legitimate liberation movements terrorists. The second argument was that the underlying causes, such as misery, frustration, and despair, were responsible for the violence, thus blaming the state for the violence and absolving the ‘liberation movement’ from guilt.

Moulaye el-Hassen, the Mauritanian ambassador, compared these violent actors to groups that resisted Nazi occupation. He further argued that the term terrorist could “hardly be held to apply to persons who were denied the most elementary human rights, dignity, freedom and independence, and whose countries objected to foreign occupation.”<sup>32</sup> During the following year, Syria, who has a history of supporting organizations that use or promote the use of terroristic tactics, argued that the international community is obligated, both legally and morally to promote liberation struggles and resist associating them with terrorism.

These types of arguments are an attempt to justify the use of violence as a means to promote liberation struggles. Historically, many liberation struggles have employed violence,

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<sup>31</sup> Hoffman, 1998, p. 31.

<sup>32</sup> Hoffman, 1998, p. 32.

but it is questionable whether violence is a necessary component of self-rule or self-determination. India gained its independence primarily through non-violent resistance, although at great cost and suffering to its people. Rather than blaming violence on state oppressors and thereby justifying violence, especially violence against civilians, as a legitimate means, India's success could be used as a model for other liberation movements worldwide, which would be much more likely to gain international support. Although, as Crenshaw (1995) states "[i]f terrorism seems to be the only effective means of armed struggle, then resistance and terrorism become synonymous."<sup>33</sup>

As the world's most important internationally accepted body, the UN, by lacking a terrorism definition, precludes implementation of a policy that would promote effective international cooperation in addressing the problem of international terrorism. There are numerous UN conventions against terrorism, but their effectiveness is limited, due to each individual state being empowered to implement their own interpretation of terrorism. On October 6<sup>th</sup> & 7<sup>th</sup>, 2005, during the 60<sup>th</sup> General Assembly, the UN again discussed the implementation of a definition of terrorism.<sup>34</sup>

During these UN discussions, the delegate from Iceland, Hjalmar Hannesson, stated that until there is a consensus on what constitutes terrorism, nations could not unite against it. This sentiment was echoed by a number of other delegates, such as the Malaysian delegate, Mohd Puad Zarkashi, who proposed that until there was agreement on the enemy, there would always be loopholes and safe havens. Some delegates were concerned with terrorism being associated with a specific religion, such as the delegate from Singapore, who cautioned against terrorism

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<sup>33</sup> Crenshaw, 1995, p.16

<sup>34</sup> October 6<sup>th</sup> 2005 UN General Assembly. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/gal3275.doc.htm>; October 7<sup>th</sup> 2005 UN General Assembly. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/gal3276.doc.htm>

being associated with any religious faith; as such an association may lead to targeting or profiling of offenders, which could then foment divisions among ethnic or religious groups. This type of division could benefit organizations that utilize terroristic tactics, as targeted communities may be more supportive of the organization.

Some terrorist experts echo this issue, in that the policies enacted by governments may be counterproductive in nature, further alienating segments of the population or increasing sympathy for the causes promoted by individuals or organizations utilizing terroristic tactics and increasing the base from which to draw resources. Crenshaw posits that “[c]oercive or repressive policies designed to destroy or contain the terrorist threat in the immediate, even if successful in achieving that end, may alienate and aggrieve others who sympathize with the claims of those resorting to violence... Thus, the response to terrorism must be legitimate if the government is to defeat a group without expanding its support base. Violations of human rights in the pursuit of counter-terrorism will be counterproductive.”<sup>35</sup>

A contemporary example of Crenshaw’s argument can be seen in the conflict in the Middle East between Hamas, the terrorist organization elected to government in Gaza, and Israel that led to the January 2009 use of the Israeli military in operations against Hamas and the death and wounding of hundreds of civilians, including women and children. While Israel may be completely justified in its response to rocket attacks to its civilian populations, the perception of human rights violations will compromise Israel’s standing in the international community and among civilians in Gaza that are opposed to the tactics and methods employed by Hamas. Images of grieving family members standing over dead children in Gaza are likely to have a greater impact on the perceptions of the general public than any report of rockets being fired by

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<sup>35</sup> Crenshaw, 2005, p.16

Hamas on civilian populations in Israel. “In Geneva, the United Nations Human Rights Council broadly condemned Israel’s military offensive in Gaza, saying it “resulted in massive violations of human rights of the Palestinian people.” The council, which does not include the US, voted 33 to 1 for the resolution, with Canada the only opposing vote.<sup>36</sup>

During the aforementioned UN discussions, some representatives were more concerned with addressing the root causes of terrorism. Bahyono Sabine, from Burkina Faso, proposed that the root causes of terrorism, such as injustices, inequalities, and frustrations that arose from marginalization and exclusion, must be addressed in order to overcome terrorism. The Saudi Arabian representative, Fawzi Shobokshi, stated that joint international efforts were necessary to combat extremism and fanaticism, but further stated those efforts were not sufficient without finding the root causes of terrorism. Although the Saudi delegate stated his country condemned terrorism in all its forms, he reaffirmed Saudi Arabia’s position to oppose the application of terrorism to struggles involving the “rights of peoples to self-determination.”<sup>37</sup> The Saudi position is consistent with the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism and the Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, which was also supported by other Islamic states such as Yemen, Libya and Sudan.

The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism was adopted by the Council of Arab Ministers of the Interior and the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice in Cairo in April 1998. Article 1 of the convention defined terrorism as follows:

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<sup>36</sup> New York Times – Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza. <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/01/07/world/20080104-conflict-graphic.html>; Israel Troops push into Gaza City. [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/13/world/middleeast/13mideast.html?\\_r=1&ref=world](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/13/world/middleeast/13mideast.html?_r=1&ref=world)

<sup>37</sup> United Nations General Assembly GA/L/3286. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/gal3276.doc.htm>

*Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs in the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda and seeking to sow panic among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or seeking to cause damage to the environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupying or seizing them, or seeking to jeopardize a national resources.*<sup>38</sup>

Article 2, subdivision a, states that “[a]ll cases of struggle by whatever means, including armed struggle, against foreign occupation and aggression for liberation and self-determination, in accordance with the principles of international law, shall not be regarded as an offence.”<sup>39</sup>

The Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, adopted at Ouagadougou on 1 July 1999, also contains a similar policy on terrorism. Article 1, subdivision 2 of the convention defines terrorism. “‘Terrorism’ means any act of violence or threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or intentions perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or imperiling their lives, honour, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent States.” Article 2, subdivision a of the convention, states that a “[p]eoples’ struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in accordance with the principles of international law shall not be considered a terrorist crime.”<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism. <http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/terrorism98.htm>

<sup>39</sup> *ibid*

<sup>40</sup> Annex to Resolution No. 59/26-P: Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism. <http://www.oic-un.org/26icfm/c.html>

There are several reasons the definition of terrorism employed in this study excludes state actors. The primary rationale for terrorism to be operationalized so as to exclude state actors is that state actors can be held accountable in ways that non-state actors cannot. Both national and international bodies may respond to acts consistent with many of the components associated with terrorism. International bodies, such as the UN, may propose and ratify sanctions against state actors. Nation states can sanction state actors without cooperation from other nations, but this does not have a significant impact unless the sanctioning nation is an economic or military superpower. With the increase in globalization in recent decades, most nation states rely on other states to maintain economic viability and require resources that are not naturally available within their borders. States that rely on international trade are vulnerable to the global economy, as they cannot maintain their economies without interaction and trade with other nations. The terrorist attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, led to the US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, despite the attacks not being directly conducted by governmental actors. This is an example of reciprocity by a state actor, the US, against another state, Afghanistan, for refusing to take action against an organization that was allowed to operate freely within its borders after that organization conducted a terrorist attack.

Nation states have leaders and those leaders can be held accountable by international bodies and by other nation states for acts of commission and omission. After the US invaded Iraq, its leader, Saddam Hussein, was captured and tried for crimes committed while acting as the leader of Iraq, sentenced to death for crimes against humanity in Dujail, and subsequently executed on December 30<sup>th</sup>, 2006.<sup>41</sup> On July 14<sup>th</sup>, 2008, the prosecutor for the International Criminal Court formally requested an arrest warrant for the president of the Sudan, Omar Hassan

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<sup>41</sup> BBC News: *Saddam Hussein executed in Iraq*. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/6218485.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6218485.stm)

al-Bashir, on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity.<sup>42</sup> As stated in the ICC press release, “[t]hree years after the Security Council requested him to investigate in Darfur, and based on the evidence collected, the Prosecutor has concluded there are reasonable grounds to believe that Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir bears criminal responsibility in relation to 10 counts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.”<sup>43</sup>

Subsequent to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990’s, numerous military and governmental leaders were also charged with war crimes. Slobodan Milosevic, former president of Serbia, died in custody while awaiting the results of his trial for “charges relating to atrocities carried out in Kosovo in 1999, to crimes against humanity committed in Croatia in 1991 and 1992, and to alleged genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995.”<sup>44</sup> Milosevic was accused of being responsible for the deaths of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Croats, which came as the result of a 1995 massacre at Srebrenica that involved the murder, imprisonment and mistreatment of thousands of civilians, including women and the elderly. Furthermore, Radovan Karadzic, a former Serbian military commander indicted by the United Nations war crimes tribunal in The Hague, was arrested for the slaughter of thousands of Bosnians and Croats.

*The UN says [Radovan Karadzic’s] forces killed at least 7,500 Muslim men and boys from Srebrenica in July 1995 as part of a campaign to ‘terrorise and demoralise the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat population’. He was also charged over the shelling of Sarajevo, and the use of 284 UN peacekeepers as human shields in May and June 1995.*<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> New York Times: *Sudan leader is accused of genocide.*

<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/15/world/africa/15sudan.html?exprod=myyahoo>

<sup>43</sup> Press Release: *ICC Prosecutor presents case against Sudanese President, Hassan Ahmad al Bashir, for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur.* <http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/406.html>

<sup>44</sup> BBC News: *Q & A: Milosevic trial.* <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1403054.stm>

<sup>45</sup> BBC News: *Karadzic arrest signals new direction.* <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7518657.stm>; *Profile: Radovan Karadzic.* <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/876084.stm>

Governmental as well as military leaders have been held responsible for their actions, tried and convicted for activities conducted while acting in an official capacity on behalf of a recognized nation state. Leaders of non-state organizations that utilize violence against civilian populations are not as identifiable and therefore are not easily held accountable for their actions. Even individuals that readily identify themselves as the leader of such an organization are not easily held accountable due to the difficulty in locating the leader. Despite a reward that is in excess of 25 million dollars, the leader of Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, infamous for the 9/11 attacks, remains at large.

Yasser Arafat is an example of a non-state actor that was never held responsible for the civilian deaths caused by his organization, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Arafat was not indicted, tried and convicted for his involvement in the PLO. However, in 1994, Arafat, along with Israelis Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin, was awarded the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to create peace in the Middle East.<sup>46</sup> In order to control the political, racial, religious bias in the perceptions and attitudes towards the concept of “terrorism” and “terrorists”, the operationalization of terrorism, the use of force by non-state actors against a civilian population in an attempt to coerce a target audience to implement a political, economic, religious or ideological change, provides an objective definition, based on behavior rather than ideology. The positive impact of events once lauded as major diplomatic accomplishments in the international community, such as the 1993 Oslo Accords (also known as the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements), are now questioned.

*The Oslo “peace accord” made the world more dangerous and subjected Palestinian Arabs to a rule of violence, corruption and intimidation. Arafat's dictatorship has since been outmatched by*

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<sup>46</sup> The Nobel Peace Prize 1994. [http://nobelprize.org/nobel\\_prizes/peace/laureates/1994/press.html](http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1994/press.html)

*an even more brutal Hamas regime that serves as the terrorist outpost of Iran. President Bush's military intervention, by contrast, destroyed a terrorist state and made the world safer for its citizens.*<sup>47</sup>

As Pillar (2001) provides: “international terrorism today is more a problem of nonstate actors than one of states.”<sup>48</sup> State actors are vulnerable to responses by the country in which an attack takes place, in addition to sanctions from the international community, while nonstate actors that are not acting as direct proxies of state actors do not have the same vulnerability, as they may not have a home or single country with which they are affiliated. In addition, nonstate actors may have the goal of a state or international response in order to polarize segments of the greater population in an attempt to increase popular support for the ideology of the group.

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<sup>47</sup> Wall Street Journal: Bush Destroyed a Dictator, Clinton Installed One – Which of our last two presidents made the world safer? <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123197784199983615.html>

<sup>48</sup> Pillar, 2001, p. xviii

## Operationalization of Terrorism

The author proposes a violence matrix, Figure 1.1 below, to determine the classification for acts of violence that attempt to coerce a target audience to implement a political, economic, religious or ideological change, examining two variables, the actor and the target. An act of violence committed by a non-state actor that targets military or governmental facilities would be operationalized as guerilla warfare or revolution. An act of violence committed by a state actor that targets civilians would be operationalized as a war crime or crime against humanity. An act of violence committed by state actor that targets foreign military or governmental facilities would be operationalized as an act of war. An act of violence committed by a non-state actor that targets civilian would be operationalized as an act of terrorism. There are gray areas that involve some crossover, but the four categories presented provide a clear framework from which to exclude situations that obscure the operationalization of terrorism.

<b>Figure 1.1: Violence Matrix: Actor v. Target</b>		
	<b><u>Actor</u></b>	
<b><u>Target</u></b>	<b><i>State</i></b>	<b><i>Non-State</i></b>
<b><i>Government or Military</i></b>	Act of War	Guerilla Warfare or Revolution
<b><i>Civilian</i></b>	War Crime or Crime against Humanity	<b>Act of Terrorism</b>

There is no inclusion of freedom fighter, the controversial term often associated with terrorism, because the groups and individuals associated with the above four categories of acts can declare themselves as freedom fighters. A freedom fighter is a subjective label describing the group or individual, while in figure 1.1 the specific act is the determining factor. A state actor may simultaneously engage in acts that are war crimes and acts of war. An example is Iraq in the 1980's, in which the military conflict with Iran would be categorized as an act of war, while the use of chemical warfare against civilian Kurdish populations in Northern Iraq would be categorized as a crime against humanity, or possibly genocide. A non-state actor may also simultaneously engage in both guerilla warfare and acts of terrorism. An example of this is the IRA, whose operations against government targets would be categorized as guerilla warfare, while an operation that targeted civilians, such as the 1983 Harrods bombing in London<sup>49</sup>, would be categorized as terrorism.

The exclusion of state actors provides for a definition more likely to be accepted by the leaders and government representatives of nation states. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) provides for acts committed by nation states, such as the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Calling these same acts terrorism does not provide any additional benefit. Saddam Hussein, the former leader of Iraq, was sentenced to death for crimes against humanity by an Iraqi court after a year-long trial over the killings of 148 people from the town of Dujail in 1982 and was subsequently executed by hanging on December 30<sup>th</sup>, 2006.<sup>50</sup> In addition to the incidents in Dujail, Hussein was also implicated in the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi government against the Kurds in Northern Iraq, in a military campaign that led to the death of 50-100 thousand Iraqi Kurds.

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<sup>49</sup> BBC: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/17/newsid\\_2538000/2538147.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/17/newsid_2538000/2538147.stm)

<sup>50</sup> BBC: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle\\_east/03/v3\\_iraq\\_timeline/html/trial\\_of\\_saddam.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/v3_iraq_timeline/html/trial_of_saddam.stm)

*Saddam Hussein is the first world leader in modern times to have brutally used chemical weapons against his own people. His goals were to systematically terrorize and exterminate the Kurdish population in northern Iraq, to silence his critics, and to test the effectiveness of his chemical and biological weapons. Hussein launched chemical attacks against 40 Kurdish villages and thousands of innocent civilians in 1987-88, using them as testing grounds. The worst of these attacks devastated the city of Halabja on March 16, 1988.*<sup>51</sup>

The exclusion of government or military targets, who may engage in oppressive tactics against civilian populations, provide for a definition more likely to be accepted by the international community. The democracy enjoyed by a number of Western governments, such as the US, was the result of an armed rebellion. The exclusion of acts committed by non-state actors against a government is consistent with the ideals promoted in the founding of the US and other Western democratic nations. In addition, the exclusion of acts committed by non-state actors against a government is consistent with the aforementioned issue brought up by many Arab countries during the early UN discussions on terrorism in the 1970's, in their desire to exclude people that struggle to liberate themselves from oppression and exploitation that use force from being labeled as terrorists. The controversy regarding terrorism in the modern age extends beyond academic or legal definitions.

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<sup>51</sup> Saddam's Chemical Weapons Campaign: Halabja, March 16, 1988. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/18714.htm>

## Terrorism Databases

There are numerous terrorism databases that have been created during past decades, many of which utilize varying definitions of terrorism, such as International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE), RAND, the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service (PGIS), the Global Terrorism Database (1970-1997) (GTD), and the American Terrorism Study (ATS). The goal of the ITERATE project was to quantify data on the characteristics of transnational terrorist groups, their activities which have international impact, and the environment in which they operate.<sup>52</sup> The goal of the RAND *Terrorism Incident Database* was to define and categorize terrorist attacks in order to help analysts, policymakers, and practitioners understand general trends in the threat.<sup>53</sup> The goal of the GTD was to code and verify a previously unavailable data set composed of 67,165 terrorist events recorded by PGIS for the entire world from 1970 to 1997.<sup>54</sup> The primary goal of the ATS was to create an empirical database from which criminological theories and governmental policies could be effectively evaluated.<sup>55</sup> Although each of these databases may have limitations, they provide an important source of information for research on the phenomenon of terrorism, which many academics are currently utilizing for empirical research. In addition, these databases provide a base from which future databases may be modeled.

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<sup>52</sup> ITERATE. <http://ssdc.ucsd.edu/ssdc/pdf/ITERATECodebook2003.pdf>

<sup>53</sup> RAND: *Terrorism Incident Database*. <http://rand.org/ise/projects/terrorismdatabase/>

<sup>54</sup> LaFree, Dugan, Fogg & Scott, 2006, (<http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/214260.pdf>)

<sup>55</sup> “This study was conducted in response to a lack of existing data collections relating specifically to acts of American terrorism. A primary goal of the American Terrorism Study was to create an empirical database from which criminological theories and governmental policies could be effectively evaluated. In addition to this goal, the study had three objectives: (1) to examine the characteristics, patterns of behavior, and tactics of American terrorist groups in the post-guidelines era to determine if terrorist groups have been modifying their tactics in response to prosecutorial success, (2) to assess the impact of potential changes in the first objective on prosecutorial and sanctioning strategies employed during the post-guidelines era and to determine the types of evidence and charges most likely to lead to successful prosecution of terrorism cases, and (3) to determine whether the introduction of federal sentencing guidelines have reduced the sentence disparity between terrorists and similarly situated non-terrorists.” (<http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/04639.xml>)

## **American Terrorism Study**

Despite the number of articles and books written on terrorism, until recently there had been a paucity of empirical studies (Silke, 1996, 2001, 2004; Merari, 1991). Among the more comprehensive empirical studies conducted on terrorism have come as a result of the American Terrorism Study (ATS), which began in 1989 when the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Terrorist Research and Analytical Center released a list of persons indicted as a result of investigation under the FBI's Counterterrorism Program. Not surprisingly, the study uses the definition provided by the FBI, which excludes certain acts which, under many other definitions, may have been included among terrorist incidents, which can impact the generalizability of the findings.

Although the primary goal was to create an empirical database, from which future analyses could be conducted, there were three additional objectives. The first objective was to examine the characteristics, patterns of behavior and tactics to determine whether groups have been adapting their behavior in response to prosecution. The second objective was to assess the findings from the first objective in order to determine the types of evidence or tactics that will lead to a successful prosecution. The third objective was to determine whether the introduction of federal sentencing guidelines led to a reduction in the disparity in the sentences received between terrorists and non-terrorists for the similar activities.

## Empirical Analyses of Terrorism

There have been paucity of empirical analyses of terrorism; however, recent studies, utilizing the data from the ATS, examine ancillary and preparatory crimes committed by individuals preceding a terrorist attack. The goal of the Smith, Damphousse & Roberts (2006) study was twofold, to determine: “(1) [if] sufficient open source data exists to examine the temporal and spatial relationships that exist in terrorist group planning, and (2) if such data do exist, can patterns of routinized preparatory conduct be identified.”<sup>56</sup> The findings, which show that many individuals planning an act of terrorism both reside and plan operations in relatively close proximity to the target location, provide insight into the potential intervention that may be utilized to address the phenomenon of terrorism.

*If preparatory behaviors can serve as pre-incident indicators to local law enforcement agencies, it is important to know the relationship between where these acts occur and the location of the residence of the terrorist and the target location. Once again, approximately one-half of the terrorists lived within a thirty mile radius of where they committed their planning activities. The same pattern persists when examining the relationship between the location of preparatory behaviors and the target location... For local law enforcement, knowledge that most terrorists “act locally” can be an important mindset as investigative agencies seek to prevent terrorism or apprehend the perpetrators of these acts. These local patterns may be used by agencies to more efficiently patrol known, high risk target areas and gather intelligence on suspected activities within a specific range from potential targets.*<sup>57</sup>

The Smith et al (2006) study found a bi-modal spatial distribution among the sixty (60) cases analyzed, in which approximately half the terrorist actors resided, planned, and prepared for the terrorist attack in relatively close proximity to the intended target. For those local actors, the potential for intervention by local law enforcement provides a contrasting view to the popular

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<sup>56</sup> Smith, Damphousse & Roberts, 2006, p.2

<sup>57</sup> Smith et al. , 2006, pp.72-73

belief that terrorism is random and can happen anywhere. Although this study was exploratory, it provides insight into possible policy implications of the locality of these events. In addition to the implications provided by the research, which include local law enforcement knowledge relating to more effective patrol of high risk targets<sup>58</sup>, there is also the impact on the limitations to law enforcement, such as the inability to identify non-overt acts of conspiracies, such as meetings and phone calls.<sup>59</sup> However, the utilization of community policing may serve to increase the potential for law enforcement to become aware of these non-overt acts, through communication and cooperation with local communities.

In a related study, Smith, Cothren, Roberts and Damphousse (2008) examined antecedent conduct of terrorist group members for 118 environmental and 55 international incidents occurring in the United States in an attempt to identify patterns of conduct that might lead to intervention prior to the commission of actual terrorist incidents, which suggested that these patterns varied by type of terrorist group. The primary goal of this study was to add geospatial and temporal data to the earlier pilot study of pre-incident indicators of terrorist incidents, which had indicated that patterns of conduct could be identified. The findings from this study supported earlier studies, in that slightly over half of both international and environmental terrorists lived within 30 miles of the target in the days immediately preceding the terrorist incident, over 60 percent of the antecedent behaviors committed by both international and environmental terrorists occurred within 30 miles of the eventual target, and there was a bimodal distribution regarding the relationship between the terrorists' place of residence and the target location.

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<sup>58</sup> Smith et al, 2006, pp. 14-15

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, p. 8

However, the temporal patterns for the international and environmental terrorists differed, as the planning process of environmental terrorists was relatively short and spontaneous (approximately 85% of their preparatory conduct occurred within six days of the incident) in contrast to the international terrorists (planning activities usually began four to six months prior to the incident). International terrorists engaged in a significantly larger number of preparatory activities per incident than environmental terrorists, committing nearly three times as many known antecedent activities per incident as environmental terrorists. Smith et al (2008) propose that this may have been due to the tendency to have a greater number of persons involved in international incidents, the size and scope of the planned incident, or the longer planning cycle for international terrorists (an average of 92 days between first planning and attack). For environmental terrorist incidents, there were a relatively low number of preparatory crimes and days involved in the planning sequence (an average of 15 days between first planning and attack), regardless of the number of persons involved. This may significantly impact law enforcement response, especially at the local level, as the type of actor may have a significant impact on the time available to engage in proactive police work in order to prevent a terrorist attack.<sup>60</sup>

*For law enforcement intervention, the implications of these patterns are fairly significant. In most cases, the commission of an act of terrorism will involve localized preparatory conduct. Although much of this conduct will not be criminal, early intelligence may give law enforcement the opportunity to interdict the terrorists in advance of the incident. Furthermore, knowledge of the threat, for example knowing whether local potential targets are more likely to be selected by environmental or international terrorists, will affect the manner in which local law enforcement responds. The identification of pre-cursor activities by environmental extremists may signal that an attack is eminent, while similar behavior by an international group might suggest that an attack is still several months off. For local law enforcement, knowledge that most terrorists “act locally” can be an important mindset as investigative agencies seek to prevent terrorism or*

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<sup>60</sup> Smith et al, 2008, p. 79-82.

*apprehend the perpetrators of these acts. These local patterns may be used by agencies to more efficiently patrol known, high risk target areas and gather intelligence on suspected activities within a specific range from potential targets. The spatial relationship between the location of the planning/preparatory acts and the terrorism target, once better understood, should also prove helpful for investigation and tactical actions by law enforcement.*<sup>61</sup>

Smith (2008) posits that terrorists think globally, but act locally, based on an analysis of 423 terrorists including the following described incidents. The analysis indicated that nearly half, or 44%, of the terrorists in the US lived within 30 miles of the intended target location.

- Ten attacks by international groups that involved 93 preparatory acts.
- Fourteen attacks by right-wing groups that involved 55 preparatory acts.
- Twenty-nine attacks by environmental groups that involved 80 preparatory acts.
- Six attacks by left-wing groups that involved eight preparatory acts.<sup>62</sup>

The following graph, *Distance From Terrorist residence to Target (All Groups)*,<sup>63</sup> provides an illustration (Figure 1.2) of the findings presented by Smith (2008) with regard to the distance between the residences of the terrorists to the target of the terrorist attack, which provides further evidence that the phenomenon of terrorist is local; therefore, local law enforcement, with assistance from local communities, have the potential to have an impact by working proactively to identify, deter or prevent terrorist attacks in the US.

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
<sup>61</sup> Smith et al, 2008, p. 82

<sup>62</sup> Smith, 2008, p. 3

<sup>63</sup> *ibid.*

## Distance From Terrorist Residence to Target (All Groups)\*

■ 44% (0-30 miles)   ■ 7% (31-90 miles)   ■ 8% (91-270 miles)   ■ 12% (271-810 miles)   ■ 29% (811-2,570 miles)



\* This is a linear analysis of the distance from the residences of 423 terrorists to their targets.

## Theoretical Framework

Cohen & Felson (1979) proposed a Routine Activities theory (RAT), which combines elements of deterrence and rational choice, to explain criminality. The three main categories that contribute to criminal activity include motivated offenders, suitable targets of criminal victimization, and capable guardians of persons or property. The probability of crime occurring increases when there is a presence of motivated offenders, a suitable target is available, and there is an absence or paucity of capable guardians. Based on the definition of terrorism provided earlier, terrorism will also be a violation of existing law. Terrorism, under the proposed definition, is crime; therefore one could apply Routine Activities to the phenomenon. Cohen & Felson (1979) argue that changes in social patterns of routine activity affect crime rates by influencing the incidence of predatory crime, which are typically associated with rape, robbery, and burglary.

RAT focuses on predatory crime, or as they describe it – *direct-contact predatory violations*, which involve physical contact between at least one offender and at least one person or object targeted by the offender.<sup>64</sup> Although terrorism targets society as a whole, RAT can be applied to a terrorist act, which, as previously operationalized, involves the use of force by non-state actors against a civilian population. The target may not be specifically selected, nor may there be direct contact typical of the crimes normally associated with RAT, but there will be direct contact between the offender and the target, such as through an explosive device detonated by the offender that impacts the target. Although there may not always be the physical direct

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<sup>64</sup> Cohen & Felson, 1979

contact, there will be a direct relationship between the offender and the target, albeit through another medium.

Cooperation and communication between the police and the community will provide an extension of the capable guardianship provided by police. The community can have a significant impact on the intelligence gathering capabilities of local police agencies, both positively and negatively. Therefore, strategies that increase cooperation and communication between law enforcement and the public can be useful in detecting, deterring and preventing future acts of terrorism. In addition, the level of community awareness and preparedness, which can be influenced through community policing, can impact the perception by an offender of the suitability of the target. A community that successfully implements community policing strategies has the potential to decrease the probability that it will be targeted for a terrorist attack and may, in addition, decrease the prevalence of crime overall. Utilizing RAT as a model, community policing will provide both general deterrence, regarding all crime, and specific deterrence, regarding terrorism.

RAT examined how “the spatio-temporal organization of the social activities helps people to translate their criminal inclinations into action”.<sup>65</sup> Empirical research in the US (Smith et. al, 2006, 2008; Smith, 2008) also examined spatial & temporal patterns, which provides a bridge between RAT and the hypotheses (pp. 54 – 56), which focus on the local response to the phenomenon of terrorism through the implementation of community policing in proactive counter-terrorism tactics.

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<sup>65</sup> Cohen & Felson, 1979, p. 589

## Community Policing and Counter-Terrorism

Before we can discuss community policing, we must first discuss the police, specifically police in urban and suburban environments, where the research took place and where a majority of the population in the US reside. According to the 2000 US Census, almost 80% of the population lives in an urban environment.<sup>66</sup> Both the urban and suburban locations in which the focus groups were conducted would be labeled as urban according to the 2000 US Census. Bittner (1990) wrote extensively regarding the police, discussing the various functions of police in an urban environment, such as traffic control, peacekeeping, and crime control. The role of the police varies based on economic, geographic and political factors. According to Bittner, the function of police could be best summed up with “something-that-ought-not-to-be-happening-and-about-which-someone-had-better-do-something-now!”<sup>67</sup> While this phrase may seem vague, it may be the most appropriate description of the role of police in modern society. Although the public associates policing with arresting criminals, research shows that most police spend only a small fraction of their time with this aspect of police work. However, the police are a unique profession in that their role is differentiated from all other non-military professions through their authority to use coercive force.

Klockars (1985) provides the following definition of police: “Police are institutions or individuals given the general right to use coercive force by the state within the state’s domestic territory.”<sup>68</sup> The ability to legitimately use coercive force against citizens in a domestic setting is the factor that separates the profession from all others. Klockars refers to Bittner’s “something-

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<sup>66</sup> 2000 US Census: <http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf1.pdf>

<sup>67</sup> Bittner, 1990, p. 249

<sup>68</sup> Klockars, 1985, p.12

that-ought-not-to-be-happening-and-about-which-someone-had-better-do-something-now!”

phrase, proposing that although the police have an obligation to do something, he does not mean an arrest, citing studies conducted in Boston, Washington D.C. and Chicago as examples supporting that a typical work day of an officer does not involve an arrest.

What is community policing? In order to apply the tenets of community policing, the first step is to identify what these tenets are. The concept of community policing is almost as amorphous as the concept of terrorism. Community policing can encompass any form of policing that involves a partnership between the community and the police, in which there is trust and communication that extends in both directions. Community policing in the US has been implemented by municipalities to varying degrees over the past three decades, enhanced through P.L. 103-322 (1994)<sup>69</sup>, which was also known as the 1994 Omnibus Crime Bill, which provided \$8.8 billion for Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) programs. Although the bill provided funding to hire and train police officers for deployment in community-oriented policing, there is limited oversight to the implementation of such programs.

*Community policing is, in essence, a collaboration between the police and the community that identifies and solves community problems. With the police no longer the sole guardians of law and order, all members of the community become active allies in the effort to enhance the safety and quality of neighborhoods. Community policing has far-reaching implications. The expanded outlook on crime control and prevention, the new emphasis on making community members active participants in the process of problem solving, and the patrol officers' pivotal role in community policing require profound changes within the police organization. The neighborhood patrol officer, backed by the police organization, helps community members mobilize support and*

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<sup>69</sup> “To amend the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to allow grants to increase police presence, to expand and improve cooperative efforts between law enforcement agencies and members of the community to address crime and disorder problems, and otherwise to enhance public safety.” <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d103:HR03355:%7CTOM:bss/d103query.html%7C>

*resources to solve problems and enhance their quality of life. Community members voice their concerns, contribute advice, and take action to address these concerns.*<sup>70</sup>

Community policing has been implemented to varying degrees in jurisdictions across the US. The Community Patrol Officer Program (CPOP) began in New York City in 1984 as a pilot program in the 72<sup>nd</sup> Precinct, Sunset Park – Brooklyn, and was administered by the Vera Institute of Justice. The goal of the program, which consisted of ten patrol officers supervised by one sergeant, was to provide a community-oriented, problem solving policing program without restructuring patrol services. The officers were given a ten day training program designed to provide them with the skills to allow each CPOP officer to be a planner, community organizer, and information link. The success of the program led to citywide expansion and community oriented policing was adopted, to varying degrees, by almost every major local law enforcement agency in the US.<sup>71</sup>

Concepts and critiques of the professional model, as well as the findings and results from a series of police focused experiments, compose the foundations of community policing. The concept of community policing is often traced back to Sir Robert Peel, the chief architect of the 1829 Metropolitan Police Act<sup>72</sup> that provided Nine Principles of Policing<sup>73</sup> (see Appendix), which included advocating for a strong relationship between the police and the public. The term community policing was not widely used until 150 years after Peel wrote his Principles of Policing. During the 1970s and early 1980s, community policing strategies were being developed and employed in an attempt to improve policing and establish a more effective and

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<sup>70</sup> Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1994, p. vii

<sup>71</sup> Haberfeld, 2002, p. 159

<sup>72</sup> JSTOR: 1829 Metropolitan Police Act. <http://www.jstor.org/>

<sup>73</sup> Reith, 1948

appropriate approach of policing.<sup>74</sup> Although there is no universal definition of community policing, Haberfeld (2002) provides 12 points that will be examined as a foundation for COP. The following are the 12 points of the Community Oriented Policing and Problem Solving philosophy illustrated by Haberfeld (2002):

1. *Reassess who is responsible for public safety and redefines the roles and relationships between the police and the community*
2. *Requires shared ownership, decision making, and accountability as well as sustained commitment from both the police and the community*
3. *Establishes new police expectations of and measurement standards for police effectiveness*
4. *Increases understanding and trust between police and community members*
5. *Supports community initiative by supplying community members with necessary information and skills, reinforcing their courage and strength, and ensuring them the influence to affect policies and share accountability for outcomes*
6. *Requires constant flexibility to respond to all emerging issues*
7. *Requires an ongoing commitment to develop long-term and proactive strategies and programs to address the underlying conditions that cause community problems*
8. *Requires knowledge of available community resources and how to access and mobilize them and the ability to develop new resources within the community*
9. *Requires buy-in of the top management of the police and other local government agencies as well as a sustained personal commitment from all levels of management and other key personnel*
10. *Decentralizes police services / operations / management, relaxes the traditional chain of command, and encourages innovation and creative problem solving*
11. *Shifts the focus of police work from responding to individual incidents to addressing problems identified by the community as well as by the police*
12. *Requires commitment to developing new skills through training*<sup>75</sup>

Is community policing the answer to the phenomenon of terrorism? One of the first issues that must be addressed is whether local law enforcement agencies are the appropriate agencies to respond to the threat of terrorism. Recent events in the US, such as the September 11<sup>th</sup> and Murrah Building attacks, have shown that in the event of a terrorist attack, local agencies, including police, fire and other rescue personnel, will be the first responders.

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<sup>74</sup> Skogan, 2004

<sup>75</sup> Haberfeld, 2002, pp. 160-161

*While it is true that the federal government is increasing its efforts in the area of terrorism prevention and response, a large degree of the responsibility for responding to threats of terrorism rests at the local level. Experience now tells us that the first responders to any incident will most assuredly be local police, fire and rescue personnel. Therefore, law enforcement officials must now strategically rethink public security procedures and practices in order to maximize the full potential of their resources.*<sup>76</sup>

The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) supports the concept of local law enforcement involvement in counter-terrorism strategies. In addition to law enforcement efforts to improve data and intelligence collection, increase the capacity to utilize technology, communicate with other public safety agencies, and prepare for and respond to incidents, the focus on prevention must be a primary concern. “A successful response to terrorism involves an array of activities, many of which are reliant on human intelligence gathering activities and productive partnerships between local law enforcement and other agencies.”<sup>77</sup> Although the above describe components are important to intelligence gathering, the author contends that there is no greater source of information than the community at large.

*[U]ntil we learn to police in ways that build trusting relationships with those communities where criminals or terrorists can more easily live lives insulated from observation – no amount of additional funding or legal authority, consistent with living in a free society, will increase the capacity of our police forces to gather the crime and terror related information we desperately need.*<sup>78</sup>

Community Oriented Policing (COP) has been viewed as a positive development since its inception, in which politicians, citizens, police officials, and the media promote its function and use. However, many researchers and academics often question the effectiveness and impact of the COP strategy. Criticisms, such as the lack of a universal definition and the difficulty

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<sup>76</sup> Chapman et al., 2002, p. 1

<sup>77</sup> Chapman et al., 2002, p. 1

<sup>78</sup> Lyons, 2002, p. 530

associated with testing, are frequently referenced. COP, by its very nature, must vary in its application in order to effectively respond to the needs and conditions specific to the individual community, therefore operationalization of community policing and empirical analyses of the effectiveness of its implementation across communities are problematic.

Although the effectiveness of applying COP to counter terrorism has not been empirically tested, there are two factors that may provide answers to its potential as a tool for local law enforcement. First, the way in which COP is defined may range among agencies, as well as the researcher or academic gathering the information and conducting the evaluations. It is important that the definition of COP is clearly operationalized in order to test whether its application is effective. Second, the expected results also require operationalization in order to consider the utilization of COP as effective. If a decrease in terrorism indicates COP as an effective method for the prevention and regulation of terrorism, the extent of the decrease expected to occur should be determined. If effectiveness is viewed as obtaining information or intelligence that results in the apprehension of terrorists and the prevention of terrorist attacks from occurring, then the frequency of such occurrences should be defined.

In democratic nations, the balance between security and civil rights is challenged by the phenomenon of terrorism, in that the government is required to respond. However, an excessive response may lead to increased support among the passive supporters of groups and organizations that engage in extreme violence against civilian populations. The police agencies, both local and national, are required to respond, maintaining legitimacy by following governmental policies and the rule of law. There is always the fear that law enforcement agents will take it upon themselves to “fight fire with fire” violating the laws they seek to uphold, which will ultimately delegitimize the agency and provide the terrorists with fertile ground for

recruitment and fundraising. It is only through an appropriate legitimate response by law enforcement that the agency will prevent the passive supporters, which tend to be significantly greater in number than the active supporters, from becoming active members in the terrorist organization.

Numerous recent articles have discussed the responsibility of local law enforcement or community policing in relation to the threat of terrorism.<sup>79</sup> Based on the findings of Smith et al. (2006), an extended use of community policing to address the phenomenon of terrorism may have a significant impact by helping to gather intelligence and identify individuals planning an attack. In order to be successful in conducting a terrorist attack, individuals planning an attack must keep their plans from being identified by law enforcement. A significant percentage of individuals planning a terrorist attack both reside and engage in preparatory acts in relatively close proximity to the location of the intended target. COP can potentially have a great impact by providing this information to the public, not so that they will be afraid, but so that they would be empowered and know that, as individuals in the community, they have the ability to protect themselves and their community from the threat of terrorism.

While many communities are hesitant to provide information to police about crimes in their neighborhood, for a variety of reasons, including the fear of retribution. It is far less likely that a community member will hesitate providing information about an individual planning a terrorist attack, after becoming informed that studies<sup>80</sup> have shown that a significant percentage of individuals planning a terrorist attack both reside and engage in preparatory acts in relatively

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<sup>79</sup> Pelfrey, 2005; Murray, 2005; Docobo, 2005; Scheider & Chapman, 2003; Donnermeyer, 2002; Henry, 2002; Sloan, 2002

<sup>80</sup> Smith et al. 2006, 2003

close proximity to the location of the intended target, which potentially puts the member of the community at risk.

While it is true that the federal government is increasing its efforts in the area of terrorism prevention and response, a large degree of the responsibility for responding to threats of terrorism rests at the local level. Experience now tells us that the first responders to any incident will most assuredly be local police, fire and rescue personnel. Therefore, all local law enforcement officials must now strategically rethink public security procedures and practices in order to maximize the full potential of their resources.

In the US, taking into account the economic crises that began in 2008, the issue of allocating resources towards programs such as community policing may be perceived as problematic. However, the implementation of community policing may serve to address both the needs of the agency and the community. Bittner (1990) discusses the obstacles to the advancement of new programs, such as community policing, when faced with the resource limitations due to agency needs in other areas, such as crime control, traffic and training. However, community policing has the potential to have far reaching effects that can address many of the other areas of concern for an agency. The difficulty in measuring the success of a community oriented policing strategy also limits the attractiveness of its implementation. It is often impossible to parse out the impact of such a program in relation to all the other efforts of an agency, in addition to the impact of external factors, such as economic conditions and other programs and agencies that are designed to address problems in a community.

Although the term community policing in the US has only been popular in the past few decades, the concept of community policing has its roots in the earliest forms of modern policing,

such as the Metropolitan police, which was formed as a result of the Metropolitan police Act of 1829. According to Bittner (1990), the Metropolitan Police was “a civil force seeking to attain the objectives of peace, order, and crime control in cooperation with the people” (p. 295). The duty to protect the rights, service the needs, and earn the trust of the population was imported from England to police departments in the US, such as the establishment of the municipal police in New York in 1844.

Municipal police agencies derive their authority both from the state and from the people in the community that they serve, therefore police cannot function efficiently without the support from both. According to Bittner (1990), in the 1950’s many European countries and in the US, police departments began public relations campaigns to portray themselves more positively to the communities they served. This was during a time when political propaganda and commercial advertising became professionalized and used sophisticated and technical methods, in part due to the technological advances in media utilizing television. This was also at a time in the US, during the Civil Rights Era, when the police were viewed by a significant portion of the public as corrupt and brutal. Confidence in the local law enforcement agency is integral to the functioning of the agency. Communities that do not have confidence in the police are less likely to provide information to law enforcement, without which police are less likely to be able to address the conditions in the community they serve. The public will be less likely to report criminal activity to an agency perceived as illegitimate, whether due to corruption, brutality, or incompetence.

Training is an important component that will impact the success of community policing. The officers policing an area must have some basic understanding of the culture and norms of the residents and others that are a part of the community, such as individuals that own or are

employed at local commercial or industrial establishments. Proper planning and preparation are integral to preventing poor performance. Rimmer (2008) posits that “effective and continual training of police and law enforcement officers in cultural awareness is critical to the delivery of community policing.”<sup>81</sup> Most of the western world, especially among densely populated metropolitan areas, has a diverse mixture of culture, ethnicity, and religion; therefore police need to be appropriately trained and representative of the communities they serve. In addition to the level of proper training and representativeness of the police, the other aspect of community policing that must be addressed is the extent of the involvement of the community.

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<sup>81</sup> Rimmer, 2008, p. 39

## **Avocational Policing**

Klockars (1985) discusses the concept of avocational policing, a part time, often unpaid, amateur activity. There are different types of avocational policing, including occasional avocational policing and obligatory avocational policing. In the US, historically, much of the avocational policing involved obligatory avocational policing, such as with the posse and the slave patrols in the Southern states prior to the Civil War. The posse, most commonly related to towns in the US during the expansion westward, was used to address serious criminal activity that required the assistance of the community, when the sheriff alone was not sufficient. The slave patrols in the south began in the early 1700's in South Carolina and required the cooperation of residents in forming patrols to capture runaway slaves. These slave patrol are often viewed as the predecessors to many law enforcement agencies in US, specifically in the states that supported the Confederacy during the Civil War.

With regard to occasional avocational policing, Klockars refers to several types of circumstances. One type of occasional avocational policing he discusses is self-defense, in which a member of the public may legitimately use coercive force with permission from the state, although the individual must exhaust all other reasonable options prior to the use of coercive force. In the US criminal justice system, the use of force by a civilian may result in the criminal prosecution of that individual for which that individual would need to convince a jury or judge of such an affirmative defense.

Another type of occasional avocational policing is the public reporting suspected criminal activity or suspicious activity. This type of occasional avocational policing is common, but underutilized, as much of criminal activity is not reported by the public. The successful

implementation of a community policing strategy will increase this type of occasional avocational policing, which will provide an extension of the capable guardianship that, according to RAT, will decrease the suitability of the target and decrease the prevalence of crime, including terrorism. The author proposes that occasional avocational policing is synonymous with community policing. However, in order to have the community provide appropriate assistance and participation, those members of the community must have training and education available to them so that they will be able to assist, rather than interfere, with proactive counter-terrorism on the local level.

Clutterbuck (2006) discusses the historical relationship between terrorism and modern policing, as the first organized police force in the UK in 1829 was utilized to prevent public violent public disorder and to inform the government of alleged revolutionary activities. Police were also used to counter Irish republican violence from the 1860's through the late twentieth century, when the lead responsibility for countering this violence was transferred from the Metropolitan Police Special Branch, which had this responsibility for over a hundred years, to the Security Service. As Clutterbuck (2006) notes: "from at least 1832, and indeed probably from their inception, the police began to carry out the function of gathering political intelligence..."<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Clutterbuck, 2006, p. 96

## Intelligence Led Policing

Although community policing may be an efficient model to collect intelligence useful to countering terrorism, intelligence-led policing (ILP), a term originating in the United Kingdom's Kent and Northumbria Constabularies<sup>83</sup>, may be a necessary model to apply to provide a structure through which the intelligence can be stored and disseminated. Both ILP and community policing depend on two way communication, although ILP is centralized, while community policing is decentralized. Again, as with many of the other concepts previously discussed, there does not appear to be a commonly accepted definition of ILP.<sup>84</sup> Although ILP was designed for use with crimes involving theft, recent studies suggest that the model can be applied to terrorism. The McGarrell, Freilich & Chermak (2007) study promotes the use of ILP model to respond to terrorism. The McGarrell et al. (2007) study reflects on the impact of ILP on the arrests subsequent to both the London and Madrid bombings.

*The arrests following the London subway and the Madrid train bombings, for instance, suggest that intelligence gathered from multiple sources, including surveillance cameras, community informants, and prison officials, was instrumental in postevent investigations. Recent arrests of suspected suspects terrorists in the United States (Florida), Canada, and Britain suggest that intelligence may be able to identify terrorist groups and allow for intervention prior to an attack. This is consistent with reports from countries, such as Israel, with long experience in combating terrorism.*<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> McGarrell, Freilich & Chermak, 2007, p.144

<sup>84</sup> Maguire & John, 2006; BJA, 2005a, 2005b; McGarrell, Freilich & Chermak, 2007

<sup>85</sup> McGarrell, Freilich & Chermak, 2007, p.147

## Humiliation

Both Stern (2003) and Juergensmeyer (2000) discuss the impact of humiliation on individuals and groups involved in terrorism. Stern states that the “perceived national humiliation of the Palestinian people by Israeli policies, and often by Israeli individuals, has given rise to desperation and uncontrollable rage.”<sup>86</sup> This humiliation can be expressed in terrorist attacks, which can lead to a cycle of violence or atrocities by both sides of a conflict. Juergensmeyer posits that “both religion and violence are seen as antidotes to humiliation.”<sup>87</sup> Juergensmeyer further states:

*Most important is the intimacy with which the humiliation is experienced and the degree to which it is regarded as a threat to one’s personal honor and respectability. These can create the conditions for a desperate need for empowerment, which, when no other options appear to be open, are symbolically and violently expressed.*<sup>88</sup>

Jones (2008) cites several authors (Abi-Hashem, 2004; Davis, 2003; Hassan, 2001; Khosrokhavar, 2005) to support the concept that humiliation is one of the most frequently cited root causes that lead to fundamentalism among Arab populations. Among Arabs and Muslims worldwide, the pictures that depict the destruction of Palestinian homes or torture of prisoners in Abu Ghirab further invoke feelings of humiliation. Jones (2008) notes that psychological research suggests a link between shame or humiliation and violence, therefore religion “can contribute to terrorism by creating and/or reinforcing and potentiating feelings of shame and humiliation, which in turn increase the likelihood of violent outbursts.”<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Stern, 2003, p. 32

<sup>87</sup> Juergensmeyer, 2000, p. 190

<sup>88</sup> Juergensmeyer, 2000, p. 198

<sup>89</sup> Jones, 2008, p. 37

Other than Arab or Muslim communities, how does humiliation relate to community policing in the US? Humiliation that leads to violence is not exclusive to Arabs or Muslims. In many high-crime, low socio-economic areas there tends to be a strained relationship between the police and the community, sometimes described as an “us versus them” type of relationship. This type of relationship, due to its implicit power differential – police over the community, may lead to feelings of humiliation on the part of the community. Furthermore, this type of relationship does not provide the type of atmosphere conducive to community policing. The implementation of effective community policing can have a great impact on the perception of the police by the community, thereby decreasing the level of humiliation experienced by members of the community, which creates the potential for increased discourse and cooperation. Communities that perceive themselves as marginalized by the government, local or national, are less likely to cooperate with governmental agents, especially police, who have the authority to use force against them and take away their freedom.

## War on Terrorism

Post (2007) criticizes the use of the term war to describe the interventions intended to eliminate or reduce terrorism. “Defining this as a war has had some very negative consequences. For it is not a war that can be won, any more than the war on poverty or the war on drugs can be won... Defined as a war, this struggle will never end.”<sup>90</sup> Similar to the war on poverty, drugs, or crime, a war on terrorism cannot be won. One cannot wage a war against an ideology, nor can one wage war against a tactic. If we concede that deviance is normal and that terrorism is a form of deviance, albeit an extreme form of deviance, we can conclude that terrorism is also normal and we can no more rid the world of its extreme violence than we can stop theft. Despite the Post (2007) criticism of the use of the term war in relation to terrorism, he proposes that terrorism is a form of psychological warfare and that the appropriate response is to counter psychological warfare with psychological warfare. “If one accepts the premise that terrorism is a vicious species of psychological warfare, waged through the media, with violence as communication, one does not counter psychological warfare with smart bombs or missiles. One counters psychological warfare with psychological warfare.”<sup>91</sup>

Warfare and terrorism are not congruent. In order to counter terrorism, a consensus in the international arena to eliminate terrorism as a tactic is required. Terrorism is an effective tactic of the weak against the strong, but its legitimacy is rooted in the inability of the international community to agree upon a definition of terrorism. Until the international community comes to at least a majority agreement on what terrorism is, there will never be adequate cooperation on addressing the problem of terrorism. Until the UN is able to put forth a

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<sup>90</sup> Post, 2007, p. 244

<sup>91</sup> *ibid.*, p. 245

definition that is acceptable to a majority of its member states, there is very little chance of international cooperation rising to the level necessary to effectively counter organizations that promote the use of these tactics, which are referred to as terrorism.

The United Nations (UN) has been discussing the definition of terrorism since 1972 Munich Olympics attack. The attack by Black September, a Palestinian organization, on the compound housing the Israeli Olympic athletes led to the deaths of 11 Israeli athletes, 5 members of Black September, and one German police officer.<sup>92</sup> Arguably, this incident led to the modern age of terrorism, as the media provided Black September, which was believed to be an offshoot of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), worldwide distribution of their message via television. Subsequent to the incident, the two members of Black September, who were captured during the Munich terrorist attack, were released after a staged hijacking of a German plane and went on to promote the ideology of the PLO as heroes and victorious soldiers of their war against occupation.

Counter-terrorism policies have often been reactionary, rather than proactive. Hewitt (2003) describes two dimensions of counter-terrorist policy. The first dimension is the cost of the policy, both financially and in terms of public inconvenience. The second dimension is the risk reduction effected by the policy. “The ideal policy is one which substantially reduces risk at a low economic and social cost.”<sup>93</sup> This is true with most policymakers, whose goal is to maximize gains, which would be a reduction in terrorist acts, while minimizing associated costs, such as monetary costs and negative public perception of enacted policies.

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<sup>92</sup> “At 4:30AM on September 5, 1972, five Arab terrorists wearing track suits climbed the six and 1/2 foot fence surrounding the Olympic Village in Munich, Germany. Once inside, they were met by three others who had gained entrance with credentials. Within 24 hours, 11 Israelis, five terrorists, and a German policeman were dead.” ([http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf\\_1967to1991\\_munich.php](http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_munich.php))

<sup>93</sup> Hewitt, 2003, pp. 128-129.

The current policy of the US in regards to terrorism is described in the US Department of State website. The policy in dealing with terrorists has four parts: (1) make no concessions to, and strike no deals with terrorists; (2) bring terrorists to justice for their crimes; (3) isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism; and (4) bolster the counterterrorism capabilities of countries that work with the US.<sup>94</sup> The US lists only six countries, Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria, as sponsors of terrorism, despite evidence of other countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, having involvement, either directly or indirectly through charitable organizations, with ‘terrorist’ organizations.

Pillar (2001) posits that there is no single approach that will provide an effective counterterrorist policy.<sup>95</sup> However, policies that improve intelligence are likely to provide the information necessary for intelligence agencies to react to detect, deter, and prevent future terrorist attacks. While intelligence failures that lead to the loss of life or destruction of property are easily identified, intelligence successes are often either overlooked or, for various reasons, not made public. As Pillar (2008) writes:

*In the intelligence business, failures (and apparent contradictions) make headlines, while successes generally remain secret. Failures also prompt inquiries, whereas successes go unnoticed. It is the nature of these inquiries to devise solutions to problems regardless whether they are soluble and to shift blame in order to avoid political land mines. Moreover, retrospective evaluations make events that were cloudy and ambiguous in real time seem blindingly clear in hindsight... Calling for intelligence reform serves psychological and political purposes that have nothing to do with the intelligence agencies’ successes or failures... But reforms that pander to psychological needs and political agendas encourage changes that are more disruptive than productive. Moreover, they foster falsely reassuring notions of accomplishment – as if the redrawing of the intelligence community’s organizational chart three*

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<sup>94</sup> US Department of State: *Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism*. <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/>

<sup>95</sup> Pillar, 2001, p. 29

*years ago left Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri shaking in their djellabas... Intelligence failures are inevitable. This fact, however discomfoting, flows directly from the nature of the job, which involves trying to uncover information that is extremely difficult to obtain. Intelligence officers share with debt collectors, vulture investors, and trauma surgeons the challenge of giving unpromising cases their best shot. The information they process is ambiguous and fragmentary and can be assembled in countless ways. Intelligence is called on to connect dots even though... many of the dots are missing or have no number. The principle challenge for US intelligence agencies is outsmarting adversaries who work assiduously to keep secret what the US government hopes to find out... And the difficulties mount when the intelligence service is expected... to predict almost every significant occurrence across the globe.<sup>96</sup>*

While military response can be very effective in targeting and eliminating terrorists, military action does not address the underlying causes of terrorism, nor does it provide proactive means to address terrorism. The military option is almost exclusively reactive, which does not allow for proactive operations designed to prevent terrorist attacks. The author posits that only proactive counter terrorism strategies that engage governmental as well as community resources will effectively deter and disrupt future attacks. A purely reactive strategy will lead to continued destruction and loss of life.

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<sup>96</sup> Pillar, 2008, p. 139-140

## Gaps in Literature

Existing literature has not conducted an examination of the perspectives of the police and the communities they serve the threat of terrorism and the potential impact of communication between the police and the community. The recent empirical research (Smith et al, 2006, 2008; Smith 2008) provide evidence that much of the planning that precedes a terrorist attack occurs locally. Therefore, members of a community as well as local police have the potential to significantly impact terrorism through intelligence gathering and identification of potential actors and the preparatory acts that are likely to occur prior to an attack.

However, the research hypotheses do not address rural communities. Although rural communities are an important part of the study of policing in the US, the differences among rural communities tend to be much greater than the differences among urban or suburban communities, which tend to be more heterogeneous across numerous variables, such as racial identification, socio-economic status, education, etc. In addition, suburban and urban communities will have a larger pool from which to elicit cooperation from both police and the community. Many rural local law enforcement agencies have very few full time active agents (a large percentage of local law enforcement agencies in the US have fewer than 10 full-time officers), which would be problematic in conducting the research, as a focus group will significantly reduce available manpower for those agencies. Larger communities and police agencies will provide a larger pool of participants with varied backgrounds, viewpoints and experiences.

## RESEARCH QUESTIONS & HYPOTHESES

1. **Research Question:** Is terrorism perceived as an important problem?
  - a. **Research Hypotheses #1:** The threat of terrorism is perceived as an important problem by community members and local law enforcement.
2. **Research Question:** Is the threat of terrorism perceived as a greater threat today than it was prior to the 9/11 attacks?
  - a. **Research Hypotheses #2:** Community and local law enforcement participants perceive terrorism as a greater threat today than it was prior to the 9/11 attacks.
3. **Research Question:** What is the level of involvement of the community with local law enforcement to counter terrorism?
  - a. **Research Hypotheses #3:** Community and local law enforcement participants perceive a low level of involvement of the community with local law enforcement to counter terrorism.
4. **Research Question:** What are the costs of utilizing local communities in proactive counter-terrorism responses?
  - a. **Research Hypotheses #4:** Community and local law enforcement participants perceive a low cost in utilizing local communities in proactive counter-terrorism responses.
5. **Research Question:** What is the level of danger associated with community participation in local law enforcement proactive counter-terrorism tactics?
  - a. **Research Hypotheses #5:** Community and local law enforcement participants perceive a low level of danger associated with community participation in local law enforcement proactive counter-terrorism tactics.

6. **Research Question:** How willing are community members and local law enforcement to engage each other in proactive counter-terrorism?
  - a. **Research Hypotheses #6:** Community and local law enforcement participants are willing to engage with each other in proactive counter-terrorism.
7. **Research Question:** What is the level of terrorist activity and terrorist threat in the community?
  - a. **Research Hypotheses #7:** Community and local law enforcement participants perceive a low level of terrorist activity and terrorist threat in the community.
8. **Research Question:** Is communication between the community and the local law enforcement agency an effective method to gather intelligence about local terrorist activity?
  - a. **Research Hypotheses #8:** Community and local law enforcement participants perceive communication between the community and the local law enforcement agency an effective method to gather intelligence about local terrorist activity.
9. **Research Question:** What is the level of support for the following components in the definition of terrorism:
  - a. terrorism involves the use of violence or force
  - b. terrorism is political
  - c. terrorism involves fear or an emphasis on terror
  - d. terrorism involves a threat
  - e. terrorism involves a civilian target
  - f. terrorism involves actions by non-state actors
  - g. coercion is a necessary component of terrorism
  - h. the goal of terrorism is to further ideological change

- **Research Hypotheses #9:** Community and local law enforcement participants support the above listed components in the definition of terrorism.

**10. Research Question:** In regards to the effectiveness in proactive counter-terrorism efforts, what is the level of support for the following?

- a. increase understanding and trust between local law enforcement and the community
  - b. have the community provide guidance and feedback on law enforcement policies and activities
  - c. provide the community with the necessary information and training to allow them to safely and effectively assist local law enforcement
  - d. have the community share responsibility for its safety and security
  - e. maintain active participation and cooperation from all levels of local law enforcement agency and its corresponding community
  - f. shift the focus of police work from reacting to incidents to working with the community to identify individuals in the planning and preparation stages of an attack
- **Research Hypotheses #10:** Community and local law enforcement participants support the above components as effective in proactive counter-terrorism.

## Chapter 3: Methodology & Research Design

This exploratory study focuses on the attitudes and perspectives of police and communities in relation to terrorism, the community, and the role of the uniform officer. The target populations include local police agencies and communities in the US. The study employs both qualitative and quantitative methods. The qualitative method includes conducting focus groups to collect data, while the quantitative methods include questionnaires and surveys to collect data. The use of multiple data collection techniques, or triangulation, provides for a greater understanding of the subjects, in addition to helping to overcome the weaknesses and biases associated with single-observer, single-theory studies. The study employs non-probability sampling, specifically homogeneous purposeful sampling.<sup>97</sup>

In order to obtain a powerful enough sample to avoid Type II error, the study encompasses five locations. A total of nine focus groups were conducted, comprised of five focus groups consisting of participants from local law enforcement agencies and four focus groups consisting of members of the corresponding communities for four of those agencies. Due to unforeseen circumstances, one of the communities was not included in this study. The participants in the local law enforcement focus groups were comprised of police officers that, as a part of their duties, interact regularly with the communities that they serve. The participants in the community focus groups were either residents in the community, or had some regular interaction with the community, such as being employed or owning a business in the community.

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<sup>97</sup> Eyrich-Garg, 2008

## Research Design

Through utilization of focus groups conducted in five locations in the Northeast region of the United States (US), the researcher measures and assesses the attitudes of both communities and local law enforcement towards the possibility of engagement and partnership in a proactive effort to counter terrorism on a local level. The research locations included three separate states; however, all the locations are within 100 miles of New York City. The focus groups are distinct in their composition in the following ways:

- participants in the community focus groups are all members of the same community and exclude individuals actively serving as a full-time law enforcement agent (federal, state, or municipal)
- participants in the law enforcement focus groups are all members of the same local law enforcement agency and exclude individuals not actively serving as a full-time law enforcement agent.

In this study, there was no interaction between the participants of the two types of focus groups. In addition, there was no interaction among the participants in the focus groups from the different locations, both for the law enforcement focus groups and the community focus groups. This separation was designed to avoid contamination of the views of the participants from the various groups.

## Focus Groups

The two main research paradigms, qualitative and quantitative, have numerous methods. When engaging in qualitative research there is an imperative focus on detail and description, thus in-depth discussions and observations are used when attaining knowledge regarding the phenomenon being analyzed. The intended purpose and objectives for the qualitative study being performed will determine the methods that will be used in order to achieve such goals.<sup>98</sup> The researcher may only obtain information strictly through afar observation, or the researcher may choose to interact with the particular person or group being studied through interviewing and discussion.<sup>99</sup> One technique that may be used when gathering knowledge through interviewing within a qualitative research study is the concept of focus groups.

Focus groups can be defined as a collection of individuals brought together based on some type of prerequisite or certain criteria that connects them to the phenomenon being analyzed in order to participate communally within the research study.<sup>100</sup> As Krueger & Casey (2000) wrote, a “focus group study is a carefully planned series of discussions designed to obtain perceptions on a defined area of interest in a permissive, nonthreatening environment.”<sup>101</sup> The purpose of using focus groups as a method for data collection within social research is to explore a particular phenomenon rather than describe or explain it. The individuals that make up a particular focus group may not necessarily be representative of a specific population, thus

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<sup>98</sup> Babbie, 2007

<sup>99</sup> Champion, 2006, p. 206

<sup>100</sup> Merton & Kendall, 1946; Kitzinger, 1995

<sup>101</sup> Krueger & Casey, 2000, p. 5

generalizability to a larger population based on information derived from the focus group interview may not be applied.<sup>102</sup>

Focus groups have been used by social scientists to obtain a more complete picture of the phenomenon they are studying. Kruger and Casey (2000) wrote that “the intent of focus groups is not to infer but to understand, not to generalize but to determine the range, and not to make statements about the population but to provide insights about how people in the groups perceive a situation.”<sup>103</sup> Focus groups can often produce information that is not accessible through other methods. Morgan (1997) wrote that the “hallmark of focus groups is their explicit use of group interaction to produce data and insights that would be less accessible without the interaction found in a group.”<sup>104</sup> Focus groups provide insights into group dynamics. Patton (1990) wrote “the fact of the matter is that we cannot observe everything. We cannot observe feelings, thoughts and intentions. We cannot observe behaviors that took place in some previous point in time.”<sup>105</sup> By employing focus groups, researcher may gain a greater understanding of these factors.

Morgan (1997) discusses three basic uses for focus groups in social science. First, in the self-contained method, the group discussion serves as the primary means of collecting qualitative data. The self-contained method requires careful matching of the goals of the research data with the data that the focus group can produce and emphasizes research design. Second, in the focus group as a supplemental source of data, the group discussions serve as a preliminary source of data in a primarily quantitative study. Third, in the multi-method study, the group discussion is

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<sup>102</sup> Babbie, 2007, pp. 308-309

<sup>103</sup> Krueger & Casey, 2000, p. 83

<sup>104</sup> Morgan, 1997, p. 2

<sup>105</sup> Patton, 1990, p. 278

one facet of the overall research study, which typically includes other qualitative methods, such as participant observation or individual interviews.<sup>106</sup>

The concept of applicability and relevancy is essential and must be utilized during the selection process of focus group participants, so that their involvement is appropriate as well as valuable toward the research study being conducted.<sup>107</sup> The technique of focus groups involves interaction and communication between the researcher and the group as well as different members within the group. A key principle behind this method of interviewing is to promote and support discussion among group participants in order to provide a difference in opinions and experiences pertaining to the issue or issues being researched.<sup>108</sup> The use of focus groups relies greatly on the level of group interaction, thus it is important that the individuals chosen are able to communicate effectively and comfortably amongst each other.<sup>109</sup> In order to guarantee such positive forms of communication among focus group members, Krueger (1994) promotes the use of homogenous groups, in which participants share similar characteristics, such as gender, age-range, ethnicity, as well as social background.

The Davis, LaTourrette, Mosher, Davis & Howell (2003) RAND report convened focus groups to obtain community feedback regarding individual preparedness and response strategies for catastrophic terrorist events. “The overall purpose of these focus groups was to inform the project’s recommendations for an individual’s strategy for catastrophic terrorism.”<sup>110</sup> The objective of the overall study was to provide guidance for individuals so that they will be better able to protect themselves in the event of a terrorist attack, which may involve unfamiliar

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<sup>106</sup> Morgan, 1997. pp. 2-3

<sup>107</sup> Burrows & Kendall, 1997

<sup>108</sup> Kitzinger, 1994

<sup>109</sup> Green, Draper, & Dowler, 2003

<sup>110</sup> Davis et al., 2003, p. 143.

hazardous conditions – such as with CBRN attacks. The focus groups had three phases. The first phase focused on general risk perceptions, which had participants identify and rate risks. The second phase elicited feedback on specific terrorist scenarios with regard to how the participants would react. The third phase elicited feedback on preparedness and communication.

There is no universally accepted minimum or maximum number of participants required within a focus group, and the range varies depending on the researcher and the conducted study. According to Babbie (2007), focus groups usually consist of twelve to fifteen people, with no less than seven, while Krueger & Casey (2000) posit that smaller groups show greater results and suggest between six and eight total participants within a focus group in order to receive the most effective data. The differences in size may also relate to the function of the focus group. Marketing focus groups tend to utilize a larger number of participants than social science focus groups. Small homogeneous focus groups, comprised of four to eight members, will allow participants to be more comfortable about discussing their thoughts, which is of great importance in dealing with police officers, who are often loathe to share their innermost thoughts with individuals outside the profession.

A frequent debate among researchers is whether pre-existing relationships among individuals participating in a focus group will have a significant impact on the ability of a researcher to obtain thorough and accurate information. According to Thomas, MacMillan, McColl, Hale, and Bond (1995), conducting a focus group in which the participants have no pre-existing relationships reduces the possibility of certain adverse group behaviors, such as an influence among opinions or threats of coercion toward certain responses. Unfamiliarity among focus group members provides the opportunity for participants to respond more honestly and

express themselves more freely, which in turn may create a wider range of responses and information for the researcher.<sup>111</sup>

However, pre-existing relationships among focus group members may also be beneficial in that participants can relate to one another, as well as feel more comfortable in questioning each other's responses or challenging opposing opinions. The local law enforcement focus groups are likely to involve participants with pre-existing relationships, especially among the smaller departments; conversely, the community focus groups are less likely to involve participants with pre-existing relationships. In situations where sensitive or personal issues are being discussed, which is probable in the discussion of terrorism due to the inclusion of law enforcement and the proximity of the locality of the focus groups to the attacks of 9/11, familiarity amongst participants may also make responding to questions and engaging in conversations easier, by providing a more accepting and/or supportive environment.<sup>112</sup>

The role of the researcher or interviewer greatly impacts the overall environment of a focus group and the level of comfort participants feel while engaging in the research study, regardless of pre-existing relationships among focus group participants. Through skillful management and organization, the researcher, or individual conducting the interview, can help decrease feelings of uneasiness and discomfort among participants, in order to create a more relaxed environment. The researcher or interviewer has the ability to encourage participants within a focus group to freely express their thoughts and opinions on the issues being questioned and to engage in more in-depth discussions amongst one another if such opportunity arises.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> Thomas, MacMillan, McColl, Hale & Bond, 1995

<sup>112</sup> Kitzinger, 1994

<sup>113</sup> Burrows & Kendall, 1997

Utilizing multiple means of recording data during focus groups, such as the use of a secondary observer, provides greater reliability of the data collected. The presence of a secondary observer to record information provided by the participants in a focus group may be beneficial by providing the primary observer the ability to compare notes, which would serve to further validate the observations. In addition, the secondary observer provides the opportunity to exchange ideas and thoughts on the information obtained from the perspective of another individual present during the focus group. The secondary observer decreases the probability that important information or relevant details will be omitted. The secondary observer may provide information, such as non-verbal interaction among group members, which escaped the primary researcher, which could contribute significantly to the research conclusions.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> Kitzinger, 1995

## Focus Group Advantages

There are several advantages to utilizing focus groups for qualitative research. As Morgan (1997) wrote, “[t]he main advantage of focus groups in comparison to participant observation is the opportunity to observe a large amount of interaction on a topic in a limited period of time based on the researcher’s ability to assemble and direct the focus group sessions.”<sup>115</sup> Focus groups capture real-life data within a social environment, are relatively low in cost to conduct, thus making them ideal for studies with a rather low budget, and provide a great deal of flexibility for researchers, especially with the use of open-ended questions, which provide the opportunity for in-depth discussions and the exchange of thoughts and opinions. Another advantage the use of focus groups offers is providing high face validity.<sup>116</sup> Face validity does not depend on any established support, rather whether it appears to measure what it intends to measure, thus the technique of focus groups in order to obtain information regarding a particular phenomenon seems like a reasonable method in order to achieve the results being sought.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> Morgan, 1997. p. 8

<sup>116</sup> Krueger, 1988

<sup>117</sup> Babbie, 2007

## Focus Group Disadvantages

In comparison to naturalistic observation, which provides the ability to collect data on a large range of behaviors, a greater variety of interaction with participants, and a more open discussion of the research topic, the use of focus groups has several disadvantages. Focus groups are generally limited to verbal behavior, consist only of interaction in discussion groups, and are artificially created and managed by the researcher or interviewer.<sup>118</sup> Focus groups, when compared to individual interviews, lack the level of control the researcher has over the process, due to the greater number of participants, which is necessary to effectively conduct focus groups, as the interaction between participants is an integral part of the process.

The researcher conducting the groups must employ certain skills, such as management and control of the dynamic of the group. In addition, the researcher conducting the focus group must provide all subjects within the group the opportunity to express ideas, feelings, and experiences about the issues being discussed. A disadvantage in conducting focus groups for qualitative research is the difficulty associated with providing a universally conducive setting. Assembling groups in order to conduct interviews can also be rather challenging and the differences between groups can be problematic. Finding the appropriate individuals to participate within a study may be difficult due to the importance of relevancy such individuals must have toward the phenomenon being studied. Furthermore, the large range of opinions and information that is collected from groups may be difficult to compare to one another.<sup>119</sup> The use of questionnaires to vet the candidates may be a useful tool; however, this process may also compromise the ability of the researcher to have sufficient participants to conduct the research.

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<sup>118</sup> Morgan, 1997. p. 8

<sup>119</sup> Krueger, 1988

Another disadvantage of utilizing focus groups for qualitative research is the difficulty associated with analyzing the data collected. Focus groups have the potential to produce a large amount of information within a relatively short period of time, in which a range of ideas and feelings may be presented on a certain topic. Since the technique of focus groups requires participants to discuss or respond to the same issue or question at the same time, contradicting opinions may often occur, as well as rather detailed and profuse replies.<sup>120</sup> Due to such possibilities, accurately obtaining all of the information that is produced throughout a conducted focus group interview can be rather difficult. In order to analyze the findings to determine results or establish conclusions from the research study, it is essential that all of the information attained has a high level of precision. However, some individuals may refuse to participate in a focus group that involves the use of an electronic recording device, such as audio or video. This is even more likely among public officials that have a high level of accountability, such as law enforcement. Not having the availability of a device that can record the entirety of the discussions held during a focus group diminishes the precision of the information attained, which could compromise the validity of the conclusions.

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<sup>120</sup> Krueger & Casey, 2000

## Procedures

The researcher contacted numerous local law enforcement agencies in the Northeastern region of the US, providing a summary of the goals and methods of the research. . Many of the agencies contacted initially agreed to participate, via communication with a representative of the agency; however a number of these agencies later declined to participate in the research. Potential participants were provided with information regarding the purpose of the study and were asked to volunteer for participation in the study. Subsequent to agreeing to participate, the subjects were asked to fill out a questionnaire and an exit survey as a part of the research. The questionnaires (see Appendix K & L), which primarily examined demographic information, were provided prior to the researcher conducting the focus group, while the surveys were provided subsequent to the focus groups. The exit surveys (see Appendix M & N) consist of questions that relate directly to the research questions and hypotheses (pp. 54-56). All participants were informed during the introduction provided by the researcher that they have no obligation to participate in the study and that participation in the study will have no impact on their relationship with John Jay College of Criminal Justice, the institution providing Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval for the research project. In addition, participants were informed that they may cease their involvement at any time during the study with no negative repercussions.

## Sample

The sample was a purposeful non-probability sample. The participants were comprised of two distinct groups; local law enforcement officers and members of the community served by the participating local law enforcement agencies. The sample was drawn from communities in the Northeast region of the US due to time and resource limitations and included locations in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut. The researcher first contacted local law enforcement agencies to obtain permission to conduct research with the agency. After obtaining permission from the agency, the researcher solicited participation from the members of the local law enforcement agency. At the time of the focus groups, all participants were literate, over the age of 18, and were required to fill out a questionnaire prior to engaging in the focus groups to confirm each participant's eligibility to participate.

Participants in the local law enforcement focus groups, at the time of the focus groups, were employed as full-time law enforcement officers that, as part of their position, interacted with the public on a regular basis. Subsequent to obtaining voluntary cooperation and participation from a local law enforcement agency, the researcher solicited and obtained participation from members of the local community from the matching jurisdiction. All participants in the community focus groups, at the time of the focus groups lived, worked, or had some other regular interaction in the target community.

## Questionnaire

The questionnaire, which was distributed prior to the start of the focus groups, provided demographic information of the subjects, including age, racial self-identification, education, and household income level. In addition, the questionnaire was employed to exclude volunteers that were not appropriate subjects for this study. The volunteer local law enforcement agents were required to be active full-time members of the participating agency. The community participants were required to have lived, worked, or had some other regular interaction in the target community that is served by the participating local law enforcement agency involved. The questionnaires for the local law enforcement agents and the members of the community are included in the appendix. No subjects were excluded as a result of their answers on the questionnaires.

## Survey

The survey was distributed subsequent to the completion of the focus groups. The survey elicited further information on the perspective of the subjects. The survey provided Likert scale questions related to the empirical questions and research hypotheses (see above). The surveys were distributed subsequent to the completion of the focus groups. The survey and the questionnaire will have identification numbers that will be linked to provide for statistical analyses. The surveys were nearly identical for the two types of focus groups, local law enforcement agents and members of the community. Only one participant ended participation prior to the exit survey. The survey for the local law enforcement agents and the survey for members of the community are included in the appendix. No subjects were excluded as a result of their answers on the questionnaires.

## **Confidentiality and Anonymity**

All participants were informed that the information obtained during the focus group would be kept confidential and that records from the focus groups, the questionnaires, surveys, and audio recordings, would be destroyed after completion of the statistical analyses that would be conducted after completion of the data collection process. Neither the questionnaire nor the survey collect the name or specific identifying information of the subject, however there is an identification number assigned to both the surveys and questionnaires in order to utilize them for statistical analyses. The completed questionnaires and the surveys were kept locked in the office of the researcher, which is not accessible to the public. All identifying information was coded to preserve the anonymity of the participants and the original questionnaires, surveys, and audio recordings of the focus groups were destroyed. All research assistants signed a letter of confidentiality in regards to their involvement in the research.

## **Potential Harms & Benefits**

There was no risk of harm to the subjects. The identity of all participants remains confidential. All questionnaires and surveys were destroyed subsequent to coding. The benefit to the subjects in this research is that the subjects may now have a greater understanding of terrorism and may be more inclined to promote the concept of participation and partnership between community members and local law enforcement in a proactive approach to counter terrorism. None of the participants appeared to suffer any harm as a result of their participation in this research.

## **Debriefing**

There was no deception employed in this research and, therefore, there was no need for debriefing of the subjects. This research did not reveal any medical or other potentially troubling condition for any of the participants. None of the volunteers complained of any negative impact as a result of participation in the research.

## Chapter 4: Findings

The communities in which the research was conducted varied in terms of the racial, socio-economic, and geographic composition. The research was conducted at five locations over three states in the Northeast region of the United States, including communities in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. None of the communities were more than about an hour and a half (with normal traffic) drive from New York City. In the participating communities examined, the number of full-time law enforcement agents varied, from approximately 50 officers for the smallest department to over 500 for the largest department, with the three other departments ranging from the 80's through the low 100's. As per the confidentiality agreement Between the researcher and the participating law enforcement agencies, the names of the communities and their law enforcement agencies are withheld.

There were a total of 52 participants in this study, with 22 community participants and 30 local law enforcement participants. The community member focus groups ranged in participants from a low of four to a high of eight. The local law enforcement focus groups ranged in participants from a low of four to a high of seven. The length of the focus groups ranged from a low of approximately 50 minutes to a high of approximately one hour and 45 minutes. Among the nine focus groups conducted, the composition of each group varied, from focus groups that were racially homogeneous (one focus group consisted of all White male participants from 39 to 59 years old with an average age of about 47, while another consisted of all Black participants – with only one woman) to heterogeneous (a few focus groups had participants of varied racial self-identification, sex, and socio-economic status). For a relatively small population, the participants represented a fair range of diversity.

## Statistical Analysis

A triangulation of methods was employed to examine the ten hypotheses presented in Chapter 3 (pp. 64-65). Specifically, descriptive statistical analysis was conducted utilizing SPSS to analyze data from surveys and questionnaires. In addition, a qualitative analysis of transcripts from focus groups was used to provide further insight into the examination of the hypotheses. Due to the relatively small number of subjects (total participants, N=52), which include two subgroups (community participants, 42.3%, N=22; local law enforcement participants, 57.7%, N=30), there are limitations to the types of statistical analyses that may be conducted. Although most of the statistical analyses employed were descriptive, providing the total number of participants (N), the mean, and the standard deviation (SD), there were additional analyses conducted, described below.

The surveys administered to the focus group participants employed a Likert-type ordinal scale that imitates an interval scale, allowing for the use of t-tests to compare the means for the two groups. Although t-tests are generally used to compare means for interval level measurements, such procedures were found to be appropriate for the examination of ordinal scale variables under the assumption that such scales imitate interval level measures because the variables are measured using a Likert-type scale with categories representing equivalent intervals.<sup>121</sup> Tables depicting the mean and standard deviation (SD) for each component, for the community, law enforcement, and combined community and law enforcement participants, can be found in the appendix (Appendix J, K, L, and M).

The Likert-type scale provided the following choices: a → strongly disagree; b → disagree; c → neither agree nor disagree; d → agree; and e → strongly agree. The letter

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<sup>121</sup> Kalton, 1993; Kiecolt & Nathan, 1985

responses were coded as numerical values as follows: a = 1; b = 2; c = 3; d = 4; and d = 5. The possible range for the means for the hypotheses ranged from a minimum value of 1, which designates that the participants strongly disagree with the survey statement, to a maximum value of 5, which designates that the participants strongly agree with the survey statement. As the means approaches a value of 3, there is evidence that participants have a neutral view of the survey statement.


The participants ranged in age from 21 years old to 82 years old, with an average age of 47 (N = 52, Mean = 47.19, SD = 14.05). The average age of the community participants (N = 22, Mean = 56.5, SD = 15.4) is higher than the average age of local law enforcement participants (N = 30, Mean = 40.37, SD = 7.85). The mean difference (16.13 years) in the age between community and local law enforcement participants was found to be significant ( $p < 0.001$ ,  $t = 4.503$ ), which is in part due to the existence of mandatory retirement (which tends to be in the early 60's) for most law enforcement agents.

Of the five self-identification race categories (Black, White, Hispanic, Asian, and other) all five categories were represented. The vast majority of the participants self-identify as either Black or White (42 of total respondents; N = 50). Among the 20 community participants who answered the race self-identification, 18 participants (90%) responded either Black or White. Among the 29 local law enforcement participants who answered the race self-identification, 24 participants (80%) responded either Black or White. Pie charts that provide an illustration of the racial distribution among the participants in the study, for the total, community and local law enforcement participants are provided in Appendix N.

## Research Hypothesis #1

Research Hypothesis #1 states the threat of terrorism is perceived as an important problem by community members and local law enforcement. To measure this hypothesis, both qualitative and quantitative, a Likert-type ordinal measure (discussed above), is utilized for the following statement: “Terrorism is an important problem for society”. The vast majority (86%) of participants either agree (25%, N = 13) or strongly agree (61%, N = 21) with the above statement. Only a small minority of participants (10%, N = 5) responded negatively, either disagree (0%, N = 0) or strongly disagree (10%, N = 5). In addition a small minority of participants responded neutrally, neither agree nor disagree (4%, N = 2).

**Chart 1.1: Frequency of All Participant Responses for Research Hypothesis #1**



There was support for Research Hypothesis #1 for the total population (N = 51, Mean = 4.27, SD = 1.218). The agreement was higher among local law enforcement participants ((N = 29, Mean = 4.52, SD = 0.871) than community participants (N = 22, Mean = 3.95, SD = 1.527). However, an independent sample t-test of the means between community and local law enforcement participants found non-significant results (means difference = 0.57), and thus we fail to reject Research Hypothesis #1.

**Table 1: Threat of Terrorism Important Problem**

<i>t = -(1.548)</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
<b>Community</b>	22	3.95	1.527
<b>Local Law Enforcement</b>	29	4.52	0.871
<b>Total</b>	51	4.27	1.218

In addition to the quantitative support for the hypothesis, there is qualitative support provided by the focus groups conducted. Among law enforcement focus groups, one participant stated that “[terrorists] want to destroy us” (Law Enforcement Focus Group (LEFG) A, P #5). Another participant argued that “Al Qaeda wants to take over a rural school... and kill all the kids” (LEFG A, P #1). There was an inordinate focus on the foreign threat from Islamic fundamentalists, but there were also participants that mentioned domestic events, such as the Oklahoma City Murrah building bombing and the Atlanta Olympics bombing, as well as acts by environmentalists and abortion activists. Some law enforcement participants did not believe that terrorism was a problem before 9/11. “[Terrorism] wasn’t [a problem] until 9/11” (LEFG A, P #1). “Obviously, terrorism has been something on our minds since 9/11” (LEFG E, P #5). There were those that did not feel that law enforcement is doing enough in regards to the threat of terrorism. “I don’t think [terrorism is] something that’s really addressed” (LEFG B, P #5).


Some participants discussed the environmental factors that allow terrorist activity to go undetected. “We are multicultural. We have mosque here. I don’t want to sound offensive; we do have a lackadaisical approach here as far as terrorism. I’m not saying this is ideal place to launch an attack or do anything. This is a place where they could blend in” (LEFG B, P #1). However, other participants acknowledged that the threat of terrorism does not have a specific origin. “There is a threat because the goal of terrorism is to bring terror into the community. The threat can come from within the community or outside the community” (LEFG E, P #1).

One issue with the statement, “terrorism is an important problem in society”, is that some may conflate terrorism with other criminal activity, such as gang activity – which was mentioned with great frequency in some of the focus groups, both by local law enforcement and community participants. One community participant stated “terrorism is a problem in any community” (CFG E, P #1), but it was unclear whether the participant was referring to the gang activity that was also part of the discussion. Furthermore, this participant was part of a community organization specifically focused on reducing gang violence in the community. As mentioned in Chapter 2 on the definition of terrorism (pp. 9 -18), the continuing disagreement as to what should be the definition of terrorism leads to individuals making statements that are not necessarily representative of their perspective. However, this participant could have simply been saying that the threat of terrorism is real for all communities.

## Research Hypothesis #2

Research Hypothesis #2 states both the community and local law enforcement perceive terrorism as a greater threat today than it was prior to the 9/11 attacks. To measure this hypothesis, both qualitative and quantitative measures are utilized for the following survey statement: “The threat of terrorism is significantly greater today than it was before the 9/11 attacks”. To measure this hypothesis, both qualitative and quantitative measures are utilized for the following statement: Terrorism is an important problem for society. The large majority of participants (67%, N = 35) responded positively to the above statement, either agree (27%, N = 14) or strongly agree (41%, N = 21) with Research Hypothesis #2. A minority (14%, N = 7) of participants responded negatively, either disagree (10%, N = 5) or strongly disagree (4%, N = 2). In addition, a minority of participants responded neutrally, neither agree nor disagree (18%, N = 9).

**Chart 2.1: Frequency of All Participant Responses for Research Hypothesis #2**



There was support for Research Hypothesis #2, both the community and local law enforcement perceive terrorism as a greater threat today than it was prior to the 9/11 attacks, for the total population (N = 51, Mean = 3.92). The agreement with the survey statement was almost identical among local law enforcement participants (N = 29, Mean = 3.93) and community participants (N = 22, Mean = 3.91). An independent sample t-test of the means between community and local law enforcement participants found non-significant results, and thus we fail to reject Research Hypothesis #2.

**Table 2: Terrorism is a Greater Threat Today than Prior to 9/11**


t = -(0.063)	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
<b>Community</b>	22	3.91	1.377
<b>Local Law Enforcement</b>	29	3.93	0.998
<b>Total</b>	51	3.92	1.163

In addition to the quantitative support for the hypothesis, there is qualitative support from the focus groups conducted. Among the statements of support for this hypothesis are the following: “[Terrorism] wasn’t [an important problem] until 9/11” (LEFG A, P #1); “The scale [changed the perceived threat of terrorism]. So many people died [in 9/11]” (LEFG A, P #2); “[The 9/11 attacks were] on TV. So many people die in car crashes every day, but because it was one event in which so many people died” (LEFG A, P #5); “During one of the last counterterrorism classes I took, someone said that Al Qaeda wants to take over a rural school, like in [neighboring community] where there are few police and there would be a slower response, and kill all the kids. Cops are encouraged to always carry their guns because you never know what’s going to happen” (LEFG A, P #1).

### Research Hypothesis #3


Research Hypothesis #3 states both the community and local law enforcement perceive a low level of involvement of the community with local law enforcement to counter terrorism. To measure this hypothesis, both qualitative and quantitative measures are utilized for the following statement: “members of [my community / the community you serve] are highly involved in local law enforcement proactive counter-terrorism tactics [proactive counter-terrorism tactics = activity designed to prevent terrorism by intervening prior to an attack, not subsequent to an attack]”. A majority of participants (60%, N = 30) responded negatively to the survey statement, either disagree (29%, N = 15) or strongly disagree (31%, N = 16) with the above statement. A substantial minority of participants responded neutrally, neither agree nor disagree (28%, N = 14). In addition, a minority (12%) of participants responded positively, either agree (10%, N = 5) or strongly agree (2%, N = 1).

**Chart 3.1: Frequency of Participants (N = 51) Responses for Research Question #3**




Half of community participants responded neither agree nor disagree (50%, N = 11) with the above statement. A substantial minority (32%, N = 7) responded negatively to the survey statement, either disagree (18%, N = 4) or strongly disagree (14%, N = 3). In addition, a minority (18%, N = 4) of participants responded positively, either agree (14%, N = 3) or strongly agree (4%, N = 1). This was one of the more convoluted statements provided on the survey, which may account, in part, for the high number of community participants who responded neither agree nor disagree. Another contributing factor may be the limited knowledge of community engagement with the police in proactive counter-terrorism tactics. The research recognized that this statement may be problematic for the community participants. Therefore, the bracketed explanation was added prior to the initiation of data collection. However, the amended statement may have still been somewhat confusing to community participants.

**Chart 3.2: Frequency of Community (N = 22) Responses for Research Question #3**



The overwhelming majority of local law enforcement participants (83%, N = 24) responded negatively, either disagree (38%, N = 11) or strongly disagree (45%, N = 13) with the survey statement, while only a small minority of local law enforcement participants (10%, N = 3) responded neutrally, neither agree nor disagree. A very small minority of local law enforcement participants responded positively, agree (7%, N = 2) or strongly agree (0%, N = 0). As with some of the other statements that examine the existing relationship between the local law enforcement agency and the corresponding community, the local law enforcement agents are more likely to have information regarding the policies and programs in existence. This would account for the small minority that responded neither agree nor disagree. The overwhelming majority of local law enforcement participants who responded negatively to the statement provide evidence that the involvement of the local community in proactive counter-terrorism tactics is greatly underutilized.

**Chart 3.3: Frequency of Law Enforcement (N = 29) Responses for Research Question #3**



There was support for Research Hypothesis #3 for the total population (N = 51, Mean = 2.22, SD = 1.064). This hypothesis is supported for both community participants (N = 22, Mean = 2.77, SD = 1.02) and local law enforcement (LLE) participants (N = 29, Mean = 1.79, SD = 0.902). Participants tended to disagree with this statement, which is consistent with the hypothesis. An independent sample t-test provided evidence of a significant difference in the means (mean difference = 0.98) between community and local law enforcement participants ( $p < 0.01$ ,  $t = 3.631$ ). The significance in the mean difference may be attributable to the local law enforcement participants' preexisting knowledge of programs and policies involving community engagement, as discussed above.

**Table 3: High community involvement in counter-terrorism**

$t = - (3.631) **$	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
<b>Community</b>	22	2.77	1.02
<b>Local Law Enforcement</b>	29	1.79	0.902
<b>Total</b>	51	2.22	1.064
** $p < 0.01$			

In addition to the quantitative support for the hypothesis, there is qualitative support from the focus groups conducted. Law enforcement participants perceive a low community involvement in proactive counter-terrorism. One participant discusses the changes required prior to involving the community in proactive counter-terrorism tactics: “There is no training that deals with terrorism or community policing. It’s something we haven’t adopted yet. Certainly at the foundational level, developing communication, directed communication, through a neighborhood and meeting their own quality of life needs has to be established and that conduit developed before a training process goes back into the community. The first step is to establish

communication. Once you develop good communication with that group, you can then provide training” (LEFG A, P #7). This statement also supports Research Hypothesis #8, which addresses communication as an integral part of intelligence gathering regarding local terrorist activity.


Some community members may have conflated willingness to engage in proactive counter-terrorism with actual participation. As one community participant stated: “I’ve had no occasion to observe anything, but if I had, I would call the police” (CFG C, P #4). This could be one justification for the significant difference in the means between the local law enforcement and community participants.

There was some question as to what the participation by community would entail, as noted by one community participant: “When I think of terrorism, I think of something done by strangers ... in fact I think that’s one reason why it’s terrorism, rather than just street crime ... so, I don’t think things like what [Participant #2] is talking about would apply to having local people reporting suspected terrorists. I think it’s probably pretty safe to have the community looking out for things, but I’m not sure, other than a strange or unknown person, and unexplained behavior, it would be rather difficult ... everyone will help you, but what are they helping you do, what are you asking them to do?” (CFG C, P #1).

#### Research Hypothesis #4

Research Hypothesis #4 states that participants perceive the costs of utilizing local communities in proactive counter-terrorism responses as low. To measure this hypothesis, both qualitative and quantitative measures are utilized for the following statement: “The costs of utilizing local communities in proactive counter-terrorism responses are low”. There is a wide distribution of responses by participants to the above statement. The greatest frequency among the participants was disagree (31%, N = 16), followed by agree (27%, N = 14), neither agree nor disagree (22%, N = 11), and, in a tie for least frequent, strongly agree (10%, N = 5) and strongly disagree (10%, N = 5). The statement provided may have been unclear to participants, as the term cost was not operationalized for participants. During focus group discussion, the researcher encouraged participants to free associate to the concept of cost to provide a broader range of qualitative responses, which may have further confounded the responses to the survey statement.

**Chart 4.1: Frequency of All Participant Responses for Research Hypothesis #4**



Research Hypothesis #4 is not supported by the total population (N = 51, Mean = 2.96, SD = 1.183), as the mean is close to 3, which indicates neutrality to the survey statement by the participants. Community participants are marginally supportive of this hypothesis (N = 22, Mean = 3.14, SD = 1.082), while local law enforcement participants are marginally opposed (N = 29, Mean = 2.83, SD = 1.256). The means for this statement provides evidence that there is neither substantial support nor opposition to the survey statement; therefore the researcher rejects Research Hypothesis #4, which was in agreement with the survey statement. In addition, an independent sample t-test of the means between community and local law enforcement participants found non-significant results.

**Table 4: The Costs of Utilizing the Community in Counter Terrorism is Low**

<b>t = 0.922</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>
<b>Community</b>	22	3.14	1.082
<b>Local Law Enforcement</b>	29	2.83	1.256
<b>Total</b>	51	2.96	1.183

In addition to the quantitative analysis, there is also qualitative evidence provided by the focus groups conducted that would support a rejection of Research Hypothesis #4. One issue discussed, which overlaps with Research Hypothesis #5, is the potential repercussions or reprisals for providing information to local law enforcement. As one local law enforcement participant notes: “Their neighbors could retaliate for giving information to the police” (LEFG A, P #6). “Reprisals [are a cost of utilizing local communities in proactive counter terrorism responses]” (CFG B, P #2). “You cannot force anybody to say anything. You can encourage them, but I just don’t see it happening because people are so scared because there’s going to be a

repercussion against them” (LEFG C, P #3). “Nobody is going to talk to you if they think that their name will be involved or their family will be harmed in some way” (LEFG E, P #1).


Some local law enforcement participants mentioned the monetary costs associated with counter-terrorism, such as the cost of providing overtime. Agencies that have limited manpower may need to have their officers work additional hours to be able to address the normal police functions in addition to addressing the phenomenon of terrorism. “The overtime costs associated with community policing” (LEFG A, P #8). “[In dealing with the costs,] It’s a lesser of two evils. Do you want another twin towers and have three thousand people die or do you want say there’s something suspicious with your neighbors? I’m sure there is no easy answer. Like in big cities, with gangs – do you want to have kids keep dying or do you want to go to the police?” (LEFG A, P #4).

One issue presented by law enforcement participants is the potential for overreaction by the community if they were to become involved in proactive counter-terrorism. “[The community would] call up on every little thing. A homeless person might leave a bag somewhere. Eventually that died down, but they’d be outside with their binoculars looking” (LEFG D, P #5). “[The community will] see Al Qaeda in every tree” (LEFG D, P#3). Another issue presented by law enforcement participants is the dissemination of methods and tactics may provide terrorists with information that could be used against them. “The more [terrorists] know about how we do things, the easier it is [for them to execute an attack]” (LEFG D, P #4).

### Research Hypothesis #5

Research Hypothesis #5 states that both the community and local law enforcement perceive a low level of danger associated with community participation in local law enforcement proactive counter-terrorism tactics. To measure this hypothesis, both qualitative and quantitative measures are utilized for the following statement: “It is dangerous for members of the community to engage with local law enforcement to counter terrorism”. Among all participants, the majority (66%, N = 32) responded either disagree (50%, N = 24) or strongly disagree (16%, N = 8) with the above statement, while only a minority (22%, N = 12) responded either agree (16%, N = 9) or strongly agree (6%, N = 3). In addition, a minority of participants (12%, N = 6) responded neither agree nor disagree. Negative responses are supportive of the hypothesis.

**Chart 5: Frequency of All Participant Responses for Research Hypothesis #5**



Research Hypothesis #5 is marginally supported for the total population (N = 50, Mean = 2.5, SD = 1.147), as the participants tend to provide negative responses that are supportive of the hypothesis. The disagreement was slightly higher among community participants (N = 21, Mean = 2.38, SD = 1.071) than local law enforcement participants (N = 29, Mean = 2.59, SD = 1.211). However, an independent sample t-test of the means between community and local law enforcement participants found non-significant results.

**Table 5: Dangerous for Community to Engage in Counter-Terrorism**

$t = - (0.62)$	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
<b>Community</b>	21	2.38	1.071
<b>Local Law Enforcement</b>	29	2.59	1.211
<b>Total</b>	50	2.5	1.147

An overwhelming majority of community participants (71.4%, N = 15) responded negatively to the survey statement, either disagree or strongly disagree that it is dangerous for members of the community to engage with local law enforcement to counter terrorism, while only a minority (19.1%, N = 4) responded positively, either agree or strongly agree. The majority of local law enforcement participants (58.6%, N = 17) responded negatively, either disagree or strongly disagree that it is dangerous for members of the community to engage with local law enforcement to counter terrorism, while only a minority (27.6%, N = 11) responded positively, either agree or strongly agree.

In addition to the marginal quantitative support, the qualitative data provided by the focus groups conducted questions the validity of Research Hypothesis #5. Most frequently discussed by law enforcement participants is the fear that the community has of repercussions to them or their families as a result of providing information to police. “Their neighbors could retaliate for

giving information to the police” (LEFG A, P #6). “Nobody is going to talk to you if they think that their name will be involved or their family will be harmed in some way” (LEFG E, P #1). Some law enforcement agents describe the dangers of having the community involved in counter-terrorism, stating the community: “are not going to listen”; will “cause more problems”; “are not going to be liable for what they do” (LEFG B, P’s #3, 4 & 6). Fear or repercussions was not as common a theme among community participants. Among the community, there was greater concern for the safety of those involved in proactive counter-terrorism, in regards to what type of role they would be asked to play. For example, one community participant stated that he would be willing to help, but that he was not at a point in his life where he was able to go out and fight terrorists. While this was not part of the discussion, which focused on the community providing intelligence to local law enforcement, a few other community participants echoed this sentiment, stating they were more concerned about the danger from active participation in counter-terrorism.


Although the majority of the community participants had positive feelings and interactions about law enforcement, one participant provided a different perspective. This outlier may be representative of an important component of society: the disenfranchised, undereducated, minority, poor that live in an urban environment. Some individuals may be more concerned about the code of the street than of the threat of terrorism. As described by this community participant: “There could be [problems involving the community in intelligence gathering]. If I see something in my neighborhood, they call it snitching. They could go after me, or my family. I don’t think it would be too much of a problem here, in [this community], but where I come from ... they could come after you. You can make an anonymous call to 911. In my town ... I’m not going to call it a community ... somebody always knows something and if somebody

even thinks that you was the one, they still going to come after you. Another thing is, the repercussion, if you see three guys beat a guy or girl up on the corner, if the police come and they see you talking to police, that could be problem (CFG C, P #2).

## Research Hypothesis #6

Research Hypothesis #6 states both the community and local law enforcement are willing to engage with each other in proactive counter-terrorism. To measure this hypothesis, both qualitative and quantitative measures are utilized for the following statement: “I am willing to engage with [the community / my local law enforcement agency] in proactive counter-terrorism efforts”. The vast majority of participants (84%, N = 43) responded positively to the survey statement, either agree (51%, N = 26) or strongly agree (33%, N = 17). Only a small minority (12%, N = 6) of participants responded negatively to the statement, either disagree (4%, N = 2) or strongly disagree (8%, N = 4). A very small minority (4%, N = 2) responded neutrally, neither agree nor disagree. Furthermore, the vast majority of local law enforcement (89.7%) and community participants (77.2%) responded positively, either agree or strongly agree. Only one local law enforcement participant (3.4%) and a minority (22.7%) of community participants responded either disagree or strongly disagree.

**Chart 6.1: Frequency of All Participants for Research Hypothesis #6**



Research Hypothesis #6 is overwhelmingly supported for the total population (N = 51, Mean = 4.27, SD = 1.218). The agreement was slightly higher among local law enforcement participants (N = 29, Mean = 4.52, SD = 0.871) than community participants (N = 21, Mean = 3.95, SD = 1.527). An independent sample t-test found marginal significance ( $t = -1.960$ ),  $p < 0.10$ ) in the means (mean difference = 0.605) between community and local law enforcement participants. This difference in means could be attributable to the perception by the local law enforcement participants that the engagement with the community will provide a clear benefit to the agency, while for community participants, engagement with local law enforcement will cost time and energy that may not be readily available to the community participants, which relates to Research Hypothesis #4. In addition some community participants may perceive the engagement with local law enforcement as involving a degree of personal danger, which relates to Research Hypothesis #5.

**Table 6: Community & Local Law Enforcement Willing to Engage**

$t = -(1.96) @$	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
<b>Community</b>	22	3.95	1.527
<b>Local Law Enforcement</b>	29	4.52	0.871
<b>Total</b>	51	4.27	1.218
@ $p < 0.10$			

Almost all of the participants expressed their willingness to engage with either the community or their local law enforcement agency in counter-terrorism, however some participants had reservations. One issue discussed by community participants was the extent to which they would be willing to engage in proactive counter-terrorism. “The only problem would be ... depending on what they would ask of me, what I’d be expected to do. When you offer you


say, what does this entail, and if it's something I'm capable of [I would be willing to participate]. When you get to be [specific age], you learn to say no. I never did when I was younger, but I do now ... I'm always ready to help my friends and I'd certainly be ready to help the community, my country" (CFG C, P #3).

Only one community participant verbally expressed an unwillingness to engage with the local law enforcement agency. "I m not willing [to work with my local law enforcement agency to counter terrorism], but I keep my eyes and ears open. Me and the police don't get along... I would go to you or somebody else tell them that they need to call the police. That's how I would do it" (CFG C, P #2). As previously discussed, this perspective may be representative of a significant proportion of society, specifically poor, undereducated, minorities in urban environments. One of the reasons this is significant is because these are the environments that would be most attractive for individuals planning and preparing for a terrorist attack, due to the hesitancy with which many of the residents in these types of environments will engage with local law enforcement

### Research Hypothesis #7


Research Hypothesis #7 states both the community and local law enforcement perceive a low level of terrorist activity in the community. To measure this hypothesis, both qualitative and quantitative measures are utilized for the following statement: “There is a low level of terrorist activity in [my community / the community I serve]”. There was a wide distribution in the responses to the above statement. Nearly half the participants (45%, N = 24) provided a positive response to the above statement, either agree (33%, N = 18) or strongly agree (12%, N = 6). A substantial minority (31%, N = 15) provided a negative response, either disagree (23%, N = 11) or strongly disagree (8%, N = 4). In addition, a substantial minority (24%, N = 12) responded neutrally, neither agree nor disagree. The pie charts below illustrate the differences in frequencies between groups.

**Chart 7.1: Frequency of All Participant Responses for Research Hypothesis #7**




Among community participants, an overwhelming majority (77%, N = 17) responded to the survey statement positively, either agree (59%, N = 13) or strongly agree (18%, N = 4). A minority (18%, N = 4) responded negatively, either disagree (9%, N = 2) or strongly disagree (9%, N = 2), with a small minority (5%, N = 1) providing a neutral response, neither agree nor disagree response.

**Chart 7.2: Frequency of Community Responses for Research Hypothesis #7**



Among local law enforcement participants, the response to the survey statement with the greatest frequency was neutral, neither agree nor disagree (38%, N=11). A substantial minority responded negatively, either disagree (31%, N = 9) or strongly disagree (6.7%, N = 2). A small minority of participants responded positively, either agree (16.7%, N = 5) or strongly agree (6.7%, N = 2). The frequency of positive responses among community participants was significantly higher than the positive responses among local law enforcement participants.

**Chart 7.3: Frequency of Local Law Enforcement Responses for Research Hypothesis #7**



There was marginal support for Research Hypothesis #7 for the total population (N = 51, Mean = 3.22, SD = 1.154). There was support among community participants (N = 22, Mean = 3.68, SD = 1.171), however, there was marginal disagreement among local law enforcement participants (N = 29, Mean = 2.86, SD = 1.026), though the mean response for this statement approaches neutrality. An independent sample t-test found evidence of significance ( $t = 2.66$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ) in the means (mean difference = 0.82) between community and local law enforcement participants. This difference in means may be attributable to the availability of information to the two groups. It is likely that individuals employed as full-time law enforcement agents will have greater availability to information regarding terrorist activity in the community than community participants.

**Table 7: Low level of terrorist activity in community**

$t = 2.66 *$	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
<b>Community</b>	22	3.68	1.171
<b>Local Law Enforcement</b>	29	2.86	1.026
<b>Total</b>	51	3.22	1.154
* $p < 0.05$			

Qualitative analysis only provided support for the community participants, while the local law enforcement participants were negative about the survey statement. However, the qualitative support for this hypothesis provides evidence of support for this hypothesis among local law enforcement participants. One local law enforcement participant stated “we don’t have a lot of [terrorist] activity” (LEFG A, P #6). While yet another acknowledged “[terrorism is] important, but it’s not a priority... But we do have potential areas [for terrorist activity]” (LEFG A, P #8).


This support for the hypothesis inclines the researcher to accept the hypothesis, despite the lack of qualitative support.

Part of the hesitancy for law enforcement to acknowledge a low level of terrorist activity may be cultural, in that they are disinclined to make statements that would diminish the dangerousness of their profession. However, one of the locations was a relatively high crime area with a large Muslim community, which may have confounded the results. Overall, the tendency for local law enforcement participants to respond neutrally offers possible evidence of acknowledgement by local law enforcement participants that they may not have the necessary information to provide a definitive response to the survey statement. This survey statement bears further examination.

## Research Hypothesis #8


Research Hypothesis #8 states both the community and local law enforcement perceive communication between the community and local law enforcement as an effective method to gather intelligence about local terrorist activity. To measure this hypothesis, both qualitative and quantitative measures are utilized for the following statement: “An effective method to gather intelligence about local terrorist activity is through communication with members of the community”. An overwhelming majority of participants (90%, N = 46) provided a positive response to the survey statement, either agree (45%, N = 23) or strongly agree (45%, N = 23). A small minority provided a negative response, either disagree (4%, N = 2) or strongly disagree (6%, N = 3), with no neutral responses.

**Chart 8.1: Frequency of All Participant Responses for Research Hypothesis #8**




An overwhelming majority of community participants (82%, N = 18) provided a positive response to the survey statement, either agree (50%, N = 11) or strongly agree (32%, N = 7). A small minority provided a negative response, either disagree (9%, N = 2) or strongly disagree (9%, N = 2), with no neutral responses.

**Chart 8.2: Frequency of All Community Responses for Research Hypothesis #8**



An overwhelming majority of community participants (96%, N = 18) provided a positive response to the survey statement, either agree (41%, N = 12) or strongly agree (55%, N = 16). A small minority provided a negative response, either disagree (0%, N = 0) or strongly disagree (4%, N = 1), with no neutral responses.

**Chart 8.3: Frequency of Local Law Enforcement Responses for Research Hypothesis #8**



There was overwhelming support for Research Hypothesis #8 for the total population (N = 51, Mean = 4.2, SD = 1.059). There was greater agreement among local law enforcement (N = 29, Mean = 4.45, SD = 0.827) than community participants (N = 22, Mean = 3.86, SD = 1.246). An independent sample t-test found evidence of significance ( $t = - (2.012)$ ,  $p = 0.05$ ) in the means (mean difference = 0.585) between community and local law enforcement participants.

**Table 8.1: Communication with community effective to gather intelligence**

$t = - (2.012) @$	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
<b>Community</b>	22	3.86	1.246
<b>Local Law Enforcement</b>	29	4.45	0.827
<b>Total</b>	51	4.2	1.059
@ $p < 0.10$			

In addition to the quantitative support for the hypothesis, there is qualitative support provided by the focus groups conducted. Both community and local law enforcement participants stated that the community was an effective method to gather intelligence about all criminal activity, including terrorism. Among the issues that would impact the willingness of community members to provide such information to local law enforcement was the relationship between the two groups, including the perceived comfort level and trust by the community for the local law enforcement agency, which are consistent with the tenets of community policing.

An additional issue was the perceived availability of the local law enforcement agency. Some local law enforcement officers acknowledged that community members are often loathe to provide information to anyone other than those local law enforcement agents with whom they

have a preexisting relationship. Overall there were many common statements by local law enforcement participants. “Would effective communication help? Yes” (LEFG D, P #1). “Constant dialogue with community [is the most effective method to gather intelligence about local terrorist activity]” (LEFG D, P #4). “The community is the best resource [for gathering information about local terrorist activity]” (LEFG E, P #5).

## **Overview of Hypotheses 1 - 8**

There were similar perspectives for local law enforcement and community participants for many of the first eight hypotheses. The comparisons between the means for the community and law enforcement participants are depicted in the below table (Table 8.2), which also provides the significance and t value for the first eight hypotheses. Only two of these hypotheses, Hypothesis #3, there is low community involvement in proactive counter-terrorism tactics, and Hypothesis #7, there is a low level of terrorist activity, were found to have significance in the difference between the means of the two groups: there is a low level of community involvement in proactive counter-terrorism; and there is a low level of terrorist activity in the community. In addition, Hypothesis #6, the community and local law enforcement are willing to engage in proactive counter-terrorism, and Hypothesis #8, communication with the community is an effective method to gather intelligence about local terrorist activity, near significance; perhaps with a larger sample size there would be a clearer depiction of the difference in means between the two groups.

**Table 8.2: Summary of Findings for Hypotheses 1 – 8**

Independent Sample T-Test for Research Hypotheses # 1 – 8	Mean		
	Community	Law Enforcement	t
<b>Terrorism problem</b>	3.95	4.52	-(1.548)
<b>Greater terrorism threat</b>	3.91	3.93	-(0.063)
<b>High Community Involvement</b>	2.77	1.79	3.631 **
<b>Low Costs Utilizing Community</b>	3.14	2.83	0.922
<b>Danger for Community in CT</b>	2.38	2.59	-(0.62)
<b>Willingness to Engage in CT</b>	3.64	4.24	-(1.96) @
<b>Low Level of Terrorist Activity</b>	3.68	2.86	2.66 *
<b>Communication Effective Intel</b>	3.86	4.45	-(2.012) @
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; @ p < 0.10			

## Research Hypothesis #9

Research Hypothesis #9 states both the community and local law enforcement support all the following components of terrorism:

- a. an act of terrorism involves the use of violence or force
- b. an act of terrorism is political in nature
- c. an act of terrorism involves fear or an emphasis on terror
- d. an act of terrorism involves a threat
- e. an act of terrorism involves a civilian target
- f. an act of terrorism involves actions by non-state actors
- g. an act of coercion is a necessary component of terrorism
- h. an act of the goal of terrorism is to further ideological change

There was support for most, but not all the above components of the definition of terrorism. The components in this hypothesis were based on prior research on the definition of terrorism.<sup>122</sup> The wording or phrasing of the components is not exact, such as the author's use of the term "non-state actor" as a replacement for "group, movement, organization as perpetrator", but these are not necessarily equivalent. There were similarities between the earlier study and the evidence provided as a result of this study. For example, there was overwhelming support for components a, b, c and d, which were the elements with the greatest frequency in earlier research. An analysis of the components of terrorism yielded a good reliability score; Cronbach's Alpha = 0.751.


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<sup>122</sup> Schmid & Jongman, 1988. pp. 5-6

### Research Hypothesis #9a

Research Hypothesis #9a states both the community and local law enforcement perceive an act of terrorism involves the use of violence or force. To measure this hypothesis, both qualitative and quantitative measures are utilized for the above statements. The vast majority of participants support the statement, responding either agree (37%, N = 19) or strongly agree (43%, N = 22) that terrorism involves the use of violence or force. Among the remaining participants, only a minority responded strongly disagree, only a small minority responded either strongly disagree (6%, N = 4) or disagree (8%, N = 5) of participants that terrorism involves the use of violence or force. In addition, a small minority of participants (6%, N = 3) responded neutrally, neither agree nor disagree.

**Chart 9.1a: Frequency of All Participant Responses for Research Hypothesis #9a**



There was support for this hypothesis for the total population (N = 51, Mean = 4.04, SD = 1.166). The agreement was slightly higher for local law enforcement participants (N = 29,

Mean = 4.1, SD = 1.012) than community participants (N = 22, Mean = 3.95, SD = 1.362). An independent sample t-test found no significance in the means between community and local law enforcement participants.

**Table 9.1a: Terrorism involves the use of violence or force**


<i>t</i> = - (0.488)	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
<b>Community</b>	22	3.95	1.362
<b>Local Law Enforcement</b>	29	4.1	1.012
<b>Total</b>	51	4.04	1.166

In addition to the quantitative support for the hypothesis, there is qualitative support provided by the focus groups conducted. Among the responses provided during the focus groups are the following: “If you try and influence someone using violence then its terrorism” (LEFG A, P # 1); “Anti-legal violent destruction without any reason” (CFG C, P #4); “Terrorism is random violence” (CFG C, P #1).

### Research Hypothesis #9b

Research Hypothesis #9b states both the community and local law enforcement perceive an act of terrorism as political in nature. To measure this hypothesis, both qualitative and quantitative measures are utilized for the above statement. The vast majority of participants support the statement, responding either agree (43%, N = 22) or strongly agree (20%, N = 10) that terrorism is political in nature. Among the remaining participants, only a minority responded strongly disagree (6%, N = 4) or disagree (8%, N = 5) that terrorism is political in nature. However, a significant number of participants (29 %, N = 15) responded neutrally, neither agree nor disagree.

**Chart 9.1b: Frequency of All Participant Responses for Research Hypothesis #9b**



There was support for this hypothesis for the total population (N = 51, Mean = 3.73, SD = 0.918). The agreement was nearly equivalent for both local law enforcement participants (N =

29, Mean = 3.69, SD = 0.806) than (N = 22, Mean = 3.77, SD = 1.066). An independent sample t-test found no significance in the means between community and local law enforcement participants.

**Table 9.1b: Terrorism is political in nature**

<i>t</i> = - (0.488)	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
<b>Community</b>	22	3.95	1.362
<b>Local Law Enforcement</b>	29	4.1	1.012
<b>Total</b>	51	4.04	1.166


In addition to the quantitative support for the hypothesis, there is qualitative support provided by the focus groups conducted. Among the responses provided during the focus groups that support Research Hypothesis #9b are the following: “Doesn’t have to be political group. [Terrorists] could be any group” (LEFG A, P #3); “Terrorists] could be any radical group or it could be just a single person” (LEFG A, P #7). In addition, a number of participants mentioned the war of independence for the United States, whose fighters were labeled as terrorists by the British. “[Terrorism involves a] political agenda” (LEFG D, P #2).

The following statements support both Research Hypothesis #9a, the use of violence or force in the definition of terrorism and Research Hypothesis #9b, the political nature of terrorism: “Individual or group who use the threat of violence or violence to influence the political views on another section of the world” (LEFG A, P # 1), “The use of violence to meet some political or social end” (CFG A, P #8); CFG A, P #7 discusses the contextual issues associated with labeling an individual as a terrorist or freedom fighter, noting that Menachem Begin, a member of the Irgun, later became the Prime Minister of Israel.

### Research Hypothesis #9c

Research Hypothesis #9c states both the community and local law enforcement perceive that an act of terrorism involves fear or emphasis on terror. To measure this hypothesis, both qualitative and quantitative measures are utilized for the above statement. The overwhelming majority of participants (96%, N = 49) support the statement, responding either agree (43%, N = 22) or strongly agree (53%, N = 27) that terrorism involves fear or emphasis on terror. Among the remaining participants, only a minority responded strongly disagree (2%, N = 1) that terrorism involves fear or emphasis on terror, with no participants responding disagree. In addition, a small minority of participants (2%, N = 1) responded neutrally, neither agree nor disagree.

**Chart 9.1c: Frequency of All Participant Responses for Research Hypothesis #9c**



There was support for this hypothesis for the total population (N = 51, Mean = 4.45, SD = 0.73). The agreement was greater for local law enforcement (N = 29, Mean = 4.59, SD =

0.501) than community participants (N = 22, Mean = 4.27, SD = 0.935). An independent sample t-test found no significance in the means between community and local law enforcement participants.

**Table 9.1c: Terrorism involves fear or emphasis on terror**

<i>t = - (1.540)</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
<b>Community</b>	22	4.27	0.935
<b>Local Law Enforcement</b>	29	4.59	0.501
<b>Total</b>	51	4.45	0.73


In addition to the quantitative support for the hypothesis, there is qualitative support provided by the focus groups conducted. Among the responses provided during the focus groups that support Research Hypothesis #9c are the following: “Acts or incidents that are committed by a single or a group of people, whose primary focus is to induce overwhelming fear to another group of people” (LEFG A, P #7); “[Terrorism involves] making someone fear for their safety” (LEFG B, P #6); “[Terrorism is] an act that causes fear” (LEFG C, P #5); “[Terrorism] strikes terror in hearts of the public” (CFG C, P #4); “[Terrorism involves a] group causing horror or fear” (CFG D, P #4).

The following statement supports both Research Hypothesis #9c, an act of terrorism involves fear or emphasis on terror, and Research Hypothesis #9g, an act of terrorism involves coercion: “To influence them. Induce fear to influence beliefs” (LEFG A, P # 1).

### Research Hypothesis #9d

Research Hypothesis #9d states both the community and local law enforcement perceive that an act of terrorism involves a threat. To measure this hypothesis, both qualitative and quantitative measures are utilized for the above statement. The vast majority of participants (70%, N = 36) support the statement, responding either agree (35%, N = 18) or strongly agree (35%, N = 18) that terrorism involves a threat. Among the remaining participants, only a small minority (14%, N = 7) responded strongly disagree (4%, N = 2) or disagree (10%, N = 5) that terrorism involves a threat. In addition, a minority of participants (16%, N = 8) responded neutrally, neither agree nor disagree.

**Chart 9.1d: Frequency of All Participant Responses for Research Hypothesis #9d**



There was support for this hypothesis for the total population (N = 51, Mean = 3.88, SD = 1.125). The agreement was greater for local law enforcement (N = 29, Mean = 4.1, SD = 0.817) than community participants (N = 22, Mean = 3.59, SD = 1.403). An independent sample

t-test found no significance in the means between community and local law enforcement participants.

**Table 9.1d: Terrorism involves a threat**


<i>t = - (1.528)</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
<b>Community</b>	22	3.59	1.403
<b>Local Law Enforcement</b>	29	4.1	0.817
<b>Total</b>	51	3.88	1.125

In addition to the quantitative support for the hypothesis, there is qualitative support provided by the focus groups conducted. Among the responses provided during the focus groups that support Research Hypothesis #9d is the following: “[Terrorism is] not always violence, it can just be fear of violence” (LEFG A, P #2).

### Research Hypothesis #9e

Research Hypothesis #9e states both the community and local law enforcement perceive that an act of terrorism involves a civilian target. To measure this hypothesis, both qualitative and quantitative measures are utilized for the above statement. There was significant variation among the responses of the participants to the statement that an act of terrorism involves. Only 43% of participants responded in support of this statement, either agree (20%, N = 10) or strongly agree (23%, N = 12). Another 39% responded negatively to the statement, either strongly disagree (8%, N = 4) or disagree (31%, N = 16). In addition, a significant number of participants (18%, N = 9) responded neutrally, neither agree nor disagree.

**Chart 9.1e: Frequency of All Participant Responses for Research Hypothesis #9e**



There was marginal support for this hypothesis for the total population (N = 51, Mean = 3.2, SD = 1.327). There was agreement among local law enforcement participants (N = 29, Mean = 3.48, SD = 1.299), however there was slight disagreement among community

participants (N = 22, Mean = 2.82, SD = 1.296). An independent sample t-test found marginal significance ( $t = - (1.811)$ ,  $p < 0.10$ ) in the means between community and local law enforcement participants (means difference = 0.665).

**Table 9.1e: Terrorism involves a civilian target**


<i>t = - (1.811)</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
<b>Community</b>	22	2.82	1.296
<b>Local Law Enforcement</b>	29	4.1	1.299
<b>Total</b>	51	3.2	1.327

Despite the lack of quantitative support for the hypothesis, there is qualitative support provided by the focus groups conducted. Among the responses provided during the focus groups that support Research Hypothesis #9e are the following: “I think the difference is who the target is. Terrorists tend to target innocent people, civilians, where a war tends to be army vs. army or a designated group of people who are fighting each other for a purpose, while terrorism involves innocent people that have no reason to be targeted, other than their beliefs” (LEFG A, P #5); “If it’s the Iraqi people engaged in road side bombings clearly at American armed forces then you could draw a closer line of an act of war because [it could be argued that] they are protecting their country [from foreign occupation]. However, when they are using roadside bombs and [improvised explosive devices] directed at their own people to influence that group of people to either side with, or prevent something they are politically against then it would more align itself with an act of terrorism” (LEFG A, P #7); “I think that once you involve the innocent lives [it’s terrorism]” (LEFG C, P #2).

### Research Hypothesis #9f

Research Hypothesis #9f states both the community and local law enforcement perceive that an act of terrorism involves activities by non-state actors. To measure this hypothesis, both qualitative and quantitative measures are utilized for the above statement. There was significant variation among the responses of the participants to the statement that an act of terrorism involves activities by non-state actors. Only 37% of participants responded in support of this statement, either agree (25%, N = 14) or strongly agree (12%, N = 6). Another 41% responded negatively to the statement, either strongly disagree (10%, N = 5) or disagree (31%, N = 15). In addition, a significant number of participants (22%, N = 11) responded neutrally, neither agree nor disagree.

**Chart 9.1f: Frequency of All Participant Responses for Research Hypothesis #9f**



There was insignificant support for this hypothesis for the total population (N = 51, Mean = 3.02, SD = 1.208). There was marginal support for this hypothesis for local law enforcement

(N = 29, Mean = 3.14, SD = 1.187), while there was marginal disagreement among community participants (N = 22, Mean = 2.86, SD = 1.246). An independent sample t-test found no significance in the means between community and local law enforcement participants.

**Table 9.1f: Terrorism involves actions by non-state actors**


<i>t = - (0.8)</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
<b>Community</b>	22	2.86	1.246
<b>Local Law Enforcement</b>	29	3.14	1.187
<b>Total</b>	51	3.02	1.208

In addition to the lack of quantitative support for the hypothesis, there is also a lack of qualitative support provided by the focus groups conducted. There was limited discussion on this component of terrorism in the focus groups. For both community and local law enforcement participants, there appeared to be minimal interest in the affiliations of the actors involved in an attack. The following statement provides some support for the differences between state and non-state actors: “There are clear rules for the engagement of war covered by the Geneva Convention that specify the difference between states, conflicts, police actions. There are international definitions of each” (LEFG A, P #7).

### Research Hypothesis #9g

Research Hypothesis #9g states both the community and local law enforcement perceive that an act of terrorism involves coercion. To measure this hypothesis, both qualitative and quantitative measures are utilized for the above statement. The majority of participants support the statement, responding either agree (45%, N = 23) or strongly agree (18%, N = 9) that an act of terrorism involves coercion. Among the remaining participants, only a minority responded strongly disagree (2%, N = 1) or disagree (10%, N = 5) that an act of terrorism involves coercion. However, a significant number of participants (25%, N = 13) responded neutrally, neither agree nor disagree.

**Chart 9.1g: Frequency of All Participant Responses for Research Hypothesis #9g**



There was support for this hypothesis for the total population (N = 51, Mean = 3.88, SD = 1.125). The agreement was greater for local law enforcement (N = 29, Mean = 4.1, SD = 0.817) than community participants (N = 22, Mean = 3.59, SD = 1.403). An independent sample

t-test found no significance in the means between community and local law enforcement participants.

**Table 9.1g: Terrorism involves coercion**


<i>t = - (0.488)</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
<b>Community</b>	22	3.45	1.101
<b>Local Law Enforcement</b>	29	3.83	0.805
<b>Total</b>	51	3.67	0.952

In addition to the quantitative support for the hypothesis, there is qualitative support provided by the focus groups conducted. In addition to the support provided in the qualitative discussion of Research Hypothesis #9c, are the following: “To impact someone else’s behavior, but not necessarily change their views” (LEFG A, P #4); “To influence them. Induce fear to influence beliefs” (LEFG A, P #1); “[Terrorism is a] scare tactic to force people to do what they do” (LEFG B, P #3); “[Terrorists] want that power over you” (LEFG C, P #4).

### Research Hypothesis #9h

Research Hypothesis #9h states both the community and local law enforcement perceive that “an act of terrorism involves a goal of furtherance of ideological goal”. To measure this hypothesis, both qualitative and quantitative measures are utilized for the above statement. There was overwhelming support for this hypothesis. Approximately 80% of all participants responded positively to this statement, with 42% responding agree and 38% responding strongly agree. Only 10% responded negatively, with 2% responding strongly disagree and 8% responding disagree. Another 10% responded neutrally, neither agree nor disagree.

**Chart 9.1h: Frequency of All Participant Responses for Research Hypothesis #9h**



There was support for this hypothesis for the total population (N = 51, Mean = 4.06, SD = 0.998). The agreement was greater for local law enforcement (N = 29, Mean = 4.17, SD = 0.966) than community participants (N = 22, Mean = 3.9, SD = 1.044). An independent sample

t-test found no significance in the means between community and local law enforcement participants.

**Table 9.1h: Terrorism involves an ideological goal**

<i>t = - (0.935)</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
<b>Community</b>	22	3.9	1.044
<b>Local Law Enforcement</b>	29	4.17	0.966
<b>Total</b>	51	4.06	0.998

In addition to the quantitative support for the hypothesis, there is qualitative support provided by the focus groups conducted. Both community and law enforcement participants mention the different ideologies that are associated with terrorism, such as religious, political, and social viewpoints. “[Terrorism] can even be based on religious philosophy” (CFG C, P #4). Among the religious ideologies, fundamentalist Islam was mentioned most frequently, although Christian right wing domestic groups, such as the KKK, were also mentioned: “I would call Ku Klux Klan activity terrorism” (CFG E, P #6). These religious groups can also be viewed as political and social ideologies. Other social issues mentioned were abortion, the environment, homosexuality, and racism.

**Table 9.2: Independent Sample T-Tests for Terrorism Components**

<i>Terrorism Involves</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Focus Group</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
<b>Use of Violence or Force</b>	- (0.448)	Community	22	3.95	1.362
		Law Enforcement	29	4.1	1.012
<b>Political in Nature</b>	0.317	Community	22	3.77	1.066
		Law Enforcement	29	3.69	0.806
<b>Fear or Emphasis on Terror</b>	- (1.54)	Community	22	4.27	0.935
		Law Enforcement	29	4.59	0.501
<b>Threat</b>	- (1.528)	Community	22	3.59	1.403
		Law Enforcement	29	4.1	0.817
<b>Civilian Target</b>	- (1.812)	Community	22	2.82	1.296
		Law Enforcement	29	3.48	1.299
<b>Activities by Non-State Actors</b>	- (0.8)	Community	22	2.86	1.246
		Law Enforcement	29	3.14	1.187
<b>Coercion</b>	- (1.399)	Community	22	3.45	1.101
		Law Enforcement	29	3.83	0.805
<b>Furtherance of Ideological Goal</b>	- (0.935)	Community	21	3.9	1.093
		Law Enforcement	29	4.17	0.966
<b>Cronbach's Alpha = 0.751</b>					


Support for the operationalization of terrorism is a variable created through the summation of six variables from the survey instrument (items 9a + 9b + 9c + 9d + 9e + 9f + 9g + 9h). A reliability analysis of the measure provided evidence that the new variable was a reliable measure (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.751). The possible range for the new variable was from 8 (strongly disagree = 1 \* 8) to 40 (strongly agree = 5 \* 8), with the midpoint 24 (neither agree nor disagree = 3 \* 8). There was support for the new variable for the total population (N = 50, Mean = 30.18, SD = 5.157). The agreement was slightly higher among local law enforcement participants (N = 29, Mean = 31.1, SD = 4.065) than community participants (N = 21, Mean = 28.9, SD = 6.252). However, an independent sample t-test found is no significance in the means between community and local law enforcement participants.

There is variation among participants in the support of the components of the author's operationalization of terrorism. Hypothesis 9c (terrorism involving fear or an emphasis on terror) has the greatest level of agreement for both local law enforcement (N = 29; Mean = 4.59; SD = 0.501) and community participants (N = 22; Mean = 4.27; SD = 0.935). The hypotheses with the lowest level of agreement are the components of terrorism that differentiate the author's operationalization of terrorism; hypotheses 9e (terrorism involves civilian targets) and 9f (terrorism involves activities by non-state actors) were only marginally supported by the research (discussed above).

The varying level of support for the components of Research Hypothesis #9 is further illustrated below (Chart 9.2), which depicts the eight components provided in the definition of terrorism. The positive and negative responses were combined in the below chart, as described in the text on the right side of the chart, with the top shaded area representing positive (agree & strongly agree) responses, the middle shaded area representing neutral responses (neither agree

nor disagree), and the bottom shaded area representing negative (disagree & strongly disagree) responses.

**Chart 9.2: Support for Terrorism Components**



## **Research Hypothesis #10**


Research Hypothesis #10 states both the community and local law enforcement support all the following efforts:

- a. increase understanding and trust between local law enforcement and the community
- b. have community provide guidance & feedback on law enforcement policies & activities
- c. provide the community with the necessary information and training to allow them to safely & effectively assist local law enforcement
- d. have the community share responsibility for its safety and security
- e. maintain active participation & cooperation from all levels of local law enforcement agency and its corresponding community
- f. shift the focus of police work from reacting to incidents to working with the community to identify individuals in the planning & preparation stages of an attack


All the components of this hypothesis are overwhelmingly supported by the research. At least 80% of participants agreed with each statement, including over 90% agreement for hypothesis 10a – which states that participants support an increase in understanding and trust between local law enforcement and the community. The pie charts below further illustrate the overwhelming support for the six components that provide a foundation for community policing in proactive counter-terrorism.

Below are charts providing the frequencies for each of the above components (10a – 10f). A discussion in regards to Research Hypothesis #10 is provided subsequent to the charts, incorporating both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of this study. In addition, a table is provided depicting and comparing the means for each component and for the operationalized transformed variables created by combining each component for Research Hypotheses #9 & 10.


**Chart 10.1a: Frequency of All Participant Responses for Research Hypothesis #10a**




**Chart 10.1b: Frequency of All Participant Responses for Research Hypothesis #10b**




**Chart 10.1c: Frequency of All Participant Responses for Research Hypothesis #10c**




**Chart 10.1d: Frequency of All Participant Responses for Research Hypothesis #10d**



**Chart 10.1e: Frequency of All Participant Responses for Research Hypothesis #10e**



**Chart 10.1f: Frequency of All Participant Responses for Research Hypothesis #10f**




Support for community policing in proactive counter-terrorism is a variable created through the summation of six variables from the survey instrument (items 10a + 10b + 10c + 10d + 10e + 10f). A reliability analysis of the measure provided evidence that the new variable was a reliable measure (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.847). The range for the new variable was from 6 (strongly disagree = 1 \* 6) to 30 (strongly agree = 5 \* 6), with the midpoint 18 (neither agree nor disagree = 3 \* 6). There was overwhelming support for the new variable for the total population (N = 51, Mean = 25, SD = 4.025). The agreement was slightly higher among local law enforcement participants (N = 29, Mean = 25.34, SD = 3.276) than community participants (N = 22, Mean = 24.55, SD = 4.887). However, an independent sample t-test found no significance in the means between community and local law enforcement participants.

The support for each component varied, with the greatest support for terrorism involving fear or terror (94.2% of all participants responded either agree or strongly agree; Mean = 4.45, SD = 0.730) and the least support for terrorism involving a non-state actor, for which there was marginal overall support (N = 51, mean = 2.98, SD = 1.208).

There was support, both on the part of the community and law enforcement focus groups, for the use of community policing in proactive counter terrorism. For the entirety of the participants (N = 52), the reliability for the support of the community policing in proactive counter terrorism, which was determined by adding the values for the following: terrorism involves the use of violence or force; terrorism is political; terrorism involves fear or an emphasis on terror; terrorism involves a threat; terrorism involves a civilian target; terrorism involves actions by non-state actors; coercion is a necessary component of terrorism; and the goal of terrorism is to further ideological change, was high (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.847).

**Chart 10.2: Comparison of Means for transformed variables**



An interesting finding from the statistical analyses conducted on the surveys from the focus groups was the relationship between the operationalization of terrorism and the support for community policing in proactive counter terrorism. The greater agreement with the definitional components of terrorism by the participants in the focus groups, the greater the support for community policing in proactive counter terrorism. Future research could provide a validation of the relationship between these two transformed variables.

There is no difference in the relationship between race and support for community policing in counter terrorism [comparison of means for components 10a-10f] for community participants. However, one participant who was black and was from a low socio-economic background stated “add funny quote [me and the police don’t get along]”, leading the researcher to conclude that there may be difference for minority community members from a lower socio-economic background than for the other participants from the community that had higher socio-economic backgrounds. In addition, there is no difference in the relationship between race and support for community policing in counter terrorism [comparison of means for components 10a-10f] for law enforcement participants.

Some police officers from the same agencies were not in agreement as to whether their agency engages in community policing. Furthermore some officers that responded that their agency did not engage in community policing also responded that their assignment involved community policing. This may confound some of the results regarding community policing. One of the issues may have been whether there was a unit within the agency that was specifically called community policing contrasted with whether the individual law enforcement agents perceived their role as encompassing the concepts of community policing. This research did not fully explore these differences, although future research could examine this confound.

Focus groups involving police agencies had similarities. Many police officers stated that the training provided to officers regarding counter terrorism was insufficient; community policing was not a priority and that the politics of the department determined when and if officers would be assigned to duties involving community policing. There was no clear understanding of what terrorism is, both among police and civilian focus groups, with viewpoints ranging from the

acts of radical Islamic fundamentalists to past and current US policies. Some community and local law enforcement participants conflated terrorism with gang activity. This issue bears further investigation. Gang activity can vary in its tactics and goals, some of which may mirror the operationalization of terrorism provided by the author. There was a preponderance of distrust of the US government, ranging from conspiracies of the oligarchy to the belief that those in power have little understanding of policing on a local level and little interest in anything other than their political career or re-election.

Community participation has great potential to impact the phenomenon of terrorism. Among community participants there is the perception that community involvement has had an impact on crime through the ability of local law enforcement to solve crime and crime reduction: “Like [participant #6] said, a lot of the shootings are now being solved. Now people are getting involved. The solvable shooting rates are increasing. And at one point, the shooting was down” (CFG E, P#5). The perception by members of the community that community involvement will lead to both a decrease in crime and an increase in solving criminal investigations is important, as this perception will likely lead to increased cooperation and partnership between members of the community and its local law enforcement agency.

## **Discussion of Qualitative Data**

### **Obstacles to the implementation of community policing to counter-terrorism**

Despite the overwhelming qualitative and quantitative support for community policing in proactive counter-terrorism, not all participants were completely in agreement with the application of community policing. One local law enforcement participant provided statements that not only conflicted with support of community policing, but also conflicted with some of this participants' other statements in support of community policing. "Community policing is wrong. We are authority figures, law enforcement. You should get an outside group to do it [community policing]. How are we supposed to enforce the law and be authority figures, it's like being a parent... Community policing has watered down our role as authority figures" (LEFG B, P #1). In response to the above statement, another participant provided the following: "Depends on who in the public you are communicating. They have a sense of entitlement. You can't be the friend and the cop in same package, it doesn't work" (LEFG B, P #5).

The following statement discusses a perceived reality of policing, involving the allocation of limited resources: "The problem is we're aware of these potential targets but there are always local issues that overshadow those risks. We know, as a group, that these potential targets exist, but there is always something else that comes up that is perceived by the public as being more important, i.e. someone's parking...so it gets overshadowed. We can laugh about those things, but that is the reality. Resources go to the squeaky wheel, and the squeaky wheel doesn't look at what we do" (LEFG A, P #6).

The following is an example of a perception that the current involvement and interaction within a community may be an obstacle to the implementation of a community policing model in proactive counter-terrorism: "One of the hurdles is that the community has become more of an

individual... you don't know your neighbors as well as before. You can go to people's houses that have lived in a community for 10 years don't know their neighbor's name. There's no more of that apple pie, having you kids play next door mentally. Everybody has isolated themselves. The biggest hurdle is to get the community to open up to themselves, and not so much the police" (LEFG A, P #5); "[Residents] haven't taken stake in the community, they just move in because they like the area and they just go to work every day" (LEFG A, P #6); "People need to take a stake in their neighborhood" (LEFG A, P #5), which implies that the members in the community are not very involved in the community. "It requires a huge cultural change to get back to a community policing model where officers are, on a day to day basis, engaged with community... It becomes a cultural change for an agency that has not engaged [the community] for some time" (LEFG A, P #7). Without a sense of community among members of the community, can community policing function as a model?

Some local law enforcement participants provided statements that imply that they perceive the community as negative or even antagonistic toward the police: "The community doesn't necessarily trust the police" (LEFG A, P #1); "[A specific community group] calls us Gestapo" (LEFG B, P #6). One participant implies that community engagement may impede on the freedom and privacy of community members: "How much of your freedom do you want intruded on?" (CFG A, P #8). However, in this statement the participant appears to conflate privacy with freedom.

One issue in regards to cooperation and engagement with local law enforcement is the type of response that comes as a result of direct involvement. "I think also you would be much more likely to call [about suspicious activity] if you thought the policing agency would act in a very sophisticated way... Not going to go in with guns drawn and a SWAT team and dogs, but

casually with due diligence react in an appropriate manner... you need to have confidence in their degree of sophistication when handling events so that you will call. Like to see that officers are staying ahead of curve and learning all new policing and looking at new ways to look at things.” (CFG A, P #7). This participant implies that the perception of, and response by the law enforcement agency would influence the decision to provide information. Another obstacle to community involvement, are perceived repercussions, as described by a community participant: “When reporting on neighbors who are ethnic, people are oftentimes so afraid of calling authorities because they don’t want to be labeled racist or politically incorrect” (CFG A, P #8).

Some local law enforcement participants note the shift back to more traditional model, which draws them away from the tenets of community policing. One local law enforcement participant discusses how the change in the administration led to a shift from proactive to reactive response by the agency: “Things change as the administration changes... I hate to keep going back to it, but when we were [assigned to] the juvenile [squad] we were assigned at schools every day when school got out and internally things have changed, people have changed, administration... It’s reactive. What we did was proactive” (LECG B, P #5).

Another obstacle to community policing is that one area may have multiple communities. An example of this is illustrated in one of the focus groups in which law enforcement discuss the variation of residents with one relatively small area. “Other [neighboring communities] don’t have the same diversity” (LEFG B, P #6). “They tried to make us out to be like other community in terms of size and react to things like them and we are more diverse than that” (LEFG B, P #4). “There are areas where people don’t lock their doors to where people [can’t afford] locks on their door” ((LEFG B, P #3). “Or the locks get punched out” (LEFG B, P #1). “There are movie stars and judges [on one side] and then” (LEFG B, P #2). “Crack-heads and

whores [on the other]” (LEFG B, P #5). “[This community] is very wealthy on one end and the other side is section eight [housing]” (LEFG B, P #3).

Some police officers express a fear of repercussions due to community involvement. “[This community] is so small that everyone knows everyone. You are always pulling over someone’s brother, mother, or son. They all know someone up top and they call, the mayor” (LEFG B, P #4). “You can attest to how community policing can bite you in the ass as well. By knowing everyone so well and interacting with community” (LEFG B, P #5). “Your kid almost kills somebody and then they get arrested and it’s *How dare you arrest my child. I’m going to try to get you fired*” (LEFG B, P #1).

**General support for community policing in counter-terrorism:**

“Recognition [of terrorist activity] is a major concern and community policing is good for that. Community policing can help identify precursors and bringing in information. There is a greater opportunity with training and recognition for those precursors that may trigger an officer’s awareness to terrorism, coupled with community policing where officers are now out into the community and have a heightened awareness to it. They may recognize incidents that occur and may be more apt to report them to an intelligence division. There is a great correlation between terrorism awareness and problem oriented policing” (LEFG A, P #7).

“We’ve become more proactive rather than reactive” (LEFG A, P #4). “At the same time you’re giving people more information you might be scaring the crap out of them” (LEFG D, P #3). “I also think we have to keep terrorism, or counter-terrorism, in the forefront. People get complacent now but it wasn’t like that right after 9/11, when people were always calling the police about suspected terrorism. We were responding to calls like that all the time. Now everybody is more complacent and thinks that it’s not going to happen. It’s not on their mind

every day. We need to have government, through information, keep this stuff in the front of people's mind" (LEFG A, P #1). Regarding the locality of the issues: "All of these incidents are local. Nothing starts out on the national level. All these situations are local. The people that are responsible for training have to recognize the need" (LEFG A, P #7).

### **Training for law enforcement:**

Many of the participants discussed issues of training and resources, including equipment and manpower. Resources available to police agencies are limited, as one participant notes: "With all the responsibilities of a police officer, how does he engage in community policing and counter terrorism and still be able to complete all his other normal assignments and responsibilities?" (CFG B, P #4). One local law enforcement participant complained "we need more training and more cops" (LEFG B, P #6). A common theme among many local law enforcement participants focused on the underutilization of training, in addition to resource limitations. "I think a lot of it comes back to training. If you don't have someone trained to recognize information and pass it along. If information is not being filtered properly, then it's garbage in. [You need] training for officers and members of the community. Information comes in constantly and a good portion of it is not being filtered properly. The first part is proper training in identifying the issues that are coming in; it's the most important part" (LEFG A, P #5). One participant notes the resistance to training among law enforcement: "We are resistant [to training]" (LEFG A, P #1).

The following are vignettes regarding training for an active shooter: "One of the problems is they sent me and another guy to active shooter instructor school, which cost a thousand dollars each and took a week. We came back and set up a training course, but were told we don't have enough time to teach this. Now we don't have the money to do anything with

that afterwards. We were told we don't have the time to teach it" (LEFG A, P #1); "It's about money, budgetary and training. If I give you a one-day course on, for example, an active shooter, which is also a form of terrorism, and I went to the school [to become an instructor for dealing with an active shooter] and I came back and over the course of three or four days, we went into the school and showed these guys, they were all great, they kind of picked up the basics. It's a year later and they haven't done it again. I gave officers a familiarization, over a four hour day, but it's a year later and there's been no further training" (LEFG C, P #2).

### **Training for the community:**

Involving the community would require providing the information and education necessary to assist, rather than impede, effective proactive counter-terrorism. Among the statements in support of involving the community are the following: "We don't teach [the community] about doing anti-terrorism, never" (LEFG D, P #5); "We tell people call about suspicious behavior" (LEFG D, P #3); "Why can't we educate [the community] what to look for?" (LEFG E, P #5). "There is no training that deals with terrorism or community policing. It's something we haven't adopted yet. Certainly at the foundational level, developing communication, directed communication, through a neighborhood and meeting their own quality of life needs has to be established and that conduit developed before a training process goes back into the community. The first step is to establish communication. Once you develop good communication with that group, you can then provide training" (LEFG A, P #7).

### **Impact of terrorism:**

Members of the community focus groups provided anecdotal evidence that the attacks on 9/11 have impacted their behavior and level of fear. Several community participants stated that they were less willing or unwilling to visit New York City because of the attacks and their fears

that there is high probability of future attacks occurring. “[Terrorism is] not a problem but something you always have to keep in the back of your mind. [This community is not] a high terrorism area but you never know. I think it’s an important problem, not a problem but something we always have to keep in back of mind that can happen anywhere” (CFG A, P #5). Some local law enforcement participants view counter-terrorism as beyond their ability. “You can’t stop terrorism. If there’s someone out there that wants to commit that act, people won’t even know about it till it’s too late” (LEFG D, P #3).

**Response to terrorism:**

The plans for response by local law enforcement participants to a future terrorist attack are problematic, as described by participants from LEFG D. One local law enforcement participant stated he would leave the area if there was a future terrorist attack. Another local law enforcement participant stated he would call a supervisor for direction. Upon being presented with the possibility that communications could be compromised in the event of an attack, one local law enforcement participant jokingly mentioned the use of homing pigeons, while another stated it would mean he is on vacation. While one local law enforcement participant stated that he believed that his instincts would take over, another stated that they are trained how to respond when communications are not functioning, but declined to provide any further information.

**Perceptions of community policing:**

There was disagreement among both community and law enforcement participants as to the existence or level of community policing in their communities. There were statements that implied that there was not a consistent message sent to police officers regarding the expectations or support of community policing. “Different administrations want different things” (LEFG B, P #5). There were some criticisms of the contrast between the training for and the application of

community policing: “Matter of fact things they taught us [at the police academy] is almost the opposite of what we’re told to do here and that’s as far as they wanted us that community policing to be become familiar with particular areas or working in one area and the people in it. Here you can be in different area each week (LEFG B, P #4).

Some participants were very supportive of community policing and discussed their volunteer work in the community they serve: “Community policing is bigger than community policing. Community policing goes deeper. I coach, [participant #4] coaches. We get to interact with the kids; they see us in a different light. If they do have a problem, or if they do know something, or something that happened, then they’ll come tell you. There’s no compensation for us, it’s just us giving up our time. If [participant #2] could afford to pay the taxes, they might stay a little bit closer. Community policing is lost because you can’t keep the officers in the community” (LEFG C, P #5).

Volunteer community activity on the part of law enforcement agents is expressed as unsolicited and without compensation from the agency. An issue in some communities is that the local law enforcement may feel they need to live outside the community due to financial strain. Living outside a community may lead to decreased availability or desire for volunteerism in the work community. Some local law enforcement participants implied a greater disconnect between members of the community and law enforcement agents that live outside the community. “You have officers who come to work miserable because they have to drive hour and a have to get here” (LEFG C, P #1). Although an officer that lives and works in the same community may have stronger ties to the community, this is beyond the scope of this research and warrants future examination.

Preexisting relationships may present obstacles for effective community policing. As stated by one participant: “Another problem with the community, we don’t really have the greatest fans either, as far as police are concerned, and not just because of what’s been going on here, but I’ve been here for [specific number] of years and since I can remember, the police department has been treated like we are a necessary evil. If it were up to them, they would get rid of probably a hundred of us and keep a handful. Obviously, they don’t see on paper what goes on in this community, but we’ve always been treated like we’re a necessary evil, not needed. If your [local government] is treating you like that and that’s their message and that’s the way that they go about it, that kind of makes it hard to create a link and a connection with the community already” (LEFG C, P #2).

“Community policing in this department, the intent is good, the impression they want to give is good, but it doesn’t work the way it should because the [community police] officers pulled for something else. They get pulled for court; they get pulled for transports; they get pulled for crossings... when you have people within the department who believe that community policing is a waste of time, and that the officers sit down at the substation and don’t do anything, but read the newspaper – that’s a shame” (LEFG C, P #1).

While effective community policing requires support at all levels of the department, law enforcement participants have stated that high ranking members of their respective departments are not supportive of community policing: “The chief is not out there and that he needs to be more visible; he’s a major component of it, but even if he authorizes all the changes to be made, if the guys don’t do it then it doesn’t matter; it’s not going to get done. It goes back to that hiring, of putting individuals in place that are going to have that mindset. We know all the cops who have problems in community, whether it’s with rank, or without rank. We know who they are.

[The community knows the names of the officers that have problems dealing with the community and they have a bigger impact than other cops that are seen in a positive light.” (LEFG C, P #4).

Trust between the community and the local law enforcement has historically been a problematic issue. As one community participant contends: “Trust comes from knowing people. I don’t trust anybody, unless I get to know them and then still I don’t always trust them... Trust, in general, comes from knowing somebody on a personal level. [This community] is lacking community policing because I don’t think police have that kind of relationship with the community” (CFG B, P #3).

Some participants are skeptical of the potential effectiveness of community policing. One local law enforcement participant affirms that the community will not subscribe to community engagement until there is a clear presentation that there is no choice other than to become a stakeholder in the safety and security of the community: “Well, I think that the only way that there will be an effective change is if, or when, something does happen. That’s when people will decide that they want to develop their relationship. It can’t just be an effort on our part, trying to go door to door. It can’t just be an effort of us trying to reach out to them. It has to be them trying to reach out to us; it has to be a 50-50 thing. That’s the only way it’s going to work. But the only way they’re going to do it, and it goes back to what I said before, it has to affect them directly and until then there’s not going to be anything” (LEFG C, P #3).

## **Limitations**

This research was exploratory and therefore not intended to provide generalizable results, rather the research was intended to provide a foundation for future research by providing data that supports the use of community policing as a model for proactive counter-terrorism across the United States. The study was limited by many factors, including the time and resources available to the researcher during this project. The relatively low number of participants (N = 52) limits the statistical analyses that can be conducted on the data collected. In addition to the sample size, not every participant answered every question, although most did, and one participant ended involvement prior to the completion of the focus group and did not fill out an exit survey.

For one of the five locations, the researcher was unable to obtain participation from a corresponding community group. Over the course of two months, the researcher attempted to schedule a community focus group, but was unsuccessful, despite contacting public officials and individuals associated with community groups. Due to time limitations, the researcher decided to proceed with analyses with four community groups, as there was not vast variation among the four other community focus groups conducted. This missing community focus group may negatively impact the validity of the findings.

During one of the law enforcement focus groups, the recording device malfunctioned, recording approximately fifteen minutes of the hour and a half focus group. This prevented the researcher from being able to compare the transcript created by a research assistant at the time of the focus group with the audio recording of the focus group. The researcher made some minor changes to the transcript for which the audio was not available, but based on the accuracy of the

transcript provided by the research assistant, when compared with the fifteen minutes recorded, the researcher is confident that the substance of the final abridged transcript is a fair and accurate representation of the focus group.

The findings from this study are not generalizable to the target population, urban and suburban communities in the US, as there are significant differences among communities and the local law enforcement agencies that serve them, due to issues such as location (geography and topography), economy, and population (diversity and density) of the community. There are numerous variables that will impact the interaction between the local law enforcement agencies and communities which may either promote or hinder the partnership between the police and the community. Included in these variables is the diversity of the agency, the socioeconomic status of the community, the resources available to the community, geographic considerations, such as the number of police officers covering a geographic area, and pre-existing or historical issues between the police and the community.

As with any survey instrument, some of the participants may have misunderstood, misinterpreted, or misread the directions. Some of the language or phrasing of statements provided in the questionnaires and surveys may have been confusing to the participants. Throughout the nine focus groups conducted, there were a minimum of two occurrences in which there appeared to have been, based on the vignettes provided by the individuals in the focus groups, incidents in which the participant filled out the survey using the opposite response from the Likert-type scale instructions that were printed on the top of each survey. Despite the fact that the researcher emphasized the order of the possible responses prior to providing the

participants with the survey instruments at the end of the focus group, some of the participants may have unintentionally provided answers that were contrary to their perspectives.

The concept of distance is not consistent among all regions in the US. While the distances discussed in the Smith et al. (2006, 2008) research may have significance, the application of the concept of locality to those distances may differ based on geographic features and population density. In a rural section of the US, the distance of fifty miles may be perceived as a small distance, while the same distance in an urban center may be perceived as a very large distance. The operationalization of distance may need to vary across the types of areas examined in order to provide results that are more applicable to the target population, which could be a much greater factor for research conducted in rural environments; however, this study did not include rural communities.

## **Contribution**

This research, which utilized both quantitative and qualitative measures, represents an innovative study, which has not been attempted before. This study, through the utilization of focus groups in conjunction with questionnaires and surveys, has the potential to uncover a wealth of information not yet considered by terrorism researchers. The variables among the communities and the local law enforcement agencies, which were in three different states, also enhance the generalizability of the findings. Replication of this study would be relatively simple, both among communities and law enforcement agencies around the country. Furthermore, this study provides an innovative tool in the community oriented policing repertoire and assessment tool about the state of proactive policing on the local level.

The policy implications of this study are significant in their application to counter-terrorism and law enforcement in general. This research provides insight that may assist police trainers, educators and academics in efforts to design training that will adapt current training related to community oriented policing to address the phenomenon of terrorism. In addition, this research may enhance the development of training modules and or policy/procedures regarding in-service or academy training in the area of community mobilization and intelligence gathering. Properly trained police will be able to facilitate community involvement, providing, as per Routine Activities Theory, an extension of the capable guardian and diminishing the suitability of local targets. A cost benefit analysis, including human, social, political and economic costs, will likely find that the cost of responding to a major terrorist attack is significantly greater than the costs associated with providing increased training for local law enforcement and the community.

## Conclusion

The relationship between local police and the community can have a significant impact on the ability of police to gather intelligence and identify individuals involved in the planning of or preparatory acts that precede an act of terrorism. The Smith et al. (2006, 2008) studies provide evidence that nearly half of these individuals both reside and conduct planning and preparation for an act of terrorism in relatively close proximity to the target location (within about 30 miles). Community policing provides a foundation for a comprehensive proactive response to the threat of terrorism. Effective implementation of community policing will increase community cooperation and communication with local law enforcement. Employing Cohen & Felson's (1979) Routine Activities Theory (RAT), the community becomes an extension of the capable guardians, leading to a decrease in acts of terrorism. Greater trust, communication and partnership between the community and its local law enforcement agency will help to deter all criminal activity, including, but not limited to, acts of terrorism.

This research has found evidence of overwhelming support for the implementation of community policing in an effort to provide a proactive approach to counter-terrorism, both among community and local law enforcement participants. Among the ten research questions, this study found support for a majority of the hypotheses presented. Among the first eight hypotheses, the greatest support was for the hypothesis most closely linked to the application of community policing in proactive counter-terrorism; Research Hypothesis #8, which stated that "an effective method to gather intelligence about local terrorist activity is through communication with members of the community". This is the basis for the application of RAT

as a theoretical model, providing an extension of the capable guardianship necessary to deter or detect crime, specifically in relation to terrorism.

Due to the size of the sample, the demographic variables collected during from the questionnaires were not able to provide any significant tendencies, although these variables, which include age, racial self-identification, socio-economic status, and education, provide for interesting future research possibilities. During the research there was some anecdotal evidence of differences based on these demographic factors, especially among race and socio-economic status, which was not altogether unexpected. Future research further examining the impact of these demographic variables on the perspectives of both community and law enforcement may provide guidance in enacting policies designed to both foster community policing and address the phenomenon of terrorism in order to effectively reach all components of society.

Individuals involved in planning and preparing for a terrorist attack are likely to take precautionary measures, such as avoiding populations that have close relations with law enforcement; therefore the areas that have strained relations with law enforcement will be more attractive, as the probability of individuals in such a community will be less likely to provide information. This issue must be addressed if community policing is to have a significant impact on preventing future terrorist attacks in the US. Communities that have historical issues with law enforcement, such as low income, minority, and immigrant communities, are most vulnerable to penetration by individuals associated with the violent radical ideologies that encourage the use of violence against civilians. Although it is unrealistic to conceive of eliminating all those proponents of violence, the knowledge that community members have the ability to decrease the probability of an attack can provide empowerment to and increase resiliency of civilians.

The overwhelming support for community policing as a tool for local law enforcement to counter terrorism provides a foundation for future research. There are significant policy implications to this research, as it may provide a new way of addressing the phenomenon of terrorism, providing deterrence on a local level utilizing existing available resources. The costs associated with providing regular training and information to local law enforcement and members of the community is significantly less than the costs associated with another successful terrorist attack. There are segments of the population in the US that may be, for a variety of reasons, more vulnerable to radical ideologies, but the relationships between local law enforcement and the community have the potential to detect and deter terrorist attacks, for which much of the planning and preparation occurs locally. In part due to the shift in the leadership of the US, there is great potential to address the phenomenon of terrorism so as to reduce the prevalence of terrorist attacks. With the increasing lethality of terrorist attacks in recent years, against targets both in the US and on foreign lands, there is reason to believe that if this issue is not addressed, the next major attack could be comparable to, or more devastating than, the attacks of 9/11.

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## **Appendix A: Law Enforcement Focus Group A (1208723)**

**Researcher:** [Introduction.]

Participant #2: Why is this process so formal?

**Researcher:** Consent is required by the IRB for any research that uses human subjects.

Participant #7: Why is the study limited to police stations and communities? Why not open this up to other types of agencies, such as the fire department.

**Researcher:** This is an exploratory study with limited resources. [Further explanation of why the study is limited to community groups and local law enforcement & brief discussion of project]

**Researcher:** What is terrorism?

Participant #1: Individual or group who use the threat of violence or violence to influence the political views on another section of the world.

**Researcher:** That definition is very close to the FBI definition of terrorism.

Participant #1: That's where I got it.

**Researcher:** There are many definitions. Does anyone else have a definition of terrorism?

Participant #7: Acts or incidents that are committed by a single or a group of people, whose primary focus is to induce overwhelming fear to another group of people.

Participant #3: Doesn't have to be political group. It could be any group.

**Researcher:** Other than political what else could it be?

Participant #7: It could be any radical group or it could be just a single person.

Participant #3: Religious, racial.

Participant #4: Use of fear to accomplish one's goal.

**Researcher:** Can you have a state commit an act of terrorism? Enemies of the US may say that the US commits acts of terrorism.

Participant #1: If you try and influence someone using violence then its terrorism.

**Researcher:** Is there a difference between war and terrorism?

Participant #1: Depends on whose viewpoint; the person committing act would not call it terrorism.

Participant #7: There are clear rules for the engagement of war covered by the Geneva Convention that specify the difference between states, conflicts, police actions. There are international definitions of each.

Participant #5: I think the difference is who the target is. Terrorists tend to target innocent people, civilians, where a war tends to be army vs. army or a designated group of people who are fighting each other for a purpose, while terrorism involves innocent people that have no reason to be targeted, other than their beliefs.

**Researcher:** Should that make a difference? Who the target is? Whether it's a government. For example, the roadside bombs in Iraq are often referred to as terrorism. Should it be a different definition if it's an attack on a police station, a military facility, a governmental office or school, a bank or a supermarket?

Participant #7: Depends on those incidents what the target is. If it's the Iraqi people engaged in road side bombings clearly at American armed forces then you could draw a closer line of an act of war because they are protecting their country. However, when they are using roadside bombs and IED's directed at their own people to influence that group of people to either side with, or prevent something they are politically against then it would more align itself with an act of terrorism.

Participant #2: No clear adversaries. The enemy is not well defined in terrorism. It's not like it's an organized army. It's not always violence; it can just be fear of violence, reprisal, economic sanction, disease – like when people send powder around, purported to be anthrax, to create fear

**Researcher:** What's the goal of terrorism?

Participant #5: Align your beliefs with someone else.

Participant #7: Induce fear into other human beings.

**Researcher:** What's the purpose in making other people afraid?

Participant #1: To influence them. Induce fear to influence beliefs.

Participant #2: To take their side.

Participant #4: Not necessarily to make someone believe, but to not go against them. To impact someone else's behavior, but not necessarily change their views. Like the Sunnis and Shias in Iraq blowing each other up. They don't necessarily want them to convert. They don't have to agree with their views, just not go against them.

**Researcher:** So, are you saying it's to impact someone else's behavior?

Participant #2: To get them to conform to their beliefs.

Participant #7: It may be just to inflict fear. There may be those people that use terrorism, not to move anyone's opinion, but just for inflicting fear itself. Not to change anyone's belief.

Participant #1: Radical Islamists just want to kill us, not make us convert to Islam.

Participant #5: They want to destroy us.

Participant #2: Does economic or political gain not come into play?

**Researcher:** [Operationalization of terrorism for study]

**Researcher:** Is terrorism an important problem for law enforcement?

Participant #3: Yes.

Participant #1: It wasn't until 9/11.

**Researcher:** Did it not exist before 9/11?

Participant #1: It did; Oklahoma City.

Participant #7: The first WTC bombing in 1993. Unfortunately, at that particular point it just wasn't a recognizable viable concern of law enforcement as a major mission.

Participant #4: We saw it domestically with PETA, [the environmentalists] burning areas in California, but I don't think they meant for those firefighters to die.

Participant #3: For years there have been groups. Since KKK its' existed

Participant #2: Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber.

Participant #3: Eric Rudolph, the Olympic bombing.

**Researcher:** What changed to make it so important?

Participant #2: The scale. So many people died [in 9/11].

Participant #5: It was on TV. So many people die in car crashes every day, but because it was one event in which so many people died.

Participant #4: Hits the news more because it's so sensational.

Participant #7: First major domestic event was Oklahoma. That's probably when law enforcement started to get concerned.

Participant #7: Most people don't even know about the first WTC bombing before Oklahoma. Many people were not concerned with the first WTC bombing, unless they were part of law enforcement. I don't think many people realized the impact of the first WTC bombing. They recognize Oklahoma City as one of the first terrorist attacks.

Participant #2: [Terrorism] is new in this country, but it's been going on around the world for years.

Participant #7: I mean on level of law enforcement to be concerned or become involved or begin to recognize it as a training issue or hot spot where law enforcement officers need to be concerned.

**Researcher:** Is the issue of terrorism important for your agency?

Participant #3: No.

Participant #2: It should be.

Participant #8: It's important, but it's not a priority.

Participant #6: We don't have a lot of activity.

Participant #8: But we do have potential areas that could be.

Participant #7: Recognition is a major concern and community policing is good for that. Community policing can help identify precursors and bringing in information. There is a greater opportunity with training and recognition for those precursors that may trigger an officer's awareness to terrorism, coupled with community policing where officers are now out into the community and have a heightened awareness to it. They may recognize incidents that occur and may be more apt to report them to an intelligence division. There is a great correlation between terrorism awareness and problem oriented policing.

**Researcher:** You mentioned potential. What were you referring to?

Participant #6: Great potential we have [major highway] that comes straight though near here.

Participant #7: Based on what we know of that corridor, probably a fair amount of people that were involved in 9/11 travelled through this area on the [major highway] and through our community. They stayed in [neighboring community]. They tested their devices prior to the 1993 bombing in [neighboring community]. There is certainly an area of concern for us being on the corridor.

Participant #6: We have [major highway]. We have the train. They all run right through [here] every day.

Participant #2: We have a truck stop.

Participant #1: A reservoir.

Participant #4: We have an animal research center that's gotten a lot of bomb threats. That is a potential target. Somebody is going to bomb that place someday. It's just a matter of time. They are a huge company that does major animal research.

Participant #2: There are biotech industries in town.

Participant #5: The [major highway] goes right over the top of the reservoir.

Participant #1: During one of the last counterterrorism classes I took, someone said that Al Qaeda wants to take over a rural school, like in [neighboring community] where there are few police and there would be a slower response, and kill all the kids. Cops are encouraged to always carry their guns because you never know what's going to happen.

Participant #6: The problem is we're aware of these potential targets but there are always local issues that overshadow those risks. We know, as a group, that these potential targets exist, but there is always something else that comes up that is perceived by the public as being more important, i.e. someone's parking...so it gets overshadowed. We can laugh about those things, but that is the reality. Resources go to the squeaky wheel, and the squeaky wheel doesn't look at what we do.

Participant #7: But, more importantly, we haven't been serious enough in the training of officers at a recognition stage and provide them with good solid information so that they can recognize a potential sleeper group or something like that when they may be handling something completely unrelated to a terrorism incident. We have not trained our officers to recognize potential terrorist activity or individuals that are planning a terrorist attack.

Participant #1: New York City is starting to do that.

Participant #4: To be able to recognize things that are out of the ordinary.

Participant #7: Or things like lots of computer lines, etc. We just don't give them techniques to recognize a potential threat when responding to regular calls. We don't pass on that information. The fire department has access to people's homes, but we haven't provided them with the techniques to recognize a potential incident. They would just assume the guy was a computer geek, as opposed to providing communication services for terrorist activity.

**Researcher:** When did you start community policing?

Participant #8: We just started doing a community policing project.

Participant #2: It started this morning (followed by laughter from the group).

Participant #4: About a month.

Participant #7: Working on preparing it for a year but we're just recently started. It's a work in progress. Over the last month, we have gotten down to assigning sectors, geographical policing, and responsibility for officers and supervisors.

**Researcher:** What is community policing?

Participant #3: Getting to know your neighborhood and the people in it.

Participant #1: Community participation, having officers talk to the community; find out what they want; getting people to police their own neighborhood through the police.

**Researcher:** What is necessary to do that?

Participant #5: One of the hurdles is that the community has become more of an individual... you don't know your neighbors as well as before. You can go to people's houses that have lived in a community for 10 years don't know their neighbor's name. There's no more of that apple pie, having you kids play next door mentally. Everybody has isolated themselves. The biggest hurdle is to get the community to open up to themselves, and not so much the police.

Participant #5: People need to take a stake in their neighborhood.

Participant #1: The community doesn't necessarily trust the police. [Discussion of history of local police corruption and police that were fired and arrested in nearby regions]

Participant #7: It requires a huge cultural change to get back to a community policing model where officers are, on a day to day basis, engaged with community on their own without being directed. It becomes a cultural change for an agency that has not engaged [the community] for some time.

**Researcher:** So you are saying that it requires cultural change both for the agency and the community.

Participant #7: Absolutely.

**Researcher:** You mentioned something earlier about training for police. Does community policing also involve training for community as well?

Participant #7: Oh, yeah.

Participant #4: Certainly.

Participant #7: For terrorism based incidents?

**Researcher:** For anything. More general, but could also relate to terrorism.

Participant #2: Why not?

Participant #8: Meet with communities and teach them to interact and communicate with us.

Participant #3: Teach them to report things that seem out of place in their neighborhood or places that they are familiar; cars, people, etc.

Participant #1: In NY, the commercials and signs help, such as in the subways. You can help teach the public, teach them with signs about you see something say something. That's training for the community.

Participant #8: Amtrak or Metro North. The signs are everywhere. You go to Penn Station or Grand Central. They are basically using every passenger for community policing. Everywhere you go, that's what they want you to do; be their eyes and ears. We can't be everywhere, so ...

Participant #4: You use all passengers to help you patrol.

**Researcher:** Is it enough to tell them?

Participant #6: We've started with the community academy; we've had one or two sessions with the citizens academy to actually teach them what we do; they can spread that out there and tell others.

Participant #7: There is no training that deals with terrorism or community policing. It's something we haven't adopted yet. Certainly at the foundational level, developing communication, directed communication, through a neighborhood and meeting their own quality of life needs has to be established and that conduit developed before a training process goes back into the community. The first step is to establish communication. Once you develop good communication with that group, you can then provide training.

**Researcher:** You mentioned that neighbors don't really know each other. Is there a sense of community among the residents of your jurisdiction?

Participant #6: [Specific neighborhood] does, but some areas only.

Participant #1: Some areas.

Participant #3: Some areas.

Participant #5: Some areas.

Participant #6: The smaller, like [specific neighborhood] has its own nucleus of people that have associations; [another specific neighborhood] has it; [another specific neighborhood] does.

Participant #2: Suburbs of our jurisdiction do.

Participant #6: Still it's small. The rest of them are just families that have moved in; they haven't taken stake in the community; they just move in because they like the area and they just go to work every day.

Participant #1: That's part of the problem; the moms & dads buy these houses for a million dollars; they got to work 18 hours a day and they're never home.

**Researcher:** How would you characterize the amount of cooperation between community and police?

Participant #2: Fair.

Participant #8: Getting better.

Participant #6: In progress.

**Researcher:** How has it changed recently?

Participant #3: It's [community policing] just starting; it's so new so you can't really judge that yet.

Participant #6: I've had a different outlook over the last year. We're working on it.

Participant #7: I've gone to a lot of meetings with both business and residents and I've lived here, as a few of us still do, but many of us who may have been born here have moved to other communities, and I spend not only my day working here, I also spend off-duty time here. Over the past year, the number of people have expressed a higher degree of satisfaction with the police has increased two or three fold. I think that public opinion of the police is very high.

Participant #4: We've become more proactive rather than reactive. We're out there aggressively meeting with groups, meeting with the neighborhoods, instead of just going from complaint to complaint. Until we arrest all the people that actually make the complaint and then they hate us again. You get complaints from people about all the speeders going through the neighborhood and then the people you arrest are the people who called in the first place.

Participant #5: I think some part of it too is that with community policing you're problem solving as opposed to just report taking. You're getting more into the essence of the problem, instead of taking a report every time the problem occurs, so people understand you're really trying to solve the problem so it's not a repeat issue and the community understands that instead of having to call every time, the problem is no longer there to call about. You get more of a sense of community involvement. They are happier with the police department because the problems are being taken care of as opposed to just reported and documented. I think that will go a long way and you will see an increase in the participation from the community and the acceptance of us because of that. It's a huge societal change to get them to go from not knowing the guy upstairs someone to get involved in a block watch or the community and actually know more than their neighbors name to identifying a terrorist cell group within your condominium complex. I mean that's a huge jump to ask society to do and I think it will take a huge effort. We get calls about Johnny playing his music too loud next door. The first thing I will do is ask "what did you say to Johnny" or "what did he say when you asked him to turn it down" and people say "I didn't ask him to turn it down, I don't even know him". Now we are going to ask these same people to know Johnny's name and Johnny's mother's name and Johnny's phone number, but to get involved with Johnny and identify all these things happening in their community, streets or neighborhoods. It's a huge societal change, huge.

**Researcher:** Are you, as individuals, willing to work with community and engage in community policing?

Participant #3: Some are.

Participant #7: Absolutely.

Participant # 6: It varies among the men.

Participant #8: Some are buying in some aren't.

**Researcher:** What percent are not willing?

Participant #3: Hard to tell cause it's too early

Participant #1: Some people will just complain about anything. "I went to work and they are actually trying to make me work." Crazy.

Participant #5: Cops will complain about everything

Participant #3: One of the responses I get is "What, are they going to call me when I'm at home if they have a problem" or "They will think I'm their private police officer."

Participant #7: Because of this department's size, it would take the entire department to do community policing. We don't have the luxury of a lot of men for community policing.

Community policing ties up almost every person on patrol, so almost everyone is involved. Almost everybody has some stake or involvement in the community policing effort.

**Researcher:** Are their costs to community policing, involving the community in law enforcement functions?

Participant #8: Financial or otherwise

**Researcher:** How might it be a financial cost?

Participant #8: We have a matrix team that is a financial cost. The overtime costs associated with community policing.

**Researcher:** I'm referring to costs to the community itself?

Participant #7: Do you mean does community policing have a negative impact on the community itself?

**Researcher:** That could be an aspect.

Participant #6: Their neighbors could retaliate for giving information to the police. That would be a cost.

Participant #2: A person had rocks thrown at their house.

Participant #3: One's person got their house bombarded with rocks because of this.

Participant #2: We know who the kids are that threw the rocks.

Participant #6: In different areas there are different degrees of retaliation.

**Researcher:** How do you deal with these costs?

Participant #4: It's a lesser of two evils. Do you want another twin towers and have three thousand people die or do you want say there's something suspicious with your neighbors? I'm sure there is no easy answer. Like in big cities, with gangs – do you want to have kids keep dying or do you want to go to the police?

**Researcher:** What would that entail on the part of the police?

Participant #4: Massive meetings, from the clergy to the public; politicians and everybody working together with the police department, having interaction with them. You need to communicate that we would do everything in our power to help them with their problems if they call us. It just comes down to a trust issue. I don't think that's going to happen overnight. At some point someone will say "you know what, I don't want that to happen,

and I'm not going to fear giving information because I'm afraid for myself. It could be worse for more people than just me."

Participant #3: It's difficult. People don't want to get involved. Everybody is afraid. We get phone calls, "I don't want to get involved, but this is happening"

Participant #7: It would take a concerted, focused effort from our own agency to train our men in terrorism awareness and prevention and also get the same information to the general populous and neighborhoods. I still believe that awareness is low. It comes at a cost, whether I provide an officer with training. A community member may see something as a potential threat and may mention it to an officer in passing and that officer, without training, may fail to recognize it as anything, as a potential incident. I don't think our department has the skills or knowledge to recognize terrorism precursors, correct me if I'm wrong guys. There are probably only a handful of officers that have received specific training. On a day to day, everyone has so much on their mind that it's hard to be proactive.

**Researcher:** Most of the information about terrorism is very flawed which is a problem. It's only recently that academics are finally starting to do quality research, mostly after 9/11.

Participant #7: Prevention and awareness aside, we haven't even seen enough training to respond to terrorist events; i.e. suicide bombers. Remove the awareness segment, our officers are not even trained enough to respond to a terrorist event or anywhere in the state.

**Researcher:** What about your specialists, such as SWAT?

Participant #1: Our guys are more trained more frequently and not to just shoot a suicide bomber right away but we're not really trained to react specifically to terrorist attacks...

Participant #7: But I'm talking about incidents that are not as clear cut like the guy who's running through a station with a backpack with wires hanging out and he's repeatedly been told by police to stop, the rules of engagement are different then...

Participant #1: The guy could just be someone with an iPod running late for work.

**Researcher:** There has been some recent research regarding terrorism and time and distance; half of the actors lived, planned & prepared within a 30 mile radius [discussion of Smith et.al (2006, 2008) research].

**Researcher:** What is risk level in your community?

Participant #3: Low

Participant #1: There is an operation in New York City that is trying to learn about terrorism through other departments in a 90 mile radius around NYC. They train officers to report

back any incident because although the terrorist attack may happen in this community, but the terrorists are making their bombs in a nearby town or city. This community may not be the center of an attack, but may be a location where preparation occurs. The terrorists may be staying in this community while preparing to attack a nearby area.

Participant #7: The operation in New York City is like a criminal intelligence division. Other cities have similar, programs like Boston. Another hold up in the information sharing process is due to some material being classified, or information that has not been declassified, so that we can't share. I still see that as a huge problem.

**Researcher:** I want to get some feedback on what you think is the best way to get feedback about terrorist activity in your community.

Participant #2: Regional terrorism task force

**Researcher:** I'm talking more local. How do you get information from the people in your community?

Participant #3: Community policing meetings

Participant #1: Meetings

Participant #5: I think a lot of it comes back to training. If you don't have someone trained to recognize information and pass it along. If information is not being filtered properly, then it's garbage in. [You need] training for officers and members of the community. Information comes in constantly and a good portion of it is not being filtered properly. The first part is proper training in identifying the issues that are coming in; it's the most important part.

Participant #7: I believe it's not a matter of if something happens on American soil; it's a question of when. We're in a perfect position now with community policing and problem oriented policing, since our officers are interacting more with the community and with the proper training this right information will be recognized and brought back. With proper training and the implementation of problem oriented and community policing, the likelihood that information will be identified will certainly increase.

Participant #1: I also think we have to keep terrorism, or counter-terrorism, in the forefront. People get complacent now but it wasn't like that right after 9/11, when people were always calling the police about suspected terrorism. We were responding to calls like that all the time. Now everybody is more complacent and thinks that it's not going to happen. It's not on their mind every day. We need to have government, through information, keep this stuff in the front of people's mind.

Participant #3: It's like the alert levels.

Participant #5: The different alerts, yellow, orange, red; people didn't know what to do with the alerts. There was no training. There was nothing. They changed the colors, but that was all. One time my father called me and said "They changed the alert. What are you doing?" and I responded "Nothing."

Participant #4: Media was saying that we were deploying more men at higher alert levels but really when you asked cops about what they did extra they said nothing.

Participant #3: You'd watch the news and it seemed like everybody was reacting to the alert changes, but I don't think any department changed anything.

Participant #7: One of the recommendations of the 9/11 commission was to change the alert system because it's useless. It had no public value. Today you're orange, tomorrow you're yellow. What's the world doing differently?

Participant #6: People aren't going to take it seriously until we take it seriously. We're not prepared. We're not ready... We're not even prepared for active shooters. A training scenario prepared a year ago was never enacted. That's another thing that fell by the wayside. If we had to go into that situation today, we could call our special teams, which would take a half hour to 45 minutes, but are we really ready for it? No. If we're not ready, how can we expect the public to have trust in us? We talk about a lot of things, but we don't do a lot.

Participant #1: One of the problems is they sent me and another guy to active shooter instructor school, which cost a thousand dollars each and took a week. We came back and set up a training course, but were told we don't have enough time to teach this. Now we don't have the money to do anything with that afterwards. We were told we don't have the time to teach it.

Participant #2: It comes down to training. We are told there are manpower shortages, we can't do this.

Participant #1: We're told we can't do it.

**Researcher:** That relates to costs associated with counter-terrorism. When you take the time to train individuals, you take an officer off the street.

Participant #1: Yes.

Participant #7: All of these incidents are local. Nothing starts out on the national level. All these situations are local. The people that are responsible for training have to recognize the need. If you were to query our boss, the top three issues are crime, the fear of crime, and motor vehicle accidents.

**Researcher:** Any comments or questions before we finish this up? I am going to ask you to complete a survey about what we have discussed. Thank you for your participation.

## **Appendix B: Community Focus Group A (03080723)**

**Researcher:** Introduction

**Researcher:** What is terrorism?

Participant #8: The use of violence to meet some political or social end or...

**Researcher:** Using violence to obtain some political or other ideological objective

Participant #4: Isn't always violence. Could be some sort of espionage. The bad guys are trying to infiltrate or destroy our system to then sabotage it through acquiring information which ultimately might be used to prompt violence; people who go on the internet and intercept information from government agencies; those are terrorists just as much as those who blow up building

**Researcher:** Some people include acts of preparation for terrorism as acts of terrorism themselves.

Participant #7: The idea of the threat of terrorism, disrupting a sense of confidence in your community and in your policing agencies is as powerful almost as actual explosion itself when and if it ever takes place. Threat to water supply threat to harbor with shipping we have in this region. The idea of it is really a terrorist.

**Researcher:** What does the threat do/cause?

Participant #3: Fear

Participant #5: Disrupts lifestyle you're used to and can feel comfortable in.

Participant #7: Makes you question things to when you talk about policing are we doing enough can we handle it? Our first selectman just sent us all voicemail message telling us system is up and running. When will it happen, who will tell us, where will we go? All those things make you feel very insecure and put pressure on people that you are hoping are doing the job of taking care of you and anticipating and staying ahead of the curve on these things.

**Researcher:** What do terrorists want to do?

Participant #8: I think ultimately when I think of it is about someone who wants to change my way of life and that creates some sort of anxiety I just want to go along and raise my kids, live my life and not have anxiety about sending my kids to school and you know, even as probably unlikely as it is there's times I sit there and think what would I do if what better target is there than school children to put fear into you. 10 years ago I didn't, I never had to think about that and every now and then it flashes we don't have that sort of freedom to enjoy our lives

**Researcher:** Does the target matter?

Participant #5: It would to a certain degree. But I think it wakes everybody up, what was it anthrax in mail, paranoid about taking your mail in and opening mail and then wash your hands after opening it, even though there's nothing there. There could be. It's just stuff we're not used to having to think about. It changes your whole lifestyle.

Participant #3: Vulnerability is a big factor. People that either aren't expecting it or are just vulnerable by definition in terms of target ...

**Researcher:** Should the type of target have an impact on the definition of terrorism?

Participant #4: I would say so. I don't think the world is ever going to be the same after 9/11. Everybody approaches life totally differently. This weekend I am taking my 2 grandsons New York to game which I may regret, for fear of losing kids for one thing and game held at Yankee Stadium and 50,000 people you do think differently going into those situations where there are lots of people, everybody thinks going in differently which you didn't think of prior to 9/11. Also, the Superbowl being played ... and high security going on. We don't bring it down to this level as much here, but there are times when it's thought about, kids in school. All part of what's happened since that infamous day.

Participant #2: I think what's changed in prior years we've had wars in past and now the rules of engagement have changed; there was always an understating especially I think that as Americans the only wars we have on own grounds was civil war and revolutionary war, we were removed from the impact and violence of war to that extent; previously military fighting military and now it's much more of a guerilla type operation, let's attack the public even it's only small attacks, creates sense feeling of unrest not only in war situation but also in our daily lives. Sense of unrest in world and certainly more recently in U.S.

Participant #7: It's become more mainstream. I remember the 1993 WTC bombing and blind sheik. They had said they were coming back to take it down and everybody knew that and the people who were involved in the business of terrorism really understood that but American public didn't understand and we're so far removed, separate from rest of world we're almost our own continent. They came back to send message and make a huge statement and they did it in the financial community and I think they shocked themselves they were able to take them down, take them both down now everybody is aware and it's in our molecular structure we now begin to look around in new ways. And even if you relax a little between terrorist possibilities and you worry if it's terrorism or just another crazy wacko, you immediately go to terrorist place.

**Researcher:** Does the target matter?

Participant #8: I was taking with my son, who is just 13, about World War II and the resistance, and there were resistance groups that targeted official government agencies. We're going down a path determined by your perspective can you give definition to when it is actually

terrorism, one side thinks they're right and the other side thinks they are right. I agree with [participant #4], even if they attack a police station if you have someone hiding behind civilian façade to perpetrate fear for objective or produce fear for kicks, it's still terrorism.

Participant #7: It's interesting, in global context, in some context yesterdays' terrorist is tomorrow's freedom fighter. The Irgun, who blew up the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, and Menachem Begin was a part of that group, became Israel's Prime Minister many, many years later after fighting for Israel's freedom. It's gets squishy and fuzzy around the edges. Part of the revolutionary war.

**Researcher:** [Operationalization of terrorism] Is terrorism an important factor in your community?

Participant #1: No.

Participant #5: Not a problem but something you always have to keep in the back of your mind. We are not a high terrorism area but you never know. I think it's an important problem, not a problem but something we always have to keep in back of mind that can happen anywhere. People think we live in a comfortable shoreline community with only 10,000 people in town and we're a summer colony, but we are not, we are small city but we don't look at ourselves that way but yet it's something that has to be considered. Are we high terror rate, no I don't think so but God knows, you never know.

Participant #4: I don't think of or look at our community as being the same type of target as going to the city, just because of the masses and the impact. They didn't crash into the old telephone company on Church St. They got maximum impact of what they ended up doing, by crashing into those two towers down there. I look upon my going to New York next week differently than going to town to have a cup of coffee. I don't think about it when I come in here. Maybe it does exist. Maybe I look at them and look at them twice but it goes away pretty quick. But I don't think of us as any kind of target.

Participant #7: I go to New York two days a week but I don't worry about it at all there.

Participant #5: I don't go to New York, but I do travel to Boston and feel very comfortable there. I don't know why but I just avoid it. But every time my husband says let's go to NY, I say later.

Participant #4: Did you originally, the first time you went down there after the attacks feel uncomfortable?

Participant #7: But I have to be there on business. I used to live right overlooking the World Trade Center, but shortly after 9/11 I moved here permanently. We can say that it impacted me. I came on weekends and then suddenly I realized I wasn't going back. It changed my life.

Participant #5: To the comfortable shoreline community.

Participant #4: In 2001 your attitude to living in a city is different than it is today. You haven't seen any serious issues.

Participant #7: I feel a presence in New York; a secure presence. It may be a product of just being there a lot and seeing my friends who feel comfortable there. I love the subways it's my favorite way to get around. If I go in, I take subway everywhere. I feel comfortable there.

Participant #4: What do you mean by presence?

Participant #7: A presence of police officers. Flight 93 once they knew they were terrorist the citizens on that plane got up I get the feeling New Yorkers people are much more aware; I'm not saying things can't happen without official terrorism; in subways and tunnels any kind of smoke or weird package people get off that subway like crazy, the next stop they're gone. I feel going about my business and friends who seem comfortable.

Participant #1: When you figure what are the odds are that you would be killed, or someone you know or a family member would be killed by terrorists are very slight versus driving to work on I-95 everyday. It is clear which is more dangerous or any bad thing happening. It's just terrorism is so dramatic it seems like more a threat it's so phenomenally unlikely that any of us will be directly affected. I liken it to the difference between walking along a curb on the street you could fall off but you don't worry about it but walking along girder 10 stories up is really scary it's because the consequences are so horrible you don't worry about walking on something 1 foot or 6 inches wide when consequences are nothing. Perception of risk is a little different when very remote something will happen it's prominent in our mind the necessity of spending a lot of resources on such a phenomenally slight risk seems odd.

Participant #8: I agree with you partly and I differ in this respect. If I'm in a car accident, I can understand that and I clearly understand that's far more likely to happen than being blown up by a terrorist here. Know that it is likely to happen but a terrorist attack somewhere in the US anywhere in the US impacts us all. We've been attacked. It's not just something bad happened but somebody is after us. They want to change our way of life. That has been the biggest impact on 9/11 that someone doesn't like the way we live and they went to extreme measures to give us that message. While agree the probability is small we cannot let our guard down. I go to New York City with my kids and I feel relatively safe. I have never been to Yankee Stadium. I would go in with a sense of trepidation or wondering. I can relate to that and I feel safe and I feel there is a huge network of law enforcement and government keeping an eye on it. I would not want those people to relax their guard. We have extremely porous borders, they're streaming across here. I worry about people like the Lackawanna Six. Who would ever have thought that in Lackawanna, that you're going to find somebody?

Participant #7: The homegrown terrorism in London. It's interesting how London reacted to those bombings. They were back on line very fast. The bar got raised on level of fear and how it's going to traumatize citizens sort of an anger component.

Participant #2: I was in London in 1985 when there were Middle East bombings and I was scared to death. And we had to tell everyone we were from Canada. Our group leaders told us to say that. There were bags in front of stores with bombs in them. Really scary. Long history of terrorists attacks [in London].

Participant #3: People think about blowing things up as terrorism but cyber-terrorism is also a big part of terrorism, it's not all explosions. I think everyone's perception of things blowing up in chances of different types of terrorisms actually happening are much greater. Stolen identity should be in more forefront of people's minds because it's more realistic and can happen to people. Cyber terrorism is so much more feasible than something actually blowing up.

Participant #4: You didn't have any of that in your description of terrorism.

**Researcher:** No my definition did not encompass this aspect of terrorism. There are acts that can be committed in preparation for a terrorist attack, to get the necessary resources.

Participant #6: Back to our community though. I don't worry so much about an attack in [this community] but I would be more worried about someone infiltrating our community and advancing up the ranks to then prepare a terrorist attacks because we're not aware where they start.

**Researcher:** [Smith et al. (2006, 2008) research]

**Researcher:** Does your local law enforcement agency engage in community policing methods?

Participant #6: Yes, they're beginning to, yes.

Participant #2: Not in our community.

Participant #4: No

**Researcher:** What is community policing to you?

Participant #5: Having officers out on the street talking with community members. We'll have officers out on the beach and in public places talking to the people and helping them with problems. Going into community-officers do find out problems in different neighborhoods and address them. We've done that.

Participant #4: I would say we don't. I see a lot of things happenings.

Participant #5: We have had community meetings to talk about how citizens feel their concerns are being looked at and hopefully dealt with.

Participant #6: They're also working with the elderly because a lot of crime is geared toward them like identity theft and swindling and how to keep them aware of what's going on and how to handle it.

Participant #4: We've had the chief on local television talking about issues at a local festival talking to people about issues in the community and having police at the festival weekend activities to prevent problems from occurring. I haven't seen that before or if it was talked about before I was not aware of it. There's nothing wrong with that. We didn't have that before or at least you didn't see it as much. It's good.

**Researcher:** What are the components of community policing? What's important about community policing?

Participant #3: I feel like just from what I've seen obviously the contact with the public is a big part but it's the whole mentality of the officers because where they start their mentality is what leads into the community in how they handle the community in the way they look at different problems and where they focus. For community policing to be at all effective it's a whole type of quote unquote, lifestyle change for a department to go through.

Participant #5: Officers are becoming more proactive rather than reactive.

Participant #4: In a nearby city, community policing as I remember had substations in certain neighborhoods to have continuity for the community. When they first got off the ground they were maintained, budget cuts took care of a lot of that, closed down buildings. I don't think that this town will ever get to the point of need for it. What I found in community relations in local contingency of police in your neighborhood. I don't see them in my neighborhood. I recognize a lot but there are a lot that I don't know never saw. At the festival, we joked about the cops being "rent-a-cops." I don't know them all and I'm glad I don't know them all. [Laughter]

**Researcher:** How much cooperation exists between your community and local law enforcement?

Participant #4: What are you looking for? Every time I have an issue they take care of it. I don't have a problem with that.

Participant #5: I'm biased, but I think we have a good interaction.

Participant #8: I've heard from people on harbor road that leads to beach area, I just happen to go down there with my kid and three different people were saying how pleased they were police presence slowing down traffic and they like the things that the dept is implementing. I have issue with traffic and other things in my neighborhood. I can walk in there and feel my concerns are being addressed. My kids also noticed in the past 6

months; “boy there’s a lot of police cars around here these days.” More presence and I don’t see them sitting in parking lot every night like clockwork. So I think it’s improving and I would never when my son’s bikes were stolen in the spring, there’s nothing is they’re not going to do anything. I mentioned it to the chief and he said “you should have called and we would have gotten them back.” I feel more comfortable and confident now.

**Researcher:** How is your community interacting with your local law enforcement?

Participant #2: I attended one of the community meetings down in the beach and there was good turnout. People talked about a whole number of issues. It was for association.

Participant #7: I think this chief has made a difference quite frankly much more proactive understands sense of citizens feeling sense of responsiveness. You’ll always have certain areas whose residents feel they are not getting enough attention. The Chief has helped; people feel that police care more and takes care of more things.

**Researcher:** What are the costs with members of community?

Participant #4: You mean financial? Time? I don’t feel any danger. I think we have a good police department here that is responsive to situations.

Participant #6: When you report crime, they can keep you anonymous you don’t have to give name and address. There is a hotline you can call if you don’t want to give your name.

Participant #5: We pay for a lot of stuff through asset forfeiture so it doesn’t come out of the town budget. We have the police academy that we are starting here in the fall to create part-time police officers. We are going to be training people to be supernumeraries, to take some of the responsibility from the full-time officers.

Participant #8: It’s a cost benefit thing. From the top they’re looking at how to best use resources and moving around to what they allocate funds so that resources are best used. Community policing addresses both crime and the fear of crime.

**Researcher:** What is dangerous about involving community specifically related to counter terrorism responses?

Participant #3: Prejudice. Stereotypes are dangerous. A perfect example is how after 9/11 people with different ethnic backgrounds were treated. You’ll always have some people who take prevention to a higher level than others.

Participant #7: Gossip and rumors this is a small town and can thrive on this. That can really cause pain and suffering and grievances.

**Researcher:** Would you be willing to work with your local community in proactive counterterrorism efforts?

Participant #4: How can you say no? You're not going to go undercover but otherwise why not?

Participant #1: It depends on what I would be asked to do and a very recent experience, homeland security arrested all the males back and shipped them back to Guatemala or wherever. I would not be willing to rat out my neighbors. I have some distrust of homeland security doing things that I don't really make us more secure.

Participant #4: If you have no reason to be suspicious then you wouldn't rat them out right? But if you did then would you?

Participant #1: I don't know that's a little too hypothetical. All I can say is my initial reaction to homeland security coming into my neighborhood did not make me feel more secure.

**Researcher:** I would like to bring the focus back to local law enforcement.

Participant #5: We have something called neighborhood watch and I call them when someone comes to my door late at night and they're not registered with an agency as a vendor.

Participant #8: How much of your freedom do you want intruded on?

Participant #4: If I had reason to be suspicion I wouldn't hesitate to call. With the environment we're in today I don't see why I wouldn't have reason to believe.

Participant #1: It's hard for me to fathom the likelihood to think about a reason that wasn't crime related for calling. It's hard to think of a valid scenario for terrorism.

**Researcher:** What about a scenario with a new neighbor, cars coming and going late at night, dropping off unknown supplies etc. Would you call?

Participant #1: Yes, eventually.

Participant #8: When reporting on neighbors who are ethnic, people are oftentimes so afraid of calling authorities because they don't want to be labeled racist or politically incorrect.

Participant #7: I think also you would be much more likely to call if you thought the policing agency would act in a very sophisticated way that wouldn't give their intentions away when going to check it out. Not going to go in with guns drawn and a swat team and dogs, but casually with due diligence react in an appropriate manner. Quiet to see what's what.

**Researcher:** So, are you saying it would depend on your faith in your local law enforcement?

Participant #7: Yes, you need to have confidence in their degree of sophistication when handling events so that you will call. Like to see that officers are staying ahead of curve and learning all new policing and looking at new ways to look at things.

**Researcher:** Who represents a threat for terrorism?

Participant #4: I can't think of someone specific. If I see it materialize in front of me then I would know what it looks like, but I don't have any perceived feelings towards any group right now.

Participant #5: I don't either. It's not ethnically related. It's the activity you're observing no matter what the person is that gets your interest up.

**Researcher:** How do you gather intelligence about possible terrorist activity?

Participant #4: Both eyes. You see and you react to it? The police department.

Participant #5: Unless you fall into something it should be local law enforcement.

Participant #6: The local law enforcement gets a lot of their information from the local people. A lot of people do call and say what's going on. A lot of the cops here live in the neighborhood and so they know the people and get their information by interacting with them on a regular basis. They make themselves aware in what's happening in the community.

Participant #8: I don't think it's a lot different from how they gather information on drug activity. I would think from snitches and such. I image the track in looking for drug activities would be somewhat similar in looking for any possible terrorist.

**Researcher:** Except that in the drug trade there is a profit and so you can get people to roll against the competition. Terrorism is ideologically driven.

Participant #5: Big difference in the drug selling into community where terrorists are much more secretive. There is no need for them to infiltrate school system. They are not selling anything into the community. The 9/11 terrorists who lived in communities for months and years and their next door neighbors didn't know anything.

Participant #8: I agree with participant #7, that we have officers that understand and have that level of sophistication that they can recognize appropriate situations/precursors.

**Researcher:** What provides people with that level of sophistication?

Participant #8: Training.

Participant #1: And they have knowledge of the neighborhood and therefore are able to pick out things that are out of place. Knowing the community and what to look for and how to deal well with the public. Respect civil rights and they can communicate well and carry out with professionalism.

Participant #4: The idea of having policemen being responsible for a specific part of town is useful.

Participant #5: They are doing that now.

Participant #3: Yeah, they are doing that.

**Researcher:** Any comments or questions before we finish this up? I am going to ask you to complete a survey about what we have discussed. Thank you for your participation.

## **Appendix C: Law Enforcement Focus Group B (12080816)**

**Researcher:** [Introduction.] What is terrorism?

Participant #6: Making someone fear for their safety.

Participant #1: A group that has a strong belief and has a very strong dislike for people who don't believe in their belief and take action to get force those people to join their side, through violence.

Participant #2: Same thing group that undermines the stability of the more common group in an effort to persuade you to see their way whether their way is right or wrong is perspective.

Participant #5: I don't know if I agree with trying to get people to join.

Participant #1: To adhere to their beliefs whether religion or ideology they want you to believe same. Use their actions to persuade to believe the same, that's my definition.

Participant #3: Scare tactic to force people to do what they do.

Participant #5: I never heard it in those terms or thought of it in those terms trying to force somebody to join or sway beliefs I think of it as to destroy people or eliminate those who don't believe in their beliefs.

Participant #2: A combination.

Participant #6: If you're not with us you're against us. Scare tactic.

Participant #4: To notice who you are. I've never heard of some of these groups.

**Researcher:** Is terrorism an important problem for your law enforcement agency?

Participant #5: Should be. I don't think it's something that's really addressed.

Participant #6: Don't deal with it every day, not an everyday thing. Terrorism. Acts of terrorism going on. Depends on your definition.

Participant #4: Something as major as what happens in New York if something doesn't happen here we're not going to get prepared, going to react not proactive and trying to prevent.

Participant #5: Reaction is always short term, let's get gas mask, then we give them back. Let's use Columbine, we had vague training for a couple of weeks, no follow through. Went by the wayside.

Participant #2: Only now we're starting county-wide, with office emergency management as long term solutions and ideas just like we were doing the thing at the high school, an active shooting, which everyone did not do.

Participant #4: Actually went through high school? We went through the building here as well.

Participant #6: We did building here, simulation active shooting in a public environment

Participant #2: The County making slowly sifting down something long term in terms of terrorism and any other emergency situation we can encounter takes so long sometimes, they officers here don't know about it sometimes. If they do it's not as in depth as they should. It's a slow process

Participant #1: I think we need to do something. We are textbook definition of terrorist organization wants to place members in and scout out locations. We are multicultural. We have mosque here. I don't want to sound offensive; we do have a lackadaisical approach here as far as terrorism. I'm not saying this is ideal place to launch an attack or do anything. This is a place where they could blend in.

Participant #3: Lack of communication here.

Participant #4: Not only the mosque, don't narrow it. We have an abortion clinic, a large medical clinic, several large high schools. So many different avenues, not avenues... maybe targets.

Participant#3: Setting up home bases.

Participant #6: Everything we do is reactive, not proactive.

Participant #2: We have such a diverse community. It's easy to blend in here. Let's be honest if you move into an area that has all one ethnic group you stand out. Here you blend in you don't blink an eye.

Participant #6: Nothing really looks suspicious

Participant #2: Unless it comes from neighbor. Unless comes from neighbor saying there's deliveries coming in and out at all hours of the night.

Participant #3: Drives vans between three and four in the morning.

**Researcher:** Does your local law enforcement agency engage in community policing? What do they do?

Participant #6: Yes.

Participant #2: Yes and no.

Participant #4: Depends on what time of year it is and if there's event.

Participant #5: Phases in and out. When we were in youth bureaus was slash/community bureau/crime again. Again it's reactive not proactive. Something has to happen to be deployed. Before we go out and do crime prevention there has to be a rash of burglary. Then we go out and talk to you.

Participant #6: High presence of police for that week and then.

Participant #2: We all went to community policing.

Participant #3: We did [community policing training] in [the police] academy.

Participant #4: Matter of fact things they taught us there is almost the opposite of what we're told to do here and that's as far as they wanted us that community policing to be become familiar with particular areas or working in one area and the people in it. Here you can be in different area each week.

Participant #5: On paper it's different. We are all assigned a sector and supposed to be in that sector every day. I'm assigned to sector three. I'm supposed to be in sector three all the. That was again, a part of the community policing. Really you can consider just being a police officer and patrolling the community.

Participant #3: I don't even know what sector I'm supposed to be in.

Participant #1: I agree, never saw need.

Participant #2: Help bridge gap of communication things come and go things come back.

Participant #6: How people move and how they feel about police officers at the time.

Participant #4: One week it's like you said, it depends on if it's brought on by public or police offers public reaction to it determines what happens inside here. That's just how things are here. One person complains about something next thing you know we're running down the block writing parking tickets.

Participant #3: Especially speeders if someone calls and complains and then a week passes and you're gone. Speeding again in the next week.

**Researcher:** So they react in the short term. No long term solutions.

Participant #5: Definitely

Participant #2: Due to fact of man power that dictates sometime.

Participant #5: Always seven people on the road. No matter how many cops we have in the department.

Participant #2: Where they are and what they do determines what happens at time.

Participant #3: When school is in session sector three is the worst. At three o'clock they fight every day. At a lineup [roll call] we go five cars to sector three.

Participant #5: Things change as the administration changes... I hate to keep going back to it, but when we were in juvenile we were assigned at schools every day when school got out and internally things have changed, people have chance, administration. It's reactive. What we did was proactive.

Participant #2: We were out there in the morning in the afternoon. Uniforms didn't have to come up there unless we called them.

**Researcher:** Was the proactive work effective?

Participant #1, 2, 5: Yes.

Participant #5: Kids knew we were there.

Participant #2: We were in schools almost every day whether patrolling going up. We handle a lot of things that these guys would never know what was going on. We didn't call for reports, we did the reports.

**Researcher:** Was intra-agency communication lacking?

Participant #5: It wasn't necessary.

Participant #4: The way it is now, they have [school] resource officers, they'll be a problem and now they call patrolmen to handle it. Before they took care of it and we didn't have to hear about it.

Participant #3: It wasn't just one [resource officer]. A few of them up there at the same time. If you know the kid, go home, I know you're mother, and they go home, we handle it.

Participant #2: Different administrations want different things.

Participant #5: At the time it was effective.

Participant #3: Community policing doesn't really work I don't think it's so good here for the simple fact that a certain officer that patrols and talks to people and then you have another officer who patrols that area whose mind is somewhere where he wants to be a criminal proactive controller. Arresting people, pulling people over that have been here 35 years never been arrested before; those people go against [police].

Participant #5: They're antagonistic.

**Researcher:** Do you mean zero tolerance policing?

Participant #4: Yeah, write [summonses to] everybody.

Participant #3: But at the same time you need both. You need an officer going to go in there and do community policing and the person who will go in and be Super Cop and arrest everybody. You need that the person who knows everyone will give more breaks to the other on who will go in and lock up everybody.

Participant #1: You need a balance. At first I was going to be politically correct, but it does not work, not in this town. What ends up happening is they [the community] get so comfortable it turns from community policing to [the community] controlling the police. That's what ends up happening. It's the city that becomes our boss and not the administration within the police department and then when something happens and you have to be the police officer tot eh people that you were the community police officer...

Participant #6: They reject it.

Participant#1: ...they reject it and go off the handle.

Participant#5: Riot situations.

Participant #6: [This community] is so diverse in terms of income. Millions of dollars on the hill to the bottom of the hill section eight [housing].

**Researcher:** So, you're saying the community is not just multicultural, but there is also economic diversity.

Participant #2: You have the richest and poorest.

Participant #6: Other surrounding towns you have one community with the same income. They don't deal with same type of calls that we would deal with.

Participant #5: [Other neighboring communities] don't have the same diversity.

Participant #4: They tried to make us out to be like other community in terms of size and react to things like them and we are more diverse than that.

Participant #3: There are areas where people don't lock their doors to where people don't have locks on their door.

**Researcher:** Don't have locks because they can't afford them?

Participant #3: They can't afford locks.

Participant#1: Or the locks get punched out.

Participant #2: There are movie stars and judges [on one side] and then

Participant #5: Crack-heads and whores [on the other].

Participant #3: [This community] is very wealthy on one end and the other side is section eight [housing].

Participant #1: [This community] is a mini-city.

Participant #2: So politically correct you're scared to do anything.

Participant #6: It can have a negative effect on your career.

Participant #6: Because everyone knows everyone. Black, white, Spanish. Housing situation you go after you're wrong because they're Spanish. Not because of who they are but because it's wrong.

Participant #2: With the fires the housing situation all of a sudden it's wrong because they're Spanish.

Participant #6: [A specific community group] calls us Gestapo.

Participant #2: No because it's wrong you have to deal with that part of it too.

Participant #5: That's what directs our response to terrorism.

Participant #4: [This community] is so small that everyone knows everyone. You are always pulling over someone's brother, mother, or son. They all know someone up top and they call, the mayor.

Participant #1: That can lead you to be very susceptible to terrorism we heard shots fired call and it was two kids we knew and we stopped and talked to them sitting in the patrol car and then I saw the bulge in the kids shirt. I find out that they were the ones firing shots, and pulled a 38 [.38 caliber handgun] off this kid. We weren't on our toes and those two kids could have said "pow, pow". By us knowing everybody, that leaves us very susceptible [to terrorism].

Participant #5: You can attest to how community policing can bite you in the ass as well. By knowing everyone so well and interacting with community.

Participant #1: Your kid almost kills somebody and then they get arrested and it's "How dare you arrest my child. I'm going to try to get you fired".

Participant #3: That's why I moved.

Participant#5: That's why I live 75 miles away.

Participant #2: I still live here. I grew up here. You face people who think you owe them something because they know you.

Participant #1: I did that once with a serious case and it didn't matter, because of who people were.

Participant #2: Whether it's going to go over administratively or politically that's another story. As an officer you can say it's not right.

**Researcher:** What is the main focus of community policing?

Participant #4: To bridge the gap.

Participant #6: To let them know we're not only here to lock you up and throw away the key.

Participant #5: Depends on who the public you are communicating. They have a sense of entitlement. You can't be the friend and the cop in same package, it doesn't work.

Participant #3: Depends on who people are. You can't be a friend and a cop.

Participant #1: Community policing is wrong. We are authority figures, law enforcement. You should get outside group to do it [community policing]. How are we supposed to enforce the law and be authority figures, it's like being a parent.

Participant #5: Jr. Sergeant spending hardly any time enforcing law

Participant #2: We were in juvenile I get out with the people. I've been in homes with families. I've had success that way. It helped me bridge the gap that we're talking about here.

Participant #5: I was outsider and I had totally different approach.

Participant #2: I parlayed with what I had.

Participant #6: Good cop, bad cop.

Participant #5: Different generation of cops. Kids today are different.

Participant #3: As a kid I had more respect for cops. If they told you to go home, I'd go home.

Participant#1: Community policing has watered down our role as authority figures.

Participant #6: Also, internet, TV all types of things.

Participant #5: It comes down to parenting. How many kids have we picked up and take kid home, “why are you picking on my kid?” “Your kid was just throwing rocks at cars driving down street...”

**Researcher:** How much cooperation exists between your law enforcement agency & your local community?

Participant #1: It’s not like it used to be.

Participant #4: Just as many who are friendly with community there are those who are not friendly. Set back.

Participant #2: Two things when we were in juvenile it was different juvenile bureau. The stuff we did in there helped the entire police department. We helped out. We interacted with families and kids. It was an effect on the police department; they didn’t have to do as much. I don’t want to knock anybody [in juvenile] but they don’t do the lectures we did.

Participant #5: Internally things have changed. Regimes.

Participant #3: Our biggest problem here is juveniles, and it’s the smallest part of the department.

Participant #4: The events we were at, everything; the games...

Participant #5: Dances.

Participant#2: We were at everything. Juvenile bureau was community policing bureau.

Participant #6: Thinking back, you guys did a good job.

Participant #2: Back then we were the juvenile enforcement. You can have impact on family. It relates a little better...

Participant #3: As juveniles get older and become adults you still have connection with them.

Participant #1: Just a quick classic example. There was this one kid who got involved with the wrong crowd smoking and drinking and then got caught shoplifting. At the time we had the juvenile bureau going our way and we were able to talk to him and get him on the right track and he just graduated from the Washington DC Police Department. We never lost communication with them. It was effective.

**Researcher:** Now weren’t you just saying five minutes ago that community policing doesn’t work?

Participant #1: Because of the other situation that left a bad taste in my mouth.

Participant #2: We were juvenile association. We did what you didn't want to do. Block associations.

Participant #1: It backfired though. There was one family where I'd connected with and spoke to on a constant basis and the kid committed a serious offence and their mind it's just [Participant #1] but then I'm typing up attempted murder charges, now I'm the bad cop and they ended up calling the NAACP on me.

Participant #5: Different eras of police officer. Back then the job wasn't paying you had to have some type of love for job, now newer guys come on do it just for money. [Participant #4 raises hand implying that joined police force for the money]. They have no ties to police department or respect for anyone.

Participant #4: The money coming on, that's why I came on when I saw there was ways I could help, the other officers have pointed me in the direction of kids to help out on individual basis using my own time. Kids will come up and they're one of mine I get involved. By doing that I get to their friends sometimes I don't.

Participant #3: The kids, they'll call me up and say "[Participant #3] isn't working," and they need help.

Participant #2: It's the individual stuff we did.

Participant #3: Straight up. Some guys under mining what we've done some are just vindictive they want to mess with what you're doing. I want to prevent crimes and put this place out of business.

Participant #6: They are looking for you to fail.

Participant #4: You're still going to have guys trying to do that within the department. They're doing the same thing. For every action there is an equal reaction.

Participant #2: One thing I respect is that Participant #5 never wanted to do juvenile, but always came and did the job.

Participant #5: Now you have open enrollment. "Who wants to do community policing, who wants to be on bike patrol". They have no genuine love for the job. Those assignments are seen as an easy way out, you don't have to answer calls and they see it as easy work. You have to do your job, that's why you're here.

**Researcher:** Are you willing to work with your local community in proactive counter-terrorism efforts?

Participant #6: Yeah, I live here.

Participant #1: If you limit it just to that I think it would be beneficial because it's something everyone is worried about. Once you get foot in door.

Participant #6: Unless there is imminent threat, it turns into everything but what you're getting into.

Participant #4: If it wasn't obvious, I wouldn't know what terrorism was. If it was right in my face, that's a nice big white van driving by?

Participant #1: I was victim of [terrorism]. That's just life you know? It wasn't something I planned. I have different perspective I was directly involved in act of terrorism. I was in Berlin disco bombing. I was a block away, boom. I have completely different perspective on terrorism then guys here, not because I am special; I was in the right place at the wrong time. I look at it differently.

Participant #5: I see terrorism in a broader spectrum of terrorism. Incidents like Columbine. Would that fall under a category of terrorism?

Participant #2: Domestic or not.

Participant #3: I think these gangs are act of terrorism you can't wear certain color without someone attacking you. I love [the colors] red and blue and I can't wear either one.

Participant #4: When I joined the service, they took it [red and blue clothing] out of my bag when I was going to California. And that was back in the 1980's.

Participant #1: That is terrorism straight out.

Participant #2: You have to be so politically correct; you don't protect the community, you protect the criminals, it's ridiculous.

Participant #1: More than international terrorism. I don't understand why street gangs are not legally terrorists. They terrorize the community.

Participant #5: If residents of an area are afraid to reach out to police they are terrorized.

Participant #3: They have no rules. We have to follow rules. The gang members in [this community] have nothing to lose and they can get away with it. As soon as something happens between an officer and a gang member, [the gang member] will sue the department and the officer may lose their job or go to jail.

Participant #6: That determines if officer lives or dies. I'm out there fighting for everything I've got, my job, and they're fighting for their freedom.

Participant #2: We have to have different laws to allow us to be more effective.

**Researcher:** What is the goal of the gangs?

Participant #2: Money.

Participant #1: Money and power. Drugs.

Participant #6: Street corners.

Participant #3: If you can take over a block and cops don't want to come down your street. If you interfere [gangs] will come to your house and get rid of your family. I care about my wife, my kids. They don't care.

Participant #6: Hits on police officers.

Participant #3: The community is scared. Certain areas in this town, certain stores where kids hang out wearing blue red. People don't go to the store. Store manager would kick you and then be attacked. He would throw out gang members and they would bust all his windows out. He closed up the business and left down.

Participant #2: Comes back to parents. Parents don't see that kids are in gangs. You constantly come down here. Why do you come down here, because we pick on your kids? There is so much ignorance or lack of wanting to accept.

Participant #3: My nephew had red hats, beads, etc and I went and threw it all out. He said, "that's my girlfriends" and I told him to tell her to come see me.

Participant #2: Should be parents doing this. Scared of offend someone.

Participant #6: Parents are manipulative to hit, discipline, abusing. For everyone that wasn't to do good and influence we have people there are laws and agencies that set you back.

Participant #1: It's amazing because the fear they set in the community. As shocking as 9/11 was, it was short term. Gangs we fear on a daily basis.

Participant #5: The threat of international terrorism "it's going to happen to someone else."

Participant #4: Patriot Act geared towards domestic terrorism. Gangs are domestic terrorism.

Participant #1: The gangs are well armed.

Participant #5: Embassy. Their country's law. Someone here in our city.

Participant #3: More churches than stores in this town.

Participant #2: Mosque. There are a lot of out of state license plates.

Participant #4: Groups in government could be considered terrorist. CIA.

Participant #1: That's right. Gotta do what you gotta do.

Participant #4: Someone else is sitting around and talking about us.

Participant #1: Hard-line approach for people who want to protect us. amusement park is using it as a ride. Played it up as so terrible. CIA. So what? So what? PC is most dangerous thing ever created.

Participant #3: Starts from us. tie our hands, tie theirs. I didn't know how to decipher people. Only 4 options: Black, white, Asian, Pacific Islander.

Participant #1: Religion should be on report. Airport security after 9/11 lots of searching. big fuss, same people who claim agency are not politically correct searching people who do not meet criteria. Play our own politically correct against us.

Participant #3: Had to fax everything. How am I a no fly. I'm not blowing up anything.

Participant #1: Nothing wrong with hard-line approach with safety.

**Researcher:** Are there any costs associated with a community assisting its local law enforcement agency in proactive counter-terrorism efforts? What are the costs?

Participant #1: Yep. inundated over react to everything. train them send them to class. help them spot. don't openly say we will work without training.

Participant #3: Please don't do that. super civilian

Participant #6: It will put us at more risk.

Participant #2: up. volume of calls will elevate. how to get info from different groups in town. different denominations in certain sector are the willing to talk to each other on certain needs of that community. Jew against Muslim, how do we work this out? we had serious arguments of determining needs. you have to find ways to funnel. finally came up w/something.

Participant #1: talk like never been done to protect nation against T. before 9/11 it was pre PC that kept this nation safe. during cold war. 60 and 70 situation with Russia. To protect America. But this person needs special needs. it was America.

Participant #5: Before you were American now you are African American, Cuban American.

Participant #6: coming from another country speak other language you need to speak English.

Participant #1:

**Researcher:** Are there dangers associated with a community assisting its local law enforcement agency in proactive counter-terrorism efforts? What are the dangers?

Participant #6: Yes. They think they are police officers.

Participant #4: [The community] are not going to listen.

Participant #6: [The community] cause more problems.

Participant #3: [The community] are not going to be liable for what they do.

Participant #2: There are issues of liability.

Participant #1: Border patrol. I remember the incident of that photo shop that developed the picture.

Participant #5: Innocent people get hurt. Neighbors turning on neighbors.

Participant #3: If you're neighbor is child molester you look at them like it's going to happen again.

Participant #3: CIA, NSA, DHS, Navy Seals, and organizations you don't know.

Participant #6: First responders need better training, better equipment.

Participant #2: Local neighbors.

Participant #1: Local level.

**Researcher:** How significant is threat of terrorism in your community; from whom?

Participant #4: Power plant. Bridges. Tunnels.

Participant #5: I live near a power plant that was closed after 9/11.

Participant #6: Doesn't happen become complacent that anything is going to happen.

Participant #3: It's like a shooting. You don't think it will happen until it does. Like in Los Angeles when there was the bank robbery and the guys were wearing full body armor. It would have been a massacre if we ever had that kind of situation. We put out seven guys on the road without proper weaponry. [Los Angeles police officers] weren't prepared and they are one of biggest agencies in United States.

Participant #2: I think they responded phenomenally well. To go into war or battle you have to be equal or better.

Participant #5: When the planes hit the World Trade Center, what difference would it make?

Participant #6: [Terrorists] can get their hands on any type of weapon out there. Rifles are much better than what we patrol with.

Participant #4: Depends on who is on duty here.

Participant #1: What saved cops and civilians initially... there could have been more casualties without their training. It was their training and mentality. A majority of us are not thinking as cops anymore.

Participant #6: Thinking about money, don't rely on training. It is a war zone in [nearby major city with high level of criminal activity].

Participant #3: Go through [another nearby major city with high level of criminal activity].

Participant #2: We've been exposed more around here but you worked in New York.

Participant #6: We need more training and more cops.

Participant #5: More cops not knowing what they're doing. No regular training.

Participant #1: We are resistant [to training].

Participant #4: Need to show deterrent to domestic terrorism goes along lines of we don't deter anyone from trying anything here. Not show of force to show that we are prepared to deter anyone from even thinking about. I wouldn't say publicize.

Participant #1: Continued training.

Participant #5: Learn by repetition.

**Researcher:** What do you think is the most effective manner of gathering intelligence about terrorism?

Participant #1: It can work with proper training on civilian and police level.

Participant #2: You can't be scared to pay for resources; always the biggest thing is money. You can adequately [provide] training consistently two to three times a year for real that we can learn from. Complacency kills cops.

Participant #5: Not everything is routine.

**Researcher:** Does anyone have any comments or questions before we finish this up? I am going to ask you to complete a survey about what we have discussed. Thank you for your participation.

## Appendix D: Community Focus Group B (03080816)

**Researcher:** [Introduction]; What is terrorism?

Participant #1: Terrorism is when you destruct a whole society of people; a country, a neighborhood, an area anywhere that you know people lives are everyday lives are affected. Basically, if you're used to going to walk to the bust stop and you find you can't walk to the bus stop anymore; you have to have someone walk you to the train station or bus stop, or you don't feel comfortable traveling; you don't feel comfortable walking the streets; you don't feel comfortable flying; you don't feel comfortable on the rails; anywhere you have to change your life, from the life you used to live, to the life you have to live now; we have to be more cautious and watch your back all the time now.

Participant #2: Terrorism is, to me, terrorism is another party imposing their will upon either a person or group of people through the instrument of fear.

Participant #3: For me too ... It's something really scary that somebody does that won't ... that probably won't happen again any time or soon, or control, but plays with your mind over and over again you become unjustly afraid, or maybe not unjustly, but you become afraid ... you have no control over what people do, so you become afraid.

Participant #4: For me terrorism is close to what [participant #1] said. Terrorism to me is, if I walk out of my house in the morning, I'm not sure I'm going to get home at night. And that can be by virtue of rogue group, it could be by virtue of a government out of control. It can be a lot of things. But, it would not being sure what will happen next because rules have been changed.

**Researcher:** What rules are you referring to?

Participant #4: Without getting on my political soapbox, this administration we have, clearly the worst administration in history of US, has taken away some of our freedoms and where does it stop? I don't know where it's going to stop. Now the government can get into our private lives, telephone, email, whatever they wish, without court order; whatever they wish. It's a little bit out of control here. And that's just one aspect; the Gestapo went many steps beyond that. I wouldn't want the government to have any more license to go into lives, than it has gotten already. The worst part of it is that no future government administration will try to go back on it, and they are going to try to go further, independent of who gets elected. No president wants to give up power. They want to make it more imperial. That's only part of the problem. The rogue groups you can't control either. And I see a big difference between those, but not too much at times. there are various domestic or foreign ... some of these radical green groups, as an example, I think they are outrageous. I am all in favor of environment, but can't tolerate those who burn other homes, or whatever they do, or properties, to get point across. The same thing is true about government getting involved in an uncontrolled way.

Participant #3: Do you think sometimes extreme measures, kind of like two extremes on either side, bring society into balance?

Participant #4: I wish that were true, I don't think so.

Participant #2: I think you're talking about the elective movement ... I was thinking about that some months ago ... when one extreme second extreme and then that extreme ends up coming to a middle ground because of the disgust from both groups. For me, I would have believed that before, from a theoretical standpoint. But with the current government ... I am not a political person, but I hate politicians because, no matter how you tell me, I think they are all liars. I come from a family of politicians and they always spin the truth, no matter what, and it always comes in guise of legality. Look at McCarthy ... he terrorized people. Look at Cheney, look at Rove, look at all the idiots in government now, I have no patience. Is that form of terrorism? I have been labeling this as being immoral. But, if you were to put handle on it, it would be form of terrorism, but it's been tempered by fact that we, as people, are willing to be blamed for it because we tolerate it. We should have long since impeached these idiots in Washington.

Participant #4: They're not idiots; they're very bright people.

Participant #1: They are some of the smartest people in the world. They are so smart, when you think about what they do, they think five to ten years in advance.

Participant #2: Something simple. George Bush already showed his colors, but was elected again after second 4 years.

Participant #1: They stole the election.

Participant #4: That's right, they stole the election. That's a form of terrorism, by the way. One of the biggest problems I have in this country now is that I am afraid of the future of democracy here. The reason I am afraid is that the electronic voting is easily hackable and I am convinced, and, in fact, a good friend of mine, who is a professor of neurobiology at [specific university] did a study with another professor from [specific university], in which they got all the election data from state of California on Freedom of Information Act and they reviewed all the data and then they made a statistical model of all those counties that had electronic voting machines, they were all Diebold machines, the chairman of Diebold is one of the biggest supporters of Bush. They did a model ... the key and smoking gun is that in all those counties where there were electronic voting machines, a percentage changed from Kerry to Bush electronically, even though Kerry won the state, was exact same percentage. What does that tell you? There was a computer program that when you push a button, bingo the data is all modified.

Participant #1: That's society now. My son told me, "Dad, when I was in college it was easy." When I went to college, I had to go to the library. I had to research. I didn't have laptop where I can be comfortable and warm. It's the same thing with society. You have so much more that is accessible, of your life for things that you do, and for the government

that we can't control. Who makes computers? Make everything any way that is convenient for people running government.

Participant #2: I acknowledge what you're saying. Even accepting that that happens, what are we saying here, that we cannot help it? Let me tell you what problem I am seeing here, because I've thought about this because I've been so furious about this. The problem is that the United States is so segmented. We have so many groups. The largest groups would probably be, I am just generalizing here, the more liberal and the ultra-conservative. So we talk within our groups. Now who are the ones who are more aware? The conservatives just accept thing the way their bosses, their leaders, I don't mean their bosses, tell them. I have friends who are very conservative, and they are a little bit mislead Christians, and because Bush put his hand on the bible, they just vote straight down the line and it's so frustrating for me to see that. So, there are the liberals ... sometimes we get so liberal that we only read certain newspapers and talk among ourselves. Horrible world we are living in, but what are we doing about it? How do we, from a communications standpoint, those of us who are aware of what's going on in Washington, all the manipulation of all those people. I place this question to everybody. how are we filtering that information that fact based information, for those of us that label ourselves as "in the know", how do we filter it down, what kind of mechanism do we have to be able to filter it down to the other groups so that they can be better informed? I think the intellectuals are arrogant. Who is going to be active in passing the information down? I accept that we are in a horrible situation right now.

Participant #1: The government controls everything.

Participant #2: I think the first step is communication. How do we move the facts that we know. We all knew that it was a lie about the enrichment of uranium [in Iraq]. The question is, from a standpoint of communication, how do we reform the information [process] so that it is communicated from the perspective for the people that continued to vote for George Bush. I think we let it happen.

**Researcher:** Is terrorism an important problem in your community? [Briefly discuss the tenets of community policing – focusing on the tenets that are part of the survey instrument]  
Does your local law enforcement agency engage in community policing?

Participant #3: Throughout the years, stints of it.

Participant #1: Counting meetings, realistically they have it but whether or not they do it or not. The community is broken up into different [areas].

Participant #2: We cannot tell you what would be the standard if we don't know the structure.

Participant #1: [The goal of the] police department is to serve and protect. [The goal of community policing] is to help the community to be able to interact and communicate with the police. The young people don't get it; they run rampant. They [the police] need

to learn to talk to people. We don't talk to nobody no more. The police may have cameras watching areas, but they don't have police officers walking the beat.

Participant #4: In order to have effective community policing, you need to have trust between the community and the police department. For example, in [this community], doesn't have a great... put it this way, the police could use a good PR [public relations] job. The police department in [this community] has had some serious problems. It's been obvious to the public, which does not help. They really could use a good PR department.

Participant #3: Do you think that is just [this community], or do you think it's most departments?

Participant #1: You can only speak about where you live, and what has happened in the last few years within the community, where you have the police department questioning its own leaders. There are always problems.

Participant #3: I don't see them walking around.

Participant #2: I do not see police very often in [this community]. we haven't experienced any crime, so I assume [this community] is a very safe place.

Participant #4: But if we could relate this to terrorism for a second, is the object to see how community policing could be on the pulse of the community. Let's say the police department would have the pulse of the community, which would help them in the intelligence mode in recognizing a terrorist situation in its initial stages. Is that the object?

**Researcher:** One of the key components of this exploratory research is to determine whether utilizing community policing in proactive counter terrorism is a viable concept.

Participant #3: How can two groups come together on terms that are still undefined?

**Researcher:** [Presentation of operationalization of terrorism]

Participant #4: With all the responsibilities of a police officer, how does he engage in community policing and counter terrorism and still be able to complete all his other normal assignments and responsibilities?

**Researcher:** [Presentation of summary of Smith et al. (2006, 2008) research]

Participants #4: There are two extremes. There are cases where there are investigations that involve the FBI and other agencies. There are the other extremes, with a Timothy McVeigh type of guy, where you capture somebody because you he didn't have the license plate on right or something. I think all that stuff in between is really hazy to me. What I'm saying is that I think that a lot of the progress or activities that led to the apprehension of people involved in these things happened by ordinary policing on one

hand, a traffic violation that led to a Timothy McVeigh being caught, or the other extreme, an intense investigation on a particular cell or group that you know is out to do some bad stuff.

Participant #1: Who should we fear more? You had Timothy McVeigh, who blew up a federal building and killed I don't know how many people. You had the crazy people with 9/11 who killed up to 3000 people, and it's still growing. And then you still have the people, that people say are terrorists, I'm not saying everyday terrorist, that are not in the spotlight like that, that do things every single day... Basically just, terrorists ... people that are terrorized to walk out their door. They had these guys in New York that were raping or molesting women walking to the bus stop ... as far as I'm concerned, that's a form of terrorism also.

Participant #3: To catch people, when you go back to community policing, people get mad when the police are possibly doing their job ... interfering with their liberties. When you talk about Timothy McVeigh and 9/11, the true terrorism that we think of, the big international, Timothy McVeigh is not international but, the secrecy, like Timothy McVeigh didn't really talk to anybody... If you can get a small group together to talk, you can't get a community police officer to infiltrate the small group. The students that shoot other students, there are often signs of that, that are either ignored or investigated and dismissed, so don't you think that will still happen?

Participant #2: I feel the police need to communicate more with the community. If there was an emergency, panic sets in and there may be pandemonium. When 9/11 happened ... I was stuck in traffic and it was chaos. What is the rational way in handling emergency? I would prefer to see some direction in the case of an emergency.

Participant #3: The biggest abomination of 9/11 was that they told people in the second building that was hit to stay in their building. So many people follow the rules and the rules or directions are not always right.

Participant #4: There are many issues to discuss here. There is a problem of misinformation and there is a trust problem.

Participant #1: That [trust] is the biggest problem.

Participant #4: When I hear something coming out of the White House, I never believe it. It is all lies. Anything coming from government agencies are also all lies. When I hear unemployment numbers, they are all wrong. If you look at Israel, they have issues of trust, but not in regards to terrorism because it happens so often and people see it so often. People's antennae are way up and people don't have the luxury of not worrying about a bag left on a bus, unidentified. They have to get involved all the time; 100% of the time if not more. That's the difference between us and them. Most people don't think about 9/11 anymore. They don't think it could happen again and it could.

Participant #2: It could.

Participant #3: I disagree.

Participant #4: The cooperation that exists between the police and the community on a community policing basis, it's somewhat disconnected.

Participant #2: People take one more incident and the people will find out. I learned the hard way. We drove around [on 9/11] not knowing what was next. My husband and I were lost. We didn't know what to do. We didn't know what to do. There has to be structure.

Participant #3: I think people have 9/11 very fresh on their mind. I recently went, with an old friend from high school, to Canada to see Niagara Falls. As we were going across the border to Canada, we had to show our passports, and we were waiting and waiting, and everybody hates waiting, and I said "I can't stand this" and she said "Oh, no." I think I'm pretty liberal, but my friend, when we were in high school, she was even more liberal than I was. She said "Oh no, this is great. You know 9/11. I'm afraid all the time because of 9/11. Those people are making us wait in line."

Participant #4: But if you weren't going across the border into Canada, you wouldn't even think about 9/11. On an average day, I don't think most people think about 9/11. People forget. Just like with politicians, people don't remember what happened last month.

Participant #2: I think yes and no. Many people from my office saw people jumping out [of the windows of the World Trade Center on 9/11]. I'll tell you what I mean by structure. God forbid there is an announcement saying there is Anthrax or that something has been spread in the air. What I'm saying is that when that announcement comes, the local government should [give specific directions] say cover your windows, proceed to [a specific location].

Participant #1: Take yesterday, when the storm hit, there was nothing from the [local government]. Even with terrorism, it's something that all people wish never happened. But, unfortunately, society in this world is the way it is. You can't do anything about that. The only thing you can try to do is control it.

**Researcher:** In your opinion, based on your experience with your local law enforcement agency, do they engage in community policing?

Participant #3: I think that over the years they have had little stints of it.

Participant #1: If you go to the council meetings, they have "community policing", but as to whether they do it or not, I would say no.

Participant #2: Maybe because there's no crime? I don't know.

Participant #1: [This community] has crime, just like any other community. But I don't think they have community policing. They have community affairs officers, but they don't really have community policing.

Participant #2: I have been here [more than 20 years] and I have seen few police actions. Politicians [are slow in getting things done – cites specific example].

Participant #4: Just as a point of information, I don't know if you know this, but [this community has very corrupt politicians].

Participant #1: Who actually runs this community? You have a council and then you have a city manager and then you have a mayor. You don't know who runs anything.

Participant #2: I come from NY and I find police threatening. You cannot walk around any minute you see them in cars, beat them in head, but what kind of policemen are you expecting to see walk around [this community] for you to trust them?

Participant #3: Trust comes from knowing people. I don't trust anybody, unless I get to know them and then still I don't always trust them. Human nature is to disappoint. Trust, in general, comes from knowing somebody on a personal level. [This community] is lacking community policing because I don't think police have that kind of relationship with the community.

Participant #1: They don't do it. You don't have police officers walking the beat.

Participant #3: But why don't they? I would guess there's not enough manpower.

Participant #1: There's not enough manpower. You need at least [specific number] more cops.

Participant #4: The interaction between the average citizen and the police, take me – I'm an average citizen – do I have interaction with the police on any regular basis? Absolutely not. I don't see them. To me I see them in a police car driving by, but the last time I spoke to a police officer, except for coming in [the local station] ... It's a long time ago. I don't even remember, it was a long time ago. I have no idea.

Participant #3: [Question directed to Participant #4] Is community policing just walking the avenue? Would you trust police more if they were walking around? Would that make you know them more?

Participant #4: Yes.

Participant #1: You know people by talking to them.

Participant #2: I come from New York [having left New York over 20 years ago] ... and I find the police in New York threatening. What kind of police are you expecting to walk around [this community]? I don't trust anybody.

Participant #3: If, by nature, you don't trust anybody, by them walking the avenue, will that make you trust them more. They have to not only walk it, but also interact. They can't just be a physical presence.

Participant #4: What's going to precipitate some citizen in this community to go and approach some policemen and say "I think there is a problem with so and so, and he is doing oddball stuff"? What are the chances of that happening?

Participant #1: I do it all the time.

Participant #3: You would have to trust who you say it to.

Participant #4: Which cop would they go to? Would they just go to any cop on the street?

Participant #2: If it is suspicious activity that smacks of terrorism, are you likely to go to policemen, even if you are friendly with them, or are you going to call FBI?

**Researcher:** Who would you be more likely to provide information to?

Participant #1: The local officer.

Participant #4: Part of problem is that when you call someone in a government agency, not always, but to a very large extent, you get ignored. You may as well just talk to a wall. Both with state and federal agencies.

Participant #1: I called state one time and was ignored.

Participant #4: The only way of getting around that, I think, is if you know someone on a personal level and that person would have to be at a fairly decent level [in the government agency]. You just can't talk to someone who is going to try to pass it on, so that by the time it gets to the top, where action takes place, it's lost. But you don't see that guy. You're going to get on the phone and that person more than likely is going to blow you off.

Participant #1: When you come in [to the local police agency], you usually have to pick up the phone and talk to the person at the desk, which does not lead to a personal interaction.

Participant #2: If there is a framework, and I am big with frameworks ... I start with strategy in my head. Framework. What is objective, all the way down? If for example, on local level, if we get informed that if we see anything suspicious that smacks of terrorism, we should call police. I will call police, but if you leave it suspended... It would be easier than for you to be left in limbo. Whether it is a million dollar project or a minor project, I go by the statement... Where are we? Where do we want to be? How do we get there? Are we there yet? I should set parameters, checkpoints. Very simple process in my head no matter what I handle. When I was talking to [local political activists], your problem from communication standpoint, you're all over the place. In framework I would like to hear if this happens, at end of program. Who do you contact? How do you know if it's acceptable?

Participant #4: If I may provide an example of a potential attack I lose sleep about. I was in the oil and gas business and there are pipelines around the world, mostly in South America, and there is a primary pipeline that goes from Houston to [the Northeast US]. Most of product refined in Houston, Texas, winds up getting discharged into barges in Bayonne Harbor. I once communicated this to [an elected government official]. Do you want to know what I heard back? Nothing. That is one of the biggest targets. There are certain things that are targets and oil tank farms are a serious target. And I think it is a serious, serious problem and I tried to communicate that as problem and was ignored.

Participant #2: When emergency happens are we going to leave everybody to their own definition of things. Are we left in limbo? If we assign police as contact point, but we have not defined in community.

Participant #4: Let's take 9/11 as an example, how many pieces of information were ignored? That business or color coding terrorist threat levels, under Tom Ridge, set us back like a hundred years. People just looked at it and thought "what nonsense". But it wasn't nonsense, but the way it was handled was terrible. The trust issue is such an important one, and how you trust the government or don't trust the government is a key issue.

**Researcher:** How much cooperation exists between your community and your local law enforcement agency?

Participant #4: When I was in the service, I once went to the Inspector General (IG) about something that I thought deserved their attention. The result was that an investigation was started, the situation planned in advance to monitor the thing, and the end result was that they couldn't prove, even though they may have thought my information was good, they couldn't prove. Now the result was that the IG had mud on his face and so did I. That's another part of it, when the information might be right and you can't really grab a hold of it.

**Researcher:** Are there costs or dangers associated with a community assisting its local law enforcement agency in proactive counter-terrorism efforts? What are they?

Participant #2: Reprisals.

Participant #4: That's right, absolutely, which could be bigger problem than the other problem.

Participant #2: Doesn't that come with training of police department though? So, if the police are trained, they don't overreact then community will feel freer. Americans usually ... some communities is like you know, like how Hillary [said] it takes a village to raise a child, a lot of communities abroad are like that. Americans are very independent. I was finally allowed by my father, eventually, to leave my country because I was too independent, too American. He allowed me to go to America to go to graduate school. Americans usually give a lot of space to people. We don't get involved in people's lives.

Participant #4: The main problem here, having taught by 5 years, teaching in place like [local college], which is a 3<sup>rd</sup> tier school, if you ask a kid a question of 40 macroeconomics, who is president they know. Who is the Vice President? Most know. Any other question about government, they are out to lunch. I asked them, when the California fires were going crazy, if anyone knew what was going on and no one knew. They are so self-involved in surviving from day to day that they don't pay attention to anything beyond their immediate needs. These are not rich kids. They don't pay attention to anything beyond their immediate needs, the price of gas, who is playing what music when, and their girlfriend. It's amazing how uninformed. And if they're uninformed, why would they go to a policemen if they knew about something? They are not in tune with anything. The education level of Americans, as opposed to Europeans who live so close to each other's borders, is really, really diminished. That's part of the problem

Participant #2: That is exactly what I am talking about. The reason they are that way is that there is no relevance to them. The whole thing has no relevance to them. Let me tell you why advertising people are so good at getting people to buy their products. I took a class, I learned that all perfumes are made the same, but by the time it gets to you it has a personality of its own. The whole point of the class was to ... Is it moral to sell this perfume that really have no product differences to people? And the way that you do that, and we are so successful is that we create relevance. That is precisely what I am talking about. If we do not show relevance to people, it's going to be a failure to communicate. It begins with the people who send out the message. It's a simple task. Telling the people why they should do X, Y and Z. Explain the relevance to them, as people who live there. Define who are the people who are going to communicate with the community in times of an emergency, such as terrorism ... is it function of policemen? You tell the people why it is important for them to know X, Y and Z. It's a creation of relevance. From a local standpoint, the mayor, or whoever is in charge in a local community, should grab that kind of communication. We are not taking responsibility. You take charge of this. If the whole structure does not work, we are just going to accept it the way it is.

Participant #3: I took a college course in journalism. The teacher wrote 15 facts on board and we had to write story. You would not recognize one story from the other. How different stories come out of the same facts. It blew my mind how different the stories may be using the same facts.

Participant #4: You have to have trust. If the government lies to you about everything, who can you believe? That's the problem. You might have more trust with somebody who is more local because you see them more regularly.

**Researcher:** Are you willing, as individuals, to assist your local law enforcement agency in proactive counter-terrorism efforts?

Participant #2: Of course.

Participant #4: Sure.

Participant #3: Assist, by how? In any way? Anonymously.

Participant #4: Part of the problem without details because it's too involved. Essentially if you ever had a personal connection with FBI, CIA let me assure you if you are outside the agency you will never be told their real goal you will be told a story and their main goal and story may not line up. I never get involved too much having been involved with them in the past. Loyalty is a one way street you had to give agency loyalty they gave you none. To me trust is still the main issue and even within the system it's

**Researcher:** What is the threat of terrorism in your community? Who represents the threat?

Participant #4: No

Participant #3: No

Participant #2: In [this community] no. In New York City, yes.

Participant #4: This community is pretty divided. There is a substantial African American community, orthodox community, Muslim is small but I would sway in general, trivial. From that standpoint in terms of Muslim or Middle Eastern I would say we don't have a problem. If we lived in [neighboring community with higher Muslim population], I would have a different story.

Participant #2: The threat comes from New York.

**Researcher:** What do you think is the most effective manner of gathering intelligence about possible terrorist activity taking place in a local community?

Participant #2: Here or in general? Stay within in neighborhood. Realistically we are only aware of what is going on in area closest to place. Unlike NYC where everyone walks all over the place, I don't even see our neighbors because they drive out of driveway. The only way I would notice is b/c neighbors complained there is too much people coming out of the place and then it was reported and then they disappeared. I went to a neighbor to create garden association and got my head bit off, if I don't have time to exist I do not have time for a garden association.

Participant #3: Come from? Bigger question is who it would go to? Would you be more likely, I would if I know if the police department had a subdivision where you would tell cop on corner, special number might be more apt to do it. I think in my head, they must be somewhat interested because they are giving me information.

Participant #4: Very good questions. I would think that some of the politically involved people who have tentacles out more than other people who don't but in truth this is a very insular community and as said, I had my neighbors I see them say hello, I do not have much connection, with some I do some I don't it's really hard to know what's happening down the street from me. Someone involved with board of education.

Participant #2: Glance at paper once in a while, my neighbors read it b/c neighbors quote it, but if ward was active, one thing I found out during election costs lots of money to send out mailings.

**Researcher:** Does anyone have any last thoughts about community policing?

Participant #4: Local police department to have ability to hone in on the assistance in honing in it might be easier to do.

Participant #2: People could volunteer.

Participant #4: Sharing office space with political consultant in NYC working on campaigns, why are you talking to so in so in such and such country... how do you know? He said, "I know." A few days before, I had visited him even though I complain about liberties and so forth the monitoring the past 40 years in and out of the United States in monitored and erased and no keywords found. Oil trade, call, to Mark Rich, generally if police can be given assistance from that source, now it's legal has to be more than random access to information. Compass given to police to help them to get it to where it's got to go.

Participant #2: Nothing going on but stupid politics here. I would hate for police to listen to all calls. Concentrate them where they are more likely to happen.

**Researcher:** Does anyone have any comments or questions before we finish this up? I am going to ask you to complete a survey about what we have discussed. Thank you for your participation.

## **Appendix E: Law Enforcement Focus Group C (12080820)**

**Researcher:** What is terrorism?

Participant #5: It's an act that causes fear.

Participant #2: Usually motivated by some issue they have, whether it's religion, politics, or something that they hold strongly.

Participant #5: Sometimes violence.

Participant #1: Manipulation of ideas... I think to get other people to believe things and get them to, coerce them to do things that you want them to do.

Participant #4: Or cause them to react.

Participant #5: Or force them to do something different.

Participant #4: To cause a reaction, like part of terrorism is causing a reaction, stimulating that type of issue to cause a reaction, I would say cyber-terrorism be a form of engaging in someone's infrastructure to taking over their computer and redirecting to, harassment, a form of redirection in my opinion.

Participant #2: Obviously trying to force change, whether it's good or bad, even if it just alters your normal lifestyle, so they succeed in, you know, if they've caused that fear then they've done what they want, and that cause you to start living differently then that's part of their success.

Participant #5: It could be a form of revenge.

**Researcher:** What about the target? Should the target have any bearing on whether an act should be considered terrorism?

Participant #2: I think the target is one of the biggest parts of their plan.

Participant #1: Usually very specific I would say.

Participant #2: If they want to cause that mass fear that...

Participant #1: Whether they're targeting a location or targeting a specific group, there's reason why they're choosing either or.

**Researcher:** Is there a difference between a "freedom fighter" and a terrorist?

Participant #5: It depends on where they come from and who they're fighting for.

Participant #1: I think that most terrorists believe that they're freedom fighters.

Participant #5: It's all in their mind.

Participant #1: In themselves.

Participant #5: Because we can believe we're fighting for freedom and somewhere else we're considered the terrorists.

Participant #1: It's all in how you manipulate the term.

**Researcher:** Does the term terrorism depend on the types of acts committed?

Participant #2: I think you do, but that's not, you're not necessarily correct. You know, you might not have all the information, you might be misinformed, and then again, you're also entitled to your opinion, so I think it's all relative to the individual.

Participant #1: When the World Trade Center (WTC) went down in 2001, as an American, you don't say to yourself, well someone must have been fighting for their freedom that day. To us, and to most people, I think it was an obvious act of some type of terrorism. The first incident at the [WTC] in the 90s, I don't know if people were sure that that was an act of terrorism or if it was some, initially, the specific reasons for that were, I think were uncertain whereas 2001 was a lot more obvious when it initially happened. I don't know of anyone who said to themselves that that was an act of some freedom fighter, except for maybe the people who took part in it and caused it, and I don't even think that they thought it was a freedom fight. I think they purposely intended to just kind of say, we're here, we don't like you. And no matter what you do to try to stop us, we will find a way.

**Researcher:** So, are there certain acts you see as terrorism that others may see as the acts of freedom fighters?

Participant #4: Yea, I think there are. Different issues that one may have fought for, different issues that can be considered terrorism, or their resistance to certain movements. When you take, in terms of ethnic cleansing in different countries, it becomes along those issues of ... it's a self-defining issue but, which can never clearly be explained. Because, even if we talk about the war in Iraq right now, we're considered terrorists in their eyes, of coming over to their country, even though we, that aspect, liberated them from freedom, but you have the same situation there, where we went to war, we went into their country for the purpose of giving them freedom. But, and still years later, we're now, in certain sections of Iraq, the citizens of Iraq feel as if we're there terrorizing them. And even in the aspect of Blackwater, so it becomes, it may have been a very defined sense of where we were taught in school in terms of what we were taught in school, of what terrorism meant, to know an expanded version of what terrorism is. So now it's no longer just the act of putting a bomb, and blowing up, or setting out to cause a reaction, it's now changed.

**Researcher:** Is there a difference between the 9/11 attacks and the attack on the USS Cole?  
Does the target impact whether an act should be considered terrorism?

Participant #5: I think sometimes in war, it's expected, I think it's considered more terrorism when it's not expected, you know, you always be in a war but we weren't in a war like when they attacked the troops in Iraq they know we were at war so it's expected. Over here, we weren't at war with the people so they brought it over here, so...

Participant #2: I think when you involve the innocent lives, I think it you can go back through history, like he said when you're resisting a movement from a country or some dictator, you know, the means that you take to get yourself there you kind of accept that it's understood because there was a purpose. But the minute you start involving, so if your attack is against an army, you know, and that dictatorship, I think it's kind of accepted. But once you start to involve the innocent lives, and your sole purpose like I said is to bring about that change, because you're actually terrorizing people, you're putting people in fear, and I, no longer, a simple ride on a ferry to New York City, you don't know what's going to happen, you take a train ride now, you don't, you know you're there with your children, you're taking them to the Statue of Liberty, you can't even walk in there and feel comfortable going to the top, to show them something that you're proud of here. I think that once you involve the innocent lives [it's terrorism].

**Researcher:** When you say innocent, do you mean civilians?

Participant #5: Civilians outside the military.

Participant #2: Correct.

Participant #1: I think on an armed force that is currently engaged in some type of detail, action. Because I consider our department an armed force, and if we get attacked that's going to be an act of terrorism.

Participant #5: But, it's kind of like it would be accepted because we kind of signed up for this, and you know the risk when you take it. The other people were just walking on the streets, are normal civilians, and they didn't sign up for the risk, although when you choose to live somewhere, it's kind of like, okay, you've got to take, that why, you know, we don't go certain places, because we know if we go there, it's a danger there, you know, something might happen. We as civilians, a lot of people won't go to the Middle East, because they know it's not a good time, a lot of people won't go to Israel right now because it's not a good time to go, so you know, we choose to go, you know, where we feel safe.

Participant #3: I agree with [Participant #5]. When you go somewhere it's kind of like signing a waiver, like alright, I'm here so I accept whatever happens when I come here but when, like he said, when you're just taking your kid somewhere you want that security and that safety to know that nothing's going to happen and it's okay to be here but you don't have that anymore.

Participant #1: Which means that the terrorists --

Participant #3: -- have succeeded and --

Participant #1: -- accomplished their goal in creating that --

Participant #3: -- fear factor.

Participant #1: That sense of having to look your shoulder. I think that a lot of people didn't necessarily have, I mean you always have the one or two paranoid, but you know, I think that most people didn't have that sense before ... But now, I think, now more people do [have that sense to look over their shoulder]. And I do it but I fight it, you know, I want to go on vacation, I'm going to go. Can something happen on a plane? Yes, but you know what, engine failure can happen on a plane, so what am I going to do ... sit there a go, I'm not going to go on a vacation because of what happened years ago. You can't do that, you can't do that. If we all settle down and do that, then they've definitely accomplished their mission. Then we're done.

Participant #5: It took me about a year to go [a specific method to enter New York City] after [the 9/11 attacks]. I thought something bad was going to happen.

Participant #3: Everyone's trying to predict the next place, like what's going to be next, you know?

Participant #5: And that's part of terrorism. they win when they do that.

Participant #4: The psychological impact in this case of the WTC and our response thereof, has played a big role. Now I went to Canada, I guess the only country that I've gone to since, and seen how other people tend to view their security or their issue as much as we do ... looking at the news, ... the country next door, Canada, it was, it didn't seem as like that big of a concern to them, as ... for us. I mean, every day you pick up your local paper and it's almost an issue related to Iraq, terror, anthrax or any some type of concern for domestic terrorism, or foreign terrorism now on domestic soil. It didn't seem like that a big concern for them. I mean, I was there for a weekend. If they talked about anything in Iraq once during the week, that was a big thing.

Participant #1: Well that's also media. Let's be real. In our country the media will bombard you with whatever they think is going to get their ratings up. Now, does that mean that that's not necessarily their job? Obviously their job is to report the news, to report what's going on, not only here in our society but around the world. That's fine. Frankly I'm tired of turning on every news channel and they're all talking about the same thing. There are more things to talk about in the world.

Participant #2: I think it has more to do with, it's home because it's home. You're from here. If it was Canada and they attacked something in Canada then it would hit home probably a little harder. Because, wow, they did it to us. And that's part of the impact that I said.

The psychological impact is by far, I think, their biggest intent. They know they're going to, if they're going to kill 500 people, they're going to blow up a stadium, yeah, initially, that initial impact is like, oh my god, look how many people died. But it's not, the target is, eight years from now, I mean it's, the attacks happened in 2001 and eight years later, we still don't know where the next attack is coming, and we're not sure what to do.

Participant #5: Even beyond that, I think they accomplished their goal, I think a lot of that stuff was to shake us up financially. They took out the world financial center, and look at how we're living now. Everything is messed up.

Participant #2: Not that it wasn't part of it. The biggest thing is the psychological thing that, like I said, that you still have people ...

Participant #5: They got us psychologically, but they also got us financially.

Participant #2: It was multiple targets. What I'm saying is, what sticks? You can recover financially, eventually. What sticks with you psychologically? 15 years. I mean, we've see this. Our kids were small, they'll read about it in history books, but for most of us this happened to us, you'll never forget that, that day, watching those towers go down.

Participant #4: And it doesn't affect the kids as much.

Participant #5: Yeah, but, a few months later, how many people just forgot about it and went on about their lives? I mean, as far as the younger people, but as far as we go, I was in academy when that happened and I'll never forget that day. but, like I said, all those effects, they're still affecting us financially. I mean, even in ways maybe that it shouldn't. The fact that we're still at war, is like, war crippling the country. Gas prices are ridiculous, and that could also be considered another form of terrorism, the financial. Because, you cripple the country ... nobody wants to enlist in the armed forces or [enlistment is] way down.

**Researcher:** On a local level, is terrorism a problem for your agency?

Participant #1: I think we are close enough to what would be considered ideal targets. We have close proximity to New York City, close proximity to chemical refineries ... and so I think that it is. I think that that's probably the reason we get the emails that we get on a constant basis letting us know what's out there, what other agencies are finding, and that kind of thing.

Participant #2: The bulletin we get from FBI about terrorism.

Participant #1: I guess it's sent out to local municipalities with, just information, things to look for. So I think that it is important, I think terrorism, I come to work looking around, okay. My gas mask is in my locker, it's not going to do me any good there. You know, and every now and then, it's in the locker. I should probably have it in my car, but so even

though it plays a role a lot of us think, eh, nothing's going to happen, I don't think it's going to happen.

Participant #4: I personally think we are ill-equipped. I think the first time it came out I thought ... local agencies, and us particular, were really serious about it. And then after the first year I realized we're not. And then I realized that maybe we're not the type of target where we may have the conduit to their location, I definitely think we've had people living in town who may have been affiliated with other networks, but because of our local agency status, that information is not really shared, still, and it won't be shared still, so that type of Intel that we would have to do as a local agency to know who lives in your town, it's kind of incumbent on us if we see people just pop up to kind of do our own little investigations on them. Because, you know, we have stores in town that don't make any money but seem to stay open forever. It's those types of things that, you wonder, you see the type of connection. You know, things like this are relative. So do I think that a terrorist is going to circle [local zip code] on a map and go, yeah I can get that location? Not particularly. Do I think, on a route to something? Absolutely. But I definitely think that if there was going to be another terrorist attack to affect a mass group of people, it would be either at a bigger location or to identify certain main targets like certain presidents or banks. Those would be the people...

Participant #5: You say that, but that's if you're thinking of foreign terrorism, but local terrorism are like the people who go and ring the doorbells for ... people who work for [specific company involved with chemical testing on animals], and stuff like that. We're on that all the time. You've got to check that ...

Participant #2: We've got an abortion clinic right in the middle of town, so the abortion clinic automatically makes us a target every day. I mean, we have a police officer working there every Saturday. And that issue, that's just here, it's not a foreign issue, but it's the abortion issue.

Participant #5: I think we're probably not on point as far as foreign terrorism goes, but as far as local terrorism ...

Participant #1: We're certainly a target for PETA... people seem to know where people live, all the addresses seem to be found out, and executives that work for research companies and laboratories, who may be living here, are constantly getting threatened.

Participant #5: When they test on animals, and people come in here upset about that, and I think there's a lot of people who are heavy into their beliefs, even certain churches or organizations that probably meet in town that we don't see.

Participant #3: I don't think there's such thing as a target exemption. Everybody has the potential to be a target.

Participant #1: Someone fits the target criteria for someone, somewhere.

Participant #5: It goes all the way around. Sometimes the synagogues, sometimes the churches. We deal with that all the time.

Participant #3: We have such a variety of cultural backgrounds and a lot of mixing that goes on in this town specifically. I mean, that right there poses a threat because the diversity, like this town is known as probably top ten in the nation right now for diversity. That right there makes us a target. A lot of people are against that, different groups, and they could come in at any time and decide, you know what, we don't like this town or what they stand for. It's a very liberal town.

Participant #5: They have as far as interracial couples –

Participant #3: and children that come from that –

Participant #5: and homosexuality also.

**Researcher:** Do you think that terrorism is an important problem for your agency?

Participant #2: Not only the law enforcement agency. Because the biggest thing is now, your community has to be so involved with you, you take community policing, but it's amazing the amount of people that don't report issues, it doesn't have to be a terrorism situation. You step outside and get your morning newspaper, and you see a car, it's not your neighbor's car, it's in the driveway and there's someone coming in and out of the house. They don't even report that. And maybe an hour later, it's at work, and it hits them. And they go, you know, I came out this morning ... and it ends up being a burglary. That's the problem, the networking with the community, and I don't know how to that information out, or to get people involved, some people just don't want to. But the biggest thing is that ... it's known now that we have to live this way, and if you sit there and you say, if I ... and sometimes the silliest of things may be something, but report what you see.

Participant #5: It makes it harder for us, because now we have to be all eyes and ears. Whereas before you'd have people, you used to hate the nosy neighbor, but now it's like you want the nosy neighbor.

Participant #2: You can't rely on just us seeing things, being aware of things. Like he said before, you're not going to get some of the Intel that you need that's deeper, that's related to a hard target, someone that they believe is involved in a cell. And so you need that person to go, you know, my neighbor is, kind of so quiet, he's always got the blinds closed, he never does this, and very quiet. Because that alone, that just raises your awareness, and now, [Participant #4] might get something like that, and now he looks into it and checks out the house and finds out. ... He may not get all the Intel that the FBI might have, but he's certainly going to say, alright something's going on here and it's information he can pass on to us and now we're aware of that.

Participant #5: Here's another terrorism thing. As far as gang violence. I remember before, all the type of gang initiation, kill a cop ... I think that's also a form of terrorism that, you know...

Participant #4: I don't like the word, and I'm trying to understand everyone's viewpoint. I think a part of where we are with the word, and it's not any reflection on us, or the country. ... [Every so often], we classify or attempt to classify certain acts to become the new buzzword. Like when you say the word terrorism, and trying to understand it ... I don't teach my daughter, terrorism all around. I don't. There's crime all around, and there's different types of criminals all around, but when the word terrorism has, I guess, culturally ... has always been to terrorize... to express that fear. If you try to say, terrorism, it's just this broad, but it's so prevalent. It becomes, back to that psychological thing of now, this person has to operate in fear. If I tell my daughter, yeah this type of terrorist, that type of terrorist, that type of terrorist. She's going, I imagine she's going to say to me, but Dad, that's everybody. Everybody could fall in that category. And I think that's where there needs to be a separation of the categories and terrorism. I know where we were going with the gangs being terrorists but I don't want to label them as such, because actually I would say that we're outnumbered already. And they now have the ability to counter-plan against us before we can even plan against them.

Participant #5: The reason, I guess, I never label, and it's already been labeled. They're an organization and what they're doing is, in all their actions, is causing fear in other people.

Participant #2: It's not just other people. The thing is, think about this as time goes forward. It's going to get worse. Because these gangs get bigger, the gangs get a little more bold, it's just like the terrorists. 9/11, it took them years to finally plan that and get that off, so if you don't think these gangs are doing the same thing. But the gang's intent are to try to terrorize us too. Because you intimidate the police to sit here now, every time I get in my car and I drive down the street I don't know who's going to turn around. That's part of their game. So it does fall under it even though it's a different form. But it falls under the whole terrorism thing.

Participant #4: They want that power over you.

Participant #3: I think that they have succeeded in that sense because people won't say anything unless it affects them directly. Unless they are the ones being robbed or unless they are the ones that have lost a loved one, it doesn't affect them. It doesn't matter where you are or where you were at that time, a lot of people don't take it seriously because it had no impact on their life personally. And just as recent as a bank robbery, somebody watched the individual put on the whole garb to go inside in a disguise and they didn't think to pick up the phone and say, this is what I'm seeing, this is what's going on, it looks a little odd to me. It's 2:00 in afternoon, and this guy is putting on a whole attire, a Muslim attire, and covering his face and everything but, I guess that's just normal. Because he didn't see any immediate or imminent fear in his own life or safety so it had no affect on him. And that's how people are, and that's what their sole purpose is. They want to put their fear but nobody's going to come together to fix the problem because it

doesn't affect them directly. You don't know, it that was going to be an act of terrorism or what. They could've went in there, they could've blown it up, and it could've affected the entire town. It could've affected 20 towns surrounding us. Who knows. They didn't care at that moment.

Participant #5: If they took hostages, it would've, probably been considered an act of terrorism.

**Researcher:** Can you suggest a way that would ... make people more likely to engage with local law enforcement?

Participant #3: Unfortunately, no. Because people, you cannot force anybody to say anything. You can encourage them, but I just don't see it happening because people are so scared because there's going to be a repercussion against them. What if he sees me picking up the phone? What if I miss something for a second? Everybody's just so interested in their own safety that it doesn't matter about the people around them.

Participant #5: They're scared.

**Researcher:** From what I heard earlier, there is some level of community policing in this agency? How involved are the police with the community here?

Participant #2: This isn't going to go anywhere, it's just going to stay right here?

Participant #5: Community policing is a casualty of finances; it a casualty there's no more community policing as of right now.

Participant #2: At least for the Summer.

Participant #1: [Community policing] was suspended for summer.

Participant #4: Even beyond that, it's more than that. This maybe gave them a good reason to do so. The commitments to community policing, and I talk specifically about us, has changed. It's changed over the number of chiefs. It changed over the number of philosophies, It's changed when the grant funding tended to get lower. I know our agency tends to take a different approach towards community policing. I was a good thing to do, [we] started taking the grant money, but it requires a commitment beyond that. It requires philosophy that's supposed to come from the top down. And back and forth. But when it's not shared, and when it's not believed upon by the officers, it becomes really hard to have a good community policing program. [Participant #3] can't really go out there and engage with the community because it not widely accepted by the whole department. And so if you have six or seven good community policing officers, and [Participant #3] was out there on a bike, and [Participant #3] goes back there to the ... supervisor and says, can you come over here for this program, and it's not really perceived or respected in a good sense, it becomes almost a fruitless job. And then it becomes a part of not having the community behind you because if someone asks [Participant #1] for a favor, or to reach out for certain things, and then [Participant #1]

went to the boss, he went to the other boss, and they got stopped there, now that person's perception of the police is a little diminished but even more so, we went to [Participant #1] ... a community minded police officer, if they couldn't succeed at it, then the average cop coming to the door, they're going to have that problem.

Participant #1: Community policing needs, if you have a separate unit that is called community policing, it needs the support of your everyday patrol; without them, you look like you are talking out of both sides of your face... because here you are, the community officer, going to meetings, talking to the neighborhood, saying this is what we want to do, we want to work together and they see your face and maybe your partner's face dressed in a very nice community policing uniform and here come the guys in blue, and please don't take this personally [to the other members of the group], it's not you guys, I'm just saying this in general, here comes the guy in blue and they are out there slamming the same group of people that you're were just saying "we're trying to work with you, not against you". And so they're seeing two different sides. "How come [specific officer], who teaches DARE and likes my kid is so sweet and these patrol guys...? Why we got four cars on our block? Why they got to roll in here like that? Why they got to be stopping my son on sidewalk?"

Participant #5: I'm going to say this, in this town, because the philosophy used to be we're going to bring some homegrown people so that they have a relationship with the community. I feel like that philosophy has also been lost. I grew up here. A lot of times, people take things differently from me than they would take it from somebody else. My perception of police when I was growing up is different than my perception of the police now.

**Researcher:** Are you saying that there is not a consistent message presented by the department as a whole in regards to community policing?

Participant #1: Yes. As a matter of fact, it's hard enough in this department to get an officer to say yes, I want to be a part of community policing.

Participant #2: If you're using community policing, you may have a specific unit with a certain number of members that you allot to that, but it has to be supported by the whole department. If you don't have people with the personalities, like [[Participant #5] said, even though we had our run-in's when [Participant #5] was a juvenile, before he got on the police department, If you don't the people that know how to get along with the community. Like I said you have to do your job. I have to pull you over and I may have to give you a ticket. But I don't have to treat you like you're a piece of garbage and I'm walking up and I don't want to hear your excuse and I don't want to talk to you and I don't have to give you an explanation because I'm going to give you a ticket and move on to the next one. There's no reason you can't give to driver an explanation. If you take your time and, while you have the camera going, you have the recorder going, if you treat them like you're doing your job, but that you truly care, that's where community policing comes into play, because now people want to interact with you. If you walk away with a ticket and [you feel that you've been treated fairly, no problem] ... but, here I am, a police officer and I have to give you, a resident of this community, and I treat you like

garbage, you will be left with a bad taste in your mouth ... that guy doesn't give two hoots about you. Why would residents want to deal with police?

Participant #4: And he's not going to call you with any information.

Participant #1: They're not going to help you in any way, in the least, at all.

Participant #5: And that's how we lose them.

**Researcher:** Are summonses discretionary in your agency?

Participant #2: Yes, but we have a regime that really, really emphasizes tickets ... and that in turn is coupled with the personalities that I think every police department has that you somehow put this uniform on and you think that you are the almighty, this is my street, and you're standing on my sidewalk and that's where the problem lies.

Participant #1: We have people who forget that when they're not wearing that uniform, yes, we took the oath and we're cops 24 – 7, before you were a cop, you were a regular Joe, and you should never forget that you were a regular Joe. Because when you go to somebody else's town, and you're not wearing that uniform, they don't know who you are and they'll treat you the same way you treated somebody else. And the problem is, yes, right now there's this big emphasis, on like trying to go and ... yes we have discretion, I believe in my heart that they prefer we not use it. Flat out. We are living under terroristic regime. People in this department, some people in this department look over shoulder every day, from something as simple as walking from the door to their patrol vehicle, and making sure that the hat goes on just in time, because if you're not wearing it within those ten feet, you're going to get written up, to "Oh my god, I haven't given a ticket all day long. What am I going to do? Oh my god, I'm going to get in trouble if I don't write one ticket." I mean, that's asinine. We are people, they chose us, they chose us, I thought, because, from what they saw in our applications and our interviews, they believe we can do job. And now we're all being treated like - yeah, you can do the job, but I'm going to tell you how I want you to do it. You know, it's like forget the fact that you are of an individual mind, it's my way or the highway. And that's just the way it is. What, you're laughing at me like I shouldn't have said anything? What? That's the way it is.

Participant #4: [Participant #2] said, the cop being on the corner saying my street, my way, and what [Participant #1] just said was about a supervisor or administrator saying – this way or no way. When you take that approach, and it goes back into community, and it goes back into expecting a phone call about a neighbor's blinds being down all week, well they're not going to communicate that with same cop who made them feel like this was their street. the attitude is – if you feel so big and bad then you figure out what's going on.

Participant #1: That's right.

Participant #4: I'm not going to do your job for you. And that has crossed both lines of ethnicity and class here in [this community], where you may have somebody making six million dollars [a year] who does not have the time to really see what's going on. He, or she, doesn't communicate that well or effectively with the police. And the resident in a lower area upset with they were treated. So now you have two sets of residents who both feel, you know what, let police do their job. And then, that where we lose it and become most vulnerable, because when we are not getting that phone call or that Intel about what's happening on that block ...

Participant #5: Community policing is bigger that community policing. Community policing goes deeper. I coach, [Participant #4] coaches. We get to interact with the kids; they see us in a different light. If they do have a problem, or if they do know something, or something that happened, then they'll come tell you. There's no compensation for us, it's just us giving up our time. If [Participant #2] could afford to pay the taxes, they might stay a little bit closer. Community policing is lost because you can't keep the officers in the community.

Participant #1: I would live in this area. I love [this community], but I can't afford the taxes.

Participant #5: If you can keep [police officers] a little closer, than they would do a little bit more.

Participant #2: I would go one step further. Because of the time that [Participants #4 & #5] put into this community, those people that want to deal with them, [members of the community] only want to deal with them. The community doesn't want to deal with officers other than [Participants #4 & #5]. Some community members will only talk to [Participants #4 or #5], which can cause a delay in receiving vital information, or the information doesn't get to us.

**Researcher:** How much cooperation is there between your LEA and your community?

Participant #5: Depends on the person.

Participant #1: It really does. We have officers that only make friends uptown, but don't make any friends downtown. For whatever the reason, they're just more comfortable with certain people. Something that [Participant #4] said, someone with a six million dollar house, there's also the detachment from the community just because of society and financially ...

Participant #5: Everybody puts their fences up, everybody works two jobs.

Participant #1: They work two jobs and they're never in town. They work in the city. How many people do we have that moved in from the city, but they're still working in the city. So they're out of the house at 5:30 in the morning and they're not getting home until 9:30 – 10:00 at night. They have no idea what's going on in town.

**Researcher:** So are you saying that there is not a sense of community?

Participant #5: That's missing right now.

Participant #1: I think there is a detachment between that group of residents and the police department because they're too busy. They're too busy with "I've got to get to work", "I've got to go to the [specific vacation or weekend location associated with wealthy individuals]" ...

Participant #5: It's beyond that. If they see that bag at the train station, they'll call after they get on the train, because they've got to get to work on time.

Participant #4: Exactly. And that's the bigger problem. People see bag at the train station, where they believe something's wrong, get on the train even though they've seen the bag and wait one stop to call the police so the train they're about to get on don't blow up. It just becomes a sense of, I'll make a mental note – I see it, I'll call when I get to work. They make a conscious decision, at that point they are saying – you know what, at that point, it doesn't matter. And this is how we go along with policing. We see a sign, we know something doesn't fit, we look at it, make a mental note and continue on.

Participant #2: Each individual situation obviously doesn't register right away, you may look outside and see that car next door and you may think something, but you are distracted by other things and later you realize ...

**Researcher:** Are you willing, as individuals, to work with your community in order to address the threat of terrorism?

Participant #1: Sure.

Participant #5: In this room alone, you have a core of people who will talk to people, who will gather information and distribute information to people. We like to talk to people. In this room, I think you'll find a lot of people who are willing to talk to people and get information and pass it out and get people to talk to them.

Participant #2: Another problem with the community, we don't really have the greatest fans either, as far as police are concerned, and not just because of what's been going on here, but I've been here for [specific number] of years and since I can remember, the police department has been treated like we are a necessary evil. If it were up to them, they would get rid of probably a hundred of us and keep a handful. Obviously, they don't see on paper what goes on in this community, but we've always been treated like we're a necessary evil, not needed. If your [local government] is treating you like that and that's their message and that's the way that they go about it, that kind of makes it hard to create a link and a connection with the community already.

Participant #4: It is a taboo subject. I'm a police officer, in social setting, it's the last thing I introduce myself as.

Participant #5: If people know, they know.

Participant #1: I'm not. I'm in public relations. I relate with the public every day. I'm not lying. But I will not tell people that I'm a police officer when I'm off duty. My brother, who used to hate police, introduces me – that's my sister, she's a cop.

Participant #5: Even though we're not in community policing now, we talk to the people and they come talk to us.

Participant #1: I had people, when I was in community policing, asking for [participant #3]. Everybody wants to ask for [participants #4 & #5]. There are days when I want to get to the point people are asking for me. I'm a little jealous, you know, and it's hard. Community policing in this department, the intent is good, the impression they want to give is good, but it doesn't work the way it should because the [community police] officers pulled for something else. They get pulled for court; they get pulled for transports; they get pulled for crossings.

Participant #5: There are also assignments they give, that really have nothing [to do with community policing]. Like, you know, what are you really trying to get? What information ... what are you really trying to get out of people?

Participant #1: It's very difficult. And when you have people within the department who believe that community policing is a waste of time, and that the officers sit down at the substation and don't do anything, but read the newspaper – that's a shame.

Participant #5: When I grew up, there must have been more [specialized units] here.

Participant #1: Community policing had [more than twenty] people in it.

Participant #5: They had community policing run the explorers program, and I remember that. So, I had my bad dealings with the police, but I also had [specific officer], who ran the explorers program.

Participant #1: Thank god we tried to maintain those programs.

Participant #5: But, we don't have any of them now. They're all gone. When I first came on job they had PAL (Police Athletic League) night, buy kids pizza soda, open gym all night. That's gone now. There are a lot of community-policing things that are gone. That's something I used to volunteer for.

Participant #1: That's a resource issue.

Participant#5: You still have the department. You still have the personnel. You just have to reassign them one night a month to the night shift.

Participant #1: They can't afford to do that. They need to supplement patrol.

Participant #3: It's won't afford, though.

Participant #1: If people could live closer to town they would be more apt to do so, but that's an economic thing.

Participant #3: I think it's that and that your kids would be a part of the community as well. I think that plays a major part.

Participant #2: You work here, but care about the high school [where the officer's children go to school]. You really don't care, or know, about the graduation rate at the high school in [this community], but in the high school [where the officer's children go to school], you do.

Participant #1: When you have officers who come to work miserable because they have to drive hour and a have to get here. Granted, you have to do what you have to do. You have to do what's right for you. But don't come to work miserable because you have to drive an hour and a half. Just move closer to [this community]. But that's my own personal opinion. I can't ... but then they're like, "well, I can't stand [this community]". If you can't stand this town, then go work somewhere else. We have a detachment, both from the residents and from the officers themselves.

Participant #4: Causing officers to be unhappy, forcing him or her to be miserable at work, and to have that negative output to community, which is ...

Participant #5: That affects communication.

Participant #1: Nobody's perfect every day. I've had my moments. We all have our days where it's like – I don't really want to deal with you.

**Researcher:** Let's get back to local police working with the local community in regards to counter-terrorism? Are there any potential dangers or costs?

Participant #5: I think there are costs, because sometimes people overreact and immediately call the police. "Oh, I've got anthrax on my envelope". The hazmat team has to come out – that costs money. You've got to close roads down.

Participant #1: And if you're causing overtime, you're screwed. There can be traffic and transit problems. The economic repercussions are not just to the department. There's going to be delays everywhere.

Participant #4: But I also think that they need to be looking at us, looking at county. There needs to be a better blueprint on how to continue to deal with certain issues. If we have an anthrax scare, or whatever, there needs to be systematic approach, moving ahead. It doesn't need to be something where every time something comes out we're spending two or three hours on it, dedicating resources to that. Of course the bomb squad may have to come out; you have to isolate the area and then move on to next assignment. It can't

continue to be where we're sacrificing four to six cops to hold up until we determine exactly what we have. There has to be some type of protocols to address some of the needs and concerns and I think there needs to be a county... we have that rapid response team, but it needs to be more of a designated individual to address these types of things.

Participant #5: The problem we run into is, if you have multiple incidents within a small time frame, we're not equipped to deal with it.

Participant #4: I think we need certain amount of cross trained individuals and there need to be specific guidelines to handle certain things.

**Researcher:** Are you saying that you don't currently have the structure, guidelines and training to respond to these types of incidents?

Participant #4: Not all of them. Some of them. Some we started doing.

Participant #1: We have very basic...

Participant #2: It boils down to... it's about money, budgets and training. If I give you a one-day course on, for example, an active shooter, which is also a form of terrorism, and I went to the school [to become an instructor for dealing with an active shooter] and I came back and over the course of three or four days, we went into the school and showed these guys, they were all great, they kind of picked up the basics. It's a year later and they haven't done it again. I gave officers a familiarization, over a four hour day, but it's a year later and there's been no further training.

Participant #4: There's no training. Officers are not equipped, not just here, but in general, to deal with this form of aggravated terrorism.

Participant #1: That's physically equipped, emotionally equipped, not that anyone can emotionally prepare for something like that, but the training aspect is so necessary and we just don't have it. To go in there for one day and then pretend that you are going to be able to handle it...

Participant #5: I don't think we do enough with high school students. If something like that was going to happen, then we don't have enough interaction where it's like, okay, somebody say something to somebody if you think something like this is going to happen. There's not enough interaction with any of the kids. The high school kids experience with the police is ... they hide out outside, they give us tickets for piling up in the car, so they're not talking to the police.

**Researcher:** Do your high school students in your community provide information to the police?

Participant #5: You have students that will come up and tell you what's about to happen, like a little bird, as long as you don't tell anybody I told you, this is what's about to happen, then the little bird flies away.

**Researcher:** What percentage of your department has some kind of working relationship with community?

Participant #3: Ten percent.

Participant #1: You're being generous.

Participant #2: It's sad. You have a bunch of minorities in the room, not that that has anything to do with it, but we have, it's really sad, some of it has to do with the hiring process, but we just don't have people... You have a situation where [Participant #5] will soon become a school resource officer, but we have two very good officers who work well with kids, but then at that lunch hour, when the kids go get something to eat, we have traffic bureau targeting the kids, that pull over kids, piled in car. And it's an absolute no tolerance policy. Instead of saying "guys, for your own safety... we'll give you guys a break and let things go for a little while" and then if you catch a kid, it's going to be the same kids over and over, but if you get them a second or third time then you issue the summons and say "listen, I warned you, for your own safety I am giving you a ticket".

**Researcher:** Are you saying that there is no use of discretion?

Participant #2: It goes right back to that situation, where you know what, I like [Participant #5] and he's my school resource officer, but the jerk off that gave me the ticket, you know what, I'm not giving him anything. I'm not dealing with the police anymore. They may still respect [Participant #5], but there's that little portion of them that holds back because they're like – even though I like [Participant #5], he still works with those guys. It's very difficult to get that portion of these guys. We have way too many guys that treat [policing] as a power struggle. They come out here and they think it's their street and their issue is to move up the ladder and impress the administration. I grew up a minority in [nearby community]. I have a funny story. I got stopped [by the police]. I had a friend who asked me for a ride. I give him a ride, he gets out of my car and goes in a house and comes back outside, he's picked up some shotgun shells. I have no idea. He throws them under the seat when I the cops pulled me over. The cops tossed my car, they go through us and they arrest him, he says the shells were his and my insurance had lapsed. And they turned around and did the odds and evens thing – odds we tow it, evens we don't, and thank god it was evens and they said get the car home, get your butt home. but you know, I thank god that number one, they could have easily arrested me. We have police officers here that would have locked both guys up. I was good kid. I was a good student. I was a smart kid, an athlete, and was not into trouble. We have supervisors right here who would have arrested me and put me into the system that I didn't need to be in. Regardless whether I would have gotten PTI or not, that could have sent me on completely different path. And we have that same situation here with too many officers.

**Researcher:** How might you foster change within your department?

Participant #2: It starts from the top.

Participant #1: It has to start from the top. Because as much as you want to in here, that fear that these officers have; their career is first, and though they may say “I want to do something for the community”, when it comes down to it, what’s it all about, my paycheck, that’s what you need to survive, and if it’s not coming from up there and they’re not telling you “hey listen, soften up”, they’re not going to come over here and say “yeah, let’s be pals” and when the people in these offices don’t show face to the community that they are supposed to represent at any event, why should any other officer in the department? And that’s the problem.

Participant #5: It can start with Sergeants, because if you have good supervisors who show up at the scene, and he says we’re only talking him, have a nice day. That’s where it would really start.

Participant #4: It starts with you. It starts with that officer.

Participant #2: I think the point that [Participant #1] is trying to make is ... It’s in any job, across the board, any job you pick, personalities, the way you are raised, what you have experienced socially, when you get on the job, you can’t tell guy not to be money hungry, you can have a guy who wants money, wants to get to top; or you can have a guy who is happy to do the job and “I’m going to do what’s asked of me” and wants to be a team player. So you can’t mold that outside here, it starts with the hiring process. I think you need to be very good at picking the people that have a better understanding of an overall group of people. But then you do need a chief, if you’ve got a personality who slips through the cracks, because you can’t do everything to prevent it, when you turn around and you’re a chief and your sitting here saying “no tolerance, no tolerance – go out there and hammer people”, what does that do to the ego of the power hungry guy? “I’ve got the backing of the chief – I’m impressing those guys, and you know what, I’m going to do it because eventually they’re going to move me up the ladder”. So if you don’t have it from top down, where you don’t have [the administration] say to the guy “you know what, you’re doing a god job, but you’re getting a few complaints and I understand you’re having a rough relationship with the community ... back off a little, try a little nicer approach, go do your job, but back off a little bit”. But if you don’t have that, you take that mold of a guy who is a lunatic and you’re just making things worse.

Participant #4: If you replace chief now, you will just have another set of issues, without naming specific supervisors. We know the chief is not out there and that he needs to be more visible; he’s a major component of it, but even if he authorizes all the changes to be made, if the guys don’t do it then it doesn’t matter; it’s not going to get done. It goes back to that hiring, of putting individuals in place that are going to have that mindset. We know all the cops who have problems in community, whether it’s with rank, or without rank. We know who they are. [The community knows the names of the officers that have

problems dealing with the community and they have a bigger impact than other cops that are seen in a positive light.]

Participant #5: People remember negative more than they remember positive.

Participant #4: It starts with us, when I say us, I mean the officers with the same mindset, changing the culture, which is a hard thing. We are a paramilitary organization that is structured so that ...

Participant #1: But in saying that, this paramilitary organization, though you and I and can go out there and go to every meeting, we can support every athletic program that we have out there for the kids, we can do whatever we want, junior police academies, the explorers, we can be part of all of that, you [Participant #4] & I, let's say, but unless they say "hey, that's great what [Participant #1 & Participant #4] are doing", unless they say that, everybody else in uniform, that is supposed to be on our side, they're still doing their own thing, and it's just you and me out there. We can go out there and be the most positive people in the world, but without support doesn't matter.

Participant #5: My perception of the police growing up was just the worst. My experience with the police department seemed to be the worst. I would never have talked to [Participant #2] if I hadn't become a cop, but I can say by doing what they did, it probably kept me on the straight track. If I ever, I wasn't doing anything, but if I ever did decide to do anything, they would have been right on me. Had I known you ... it's all based on life experience. Now if [Participant #2] was able to participate in community policing, we would have known him a little better. It comes down to ... involve yourself with the community a little bit. If you can do that, then people can get to know you, the other side of you, then they'll come talk to you. The one thing we do, although we're not doing it this year, even a little basketball game. Everyone is picking out their favorite officer, or their favorite firefighter. I'm just telling you, it's the truth. When you're not in uniform, they will pull you over after the game and talk to you. They want to get to know the other side of you. So, when they get to know the other side of you, then you'll have a better relationship with the community.

**Researcher:** What's most effective manner of gathering intelligence about potential terrorist activity in your community?

Participant #1: It all comes down to your relationship with the community.

Participant #5: It comes down to the relationship with the public.

Participant #1: It all comes down to the relationship that the department, the officer, the community have with each other.

Participant #5: They need to feel comfortable that they can call and give you information.

Participant #1: They have to feel that, like when they call, and it's respect on both sides; it can be all sweet, sweet, but they have to understand if they have to bring their child because they had weed in their pocket, then he's got to do it. But it's all about the relationship between the cops and the community. I believe that's what it boils down to.

Participant #2: Information has to get out. I don't think you should rely on one issue, it should be through phone calls, but obviously this information has to get out; it could be through phone calls, letters, but I think one of the biggest one is if you have a team concept of community policing in your whole department; you might have your specific individuals that are teaching DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance Education), and are able to allot the time; like he's going to call for service, that person may want to talk to you, but you might have to say "listen, I've got another call to go to, but I'll get back to you"; where [the DARE officer] will have more time to say "if you want to meet with me, we can meet on Tuesday at 3PM" and you free up that time. But if you have the police department caring, and really, I don't mean caring like, you don't have to like anyone, you treat individuals the way you want to be treated. I could never understand that... I treat individuals the way I want to be treated. I don't want to be treated rudely; I don't want you to talk down to me. I will have any conversation you want, as long as you treat me like an equal. And once we can get that, like I said, then if I'm on a burglary and doing a canvass, and those people have gotten into a relationship with the officer that's there, and he's not a community policing officer, but now it's "hey Officer Johnson I've seen" and that information gets passed on verbally, so I don't think it's one specific way of getting that Intel out, but it's somehow getting the information, but you have to rely on the fact that these officers that are out there are doing their job. We've somehow detached themselves from that. Most of the business section here expect the cops to come by and hammer them with tickets. So, who wants to say hello to you. I feel awkward sometimes. there are places you walk in and the people that I used to get along with very well and now you walk in for that cup of coffee and it's like, you kind of get those eyes and those looks and you're like, oh great, I don't feel too comfortable here and now I'm going to have to find somewhere to go to. Even for dinner, you go to sit down to eat and those people who were always smiling and you can sense that, and it had nothing to do with you it's the other two cops from the week before. And we've completely eliminated that link between the community and the department. Like I said, if I give you a ticket, when I give an individual a ticket, when you walk away you not hating me, because, you know, "you've got to be more careful", "we're targeting this area", and I treat you with respect. Professional is not "license and registration" and then I give you a ticket. That's not professional. If that person wants to ask you a question, "give me one second sir, as soon as I get your license and registration, I will answer your question". Where are you off to go to? If he wants to ask you twenty questions, you can answer the twenty questions.

Participant #1: If you're a jerk in uniform, probably jerk out of it.

Participant #5: Another thing is a lot of people don't read newspaper, our local TV channel sucks. It's almost like you have to go door to door, you're not going to get it done in one night, but you have to get the information out and explain, some people live near water, tell

them if you see anything, ask your children if they see anything. I think the kids are probably a greater resource than the parents because they are home during the day.

Participant #2: Think about the burglary situation. I was on a detail the other day. If you get hit on [name] street, you don't need community policing to do it, if things are quiet, send officers out in a five block radius and go door to door. Leave a note, go out there and say "don't leave screen doors open", "we're getting hit hard", "we haven't tracked down exactly where they are targeting, but yesterday they were two blocks away from your home, so this area could be hit soon". I think people appreciate that and we don't do that.

**Researcher:** So are you saying you need to have the police provide information to the community?

Participant #2: But on a face-to-face level; because part of your duties are to... this place makes you feel like – I've got to get in a car – first I need mileage on the car, so I've got to drive; and then I've got to call in that I'm checking an area; so I've got to do a certain amount of those and I've got to write certain number of tickets. You almost feel robotic. As opposed to, hey it's a Saturday. Things are slow for the first two or three hours. You know what, at a reasonable time, you don't want to wake anybody up too early, at about 9:00 get out there on foot, say hello to people, tell them what's going on in the area, the sense that you're going to alarm them, hey I'm trying to give you a heads-up here, don't leave garage open and don't leave back door open. Someone's coming in here and opening doors and getting in.

Participant #4: Gathering Intel, in all my years [as a detective], the last one we had was the homicide investigation. We gather written intelligence a number of different ways: we gather Intel from officers, from the phone call received, through the internet. This was one of first ones that I'd ever seen that where was a lack of information coming in. The type of information coming in was nothing like we had seen in the past. What it meant was ... it put us at a disadvantage to investigate, but to rely on technology to find our murderer. If those relationships are not cultivated ... we require officers to fill out debriefing form arrest. We go through the debriefing forms and out of all the debriefing forms we get, if I say that out of five hundred maybe five may have Intel on it, five. So that's five hundred arrests being made and there are five with information regarding Intel. That means to me that no one's talking to the cops; no one is sharing any information from the criminal aspect. And so, if you take that and then you couple that number with the non-arrest, the field interview – we're not getting Intel. So if you don't have the Intel, you cannot possibly know what's going on with your community. We're relying right now on the internet. We get a report in, [an example], we have a carjacking in [neighboring community], a doctor from [this community]. We knew nothing about it. We get a call from another agency inquiring about finding her. We check our records, we didn't find anything. We had to go to the good old reliable internet to find out she was victim of carjacking. So, the point is that the communications [issues] are not just with cops and community but also cops and cops. The lack of intelligence puts us at a disadvantage. Whether it's a criminal case or terrorism, the lack of information puts us at a severe disadvantage.

Participant # [1]: I think [participant #2] made very good point. Most people's perception is that we drive around in a car and all we do is give tickets. But when we did community meetings, I had a lot of people express "I really like to see you guys out there on the bicycles, it makes me feel better". We had some commuters coming home late at night on the train; the bicycles were out there until about 10 [PM]. A couple of nights, supervisors got calls, "hey listen, I got off the train, I saw some bicycle officers; I was very happy; it made me feel comfortable; keep up the good work". You get that every now and then. But those people who feel like we don't talk to them, when you do get that interaction, as [participant #2] was describing, and you are going door to door, I think it gives them that impression of "alright they're bothering me on a Saturday morning, but, okay, they're trying to do something"; "oh wow, the cops are trying". So, if they see us trying, they're probably more apt to say "you know what... they're trying to do their job, so let me do my part". So that's what's important too, that they do see us out there trying to something.

**Researcher:** We are going to have to wrap this up, but I want to give everyone a last chance to give their thoughts on terrorism and community policing.

Participant #3: Well, I think that the only way that there will be an effective change is if, or when, something does happen. That's when people will decide that they want to develop their relationship. It can't just be an effort on our part, trying to go door to door. It can't just be an effort of us trying to reach out to them. It has to be them trying to reach out to us; it has to be a 50-50 thing. That's the only way it's going to work. But the only way they're going to do it, and it goes back to what I said before, it has to affect them directly and until then there's not going to be anything. Because they didn't care about community policing when it was going on; they didn't care when they disbanded us for the summer, until they needed their car seat installed and then it's like "who the hell's gonna do this for me? There's nobody to do this for me. Oh no, what do you mean community policing is gone?" But they read about two months ago in the paper; it didn't affect them then. It's only when stuff affects them. So maybe if something serious happens to them, then they will reach out for that bond and that relationship with the police, but until then ...

**Researcher:** [Brief discussion of Smith et al. (2006, 2008) research on the temporal and spatial relationship among terrorism in the US]

**Researcher:** What does this research mean to you? If the public knew this, do you think they would be more likely to provide information?

Participant #4: I think so.

Participant #5: There was a case where a mother called in on her son. He was about to act up. I think part of it is that we have to let them know we are open and available to them for any information.

Participant #2: Here's the biggest thing, turn on TV, and we had our shooting for a homicide just recently. And you can turn that TV on and, on every news station, there was the same info over and over again. What needs to be put out there is information, it sounds like you're beating a dead horse, but if you sit here, and on every news channel, every day, you go over something about terrorism, you talk about that statistic, over and over again, eventually, you turn the TV on, you may not even be listening to it, but you're still hearing it, and you continue to put that information out, whether it's a small paragraph, eventually it becomes second nature. And you know what, they may be out in the backyard mowing the lawn, and they just came out from inside where the TV said "hey listen, contact your local police department with information regarding whatever the situation is..." All of the sudden it snaps in your head and you're like "you know what, let me make a phone call". I don't think we get the information out, but once you get that across to them, the venue of how it comes in, I think eventually it will take care of itself, to be honest with you. Education and information; and an emphasis on coming through with the information, for the most minute things, if need be.

Participant #1: Emphasis is good because, like [participant #3] said, if it doesn't affect the individual, chances are ... you know, they're too busy. Right now, in society, everyone is just too busy. And, as far as ... I think if people knew, if all the local residents, the civilians were getting the emails that we got, they'd be like, "oh, it's still going on?" Yes, it's still going on. Guess what, it's not over.

Participant #4: Do you honestly read all those emails?

Participant #1: Yes, I do.

Participant #4: I don't.

Participant #1: Whether I read it immediately, or tomorrow, but I actually do read it because you never know what kind of strange things are going on out there. maybe I'm one of those paranoid people.

Participant #4: We get those emails, and for those first four months you read them, but after a while ... I don't read them, because it's not categorized specifically, it's generic.

Participant #1: I don't read every word, but ... as far as, you know, people in the community and their relaying of information ... it's hard to say. I think a lot of people are so involved in, say taking their four kids to tae kwon do, baseball, football, soccer and basketball, "I have to get to work; I have a business meeting; I'm working two jobs, so that I can take care of my kids ..." Terrorism is probably not number one on their list.

**Researcher:** Any comments or questions before we finish this up? I am going to ask you to complete a survey about what we have discussed. Thank you for your participation.

## Appendix F: Community Focus Group C (03080820)

**Researcher:** [Introduction.] What is Terrorism?

Participant #4: To me, it starts out as being anti-legal violent destruction without any reason, they may have their own ideology; it's illegal, it is extremely destructive. It can even be based on religious philosophy, as some of them believe it to be; 9/11 and the marine barracks, and when they pulled along a battleship and put some explosives on that ... It's beyond any human reason. To me it is completely unjustified.

Participant #2: Unjustified, that's what I say.

Participant #4: It involves the loss of life.

Participant #1: Well I think terrorism is random violence because, for instance, when our country went into Iraq that was an invasion, that was not terrorism, even though it might have looked like terrorism to the folks there, it was something that was announced, you know, for what it was worth's. So I'd say the randomness is part of that. The other thing is that it's meant to create ... an action that creates fear among the general population, rather than just those that were actually killed by it. So, it's meant to have a wider effect on everybody.

Participant #2: Did terrorism come from them going over to Iraq? They were doing this before they went to Iraq. But there's been more terrorism after they went into Iraq?

Participant #1: I would say that terrorist get more bang for their buck these days because an incident on the other side of the world gets immediate press coverage online and in the news, so I imagine terrorists feel more rewarded, they're more highly motivated to commit their actions today because the news does get out very quickly.

Participant #3: There's no reasonable logical reason for terrorism.

Participant #4: To me it goes beyond random; it's sometimes a very specific target. Put a hit on someone, to kill the president; it's extremely specific, and they blew up the battleship.

**Researcher:** Should the target of an attack make a difference, whether it's a military base or a building filled with individuals that are non-military personnel, as to whether the event should be considered terrorism?

Participant #4: To me it's terrorism, but it's more reprehensible if you are hitting a civilian target, rather than if you have two countries. With the North Korean situation, they've done things they don't call it war.

Participant #1: One of the definitions of terrorism is that you don't know where it's coming from or who originated it. So, for instance, 9/11 was something that, not only was it a

terrible attack on civilians, we know the individuals who were in the planes and stuff, but we're actually not even sure where it came from. I'm not even sure it was Osama Bin Laden. Sometimes I think that maybe they have an actor or something that they film ... But it gave George Bush an excuse to go into Iraq ... maybe it was not the source of the attack at all. Maybe one part of the definition is that you don't know who planned it or who sent the killers to do what they were doing. Anyone could take credit for it.

Participant #4: I was wondering about that. Do they take phony credit, or bonafide credit? Someone says we did it, or someone takes credit. It strikes terror in hearts of the public.

**Researcher:** Other than fear, what do you think is the goal of terrorists?

Participant #1: They want respect. Osama Bin Laden, or whoever really did it, wants folks to turn on their TV's and say "oh my gosh, look at this terrible guy". Get the garlic out ... They want to be known, be famous.

Participant #4: They want to recruit. They want to get publicity out of it. They were successful and some other frustrated individuals latch onto it.

Participant #1: Actually, our reaction has given them more recruits than their own action.

Participant #2: They want to do what they want to do when they want to do it, without the US having anything to do with it. That's how I'm looking at their point of view.

Participant #3: I've often thought of that. What do they want?

Participant #4: They want revenge, for something they feel they have been slighted; some perceived injustice we've perpetrated on them.

Participant #3: Sometimes they want prisoners released.

Participant #2: If they want revenge, why don't they go after Bush? Why get us, why attack innocent people? If they could blow up 9/11 they could get to the White House.

Participant #1: There's a theory around that because Bush is friends of Bin Laden's family, that this [9/11] was all an inside job.

**Researcher:** Is terrorism an important problem in your community?

Participant #4: It's an important problem in New York. In NY, my son was thinking of moving office out of Manhattan after 9/11. Not here. I don't see this as being a military target. They [the terrorists] are not to going accomplish much in [this community].

**Researcher:** Are there targets in [this community]

Participant #4: Not that I'm aware of. We don't have any nuclear facilities or anything that they really want to make a show of, or contamination, that I'm aware of.

Participant #1: Remember the radon contamination? I don't think you need any specific targets; there are people here who would die ... if someone's coming who is prepared to drop a bomb, for instance, as the US did in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, then it's just the fact that there's a population center and it would be, you know ... someone could be aiming for NY and miss and hit [this community].

Participant #4: I worked in [nearby community] for many years. That would be a terrible target for the hit; there's a concentration of buildings and people. During the day there's a lot of people ... there could be a lot of damage. The human sacrifice, send someone in to blow themselves up. There are banks and insurance companies.

Participant #1: They had a specific threat against the [specific commercial] building when I was working there. They blocked off streets and put up stations, to block traffic. That's maybe five miles from here.

Participant #4: During the Viet Nam War, we were getting threats all the time at the Federal Building. They would do a sweep of the building. We took the first few seriously then we ignored.

Participant #1: About a month ago I'd gone up to [a nearby] mall .... When I got there it was all closed off and they said they'd gotten a bomb scare and closed the mall closed for several hours, while they checked it thoroughly. And that's the kind of thing they wouldn't have done before 9/11.

**Researcher:** Do they have community policing in [this community]?

Participant #1: They did, they just cut the budget. I think they eliminated it. They closed the [substation].

Participant #2: They stopped community policing in [neighboring community] too.

Participant #1: They cancelled the official community night, which all the surrounding towns had, because they said they didn't have enough community policemen to patrol the streets; so this is very recent. I think they used to have it, but they cut back on the budget. I used to see cops out walking, on bicycles, but I don't see them anymore. To me, [community policing] is ... if they are in a car, they get out and walk around and speak to people; if they're in a car, you can wave to them, but if they're walking or biking then they're really on the street.

Participant #2: If they get out of their car or if they are on a bicycle they can know more about what is going on, the activities and crime that is going on in the street

Participant #3: I agree with what they've said, I don't know too much about the community at this point. But I do know that when we walk around, we don't see many police right now. We see police officers [two main intersections], there's always somebody there, the traffic police; as far as other police, we don't see them.

**Researcher:** What does community policing mean to you?

Participant #4: To establish a good relationship between the police and the community; so they don't think the cops are there to hang them or to throw narcotics in their car ... to have a good relationship with them so that if something does happen, they are going to get willing witnesses, instead of "I didn't see anything; I don't know anything"; in general, not just for terrorism. We have a PAL, the Police Athletic League, that's where they sometimes have things ... something for the children. To me it's to get a good relationship so the community trusts the police, as having legitimate objectives ... that they're not going to rough them up or anything.

Participant #2: In [this community], I don't know. In [neighboring community], the police ... if they know you they speak to you; if they don't know you, they don't.

Participant #4: I haven't heard anything about allegations of brutality ... which isn't saying there aren't allegations, which isn't a way of saying there is a good relationship ... Some communities, you get allegations where they stop a car ... where they're alleging brutality.

**Researcher:** Do you think the police in this community perceived as legitimate & trustworthy?

Participant #1: Yeah, I would say so. I used to live in New York, where there seemed to be more antagonism between the people and the cops. And I know that recently when my daughter struck a pedestrian in her car, but he was very nice and offered to help by offering to testify in court on her behalf. I'd say things are pretty positive. I'd say there isn't much difference in [this community] between community policing and regular police work, whereas the things that were done in New York ... there was probably a bigger difference.

Participant #3: This is considered a very good, racially integrated community. It has always had that feeling.

Participant #4: Good community... there is a mix in uniform police; it's a well rounded situation.

Participant #3: We live in a building with 130 people; very mixed racially. We have an Indian family across from us; we have 2 black Ph.D.'s on our floor, and it's very nice because frequently in all white communities, you don't ever get to speak with anyone else, who's not like you. And I think partially ... don't you think police have something to do with that too?

**Researcher:** Do you think that there is there cooperation between this community & the local police agency?

Participant #1: Yeah.

Participant #2: I've only been here a year, maybe a year and a half.

**Researcher:** What do you think is the level of cooperation, on a scale of 1-10, with 10 being the highest level of cooperation and 1 being the lowest level of cooperation?

Participant #1: A nine ... so, I see a little bit of the folks that don't get along with the police. My daughter, up to recently, had friends with unsavory records, they said cops always on them picking them up as suspects in things they actually couldn't have be involved in, but they have a bad enough record that they are likely suspects regardless. So, I do this population that, you know, doesn't like the police at all.

Participant #2: I wouldn't rate them a 9 then.

Participant #4: I have a good feeling when I see them in the street ... they help them across the street. If there's a medical emergency, 911 medical, you typically have police come to render support.

**Researcher:** Do you think that community members are willing to provide information or intelligence to the local police agency?

Participant #1: Basically, yes.

Participant #2: Yes.

Participant #4: I've had no occasion to observe anything, but if I had, I would call the police.

Participant #1: I called the police about loud alarm at local store on 4<sup>th</sup> of July, so I called them and they said "thank you, but we don't have anyone to send yet".

**Researcher:** What do you think about having the community involved, proactively, in the fight against terrorism, before the attack happens? Do you think that there are any problems, costs or dangers, with involving the community as intelligence resources?

Participant #2: There could be. If I see something in my neighborhood, they call it snitching. They could go after me, or my family. I don't think it would be too much of a problem here, in [this community], but where I come from ... they could come after you. You can make an anonymous call to 911. In my town ... I'm not going to call it a community ... somebody always knows something and if somebody even thinks that you was the one, they still going to come after you. Another thing is, the repercussion, if you see three guys beat a guy or girl up on the corner, if the police come and they see you talking to police, that could be problem.

Participant #1: When I think of terrorism, I think of something done by strangers ... in fact I think that's one reason why it's terrorism, rather than just street crime ... so, I don't think things like what [Participant #2] is talking about would apply to having local people reporting suspected terrorists. I think it's probably pretty safe to have the community looking out for things, but I'm not sure, other than a strange or unknown person, and unexplained behavior, it would be rather difficult ... everyone will help you, but what are they helping you do, what are you asking them to do?

**Researcher:** What can people do to stop terrorism?

Participant #4: It could be very minimal because I don't look upon [this community] as being a target for a terrorist. If it were a different kind of a crime...

**Researcher:** [Smith et al. (2006, 2008) research on the temporal & spatial relationships of terrorism in the US]

Participant #4: We're about [specific number] miles from New York City

Participant #1: So someone could be planning an attack within 30 miles, but I'd be more interested in a 30 block radius.

Participant #4: If there're smart they wouldn't do it in New York City because Commissioner Kelly, I'm told, has extremely efficient intelligence set up in New York, which is better than the Federal in some cases. And he's coordinated all over the world.

Participant #3: You've got to listen to people and be aware of what's going on around you. I'm listening, but not everyone is. We should, I feel that most of these people who are involved in this type of activity have to have some type of mental incapacity. I just feel that they are very insecure people and they have a need to be in a group, this tremendous need to be in a group, where they're doing something so they can get some type of notoriety.

**Researcher:** Do you mean that you think they are interested in the response from the public or media publicity?

Participant #3: I feel that way. I'm very suspicious of people I don't know.

Participant #4: I don't see any suspicious persons taking pictures of federal buildings. I was a raid photographer, so I'm interested in people taking pictures.

**Researcher:** Are you, as individuals, willing to work with your local law enforcement agency in an effort to counter terrorism?

Participant #2: Not me.

Participant #1: I'd say yes.

Participant #3: I am willing to keep my eyes and ears open.

Participant #2: I'm not willing, but I keep my eyes and ears open. Me and the police don't get along.

Participant #4: Do they have a reward system?

Participant #2: If there's a reward given, you have to wait for that person to be convicted. I should've known that because one night I was walking [the police] were looking for this guy and they said his name wrong, so I laughed at them. They asked why I was laughing and I told them it was because they got his name wrong. Once they realized I knew his name, they said get in the car. So I said, "How you want me to get in the car when there are people up the street ... if they see me get in your car [it could be a problem for me]". They asked me a few questions and I told them the guy used to be out here on the corner, but that he's not out here anymore; so they gave me a \$20 and told me to get the hell out of the car. That was a little reward that I wasn't expecting and didn't want to expect.

Participant #1: I would guess that if you [Participant #2] saw something terrorism, bomb, that you would go to the cops and tell them.

Participant #2: No I wouldn't. I would go to you or somebody else tell them that they need to call the police. That's how I would do it.

Participant #4: I would go to a public payphone, wear a pair of gloves and call. On television, they have different tip numbers.

Participant #2: They have different tip numbers .... They have it all.

**Researcher:** What do you think is the most effective manner for gathering intelligence on terrorism that's talking place in local community?

Participant #4: As [Participant #3] said, listening and being alert to what's going on. If you sense anything, without exaggerating ...

Participant #1: Then you'd have to report anything to the police that you think might lead up to terrorism, which would be a terrible overload on the cops.

Participant #2: Then you have a lot of people that come from that country where terrorism is happening that look like those people that put the bombs on the planes.

Participant #4: No reflection on local police, but if I did see something, I'd call 411 for the local FBI office. I think they are more specialized in doing that ... It's definitely a federal violation.

Participant #1: I wouldn't even know how to call the FBI.

Participant #4: On second thought, you would probably have a quicker response from local police. Like on a bank robbery, like the [specific bank] robbery we had here recently.

Participant #2: If it wasn't for 911, I wouldn't even know how to call the police.

**Researcher:** What might impact your willingness to work with your local law enforcement agency? Are there specific aspects, hypothetically, doesn't have to be [this community]; what aspects of that agency would impact your willingness to cooperate and provide information?

Participant #4: To me, it would be based on my previous experiences with them. If they seem to be respectful, straight, if didn't hear about allegations of corruption, brutality, or impropriety; or if I knew someone.

Participant #2: If had to do something, like work with the police, it would be through Crime-Stoppers; or stop the drugs.

Participant #3: The only problem would be ... depending on what they would ask of me, what I'd be expected to do. When you offer you say, what does this entail, and if it's something I'm capable of. When you get to be [specific age], you learn to say no. I never did when I was younger, but I do now ... I'm always ready to help my friends and I'd certainly be ready to help the community, my country.

Participant #1: I think if the police held once a month community meetings and had a little presentation and invited people to speak ... I think it would encourage communication and they might find out things that otherwise folks would simply never mention to them ... you serve coffee and cake, meet your friendly police officer, I think that would help to have people stay in touch with the police department.

**Researcher:** Do you have any other suggestions that would help to encourage the community to work with local law enforcement agencies?

Participant #4: How good would posters be on telephone poles? We have a fairly good auxiliary police force. Maybe training or education for the community ...

**Researcher:** Any comments or questions before we finish this up? I am going to ask you to complete a survey about what we have discussed. Thank you for your participation.

## **Appendix G: Law Enforcement Focus Group D (12081125)**

**Researcher:** [Introduction] What is Terrorism?

Participant #4: Group causing horror or fear ... having an agenda.

Participant #6: Or personal agenda.

Participant #3: Something to create mass hysteria, fear, afraid to go anywhere, do anything, afraid to go to the mall.

Participant #2: Fear, intimidate, ... political agenda.

Participant #3: Anyone can be affected by it, buy being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

**Researcher:** Specific example?

**Researcher:** ?? You mentioned earlier, the

Participant #4: After the anthrax scare, people were afraid to open the mail. It could happen anywhere.

Participant #3: Something that could occur in anyone's day to day life, whether you're going down the driveway, to get mail.

Participant #6: Explosive, certain to caused death, usually a mass of people usually their person involved group involved willing to die.

**Researcher:** Does terrorism have to involve violence?

Participant #3: No.

Participant #4: It's fear .

Participant #3: Fear to society.

Participant #2: Imminent commission.

Participant #4: Fear you can't go on with your day to day life. Fear you'll lose your house.

Participant #3: Fear you will lose your house.

Participant #3: Depending on how the terrorists use it, yeah, you disintegrate Wall Street...

**Researcher:** What about target?

Participant #2: If there's no fear, the target will bring fear to someone, it wouldn't be terrorism if you're poisoning cows, used for food, that's terrorism. If nobody knows, it's not terrorism.

**Researcher:** Should target make difference?

Participant #5: No.

Participant #3: I would say yes, if you're attacking a military installation ...

Participant #5: Madison Square Garden, with the Kicks playing...

Participant #4: They could say act of war is act of terrorism.

Participant #3: but you know what, you're there in war zone

Participant #2: Rules of engagement

Participant #3: We've been at war for the last ten years, but no one in the country has realized it.

Participant #6: ...

Participant #3: The first World Trade Center attack [in 1993] was terrorism, but no one realized it...

Participant #5: Sheik rack...

Participant #3: Rahman [reference to the "Blind Sheik", Omar Abdel-Rahman, who was convicted of being involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing]

Participant #1: I think there's a difference like [participant #3] said, as opposed to what x said, if Mad Sq garden was hit, as opposed to a military base, they'd think were at war

Participant #5: Well, planes went into the World Trade Center.

Participant #4: It's still terrorism, but as a civilian you still feel more at risk.

Participant #5: More times civilian or military? People, they're blowing up planes, busses

Participant #3: But why do they want the casualties?

Participant #3: If they blow up ship. In military

Participant #6: Showing this country's vulnerable.

Participant #1: What was the question?

**Researcher:** Is there a difference whether the target of an attack is military or civilian?

Participant #1: No.

Participant #5: If it didn't have governmental, it would still be terrorism.

**Researcher:** What is difference between a terrorist attack on military target and an act of war?  
Is there a difference?

Participant #1: Like we have to retaliate.

Participant #4: Rules of engagement. The idea is that in a combat situation, people know who you are. We have covert operations, ... to fulfill our agenda also.

Participant #4: You make one side, other side have to fight them, as a third party, is that an act of terrorism or are you being deceptive.

Participant #3: To try to create fear.

Participant #4: Guerilla warfare.

Participant #3: That's how our country was formed.

Participant #3: We were.

**Researcher:** There is no agreed upon def of terrorism. In the US, prior to 9/11, there were numerous different legal and academic definitions of terrorism. There was some agreement that it included the use of violence, the intent to spread fear, political nature or threat, but there was not one agreed upon one definition of terrorism. Can a state commit act of terrorism?

Participant #1: Yes, Libya with the Lockerbie airlines [reference to the December 1988 Pan Am flight 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland, for which Libya took responsibility and provided monetary compensation to the families of the victims].

**Researcher:** Couldn't an attack sanctioned or supported by a state be considered an act of war?

Participant #3: Yes, but also they didn't say ...

Participant #4: I guess state could, but the idea again is terrorism.

**Researcher:** If you call everything terrorism, then the term terrorism loses its meaning. [Operationalization of terrorism] If a state commits act, there can be repercussions. Other state can declare war in response. Attacks conducted by a state against its own population, such as the chemical attack on the Kurds in Iraq can be addressed differently than an attack conducted by a non-state actor. [Brief discussion of the Geneva

Conventions, genocide, and war crimes] It is much harder to retaliate against non-state actors.

**Researcher:** Is terrorism an important problem for your agency?

Participant #4: In that we must be aware of it, something will happen again, when or where, secondary incident ... day to day routine, we don't do patrols for terrorism.

Participant #1: Yeah, we should all be aware of it, as [Participant #1] said, we have bus terminals, railroads, water supply...

Participant #2: Can gangs be defined as terrorism?

Participant #1: Stories with MS 13, ...?

Participant #6: yes because the potential is always there, transportation hub, water tanks

Participant #5: Not just because if it doesn't happen in village of [this community], outside, ... we're 30 miles or so.

Participant #1: at this time, no, not only here, throughout the whole country, people become complacent.

Participant #3: I look at it this way: Everything is a target.

Participant #2: A structure can be replaced, how do you replace people, that s a bigger issue.

**Researcher:** Does your local law enforcement agency engage in community policing? If so, what do you do?

Participant #6: For one thing, we started a coat drive.

Participant #4: Outreach, different forms of community policing.

Participant #1: More things, about quality of life, than patrol might do.

Participant #2: We have a community police academy for civilians, not for auxiliary officers.

Participant #4: To help define problems, possible solutions. It helps, goes a long way, it's not what's right or wrong, but what's perceived to be right or wrong.

Participant #2: You have to have communication between civilians and LE, and to that end, the dept actively participates in numerous programs, like ... academy, free to most children, the police athletic league, attend meetings throughout community, meetings at senior center on [specific location in community].

Participant #5: Also, too, you might want to send an officer from community policing, where an officer can't spend the time.

Participant #2: Active dialogue between dept and those commercial businesses that are impacted by the influx of day laborers, there are numerous ways in which the dept engages in community policing.

**Researcher:** Is there a partnership between the comm. And the agency such that community input has impact on policy?

Participant #4: There are different forms that have input, ... there's very little policy that's different than what ... A

Participant #1:

Participant #2: The district attorney's office provides a forum, the ... meets with diff stakeholders in comm., there's another one that meets on Thurs morning, greater [ ] area, comm. law enforcement agency to try to find out what's going on ... special patrols

**Researcher:** Cooperation?

Participant #1: Oh yeah, if you see something say something.

Participant #6: eyes and ears.

Participant #4: More so, how to report it if there's an emergency, dial 911 ... who to contact for what reasons.

Training for civilians, provide comm. to recognize suspected T?

Participant #1: Hopefully. Makes them notice things more , make them more aware of what they're seeing.

Participant #3: They feel they might get some type of reaction from police

**Researcher:** Obstacles to involving the community in counter terrorism efforts?

Participant #5: Yeah because they'd call up on every little thing a homeless person leave a bag somewhere, eventually that died down, but ... they'd be outside with their binoculars looking.

Participant #4: The more they know about how we do things, the easier it is

Participant #4: It's very easy [for terrorism to find out law enforcement tactics].

**Researcher:** Does providing info about how you operative cause detriment?

Participant #4: It can be, in providing info there's no trade secrets given.

Participant #6: Certain training methods, if they know what we were doing, they'd...

Participant #4: Yes.

**Researcher:** TV tactics?

Participant #4: Wish they hadn't seen, but people sell drugs same way as on TV.

Participant #1: Emergency drills, for all including prisoners.

**Researcher:** Do you know what to do in the case of a terrorist attack?

Participant #4: I'd go and leave.

Participant #3: Depends on what kind of terrorist event you're talking about.

Participant #2: Shooting or weapon of mass destruction or hostage situation, Columbine.

**Researcher:** What about a major explosion at a location vital to city?

Participant #2: Call the boss.

Participant #5: I think your instincts take over.

**Researcher:** What do you do if communications are not functioning?

Participant #3: Homing pigeons.

Participant #6: It means you're off, on vacation.

**Researcher:** Do you have training on what to do if your communications are out?

Participant #5: We have training on that.

Participant #2: Last week.

Participant #5: If communications were out, you'd know where people are.

Participant #3: The communications doesn't always work the best here ... you do have secondary communication posts.

**Researcher:** Fairly diverse here in [this community]? Do you address all the different communities through your community policing?

Participant #5: Yeah

Participant #1: Yes.

Participant #4: Sunday morning drive.

**Researcher:** What else to involve community in proactive counter terrorism?

Participant #2: Since terrorists are oftentimes hard to identify, they might be part of the group that you're targeting, no uniforms.

Participant #3: At the same time you're giving people more information you might be scaring the crap out of them.

Participant #2: Creating fear.

**Researcher:** Over-response??

Participant #3: I don't think we really know, even us even you all the different things that have occurred since 911 that kept quiet about.

Participant #1: Buy fertilizer.

**Researcher:** How do you do that, provide adequate training?

Participant #5: We don't teach people about doing anti-terrorism, never.

Participant #3: We tell people call about suspicious behavior.

**Researcher:** Is it part of community policing to tell people what to report?

Participant #4: That's something that should be determined by state or federal government, so that everyone has the same information.

**Researcher:** [Discussion of Smith et al. (2006, 2008) research] Should the research findings regarding the locality of many terrorist acts have an impact on local law enforcement?

Participant #4: [This community] is three square miles.

Participant #6: Absolutely, If there's an agency that covers 30 miles, perhaps there's a terrorist cell in their backyard.

Participant #1: 9/11 had an impact.

Participant #4: It caused a drain on medical staff. Everyone here would likely respond.

**Researcher:** Response of allegations to address phenomenon of terrorism?

Hesitancy to cooperate with police, lower income, high crime, people feel policing is overly aggressive, more strained?

Participant #1: Yes.

**Researcher:** How does a local law enforcement agency overcome these obstacles?

Participant #4: Easy part ... still have to do your job, they see police, uniform, car, when you talk to person, humanize yourself, a...

Participant #1: We know who all the bad guys are, still talk to them...

Participant #5: not their friends but...

**Researcher:** Would knowledge of proximity matter?

Participant #1: Don't think it matters to them.

Participant #5: People watch TV, they know things.

Participant #5: They did something after the fact, we'd be getting calls every day.

Participant #3: You can't stop terrorism. If there's someone out that that wants to commit that act, people won't even know about it till it's too late.

Participant #1: Would effective communication help? Yes.

**Researcher:** How do you provide info, would it help

Participant #5: I don't think so.

Participant #1: I don't think so.

Participant #4: Some international group moves in ...

Participant #3: Once I think you use the term terrorism, they already have a thought in their mind, they'll see Al Qaeda in every tree see anything suspicious, let us know.

Participant #4: [Discussion of fertilizer as a component in homemade explosives] Should police investigate people buying lots of fertilizer at Home Depot, even if it turns up negative?

Participant #1: What we do all the time. We do field interviews, name, address, etc. forward to investigations.

Participant #3: The community includes businesses ...

**Researcher:** Is terrorism a significant threat in your community?

Participant #3: Possible targets anywhere you go.

Participant #4: We're close to a lot of major targets, field, prime target, natural gas refilling for busses, coliseum right down the road.

Participant #4: So we're close to a lot of things, major sites, we're a secondary sight at best.

**Researcher:** What's the most effective manner to gather intelligence on terrorist activity?

Participant #4: Constant dialogue with community.

Participant #1: They can be informed about what's suspicious by commercials.

**Researcher:** Other than constant dialogue, what else?

Participant #4: Patrol.

Participant #6: Dialogues with other departments.

Participant #5: Often with other agencies.

Participant #3: Yes.

Participant #5: Usually with gangs. Intelligence gathering, field interviews, the entire county gets it, that guy's a gang member.

**Researcher:** Training for police officers and the community?

Participant #5: I don't think the civilians need training.

Participant #3: No.

Participant #1: I do.

Participant #3: But the other thing is now, you might be ... police are really concerned about bus depot but not train station, terrorists go, hmm. ... less is better.

Participant #4: The guy with the beard, I like him....

**Researcher:** Any comments or questions before we finish this up? I am going to ask you to complete a survey about what we have discussed. Thank you for your participation.

## **Appendix H: Community Focus Group D (03081125)**

Due to unforeseen circumstances, Community Focus Group D was not included.

## Appendix I: Law Enforcement Focus Group E (12081218)

**Researcher:** What is terrorism?

Participant #1: Obviously terrorism has been something on our minds since 9/11. We've all, from the local New York area, so we've all been affected by it one way or another. Plus we are in an area where [reference to specific actors suspected of engaging in a terrorist attack]; but there's all different types of terrorism that [the United States (US)] have dealt with, whether it is local terrorism in [this community] or from some foreign person, like the 9/11 attacks, or even before that the 1993 attacks [on the World Trade Center]; I had assisted with that incident also; but it's basically the fear that comes upon a community, or multiple communities, based on actions of person or group that we as law enforcement have to respond to.

Participant #2: I was going to say, [participant #1] already touched on it, when we say terrorism, we think about the big [incidents], but it can also be local, like a gang, who could also be considered terrorism because they terrorize the community where they do their crimes.

Participant #5: I think it's something that we didn't think too much about it until first in 1993 and then certainly after 2001; it was something that became very real; before that I think a lot of people thought of it as acts that took place overseas or out of our country; but certainly after 2001, and being so close to NYC, and as [participant #1] said [reference to specific actors suspected of engaging in a terrorist attack], we actually had a first-hand knowledge, you know a first-hand view and it's something that has become a lot more scary and real to most people since it happened.

Participant #4: I was part of the counter-terrorism [response]. After 9/11, I was the liaison for the prosecutor's office, who started a unit on counter-terrorism, and any job, because we have a large Arabic community, and any jobs that were suspicious or related to terrorism would be assigned to us to investigate. If it was [substantiated] we would hand it over to the prosecutor or FBI or whoever else was going to handle that aspect of the case. I am a Gulf War veteran and I have seen terrorism when I was in the Gulf; some of the acts, like buildings being blown up where our soldiers were, so I have seen terrorism in that aspect.

Participant #3: With terrorism, I never focused much on terrorism until 9-11 because I was [specific age] and in school. That morning when 9/11 occurred I was on my way to school and heard it on the radio and when I got to school I saw it on the television. After that, it broadened my view on terrorism; it expanded my view. And now, work wise in [this community], we deal with local terrorism, like [Participant #2] said, such as with the local gangs. Now I am more aware of terrorism.

**Researcher:** You mention certain acts of terrorism, but do you think that terrorism has a clear definition?

Participant #4: No it doesn't. Terrorism does not have clear definition but it can be a group that wants to send a message, not only to their community, but to the world. A message wanting attention or wanting some kind of act or something stopped or even other leaders from their group freed, through certain acts, not only to one community, but to the world, to show that they mean business, so that they will do acts of violence just to show that they are not playing and they want certain things done. We see a lot of things happen, and the news, but our government will only tell us certain things because only certain things can be dispersed to the public. Some information is classified and a lot of things we don't know about, but we know that there is always stuff behind lines that we don't know about that are the reasons for the acts or for the crimes that are committed.

**Researcher:** When you talk about acts of terrorism, is there anything that differentiates it from common criminal acts or acts of war?

Participant #5: I think in most cases, terrorism targets much larger groups of people, whereas everyday street crime or robbery is usually one or two persons as target and is random, and I think as [participant #4] said, many times there is no message – it's just an act of violence, but terrorism, I think – like we said before, there is a message being sent out or there is some benefit group hopes to obtain as result of that act of terrorism. Like with 9/11, one of the things they were hoping to do was to shut down American economy. That was one of the main things that they hoped to do.

**Researcher:** Is the act of terrorism, other than its intention, different in from a criminal act?

Participant #2: I think that one of the differences that we have to consider is that the act, the crime committed by street robber is a crime, but terrorism is bigger scale, because of the message they want to send out, they want to make sure that the crime they have committed is big enough for more people to see, with a larger audience.

**Researcher:** What about victim, the immediate victim? Does that have any impact on whether something should be considered an act of terrorism?

Participant #1: Depends on what scale, or what category the act of terrorism is on. A gang war or trying to terrorize a community to submit to their interests, to their leadership, then the victim may be the opposite participant, might be rival gang member, but the community, affected by the crime or drive by shooting – with the potential of being hit by a stray bullet, how it affects their quality of life – is another victim of the circumstances.

Participant#5: So that they can operate within their turf.

Participant #1: On a greater scale, terrorism on the scale of 9/11, the intent is to communicate or instill fear in community. By hitting the World Trade Center, the attack was on the financial district and to show the US that they can be reached, which is something that most of us didn't think could happen. We live in an open society, where anyone can move around freely. You have your victims and collateral damage that comes after.

Participant #4: In the first World Trade Center attack, it still got attention from the media. I think, because of that, although it was not as successful an attack, to them – to the people that created the attack – they got the media and the recognition – and although it didn't cause the same level of fear in people, but it started making people think and in 2001 it really did.

**Researcher:** So, are you saying the success of an attack not necessarily related to damage or the life lost, but to the communication and to bring attention to the cause?

Participant #4: Yes because then people are scared to do daily routine. Just like with a community getting hit by a gang – if they attack 7 or 8 victims in the community, the rest of the community is going to be scared to go about their daily routine. After 9/11, people were scared to, for example, go to a Yankee game and the heightened security that had to be taken was on a bigger scale.

**Researcher:** So they were successful in causing damage and changing behavior of target audience? Getting back to targets, should there be a difference whether target is government or military or civilian?

Participant #2: I don't think so. Same thing if it is a terrorist act.

Participant #1: Should be considered what is the goal of act and what is the outcome. Biased crimes also fall into area of causing fear in community and create a sense of hate that I would say falls near terrorism, although some people consider it low-scale, the emotional and mental harm that it causes to the community makes it fall under that category.

**Researcher:** In a case where non-uniformed individuals attack the US military in Iraq, should that be considered terrorism? What about the Timothy McVeigh attack, should that be considered terrorism?

Participant #1: Yes that is terrorism; he wanted to bring down government by destroying federal building. He wanted a revolution against the government.

**Researcher:** So, what about the American colonies' revolution against England – should that be considered terrorism?

Participant #1: Depends on whose perception you are talking about, but the revolution was based on colonists not getting same rights.

**Researcher:** [Author's operationalization of terrorism]

**Researcher:** Is terrorism an important problem for your agency?

Participant #1: Well, how do we define terrorism?

Participant #2: Is a drive-by shooting an act of terrorism?

Participant #1: Right now we act on intent of certain crimes or was it just a gang rival? We are basing it on NJ statutes. We had situation where somebody was planting a bomb in a mosque and it probably falls under bias laws in New Jersey but we would probably send it to FBI and handle it ourselves.

**Researcher:** Other than gangs, what type of terrorist issues do you have in the community?

Participant #1: We have a lot of mixed cultures, very heavy South American and Asian communities, Bangladesh so we have to pay attention to what's happening in their communities and the countries where they are from. We may have an issue that could potentially be a problem.

Participant #4: For example, if something is happening in Middle East in Iraq or somewhere, they might do rallies and acts of violence here against local government making bomb threats or local schools or calling the media and making threats. I think that's as far as we might see here.

**Researcher:** You stated that two individuals [alleged to have been involved in a terrorist act] act were living [in this community]. Is there a concern that others in this community support similar ideologies and might be willing to act?

Participant #1: Absolutely.

Participant #2: They have assigned people to work on terrorism task forces.

**Researcher:** Other than that, is your agency doing anything else in communities that encourage that type of violence?

Participant #1: We have officers who are familiar with certain communities and because of their relationships with community members, have a better grasp on what is going on. We also do a cultural diversity training.

Participant #3: There is in-house training for diverse communities and cultures to help you better relate to community.

**Researcher:** Do you think your training is effective?

Participant #3: Absolutely.

Participant #2: Depends on person attending training, if they go in with mentality that 'I ain't gonna learn anything', than purpose is defeated.

Participant #1: It's a foundation to learn more about community. Might not give you the knowledge but it will give you foundation to deal with different religions and different communities. If you don't understand why some people want you to take off their shoes in their home, then you will be perceived as disrespectful and you might have less

cooperation from community members. If you know community and you are part of it than that is your beat. If you talk to people and get to know them, then you gain respect and with that comes trust. Maybe a situation comes when a person has information, they may come and talk to you. The two attackers that were involved in 9-11 didn't live here, they were just here for a short time and if we had tighter relationship with community then, we may have gotten information about outsiders.

Participant #5: If a certain ethnic group sees that police are putting forth some effort to educate cops on their way of life and officers can take training and show community that they are serious, there is a pretty good chance you may get trust that you haven't gotten before.

Participant #1: When 9/11 happened, the Arabic community in [specific community] made a real effort to show that they didn't support what happened. They had American flags out and it affected them as much as any one of us.

**Researcher:** Do you think that their outward support for the US was based on their actual feelings or based on fear of repercussions?

Participant #1: I think both. But as people are here longer, they become more Americanized. The police officer that gets to know people and gain respect tends to get information. [Participant #4] knows everyone on the North side and he is always being called out by people who give him information. And that's the kind of attitude law enforcement has to have.

**Researcher:** Do you agree with [Participant #1]?

Participant #3: Yes.

Participant #2: Yes.

**Researcher:** Is there an understanding of uniform cops of the different cultures in your community and is there an effort to gain the trust of the community?

Participant #3: Yeah, people will help you out when they trust you. Community notices trust and you have to build it.

**Researcher:** Does your law enforcement agency have community policing?

Participant #1: No we used to have community policing but the idea is that everyone should do community policing.

**Researcher:** Is that encouraged in patrol?

Participant #3: Yeah. Get out on the streets and talk to people and do field interviews, known as "park and walk."

Participant #5: It's mandatory and cops will be taken out of service to do park and walk time.

**Researcher:** Does your agency incorporate community policing into regular patrol?

Participant #5: Yes.

**Researcher:** What do you think is the level of cooperation between communities and law enforcement?

Participant #1: I remember one time where an Asian man was beat up by 7 or 8 kids and it was elderly neighbor that lived on corner that called out to me to help. This happens a lot in canvassing. This unit has really focused on getting community involved in Cease Fire. We've gotten information on crimes through community involvement.

Participant #4: Detectives conduct canvasses and during that canvass, we talk to people and tell them that if they need anything or any issues, you can call on us. When they have information then they might reach out to us. By us going out there and engaging in canvass, sometimes enough for them to trust us. All they want in return for information is to know that they aren't going to be put in harm's way but they are willing sometimes to identify suspect or point us in right direction.

**Researcher:** Are there any communities that are less than cooperative?

Participant #1: Not that they are less cooperative, but some communities like the Bangladesh and Middle Eastern, there are issues with communication. I think the communication takes a while to build up.

Participant #5: We had a shooting during the summer where victim and attacker were of Jamaican ethnicity, it seemed that they didn't trust police in general since they thought that Jamaican police were corrupt but after a while, they helped. We had to keep going back out there for a while and although it took some time, we developed that trust and information came back to us. People spread the word that the cops aren't bad guys. This showed us that is possible to develop that trust.

**Researcher:** Do they discuss this as issue in cultural diversity training?

Participant #2: Yes.

Participant #4: Yes.

Participant #5: Yes.

**Researcher:** Are there any obstacles that might be problematic in involving community in counter-terrorism efforts?

Participant #1: Again, it becomes the trust issue. Only so much information that we can give them but what needs to be done more is that they need to be more educated, or not educated, but given more information about what law enforcement needs. Nobody is going to talk to you if they think that their name will be involved or their family will be harmed in some way.

**Researcher:** Does the community know what to look for or how to contact proper people? [Discussion of the Smith et al. (2006, 2008) research] One study, NIJ grant, where researchers looked at cases of terrorism in U.S. and time and space patterns, and one of the things they found was that half of all of these attacks among 60 they looked at, occurred within 30 miles of where perpetrator was living and so was the planning. How large an area do you police?

Participant #5: We cover about 8 miles.

Participant #1: It's about 8 square miles.

**Researcher:** So do you think that if public knew that there was a relationship between where individual lives and where they attack, do you think they'd be more willing to help?

Participant #1: Yeah because perception is that bad guys are coming from overseas. Perception is that it is happening in Afghanistan or Iraq but it isn't happening here. We are falling back to where we were pre-911.

**Researcher:** I read this as an academic but this information only goes to academics and not where it may be needed, like police agencies.

Participant #1: More information needs to be put out there that we can't just relax and wait for something to happen.

**Researcher:** It might not be a bad idea to provide information to community that might lead community to provide information. What about causing unnecessary fear in public?

Participant #2: It could cause fear depending on how it's conveyed.

Participant #1: I think we don't give them enough credit. Unless you are crying wolf all of the time, the public should be more aware.

Participant #5: Yeah and if you can intertwine some statistics with general information, it would heighten their awareness and then information on a regular basis.

**Researcher:** What about providing information about what to look for? Are businesses aware of items that they sell that could be used to make explosives?

Participant #1: Not only should they be aware, but they have a responsibility. If a kid buys gasoline, person pouring gasoline has a responsibility to ask what kid is doing. There's a responsibility when something is out of the norm to be at least questioning.

**Researcher:** But doesn't it come down to information education?

Participant #5: Yeah, if they were educated they'd be more apt to write down a plate number or make a call. Like in McVeigh's case where they might not have been aware of why materials were purchased.

Participant #4: Another problem is that just like we are trying to get trust, person committing terrorist act might also be trying to do that. Only certain things police officers can do sometimes with information. Do all jobs get investigated? You may get information but they might not be committing a crime, so where do you go from there?

Participant #3: At the same time, like McVeigh, he probably gained trust. He might have brought store owners coffee or something.

Participant #5: Why can't we educate them what to look for?

**Researcher:** How? What resources do you have to educate community?

Participant #1: That becomes a problem. Community groups and police officers can do that but that becomes a task.

Participant #5: Maybe we can use business associations.

**Researcher:** Can you use media?

Participant #5: Yes.

Participant #4: Yes.

Participant #1: Yes.

Participant #5: Simple tip sheet while doing a park and walk.

**Researcher:** Maybe provide ways in which community members can report suspicious information?

Participant #4: Well we have that now, an anonymous tip line.

**Researcher:** How significant is threat of terrorism in your community?

Participant #1: There is a threat because the goal of terrorism is to bring terror into the community. The threat can come from within the community or outside the community. Again, the two hijackers were in [this community] but did not live in [this community].

**Researcher:** There is a 7:1 ratio of domestic to international attacks so most attacks are people that live here and attack here. We are a little focused on Islamic fundamentalism right now so just to get to wrapping it up, what do you think the most effective manner is for gathering intelligence about terrorist activity?

Participant #2: Get out there and talk to people.

Participant #5: Community is the best resource.

Participant #1: It is also being aware of what to talk to community about. If you aren't aware of what to look for, then it might not register. Without a doubt, need to build relationship between law enforcement and community.

**Researcher:** Does anyone have any last questions or comments? Would everyone please fill out an exit-survey. Thank you for your participation.

## **Appendix J: Community Focus Group E (03081218)**

**Researcher:** What is terrorism?

Participant #5: The first thing that comes to mind with terrorism is violence.

Participant #6: I would say violence against the citizens of the United States (US) in an attempt to damage or to overthrow the government.

Participant #1: I think, when it comes to terrorism, like what they do – they hurt so many innocent people, what they do is that I think of. I am most concerned about what happened on 9/11. That was the closest thing to me.

**Researcher:** So, are you saying that the targets make a difference?

Participant #1: Right.

Participant #6: I don't think it is restricted, however, to foreigners. I think the situation in our own country, whether it is internal or external, if it's to damage the citizens of our country in order to make a point, or to make an impact, or to change something, it is still terrorism.

Participant #2: I would say anything that takes you out of peaceful norm. Some people are terrorized by their own family members. It's not limited to foreign groups, but also within the US.

**Researcher:** But to be terrorized, or to feel fear, is not always associated with an act of terrorism? What differentiates an act of terrorism from regular street crime, or acts of war?

Participant #6: I guess it's most unexpected, surprise elements. Of course that can be anything.

Participant #5: There is no difference. Violence is violence and innocent people are being hurt and no point is made.

Participant #2: The situation with [specific individual killed by family member], that was an example. It's not limited to other countries. People we know can terrorize us.

Participant #6: I think that is it. Terrorism produces uncertainty and fear.

**Researcher:** If you include any type of activity that causes fear, as almost anyone or anything can potentially cause fear, wouldn't terrorism lose its meaning. Couldn't anything be called terrorism? What would be the point in calling anything terrorism? Can we limit the definition?

Participant #6: Terrorism is a violent threat against a particular group. I would call Ku Klux Klan activity terrorism. The Nazi committed terrorism against the Jewish group, especially the use of certain tactics, such as the use of gas chambers. Whatever you do against a certain group, it could be ethnic cleansing, like what is going on in Rwanda right now, that's terrorism.

**Researcher:** So are there certain terms that can be applied to when a state conducts acts? So then do we also need call them terrorism, if there are already definitions available for the same activities, such as the term war crime or crime against humanity that can be applied to states and their leaders and officials?

Participant #6: You mean like Genocide. It's hard [to come up with a definition of terrorism].

Participant #1: That's right. Because if we look at what is happening right now, the individuals being held are as [enemy combatants] say that they are being treated badly and that the US are terrorists.

Participant #5: What would you call what Castro is doing to his own people? He terrorized his own people.

**Researcher:** What happens when a state commits crimes against its own people? Is there a difference?

Participant #6: We had that in Bosnia. I do see the danger in lumping everything together as terrorism because it would lose its meaning.

Participant #5: So what Jim Jones did in Guyana, was that terrorism?

Participant #6: That was religious.

Participant #5: They were brainwashed.

**Researcher:** What's the goal of terrorism? Is it similar to the goal of individuals like Jim Jones?

Participant #5: I think the goal of terrorism is to... maybe to prove a point – like my country is better than yours. Basically, it boils down to freedom. If you take what is going on over there with the Taliban, personally I think the US should have minded their business. We have no reason to be over there.

Participant #6: I think the aim of terrorism, wherever you find it, whether it's in Afghanistan or Iraq, it's to say – Okay, you aren't going to dominate me because you have nuclear weapons. I don't care what you have. I put my life on the line to bring you down. I am willing to sacrifice my life to convince you that I am stronger than you are. Even with all of your technology, all your money, you still will not win because I am willing to die. That's the difference between me and you. You are afraid to die. That's their message.

**Researcher:** So it's about the message, about communication?

Participant #6: Yes. It's better for you to negotiate with me because I'm not going to give you something because you have nuclear weapons or money or whatever.

**Researcher:** So are you saying that the group is saying that it has power and that it wants to change the target, whether it's a group of people or a country.

Participant #6: Yes. They are saying – We have something to bring to the table. Sacrifice. The willingness to use violence – the sacrifice of their lives.

**Researcher:** Does all terrorism involve suicide?

Participant #5: No

Participant #6: No

Participant #1: No

**Researcher:** What's the risk of being involved in terrorist act?

Participant #5: Death.

Participant #6: Death; life in prison.

Participant #1: The risk of getting caught.

**Researcher:** For the remainder of this discussion, in regards to terrorism, I want you to think about non-state actors who commit acts against civilians in order to change the behavior of a larger target population.

Participant #6: You want to talk about non-state actors that commit violent acts against civilians. So, an attack on the Pentagon would not be considered a terrorist attack, but an attack on the World Trade Center would be considered a terrorist attack.

**Researcher:** Is terrorism a problem in your community?

Participant #1: Terrorism is a problem in any community.

Participant #6: The biggest terrorism we face are the gangs. I wouldn't care whether it's the Bloods, the Crips, the Latin Kings or whoever. That's the biggest terrorism we face now. They have the power to take the kids out of the house. They offer something that the parents sometimes can't; intimacy, love,

Participant #3: family, and something to be a part of. It's very easy to be inducted into a gang. They talk to kids at school, like they are teaching their ideals.

Participant #6: Especially in a city like ours, where you have so many kids that come from broken homes, where the parents are never there, or if the parent is a user [of drugs] themselves, or in jail themselves...

Participant #5: Or a gang member themselves...

Participant #6: Yeah, some parents are members of gangs. [Young people] are looking for something to be a part of. It's very easy to be inducted into a gang. I've seen [gang members] under the trees over by the schools. They take time and tutor them.

Participant #5: [Gang members] have lesson that they teach to [the young people].

**Researcher:** Are you saying they promote a certain type of ideology?

Participant #6: Yes. With us, we're going to take care of you. And at a certain time, at some later date, I am going to ask you to do something for me – because you can't say no to me. I'm there for you, and when I need you to do this – please don't say no.

Participant #5: I look out for yours, you look out for me. That's basically what it is. I take care of you so when it's time that I need something done and I come to you, you should do it for me. You should not deny me. You should not tell me no. But a lot of the younger kids don't understand what that may mean. They don't know what they are getting involved in. You can coach someone into selling drugs for you.

Participant #3: The kids want to get clothes, cars, jewelry...

Participant #5: They look up to these guys and they see other guys flashing cars, clothes, money and they want that stuff. If [Participant #4] sees me on the corner and I am making money and I have the clothes and cars and everything, he's gonna follow me. I would be like a mentor to him. He looks up to me. He wants to do what I am doing. These kids have nowhere to go. They see another person flashing this and that. They don't have that. They want that.

Participant #6: Vulnerable populations of children.

Participant #5: But there are some kids that see their parents doing these things, like selling drugs or being involved in a gang, and they don't want to go that route. They wind up going the other way. But if it's surrounding them and that's all they see, nine out of ten – that's what they gonna do.

Participant #6: There are many dysfunctional homes. There are kids who come out of those homes who wind up as lawyers or doctors so you can't blanket everybody. All my brothers were alcoholics and drug users and all died young, so you can't blanket everyone.

Participant #5: When I speak to young kids, I was brought up in a part of [this community] where you didn't see drugs, you didn't hear police cars and fire trucks, you didn't hear any of that, and I was brought up in a good home. But, it's what I encountered, not even in school – I didn't see drug dealing in the school, but it was when I moved away from my parents and I had a job and was on my own – seeing my friends out there, they're not working but they had money in their pocket, but I'm on a budget when I go out and they spend all this money and, you know, your mind – somewhere in the back of your head you're like – “man, how can I get some of that money you're making?” Money is power. Money is powerful. If you don't have it, you're nothing.

Participant #6: Based on what has happened in the stock market, poor people are not the only people convinced of this.

**Researcher:** Other than gang issue, is there any other threat of terrorism in this community?

Participant #5: If you call bullying an act.

Participant #6: It's perspective. From which perspective do you come? There are places on the street, in some environments, the police are the enemy. There has been brutality. There was the philosophy that – look, if you live in this area, you know who does the stealing, you know who does the selling [of drugs], you know who are the gang [members]... So, if one of them rob you or shoot you, you are the one who could have done something about it. So instead of arriving there ten minutes after somebody gets shot, maybe I [speaking from the perspective of the police in this community] want to arrive there an hour and ten minutes. So, let you do all your shooting and I'll come solve the problem after it's over. But I'm not putting myself on the line and getting shot for one of you guys because you're not worth it because you allowed us to come and [members of this community] have that attitude that some of the police have that viewpoint. There was a time that [the police] would wait until people are done killing each other and then come. Whether it's true or not, that's the way people [in this community] see [the police].

**Researcher:** So, are you saying that some of the public believe that the police intentionally delay their response to decrease potential harm to police?

Participant #6: Yes, I know for a fact. In the early 1960's, the police were not coming into a certain area and getting shot for you, especially if you are black.

Participant #5: That happens now.

Participant #6: I don't know about now, but I've seen police parked and waiting while two guys have tried to knife each other after we've called police two or three times. I have been at sit-ins back [during the Civil Rights Era in the South] and saw the atrocities committed. My family left soon after that. The new generation doesn't have a clue. Every generation, they get further and further away from that memory.

**Researcher:** In your community, what do you think about the level of cooperation between police and community?

Participant #6: We've seen remarkable change. We have cookouts with prosecution, police and community members. It has had an indelible effect on all of us. Not just the community, but the police have changed. They have warmed up to the community and the community has warmed up to them. There was a big change from even two years ago.

**Researcher:** Did most of this change happen when [the former head of police agency] was director of police?

Participant #6: Yes. I have advised people to go to the police and those people have listened. Put the information in the proper hands.

**Researcher:** So you mentioned some terms that are probably quite common in your community: snitch, stool pigeon, squealer. Is that still common for members of this community to have a negative view of people who talk to the police?

Participant #5: Yes. What I try to do is give them scenarios and show how it could happen to their family or someone they love. So I try to tell them to help. If you see it, come forth and help. It's not snitching because the same thing can happen to your family.

**Researcher:** So what is the difference?

Participant #5: Snitching is just a slang. Put it this way, if you have two drug dealers and one makes more money, he's gonna get jealous, because he's not making the same money, so he's gonna call the police or make a phone call telling where the guy is dealing from and where his stuff is.

Participant #6: The informant is still the informant. The difference is that with us, we say don't get yourself in a position where you can't do what you're supposed to do. We can't go out into the community and be accepted by the community if we were to use our position to inform on people. We don't provide information, but we encourage people to call the proper authorities.

Participant #5: We have people who talk to us voluntarily and we are making a big impact on [this community]. We get respect and we never had any confrontation in [this community]. I have gang members who ask how they can get involved in [specific community program]. We can't stop everything but we can help the community. We can put a dent in the problem.

Participant #6: I have two principals who want us to come to their schools and do a presentation.

**Researcher:** So what has the impact been?

Participant #6: I think we saw it in their mannerism. We had a cookout here and we gave out about four hundred backpacks and when they came for that, the people who came were here from word of mouth. They evidently took it home. A mobilization of the community to get involved to stop the violence or to prevent the next shooting.

Participant #5: Like [participant #6] said, a lot of the shootings are now being solved. Now people are getting involved. The solvable shooting rates are increasing. And at one point, the shooting was down.

Participant #6: Right now, we are a bit heavier but up until August, we were down.

Participant #1: They were greeting us and everything in the hot weather.

Participant #2: We go out and we have a lot of people in the community who thank us because they think what we are doing is good. Nobody wants to get shot. It's survival of the fittest. We are trying to survive. A lot of people are tired, especially now with the new President a lot of people see a change to start anew. They want to live normal and have their families live a normal life. The point is that there is a change. There is a positive response. They see all of us out there together and they say they want to be part of it. It's slow and coming but I think it's going to be a positive change in 2009 and 2010 to the point where people who walk the streets may not be afraid at night. People will start taking steps to stop others from committing crime.

Participant #3: There was a guy who came in to offer a gun. People are asking where they can turn in guns now. That's the kind of response we've been getting out there.

Participant #5: And also, me being locked up in prison and all, and they see me and what I'm doing, and they ask what we are about and they want to be part of it. We tell them to talk to the younger guys. They see the troubles I have been through with them and then I turned out to do positive things. [Specific rap music performer] wanted to know about what we were doing.

**Researcher:** And so you feel that you have significant support from [this community's] police department?

Participant #3: Yes.

Participant #5: Definitely.

Participant #6: Oh yes.

Participant #5: The gang members see us doing positive things and they want to rep themselves. They want to know what they are about and I never hear that I am a snitch. We could be called snitches since they work with the police, but we aren't.

**Researcher:** But you don't give the police information about them. So I'm sure that has given you some street credibility?

Participant #5: Yes.

**Researcher:** Are there any other issues that are associated with providing information to the police, other than the issue of being called a rat or snitch?

Participant #4: Not at all.

Participant #6: I don't think so.

Participant #5: You should see the response from the schools. I was watching a kid throwing up gang signs and I took this boy aside and talked to him and explained what can happen and he listened. We have a lot of respect from the community.

**Researcher:** Do you think any of the things you are doing right now can be applied to counter terrorism?

Participant #6: I do believe that any time you can negotiate or communicate or talk, there is a world of positive results that can come from that.

Participant #2: We have different areas of [specific community program] throughout the city but this portion of [specific community program], the [this community] area is more involved with the police than other areas across the state.

Participant #6: [This community] has been able to overcome issues with coming together more so than other areas. There are other people who have come in to [specific community program] and they are what we call our Community Core Group.

**Researcher:** Why do you think [this community] succeeded where other groups failed?

Participant #1: [This community] had community mobilization before [specific community program].

Participant #6: Our church began to march with other churches.

Participant #5: I think it was successful because we went to other cities as well and saw that these areas were not as bad as [this community]. We went to areas that we should not have been in and we had to watch our backs. We all talked about that and we couldn't wait to get back to [this community].

Participant #6: Also we go at the businesses.

Participant #5: We go into businesses and hang fliers and hold meetings in that area or hold a barbecue. Our presence in these areas, it's just our presence.

**Researcher:** Do you cover all parts of [this community] or high-crime areas?

Participant #6: We do cover places outside the target areas. But normally we are dictated to follow community alerts after something happens. We are proactive with our mobilization but reactive to shootings and violence.

**Researcher:** Would you be willing to work with police in regards to stopping terrorism related violence?

Participant #6: Sure.

Participant #5: Sure.

Participant #3: Yes.

Participant #2: How the world sees terrorism is different than the gangs.

Participant #1: I don't think we want to be in that kind of training (referring to terrorist training).

Participant #6: It would be similar to trying to educate the community.

Participant #2: From my experience in the military, I have been well trained to fight. Training is the key to everything. Wherever you go, training and education is the key to ignorance. If I don't know what it is about, I won't get into it unless I am well-informed.

Participant #6: My problem is that I know what [specific community program] requires, we had 10 weeks of training. We learned how to do things. That had to get in to me to learn how not to do what I normally do because now we are representing another group. If it is some kind of intelligence or communication that we can provide, at the same time we would not communicate directly with the police, but we would encourage others to do so.

**Researcher:** [Discussion of Smith et al. (2006, 2008) research on temporal and spatial patterns in terrorist incidents in the United States] Studies have found that there is a relationship between where a terrorist lives and attack. About half of the time, they do their planning and attack within thirty miles of their residence. If the public were to have that information, and we are talking about mostly domestic acts, do you think it would have an impact on their willingness to cooperate with local law enforcement in regards to intelligence gathering to prevent future terrorist attacks?

Participant #1: In the schools it is happening.

**Researcher:** And the work that I am talking about is providing information to the community about how to provide information to the police. Are there any thoughts about how to increase the police working with the community?

Participant #6: I think we need to continue our model. It has been quite successful.

**Researcher:** Any comments or questions before we finish this up? I am going to ask you to complete a survey about what we have discussed.

**End Transcripts**

## Appendix K: Questionnaire for Law Enforcement

### Questionnaire for Law Enforcement

1. Are you a full-time law enforcement officer? YES / NO
2. What is the zip code for your current workplace? \_\_\_\_\_
3. What year did you start to work in law enforcement? \_\_\_\_\_
4. What was your age when you first started to work in law enforcement? \_\_\_\_\_
5. What year did you start to work in your current department? \_\_\_\_\_
6. How many full-time law enforcement officers are in your department? \_\_\_\_\_
7. What is your current rank? \_\_\_\_\_
8. How many years/months have you been at your current rank? \_\_\_\_\_
9. What is the distance, in miles, from your residence to your current workplace? \_\_\_\_\_
10. How often do you interact with members of the community that you serve?
  - a. every day
  - b. a few times a week
  - c. a few times a month
  - d. a few times a year
11. Does your agency engage in Community Policing? YES / NO
12. Does your current assignment involve Community Policing? YES / NO
13. Are you married? YES / NO
14. Do you have children? YES / NO
15. What is your sex? Male / Female
16. What race do you identify with? \_\_\_\_\_
17. What is your current age? \_\_\_\_\_
18. What is the highest education level you have completed?
  - a. high school degree or equivalent
  - b. some college
  - c. bachelor's degree
  - d. some graduate school
  - e. graduate degree or JD
  - f. Ph.D. or MD
19. What was your household income in 2007?
  - a. less than \$30,000
  - b. \$30,001 – \$50,000
  - c. \$50,001 – \$70,000
  - d. \$70,001 – \$90,000
  - e. \$90,001 – \$110,000
  - f. more than \$110,000

## Appendix L: Questionnaire for Community Members

1. What is the zip code for your current residence? \_\_\_\_\_
2. What year did you move to your current residence? \_\_\_\_\_
3. What was your age when you first moved to your current residence? \_\_\_\_\_
4. How many years have you lived in the community you now reside in? \_\_\_\_\_
5. Are you a US citizen? YES / NO
6. Did you serve in the US military? YES / NO
7. Is a member of your immediate family employed as law enforcement? YES / NO
8. Do you participate in local politics? YES / NO
9. Do you participate in local community groups? YES / NO
10. How often do you attend local political or community meetings?
  - a. every day
  - b. a few times a week
  - c. a few times a month
  - d. a few times a year
11. How often do you interact with members of your local law enforcement agency?
  - a. every day
  - b. a few times a week
  - c. a few times a month
  - d. a few times a year
12. Does your local law enforcement agency engage in Community Policing? YES / NO
13. Are you married? YES / NO
14. Do you have children? YES / NO
15. What is your sex? Male / Female
16. What is your age? \_\_\_\_\_
17. What race do you identify with? \_\_\_\_\_
18. What is the highest education level you have completed?
  - a. high school degree or equivalent
  - b. some college
  - c. bachelor's degree
  - d. some graduate school
  - e. graduate degree or JD
  - f. Ph.D. or MD
19. What was your household income in 2007?
  - a. less than \$30,000
  - b. \$30,001 – \$50,000
  - c. \$50,001 – \$70,000
  - d. \$70,001 – \$90,000
  - e. \$90,001 – \$110,000
  - f. more than \$110,000

## Appendix M: Survey for Law Enforcement

For the following 10 statements, please answer using one of the following five responses:

- A. strongly disagree
- B. disagree
- C. neither agree nor disagree
- D. agree
- E. strongly agree

1. Terrorism is an important problem.
2. The threat of terrorism is significantly greater today than it was before the 9/11 attacks.
3. Members of my community are highly involved in local law enforcement proactive counter-terrorism tactics [proactive counter-terrorism tactics = activity designed to prevent terrorism by intervening prior to an attack, not subsequent to an attack].
4. The costs of utilizing local communities in proactive counter-terrorism responses are low.
5. It is dangerous for members of the community to engage with local law enforcement to counter terrorism.
6. I am willing to engage with the community in proactive counter-terrorism efforts.
7. There is a low level of terrorist activity and terrorist threat in the community I serve.
8. An effective method to gather intelligence about local terrorist activity is through communication with members of the community.
9. The following eight elements are important to the definition of terrorism:
  - a. an act of terrorism involves the use of violence or force
  - b. an act of terrorism is political in nature
  - c. an act of terrorism involves fear or emphasis on terror
  - d. an act of terrorism involves a threat
  - e. an act of terrorism involves a civilian target
  - f. an act of terrorism involves activities by non-state actors
  - g. an act of terrorism involves coercion
  - h. an act of terrorism involves a goal of furtherance of ideological change
10. The following will be effective in proactive counter-terrorism efforts:
  - a. Increase understanding and trust between local law enforcement and the community.
  - b. Have the community provide guidance and feedback on law enforcement policies and activities.
  - c. Provide the community with the necessary information and training to allow them to safely and effectively assist local law enforcement.
  - d. Have the community share responsibility for its safety and security.
  - e. Maintain active participation and cooperation from all levels of local law enforcement agency and its corresponding community.
  - f. Shift the focus of police work from reacting to incidents to working with the community to identify individuals in the planning and preparation stages of an attack.

## Appendix N: Survey for Community Members

For the following 10 statements, please answer using one of the following five responses:

- A. strongly disagree
- B. disagree
- C. neither agree nor disagree
- D. agree
- E. strongly agree

1. Terrorism is an important problem.
2. The threat of terrorism is significantly greater today than it was before the 9/11 attacks.
3. Members of my community are highly involved in local law enforcement proactive counter-terrorism tactics [proactive counter-terrorism tactics = activity designed to prevent terrorism by intervening prior to an attack, not subsequent to an attack].
4. The costs of utilizing local communities in proactive counter-terrorism responses are low.
5. It is dangerous for members of the community to engage with local law enforcement to counter terrorism.
6. I am willing to engage with my local law enforcement agency in proactive counter-terrorism efforts.
7. There is a low level of terrorist activity and terrorist threat in this community.
8. An effective method to gather intelligence about local terrorist activity is through communication with members of the community.
9. The following eight elements are important to the definition of terrorism:
  - a. an act of terrorism involves the use of violence or force
  - b. an act of terrorism is political in nature
  - c. an act of terrorism involves fear or emphasis on terror
  - d. an act of terrorism involves a threat
  - e. an act of terrorism involves a civilian target
  - f. an act of terrorism involves activities by non-state actors
  - g. an act of terrorism involves coercion
  - h. an act of terrorism involves a goal of furtherance of ideological change
10. The following will be effective in proactive counter-terrorism efforts:
  - a. Increase understanding and trust between local law enforcement and the community.
  - b. Have the community provide guidance and feedback on law enforcement policies and activities.
  - c. Provide the community with the necessary information and training to allow them to safely and effectively assist local law enforcement.
  - d. Have the community share responsibility for its safety and security.
  - e. Maintain active participation and cooperation from all levels of local law enforcement agency and its corresponding community.
  - f. Shift the focus of police work from reacting to incidents to working with the community to identify individuals in the planning and preparation stages of an attack.

## **Appendix O: Sir Robert Peel's Nine Principles of Policing<sup>123</sup>**

1. To prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their repression by military force and by severity of legal punishment
2. To recognize always that the power of the police to fulfill their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behavior, and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect.
3. To recognize always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing of willing cooperation of the public in the task of securing observance of laws.
4. To recognize always that the extent to which the cooperation of the public can be secured diminishes, proportionately, the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives.
5. To seek and to preserve public favour, not by pandering to public opinion, but by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to law, in complete independence of policy, and without regard to the justice or injustices of the substance of individual laws; by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the public without regard to their wealth or social standing; by ready exercise of courtesy and friendly good humour; and by ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life.
6. To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public cooperation to an extent necessary to secure observance of law or to restore order; and to use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective.
7. To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen, in the interests of community welfare and existence.
8. To recognize always the need for strict adherence to police-executive functions, and to refrain from even seeming to usurp the powers of the judiciary of avenging individuals or the state, and of authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the guilty.
9. To recognize always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.

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<sup>123</sup> Reith, 1948

## Appendix P: IRB Approved Informed Consent Form

You are invited to participate in a research study entitled “Community Policing Philosophy as a Tool for Local Law Enforcement to Counter Terrorist Activities.” The purpose of this research is to assess the feasibility of implementation of some of the most basic tenets of the Community Oriented Policing (COP) philosophy in mobilization of the communities by local law enforcement agencies in their effort and strive to become proactive in the fight against local and global terrorist threat. We plan to enroll approximately 100 participants into this study. If you decide to participate, you will be asked to participate in a focus group and fill out a questionnaire and survey. Participation should take about one hour for the duration of one day.

The foreseeable risks of participation in this study are minimal. The possible benefits to you are an increased understanding of terrorism and the opportunity to discuss the phenomenon with others. The potential benefits to society are that the research will provide an assessment regarding the state of proactive policing on the local level. Furthermore, there are significant policy implications in relation to counter-terrorism and law enforcement in general.

Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You have a right to refuse to participate without consequences. If you decide not to participate your decision will not affect your relationship with John Jay College or your employer.

If you decide to participate you may discontinue participation at any time. You may refuse to answer any specific questions or refuse to engage in any task at any time during the study. Withdrawal or refusing to answer specific questions or engage in specific tasks will not result in any consequences to you and will not affect your relationship with John Jay College or your employer.

Information gathered from you will be kept until it can be coded, at which point it will be destroyed.

Your signature below means that you have read this consent form, that you fully understand the nature and consequences of participation and that you have had all questions regarding participation in this study answered satisfactorily. If you have further questions about this research please feel free to contact the Principle Investigator, Charles Lieberman at 646-557-4566 or [clieberman@jjay.cuny.edu](mailto:clieberman@jjay.cuny.edu).

If you have any questions regarding your rights as a research participant please feel free to contact the John Jay Institutional Review Board Office at [jj-irb@jjay.cuny.edu](mailto:jj-irb@jjay.cuny.edu), or (212) 237-8961.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Participant Name

\_\_\_\_\_  
Participant Signature

\_\_\_\_\_  
Principle Investigator/Research Staff

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Witness Signature

## **Appendix Q: IRB Approved Letter to Law Enforcement Agency**

*Local Law Enforcement Agency*

*Head of Local Law Enforcement Agency,*

You are invited to participate in a research study entitled “Community Policing Philosophy as a Tool for Local Law Enforcement to Counter Terrorist Activities.” The purpose of this research is to assess the feasibility of implementation of some of the most basic tenets of the Community Oriented Policing (COP) philosophy in mobilization of the communities by local law enforcement agencies in their effort and strive to become proactive in the fight against local and global terrorist threat.

This study will include six local law enforcement agencies. If you decide to participate, your officers will be asked to voluntarily participate in a focus group and fill out a questionnaire and survey. Participation should take about one hour for the duration of one day. The study will require a minimum of five officers at one time, but I would prefer eight in the event that any of the officers decide to withdraw from the study. The officers will be provided with refreshments during the study (light food and non-alcoholic beverages).

The foreseeable risks of participation in this study are minimal. The possible benefits to the participants are an increased understanding of terrorism and the opportunity to discuss the phenomenon with others. The potential benefits to society are that the research will provide an assessment regarding the state of proactive policing on the local level. Furthermore, there are significant policy implications in relation to counter-terrorism and law enforcement in general.

The participation of your agency in this study is completely voluntary. You have a right to refuse to participate without consequences. If you decide not to participate your decision will not affect your relationship with John Jay College or your employer.

If your agency agrees to participate, you may discontinue participation at any time. Your officers may refuse to answer any specific questions or refuse to engage in any task at any time during the study. Withdrawal or refusing to answer specific questions or engage in specific tasks will not result in any consequences to you and will not affect your relationship with John Jay College or your employer.

Information gathered from you will be kept until it can be coded, at which point it will be destroyed.

Thank you for your consideration,

Charles Lieberman  
John Jay College of Criminal Justice  
Department of Law, Police Science  
& Criminal Justice Administration  
899 Tenth Ave, 422T/41  
New York, NY 10019  
(646)557-4566  
[clieberman@jjay.cuny.edu](mailto:clieberman@jjay.cuny.edu)

## **Policing Research**

**If you are an active local law enforcement agent in \_\_\_\_\_ Department and would like to participate in a study that examines police perspectives in relation to local law enforcement counter-terrorism efforts and community policing, please call the following telephone number 646-557-4566 or send an email to the following address [clieberman@jjay.cuny.edu](mailto:clieberman@jjay.cuny.edu)**

**All participation is voluntary and all participants may withdraw at any time**

**All information collected will be confidential**

Refreshments will be provided for all participants  
(food & non-alcoholic beverages)

## Appendix S: IRB Approved Community Solicitation



JOHN JAY COLLEGE  
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK  
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

# Community Research

**If you are over the age of 18 and would like to participate in a study that examines community perspectives in relation to counter-terrorism and community policing, please call the following telephone number 646-557-4566 or send an email to the following address [clieberman@jjay.cuny.edu](mailto:clieberman@jjay.cuny.edu)**

**All participation is voluntary**

Refreshments will be provided for all participants  
(food & non-alcoholic beverages)

## Appendix T: Descriptive Statistics for All Participants

<i>Descriptive Statistics for All Participants</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
<b>Terrorism problem</b>	51	1	5	4.27	1.218
<b>Greater terrorism threat</b>	51	1	5	3.92	1.163
<b>High Community Involvement</b>	51	1	5	2.22	1.064
<b>Low Costs Utilizing Community</b>	51	1	5	2.96	1.183
<b>Danger for Community in CT</b>	50	1	5	2.50	1.147
<b>Willingness to Engage Local Law Enforcement</b>	51	1	5	3.98	1.122
<b>Low Level of Terrorist Activity</b>	51	1	5	3.22	1.154
<b>Communication with Community Effective Intel</b>	51	1	5	4.20	1.059
<b>Terrorism involves Violence</b>	51	1	5	4.04	1.166
<b>Terrorism involves Political Nature</b>	51	1	5	3.73	0.918
<b>Terrorism involves Fear or Emphasis on Terror</b>	51	1	5	4.45	0.730
<b>Terrorism involves a Threat</b>	51	1	5	3.88	1.125
<b>Terrorism involves Civilian Targets</b>	51	1	5	3.20	1.327
<b>Terrorism involves Activities by Non-State Actors</b>	51	1	5	3.02	1.208
<b>Terrorism involves Coercion</b>	51	1	5	3.67	0.952
<b>Terrorism involves an Ideological Goal</b>	50	1	5	4.06	0.998
<b>Increase Understanding and Trust</b>	51	1	5	4.45	0.832
<b>Community Provide Guidance and Feedback</b>	51	2	5	3.98	0.948
<b>Provide Community with Information &amp; Training</b>	51	2	5	4.22	0.856
<b>Community Share Responsibility for Safety &amp; Security</b>	51	2	5	4.02	0.948
<b>Maintain Active Participation and Cooperation</b>	51	2	5	4.33	0.792
<b>Shift Focus from Reactive to Proactive</b>	51	2	5	4.00	0.959
<b>Support for Community Policing in Counter Terrorism</b>	51	13	30	25.00	4.025
<b>Support for Terrorism Operationalization</b>	50	15	40	30.18	5.157

## Appendix U: Descriptive Statistics for Community Participants

<i>Descriptive Statistics for Community Participants</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
<b>Terrorism problem</b>	22	1	5	3.95	1.527
<b>Greater terrorism threat</b>	22	1	5	3.91	1.377
<b>High Community Involvement</b>	22	1	5	2.77	1.020
<b>Low Costs Utilizing Community</b>	22	2	5	3.14	1.082
<b>Danger for Community in CT</b>	21	1	5	2.38	1.071
<b>Willingness to Engage Local Law Enforcement</b>	22	1	5	3.64	1.329
<b>Low Level of Terrorist Activity</b>	22	1	5	3.68	1.171
<b>Communication with Community Effective Intel</b>	22	1	5	3.86	1.246
<b>Terrorism involves Violence</b>	22	1	5	3.95	1.362
<b>Terrorism involves Political Nature</b>	22	1	5	3.77	1.066
<b>Terrorism involves Fear or Emphasis on Terror</b>	22	1	5	4.27	0.935
<b>Terrorism involves a Threat</b>	22	1	5	3.59	1.403
<b>Terrorism involves Civilian Targets</b>	22	1	5	2.82	1.296
<b>Terrorism involves Activities by Non-State Actors</b>	22	1	5	2.86	1.246
<b>Terrorism involves Coercion</b>	22	1	5	3.45	1.101
<b>Terrorism involves an Ideological Goal</b>	21	1	5	3.90	1.044
<b>Increase Understanding and Trust</b>	22	1	5	4.36	1.093
<b>Community Provide Guidance and Feedback</b>	22	2	5	4.05	1.046
<b>Provide Community with Information &amp; Training</b>	22	2	5	4.09	0.921
<b>Community Share Responsibility for Safety &amp; Security</b>	22	2	5	3.91	1.065
<b>Maintain Active Participation and Cooperation</b>	22	2	5	4.32	0.894
<b>Shift Focus from Reactive to Proactive</b>	22	2	5	3.82	1.097
<b>Support for Community Policing in Counter Terrorism</b>	22	13	30	24.55	4.887
<b>Support for Terrorism Operationalization</b>	21	15	40	28.90	6.252

## Appendix V: Descriptive Statistics for Local Law Enforcement

<i>Descriptive Statistics for Local Law Enforcement Participants</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
<b>Terrorism problem</b>	29	1	5	4.52	0.871
<b>Greater terrorism threat</b>	29	2	5	3.93	0.998
<b>High Community Involvement</b>	29	1	4	1.79	0.902
<b>Low Costs Utilizing Community</b>	29	1	5	2.83	1.256
<b>Danger for Community in CT</b>	29	1	5	2.59	1.211
<b>Willingness to Engage Local Law Enforcement</b>	29	1	5	4.24	0.872
<b>Low Level of Terrorist Activity</b>	29	1	5	2.86	1.026
<b>Communication with Community Effective Intel</b>	29	1	5	4.45	0.827
<b>Terrorism involves Violence</b>	29	1	5	4.10	1.012
<b>Terrorism involves Political Nature</b>	29	2	5	3.69	0.806
<b>Terrorism involves Fear or Emphasis on Terror</b>	29	4	5	4.59	0.501
<b>Terrorism involves a Threat</b>	29	2	5	4.10	0.817
<b>Terrorism involves Civilian Targets</b>	29	1	5	3.48	1.299
<b>Terrorism involves Activities by Non-State Actors</b>	29	1	5	3.14	1.187
<b>Terrorism involves Coercion</b>	29	2	5	3.83	0.805
<b>Terrorism involves an Ideological Goal</b>	29	2	5	4.17	0.966
<b>Increase Understanding and Trust</b>	29	3	5	4.52	0.574
<b>Community Provide Guidance and Feedback</b>	29	2	5	3.93	0.884
<b>Provide Community with Information &amp; Training</b>	29	2	5	4.31	0.806
<b>Community Share Responsibility for Safety &amp; Security</b>	29	2	5	4.10	0.860
<b>Maintain Active Participation and Cooperation</b>	29	2	5	4.34	0.721
<b>Shift Focus from Reactive to Proactive</b>	29	2	5	4.14	0.833
<b>Support for Community Policing in Counter Terrorism</b>	29	18	30	25.34	3.276
<b>Support for Terrorism Operationalization</b>	29	24	40	31.10	4.065


## Appendix W: T-Test for Community & Law Enforcement

<i>Comparison of Participants' Surveys</i>	<i>Community Mean</i>	<i>LE Mean</i>	<i>t</i>
<b>Terrorism is an important problem</b>	3.95	4.52	-(1.548)
<b>The threat of terrorism is greater today than before 9/11</b>	3.91	3.93	-(0.063)
<b>The community is highly involved in counter-terrorism</b>	2.77	1.79	3.631 **
<b>The cost of community involvement in CT is low</b>	3.14	2.83	0.922
<b>It is dangerous for the community to be involved in CT</b>	2.38	2.59	-(0.62)
<b>Willingness to have community and local law enforcement engage with each other in CT</b>	3.64	4.24	-(1.96) @
<b>Low level of terrorist activity in community</b>	3.68	2.86	2.66 *
<b>Communication with community is an effective method of gathering intelligence on terrorist activity</b>	3.86	4.45	-(2.012) @
<b>Support for operationalization of terrorism</b>	28.9	31.1	-(1.507)
<b>Terrorism involves the use of violence or force</b>	3.95	4.1	-(0.448)
<b>Terrorism is political in nature</b>	3.77	3.69	0.317
<b>Terrorism involves fear or emphasis on terror</b>	4.27	4.59	-(1.540)
<b>Terrorism involves a threat</b>	3.59	4.1	-(1.528)
<b>Terrorism involves a civilian target</b>	2.82	3.48	-(1.811) @
<b>Terrorism involves activities by non-state actor</b>	2.86	3.14	-(0.8)
<b>Terrorism involves coercion</b>	3.45	3.83	-(1.399) *
<b>Terrorism involves an ideological goal</b>	3.9	4.17	-(0.935)
<b>Support for CP as a proactive measure in CT</b>	24.55	25.34	-(0.699)
<b>Increase understanding and trust between local law enforcement and the community</b>	4.36	4.52	-(0.599)
<b>Have the community provide guidance and feedback on law enforcement policies and activities</b>	4.05	3.93	0.423
<b>Provide the community with the information &amp; training</b>	4.09	4.31	-(905)
<b>Community share responsibility for its safety &amp; security</b>	3.91	4.10	-(0.721)
<b>Maintain active participation and cooperation from local law enforcement and community</b>	4.32	4.34	-(0.118)
<b>Shift the focus from reactive to proactive</b>	3.82	4.14	-(1.184)


\* p < 0.05; \*\* p < 0.01; @ p > 0.10

## Appendix X: Frequency of Racial Self-Identification


### Frequency of Racial Self-Identification for All Participants



## Frequency of Racial Self-Identification for Community



## Frequency of Racial Self-Identification for Law Enforcement



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