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PROMISES AND SELF-FOCUSED ATTENTION

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PROMISES AND SELF-FOCUSED ATTENTION

by

SIDNEY CALLAHAN

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Abstract

PROMISES AND SELF-FOCUSED ATTENTION

by

SIDNEY CALLAHAN

Adviser: Professor Charles P. Smith

An empirical study of promises and self-focused attention was carried out using 72 women as subjects. Questionnaire measures of self-consciousness, or self-focused attention, age, locus of control and family embeddedness were obtained. The women then filled out a specially constructed promise questionnaire either in front of a large mirror or in a no mirror condition; they were then asked to promise to send back four postcards over three weeks time. The seven dependent variables of the study consisted of five self-report variables derived from the promise questionnaire and two behavioral variables consisting of a latency measure of the time taken to make a promise and the number of postcards returned. The five self-report variables were: self-responsibility for promise breaking, subjectivity of moral judgments about promising,

self-confidence for promise keeping, estimates of others' promise keeping, and assessed possibility of promises. Hypotheses were derived and predictions made for the relationship of the four independent variables of self-consciousness, age, locus of control and family embeddedness to the seven dependent variables. When tested the hypotheses for the effects of self-consciousness induced by a mirror were not supported. Private self-consciousness, as measured by a self-consciousness scale, was positively and significantly correlated with subjectivity of moral judgment about promising, and negatively and significantly correlated with self-confidence for promise keeping. In addition, private self-consciousness was positively correlated with time taken to make a promise and the number of postcards returned. As also hypothesized, internality of locus of control was positively and significantly related to estimates of others' promise keeping. These results, along with descriptive data exploring the domain of promises, are discussed.

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Chapter I

Introduction

In everyday life people make promises and either keep them or break them in the course of events. Some promises are practically routine, while other promises are made in matters of great importance at significant moments in life. Instances of the latter would be promises made at death-beds, weddings, initiations in religious and fraternal groups, in courts of law and in certain therapeutic treatment situations. The less important promises individuals make seem too numerous to catalogue, but they may range from promises to lunch on Thursday next to promises to return a book on time. Promises ranging from the ordinary to the dramatic are depicted often in novels, movies, poetry and operas--sometimes with the resolution of the plot resting on the promise. Whether promises are kept or not also seems to be important in our politics.

It would seem that we all more or less understand what a promise is and what it is to make a promise. In Webster's Dictionary one finds that the first definition of the noun is as follows: "One's pledge to another to do or not do something specified; narrowly, a declaration which gives to the person to whom it is made a right to expect or to claim the performance or forbearance of a specified act." The

first definition of the verb "to promise" is: "To engage to do, give, make, obtain, etc.; to make (to another) a promise of; also, to give one's promise to." These definitions may seem fairly straightforward, but in the analyses of promises and promising found in law, religion and philosophy, endless complications and refinements arise.

In law the question seems to be one of distinguishing whether certain promises are also contracts and thus should be included in contract law (Smith, 1973). In religious thought there are great debates over whether in entering a religious order, or a marriage, a person can or should, make a promise for life (Westley, 1972). Debates concerning religious promises usually involve theological questions as to God's nature and existence, and whether God can make a promise or covenant with humankind. In philosophy there is a similarly long-standing concern with promises and the act of promising. Philosophical treatments of promising and promises have focused on the act of promising and promise keeping as a paradigmatic instance of moral obligation (Frankena, 1963). Hannah Arendt, in emphasizing the centrality of promise keeping to morality, has even rather poetically described a promise as a "sacrament of the will" (Arendt, 1958). Different analyses of the questions of promises are still currently being debated (Austin, 1962; Hare, 1964).

Impressed and stimulated by the treatment of promises and promising in other disciplines, and mindful of everyday

practical applications, I have undertaken an exploratory empirical psychological investigation of promises and promising. The major challenge of the research project involved framing a theoretical model to employ in the study and creating appropriate research questionnaires and experimental manipulations suitable for a correlational and experimental research investigation.

Guided by dictionary definitions and philosophical analyses, I reasoned that the study should focus on a person's self-consciousness, relationships to significant others, and a personal sense of internal control. After all, to make a promise, according to the philosopher Austin (1962), is to personally and self-consciously do something with words. Unlike much other speech, a promise is a "performative utterance" or "speech act" which accomplishes something, that is, a promise is made. A similar case of a speech act is in a christening ceremony when someone says, "I name thee so and so," and thus bestows a name. Making a promise is a special kind of self-conscious self-commitment involving an engagement or undertaking of an obligation, usually to another and often in the presence of others. Austin holds that an awareness of mutual understanding or "uptake" by a social other must be present for a valid promise to be made. Making a promise or giving one's word necessarily involves self-conscious attention to the self as an agent. A self-consciously aware person pledges or binds the self to the self-initiated course in the future.

A theoretical framework for studying promises exists in the theory of objective self-awareness proposed by Duval and Wicklund (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975). The theory involves the appropriate elements of interest, that is, statements about the relationship of self-consciousness or self-focused attention to conformity to norms, to attributions of personal responsibility, to deindividuation in a group, to a sense of personal control. An act of promising should theoretically be related to all of the above elements found in objective self-awareness theory.

Briefly, self-awareness theory postulates that there is a necessary dichotomy in attention; attention is either directed outward toward the environment or attention is directed inward upon the self as an object in the world. Attention directed outward to a task, action or other stimuli external to the self produces a sense of confident personal control, a deindividuated state, and an tendency to act counter-normatively without reflection. Duval and Wicklund called this state "subjective self-awareness." When, however, attention is directed to the self, a state of self-consciousness occurs which produces other consequences. Duval and Wicklund called this state "objective self-awareness;" but this usage was so awkward and confusing that those working in the research tradition have changed the term to "self-consciousness" or "self-focused attention."

Self-consciousness or self-focused attention is postulated to produce self-evaluation and a sense of discrepancy

between the self and any norms salient in the situation. Usually the discrepancy will be a negative one, and negative affect will be aroused. But occasionally, in Wicklund's revision of the original theory (1975), the discrepancy will be positive and positive affect will result. When negative affect is aroused, the person will either withdraw from the field to avoid self-consciousness, try to change the self-conscious state, or try to reduce the negative discrepancy by appropriate means. In any event, self-consciousness motivates a person. Self-consciousness produces self-criticism, self-attributions of responsibility, individuation as a unique object in the world, lessening of personal control, conformity to norms, and social facilitation. In those rare cases of an experience of positive discrepancies to a salient norm, self-consciousness produces self-aggrandizement, self-exaltation and approach behavior.

How is attention determined? In the original formulation of the theory, Duval and Wicklund (1972) made the point that outside situational stimuli determined whether attention would be turned inward or outward. Attention was conceived of as oscillating instantaneously from one dichotomous state to another under the control of stimuli in the environment. In Wicklund's more recent formulation (1975), the direction of attention is still viewed as dichotomous, but as only guided by stimuli and environmental events. Self-focused attention is produced by stimuli such as mirrors, video cameras, photographs, tape recordings of the voice, audience

attention, and minority status in a group. The idea of minority status inducing self-consciousness comes from the figure-ground distinction in gestalt psychology. If a person is in a minority, he will see himself as a figure and self-consciousness will be induced. The theory also states that there may be an adaptive effect over time, reducing the power of stimuli to produce self-consciousness.

Originally self-awareness was conceptualized as a stimulus determined state in which attention would oscillate and the amount of self-consciousness would be measured by the time spent with attention focused outward. Later this conception was expanded by other researchers to include the idea of self-consciousness as an organismic variable or chronic disposition of the individual, capable of being tapped by a self-consciousness scale (Carver & Glass, 1976; Carver & Scheier, 1978; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). A self-consciousness scale (See Appendix A for scale) was developed and in the course of testing for reliability and validity, three factors emerged (Fenigstein et al., 1975). One factor was conceptualized as private self-consciousness, one, public self-consciousness and one, social anxiety. The private self-consciousness scale was found by Carver and Scheier (1978) to reliably tap as a chronic disposition the self-consciousness which can be produced by the presence of a mirror. More recent research on self-awareness and

self-consciousness has focused on the discriminant validity and correlates of the scale (Carver & Glass, 1976; Turner, Scheier, Carver & Ickes, 1978). Recent researchers have begun using the self-consciousness scale with its concept of differentiated self-consciousness along with other environmental manipulations of self-focusing attention (Buss & Scheier, 1976; Diener & Srull, 1979; Scheier, 1976; Scheier & Carver, 1977).

Indeed, self-awareness theory has been extremely fruitful in producing experimental research. The richness, complexity and perhaps the looseness of the original theoretical formulations have stimulated research in various directions. Initially there were ingenious experiments to validate the claim that self-focusing stimuli were actually producing self-consciousness (Carver & Scheier, 1978; Davis & Brock, 1975; Geller & Shaver, 1976); these validations of tape recordings, mirrors, audience attention and videocamera manipulations were added to by one more recent manipulation, auditory heartbeat feedback (Fenigstein & Carver, 1978).

Experiments have studied the effect of self-consciousness on personal control and reactance (Carver, 1977; Duval & Ritz, 1972); self-consciousness and helping behavior (Wegner & Schaefer, 1978); self-consciousness and self-attribution (Buss & Scheier, 1976; Duval & Wicklund, 1973); self-consciousness and sensitivity and awareness of one's own emotions and suggestibility (Scheier, 1976; Scheier & Carver, 1977; Scheier, Carver & Gibbons, 1979); self-consciousness

and self-esteem and self-criticism (Ickes & Wicklund, 1973); self-consciousness, deindividuation, and conformity to norms and standards (Carver, 1974; Diener, 1979; Diener & Srull, 1979; Scheier, Fenigstein & Buss, 1974); self-consciousness and validity and consistency of self-report (Gibbons, 1978; Pryor, Gibbons, Wicklund, Fazio & Hood, 1977); self-consciousness and social facilitation and achievement (Brockner, 1979; Carver, 1974; Insko, Worchel, Senger & Arnold, 1973).

The hypotheses of this research applying self-awareness theory to promises have mainly been derived from the original theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975), but I have also drawn on the later research findings and have used some of the same experimental manipulations. From the point of view of extending self-awareness theory, this experimental project can be seen as extending the research into the explicitly moral and ethical domain of the effects of self-consciousness on promises.

Promises and promising may be a very specific domain, as the copious treatment in philosophy, law and religion would attest. People may have specific ideas about promises and promise keeping and display corresponding behavior which may or may not be related to other beliefs, attitudes and behavior. The major research question of interest was whether self-reports, attributions, judgments, assessments and promise behavior vary with different levels of self-focused attention either occurring naturally as a chronic

individual disposition, or as experimentally manipulated in a situation by environmental stimuli.

Since many different types of promises exist, it is important to conceptualize the promise behavior chosen to be studied. In order to fall within the strict definition of a promise, a promise must be a self-conscious pledge, so any deception was impossible for both theoretical and ethical reasons of informed consent. A person must know that he is making a promise when he does so. A promise given has to be an explicit pledge fully understood as such. Moreover, when the moral obligation involved in a promise is of interest, a promise should be voluntary and be clearly different from a contracted business obligation or purchase. To be differentiated from a contract, no payment should be involved and the option to refuse clear, so that there is no coercive pressure from a previous contractual exchange.

A promise can be further embedded in the realm of voluntary moral obligation by insuring that a promiser remains anonymous and the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the promise will be without social penalty. If no one knows the name of a promiser, and no one will know or reproach a person for not following through, external social pressure and any loss of social status can be eliminated as a motive, thus providing a stringent test of internalized moral obligation. Many real life promises are given which are not subject to future social sanctions or

negative consequences if not fulfilled, for example, the promise to cast a secret ballot for a candidate, put in a private word on behalf of a friend's cause, or to carry out an obligation for a person departing the country or dying.

Another obvious factor to be taken into account when studying promise keeping behavior is the level of difficulty of the promise. How much effort will it take to keep the promise? Over how long a time will the efforts have to be continued? Considerations of seriousness and importance of the promise are also pertinent. The most representative information can perhaps be gained from studying a promise of medium importance which is neither trivial or a life or death matter. So too, the level of difficulty should be such that the required effort is neither excessive or too easy. If the same promise is asked of many different people while varying self-consciousness, the variation in response should be informative. The latency of a promise response is also of interest. Will a person make a promise only after a great deal of hesitation or will he immediately refuse or assent? And most important, once a promise has been given, will it then be kept? Who keeps a promise under which conditions is of the greatest theoretical and practical importance.

While actual behavior in regard to promises is of interest, so are the ideas, assessments and judgments that people report about promises and promise behavior. When

asked about promises and promise behavior, will people give different answers which have some relationship to varying levels of self-consciousness? Some central issues which can be investigated by self-report are individual assessments of the following: self-responsibility for breaking promises, self-confidence for keeping promises, estimates of others' promise keeping, subjectivity of moral judgments about promising and ideas about what promises are possible. Thus the hypotheses of this study of self-consciousness and promises involve as dependent variables both behaviors and self-reports.

Hypotheses for Self-Consciousness

These hypotheses are drawn from the statements of the original theory of objective self-awareness or self-focused attention (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975), buttressed by later research on self-consciousness and supplemented by other relevant theories.

The first hypothesis is that self-consciousness will vary positively with reported self-responsibility for promise breaking.

Self-responsibility for promise breaking is conceptualized as the assignment of responsibility for breaking a promise to one's self. If one also assigns responsibility to one's self when a broken promise has been forgotten, this would be seen as heightening self-responsibility for promise breaking. Then, even a temporarily unconscious obligation would be judged as a person's responsibility. The prediction

of the effect of self-consciousness is drawn both from the original theory and supporting research. Theoretically when the self's attention is focused on the self, the self will dominate the field and attributions of self-responsibility or self-causality will increase (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975). This increase of self-attributions in self-consciousness conditions has been produced experimentally (Buss & Scheier, 1976; Duval & Wicklund, 1972, 1973). The only departure in this study is to apply the theory and experimental manipulation to a question of promise breaking which is an explicitly moral category or paradigm of moral obligation.

The second hypothesis is that subjectivity of moral judgments about promising will vary positively with self-consciousness. Subjectivity of moral judgments about promising is conceptualized as weighting the claims of the individual self more than the claims of duty or the binding force of a promise. In a choice between individual personal interests versus the force of an objective rule, a subjective judgment puts personal interests first. The prediction of the effect of self-consciousness is made since the focus of attention on the self should keep attention from being wholly fixed on the moral rule as an objective and binding obligation. Attention directed to the individuated self should increase the weighting of subjective personal concerns over against a transcendent rule.

There are precedents for seeing the direction and maintenance of attention as related to morality (Allport, 1955; Grim & Kohlberg, 1968; James, 1890; Mischel & Mischel, 1972; Piaget, 1948). Piaget defines objectivity or moral realism as the perception of rules as immutable, fixed forever, transcendent, and inflexibly applied always and everywhere (Piaget, 1948). This moral objectivity exists when there is a fixation of attention on the rules rather than on the experience of the subjective selves who must apply and live with rules. According to Piaget when the child becomes more self-conscious or psychologically aware, a more flexible moral approach evolves taking into account personal intentions, changing individual circumstances and the perceived social fact that people construct the rules in the first place. More subjective moral judgments are then made (Lickona, 1976; Piaget, 1948).

Other investigators of moral development following Piaget, such as Kohlberg (1976) and others working with his theories (Rest, 1976; Selman, 1976) have connected changes in moral judgments with changing cognitive capacities to take another's point of view towards one's self, or to decenter one's attention. As the person outgrows the child's fixated egocentric condition by engaging in more social role taking experience, absolute morally objective realistic rules gradually give way to personal, relational rules, taking personal intentions and subjectivity

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into account. However, despite Piaget's ideas, a tension seems to continue into adulthood between attending to the objective external rule or norm and attending to the individualized subjective person's condition. Norma Haan (1977) has differentiated between a cognitive objective approach to morality and a more flexible socially constructed interpersonal approach. Bloom (1977) has distinguished between social principledness and social humanism in morality. Other theorists have seen moral judgments to differ depending upon selective attention (Hogan, 1973; Kelley, 1971).

In philosophy two different emphases in moral obligation and ethical reasoning have been noted by those surveying ethics (Frankena, 1963). One mode advocates the force of objective principles existing beyond the self or individual; this is a deontological approach putting principled duty first and last. Another mode of ethical reasoning focuses upon consequences to the individual or individuals. In the deontological approach to duty and principles, personal subjective psychological factors involving the self are not given much weight. When there is seen to be a choice between personal individual freedom or fidelity to the immutable demand from beyond (DiIanni, 1978), the ethics of duty chooses to follow the demand of the immutable rule before considerations of self. Thinkers such as Bergson (1954) and Durkheim (1961), also analyze

one force of morality as coming from beyond the self. Durkheim commenting on the nature of a rule says, "It is in some measure--and to the same extent that it is a rule--beyond personal preference" (Durkheim, 1961, p. 28). The imperative character of moral obligation or of moral discipline is derived from outside the individual and not seen as an individualized subjective construct.

Iris Murdoch (1971) has connected the direction of attention away from the self with a realistic transcendent view of good as objectively out there. She says: "It may be agreed that the direction of attention should properly be outward, away from self, but it will be said that it is a long step from the idea of realism to the idea of transcendence. I think, however, that these two ideas are related . . . (p. 59)." When attention is focused on the self, Murdoch thinks there will follow a denial of the imperative transcendent demand of objective moral reality. In her view, self-focused attention produces subjectivity and a corresponding relativism in values. If so, increasing self-consciousness and self-focused attention should increase subjectivity of moral judgments about promising.

The third hypothesis involves behavior and is that self-consciousness will vary positively with the latency of a promise response. In other words, the more self-consciousness, the longer the time taken before giving a

promise. This prediction derives directly from the original theory of Duval and Wicklund (1972).

Increasing self-consciousness should increase the time taken to make a promise, or latency of promise response, since hesitation should arise from self-reflection, self-criticalness and the lessened sense of personal control postulated as an effect of self-consciousness. As Duval and Wicklund (1972) say: "We might expect the self-critical person to show reluctance to proceed with the task, in contrast with a subjectively self-aware person who should be at the other extreme with his self-confidence and absence of reflection (p. 149)." Self-consciousness is supposed to induce comparison with a salient standard and either an avoidance or a facilitation in conforming to the standard (Duval and Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975). Since the salient standard is to refrain from promising unless one will be able to keep the promise, the self-conscious, self-reflective person should hesitate longer as the comparison of self with the standard and norm is processed.

After a promise is made, the salient norm is to keep the promise and to validate one's pledge in the future. One of the most intriguing findings of self-consciousness research has been that increased self-consciousness induces increased conformity to a salient norm (Carver, 1974;

Diener & Srull, 1979; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Scheier, Fenigstein & Buss, 1974) and induces validity in self-reports (Gibbons, 1978; Pryor et al., 1977). Therefore the fourth hypothesis is that self-consciousness will vary positively with promises kept. The prediction is based on the reasoning that increased self-consciousness will produce the increased self-criticism and self-motivation to conform to the norm, that is, to keep a promise one makes, thus validating the pledge to do so.

If self-conscious conditions produce individuation and self-responsibility attributions, these effects also should produce greater compliance; the promise may be seen as a more personally responsible action of an individuated self. With less self-consciousness, attention is deployed more to external objects in the environment and away from the self's discrepancies from salient standards and norms. Less self-awareness, less self-criticism, and less individuation and self-responsibility, are hypothesized to result in less conformity to salient standards of correctness and moral obligation, that is, promise keeping.

The remaining hypotheses predict that self-consciousness will vary negatively with self-confidence for promise keeping, estimates of others' promise keeping, and assessed possibility of promises. The fifth hypothesis is that self-consciousness will vary negatively with self-confidence for promise keeping. Self-confidence for promise keeping is conceptualized as a reported self-assessment of the probability

of one's ability to keep one's promise, once it has been given. This hypothesis is based on the original theory's assertion that self-focused attention produces a "pawn" condition as opposed to an "origin" condition, which is related to Rotter's concept of external-internal locus of control (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). There is some experimental evidence for this sense of lessened personal control in the self-conscious condition (Carver, 1977, Duval & Ritz, 1971; Duval & Wicklund, 1972). If self-conscious persons feel less sense of personal control, they should make lower estimates of their own future chances to keep a promise. Since self-evaluation against a standard is also produced in self-consciousness, any personal negative discrepancies which come to mind in self-reflection and self-criticism should also produce lowered self-confidence estimates.

Yet self-consciousness is also predicted in the first hypothesis of the study to increase self-responsibility for promise breaking. How can one have less personal control and be more responsible at the same time? This paradox pointed to in the original theory of objective self-awareness has been noted by Abramson and Sackeim (1977) as one more instance of a paradox most often found in a heightened form among those suffering from depression. Self-blame and a sense of personal helplessness seem to go together psychologically, despite the irrationality of the relationship.

One explanation of this phenomenon is to speculate that the contradiction is not experienced because self-attribution of responsibility and blame look backward toward the past and a sense of personal helplessness and lack of control are oriented to the future. Thus, in the case of promising, a person high in self-consciousness could take more personal responsibility for breaking promises yet have less self-confidence about her own ability to keep promises in the future.

The sixth hypothesis is that self-consciousness will vary negatively with estimates of others' promise keeping. Estimates of others' promise keeping is conceptualized as an assessment of the probability that other people will keep their promises plus estimates of how long in the future promises can be expected to be kept. The prediction is based on the assumption that people judge others as they judge themselves. Therefore the arguments for self-consciousness lowering self-confidence would apply to the lowering of confidence in others. Thus, with lowered personal control, more self-critical evaluation against a standard and more awareness of personal discrepancies, there will be a corresponding lowering of estimates of others' likelihood of keeping promises. Rotter, too, in his work on interpersonal trust has indicated that those low in generalized expectancies of internal locus of control have less interpersonal trust that others will carry through on their commitments (Rotter, 1971).

The seventh and final hypothesis is that self-consciousness will vary negatively with assessed possibility of promises. Assessed possibility of promises is conceptualized as the assessment of whether it is possible to make promises to a narrow or wide range of recipients, as well as whether mutual promises can be made between different agents. The prediction of the effect of self-consciousness is derived from the original theory's claim that self-consciousness lowers personal control and confidence thus producing a condition in which fewer promises are assessed possible. The scope of possible promises should be contracted when attention is focused on the self rather than turned outward. Since self-consciousness is posited to produce individuation and separation from the environment, there should be fewer possible links to existing others. Moreover, since a subjective sense of power and control is decreased in self-focused attention, a greater need for a mutual conscious agreement in a promise should surface and promises should be more likely to be seen as requiring psychological social "uptake" on the part of another. It should be unlikely that a highly self-conscious person would consider it possible to make a promise to a piece of land, a tree, a pet, the dead, or future generations.

Summary of hypotheses for self-consciousness. Since self-consciousness can be assessed in two different ways, that is, as the product of environmental stimuli and as a chronic individual disposition measured by a private self-

consciousness scale, two sets of hypotheses are stated. Both sets predict the same pattern of relationships for self-consciousness and the seven dependent variables of the study. They are as follows:

Hypothesis I.A.: Subjects in a self-conscious condition as compared with subjects in a nonself-conscious condition will have higher scores on the following four variables:

- I.A.1. Self-responsibility for promise breaking
- I.A.2. Subjectivity of moral judgment about promising
- I.A.3. Latency of promise response
- I.A.4. Promises kept

The same subjects will have lower scores on the following three variables:

- I.A.5. Self-confidence for promise keeping
- I.A.6. Estimates of others' promise keeping
- I.A.7. Assessed possibility of promises

Hypothesis I.B.: Subjects' scores on the private self-consciousness scale will vary positively with their scores on the following four variables:

- I.B.1. Self-responsibility for promise breaking
- I.B.2. Subjectivity of moral judgment about promising
- I.B.3. Latency of promise response
- I.B.4. Promises kept

Subjects' scores will vary negatively with the following three variables:

I.B.5. Self-confidence for promise keeping

I.B.6. Estimates of others' promise keeping

I.B.7. Assessed possibility of promises

Secondary Hypotheses

Secondary hypotheses were also derived for three other independent variables and the seven dependent variables of the study. The three additional independent variables are age, locus of control and family embeddedness.

Age. Age in this study refers to an adult age range of twenty to forty. The hypotheses for age are the same as for self-consciousness. Age is hypothesized to vary positively with self-responsibility for promise breaking, subjectivity of moral judgment about promising, latency of promise response and promises kept. Age is hypothesized to vary negatively with self-confidence for promise keeping, estimates of others' promise keeping and assessed possibility of promises. The rationale for these predictions is based upon the assumption that age and self-consciousness increase together so that the older the person, the more self-conscious he will be.

This assumption is an extension of the original theory of how self-consciousness is developed (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Self-consciousness increases as the child becomes cognitively able to take the role of the other and socially experiences viewpoints which are discrepant from his own. Much as in the theories of Mead and Piaget, Duval and Wicklund think that the child's increasing social experience changes his original sense of omnipotence and unity with the

environment so that the child looks upon himself as an individuated object in the universe, that is, as seen through the eyes of observers. Attention directed to the self rather than to the outer environment produces a loss of connection and contact with the environment and produces a loss of control and mastery. One becomes an object rather than a subject operating unselfconsciously on the environment; and with self-consciousness comes self-evaluation and self-criticism.

In the original theory, the social experiences producing discrepancies and self-focused attention are assumed to increase as the child ages. My assumption has been that as adults age from their 20s to their 40s, their increasing social interactions will increase their self-consciousness. Like the growing child, adults will with age and social experience become more individuated and lose their earlier childlike sense of unity, omnipotence and sense of personal control over the world. Other theorists on the effects of aging have also seen an increase in interiority and individuation, and the growth of disengagement from the environment (Jung, 1933; Lowenthal, Thurner & Chiribaga, 1975; Neugarten, 1976). Age and self-consciousness should increase together and predict similar effects. Persons who are older will be more self-conscious and thereby have more self-responsibility, be more subjective in their moral judgments, more hesitant in making a promise, but better at keeping it. On the other hand, they will be less self-confident. With the

loss of self-confidence they will have less confidence in others and lessened assessments of the possibility of making promises.

Hypotheses II: Age of subjects will vary positively with their scores on the following four variables:

- II.1. Self-responsibility for promise breaking
- II.2. Subjectivity of moral judgment about promising
- II.3. Latency of promise response
- II.4. Promises kept

Age of subjects will vary negatively with their scores on the following three variables:

- II.5. Self-confidence for promise keeping
- II.6. Estimates of others' promise keeping
- II.7. Assessed possibility of promises.

Locus of control. Much research has been done on Rotter's original concept of locus of control (Lefcourt, 1976). In this study the concept of generalized locus of control is differentiated, with self-control seen as a specialized form of locus of control (Reid & Ware, 1973, 1974). The hypotheses for locus of control and the seven dependent variables of the study are opposite to those of self-consciousness and age. Internality of self-control will vary positively with self-confidence for promise keeping, estimates of others' promise keeping and assessed possibility of promises. Internality will vary negatively with self-responsibility for promise breaking, subjectivity

of moral judgment about promising, latency of promise response and promises kept.

The rationale for these hypotheses is based upon the assumption that an internal locus of control is negatively related to self-consciousness. These patterns of prediction relate to a specific aspect of Duval and Wicklund's original theory. The theory claims that self-focused attention produces a "pawn" condition, while attention directed outward produces an "origin" condition, much like Rotter's concept of locus of control (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975). Since attention is dichotomously directed either outward or within to the self, one is always presumably either in an "origin" or "pawn" condition. One condition is experienced when the other is not. Therefore, internality of locus of control should be related to the dependent variables of the study in the opposite way that self-consciousness measures are.

In addition, it is consistent with much other locus of control research that the hypothesized relationships should exist. Those high in internal locus of control should have high self-confidence and so have higher estimates of others' promise keeping or interpersonal trust, as Rotter has called it (Rotter, 1971, 1980). It also makes sense that those experiencing a higher sense of internal control and more confidence should have higher assessments of the possibilities of making promises.

On the other hand, highly confident persons with a higher sense of internal control should blame themselves less, if the paradoxical relationship pointed out by Abramson and Sackeim (1977) hold: that is, the less personal control, the more self-responsibility and self-blame. Those high on internal locus of control should also have less subjectivity of moral judgment since they feel such control over the environment that to keep objective immutable moral laws seems no problem. High scorers on a locus of control measure should also be more confident and less hesitant to make a promise. But they will be less apt to keep promises because they are less likely to self-consciously worry about conforming to external norms. Generally those full of confidence and a sense of control will feel less discrepancy between self and norms, and so make less efforts to reduce discrepancies.

Hypotheses III: Internality of locus of control will vary positively with scores on the three following variables:

- III.1. Self-confidence for promise keeping
- III.2. Estimates of others' promise keeping
- III.3. Assessed possibility of promises

Internality of locus of control will vary negatively with scores on the four following variables:

- III.4. Self-responsibility for promise breaking
- III.5. Subjectivity of moral judgment about promising
- III.6. Latency of promise response
- III.7. Promises kept.

Family embeddedness. This construct of family personnel embeddedness is theoretically defined by Bert Adams (1975). Adams analyzes the various social system characteristics of family systems and theorizes that there is a continuum of personnel embeddedness displayed. At one pole in family systems the extended kin group is the basic social unit of value and the individual qua individual counts for little. At the other extreme end of the continuum the separate and unique individual is the basic unit of value and neither the nuclear family nor the extended kin group is given much weight. In between the poles the nuclear family is valued as the basic unit, and the individual and extended family are subsidiary.

Adams sees a difference among individuals and sub-cultures in the United States on this dimension of family and kin personnel embeddedness. Personnel embeddedness is seen as a multi-faceted construct with many dimensions. In this study embeddedness in the family of origin is the focus of interest. The question investigated is how much adults feel embedded in their original family group as opposed to being individuated, separated or distanced from their kinship group and how this embeddedness relates to the seven dependent variables of the study.

The hypotheses for family embeddedness are the opposite of the predictions for self-consciousness. The hypotheses are that family embeddedness will vary positively with

self-confidence for promise keeping, estimates of others' promise keeping, and assessed possibility of promises.

Family embeddedness will vary negatively with self-responsibility for promise breaking, subjectivity of moral judgment about promising, latency of promise response and promises kept. The rationale for this pattern of predictions is based mainly on the assumption that family embeddedness is negatively related to self-consciousness, and so will have opposite relationships to the dependent variables. However, there is also a relevant aspect of the original formulation of objective awareness theory which applies to these predictions (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975).

When attention is directed outward, or with a "subjective self-awareness," a deindividuated state ensues in which a person is merged or embedded in the group. In the deindividuated state there is little self-reflection or self-criticism so behavior may take place impulsively against individual personal norms and standards. Duval and Wicklund make the connection between their theory and previous deindividuation research. A confident sense of power and control goes along with the unity given by a sense of deindividuation in a group; there is also a loosening of personal responsibility in deindividuation (Zimbardo, 1970). However, self-consciousness or self-focused attention destroys this confident unity with the environment.

Wicklund compares deindividuated confident unity and its destruction by the emergence of individuating self-consciousness to the concepts of egoism and anomie described by Durkheim (Wicklund, 1975). When an individual is embedded in a group identity, he is individuated and confident, but the growth of self-consciousness can produce the self-criticism, depression and individuating loneliness which in extreme cases leads to suicide. Wicklund (1975) describes the process in this way:

Taking a more generalized view of egoism, we arrive at a distinction of self-focused attention vs. outward focused attention. Presumably the person subject to egoism examines himself, becomes aware of his own rules for existence, and evaluates his unique approaches to the world. In contrast, the member of an intense group has no opportunity to reflect upon himself. The constant circulation of common group values forces individual thought processes to deindividuate--or to melt into the commonly shared group thought processes. (p. 272)

The present study assumes that embeddedness in the family of origin kinship system serves as "an intense group" militating against self-consciousness and the effects self-consciousness is supposed to produce. It may be argued that family embeddedness is not a group membership which serves to deindividuate in the same way as extra-family membership groups such as religious, ethnic groups or national groups do. However, the assumption here is that a higher sense of family embeddedness in a kinship network will vary negatively with self-consciousness. Thus, the more a person is embedded in the family kinship system, the more self-confidence, trust of others and higher assessed possibility

of promises will be seen. Such a person will make promises more impulsively. However, the embeddedness in the family group and kinship structure will reduce self-consciousness and judgments of self-responsibility, and the subjectivity of moral judgments. Behaviorally, the more embedded and deindividuated the person, the less time he should take to make a promise, but being less self-conscious and self-critical, the fewer promises he will keep in conformity to the norm.

Fewer promises will be kept because the lessened self-consciousness of the embedded state will not produce the self-criticism and motivation to conform to the norm. The need for reducing discrepancies from a salient norm will be lessened because the less self-conscious person will be less self-aware of such discrepancies. The paradox implied here is that the embedded less self-conscious person who should make more objective externalized realistic judgments of moral obligations will behave more counter-normatively because of less individuation, self-evaluation and self-criticism.

In a similar vein Allport (1955) speaks of the difference in conscience produced by "tribalism" versus "individuation." Allport's idea of tribalism is much like the concept of family embeddedness. Allport, following Bergson, thought tribalism produced a socialization into rigid conventional negative sanctions, but individuation (or self-

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consciousness in this theory) produces the "ought" or push, into individual acts of moral obligation. In a sense Allport's argument about the different effects of tribalism and individuation in conscience formation reflect the hypotheses proposed in this study about self-consciousness and family embeddedness.

Summary

In conclusion, the hypotheses of the study are primarily drawn from the theory and research of objective self-awareness theory, but are supplemented by other theories and research traditions. The major focus of the study is to investigate the correlates of self-consciousness. But age and locus of control, along with family embeddedness, are also independent variables of interest. There is a basic assumption that self-consciousness and age will vary positively together and be negatively related to family embeddedness and internal locus of control. Thus, opposite predictions are made for the relationships of these variables to the seven dependent variables involved in this study of promises and promising.

Chapter II

Method

Overview of Method

Seventy-two women were recruited and given individual appointments. Each was met by the experimenter and given pre-treatment questionnaires assessing private self-consciousness, age, family embeddedness and locus of control. Each participant was then led to another room where she answered a promise questionnaire in either a mirror or no mirror treatment condition. After receiving her pay, she was asked by the experimenter to make a promise to agree to return four postcards over the next three weeks. The time required for the woman to refuse or to make a promise was measured. The postcards contained ratings of memory for the experiment and experimenter and also served as a behavioral measure of promise keeping.

Subjects

The subjects were 72 women--24 in their twenties, 24 in their thirties, and 24 in their forties. The mean age of the women in their twenties was 21.4. The mean age of women in their thirties was 35.5, and the mean age of the women in their forties was 45.6. Women were recruited in and around a private academic institution in a middle class suburb, Fairfield County, Connecticut. Methods of recruitment included advertisements in the local college newspaper, posted announcements on the campus, personal appeal of the researcher and her assistant, and other informal personal

channels provided by some of the women who participated in the study. Often a woman would offer to bring a friend along to participate after she had had her appointment. The standardized request which was printed on posters and in the newspaper, and which was orally presented to each subject was as follows:

A study of values is now in progress. The participation of women in their 20s, 30s and 40s is desired for anonymous self-reports of attitudes and values. It will take less than an hour to answer the questionnaires and \$4.00 will be paid for your time. Call for an appointment.

Subjects were assured that their data were to be kept confidential and be anonymous. No names were used or recorded in any of the procedures.

Women who participated in the study were either enrolled in the university as students or worked on the university staff or were residents of the surrounding community. Almost all the participants had taken some college courses, and some of the women had also had graduate study. More specifically, 8% of the women had only a high school education, 35% of the women had some college, but had not finished college, 25% of the women had finished college and 32% of the women had some graduate school education. With respect to marital status, 35% were single, 40% were married, 21% were separated and divorced and 4% were widowed. Sixty-four percent of the women had children. Present religious affiliation was reported as

follows: 14% reported none, 17% were Protestant, 60% were Roman Catholic, 4% Greek Orthodox and 6% were Jewish.

Assignment to conditions. The 72 women were randomly assigned to either a mirror or a no mirror condition and balanced for age groups in the following manner. Twenty four slips of paper containing either mirror or no mirror markings were placed in a paper bag and were randomly drawn until all 24 of the women in their 20s were assigned either to a mirror or no mirror condition. The procedure was then repeated for the subjects in the 30s and 40s age group.

Experimenter

The assistant employed in the research study was a 24-year-old female graduate student at the university. She served as experimenter and ran all 72 subjects. The experimenter did not know the hypotheses of the study, did not know the contents of the questionnaires and purposefully refrained from making hypotheses about the research. After the research was completed, she had not been able to guess its purpose. However, the experimenter did know that the subjects were asked to make a promise and that the subjects were either in a mirror or no mirror condition; she had to arrange the room appropriately and request the promise either in front of the mirror or in its absence.

The experimenter was trained in the procedures by the researcher and attempted to standardize her instructions and interactions with the subjects. As the subjects were run, the

researcher refrained from commenting on their behavior in the different conditions when communicating with the experimenter. This restraint was an effort to control any researcher induced experimenter demand on the part of the experimenter as she interacted with the subjects (O'Leary and O'Leary, 1976).

Operationalizing Variables

In a study of promises and self-consciousness, the first task was to operationalize the relevant variables.

Self-consciousness. Self-consciousness can be conceptualized as a chronic individual disposition measured by a self-conscious scale (See Appendix A). The self-consciousness scale was developed by Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss (1975) and has been validated and used in self-focused attention research since that time (Carver & Glass, 1976; Carver & Scheier, 1978; Turner, Scheier, Carver & Ickes, 1978).

Three factors have been found in the scale. One is private self-consciousness, one is public self-consciousness and one, social anxiety. The private self-consciousness factor of the scale is seen as tapping chronic dispositions to self-consciousness and predicting effects highly correlated with a mirror condition (Carver & Scheier, 1978). In this study only scores from the private self-consciousness subscale were used.

The self-consciousness items ask persons to rate themselves on such statements as whether they are aware of themselves, and whether they reflect upon and scrutinize themselves. Both self-focused feelings and self-focused cognitions

are rated on a five-point scale from "extremely uncharacteristic" to "extremely characteristic."

Self-consciousness is also conceptualized as a state induced by stimuli in the environment. In prior research various stimuli have been employed to produce self-consciousness, including mirrors, video cameras, photographs, tape recordings of the voice, audience attention, minority status in a group and auditory heartbeat feedback. In the present study a large mirror was used to produce a self-consciousness condition because a mirror, no mirror treatment is a relatively unobtrusive manipulation and has been used most frequently in past research. A mirror in contrast to other manipulations can be incorporated into a non-laboratory setting.

Promise variables. Efforts were made to set up a situation in which a promise could be asked for and given which would have the following characteristics. The promise should be free and voluntary and not part of a business contract. Therefore the request was made after subjects had received their money for participating in the study. Their giving a promise was clearly labeled as such and was explicitly described as being voluntary and extra with no compensation or pay. It was also made clear that no names were being used and so the keeping of the promise would be anonymous. This strategy was employed in order to ensure that the promise would be seen as an internalized moral obligation, involving no external social penalty.

The promise requested should for the sake of representativeness not seem trivial in importance or of overwhelming seriousness. Furthermore, the promise should not be too easy or too difficult to carry out. The promise requested was to send back four postcards over a month's time as part of a research project on memory. The women were asked to rate their memory of the experimental questions and researcher, date the cards and return them. The postcards which were used as a promise keeping measure were self-addressed to the secretary of the psychology division and were identified by a number in the upper left hand corner for the individual subject. The subjects were asked to circle answers to the following two questions:

At the time my recall of most of the questions and of my answers in this study is:

Faded Unclear Clear Vivid Perfectly recalled

At the time my recall of the experimenter is:

Faded Unclear Clear Vivid Perfectly recalled

There was also a section for other comments if the respondents wished to add any; there was a space for the postcard to be dated.

The measure of promises kept was the number of postcards returned by each subject in the study. The possible range was from 0 - 4.

Another behavioral variable of interest was the time taken to give the promise after the promise was requested, that is, a latency of response measure. This measure was

operationalized as the number of seconds between the promise request and a definitive answer. The measure was taken by an experimenter with an unobtrusive digital stopwatch.

Promise self-report variables. A promise questionnaire was constructed for this research. (See Appendix B for questionnaire.) After a review of relevant sources, consultation with philosophers in ethics and extended interviews with subjects, a pool of questions about promises and promising was generated. This questionnaire was given on two occasions, and the responses statistically analyzed. In the final pre-testing, the items which are aggregated to define the various self-report variables of the study were statistically analyzed for homogeneity. Those items which are used within a subscale or to make up a variable such as "subjectivity of moral judgment" are correlated with the total subscale score. Items which did not correlate positively and significantly with the subscale score in the pre-test data were not included in the scale. In this way an attempt was made to insure internal consistency for the following five variables:

Self-responsibility for promise breaking was operationalized as the responses to questions 1 and 3 on the questionnaire. These questions are as follows:

1. When I break a promise I usually hold myself personally responsible to the following extent:
3. If I forget a promise and don't keep it, I usually hold myself personally responsible to the following extent:

The women's answers, measured on a scale from 0 to 100%, were considered to tap their sense of personal responsibility for breaking a promise. If a woman blamed herself for forgetting as well as breaking a remembered promise, this was considered as increased self-responsibility.

Self-confidence for promise-keeping was operationalized as the response to the following question:

2. When I make a promise that is important to me, and I really want to keep it despite the strenuous effort and persistence it's going to take, I'd say the chances of my being able to keep it are:

It was assumed that the higher the scale value chosen (on a scale from 0 to 100%), the higher the self-confidence in promise-keeping.

Estimates of others' promise keeping behavior was operationalized by the answers to questions 4 and 6:

4. When other people make promises that are important to them and they really want to keep them despite the strenuous effort and persistence it's going to take, I'd say their chances of being able to keep them are:
6. How realistic is it for a person to make a promise that is to be fulfilled at some time in the future? For example, how likely do you think it would be that a person keep a promise that is to be fulfilled:
(Circle your answers on all five parts.)

- a. one week hence----Not likely---Even chance---Very likely
- b. one month hence---Not likely---Even chance---Very likely
- c. one year hency----Not likely---Even chance---Very likely
- d. ten years hence---Not likely---Even chance---Very likely
- e. 20 years hence----Not likely---Even chance---Very likely

Here the assumption was that women who estimated higher scale values on a scale of 0 to 100% and longer time periods in the future had higher estimates of others' promise keeping behavior.

Subjectivity of moral judgments about promising was operationalized by scoring a series of answers on the promise questionnaire in which agreement was requested on a scale of 0 to 9. The statements were as follows:

8. One of the most important moral considerations to take into account whenever I make a promise is the absolute moral duty to keep promises.

9. One of the most important moral considerations to take into account whenever I make a promise is the moral worth or seriousness of whatever it is I am promising, i.e., is it right or wrong?

10. A promise once given, even if made through coercion or deception, can never be broken morally.

11. A promise freely given can never be broken morally.

12. A promise freely given can be broken morally only if another equally serious conflicting moral obligation demands it.

13. A promise freely given can be broken morally if important personal plans and intentions have radically changed over time and now conflict with keeping the promise.

14. A promise freely given can be broken morally if any of one's personal plans and intentions have changed over time and now conflict with keeping the promise.

Subjectivity of moral judgment about promising was operationalized as the choosing of answers which give priority to the individual's personal plans, intentions and changes in circumstance rather than to moral duty, moral obligation, moral seriousness, considerations of right and wrong, and immutable rules which apply regardless of individual intentions, changes in personal plans or concerns. In these questions the intent was to tap a person's weighting of the validity of the claims of the individual self versus the claims of impersonal objective rules.

Assessed possibility of promises was operationalized by scoring the answers to questions 15 and 16 on the promise questionnaire. The questions were as follows:

15. Do you think you can make a promise to the following? Check yes or no.

- | | |
|-----------------|--------------------|
| A piece of land | One's self |
| A tree or plant | God |
| A pet | The dead |
| A person | Future generations |
| A group | |

16. Do you think there can be such a thing as a mutual promise between the following? Check yes or no.

Two animals

A person and a pet

Two persons

A person and a group

Two groups

God and a person

God and a group

This variable was of interest since Austin (1962) has maintained that only under certain conditions can a promise count as a promise, that is, one can not make a valid promise to an animal, who can not provide social "uptake." The questions were created to test whether a woman would define a promise in the stringent way some philosophers do, and if not, would the variation be predictable.

In pretesting the responses to the various items in the promise questionnaire were also analyzed to insure that there was an acceptable amount of variation in the distribution of the responses.

The responses and scores on the various items and scales of the promise questionnaire were also correlated with the social desirability measure devised by Crowne and Marlowe (1964). There were not statistically significant correlations between the social desirability measures and the answers on the promise questionnaire with the exception of one variable. The social desirability measure did

correlate negatively and significantly with a measure of moral subjectivity in judgments about promising. This relationship was considered acceptable since the theoretical constructs underlying social desirability measures and moral subjectivity measures should produce the observed pattern of correlation. As McLemore and Benjamin (1979) state the case in their discussion of measurement:

The heart of the issue is whether social desirability represents a contamination, a source of unwanted systematic bias, or whether it is intrinsic to what one is actually intending to measure and therefore ought not to be arbitrarily eliminated. (p. 25)

In this case the correlation was not considered a contamination or a source of unwanted systematic bias but intrinsic to what is actually intended to be measured. With the approval motive, a person's attention is directed to external observers and their approval. The same external direction of attention to objective rules would insure that a measure of social desirability would correlate negatively with a measure of moral subjectivity, which is considered to be a measure of attention paid to internal personal subjective standards as opposed to external standards. Benjamin (1977) has used a social desirability measure as a clinically meaningful defensiveness measure, and much the same reasoning might be posited for the dynamics involved in a high correlation of social desirability with attention directed outward to the rule, versus attention paid to personal subjective concerns. The defensiveness of outlook which produces a high social desirability score

would produce morally objective realistic reasoning about rules. Thus items which did correlate negatively and significantly with social desirability scores were retained in the promise questionnaire measure of moral subjectivity.

Scoring for the promise questionnaire is given in Appendix B.

Age. Age was ascertained by asking the respondent's age on the Personal Background Questionnaire (See Appendix D).

Locus of control. The locus of control measure which was used was that developed by Reid and Ware (1973, 1974) (See Appendix C for scale and scoring). The advantage of this scale over the original Rotter measure is that it recognizes multi-dimensionality and adds a self-control factor. The three factors composing the measure are self-control, social systems control and fatalism. The additional self-control factor is important in this study's prediction that a high perception of internal self-control will result in different verbal and behavioral responses involving promises. A global multi-dimensional locus of control score including all three factors, and scores from the self-control subscale were used in the analysis. The scales were scored so that high scores meant a subject was more internal.

Family embeddedness. A Personal Background Questionnaire including a family embeddedness measure was constructed specifically for this study. (See Appendix D). Questions 1

through 12 are aimed at ascertaining the age of the subject and personal background information such as education of parents, education of subject, religious affiliation, ethnic background, marital status and whether the subject has children. Questions 13 through 25 are designed to be the family embeddedness measure. In pretesting, each of these questions produced an acceptable amount of variation in the answers. Each item was also correlated .34 or higher with the total family embeddedness scale score. In these items certain statements were reversed so that a response bias of acquiescence would be avoided. The item asking about the subject's feelings toward siblings has been omitted from the present analysis since it would bias the results of those who were only children.

Pretest results indicated that the scale for family embeddedness did not correlate significantly with a measure of social desirability. Therefore it is assumed that the approval motive (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964) is not being tapped by the family embeddedness measure.

Testing Situation

In an effort to increase ecological validity, this research was carried out in two cubicles which serve as faculty offices. Thus any possible effects from a laboratory atmosphere were avoided which might affect the generalization of results to other settings. The faculty offices are visually but not auditorily private. However, the hum of conversation in the huge room provides the privacy of

a white noise effect. One office contained a desk, chair and the pre-treatment self-report measures and a bell to call the experimenter when the questionnaires were completed. The second office cubicle contained a desk, chair, another chair, the envelopes containing the promise questionnaire and the information cards along with payment of \$4.00 for the participants. In the second room, however, there was a large mirror leaning against the wall on top of the desk.

The mirror was 30 inches by 42 inches and decorated around the border with decals to make it look as though it were part of the decor of the faculty office. A subject seated at the desk was placed directly in front of the mirror and could not avoid the mirror reflection of her own image which was 30 inches in front of her face. Overhead lighting was bright. In the no mirror condition, the large mirror was covered by a thick printed oriental cloth which looked as though it were a part of the general decor, which included plants and posters on the walls. Other faculty cubicles and offices nearby were decorated in similar ways. Only three subjects commented on the mirror. Two subjects admired the decals, and one subject made a joke asking if the real test was to see if she could stand looking at herself.

The questionnaire sheets for the pretreatment self-report measures looked different from the test booklets

in the treatment room. In both settings there were large envelopes (with an unobtrusive number in one corner) in which subjects were instructed to seal their answer sheets or booklets in the interest of confidentiality. In the treatment room the envelopes also contained \$4.00 in cash and information cards containing instructions for finding out the results of the experiment without having to breach confidentiality. The instruction cards read as follows:

Thank you for your participation in this study. To obtain results of this study, call Mrs. Y, the secretary for the division of psychology, and give your name and address for the list of those wishing results of the values research project. Allow five months for analysis of results.

The subjects were instructed to take their money and the card from the envelope before sealing in their results so that they received their money and information about obtaining results before the experimenter returned to the cubicle.

Other materials used in the study were bells for the subjects to call the experimenter when they had completed the questionnaires and a small unobtrusive stopwatch which was used by the experimenter on her return.

Experimental Procedure

Subjects were met by the experimenter; she was dressed in street clothes rather than a white coat, the better to be seen as an individual person. The experimenter had been trained to try to move and act the same

with all participants as much as was possible. When ascertaining that the person had come for her appointment at the correct time, the experimenter said:

Hello. I'm Betsy and I'm glad you can take part in our research. We want it to be anonymous and confidential so we don't record names, but since age is one of the things we are studying, we need to know if you are one of the participants in your 20s, 30s or 40s. Today you can't guess, so we have to ask. Good. For efficiency's sake we are running the study in two stages, first a background set of questions and then the values questionnaire in another faculty office. For confidentiality's sake we don't want names recorded and to insure no bias in the results, we are not able to tell you the results right away. If you wish a full description of the study and a report of the results, call in later or stop at the desk on your way out and give Mrs. Y. your name and address, and we will send you a full report. Any questions before we begin? O.K. Good. Come this way.

The experimenter then led the person to the first cubicle, which was a faculty office, and indicated that she should sit down at the desk and put her things on the chair. After the person was seated, the experimenter put down on the desk the envelope containing the first set of questions along with a bell and said:

Remember not to give your name and when you finish to seal your answers in the envelope. Please answer all questions as best you can. The results will not be analyzed for quite a while so you can be sure of confidentiality. We want people to feel free to answer frankly. Ring the bell when you are through and don't worry about time. Any questions? Good.

The experimenter then left the subject in the first cubicle and went back to the second cubicle to prepare the mirror or no mirror condition, depending upon the prearranged randomly assigned condition for the women in that particular age group.

When the bell rang the experimenter went back to the first cubicle and pleasantly ushered the participant to the second office which was prepared in either the mirror or no mirror condition. Once the subject had been seated with the questionnaire in front of the person, the experimenter remained standing and said:

Again, don't use your name and try to answer all questions as best you can. And don't worry about time. At the end of the booklet there are instructions about sealing your answers and getting your fee. And again just ring the bell when you are through. Any questions? O.K.

The experimenter left the room, closed the door and waited for the bell to ring to signal that the person was through with the promise questionnaire. She then entered the office and drew up a chair and seated herself next to the participant so that both experimenter and subject were directly in front of the mirror or decorative cloth. She carried in her hand four self-addressed postcards which were numbered with the same number as the subject's envelopes. She also carried an unobtrusive stopwatch. She then said:

Did you get your \$4.00 and the information card and seal your answers? Good. I want you to have your fee to emphasize that you've done your part and fulfilled your agreement. Thank you so much. But I would like to ask you about another research problem involving a person's memory for participating in research like this. We prepared recall measures on postcards (she then showed the postcards) one to be sent tomorrow and one a week for three more weeks. Any day during the week is O.K. as long as it's dated. The postage comes from our grant, but there is no pay for this research. It's extra, volunteer and of course anonymous. As you know, we

are involved in studying values and promises, so I certainly don't want you to feel under any pressure to promise just to please us. You should only commit yourself if you can really do it. Would you promise to send back one tomorrow and one during the next week and the next and the next?

As she finished the question the experimenter punched her stopwatch in order to measure how long it would take for the subject to either promise or refuse. If the subject had started to promise before she finished asking, the experimenter continued her full request and waited for the participant to say yes once more. She did not stare at the subject or try in any way to exert coercive pressure on the person's response. If the subject asked questions, she answered truthfully, pleasantly and noncommittally. When the person agreed or not, the experimenter punched the stopwatch to produce a latency measure of the promise response. Whatever the outcome, she smiled at the subject and said:

O.K. Good. Thank you again for coming in today. Your help is appreciated (Rising). Do you know your way out? Good. I've got to get organized for the next appointment. Thank you again. Good bye.

The experimenter was trained to try to control the interaction so that it would be similar for all participants. The postcards which were displayed on the desk were left for the subject to pick up if she had promised to send them back. The experimenter tried to disengage quickly at the end of the treatment so that there would be an equal amount of time of interaction with all the different

subjects. After the participant left, the experimenter recorded the number and condition of the subject and several behavioral measures. The experimenter recorded the amount of time taken to complete the values questionnaire, the amount of time to respond to the request for a promise, whether the person said "yes" or "no" and the exact words the subject used in this response. The experimenter was also asked to assess the subject's suspiciousness on a scale and to record anything else that happened during the interaction.

As the weeks went by after each subject had been tested, the postcards mailed back to the psychology department were collected and counted in order to obtain a measure of promise keeping.

Chapter III

Results

Descriptive Data

The means and standard deviations for the eleven variables of the study are reported in Table 1. From these data it can be seen that the women on the average rated themselves at a rather high level of self-responsibility for promise breaking. Apparently forgetting a promise is not considered an excuse for not keeping it, since 70% of the women report holding themselves 90% to 100% responsible even if they forget a promise.

The mean for reported self-confidence for promise keeping is also rather high. It is interesting to note that ratings of self-confidence for promise keeping and estimates of other's promise keeping are positively correlated, ($r = .26$, $p < .03$). Judgments of confidence about self and others are, on the whole, similar, as the prior assumptions and rationale for the hypotheses of the study assumed. As might be expected, extending the period of time into the future lowers estimates of promise keeping. While none of the women report it "not likely" that a person would keep a promise for a week, neither did any woman think it "very likely" that a person would keep a promise ten or twenty years hence. The item assessing the chances of promise keeping for a year produced 31% answering

Table 1

Means and Standard Deviations of Variables

Variable	n	Possible Range of Scores	Mean	SD
Private self-consciousness	72	0-40	24.12	6.349
Self-responsibility for promise breaking	72	0-20	17.17	3.611
Self-confidence for promise keeping	72	0-10	8.94	1.491
Estimates of others' prom- ise keeping	71	0-20	12.52	2.311
Subjectivity of moral judgment about promising	72	0-63	29.92	8.307
Assessed possibility of promises	72	0-16	10.58	2.577
Latency of promise response (in seconds)	72	0-99	13.17	19.396
Promises kept if made	71	0-4	3.24	1.336
Family embeddedness	71	0-91	53.30	11.731
Locus of control (global)	72	0-32	17.00	5.208
Self-control	72	0-8	3.58	2.040

"not likely," 62% answering "even chance," and only 7% "very likely." In this sample the general estimates of the likelihood of keeping a promise for a time period of 10 years or more are not high, and only a third of the women think it likely that a promise would be kept in a year's time.

An analysis of the items making up the variable "subjectivity of moral judgments about promises" reveals that half or 50% of the women agree to some extent with the proposition that, "A promise once given, even if made through coercion or deception can never be broken morally." The voluntary intentional characteristics necessary in a promise are denied by these women's answers. At the other end of the spectrum, there is a denial of the binding obligation of a promise in the 17% of women who agreed completely with the statement that, "A promise can be broken morally if any of one's personal plans and intentions have changed over time and now conflict with keeping the promise."

As for the behavioral variables of latency of promise response and promises kept, it may be somewhat surprising that 71 out of 72 women promised to send back four postcards over a month, and that the mean number of postcards returned was 3.24. Sixty-nine percent of the women sent back all four postcards. Thus, correlations for this measure were affected by the lack of variation in the distribution of responses. Although so many women promised and kept their promises, there was a great deal of variation

in the distribution of seconds taken to agree to the promise.

A more detailed analysis of the variable "assessed possibility of promises" was also of interest. Although Austin (1962) had claimed that persons cannot make a valid promise without receiving human social "uptake," many of these women reported that they could make such promises and that such promises could exist. The percentages of agreement are given in Table 2 and Table 3. The fact that half the women thought they could make promises to a pet or to future generations : may be as surprising as that 24% think there could be a mutual promise between two animals, or that 42% think that there could be a mutual promise between a person and a pet.

Intercorrelations Among Self-consciousness,

Age, Locus of Control and Family Embeddedness

The secondary hypotheses of the study were derived on the basis of certain assumed interrelationships among the independent variables of self-consciousness, age, locus of control and family embeddedness. The intercorrelations among these variables are given in Table 4 with private self-consciousness and locus of control measured both globally and by the self-control scale.

The pattern of results reveals that self-consciousness and self-control are negatively correlated as the original theory of Duval and Wicklund assumed. Self-consciousness and family embeddedness are also negatively correlated as they should be according to the theoretical constructs of both

Table 2

Percentage of 72 Women Agreeing to the Possibility
of Different Individual Promises

Question	Promise	n	Percent Answering Yes
Do you think you can make a promise to the following?	A piece of land	14	19.4
	A tree or plant	22	30.6
	A pet	36	50.0
	A person	72	100.0
	A group	65	90.3
	One's self	69	95.8
	God	61	84.7
	The dead	29	40.3
	Future generations	36	50.0

Table 3

Percentage of 72 Women Agreeing to the Possibility
of Different Mutual Promises

Question	Promise	n	Percent Answering Yes
Do you think there can be such a thing as a mutual promise between the following?	Two animals	17	23.6
	A person and a pet	30	41.7
	Two persons	72	100.0
	A person and a group	67	93.1
	Two groups	66	91.7
	God and a person	58	80.6
	God and a group	48	66.7

Table 4

Intercorrelations Among Private Self-Consciousness,
Age, Family Embeddedness, Locus of Control
and Self-Control

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
1. Private self-consciousness	1.00	-.188 (.12)	-.201 (.10)	-.143 (.23)	-.208 (.08)
2. Age		1.00	-.214 (.07)	.353 (.002)	.264 (.03)
3. Family embeddedness			1.00	.027 (.82)	.025 (.84)
4. Locus of control				1.00	.652 (.002)
5. Self-control					1.00

Note: two-tailed p values are given in parentheses

variables. However, while age is negatively related to family embeddedness as it was assumed it would be, it is also negatively related to self-consciousness. The basic assumption of a positive correlation between age and self-consciousness was mistaken. Age and both locus of control measures are significantly and positively correlated in the opposite direction than was assumed. These findings will be considered in the discussion chapter.

When considering the correlation between private self-consciousness and family embeddedness in a more detailed analysis of the items, one finds an interesting result: The highest negative correlation of self-consciousness was with the item rating present feelings towards one's mother. The correlation was $-.29$, $p < .01$. There was a similar relationship between the ratings of self-consciousness and how much the woman had modeled herself on her mother's example ($r = .24$, $p < .04$.) These relationships suggest that for women the relationship with the mother is related to private self-consciousness.

Tests of Hypotheses

Self-consciousness

Two different methods were employed to test hypotheses about the relationship between self-consciousness and promise making and promise keeping. One method involved the comparison of mirror versus no mirror conditions (Hypotheses I.A); the other made use of self-reported differences on a measure of private self-consciousness (Hypotheses I.B).

Mirror vs. no mirror. On the assumption that a mirror condition would increase self-focused attention, a series of hypotheses was derived. As compared with subjects in the no mirror condition, subjects in the mirror condition were expected to have higher scores on four dependent variables (Hypotheses I.A.1 to I.A.4) and lower scores on three dependent variables (I.A.5 to I.A.7). A comparison of the means of the two groups for these variables is reported in Table 5. It is evident that none of the differences is statistically significant.

These results revealing no effects of the mirror vs. no mirror condition were not attributable to any pre-existing differences between the two groups with respect to the independent variables of the study. Pretreatment measures were taken of age, locus of control, family embeddedness and private self-consciousness and a one-way analysis of variance revealed no difference between the mirror and no mirror groups on any of these measures.

Two by three analyses of variance comparing mirror, no mirror groups and the three age groups were performed for each of the seven dependent variables. No main effects for age or mirror were found for any of the dependent variables. In only one of the seven analyses was the interaction term significant. The results for this analysis, with the dependent variable "subjectivity of moral judgment about promising" are presented in Table 6. For subjectivity scores the age by mirror interaction is significant ($p < .04$).

Table 5

A Comparison of the Means of the Mirror vs. No Mirror Groups
for Seven Dependent Variables

Hypo- the- sis	Variable	Mirror Group		No Mirror Group		F*	p**
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD		
IA.1	Self-responsi- bility for promise breaking	17.00	4.049	17.33	3.098	.152	n.s.
IA.2	Subjectivity of moral judgment about promising	29.47	7.766	30.36	8.903	.204	n.s.
IA.3	Latency of promise response	15.72	21.713	10.61	16.681	1.254	n.s.
IA.4	Promises kept	3.28	1.301	3.20	1.389	.059	n.s.
IA.5	Self-confi- dence for promise keeping	9.05	1.308	8.83	1.665	.397	n.s.
IA.6	Estimates of others' promise keeping	12.85	2.378	12.19	2.227	1.470	n.s.
IA.7	Assessed possibility of promises	10.14	2.609	11.03	2.501	2.177	.07

*
df = 1/70

**
one-tailed tests

The meaning of this interaction may be seen in the pattern of means reported in Table 6. It appears that the effect of the mirror condition relative to the no mirror condition is to decrease subjectivity for the twenty and thirty year olds and to increase subjectivity for the forty year olds. This result was not predicted and is not readily interpretable in terms of the theory on which the hypotheses were based. Possible reasons for the failure of the mirror condition to produce any hypothesized effects will be considered in the discussion chapter.

Private self-consciousness. Hypotheses I.B predicted that subjects' scores on the private self-consciousness scale would vary positively with their scores on four variables and negatively with the three other dependent variables of the study. The hypotheses were tested by calculating product moment correlations with one-tailed tests of significance between private self-consciousness scale scores and the seven dependent variables. The results are as shown in Table 7. Two of the seven hypotheses are supported with statistically significant correlations, and the probabilities for three others were less than .10.

Hypotheses I.B.2 was supported by a positive and significant correlation between self-consciousness and subjectivity of moral judgment about promising. Women's self-reports of

1

One-tailed tests were used because in each case the hypotheses predicted correlation results in a specific direction. (Cf. McNemar, 1969, p. 64.)

Table 6

Mean Subjectivity of Moral Judgment About Promising
By Age and Mirror vs. No Mirror Groups

Age Group	No Mirror			Mirror			Total		
	n	Mean	SD	n	Mean	SD	n	Mean	SD
20	12	31.83	9.21	12	29.08	7.89	24	30.46	8.51
30	12	33.92	5.09	12	28.58	6.71	24	31.25	6.43
40	12	24.75	9.32	12	30.75	9.05	24	27.75	9.49
Total	36	30.17	28.90	36	29.47	7.77	72	29.92	8.31

Analysis of Variance

Source	df	SS	F	p
Mirror (A)	1	14.22	.22	.64
Age (B)	2	172.00	1.33	.27
A X B	2	439.11	3.39	.04

Table 7
Correlations of Private Self-Consciousness Scores
With the Seven Dependent Variables

Hypothesis	Variable	n	r	r (age-partialled out)
I.B.1	Self-responsibility for promise breaking	72	.025	.057
I.B.2	Subjectivity of moral judgment about promising	72	.228**	.220**
I.B.3	Latency of promise Response	72	.188*	.226**
I.B.4	Promises kept	71	.172*	.207**
I.B.5	Self-confidence for promise keeping	72	-.260**	-.254**
I.B.6	Estimates of others' promise keeping	71	-.194*	-.178*
I.B.7	Assessed possibility of promises	72	.041	.045

*
p < .10 one-tailed

**
p < .05 one-tailed

attention focused on the self were positively and significantly correlated with reported moral judgments of promise making and promise breaking ($p < .05$, one-tailed). Hypotheses I.B.5 was supported in that the predicted negative relationship of self-consciousness to self-confidence for promise keeping is found. The women high in self-consciousness were low in reporting self-confidence in their abilities to keep a promise ($p < .05$, one-tailed). The predicted relationship of self-consciousness and estimates of other's promise keeping (I.B.6) was also negative as expected, but did not attain statistical significance ($p < .06$, one-tailed).

The test of Hypothesis I.B.3 shows that highly self-conscious women tend to hesitate more before making a promise ($r = .19$, $p < .10$, one-tailed). As Table 7 shows, when age is partialled out, the correlation is increased ($r = .25$, $p < .05$, one-tailed). The test of Hypothesis I.B.4 gives a correlation of .17 ($p < .10$, one-tailed) between private self-consciousness and postcards returned. When age is partialled out, this correlation is increased to .21 ($p < .05$, one-tailed).

The predicted relationship between self-consciousness and self-responsibility for promise breaking (I.B.1) was not obtained, nor was the predicted relationship between self-consciousness and assessed possibility of promises (I.B.7).

Secondary Hypotheses for Age, Locus of Control and Family Embeddedness

Age

Hypotheses II predicted that the age of subjects would

vary positively with the scores of four of the dependent variables of the study (II.1 to II.4) and negatively with the scores of three of the dependent variables of the study (II.5 to II.7). The hypotheses were tested by means of correlations between age and the scores of the seven dependent variables. The results are given in Table 8. None of these results is significant.

Locus of Control

Hypotheses III predicted that locus of control scores would vary positively with three of the dependent variables (III.1 to III.3) and negatively with four of the dependent variables (III.4 to III.7). The locus of control measures were scored so that higher scores indicated internal control. The global locus of control measure was obtained as well as the subscore for self-control. The results are given in Table 9.

Of these hypotheses only III.2 or the predicted positive relationship between locus of control and estimates of others' promise keeping attains statistical significance. In addition, the negative relationship between self-control and subjectivity of moral judgment is in the predicted direction, although it did not attain statistical significance ($r = -.18$, $p < .08$, one-tailed). It should be noted that the result for latency of promise response (III.6) is clearly in the opposite direction than predicted for self-control.

Family Embeddedness

Hypotheses for family embeddedness predicted that

Table 8

Correlations Between Age and the Seven Dependent Variables

Variable	n	r*
II.1 Self-responsibility for promise breaking	72	.164
II.2 Subjectivity of moral judgment about promising	72	-.069
II.3 Latency of promise response	72	.166
II.4 Promises kept	71	.152
II.5 Self-confidence for promise keeping	72	.056
II.6 Estimates of others' promise keeping	71	.121
II.7 Assessed possibility of promises	72	.016

*

None of these correlations is statistically significant

Table 9

Correlations of Locus of Control and Self-Control Scores
With the Seven Dependent Variables

Variable		n	Locus of Control r	Self- Control r
III.1	Self-confidence for promise keeping	72	.033	.076
III.2	Estimates of others' promise keeping	71	.491**	.366**
III.3	Assessed possibility of promises	72	-.007	-.108
III.4	Self-responsibility for promise breaking	72	.093	.130
III.5	Subjectivity of moral judgment about promising	72	-.099	-.176*
III.6	Latency of promise response	72	.086	.236
III.7	Promises kept	71	.013	.011

* $p < .10$ one-tailed test

** $p < .001$ one-tailed test

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scores of subjects on the family embeddedness measure would vary positively with scores on three dependent variables of the study (IV.1 to IV.3) and negatively with four variables of the study (IV.4 to IV.7).

The results are as shown in Table 10.

Table 10
Correlations Between Family Embeddedness Scores
and the Seven Dependent Variables

	Variable	n	r
IV.1	Self-confidence for promise keeping	72	.090
IV.2	Estimates of others' promise keeping	71	.096
IV.3	Assessed possibility of promises	72	.154*
IV.4	Self-responsibility for promise breaking	72	-.042
IV.5	Subjectivity of moral judgment about promising	72	-.101
IV.6	Latency of promise response	72	-.027
IV.7	Promises kept	71	.170

*
p < .10 one-tailed test

All of these correlations are in the predicted direction with the exception of IV.7. However, none is statistically significant.

Chapter IV

Discussion

The purpose of this research was to investigate the domain of promises and to relate it to varying levels of self-consciousness or self-focused attention. Other independent variables of secondary interest were age, locus of control and family embeddedness.

Some of the information obtained from the promise questionnaire is of interest. For example, some adult women consider a promise made through deception or coercion obligatory and thus do not require a voluntary intentional component in a promise. In addition, promises which are forgotten are generally considered the person's responsibility. A person can hold herself responsible for material that is not in consciousness. A moral realism seems to exist in some adults which Piaget and others would expect to be outgrown in the course of social and cognitive development. Similarly, the fact that some adult women report it possible to make a promise to a piece of land, a tree, a pet, to God, the dead and future generations suggests the existence of an autistic unilateral conception of a promise. While Webster's dictionary and philosophers may insist on social "uptake" and mutuality for a promise to exist, many women do not. Possible participants in an individual's promise behavior can be less than human, and past and future generations. Thus ordinary women disagree with "ordinary

language" philosophers. The moral universe of many adults may be much less rational than is usually postulated.

It was also of interest to see the high rate of promise making (71 out of 72 women) and promise keeping (69% of the women sent back all of the postcards). Experimenter demand and social pressure may account for the giving of the promise, but since the promise keeping was anonymous, the force of an incurred moral obligation may be counted as a factor. A question arises as to whether this perhaps was a particularly moral sample of subjects? Would the results be the same for another subject pool, for instance, a similar group of males, or a less middle-class sample?

In future research perhaps different types of subjects could be found, or a subject pool with more variability. In addition, perhaps the promise asked for could be more difficult, or a more naturalistic field setting could be devised or discovered, which would produce more variation in the responses. Of course, it may be the case that people simply keep their promises more than pessimists might imagine.

Self-consciousness Related to Promises

The hypotheses that self-consciousness as an organismic variable will be related to promises are given partial support by the results of this study. Subjects who report themselves as highly self-conscious are more likely to make

subjective moral judgments about promise making and promise breaking, and to have less confidence in their promise keeping ability and tend to have less confidence in the promise keeping ability of others. Furthermore, the highly self-conscious subjects tend to take longer to make a promise, ($p < .06$, one-tailed) but are as equally or more likely to keep it ($p < .08$, one-tailed).

The findings about subjectivity of moral judgments about promises are consistent with the reasoning that attention habitually focused upon the self will correlate positively with giving weight to personal claims in moral judgments. Those high in self-consciousness will more likely think that promises can be broken when personal plans change. They will be less likely to weight the claims of duty, the moral worth of a promise, or to say that a promise can never be morally broken. Greater attention to the self seems to go with lessened attention to rules that are objective, immutable and transcend personal individual concerns. Self-consciousness seems to be associated with a more flexible consequentialist approach to moral judgments.

The finding that highly self-conscious persons will be less confident about their abilities to keep promises and tend to doubt the promise keeping of others seems consistent with their subjectivity of moral judgment. After all, if human promise keeping abilities are considered

limited, then personal plans and changes are more likely to be considered valid grounds for breaking promises.

When conscious of human frailties, one will have fewer expectations that immutable principles can or should be followed. If the self-conscious are more aware of their own and others' limitations, the original theory of Duval and Wicklund (1972) seems to be supported. Self-focused attention does produce a "pawn" condition in which confidence and personal control are lessened and discrepancies from ideal norms are salient.

The lack of self-confidence and the greater self-criticism of the highly self-conscious person should also affect her speed in giving a promise. In this study the more self-conscious persons tended to take longer to give a promise ($p < .06$). Although this result did not attain statistical significance, it might be noted that this trend seems consistent with the "reluctance to proceed with the task" predicted in the original theory of Duval and Wicklund (1972) for persons with self-focused attention. Yet this self-critical approach with attention focused upon the self and discrepancies from the norm may predispose a person to fulfill the obligation once it is undertaken. From the data of the present study (postcard returning) there is a tendency for self-consciousness and promise keeping to be related.

In view of the borderline nature of these findings, future research with improved measures might be worth doing. The procedures used for measuring latency responses could be improved upon. The measure employed in the present study was a fairly crude one. Often the problem arose of people interrupting the experimenter's request for the promise, with an early assent or a question. She continued on with her request and then measured the time in seconds for the subject to make a reply. In this situation, errors of measurement were probably inevitable. Perhaps using a video tape or some other recording device could improve the objectivity and accuracy of measurement.

Contrary to the hypothesis, there was no significant positive relationship between self-consciousness and self-responsibility for promise breaking. The hypothesis that self-consciousness should produce a greater amount of self-attribution of responsibility was based upon relationships found in previous research (Buss & Scheier, 1976; Duval & Wicklund, 1973). A reappraisal of the way the questions were worded provided a possible explanation of the negative results obtained in the present study. The questions as stated are ambiguous, that is, "When I break a promise, I usually hold myself personally responsible to the following extent," and "If I forget a promise and don't keep it, I usually hold myself personally responsible to the following extent." The question was meant to tap

the amount of personal responsibility assigned to the self for breaking and forgetting a promise. However, the question can be read as asking whether the person usually holds herself responsible, not whether she is responsible. Thus a self-critical person could answer that she really doesn't hold herself responsible though she is responsible and should do so. In further research this statement should be reworded to ask for personal responsibility directly, and results might support the original hypothesis.

On the other hand, the prediction that self-consciousness would correlate negatively with assessed possibility of promises seems to have been based upon wrong reasoning. Instead of a negative correlation, there is a slight positive correlation. An examination of the individual items included in the variable of assessed possibility of promises reveals an inconsistent pattern. Self-consciousness is positively correlated ($r = .19$) with an affirmative answer to whether one can make a promise to a pet, but there is a negative correlation ($r = -.33$) with the item affirming the possibility of making a promise to God. It seems that with the exception of promises to God, highly self-conscious persons are more likely to think promises can be made without the social "uptake" of another person's response. Self-focused attention may make a person more sensitive to the possibility of a personal one-sided promise, not requiring the social acknowledgment of another. More

support for such a person's lesser need for social acknowledgment arises in the fact that self-consciousness was positively and significantly correlated ($r = .27$ $p < .02$) with affirmative answers to the question "A real promise can be given by explicit words, by some signals, but also by some habitual acts and behavior without words or specific symbols. If a person, for instance, should act like a prospective marriage partner, but never say anything or give a signal, he or she can still be said to have made a promise." A person's habitual behavior without explicit social signals is seen as sufficient to make a promise. A sensitivity to, and focus on one's own behavior is enough. These results would be consistent with previous research indicating that self-conscious persons are more sensitive to their own emotions.

The failure of the mirror to produce an effect. Why didn't the mirror produce an effect when similar hypotheses for self-consciousness were supported by correlations with the self-consciousness scale? One possibility of course could be that the scale does not tap the self-consciousness that the mirror condition supposedly produces, despite the validation study of Carver and Scheier (1978). However, if the construct of self-consciousness is different when measured by the scale, rather than when produced by a mirror, it is strange that certain predictions derived from the original theory should be confirmed. The original theory

of Duval and Wicklund was based upon experimental manipulations of environmental stimuli and did not involve the scale which was developed later by Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss in 1975.

Another possibility might be that the mirror in this experiment was somehow different than mirrors used in past experimentation. Could the fact that the mirror was decorated around the edge and incorporated into the decor of a faculty office keep it from producing an effect? This seems unlikely since the mirror was so large and close to the subjects that it could hardly be neutralized. Also, other experimenters using mirror manipulations in past research had made efforts to incorporate them unobtrusively and naturally into the experimental situation.

One possible explanation for the lack of effect from the mirror might be that the subjects simply did not look at the mirror. It is conceivable, if not probable, that subjects focused their attention solely on the task of answering the values questionnaire. Most previous self-focused attention research using mirrors has not measured time spent gazing in the mirror, but has inferred from the research findings, that the unavoidable presence of a large mirror is sufficient to guarantee the induction of self-consciousness (Carver & Blaney, Scheier, 1979; Carver & Scheier, 1978; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Geller & Scheier, 1976; Gibbons, 1978; Wicklund, 1975).

In an effort to deal with the difficulty of controlling a subject's attention to his self-image, one experiment explicitly directed the subject's attention to the mirror and informed him that the mirror was part of the experiment (Carver, Blaney & Scheier, 1979). Other experiments have tried to control and ensure self-consciousness by coupling the mirror with either a video image, or with the presence and attention of an experimenter who could be viewed in the mirror (Brockner, 1979a; Brockner, 1979b). One ingenious solution to the problem of controlling gaze behavior was the construction of a slide viewing projector which could have a subject's mirror image projected between viewing of the slides being used in the experiment (Neumann, Carver & Scheier, 1977; Scheier, Carver & Gibbons, 1979).

In a study of promising however, elaborate laboratory equipment and procedures would certainly take away the advantage gained from using a more natural field setting. For future research perhaps the best solution might be unobtrusive observation and measurement of the direction of attention. This unobtrusive observation was employed in a field study of children with a mirror manipulation, although an attention or gaze measure was not taken (Beaman & Klentz, Diener, & Sranum, 1979). Perhaps a mirror combined with the attention of an experimenter who is also unobtrusively measuring gaze behavior would be the best solution. This self-consciousness manipulation could preserve both

the naturalness of a mirror in a field setting as well as add the attention of an observer to strengthen self-consciousness, and provide a measurement of time spent looking in the mirror.

A more sensitive measure of promise keeping might also be employed. For example, the measurement of the postcard returns could be improved by dating the returned postcards. With dates of return clearly specified, one could see whether the first returns displayed an effect of the mirror treatment which dropped off in time.

But another question can also be asked: Was there perhaps something different about this group of subjects? Could the fact that this sample involved senior class college students and women in their 30's and 40's neutralize the mirror effect found previously in research with younger college students? It is conceivable that in contrast to the college sophomore, older women are adapted to their mirror image and are too inured to have a mirror produce self-consciousness. If this is so, either studying only college students, or substituting a video tape experimental condition for the mirror, might, through novelty, produce self-consciousness effects.

It may also be the case that answering the self-oriented questionnaires before the treatment condition aroused so much self-consciousness in all the subjects that no further effects could be induced by the mirror. Adaptation

may have already occurred by the time of the treatment. One way the problem could be handled would be to provide a control group who could answer questionnaires on neutral subjects rather than self-ratings.

Finally a more provocative explanation may be that in this experiment women were being asked about their own moral judgments and were requested to undertake a real life moral obligation. Such personal assessments and behavior overtly labeled as in the domain of morality and values, may be behavior that is too stable an individual difference to be susceptible to a brief situational stimuli. Whatever the effects of the mirror, they could not compete with the habitual thought and behavior patterns of a lifetime. On the other hand, a scale tapping chronic habitual dispositions of self-consciousness will discriminate among individuals and allow predictions. There has been recent support for the stability of individual differences (Epstein, 1979).

Implications for self-consciousness theory. Methodological weaknesses in this present study keep one from concluding that self-consciousness theory does not have predictive power when depending upon environmental stimuli. Yet it may be the case that the original theory with its emphasis upon environmental stimuli and situational determinants of self-consciousness needs refinement. Carver has attempted a revision and refinement of self-consciousness

theory emphasizing an expectancy component (Carver, 1979). Another approach has been the attempt of Taylor and Fiske (1978) to subsume self-focused attention research into their general theory of a psychology of salience. They contend that self-consciousness effects are no more than a specific instance of salience effects. Other theorists such as Hull and Levy (1979) have insisted that a radically alternative approach must be taken into self-consciousness theory. In any event after stimulating so much research over the last eight years, it is clear that self-consciousness theory is now in a stage of change and development.

Secondary Findings for Age, Locus of Control and Family Embeddedness

Age. None of the hypotheses for age and the dependent variables of the study were supported. This was not surprising once it became apparent that the assumption underlying the predictions were wrong. Age was not positively correlated with private self-consciousness, but was instead negatively correlated ($r = -.19$). Also contrary to previous assumptions, age was positively correlated with both locus of control measures. That is, older women were significantly more internal. (See Table 4.) Thus none of the reasoning that went into the predicted relationships for age is pertinent.

Why was the prior assumption so off the mark? On further reflection it seems that the self-consciousness,

individuation, disengagement and lessened sense of control assumed for an aging individual may not yet begin for women in their relatively young 30's and 40's. In addition, the women in their 30's and 40's almost all had children and were still involved in group and family life. The women in their 20's were almost all unmarried, childless and graduating from college, a time of heightened self-consciousness and self-examination, especially since immediate career choices had to be made.

The fact that age was negatively and significantly correlated with family embeddedness was consistent with the basic assumptions of growing individuation accompanying age. However, the family embeddedness measure was oriented to the family of origin rather than the family of procreation, and one could not tell whether the older women were also less embedded in their family of procreation.

Thus this study did not reveal any relationship of age to promise making or promise keeping or moral judgments and assessments about the same; but the study did produce some suggestive findings about the relationship between age and the other independent variables. In this sample age is negatively correlated with self-consciousness and family embeddedness and positively correlated with internal locus of control. Further research might investigate whether these findings represent a developmental pattern or are chance occurrences in this particular sample.

Locus of control. The only hypothesis clearly supported

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for locus of control was the predicted positive relationship of internal locus of control with estimates of others' promise keeping. (See Table 9.) This result is consistent with the work of Rotter on interpersonal trust (1971). It makes sense that those who feel they have personal control of themselves and the environment should also trust that others will possess enough control to be counted on to keep promises. But it is odd that the high scorers on locus of control scales did not rate their confidence in their own promise keeping abilities higher. The correlation was positive, but did not reach statistical significance.

Although the predicted negative correlation between self-control and subjectivity of moral judgment did not attain statistical significance ($\underline{r} = -.17$, $p < .08$, one-tailed), it is suggestive. Those who report feeling highly in control of themselves may not feel the necessity to weight personal concerns and changes when considering promise breaking, but instead endorse the claims of duty and the immutable rules.

The high estimates of others' promise keeping ability and a possible tendency to objective moral judgments may arise because those high in a sense of internal self-control are low in private self-consciousness scores ($\underline{r} = -.21$). Thus as the prior theoretical assumptions would hold, attention directed away from the self tends to produce a sense of personal control, confidence, more

attention to the external rule, and lessened self-criticism. At the very least, the negative correlation between self-consciousness and self-control gives support to the original formulation of the theory of Duval and Wicklund which assumed this very relationship.

The other hypotheses concerning locus of control were not supported however. The paradoxical relationship of low control and high self-blame (Abramson and Sackeim, 1977) was not found, perhaps because the wording of the questions dealing with self-responsibility was ambiguous. There was no relationship between locus of control and assessed possibility of promises or promises kept. As for the relationship of latency of promise response and self-control, there was a positive rather than a negative correlation, ($r = .24$). Instead of rushing self-confidently into the promise, the highly self-controlled took longer to assent. This carefulness was also shown in the fact that they took longer to fill out the values questionnaire in the experimental condition ($r = .30$, $p < .01$). In other words, those high in self-control did not always act in opposite ways from those high in self-consciousness. They more often acted in accordance with other research findings about the carefulness of highly internal persons (Lefcourt, 1976).

In sum, the reasoning that locus of control would be related to promises is only partially supported by this study. Further research could explore this relationship

more fully; for instance, would those high in internal locus of control be more severe as they judge others who broke promises?

Family embeddedness. Although six out of seven correlations were in the expected direction, none of the hypotheses for family embeddedness were supported by the results of this study. (See Table 10.) In fact, the correlation with promises kept was positive ($r = .17$). This last finding goes against the rationale for the hypotheses for family embeddedness. One is left with the puzzling result that self-consciousness and family embeddedness are both positively correlated to approximately the same extent with promises kept, but they are negatively correlated with each other. Is this a meaningless chance occurrence, or is this an indication that two different sources of moral obligation (Allport, 1955; Hoffman & Saltzstein, 1967) are both operating to produce conformity to the moral norm? Further research could attempt to disentangle these conflicting interpretations.

Perhaps the most interesting result concerning family embeddedness is its negative relationship to private self-consciousness, just as the original Duval and Wicklund theory would assume. Those women who did not relate to their original family group, and especially to their mother, with feelings of affection and admiration were also those who reported themselves most self-conscious.

If, as Wicklund (1975) speculates, self consciousness is the same as the egoism of Durkheim, then the family kinship group is one of those groups militating against egoism. The woman embedded in her kinship network and family of origin does not tend to extensive self-reflection or self-scrutiny which may produce a sense of self-criticism, powerlessness, and lack of personal control. While the variable of family embeddedness may not relate to the domain of promises, there are interesting relationships with the construct of self-consciousness.

The secondary findings with the exception of the correlation between locus of control and confidence in others, did not contribute much to a study of the relationship of self-consciousness and promises. However, the interrelationships among the secondary independent variables do provide some support for the original theory of Duval and Wicklund. Self-focused attention does seem to produce a "pawn" condition and to be uncharacteristic of a person integrated in a group.

Implications of Findings

In such an exploratory study, it would be rash to conclude that there could be any clear practical implications of these findings. It might be safe to say that ordinary women and philosophers do not agree in their analyses of promises. Or to be more daring, one might say that the woman who is highly self-conscious will have little self-confidence in herself or others' ability to keep promises

and may tend to take longer to make a promise. She will also be more likely to condone the breaking of promises in general while not being any less likely to keep a specific promise, and in fact, perhaps more likely to do so. Also it might be safe to say that those with a high sense of internal control will more likely expect others to keep their promises, though they themselves may not do so any better than others. The only dubious moral that might be drawn from these findings is, when in doubt, depend upon the more doubtful.

Some implications for moral education might also be seen. This study gives some support to the idea that the focus of attention upon the self may have effects in the domain of morality. Certain studies of parental discipline techniques by Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) have found that different parental induction techniques in discipline have produced different moral orientations. Whether attention was directed toward parents or peers made a difference in producing either a "conventional" or "humanistic" moral orientation. It may well be the case that inducing self-consciousness in a developing young person will also produce a subjective moral orientation, with corresponding behaviors. Whether one wished to encourage such an orientation would of course depend upon a prior value decision about which moral orientations should be encouraged as preferable.

Summary and Conclusion

The major value of this research is in having done two things. First, the psychological exploration of the domain of promises is of interest. Heretofore, the huge amount of philosophical, legal and religious reflection devoted to promises and promising has not been empirically based, to say the least.

Secondly, the reasoning that self-consciousness and morality would be related was partially supported by the research findings. The relatively new theory and recent body of research concerning self-consciousness or self-focused attention has been extended into the explicitly moral domain of promises.

Appendix A

Self-consciousness Scale and Scoring Instructions

Please check the answer that best describes you. 0 means "Extremely uncharacteristic" and 4 means "Extremely characteristic."

P 1. I'm always trying to figure myself out.

Extremely Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Extremely Characteristic
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* 2. I'm concerned about my style of doing things.

Extremely Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Extremely Characteristic
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PR 3. Generally, I'm not very aware of myself.

Extremely Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Extremely Characteristic
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* 4. It takes me time to overcome my shyness in new situations.

Extremely Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Extremely Characteristic
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P 5. I reflect about myself a lot.

Extremely Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Extremely Characteristic
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* 6. I'm concerned about the way I present myself.

Extremely Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Extremely Characteristic
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P 7. I'm often the subject of my own fantasies.

Extremely Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Extremely Characteristic
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* 8. I have trouble working when someone is watching me.

Extremely Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Extremely Characteristic
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PR 9. I never scrutinize myself.

Extremely Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Extremely Characteristic
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* 10. I get embarrassed very easily.

Extremely Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Extremely Characteristic
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* 11. I'm self-conscious about the way I look.

Extremely Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Extremely Characteristic
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* 12. I don't find it hard to talk to strangers.

Extremely Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Extremely Characteristic
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P 13. I'm generally attentive to my inner feelings.

Extremely Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Extremely Characteristic
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* 14. I usually worry about making a good impression.

Extremely Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Extremely Characteristic
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P 15. I'm constantly examining my motives.

Extremely Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Extremely Characteristic
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* 16. I feel anxious when I speak in front of a group.

Extremely Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Extremely Characteristic
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* 17. One of the last things I do before I leave my house is look in the mirror.

Extremely Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Extremely Characteristic
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P 18. I sometimes have the feeling that I'm off somewhere watching myself.

Extremely Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Extremely Characteristic
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* 19. I'm concerned about what other people think of me.

Extremely						Extremely
Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Characteristic

P 20. I'm alert to changes in my mood.

Extremely						Extremely
Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Characteristic

* 21. I'm usually aware of my appearance.

Extremely						Extremely
Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Characteristic

P 22. I'm aware of the way my mind works when I work through a problem

Extremely						Extremely
Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Characteristic

* 23. Large groups make me nervous.

Extremely						Extremely
Uncharacteristic	0	1	2	3	4	Characteristic

Scoring for Private Self-consciousness Scale

P Private self-consciousness item scored from 0 - 4

PR Private self-consciousness item scored in reverse from 0 - 4

* Items not included in this present study

Appendix B

Promise Questionnaire and Scoring Instructions

Values Study

This is a study of different personal attitudes and values concerning promises. There have been many contrasting ideas about promises in the fields of law, religion and philosophy, so there are no correct or incorrect answers to these questions. We are interested in your ideas and want you to answer the questions as best you can. All answers will be anonymous and sealed in an envelope by you at the conclusion of the session, so feel free to give your own private opinion.

First take a moment to reflect on what you think a promise is and what is involved in making a promise and keeping it. Then answer the following questions by circling your choice of answers. The scales provided for answers run from 0% to 100%, meaning "Not at all"--0% to "Completely"--100%.

1. When I break a promise I usually hold myself personally responsible to the following extent:

Not at all 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Completely

2. When I make a promise that is important to me and I really want to keep it despite the strenuous effort and persistence it's going to take, I'd say the chances of my being able to keep it are:

Not at all 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Completely

3. If I forget a promise and don't keep it, I usually hold myself personally responsible to the following extent:

Not at all 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Completely

4. When other people make promises that are important to them and they really want to keep them despite the strenuous effort and persistence it's going to take, I'd say their chances of being able to keep them are:

Not at all 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Completely

5. When other people break promises, I usually hold them personally responsible to the following extent:

Not at all 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Completely

6. How realistic is it for a person to make a promise that is to be fulfilled at some time in the future? For example, how likely do you think it would be that a person keep a promise that is to be fulfilled:

(Circle your answers on all five parts.)

- a. one week hence--Not likely--Even chance--Very likely
- b. one month hence--Not likely--Even chance--Very likely
- c. one year hence--Not likely--Even chance--Very likely
- d. ten years hence--Not likely--Even chance--Very likely
- e. 20 years hence--Not likely--Even chance--Very likely

Below are some statements about the morality of making and breaking promises. Again, there are many disagreements over these questions, so there are no correct or incorrect answers. We are interested in your judgments. Rate your agreement or disagreement with these statements on the scales provided, with 0 meaning "Do not agree at all" and 9 meaning "Agree completely." Try to match your answers with your actual judgments and not answer all the questions the same.

- * 7. One of the most important moral considerations to take into account whenever I make a promise to someone is the strength of the inter-personal relationships I have with that person as a member of my family, work group, or circle of old friends.
- Do not agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Agree completely
- R 8. One of the most important moral considerations to take into account whenever I make a promise is the absolute moral duty to keep promises.
- Do not agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Agree completely
- R 9. One of the most important moral considerations to take into account whenever I make a promise is the moral worth or seriousness of whatever it is I am promising, i.e., is it right or wrong?
- Do not agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Agree completely
- R 10. A promise once given, even if made through coercion or deception, can never be broken morally.
- Do not agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Agree completely
- R 11. A promise freely given can never be broken morally.
- Do not agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Agree completely
- R 12. A promise freely given can be broken morally only if another equally serious conflicting moral obligation demands it.
- Do not agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Agree completely
13. A promise freely given can be broken morally if important personal plans and intentions have radically changed over time and now conflict with keeping the promise.
- Do not agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Agree completely
14. A promise freely given can be broken morally if any of one's personal plans and intentions have changed over time and now conflict with keeping the promise.
- Do not agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Agree completely

15. Do you think you can make a promise to the following?
Check yes or no.

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
A piece of land	_____	_____
A tree or plant	_____	_____
A pet	_____	_____
A person	_____	_____
A group	_____	_____
One's self	_____	_____
God	_____	_____
The dead	_____	_____
Future generations	_____	_____

16. Do you think there can be such a thing as mutual
promise between the following? Check yes or no.

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
Two animals	_____	_____
A person & a pet	_____	_____
Two persons	_____	_____
A person & a group	_____	_____
Two groups	_____	_____
God & a person	_____	_____
God & a group	_____	_____

Here are some more statements about which people disagree.
Rate your own agreement or disagreement on the scale
provided with 0 meaning "Do not agree" and 7 meaning "Agree
completely."

People disagree about how explicit, clear, distinct and verbal
a promise must be to count as a promise. Below are four
statements; read all four first and then rate your agree-
ment or disagreement on the scales.

- * 17. In order for a promise to have been made and to exist, the promise must have been heard by someone else, maybe the promisee, who understands a promise is being made.

Do not agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely

- * 18. A real promise must consist of a person's explicit statement in words (either spoken or written). If a person does not use words such as "I promise" or "I assure you" or "I certainly shall do it," etc. then he hasn't made a promise.

Do not agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely

- * 19. A real promise can be given in explicit words but also by some act or signal without words. If a person nods his head or shakes hands or gives some signal when asked, the non-verbal signal can be a promise.

Do not agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely

- R 20. A real promise can be given by explicit words, by some signal, but also by some habitual acts and behavior without words or specific signals. If a person, for instance, should act like a prospective marriage partner but never say anything or give a signal, he or she can still be said to have made a promise.

Do not agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely

Scoring for Promise Questionnaire

Questions 1-5 are scored from 1 to 10 depending on the percentages chosen

Question 6 answers are scored so that Not likely is 0
Even chance is 1
Very likely is 2

Questions 8-14 are scored from 0-9 with questions 8-12 scored in reverse

Questions 15 & 16 are scored with Yes equalling 1 and No 0

Question 20 is scored from 0-7 in the reverse direction

* Questions were not used in this present study

R denotes questions scored in reverse

Appendix C

Locus of Control Measure and Scoring Instructions

This questionnaire is a measure of personal belief: obviously there are no right or wrong answers. Each item consists of a pair of alternatives lettered (A) or (B). Please select the one statement of each pair (and only one) which you more strongly believe as far as you are concerned. Be sure to select the one you actually believe to be more true rather than the one you think you should choose or the one you would like to be true.

Please answer these items carefully, but do not spend too much time on any one item. Be sure to find an answer for every choice. Circle the letter of the statement (A or B) which you choose.

In some cases you may discover that you believe both statements or neither one. In such cases be sure to select the one you more strongly believe to be the case as far as you are concerned. Also try to respond to each item independently when making your choice: do not be influenced by your previous choices.

- * 1. (A) Various sports activities in the community help increase solidarity amongst people in the community.
(B) Various sports activities in the community can lead to rivalry detrimental to the solidarity of the community.
- * 2. (A) War brings out the worst aspects of men.
(B) Although war is terrible, it can have some value.
- * 3. (A) Patriotism demands that the citizens of a nation participate in any war.
(B) To be a patriot for one's country does not necessarily mean he must go to war for his country.
- I 4. (A) In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck.
(B) It is not always wise for me to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow.
- I 5. (A) Sometimes I impulsively do things which at other times I definitely would not let myself do.
SC (B) I find that I can keep my impulses in control.

- I 6. (A) In many situations what happens to people seems to be determined by fate.
(B) People do not realize how much they personally determine their own outcomes.
- * 7. (A) College students should be trained in times of peace to assume military duties.
(B) The ills of war are greater than any possible benefits.
- I 8. (A) Most people do not realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by accidental happenings.
(B) For any guy, there is no such thing as luck.
- I 9. (A) If I put my mind to it I could have an important influence on what a politician does in office.
(B) When I look at it carefully, I realize it is impossible for me to have any really important influence over what politicians do.
- I 10. (A) With fate the way it is, many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me.
(B) It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in my life.
- I 11. (A) When I put my mind to it, I can constrain my emotions.
SC (B) There are moments when I cannot subdue my emotions and keep them in check.
- * 12. (A) Every person should give some of his time for the good of his town or country.
(B) People would be a lot better off if they could live far away from other people and never have to do anything for them.
- I 13. (A) As far as the affairs of our country are concerned, most people are the victims of forces they do not control and frequently do not even understand.
(B) By taking part in political and social events, the people can directly control much of the country's affairs.
- I 14. (A) People cannot always hold back their personal desires; they will behave out of impulse.
SC (B) If they want to, people can always control their immediate wishes and not let these motives determine their total behavior.

- I 15. (A) Many times I feel I might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin.
(B) In most cases I do not depend on luck when I decide to do something.
- * 16. (A) Our federal government should promote the mass production of low rental apartment buildings to reduce the housing shortage.
(B) The best way for our government to reduce the housing shortage is to make low interest mortgages available and to stimulate the building of low cost houses.
- I 17. (A) I do not know why politicians make the decisions they do.
(B) It is easy for me to understand why politicians do the things they do.
- I 18. (A) Although sometimes it is difficult, I can always willfully restrain my immediate behavior.
SC (B) Something I cannot do is have complete mastery over all my behavioral tendencies.
- I 19. (A) In the long run people receive the respect and good outcomes they worked for.
(B) Unfortunately, because of misfortune or bad luck, the average guy's worth often passes unrecognized no matter how hard he tries.
- I 20. (A) With enough effort people can wipe out political corruption.
(B) It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in office.
- I 21. (A) By active participation in the appropriate political organizations, people can do a lot to keep the cost of living from going higher.
(B) There is very little people can do to keep the cost of living from going higher.
- I 22. (A) It is possible for me to behave in a manner very different from the way I would want to behave.
SC (B) It would be very difficult for me to not have mastery over the way I behave.
- I 23. (A) In this world I am affected by social forces which I neither control or understand.
(B) It is easy for me to avoid and function independently of any social forces that may attempt to have control over me.

- * 24. (A) It hurts more to lose money than to lose a friend.
(B) The people are the most important thing in this world of ours.
- I 25. (A) What people get out of life is always a function of how much effort they put into it.
(B) Quite often one finds that what happens to people has no relation to what they do, what happens just happens.
- I 26. (A) Generally speaking, my behavior is not governed by others.
(B) My behavior is frequently determined by other influential people.
- I 27. (A) People can and should do what they want to do both now and in the future.
(B) There is no point in people planning their lives too far in advance because other groups of people in our society will invariably upset their plans.
- * 28. (A) Happiness is having your own house and car.
(B) Happiness to most people is having their own close friends.
- I 29. (A) There is no such thing as luck, what happens to me is a result of my own behavior.
(B) Sometimes I do not understand how I can have such poor luck.
- * 30. (A) More emphasis should be placed on teaching the principles of Christianity in public school.
(B) Christianity should not be included in a school curriculum; it can be taught in church.
- I 31. (A) Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are at least partly due to bad luck.
(B) People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.
- I 32. (A) Self-regulation of one's behavior is always possible.
SC (B) I frequently find that when certain things happen to me, I cannot restrain my reaction.
- I 33. (A) The average man can have an influence in governmental decisions.
(B) This world is run by a few people in power, and there is not much the little guy can do about it.

- I 34. (A) When I make up my mind, I can always resist temptation and keep control of my behavior.
SC (B) Even if I try not to submit, I often find I cannot control myself from some of the enticements of life such as overeating or drinking.
- I 35. (A) My getting a good job or promotion in the future will depend a lot on my getting the right turn of fate.
(B) When I get a good job, it is always a direct result of my own ability and/or motivation.
- * 36. (A) Successful people are mostly honest and good.
(B) One should not always associate achievement with integrity and honor.
- I 37. (A) Most people do not understand why politicians behave the way they do.
(B) In the long run people are responsible for bad governments on a national as well as on a local level.
- I 38. (A) I often realize that despite my best efforts some outcomes seem to happen as if fate planned it that way.
(B) The misfortunes and successes I have had were the direct result of my own behavior.
- * 39. (A) Most people are kind and good.
(B) People will not help others unless circumstances force them to.
- I 40. (A) There will always be wars no matter how hard people try to prevent them.
(B) One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people do not take enough interest in politics.
- I 41. (A) Even when there was nothing forcing me, I have found that I will sometimes do things I really did not want to do.
SC (B) I always feel in control of what I am doing.
- I 43. (A) There are institutions in our society that have considerable control over me.
(B) Little in this world controls me, I usually can do what I decide to do.
- * 44. (A) I would like to live in a small town or a rural environment.
(B) I would like to live in a large city.

- I 45. (A) For the average citizen becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do with it.
- (B) For the average guy getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time.

Scoring for the Locus of Control Measure

All items marked I are scored 1 for internality in the global measure of internal locus of control

All items marked ISC are used in the specific self-control measure of internality

* Items not used in this analysis.

Appendix D

Personal Background Questionnaire and Family
Embeddedness Measure and Scoring Instructions

Personal Background Information

Please answer these questions as best you can. No names are used, and the answers are absolutely confidential. When you finish, please seal your answers in the envelope provided.

1. Age_____ 2. Sex_____ 3. Occupation_____

Circle the answer that applies.

4. Your education: Finished grade school Some high school
Finished high school Some college
Finished college Graduate work beyond college

5. Your father's education: Finished grade school
Some high school Finished high school Some college
Finished college Graduate work beyond college

6. Your mother's education: Finished grade school
Some high school Finished high school Some college
Finished college Graduate work beyond college

7. What was your family's religious affiliation?_____

8. What is your present religious affiliation?_____

9. What was your family's ethnic background?_____

10. What is your present marital status?_____

11. Do you have children?_____

12. Ages and sexes of children?_____

FE 13. Counting yourself, how many people were in your immediate family, parents and children?_____

- FE 20. When I was growing up I always felt closer to my friends
R outside my family than to any of my immediate family
or relatives.
- Do not agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
- FE 21. I think that when I was growing up I was more of a
R loner and individualist than a member of my family.
- Do not agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
- FE 22. When I was growing up I had relatives outside my own
immediate family of parents and brothers and sisters,
who were just as important to me as my immediate
family.
- Do not agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
- * 23. On the whole, how do you feel about any brothers or
sisters you have? (Count any half-brothers or sisters;
if you are an only child, make an X mark and do not
answer.)
- Mostly negative Uninvolved Friendly respect
Deep affection Strong love
- FE 24. On the whole, how close do you feel to any of your
other relatives besides brothers, sisters and parents?
- Mostly negative Uninvolved Friendly respect
Deep affection Strong love
- FE 25. On the whole, how much do you feel you are still a
member of the family you grew up in?
- Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Exceptionally much

Scoring for Family Embeddedness Measure

Items marked FE are used in the Family Embeddedness Measure

Those items marked R are scored in reverse

Specific items are scored in the following way:

13 is scored as number given

14 is scored from 0-4 so that Not at all equals 0 and Yes
a great many equals 4

15 is scored from 1-6 so that Once or twice in life equals 1
and daily equals 6

16 is scored from 0-4 for both parts so that Mostly negative
equals 0 and Strong love equals 4

17 is scored from 0-7

18 is scored in reverse from 0-7

19 is scored in reverse from 0-7

20 is scored in reverse from 0-7

21 is scored in reverse from 0-7

22 is scored from 0-7

24 is scored from 0-4 so that Mostly negative equals 0
and Strong love equals 4

25 is scored from 0-7

* Items not used in this analysis

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