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No Place Like Home: Organizing Home-Based Labor in the Era of Structural Adjustment

by

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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Sociology
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
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Preface

My interest in homework, or home-based work, derived initially from an interest in cross-border organizing of maquiladora workers in Texas and Mexico. I was especially interested in the work of community-based labor organizations such as La Mujer Obrera in El Paso, which had achieved some success through what turned out to be a strategy incorporating "home-based" organizing. Home-based in two respects: one, because home is where La Mujer Obrera found they could actually contact women workers; and two, because home was where – under the intensifying conditions of maquiladorization and structural adjustment, including the North American Free Trade Agreement – more and more "factory" work was beginning to take place, or take place again. This double movement – of both work and labor organizing from factory to home – launched me in a very particular way on the trail of homework, and more specifically, the organization of home-based labor. "Labor" entered the picture once it became clear that despite what many were saying (and not saying), homework appears not as a minor history, but a long-term strategy of capital exploitation. Far from an isolated or contingent situation, homework constitutes an extension of the workday worldwide, especially the workday of women (and many children). Moreover, homework is tightly connected to issues of national and international economic policy, including micro-economic development strategies and official programs of structural adjustment, which we know from other instances have always been concerned with the relationship of capital to labor across the borders of the nation, as well as the borders of public and private sectors, formal and informal production, productive and reproductive labor, and workplace and home.

So my interest in home-based labor issues developed into an interest in the crossing of those binary divisions, including the way that home-based labor has always appeared crisscrossed by sexual, ethno-racial, and international divisions. "Organizing," in the historical conjuncture of home-based labor across multiple material and ideological borders, struck me as a particularly important task, and research on and thought about home-based organizing appealed to me for other reasons. One of these was that in my work as a philanthropic fundraiser for a community-based labor organization in Alexandria, Virginia, the Tenants' & Workers' Support Committee (TWSC), I was in touch with a group of organizers and workers who had already started to learn a lot about organizing home-based workers, specifically home-based childcare providers. In addition to writing grant proposals for the TWSC's Unity Campaign of childcare providers (and other projects), I began spending some time – very little compared to the organizers with whom I spoke often – following the public organizing activities of home-based childcare workers in Alexandria, a so-called "inner-suburban" city of 130,000, starkly divided by race and class, located just miles from Washington, DC.

Combined, these interests formed one basis for my research, which is reflected more or less in the first half of *No Place Like Home*, where I discuss the TWSC's Unity Campaign and a small number of additional cases, including DARE in Rhode Island, Homenet/SEWA at the International Labour Organization, and trade union organizing of home-based workers, all in relation to local and global structural adjustment, in which I include so-called "welfare reform" in the United States. The second basis for my research was a kind of threading of textual and theoretical sources around questions arising from the crossing of home, labor, and the state; around the sexual, ethnoracial and international division underlying, and in many ways, undergirding these crossings; and the interests of and in the politics, that very loaded word, of organizing *this* labor at *this time*.

One of the less visible "threads" running through *No Place Like Home* is the place of home-based labor and home-based work in advocacy associated with the "gender gap," the "glass ceiling," gender parity, etc., and the sociological studies these political goals attract. The growing body of research on the enormous range of home-based work indicates that the continuing location of work at home undermines women's efforts to achieve gender/wage parity elsewhere. Lourdes Benería and Marta Roldán had already found this in the late 1970s and early 1980s, in their groundbreaking work on women's home-based labor in Mexico City. The growing field of studies inspired in part by their research today finds that homework, by its very contingent nature, offers a kind of illusory freedom to women (and to men somewhat differently), in exchange for the dubious status of "self-employed," including apparent, but rarely actual, work process control; apparent (and actual) higher costs borne by the home-based worker; as well as generally lower wages and income than the already unequal wages of the modern factory and office.

Paralleling this, and deep in the heart of the home-based work structure, are dual processes that undergird the location of work at home. One is the way in which the organization of home-based work taps into the unpaid labor of home as source of both work and energy. That is to say, it taps into what Marxist feminists called for a contentious period of time in the 1970s and early 1980s, "domestic labor" (including the labor of cleaning, cooking, childcare, home maintenance, "emotional labor"—and sex, some have argued). The other process is the way in which neo-liberalist programs of structural adjustment, including welfare reform in the United States, collude in the sexual and racial definitions and divisions of labor with the effect of not only situating more low-paid and unpaid work at home through privatization (i.e. a process of de-valorizing labor through what Maria Mies has termed "housewifeization"), but of making home at once a more desirable and a more controlled place of work – for women, and mothers, in particular.

With the crossing of home-based work with "domestic labor," I began to look at a set of political considerations that was forced to draw on what researchers of home-based work repeatedly referred to as the "hidden," "invisible" or "secret" logic of home. To anyone reading the literature, it appears quite quickly that "invisibility" has been and continues to be the most frequent and powerful trope in home-based labor studies. The untangling or unhitching of invisibility from its literal referent, I argue in a variety of ways in *No Place Like Home*, is a paramount political and theoretical task for studies of "race," gender and labor, especially home-based labor and work. What exactly is hidden? What is being kept secret? What remains invisible and to whom? In turning to some of the labor theory sources, it became apparent that both in classical political economy and neo-Marxist political economy, the subject of home-based laboring is only partially predicated in historical and theoretical terms. Indeed, Marx referred in *Capital* to home-based labor as the "army set into motion by capital by means of invisible threads." His concern, as we know, was with the capitalist socialization of other, more "visible" forms of labor, forms thought to be more central, if not more prone to centralization, than homeworkers. For Marx, with the advent of capitalism on a social scale, women and children would henceforth be "cheap labor" *tout court*. In theory as well as practice, so-called "women's work," including what we call housework and childcare, as well as "homework," were subsumed, but not in an obvious way, in the formation of the "working-class" and labor subject. At least, this is what one reading of Marx would have us believe.

But Marx's formulation mistook a key turning point, a point of crossing. For as feminist scholars of Marx noted several decades ago, Marx also considered "women's work" to be the organization of the "natural," i.e. *given*, force of "total social labor," the latter an absolutely crucial concept for Marx, then, and Marxists today. "Total social labor" is not, to use Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's formulation, an "undivided perspective." And what researchers of home-based work literally all over the world have discovered is that home-based work is drawn inexorably to the very differently subsumed structure of unpaid domestic labor, to the "natural" and "given" force of "socialized labor" – and therefore, more properly speaking, to the ethno-racially distinct laboring bodies of women of all ages in metropolises, cities, suburbs, towns, and villages in virtually every country of the world. This division in Marx's critique, of specifically female (as well as child) labor that is paid and unpaid, visible and invisible, valuable and valueless – all at the same time – is a "closed" opening, an "aporia" to use a more technical term, through which the home-based worker, and home-based researcher, it appears, must continue to pass.

The Force of Home-based Labor

Part of the attraction of home-based labor for local and global capital and their institutional allies, I argue along with others, is that the structure of paid and unpaid domestic labor is given to a kind of value-production that appears to be infinite, in a context that some theorists have termed "zero-work." Even while the work of domestic and home-based labor has generally appeared in popular culture, as much as political economic theory, as non-work – as "spare time" or "leisure," for example – its productivity is, so to speak, taken for granted. I cite, for example, the numerous studies of homework which find that the earnings of home-based women workers, while they typically are applied to major household expenses such as rent and food and utilities, are just as often perceived, by both official and casual observers, as "extra income" or "pin money" for work that is defined formally and informally as household chores, "housework," "mother's work," etc. Not work as such. The gendered definition of labor explains some, but not all, of this phenomenon. For at the same time, as I show, structural adjustment programs such as micro-lending launch women's home-based work as work, but in the context of a debt structure premised on a dubious self-employment status, critical investigation of which has found that micro-lending earnings from women's home-based work typically are controlled by others, including husbands, subcontractors, and bankers. These and other findings from the global homework field do raise the question of the gendered divisions and definitions of work, but they also raise the problem-question, following Foucault, of "biopower" in the circuits of institutional and subjective force, which I come to shortly.

I follow the thought of the "infinite production" of value, "zero-work," and the systematic given-ness of home-based labor, in the path of the techno-scientifically inspired nineteenth-century critique of political economy of labor and value through which Marx was, and has remained, so influential. As a variety of late-twentieth commentators on the revolutionary displacement of human labor in machines, information and other technologies have noted, Marx's labor theory of value was deeply informed by both the social and technoscientific developments of his own day, where questions ranged from whether machines theoretically could (and politically should) produce value, to what the place of women and children in production morally should (and politically could) be, to the physical limits of abstract labor's capacity to work and produce value infinitely. As Anson Rabinbach, George Caffentzis, and others have noted, nineteenth century studies of thermodynamics – the exchange of heat between energy-producing machines – were as "deterministic" for Marx as supply and demand was for classical political economy. And for better or worse, Marx did not apply ideology critique to the physical sciences. His critique of political economy, on the other hand, with its dialectical insistence on the human-centered (and androcentric) production of value, has remained a powerful, if techno-scientifically outmoded, source for thinking about the dualistic dynamics of home-based work; i.e., for thinking through the binary relationships of paid to unpaid labor, of productive to "reproductive" work, of formal to informal sectors of labor, of "public" to "private," and of culture to class. Today in particular, I argue, there is growing evidence (which I realize is what the neo-liberal versions of social science must always be seeking, and so risk repeating from time to time) of the crossing of these binary oppositions in a way that exposes, in low-wage industrial and service work in the home, the definitive force of unpaid labor, which one might also think of at least partially as "domestic labor," in the politics of structural adjustment, as well as in the ongoing dividing and defining of work, along sexual, racial, and international lines.

What also becomes evident in reading the neo-Marxist and post-Marxist texts is that this "force" of unpaid labor, exemplified in *No Place Like Home* by the figure of the home-based childcare provider, is both "far from equilibrium" and "non-linear" in technoscientific terms. That is, it is not exactly "knowable" from the perspective of thermodynamically-influenced Marxist political economy. In this context, I look at a short, but influential essay by Luciani Parisi and Tiziana Terranova, who theorize "women's work" from the perspective of fluid dynamics, on the one hand, and genetic engineering and artificial life on the other. What I take from their work in particular, is the shift from a notion of "entropy" in relation to labor (that Caffentzis for one picked up on following Marx) to a notion of "turbulence" that owes its formulation perhaps most to Michel Serres (2000).

The growing field of home-based labor studies notes most of these tendencies rather implicitly. There has been a somewhat more explicit attempt made to bring homework scholarship into theoretical dialogue with earlier research and debate on so-called "reproductive" or domestic labor, as well as the growing body of research on "domestic workers" such as maids, housekeepers, nannies, home health assistants, etc. I address the former in *No Place Like Home* considerably more than the latter, an unevenness that becomes obvious at certain points. Theoretical perspectives appear many places in the manuscript and may be quite different from other essays in the field of homework studies. While a small number of studies have begun moving towards explicitly theoretical approaches, usually around the so-called "gendering" and "globalizing" of such work, much of the field is dominated by positivist approaches which generally do not seek to theorize how home-based labor draws on any given or existing structure and features of gender or the globe. much less the given-ness of the structure of unpaid labor. Even more important. in the much-discussed conjuncture of "globalization" and "structural adjustment," there are still many studies which fail to examine how the expansion of home-based work reasserts women's practical place in the home as domestic labor that "underwrites" (that is, that politically and economically insures) broader social change strategies involving the privatization of public jobs, health care, education, energy resources and other public works and public goods – in short, the dynamic structural conditions for what we think of as global capitalist class, or neoliberal, hegemony, or globalization from above.

I join many in arguing that structural adjustment has been led by the United States not merely "globally" but "at home," where the well-known "welfare reform" of the mid-1990s had the effect of eliminating the jobs, income, welfare, and education of millions of women and children, and in the process, of expanding the field of home-based work across the board, including the home-based work I look at most closely, that is child care. What this leads me to argue in *No Place Like Home* is – this being the political, if not sociological interest of the work – that home-based work is not only a strategy for global and local capitalist and state control, but it is also a key arena for political and social contestation and counter-organizing, the final thread in my overall argument. 'Key arena': I suppose this refers to the 'invisible,' 'hidden,' behind-closed-doors nature of home-based organizing as well as home-based work in general. The community and labor organizing among home-based workers (in particular child care providers) that I discuss in the pages that follow, exposes not only the super-exploitation of women workers in, and through, the home. It also exposes the power of home-based organizing – including homeworker organizations, grassroots lobbying groups, networks and networks of networks, and trade unions – to mobilize the otherwise divided labor of the home. It exposes the power of organizing, advocacy and lobbying for multi-scaled legislative and regulatory changes that improve or enhance the power, status and position of women workers in a wide variety of low-wage, home-based work. And it exposes the power specifically of home-based women workers to make change in the relationship between the force of their subsumed domestic labor and the state.

Beyond (and in a definitive way, confronting) its own power to make change, home-based organizing also exposes, as I examine in the case of home-based childcare worker organizing in the United States, the powerful neoliberalist mechanisms of what Foucault termed "governmentality," of policing and control at the sub-individual level. Savvy organizers recognize this in the paternalistic and racist treatment of the African American and multinational immigrant women who make up a large portion of the urban childcare labor force in the United States. Such a perspective takes us one step beyond, or rather beneath, the politics of recognition and redistribution of the value of child care labor, which some might wish to argue is, or should be, the strategy for "care workers" across the board. The cases I discuss in Rhode Island and Virginia highlight a turbulent politics of control and counter-control, where the political power of organized homeworkers depends not so much on gaining recognition for their work or higher rates of reimbursement, or even employment benefits such as health insurance –all of which are vital, and all of which are being sought. Power depends more on altering the racist and paternalist violence flowing from state apparatuses which seek to de-value, de-house, and disrupt the organized force of home-based labor – that is, the pervasive governmentalist forces that seek to control home-based labor once it has been recognized and once "redistribution" and efforts for "social justice" and "human rights" are well underway. That is to say, in the place of (home-based) labor organizing, a nuanced politics of control and counter-control is emerging, and I must say I continue to learn a great deal from the kinds of "bottom-up" and home-based organizing that understand that the starting point for organizing is always what the next strategy of hierarchical re-insertion, especially of women and ethno-racially marked worker-populations, is becoming.

Given these cases and findings, I argue that more thinking is required to address the political dangers or risks identified by Lourdes Benería and Marta Roldán nearly two decades ago in their work on home-based labor in Mexico. Where sociologists and other researchers, feminists, policymakers and advocates, particularly (although not exclusively) in the United States and Europe, are concerned to address the problems of wage inequality between men and women workers, studies of home-based work such as Benería and Roldán's (1987) demonstrate that even when and where progress is being made, however slowly and inadequately, there is a counter-movement taking place "below." This movement is formal and informal at the same time, and it both subverts the gains being made elsewhere, as well as subtly alters the deep-rooted sexual and racial divisions of labor – divisions that we might understand better as control operating via culture – which undergird the politics of equality and inequality in *other* parts of the economy. What one finds is that for launching and modulating this not so hidden, not so invisible, not so underground work which homework researchers so often refer to, there is no place like home, a phrasing and a framing which I have intended throughout this work to both draw on the (paid and unpaid, formal and informal, productive and reproductive) labor and political experience of women who are always positioned "at home," as well as, less directly, the subjective experience of "internalized gendering" that revolves in and around family, sexual, community, and personal life "at home."

In the second half of this dissertation, I explore a number of theories which address in different ways the confluence of these laboring and subjective forces in and of the "home," with an eye generally to seeing how the contemporary historical developments of state, capital and labor have sought in a variety of ways, sometimes in cooperation, other times in conflict, to manage and control the turbulent relation of home to political economy. With Georges Bataille (1991), I have sought in particular to show how there is a "general economic" movement, and moment, in the broadly conceived labor of home, situated (in deconstructive terms) in both "gift" and exchange economies. This "general economy" of home does not have a definitive or conclusive "end" for human labor, but instead draws on the "gratuitous" gifts of socialized surplus labor time – including material and immaterial labor as diverse as information production and child care – for the ever-expanding forms of capitalist sociality and neoliberal governmentality which are simultaneously attempting to modulate and control these sub-divided labor forces. The organizing I have sought to highlight, organizing in and against capitalist sociality and neoliberal governmentality, reveals these layers of modulation and control to approximate what Foucault called "biopolitics," that is relations at the sub-individual level which precisely enable the linkages between work and life, exchange and "gift" economies, paid and unpaid labor time, as well as between the home as a site of sexual, racial and familial – in short, political – "reproduction," and the home as the historic site of the social and economic circulation (including production, consumption and distribution) of "values." A reading of Bataille suggests that the entropic movement theorized by Marx in relation to capitalism, the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to decline, for instance, has its un-representable, formally impossible and meaning-less moments, among which Bataille cites the ritual destruction of wealth, war, gift-giving, alms, potlatch, and "expenditure without return." While such a view does not fundamentally alter the dialectic of Marxist or neo-Marxist political economy, it does point to the elements of contingency, undecidability and unpredictability, the non-place places and the non-sense senses, in and of what Bataille called the "restricted economy," i.e. the formal sphere of production, consumption, and circulation that political economists (including Marx) have usually dealt with. In this context, I have tried to look carefully at unpaid labor as what Derrida calls a "gift of time," where gift is understood, after Mauss and others, as a giving that launches duty, obligation and debt in such a way that the possibility of return is by definition forgotten, and I suppose, in a related sense, hidden or invisible. The gift of what feminists of the 1970s and 1980s called 'domestic labor' is the one, thirty years on, that keeps on giving. By this I mean neither to trivialize nor romanticize the reality or perspectives embodied in "women's work." However, I leave to readers to determine how well I attend to these risks.

The implications of a "general economic" approach to home-based labor, as well as to the politics of home-based labor organizing, are the final concern of this work. For this discussion, I turn to Foucault in particular, to understand neoliberalism as a two-sided strategy of positioned (theoretical and political) critique of the state as such, on the one hand, and the ever-intensified policing and biopolitical control of all aspects of social, economic, and political life, on the other. Foucault elsewhere referred to this strategy as "governmentality." I attempt to show that there is a double-bind in this view of neoliberal capitalist governmentality which is especially appropriate to the revision of neo-Marxist theories of class formation and value production. Although the latter had in the past greatly neglected to theorize the political-economic (and theoretical) "value" of unpaid labor in the capitalist economy, some today are producing insights of some utility for those interested in class and gender-oriented studies of home-based work. With Antonio Negri, in particular, one can see the movement in neo-classical and critical political economy away from the calculable and measurable terms of value in exchange-driven capitalism, to the incalculable, "immaterial" forms of value associated with the so-called "affective labor" of producers in high-tech, information-driven capitalism, as well as the "care workers" and service sector workers who are both institutionally-based (in capitalist enterprise and the public sector) as well as historically home-based.

For the politics of class composition, the historic province of Marxist political analysis, this latter point is especially relevant, for here once again, the sexual, racial and international divisions of labor return in unpredictable ways to confound both the categories of what Negri, diverging somewhat from Foucault's use, also terms "biopower," as well as of everyday practical politics, when representatives are chosen to stand in for the "new working-class," or the "grassroots," or the new "revolutionary subject" or the new "proletariat." I suggest in *No Place Like Home* that home-based organizing seeks to make those interested in counter-biopolitics more attentive to these everyday politics. This is not an altogether easy task, for a lot of painful reasons. Even more difficult to come to terms with in the neo-Marxist-feminist frameworks that I partially argue for and with. is the relative dynamism of the all-too-important "divisions" of "biopower" in the strategic organizing as well as theory-building taking place today in far-flung places such as Porto Alegre. Quito and Mumbai (i.e. the World Social Forum). in the International Labour Organization. which sets international rules on labor (and thus in a restricted way sets rules for class formation). and in localities and regions where home-based women workers. among many others. are organizing towards a variety of turbulent. but not necessarily "revolutionary" in the old sense. changes in capitalist sociality.

Home-based labor. in the words of Sheila Rowbotham. "confuses the categories." and it does so literally and in incalculable ways. With Derrida and Bataille. I argue that it would be a mistake to believe that the categories could be defused. or that the "confusion" is anything other than what Derrida has called an "aporia." or the experience of the "impossible." With Spivak (1999). I argue that the figure of the impossible doesn't refer to things that can't or won't be done politically or otherwise. or to the possibility that with the right informants we can finally enter into the domain of the political-culture game knowing the score. On the contrary. much is being done all the time. in diverse and conflicting names and registers. and often with a nod to "native informancy" – including "democratic" or "grassroots" "consultation." and indeed. as Julia Elyachar has critically shown. "grassroots organizing" – as the legitimating practice of cultural control. And it is the task of deconstructive. Marxist-feminist analysis to provide a corrective to the ethico-political foreclosures of and within much well-meaning political organizing. policy advocacy. and cultural analysis – while noting the continuous formation of debts to divided labor and organizing elsewhere. In the case of organizing home-based labor. it is important to see not only how global capital reaches out to and depends on the sweating of home-based labor of all kinds to launch its cycles; it is also important to see how this labor draws on another figure, that of the domestic laborer, for whom, as Spivak has written in a number of places, "internalized gendering perceived as ethical choice" remains a key obstacle. To this we would also have to counter-pose ethno-racial subjection perceived as what Patricia Clough (2000) terms "autoaffection." Understanding these obstacles – and as Swasti Mitter put it, the "common fate" and "common bond" in them – is essential to understanding "gendering" and "race" as a linked site (a "non-place like home") of culture and control which is biopolitically, that is to say, pervasively linked to capital via an ethics, or governmentality, that extends into the home, into the life of the mother, the caregiver, the provider, the nurturer, the partner, etc. – and then back out into the better known and understood areas of social policy, change-oriented philanthropy, and politically motivated research.

In the case of homework and "progressive social change" organizing in the home-work field (with childcare as a principal example) the figure of the "responsible woman" or "mother" assumes a many-sided importance and power, not only for controlling, through her biopolitical gendering and ethno-racial subjection, her and others' labors, nor merely to auto-valorize her labors by resisting or refusing elements of responsible motherhood. The worker at home, by definition a woman, or a child, redefines the boundaries of "economy" in general, as much in the street-level organizer's sense of building power, as in the full-blown global and local divisions of labor which capital seeks to exploit. In between the structured political perspectives of "bottom-up" and "top-down," there is the undecidable and turbulent world of work and home.

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Chapter One – The Turbulent World of Home-based Work

...capital also sets another army in motion, by means of invisible threads: the outworkers in the domestic industries... (Karl Marx, *Capital, vol. 1*)

Home based workers are presently invisible. There are no official or even unofficial records of their existence, their conditions and their contribution to the national economy. (Ela Bhatt, "The Invisibility of Home-Based Work...")

Homework confuses the categories. (Sheila Rowbotham, *Homeworkers Worldwide*)

What is Homework, Anyway? The Disciplines and Divisions of Home-based Work

From low-wage manufacturing and service sector homework to relatively high-wage professional "at-home" work, including telecommunications, administration and financial management, home-based work of all kinds is gaining increased exposure. Evidence points to the increase of home-based work per se in recent decades as well as the erosion of the roughly two hundred year-old, ideological opposition between home and work, a powerful fiction that was long premised on the certainty of an *increase* of both paid and unpaid female labor within the home. However, today, women's increased rates of participation in paid labor both outside and inside the home, especially of married women with children (roughly double what it was at the end of the 1950s), has not significantly altered the division of labor inside the home, as one knows from both social science and everyday observation, if not personal experience (Christensen 1988). As Hochschild (1989, 1997) has argued, with the advent of women's increased full-time labor force participation and flex-time, women continue to perform a far greater amount of labor at home, even as work and home shift place often and unexpectedly in their material and emotional lives, particularly (although by no means exclusively) for women with children, aging parents, and other whom they must care for.

In the United States, home-based work never "left" the labor scene, even if it dropped largely out of labor studies and organizing for a period of about fifty years following the Depression. Once principally, or purportedly, the domain of seamstresses, knitters, manufacturing workers, and self-employed artisans and professionals, homework is now positioned across the spectrum of job categories and occupations. Since the early 1980s, with an overall loss of manufacturing jobs, plus increases in information technology work and telecommuting capabilities, it is estimated that 30-40% of home-based production of all kinds in the U.S. is low-wage service sector and manufacturing homework of one type or another (Silver 1989). As in the wider economy, there is a trend towards increasing wage polarization, with both relatively high-paid and very low-paid homework (Christensen 1988). However, in nearly all cases, wages, salaries or piece rates for home-based workers are *below* the lowest average wage for comparable "on-premises" work. Not only is there more than one price for working at home, and more than one value, there is more than one sense of "worth."

There is no known or even estimated number of homeworkers globally, although there is a growing sense of the scale and magnitude of home-based work. Actual numbers, even at the local level, are generally impossible to generate, as most homework remains hidden, relegated by both social science practice and neoliberal government to the uncounted informal sector and incalculable household economy, a curious empirical cul-de-sac for the past two decades that shows little sign of being displaced (Smith and Wallerstein 1984; Mitter 1986). Surveys from country to country, however, have found that from 30% to 95% of home-based work is low or very low wage (Felstead and Jewson 1999; Rowbotham 1993); and tellingly, it is estimated that as many as 90% of *these* homeworkers worldwide – based in manufacturing, clerical, child care and personal service homework – are women (Boris and Daniel 1989). And these women are frequently rural to urban and international migrants, as well as, in some or many cases, numerical ethnic minorities in the countries, cities or communities where they work. In relation, and addition, to these sexual and ethnic divisions, which quantitative social science unaccountably continues to treat as "unexplainable wage gaps," one encounters in home-based work tremendous cost savings to employers (including the state) as a result of the absence, elimination or reduction of health, pension and vacation benefits, job training, as well as other not so incalculable infrastructure costs such as plant, electricity, water and quite often, supplies and basic machinery. Put all this together and there exists a vast labor force and productive space – women workers at home – located squarely in the midst of super-exploitative international and racial divisions of labor where, as Mies (1986), pointed out, they are most often seen not as workers, but as racially-distinct "housewives" who by official definition and practice are "formally" located outside the labor force, and thus ineligible for established labor protections, including unionization.

This sexually and racially inflected politics of the home has a tremendous impact at the macro-levels of social and political organization, of course, since capitalist employers and their state allies benefit directly from the exploitation of this "domestic" labor force, forged by a material-ideological process of what Maria Mies (1986) termed "housewifeization." As Ela Bhatt, a noted advocate among home-based worker organizations, has noted:

> Home-based producers form a dispensable pool of workers for the employer. He employs them whenever and as frequently as he needs them and dismisses them when he no longer requires their services. Employment is irregular and uncertain for the workers. They may have to work sixteen hours a day during a peak season and sit idle for three months during the lean season. Work is given according to the needs of the business, with no consideration for the workers' needs. (Bhatt 1987: 33)

Given the common conditions of homework around the world, as well as the history and social characteristics of homework in capitalist industry, low-wage industrial and service-sector homework has been regarded as both a leading edge and illustrative example of the ongoing international sexual division of labor (Boris and Prügl 1996; Mitter 1986). The implications of this for understanding both post-1973 political economic restructuring and the "place" of homework in it are significant. As Swasti Mitter has indicated in her analysis of the links between early globalization and the then "new international division of labor,"

> The growth of the unregulated or hidden economy becomes an important feature of the current industrial restructuring in the West, as capital increasingly comes home. Homeworking in the hidden economy, in this context, cannot be viewed as an isolated phenomenon: it is the ultimate form of flexible employment that management demands. [...]

> The role of homeworking in the global economy, therefore, can be understood only with reference to a chain of subcontracting that links home-based female workers to the business strategies of the global corporations. (Mitter 1986: 125-26)

More recent studies have suggested that the link in the chain of global commodity-production is also a link in the chain of global political-economic restructuring, that women's home-based work is an incalculable site of economic, political and cultural "value production" in the context of global financialization and struggles for hegemonic control (Negri and Hardt 2000; Prügl 2000). Why "incalculable"? As I discuss at greater length in the next chapter, labor confined to the home takes on the appearance and characteristics of "traditional," that is to say modern, women's work: literally worth less, "informal," and tightly linked to "housework" and familial care responsibilities which together comprise the literally and morally "invaluable" labors of love, duty, and personal sacrifice. The contradiction of "own account", self-employed, as well as exchanged and subcontracted labor which resists being monetized, from multiple sides and for multiple reasons, presents capital in particular, and the state in more nuanced ways, with a uniquely exploitable, and specially governed, supply of labor.

A number of studies have documented low-wage homework conditions and conjunctures in regions, countries, cities and localities throughout the world.[1] Benería and Roldán's (1987) study of industrial homeworkers in Mexico City was a landmark essay in laying out the class and gender dynamics of the expansion of homework and homeworking strategies in an internationally subordinate, industrializing economy. They accomplished this by examining the generational, household and internal migration dynamics integral to the composition of class and gender. In the context of development studies, they documented as well the uneven and unequal entry of women, and men, into global and local capitalist industry. In this context, women's industrial homework was a linchpin in a class, sex and race-divided historical process of subsumption, whose difference from classical political economic and development paradigms, and whose specific dynamics of the age, place, and mobility of labor, revealed an important movement of the global/local substructure, the "substrate," of capitalist hegemony. "What is important to stress here is that the making of the subproletariat in industrial homework is not separated from but rather subordinately linked to other processes of female and male proletarianization," they wrote (Benería and Roldán 1987: 102). "Subproletarianization," or what these and other writers have also referred to as "quasi-proletarianization," epitomized for them the gendered class composition of internationally divided labor.

> The historical conformation of Mexico City's proletariat is...a production not only of migratory waves from the hinterlands, but also of gender and generational "waves" of female proletarianization and subproletarianization of wives, heads of household, and daughters who facilitate the proletarianization of spouses, sons, or fathers. It can be argued, therefore, that a kind of "functionality" of gender subordination exists for capital, not only through cheap reproduction of labor

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[1] See, among others, Balakrishnan 2001; Benería and Roldán 1987; Boris and Prügl 1996; Delaney 1996; Dagg 1996; Giles and Preston 1996; Lui 1994; Bhatt 1987; Lazo 1996; Hsiung 1996; Allen and Wolkowitz

> power by means of the housewife's non-remunerated domestic work, but also through the subproletarianization of the wives in countries such as Mexico (and one can assume in other peripheral societies) where no family salary exists that would permit the reproduction of the worker and his family. (Benería and Roldán 1987: 103)

The difference of the wage that "would permit the reproduction of the worker and *his* family" is in many ways still the difference of organizing in the field of homework, as Eileen Boris noted about the concurrent political struggle over the ongoing existence of industrial homework and the drive for a "family wage" in the United States. "...[T]rade unionists and women's reform groups from the 1880s had juxtaposed organization and abolition as oppositions, choosing the end of homework over the empowerment of homeworkers, accepting the goal of the family wage over a cross-class alliance of women working at home and in the factories." Interestingly, Boris goes on to write, "The only time that the ILGWU (International Ladies Garment Workers Union) attempted to organize homeworkers along with inside workers was in 1937 during a strike among Mexicans in the San Antonio dress industry where a shared ethnic community facilitated their effort" (Boris 1994: 250). I examine some of the implications of the racial division of homeworker organizing in Chapter Three; however, it bears asserting that as in homes in Mexico City in the early 1980s, homeworking housewives (a profound term, to be sure) in San Antonio had struggled, fifty years earlier, under the premise that homework was organized to supplement the difference between the *female* factory wage and the family's reproduction. The U.S. male factory wage at that point, and then again after

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1987; Tate 1994, 1996; Phizacklea and Wolkowitz 1995

1973 as we shall see, was insufficient on its own for the reproduction of the *working-class* family, by which we should understand, as Benería and Roldán made clear, both proletariat and sub-proletariat gender and ethno-racial formations. Moreover, as they documented and analyzed at some length, homework neither shortened women's collective household labor time, nor did it lead in most cases to greater financial autonomy or control of collective household income.[2]

Similar studies have not been confined to the so-called peripheral, or newly industrializing, countries and regions of the "global South." In *Common Fate, Common Bond*, Swasti Mitter provided extensive analysis of the subcontracting chains of transnational corporations in the electronic manufacturing and assembly, garment manufacturing, clerical and service sectors situated in the United Kingdom and Europe. The "new international division of labor" heralded by free trade agreements, structural adjustment programs, and export processing zone propaganda beginning as early as the late 1960s was, like the transnationals themselves, never intended to be geographically limited. Through subcontracting, the transnational corporations exploited the sexually and racially divided, and quite often transnational, workers who comprised the invisible "out-sourced," "offshore," and home-based labor supply in the globalizing North. "Trapped between the racism of the host community and the sexism of their own, women of the ethnic minorities offer the advantage of Third World labour in the middle of the First," Mitter wrote (1986: 123). Following Mitter, other studies of home-based labor in the United Kingdom appeared, confirming and deepening Mitter's and others' findings that homework was expanding and intensifying in the cities and countryside of post-imperialist Britain (e.g. Allen and Wolkowitz 1987; Phizacklea and Wolkowitz 1995).

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[2] For their methodology and discussion, see chapter six of Benería and Roldán (1987). I am less interested in the statistical findings regarding labor time and income pooling than in the crux of their argument that homework launches a cycle of proletarianization of men by women and subproletarianization of women by

In North America, home-based labor studies have focused, in roughly equal measure, on so-called "telework" and low-wage industrial homework. The homeworking picture in the United States remains far from complete, however, as the small group of researchers of home-based work have already noted (Boris 1994; Boris and Daniels 1989; Christensen 1988; Lozano 1988). As a major focus of public and corporate investment in the ongoing pursuit of "flexibility" and capital, telework has had great appeal in terms of business organization, technology and labor management (Christensen 1988). It also has had the merit of slotting into the contemporaneous drive for the mass electronic networking of the house and home. In this context, Alvin Toffler's prediction in 1980 of the rapid rise of "the electronic cottage" in the United States and industrialized North wasn't entirely unwarranted. However, as I explore in the next chapter, telework in the networked home is represented today as *the* revolutionary wave of the electronic future. Or as Toffler envisaged, "The leap to a new production system in both manufacturing and the white-collar sector, and the possible breakthrough to the electronic cottage, promise to change all the existing terms of debate, making obsolete most of the issues over which men and women today argue, struggle and sometimes die" (Toffler 1980: 223). As we know from more recent studies of telework, neither have men's and women's "issues," nor old production systems (nor domestic violence, if I understand correctly) entirely receded in the new and revolutionary times of telework (Felstead and Jewson 1999). More important, perhaps, there is nothing new about homework *per se*. Centralization of

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men inside and outside the home. Far from being the end of a chain of commodity production and corresponding class formation, homework appears here as a beginning.

industrial production was always premised on a readily available out-source of labor, on the one hand, and the daily reproduction of the factory work force. Telework, taking home unfinished work, running a home-based business – all of these represent significant trends, and mark the most discussed and officially sanctioned forms of homework (see BLS 1997, 2001); the promises of flexibility in the post-industrial home conceal – once again – what the home has always been expected to offer.

Foremost among these expectations, I argue throughout, is access to unregulated female, immigrant and Black labor. Giles and Preston's (1996) comparative study of Chinese and Portuguese immigrant women homeworkers in Canada, taking off on the theme of global economic restructuring and trade liberalization, turns to home-based labor that is subject to both "informalization" and "domestication," that is to say, home-based flexibility which avoids labor protections and workplace regulations and relies on existing social hierarchies and divisions of labor to devalue work which is done in the home. As with Phizacklea and Walkowitz's (1995) study of Black and Asian immigrant homeworkers in the U.K., Giles and Preston are careful to articulate the link between ethno-race and the informalization and domestication of work. "The relative invisibility of homework in the garment industry," they write, "is attributed as much to the marginal positions of the women who do the sewing as to its location in the home" (Giles and Preston 1996: 155). Such a formulation has the merit of highlighting how the perceived invisibility of homework is more than, or not only, a problem of valuation; even if they were relatively well paid, which they are not, ethno-racial minority homeworking women would be only somewhat less invisible than their low-wage factory-based peers, that is to say neither visible nor invisible. Moreover, as Giles and Preston, note, "the diversity of women's experiences of homework…underscores how involvement in paid work is defined by and through their ethnicity." That is to say, not all women homeworkers' experiences are the same; and not all low-wage *immigrant* women homeworkers' experiences are the same. In addition to these differences, they go on to write, we should also consider "patriarchal relations within the family, limited access to state services, class position, the racism that ethnic minorities experience in Canada, and the working conditions characteristic of homework" (ibid.: 174).

There are relatively few contemporary studies of low-wage homework in the U.S. Most to date have focused on white, working-class, rural women homeworkers in the manufacturing sector (see, e.g., Boris and Daniels 1989). Betty Beach's (1989) study of home-based shoemakers in Maine looked at the trade-offs for working-class, white women workers between lower wages and increased control of the work process. Jamie Faricellia Dangler's study of predominantly white, home-based electronic assembly workers in upstate New York (1994) analyzes their positioning in the global economy as well as in the context of historic social and sexual divisions of labor. Christina Gringeri (1994) documented the case of state-sponsored economic development strategies in the Midwest, which brought hundreds of agrarian white women into low-wage, home-based auto parts assembly work. Edwards and Field-Hendrey's (1996) study of home-based workers, which is based on microdata samples of the 1990 census, in many ways mistakenly justifies the focus on rural white women homeworkers, while pointing correctly to a significant increase in service sector self-employment among the same sectors of women homeworkers. On the other hand, Edwards and Field-Hendrey's assumption that the self-employed status of the majority of known home-based workers in the United States negates the possibility of labor exploitation is highly problematic. Knowledge of how the use of "self-employed" status operates as a strategy to separate firms from responsibility for more or less exclusively contracted or subcontracted home-based, "self-employed" workers, has been available for some time (Christensen 1988; Mitter 1986). Moreover, as was the case in homeworker surveys in the United Kingdom, there is an undoubted undercounting of the lowest-wage homeworkers, who are also likely to be women as well as ethno-racial numerical minorities.[3] In Edwards and Field-Hendrey's study of 1989 census data, there were a total of 334,658 women counted in home-based personal and professional service occupations. Just ten years later, the census counted 478,000 self-employed, home-based child care service providers alone.[4]

It seem quite clear that not only was there a *very* significant growth in home-based child care over the past decade, but there was also a significant undercounting of home-based child care and other "services" ten years before. Moreover, as the Bureau of Labor Studies itself points out about child care in general, "Employment estimates understate the total number of people working in this industry *because family childcare homes run by relatives often are not counted*, and because many other family childcare providers operate illegally without a license to avoid the expense of licensing and taxation."[5] Even official labor statistics emphasize the deficit of information related to low-wage urban and rural homework in the United States where, as researchers point out, one also "expects" to find non-white, migrant and undocumented women workers (Dangler 1994). Mary Tuominen's (1994a; 1994b; 1998) studies of African American and immigrant home-based child care providers are extremely important efforts, in more ways than one, to highlight not only the historically significant home-based work of African American and other women (see Boris 1989), but the vast sector of home-based child care work, where studies typically have focused on nannies and domestic workers to the (clearly unintended) exclusion of "own-account" home-based workers. I look at this point in detail in chapter three.

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[3] See Phizacklea and Wolkowitz 1995, chapter three, for more on this point.
[4] See Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2002-03 *Career Guide to Industries, Childcare Services*. See also Smith 2002.
[5] Ibid., emphasis added.

As the ground of economic restructuring has shifted over the past three decades, and as homework and female labor have become such vital local forces in the era of internationally mandated "structural adjustment policies," organized political and social responses to the extremely vulnerable situations of home-based workers have proliferated (Boris and Prügl 1996). Policy studies have pointed to the need for concerted local and international political action to improve the conditions of homeworkers worldwide (Boris and Prügl 1996; European Commission 1995; ILO 1990; Mitter 1994; Prügl 1999; Rowbotham 1993). Yet, home-based worker organizing is certainly as old as home-based work. The fact that there is relatively very little social scientific, historical or cultural analysis of the politics of homework should not mislead us in this important respect (Boris 1994). Nor should the fact that the contemporary impetus for home-based labor organizing (and studies of home-based organizing) has been, in many respects, the political response of home-based workers, advocates, and academics in the global South to local political and economic divisions as much as, if not more than, the local onslaught of globalization and structural adjustment (Balakrishnan 2001; Boris and Prügl 1996).

The Category Confusions in Women's Home-Based Work

Historical and contemporary studies of home-based work suggest that women's work at home is turbulent and volatile work, closely connected to local and global capitalist divisions as well as the historic, male-centered definition of labor. In the era of "globalization" and "structural adjustment," I am suggesting that one look at the home, and work at home, somewhat more emphatically than many homework studies have, to look at the home as an expansive place of "women's work," where "invisible threads" of value and control are weaving new kinds of material for political economic organizing on multiple sides.

As one sign of the growing turbulence of "women's work" which homework studies indicate, women are working more, and in more places, than ever before. The official rate of women's labor force participation continues a broken but steady rise, with notably few exceptions throughout the world. Women's so-called informal labor, occurring outside or alongside historically recognized and officially counted forms of labor (including home-based labor), is growing extremely rapidly throughout sub-Saharan African, Latin America, and Central and South Asia, that is, in most, and in the most populated areas, of the world. Add to this surge in women's informal (and formal) sector work, subsistence agricultural production. And then add to informal and formal sector work and subsistence agricultural production, so-called traditional "women's work," including housework, domestic work, "homework," homemaking, cooking, shopping, taking care of children and the elderly, nursing the sick, community work, volunteering, budgeting, planning, educating, advocating, community and neighborhood organizing, etc.

Far from being facetious. I offer this laundry list of "women's work" to draw attention to the fact that virtually all of the latter activities are done predominantly (although certainly not exclusively) by women. and virtually all of them are done "for free." that is without remuneration. Thus. stepping aside from the divisions of home-based work for a moment. one might stop and briefly consider the more general economic structure which invests most. if not all. laboring activity – i.e. most expense of human energy – with sex and moral coding of one sort or another. From the perspective of the turbulent field of women's work today. the home remains a super-expansive site. a non-place. if you will. of and for the perspective of globalization. structural adjustment. and internationally and sexually-divided labor organizing. as homework studies have so clearly shown. However. it also remains a site for the continued elaboration of sex and gender. particularly in relationship to the rapidly fluctuating. sexually divided relationship of paid to unpaid work. of homework to housework. and of productive to reproductive labor. areas where homework studies have noted considerable connections. but made relatively few interventions.

What is "work at home"? Who does it? When? Why? What is it worth? Who owns it? Who controls it? Who needs it? Who wants it? The answers to these questions today increasingly inform the global and local histories of sex. gender. race in which the neat distinctions of public and private. formal and informal. productive and reproductive tend to conceal or make one forget the actual struggles and conditions of work and life in today's era of global and local structural adjustments. As one major indication of the power of that "forgetting": women provide two-thirds of the labor that is both economically essential yet literally "worthless" in the world. i.e. worth far *less* than most other work—slavery and bonded labor being the widespread exceptions (UNDP 1995). Labor that is historically cited as a civic institution and cultural contribution, a "natural force" of social life, "women's work" is consistently excluded in the annals of social policy, the law, economics and political science, to name just a few of the more power-oriented fields (Folbre 2001). Some, maybe most, of it is "valued" in one way or another, but what little is actually paid is generally paid very little. Most of it – an estimated $16 *trillion* worldwide in 1995 – isn't paid at all. By way of this undoubtedly underestimated figure, we are asked to forget that sex has a value, too.[6]

At the general economic level of all laboring activity in the home, analysis can be as unclear and turbulent as the transition between paid and unpaid activities for home-based workers, as spontaneously and imperceptibly as these often occur. For now, let us take the commonly made or presumed distinction between home-based production, on the one hand, and housework, on the other. (Shortly, I will return to this to see how, in fact, each holds the other in place, theoretically, politically, and in everyday practice.) One problem with this distinction is that it assumes homogeneity in the terms. By itself, home-based work (including work as diverse as manufacturing, telework, child care, and, in an extended way, "domestic work") is organized, structured and classified in diverse and contradictory ways. There is considerable effort being made today to classify those who work principally at home for pay, but little agreement on how to accomplish this. Is one a "homeworker," "outworker," "self-employed entrepreneur," "petty commodity producer," "informal" or "underground" worker, "subsistence" worker, or a combination of these, at any given moment? The example I turn to in Chapter Three, home-based child care providers, often referred to as "family day care providers," fit into most of these (as well as other) categories of home-based work. Turbulence, it appears, resides not only in the home and work, but in systematic classification as well, or as Sheila Rowbotham (1993) put it: "Homework confuses the categories." How to sort and make sense of the categories becomes a struggle at once over how to organize the space and the worker(s), but also how to divide the time and the labors; how the flows of money and time and value will be arranged and coded; and how the (female) labor and its value will be controlled, and by whom. The analysis of home-based work, thus, draws one more or less immediately into the heart of much more common, and much more divided, forms of social labor, political organization and sexual reproduction.

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[6] See UNDP 1995. The UNDP report doesn't include sexual activity, legal or illegal, in its estimation of the monetary value of unpaid labor worldwide.

There are pitfalls and strategies in the use of any name. The ruse of homework is its established affinity to housework. When I use, for the most part, the terms home-based work or homework to refer explicitly to the wide variety of work done primarily in the home for monetary payment of one kind of another, and implicitly to the multiplicity of forms of social organization and reproduction bound up in the domestic economy, it should be evident that I am making a very partial choice. In such a conflation, "homework" tends to unify the common characteristics and classifications of the diverse forms of home-based work, including how these forms share theoretically and practically with "housework," "homemaking," and "household survival" (which are rarely the same strategy or experience), as well as how housework, homemaking and household survival are stereotypically sexually divided labors. For in the theory and practice of homework, the rhetorical, and perhaps more often the empirical, question is almost ways posed: how many home-based income-earners self-identify as homemakers, mothers, or housewives, rather than homeworkers? The classic confusion in the question should be quickly put to rest: many, maybe most, do. And many, and in some places most, do not.

The consequences of these differences are incalculable in a way that labor organizers perhaps have yet to realize (that is, in the way that both large and petty capitalist subcontractors of homework have): production, including the production of value, in the home is infinite. Home-based industrial producers (e.g. assembly, sewing, manufacture) consistently work on and off, throughout the day and night, throughout the week, month and year, and decade, interweaving homework with housework, child care, shopping, agricultural work, community work, and the rest. Apparently, many teleworkers and home-based child care providers, the new service-sector homeworkers par excellence, do as well. And some do not. Indeed, many set specific blocks of time aside to focus, successfully or not, on their (or their spouse's) homework. The "trade-offs" and "imbalances" are continuous, around the clock, and assume more or less importance depending on the day, the week, the moment, the year.

Thus, making a distinction between homework and housework doesn't necessarily simplify things. One has to keep it in mind, even while refusing to watch the clock and mind the turbulence. Sociologists Alan Felstead and Nick Jewson (1999), in an effort to develop the kind of typology of home-based work I am arguing is theoretically (because practically) impossible (and yet still "empirically" necessary), identified and described strategies which home-based workers – principally in the United Kingdom, although they draw on international data as well – employ to negotiate the difficulties and advantages of home and work when home is work and work is home. Useful as such a typology may be for the experts, even the authors admit that there are far more in-between, crossover, and hybrid strategies than one could possibly identify. And it is important to note how such typologies, in attempting to positively clarify the field, can end up creating false distinctions and missing important connections.[7]

Thus, analysts of home-based work have attempted to show that the multiplicity of situations, strategies, and scenarios of homework is in part related to the absence of explicit rules, theoretical, legal or otherwise, governing home-based work (Felstead and Jewson 1999; Boris and Prügl 1999). Indeed, much as there is virtually no law governing "housework," there is very little regulation for home-based labor, such as labor protections for homeworkers or organizational frameworks for managing, disciplining, unionizing or otherwise organizing homeworkers (European Commission 1995; Prügl 2000; Phizacklea and Walkowitz 1995). In the United States, homework was regulated in a number of industries, in particular garment manufacturing, where unlicensed homework was outlawed for decades. However, there was little enforcement from local, state or federal labor inspectors, especially in the past few decades, as restrictions on the employment of homeworkers were gradually removed (Boris 1994). The social exposure of large-scale scenes of illicit homework, such as the case of the thousands of immigrant, home-based garment workers tracked down in New Jersey in the 1980s, illustrate both the weaknesses and complicities in the enforcement system, as well as the widespread, underground nature of officially outlawed home-based work (New Jersey State Department of Labor 1982). Internationally, the first-ever International Labour Organization convention on homework was passed in 1996, largely as a result of the organization of home-based workers and the lobbying of homeworker advocates (Prügl 2000). I discuss these efforts in greater detail in the next chapter. Since passage of the homework convention, only a handful of countries have ratified it, both indicating the difficulties in forcing the issue onto national agendas, but also heightening the prospect of long-term national and international organizing and lobbying around the specific issues of home-based work (ILO 1990; Tate 1996).

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[7] Re-examining Bourdieu's notion of habitus, closely related to Felstead and Jewson's analysis of "household understandings" in the context of home-based production, may be helpful here, once disentangled from the European enclosure which unequally reproduces it. I discuss this at greater length in chapters two and six.

Absent formal regulations, home-based workers find themselves in situations where they may often be able to control their time or work process (although this generalization strains against itself as well: "may often...be able...to control...their time"), but rarely how much they will get paid, or *if* they will get paid, another frequent problem among low-wage home-based workers; or whether the supply of work will last more than a week, month or season. On the other hand, where better-positioned home-based workers have more leverage on wages and supply of work, they may have less or no control over time or quality. Or, at any given time, they may have both. Or neither. In short, control over time and the value of labor are turbulent areas for those interested and invested in home-based work. That is, to reiterate, there is always something else happening in work at home which impedes and resists empirical classification and measurement; positivist specifications – or generalizations for that matter – are useful only to the extent that one is willing to exclude those populations of home-based workers, and those kinds of work, which are not counted or classified or known. I am arguing that with the tight relationship of women's paid and unpaid labor in the home, "homework" or "home-based production" (or whatever one wishes to call it) cannot be "properly" classified, counted, or rationalized. This doesn't mean that powerful forces have not tried, or will not continue to do so – dangerously, I would add. However, the obverse is also true: that if anything could be said to characterize the world of home-based work, it is uncertainty and confusion. And over time, uncertainty and confusion have a way of looking a lot like volatility and turbulence – where change is not only likely; it is planned, organized and expected. As one moves from wealthier to poorer sites and regions within a country, and between world regions, this "turbulence" grounded on change tends to rise and fall, as it does, in different ways, when homeworkers organize themselves and each other to expose and change the conditions of their work. The dynamic of home-based work, thus, is positioned within the conflux of the powerful home-based forces of production and consumption, sex and reproduction, work and leisure, and the lived, "at home" experience of class and culture. The "energies" of home, in short, fuel a different kind of political economy than has been imagined thus far.

Homework and Capitalism

What has been said with somewhat less uncertainty and confusion is that for over one hundred and fifty years, low-wage work conducted in workers' own homes, alongside formally unpaid housework, child care, and other household or domestic labor, has been a *formal* feature of capitalist production and services on a global scale.[8] In *Capital*, Marx analyzed the introduction of machinery into manufacturing as the cause of a dissolution not just of the work process, but of the entire social division of labor. Henceforth, he wrote, the social division of labor would be:

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[8] Clearly, this formulation should also include the domestic work of servants, nannies, babysitters, housekeepers, maids, cooks, and other paid and very often unpaid workers, whose work is conducted in *other* workers' "own homes" all the time; the split between home-based labor studies and domestic work

> based, wherever possible, on the employment of women, of children of all ages and of unskilled workers, in short of 'cheap labour' as the Englishman typically describes it. This is true not only for all large-scale production, whether machinery is employed or not, but also for the so-called domestic industries, whether carried on in the private dwellings of the workers, or in small workshops. (Marx 1976: 590)

Several things are still at stake in Marx's 150-year old formula of capitalism: industrial labor divided as much by the combined forces of sex, generation and empire, as by skill; specifically capitalist production based explicitly on women's and children's home-based labor; and, as we shall see, and as noted by Marxist feminists for some time, a patriarchal, or at very least androcentric, conceptualization of the home as well as of economic production. Home-based industry, Marx wrote, once characterized by "independent urban handicrafts, independent peasant farming and, *above all, a dwelling-house for the worker and his family*...has now been converted into an external department of the factory..." (ibid.: 591, emphasis added). That is to say, things had already changed in Marx's time: the deskilling and dissolution of the old division of labor; the emergence of homework on a large industrial scale, where previously it had existed on a more or less independent or decentralized scale; and the emergence of sexually and generationally divided labor in capitalist production. Sexually divided home-based production had gone on before, to be sure, and would continue "for the worker and his family." But for Marx,

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studies must not be papered over, although I admit I am doing little here to make practical connections in terms of a program of research. This remains to be done.

the devaluation of *this* labor, set in motion "by means of invisible threads" in capitalism, represented a loss not merely of value in the "collective labourer," as he termed it, but a loss of the women's and children's labors that had traditionally maintained the home. Yet contrary to appearances, what had changed was not the specifically sexual division of labor of the home. Far from inexorable progress, then, the ensuing labor struggle for a "family wage" under capitalism would be marked in years to come by efforts to return the sexual division of home-based labor "back to the future." Much as Dorothy intoned on her return from the multiply sexualized and gendered dream of Oz, "there's no place like home."

Even farther from progress, in a sense that Marx also didn't recognize, were the inexorable cycles of decentralization of capitalist production. Homework never has given way to centralized production: far from it (Benton 1990; Portes et al. 1989). In the United States for example, officially counted work that is done for pay in people's own homes, including manufacturing, assembly and literally hundreds of different personal and business services, has been more or less steadily increasing over the past three decades (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1998). Telework, clerical, personal service homework, and child care, in particular, have risen quickly over the past two decades (Christensen 1988). As I have indicated, home-based work, and underground economic activity in general, are impossible to know with statistical certainty, much as researchers will continue to try.[9] Estimates of unlicensed home-based child care providers in the U.S., for instance, range from several million to tens of millions (Smith 2002). Neighbors, friends, parents, grandparents, siblings—all provide various forms of child care in their own homes, many for pay, many for exchange of one sort or another, many for love, many for free, many because they don't conceive of not doing it. That these forms of homework are not counted – literally don't count as work – is part of the problematic, defined by the intersection of sex, race, home and work, which the politics of home-based worker "organizing," together with theory, are forced, one way or another, to account for.

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[9] The increasing appearance of time-use studies in the home reflects the demographic effort to catch up with the rapidly changing times, a theme and context I return to in later chapters.

So what are the forces propelling the increase in home-based work in the U.S., where in the past decade it is the increasing number of hours people, especially married women with children, are spending or being forced to spend at work outside the home, that has garnered more academic and political attention than work inside the home?[10] This is a deceptively empirical question: knowing the causes or factors of the current increase may not matter all that much historically. For homework, as we know from Marx, has been around since the first belching mills of capitalism were outsourcing different parts of the production process, from carting or carrying in raw materials to taking out products for overnight processing to final assembly or finish work.[11] Belief in the expectation that home-based work would wither away as a vestige of pre-modern modes of production is our own calculated theoretical and empirical mistake. Why liberals and conservatives alike should think that homework is outmoded, I will show, has as much to do with the conceit of globalizing capitalism as being the most scientifically advanced way (and in a eugenic sense, the *only* way) of doing things in the world, as with the need to continually forget that work – most of it unpaid, most of it by women – goes on in the home all the time in any case, from the wealthiest sites of capital accumulation to the poorest sites of economic pillage, physical devastation and capital flight. In this context, what must be remembered is that there are always-already alternative (and not just oppositional) forms of social and economic organization, and that the alternatives are (at certain moments) up for grabs, so to speak. In a fragmented political culture which many still theorize in Gramsci's frame of class hegemony, the protracted struggle for moral and political control of the transnational home involves both the creation of a common cultural sense of what the home should be, as well as consent to what it actually is, that is to the conditions of control over and within the class politics of the "household," which one should be clear have always been "multiply divided," socially "networked," and productively integrated in an expansive "general" (and in this sense, libidinal) economy.[12]

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[10] On one hand, Schor (1993) and Hochschild (1997) show how work hours are increasing as well as how the external and internal dynamics of the intensification of work can be linked to a liberal politics of and within the home and family; on the other hand, cultural conservatives such as Robertson (2000) use similar data to draw politically opposed conclusions about what Hochschild calls the "time bind" between home and work. Where liberals see exploitation and false promise in the new sexual division of labor, conservatives see cultural erosion and false hope.

[11] See Thompson (1966). For further discussion, see Dangler (1994), chapter four.

There are several implications of this argument, which I explore in later chapters. However, the thought of hegemony in the field of homework studies does begin the process of shifting the focus of questions of control, ownership and subjectivity in the political context of home-based work. Who owns and controls the product of the self-employed workers' labor? In classical Marxist terminology, does the self-employed homeworker, for example a child care provider, own or control her own means of production? Who controls her work process? The worker? The contractor for services? The family? The state? Is there ever uniquely one source of ownership or control? The turbulent situation in which one works at home, possibly with the support of child and spousal labor – "in service" not only to self, "home" and family most if not all of the time, but also in service to the state and capital; or selling a service on the formal or informal market, being subcontracted as a self-employed producer, and being made available for work, so to speak, as part of state-led economic development and structural adjustment policies – the worker of these scenarios, inasmuch as she hardly ever exists simply as "worker" (in that old masculinist, factory-floor kind of way), is interpellated by a series of powerful forces that, I will argue, borrowing the term from Stuart Hall, "overdetermine" the time and space of home-based work and production.

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[12] One still thinks of hegemony with Gramsci partially because the paradigmatic class struggle which informed his use of the term came to dominate the historical scene (and historiography) both within and across national borders, and because the cultural, racial, ethnic and sexual struggles which underscored Eurocentric hegemony themselves gradually took on a more hegemonic appearance. See Stuart Hall's *The Hard Road to Renewal*, where he argues, in the British context, that hegemony has always been up for grabs—and radically re-rooted in racial, sexual and cultural modalities of "class struggle." For a view on hegemony with some thought to the cultural and economic dimensions of home-based (artisanal) production, see García-Canclini (1993). For more on what is meant by "general economy," see Bataille (1991), and the final sections of chapter four here.

The literature of homework reveals the home, "home bodies" and home-based labor to be "privileged" sites of ongoing globalization, structural adjustment, commodification, informalization as well as colonization: "privileged" in the sense that the home and the labor it is expected to offer comes without rules, laws, treaties or negotiations. The "rules" that govern the home are altogether different, and though related, derive from social processes and cultural formations which stem much more prominently from and "everyday life" and "deep" bio-relations (Petersen 1996; Bourdieu 1977). The promise of "work at home," built on the drive and desire for "flexibility" in the circulation of labor, familial reproduction, and productive value, hinges on ethics and politics that precede and underwrite the exchanges and antagonisms of capital and labor, men and women, and parents and children to name only the most obvious and generic players. Hegemony, in this context, is built up not so much in the supply and demand of home-based laboring bodies, although this cannot be underestimated. Rather, cultural and political analysis of home-based labor helps in seeing how hegemony gathers force in the tri-partite organization of laboring "affects," regimes of sexual and ethnoracial autonomy and difference, and "standards of living" (and, one might add, measures of dying). I return in a variety of ways to this organization in the chapters that follow.

Deconstructing Home-based Labor

Classical and Marxist critiques of political economy have relied on analysis grounded in the multiple dichotomies – public and private, formal and informal, production and reproduction – which were theorized as more or less autonomous foundations of capitalist historicity. As with binary oppositions in philosophy and theory, in social practice (as well as hegemonic conceptualizations), one term of the dichotomous pairs was given preference over the other. In both classical and Marxist political economy, analytical attention historically focused on the public and formal economic sectors, on production, and on the interactions between and among these areas. Political economy's failures or inabilities to address the sublated term of each opposition – the private, the informal, reproduction (as well as non-production) – have been criticized, and remedied in certain ways, in recent decades, by Marxist and other feminists critical of the male-centered and "productivist" orientations of dominant political economic approaches.[13] The mutual determinations *within* the dichotomies have also received critical attention, offering a resource to begin thinking differently about social and economic activities that are constantly and simultaneously public and private, formal and informal, productive and reproductive (Redclift and Mingione 1985).

The challenge remains to deconstruct the binary oppositions that have dominated liberal and Marxist political economy and labor studies and develop theory and analysis appropriate to the crossing and movement between and among the oppositions. As we find, for instance, home-based work shot through with "public" and "private" pressures and interests, so much so that it is unclear exactly what either of these terms actually signifies, we can question whether "public" and "private," together or separately, are still appropriate concepts for understanding the dynamics, trajectories, or force of homework either within or across diverse economies and geographies. When we theorize homework at the intersection of formal and informal economic processes, or formal at one point in time, informal at another, we begin to question what the convenience of the distinction between formal and informal sectors is designed to accomplish. In vast regions of the globe, the majority of monetized economic activity is being classified, or reclassified, as "informal sector" work, with street vending and homework being two of the largest categories of so-called "informal work" (International Labour Office 2002). Within the "informal," we note the absolute heterogeneity of activities, so diverse, and so interspersed with "formal" economic activities (the difference often a matter of "statistics," not to mention on-the-ground relations of power) that "informal sector" as it is increasingly being used, ceases to connote anything really useful for a counter-hegemonic politics (Redclift and Mingione 1985). On the other hand, early researchers of "informal work" such as Philip Mattera suggest retaining the distinction between formal and informal because of the possibilities of progressive social and political struggle, arguing that "capital uses the new arrangements [of "off the books" and decentralized economic activity] to increase the degree of exploitation...But insofar as

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See for example Hartmann (1976), Fortunati (1995), Fox (1980), Fraad et al. (1994), and Malos (1980).

people are able to turn the new forms of income-generating activity to their advantage, the structure is less of a *market* and more of a terrain in the struggle for some measure of social autonomy" (Mattera 1985: 26).

I return to these themes, or elements of them, in later chapters. What is important to recall for the discussion of home-based labor – as Mattera wrote about the geographic and political economic shifts towards decentralized (including home-based) production in the globalizing North in the 1970s and early 1980s – is how "the increasing dependence of regular enterprises on marginal and underground labor suggests that the dividing line between the formal and informal sectors is far from clear" (ibid.: 38). The distinction between formal and informal, useful as it was in discovering forgotten elements of social and economic organization (e.g., Benton 1990; Portes et al. 1989), continues to be made at the risk of forgetting the sexual, racial and geographic divisions which underscore the dialectics of liberal and Marxian political economy, as well as the continuous and complex interactions between different modes and spheres of social and economic action which mark such time, body and place-specific analysis (Tuominen 1994b). Thus, the not-so archetypal case of a woman worker who, having recently given birth or forced to take care of an ailing relative or child, shifts from formal industrial or service-sector work to paid home-based, "informal sector" work: she now ends up working far more at home on the unpaid domestic labor that she previously had less time for, but ultimately remained responsible for. Unnoticed in this (ethnoracially and geographically unspecific) account of formal and informal is the "hidden" transfer of domestic labor-time, which analysis of both the formal and the informal still largely conceal. And even this is only a partial acknowledgement of the cost of replacing her labor from outside, of greater household "reproductive" and "care" needs, and of the continuous need for monetary income, the absence of which remains the ultimate determinant of economic status and, given social and geographic conditions, partially or wholly determines physical survival.

Thus, what may be forgotten in this brief description, which crisscrosses the formal and informal, productive and reproductive (as well as, implicitly the public and private) divisions, is the specifically sexual division of domestic labor "energies," which in this account vie with money as the last-instance structural determinant. Both sex and money are certainly economic aspects, but so thoroughly interwoven with other social and cultural texts and textures that they demand another kind of analysis, one that at least acknowledges, as Althusser didn't, that the economic, in the first or last instance, is not an undivided perspective. The description of the formal to informal home-based woman worker I offered above also obscures precisely how sexual determination operates: through internalized gendering, racial and national formation, desire and violence; such that homework is engineered as the failure or impossibility of convincing husbands (or homeworkers themselves) of the social (i.e. national, global/local, or cultural) desirability of wives' earning outside (and "not-earning" inside) the home (Benería and Roldán 1985; Boris 1994; Singh and Kelles-Viitanen 1987). In classical Marxian political economy, this more or less violent patriarchal control of women's labor and bodies should constitute a barrier for capital to overcome; but far from slowing things down, home-based work, in lowering "the costs" (and increasing the controls) of production and reproduction, may in fact speed the circulation of value considerably – and at very least make things politically and culturally different for capital from place to place. I explore some of the implications of this thought at greater length in chapters four and five.

The dichotomies within studies of home-based labor that continue to govern the field are those between homework and housework (with child care appearing ever more frequently to stand in for "housework" in the globalizing North), and paid and unpaid labor. Given the public record of industrial homework around the world, it appears that any contemporary analysis of homework requires a concurrent account of the ways in which women's domestic labor (e.g. cleaning, cooking, shopping, care-giving, etc.) is undergoing major transformations as women worldwide work more and more outside – and more and more inside – the home (Dangler 1999; Felstead and Jewson 1999; Mitter 1986). Homework studies, in this context, have certainly contributed to breaking down many of the false distinctions between public and private, homework and housework, which underlay United States labor history (Boris and Daniels 1989; Boris 1994) – although, as Dangler (1994) notes, the implications of this breakdown still remain important to theorize.

Part of the reason that homework studies succeeded in closing the gap between homework and housework, I would argue, is that it so starkly posed the problem of the sexual division and definition of "labor" as such. As Eileen Boris illustrated so well in *Home to Work*, her landmark (1994) history of homework in the United States, virtually all of the twentieth century social and political debates over the continued existence of homework in the United States centered on homeworkers' position as mothers, caregivers, and "homemakers," far more than on their super-exploited status as out-of-the-factory workers. Similarly, Jeanne Boydston's (1990) discussion of eighteenth and nineteenth century home-based labor demonstrated how thoroughly the "gender division of labor" at the turn of the eighteenth century became a "gender definition of labor." As she noted:

> Although women have been involved in cash-based labor throughout the history of the United States, much of that work has been comparatively unorganized and erratic, interwoven with their unpaid labor. Consequently, the history of paid work, especially when "paid work" is analyzed as an experience separable from other aspects of social life, is most visibly a history of men's experiences. The result is a construction of industrialization as a largely genderless process—genderless both because men are treated as un-gendered creatures, and becomes the transformation is assumed to have raised gender issues only peripherally. (Boydston 1990: 122)

With "labor" as a denotation for men's paid work, or work which women might do occasionally or under special circumstances, vast ranges of women's experience – which men often shared – became defined and organized variously as homemaking, household management, home economics, domestic science, childrearing, leisure activity, etc., and not "work." As Boydston and others have shown, such definitions have always been contested by individual women as well as women's organization, privately and publicly, in writing and in collective action. Yet, the power to transform them has remained elusive. Legal scholar Reva Siegel (1998), for instance, discusses the efforts of the white, middle-class women's movement of the mid-nineteenth century to put a price on women's domestic labor in order to make a case for women's property rights. As she and others note, courts have refused valuing housework, including child care, to this day (see also Crittenden 2001; Folbre 2001). Nor has the economic necessity of women's home-based earning challenged the hard "empirical" distinctions of housework and homework. Homework researchers regularly (and often critically) report that women's earnings from home-based labor are stereotypically viewed by both official and unofficial observers as "pin-money," "supplemental income," "extra earnings," etc., even when, as in the majority of cases, they are used for basic household expenses; or alternatively, as is increasingly the case in the global South and globalizing North, they constitute the largest source of income in the household (Beneria and Roldan 1987).[14]

The supplemental dichotomy to housework and homework turns out to be paid and unpaid labor, and what tends to drop out in treatments of home-based labor is the "unpaid" labor of housework and child care. This remains, in many ways, the underlying problematic which this work seeks to examine. Income-distribution strategies, time-use strategies, conditions of paid work, international subcontracting links, employment status, social protections of wage and piece-rate workers—all of these tend to dominate the analysis of and research response to homework, and rightly so. What I will argue in subsequent chapters is that in losing sight of, that is not theorizing, the conditions that govern *unpaid* "home-based labor," including the production of housewives and caregivers, well-intentioned researchers and advocates risk forgetting that the invisibility of home-based labor is itself productive of other important, and highly valuable, "disappearances." Waged and other home-based labor, I am arguing, is not the "final link in the chain of production," as some homework researchers have claimed. In their own way, the petty capitalist and labor contractors of home-based production know that the logic of "work at home" isn't only, or even ultimately, "decentralization," lower-costs, or flexibility. They know the logic is about – and desperately want it to be about – women's "traditional," that is to say "modern," work and "place," a geographic, sexual and racial control of labor power that undergirds the social division of labor as well as the flows of value that the home circulates in abundance.

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[14] Various studies of the Women in Informal Employment Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) critically document the reports and analysis of these "informal" earnings and distributions. See www.wiego.org.

In the context of hegemonic relations of force, the difference between housework and homework – for the tenuous distinction still remains important – is not which work is paid and which is unpaid. There is ample and growing research that documents how, particularly in the class context of low-paid homework, virtually all house/homework is economically "vital" and "valuable." Most of the time, monetary income is "obviously" most important, as is often noted. Yet the substitution of unpaid for previously or potentially contracted out work (such as child care, cooking, or cleaning) may be equally, if not more, important at times, according to at least some schools of economic sociology (Redclift and Mingione 1985). Paid and unpaid, many women do certain work or jobs at home because they need or experience a demand for monetary income, and for a variety of reasons do not or cannot or will not do similar (and typically better paid) work *outside* the home. The "reasons" are as varied as the material and immaterial, manual and emotional, educational and sexual labors brought together under the rubric of "housework." What the latter has come to represent is not only the taken-for-granted baseline reproduction of capital and the socius;[15] it is also the major repository of the planet's sexually, racially and nationally divided surplus labor (Mies 1986). For in the lingering logic of neoliberal capitalist society. if you don't work. you are either unemployed or a housewife. And as has been noted literally all over the world. if you are a homeworker. you are (still) a housewife.[16] By the same token. housewives are generally never unemployed. Except in times of war. housewives have generally been considered out of the workforce and/or unavailable for work. Until recently. that is. Since the 1950s. the percentage of married and unmarried women. with and without children participating in the paid labor force outside the home. has risen. "dramatically" in common journalistic parlance. in almost all countries of the world. I discuss these global changes in women's labor force participation more in the section that follows: in Chapter Two I also discuss the dynamics of "housework" at greater length.

To this point. I have sought to draw out the distinctions between housework and homework. indeed to more or less collapse them. in order to begin theorizing the dynamics which both link and underlie them. The "relationship" of housework and homework. I am arguing. is one of *différance*. to borrow Jacques Derrida's philosophical term: a relationship of one to the other which is different in space and deferred in time. still in the economy of the same. Different in space and form. and deferred in time and memory. the "forgotten" labors of home. are also. researchers of home-based work commonly remind us. "hidden" and "invisible." Hidden and invisible because employers (which also include and involve husbands and fathers and other male heads) want (to keep) it that way. Hidden and invisible because concerned researchers and advocates

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[15] With the rise of mass home-based schooling and home shopping in the United States. there re-emerges the specter of a "frontier" population. with some common national and cultural characteristics. who never leave home. even if they do have American Express.

[16] The dominant logic applies mostly. but not exclusively. to married women. An unmarried mother who works at home. remains. at best. a "head of household." or "single-earner mother" in today's classificatory schema. In the U.S.. reminiscent of an earlier era of welfare provision. this figure thus remains a prime subject of social control. state-sponsored marriage lessons. and police suspicion.

have difficulty measuring and calculating it, and because they are few and it is vast. Hidden and invisible because governments, with few exceptions, wish to generally encourage it or ignore it (often the same thing); or where they wish to do something about it, lack the means, will or force. Forgotten because its invisibility hides other secrets grounded in the sexual and racial divisions of labor – in violence as well as in desire – which one is variously complicit with at any given moment. I return to these themes, and the crossing of homework with housework, throughout the remaining chapters.

The Globalization and Structural Adjustment of Women's Home-based Labors

The scale of the crossing of homework with housework is both global and local, or to use Eric Swyngedouw's dissonant amalgam, "glocal." The much heralded technological revolution of the past thirty years in the post-industrializing, now "glocalizing," North has been premised both strategically and materially on shifts to decentralized production, "flexible" and casualized employment, massive technological investment and tremendous capitalization in its own highly industrialized countries, as well as super-exploitation strategies, including "offshore assembly" and export processing zones, financial deregulation and informal sector economic development in the industrializing postcolonies of the "global South" (Moody 1997). Part and parcel of this shift to a so-called post-Fordist regulation of labor and deregulation of capital has been an intensified multinational capitalist push for higher rates of profit based on favorable trade agreements, strategic international financial dominance, and the super-exploitation of women's very low wage labor (Mitter 1986; Piore and Sabel 1984). Such strategies were themselves premised on already existing and manipulable local and global divisions of labor based on race and migration (Nakano Glenn 1992; Phizacklea 1984; Portes et al. 1989; Sassen 1988). There is an abundance of studies which have documented the impact of foreign and national investment in export-based production on sexually divided labor in maquiladora and other on- and offshore assembly work around the world, often with a focus on U.S. led industrialization in the Americas and Carribean, as well as East Asia (see, e.g., Fuentes and Ehrenreich 1983; Fernandez Kelly 1983; Fernandez-Kelly and Garcia 1989; Tiano 1994).

Backing up these enormous shifts of sexually-divided labor, IMF, World Bank and U.S. and European structural adjustment policies – the so-called "Washington Consensus" – forced industrializing countries in the Southern hemisphere to restructure internal markets and domestic economies as preconditions for "development" in the form of continued international loans, economic assistance, and capital investment (see, e.g., Bello 1994; Chang 1999). However, the casualization of labor in the "global South," including the creation of massive informal economies and forced migration, as well as export-oriented economic restructuring, cannot be explained as mere appurtenances of "economic globalization" (Sassen 1988). Even as the "globalization" thesis continues to hold sway in the popular media and misnamed "anti-globalization" social movements in the 2000s, its rapid academic diffusion as a multi-valent signifier of local, national, and international structural change has become more controversial, and the extent of changes which "globalization" is purported to explain are now receiving much closer scrutiny (Aronowitz and Gautney 2002; Moody 1997; Panitch and Leys 1999). Behind economic "globalization," there was certainly abundant evidence for major shifts after the 1950s in capitalist enterprise, towards, for example, longer chains of production through subcontracting (Carr et al. 2000). Yet compared to a century ago, the proportion of global trade and investment isn't significantly different today (Moody 1997).

What is different from a century ago is multinational commodity production – production of a line of clothing or furniture that begins in a design department of a US-based company, for instance, that make its way through a chain of managers and subcontractors based in different countries to a home-based assembly shop in yet another country, and returns ultimately for distribution and sale back in the U.S. or in Europe or Japan. But truly multinational production still isn't such a vast percentage of total production on a global scale (Moody 1997). In the colonial period, the typical demand by the dominant national economies was for raw materials, as well as manufactures such as cloth and agricultural productions. In the neo-colonial and post-colonial periods, this hasn't changed much.

The difference from the perspective of the international division of labor, important as it is, isn't exactly phenomenal. There was compelling evidence in the post-1973 period of profound political, economic and social changes as the result of an intensified (although not qualitatively different) international division of labor and sex (Mies 1986; Heyzer 1986; Midnight Notes Collective 1992). The creation of so-called free trade zones was the direct – even explicit – effect of structural adjustment policies imposed by international finance agencies of the North as well as of other forms of international-state complicity in *producing* low-wage labor and low-wage labor migrants. Far from *searching* for "cheap" labor, as today's globalization-friendly story tells us, structural adjustment policies and other international trade agreements effectively *commanded* developing nation-states to make ever cheaper labor present (and present labor cheaper) in exchange for loans, capital, military aid and a place in the "family of nations" (Fuentes and Ehrenreich 1983; Mitter 1986). In this broad global economic and international political context, women's increasing presence as devalued and degraded labor in free-trade zones, maquiladoras, sweatshops, multinational telework offices and other paid labor outside and inside the home, has been viewed both as the intended effect of economic and social liberalization, as well as a discrete (though often quite explicit) form of local and global sex trafficking (Chang 1999; Enloe 1989; Fuentes and Ehrenreich 1983).

However, what is phenomenally different today in globalizing terms – and this may be the signature effect of structural adjustment – is financial "liberalization" and massive indebtedness, as well as the enormity and speed of multinational financial transactions, all of which have ultimately changed the nature and stakes of global capitalism. The 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 2001-02 Argentina financial (and subsequent political crisis), and the ongoing debt crisis in the global South are telltales of the changes wrought by global financialization and IMF structural adjustment programs. With the deregulation of state controls on capital movement, part and parcel of a broader liberalizing strategy to open newly industrializing markets to multinational corporate ownership and control, capital became in the 1990s increasingly secure in knowing that it could flow, while rebellious and redundant labor would still be subject to strict controls on international movement. So when the bottom dropped out in Thailand in 1997, capital pulled out, freely and quickly, from the many countries in the region where it had wrested control.[17]

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[17] Malaysia being one case where the government renewed controls on foreign capital, and subsequently felt far less of the impact in 1997, earning even the grudging respect of the IMF and U.S. pro-capitalist

This freedom of capital mobility, as well as multinational corporate ownership and control (with increased focus on intellectual property rights and royalties), could not have proceeded, however, without the political and economic force of structural adjustment policies; and this, I would argue, is what defines "globalization" from the perspective of internationally divided sexual labor. "Structural adjustment programmes, designed to reorient economies to the advantage of foreign investors, typically through the wholesale privatisation of state-owned industries and services, the liberalisation of rules on trade and investment, a reduction in wages and social spending, a tight monetary policy and related measures, have generated widespread condemnation among affected citizens' groups around the world," reports 50 Years is Enough, a leading political network for global debt cancellation. "It is generally acknowledged that adjustment programmes have been devastating for the poor and have increased income inequality and social instability. Just as importantly, they have wrecked the national productive capacity of many countries."[18] The sell-off of state-owned or controlled property and industry, as well as natural resources, has meant massive unemployment in these sectors, weakening of existing trade union power, lower wages, and the informalization of much of this previously public, formal and state-sector employment (Elyachar 2002). And informalization, in turn, reinforced what Mies (1986) termed "housewifeization": the hand-in-glove process of "ex-territorialization of costs which otherwise would have to be covered by the capitalists" and the "total atomization and disorganization of these hidden workers" (Mies 1986: 110).

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economic pundits such as Paul Blustein: "Malaysia Survives Dire Predictions," *Washington Post* Wednesday, May 19, 1999, Page E01.

Theoretically, seeing "housewifeization" conjoined to informalization of labor and structural adjustment policies and outcomes (that is to economic and political "ex-territorialization of costs") helps to fill in the gaps of otherwise useful feminist critiques of structural adjustment, as in the following:

> Policy shifts can affect which kinds of work fall into the productive and reproductive spheres, who does the work and how much time each individual within a household allocates to each. For example, consider the arrival of a cheap imported foodstuff. Previously, women made it in the home for the household's own consumption because it was too expensive or not available in the market. Now the family can afford to purchase it in the market. Consequently, the making of this foodstuff could shift from unpaid reproductive work to paid productive work. Might this free up some women's time previously spent on domestic chores? Might there be a disagreement between men in the family who want the food to be made in the "traditional way" at home and females who prefer the labor-saving market option?[19]

From the perspective of housewifeization/informalization, one would also have to ask, might this gender and class-based disagreement be resolved through the informal/domestic-sector transfer of women's unpaid to paid labor in the commodified form of home-based work? This and other similar transfers, which are neither transfers

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[18] Karen Hansen-Kuhn and Steve Hellinger, "SAPs Link Sharpens Debt Relief Debate. Cologne G-7 Initiative a 'Self-serving Formula'" *Economic Justice News*, Vol. 2, No. 3, September 1999, Washington, DC. Fifty Year is Enough.

of place nor of time, but transfers, as we shall see, of value and control, rapidly (cf. "invisibly") transpose the critical terms of discussion about structural adjustment from the political economy of the international system and nation-state to the political economy of the home and patriarchy. This is not to say that either structural adjustment or the home is the same everywhere all the time, nor that patriarchy is sufficiently specified a term to apply equally just anywhere. Global and domestic geographies, broken out of the Cold War freeze-frame but attuned to "global/local" realpolitik, help to specify the twinning of structural and home-based adjustment in place and time, a necessary step towards organizing (of many kinds), as we shall see in the following chapters.[20]

Homework and Hegemony

The global shifts to home-based work can be straightforwardly understood, I have suggested, in the context of structural adjustment. Privatization and economic development strategies that demand the informalization of labor shift value – and power – from the state sector, organized labor, and trade unions to multinational corporations, dispersed chains of commodity production, and intensified forms of policing and control at the "grassroots" level – including the household. As Julia Elyachar describes it in the context of World Bank-led structural adjustment in Egypt in the 1990s:

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[19] Pam Sparr, "Making the Connections Between Debt, Trade & Gender" *Economic Justice News*, Vol. 4, No. 3, October 2001 (Washington, DC: 50 Years is Enough).

[20] See Dan Moshenberg (Forthcoming [a]) for further elaboration of this thought in the structurally adjusted field of immigrant occupational health.

> Whether intentionally or not, a development program directed toward the informal economy expands the social space over which the state is not sovereign. Such a development approach thus accords well with neoliberal ideology in that it advocates a dimunition of the state and its disengagement from the terrain of economic activity. (Elyachar 2002: 496)

As Elyachar goes on to point out, however, the loss of state economic hegemony leads to a shift in power to institutions of globalization such as the World Bank and dominant transnational corporations (e.g., Monsanto), as well to the newly "empowered" NGOs who must remake themselves as agencies of the "grassroots" in order to re-construct the flows of both finance and social control.[21] As we know from studies of home-based work, the flows of finance and control at home are intensive, entailing not merely "household survival strategies," and reallocations of labor time, but also the reassertion of domestic patriarchal control, or at least its possibility, as well as a re-structuring of local economic and labor networks also frequently centered on petty-patriarchal and petty-capitalist control (Balakrishnan 2000; Prügl 1999).

Despite, or rather because of this, it remains important to emphasize not only the vertical and lateral movements of capital and control on the shifting, turbulent ground of structural adjustment at the macro level, but also the systematic circulation of social forces in the structurally compressed environments of and surrounding "home." Informalization, in this context, reterritorializes power and control through the flows of capital on a super-expanded scale, where small and medium-scale mediating institutions, in particular NGOs, political and economic associations, and community-based organizations, increasingly find themselves in the position of political elite, welfare and regulatory agency, and economic development specialist. Capital in subtle or not so subtle ways may take on the mantle of home-based and community "organizer." In this context, the state, far from withering away (especially at the local level), helps pave the way for expanded and intensified neoliberal structural adjustment through its locally controlled "economic development" political machinery. Through population control, micro-investment and policing of all kinds, the local state and its functionaries and political allies clear away social and political obstacles to "development," simultaneously legitimizing not only the strategy, but the mediating institutions which will carry out the work. Those that are not with the "program" face tremendous state opposition.

In *The Labor of Dionysus*, Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt traced in social, political and juridical theory some of what preceded or accompanied this on-the-ground movement. Their conclusion that "not the state, but civil society has withered away" appears justified in the context of structural adjustment and economic globalization, if "civil society" is understood as a polemical space of oppositional political organizing. At the "grassroots" level, which I am suggesting is always more or less routed through the home – and therefore women's home-based labors – trade unions and traditional Left political parties speak for, and to, smaller and smaller populations, and they control increasingly smaller shares of political hegemony (Moody 1997). [22]

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[21] Elyachar (2002) details the shifting political economic strategies of the kind of World Bank-led development which directly entails, and exposes, the complicity of NGOs which must, in the neo-liberal framework, present themselves standing in for the "grassroots".

[22] This is perhaps more true in post-industrial than in industrializing countries (such as Brazil), and may point to another, and different, global arrangement of capital and labor than in the previous First-Second-Third World system.

The question to Negri and Hardt, which readers of their more recent excursion into power on a global scale, *Empire*, have also been posing, focuses attention on how the social and political "multitudes" they allude to might respond to the rearrangement of (bio)political-economic power and control under the rubric of increasingly subsumed mechanisms of "grassroots organizing." Bear in mind, Negri's long association with the Italian workerist and autonomist schools of Marxism, which argued more or less coherently throughout the 1960s and 1970s that shifts in global and local power were the result of continuous struggle between changing formations of capital and labor, suggesting that the political economic changes we are seeing today are, in fact, a counter-revolution by national and multinational capitals, which "went global" as a response to the rising national political power of labor movements, social movements, and traditional working class political power. Rethinking home-based work in neo-Gramscian terms, i.e. *glocal* class struggle for moral and political consensus, or hegemony, as I noted earlier in this chapter, would require a rethinking of how home-based labor is positioned by, and re-positions, always contested "grassroots" social forces (the "multitudes" of "Empire") at the front door of, as well as inside, the home, i.e. in the whorl of twenty-first century political economy. It would also require a rethinking of precisely which forces the home mobilizes, that is to say, how the composition and re-composition of "class" in the context of political and social struggles over power, value, and ownership relies on changing sexual, racial and international divisions of labor, power, and "energy." I take up these themes in greater detail in the chapters that follow, turning first to a greater look at the topography of "women's work" at home.

Chapter Two – 'No Place Like Home': Marxist and Feminist Topographies of House and Homework

What the Nation must realize is that the home, when both parents work, is non-existent. (Agnes E. Meyer, 1943)[23]

Secure housing is the greatest risk of deconstructive discourse. (Mark Wigley, *The Architecture of Deconstruction: Derrida's Haunt*)

The Home/Work "Revolution"

By the 1990s, home was being heralded in the United States – not, of course, for the first time – as a new utopia. It appeared that Alvin Toffler's (1980) prediction of the "mass electronic cottage" was being realized on an altogether new scale. A trade magazine devoted entirely to the home-based e-business "explosion," *House of Business*, was launched at the turn of the century. A lead editorial in an early 2001 issue of the magazine, entitled "The Bandwidth Revolution," proclaimed:

> It's a new year, and a new vision is sweeping the land – the vision of total connectivity at home. All the injustices of the old order are dissolving in the path of this new marvel: Gone are death by dial-up, meg-starvation, and imprisonment and slow torture in graybar land. In their place is the shimmering new world of electronic proximity, networked homes, and universal work anywhere-anytime connectivity.[24]

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[23] Agnes E. Meyer, *Washington Post*, April 10, 1943.
[24] Editor's Note, *House of Business*, January-February 2001, p. 6.

While noting some of the "bugs" in the home connectivity social program, the editorial had the requisite spirit of the networking day, up-beat and down-to-earth at the same time. History, not to mention anachronism, is a thing of the past! The editorial continued:

> ...[R]ead about the art gallery owners who have an artist in residence in their stunning gallery/office/home. That's a place with 'no dividing line between home and work,' says one of the owners. In antediluvian times you would have assumed she was complaining. But then she adds, 'But we like it this way. Open space makes for a nice flow.'

The description of the free-flowing, networked house is unusually similar to that of the pre-industrial town house—with workers and others circulating in and out day and night, work and leisure running parallel and often simultaneous courses, and family and privacy being objects that had acquired neither a connection to each other nor a social significances of their own (Rybczynski 1986). The difference of today's "revolution" is precisely the family, however, as the editor of *House of Business* noted in the closing lines of the editorial:

> ...[L]est all this seem too future-oriented for you, it's good old-fashioned love of family that our subjects cite over and over as their reason for working in a house of business.

> "I have three kids for whom it is just so much better to live here," says [Andy] Stewart [Martha Stewart's ex-husband, living/working in Vermont, out of New York offices].
>
> Yes you can live anywhere. With the revolution, all distances are created equal. [25]

The propaganda of networked home e-business is fomented through appeal to the privatized family, on the one hand, and social, that is to say, spatial equality on the other. Located somewhere between the desirable and necessary reproduction of the family and the democratic space of social equality, I am arguing, is the contemporary (hidden, invisible) "homeworker." Neither free from familial responsibility, nor with immediate access to democratized space, the homeworker finds herself in the very place where she is purported to be most safe, most free, and most respected: at home—only she's not really there, or not yet, or not enough. The Enlightenment discourse of social equality serves here not only to obfuscate the realities of home-based work: it also reinforces the value of the disappearance of the "antediluvian" industrial economy and its social woes. On the other hand, in the ghostly re-imagining of the broadband home, the pre-capitalist town house meets the modernist family in an open space, flowing with people and work, and effectively erasing the nineteenth century's ideological and material separations of home and work, private and public, production and reproduction—if not also the sexes and races.

I cite this editorial of the "new economy" for several reasons. First, to recall (once again) that not all homework is the same, despite the class-inflected exposure of "work at home" as a socio-economic utopia in the early twenty-first century. To illustrate in part how home-based work in the U.S. is being treated more or less hegemonically, I would turn to the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration's first directive on home-based work, which was released in 2000 (not all that late considering that OSHA was forced on a reluctant government by labor unions only a few decades before). Under the terms of the directive, home-based worksites in general, while falling under the rules and regulations of the agency, will nevertheless *not* be inspected by OSHA field agents for health and safety conditions. The directive cites the privacy of the home as the general rule guiding the decision to not inspect. Home-based *offices* are explicitly named in this context: they will not be inspected under any circumstances. Home-based industrial worksites, involving certain kinds of machinery, electronic equipment, and so on, may be inspected, but *only if a complaint is made.* [26] Low-paying and industrial homework, though acknowledged to be different from home-based office work in terms of health and safety risk, is nevertheless subordinated to telework and other forms of "white-collar" and/or entrepreneurial home-based work in the regulatory context of health and safety. All home-based work begins to look the same through such exposure, and the apparent virtue of home-based work goes more or less unexamined. Indeed, the health risks of routine office work such as data processing – i.e. risks addressed by ergonomics – are out of the question in the publicly sanctioned privacy of the home.

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[25] Ibid., p. 6.

[26] See OSHA Directive CPL 2-0.125, effective date February 25, 2000. Home-based child care is not mentioned in the directive, despite being the largest single homeworking sector in the U.S. In the next chapter, I examine some of the consequences of the regulation of the child care home and child care worker

Second, it is important to recall that home-based work is rationalized or normalized across class lines by an appeal to reproduction of the family. Family, of course, has many meanings, some obvious, others rooted out by social scientists, and more commonly, by psychoanalysts and therapists of all sorts. The theme I will be pursuing is that in home-based work one continually sees the displacement of the value of labor onto the affective value of family and child care, which has the circuitous effect of devaluing the work (both paid and unpaid) itself. In the most stripped-down sense, homework "informs" an economy of familial emotional attention, where the absence of the "dividing line between home and work" appears as the presence of the (becoming-productive) life of children: take care, get dressed, go to school, take tests, make the grade, and of course, do your homework (Fraad et al. 2000). It is no coincidence, as Jacques Donzelot noted in *Policing the Family*, that mandatory education began in the midst of very broad and divisive political debate on whether and how much children should work, whether in the factory, at home, in the orphanage, etc. The extension of mandatory public education, a little over a century later, is the form of combined and expanded public-private education which homework subtends. By this I am not suggesting that homeworking mothers (as well as some fathers or "househusbands") in the United States have so much more time available to work and play with their children. Studies suggest that home-based workers have less or, at best, the same amount of time available for unpaid work than when they work outside the home (Silver and Goldscheider 1994; Smith 2002).

What I wish to suggest beyond this is that homeworking positions parents, mothers in particular, in an "affective economy," well beyond the reproduction, in

Marxist terms, of one's own and other household members' labor power (Negri 1999). The investments and expenditures (of time, money, energy, emotions) one makes in work at home are singularly overdetermined by the socially mediated impulses to love and oversee one's children, elderly parents, etc. Such an impulse, I would argue, is "economic" in the last instance, not in necessarily calculated or rational ways (although these must be acknowledged) but rather in the pro-active and re-active drives to be present to children, to protect them, and to supervise and discipline them. In the "new economy", as in the old economy, this invisible, "immaterial" labor of mothers and "care providers" is written not as labor, but as predication of the (future) laboring subject – that is, as social and political struggle (Fortunati 1995; Fraad 2000; Negri 1999).

Third, I would also note the continuing extension of one version or another of sovereignty to the family/working home. Undoubtedly, one could trace this far back in the volatile history of the home (Wigley 1992), but for the purposes of this study, I would suggest we turn, as other researchers of modern homeworking have, to the rise of the bourgeois distinction and separation between public and private spaces, as well gendered definitions and divisions of labor as such, in the latter part of the eighteenth century. The twofold effect of these emergences were to valorize (and monetize) the growing number of market-based exchanges, including labor (of men, primarily, with women and children as lower-valued reserve laborers), and to forge a new kind of household space, rooted in the unpaid labor of women, and materially configured in the new arts (and, later, sciences) of domesticity (Boydston 1990). The bourgeois European-American home would emerge in the nineteenth century as the ideological shrine of bedrock values of civilized, white republicanism: property rights, accumulation of wealth, male sexual supremacy, and humanistic education. Given the excesses of the age, and ensuing class struggles, the reproduction of the bourgeois home in working-class society became not only a moral and political necessity for the ruling classes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but increasingly an enticement for multi-national working-class men, in search of their own ideological and material homes.

This by now familiar history is complicated, like the national cultural and politicial history of the United States, by the sheer racism of its account (Saxton 1990). In terms of work, "home" in African American historical accounting is inflected by the experience of slavery, sharecropping, forced labor, industrial and union exclusivism, and paid and unpaid service of and in white homes (Davis 1981). The reproduction of the African American working-class home was continuously undermined by extreme prejudice, exclusion, and exploitation. Given the numbers of African American women involved in domestic service from slavery to the turn of the twentieth century, it makes less sense to see the "cult of domesticity" as a re-articulation of the sexual division of labor in home and work, or the ideology of separate private and public spheres, than as a re-articulation of a specifically racial (and sexual) division of labor and populations in public and private life. The ideologically, if not practically, enforced domesticity of white middle-class women between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, was materially premised on the labor time of African American women in paid and unpaid domestic work of all kinds, housecleaning and child care in particular – an historical phenomenon Wong (1994) has referred to as "diverted mothering" in the contemporary ethno-racial context of child care giving in the United States. This, along with the physical and economic degradation of African American men and women under slavery and Jim Crow, had profound repercussions for the organization and reproduction of the specifically African American family and domestic economy – which took different historic form from white and immigrant working-class families in any case (Davis 1981; Mullings 1997).

In comparative U.S. social history, African American women's and men's differing resistances to, and exclusions from, the white, bourgeois "cult of domesticity" and Fordist social relations thus rise to the top, as do collectivized notions of home and community (hooks 1990; Mullings 1997; Collins 1990). One result of this difference is that African American homeworking and houseworking wives at the turn of the century, and later for that matter, were perforce thrown into the volatility of a fast-changing political economy, where home-based work was sought as a refuge from the sexual and economic punishment of the worst industrial jobs or service in white homes (Boris 1989). African American women's paid and unpaid work at home, in this respect, partially reversed the charge of the white women's cult of domesticity—while launching African American house and homeworking women's own pioneering political, civic and community leadership roles (Landry 2000). As we will see in the next chapter on African American and immigrant home-based child care worker organizing, taking the historical separation of home and work, or public and private, as foundational for study and management of the *sexual* division of labor in U.S. society effectively conceals the ongoing violence against racially subordinated women workers, families, and populations, inside and outside the otherwise divided perspective of home/work.

Ideological Homes and Reproductive Labor

Researchers across political and disciplinary divisions have noted major shifts in the relations – social, economic, political, geographic, architectural – between work and home over the past two decades. Shifting time and space boundaries are influencing definitions of work and leisure time, as well as the practical understanding of the social organization of labor (Harvey 1990; Massey 1996). Arlie Hochschild (1997), for instance, describes how both female and male corporate workers with children often find themselves going to the *office* for moments of privacy and relaxation, away from the time-intensive and emotional demands of *home*; the flip side of this coin is the grim reality behind corporate capital's much-hyped "family-friendly," "flex-time," and in-house childcare policies and programs: if you don't work overtime (at the office, at home, during your commute), you may be out of a job – or soon seeking work at home.

While much of this research is concerned with shifting perceptions of home and work, restructuring of family life, and new distributions of "free time," "leisure," and "care," little has focused on the co-location of life and work, of consumption and production, in the home. Studies of home-based labor have implicated sociologists and political economists for ignoring the significance of work at home, or of obscuring the divisions and forces at play in home-based work (Allen 1983; Allen and Wolkowitz 1986, 1987; Mitter 1986), much as studies of housework and domestic labor had done in the decade before (Oakley 1974; Hartmann 1976). A broader critique would suggest that sociologists and political economists have largely ignored the home as such, that is the home as a unique subject and object of social, political and economic interaction, focusing largely instead on marriage, family and gender (Chapman and Hockey 1999).

The failure to take the home as itself a social subject has not been addressed either by the recent entry of urban studies and critical geography, which with few exceptions have treated the home less as a singular space or site of intervention and more as a placeholder for class-inflected discourses and practices of economic development, race-based politics, and the shift from local to regionalist approaches in urban political economy. It would appear that architects have had more to say about the home as such than social scientists. I return to this observation a bit later in this chapter.

Home-based labor studies, along with domestic labor studies, have perhaps better understood the home as a complex place for the interaction of divergent social forces than any other social science sub-disciplines. Hsiung's (1996) study of homework in Taiwan, *Living Rooms as Factories*, disclosed the powerful political, economic and social forces, including state economic development policy, economic globalization and patriarchy, which resulted in a large-scale, distributed urban network of home-based workshops and women house/homeworkers, managed largely by petty capitalist middle-men, as well as husbands, brothers and fathers. Benería and Roldán (1986) and Miraftab (1994) also examined home-based labor in the context of economic globalization, specifically home-based work and economic development strategies in Mexico City and Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. For them, not only is the home a significant site of political and economic development on both sides of the local/global divide; the home is also a significant site of gendered division of labor, contestation of patriarchal and class power, and rearrangement of domestic social space.

Felstead and Jewson's (1999) study of homeworking offers a meta-description of changes wrought by the live/work transformation, as well as strategies adopted or adapted by homeworkers to make homework work for them, their families, and their employers. Building on the work of home-based researchers as well as their own surveys of home-based workers, Felstead and Jewson develop a typological approach to understanding how home-based workers situate themselves in relation to their work, outside contractors and employers, and other household members, arguing that home is "a paradigm case of the compression of time-space and the disembedding of economic relations from place" and "...thus reflects contradictory processes with respect to space and place in late modernity" (Felstead and Jewson 1999: 177-78). They cite, among other processes, struggles over the control and management of labor, the reconciliation of domestic (i.e. housework) and home-based labor, and, borrowing from Foucault, "technologies of the self."

Felstead and Jewson's approach to how work at home affects households and how this, in turn, relates to broader spatio-temporal shifts in late modernity, falters, I would argue, in understanding the crossing of homework with housework. Wielding the notion of "household understandings" to explain the power-laden social relations of the home, they fail to examine the historically unequal and conflictual sexual division of domestic labor, analysis of which might otherwise be useful in theorizing how the home comes to be such an important place for both capitalist production and social reproduction. I would argue that "household understandings," a concept which they derive from Pierre Bourdieu's notion of habitus, is an analytical euphemism – in this case a misleading one – for sex and power. Most treatments of home-based labor, while varying in terms of theoretical approach, in one way or another acknowledge the combined historical force of sexual oppression and capitalism which have situated low-paid or unpaid work at home, and thus situated the home as a place to materially embody and engender unequal social relations, especially relations of reproduction.[27] In reducing the dynamic forces of sex and work to an analytical derivative of habitus, Felstead and Jewson circumvent the political economy of sex, value and money which theorists of home-based labor have treated as not mere historical context, but as material foundation for situating paid and unpaid work at home and rethinking the place of home in post-1973 modernity (e.g. Fraad et al. 1994; Hartmann 1981; Seecombe 1980; Spivak 1988). I return to the theme of Bourdieu's treatment of sex and power in the final chapter. For now, it should be noted that a substantial tradition of sociology of housework, and even the most mundane observations, have found that the household division of labor proceeds far from equilibrium, even in the critical realist sense one finds in Bourdieu's approach, where household "understandings" must always be understood as *méconnaisances*, i.e. as "misunderstandings."[28] Taking far-from-equilibrium household dynamics as a starting point, rather than a conclusion, should better help in understanding how crucial the place of home is in embodying, and propelling, sexual, race, class and local/global struggles over power and sovereignty in the early twenty-first century.

Early studies of homework, which Felstead and Jewson note but unaccountably disregard, were careful to clarify the implications of homework for women's sexually and racially divided labors. Sheila Allen and Carol Wolkowitz's path-breaking studies of racially and ethnically diverse homeworkers in northern England made clear some of these implications.

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[27] For an alternative Foucauldian treatment of home and work see Valsecchi (1999). See also Dangler (1994), Mitter (1986) and Boris and Prügl (1996).

[28] On housework, see Berk (1985); Oakley (1974); Hochschild (1989). For his use of *méconnaisance*, see Bourdieu (1990).

> Indeed in many respects homeworking is more onerous than going out to work. This is partly because there is no spatial separation between paid and unpaid work. Homeworking is 'always on your mind, always there'. As homeworkers recognize, 'You do not come home from work and leave it behind you.' Moreover, while those going out to work are at least allocated tea breaks, the homeworker's day is so dominated by simultaneous demands on her labour that a break in one kind of work is used to get on with another. The use of domestic space means that this way of organizing work is not even convenient. Few homeworkers have a separate place to work, and they are therefore unable to leave their work set up. (Allen and Wolkowitz 1986: 255)

With Allen and Wolkowitz, we learn that homework and housework generally take place together, if not simultaneously, and that this knowledge transforms social understanding and uses of the home as a unified place away from work into home as a divided live/work place. In practice, homework studies such as those of Allen and Wolkowitz, and time-use studies show how this utopian co-location of housework and homework becomes extension of the female workday in the subterranean economy of capitalist modernity. Whose utopia is this? Allen and Wolkowitz are emphatic about the constraints homeworking imposes—and about deconstructing the myth of home-based work autonomy for low-wage, piece-rate and other low-paid homeworkers. They are equally stress how homework re-positions housework as the defining structure of women's work and status: in the situation "in which the wife is perceived as *already* doing a full-time job (i.e. a housewife), then the homework becomes invisible as work and as a source of income. When homeworkers collude in this definition, homework becomes the wife's 'choice' in the use of her free time rather than an extension of the working day" (ibid.: 259).[29] The implications of this recognition are enormous: whereas a great number of homework studies acknowledge the force of "housework," such as childcare, in (partially or largely) determining women's entry into homework, i.e. that housework positions homework, Allen and Wolkowitz make clear that the effect of the sexual definition and division of labor is the reinstantiation of unpaid (or low-paid) "women's work" via the circuit of home-based work and productivity: homework positions housework.

Homework and housework studies, then, constitute an ideological home in and of themselves. Allen and Wolkowitz, for instance, take to task those researchers and advocates who fail to lift the veil concealing unpaid labor in the home as well as those who fail to account for the ethno-racial diversity of the home-based labor force. They and other Marxist and feminist sociologists, geographers and political economists analyzed shifts between home and work in the context of the gradual reduction in social, temporal and spatial difference between "productive" and "reproductive" labor (e.g. Allen 1981; Collins and Gimenez 1990; Massey 1996). For a time in the 1970s and early 1980s, there was a substantial theoretical and ideological debate among Marxist-feminists over the value and productivity of housework.[30] Much of the highly politicized theoretical debate centered on the question of whether housework was productive of surplus value for capital, or not, as well as the political ("revolutionary" or not) implications of responses to this question. Key proponents of the housework-creates-value camp were affiliated with the nascent Wages for Housework Campaign in Europe and, later, in the United States. Advocates of "wages for housework" argued that women's struggles for justice under capitalist patriarchy were bound up not only with sexual and political oppression; they were equally bound up with women's servile positions as unpaid household laborers (Dalla Costa and James 1973). As the unique unpaid labor of women at home was resisted and rejected, they theorized, capital and patriarchy would be forced to surrender, and the bonds of domestic slavery would be thrown off.

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[29] Note the resemblance in formulation to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's analysis of gender and prostitution in post-Independence India: "Internalized gendering perceived as ethical choice is the hardest roadblock for women the world over. The recognition of male exploitation must be supplemented with this acknowledgement." See her introductory remarks to Devi 1995: xxviii. I return to examine this insight for home-based labor studies in the final chapter.

[30] See Vogel (2000) for a recap of these debates and Himmelweit (2000) for a more extensive review and updating.

The provocative thesis of the Wages for Housework Campaign, which continues in theory, and mostly underground practice, today, did not meet with universal feminist approval. The liberal (and in some cases, radical) feminist rejoinder to "wages for housework" was that demanding payment for their lowly household labor would guarantee women lifetimes of (at best, low paid) domestic drudgery. Better to struggle out from under the grip of housework and the internalized oppression of patriarchy, get a higher education degree, and pursue a career (so the un-caricatured liberal feminist argument went). Wages for Housework theorists returned fire: liberal feminists missed the point of "wages for housework": the point is not simply to get paid for drudgery, or wages for housework, but to demand revolutionary social and economic change from capital and the state, as well as husbands and families, i.e. wages…for housework!!

> If we start from this analysis we can see the revolutionary implications of the demand for wages for housework. *It is the demand by which our nature ends and our struggle begins because just to want wages for housework means to refuse that work as the expression of our nature*, and therefore to refuse precisely the female role that capital has invented for us. (Federici 1980: 257, emphasis in original)

Fortunati's (1995 [1981]) trenchant analysis of housework, prostitution and reproduction picks up precisely on the 'naturalness' of housework in the stereotypical nuclear household, swiftly moving both Marxist and feminist debate out of the theoretical impasse of whether housework creates surplus value or not (for Fortunati, it does, unequivocally, but this really isn't her point). Beginning with a critique of Marx's two principal claims, that work appears as waged work in capitalism, and that value in capitalism is measured by alienated labor time, or the capacity of "living labor," Fortunati argues that the dualism which pervades Marx's analysis of capital applies equally to non-wage work such as housework and the sexual reproduction of "living labor." Capital's positing of the "reproductive labor" of housework, childcare, and sexual reproduction as "non-work" (because unwaged), enables it to posit "productive labor" both as work (in the material-ideological sense) and as value-producing work for the capitalist. Housework *must* appear under capitalism, thus, as a "natural force of social labor" (cf. Marx) *in order for* waged work to appear as value-production. Applying Marx's critique of capital to itself – the feminist critique of the critique – Fortunati recast the debate around whether women's household labor should appear as any other form of productive social labor:

> [T]he real difference between production and reproduction is not that of value/non-value, but that while production both *is* and *appears as* the creation of value, reproduction *is* the creation of value but *appears otherwise*. (1995: 8)

The mechanisms of this appearance, according to Fortunati, are not merely to be found in theory, however, but in the sexual labor process itself, in the mundane reproduction of men's, husbands, fathers', brothers' and children's material, emotional and sexual lives by the unpaid, and one might say, utterly devalued labor of wives, mothers, sisters, and daughters.

The political struggle over the definition of value in domestic labor has been taken up in diverse ways over the past two decades, from organized refusal of housework, to re-organization of the domestic work industry, to the socialization and commodification of various kinds of household labor (see, e.g. Davis 1981; Glazer 1993; Romero 1992). In many ways, the theoretical impasse of Marxist feminism in the 1970s, and the debate around Wages for Housework, have given way, as theory must, to these on-the-ground, in-the-home changes. The commodification or valorization of housework, childcare and sexual reproduction is not a unilinear movement, on the other hand. It remains divided by precisely what Fortunati calls the "line of value," which I would argue operates in her text as a Eurocentric philosophical enclosure, or aporia, which she shares with Marx.[31] An alternative reading of Fortunati might suggest that in the commodification of household surplus labor, we should begin to see an opening to contested claims on affect (in the form of attention, training, or "care"), on the one hand, as well as to capitalist claims (via material debt and consumption) on future reproductive and productive labor, on the other hand. For as we have been seeing for some time now, capitalist sociality demands "service" not only with a smile but with increasing degrees of care and attention to the consumer, as well as the "third party payer" in many instances, all modulated by continuous customer service, vocational, and professional development training – and all subject to more or less traditional routes of trade union organizing and workplace resistances (Macdonald and Sirianni 1996). The "line of value" which I will follow from here, following Fortunati and Wages for Housework in varying ways, is rapidly appearing as the struggle for a limit to capital's exploitation of house/home work, that is for a counter-domesticity or counter-servitude, fueled by internationally divided female home-based/domestic workers (Parrenas 2001; Sassen 2000).

For contemporary critical political economy, that is to say for Marxists beyond Marx, the information, service, and affect industries are the engines priming the capitalist pump of world market growth (Witheford 1994). For in Marx's early formulation of the critique of capital in the *Grundrisse*, which Antonio Negri (1991) has so carefully theorized for readers today, capital, in the form of surplus value, in the form of money, is "simply a claim on future (new) labour":

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[31] See Fortunati 1995, p. 161, in contrast to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, who sees more or less the same "line of value" as a "multinational" or even, with much redaction, a "multi-cultural" enclosure. See the

> Like the creditor of the State, every capitalist with his newly gained value possesses a claim on future labour, and, by means of the appropriation of ongoing labour has already at the same time appropriated future labour. (Negri 1991: 86)

What Negri helps readers to understand is that in the context of capital (and Marx's extended critique of capital), the material "claims on future labor" which the full-blown exploitative nature of capital commands are constituted not by capital, but by the "totality of social labor," i.e. by the combined productive and reproductive forces of "social labor." Moreover, capital is so constituted "*gratuitously*," according to Negri's reading of Marx. "In short," Marx wrote of the constitution of capital by the expanded forces of factory and home-based work, "all the social powers developing with the growth of population and with the historic development of society cost it nothing."[32]

I return to the theme of gratuitous social labor, of labor that is "given without return," in Chapters Four and Five, where I further develop a corresponding argument around value informed by the house/homework perspective. What I wish to emphasize at this point is how in setting the dual nature of productive and reproductive labor side by side, as Fortunati did, and in casting the "growth of population" (i.e. sexual and ethno-racial reproduction) and "the historic development of society" (i.e. technology, domesticity, family, and education) as the gratuitous constitution of capital's claim on *future* labor, on labor-to-be-reproduced, as Negri has, these neo-Marxists contribute to resolving (or at least displacing) the old articulation of modes of production argument once and (perhaps) for all. In earlier times, non-wage work such as housework had to

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chapter on "Culture" in Spivak (1999).

[32] Negri 1991: 86-87, citing Marx 1973: 367, 765.

appear, according to Fortunati, as a natural force of social labor so that it could produce value. More important, it had to be provided for free in order for the home to operate as the essential site of the consumption, distribution, production and circulation of value in society. This was the premise of the twentieth century Fordist political-economic arrangement. For the theorists of "modes of production" the question was how the "domestic mode" was articulated with the "capitalist mode" of production; and at stake was the violent social and political balance that had been built on the backs of predominantly male factory workers and predominantly female houseworkers. The homeostatic/social-balance premise of Fordism would be ruptured by the 1960s and, as we will see in Chapter Four, would increasingly become less the ultimate goal of macro-political-economic management, partly because of the increasing presence of "multinational" women in the workforce and partly because of the increasing ideological and material rejection by women of unpaid housework as the "expression of...their nature." As a result, Marxist-feminist concerns with analyzing the exploitation of women's domestic labor have given way, at least in part, to attention to the valorization of caring labor, on the one hand, as well as to the gendered allocation of time and money, and the flows of value, *inside* the household (Gibson-Graham et al. 2000). Thus, the female proletariat, locally and globally, might be thought of as providing more monetary value to household expenses under post-Fordist (or non-Fordist) conditions (and more than appears), but controlling less and less of that wage and the labor which they now exchange for it (Benería and Roldán 1986; Pearson 2000). Wages for housework, it seems, are no less important today than in 1973.

No Place Like Home

The home – against all bourgeois ideology and mystification – is neither politically, socially nor geographically isolated (Markusen 1980; McDowell 1998). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the home, and housing more broadly, remain the spatial focus of social policy and practices centered on the reproductive family, work, local development, public education, land use, and public health, as well as capital investment. Donzelot's (1979) history of social policy in France – policy which he argues took the form of the *policing of families* – demonstrates how, beginning in the late eighteenth century, the home operated as a "spatio-temporal fix" in the state's effort to structure and fashion order among the laboring classes. For the next one hundred and fifty years, the point of family, housing, child welfare and educational policies, according to Donzelot, would be to re-establish and re-shape the patriarchal/nuclear family for the sake of a restless class of proletariat men, fast-growing social welfare, public health and psychiatry industries, a virtuous class of wealthy philanthropists, and capitalist economic and social production. Bringing "private", "domestic," "personal", individual and family struggles into "public" discourse – in short, traditionally feminist subjects – has always been a political strategy of the capitalist/patriarchal state and its social representatives and allies (Ehrenreich and English 1978).

Given this history, one might argue that the home remains, two centuries later, a highly *privatized* social space of struggle over reproductive labor, including housework and sex, in large part due to the discursive and regulatory practice of the state (and its sociological epigones) to police the working-class family into "public" (i.e. bourgeois) standards on the one hand, and to privatize and de-politicize as *the* family – monolithic and undifferentiated – on the other (Coontz 1997). Returning to the theme of domestic labor, feminist economists and activists have documented, among other crucial examples of state power, the practice of concealing the materiality of home life and labor through national accounting statistics that exclude unpaid labor in the home (Folbre 2001; Waring 1988). Depending on how housework is valued, at average wage levels or at (considerably lower) prevailing market rates for specific occupations (childcare workers, cleaners, cooks, etc.), the value of the "household economy" in the United Kingdom in 1997, for instance, was anywhere from half to over 100% of the UK's official Gross Domestic Product (McDowell 1999). Moreover, women's increased work outside (and inside) the home, and increased monetary contributions to family and household incomes in recent decades, have led neither to a reduced share of domestic labor by women, nor to great changes in men's and women's perceptions of the sexual division of labor (Hochschild 1989; Silver and Goldscheider 1994). It has also led to women's greater fiscal responsibility for family survival and reproduction, with little gain in terms of social control or political power: women's increased "micro-earnings" flow into men's accounts, a global phenomenon which undercuts many of the stated intentions of women in development programs, including micro-credit and home-based labor strategies.[33]

So despite the fact that in the post-industrial and industrializing nations of the world, women are working far more, and earning more, outside the home than ever before, work inside the home remains relatively unvalued and women's earnings, wherever they derive from, relatively highly expropriated. Homework, coupled with an ideology of domesticity and material practices of separating women from their own property and wages – housewifeization – reshape the materiality of the home. for women workers worldwide. In a similar vein to Felstead and Jewson's analysis of homework. Sherry Boland Ahrentzen (1992) broadens research perspectives on homework not only by examining the real variations in women's experiences of co-located homework and housework. in this case African American homeworkers in the 1920s and white homeworkers in the 1980s. but points to examples of the ways in which homework shifts boundaries inside and outside the home for specific groups of home-based women workers.

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[33] For further discussion and research, see Hsiung (1996) and Pearson (2000). On the unequal gendered outcomes of micro-credit, see Rahman (1999).

> Historically. being at home means doing domestic work. Because women's contribution of domestic work in the home has been roundly devalued in this century…. it is understandable why homeworkers are upset with the association of their occupational role and status with the domesticated home. The advent of women in the paid labor force outside the home may have further denigrated work done in the home by making housework—and the home workplace—more socially isolated and culturally marginal. (Ahrentzen 1992: 131-32)

The question researchers such as Ahrentzen and homeworker advocates and organizers pose. as a result. is what is the relationship between "the home" as a traditional. if not patriarchal. kind of anthropo-/socio- logical place of family. marriage. identity. socialization. etc.. and the home as a volatile workplace made modern by the inscription and incorporation of domesticity. servitude. and the invisibility of its racially marked female labor force? Insofar as the histories. relationships and identities of the home/work place remain in many ways subjugated, forgotten, and untheorized, the homeworker and researchers alike are confronted with the dilemma, as Ahrenzten has put it, of replacing "an ideology of the home as haven with one of the home as work place" (ibid.: 133).

One may infer from postmodern anthropologists such as Marc Augé that it is in fact such a dilemma that informs broader social categories of place and space in theory, as well. Augé (1995) argues that the traditional experience of "places" such as communities and homes (in the "territorial" rather than household sense) was strongly associated with anthropological identifiers such as place names, fictive and territorial nations, and extended kinship. In the burgeoning sites of what Augé terms "supermodernity," where many of these identifiers lose significance or actively disappear, he argues, the palpably marked places that previously contained people's identities now contain only movement, flows, and endless circulation of bodies. Citing "super-modern" airports as a principal example, Augé suggests that such spaces function as "non-places" owing to their smoothed-out, yet hyper-differentiated environments and boundaries: multinational, generic, volatile, and in continuous motion.

Non-place, therefore, may be the wrong name (rather than a bad translation), I would suggest. For, as I explain below, airports are places, although admittedly not in the traditional anthropological senses of ethnically named, claimed, and identified spaces, as Augé describes. On the other hand, it appears that with the notion of "non-place," Augé does not intend a postmodern, nihilistic erasure of "place." Rather, by non-place, it appears that he wishes to call attention to the gap in social thinking about how some places are being radically altered or modulated in conditions of postmodernity, where far from being places of formal destination ("homes," as it were), they are or are becoming sites of informal and incessant transit, spaces produced, as Henri Lefèbvre famously put it, out of the crisis of specifically capitalist social reproduction. *Mutatis mutandis*, one would be tempted to make a similar argument for the home, as I have been describing it here: homes, no longer "homes" in the traditional sense, but home/work places. Yet homes that are also volatile and in constant motion, and therefore more and more non-places in the "supermodern" sense: non-places like home.

And yet, such an argument would be wrong, for precisely the reasons that the sexually and racially divided histories of homework tell us it would be. I want to return to the quotation I begin this chapter with. In times of war, with women working both outside and inside the home – that is to say, with the remuneration of women's work – the "home" as such ceased to exist. Yet the home had always been defined, in transient and invisible terms, by the absence or presence of gendered, and ethno-racially marked, workers. The ideological home of bourgeois reproduction concealed not only the unpaid and "invisible" labor of housewives: it also concealed other homes, homeworkers' homes, which themselves concealed homeworkers and home-based laborers, and so on. Likewise, the supermodern airport has more than multinational, "stateless" and refugee travelers in it. It also has multinational workers, who are there all day, every day of the year. Where the anthropological understanding of place breaks down, I would argue, is in theorizing not what, but who (in the old, embodied, fleshy sense) actually makes or creates a place, a view which is understandably partially at odds with the Western, androcentric anthropological tradition (cf. Trinh 1989).

Writing on classical and critical empiricist philosophies of space and place, Edward Casey argues that what locates or situates place in the intellectual history of space is neither territory nor surface, but the body. The binary oppositions in Western philosophy, between mind and matter, spirit and body, space and place, have typically resulted in a hierarchical suppression of one term in each oppositional pair. Thus, matter, body and place have themselves occupied a more or less suppressed place in the history of Western thought—returning in recent times only through the concerted efforts of postmodern, critical, feminist and deconstructive theorists. "The only trace of place remaining after it had been incorporated into space," Casey argues, "occurred in the form of site, which in Leibniz's deft hands became the dominant spatial module of the modern age, affecting and infecting every aspect of modern life: architecture and medicine, schools and prisons, not to mention philosophical thought itself" (Casey 1997: 334). The subsequent rethinking of place which Casey outlines draws on hybrid discourses of the body and space to break place free of the philosophical shackles of pure space. "The new bases of any putative primacy of place," he writes "are themselves multiple: bodily certainly, but also psychical, nomadological, architectural, institutional and sexual."[34] From where I sit, the home/work place may be archetypal in terms of the complex integration of these bases. Like the racially and sexually divided labor that creates and re-creates them, houses and homes are profoundly taken-for-granted places – at least in the literature of social sciences. They are everywhere, yet one rarely sees the political-economic relationships inside them. Huge amounts of work take place there, and yet little of it is counted, one way or another. But what makes them homes ultimately, and what make the home a place (even if a misunderstood or paradoxical place) and not a non-place, are the socially engineered bodies, relations, and labors the home is supposed to contain, if not conceal.

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[34] By "nomadological," Casey is referring broadly to Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) notions of smooth versus striated space, as well as regionalism. The implications of these for theorizing large-scale home networking in informational and value-extracting global capitalism hover between the calculable and incalculable. See Deleuze and Guattari (1987): 477-78 and passim.

The philosophical tradition of space that Casey traces is rooted most powerfully in the differentiation of interior and exterior, which in the context of the house and home marks the clear distinction between them and other places. Writing on the relationship between architecture and philosophical deconstruction, architectural theorist Mark Wigley observes:

> The house is always first understood as the most primitive drawing of a line that produces an inside opposed to an outside, a line that acts as a mechanism of domestication. It is as the paradigm [literally, the architectural model] of interiority that the house is indispensable to philosophy, establishing (note the metaphor of metaphors, once again) the distinction between the interiority of presence and the exteriority of representation on which the discourse depends. (Wigley 1993: 104)

House as home, that is space as place, literally domesticates its occupants from the inside. The interior space of the home, which Wigley has traced to the fourteenth and fifteenth century architectural design of the studio – literally a closet, and the only space of privacy in the house – was always a "sexed" place. The studio was always intended as, and historically served as, a man's private place of study, reflection, accounting, concealing, and withdrawing (Wigley 1992). Man's habitation of the home might also be thought, in this respect, as his habitation of thought, knowledge and language, Wigley observes. One communicates from inside a system of signs which one inhabits. Echoing Derrida, Wigley argues that the spatial metaphor in Western philosophy extends itself to the house because of the precise correspondence of the interiority (privacy, dwelling, security) which house-space is thought to contain, and the interiority of voice, rationality and identity which consciousness is thought to contain.

> The edifice of metaphysics is necessarily a house. Within every explicit appeal to the necessity of stable construction is an implicit appeal to the necessity of a secure house. The philosophical economy is always a domestic economy, the economy of the domestic, the family house, the familiar enclosure. Deconstructive discourse must therefore be first and foremost an occupation of the idea of the house that displaces it from within. (Wigley 1993: 106)

The domestic economy of presence and place, being "at home," promises "ontological" stability, if not comfort. In expert traditions of space and place, it has also promised and delivered identity, meaning, kinship, and normative socialization, as Augé shows. However, we know through examination that what underwrites the twenty-first century domestic economy of presence and place at home is, among other things, a shifting, unstable sexual and racial division of labor, and fast-changing technologies, such as time-altering machines, *pouvoir-savoir* (to use Foucault's term), as well as "affective technologies" such as attention, care, and love. More troubling for the home=security paradigm is, once again, the sexed body: worldwide, women and girls are far more likely to be violently treated in their homes by men they know, for example, than outside the home by men they do not know (Goldsack 1999; Heise et al. 1994). For the bodies of homeworkers, home is not necessarily, or even often, a place of security or stability. Stability at home is always, at best, relative to the instability of forces inside and outside the home, that is to say, inside and outside of everyday practice, or habitus (Bourdieu 1977). Calculating the health, safety, security and value of home-based labor remains, philosophically speaking, impossible—which doesn't mean of course that such calculations are not always being attempted.

In the context of home-located production, Felstead and Jewson (1999) have rightly contrasted what I am calling domestic-economic instability with Anthony Giddens' notion of "ontological security": "a sense of continuity and order in events, including those not directly within the perceptual environment of the individual" (Giddens 1991: 243). In tandem with a "defensive protection which filters out potential dangers impinging upon the external world and which is founded psychologically upon basic trust," 'ontological security,' for Giddens, constitutes the root form of mundane trust, psychic freedom, and self-identity which characterizes the individual in modernity (ibid.: 244 and *passim*). In the hands of sociologists, the home becomes the quintessential site of such a notion of 'ontological security' in late modernity, i.e. the *locus classicus* Wigley (1993) critically suggested the home would have to be.[35] In the contest between expert systems of knowledge and home-based worker-centered research, the home thus becomes a *site*, once again, of ideological and material struggle, this time over the safety, security, and stability of the twenty-first century home as divided live/work *place*.

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[35] See Thorns (1998) for a discussion of his own and others' sociological treatments.

Upsetting the Structure of Home-Work: Global Home-based Worker Organizing

The politics implied by the latter formulation, however, suggest a top-down view of work and labor organizing at home. In cultural-political discourses of home, as Karen Hansen (1992) discusses in *African Encounters with Domesticity*, one must look beyond the balanced, dualist models (production-reproduction, structure-agency, base-superstructure) of domesticity on which feminists, Marxists and others have attempted to ground shaky theoretical and political interventions. Emphasis on the structural economic constraints of an always already existing sexual and racial division of labor, on the one hand, and cultural or ideological expressions of some form or other of subjective determination (i.e. patriarchy, racism, heterosexism, etc.), on the other, have served only to reinstate the problem of domesticity in a gesture not unlike the one on which Derrida bases his deconstruction of Heidegger's metaphorical return (to) "home" (see Wigley 1993). Somewhere beyond such dichotomous thinking, one may begin to resurface into what Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak terms the "vanishing history of the present," or as Hansen describes it in the African postcolonial historical context:

> ...how domesticity gets reinvented or changed in the process of local and foreign development planning, and how project implementation affects the attempts of women and men of different backgrounds to bridge or widen the gulf between their personal lives and public activities. How variously constituted feminisms in Africa react to and

> incorporate ideological elements of domesticity is a question of critical concern for social movements aimed at transforming gender, race, and class inequalities in many societies. (Hansen 1992: 26-27)

Home, as Linda McDowell (1999) writes, "is one of the most strongly gendered spatial locations," yet it is important not to take this, too, for granted, as she also notes. In deconstructive terms, home, like domesticity, does not exist as such. It is, however, the structure, as Spivak used to say about deconstruction, that one cannot not inhabit. The forced displacement of the homeless in cities across the United States in the 1980s and 1990s is an example at the opposite end of the spectrum of home/domesticity, where street-level codes and simulacra of home were fiercely policed and destroyed, and the "homeless" themselves were "de-housed," either into mass shelters or, more commonly, into prisons (Feldman 2001). The material and ideological structures of houses and homes can and do change, but that is not the point. Top-down views, which privilege neo-liberal, racist and patriarchal structural forces, do not aid in seeing how social and political resistances and grassroots-level changes implicitly, if not complicitly, challenge both those forces and the expert knowledges that theoretically underwrite them.[36]

Elizabeth Prügl (1999) takes up this theme in her studies of homeworker organizing that challenges both the hegemonic globalization of gendered home-based labor, as well as the developmentalist discourses and practices that invisibly thread work into the sexually divided home. In her account of the post 1973-era of "globalization," economic development in geographically and economically diverse countries was premised on the promotion and expansion of work-at-home, understood as the combined value of culture production with traditional "women's work." The rule-driven practices of development which she frames suggest that homeworkers must find ways to engage counter-hegemonic rule-forming development institutions – such as the International Labor Organization (ILO) and national labor laws – in order to contest their highly exploited and politically subordinate positioning in global, national and local schemes of (highly culturalized) economic development.

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[36] Mike Roberts elaborated this problematic in the context of housing takeovers in San Jose, California, in "Schizo-Space: the Micropolitics of Housing and Homeless Takeovers," a paper presented at the conference of the Midwest Sociological Association, 1995. See also Talmadge Wright, *Out of Place: Homeless Moblizations, Subcities, and Contested Landscapes* (Albany: SUNY Press: 1992).

In home-based work, Prügl argues, one can trace capital's move to sites of production located largely outside the Fordist regulatory regime of labor and capital. Traditional labor organizing had long seen home-based work both as a threat to unionized labor, as well as a desecration of the working-class family and traditional motherhood. The traditional struggle over a "family wage," premised on the myth of *the male* breadwinner, left the rising numbers of homeworkers worldwide not only outside the framework of labor-capital struggle, but in an organizational and political vacuum. Absent institutional force, homeworkers sought forms of self-organization, allying themselves with grassroots and community-based organizations, as well as trade unions which, in the face of the post-Fordist recomposition of labor, were finally forced to recognize that homeworkers, part-time and contingent workers, and laborers of the informal sector, were, in various manufacturing industries, the primary workforce of many or most of the new "glocalities" (Portes et al. 1989). The factory workforce and factory work had, more perceptibly than in previous decades, "gone home." Late as they were to the seismic changes in work, labor unions found themselves confronting two new roles: one, as organizers who had to walk into the dispersed geography of home-based factories in order to communicate to workers; and two, as power brokers who had to operate between among capital, the state, and the newly self-forming organizations of homeworkers.

Prügl describes the case of Homenet, an international network of homeworker organizations, informal sector labor associations, trade union representatives, and homeworker cooperatives, which succeeded in putting the labor rights and social protection of homeworkers onto the ILO's agenda in the early-1990s, and later in lobbying for the ILO to pass a convention and recommendation on homework. The ILO's conventions on work are few and notable – including conventions on child labor, workers' rights to unionize and freely associate, discrimination and forced labor – and in this respect constitute foundational standards and discourses of international labor practice. Homenet's success merely in having a convention proposed and discussed, let alone approved, by the ILO, was significant. Despite the 1996 Homework Convention being only nominally once individual countries approve and ratify the treaty (and only four countries – Finland, Ireland, Albania and the Netherlands – had done so in six years since its approval), it bears analyzing the nature of Homenet's organizing/lobbying success – and the nature of organizing in the homework "field" itself.

First, Homenet is a network, not a non-governmental organization (NGO), and its member organizations, likewise, are for the most part not NGOs. It is comprised of homeworkers' and informal sector workers' associations, unions and grassroots organizations such as the Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA) in India, the Self-Employed Women's Union (SEWU) in South Africa, and the National

Homeworking Group in the United Kingdom, which are member-based and for the most part member-led grassroots organizations which directly represent and struggle in the interests of their own members and leaders, as well as those, indirectly and obliquely, of similarly situated workers, labor sectors, and communities elsewhere. Their complicity with global and local capital or with globalizing institutions, and thus their accountability to workers and members as such, are much different from NGOs following the international human rights and grant money trails, with the required camouflage of "grassroots presence" and "native information" (Cheah 1997; Elyachar 2002; Spivak 1999). This difference, which I am loosely characterizing as "bottom-up" versus "top-down" grassroots organizing, can be traced, in great part, to what drives the demands for action, justice, or political change. In the case of the ILO Convention on Homework, the impetus was not from the trade union, employer or government representatives who comprise the ILO's tri-partite decision-making structure, and, in a broader historical context, the key players in the Fordist and Keynesian regimes that dominated, through both class struggle and class compromise, twentieth century political economic arrangements. Although, as Prügl notes, the trade union representatives on the ILO governing body played an instrumental role in influencing state representatives to pass the convention over the objections of employers, the impetus for change, and pressure on the unions, came from the new post-Fordist organizations of home-based workers.

What one sees in the case of Homenet, and in particular of SEWA, Homenet's founding member, is an NGO-like actor (SEWA is formally a women's trade union based in Ahmedabad), with the scripting coming from its variously differentiated grassroots "bases" as well as the particular, formative histories which surround its development. For

SEWA, the "base" includes several hundred thousand individual members, mostly very low-wage, lower-caste women workers, who are participants and leaders in more than a dozen component trade associations, federations and cooperatives, as well as a large number of on-going local organizing campaigns, service and building projects, and community and leadership development activities. As a uniquely structured trade union of sectorally diverse women workers, SEWA operates both like a traditional union, i.e. organizing for increased worker power and higher wages, as well as a "self-help" organization, mobilizing diverse social sectors into and around a range of globally and locally configured social and economic needs, such as health care, child care, financial credit, housing, clean air and water, food and agricultural production, and insurance.

Its combined organizing objectives and practices challenge the notion of the home, especially the home work/place, as a site of structural oppression, unconscious subject-positioning, and entry into sexual and racial subordination. Indeed, as Prügl notes, "SEWA recognized that the houses of women in the informal sector often were workplaces, so that investing in housing was productive investment....housing loans were the most common type of loan the SEWA Bank extended to home-based workers" (Prügl 1999: 126). As a place outside the law, and outside official control, in various ways, the home work/place has thus been a site of legal prohibition as well as of immanent struggle for auto-valorization (in the language of neo-Marxism) and "empowerment" (in the language of grassroots political organization and economic development) against patriarchy, exploitation and psychic subordination. Forms of communal sharing of resources, rearrangement of housework relations, collective home/work/place organizing, mark the history of home-based labor struggles, which also include, of course, the refusal of housework (and sex). Homeworkers have repeatedly found themselves objecting that there is nothing morally or politically wrong with working at home—except everything wrapped up in the home itself: sexual and racial divisions and definitions of labor. the relative volatility and instability of paid work. devaluation of labor. and the ongoing modulations of home-based work. including changes in home design. state or capitalist-led "counter-planning" and counter-organizing. and technological change. I return to the theme of the refusal of house/home work in later chapters. where it becomes evident that the labor theory of value depends precisely on this power of refusal.

What many of these "post-structural" shifts suggest is that the home work/place is primed for an uncertain and potentially turbulent social and political transformation. In capitalist modernity. the factory/office workplace and civil society were perceived and fashioned as places and spaces for the exercise of political and social speech. labor's countervailing power. and democratic contestation. with varying accompaniments of repression. policing. and reprisals (Aronowitz 2003). One of the key questions being broached by home-based workers of all kinds is whether and how the home will become such a place/space. "From below." one might argue. home-based labor appears now to be "jumping scale." to borrow Neil Smith's felicitous phrase. as homeworkers shift the borders between home and work in response to global and local forces – forces which. as we have seen. see the home as a new kind of "spatio-temporal fix" for the problem of an increasingly highly valorized "total social labor force" (Harvey 1990; Negri 1991; Smith 1993). "Seizing place" through a reconnection of collective work to collective homes. home-based workers worldwide are "doing their homework" in wholly new ways:

organizing, networking, protesting, cooperativizing, lobbying, and transforming relations inside, around, and throughout the home/work world (Boris and Prügl 1996).

In spatial terms, thus, Ahrentzen (1992) notes how in this new and uncertain context, ethno-racial, kin, gender, geographic and labor-centered neighborhoods, networks and "communities" might be the models for home-based worker organizing, posing new definitions and attributes for class and class composition. Moving from the top-down model of the home – the solitary, isolated, self-contained household space – and the socialist feminist models of collective home/workplaces whose critical history Dolores Hayden (1981, 1984), for one, has traced so well, one can begin to trace in the expanding organizing programs of home-based work, circuits of socialized live/work space that are constructed through the self-valorization and control of its cooperative, creative workers. The example I turn to in the next chapter, the organization of predominantly African American home-based childcare workers in the United States, draws on and informs a cultural history of the African American women-centered organization of the house and home:

> In doing transformative work, then, women seek to construct a space in which they can ensure continuity for themselves, their children, and their communities. ...But what is perhaps unique about the experience of African American women is the dramatic way in which their experience has linked the domains of household, community, and the larger society. For women of color, working-class women, and increasingly for middle-strata women, protection of their children, which mobilizes their activism, requires the protection and

> transformation of their households, their communities, and the larger society. (Mullings 1997: 100)

And while the professionalized versions of these workers, including telecommuters and middle-class childcare providers, are certainly "top models" for the post-Fordist re-arrangement of home and work, capital is already confronting the absolute limitations of these workers and is forced now to deal with the re-appropriation of homework on a much larger scale (Tuominen 1997). Prügl describes how in attempting to define home-based workers as non-employees, and thus outside the protection of the ILO convention, employer representatives unintentionally acknowledged that in post-Fordism, arguments for "true self-employment had become impossible as well" (1999: 134). Everyone in contemporary home-based work, including the home-based management and design consultant and the home-based assembly worker at the spatial end of the global chain of commodity production, is dependent on, and employed in, the circulation of capital at some point or other. The version of scale-jumping which I am referring to, thus, is a "dialectical utopianism" forced to acknowledge the slippages in what is meant not only by "dialectical" but by "organizing," "class," and "self-valorization" in what increasingly appears as "circuits" and "cycles," and not dualist forces, of increasingly global and "domestic" class struggle.[37]

As is commonly the case, the slippages become most evident in the examples. In the case of Homenet's organizing victory at the ILO, Elisabeth Prügl concludes that what

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[37] On "dialectical utopianism," see Harvey (2000), whose critique of the politically and economically "built" environment curiously tends to overshadow whatever optimism of the will he set out to map. For a dialectical approach that differently acknowledges the circulation of value that my argument intends, see Witheford (1999).

I refer to as "bottom up" organizing, or what she calls "emancipatory politics" at the level of international regulatory organizations such as the ILO, must not be conflated with homeworker organizing at varying "local" geographic scales, on the one hand; and that the ILO convention on homework, intended to regulate home-based workers into formal equality with the mass workers of the Fordist regime, must not be confused with the misleading universality which pervades human rights discourses and practices, on the other. Organizing at the global level is, for her, organizing in another space of the social, a space which profoundly shapes and informs the various scales of "the local" which, she critically notes, have been treated by feminist and others critics of human rights discourses as the preferred space of counter-hegemonic politics. That Prügl feels she has to defend her focus on organizing at this scale underscores how the new global rules of homework she analyzes constitute, as Pheng Cheah (1997) has critically said of international human rights, a "violent gift" to homeworkers. For as the rules reductively work their way, as Prügl suggests they will, through vast social institutions, networks and codes, homeworkers should expect, indeed they will increasingly be forced, to "organize."[38] In a similar vein, Julia Elyachar has noted how World Bank-led microlending in Egypt has led not only to the forced creation of dubious "grassroots organizations" which now are representing the interests of the peasantry *à la* Marx. It has also re-arranged the "field" of global development, the place where Prügl begins her analysis of global homework:

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[38] See Prügl (1999): 149-50. See also Cheah, who writes: "Rights are thus not, in the original instance, entitlements of intersubjectively constituted rational agents but violent gifts, the necessary nexuses within immanent global force-relations which produce the identities of its claimants. Yet, they are the only way for the disenfranchised to moblilise" (Cheah 1997: 261).

> What might have been previously seen as informal economy—that which is external to the state. that which is not the real economy—is now being assimilated into prevailing notions of *the* economy. And microlending looks like what we think *the* economy really is. Money is exchanged. interest is collected. enterprises are established. and unemployed women become. at least on paper. entrepreneurs. (Elyachar 2002: 507-08)

I do not intend this as criticism of Prügl's excellent analysis and work. That emancipatory politics and bottom-up organizing may be changing things so radically—so much that the changes they seek are pre-emptively re-appropriated at the "top"—points obliquely back to the political limit of the location of "individual home-based workers." as Prügl herself notes. workers who are becoming. "at least on paper." something different than they were a few years. or even a few months. ago (Prügl 1999: 148). The problem with global labor regulations and human rights. in the context of competitive organizing at and of the "grassroots." is that those invested in "emancipatory politics" and "bottom-up" organizing still believe in the *idée fixe* of the power of rules and rights *for others*—even as "our" constituencies are getting organized with these rights in mind by someone else (e.g. the World Bank. the "anti-welfare/pro-warfare" state. the local social service agency. the petty capitalist employer of home-based workers. and most often. all of these working together with or alongside each other)—for someone else's profit. Paraphrasing Marx. capital is the most aggressive "organizer" the world has ever known! Jumping the scale of home thus requires supplementing the new global and local rules of homework with recognition of a re-routing (or "reterritorialization." in the long ignored formulation of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) of the racial and sexual divisions of labor through capital. With this in mind, I turn next to "organizing" of home-based work on a variety of scales in the United States, conscious both of the fact that the United States has ratified only two of the ILO's eight fundamental conventions in its history, and that the movements of labor in the United States have for a variety of reasons either not felt compelled to force ratification or not succeeded at forcing ratification of the conventions; that is to say, conscious not so much of the "exceptionalist" social and political history of the United States, as its ongoing political, economic and cultural imperialism.

Chapter Three – Homeworker Organizing and the Crisis of U.S. Welfare Reform: Home-based Child Care Workers In, And, and Against the State

It was only thirty years ago that we first heard that woman's place was in the home. We are never aware of the present; each instant of living becomes perceptible only when it is past, so that in a sense we do not live at all, but only remember living. And we are blind to conditions forming our lives, until those conditions are becoming part of the past. It was not seen that woman's place was in the home until she began to go out of it: the statement was a reply to an unspoken challenge, it was attempted resistance to irresistible change. (Rose Wilder Lane, *Old Home Town*)

...I had run into an article somewhere about organizing home workers... (Shannah Kurland, former director, Direct Action for Rights and Equality)

Mothers Work at Home

Shifting conditions and divisions of social labor continue to place racially divided women where the work is unpaid or low-paid—and to place unpaid and low-paid work at home, where women are expected to be. The structuralist logic of locating work at home conceals, as we saw in the previous chapter, both the home as an "outlawed" site of work and labor contestation, as well as the agents who are continually re-building and maneuvering around the shaky structure of home-based work: employers, contractors, policymakers, trade unionists, homeworkers, organizers, etc. In her extensive archival research on homework in the United States, Eileen Boris (1994a, 1994b) has clarified both the contradictory discourses of women's home-based work, as well as how the politics of home-based worker regulation and organization were consistently overdetermined by changing discourses and practices of an always racialized motherhood. Her analysis of the twentieth century politics of homework in the United States implicitly questions a traditional U.S. working-class history that uncritically configures the male worker as *the* class and laboring subject, the male-centered factory and workplace as *the* site of labor organizing and class struggle, and itself as the story, in short form, of how Fordism, driven on by these subjects in these places, defined the twentieth century regulation and organization of labor and capital.

Most important for the purposes of understanding the politics of home-based worker organization today, Boris draws the contradictory lines of argument around the existence and regulation of home-based industrial, clerical and service work to their common point of connection, or nodal point, in the circuit of homework organizing: "motherhood." Understanding the historical and political economic implications of "motherhood" holds tremendous significance, on the one hand, for homeworker organizing today and, on the other, for the ethics and politics of child labor and the education and socialization of children, to name two major turning points in the reproduction of labor under capitalism, which I will return to later in this work. Writing in the early 1990s on an episode of the politics of homeworker organizing in post-World War II New York, involving predominantly white and immigrant clerical homeworkers, Boris concludes that the result of identifying these homeworkers as mothers was that women's home-based productive and reproductive labors were *both* denied. Flowing from that denial, two other extremely important facts: "neither side in the regulatory debate of forty years ago addressed the conditions of homeworking mothers," and black women homeworkers/mothers were almost universally positioned by these and other debates as workers first and foremost, not as mothers.

> Women like Mrs. K. had to type envelopes to make ends meet without much guarantee that the work would be there for her tomorrow at the same rate.

> Without child care or other employment options, mothers made the best out of what they had. Neither trade unionists nor most organized women's groups ever proposed alternatives for homeworkers; their concern ended with the stopping of an exploitative labor system rather than the organizing of homeworkers or the improving of their labor standards. Only the Congress of American Women recognized the need for an alliance between homeworking women and those who labored in shops and offices. It alone challenged the false division between mother and worker. Trade unionists, other women advocates, and employers reinforced this separation, albeit in a manner to buttress opposing positions. (Boris 1994b: 175)

Boris' rich historical and political analysis of early and mid-twentieth century homework in the United States, careful as it is to note the continuous racial divide in the organization of homework around motherhood, is a valuable resource for homeworker organizing today. Her analysis points to the failure of trade unionists in particular to overcome their historic compromise with the state and capital on the place of women's work. The cult of domesticity, in the twentieth century context of male-centered industrial production, capital accumulation, and family-based consumerism was not merely a framework for the reproduction of working men's material, sexual and emotional lives. It was also not simply a framework for reproduction of the family as the ethical and political resolution of a far-from-equilibrium political-economic system. It was a concerted social and political response to the efforts of white and immigrant women to break out of the double bind of motherhood, a position that at once demanded women's work and labor to reproduce husbands, children and families, and denied the labor value of this work. And it was a silent and complicated response to the efforts of black women to challenge racist violence and break out of the cult of servitude, which involved not only domestic work in white homes but, on a smaller scale, home-based work in black homes (Nakano Glenn 1992).

Domesticity defined the home as a place of non-work and found in a diverse, but by no means all-inclusive population of "unemployed" mothers and wives, supple agents of seemingly infinite moral and emotional support, family nurturance and care, and manual household labor. Yet this unpaid, invisible work was a force of its own. The variety of prohibitions on women working outside the home, race- and class-specific as they were (and continue to be on a dwindling scale), forced, and allowed, sectors of women to seek and conduct paid work inside the home from the dawn of industrial capitalism, a situation that was increasingly preferable for employers, who saw in it a way to increase profits through the disorganization of the growing power of unionized labor. Homework also appealed, less profitably perhaps, to a white middle- and working-class patriarchalism that invested in the cult of domesticity, a wife and mother at home, as it faced up to the necessity of at least two earners to "get ahead" or "keep afloat." Despite the multiply unequal exchange of the increasingly mythical status of male breadwinner for a "non-working" (and/or "homeworking") wife and mother at home, the compromise worked for about one hundred and fifty years, with structural changes coming, for the most part, very slowly and on the margins.

Yet there were always several "resistances" built into this powerful machine. One was capital itself, which, paraphrasing one of Marx's most Hegelian phrases, always confronted its own limit in labor. In continually struggling to reduce industrial labor to the cost of its own reproduction. the formulation and practice of which relied on the "invisibly," or freely given and taken domestic labor of women and children. capital would inevitably drive some. and at some times many. sectors and populations of workers under the escalating costs of living. This. in turn. would force more women into industrial production of one kind or another. including home-based production and a whole range of what we still mistakenly call "informal" economic activities. This process continued in almost linear fashion throughout the twentieth century in most of the industrial and post-industrial countries of the global North. as an ever-increasing proportion of wives and mothers entered the "formal" job force.

As one consequence of this. there was a slippage in the white. middle-class cultural restrictions on women's participation in employment (for as we have noted throughout. white and immigrant working-class women and black women faced restrictions in the other direction. i.e. a positive expectation of work and a negative one of motherhood). what Kessler-Harris and Sacks (1987) termed the "demise of domesticity." Women could. and did. claim more in the way of jobs. wages and status as workers of the world. a global process which took off at a rapid pace beginning in the 1960s. and which has accelerated decade by decade since then. Subsequent demands from women workers would inevitably extend to the home. since women had always been working at home (paid and unpaid). and since the 1960s-era breakdown in cultural and economic distinctions would put. as we have seen. wages for housework. and today. wages for child care. on the social and political agenda.

In the wake of these changes, changes complexly related to grassroots feminism's second and third waves, the intertwined discourses of work and motherhood – the latter with its now somewhat anachronistic sound – have taken on different tones, but lost little of their power or determination. They now circulate in the ever more dispersed discursive networks of "work-family balance," the "mommy track," and "child care," which encompass much of the crisis in today's political economy of home and work, much as motherhood, in previous conjunctures, brokered a wide range of discourses and practices that would situate labor, gender, race, class, and nation in the formally de-politicized home. In short, the politics of home-based work today are being tracked through a new material crisis of "motherhood," one that still centers on who will bear and care for children, but now in the context of far more volatile and dispersed forces of social reproduction.

In the twentieth century era of mass industrialization, socialization, and education, the home, as we have described it up until now, was a functional and always contested site for the attempted resolution of the unmet needs of whole classes of mostly male industrial laborers. This bland observation conceals both the magnitude and scale of industrialization, socialization and education in the home, as well as the continuing social and political struggles of household labor in relation to what Marx termed total social labor, which for him did not include the "natural" social labor of housewives and other domestic workers, unpaid or otherwise. Exploring the relationship of home-based laborers to their invisibility within dominant categories of political economy is not entirely new. Feminist and other historians, as well as social scientists, have for some time been excavating the subjugated histories of housewives and maids as well as the practices and discourses of housework, home economics, domestic work, etc.

The domestic labor debates of the 1970s and 1980s directly addressed the needs to theorize housewives as laborers, and domestic labor as socially productive and valorized work. Much of the domestic labor debate, it appears now, had little to say about the paid home-based labor of mothers as such. That is to say, there is little from the side of the previous generation of sociologies, histories, and critical political economies of housework to complement the more contemporary work of historians of home-based industrial, service sector, and clerical labor. And while today's generation of housework studies, focused almost exclusively on the distribution of labor time in the household, do shed light on the calculable trade-offs between paid and unpaid work, they almost resolutely fail to relate these trade-offs, which are massive in aggregate form, to a broader political economy. In other words, while homework studies have noted and analyzed the inter-connections among ideologies and practices of patriarchy and motherhood, the sexual division of labor, and homework, there is considerably less material in sociological studies of housework to begin to theorize the relationship of homework to housework in the context of specifically capitalist production and social reproduction. What the theorists of domestic labor and sociologies of housework failed to notice, and here I risk great overgeneralization to make the point, is that the unpaid labor of housewives and mothers was never exclusively unpaid. The presence of paid home-based labor in the industrial and post-industrial home complicates the focus on domestic labor, I shall argue, in politically important ways. What studies of homework tell students of housework is that housewives and mothers, through force and widely constrained choices, continually seek and find ways to valorize their work as wives, servants, cleaners, cooks, caregivers, educators, guardians, sexual partners, and so on. They seek "wages for housework," in other words, and it is here that one must leave aside any question of "class consciousness" in order to get first at class theory and political practice.

The example that I turn to in this chapter, the organization of the paid labor of home-based child care providers, underscores how changes in the economic production and social provision of child care in the late twentieth century have led less to a 'demise of domesticity' than a resurgence of home-based work by a new working class of "others' mothers." In examining the organization of these workers, who include licensed and unlicensed child care workers, or so-called "family daycare providers," who take care of their own and other people's children in their own homes,[39] I link the contemporary shift of the home from a privatized space of social reproduction to a socialized and politicized home/work place to the transformation of unpaid domestic labor, in this case child care, into (low-) paid homework.[40] And what links the transformation of the home/work place to the valorization of unpaid labor, I am arguing, is the organized labor of child care providers and their struggles over the control of work and value. Finally, I am arguing that the transformation of the home/work place, linked to the socialization and politicization of domestic labor, continues to be a major impetus to the rise of the "service sector" and "affect economy," which are uniquely grounded in women's waged labor outside and, as we shall see, inside the home (Collins and Gimenez 1990; Glazer 1993; Hardt 2000).

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[39] As with the classification of homeworkers in general, the classification of home-based child care providers can be confusing. All child care that takes place in anyone's home is home-based by definition. Thus home-based child care would include the paid and unpaid provision of care by parents, grandparents, siblings, other relatives, neighbors, nannies, maids, other domestic workers, and licensed and unlicensed family daycare providers, as they are known. While much of the focus of this chapter will be on the latter, 'family daycare provider' is at best a tenuous distinction given that many are unlicensed and uncounted but perform similar care, numerous others provide paid care for children in their own home, as well as in children's own homes, and a still greater number (mostly of parents and relatives) provide unpaid care at a variety of social and economic "costs."

[40] One could make a comparable analysis of elderly care, health care, cleaning, cooking, etc., but here I focus on child care.

An additional reading of the transformation of home via the organization and valorization of child care would suggest that the relative spatial isolation of the home/work place does not signify social or political isolation, and that child care and child care workers are thoroughly linked to changes in social policy, economy, culture, and power. Among other things, a significant proportion of home-based child care workers, like many, perhaps most, industrial homeworkers, typically work under contract with the same employer(s) in a given geographic area. In the United Kingdom and the United States, for example, the vast majority of licensed home child care workers are under contract with local government authorities, particularly in the wake of welfare state structural adjustments. Moreover, home-based child care workers, similar to other sectors of "care workers," are women (by sexual definition, as well as practice) who are typically more active than other women and most men in a range of social institutions including civic associations, schools, community and grassroots organizations, religious congregations, and of course, their own and other families (Ahrentzen 1993; Naples 2002). These, and other characteristics which I will explore, suggest that home-based workers in general, and care workers in particular, are at the cusp of social and political movement-building which directly links the reproduction of society to their status as labor. I explore in the second half of this work how the organization and valorization of this labor proceeds in a biopolitical realm of control that at once affects and surpasses the material calculation of value, i.e. the traditional starting point for Marxist critique of political economy.

The Crisis of Social Reproduction in the United States I

Home is where, it might be said, work begins. The growing focus on various kinds of home-based work, from industrial production and assembly, to telework, to professional work, to so-called "care work," must be mindful of the sexual and ethno-racial divisions of labor that situate these various kinds of work in class and race-differentiated homes. Staking homework on women's continued marking for family and sexual reproduction responsibilities – including women's own powerful investments in this marking – has been the hallmark of political-economic, regulatory, institutional and grassroots debates around homework for over one hundred fifty years. What is becoming more obvious today are the situations that straddle the paid/unpaid, productive/ reproductive, and housework/homework divides: domestic work, care work, counseling and therapy, education, and so on. As vast as these laboring sectors are, they do not occupy a pivotal place in labor studies, political economic theory, and sociologies of work and gender precisely because they challenge thinking about who works, who is expected to be organized, and how the broad sets of social and political constraints and possibilities which these sectors mobilize differ powerfully from other traditional sectors.

Child care labor is a case in point. The child care market in the United States has grown tremendously since the mid-point of the twentieth century. The Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates that nearly 60 percent of women with children younger than six were working in 1996, up from 12 percent fifty years before, and 30 percent in 1972 (see NCJW 1999). The proportional increase in the number of single parents over the same period has also led to an increased demand for child care. Of the total of 19.6 million children under five years of age in 1997, 63 percent were in some form of child care arrangement other than a parent at home, and of these 56 percent were cared for by someone other than a parent, grandparent or relative. 86 percent of children of partly or fully employed women were in some form of child care arrangement other than a parent at home (Smith 2002). Nearly seven million children were cared for by non-relatives in 1997, including home-based providers, the largest sector (36%), day care centers (33%), nursery or preschools (16%), nannies and others in children's own homes (12%), schools (8%), and the federal Head Start program (2%).[41]

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA or "welfare reform") mandated work requirements for single parents with young children who receive (newly re-named) Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) payments from the state, also contributing to increased child care demand—and a growing crisis. In 1997, 812,000 children under fifteen years old received some form of government subsidized child care (Smith 2002: 18). The following year, this number increased significantly to nearly 1.25 million children served by programs funded through federal and state child care and TANF block grants.[42] Nationwide at the time, it was estimated that between 10 million and 14.7 million children of all ages were eligible for child care subsidy under state and federal income guidelines (see NCJW 1999).

The apparent crisis of child care in the United States has several dimensions. The sheer expansion of demand due to the increasing number of mothers, and more or less steady number of father, employed outside the home, is drawing increasing attention to the availability, affordability, and quality of child care (Uttal 2002). The cost of child care is high for most families in the U.S., and prohibitive for others, averaging around \$70-\$75 a week, or \$3,800 per year in the 1990s.[43] This represents approximately 25% or more of the total household income of the 6.8 million families (including 23.2 million parents and children) under the federal poverty line in 2001,[44] and 7% of the average 2002 family income of approximately \$51,000 in the United States. The Urban Institute estimates that of the 48% of families with children in the United States who paid for some form of child care for at least one of their children in 1997, the total cost represented 9% of average income (Giannarelli and Barsimantov 2000). The Children's Defense Fund and others have reported that the average annual cost of child care for a four-year-old is greater than the average annual cost of public college tuition in all fifty states, and that child care expenditures now represent a typical family's second-highest expense category after housing.[45]

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[41] Percentages exceed 100.0 because of multiple care arrangements. See Smith 2002: 3.
[42] See Administration for Children and Families (1998).

The reverse side of the crisis – what actually makes it a crisis – is the problem of supplying adequate levels of child care labor. Volatility among both employed and "self-employed" child care workers (who have a job turnover rate estimated to be around 30% annually) and rapid turnover in clientele, contribute to an unstable and uncertain supply of child care labor. Overshadowing, and partially determining this volatility, is the virtual absence of employment benefits and above poverty level wages of most child care work (Salmon 1999; Uttal 2002; Whitebook and Phillips 1999). The overall poor conditions that pervade the child care industry, which apply differently but equally to determinations of the quality of child care, are felt keenly by parents and children (at all income levels), it is true (Uttal 2002). Yet the pivotal agents in the crisis are not the parents, or the children, or policymakers, for that matter (who, it will be shown, have enormous power, mostly unused, to act), but the paid child care providers – 98% women – on whom the state, public and private agencies, parents and children ultimately rely.

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[43] See Smith (2002), p. 16.

[44] Poverty figures from Proctor and Dalaker/U.S. Census Bureau (2002).

[45] See NCJW (1997) for a profile and Giannarelli and Barsimantov (2000) for an extended study of child care expenditures.

The Administration for Children and Families, the federal agency in charge of a variety of state funding programs for children, including child welfare, child support, Head Start, and child care, provides a profile of the United States child care work force:

- Approximately three million child care teachers, assistants, and family child care providers in the U.S. care for ten million children each day.
- 97 percent are female, 41 percent have children, and 10 percent are single parents.
- Child care teaching staff earn an average of $6.89 per hour or $12,058 per year (based on 35 hours per week and 50 weeks per year, salary data in 1993 dollars).
- Only 18 percent of child care centers offer fully paid health coverage to teaching staff. Although they earn lower wages, child care teachers are better educated than the general population.
- One-third of all child care teachers leave their centers each year.
- Family child care providers who care for and educate young children in their homes also have very low earnings. Providers earn $9,528 annually after expenses.

- Unregulated providers, who care for fewer children and are offered fewer supports, earned just $5,132 after expenses.[46]

What this profile fails to convey is how vital a part of political-economic changes – driven by structural adjustment and "welfare reform" in the United States – the provision of child care became in the 1990s. As leading researcher-advocates in the field described in an abstract of a briefing paper on child care employment:

> [C]urrent policy decision and research efforts are largely focused on how to build the U.S. child care supply, but unfortunately, they typically pay scant attention to child care employment itself as a precarious, low-wage job sector....Child care is one of the fastest growing occupations in the country, and one of the largest employers of low-income women; it is being increasingly identified as a job opportunity for women coming off welfare...(Whitebook and Phillips 1999: 1)

The structural changes signaled by welfare state reform in the United States in the 1990s were built on a pre-existing structure of sexually and racially-divided child care labor which had followed a more or less traditional pattern of home and market-based industrialization in the preceding three decades, including state de-regulation and other policies. These policies had created the conditions both for formal exploitation of a growing, informal and informalized labor force as well as the large-scale quasi-privatization which occurred in the late 1990s.

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[46] Adapted from Administration for Children and Families (ACF), "A Profile of the Child Care Work Force." (http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ccb/faq1/workforc.htm). There is a discrepancy in the number of children receiving care between this profile and the figures in Smith (2002), a result most likely of quite different counting methods. On a similar note, the Center for the Child Care Work Force, which may be assumed to have a better sense of the number of providers, reports that there are at least 2.5 million child care workers in the United States, a figure that they acknowledge does not take account of turnover among paid relatives and non-relative care providers (as distinct from the known turnover among center-based staff and family providers). See Burton, Whitebook et al. (2002), p. 17 and passim. There appears to be a basic agreement, however, between the ACF's data on the earnings of child care workers and earnings reported elsewhere. See Whitebook and Phillips (1999).

Mary Tuominen has extensively studied this phenomenon and its implications for child care and similarly situated labor sectors. In her political economic and feminist ethnography of ethno-racially diverse family daycare providers in the United States, Tuominen has sought to critically de-center the "ideology of motherhood" from the study of home-based child care, in order to expose the material determinations of child care labor, much in the same way that researchers such as Boris have done in the field of homework studies. The difficulty in the task of studying child care work is that motherhood is the very structure through which child care labor must operate, one way or another. She differentiates her own work from those such as Nelson (1990), who centered her work on Vermont home-based family day care providers on their ideological and practical commitments to "full-time motherhood."

> Clearly, researchers of home-based child-care, while not seeking to identify the factors that draw women into the work of family day care, identify motherhood as a primary factor organizing home-based child-care work. The very choice to describe providers in relation to their status as mothers and, explicitly, to use various stages of motherhood (early motherhood care-giver, later motherhood care-giver) as a means of characterizing diversity among care-givers makes clear the centrality of motherhood to the formation of a pool of labor for the work of paid, home-based child care. (Tuominen 1994a: 88)

Citing Mary Romero (1992) and other studies of domestic work (e.g. Wrigley 1995), Tuominen further acknowledges the ways in which employers appropriate the ideology of motherhood and exploit women of color as household workers, nannies and child care providers. Noting that the "interaction between paid labor and the ideology and practice of motherhood is both reflected and recreated in the choices of women," she seeks to discover other factors and forces – economic, cultural, political – which otherwise determine these choices.[47] Primary factors such as ethno-racial identity, language, geography, and immigration status powerfully shift the material structure of motherhood as it determines women's needs and choices to work, to seek child care, and to seek child care work (Tuominen 1998). In her own ethnographic studies of predominantly African American and Mexican immigrant home-based child care workers in Washington state, Tuominen notes that while these workers cited the "responsibilities of motherhood" in the choice of their home-based child care work, "responsibility" here extends primarily to income earning in the context of community-based and national crises of inadequate child care supply. Women in Tuominen's studies entered child care work quite often because they were approached by neighbors, relatives and friends looking for care from someone they knew and trusted. Among African American providers, Tuominen also notes what she refers to as an ethical and religious "call to service"—to fulfill the need for child care in low-income and impoverished communities and neighborhoods (Tuominen 1997; 1998).

In these instances, it is evident that what Tuominen terms the "practice of motherhood" has a tremendous effect on its ideology and socio-normative value. While there is as well a reciprocal effect – ideology certainly mobilizes individual and social forces, as Nelson's studies of predominantly rural, white child care providers finds – the ideology of motherhood is meaningless absent the practical effect of so much unpaid labor time that must be valorized in order for mothers to provide for themselves, their children, and the children of others whom they value in one way or another. The myth of the male breadwinner is the obverse image of the distorted ideology of motherhood. Were it simply a question of ideology, motherhood should or would become more like fatherhood in time, which of course wouldn't be unaffected by a dramatic change in the practice of motherhood. The fact that fathers are among the fast growing group of home-based child care providers is one indication, among others, that ideological arguments are less persuasive in the political economic context of women's historic paid and unpaid labor participation.[48]

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[47] See Tuominen (1994): 89; (1998): 63-64.

The point which underscores Tuominen's argument here and elsewhere is that the sexual division of labor is itself always already differentiated, by race and ethnicity, by class, by education, and by "community" or culture. In this sense, the contrast she draws between family child care providers and domestic workers or nannies is instructive. Noting how the bulk of research on domestic work concerns middle and upper-class women hiring working-class reproductive labor (to both ideological and practical ends), Tuominen emphasizes the class, cultural, and geographic specificity of home-based child care providers and the families of the children they care for.

> Clearly family day care work, like domestic work, is paid, reproductive labor occurring in households and is also part of the "societal reproductive system." However, family day care work reproduces material and ideological structures in a manner somewhat different than paid domestic labor. By providing child-care in their own homes family day care workers, regardless of their racial/ethnic and

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[48] Brenner (2000) makes this point more clearly in her critique of Michele Barrett on the role of patriarchal ideology in determining women's oppression.

> economic backgrounds, recreate ideologies that identify women with home, family and nurturance. By providing care to families who share their own cultural backgrounds, racial/ethnic identity and employment histories, family day care workers foster and recreate class, cultural and racial/ethnic identities and norms. (Tuominen 1994a: 183)

The double-bind which Tuominen suggests we attend to – that the exposure of home-based work is always at risk of re-imposing gendered stereotypes and mythologies – must be elaborated through other determinations, such as ethno-racial difference, immigration history, geographic location, and educational attainment. That is to say, one can't simply separate paid from unpaid labor. That is the "impossible" practice of motherhood.[49] One can, however, look to others – co-workers, parents, community leaders, and peers – to see how the engagement of mothers with home-based work, home-based child care work in particular, extends the politics of homework, and the place of the home, well beyond the geographical imagination of sexual oppression and subordination. In home-based child care, especially, one must see beyond the confines of the home to see where women's always constrained choices – and differently constrained political and social power – are being directed.

Tuominen (1997) takes this up in her analysis of state policies affecting child care – and by practical extension the sexual division of labor locally, nationally and globally, by way of immigration – and points to a struggle within the state over what I would term, for lack of better references, a socialist society versus a neo-liberal society. According to

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[49] Cf. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's formulation of the impossible: "the structure one cannot not wish to inhabit." See her preface to Devi 1995: xxiii-xxix.

Tuominen, the neo-liberal dominance of the state since the end of World War II resulted in an ongoing effort to shape and re-shape federal child care and sexual policies in favor of a market-based, capitalist and patriarchal privatization of social welfare programs.[50] Since the ascendancy of the neo-conservative wing of the Republican Party in the federal government beginning in around 1980, federal policy has been focused extensively on the curtailment of the welfare state, including state-sponsored child care as a key matrix of state family and employment policies. Tuominen (1994a) cites five key initiatives of the Reagan Administration during the 1980s: 1) Reducing direct federal support for child care (cutting support for services to low-income families from $835 million in 1981 to $422 million in 1986, offset only partially by increased support during this period to the Head Start program); 2) Use of federal tax credits for child care as a substitute for direct support (expanding the tax credit by 350% in the same period, from $956 million to $3.4 billion); 3) Creating corporate tax benefits for employer-sponsored child care; 4) Eliminating federal regulations in an effort to increase the supply of unlicensed providers; and 5) Related to the elimination of regulations, stressing the sufficiency of the supply of child care by emphasizing the informal sector.

Tuominen points to a struggle on the Right – between southern and Sun Belt religious neo-conservatives attempting to take over the Republican Party via a grassroots appeal to "family values" and anti-abortion rhetoric, and mainstream conservatives bent on advancing the party through a broader appeal to "traditional" suburban values of motherhood, family and work; and in so doing, she identifies a convergence between neo-conservative and neo-liberal approaches underway in the Republican Party in the 1980s that would assert more or less nationwide political hegemony by the late 1990s: "...the Republican Party itself," Tuominen writes, became "an arena of struggle regarding the societal roles of women in general, and mothers, in particular" (Tuominen 1994a: 243).

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[50] In this context, one should also cite the elimination of federally funded abortion and gradual erosion of the protection of women's right to abortion in the U.S. and internationally; Reagan/Bush opposition to the Family and Medical Leave Act passed finally in 1994; and weak enforcement of sexual harassment and assault policies, child support and alimony laws, etc.

The struggle for hegemony within the Republican Party was duplicated in the Democratic Party in the early 1990s, with the rise of Bill Clinton's "New Democrat" bloc, masterminded by the right-leaning Democratic Leadership Council (and paralleling the Republican Party's neo-conservative and neo-liberal convergence). Tuominen points to the weak version of the Family Medical Leave Act agreed to by Clinton, as well as his signature "welfare reform" legislation – stricter than any proposed by Republicans in the previous two decades – as instances of a broader political attack based on privatization of the welfare state, including the privatization of child care.[51] Clinton's welfare reform further advanced privatization by shifting responsibility for welfare and child care to the states, and a key result of welfare reform privatization, crucial to the present study, is the expansion of a low-paid home-based child care workforce:

> While mothers on public assistance move into paid employment, another group of women emerges to provide, for pay, the unwaged child-care previously provided by mothers. These child-care workers are also mothers. And the working conditions of these state-funded child-care workers consistently reflect the working condition of the low-income mothers of the children for whom they

> care...some of these child-care workers make so little money in providing full-time, state-funded child care that they, themselves, are low-income workers who qualify for government-subsidized child care.[52] (ibid.: 254)

Structural adjustment by way of welfare reform has had the multiple effects of cutting state subsidies to low-income women and children, turning the same women onto the very low-wage market, including home-based child care, and re-instantiating the power of the state to control women's work and wages – in the case of child care workers, more or less directly, rather than through male breadwinners as in the previous era. With the declining power of trade unions, again a calculated political objective of the state in the era of structural adjustment, the possibility of configuring home-based child care workers as public employees (whom trade unions had most successfully organized in the previous two decades), was hardly a question from the perspective of top-down organizing. Were the United States a signatory of the ILO homework convention, state and local governments would not be able to exploit the indeterminate category of home-based worker as they currently do. As Tuominen notes:

> I found no indication that any discussion has ever arisen among state or federal policy makers regarding alternatives to contracting-out child-care services (i.e.,

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[51] I would add to privatization, correlative expansion of the moral and social policing of the poor, people of color, and children, and the huge increases in incarceration, as elements of more control-oriented structural adjustment in the United States. See Garland (1999) and Wacquant (2001).

[52] One should note, however, that most states deny payment to child-care providers for their own children: the child of a child care provider must go to another provider, or else the privatized logic of home-based child care work would be upset on a structural level. With the ideology of home-based motherhood more or less in retreat, the objection to paying homeworkers for the care of their own children concerns the economic and political power of home-based women workers – the "practice of motherhood" – against the

> the option of the state's directly employing women to provide child-care). While the state is willing to purchase these services (in fact the purchase and provision of these services is essential to the employment goals of the current welfare state) the historical provision of child-care outside of the structures of the formal market economy and the gendered ideologies of motherhood and care-giving continue to shape the state's policies regarding child care work. (ibid.: 289)

The result is a growing, super-exploited home-based child care workforce under direct contract to the state – which has no formal labor rights and is barred technically by antitrust law from joining forces to increase the prices they charge as "self-employed" workers. On top of this, federal child care legislation sets a limit to how much the state will pay a home-based child care worker. The maximum the states which administer federal child care subsidies can pay providers is the 75th percentile of local market rates, that is, higher than the prices charged by 75% of providers in a local area, but lower than those of the remaining 25%. Tuominen found that state-contracted family day care providers in the state of Washington, where she conducted research, earned half as much as state-employed child care workers, counting the value of employment benefits such as health care. By employing the majority of family day care providers in the country, and paying them at or, in most cases, below the 75th percentile of local market rates, states exert powerful pressure against any rapid increase in child care wages. With poverty-level income, the majority of family day care providers can little afford to supply

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state and capital. This goes very much to the heart of the matter: class composition proceeds through struggle over the provision of auto-valorized child care.

themselves with employment benefits. such as health insurance. the cost of which has risen rapidly since the 1990s. or pensions.

The Power of Organization: Home-Based Child care Workers in, and, and Against the State

Tuominen's work on the 1990s, useful as it is in examining how diverse women are drawn to highly exploited home-based child care work by the state and parents of all income categories seeking affordable care for their children. helps readers understand political-economic determination from the top better than it does from the bottom.[53] One has to look elsewhere. for example at early efforts to organize domestic workers in race-exclusive unions. to see the complicated experience of bottom-up organizing of the home-based work force in the United States (Van Raaphorst 1988). As Boris (1994b) has pointed out. the twentieth century U.S. regulatory debate involving trade unions. employers and the state subjected homeworkers to a more or less discursive status in efforts to organize homeworkers – either into or out of existence – from above. The successful efforts to gain the ILO's approval of a homework convention. as we saw in the previous chapters. may be understood as a case of bottom-up organizing for top-down changes that should give rise to greater efforts by the state. employers. as well as grassroots organizations and trade unions to organize home-based workers – for their own diverse purposes. The complications that arise from regulatory changes are. no doubt. beginning to be felt in the few countries where the convention has been ratified.

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[53] I do not write this by way of critique. but rather wish to draw out the implications of her excellent studies of the factors that shape the choices of women in home-based child care work. Tuominen (2002) does look at the bottom-up organization of child care center workers. who as both private and public employees. have had success in unionizing in a number of cases in recent years.

That is to say, "organizing" has its own divisions as well. The state and employers, or in the case of home-based child care in the United States, the state as national policymaker *and* largest national employer (or "purchaser of services" in the linguistic era of structural adjustment), also seeks "to organize" homeworkers, and is better positioned to organize homeworkers than trade unions and community organizations in most instances. "Better positioned," in this case, means they are in frequent contact with providers; they license and supervise them; in some instances they train and educate them; and for virtually all child care workers, the state/employer determines what levels of training and education are required for providers to be licensed and/or subsidized. And this "better positioning" is precisely the arena of social and political struggle for home-based child care workers in the United States in the twenty-first century. Given the social and political forces arrayed against them at the federal level, home-based child care workers must (and in any case do) organize locally, where they can and do exert their own considerable political power.

In the field of home-based child care work, local government authorities act as local authorities often do, as if their mission were to rule "positively," to govern "morally," to act as the agents of morality and protectors of humanity – and of children most of all; in short, as the "police," in the quaint turn-of-the-nineteenth century French usage outlined by Donzelot (1997). Donzelot's account details how social workers, beginning in the nineteenth century, began to deal with those seeking or receiving welfare and other forms of economic and social support and assistance: patronizingly, "educatively," intrusively, and ultimately, punitively; or less commonly, with complete neglect. As a result of some of these functions, the new social workers were often "bad" organizers; as a result of others, particularly the educational and punitive functions, these agents of local authorities and service agencies wielded tremendous force in mobilizing the populations in their midst into various kinds of action: learning a trade, getting a job, marrying and having children, abstaining from law-breaking activities, etc.: in short, local authorities endeavored to police people into policing themselves, as well as their peers, family members, friends and neighbors, along productive and reproductive – what Foucault termed "biopolitical" – lines, dictated in large part by educators, academics and philanthropists, and secondly by government officials, political parties and business interests.

Local government practice, in general, is little different in the child care field today, where localities place greatest emphasis on the "professionalization" of the child care workforce via financial and other incentives for educational certification – a professionalization which does not significantly increase providers' incomes, but does appear to reduce the massive turnover which plagues the industry. Indeed, the majority of state and local government initiatives to improve, ameliorate or otherwise affect the conditions of child care work have had little impact on improving compensation.[54] While most offer some sort of financial incentive to child care workers to participate in "professional development" and early child hood education learning of one sort or another, already well-educated child care workers tend to benefit the most in terms of increased compensation and professional status. Indeed, Whitebook and Eichberg, two leading advocates, note, "the degree of emphasis on education and training in many initiatives is problematic for family child care providers who typically have lower levels of formal education and child-related training and may have restricted access to relevant, affordable, and accessible training" (2002: 15). They offer a useful typology of the diversely pitched government efforts to re-tool child care work, suggesting that given the top-down politics and weak funding behind most of these efforts, those interested in improving the child care labor system should be evaluating improvements on the extent to which "various initiatives contribute to a movement to secure a better child care system."

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[54] Whitebook and Eichberg (2002) discuss "Teacher Education And Compensation Helps" (TEACH), which is now administered in fifteen to twenty states. It offers providers small subsidies to take a number of early education courses, and a corresponding schedule of reimbursement increases, which are generally being reported at around 10%. This means that a home-based provider enrolled in a state's TEACH program, who earns the nationwide average of a little less than $10,000, should, after a year or more of classroom study (and homework of the other sort), make $11,000. The scale of change recommended by

> Specifically, does the initiative contribute toward building the necessary will to support a greater public investment in comprehensive services for all young children? Is it well-publicized? Is there a growing awareness of the need for skilled workers in child care, and how the initiative is taking steps to achieve this goal? We should ask whether an initiative contributes to an ever-expanding group of stakeholders who understand the components of child care and are willing to advocate on its behalf. (ibid.: 20)

But, as these well-positioned writers – Whitebook is a founder and former director of the leading national advocacy organization for child care workers, the Center for the Childcare Workforce – go on to note, "because most child care workers are not represented by a collective bargaining agreement or are not members of a work-related or professional organization, they have not necessarily been represented or engaged in the

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the state, in this state, remains powerfully skewed towards further exploitation of a growingly "professional," and thus divided, child care workforce.

development or implementation of policy initiatives intended to meet their needs" (ibid.: 20-21). Only a handful of community-based and unions organizations do "represent and engage" child care workers, home-based providers in particular, in "policy initiatives intended to meet their needs." Whitebook and Eichberg cite Coleman Advocates and Wu Yee Children's Services in the organization of child care providers in California, the Home Daycare Justice Committee in gaining health insurance coverage for providers in Rhode Island, and union organizing efforts in Washington state, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, California and elsewhere to create systemic change via legislation as well as unionize child care workers for collective bargaining.

However, in contrast to Whitebook and Eichberg, I would argue that the difference of these bottom-up efforts is not merely that they are more systemic in their approach to improving child care working conditions, or that they contribute to broader movement-building—important and rare as these are. Grassroots organizing that demands the leadership and action of child care workers – especially, for a variety of reasons, the leadership and action of home-based providers – has the additional effects of reconfiguring the power-laden relationships between child care workers and government authorities, challenging the racist and sexist configuration of child care work, and positioning child care workers at the leading edge of social and political struggles over the production and appropriation of value (or "affect," as we shall see in chapter five) in the structural adjustment era of intensified policing and control. In short, the kind of organizing that Whitebook and Eichberg cite as movement-building, and most worthy of top-down political support, is also the organizing that most challenges top-down control.

that embodies counter-racist and counter-sexist hegemony, and exposes the violent costs of child care work in the circuit of government authority.

The case of the Home Daycare Justice Committee (HDJC) in Rhode Island is instructive – and has proven to be a significant model for other grassroots child care worker organizing elsewhere, as I discuss below. HDJC was a project of a community-based organization, Direct Action for Rights and Equality (DARE), whose mission since the 1980s has been to organize low-income people of color to win social, economic and political justice. Between 1990 and 1996, before its spin-off into a cooperative of home-based child care providers (the Daycare Justice Cooperative), HDJC successfully organized home-based providers to win state-subsidized health insurance, a policy that was eventually extended to cover center-based child care workers in 1998. Today, most of Rhode Island's center-based and state-licensed home-based providers are eligible for health insurance coverage under the state's managed health care (Medicaid) program as a direct result of HDJC's six-year struggle—one of only two such state initiatives in the United States.[55]

HJDC's protracted campaign for health insurance began in 1990 with word that the state's Department of Human Services was late again – three months on average in the case of some home-based providers – in reimbursing its contracted providers. Shannah Kurland (a DARE intern at the time, and later the HDJC organizer and DARE executive director) recalled that the experience of organizing home-based providers around late payments was an unexpected catalyst for the future campaign for wide-scale health care coverage.

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[55] Home-based workers are required to provide at least $1,800 of services to the state's Department of Human Services within a six-month period to be eligible for the program. The Center for the Child Care Work Force reports that Michigan also has a state-based health insurance program for child care workers, and that health insurance is a component of several of the state-based TEACH initiatives, although the latter extends exclusively to workers enrolled in TEACH, not to all providers. See Whitebook and Eichberg (2002).

> ...I had run into an article somewhere about organizing home workers...it just wouldn't go totally out of my brain...I didn't realize at the time we were thinking about something immense. I thought we were talking about something on the scale of door-knocking on a street and getting neighbors involved around a playground...It didn't strike me how big it would be in terms of DARE...[that we would be] creating a new chapter of history in organizing low-wage women workers. (Abrams 1999: 7-8)

The intervention of home-based providers, and the response of community-based organizers to seek a collective solution, marked the HJDC campaign from the beginning. It foretold, as well, the struggle over the six-year period for home-based providers to claim the organizing issues – late payments, lack of health insurance, and political disrespect – in the face of government officials, who refused to grant meetings, stonewalled, and used a variety of other delaying, dividing and diversionary tactics to force the providers off the campaign trail.[56] In pursuing health insurance coverage, the home-based providers had identified a need that the state otherwise didn't care about –

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[56] Interesting from the perspective of homework, government officials attempted to HDJC's effort by arguing that it would have to cover center-based child care workers as well. HDJC's response was that their proposal in no way prevented the state from extending coverage to other workers, which it did two years after beginning it for home-based providers. This was by no means the first effort to divide and conquer predominantly non-white, low-income home-based workers. See Abrams (1999: 17) and Whitebook and Eichberg (2002) on the race- and class-based continuity of struggles over professionalization and center vs. home-based child care workers.

and spent five years denying. As Kristy Abrams notes in her account of the Home Daycare Justice Committee's struggle for health benefits:

> By the 90s, the state (at least the state of Rhode Island) had begrudgingly admitted that low-income families need help paying for childcare, since these families can't afford to keep a parent at home or to pay for childcare themselves. But the tradition of racism and sexism continued, metamorphosing from complete silence on the issue, to treating childcare workers deplorably. How else could the $2.38 per hour wage without benefits have come about, unless politicians and officials didn't consider providing childcare a real job—unless they consider it "women's work (and in particular, women of color's) work"? DARE's providers realized that the state was in the wrong, that providers perform an incredibly important service, and that they deserve to live a healthy life. (Abrams 1999: 9)

Indeed, DARE's providers named names, called those in control to account, and forced both cooperative and uncooperative government officials and policymakers to action. They put a name and face, phone number and address, on those who were in positions to control – and alter – the daily oppression (i.e. unaffordable medical care) which they were experiencing. In transforming individual and collective oppression into a campaign for structural change with identified individual and institutional targets and allies, HDJC aggressively cut through the top-down model of negotiated and incremental, that is to say, paltry change which pervades the "childcare system." HDJC "wanted to make it clear that the ideas behind [the health insurance] legislation came straight from the community it would affect, rather than from well-intentioned advocates who think they knew what the community needed. They wanted to make the reality of their lives and work concrete" (Abrams 1999: 17). The stakes of the HJDC campaign were real and concrete enough. Three years into the campaign, HDJC member and home-based provider Yolanda Gonzalez died of undiagnosed leukemia, which marked a turning point for campaign leaders. Still, it would take two more years of direct action, including office invasions, hearing take-overs, daycare sit-ins and negotiation cut-offs for HJDC to win subsidized health coverage from the state. Even then it took the promise of increased federal funding to the state as a result of the 1996 welfare reform legislation to move state legislators to allocate funding for the insurance which they had, by then, agreed was warranted.

This brief retelling of DARE's Home Daycare Justice Committee campaign is all the more important as a result of its effects outside of Rhode Island. Advocates seized on it as a landmark in the slow movement to improving child care work. Yet as Whitebook and Eichberg's study of child care compensation policy initiatives implied, such a radical result – a major employment benefit worth thousands of dollars a year to an individual worker and her children – particularly as it benefited (and was led and organized by) the most degraded and devalorized child care workers (home-based providers), is far from the norm of contemporary child care "movement-building." The otherwise unexpected result of home-based providers organizing and winning employer health benefits, nevertheless, has informed similar bottom-up campaigns and organizing efforts in at least a few other places in the United States.[57] In Illinois, for example, Service Employees

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[57] See Jacqueline Salmon, "Va. Providers of Child Care Get Organized," *The Washington Post*, Wednesday, March 14, 2001, A10.

International Union Local 880, together with the Association for Community Reform Now (ACORN), has been organizing home-based child care and home health care workers simultaneously since the mid-1990s, including an ongoing statewide legislative campaign for a so-called Living Wage law, including health insurance provisions, that would specifically cover these workers. Through the direct action of home child care workers from Local 880's base of 2000 child care worker-members, the union succeeded in 1999 in forcing the state to increase the daily reimbursement rate to home-based providers from approximately $13 per day to over $20 per day.[58]

Possibly the most similar case to HDJC of community-based mobilization for home-based provider health care coverage is the Unity Campaign in Alexandria, Virginia. Like HDJC, the Unity Campaign is a home-based child care provider organizing project of a community-based organization, the Tenants' and Workers' Support Committee (TWSC), whose mission is to organize low-income people in Northern Virginia to win social and economic justice, fight against racism and sexism, develop their own political leadership, and collectively control and own community resources such as housing and child care. The parallels of the Unity Campaign's struggle for improved working conditions, "respect and dignity" to HDJC's efforts are not coincidental. TWSC organizers were familiar with DARE's child care worker organizing of the 1990s and their success in gaining statewide health insurance coverage. Both organizations were formed in the mid-1980s, and their similar organizing approaches, including direct action and political leadership development directed towards pro-active policy and legislative change benefiting racially and economically oppressed people, reflected the political sense that in the face of worsening neighborhood and economic conditions throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, including massive gentrification and public and private disinvestments from low-income neighborhoods comprised of a majority of people of color, new kinds of community organizing that could challenge racist and class-based oppression were necessary. The durability of both of these organizations, each of which has grown incrementally over nearly two decades, is an indicator of the success of each organization in developing and mobilizing its community membership and leadership bases, developing internal political skills and resources (such as policy analysis and development, strategic planning and campaign implementation, and fundraising), and political perseverance in the face of top-down pressure, opposition, resistance, and refusal.

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[58] Communication with Keith Kelleher, SEIU Local 880, December 18, 2002.

Aware of HDJC's six-year struggle and ultimate success, TWSC organizers realized in late 1998 that the difficulty Latina immigrant child care providers were having in obtaining licensing from the City of Alexandria's Department of Human Services (DHS) was likely just a small facet of a much larger set of political problems. At the time, the organization (then named simply the Tenants' Support Committee) had just completed formation of a nearly 300-unit limited-equity housing cooperative, a milestone for the organization, which had begun in the mid-1980s as a multi-racial community coalition of established African American residents and newly-arrived Latino (predominantly Salvadoran and Honduran) immigrants who were facing planned mass evictions as a prelude to the gentrification of the Arlandria neighborhood of Alexandria, Virginia, located about one mile from Washington's Reagan National Airport. With a strong foothold in the growing immigrant community, which over the next ten years would become the ethno-racial majority in the neighborhood, the TWSC continued organizing tenants to prevent evictions, bring building up to code, and ultimately form a limited-equity housing cooperative, with the long-term goal of community ownership and control of the area's increasingly costly housing stock. With initial purchase of the Arlandria-Chirilagua Housing Cooperative in 1993, the group began organizing many of the same tenants around the problems they experienced as low-wage workers. Subsequently renamed the Tenants' and Workers' Support Committee, the organization began a unionization drive among hotel housekeepers in 1994 that resulted several years later in the first unionization of a hotel in the state of Virginia in nearly twenty years, a campaign jointly conducted with the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees union. In the newly formed Arlandria-Chirilagua Housing Cooperative, with over 1,000 predominantly low-income Latino and African American owner-residents, a number of African American and a smaller number of Latina residents were licensed home-based child care providers. As Tumoninen (1998) has documented, among the major impetuses to women entering home-based child care work is parental demand – often of neighbors, friends, and relatives – for culturally and linguistically appropriate care. Among Latino parents, the demand became increasingly problematic as the prevailing informality of home-based care was transformed by a number of residents who sought, or were forced to seek, licenses for the opportunity to sub-contract with DHS and offer subsidized care for the eligible children of low-income Latino parents.

However, in early 1998, DHS had cut off funding of bilingual certification classes, which had been provided under contract to the city by a neighborhood-based pre-school network. Members of the TWSC's Women's Leadership Group, which was involved at the time in developing a community health access project and a participatory research and action project to gain public investment in outdoor recreation facilities in the neighborhood, seized the initiative, gathering signatures of home child care providers, parents and others on a petition to DHS. In a letter to the director of the city's Office of Early Childhood Development, the office of DHS responsible for child care provider licensing and oversight, the coordinator of the TWSC Women's Leadership Group wrote:

> The Arlandria / Chirilagua community wishes to relay our concern about the situation of *Home Child Care Providers* in our community, especially 5 women that, to date, Social Services has not approved to become city-licensed *Home Child Care Providers*. These providers are appreciated for the important service they provide to our community. Not approving them affects both the women and most important the children who are denied access to quality Spanish-speaking child care.[59]

With their experience organizing tenants into a housing cooperative and organizing low-wage workers into a union, TWSC organizers knew that the five Latina child care providers who first approached the TWSC were part of a larger force of racially, economically and sexually oppressed women of color who, as history would have it, were for the most part contracted to the same entity, the City's Department of Human Services, which looked increasingly like the "employer of record" for what were in 1998-99 the approximately two-hundred and fifty licensed providers in the city. With one small but significant step, a letter that linked linguistically-appropriate child care to the training (as well as compensation) of home-based Latina child care providers, an organizing project was born. The petition was successful. DHS began offering bilingual certification classes, and TWSC organizers met in late 1998 to discuss strategies for organizing the licensed home child care providers in the city, who were about 90 percent African-American, along with the small but growing number of Latina as well as South Asian immigrant providers.

Throughout 1999, TWSC organizers began the process of communicating with the city's 250 licensed providers, to recruit members, gain information about their work and experiences as home-based providers, and begin identifying organizing issues. They obtained the DHS list of licensed providers and began contacting individual providers in several neighborhoods. They invited providers to meetings to learn more and begin building a community base. It gradually surfaced, again not coincidentally, that providers in Alexandria were experiencing the same problems as providers in Rhode Island, and that the first and apparently easiest of the issues to tackle was late reimbursement checks. Organizers began a meticulous door-to-door campaign late in the year, building up to a meeting in April 2000 with the director of Alexandria's DHS, Meg O'Reagan. "About 50 angry Alexandria day-care providers are taking the city's human services director to task over their paychecks, many more than three weeks late and some not received at all," read the lead paragraph of one newspaper account of the meeting.

> Sheryl Bell, a mother for 28 years and a childcare provider for 18, said she wants the city to take her protest seriously.
>
> "We are not babysitters," she said. "We are child-care professionals."

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[59] TWSC correspondence, April 30, 1998, emphasis in original.

> She called caring for children one of the most important jobs there is. "What we do counts because we are raising America's future," she said.
>
> Other women told how they were behind on making credit card and rent payments, and their gas was turned off because they live paycheck to paycheck.
>
> "Ya'll have messed up my credit," said Tammy Ingram, with 6-month-old Antonio Goodman, one of her child-care charges, on her lap. "I can't buy a house. I can't get a car."[60]

I cite this necessarily partial, even partisan account for several reasons. One, it reiterates one of the principal goals of the bottom-up organizing embodied both in HDJC and Unity: having the state take the protest of home-based child care providers seriously. Two, it suggests that the valorization of home-based child care operates through both a political appeal to professionalism and a discursive appeal to the production of an "imagined" ethno-racial community. Three, it acknowledges the violent, power-laden conditions of home-based work that surround and invade the economic, physical and psychical (the "ontological") security of home-based workers. And as with DARE, and with home-based worker organizing around the world, the violence surges from racism, and the ongoing technological evolution of racialized policing and management of subordinated populations.

> [DHS Director] O'Reagan said she had "tremendous respect" for the child-care providers, but in responding to their questions she twice referred to them as "you people."

> She said no offense was intended, the mostly-black crowd was clearly upset by the remark, with several saying that they were being addressed "like we're ignorant." [sic]
>
> In a Dec. 3 letter, the city's 213 city-paid child-care providers, each care for five or fewer children in their homes, were told to "please budget wisely" while the agency changes the way it processes invoices.[61]

It would take DHS six additional months to change the way it processes invoices, changes that O'Reagan claimed at the April meeting would have cost up to $250,000 in software re-writing, but that were eventually made at no additional cost. However, it did take six months of continuous organizing, pressure, petitioning, letter-writing, and several follow-up meetings, including one in October 2000 with a representative of the city manager's office, which formally oversaw DHS's director, to gain the change demanded by providers since early in the year.

The victory for timely paychecks, which as in the DARE experience was clearly as well a victory in terms of political respect and power, led Unity leaders, who by now had become fully energized by the campaign, onto the next, and much broader, organizing issues: employment compensation and benefits. They continued meeting monthly, with organizers – including some providers – continuing the door-to-door strategy to inform providers of the paycheck victory and recruit members to the campaign. Unity members began looking at the possibility of winning health care insurance. In Spring 2001, Unity leader (and later president) Sheryl Bell testified before

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[60] Trigie Ealey, "Day-care Providers Slam Human Services," *The Alexandria Journal*, April 6, 2000, A1.
[61] Ibid.

the Alexandria City Council about the need to increase the reimbursement rate of the city's home-based providers, to keep up with the rates in a neighboring jurisdiction, with roughly the same demographics as Alexandria. The Council approved $150,000 in June 2001, bringing the city's rate into parity with its neighbor, and signaling the growing power of Unity to make change through direct action and collective organization.

The campaign for city-subsidized health insurance began in earnest in mid-2001. A speak-out scheduled for mid-September 2001 turned into a widely attended memorial in the wake of the Al-Quaida attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center days before – and a passionate demand for health insurance for home-based child care providers. A hundred and fifty labor and religious leaders, elected officials, bureaucrats, Unity members, organizers, parents, children, community supporters and others heard testimonials from the home-based providers, received assurances from child care and legal experts that the city had every right and reason to subsidize health care for the child care providers it contracted, and were encouraged by the parents and children to whom the workers provided care to bring justice and stability into a system of care, education and support which they depended on heavily.

The four members of the seven-member Alexandria City Council who were present at the September speak-out indicated their tentative support for Unity's health insurance proposal. However, over the next six months, intensification of the conflictive relationship between DHS and Unity – spurred in part by the exposure of several unrelated "child protection" fiascos in the department – resulted in the revocation of nearly 10% of the licenses of the home-based providers in the city. This, in turn, led to temporary divisions among Unity members over how to respond to the mounting aggression of DHS to Unity's "campaign for dignity and respect" as well as to individual Unity leaders and members. DHS was under increasing pressure as a result of its perceived mishandling in the case of a child who died in the custody of her mother as a result of the brutal beating by the mother's boyfriend. The three-year old child had spent the majority of her life in the custody of foster parents, and the Alexandria DHS had been guilty not so much of neglect – they had visited the child's mother's home on repeated occasions – but of failing to notice the emerging signs of abuse that culminated in the child's death within three months of being returned to her mother from foster care.[62] As director of the agency in charge of overseeing child abuse cases, O'Reagan was under increasing pressure from her own bosses to account for her office's failings throughout the next eighteen months, a period during which Unity was gaining public power around compensation and health care issues. Pressure on DHS was coming thus from a number of sides. One of the results was a clampdown by DHS on the licensing of home-based child care providers. Providers, including approximately a dozen members of Unity, had their licenses revoked beginning in late 2001 and continuing into the spring of 2002. As Unity leaders began to learn the details of the revocations, startling news began to emerge about the arbitrary and apparently retaliatory nature of license reviews and decision-making at DHS.

With a number of Unity leaders facing the loss of their licenses, campaign members were confronted with how to respond. For a short period of time, debate about the relative merits of one provider's appeal over another began to divide Unity members across ethno-racial lines. However, Unity's leadership prevailed over the possibility of a breakdown in multi-racial unity in the interest of pursuing the underlying problem of the cases: the complete lack of any due process in DHS's handling of license restrictions or revocations. Unity organizers began documenting the cases – as many and as in-depth as possible – of the providers whose licenses had been revoked or suspended in the previous six months. More than half of the revocations appeared to be the result of controls newly imposed by the Virginia state legislature that outlawed licensing providers in whose home resided *anyone* – spouse, domestic partner, family member, etc. – who had been convicted of two categories of *misdemeanor* offense at any prior point. (Providers themselves were already subject to stringent criminal background checks, with a broad range of convictions constituting so-called "barrier offenses" to licensing.) The new controls, which augmented the existing regulations on *felony* offenders residing in the home of state or city-licensed child care providers, went beyond the regulatory requirements of most other states, which typically have a statute of limitations on misdemeanors as "barrier offenses" in determining a child care provider's licensing eligibility. At a 2002 public hearing of the Alexandria Human Rights Commission attended by Unity, one white commission member noted the virtual impossibility of being an African American man in the state of Virginia in the 1960s and 1970s and not being hauled up on one misdemeanor offense or another. In mandating home-based controls that lifted the statute of limitations on counting misdemeanors as barrier crimes, the conservative-dominated Virginia legislature was effectively rolling back the clock to Jim Crow and inaugurating a new tactic in the emerging national "culture of control" (Garland 2001; Wacquant 2001).

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[62] See Sarah Godfrey, "Sticks and Bones," *Washington City Paper*, Feb. 8-14 2002, for a partial account of this story.

The remaining instances of license revocation, while all quite different in case and point, nevertheless shared the common characteristic of an almost complete absence of due process in which workers could appeal their license review by DHS.[63] This was confirmed at a Workers' Rights Board hearing convened by Unity in August 2002, when DHS Director O'Reagan, pushed on whether providers had been given a fair opportunity to appeal the loss of their licenses, replied that providers were free to appeal their cases to her, and that in the cases of the providers who testified at the August hearing, the decision to revoke the licenses was hers alone to make. In other words, providers could appeal to her, but she had already decided the disposition of their cases. In extended and emotional testimony to the Alexandria Human Rights Commission two weeks later, Unity members who had had their licenses revoked – and, as they argued, their fundamental rights to due process negated – spoke to the loss of income, housing, community status and health which resulted from the revocation of their licenses, as well as the typically foot-dragging, punitive and accusatory manner in which DHS followed-up – or refused to follow-up – on requests to review their individual cases.

The testimony to the local Human Rights Commission was auspicious in more than one way. It came on the day that DHS Director O'Reagan was reassigned to another city agency and an interim DHS director appointed. Although it is difficult to assess the impact of Unity's two-year struggle with O'Reagan on her reassignment by city managers, it certainly contributed something – along with the mishandling of the child abuse case the previous year – to the decision to remove her from DHS. Unity's increasingly explicit sense of a pattern of paternalistic, racist and punitive treatment of child care providers by DHS social workers and administrators was not what city managers wanted to see in the headlines. Unity's testimony to the Human Rights Commission shed bright light on the vindictive and arbitrary treatment of providers by O'Reagan in particular, as well as by the head of the DHS Office of Early Childhood Development, Carol Ferrell. At the hearing, Unity leaders presented the Commission with a proposal for the creation of an independent appeals board, comprised of child care providers, labor, community and religious representatives, that would step in where O'Reagan had more or less usurped administrative-judicial power in the absence of any countervailing force. Weeks later, four Unity members had their licenses restored, in an immediate response to the legal and political challenges Unity was posing. Four more providers came forward later in 2002 to present their cases to Unity organizers. Around the same time, it was reported by Unity members that, in fact, not only had DHS administrators taken final judgment and oversight of the city's providers upon themselves, but social workers in the DHS had intentionally targeted Unity members for increased pressure and policing, including the probable loss of referrals for child care placement. In the most telling instance, a Bangladeshi provider who had been participating in Unity meetings and actions for the past year reported in Fall 2002 to the interim DHS director that during the previous summer, her assigned social worker had told her and her husband that Unity would not get them health insurance and that they should quit Unity. For some time, she had not received any child care placements and was, in addition, suffering from an illness that required medication costing $500 per month. Although it is possible that the particular social worker was not retaliating directly by withholding child care placements to the Bangladeshi Unity member – non-

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[63] *Unity News, A Newsletter for Unity Providers*, September 2002 (Alexandria, VA: Tenants' and Workers' Support Committee). See also Trigie Ealey, "Day Care Workers Say Their Licenses Unfairly Revoked,"

The Northern Virginia Journal, Friday, August 30, 2002, A1, A9.

Unity South Asian and African immigrant providers in the same zone of the city were also not receiving placements during the same period – certainly the challenge to quit Unity and the insistence to the seriously ill provider that Unity's campaign for health insurance was not the answer to her health problems, was antagonistic enough.

Equally catalyzing in Fall 2002, Unity's recently elected President, Sheryl Bell, a longstanding leader and child advocate in the city's African American neighborhoods, schools, and community, was hospitalized with a life-threatening illness. As a founding member of Unity and key figure in the ongoing campaign for health insurance, Bell's illness put into stark relief for the campaign's leaders and supporters the traumatic conditions of home-based child care work which they were addressing in the campaign for health insurance, dignity and respect. The relatively older African American women who continue to constitute the majority of home-based child care providers in the city (which is not atypical for cities nationwide), are at much greater health risk than the general population – and at even greater health and economic risk because of their medically uninsured status (Mullings 1997).

Moved by the events of the previous months, by the end of 2002, the Unity Campaign was in full effect: continuing the pursuit of city-subsidized health insurance, winning preliminary approval of a new due process policy and a community appeals board, calling for a complete review of the DHS's policies and practices affecting child care workers; and drafting a legislative proposal to alter the new state controls which effectively re-criminalized the spouses and family members of home-based providers. Members readied a variety of direct action props – including a mock coffin symbolizing the death awaiting child care providers without access to medical care – and planned strategies and tactics for the upcoming City Council budget session. And returning full circle to where the campaign began, Unity leaders and organizers began developing a proposal to organize and conduct multilingual (Spanish, English, and possibly Bengali) child care worker education and training classes required for licensing approval and renewal – signaling the importance of these areas of control for sustained leadership development, political education, and systemic transformation.

The "Unity Campaign" began with the goal of uniting a local area's ethno-racially, linguistically and culturally diverse home-based child care providers for what they termed "respect and dignity" and continues, to the present day, with a series of escalating demands and proposals to gain pay increases and employment benefits and end the paternalistic, racist, arbitrary and punitive management and control – the indignity and disrespect – which they have suffered for years in many cases. Clearly, there are close parallels in this three-year history to DARE's Home Daycare Justice Campaign of the early 1990s. Most of the goals and objectives, the approaches to community organizing, and the language and day-to-day experience of organizing home-based child care workers are comparable, if not identical. With the action around licensing and due process, however, Unity members and organizers exposed a range of formal and informal (as well as institutional and individual) mechanisms of control and policing that exceed, and in many ways, underpin, the better-known and -explored issues of compensation and "stabilization" of the child care system. If they are ultimately successful in their struggle for publicly subsidized health insurance, Unity Campaign leaders and members will have had first to expose and transform the paternalistic supervision and "outlaw" system of licensing review which positions them as suspect, subordinate and subjugated home-based workers. While such a history may not emerge wherever home-based worker organize, it certainly transfigures is already known about the arduousness of the struggle for home-based justice – which may be too little at this point. Indeed, the material contingencies of HJDC's and Unity's organizing – the needs for sustained political leadership, skilled organizers, funding, support from larger organizations, internal unity, mass membership, and above all, organizational perseverance – are played down in this account, as in too many other accounts of home-based worker organizing I would argue. Yet they are undoubtedly more important, or just as important, as the needs to form demands, educate and pressure elected officials, and gain media coverage. Analysis of the contingencies of organizing goes directly to the issue of "bottom-up" versus "top-down" organizing which I noted earlier, and textually links the organizations and social struggles of home-based black and immigrant workers in the United States with those, for instance, in the United Kingdom (Sudbury 1998).

Organizing Circuits of Home-Based Labor, Bio-Power and Capital

Analysis of the top-down and bottom-up economies of home-based child care work, extended to home-based work, "caring work" and service sector work of all kinds, gives one a sense of the global and local structures that unite paid and unpaid work, social production and reproduction, and homework and housework. Indeed, these unified structures appear in today's "structurally adjusted" and "reformed" welfare societies one hundred and fifty years after the birth of what Michel Foucault termed biopolitics, the turn within liberalism to systematic government through the rigorous life-management and policing of specifically defined and distributed populations and the extension of this rationalization to all areas of life.[64] If structural adjustment can be said to be the product of a "Washington Consensus," as it has by numerous critics of economic and cultural globalization, that is if the socio-economic policies of international financial institutions charged with managing societies in a globalizing economy are rooted in the development of a specifically American liberalism, then Foucault's analysis of biopolitics, which is increasingly being taken up in the neo-Marxist iterations of global capital critique, appears ripe for further consideration (Witheford 1999; Hardt and Negri 2000).

> ...American neoliberalism was a movement completely contrary to what is found in the social economy of the market in Germany: where the latter considers regulation of prices by the market—the only basis for a rational economy—to be in itself so fragile that it must be supported, managed, and "ordered" by a vigilant internal policy of social interventions (involving assistance to the unemployed, health care coverage, a housing policy, and so on), American neoliberalism seeks rather to extend the rationality of the market, the schemes of analysis it proposes, and the decision making criteria it suggests to areas that are not exclusively or not primarily economic. For example, the family and birth policy, or delinquency and penal policy. (Foucault 1997: 78-79).

Read alongside analysis of the political economies of home-based child care, among many other things, American neoliberal biopolitics indicates a shifting reliance on the top-down organization of the inter-looped circuits of women's productive-reproductive labor. Whereas academic feminism and sociologies of gender and work largely continue

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[64] See Foucault 1978: 135-45; 1997: 73-79.

to treat the rise of the broadly configured service society in the dualistic terms of segmented labor markets and shadow or informal work, home-based child care work and domestic work studies such as Tuominen (1994a) and Parrenas (2001) suggest more unified global/local approaches to the state-configured and controlled "services" of racially subordinated home-based women workers, much as earlier studies of homework countered the official and exclusivist labor studies that viewed homework as simply another kind of poorly compensated industrial work (Allen 1989; Dangler 1994; Mitter 1986; Phizacklea and Wolkowitz 1995). "Operating within the norms of liberal individualism and the formal market economy," Tuominen writes, "dualistic notions of work emerged: waged labor equals work, unwaged labor does not. These dualistic definitions of work shaped dualistic notions of citizenship and, subsequently, the role of the welfare state including the formation of child-care policies and practices" (Tuominen 1997: 64).

Noting the wavering ideological force of the racialized reproductive norm of full-time motherhood, Tuominen focuses on the considerable power of the state, policymakers, and advocates in the ongoing "stimulation" and exploitative organization of home-based child care work. Yet in seeking to understand how and why home-based child care remains so highly exploited, she unaccountably argues that unwaged housework and child-care go unrecognized as work in liberalism – the latter with its focus on the normative value of independence, individualism, and autonomy, – and *thus* women's caring work remains undervalued: "the work of care-giving, work historically performed as unwaged work, by women, outside of the formal market economy, remains ignored in the theory and practice of liberal individualism" (ibid.). Drawing on feminist critiques of the welfare state. Tuominen ties the liberal devaluation of home-based work to specifically gendered divisions and definitions of work and criticizes both classical and Marxist political economy for failing to undo this devaluation and focusing exclusively on the production and productivity of waged labor. Following feminist critics of the welfare state such as Carol Pateman and Anne Showstack Sassoon, Tuominen suggests that home-based child care and other caring work emerges contradictorily in liberalism, ignored in theory yet exploited in practice.

Foucault's description of the emergence of biopolitics in liberalism suggests that the apparent "ignored in theory/exploited in practice" dualism is neither a dualism nor a contradiction. Liberalism, for Foucault, is built through practices of biopolitical management, policing and control as a *critique* (and here may be the only place in Foucault's formulation where ideology may be thought to enter) of the excesses of government. In this sense, it makes more sense to say, as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1993) does in relation to Foucault and Derrida, that "practice norms theory," and that in acknowledgement of the power of liberalism one must always learn to learn from below to see "the terminals of resistance inscribed *under* the level of the tactics, sometimes explicit, with which [...] women fill their lives", or how 'he who wins, also loses':

> One must not stop here, of course. The homely tactics of everyday *pouvoir/savoir*, the stuff of women's lives, lead, not only to the governmentality of dress codes and work habits, guilt feelings and guilt trips, but also to the delineation of the great aggregative apparatuses of power/knowledge which deploy the family as a

> repressive issue, day care as an alibi, and reproductive rights as a moral melodrama in national elections and policy. (Spivak 1993: 35)

Indeed, the state is not exploiting women's home-based child care nearly as much as it could, or perhaps will. With this in mind, it bears repeating that homework literally confuses the categories. While the critique of the dualism inherent in liberal and Marxist political economy is necessary, to argue that ideological norms embedded in liberalism discount women's home-based caring work in particular (ignoring it in theory but relying on it in practice) forecloses possible openings to other configurations of, and bottom-up struggles within, American neoliberalism: for instance debt structures of various kinds and the broad spectrum of race and sex-allied reproductive struggles within marriage, family and other biopolitical domains of state-supervised capitalism. Focusing, as Tuominen usefully, but narrowly does, on the question of why women would enter into the exploitative conditions of home-based child care work, obscures the active presence of women's "organized" resistance – and "organized" compliance – from below, that is to say, the counter-revolution, so to speak, in the top-down configuration of ethics within liberalism. As one instance of the complications of "organizing," throughout the period of Unity's community organizing efforts, the Alexandria DHS was organizing its own, rather ineffectual, association of family providers, along the lines of a company union, responsible in the old Gramscian sense for the moral and political education of its traditional intellectual members. It would be a mistake to say that this is a case of misrecognition of the value of women's home-based work. Or to give just one more example, Tuominen's position on the "call to service" as a powerful motivating factor in

African American women's entry into home-based child care, and a more broadly configured 'caring Black community' ignored, ironically, the underlying conditions of the affective control of Black women's laboring bodies in state-controlled child care. Thus, the "call to service" must be considered alongside the historic 'call to servitude,' the living tissue of the machine of plantation slavery, in order to see from below where normative change from the top may be headed.[65]

Julia Sudbury (1998) documents these and related dynamics in her exposition of black women's working-class and other organizations in the United Kingdom from the 1960s to the 1990s. She notes, among other things, how child care referred in the 1970s and 1980s not only to the organized struggles of "black wages for housework" in the United Kingdom, but to the specific desires and perceived political needs for political education of black British children along anti-racist and cross-cultural lines (Sudbury 1998: 57-58; 165-66). The academic and cultural configurations of the "race-class-gender" debates of the 1980s in particular took distinct forms in autonomous black women's organizations in the United Kingdom, whose 'other kinds of dreams' of class power were virtually always directly tied to the state through social service organizing issues on the one hand – in particular access to and delivery of child care and education – and the combined policy and funding power of state and local authorities, on the other.

Foucault's analysis of biopolitics in the formation and extension of liberalism from the nineteenth century onwards is thus an important corrective to the narrow, rights-based versions of liberal political theory that academic, including academic feminist, policy analysts seem to consistently misread as normative before the fact. For in understanding liberalism as an ongoing *critique* of government through the active and tightly-woven life-management and control of racially marked populations, Foucault's analysis of biopolitics does not mistakenly displace onto the field of liberal political *theory*, women's struggles over value, sex, and power of the last one hundred and fifty years.[66] One of the ways American neoliberalism has reformed the welfare state, at least in the local versions I have looked at in the rather different sites of Providence, Rhode Island and Alexandria, Virginia, is to extend policing and penal policy in the management and control of the home-based child care workforce to the ongoing rationalization through marketization of women's work, including child care. While some well-positioned advocates might choose to view this as an unfortunate and unfair limitation on black women's participation in child care work, or a misguided policy from the point of view of child safety, it would be a mistake not to see in it an effort at weakening the child care workforce politically by whitening it. There is little more fearful to the white male lawmakers of a "neoliberal" southern state such as Virginia than African American women (and men) "rising up" as the rightful teachers, protectors, and guardians of "America's future," to return to the words of the Unity Campaign leader. This is one possible reading, at least.

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[65] I am grateful to Ifeona Fulani for this thought. See Antonio Benitez Rojo's *The Repeating Island. The Caribbean and the Postmodern Perspective* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), which views the machinic reproduction of the plantation system in the non-Spanish Caribbean through a Deleuzian framework.

Another, more literal reading would have to suggest that it is not through the narrowness of normative individualism or the sexism of normative autonomy and independence that liberalism succeeds in relegating unpaid and underpaid labor to racially divided women, mothers, nurses, child care workers, etc. American neoliberalism, in the home care work context, succeeds less through ideology and discourse, as Tuominen herself argued throughout the 1990s, and more through pre-emptive struggle over the ever-expanding mechanisms of control, technologies of policing, and material forms of organization and contestation– e.g. home-based human service work/worker organizing – which are both cause and effect of sexually and racially (and we have to say today, internationally) divided labor. The top-down organization of home-based child care today is just such an attempted response to a similar kind of "irresistible change" taking place almost a century after the time this chapter's opening quotation refers to. Thus, when Tuominen argues that "classical liberal political theory provides the basis for the emergence of the welfare state within the United States," 'emergence' here can be connected to what could only be called "history" by someone such as Hegel.[67] Foucault's understanding of liberalism as a strategic, rationalizing method and set of practices – not as theory or, even less, ideology – supplements the historical, reproductive struggles over value in capitalism which Marx, it is true, for the most part "handed over" to European and American men of various classes. Marx was certainly no feminist, but he wasn't exactly a liberal, either.

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[66] One would have to add, "life-management and control of racially marked populations" in *strategic situations of power*, as Foucault (1978) does.

Before returning in the final chapter to further examination of what might best be called a struggle over home-based "governmentality" in a loosely Foucauldian framework, I look in a variety of critical Marxist sources for a better sense of how being "beyond Marx," different perhaps than being post-Marxist, keeps one nevertheless bound to a system whose limits or closures are, not so strangely, being lived and determined precisely in the (otherwise very "open") "non-places" like home where structural stability is always being sought, and yet always being unsettled and deferred. In the chapter that follows I explore two critical approaches to late twentieth century political economy, one neo-Marxist and the other "neo-cybernetic" (for lack of a better label), each of which draws considerably on the place of home-based labor in the unstable social and political economy of an ever-expanding global capitalism and capitalist sociality.

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[67] Tuominen (1994a: 225). This thought is in part indebted to Spivak (1999, Part I, "Philosophy"). For a vastly different notion of emergence that further unsettles the dependence on liberal political theory, see

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DeLanda (1997, Introduction).

Chapter Four – The Political Economy, Value and Control of Unpaid Labor

It is the long history of women's work which is a sustained example of zero-work: work not only outside of wage-work, but *in one way or another*, "outside" of the definitive modes of production. The displacement required here is a transvaluation, an uncatastrophic *im*plosion of the search for validation via the circuit of productivity.
(Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *In Other Worlds*)

In chapter two, I looked briefly at the impasse of the Marxist-feminist debates of the 1970s and '80s over the value of "domestic labor" – as well as some of the political stances associated with these debates. Whether or not there is surplus value in the exploitation of domestic labor – in Fortunati's feminist Marxism, there is – what remains problematic in many of the prior approaches is not only the frequently absent or "invisible" presence of racially- and internationally-divided labor in the ubiquitous post-colonial and post-imperialist historical contexts – e.g. the vast local and global workforce of "other" domestic workers, maids, cooks, cleaners, gardeners, servants, nannies, child care providers, babysitters, etc. What was also largely "absent-present" in these discussions was the homework of the housewife – the one whom virtually all studies of home-based labor found to be seeking to valorize her unpaid labor in one way or another. Whether or not the question of a *housewife's* production of surplus value is answered satisfactorily, I would suggest that the materialist response must be to displace the question of value, of surplus and exchange, onto the multi-divided terrain of ever more socialized, industrialized, and "biopoliticized" labor forces and struggles. In home-based child care studies, this task remains paramount. As Tuominen notes, "To understand the work of child care, a theoretical framework is needed which reveals gender and race as the fundamental structures by which all child-care work is organized, regardless of its provision in formal or informal markets" (Tuominen 1994b: 242). Of course, in such a framework, one would have to supplement gender and race with internationality in the division of child care work – and in so doing, one would have to do in theory as in homeworker organizing: i.e., comprehend the networked relations of biopolitical power and capital production which both undergird and attempt to destabilize organizing efforts on different sides of the divide(s).

In short, we would have to see in "organizing" how the inexorable desire and search for an "expanded textuality of value" – a concept I explore in the next chapter – is crossed by the sexualized, racialized and internationalized violence of what might still be called "primitive capitalist accumulation," following Maria Mies, or "biopolitics," with practice norming theory, following Foucault.[68] The types and intensity of this violence vary in such a way that any effort to catalog them would have to first acknowledge the epistemic violence in the task.[69] Theorizing labor in the ontological realm of affectivity ("care work" being one such example), as Negri and Hardt (2000) propose, has the virtue of acknowledging the unstable productivity for capital of unwaged reproductive labor, of ontological instability as such in a (capitalist) sociality that requires so much care, thought and affective energy to be reproduced; but waged or unwaged, affective labor is neither the same everywhere, nor does it produce equivalent values (or instabilities), in

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[68] On the notion of expanded textuality of value, see Spivak 1988. I hope to explore in this and the concluding chapters the possibilities and difficulties within "primitive capitalist accumulation" of separating home-based workers from the means of their "affective labor" production.

[69] The global market in human body parts, including the elements of human reproduction, might be thought of as the latest in an updated form of primitive accumulation: separation of owners from their physical means of (re)production. The primitive accumulation process I have foremost in mind, as should be noted throughout, is almost immediately enabled by, and thus (im)possible to distinguish from, institutionally-led structural adjustment programs. How and where these two seemingly remote figures of violence are related and collaborative is not an example of the epistemic violence I refer to, although, no doubt, the members of the World Economic Forum do not wish (us) to see it either. The 50 Years Is Enough Network is certainly one of the best resources for learning to recognize this.

(or for) structurally adjusting global capital. itself a divided subject (which I will not take on for the moment). Thus. I am arguing that theorizing – and more effectively controlling – the differential and uncoordinated instabilities of aggregative home-based labor is the *ne plus ultra* of globalizing capitalism. national-global capitalist governmentality. as well as the countervailing forces within these. Capital. and the biopolitical state. want to get to people where they live most. and as we have seen. there's no place like home.

In this chapter I propose to situate the analysis of homework I have developed so far on a broader critical terrain. First. I examine an early essay by George Caffentzis (1980). entitled the "Work/Energy Crisis." as well as a more recent piece by Luciana Parisi and Tiziana Terranova (1999). "Heat Death." as notable efforts to theorize the turbulence of broadly configured (that is to say. not only home-based. not only female) labor for capital. I hope to show how these writers analyze the search and desire for an "expanded textuality of value" in relation to the dynamic. differential force of "entropic" and turbulent "labor power" – Marx's oft-cited discovery for critical political economy – in and against the global flows of capital. In so doing. I look to show how these critical writers envision (differently) the threat of excessive instability for capital and late-capitalist governmentality posed by the inexorable technological and biopolitical transformations of labor and capital in the twentieth century. engendering both new sites (such as home) as well as techniques of the reproduction and control of bodies and labor power (such as home-based work).

In each of these pieces. I am quick to note. the body of the woman worker is central to the analysis of the changing political economy of twentieth century capitalism.

Marxist-feminists of the 1970s were intent on revealing the productivity for capital of housework and other unpaid labor of women – and thereby how the sexual and labor resistance (among other kinds) of domestic laborers (housewives, mothers, as well as what we now call sex workers) distinctly (and differentially) threatens patriarchy and capital. In the second part of this chapter, I suggest a supplement to these discussions. I argue that in Marxist-feminist studies, the configuration of political economy is a restricted one, in the sense of the distinction between "restricted" and "general economy" developed by Georges Bataille (1991). I argue that in these "science studies" of labor, a more generalized figure of economy predominates, accounting in diverse ways for the expanded textuality of value in twentieth century biopolitical capitalism, but also for a differentialist logic that sees in the historical tendency of capital's rate of surplus value to decline not only the turbulent flows of global class struggle, but also the decodified flows of women's home-based labor – of sexualized material and affective production.

In the final section of the chapter, I note the parallels between the analysis of "thermodynamics," excess energy and entropy of labor power in the science studies of labor I cite, and the French social theoretical tradition built on the foundation of Marcel Mauss's study of gift economies. I note in particular Bataille's reflections on the gift and the historical tendencies of violent dissipation of accumulated wealth and suggest that, although radically heterological to contemporary deconstruction and science studies of labor, Bataille's work does have the merit of theorizing outside the operation – i.e., of opening the "closed system" – of the restricted economy of orthodox Marxian and neo-classical political economics alike. Here, I take note of Jacques Derrida's (1992) reflection on Mauss's work. In Derrida's work on the economy of "the gift," one finds a counterpart to what some have termed "post-thermodynamic" speculations on the differential movements of force in EuroAmerican-centered venture capital, philanthropic giving, and unpaid reproductive labor – a broad swath of the general economy which I argue must locate itself in turbulent flows through the homeworking body, as theorized by science studies of labor. Through its underwriting of capital, I argue, the general economy constitutes the ("post-structural") condition of our given and received notions, and uses, of energy, value and time.

Marx and Social Thermodynamics

One could trace the history of social theory through developments or epistemic shifts of the "natural" sciences and, *translating*, retrace not only the paradigmatic shifts of social theory, but the circuitous feedback mechanisms which launched the shifts in what we now call the "hard" sciences, in advance. This is one possible reading of Gilles Deleuze on the historical operation of "the fold" as well as the so-called "sociology of translation" from the vantage point of actor-network theory:

> A situation rather like the state of total entropy envisaged as limit point by the second law of thermodynamics. No exchange, no connextion, no relations, just in-difference. The very end of the system. What the actor-network approach does is to take the end as its beginning and run counter to all chronology, moving 'backwards' to the flowering and blooming of networks. It makes the most curious of folds, where 'after' comes 'before' the 'beginning'. To be 'after actor-network' is then to be moving simultaneously away from and toward the end of

> things. In other words, to be going in circles, circulating around the fold. (Brown and Capdevila 1999: 35)

About his own methodology, Marx had written: "Human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape. The intimations of higher development among the subordinate animal species, however, can be understood only after the higher development is already known. The bourgeois economy thus supplies the key to the ancient, etc." (Marx 1973: 105). Economistic readings of Marx see in this episteme a useful determinism. However, I wouldn't be the first to see in Marx's methodology, especially the one outlined in *Grundrisse*, a determinism always on the receding horizon, something close to the force of the final of Marx's theses on the scientific materialist Feuerbach: the point is to make the (always already interpreted) world different.[70]

Physical anthropology wasn't the least of the theoretical-scientific forces with which Marx ultimately entered into complicity. A generation of proto-"techno-scientists" was transforming thought about the physical forces of the cosmos and, ultimately, cosmopolitan society and culture, all during Marx's early, middle and late writing periods. Marx and the capitalist subjects of his own critical labor were affected by works which, informed by studies of the conversion of force, of energy and heat, in the new engines of industry – *viz.*, thermodynamics – were re-conceptualizing human labor as one force (*arbeitskraft*) equivalent to all other natural forces. That is to say, the new machine sciences of the day were beginning to conceive of human labor as part of an essential universal force (*kraft*) that could neither be created or destroyed. This thought of "universal work energy" was a debt owed to Hermann von Helmholtz's elaboration of the law of conservation of energy in 1847, better known as the first law of thermodynamics, and theoretically, it was an extremely useful complement to liberal bourgeois practices of the day. *Liberté* and *Egalité* in practice made all labor abstractly free and equal, from the standpoint of capital (Rabinbach 1990). As Marx was quick to recognize, in the theoretical shift from "labor" to "labor power" (made in order to better describe the transformation of labor power into abstract labor, that is to say, the subsumption of labor in capital), just as in the shift from production as a process of metabolic exchange with nature to production as expenditure and consumption of energy, the free laboring subject of bourgeois social theory and political economy could finally be thought of as equivalent to all other kinds of energy, including machines. With labor power established as a general equivalent of energy, at least in theory, the free laboring *subject* could also be thought, *mutatis mutandis*, to exceed itself, literally out of all balance and proportion to "nature" (Rabinbach 1990). This paradigmatic shift assumes tremendous historical importance. For if the laboring subject of bourgeois capitalism could be universally thought to produce excess, surplus, even waste in a variety of useful, if sometimes unstable forms of production, it could produce value in excess of itself. More important, the subject of capitalist labor could be put to work much like a machine.

Well before Marx began theorizing the production of value under capitalism, the study of thermodynamics was shifting the natural sciences paradigm. The widespread presence of machines had the circular (what we would call today, the cybernetic) effect of informing scientists about the dynamics of energy flows, including the dissipation of energy. One major result of machine-informed science was encapsulated in the second law of thermodynamics, articulated by Rudolf Clausius about the same time as

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[70] See Negri's captivating analysis of Marx's methodology in *Grundrisse* in Negri 1991:. 41-58.

Helmholtz's conservation of energy theory. The second law of thermodynamics viewed the conversion of force, specifically the transfer of heat energy from a warmer source to a cooler source, as the process of, or one accompanied by, the gradual decrease in the amount of total energy available for work, an effect also known as entropy. In the translation between the natural and social sciences of the day, the problem of entropy became the part-political, part-technological problem of how to keep slowly dying labor going, i.e. how to extract as much as possible from labor before it could no longer produce, or needed to be replenished. For Marx, as we will see, the second law of thermodynamics became, effectively, the law of tendency of the rate of profit to decline in capitalist production, what for him was an evolutionary step on the road to the "heat death" of capitalism.

Anson Rabinbach (1990) argues that this theoretical translation between dominant traditions of nineteenth century thought, specifically the scientific studies of thermodynamics and the bourgeois and critical studies of political economy, was radically transformative of social scientific theory and practice. The attraction of the emerging machine-based economy was powerful for scientists and laboratory researchers in the middle decades of the century, and, later, the *raison d'etre* for the growing contingent of industry-based scientific theorists and experts (today's technoscientists) who would be responsible for, among other things, Taylorization, time-motion studies, and other synthesized forms of systematic industrial organization. Between thermodynamics and political economy, a radical correspondence developed: "...Taylorism, bolshevism, and fascism....These movements conceived of the body both as a productive force and as a political instrument whose energies could be subjected to scientifically designed systems of organization…The laboring body was thus interpreted as the site of conversion, or exchange, between nature and society—the medium through which the forces of nature are transformed into the forces that propel society" (Rabinbach 1990: 3). What would be even more crucial is understanding and ultimately proving whether these "forces of nature" were (or were not) necessarily in contradiction with the social relations they propelled; i.e., whether the second law of thermodynamics – that heat energy cannot be completely converted into work energy – did not negate the first – that in a closed or isolated system, energy is constant and cannot be added to or destroyed. The limits on movement or change in these laws would propel scientific inquiry and political economy far into the future.

Why is this rich history, which I can only gesture to in these pages, important for home-based labor studies? What do they suggest about the impasse over Marxist theories of value in Marxist-feminist debates, or about the politics of organizing in and against structurally adjusting state institutions? The reasoning, as I have suggested in passing in the previous chapters, lies beneath the historiography, in the un-theorized and confused "underwriting" of waged work by the immeasurable time of unpaid, biopolitical labor. Recognizing this does not altogether shift the "social thermodynamic" paradigm first outlined in the nineteenth century. Indeed, the place of thermodynamic thought in capitalist sociality is repeated here to signify not only nineteenth- and twentieth-century Marxism's complicity with machine science and "closed system" theories such as thermodynamics, important as this recognition is. What interests me instead, with respect to the study of home-based, productive-reproductive labor, lies in the gradual evolution of the suppressed moments in the inter-looped circuitry of critical political economy and scientific theory: the circulation and flows of labor power, global capitalism as an open system, entropy as a force of information, and "power" as a universally-configured force of control.

The Crisis of Social Reproduction in the United States II: Entropic Labor

Beginning in the mid-1960s, a gradual decline in the rate of profit in the United States culminated in a period of political economic crisis occasioned by the success of OPEC in tightening the world supply of oil and increasing the prices of energy. Bourgeois political economic analyses looked at OPEC as the culprit in energy cost inflation. However, analysis of this period by the neo-Marxist Midnight Notes Collective (1992) suggests a different history of the energy crisis, part of it straight from the pages of nineteenth-century thermodynamics. Their argument, in short, was that the energy crisis of 1973 and onwards was, properly speaking, a labor crisis. As George Caffentzis, one of the collective's members put it in 1980, the calculable relationship of work (productive/reproductive labor) to energy (in this instance, financial capital which supplants competitive capital), is "[f]rom capital's point of view...a more generalized form of the exploitation (profit) rate" (Caffentzis 1992: 228). Thus, according to Caffentzis, the "work/energy crisis" of 1973 was born.

I focus here on this key essay by Caffentzis, which linked the capitalist crisis in profit decline leading up to the 1973 oil price hikes, to a theoretical version of what I would call, for lack of a better term, socio-historical thermodynamics. In brief, Caffentzis argued that Keynesian regulation of the U.S. economy broke down after World War II because of the unhinging from value-productivity of a mass-socialized labor force traditionally centered in the home, factory, and school and typified by the socialization of a capitalist work/family ethic on the one hand, and a broadly trade unionist class discipline, on the other. Operating within a framework centered on the social reproduction of labor, Caffentzis was quite clear about the importance of the sexual reproductive nexus, in a formulation quite comparable to that of Marxist-feminists of the time: "Not only must labor power be produced, it must be reproduced. The housewife becomes the correlate of the line worker in the Keynesian equations. Standardly, the housewife is taken as the consumer, but the Depression planners were more concerned with her as the producer of a 'very special article,' the *availability for work* of a factory worker. This requires capital, the home" (ibid.: 231, emphasis added). The mounting instability of this reproductive cycle in "Keynesian-Fordism" (a shorthand for the government spending and consumption-led regulation of class struggle in the middle decades of the twentieth century) is pivotal in Caffentzis' analysis; on it turn conceptual elements of the contemporary relationship of global and local structural adjustment to the divisions of home-based reproductive-productive labor which I examined in the previous chapters.

In the "Work/Energy Crisis," Caffentzis constructed a careful Marxist political economic critique that opened inward to an "expanded textuality of value" and outward to how the intensified search for value via productivity in the early and mid-twentieth century gave way to a new regime of value production rooted in international and home-based divisions of labor. With such an analysis, one began to see not only the challenge to capital's overcoming of its limits in liberalism, that is to its reproduction in broadly speaking sexual, racial and ethico-political terms; one began also see, ultimately, the limits of thermodynamics (what Caffentzis termed the "invasion of entropic energy") in and for capitalist class strategy in the wake of the 1960s-era social and political rebellions.

> The dynamic equilibrium between home and line required a precise meshing of the variables of wage, factory work and housework. In the period from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s the mesh began to tear. Divorce, for example, accelerated with the wage, which revealed a new tension between the poles of the Keynesian synthesis…They were "boom" years, but not for capital. Not only did the struggle in the factories, homes and streets force capital to pay more for factory work; increasingly, capital had to pay, through the state *directly* for reproduction work that had previously come financed via the male, factory wage. Women and young people would no more "naturally" do what they used to do under the direction of husband and daddy. Thus, though there was an enormous increase of energy generated by the working class during that period, it proved especially resistant to the transformation into work. There was a precipitous drop in the work/energy ratio; this was translated into a "profits crisis" and a subversion of the axioms of Keynesianism. (ibid.: 232)

According to Caffentzis and other writers of the Midnight Notes Collective, the multinational capitalist response to this resistance to the transformation of "energy into work" (and therefore a somewhat different dynamic from the Marcusean "great refusal"), was to change the ratio of energy prices to other prices,[71] including wages, and thereby redirect the composition of labor and the work/profits crisis: to "centralize the accumulation process" while "decentralizing the exploitation process."

There was a correspondence, then, between de-industrialization in the United States and Europe – signaled by the rise of the information, energy, and "service" sectors – and the increase of women worker-centered "offshore assembly" and "export processing" strategies in the becoming-global South. And each of these ultimately corresponded to the rise in energy prices, according to Caffentzis. In the slow but growing transfer of work from one sector and geographic region to another, a new idea arose for the new cadres of multinational capitalism – prompted in part by the social and sexual struggles of the 1960s and by the decline of profits in the early 1970s: everyone (who was on the "power grid" at least), working everywhere (again, within the limits of the "world market"), would have to pay for (the higher price of) energy, that is to say, for the apparent "loss" of value in the leading sectors and regions of the "world economy."[72]

A similarly expansive notion of capitalist hegemony was the premise for what, a decade earlier, Mario Tronti and Toni Negri had called the "social factory": capital had penetrated everywhere because U.S. and European labor had been really and formally subsumed under it *and* because labor had expanded the class struggle through its successful demands for lower prices, higher wages, better pensions, and so on –

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[71] Without, however, leaving the terrain of the labor theory of value – here we have to resort with Caffentzis to the other face of capitalist subjectivization: planetary domination, not to be confused with intra-class capitalist competition. "[Capital] no more rewards capitalists to the extent that they exploit than it rewards workers to the extent that they are exploited. There is no justice for anyone but itself" (Caffentzis 1992: 236).

[72] The global energy price fix continues today in less heralded ways, in the "extreme" natural and built environmental conditions of the 30-40% of the world's population who are "off the power grid." See David Lipschultz, "Solar Power is Reaching where Wires Can't," *New York Times*, September 9, 2001, Sec. 3, p. 4.

achieving through struggle elements of what the Italian autonomists called "the social wage" (Red Notes 1989). "Auto-reductions" in rent, transportation, and utilities; extra-parliamentary political organization; street-level takeovers and direct action; welfare action; and the refusal of a wide variety of industrial, public and service sector work—all exemplified this movement towards a re-composition of the working class through bottom-up struggle over the growing crisis of money, value, prices, and profits.[73] Caffentzis formulated the social movement for what he termed the "political wage" somewhat differently for the United States, arguably as one result of the emphasis placed by Wages for Housework and Marxist-feminists on the crisis posed by the refusal of unpaid value-reproductive labor:

> ...you confront your boss but he cries that "he has bills to pay," and even more deeply *you don't see your exploitation any* more. On the line, you literally could observe the crystallization of your labor power into the commodity, you could see your life vanishing down the line, you could feel the materialization of your alienation. But in the service industries, your surplus labor seems to be non-existent, even "non-productive," "just" a paid form of "housework," cleaning bedpans, massaging jogger's muscles, scrambling eggs. While in the "energy/information" sector you seem to be engulfed by the immense fixed capital surrounding you, it feels as if you were not exploited at all, but a servant of the machine, even "privileged" to be part of the "brains of the system." These feelings disorient struggles...A "society" built on autos is not like a "society"

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[73] See MNC (1992) and Red Notes (1979), passim. For a full historical account of the Italian social struggles of the 1960s and 1970s, see Bob Lumley's *States of Emergency. Cultures of Revolt in Italy from*

> built on computers, McDonalds and nukes, where by "society" we mean the *entire reproduction process*. (Caffentzis 1992: 234-35, emphasis in original)

Thus, as the Midnight Notes Collective put it, "it is the political recomposition of the waged and the unwaged that imposes the crisis on capital," or, as Caffentzis, put it slightly differently: "Reproduction becomes a 'dynamic force of production' instead of merely guaranteeing the subsistence of labor power" (ibid.: 241).

Exceeding the limits of the Fordist factory-home/production-consumption cycle, the U.S. working class increasingly forced capital, largely though not exclusively through struggles directed at the state, to guarantee more and more of its subsistence, to the point of forcing a theoretical rupture in capital's configuration of profit as productivity, i.e. in the marginal theory of value regulated by the Fordist-Keynesian cycle of production and consumption. But could labor, or capital for that matter, really alter the theory of value? As the Midnight Notes Collective and Caffentzis frame it in a number of different articles, part of the answer lies in the difference between what they termed "zero-work" and no work at all, or working but not producing value (including the apparent production of value in the absence of labor), and the refusal (including the absence) of value-producing work.[74] One conceptual key to understanding this difference is the human labor-centered production of value, the legacy of Marx's era of anti-machine politics and (androcentric) class theory, according to Caffentzis (1997). Another is the local and global at work in (and through) capital. A third is reproduction. I begin with the first two.

1968 to 1978, (London: Verso, 1990).

For value to be produced, according to Marx's reading of classical political economy, one must have measure of the socially necessary labor time to produce a commodity. An industry built on perpetual motion machines – Caffentzis (1997) refers to these machines, following the work of mathematical theorist John von Neumann, as self-reproducing automata – which could produce and reproduce without the use of human labor as such, would, in theory, be infinitely productive. Without labor to define their production, however, their product (ultimately, their own self-reproduction) could not count as "value."

> Every time capitalists introduce machinery in response to working class efforts to increase wages and/or reduce the working day, they threaten the average rate of profit. That is, the wage struggle intensified mechanization, which in turn causes the relative diminution of the variable (and value creating) part of capital. (Caffentzis 1997: 47)

Paradoxically, the radical dream of perpetual motion machines is as pathological for capital as for labor, neither of which would any longer be needed by the self-reproducing automata. The logical implications of this situation for capital and labor, however, are radically different. For capital, the paradox of the labor theory of value in the context of mechanization is, according to Caffentzis, that value must be produced, with greater and greater intensity, elsewhere (e.g. through expansion of the world labor market, decomposition of the working class through higher prices, home-based work,

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[74] For more on the notion of zero-work see MNC 1992: 109-114, "Introduction to Zero-Work I." See also Caffentzis (1990) and (1997). The latter is a revised and extended version of the zero-work/value argument.

etc.). That is, it cannot produce value as such exclusively in machines. For labor in the expanding world market (especially industrial homeworkers), so the argument must go, it means a return to the struggle over absolute surplus value—to time as the real measure of labor's value, e.g. the length of the working day/night/week/year, especially when wages are paid in piece rates, as is the case in much of today's home-based manufacturing and assembly around the world. The paradox presented by presented by zero-work also signifies, according to this logic, the probability of continuous struggles over unpaid labor as well as the prices of basic commodities, such as energy and information, which are required for the production of the commodities which have defined both Fordist and post-Fordist regimes of accumulation: televisions, cars, personal computers, etc. (as well as, Caffentzis notes, automation itself). Finally, as we will see in the following chapter, the need for human labor-centered valorization signifies a struggle over the combined composition of (and in this sense, the political refusal of) "productive" and "reproductive" labor, of "no work" and "zero-work", if you will.

Caffentzis (1997) goes on to argue that in the wake of Marx's thermodynamic critique of capital, as well as the work of the pioneering computer scientist Alan Turing, there are no absolute perpetual motion machines or self-reproducing automata that can produce value in capitalism.[75] There are machines that require virtually no human labor or less labor power than others in order to work, that produce more than other machines, or that can compute or simulate any human's labor. But, he argues, there are no machines that create value as such. Caffentzis' effort to hold on to Marx's labor theory of value depends on a relatively simple, but difficult to sustain, proposition: that what differentiates human labor from both simple heat engines and complex simulation machines, i.e. what constitutes the value-creating capacity of human labor, "must lie in its negative capability, that is, its capacity to refuse to be labor." Labor has the potential to stand outside value, according to Caffentzis. In contrast, machines cannot create value, "because they are values already" (ibid.: 54).

The "capacity to refuse to be labor" deeply informs the thinking that we previously saw with regard to the work/energy crisis of the early 1970s. The U.S. and European working class's success in forcing more "surplus-profit" for itself through struggles for the "political wage" (pensions, health care, welfare, education, cheaper transportation, etc.) *forced* capital to increase basic commodity prices (energy in particular) and simultaneously intensify absolute surplus value extraction in newly industrializing zones of the globe; in other words, to shift value-production from "high organic composition" industries such as oil (where labor costs are comparatively very low) to the "low organic composition" sectors such as clothing, tourism, for-profit education, health and other "caring" work in increasingly "valuable" world regions and zones.[76] The rise in oil prices, thus, did not signify increased "profits" in the oil industry. Higher oil prices were a direct response to the "real" profit crisis (i.e. the crisis in value extraction) in the imbalanced, post-Fordist economies of the global North. Value, in other words, was being shifted around, both between sectors with lower and higher

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[75] Caffentzis (1997) gives the example of the Turing machine, which in its capacity to simulate the human logic of commodity production, pushes the labor theory of value to another extreme, beyond the thermodynamics of the heat engine.

[76] The "organic composition" of a given industry refers to the ratio of fixed vs. variable capital, or the value of the automation vs. the value of the labor-power employed. Caffentzis elsewhere discusses the 1980s era of debt-equity swaps and structural adjustment programs in Africa; one would also have to reference low-tech export-processing strategies in Latin America and Asia, and ultimately, international "housewifeization" (Mies 1986). I turn to several of these themes in the next chapter.

concentrations of labor, and between places in the international division of labor with lower and higher waged workforces, both at the "top" and the "bottom."

While orthodox Marxists might have had some problems with this description of the oil price mechanism as capital's forced response to labor's rupturing of the Fordist/Keynesian profit/productivity mode of regulation, I am inclined to agree with Caffentzis' analysis in the "Work/Energy Crisis" of economists such as Sraffa, whose suggestion that the labor theory of value had lost its explanatory power – that prices of commodities such as oil could diverge from commodity values so radically because in late capitalism, commodity production (prices, supply, and demand) were proceeding because of the self-reproducing nature of commodities themselves – was, Caffentzis argues brilliantly, itself a theoretical response to the crisis imposed by labor on capital. With value unhinging itself from productivity in regions with higher densities of high organic composition industries (North America, Western Europe, the oil fields of the Middle East), the struggle over profits would be thrown back precisely to labor time as measure in the "developing world," led by the World Bank, IMF, and multinational capitalists in search of profits in exchange for (i.e. by way of) the creation of new, low-wage, women-centered industrial labor forces, such homeworkers and "housewives." In the decades following the oil shock, energy prices would eventually settle down; however, real average wages would not go up for another twenty-five years in the United States, and then only slightly. Capital's oil price shock to the system was indeed its powerful rejoinder to the social struggles of the 1960s, in this view. In the twenty or so years after 1973, as Juliet Schor (1993) and others have amply documented in the United States, wage workers (in particular waged women workers) would work more wage hours than they ever did in the Fordist era, and earn less over time for it.[77] Real government spending on the military budget would also skyrocket, while decreasing proportionately for public education, welfare, health care, etc.

Writing in the late 1970s, Caffentzis was certainly prescient. But as he later put it in a response to his orthodox marxist critics, it was the "retrodictive" value of his analysis that he was offering as a sign of Marxism beyond Marx – that is, a sign of what I began this chapter by citing as "moving backwards to the flowering of networks." Clearly attempting to renovate, even restore Marx's labor theory of value (along the pathways of the Italian autonomia and Marxist feminists), Caffentzis understood not only that "[f]or the energy price rise strategy to succeed, an enormous amount of work must be produced and extracted from the Low sectors in order to be transformed to capital available for the High sector" (Caffentzis 1992: 249). He also argued that this transformation required the "creation of a new figure of exploitation": the twenty-four hour, house- and home-working, social factory woman.

Like Fortunati, Caffentzis focuses the analysis of unpaid home-based labor focuses on its 'secret'. It is "the essential micro-work, largely feminine, unpaid and thus invisible"; "hidden in the male wage"; and "veiled by the wage." The reverse side of this analysis is that the implications of the refusal of housework are a challenge more to patriarchy ("the fights, the visits to the therapist, the affairs, the divorce, the welfare line, the service sector job") than to capital "as a claim on future labor":

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[77] This is not to forget the intensifying international division of labor during this period, when a home-based child care worker in the U.S. would come to make five to eight times more per day than a maquiladora worker in Central America, or just across the border in Mexico. "Low organic composition"

> The energies released by women's revolt against unpaid labor in the home have been the basis of the enormous expansion of a low organic composition sector which has provided the work necessary for the energy price transformation. Women's revolt, while revealing their exploitation through the Oedipal wage, opened a new path for capitalist development. (ibid.: 250)

For the analysis of homework, this analysis is crucial, for it recognizes how while expanding the textuality of value, the socialization and commodification of housework also re-instantiates value from the ground up. Women's revolt against patriarchal oppression at home, and the consequent demand for free and equal participation in the wage-labor market, represented a shock to capital on one level (the rupturing of the male wage as a regulatory gauge of the thermodynamic economy), but an opening on another, with an extension of patriarchal controls in the increasingly global workplace (Fuentes and Ehrenreich 1983; Heyzer 1986). It is noteworthy in this context that Caffentzis draws the work/engery crisis to the point not of production, but of reproduction. Both in terms of housework's commodification ("only when women struggle against this work does it become a commodity") and in terms of the "entropic" energy of housework ("At the very moment when Nature 'refuses to gives its gifts in abundance,' the 'Nature' within society, the woman, refuses its place"),[78] there remains the problem of self-reproduction, of the labor power necessary to make other labor power available for work. If, as Marx claimed (and multinational capitalists appeared to be confirming in practice), value could only be produced through the exploitation of human labor power (with its

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industries such as child care and electronics assembly, for instance, are analogous, in some ways, but not necessarily comparable.

capacity of refusal), and more important, that the capitalist system depended on *this* source of value for its ongoing reproduction, then who or what (by way of force, including conceptual metaphor) would produce this 'originating' labor power?

Capital's reproduction, because it is not ever auto-reproductive, according at least to thermodynamic Marxism, requires a claim on future productive and reproductive labor, while also requiring the production of resistance, loss, decay, waste and dissipation in "the system," including (that of) the laboring body—especially, as we see in the extension of housework everywhere, of the female laboring body. Thermodynamic capitalism, recoded in the social factory of the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in the continuous re-launching of the productive-reproductive cycle, must somehow transform or eliminate so-called "entropic" labor forces (Caffentzis names "recalcitrant" workers, "unhappy" housewives, social "deviants," "rebellious" colonials, etc.), i.e. all the energy that is unavailable for work. Transform, because on the one hand, not all entropic energy is unproductive, and on the other hand, there are more- and less-entropic sectors of labor; eliminate because some sectors (armed or revolutionary social movements of workers, peasants, the oppressed) are so destabilizing that they represent a threat to the viability of the system. Capital's productive effort, according to Caffentzis, is to shift the low entropic sectors and wastes around in order to get *some* work out of them (e.g. the housewife, prison industry, toxic 'clean-up') and to eliminate the highest entropy labor sectors and wastes, to the extent that this is possible in thermodynamic terms.

Caffentzis's response here usefully shifts registers, counter-contextualizing the commodification of unpaid women's work and labor in a politics of control over the "thermodynamic" composition of classes in capitalist society; but the dynamic of labor

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[78] Caffentzis 1992: 251.

power reproduction remains less understood than given in these places, which, we must remind ourselves (and the Midnight Notes Collective carefully and repeatedly does), is always internationally linked. Political and social "waste" can be made useful, from the standpoint of capital. However, for labor, the question is less what happens when unpaid labor is refused and/or withheld, or even, in a crucially different way, when it is accepted – for as we know, in the case of homework, the struggle to commodify, to enter into political and social exchange, comes from both sides of the paid and unpaid sexual and racial labor divides. Indeed, the openings for labor in the logic of multinational thermodynamic capital are overwhelmed in Caffentzis's text, much as in Marx's, by the power of capital: "...capital develops both from our death and our refusal of it. *The revolutions of desires that lay behind the tides of capital's technological "creative destruction" are rooted in the refusal of the working class to just be.*" (Caffentzis 1992: 251, emphasis in original).

Where entropic labor is negated, he argues, capital flourishes. Where paid and unpaid work are refused, value is created elsewhere. Waste/death – and woman in this conceptual place of destructive excess and loss – can be made useful. But capital does not flourish automatically. I return to this critical point in a later section of this chapter. "Entropic" (dangerously-excess) labor is launched into exchange, one way or another; however, this may require continually different movements on the part of *capitalist* sociality. The mechanisms of the movement, of the control of labor power otherwise unavailable for work into capital-productive exchange, may be as important for capital as exchange itself, which would suggest that as in the case of Italy in the 1970s, which in part inspired the thesis of "Work/Energy Crisis," the point may be the different kind of world that was being created through the extremely diverse. and diversely situated. struggles over the political wage. and not the wage itself. But. this begs the question of what I am abbreviating as social thermodynamics in a slightly different way: what exactly is the difference between the mechanics of value-production and value-production itself?

From Thermodynamic Entropy to Technoscientific Control

Thirty years in the wake of the work/energy crisis. the intensification of thermodynamic capitalism has prompted some critics and theorists to extend and revise the analysis of labor entropy. In "Heat Death: Emergence and Control in Genetic Engineering and Artificial Life." Luciana Parisi and Tiziana Terranova (2000) theorize thermodynamic capitalism through the lenses of cybernetics and changes resulting from biotechnology. which together. they argue. have marked capitalist sociality as a radically different configuration of labor. human bodies and biopolitics at the end of the twentieth century. Taking the analysis of thermodynamic capitalism as their starting point. Parisi and Terranova. like Caffentzis. theorize the extended movement in capitalism from one crisis to another as the thoroughgoing transformation of the 'invasion of entropy' into a productive force for capitalism. "The threat of entropy was real to the natural and political sciences of industrial capitalism. it was a problem that needed a solution. This solution was temporarily and partially provided by the female body. whose subordination to reproduction came to guarantee the return to stability and completion of the cycle through a new beginning" (Parisi and Terranova 2000: 4).

However, where Caffentzis theorized an antagonistic movement between multinational capitalists and the force of reproductive social labor (epitomized by the homeworking woman), Parisi and Terranova theorize the emergence of turbulent flows of female labor whose diverse and infinite capacities for social reproduction have become the starting points for technoscientific development and the broad transformation of the disciplinary society of the Fordist-Keynesian era into a "society of control."

> Death no longer marks the point of exhaustion and random accumulation which needs to be constantly re-channeled into reproductive lineage. Death is now stretched...The female body therefore appears as no longer enclosed into the organism and limited exclusively to reproductive sex (meiotic sex). It is no longer exclusively defined by exchange, but by *circulation*." (ibid.: 1, emphasis added)

The implications of this observation are important for homeworker organizing today. Drawing on developments of technoscience, cybernetics, and social theory after World War II, and then again after 1973, Parisi and Terranova suggest that far from seeking the preservation of the female laboring body for the sake of homeostatic equilibrium, capitalism, and its allied technosciences of social bio-engineering and control, seeks, and must contend with, the radical displacement of the female laboring body. This remains a tremendous undertaking, literally. How to destroy all those bodies yet preserve the organism?

If such a questions seems imported from the outside, even into an already 'foreign' deconstructive Marxist-feminism, one must recall the philosophical tradition of

Spinoza, Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari, to understand that the body, as such, is not pre-sent, "but always emerges within a process of relations (including relations of power) which defines its singularity" (ibid.: 2). Flowing from this understanding, Parisi and Terranova theorize a body whose capacities are never finally known, a body in a continuous state of flux and flows. The grounding metaphors of machine, organism and subject for the human body, so important in the thermodynamic conception of capitalism, are literally washed away in their conceptualization.

> "[A] body no longer corresponds to the fleshy representation or phenomenon of the human subject, but rather is opened up to particles, waves and attractors, which constitute it as far from [an] equilibrium system. What is perceived of the body is the movement of forces, the process of composition of differential elements which defines the origin of life as turbulent rather than derived from entropic collapse. In contemporary technoscience, lethal entropy becomes vital turbulence." (ibid.: 5)

In tracing the organic and inorganic tendencies of the body in what the writers, following Gilles Deleuze, term today's "societies of control" – that is the shift from the disciplined "walls" of the factory, the home, and prison to the controlled "flows" *of and between those walls* – Parisi and Terranova assure us they are not proposing a radical break from Foucault's *dispositifs* of disciplinary power and biopolitics, whose traces are "obviously…still operational within the current historical moment." (ibid.: 5) They do argue, however, that the thermodynamic body is now moving "away from the realm of representation." This is a serious proposition, and therefore one that I would subject to greater scrutiny, particularly in light of similar claims from French theory in recent decades. The 'obvious' nature of "still operational" disciplinary power is dangerously supplemental, as I attempted to argue in another way in the previous chapter, first through and then outside the restricted economy of Marxism-feminism and the emergence of contending forms of "organizing" in and against the state. The movement away from "representation" of the embodied, disciplinary subject, likely implies the foreclosure of others or other bodies which can not or do not (and possibly never did) register either in control or disciplinary societies. The problem of the subaltern, perforce an unregistered "home-based worker," thus, remains for any deconstructive ethicopolitics that takes technoscientific capitalism seriously, both in the U.S./European enclosure and the 'new enclosures' of Africa, Latin America, Asia, and North America.[79] I return to this thought later, noting for now the kind of deep, planetary turbulence figured in the Kyoto protocols on global warming, where the global flows of counter-planning and counter-organizing continue to end up in the highly "representative" modes of nationalism and GDP and not, for example, in regionalism or biodiversity, where "representation" is as yet unpredictable, if not indeterminate.[80]

Global warming, however, is my example and not Parisi and Terranova's, who rightly argue that in genetic engineering and artificial life, the technoscientific movement towards *unpredictability* which is a hallmark of global financialization in particular, and the corresponding need for *management and control* that re-orders and revises fiscal discipline (e.g. structural adjustment policies), for instance, are accompanied – or accomplished – by myriad movements away from "representation," with its twin pillars of order and discipline. The outcome of the capitalist financialization and privatization of natural resource, transportation and health sectors in the global South, has been tremendous disorder and chaos – not the opposite, as neo-liberal apologists claim. In this respect, Parisi and Terranova are correct in their argument that "Entropy, a child of the heat engine, will be partially reabsorbed by turbulence" (ibid.: 7).[81] For capital and capitalist governmentality, the *strategic* effort may be less to manage through deferment and pollution credits the crisis of global warming, to return to that example, than to mine the ocean depths of life-production itself in the genetic and artificial life laboratories where cybernetics took over from thermodynamics in the search for self-reproducing automata, as Parisi and Terranova note.

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[79] One such example is given by Joao Biehl (2001), who describes the literally un-representable situation of those "let to die" in the configuration of AIDS and immiseration in the global South. This is not intended as a critique of Parisi and Terranova, who clearly would not intend to foreclose the possibility of the emergence of counter-organization in the places where "death is now stretched." On today's subaltern homeworker, see Spivak 1999: 387-94.

[80] While one might reasonably cite Spivak's comments on representation, including her discussion of Deleuze and Foucault on the 'passing' of representation ("Can the Subaltern Speak?"), I prefer to have us think more of the international divide today. Turning to Spivak in 2001, one is invited to think the *différance* of control and discipline in a different space: Why is it good, she asks, for there to be child investors and bad for there to be child laborers? (Spivak, Lecture at CUNY Graduate Center, October 2001).

The radical political economic shifts which Parisi and Terranova theorize – from discipline to control, from entropy to turbulent flows – are informed in particular by the passage of both capitalism and social through cybernetics. They document in brief the successive waves of cybernetic theory that transformed entropy from the thermodynamic principle of heat death, into the positive identification of entropy with information.[82] In political economic terms, this post-thermodynamic shift – with entropy re-coded through the uncertainty and unpredictability principles of information theory – poses "[r]ather than an ultimate collapse of the universe…an indefinite and discontinuous process of production, where nothing gets lost or wasted, but everything becomes useful." The difference between this conceptualization and Marx's thought of "zero-work" is considerable.

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[81] The Fifty Years is Enough network provides frequent and ample documentation of the disruptive, indeed turbulent, social and economic impact of structural adjustment on the continuously re-shaped social and natural environment.

[82] Patricia Clough clarified this point for me. See Clough 2002.

> [T]he question of entropy needed to be rethought in order to access the level of indefinite production which is desired by capital and the forces unleashed by its historical development. Entropy ceases to be a threat to life and is displaced by a principle of universalized production able to engender and organise endless difference—a line between order and disorder, between predictability and chaos. (ibid..: 7)

In their short, but far-ranging theoretical analysis, Parisi and Terranova effectively, brilliantly, and sometimes breathtakingly, pick up where Caffentzis left off. Like Caffentzis, they note how in thermodyamic capitalism, the biopolitical practices and apparatuses of society required a body that could be disciplined to manage the inevitable entropy of its value-producing labor. Marx theorized a thermodynamic capitalism moving steadily towards its own collapse, with the revolutionary energies of entropic labor bursting out into social and political revolution, a disorder that capitalism would ultimately be unable to contain or put to use. Caffentzis, faithful to Marx for the most part, theorized the possibility that capitalism and its technoscientific forces would seek to overcome the limits posed by entropic labor not merely through the expansion of the world market, i.e. by shifting value-production from high to low entropic sectors, but also – following Marxist feminists – through the re-organization of female labor in such a way that sexual and labor reproduction would continue to ward off the entropic excesses posed by the successful demands for national liberation, sexual liberation, and the political wage. But Parisi and Terranova complement this analysis with a theory of the human body and organism, looking at the micro-levels of social organization to see the intensification of capital's efforts to re-code labor and revise its own strategy for social control.

> Heat-death, the final triumph of entropy, is both a scientific hypothesis about the end of the universe, a way to organize sexual relationships and a tendency of industrial capitalism. Entropy indicates an incapacity of industrial capitalism to absorb all the energies it has generated and the inevitability of death as an attribute of the individual as an organism. It is the combination of these two anxieties which eventually called for the end of the disciplinary order. ...The thermodynamic order became not only an inefficient way of organising production, but also a dangerous one that eventually unleashed its destructive powers in the great bloodbaths of the first half of the twentieth century...(ibid.: 4)

The difference in this formulation seems to rest, once again, on the principle of human subjectivity. For Caffentzis, following in the tradition of Marxism and Marxist feminism, the laboring body – the female body in particular – was the placeholder for both value and meaning in capitalist sociality. In distinguishing the "female body" from female "flows," i.e. the "fleshy representation or phenomenon of the human subject" from the infinitely productive flows of female energy (and power, one should add), in the post-thermodynamic economy, Parisi and Terranova postulate a significant emergence: "an inexhaustible source of surplus value" which is certainly of interest to today's home-based labor and gender studies. In the modulated, post-thermodynamic flows of female reproductive labor/energy,

> the noise and uncertainty of female flows no longer drive the self-reproductive cycle to finitude, but open up possibilities of infinite production....This infinitely productive energy-matter which cannot be calculated, but only orientated towards an optimised reproduction, is the space where control tries out its new strategies. (ibid.: 7)

Parisi and Terranova claim that "[t]he price to pay (and the challenge to feminism)," of the shift from disciplinary to control society, and from entropy to turbulence, "is that a woman's body does not guarantee access to turbulence...there is an affinity (not an identity) between turbulence and the female body." In the social thermodynamics of the work/energy crisis, the identification of woman with reproductive labor offered a way to see the emergence of a new figure of anti-entropic labor. In the post-thermodynamic state between order and disorder, Parisi and Terranova's analysis seems to suggest, one can only see a kind of kinship (i.e. a kind of "bio-diversity" of marital, sexual and familial relations), between turbulence (as the emergence of a paradigm of flows and controls of vastly differentiated labor energies and forces which seeks only its own infinite social reproduction) and the global (female) homeworker, for example.

Given this, it is worth questioning whether such an affinity/kinship rejoins the problematic of representation and state-crisis that appears still in the framework of (an increasingly multi-/inter-nationalist) biopolitical governmentality? On the one hand we can seek (in an admittedly patriarchal mode) something like the heterogeneous 'origins' of the emergence of 'capital' in the fourteenth century as well as of, several centuries later, 'capitalism,' which Fernand Braudel shows to have been (and to have remained) 'market-' and 'anti-market-' and 'non-market-' based. In short, capital/ism was always mutating, and never monolithic in terms of laboring bodies.[83] As we know from home-based child care provider studies in the United States, even informal sector theory does not help in clarifying the connections to governmentality. On the other hand, we can see in evidence of the continuous, massive 'turnover' (the 'turbulence') of home-based work, the flows and controls streaming through both contemporary governmentality and the search for reproductive time-value on multiple sides of the increasingly fluid and disciplined global 'class' struggle. Capital's strategy, according to Marxist feminists, was premised on the claim on future reproductive labor. With Parisi and Terranova, we are faced with the question of capitalism no longer registering whether labor does or does not recognize the claim on its self or its futurity, much as petty commodity producers ('capitalists' is not the right term historically or politically) did not recognize the claims on their future by a feudal aristocracy in the early modern period. In this sense, we are faced not with the improbability of the capitalist-state's management and control of turbulent, undisciplined, emergent forms of labor, but with the question (and political struggle) over the continuing effectiveness and, to a certain extent, the competency of capitalist-state control of reproductive labor.

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[83] I take this formulation from Manuel DeLanda (1997). Braudel writes: "Today, just as in the eighteenth century, there is quite a sizeable lower floor, a sort of bargain basement, below the other two storeys; some economists estimate it at about 30 to 40% of economic activity in the *industrialized* countries. This surprisingly large figure, for which estimate have only recently appeared, is made up of all the activities outside the market and state controls—fraud, barter of goods and services, moonlighting, housework—that domestic economy which St. Thomas Aquinas regarded as the *economia pura* and which still of course exists today." *The Perspective of the World* (New York: Harper & Row: 1984), p. 630. The 'other two storeys', roughly speaking, of monopolist and competitive capitals, remained, for economists and politicians, the preferred *economia pura*, after having left behind and then rediscovered domestic economy.

The revaluation implicit in successive waves of cybernetic recoding of entropy as information and turbulence receives its most complex appearance in the emerging biomachines of Artifical Life and Artificial Intelligence, according to Parisi and Terranova.[84] As a "simulation of liquid space, [Alife] recreates the condition of fluidity and is therefore an experiment in the management of flows," a problem of (and probably for) the "post-disciplinary society of control" (Parisi and Terranova 2000: 10). The political economy of ALife is both conscious of its desires ("Technoscience wants to make turbulence work for capital") and its actual limits of conscious purposiveness ("it has to give up the absolute control of discipline").[85] Cloning, for example, must "partake even more of an autonomous turbulent order of production." We are, it seems, as much as ever on the shaky ground of the sexual division of labor/energy, where capital does not describe every form of value-production, and where the controllable but unpredictable flows of (female labor) energy emerge as new forms and sources of value which must be managed, channeled, pooled, controlled, etc. from the point of view of global-nationalist class governmentality. This appears to be the case, at any rate, following the overlapping, but distinct thought of Caffentzis, Parisi, and Terranova.

Where entropy spelled (universal) heat death, turbulence spells the indefinite production of (increasingly simulated) life. "[C]ontrol emerges as an immanent process of rechanneling of turbulent flows" (ibid.: 14). Missing in this formulation, as I noted earlier, are the interactions that may be occurring *between* entropy and turbulence, as well as, in a very different way, between the remnants and new configurations of thermodynamic capitalism and the emerging forms of cybernetic capitalism. Female bodies historically have been "confined outside the thermodynamic cycle," as Parisi and Terranova note, but they have been forced into and complicitous with it as well, on both sides of the international divide. Value in the old thermodynamic sense is still being extracted, particularly at the ends and on the edges of the long global commodity chains which homework studies in part documents (Carr et al. 2000). The difference between homework "at the bottom" and homework "at the top" may still be important, as the society of control demands disciplined labor forces elsewhere in the short-run. Homework, child care provision, and child rearing, thus, all with affinities to female labor and female flows, are not set to work everywhere the same. Appearing to acknowledge the temporality of the shift from disciplinary to control society, Parisi and Terranova suggest in their conclusion that in "a productive engagement with turbulence," feminists are called to "account for control but also elaborate an ethics of relations of power within a turbulent order" (Parisi and Terranova 2000: 14). But what would this ethics look like? What are the ethics of power in the turbulent politics of home-based child care work?

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[84] The authors cite Artificial Life models including "Cellular Automata (CAs), genetic algorithms (GAs), autonomous agents, mobotics, and ecological models such as Tierra." See Parisi and Terranova 2000: 9.

In the interest of setting deconstructive Marxist feminism differently to work, of moving with the paradigm of entropy/information in order to explore the ethics of power in the multiply divided inside of female 'energy/work', one must acknowledge that theory, including ethical theory, can never provide any political solution, only a kind of recovery or recuperation, in and through which to better see the stakes and, perhaps, responsibilities of the political games that are often played without knowing the rules (or

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[85] Ibid.: 13.

without there being rules, as in most home-based work). This is a way of referring to the critical objects, so to speak, of poststructuralists such as Foucault and deconstructionists such as Derrida. For the moment, I turn to the latter, coming back to Foucault in the concluding chapter.

When Isn't Energy Work? The Gift and Excess of Time

Before turning to Derrida, I take a brief step into the theoretical economy of entropy. With the political economic analysis of entropy, and its present-day rewriting as turbulence, we begin to understand the ways in which relations of force are increasingly heterological; capital and labor operate in an increasingly "open system" of productive difference (Clough 2002). "Productive difference," has the uncanny sound of deconstruction to it; given this, it may be worth exploring another way of elaborating entropy as systematic productive difference, if only momentarily, that is, to examine entropy/turbulence in an expanded, proto-deconstructive form of political economy. One who perhaps most explicitly and productively (prior to the thought that came to be known as deconstruction) did this was Georges Bataille (1991) – whose political economic analysis rested in great part on the theoretical difference between what he termed "restrictive economy" and "general economy." I turn to Bataille both because of his influence on Derrida, whose analysis of the gift economy I explore in this final section, and because the starting point for Bataille's distinction between restrictive and general economy was entropy, the work/energy excess unavailable for further use. The thought of entropy fit closely with his theoretical work on expenditure and consumption, which he began rather early on, in the 1930s, and elaborated several decades later in *The*

Accursed Share. The fundamental difference at work in Bataille's analysis of the *The Accursed Share*, at least as it concerned political economy, was that the "restrictive economy," the typical form taken by most political economies, including Marxism, was principally concerned with the limited ends of production, including consumption. "General economy," on the other hand, took as its starting point the excess of wealth, according to Bataille, which was always a systematic result of the economy. Hence, he argued, the general economy was concerned with "expenditure" *tout court*, with the unlimited use and dissipation of labor and energies.

Bataille's concern in *The Accursed Share* with the gift, sacrifice, and potlatch, among other things, was attributable, I would argue, to the deep-rooted thought of thermodynamics in his approach, and not to any ethnographic impulse, surrealist or otherwise. "On the surface of the globe, for *living matter in general*, energy is always in excess" he wrote. "...[T]he question is always posed in terms of extravagance. The choice is limited to how the wealth is to be squandered" (Bataille 1991: 23). There is no doubt that the complexities of Bataille's argument, particularly those concerning his appropriation of Hegel and the intertwined relations among the sacred, eroticism, and power, must not be reduced to a deconstructive gesture.[86] My interest at this point is to draw the distinction between restrictive and general economy to one key conclusion. If energy is always in excess, and the question is ultimately only one of how the excess is to be dissipated, then in Bataille we have a consideration which might help represent a distinction critical not only for understanding what 'post'-thermodynamic might mean, but also some of the currents ethico-politics of homework might follow precisely in the turbulent wake of entropic labor and capital.

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[86] See Michele Richman for an excellent overall review of the relationship of Bataille's work on the gift to critical theory and Derrida. Michele H. Richman, *Reading Georges Bataille. Beyond the Gift* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). See also Derrida 1978.

If the "restricted economy" is concerned with production and consumption, i.e. with the organismic increase or decrease of the system, it must always confront a limit in terms of excess – entropy, for one. This much Marx understood, in a variety of intriguing ways (even, or especially, in relation to Hegelianism). What Bataille was proposing by way of the "general economy" of energy excess is not only that the excess must be dissipated, but it must be dissipated "without reserve." This deconstructive gesture takes us very close to the cybernetic re-coding of entropy as information: pure dissipation or loss of energy requires in turn—a loss of signification, an increase in uncertainty, in short an undecidability in the thing.[87] The meaning of the gift or sacrifice, or rather the information provided in the gift, remains undecidable. It cannot be re-located in the signification structure of the restrictive economy, if it is to retain its "expanded value" as pure expenditure, as "information" that destabilizes the structure.

There are two thoughts in this very brief reading of Bataille that I would like to retain, which correspond generally to the two treatments of entropy which I have examined in this chapter: entropy as undecidable (i.e. as information, or turbulence) and entropy as loss of meaning (i.e. value).[88] With entropy as loss of meaning or value, one still remains in the restrictive economy of, for example, Marxist political economy, the work/energy crisis being the example I have given here. Entropy as information, as turbulence, does indeed entail another development in the thought of entropy, which the authors of "Heat Death" have sought to capture in a theoretical route that properly bypassed Bataille. If the universal loss of energy brings with it an increase in (unstable, unpredictable, mutable information), as second-order cybernetics surmised, then an opening not merely to difference, but to productive difference and heterogeneity is retained as a necessary practical gesture to, among other things, ethics. A continuous return to the heterological origin, as Derrida (1978) would have it.

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[87] Patricia Clough (2002), following Deleuze, sees in the technoscientific crossing of meaning with information one of the paradigmatic shifts from disciplinary to control society. Folllowing Derrida, Arkady Plotnitsky reads entropy quite differently as loss of "critical" meaning. See Plotnitsky, *Reconfigurations. Critical Theory and General Economy* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1993). The difference between these two approaches should become more apparent in later chapters.

[88] There is a third that interests me – concerning the place of philanthropy in Bataille's analysis of general and restrictive economy: "If a part of wealth (subject to rough estimate) is doomed to destruction or at least to unproductive use without any possible profit, it is logical, even *inescapable*, to surrender commodities without return" (Bataille 1991: 25). It is certainly intriguing to consider the funding that I have sought on behalf of the TWSC Unity Campaign, for example, as capital's inescapable "surrender of commodities." This points obliquely to a different kind of productivity for "grassroots" and home-based worker "organizing," as Elyachar (2002) describes at fascinating length.

One could proceed then, with caution, by expanding Bataille's (1991) analysis to contemporary political economic history. Indeed, his very contemporary prognostications on war, global philanthropy and economic development, almsgiving and religious martyrdom, bear this out. In "Putting Global Capitalism in Its Place," Mayfair Mei-hui Yang (2000) explicitly takes up Bataille's proto-deconstructive political economy, analyzing the rapid economic development of Wenzhou province in China in the 1990s not in the restricted economy of capitalist marketization but in a more general, "hybrid" economy featuring market exchange, potlatch, spectacular destruction of wealth, and expansive gift-giving. In this hybrid "capitalism" (she retains the name while qualifying its meaning), "driven by consumption rather than production" (pure expenditure, Bataille would say), market exchange is both inflected and launched by a ritual economy of lavish public and private expense (the kind of "luxurious squandering" which Bataille thought "inescapable"), whose purposes are, on the one hand, mundanely oriented to public display and exhibitionism, and on the other, according to Yang, an indeterminable challenge to the classical capitalist principles of accumulation. Yang draws a further distinction between the consumption-intensive models of contemporary capitalism (e.g., shop at Amazon.com, create a consumer profile, be electronically solicited with things the company more or less legitimately knows you will want, and you buy more), and "Bataille's vision of the ritual destruction of wealth as defying the principles of accumulative and productive capitalism [which] does not address this different phase of [postmodern] consumer capitalism…" (Yang 2000: 483). Postmodern consumption is mediated by its informational feedback into the supply-side: the more time you spend shopping, the more you are given to spending, although this was clearly not what Bataille had in mind in terms of dissipation of wealth without reserve.

One must proceed with caution, therefore. In articulating "non-productive expenditure" with market capitalism, and not reducing one to the other, Yang's postulates a "hybrid" general economy while holding on critically to "socialism with Chinese characteristics," as she notes its official designation, as formally undecidable. Yet Yang offers no articulation of technology and international sexual division of labor such as Caffentzis did in the "Work/Energy Crisis," or Parisi and Terranova offer in a radically de-subjectified way in "Heat Death." Certainly, in the case of Wenzhou province in China, as Yang writes, "a ritual economy can actually spur production" (ibid.: 495). But this is the cautionary tale of restrictive and general economy, for in this one phrase, we are moved from the general back into the restrictive economy. The questions of the articulation of any specific antagonisms of capital and labor, or of nonproductive expenditure and women's unpaid labor in the general economy of Wenzhou province, are here foreclosed.

Rethinking non-productive expenditure as both undecidable and heterological increase of information and uncertainty might yield an approach that is forced neither to reinsert the gift economy into productive exchange or reinsert woman-as-excess in the capitalist/patriarchal machine of productivity and accumulation. If gift-giving launches exchange, and if the thing given, the gift, isn't reducible to the bartered good or the commodity, then a different political-ethical question can be asked. If the undecidable future of the non-productive expenditure retains altogether different "information" (including turbulence), even as it continually launches exchange, including the most powerful forms of capitalist exchange, then are we required to theorize political economy or political ethics differently?

To return to home-based child care provider organizing for a moment, I find remarkable the ethics and politics behind, or rather the ethico-political future facing, the child care provider who, in the context of a public forum organized by the Unity Campaign in September 2001 – where providers, supporters, parents, children, trade unionists, religious leaders and others spoke to the "valuable services childcare workers provide" and how they merit (and urgently need) publicly subsidized health care insurance – announced her deep-seated hope and plan to take care of children until she dies. Such an affect, and the child care practice it professes, cannot, should not, be located in the realm of exchange, I would argue. There is no expected return in this expectation, at least not a calculable one, only a giving and giving, rooted by herself, the children and their parents in more or less well understood practices of love, care and giving. A giving, and also, in the context of "organizing," a counter-demanding. The "call to service," crossed with the "call to servitude," is not simply another iteration of the master-slave dialectic, or simply the powerful, re-composed class response to patriarchal devalorization. Home-based child care worker organizing, where the stakes are indeed power and control, appears to bear this out. The radicalism embodied here is not met by academic human rights prose or talk, either in the U.S., where the economic rights of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights have been rejected by democratic capitalism, or elsewhere, where the rights, when they are upheld, are vitiated by the lack of global economic democracy. Nor, I am arguing, is it comprehended in the restricted economy of what I am erroneously calling thermodynamic capitalism, where the continuous return to capital is enabled precisely by reconfiguring ritual economy and specifically women's unpaid labors in the circuit of productivity.

Giving, in a "general economic" sense, has always underwritten power, sovereignty, or *mana*, much as it underwrites hybrid and neoliberal capitalisms. Recall Negri's (1991) reading of Marx's *Grundrisse*, that capital's claims on future labor are "constituted *gratuitously*, by the totality of social labor" – including social reproductive labor. Capitalists understand this in their blood and bones. George Gilder (1981), the high priest of supply-side economics and the Reagan counterrevolution, in his (at the time influential) *Wealth and Poverty*, re-wrote "giving without return" as, on the one hand, capitalist investment, and on the other, as the "x-factor" of productivity: "the metaphysics of freedom and creativity." The danger to contemporary capitalism, he wrote at the start of the era of structural adjustment of the United States, "lies not chiefly in a deterioration of physical capital, but in a persistent subversion of the psychological means of production—the morale and inspiration of economic man—undermining the very conscience of capitalism: the awareness that one must give in order to get, supply in order to demand" (Gilder 1981: 28). I write this in 2002 in full knowledge of Gilder's current status as a guru for the New Economy of broadband and information technology. But in 1981, he juxtaposed socialism, where planned expenditure may beget egalitarianism ("from each according to ability") to unfettered capitalism, where giving begets capital; on the other hand (and unsurprisingly), for Gilder and other notables among today's capitalist metaphysicians, "egalitarianism in the economy tends to promote greed over giving" (ibid.: 30). Precisely the heart of liberalist ethics! Here, the second half of the communist mantra, 'to each according to need,' is subverted for the sake of the "x-factor" of gift economy – and a complementary ethics of unpaid labor – preliminary to the extraction of surplus value. Capital's claims on future labor, Gilder makes abundantly clear, are all about the ethics, and control, of the (turbulent) gift.

In the early going, and to a greater extent in chapter five, I argued that "homework" be seen as the valorization of "housework." Following Bataille's reflections on entropy and expenditure, homework might also be thought of in terms of *la part maudit*, "the accursed share," or object of general economic sacrifice. Bataille's immediate references for his observations on gift and ritual economies were Mauss and Levi-Strauss, whose writings on the subject gave rise to entire schools of sociological and structuralist thought (which are well beyond the scope and desire of my interventions here). In brief, however, it might be important to note the following. Mauss interpreted the gift in the narrow sense as an elemental form of a total social system of exchange. The phenomenology of the gift could be seen in the way its 'spirit' always brought it back to the giver. Levi-Strauss took this several steps further: the gift produced an obligatory counter-gift as a function of the unconscious collective-symbolic exchange of everything from language to marriage partners to, most famously, women.

The reversal and displacement I have been moving towards in this chapters is that the expansion of the textuality of value would not only have to account for the interruption of the gift economy through the valorization of domestic labor; it would also have to account for the ethical "subjection" (including the de-subjectification) of the race and sex divided global/local homeworker. I elaborate on this more fully in the next chapter. For the time being, I am left with two questions: Would this ethical subjection, in the process, have required the capacity in *these* workers to see in the demand for equality of treatment with other legally constituted laboring subjects the equally significant moment of the valorization of housework (including, in particular, the care of their own children)? As homeworkers are made more "visible," through organizing and exposure of all kinds, what comes of the domestic laborers in these same homes (Parrenas 2001)? Who or what will organize them? The gift economy text, like the text of child care worker organizing, for the most part does not respond to these questions. And if these questions are passed over in silence, what, once again, is being given over gratuitously?

My second question concerns the gift, which I am attempting to show, assumes in the text of thermodynamic capitalism the complementary space and economy of both women-in-excess and entropic labor. By way of answering this question, I turn finally to Derrida's reflection on the economy of the gift in *Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money*. I confine myself for the most part to the first two chapters of this text, where Derrida deals principally with Mauss's text.

In what is perhaps a familiar theoretical move for readers of Derrida, he holds up the gift – takes it hostage as it were – as the figure (or experience) of the "impossible." For Derrida, the experience of "the impossible" is a theoretical and ethical aporia: an erasure of Being through which one must nevertheless travel. This has been understood by others as the experience of the "double bind," or, in the perhaps more relevant phrasing of Spivak, the experience of operating in the 'structure that one cannot not wish to inhabit.' In the Derridean aporia, that is, in the experience of the impossible, the loss of metaphysical grounding occurs in complementary relation with the undecidable. The importance of this in terms of the economy of the gift, for Derrida, is that it carries the added weight of an ethical relationship rooted in a kind of justice where, as Elizabeth Grosz (1999) points out, one must first do violence in order to do justice.

Derrida's reflections on Mauss's analysis of the gift shifts the gift not so subtly from the restrictive economic space of social structure and a certain kind of productive agency, to the "general economy" of deconstruction. "On the one hand," Derrida writes, "Mauss reminds us that there is no gift without bond, without bind, without obligation or ligature; but on the other hand, there is no gift that does not have to untie itself from obligation, from debt, contract, exchange, and thus from the bind" (Derrida 1992: 27). Derrida's fascination with the disappearance, the inexorable loss or escape of the "thing itself," causes him to question repeatedly what exactly is the nature of the social relation that, in the case of the gift, resides so much in the loss of any property of the gift in the "thing itself." The condition of the gift, for Derrida, as for Mauss in a less emphatic way, is also the condition of forgetting that the gift is a gift. "Forget it," says the giver to the recipient, who must already have forgotten the giving for the gift *to be* at all. For

Derrida, the force of forgetting as the condition of the gift lies not in the unconscious, however. In the unconscious, the gift would only be displaced in one way or another by repression, and hence un-forgotten. The gift wouldn't be, wouldn't exist, as such.

Derrida takes us in this manner to Heidegger's *On Time and Being*, specifically to the paradigmatic thought of "*es gibt*." "*Es gibt*," which I would translate as "giving without giving," or "giving without reserve" (in the Bataillean sense), is a thought analogous to what, in other essays (and I am simplifying considerably here), Derrida terms the 'presenceing' effects of *ousia* and thereby of writing.[89] The implications of the gift as forgetting, of *es gibt*, are strangely important for Derrida's treatment of the gift. "To tell the truth, the gift must not even appear or signify, consciously or unconsciously, *as* gift for the donors, whether individual or collective subjects. From the moment the gift would appear as gift…it would be engaged in a symbolic, sacrificial, or economic structure that would annul the gift in the ritual circle of the debt" (ibid. 1992: 23). To give a gift already requires, in itself, a duty (a debt, an ought, structured as *is*), *not* to return the gift (including, as well, not to give or return excessively). For Levi-Strauss, the solution to this dilemma, the formation of the debt-bond structure, was to reconstitute the gift according to the laws of the unconscious, as being in the symbolic social order of the gift relation (which itself was Mauss's gift to sociology, and possibly his own debt to Durkheim). Derrida's solution, by way of Heidegger, is to "pre-pose" the gift before the exchange of symbols and signs, linguistic, unconscious or other, that is to trace the originary structure of the gift, and the force or forces that ground it in Being itself. Such an analysis presupposes, like much other French poststructuralist thought, at least a partial movement prior to the constitution, or even the possibility, of a subject of giving or exchange. "One would be tempted to say," Derrida writes, "that a subject as such never gives or receives a gift. It is constituted, on the contrary, in view of dominating, through calculation and exchange, the mastery of this *hubris* or of this impossibility that is announced in the promise of the gift" (ibid.: 24). The subject of the gift does not exist as such, but rather exists as an effect, an "arrest" of the gift, serving to underscore the importance of the gift and giving in a more general movement of subjectivation, that is to say, the originary importance of the circulation of the gift in the thought of the subject.

With Mauss, who saw in this originary importance of the gift a 'total social phenomenon,' the gift had neither the structural unconscious effect theorized by Levi-Strauss, nor the movement of pre-subjective displacement given it by Derrida (as well as by Mauss himself, who as Derrida notes, was equally carried away by the violent destruction of wealth, the proto-deconstruction of the gift as such, in the American potlatch observed by Davy). Mauss's gift was, as Derrida notes, as much a *name* for the object of gift-exchange as the splitting of itself from exchange, i.e. the gift's differentiation from calculated, rational economic exchange and its consequent phenomenological stature as an object of counter-economistic social fact. The continuous, and typically violent, displacement of the gift that Derrida pursues in *Given Time*, has been interpreted by some as antagonistic with the tradition of Maussian gift-scholarship.[90] Rather than antagonism, I would surmise, Derrida proposes a momentary

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[89] That is, the making present of 'giving without giving,' of how what Being gives is present (in Heidegger's language: "what 'Being' means, which—It gives (*das—es gibt*); what "time" means, which—It gives (*das—es gibt*)" (cited by Derrida 1992: 21).

[90] See David Graeber (2001). *Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of Our Own Dreams*. (NY: Palgrave Press). Derrida's statement that "there is no longer any 'logic of the gift,'" may indeed be a reference to the work of Marxist anthropologist Maurice Godelier, who in turn takes a jab at Derrida in the *Enigma of the Gift*. I leave to others to judge the merits of the claims and counter-claims.

"departure" from the Maussian tradition, in order precisely to acknowledge the possibility of violence in the tradition itself: not to destroy or annul, but to maintain the gift, still repressed, as the social mediating experience of the *impossible* – of both zero-work and non-work, if you will. "Even if the gift were never anything but a simulacrum, one must still *render an account* of the possibility of this simulacrum and of the desire that impels towards this simulacrum" (ibid. 1992: 31). The obligation to give, even, or especially, in the account of giving, is the *unheimlicht* experience of the impossible, of undecidability. As Grosz writes, it is "the openness of any articulation, any object or any event, the propulsion of any "thing" (whether avowedly self-present or not) to a future context or scene where its current meaning, value and status is reread, rewritten, and transmuted" (Grosz 1999: 13).

I make this final point with two perspectives in mind. If one continues *Given Time*, which is really an extended reading of a very short story ("Counterfeit Money") by Baudelaire, what one gets is an account of giving, specifically of charitable giving, that poses the ethical question of giving in terms of literal "secret," that is to say of the undecidability of ethical knowledge corresponding, I would argue, to the entropic/informational increase of turbulence and uncertainty in what we would now call a society of control, following Deleuze (Clough 2002). This is one perspective. The second is that in an abridged version of the argument he later makes in *Specters of Marx*, Derrida treats the obligation to give in capitalism as the obligation to give time. Time is the only thing, according to Derrida, that cannot be given, thus fulfilling the deconstructive criteria of giving – i.e. that condition of impossibility that is giving – which does not demand repayment or create a debt (Derrida 1992: 36). Derrida's debt to

Marx in *Given Time*, thus, was not entirely forgotten, and his expression is quite clear, if brief.

> If there is something that can in no case be given, it is time, since it is nothing and since in any case it does not properly belong to anyone; if certain persons or certain social classes have more time than others—and this is finally the most serious stake of political economy—it is certainly not *time itself* that they possess. (ibid.: 28)

In Derrida's hands, the gift gives time, or according to Grosz, "the gift gives a possible future, a temporality in excess of the present and never contained within its horizon, the temporality of endless iteration" (Grosz 1999: 15). However, in the Marxist-feminist text, with the gift of time, as the gift can only be according to Derrida, it is always tempting to get caught up in the structure of a duty to repay debt in acknowledgement of a claim on future reproductive labor. As Spivak has remarked, "internalized gendering perceived as ethical choice is the hardest roadblock for women the world over" (Devi 1995: xxviii). This inspires a much more extended thought-analysis of time in the circulation of the gift as "caring" or "affect" than I can hope to accomplish here; however, a few short reflections are necessary, until I turn in the next chapter to a more extended reflection.

In discussing the relationship of the gift to calculability and rationality, Derrida writes that the gift, "if there is any, does not even belong to practical reason…It *should* surpass *duty* itself: duty beyond duty" (Derrida 1992: 156, emphasis in original). I choose *Given Time* because Derrida's deconstruction of the gift bears a more or less equivalent (though by no means the same) load as Bataille's principle of expenditure without return. Each offers a slightly different framing of the gift as the necessary iteration of a different kind of economy altogether: forgotten, "invisible," hidden, secret. The time that is given, the forgotten, uncaulculated time of domestic labor, for instance, must be expended and can't be returned. And almost by definition, it is never entropic. It is always available, and when it is not (when, as Caffentzis points out, it is refused), it crosses over into another kind of economy, into exchange, into commodification, and eventually, as we see, into "organizing." But at the point of organizing, as we saw, it is not exactly what it was before. The giving of time, unlike labor, cannot be "organized," which brings me back to the question of value and control in the displacement, or the crossing, of homework into housework. If time cannot be organized, and if time in fact is not what people possess but what they give, then the giving of time in, for example, the unpaid care of children – the largest segment of what I have been calling "housework" up to this point – then what exactly is the time that race and sex-divided domestic labor gives without return? And if it is not time, then what is it? What I am arguing, by way of Derrida, is that any response to this question must appear to be "deontological," i.e. a "duty beyond duty." Or in the space of Marxist-feminist economy, "a transvaluation, an uncatastrophic implosion of the search for value via the circuit of productivity," to return to the citation from Spivak I began the chapter with. In Marxist-feminist class terms, the time of reproductive labor must appear in international, sectoral struggles as the ethical control of "free" (i.e. given) time, understood here not as leisure, but as, for example, "child care," "community organizing," "sex work," and so on.

This is why a current of the Western Marxist tradition could argue that class struggle is always overdetermined as cultural struggle, as 'whole ways of life' (note the resemblance to Mauss's total social fact), most illustriously captured in the early twentieth century by Gramsci, and later by cultural studies forerunners such as Raymond Williams and E. P. Thompson. The resulting proliferation of social and cultural studies which have succeeded (rarely unproblematically) in trans-mapping and transfiguring Marxism in and throughout the overlaid critical-theoretical matrices of race, nation, sexuality, generation, gender, migration, location, etc., and in challenging the economism of a restrictive marxism stuck in thermodynamics, must, because of the duty to give prior to and beyond the claim on future labor – that is to say, prior to and beyond entropy – give an account of what Thompson, for one, termed the "moral economy," Williams the "structure of feeling," and Parisi and Terranova, in a very different register, "turboethics." For home-based child care worker organizing in the era of structural adjustment, I turn in the final chapter to Foucault, with a view to examining how house/homeworkers are implicated in the dominant form of modernist ethics, or what Foucault termed governmentality. Preliminary to that, however, I look a bit more closely at a number of contemporary efforts to reclaim the labor theory of value in the turbulent cultural and political wake of post-thermodynamic capitalism.

Chapter Five – The Politics of Domestic and Home-Based Labor Value

...the estimated worth of a thing... is its money value. Law and society say this home work need not be paid in money; therefore society and law value this work.... at—how much?... (Helen Jenkins, 1872)[91]

Analysis of the economy of the gift offers one way of exploring the organization of home-based labor in the era of structural adjustment. At the vanishing point of the gift economy is an ethical obligation to "give time," which in the language of Marxist feminism, and in the place of the home, we would have to think of as a sexual, racial, moral and political economy of domestic labor. What binds this economy is not an unconscious language structure (Lévi-Strauss), or a total system of social prestations (Mauss), but the gift of "time itself," which always gives, and is forgotten – and thereby escapes structuralist confines.

The gift of time is more than an analogy to women's unpaid domestic labor. The predication of household labor as a "natural social force" in bourgeois political economy – and its critique – is bound up in the forgetting of household labor that produces, among other things, economic value, including, some would say, surplus value. In yet another unacknowledged debt, Marxist and classical political economy take it for granted that people will self-subsist and reproduce themselves, one way or another; no ordinary reflection on the production and accumulation of wealth suggests otherwise. For Marx, this problem was solved, by a dualism that put labor value on one side (the calculation of the time needed to reproduce the worker), and domestic labor on the other (the unacknowledged, uncalculated source, or "gift," of reproduction). Insofar as "workers" have to produce and be reproduced by subsumed domestic labor, thermodynamic capitalism had to continually seek counter-entropic responses to the inexorable dissipation of this dual structure of social reproduction (Caffentzis 1992). Or, as Marxist feminists argued, the surplus value of household labor time, in a super-expanded form that I argue is connected to "homework," has to be circulated so that commodity-producing (i.e. traditionally waged) labor may produce surplus value on an ever-expanded basis (Fortunati 1995). The double accounting here – household labor on one side and commodity-producing or surplus-value producing labor on the other – bears an operational similarity to the relationship of housework and homework which we saw in chapters one and two, each one subtending the other and holding it in place, so much so that it is impossible to separate them. And the home is offered and sought as a "spatio-temporal fix," to use David Harvey's (1990) term, for the completion of the expanding circuits of this specifically capitalist reproduction of society.

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[91] Cited in Siegel 1998.

Forgetting that domestic labor produces value (as well as a commodity), forgetting that domestic labor both produces and reproduces value, one is subtly brought back to the thought of entropy and turbulence. For, in the case of the United States, if the physical reproduction of labor – labor provided almost exclusively by women, African American and immigrant domestic workers, housewives and homeworkers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the United States – alongside the refusal of (productive and reproductive) labor, were the cornerstones of both value-production, as well as the social engineering of domestic labor as source of productive consumption and social reproduction, then the management of entropy and the control of turbulence would have to be, as we saw in the "work/energy crisis," most forcefully articulated in, simultaneously, the shifting divisions of international labor, on the one hand, and the home, on the other. The articulation of *these* divisions, to go back to a formula that worked quite well for some years, is the stuff that capitalist hegemony is made of. Hegemony clarifies the misconception that everything, everywhere is capitalist all the time, and in so doing it recalls the subtle politics of critical political economic analysis: to theorize the differential effects of power in the "text" of value. Read now, the sometimes agonizing debates among Marxists and feminists about whether domestic labor produces surplus value *or not*, and *therefore* whether domestic laborers (including domestic workers, housewives and homeworkers) constitute a class *or not* in Marxist terms (a debate which had the effect of foreclosing any and all discussions of power *per se*) are useful reminders of the internalized limits of restrictive political economic theory. Marx's theoretical complicity with thermodynamics required a solution that challenged the limits of his own dialectic: for Marxist epigones who ruthlessly criticized everything in "nature," reproductive (i.e. household) labor typically escaped critical class analysis, appearing as a "natural force" of social labor which did not fit precisely into either (and, at the same time, fit into both) of Marx's twin sources of wealth: labor and natural resources (Fortunati 1995).

This fluid crossing of labor and nature in the body of the female domestic laborer, and its "absent presence" in Marx's writings, has been little theorized from the combined perspective of value, work, and gift.[92] While outwork does make a few ghostly appearances in *Capital*, here I am interested in tracing some of the contemporary thinking about the gift and value of domestic labor, with a view precisely to the ongoing exploitative chain of production which ends, at least as I have framed it so far, in the co-location of housework and homework in the global South, and the commodification of housework ("care work" and "domestic work" of all kinds) into homework in the post-industrial North. The challenge posed by the relationship of homework to housework, of paid to unpaid home-based labor, within internationally divided female labor, remains paramount.

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[92] At least for so-called capitalist societies. There is a fairly large body of feminist social and economic anthropology that examines these intersections in non-capitalist societies. See Weiner 1992.

In this chapter, I focus first on the developing school of theory centered on household surplus labor as an integrated class process, examining in particular the rise of paid and unpaid home-based child care labor. Next, I turn to a short piece by Antonio Negri (1999) on the elision of "value" in the context of a globalizing class struggle through the political economic turn to the "affect" of value. I conclude with several critical reflections on Negri and Michael Hardt's (1994, 2000) works, with special focus on the theory of class struggle that emerges from these works.

Increases in U.S. (and, as we have seen, global) women's labor force participation throughout the past decades gave rise to substantial increases in paid and unpaid labor of all kinds. I have focused here on home-based child care, the informal care provided by grandparents and other relatives, neighbors and friends, domestic workers, and unlicensed home-based workers as well as the "formal" care of paid home-based providers and domestic workers. The massive development of home-based child care (alongside elderly and disabled care) labor forces represented a measurable gain for hegemonic capital, evidenced as much by growth in GDP and profits, as by the gradual proletarianization of sectors of paid and unpaid laborers in the domestic economy and the ongoing devaluation of the average social wage, which increasingly had to pay for child care and other forms of reproductive labor in the "formal" economy. Less visibly and far less measurably, more and more surplus domestic labor was being mobilized in the reproduction of specifically capitalist sociality, in the controlled (and as we have seen, increasingly contested) biopolitics of neoliberalism.

State welfare reform in the 1990s was possibly the trailing effect of this massive reorganization of domestic labor in the United States. The breakdown of the political strength of traditionally organized labor was evidenced most powerfully in the neo-conservative surge into the U.S. House of Representatives and the promulgation of the Republican "Contract with America" in the 1992 elections. It was equally empowered by the compromised ("centrist") party politics of the "New Democrats," led by Bill Clinton, who correctly surmised that a legislative trade-off of welfare reform, the most tactical campaign promise that year, for health care reform, arguably his most "progressive" long-term strategy, could be achieved. Health care reform legislation was defeated within two years of its introduction by a powerful bloc of health corporations, insurance companies, and their Republican Party and Fortune 500 political allies. In the end, welfare reform became, many have argued, the signature legislation of the decade, and the defeat for domestic and wage labor was profound as the onslaught from both liberals and conservatives decisively cut back on the small, but crucial piece of the total social wage which had been forced on the state in the late 1960s. As has been noted elsewhere, "reform" of this politically important portion of the Fordist-Keynesian state (the shifting meanings of "welfare" might be seen as a shorthand for the ongoing social struggles of "entropic labor" in the U.S. in this era) had been attempted several times in the previous two decades; but social organization had changed after twelve years of deficit spending and a huge shift of tax burden from the wealthy and corporations onto low- and middle-income earners (Mink 1998). From 1979 to 1992, average after-tax wages fell. Socially, centrist politics attacked non-whites, women, and immigrants as irresponsible, unproductive and dangerous, and this turbulent excess theorized by post-thermodynamic capitalism would soon be marked for control by the growth of a burgeoning carceral state apparatus (Wacquant 2001). By, 1997, new state laws injected state-subsidized domestic laborers into the formal economy in mandated, sub-minimum jobs that threatened or actively replaced higher-wage and unionized jobs. In addition, as we have seen, domestic laborers increasingly entered the privatized economy of home-based child care and other service and caring work (Tuominen 1997, 1998).

In gutting that relatively small but measurably important portion of its budget, the state could cut the social wage by reducing or eliminating cash and care "transfers" as well as by injecting millions of new super-exploitable women workers into very low-wage work and homework. Many observers have argued, quite rightly, that welfare payments (AFDC) were rarely, if ever, sufficient for subsistence; however, findings suggest that formal sector low-wage work alone does not provide greater income for those cut from AFDC. It should come as no surprise, then, that households that received welfare transfers supplemented their income from a variety of sources, formal and informal, legal and illegal.

Racist stereotypes of "welfare queens" in the 1980s and '90s exposed the deeper desire of welfare reform: policing and enclosing (but not necessarily eradicating) the informal economies of drugs, sex, homework, child labor, barter and commodity exchange that supported broad sectors of the low- and no-wage population. Enclosure of these informal sectors continues to be formally about policing and control, but in this and other instances, it is also part and parcel of a broader hegemonic strategy to launch them into an expanding capitalist domain by way of prison, prison labor, and social and community "service," with the non-profit organization, academic study and philanthropic initiative following closely alongside.[93] In the era of global structural adjustment, what Marx (1976) called "primitive accumulation" – the separation of "alien" labor from their means of production – continues to launch the hegemonic capitalist cycle, by forcing surplus labor, possessed of its own economy (in one way or another "foreign" to capital), into capitalist production through the state's biopolitical controls. Recall the distinction Marx made between the "formal subsumption" of labor, where capital manages and directs labor which is otherwise "foreign" or "alien" to it, and the "real subsumption" of labor where capital *is* the total laboring activity of society (Negri and Hardt 1994: 225, citing Marx 1973: 709).

As I suggested early on, welfare reform in the U.S. should also be seen as part of structural adjustment on a global scale. The oil crisis of the early 1970s sent newly industrializing countries to international creditors for money, launching the large-scale indebtedness they shed ownership and control under today. In the early 1980s, commodity prices dropped off on a large scale on the global market (including oil, as we saw), sending dozens of national and local economies into even deeper crisis: imports were still expensive, there was less by way of export earnings, and powerful states such as the U.S. put increasing pressure on international funding agencies to impose strict political-economic conditions on further loans. Thus was born the extremely destructive era of structural adjustment. The profit crunch of the late '70s and '80s in the U.S.. Japan and Europe was being attacked on multiple fronts: through increased interest payment to creditor nations. through improved terms of trade benefiting their heavily subsidized agricultural and high-tech sectors. and through multinational transfers of millions of jobs from the de-industrializing North to the export processing and free trade zones of an increasingly global (and home-based) "foreign" assembly line.

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[93] This can be traced in the explosive growth of the prison as well as after-prison industries of supervision, surveillance, counseling, training, and low-wage job channeling. With the rise of major philanthropic initiatives in this area, most notably the Open Society Institute of globalization guru George Soros, one can

The violence of structural adjustment policies is not merely a matter of increased control of turbulent and indebted national and local economies. however. The highly coordinated effort to control economic development on a global scale retains the powerful effect of securing the hegemonic conditions for class control. conditions which Negri and Hardt (1994) have argued are no longer normative in the juridical sense. Foremost among these non-normative conditions of hegemony. I would argue. are debt. on the one hand. and the "formal subsumption" or articulation of a vast range of "informal" and non-capitalist. including domestic. economies. on the other. The *international* division of labor. in this frame of reference. might be located precisely in how at the macro level massive consumer and government debt in the post-industrial North spurs economic growth and upwards redistribution of wealth there. whereas in the South. the "same" debt actively produces economic devastation. informalization. social upheaval. and upwards (i.e. de-nationalized) redistribution of wealth in the form of money. natural resources. and labor flowing northwards. The international division of *labor*. following this. might be thought to flow through the class control of debts – including claims on future reproductive labor – that do not operate the same everywhere.

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see similarities to developments in turn of the nineteenth century France – specifically the rise of the heavily policed "social" sector – as described by Donzelot (1979).

With these two movements, at the micro level, there is no measure of debt equivalence between a "working-class" family in, e.g., the United States and "the same" working-class family in Argentina or Venezuela (even when not in a period of enormous financial and political turbulence, such as 2001-02). A parallel analysis of the relationship of home-based child care labor in the United States to home-based industrial labor, for example, in India, could and should be made.[94] "Structural adjustment," in this sense, widens the international divide and spurs international economic turbulence, even as it draws more and more economic activity into a single system of multinational (capitalist) class hegemony (Hardt and Negri 2000).[95]

So far, I have stayed for the most part within the "restrictive economy" of a critical neoliberal political economy, where the undecidable dialectical outcome of global class struggle looks very determined, if not deterministic. As in Caffentzis's analysis of the work/energy crisis, the transfer of value production from low to high organic composition sectors of capital, and the corresponding analysis of a move from relative to absolute surplus value on a global scale, entropic labor remains managed and controlled, put to work and put to death on the global assembly line, as well as in international housewifeization, prison labor, state militarization, low-intensity conflict, and imperial "policing." The *restrictive* economy of neo-Marxian political economy sees in all of these developments, and the countervailing forces which give rise to them, a total system of more or less absolute hegemonic struggle for control between increasingly less oppositional, and more and more dependent forces of labor and capital (ibid.).

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[94] Spivak implies such an argument in her preface to Devi 1999: xxiii-xxix.

[95] There is little contradiction, then, in the correspondence of massive industrialization in the South and widening national and international economic inequality throughout the world.

A general economic approach would have us account, however, for the "expenditure without reserve"—which one can see rewritten in post-thermodynamic capitalism as the "vital turbulence" of such forces as home-based labor. Such an approach, although it too is subject to totalizing impulses, would have us view the otherwise "invisible" or "forgotten" body of the sexually and racially divided home-based worker and domestic laborer, not as excess that must be set to work in capitalism, but as a heterological force of general economic production that is both different from other laboring bodies and internally differentiated – a force which capital cannot entirely control, even as it tries and tries (Parisi and Terranova 2000). If I am interpreting Parisi and Terranova correctly, this *sexual* division of labor within the simultaneously widening and sharpening international divide, is infinitely productive of value, but not necessarily for capital. Once again, the willingness not to foreclose the meaning of "value," i.e. to theorize incalculable expenditure and the gift in the production of value, rests on holding open the possibility of the "emergence" of non-capitalist, or perhaps post-capitalist, valorization. Then, the question might be, could collective home-based labor time be organized? How? Where? By whom? Thus, I would not merely counterpose the political experience of networks such as SEWA (which organizes home-based workers into cooperatives), to the powerfully promoted micro-credit programs in India and elsewhere that have resulted in a re-assertion of patriarchal rule within the home-based economy, important as this distinction is to recognize. Rather, I would look to see how the value being produced differently in (the micro-tissues of) homeworkers' lives and homes, is being organized and controlled by institutions such as SEWA, which re-valorize this set of differences in struggles for domestic and economic justice that simultaneously model "democratic socialist feminist" – or one might say, with Marx, "pre-communist" – governance and political economic control on ever-increasing scales. Organization of the home, the field, water, land, systems of credit, heath care, child care, insurance, etc. – the very tissues of women-centered sociality which SEWA, and in comparable ways the home-based child care providers of Rhode Island and Virginia, address – are also the places through which class control must circulate in order for it to dominate socially. But which, or what, class? And how?

Thus, one question that concerns me is how various types and forms of home-based work might differ from other forms of wage earning or commodity production in terms of value-production – and what the implications of these differences are for theorizing class control? How does the organization of home-based labor reach back on its own uncertain or undecidable structure in a way that could provide future direction for "pre-communist" feminist labor movement "from below"? With homework – and, more broadly, low-wage women's service sector work, informal sector work, and self-employment – exploitation comes from many sides: capitalists, subcontractors, the state, husbands and fathers, children, families, clients, "third parties," and workers themselves. This is even more the case for unpaid domestic labor: for example, Fortunati's argument for domestic labor's contiguous role in the extraction of surplus value, and the counter-argument, still in the realm of value-production, that houseworkers who reproduce labor don't directly produce surplus value: since labor is not value, it cannot be produced as value. This presents something of a paradox for classical Marxian theory, where one should always theorize value in the minimal terms of the socially necessary labor required to produce it. Where labor *doesn't require reproduction*, i.e. where it is always in excess, or as I have argued (with a view to general economy), where it is a heterological gift or expenditure,[96] there arises the paradoxical condition or possibility of an infinite production, an utterly *value-less* infinite production: "zero-work" (cf. Caffentzis 1997).

The Value of "This Home Work" and Class Formation

In chapters one and two, I attempted to show how in explaining the resurgence of homework, one needed to look at the sexual division of labor, and specifically women's unpaid household labor, to see how and why wage-earning work increasingly finds its way into the home – and how this is typically a many-sided strategy. As writers such as Johanna Brenner (2000) are quite clear about, it is theoretically insufficient and politically mistaken to argue that women's domination and domestication are principally the effects of ideology. She shows how sexual "inequality" as measured by pay and hours of work, domestic labor, economic "status," property ownership, and so on, rather than an ideological effect, is an effect of ongoing social divisions of labor which practically and materially link women, as sexually divided labor, with biological and social reproduction (Brenner 2000, Chapter 1). One would have to take note of the thousands of popular women's magazine articles on so-called "supermoms" with full-time caregiving and income-earning practices to see how the time and value dilemmas of simultaneous earning and reproducing – what Arlie Hochschild (1997) has called the "time bind" – typically get resolved with powerful truisms like, "you don't have to choose between work and family, you can do it all!" Analysis of contemporary women's magazines leads to the unmistakable conclusion that there is no more powerful ideology around than what is "in practice": in the beginning there were women working eighty hours a week, *then* there were "supermoms."

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[96] This may be the closest approximation to Bataille's notion of the 'part maudit' or accursed share, i.e. the surplus which must be utterly spent, sacrificed, or otherwise given away.

A corresponding change in the turbulent framework of post-thermodynamic capitalism is that in the United States and elsewhere, homework, in an increasing number of sectors, is now situating housework at the site of value-production, reversing the charge of homework grounded in the sexual division of labor and patriarchy. Sherry Ahrentzen's (1992) cultural study of home-based work bears this subtle, but eminently "non-ideological" shift out:

> After completing a 2-hour interview, a homeworker hesitated when I got up to leave. "I must tell you," she said, "working at home has made me a housewife." Her husband and teenage children do not see her as "working" since she does not display the exterior signs of professional work, that is, she does not dress up and go out....Because her family sees her at home all day, they now expect her to do all the housework. When she tells friends she works at home, they exclaim that she now must be able to get all her household chores done. She complains. (Ahrentzen 1992: 131)

In South and East Asia, where structural adjustment policies have increased women's home-based labor and production across the board, household labor remains more or less what it used to be before taking up homework, that is to say home-based work in no way diminishes the burden of domestic labor (Balakrishnan 2002). There is, of course, no simple or total reversal of this force. The point I want to make here is that in the structurally-adjusted juxtaposition of housework and homework, home-based labor articulates domestic labor with the form and substance of value production, even while the magnitude of housework remains more or less immeasurable. Homework, in this context, could be seen as a more direct *valorization* of housework than the patriarchal "family wage" ever was. Of course, this defies the singular critique against viewing domestic labor in terms of surplus value production – i.e. housework cannot obey the law of value in quantitative terms, precisely because in capitalist terms it cannot be measured and therefore has to remain secret in capitalist production, in the privatized space of the "natural forces of social labor."[97] The corresponding theme in empirical sociological studies of housework is that even when you can measure it, as an increasing number of time-use studies (including some homework studies) are attempting, one is still left with the task of explaining housework in "exchange" terms such as value, that "simple, contentless thing" that still exercises the ghosts of two centuries of political economy.[98]

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[97] This was Paul Smith's argument, at any rate, in "Domestic Labor and Marx's Theory of Value," in Kuhn and Wolpe (1978). What Smith guessed wrong there, other than that Marx's critique of bourgeois political economy wasn't itself related to the gendered socialist practice of the day, was that there was nothing to pin women's domestic labor to their own wage earning. That is, he completely forgot or foreclosed the modernist juxtaposition of not only economic and symbolic production (á la Levi-Strauss), but also the modernist juxtaposition of paid outwork and other forms of women's and children's home-based labor with unpaid domestic labor, as Marx described it! I was reminded of this latter point by Dan Moshenberg. See Moshenberg (forthcoming [b]).

[98] For one such sociological survey, see Julie Brines (1993), who in the end opts for a position well short of a theory of value, but well within the orbit of liberal feminism, in which framework it appears sufficient to argue that housework is, in the final analysis, a matter of gender performance. This is quite different from Saba Gul Khattak's analysis in Balakrishnan 2002, in which, citing data from a homeworker study in Karachi, she concluded "there is some logic to women's preference to staying home," because child mortality rates were significantly higher for informal sector workers employed outside the home than for home-based workers. In this instance, value, in one of its most concrete forms, i.e. human survival, is a long (though certainly not unconnected) way from gender performance, since as Khattak continues, "the same study also states that children of home-based women workers have fewer chances of attending school…in all probability home-based women workers' children are child workers, assisting their mothers in home-based work." See Saba Gul Khattak, "Subcontracted Work and Gender Relations: The Case of Pakistan," in Balakrishnan 2002, p. 44.

The political implication of much of the work on value in the context of domestic labor, however, bears out the "simple, contentless truth" that even if it produces value, domestic labor still doesn't constitute a class subject in restrictive terms of Marxist political economy.[99]

A more nuanced school of thought on the question of the value of domestic labor, with direct relation to theories of class formation, has loosely gathered around the work of scholars associated with the journal *Rethinking Marxism*. These writers have collaborated in producing several volumes that broaden the discussion on class formation as a struggle over time and value—in the home and elsewhere. For this loosely configured school of revisionist Marxism, *class formation* refers less to surplus value and more to the production, appropriation, and distribution of *surplus labor*. In their effort to rethink Marxism, they are obliged to go beyond Marx, who highlighted those class processes in the production and appropriation of surplus labor more or less exclusively in the expanded form of waged, industrial commodity production. That is to say, in Marx's restrictive economy of the labor theory of value, the sales clerk who earns the minimum wage selling clothing for a profit-making retailer technically was not producing *surplus value*, while the homeworkers who stitched the garments were. I do not want to lose sight of this methodological distinction, even while shifting theory to value-production in multiple sites of labor, including sites of production and distribution, as the Rethinking Marxism (RM) group does for, among other sites, the household (Fraad et al. 1994; Gibson-Graham et al. 2000).

While they are intent on rethinking class-based politics, the RM writers are equally interested in moving beyond *a priori* theoretical categories, identities and formulations, particularly those related to value and class (Gibson-Graham et al. 2000: 9-10). While a number of issues are raised by their rethinking, two elements of an overall argument about class interest me above all: one, that in focusing on the production and circulation of surplus labor, they radically shift the labor theory of value; and two, that multiple class (domestic, capitalist, communist, feudal, etc.) processes simultaneously co-exist in a structured social overdetermination. The theory of social overdetermination, drawn from Freudian psychoanalysis by Althusser in the 1960s and taken up in the decades that followed by a variety of Marxist-inspired cultural studies, suggested that the social and political articulation (or in psychoanalytic terms, the "suturing") of multiple "class" processes (including the social production of race, gender, sexuality, and nation, for example) is more central in terms of arresting and altering social and political change than the traditional class struggle over the industrial wage and control of the work process. That is, capital and labor are not the only, or at times, even the most important, determinants of the complex arrangements of power, contestation, and control in modern societies "structured in dominance" (Hall 1986).

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[99] See, for example, Seecombe 1980 for an early iteration of this argument.

In the previous chapter, I discussed the cybernetic reordering of entropic labor as "vital turbulence" in the aftermath of the "work/energy crisis" and suggested that, following the trail of the gift, we look at the relationships of force which launch exchange. My premise is that in the turbulent order of globalization, the control of the (sexual, international, home-based) flows of an ever-expanded textuality of value, to use Spivak's formulation, becomes the most important task for capitalists seeking class control. The so-called "race to the bottom" in which subcontracted labor is reduced to the lowest possible exchange value is nothing new for capital, which continues to depend on incalculable gifts of time that must appear precisely not as time, or anything measurable, but as duty or, especially in its increasingly financialized form, debt. Whether we think of this as the payment of the claim on future labor, i.e. the debt to capital, or as "labor of love," i.e. the powerfully configured obligation to home, children, loved ones, family, "community," and so on, we are obliged to think through the ethics of the gift in the restrictive political economy of home-based labor. Focusing on the production, appropriation and distribution of surplus household labor, the RM group draws our attention to the site – both a space and temporal "non-place" – of the "invisible" flows of labor that home-based labor researchers, among others, have been documenting over the past two decades.

Drawing on Marx's restrictive distinction between necessary and surplus labor, where necessary labor is the labor required to reproduce one's own subsistence (already, we have seen, a methodological aporia), the RM group creates an opening to the complex theorizing of class relations and interactions within households and between households, the state, capitalist and other enterprises. As commentators to *Bringing It All Back Home* (Fraad et al. 1994) suggest, it is not clear whether the RM authors' multi-class model of household-state relations altogether succeeds in the account of post-1973 class struggles in the United States.[100] As Spivak hopefully acknowledges in her introduction, whether the authors fully succeed in the space of that book doesn't matter so much, since the point of theorizing the "feudal" (or communist) household, as they put it, is not to pin the household to a particular historical mode of production, but to rethink the *approach* to historical modes of production inaugurated by Marx and Engels, the dominant reading of which highlighted a progressive passage from one dominant mode of production to another, more advanced one (Fraad et al 1994: ix-xvi). The orthodox reading of Marx and Engels, particularly in the Second International, was inclined to viewing social and political progress as more or less determined in the modern period by intensified factory worker and party struggle against the state and capital. It was not inclined to see how factory workers might occupy more than one, or sometimes opposed, modes of production (a capitalist one at work, a feudal one at home, for example), nor how the interactions between modes might influence the otherwise privileged struggle on the factory floor, itself a metonym for sociality *tout court*. Far from superceding the feudal mode of production, the RM authors theorize the household as a principal site of ongoing class relations in which male wage workers, with the legalistic backing of the state and the normative support of patriarchy, command the surplus labor of housewives: "feudal lords" in an era of capitalism.

Given Fortunati's (1995) argument that women's unpaid household labor is indirectly waged labor and therefore constitutes a class relationship between housewives and capitalist mediated by male wage workers, yet another theory of household labor may appear unnecessary. However, I would agree with its commentators that the discussion of multiple modes of production (and, more importantly, their articulation) in *Bringing It All Back Home* shouldn't be read as an alternative explanatory theory or model, good or bad. Rather, I would argue that it accomplishes something that earlier Marxist-feminist theorizing rarely attempted: an alternative theory of class formation based on household surplus labor and the articulation of multiple modes of production. In differentiating the Marxist category of class internally and looking at its total composition in macro-economic analysis, they simultaneously differentiate it externally, suggesting we theorize

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[100] See "Debating the Marxist-Feminist Interpretation of the Household," in Fraad et al. 1994: 42-87.

class beyond the confines of both existing political-economic and cultural categories as well as the "dominant mode of production." Theorizing class in multiple sites of the production, appropriation and distribution of surplus labor as the RM writers variously do – including self-appropriative domestic labor, for example – Marx's restrictive economic distinction between necessary and surplus labor gives way to the turbulent excesses of the flows of value in contemporary United States society. As Jenny Cameron remarks in *Class and Its Others*:

> ...the feminine domestic subject is the agent of change bringing about a transformation in domestic class processes...To represent women as acting political subjects rather than victims who are acted upon, and households as sites of a diverse range of class processes rather than just a single traditional class process, is to constitute fluidity in the economic and political terrain and to multiply the possibilities for transformation in the domestic situation. (Gibson-Graham et al.: 60)

A key element of the challenge of rethinking class along the lines proposed by the RM writers is to collapse class as a category and rewrite it as both a metaphor and process. This deconstructive move has the additional charge of immediately linking class to sex and race. For if the force or power of class derives from the production, appropriation and distribution of surplus labor (including domestic labor) on the one hand, and the articulation of differential modes of production, on the other, then it would be more or less contingent upon us to theorize class really very differently from the past, where political economic privileging of the subject of Fordist wage-work and male breadwinning mirrored the burly proletarian struggles in the "streets and in the suites." As Cameron notes in *Class and Its Others*, "...domestic labor and gendered becomings in households are always already instances of difference." It would come as no surprise if, as representatives of class-as-such, domestic labor and "gendered becomings in households" were to disturb the sleep of the grumpy old men of Marxism and "class struggle" past and present. What would be a surprise, however, is if, while rejecting domestic labor and gendering as stand-ins for class, Marxists somehow managed to keep "class" as a veiled stand-in for domestic labor and gendering.

Such an analysis of household surplus labor offers a tremendous resource in theorizing the flows of value in neoliberal global hegemony. Homework, at the base (but not the end) of the long chains of value production, is rooted in international sexual divisions of labor which simultaneously position women as houseworkers and caregivers, primary income earners, and wage workers, community "servants" and voluntary workers, in the rapid economic deterioration flowing from structural adjustment. The 1970s revolts of women and feminists in the U.S. and Europe – from housework, sexual reproduction, and sexual subordination – were recuperated in Asia, Africa and Latin America with out-migration of domestic servants, child adoption services, and the proliferation of sex tourism, as well as home-based service and industrial labor of all other kinds (Parrenas 2001).

Thus, surplus household labor is, *par excellence*, an international figure and phenomenon, the mobilization of which differs widely both between and within the structurally adjusted debtor countries of the South and creditor nations such as the U.S.

Such differences require international historical analyses that might nevertheless draw on the insights of the specifically *class* analysis presented here. For if the claim on surplus labor, including surplus household labor, is what drives class processes forward, then the articulation of international surplus labor would clearly be on the agenda of an international capitalist class. House and homework in South Asia, for instance, differs considerably from home-based child care in the United States. However, they both rely on one form or another of sexual and ethno-racial division of surplus labor to position women's time and work at home and produce value for neo-liberal capital in ways home-based workers are not only conscious of (to reference an altogether different discourse of class politics and history), but in ways they are resistant to. And in this space, consciousness of resistance, and resistance to forgetting, while not the same thing, may be thought of in the (domestic) economy of the same.

The commodification of home-based child care, and the emerging politics of child care provider organizing in the United States – the limited but important example I have presented here – should certainly be understood in the context of (the unacknowledged debt of) massively accumulated wealth in post-industrial societies produced in part, as we have seen, from the home-based production of value flowing Northwards. Bracketing this, the question remains of how the "gift of time" of child care, once refused as "free time" in the wake of its state-controlled commodification, will be politically controlled. From the top of the political structure, emerging policy calls in the United States for universal child care are one step in charting the direction of the future class politics of home-based labor.[101] The experience of the Unity Campaign in Virginia gives some indication, however, of other political openings enabled, in this case, by "bottom-up" organizing. There, child care providers have refused not only the "de-valuation" of their labor through continuing efforts to increase rates of reimbursement ("value for services") and gain formal employment benefits such as health insurance; they have refused the elements of the top-down and punitive state control of their work, community and labor organization, and homes; and they have seized another political initiative in their call, and preliminary efforts, for autonomous, worker-led education and training.

In linking their home-based labor to worker, community, and ultimately, child education and organizing, the specifically African American and immigrant child care providers of the Unity Campaign launch their giving of time – understood at least in part as the "call to service" and "love of children" – into an expanding general economy of violent flows, circulation, and extraction of value. In this sense, I would have to disagree with otherwise interesting commentators on the political economy of the gift such as Frow (1997), who argues that the gift is *structurally* insignificant in late capitalist societies:

> [A] concept of the public good grounded in the category of the inalienable gift cannot be applied in any direct way to the social. The state is not a 'gift' domain because its forms of sociability do not involve the magical and dangerous ties of personal obligation; obligation at this level is an abstract matter. Nor of course is the market a domain of the gift, both because it is built on the price mechanism

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[101] See Whitebook and Eichberg 2002. It should be noted that in Rhode Island, the success of DARE's health insurance campaign for child care providers was strengthened at least in part by expansion of the

> and because, like the state, its working are complex, impersonal, and abstract. In any strict sense, the concept of the gift is irrelevant to the structural understanding of modern societies, with the exception of the micro-level of everyday life. (Frow 1997: 216-17)

As we have seen in Yang's (2000) political economic study of Wenzhou Province, the market is certainly a domain of the gift: there, ritual expenditure of wealth "launches production," in the increasingly capitalist market-place of "socialism with Chinese characteristics." And somewhat closer to "home," it is not so clear to me that child care provision in the United States, especially home-based child care, is merely a phenomenon at the "micro-level of everyday life," a formulation that has the nineteenth-century ring of "natural forces of social labor." This is indeed surprising, given Frow's partial reliance on Annette Weiner's (1992) anthropological work on the gift, in which Weiner understands the "inalienable possession" of the gift as the power or *mana* produced in the "enchainment" of the circulating gift (typically a textile produced by women). Indeed, Frow cites Weiner in this context:

> Here is where we locate women's exclusive role: it is in the rituals surrounding human reproduction and cloth production where women gain control over mana which, in turn, gives them a domain of authority and power in their own right. And here, also, we locate the source of the 'spirit of the gift.' (Weiner 1992: 50, cited by Frow 1997: 113-14)

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state subsidized child care market by making child care an income-based entitlement.

I am arguing, then, that it is a political (if not also methodological) mistake not to see in organized home-based child care labor the "spirit of the gift" in which women specifically gain control over "mana" understood as power. For is it not the case that the sometimes "magical," sometimes "fierce" love (which we know also to be a labor) of a mother, and a child care provider, has a certain power in society that extends beyond the micro-level of everyday life? The local and global histories and politics of home-based work – as well as, for example, "reproductive rights" in a related, but different way – suggest that they do. Indeed, I am arguing that the "provision" (and here, finally, this term assumes its general economic weight) of child care – an area of immense "biopolitical," and in this sense economic, power – is not all-enclosed, or best understood, by relations of exchange and commodification. This, of course, does not imply that all women find in providing child care "a domain of authority and power in their own right," but it does mean that the women who are increasingly struggling over their time will find a place or a situation (in the case I have presented, the local appendages of the ex-welfare state) where control rests not so much on abstract exchange or money, upon which Marx built his analysis, as in the "need *not* to relinquish the things which are the object of most intense desire," including the children in their care.[102] At the point of this powerfully organized and contested desire, the impossibility of the theoretical measure of the "value" of domestic and home-based labor gives way to a "value beyond value," situated in the complex macro and micro-levels of social and biological reproduction.

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[102] See Frow 1997: 129. Frow also cites Margaret Jane Radin, "Market-Inalienability" *Harvard Law Review* 100:8, 1987, pp. 1849-1937. This article came to my attention too late to address here.

Affective Labor, Value and Power

In "Value and Affect," Antonio Negri (1999) argues that nowadays, labor-power is situated in a "non-place" *vis-à-vis* capital. In classical political economy, the extraction of value from surplus labor produced a measurable profit, which reintroduced into productive circulation became capital. However, in a time when money has "broken free" of production (e.g. the 1999 Asian and 2001 Argentinian financial crises), exchange value (the wage) and surplus value (capitalist profit) are, according to Negri, being recast as measures of value. "Money is no longer the product of a regime of exchange (between capital and more or less subjectivized labor-power) but the production of a regime of exchange." In this "postmodern" political economy, the labor theory of value has been "transfigured into monetary theory—constructed on the horizon of globalization, organized by imperial command." (Negri 1999: 82) As others have remarked, and as we saw in the theory of the "work/energy crisis," in high-tech capitalist regimes, value has been thoroughly unhinged from the labor which might otherwise have been thought to produce it (Midnight Notes 1992). The use-value of "information" (which cannot be measured in any case), to return to some of the arguments in Chapter Four (e.g., information as the "positive valuation" of entropy), makes its appearance in the networked global capitalist economy as the infinite productivity of genetically engineered bio-reproduction and the artificial elaboration of the female "body without organs" (Parisi and Terranova 2000). In contrast to the woolly commodities of Marx's time (and still, of course, our own), the information commodity isn't produced and then used up once and for all. Its value, well beyond any measure of production, accrues in its continuing, expanded (and, indeed, uncertain, indeterminate and turbulent) flows of and towards productive reproduction *tout court*.

With the commodification of child care, something bought and sold in and on (the margins of) this thoroughly self-reproducing market, we see something remarkably similar: surpassing the necessary/surplus labor distinction, child care labor-power poses itself as "value beyond value." But why, or how is this? For the moment, I wish only to draw the comparison between the production of information and the provision of child care in order to bring us closer to Negri's arguments regarding the theory of value, which in these and other (but not all) cases is a product of the production, appropriation and distribution of "labor-power-in-surplus" in a wholly different form than classical political economy theorized, or as Negri famously put it, as a case of "Marx beyond Marx." In the "Fragment on Machines" of *Grundrisse*, Marx (1973) gestured to the emerging, transformative element of this hyper-extended form of human labor power. Subsequently, some today discuss the workers of the new information economy in terms of their "immaterial labor," where surplus labor time refers precisely to what cannot be measured in the classical terms of surplus value and the product of their labor as something whose value, too, is incalculable (Terranova 2000; Negri and Hardt 2000). Negri has for three decades documented in elaborate analytical form the phased class transition from what he termed the "mass worker" of Fordist-Keynesianism, to the rise of the "social worker" and "social wage" in the advancing social and technoscientific "cooperation" of multinational capitalism, to the "immaterial labor" of the multitudes flowing full stream through a thoroughly bio-politicized "empire" of capital (Negri, 1988; Negri and Hardt 2000; Red

Notes 1979). I return to the "non-place" of child care labor in these arguments in a moment.

Of course, by "non-place of labor-power,"[103] Negri does not mean that labor has no place in capitalism, or that it is a kind of virtual or vanishing force in post- or "super-"modernity. On the contrary, by "non-place" he means, like Augé in a different context, that labor-power really cannot be measured any more by restrictive political economy, that "labor power" is now so completely subsumed in capitalism (as Marx theorized it would be), that capital less and less confronts its limits in labor. "The criterion that allowed for [labor's] control, through measure," Negri writes, "was its relative independence." Today, that independence, according to Negri, is no more.[104] By the same token, the political and monetary forces that commanded labor in the Keynesian regime, as Caffentzis showed, have dissipated to the point that finance has become unhinged from production, with the state itself securing less and less monetary credit. Nowadays, interest rate changes in the U.S. Federal Reserve and European Central Bank are more carefully monitored and manipulated than productivity figures. With the emergence of global financialization, "labor-power is presented in mobile and interchangeable, material and immaterial aggregations (or subjectivities), the production power of which is organized according to mechanisms of mobilization (and/or of segregation, segmentation, and so on)," and no longer as the measure of value or productivity. At the same time, Negri argues, "labor-power is presented as the social fabric, as population and culture, traditions and innovation, and so forth—in short, its productive force is exploited within the processes of social reproduction." (Negri 1999: 83).

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[103] The theme of the "non-place" returns for a third time in Deleuze's analysis of "power" in Foucault, which I note in chapter six.

[104] I am not entirely won over to this argument, for reasons that will appear below; for now, let us simply note that in those micro-places where capital no longer needs "labor," indeed where labor is "let to die," it may still be forced to confront the countervailing power of new measures of human survival, some extremely pertinent to the (very different) fundamentals of what we're calling the gift economy, including domestic labor and progressive philanthropy.

Thus, for Negri, the "non-place of labor power" refers in its own way to the expansiveness of the production, appropriation and distribution of surplus *reproductive* labor globally, where we know that with slightest bit of "turbulence," capital's subcontractors will pack up and leave home-based workers in a flash, in search of other (cheaper, 'more flexible,' more favorably organized, 'more cooperative') home-based labor in another home, village, region, country, or continent.[105] Capitalist globalization, as David Harvey (1990) and Sassia Sasken (1988) showed over a decade ago, has reached a non-linear point of more or less instantaneous local and global mobility. Its extensiveness in this sense has taken the form of an intensification of the social and communal forms of development that link productive and reproductive forces: for example, the huge labor increases in the educational, information and service sectors, the subcontracting of numerous social services, and home-based labor of all kinds, which Negri and Hardt collectively term "immaterial labor" (2000: 292-93). As I have been attempting to show, it is no coincidence that homework is to be found on multiple sides (local and global, South and North, productive and reproductive) of these shifts, and that the homeworker is a paradigmatic figure for globalized capitalism today (Spivak 1999). Thus, the capitalist subsumption of so many "alien" forms of labor – Negri cites "the social capacity of reproduction, the productive surplus of cooperation, the 'small-scale circulation,' [i.e. gift economy] the new needs and desires produced by the struggles" (Negri 1999: 82) – has led to a situation where, at least in the high-tech creditor economies, virtually all work, including unpaid labor, is either directly or indirectly waged work, and the antagonistic distinction between necessary and surplus labor which he discussed at length in *Marx Beyond Marx* has effectively broken down. The place of the international divide of labor, that is if there still is any, remains somewhat obscure in this latter analysis.

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[105] For the thousands of small-scale capitalists roaming the globe in the service of large-scale capitalists as well as their own profit, labor is literally everywhere, or when refused as such, "anyplace but here." In the paradigmatic case I have been examining throughout, there is still "no-place" like home. Cf. Balakrishnan 2002.

What has transformed the antagonism, according to Negri (clearly gesturing to global feminist critique but less so, I would argue, to global women workers in subcontracted homework) is the production of value as affect "from below." One lesson of *Marx Beyond Marx* was that value linked prices and profits immediately to social conflict and political crisis, in line with Caffentzis' analysis of the work/energy crisis (Negri 1991: 63f). With the work of "affective labor" in the era of structural adjustment, however, Negri theorizes for us a fundamental disjunction between the "cost" and the "price" of reproduction (like child care) in places like the United States and United Kingdom. And while control over the surplus of labor time may have something to do with the price of child care, there is still no adequate measure of its cost, much as home-based workers worldwide realize as they pay their energy bill. "Affect," as the gift of time in the domain of control and authority over children, may be incalculably producing value – but, like housework, it must not appear as such. Someone, usually at home, must "pay," somewhere. So how is the "child care crisis" produced or responded to here? In the biopolitical subject-formation of the global homeworker and home-based child care provider? And what about homeworkers' struggles over their own wage/piece rate, employment benefits, regularity and hours of work...and their own "employees" (cf. Parrenas 2001)? The next generation of politically organized responses would appear to have to shift the burden for self-valorization of surplus labor from variable capital (the simple, contentless wage form) to a combined and expanded form of affective labor economy: time for the kids, time for study, time for shopping, time for work, time for sex, time for cleaning, time for caring, etc. That is, a more or less continuous struggle over time which generally appears, or is generally posed, in a "non-place" of value-affect like home.

There is certainly no question that the "home" is such a non-place of limitless value production, but what is gained or lost by seeing the value incalculably produced in the home as "affect"? One thing that is gained is a way into seeing how home-based labor, in particular, "gratuitously" constitutes capital (and itself) – in both the high- and low-organic sectors of capital.[106] In Negri and Hardt's (2000) recent work, however, "affective value" comes to stand in for value as such, and I would argue that this intriguing move also must forget what in a general economic sense is "given" in the specifically sexual (and racial) economy of affect-time. With the production of "value beyond value" or "measureless value," and/or where domestic labor rises from the field of global class struggle, in another frame, one may indeed be seeing the leading edges of social transformation inside the empire of capital. Yet "affective labor" is a double-edged sword. In the Fordist-Keynesian era of the "mass worker," as we have seen, there was never any abstract or statistical measure of value for the "purely" reproductive labor of child care, for instance, other than the workingman's "socially necessary labor." The scission of value from measure (if there ever was any real measure given the hidden labor-power of the domestic economy) was always already affective inside the developing states of capitalist sociality, especially as it related to the micro-level of power, which was also always being sought on a macro-level by the combined political forces of "biopower" (Foucault 1979). There is ample documentation, as we have seen, of the changing social norms, not to mention "biopolitics," around nineteenth century housing, education, philanthropy, child care, and marriage, for instance, which were increasingly tied in to the abstract value-measures of labor, even as they were directly mobilized by and for governmental security apparatuses (Donzelot 1979). By the turn of the twentieth century, if not earlier, a robust science of home economics was created around the household whose primary explicit purpose was to increase the productivity of domestic labor (Ehrenreich and English 1979; Hayden 1984). What we see in the theory of affect-value is a reversal of the charge in sexually (and, given mass migrancy, internationally) divided labor time. As in the ritual economy, where women's gift of time must be forgotten, and therefore the supposed prestige, sacrifice, and obligation that were to accompany *her* gift, according to Mauss, also effaced (Weiner 1992), so apparently in the theory of value-affect. It bears repeating that "women's work" has long invested "universal" wage and value production not only with work and energy, but with affect and desire too. And although Negri and Hardt do gesture in *Empire* to this, there remains the troubling prospect elsewhere that the well-educated artisans and radical biopoliticians

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[106] This, in part, reproduces Terranova's (2000) argument about immaterial labor in the digital economy, although interestingly, she doesn't make the connection to the vast "non-place" of home-based and domestic labor.

of the digital economy will not only "forget," in the political/policy realm, but continue to exploit, in the domestic realm, the continuing "gifts" of "their" care workers.[107]

In this sense, Negri is correct that value-affect should be properly understood as the "path from affect to value," and not the other way around (Negri 1999: 84). Even more important, he argues, along the path from affect to value, "affect" appears as "multitudinous" forms of power – to transform, appropriate and expand on multiple ontological planes which are not anymore oppositional forms in the old "workers of the world" sense, but "omnilateral" and anti-dialectical forms of power, viz. "biopower":

> The relationship between production and life has thus been altered such that it is now completely inverted with respect to how the discipline of political economy understands it. Life is no longer produced in the cycles of reproduction that are subordinated to the working day; on the contrary, life is what infuses and dominates all production. In fact, the value of labor and production is determined deep in the viscera of life. Industry produces no surplus except what is generated by social activity—and this is why, buried in the great whale of life, value is beyond measure. (Negri and Hardt 2000: 365)

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[107] "Affective labor is better understood by beginning from what feminist analyses of 'women's work' have called 'labor in the bodily mode' (Negri and Hardt 2000: 293). Cf. Franco Berardi's *Fabbrica dell'Infelicità. New Economy e movimento del cognitario* (Genoa: 2001), where, if I understand correctly, "Bifo" argues that the global "cybertariat" is the paradigmatic figure of class struggle in the new economic era, and that the "marginalized workers" the Italian autonomists had long spoken of – housewives, informal sector workers, sweatshop workers, migrant workers, women workers, etc. – in short, "labor in the bodily mode," remain just that, marginal. Certainly, one cannot fault Negri and Hardt for another's analysis, particularly since their notion of "multitudes" does not, in theory, privilege sexes, generations, or sectors. However, more must be learned about what specific new practices inform the theory of multitudes. Child care and domestic worker organizing certainly are good places to start, but so far, this movement has yet to even partially captivate the Social Forum and anti-capitalist scenes in the U.S., which are in many

As we have said, this much was known, from the nineteenth century standpoint of value, by women who worked at home for nothing, such as the one whom I cited at the beginning of this chapter. And thus, my argument throughout this work has been that, "women's work" is that sustained historical example of "zero-work" (of value production beyond value) which capital has continuously sought to "colonize," "discipline" and subsume in the sense of the "old" (but certainly not *passé*) imperialist and patriarchal orders, and which today it seeks increasingly to control in the turbulent super-expansiveness of "home."

So what about the place of "class" in this recent deconstruction of political economy and value by Negri and Hardt? A more or less continuous theme in Negri's earlier writing was the dialectical cycle between the dissipation of the law of value (i.e. the rise of the "social worker," "mass intellectuality," and "immaterial labor") and the recomposition of antagonistic classes (Negri 1988; Red Notes 1979). As new class forms emerged, social and political organization likewise took multiple and new forms. By the time of the *Labor of Dionysus* (Negri and Hardt 1994), this was already transpiring (through a critique of modern and postmodern juridical theories, in particular that of Rawls) into a flattening out of these once "revolutionary" antagonisms and an extension of the notion of power to more broadly configured forms of ontologically transformative political subjectivity, or what they have termed "constituent power." Nick Dyer-Witheford (1994) noted critiques of Negri's earlier work that exploit the very anti-universalism of his approach: that his analysis is narrowly focused on the high-organic sectors of capital, that it neglects low-wage workers of many kinds, that it fails to

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problematic (and decisive) ways "manned" by well-networked cybertariats and their list-serves. By way of this, I am referring to a rather different aspect of the so-called "digital divide."

theorize what is happening to historic sexual, racial and international labor divisions.[108] He concludes that:

> Heightened tendencies toward segmentation of the workforce are, in Negri's analysis, a basically *reactive* strategy of neo-liberal capital against the equalitarian potentials resident within highly socialised labour-power, a 'divide and conquer' gambit that assumes increasingly arbitrary, destructive, and fantastic features the more it runs counter to the practical dependence of production on widely distributed and interlinked pools of knowledge and communication. In speaking of the socialised worker he is identifying not so much a given or fully achieved level of class solidarity, as a potential which capital is striving to hold down - an axis of struggle *against* segmentation and dualisation, the basis for a political project of recomposition. (Dyer-Witheford 1994: 111-12)

If it is the case in the thoroughly biopolitical production of Empire that value is now to be found in the production, precisely, of "life," then indeed it makes sense to see 24-hour-working-men- and-women of all races across national, cultural, linguistic, and "desiring" lines as the undivided potential, the biopower, which capital is at once exploiting and struggling to control (Moshenberg 2002). But how does this look from inside the reproductive "home" of biopower? If the figure of the homeworking woman, the mother, the domestic worker displaces the normativity of gender so efficiently that "gender" remains merely a residual effect of unequal time appropriation, and vice versa, how in turn, are we to understand differently what is "domestic violence," for example in the physical disappearances (by abduction and murder) of Mexican home-based, migrant and sex workers, i.e. "labor in the bodily mode," along the U.S.-Mexican frontier? As Melissa Wright makes clear in her studies of this highly mysterious, but central aspect of the high-tech maquiladorization of that border, with the fundamental multivalence at the core of Marx's discussion of value production, situated precisely in the sexual division of labor, "value" takes precedence not so much through forgetting that "sex" or affect (e.g. prostitution, domestic labor, marriage, etc.) produces value, but through forgetting that women specifically are killed, disappeared, violated, "domesticated" and "devalued" because of their sex and relationship to work.[109] Thus, there is enormous value made in the "whale of death," too, disappearances of female biopower that, in the very contemporary circulation of "value-affect," are premised on the calculation that neoliberal economic development is attainable by forgetting and erasing the violent sexual and racial divisions (and disappearances) which materially and discursively "underwrite" and insure it. Is there not a difference, as well as a different meaning of "class," between *those* workers and the genderless dot-com proletariats given millions to come up with new ways to exploit the biopower of the super-networked, high-security, high-consuming homes of multi-racial America?

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[108] It seems less urgent to note Alain Lipietz's (1987) objection to Negri's work – that it constitutes a 'headlong rush into voluntarist fantasy' – after the "multitudinous" events such as those literally surrounding the 2001 conference of the G8 in Genoa and 2002 EU conference in Barcelona. This would

I would continue to argue that the divisions of labor, and division of "labors," such as they are, are not principally capital's concern, although it certainly does exploit

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require greater experience of the social, sexual, racial and cultural composition, if you will, of the "Tute Bianchi," to give just one example, than I have.

[109] Melissa Wright, "Sex Work, Value, and Female Disappearance in Ciudad Juarez," paper presented at CUNY Graduate Center, March 15, 2002.

and intensify them at every opportunity. Rather, I think that what these divisions point to is a necessary vigilance in organizing on the inside (the "household," for example) of "biopower," which, if I understand Negri and Hardt correctly, doesn't really "tend" towards social unification and cooperation, as much as create the material conditions over and over for "class solidarity," "constituent power," and the transformative activities of today's biopoliticized "multitudes." If this is true, affective labor, labor "in the bodily mode," not only bears remembering; it creates the conditions for what is meant by "organizing" in the era of welfare reform, and other instances of international structural adjustment.

Chapter Six – The Politics of Homework in the Era of Structural Adjustment

Any policy aimed at eliminating the wage gap between men and women is likely to have limited results if a continuous restructuring of the labor process creates new labor hierarchies and places women at the lower end. (Benería and Roldán, *The Crossroads of Class & Gender*)

I begin with this quotation to reiterate implications of arguments in the previous chapters. Both in classical political economy and neo-Marxist political economy, the subject of home-based laboring is predicated partially in theoretical terms. In practice, "women's work," especially what we have been calling domestic labor, is subsumed, visibly and "invisibly," in the formation of the "working-class" and labor subject. Drawn to the "hidden" structure of unpaid domestic labor, capital, governments and local and global agencies of development seek to exploit and control the rapidly expanding informal labor force of women, particularly, although not exclusively, in the "global South."

Part of the attraction of home-based labor for local and global capital and their institutional allies is that the home – and its labor forces – appears a site of "infinite production." The idea of "infinite production" itself can be related back to Marx's thermodynamically inspired critique of theories of labor and value. As a variety of late-twentieth commentators on the displacement of human labor in technoscientific, information and other commodities have noted, Marx's critical theories of value-production were themselves closely tied to the technoscientific developments of the era, a time when social and political developments began to appear ever more under the guise of technology. Indeed, the nineteenth century political-economic question of whether machines could (or should) produce value was tightly linked, theoretically and practically, to what the place of women and children in production should (or could) be. Yet these questions were typically posed in the context of what we might think of today as theoretically and politically "closed systems": even then, the physical laws of thermodynamics were only thought to apply in a "closed system" of heat transfer – and industrial-age labor politics of "liberty and equality" were typically minoritarian and nationalistic. In the contemporary context of global financialization, successive waves of international migration, the commodification of "women's work," the massification of stateless refugee populations, and "open-systems" theories, the same questions take on radically different meanings. Marx's critique of political economy remains a powerful source for thinking about the *dualistic* dynamics of home-based work, about the relationship of paid to unpaid labor, of productive to "reproductive" work, of formal to informal sectors of labor, and of "public" to "private." But it is less clear how much it helps to think about the non-linear flows of production, distribution and appropriation of surplus labor time(s) in ever-expanding "glocal" systems and networks of biopolitical production (Clough 2000). With home-based work, we see the crossing of the old (yet still active) binary oppositions in a way that reveals the force of domestic labor in the "spatio-temporal fixing" of industrial, service, care, and other forms of work in the home. What is just as evident, however, is home-based labor's multi-directional, multi-valent social and political forces. The sexual, racial and international dynamics of subjective and class formation powerfully "overdetermine" the "choices" many women make –and are constrained or forced to make – to seek and continue (paid and unpaid) work at home. Yet "overdetermination" of this kind, of a society structured in domination, is, as we have seen, absolutely dependent on and attracted to the increasingly contested provision of time and "immaterial labor" of global forces of home-based and domestic workers, not merely for direct profit, but for race and gender-specific class hegemonies, some of them "global," most of them local, hegemonies which are conductive to profit-taking elsewhere.

Marxists and feminists, especially those interested in renewing the restrictive political economy of traditionally waged, entropic labor power, might find such an analysis far too molecular to be of any use. One of the reasons for this I suggested early on: the counter-politics implied by such an analysis, centered on home-based work no less, appear more "turbulent" than "revolutionary" in the old sense (although these, I would like to believe, are not mutually exclusive perspectives). But where exactly does the "turbulence" in racially, sexually, and internationally divided "class struggle" lie? The analysis I have presented suggests locating at least one source of turbulence in the gift structure of domestic labor which "homework" as both practice and perspective launches and, to a certain extent, mediates. But this, in turn, necessitates a series of further displacements. For much of the absolute and relative time of house/home work is given, as we know, to children.[110] Displacing, and deviating ever so slightly from this thought, we must acknowledge that in the home and elsewhere, children labor, too (Bachman 2000). The International Labor Organization, which takes child labor very seriously, focuses on still another forceful displacement of domestic/homework and wage labor: forced labor, which they and others locate, for example, in the extensive and profitable connections between "bonded labor," patriarchy, and local/global capital in prostitution, as well as child labor.[111] From inside the United States, one mostly hears of these connections in the form of sex tourism promotion, but it can also be seen in oil-industry dominated debates over global warming, in the sex-service industry built up in and around U.S. military bases worldwide, and in the continuous reappearance of migrant slave labor camps and sweatshops in the globalizing North, as a variety of commentators have pointed out (Devi 1995; Enloe 1989).

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[110] By way of conclusion, one should not fail to mention the better-known connotation of "homework": the often-compulsory education of desire that continues to mediate the biopolitical structures of everyday life. How to connect this kind of "homework" with child and home-based labor, remains the subject of a future work.

"Forced sex labor" isn't "housewifeization," the term Mies (1986) used to direct us to the material and ideological effects of the race and sex divisions of super-exploited labor in neo-colonialist capitalism. However, I am suggesting that "housewifeization" – so important a concept in the study of home-based work and "subsistence work" – and "forced sex labor" are possibly homologous. To see the *différance* between them, I would argue, is to see the productive crisis in the restructuring of the sexual, international and racial divisions of labor today. The point then would be to see the displacement of forced labor (including historic slavery) into homework by way not only of its spatial juxtaposition with "housework" and domestic work, but also by the share of "biopower" in global value production—indeed, Chang (1999) has shown how today's domestic workers and home health care workers from the Philippines work off their contracts in the U.S. and Europe in service, ultimately, to the IMF's structural adjustment programs.[112] This is "forced (domestic) labor migration" *at the official level.* Unofficially, the interest on the debt of migrant domestic laborers owed to the agents of the global labor trade is always growing. This debt may never be paid, as in bonded labor elsewhere.

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[111] See International Labour Office 2001. For more contextualized research, addressing the constitution of women "from below," see Devi 1995, and in different way, Kempadoo and Doezema 1998.

[112] And here one might add sex workers as well. See Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002 for a collection of essays that address this and other problems confronting the global domestic/sex labor force.

The foreclosure of the possibility of ever paying off the debt, in turn, has repercussions for thinking the difference of home-based work in the United States, and home-based work in industrializing countries of the global South. As Parrenas (2001) has noted, Filipina domestic workers in the United States must employ home-based domestic workers for their own families "back home." Thus "home-based work" is not an undivided perspective, even from the "bottom up." The implication of these points for trade unionists and organizers around the world is that "offshore assembly" and "work at home" have all the markings of "primitive accumulation": the *violent* separation of people from the means of (re)production, *prior* to the capitalist subsumption of their labor.

That is to say, specifically capitalist exchange is increasingly mediated by a great "turbulence" both at the top and bottom. The biopolitical conditions for what I have been calling the (violent) "gift economy," are being created and maintained, in a process that is leading to ever more turbulence in the multinational working-class home. The confusion embodied in this formulation no doubt has much to do with the longstanding conflation of home and empire (McClintock 1995). There is no doubt that Marx was closely concerned with this, even if he was "slagged off" by feminists and others for theorizing women's domestic labor so badly. Industrial and post-industrial workers worldwide will continually struggle over the expropriation of the "surplus value" they create, even as it may happen to define less of the political perspective and social conditions of their struggle – and debts are legally and illegally amassed elsewhere. To these well-positioned workers, more and more "the struggle" appears as one for greater state expenditure for biopolitical reproduction—social insurances of all kind, child care, health care, sexual reproduction, education and training, transportation investment, "environmental security," etc. And while to many of these, this may look a lot like "things getting worse," to others, this is the kind of turbulence that forces ethno-racially subordinated women and girls into domestic service of Empire.

With this in mind, I turn to the "struggle for biopolitical reproduction," since it continues to define so much of what formally-defined "homeworkers worldwide" confront. Following Foucault, as Negri and Hardt among others do, I am suggesting that the ethico-politics required of home-based labor organizing is located increasingly in the circuit of what Foucault called governmentality, that is between the strategies of "affective labor" power, as we have seen, and the technologies of knowledge production, domination, and subjectivity. There, what we find, beyond the global/local effects of structural adjustment, are the "chains of subcontracted production" to which organizations like HomeNet and the Unity Campaign draw our attention. "Subcontracted" precisely. Beneath, and to an ever-greater extent, inside the structural relations of the labor employment contract, there are few if any protections, laws, or regulation. This absence once emboldened theorists such as Negri and Hardt (1994) to argue that not the state, but "civil society has withered away." Yet to focus only on civil society, cosmopolitan norms, human rights, etc. would be misguided, however benevolent (Cheah 1997). Civil society stops at the border, if you will, between factory and housework, between the "social factory" and biopolitical reproduction. There are few regulations governing homework, although this may be slowly changing. There are even fewer governing "housework."[113] Family child care, domestic work, and other forms of homework are only in the last decade undergoing what might be called a "positive" reformation (in Foucault's sense of positive disciplinization), i.e. one in which homework is regarded as both desirable and able to be regulated by homeworkers themselves. The shape of this to come, which one can see in the growing practice of "time-use studies" both by policymakers and home-based labor advocates in the global South, has much to do with how "domestic labor" will be used by the practitioners and politicians seeking one form or another of "progressive social change." So far, however, such change remains off the state/civil society agendas, and much about the domestic economy remains, literally speaking, "uncivil."[114]

I am arguing, in a necessarily roundabout way, that the space of the "uncivil" – routed through "the home" – touches virtually all other domains of what many continue to misperceive as (only) state and civil society. For theorists such as Hardt and Negri, the response to the "withering away of civil society" is a recomposition of proletarian subjectivities that, as a constitutive force of society as such (what they termed "constituent biopower"), expands and re-appropriates the political not so much to reform social and political institutions, as re-shape or modulate time and place ontologies

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[113] Family and maternity leave policies, of course, are increasingly important areas of "struggle," both in sexual and class terms. Cuba likely has the most advanced regulatory protections for what I am calling "housework" here, although no doubt there are other examples.

[114] The problematic of "regulation of the home" is compounded not so much in the informal sector, where regulations are absent by definition, as in the public political sphere where legal and illegal sexual arousal can and does move mountains. In this context, one would have to cite not only the frequent frenzies around stock market gyrations but also the "feminization of war" in which, as Silvia Federici (2000) has shown, women and children are, once again, the enemies in increasingly "virtual" wars (e.g. the "low-intensity conflicts") of smart missiles, "collateral damage," genocide, and symbolic victories over violated women and children—all alongside ongoing structural adjustment. The problem isn't so much about challenging the rules of war, as about the changing perception of the place of sexual and domestic violence in warfare. Only in the wake of the Bosnian war was wartime rape criminalized. Prior to that, in the absence of legal, political, and organizational enforcement (which "technologies" have not changed very much), rape in time of war was, at most, *uncivil.*

(Witheford 1994). At a later stage, this supposedly takes the form of popular, or what they term "multitudinous," control of affect-value (Hardt and Negri 2000). My own response would be that much that isn't inside, or an immediate effect of, the state, continues to draw the state towards it, in a reversal or transversal of directions of power and cause/effect. We were used to thinking with Gramsci, for instance, of the state as the source of norms, on the one hand, and dominating power on the other (or to put it slightly differently, the state as the source of law and order). Today, we must ask, what (hegemonic and socialist) strategy was that the thinking of? What we have instead today, according to the previous chapters, is a civil society-state struggle far from "war of maneuver" or "war of position," the result of a breakdown in the absolute necessity of normativity and disciplinization (the "war of position" having been won) and the consequent intensification and extensification of policing, surveillance and control of the gradually increasing (and widening) turbulence of multiply divided, global class society.[115]

As political (e.g. "community organized") subjectivities begin to form around homework and other subcontracted work – in spite, and because of, their "underground" and "uncivil" status – it is important then to see what makes them flow – and where. If I am reading the diversely situated studies of home-based work correctly, what binds the structure of forced labor displaced in domestic labor/homework – what makes political subjectivities in this space flow – are the highly controlled technologies of "sex" and "race" both in and outside the state. At certain points, I have referred to Spivak's remark in the introduction to Mahasweta Devi's writings, that "Internalized gendering perceived as ethical choice is the hardest roadblock for women the world over. The recognition of male exploitation must be supplemented with this acknowledgement" (Devi 1995: xxviii). In the footnote to this passage, Spivak draws attention to the passage, through *differánce*, from bonded sex labor in India to homeworking in the United Kingdom, and then draws it back again (to Devi's own writing on indigenous struggles for cultural and ethnic survival). Her point, which she has pursued elsewhere (Spivak 1990, 1999), is to undo the easy teleology of benevolent organizers and movement fundraisers (such as myself) through a "persistent critique of the structures" of internationally divided labor in the home, structures which, as she put it much earlier, "we cannot not wish to inhabit." Allen and Wolkowitz (1987) too were concerned about the easy positivism and political positivity pervading discourses of homeworking in the United Kingdom – discourses which erased differences among homeworkers such as "race" as swiftly as they suggested that homework constitutes a "choice" for women among other more or less equal "opportunities." Allen and Wolkowitz demystified this kind of political "choice," partially through their own interest in child care, which highlighted in reverse one of the

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[115] Cf. Gramsci 1971: 238-39 on the transition from "war of maneuver" to "war of position." The latter, Gramsci writes, "demands enormous sacrifices by infinite masses of people. So an unprecedented concentration of hegemony is necessary, and hence a more 'interventionist' government, which will take the offensive more openly against the oppositionists and organize permanently the "impossibility" of internal disintegration—with controls of every kind, political, administrative, etc., reinforcement of the hegemonic 'positions' of the dominant group, etc. ...the 'war of position', once won, is decisive definitively." If I understand Gramsci correctly in these pages, Trotsky, the "political theorist of frontal attack," is the model revolutionary for today's control societies—but perhaps equally so from the side of the state, whose hegemony appears more or less definitively decisive. Negri and Hardt (1994), and autonomist Marxists in general, so terrifically reverse the charge of power in postmodern capitalist society, that one begins to understand how important it is that the state assume the role of its own opposition. "Control" re-opens the possibilities for wars of maneuver, which Gramsci notes, however, are never decisive in hegemonic terms, inside the state itself, and on multiple sides. This leads some in the growing

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anti-capitalist globalization movement to practice the possibilities for regional or municipal socialisms on ever-expanding scales.

issues which concerned me especially in chapter three—that child care providers are "homeworkers" too![116]

Much more can be said about biopower-centered subjectivities: one part from the point of view of a deconstructive critique that would displace the center onto its sexual and racial margins, as I have been attempting thus far—and another part from the point of view of "governmentality." Much is being made, for instance, from an uncritical version of Foucault that centers homework/housework (among other phenomena) in a traditional intellectual struggle for control over worker subjectivities.[117] What this version chooses to forget historically is that beginning in the late eighteenth century, the "spatial fixing" of the European/American home became not only a social strategy for control of laboring subjects, but a state strategy for control of laboring subjects premised on controlling sexuality and marriage, and thereby the "biopolitical field" tout court (Ehrenreich and English 1978).[118] At the same time that labor was being commodified throughout the home – especially in the correlated rise of homework and factory production – domestic labor was being coerced, policed and "civilized" into and, then inside, the home. In this respect, Donzelot (1997) was quite clear about the ensuing class divisions (although much less so about gender divisions, and not at all about "race" and colonialism). What Allen and Wolkowitz, Tuominen, and others have made clear is that the focus on class-divided homework must also always account for sexual and racial divisions (within migrancy, in particular), if it is to specify the structural (i.e. "biopolitical") forces that find in the home a place for class formation and organizing.

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[116] See Allen and Wolkowitz 1987: 273, which Spivak (see Devi 1995) also cites in this context.

[117] I would cite Felstead and Jewston (1999) as a politically dangerous instance of this. See especially pages 113-119.

[118] This should also be examined in its simultaneity – as Donzelot, for one did not do – with colonial policies of settlement, and the sexualized violence of colonial patriarchy directed at both women and men. Among the many who have done so I would cite Anne McClintock, Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, Ann Stoler, and Robert Young.

It would be a mistake to read *Discipline and Punish*, on the one hand, and Volume Three of the *History of Sexuality*, on the other, and deduce that policing was once directed from the outside and then, at a later stage of social development, internalized.[119] One must turn to Foucault's texts on "governmentality" (1979, 1999) to see how social policing became at a certain point instrumental to *self*-policing in the same way, and more or less at the same time, that "the family" became instrumental to government. The relationship of policing to self-policing, in this regard, was an inverted loop or circuit: moral education and training provided by institutional authorities required coercion and compliance, and therefore surveillance, as conditions of their effectiveness. Seeing this movement in relationship to the individual isn't only or merely a question of measurement – i.e. of value in the restrictive economic sense – but rather one of asking where does the individual begin and end in the practice of governmentality. In contemporary telework, for example, surveillance extends from the teleworker to the telework family via the telephone and networking of domestic space.[120] Everyone's at work and under control in this scenario, not least where educational homework and routine testing take on greater social and political engineering significance for the child. This means of course, that we have surpassed neither policing (indeed it is both a more potent and necessary force), nor the family. What it also means is that, since these terms are discursively and politically interrelated, the terrain of governmentality, as Foucault writes, is principled on the ongoing instrumentalization of the family, but through means that aren't only experienced as self-policing; or more narrowly and presumably at all times, governmentality is principled on control within the always turbulent family.[121] I return to this theme below.

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[119] I am not proposing, then, a literary analysis that would note first off that virtually all of Volume Three concerns texts and practices of the "self" in classical antiquity.

[120] Heather Menzies (1997) makes these general points much more politically specific in her analysis of the privatization of public communications through women's home-based telework.

To extend the same critique a bit further, to use Foucault or a Foucauldian analysis in the way in which some researchers of homework have done, requires a displacement onto the terrain of home-based and family-based sexual and gender *identities* in such a way that the use of the term "choice" in home-base work studies would have to appear differently, although still not entirely within the framework Foucault outlines for the post-Enlightenment political-ethical subject. "Internalized gendering perceived as ethical choice" becomes a technology of the self, or of the home-based laboring subject, only by subtracting it from the calculus of "the social," of "control society," or of governmentality. That is to say, the flow of politicized subjectivity through the self (in the case of homework through the powerful practice and performativity of the sexual and racial dividing of labor), becomes a successful strategy of *domination* when it succeeds in erasing the linkage to the circuitry of power that is to be found, increasingly throughout the globe, in the multi-face of what many have been otherwise calling "control" inside the network comprised by the homeworker, the state social worker, the NGO advocate, the organizer, the academic, and the policymaker (Clough 2002).

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[121] If anthropologist David Schneider was correct in 1973 in saying that class is the primary cultural characteristic of *family differentiation* in the United States, then it continues to makes sense to return, I would argue, to a (deconstructive) class analysis in the context of sex and race-divided "family labor" that is attentive to the circuits of governmentality in neoliberal capitalism. See David M. Schneider and Raymond T. Smith, *Class Differences and Sex Roles in American Kinship and Family Structure* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973).

One needs, then, to perform an analysis of homework that links social reproduction, or the possibility of reproduction, to policing which is not reduced to individual or "household strategies," but to something like what Spivak (1990) referred to as the "strategic essentialisms" (which academic theorists typically refuse) of the race- and sex-divided practical politics of "class formation" and various kinds of "organizing." The diffusion of homeworkers throughout social time and space is indeed part of the strategy of the state and individual capitalists, and this could very easily become reflected in the work of the well-meaning NGO or academic expert. Accepting it in analytical terms, and countering with "technologies of the self," serves only to ante-up in a game whose rules are already controlled by the "definitively decisive" victor of the "war of position"; likewise, in the presence of the erasure of these rules, it is to play the game without knowledge of the rules, as working a definition of structuralist research if ever there were one, as Stuart Hall (1986) once put it for British cultural studies.

It is in the spirit of exposing regulation that I now turn to Foucault with a different program in mind, i.e. to re-read the "post-structuralist" Foucault as one invested in a history of the present that doesn't reduce individual being to the individual, that doesn't envision strategy without collective action, and that flows between discourses and practices of the self, rationalization of these and other techniques, and rationalization of the state – governmentality. I feel it is appropriate and important to do this reading of Foucault, since others in the field of homework studies have done so with varying success (Felstead and Jewson 1999; Parrenas 2001; Valsecchi 1999). I do intend, however, to try as well to re-produce the specificity of what Foucault theorized as power, ethics, and governmentality, this time for the field of home-based child care provider organizing in the United States—which it should be clear by now does not stand in for homeworker organizing anywhere or at any time.[122] In this context, one must come to terms with what Foucault meant by power in "specific situations," not because power was his principal concern (possibly it was), but because power inscribed specific "subjects" in such a way that, he argued, one could not avoid power as a reference in the politicized research fields of national history and political theory, crisscrossed as these were by other kinds of "subjects" such as sex and race (Foucault 2003). In a 1984 interview, Foucault stated:

> ...we must distinguish between power relations understood as strategic games between liberties—in which some try to control the conduct of others, who in turn try to avoid allowing their conduct to be controlled or try to control the conduct of the others—and the states of domination that people ordinarily call "power." And between the two, between games of power and states of domination, you have technologies of government—understood, of course, in a very broad sense that includes not only the way institutions are governed but also the way one governs one's wife and children. The analysis of these techniques is necessary because it is very often through such techniques that states of domination are established and maintained. There are three levels to my analysis of power: strategic relations, techniques of government, and states of domination. (Foucault 1997: 299)

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[122] One must resist the totalizing impulse in Foucault, especially as it partially makes its way around the world in the critique of "Empire," and be reminded of those who have neither access to neo-liberal governmentality nor any "indigenous" tradition of "representation." See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can

Foucault's concern for "the subject," over several decades, was explicitly and closely bound to the problem of seeing it in terms other than those given in Enlightenment discourse, i.e. rights, law, the state, etc. Not that the Enlightenment "Subject" wasn't part of the problematic: Foucault's concern over time, on the contrary, was to show how seeing "the Subject" preeminently as the subject of legal rights was enabled only through the discursive configuration of this subject over against the exclusion, enclosure, domination and separation of other historical subjects, e.g. the slave, the prisoner, the insane, the homosexual, and – one might argue given clues from Foucault's own examples and exclusions – women and children (Hekman 1996).

Even if writers such as Felstead and Jewson were to acknowledge the broader social relations which certainly are interspersed, if not at some points isomorphic, with political and administrative policy governing home-based work – which a reading of Foucault would suggest they must do if they are to read homeworker subjectivities in terms of technologies of self-management and control – then they still should *want* to see how their categorization of "home-located workers" (i.e. those who are not also employers) into "petty commodity producers" (where they place "family daycare providers") on one side, and low-wage workers/"homeworkers" on the other side, might function instead as an unacknowledged technology of control in and of "the field."[123] That is to say, such a categorization itself might further disaggregate, "de-classify" and de-politicize these otherwise diversely situated workers, and in so doing forget the social

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the Subaltern Speak," in C. Nelson and L Grossberg, eds. *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), pp. 271-313.

[123] See Felstead and Jewson 1999: 16. The key here is that child care providers, like homeworkers, also deliver their product to a "third party," in this case the state. This is not a point about taxonomy, but precisely about how what they term "technologies of the self", referencing Foucault, are not simply confined to household and "market" practices, unless we say they are.

and political dynamics of their grouping, which is part of the very critique brought by Allen, Wolkowitz and others, that Felstead and Jewson dismiss as too "one-sided."

In terms of "re-classifying" (or counter-classifying) home-based work, which analysis of the technology of governmentality should help us to accomplish, one might situate industrial homeworkers in the same "division" with family daycare providers and personal service homeworkers, even, or especially, from a strictly policy-oriented point of view. From the perspective of these workers, a low-wage is a low-rate is a low-price is a low-income. Technically, the home-based hair cutter is free to start charging more, but she could feel she might lose business and relationships. The same with the child care provider, only she has less freedom to change prices insofar as the state comes to predominate in the organized demand for child care. The home-based assembler, never "free" to change piece rates could, and often does, search out other industrial sector employers, as well as other (often home-based) industries, including child care and hair-cutting (Boris and Prügl 1996; Miraftab 1994).

But even if the "classification" system many homework researchers and advocates are concerned about is altered, and if the decisive issue instead is the controlled relationships of home-based workers *vis à vis* employers and/or purchasers or contractors of services (including the state), then analysis of what I am calling low-wage homework (such as child care) reminds us, from the perspective of governmentality, that homeworker "subjectivities" are shaped by a "practice of freedom" which is often in direct conflict with another's practice, to use Foucault's most generic terminology of ethics and power. Felstead and Jewson underestimate this – not so much foundational as ubiquitous – antagonism. Low-wage homeworkers, as we have said, are frequently not paid on time, and occasionally not paid at all. They are by definition "low-paid," although we do certainly know of exceptions to this general rule. In the case that this is not something that an individual homeworker will be able to change in a meaningful way, according to Foucault, what we are seeing are effects of a "technology of domination." Within and against the technology of domination (cf. "within and against the state"), we have seen that homeworker/child care networks utilize an explicit form of "power analysis" to collectively and individually incorporate both transgressive and transformative practices of freedom (Abrams 1999; Tuominen 2002). This is partially what I take from Foucault to be the ethics of the care or technology of the self, at least in terms of the active struggles around home-based work, however broadly or narrowly conceived.[124]

Inside the technology of domination, surely, there is another kind of maneuvering room, and here is where, once again, the sexual and racial divisions of labor return (which Felstead and Jewson, to their credit, insist homework researchers must further analyze). But they don't return as though they don't exist outside the home. Felstead and Jewson's politically neutral choice of "household understandings" is helpful to them in one regard: the habitus of sexual distinction, the "androcentric unconscious," and male domination by definition and in practice circulate in and around "comprehensive fields" of social practices and action – concepts appropriate to Bourdieu's (1977) theory of social practice, which Felstead and Jewson cite. They are principles of vision, in the most nearly literal sense of that word. One sees a man or woman, a boy or girl, and *immediately* one has already begun dividing space and objects along differential, and in most cases, hierarchical terms. Insofar as "household understandings" intends the kind of divisive negotiations that stereotypically go on in the family/home, they are not incorrect.

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[124] Cf. Deleuze's discussion of the 'diagram' in *Foucault*: "...the diagram, in so far as it exposes a set of relations between forces, is not a place but rather 'a non-place': it is the place only of mutation. Suddenly things are no longer perceived or propositions articulated in the same way" (p. 85). One might also return again to Negri and Hardt's critical reference to Gramsci's understanding of the relation between civil society and the state. For them, Gramsci's (1971) notion that civil society would itself overcome the state through counter-hegemonic force, i.e. that the political and cultural forces of civil society would engage in a free exchange of power, with State structures progressively and sometimes violently subordinated to the popular will, is a-topic. They argue that the *space* for such struggle no longer exists. "Not the state, but civil society has withered away." More important, the "state doesn't need civil society," its institutions, etc. to practice order. Without completely collapsing the difference between place and space, one can with Deleuze and Foucault nevertheless envision a non-place space where change, a resistant, differential force, does takes spatio-temporal place. See Negri and Hardt 1994: 258-59. Negri and Hardt suggest we think of the latter place in terms of constituent power flowing from immaterial and reproductive labor of all kinds. I suggest we think of it in terms such as "child care."

The authors of *In Work, at Home* are constrained in their use of "household understandings," however, in a way that is also relevant to a perspective critical of Bourdieu's theory of change in the structure of sexual division, as mine has been implicitly up until now. For if Foucault is correct, if "we must distinguish between power relations understood as strategic games between liberties—in which some try to control the conduct of others, who in turn try to avoid allowing their conduct to be controlled or try to control the conduct of the others—and the states of domination that people ordinarily call 'power,'" (Foucault 1997: 299) then homework researchers must move beyond "habitus" to the technologies of governmentality – i.e. "not only the way institutions are governed but the way one governs one's wife and children" in the telling phrase immediately following this passage – and also be willing to examine how theory of governmentality may preclude an analysis precisely of what remains outside of domination, what in the context of domestic labor and home-based work one might better understand as "forced labor" *elsewhere*. Thus, even (or especially) where the state wishes to eliminate sexual and other forms of *slavery* and its vestiges (as well in those places where it lacks the political will to do so), it sees tremendous social promise and economic progress in the massification of very low wage home-based work. Homework researchers need at very least to find ways to account for this.

In the European context of the fully public/private promotion and struggle over gender equality, Pierre Bourdieu (2001) acknowledged the productive encounter of self/other struggles with technologies of masculine domination. As in his much earlier *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1977), the theory of domination in Bourdieu's later work remained bound both by the circulation of symbolic values – closely tied to both the circular construction of fields, knowledges and distinctive practices – as well as his hallmark notion of habitus—the circulation of social and cultural practices flowing together with subjective cognition, perception, and vision (Bourdieu 1990). Change in the structure of masculine domination occurs, according to Bourdieu (2001), to the extent that the de-historicization on which masculine domination depends for its permanence is forcibly uprooted, and the erasure of feminine/feminist history and masculine domination themselves are exposed and historicized. Methodologically, this appears to have much in common with Foucault's archaeology of subjugated knowledges, which was also intent on rupturing the hold of dominant discourses by exposing the erasure of minoritarian (and dominant) discourses, as Bourdieu himself noted (Bourdieu 2001: 103).[125]

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[125] There may be other commonalities between Foucault and Bourdieu worth noting. There is certainly the subjective context of colonial history to be looked at, as Ann Stoler has done with regard to Foucault. *Masculine Domination* shuttles repeatedly between Kabylia and Europe. Yet, at least in this text, Bourdieu discusses change in the permanence of the structure of male domination only in the European context, with only brief reference to the passing of the "ideal" conditions for masculine domination in Kabylia (Bourdieu 2001: 56). At very least, this presents a problem of historical imprecision around the notion of "masculine" domination: if change in the permanence of the structure of male domination or in sexual vision isn't happening in Kabylia, which is precisely what is and is not being said, why not? Do the contemporary Amazigh movements for cultural and linguistic autonomy say and do nothing (anew) about sexual difference? Clearly there are myriad other sources one could turn to for evidence of "change" in the sense Bourdieu outlines. Spivak (1992) has discussed the literature of Algerian novelist Assia Djebar in this meta-context. See Djebar's *So Vast the Prison* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2001) for an excellent historical-fictional counterpoint to Bourdieu's patronage of Kabylian "permanence."

In the context of First World feminism, this problem of the dehistoricization of the *differential* movements and struggles around value, sex and labor has been repeated (and built upon) many times. One could cite much critical material. Unlike anthropology, much of American and European sociology continues to dismiss variations of "auto-ethnography" in the context of globality as well as inter-nationality, consigning the nomadic subject to the traditional (i.e. anthropological) category of self-consolidating Other.[126] Within his own national enclosure, Bourdieu was certainly attentive to "institutional power" (ibid.: 85-88). Yet his self-contrasting allusion to Foucault indicates something else: a radical difference in historical object to be sure, but also a note that he is obliged to reiterate about the *History of Sexuality*, namely that the dominant linkage of power to sexuality was always "masculine":

> It follows that the genetic sociology of the sexual unconscious is logically extended into the analysis of the structures of the social universes in which this unconscious is rooted and reproduces itself, whether it be the divisions embodied in the form of principles of division or the objective divisions that are established between social positions (and their occupants, who are preferentially male or female...), the most important of which, from the point of view of the perpetuation of these divisions, is undoubtedly the one which distinguishes the fields devoted to symbolic production. The fundamental opposition, of which Kabyle society offers the canonical form, is 'geared down' or diffracted in a series of homologous oppositions, which reproduce it, but in dispersed and often almost

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[126] Michael Burawoy suggests such an analysis in the context of a proposal for "global ethnography." See "Introduction: Reaching for the Global" in M. Burawoy et al., *Global Ethnography: Forces, Connections*

> unrecognizable forms...These specific oppositions channel the mind, in a more or less insidious way, without ever allowing themselves to be seen in their unity and for what they are, namely, so many facets of one and the same structure of relations of sexual domination. (ibid.: 106)

Reading Foucault suggests, often quite explicitly, that it isn't enough – critically – *to see*, as Bourdieu wrote, the "visible changes that have affected the condition of women mask[ing] the permanence of the invisible structures, which can only be brought to light by relational thinking capable of *making the connection between the domestic economy, and therefore the division of labor and powers which characterize it, and the various sectors of the labour market* (the field) in which men and women are involved" (ibid., emphasis in original). Foucault is often quite plain about this: those of us observing the passage of masculine domination from "outside in the academy" need to see how we come to theorize the techniques and apparatuses that allow us – or oblige us – to "see things" and "others" *differently*. I write this primarily because Bourdieu's analysis of strategy and habitus in the context of the "household" and sex division of labor partially informs thinking in the field of homework studies. But there is another more important point to be made here, beyond the way in which Bourdieu, in a misleading attempt to contrast his work with the *History of Sexuality* (which title, we should remind ourselves, was changed in translation from *The Will to Knowledge*), also attempted to "flatten out" Foucault, as Spivak (1993) notes about other prominent readers of Foucault, such as Richard Rorty. Spivak clarifies that Foucault was concerned to show how movements just inside *visible* masculine domination – i.e. the discursive, technical, bodily, and other

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and Imaginations in a Postmodern World **(Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 2000).**

movements at the *sub-individual* level, at the level of force – *induce* or generate the techniques and apparatuses of truth and power, and ultimately of governmentality, with and through which masculine domination then becomes visible and felt.

In this context, of technological "visibility" inside the field of cognition (including *méconnaissance*), the masculine sociologist's power to construct his object is indeed the power to construct the object as *sexual*, holding himself up as mirror in the process of textualizing the reflexive de-historicization which here constitutes not a relation or reflection but a power-laden, governing set of principles in which frame of reference and authority one is to theorize, practice and organize "the sexual." In short, far from a contrast to the *Will to Knowledge*, *Masculine Domination* succeeds in managing its own truth regime.[127] In the same vein, one might also note Bourdieu's misapprehension at Butler's position on gender performativity in *Gender Trouble*, which he characterizes (much as Lipietz does Negri) as "voluntaristic." With Butler, one could view what Bourdieu disparagingly labels the postmodern "supersession of dualisms" as the traversing of barriers to social transformation, although one would still have to explain what is meant by supersession. One possible reading of Butler is that heterosexual structuration creates sites of discursive and performative exteriority which function (just) inside the cultural 'outside' of the structure. One might think of this exteriority as pure deviations from the norm. In Butler's thinking, the "outside" of this exteriority is the "out-lawed" possibility *within* the cultural. In superseding the binaries – which Bourdieu does not apparently wish to argue is Butler's object – one is obliged to reread structuralism as *prohibition* and its *sites* as sites of resistance and (potential) subversion (Butler 1993).[128]

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[127] See Bourdieu 1990: 24, where he states, "...it's impossible not to see that the forms of classification are forms of domination, that the sociology of knowledge or cognition is inseparably a sociology of recognition and méconnaissance, that is, of symbolic domination...", so much so that "...the classificatory structures which organize the whole vision of the world refer, in the final analysis, to the sexual division of labor" for Kabyle society. Isn't Bourdieu a bit too eager to rescue reason here? As Spivak (1993) does very differently with Foucault, we must give Bourdieu in to Derrida. When Bourdieu writes that we should look for change in the "permanence of the invisible structure," he is writing, as it were, *sous rature*. When he suggests we historicize the dehistoricization on which masculine domination relies for permanence, he risks little or nothing. And in the European case of Kabylia, we do not see the resistances which *undergird* the structure, ideal, canonical, or mundane, of masculine domination. Giving Bourdieu in to Derrida, we begin to see how the temporal proximity and spatial separation of selves and others so crucial to the 'natural'

In the context of work at home as presented by Felstead and Jewson, this kind of subversion would be mundanely simple: first get together with similarly situated others, next analyze power "diagrammatically," as Deleuze (1996) put it. The contestation of what we are witnessing in the organizing of homeworkers such as child care providers (and here the language of "witnessing" is itself already discursively positioned in the highly controlled truth-regimes of criminal justice and evangelism) remains partially, or perhaps principally, mired in the structuralist metaphor of the legal subject as such. The prohibition "at work" in home-based labor is that home-based laborers do not – and in the governmental strategy *can not* – "get together" with one another, and that if they do it should be only for the purpose of developing those needs which governmental experts dictate, e.g., as in the case of the family child care provider, "professionalization" or training of one highly controlled kind or another. Indeed, it is easy to see in the U.S. case of home-based child care "provision" that legal prohibitions on collective action are intended to force a greater and greater degree of (collective) self-exploitation, or forced

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order of social capital and classification, once inscribed in the foundational sociological text, *shakes* both that text *and* the (enduring, colonial) social order it seeks not to historicize but, ultimately, to manage.

[128] Gilles Deleuze's reading of Foucault gives Butler's analysis of the 'outside' a more definitive, if philosophical, edge: "...the final word on power is that *resistance comes first*, to the extent that power relations operate completely within the diagram, while resistances necessarily operate in a direct relation with the outside from which the diagrams emerge" (Deleuze 1986: 89). At the end of this passage, Deleuze cites Mario Tronti, one of Negri's early collaborators. For more of that history, see Red Notes 1979.

giving, of home-based labor. As the Center for Childcare Workforce, one of the leading national advocates of home-based child care workers during the 1990s, noted:

> ...individual businesses, such as child care centers and family child care providers, cannot join together to agree to charge a certain rate, pay a certain wage, or maintain hours of operation. These activities would constitute price fixing and would violate [...] antitrust laws. Nothing in the law, however, prohibits an individual provider from making her own individual business decisions. (CCW 1999: 35)

From this perspective, the prohibition should extend as well to the child care worker organization, as in the following: "...CCW cannot recommend or suggest that family child care providers in a community come together and agree to set their fees at a certain rate. We are prohibited from doing so, just as family child care providers and center directors are..." (ibid.) The prohibition is not a meaningless one, even as it is subverted through collective organizing—and indeed CCW may have been forced into a certain organizational irony in the particular text I have cited. Unionization efforts of family child care providers in Illinois *were* preemptively halted through an antitrust suit brought by that state's attorney general some years back. Nonetheless, the Unity Campaign and Service Employees Union International Local 880 continue to organize as well as *unionize* home-based child care workers and home health workers; take over state and local offices; win local and statewide legislation mandating higher rates of reimbursement and employment benefits; and gain due process and grievance procedures in the non-place of home-based care work.

I have taken this detour through Bourdieu, via Foucault, in order to return to "internalized gendering perceived as ethical choice" as a key strategy of governmentality today. I have done this in order to highlight the importance of governmental discourses and technologies (of which home-based work and the privatization of social welfare in the "globalizing" of domestic economy are prime examples) for the consolidation of normalized "auto-affections" of inter-subjective good—a bio- and techno-political process well beyond the need for "docile bodies" laboring under capitalist self-exploitation (Clough 2000). I have moved in this way to begin to reconnect the circuitry of "governmentality," as it were, among the players in the home-based game of technologies of the self and the social, a process which I am suggesting researchers begin viewing more from the perspective of social and political "organizing" both within and alongside biopolitical capitalism, and less from the perspective of either sociological theories of industrial organization or positivist classification.

In one of the very few articles examining the organizing experience of child care workers (Macdonald and Merrill 2002), including those home-based, in the United States, we can see where the resulting differences in approach might begin to emerge. In this piece, which focuses on the organizing experience of the Center for the Childcare Workforce, Macdonald and Merrill argue that if the politics of care work organizing in the United States are to succeed, child care workers must seek, on the one hand, increasing recognition for their status as professionals givers of care, and on the other, greater "justice" through the redistribution of child care wages and public subsidies of child care. They explore some of the tensions – including the misleading "trade-offs" – between seeking institutional (and inter-subjective) recognition for the "labor of love" of child care work and seeking recognition (and ultimately redistribution) by appealing one way or another to the professional, highly skilled, and demanding work of public child care provision. They cite the ways in which child care workers suffer as a result of the degraded status of their work and labor, including the ways in which they continue to care, and continue to give care, even when there is no payment, no respect, no recognition in return. They describe the policy reform-oriented efforts of the Center for the Childcare Workforce to advance institutional recognition and improve the status of child care workers, as well as increase state distribution of funding for, and subsidization of, expanded public child care.

Yet Macdonald and Merrill fail to capture what I argue is the bottom-up "organizing" experience of the campaigns in Rhode Island and Virginia, which learned that far from getting institutional recognition via organizing, what their organizing exposed were deeper and thicker layers of sanctioned governmental violence and strategies/tactics of control of and inside the home/work place. When they write that "[a]ny attempt to revalue care work must involve not only appeals to redistributive justice, but also to overcoming institutional misrecognition" (Macdonald and Merrill 2002: 73), one must supplement this understanding with the knowledge that, as with Bourdieu's analysis of *méconnaissance* in the context of masculine domination, "institutional misrecognition" almost always follows a path that leads downwards to the dynamics of patriarchal racism and colonization, where the results of "misrecognition" are not merely "a lack of self-esteem" and "poor quality care," as many have pointed out, but the loss of work and home, hunger, untreated illness, imprisonment, destitution, and death.

Such techniques of government continue to mediate between what Foucault termed the "strategic relations" and "power relations" (the "games of power" and "states of domination") implicated by a politics of recognition. Underneath, in the turbulence of the latter, however, emerge a politics (and ethics) that discover in the technologies of government the violent flows of the 'way institutions are governed but also the way one governs one's wife and children': a politics of organizing labor in the bodily mode in powerful places like home. Only at that point one would be able not to forget (through historicization) the woman homeworker as a paradigmatic figure of capitalist globality which is constantly being virtualized, hidden, and forgotten. Theorizing and challenging this violence through bottom-up organizing produces a new series of demands, in pathways that circulate now, as much as ever, through the political economy of affect, the state and home.

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