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INTERAGENCY COOPERATION: AN EXAMINATION OF COOPERATION ATTITUDES ON FEDERAL AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DRUG TASK FORCES

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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Criminal Justice in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Criminal Justice in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my parents, John Maurice and Mary Kathryn Newbold. They have been my role models through whom I have an appreciation of the importance of integrity, kindness and inclusiveness; that success is measured by the quality of one's relationships rather than one's possessions or accomplishments.

Abstract

Interagency Cooperation: An Examination of Cooperation Attitudes on Federal and Local Law Enforcement Drug Task Forces

by

Katherine M. Newbold

Adviser: Professor Robert Bonn

Cooperation among law enforcement agencies is well known to be problematic. The issues examined and discussed in this case study involve the cooperation attitudes of federal and local law enforcement investigators assigned to interagency drug task forces. The task forces studies are those under the auspices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York Division and include both FBI agents and New York Police Department detectives in 1993.

The study included a self-administered survey questionnaire to all investigators assigned to these five squads. The questionnaire was designed to capture attitudes regarding task force work in general and those involving their current task force assignment. Also included in this work are the results of interviews conducted with both FBI and NYPD task force supervisors and selected managers in the hierarchies of each agency. The interviews followed the context of the questionnaires and issues related to managing these interagency units.

The three unifying hypotheses asserted that local law enforcement investigators were less prone than federal law enforcement investigators to perceive the interagency task force as a cooperative work environment; as an environment where information was shared fully; and as an environment where mutual, professional respect was experienced by investigators. The literature review details the juxtaposition of the sacred autonomy and elitism of law enforcement organizations and the new evolving interdependence and team driven work environments. Police agencies were found to use over-bearing tactics in interagency work groups and usually attempt to unilaterally control these endeavors.

The results of this study have borne out the hypothesized assertions. In addition, the quantitative and qualitative data strongly supported the hypotheses regarding the lack of shared investigative information and the sense of disenfranchisement and exclusion experienced by local law enforcement in the decision-making process of investigations; the lead agency designation ascribed to interagency investigations. This study contends that agencies must dictate cooperation as important and integral to their overall operational missions. Too, that task force units are important and unique and that personnel assigned to them must be carefully selected to meet the demands of interagency work. Teams and interdependencies are the evolving organizational relationships and even the parochialism of law enforcement find themselves inextricably tied to this progress.

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encouraged those he worked with to grow personally and professionally. He and NYPD Lt. Joe Polly are extraordinary managers; they are credited with creating the environment for true team relations.

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Finally, I would like to thank both the FBI and the NYPD management for their support of this study. This was a provocative issue and both agencies embraced its concept with no conditions or wishes to control its content or its outcome. I am a better agent as a result of my task force experience and through my association with my NYPD colleagues and local colleagues since them. Indeed, law enforcement management recognizes that the goals of public service cannot be pursued successfully in the vacuum of their parochial environments.

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CHAPTER ONE: The Problem

The Drug Enforcement Venue

> "... the newspaper said..[DEA] agents used one of their informers to set up an [FBI] informer who had been working for a multi-agency task force...sources said [DEA] agents were apparently jealous over favorable media coverage other drug agencies were receiving" (Narcotic Control Digest, 1990 p.4)(1)

There are at least two givens in drug enforcement today. The first is that drug trafficking activities cross all law enforcement jurisdictions moving as quickly and quietly as modern technology allows. Illegal product, personnel, and its financial rewards find easy refuge in the subterfuge money can buy. Second, some 34 federal agencies (Appendix A) and innumerable state and local law enforcement entities continue to report difficulties in sorting out jurisdictional or "turf" issues.

What is certain is that the complexity and vastness of drug trafficking crimes defy a centrally directed enforcement approach

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1/ Discussions with FBI agents familiar with the Cleveland conflict revealed that DEA agents had developed information regarding a robbery which they alleged involved the FBI task force source. DEA agents executed a search warrant wherein DEA is said to have recovered incriminating evidence of above sources involvement in the robbery. A subsequent internal investigation resulted in DEA's admission of their irresponsible interruption of the task force case.

as the media continue to report that the "war on drugs" is lost or, at best, experiencing only limited success. The traditional parochialism of law enforcement agencies, evidenced in their image, ideology, autonomy, and guarded intelligence appears to only serve the violator. Such insularity perpetuates the "turf" battles among law enforcement agencies.

For example, an article from Legal Times (October 1991) alleged that the continued competition for intelligence and the failure to share this information between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has produced infighting that "does serious damage to the cause". In January, 1994, Director of the FBI, Louis Freeh , acting in his capacity as Director of Investigative Policy (2), forged a directive that initiated the sharing of the drug intelligence data bases used by each agency.

Further, at the International Association of Police Chiefs Conference in 1993 Attorney General Reno had publicly acknowledged the position that federal law enforcement failed to cooperate with local law enforcement in a fair, respectful manner (St. Louis Post Dispatch, October 20,1993) and said she would seek to change this through her office. Her statement indicates that competition between federal law enforcement officials

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2/On October 21, 1993, Attorney General Reno announced the creation of this position as a result of Vice President Gore's recommendations for integration of the drug enforcement efforts of the DEA and FBI. It is designed to resolve operational issues among all Department of Justice law enforcement agencies subject to Attorney General review.

and state and local officials was an important element in this problem. Cooperation is ongoing and a mutual exchange of agency personnel and information is currently accepted policy for both the FBI and the DEA. (3)

Many studies of interagency work and task forces (4) involved in drug enforcement have noted that agencies resist sharing of information and relinquishing control of personnel, cases and investigative information, and resources. At the same time, the same agencies readily concede the necessity for cooperation in light of the increasing need for personnel and resources to combat sophisticated, highly mobile drug trafficking organizations.

Interagency cooperation relies greatly on what organizational research refers to as "exchanges." The nature of these exchanges is determined by the relative status of the parent organizations participating in interagency endeavors. At this point, it is useful to distinguish two main types of interagency cooperation: ad hoc and permanent task forces.

3/ The 1977 research by Williams, Redlinger, and Manning reported tension between local and federal law enforcement during drug enforcement investigations. References to this problem are also prominently reported by Purdy (1979); Walton (1987); Gates (1989) to mention a few.

4/ The first exchange of federal agency managers between DEA and FBI began in December, 1987. In February, 1994, under the aegis of the Office of Investigative Policies a new comprehensive plan for drug intelligence sharing was initiated.

Interagency cooperation is evident most often in what law enforcement calls an "ad hoc arrangement": a situation in which agencies work a case(s) together handling contacts, case direction, and management with telephone or infrequent meetings. Each agency pursues its own goals but surveillances or major activities of the case are worked together. Cooperation ceases when the case is solved. Some familiar examples of ad hoc task forces are those assembled to investigate high profile kidnappings, homicides, and other urgent crime problems that require the coordination of agency resources (Nowicki,1990; Green, 1993; Higgins, 1993).

Another type of interagency cooperation is the permanent task force: an organizational structure in which participating agencies detach investigators to a designated location to work together daily. These task forces are managed by supervisors from the agencies involved. These task forces are created to handle numerous cases rather than the case by case approach of the ad hoc arrangement. The permanent task force form of cooperation is the subject of this study. The extent and the manner in which an organization participates in any interagency effort depends upon its expectations and the calculated impact that such cooperation has on its established organizational culture.

Law enforcement work cultures are often characterized as selective, secretive, and closed. The very idea of cooperation is sometimes perceived as a threat by investigators who are

comfortable with a work environment which is described and defined to them by the parent organization. Investigators naturally embrace the particular way of viewing their work environment promoted by their own agencies.

The drug enforcement venue is now world wide; it requires unprecedented cooperation among law enforcement entities if investigations are to come to a successful conclusion. Law enforcement agencies continually evaluate their participation in task forces. The use of task forces is one technique that has resulted in both great successes and failures. Law enforcement circles recognize that drug trafficking crimes cross geographic and jurisdictional borders. Agency cooperation is vital in the fight against them.

This study examines the perception of cooperation as it is experienced by federal and local law enforcement agencies: the Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York Division and the New York City Police Department.

The Task Force As a Drug Enforcement Tool

During the last 20 years, law enforcement management has combatted varied crime problems with a tool known as the task force. A task force is defined by organizational and management theorists as a work unit that is separated from the organization's regular infrastructure to address specific problems that cannot be successfully attacked by a standing group or unit (Morgan, 1984). In law enforcement, task forces have been useful for solving crimes such as bank robbery, kidnapping, homicide, and fraud. The key to a task force's value is its ability to identify the movement and activities of criminal subjects and enterprises by forging the cooperation of the jurisdictions in which they operate.

An interagency drug task force comprises supervisors and investigators appointed by participating law enforcement agencies. Ideally, members are chosen for the particular expertise that they bring to the investigation(s) of the identified problem. The existence of a task force is an implicit recognition by the parent organizations that the problem is best solved through cooperation and it probably cannot be solved through a single agency's efforts (Morgan, 1984).

Law enforcement is a decentralized element of the American criminal justice system. Most law enforcement agencies and employees work at the state, county, or municipal level (Cole, 1986). Federal involvement with state or local law enforcement has increased as individuals have become more mobile; criminal

activities have crossed state lines; as federal resources have diminished. The history of the criminal justice system shows that law enforcement agencies have traditionally respected jurisdictions (Cole, 1986). Cole reported that there were more than 20,000 public agencies involved in law enforcement in the United States in 1986. While responsibilities of agencies are clearly defined by law, the interpretation of their duties often depends upon the political agenda of the local communities served. Moreover, agencies interpret their statutory mandate and define their enforcement function in the light of an organizational culture, which is designed to perpetuate their existence and their control of the work environment (Cole, 1986). Cole further observed that, In a metropolitan area the law enforcement function may be divided among agencies at all governmental levels, and jurisdictional conflict may inhibit the efficient use of police resources. America is essentially a nation of small police forces, each of which operates independently within the limits of its jurisdiction.

Law enforcement organizations are designed to maintain their identity and autonomy within work environments populated by other similarly tasked organizations. Law enforcement organizations are designed to be free from political influence. Additionally, their task also involves the efficient and effective provision of equal justice and service to citizens. Because of this autonomy, law enforcement organizations create work cultures that have been characterized as elitist, secretive, and powerful (Bonifacio,

1991; Lefkowitz, 1973; Manning, 1978; Martin, 1980). Investigators who have strong insider/outsider organizational preconceptions or prejudices may be reluctant to cooperate with representatives of other agencies. Now that law enforcement agencies have agreed that drug enforcement cannot realistically be addressed by any single agency, such organizations are forced to cooperate while preserving both their autonomous existence under statutory mandates and the rules that govern their organizational ethos. This mission must be accomplished as they simultaneously address drug trafficking crimes that move in and out of their prescribed territory and statutory jurisdictions.

Statistics available from the National Institute of Justice indicate that more than 1,000 interagency drug task forces are in place nationwide (Levine and Martin, 1992). These units take a variety of forms at different levels of government.(5) Limited resources and personnel make a compelling case for what the U.S. crime prevention policymakers in the 1980s termed "interagency cooperation" (Sampson, et al.,1988). The manner in which drug

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5/ Task forces wishing to receive federal resources must be formed under the sponsorship of a federal agency having drug violation enforcement authority with/among state and local law enforcement departments. The Municipal Enforcement Groups (MEG units) are an example of drug task forces formed without federal involvement and usually among several state/local police agencies wishing to capitalize on the strength of their mingled resources.

trafficking crimes are committed today makes extraordinary new demands upon levels of government that have for years carried out their responsibilities within limited territories defined by statute. These boundaries have had to expand with the mobility of criminal subjects, contraband, and criminally derived assets. Cooperation among agencies is mandated both by circumstance and by the public outcry for the elimination of violent, criminal drug organizations that operate lucrative enterprises in American cities.

Levine and Martin (1992) enumerated some issues of concern for participants in these interagency groups: shared communication and intelligence, interjurisdictional respect, the goodwill of larger agencies in consideration of smaller departments' concerns about being consumed or controlled, and the necessity for using experienced supervisors and investigative personnel.

The 1993 report by Vice President Al Gore, Creating Government That Works Better and Costs Less, focused on reinventing government. Its foremost recommendation for law enforcers was to improve coordination among federal law enforcement agencies. The report even proposed the merger of the law enforcement efforts of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Whether these agencies merge or simply cooperate, the message was clear: Law enforcement agencies were to begin working together. In this report, cooperation was praised as the way to deliver the most

informed and efficient service to the public, especially given the far-reaching impact of such crime problems as drug trafficking. However, no official steps to date have been taken to merge the FBI and DEA.

In remarks before the International Association of Police Chiefs (IACP) in 1993, Attorney General Janet Reno won applause for her assertion that the "feds" should show more respect for local police. Reno recalled:

> "I've sat at the table when the federal people came in and said they knew better than we did, or at least acted like it. The feds would get a lot more information from us, but it was very hard to get much from them. I'm one of them now, and if I have anything to say about it, it's going to be a two-way street. I don't want us grabbing headlines. I want us developing a relationship with you." (Reno, 1993)

Also, Reno addressed issues of mutual respect and mistrust, the need for cooperation, and the practice of usurping credit for successful outcomes from one another through rushed or misleading media releases. These issues are felt quite viscerally in the law enforcement community.

Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Louis J. Freeh remarked during his confirmation hearings that he has personally experienced the value of interagency efforts and recognized the need to solidify that commitment with managers. Freeh suggested that in his experience personal and professional

relationships among street investigators appeared to transcend agency politics and facilitate the work at hand (Freeh, 1993).

The relationships to which Reno and Freeh alluded in their public remarks have been reinventing themselves for more than 50 years. The founding director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, was resistant to the idea of relinquishing control of his agents to other agencies (Powers, 1987). In a similar vein, a former head of the New York DEA region, Bruce E. Jensen once asked:

> "How many law enforcement agencies that intermingle in large metropolitan areas are willing to set aside rivalries as public responsibilities mount?" (Jensen, 1976, p.11)

In principle, interagency task forces address a specific investigation or an overall crime problem that law enforcement agencies cannot solve alone. The declared "war on drugs" is one such superordinate goal as defined by Sheriff (1966) in his work on intergroup relations. However, the turf battles and rhetoric attached to each organization's assertions of individual competence continue to present obstacles to progress in investigations.

Task forces are the physical and political embodiment of joint drug enforcement efforts. Task forces mingle jurisdictional prerogatives, resources, and organizational cultures. This mingling requires that participants sacrifice some of their autonomy and share their intelligence and other investigative information. Participating agencies often rationalize such joint efforts by viewing them as simple joinings of personnel and

resources rather than as diluting an agency's power. Individual agencies recognize that their approaches cannot compete with the bottomless bank accounts of drug traffickers. Cooperation is a way to increase useful resources.

Drug task forces have undoubtedly increased arrests, search warrants and convictions, as well as asset forfeitures which turn money back to participating agencies after monies and property have been seized during search warrants.(6) However, insufficient attention to human dynamics still allows problems to persist in task force workplaces. This study examines the difficulties inherent in a drug task force work environment populated by individuals from the closed, strictly defined organizational subcultures. The individuals assigned to these interagency units are expected to reorient their perceptions quickly, accepting former competitors as colleagues in an open and cooperative work force. This not only requires new work

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6/ For example, FBI and DEA offices administrate "adoptive forfeitures" for local law enforcement as a matter of cooperation. Forfeiture thresholds are set in each judicial district. Assistant U.S. Attorneys assigned to forfeiture matters process these submissions. A percentage of the forfeitures are retained for administrative costs and the remainder turned back to the local submitting agency. The percentage varies from case to case depending on the extent of administrative casts accrued. and the necessity for work. It is essential that their work relationships be supportive and predictable.

habits, but new loyalties. Trust must become second nature to investigators who face the daily danger of drug enforcement work.

The examination of cooperation among law enforcement agencies in drug enforcement has often been limited to reports of increased case loads, personnel, and arrests and convictions (Olsen & Bern, 1977). The 1977 study Police Narcotics Control: Patterns and Strategies, conducted by Williams, Redlinger, and Manning for the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, was one of the first to address enforcement and investigative operations unique to drug violations. Their research included interviews with police command personnel on the problems of drug enforcement. This study found that one of the greatest problems was cooperation with other units either inside or outside of the police department. Other problems were sharing information and informants and maintaining good relations among unit members.

In The Narc's Game (1980), Manning examined the patterns and process of drug enforcement investigators and investigations. He wrote:

> "Cooperative ventures ...are a source of constant concern and irritation. ..since they would mean sharing evidence, publicity, and credit..."(p.131).(7)

7/ Credit claiming is an ongoing problem. For example, in some cases the FBI will draw up a Memorandum of Understanding where a section regarding media release is set forth. However, each agency still maintains primary direction of its investigators and reports statistical successes according to their own administrative policy.

Manning argued in both The Narc's Game and Organizational Communication (1992) that by selectively presenting and concealing messages, organizations can control the organizational image they present to the public. This might explain the plethora of published articles that celebrate the successes of drug units while barely alluding to the difficulties of operating interagency units. This might also explain the ineffectiveness of dealing with the larger drug problem. Manning wrote that successful drug investigations rely on and are determined by individual investigators' practical decision making. That decision making process is affected by the environment within which those decisions are made.

The literature on drug enforcement has reported many successful investigations and the impressive statistical accomplishments associated with them. There is an unattributed joke among task force participants that one case can result in astounding statistical accomplishments because all investigators claim the same successful case under the reporting requirements of their parent organizations. The drugs seized, arrests made, assets recovered and convictions held are reported as many times as there are agencies involved.

In spite of its flaws, however, the task force has become a political necessity, as described earlier. Task forces require agencies, unfamiliar with interdependence and uncomfortable with outsiders to open their files and their minds to cooperation. Manning (1980) contends that the public has been socialized to

view drug enforcement as a series of dramatic confrontations between good and evil in which the resources, skills, and virtue of the police win out. Law enforcement organizations perceive that to lose control of the positive public perception of their performance (Goffman, 1959) is to risk losing the control that their autonomy and elite character allow them. Cooperation among law enforcement agencies is therefore both complex and delicate. It seeks to mesh the purposes of several organizations while de-emphasizing the task force members' identification with their parent organizations. The interagency task force itself becomes a unique environment with its own subculture and expectations of assimilation. Frequent anecdotal reports of critical operational and personnel difficulties indicate that cooperation cannot merely be dictated by directives from above.

Few organizations or individuals wish to be viewed as uncooperative. However, paramilitary organizations are usually defensive about their autonomy. They resist sharing the hard-won information and expertise that have given them their investigative successes and an elitist public image. Like all organizations, law enforcement agencies have purposes deeply rooted in self-preservation (Grusky & Miller 1970). An organization's success is often assessed by its control of the work environment. Sharing this environment and the credit for success is often perceived by organizations as a diminution of their contribution and a threat to their longevity.

This research examines the perceptions of respondents assigned to interagency drug task forces and cooperation in these units, as well as perceptions about shared investigative information and mutual professional respect. Since the street-level investigators usually implement the cooperative mission, these investigators constitute the sample selected for this study, which describes the workplace and those who populate it. It also examines the comments of first-line task force managers and upper management in order to understand the organizations' articulated commitment to the task force unit. The reported perceptions of both managers and investigators will provide an overall view of how agencies cooperate.

The workplace studied was staffed by members assigned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the New York City Police Department (NYPD). New York is one of the largest metropolitan areas in the country and is a port of entry for lucrative drug trafficking organizations. The FBI and the NYPD differ in their mission orientation and the manner in which the investigations are carried out.

The FBI is one of the many law enforcement agencies attached to the United States Department of Justice. The FBI's vision must necessarily be broad enough to encompass the crime problems affecting its national territory. Briefly, the FBI has developed a National Drug Strategy (NDS) which inextricably ties the FBI to developing criminal enterprise investigations and attacks the controlling entities of drug organizations. Enterprise cases

involve the use of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute. This allows investigators and prosecutors to develop cases against multiple members of criminal organizations based on a pattern of criminal activity which underlies the organization's tactics designed to acquire profit and power. The RICO statute outlaws specific criminal activities through the use of federal and state crimes already on the books. It is designed to address the variety of crimes utilized by organized criminals who invest in, acquire, infiltrate, and use legitimate and illegitimate organizations.

The NYPD is tied closely to the needs of the community and attempting to stem the tide of local and street dealers who directly impact the quality of life in New York City neighborhoods. NYPD investigators are directed to constantly evaluate the needs and the crime problem endemic to their neighborhoods. The NYPD must also incorporate the expressed needs of the community it serves and there are often a number of political influences that affect the direction or emphasis of enforcement duties. As the FBI pursues enterprise cases, it is necessary to utilize a long-term approach to case management. Much of this work is known as proactive investigation. This means that the cases are developed from intelligence and the research of the pattern of criminal activity associated with individuals and their criminal organizations. This includes much attention and involvement in the prosecutorial stage.

Conversely, the NYPD focuses on the arrest stage of investigations. The NYPD engages predominantly in reactive type investigations. This means that cases are developed and proceed directly from immediate acts of criminality. Examples of reactive crimes are bank robberies, kidnappings, assaults, street robberies, and home invasions. The NYPD therefore traditionally focuses on short-term investigations which come to an end at the time of arrest and investigators go on to the next case. NYPD investigators are, of course, called to testify but they are not traditionally as involved as federal investigators in the prosecutorial stage beyond their testimony.

The insights offered by both managers and investigators are vital to this work's credibility. The task forces studied are sponsored by the FBI and located in FBI office space. The research describes the task force workplace and the perceptions of members who can provide credible insights into its operation.

Research Issues

The central issue in this study is the perception of the quality and quantity of cooperation in permanent law enforcement task forces by its members. Cooperation is first analyzed at the theoretical level and then examined by eliciting the personal perceptions of cooperation of respondents. This study explores task force issues identified in the literature and framed by interagency (federal/local) investigators' encounters. This work is a case study of one group of interagency drug task forces which are populated by federal and local investigators. This case study incorporates both qualitative and limited quantitative data in order to present both the picture of this work environment and the perceptions and attitudes of the respondents. This research intends to describe "the meaning, not the frequency, of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena" (Van Maanen, 1979, p. 9) associated with the element of cooperation among law enforcement agencies and the investigators in this unique work environment. Qualitative methodology, in particular, derives its importance from the assertion that "contextual understandings and empathetic objectives are unlikely to be achieved without direct, firsthand, and more or less intimate knowledge of a research setting" (Van Maanen, 1979, p. 10). The sample is not a representative sample but a case sample in which surveys were distributed to all 94 task force members in five interagency task forces. The overall return rate was over 70%, which is

substantial for survey/attitudinal studies. Due to the manpower needs of both agencies, the population and ratio of federal to local investigators changed during the preparation and the final administration of this survey instrument.

Specifically, the hypotheses examine task force member perceptions of the task force in three areas: the task force work environment as a cooperative work environment, the task force as a work environment where investigative information is shared, and the task force work environment as a work environment where members value one another as colleagues and where mutual, professional respect is experienced.

The hypotheses are formulated on the basis of the literature review which supported the contention that federal investigators are more likely not to cooperate with state and local officials. The lack of cooperation is especially evident in the areas of sharing information and taking credit for investigations. The literature review also supports this contention by describing "turf battles" between and among federal law enforcement agencies, also suggesting their tendency to not cooperate in drug cases. Therefore, the hypotheses are written with this underlying perception in mind.

Research Objectives

The overall objectives of this study are:

* To examine and to describe law enforcement's use of the task force in drug enforcement.

* To survey the perceptions of managers and investigators regarding cooperation, shared information, and mutual professional respect.

* To examine the underlying assertion that federal law enforcement tends to assert a superior attitude when working with local law enforcement officials.

CHAPTER TWO: History of Interagency Relations Among Federal, State and Local Law Enforcement

Perceptions of Cooperation

> There were close to twenty of us now, all at the mercy of the FBI for vital information....This is getting to be a bad deal. Being left in the dark all the time. The Fibbers don't trust us. We trust them even less than we did from the get go. We didn't trust the FBI in the beginning, I reminded him." (Patterson,1993, p.104)

> The FBI are masters at the public relations game, Paul. ... They'll leak the contents of the diary to every paper in the country, and to add insult to injury, they'll say they found the disk and cracked it. These guys are good and they are ruthless. They're almost as ruthless as you...the FBI philosophy is whatever makes any other law enforcement agency or institution look bad makes us look better. (DeMille, 1993, p.376)

> Hasn't he ever worked a case with the "G"? They don't cooperate. They think they're God Almighty."
>
> (Law and Order,1995)

Both novels cited above were on the New York Times best seller list in 1993. John Patterson's, Along Came a Spider was the tale of a Washington, D.C. detective/psychologist and Nelson

DeMille's The General's Daughter was about an Army Criminal Intelligence Division officer whose investigations were inextricably tied to the federal government because of the mobility of the perpetrator and the politics of jurisdiction. The television show Law and Order is set in New York City and often thinly portrays the facts of actual recent investigations. The conflicts inherent in interagency cooperation have become so well known that writers of popular fiction frequently use them to provide dramatic context for their story situations. References to turf battles lend verisimilitude to police action dramas.

The public's fascination with law enforcement work has much to do with the autonomy and the secrecy of "the job" (1) and the manner in which it is done. Although tangential to the thrust of this study, the Patterson, DeMille, and Law and Order examples suggest the powerful influence that organizational dysfunction may have on field operations. Chapter 2 examines each decade from 1960 to 1995 and discusses cooperation among police agencies in the context of drug enforcement.

1/ The "job" is an organizationally driven term used by NYPD Detectives and police officers to denote their occupation as law enforcement officers.

A Historical View of Interagency Relations from 1960 to The Present

1960-1969 Review

The 1960s found the U.S. Government coming out of political battles in the 1950s that included the McCarthy hearings and the Communist threat (Freemantle, 1985). The developing law on the possession, use, and sale of illegal drugs invested governmental responsibility in newly evolving federal agencies. Both the American Bar Association (ABA) and the American Medical Association (AMA) asserted that law enforcement intervention was important. However, the AMA argued that users were addicts and therefore to be considered "patients" (Freemantle, 1985). Meanwhile, organized crime's Apalachin Meeting of 1957 proposed to organize the multibillion-dollar business of drug trafficking across the nation. At the same time, law enforcement continued to deny the increasing mobility and at times even the very existence of organized crime.

By the 1960s, federal government agencies began to struggle to find a foothold in this directed law enforcement environment. J. Edgar Hoover assumed control of the troubled Bureau of Investigation in 1924 (Ungar, 1975) and transformed it into the FBI. Under Hoover, the FBI continued to focus on national security issues. As his agency expanded, he avoided any acknowledgment of a criminal mafia, refusing even to utter the "M" word (Gates, 1992). The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) went through many metamorphoses into the 1970s, falling under

various cabinet-level agencies. Although making the only recognized headway in drug enforcement, local law enforcement agencies were attempting to stem the influx of drugs by developing street-level cases. Large police departments were professionalizing police forces. Smaller departments were hamstrung by jurisdictional and resource constraints. Both were beginning to experience the corruption problems that erupted when susceptible officers compared the limited financial rewards of policing with the opportunities resulting from the immense drug trafficking profits (Ungar, 1975).

In 1963, President John F. Kennedy established the President's Advisory Committee on Narcotics and Drug Abuse to reorganize federal agencies involved in the growing drug problem. This committee recommended that drug traffickers be federally prosecuted but suggested that drug abuse be viewed as an illness. Increased activity by law enforcement was one of several strategies suggested by this Committee (Freemantle, 1985).

In 1964, FBI Director J.Edgar Hoover defended the official prerogatives and competence of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) to congressional committees while discussions continued regarding whether the FBI should assume some portion of the federal drug enforcement responsibilities. Hoover was against the FBI becoming involved in drug investigations (Ungar,1975). With limited resources, the FBN was fighting an escalating battle. Drug enforcement was still widely viewed as a regulatory problem involving schedule drugs and narcotics and not as an

investigative issue (Ungar, 1975). Hoover was wary about a drug enforcement mission that involved multi-jurisdictional problems already surfacing in the national drug strategy. Hoover privately asserted that he did not wish to lose control of "his agents" that he felt would be the direct result of cooperative ventures with other agencies (Powers, 1987). His attitude was one often expressed by heads of various law enforcement agencies over the years (Ungar, 1975, Jensen, 1977, Powers, 1987, Gates, 1992).

In the late 1960s, drug enforcement initiatives prompted the merger of the FBN with the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (BDAC) to a single agency identified as the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)(Freemantle, 1985). Among the enforcement initiatives, the 1966 Drug Abuse Amendments legislation was created to classify and govern the use of depressants, stimulants, and hallucinogens. Finally, in July 1969, U.S. Attorney General John Mitchell suggested a unification of the fragmented existing drug statutes and legislation. Several months later Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. Title 11 of this Act delineated the enforcement regulations and set up five schedules that classified controlled substances in the order of their potential for abuse.

The merger of the FBN and the BDAC was marred by petty jealousies and demarcation disputes. Underlying concern for independence was expressed by both sides. FBN's rivalries with BDAC were a result of its sporadic involvement in domestic

investigations.

BNDD's increased activity during this period resulted in negative relations with locals who believed that BNDD had entered cases selectively, and local authorities claimed that BNDD attempted to obtain some quick publicity through those involvements. Locals further claimed that BNDD would then remove itself when long-term assistance was needed. Disputes among the BNDD, U.S.Customs, and varied state and local law enforcement entities persisted through the BNDD's transformation into the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1973.

Drug laws were still confusing. They were divided into regulations empowering federal agencies to work towards drug prevention and those toward enforcement goals. With the 1969 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act in effect, it delineated the classification and schedules of controlled substances. They were classified in order of their potential danger. The resulting legal exposure of those found guilty of such possession, sale, or abuse was also defined. Legal exposure is a term used to suggest the amount of sentencing time available as punishment for criminal acts.

1970-1979 Review

Early in 1970 BNDD instituted an interagency drug task force with the New York regional office of BNDD, the New York State Police, and the New York City Police Department. Early task forces, though case-specific, were a significant step in drug enforcement cooperation. This task force in particular reported

both statistical success (2) and a change of mission from the street-level dealers to more mid-level drug operations. It introduced both the New York State Police and the New York City Police Department into a venue not previously available to them. Formerly, they were forced to stop at their borders both figuratively and literally. Further, this task force gave the BNDD access to street-level intelligence critical to case development. It also allowed each agency to become familiar with each other's respective administrative operations which provided grounds for future contacts. This task force followed BNDD's reporting requirements and operated under federal regulations. Cases were prosecuted in both federal and state courts. The task force would present the case in whatever jurisdiction the greatest judicial impact would be realized. This group "...transcended traditional bureaucratic rivalry." (Jensen, 1976) It was through cooperation that each agency was able to fulfill their separate responsibilities. Jensen's overall remarks advised that "...it takes all law enforcement working together in an atmosphere of unreserved cooperation to guarantee that the job will get done." (1976, p.13)

2/ Statistical success is merely the term used to characterizethe overall significant number of arrests, search warrants, convictions, and asset forfeitures achieved through culmination of investigations.

BNDD- or DEA-sponsored task forces periodically suffered the financial constraints of individual departments' decisions to recall personnel and reduce resources. The New York City Police Department was particularly affected by organizational constraints during the run of this task force. However, task forces spearheaded by the DEA in concert with the New York City Police Department survived and still engage in joint ventures. Bruce E. Jensen, then BNDD's (DEA) Agent in Charge in the New York region and chief of this task force, stated that the looming drug problem developing in the late 1960's necessitated that law enforcement agencies working in the same geographic areas find a new approach to a problem each could not solve alone. (Jensen, 1976) Jensen further reported that rivalries were set aside and that dedicated and experienced personnel were the greatest strength of this unit. Jensen also indicated that the opportunity for cross training was possible and advantageous.

Over the years, federal responsibility for drug violations had alternated between the U.S. Department of Treasury and U.S. Department of Justice. In January 1972, President Richard Nixon created the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement by executive order. Although this program had some successes, its mission was too expansive. The federal authorities practice of targeting street dealers soon exhausted the available resources. Nixon had said that the purpose of this office was to bring together several agencies to attack the spreading criminal

activity associated with drug use and abuse. However, the newly organized Office of Narcotics' Intelligence was created "to coordinate collection, analysis and dissemination of drug intelligence..." (Freemantle,1985 p.39). Drug enforcement was still stymied by the lack of a unified enforcement mission and the absence of defined agency responsibilities.

In 1973, the BNDD was reorganized as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and it was given primary responsibility for drug enforcement in the United States with overseas authority. The DEA continued to conduct investigations inherited from BNDD's rivalries experienced with U.S. Customs. U.S. Customs claimed that DEA failed to cover leads and provide sufficient intelligence to assist in border operations. The DEA counterclaimed that U.S. Customs was selective in providing information and that its intelligence usually failed to lead to the significant cases. (Freemantle, 1985)

The DEA assumed its new role as the primary federal agency charged with the investigation of drug violations. Unique to the DEA's powers was its international authority. DEA was designed to be on parallel status with the FBI under the purview of the U.S. Department of Justice. The DEA was to take guidance from the Director of the FBI. The FBI still remained primary in its domestic jurisdiction with overseas liaison offices. State and local officials were limited by their own geographical restraints. The DEA was designated to receive all drug intelligence information from the FBI and other law enforcement

agencies. The DEA was at the forefront of developing cooperative ventures with state and local law enforcement. These cooperative efforts were dictated by DEA. Police departments working with DEA had unprecedented access to both DEA personnel and resources, thus enhancing their delivery of services to their communities. The early efforts of the DEA got mixed reviews.

By the mid-70s state and local police departments were merging their efforts in regional task forces identified as Municipal Enforcement Groups or MEG Units. Task force and strike force groups were the developing catchwords in law enforcement management circles (United States Department of Law Enforcement Assistance, Houston, 1975). It was increasingly accepted that drug investigations by smaller law enforcement organizations required cooperative efforts. Even the smallest police departments discovered that to provide drug enforcement to their communities they needed to structure joint arrangements (Rossler, 1977; Infante, 1977; Purdy, 1979).

As of 1973, the DEA asserted itself as the leading drug enforcement agency. The FBI was instructed to pass all drug intelligence information to the DEA and to any appropriate state, or local agencies. The FBI's mission was to provide support and coordination so as to minimize duplication of efforts. All FBI resources, including the investigative support through the identification or laboratory divisions, were to be provided to police agencies upon request. The FBI designated drug coordinators to insure this cooperation (GAO Report, 1979).

Many task forces across the country soon discovered they were targeting the same criminal subjects as were other law enforcement agencies in their territory. Some cities developed a common drug intelligence database for drug investigations containing subjects' names, addresses, and telephone numbers. This system was often run by the local DEA office; the data were developed through intelligence related reports submitted by agencies for inclusion in this database. When an agency initiated a case, it was expected an investigator would contact this system and advise the identities of intended subjects and of any locations of interest. This database was designed to insure the safety of investigators and the integrity of cases being worked throughout the city. Its aim was to assist investigators in determining a more complete profile of their targets and to insure that investigators were not targeting one another in reverse undercover operations. (A reverse undercover operation is one in which the police operative offers to sell rather than buy the drug product.)

Names were routinely processed through the database and investigators were told whether or not any other agency was working on or had "proprietary interest" in these subjects or locations. The agency showing the earliest and most significant investigative action was presumed to have proprietary interest and control in the case. If an investigator determined that another agency had reported an interest in the same subjects or locations, the querying investigator was provided the identity of

the officers/agents who was presumably already involved in an investigation. It was also presumed that contact between the two investigators would be the next step.

At the same time, it was also understood that the agency 'having a buy' (3) into any of the subjects or associates in the criminal organization to which the subject had been linked had controlling or proprietary interest. This inevitably led to arguments about precedence. Because of the informal proprietary interest rule, there was a marked reticence on the part of many investigators to make the call to the database for the initial submission of facts or query. It was believed by investigators that their case interests would either be revealed to other agencies or another agency would overstate its investigative activity in order to assert the controlling interest in a case. Additionally, many investigators believed that the prestige or reputation attached to certain investigators or enforcement groups insured that the subjects, locations, or organizations queried through this system probably indicated "good targets' and subsequently productive cases. Many investigators came to believe

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3/ "Having a buy" into a group means that the investigative activity includes a hand to hand drug purchase with identified criminal subjects. This also signifies that one investigation is further along and thus has control of this investigative matter.

that cases were often stolen as a result of their query to this data system. (4)

During the late 70s several local police departments published reports of their experience with task forces. Gerald Rossler (1977), senior investigator for a small Illinois police department, wrote that the use of the aforementioned MEG units represented a pooling of personnel and resources for agencies not supported by separate drug units. Rossler stated the participating municipalities did not view these units as a repudiation of their responsibility to their respective communities. They accepted the fact that drug trafficking crossed many geographic borders with little respect for jurisdictional boundaries. The operational control of these units was left to a board of the Chiefs of Police of the municipalities involved. Rossler's report of the statistical accomplishments (arrests/search warrants, convictions, and asset forfeitures) showed that the task force or MEG unit was significantly more effective than the individual department's efforts. Cooperation among law enforcement agencies was relatively uncommon during this period.

4/ The Drug Enforcement Communication System (DECS) is used throughout the country in varied forms. One agency usually sponsors the operation of the database and is, therefore, privy to investigative interests expressed during a query of this system by other agencies.

In 1977, Sheriff George L. Infante of Albany, New York, asserted that the increasing sophistication of drug trafficking operations had made the constraint of adhering to jurisdictional boundaries a critical problem in the enforcement of drug statutes. Infante described a task force comprised of federal, state and local officials. Infante argued that the key factor in cooperative ventures was that each agency brought a particular expertise that was necessary to bring the case to a successful conclusion. He articulated the necessity for sharing intelligence and resources and the ability to cross all jurisdictional boundaries in pursuit of criminal drug targets. Infante also argued that access to more equipment, manpower and prosecutive resources was crucial for smaller agencies that were attempting to attack drug operations that flourished in their territory. Infante credited the DEA for its training programs and the U.S. Customs, Border Patrol and Coast Guard for their contributions to task forces.

E. Wilson Purdy, Former Director of Public Safety in Dade County, Florida, reported in 1979 that although there were growing philosophical disagreements within law enforcement about the manner of drug enforcement, cooperation among varied law enforcement agencies was essential to drug investigations. Purdy also noted that such cooperation had not been easy. He further stated that these task forces reported problems involving the disclosure of informants and other investigative information and credit claiming for arrests and seizures. Purdy's conclusions

were based on his experience with a DEA task force in south Florida coupled with Dade County law enforcement officials. This relationship provided access to county intelligence reports. This task force ultimately included eight local and two federal agencies. Increased arrests and seizures were attributed to this unit. Purdy noted that task forces made an important contribution to future interagency relationships and cooperation. According to Purdy, the ongoing liaison is a key to winning the drug war.

Daryl F. Gates (1979), former chief of police in Los Angeles, reported the "fulfillments and the frustrations" of the multi-agency approach. Gates acknowledged that the increased mobility and technology available to criminal enterprises had forced police departments to take stock of their own capabilities. Gates stated that it became legally expedient for federal, state, and local law enforcement to cooperate towards eradicating drug trafficking activities.

However, Gates (1979) reported a number of problems that hampered investigations. One of these problems was that agencies held differing approaches in drug enforcement. Another was that local and state officers were unfamiliar with federal laws and restrictions. Gates also perceived inadequate communications systems as a hinderance to investigations.

At the same time, Gates reported several investigative successes which he credited to the inclusion and assistance of the Narcotic Information Network (NIN) of the state of California. This network provided information which enabled task

forces to conclude national and international cases. As a result, Gates observed that interagency mistrust and lack of cooperation could no longer be counted on by criminals and used to their advantage. However, throughout the summer of 1984 as the Olympics were unfolding in Los Angeles, Gates continued to express concerns regarding interagency cooperation. Gates was adamant about the Los Angeles Police Department's primacy in the direction of security for this event. Gates expressed the earlier position of former police chief William Parker regarding relinquishing control to federal law enforcement in responding to the FBI's entreaty to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (5) regarding a multi-agency effort at the 1984 Olympics. Gates advised that he would not sign this agreement and that "The LAPD was the lead agency in the City of Los Angeles. I was in charge, as I intended to be." (Shah, 1992, p.244).

Published reports from state and local officials indicated benefits from cooperative efforts. Although problems were reported, they appeared to be subordinate to the statistical accomplishments involving arrests, search warrants, and asset

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5/ A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is an FBI term used to describe the contract forged with local/state law enforcement regarding the policies and practices of a joint operation. This MOU can be used for both long or short term ventures and spell out manpower, administrative, forfeiture sharing, media releases, and equipment provisions for a cooperative effort. It also usually includes a section through which an agency can dissolve the relationship. This also addresses that all decision will be made by consensus and lays out the system of direct supervision of the task force.

seizures. Statistical accomplishments appear to be the key to the political acceptance and survival of task forces. Each agency participating in the task force had to be able to show a positive impact in a crime problem area where its prior performance had been less effective.

Joint efforts often arise from the realization that departments are working the same targets. Former DEA Administrator, Peter Bensinger (GAO, 1982), advised that he wanted close cooperation in order to reduce the jealousies of the past. DEA, in particular, reported it own ambivalence while participating on task forces even though it had orchestrated and sponsored such endeavors since the 1970's (Jensen, 1976).

In early 1977, a nationwide study of drug enforcement was conducted by a research team comprised of Dr. Jay R. Williams, Dr. Lawrence J. Redlinger, and Dr. Peter K. Manning funded by a grant through the Law Enforcement Administration Association (LEAA). This study was one of the few that involved drug enforcement on both an organizational and investigative levels. This research was designed to identify the varying missions and strategies of drug enforcement used by small to medium-sized police departments. The following is a listing of the interorganizational problems identified during interviews

with officers and command personnel:

> 1. Competition for informants: Federal agents could pay more. Sometimes local units lost cases and informants because of this competition.
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> 2. Competition with other drug units: Federal agents and a local detectives knew they were working the same subjects, but did not make cooperative arrangements.
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> 3. Shared information issues: Lack of shared information on subjects, dealing networks,and informants.
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> 4. Resources: Local detectives expressed envy of equipment and working conditions available to to federal agents.
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> 5. Historical competition/feuds: Past histories of feuds either among drug unit investigators or among the heads of units.
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> 6. Prosecutive differences: Participants disagreed on legal questions surrounding the charges and the courts in which cases would be prosecuted.
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> 7. Jurisdictional disputes: Units would feel that the other overstepped its jurisdiction while engaged in chases, raids, or investigations.
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> 8. No formalized cooperative arrangements: Participants failed to create policies through which sharing cases, information, money, equipment, personnel, could be coordinated. Cooperation was seemed wholly dependent on the personal relations maintained by the heads of units, sergeants or supervisors.(Narcotics Control Digest, 1979)

Although the research identified the problems inherent in cooperation or coordination among law enforcement agencies engaged in drug enforcement, the thrust of this study's findings was to suggest strategies for ideally effective drug units. These

strategies involved "organization-based" modes of control that seek to evaluate the drug problem, to set enforcement goals, to determine resources, to monitor and evaluate the progress of these units, and to adjust resources and goals as the drug trafficking environment changes.

This research found that cooperation, whether interdepartmental or interagency, was often withheld because of the agencies' sense of protecting turf. It reported that case targeting was grounded in the exchange and interchange of information. Such intelligence tended to be regarded as the property of individual investigators or "unit owned". As a result, this information was often withheld when sought from 'outsiders' or even other unit investigators. This withholding often proved a detriment to investigations. Interestingly, although the focus of this research was not interagency coordination, it described coordination with other agencies as one of the most common problems experienced in managing drug enforcement squads or units.

The interviews conducted with officers and command personnel showed that the methods of targeting criminal subjects varied from department to department. Targeting was based on the particular mission of the department (service and crime control). This study (Williams, et al., 1979) noted that varied rules of entry and recruitment, modes of training, continuing education, and task evaluations were all important to the overall effectiveness of drug enforcement. This study observed that drug

enforcement units developed their own personality as they adjusted their practices to departmental polices to insure survival. In these interviews, managers of drug units expressed the wish to control staffing of these units. They employed varying methods of filling vacancies. Nevertheless, assignment to a drug unit was perceived as a reward by task force personnel.

Overall, this research (Williams, et al., 1979) found that personal relations among unit or agency heads were critical to cooperation. Further, frequent contact or shared office space for drug unit members with a similar orientation to task was important to the successful outcome of cases. Additionally, mutual respect among investigators was observed to be significant to task force success. The control of information or sources of information also proved vital to developing and controlling drug cases.

During the late 1970s discussions of a possible DEA/FBI merger were being pursued. U.S. Attorney General Griffin Bell announced at the April 1977 National Border Crime Conference that greater cooperation was needed among federal agencies and among federal, state, and local government agencies. Bell announced that since the FBI was considered the finest investigative agency, including the FBI in drug enforcement efforts might make a significant contribution in controlling the drug crime problem. Bell advised that there was already a U.S. Department of Justice study in progress regarding a merger between the DEA and FBI.

By July 1977, the merger seemed likely, although several legislative issues still needed to be explored. An important concern was that DEA agents are classified under civil service while FBI agents are classified as an "excepted status." The merger also raised possible difficulties about conducting overseas operations with the FBI having only domestic authority. In a subsequent press release, U.S. Attorney General Bell said that he was never in favor of the merger. Bell then announced the formation of FBI/DEA task forces in several large cities. Later, it was reported (Narcotics Control Digest, April 27,1977) that U.S. Attorney General Bell's comments were intended only to force discussions between the two agencies and not to enforce a merger.

In September 1977, final plans for the Bell task forces were formulated (Narcotics Control Digest, September, 1977). Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City were the chosen sites. The number and the structure of these task forces was left to the agencies involved. As it happened, each city created one task force under this plan. Two of the units were headed by FBI supervisors and one by a DEA supervisor. However, it has been suggested that the DEA had asked that the task forces be initiated as a compromise to avoid the much discussed merger with the FBI (GAO, 1982). The task forces were designed to improve operational efficiency in worldwide drug enforcement. At the outset of this undertaking, cooperation among federal agencies and cooperation with state and local officials was the overriding goal.

1980-1989 Review

The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report (1982) entitled: FBI-DEA Task Forces: An Unsuccessful Attempt at Joint Investigations reviewed the experience of the task forces created by U.S. Attorney General Bell. This report had been ordered by the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights. GAO found that the task forces were beset with insurmountable problems and that the attempts to correct the problems had proved unsuccessful. The task forces were officially terminated in 1979. It is interesting to note that GAO had tremendous problems in obtaining records or information for its review from both agencies. Although the experiment with these task forces was officially deemed a failure, the Los Angeles task force was perceived as successful and remained active for one year beyond the termination of the program. This success was attributed to successful prosecutions and genial relations between the agencies in Los Angeles. In fact, the GAO reported that the continuation of the task force was due to productive cases at Los Angeles. An FBI source in Los Angeles revealed that the relationships among task force managers and members were "good" and said that the continuation of the task force involving the FBI, Long Beach Police Department, Los Angeles Police Department, and the California Department of Safety proved beneficial to participants.

The GAO (1982) further reported that its review had been limited due to the poor cooperation received from both the

FBI and DEA personnel. GAO's review involved analysis of task force administrative documents and interviews of task force supervisors from both agencies. GAO stated this analysis was hampered by the selective provision of information and the guarded observations of both agency personnel. GAO said that its review was incomplete and that it was impossible to independently verify the information that was provided.

However, the GAO's analysis did result in several findings:

1. The task forces were troubled from the outset because of differing investigative philosophies, lack of case progress, and the continuing disagreements between the FBI and DEA supervisors over investigative procedures.

2. A mid-course correction was attempted. Supervisory personnel were changed twice in two cities, as was the case targeting strategy in all units. These adjustments failed to revive the failing program.

3. An FBI internal evaluation agreed with the GAO report as noted in item Number 1. The DEA did not conduct its own internal formal review of these experiences.

During a June 1979 appearance before a congressional committee, DEA Administrator Bensinger revealed that discussions between himself and Director of the FBI, William Webster, produced similar conclusions. They decided that informal working relations were preferable to formalized task force groups.

The GAO report noted that the stated purpose of these task forces was to "combine both agencies' resources in order to achieve successful prosecution of organized crime figures engaged in high level narcotics trafficking"(GAO, 1982, p.1). This was not accomplished. Overall, the DEA Agents believed that the FBI agents were unprepared and ill-suited for drug enforcement work. DEA personnel were particularly unimpressed with the quality and quantity of FBI informants and FBI intelligence directed at drug investigations. FBI agents reported DEA agents relied on a narrow scope of investigative techniques. The DEA responded that the FBI's techniques often compromised ongoing drug investigations. The FBI reported that the DEA incentive program requiring the evidence of arrests and seizures interfered with long-term targeting of major drug targets. Overall, FBI and DEA agents viewed themselves as " inherently incompatible because of their differing backgrounds, training, and investigative philosophies" (GAO, 1982, p.9). The GAO report indicated that street investigators assigned to these units believed that all task force personnel were hardworking and competent "in their own areas of experience and expertise." (GAO, 1982, p.9). The GAO reported that the interjection of the FBI into drug enforcement provided an expanded personnel pool and a domestic law enforcement network that could assist DEA and other law enforcement agencies in their pursuit of more elusive and competent criminal drug enterprises.

As reported in item Number 2 of the GAO report findings, approximately six months after these task forces were initiated, agency leaders met in Washington, D.C. regarding the continued viability of these units. The outcome was the replacement of five of the six supervisors assigned to the three task forces (Two of the replacements were later replaced themselves). With changes of leadership, these groups also attempted new systems for targeting criminal operations. Another review six months later determined the task forces were operating principally as street drug units arresting only low level violators. As a result, the units failed to develop the organization or enterprise cases for which they were created. The FBI evaluation concluded that the greatest difficulty was the task force concept itself "attempting to combine agency personnel having divergent methods of investigation which resulted in broad disagreements" (GAO, 1982, p.8). The DEA did not conduct an internal evaluation.

The GAO reported that by January 1979 these task forces terminated operations. Personnel from both agencies told the GAO that they did not believe that the other agency had unique skills that could enhance their own drug enforcement efforts. The Los Angeles task force reported improved communication between the two agencies as a result of this project. The GAO report reiterated the continuing effort on the part of the U.S. Attorney General to improve coordination and cooperation among federal, state, and local law enforcement. At the close of this report,

the GAO restated the U.S. Attorney General's intent to continue studying the merger of the FBI and DEA as an option for improving relations among agencies handling drug violations (GAO, 1982).

Many public reports indicated that law enforcement agencies were committed to cooperation to foil the mobility and expertise of drug operations and to overcome the political realities of funding. However, behind the public facade, the perceived encroachment of agencies into one another's investigations consistently appeared to thwart the unreserved cooperation needed to meet the expanding scope of international drug trafficking.

The 1980s saw the greatest increase in funding and personnel dedicated to the drug enforcement effort (Appendix B). Interagency cooperation was an issue discussed at all government levels. The mingling of intelligence bases and discussions about cooperation between the FBI and the DEA continued. Many state and local law enforcement agencies adopted the task force as a tool to combat criminals who repeated their successful methods from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

The gulf between the "locals" and "feds" had existed since the 1930s but the drug enforcement imperative seemed to highlight the issue more acutely. It was in the early 1980s that the U.S. Attorney General formed the Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee (LECC) in each of the 94 federal judicial districts. Officials from federal, state, and local law enforcement were asked to play a role in setting enforcement priorities for

federal authorities in those districts. Federal authorities were required to include the opinions of local officials regarding the manner in which drug enforcement was pursued within their areas. It was an attempt to tailor law enforcement priorities to specific areas of the country and the particular personalities and needs of state and local law enforcement agencies involved.

On January 21, 1982, U.S. Attorney General William French Smith announced that the FBI would be given concurrent jurisdiction with the DEA for the investigation of drug offenses. This Justice Department Order was signed several days later, and the Implementation Directive was issued on March 12, 1982. On October 14, 1982, President Ronald Reagan announced the creation of 13 regional task forces; they would be collectively referred to as the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF). Initially, these task forces were designed as U.S. Department of Justice entities. However, over the years, these groups have expanded to include many combinations of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Funding committed to the OCDETF program made cooperation an attractive option. OCDETF funding reimbursed local law enforcement for the overtime committed by officers to these cases and was of particular importance to both investigators and managers of these agencies.

The initiation and operation of OCDETF investigations are controlled by each judicial district and can vary in small administrative ways. However, case initiation usually proceeds in the following manner: one or more agencies of varied government

levels determines a criminal target and authors a case initiation form which describes the targets, intent and justification for the investigation. Federal agencies mandated to investigate drug offenses often sponsor a local or state-generated investigation that is determined to have multi-jurisdictional elements. In this way, a state or local investigation can smoothly move across jurisdictions with the same full financial and investigatory support that federal agencies enjoy through their offices located throughout the United States and abroad.

An OCDETF committee composed of managers from each member federal agency reviews this initiation form. This review accomplishes several goals. It alerts agencies not involved in the initial submission of the case write-up of the intended targets. Investigators often unknowingly target the same criminal subjects. Contact from the OCDETF committee provides the coordination necessary for safety, case integrity and investigatory support issues. The committee discusses the importance of the investigation and its relation to the crime problem identified by the OCDETF members in that region. Usually, cases are approved without issue. It is also interesting to note in the 13 regions that the Assistant U.S. Attorneys' often attempt to assert control of even the investigatory phase of these cases. Depending on the relationship among agencies and with the U.S. Attorney's office, this control is either abdicated or maintained by law enforcement investigators. Either way, the

input of government attorneys is important is designing the prosecution of cases and supporting case direction.

Several OCDETF investigations have been reported in law enforcement journals and the news media. OCDETF was said to have brought a new dimension to drug enforcement effort. In January 1983,. the first FBI/NYPD drug task force was created under the OCDETF program. This coupling was possible due to the foresight of New York City Police Commissioner Patrick Murphy and Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI's New York Division, Kenneth P.Walton who, in 1979, agreed that New York City was experiencing a major bank robbery problem. It was because of this crime problem that the first NYPD /FBI Task Force was created by Murphy and Walton. Walton (1987) later reflected on this project in an article discussing this experience. He contended there must be both commitment and solidarity among agency heads. This commitment must be communicated to members of the task force in its early stages. Walton said it was normal for agency hierarchies to begin to worry about credit taking as the task force produced results. The spirit of task forces must be that the job gets done and not who gets the credit. The sharing of credit comes naturally if there is solidarity among agency heads.

Using the approach developed by Murphy and Walton, agency heads and task force supervisors were tasked to communicate with one another frequently. Murphy and Walton believed that co-location of task force personnel was vital and that no information was so sensitive it could not be shared among

task force members. Walton (1987) warned that any withholding of information would damage the partnership concept.

Walton (1987) believed that the personalities of those spearheading task force efforts were critical to ensuring cooperation and that anything less than real cooperation should not be tolerated. One of the first difficulties encountered in this effort was that FBI agents would conduct background checks of even seasoned NYPD detectives in order to allow full disclosure of FBI information. Detectives insulted by the idea of background checks were transferred by the NYPD to another unit. Walton reported that the NYPD detectives who remained after the flurry of transfers were well accepted. All local investigators were sworn in as Deputy U.S. Marshals in order to allow their movement across jurisdictions and access to investigative information as equals with their federal counterparts. This process is known as deputation and it is usually case specific and renewed yearly. Permanent task forces undertake numerous investigations together. Deputation of local law enforcement officers is designed to cover all investigations undertaken by the task force rather than to deputize for each individual case.

The first drug task force created between the FBI and the NYPD had approximately 17 agents and 15 detectives. This task force was later expanded to include 6 DEA agents with a senior DEA agent with supervisory authority. The first unit, one of the squads examined in this dissertation, was supervised by one FBI manager and two NYPD commanders, a lieutenant and sergeant. The

investigative personnel were NYPD detectives with more than ten years experience and FBI agents with more than seven years experience. The total number of investigators assigned to this unit varied from 35-40.

One of the first investigations handled by this unit was a case brought to it by detectives from one of the NYPD borough narcotics' units now assigned to the task force. It was code named Brooknor.(Brooklyn North Narcotics). This case involved heroin trafficking by Italian mafia figures operating both domestically and internationally. DEA agents also brought cases to the unit. One DEA sponsored case involved a Honduran businessman and several Colombian confederates who attempted to sell members of the task force hundreds of kilos of cocaine. The FBI brought a developing investigation that became known as the Pizza Connection. It involved the heroin trafficking activities of Sicilian mafia figures. This investigation resulted in the creation of an unprecedented international law enforcement working group through the U.S. Department of Justice, titled the American-Italian Working Group. The cooperation with foreign police would later serve other drug task forces as well as identify and assist in the investigation of the previously unaddressed problem of Sicilian drug traffickers in the United States.

The DEA, FBI and NYPD played integral roles in the success of these investigations as this unit was touted as an example of a successful OCDETF operation. Many agency managers

agreed that prior to the infusion of OCDETF there was much "smoke and mirrors" (Crime Control Digest, December 12, 1983 p. 3) in the discussions of doing things better together.

This study contends that agency rivalries and turf protection still exist. There is a dichotomy between the rhetoric and the reality. The turf is information, resources, large-scale targets, and funding which is dependent on an agency selling its effectiveness to the public and Congress. All law enforcement entities are involved in self-perpetuation. They must maximize their accomplishments to obtain the public approval that allows them to accomplish their mission. Manning (1992) observed in his work on organizational communication noted that police authority is granted by the deference of the public audience. Police agencies manage their mandate and induce or persuade or make possible the cooperation of their significant audiences in their performances via their work product. The significance of this performance is translated in public confidence and governmental funding at all levels.

For law enforcement, cooperation can mean increased budgets, public moral support, and recognition of its particular ability to accomplish its mission. Agencies can grow or diminish depending on their success at winning the public's confidence. Like any organization, law enforcement publishes its successes and internalizes its problems for its own review. Every law enforcement agency has its own organizational culture, attitudes, or policies which affect and its work force or mission in a

variety of ways. The use of task forces challenges the autonomy that is an integral characteristic of law enforcement entities.

New York Mayor, Rudolph W. Giuliani, as U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York, critiqued the OCDETF program in the Public Administrative Review (November, 1985). He remarked that the key to successful task forces appeared to be the quality and nature of the working relationship with locals. Giuliani observed that getting agents to work is to create a team relationship rather than a command structure. Task force participants must act as equal partners with everyone sharing both the responsibility and the credit. As task forces are formed across the country, the daily contact of investigators is increasingly necessary as is the sharing of task force expenses (McChesney, 1988).

In 1984, President Ronald Reagan signed the National Narcotics Act, which expanded the resources applied to the drug enforcement commitment affecting federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts. The National Drug Enforcement Policy Board was also created by the National Narcotics Act to coordinate the activities of the agencies involved in federal drug enforcement. The board provides policy guidance to both the OCDETF program and the National Narcotics Board Interdiction System (NNBIS). NNBIS is a management system, under the direction of the Vice President of the United States, designed to coordinate the drug interdiction efforts spearheaded with the U.S. Department of

Defense, the military services and other federal, state, and local law enforcement.

The board acts in an advisory capacity on the direction of federal drug enforcement policy and allocation of resources. The board is also involved in issues of drug demand reduction and drug education as it oversees a comprehensive drug policy for the federal government.

Early in 1986, a series of meetings evolved directing an FBI/NYPD/DEA task force at the activities of major heroin dealers in the New York metropolitan area. (This squad is also one of the units examined in this dissertation) Both local and federal prosecutors were involved in these conferences, which were designed to make peace among the various law enforcement agencies that often seemed more intent on protecting their turf and gaining exclusive arrests than on pooling their resources to attack a specific crime problem (Holmes, 1991). The squad focused on drug organizations in Harlem and the South Bronx. The squad claimed to share informants, witnesses, and resources supporting undercover operations and wiretap installations. FBI Supervisor Arthur C. Grubert said that the key interest of this squad's work was not to be statistically oriented or to worry about making big seizures. The interest was to take down distribution networks (Holmes, 1991).

In 1988, the FBI and the DEA formulated joint drug strategy plans for six major cities- New York, Miami, Chicago, Houston, San Diego, and Los Angeles under the High Density Drug

Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) program. The plan was to maximize the resources of both agencies in joint drug operations. These joint plans were designed to strengthen the cooperative bond between two agencies that additional resources were deemed necessary. The FBI's National Drug Strategy fully supported this effort. Journal articles regarding joint operations stressed the need for equal participation and mutual decision making among agencies implementing task forces (Revell, 1990).

1990 Review

In September 1990, amidst the cooperative rhetoric, a Cleveland FBI-sponsored task force charged it had been betrayed by members of a DEA task force who were reportedly jealous over the media attention given the successes of other agencies. The Cleveland DEA came across information regarding a Wells Fargo robbery which was not within its investigative responsibility. A DEA informant told DEA Agents that an FBI informant was possibly involved. It was known to the DEA through their informant that an FBI-sponsored task force was setting up a multi-kilo drug deal with subjects identified by their informant. DEA agents instructed their informant to 'set up' the informant being used by the FBI-sponsored task force. The DEA raided the residence of the FBI task force informant on the Wells Fargo violation information and interrupted a long term operation involving a 220 kilo load of cocaine from Los Angeles. The DEA concurred that there was a problem with the behavior of its agents. Some members of the FBI sponsored task force, who wished not to be identified,

said that an ongoing adversarial relationship existed between the FBI/local law enforcement agencies and the regional DEA office. This case was illustrative of the extent to which turf and rivalry can affect ongoing and multi-agency investigations.

In October 1990 the House Armed Services Committee decried the turf battles that continued between the U.S. Department of Defense and other drug enforcement agencies. The problem involved a task force in Florida. The Office of National Drug Control Policy was called to arbitrate. The committee had information that indicated the cooperative effort was fragmented and had little strategic focus coupled with inadequate sharing of information (Drug Enforcement Report, 1990). According to the findings of the board, the sharing and the integration of this information were necessary to achieve the broad national purpose of drug interdiction.

Federal agencies involved in drug enforcement continue to publicly espouse cooperation. Official memorandums issued by the FBI discuss task forces as workplaces where all investigators are on equal footing. Such memorandums usually say that information, resources, and investigations should be shared fully. The NYPD has historically participated in multi-agency task forces. Task forces are an accepted method of cooperation in the investigations of a range of violations that now include violent crime and the arrest of violent offenders/fugitives. The

reality of limited funding, resources, and personnel often makes the use of task forces the most effective and prudent option.

In 1991, Richard Bocklet published a critique of DEA-sponsored task forces across the country. Bocklet observed there were 44 permanent and 12 provisional task forces sponsored by DEA nationwide with varied state and local law enforcement agencies. Bocklet advised that one of the reported advantages of these task forces was the access to investigators with street savvy and street contacts coupled with the national and international capabilities of DEA. The cohesion of these groups is credited to meaningful representation, decisional input, and fairly shared credit. Managers of the task forces told Blocklet that members hang up their hats at the door and assume the identity of the group. Problems are handled quickly as they develop.

Bocklet reported comments from varied managers of these task forces:

> "The success of a task force lies in its cohesion and sense of purpose. It's a win-win situation for both feds and local law enforcement. The only advice I'd give is to make sure that the operation is completely integrated, decisions are made democratically, and recognition is shared equally." (Law and Order, 1991, p.276)

Bocklet (1991) said that while their detectives assumed the identity of the task force, they were encouraged to maintain critical contact with their parent department. These managers said that detectives assigned to the task force were assigned the collateral duty of liaison. Managers advised they emphasized the multi-agency aspect of the cases when there was media coverage. They reported that non-team players were quickly ferreted out and reassigned. The availability of shared forfeitures and personnel were particularly attractive aspects of task force operations for smaller local police departments.

Mixed reactions continued regarding the value of engaging in task force ventures. There were still public admonishments regarding turf battles as evidenced in the previously noted remarks of both U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno and Director of the FBI Louis J. Freeh. The fact the International Association of Police Chiefs and the International Narcotics Officers Association routinely addressed turf problems in their regular newsletters and journals affirms the continuing concern with the personal dynamics associated with cooperative ventures. The possibility of an FBI/DEA merger arose again during the Clinton Administration's talk of recreating government. The merger was put to rest when U.S. Attorney General Reno created the position of Director For Investigative Agency Policies. The purpose of this position was to coordinate the resolution of operational issues where there is overlapping jurisdiction among law enforcement agencies of the Department of Justice. The DEA

would continue as a single-mission agency for drug enforcement and continue to be headed by its own administrator. The current FBI director, Louis Freeh, holds the position of Director for this adjunct office of the U.S. Justice Department. Predictably, other Justice Department agencies felt that the FBI's interests may be served above others. However, Director Freeh, in his capacity as Director For Investigative Agency Policies, initiated and put into operation a shared drug intelligence database between the FBI and DEA. This effort was achieved within six months of his appointment.

The Police Subculture in the Context of Drug Enforcement

Law enforcement organizations have a certain esprit de corps. They define themselves and recruit with historically derived personas and the suggestion of elitism and selectivity. Law enforcement organizations boast that this "family" and the "few good men" theory of recruitment affects the psychological contract (Schein, 1971) and commitment to the organization. Organizations utilize the recruitment phase to imbue their members with the special characteristics and demands of the job. Organizations do this to emphasize the special people needed to join their ranks. The agencies involved in this study have histories and heroes with which to persuade recruits as evidence of their elitism and the serious obligation and commitment one undertakes as one of them or as a member of the family; thus the

identification of the home organization as the parent organization.

Munro (1974) asserted that each police organization develops its own mythology. This body of beliefs acts as the first line of psychological defense when law enforcement is confronted with the differences between what it articulates to the public and what it may actually accomplish (Manning, 1992).

Organizations develop distinctive subcultures in which members define their roles. A subculture defines an occupational group as distinctive (Cole, 1986). Cole writes that the subculture is the aggregate of symbols, beliefs, and values shared by members of the subgroup within the larger society. These shared views define a member's view of the work environment, the organization, and the circumstances which one is expected to confront. These shared views are orchestrated by entry requirements, training, behavioral standards, and organizationally derived goals (Cole,1986). Socialization to the subculture is a critical part of a recruit's adaptation to the job. At the same point, it is likely that a recruit will come into contact with a senior member who will point out to the recruit that the "real NYPD or FBI" is out on the street, not in the academy or the training manuals. The test of loyalty and the willingness to adopt a professional esprit de corps of the police organizations are essential to a member's real acceptance within any subgroup of the organization's task environment (Westley, 1970; McNamara, 1967; Neiderhoffer,1967)

This socialization process has a great impact on law enforcement operations. The working personalities of law enforcement officers separate them from the rest of society. (Skolnick, 1966; Cole, 1986) For many law enforcement officials the job is a major source of identity and self-esteem. The relinquishing of any of its aura or elitism may severely diminish the individual's perception of self in the face of their law enforcement role (Martin, 1980; Steihm, 1981). The elements of danger, authority, and the work personality constantly reinforce one another. They must be perpetuated for the sake of the organization and for the individual officer's ability to interact with the parent organization.

The work personality is essential to presenting the image and team performance. (Goffman, 1959) It is also vital to attaining the organization's goals while meeting the public's expectations. Skolnick (1966) argued that the police personality is comprised of norms, sanctions, and collective ends. The danger of adhering too closely to an occupational ideology is that it isolates an officer from the rest of society. One result is that the officer may come to turn to their occupational community for support, solidarity, and social identity. This dependency spills over to off-duty activities. According to Skolnick, officers protect themselves from both supervisors and the public by adopting strategies that guide behavior and elevate the interests of the group.

The Drug Enforcement Work Culture

The drug task force also takes on a particular set of rituals and expectations. These are partly driven by the parent organization's assertions of control, policies, and regulations, and demands of the drug trafficking subculture (Manning, 1980). Manning contended that the drug agent must also adopt a mythic perception of his or her ability to have an impact on the "war on drugs", to address the problem with some integrity.

Wilson's work (1978) regarding FBI agents and narcotics agents suggested that accountability to supervisors was perceived to be less important than in other assignments. Drug agents and detectives are viewed by colleagues who are not drug investigators, as "running fast and hard, getting over on the system, cowboys, and not really working". It is perceived by law enforcement officers that those who work drugs are out of the mainstream of the organization and out of the direct control of managers. Drug enforcement takes place primarily during the evening and early morning hours which tend to be different hours than those of other non-drug assigned colleagues. (Manning, 1980; Wilson, 1978; Levine, 1990; Pistone, 1985)

Drug enforcement demands an extraordinary commitment of time and sacrifices in the agent/detective's personal life. One of the measures of loyalty to the task force unit is a member's availability and willingness to "answer the bell" or to be there when the "deal goes down". For example, it is not uncommon for a member of the task force to be working in an undercover capacity

arranging the purchase of drugs from a criminal target. This transaction may be scheduled for a morning meet. However, many calls and arrangements later, the target has delayed the transaction while the product is located or packaged, arranges transportation or money, or simply puts off the undercover agent in an effort to determine the agent's assertion that he or she is the person he or she represents him or herself to be. The target may suggest sites for the transaction to take place in order to control the situation. The target and the investigator may engage in endless discussions and negotiations that set the "meet" to occur after midnight the same day or in the early morning hours of the next. This transaction may not evolve at all but the drug agent must be patient and interpret the endless negotiations in relation to the target's actions. This analysis must involve a threat assessment as it pertains to the logistics of the meet and the ultimate control of circumstances surrounding the drug buy.

Patience is the byword for drug agents/detectives. They recognize that they cannot control integral portions of drug investigations. They certainly do not control the unpredictable behavior of drug traffickers. Drug traffickers' activities are full of deceit, subterfuge, and self-interest. It is vital for those involved in drug enforcement to have the patience to develop high-impact targets that make the endless hours of surveillance and contact with these criminal targets worthwhile (Levine, 1990; Blumenthal, 1989; Sterling, 1990).

Drug targets rarely keep timely appointments. They attempt to keep their customers and competition off balance through their unpredictable schedules and locations. They have no regard for normal working hours. Drug targets can also be drug users whose day begins after 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Drug targets are entrenched in their own subculture to which the drug investigator must be attuned in order to track the activities of these individuals. The language, dress, vehicles, marketing, and product packaging of the drugs is a unique identification of varied drug trafficking organizations (Sterling, 1990).

Source development is critical to an investigator's ability to determine inside details regarding the practice and operation of drug trafficking organizations. The relationship with and the development of sources is a process that requires extraordinary flexibility in arranging meetings and taking late night telephone calls. Some of these calls require an investigator to leave home in the middle of the night in order to meet with sources and confirm investigative information. Considerable patience is required to determine the motivation of sources. Analysis of motivation is critical to protecting the source and the investigator if situations turn violent. Drug investigators must also accept beeps and telephone calls all hours of the day or night in order to remain in touch with sources and the timely information sources provide. (Levine 1990, Pistone, 1985)

The understanding of spouses, families, and others close to investigators is critical to their ability to accomplish the job in a healthy mode, both physically and psychologically. The stress on family life can be inordinate (Pistone, 1985). It is important that investigators recognize this stress as real. Investigators assigned to drug enforcement interpret the perceived lack of understanding as attributable to the stress associated with the dichotomy of the drug subculture and the ability to move back to one's own life. (Pistone, 1985; Marx, 1988)

Any investigator unwilling to "answer the bell" regarding aspects of this work is usually ostracized by the unit. There are several other indicators of an investigator's credibility with other task force members. Time on the job is one. Irrespective of agency origin, seniority is an important element of one's acceptance by the unit and is used in conversation as a means to weight the importance or the rightness of an asserted point of view. Additionally, investigators perceived as seeking promotions tend to lose respect on the unit. Street investigators prefer to work cases rather than promote their careers. Another negative attribute is known as the prima donna or "star pattern" characteristic (Douglas, 1983). This description pertains to task force members who keep information to themselves so that they can, seemingly, control the case. This issue is often present when a "case goes down" and an investigator takes undue credit for the successful completion of

the investigation which the unit knows to have been a team effort. These individuals are often known to control investigative information for their own benefit and to the detriment of the team's credit. Individuals are also known to privately tout their contribution or investigative prowess in the company of supervisors but out of the presence of team members.

It is not uncommon for high profile cases to result in popular fiction or non-fiction books. Some investigators provide authors with information which describes themselves as more influential and important to a case than is true. In fact, the team knows that scores of investigators are necessary to bring high-profile cases to fruition (Blumenthal, 1989; Sterling, 1990). It is considered utter betrayal for any individual team member to manipulate facts in order to advance a personal career or to bask in public glory which should include the team. In this situation, the task force itself is a subculture that dictates the action and behavior of its members.

Task forces, by nature, are designed to work outside the normal patterns of organizational scrutiny and red tape (Morgan, 1984). This partially explains why drug investigators are labelled as rebels or mavericks. Task force assignments are perceived as elite assignments because of their separation from the organization, irregular work hours, access to luxury vehicles and heightened funding, and the perception of less control by superiors (Manning, 1980). Investigators proudly accept the image

of rebel and often have difficulty reintegrating to normal work assignments (Pistone, 1985; Levine,1990).

The administrative demands of drug enforcement work are virtually doubled by the implied risk, both in the operation of undercover scenarios and the use of great amounts of money. The authority levels for approving drug transactions and undercover operations are designed to offset both personal and organizational corruption. Drug enforcement work has a notorious reputation for fast and loose operations that come perilously close to the line dividing law enforcement from criminals. (Manning, 1980; Pistone, 1985; Levine, 1990)

Investigators assigned to drug enforcement usually dress in street clothing as opposed to the business attire appropriate to other assignments. The equipment used is often comprised of luxury, profile vehicles versus the "cop" sedans and there are resources with which to play the role of drug trafficker. Overtime is another important advantage for detectives and a plague for federal agents who receive the same overtime benefits as those agents not working this unconventional assignment. For example, one of the units examined for this study described a particular situation in which an undercover scenario initiated in the early morning hours continued for almost forty-eight hours. The detectives assigned to this unit talked about being "on the wheel" which meant that they completed a full rotation of the clock or a twenty-four hour period in which their negotiated union contract insured them a generous overtime

payment for these additional hours. FBI agents' salaries are on a schedule known as availability pay. Availability pay is a percentage of the agents' base salary paid over the year. FBI agents are expected to be "available" for duty at any time and within a two-hour reporting rule. FBI agents are not paid for the actual hours of overtime. NYPD detectives have a union contract and established tours of duty that dictate and protect their overtime pay interests. In fact, black humor is expressed in some task forces by FBI agents who "accuse" their NYPD counterparts of orchestrating long day scenarios for buy operations or surveillances in order to take advantage of the "wheel" and the overtime.

CHAPTER THREE: Literature Review

Overview

The human tendency towards cooperation or competition is the guiding principle of this study. The body of cooperation theory is great and ranges from business game theory and win-lose factors to the sociological implications of cooperative behavior (Barnard, 1938, Goffman, 1959; Sherif, 1966; Katz & Kahn, 1967; and Axelrod, 1984).

In 1938, Chester I.Barnard, a business executive turned theorist and organizational philosopher, wrote about formal organizations and the concept of cooperation. Barnard's work regarding organizations was basic in its definitions. Barnard contended that organizations come into "being when (1) there are persons able to communicate with each other, (2) who are willing to contribute action (3) to accomplish a common purpose" (Litterer, 1963, p.45). Barnard asserted that the continued existence of an organization is based on the interdependence of effectiveness and efficiency. Barnard defined effectiveness as the "relevance of it purpose to the environmental situation and efficiency as the interchange between the organization and the individual." Law enforcement's effectiveness is directly tied to the accomplishment of its mission, which is measured through the numbers of arrests, search warrants, and financial seizures. Law enforcement's efficiency is revealed through the relationship that the organization develops with its members. In the case of

law enforcement organizations, members are socialized into the paramilitary demands and ideology required to maintain an organization's ideology and norms. Socialization is particularly strident due to the asserted elitism.

Barnard also stated that organizations depend on the intensity of attachment to the "cause". (Litterer, 1963, p. 46) The cause being identified as an organization's mission. In addition, Barnard indicated that organizational cohesion required a surrendering of control and the depersonalization of personal action. This surrender is heightened in task forces as autonomous agencies must agree on a common purpose and act in the context of the task force rather than within one's own organizational expectations.

One of Barnard's approaches to organization is integral to his conceptualization of cooperation in organizations. Barnard has a very basic assertion about cooperation. Barnard indicated that the assessment of benefit and sacrifice is at the core of cooperative action. Barnard contended that there are intangible barriers in organizations comprised of departments, grades, ranks, policies, laws, prejudices, and the limitations placed upon it by its "consumers" (Barnard, 1938). Barnard suggested that individuals will oppose or promote cooperation based on these assessments. Barnard advanced that "..A high stage of civilization requires extensive human cooperation" (Wolf & Iino, 1986, p. 13).

Barnard stated that jealousy is one of the most basic conflicts underlying the human characteristic of the love of distinction. Jealousy is produced through conflicts of doctrine, theory, policy, and practices. Jealousy can have the favorable manifestations, one of which is competition. It can also result in unfavorable manifestations, some which are noncompliance and jurisdictional disputes (Barnard, 1938). Overall, Barnard asserted that cooperation or collective action "...greatly increases the effectiveness of human effort and accomplishes many indispensable functions impossible otherwise" (Wolf & Iino, 1986, p.17). According to Barnard (1938) both self-interest and the desire for distinction are powerful human traits inhibiting cooperative action.

Organizations or individuals consider the inducements to cooperate and then balance the assessed sacrifices as they relate to other options. There is an assessment of whether the cooperative action results in any advantage compared with independent action (Litterer, 1963, p.46). Barnard asserts that cooperation is viewed differently by the organization and the individual with respect to the assessment of interests served.

Barnard's work is important as the underlying theory used in this study. However, law enforcement organizations present complex work environments where autonomy and organizational ideology are considered primary elements of self-preservation and effectiveness. Law enforcement organizations and their acceptance of interagency task forces provide a forum for

this very basic assessment of benefit and sacrifice. The assessment of cooperative action by interagency task force investigators is the primary interest of this study. The thrust of Barnard's work goes to the heart of law enforcement's willingness or unwillingness to invest resources, personnel, and their organizational identity in these units.

However, the experience of law enforcement organizations and task forces lends itself greatly to organizational behavior work subsequent to Barnard's and has also been used in framing the hypotheses in this study. The body of literature regarding organizational structure and inter-organizational behavior as they relate to law enforcement organizations are presented as a foundation for the overall consideration of this study. The hypotheses frame the perceptions of interagency cooperation by federal and local law enforcement officials as reported in professional journals and popular media. The literature available suggests that local law enforcement agencies/investigators are less prone than federal law enforcement agencies/investigators to perceive the task force as a cooperative work environment, to perceive the task force as an environment in which investigative information is shared, and to perceive the task force as an environment in which task force members express or receive mutual, professional respect.

Lastly, law enforcement organizations are bureaucracies. Bureaucracies are defined as administrative systems with inflexible rules of operation and complex procedures

that can impede effective action Webster's II Riverside University Dictionary, 1984, p. 210). Coupled with the law enforcement's air of elitism and secrecy, bureaucracy makes cooperative interagency work groups problematic since the task force group is itself an extension of the parent organization's bureaucratic system. Taken in total, the literature on these topics provided both the research questions and the context of this study.

Literature Review

Barnard's (1938) theory of cooperation provides a basic view of human tendencies within the structure of organizations. Barnard's work suggested that cooperation is assessed at both the organizational and individual level. Barnard stated that the assessment of benefit and sacrifice is based on the perceived advantage or disadvantage that such cooperation would provide. Issues of benefit and sacrifice make task force participants acutely aware of the potential for lost autonomy while enhancing their access to limited resources. Organizations consider the surrender of control of personnel while enhancing their ability to solve crime problems traversing jurisdictions.

Law enforcement agencies operate on the premise of independence both for the sake of blind justice (distance from political influence) and for the perpetuation of organizational interests. The participation in interagency task forces are often viewed as a diminution of their perceived primacy in the law enforcement work environment.

In cooperation there is a surrender of personal action (Grusky & Miller, 1970). Barnard wrote that cooperation is a social aspect of organizations. Cooperation is shown through social acts or factors arising from the decision to cooperate (Barnard, 1938). He said that the dynamics of these social factors may also result in negative exchanges that limit cooperation. Barnard contended that effectiveness can be gauged by the accomplishment of the cooperative purpose and satisfaction

of the individual motives comprising the cooperative action. The existence of cooperation presupposes the accomplishments must be possible within the environment in which cooperation is undertaken. Further, there must be a fair distribution of satisfactions among those individuals carrying out the cooperative function. Barnard insisted that cooperation involved the indispensable ability to communicate with one another and sustain the integrity of purpose and the continuity of contributions realized (Barnard, 1938).

The literature review is organized so as to examine the unique organizational personality of law enforcement organizations as a foundation for the subsequent discussion of task force participation. In addition, the literature is presented around the three driving issues of this study, task forces as cooperative work environments, shared information as major element of the perception of cooperation within task force environments, and the perception of mutual, professional respect as evidence of inclusion and cooperation.

Organizational Literature as it Relates to Law Enforcement

The research is replete with theories and paradigms which examine organizations and the behavior attributed to both the organization and its members. Law enforcement agencies fall under the organizational rubric of bureaucracy with its issues of accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness. Law enforcement organizations must also be examined within the context of their work environment, which is characterized by a high level of

discretionary power and the use of force. Law enforcement organizations are often driven by their assertion of elitism, autonomy, and the separate and special status conferred by their mandate (Wilson, 1968; Van Maanen, 1973; Munro, 1974; Manning, 1977). There is much research supporting the assertion that police work affects employees in unique and varied ways as a result of the organization's expectations and the types of assignments experienced. (Niederhoffer, 1967; Reiser, 1973; Bonifacio, 1990). Manning (1980) found that drug enforcement units mirror the environments and subcultures in which they operate. Wilson (1978) noted that administrative systems often have a great effect on the work of law enforcement agencies. He even argued that internal agency procedures had a greater impact on the manner of enforcement than the nature of the crimes being investigated.

International and domestic localities coupled with technology purchased with criminal proceeds have assisted the often undetected flight of the drug trafficker. This was often the result of conflict and confusion among law enforcement organizations attempting to define responsibility in multi-jurisdictional investigative scenarios (Infante, 1977). Law enforcement organizations once claiming very individual and separate authority now find themselves inextricably tied to cooperative efforts. Cooperation became a necessity when dealing with complex drug trafficking crimes. Cooperation rhetoric from law enforcement is used to attempt to convince the public that

enforcement efforts were effective. An enormous effort is expended by law enforcement organizations as they came to negotiate when and where this cooperation would take place and how to preserve the needs of the parent organizations.

Wilson (1978) stated that bureaucracies, in particular, go to considerable length to create a set of attitudes or an organizational ethos. Law enforcement organizations know that their discretionary power and their ability to apply physical force makes their professional experience uniquely serious and perceived as powerful (Neiderhoffer, 1967; Wilson, 1968; Westley, 1970; Goldstein, 1977). Wilson (1978) asked in his book entitled The Investigators: Managing FBI and Narcotics Agents, if organizational structures facilitate or hinder the work of investigators. Wilson contended that the internal administrative demands of law enforcement often overshadowed or even hindered the work.

Law enforcement organizations, like other hierarchical organizations (Dill, 1958; Blau, 1964; Argyris, 1972) are greatly driven by their concern for continued autonomy and the perpetuation of a particular view of their work environment. Law enforcement organizations find themselves in a work environment populated by agencies of similar purpose and limited resources (Walton, 1974; Jensen, 1976; Gates, 1979; Sessions, 1990). This drive for autonomy in an environment of interdependence can often result in counterproductive enforcement activities.

Bureaucratic organizations often tacitly place their own survival above their publicized mission or goal. This activity of self-preservation is usually attributable to highly institutionalized environments (Scott, 1981). The ability of an organization to control its own work environment is the usual measure of its effectiveness (Barnard, 1938). Law enforcement organizations are aware of the unique role they play in society. They are confident that their pursuit of control and autonomy is in keeping with this perceived role.

Law enforcement agencies know, of course, that the continued public allusion to turf battles inhibits their ability to maintain popular support for their particular mission, and thus, funding. The public demands the most efficient use of government resources and law enforcement agencies continue to espouse cooperation in their public rhetoric. Manning (1992) asserted that action, as well as, words give very specific signals regarding the organization's intentions. The signals sent by law enforcement agencies is the perpetuation of their individual realities.

In the battle to control or assert superiority in the drug enforcement work environment, individual organizational ideology is at stake, as is, the perception of service to the community to which these organizations are accountable. Manning's (1980) work, The Narc's Game, argued that law enforcement cannot reasonably deliver the vaulted, promised, and socially redeeming results that the public demands of reduced

drug use and trafficking eradication. In fact, in a later work, Manning (1992) stated that organizational expansion, survival, maintenance, and autonomy supersedes concerns for achieving the publicly designated mandate. Parent organizations often view task forces as a diminution of their authority (Powers, 1987; Morgan, 1984). However, the task force is publicly touted as both a strategically and economically prudent direction by law enforcement managers (Jensen, 1976; Olson, Bern, 1977; Navarro, 1991; Levine, 1992).

Weber (1947) suggested that control in organizations falls into three categories: physical, material, and symbolic. Clarke (1972) addresses the symbolic control that the organizational saga thrusts on recruits and members. Thayer (1973) reported that the clear identification of boundaries is essential to an organization's sense of control. Boundaries for law enforcement can be defined as physical, statutory, and symbolic. Organizations control their work environments through infrastructures that include buildings, resources, ideology and their culture and rituals perpetuated by members. The statutory boundaries are set forth in legislative regulations which are often determined by the quality of influence that individual organizations can exert through the assertion and examples of

their effectiveness.(1)

Physical control is embodied in jurisdictional mandates. Material control is achieved through acquiring public funding. While the symbolic control is epitomized through a public journal of accomplishments that garner continued public support and reinforces members' loyalty. The symbolic control is as integral to their existence as is their physical control, i.e. mastering of the work task (Munro, 1974). The mythic images that law enforcement agencies have of themselves influence the perpetuation of their drive for control and power both within and outside the organization. If an organization's mandate is diluted through cooperative ventures, then so is the image and power upon which their control of the work environment is based.

Law enforcement jurisdictions that were once defined by physical territories are now, through advanced technology, also conceptual. Jurisdictions are conceptual in the sense that given a certain sets of facts and circumstances particular agencies are set into motion. The conceptual jurisdictions were created by statutes that were designed to distinguish one agency's mission

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1/ Agency heads all have political contacts which they attempt to garner when seeking budgets for their programs. The FBI has a Congressional Affairs Office which maintains contact with legislators regarding the impact of government regulations on the FBI. Further, it is not unusual for the Director of the FBI to meet with members of Congress regarding impact legislation. A recent effort by the Director of the FBI concerned legislation governing digital telephony. The Director was successful in attaining the goals of the FBI and law enforcement in this matter.

from the other. The way in which each agency interprets its legislated role reveals its intent to control a significant part of the task environment.

Law enforcement organizations rely greatly on their image, ideology, and sense of elitism to attract and retain members. Law enforcement organizations are bureaucracies whose performance can be described as both ritualistic and conforming (Weber, 1947). It is ritualistic in that it is based in law and regulations, as well as self-imposed procedures and policy. It is conforming in that membership and organizational acceptance are based on an individuals embracing the parent organization's definition of the task environment (Clarke, 1972).

This confidence and certainty in one's own strength is essential in law enforcement, where the level of discretionary power is high and identification with the organization's ethos is the price of membership. The history of "on the job decisions" is handed down to new recruits as if it were immutable policy (Cole, 1986). Law enforcement organizations depend on this socialization for successful assimilation of new members. If law enforcement organizations can maintain their unique contribution, then they also preserve themselves.

What is different about modern drug enforcement is the concurrent jurisdiction. At least 14 federal agencies now assert a role in drug enforcement either through direct involvement or by proxy through interaction with other federal agencies. Organizational boundaries are expanded through this interaction.

Accordingly, an organization's assertion of its overall importance in such a crowded arena wanes.

Selznick's (1949) work asserted that organizations demand control of the conditions under which personnel work. They can thereby identify and eliminate those who do not embrace the organization's ideology. This ideology is what Clarke (1972) referred to as the organizational saga. The organizational saga is rooted in the insider's assertion of elitism, power, and autonomy. The organizational saga involves the history, ideology, and purpose underlying both the organization's autonomy and external image. The long screening process for law enforcement recruits reinforces their sense of being special and their pursuit of that coveted link with the organization (Van Maanen, 1975).

Research indicates that early organizational learning is a major determinant of one's later organizationally relevant beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors (Van Maanen, 1972). Getting the picture early is vital in law enforcement organizations. Schein (1971) contended that this link begins even before actual acceptance or appointment to the organization. Schein called it a psychological contract that links the goals of the individual to the constraints and purposes of the organization. This link with the organization is the new member's measure of loyalty to the "family" with whom the recruit will be aligned. Organizations frequently use emotionally charged terms which require members to associate themselves on that level with the organization

(Van Maanen, 1972). In fact, Mayo (1933) observed that cooperation is more often founded on emotionally based attitudes rather than the objective necessity of completing a given task.

Wilson (1978) noted that some researchers have been overly interested in the outputs or products or results of organizational activity, rather than in the internal arrangements that are responsible for those outputs. The principal outputs in law enforcement are expressed in statistical accomplishments counted by arrests, search warrants, and the seizure of assets. Wilson (1978) also asserted that bureaucracies (in this case law enforcement) go to considerable lengths to create a set of attitudes or organizational ethos that will cause members to resist change. Drug enforcement work resists the control of singular organizations, and cooperation requires considerable change in organizational orientation.

Wilson (1978) argued that peer expectations are created to control the behavior of individuals and groups. Miner (1988) specifically indicated the importance of ascertaining whether the organization fosters group formation or the need to sustain a separate identity. Does the organization say one thing and mean another? Do task forces represent a group of individuals who come together and yet maintain a separateness? Does management really support task forces?

Many investigators feel that the parent organization maintains unusual and often unreasonable control over many facets of the investigators' professional and personal lives and

behavior. Law enforcement officers are, quite literally, on duty 24 hours per day. (2) For example, law enforcement organizations conduct detailed background checks that signal the types of individuals acceptable to them. These background checks indicate the boundaries within which the organization operates. Investigators find almost all facets of their personal lives are subject to review by the parent organization. Frequently, ties and bonds formed with other investigators become extremely important and critical to an investigators' feeling of well-being. Some investigators contacted in this study, remarked that the background checks bring honest individuals of great personal integrity into the agency and then they laughingly state that "lying starts." Asked to explain, many investigators hesitantly indicated that the "job" has some unique administrative practices which are self-defeating and could expose the organization to undue criticism if "outsiders" were left to interpret them. At this time investigators would not be specific and were careful to note that these practices had nothing to do with the integrity of investigations or real truth but rather were related to paperwork and record-keeping functions. Investigators

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2/ FBI Agents are on call 24 hours a day. FBI Agents are directed under the '2 hour' rule which means that they must be available for duty within two hours of contact. FBI Agents are paid for this time through, what is recently renamed, availability pay. NYPD Detective operate with union contracts which dictate tours and overtime pay scales.

stated that "the lying" was not a matter of giving misinformation but a matter of reporting certain information or carrying out administrative functions in an archaic manner.

This work culture values silence (Neiderhoffer, 1967; Stoddard, 1968; Westley, 1970). Silence separates the law enforcement agency and its personnel from society as a whole. What is secret is by implication not subject to review. What is secret is also special, unique, and has a way of empowering those who are accepted members within the group. Van Maanen (1979) calls this the 'blue code' in which the investigator is expected to cover the mistakes or inappropriate behavior of colleagues. The loss of autonomy is also a bellwether for organizations relinquishing access and knowledge of organizational myths and processes to outsiders. This autonomy is characteristic of the control an organization exerts over its environment and personnel. This is one of the "dangers" of task force units. Outsiders become insiders and the organizational truths once accessible only to members of an organization are now open to the review and analysis of others.

Drug enforcement work, in particular, offers an attractive option for those who seek danger and excitement. It allows an investigator to work late hours with informants in clandestine meeting places. It offers them an opportunity to play roles as drug traffickers, to drive fast luxury vehicles, to dress in street clothing, to travel in different social circles, and to spend the government's money while posturing a faster

lifestyle. Regimentation and accountability to superiors are perceived as less a part of drug enforcement assignments.

Law enforcement organizations' entrenched in a process of socialization provide a member with the parent organization's view of its work environment and its "competitors." Early in their careers, law enforcement officers are provided assessments of other agencies as defined through their agency's socialization process. Investigators must accept these perceptions to be accepted by the parent organization and its members.

Additionally, Balch (1972) contended that some researchers have underestimated the important role that organizational and experiential factors play in shaping police behavior. Manning (1980) suggested that an investigator must consider the extent to which he or she is free to choose and is committed to the organizational project and how this tension creates an important organizational dialectic. Manning also observed that organizations have particular and accepted patterns of enforcement unique to those agencies. "Police organizations act out their own visions and must live with and within them." (Manning, 1980, p. 262)

Inter-organizational Behavior

The literature on inter-organizational behavior has suggested that agencies involved in cooperative activities have significant concerns about the fear of domination and loss of control. It's concerns are directly related to the power exerted within its task environment. Models of inter-organizational cooperation began to appear in the 1970s. Roger and Whetter (1982) contended that cooperation in the public sector is markedly different from that in the private sector. Their work asserted that the goal of cooperation in the public sector should remove impediments, while in the private sector its goal is to maintain competition. Blau (1964), Terreberry (1968), Thayer (1973), Evan (1976), and Roger and Whetter (1982), all stated that we have entered an era of interdependence in which autonomous organizations can do little of importance alone. New social patterns of interdependence have arisen or are needed to meet current social demands. Consensus decision making and cooperation lead to more successful outcomes than independent actions of agencies operating on their own.

Kriesberg's study (1962) of the interprofessional cooperation among public health and mental health professionals asserted that cooperation is desirable in current work environments and that the ever-changing environments in professions and organizations create pressure for cooperation, as well as constraints. Kriesberg contended that although the changing work-place is a salient argument for increased

cooperation, there is a great fear of domination by others and of miscommunication regarding each other's problems. The loss of control of work activities and lost autonomy were greatly feared. Informal consultations were the preferred manner of cooperative efforts reported in Kriesberg's work. Kriesberg's informal consultations are similar to the ad hoc liaison preferred by many law enforcement managers. Equal power and a preference for control were revealed as important issues of cooperation as well in Akinbode and Clark's (1974) work.

Societal products or services cannot usually be delivered by a single organization's activities in isolation. Organizations are becoming increasingly less autonomous. Formerly separate organizations are finding each other to be important components of the environment in which they work. Thayer (1973) called this a trans-organizational process; emphasis began shifting in the late 1960s from controlling internal activities to managing external constraints.

The early 1980s witnessed the largest increase in drug enforcement funding and staffing in U.S. history (National Drug Enforcement Policy Board, 1987). The research suggested that the multi-agency approach to crime control and policy has become "...fashionable in the recent years as a solution to almost any crisis affecting cities..." (Sampson, et al., 1988, p.481) In the context of multi-agency work groups, Sampson et al. suggested that police agencies are opposed to other social service type organizations and are more likely to attempt to set the agendas

of these groups. Further, police agencies are more likely to attempt to dominate discussions; and to make autonomous decisions outside of the multi-agency framework. The questions of autonomy and shared information were continuing issues in the interagency relations. In addition, dynamics in multi-agency work groups revealed the need to assert one's own goals rather than to accommodate the group's collective purpose. This attitude was particularly prevalent where police agencies were concerned. Police agencies were described as notorious for making unilateral decisions and then informing fellow members without seeking their input. Police agencies involved in task force work groups sometimes exhibited what Sampson et al. (1988) referred to as a conspiratorial or take-over approach to these groups. Essentially, police group participants are viewed as "...coopting other agencies, and even the entire community, to pursue police-defined goals and objectives, rather than engaging in the spirit of mutual consultation and shared agreements of goals and objectives" (Sampson et al., 1988, pp.479-480).

This research further suggested that police agencies rush to assume the self-appointed lead agency role in these work groups. (3) Through this position police agencies attempt to

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3/ The lead agency role is one usually given investigators of a given organization who initiate or bring a case to the task force; sponsor and initiate a task force; or control the informants who, without them, few if any drug investigations progress or survive. The lead agency role is a term of power which most law enforcement agencies understand when applied to the operation of cooperative ventures.

shape and adapt the task force agenda to their own interests and goals (Sampson, et al.,1988). Senior managers of varied agencies interviewed during this project identified excessive breaches of confidentiality when it came to sharing information among all task force participants.

If police agencies react in this manner to groups not associated with law enforcement, one might assume that the competitiveness is heightened by the confluence of several law enforcement entities. There is certainly no reason to assume that law enforcement agencies react differently when confronted with other aggressive law enforcement agencies in a similarly contrived work group. Understanding the research on police reactions to multi-agency interaction is important to interagency law enforcement task forces.

J. Kenneth Benson (1975) discussed cooperative action in relation to the economic and political climate within which it operates. According to Benson organizational equilibrium is achieved through consensus on domain, ideology, and positive evaluations of one's colleagues work. Benson defined domain consensus as agreement among participants on the role and scope of participating agencies, and defined ideological consensus as agreement among participants on the nature of the task and the approach undertaken to achieve or complete that task, and positive evaluations were defined as agreement by participants of other members' value and competency. Thayer (1975) wrote that the best environment for reaching a consensus is one in which no

individual or group can impose a solution on the other. According to Thayer, the relationships pursued cannot be twisted into superior/subordinate patterns.

Inter-organizational literature has pointed out a semantic dilemma regarding the interchange of the words "cooperation" and "coordination." In the literature reviewed for this study, the terms appear interchangeably. The distinction appears to reflect the author's preference. Roger and Mulford (1984) contended that clearing this up is critical to any evaluation or furtherance of research in this area. Rogers and Mulford (1984) defined coordination as a coming together and establishing new rules to govern a shared work environment. Schermerhorn (1975) defined cooperation as the coming together of otherwise autonomous agencies to work towards the accomplishment of each organization's respective goals. Coordination emphasizes the common purpose and collective goals in contrast to an environment that fosters the pursuit of one's own goals.

There are almost as many ways to frame the definitions of cooperation and coordination as there are agencies that interpret them. The Oxford American Dictionary (1980) defines cooperation as the act of working together in a helpful way with another or others; running activities jointly by members with profits shared among them. Coordination is defined as bringing into proper order or relation so as to have harmonious action. Rogers and Mulford (1984) argued that issues of ideology, primary decision making, the extent of organizational dependency and

control are vital elements associated in differentiating between cooperation and coordination. Mott (1970) suggested that coordination required adjustments among organizations with regard to their respective outlooks, objectives, and method of operation. The 1982 GAO report quoted officials who stated that the joint efforts failed due to inherent differences in background, investigative philosophies, and training. Cooperation seems to define the intent of task forces, whereas, coordination probably defines the reality experienced within task forces.

Task Forces as Cooperative Work Environments

When individuals are not members of the same group but interact, they have a choice to cooperate or compete (Freedman, Carlsmith, Sears, 1970). Over the past decade, there has been a growing interest in the relationships among agencies operating within the same work environment and attempting to address similar problems (Sampson, Smith, Stubbs, Pearson, Blagg, 1988). In part, recognition of the complicated politics of organization accounts for the repeated references to interagency "turf battles."

The task force, as a cooperative venture, emerged as an organizational and management form in the 1970s (Thayer, 1973). Law enforcement began to employ the task force in drug investigations with some frequency through the 1970s. Cooperation among police agencies became necessary as cases became more complex and as subjects and criminal acts crossed jurisdictions

(Jensen, 1976; Williams, Redlinger & Manning, 1977). The task force is used by organizations as a method of handling interdepartmental projects that can not be completed without interdependency and cooperation among several participating units (Morgan, 1984). Morgan (1984) explained that the primary loyalty of task force members usually remained with the department from which the individual was assigned. In fact, the "departmental line" on issues was usually represented during meetings by department members assigned to the task force. Although in theory the task force was considered a welcome departure from the usual organizational control, what often resulted was a clone of the participating bureaucratic organizations where information was passed up the hierarchy and the decisions down (Morgan, 1984).

The "departmental line" that task force members bring with them is the result of group socialization; it reflects a member's understanding of the expectations and mores of the parent organization. Socialization is the process by which the rules, symbols, and values of a group or subculture are learned by members (Freedman, Carlsmith, Sears, 1970). Law enforcement organizations, like other organizations, desire to form, explain, and control the environment in which their employees act (McNamara, 1967; Niederhoffer, 1967; Westley, 1970; Van Maanen, 1973; Walker, 1980, and Bonifacio, 1990). This desire for control is an essential element of the autonomy that police agencies maintain is integral to their effectiveness.

Task forces are expected to skirt the normal boundaries or red tape of an organization and instead to rely on the resourcefulness of varied individuals as their greatest resource for accomplishing the goal. The object is to bring together talented individuals who are not ordinarily in touch with one another (Douglas, 1983). Organizations that value their human resources and do not alienate their workers will be more efficient than organizations relying only on production issues (Barnard, 1938; Weber, 1947; Selznick, 1957). This is especially true for law enforcement as it is based on accomplishments that are largely ideological (i.e., the pursuit of justice). It is the underlying ideology of law that propels its actions: arrests/search warrants and the criminal seizure of assets related to the crimes.

Organizations usually strive for a unified pattern of response and a certain level of ritual and conformity. The integration of purpose and response allows managers to predict the general attitudes of their personnel to specific problems (Selznick, 1957). Selznick wrote that in an organization whose discretionary power on social questions is broad, there is pressure to make a choice among the historical alternatives that are available. Once that choice is made, the organization will tend to reflect in its own character the general sentiments with which it has become aligned. For example, law enforcement agencies have historically contended that the expertise necessary to solve crime problems could be found within their own ranks.

Therefore, they saw cooperation as a weakness; they felt it would inhibit their effectiveness and the public's perception of their effectiveness. While cooperative ventures may be recognized as necessary in many areas of crime fighting, the general sentiment of many in law enforcement is to resist any internal acknowledgement that interagency cooperation is, in fact a weakness in their organizational cultures.

Goals are both socially and organizationally driven. Funding and budgets depend heavily on the public perception of the organization's ability to accomplish its mission. Manning advised that organizations have "...deeply structured feelings, along with personal goals, intentions, and self-maximizations which are set off against organizational plans, rules, and strategies." (1980, p.iv). Organizational missions are often overwhelmingly enmeshed with the perpetuation of the organizational ethos/saga (Clarke, 1972) and the organizational culture. It is by the perpetuation of the organizational ethos/saga and statistical accomplishments represented by arrests, search warrants, and asset seizures that most organizations define themselves as effective.

Task forces require organizations to assess benefit and sacrifice in considering participation in these work groups (Barnard, 1938). Organizational literature on cooperation has revealed that successful joint ventures are those in which an expectation of frequent or continued contact results in some team

identification (Adorno, 1950; Zander & Cartwright, 1968; Douglas, 1983; Axelrod, 1984).

However, Whyte (1960) asserted that any assembly of people can be called a group even if not functioning as one or not having its members experiencing real connection. Goffman (1959) referred to some team performances as intimacy without warmth. Goffman wrote that the concept of cooperation required team members agree to maintain the same definition of a given situation or performance. For Goffman the team is defined as any set of individuals who cooperate to stage a single function. Public disagreement among team members not only incapacitates united action, but also embarrasses and inhibits the reality or the performance being presented by the team.

Shared Information as an Element of Cooperation

Harlan Cleveland (1985) noted that the progress of individuals and technology resulted in an information environment in which consensus, or cooperation, was the most plausible choice for putting organizational policies into effect. The organizational research of Harlan Cleveland (1985) contributes a view of the information environment and complex organizations. Cleveland asserted that we in the United States live in a pluralistic democracy; thus, by constitutional design exist in a system of consensus. Cleveland also observed that information has always been the basis of human organization and those with better or more recent information hold sway over the rest of humankind.

He explained that unilateral control must be replaced by the collaborative process in the face of technology vaulting information and knowledge into more and more hands (Morgan, 1984).

Cleveland stated that as knowledge and information spread, power is diffused; this is a natural consequence of progress. He also observed that more and more organizational decisions are made with wider and wider consultation or else those decisions don't stick (Cleveland, 1985). Organizations have become systems of consensus. Cleveland states that collegial rather than command structures get things done. It is important to bring those who are going to have to make the decision work into the process of the decision; there must be a shared sense of direction among those who must form the parade if there is to be a parade (Cleveland, 1985). This theory relates to the major assumptions of this study which are about shared investigative information, the concern for professional respect and consideration, and a general assessment of a cooperative environment based on consensus management by which no unilateral direction of the task force is taken by any individual agency. Task forces present special challenges in organizational and personal dynamics. This is especially so in the circumstances being studied in which the crime problem fails to respect either organizational or legal definitions of boundaries. It is recalled that police organizations are notorious for making unilateral decisions in cooperative relationships and seek to control the

direction of joint ventures in the pursuit of their own interests (Sampson, et al., 1988).

Barnard (1938) viewed communication as integral to cooperation. One of the major complaints in interagency work groups is the lack of shared information and the perception that information often goes only one way (Sampson, et al., 1988). One need only recall U.S. Attorney General Reno's remarks before the International Association of Police Chiefs annual meeting in 1993 to realize how deeply communication or the lack of it is felt among law enforcement agencies confronted with interagency issues or investigations (Reno, 1993). With few exceptions, the lack of communication and information sharing are the most frequent complaints of individuals associated with task forces. Sampson (1988) in her policy implications section contended that one of the two problems with interagency relations was communication. Issues of confidentiality were found to be a frequent fear in interagency ventures. Sampson suggests that informal lines of communication are preferred to the formalities of organizationally driven arrangements.

Due to the continuing concern for autonomy, communication across agency lines is by choice selective and infrequent. However, the literature asserts that real cooperation often depends precisely on the frequency of such communication (Sherif, 1966; Douglas, 1983). Some law enforcement organizations seek to maintain their autonomy by a strictly limited exchange of intelligence and information. Many in law enforcement prefer this

ad hoc arrangement (Bonavolanta, 1985) in which the exchange is limited by the needs of a specific investigation.(4) Many in law enforcement use this form of task force arrangements to solve particular crimes and prefer the short term association. This allows agencies to avoid committing resources on an indeterminate or long term basis (Nowicki, 1990; Kaiser & Smith, 1991; Green, 1993; Higgins, 1993; Lacayo, 1993).

The control of exchanges or communication becomes paramount in an expanding task environment. Control of information determines an agency's influence in that environment and also the employees' perception of the organization and its task (Katz & Kahn, 1970). Control of employees' perceptions is an important element of work environment control.

Vital to Goffman's (1959) definition of team is the issue of not withholding information from any team member. Goffman insisted that withholding information is tantamount to withholding a team member's ability to exercise the team performance; thus causing the diminution of the team goal. An extrapolation of Goffman's theory might be that the task force's public and political successes depend on the task force members' ability to cooperate and thus to present a unified drug enforcement strategy to the participating parent organizations

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4/ FBI, New York Division, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Jules Bonavolanta remarked in observations made to this researcher, that an agency's program was better served through ad hoc arrangements.

and society. Further, task force members have a vested interest in the success of this effort insofar as they find task force membership an advantage in that it provides exciting assignments with little accountability to the parent organization.

Task Forces and Team Building

Task forces are traditionally described in the organizational literature as units formed to address specific problems. The Tavistock Institute was one of the first research groups to assert the importance and influence that the task exerted on a group and the social relations within that group (Morgan, 1984). Dill (1958) wrote that both the task and the contextual environments within which the task took place were important considerations in the overall operation of the organization. Dill (1958) defined contextual environment as those cultural, social, political, economic, and technological elements shaping the direction of the organization's activities. The task environment in this case is comprised of those organizations tasked to eradicate drug crimes and all tangential criminal acts associated with drug trafficking. (5)

5/ Title 21 is the reference made to drug criminal violations. United States Code, Title 21, FOOD and DRUGS, Sections 801 to 950 comprise all federal drug violations. Within the ascribed sections of Title 21, many federal agencies define and interpret their role. However, Title 21 authority usually is exclusive to the DEA and FBI. The FBI was given concurrent jurisdiction in 1982. So that, many agencies set up cooperative relationships with either DEA or the FBI in order to assert their drug enforcement initiatives.

For drug enforcement the contextual environment is defined as the overall societal outcry for the reduction of drug use, abuse, and trafficking. Groups outside of law enforcement that control funding and legislation are also included in this definition. The task environment for drug enforcement also encompasses all federal agencies with enforcement authority related to drug violations and the several state and local law enforcement agencies that act in this capacity. The political competition for funding has given way to the publicized turf battles surrounding the control and sanctioned leadership in drug enforcement activities. These turf battles rage on even though the rhetoric among law enforcement managers that drug enforcement is uniquely suited to the interagency cooperation.

For example, in the case of drug enforcement, many managers have indicated that without the task force, their enforcement goals could not be reached. Organizations benefit from the communication developed in task forces in conducting other business with various units within their organizations. It is not uncommon for an investigator who "knows a guy" in another unit or on another squad to smooth the way for the desired exchange.

Collins and Guetzkow (1964) conducted several studies regarding cooperative work groups. They found that groups whose members are motivated by personal, self-centered needs have reduced effectiveness. Collins and Guetzkow's work emphasized that competitive and individualistic motivations tended to lower

the groups' task accomplishment scores. When competition was a strong motivation, they found that group members failed to develop interpersonal relationships. Collins and Guetzkow (1964) concluded that humane and productive organizations foster cooperative relations.

Effective group performance is a function of the ongoing emotional life of the group and the development of the group's rituals and identification (Simmons,1981). As one news editorial pointed out regarding a multi-agency law enforcement effort, " With so many jurisdictions involved in the investigations, everybody in law enforcement has been pledging cooperation with everybody else, but cooperation does not mean the absence of rivalry" (McClellan, 1993, p.D1).

Organizational literature places significant importance on the work and task environments. Emery and Trist's (1965) work argued that each organization must take serious account of the others when competing to accomplish similar tasks. Decentralization, speed, and the ability to compete, compromise, or negotiate become valuable capabilities. An organization must decide when to fight to the death (Morgan, 1984).

Additionally, groups or task forces can often be distinguished by setting aside a location for themselves, naming themselves, and adopting a particular style of behavior and dress. Cartwright and Zander (1968) proposed an often-quoted definition of group. They stated that groups are collections of individuals who may exhibit some of the following

characteristics: engage in frequent interaction; define themselves as members of a group; are defined by others as members of a group; identify with one another; feel the group to be rewarding; and pursue independent goals from the home organization. Douglas (1983) argued that the simple fact of contact brought with it the possibility of liking and appreciation of other group members. Further, shared experiences and similar knowledge can be strong bonding factors. Members separated by space and time have little chance of bonding. Sharing work that is exhausting, dangerous, and stressful can cause members to extend to one another both emotional and physical support (Douglas, 1983).

Going along with others has great survival value. Douglas (1983) observed that while the cooperative effort is in progress, a state of mutual interdependence occurs. There is a tendency toward reduced hostility, prejudice, and increased friendliness and attentiveness to others. Alternately, in a competitive situation, prejudice, discrimination, and stereotypes are strengthened (Douglas, 1983). Douglas also noticed that some of the obstacles to cooperative action were caused by the groups' own perceptions of themselves. In this study, New York City detectives on one of the five squads remarked that they spent an inordinate amount of time training "these baby agents" assigned to drug squads directly out of their training academy at Quantico. New York City detectives felt that these younger investigators were not experienced enough to be assigned to these

units. Conversely, FBI agents assigned to one of the other squads, felt that New York City detectives should recognize there role as a manpower pool and accept their subordinated position.

Management support can also determine the viability of the group process. What is often difficult about forming task force units is the insider-outsider relationship which previously existed between members of the respective participating parent organizations.

Sherif's (1966) concept of superordinate goals formulated the theory that there exist goals with compelling appeal for all involved and transcend individually driven desires. When individuals continue to experience tasks which require interdependency, the relations tend to be more harmonious or cooperative. Barnard's (1938) use of common purpose is directly related to common goals. It is now a widely articulated position of law enforcement agencies that the dismantling of criminal drug trafficking organizations is without solution absent cooperative and inter-jurisdictional expertise.

Game theory research is also applicable to intergroup studies. Axelrod (1984) treats cooperative behavior as an individual trait. It can be passed down and spread among a population or become extinct. Axelrod contends that cooperation cannot be carried on long-term by isolated individuals. Axelrod observed that for cooperation to exist, individuals must have a reasonable chance of meeting again and have a stake in future interactions. Axelrod contended that individuals who espouse

cooperative behavior will also positively affect the cooperative relations of those close to them. Several law enforcement managers have noted the importance of task force leadership in effecting a cooperative effort.

The literature on organizational behavior also discusses team behavior as an example of cooperative groups. In teams, members are chosen for their specialization. Teams are expected to set personal dislikes and desires aside for the sake of the group goal. Due to the culture and politics involved, parent organizations still attempt to maintain control of the team's exchanges. Such attempts have an adverse affect on the team; they prevent communication that is necessary for meeting the goals.

Summary

The literature clearly reflects that the operation of law enforcement agencies is driven by its unique social mission and its interest in autonomy which directly impacts its desire and success in cooperative ventures. The work of Chester Barnard provides the foundation for describing very basic human tendencies to cooperate or enter into collective action or not. This assessment by human beings and organizations is based on the competing needs for distinction versus reaching goals which cannot be reached except for cooperation. This act of cooperation is considered on the careful delineation of benefits and sacrifices. Organizational assessment is directed by its culture and its perceived place in the work environment.

The literature also details the evolvement of organizational environments in which consensus is imperative as technology affects the mobility of criminal targets and the accessibility to critical investigative information is at a premium. Varied sources in the literature reveal the impact information "ownership" may have on interagency relations.

Law enforcement agencies have historically operated within both geographical and statutory boundaries. The drug enforcement work environment, however, is an important example of blurred organizational boundaries and responsibilities. Task forces are designed to vault boundaries while keeping each organization's identity intact. They are designed to reduce the red tape associated with organizational action and to allow investigators

to respond more effectively to the solution of particular crime problems. Simmons (1981) noted that effective group performance relies on the healthy ongoing emotional life of the group.

Drug enforcement has highlighted the mobility and advanced capabilities of drug traffickers. However, the relinquishing of self-direction, which is an outcome of interagency relations, often results in a "knee-jerk" reaction among managers regarding the benefit and sacrifice of these ventures as mentioned above. Sacrifice leads to benefit, and organizations are quick to identify just how much benefit can be attributed to cooperation. Organizations are very clear about the loss of autonomy and control which are direct elements of their continued effectiveness.

The literature described the drug enforcement work environment as complex and changing. It further described drug trafficking organizations that operate with the vast resources usually attributed to Fortune 500 corporations. World-wide drug enforcement is unattainable without the cooperation and integration of all law enforcement organizations within the shrinking world geography. Drug trafficking eradication is documented in media and journal reports as an encompassing goal of law enforcement; a superordinate goal. Sharing information across agency lines is documented as problematic based on separate organizational cultures. The impact on task force member relations is directly affected by the lack of sharing and often

resulted in the feeling that mutual professional respect was also lacking.

The literature has identified the task force as a work group designed to skirt the formalities and controls of parent organizations. The task force is designed to bring the varied talents and resources of multiple agencies together in order to address a problem which has, heretofore, been unsuccessfully addressed by single agencies. Cooperation is affirmed as problematic (Jensen, 1976; Williams, et al., 1977, Wilson, 1978) for law enforcement entities. Law enforcement agencies continue to develop their own definition of cooperation. The task force is one such definition. Organizations, especially law enforcement, find it difficult to surrender self-interest and the self-perpetuation designed to make each agency primary in its field. It is clear that the literature is correct when it asserts that organizational ideologies, objectives, and operational methods affect an organization's decision to cooperate (Mott, 1970; Roger and Mulford, 1975).

The literature regarding police agencies contended that, in general, they attempt to dominate interagency work groups and tend to make unilateral decisions without involving other agency input. Police organizations tend to assert their own goals at the expense of other contributors. This behavior connotes a desire to control information and to systematically exclude other members.

Finally, cooperative group behavior is expected to exist in situations in which members expect to have frequent, future

contact. The literature also suggested that consensus is the wave of the future and ideally exists in a situation in which no member can impose a solution on the other (Thayer, 1973; Schermerhorn, 1975; Roger and Whetter, 1982).

Law enforcement agencies bring to bear a complicated integration of organizational and personal perceptions of cooperation. The literature suggests the continuing reticence of law enforcement organizations to accept the reality of cooperation. This reticence and the perception of cooperation in ongoing interagency task forces is the subject of this study.

CHAPTER FOUR: Hypotheses

Overview

The study's purpose is two-fold. First, it examined the use of task forces in the context of law enforcement organizations and specifically for drug enforcement work. Second, it examined whether task force assignments were perceived as positive or negative experiences. Investigators were asked for their attitudes on the following issues:

1. Overall cooperation on interagency drug task forces;
2. Sharing of investigative information in task forces and with colleagues and the agencies involved; and
3. Mutual professional respect among task force members.

Hypotheses and Their Relationship to the Research

By definition, a task force is distinct from its participating parent organizations. There has been little research on the specific attitudes towards organizational primacy that law enforcement investigators bring to their task force assignments. Even government oversight groups (General Accounting Office, 1982) have been unable to get unrestricted access to internal information of agencies involved in interagency task force's efforts. But the literature available regarding drug enforcement suggests that while cooperation is vital to the viability of task forces they continue to report problems associated with turf.

This study sought to verify the suggestion of earlier qualitative research (Williams, Redlinger, and Manning, 1977) that cooperation, shared information, and professional respect are critical to interagency relations. The independent variable used in this study is agency membership - FBI versus NYPD. The dependent variables are issues defined by the literature as the perception of the task force as a work environment in which 1) cooperation is experienced, 2) compliance with shared information requests by participating agencies is experienced, and 3) task force members perceive they are respected as professionals.

The independent variables are operationalized by linking them to groups of survey questions categorized under the concepts of cooperation, shared investigative information, and mutual professional respect. This process and those variables will be presented in chapter five.

The three organizing hypotheses are presented below. The hypotheses reflect issues discovered in the literature, which offered many observations about police organizations, task forces, and cooperation on a personal and organizational level. Overall, task force participation is presented in the literature as difficult for police organizations because of their organizational and chauvinistic ideology and their unique autonomous and controlling nature (Wilson, 1978; Sampson, Smith, Stubbs, Pearson, Blagg, 1988). Police organizations involved in interagency groups have a propensity to make unilateral decisions

based on the needs of the parent organization, not the new group (Sampson, et al., 1989). Professional respect is particularly felt in the management and interpersonal relations within such units (Wilson, 1978, Williams, et al., 1979, Morgan, 1984). Further, an overriding issue in cooperation is the need for all parties to feel that they are operating with the same information and that they are privy to the same intelligence (Goffman, 1959; Walton, 1977; Williams, et al. 1979).

The hypotheses that seek to determine the perceptions of those investigators involved in task force assignments are presented below.

H1. Local law enforcement investigators are less prone than federal law enforcement agents to perceive the task force assignment as an experience in which task force members cooperate.

H2. Local law enforcement investigators are less prone than federal law enforcement agents to perceive the task force assignment as an experience in which task force members share investigative information.

H3. Local law enforcement investigators are less prone than federal law enforcement agents

to perceive the task force assignment as an experience in which task force members express or receive professional respect.

The balance of literature available regarding task forces suggests that federal law enforcement assert a superior attitude within these units. There is much qualitative information available regarding local law enforcement's sense of their expected subordination by their federal counterparts. The hypotheses in this study are directed at that contention.

Overall, organizational culture (Clark, 1972) is the glue that binds the organization's employees and its purpose together. It is the script from which the organization's public image is evidenced. Organizational culture is exclusionary; it distinguishes the attitudes, beliefs, and behavior expected of members from outsiders. There is significant emphasis on socialization as evidence of one's commitment to the job and ultimately the organization (Wilson, 1968; Westley, 1970; Van Maanen, 1973; Manning, 1977; Repetto, 1978; Schein, 1985). Coupled with Cleveland's assertion that the control of information is primary to organizational power, cooperation among colleagues might be affected by this type of exclusionary socialization and maintenance of an organization's perception of their power in the work environment.

Schein (1971) asserted that cultural integration declines as new subcultures are spawned. A great fear of many

organizations, especially law enforcement organizations is the loss of control and autonomy. Thayer (1973) noted that the cooperative venture itself constitutes a new organization. Law enforcement organizations command an unusual commitment from their members. Law enforcement organizations are said to separate their officers from the larger society and to keep their social contacts largely with members of the organization (Brown, 1981; Cole, 1986; Bonifacio, 1991). Many law enforcement leaders have stated privately and publicly that they shun cooperation to avoid losing control of their investigators (Powers, 1987). Law enforcement entities seek to maintain power through control of information.

The above hypotheses were developed to determine the task force members' perceptions of cooperation, the sharing of investigative information, and professional respect. Limited quantification and qualitative data are commingled to assess the strength of each hypotheses.

CHAPTER FIVE: Methodology

Overview

The methodology of this study is presented in five segments:

1. Discussion of respondents/site selection,
2. Data collection,
3. Survey instrument,
4. Operationalization of key measures, and
5. Analysis plan.

1. Discussion of Respondents/Site Selection

This study was conducted in the New York City metropolitan area with the cooperation of both the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and the New York Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).(1) New York City is considered a major venue for the trafficking and transhipment of illegal drugs. The drug task forces in the New York Division of the FBI were the bureau's first permanent foray into interagency task forces following the United States Department of Justices' directive of concurrent jurisdiction with the DEA in drug investigations and the implementation of the Organized Crime

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1/ Permission to conduct this research was sought in 1991. Final authority for access was granted by the FBI and NYPD in fall, 1992 and spring, 1993 respectively. Conversations regarding content of survey instrument were held with FBI and NYPD management prior to administration. Neither agency suggested changes in survey's content.

Drug Enforcement Task Forces program. The FBI had been developing strong cooperative relationships with the NYPD in the area of bank robberies (Walton, 1987, Sessions, 1991) and other reactive crimes. The use of permanent task forces at this time was, it seemed, the eventual evolution of this developing relationship.

Data collection took place during the spring of 1993. The task forces were located in FBI office space. At the time of the data collection, the total number of investigators assigned to these five task forces was ninety-four. Twenty-nine task force members were NYPD Detectives and sixty-five members were FBI Agents.

All ninety-four task force members were provided with questionnaires. Sixty-eight or 72.3% of the questionnaires were completed and returned. Twenty or 69% of the NYPD detectives completed and returned surveys while Forty-eight or 73.8% of FBI agents completed surveys. Many investigators orally reported at the time of the survey's administration that they did not wish to participate due to their fear that results would not be accurately reported, that their opinions would not be taken seriously and that this study was a waste of time.

Table 5.1 provides a summary of completed surveys by task force. Although the number of subjects was small, the study represents personnel assigned to these task forces since 1983.

Table 5.1

Summary of Response Rate by Agency

Squad	Surveys Distributed 1	2	3	4	5	Total	Surveys Returned Completed	Response Rate /Total
FBI Agents	16	13	9	11	16	65	48	69%
NYPD Detectives	10	7	6	6	0	29	20	74%
Total	26	20	15	17	16	94	68	72%

According to managers' and task force members' comments, the deployment of personnel to these task forces has varied over the years because of the "needs of the organizations." The largest number of investigators was assigned during the mid to late 1980s. (2) Participation in these task forces by the NYPD and the FBI has remained constant since 1983.

The enforcement missions of these five task forces vary. They address the drug trafficking activities of criminal organizations associated with the Sicilian and Italian mafias, Colombian cartels, Oriental tongs, and non-traditional crime groups such as Dominican/Jamaican organized and violent street

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2/ The DEA once participated in these task forces but withdrew personnel in the late 1980s. DEA Agents once assigned to Squad 1 perceived FBI task forces as removing them from their agency promotion tract. This assignment was viewed as a dead end for DEA career upward mobility, although personal relations were deemed positive. The DEA also withdrew their Agents as a result of increased organizational and singular investigative demands. task force is supervised by NYPD and FBI managers of comparable rank.

gangs. Task forces also engage in intelligence gathering. Each task force is supervised by NYPD and FBI managers of comparable rank. These task forces report to upper managers in their respective organizations. NYPD personnel report to the Chief of the Organized Crime Control Bureau (OCCB) and FBI personnel report to the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the Criminal Division at New York.

Task force cases are developed to be prosecuted federally, so investigators of both agencies are expected to follow the policy and administrative demands of FBI investigations. At the same time, the NYPD detectives also file reports and send information to the NYPD through using their own administrative systems.

The Site

The discussion of the site will involve a general identification of the subjects, task orientation, and current task force climate. These specifics will assist in understanding the research site better.

The Subjects

Police organizations operate within infrastructures that have direct lines of command. The interagency drug task forces in this study and their respective home organizations have well-defined command protocols. The New York City Police Department (NYPD) directs the drug task forces through its Organized Crime Investigation Division which is commanded by an Inspector. The NYPD has delegated supervision of these task forces to lieutenant

commanders and sergeants depending on the number of personnel assigned to a particular unit. Five NYPD supervisors assigned to manage these task forces agreed to be interviewed, as did a member of the command hierarchy of the New York Police Department.

NYPD personnel indicated that their primary concern was crime in the New York City metropolitan area. NYPD personnel also stated that their accountability was to the residents of New York City and was mandated through city and community politics. NYPD personnel said that they were tasked with the service and crime control needs of New York City residents and businesses.

NYPD personnel noted that drug enforcement in the city of New York involved several levels of attention. The first line of defense is the patrol officer who develops intelligence through his or her day-to-day contacts on the street. Information is also developed through the arrest and interview of individuals engaged in varied criminal acts. Each borough has assigned to it drug units, e.g., Brooklyn North and Brooklyn South Narcotics, which are staffed by detectives and undercover operatives. Detectives assigned there develop cases involving targets who are identified by anonymous or hot-line calls, as well as, by street intelligence from precincts and informants. These cases have increasingly involved drug traffickers who operate outside of the New York area. The NYPD has for several years prior to its association with the FBI been involved with the Drug Enforcement

Administration, the New York State Highway Patrol, and other state and local agencies as cases dictated.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) operates through fifty-eight field divisions. The New York field division is the largest in the country. The drug task forces are directed through the Criminal Investigative Division, Drug Branch. The Criminal Investigative Division is directed by a Special Agent in Charge (SAC). An Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) is assigned the immediate supervision of the Drug Branch with the assistance of a Coordinating Supervisory Special Agent (CSSA) specifically assigned to the oversight of the OCDETF program. The drug task forces are under the supervision of individual supervisory special agents (SSA) who confer with the aforementioned CSSA and ASAC. The SSAs co-direct the task force units with NYPD supervisors. They perform their duties through "decision by consensus". Top managers are called upon only when issues cannot be resolved at the unit level. Five supervisors and a member of the FBI command hierarchy agreed to interviews. In this section, the terms "FBI and NYPD personnel" refer to managers contacted. These remarks are provided in this form to prevent identification of interviewees.

Task Orientation

It is important to understand the organizational orientation to drug enforcement of the FBI and the NYPD. NYPD personnel asserted the importance of community interest and accountability in dealing with the specific crime problems affecting New York

City neighborhoods. NYPD personnel said that they must be sensitive to the articulated needs of community and political leaders.

FBI divisions are categorized as large, medium-sized, and small offices, according to the number of agents assigned to them. The size of the office depends upon the population of the region covered. The FBI divides the United States into 58 divisions. Divisions have been merged, closed, or enhanced to adjust to changing crime problems in particular regions.

In 1986, the FBI formulated its National Drug Strategy (NDS). The FBI's role in drug enforcement is to direct its resources against the highest levels of international and domestic drug trafficking. Each FBI division is directed to identify the most significant drug trafficking organizations within its territory and to direct its resources accordingly. The NDS-articulated mission of the FBI is to conduct drug investigations on a systematic, coordinated and sustained basis (FBI, 1990). The FBI should direct its attention to high-level drug organizations and targets, as opposed to street-level dealers. Street-level targets are the defined responsibility of most state and local law enforcement.

Interestingly, FBI personnel reported continued discussions among FBI investigators and their state and local law enforcement colleagues over the viability of the NDS and its application to individual FBI divisions. In fact, FBI personnel have strong opinions on the need to manipulate their drug enforcement

investigations to meet NDS requirements and to get sanction from FBI headquarters for pursuit of selected cases. For example, the NDS enforcement directives for midwestern cities and east coast or west coast are often too similar to distinguish their separate needs. FBI personnel said that the NDS often fails to address a variety of drug crime problems associated with areas of the country not experiencing the issues identified in major metropolitan or port locations.

The NDS describes criteria that are employed by FBI agents in initiating investigations. For example, midwestern cities may be transhipment locations, where highway interdiction is a very successful enforcement technique. However, the NDS may require that local FBI field offices show ties to major cartel organizations before it becomes involved. The FBI is increasingly involved in devising enforcement strategies commensurate with region-identified crime problems through the use of crime surveys. FBI headquarters personnel encounter these"deviations" from the NDS regularly in communications with "the field." FBI headquarters usually submits to the region's assessment of its enforcement needs.

Drug crimes have transcended the one-dimensional agendas of individual law enforcement policies, forcing the drive towards mutually beneficial cooperation. The OCDETF program is designed to coordinate interagency investigations among federal agencies. The OCDETF program is the method by which state and local law enforcement agencies are integrated into federal cases. The

OCDETF program can provide both resources and financial reimbursement for state and local law enforcement agencies that cooperate with federal authorities. This financial reimbursement can come through the subsidization of salaries and a share of any monetary forfeitures obtained during a case. The OCDETF program works in 13 regions as previously discussed. There are no specific methods of implementation and implementation does vary from region to region. Each region develops its own strategy for case work.

2. Data Collection

The data collected for this study were gathered from several sources:

1. Survey questionnaires administered to investigators on the aforementioned five task forces,
2. Interviews conducted a total of 12 members of NYPD/FBI management associated directly with the operation and administration of the five task forces in this study. Each task force usually had one federal and one police department supervisor, although this pattern varied in some times and places. Equal numbers of FBI and NYPD task force supervisors were contacted. In addition, one FBI and one NYPD manager overseeing the operation of these task forces were also interviewed, which brought the total to twelve.

3. Extemporaneous remarks by investigators during administration of survey questionnaire.
4. Telephone conversations with 5 FBI managers involved in interagency task forces in comparable metropolitan areas.

Overall, respondent cooperation was based on the assurance of anonymity. No respondents objected to the attribution of their remarks along agency lines. However, across the board, investigators and managers objected to the electronic recording of their comments. Consequently, these comments were recorded by hand. No incentives were offered respondents to induce participation.

This researcher recorded both positive and negative unsolicited comments from respondents when the survey was administered. Several respondents provided unsolicited comments when the questionnaire was provided to them. Their remarks suggested a lack of interest in participation in the study, their lack of time, and their belief that their views were not valued by the organizations involved in the task forces. The principal observation was that several NYPD and FBI subjects suggested that researcher's prior task force assignment at New York and researcher's current FBI agent status did give the study some measure of credibility. Many respondents of both agencies indicated that their participation was solely based on their familiarity with this researcher.

Two specific observations are recorded below:

1. The researcher's familiarity with the task forces at New York provided essential credibility both at the research site and during subsequent agency contacts.

2. The researcher's FBI agent status did not compromise the purpose or response rate in this study. The role of researcher was enhanced by both the researcher's task force experience and law enforcement background.

Finally, some respondents felt that researcher's employment status might skew the reported results in favor of the FBI. However, these concerns did not seem to inhibit participation.

Additionally, this researcher hand-recorded the comments of 5 FBI supervisors who oversee task forces of varied structure in comparable metropolitan areas across the United States. These remarks were taken down with the same promise of anonymity as were the New York respondents.

Sample Size

Quantitative data used in this study were derived from a self-administered questionnaire distributed and collected immediately after its administration. As reported, a total of ninety-four questionnaires was distributed. The overall response rate was 72%. Of the ninety-four surveys sixty-eight were completed and returned. Twelve interviews were completed and recorded. These notes were transcribed into a narrative section. They are reported in Chapter 6 of this study.

During the administration of the survey to the five task forces, several respondents offered unsolicited remarks regarding the survey instrument, their task force assignments, and the perception of their colleagues and themselves. These were recorded in handwritten notes following those particular contacts. Additionally, five NYPD and six FBI investigators assigned to these task forces provided remarks in subsequent telephone contacts. These are also recorded separately in chapter 6 of this research.

Data Entry and Coding

Virtually all data coding and entry was done by Marketeam Associates, Inc., of St. Louis, Missouri. The fifteen open-ended questions were reviewed and coded by the author. Forty-five of the forty-eight FBI respondents offered additional comments as did thirteen of the twenty-nine NYPD respondents.

3. Survey Instrument

The questionnaire is a ten-page survey instrument. The first page consists of an introduction and explanation of this research. The questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix C. The questionnaire was pretested with 10 FBI agents and 8 local police department investigators at both New York City and St. Louis, Missouri, prior to being administered to task force respondents. Exploratory interviews with several task force supervisors of both federal and local law enforcement agencies helped this researcher to identify and define the elements

associated with a "successful" task force. These elements ranged from administrative to personnel to resource issues. These issues were incorporated into the survey questions.

Among the sources consulted for questions, wordings, or possible use of scales were Sudman and Bradburn's Asking Questions (1982), A.N. Oppenheim's Question Design, Interviewing and Attitude Measurement (1966), William A. Belson's The Design and Understanding of Survey Questions (1981), and Norman M. Bradburn's Improving Interview Methods and Question Design, (1979). This literature was helpful in framing certain questions as they applied to organizational cooperation within the law enforcement work culture.

The survey instrument was color-coded to distinguish the FBI responses from the NYPD responses. The words "FBI" and "NYPD" were interchanged to create two separate surveys. When FBI and NYPD managers expressed concern that the surveys might not be identical, explanations were offered regarding this fact. (3)

3/ The NYPD Organized Crime Control Bureau Chief and the FBI ASAC questioned whether surveys were identical for both agencies asked what the reason was for this difference if the task force was perceived as a cooperative effort. Review of the separate surveys was afforded both FBI and NYPD prior to administration to insure credibility.

But it also evoked nonparticipation by some NYPD detectives who still suspected that the surveys would be skewed to make the FBI appear in a more positive light than the NYPD. However, several NYPD respondents still refused to participate because of the seeming dual nature of the survey instrument. This researcher's FBI agent status provided, to most task force members, assurance that the survey instruments were identical.

There were twenty questions about each respondent's background. These were designed to elicit routine demographic information as well as to determine respondent's tenure in drug enforcement work, the parent organization, the task force, and any experience prior to the task force with other agency personnel. Other descriptive information dealt with respondent's assignment to the task force and his or her orientation to personal relations in work settings. Once again, many respondents objected to the extent of questions raised regarding personal information requested in this background section, e.g., marital status, education and rank. Respondents apparently felt that some items were intrusive and that they feared that the more items they answered the more easily they could be identified.

Survey Questions

The fifty questions were divided into two sections to capture perceptions related both to general task force work and to the current task force assignment. The questions were designed

to elicit each respondent's perceptions and attitudes about the three variables defined by the hypotheses in this study.

Briefly, the survey flow was as follows:

Cooperation related survey questions:

Questions 22, 25, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 51, 53, 55, 59, 61, 66, 67, 68, and 69 dealt with perceptions related to the respondent's view of themselves, colleagues, and cooperation in their task force assignment.

Shared information related questions:

Questions 21, 23, 27, 30, 40, 50, 60, 67, and 70 dealt with sharing information, the ability to obtain information, concerns related to providing information to other task force members, and the general tone of cooperation expected and experienced on task forces.

Mutual professional respect questions:

Questions 24, 25, 26, 29, 34, 41, 48, 49, 52, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 63, 64, and 65 dealt with attitudes related to the respondent's description of task force member relations and the perception of respect and competency among members.

The survey closed with 15 open-ended statements. Completion of those statements was sought from the respondent. These statements were also configured on the themes of cooperation,

shared information, and mutual respect. They fell into the following variable categories:

Cooperation statements:

Statements 71, 72, 76, 77, 79, 83, 84

Shared information statements:

Statement 80

Mutual professional respect statements:

Statement 73, 74, 75, 78, 81, 82, 85

4. Operationalization of Key Measures

The hypotheses in the previous chapter refer to three independent variables: cooperation, shared investigative information, and mutual professional respect among task force members. The operationalization of these terms is presented below.

Cooperation:

The inter-organizational literature identified the semantic dilemma in defining interdependent relationships as "cooperation" or "coordination" (Schermerhorn, 1975; Roger & Whetter, 1982; Mulford, 1984). For the purposes of this study, cooperation is defined in the context of human relations. Cooperation is used here to mean not simply the integration of resources, but also a mingling of human needs and activities. Therefore, cooperation is defined as working together in a helpful way and arriving at a consensus, with all participants sharing in the outcomes. These

are the self-reports by respondents on a four-point scale ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree". The scale will be used as a continuous (interval) variable for the purposes of analysis. One reflecting strongly agree and four reflecting strongly disagree.

Shared investigative information:

The literature clearly defined shared investigative information as critical to drug investigations that involve mobile criminal targets and drugs. The investigative data of most concern to task force members are the evolved criminal intelligence databases of each agency, the informants and the information that can be derived through their operation and debriefing, and the investigative expertise that is available from special agency units. The latter might include the Special Operations Groups (SOG) of the FBI that undertake surveillance duties in complex investigations and the NYPD borough narcotics units that provide street-level intelligence critical to the daily pursuit of drug targets and organizations.

Mutual professional respect among task force members:

The literature indicated that mutual professional respect has been defined as the recognition that one is knowledgeable, competent, trustworthy, and valued as a team member.

5. Analysis

The analysis consists of qualitative and quantitative methods. A discussion of both methods follows.

Qualitative Analysis

The qualitative methods include structured interviews and a narrative assessment of those interviews. Qualitative data ascribe to describing social processes rather than structures and allows a contextual understanding not possible in quantitative analysis (Van Maanen, 1979). The analysis includes content analysis and an attitudinal survey supplemented by the aforementioned interviews and other extemporaneous comments.

Content analysis (Babbie, 1986) of respondents' answers in the short-response section of the questionnaire is used to examine the explicit (manifest) language in which respondents describe cooperation, shared information and mutual professional respect. There is also a brief analysis of the contextual (latent) meaning of the statements and their relation to the hypotheses.

Qualitative data are presented in narrative, case-study form. Both the reports of the interviews and the open-ended statement responses are presented in their entirety.

The interviews conducted with management were derived from the questionnaire administered to task force investigators. In addition to the questionnaire, supervisors and managers were

asked to respond to questions concerning the following specific issues:

1. interagency cooperation
2. supervising task forces
3. benefits/sacrifices of task force cooperation
4. organizational commitment and support of task forces

The unsolicited remarks by respondents and telephone interviews with FBI managers from other metropolitan areas with task force experience are written in a narrative form. The overall analysis of the qualitative work is used to enhance and explain the quantitative analysis of the survey instrument.

Content analysis:

The content analysis was separated into both manifest and latent conceptualizations. The manifest analysis is an assessment of explicit content related to the three unifying principles that underlie the 50 questions in the preceding section: cooperation, shared investigative information, and mutual professional respect. The responses were scanned for the use of verbiage related to each category. The results are provided and discussed in a later section.

The verbiage categories used in this analysis were as follows:

cooperation: share, communicate,
depend, goal consensus, rewarding, vital
necessary, worthwhile,
patience, control, getting along, important,
resources, good cases, disband,
productive, satisfy, support, benefit,
challenging, relationships,
good work conditions, cooperation, and
personal cooperation:

shared information: share, open, we/our, them/us, unselfish
lead agency, control, prima donna, clique,
non-support, communicate, access, informed,
secretive, close-minded, and colleague

mutual professional respect: integrity,
trust/trustworthy, respect, capable/competent,
we/our, loyal, egotistical, friendship,
unselfish, hardworking, team/team player,
equals, jealous, professional, savvy,
enthusiastic, knowledgeable, sense of humor,
creative, dedicated, lazy, experienced,
cliques, honest, intelligent, motivated,
insecure, arrogant,

insightful, flexible, resourceful, aggressive, open, courage, independent, moody/stubborn, common sense, close minded, educated, availability, mature, and opinionated.

The latent analysis is an assessment of implicit content related to overall task force principles. These underlying attitudes are reflected in the following categories which were used to assess the latent content of the open ended responses:

1. Task force assignment is a positive experience.
2. There is no problem sharing investigative information with task force colleagues.
3. Task force members respect and rely on one another's knowledge and expertise.

The information derived from this content analysis will be used to support and/or challenge both the information from the survey and from the interviews.

Quantitative Analysis

The quantitative analysis applied to the survey instrument is both straightforward and drawn from a population believed to be representative of normal task force units or a normally distributed population for the study context. This study uses the *t*-test for description of the relationship between the FBI and the NYPD in task force assignments. The *t*-test reflects the

difference between the responses of the FBI and NYPD respondents and the variation of values regarding these two groups. This analysis represents the likelihood of the observed differences or the statistical significance of the observed differences (Babbie, 1982). The level of significance used in this study is .05 which means that the chances of obtaining the measured association as a result of sampling error is 5 in one hundred. The level of significance is commensurate with the analysis of attitudinal data. The t-test is applicable even where the N is small (Bohrnstedt, Knoke 1982). The survey questions used to explain the hypotheses in this study are as follows:

Survey questions associated with H1:

Question 32: The management of participating agencies seem to fully support task force work.

Question 34: No member agency alone should direct the activities of the task force.

Question 36: It is my experience that interagency investigations promote investigative secrecy among agents/detectives.

Question 39: Activity in my current task force assignment seems to be based on each agency reaching their own goals and not those of the task force group itself.

Survey questions associated with H2:

Question 40: Activity in my current task force assignment seems to be inhibited through lack of sharing information.

Question 70: I have never had a problem obtaining investigative information from a task force co-worker.

Survey questions associated with H3:

Question 41: The benefits of my current task force assignment can be described as the access to knowledge/expertise of other agency personnel.

Question 49: The problems associated with my current task force assignment can be described as case agent status and control always goes to the NYPD/FBI (respondent reads own agency in this question).

Question 59: I would be more satisfied assigned to a unit comprised of NYPD detectives/FBI agents only. (Respondent received a survey designating own agency in this question)

Finally, a correlation matrix is presented in the succeeding chapter which helps to illustrate the level of association among survey questions associated with the above noted variables. These associations, both in the positive and negative directions will be examined and discussed. This analysis will evidence the internal reliability of the survey instrument and the survey questions chosen to test the stated hypotheses.

CHAPTER SIX: Findings

Overview

The data in this study are the result of the self reported perceptions and attitudes of respondents assigned to or supervising the identified five interagency task forces. The findings are organized into six categories:

1. Quantitative survey results.
2. Analysis of open-ended responses. This includes a content analysis and narrative examination of these responses in relation to the hypotheses.
3. Respondents' unsolicited statements regarding survey and research topics at time of survey administration.
4. Management/supervisory interview results.
5. Telephone interviews with selected FBI managers located in comparable metropolitan FBI divisions.
6. A summary analysis.

Quantitative Survey Results

The results of the survey are organized as follows:

1. Correlation matrix of Selected Survey Questions
2. Quantitative results for H1.
3. Quantitative results for H2.
4. Quantitative results for H3.
5. Summary of education ratio of FBI vs NYPD
6. A summary of findings.

Correlations Matrix construction and Analysis

The use of the correlation matrix is a measure of association between pairs of variables. Table 6.1 illustrates this matrix and the level of association among survey question pairs. As noted in the previous chapter, the following survey questions were identified as "paired" for the purposes of explaining the three separate hypotheses. Survey questions 32, 34, 36, and 39 are associated with H(1); survey questions 40 and 70 are associated with H(2), and survey questions 41,49, and 59 are associated with H(3). These pairs are examined accordingly. Because this is attitudinal data and it assesses association, the lowest level of significance used to analyze the correlations is .3 and in essence indicates that the numerical figure indicates that (the percentage amount, i.e. .3= 30%) the pairs examined had the same or opposite ranking depending on its positive or negative measure. This represents both the direction and the magnitude of the association. (Babbie, 1983) The matrix is

presented below in Table 6.1:

Table 6.1

Correlation Matrix of Selected Survey Questions

	32	34	36	39	40	41	49	59	70
32	-								
34	.007	-							
36	-.159	.076	-						
39	-.316	.072	.363	-					
40	-.292	.046	.406	.596	-				
41	.300	.182	-.379	-.189	-.346	-			
49	.264	-.286	-.017	.024	.091	.130	-		
59	.080	-.471	.184	.294	.116	.012	-.124	-	
70	.442	-.062	-.392	-.330	-.435	.521	.130	.012	

Analyzing the matrix it is determined that significant associations occurred between the following survey items in the following positive or negative direction:

39/32 (negative) -.316
39/36 (positive) +.363

40/36 (positive) +.406
40/39 (positive) +.596

41/32 (positive) +.300
41/36 (negative) -.379
41/40 (negative) -.346

59/34	(negative)	-.471
70/32	(positive)	+.442
70/36	(negative)	-.392
70/39	(negative)	-.330
70/40	(negative)	-.435
70/41	(positive)	+.521

Survey question 39 reads: Activity in my current task force assignment seems to be based on each agency reaching their own goals and not those of the task force group itself. Survey question 39 associates to survey question 32 in a negative direction. Survey question 32 reads: The management of participating agencies seem to fully support task force work. This association is consistent as these statements describe opposite points of view. Survey question 36 reads: It is my experience that interagency investigations promote investigative secrecy among agents/detectives. The significant positive association is consistent as both survey questions 39 and 36 contend that agencies are engaged in self-interest.

Survey question 40 reads: Activity in my current task force assignment seems to be inhibited through lack of sharing information. Survey question 36 asserts that task force members experience secrecy among task force members in investigations. These two survey questions assert similar attitudes and a positive association is a consistent measure. Survey question 39 states that agencies seek to reach own goals in task force work groups. The positive association is also consistent with the similar attitudes posited by the questions.

Survey question 41 reads: The benefits of my current task force assignment can be described as the access to knowledge/expertise of other agency personnel. The positive association with survey question 32 which states that management of agencies support task forces, is consistent with the benefit aspect of survey question 41. The negative association with survey questions 36 and 40 are consistent since these items describe negative attributes of the task force experience in the area of secrecy and shared investigative information.

Survey question 59 reads: I would be more satisfied assigned to a unit comprised of NYPD detectives/FBI agents only. The negative association to survey question 34 is consistent since survey question 59 speaks to single agency units and 34 suggests consensus and unified action.

Survey question 70 reads: I have never had a problem obtaining investigative information from a task force co-worker. Survey question 70 associates positively with survey questions 32 and 41. This is consistent since assert the positive aspects of task force work and relations with co-workers. Survey question 70 associates in a negative direction with survey questions 36, 39, and 40 and is consistent since these survey items describe negative experiences and relations with task force co-workers.

The above delineated analysis evidences the interrelationship of these survey items and the efficacy is using them to assess the attitudes of respondents for this study.

Hypotheses 1 Results:

The first hypothesis deals with the perception of cooperation on task forces. Specifically, it states that local law enforcement investigators are less prone than federal law enforcement agents to perceive task force assignments as cooperative work environments. As recollection for consideration of this information, it is reported that a total of 48 FBI respondents and 20 NYPD respondents are accounted for unless otherwise corrected.

Table 6.2 illustrates the mean difference, standard deviation, and t scores for questions 32, 34, 36, and 39 used in the explanation of FBI/NYPD responses.

Table 6.2
Differences in Perception Between FBI and NYPD on Survey Questions 32, 34, 36, and 39

Survey Q	FBI Mean/S.D.	NYPD Mean/S.D.	T	Prob>T
Q 32	2.25/.87	2.85/.87	-2.55	.01
Q 34	2.39/1.02	1.85/.74	-2.13	.03
Q 36	2.77/.75	2.40/.60	1.96	.05
Q 39	2.96/.69	2.55/.60	1.98	.05

Note: S.D.= standard deviation

Question 32 reads as follows:

The management of participating agencies seem to fully support task force work.

The result of the above t scores show that the NYPD detectives are more likely to disagree with that particular survey question. This result tends to support the assertion that local investigators are more likely to perceive that cooperation

on task forces is rhetorical rather than experienced. Organizational literature notes that the perspective of the parent organization, due to the recruitment process and the member's strong relationship to it affects a member's orientation to other groups/competitors. The results noted from this survey question and the supporting documentation of qualitative data suggest that the NYPD respondents view cooperation and the issue of management support as problematic and as not conducive to task force cooperation.

Question 34 reads as follows:

No member agency alone should direct the activities of the task force.

The result of the above *t* scores show that FBI agents are more likely to disagree with that particular survey question. This tends to support H(1) in that it signals that FBI agents are more likely to agree that one agency should direct the activities of the task force. The literature is replete with assertions that the FBI, and federal law enforcement in general has a tendency to make decisions unilaterally and to withhold information for the purposes of control. FBI respondents tended to believe that cooperation does not necessarily mean no unilateral direction of task forces. Cooperation rhetoric is used by both agencies and consensus management is often the goal espoused by organizational management.

The fact that FBI respondents did not disqualify unilateral direction entirely is a measure of the desire to control task force activities. In fact, since federal investigators believe that cooperation does not negate unilateral direction of the task force, it is probably their opinion that they should be in charge. In fact, the comments which will be provided in a later section do support the contention that a number of federal investigators evidence this feeling. This result is consistent with the first hypothesis which contends that local law enforcement investigators do not experience the task force as a cooperative work environment.

Question 36 reads as follows:

It is my experience that interagency investigations promote investigative secrecy among agents/detectives.

The result of the above t scores show that FBI agents are more likely to disagree with the perception that interagency investigations promote secrecy among agents/detectives. This supports the contention of H(1) that local investigators are less prone to perceive that a cooperative environment exists on task forces. In fact, cooperation as defined in this study indicates that this behavior (cooperation) means working together and arriving at consensus. Consensus is hardly possible in an environment perceived to be secretive or exclusive. These responses evidence that NYPD detectives are more likely to believe that close personal relationships are not formed among

task force members and that they are more likely than FBI investigators to perceive secrecy among agents and detectives.

Question 39 reads as follows:

Activity in my current task force assignment seems to be based on each agency reaching their own goals and not those of the task force group itself. (47 FBI respondents and 19 NYPD respondents reported answers to this question)

The results of the t scores show that FBI agents are more likely to disagree with this statement and to perceive the task force environment to be a cooperative one. The data suggests that NYPD respondents are less likely to disagree with this statement and thus perceive that agencies in the task force appear to be interested in the separate goals and not the cooperative environment required for reaching the combined goals of the task force as a separate unit. The results of this question tend to support H(1) based on the secondary interpretation of the NYPD's responses.

Hypothesis 2 Results:

The second hypothesis deals with the perception of shared investigative information in the task force environment. Specifically, the hypothesis states that local law enforcement investigators are less prone than federal law enforcement agents to perceive the task force as an environment in which investigative information is shared. Table 6.3 illustrates the

means, standard deviations, and t scores for questions 40 and 70 used in the explanation of FBI/NYPD responses.

Table 6.3
Differences in Perceptions Between FBI and NYPD on Survey Question 40 and 70

Survey Q	FBI Mean/S.D.	NYPD Mean/S.D.	T	Prob>T
Q 40	2.95/ .69	2.55/.60	2.29	.02
Q 70	1.71/ .68	2.35/.59	-3.58	.0007

Note: S.D.= standard deviation

Question 40 reads as follows:

Activity in my current task force assignment seems to be inhibited through the lack of investigators sharing information.

The results of the above t scores show that FBI agents are more likely to disagree with that particular survey statement. According to these responses FBI agents are less likely to perceive that there is a problem in sharing investigative information within the task force setting. This tends to support the assertion of H(2) and also suggests that NYPD respondents were less likely to disagree with that statement thus suggesting that they assert concern regarding this aspect of task force work. This is both consistent with the literature and the qualitative information provided in a later part of this chapter. It appears that local law enforcement investigators are more likely to view the task force as problematic, whereas

federal counterparts perceive the task force as operating appropriately.

Question 70 reads as follows:

I have never had a problem obtaining investigative information from a task force co-worker.

The results of the reported t scores indicate overwhelmingly that NYPD detectives are more likely to disagree with this statement. This t score clearly indicates that NYPD detectives reported that they have had trouble obtaining investigative information in a task force setting. This overwhelmingly supports H(2). The data reveals quite specifically that NYPD detectives are more suspicious of the process of shared investigative information than FBI agents.

Hypothesis 3 Results:

The third hypothesis deals with the perception of mutual, professional respect within the task force work environment., Specifically, it asserted that local law enforcement investigators are less prone than federal law enforcement agents to perceive the task force environment as one in which mutual, professional respect is expressed or received. Table 6.4 Illustrates the mean difference, standard deviation, and t scores for survey questions 41, 49 and 59 used in the explanation of FBI/NYPD responses.

Table 6.4
Differences in Perception Between FBI and NYPD on Survey Questions 41, 49 and 59

Survey Q	FBI Mean/S.D.	NYPD Mean/S.D.	T	Prob> T
Q 41	1.63/.67	2.05/.60	-2.35	.02
Q 49	2.70/.75	3.45/.51	-4.07	.0001
Q 59	2.47/.84	3.00/.75	-2.35	.02

Note:S.D.= standard deviation

Question 41 reads as follows:

The benefits of my current task force assignment can be described as the access to knowledge/expertise of other agency personnel.

The result of the above t score shows that the NYPD detectives are more likely to disagree with that particular survey question. It is consistent with the perception of local investigators that the task force work environment fails to provide an environment where investigators access one another's knowledge and expertise. In keeping with the perception that interaction is lacking and one's contribution is not sought, then there is a perception that one's contribution is not valued.

Question 49 reads as follows:

The problems associated with my current task force assignment can be described as case agent status and control of cases always goes to the NYPD/FBI (respondents read own agency in this response).

The result of the above t score marks an overwhelming perception on the part of the NYPD that they are more likely to disagree that the NYPD is afforded case agent status and case control. NYPD respondents strongly believe that case control and status are always held by the FBI in task force cases. The results reveal that NYPD detectives perceive that case control and case agent status are viable to the perception of mutual professional respect in the task force setting, and that they do not fully participate in this important role.

Question 59 reads as follows:

I would be more satisfied assigned to a unit comprised of NYPD detectives/FBI agents only.

The results of the above t scores show that NYPD detectives are more likely to disagree with that particular survey question. The importance of this result is that FBI agents are more likely to choose a squad comprised of only FBI agents than their NYPD counterparts are to choose a squad of only NYPD detectives. This indicates that FBI agents may fail to value the interagency experience. This inferred devaluation by FBI agents may explain local law enforcements' perception that the task force is not an environment in which their contribution is sought or valued. This tends to support the assertion in H(3).

Summary Analysis

The analysis scrutinizes each of the three guiding relationships suggested by the hypotheses. The analysis correlates agency membership and the respondents' opinions about the task force as a cooperative work environment, as a work environment in which investigative information is shared, and as a work environment in which members perceive mutual, professional respect. Briefly, all hypotheses were supported by the limited quantitative data.

Agency membership did prove to be a pivotal factor which clearly supported the literature that organizations, and in particular law enforcement agencies, are driven by very individual interpretations and perceptions of the work-place environment. Additionally, the hypotheses supported the media and journal representations that federal law enforcement is perceived as exerting a superior attitude with regard to their local law enforcement counterparts.

H1 Summary:

The results of H1 support the assertion that the NYPD was less prone than the FBI to perceive the task forces as cooperative work environments.

Available research identified law enforcement agencies as participants in interagency task forces who often attempt to make unilateral decisions regarding the direction of these groups. (Sampson, Stubbs, Smith, Pearson,Blagg, 1988; Bottoms,

1990) The FBI responses seem to support the results obtained by Bottoms, et al. The FBI believes that unilateral direction is not necessarily a negation of cooperation on task forces. Federal law enforcement agencies appears to assert a superior attitude regarding local law enforcement. This is consistent with federal law enforcement probably believing that they should direct activities of task forces. It is important to note that the law enforcement agency "sponsoring" the task force usually asserts this leadership role or "lead agency role." It would be interesting to measure these same perceptions were the task forces found in NYPD space and sponsored by them.

The literature identified the fear of domination as an overwhelming concern of organizations in general. Self-preservation is an important goal of bureaucracies. Moreover, autonomy is an integral element of law enforcement's perception of their own effectiveness. Autonomy connotes the singular power of an organization. Unilateral direction achieves this goal. In fact, the FBI respondents were more likely to perceive that the task force does not engender secrecy.

H(2) summary:

The hypothesized relationship suggesting the FBI was less prone than the NYPD to perceive that agencies complied with shared information requests was supported by the data. In fact, the investigators' responses evidence that 62 percent of the NYPD and 46 percent of the FBI respondents believe that sharing investigative information is not complied with by the other.

Overall, NYPD respondents viewed sharing all investigative information in a task force situation to be problematic.

H(3) summary:

Once again, the hypothesized relationship was supported along the agency lines asserted by the hypothesis. The data did support the thrust of the hypothesis which stated that the NYPD investigators are more likely to perceive that the task force is not a work environment where mutual, and professional respect is expressed. Specifically, the data evidenced the NYPD respondents' sensitivity to case control and case agent status. NYPD respondents failed to view the task force work environment as a place where knowledge and expertise were available due to the strained relations within the task force. These results also suggest that NYPD investigators felt less valued in the task force setting than did FBI agents.

Consistent with the context of being valued is the question of the differing educational requirements of the FBI and the NYPD. The FBI demands a four year college degree as an entry level requirement while the NYPD demands a high school diploma as the entry level requirement to application for their academy. In the assessment of respondents for this study the numbers are

accounted for in Table 6.5:

Table 6.5
Differences in Educational Background of FBI and NYPD Study Respondents

Agency	HS/2YR college	4yr/graduate school
FBI	0 (0%)	48 (100%)
NYPD	16 (80%)	4 (20%)
Total Numbers	16 (25%)	52 (75%)

The question arises about any feelings of resentment among respondents which can be related to the differences in educational background. The only indications revealed in the findings are comments by NYPD respondents about FBI agents being overpaid paper pushers and some singular comments about the fact that FBI agents are educated and intelligent. However, FBI agents also remark that their NYPD counterparts are intelligent but also possess a strong knowledge about the streets. Too, it was revealed through all respondents that credibility in law enforcement is often related more to "time on the job" as opposed to documented or paper credentials. In this case, it is observed and reported in this study that the NYPD respondents have, on the average, more "time on the job" than do the FBI agents assigned to these task forces at the time of this study. The NYPD respondents remark that they are forced to train "baby agents"

and feel that more experienced FBI agents should be assigned to drug enforcement work.

Analysis of Short Response Survey Section

Information obtained from the short-response section of the survey is presented in two parts. The first part is a content analysis of the short responses. This analysis studies the language used by respondents to describe their task force experiences. The second section is an item analysis of responses. It is reported in narrative style for each agency affiliation.

Content Analysis

Content analysis is an unobtrusive research technique in which an observer uses data in oral communication or written documents to identify patterns (Marshall, Rossman, 1989; Babbie, 1983). It is a means to apply some objectivity and quantification to the content of oral communications and written documents. The goal is to produce countable results. The key variables in this study were (1) cooperation, (2) shared investigative information, and (3) the perception of mutual professional respect among task force members. The link between the questionnaire and the short responses is illustrated by the list of verbiage used to describe task force activity.

The coding of manifest content expressed by Babbie (1983) as the visible, surface content of communication involved, using a list of words that operationalize the three variables presented above. The frequency of these words in the responses was counted and categorized along agency lines.

Latent content refers to the underlying meaning of a communication (Babbie, 1983). The categories used to identify latent content mirror the hypotheses of this study. They are:

1. Task force assignment is a cooperative experience.
2. Task Force members have no problem sharing investigative information with task force colleagues.
3. Task force members perceive they are professionally valued and respected by one another.

These latent meanings are tallied according to the individual responses provided and identified by agency. Each statement is reviewed for its overall content and the contextual meaning as related to the aforementioned concepts. This researcher utilized another rater in ensuring the uniformity of context for tallying purposes.

This researcher coded and tallied the results which provided uniformity in analysis of statements. The 15 statements comprising this section are open-ended statements which require completion by the respondent. Respondents' answers were assessed through direct references and inferences applicable to each of the three conceptual categories which frame the hypotheses in this study.

For example: One NYPD respondent completed statement 73 as follows: "The thing I most appreciate about my FBI colleagues is ...that they share information and work jointly." For the purposes of this analysis, this response was tallied in both the cooperation and shared information categories.

Manifest Content Analysis

This analysis was undertaken by operationalizing the categories of cooperation, shared investigative information, and mutual professional respect. These concepts were operationalized through a listing of terms gleaned from the literature and tallied on a coding sheet. This list is provided in Chapter 5 of this study.

Cooperation:

Table 6.6 distinguishes agency use of words having to do with cooperation (or the lack of it) in task force work. Table 6.7 illustrates the use of words having to do with shared investigative information. Finally, Table 6.8 shows how agency members use words having to do with mutual, professional respect.

Table 6.6

Cooperation Language: FBI/NYPD Word Usage Responses and Percentages of that Word Usage Among all Respondents

term	FBI	NYPD	Total Actual #	Total %
cooperation	11	15	26	45
share	13	8	21	37
communicate	1	3	4	7
depend	1	3	4	7
goal	12	7	19	33
consensus	0	0	0	0
rewarding	5	8	11	18
vital/necessary	9	10	19	33
getting along	7	10	17	29
important	6	4	10	17
good cases	6	10	16	28
disband	3	1	4	7
beneficial	4	2	6	9

Table 6.7

Shared Investigative Information Language: FBI/ NYPD Word Usage Responses and Percentages of that Word Usage Among All Respondents

term	FBI	NYPD	Total Actual #	Total %
share	13	8	26	37
we/our	0	0	0	0
unselfish	12	10	22	38
flexible	11	4	15	26
open	2	5	7	9
prima donnas	1	1	2	3
lead agency	4	0	4	7
communicate	1	3	4	7
cliques	2	0	2	3
non-support	8	7	15	26

Table 6.8

Mutual, Professional Respect Language:FBI/NYPD Word Usage Responses and the Percentages of that Word Usage Among All Respondents

term	FBI	NYPD	Total Actual #	Total %
hardworking	14	15	29	50
integrity	2	4	6	10
trustworthy	11	8	19	33
respect	4	4	8	14
capable/competent	10	8	18	31
loyal	5	1	6	10
egotistical	2	5	7	9
team player	13	11	24	41
professional	8	4	12	21
knowledgeable	7	9	16	28
humor	8	4	12	21
creative	3	0	3	5
lazy	0	2	2	3
experienced	10	6	16	28
intelligent	5	5	10	17
arrogant	0	6	6	10
courage	3	0	3	5
don't care	2	4	6	10
incompetent	3	3	6	10
inexperienced	1	3	4	7
indecisive	2	8	10	17

Language can be indicative of the intent and perception of the individual speaking. Language can either assist the observer in explaining behavior or behavior can contradict the language being used by the speaker. Language can either reflect the reality of the speaker's experience or define in some way the desired experience sought or expected by the speaker. The words used by task force members in regard to cooperation, shared information, and mutual, professional respect reflected in Tables 6.6-6.7 fail to reach any overall measure greater than 50%. This appears to suggest that the task force is problematic and creates some ambivalence for respondents in general. This is consistent with the literature which suggests that most law enforcement agencies embrace the rhetoric of cooperation while maintaining internal directives of autonomy and often superiority in the work-place. It is suggested that the reference to cooperation and shared information may signify an organizational directive or organizational behavior in the context of task forces, while the terms associated with mutual respect lend themselves to a more personal behavior on the part of respondents.

For example, in Table 6.6 there are larger numbers associated with words like cooperation, vital, necessary, and goal. However, when terms such as communicate, consensus, and depend are examined, the numbers for word usage are greatly reduced.

Examining Table 6.7 the delineation is not quite so clear. Words such as share, unselfish, flexible evidence comparable

measures. However, the essential reference of we and our revealed no measure. Terms such as open and communicate also revealed low measures.

Analyzing Table 6.8 there are large numbers associated with words such as hardworking, trustworthy, capable, competent, team player. Lazy, arrogant, don't care, and indecisive are terms which revealed lower measures. It is suggested that the personal nature associated with the perception of mutual, professional respect is one expressed by respondents without the weight of organizational expectations. For a group which is permanently located together on a daily basis, the evolution of personal relations is both expected as asserted in the research of Goffman (1959), Sheriff (1966), Cartwright and Zander (1968), Douglas (1983), and Axelrod (1984). The development of group and relations is primary in close, regular associations.

Latent Content Analysis

Responses were reviewed to assign them to the three identified categories. The responses were judged on their overall content as it reflected an attitude identified with cooperation, shared information, and mutual,professional respect. The results are reported in terms of each agency's observations. Tables 6.9, 6.10, and 6.11 give a quick summary of the latent content of the short-response section as applied to cooperation, shared investigative information, and the state of mutual professional respect.

Table 6.9

Cooperation: Percentage Responses FBI/NYPD Latent Content Analysis

Concept	FBI (N=45)	NYPD (N=13)
Task force is a positive experience	78	54
Task force is a negative experience	20	8
No response	2	38
Total	100%	100%

The results in this table are consistent with this study's assertion about task forces. Local law enforcement respondents are less likely to perceive the task force as a positive work environment. Even with 38% of the respondents in the "no response" category could be interpreted as dissatisfaction as noted in several of the NYPD respondents' statements during the administration of this study that this was a problem associated with agency politics and their responses would not be taken seriously or valued.

Table 6.10

Shared Investigative Information:Percentage Responses of FBI/NYPD Latent Content Analysis

Concept	FBI (N=45)	NYPD (N=13)
No problem sharing investigative information	47	62
Sharing problematic	20	23
No response	33	15
Total	100%	100%

The results in this table seem to infer that local law enforcement respondents are less likely to have problems sharing investigative information. Two thirds of local law enforcement respondents revealed they have no problem sharing information whereas less than half of the federal respondents reported they have no problem sharing information. One third of federal respondents failed to reveal any attitude. Over half of federal respondents either did not respond or found sharing problematic. These findings seem to support this study's assertions.

Table 6.11

Mutual, Professional Respect: Percentage Responses of FBI/NYPD Latent Content Analysis

Concept	FBI (N=45)	NYPD (N=13)
Reported overall positive perception of task force colleagues	80	85
Reported overall negative perception of task force colleagues	9	15
No response	11	0
Total	100%	100%

The results reported in this table do not support the assertions in this study but are consistent with the explanation associated with the formation and efficacy of group cohesion. The overall positive attitude of task force members in regard to their perception of one another as colleagues may suggest the day to day necessity of engagement in a permanently situated task force. It is interesting to note that where 11% of federal respondents reported no response 15% of local law enforcement respondents reported a negative perception of their colleagues.

Overall, both NYPD detectives and FBI agents revealed through their use of certain words that:

1. Cooperation is vital to task force operations even in view of the elements that contradict its purpose.

2. Sharing investigative information is still a problem, even in view of a positive feeling about their task force experience.
3. Personal relations are important to task force members as are feeling valued and being treated as equals and professionals.

Narrative Analysis of Short-Response Survey Section

Each of the fifteen open-ended statements that required completion by respondents is presented here individually. Narrative summaries are provided. For the purposes of this section a total of forty-eight FBI agents and eighteen NYPD detectives provided responses in this section. The narrative in this section will distinguish individual responses which often noted the endorsement of a particular observation. Narrative observations and analysis will follow each statement and are reported along agency lines.

Narrative Summary of Short Response Section

These responses are reported along agency lines. The quantification in parentheses serves to give the percentage of the total number of respondents per agency who answered in the manner described. The primary responses are provided and then other responses are delineated. The statements are reported in the order they occur on the survey.

Statement 71: Task force work is:

The most frequent response to this item identified task force work as satisfying, rewarding, valuable and as producing good results.(NYPD, n= 6/33%) (FBI, n= 25/59%) Respondents indicated that task force work is more demanding than other assignments because of the long and uncertain hours and the unpredictability of the work itself.

One NYPD respondent remarked that task force work was a hassle in that it was overly complicated by management's inability to understand how the work of drug enforcement is carried out. Another NYPD comment indicated that task force work was both instrumental and necessary in combatting organized crime, although the respondent felt that federal case work was slow and boring. Two NYPD respondents said that task force work can be frustrating and counterproductive; they were overburdened with too many regulations and policies not conducive to creating the collective front required to address drug crimes. Only one NYPD respondent viewed the combined knowledge and experience of investigators to be a great advantage in task force work.

The remaining FBI responses to this statement are singularly distinguished. One FBI respondent noted that task force work is considered politically correct. Another FBI respondent suggested that task force work could be more effective if management were better informed regarding the actual nature of drug work. Still, another FBI respondent indicated that a successful task force is one in which members cooperate and get along with one another. One FBI respondent thought that task force assignments were considered quality and diverse positions. However, another FBI respondent stated that task force work was unfocused due to the multi-level authorities necessitated for case progress. Finally, two FBI respondents advised that this work was an efficient application of resources and experience.

Statement 72: The greatest difficulty in task force cooperation is:

The most frequent completion to this item identified the 'bosses from each agency' as the main problem. Federal respondents indicated that the lack of unified administrative policies was a critical flaw in task force work.(NYPD,n=0) (FBI,n=6/12%) as was differing goals (NYPD,n=0) (FBI,n=8/15%) Both federal and local respondents noted that the clash of personalities (NYPD,n=6/30%) (FBI,n=6/12%) was problematic in task force work.

NYPD respondents made individual statements that it was difficult to put old fears and bad past experiences behind them

and to start anew, and that the task force attempted to address too many cases at once. An NYPD comment noted that the separate political agendas of both agencies interfered with unified action. Another NYPD statement provided that the work hours were long and it was difficult to get the NYPD to approve the necessary overtime. One NYPD response noted the overwhelming presence of egos and said that individual needs took precedence over casework. An additional NYPD statement pointed to the lack of communication in task force work.

FBI responses were as varied. One agent observed that the NYPD emphasized arrests while the federal focus was on the process toward conviction. Another FBI response indicated that while the issue of overtime was a positive aspect of task force work for NYPD members, FBI task force members considered it a negative aspect. FBI agents are not paid for actual recorded overtime but receive a percentage of their yearly salary to ensure their work availability. An FBI respondent observed that it was widely believed that NYPD did not provide an equal amount of financial resources to the task force. Two individual FBI respondents said that the FBI asserted more authority on the task force and took more of a lead agency role. But one FBI respondent thought that the FBI should take less of a lead agency posture. Another FBI respondent believed that the task force had been micro-managed into low morale. According to another FBI respondent, NYPD personnel should be more familiar with federal paperwork. One FBI respondent indicated that they experienced no

difficulties, while another FBI respondent said federal investigators were often tactless and undiplomatic towards NYPD members.

Statement 73(a): The thing I most appreciate about my NYPD/FBI [opposite respondent's] colleagues is:

The most frequent response to this item by NYPD detectives regarding FBI agents was their knowledge and ability (NYPD,n=7/38%). Other NYPD responses to this item were that FBI agents provided "good resources, like cars"; they "want to work jointly and get along"; and that "they have a sense of humor." One NYPD respondent said that FBI agents brought a "fresh, non-police approach to drug investigations." Generally, NYPD detectives observed that FBI agents had good training and a positive work ethic. NYPD detectives observed that FBI agents appeared competent and "very creative when it comes to waiting on cases that take a long time." Other NYPD comments noted that FBI agents "appear to want to share information and some even have a sense of humor."

The most frequent response made by FBI agents regarding NYPD detectives concerned "their street savvy," "street experience," "knowledge of the city," "ability to talk to people on the street," and their "street contacts."(FBI,n=22/68%) The second most reported characteristic reported by FBI agents to describe NYPD Detectives concerned "their friendliness, honesty, sense of

humor, and their brotherhood;" "they're more unified than agents." FBI agents (FBI,n=5/15%) answered in this manner. Some of the other responses attributed sincerity, experience, aggressiveness, common sense, dedication to duty, professionalism, and enthusiasm for "the job" to NYPD detectives. FBI agents also reported humor and professionalism in describing their NYPD colleagues.(FBI,n=5/15%)

Question 73(b): The one thing I find most troubling about my NYPD/FBI [opposite respondent's] colleagues is:

The most frequent response made by NYPD detectives regarding FBI agents was about their attitudes towards NYPD colleagues and other law enforcement agency personnel. Specifically, these responses objected to "their attitude that all other law enforcement personnel are beneath them," "no comraderie," "sometimes and attitude of distrusts of other agency personnel is projected," "self-righteous attitudes," and "they have big egos." (NYPD,n=12/67%) NYPD respondents reported that FBI agents exhibit a "sense of what it good for me and not for us," " FBI agents can't learn from other agencies," and they have "no work ethic." NYPD detectives related that the slow federal paperwork is a detriment to drug investigations and that many FBI agents were unwilling to put in the long days required by drug enforcement. Lastly, one detective observed that FBI agents had a tough time communicating with other task force members.

The most frequent response made by FBI agents regarding NYPD detectives was "they won't do and cannot adapt to FBI paperwork." (FBI,n=7/22%) Other responses are "NYPD are treated like children by FBI management" (FBI,n=6/13%), and "there is no follow-through and they're shortsighted and lazy". (FBI,n=6/13%) The next most reported observations were "there is always an issue of overtime" (FBI,n=5/11%) and "I have no problem at all." (FBI,n=5/11%) Other singular responses by FBI agents regarding NYPD detectives were "they are not equal to FBI agents", "their knowledge did not extend to outside of New York City", and "they did not initiate cases for the task force." One agent described NYPD detectives as slip-shod investigators, while another felt they were close-minded and inflexible. One FBI agent said that NYPD detectives are unable to learn new ideas and that the FBI and NYPD "don't see eye to eye." Another FBI agent felt that NYPD detectives evidenced resentment and antagonism towards FBI agents and that some NYPD detectives "hate the FBI." Lastly, one FBI observation indicated that NYPD detectives are more interested in short cases and arrests rather than seeing cases through to conviction.

Statement 74: NYPD Detectives can be described as:

The most frequent NYPD responses to this item about themselves were that they were "hardworking, loyal, creative and diligent" and "streetwise". Additional, singular observations were that NYPD detectives saw themselves as "basically well

intentioned, aggressive, persistent professionals, and efficient investigators." Other singular observations were they viewed themselves as "very cynical, despising bureaucracies, and willing to cooperate and teach and to learn."

The most frequent response of FBI agents regarding NYPD detectives was "they are street wise beyond the average agent" and are "hardworking, loyal" (especially with one another). Several FBI agent responses (FBI,n=6/13%) observed NYPD detectives are "professional," "competent," and "enthusiastic." Singular observations by FBI agents noted that NYPD detectives are "ball busters" and "aggressive," "resourceful," "friendly and dedicated." Other FBI agents noted that NYPD detectives are "always ready to give a hand," "more worldly than agents," and they can be "opinionated." FBI agents further stated that NYPD detectives "lack the higher education of agents and are not attuned to long term investigations." One FBI agent observed that "party animal" describes most detectives. One FBI agent observed that NYPD detectives "don't like FBI agents who are overpaid paper pushers," while another comment observed that NYPD detectives are often "better investigators than agents." Lastly, one FBI agent indicated that some NYPD detectives can "too often act as racists with minorities."

Question 75: FBI Agents can be described as:

The most frequent response by NYPD detectives to this item was that FBI agents are "professional and intelligent."

(NYPD,n=6/33%) The singular responses regarding FBI agents were that "they are conscientious in their duties but reluctant to be completely open and cooperate with the PD," 'knowledgeable and honest," and some are "impressed with themselves." NYPD detectives described most agents as "well spoken, well meaning, but not too experienced." Other NYPD observations were that FBI agents are often "closed minded" and "a unique lot." Lastly, one NYPD detective reported that FBI agents are "often uncooperative and unable to apply their resources effectively." One response simply used a question mark.

The most frequent terms used by FBI agents about themselves were that they are "hardworking and professional."(FBI,n=15/31%) However, the second most reported observation by FBI agents of themselves was critical: "several agents are too egotistical and appear to feel superior to the cops," "agents are pampered, spoiled know-it-alls who are often arrogant," and some agents are "prima donnas and do very little work which contributes to the overall task force mission."(FBI,n=12/25%). Comments which were made by at least 6% (n=3) of the FBI respondents were that " agents are overburdened with administrative responsibilities and less experienced than the cops in drug enforcement." The remaining singular responses made by FBI agents about themselves were they make better investigators than the NYPD detectives and can stick to long term investigations longer than the NYPD

detectives. However, terms such as "moody, stubborn, temperamental, overly analytical, and cheap" were also terms related by FBI agents about themselves. Two FBI respondents observed "for the most part agents are ok; however, a lot are only concerned with what they can get and how it will all benefit themselves rather than the group," and that agents are "ambitious and goal-oriented while having difficulty integrating with the PD."

Statement 76: If I could change one thing about task force work it would be:

The most frequent response by NYPD detectives was they believed they "needed a greater share of the decision making, to be considered "co-case agents and to be given that status through complete access to all investigative information."(NYPD,n=4/22%) The second most frequent response was to have less management oversight regarding the task force (NYPD,n=5/23%). The remaining single NYPD responses involved "getting rid of the idea of one dominant agency or lead agency," and "agencies other than the FBI are treated like second class citizens." Additional singular NYPD responses were to "relieve the task force of less political agendas," "to involve more street work," and "to assign FBI agents who actually want to be assigned to task forces." Lastly, a few NYPD respondents observed the "cop turnover" on task forces should be less frequent and the task forces needed more people.

The FBI responses involved many discrete observations. However, variations on three observations provided by the FBI respondents were that "Cop turnover too frequent, "Too many political agendas involved in task force work," "There should be less upper management involvement," and "Everyone should be treated equally." (FBI,n=7/19%) Individual observations by FBI respondents were that "factionalism should be reduced," "detectives should be made to respect and obey FBI directives," and "eliminate the need for detectives to follow so many of their own procedures and reporting requirements." Three FBI respondents noted that agents "who do not want to be assigned to the task force should be transferred," "placement on the task force should be due to merit rather than who you know," and "get rid of FBI prima donnas." One FBI respondent complained that a "one agency unit would be better," while another FBI comment was for the "PD to bring more work to the task force."

On a practical level, several FBI responses noted that task force members should "train more together," "unify data bases," and "limit input from outside sources." One other FBI response remarked it was "important to expand the task force to other federal agencies and to increase personnel and money to these units." Lastly, it was reported by a few FBI agents that "interagency jealousy regarding getting the headlines on investigations needs to be controlled better."

Statement 77: Interagency cooperation requires:

The most frequent NYPD response to this item was trust and openness. (NYPD,n=4/22%) Common goals was the second most frequent response (NYPD,n=3/15%). Other NYPD observations were singular responses which reported that compromise and the ability to get along with others was important. Further, it was observed that management should cooperate with one another and that ego should be discarded upon assignment to a task force. Another NYPD statement observed that all task force members be "equal and on the same level." Lastly, an NYPD response was the task force should be "a total effort on both sides" and to make a "good faith attempt to share responsibility."

The most frequent FBI response was that cooperation required respect, trust, and being open minded.(FBI,n=32/66%) The second most voiced observation was management should "cooperate and leave the egos at home." (FBI,n=33/69%) 46% (n=22) of FBI respondents indicated a "partnership mentality" and the "ability to get along" as important. 15% (n=7) of FBI responses observed there "should be only one decision maker," that a "clearer written statement of commitment" is needed, and there should be "a better understanding of the task." The remaining singular responses were made by FBI respondents. Those remarks included task force members are equals and this work required great patience, mutual support, and good relations. Additionally, individual FBI responses observed there should be a complete

exchange of information and another believed that task force members needed to be flexible.

Question 78: The relationship of coworkers depends largely on:

The most frequent observation by NYPD respondents noted their relationship with coworkers depended on a "chemistry and personalities involved, "as well as, the "desire to work together and share information along with mutual respect."(NYPD,n=3/16%) 11% (n=2) of NYPD respondents also noted that the "attitudes of respective management and the competence and leadership of management" were important to task force relations. The individual remarks by NYPD respondents also noted that trust, a sense of humor, and flexibility were integral to task force relations. One NYPD respondent stated it was necessary to "prove oneself" to coworkers in order for relations to develop well.

The most frequent FBI responses to this item were that "cooperation" was important, as well as, "personalities fitting together. (FBI,n=12/29%) FBI respondents also indicated that "mutual respect, trust, and effort" (FBI,n=8/16%) were important among task force members. 9% (n=4) of FBI responses indicated that task force members should support one another and should share personal, life, and career goals. One comment following one of these response in parentheses was "(won't ever happen on a task force!)." 7% (n= 3) of FBI respondents observed management needed to afford the example for cooperation. Other individual

FBI responses indicated personal integrity and "who you are and what you can do for others" as an important aspect of task force relations. Further, one FBI respondent noted that being open minded, having a sense of humor, and exhibiting a dedication to duty contribute to good relations on a task force. Lastly, one FBI respondent observed fairness and "who controls the cases" can dictate the condition of task force relations.

Statement 79: Task force assignments can be described as positive/negative experience due to:

The most frequent response provided to this item by all NYPD respondents indicated that the task force experience was positive. Of the responses provided by FBI respondents, 40 indicated that the task force experience was a positive one. Specifically, the most frequent response provided by NYPD respondents was that they can get involved in "long term, more complex, and better cases." (NYPD, n=10/54%) The second most frequent response was that task force assignments allowed access to "better working conditions and resources, in particular vehicles." (NYPD,n=4/23%) The remaining singular comments were that task forces provided the formation of "new working partnerships and contacts, as well as, experiencing new investigative techniques." One NYPD response observed that friendship and "catching the untouchable criminals" made the task force experience a positive one for them.

Of the positive responses provided by FBI respondents, 29% (n=12) observed task forces were a positive experience due to the "nature of the work required and the opportunity to develop higher impact cases through cooperation." Another frequent response (FBI,n=18/37%) was that FBI agents "need to be exposed to the experience and talent of the NYPD" and that FBI agents "need to share and be exposed to new ideas," "exposure to the NYPD is a learning experience involving different personalities and backgrounds." Two FBI respondents indicated there was a "need for dedicated management in order to make it work." The remaining singular comments noted that future, necessary work contacts were developed in task forces. Lastly, one FBI respondent indicated that task force assignments were preferred. 11% (n=5) of FBI responses indicated that the task force experience was negative. Two of these responses observed that "New York City is a hole," while another two observed that "there are too many philosophical and goals differences." The remaining observation was that there were "long term problems between the NYPD and the FBI."

Statement 80: Sharing investigative information including source and informants with NYPD/FBI investigators is:

The most frequent NYPD response was it "was the only way to get the job done and for the FBI to open up more." (NYPD,n=9/50%) The remaining responses were singular and involved observations that the experience was "sometimes difficult," "important," "easy

from the direction of the NYPD to the FBI," "usually works," and "generally only done when you are a co-case agent-all and other members don't generally get access to informants."

The most frequent FBI response to this item indicated it was essential for case development and progress that the information be shared. (FBI,n=20/44%) The second most frequent response (FBI,n=6/13%) was that sharing was "valuable to developing a trusting relationship." Other prominent responses by FBI agents (FBI,n=4/8%) noted that "sharing was OK," "not a problem," and "not the way to go." 6% (n=3) of FBI respondents indicated that "FBI procedural rules and regulations made complete sharing difficult." The remaining responses were individual and are presented below:

> "Pro forma on my task force is we cooperated and trust each other; otherwise, the task force purpose is lost."
>
> "Usually OK, but could harm your source if information gets to someone less than trustworthy (someone not necessarily attached to the task force)."
>
> "Too regulated for drug investigations--most sources fall into a cooperating witness category, therefore, NYPD should be allowed to conduct source interviews freely."
>
> "Tenuous work under current FBI guidelines."

"Essential--often detectives are the only ones with the foreign language ability to conduct interviews with sources."

"Necessary, but it causes me concern because of past leaks during investigations."

Statement 81: The three most important qualities which describe a 'good' task force co-worker are:

The three most important qualities identified by NYPD respondents in the order of their importance were:

1. Selflessness--putting personal differences aside to be a team player (NYPD,n=10/54%)
2. Trust-integrity (NYPD,n=8/46%)
3. Intelligence (NYPD,n=6/31%)

The remaining qualities which were noted by NYPD respondents were: dedication, sharing information, motivated, mutual respect, streetwise. open, sense of humor, good listener, and understanding.

The three most important qualities identified by FBI respondents in the order of their importance were:

1. Cooperative/team player, able to put mission of task force before self and own agency (FBI,n=25/51%)
2. Trust/integrity (FBI,n=13/28%)
3. Experienced/mature investigator (FBI,n=12/24%)

The remaining qualities which were listed by FBI respondents were: sense of humor, mutual respect, dependable, flexible, share

information, open-minded, enthusiastic, loyal, humble, available for long hours, wants to be on task force, no prima donnas, leadership, courage, energy, and can develop informants.

Statement 82: The supervisory personnel heading my current assignment can be described as:

There was virtually no delineation by respondents regarding the agency identity of supervisors in this statement; only one NYPD respondent noted an agency differentiation. The most frequent NYPD responses were that supervisors were "handicapped by own agency's political agendas which limit free flowing, open, cooperative feelings and exchanges" and "very competent." (NYPD,n=2/11%) The remaining individual responses were that supervisors are "well intentioned", "uncooperative with one another", "good", "fair", "FBI overbearing, NYPD don't want problems", "idiots and untested", and "lacking direction."

The most frequent FBI response was that task force supervisors were "excellent and have a great understanding of task force work; they are experienced."(FBI,n=17/38%) The second most frequent observation was that the current supervisors "were afraid to make decisions and should have never been assigned to a task force; they are too inexperienced.(FBI,n=9/18%). 8% (n=4) of the FBI respondents observed that the current supervisors are "overburdened and overly concerned with administrative, non-investigative situations meaning they don't focus on cases" and

"are not strong enough or aggressive enough to handle task forces." 6% (n=3) of the FBI respondents observed they believed that the current task force supervisors were competent. The remaining individual responses noted that the current supervisors were "wimpy." Of all the FBI responses, 22% (n=10) made no comment at all.

Statement 83: The most gratifying aspect of my current assignment is:

The most gratifying aspect reported by NYPD respondents was the development of close, personal relationships. The second most frequent response was the opportunity to work major cases and experience new challenges (NYPD,n=7/38%). The remaining individual responses were:

"I try, in my own way to bring members together and get the job done; have fun, too."

"Good working conditions."

"Interagency contacts for future."

"Experience cooperation."

"I like being treated like an adult. The NYPD has a tendency to treat investigators like children and not allow them to make decisions."

"I can actually make case decisions and have input in the direction of cases."

The most gratifying aspect of the current assignment identified by FBI respondents was the opportunity to work major

cases which have national and international importance while presenting challenges and affording numerous arrest situations. (FBI,n=23/51%) The second most gratifying aspect of this work was identified by FBI respondents as the experience of working with the NYPD who are "experienced street cops and who exhibit stronger comraderie than Agents." (FBI,n=12/24%) The remaining individual responses are identified as:

"I can control my own destiny."

"I can gain good experience."

"I like working with experienced people."

It is noted that 15% (n=7) of the FBI respondents made no comment.

Statement 84: The least satisfying aspect of my current assignment is:

NYPD responses to this item were very individual. Only one response was made by five NYPD respondents (30%) who observed that the administrative differences between the agencies inhibited the enforcement work of the task forces. The remaining individual responses are provided below:

"I don't like having to do a particular thing just because it is politically mandated and it doesn't help anyway, but drives people apart."

"Too little overtime involved in this assignment."

"Always a threat of a transfer."

"I have no real access to the good cases."

"Some agents don't like cops and they should not be assigned to the task force."

"Females are not given the good cases on task forces."

"Too much agency rivalry."

"You need to feed the Agents' egos every minute to get along."

"There is a lack of respect from One Police Plaza."

The most frequent FBI response to this item was that there was too much "administrative oversight and no support from management which detracts from investigative duties and that these administrative requirements take agents off the street for non-investigative duties." (FBI,n=10/23%) The second most frequent response (FBI,n=4/8%) by FBI respondents was that the "long hours go unrewarded" for the time that agents spend on drug enforcement work. 4% (n=2) of FBI respondents indicated that "management fails to acknowledge my abilities," that "I am dealing with people who aren't team players and use other members for their own advantage," that" we need more detectives," and that "there are too many philosophical differences between the NYPD and the FBI and that task forces will never work completely." The remaining observations by FBI respondents follow:

"Task force is foiled by factionalism."

"I don't like working with the PD."

"The unpredictable hours."

"NYPD doesn't like the FBI."

"Lack of resources."

"I'm left in this office to rot."

"FBI agents do all the paperwork."

"Some agents are too self-absorbed and are not team players."

"Hard and dangerous work is not compensated."

"Administration can say whatever they want, they are not in the trenches and we can't fight City Hall."

"I don't like dealing with new agents who think they know more than experienced members and refuse to learn from more experienced members."

Statement 85: Task force personnel should/should not be recruited for the following reasons:

It is noted that all NYPD and FBI respondents believed that task force personnel should be recruited into these units. The two frequent responses made by NYPD respondents were that "relationships are a vital part of task force success while being a team player also contributes to the level of safety among task force members on the street" and "there must be a willingness to work with other agencies and to understand the task force concept. Not everyone is cut out for task force assignments" (NYPD,n=7/38%). NYPD respondents observed that "thorough background checks to determine integrity and work ethic was important." (NYPD,n=3/15%) Additionally, NYPD respondents believed that "street knowledge, time on the job, maturity, and

drug enforcement experience" were all important characteristics for task force assignments. One NYPD respondent observed that drug enforcement is "sensitive and dangerous work" and that task force members need to understand and accept the reality of the assignment.

The most frequent response offered by FBI respondents was that task force assignments required "team players who believe in the equality and abilities of one another and that people who do not like task forces should not be assigned as they will ruin the effort."(FBI,n=22/49%) The second most frequent observation was that "drug enforcement work is sensitive and involves long hours." (FBI,n=13/28%) One FBI respondent observed many agents do not like the irregular hours of drug enforcement work and that this should be determined prior to assignment to a drug task force. 8% (n=4) of FBI respondents noted that there was a "need for experienced, mature investigators" and simply noted "yes" in their response. The remaining, individual observations by FBI respondents follow:

"Task forces are important and they need to have special leadership who can set an example of cooperation."

"Need to understand other agencies."

"Should volunteer for this assignment."

"Need common sense."

"Need to be street wise."

Summary Analysis of Short Response Section

Overall, the data in the short responses are consistent with the findings of the survey questionnaire. In review, the issue suggested by H(1) in this study was that local law enforcement is less prone to perceive the task force as a cooperative work environment.

The perceptions by task force members expressed the view that task force work can be satisfying, rewarding, and valuable. In fact, the percentages indicate that the FBI respondents were more positive about this claim than NYPD respondents. These respondents also said that task force work was more demanding than most assignments. This was so because of the competing administrative and political demands of participating agencies . Too, the pall of negative historical stereotypes and experiences are brought to the task force by individual investigators about the other's agency.

Both agency respondents felt that the task force provided an environment where greater impact cases could be developed. High impact cases are those defined as ones attacking the organizationally hierarchy of criminal organizations and which move both domestically and internationally in support of their endeavors. The NYPD detectives seem to speak to the way they feel more than the FBI agents. NYPD detectives talk about developing close, personal work relations and better resources and equipment. NYPD respondents advised that they needed a greater share of the decision-making process and to be accorded the

status of co-case agent. In fact, some NYPD respondents suggested that the term "lead agency" needs to be eliminated from the task force language. NYPD respondents sought to be recognized as equals.

FBI agents recognize the value and experience brought to the task force by their NYPD counterpart. FBI agents even chastise themselves for the lack of brotherhood which seems more evident among their NYPD counterparts. Some FBI agents recognize the importance of the street-savvy and informants that NYPD detectives bring to the task force and enjoy a very positive relationship with their counterparts.

However, as suggested earlier, it is reiterated that both NYPD detectives and FBI agents suggest that the differences in philosophical and investigative approaches make cooperation very difficult. In addition, both NYPD and FBI investigators felt that the task force made working cases a long, tedious process. More FBI agents than NYPD detectives indicated that they would be prefer a same agency assignment.

Finally, without exception, all task force investigators felt that membership on these units should involve careful recruitment for very specific characteristics. At the top of both agency's lists were the ability to be a team-player and to create relationships which translate into a positive knowledge and confidence about the other on the street. Task force members should fully understand the task force concept of equality and consensus. All investigators agreed that not everyone is "cut out

for task force assignments." Investigators with negative predispositions to the other participating agencies should be ferreted out and excluded from these assignments. All investigators felt that maturity and prior drug enforcement experience was critical due to the unique and demanding nature of drug enforcement work. All investigators noted that true management support and leadership versus mere rhetoric was essential to the success of interagency groups.

The issue suggested by the H(2) was that local law enforcement was less prone to perceive the task force as a work environment where investigative information was shared. Both agencies indicated responses that acknowledged the idea that shared information across the board was essential to task force success. NYPD detectives expressed the greater concern about the lack of shared investigative and informant information. NYPD detectives complained that they did not feel they were full partners. It was noted that the problem of sharing emanated from the FBI, with some agents feeling that FBI policy and procedures prevented complete sharing and that trust precedes sharing. Some agents felt no problem sharing information and welcomed the exchange of information.

NYPD detectives noted that sharing was sometimes difficult, and there were equivocations on the part of FBI agents who are reticent about the exchange of information outside the agency. Media stories and popular journalism are replete with the

"one-way feds" image. Some NYPD detectives believe this to be true and some FBI agents still maintain this stance in defense of protecting against case leaks to detectives outside the task force.

The issue suggested by H(3) was that local law enforcement was less prone than federal law enforcement to perceive that the task force as a work environment where mutual professional respect is expressed. Respondents from both agencies described similar ideas about the respect and admiration they have for one another as investigators. Respondents similarly ranked trust, selflessness, and team player attitude as primary for assignment to task forces. Many of the responses in this section reveal the ambivalence felt by investigators of both agencies.

Keeping this in mind, NYPD respondents voiced concern over their acceptance by FBI agents and felt that some FBI agents treated them as inferiors or subordinates. Some NYPD detectives felt that there were FBI agents assigned to task forces who "simply did not like cops." NYPD detectives also suggested that some FBI agents treat police officers with arrogance. NYPD respondents repeatedly noted that they felt excluded from the decision-making process, and that this act alone impeded real cooperation. NYPD detectives noted that even the less experienced agents did not feel to need to learn from the more experienced detectives.

Some FBI agents noted in singular responses that "cops don't measure up to agents," "cops are less educated than agents," and

that "the NYPD doesn't like the FBI." Some FBI agents did reaffirm the importance of working with locals and believed that drug crimes especially necessitated accepting everyone as equals and as bringing consensus to this work-place.

Overall, respondents of both agencies express positive perceptions of their day-to-day work partners. The reticence seems to evidence itself when respondents are speaking in terms of agency driven concerns. Respondents also admit that historical feuds and some negative experiences affect the process of developing relationships on today's task forces.

Respondents Unsolicited Statements Regarding Survey and Research

At the time this research questionnaire was administered at New York, at least 9 FBI agents and 6 NYPD detectives offered unsolicited comments to this researcher regarding the questionnaire and the research topic. These remarks are presented with agency designation where appropriate.

Initial remarks asserted that there was little time to complete a survey and that there was little interest in the topic of task forces, as management failed to take the street work of these units seriously. It was observed that management failed to adequately support these units and that creativity was lacking in current management hierarchy. Respondents claimed that they were suspicious about the color coding of the surveys distributed as discussed in Chapter 5. Respondents also indicated that they were suspicious of the access management might have to their remarks. Several NYPD respondents refused to fill out the survey due to their displeasure with unspecified aspects of task force assignments and/or the fact that the person conducting the study was an FBI Agent.

Many responses referred to organizations involved in "self-protection and game playing." Many respondents felt that a critical difference between detectives and agents was that detectives wanted the 'quick hit' cases and that agents were interested in long term investigations. Further, some FBI

respondents felt that detectives were interested in achieving arrests while agents related more to the prosecutive stage of investigations. FBI agents advised that they did much of the burdensome paperwork and that the detectives can't or won't get involved with "paper," and that some detectives have "abdicated their responsibility with the record keeping."

Many agents remarked that the FBI does not work drugs correctly. These agents remarked that the FBI moves too slowing in their authorization of cases and operations. Further, the detectives are impatient with the administrative demands of the FBI system. Too, there often existed an "us and them" mentality (NYPD respondent) and that "we just don't blend very well" (FBI respondent). This attitude was expressed by both managers and task force members of both agencies. Many detectives remarked that "baby agents" are assigned to these units and substantial time is required to "train" them. NYPD respondents also indicated that some agents are unwilling to "learn from cops."

Respondents from both organizations believed that management exerted too much oversight and that the real decision making should be left with the squads and not managers who "haven't been on the street for years." Many respondents of both organizations believed the authority levels for investigations were prohibitive and slowed investigations unnecessarily. Respondents also advised that it was important to recognize the differing work philosophies and that the parent organizations

don't really support these units but realize they are a politically expedient and beneficial.

Respondents also believed that organizational egos were a great source of difficulty. Respondents noted that personal as well as the chauvinistic presumptions of agency primacy were a problem. Respondents believed that there was no place for "loners" in this work. Respondents also commented it was important for everyone to get the "credit" and "what they needed" for it to work out. Agents believed that the detectives could "smooze" their way around their organization very well and often to the task forces' advantage when it resulted in a unit receiving special services or information. Respondents noted that "partnering up" with detectives was important for relationships and the work. In fact, some respondents advised good relations often overcame the administrative problems.

Many respondents of both organizations complained about the complex geography of New York City and the difficulty of getting around. Many agents indicated they would rather be assigned to another part of the country due to the high cost of living in New York City and location of family and relatives. This aspect of agents' assignment to New York City often served as an important emotional aspect to dedicating the inordinately demanding drug enforcement work schedule.

Management/Supervisory Interviews

Access, Presentation, and Analysis of Interviews

Task force arrangements between the FBI and the NYPD have existed since the creation of the bank robbery task force in the 1970s. Task forces have been used to solve a variety of crime problems, such as homicides, kidnappings, and street gang violence. The drug enforcement initiative commenced in 1983, when the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program was developed by the federal government. The OCDETF program served as the basis for the NYPD and FBI cooperative work discussed in this study. No one from either organization disagreed with the idea that drug crimes necessitate some form of cooperation. But, there are various approaches to interagency cooperation, and the variations are revealed in the information imparted through these interviews.

Face-to-face interviews were conducted in the spring of 1993 with assurances of anonymity. The researcher took handwritten notes because of respondents' general objections to taped interviews. Of the ten supervisors assigned to these task forces, five interviewed were from the FBI and five from the NYPD. In addition, one top manager of each organization was also interviewed. The comments of the twelve interviewees are presented in a summary, narrative manner to ensure the anonymity promised. The comments are distinguished by agency only in their presentation. Direct quotations are attributed to consecutively

numbered interviews. These range from one to twelve and are identified by agency name and interview number.

Additionally, this study included interviews of three FBI managers in three separate FBI field division offices in comparable major metropolitan areas. This was done in order to determine the FBI's general experience with task forces and its relations with state and local police authorities. These interviews were conducted by telephone; handwritten notes were taken during these conversations. These interviews are reported to provide further perceptions regarding drug enforcement cooperation in comparable law enforcement communities. These interviews are reported with direct quotations using letters with the FBI notation. This study makes no formal comparison among task forces in metropolitan areas. However, the information obtained in these additional interviews serves as a context for the information culled from the interviews conducted at New York City. All interviewees were promised that the cities and managers would not be identified.

The guide for all of these interviews was the questionnaire answered by respondents in this study. The general topics addressed were interagency cooperation, supervision of task forces, separation from the home organization's immediate direction, benefits/sacrifices of task force cooperation, and task force investigators' relations.

Task Force Climate

It is important to describe the task force organizational climate under which these interviews were conducted. At the time of this study, there was much spontaneous discussion about the current perception of how the FBI handled security clearances for NYPD personnel assigned to FBI-sponsored task forces in FBI office space in Manhattan and Queens, New York.

Many NYPD personnel and some FBI personnel believed that the FBI took a hard and unreasonable line towards NYPD investigators regarding movement in FBI office space while the security clearance process were being conducted and completed. These security clearances involved background investigation and could often take weeks. These security clearances were undertaken to determine that neither NYPD Internal Affairs nor any other law enforcement agency had ongoing investigations into any detective being considered for a task force assignment. These clearances were also part of a process known as federal deputation, which many federal law enforcement agencies use to integrate state and local investigators into federal cases. This deputation process also allows state and local investigators clearance to participate fully in federal wiretap and undercover investigative techniques that involve direct access to informants and cooperating witnesses. Deputation is usually limited to access and participation on a particular case and can be extended where

the need arises. However, in permanently situated task forces, deputation extends to all investigations handled by that unit.

Historically, NYPD investigators newly assigned to FBI task forces were allowed unescorted access to FBI office space as the clearance process was conducted. During previous assignments with the FBI, NYPD detectives were given security codes necessary to enter FBI office space. In recent cases, NYPD investigators were not provided security codes to gain entry into FBI space and were forced to present themselves in the reception area of the FBI office and wait for an agent escort. Once the security clearance was completed successfully, task force members were given security codes and were allowed to move about the assigned unit area without an escort.

Among those interviewed, NYPD personnel, with completed security clearances believed that newly assigned NYPD investigators had been inordinately monitored in their movement and access to FBI office space. Many respondents believed that this inordinate monitoring was an overreaction to a recent investigation in New York City regarding the alleged corruption involving a few members assigned to a NYPD/New York Region Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) task force. Several NYPD detectives had been assigned to this unit; the alleged corruption involved a limited number of these investigators. That investigation was ongoing at the time of this study. More than 20 NYPD and FBI respondents believed that the increased monitoring of new task force members involved in the clearance process

constituted an insult to a relationship which was longstanding, trustworthy. The resentment was evident and acknowledged by several NYPD and FBI respondents throughout the interviews conducted in the spring, 1993.

Of the 6 FBI managers interviewed, 3 felt that the New York FBI policy on security clearances and escorts was in error. They said that FBI agents would not wish to be treated in such a manner if they were assigned to NYPD-sponsored task forces in NYPD office space. This issue created tensions between task force members not previously experienced. However, the remaining 3 FBI managers insisted that the escort system was appropriate. These remaining FBI managers expressed that the "bad feelings" were the cost of doing business by the book.

Additionally, during the time of this study, FBI vehicles were being towed by city traffic authorities. That produced a resentful reaction from many FBI respondents. Unravelling the towing of any vehicle in New York City is a day-long effort. The reaction was so strong that several FBI respondents made jokes about the towing problem as city retaliation for the security clearance issue. Both events suggested an undercurrent of ill will. Although some respondents spoke of these issues in a facetious manner, they felt the events were important enough to be related.

Task Force Management

NYPD Remarks

Overall, NYPD personnel noted that without task forces, the job of drug enforcement would "still get done, but not as well" (NYPD-6). They believed that shared decision making would result in shared responsibility, especially in complex and politically charged investigations crossing multiple jurisdictions. The task force was described as "an instrument" (NYPD-6) for attacking drug trafficking. Another comment was that "task forces are invaluable tools" (NYPD-2). NYPD personnel observed the lack of resources as a vital incentive for cooperation. Another manager observed the FBI's approach to task forces is, "It's my ball and if you don't play by my rules we'll go home." (NYPD-3) Another comment related a need for these units, but that "task forces cannot do it alone; we need the assistance of all federal agencies and the feds have to stop fighting with one another" (NYPD-4). However, all NYPD interviewees noted that the task force allowed them to develop and pursue cases that moved out of their jurisdiction, to "stay in the game" (NYPD-1, 2, 4, 6).

NYPD personnel agreed that task forces existed in spite of the difficulty of managing by consensus. NYPD personnel exhibited little naivete and observed that drug organizations moving beyond the New York City boundaries made it necessary to cooperate in order to impact criminal organizations finding the city a lucrative location for their activities. NYPD personnel

noted that task force participation helped address their mandate to protect and serve the citizens of New York City.

NYPD personnel emphasized that NYPD task force members should not forget who their primary employer was. NYPD personnel were adamant about maintaining their focus of loyalty and responsibility (NYPD-1, 4). NYPD personnel were emphatically advised at monthly meetings held by the Organized Crime Control Bureau that task force command personnel should be watchful that detectives not lose sight of the fact that they were NYPD officers first. "Police are reminded that they are not feds, and this is reinforced during NYPD OCCB meetings" (NYPD-4, 6). Police often felt that they were considered guests in federal space (NYPD-1, 3).

NYPD personnel said that control of their own investigators was particularly important in task force assignments. NYPD personnel advised that the participating agencies were driven by different drug enforcement missions. NYPD personnel acknowledged that it was necessary to act in a professional manner (NYPD-1, 3). Several of the differences between the NYPD and FBI investigative policies were noted by NYPD personnel as case targeting, wiretap authority levels and procedures, street/case operations, burdensome paperwork, and decision making power police officers had but street Agents did not. (NYPD-1, 2, 4, 6)

NYPD personnel observed that FBI support had eroded since the inception of the permanent task force units in 1983.

For example,there was a decided diminution of resources for travel and overtime, in particular, which adversely affected one of the main reasons for cooperation, access to increased resources. (NYPD-6) One NYPD manager offered the following example: task force case travel of case agents is currently and often limited by the FBI to their own personnel, thereby, affecting the asserted co-case agent role of NYPD Detectives (NYPD-6). It had a demoralizing affect on investigators who worked cases together and should equally receive the "perks."

Four NYPD personnel interviewed observed that the FBI conducted drug investigations under "archaic" rules (NYPD-1, 2, 4, 6). Several NYPD personnel noted that the FBI's approach to drug investigations was overburdened with authority levels. Its bureaucracy adversely affected drug investigations that required immediate decision making and action. As a result, investigations got stalled while FBI investigators awaited approval to use certain investigative techniques (NYPD-1, 2, 4). For example, the most burdensome problems identified were FBI drug buys and wire-tap authority. NYPD personnel noted that their own mechanisms were more timely and efficient.

In addition, several NYPD personnel felt that FBI supervisory counterparts were often less creative in investigations due to concern for their own careers and their anticipation of oversight by FBI upper management. Some NYPD personnel remarked," The FBI has no real leadership in the area of drug enforcement on these task forces; most FBI supervisors

are too scared to make decisions" (NYPD-2,4). Some NYPD personnel observed individuals in their own hierarchy " are ego-maniacs and do not understand drug cases and don't know how to manage them. They seek to maintain too much control over investigators and are looking to bring the media attention to the NYPD" (NYPD 1, 2, 4).

One NYPD interviewee pronounced, "Task forces are here to stay and the feds need to do away with these insulting discussions with locals regarding security clearances which are too long and often offend an officer by their negative insinuations. And language needs to be softened" (NYPD-4). Finally, "No one really cares about these task forces, it is all rhetoric" (NYPD-2).

FBI Remarks

FBI personnel observed that task forces combine federal and local law enforcement to bring drug enforcement into balance in a large metropolitan areas where there are competing federal agencies (FBI-12). One FBI respondent observed if NYPD were not "with us, then we would spend a great deal of time sorting out problems" (FBI-12). Several FBI personnel agreed that the investigative philosophies of the NYPD and the FBI are different (FBI-7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12). Some FBI personnel indicated it was important to recognize these differences in order to offset task force problems (FBI-7,12). At the same time, several FBI personnel indicated that drug work, by its nature, is suited to cooperative efforts (FBI-8, 9, 10, 11, 12).

FBI personnel agreed that they spent too much time on administrative duties, which left less time to direct investigations (FBI-8, 9, 10). One FBI interviewee observed that issues of personalities and co-location of investigators were not significant, "Subordination is the key" (FBI-12). This interviewee did not like to hear task forces referred to as "Lt. so and so's task force." One FBI manager said that there was "fear on both sides regarding control issues and who is the boss" (FBI-2, 12). One interviewee argued that the task force should be run on "sweat equity;" all problems encountered by the task force should be shared by all and not left to the FBI to solve. It was important that the day-to-day efforts of all task force members and the accomplishments produced by these units be recognized, and that all task force investigators be accorded equal standing (FBI-12). Several FBI personnel commented that it was a widely held perception by members of these task forces that FBI higher-ups do not have a "clue as to how drug work should be accomplished" (FBI-9, 10, 11). "The further away from the actual street work you get, the worse the problems with management" (FBI-9). Other remarks suggested that the FBI hierarchy had too much oversight of drug investigations and that this inhibited development and response required in fast-paced and erratic drug work. In other words, FBI supervisors are over-managed. (FBI-9,10,11) Several FBI personnel agreed that some investigative functions, such as wire-taps, are executed more quickly by the state authorities (FBI-8, 10, 11, 12).

Some FBI personnel believed that they had to disguise problems in task forces because the understanding among these managers was that the FBI hierarchy would not tolerate any problems and to admit difficulty might be interpreted as their inadequacy rather than the organizations (FBI-7,9). One FBI interviewee commented that when drug task forces were initiated at New York, FBI supervisors were told to "make it work" regardless of the problems and no other response was acceptable (FBI-11).

Finally, the issue of competition was broached by some FBI personnel. One interviewee believed that healthy competition does not exist (FBI-12). This person argued that there must be one leader so that competition for cases within the task force could be avoided. Other FBI personnel disagreed and thought task forces must be managed by consensus (FBI-8, 10, 11).

Task Force Cooperation, Shared Investigative Information, and Issues of Mutual, Professional Respect

Overall, NYPD and FBI personnel had a considerable range of opinions on the benefit and sacrifice of task force participation. NYPD and FBI personnel related their observations of positive and negative aspects of cooperation, shared investigative information, and professional relationships on task forces.

Cooperation and Mutual Professional Respect Issues

NYPD Remarks

NYPD personnel observed that one of the greatest benefits of task force participation was being involved in investigations that addressed larger criminal organizations expanding their jurisdiction (NYPD-1, 2, 4). NYPD personnel saw task force work as a means of sharing the important responsibility of drug trafficking eradication (NYPD-6). NYPD personnel observed that task force work allowed them access to federal resources which are often more plentiful than their own (NYPD-1, 4).

Sacrifices identified by NYPD managers were the loss of control of their own people and the difficulty of managing their investigators away from the parent organization structure (NYPD-1, 8). A few NYPD personnel agreed that the NYPD investigators assigned to task forces had a tendency to identify with the work unit to which they were assigned rather than with the NYPD itself (NYPD-1, 5). Other NYPD personnel observed it was important that their officers not lose their identity or pride as NYPD officers. Further, agencies will never completely cooperate because each agency guards its autonomy and is consistently answering to its own hierarchy (NYPD-1). One NYPD interviewee remarked that it was important to maintain an "atmosphere of professionalism and to blend administrative systems and personalities" (NYPD-1, 2).

NYPD personnel observed that there are behavioral subtleties in the interaction of agencies (NYPD-1, 3). One NYPD

interviewee believed that were "healthy and unhealthy rivalries which are differentiated by a genuine interest in excellence versus the spiteful diminution of each other" (NYPD-1). NYPD personnel agreed that cooperation meant the complete sharing of assets, information, and resources (NYPD-1, 4, 5, 6). NYPD personnel believed that one of the overriding difficulties in work with the FBI was the archaic manner in which the FBI conducts drug cases. The NYPD and FBI administrative systems were viewed as very different and equally cumbersome (NYPD-1, 2, 4). In fact, one NYPD interviewee remarked that the FBI had more trouble communicating and cooperating with its own divisions in important cases than problems with NYPD task force members: "There has been back-stabbing and case disruption from other FBI divisions rather than turf battles with local NYC agencies" (NYPD-4). The NYPD interviewees believed that the NYPD brought more to the task force in terms of street experience, informants, and knowledge of the city than the FBI (NYPD 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6).

NYPD personnel believed in the importance of considering the individual personalities of those assigned to task forces (NYPD-1). Further, it was stated that police officers need an orientation period to learn how the federal government handled cases (NYPD-1, 5). Several NYPD personnel liked having control of their staffing; they noted that their FBI counterparts did not seem to control the transfer of their investigators to the task force (NYPD-1, 4).

According to NYPD personnel "some feds don't realize that drug work is not an 8-4 job and they don't have the commitment to the long, irregular hours. Feds appointed anyone to these groups and do not take into account the needs of the group" (NYPD-2). "There are no experienced feds and we have to teach the new FBI guys about drug cases. We have to train these new agents, and we don't mind, but it does take up time when experienced investigators should be assigned to this work" (NYPD-3, 4, 5).

NYPD personnel believed that FBI agents were often distracted from task force work by too many leads from other FBI divisions (NYPD-3). Additionally, NYPD personnel believed that most agents were passing through to other offices and did not have the vested interest in the New York City community as their NYPD investigators (NYPD-1,4). NYPD personnel observed that there are FBI agents who did want to learn from their NYPD counterparts. These were usually younger, newer agents (NYPD-4). There was no place for prima donnas in this type of work. It was important that task force members be team players (NYPD-1, 4, 5).

FBI Remarks

The FBI viewed task forces as very political and a forum for locals to share cases of which they would not normally not be a part. FBI managers admitted that federal law enforcement did not work within a vacuum (FBI-7, 12). It is important to recognize the vast differences between the NYPD and the FBI (FBI-

7, 12). One FBI interviewee advised "there will always be an innate rivalry which comes from the cultural differences in the organizations; also, competition is healthy, it is a sign of pride" (FBI-8). Task forces prevent case disruption in a large metropolitan area such as New York City (FBI-7, 12). One FBI interviewee remarked that FBI cases are "in danger if agency (FBI) interests are threatened; task forces at least avert the need to fight for that agency (FBI) interest" (FBI-7). Task forces were recognized as an economic necessity; they allowed investigations to be addressed with limited resources (FBI-7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12).

FBI personnel said that the FBI "makes out in the task force deal due to the maturity and street-wise abilities" of the NYPD investigators (FBI- 8, 9, 10, 11). FBI personnel noted that the NYPD brought language specialists (FBI-7, 8, 10, 11, 12) to the effort. NYPD personnel bring an ethnic mix (FBI-7) and a knowledge of the community which is vital to surveillance operations (FBI-9). FBI personnel further remarked that the NYPD's knowledge of and commitment to the community is a quality that oft-transferred FBI agents have difficulty contributing to the task force experience (FBI-8, 9, 10, 11). Further, the "FBI suffers from tremendous organizational shifts which can result in low morale" (FBI-9). These shifts were described as the transfer of personnel from squad to squad or interdivisional and the inability of FBI headquarters and top management to set drug enforcement policy which does not change every thirty days.

Transfers are of great interest to FBI agents. In fact, many FBI agents were not assigned to squads either by choice or skill, so that there is often a problem of motivation among federal investigators (FBI-8, 10, 11). Unique to New York City is the overriding interest in transfers out of the New York Division by FBI agents. This is due to agents seeking assignments to locations in the country which are closer to their homes (FBI-8, 10, 11).

FBI personnel noted that unlike currently assigned FBI Agents, NYPD personnel brought drug investigative experience to the task force (FBI-8, 10, 11). FBI personnel remarked that NYPD participation "broadens our base of experience, that we (FBI) get the cream of the crop with senior NYPD investigators assigned to these task forces. We get a level of experience and knowledge which enlarges our work-force" (FBI-8). "Feds are not raising street-wise agents, and drug work demands experience and maturity. We need to reassess our hiring practices which often take people right from school. We need the police experience and the continuity of police investigators" (FBI-10). An FBI interviewee remarked that today's FBI agents often "fail to have prior military or police experience and are right out of school" (FBI-9). This FBI interviewee believed this was a lacking in FBI hiring practices (FBI-9). One FBI interviewee observed that "the cops bring a positive approach to assignments which may be a result of the perks attached to this assignment for them"

(FBI-9). This FBI interviewee remarked that success in a task force was based both on the "environment one creates and the fact that this environment is conducive to working together" (FBI-8). FBI personnel agreed that it was important for task force members to be housed together (FBI-8, 9, 10, 11). Further, FBI personnel remarked that task forces cannot exist with members in "physical isolation of one another" (FBI-8). "Working side by side makes the cops feel like equals and creates a comraderie longer you work together the more friendships develop, and you cannot be successful without positive human interaction" (FBI-9).

FBI personnel assert that one sacrifice of task force participation is that NYPD investigators do not bring cases or informants to the effort (FBI-7, 12). One FBI interviewee noted that NYPD members bring very little investigative expertise to the task forces (FBI-7). This FBI interviewee noted that "feds can stay with the minutia, the planning, and commitment whereas the police have contracts and overtime constraints which limit their participation past regular hours" (FBI-7). An FBI interviewee remarked that NYPD investigators are geared towards arrests rather than convictions (FBI-11, 12). "Some feds still hang on to stereotypes of cops, and this sets up a wall between cops and agents" (FBI-10, 11).

FBI hierarchies need to understand the uniqueness of drug cases (FBI-8, 10, 11) and to reduce the direct control of cases on task forces (NYPD-10). This interviewee noted that if no

task forces existed, cases would still get worked "but not as well or of the caliber we do together" (FBI-10).

Overall, the FBI remarks reflected that there was no systematic recruitment for task forces (FBI-7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12). "We do not care and we do not screen for interpersonal skills. If we value the quality of the work the task force is doing, then we need to recruit people suited to this work. I feel that some FBI agent behavior is enormously egotistical and that we, the FBI, should not tolerate this behavior on a task force" (FBI-4). There is not place for the "palace guard" personality on a task force (FBI-7). One FBI interviewee observed many task forces suffered from prima donna personalities who caused disruption of cohesive task force squads (FBI-8). Moreover, there was a "need to avoid the lone ranger, cowboy, or Dirty Harry type personality" on task forces (FBI-8). FBI personnel indicated a need to recruit team players, as well as, self-starters and individuals who are flexible and accepting of differing roles and experiences (FBI-7, 8, 10, 11). Further, "if a team is loaded with takers and individuals rather than team players, it will not be successful" (FBI-8). Another FBI interviewee observed that "cops are used to developing partnerships" (FBI-8), and that task force members should have good people skills and a willingness to get along (FBI-8, 9, 10, 11). FBI personnel saw that staffing task forces was just a matter of numbers and see "cops as rented pools of manpower" (FBI-7, 12). Two FBI interviewees indicated

that the atmosphere of cooperation must begin with upper level mangers (FBI-11, 12).

Compliance With Shared Information Requests

NYPD personnel indicated that they had no problem sharing all investigative information with their FBI counterparts (NYPD-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). NYPD personnel did perceive that the FBI could be possessive of informants and information (NYPD-1, 2, 4). One NYPD interviewee observed that NYPD was interested in bringing informants and quality cases to the task force (NYPD-2, 6). Another NYPD interviewee remarked, "I fully support the task force and have no problem with intelligence sharing. I believe it is good to have exposure to task forces and the work they do" (NYPD-4).

FBI personnel noted that there were more FBI interdivisional turf battles than conflict with the NYPD (FBI-7, 9). Two other FBI interviewees believed that it was important to "keep some information back, like informants. You don't know where the information will go, even if it is unintentional" (FBI-7, 12). In general, FBI personnel felt that sharing investigative information was very important to having a cohesive group (FBI-8, 9, 10, 11).

Overall Analysis

Personnel in both organizations said that lack of resources and personnel provided one of the strongest incentives for working together on a task force. Personnel in both organizations further stated that drug cases necessitated cooperation.

However, personnel in both organizations indicated that the issue concerning permanent versus ad hoc liaison relationships lay with the control of investigators. Permanent task forces are usually set at the sponsoring organization's space or in a neutral, off-site location paid for by the sponsoring organization. Permanent task forces are situations wherein the work culture develops apart from the parent organization.

In comparison, ad hoc liaison relationships involve contact which is carried out or maintained through telephone conversations or sporadic case meetings. Individuals assigned to joint cases using ad hoc measures continue to report to their own organization's office space, to maintain contact with their parent organization's work culture, and to fulfill other organizational duties not connected with the joint investigation.

Most NYPD and FBI personnel noted the need for co-location, although most also acknowledged there was great fear of loss of control of investigators by managers. Administrative measures can alleviate that fear by maintaining a sense of membership with the parent organization. One NYPD interviewee

noted that the "telephone does not work, things fall apart when task force members are not located together" (NYPD-3).

An FBI interviewee who called subordination the key to cooperation suggested there be only one leader in a joint effort (even though consensus is the asserted management technique for task force operation). The FBI remarked that the NYPD seemed to assert their control by referring to units as "Lieutenant so and so's," while the NYPD observed that the FBI attempted to rule unilaterally, NYPD members got the impression that if you do not follow the FBI orientation to task forces they could "go home".

Both organizations observed that drug enforcement required cooperation. The interviewees culminated these discussions with the "cooperation rhetoric" they believed to be politically correct. However, their remarks demonstrated strong egos that seek to control their investigators. Lead agency status in investigations remained important to them as was the perception that investigative information was not shared as forthrightly as the rhetoric indicated it should be. The issues of mutual respect was a subtext: the interviewees comments lauding the expertise also pointed to organizational stereotypes that continued to surface in conversation.

Barnard (1938) asserted that cooperation is founded on the participants' evaluation of benefit and sacrifice. The NYPD personnel observed that the great benefit of task force work was involvement in investigations of complex criminal organizations and cases that move out of their authorized territory. Both

organizations agreed that it is important to weigh the value of taking drug cases to either state or federal court although cases pursued by these task forces were prosecuted federally. This issue was determined at the outset of these task force activities. Personnel at both agencies remarked that there should be more serious consideration of these differing prosecutive strategies. The FBI usually views local prosecution as less desirable than the federal prosecution.

Prior agency rivalries were admitted by both the NYPD and FBI. These rivalries were based on competition for quality investigations and thirst for public credit which the organizations believe perpetuate their existence and public support. A public organization's viability is grounded in the public's perception of its competence. Rivalries maintain turf and protect the confidentiality of each organization's intelligence base. Knowledge is power, especially in the development and execution of investigations. Both NYPD and FBI interviewees noted that competition can exist in healthy and unhealthy forms. Respondents noted the existence of subtleties in organizational behavior, in that it was important to distinguish between an organization's "way of doing things" from outright hostility. An FBI interviewee noted that even though there was talk of consensus, a task force can only have one leader. Two FBI interviewees said that the FBI is open to suggestions regarding case strategy, but both believed the ultimate case decisions belonged to them.

An important admission by FBI interviewees was that if the NYPD left the task forces, the FBI would lose valuable intelligence, access to street cases and informants who are critical for developing drug investigations. FBI interviewees admitted that few FBI investigators are able to cultivate the street contacts and information held by the NYPD investigators. It would take the FBI years to duplicate this valuable intelligence. One reason for this situation is due to the youth and inexperience of many current FBI investigators assigned to task forces. The transfer policy of the FBI often prevented agents from being assigned to areas near their homes where their street savvy would be comparable to that of NYPD investigators.

Both NYPD and FBI interviewees admitted that the FBI has archaic and time-consuming rules regulating drug investigations. Personnel in both organizations objected to the FBI's lengthy system of authorizations for use of certain, sensitive investigative techniques such as wire-taps and drug buy operations.

Personnel in both organizations felt that full cooperation with the other group would be contrary to their interests; it might result in the loss of an individual organization's autonomy and pride. Task force members will probably continue to answer to respective parent hierarchies. If it does not change, then the duplication of paperwork will continue which makes task force work cumbersome and tedious in the search for consensus. FBI rules and procedures coopt the task

force unit's ability to effectively respond to immediate matters which often arise spontaneously in drug cases.

Overall, NYPD personnel believed that the FBI has failed to articulate a clear and defined policy on the role and acceptance of police in task force work groups. The use of police stereotypes by several FBI interviewees is evidence of these shortcomings. NYPD interviewees asserted that leadership styles of the two organizations differed. A few FBI interviewees believed that the FBI should make all the decisions for FBI sponsored task forces. Both NYPD and many FBI interviewees agreed that FBI supervisors were often reluctant to bring problems to the attention of the FBI hierarchy, fearing it would have a negative effect their personal careers.

It was observed by both NYPD and FBI managers that NYPD investigators appeared to identify with the particular work unit to which they were assigned, while FBI agents were tentative in making a commitment to the unit or the geographic location.

A significant insight on the part of both NYPD and FBI interviewees was the need to recruit suitable personality types for task force units. Much discussion centered on choosing individuals who sought these interagency assignments. The characteristics sought for potential task force members included the ability to be a team player, hard worker, flexible, street-wise, mature, and possess people skills. Both NYPD and FBI interviewees insisted that prima donnas, loners, cowboys, and Dirty Harry types only detracted from task force units.

Many agreed that no single agency should be able to direct the actions of the other. Consensus management was preferred even though it was cumbersome and often produced delays in investigations. NYPD personnel reported many FBI investigators currently assigned to the task forces were inexperienced. FBI personnel felt that NYPD investigators did not fully share the required paperwork, although FBI managers conceded that many NYPD detectives were willing to learn the federal system. Personnel in both agencies observed that responding to their respective administrative systems presented an unnecessary and additional burden on task force investigators.

In the opinion of those interviewed, the physical configuration of task force operations was less important than the power configurations and task force relations. There were mutual and relentless assertions on the part of participating managers of the need to preserve separate identities over the cooperative venture. The question of organizational primacy and agency identification by task force participants remains a primary issue in cooperative ventures.

Telephone Interviews With FBI Managers in Comparable Metropolitan FBI Divisions

Four telephone interviews were conducted with FBI supervisors and managers who were involved in drug investigations and cooperation with local and state officials within their divisions. These interviewees were given the express promise of anonymity both with respect to respondent's identity and their geographic assignments. These discussions were conducted by telephone; handwritten notes were taken throughout these conversations. These interviews were similar to those conducted with supervisors and managers in this study. Their comments are recorded in a narrative format. These supervisors were selected because their assignments have involved drug task forces. Further, the experience of these supervisors provides a valuable comparison. These sites are all major metropolitan areas where the law enforcement communities must interact in complex drug investigations.

All respondents indicated that they felt that cooperation was vital for drug enforcement. Further, they noted that there still remained some differences among agencies because of the stereotypes and conflicts which have existed in these cities and in some cases are historically difficult with local and state law enforcement. These respondents reported that both ad hoc and permanent drug task forces have been utilized in their divisions.

All respondents reported that the personalities of individual investigators and the relationship of task force

members were important in attaining the enforcement goals that individual law enforcement agencies cannot reach alone. One respondent said that good task force members are "willing to work with one another and to stop the fragmentation." "Knowledge and relationships are primary" and "Individual heads of departments must get along," were expressed as essential to cooperation.

All respondents asserted that management must agree among themselves as to the direction and atmosphere of the task force. The leadership shown by managers will assist task force members in fostering the personal relationships required to make investigations successful. Respondents observed that the needs of one another, trust, communication all present a delicate balance when trying to achieve the goals demanded by the individual organizations. Two respondents noted that the ad hoc task force arrangement is often preferred because it does not demand a long term relationship and an adjustment of personnel to a new work environment that is often problematic.

The respondents noted that sharing intelligence is important whether one is on a task force or not. The issue of informants was dealt with glibly by two of the respondents, who noted that informants usually sell their information to the highest bidder anyway. Task forces combine resources, thereby diminishing the competition for informants. It is recalled that this assertion of competition for informant was an important observation of the study by Williams, Redlinger, and Manning (1977).

Two respondents indicated that the 'lead agency' control element must be eliminated from these task force relationships. One respondent suggested that task force participants must work out firm agreements and abide by them while improving communication throughout these undertakings. All respondents reported tense and often conflicting relations with other law enforcement organizations in their areas. Overall, these respondents described their perception of innate differences in philosophies, investigative techniques, and organizational ideas of the FBI in relation to other law enforcement agencies. None of the respondents felt that the task force was the only answer to cooperation. Two respondents felt that the ad hoc arrangements were the preferred process. Two respondents related details of failed task force efforts. They attributed this to "jealousy and exaggerated competition" among agencies.

CHAPTER SEVEN: Conclusions

Overview

This case study illustrates an example of task force dynamics played out across this country on a daily basis. Law enforcement has recognized the necessity for an interagency approach to drug investigations. Much that was accomplished through formal contacts and drawn out exchanges can now be handled within the context of the task force and on a timely basis. Under ideal circumstances members of various agencies assigned to one group would include the overseas capability of DEA; the border expertise of the United States Customs Service and United States Border Patrol; the street savvy and street intelligence available from local and state police agencies; and the long term investigative experience and commitment of the FBI. All these elements are necessary in combatting sophisticated criminal organizations. There are several examples which can be publicly extolled as success stories. However, the literature on this subject continues to detail the difficulties associated with the dynamics of task force operation.

However, Francis Bacon was correct when he said that information is power. The crux of criminal investigations is and will always be information. Drug investigations are lost or made on the development of high tech data bases and critical informants. If one controls those elements and the access to them, one can control cases. Law enforcement agencies do control cases in this manner and barter for resources and public

affirmation with them in hand. Resources and manpower are vital pawns in the success of transnational drug investigations. Interagency cooperation is inevitable. What cannot be dictated is how that cooperation is undertaken. Barnard's theory of benefit and sacrifice go directly to the most basic human question, What's in it for me? The decision process of participating in interagency task forces is clearly based on that assessment by individual organizations.

Cleveland's theory asserted that the new information environment redefines rule, power, and authority. Consensus and collaboration define decision making in an environment of multiple agencies. Collegial structures rather than command have become the rule; conferring and networking are mandatory for effectiveness (Morgan, 1984).

Law enforcement's struggles with cooperative ventures is well documented in both the academic literature and popular media. The FBI and the NYPD represent strong, historically driven entities which are perpetuated by their cultural ethos detailing heroes and extraordinary accomplishments. What has changed is that the work environment is no longer defined by geographical boundaries, jurisdiction, and past track record alone. Their asserted primacy was as much related to their limited mandates as was their show of force and competency. These agencies came into their own under circumstances which were well defined and limited by both statute and public policy. The federal and local lines of authority were once very clear. But the work environment has been

expanded by technology and the mobility of offenders. For example, multiple agencies and their expertise is now one of the many efforts necessary to the "war on drugs". No agency alone can have the impact necessary to address this crime problem.

Cleveland also noted that it was important to allow those who "form the parade" have some part in the decision-making process if the parade is to go forward. Barnard also asserted that "...to form personal attachments is a tremendous incentive to productive work..." (Wold & Iino, 1986 p.15). Task force investigators must feel that they have both access to the information and a part of the control and status in case direction and that they are full members and not simply temporary guests in another agency's space. We can see that in New York City, a major venue of both law enforcement and drug trafficking, that many local investigators still feel a disenfranchisment in relations with federal agents. Many federal agents feel that local law enforcement represent a manpower pool and should accept their supportive role. Local law enforcement investigators clearly reveal concern for shared information and the fact they may not be taken seriously in the overall development and progress of cases. Although this does not represent the total of task force experiences, it does reveal the ongoing concerns evident in task force operation.

It should also be noted that many local and federal investigators are able to transcend their agency's parochialism and find the task force assignment as the ultimate course to job

satisfaction. Time and again, investigators reported that they were able to develop and be involved in high impact cases. They felt they were no longer restricted by their individual jurisdictions. Task force assignments meant investigatory freedom by giving them multi-jurisdictional powers. Many also recognized the unique talents of colleagues and reported their positive observations in parts of this survey. Importantly, without exception, all of the respondents reported that task force assignments should be recruited carefully. There was a recognition by several respondents that task force assignments are not for everyone, and that interpersonal relationships are a vital part of task force success and that being a team player contributes to the overall personal safety of task force members on the street. Respondents observed that individuals recruited for task forces should be team players, mature, have a strong work ethic and demonstrated integrity. Respondents also observed that drug task forces are both difficult and politically sensitive assignments. Respondents noted that task force assignments require common sense and a commitment to the interagency process and the demands of drug enforcement work.

This chapter presents the conclusions drawn from this case study. The policy implications, limitations, and suggestions for future research are also discussed.

Specific Findings

This case study has found that task forces are problematic in some areas. Guided by the hypothesized relationships, the following observations are made:

1. Task forces are a recognized reality by law enforcement organizations. Drug enforcement, in particular, lends itself to interagency cooperation in order to accomplish high impact cases. Teams are the future and outperform individuals or organizations acting alone. It is recognized that it is natural to resist moving away from individual roles and accountability. In fact, a meaningful "team" is always a result of pursuing a demanding performance challenge" (Katzenbach, Smith, 1993, pg.9) The investigations facing drug enforcement are representative of that performance challenge.

2. Task forces are not unilaterally recognized as cooperative work environments. In fact, local law enforcement perceive a greater disenfranchisement than do federal agents. The disenfranchisement may be directly related to who "sponsors" these task forces. Federal agencies usually have the resources to sponsor task forces and also have the domestic and international jurisdictions appropriate to high impact cases.

Disenfranchisement can possibly be related to the autonomy that most law enforcement organizations have previously enjoyed and they find that their individual control diminishes in a task force setting. Federal law enforcement agents perceived that unilateral direction of task forces was necessary, while local

law enforcement investigators felt that such control inhibited cooperation. Local law enforcement's feeling of disenfranchisement is related to the ultimate concept of cooperation.

3. The history of law enforcement organizations and their elitist ideology and autonomy are still strong, as many of the respondents reported a problem with the shared information aspect of task force assignments. Some respondents of both agencies reported a perception that information was shared as broadly as it should be in task forces among members. Respondents of both agencies also reflected that access to informants was a special problem and should be guarded even from members of the same unit. Organizations have differing approaches to informants. For example, the FBI has a strong tradition for protecting the identity of informants. FBI policy regarding informants prevents even other FBI agents from access to the identity of informants or access to them. The provision of informant information is also administered through structured policies, some of which are directly related to the United States Attorney General's guidelines for those agencies under that purview.

4. Respondents acknowledged that mutual, and professional respect was necessary for successful interaction. Many of the local law enforcement investigators indicated that they felt that this aspect was lacking in their current assignment. Respondents also noted that positive task force experiences were based on positive relations and confidence with one's counterparts work

and attitude. Mutual and professional respect is also inextricably tied to the issues of case control and decision-making, as well as, access to information. Goffman (1959) stated that to keep information from some group members is to insult the concept of team.

5. Respondents reported positive perceptions of their task force counterparts when related to personal attributes. However, when speaking in an organizational sense as NYPD detectives or FBI agents, the descriptions were not so generous. It is suggested that these not so generous descriptions reflected a respondents' perception of the agency as a political entity rather than associated as a team member with whom task force members work on a daily basis. In fact, investigators and managers of both organizations reported stereotypical perceptions of the other in referring to one another as "NYPD detectives" and "FBI agents" in an overall organizationally sense.

6. Local law enforcement investigators were more likely to choose the task force assignment over federal agents. Federal agents expressed more chauvinistic attitudes regarding their task force assignments. Some NYPD detectives related that the age and experience of the currently assigned FBI agents was less than most NYPD personnel. The need to bond with the parent agency may be stronger in younger agents than of those with maturity and experience. Although NYPD respondents felt that younger agents were assigned to task forces rather than seasoned agents, the reality is that 36% of responding FBI agents were between the

ages of 26-35 with 35% of NYPD detectives falling into that category. Accordingly, 64% of FBI agents and 65% of NYPD detectives fell into the 36-49 year old category. Additionally, with respect to "time on the job", 79% of the NYPD detectives were employed in law enforcement between the years of 1970 to 1983 while 59% of FBI agents fell into that category. "Time on the job" was stated to be a manner in which competency was often judged by peers. This may explain part of that assessment by NYPD detectives.

7. Managers' from both organizations still expressed some reticence to formal cooperation. They have a vested interest in perpetuating the goals of the organization. Formal cooperation means relinquishing some control of manpower and investigations. This may be where the semantics of cooperation may be sorted out. In fact an unnamed FBI manager attempted to clearly distinguish to colleagues the difference between turf issues and the strive towards excellence in one's work product while espousing cooperation.

As in Chester Barnard's theory of authority and cooperation, each organization will assess the benefit and sacrifice of this commingling. Work environments are becoming so expansive and

complex that interagency cooperation, or co-opetition (1) (Brandenburger, Nalebuff, 1996) is inevitable to success.

The study's implications for law enforcement are directly related to the future. More interagency relations are inevitable and are evolving both domestically and internationally.(2) They are required by the very character of criminal activities which cross jurisdictions and involve the responsibilities of more than just a single agency. New information related to the perception of cooperation and the relations of the personnel staffing of these interagency units can only enhance future task force recruitment, management, and operation.

1/ Co-opetition is described as an extension of classic game theory. Cooperation is defined as creating the pie and competition when it comes to dividing it up. Ray Noorda, founder of computer software company Novell, coined the term when speaking of market share and success in a work-place of multiple players.

2/ In Spring, 1995 the FBI spearheaded the establishment of an International Law Enforcement Academy located in Budapest, Hungary. This Academy was established with the assistance of other U.S. and international federal law enforcement and governments agencies.

Limitations

There are two limitations identified with this study. One is technical, while the other is conceptual. The technical limitation deals with sample size and the conceptual limitation is identified with researcher's employment as an FBI agent. These are discussed below:

The technical limitation arises from the sample size. This case study examined a small universe of permanently located drug task forces. The sample was small, and the population varied over the course of the study. By the time of the administration of the survey, the NYPD representation was down. At one time, its number had been almost equal to that of the FBI. This population was drawn from two of the most prominent law enforcement agencies in the country and from a geographical location where drug trafficking organizations are active and a wide range of investigations are pursued.

Additionally, these task forces are permanent and therefore unique since many similar metropolitan areas prefer the case-by-case mingling of personnel and resources. The permanency of the task forces does offer a unique view of group relations which should encourage cooperation because they result in "expected and frequent" contact (Axelrod, 1984, Cartwright, Zander, 1968). Case-by-case task force cooperation may produce different issues.

The sample population continued to vary over the course of the study and through the data collection phase. There was no way to control the sample size in this work environment. When the

proposal for this research was first prepared, the five task forces numbered over one hundred fifty investigators with almost equal representation among agencies. The population had dropped and was ninety-four at the time of the survey administration. Generalization beyond this type of population should be made with great caution.

The most notable potential challenge to this study's objectivity is that this researcher was and continues to be employed as an FBI agent. This, however, must be balanced against the fact that access to this work-place would have been extremely difficult for an outsider. To compensate for an unconscious bias, the survey and interview questions were drawn in consultation with a non-law enforcement practitioners in the field of criminal justice.

Additionally, these questions were field tested among both FBI and local police department detectives. The interviews were conducted in keeping with the wording in the surveys. The interview questions were also drawn with the assistance of uninvolved FBI and NYPD managers for their content and expected response to those interviews.

Participation in the survey, receipt of the unsolicited statements by task force members, and access to interviews with both NYPD and FBI managers were enhanced by the credibility attached to this researcher's status as an FBI agent and as a drug task force investigator for more than eight years at New York. This credibility enhanced candor and overall responsiveness

to this research as respondents of all levels felt that researcher could communicate in the language of the work-place. The researcher's employment also enhanced contacts with other FBI divisions. Whether to prefer access or objectivity is a valid debate, and the analysis offered in this study must be examined with this dilemma in mind.

Suggestions for Future Research

Future research on interagency cooperation among police organizations should seek to refine the specific management practices that inhibit task force operation. There is still ambivalence regarding cooperation among competitors. Police organizations "value healthy competition". It appears that one-to-one relations develop as groups have the expected and frequent contact. However, in the context of discussing participating agencies, investigators explore their prior contacts and question the efficacy of these interagency relationships. Task forces do not dissolve an investigator's relationship with their parent organization. Investigators perceive that real benefit is still extracted from their parent organization.

The importance of congenial work relationships among task force investigators are critical. Task force members reported their personal relations as generally positive. It was only when they spoke of organizational issues that stereotypes surfaced. This may be related to organizational loyalty and validation of

the organizational ethos which is very strong within law enforcement agencies. Analysts are moving towards the recognition of the vitality of teams and teamwork in organizational research. (Katzenbach, Smith, 1993) The refinement of game theory to incorporate the positive option of cooperation is also an evolving framework in research. (Bradenburger, Nalebuff, 1996) Future research should be applied to the concept of teams relative to law enforcement agencies which differ from product oriented organizations.

Future research should also seek to identify more specifically management's definition of cooperation and under what conditions this cooperation would take place within law enforcement work environments. Finally, future research should seek to determine the extent of law enforcement detectives'/agents' socialization with and loyalty to the parent organization. It is felt that this assessment could determine the extent to which an individual detective or agent could transpose organizational commitment to the task force.

Policy Implications

As a result of the information developed from this study, the implications for law enforcement policy-makers are two-fold. First, agencies need to reflect and adjust the organizational climate relative to interagency cooperation. In some cases, organizations need to adjust their intragency behaviors and attitudes. Secondly, the formulation and operation of interagency

task forces require organizations to identify personnel and staff interagency task forces with investigators whom they feel will demonstrate and support the organization's commitment to these interagency ventures. Further, the sensitive issues of mutual professional respect and shared information must be clearly delineated by the parent organization as critical characteristics for the success of these task forces and as expected behavior by those managers and investigators assigned to these units.

The question remains: can paramilitary organizations relinquish the concept of competitiveness or superiority? Probably not. Managerial attitudes towards task force assignments should be designated as important by organizational hierarchy. Assignment to these units should be preceded by objective evaluations of work ethic and an assessment of an investigator's predisposition to working with other agency personnel. Task force assignment recruitment should be refined to attract those individuals positively predisposed to interagency relations. A personnel survey and interview should be employed in order to negate the usual "good ole' boy" selection process.

Law enforcement organizations can no longer ignore the assertions that success means the use of teams, team building and the combination of competition and cooperation. (Katzenbach, Smith, 1993, Brandenburger, Nalebuff, 1996) The old game theory strategy is changing the traditional "war like" language of business and creating the possibilities of a win-win strategy. Already, political figures are turning from the "drug war"

verbiage and taking United States drug enforcement to a more comprehensive policy. More attention to prevention and the utilization of other federal agencies are currently being considered. The continued professionalization of law enforcement organizations means that federal agencies can no longer rely on their historical and asserted superior status in order to control multi-jurisdictional investigations.

Resources continue to be a key element. Resources are defined as personnel, intelligence, and equipment. It is easy to share things. It is far more difficult to share what is felt to be intrinsically a part of one's identity. Law enforcement must formulate new organizational identities borne of cooperation in a geographically expanding work environment but a shrinking professional environment. Strength and leadership within the organization must be redefined to address the value of cooperative ventures. Cooperation must become a part of the organizational ethos.

Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1993) advise that a win-lose strategy means the supposed "pie" may be destroyed in the end. They also assert that literal game theory is simply the process of finding the right strategies and making the right decisions. The team's theory asserts the concept of common purpose and goals in the context of complementary skills (Katzenbach, Smith, 1993). This is the future of high-impact drug investigations. Organizations which do not have the vision or leadership to honestly commit to joint ventures will ultimately suffer a

diminution of their status and effectiveness, and ultimately their public support and consequent resources.

Summary

This study represents a modest but important step toward understanding the use of task forces in law enforcement work environments. It confirms the unique nature of law enforcement organizations and reveals the varied interpretations of cooperation to autonomous, elitist agencies. It confirms that the law enforcement work environment has been modified both by technology and the sophistication of transportation and mobile societies. This study also confirms that organizational interdependencies are the relationships of the future. Law enforcement organizations can no longer operate within the vacuum of their parochial and self proscribed universes, especially in drug enforcement.

Information from this study does support the organizational literature that police agencies do have a proclivity to unilateral decision making and direction of interagency efforts. (Sampson, Stubbs, Smith, Pearson, Blagg, 1988). Law enforcement agencies appear to assert this same control with one another. Police organizations must come to terms with interdependencies and task force relations. Interdependencies require shared information. Sharing information among all task force participants signifies mutual respect among investigators, and secrecy or limited access signifies distrust. Law enforcement's

ability to accomplish its singular or combined missions depend on this adjusted orientation to one another.

APPENDIX A

AGENCY ROLES

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The Drug Enforcement Administration is responsible for providing central leadership, management and coordination for intelligence and investigative functions to suppress trafficking in illicit drugs. DEA enforces Title 21 of the Controlled Substances Act and drug-related segments of other laws, and also participates in non-enforcement programs to reduce the demand for drugs.

DEA's responsibilities include:

- Investigating and apprehending major drug traffickers and immobilizing their organizations;
- Preparing illicit drug trafficking cases for prosecution;
- Providing assistance to foreign countries in developing law enforcement and other programs aimed at reducing the supply of illicit drugs;
- Regulating the legitimate manufacture and distribution of controlled substances;
- Providing narcotics related training to Federal, State, local, and foreign enforcement agencies;
- Managing a drug intelligence program that includes reporting systems for illicit drug production, drug trafficking, and drug abuse in the United States;
- Maintaining a system of performance indicators regarding all Federal illicit drug seizures; and
- Coordinating and cooperating in the above areas with appropriate Federal, State, and local enforcement agencies.

The Administrator of the DEA performs his functions under the general supervision of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and reports through him to the Attorney General.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The Federal Bureau of Investigation has had concurrent jurisdiction to investigate drug matters since 1982. The FBI's mission in drug law enforcement is to "endeavor to reduce the incidence of illegal drug trafficking and other criminal activity which drug trafficking generates in American society, through investigations conducted on a systematic, coordinated, and sustained basis." The FBI recently modified its drug strategy to focus investigative efforts and resources more clearly on those organized crime networks controlling significant segments of the illegal drug market. The majority of the FBI's resources allocated to the drug program are now devoted to investigations of the La Cosa Nostra/Sicilian Mafia, Colombian/South American trafficking organizations, and Mexican networks that are responsible for importing and distributing large quantities of cocaine and heroin into and throughout the United States. Cases are pursued with the twofold objective of neutralizing criminal networks and seizing illegal profits.

Because many organized crime investigations extend to foreign countries, the FBI has placed additional assistant legal attaches overseas to coordinate with foreign authorities in pursuing the ties between organized crime figures in the United States and other countries. These FBI legal attaches have also contributed to international money laundering investigations.

United States Customs Service. The United States Customs Service is responsible for examining persons, carriers, cargo, currency and mail that pass in to and out of the United States. As the primary defense along our borders for detecting and intercepting drugs being smuggled into the country, the Customs Service conducts inspection and air and marine interdiction programs. Customs also investigates money laundering activities, and has primary jurisdiction for the enforcement of laws concerning the illegal transportation of currency or monetary

instruments in excess of $10,000 into or out of the country. Further, Customs works closely with IRS concerning the reporting of cash transactions over $10,000 by financial institutions.

Customs also works closely with DEA in joint narcotics investigations. This cooperation has been made possible by granting Title 21 authority to selected Customs special agents allowing their participation in drug investigations in certain situations.

Customs has twelve overseas offices actively engaged in investigative activities with priority given to international money laundering operations. These offices, in coordination with DEA, also exchange drug information and intelligence with host nations.

United States Coast Guard. The United States Coast Guard is responsible for a wide array of Federal maritime programs including search and rescue, aids to navigation, icebreaking, marine safety, and, as an Armed Service, military readiness. In addition, the Coast Guard enforces a variety of Federal laws on the navigable waters of the United States and on the high seas. Principal among these is the responsibility for the interdiction of drugs. The Coast Guard is the only Federal agency with jurisdiction on the high seas, as well as in U.S. territorial waters. Coast Guard ships, boats, planes, and helicopters conduct routine drug law enforcement patrols and special operations throughout the maritime arena, both in waters adjacent to principal source and transit countries and in U.S. coastal areas. Coast Guard emphasis is on detecting and boarding vessels smuggling marijuana and cocaine while in transit to the United States on the high seas, where loads are larger and traffic routes somewhat predictable. In support of its expansive role in interdiction, the Coast Guard maintains an extensive intelligence organization with heavy emphasis on drug trafficking.

Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The Internal Revenue Service is responsible for income tax investigations and all domestic violations of Title 31 related to the financial aspects of illegal drug trafficking. Financial investigations are often the only way government can reach the upper echelons of criminal organizations, and the IRS typically investigates high-level traffickers and their corrupt bankers and financiers.

IRS agents trace the movement of funds to document the acquisition of forfeitable assets by drug traffickers. Using search warrants, IRS seizes various financial reports, including travel records, money orders, and cashier check receipts, which can reveal the concealment or illegal transfer of financial assets. The information gained through the warrants can lead to assets seizable under statutory forfeiture provisions.

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms is the Federal agency with primary responsibility for investigating violations of the Federal explosives and firearms laws. Most of ATF's criminal firearms and explosives investigations are targeted at drug organizations that use violence in their drug trafficking activities. Over half of the defendants arrested during FY 1985 by ATF were involved with illegal drug businesses. Although these investigations primarily involve firearms and explosives violations, they often contribute to the suppression of illegal drug activity and provide intelligence concerning illegal drug marketing.

ATF's resources include undercover agents, national response bomb scene investigation teams, an international firearms identification and tracking system, a worldwide explosives incident data bank and tracking capability, auditors, and agents with experience in investigating complex RICO and conspiracy cases.

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The Federal Aviation Administration establishes and enforces regulations for the operation of all aircraft in the United States. The FAA assists in identifying and intercepting airborne drug smugglers by using radar, posting aircraft lookouts, and tracking the movement of suspect aircraft through air traffic control centers. Additionally, FAA supports law enforcement agencies by providing technical expertise for radar surveillance projects and program development.

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The Immigration and Naturalization Service is responsible for the admission, control, and removal of aliens within the United States. The U.S. Border Patrol, the principal enforcement branch of the INS, is responsible for controlling the illegal entry of persons across U.S. Borders and assisting in the interdiction of drug traffickers and narcotics into the United States. Many illegal entrants are manipulated by narcotics and terrorist groups that work in concert. Selected targeting of major alien smuggling organizations frequently yields investigative leads which are subsequently shared with the DEA, FBI, and Customs. The INS also cooperates with other Federal agencies in locating, apprehending, and removing alien drug traffickers at ports of entry and within the interior of the United States, and in escorting alien witnesses into the U.S. to testify in drug trials.

United States Marshals Service (Marshals). The United States Marshals Service supports drug law enforcement in its role as the custodian for both Federal prisoners and the vast amounts of seized property awaiting possible forfeiture. The Marshals Service also manages the Witness Protection Program, which is designed to assist in the prosecution of violent criminals, and tracks fugitive felons both domestically and internationally. In addition, the Marshals participate in the Fugitive Investigative

Strike Team (FIST), comprised of various Federal law enforcement agencies and their State and local counterparts, which identifies, locates, and arrests fugitive felons.

Department of Defense and United States Armed Forces. The Department of Defense military services assist in drug interdiction and support drug law enforcement agencies in the form of aircraft and equipment loans, intelligence, surveillance, communications, planning, and training. Public Law 97-86, December 1, 1981 (10 U.S.C. 371-378), defines permissible DOD assistance under the Posse Comitatus Act.

United States Intelligence Community Agencies. The intelligence community assists drug law enforcement agencies by supplying intelligence concerning virtually every aspect of international drug production and distribution, including: money-laundering operations conducted by drug trafficking organizations; the role of political factions, terrorists, and government officials in the narcotics trade; and the political, social, and economic impact of drug trafficking on source and transshipment countries.

United States Attorneys. The United States Attorneys and their assistants conduct prosecutions in Federal court of drug trafficking and connected illegal activities, and coordinate major drug investigations to prepare cases for prosecution. The United States Attorneys have established Law Enforcement Coordinating Committees (LECCs) in all Federal judicial districts. Through the LECCs, officials of Federal, State, and local law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies collectively assess the crime problems in each district and determine how best to use available resources to address those problems. Cross-designation of State and local prosecutors as Federal prosecutors (Assistant United States Attorneys), and of Federal prosecutors as State and local prosecutors, is now a frequent

occurrence in cooperative investigations and prosecutions. Many United States Attorneys also sponsor drug abuse prevention programs within their districts.

Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM), Department of State. The responsibilities for international drug control have been delegated to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters. INM has overall responsibility for international drug policy development, program management, and diplomatic initiatives. Its major programs are concerned with bilateral and multilateral assistance for crop control, interdiction, and related enforcement activities in producer and transit nations. INM also provides narcotics-related development assistance, technical assistance for demand reduction programs, and training for foreign personnel in narcotics enforcement and related procedures. INM coordinates its international efforts with domestic drug abuse strategies. Further, INM is responsible for negotiating, implementing, monitoring, and terminating narcotics control agreements with foreign governments.

Criminal Division, Department of Justice. The Criminal Division's involvement in Federal drug law enforcement is primarily through its Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section and the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section. Both sections prosecute drug-related cases; the latter also supervises Organized Crime Strike Forces located in 25 U.S. cities. The Division's Asset Forfeiture Office offers legal advice and assistance to United States Attorneys conducting forfeiture proceedings, and conducts forfeiture training for agents and prosecutors throughout the country. The Division's Office of International Affairs coordinates the Department's international activities in support of drug prosecutions, and, along with the Departments of State and Treasury, negotiates extradition treaties and mutual legal assistance treaties that allow access to financial records for use in prosecution.

Multi-agency Organizations

El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). EPIC responds to requests from federal agencies' field units and all 50 states on specific conveyances and people suspected of smuggling drugs. It also provides analyses of smuggling methods, routes, and sources.

National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS). NNBIS is a management system designed to coordinate the multi-agency efforts of the drug law enforcement agencies, and to call on those Federal, State, and local resources that will improve the effectiveness and efficiency of drug interdiction efforts. NNBIS' primary objectives are to: enhance interagency coordination and cooperation; increase the contributions of the Department of Defense and the military services in the effort against drugs; increase national intelligence community support; and coordinate international interdiction efforts with U.S. agency efforts.

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Program. This network of 13 regional Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces is designed to coordinate Federal law enforcement efforts with State and local efforts to combat the national and international organizations that cultivate, process, and distribute illicit drugs. The program uses a consensus approach to investigation and prosecution that pools the strengths of participating agencies.



APPENDIX C

Research Regarding Factors Affecting Interagency Cooperation on Drug Enforcement Task Forces

The purpose of this brief survey is to capture the perceptions of the street level investigators as it relates to assignments on interagency drug task forces. There are over 1,200 of these task forces in place across this country and it is becoming a recognized investigative technique for many criminal problems.

I am looking for volunteers who are willing to complete an anonymous, short questionnaire regarding your perceptions of assignment to interagency task forces. I have been an Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Agent for over fifteen (15) years and have spent over ten of those years assigned to interagency drug task forces. This questionnaire is part of my doctoral work and will comprise the basis for my dissertation.

Your participation is confidential, voluntary, and anonymous. The research data will in no way attempt to identify you individually nor will there be any attempt to do so through coding or correlation of information. The interest of this research is the squad as a group and will be assessed accordingly. However, you individual comments are invaluable to the overall contextual analysis of the information and those comments are encouraged. The data will be controlled by me and neither the FBI nor NYPD management will have access or play a part in the presentation or interpretation of the material. Neither will the FBI nor the NYPD be notified as to who participated in this qeustionnaire.

I will be pleased to answer any questions you might have individually regarding this work or your participation in responding to this survey.

Katherine M. Newbold
(314) 241-5357 (work)
9110 Old Bonhomme Road
St. Louis, Missouri 63132

SECTION ONE: BACKGROUND

Please provide the information requested in the spaces provided for questions below:

1. What is your current age? _____years

2. What is your sex? male _____
female_____

3. What is your racial identity? Caucasian/White _____
Afro-American/Black _____
Latin/Hispanic _____
Asian _____
American Indian _____
Other _____

4. What is your current marital status?
single, never married ___
married ____
divorced____
widowed ____

5. Were you actively recruited by the NYPD ? yes____
no ____

6. Did you actively seek employment with the NYPD ?
yes_____
no _____

7. How long was the process from the start of the application process with the NYPD to the time you received your appointment? 1-2 years_____ 3-4 years _____
more than 5 _____

8. When did you begin service with the NYPD are:
(dates) from _____ to _____.

9. What is you rank/GS level? _____

10. When did you begin your assignment on your current task force?
(dates) from _____ to _____.

11. What is the highest educational level you have achieved?
high school _____
Two year degree _____
Four year degree _____
Master's degree _____
Post Master's _____

12. Have you served in the military ? yes _____
no _____

13. Do you intend to pursue promotion in the NYPD ?
yes _____
no _____
If no, why not ?_____

14. What category best describes how you were assigned to your current task force?
volunteered _____
recruited _____
assigned without prior notice of superiors _____

15. Do you have prior task force experience?
yes _____
no _____
If yes, please list and the length of that assignment
_____

16. What is the total length of law enforcement time you have been assigned to DRUG enforcement work?
_____years months _____

17. Do you believe that cooperation among task force members plays an important part in the work of the group? -
yes _____
no _____

18. Does the fact that the FBI investigates local police in the area of civil right negatively effect any cooperation with the FBI ?
_____yes _____no

19. Do you develop personal relationships easily in work groups?
yes_____
no _____

20. Did you have personal experience working with the FBI prior to your current task force assignment? yes _____ no _____
If yes, was it positive or negative and give a short reason:
_____
_____

SECTION TWO

These statements are focused on your perceptions of task force work in general and then your perceptions regarding your current task force assignment. Place an 'X' in the appropriate box indicating your reaction or provide a short answer where requested. The selections move from strongly agree to agree and disagree to strongly disagree.(SA,A,D,SD)

General Task Force Work Perceptions

	SA	A	D	SD
Cooperation in task force assignments should be:				
21. a full exchange of investigative information.				
22. the physical location of task force members in the same space.				
23. the complete sharing of source or informant information.				
24. a work environment where no member agency can impose decisions on the other.				
25. a situation designed to balance productivity with human relations.				
26. Task force assignments produce close personal relationships.				
27. Law enforcement agencies readily comply with shared information requests.				
28. Immediate work group identification is critical to successful task force units.				
29. Socializing with coworkers after hours is important for close working relations.				
30. Controlling information means you control cases in task force work.				
31. Immediate supervisory creativity is essential to cooperative efforts.				

	SA	A	D	SD
32. The management of participating agencies seem to fully support task force work.				
33. A task force assignment is considered a reward.				
34. No member agency alone should direct the activities of the task force.				
35. Differing administrative requirements are a major source of difficulty in cooperative efforts.				
36. It is my experience that interagency investigations promote investigative secrecy among agents/detectives. ✓				

Current Task Force Assignment Perceptions

Activity in my current task force assignment seems to be:

	SA	A	D	SD
37. preoccupied with interpersonal disputes rather than case work.				
38. always tied to political interests of each agencies' bosses.				
39. based on each agency reaching their own goals and not those of the task force group itself.				
40. inhibited through the lack of investigators sharing information. ✓				

	SA	A	D	SD
The benefits of my current task force assignment can be described as:				
41. the access to knowledge/expertise of other agency personnel. ✓				
42. the opportunity to promoted my agency's ideas on a larger scale.				
43. less control by bosses of either agency.				
44. better equipment and resources.				
45. the opportunity for personal recognition and career development.				

Comments: What are some of the benefits you have experienced in your current assignment which are not addressed above:_____

	SA	A	D	SD
The problems associated with my current task force assignment can be described as:				
46. lack of unified drug enforcement strategy.				
47. removal from my agency's promotion tract.				
48. premature investigative leaks causing case disruption.				
49. case agent status and control of cases always goes to the NYPD.				
50. forced sharing of informants and sources limiting protection of these individuals.				

Comments: What are some of the problems you have experienced in your current assignment which are not addressed above:_____

I would describe the NYPD as:

	SA	A	D	SD
51. a respected law enforcement agency.				
52. exerting too much control over this task force operation.				
53. an agency committed to cooperation with other law enforcement agencies.				
54. contributing greatly to the way in which I view and react to other law enforcement officers.				
55. uncooperative with most outside law enforcement agencies.				

Comments: Please relate the above qualities to your perception of the FBI and briefly explain your answer:_____

	SA	A	D	SD
56. Task force members with whom I work are trustworthy.				
57. Task force members with whom I work are competent.				
58. My task force is comprised of individuals who show little loyalty to one another.				
59. I would be more satisfied assigned to a unit comprised of NYPD Detectives only.				
60. Sharing intelligence or investigative information with other task force members does not cause me concern.				
61. Membership in the NYPD was a lifelong desire.				
62. Task force members frequently praise the work of one another in my assignment.				
63. I often feel other task force members do not value my abilities.				

	SA	A	D	SD
64. Coworkers in my current assignment seem to support the work of one another.				
65. This task force assignment has made me a better NYPD Detective.				
66. Lack of cooperation has led to poor statistical performance in my current assignment.				
67. My task force unit should be disbanded because coworkers compete more than cooperate.				
68. Drug crimes in this geographical area provide a compelling reason for cooperation with the FBI.				
69. Morale in my current assignment is high.				
70. I have never had a problem obtaining investigative information from a task force coworker.				

Short Answer Responses

You are requested to finish the below sentences with your FIRST impression.

71. Task force work is _____.

72. The greatest difficulty in task force cooperation is _____.

73. The thing I most appreciate about my FBI colleagues is _____.

The thing I find most troubling about my FBI colleagues is _____.

74. NYPD Detectives can be described as _____.

75. FBI Agents can be described as _____
_____.

76. If I could change one thing about task force work it would be _____.

77. Interagency cooperation requires _____
_____.

78. The relationship of coworkers depends largely on _____
_____
_____.

79. Task force assignments are generally a (circle one) positive or negative experience due to _____
_____
_____.

80. Sharing investigative information with FBI Agents including sources and informants is _____
_____
_____.

81. The three most important qualities which describe a 'good' task force coworker are: _____
_____.

82. The supervisory personnel heading my current assignment can be described as _____
_____
_____.

83. The most satisfying aspect of my current task force assignment is _____
_____
_____.

84. The least satisfying aspect of my current task-force assignment is _____

_____

_____.

85. Task force personnel should or should not be carefully recruited for the following reasons _____

_____

_____

_____

_____.

COMMENTS

You are requested to provide any comments which you feel were not addressed by the survey. Your thoughts and insights are of great value and are sincerely encouraged.

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