

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.



University Microfilms International
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
313-761-4700 800-521-0600

Order Number 9315488

Mitterrand, the socialists and French security policy. French nuclear policy and the left elite culture: The evolution of the French defense consensus under François Mitterand

Mason, John Grouard, Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1993

Copyright ©1993 by Mason, John Grouard. All rights reserved.

U·M·I

**300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106**

MITTERRAND, THE SOCIALISTS AND FRENCH SECURITY POLICY

French Nuclear Policy and the Left Elite Culture:
The Evolution of the French Defense Consensus Under
François Mitterrand

JOHN GROUARD MASON

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Sociology
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University
of New York.

1993

c 1993

JOHN GROUARD MASON

All Rights Reserved

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Feb 2 1993

Date

Bogdan Denitch

Chair of Examining Committee

Feb 2nd 1993

Date

Paul Attewell

Executive Officer

Prof. Bogdan Denitch

Prof. Paul Attewell

Prof. William Kornblum

Supervisory Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Abstract

MITTERRAND, THE SOCIALISTS AND FRENCH SECURITY POLICY

by

John Grouard Mason

Adviser: Professor Bogdan Denitch

This dissertation proposes to use a case study of opinion-holding and formation among Socialist political and cultural elites in France concerning national defense policy to investigate the exceptional support these elites have given to the expansion and modernization of France's national nuclear forces during the decade of the 1980's. France has been exceptional among her continental neighbors (West Germany, Italy, Spain or Holland), because she has pursued an ambitious array of nuclear weapons programs independent of the United States.

More specifically, this dissertation will focus on the role played by Left party and intellectual elites in facilitating the "normalization" of nuclear weapons development and defense issues, and in promoting a "European evolution" of the inter-party defense consensus during the Mitterrand Presidency. Collateral issues concerning the exceptional position of France as an "independent" nuclear weapons state in the post-war European system, and its likely erosion in the near future, will also be addressed.

I seek to identify the institutional processes in France which have promoted the emergence of a common strategic discourse among national party, bureaucratic and media elites, and most particularly among those elite groups who identify with the Socialist Left. I argue that this strategic "consensus" has operated at three levels: first, in consolidating an inter-party accord in support of the development and deployment of an array of nuclear weapons systems under national control; second, in legitimating effective control over the decision-making process concerning French nuclear development and security policies by military technicians and security policy specialists; and, third, in generally promoting the acceptance of pro-nuclear options in security policy by most sectors of French public opinion.

I aim to demonstrate that a significant degree of convergence in opinion exists among political and intellectual elites concerning nuclear defense issues by focusing on those political and intellectual groups who were initially the most hostile to French nuclear weapons policy: the intellectuals and activists of the French Left, who "rallied" to a nuclear policy discourse developed by the parties of the Gaullist Right which the Left opposed during the 1960's and 70's.

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to many individuals and organizations for help in completing this study. A French government fellowship, La Bourse Chateaubriand, paid for the first year of my research. Over several years, a research assistantship with Bogdan Denitch at the CUNY Research Foundation helped carry my research forward - as did a contract from the Foundation for National Defense Studies in France.

I owe a debt to many individuals in Paris as well as in New York. Dozens of French officials, intellectuals and activists took time out of busy schedules to spend hours answering questions about their lives and their country; taking me into their confidence and helping a stranger find his footing on foreign ground. I thank them all, but I owe a special thanks to certain individuals. André Brigot and Dominique David at La Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense Nationale gave me an institutional sponsor for a year and invaluable help with finding documents and contacts within the Parisian "Strategic Community." Jérôme Paolini at IFRI has always shown himself ready to argue the French position on a wide range of issues and very helpful in finding documents and books. Alain Carton at the National Assembly was always forthcoming with information, insights and encouragement. Olivier Mongin and Paul Thibaud of Esprit were generous with their time and introductions within different Parisian intellectual milieux. Guy

Sitbon of the Nouvel Observateur served as my advocate among his journalistic colleagues and Dominic Pignon of the CNRS introduced me to scientific and anti-nuclear circles.

In New York, Bogdan Denitch has played an invaluable role in keeping this project on the road and on track, while Nick Wahl and Martin Schain at the NYU Center for French Studies have over the years provided access to the NYU Library in addition to personal introductions to key players in the transatlantic dialogue regarding French social and political trends during the Mitterrand era.

Finally I owe a special thanks to my wife Catherine, daughter Julia, and mother Ruth, who allowed their homelife to be invaded by the strange business of nuclear strategy with patience and good humor. Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen have also been good friends who helped us pick up the pace whenever the long dissertation process threatened to bring us down. I thank them and many others too numerous to name as well.

All translations from the French are mine as are any errors of judgement and appreciation.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	vi
List of Tables	ix
List of Figures	x
1. Introduction:	page 1
2. The Scope of the Research:	page 32
3. The French Elite System	page 55
4. The Disciplinary Context:	page 80
5. Patterns of French Development	page 105
6. The Post-War Strategic Revolution	page 141
7. The Inter-Party Defense Consensus	page 167
8. French Security Policy Under Mitterrand	page 201
9. Nuclear Nationalism and Public Opinion	page 243
10. Nuclear Nationalism and the Socialists	page 271
11. Paris Intellectual Opinion Leaders	page 298
12. The Dilemmas of Nuclear Dissidence	page 326
13. Conclusion	page 362
Appendixes	
Appendix A List of Paris Informants	page 384
Appendix B Paris Questionnaire	page 388
Bibliography	page 392

List of Tables

Table 5-1 Military Budgets in France Since 1958	page 121
Table 5-2. Military Budgets as % of GDP	page 123
Table 5-3. Western Defense Expenditures	page 124
Table 5-4. The Great Economic Transformation	page 126
Table 5-5. French Share of World Trade	page 129
Table 5-6. Leading Arms Exporters and Importers	page 131
Table 5-7. End of French Economic Miracle	page 133
Table 7-1. Elite View of France's World Rank	page 193
Table 8-1. Growth of French Conventional Forces	page 207
Table 8-2. Comparative Military Resources	page 207
Table 8-3. Funds dedicated to Nuclear Forces	page 210
Table 9-1. Major Concerns of the French Public	page 243
Table 9-2. Elite Estimates of Security Risks	page 246
Table 9-3. Alliance Preferences of Informants	page 254
Table 11-1. Strategists Cited by Informants	page 303

List of Figures

Figure 2-1. French Elite Policy Centers 1985	page 48
Figure 7-1. French Elite Alignment Circa 1985	page 177
Figure 11-1. French Elite Opinion Leaders 1985	page 306
Figure 13-1. Emerging Elite Realignment 1993	page 379

Introduction

This dissertation proposes to use a case study of opinion-holding and formation among Socialist political and cultural elites in France concerning national defense policy to investigate the exceptional support these elites have given to the expansion and modernization of France's national nuclear forces during the decade of the 1980's. This occurred at a moment when Socialist cultural elites and party leaders in the rest of Western Europe became increasingly anti-nuclear in orientation. France was exceptional among her continental neighbors (West Germany, Italy, Spain or Holland), because she pursued an ambitious array of nuclear weapons programs independent of the United States. The "warfare" role of the French state remains central to government legitimacy and to the national economy - co-existing with the more usual "welfare" definitions of social security and economic well being found in the other West European "welfare states" rather than being effaced by them. In an age when national elites in welfare states such as Holland, Sweden and Germany have resigned from the global geo-political competition, French elites, stubbornly, have not¹.

More specifically, this dissertation will focus on the role played by Left party and intellectual elites in facilitating the "normalization" of nuclear weapons development and defense issues, and in promoting an "European evolution" of the inter-party defense consensus during the Mitterrand Presidency. Collateral issues concerning the exceptional position of France as an "independent" nuclear weapons state in the post-war European system, and its likely erosion in the near future, will also be addressed. Finally we may ask how well public unanimity on issues of nuclear policy will hold up in the face of the disintegration of the former Communist Bloc and Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany and the modification of both the external mission of French nuclear forces and the domestic economic assumptions under which the French presidential regime has operated for the past thirty years.

I believe an approach using a single, national case study is justified because France's position as an independent, "middle-weight," nuclear-weapon state with an "oligarchical," but open, democratic political system was in many ways exceptional within the post-war state system of competing strategic blocs. Other medium-rank nuclear powers either have authoritarian political systems as in the case of China; have nuclear weapons policies which go undeclared as in the cases of Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, Iraq and India; or nuclear testing, weapons development, and acquisition programs which

are heavily dependent on a Superpower partner as in the case of the United Kingdom².

French exceptionalism in the post-war bloc system:

. Since the early sixties, France's position among her European neighbors has been exceptional in a number of ways - even when compared with the other West European nuclear power, the United Kingdom. She was the only continental European state besides the Soviet Union to possess nuclear weapons and delivery systems which were developed independently by her national nuclear and aerospace industries - albeit with some grudging American technical cooperation since the early seventies³. She was the only American ally which had neither American troops or weapons stationed on her soil, and like Spain, French troops and weapons today are not subject to American oversight in peacetime through the NATO integrated command. This means that France did not allow her security tie to the US to impair national control over choices of defense strategy, the deployment of national forces, and the development of weapons systems and military technology as well as their sale and transfer to other nations. The French system of national defense planning remained remarkably autonomous allowing the French leadership to pursue a national strategy of scientific and technological development which relied heavily on the defense sector and an industrial export strategy which depended on foreign arms sales to developing states⁴. This contrasts strongly with the position of the defense forces of other European states, (especially the armed

forces of the former German states), which were so tightly intermeshed within the American or Soviet blocs that they often appeared as "sub-systems" in the armed forces of their superpower partners.

Throughout the post-war era which has just now drawn to a close, French leaders worked to gain for themselves a position of strategic and political autonomy within the Atlantic Alliance as an "independent power within an otherwise aligned Europe⁵". In the eyes of many NATO critics during the Cold War period, this position made the French into a nation of "free-riders" - happy to sit behind their German "glacis" and benefit from the "neighborhood effects" of the American dominated security system, while remaining free to devote the better part of their national resources to pursuit of independent diplomatic initiatives inside and outside of Europe and the defense of overseas commitments⁶. To the French, things looked quite different. They saw themselves promoted to the rank of "le troisième grand," that is, the world's third nuclear power. By constructing their own nuclear "sanctuary," the French felt they had attained equal status with the Superpowers, at least in strategic terms, because they possessed a national deterrent which was both independent and deadly - even if unequal in terms of megatonnage. Defending the inviolability of this national "nuclear redoubt" is the "first circle" of French strategic planning⁷.

Relative autonomy within the American bloc paid off for France in the form of diplomatic dividends in the third-world

and, to a lesser extent, in Europe itself - the immediate security environment which constitutes "the second circle" of French strategic policy. This diplomatic autonomy in turn reinforced her technical and military independence and allowed for French penetration of foreign markets for conventional arms sales - mainly to regional powers in the third world seeking a "non-superpower" supplier. By the beginning of the 1980's France had established her position as the world's third most important arms exporter, a rank which she has maintained through 1991⁸.

Foreign complaints about French "meddling" in third world countries underscore the fact that France struggles on valiantly maintaining a world-wide presence which the other former great powers in Europe have all but abandoned - the UK's "Fortress Falklands" excepted. France appears in Thierry de Montbrial's phrase "like the last of the Mohicans⁹," the last European power which claims to have strategic interests which lie outside Europe itself. France alone continues to maintain significant military forces worldwide. Excluding the armored forces remaining in Germany, France maintains some 25,000 troops in a string of bases which stretch in a belt along the Equator from Guyana across West Africa to Djibouti across the Indian Ocean to French Polynesia and then to the Caribbean and French Guyana ¹⁰. If we include the armored corps remaining in Germany and the troops dedicated to various UN "peace-keeping" missions around the world, by 1992 close to fifty thousand French troops were posted outside France's

national borders - a figure representing one tenth of her total armed forces, and one sixth of her land army¹¹.

At the same time, France alone has attempted since the sixties to build a national scientific-industrial complex capable of competing with the Superpowers across the full-range of existing military technologies and weapons systems. Although De Gaulle may have wished to substitute high-technology projects for the colonial empire as a new foundation for France's politics of grandeur¹², by the early eighties the "confetti" of the old empire had become critical bases for France's pursuit of advanced technology exports. This was no accident because the maintenance of the capability to project force globally and to compete technologically with the two Superpowers went hand in hand.

Up until April 1992 when the French government suspended provisionally its nuclear testing program, the French poured billions of Francs into its Polynesian territories in order to develop her testing facilities on the island of Mururoa and buy local loyalty in order to safeguard them¹³. Similarly the French space program needed the equatorial launching facilities in French Guyana, and the French made major investments in this obscure corner of Latin America previously known for its notorious military prison - Devil's Island¹⁴. Along with the other overseas departments and territories, "les DOM-TOM," these colonial assets outside Europe represent the "third circle" of the French defense perimeter.

As Dominic Moïsi has observed post-war "France behaves like a mini-superpower¹⁵," but the costs of maintaining a neo-colonial role are rising. The fact that the French presence in West Africa was larger in the eighties than at the time of decolonization shows that France plays the neo-colonial game better than most¹⁶. But troubles in New Caledonia and the diplomatic scandal provoked by the sinking of the Greenpeace ship, the Rainbow Warrior, in 1985 by the French secret services, were only a foretaste of what was coming in the French territories in the South Pacific¹⁷.

Strategic Consensus or elite settlement?

By the time of the election of the first Mitterrand government in 1981, all the major political parties in France had joined together in a common agreement to support: 1) the expansion of France's strategic force and the military and nuclear industrial sectors which support it; 2) the strong presidential regime which commands it, and 3) the independent foreign policy which supported French claims to an strategic role independent of its American ally and justified the policies of arms exports to the third world on which the survival of France's share of world trade in "high technology" industries increasingly depended¹⁸.

This "consensus" seems to bind matters as disparate as the attitudes of French political and intellectual elites toward their Presidential regime; the expansion of their nuclear arsenal; their estimates of "the Soviet threat," or

their view of their own rank in the world, into a belief system held together by an elaborate framework of political argument and strategic doctrine, creating a common "strategic culture" which has been widely diffused among different elite groups. The French elite consensus over security policy works as a strategic "rationale" which helps policy-making elites coordinate conflicting agendas and limit the bureaucratic politics associated with policy and budgetary decisions. It is also a cultural "discourse" demanding "ethnographic" understanding in that it creates both a common "national security culture" which is shared by different communities of policy-makers, and provides a broader ideological "worldview" which promotes acceptance of policy outcomes among a cross section of national political and intellectual elites¹⁹.

My use of the term discourse here follows that of George Ross who defines a discourse as "a conceptual vocabulary serving as a basic framework of orientation for..diverse political actors...for a period of time²⁰." Ideological discourses establish common "frames of meaning" which allow social actors to connect otherwise disconnected events and issues in ways which are mutually understood. French strategic doctrines qualify as a "discourse" in this sense because they make systematic links between the nation's vital interests, concerning both resources and political commitments, and its existing military capabilities, concerning both arms procurement and deployment of forces²¹.

Shared strategic discourses lay the foundation for an "elite settlement" because they orient the professional military, directing the development and planned uses of arsenals in ways compatible with declared policy concerning national purposes and values. At the same time they also rationalize limits on the demands of the military upon social and economic resources which help to ensure that military programs fit with the global strategy of "national defense" which includes industrial and political goals as well as military ones²². Nuclear doctrines in France have served, for instance, to justify "downsizing" the conventional forces of the army so that they would no longer pose a threat to domestic prosperity and regime stability²³. The basic task of the strategic consensus in France, as in the US, has been, in Charles Bright terms, "to coordinate military and political interests, controlling the social costs of violence in a way that does not jeopardize the tangible benefits of military power²⁴." Up until the 1980's it has differed from the American "consensus" mainly in its refusal to identify clearly the enemy threat against which French forces were directed. French strategists preferred to talk instead about a variety of "potential adversaries" to national security which went unnamed in official texts such as the Defense White Paper issued in 1972²⁵. But overall, defending "her world-wide strategic interests" and continuing the technological and military competition with the Superpowers have been important stakes for French elites for reasons relating to international prestige,

defending "her world-wide strategic interests" and continuing the technological and military competition with the Superpowers have been important stakes for French elites for reasons relating to international prestige, the legitimacy of French domestic regime, and the pursuit of a national strategy of "state led," industrial development.

The Politics of French Exceptionalism

For writers such as François Furet, the historian of the French Revolution, the national defense "consensus" has become symbolic of the broad legitimacy enjoyed by the institutions of the Fifth Republic and of the completion of France's political modernization²⁶. In this view, the continuity in policy between governments of the center-right and center-left is presented as compelling evidence that France had finally emerged in the eighties as a stable "consensus society" similar to other mature democracies, and that the bitter ideological divisions between Left and Right dating back to 1789 had been put safely behind her²⁷.

In contrast to this reading of the significance of "consensual politics," I think that French elites have enjoyed this great margin of "public tolerance" (more realistically public apathy and indifference) for their nuclear policies in large part because the leadership of all major parties (Communists included) participated in a common "elite settlement" for reasons having to do with stabilizing the domestic and international position of the first government of the left which France had seen in decades. More

elites to reach an accommodation with the military which keeps it satisfied is understandable given the record of military defeats of modern French armies and their de-stabilizing role in postwar French politics and history²⁹. The nuclearization of the defense policy also has been "beneficial" by promoting a party accord which serves to justify the centralization of control over defense and foreign policy issues in the hands of the president, the famous "domaine réservé." In France nuclear weapons policy and presidential authority have been parts of a mutually supportive mix which I have called elsewhere "the marriage of nuclear nationalism and the nuclear presidency³⁰."

Over the past twenty years the relationship between the pursuit of strategic weapons and the legitimation of domestic political institutions has largely been a "positive sum game" in France not only because it kept public opinion immobilized, (that is "en repos"), but more importantly because it kept down elite conflicts over the allocation of resources. More broadly, the "normalization" of Left-wing attitudes in France belong to a post-war pattern of the interplay of nuclear defense policy and domestic political institutions, a distinctive "elite settlement." By the term "elite settlement" I mean a political alignment of different elites who could agree on common rules governing their competition for resources and influence³¹. The particular peculiarity of elite settlements in modern France is that they are as much alignments against one or another dissident elite group as they are common

agreements which include all major parties. The fact that these settlements invariably leave some major elite group in the position of a regime adversary is one of the reasons for the instability of constitutional regimes of which there have been more than a dozen since the Revolution of 1789³².

The Third Republic, for instance, was an alignment which unified a radical and secular rural coalition by excluding the Parisian working class and conservative catholics³³. Later under the leadership of Guy Mollet during the Fourth Republic the Socialists had successfully held the political center by pursuing centrist voters and coalition partners, even as they excluded the left and right extremes - a strategy which Jacques Julliard calls "cutting the two ends of the omelette"³⁴. The Gaullist settlement in 1962 ended this political alignment of the Fourth Republic where some elite groups, Communists and Gaullists, were excluded from the centrist party regime (which they rejected anyway), even while other elites in the army and the civil administration actively worked to destabilize the regime by parliamentary maneuver, military intimidation, and political terrorism³⁵. The Gaullist settlement was intended to keep the right-wing coalition in power indefinitely by excluding the organized left from power. This was accomplished by consolidating the position of the Communist Party as the dominant left wing party even as it was cast in the role of the outside "threat" designated to unify the other system actors against it³⁶.

The exclusion of the Communists and the weakening of the parliamentary notables of the centrist Radical and Socialist parties lead to the effective marginalization of the representatives of working class and rural France during the first two decades of the Fifth Republic³⁷. De Gaulle created a strong presidential regime with governments dominated by modernizing elites drawn from the higher civil service and larger capitalist firms tied to the state-led sectors of industry, consolidating the role of a state-created oligarchy, the technocrats, as the leaders of France's social and economic transformation in the late fifties and sixties³⁸. Challenged by simultaneous, but separate student and worker rebellions in 1968, this Gaullist power arrangement was finally altered in the seventies by François Mitterrand's success in reducing the Communists to the position of a junior partner in a broader coalition, the Union of the Left³⁹. This prepared the way for a united left to reassume governmental power and offered the prospect for the "inclusion" of the representatives of previously excluded social groups within the ruling coalition. But while the Mitterrand victory did result in the integration of left-wing party elites within the state administration, it did not do much to alter the basic weakness of French unions or to empower the representatives of the new social movements. Under Mitterrand, the most recent version à la française of the European welfare state has remained very much "socialism without the workers"⁴⁰.

For most of the 1980's under the rule of François Mitterrand's Presidency (France's first left government in decades), France was the exception - the nuclear policy discussion largely remained a technical debate confined to top policy-makers within the executive ministries and administrative corps. In the French media, everything from the Euro-missile deployment and the rise of the "pacifist" movements at the beginning of the decade to the arms reduction treaties at its end were treated as "foreign affairs" stories, rather than as events which raised domestic policy issues. The French acted like bystanders to these events which were seen as being of concern to the extent that they raised questions about German, British or American reliability as French alliance partners. Unlike the 1970's, questions of nuclear policy, civil and military, have remained "non-issues" for French public opinion right through the beginning of the nineteen nineties⁴¹.

The peculiar French mix of the "welfare" and warfare state has been exceptional in Europe precisely because nuclear policy and foreign arms sales were not the source of much political conflict or debate during the 1980's. France was the only important American ally in Western Europe in the last decade which did not witness the rise of mass social movements with sufficient public support to challenge the monopoly of security policy specialists over vital national security decisions. In the U.K. and West Germany such movements have at times been strong enough to impose their anti-nuclear agendas

on reluctant party and parliamentary leadership, and influence the terms of electoral debate, even where they were too weak to actually determine the outcomes of recent elections⁴². In France, on the other hand, the anti-nuclear and conscript movements of the middle 70's which had challenged the expansion of France's ambitious nuclear power program and the conditions of military service faded away into relative inactivity under the Socialist government⁴³. But not entirely, they were active enough to serve as a useful foil for press attacks and intellectual polemics aimed at combatting the "Dutch pacifist disease" before it took root in France. Indeed one could argue that by the middle eighties the weak anti-nuclear movement and the Communists had been cast into the "outsider" role which served during the waning years of the "Second Cold War" to unite the rest of the political system against them.

The enthusiasm elite members show to this day for the existing consensus, and the intensity of the anger they feel towards those who put themselves outside it, is a measure perhaps of their real fears about its fragility and the dangers they perceive in any breakdown of the current settlement between elite groups. The close escape from civil war experienced by many of them during the last regime crisis in 1958 and 1962 has not been forgotten nor has the savagery of the "franco-français" battles between resistance forces and the Vichy milice in the last days of the German occupation.

In the view of one of my respondents, a strategic analyst at IFRI, even the prospect of nuclear strikes against a foreign invader and the certain retaliation they would bring, seemed less terrible than the possible renewal of the French civil wars of the forties and fifties which he had heard described by his father⁴⁴. In contrast, another informant, a well known spokesperson for the pacifist organization CODENE, had participated in the wartime resistance within France in his youth and still gloried in the experience. In the case of a future war he was prepared to surrender the "national territory" to foreign occupation to avoid nuclear annihilation, but was also ready to lead a relentless resistance against the occupier⁴⁵ - seemingly to refight the resistance struggle of WWII against enemies foreign and internal and win.

Experiences of civil conflict lie close to surface of the discussion concerning national defense in part because most of the regime crises of the past century from the Paris Commune 1871 to the threatened coups by the "paras" in 1958 and 1960 were triggered by the failure of the French armies to overcome foreign enemies⁴⁶. Indeed for one of the architects of the French deterrent theory and nuclear strategic force, General Pierre Gallois, it was this experience of repeated military defeats and internal revolutions which provided the ultimate rationale for France's strategic policy. As the General told me:

"Between 1790 and 1941 France was the world champion in terms of the number of dead in proportion to its

population. The French have shown that they can no longer wage wars without losing them. The average Frenchman has demonstrated that he is incapable of fighting and is not a reliable fightingman. Therefore we had to try something else - to create a corps of professionals which could take charge of the national defense without them (ie. the French, JGM). The Nuclear bomb is our guarantee of maintaining the current condition of non war.. the technical means by which we can persuade the adversary to leave us the hell alone⁴⁷."

In Gallois' version of French doctrine of nuclear dissuasion, we can hear not only a technical response to France's weakened position within the international state system, but also an answer to the threat of the destabilization of the domestic political settlement which any future military defeat would carry with it. By possessing nuclear weapons, the post-war generation of the French political elite has - in a manner strikingly similar to their grandfathers' construction of the Maginot Line - overcome their memories of defeat and occupation during World War II and announced to rest of the world "Never Again."

I believe that the post-war "profile" of elite opinion in France owes much to the peculiar flexibility of their common "strategic discourse" - a "cultural product" developed by Gaullist strategic thinkers such as Generals Gallois, Beaufre, Poirier and Ailleret in the 1960's and actively diffused since

that time among civilian elites by "defense foundations and institutes" such as the Foundation for National Defense Studies (FEDN) associated with the Ministry of Defense. Until middle of the eighties the official strategic "orthodoxy" was sufficiently abstract and ambiguous that it could accommodate several different competing foreign policy orientations and economic strategies⁴⁸. The language and ambiguous policy orientation of this "national strategic discourse" allowed it to be adopted by the end of the seventies by conflicting elite groups for different, and sometimes contradictory, electoral and ideological reasons.

The Evolution of the Consensus in the eighties:

In the argument developed in the chapters to follow the evolution of the inter-party accord over the past two decades is marked by several key turning points, which can be briefly summarized as follows. Firstly, the consolidation of the inter-party consensus on defense was marked by adoption by left-wing party and intellectual elites of the "Orthodox" strategic doctrine elaborated by members of the military establishment associated with General De Gaulle, and diffused among civilian elites by institutions controlled by the military⁴⁹. A central principle of this strategic doctrine is the idea of "strategic ambiguity" which has provided a justification for France's military and diplomatic autonomy within the Atlantic Alliance, and established independence from the post-war bloc system as a central requirement for effective national sovereignty. This principle governing

French strategic planning and organization also served as a central doctrinal support for the inter-party consensus by establishing nationalist goals for defense policy which all party leaders could accept, and by leaving room for different foreign policy orientations (Atlanticist, Nuclear Nationalist, Anti Nuclear Non-Aligned, Pro-Soviet) to co-exist - with the proviso that anti-nuclear critics be cast out into the political wilderness⁵⁰.

Secondly, Socialist acceptance of Nuclear deterrence necessarily implied their reconciliation with the Gaullist Presidential regime which they had previously rejected, and represented a necessary precondition for their emergence as a responsible party of government. This policy reversal of the major left-wing parties made an important contribution to the capacity of French policy makers to manage public opinion on nuclear issues, and to preempt the emergence of social movements hostile to official French nuclear policy, and/or to the centralization of the policy process concerning these issues in the hands of the executive. The ambiguities of Gaullist "strategic orthodoxy" also facilitated an internal compromise on nuclear weapons between the major currents within the PS, allowing the Party's policy reversal on nuclear policy in the late 1970's. The hegemony of this "strategic discourse" became critical to the stability of the Mitterrand coalition within the PS because it supported an internal party compromise between "Atlanticist" and "Nuclear nationalists" currents within the party who had sharply opposed preferences

concerning the foreign policy orientation of a future left government⁵¹. The adoption of "strategic orthodoxy" by Socialist party elites as the rationale for an internal party compromise meant that acceptance of nuclear deterrence became an ideological test of loyalty to the Presidential coalition. These political functions of the strategic discourse seem to hold true at the broader level of the Union of the Left, and the Mitterrand Government coalition.

Thirdly the conversion of major Left spokespersons to the Gaullist strategic orthodoxy coincided with a sea-change in intellectual attitudes toward the Soviet Union. The gradual replacement of Left-wing ideological perspectives toward French relations to the third-world and the two Super-power blocs by the orthodox "strategic discourse" of the military strategists within the PS converged with the diffusion of "Dissident critiques" of Soviet Society within left-wing intellectual milieux creating a social conjuncture hostile to traditional Marxism and to the emergence of "leftist" social movements⁵². The belated recognition by left Catholic and ex-Maoist intellectuals of the Soviet imperial system in central and Eastern Europe led to a radical reduction of Communist Party (PCF) influence among intellectuals and to the rapid collapse of Marxism as a legitimate intellectual discourse for political and policy debate within the Democratic Left⁵³.

Both these developments led to the rejection by the "anti-totalitarian" Left of the idea of the "moral and strategic equivalence of the Superpowers" and to reversal of

intellectual attitudes toward the Soviet Union and the US⁵⁴. Militant opposition to Soviet policies in Poland and Afghanistan led in turn to undermining the intellectual legitimacy of the Gaullist principle of "strategic ambiguity" and the policy of "equidistance from the Superpowers" which had made the strategic orthodoxy attractive to political elites in the first place. Intellectual pressures helped weaken the internal political compromise within the PS and the Union of the Left, even as it led to delegitimation of the CERES current within the PS and of the PCF within the Left coalition. Militant opposition to Soviet policy and the delegitimation of the Soviet model created an intellectual climate hostile to the emergence of pacifist social movements allied to the peace and ecological movements in other West European countries. Intellectual identification with militant "anti-totalitarian ideologies" and the mobilization of intellectual milieux in support for foreign social movements in Eastern Europe and Afghanistan occupied the social and political space which might have been occupied otherwise by anti-nuclear social movements.

By the middle eighties the anti-soviet turn of intellectual opinion-makers had supported the closure of the nuclear policy debate and encouraged the hardening of the strategic consensus of the 1970's in an explicitly anti-Soviet orientation⁵⁵. They played a central role in the campaign to transform French cultural attitudes toward the Soviet Union and French Communism. This help to create the "articles of recon-

ciliation" necessary for a "human rights" coalition of intellectuals drawn from the official parliamentary right (RPR and UDF) and the anti-totalitarian, Rocardian "Second Left," and prepared the framework for the "co-habitation" of Left and Right between 1986 and 1988⁵⁶. At the same time the centrist alliance around the liberal "human rights agenda" justified the exclusion of both the "pro-detente" communists and anti-nuclear "holdouts" from the alternative Left movements grouped around the Unified Socialist Party (PSU), CODENE, and Les Verts (the French Green Party).

Finally, in the 1970's and 1980's France belatedly experienced the "cultural normalization" associated with the "end of ideology" which other Western societies had experienced several decades earlier. "Nuclear nationalism" and the inter-party consensus promoted public passivity over foreign policy and defense issues generally, and questions of nuclear weapons development in particular, contributing to the failure of social movements around these issues to take hold as in other Western European countries. The general political significance of this trend could be expanded, as it has been, for instance, by Daniel Singer, to include intellectual hostility to all social movements proposing major changes in either domestic social arrangements or the global economy⁵⁷.

In contrast to Anglo-American elites in the eighties the centrist consensus in France resisted the fashion for laissez-faire liberalism and settled for a modified social democratic model of "socially regulated capitalism" limited by a "social

charter" of citizen entitlements⁵⁸. However the idea that "there is no alternative" to the existing capitalist order of the world economy and the existing system of elite rule within France did take root in the wake of the collapse of the Communist alternative - a collapse which seemed to take down with it the credibility of any and all popular democratic alternatives to the existing system. Public acceptance of, and indifference to, nuclear defense policy is therefore part of a larger process of political demobilization in France which resulted in the disconnection of large numbers of ordinary people from Left party politics in particular and the political process in general. Further one could make the case that this "hollowing out" of the popular Left helped to create a social absence and political void which was filled by the National Front (FN) and the extreme right⁵⁹.

The Post 1989 Erosion of Consensus Politics.

By the 1980's, the continuation of France's rank as a "global power" and domestic stability and prosperity had come to be identified in the prevailing elite consensus with the preservation of France's status as a nuclear weapon state, and with her active pursuit of research and development programs in all areas relevant to modern strategic weapons systems. Valery Giscard D'Estang expressed this clearly when he declared in June 1976 in a speech to the IHEDN that France could not remain and "autonomous power" without being a "military power⁶⁰." This means that the strength of the French "strategic consensus" was rooted in economic as well as mili-

"strategic consensus" was rooted in economic as well as military rationales. The development and modernization of nuclear weapons was accepted by a cross-section of French elites as a necessary precondition for maintaining French "technological competitiveness" and economic independence as much as for defending her national territory and strategic interests⁶¹. This "productive" relationship between strategic concerns, symbolic politics and economic development may well represent a unique case among nuclear weapons states. Even if one argues that it is not, the low domestic "costs" which French governments have incurred as a consequence of their nuclear policies certainly seemed atypical of "nuclear politics" elsewhere in Western Europe, or in the United States for that matter in the 1980's.

Despite large areas of agreement concerning the Gaullist nuclear policy, elite awareness has grown over the Mitterrand years that the realization of ambitious foreign policy goals exceeded France's resource base as a middle-range power - according to François Heisbourg by 1987 the policy "status quo" had already become "impossible"⁶². After 1989 the internal debate within French policy circles about the continued longevity and relevance of the Gaullist security consensus has intensified. This coincided with doubts about the future; with a feeling that France was growing more dependent on outside centers of decision, and that in many technological areas she could no longer compete using her own resources alone⁶³. If this was not already clear after 1989 with the fall of the

Berlin Wall and German reunification, France's inability to resist American pressures to involve herself in the Allied campaign against her former Iraqi client; the relatively small size of her military contribution in the Gulf and the less than brilliant performance of her air forces, drove home a new sense of limits. Straitened circumstances were reflected in the urgency with which the new "European vocation" in Mitterrand's foreign policy was promoted within French political circles. Attempts to raise some of these issues in the 1988 presidential campaign were turned aside by the major candidates, who kept the public focus on the unified European market promised for 1992, but this success seemed at most tactical. It only postponed what promised to be a messy public debate for the next time - which duly arrived in the summer of 1992 in the form of a popular revolt against Mitterrand's European policy.

In view of recent events we should be skeptical of the vision of France in "the Mitterrand decade" as a "consensus society:" a vision which elevates the existence of this limited inter-party accord (with its built-in constraints and taboos) to the status of an "ideological value" in and of itself. My research in 1985, 1986 and 1988 captured this consensus among French elites at a moment when elite attitudes on a number of important issues were beginning to shift, and when at least two elite groups, the French Communists on the left and the National Front on the right, had already broken

with the national policy consensus which the Communists had supported for almost a decade.

This means, in my view, that the celebrated "defense consensus" operates mainly as a distinctive kind of "elite settlement" between competing political clans within the French party system and executive administration. The average citizen knew little about these internal arrangements between elite groups, and apparently cared less, in large measure because they were not informed about the budgetary costs or security risks of France's nuclear build up. On the other hand, they did hear throughout the 1980's a good deal of optimistic talk from official spokespersons about the job and trade benefits of France's nuclear power industry and policy of arms exports overseas. One of the most important results of this policy "consensus" was to remove defense issues as "stakes" open to the normal processes of electoral competition and debate by marginalizing its critics.

All in all, I will argue, the policy decision to possess nuclear weapons - first taken by De Gaulle and supported by all French Presidents since - seems to have had the effect of "pre-empting" domestic political conflict rather than provoking it - at least through the end of the 1980's. At the same time, the domestic "politics of pre-emption" seems to have contributed to the "hollowing out" of French political parties, unions and associations and to the growth of popular cynicism about the national leadership. Even in terms of French diplomacy within Europe, I believe that the prevalence

of a orthodox strategic discourse among French elites is not necessarily an "asset." I will argue that it promotes a degree of ideological rigidity and policy immobility which creates real obstacles to the capacity of French intellectuals and policy-makers to understand the new security environment developing outside of France.

Despite my reservations about the benefits and durability of the current consensus, the case for French strategic exceptionalism among America's European allies remains strong, and I believe that this exceptionalism is of major theoretical as well as comparative interest, notwithstanding the fact that American Sociology has remained largely indifferent to it. It is my hope that the study of "security politics" in France has much to tell us about the linkage between state violence and legitimation in modern societies.

1 Here I am drawing on John Mueller's argument about the "non-strategic" diplomacy of certain of the smaller middle-range powers in Western Europe such as Holland which he makes in his "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Post-war World," which appeared in International Security, Vol 13, No. 2, Fall 1988, pp. 73 -79.

2 This was a theme which came up often during my interviewing in Paris in 1985 and 1986. My French informants seemed skeptical about Great Britain's right to make a similar claim of strategic independence on the grounds that Great Britain depends on the U. S. for its delivery systems; on U.S. testing facilities and technology for the development of its nuclear warheads and guidance systems, and is subject to American oversight and control over any British initiatives in sharing her nuclear technology with third parties.

3 Richard Ullman created something of a scandal some years ago by revealing the full extent of American technical assistance to French strategic weapons programs with his article, "The Covert French Connection", Foreign Policy, No 75, Summer 1989, pp. 10 -17. My informants in France confirmed his story but downplayed its significance by describing the exchange of technical information as more like playing a technical version of "Twenty Questions" than a simple gift.

4 Edward Kolodziej makes the connection between Nuclear weapons, strategic independence and arms transfers in his Making and Marketing Arms: The French Experience and Its Implications for the International System, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1987, pp. 60-61.

5 Alfredo Valladao, "Une Puissance Moyenne En Voie de déclassement, L'Etat de la France, Editions de la Découverte, Paris, 1992. p 578

6 See David Vost, La France et la sécurité européenne, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1985, pp. 36-45; 229-257. (English edition, France's Deterrent Postures and Security in Europe, IISS, London 1985).

7 For a coherent summary of the French system of nuclear strategy, see Hervé Coutau-Bégaire, "La Politique de Défense De la France," in La Stratégie Française, No 53, Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense Nationale, January 1992, pp. 13-17.

8 See Table 6-6.

9 Thierry De Montbrial uses this phrase in Thierry de Montbrial and Régis Debray, "Quelle politique étrangère pour la France," Le Débat, No 34, March 1985, p. 43.

10 See Amiral Marcel Duval, "Le 'hors zone' dans la coopération Franco-Britannique et le maintien de la paix," Pour Une Nouvelle Entente Cordiale, Yves Boyer, Pierre Lellouche and John Roper editors, IFRI/Masson, Paris 1988, pp. 82 & 86, for figures and an informative comparison of the overseas positions of France and Britain.

11. Alain Joxe, "Humanisme et Empires," Le Monde Diplomatique, No. 466, January 1993, p.7.

12 Kolodziej, *ibid*, p 58 & 70.

13 See Christian Makarian, "Polynésie, L'envers du paradis," Le Point, No. 1058, December 24-30 1992, pp. 32-33.

14 Guy Labertit, "Les DOM-TOM: au bénéfice de la Métropole," L'Etat de la France et de Ses Habitants, Editions de la Découverte, Paris, 1989, p 482.

15 Dominic Moïsi used this expression in his introduction to the summer issue of Politique Etrangère, No 2, Summer 1985, IFRI, Paris, p 317.

16 Gérard Viratelle, "Les Rapports Nord-Sud Selon François Mitterrand," L'Etat de La France et de Ses Habitants, ibid, pp. 472-73. See also the description of Franco-African relations in the mid-eighties given by Mort Rosenblum in Mission to Civilize: The French Way, Harcourt Brace Janovich, New York, 1986, pp. 215-259.

17 Rosenblum, op cit., pp. 307-345. Also see Dominique Moïsi, "French Foreign Policy: The Challenge of Adaptation," Foreign Affairs, Vol 67, No 1, Fall 1988, pp. 161-163.

18 Kolodziej, Making and Marketing Arms, ibid, pp, 201-209.

19 See Bruno Colson's discussion of French strategic culture, "La Culture Stratégique Française," in La Stratégie Française No 53, op cit., pp. 27-32.

20 George Ross, "Adieu veilles idées: the middle strata and the decline of the Resistance-Liberation Left discourse," Contemporary France, Jolyon Howorth and George Ross editors, Frances Pinter Publishers, London, 1987, p 57.

21 Charles Bright, "The Road to War with the Soviet Union: Strategic Consensus for the 1990s," Socialist Review, No 85, January-February 1986, p. 9.

22 Charles Bright, ibid, pp. 12-14.

23 Michel Martin, From Warriors to Managers: The French Military Establishment Since 1945, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1981, pp. 34-52.

24 Charles Bright, ibid, p 12.

25 Ministère de la Défense, The French White Book, 1972, SIRPA, Paris, 1972. Relevant excerpts can be found in La Politique de Défense de la France: Textes et Documents, Dominique David editor, Fondation Pour les Etudes de Défense Nationale, Paris, 1989, pp 45 -50.

26 François Furet, "La France unie..," La République du Centre, François Furet, Jacques Julliard & Pierre Rosanvallon, Editions Pluriel, Calmann-Levy, Paris, 1988, pp. 36-42 & and in particular page 54, where Furet remarks " France has closed its exceptional political theatre and has entered the common order of the democracies..."

27 Arguments about the "normalization" of French politics became a cliché for the journalistic celebration of contemporary France at the end of the eighties. For a typical example see Tad Szulc's "A Sense of Renaissance," in France Magazine, No 13, Spring 1989, pp 23-31.

28 Michel Martin, ibid, pp. 158-159.

29 Alistair Horne, The French Army and Politics, Peter Bodrick Books, New York, 1984, pp. 82-83.

30 I discuss this connection in the first section of my "Mitterrand, the Socialists, and French Nuclear Policy," in the collection edited by Phillippe LePrestre, French Security Policy in a Dismaying World, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder Colorado, November 1988, chap 3, pp. 51-52.

31 Michael G. Burton & John Higley, "Elite Settlements," American Sociological Review, Vol 52, June 1987, p 295.

32 Henry Ehrman and Martin Schain, Politics In France, Harper Collins Publishers, New York, 1992, pp 19-21 & 237.

33 J.E.S. Hayward, Governing France: The One and Indivisible Republic, W.W. Norton & Co. New York, 1983, pp. 12-13. Also see Ehrmann and Schain, op cit. pp 75-78.

34 Jacques Julliard, "La Course au Centre," La République du Centre, Furet, Julliard, Rosanvallon, op cit., p.80.

35 De Gaulle and The French Army: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations, Edgar S. Furniss, Jr, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1984, pp. 27-29.

36 François Furet, op cit., p 21.

37 Mark Kesselman, "France: The Rise and Fall of the Post-War Settlement" in European Politics in Transition, Mark Kesselman, Joel Krieger et al, D.C. Heath And Company, Lexington, 1992, pp. 150.

38 Kesselman & Krieger, op cit, pp 153-54 & 163.

39 Albert du Roy and Robert Schneider, Le Roman de la Rose, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1982, pp.154-88. See also, Kesselman, op cit, pp. 174-78.

40 Kesselman, op cit. pp. 218 & 220.

41 Pierre Hassner's "Un chef d'oeuvre en péril: le consensus français sur la défense," which appeared in La France en Politique, a special issue of Esprit, No. 3-4, Spring 1988, p. 74 makes the case for French immunity to pacifism one often hears in France.

42 For Germany see Diana Johnstone, The Politics of Euromissiles, Schocken Books, New York, 1985, pp.68-78. She also has an interesting chapter on France during the early Mitterrand years. See also Dorothy Nelkin and Micheal Pollak for an interesting comparison of German and French anti-nuclear movements, The Atom Besieged, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 57-104.

43 James Jaspers, Nuclear Politics: Energy and the State in the United States, Sweden and France, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1990, pp. 238-41.

44 Paris Interview by J. Mason, August 1986.

45 Paris Interview, J. Mason, April 1985.

46 Joylon Howorth, France: The Politics of Peace, Merlin Press/END, London, 1984, p 16.

47 Interview with General Gallois by J.Mason, June 17,1985.

48 See Chapter 21 of Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1981 pp. 313-24, for a succinct summary of this doctrine.

49 This is based on my interview with a former senior official of the F.E.D.N. in the Spring of 1985 which is described in detail in Chapter 2.

50 Pascal Krop, Les Socialistes et l'Armée, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1983, see pp.104-112.

51 Krop, op cit, and Michael Harrison, "The Left in Search of a Defense Policy," in Andrew Harrison and Stanley Hoffman, The Impact of the Fifth Republic on France, SUNY-Albany, 1981 pp. 261-280.

52 See Diana Pinto's "La conversion de l'intelligentsia," in L'Amérique Dans les Têtes, edited by Lacorne, Rupnik and Toinet, Hachette, Paris, 1986, pp. 124-36.

53 See Jack Hayward's "Ideological Change: The Exhaustion of the Revolutionary Impetus," in Hall, Hayward and Machin, op cit., pp. 20-27. Also see, George Ross, op cit, 67-76.

54 Pinto, op cit, pp 129-31.

55 Pierre Lellouche, "France and the Euromissiles: The Limits of Immunity," Foreign Affairs, Vol 62, No 2, Winter 1983/84, pp.320-23.

56 See Olivier Mongin and Jean Luc Pouthier, "Libéralisme/Socialisme: une confrontation manquée," La France en politique 1988, Esprit No 136-37, March-April 1988, pp 83.-86.

57 Daniel Singer, Is Socialism Doomed? The Meaning of Mitterrand, Oxford University Press, New York, 1988, pp.156-170.

58 Suzanne Berger, "Liberalism Reborn, the new liberal synthesis in France," Howorth and Ross, op cit, pp. 97-101.

59 This point is argued by Jacques Julliard in La Genie de la Liberté, Editions du Seuil, pp 83, where he remarks " One would have to say that there where the PCF has disappeared the suburbs have returned to the state of nature."

60 Cited in Dominique David, editor, La Politique de Défense de la France: Textes et Documents, FEDN, Paris 1989. p 234.

61 Kolodziej, op cit. pp. 294-98. See also Dominique David's introduction to La Politique de Défense de la France, op cit., pp.16-17.

62 See François Heisbourgh's article "Défense Française: L'Impossible Statu Quo," Politique Internationale, Summer 1987, IFRI, Paris, p 5.

63 Alfredo Valladao, op cit, pp.578-582.

II

The Scope of the Research:

Research goals

Throughout my interviewing in France I sought to identify the institutional processes in France which have promoted the emergence of an common strategic discourse among national party, bureaucratic and media elites, and most particularly among those elite groups who identify with the Socialist Left. I argue that this strategic "consensus" has operated at three levels: first, in consolidating an inter-party accord among parties of the Left and Right in support of the development and deployment of an array of nuclear weapons systems under national control; second, in legitimating effective control over the decision-making process concerning French nuclear development and security policies by military technicians and security policy specialists; and, third, in generally promoting the acceptance of pro-nuclear options in security policy by most sectors of French public opinion.

The French policy consensus appears as a multi-faceted complex of political orientations and institutional "policy styles" which serves different functions for different groups of "users." It has practical implications for policy makers even as it helps legitimate to subordinates the policy choices they have made. I aim to demonstrate that a significant degree of convergence in opinion exists among political and intellec-

tual elites concerning nuclear defense issues by focusing on those political and intellectual groups who were initially the most hostile to French nuclear weapons policy: the intellectuals and activists of the French Left, the majority of whom "rallied" in the early eighties to a nuclear policy discourse developed by the parties of the Gaullist Right which the Left opposed during most of the 1960's and 70's. My field research therefore has focused mainly on the uses of this discourse by intellectual or political "opinion leaders" who are outside the formal policy-making apparatus.

Extensive interviewing done in 1985, 1986 and 1988 with Parisian intellectuals, journalists, and policy-analysts who were either Socialist activists or sympathizers, (along with limited interviewing done with communist; right-wing; and pacifist activists), suggests significant overlapping in security policy positions which cut across the traditional Left/Right divide in French political and ideological cultures. The "consensus" pro nuclear orientation provides a unifying focus which helps to override policy divisions between competing clans of Atlanticists, European Federalists, Gaullist Nationalists and pro-Soviet, "Detente" forces present within the Right and Left wing parliamentary parties. At the same time, my interviewing also shows evidence of a nuclear/anti-nuclear cleavage between members of traditional political parties and the marginal "Green" pacifist and ecological movement which parallels, but weakly, political divisions elsewhere in Western Europe during the 1980's.

The goals of my interviewing were to understand the key concepts of the French "strategic discourse;" to identify the institutional channels by which it has been diffused within French political and intellectual elites, and to chart the contours of the elite debate over the course of the past fifteen years, the period of the Socialist Party's rise as a party of government. I understand my research to be in large part an effort to gain an ethnological understanding of a foreign culture: in this case the "strategic culture" which, is shared by different elite groups in central institutions ranging from the French military to the mass media. My objective is not only to understand this culture and the "discourses" which express it, but to translate this "world-view" into terms open to "outsiders," In my view a major test of the validity of my research will simply be "communicative:"

Defense Intellectuals and the Problem of Censorship:

Institutional constraints as well as intellectual interest recommended to me a research strategy which focused on those groups which were involved in efforts to influence both the "opinion leaders" and the "informed public" who are both the producers and consumers of policy and ideological debate, rather than on the decision makers actually involved in day to day policy choices. This focus on public intellectuals rather than on policy makers; on policy rhetoric - "la politique verbale" - rather than on policy "outputs," might seem questionable to some. One of my informants, a Socialist "policy insider," chided me during his interview remarking at

its conclusion: "Remember in Paris there is very little overlap between those who know, but don't speak, and those who don't know, who do¹..." He had a point - what do the members of "chattering classes" really know?

In Paris, as Edward Kolodziej notes in his Making and Marketing Arms: The French Experience and its International Implications², within the closed bureaucratic "corps" such as La Délégation Générale pour l'Armement (DGA), or la Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique (CEA) is extremely hard to come by. These two institutional corps are the most directly involved in shaping French weapons development and procurement policy and the elaboration of operational doctrines governing their deployment and use. Penetrating the bureaucratic secrecy of these closed defense "communities" is not impossible - as Kolodziej's own work on the French weapons complex and arms exports amply demonstrates³ - but it certainly is very difficult. Not only is this decision-making process closed to foreign researchers, but also few, if any, French nationals, whether civilian defense analysts or parliamentary deputies and staffers, have even minimal security clearances allowing them access to the lowest level of defense secrets - as my informants among the socialist "staffers" and civilian defense analysts were quick to point out⁴.

Indeed, my interviews in Paris point to this veil of secrecy over the operations and budgets of the French military industrial complex as one of the greatest sources of elite dissatisfaction with the current defense consensus. Out of

sixty-four respondents to my questionnaire only about ten expressed satisfaction with the current debate over strategic issues in France and with the availability of information about Governmental policy decisions while forty-five expressed varying degrees of dissatisfaction and concern. Most of those who agreed with the current restricted information policy were either military officers or policy "insiders" associated with the current Socialist government.

These Socialist "insiders" argued for the status quo basically on the grounds that, unlike the US or West Germany, there was little public demand for information dealing with defense policy. In this view, the limited supply of official information reflected the disinterest of the average Frenchmen in the details of nuclear planning, and, (in what sounded like a leap of faith), their basic confidence in the wisdom of President Mitterrand and his national leadership. As one former defense ministry official told me: "I like the policy. However, the level of knowledge in the French media is lower than in Britain, Germany or the States, but this is because defense is not a major issue. Whatever the effort to provoke debate, people are not excited about it as long as the policy seems to work⁵..." In this view public indifference to matters of nuclear policy was understood as synonymous with public consent to them.

Some of the military officers I spoke with, on the other hand, actively endorsed the principle of restricting publicity about nuclear planning on the pragmatic grounds that "the less

said the better." One retired Army General expressed this view about the limits on public debate when he remarked that as far as he was concerned the "nuclear debate in France was already too obvious, too visible." For him: "The nature of nuclear weapons is such that planning for their use demands a certain degree of discretion. With too much information one runs the risk of panicking people⁶...."

Beyond a professional distrust of civilian squeamishness and a marked, military esprit de corps, governmental restrictions on public information follow quite logically from the French doctrine of nuclear deterrence itself. Unlike the American strategists of MAD, for the French, strategic secrecy is an integral part of deterrence whose effectiveness in moments of international crisis demands both uncertainty about French intentions in the mind of the potential adversary, and total national unity around the presidential leader who will carry out the game of nuclear bluff and intimidation. In this view the secrets of the French security state should be reserved for a professional elite carefully prepared to wield, and protect, the instruments of nuclear intimidation - invariably called in awestruck tones as "le feu nucléaire." The assumption being apparently that the nuclear warrior's vocation is a burden too great for ordinary men and women to bear.

While some of the civilian strategists I talked with shared this distrust of the average citizen, many of the - intellectuals, journalists and activists I interviewed

disagreed sharply and were concerned about the "deficit" in French democracy implied by the restrictions on official information concerning both nuclear planning and conventional arms sales. Many of these intellectuals were sufficiently aware of the nuclear controversies raging outside France that even the pro nuclear majority felt some embarrassment about the relative poverty of the French domestic debate. The democratic credo of the intellectuals of the left, pro and anti-nuclear alike, led them to regret the fact that the Socialists had gone back on their campaign promises to open a national debate on the nuclear question and put the future of the French strike force up to a national referendum.

Many of the Socialist intellectuals I interviewed shared a common resentment over the idea that "their" Socialist government, like Gaullist governments before them, seemed to doubt the capacity of the ordinary citizens to "deal" like grown ups with the question of nuclear warfare. Like good "pedagogues," they would have preferred that their fellow citizens have had the opportunity to fully study and discuss the lesson taught by France's nuclear strategists. And like the ex-communists so many of them had once been, most expected that their fellow citizens would inevitably agree - as any reasonable person "must" - with the pro-nuclear conclusions that the Parisian intellectual elite had already drawn from its own internal debates. Seemingly for some of my informants at least, dissent from official policy could only mean that one had misunderstood the authoritative texts.

The national security state in France - with its elite caste of military officers and engineers, and narrow presidential circle of policy advisers and decision makers - remains very much a "closed community." In comparison with their American counterparts, outside "watchdog" institutions, whether they are parliamentary sub-committees or members of the working press, either have only limited powers to probe official policy choices or are weakly equipped to investigate and expose policy errors and administrative scandals. Indeed, several of my informants who were familiar with the United States or Germany insisted on the importance of the relative lack in France of the public interest lobbies, defense related NGO's, "peace research institutes," and press traditions of investigative reporting that in other countries had contributed to the emergence of a pool of "counter-expertise" with a popular base and real social impact.

The French military establishment, appropriately nicknamed "La Grande Muette," (the "great mute"), has learned to guard its silence well. Active duty personnel are under a professional obligation, "l'obligation de reserve," not to comment on Governmental policy or defense issues without the express permission of their superiors. The military usually limits itself to speaking to the outside world through the PR specialists of the SIRPA, (The Service for Information and Public Relations of the Armies), and the handful of "defense correspondents" writing for the Parisian dailies with whom the SIRPA has a privileged relationship "of mutual confidence."

As a result my field experience in Paris suggested to me that it is the uses of "strategic discourse" as policy rhetoric by political, intellectual and media "opinion-makers" which remain the most accessible area open to outside research.

The Strategic "Community:" Institutes and Opinion Leaders.

Against this background of official censorship and "constrained communication," my interviewing found evidence of the broad influence of a small strategic "community" - a group of forty or so "opinion leaders" in foreign affairs. Their opinions served as "authoritative" reference points for members of different groups of "opinion makers" in government, the print media, and among Parisian intellectuals, who in turn serve as reference points for local "opinion leaders" throughout the rest of France. In the "guesstimate" of one young Socialist defense intellectual, the "opinion makers" in the defense area was no larger than forty or fifty, and their media and political audience no larger than several hundred⁷. Other informants placed the number of "issue specialists" in the elite audience concerned with national security questions at closer to one thousand⁸.

Of no less interest, my interviewing also turned up evidence of the broad (and largely anonymous) influence of the activities of what we might call institutions of "elite socialization," such as the IHEDN, (the Institute of Higher Studies for National Defense), and the FEDN, (The Foundation for National Defense Studies). Military "outreach" programs sponsored by these institutions promoted acceptance of Gaul-

list strategic doctrines by a cross-section of civilian elite groups, ranging from left-wing journalists and trade-union leaders to party chiefs. Seminars on strategy organized by these foundations provided a meeting ground for Left intellectuals and politicians and reform minded military officers in the seventies. This unique opening by the military provided a rare opportunity for civilian leaders, (especially leftist political figures), to debate with their military counterparts - thereby creating a bridge between civilian and military milieux which had largely been closed to each other by bitter divisions dating back to the wartime resistance and the Algerian War⁹.

I spoke at length with General George Buis in 1985 who was the instigator of these organized encounters. He was well placed to comment, having been the Director of the IHEDN from 1968 to 1972 and President of the FEDN from 1972 to 1977, and the founder along with Lucien Poirier of the strategic review "Les Sept épées." Buis told me that he initiated these public programs in order to create an opening of the professional military milieu to civilian leaders and opinion makers. As one might expect from the reputation of the military as "La Grande Muette," this innovation met with stubborn resistance from his tradition minded superiors:

"When I directed the Institute, Lucien Poirier had just written the three texts which gave the fundamentals of French strategic doctrine for the three armed services. Now I received the order from the high command not to

talk about it at the Institute (IHEDN), but I brought Lucien Poirier over to my side and replied to one highly placed individual that: 'I must refuse with regret, but you should know that I intend to focus primarily on the nuclear question because it concerns the future defense of France.'..Now right next door we also had the Foundation (FEDN) which had a military audience but which was also something like 75% civilian. There we talked deeply and extensively about the links between the nuclear question and the defense of Europe¹⁰."

Buis described the impact of the two Defense Foundations on Left-wing party leaders in these terms:

"We had the occasion to invite there from time to time the various intellectuals from the parties from the Right and the left, not simply to be part of the audience but to talk and argue. It gave us an opportunity to say to those who were for and those who were against (the French nuclear program), 'You have a forum, come explain yourselves...' Jacques Huntzinger (the international secretary of the PS) was one of the first we convinced right along with Charles Hernu and two or three others... So little by little, a ironclad consensus formed around these questions from left to right which was absolutely undebatable. Even though we only had two or three persons in each party who really knew what they were

talking about, they were in a position to shape the opinion of their party organization¹¹."

What may have begun as an informal initiative by a few highly placed individuals within the military became in time a regular institution organizing the communication between military and civil elites. Over the past fifteen years the IHEDN, for instance, has organized hundreds of national and regional "stages de defense nationale" or defense workshops, where military officers and defense officials could meet and debate with influential members of civilian organizations. According to then current director of the IHEDN with whom I spoke in the summer of 1985, the Institute organizes a year long seminar which forms mixed working groups of civilians and military (approximately three/fourths civilian, one fourth career military officers and engineers) which meet several times a week to discuss and analyze together a particular strategic issue area. These seminars encourage the formation of a common language and perspective in addition to creating a network of personal contacts between members of different and frequently competing elite institutions. The same formula is followed on less ambitious and intense scale on the regional level with a series of local seminars which meet periodically over the course of the year in the major provincial cities¹². According to one of my informants who had "graduated" from the "national seminar" the IHEDN network includes several thousand people from diverse elite backgrounds¹³.

The Institute and other "outreach programs" represent a highly organized, governmental effort to shape the public debate by an ongoing process of "elite socialization." I believe that these programs represent a conscious attempt to "manage" elite opinion by encouraging the formation of informal networks of Institute "alumni" who share a common language on security issues, and who regularly communicate with one another about them, even if they don't always share common positions. In the view of one highly placed Socialist activist who had just made the transition from Defense Ministry to an top executive position in a leading French defense contractor, informal elite communications in Paris are quite centralized. He described the elite network which grew up around the IHEDN seminars in these terms:

"There's a network here of people who know each other who been through the Institute together. Because of them, the Russians didn't have a chance to turn public opinion (against nuclear weapons). This is a highly centralized country where it's easy to get people in touch with one another. When (the French Catholic) Bishops wrote their letter (the 1982 pastoral letter supporting nuclear deterrence), we had no problem because it was so easy to communicate. They (the Bishops) didn't need much convincing because there are no serious barriers between the people who make policy, those who live with it and those who comment on it¹⁴...."

Viewed then by influential "insiders" the processes for opinion formation within the French "political class" concerning security matters appears to be quite centralized. Further my interviewing suggested that the members of "mainstream" organizations and parties seem to follow to a surprising degree the leadership of a small community of strategic thinkers which serves as an authoritative reference group for journalists, activists and policy-makers belonging to several distinct elite groups of the center-left and center-right. At the same time, one can argue that this apparently "unified strategic community" is actually divided into distinct professional and political "clans" or "networks" which reflects the divisions between the different political parties and ideological currents. In addition, there seems to exist a real social distance between the civilian "defense policy specialists" working for the handful of "political research institutes" - a relatively new institution in France - and the traditional academicians and "public" intellectuals who write both for professional audiences and the broader and more diffuse group we can call the "informed public."

At the core of this system we find the "policy" intellectuals and researchers who work for a handful of foreign and security policy institutes, some official, some "independent," but all partially under contract either to the Ministry of Defense or the Quai D'Orsay. Each of these Institutes has their own "in house" publications with elite "publics" of university researchers, public officials or defense and


foreign policy correspondents who represent "specialized audiences" of influentials who in turn act as "opinion leaders" for broader "informed publics." To some degree these Institutes each have their own particular professional and partisan audiences, and can be distributed across the spectrum of ideological opinions contained within the official consensus as discussed below.

The official "policy centers" include the IHEDN and FEDN which are heavily influenced by the professional military and which have provided a home for some of the better known Gaullist strategists. The FEDN publishes two official defense reviews, The Review of National Defense and the theoretical journal, Stratégiques. The other important official "policy shop" is the CAP, The Center for Analysis and Forecasts, of the French Foreign Ministry. In addition we can point to two civilian "think tanks," the IFP, the French Institute for the Study of Conflict, and INSED, The National Institute for Higher Studies of Defense and Disarmament, both of which enjoy official sponsorship and are closely associated with the ruling Socialist Party. Finally there is one private foundation, IFRI, The French Institute for International Relations, which is reputed to be well funded by French defense firms, various American foundations as well as the French Government itself. IFRI, despite its private character and close association with the leadership of the parliamentary Right, has an influence, in the opinion of many of my informants, which is as great as that of all the official "policy

centers" combined. IFRI publishes the influential review, Politique Etrangère, and the yearly report, Ramses. There is also another right-wing foundation, IIGP, The International Institute for Geo-politics, where General Gallois currently resides, which shares and promotes the conservative outlook of the nationalist wing of the Parliamentary right. The distribution of these Institutes across the political spectrum is represented in Figure 2-1.

In Figure 2-1 right wing Institutes newspapers and journals are represented by squares and left-wing formations by circles. The strategic "dissidents" are separated from the official and private "think-tanks" and opinion leaders associated with the official party consensus by two possible lines of division. The first and the most important separates pro and anti nuclear forces located in Figure 2-1 along the vertical axis.

For the most part Figure 2-1 locates policy centers and ideological publics which belong to the broad pronuclear consensus. These policy centers can be located along a political spectrum which ranges from the left of the Socialist Party to the Independent Reform Gaullists and the official parliamentary right-wing parties, the UDF and the RPR. The second line of cleavage separates pro-American from anti Soviet forces with pro-European, Nationalist and Non-Aligned positions scattered along a continuum between these two



French Elite Opinion-Makers
and Policy Centers

GUIDE TO FIGURE 2-1.

Dissident Forces, Reviews and Policy Centers

Communists:

PCF, L'Humanité, Communist Party Newspaper.

C.G.T., *General Confederation of Labor*, Communist dominated trade union, strong presence in the French Nuclear power industry, l'EDF, L'Electricité de France, the national power utility.

Anti-Nuclear activists and Communist Dissidents:

Rencontres Communistes, (Communist Encounters)

Pierre Juquin, Political Leader.

Mouvement de la Paix, Former Party Peace Organization.

C.I.R.P.E.S., Le Centre Interdisciplinaire pour la Recherche de la Paix et la Stratégie, *Interdisciplinary Center for Research in Peace and Strategy*. A policy center subsidized by the Socialist government but strongly aligned with non-communist peace organizations.

C.O.D.E.N.E., Le Comité pour le Désarmement Nucléaire en Europe, French Branch of European Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

Les Temps Modernes, the intellectual review founded by Jean_Paul Sartre.

Politique Aujourd'hui, Euro-Left review founded by ex-communists and left socialists in the eighties to promote a left-wing alternative to the Mitterrand coalition.

Le Monde Diplomatique, edited by Claude Julien, principal forum for left wing dissidents. Critical of Anglo-American conservative ideas, "le Monde Diplo" is an channel for the diffusion of American peace research and "strategic counter expertise."

Alternatives Non Violentes, the principal political journal of the anti-nuclear peace movement and an important channel for the publication in France of the views of English and German anti-nuclear spokespersons.

Consensus Forces, Opinion makers and Policy Centers:

Independent Gaullists:

F.E.D.N., La Fondation pour les Etudes de la Défense Nationale, *The National Foundation for Defense Studies*, meeting point for Gaullist Strategists and Socialists with nationalist pro-nuclear views.

La Revue De Defense Nationale, Official Defense Review.

Stratégiques, theoretical review edited by L. Poirier.

I.H.E.D.N., l'Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale, *The National Institute for Higher Defense Studies*, important center for elite socialization on defense issues.

Parliamentary Right Opposition:

ENA, l'Ecole Nationale d'Administration, the principal Grand Ecole for training high civil servants, l'ENA graduates are found in the leadership of Left and Right wing parties.

"Science Po," L'Institut d'Etudes Politiques, principal preparatory school for l'ENA and the other "Grands Ecoles."

IFRI, l'Institut Français de Relations Internationales, *The French Institute of Foreign Relations*, moderate right-wing defense policy center, Atlanticist but pro-European, with strong ties to American foundations and policy centers.

Politique Etrangère, flagship policy review of IFRI, one of the principal reviews on foreign and strategic policy.

IIGP, l'Institut International de Geo-politique, *The International Institute for Geo-politics*, right-wing nationalist defense policy center reputed to be funded by conservative donors in Europe and North America.

Commentaire, principal conservative intellectual review.

Le Figaro, principal conservative daily, its sunday magazine section, known colloquially as the "Fig Mag", plays a leading role in launching conservative ideas and trends.

L'Express, principal "liberal" newsweekly, increasingly taken in a "Anglo-american conservative" direction by its English publisher, James Goldschmidt in the eighties.

Le Point, conservative newsweekly, favored by military and conservative civil servants.

Ruling Socialist Coalition:

IFP, l'Institut Français de Poléménologie, The French Center for the Study of Conflict, a strategic "think tank" located within the FEDN with close ties to the Socialist Party. Its director, Colonel Paucot, was an important liaison between the Socialist Party and Army officers in the 1970's.

INSED, l'Institut National Supérieur d'Etudes de Défense et de Désarmement, a strategic "think tank" with strong socialist affiliations, publishes L'Année Stratégique. Served as "parking place" for socialist defense consultants during the "era of cohabitation" between 1986 and 1988.

Libération, Leftist daily close to Rocardians.

Le Monde, Independent daily close to Socialists.

Le Nouvel Observateur, principal left newsweekly strongly identified with Rocardian intellectuals and opinion makers.

Le Matin, Paris daily identified with the Socialists.

Le Forum pour l'Indépendance et la Paix, Political Forum for Independence and Peace, militantly pro European, Socialist bridge to non-communist peace movement.

Rocardians, and the Anti-Totalitarian Left:

E.H.E.S.S., L'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, School for Higher Studies in the Social Sciences, intellectual "home" for many intellectuals associated with the "Second left" and Parisian reviews.

Fondation Saint Simon, Public Policy Center associated with the Rocardians, principal link between Rocardian intellectuals and business and political elites.

Esprit, Principal review of Catholic Second Left.

Le Débat, Intellectual Review associated with the Rocardians.

Globe, Popular review directed by Bernard Henri Levy.

CERES, Center for Socialist Studies and Research, Left PS Current lead by Jean-Pierre Chevènement.

L'Enjeu, CERES political journal.

poles. This cleavage is represented by the horizontal axis of Figure 2.1. This represents a cross-cutting issue which not only divides the traditional left and right but also various Socialist currents and different families of Gaullists.

On the Anti-American nationalist pole of the horizontal axis we find not only the extreme right and the pro-Soviet PCF but also the Nationalist wing of the Socialists, the CERES, and many of the independent Gaullists and most of the non aligned peace groups such as CODENE and the PSU. While these groups were divided in their political appreciation of the Soviet Union between Communist loyalists and non-communists critics, they were united in their suspicion of American power and motives and their common conviction that the true meaning of De Gaulle's diplomacy lay in France pursuing an "third path" independent of either Superpower - a path they accused both the Socialists and Neo-Gaullists of having abandoned.

On the other side of this line in the upper left hand corner we find both Socialist intellectuals and right-wing conservatives whose fear of the Soviet Union has led them to accept the need for the NATO Alliance in the short run even as they seek to construct a European Community Defense entity capable of replacing the American Alliance in the long-run future. Many of the Socialists intellectuals who belong to this strongly anti-Soviet and pro-nuclear pole of elite opinion are grouped around l'EHESS, The Faculty for Higher Studies in the Social Sciences, and have an "agenda setting

role for the electronic media thanks to their ties to daily newspapers such as Le Monde and Libération, newsweeklies like Le Nouvel Observateur, and intellectual reviews such as Esprit and Le Débat. The Conservatives' intellectuals have found a voice through Commentaire, a French monthly with strong ties to the American neo-conservatives. Otherwise they were represented by columnists writing for the Conservative newsweeklies, L'Express and le Point, and the Paris Daily, Le Figaro, which serves as an conservative trend setter with the influential "think pieces" it publishes in its Sunday Magazine supplement, familiarly known as the "Fig-Mag."

In the lower right hand corner of figure 2-1 we find the small minority of anti-nuclear dissidents made up of communist and non-communist peace groups. The principal and only "think-tank" which is associated with these dissidents is CIRPES, the Center for Interdisciplinary Research on Strategic Studies and Peace, which - due to the ties of its Director Alain Joxe to the leadership circles of the Socialist Party - has been kept alive on a shoe-string budget and small research contracts from the Ministry of Defense throughout the 1980's¹⁵. The principal reviews associated with this dissident pole of opinion are Claude Julien's Le Monde Diplomatique and the Catholic pacifist review, Alternatives Non-Violentes.

My research on the French nuclear consensus inevitably raised questions about public access to official information and the degree of public accountability which existed concerning the decisions taken by French governmental elites.

The issues raised were at once substantive in terms of what meaning democracy retains within nuclear warfare states, and methodological in terms of one's ability to actually carry out research in the climate of official and informal constraints on policy debate prevalent in France. The answer to these questions, practical as well as theoretical, turn on understanding the institutional hierarchies, organizational cultures, and "family" networks of the French elite system.

1 Paris Interview, J. Mason, May 14, 1985.

2 Kolodziej, op cit. pp. 279-285.

3 Kolodziej, "Note on Sources," op cit. pp 411-15.

4 Paris Interviews, May 1985. These anonymous interviews signaled a problem which is widely recognized in the political science literature, see, for instance, Hayward, op cit., pp 160 -70.

5 Paris Interview, J. Mason, May 14, 1985.

6 Paris Interview, J. Mason, June 27, 1985.

7 Paris Interview, J. Mason, May 15, 1985.

8 Paris Interview, J. Mason, May 31, 1985.

9 The importance of these civil/military contacts was stressed to me by one senior Socialist Party leader, Paris interview, J. Mason, April 23, 1985.

10 Paris Interview, J. Mason, June 17, 1985.

11 Paris Interview, J. Mason, May 17, 1985.

12 Paris Interview, J.Mason, July 30, 1985.

13 Paris Interview, J.Mason, April 23, 1985

14 Paris Interview, J. Mason, May 15, 1985.

15 Alain Joxe is the sibling of Pierre Joxe, the current Defense Minister, who has held positions of responsibility within the Mitterrand Government and the Socialist Party.

III

Left elites and the Research Procedure:

The French elite system, Formation and Recruitment:

The social science literature here and in France which deals with the particularities of the French system of elite recruitment and education is directly relevant to the discussion of constraints on research and public communication. Among the principal works in this social science discussion one can point to Ezra Sulieman's studies of the politics of the French bureaucracy, Politics, Power and Bureaucracy, and regarding the conservation of elite institutions and networks across major crises of wartime and post-war political regimes, his Elites in French society. Sulieman's works are frequently cited in the French discussion which they helped to initiate and focus. Equally powerful is the research which has been done by French students of elite membership and elite culture of whom Pierre Birnbaum's Les Sommets de L'Etat and La classe dirigeante française and Pierre Bourdieu's Les Héritiers and La Noblesse D'Etat, are only two of the better known in the United States, but which includes lesser known works such as Denis Lacorne's, Les Notables Rouges. This is a literature which has gained a broad popular audience in France itself over the past ten years¹.

In this literature the system of elite education in France is seen as national system of power reproduction which works across generations and constitutes a key resource supporting the social influence and prestige of the state-created and trained oligarchy. The literature points out the peculiar significance in France of state institutions of higher learning and the national civil service in shaping both the cultural outlook and social networks of French elites whether public or private. Unlike the United States or the United Kingdom, private business and financial elites have not occupied the "summits of power and prestige," rather this hegemonic role has been played in French society by an elite composed of high civil servants and professional educators. Their privileged position in the state bureaucracy allows them to connect with political notables at the local level and with private business elites at the national level, providing French society with a center of elite coordination and communication whose impact is felt across private organizations and local communities nation-wide². It is the job of the state schools to find and mold this elite, or in other words, as we are told by a former head of Ecole Normale Supérieure: "Democracy needs an elite, to represent the only superiority it recognizes - that of the mind. It is up to us to recruit this elite³."

In contrast with Anglo-American system responsibility for the formation of French elites is not carried out by expensive and socially exclusive private schools and universities, such

as the "public school" network which feeds into "Oxbridge" in Britain, or the "prep schools" which prepare students for the prestigious "Ivy League Universities" in the United States⁴. Rather in France national elites are trained in highly selective Lycées and state schools for the entrance exams of state institutions of higher learning, les Grandes Ecoles. These highly competitive "Great Schools" constitute a distinct "fast track" for elite recruitment which is virtually divorced from the rest of the state run university system⁵.

The different elite schools feed their graduates directly into distinct and competing branches of the state bureaucracy. Historically, this has meant, for instance, that l'Ecole Polytechnique, the school founded by Napoleon and more familiarly known as "X", represented a privileged point of access for the army corps of engineers and for private engineering firms. Today it continues to play this role for the DGA, the CEA and private firms in the French defense, aerospace, and atomic energy industries⁶. Similarly the Ecole Normale Supérieure, "la Rue d'Ulm," was established under the Third Republic, and feed its graduates, les agrégés, into lycées under control of the National Education Administration and into literary and publishing circles within Paris⁷. L'Ecole Normale Supérieure was the alma mater to many of the most famous intellectuals of post-war France including Jean Paul Sartre and Raymond Aron. Especially during the interwar years, the "normaliens" are reputed to have stood at the summit of prestige hierarchy and to have imparted to French political elites their marked

taste for intellectual abstraction and ideological polemics. This intellectual style, according to Pierre Bourdieu at least, constitutes a central feature of the mix of "cultural capital and social distinction" transmitted to the members of the French elite by Les Grandes Ecoles⁸.

Alongside these two better known institutions, there exist the military academies of the different armed services, such as the Army academy, Saint Cyr, established in the last decade of the Bourbon monarchy. These academies represent a "recruitment track" differentiated from the others by their tendency to recruit almost exclusively from a closed pool of candidates made up of the children of the "officer caste"⁹. Saint Cyr in particular is widely perceived as a tradition bound bastion of conservative catholicism, at once nationalist in sentiment and monarchist by sympathy, which is largely disconnected from the modern intellectual culture shared by civilian elites¹⁰. The "self selecting" character of officer candidates reinforces the marked tendencies of "La Grande Murette" to constitute a institutional corps which not only stands apart from the system of civilian elites, but which stood for much of the twentieth century in opposition to it.

This rejectionist stance still remains true today, if we are to believe recent press reports concerning the presence within the cadet corps at Saint Cyr of a fair number of National Front sympathizers¹¹. At the end of the eighties two popular works by left-wing researchers opened an window into this closed milieu. Les Généraux written by Jean Guisnel, a

journalist for Liberation, and L'Armée: Un Enquête sur 300,000 soldats méconnus, by Pascal Boniface, a Socialist defense analyst associated with l'INSED, have given a voice to rank and file soldiers and to career officers of the armed services. Many of their informants express both their dedication to their national "vocation" as well as their increasing anguish over the separation they feel from the "rest of the society." Post-War Elite Institutions:

The prestige and influence of these traditional Grandes Ecoles have been curtailed by the rise of two new institutions of elite formation, l'ENA, The National School of Administration, and l'EHESS, The School for Higher Studies in the Social Sciences, which were both created in the immediate post-war period. Of the two, l'ENA is the more of the important, and sits at the crossroads of a network of preparatory schools made up of select Parisian Lycées and the prestigious Institut d'Etudes Politiques, better known simply as "Science Po," and the recruitment process for the higher levels of the State civil service¹². Typically upon graduation from l'ENA as from the other Grandes Ecoles, new graduates are promoted into the higher grades of the state civil service where they gain managerial and political experience at a relatively young age. Working in the civil service gives them the "paper trail" and personal contacts that qualify them in turn to move on to senior positions in the government ministries or to move out to leadership positions within the political parties or private business firms¹³.

This practice is called "pantouflage," (putting on soft slippers) and allows senior civil servants to take long leaves from their home ministry in order to accept senior executive positions in private organizations. Frequently the ENA graduate is quite literally "parachuted" in from the outside over the heads of other corporate managers with greater seniority but "inferior" credentials¹⁴. Since the sixties as managers began to displace engineers at the summit of the hierarchy of prestige, l'ENA has increasingly beat out l'Ecole Polytechnique in the competition to see which would be the principal training ground for French business and industrial elites¹⁵. The importance of l'ENA for creating the post-war technocratic style, and in training several generations of "grands fonctionnaires" has been so great that it has determined in large measure the image of the state-created oligarchy as whole. It is striking that the use of the term "énarque," (the name given to l'ENA graduates), as a synonym in everyday speech for any national political leader or business executive with a civil service background, has become quite current. In a similar fashion the expression "l'énarchie" has become a descriptive term which covers the French technocracy in general.

"Les énarques" first emerged as central players in the French leadership class during the early years of the Fourth Republic and were generally perceived as being identified with the modernizing right. Over the late sixties and seventies, however, they have also climbed into the top leadership of the

Socialist party, displacing the more traditional radical notables, local high school teachers and provincial trade-union leaders who used to constitute the inner core of the Socialist leadership, the old "République des Profs"¹⁶." Initially the arrival of the Socialists in power in 1981 was marked by the movement of significant number of "normaliens" from the National Education Ministry to other branches of government and to the National Assembly¹⁷. But as Jacques Julliard points out in his La Genie de la Liberté, the Socialists long tenure in government over the eighties meant that large numbers of young "énarques" have sought fame, fortune and political careers by joining the Socialist Party, giving rise to the popular image of the "Caviar Socialist"¹⁸." The rise of "l'énarchie" has been symptomatic of the emergence of a shared managerial outlook and elite culture which now encompasses the moderate modernizing right and left, and cuts across public bureaucracies and private business firms.

A shift of equivalent importance occurred in French intellectual life with the rise of the l'EHESS which replaced l'Ecole Normale "Sup" as the main trend setter for French higher education and more importantly, for the Paris publishing houses. An outgrowth of the prewar "Sixième Section," which housed the famous French school of social historians, l'Ecole Annales, l'EHESS is home to many of the leading figures in the post-war Social Sciences, such as Pierre Bourdieu, Ferdinand Braudel, Claude Levi-Strauss and Alain Touraine¹⁹. L'EHESS sits at the nexus between two other

institutions which are central to training the faculty of the French University system, le Collège de France and "Sciences Po," which also acts as the "antechamber" of l'ENA²⁰. Equally important, l'EHESS is the home institution to many of the Rocardian intellectuals who play a highly visible "intermediary role" between academy and the worlds of the Parisian reviews and the national mass media. While most of these intellectuals belong to what Hervé Hermon and Patrick Hermon have called in their 1981 study, Les Intellocrats, "the two greatest families" in France - the ex-Communists and the ex-Catholics²¹- they have distanced themselves from the older intellectual model established by les Normaliens of the "intellectual generalist" in favor of a more narrow professional focus on a particular area of scientific expertise²². Even so, the faculty of l'EHESS contains a disproportionate number of the "public intellectuals" who are frequently published in the leading intellectual reviews such as Le Débat, Esprit, or Commentaire²³.

The "Elite Controversy" of the 1980's:

During the eighties the power and the performance of these state-created elites became subject to controversy in France. As part of the more general attack on both the Socialist government and state centered industrial strategies, several highly polemical works were written by neo-liberal authors in the middle eighties that made the énarques their main target. Following the path opened by François de Closet's polemic against state sponsored corporatism, Toujours Plus, right-wing

authors such as Sophie Coignard, Jean François Lacan and Alexandre Wickham published frontal attacks against the privileges and powers of the state elite. In popular works such as La République bannanière, (The Banana Republic) and La Nomenklatura Française, these authors took the pro-market conservative argument against the "new class" which formerly had been reserved for Soviet style "state socialism" and redirected it against domestic elites and industrial policy in France. This attack was facilitated by the fact that the current occupants of the "summits of the state" were Socialist appointees or sympathizers, "l'élite rose." It also represented a peculiar French "spin" on the conservative "zeitgeist" created by the general ideological attack against the "New Deal" welfare state and post-war social democracy which set the tone for government social policy in the United States and the United Kingdom during the Reagan/Thatcher years²⁴. In France this attack gave rise to a "popular" image in the conservative press of l'énarchie as a French equivalent of the Soviet party nomenklatura implying that the members of the Socialist elite were as arrogant, corrupt and inefficient as their Soviet counterparts.

The impact of this "neo-liberal" attack may be reflected in a decline of the occupational standing of State civil servants in recent public opinion polls, and signs of demoralization within the ranks of the civil service itself²⁵. Lastly but perhaps more seriously, we can point to recent evidence that French MBA's graduating from private business schools or-

ganized along American lines have now become competitive with the graduates of Les Grandes Ecoles in terms of placement within the corporate management of French business firms²⁶. Certainly, the combination of public dissatisfaction with the slow growth/high unemployment performance of the French economy under Mitterrand and the popularity of Anglo-American market nostrums among the right-wing opposition have worked to lessen the prestige, if not the actual influence, of the state schools and of higher civil service.

In response to this climate of crisis of public confidence and drift at the top at the end of eighties, several powerful journalistic voices were raised on the democratic left against the pretensions and abuses of the Socialist governing elite which developed during "the Mitterrand decade." Jacques Julliard launched a powerful polemic in the name of "the people of the Left" against the "Caviar Socialists" in an essay "La course au Centre" published in 1988 alongside essays by François Furet and Pierre Rosanvallon in La République du Centre. He then developed his critique further in a full length book, La Genie de la Liberté in 1990. His attack was amplified by Laurent Joffrin in his book La Regression Française published in 1991. These works by "left democratic" critics of the Socialist Government simultaneously attacked the "money culture" of the Mitterrand years and the domination of French society by a Parisian "Superelite" based on personal bureaucratic connections, financial and real-estate speculation and media celebrity.

Julliard describes his vision of a national superelite in these terms in "La Course au Centre":

"As a result of its centralized structure, France has been for long time the classic example of the interpenetration of elites... 'Le Tout Paris,' a generic expression often copied but never equaled, designates a universe of celebrities where politicians, bankers, film stars, aristocrats, gangsters, businessmen, writers, musicians, journalists and University professors, meet and exchange impressions, courtesies, ideas, addresses, services, women and social positions. What do they have in common? Nothing except that they know each other, and that being 'known' is, above a certain level, a sign of social recognition, that of belonging to a milieu, or better yet a network²⁷..."

In this passage, Julliard's polemic quite consciously echoes C. Wright Mill's critique of the American "Power Elite" by presenting the French ruling class as a coherent and unitary elite which is defined by as much by celebrity and money as by organizational position and professional credentials. Indeed, Julliard speaks in tones of mandarin resentment as well as in the language of outraged democracy when he denounces the spectacle of a "new media elite" which is not based on the possession of real professional credentials or solid technical expertise²⁸.

Other popular journalistic pieces follow a different path from that taken by Julliard. Taking the path which was already explored by Harmon and Rotman in their 1981 study of the world of the Parisian intelligentsia, Les Intellocrats, much of the recent journalism concerning the French elite structure insists on the centrality of "copinage," ie membership in informal networks²⁹, as much as of "piston," that is, organizational power or "juice." In this pluralistic vision of the French elite, its main feature is not its unity but rather the competition and rivalries of contending "clans" and "networks," - in short "des bandes de copains." In part these networks are an expression of the compartmentalization of social contacts which can occur as a byproduct of the bureaucratic competition between different branches of the civil service and the University administration. This social distance is reinforced in turn by the lifelong solidarities between members of particular "classes" or "promotions" which develop during the passage of specific age cohorts through the separate institutional "tracks" of the system of elite education and recruitment³⁰. To some extent, however, these tendencies toward the fragmentation of elite loyalties are counteracted by broader generational identities which are defined by common political experience - so it is quite common when speaking of French intellectuals to identify them as the generation of the resistance, the Algerian War or the May events of 1968, etc. The common experience of the loss of political and religious identity may also work as a iden-

tification "tag" in intellectual circles - hence Harmon and Rotman's use of the term "family" to describe the experience of the loss of faith shared by "ex-Catholics" or "ex Communists" - most of whom now belong on the Democratic Left.

All in all, the current controversy over the power and make up of the French elite structure offers us three different images of the elite system: that of the state-created oligarchy, or nomenklatura, that of a cohesive "superelite" defined by money and status, and that of a pluralistic system characterized by intense group loyalties and institutional competition. Perhaps, all three of these popular images tell us something about the system they partially describe. Certainly the neo-liberals are correct to insist that the French elite system is defined by its peculiar "state-centered" culture and institutional setting. Certainly viewed from below by "outsiders", today's elite "champions" only become visible at the moment where they surface in the national media - enjoying the spotlight whenever their network friends and sponsors finally succeed in "putting them over" on the national stage. But experienced from the inside, it seems equally valid, and perhaps a little more "authentic," to describe the elite system in terms of competing networks and clan rivalries as I will do in the discussion of the contours of my research "universe" which follows.

To the degree that my interviewing "worked" the system of informal "networks" within the French "strategic community," my research belongs as much to the tradition of "community

studies" as it does to the literature of "national case studies." The "community" of "strategic insiders," which I describe here and the "networks" of "opinion leaders" on the left and Right who follow their authoritative pronouncements (and communicate them to larger publics) represent more than actors in a "two-step" model of political communication. They also belong to real professional and intellectual communities with specific Parisian identities and competing institutional bases.

The Sample and its limits:

The principal group of interview subjects for my 1985 field work were selected from members of Parisian sections of the Socialist Party, and policy and intellectual circles closely associated with it. During the Spring and Summer of 1985 I interviewed some forty persons who were party members or sympathizers as the major part of an elite survey which involved a total of some eighty persons. These party members represented an interesting group of informants because many were linked with the national leadership of the Socialist Party, and others among them with journalistic milieux which have an important influence over the issue agenda discussed in the national media. My other forty interview subjects were either drawn from the official milieu of French security policy analysts, right-wing and communist party organizations and from the small circle of anti-nuclear activists and intellectuals.

The individuals I interviewed intensively over a period of five months in 1985 can not be considered a "representative sample" of French elite opinion. Rather they can be seen as a group of "expert informants" who know their organizational worlds better than any foreign investigator could ever hope to know them. They represent a selection of individuals with elite backgrounds to whom I was directed by other informants: either representatives of the French organizations which interested me; other interview subjects who made suggestions about whom I might see in addition to themselves, and finally friends and acquaintances whom I have come to know previous stays in Paris in 1980 and 81 when I was doing interviewing for Pacifica Radio and TELOS magazine. Gradually by picking up hints, and by following leads, I worked my way through and around a series of different informal networks. In this sense the shape as well as the content of my research depended on the active co-operation of my informants in helping me select other interview subjects. The practical process of identifying and selecting interview subjects brought an unanticipated payoff in the form of added information allowing me to trace the outlines of networks of influence (what the French call "copinage" or "piston"), which link different groups of policy analysts and opinion makers together through informal channels of communication and opinion formation.

Follow up interviews done in 1986, 1988 and 1990 suggested that these "networks" are maintaining their cohesiveness even as the French policy "consensus" undergoes a major "evolution"

during the Mitterrand Presidency away from a nationalist preoccupation with conserving France's status as a "great power" toward cooperation with European partners in building a "European Defense Community." The "cohesiveness" of these networks should not be surprising in view of the experience of other elite surveys of "party governments," and indeed was one of the reasons I choose to concentrate my field research on the Socialist Party and its intellectual environment³¹.

The Socialist party also recommended itself because my own status as a working member of the international affairs committee of the late Michael Harrington's Democratic Socialists of America gave me an privileged organizational "entree." This connection served me well. The Party's International Sector recommended an initial set of subjects from the Party's apparatus for me to interview, and later facilitated contacts with the Party's defense and foreign affairs specialists, as well as with members of local party "sections" in Paris neighborhoods.

The "Mitterrandist" bias of these Party recommendations was compensated by my own independent connections with competing party "currents," especially with the CERES which claims to represent the Party's "nationalist-left," and which also attracts the largest number of former Communist Party members and activists from the "Extreme Left." Similarly my contacts with members of the editorial group at the Catholic cultural review Esprit, and with journalists working at the newsweekly Le Nouvel Observateur were invaluable for giving

me access to intellectual and media networks which represented an alternative list to my "party" contacts. The Esprit network, "la mouvance Esprit," had the added virtue of being largely drawn from yet another party "tendency," that of Michel Rocard, made up intellectuals close to the CFTD, the formerly Catholic trade union, and old activists from the PSU, the party of the auto-gestionnaire "Second Left," - the French "New Left" which emerged in the late sixties. I rounded out the interviewing process with a limited number of contacts with the two major right-wing parties, the RPR and UDF, and from the Communist Party. I also contacted the two best known peace organizations, CODENE and le Mouvement de la Paix, (the latter Communist, the former PSU) in order to see if they would not also co-operate in my cycle of interviews, which they did willingly.

Following these various "pathways," I conducted over eighty interviews, and administered a scheduled questionnaire to sixty four of the above (some of whom were interviewed twice, once with the questionnaire, and once without). Of the total "set," thirty five were conducted with members of sympathizers of the Socialist Party; another fifteen were conducted with members of the radical, non-communist left, and ten were conducted with communist or recently expelled ex-communist activists (all of the latter are close to the dissident Communist breakaway organization, Rencontres Communistes). This gives the overall set of interviews a pronounced orientation toward individuals who supported the "Union of the

left," the coalition of left-wing parties which supported Mitterrand's first presidential bid in 1981. By contrast, voices representing the right-wing parties are relatively few - I only spoke with ten individuals who identified themselves with either the UDF or the RPR, and one supporter of the National Front who came out of the political "closet" during our interview. Certain of my other informants who choose not to identify themselves in party terms seemed to me to have definite sympathies with the "independent" Right opposition to Mitterrand.

In terms of occupational and professional background, I conducted interviews with fifteen journalists, twelve informants with academic backgrounds and ties to one of the intellectual reviews, twenty party officials, sixteen defense and foreign party analysts, eight retired army colonels and generals, and fourteen activists with diverse occupational backgrounds but full-time political commitments. A very high proportion of these informants had university and advanced degrees, and a majority of them read foreign publications and had travelled extensively abroad. Despite this definitely "cosmopolitan" cast to the interview population, virtually all of the interviews were conducted in French, and the responses written down by me. At the same time, almost all these interviews were tape-recorded.

All interview subjects were administered a confidential questionnaire sight unseen. The questionnaire was memorized by me in advance and presented in the form of an oral inter-

view even though I was using scheduled questions. I used this technique so as to solicit spontaneous responses from my informants because experience showed me that civil servants would have given me prepared answers if they were given the opportunity. This oral presentation allowed me to modify the question schedule so as to pursue topics of interest in depth if time permitted, and to skip questions if time constraints did not. I also allowed my informants to modify my questions, or to replace them with their own questions if they so choose. Most of these interviews lasted from an hour and a half to two hours or so.

The scheduled questionnaire was broken down into three sections. The first section dealt with the personal background of the subject; the second used a reputational method to ask questions concerning the people whom the subject considered to be "authoritative" voices for the discussion of defense issues, and the last section surveyed the informant's personal outlook and opinions on a variety of defense and security issues. Some of the questions were "open," and others were designed so that they could be easily tabulated and analyzed. These last questions were frequently framed in such a way that their wording matched that used in the public opinion surveys conducted by the SOFRES polling organization for the Ministry of Defense; surveys to which I had exceptional access (the results are considered to be confidential information). At the end of each interview I asked each informant to give me his evaluation of the questionnaire and of the interview, and to

volunteer any important topic which he or she felt had not been covered adequately.

I was surprised by the quality of access which I had as a foreign researcher to elite groups which throughout most of the post-war period have had little confidence in US foreign policy or in Americans generally - as indeed several of my informants told me I should be. In view of the sensitive nature of the issues under discussion, I was also surprised by the extent of the co-operation which I received. This may be a consequence of the route by which I was introduced - ie. with the quasi-official sponsorship of major personalities within the Socialist party - or it may simply reflect the impatience of many of my interview subjects to express themselves on security matters. As I have already noted, the overwhelming majority of my respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of the public debate over security issues in France - even when they were supporters of the Government's pro-nuclear security policy. Many expressed frustration over the lack of public access to information about defense planning as well as concerns about the unfavorable contrast between the public mobilizations around defense questions in the United States and other countries in Europe and the wide-spread public indifference to these matters in their own country. In any case some of my informants volunteered that they felt they could express themselves more freely on these topics with a foreign researcher than with professional colleagues or political associates who

belonged to the same social and political networks as they did. This struck me as flattering but also somewhat unlikely. The Problem of bias and partisanship.

In 1984/85 I was one of the recipients of the French government fellowships for North American social science students, la Bourse Chateaubriand. As a condition of this fellowship, I had to be enrolled at a French university and taken in charge by an official "sponsoring" organization in my area of research. Through an introduction by friends who were part of the Esprit magazine network, I was enrolled at l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Science Sociales and ended up being accepted as a stagiaire, a research intern at the official "think-tank" of the Ministry of Defense, l'Institut Français de Polémologie, (The French Institute for the Study of Conflict). This gave me a wide range of contacts in defense policy institutes such as The Foundation for National Defense Studies (F.E.D.-N.) and the French Institute for Foreign Relations (IFRI). These contacts in turn were most helpful in suggesting other informants in and outside the government and military, especially my contacts with the defense and foreign policy experts in the ministries, handful of independent research institutes, and policy groups of the parties of the parliamentary Left and Right.

My internship at IFP in 1984/85 marked the beginning of an on-going relationship with the defense research group at the FEDN. Over the course of my research, it turned out that I was indeed fortunate to have ended up working in the offices

of the FEDN in the l'Hotel National des Invalides, "la vieille maison," which also housed the headquarters of the Paris Military region, the Army Sociological Center and the Museum of the Army. As I moved through different political and intellectual networks within the official Left and outside it, my interviews frequently turned up connections back to the researchers at the FEDN, who turned out to be a "nodal point" where members of competing and often antagonistic networks meet one another in policy seminars, or were pulled into its orbit by judicious grants of research and publishing contracts.

After my fellowship ended in 1985, I too was pulled into the Foundation family by the grant of a small research contract dealing with current American defense controversies. Work on this contract and my own dissertation kept me in contact with their in-house research staff for the next several years. The contract gave me a quasi-official standing which was helpful in keeping up my contacts with the broader community of "defense intellectuals" in Paris, some of whom I now consider personal collaborators and friends.

Thus I entered the Parisian policy network as a "visiting observer," an outsider passed on to the FEDN by members of its informal network of influence. This was a status within the organization which could be best described as that of an "accepted incompetent." Gradually my identity within the group changed from "foreign peace researcher" to "fellow defense intellectual" as I worked my way into the position of a par-

ticipant who was viewed by the research community as a "resource" and collaborator. To this degree, I have become a consenting party to the very network of "copinage" which I sought to study. To some readers this might amount to an admission that I have allowed myself to be taken "hostage" by organization of power which was my research subject - inevitably raising issue of whether or not I have overidentified with my informants or succumbed to their biases and sense of partisanship.

While I agree that these are real dangers, I wouldn't accept such reading of my relationship to the Paris "defense community," because I think that one of the challenges of cross-cultural comparative research lies in one's ability to enter the cultural "frame of meaning" of the organizational world one is researching, and return from it with an interpretation which is comprehensible in the language of one's home culture. To this extent, my relationships to various Parisian circles can stand as a kind of ethnological test of validity, if we accept that demonstrating "communication competence" within a foreign community is one plausible measure of the success or failure of field work abroad.

over the past ten years.

1 See the discussion of the "place of Sociology" in Keith Reader, op cit, pp. 115-130.

2 See Ezra Suleiman, Chapter 1 "State Created Elites," in his Elites in French Society, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1978 pp. 17-56.

3 Cited by William Pfaff in his Barbarian Sentiments: How the American Century Ends, Hill & Wang, New York, 1989, p 29.

4 For recent developments in French higher education see Ehrmann and Schain, op cit., pp. 106-118.

5 See Suleiman, op cit, pp. 58-74.

6 Pierre Birnbaum, La classe dirigeante française, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1978, pp. 64-67.

7 Régis Debray, Le pouvoir intellectuel en France, Editions Ramsay, Paris, 1979, pp 70-73. See also Hervé Hamon and Patrick Rotman, Les intellocrates: Expédition en haute intelligentsia, Editions Ramsay, Paris, 1981, pp. 32-33 for a recent view of the decline of l'Ecole Normale.

8 Pierre Bourdieu, La Noblesse D'Etat, Les Editions du Minuit, Paris, 1989, pp 156-162.

9 Pascal Boniface, L'Armée: Enquête sur 300,000 Soldats Méconnus, Edition*1, Paris, 1990, pp. 26-30.

10 See Jean Guisnel, Les généraux: Enquête sur le pouvoir militaire en France, Editions de la Découvertes, Paris, 1990, pp 31-34.

11 Pascal Boniface, op cit. pp. 306-311.

12 Ehrmann and Schain, op cit., pp. 148-50.

13 Ehrmann and Schain, op cit. pp. 315-321.

14 Sulieman, op cit, pp. 108-125. Also see Ehrmann and Schain, op cit. pp. 148-153.

15 Sulieman, op cit., pp.101-108. See also Pierre Birnbaum, op cit., pp 121-129.

16 Ehrmann and Schain, op cit. pp. 316-319.

17 Ehrmann and Schain, op cit. p. 143.

18 Julliard, La Genie de la Liberté, op cit. p. 59.

19 Hamon and Rotman. op cit., pp. 40-44.

20 Hamon and Rotman, op cit. p. 52.

21 Hamon and Rotman, op cit., pp. 196-211.

22 Pinto, op cit., pp. 131-135.

- 23 Hamon and Rotman, op cit. pp. 46-47.
- 24 Julliard, "La Course au Centre," op cit., pp. 18-121.
- 25 Laurent Joffrin, La Régression Française, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1992, pp. 218-222.
- 26 Vincent Wright, "The Administrative Machine: Old Problems and New Dilemmas," in Developments in French Politics, Peter Hall, Jack Hayward and Howard Machin, editors, Macmillan, London, 1990, pp 124 -25.
- 27 Julliard, "La Course au Centre," op cit., pp. 115-116.
- 28 Julliard, "La Course au Centre," op cit., p. 116.
- 29 Two recent examples of the genre are "l'Intelligentsia Française en Question," by Jean François Kahn, the maverick editor of the newsweekly, L'Evenement du Jeudi, No 398, June 18, 1992, pp. 6-10 and Lilliane Sichler's "Le Peuple Contre les Elites," L'Evenement du Jeudi, No 424, 17 December, 1992 pp. 56-60.
- 30 Hamon and Rotman, op cit., pp 216-26.
- 31 See Bogdan Denitch's "Elite Interviewing and Social Structure: An Example from Yugoslavia," in Opinion-Making Elites in Yugoslavia, edited by Allen Barton, Bogdan Denitch and Charles Kadushin, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1973.

IV

The Disciplinary Context:

War and strategic competition between nation states have been problematic for both modern Sociology and modern socialist movements. As Anthony Giddens argues in his Social Theory and Modern Sociology, the theorists of industrial society have been primarily concerned with the state's "steering function" in managing the "authoritative allocation of collective values" to areas such as the production of public goods and services or the distribution of benefits between competing interest groups. In the meantime, the steady accumulation over the course of the modern period of the instruments of mass repression, both nuclear and conventional, by modern state organizations, and the centrality of what Carl Schmitt called the "friend/foe" relation with other states, remained largely excluded from Sociology's field of vision¹. Warfare between states has been left to the students of international relations, while the use of military and police violence to maintain internal order has been seen as a problem specific to "developing societies²."

Marxist and Liberal Views of Modern Warfare.

These absences should not be surprising because modern Sociology, much like the Liberal "laissez-faire" and Socialist ideologies which helped shape its context of origin, first

emerged as a intellectual discipline in Europe during the "long peace" which lasted from 1815 to 1914³. The "total wars" of the next century were still only a distant threat to sociological thinkers caught up in the agonies of the industrial and urban transformations of European societies brought on by the early development of liberal capitalism. The "long peace" between also brought with it the steady expansion of the European market system to the entire globe and a series of frontier wars along the periphery of the European world system as it moved outward⁴. For the first generation of social theorists struggling to grasp the industrial transformation of traditional societies in Europe, warfare between nation-states seemed like an archaic institution which had lost its function in managing the trade relations and market exchanges which organized the social life of civilized societies. They had inherited the confidence of the liberal market philosophers of the late 18th century that once freed to do their civilizing work, free trade and steady economic development could create iron bonds of self-interest which would bind the civilized nations together. In the process, "sweet commerce" would calm the feudal passion for "honor" and appetite for booty which they believed motivated the savage warfare of past ages⁵.

If wars and armies retained a place in this worldview, it was only as an instrument necessary for the "subjugation" of primitive peoples who perversely refused to join in (producing) the benefits of modern civilization⁶. Even though 17th

and 18th century liberal philosophers had been very concerned with controlling the political uses and ambitions of professional armies⁷, the idea that colonial armies might not be confined to the distant periphery did not seem to occur to their nineteenth century successors. But as Hannah Ahrendt observed, once organizational traditions of mass violence and systems of police control and military administration had been established as instruments of imperial expansion overseas, it would not be long before they were imported back to the home countries of Europe and used against their citizens during the two World Wars⁸.

Marx was well aware that national armies functioned as much as agents of repression policing the class divide of modern society as they did instruments for gaining trading rights and advantages outside of Europe. But as a consequence of his focus on England as a paradigm for capitalist industrialization, Marx did not view the diplomatic and military apparatuses of modern nation states as an autonomous organizations capable of acting on their own set of strategic rules and motives. Rather he saw the state as a class agency which translated the interests of the bourgeoisie directly into national policy, even though he knew that class only arose after the administrative institutions and traditions of modern states had been established in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries⁹. And indeed within mature "liberal trading states" such as England and Holland, or developing capitalist democracies such the United States, the relationship

between state policy-making, empire building and capital accumulation often seemed self-evident - as did the political links between different property interests and conflicts over free trade, tariffs, banking and foreign policy. Like his liberal counterparts, the idea that the warfare institutions of "trading states" might ever act against capitalist interests in order to follow their own organizational agenda did not seem to trouble him greatly, indeed Marx does not appear to have thought seriously about what kind of social countervailing power could prevail against the organized violence of the state apparatus¹⁰.

Marx, like many other 19th century social revolutionaries, seems to have accepted the Liberal notion that the spread of capitalism was synonymous with world-wide economic development which, they thought, would decrease the chances of large-scale warfare between nation states - even while it increased the intensity of the social conflict within them. For the revolutionaries, the dynamism of modern capitalism was being felt world wide - disrupting traditional social orders; dissolving the tribal identities of primitive nations and thereby making room for the emergence of modern class conflicts and interests in their place¹¹. This social dynamic was central to Marx's belief that the working class around the world would rally to the international program of the Socialist revolutionaries. This hope lead Marx to take a surprisingly benign view of the colonial expansion of industrial capitalism as a "progressive force" doing history's "hidden

work." In a way which parallels the evolutionary faith of their Liberal rivals, Marxists saw modern capitalism as preparing the way for the workers revolution which would led to the peaceful integration of the entire world in a new global order. This is idea is clearly at work in a dispatch Marx wrote to Neue Rheinische Zeitung in February 1850, which is both prescient and quaint, concerning his hopes for Chinese revolutionary upsurge corresponding to the European Revolution of 1849:

"..it is an amusing fact that the oldest and most unshattered Empire on this earth has been pushed towards the brink of a social upheaval... When our European reactionaries finally reach..the Chinese Wall..who knows perhaps they will read the following inscription...

République Chinoise

Liberté, Egalité et Fraternité¹².."

By and large the Socialists got by for much of the 19th century without having to give foreign policy questions much attention except when "great power" politics and diplomacy touched directly on the "domestic" class conflicts triggered by industrialization, or the national aspirations of oppressed language and ethnic groups awakened by the spread of democratic values. This revolutionary impulse collided most spectacularly with the system of constraints built into the international alliance system during the "Great Revolution of the Nations" in 1848 - the wave of democratic revolutions which

formed the background to Marx's Communist Manifesto and which ended with the intervention of the Russian army in support of Central Europe's shaken monarchies. It was raised again in 1871 by Germany's unification and France's defeat in the Franco-Prussian War which precipitated a regime crisis which led to a revolutionary uprising of the Paris Commune¹³.

Over the next fifty years, the combined effects of nationalist agitation and local class struggles led to an explosive convergence of class and "national" questions which threatened the old order across Europe - from the Irish question in Victorian Britain, to the "Polish problem" in Tsarist Russia and the independence movements of the various nationalities bottled up within the multi-national Ottoman and Austro-hungarian Empires¹⁴. By the end of the century popular nationalisms of various sorts were competitors as well as allies of the Socialist movement. In many cases, these movements confounded Socialist expectations by providing an alternative focus for the formation of collective identities as well as ample evidence that popular politics needn't always take a democratic and "internationalist" turn.

Their confusion has led to what has been called "The Historical Wrong Address Theory." Giddens cites Gellner's caustic description: "...Marxists basically like to think that the spirit of history..has made a terrible boob. The awakening message was intended for *classes*, but by some terrible postal error was delivered to *nations*¹⁵." These same nationalisms provided the fuse which would blow the international alliance

system apart in World War One. By the beginning of the new century, Socialist arguments based on denial were already wearing thin, and issues concerning colonialism, the various "national questions" and the threat of general war began to assume a more important place in the deliberations of the international socialist movement. Grappling with the twin curses of imperialism and world war - and later their totalitarian progeny - would give twentieth century Socialism a very different character from its 19th century predecessor. Imperialism, World War One and the Bolshevik Challenge.

With the rise of the New Imperialism at the end of the long 19th century "peace," and the heightening of international tensions associated with the "scramble" in the 1890's and early 1900's for overseas colonies in Africa, the Orient and the Pacific, socialists and liberals began to debate the meaning of imperialism and its relationship to modern capitalism. Rejecting the liberal view of Capitalism as inherently pacific and progressive, Lenin saw imperialist competition and colonial expansion overseas as systemic necessities for modern capitalism. Other Socialists such as the German Socialist leader Karl Kautsky saw them only as systemic possibilities. The German economist Schumpeter argued to the contrary that capitalism was by nature anti-imperialist, and that imperialism and war were byproducts of pre-capitalist formations and a "lag" in social modernization¹⁶. These theoretical debates became absolutely central to Socialist politics and strategy with the outbreak of World War One in Europe.

During the mobilization for general war in summer of 1914, the majority of each socialist party moved to support its own national bourgeoisie, and vote for war cabinets and budgets. This meant to many that the established socialist parties had "betrayed" the cause of peace as well as the pre-war declaration by the Socialist International in 1912 that war mobilizations by the governments of Europe would be halted by a general strike by the working classes of the warring nations¹⁷. By 1917 three years of military stalemate had lead to the deaths of millions of European workers (and hundreds of thousands of colonial troops brought from Africa, India and the Far East) along the Western and Eastern Fronts¹⁸. These military horrors lead to both large-scale mutinies by French frontline troops and to a split in the world socialist movement¹⁹. It was out of the anti-war conference in 1917 held in Zimmerwald Switzerland that a revolutionary left-wing represented by the Bolsheviks in Russia and the Luxemburgists in Germany emerged as an alternative to the established party leaderships discredited by their collaboration with the war policies of their national governments.

The outbreak of World War One in 1914 and the successful Bolshevik uprising in Petrograd in 1917 then are the two events which mark the beginning of the "short" twentieth century which lasted only seventy-five years between 1914 and 1989, and saw both the destruction of the European Empires overseas and in Eurasia and the rise of the United States as the new hegemonic power in the world. Even though the vic-

torious European powers such as England and France saw their territorial empires overseas reach their greatest extent in the years following the war, World War I marked the effective end of the European centered world system built up over the previous four hundred years²⁰. By 1917 the transfer of the world financial headquarters from London to New York had already been finalized even before America's enthusiastic but late entry into the War²¹. At the same time, the industrial and financial strength of the US, along with its obvious but underdeveloped military potential, gave it a leading role in the post-war peace negotiations - a leading role America then abandoned when isolationists senators balked at accepting permanent involvement in post-war security arrangements.

The war also witnessed the full emergence of Japan as a major non-European power in the Pacific, accelerating the imperial dynamism already evident in Japan's unexpected victories over China in 1895 and over Tsarist Russia in 1905²². At the same time the engagement of colonial troops on fronts from equatorial Africa to the Middle East, and their introduction on the European frontlines in large numbers, encouraged the spread of the anti-colonial struggle. It also demonstrated the social and demographic recovery of important regional societies such as China, India and Egypt²³. This recovery in combination with the crisis of the European order brought on by the war created mounting pressures for their eventual political independence²⁴.

The most spectacular sign of the eclipse of a European centered world, however, was the Russian Revolution of 1917 which raised hopes of a revolutionary transformation of the existing social order in both Europe and in the third world²⁵. Communist revolutionary movements attempted to ride the wave of popular revulsion against the national regimes who had lead the industrial countries to disaster. But at the same time, the internal outlook, political organization and cultural values of the revolutionary parties were shaped by the terrible experiences of trench warfare and "homefront" privation, and, much like their fascist adversaries, they carried over the wartime "spirit" into the street battles and civil wars which marked post-war Central Europe²⁶.

The new Bolshevik party in particular represented an authoritarian - "militarized" party - an disciplined organization designed to wage revolutionary war against the old order of its own society, (and any rival organizations which emerged from its destruction), by political agitation, social mobilization and military action²⁷. Between 1917 and 1921 the Bolsheviks managed both to capture the utopian yearnings of "warsick" workers and intellectuals all over Europe and to forge a form of party organization which was uniquely adapted to wartime environments. By the force of their revolutionary example and their anti-imperialist politics, the Bolsheviks also attracted a generation of intellectuals from third world countries who came to Europe to fight during World War One or who arrived during its troubled aftermath - intellectuals like

Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam and Chou En Lai of China. The Communists, unlike most of the remaining Socialist parties, gained a third world audience and political vocation. This was an organizational and political achievement which would prove its worth during the later civil and world wars of the twentieth century and give them a distinct edge over their "softer" democratic and socialist rivals in situations of extreme social conflict.

The Bolshevik success in capturing the leadership of the Russian revolution from other revolutionary parties and imposing their own party dictatorship over the multi-national Tsarist empire after three years of civil war led directly to the division of the worker's movement world-wide. From 1921 on there were to be two rival internationals promoting competing visions of Socialism, a Communist one based on a military model of mass mobilization for revolutionary warfare²⁸ and a Social Democratic one based on trade-union organization and democratic party politics. For much of the century member parties the Socialist International found themselves put on the defensive by their communist rivals in Europe and the third world.

All too often Socialists represented a "third camp" position which was squeezed between the communists and whatever party stood as the anti-communist alternative - be they fascists, liberals or simply corrupt authoritarians. As a result for much of the "short" twentieth century the Socialists were faced with forms of internal political warfare

for which their democratic trade union tradition had ill prepared them. Especially during the years immediately before and after World War Two, European Socialists were left with the agonizing choice of aligning with one or the other authoritarian force as being the lesser of the "two evils."

War and Coercion in Twentieth Century Sociology:

In most of continental Europe during the 19th century trade and colonial issues seemed marginal to multi-national states which had been defined by centuries of constant war, and the link between policy makers and capitalist interest groups much less obvious in traditional political systems still dominated by state functionaries and agrarian aristocrats²⁹. In Germany, in particular, the relation between the coercive capacity of the modern state and its authority in modern society was a central question for the first generation of political sociologists who revived Hobbes' view of the state as a system which existed in order organize power and domination. Indeed the state's monopoly over the use of the "means of violence" within a specific territory was the central feature of Max Weber's definition of the organizational specificity of states of the modern type. In Weber's view the state's capacity to make war lies at the heart of modern concepts of "national sovereignty," and this "macht-politik" viewpoint has been conserved by military strategists and geo-politican theorists of international relations who continue to this very day to work in the "realist" tradition of "power politics."

However with the transatlantic shift of the center sociological inquiry to the US during the nineteen thirties and forties, this focus on the problem of state violence was lost by American sociologists who gave an optimistic, pluralist spin to the liberal perspective on the link between political modernization and economic development. The use of the armed forces and police to maintain the social order was seen as typical of developing nations where state authority is weak because the mechanisms of social integration through market rewards and consensus building through institutionalized party competition are "not yet" well established³⁰. As far as advanced societies are concerned the focus of contemporary sociology has been on the "legitimate" forms of conflict resolution organized through the institutions of pluralist democracy or the structures of technical rationality characteristic of modern bureaucratic organizations.

Nationalism and the nation states were of interest mainly to the extent that they provided a setting for the creation and extension of civil and political rights to the citizen body. As part of this evolution it was assumed that in modern "liberal polities," social relationships have been "pacified" by the market and judicial systems to an point where the fear of violent death at the hands of fellow citizens, abusive state officials, or outside invaders, has become a marginal concern for most citizens. This is not true, of course, for the unlucky few involved with the criminal enterprises or

deviant sub-cultures which lie outside the mainstream of modern society.

Post-War Continental Marxism:

Western Marxists, on the other hand, have continued to focus on the state's "police role" as an agency of class repression which intervenes in the class struggle to maintain the existing "mode of accumulation" and the bargaining advantages of capital over the rest of society. The state in capitalist society is presented as an institution which is constrained by the economic pressures generated by local and international capital even where its administrative command posts are not directly occupied by members the ruling class. In this view, the constraints on state policy follow from the fact that the State relies on the private organizations of an independent social class to manage social investment decisions concerning the production of economic wealth and to set the direction of national economic development³¹.

According to the current restatement of Marx's argument, state power ultimately depends on its ability to tax, but in capitalist societies the volume of tax receipts depends on a pattern of economic growth not subject to direct state control³². This condition of dependence on an independent class "wealth makers and job creators" is heightened by the fact that unlike business corporations, states are territorially rooted institutions operating in a global capitalist economy which has always been larger than the political jurisdictions of any of the nation-states within it. As long

as Capital is free to move money, information and skilled people to other production sites across national borders, territorial states are subject to economic blackmail³³.

If local states make policy choices which depress profits or infringe on management prerogatives, they can be checked by the threat of investment strikes or capital flight by business - either of which could have severe effects on local employment, welfare expenditures and tax receipts. A "boycott" by investment capital of any particular state can have the effective of damaging its national resource base, and strengthening the economies of neighboring states. In an international state system characterized by strong strategic competition and occasional warfare, this is a development which can prove fatal in the long run to the internal position of local leadership groups.

However, as the geo-politicians remind us, the Marxist case for nation states being at a permanent bargaining disadvantage in the modern world system only holds true under conditions when capital is free to move, and this can occur only as long as the international trading system remains truly open³⁴. The capitalist "voice" in state affairs depends to a considerable degree on their "right to exit" local situations which prove unfavorable. Under wartime conditions, however, when international borders shut down and even neutral shipping and citizens are put at risk by belligerents, business groups suddenly find "there's no place to run - no room to hide." When the international economy closes down during world wars,

the mobility of capital is constrained, and the bargaining strength of nation states vis à vis their own business organizations increases - as does the advantage of warfare states over "trading states"³⁵."

Despite this variability in the relationship between the international state system and the global economy, Marxists continue to see the prevalence of large military establishments and expenditures as being primarily the result of state intervention in the business cycle in the interests of Capital. State investments in military R & D or arms production are seen as a strategy for managing crises of accumulation in particular sectors of industry without challenging the principle of private control of the economy as a whole³⁶. This is the case much of the time but still reflects an assumption that state policy is determined by its dependence on the overall health of the capitalist economy. As we have seen the degree of state leverage vis à vis capital depends very much on the current state of international system - on whether it is in a wartime or peacetime "mode" - something which, up until the age of nuclear deterrence and Superpower blocs, was left pretty much to individual state decision.

Society-Driven Models of the State:

Alford and Friedland have argued in The Powers of Theory that the American pluralists and Western Marxists are divided in their approaches to the State by major differences in the assumptions which govern their "home domains" - the pluralists focusing on individual preferences and the difficulties of

their integration into a broader social consensus, while the Marxists stress the confrontation of Capital and Labor and the contradiction between capitalist structures of accumulation and democratic procedures³⁷. However, despite these very real differences, both of these approaches to understanding the relationship of the state and society remain basically "society-driven." They treat the state basically as an "secondary institution" which is shaped by social actors - organized and represented by either interest groups, conflicting class, and/or social movements. These actors in turn arise within national societies as they in turn adopt models of political development, cultural norms and forms of industrial organization imported from the outside world.

Weber and State-centered Theory.

Over the past decade or so, however, a more "state centered" approach to the understanding of the development and structure of national polities has emerged to challenge the pluralist and marxist "social determinisms" so prevalent during the post-war period³⁸. Alford and Friedland call this the "managerial perspective" of theorists working in the Weberian tradition whose "domain assumptions" tend to privilege the role of bureaucratic centralization in the overall development of industrial societies and views "steering problems" in the form of organizational irrationality and the fragmentation of authority as the main threats to social stability³⁹. Pluralists and Marxists alike stand accused by these "managerial" theorists of "functionalizing" our under-

standing of the state, reducing it either to an instrument "up for grabs" in the competition between a cast of social actors which stood outside it, or to the status of an agency designated by "the social system" to perform such socially necessary functions as "interest aggregation," social legitimation, or economic accumulation (and so on).

The "state centered" approach championed recently by social theorists such as Anthony Giddens and comparative historians such as Charles Tilly and Theda Skocpol, does more than simply emphasize the "structural autonomy" of state institutions in regulating social conflicts or undertaking management tasks associated with the economic and technological development of national economies. It proposes that the state is a "structural agent" whose power has been central to the creation of national societies out of a jumble of traditional clan communities, imperial dependencies, competing regional states and independent city republics. These theorists remind us there is nothing "natural" about the modern nation state and that in the past territorial states existed in a world in which broad multinational empires and independent urban republics were the most common forms of political organization⁴⁰.

In this view, most modern national societies are as much "state nations" as they are "nation states." They owe their common national culture and current economic integration to the steady work of generations of state officials, who - acting in the name of a central authority - have imposed taxes

and conscription, as well as themselves and their national languages, on unwilling local societies. This is the process which Charles Tilly has called "circumscription" by which he means the "power to regulate the stocks and flows of a wide range of resources within and across their frontiers⁴¹." National societies, then, are created in large measure by patterns of coercive cooperation imposed by state administrations, rather than the political expression of a common cultural community, or a voluntary contract arrived at through bargaining between social leadership groups⁴².

The arbitrary character of this historical process of social integration is highlighted when we recall that the national boundaries between societies owe as much wars of conquest as to the cultural identities and traditions of the communities which they enclose. With the possible exception of the United Kingdom, the "state nations" which emerged in 17th century Europe were first and foremost "warfare states⁴³." The creation by centralized states of modern armies and national systems of administration were responses to the fiscal and military pressures of strategic competition and warfare - and those national communities which failed to build militarized states simply disappeared as independent polities⁴⁴. States with strong centralized administrations like that of France expanded the scope of their authority at the expense of neighboring states, thereby increasing the size of their resource base, and eventually, the reach and prestige of their "home" cultures and languages. Those cultural com-

munities which lagged behind in development of a modern state system, such as Poland and Ireland for instance, disappeared from the map and their linguistic and cultural identities went underground - where they simply didn't wither away completely as in the case of the Duchy of Burgundy or the Kingdom of Aragon⁴⁵. As a consequence, the pressures of inter-state warfare created strong incentives for state elites to encourage the cultural modernization, economic integration and industrial development of the regional societies subject to their control.

As Anthony Giddens has argued one can see absolutist monarchies of the early modern period as critical agents in the construction of modern nation states. In order for their sovereignty to be effective something more than central control over decisions governing warfare with other states was needed. It required the suppression of the ability of local authorities to wage private warfare against each other and the officers of the central government, and more generally, the pacification of social relations through the disarming of the civilian population. These developments took place in conjunction with extension of the capacities of the central administration to exercise close and exact "surveillance and supervision" over subject populations. This involved both the development of bureaucratic systems of record keeping for tax and conscription purposes which created "paper trails" which allowed the activities of individuals to be monitored, and national transportation and communication systems which

allowed for central coordination of the supervisory actions at the local level⁴⁶.

As state systems of command and discipline became effective over entire territories, state borders, for the first time, were firmly fixed as the outer limit of competing systems of administration. The fact that a populations were enclosed within the borders of a particular territorial state did not necessarily coincide with their sharing a common community of identity⁴⁷. As a consequence, "citizenship" and nationality were often opposed, laying the foundation for democratic "nationality struggles" against the nation state in the nineteenth century.

The contours of these national societies were obviously not only shaped by the managerial successes or military failures of their own state administrations, but also by the strategies in war and trade competition of the states which surround them⁴⁸. State organizations are responsible for decisions of war and peace which also involve managing the interface of the local societies within their borders and the international state and market systems outside them. As Theda Skocpol argues those state regimes which failed to organize their populations or develop their resource base often lost territories and markets in wars with their international competitors. As a consequence their internal legitimacy could weaken to the point where challenges by dissident elite groups could occur, or, in a few notable cases, where they were over-

thrown "from below" by the revolutionary mobilization of previously inactive sections of the general population⁴⁹.

Modern France provides a clear case which supports the "state centered" theory of national development as well as several spectacular examples of bureaucratic failures which fit within the "domain assumptions" of the managerial perspective. We might add these failures have had heavy costs to French society in terms of its political stability, national cohesion and economic development. The modern French experience suggests that the warfare role of modern states has not diminished in its importance for maintaining the internal legitimacy of political regimes and of the territorial and cultural integrity of national societies. Unless state administrations maintain the capacity to defend national sovereignty both democratic legitimacy and national cultural identity can be undone.

- 1 Anthony Giddens makes this argument in The Nation State and Violence, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1985, pp 22-31.
- 2 Anthony Giddens, The Nation State and Violence, op cit., p.233.
- 3 Giddens, The Nation State and Violence, op cit., p.222-23.
- 4 William H. Mc Neil, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982, pp. 256-261.
- 5 Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977, pp. 56-66.
- 6 Giddens, The Nation State and Violence, op cit., pp. 226-27.
- 7 See Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776 -1787, W.W. Norton Co., New York, 1972, Chap 1, "The Whig Science Of Politics," pp. 18-28.
- 8 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, World Publishing Co. New York, 1966. pp. 207-221.
- 9 See, for instance, Marx's article for the New York Daily Tribune, dated August 1852, "Tories and Whigs," in which he describes the Whig party, dominated as it was by agrarian landowners as the "aristocratic representatives of the bourgeoisie," in Karl Marx, Surveys From Exile: Political Writing Vol III, David Fernbach, Editor, Vintage Publishers, New York, 1974 pp. 256-260.
- 10 Giddens, The Nation State and Violence, op cit., pp. 326.
- 11 As Marx's writes in the Manifesto: the bourgeoisie " draws all, even the most barbarian into civilization.. Just as it has made the country dependent on the towns , so it has made barbarian and semi barbarian countries dependent on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West." Karl Marx on Colonialism & Modernization, Schlomo Alvineri editor, Anchor Books, New York, 1969, p 3.
- 12 Karl Marx, "Chinese Socialism?", in Karl Marx on Colonialism & Modernization, Schlomo Avineri, op cit., pp. 49-50.
- 13 Frank Jellinek, The Paris Commune of 1871, Grosset & Dunlap, New York, 1965, pp. 47-60.
- 14 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of The Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Random House, New York, 1987. pp 158-56, 215-19 & 232-42.
- 15 Giddens, The Nation State and Violence, op cit. pp.212.
- 16 This discussion follows closely the draft of an article "Socialists, Foreign Policy and American Globalism," which I co-wrote with Jim Chapin for the Democratic Socialists of America and which remains unpublished at this time.
- 17 Mc Neil, op cit., p 317. The initial popular enthusiasm can be explained at least in part by the nearly universal expectation that the War could only last several weeks.
- 18 Kennedy, op cit., pp 260-71.
- 19 Alistair Horne, op cit. p. 40.

- 20 Kennedy, "The European Miracle," op cit., pp 18-30.
- 21 David Dimbley and David Reynold, An Ocean Apart: The Relationship between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century, Random House, New York, 1987 pp. 60-62. By February 1917, Britain had only enough reserves to cover purchases of war supplies for four more weeks.
- 22 Kennedy, op cit., pp. 14-16 & 206-209.
- 23 Kennedy, op cit., pp. 286-288.
- 24 Mc Neil, op cit., pp. 315 & 356.
- 25 Wolfgang Leonhard, Three Faces of Marxism: The political Concepts of Soviet Ideology, Maoism and Humanist Marxism, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1974, pp. 60-64.
- 26 See Eric J. Leed, No Man's Land: Combat & Identity in World War I, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979, pp. 150-162 and pp. 193-210.
- 27 Leonhard, op cit. pp 52 & 57-60.
- 28 Mc Neil, op cit, pp. 346-47.
- 29 See Perry Anderson, The Lineages of the Absolutist State, New Left Books, London, 1974, on Eastern Absolutism, p 202.
- 30 Giddens, op cit pp 28 -29 & 233.
- 31 See, for instance, Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers' application of a "capitalist constraint theory" to American politics, On Democracy: Towards a Transformation of American Society, Penguin Books, New York, 1983, pp 52-62.
- 32 See Charles Lindblom's liberal restatement of this notion of the State's fundamental dependance on market actors and services in Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems, Basic Books, New York, 1977, pp 172-73 & 175-177.
- 33 See Immanuel Wallerstein's strong statement of the constraint theory in his, The Origins of the Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century, Academic Press, New York, 1974, pp 348 & 354-55.
- 34 Wallerstein, op cit. p 355
- 35 see Richard Rosencrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World, Basic Books, New York, 1986. pp 86-108.
- 36 James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State, St Martin's Press, New York, 1973. pp. 151-58.
- 37 Robert Alford and Roger Friedland, Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy, Cambridge University Press, pp 4-5 & 8-11.
- 38 see Ira Katznelson's description of this movement, "The State to the Rescue? Political Science and History reconnect," Social Research, Vol 59, No 4, Winter 1992, pp 719-737.
- 39 Alford and Friedland, op cit, pp 161-64.

- 40 Anthony Giddens, Social Theory and Modern Sociology, Stamford University Press, Stamford, 1987, pp.169-172.
- 41 Charles Tilly, "Futures of European States," Social Research, Vol 59, No 4, Winter 1992. pp 707-709.
- 42 Giddens, The Nation State and Violence, op cit. pp 117-121.
- 43 Giddens, op cit., pp 112-113.
- 44 Anderson, op cit., p 200.
- 45 Giddens, op cit, pp 103-104.
- 46 See Giddens discussion of internal pacification, The Nation State and Violence, op cit. pp 181-193.
- 47 Giddens, The Nation State and Violence, op cit. pp 88-90.
- 48 Samuel E. Finer, "State and Nation-building in Europe: The role of the military," in The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe, Charles Tilly editor, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1979. pp. 85-90 & 92-97.
- 49 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, pp 28-49.

V

Patterns in French national development:

In the view of "state centered" theorists, France's industrial and economic backwardness relative to England and Holland was the byproduct of the successful alliance between the absolute monarchy and various regional aristocracies which supplied the bulk of royal office holders and army officers¹. The French state apparatus, (easily the strongest and most coherent in Europe at the time of Louis XIV), was fragmented throughout the 18th century by a revival of the aristocracy which led to the state's progressive colonization by noble pressure groups². These groups succeeded in monopolizing the rewards of state service even as they depended on the state administration and its armies to extract from the peasantry the rents upon which they depended³. Indifferent to the importance of France's overseas trade, they willingly sacrificed her worldwide mercantile interests in order to make trivial territorial gains along France's continental frontiers⁴. Finally their privileged relation to the state allowed them to protect themselves from taxation and to pass along the costs of the administrative system to the rest of the population. The stage for the French Revolution was thus set by the late eighteenth century, when the authority and finances of France's ancien regime were overdrawn by a series of defeats

in colonial wars with Great Britain and her coalition partners on the continent. Failure in war demonstrated the price that France paid for inability of the monarchy to maintain the cohesion of its centralized state, or to allow sufficient space for the commercial transformation of France's agrarian economy and rural social order⁵.

As both Marx and De Tocqueville remarked the French Revolution tied the expansion of the powers of the state administration to ideologies of revolutionary nationalism and to the political mobilization of the general population. The Revolution created both a more efficient version of the centralized state and a unitary vision of the national community which provided a popular foundation for state legitimacy. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic regimes seized the opportunity to create an effective central executive authority and the national system for recruiting and training an elite corps of administrators to which we have referred earlier. The Revolution also swept away local barriers to central control and extended a network of state agents into every town and village leaving a legacy of administrative centralization which survived intact through future changes of regime⁶.

At the same time, the revolutionary formula allowed for the integration of previously disconnected regional groups and promoted the identification of the popular classes with a national community of citizens - providing ideological motivations which facilitated the mobilization of mass citizen

armies of unprecedented size⁷. These armies were not only very effective as a fighting force, they also became a school for citizenship⁸. The army became an institution which carried out the political socialization of peasant conscripts who learned to adopt both the French language and a French identity during their time in the ranks⁹. This left a vision of a unitary national state and a military definition of citizenship which became integral elements of the jacobin heritage which have remained important features of the tradition of the "people of the Left" up until present times¹⁰.

Under Napoleon's dictatorship, this new French model of citizenship and the nation state demonstrated that it had a capacity for power mobilization vastly superior than the old absolutist regimes. For two decades the French were able to overwhelm successive coalitions of the European Great powers, and to march their revolutionary armies across Germany and most of Central Europe¹¹. But unable to reconcile nationalist principles of legitimacy with Napoleon's ongoing "flight forward," the French were finally exhausted by imperial overstretch, a combination of guerilla rebellion in Spain and popular-national mobilization in Germany, and finally continuous naval and commercial warfare with Great Britain¹².

During the long peace which followed France's defeat in 1815 most of Europe followed Britain's lead toward industrial capitalism even as their national intelligentsias dreamed of remaking the great French revolution of 1789. In the course of the century most European countries saw the familiar

agrarian order transformed and experienced a rapid increase in the size of their urban populations - changes which laid the foundation for the rise of democratic and workers movements across Europe. France was the exception to this general pattern as successive conservative regimes attempted to contain the potentially insurrectionary populations of Paris and Lyons by relying on the conservative social forces of rural France - forces which they sought to protect against disruptive cultural and economic modernization¹³.

In particular this meant consolidating the hold that the small peasants had gained over rural lands during the period of the Revolution, and protecting local craft communities and merchant groups from outside competition by new industrial producers. Conservative policies at the national level locked France into a "malthusian" pattern of gradual industrialization, and slow population growth for a century¹⁴. This pattern of social stalemate protected the "lock" of local notables on national politics but left France at an increasing disadvantage in the competition for overseas colonies with Great Britain and in the industrial race with the German states undergoing a forced march to unification under Bismarck.

Outside of France, the rest of nineteenth Century Europe experienced a population boom which gave the European powers a demographic as well as military and technological edge over regional competitors elsewhere in the world¹⁵. This meant on the one hand that European ruling elites had surplus people with which to feed the expansion of both their colonies and

armies overseas and new urban factories at home. On the other, many traditional societies in the third world suffered dramatic population declines and social dislocation as they were coerced into European empires and market networks by armies of professional soldiers and successive waves of colonial settlers¹⁶. Here again France showed herself to an exception in that, despite the successful colonial conquests of French armies in West Africa and Indochina, French society provided few overseas immigrants - even the French-speaking colonists of French Algeria were recruited largely outside of France in "immigrant" societies like Italy and Spain¹⁷.

In Europe itself the "long peace" of the 19th century was successfully maintained by diplomatic management of the "strategic balance" between the great powers, and saw direct military conflicts largely confined to wars against the weaker non-european societies located along the periphery of the expanding capitalist world system¹⁸. Even so this long period of general peace, unequal growth and colonial aggression was punctuated by several local wars such as the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian war of 1871. Besides being terribly destructive, these wars involved the use of conscript armies, railroad networks and the mass mobilization of civilian manpower and economy on a scale that allows them to be seen as full dress rehearsals for the "total wars" of the twentieth century - WWI & II¹⁹.

A fate similar to that of the Ancien Regime befell later French regimes in the wars of the 19th and 20th centuries when

France fought three wars with Germany and lost two of them. In 1871 military defeat at hands of Imperial Germany set in motion the overthrow of Napoleon the Third; the worker's revolt of the Paris Commune and civil war between the communard and the national army - all under the watchful eye of the Prussian army of occupation²⁰. In 1914 France managed to avoid defeat and occupation during World War I in large measure thanks to the reserves of her colonial empire and her alliance with two of the leading maritime and industrial powers of the age, Great Britain and the United States²¹. But her survival was a close run thing. France entered the war handicapped by a political regime based on the exclusion of Catholic conservatives and urban workers and divided by conflicts between the political class and the military caste²². Her political leadership managed to unite for the duration of the war and to both mobilize her manpower reserves and modernize her industrial plant for war production - to a point where France became WWI's "arsenal of democracy" at least as far as Allied arms production was concerned²³. But victory came as we know at a terrible human and social cost - with the loss of 640,000 Frenchmen in just the first five months of war²⁴.

Once again the military collapse of French Armies in the face of the German Blitzkrieg in 1940 led to the dissolution of the Third Republic, the foreign occupation of northern France, and the (very unequal) division of national authority between the Vichy client regime in unoccupied Southern France allied with Hitler and Free French units allied with Chur-

chill²⁵. This picture of the fragmentation of the French polity was completed by the survival of French colonial armies in North Africa and the Levant which attempted to maintain a posture of "armed neutrality" between the allied and Nazi coalitions²⁶. In the final years of the War, France herself was torn apart by a vicious three sided struggle between communist resistance groups, Free French units loyal to De Gaulle and the Vichy Police and Militia. Thus France's disastrous performance in the opening campaigns of World War Two led directly to the dissolution of the central unity of the French State which was divided into rival administrations as well as subjected to foreign military occupation in Europe and North Africa by Nazi and Anglo-American armies.

Overall it is something of a political miracle that France's position as a member of the victorious coalition was saved, given the fact that French territory and industry proved to be more of a strategic asset to the Germans than to the Allies for much of World War Two²⁷. The French escaped the full consequences of her repeated changes in wartime partners, largely because of De Gaulle's capacity to bluff the Allied leadership over the symbols of France's great power status²⁸. That he had any assets with which to bargain at all was due in large part to the survival of France's overseas empire in Africa. Her African colonies gave French armies a colonial manpower reserve upon which to draw and a location from which to regroup while they were being reequipped by her American ally and sponsor²⁹.

France emerged from World War II impoverished by German demands on her wartime economy and with her national industry and transportation devastated by Allied air raids. At the same time her army and state administration remained divided and embittered well into the post-war period by recriminations over wartime collaboration by the "Petainists," accusations of "treason to the State" against the Free French, and charges of "banditry" against the Communist led resistance forces of the interior³⁰.

The Fourth Republic

At the close of the war all of Europe had experienced a common disaster as the former "Axis powers," Germany, Italy and Japan, were eliminated from the "strategic game," and the two victors, Great Britain and France, fell back into the second rank of strategic power³¹. In contrast to Great Britain, however, France came out of WW II, in which she was surely one of the greatest losers, as one of the few states in Europe which won real diplomatic gains from the post-war peace. The defeat of Germany meant that her greatest geo-political rival was divided into bits of more manageable size - in the words of one French foreign minister: "We love Germany so much, we want two of them". Also for the first time since the Napoleonic Wars, France's security perimeter fell on someone else's eastern frontier, West Germany's, rather than her own. Further the security cost of defending Germany largely fell on the United States which has maintained a large force of conventional troops on the ground and extended West Germany a

nuclear guarantee of its territorial integrity and political independence. Finally France's status as one of the "victors" was ratified by her temporary status as one of the occupying powers, by her participation in the Four-Power military commission governing Berlin and her position as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council³².

However despite these gains during the twelve year span of the Fourth Republic, French attempts to build a legitimate political regime and to revive her wartorn economy had to overcome not only deep internal divisions within France herself, but a new set of constraints on her autonomy created as a consequence of her defeat in 1940 and the scope of the American triumph in 1945³³. This triumph symbolized by America's brief nuclear monopoly at the close of WWII simultaneously altered both the hierarchy of the international state system and its internal dynamics by effectively closing the recourse to war in the post-war period³⁴. The impact of the wartime expansion America's domestic industrial base changed the balance of commercial power within the global economy in ways which blocked any return to the prewar system of national economic strategies based on the preservation of protected colonial markets³⁵. In the new American dominated world system France was reduced to position of economic dependency and strategic subordination.

Throughout the early post-war years France like Britain was economically and financially exhausted. This left her heavily dependent on large infusions of American foodstuffs

and financial loans for the immediate survival of its urban populations - especially during the severe winters of the late forties³⁶. Once the immediate crisis was passed American aid remained essential for the revival of its civil industry and the reconstruction of its transportation infrastructure. Thanks in large part to the Marshall plan, France had received 2.7 billion dollars in American aid (17 billion in 1989 dollars) by the middle fifties of which 2.2 came as straight grants a sum which made her the largest single recipient of American largesse, (as opposed to dollar loans), in Western Europe³⁷.

Naturally this support on this level was not the pure product of "Ami" generosity. With the real onset of the Cold War in the late forties, the Americans came to see France as a strategic support base for their plans to defend Western Europe. The Americans not only viewed France as a secure rear area vital for the support of Allied force in the German theatre, but also saw the French army as a vast manpower reserve³⁸. The French countryside was soon dotted with American air bases, port facilities and fuel pipelines. At the same time, Americans also turned to the French arms industry as a local source of supply for American forces in Europe and also as a "offshore" producer of the conventional arms needed for the build-up of allied armies in Europe³⁹. American aid and equipment orders were thus central to the reconstruction of the French aviation and defense industry in the forties and fifties as were sales of French equipment to the armies of

other countries allied to the US including notably to the new German army⁴⁰.

The French understood their role in the American strategic script as being limited to supplying the Americans with French manpower as conventional "cannon fodder" and extending free and unlimited, access to French territory for American ground and air forces who needed to give their regional operational area the "strategic depth" which was missing along the narrow German front⁴¹. French feelings of subordination were reinforced by the American refusal to cooperate with the French in the development of the new strategic technologies⁴². Not content only to reserve to themselves the pick of the German rocket scientists and new aviation technology which the Western Allies had salvaged from the ruins of Nazi Germany⁴³, but the Americans and the British also refused to include France within their post-war cooperation in the area of nuclear energy⁴⁴. The Americans apparently feared that French scientific community was penetrated by Soviet agents of influence - a view which comes as no surprise given the successful penetration by Beria of the wartime Manhattan Project and the fact that the French nuclear research program was headed by a Communist Party member, Joliot Curie, until 1950⁴⁵. Further given recent wartime memories, neither the Americans nor their British ally had any particular interest in encouraging French strategic ambitions and scientific/industrial rivalry in Europe.

Despite Anglo-American reluctance, the governments of the Fourth Republic did succeed in rebuilding an aviation industry capable of producing advanced jet aircraft - with an initial order in 1952 of 225 Mistral jets for the French Air force paid for by the US Government⁴⁶. Soon the highly capable, and cost competitive, Mirage series designed by Dassault was made available for export to Europe and overseas - most notably to the Israeli Air Force. At the same time Franco-Israeli cooperation helped revive French research in Atomic energy⁴⁷. Finally by the fifties a French missile program was initiated which successfully developed French SAM's, anti-tank missiles and sounding rockets⁴⁸. The CEA, (Atomic Energy Commission), the CNRS (National Center for Scientific Research) CNES (National Center for Space Studies), DGA (Delegation General for Armaments), were all created during this period⁴⁹. The Fourth Republic did succeed in laying the foundation of a modern scientific/industrial complex along American lines which the Fifth Republic would build upon.

At the same time, French leaders resisted playing the conventional role in Europe that the Americans had proposed for their large land army. Beginning in 1946 with their return to Saigon, the French sought to defend their global standing by the traditional route of reasserting their military presence overseas⁵⁰. This lead them to draw down their ground forces in Europe⁵¹. This reassertion of an imperial strategy also meant unfortunately that French elites had failed to unlearn the "obvious" lessons of their wartime experience.

In the forties many French analysts had concluded that France owed her national survival in both World Wars to her possession of an African colonial empire. For them the best way to ensure France's future national survival as well as the recovery of her Great Power status was to reestablish the world wide "French Union" as quickly as possible⁵². This analysis was shared by the leaders of France's colonial armies, many of whom had a "good war" waiting out the end of WWII in Algeria⁵³. In the forties and the fifties French elites proceeded to lock themselves into a series of colonial wars - first in Indochina and Madagascar and then in North Africa in order to defend strategic bases and protected markets which had become strategically and economically irrelevant in the new liberal world market system which the Americans were building⁵⁴.

Even though the French did eventually persuade their American patron to provide most of the funds and much of the equipment for the Indochina war⁵⁵, the French found themselves undertaking several overseas wars in Indochina, Madagascar and North Africa in succession. The costs they entailed were only partially covered by American military aid programs. The home governments which had to assume these costs were weak and divided, incapable of mobilizing French society in support of her overseas armies which expanded rapidly from the immediate post-war build-down to over a million men⁵⁶.

This incapacity reflected deep splits within the French leadership class which only reinforced the divisions left over

from WWII. Firstly the radical and Socialist parliamentary leaderships of the home government were already weakened by their political strategy of governing from the center while excluding the political extremes. At any one time, it was common for the governments of the Fourth Republic to count on the support of only some 400 "useful" deputies in the National Assembly grouped around the centrist parties, while some 200 Gaullist and Communist deputies stood automatically in the opposition⁵⁷. This limited base of support promoted the governmental instability for which the Fourth Republic is justifiably remembered.

Secondly, the parliamentary leadership was composed of local political notables from rural areas and small provincial towns who were socially and culturally distant from the elite milieux of the "grands fonctionnaires" on whom they depended⁵⁸. This cultural divorce and the instability of parliamentary government promoted a gradual takeover in many areas of day to day administration by the civil service⁵⁹. This gave the bureaucracy the autonomy it needed to pursue the national plans that modernized the French countryside and laid the foundation for the industrial takeoff and technological achievements of the late fifties and sixties. At the same time, one should note that these successful experiments in "government by the civil service" prepared the ground for the emergence of the elitist "République des Fonctionnaires" which characterized the governments of the early Fifth Republic⁶⁰.

Finally throughout the fifties both civilian politicians and bureaucrats grew increasingly divorced from the needs and concerns of the officer class directing the professional armies fighting desperate rearguard actions overseas - often with American money and arms⁶¹. The defeat in Indochina and the lack of consensus and support of the Army in Algeria lead by 1958 to the threat by the colonial army to invade France and replace the Socialist government with one of its choice. This is something the Army leaders thought they had accomplished with the return of De Gaulle to power, but when they realized their error they were ready to drop paratroopers on Paris again in 1960 to overthrow him as well⁶².

Some officers, moreover, were led by their experience in waging anti-insurgency warfare abroad to develop an doctrine of revolutionary war - a national revolution - which they planned to wage in France herself in order to transform French civil society into a more reliable base of support for its armies overseas⁶³. In this the colonial army was ready to repeat the wartime rebellion of the "Free French Forces" once again - this time in the name of Anti-communism and the Army's duty to interpret as well as defend the greater national interest⁶⁴. The threat posed by this "revolutionary" insurgency against the civilian elites was the main challenge De Gaulle had to meet in the first years of the Fifth Republic. The Fifth Republic: an independent player in Europe.

With De Gaulle's return to power in 1958, France ended the Algerian War and granted formal independence to her colonies

in Africa. This allowed the French to improve on her diplomatic and strategic gains within an American dominated Europe by carrying to completion the development of her own national nuclear capability and of intermediate range delivery systems, begun under the governments of the Fourth Republic⁶⁵. Equally important, De Gaulle rejected the "support" role the Americans had assigned to the French military in Europe. By 1966 he had succeeded in withdrawing France from the NATO military command, and in negotiating the withdrawal of American troops, equipment and support facilities from French soil⁶⁶. This means, as we have previously noted, that after the 1960's French elites did not allow their security tie with the U.S. to conflict with the exercise of national control over defense strategy; the deployment of national military forces, or the production and sale overseas of advanced weapons systems and military technology.

De Gaulle's determination to modernize French weapons systems also provided him with an argument for eliminating costly colonial commitments and along with them those elements of the overseas armed forces who stood ready to destabilize his new national regime. In order to sustain the technical and organizational effort necessary to become a nuclear weapons state, and to modernize those weapons so as to maintain their technical credibility, the Gaullist regime consolidated the budgetary claim of the French military on national resources

Table 5-1

MILITARY BUDGETS IN FRANCE SINCE 1958
(IN BILLIONS INFLATION ADJUSTED FRANCS 1970)

Year	Capital Budget	Operational Budget	Total
1958	7,74	14,7	22,44
1959	9,49	15,71	25,2
1960	9,08	15,7	24,78
1961	8,58	15,37	23,95
1962	7,99	15,00	22,99
1963	10,48	14,32	24,80
1964	11,70	13,73	25,43
1965	13,01	13,06	26,07
1966	13,73	13,03	26,76
1967	14,45	13,42	27,87
1968	14,67	13,57	28,24
1969	13,80	14,03	27,83
1970	13,08	14,11	27,19
1971	12,77	14,48	27,25
1972	12,89	14,71	27,60
1973	13,61	15,09	28,70
1974	13,18	15,02	28,20
1975	12,48	16,20	28,68
1976	12,52	17,36	29,88
1977	13,17	18,98	32,15
1978	14,65	20,15	34,80
1979	15,29	20,07	35,36
1980	15,87	19,42	35,29
1981	17,60	20,95	38,55
1982	18,58	21,96	40,54
1983	18,58	22,02	40,60
1984	18,67	21,16	39,83
1985	18,93	20,73	39,66
1986(e)	19,27	21,06	40,33
(e) estimate			

Source: Jacques Fontanel, "le Coût de la
défense en France," Pour Une Nouvelle Entente Cordiale,
Yves Boyer, edit. IFRI Masson, Paris, 1988, p.127.

even as nuclear deterrence provided the policy argument for a radical reduction of the size of the French land army⁶⁷.

Up until the early sixties, France had the largest army, 1.1 million men, and the highest rates of military participation of any European country besides Russia⁶⁸. After De Gaulle's transformation of the force structure of French armies at the close of the Algerian War, the size of the armed forces fell to 545,000 men by 1965 and the military share of the state budget dropped sharply in terms of manpower costs⁶⁹. It increased dramatically, however, in terms of its share of state R & D expenditures as the costs of the different nuclear and strategic programs shot up through the end of the late sixties⁷⁰. This change is reflected in Table 5-1 in falling operational budget and rising capital budgets for the years 1963-1968. At the same time the need for support facilities for both nuclear weapons and missile development provided a rationale for retaining French control over the "confetti" of empire and some "neo-colonial" missions for loyal elements of the Army in French speaking Africa where the French have carried out dozens of limited interventions since the early sixties⁷¹. Modernization of the French military brought with other benefits. Reliance on technically qualified "forces in being" lead to a downgrading of the importance of conscripts and reserve forces in the French force structure. This change in the balance between conscript and professional troops tended to lower the saliency of the draft and the army as domestic issues which needlessly borrow social trouble⁷².

Table No. 5-2

MILITARY BUDGETS IN FRANCE AS PERCENTAGES OF
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND OF THE STATE BUDGET

Year	% of GNP	% of State Budget
1959	5.9	28.9
1964	4.93	23
1969	3.76	17.8
1974	2.99	17.4
1976	2.98	17.1
1978	3.16	16.97
1980	3.2	16.87
1982	3.44	15.58
1984	3.37	15.15
1985	3.29	15.15
1986	3.23(e)	15.4

(e): estimate

source: Jacques Fontanel, "le Coût de la défense en France," Pour Une Nouvelle Entente Cordiale, Yves Boyer, edit. IFRI Masson, Paris, 1988, p.126.

In the aftermath of the May events of 1968, the governments of Pompidou and Valery Giscard D'Estang faced youth protests against the draft and the emergence of a rank and file conscript movement. They dealt with them through a judicious mix of repression and concessions to pressure from below. In the middle seventies the French shortened the length of national service, increased the numbers and kinds of exemptions from military service and improved the wages and material conditions of French officers and enlisted men⁷³. Much to the dismay of Gaullist strategists such as General Gallois⁷⁴, these concessions also resulted increased manpower costs which led to cutbacks in some strategic programs and to an overall slowdown in the deployment of new weapon systems as is reflected in the drop in capital budget between the 1970 - 1978. These decisions delayed the entry of missile sub-

marines into the Fleet and lead to the cancellation of plans for the development of a true intercontinental missile.

Even so, budgets remained generous enough by comparison with the Fourth Republic that this policy "de-politicized" the armed forces, and removed them as discontented actors within the domestic system. De Gaulle's "Nuclear nationalism" then led to a lowering of the domestic political and social costs of maintaining a large military establishment with important overseas commitments as can be seen in the steady decrease in share of French GNP taken by the military between 1964 and 1986. The lowering of social costs followed from the modification of traditional military missions produced by the substitution of "nuclear deterrence" for "territorial defense," and the shift from a large conscript army to a much smaller, professional "forces in being" model⁷⁵. This shift is reflected in the declining share of GNP devoted to the armed forces over the past thirty years as seen in Table 5-2.

Table No. 5-3.

COMPARATIVE WESTERN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, 1984

Country	W. Germany	France	Britain	US
Defense Expenditure as % of GDP.	3.3%	4.1%	5.5%	6.4%
Total Defense Expenditures (Millions of \$).	20,125	20,212	32,294	237,052
Per Capita Defense Expenditures. (in US \$)	328	370	416	1001

Source: I.I.S.S., The Military Balance 1986-87, London International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986, p 212.

Finally, the possession of nuclear weapons facilitated the preservation of France's strategic credibility even as the overall gap between her conventional military forces and those of her British and American allies and Soviet rival remained relatively important as we see in Table 5-3 above.

French doctrines of "nuclear sufficiency" allowed her to conserve the "strategic" mission of her armed forces, and traditional ideas of state legitimacy as the exercise of effective national sovereignty at a time when integration into the super-power blocs had eroded the credibility of these traditional functions of the nation-state in other European societies. In France, this substitution of nuclear retaliation for territorial defense (ie. the active defense of civil society) has not produced a crisis of identity within the armed forces nor a crisis of legitimacy for State policy.

The pro-nuclear "consensus" French elites forged over the past thirty years appears to many observers as a singular arrangement which stands out against the regular contours of the post-war settlement in Europe. The features of this settlement are well known, the political regulation of the market economy "temporarily succeeded in reconciling the demands of economic efficiency and social equity, democracy and the market⁷⁶." Sometimes known as the "social democratic compromise," this arrangement used Keynesian economic policies to ensure private producers access to mass markets and reasonable independence in investment decisions and managerial prerogatives. In exchange for a growing economic pie, the

state imposed taxes which redistributed profits downward to empower disadvantaged individuals, classes and regions in the marketplace. In northern Europe, at least, this pattern was managed through a "neo-corporatist" system of interest representation in which labor and business groups met under the guidance of state representatives in order to regulate industrial conflicts and to coordinate national programs of industrial and regional development⁷⁷.

Table No. 5-4

THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION OF THE FRENCH ECONOMY

Indicator	1870	1913	1950	1973	1990
% of Employment					
Agriculture	49.2	37.4	28.5	11.0	7.6
Industry	27.8	33.8	34.8	38.4	32.0
Services	23.0	28.0	36.7	50.6	60.4
Life Style					
Women Working	N.A.	35.6	36.0	37.1	41.2
Average years in School	N.A.	6.18	8.18	9.58	10.79
aged 15-64					
Hours worked annually	2,045	2,588	1,989	1,785	1,554
Role of the State					
Share of Social Expenses of GDP	0,3%	1.2%	3.7%	9.3%	N.A.
Total of State Expenditures of GDP	8.2 %	8.8%	28.9%	26.7%	N.A.
Productivity (Hourly GDP) compared with the US (U.S. = 100%)	54.7	49.2	41.5	74.7	97.5

Source: Robert Boyer, "Le capitalisme français et ses concurrents," L'Etat De La France: 1992, Edit. Découverte, Paris 1992, p 365.

France fitted this pattern in some respects, but not in others. Since the 1940s, France has undergone a industrial revolution which arrived late but still in time to fundamentally alter the agrarian society of provincial France - bringing an end to the "malthusian pattern" of the 19th century. As we can see from Table 5-4, the post war period in France was characterized by a rapid rise in population growth which was accompanied by a significant decline in the proportion of the national population still residing in the countryside. The population shift to the cities has led not only to temporary increase in the size of the industrial working class but also to an expansion in service sector employment and the massive entry of French women into the active work force⁷⁸. Further, average educational achievement levels increased and the productivity of the French work force grew to the point where it almost equals US levels.

France differed from her northern neighbors because French labor was politically divided and effectively excluded from the state planning process. This exclusion was reflected in the fact that France's economic modernization was pursued at labor's expense as wages and benefits did not catch up with gains in productivity before 1968⁷⁹. Finally in France the military had a larger claim on social resources than anywhere in continental Europe outside of the UK. - at least that is, up until the early seventies. After 1969 the trade union settlement which followed the general strike of May 1968 forced both a sharp increase in wages and benefits going to

French workers⁸⁰, and the scaling back of some strategic programs in the early seventies.

Post-war France's place in the international division of labor has been shaped by its special place in the international state system, that is, by the fact that military and industrial policies have worked together to improve her international competitive standing. The French national development strategy depended on a military industrial sector which played an exceptionally important role and which was unique in Europe - especially given the British decision to resign from the aerospace technological competition with the Superpowers in the late fifties⁸¹.

The industrial transformation of the forties, fifties and sixties was state-led to a considerable degree, with defense related sectors playing a crucial role in the development of competitive high-technology industries -atomic energy, aerospace and aviation, telecommunications and electronics, space satellites and launch vehicles. Even though the French state pursued state "planning" for the national economy which promoted rapid economic growth from the late forties through the early seventies, the national development plans were implemented by private business organizations under state guidance exercised through state incentives in the form of investment credits and subsidies⁸². More particularly, the state provides a disproportionately large share of R & D funding (relative to the other leading industrial countries), mainly through the national budgets for defense and nuclear

energy⁸³. State goals for technological modernization were often implemented through public companies which had either monopolies or important market shares in telecommunications, transport, aerospace, energy, banking and arms production.

At the same time the French were able to use massive arms sales abroad to support the financial weight of the effort required to remain technically competitive with the Superpowers in the nuclear and aerospace fields as well as across a broad range of advanced conventional weapons technologies. Successes in the foreign arms and aerospace markets helped to defend France's overall position in the manufacture of high-value, high technology products and to redress a deficit in the export of industrial goods which had become a chronic problem in the French balance of commerce⁸⁴.

Table No. 5-5

FRENCH SHARE OF WORLD TRADE

Sector	France		Structure of World Trade	
	1963	1988	1963	1988
Industrial Manufacture	8.1%	7.1%	62%	76%
Agriculture	3.0%	10.1%	13%	7%
Energy	2.5%	2.7%	25%	17%
Total	6.6%	6.8%	100%	100%

Source: Pierre Ralée, "Quel est le poids économique de la France dans le monde?," L'Etat De La France: 1992, Edit.Découverte, Paris 1992, p 582.

Whatever their value as instruments of French diplomacy in the Third World, conventional arms sales created needed jobs within the French military industrial complex and kept

production lines open permitting longer production runs and economies of scale. Profitable foreign contracts in conventional areas helped offset the costs of high-technology "prestige projects" in space and nuclear weapons technology which could only be sold to French state buyers. Further the sales of advanced conventional weapons systems remained an area where the French could be confident about retaining their share of "high tech" equipment sales during a time when their overall share of manufacturing sales was in decline as can be seen above in Table 5-5.

After having pursued an aggressive policy of conventional arms exports to regional powers in the Middle East and elsewhere in the third world for several decades, by the early eighties France had become the world's third largest arms supplier after the U.S. and the Soviet Union, followed closely by the United Kingdom (see Table 5-6 below). As Edward Kolodziej cogently argues in his Making and Marketing Arms, the French national arms industry has become an important export platform which has promoted "domestic" welfare in France as well as the capacity of the French state to wage modern warfare⁸⁵. We can note, however, that their ability to keep this up indefinitely has been called into question by the drying up of the Middle East arms market outside of Iran and Iraq and by the entry of other arms producers such as China, Germany and Brazil into the world arms market - all of whom have cut into France's share of the third-world markets which remain. Doubts now exist as to whether the state-led

pattern of industrial development will work in the future as it has in the past⁸⁶.

One concern is that the influence of defense bureaucracies on the choice of future technology, especially that of the missile and atomic "lobbies" in DGA or CEA, will push France in the direction of "baroque innovations" of existing technologies⁸⁷. Another is that the effect of state-led modernization will distort the competitiveness of French firms in the international marketplace.

Table 5-6.

Leading Exporters and Importers of Major Conventional Weapons, 1987-91

Exporters	Value	Importers	Value
	(billions \$*)		(billions \$*)
USSR	61.3	India	17.6
US	60.0	Saudi Arabia	10.6
France	11.2	Iraq	10.3
Britain	9.1	Japan	9.8
China	7.9	Afghanistan	8.4
W. Germany	6.1	Turkey	6.4
Czechoslovakia	3.3	Egypt	5.5
Italy	1.9	Spain	5.0
Netherlands	1.8	Czechoslovakia	4.7
Brazil	1.6	North Korea	4.0
Top 10 total	164.1	Top 10 total	82.9

* In constant 1990 prices; all numbers are rounded.

Source: Adapted from Ian Anthony et al., "The Trade in Major Conventional Weapons," in Stockholm Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1992.

Here the main worry is that the influence of defense-related R&D will perpetuate an export strategy based on "state to state" negotiations for big-ticket items - metro systems, or fighter aircraft - rather than a fight for position in consumer markets. Despite France's post-war achievement in

creating a world class scientific complex which has had some real commercial success in marketing aircraft, satellites, telecommunications and nuclear power plants, in other areas state initiatives have not met with success, most notably with failure of the French computer industry to become truly competitive. More importantly, France has basically avoided industrial dependance on the US and Germany by becoming "a specialty producer of arms and military technology" which is heavily reliant on exports to third world countries⁸⁸.

The European turn of Mitterrand's policy represents an attempt to create or to reinforce European institutions which will permit France's to use her neighbor's budgets to realize French technological and strategic projects, as has already occurred with the Ariane and Hermes space projects. The question is whether this really represents a winning formula. Apparently, the Socialists still think so, and Mitterrand's Eureka program for the development of European-wide R&D in the sunrise industries represents an innovative variant on the traditional approach French policy-makers⁸⁹. But in the 1980s the nuclear fetish of French elites made it seem unlikely that there was much room for the exploration of alternative paths of development - the current fashion for neo-liberal ideology notwithstanding. It is possible, however, that the space program might be a focus for reforging a technological consensus in which aerospace achievements would gradual displace the nuclear industry as France's prestige symbol.

This path would not threaten the role of the state scientific and technical apparatus, but it is workable only if this represents a project which can mobilize the support of other European states and their budgets. The fact that nearly everyone thinks of the European Space Agency's ARIANE launch vehicle as a French rocket suggests that this trick is not impossible. And the fact that the Germans have signed on with budgetary support for the Ariane 5, and the Italians and Spanish for a military version of the SPOT reconnaissance satellite⁹⁰, suggest that the French can do it more than once. This is in effect what the Eureka project seeks to do for other areas of technology.

Questions of industrial policy are relevant to understanding the promise and limits of Mitterrand's vision of France as one of the leaders of a New Europe. It was a troubled vision in trouble, because it was essentially a technocratic/industrial vision of the New Europe as a commercial competitor for the U.S. and Japan, as well as a

TABLE No. 5-7

FROM THE MIRACLE TO THE END OF FRENCH EXCEPTIONALISM

Country	Growth Rate			Rate of Unemployment		
	1962-73	1973-79	1979-89	1973	1979	1990
US	4.1%	2.4%	2.8%	4.8%	5.8%	5.4%
Japan	10.4%	3.6%	4.2%	1.3%	2.1%	2.1%
EEC (average)	4.6%	2.5%	2.1%	2.9%	5.7%	8.4%
France	5.5%	2.8%	2.0%	2.7%	5.9%	9.0%
West Germany	4.5%	2.3%	1.8%	0.8%	3.2%	5.1%
UK	3.3%	1.5%	2.3%	3.0%	5.0%	6.9%
Italy	4.8%	3.7%	2.5%	6.2%	7.6%	9.9%

Source: Robert Boyer, "Le capitalisme français et ses concurrents," L'Etat De La France: 1992, Edit. Découverte, Paris 1992, p 365.

geopolitical power which could have rivaled Soviet influence in Central and Eastern Europe and perhaps the power of the US in the Middle East. Despite the efforts of the anti-totalitarian Left to give it republican credentials, and a some moral depth, it is still unclear that this vision of Europe has all that much appeal (or credibility) outside of the French leadership class. It does come attached to not a few drawbacks. Besides being wedded to a nuclear energy program which is as hazardous to economies as to the biosphere, it is associated with a model of state planning which appears commercially unviable. Its technocratic cast gives it the further disadvantage of not being very democratic, but it would not do to discount its appeal on those grounds alone. Despite this negative baggage, the French program has the considerable merit of clearly confronting the dangers of continued European dependence on the U.S. for its basic security and technological leadership.

The drawbacks in the French strategy have been felt in the economic troubles - slow growth and high unemployment - which have interrupted France's phenomenal post-war growth rate since the middle seventies. Second only to Japan's through 1973, the French now find themselves outpaced by the Italians as we see in Table 5-7. At the same time, there is a growing understanding that an economic strategy which relied on the national defense sector to conserve France's high-technology industries and spark general economic growth was no longer viable. Indeed it assumed a national industrial strategy which

is in flat contradiction with the liberal assumptions built into the market based strategy represented by France's policy of opening her economy to the unified European market. Whatever the strategic rationale for continuing the modernization of French strategic forces, it no longer seems congruent with the government's strategy for economic competition as it has been in the past. By the early 1990's the global definition of "national defense" had come unstuck with the weakening of the economic rationale for a state centered industrial strategy.

- 1 Anderson, op cit, pp 97, 101, & 106.
- 2 See R. R. Palmer on the aristocratic renewal in the 18th century, The Age of Democratic Revolution, Vol I, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1959, pp 27-30 & 74-83.
- 3 Anderson, op cit, pp 48-54.
- 4 Anderson, op cit, pp 104-05.
- 5 Skocpol, op cit,. pp 51 -65.
- 6 Kesselman and Krieger, op cit, pp 132-134.
- 7 Mc Neil, op cit, 187 -201.
- 8 Giddens, The Nation State and Violence, op cit,p 233.
- 9 Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, Stamford University Press, Stamford, 1976. pp 3-10 & 292-302.
- 10 Ehrmann and Schain, op cit,. pp. 6-11.
- 11 Mc Neil, op cit, 198-202. See also George Rudé, Revolutionary Europe: 1783 - 1815, Harper & Row, New York, 1964, pp. 201-22.
- 12 Mc Neil, op cit., pp 202-06 & 214-15. See also Rudé, op cit., pp. 264-283.
- 13 Kesselman & Krieger, op cit., pp 136-37. For a dissenting view which sees the French formula of slow industrial and population growth, see Paul Kennedy's view of France under the Second Empire as an original "hybrid power," Kennedy, op cit. pp. 166-69.
- 14 J. E. S. Hayward, op cit., pp 12 -13.
- 15 Dudley Baines, Emigration From Europe 1815-1930, Macmillan, London, 1991, pp. 7-16. Also Mc Neil, op cit., pp 308-317.
- 16 Kennedy, op cit., pp 147-50.
- 17 Baines, op cit., p 21.
- 18 Giddens, The Nation State and Violence, op cit., pp 222-27.
- 19 Mc Neil, op cit., pp. 242-54.
- 20 Alistair Horne, op cit., pp. 10-15.
- 21 Mc Neil, op cit., pp. 318-322. Also see Horne, op cit., p. 30.
- 22 Horne, op cit., pp. 17-31.
- 23 Mc Neil, op cit., p 322.
- 24 Mc Neil, op cit., p 318.

- 25 See Horne, op cit., pp. 62-72 for a portrait of the state of military morale and the character of civil/military relations by the War's end. For the political situation inside France see Robert Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order 1940-1944, W.W. Norton Company, New York, 1975, pp.280-326.
- 26 Horne, op cit., pp 69-70.
- 27 Paxton, op cit., pp 109-131 & 309-326.
- 28 Alfred Grosser, Affaires Extérieures: La Politique de la France 1944/1984, Flammarion, Paris, 1984. pp 27-32.
- 29 Horne, op cit.,. See also Edgar Furniss, op cit. pp 14 -18.
- 30 Horne, op cit. pp 72-74.
- 31 See Dominique David's introduction to La Politique de Défense de la France, op cit., pp. 8-12.
- 32 Alfredo Valladao, op cit., pp 578-79. See also Kennedy, op cit., p 366.
- 33 Kennedy, op cit., pp. 357-62.
- 34 Paul Kennedy, op cit., pp. 368-70.
- 35 Paul Kennedy, op cit., pp. 365-72. See also Robert Kuttner, The End of Laissez Faire, Alfred Knopf, New York, 1991, pp.31-40 & 48-53.
- 36 Jean-Pierre Rioux, La France de la Quatrième République, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1980, pp. 32-47.
- 37 Jean Pierre Rioux, op cit., pp 187-89. For loans as opposed to grants the British were at the top of the list.
- 38 Frédéric Bozo, La France et l'OTAN: De la guerre froide au nouvel ordre européen, Masson/IFRI, Paris, 1991. p 48-62.
- 39 Kolodziej, op cit., pp, 42-48.
- 40 Kolodziej, op cit., pp. 46-48.
- 41 Bozo, op cit., pp 51-59.
- 42 Kolodziej, op cit., pp 49-50.
- 43 My uncle by marriage, Pierre Coufleau, who played an role in the setting up of the CNES, recounted to me the frustrations of French scientists and engineers who were only able to pick off the third string of German scientific talent immediately after the war.
- 44 Wilfrid Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1971, pp 50-54. See also Kolodziej, op cit., pp 49-50.
- 45 Kohl, op cit., p.18
- 46 Kolodziej, op cit. pp. 45-46.

47 See Kohl, op cit., pp. 19-29, for an account of the French military's Bomb project. The story of Franco-Israeli cooperation in the early post war period is told by Seymour Hersh in The Sampson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy, Random House, New York, 1991, pp 33-46.

48 Kolodziej, op cit., p 46.

49 Robert Gilpin, France in the Age of the Scientific State, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1968, pp 151-171.

50 Grosser, op cit., pp. 39-47.

51 Bozo, op cit., pp.54-55.

52 See Rioux, op cit., pp 126-33.

53 Michel Martin, op cit., 16-18. See also Horne, op cit., p 71.

54 Robert Kuttner, op cit., pp. 36-43.

55 Kolodziej, op cit., p.41, points out that in 1954 almost 20% of all French military expenditures were covered by American aid programs.

56 Horne, op cit., p 73.

57 Julliard, "La Course au Centre," op cit., p 80.

58 Kesselman and Krieger, op cit., p 172.

59 Pierre Birnbaum, Les Sommets de l'Etat: Essai sur l'élite du pouvoir en France, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1980. pp. 49-66.

60 Birnbaum, Les Sommets de l'Etat, op cit., pp 69-80.

61 Horne, op cit., 74-77. See also Furniss, op cit., pp 18-22.

62 Alistair Horne, op cit., pp 80-82. For a detailed account see also his A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, Penguin Books, New York, 1977, pp 273-98 & pp 436-60.

63 Furniss, op cit., pp 41-56.

64 Furniss, op cit., pp. 70-73.

65 Grosser, op cit., pp. 147-172. See also Kohl, op cit., pp. 123-30 and Kolodziej, op cit., pp. 65-69.

66 Bozo, op cit., pp. 65-91.

67 Martin, op cit., pp. 36-38.

68 Martin, op cit., p. 128

69 Kolodziej, op cit., pp. 89-90.

70 Martin, op cit., pp. 66-73.

71 Kolodziej, op cit., pp. 373-381

72. Martin, op cit., pp 119-123.

73 Kolodziej, op cit., pp. 94-95. For a more detailed presentation of the Soldiers movement see Robert Pelletier and Serge Ravet, Le mouvement des soldats: les comités de soldats et l'antimilitarisme révolutionnaire, François Maspero, Paris, 1976, pp 37-54.

74 These program reductions altered the "global scope" of French strategic programs by cancelling the effort to build a intercontinental range missile. Gallois gives vent to his feelings about President Valéry Giscard D'Estang' slowdown of strategic programs in an unpublished manuscript, A Defenseless Septennate.

75 Martin, op cit., pp. 36-37 & 89-90.

76 Kesselman and Krieger, op cit., p. 9.

77 Kesselman and Krieger, op cit., pp.9-11.

78 Jean Fourastié, Les trente glorieuses, Fayard, Paris, 1979, pp. 35-49. For a synthesis in English see Ehrmann and Schain, op cit., pp 22-27 & 30-46.

79 Kesselman and Krieger, op cit., pp 150.

80 Kesselman and Krieger, op cit., pp 156-57.

81 Lawrence Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, Macmillan, London, 1980, pp 7-14.

82 Kesselman and Krieger, op cit., pp. 152-55.

83 Kolodziej, op cit., pp. 192-98.

84 Pierre Ralle, "Quel est le poids économique de la France dans le monde," l'Etat de la France 1992, op cit., pp. 582-84. Ralle points to the decline in the French share of the world market for intermediate manufacturing goods. Kolodziej argues convincingly that arms sales of high tech equipment has helped redress this imbalance, Kolodziej, op cit., pp. 200-203.

85 Kolodziej, op cit., pp. 407-400.

86 See Hugo Sada, "Un Marché Tendu" and "La France face à ses Armes," in Armes: France 31ème Grand, published by Autrement, Paris, Oct. 1985, pp. 178-87. Also many of these themes came up in interviewing I did in the summer of 1986.

87 I owe much of this argument to Mary Kaldor's Baroque Arsenal, Hill & Wang, New York 1981, but I heard echoes of this position from both members of CODENE and some French defense specialists in interviews done in 1985.

88 Kolodziej, op cit., p. 200.

89 For a good overview of the scope of the Eureka program, see "Eureka: Les Trésors Cachés de l'Europe des Sciences, Special issue of Sciences & Avenir, No 58, Winter 1985, pp. 7-24.

90 Jacques Isnard, "L'Espagne s'associe au projet franco-italien d'un satellite de reconnaissance militaire," Le Monde, March 27-28, 1988, p. 8

VI

The Post-War Strategic Revolution

The World System Transformed:

The Allied victory in World War Two brought the end of the multi-polar international system based on a complex balance of power centered in Europe, and resulted in the political ruin of all the former Great powers. The end of the second European "civil war" of the century, WWII, also brought both the Soviet Union and the United States into the heart of Europe where they imposed themselves as the dominant players. The intervention of these two "outside" powers brought an end not only to European hegemony within the world system, but also to the strategic independence of the former European "Great Powers" within the international state system - creating the "bi-polar" world-system typical of post-war diplomacy¹. During the early years of the Cold War American hegemony over Western Europe and Japan and the Soviet grip over Eastern Europe and China underwent rapid consolidation and the world system was reorganized in terms of the geopolitical competition between two Superpower blocs².

The Post War Nuclear Revolution:

At the same time, the traditional links between state sovereignty, regime legitimacy and national cohesion were radically altered by transformation of both warfare and armies

in what Michael Mandelbaum described as the "nuclear revolution³." The possession of nuclear arsenals by a handful of great powers transformed the hierarchy of states within the international system by raising the costs of general warfare to levels unacceptable to national leaders foreclosing recourse to war as an rational option for policy makers.

That the "Cold War" did not turn hot by technical accident or political miscalculation was no doubt due in part to the decision of the United States in the late forties to counter the conventional superiority of the Red Army with the threat of nuclear bombardment⁴ - a development which finally gave the US Air Force weapons of mass destruction equal to their exaggerated claims for the strategic value of "air power⁵." At the same time, American attempts to intimidate the Soviet leadership by the use of nuclear threats directed against the Soviet homeland were eventually countered by the development of a credible Soviet retaliatory capability against American population centers⁶. This condition of nuclear terror threatened in theory to transform any direct conflict between the Superpowers or their allies into a global conflagration but in actuality by creating the probability of "Mutual Assured Destruction" it rendered the possibility of general war increasingly hypothetical⁷. Nuclear deterrence cancelled out the relative military advantages of each side, so that the "strategic assets" accumulated became effectively useless. As a consequence mass conscript Armies and systems of national mobilization lost much of their purpose, giving way to a

"forces in being model" in which high technology weapons systems are serviced by small corps of highly trained professionals⁸.

This strategic evolution however encouraged an unhealthy European dependence on American nuclear protection as European politicians realized that it was cheaper to substitute American nuclear warheads for European conventional manpower than it was to make a regional effort to defend themselves from the "Soviet Threat." Inside Europe the warfare function of many smaller states has tended to atrophy, and social welfare policy became the new foundation for political legitimacy, citizen identity, and social cohesion in the "neo-corporatist" social systems of Western Europe⁹. Thus even as the boundaries between the European states were frozen at the close of World War Two between contending ideological and strategic alliances centered on two core superpowers, the position of most non-nuclear states was reduced to one of strategic dependency on one or another of them.

The Cold War and the Bi-Polar World:

The strategic competition - the Cold War - passed through three overlapping stages. The first lasted from 1945 to 1962, and concerned the control of the European "heartland", the former geo-political "center" of the international state system now turned into a borderland region. Here the frontiers between the blocs were essentially established along the stop lines of the advance into Germany by Anglo-American armies from the West and by Russian forces from the East¹⁰. Behind

this frontier each Superpower proceeded to establish social systems compatible with their own institutions. While the Americans intervened not so covertly to turn back the political threat represented by powerful communist parties in Italy and France¹¹, the Soviets rapidly snuffed out the existence of all social and political formations independent of the local communist parties and then followed up with a purge of "nationalist elements" within the parties themselves¹².

By contrast in Western Europe things turned out quite differently. Despite the leading role of Communist organizations in the wartime resistance movements of Nazi occupied Europe, the Leninist party organization was not particularly well suited to peacetime electoral competition in the mature democracies of Western Europe and North America¹³. Outside the area under direct military occupation by the Red army, communist parties were unable to dominate their non-communist rivals - unless they pushed their doctrine and organization in a "social democratic direction¹⁴." Not surprisingly Communist parties in the West were frequently obliged to lie about the real character of the Communist political record in the Soviet Union, the former Soviet bloc and the third world - distortions of history which had caught up with them in most places in the 1950's, but only surfaced in France in the 1970's¹⁵.

Events in 1948 and '49, the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, Tito's break with Stalin, the Berlin blockade and airlift, ushered in the first phase of the strategic competition during which the Cold War was at its "deepest."

Throughout this period which lasted until the late fifties, diplomatic contacts between the two blocs were minimal and heavily colored by ideological hostility¹⁶. Meanwhile each Superpower went ahead with the construction of regional military alliances subject to their national control - NATO and the Warsaw Pact - and with the rearmament of the two Germanies even as they built up their own garrisons in Central Europe.

The first phase of the Cold War ended once the existence of the Berlin Wall was unchallenged and the Cuban missile crisis (the moment perhaps in which World War III came closest) was over. Up until the "revolution of 1989" both sides accepted that Eastern Europe was in one camp and Western Europe in the other, and even major military interventions such as the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968 did not disturb the stability of the territorial division between the superpower blocs¹⁷. Thus the strategic competition between the two blocs was eventually stabilized and diplomatic and political communication renewed but at the cost both of a technological arms race which became evermore costly and of a military presence in a divided Europe which seemed endless¹⁸.

The second stage of the Cold War, concerning competition for position in Asia, began with the Chinese Revolution in 1948 and the Indochinese and Korean Wars in 1950. It ran finally down some thirty years later in 1975 with the end of the Vietnamese War. This conflict opened with post-war

struggles between local national liberation movements and the forces of European colonial powers such as Holland and France who sought to regain control of the colonial possessions they had earlier lost to Japan¹⁹. These local conflicts took on a global dimension when in many cases Communists took over the leadership of the local insurgencies, and the United States (and Great Britain) intervened to support and then supplant the military forces of the former colonial powers - thus connecting these regional wars with the larger pattern of strategic competition.

In the regional wars of the post-war era, indigenous communist organizations often showed a real talent in leading local resistance to the colonial powers. Their flair for "war communism" gave the Leninist organizations a built-in predisposition toward bureaucratic authoritarianism and an appalling readiness to waste human life on a massive scale - traits which worked well enough in times of war and war mobilization²⁰. These traits were attractive to those third world nationalists who were more concerned with constructing powerful war machines and national administrations than with fulfilling ideological hopes for building democratic socialism. Leninist models of party organization and unconventional warfare - "the People's War" - were adopted by communist and non-communist "liberation movements" alike all over the third world. They provided the "political and military capabilities" needed to overthrow foreign colonial administrations and at the same demonstrate that the firepower of professional armies

could not necessarily repress the national aspirations of politically mobilized populations²¹.

From Algeria to Vietnam, and Lebanon to Afghanistan, European professional armies showed that they remained formidable killing machines and that - with the notable exception of the French Army in Indochina - they were still able to avoid suffering direct defeats on the battlefield. At the end of the day, however, all the Western powers like the French, were eventually forced to settle with third world leaderships and withdraw. Experience showed that third world movements could absorb greater human losses than public opinion in the home country was willing to tolerate²². In the twentieth century the demographic explosion in the third world was systematically translated into a political advantage for national movements over against their former colonizers - now it was the third world who had surplus manpower available to "spend" in war. Ironically this rule proved as true for Soviet public opinion in Afghanistan in the 1980's as it had earlier for other old colonial powers.

The final stage of the Cold War might have its beginning placed in 1954 with the beginning of the Algerian War, and its end placed in 1988-89, when the Russians pulled out of Afghanistan, the Cubans out of Angola, and the United States ended military support for the Contras. It was a struggle for the allegiance of underdeveloped societies in Latin America and Africa and the Middle East, mostly "fought" over such militarily and economically insignificant countries as

Grenada, Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan. Although these struggles set new limits on the capacities of modern professional armies to operate successfully against "unconventional guerilla forces," it also took quite an ideological stretch by both Left and Right to believe that anything very important to the future of the world system rested on "victory" in any of these countries. This was a leap of faith that some Western geo-strategists and policy makers made willingly because they saw in these frontier skirmishes as crucial tests of strategic "credibility" and political "will" in a nuclear environment which did not allow much room for direct confrontations between the competing alliance systems²³.

The "medium and low-intensity conflicts" of the eighties, suggested a renewal of "Western gunboat" diplomacy in response to the Soviets' retreat - a trend confirmed with the massive reentry of Western armies into the Middle East during the Gulf War. Western public opinion has shown a renewed willingness to support armed intervention in the third world as we have seen with the British in the Falklands, the French in Chad, and the Americans in Grenada, Panama, Iraq and recently Somalia. Obscure conflicts in Central America, Southern Africa and Afghanistan have been fought with a changing cast of new strategic players. Countries as different as Israel, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Argentina and South Africa have entered into informal alliances with the western "great powers" who have frequently provided the men, weapons and money needed to

win²⁴. Regardless of the outcome, the impact of these conflicts on their third-world battlefields - societies such as Angola or Ethiopia and Afghanistan which figure among the poorest of the third world - has been devastating. The sudden end of the Cold War does not bode well for their recovery since it has resulted in their further marginalization within the world system.

The close of the Cold War conflict in Asia was equally ironic: the Communists "won" Indochina and lost the rest of Asia by and during their victory. At the same time, American involvement in the Korean and Vietnam Wars helped "jumpstart" the recovery of Japanese industry and to feed Japan's economic expansion even as it encouraged the industrialization of Korea and the growth of the overseas outposts of Chinese capitalism - Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore²⁵. American Capitalism finds itself under increasing pressure from its former Asian clients - Japan and the "four little dragons" - which represent not only commercial and technological challengers but increasingly, very much like Western Europe, an alternative model of societal organization²⁶.

The Transformation of the Cold War Bloc System:

By the late 1980's the Cold War was over because the former Soviet Union could no longer afford the continued costs of the strategic competition. More fundamentally the Communist revolutionary challenge to Western Capitalism has ended because the revolutionary Leninist model, the Soviet State to which it gave birth, and the post-war system of client regimes

in Eastern Europe imposed by the Red Army have all collapsed in quick succession. The Russian retreat to the margins of the European state system, and the restoration of a variety of nationalist capitalist regimes in Eastern Europe, have removed the principle issues over which the United States and the Soviet Union were opposed in the central arena of their cold war competition: Western and Central Europe²⁷.

We now know that the Superpower accommodation of the 1960's "froze" the post-war division of Europe in appearance only, and that profound cultural and political forces were at work which cut across the Cold War frontiers. The "Cold War" peace allowed the social democracies of the West to cut their military "overhead" and to create modern consumer economies and democratic welfare states in the fifties and sixties²⁸. During the sixties and seventies they began to export this societal model to the relatively underdeveloped countries of Southern Europe. At the same time the economic and social successes of Western Europe helped to delegitimize the squalid little "socialist" regimes maintained by the Red Army in Eastern Europe²⁹. One could also argue that the period of American "hegemony" gave the West European social democracies needed time to lay the foundations for an independent center of world influence: The European Economic Community - and thus to prepare the restoration of a multi-polar world in which the United States would again be just one "great power" among several others³⁰.

At the same time we now face in the very "heartland" of the former Soviet Superpower an unstable zone populated by "failed multi-ethnic states" - the former Soviet Union itself and the ex-Yugoslavia - and weak, fragmentary "post communist regimes"³¹. New "national states," such as the Ukraine, have succeeded the old Soviet Union inheriting its ethnic tensions and economy and ecological failures, and, in some cases, sizable bits of its strategic nuclear arsenal as well. Since 1989 the rapid disintegration of the former Soviet bloc eliminated one pole of the bi-polar post-war system transforming the international state system for the second time in fifty years. This transformation raises old fears and new questions. Analysts now must ask themselves: Could Germany, France and the United Kingdom reemerge as regional "Great Powers" who are ready to compete against one another for the allegiance of the new "micro-states" of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union? Can the Franco-German couple somehow endure as regional pole of hegemony capable of consolidating the European Community and continuing the construction of a second global power center? The questions are real even though the answers lie beyond the scope of the present study³².

The Nuclear Revolution Revisited;

The effects of the post-war nuclear revolution are so pervasive that they present pressing social, ecological and ideological reasons for rethinking the problematic relation within modern societies between state violence and national authority. Defense policies based on nuclear deterrence modify the

rules of strategic realism because they are not truly "strategic" in the classical military sense of the term - even when they are commonly labeled as such. When nuclear weapons are deployed as instruments of dissuasion, they do not exist as military resources available for coercive violence. Since they are never intended to be used, they are never expected to contribute to the military resolution of a strategic conflict³³. Rather they are "assets" only to the degree that they block the possibility of a particular military confrontation exceeding a specified threshold of violence³⁴. In this view nuclear weapons deter conflict simply by their very existence not by their actual use. This classification of nuclear weapons as a species of non-strategic assets bends the Clausewitzian rules of strategic conflict in several important ways³⁵.

First it tends to modify the definition of strategic conflicts as "winner take all" situations of absolute antagonism³⁶. Policies of total war or unconditional surrender are excluded because no particular policy objective or national interest is so important that it is worth the risk of the breakdown of deterrence. Further, even should war begin, the uses of violence by "winning side" are restrained by its knowledge that the "losers" can go down to total defeat and still strike devastating blows against the victor's home society. Consequentially, we are lead to expect that crises will be subject to management and resolved in such a way that

no party will feel his central issues are fundamentally threatened.

The interest in crisis management tends to displace the field of conflict away from military forms of confrontation towards forms of political and ideological warfare which remain below the "threshold of violence" which might trigger a nuclear response³⁷. These limits on force tend to violate Clausewitz' principle that military conflicts, once begun, naturally escalate to the maximum extreme of violence possible before one party or another will compromise. Second, effective deterrence assumes that the usual rules of secrecy and deception must be suspended. In order for adversaries to be deterred it is essential that they understand what one's military capabilities are and where the limits of one's tolerance lie. Otherwise miscalculations concerning what one can do and why may lead one party or another to unwittingly exceed the threshold of tolerance of his adversary.

The revolution ushered in by nuclear weapons changed more than the Clausewitzian "rules" in regard to warfare and strategic competition between states. It also changed the rules governing the relations between state organizations and citizens. Nuclear deterrent policies, for instance, only promise certain retaliation for nuclear attack rather than effective protection for society. This policy's best hope is for the maintenance of a condition of "strategic stability" which amounts to an accord between governments to make our vulnerability to enemy attack mutual and permanent³⁸. I believe

that this kind of interstate agreement represents a radical modification of the traditional terms of the social contract between liberal states and their citizens. It simultaneously alters the mission of national defense forces and changes the meaning and value of citizenship itself.

The new and problematic relationship between the state's warfare role and its domestic legitimacy exists for all modern states whether nuclear or non-nuclear, but it finds different expressions within the international state system. For non-nuclear states, their vulnerability to nuclear attack may lead them to transfer some of the responsibility for the protection of their populations to outside powers, surrendering in effect a part of their traditional "warfare" role and state sovereignty to a foreign "protector," and risking the erosion of their domestic legitimacy. The path towards "strategic dependency" was the one chosen by (or in some cases the path imposed upon) most middle-range powers in Western and Central Europe in the aftermath of WWII. For nuclear states, however, the insecurity experienced by their populations may very well follow from the actions of their own national governments and political leadership³⁹. Either way, the existence of nuclear weapons has raised anew the issue of the linkage between state institutions of violence, and the legitimacy of the state in relation to the society (or societies) which it claims to protect and defend.

Official French analysts seem to think strategic dependency inevitably erodes both national independence and public

confidence, and see the rise of anti-nuclear movements as a misplaced response to the wounds that the Yalta Agreement inflicted on the sovereignty of their European neighbors. Naturally, they also argue that French public opinion is free of this "pacifist/defeatist" deviation because she has won her people's trust by pursuing a policy of national responsibility for defense⁴⁰. They point to the high levels of support this policy enjoys in the opinion polls; high levels of public tolerance for French defense budgets and the very low levels of draft evasion, as evidence that the French "consensus" is not limited to elite groups. This is viewed by them as being only France's just desserts for having defended her national virtue and the values of "patriotism" for more than a generation⁴¹.

The two British and Danish pacifist analysts cited above, Mary Kaldor and Anders Boserup, pose the issue differently. For them the essential problems for national sovereignty are created by nuclear weapons themselves and "the nuclear revolution" in domestic political systems and in military strategy that these weapons have ushered in. In essence, these analysts believe that nuclear weapons have broken the liberal social contract by undermining the political exchange basic to the nation-state in which citizens gave loyalty in exchange for effective protection from external and domestic threats to their personal security. In this view - one that is also shared by French pacifist spokesman such as Patrick Viveret - nuclear weapons states risk forfeiting citizen loyalty

because instead of protection they only promise retaliation. In effect, nuclear weapons states are charged with offering their own citizens up to their enemies as hostages for their own good behavior.

In this view, nuclear weapon states use their citizens lives to protect their own existence and to advance their own organizational interests. This perverse exchange works as long as the states involved remain vulnerable to each other, and their own citizens don't catch on to the fact that national defense works to maintain, rather than to end, this permanent condition of social insecurity. This corruption of the social contract is seen by some analysts (both conservative strategists and nuclear disarmers) as undermining the function and morale of the armed forces, and as dissolving the link between military service and active citizenship. Indeed radical transvaluation of the idea of "national defense" in the hands of the American theorists of MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) such as Robert Mac Namara into mutual American/Soviet resignation to a permanent condition of nuclear terror, was not only rejected as immoral by pacifist critics on the left but also perceived as being politically defeatist and socially demoralizing by the Reagan era strategists in America.

On the one hand, the Reagan years saw various efforts by American policy-makers and military planners to break out of the political and diplomatic trap created by strategic parity with the Soviets and the policy of MAD. On the military side, the eighties saw a flirtation with doctrines of "deterrence

by denial," and "counter-force targeting", that is, war plans which aimed at meeting any Soviet military action with punishing "counter-force" strikes on the adversary's military "assets" while holding his cities hostage⁴². These doctrines - and deployment of new weapons systems which operationalized them such as the Air Force's MX missile, the Navy's new Trident missile and the Army's Pershings based in Europe -all attempted to restore the credibility of nuclear "war fighting" as a thinkable policy option⁴³. Other conservative strategists turned to promoting anti-communist insurgencies against Communist client regimes in Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua as a means of impressing Soviet leaders with our readiness to go to the brink through regular demonstrations of our willingness to spend lives in "proxy wars"⁴⁴." Finally other Reagan strategists such as Albert Wohlsetter sought an end to the nuclear state of terror through the Strategic Defense Initiative⁴⁵. The Reagan era strategists hoped to find a technological means for restoring the idea of active defense as well as a capacity for the offensive as the new basis of American defense policy which would replace MAD and reestablish the "moral foundation" of the military vocation⁴⁶.

Taken together, anti-deterrence advocates on the right as well as the left saw the "nuclear revolution" as unleashing an erosion of national sovereignty which could be as dangerous to states which possess nuclear weapons as to states which don't. These analysts were not surprised by the appearance of social movements which manifest deep distrust of nuclear

weapons policy; or by conservative protests against nuclear deterrence which propose using new technologies (SDI) to restore a world where defense is again possible, and war-fighting has some relation to traditional national defense goals. In brief, for these analysts nuclear weapons can be seen as dangerous to the preservation of national sovereignty; and as subversive of traditional military values and the social bonds that hold the political community together - and especially so when the nuclear weapons at issue are under foreign control.

Morris Janovitz already raised these issues in his The Professional Soldier in 1960, asking what role traditional soldiers could play in the age of nuclear deterrence, suggesting that modern armies might evolve into a "constabulary" force⁴⁷. More recently, he explored in his The Reconstruction of Citizenship the changing meaning of modern citizenship in a world where the citizen soldier is considered militarily obsolete⁴⁸. I consider that both these works have raised issues concerning the sociological significance of the erosion of traditional military and citizen roles which are close to the concerns which I have addressed here. In a nuclear world where the national defense efforts translates into permanent vulnerability, what meaning is left to the military's traditional vocation? In a world where crises can be decided by a few missile crews, what place is left to traditional armies and the citizen soldiers who fight in them? These are questions which were raised by Morris Janovitz's work on the

professional military, and which have been pursued by some of his students, but more generally have been ignored by much of American Sociology which appears more comfortable leaving the military and issues relating to state violence to other disciplines⁴⁹. But in the last analysis, the "nuclear revolution" is a revolution in social as well as political affairs and it is of interest to see how it has understood by cultural as well as political elites.

Cross-National Issues:

What then are we to make of France - a case in which nuclear weapons and national sovereignty seem to be partners in a political marriage that works? My dissertation intends to use the French case to explore some possible linkages between nuclear weapons policy and state legitimation. In the last analysis, in the 1980's the French strategists were offering more than strategic "perspective" to their European neighbors. Their vision of France as a "consensus society" meant to teach us a lesson of political morality and civic virtue. At the same time, it proposed to the rest of Europe both an agenda for "collective security" and a model for "community sovereignty:" something the French would call a "projet," and which we might name a "security paradigm."

What then was this paradigm? and how was understood by French elites? The French "security paradigm" raises issues which are of broad interest for purposes of cross-national comparison which might be enumerated as follows:

- How does nuclear weapons policy impact on the role of "warfare" in state legitimation, and on the possible erosion of the established roles and rationales both for traditional military organizations and for the citizen-soldier conscripts who still provide the bulk of their fighting forces. Stated in other words, we are confronted with the question of how a strategic perspective based on "nuclear deterrence" - and which accordingly relies on a threat of nuclear retaliation rather than the claim of effective defense to protect the nation-state and its citizens - can serve as a modern "rationale" for the preservation of the traditional discourse of "national sovereignty?"

- A related question concerns the impact of membership in the Superpower alliance systems on the domestic political systems of those mid-size; non-nuclear states which depended on the strategic "umbrella" granted by outside "protectors." Was their "national sovereignty" compromised, and their legitimacy as nation-states diminished in the eyes of their own citizens? If so, how can the traditional discourse of "national sovereignty" be translated into a new language of "common security and collective sovereignty?" This last, of course, should be of as great concern to the proponents of a future European "defense community" as to the defenders of the current arrangements within the Atlantic Alliance.

- We are also confronted with a series of cross-national issues regarding France's position within the existing world system: How did the French use their position within the

international state system centered on the Superpower blocs to win for themselves a exceptional degree of autonomy? How did they hope to translate their autonomy as a marginal player in the American system into a platform for the creation of greater independence for Europe as a whole. Was such an objective compatible with the security needs and industrial policies of their neighbors? These are central concerns which orient my research questions dealing with the "world-view" of my interview subjects.

French nuclear exceptionalism during the Cold War period raised a series of related issues: how could mid-sized nation states retain an effective sense of economic independence and political sovereignty in a global economy and security system dominated by two Superpower blocs? Did the transfer of the "warfare" function to outside protectors during the Cold War period create legitimacy problems for which the "neo-corporatist" politics of "welfare states" could not compensate? How did the French "warfare state" strategy differ from that of her continental neighbors, and what benefits and liabilities accrued to her as a result? Do recent changes in the international system favor their preservation or its erosion?

Now that the Cold War has ended, a new security agenda concerned with the radical transformation of the European security environment has arisen which places the existing elite consensus in France at risk. Given the collapse of the former Soviet bloc and the probable downsizing of American presence in Germany, what changes can we expect in security

policies and national strategies of the "middle-weight" nation states of Western Europe? Can nuclear deterrence work in a world where there is no military Superpower playing the role of challenger to the International state system, but rather many smaller regional challengers? How will the French adjust to the loss of the strategic rationale for the nuclear forces they have made so many sacrifices to acquire? How can their vision of their role in a "new Europe" accommodate itself to the emergence of a reunified Germany as their senior political and strategic partner as well as their banker and main economic market? These are questions we can ask even if the answers to them belong to "work in progress."

It is my belief that these issues are of relevance not only to students of modern European society and politics, but are of some importance with regard to general theoretical issues which concern students of the modern state generally. Issues raised by what Mandelbaum has called the "nuclear revolution" should concern sociologists as much as they have political scientists because this revolution impacts on the legitimation problems of modern democracies, regardless of whether the states concerned are nuclear weapons states or not. Finally, this revolution contributes to the historical process in modern societies which Anthony Giddens argues leads to the progressive "extrusion of violence from everyday life," because it tends to render warfare among developed states increasingly improbable, and extends the gradual pacification of relations of authority to the anarchic world of the

international state system. I agree with Anthony Giddens when he insists that the problem of the link between state violence and state legitimation should be returned to a place of central importance for the students of modern states and societies even when, as in the case of nuclear war-fighting, state violence manifests itself primarily by its absence, that is, as violence of an apparently hypothetical sort.

1 Anton W. De Porte, Europe between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1979, pp. 21-42 & 58-62.

2 De Porte, op cit., pp. 115-160.

3 See the introduction to Michael Mandelbaum's, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima, New York, 1981.

4 Dimbley and Reynolds, op cit., pp. 191-95.

5 See Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1981, pp. 3-12. See also McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival, Random House, New York, 1990. pp. 63-68 & 229-235.

6 Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1983, pp. 152 -167.

7 The reality of this impasse was understood virtually from the beginning by Bernard Brodie, see Kaplan, op cit.. pp. 24-32. For a general description of the strategic impasse which emerged see Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, Cornell University Press, Ithica, pp. 19-26.

8 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier , Free Press/Macmillan, New York, 1971, pp vii-ix & 415-30.

9 David Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance, Basic Books, 1987, pp. 3-7; 153-63 & 215-220. For a discussion of neo-corporatism, please see David Held, Models of Democracy, Stamford University Press, Stamford, 1987, pp. 214-20.

10 De Porte, op cit., pp. 92-141.

11 Richard Barnet, The Alliance: America-Europe-Japan Makers of the Postwar World, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1983, pp. 112-16 & 139-42.

12 Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, Le Grand Frère, Flammarion, Paris, 1983, pp 144-83. See also De Porte, op cit., pp. 118-22.

13 My discussion of the Western Communist parties is drawn from "Socialists, Foreign Power and American Globalism, which I wrote with Jim Chapin for the DSA, unpublished text

14 Bogdan Denitch, "Prospects and Dilemmas of the Socialist Left in Europe," in Democratic Socialism: The Mass Left in Advanced Industrial Society, Bogdan Denitch editor, Allanheld, Osmun, Montclair, 1981, pp. 1-19.

15 Guy Konopnicki, Le PCF ou la momie de Lénine, Editions Garnier Frères, Paris, 1980, pp. 95-112 & 169-174.

16 Kennedy, op cit., p. 371.

17 De Porte, op cit., pp. 166-187.

18 Calleo, op cit., pp. 44-64.

19 Kennedy, op cit., pp. 379-83.

- 20 Mc Neil, op cit., pp. 346-47.
- 21 Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, op cit., pp. 272-276.
- 22 Mc Neil, op cit., pp. 375-376.
- 23 Kaplan, op cit., pp. 328-342.
- 24 John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II, William Morrow & Co., New York, 1986, pp. 326-401.
- 25 See Barnett on the role of US "offshore" contracts in reviving the Japanese economy during the Korean War, op cit., pp. 93-94.
- 26 This is the argument advanced by James Fallows as part of the current debate about American reindustrialization, see his More Like Us, Houghton Mifflin & Co. Boston, 1990, pp. 28-47.
- 27 See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Cold War and Its Aftermath," Foreign Affairs, No 71, No 4, Fall 1992, pp. 31-49.
- 28 Calleo, op cit., pp. 110-114.
- 29 See William Pfaff, op cit., pp. 72-77.
- 30 Kennedy, op cit., pp. 471-88.
- 31 See Gerald Helman & Steven Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy, No 89, Winter 1992-93, pp. 3-20. Also Bogdan Denitch, "Tragedy In Former Yugoslavia," Dissent, Winter 1993, pp. 26-34.
- 32 For an recent example of the genre called the "history of the future, see Kennedy, op cit., pp. 438-536. See also Jacques Attali, Mitterrand's resident intellectual strategist, Lignes d'horizon, Fayard, Paris, 1990, pp. 7-70 and Bogdan Denitch, After the Flood: World Politics and Democracy in the Wake of Communism, Wesleyan University Press, Hanover, 1992, pp. 1-86.
- 33 See Jervis, op cit., pp. 22-29.
- 34 See for instance McNamara's attack on the Reagan era critics of "existential deterrence". Robert S. McNamara, Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age, Pantheon Books, New York, 1986, pp. 28-36 & 74-75.
- 35 Raymond Aron, Clausswitz: Philosopher of War, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliff, New Jersey, 1985, pp. 328-345.
- 36 See Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966, pp. 114 -26. See also Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, War Without Weapons: Non-Violence in National Defense, Schocken Books, New York, 1975, pp. 173-82.
- 37 Jervis, op cit., 29-34.
- 38 See my "Introduction to the English Peace Debate," Telos, No 51, Spring 1982, p. 66.
- 39 See my "Interview with Mary Kaldor," Telos, No 51, Spring 1982, p. 90.

40 See Bruno Colson, "La Culture Stratégique," op cit., pp. 30-34 See also my 1981 interview with Dominique Moïsi, "On French Military Policy," TELOS, No 55 Spring 1983, p. 237.

41 Paris interviews, J. Mason, May-June 1985.

42 See Jervis, op cit., pp. 41-63.

43 See Bright, op cit., pp. 10-12 & 24-30. On the essential folly of this policy, see Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, Cornell University Press, Ithica, 1984, pp. 64-86.

44 Bright, op cit., pp. 18-22.

45 Philip Boffey, William Broad, Leslie Gelb et al, Claiming the Heavens, Times Books, New York, 1988, pp. 56-68 & 205-222.

46 See Albert Wohlstetter, "Swords without Shields," The National Interest, No 8, Summer 1987, pp. 31-57. See also John Tirman's, "The Politics of Star Wars," for the Anti-SDI argument in Empty Promise: The Growing Case against Star Wars, John Tirman editor, Beacon Press, Boston, 1986, pp. 1-33.

47 Janowitz, op cit.

48 Morris Janowitz, The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Consciousness, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1985, pp. 43-72 & 192- 203.

49 Giddens, Social Theory and Modern Sociology, op cit., p. 182.

VII

The Inter-Party Defense Consensus

Justice and politics rarely coincide, but there may be poetic justice in the fact that the care of De Gaulle's legacy, the Fifth Republic, fell to François Mitterrand: De Gaulle's most dogged rival, and once the Republic's bitterest critic. Some have suggested that with Mitterrand's election in 1981, the Republic was no longer its original self - that in its place stood instead the Fifth and 1\2 Republic. This gained even greater plausibility when the anomaly of a Socialist government ruling with a right-wing constitution, was replaced in 1986 by an even weirder arrangement called "co-habitation." Under this arrangement France was ruled for two years between 1986 and 1988 by two heads - a chief executive divided between left-wing President and a right-wing Prime Minister and government¹. The upcoming legislative elections in the Spring of 1993 should tell us whether co-habitation is a reoccurring phenomenon, representing a permanent modification of the Gaullist presidential regime or only a temporary deviation from the main path of post-war French history.

Despite these apparent modifications in regime, the 1980's were characterized by greater continuity than change, and among those things which did not change was France's steady

pursuit of civilian nuclear energy, and the expansion of her nuclear weapon stockpiles. This in itself was hardly extraordinary - all major powers did the same. The fact, however, that France did so quietly, and without much public outcry, was exceptional in the West, especially given the doctrinal and policy changes which have accompanied the modernization of French nuclear forces under the Socialists. Public acceptance of French nuclear weapons policy can perhaps be related to its symbolic value as a totem of national modernization and international prestige in a broader sense. Certainly the institutional and technological requirements of a successful nuclear deterrence policy played a central part in the basic legitimating myth of the Fifth Republic where the "necessities of the nuclear age" helped justify the centralization of foreign policy in the hands of the President². This successful marriage of national myth and nuclear firepower was the basis of the French variant of the "Nuclear Presidency."

Throughout the 1980's a strong consensus developed between the leaders of the four major parties, the RPR and the UDF on the right and the Socialist and Communist Party on the left around defense issues, which held together without interruption until the refusal of Communist deputies to join with the other three parties in voting in favor of the 1987 - 1991 defense budget program. The effect of this consensus was to give French policy-makers great resources for managing public responses to nuclear policy questions. Indeed, they have an unparalleled record of "pre-empting" opposition to their

policies within the Western Bloc³. The capacity of the French state to pursue nuclear energy development without major opposition was especially visible in the 1980's when France enjoyed an apparent "immunity" from the nuclear debates that have plagued nuclear policy-makers in other Western countries.

French "nuclear nationalism" has supported two related developments: the emergence of a strong presidential regime, legitimated by direct elections, and a strategic policy based on the "force de frappe." Together, they represent fundamental features of the Gaullist political settlement which has endured across a change in political generations, (from the generation of the Resistance to the generation of May 68), and a shift of ruling parliamentary majorities from Right to Left in 1981, from Left to Right in 1986 and back again in 1988. Michel Debré has argued that these are related developments because without a strong presidential regime the threat to use nuclear weapons would not be credible⁴ and, as De Gaulle once remarked to John Kennedy, that without the effective sovereignty which only nuclear weapons guarantee, the chief executive would lack the authority to command his armies' loyalty⁵, or resist the pressures of party leaders in the national assembly. President Mitterrand restated the basic principles of the Nuclear Presidency when he revised his earlier (pre-presidential) view by remarking that: "authority to command nuclear weapons can not be shared. It can't be shared given French institutions and simply given the nature of the weapons themselves which forbid it - even in France. Deterrence can

only exist on the condition that decisions are taken by a single man, and quickly - otherwise it does not make much sense⁶." Perhaps Mitterrand better captured the full aroma of this French blend of presidential politics and nuclear weapons when he stated on state television some years ago that: "The keystone of deterrence strategy in France is the head of state, that is myself. All depends on my determination. All the rest is only inert matter..."

Indeed it was this relative independence of the President and his small band of nuclear specialists from popular constraints and democratic accountability in moments of crisis that was actually considered by Pierre Gallois, the original general of the apocalypse, as one of the key "selling points" in clenching the political argument in favor of a nuclear defense policy. As Gallois wrote in 1960:

We should admit that such a security policy will be even more effective because the military means on which it is founded are less dependent on public opinion. Can one imagine any of the people in Western Europe who, after an attack, would be unanimously in favor of a nuclear response which might trigger frightful nuclear reprisals?... Hence comes the other paradox of the epoch - the Western democracies have just agreed to base their security on a policy which would hardly make any sense if it had to depend on popular consent. As a consolation, let's say that the governments with the assent of public

public opinion have rather set up an automatic clock-work mechanism whose movements, like that of striking the hours, escapes afterward from any outside intervention⁷."

One common view of the Fifth Republic sees it as a "nuclear monarchy," crediting the French President with discretionary powers in defense and foreign policy unheard of in other Western systems of government. It remains unclear, however, whether these are only presidential powers, or whether they are shared with the Prime Minister. Under the current constitution, the President is the commander in chief of the armed forces. He alone can order them in and out of action, and can do so virtually without the consultation of anyone but the Chiefs of Staff, his personal aides and the Prime Minister. More importantly, it has become accepted that the President alone can by decree command the French strategic forces into action⁸. This discretion in decision-making along with the right to secrecy which covers these decisions from any legislative or cabinet review, gives the French President the widest latitude of any Western chief executive (and quite possibly greater than any of the former Soviet Party leaders as well) in decisions concerning the use of military force⁹. This certainly is the view that was reflected in my Paris interviews, where the question, "What three individuals in your opinion have the most impact on issues of national defense in France?" was almost invariably answered in terms of the constitutional chain of command with President Mitter-

rand at the top of the list followed by either his two principal military advisors or his two personal staff assistants in the Elysée.

The rub is that the Constitution has also invested important constitutional responsibilities in the hands of the Prime Minister, who is the head of the Secretariat for national defense, and responsible for co-ordinating all decisions taken by the different agencies with national security responsibilities. As long as they work together the French President and his Prime Minister represent a uniquely powerful executive¹⁰. If they do not, power may well travel downward within the national security bureaucracy¹¹.

This fine distinction between a strong presidential regime, and a strong executive regime, was moot until the "co-habitation" experience of 1986-88 because the President as the majority leader had always been in a position to overshadow his Prime Minister regardless of constitutional niceties. However when Chirac and Mitterrand held the reins of power together, these political restraints no longer applied as they have in the past, and the period of co-habitation provided some unseemly examples of jockeying for position between the two before and during important international meetings, the Tokyo summit in 1986 for instance¹².

In view of this novel experience the stability of the inter-party consensus could become critical not only to the France's nuclear policy orientation but also to the integrity of the "Nuclear Presidency." I agree with the argument made

by Sammi Cohen in his La Monarchie Nucléaire that the French security policy legitimates the current French presidential regime as well as particular security policies and military procurement and development budgets. In this last sense, the consensus appears to have had an important legitimation function for party institutions, intellectual elites, and French public opinion in general. French acquisition and development of nuclear weapons has been a central ideological support to the legitimacy of the strong executive regime instituted by General De Gaulle. Taken together the association of the strong executive regime and nuclear deterrence policy constitute a complex we call the "Nuclear Presidency," and a policy consensus we call "Nuclear Nationalism," both of which have been enduring features of the "elite settlement" underlying the Fifth Republic.

At the party level, the French "defense consensus" has for almost a generation helped to organize the co-habitation of different ideological families marked by with long-standing divisions in foreign policy orientation: Atlanticists, Nationalists and Neutralists by providing a common language which covered up the extent of "real dissensus" between these groups. Because French nuclear doctrine raised strategic "uncertainty" to the status of a central principle, official French documents did not even name the Soviet Union as France's primary geo-political adversary before 1984 - preferring instead to talk somewhat vaguely of "potential adversaries." As we have noted already one of the peculiarities of

the French elite settlement was that it left the image of the "strategic enemy" relatively undefined in order to paper over the division of French political elites along anti-Soviet/pro-American axis.

Up until 1984 legislative support for French nuclear weapons programs was ideologically "open-ended" in that it did not imply commitment to any particular set of alliance partners, or hostility to any particular strategic adversary. The language was sufficiently ambiguous that different party elites were allowed "pick the enemy" of their choice - the United States or the Soviet Union. I will argue that this "ambiguity" concerning the mission of French nuclear forces was especially useful to party leaders on the Left, allowing the partisans of François Mitterrand to first build an intra-party coalition within the Socialist Party, and later to enter into an electoral alliance with the Communist Party leadership, the Union of the Left. More broadly, acceptance by left elites of "nuclear nationalism" allowed for a "normalization" of defense policy which preceded and anticipated the general "normalization" of French politics which has been reflected in the diminished impact of party ideologies, and in greater system tolerance for the alternance of left and right-wing party coalitions in government.

Further, the emphasis on national independence and on preserving France's rank as a world power helped dampen any swings in public opinion by allowing most average Frenchmen and women to feel confident that France was still responsible

to herself for basic decisions of war and peace. This last point is emphasized in Dominique David's quasi-official description of the consensus:


"It would seem evident that the public consensus is founded on the perception.. that nuclear weapons ("le Nucléaire") is an irreplaceable constitutive element of contemporary French power - which answers both the legacy of 1940, the traumatic experience of a real defeat, and that of 1945, the loss of the France's power to act as a major actor. Public adhesion is conditioned by two reservations .. that French nuclear firepower rest completely under French control and that French weapons only be deployed for the purposes of deterrence, that is, for no first use¹³."

Strategic Uncertainty and Domestic Politics.

The orthodox strategic discourse proved itself useful politically because it stressed the military value of uncertainty as the psychological keystone of deterrence. The doctrinal privilege given to ambiguity concerning French aims and objectives created an intellectual edifice which left plenty of room for different political families to co-exist more or less peaceably throughout most of the seventies and eighties. By 1985 the cleavages between French political and opinion making elites concerning Pro Soviet and Pro American orientations and acceptance or rejection of the national nuclear strategy had produced a distinct alignment between a

majority party of pro-nuclear "consensus forces" and a small dissident, anti-nuclear minority which cut across traditional left/right divisions, represented visually in Figure 7-1.

In Figure 7-1 right wing groups are represented by squares and left-wing groups by circles. We find that the strategic "dissidents" are separated from the parliamentary majority by two possible lines of division. The first and the most important separates pro and anti nuclear forces. Here we find a small minority of anti-nuclear dissidents made up of communist and non-communist peace groups who occupy the lower right hand corner of figure 7-1. The rest of the chart locates political formations which belong to the broad pronuclear consensus along a political spectrum which ranges from the pro-Soviet Communist party and ultra nationalist National Front to the parties of the center right and left, ie the Socialists, Left Reform Gaullists, and official parliamentary right-wing parties, the UDF and the RPR.



GUIDE TO FIGURE 7-1.

Dissident Outsiders

- 1) PCF, French Communist Party, traditionalist bastion of Communist activists and sympathizers: pro-Soviet but also pro-nuclear in so far as France's own nuclear power industry and strategic strike force is concerned.
- 2) P.S.U., The Unified Socialist Party, the main political formation of the "Catholic Second Left" and "Alternative" Lefts of the sixties and seventies: strongly anti-nuclear, Third worldist and non-aligned, but also anti-communist.
- 3) PS C.E.R.E.S., Center for Socialist Research and Studies, operated both a policy center and political "current" within the PS: Socialist nationalist-neutralists, pro-nuclear and anti-American, often sympathetic to the Communist Party.
- 4) FN, The National Front, the party of the xenophobic Right, strongly nationalist, anti-communist, anti-american, anti-European Community and generally anti-foreigner.

Consensus Forces

- 1) Independent Gaullists, nationalists and pro-nuclear, strongly suspicious of the United States as well as the Soviet Union. Allied with the Mitterrand Government and governing coalition.
- 2) PS, le Parti Socialiste, the Governing Socialist Coalition, Moderately pro-nuclear and anti-Soviet, increasingly pro-European, provisionally pro-NATO. Mitterrandists are made up of competing party clans united by their loyalty to François Mitterrand, President and coalition chief.
- 3) PS Rocardians, the "Anti-Totalitarian Left," strongly anti-Soviet and pro-nuclear, made up of former Maoists and members of the Catholic "Second Left."
- 4) RPR, Neo-Gaullist Right, strongly anti-Soviet and pro-nuclear, ambivalent about Europe, increasingly "Liberal" and pro-American, but with residual nationalist wing.
- 5) l'UDF, Neo-liberal right, moderate centrist, anti-Soviet and pro-European, but deeply Atlanticist, ambivalent about strategic utility of the French strategic force.

The second line of cleavage separates pro-American from anti-Soviet forces with pro-European, Nationalist and Non-Aligned positions scattered along a continuum between these two poles. The anti and pro American cleavage represents a cross-cutting issue which not only divides the traditional left and right but also various Socialist currents and different families of Gaullists. On the Anti-American nationalist side we find not only the extreme right and the pro-Soviet PCF but also the Nationalist wing of the Socialists, the CERES, many of the independent Gaullists and most of the non aligned peace groups such as CODENE and the PSU. While these groups were divided in their political appreciation of the Soviet Union between Communist loyalists and non-communists critics, they were united in their suspicion of American power and motives and their common conviction that the true meaning of De Gaulle's diplomacy lay in France pursuing an "third path" independent of either Superpower - a path they accused both the Socialists and Neo-Gaullists of having abandoned¹⁴. On the other side of this line in the upper left hand corner we find centrist and right-wing forces whose fear of the Soviet Union has led them to accept the need for the NATO Alliance in the short run even as they built a European Community Defense entity for the long-run.

The Principles of the Nuclear Consensus:

The pro-nuclear consensus accepted by the four major French parties comprises five essential principles: three of which are explicitly stated in the preambles of the "Loi de

Programmisation," the four year, military budgetary programs presented to the national assembly. The other two seem implicit in the implementation of these programs, and broadly understood within the party leadership¹⁵. Taken together, these principles define a sort of doctrinal orthodoxy, which was refined in the works of military strategists such as Generals Poirier, Beaufre and Gallois in the 1960's¹⁶, and diffused over the years by Gaullist spokesmen and the missionary work done among French elites by quasi-military bodies such as the FEDN and the IHEDN as described earlier. As Dominique David, the Secretary General of the FEDN remarks:

"The founding Fathers" of French nuclear doctrine are few, and military officers.. Ailleret, Beaufre, Gallois, Poirier, these four name delimit more or less the entire process - from the "special weapons" of the fifties to their theoretical elaboration in the seventies. Civilians with only a few exceptions...hardly figure at all in the debate¹⁷."

The Four Principles of the French Consensus.

The first principle of the official consensus is that the preservation of French sovereignty requires that France maintain and constantly modernize a strategic nuclear force adequate to deter direct attacks on her national territory. The condition of adequacy, "minimal deterrence", is determined according to the doctrine of "deterrence of the strong by the weak." It was stated by De Gaulle with brutal clarity in July 1964: "Beyond a certain level of nuclear capacity..the pro-

portions of the means no longer have any absolute value. In effect, because a man can only die once, deterrence exists once one can inflict mortal injuries on the potential aggressor¹⁸." This principle means that the strength of French nuclear forces need only be proportional to her value as a strategic stake in the international system, i.e. French forces are deemed capable of intimidating the potential adversary (the Soviets) if they can inflict casualties on them greater than the number of France's own population (ie. 55 million dead)¹⁹.

The second principle defines the limits of minimal deterrence in terms of the doctrine of "le tout ou rien." French strategists argue that France is too weak to engage in any prolonged war whether nuclear or conventional, therefore her approach to managing any European crisis threatening her security perimeter is first to deter the enemy by using nuclear threats to maintain the existing condition of non-war, and then confront him with a rapid escalation of the conflict beyond the threshold of general war. French strategy seeks to limit the enemy to an all or nothing choice on the grounds that both limited conventional or nuclear war-fighting are too destructive for Europeans to tolerate. French orthodoxy eschews any of the recent American elaborations on flexible response, and seeks to limit the use of their own conventional forces and battlefield weapons to the role of tripwires which would signal the enemy that he is rapidly approaching the point of no return where further action will trigger nuclear

strikes on his cities. Accordingly, minimal deterrence involves a commitment to a "counter-value" policy of deterrence by "punishment" and forswears developing "counter-force" capabilities which could ultimately undermine French security by making France too threatening to ignore²⁰. It supposes that modest numbers of nuclear weapons allow medium-sized powers to effectively deter Superpowers despite the imbalance in their strategic resources.

This is presumed to hold true even under conditions where the nuclear strike forces of the Superpowers are supplemented by strategic defenses. In the French view strategic defenses are sufficient to forestall "counter-force" strikes against hardened military targets, but not adequate to stop determined attacks against soft "counter-value" targets, ie. the enemy's population centers²¹. This official confidence, however, was subjected to challenge in the middle eighties when the American SDI program seriously rattled some elite opinion leaders, especially in the RPR²².

The third element in the consensus is the principle of "strategic ambiguity." This means that France can never identify either the conditions under which she would commit her nuclear forces, nor indicate in advance the adversary against which they would probably be used. As expressed in the French Defense White Book of 1972, this principle asserts:

"But we must add that if nuclear deterrence is reserved only for the protection of our vital interests, the threshold which defines must neces-

sarily remain vague. This makes a potential adversary less able to gage his room for maneuver, which reinforces the effectiveness of deterrence - the dialectic of dissuasion feeds on uncertainty²³."

French sovereignty and security, it is argued, would be compromised if a French government were ever to allow her treaty obligations to NATO, or her German ally, to automatically engage her forces in case of Superpower confrontation. Strategic ambiguity, then, is a necessary precondition for preserving effective national control over the decision to go to war. In other words, this ambiguity is a necessary consequence of the belief that "deterrence cannot be shared," that France can not rely on others for her national survival, nor can others rely on her. Or in other words, "One must consider the facts without bitterness. They are entirely in the natural order of things, because deterrence is exclusively national. The nuclear risk can not be shared²⁴..." In the Gaullist discourse, French strike forces are meant to deter attacks on both her national territory, the "sanctuaire national" (designated by French strategists as the "first circle" of France's defense perimeter), and her "vital interests" beyond her frontier, that is, Germany (the "second circle"). While major attacks of any sort (nuclear, chemical, or conventional) on French territory are supposed to trigger immediate nuclear counter-strikes, the threshold represented by her "vital interests" beyond her national frontiers has been left open and unspecified until recently.

This ambiguity, of course, has permitted different party leaderships to pretty much pick the enemy of their choice: for the right and the majority of the Socialists, that enemy was necessarily the former Soviet Union; however, for the Communist Party; the extreme left, and some currents of the Socialists and Gaullists, the principal political threat has traditionally come from the United States²⁵. In an 1985 interview the defense journalist Pascal Krop explained to me the dual strategic threat to France in terms of the potential "fallout" of the Soviet/American strategic rivalry:

"The principal military threat is Soviet, but it is aggravated by the American strategic rivalry which is not necessarily favorable for France. The new Cold War between the Superpowers could provoke a war in Europe which would place France and Germany at risk. Europe is the ideal terrain for Soviet/American confrontation, ...the Yalta agreement is very fragile²⁶."

For others on the Left, the Soviet threat was seen as less dangerous precisely because it was seen as primarily military. The American "threat" was "economic and cultural" and hence both more pressing and less obvious. The principle of "strategic ambiguity," fortunately, has been sufficiently abstract that it allowed all tendencies to be satisfied and to co-exist for years, permitting a common strategic discourse to cover up a major point of dissension between party leadership or,

as in the case of the Socialists, between major currents within the party coalition²⁷.

This point of dissension is tied to a real difficulty: the tension in French strategic doctrine between the need to reassure France's German and American partners about her basic solidarity with them, and her need to preserve the appearance of independent national control of nuclear weapons. In theory in order for deterrence to work, foreign alliances must be contingent - France must be free in a crunch to do what her national interest dictates²⁸. In its most extreme expression, the principle of "strategic ambiguity" supported a "nuclear nationalism" which could hardly be distinguished from a doctrine of "armed neutrality."

This was a part of the Gaullist strategic legacy greatly cherished by the PCF and the former CERES wing of the PS. This is clearly what one communist journalist was referring to when he told me that he supported the French national deterrent because it "was the instrument of our non-alignment²⁹." This idea was presented in slightly different language by a young journalist close to the CERES who explained his support of French nuclear deterrent in terms of his broader nationalist outlook:

"I belong to that group of people who think that the world is divided into two grand blocs, and that Europe should find a middle path between them.. Over the past ten years is that I have become a "nationalist of the Left." By which I don't mean national-

ist in right-wing terms, but simply that there are no valid models to be found outside France, and that we must find our own original way in geo-political as well as economic terms³⁰."

This tension, introduces a new division, this time pitting "Atlanticists" against "Nationalists." This division also provided the Communists with their own version of the nationalist card to play against the "Atlanticists," as they attempted to do throughout the eighties by playing on anti-American and anti-German feeling in their criticism of Mitterrand's foreign policy shifts in a more confrontational direction.

The fourth element of the party consensus is the "spoiler principle" which concerns the international environment within which French security policy must operate. The French deterrent works best in a context of a stable balance of forces between the Superpowers. France's military and diplomatic leverage comes from being able to play as a "free agent" in the international balance - the French decision to commit, or not to commit, her nuclear forces adds an element of uncertainty to the calculations the Superpowers can make concerning one another. In crisis situations, the French argue, this principle adds to the stability of deterrence by adding a second center of decision-making, rendering unmanageable any attempt by the Superpowers to limit a conflict to the European theater alone. In this sense the French force de frappe was

presented by some as a pistol pointed as much at Washington as at Moscow³¹.

Ultimately, it was generally understood that French independence depended not only on her own efforts, but also on the preservation of the global strategic balance. This balance, in turn, reflected the interaction between a technological arms race between the Superpowers, or conversely their ability to moderate that race through the arms negotiation process. On the one hand, then, France couldn't and mustn't do anything to support the negotiating process because her own leverage came from being left out of the Superpower's official calculus of the balance of forces. On the other, the future credibility of her strategic forces depended on their success. Here the "spoiler principle" threatened very much to become a double bind.

France's deterrent policy was vulnerable to an acceleration of the Superpower's technological competition which could threaten the technical credibility of the French forces. Hence, France needed certain arms talks to succeed, especially those concerning the deployment of large-scale ABM defenses, or anti-satellite weapons. At the same time, France's ability to keep expanding and modernizing her own nuclear forces could have been threatened by successful arms agreements between the Superpowers which could lay the foundation for taking the nuclear forces of the other three nuclear powers into account. In the 1980's, the process of arms control could easily have generated pressures directly along

the faultlines buried beneath the surface of the domestic consensus, provoking political tremors.

The last element of the consensus concerned the domestic preconditions needed for nuclear deterrence, that is, the strategic role of the consensus itself. This amounted to a prohibition on French politicians saying much to question the technical credibility of French strategic forces, or the President's ability to command it in a crisis. Public criticism along any of these lines was seen as weakening the enemy's belief in French willingness to use nuclear weapons in a crunch, and hence their effectiveness in deterring enemy action when it really counted - ie. the prewar crisis period which leads up to the outbreak of actual hostilities. On the grounds that deterrence is essentially a psychological phenomenon which exists in the mind of the adversary, public discussion of the weaknesses of French nuclear forces became something of a taboo. In the rather "existential" view of one senior Socialist official: "confidence in nuclear deterrence is rather like faith in God, either one is a believer or one isn't³²." This quasi mystical notion of how deterrence works was explained to me by a young analyst at the FEDN in the following terms:

"The credibility of the French national strike force is strong today because it is credible in terms of strategic operational doctrine; at the level of technological capacity and in terms of political sovereignty. Most of all, it is strong because it

is strong, and because if we ever began to say that it wasn't strong, it wouldn't work anymore. So, we must say that it strong. If we were ever to admit that it wasn't credible that would provoke an enormous social crisis. So it must never be said, and anyway it really is strong enough for now³³."

At the same time, mismanagement of foreign affairs by the President, or the Prime Minister, could have been interpreted as upsetting the delicate balance of wills with the adversary, and could have triggered calls for the Government's resignation. As either the Greenpeace, or the Kaddaffi affairs indicated in 1985, incompetence in foreign affairs could be a serious liability for a government which was already in domestic difficulty. More importantly, the political health of the French executive had become identified closely with the credibility and ultimately the survival of the nation itself. This fateful association between the nation and the regime both placed limits on criticism and heightened its impact when it did occur.

Taken together these principles suggested that this internal party accord, founded on a strategic orthodoxy which dates from the 1960's, was vulnerable to external contingencies. Initiatives or setbacks by allies as well as adversaries had a potential for upsetting the presuppositions of the domestic consensus as much as of disturbing the international system to which France belonged. As Patrick Viveret, the Rocardian activist who straddled the divide between the Anti-totali-

tarian left and CODENE noted in 1982, the French nuclear strike force was most "productive," when the international scene was calm³⁴. Or rather, as Viveret himself put it later: "the French nuclear deterrent is like a caramel.. When it's cold outside, its hard, but when things get hot, it melts³⁵." A stable strategic relationship between the Superpowers and not confrontation, provided the only context within which France was able maximize the diplomatic leverage that their possession of nuclear weapons offered. Superpower tensions diminished this leverage because it obliged the French to move closer to their American Superpower ally and patron. Now, of course, that the Yalta system itself has collapsed, the benefits which possessing nuclear weapons confers on France have become increasingly difficult to define³⁶.

The French sense of their position and responsibilities as the "world's third nuclear power" occupied an important if not central place in the unspoken accord which united the parties of the left and right around common national goals. It was reflected in the ease with which all parties from the Neo-Gaullist RPR to the Communists referred to De Gaulle's nationalist legacy to legitimate their various programmatic statements. It was echoed in the common satisfaction expressed by party spokesmen from all corners in France's record of mastering the complex technologies required for the development of thermonuclear warheads, the construction of missile-firing submarines, or commercial space launch vehicles.

Ironically, the assertion of national pride was especially evident when I spoke with some of my Communist informants. One party defense expert proudly spoke of the role of the late Charles Tillon who as Minister of Armaments in De Gaulle's first post war cabinet played a central role in helping to resurrect the French aviation industry from the ruins of World War Two. In the course of the same interview this party expert went out of his way to also underline the importance of Joliot Curie, the communist nuclear physicist, in setting up the Commission pour l'Energie Atomique again as if to signal the validity of the Communist claim to be a long-standing supporter of France's defense industries and scientific industrial complex³⁷. The same note of technological enthusiasm could be heard from one Communist dissident from les Rencontres Communistes who took me by surprise by his insistence on the technical credibility of the French nuclear deterrent. His remarks were far removed from the dismissal of French nuclear capacities so typical of the Left in the sixties as just a technical toy - une bombinette. "I have more than a little confidence in it," he assured me, "It really can do a lot of damage,..it really can sting very hard³⁸."

My interviewing among French elites in the middle eighties showed a high degree of convergence among my informants concerning their estimate of France's weight in the international world system and the sources of French influence as shown in Table 7-1. Surprisingly half of the non-communist pacifists I spoke with agreed with the opinion held by most

of the "defense policy insiders" (civilian defense specialists) that France was indeed the "leading middle weight - power," and the "third nuclear power" on the planet. Both the specialists and the pacifists argued that this reflected the size of its nuclear arsenal and the growth of its military industrial sector. The specialists however tended to emphasize the value of their nuclear assets, while the pacifists understandably downplayed it and highlighted instead the role of French arms sales to the Third World.

Table 7-1.

ELITE VIEWS OF FRANCE'S RANK IN THE WORLD

<u>Strategic Rank 3rd Nuke. 4/5 6th</u>				<u>Resource Base.</u>				
<u>Prof/Political</u>				<u>Mil</u>	<u>Ind/</u>	<u>Cul.</u>	<u>Global</u>	
<u>Grouping</u>				<u>Nuke tech.</u>			<u>Role</u>	
Def. Spec.	(14)	8	5/1 (6)	1	12	1	4	12
Mil.Off.	(8)	3	2/2 (4)	1	7	0	5	3
Journalists	(8)	3	2/3 (5)	0	6	7	1	2
PS	(8)	1	5/1 (6)	0	5	3	0	5
2nd Left	(10)	3	2/2 (4)	1	3	1	4	3
PCF	(6)	0	2/2 (4)	2	2	3	3	2
CODENE	(10)	5	3/2 (5)	3	8	8	3	4
total responses/ 23			34	8	43	23	20	31
Total respondents, (64)								
Source: Paris field interviews 1985-86, John Mason								

The rest of my sample of Socialist journalists, intellectuals and activists were more modest in their estimates of France's strategic weight, placing it somewhere in the top four or five. They were however equally insistent on the centrality of her independent nuclear capacity and world wide diplomatic and strategic role to France's ability to "maintain her standing in the world." The role of industry and the French language ranked third and fourth in the opinion of all except the Rocardian intellectuals and journalists in my sample (identified here as "2nd Left"). Most of my respondents made a tight association between the "warfare and strategic role" of the French state and the global competitiveness of

French industry and worldwide influence of the French language and culture. This is what French defense spokesmen meant when they spoke of their "global vision" of national defense and independence³⁹.

This shared nationalism may become all the more important to the extent that party elites remain deeply divided in the face of the industrial and social choices which they must confront in the coming years. Twenty years of mounting unemployment, capital disinvestment, and increasing ethnic and racial tensions over third-world immigration have worn down the reserves of political capital which the major parties can deploy. What remained in the early eighties as a point of unity around which the political class could rally were the themes of "nuclear nationalism". What Mitterrand has offered at the end of the eighties as an ideological replacement is French leadership in the construction of a new European "supernationalism." It remains to be seen whether the defense consensus can survive this shift or continue to carry the heavy expectations which party elites have already placed upon it.

Up until 1989 the Fifth republic had been doubly blessed. First, during the fifties, sixties and early seventies it was the beneficiary of twenty five years of international economic expansion and currency stability. Secondly, it was favored by the relative stability and equality of the strategic relationship between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Neither of these external conditions still hold, a change in the international

environment which does not favor the continued cohesion of the domestic consensus. Since 1990 France has experienced a steady deterioration of its position in the world market, and the fading away of the American nuclear guarantee to Germany. Sooner than later, if the Americans and Russians implement the nuclear "build-down" already negotiated, France will find herself subjected to powerful outside pressures on her nuclear policy which could produce internal strains. This danger has undoubtedly prompted moves during the Mitterrand Presidency to modify the terms of the consensus by a quiet "revolution from above" so as to preempt a future revolt from below, lead either by a Communist defection from the ranks of the established parties, or a "Green" challenger from outside.

This French "strategic culture" claimed to be of significance not only because of the mix of "utilities" which it may have provided, and of constraints which it imposed on domestic political elites, but also because the French actively sought to diffuse it among other European party elites, and security policy-makers. The opening of the first European "session" of the IHEDN in the Fall of 1988 was an effort to build institutional mechanisms for communication and policy co-ordination at the level of the "European Community" which would duplicate French domestic arrangements, and create an intra-European channel which would be autonomous from NATO institutions⁴⁰. Most of the French analysts I spoke with subscribed to the belief that their domestic "consensus" had allowed French security elites to steadily pursue their goal of

building a significant nuclear strategic force over the past thirty years. Now that it seems that the Americans forces will be drawn down radically in Europe, French elites seem to believe that their record of political stability (as well as the nuclear assets they have actually accumulated) authorize them to play a leading role in the creation of a broader defense consensus among other European states. This consensus would promote the emergence of a European Defense "entity" which could supplement the American nuclear umbrella, and restore a measure of political "sovereignty" and technological independence to the Western European community as a whole.

In the wake of the revolution of 1989 and the fundamental transformation of the post-war security situation, these efforts have become both more urgent and more difficult as French elites find themselves torn between the conflicting imperatives of deepening European security institutions and maintaining the fundamental autonomy of French strategic planning. At the same time, the French fears are growing that they will be marginalized in a European community where the German voice has become more influential and German interests ever more central.

So just when we have grown accustomed to its permanence, it appears that the French consensus has been shifting. Itself a convergence of different currents of cultural mood and intellectual opinion, the consensus has always been in motion underneath its casing of orthodox doctrine. For almost a generation this consensus has organized the co-existence of

long-standing divisions in orientation between Atlanticists, Nationalists, and Neutralists. Because its doctrines privileged uncertainty as a strategic principle, refusing even to name its adversary, it left lots of room under its nuclear tent for different political families to co-exist. Its emphasis on national independence and on France's status as a world power helped to dampen any wild swings in national mood. Because it is an emotional as well as intellectual presence, it left many French men and women with a sense of confidence that France was still responsible to herself, however much she might be diminished in other ways. In all these senses it has acted a satisfactory security blanket, whatever its weaknesses as a security policy.

1 See Howard Machin "Political Leadership," chapter 5 in Hall, Hayward and Machin, *op cit.*, pp.102-110.

2 Samy Cohen, La Monarchie Nucléaire, Hachette, Paris, 1984, pp. 16-18.

3 For a comment on the limits of consensus politics, see Jack Hayward, "Ideological Change: The Exhaustion of the Revolutionary Change," in Hall, Hayward and Machin, *op cit.*, pp. 30-32.

4 Michel Debret, "The Constitution of 1958," in Andrew Harrison and Stanley Hoffman's The Impact of the Fifth Republic on France, *op cit.*, pp. 8-10.

5 Pierre Gallois, A Defenseless Septennate, unpublished manuscript containing Gallois' memoirs of his conversations with De Gaulle concerning the birth of the force de frappe, pp.7-9.

6 General Lacaze, "Concept de défense et sécurité en Europe," La Revue de Défense Nationale, FEDN, Paris, June 1984, p 17.

7 Pierre Gallois, "Strategie de l'Age nucléaire: les lois de la dissuasion," in David, La Politique de Défense de la France: Textes et Documents, *op cit.*, pp. 93-94.

8 Samy Cohen, *op cit.*, pp. 21-28.

9 Samy Cohen, *op cit.*, pp. 29-32.

10 Samy Cohen, *op cit.*, pp. 83-99.

11 Samy Cohen, *op cit.*, pp. 213-220.

12 See also, Phillippe LePrestre, "The Lessons of Co-habitation," in French Security Policy in a Disarming World, *op cit.*, pp. 32-39.

13 David, *op cit.*, p. 19.

14 They were not wrong in this reading of De Gaulle's strategic world view. Certainly official French defense doctrine spoke the rhetoric of strategic non-alignment in the late sixties and seventies. The French White Book of 1972, speaks of French policy being "the refusal of blocs, that is, of non-alignment on Great Powers." See David, *op cit.*, pp 45-46.

15 Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, "La politique de défense de la France," *op cit.*, pp. 11-17.

16 See Dominique David, "References for French Strategy" for a useful compilation of key declarations and texts from the 1960's. David, *op cit.*, Part Two, pp. 43-111. See also François Géré, "Quatre Généraux et l'Apocalypse: Ailleret-Beaufre-Gallois-Poirier," La Stratégie Française, *op cit.*, pp. 75-115.

17 David, *op cit.*, p 14.

- 18 Charles De Gaulle, Press Conference, July 23, 1964, in David, op cit., p. 77.
- 19 See the discussion by Paul Marie La Gorce, La Guerre et L'Atome, Plon, Paris, 1985, pp. 96-100.
- 20 See Ailleret's 1963 argument rejecting the idea of "counter-force" as a possible option for a "middle range" power in favor of an "anti-city" (counter-value) strategy, David, op cit. p.85.
- 21 See the official report of the "Group X-Defense," Les Defenses Anti-Missiles: La France et l'Europe, FEDN, Paris, 1986, pp. 62-72.
- 22 Anxiety about the technical challenge represented by SDI to the credibility of the French national deterrent was expressed by fair number of my informants in Paris in the Spring of 1985.
- 23 The French Defense White Book, David, op cit., p. 49.
- 24 French Defense White Book, David, op cit., p. 49.
- 25 Pascal Krop, Les Socialistes et l'Armée, op cit., see pp.104-112.
- 26 Paris Interview, J. Mason, April 1, 1985.
- 27 Krop, op cit., and Michael Harrison, "The Left in Search of a Defense Policy," in Harrison and Hoffman, op cit., pp. 261-280.
- 28 See Pierre Lellouche, L'Avenir de la Guerre, Editions Mazarine, Paris, 1985, for an intelligent dissection of the neutralist myth, pp. 264-278.
- 29 Paris Interview, J. Mason, July 5, 1985.
- 30 Paris Interview, J. Mason, April 1, 1985.
- 31 See Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, op cit., pp. 320.
- 32 Paris Interview, J. Mason, April 23, 1985.
- 33 Paris Interview, J. Mason, May 2, 1985.
- 34 Dick Howard, "On French Foreign Policy : an Interview with Pierre Hassner and Patrick Viveret," TELOS, No 55, 1983, pp. 227-28.
- 35 Patrick Viveret, "Comment nous avons résisté: le témoignage de Patrick Viveret," Alternatives Non Violentes, No 46, December 1982, pp. 29-30.
- 36 For an quasi official view see Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, "La Politique de défense de la France," op cit., pp. 22-25.
- 37 Paris Interview, J. Mason, July 18, 1985.
- 38 Paris Interview, J. Mason, July 3, 1985.

39 This theme came up in my interviews. For a clear expression see Dominique David's Introduction to the FEDN Collection. David, op cit., pp. 16-17.

40 See Michel Rocard's remarks introducing the first European session of the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale, "l'Europe et Sa Sécurité, November 15, 1988, pp. 6-7.

VIII

French Security Policy under Mitterrand:

During the first Mitterrand Presidency, the French consensus remained fixed on its nuclear axis, but the general orientation of strategic policy turned away from the nationalist isolation of the Gaullist era in search of a European vocation which would strengthen France's ties with her European neighbors. More particularly, this involved finding a European mission for French nuclear and conventional forces which both corresponded to the security needs felt by her German neighbor, and to the political imperative of French Presidents to conserve the integrity of French national sovereignty by maintaining undivided control over decisions concerning the engagement of the national nuclear strike force and over the conventional forces which could act as nuclear "tripwires" in future European conflict. Mitterrand, like most presidents of the Fifth Republic, had to reconcile conflicting policy imperatives - the need to demonstrate solidarity with France's European neighbors and allies without being drawn further into the American alliance system. The Mitterrand approach to dealing with this fundamental tension in French national policy led his government to progressively specify

the conditions under which French forces would be engaged in any future conflict involving the territory of France's German neighbor, even at the risk of reducing the margin of maneuver of future French presidents.

This "evolution" of the strategic consensus coincided with a sea change in the attitudes of French intellectuals toward the Soviet Union, which led both opinion leaders and the general public to adopt a generally hostile stance: rejecting both Soviet policies and the Soviet Union as a socio-cultural model. This shift had security implications because the public climate of hostility to the Soviets' invasion of Afghanistan, and to their interference in Poland, led the Socialist government to do what no government had done: name the Soviet Union as France's main strategic adversary against whom French nuclear warheads were targeted¹. This compromised the orthodox principle of "strategic uncertainty," and by narrowing the ambiguities surrounding French security policy, hastened the day when the Communists were pushed out of the national government and consensus.

Pro-american feelings have been the third major component in the reworking of the French political consensus during the Mitterrand Presidency. Pierre Hassner for one sees this as being accomplished through the convergence of three political attitudes which include in addition to America's cultural prestige, the anti-totalitarian turn, and a general indifference to the movements against nuclear arms so visible in other Western societies². All these elements have combined to

provide the existing consensus with a comfortable measure of public legitimacy, even though the number of political families adhering to it was narrowed by the defection of the Communists.

Hassner was not the only French observer to take a certain satisfaction from the evolution of the domestic political consensus during the 1980's. Many members of the French political and administrative elite subscribed to the belief that France's strategic policy and internal stability were mutually reinforcing. They argued that France's willingness to undertake the national effort necessary to guarantee her own national security and independence had already paid handsome political dividends³. Not the least of these has been a capacity to resist the feelings of dependency on a foreign protector which the French believe made other European nations vulnerable to the "anti-nuclear allergy" and temptations of pacifism⁴.

The End of French Exceptionalism?

Under Mitterrand, French foreign policy moved increasingly toward a renewed effort to build greater European unity around the pole of Franco-German co-operation - symbolic in this regard have been his attempts to breathe new life into the West European Union, the European defense organization which had been largely moribund since the 1950s⁵. At the same time, Mitterrand gave particular emphasis to assuring France's German ally about her understanding and support of Germany's defense needs - a solidarity he sought to express by deeds

such as his Bundestag speech in 1983, and gestures such as the revival of the 1963 Franco-German defense accord signed by Adenauer and De Gaulle⁶. While this policy was aimed primarily at her German partner, it necessarily involved greater co-operation with Germany's principal ally, the United States. By the 1980's, French policy makers had learned the futility of forcing Bonn to choose between Paris and Washington, so in order, perhaps, to leave the Germans free to choose both Washington and Paris, bi-lateral relations between France and the United States grew in pace with the growth of French/German relations⁷.

Mitterrand also moved France away from the position of "strategic ambiguity" so dear to French strategic orthodoxy. In the 1984 "Loi de Programmation" the Soviet Union was identified for the first time as France's only major strategic adversary⁸. At the same time, France increased the visibility of her commitments to German security by publicly declaring for the first time that the defense of Germany's eastern border is a "vital national interest" for France⁹, thereby implying that French nuclear weapons might be used if it were ever violated¹⁰. This implicit nuclear commitment was strengthened by the organization of a new conventional army of 50,000 men, the FAR, (La Force d'Action Rapide) composed primarily of helicopter and ground anti-tank forces designed for rapid insertion in the invasion route across the North German plain¹¹. The FAR is presented as a special gesture to

German fears and concerns, as Charles Hernu remarked in his address to the IHEDN in November 1983:

"The FAR can concretize our commitments to our allies...France alone remains the judge of her principle of action..But once France has decided to act the FAR will represent a precious reinforcement for our closest neighbors and allies. This is especially true for the German Federal Republic with whom France is tied by the Treaty of Elysée and which constitutes a kind of "alliance within the alliance"¹²."

This gesture was in some sense more symbolic than real since the FAR was cobbled together from airmobile units stripped from the first army corps in Strasbourg, France's main armed force behind the old NATO defense line, but it did reflect real increases in French conventional strength which had occurred in the previous decade¹³. Moreover, the integration of French Marine and Paratroop units, traditionally reserved for third-world missions within this new force gave French policy makers a fig-leaf which allowed them to claim that this force had an overseas expeditionary role, and that it did not necessarily exist only for a German mission¹⁴. At the same time, however, French spokesmen implied that the second army corps with two armored divisions stationed at Baden-Baden was available to act alone or with the FAR as an armored reserve for NATO forces in Germany. Together with the First French Army based inside France but close by the border, they were

able to claim that this armored force represented the second largest conventional contribution to Germany's defense after that represented by the Americans.

This willingness to discuss French conventional units as having more of a role than simply opening "a national deterrence maneuver" (following the hypothetical collapse of NATO's central front), represented a major rhetorical shift, which was backed up to a limited degree by concrete measures. The growth in the size of the French conventional commitment to NATO was reflected not only in successive reorganization of French land armies in proximity to the NATO central theater, but also in the steady growth since the 1970's in the number of battle tanks made available as seen in Table No. 8-1. This means that French conventional forces have finally begun to match those of other NATO armies, even though French tank forces still fall behind in terms of numbers and quality as we can see in the following table, Table 8-2.

The Germans responded to these French contributions by hosting in September 1987, "Little Sparrow," the largest Franco-German joint maneuvers in post-war history, in which 20,000 troops of the FAR entered Bavaria to join German units engaged there in repulsing an hypothetical invasion from Czechoslovakia. The Germans also proposed the creation of a Franco-German "Brigade," outside the NATO integrated command, in which German troops would serve under a French commander. The "Brigade" proposal was implemented in 1988, thereby creating what some have called the "world's most

Table No .8-1

The Growth of French Conventional Forces in Central Europe

Year	Event	Forces Available to NATO	No. of Tanks
1964	1st Army Corps Taken out of NATO	2nd Army Corps	214
1966	2nd Corps Withdrawn from NATO	---	---
1967	Aillert Accord	2nd Army Corps	214
1974	Valentin Accord	1st & 2nd Army Corps	1036
1983	F.A.R.	1st & 2nd Army Corps	1036
1984	3rd Corps	1st, 2nd & 3rd Corps	1240
1990	Dissolution of 1st Corps	2nd, 3rd Corps & FAR	1240

Source, Frédéric Bozo, La France et l'OTAN, IFRI/Masson, Paris, 1991, page 276.

Table No. 8-2.

MILITARY RESOURCES: FRANCE, WEST GERMANY AND BRITAIN, 1984

	France	W. Germany	Britain
Total Armed Forces (figures in thousands)	557.5	485.8	323.8
Ground Forces (figures in thousands)	296.4	340.8	169.7
Main Battle Tanks	1,300	4,895	1,150
Combat Aircraft	677	630	661

Source: I.I.S.S., The Military Balance 1986-87, London International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986, pp 56-70, 63-69.

expensive army language school," but it laid the foundation for the Mitterrand and Kohl's announcement of the formation of the first armored "Eurocorps" at the 59th Franco-German summit in La Rochelle in the Spring of 1992¹⁵. The Brigade contained the germ of the Eurocorps idea and solicited signs of interest from the Belgians as well as other parties including even the Spanish - whose concerns have usually been far removed from the integrity of the German frontline¹⁶.

Lest one thought that the Brigade was all icing and no cake, the official French response to this proposal was to accept exploratory discussions on the condition that the corps would be sheltered under the "umbrella" of French nuclear weapons - a "generous" offer the Germans seemed reluctant to embrace. The keepers of the temple of orthodoxy back home in France denounced these moves toward a form of "enlarged sanctuary," as reckless gestures by leaders whom were described by General Gallois as having "big hearts and little heads"¹⁷. It was safe to assume that the General spoke for more than himself, and that his reaction was shared not only by some in the military but also by some in the ranks of Chirac's RPR. However the sense of heady new potentialities was also reflected in declarations by certain RPR spokesmen, such as Pierre Lellouche, Chirac's personal strategic advisor, who had no hesitations about speaking of "la dissuasion du fort au fort," and proposing the stationing of French conventional units equipped with a full array of tactical nuclear weapons alongside frontline NATO units on Germany's eastern frontier.

Lellouche created quite a scandal in French defense circles when he proposed in the spring of 1985 the French deploy their forces in a frontline position at the conclusion of his book L'Avenir de la Guerre¹⁸.

In terms of nuclear systems, this policy shift did coincide with the production of a new medium range tactical missile, the Hades, capable of striking Eastern European targets from inside France's eastern border¹⁹, and the completion of research and development of Neutron warheads which can be fitted to both the airborne ASMP attack missile and new 55 millimeter artillery shells. New generations of battlefield weapons including "mini-nukes" as well as neutron warheads were readied for production and deployment in the hundreds²⁰, and indeed their production probably began without any official announcement²¹. This developments strongly suggested that the French were ready at the time to break with their traditional stand of "minimal deterrence," at least by increasing their capabilities at the bottom of the escalation ladder if not at the top. This build up in nuclear capacity are reflected in the expenditure figures for the 1980's shown below in Table 8-3.

Such an eventuality seemed likely as the size of France's nuclear forces continued to grow. Between 1982 and 1992 French nuclear firepower multiplied five times to five hundred and twenty five strategic warheads and several hundred tactical warheads, neutron bombs, and "mini-nukes". As French nuclear capacities diversified allowing for some counter-force capabi-

lity at the top and increasing battlefield interdiction capabilities at the bottom of the nuclear escalation ladder, so did its international visibility, and the pressures on France from the international community, as both the Greenpeace affair and the history of the INF negotiations suggest.

Table No. 8-3
FUNDS DEDICATED TO FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES
(IN BILLIONS OF CURRENT FRANCS)

Year	Strategic Nuclear Forces	Tactical Nuclear Forces
1980	11,850	730
1981	13,730	870
1982	16,190	740
1983	17,830	1,470
1984	19,300	2,440
1985	20,214	3,172
1986	20,967	4,301

source: Jacques Fontanel, "le Coût de la défense en France," Pour Une Nouvelle Entente Cordiale, Yves Boyer, edit. IFRI Masson, Paris, 1988, p.128.

By the close of Mitterrand's first mandate in 1988, French policy makers feared that the evolution of conventional military technologies in directions which allowed them to replace nuclear weapons for certain military missions, and the "denuclearization" of theater forces in Western Europe, would result in a hostile international climate for the further development of French nuclear forces. They became aware that the international conjuncture which had allowed the French exceptional autonomy for their nuclear policies and immunity from international criticism was coming to an end²². What they did not recognize was what we know only with hindsight - that denuclearization was the beginning of a process which lead to the collapse of the Soviet presence in Central Europe, and to the transformation of the post-war bloc system which had both

constrained French ambitions, and allowed her exceptional autonomy.

Old Doctrines and New Policies:

In the late 1980s the tendency to celebrate France's new strategic capability was tempered by the recognition that her security could never be assured by her national nuclear deterrent in isolation from the rest of Europe. Concerns were raised that however "robust" the French national consensus might be, the balance in the global European system in which French policy must operate was turning against her. By the middle eighties the French Socialists had recognized the political importance of this mutation elsewhere in Western Europe, and tried to overcome their isolation by finding common ground with other Socialist parties around the themes of European sovereignty²³.

Thierry de Montbrial caught the new sensibility when he wrote in Commentaire in 1988 that: "France's situation is no longer the same as twenty-five years ago.. Who can not see that under current circumstances it is only by playing, without any ambiguity, the card of solidarity card with our partners that we can regain the initiative²⁴." The key words here are "solidarity without ambiguity." This simple phrase reflects a major shift in the French definition of their vital security interests and of their defense perimeter in West Europe. It implies a modification of the principle of "uncertainty" which has been a core value of French nuclear strategy for a generation. Clearly, if de Montbrial was at all repre-

sentative, something in the French perception of the strategic situation had changed by the late 1980's, and changed enough that they felt they could no longer go it alone.

The very strength of the French concern over the INF treaty, and the intensity of the public debate in France over its implications was in itself revealing of what had changed. As de Montbrial observed: "If France today feels its is in her own interest to concern herself more with the security of her neighbors, it is because she feels that it is less and less possible to count on what the US, Great Britain, and the Federal Republic will do for her defense without her participation²⁵." Only ten years before it was still quite possible for Valéry Giscard D'Estang to pretend that France felt herself to be "not concerned" by the "double decision" regarding the original Euromissile deployment. After all, French territory was not involved. Ten years later it still wasn't, but the French appeared very much as an "interested party." This in itself represented a major shift in policy orientation.

It wasn't yet clear whether this shift is as unambiguous as Montbrial would have liked. A simple reading of the Bastille Day interview in the same year with then Minister of Defense, Mr. Chevènement, was enough to remind us that the traditional formulas of French nuclear doctrine could co-exist with a new appreciation of "the promise of Europe²⁶." It seems certain, however, that de Montbrial was justified in saying

that "France has moved over the past ten years a good distance toward the German Federal Republic and her allies²⁷..."

Changes occurred at three different levels: the first involved the new commitments which had been made in the bi-lateral context of Franco-German relations; the second concerns the multiplication of bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements with other European countries, notably with Italy and Spain and with the signatory nations of the West European Union; and third, initiatives regarding France's relations with the United States, which raised the possibility of an expansion of the French role within the formal structures of NATO²⁸.

At the level of France's bi-lateral relations with Germany the Mitterrand years saw an acceleration of a series of gestures and measures designed to bring French and German policies into co-ordination. In February 1986, Mitterrand made a formal commitment to Kohl to "consult" with the Federal Republic in any situation where the French were thinking of using tactical weapons, "les armes pre-stratégiques," on German territory²⁹. Though still subject to a disclaimer regarding the need for "consultation within the time limits imposed by the rapidity of such decisions³⁰," this represented the first sign of a French willingness to dilute national authority over the French nuclear weapons by consulting with anybody. Finally on several occasions during the fall of 1987, both President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Chirac made public statements committing France to "immediately engage

without any reservations" her conventional forces in the case of a European conflict³¹. They also made it clear on these occasions that France considered herself and Germany to be part of "a single strategic space," and that the integrity of Germany's borders represented a "vital interest" for France. Germany and French Vital Interests:

These verbal declarations received relatively little attention in the American press, but their strategic implications far outweighed in importance the events which did receive coverage: the German offer to create a Franco-German brigade, and the first joint maneuvers in twenty years, "Hardy Sparrow." In an ironic fashion, these concrete measures were in many respects "cosmetic," while Mitterrand's declaration to Kohl meant that the French were offering the West Germans not only the FAR, but also two French army corps stationed along her western border, at the very outset of a future land war. These armored corps had been reserved by previous governments for a "final maneuver of national deterrence³²."

This guarantee of immediate conventional engagement told the West German government that French military planners had in effect abandoned the notion that there can be two successive battles in Europe: the first in Germany, "the forward battle," followed by a second decisive "battle for France" that would set the stage for a final warning to the enemy to stop his military actions or face the immediate commitment of French nuclear forces³³. What replaced this traditional

scenario is French acceptance of the principle that there is only "a single strategic space" in Western Europe.

An End to "Non-belligerency?"

This agreement modified the principle that the French would reserve their conventional and nuclear forces for the defense of the "national sanctuary," leaving the French government free to use the uncertainty surrounding the engagement of French forces in the battle for Germany as a bargaining tool with the Soviets. It cut across General Poirier's system which divided French security interests into three distinct zones ranked according to the strategic priority French military planners assigned to them³⁴. By making the commitment of French forces quasi-automatic, Mitterrand gave up an important, if somewhat illusory, French prerogative: the option of "nonbelligerence" in a future war. With it also went a part of the sovereign power which the possession of nuclear weapons was to meant to guarantee to the French President. Further it represents yet another step in the process which has slowly squeezed the element of "uncertainty" out of French strategic planning, a process begun in 1984 when the Soviets were identified as the likely adversary against whom nuclear strikes would be directed.

Multi-lateral Agreements:

The second area where the French were active involved multi-lateral and bi-lateral arrangements with other European nations. Over the decade, they paid increased attention to the military potentials represented by both Italy and Spain for

political as well as budgetary reasons. In 1988, the French quietly signed multi-lateral agreements with both countries covering the co-ordination of naval forces in the Mediterranean, and the integration of their national air defense warning and interception systems. These agreements were accompanied by accords concerning the co-production of transport aircraft. At the same time, the Italians and the Spaniards signed on for part of the costs of building the Helios military reconnaissance satellite³⁵. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly the French supported Spanish entry into the Western European Union, the common defense organization they had been working to revive since 1983³⁶.

While the existence of the NATO command headquarters in Brussels seemed to make the WEO seem as useless as a fifth wheel, French observers stressed the importance of the fact that the WEO pact commits its signatories to an automatic response in the case of a European conflict³⁷. This provided a formal guarantee for Mitterrand's commitments to the Germans. It was also of interest in terms of what Spanish entry into the WEO would imply about future Spanish participation in the defense of Western Europe³⁸. While the signing of the "European security platform" by members of the WEO in October 1987 apparently gave the Union a privileged place in French efforts to encourage the formation of an European "pillar," comments made in Fall of 1988 by President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Rocard downplayed the Union in favor of a broader multi-organizational approach to the creation of

"l'Europe de Défense³⁹." But interest in the WEO was revived in the context of the Maastricht treaty and the Gulf War in 1990 making it a likely candidate for constituting the foundation of a future European defense entity. The effect of these many diplomatic efforts was to place France at the center of a complex web of security arrangements with her neighbors.

France and NATO:

For most of the eighties the French were also moving away from seeking national independence outside NATO to seeking greater influence over their European neighbors within it through a partial reintegration in NATO alliance structures. But at the same time, they were also working to build European defense institutions which could operate outside as well as inside official NATO channels. The current status of the Franco-German "Eurocorps" as a military command which is simultaneously responsible to NATO and WEO is a clear example of this policy, although nobody seems quite clear what this will mean in practice⁴⁰. Both tracks of French policy work to bring French defense policies and institutions into closer coordination with those of her neighbors. Both tracks of this European policy represent a shift away from the nationalist isolation of the Gaullist era, and both involve a break with strategic principles which have guided France's nuclear enterprise for twenty years.

The French have increasingly acknowledged the interconnected quality of Western European security arrangements, and their role within them. French recognition of this basic reality is

not only inscribed in her bi-lateral initiatives it can also be seen in her effort to increase her influence within NATO's formal councils. Increased French participation now seemed desirable because further progress toward European integration required it. Practical imperatives having to do with military coordination with Germany, as well as the general wish to make French views heard in the Alliance, meant that they had find an acceptable way of participating in NATO without rejoining the integrated military command. While de Montbrial among others felt that the French should have simply bitten the bullet, most defense specialists looked for alternative ways of easing France back into the Alliance structure. One such suggestion put forward by François Heisbourg was simply to abolish the existing planning body where French and Spanish representatives did not sit, and hand its responsibilities over to North Atlantic Council where they did⁴¹.

European Commitments and the Nuclear Presidency:

What these changes implied at the time for the evolution of France's "nuclear presidency" was not clear. On the one hand, admitting the principle of the immediate commitment of France's conventional armies, and of the de facto integration of French conventional planning with other NATO forces, did narrow executive discretion. On the other hand, nothing was allowed to interfere with traditional Presidential control concerning the timing and nature of the engagement of French nuclear forces. If anything the existing rules were reaffirmed, and Presidential authority strengthened despite the

concession to German feelings represented by the agreement to "consult" them before nuclear forces were used. Indeed, one could argue that Mitterrand had compensated for the surrender of absolute control over the conventional armies by strengthening his command over both intermediate and tactical nuclear weapon systems. All nuclear weapons were withdrawn from regular field armies, and regrouped in special units within the French strategic command. Tactical as well as medium-range systems were treated as strategic assets, and were give the awkward label of "pre-strategic" arms. All nuclear weapons were to be withheld from battlefield use, and dedicated for missions associated with the "nuclear signal" which was supposed to precede the engagement of the central strategic forces⁴². In the nuclear domain, the traditional rules still applied, and concessions to "graduated response" were rebuffed. Of course now, given the phased withdrawal of the former Red Army and Mitterrand's decision in 1992 to cancel the Hades missile, the prospect of fighting "the battle for France" on German territory with French nuclear weapons has dissipated⁴³.

The forceful defense of the traditional prerogatives by President Mitterrand could be interpreted in political as well as strategic terms. One could argue that as long as the integrity of Presidential control was maintained in the nuclear area one of the central foundations of the legitimacy of the "Nuclear Presidency" was assured. While the evolution of domestic politics and foreign diplomacy in the late 1980s

reshaped and narrowed the consensus in many respects, central principles regarding the Presidential command over the engagement of nuclear forces remained largely unaltered.

Transatlantic Disputes:

The policy orientation which was embodied in the late 1980's by support of Mitterrand's European project may, however, have only been the one side of a darker mood which was provoked by the prospect of progress toward disarmament. Even before the events of 1989, and the collapse of the Soviet adversary, many French intellectuals were feelingly rather shaky. Star Wars, the Gorbachov reform campaign and the successful negotiations of the INF treaty were seen as the signs of a fundamental realignment of the post-war system for which the French were ill prepared⁴⁴. While this reaction was far from universal, sharp responses in Paris to the Washington INF Treaty, and to what had been dubbed "the Gorbachov effect" on public opinion, suggested that tempers were already getting a little ragged. Many of the unofficial French voices which were heard across the Atlantic in the summers of 1988 and 1989 spoke in chilling tones about the untold dangers of the new period of "superpower entente." While their fears about the dire consequences of Soviet Reform and nuclear arms reductions have not been realized, their response said a great deal about the policy rigidities that are built-in to French strategic orthodoxy.

In 1988, the list of distinguished French dissenters from American policy and academic wisdom grew steadily. Despite a

determined effort by Mitterrand, and the newly installed Rocard Government, to follow German cues about American arms control policy, the French "defense community" was very cool to new "breakthroughs" in arms control. Defense Minister Giraud caught the mood when he called the prospect of success for the INF treaty a prelude to a "Second Munich" in the winter of 1988. The unhappiness began with the French analysis of the long-term impact of the INF treaty: did it simply bring us back to the strategic balance as it was before the Russians began their deployment of the SS 20's in 1977, or did it represent the beginning of a dynamic process which would later lead to the de facto "denuclearization" of Western Europe? The second position was adopted by Pierre Lellouche for one⁴⁵.

Not only did he see in the INF treaty the first step toward the division of Europe into zones of unequal security, but he saw this as part of a dynamic leading to German overtures to the East, to American troop withdrawals, and finally to a new security system centered on Moscow. According to him the origin of these multiple dangers lay in the American attempt to fool public opinion by presenting a necessary force modernization, the Pershing missile, as the creation of a nuclear bargaining chip to bring the Soviets to the arms control table⁴⁶. This then gave the Soviets the opportunity to undo the modernization, and to delegitimize theatre nuclear forces to boot⁴⁷. For Lellouche this unhappy outcome was a typical result of the tendency of Western leaders to become hostages

to the arms control process. This neo-conservative argument had few American advocates at the time, although it had a legion a few short years before⁴⁸. Apparently loyalty to President Reagan had silenced most of them. Lellouche, for one, did not face this constraint which left him free to pick up where Richard Perle in the Reagan Defense Department had left off.

A second dispute, closely related to the first, concerned the real meaning of the transformation of the official language the Soviets used to describe their foreign policy goals and military doctrines. By 1988 liberal Soviet specialists in the United States - Hough, Kennan, Cohen & Co.- had concluded that a real transformation had occurred in the Soviet approach to foreign relations and couldn't understand how anyone could think of letting an "historic opportunity" pass us by⁴⁹. French spokesmen, on the contrary, thought that all of this was at best wishful thinking, and at worst showed criminal intent⁵⁰. In the cold view of many French defense analysts Soviet objectives remained unchanged: to break the Western military bloc by decoupling Europe from the American central deterrent; by denuclearizing the central NATO front, and by helping the American contingent to leave by the nearest diplomatic exit. According to these analysts, (which include notably the IFRI group of Lellouche and de Montbrial), further reductions in American intermediate range or tactical weapons were not worth the coin in Russian troop cutbacks that Gorbachev would undoubtedly pay for them because they would be

followed by reductions in American conventional force levels according to the formula: "No Nukes, No troops⁵¹." The consequences for France as well as Germany of such a scenario were somber indeed. For these analysts the ultimate stakes at risk in Gorbachov's diplomatic game were not simply American military assets, but more importantly the chance to complete the construction of the West European community as a power center which could stand on its own with, or without, the American security guarantee⁵².

Despite the anti-Soviet shift in public attitude, and the marginalization of the Communists as a legitimate political force, in the late eighties some French observers were increasingly nervous about the rise in Gorbachov's popularity with the French public opinion, although it was far from attaining the levels found across the Rhine⁵³. There was a mounting concern that the Gorbachov's prestige, and the general euphoria about a new era of strategic "entente," would erode the progress that has been made over the past ten years toward reshaping the French domestic consensus. Here the worry was not so much that Gorbachov could, or would, do anything to revive the fading fortunes of the French Communists - who were viewed as hopelessly "backward" in the Soviet media even in 1988⁵⁴ - but rather that his diplomatic successes would plant the idea that nuclear weapons are at the root of the East/West conflict in the public's mind. From this seed, it was feared, might grow the cultural contagion which had made nuclear weapons seem illegitimate elsewhere⁵⁵.

There were also doubts concerning the ability of French elites and public opinion to withstand the political isolation and diplomatic heat which was sure to follow if France were to openly oppose Gorbachov's "peace" diplomacy. If the rest of Europe were to abandon nuclear deterrence, people asked, how long could France remain committed to her national nuclear policy? The official response, " 'Til Hell freezes over!" remained unchanged, but somehow rang a little hollow. Pierre Lellouche for one wrote that the time had come to get the downward spiral in hand by directly addressing the issue of "denuclearization." He wanted to see a political battle waged for Western public opinion. How ready German; Dutch or Danish officials were to join him in a campaign to redeem the public honor of nuclear weapons, of course, was open to doubt.

Whatever the changes in public atmosphere, the fundamental view of the Soviet Union shared by many French analysts remained much darker and more pessimistic than was the rule among most other European and American circles, outside the beleaguered group of American neo-conservatives⁵⁶. In this view Gorbachov was a passing phenomenon on the Soviet scene, and his program of perestroika was two parts repression for every one part of political and market reform. It was a view still held by many Parisian intellectuals right up until the summer of 1989, when Gorbachov's acquiescence in the dismantling of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe and the overthrow of all of the Soviet's client regimes, made it completely untenable. The "anti-totalitarian" reading of Soviet Society,

along with the belief that the Soviet Union was essentially an imperialist enterprise and the last of the colonial empires, were articles of faith shared by many French opinion leaders which colored their interpretation of every Soviet move even as Soviet adversary was visibly breaking apart⁵⁷.

This kind of intellectual "overkill" did not go unanswered in Paris. First and foremost, François Mitterrand was quite careful to distance himself from the hysteria about the INF treaty, telling his fellow citizens that France had nothing to fear, and much to gain, from the reduction of the Superpower arsenals. He spoke in support of both the Washington treaty and the arms negotiation process, in so far, that is, as it had no impact on the plans to modernize and upgrade France's own nuclear forces⁵⁸. This was the public attitude of the new Rocard Government as well, whose foreign minister, Roland Dumas, had a good working relationship with his West German counterpart, Hans Genscher, and who had begun to dismantle some of the French roadblocks to negotiations on conventional forces.

François Heisbourg, the Socialist defense specialist, gave Lellouche and others a gentle rebuke when he called on the French defense community to: "have the honesty to admit that Europeans react negatively in principle to all modifications of the strategic landscape⁵⁹." In answer to the mood of anxiety, Heisbourg held out the hope for a virtuous cycle of European development culminating in the emergence of a European pillar of NATO capable of holding its own against a

Soviet system "in decline." In responding to present fears with the promise of a secure future, Heisbourgh followed the same path taken by Mitterrand in his campaign letter to the French voters in 1988 where he answered concerns about the changing economic and technological environment by offering the unified European market as a sure formula for restoring future prosperity. This sounded more credible than appeals to national self-reliance, but it also looked at the time suspiciously like asking for credit from a bank which is not yet chartered. Heisbourgh too borrowed from future blueprints to cover current worries. He invited his readers to proceed as if his European defense community was ready money in the bank, asking them, "to act as if we were what we already are, an ensemble of 320 million inhabitants, producing more than the US, and twice as much as the USSR or Japan⁶⁰..."

The French attitude towards Arms Control talks, where they had always expressed grave reservations and deep skepticism for most of the decade, changed under the leadership of Roland Dumas as the French sought to bring their public views on arms control into greater conformity with American and more particularly, German views on these matters. The French took advantage of the lull in the Superpower negotiations to lift the roadblocks they had earlier put in place to the conventional force reduction talks in Vienna, and to present fresh initiatives on the control of Chemical weapons - particularly with regard to the proliferation of chemical weapons in the hands of smaller regional powers such as Iraq, France's

principal customer for arms during most of the 1980's⁶¹. France apparently was now entering the arms reduction games as an active player rather than sticking to its former role of being the immovable obstacle.

These moves reflected the concerns I heard from my informants in Paris in the summer of 1988 that France had locked herself into a hard position on Arms control which was leading to her isolation from her European partners, and creating credibility problems in her dealings with Germany⁶². Thus for a variety of reasons having to do with her diplomatic program in Western Europe, French policy spokesmen expressed a need to overcome the passivity of the French approach to arms control issues, and to come up with something which would at least give the impression of French movement. This they did with the arms control initiative which Mitterrand took to the United Nations in the Fall of 1988.

If we look closely at the new French positions we can see that they had quite a bit in common with the old ones. Firstly President Mitterrand in his annual address to the Institute for Higher Defense Studies, the IHEDN, in 1988 insisted on France's right to continue developing, testing and deploying the most modern weapons systems, including, if need be, chemical weapons and neutron warheads⁶³. In this the President was confirming the basic continuity of French policy concerning weapons development programs which had been announced by Chirac government in the winter and spring of 1988.

Secondly, Mitterrand's support for nuclear disarmament was exclusively focused on reductions in the arsenals of the two Superpowers. He was only willing to consider looking into the possible discussion of France's own nuclear weapons development, and testing programs once dramatic and drastic reductions of the Superpower stockpiles had actually been put into effect. Meanwhile, he supported France's ongoing strategic programs which will increase the number of her strategic warheads from 525 in 1993 to 912 by the year 2000, and refused to allow third-power national deterrents to be put on the negotiating table.

In this Mitterrand remained loyal to the basic French policy going back twenty five years, which claimed that the French contribution to global deterrence depended on the factor of "uncertainty" that the existence of the French arsenal introduced into the strategic calculations which the Superpowers could make concerning each other's forces and intentions. In order for this uncertainty factor to continue working, the argument went, French weapons must be left out of the weapons calculus the Superpowers made concerning one another⁶⁴. This also meant French weapons must never be introduced as stakes in nuclear arms negotiation talks. More importantly, this led to a fundamental sticking point which inevitably came up to confuse the new French "look" on arms control. The Mitterrand Government, like the French strategic community as a whole, shared a fundamental faith in the role of nuclear deterrence as the basic safeguard of the European

peace. They refused to condone any moves which lead to the further reduction of western nuclear forces in the European theatre, or any policy which pointed in the direction of the denuclearization of a part or the whole of the Europe. In the Spring of 1992, however, this French policy of "stone-walling" nuclear disarmament talks - and the marginalization of domestic groups who proposed active participation which went with it - suddenly was ended when Mitterrand decreed both the suspension of nuclear testing, and the cancellation of the Hades and SX missiles⁶⁵.

However much France was a beneficiary of both the Cold War division of Europe and of the post-war "Nuclear Revolution" the disadvantages of the French fixation of essential military/geo-strategic definitions of national power became clearer in the wake of popular revolutions of 1989. The current strategic consensus maintains the-by-now traditional political and budgetary priority given to the accumulation of nuclear assets at a time when the diplomatic and military value of these "assets," and of the very idea of "nuclear deterrence," is rapidly being eroded⁶⁶. French nuclear forces, like those of the other nuclear powers on both sides of the old cold war divide, now lack a clear definition of their intended targets: many the high-value targets of earlier years have either lost their strategic function and importance, or have passed into the hands of new found allies in central and Eastern Europe⁶⁷. This confusion creates a persistent irritant in the Franco-German diplomatic and economic partnership which

has been so important to the realization of the Community goals at the core of Mitterrand's regional policy in Europe. More broadly, the nuclear fixation leaves French policy makers and spokespersons at permanent disadvantage vis-a-vis their non-nuclear rivals as they find themselves hunkering down to defend a national security posture organized around France's nuclear policies.

French Security policy and European Unity

The Mitterrand government ran domestic political risks in the eighties partly to consolidate Germany as a security partner - and to keep her as the front-line state standing between France and the Soviet danger - but also because it was convinced that France could no longer afford to stay in the strategic and technological race using only her own national resources⁶⁸. In 1986, for instance, the size of the Stars Wars research budget alone was equivalent to the total yearly budget for all of France's strategic programs combined⁶⁹. This difference in the resource base impressed many French policy makers with the difficulties involved in supporting the growing costs of continued competition in high-technology fields. They were convinced that they could not continue to do so without German support, but also believed that only France has retained the political "will" to continue the effort to stay in the race as an independent player. In effect the European strategy was acceptable as long as French elites could believe that they were leading the strategic dance⁷⁰.

The French faced hard choices with limited resources in the late eighties. There were divisions within the concerned bureaucracies about the choices of follow-on strategic systems for the '90s. Some wanted to develop a French version of the cruise missile, based on the existing ASMP (medium range air-to-ground attack missile); others wished to add more missile-launching submarines to France's existing fleet of six; still others a nuclear powered aircraft carrier, and others a mobile land based missile, the SX, similar to the SS 20. The list went on to include reconnaissance satellites, and possible anti-satellite weapons. It was clear that the French could not afford all of this and still garrison her overseas possessions, or equip her land armies for a new conventional role in Germany and overseas⁷¹.

It seemed that France had arrived at the same budgetary point of no return that the British had reached at the end of the 1950s. But the fact that financial critics have made the same comments at every turn of the long road the French have travelled since the early sixties suggests that it doesn't pay to underestimate the willpower of a macho technocracy. By the early 1990's however the fundamental strategic situation had been altered by the Soviet collapse, which took with it the rationale for the French Strategic Force. Under these changed circumstances, it may well be that will of technocrats no longer suffices. In addition, the coming budgetary crunch has raised not only financial issues (how much of the GNP could the taxpayer tolerate going to defense?), or procurement prob-

lems (which weapon-system for which service, or rather how many more hits could the conventional land army absorb?), but also questions concerning national industrial strategy which now no longer rely on state-sponsored "national champions" in the defense sector.

In the mid 1980's French elites had to address what still appeared as insurmountable practical and political problems, if they wished to pursue the project of substituting a European centered security system for the American one. After all before Jacques Delors' breakthrough in the Community negotiations over the Single Market Agreement, the record seemed to show that Europeans had a difficult enough time deciding the question of agricultural tariffs, let alone other issues. One could argue therefore that U.S. hegemony in Europe may have been the pre-condition for what growth of European co-operation as had already been achieved⁷². In short, observers like Anton De Porte who subscribed to a "realist" view of international cooperation, believed that the American security system had been critical not only for holding the Soviets at bay, but also for holding down the inter-European tensions which had made the pre-war European states so dangerous to one another, or more to the point, the Germans so dangerous to everybody else⁷³. In the absence of an alternative "hegemon" to replace the United States further progress toward European unity seemed to these analysts unlikely, and they didn't hesitate to remind us that the recent European "civil wars," WWI and WWII, were fought precisely to block the most likely can-

didate, the Germans, from establishing such a hegemonic position⁷⁴.

The flurry of French proposals were in the eighties, however, above all else concerned with the Germans, and the political problem they would present in coming years if the Americans ever were to go home. The French vision was centered on a Franco/German partnership which would create an alternative strategic, technological and financial pole of influence which would keep the Germans fixed in the West European orbit, gradually attracting the rest of Europe to itself, including a reluctant Great Britain⁷⁵. This idea was not without precedent, certainly progress toward greater European cooperation owed a great deal to the Franco-German couple which constituted the economic powerhouse of the Common Market. This also seemed like an idea with some future⁷⁶. One could argue that to some degree the pole of attraction already existed - the Italians were solidly European, and the prospects had been sufficiently attractive to tempt Spain out her isolation - creating in the eyes of some French analysts new players who could help France further the European partnership whenever the Germans should happen to hesitate⁷⁷. These hints of a "European" dynamic that could stand alone confirmed Robert Keohane's argument that while a "hegemon" may be necessary as a guarantor while one is setting up a system of international cooperation, it may not be required once the pattern of cooperation has become the basis of long-standing arrangements⁷⁸.

The problem remained, however, that the existing pattern of European cooperation depended on the health of the Franco/-German relationship and there were many in France who feared that the marriage of these two central players was less radiant in the 1980's than it had been twenty years before. In the last instance, the French still depended on their German partner for their vision to succeed, while after 1989 the Germans could feel free to dream again of that once and future kingdom - "Mitteleuropa"⁷⁹.

The French economy in the eighties was no longer the growth leader in Europe, and it was increasingly dependent on German financial and monetary support. The French sought to offset this economic dependency by offering the Germans access to technologies which had been forbidden them - nuclear and otherwise, and an alternative channel to Moscow independent of the ups and downs of Moscow's relationship to Washington. But it was not at all clear that the Germans wanted the technologies the French had to propose, and after 1989 they had no need of additional channels to the East. By the early nineties the Germans could simply go out and buy them and certainly there was no shortage of eager sellers.

With the installation of the Rocard Government it became evident that the French were ready to try a new tack: the Delors approach to furthering the cause of European unity. As recently as 1986 and 1987, many Socialists believed that closer European cooperation on security questions and defense policy around a revived Western European Union represented the

best path for advancing greater European integration. The goal here was to use Franco-German military cooperation as the pole around which an eventual European defense community might emerge. The Delors line was that the best avenue for immediate and rapid advances toward the growth of the European Community was through increased openness and unification of national markets. With the negotiation of the Unitary Act and the agreement to create a unified market for capital and services for 1993, the Delors line of pursuing a market based strategy had apparently triumphed⁸⁰. Prime Minister Rocard's speech to the IHEDN in 1988 announced a decision to abandon the effort to seek greater European integration by the path of military cooperation and to put further initiatives on the European Defense community on the backburner until after 1993 single market was completed⁸¹. This is a decision which was only recently revised in the wake of the successful negotiations at Maastricht and renewed German interest in further European military cooperation.

Up through late eighties French policy makers were probably right to insist that the quality of American protection was deteriorating, even as the costs the Americans imposed, financial and strategic, were going up. Unless one shared Reagan's faith in the project of restoring overall American strategic superiority through SDI, the facts of Soviet/American parity and mutual vulnerability remained unavoidable, with all their consequences for the credibility of "extended deterrence" unaltered. Under conditions of strategic parity

between the Superpowers, American promises to guarantee European security which involved America's strategic deterrent were open to grave doubt, and any attempt to do the job with American "theatre" and battlefield forces was probably inadequate. This seemed to be all the more the case in 1988 in view of the removal of the most lethal theater weapons systems, the Pershings and Cruise missiles - up until, of course, the sudden and unexpected collapse of the Soviet adversary intervened to alter the political fundamentals of the European strategic landscape.

As if the gap between promise and fulfillment were not already dangerous enough, Washington during the Reagan years fell subject to nationalist fits, and neo-conservative flights in the direction of "global unilateralism." Reagan policymakers seemed to have prided themselves on their disdain for European sensitivities and outlooks, and, in their haste to prove themselves "not risk-adverse," showed little restraint about putting European lives and interests in jeopardy. This combination of uncertainty and abuse may have been intended to make Europeans more attentive to American wishes⁸², but in the long run it contributed to making the prospect of a "creative divorce" within the Atlantic Alliance thinkable⁸³, even if it was not yet feasible. The French policy of the eighties at least had the virtue of asking how the Europeans might turn such an eventuality to their own advantage rather than to that of the Russia.

In any case, throughout the eighties French elites persisted in trying to find another security arrangement - building the new structure within the existing alliance; drawing closer to NATO in order eventually to move further away. Undoubtedly this job of reconstruction will be difficult, but one should not hope that this will stop them from trying, if only because their vision of themselves as a power in the world will not permit them to do any less. The French persist in viewing themselves as rivals as well as clients of the American superpower. The idea may strike one as either admirable or absurd, but we should admit that the program of European autonomy is at least ambitious. Regardless of whether it makes Americans happy or not, greater European self-reliance in military as well as other areas might make everybody safer than the current arrangement based on American pledges of protection which may prove unredeemable in a future crisis however distant. The one thing that seemed certain from my interviews is that French policy elites were agreed to pay the price of their ambitions, because, as one young left-wing journalist declared to me in 1985: "the one thing left in the world for 'Old Europe' to conquer is Europe herself⁸⁴."

1 See Pierre Lellouche, "France and the Euromissiles: The Limits of Immunity," Foreign Affairs, Vol 62, No 2, Winter 1983/84, pp. 320-23.

2 Hassner, op cit., p. 75.

3 For an intelligent and critical appreciation of this mood of self-satisfaction, see Dominique Moïsi, "L'épreuve de la réalité," Politique Etrangère, No 2/1985, pp. 317-19.

4 Pierre Lellouche, editor, Pacifisme et dissuasion, IFRI, Paris, 1983, pp. 22-26.

5 For a useful introduction to the problems and promise of Franco-German relations as seen from a French perspective at the close of the eighties, see André Brigot, "A Neighbor's Fears: Enduring Issues in Franco-German Relations," in LePrestre, French Security Policy in a Disarming World," op cit., pp. 85-105.

6 See Pierre Favier and Michel Martin-Roland, La Décennie Mitterrand: les ruptures, Vol 1, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1990, pp. 264-272.

7 Favier and Roland, op cit., pp. 273-282.

8 See the Annex to this Law in David, op cit., pp. 197-98.

9 See Charles Hernu's declaration in Le Monde, June 22, 1985, p. 1.

10 See Charles Hernu's address to French Diplomats in March 1984, in which he says in relation to an intervention of the FAR in Germany that: "A potential aggressor can only hesitate before confronting physically the forces of the nuclear, independent and continental power that our country represents." David, op cit., p. 274-275.

11 The logic behind the far is laid out by Dominique David in La Force D'action Rapide en Europe: Le Dire Des Armes, l'Institut Français de Polemologie/FEDN, Paris, 1984, pp. 5-30.

12 David, op cit., p. 288.

13 Bozo, op cit., pp. 123-33.

14 David, op cit., p. 274.

15 Jacques Isnard, "La France et l'Allemagne vont créer un corps d'armée à vocation européenne," Le Monde, 21 May, 1992, p. 1.

16 See Ronald Tiersky, "France in the New Europe", Foreign Affairs, Vol 71, No 2, Spring 1992, pp. 141-143.

17 General Gallois, "Le Mythe de la défense européenne," in L'Allemagne et l'Avenir de l'Europe, Editions Anthropos, Paris, 1984, p.155. See also Gérard Fuch's reply from a Socialist perspective in the same volume.

18 Pierre Lellouche, L'Avenir de la Guerre, Mazarine, Paris, 1985, pp. 278 -288.

19 Annex to La Loi de Programmation, 1984-88, David, op cit., p.202.

20 Jean-Yves Boulic, "La Bombe à neutrons française est "prête," Le Point, November 17, 1986 p. 32.

21 Rumors about the production of neutron weapons were already in circulation in Paris in the Summer of 1985. Some French parliamentarians have expressed to me their frustration with the Government's policy of pursuing the development of these weapons while refusing to announce to France's allies and her own public that their production has already begun.

22 Dominic Moisi, "A l'épreuve de la réalité," op cit., p 318.

23 See for instance, the report of the PS Defense Commission adopted by the Party executive bureau June 26th 1985, La Sécurité de l'Europe, pp. 2-7 and 17-21.

24 Thierry de Montbrial, "Pour une politique de défense," Commentaire No 40, Winter 87/88, p. 649. See also his "Security Requires Caution," Foreign Policy, No 71, Summer 1988.

25 de Montbrial, Commentaire, op cit., p. 648.

26 Jacques Isnard, "La France, promesse d'une Europe de la défense," Le Monde, July 14 1988, p. 1.

27 de Montbrial, Commentaire, op cit., p. 647.

28 Heisbourgh, "Après le Traité: Addornamento pour une alliance," Politique Etrangère, No 1. 1988, p. 150.

29 Bruno Racine, "La France et le FNI," Politique Etrangère, No 1. 1988, p. 85.

30 Racine, op cit., p. 89.

31 de Montbrial, Commentaire, op cit., p. 647.

32 Bozo, op cit., p. 109-19.

33 Bozo, op cit., pp. 121-22.

34 de La Gorce, op cit., pp. 100-103.

35 Jacques Isnard, "L'Espagne s'associe au projet franco-italien d'un satellite de reconnaissance militaire," Le Monde, March 27-28, 1988, p. 8.

36 "L'Espagne et le Portugal sont invité à rejoindre L'UEO," Le Monde, April 20, 1988, p. 6.

37 See André Giraud's 1987 speech to the European Movement in Dominique David's La Politique de Défense de la France, op cit., pp. 290.

38 "Les questions nucléaires ne feront pas obstacle à l'entrée de l'Espagne dans l'UEO," Le Monde, April 21, 1988.

39 See Rocard's 1988 IHEDN speech, op cit, pp. 6-7.

40 Jacques Isnard, "Une Formation Souple," Le Monde, 21 May, 1992, p. 3.

41 Heisbourgh, "Après le Traité," Politique Etrangère, op cit., p. 149.

42 Jacques Isnard, "moratoire sur les essais nucléaires: la dissuasion n'a plus la même priorité," Le Monde, April 10, 1992. p. 11.

43 For an example of the extent of official concern in the face of the breakthrough on arms control, see the report of the "Groupe X-Défense," (made up of senior defense advisors to the Ministry of Defense), "La Paix Nucléaire En Question?" FEDN, Paris, 1989, pp. 71-121.

44 Pierre Lellouche, "L'après-Washington," Politique Etrangère, No 1/88, p. 156. See also his contribution to the forum, "The Ilkė-Wohlstetter Report: European Responses," entitled "Why Europe Still Matters," The National Interest, No 12, Summer 1988, pp. 16-20.

45 Lellouche, "l'Après Washington," op cit., pp. 154-55.

46 Lellouche, "l'Après Washington," op cit., pp. 155-56.

47 See Frank J. Gaffney, "A Policy Abandoned," in The National Interest, No 11, Spring 1988, pp. 53-63 for an expression of the fury and regret of the Neo-conservative "diehards" in Washington.

48 George Kennan's article, "the Gorbachov Prospect," in The New York Review of Books, January 21, 1988, is fairly representative of this position. But also see Jeffry Hough's introduction to Russia and the West, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1988.

49 Lellouche comes close to accusing the Western leadership of negligence.

50 See Heisbourgh, "l'Après le Traité," op cit., pp. 147-48.

51 Lellouche, "l'Après Washington," op cit., p. 159.

52 "L'Effet Gorbachov" menacerait le consensus de Français en matière de défense nationale," Le Monde, February 25, 1988, p.12.

53 "L'Humanité polémique avec Les Izvestia," Le Monde, May 5, 1988, p. 14.

54 Pierre Hassner, "Un chef d'oeuvre en péril, op cit., p. 75.

55 The range of the elite opinion in France in the late 1980's was well represented in a round table discussion, "De Khrouchtchev - Gorbatchev, le système soviétique est-il réformable?" with Besançon, Castoriadis, Charvin, Ellenstein, Kriegel and others. The prevalence of a relatively "hard line" is quite striking despite some spirited dissents. Pouvoirs, No 45, April 1988, pp. 115-130.

56 See Claude Le Fort, "La Démocratie se lève à l'Est," Esprit, No 177, Décembre 1991, p. 19, for the reflection of one of the better known "anti-totalitarian" critics on the sudden collapse of their adversary.

57 François Mitterrand, "Lettre à tous les Français," special insert, Liberation, April 7, 1988, p.15.

58 Heisbourgh, "L'Après le Traité," op cit., p. 144.

59 Heisbourgh, "L'Après le Traité," op cit., p. 151.

60 David, see Mitterrand's October 1988 speech to the IHEDN, in La Défense de la France, op cit., p. 322. Also I heard quite a bit of expressed about the impression of French "obstructionism" during my interviewing in August of 1988.

61 Paris Interviews, Ministry of Defense, J. Mason, August 1988.

- 62 David, La Défense de la France, op cit., pp. 321-323.
- 63 David, La Défense de la France, op cit., p. 322.
- 64 See Isnard, "La moratoire des essais nucléaires," op cit.
- 65 For an interesting commentary on the new strategic situation by one of the founding fathers of French nuclear thought, see Lucien Poirier, "La crise de fondements," La Stratégie Française, op cit., pp. 128-147.
- 66 Conversations last year with François Fillon and Jérôme Paolini of IFRI brought a frank admission that France no longer has a operational nuclear doctrine.
- 67 See Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, "La politique de défense de la France," La Stratégie Française, op cit., pp. 17-25.
- 68 The nuclear share of equipment expenditure in the past four year defense program is 31 \$ or 131.5 billion francs, which at current exchange rates works out to about 19 billion dollars for the life of the program, or a yearly average of around 4.7 billion dollars approximately the same figure as the Reagan budgetary request for 1987.
- 69 See Conor Cruise O'Brien's mordant commentary on this French leadership hang-up, "The Future of The West," National Interest, No 30. Winter 1992/93, p.7.
- 70 Heisbourgh, "Le Statu Quo Impossible," op cit.
- 71 Josef Joffe, "The Cost of Abandoning Europe," The National Interest, No 3, Spring 1986, pp. 33-39.
- 72 See Anton De Porte's, Europe and the Superpower Balance, Headline Series 247, Foreign Policy Association, New York, 1979, pp. 47-60.
- 73 For a self-described "Hobbesian Pessimist's" view of "things to come," see Jack Synder's "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," International Security, Vol 14 No 4, Spring 1990, especially pp. 9-11.
- 74 See Roland Dumas, Pour en finir avec l'euroessimisme, Politique Etrangère, No 2/1985, p. 309
- 75 See Robert Rudney for an enthusiastic account of French ambitions by a sympathetic foreigner, "France: Preparing for European Leadership," The National Interest, No. 9, Fall 1987, pp. 33-48.
- 76 Heisbourgh, "L'Impossible Statu Quo," op cit., p 5.
- 77 See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony, Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 31-49.
- 78 Dominique Moïsi, "French Foreign Policy: The challenge of Adaptation," Foreign Affairs, Vol 67, No. 1, Fall 1988, pp. 157-58 & 163-64.
- 79 See Robert Toulemon, "Le Mythe" in Europe 1993, a special issue of Pouvoirs, No 48 1989, 7-14.
- 80 Rocard's IHEDN speech, op cit.

81 See for instance the commentary of Owen Harris advocating the virtues of deliberately fostering greater "insecurity" in European/American relations in the inaugural issue of The National Interest, No 1, Fall 1986, pp. 101-11.

82 My interviews in Paris in the Spring of 1985 turned up frequent expressions of a wide-spread sentiment of "ras le bol" with attitudes in Reagan foreign policy circles among members of the French security community inside and outside the Elysée Palace.

83 Paris Interview, J. Mason, June 7, 1985.

IX

Nuclear Nationalism and Public Opinion

Recent French studies of public opinion trends in West European countries relate the capacity of the peace movements to mobilize support to two factors: the degree to which a particular national public feels dependent on American protection, and the strength of public awareness about the danger of a Superpower confrontation in the near future¹. French public opinion patterns differ because French respondents were not concerned by the risk of nuclear war - aside from one brief peak of anxiety in 1980 following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan².

Table 9-1.

1982-83: Major Concerns of The French Public

Question: Which issues on this list worry you the most today in so far as you and you country are concerned ?

	Sept. 1982	March 1983	Change
Threat of War	42%	34%	-8
Energy Crisis	22%	15%	-7
Inflation	50%	48%	-2
Inadequate Defense	5%	6%	+1
Unemployment	69%	70%	+1
Social Inequality	22%	24%	+2
Lack of Law and Order	33%	32%	-1
Nuclear Weapons	18%	19%	+1
Excessive State Spending	18%	21%	+3
Government Incompetence	18%	14%	-4
No Opinion	1%	1%	=

Source: Louis Harris-France-Le Matin, September 17-23, 1982 and March 14-April 14, 1983. Adapted from Renat Fritsch-Bournazel, Opinion Publique et Défense En France, Institut Atlantique des Affaires Internationales, Paris 1983. p. 17.

Overall French polls in the 1980's show much greater concern with American interest rates, or Superpowers rivalries in Third-World countries than with nuclear war as we can see from Table 9-1 above³. It should come as no real surprise then, that in cross-national European surveys, French respondents felt the least need for American protection⁴.

These sentiments were shared by most of my elite correspondents as we can see in Table 9-2 which presents my informants view of the current risks to French security. In my interviews I asked my informants to rank four distinct threats to French national security on a scale of 1 to 5 ranking them in terms of their probability. I then asked them to describe the threats in terms of their gravity or seriousness. The four threats which they were asked to evaluate were: first, the threat of military attack or invasion; second, the threat of a decline in industrial and technological competitiveness, third, the loss of national political sovereignty to outside centers of decision making, and lastly the risk of major terrorist attacks in continental France. The upper part of Table 9-2 displays the risks which my informants considered to be the most likely, that is risk categories which received a score of between 3 and 5 on the questionnaire. The tallies of responses are broken out by occupational category or by political identification. The lower part displays the risk categories which they thought were the least likely, that is, risks which they scored at between 0 and 2. The occupational and political breakout is the same as in Table 7-1. In the

extreme right hand column of the top of Table 9-2 I give the tallies for those respondents who said they had a high degree of confidence in the credibility of the French nuclear deterrent broken out by occupational and political category. I do the same in the bottom part for those who said that they had low or no confidence in the French national deterrent.

In the top section we see that for virtually all categories of informants the threats of industrial decline and terrorist attack were the ones they believed the most probable. Interestingly only a small minority, only 11 out of 64, thought that the risk of military attack was likely. Fifty one informants rated this as the least likely risk to French security, a majority which included most of the civilian defense analysts and military officers.

It is worth noting that among civilians only the CODENE activists, the Rocardian intellectuals, and the left journalists had significant minorities, at least one out of five, who thought that the war threat was a current and serious danger. These categories also showed the greatest skepticism about the credibility of the French nuclear deterrent. What the table does not show is that I found during my interviewing the "believers" in the imminent threat of war included some of the major intellectuals and leaders in both the CODENE and Rocardian groups.

From my interviewing it became clear that for most respondents, 42 out of 64, the prospect of industrial decline was

Table 9-2

ELITE ESTIMATES OF MOST LIKELY AND LEAST LIKELY RISKS TO FRENCH SECURITY.

Most Likely Security Risks *

Type of Risk	Mil.	Ind.	Loss.	Terrorist	High Confidence
	Invasion	Decline of	Sov.	Attacks	in Nuke Force
<u>Prof/Political</u>					
<u>Grouping</u>					
Def. Spec. (14)	3	11	4	12	10
Mil. Off. (8)	1	6	5	4	6
Journalists (8)	2	5	4	6	5
PS (8)	1	5	4	5	7
2nd Left (10)	2	7	5	5	3
PCF (6)	0	5	5	1	4
CODENE (10)	2	9	6	8	3
total responses	11	42	33	40**	38

total respondents (64)

* security threats rated by respondents at between 3 to 5 in terms of probability on a possible scale of 0 to 5.

** The threat of terrorism was rated by most respondents as quite likely but considered not very consequential in its impact on French society.

Least Likely Security Risks *

Type of Risk	Mil.	Ind.	Loss	Terrorist	Low Confi
	Invasion	Decline of	Sov.	Attack/s	dence in
<u>Nuke Force</u>					
<u>Prof/Political</u>					
<u>Grouping</u>					
Def. Spec. (14)	9	3	10	2	4
Mil Off. (8)	7	2	3	4	2
Journalists (8)	6	3	4	2	2
PS (8)	7	3	4	3	1
2nd Left (10)	8	3	5	5	4
PCF (6)	6	1	1	5	2
CODENE (10)	8	1	4	2	7
Total responses	51	16	31	23	22

total respondents (64)

* security threats rated by respondents as being less than 2 on a possible scale of 0 to 5.

Source: Field Interviews, Paris 1985-86, J. Mason.

considered not only likely but the most serious in its impact. The threat of terrorist attack on the other hand was thought to be likely by 40 of my respondents but only a small minority believed that it was serious in terms of its impact on French society. The other threat that a narrow majority of all respondents, 33 out of 64, thought both likely and took quite seriously was the loss of national sovereignty to outside centers of decision. Which center people worried about was much more a matter of partisan identity. For most of the military officers, and intellectuals from the Second Left, the outside political threat was seen as coming from Moscow. The concern here was of "finlandization" taken to mean the imposition of a Soviet veto over the foreign and defense policy decisions of a future French government.

On the other hand, for most of the Communists and CODENE activists as well as a minority of the Socialist activist, journalists and defense analysts the main political threat was seen as coming from Washington. The fear here was that of "Canadianization," understood as a loss of economic competitiveness, an erosion of cultural identity and a transfer of political sovereignty to the United States - a loss which in the opinion of many of these respondents was not a future risk but an immediate and pressing danger, if not an already accomplished fact.

An almost equal number of respondents rated this threat as being the least likely threat or no threat at all. Quite a few of them protested against what they saw as the pejor-

ative construction of the question, insisting that the loss of national sovereignty could actually be quite a good thing, if what one meant was a partial and voluntary transfer of national authority to the European Community. For these informants, especially among the Socialist activists and defense analysts, the voluntary transfer of sovereignty was seen as a desirable policy option that ought to be implemented as soon as possible so as to accelerate the construction of the European Union. Not surprisingly those respondents who had high confidence in the French nuclear deterrent were also the ones who were the least likely to think that the risk of war or the coerced loss of national decision-making authority were real or immediate threats.

This profile of the elite assessment of risks is strikingly similar to the risk assessment made by French public opinion at large. The tendency to discount the imminent threat of war makes it quite dissimilar from the attitudes expressed by significant minorities in Germany and Great Britain during the same period. This peculiar mix of public attitudes in France has been open to two interpretations: a theory of "responsible nationalism," and a theory of "nuclear pacifism".

The "responsible nationalism" interpretation is promoted by spokespersons for the Socialists and the right alike⁵. It views the relative calm of the French public as a sign of its basic good sense, and confirmation of the wisdom of De Gaulle's decision to distance France from NATO by replacing the American nuclear umbrella with something of local manufacture

and greater reliability. According to this view, the disorder that one saw elsewhere was the inevitable but wrong-headed reaction of people who had been betrayed by the irresponsible policies pursued by their own governments over the course of a generation. These governments allegedly forfeited their peoples' confidence the moment they gave up national control over basic defense policy in exchange for American protection. This bad exchange not only wounds national pride, but delivered a lesson in political irresponsibility which has come back to haunt them in the form of a "pacifist/defeatist" turn in public opinion the moment the world scene became a little rocky at the beginning of the 1980's. France is free of this "defeatism," because it won its people's trust by pursuing a policy of national responsibility in defense. These analysts point to the high levels of support this policy enjoys in the opinion polls; continued public tolerance of high defense budgets and very low levels of draft evasion, as evidence that this consensus is not limited to elite groups⁶. This is viewed only as France's just reward for having defended her national virtue for a generation⁷.

The "nuclear pacifism" school reads the same poll data differently⁸. In this view, it is the Gaullist nuclear orthodoxy which has given rise to public attitudes which, while pro-nuclear, are as escapist as elsewhere, and just as rooted in "magical" thinking. "Magical" thinking here means that the French public has distorted nuclear deterrence to mean that wars are now ruled out, that deterrence is equiva-

lent to a permanent state of "non-war." Further, it seems that the ambiguities of French nuclear doctrine permit people to imagine that, if war did come, France has the means to stay out by abandoning her allies and withdrawing into the national nuclear "sanctuary⁹." These analysts argue that the public has quite accurately perceived "nuclear nationalism" as a doctrine of "armed neutrality," which has the added advantage of being nuclear and making any active citizen participation in the defense of the national territory irrelevant. In this view public support for France's nuclear deterrent turns into its opposite, a "pacifist" fantasy that French citizens will be spared the dirty business of war, at least on their own territory. This interpretation is only reinforced by the fact that in the polls very high levels of support for France's nuclear strike forces co-exist with the widespread refusal to ever consider its use "even in the case of invasion¹⁰."

This school expects public support for France's nuclear forces to erode whenever realworld events begin to puncture the French public's sense of being immunized against the risks of history. Ironically, the same poll data indicating public support of the draft also provides evidence to support this second interpretation as well - apparently the French approve of national service because they associate it with individual social mobility rather than preparation for actual combat¹¹. The existing consensus is condemned because it leaves the French demoralized by a defense doctrine which transfers all real responsibility for national defense to the President of

the Republic and a few missile crews. The citizen is seen as stripped of all responsibility; unready to participate in the life of the nation, leaving French policy-makers politically disarmed, and unable to confront any real crisis situation. Remarkably as we will see later, this critique of French public attitudes towards nuclear weapons as made by pro-nuclear, "anti-totalitarians" such as Paul Thibaud actually incorporates a great deal of the argument made against the Nuclear Presidency by anti-nuclear Leftists such as Patrick Viveret - this unity in battle may reflect their common background in the Rocardian movement of the seventies.

Both of these interpretations were exaggerated in their common misreading of social movements elsewhere in Europe as movements for "preemptive surrender" to the Soviets, and both assume that there are no meaningful defense alternatives to nuclear weapons. They may, however, have been suggestive about what was going on with French public opinion in the 1980's. The nationalists were probably right to underscore the connection between levels of public support for nuclear policy, and the distance with which most French view American political leaders and policy debates. The French public opinion did not feel directly implicated in the American policy disputes about limited nuclear war-fighting which helped drive up levels of public anxiety in the rest of Western Europe. At the same time, this feeling of "distance" supports the idea that the French entertained ideas of a quasi-magical "immunity." The reading of this as a form of "nuclear pacifism"

points up the fact that policy changes which brought France into closer collaboration with U.S. policy could have had an unpredictable impact on the public's peace of mind.

At home the new military policy of moving closer to the Atlantic Alliance even while accelerating the process of European integration was presented to French public opinion as a kind of European supernationalism under French leadership - a sentiment expressed in London when Mitterrand declared: "France is my fatherland but Europe is my future." Its full meaning may have been better stated by a young French defense analyst who once remarked to me: "France must make Europe in order to save her own skin¹²." This sentiment was echoed repeatedly in other interviews - across the political spectrum. I was told by one leading anti-nuclear exponent of non-alignment that "Everything depends on making positive choices in our European policy. This comes quite naturally from the fact that France does not have the "weight" to resist the two Superpowers on her own¹³."

A high official in the Defense ministry - who had began his political career as a young activist in Charles Hernu's entourage - also echoed this sentiment when he told me:

"We will be in the future where Europe is... The question is whither Europe? Europe is not in a "steady state situation." Either we will pull out of decline or our decline will accelerate. France is the only country which can act as a political catalyst for Europe. France has a pivotal role to

play which we can either use to our advantage or throw away¹⁴."

This pro-European "preference" was strongly shared by most of my informants. When I administered my questionnaire in 1985 I asked my respondents to rate three possible alliance options in terms of their preference in a rank order of 1 to 3. The first option was for a strengthening of France's ties to the United States and to NATO, a position which basically corresponds to the "Atlanticist" position. The second option was that France play a greater role in creating a European defense entity which could operate autonomously from the United States, and the third was an option for a continuation of a policy of national self-reliance which basically corresponded to the Gaullist policy of the late sixties. My informants were allowed to choose one of the three or to group their preferences if they felt that such a grouping was logical and appropriate. As is shown in Table 9-3, most of my sample overwhelmingly preferred the European option - 43 out of 64 informants endorsed this option. At the same time, a significant number also endorsed the Gaullist nuclear option - 28 out of 64. Indeed, with the notable exception of the journalists I spoke with, many informants saw little conflict between these two options so they frequently grouped them together as "twinned" policy preferences. Only a small

Table No. 9-3

ALLIANCE PREFERENCES OF FRENCH ELITE RESPONDENTS

Alliance Option	Pro US	European Def. Entity	Nuclear Nationalist	Non Aligned	Pro-USSR
Political Groups/ No of Respondents					
Def. Spec. (14)	9	13	8	0	0
Mil. Off. (8)	1	7	4	0	0
Press (9)	0	4	7	0	0
PS/CERES (8)	0	6	4	0	0
2nd Left (10)	5	7	4	0	0
PCF (5)	0	1	1	3	2
CODENE (10)	0	5	0	7	0
Total res. (64)	15	43	28	10	2
Total responses (98).					

Source: Paris field interviews 1984-86, John Mason.

minority actively endorsed the "Atlanticist" option, mainly civilian defense analysts and Rocardian intellectuals, but here again the American option was grouped together with the European alliance preference or the nuclear nationalist option.

In quite a few cases, my informants among the "defense analysts" grouped all three options together as elements of a total policy package. Refusing to treat these policy preferences as polar opposites, they saw them rather as compatible once seen as parts of a policy sequence which unfolded over time. In this view, the success of De Gaulle's strategic

policy was that his nuclear nationalism had transformed France from the "Sick Man of Europe" into a reliable alliance partner for the US in the short run, and a leader in the construction of a European Defense Union in the long run. In this sense, these informants felt that the current policy consensus in France combined all of the alliance options which French elites had debated over the past twenty years into a single coherent strategic approach.

The main dissents to this unified policy vision came predictably enough from the anti-nuclear activists and the communists. Many of my informants from the PSU and CODENE refused to endorse any of the policy options I had initially presented in my questionnaire. Instead they added an option in favor of a denuclearized France in a non-aligned Europe. In at least a few cases, however, this preference for non-alignment was combined with an option in favor of the construction of an autonomous European defense entity. The Communists were divided basically between anti-nuclear activists who favored some combination of non-alignment and European defense and pro-nuclear traditionalists, who tended to group Gaullist nuclear nationalism with "la belle et grande alliance," the "great and beautiful" alliance with the Soviet Union. Obviously this nostalgia for "la grande et la belle" was a sentiment only felt by a special minority¹⁵.

The fact that these changes represented more than a "slight modification" of French declared policy passed for a time unnoticed by the French public, although contemporaneous

opinion polls did show surprisingly high levels of support for increasing French cooperation with Germany, and France's level of commitment to Germany's defense¹⁶. The new European twist on the old Gaullist doctrine came to be reflected in the defense programs of all the major parties except the Communists, but it demanded a more sophisticated mix of the themes of European co-operation, and the pursuit of independence from the Superpowers than the old consensus seemed to allow¹⁷.

At the same time, while it is unlikely that outrage at the Soviet presence in the heart of central Europe was as widely felt in "la France profonde" as among the Paris intelligentsia, over the course of the eighties one of the anomalous features of French public opinion did quietly disappear. French public opinion polls no longer showed a distrust of the U.S. which was equal to that of the Soviet Union, or for that matter, any significant reserves of goodwill concerning the Soviets remaining from WWII¹⁸. Indeed public perceptions of Soviet hostility kept pace with the changes in official policy, and with those in intellectual circles. The shift in the intellectual wind, exemplified for instance by the conversion of such left-wing warhorses as Yves Montand into apostles of the Soviet peril, encouraged a hardening of public attitudes toward the Soviet Union and a total reassessment of the global role of the United States which was reflected in a sharp deterioration of the Soviet Union's public image between 1974 and 1985¹⁹. In the late

eighties, public suspicion of Soviet motives hung on much longer in France than elsewhere in Western Europe, a consequence perhaps of the fact that the intellectual public in France received the Soviet "new look" with a much greater degree of skepticism than seems to be the rule among other Western European cultural and political elites.

Another byproduct associated with the French quest for a new European vocation, and the decline of French good-will toward the Soviets, was a positive reevaluation of French ties to the US by some intellectuals on the Left as well as the right, and even occasional surges of enthusiasm for Ronald Reagan which even left him tied with Mikhail Gorbachov in French public opinion polls in the late 1980's²⁰. For others, this improvement in the public image of the US was a consequence of the fact that the prestige of American cultural models, and the popularity of Ronald Reagan with the French public, had made both useful assets for conducting ideological battles over domestic issues²¹. Regardless, American cultural prestige, and Reagan's popularity opened the door to all kinds of American imports including neo-conservative strategic doctrines, and ideological arguments against arms control. This particular American connection had its effect on French strategic culture as Stanley Hoffmann has pointed out²², and helped to make security as well as cultural ties with United States both more attractive and legitimate.

The new openness of the mid-80's, however, to American influences and alliances also had the effect of making Ameri-

can policy debates more visible. It suggested that the international environment has become sufficiently dangerous by the early eighties that French leaders considered it prudent to join the collective European rush for shelter. These shifts tended to increase the public's awareness of the reality of outside security threats, again with unpredictable political effects. Certainly by the middle eighties some effort at a renewal of public confidence in French nuclear policy seemed necessary in certain elite circles. Already in 1985 the Reagan "Star Wars" program caught the public's imagination in France like nothing before, thanks to a combined media blitz around the technical obsolescence of the French strategic forces orchestrated by Yves Montand and Pierre Lellouche. Their combined efforts, which included a major television special, the publication of Lellouche's best seller, The Future of War, and a special edition of the newsweekly, Le Point, were seconded by politicians from the right-wing opposition²³. This created a hint of public doubt about the future credibility of France's nuclear deterrent force which was echoed in some of my interviews in 1985, and prompted calls by right-wing Atlanticists for France to throw in with the American competition before it was too late²⁴.

All of the media confusion around Star Wars suggested that outside realities were beginning to effect the closed world of French deterrent doctrine in ways which were more politically significant than the weak nuclear pacifism of the early 1980's. This must have been a troubling sign, because it

implied that the defense agenda had escaped the control of the information managers²⁵. Foreign information and ideas were to continue to seep in to trouble them further as French collaboration with the Americans and with other Europeans continued to develop. The fact that French elites didn't know how to respond to this problem was confirmed at the time by a series of calls for a major effort to counter "foreign disinformation campaigns" aimed presumably at weakening public confidence in the national deterrent force²⁶. It seems safe to assume here that French security elites were probably as much concerned by anti-nuclear "disinformation" of American or German origin as by the more familiar effort they had come to expect from the Soviets.

At the same time the shift towards closer cooperation with other European partners threatened the stability of the elite consensus on the Left because it had led to the clarification of the missions of French nuclear forces - clearly designating the Soviet Union as France's principal adversary. Successive restatements by the Mitterrand Government of its declared policy concerning France's "vital" interests and strategic commitments had the effect of removing much of the ambiguities concerning official doctrine, and necessarily narrowed the range of political positions which the official discourse could accommodate. In particular, the "nationalist/neutralist" position which saw French nuclear forces as the guarantee of France's non-engagement in a future war was marginalized by official spokesmen. This was confirmed in my interviews where

I found that respondents who thought that the mission of the French nuclear strike force should be limited to deterring attacks on France's territorial "sanctuary" to the exclusion of other missions, were the most likely to oppose Mitterrand's "European" turn in foreign policy regardless of his or her party affiliations²⁷. This rejectionist stance of the European policy was expressed by rightists as well as left "nationalists" from the CERES and the Communist Party.

The turn in doctrine under Mitterrand impacted especially heavily on the French Communist Party by nullifying its claim to be a legitimate spokesman for French independence and "left nationalism." It also contributed to the weakening of the "Union of the left" and to the decision of the Communists to leave the first Mitterrand government in 1984. By the middle eighties the Communists found themselves cast alongside the weak anti-nuclear movement in the role of the designated domestic adversaries of the official pro-nuclear, anti-Soviet consensus.

In many ways the French mix of public apathy and effective elite control over nuclear policy discussions resembled the situation in virtually all the Western political systems until the late seventies. In retrospect public sensitivity in other European states seems like an extraordinary episode when viewed against the public indifference to nuclear policy during most of the post-war period. There were waves of public concern in the 1950s and '80s whenever the relations between the blocs became particularly tense. But as the most recent

upsurge of anti-nuclear activism recedes, French exceptionalism seems less atypical than it did when it was viewed against the backdrop of the Euromissile deployment. The one principal difference between the current situation and previous ebbs and flows of public concern was that the movements of the 1980s seems to have left permanent traces on party doctrine. In Germany and Great Britain, the passage of the latest anti-nuclear movements left its mark on party platforms and party cadre in ways that may long outlive the short life-spans of the movements themselves, in much the same way as the French left parties were marked by the programmatic themes of May '68 well into the late 1970s.

Public Opinion and Risk Perception:

This discussion opened in a straight forward way by looking at the process by which the French Socialist Party took a decision concerning the French Strategic forces - a very ordinary unheroic decision despite the stakes involved - to go along with the existing political arrangements. This is precisely the kind of decision with which American political scientists feel comfortable: There was a vote and somebody lost; arguments were made, and documents abound. However, the closer one looks into the party debate, the more other questions press in - questions which touch on absences rather than objective events. Slowly, as the questions become "why did the French feel immunity from War?" or "Why didn't they develop a reaction against American theater arms and war planning when everyone around them did?" we move from the

knowable realm of decisions into the speculative realm of "bias, non-events, and non-decisions." Here, one must proceed like Holmes the detective, collecting clues to be sure, but mainly by argument: "and why, on that one night, did the watchdog fail to bark..?" This is the stuff of good fiction, perhaps, but most political scientists would say that it's chancy social science - one might as well discuss the sex of angels as the relationship between ideology and policy choices which were never taken.

One route back from the edge of the intellectual map is to redefine the problem. Our problem has been to grasp why the French failed to develop an anti-nuclear movement - a problem which could be boiled down to asking why French elites and publics did not fear the bomb as much as others did in Europe in the early 1980's. This redefines the issue as a problem concerning the selective perception of risk. This is an area which has been studied both from the point of view of the social psychology of public opinion and of the perception of risk. Research on the latter has been undertaken recently by Aron Wildafsky and Mary Douglas²⁸, who have been concerned with the public perception of environmental dangers - mainly to demonstrate the irrationality of public fears about the long-term hazards of familiar household chemicals. Unlike Wildafsky and Douglas, we are less concerned with criticizing the popular grounds for identifying environmental dangers than with the mechanisms which allow people to avoid doing so. Certainly, Wildafsky and Douglas are right to say that every-

day life is full of hazards and to ask the question of which cultural categories make people to select some risks as worthy of their attention and others as risks they can safely ignore. The bomb, it seems falls into the category of risks which most people choose to ignore.

Robert Jay Lifton, and others working in the Nuclear Task Force of the American Psychiatric Association, have advanced the notion that nuclear weapons represent a threat so total that it attacks the individual's sense of confidence in the continuity of the social world in a way which is psychologically more threatening than a simple physical threat to their individual survival²⁹. This threat strikes at one's sense of general future, the inter-generational sense of continuity and duration which provides the framework for everyday activity in the now we live³⁰. This leads people to suppress the knowledge of the existence of these weapons whenever possible so as to get on with the ordinary business of living - indeed, John Mack suggest that people who can't succeed in doing so may exhibit a fixation on the present which interferes with their everyday competence as social actors³¹.

For those who can't avoid the fact of these weapons, either because they are involved in building them, or involved in planning for their actual use, Lifton suggests that the mechanism of clinical detachment, a kind of studied affective "numbing," comes into play³². These findings are interesting and suggestive, perhaps, in terms of the element of denial which seems to be present in much of the poll data concerning

the French sense of immunity. However, inferences from the psychology of individuals, in Lifton's case from that of survivors of the Hiroshima bombing to large populations confronted with a risk like that of a global nuclear war - which remains hypothetical - is a risky business at best.

Other researchers associated with the Social Scientists Conference Against Nuclear War were working in the early 1980's on the reactions of local populations to the risks of local disasters associated with new technologies: living and working with asbestos, or living in close proximity to a storage facility for liquid natural gas³³. These researchers place great emphasis on the power of short-term interests to motivate people to accept any plausible rationalization which would allow them to reconcile their security with a tremendous objective hazard. When employment was an issue, local populations had a powerful economic motivation to accept whatever official rationalization that was offered which could justify the trade-off between short-term benefits to the community and long-range toxic or accident risks.

This research approach, I think, has the advantage of stressing the cognitive element in the perception of risk; the importance of the role of misinformation, faulty logic and official "public relations" in the creation and maintenance of a system of "false awareness." Any and all of these frameworks drawn from social psychology may be relevant for understanding poll data concerning popular attitudes in France toward nuclear weapons, and nuclear power as well. All they

ask is that the researcher suspend his or her belief that the people involved could give good reasons for their beliefs. This stance, as Anthony Giddens has argued, can, in some cases at least, mask an inherently conservative bias³⁴.

Political Communication and Elite Agenda Makers:

A better strategy, perhaps, would draw less on social psychology of risk perception and more on another model taken from the study of political communication and public opinion formation. The concepts which I believe have a particular relevance are the notions of the "two-step" process of political communication, and "selective perception." The idea of "selective perception" is a fairly simple one: it suggests that most people develop their fundamental ideas about politics early in life and then proceed to use this "frame of meaning" throughout their adult lives to process political information. Once the "frame of meaning" is set, this theory suggests, people stop thinking about it, and will simply "tune out" any information which would challenge them to reconsider it. This theory is, of course, quite pessimistic about the willingness of the average citizen to change their ideas in the light of new facts, this, to learn anything new³⁵.

The idea of a "two step" process of communication proceeds from the same basic assumptions about public opinion formation - the deep commitment of ordinary individuals to established ideas - and extends it from the psychology of individual opinion holders to group dynamics. It argues that social groups promote internal conformity by selecting members who

hold similar opinions. The group culture is actively defended from the outside world by local "gate-keepers," or "opinion-leaders," who are political specialists for the community who shape group opinion by selectively communicating, and screening out, information. In this model, the flow of information is top-down from opinion elites, who produce opinions for others consumption to local opinion leaders who choose what they consider "appropriate," or "politically correct," for the average group member at the bottom of the communication ladder³⁶.

This model has its difficulties. It is based on an American pattern which was identified during a period of relative political stability in the forties and fifties. Further, it was based on research about the impact of mass media on opinion formation which was completed before the full effects of the television revolution made themselves felt - this model still assumes that most political information is communicated by word of mouth³⁷. Despite these objections, it could apply to the French case in two senses: first, for those sectors of public opinion which are strongly partisan identified, it suggests the importance of ideological discourse held by opinion elites for creating constraints on the issue agenda available to the society as a whole, as for example in the case of the nuclear issue, and second, it suggests that middle level "opinion leaders" have an important degree of autonomy which allows them to resist and slow any change in the agenda even when they are not in a position to shape it nationally.

Taken together, the model would lead one to expect great stability in public attitudes, and a great deal of resistance to any attempt to bring about a rapid change in established beliefs, once they are set in place.

1 Gregory Flynn, "Opinions Publiques et Mouvement Pacifistes," in Dissuasion et Pacifisme, Pierre Lellouche editor, IFRI, Paris, 1982, pp.223-37.

2 Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, Opinion Publique et Défense en France, Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, June 1983, pp.13-14.

3 Renata Bournazel, op cit., pp.16-18.

4 Paul Thibaud, "Pacifism and its problems, TELOS, No 59. 1984, pp 75-80.

5 See for instance Dominique Moïsi, "Les Limites du Consensus," in Lellouche's Dissuasion et Pacifisme, op cit., pp.253-265.

6 This formula is taken virtually word for word from my interview with a high level Defense Ministry official, Paris Interviews, J. Mason. June 1985.

7 See my 1981 interview with Dominique Moïsi in TELOS No 55, op cit.

8 Thibaud, "Pacifism and its Problems," op cit.

9 I had an occasion to talk with a researcher from SOFRES, the French polling firm, who was working under contract for the Ministry of Defense in 1983 conducting sessions with "focus groups" from around France. While her survey results were held under the strictest confidence, she was able to tell me that the level of knowledge and the attitudes she encountered were real shock to her. For instance in one group in Lorraine when asked how they would respond to a Soviet invasion and conquest of West Germany, the group discussed village arrangements for taking in the odd refugee as though France would emerge from a general war in Europe as unscathed as Switzerland during the last one. Paris Interview, J. Mason, April 19, 1985.

10 Renata Bournazel, op cit., p. 27. Bournazel mentions a 1980 poll in which 58 % answered (quite sensibly perhaps) that even "the threat" to use nuclear weapons should never be made. Further 3 out of 4 women interviewed were opposed to the French President ever using nuclear weapons.

11 Martin, op cit., pp. 158-59.

12 Paris Interview, J. Mason, May 20, 1985.

13 Interview with Patrick Viveret, May 29-31, 1985.

14 Paris Interview, J. Mason, May 14, 1985.

15 These were in fact my two party officials in the sample.

16 Poll results reported in Le Monde, June 28, 1985.

17 See Moïsi, "The Challenge of adaptation," Foreign Affairs, op cit.

18 Jacques Rupnik and Muriel Humbertjean, "Images des Etats-Unis dans l'opinion publique," in Lacorne, Rupnik and Toinet, L'Amérique dans les Têtes, Hachette, Paris, 1986, pp. 102-115.

19 Rupnik and Humbertjean, op cit., pp. 106-08.

20 While Rupnik and Humpertjean, op cit., p.110, report that Reagan's image was still that of a warmonger "cowboy" in 1984 by the late eighties his popularity rose in France. See Hassner, "Un Chef d'oeuvre en péril," op cit., p. 75.

21 Rupnik and Humpertjean, op cit. pp. 102-08.

22 Stanley Hoffmann, "Coming Down from the Summit," The New York Review of Books, January 21, 1988, p. 22.

23 This media blitz hit in March, 1985 while I was in Paris and had quite an impact on elite opinion leaders who were all convinced somehow that SDI was real rather than a technological bluff. See "La Guerre En Face," Special Defense Section, Le Point, No 2402, April 1985, pp. 4-6 & 38-70. Some French analysts understood differently. See for instance Dominic Pignon, "European Responses to SDI," in TELOS, No 67 Spring 1986.

24 This was the tone of much of the right-wing criticism of Mitterrand which I heard during my 1986 interviews. This impressed me as part of the warm up and aftermath of the 1986 legislative campaign. The Socialists did their best to calm things down and hold the line. See Jacques Isnard's interview with Paul Quilès in David, La Défense de la France, op cit. pp. 277-83.

25 Certainly the need to stem the tide of public concern about the potential for a successful SDI to elicit Soviet counter-measures which would erode the credibility of the French national deterrent lay behind the decision to issue publicly the two reports of the "Groupe X-Défense" cited earlier: Les Défenses Anti-Missiles: La France et L'Europe in 1986 and La Paix Nucléaire En Question in 1989.

26 The Foundation for National Defense Studies (F.E.D.N.) was officially charged in the Fall of 1986 with the task of coming up with a response to the gradual infiltration of hostile propaganda into the French Press.

27 Paris Interviews, J. Mason, Spring 1985.

28 Aron Wildafsky and Mary Douglas, Risk and Uncertainty, Markham Press, New York, 1981.

29 Robert Jay Lifton, "In a Dark Time," The Final Epidemic, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1981, p 14-17.

30 See Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1979, pp. 218-22.

31 John Mack, "Psychosocial Trauma," Lifton editor, The Final Epidemic, op cit. pp.22-26.

32 Lifton, op cit., p.18.

33 These comments are based on a workshop held during the Social Scientists Conference of Nuclear War, which was held at the CUNY Graduate Center in New York City from June 6th through 7th, 1982.

34 Anthony Giddens, Social Theory and Modern Sociology, op cit. p. 13.

35 See, for instance, Alan Monroe's summary in Public Opinion in America, Harper & Row, New York, 1975, pp. 50-58.

36 Monroe, op cit., pp. 73-76.

37 For a critique of this communication model, see Doris Graber, Mass Media and American Politics, Congressional Quarterly Press, Washington, 1980, pp. 119-28.

X

Nuclear Nationalism and the Socialist Left.

Mitterrand's success in the 1970's in altering the balance of power between the Socialist and Communist parties laid the foundation for both his electoral victory in 1981 and the generalization of the nuclear elite settlement to include political and administrative elites drawn from the Socialist and Communist Left. Whatever its eventual outcome, however, the defense debate which took place in the seventies within the PS was shaped by the Mitterrand's need to consolidate his precarious hold over the competing Socialist party currents and to gain supremacy over the Communists within the Union of the Left. Within the Socialist Party itself, newly reorganized in 1972, Mitterrand and his personal team spent much of the decade tacking between J.P Chevènement's CERES - a "party within the party" 40,000 strong - and Michel Rocard's "Second Left" brought in from the PSU and the CFDT in 1975¹.

Both Rocard and Chevènement saw themselves as potential Party leaders and presidential candidates. Equally important, both were the standard bearers of conflicting visions of what the new Socialist Party should be about². Chevènement's CERES stood for a strongly "dirigiste" program lead by a centralized, Jacobin state - "La République Moderne" - and was a partisan of the Communist alliance as a means for anchoring

the new PS on the Left. Rocard was the leader of the new "Second Left," a loose coalition of intellectuals, catholic militants and social activists who advocated a break with statist tradition in favor of a decentralized, "self-managing" grass-roots democracy - what the CERES dismissed as "La Gauche Américaine." The Rocardians sought to break the Party alliance with the PCF to emancipate it from the Marxist traditions of the SFIO which they thought held it back from seeking a clientele among the France's new "middle classes" and social movements which had developed as a result of her industrial and social transformation in the preceding twenty years³.

This highly competitive system of factional politics more or less dictated the ideological, leftist stance taken in the public pronouncements made by Mitterrand's Socialist Party throughout the seventies. Mitterrand successively allied himself with the CERES to beat back the Rocardian challenge, and later flirted with the Rocardians to check the growth of the CERES. But basically Mitterrand had to depend on the CERES as a critical ally in his efforts to remain Party leader and to keep the Party from deviating from the basic political strategy he had chosen: pursuit of a left wing alliance with the PCF⁴. This gave the CERES leverage over the Party's program and public rhetoric - a fact of party life reflected in Mitterrand's choice of Chevènement as the author of the Party's leftist programmatic statement, "le Projet Socialiste," in 1980.

Mitterrand's strategy of pursuing an electoral and programmatic alliance with the Communist Party was a response to the transformation of French domestic politics brought about by De Gaulle's creation of a strong Presidential regime legitimated by popular vote - perhaps the only one possible. Although De Gaulle had hoped to weaken fatally the parliamentary parties of the Left, his constitution in fact invigorated them. It created a bi-polar voting system in which the outcome of Presidential elections was determined by the skill with which party leaders assembled "catch all" majority coalitions⁵. This meant that the new Socialist Party's only hope of recovery from decline of the old SFIO was by a operating "left" programmatic turn designed to appeal both to the traditional "people of the Left" who voted Communist and the new modern "middle France" which had emerged during France's industrial takeoff during the post-war period⁶.

Mitterrand's Union of the Left with the Communists inaugurated in 1974 operated more as a coalition of local voters and party activists than of national party leaderships - who remained very much in competition even while they were formally allied with each other. In allowing the Communist and Socialist candidates to compete for the support of a common pool of party voters, the Union of the Left in fact persuaded communist voters of the legitimacy of voting for socialist notables⁷. From 1973 through 1984 "The Union of the Left" brought the French Communists into the fatal embrace of

Mitterrand's Socialists and lead to the gradual loss of its voting and activist base to the benefit of the PS⁸.

Jacques Julliard for one describes the process of the transfer of left voter loyalty from the Communists to the Socialists which took place over the seventies as basically a process of ideological deception:

"The French Socialist Party situated itself on the Left of European social democracy, but was nevertheless socially on its right. A bourgeois party with a working class clientele, the PS camouflaged itself behind Marxist and revolutionary rhetoric as long as it remained in the opposition - hiding its moderate, even conservative tendencies⁹."

Hence came the strategic need for the radical discourse of the "break with Capitalism" and "transforming daily life" in the name of the "self-managing" society which was the stuff of Party brochures throughout the seventies. Certainly the Socialist party's strong official stands against the French Nuclear Strategic Force and French involvement in the international arms trade, as well as its flirtation with the anti-nuclear energy and rank and file soldier's movement at this time, were another aspect of the strategy of projecting a "militant," left image to the world for essentially electoral reasons¹⁰.

Only in the early eighties, after the Communist party apparatus had been weakened - and its voters either absorbed into the Socialist coalition or so thoroughly demoralized that

they dropped out of politics altogether - could the moderate Socialists return to their true selves and their earlier post-war strategy of pursuing centrist coalition partners¹¹ - the strategy of "cutting both ends of the omelette." The Communists' decline left the new PS free to put aside the enthusiastic "leftism" of its birth, and assume the "gravity" appropriate to a truly responsible governmental party.

From "Great Refusal" to "Great Reversal."

In the late 1970's, both Socialist and Communist leaders accepted a reversal of long-standing positions opposing further development of nuclear weapons - a reversal which has also required a revision of their opposition to the presidential institutions of the Fifth Republic. Since then the PS has generally come to embrace the most abstract version of the Gaullist orthodoxy of nuclear deterrence with all the enthusiasm of the newly converted, as have the Communists, although for different political motives as their recent decision to break out of the consensus should suggest. The influence of party leaders over the national political agenda and later the pressures of parliamentary discipline once in power, has helped to ensure that grass-roots anti-nuclear movements were denied institutional support from Unions, Churches, and the Left Press. The decision to reverse their nuclear positions met with only weak opposition - none to speak of in the Communists outside of a protests and a few resignations from the "Mouvement de la Paix," the front peace organization. Among the Socialists it was met by determined resistance by some

rank and file groups which continued for several years before it was finally swept away by the national leadership during a special party congress in 1978¹². The actors present and the positions debated at that time still have a certain interest, because they represent the PS last major internal debate concerning the nuclear issue - before, that is, the long shadow cast by the Mitterrand Presidency began to eclipse the internal life of the party¹³.

Before 1978 the French Socialist Party was still publicly committed to the phased liquidation of the French nuclear deterrent; sharply divided internally between a nationalist/neutralist wing and the old-post war "Atlanticists" over the future direction of French foreign policy, and still unreconciled to the Gaullist presidential regime. At the Paris convention of '78 a two-thirds majority of the delegates voted for a leadership motion in favor of maintaining the French force de frappe "en etat," thereby reversing the historical position of the Party and bringing effective closure to a defense debate which had been going on for several years¹⁴. The immediate protagonists were an rank and file anti-nuclear lobby with strong ties to the Rocardian wing of the Party, a pro-nuclear group around Charles Hernu with strong ties to the military and François Mitterrand, and finally the CERES Group of Jean-Pierre Chevènement.

A common interpretation of the defeat of the anti-nuclear position is to see it as the result of a internal leadership coalition between Chevènement and Mitterrand against the

Rocardians motivated by essentially electoral considerations, (and this reflects quite well the self-understanding of some participants¹⁵). But it also represented the culmination of years of lobbying by the small group of defense specialists around Charles Hernu and says much as well about the difficulties created by the political arguments advanced by the Party's anti-nuclear wing which anticipate in significant respects those of the END in England and the Greens in Germany.

Hernu's group faced a long, up-hill struggle - their initial motion in favor of nuclear weapons has received only 15 % of the votes at the Sarsenes conference in 1972 as opposed to the two-third majority received in 1978. Their success in overcoming their minority position was due in large part to their early capture of the special party commission on defense and of study groups associated with it. This commission played a critical role as a think tank and leadership forum, forming a generation of party defense experts who would later move directly into Hernu's cabinet at the Ministry of Defense after 1981, and back again to take over the party apparatus after the Socialist legislative defeat 1986¹⁶. In addition the commission ran the party organization within the armed services, *La Convention pour l'Armée Nouvelle*; which served as a conduit for tapping political advice and professional expertise from within the armed services and the defense establishment. Under the leadership of Colonel Jean Paucot the commission and its allied groups of officers played

an important role in the top-down policy process which brought the party around to a pro-nuclear position. As one anti-nuclear opponent noted before the 1977 Congress: "One had the impression that instead of creating a Socialist pressure group within the Army, we ended up by creating a military pressure group within the Party¹⁷."

This impression was also shared on the outside. Senior officers associated with the Foundation for National Defense Studies recall that seminars organized by them for the party leadership with Hernu's cooperation were instrumental in "educating" the Socialist leadership to a proper appreciation of defense issues¹⁸. Usually this meant that various Left-wing personalities would come to the seminar and give a presentation of their personal views on defense issues before an audience of military officers and defense experts - who then would proceed to tear their positions apart, or in the case of a few unfortunates punish their ignorance with thundering silence. General George Buis, the former director of the IHEDN between 1969 and 1972 and of the FEDN between 1977 and 1977, recounted to me the impression made by Alain Savary, the stalwart Mitterrandist who later went on to become equally unlucky as the Minister of Education in the Mauroy government, as though this seasoned politician had been an anxious graduate student failing his oral exams.

"At the time that we saw people like my comrade, Alain Savary, who was anti nuclear, come and talk to us. And afterwards he talked he said to me, "But

they didn't ask me any questions," and I told him, "Of course not, because everyone immediately saw that you didn't know what you were talking about.." And then he said "You're right. I must apply myself¹⁹..."

By 1976 most of the top leadership of the PS passed through Buis' strategic seminar at the FEDN and most of them learned the pro-nuclear lesson he meant to teach. He described the process in the following way:

"We had the occasion to invite there from time to time, the various intellectuals from the parties from the Right and the left, not simply to be part of the audience but to talk and argue. It gave us an opportunity to say to those who were for and those who were against (the French nuclear program), "You have a forum, come explain yourselves..." Jacques Huntzinger (the international secretary of the PS) was one of the first we convinced right along with Charles Hernu and two or three others... And so successively various personalities, François Mitterrand, Michel Rocard, J. P. Chevènement, all came to discuss these issues with us. And it was the same for various experts from the Communist party, Jean Kanapa and Louis Bayot... So by 1978, we had the Socialist party adopt the position that we had to maintain the nuclear strike force, not simply in its current state but according to the famous

famous formula "en état" (meaning maintain the force "in condition")²⁰."

This seminar took place in a third floor conference room of the imposing l'Hotel National des Invalides, the magnificent old soldiers' home built on the Seine by Louis XIV, where the Foundation for National Defense Studies is housed. While one of the analysts who worked there later in the eighties described the FEDN as something of a "hollow fortress" in terms of real resources, he did observe that its physical setting was so striking that it gave the place "le look" which can overwhelm casual visitors²¹. Nicknamed by intimates "le chateau endormi," (Sleeping Beauty's Castle), Les Invalides certainly worked its magic on the Socialists. If anything the military participants in the FEDN seminars were too imposing and their civilian audience too impressionable. As one defense analyst associated with the CERES pointed out:

"The Socialists adopted the Gaullist nuclear strategy with all the enthusiasm of new converts. The result is that they are even more rigid and conformist in their allegiance to it than is the Right who have had enough experience with the military to see it as partly a rhetorical device²²."

Hernu's activities and the FEDN seminars not only deflated Socialist apprehensions about the Army - putting to rest the phantoms of "les Paras" and Allende's Chile - but also reduced military fears about the Socialists - helping to establish the ground for the close collaboration which came to exist

later between the military and the members of Hernu's cabinet in the Defense ministry after 1981. This "entente" between the PS and the Gaullist military was reinforced by the participation of the younger socialist "defense intellectuals," many "proteges" of Hernu, in the "strategic seminar" taught by General Lucien Poirier at l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques in the seventies and early eighties. Many of these young party activists would later staff Hernu Cabinet in the Ministry of Defense and "colonize" the civilian policy research centers once the Socialist had come to power²³.

The anti-nuclear wing went into the struggle in 1977 with some public assets: they had the public commitment of the Party leadership to renounce nuclear weapons (a key plank of the united Left's Common Program); the support of a broad section of the Catholic left, and the tacit support of the old "SFIO" grouping around Robert Pontillon which had strong "Atlanticist" leanings²⁴. These advantages were quickly eroded by the fact that this wing went largely unrepresented in the Party's defense commissions. Without the support of the national leadership, they were reduced to appealing to local federations and to guerrilla warfare in the small intellectual reviews. Their position was further weakened by the sudden decision of the PCF to reverse its position in conformity with the wishes of its national secretary Jean Kanapa in July 1977. Thus despite the support of some party personalities, the anti-nuclear wing was destined to win the debate in half of

the local sections, only to lose the vote at the national party congress²⁵.

The anti-nuclear tendency advanced three main objections to a nuclear defense policy: first they argued that nuclear deterrence is useless militarily against the kind of pressures that the Superpowers might bring against an independent Socialist France, ie. against the threat of economic intimidation by the U.S. or political destabilization encouraged by the Soviets. Both of these threats could only be addressed by a defense policy which addressed the political problem of mobilizing popular forces in solidarity with the Socialist program²⁶. Second they argued that the reliance on nuclear weapons encouraged the atmosphere of insecurity which could only reinforce Europe's attachment to the bloc system of the Superpowers - frustrating European hopes for eventual autonomy from them²⁷.

Thirdly, they argued that nuclear defense policy reinforced a system of military secrecy and professionalism which was incompatible with the expansion of democratic planning and closed to the possibility of genuine popular participation in national self-defense. Taken together, nuclear defense was seen as in total contradiction with the project of building a self-managing society. This critique anticipates themes: popular sovereignty; non-nuclear defense, and European "self-determination" which would later be picked up by the anti-nuclear movement elsewhere in the 1980's. The anti-nuclear critique was summarized at the time in a declaration published

by Alternatives Non-Violentes, the anti-nuclear newsletter edited by Christian Mellon and Jean-Marie Muller, which attacked directly the core principle of the Nuclear Presidency in France:

"A nuclear society will be fatally centralized and based on secrecy. It will be a society where the preservation of the liberties of the citizen body will be surrendered to the judgement of a few men, and in the last analysis to the decisions of one man alone²⁸."

The refusal of nuclear weapons was thus tied to the rejection of France's Presidential regime at the very moment when the Socialist Party leadership was preparing the election of François Mitterrand to Presidential Office. The anti-nuclear wing represented a rejection of the deepest aspirations of the Party leadership and was necessarily rejected in turn. It had little place in the presidential party the Socialists had become. Its future, if it had one, would lie outside the Party in an independent social movement, and some of its members would finally find their place in the non-communist peace organization, CODENE, the French affiliate of the British based END (European Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament)²⁹.

The 1978 "rallying to the bomb" seems like a clear victory for the partisans of the "force de frappe," but the party motion which carried the day was a compromise document which tried to satisfy as many groupings within the party as possible. First it contained one major concession to the anti-

nuclear feelings within the party - it admitted that the concept of deterrence was in crisis and committed the party to a long-term search for a replacement - and to a public debate and national referendum once the Left came to power. Second the motion accepted all the practical policy recommendations of the special party commission headed by Hernu, and committed the future Socialist government to maintain nuclear forces adequate to defend French independence. Finally the Party committed itself to a major reform of the system of military conscription and national service, and to a reorganization of France's conventional forces along the lines of a decentralized system of local territorial militias based on popular mobilization.

This plank was a concession to the CERES wing and helped cement the left-wing's adherence to the new direction³⁰. It was justified in terms of socialist tradition by the reference to the need to broaden the base of national defense through reliance on mass mobilization, a fundamental political principle since the time of Jean Jaures' l'Armée nouvelle³¹. This was intended as a gesture to the enduring fears of the Party traditionalists concerning the reactionary character and political unreliability of the professional army, l'armée de la caserne. The purpose of politicizing the country's territorial defense can always be understood as a an avenue for creating a "parallel" military organization to frustrate any plots by "internal enemies." These ideas of territorial defense, of course, did not fit very well with Hernu's attempt

to seduce the regular army, nor did they have much place in a nuclear defense program oriented toward the perfection of "forces in being" and dependent on a small cadre of highly skilled professionals.

The party position on defense which emerged from the '78 congress was a compromise which used the language of the most abstract version of nuclear deterrence doctrine to endorse the force de frappe. Following the principle of all or nothing it proposed a cheap path to achieving European security through using French forces to "disarm" the Superpower's presence there. It proposed a theory which reasoned in terms of using French nuclear assets to maintain the condition of non-war and to cancel out the utility of military forces as war-fighting instruments. It sought to insulate France "today" from the effects of the post-war system of alliances, while promising disengagement "tomorrow" for Europe³². Taken as a whole, this rationale for nuclear weapons taps the same themes: the fear of war-fighting, and the desire for an independent Europe, which have been exploited elsewhere by pacifist movements. It may come as no surprise that Nous les Grands, the tract written by Hernu explaining the argument in full, was withdrawn from circulation shortly after the Socialists came to power. However, despite the naivete of some of its claims, this position already hints at the European concerns of later Socialist policy.

More immediately, this compromise was as interesting for what it did not say as for what it did. It passed over the

important internal division within the party concerning the Atlantic Alliance by avoiding any discussion of the specific strategic choices that a Socialist government would face in Europe. Relying heavily on the principle of "strategic ambiguity" already mentioned, the party leadership was able to postpone any choice between the "nationalist" (anti-american) orientation of the CERES which would maintain France's diplomatic independence through a kind of nuclear non-alignment, and the "Atlanticist" (pro-american) "SFIO" wing of the party which would seek closer co-ordination of French forces with France's NATO partners³³. By accepting a version of the official strategic orthodoxy, the party leadership was able to allow the CERES and the "SFIO" to have the enemy of their choice. The effect was to make orthodoxy in nuclear strategy the keystone to an internal party compromise central to Mitterrand's coalition within the party, and useful vis-à-vis the Socialists Communist allies. The fragility of this compromise provided few incentives for debate or original thinking within party ranks.

The tendency toward dampening debate was deepened during the Mitterrand Presidency by the "hollowing out" of the Party's international and defense organs, as the best talent was systematically creamed off by government ministries, and by the atrophy of internal debate at Party congresses³⁴. The SP increasingly became a spokesman for government positions at home and abroad³⁵, just as, at the same time, the ideological themes of third-worldism and non-alignment, which had

colored the SP's electoral propaganda, were displaced by a "geo-strategic" discourse more suited to justifying the military rationale of governmental policy³⁶. As one young socialist defense correspondent told me:

"Ten years ago I reasoned in emotional terms - in terms of social progress. Today I find that this kind of analysis was inadequate..even a little soft-headed. Now I think more in strategic terms, the geo-strategists have taught me a lot.. so I think about the world in terms of strategic blocs³⁷."

In order to sign on to the Socialist new nuclear orthodoxy, moreover, left-wing elites had to jettison most of the security positions adopted in the 1972 common program of the Union of the Left. These positions had included opposition to: the further modernization of French strategic forces; the continuation of nuclear testing in the Pacific; the expansion of France's nuclear power program; military intervention in the former African colonies and to future arms sales to regimes which violated human rights³⁸. The Mitterrand government willingly paid the price in order to gain the confidence of the military and technical administrations at home and in the hope that a demonstration of loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance would pay dividends in terms of American and German support for the failing Franc³⁹.

The Strategic Consensus and "Normalization":

What is a little shocking, but not very surprising given executive traditions in France, is that the Socialists did so

without explaining themselves to public opinion. In this, the socialist shift on security issues after 1981 anticipated a move of even greater significance which came in 1983 when the Socialist government suddenly embraced liberal orthodoxy in economic policy. Mitterrand personally launched the celebration of the heroic role of the capitalist entrepreneur in the national economy on national television - signaling thereby his rejection of J.P. Chevènement's advocacy of economic nationalism and the continuation of the state-led, dirigiste approach to industrial strategy in favor of Delors' market based policy⁴⁰. Equally abrupt and shocking, the timing of both these policy shifts has never really been adequately explained by governmental spokesmen or justified in terms of Socialist norms and principles by party strategists to this very day.

Far from opening a national debate and referendum on defense issues as promised, socialists and communists both worked loyally to push issues concerning the safety or security of either nuclear power and weapons off the national agenda. They worked together to keep the average citizens underinformed about upsetting particulars concerning what the implementation of the national deterrence policy might actually mean in practice, ie the mutual devastation of the French and Russian homelands. At the same time, left-wing political elites did their utmost to "co-opt" or marginalize those voices which attempted to place nuclear issues before the public.

More particularly, party discipline and partisan loyalties created a climate hostile to the anti-nuclear social movements of the 1970's which lead to their near liquidation as a current within the "governmental" left-wing coalition⁴¹. Generally the 1980's saw a "crisis of activism," which has led to a significant drop in the membership and levels of activity of most extra parliamentary organizations⁴². The organizations of both the "old" traditional left and the "new social movements" of the sixties have suffered as their respective publics have withdrawn into "private life." Those organizations which have survived this crisis of "civisme" have done so often because of their political connection to the budgetary "lifelines" thrown out by the Socialist government⁴³. In this context the combination of governmental hostility and a general weakening of popular organizations worked to reduce dramatically the resources made available by the Press, Unions and Churches for the support of anti-nuclear politics. At the same time, the net of government subsidies to "grass-roots organizations" was thrown wide enough that even figures in the anti-war movement were occasionally drawn in. CIRPES for instance was kept going in large part with small grants from the Ministry of Defense. Similarly in 1985 Christian Mellon and Jean-Marie Muller from Alternatives Non Violentes were given a contract to publish a study of non-violent "civil resistance" strategies by the prestigious Fondation pour les Etudes de la Défense Nationale⁴⁴. The "normalization" of Socialist Politics.

The strong shift in the attitudes of the Socialist left toward national defense policy and nuclear weapons was symptomatic of the transformation of the distinctive discourse of the post-war French Left, (what George Ross has called the "Resistance - Liberation" discourse⁴⁵), into a discourse of policy legitimation. The shift towards pro-nuclear policy amounted to a revolution in Left-wing attitudes toward the French state which went far beyond security issues. This shift was dictated in part by electoral concerns associated with the emergence of the Socialist Party as a potential party of government, and in part by a major cultural shift in the attitudes of the French intellectuals toward the Soviet Union and French left's own Marxist culture and traditions⁴⁶. But equally important was the fact that by the late 1970's the Socialists had become a party of government which was expected to reform and manage the Gaullist system built up over the preceding twenty five years rather than simply abolishing it.

As Jacques Julliard observes by the late eighties the process of normalization of Socialist politics and the professionalization of the Party's activist core brought about a decline in the Party membership from 200,000 to around 120,000 - perhaps more realistically 50,000⁴⁷ - which reflected a growing split between the party elite and its social base⁴⁸.

"The result is a growing distance in mentalities and well as in social composition between The Socialist Party populated exclusively by political professionals and a social democratic movement which tends

to reflect the sociological composition of the population as whole. French Social democracy is the metro at six o'clock at night, the PS is the five o'clock cocktail. L'UNEF-ID, SOS Racisme, Les Médecins du Monde have become the cadre schools of the Socialist Party. Without a doubt one can find among them future statesmen, but I doubt that such a milieu is very representative of the French population as a whole⁴⁹."

The business of reconciling the leaders and "people" of the Left to the structures and policies of the French State was at the core of the "normalization" of French politics and public opinion. As Julliard remarked in 1990:

"The governmental discourse of the Socialists does not address itself first to its traditional electorate but to the modernizing sectors of the middle and upper class. The true social project of the Socialists, once they assumed governmental power, was not social justice but modernization⁵⁰."

The division between the party leadership and its clientele among France's modernizing elites and its traditional base among "the people of the Left," is at once ideological and sociological. In addition to junking much of the Party's traditional marxist culture - the intellectual legacy of the old SFIO and Guy Mollet - the distance between the Party and its voters reflects a split in cultural orientations toward the future between different social class groups. On the one

side we find the political left which is "Bourgeois, modern, refined. With its income growing, it views the future with confidence." On the other, we have the traditional "people of the Left" who are "plebeian, archaic, and badly adapted..Their incomes are stagnant and they fear the future⁵¹." This corresponds to the sociological split which French marketing experts describe as the divorce between the "technocratic modernizing left" and the "orphans of the welfare state⁵²." The result of the Mitterrand years Julliard concludes ironically has been a great social retreat:

"France at the end of the century is Socialist the same way it was once radical... One sees the full extent of the social regression of the past decade in the fact that the Proletariat has become again merely "the poor." Rather than inspiring fear, they only inspire pity⁵³."

The Left wing debate over national security and the force de Frappe in the 1970's represents the culmination of a decade long effort to come to terms with the Gaullist presidential regime, its system of elite administration, and its legacy of state-led modernization through national industrial and scientific policies. The reversal in elite attitudes toward nuclear weapons was a key element in the transformation of the attitudes of Left elites regarding both domestic institutions, and the independent role which a Socialist France would play in the international state system.

By the beginning of the 1980's, the alignment of left-wing attitudes in France contrasted strongly with those found on the "democratic left" in other Western countries, because it retained a strongly "nationalist" twist which was also militantly "pro-nuclear." It represented, at least for a time, the reemergence of "French exceptionalism" in a new form. In France, the "collapse" of the traditional "oppositional" culture among left elites was partially compensated for in some Socialist circles by the substitution of the "strategic" language and outlook of the small group of French nuclear strategists, who were the architects of France's national nuclear doctrine in the late 1960's. As we have seen this viewpoint was promoted publicly by spokesmen for the Gaullist Right before becoming the common property of spokespeople of both the Left and the Right by the end of the 1970's.

The "normalization" of the French Left has been accomplished in part by its adoption of the discourse of "nuclear nationalism" as a cultural alternative to the more traditional left-wing culture which its elites have in large measure abandoned. At the same time, this "realist" strategic discourse seems to have successfully won over some younger activists who have put aside their earlier identification with the "post-materialist" outlook associated with the "social movements" of the late sixties and seventies in France⁵⁴.

The fact that the Socialists joined the Communists in the formal opposition following the legislative elections in 1986 did not reduce the pressures on rank and file members to

conform to government policy, or do much to restore a space for social movements. Given the "co-habitation" between a Socialist President and a right-wing government, this space was not very wide, and was largely occupied by movements like SOS Racisme, which were closely tied into Jacques Lang and the cultural politics of the Socialist Party⁵⁵. Thus by the mid 1980's cultural and institutional trends converged to produce a collapse of the left tradition of trade union and social activism which at the time seemed to all too many to be final.

- 1 See du Roy and Schneider, Le Roman de la Rose, op cit., pp. 226-67.
- 2 D.S. Bell and Byron Criddle, The French Socialist Party: The emergence of a Party of Government, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987, pp. 115-120; 238-48; 243-6 & 255-6.
- 3 See Jacques Julliard's introduction to Michel Rocard's Parler Vrai, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1979, pp. 7-16.
- 4 Bell and Criddle, op cit. p. 240.
- 5 Kesselman and Krieger, op cit., pp. 172 & 197.
- 6 Ehrmann and Schain, op cit., pp. 241-246.
- 7 Ehrmann and Schain, op cit., p. 244. See also du Roy and Schneider, op cit., pp. 182-83.
- 8 Kesselman and Krieger, op cit., pp. 182-85.
- 9 Julliard, La Genie de la Liberté, op cit., pp. 80-81.
- 10 See du Roy and Schneider, op cit., pp. 200-201.
- 11 Steven Lewis and Serenella Sferza, "French Socialists between State and Society," in The Mitterrand Experiment, Edited by George Ross, Stanley Hoffmann and Sylvia Malzacher, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987, pp. 100-113. See also Hayward, "The Exhaustion of the Revolutionary Impetus," op cit., pp. 20-22.
- 12 Krop, op cit., pp. 104-11.
- 13 See Julliard's amusing but bitter reflection on the competition of the "currents" of the different "presidentiables" which has become virtually the total focus of internal party politics. Julliard, La Genie de la Liberté, op cit. pp. 57-63.
- 14 Krop, op cit., p. 109.
- 15 Paris interviews with CERES leaders, J. Mason, Spring 1985.
- 16 Pascal Krop, op cit. pp 64-71, and Nancy Lieber, "French Socialist Foreign Policy: Atlantic Relations, Defense and European Unity," in Democratic Socialism, Bogdan Denitch, editor, Allenheld and Osun, Montclair, 1981, p. 122.
- 17 Krop, op cit., p. 134, footnote 19.
- 18 Paris Interview with General George Buis, June 17th and July 2nd, 1985.
- 19 Paris Interview with Gen. Buis, June 17th 1985
- 20 Paris Interview with Gen. Buis, June 17th, 1985.

21 This was a casual comment dropped by one of the researchers at the FEDN that turned out to be quite revealing.

22 Paris Interview with CERES analyst, May 20, 1985.

23 Paris Interviews, J. Mason, Spring 1985 Summer 1986.

24 Krop, op cit., p. 107.

25 See Patrick Viveret, "Comment nous avons résisté: le témoignage de Patrick Viveret, in "la gauche nucléaire: Comment le PC et PS se sont ralliés à l'arme atomique," Alternatives Non Violentes, No 46, December 1982, pp. 24-32.

26 Krop, op cit., p. 108.

27 Krop, op cit., p. 107.

28 Krop, op cit., p. 97.

29 Paris Interviews with PSU and CODENE activists, Spring 1985.

30 Krop, ibid, p. 97.

31 Krop, ibid, pp. 15-24.

32 Charles Hernu, Nous les Grands, F-G -P.R.E.S. Paris, 1980, p. 80.

33 Nicole Gnesotto, "PC, PS une ligne peut en chacher une autre," Esprit, No 79, July 1983, p. 89.

34 Paris Interviews, J. Mason, Spring 1985.

35 Gnesotto, "PC, PS...", op cit., p. 88. See also Nicole Gnesotto, "Le Pacifisme Aux Couleurs De La France, notes de la foundation saint simon, No 8, Paris, December 1983, pp. 83-95.

36 For an example of this shift see the document produced by the Party defense commission which represents a compromise between Didier Motchane of the CERES, Gerard Fuchs from the Rocardians and Jacques Hutinzger on deterrence and non alignment, "La Sécurité de l'Europe," adopted by le Bureau Exécutif of the PS op cit., pp. 7-15 & 15-22.

37 Paris Interview, J. Mason, April 1, 1985.

38 See "Les Positions du PS à travers les textes de Mai 1971 à Mai 1981," in CODENE, "Paix, Desarmement, Défense, Tiers Monde et le Parti Socialiste," Alerte Atomique, No. 95/96, May-June 1984, pp. 15-27.

39 See Favier and Roland, La Décennie Mitterrand, Vol 1, op cit., pp. 255-63.

40 Favier and Roland, op cit., pp. 465-492.

41 See Christian Mellon, "L'Histoire du ralliement: 1972/1981," Alternatives Non Violentes, op cit., pp. 19-23.

42 See Hughes Portelli, "La Crise des corps intermédiaires," in L'Etat de La France-1989, Editions de la Découverte, op cit., pp. 359-363. See also René Mouriaux, "L'Evolution des Mouvements Sociaux," L'Etat de la France:1992, op cit. pp. 468-470.

43 See Peter Hall, "Pluralism and Pressure Politics," in Developments in French Politics, Hall, Hayward and Machin, op cit., pp. 78-82.

44 Christian Mellon, Jean Marie Muller and Jacques Semelin published La Dissuasion Civile, at the FEDN in the collection "Les Sept épées" directed by Lucien Poirier in 1985. This opening by Foundation to anti-nuclear dissidents was typical of its efforts to maintain ties to a broad spectrum of elite groups.

45 Ross, op cit.

46 Hayward, op cit.

47 Julliard, La Genie de la Liberté, op cit., p. 75.

48 See Stéphane Rozès, "Sondages Politiques: Rupture entre l'opinion et les socialistes," L'Etat de la France-1992, op cit., pp. 481-483.

49 Julliard, La Genie de la Liberté, op cit., p. 79.

50 Julliard, *ibid*, p.81.

51 Julliard, *ibid*, pp 86-87.

52 Gérard Mermet, Francoscopie - Les Français: Qui Sont-ils? Où Vont-ils?, Librairie Larousse, Paris, 1985, pp. 203-209 & 414-425.

53 Julliard, La Genie de la Liberté, p. 84.

54 For a useful summary of the debate about the link between "post-materialist" values, the new social movements and the "successor generation," take a look at Harvey Waterman's, "Sins of the Children: Social Change, Democratic Politics, and the Successor Generation in Western Europe," which appeared in Comparative Politics, Vol. 20 No. 4, July 1988, pp. 406-407. For a more detailed look at trends in France please consult Michael Harrison's "The Successor Generation, Social Change and New Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy in France" which appears in The Successor Generation, Perspectives of Post-war Europeans, Butterworth, London, 1983.

55 Harlem Desir, the leader of SOS Racisme and a major "pop" media figure, was a member of the PS and was being groomed as a possible candidate in the mid-eighties.

XI

Paris Intellectuals: The Anti-totalitarian Left

Paris Opinion Leaders and their world.

Beyond the world of Left party elites, the French defense consensus in the 1980's received critical reinforcement from a cultural shift among the left intelligentsia which has undermined the legitimacy of any "leftist" challenge to the reigning strategic orthodoxy. Throughout the post-war period in France, it was a truism that "The Right rules and the Left thinks." Since the Dreyfus Affair in the early years of the century there had been a long-standing dislocation between the world of government and official politics and the world of culture and intellectual criticism - which nonetheless has carried its own mantle of political authority as constituting "le parti intellectuel¹." This created a double ladder of political communication: one coming from the official media and the party leaders of the ruling majority, the other coming from the leading cultural institutions in Paris which were autonomous from the official regime and only loosely associated with the party leadership of the 'Left².

The attitudes of intellectual elites have been an important cultural force in France, creating real constraints in the general climate of opinion within which Party leaders must operate³. In the fifties, for instance, the official politi-

cal world was anti-communist and pro-American (Atlanticist), at a time when the intellectual world identified with the "Socialist Camp," i.e., with its own Communist Party and the international communist movement. In the 1970's, in contrast, the official world under Valery Giscard D'Estang was still sufficiently Gaullist to be vaguely anti-American and "soft" on the Soviets, at very moment when the intellectual world was undergoing its sea-change regarding Communism and the Soviet Union. This set the stage for a series of confrontations between the official world and the current incarnation of le parti intellectual of which the uneasy relationship between the left majorities of the eighties and the self styled anti-totalitarian left was only the latest wrinkle⁴.

In the early 1980's, this tension continued, only it was focused on the official Socialist Left which oscillated in the first half of the decade between a relatively "hard" line on the Soviets in foreign policy, and a soft line vis à vis its domestic Communist allies. A new intellectual sensibility had emerged, that of the "anti-totalitarian left," which contributed to the collapse of Marxism as a legitimate political discourse, and its replacement by a liberal discourse in economics and a "republican" discourse in politics⁵. More importantly, it had a significant impact on the political culture of the Socialist Party, helping to remove the ideological barriers that stood between it and certain tendencies of the center right⁶ and occupying the social and institutional space that in other European countries had been that of the

peace movement⁷. This very same movement also set in motion a critical process of historical review which discredited some of the best known French intellectuals of the century as Soviet apologists. This revisionism not only undermining these intellectuals personal reputations but also weakening the special authority which intellectuals had enjoyed in French cultural and political life and placing the very idea of the "intellectual party" itself into question⁸.

This recent history of the relationship of French intellectuals to the elites in power sheds also some light on the applicability of the American model of political communications to France. The "two step" model may seem like an overly simple one to the degree that it supposes a relatively cohesive group of opinion makers, but it is precisely this feature which gives it a certain plausibility in so far as the Parisian intellectual elite is concerned. If we are to believe the famous study done in 1981 by Hervé Hamon and Patrick Rotman, Les intellocrates, this elite includes only some two hundred individuals at its narrow summit⁹.

With the notable exception of the handful of highly visible retired generals such as Buis or Poirier who are associated with the FEDN, most of the public intellectuals who define the national cultural agenda are individuals belonging to the Parisian intellectual community, "la république des cumuls." They occupy overlapping positions in academia - primarily in the pyramid of influence defined by l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Science Sociales, Le College de France and

l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques, in publishing, where they often are the editors of particular collections, in the press, where they are often editorial commentators in the major newsweeklies, and in the electronic media, where they are frequently invited guest commentators. Taken together they represent a distinct group of "intellocrats," who are well positioned to initiate intellectual fashions as well as promote books and personalities¹⁰.

Because they were politically and culturally distant from the dominant Mitterrand current of the Socialist party¹¹, Mitterrand's arrival in power was greeted by a relative silence by many of these cultural influentials - the so called "silence of the intellectuals¹²." Most of them did however identify themselves with the "Second" Left grouped in the seventies around the CFDT and the PSU current of Michel Rocard. After Rocard's secession from the PSU and the integration of most of his current within Mitterrand's reformed Socialist Party, the influence of the opinions and "discourse" of the Rocardian "intellocrats" grew in step with the decline of the Socialist party's own left-wing "cultural" organizations and internal party life¹³. These developments opened both party leaders to pressures from - and the rank and file to the influence of - the national television and print media. I believe that the influence of these authoritative "public voices" still reaches across a broad cross-section of the elite publics Center-Left and Right despite signs that the broader public has disconnected from the media spectacle¹⁴.

This result of this centralization of opinion making in the hands of a relatively narrow elite showed itself in my interviewing in diverse ways - most directly in terms of the choice of information sources and "authorized voices" in the security debate. Not surprisingly given the effects of official secrecy and the centralization of "agenda-setting," the number and variety of information sources concerning national security issues was limited in France. For instance, most of my informants could name only a handful of defense journalists regularly writing in the national press who they considered to be competent or "reliable." Almost invariably my informants gave the same three or four names from the Paris dailies - namely Jacques Isnard and Michel Tatu from Le Monde, Carlos de Sa Rego of Liberation, and somewhat less frequently, Patrick Vageman from the right-wing Le Figaro ¹⁵.

A similar degree of uniformity seemed to exist among my informants concerning their recommendations of relevant reading. My request for "the names of the three authors who had done the most to shape the French defense debate" all too frequently resulted in a recommendation to read General Poirier and Gallois and/or General De Gaulle and Buis. As we can see in Table 11-1 these military authors were cited by respondents from across the political spectrum 35, 31, 26 and 13 times respectively. The only civilian thinker who came close in terms of the number of citations, was Raymond Aron, the "liberal" geo-political philosopher of the sixties and seventies who died in 1983.

Table 11-1.

STRATEGIC AUTHORITIES CITED BY FRENCH POLICY AND POLITICAL ELITES*

Authors Aron De Gaulle Lellouche Gallois Poirier Debray Buis
Major Citations/
No of Respondents
Pol. Groups

Def Spec (14)	7	2	4	8	9	5	0
Mil Off (8)	3	4	3	6	7	2	1
PS (8)	1	5	4	3	4	0	1
2nd Left (10)	6	3	4	2	3	1	4
Press (9)	1	2	1	2	2	2	2
PCF (5)	2	5	0	3	2	0	2
CODENE (10)	4	9	6	7	8	3	5
Total cit.	24	26	22	31	35	12	13

total respondents (64)

* Authors cited in response to question asking respondents' recommendation of the three best works for helping a foreigner to understand the French strategic debate.

Authors Yost Hassner Glucksman A.Joxe Gorce Sanguinetti Mellon
Specialized Citations

Def Spec.* (14)	6	3	1	0	2	0	0
Mil Off. (10)	1	0	1	1	4	3	1
Press (8)	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
PS (8)	0	1	0	1	2	1	0
2nd Left (10)	1	9	5	0	1	1	0
PCF ** (6)	0	0	0	2	3	4	0
Codene*** (10)	0	3	5	8	2	10	5
total cit.	8	17	12	13	15	20	6

total respondents (64).

* One conservative defense analyst cited J.F. Revel and A. Besançon.

** Two Communists cited Joliot Curie and Jean Kanapa.

*** Several CODENE activists cited the German peace activist Dieter Lutz, two others E.P. Thompson, the leader of the English END.

Source, Field Interviews 1985-86, J. Mason.


The responses became more diverse and more polarized when I rephrased the question to ask for contemporary writers who were influencing the debate today. In general, informants who felt close to the official pro-nuclear consensus frequently mentioned Pierre Lelloche, the strategic analyst from IFRI who frequently published commentary in the Paris press, and Pierre Hassner, the strategic analyst from EHESS who was published and cited in the main intellectual reviews¹⁶. Informants who belonged to the Rocardian "Second Left" of the Socialist party were the most likely to cite the anti-Soviet polemicists such as Paul Thibaud, Cornelius Castoriadis and Andre Glucksman who drew international attention in the early 1980's with their strong attacks against the pacifist movement¹⁷. The intellectuals of the "anti-totalitarian left," showed some degree of autonomy to the degree that they preferred their own analysis of Soviet Society and strategic intentions to the "official wisdom" coming out the handful of policy institutes - a story to which I will return in greater detail shortly. The distribution of these opinion "networks" and authorized "opinion leaders" as well as the various leaders of political "currents" and parties across the political spectrum is represented in Figure 11-1, a figure which follows the format of the earlier ones in a way which should be self-explanatory.

Civilian defense specialists were distinguished from the pro-nuclear "generalists" by their enthusiasm for Anglo-American authors and strategic thinking. This is reflected by the citation by six of them of the French language edition of

a book by an American author, David Yost, as the best available discussion of French security problems¹⁸. I found more generally that defense analysts and military officers alike depended to a great degree on Anglo-American sources of information for their evaluation of current strategic issues and military threats. This situation was summed up for me by an senior analyst at the CAP of the Quai D'Orsay who described his own work as "a judicious mixture of Anglo-Saxon Information and French Interpretation¹⁹." The full extent of this intellectual dependance on "les Anglo Saxons" became clear only when it dawned on me that most of the defense analysts in my sample relied on NATO and American information sources to bypass official censorship in France and find information concerning the procurement programs of their own military²⁰.

The penetration of English-language publications also reflects the general shift in elite attitudes towards the Soviet Union which opened the door to the wholesale importation of the arguments against strategic detente and the arms control. This elite preference for the Anglo-American conservatives was deeply offensive to many left nationalists and led one left wing journalist to conclude with only a little exaggeration, that: "There is no longer any independent strategic thought in France, today it all comes from the US²¹."

I found that the people among my informants who seemed the most ready to dissent from the "authoritative opinions" of the strategic establishment were those such as the Com-



GUIDE TO FIGURE 11-1.

Dissident Spokespersons

PCF.

George. Marchais, Party Leader.

L'Appel des Cent, Party Peace Organization.

Rencontres Communistes

Pierre Juquin, Spokesperson and Presidential Candidate

CERES

Jean Pierre Chevènement, Leader of CERES current, Defense Minister.

Didier Motchane, CERES Spokesperson.

CODENE, PSU, CIRPES, MAN.

Claude Bourdet, Bernard Dreano, CODENE Spokepersons.

Bernard Ravel, PSU Party Leader.

Christian Mellon, MAN (Mouvement Anti-nucléaire) Spokesperson.

Les Verts, The French Green Party.

Alain Joxe, Director of CIRPES, director of research at l'E.H.E.S.S..

C.F.D.T., Confederation of Democratic Labor.

Patrick Vivret, Anti-nuclear Rocardian intellectual.

Admiral Sanguinetti, Pro-Nuclear, non-aligned Strategist.

FN, Xenophobic Right

Jean Marie Le Pen, National Front Party Leader.

Consensus Forces

Independent Gaullists, FEDN

General George Buis, retired officer, popular commentator.

General Lucien Poirier, Gaullist nuclear strategist.

Paul Marie de la Gorce, non-aligned, pro-nuclear strategist and writer.

Dominique David. General Secretary of the F.E.D.N..

General Copel, Retired Air Force General, a maverick.

Parliamentary right

Jacques Chirac, Mayor of Paris, RPR Party leader.

François Fillon, RPR deputy and defense intellectual.

Pierre Lellouche, Director of IFRI, Chirac's defense advisor.

Thierry de Montbrial, Director of IFRI.

Dominic Moïsi, Director of IFRI.

Marie-France Giraud, Director of the IIIGP.

General Gallois, Gaullist nuclear strategist at IIIGP.

Jean Claude Casanova, editor of Commentaire.

Jean François Revel, commentator for l'Express.

Valéry Giscard D'Estang, former President, UDF party leader.

Raymond Barre, former Prime Minister, independent party leader.

Raymond Aron, Conservative political analyst and director of research at the I'E.H.E.S.S. until his death in 1983.
 François de Rose, former Ambassador and Atlanticist strategic analyst and spokesperson.

PS. Socialist Coalition

Lionel Jospin, a leader of Mitterrandist party current.
 Laurent Fabius, Prime Minister and a leader of Mitterrandist party current.
 Pierre Mauroy, Prime Minister and leader of Social Democratic party current.
 Pierre Joxe, Defense Minister, party leader and Mitterrand loyalist.
 Roland Dumas, Foreign Minister and Mitterrand loyalist.
 Charles Hernu, Minister of Defense, Mitterrand loyalist.
 André Fontaine, Editor of Le Monde.
 Michel Tatu, Soviet Correspondent for Le Monde.
 Jacques Isnard, Defense Correspondent Le Monde.
 Serge July, Editor, Liberation.
 Jean Ellenstein, Director, Le Forum pour l'Indépendance et la Paix, former communist intellectual close to the Socialists.
L'Enjeux Européen, Left Socialist Review, pro-European.

Rocardians, Anti-Totalitarian Left

Michel Rocard, Prime Minister, and leader of party current.
 Gérard Fuchs, Rocardian defense spokesperson.
 Paul Thibaud, Editor of Esprit, spokesperson for the anti-totalitarian intellectuals.
 Olivier Mongin, Associate editor of Esprit, editor at Editions du Seuil.
 Pierre Nora, historian, editor at Gallimard Publishers, and editor of Le Débat.
 Pierre Rosenvallon, Director of Foundation Saint Simon, director of Research, I'E.H.E.S.S..
 Corneille Castoriadis, independent left intellectual, director of research, I'E.H.E.S.S..
 Claude Le Fort, independent Left intellectual, director of research, I'E.H.E.S.S..
 Pierre Hassner, strategic and political analyst, director of research, I'E.H.E.S.S..
 Edgar Morin, independent Left intellectual, director of research, I'E.H.E.S.S..
 Bernard Henri Lévy, Ex Maoist, anti-totalitarian intellectual, editor at Grasset Publishers, editor of Globe Magazine.
 André Glucksman, Ex Maoist, anti-totalitarian intellectual.

munists or anti-nuclear activists who had strong associations with social and political groups outside of France, and who had their own sets of internal authorities as references. In addition to citing "the usual authoritative sources" listed in Table 11-1 above, the French anti-nuclear activists from CODENE and the Communist Mouvement pour la Paix, for instance, mentioned their own set of "strategic" analysts. The names which were cited the most often were intellectuals such as Christian Mellon, the Catholic priest who edits the review Alternatives Non-Violentes; Alain Joxe, the director of CIR-PES, who had edited in 1981 an anti-war collection Demain La Guerre, and two military analysts, Paul Marie La Gorce and Admiral Sanguinetti, who contribute commentary in a Gaullist nationalist vein to Le Monde Diplomatique. At the same time, they also made references to E.P Thompson, the leader of the British European Disarmament Campaign, END, German writers such as Dieter Lutz, and American "nuclear counter-experts," such as Michael Klare and Bill Arkin of the Washington based left-wing policy institute, the Institute for Policy Studies²².

Unfortunately given the general intellectual climate of the 1980's the impact of this kind of intellectual opening to the outside on elite opinion was initially quite limited. Take for instance the ambiguous status of a publication like Le Monde Diplomatique which went in the period of ten years from being the fashionable clarion of "Third Worldism" in the seventies to being a "politically incorrect" pariah among the anti-soviet intelligentsia in the eighties. While some of the

civilian defense analysts I interviewed still felt free to recommend Le Monde Diplomatique as a valuable source of alternative news and view, the reaction of many of my intellectual informants who dismissed the "Le Monde Diplo" as a "primitive anti-American tract" suitable only for a "third-world audience" was far more common. One high official in the Socialist Party told me that anyone who made the mistake of writing for "that paper" was automatically "brûlé," that is, "burned," meaning they were excluded forthwith from serious consideration by Parisian opinion-makers²³. This reaction was symptomatic of the climate of political polarization in the mid-eighties which unified intellectual opinion in Paris against the minority of dissenters on the nuclear question. Interestingly I should note that the only intellectuals among my informants who managed to straddle both sides of the nuclear divide, were on the one hand, Patrick Viveret who managed the difficult trick of being simultaneously the editor of the Rocardian review, Intervention, and a leading spokesperson for CODENE, and on the other, certain staffers at the FEDN who kept feelers out (and gave contracts) to virtually everybody who was active in the strategic debate²⁴.

The Anti-Totalitarian Shift:

The left intellectual milieu in Paris went through its decade long anti-totalitarian swing in large part because of its recognition of "selective perception" at work in the distorted treatment of the former Soviet Union by two generations of Marxist intellectuals. Indeed working through the

ramifications of the labyrinth of misinformation constructed by their "marxisant" elders seems to have absorbed a good part of the energies of the intellectual generation in Paris writing from the middle seventies to the late eighties²⁵.

This was apparently a searing experience that shook many members of this generation loose from their roots in the traditional political culture of the Left - a culture which "la génération soixante-huit" had absorbed in an already dissident, "anti-stalinist" variety from their exposure to the Trotskyist and Maoist youth organizations of the late sixties and early seventies²⁶. The result has been that the traditional culture of the Left was disdained by them for its history of self deception and compromise with the Soviet Dictatorship, and its local communist surrogate, le P.C.F.²⁷. The belated Parisian discovery of a hidden history provided the generational filter through which all other political information and initiatives must pass for review and rectification - much as it now does in Moscow itself²⁸.

This shift goes along way toward explaining the attitudes which the new generation of left opinion makers brought both to the European anti-nuclear campaign in the early eighties and to Gorbachov's reform drive later in the decade. Their rejection of the European peace movement was not based on a love affair with the bomb, but their belief that the Gulag represented a danger which appeared as immediate and as massive as the dangers of nuclear war.

In many of their writings the Bomb and the Gulag appear as twin dangers which balance each other off. The refusal to take the peace movement seriously follows from their judgement about its presumed constitutional inability to acknowledge the totalitarian and imperialist character of the old Soviet Society²⁹. Many people in Paris weren't impressed by the contrast between the German peace movement's strong response to the American Euromissile deployment and its relative passivity in the face of the smashing of the Polish Solidarity movement during the Military crackdown in the winter of 1981. To the degree that the peace movement failed this test of its intellectual integrity, it was identified by its Parisian critics as the continuation of the history of dishonesty and evasion of the traditional communist left that this generation wished to put behind it. The belated discovery of the "Empire" in the neighborhood, and the scandal of French intellectuals post-war complicity in the defense of the Soviet system in Eastern Europe, absorbed energies that might otherwise have been enlisted in the French equivalent of the anti-nuclear campaigns of the early '80s. The fact that the attention of the French intellectual left was fixed on the drama of the Gdansk shipyards, or the battles around Kaboul, when others were looking at the deployment deadlines of cruise and Pershing missiles does not come as news³⁰. But is worthy of mention if only because it helped erase in elite circles the Gaullist idea that the post-war systems created by the Americans and the Soviets were in some way equivalent, and that the best

policy for France was to seek a position of equal distance between them.

The anti-totalitarian view of Soviet society stressed the absence of liberal political institutions and norms, and the central place occupied by the military and police apparatus in Party/State's system of domination over Russian society. The Soviet Union emerges from this critique as a fragile but ruthless dictatorship which stood at the center of a bureaucratic empire which had extended its frontiers into the very heart of Europe³¹. Unable to compete with the liberal democracies on its periphery, this empire was seen as requiring military superiority in Europe to maintain its hold over its European satellites³², and to intimidate the independent societies lying beyond its direct control. According to the anti-totalitarian Left the chief threat facing France did not come from the United States but from the empire which dominates the central-European heartland of Western civilization³³. America was seen as a failing hegemonic power, but given fears about the Soviet threat, its apparent recovery under Reagan came as welcome event³⁴. Thus the past decade brought elite attitudes more into line with French public opinion which had already had a relatively positive view of American society for some time. According to some analysts this upward movement in America's standing worked in inverse proportion to the strength of the Soviets' decline.

The American presence, in this view, had to be supported until such time as Western Europe found the political will to

undertake its own defense and to begin the struggle to force a Soviet retreat from Prague, Budapest and Warsaw³⁵. The responsibility of France was to shore up Atlantic and European solidarity in the short term, and to help build the political mechanisms of will formation within the European Community which would allow for a unified political intervention in the Eastern Bloc to rollback the Soviet presence.

Even if this moral political awakening was a development mainly limited to some circles of the intellectual left in Paris, it had important effects nevertheless. The diffusion of the anti-totalitarian critique of Soviet Style "state socialism" within the Rocardian wing of PS and the Catholic left marked a break with the traditional Marxist culture of the PS which had informed the party's earlier evaluations of the strategic balance and threats to France and colored much of the CERES inspired Projet Socialist of 1980. It undermined the moral authority of the 1978 Socialist compromise by working to delegitimize the nationalist discourse of "non-alignment" which provided the rationale for the Socialists simultaneous acceptance of the force de frappe, and ambivalence toward the Atlantic alliance. By adding the force of their moral argument against the Eastern bloc to the "neo-gaullist" discourse already adopted by the party defense experts, they also helped create the articles of reconciliation between the Rocardians, Mitterrandists and "Atlantacists." At the same time, these developments made the electoral alliance with the Communists increasingly difficult. It

kept on stumbling over Kaboul and Gdansk... Finally all of these trends contributed to the marginalization of the CERES current within the Socialist Party by shifting the intellectual climate against their nationalist/neutralist discourse, and eliminating the need for their role as privileged intermediaries with the Communists.

The impact of the eruption of the anti-totalitarian discourse was to "desanctify" the anti-nuclear position which came to be identified in their minds with the basest kind of retreat from political values. As Paul Thibaud editorialized in Esprit, the review of the Rocardian Left:

"Pacifism involves giving no positive value to peace beyond reducing human life to simple human survival. It can not be enough to do what we can to see that human life should continue. We must act so that it can also be a humane life, that is, a free one³⁶."

Pacifism was thus identified with a willingness to sacrifice all political values on the altar of peace - a peace with the Soviets compromised by its willingness to accept peace on Soviet terms. The slogan of Esprit: "the Masquerade of the Dictatorships is finished: Change Culture and Politics," says much about the ability of the anti-totalitarians to occupy the moral ground within the Catholic and non-marxist left which otherwise might have been left open for other movements. The non-communist anti-nuclear movement in France saw its best troops in the Church and the independent trade unions lost to

it the moment they were won over to this moral and political revival of left-wing anti-communism.

More importantly, perhaps, the anti-totalitarian left initiated an influential debate about the political meaning of the rise of pacifist movements in Western democracy. This focused the attention of French intellectual elites on the problem of the vitality of the "esprit de defense" underlying the nuclear consensus of western societies. It raised the larger problem of the interrelation between national defense, public opinion and nuclear weapons, asking whether nuclear deterrence did not ultimately erode the public confidence necessary for maintaining a vigorous national defense effort. This question was asked not only for France but in particular for West Germany, focusing on her future reliability as a security partner for France. The anti-totalitarians defended the notion that in the German case the rise of the Peace movement was a form of displaced nationalism, and this formulation gave the Mitterrand government a political rationale which went beyond the existing strategic ones to guide its new European orientation to France's foreign policy³⁷.

The Gorbatchov "Effect" and the "Disinformation Thesis":

The emergence of a clear "enemy image" of the Soviet Union was one of the major trends in political and cultural life of French elites in the 1970's and 1980's, and only reversed itself relatively late in response to President Gorbatchov's dismantling of the post-war division of Europe. The collapse of communism outside France and the new strategic balance

created by German unification has yet to be assimilated by French nuclear planners and strategic elites, but the French debate over the meaning of Gorbachov's reforms was revealing. And again while many Americans had a wish to see Perestroika as a clearcut process of reform which deserved our support, the French intellectuals described it as a "reformist interlude" at best.

Françoise Thom, an analyst at the FEDN, and Alain Besançon, a columnist for L'Express, apparently spoke for many French sovietologists when they argued that we knew little of what was actually occurring in the Soviet Union under Gorbachov, and the little we did know suggested something other than a "liberal, westernizing" experiment in social reform. Essentially Thom and Besançon presented Gorbachov as a Stalinist reformer who mobilized the masses mainly to discipline them better. According to them, the aim of structural reform in the former Soviet Union was political - to repress the emerging underground economy and crush the "corrupt" mafias within the different national party apparatuses³⁸.

This interpretation had certain facts on its side in 1987, but most importantly it had the ideological merit, unlike some other interpretations then current on the Left, of leaving the basic anti-totalitarian thrust to French intellectual politics intact³⁹. These arguments had the further virtue of hitting more than one target at once. In this regard the inferences that Thom drew concerning the Western media from her argument about our basic ignorance of the Soviet Union were quite

striking. Thom had ingenious analysis which supported radical skepticism about the soundness of Western institutions, and of American arms control policies. Thom argued that:

"Gorbachov wants to create events, to give the impression that nowadays in URSS things are really happening whereas before ..it was a country where nothing happened.. Today the events that Gorbachov puts on the surface reveal as little about what's happening as the silence which reigned before. What we have is a showcase for events⁴⁰..."

If Perestroika was only a repressive restructuration of Soviet Society, then Glasnost amounted to nothing more than "showcase events" staged for the Western Media. At the time this thesis received a surprisingly respectful hearing in France.

The import of her argument lay elsewhere than in the Soviet Union. Thom argued in Commentaire that Glasnost was a new form of Soviet "disinformation strategy" which used the Western media as its principal channel of communication with mass audiences not only in the West, but also in Eastern Europe and in Russia itself. The trick to "enrolling" the Western media for this job was simply "to pass propaganda off as newsworthy events⁴¹." In other words: create a news opportunity, and the Western Press would do the rest. This represented a clever twist by Thom on the "disinformation" argument popular with American right-wing circles in the eighties which had been imported several years before as a ready made, all-purpose interpretation of Western protest movements⁴².

.

Interpretations of this kind, moreover, seemed common to many French interpretations of Gorbachov's domestic reforms; the goals of Russian diplomacy; and his appeal in the Western Media. While others did not use the concept of "disinformation" to shape their analysis; references to Gorbachov as the great "co-opter"⁴³, or to the Gorbachov "illusion"⁴⁴ were fairly popular. Equally widespread was the idea that Gorbachov's success was due to his capacity to adapt to his own purposes the language of Western institutions. In this view, Gorbachov was a masterful "mimic" who picked up disparate voices from Western movements and played them back endlessly through Western media channels seducing us with the echo of our own words and proposals. Gorbachov's success with Western public opinion followed, then, from the fact that the new "Soviet Peril" now wore a distinctly "Western" and "liberal" face, and spoke to us in our own idiom through our own media.

By the end of the eighties not only did Soviet commentators on past policy suddenly seem incomplete without some fresh admission of past stupidity, but reformed version of Soviet "new speak" appropriated many of the "buzzwords" of liberal American arms control community, or of the alternative defense planners of German and British "peace research" institutes. Paul Thibaud of Esprit called this the vocabulary of "Peace and Pollution"⁴⁵. This raised the question of whether all this talk of "global interdependence" and "military sufficiency" reflected a real shift in Soviet goals and

doctrines, or was simply a cover for a less benign political and diplomatic game plan.

The Western anti-nuclear movement stood accused of providing him with a new language, "the discourse of Disarmament and Ecology," which helped the Soviets' to recoup their ideological appeal at home and abroad by allowing them to speak in "the interest of all humanity." Viewed in this light, the democratic or ecological Lefts appeared as (unwitting?) allies of the strategic adversary; allies who were more useful to him than the remaining communist organizations because they enjoyed a real social legitimacy⁴⁶. This argument neatly identified political adversaries at home with the strategic enemy abroad - reducing disparate social and political forces and voices to a single force working to denuclearize Western Europe, and to weaken the European political community, even as it lent intellectual support to the new Soviet regime⁴⁷.

Pierre Hassner, the favorite analyst of many of the anti-totalitarian intellectuals, criticized this "disinformation thesis" in 1988 as being at the root of the current "credibility crisis of the dominant tendency of French Sovietology," and decried the chilling effect that it had on relations with foreign colleagues⁴⁸. For him the stakes were anything but "academic." He feared that the "extremism" of French press commentaries would touch the entire French political class undermining its credibility with elite groups outside France. Hassner was equally concerned about the possibility that portraying Gorbachov as a new Stalin, or the INF treaty as

a strategic defeat, would simply cease to be credible to the French public as well. He feared the potential for a "crisis of perceptions" which would damage public confidence in both media and intellectual opinion leaders. Any such split would not only hurt the French consensus, he argued but create an opening through which the spokesmen for the old left might return to the national political scene thereby undoing what the democratic critics of the Communist left had sought to accomplish⁴⁹.

While this rather nasty polemic over the peace movement may now seem a little silly given subsequent events, the global reach of this "hermeneutic of suspicion" did not make the task of conducting a political debate about the INF; the American covert war against the Sandinistas; Soviet strategic intentions, or anything else, much easier at the time. The currency that this type of argument received in a review like Commentaire was a sure sign that the response in Paris to the dramatic developments in international politics at the end of the eighties was a season of fear and loathing. It kept some intellectuals circles firmly in its grip up until the Winter of 1989/1990.

This kind of "cultural lag" represented an ironic reversal on the more common pattern where Anglo-Americans fear they will be the last to get the word on who's in and who's out in Paris. The "neo-conservative moment" hung on longer in Paris for many reasons, but one of them certainly was that in the eighties the trans-Atlantic communications of a directly

political sort tended to pass through conservative ideological channels - what we might call the "Commentary-Commentaire Connection." It should come as no surprise then that in the eighties members of conservative networks succeeded in making themselves heard across the Atlantic, while voices on the Left very often got lost in translation⁵⁰.

- 1 Régis Debray, Le Pouvoir Intellectuel en France, op cit., pp. 42-47.
- 2 See Michael Crozier, "France's Cultural Anxieties Under Gaullism," in Andrews and Hoffman, op cit., pp. 231-246.
- 3 Ehrmann and Schain, op cit., pp. 124-128 & 142-43.
- 4 See my interview with Dominique Moïsi, "On French Military Policy," TELOS, No. 55, Spring 1983, pp.238-39.
- 5 See Hall, op cit. and Ross, op cit.
- 6 A good example of this "meeting of the minds" between the Center-Right and the Socialist Left in anticipation of "cohabitation" was the Colloquia "Le Tiers Mondisme En Question," held January 23rd and 24th which assembled a host of intellectual personalities to publicly bury the Third World ideological rhetoric of the seventies.
- 7 See Hall, op cit., and Mongin and Pouthier, "Libéralisme/socialisme: une confrontation manquée," op cit.
- 8 Reader, op cit., 19-29.
- 9 Hamon and Rotman, op cit., pp. 271-282.
- 10 Hamon and Rotman, op cit., pp. 127-148 & 227-267.
- 11 See Diana Pinto, "Le Socialisme et les intellectuels, le conflit caché," Le Débat, No. 18, January 1982.
- 12 This was much talked about following an article by Max Gallo denouncing the "silence" the Paris intelligentsia in response to the Socialist victory, See Ross, op cit., pp. 60-70.
- 13 Laurent Joffrin, La Gauche en Voie de Disparition: Comment changer sans trahir, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1984, pp. 77-82 & 225-241.
- 14 See Laurent Joffrin, "Reflexions sur l'archaïsme Français," in SOFRES L'Etat de L'Opinion 1992, op cit., p. 34, where we find surprisingly that according to one SOFRES poll from September 1990, deputies, fonctionnaires, journalists, and university professors all rank higher on a scale of "social disutility" than do nurses, postmen and..prostitutes.
- 15 Paris Interviews, J. Mason, Spring 1985.
- 16 Paris Interviews, J. Mason, Spring 1985.
- 17 *ibid.*
- 18 *ibid.*
- 19 Paris Interview, J. Mason, May 21, 1985.
- 20 Paris interview, J. Mason, Spring 1985.
- 21 Paris Interview, J.Mason, June 7th 1985.

- 22 Paris interviews, J. Mason, Spring/Summer, 1985.
- 23 Paris Interview, J. Mason, June 9th 1985.
- 24 Paris interviews, J. Mason, Spring 1985/Summer 1986.
- 25 Paris Interviews, J. Mason, Spring 1985.
- 26 Reader, op cit., pp. 8-18.
- 27 This sense of outrage is well expressed in Claude Le Fort's introduction to his L'Invention Démocratique, Fayard Paris, 1981, pp. 12-25.
- 28 See J. Semprun, "Rester de Gauche," Le Débat, No 13, June 1981.
- 29 See for instance, Paul Thibaud's "Les évêques américains entre la guerre juste et le pacifisme," Esprit, No 79, July 1983, p. 97.
- 30 Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, "The Peace Movement and Western European Sovereignty," TELOS, No. 51, Spring 1982, p.160.
- 31 Cornelius Castoriadis, "The Social Regime in Russia" TELOS, No 38, Winter 1978/79, pp. 36-37, and his interview, "Le plus dur et le plus fragile des régimes," Esprit No 63, March 1982, p. 140.
- 32 See Cornelius Castoriadis, Devant La Guerre: Les réalités, Fayard, Paris, 1981, pp. 47-95, for an example of a well-known social theorist recycling the worst case estimates of Soviet military strength of the American neo-conservatives for a credulous Parisian intellectual audience.
- 33 Paul Thibaud, "Mesure d'une défaite," Esprit, No 63, March 1982, pp. 108-109, and also his introduction to the special issue "Devant les totalitarismes," Esprit, No 64, April 1982, pp. 3-10.
- 34 See, for instance, the laudatory special issue of Le Nouvel Observateur from August 10th 1984, "L'Explosion Américaine," which announced a pro-american turn in the cultural climate in Paris.
- 35 André Glucksmann, "Le pacifisme en Europe," Esprit, No-67-68, July-August, 1982, pp. 14-20.
- 36 Thibaud, "Les évêques américains entre la guerre juste et le pacifisme," op cit., p. 97.
- 37 Paul Thibaud, "Politique Internationale: principe et stratégie," Esprit, No 58 May 1981, pp. 75-80. See also for public echoes of this debate, Jean Klein, "Les mouvements de contestation antinucléaire en Europe," Cahiers du Forum pour l'Indépendance et la paix, No 1, Summer 1983, pp. 86-94.
- 38 Françoise Thom, "Gorbatchov: Table Ronde," Esprit, op cit., pp. 22 & 24. See also her contribution with Alain Besançon to the forum, "What's Happening in Moscow," The National Interest, No 8, Summer 1987, pp. 27-30.
- 39 Paris Interviews, J. Mason, August 1988.
- 40 Thom, "Gorbatchov: table ronde," Esprit, op cit., p. 21.

41 Françoise Thom, "La désinformation," Commentaire, No. 40, Winter 1987/88, p. 679.

42 The revival of the "disinformation" thesis in Paris dates back to the middle eighties. Its emergence as an intellectually fashionable "gadget" coincided with the publication by a left-wing publishing house, Editions Anthropos, of the French translation of Dezinformatsia: Mesures actives de la stratégie soviétique, with prefaces by Sidney Hook and Annie Kriegel, one of the leading students of the history of the French Communist Party. See Richard Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia, éditions anthropos, Paris, 1985, pp. xi-xv.

43 Pierre Hassner uses this expression in "Gorbatchov à l'Ouest," Pouvoirs, No 45, april 1988, pp. 103 & 109.

44 See the round table organized by Pouvoirs in April 1988 where Castoriadis uses this term. Unlike many others he argues insightfully that it was the reformist group around Gorbatchov who were suffering from an illusion: that they would somehow be able to "westernize" and "normalize" the existing Soviet system - and not the Western media. Pouvoirs, April 1988, op cit.

45 Thibaud et al, "Gorbatchov: table ronde," Esprit, op cit.

46 Hassner and Thom, "Gorbatchov: table ronde," Esprit, op cit., p. 36.

47 Françoise Thom, "Perestroïka and idéologie," Commentaire, No 42, Summer 1988, p. 484.

48 Hassner, "Un chef d'oeuvre en péril," op cit., p. 81.

49 Hassner, *ibid*.

50 I make this assertion based on personal experience having tried frequently in vain to place American opinion pieces in the Paris reviews.

XII

The Dilemmas of Dissidence:

Unlike the seventies, the anti-nuclear movement during the Mitterrand Presidency did not attain a level of militancy sufficient to warrant the kinds of police repression which suppressed violent anti-nuclear protests in 1975 and 1976¹. The relative moderation of the few mass demonstrations organized in the early eighties by the partisans of "non-alignment" in the Mouvement Anti-Nucléaire (MAN) and the French branch of the European Nuclear Disarmament Campaign (CODENE), or the more pro-soviet l'Appel des Cent and Mouvement de la Paix², however, did not prevent them from becoming the target of a major campaign in the media or of the counter-mobilization of France's best known intellectuals belonging to the Rocardian/Catholic wing of the Socialist Party.

Communist Dilemmas

The possibility of challenges to the official defense consensus from the outside was also limited by the positions adopted by the Communist Party which rallied to the nuclear consensus in 1977 even before the Socialists had completed their reversal³. This shift in the Communist "party line" occurred quite suddenly as far as rank and file militants were concerned. One of my communist informants told me that prior

to 1977 he had never participated in an in depth discussion of nuclear weapons or strategy at a party meeting, and as for himself, he had "cobbled together" (bricolé) positions on foreign policy based on his readings of various anti-imperialist authors. He characterized the attitude of the party's rank and file as a kind of anti-nuclear "fundamentalism" which rejected the hidden "social content" of De Gaulle's "force de Frappe" and spurned nuclear weapons as instruments of mass destruction useful only to fearful bourgeois states⁴.

However this basic distrust of nuclear weapons - especially when in American hands - was counterbalanced by the technological enthusiasm of many party members for nuclear energy which was just as strong. The party had its own pro-nuclear lobby at both the leadership and rank and file level. Thanks to the proprietary feelings of some of the party experts concerning the CEA - Joliot Curie's creation - and the heavy presence of the CGT within the EDF, l'Electricité de France, (the state owned electricity utility which was the main client for the French nuclear power industry⁵), many Party leaders and activists were unsympathetic to the "Green ethos" and "luddite" rejection of nuclear technology diffused by the grass-roots anti-nuclear movement.

In addition by 1976 the old anti-nuclear "fundamentalism" seemed inadequate to national "Eurocommunist" leaders like Jean Kanapa, who were engaged in elaborating an electoral program promising "Un Communisme aux couleurs de la France," that is, a Communism consistent with a French nationalist

identity⁶. According to my dissident informants, promoting the discussion of nuclear weapons within the Party leadership and rank and file became a priority at this time for Kanapa and other "Eurocommunists." The key to Kanapa's political strategy, "his strategic aim," was to "decouple the Party from the Soviet Union" by rejecting the traditional policy in which the unconditional defense of the USSR figured as the "stable anchor for the political identity of the party militants⁷."

In his view, Kanapa's "determination to forge an independent policy" demanded a foreign policy based on "non-alignment," which meant in practical terms the active "disalignment" of the party from Soviet policies and the "Soviet Model." The political rationale for this new policy was found in the adoption of De Gaulle's policy of strategic independence as a source of political inspiration. "So" my informant told me, "we talked a lot in cell meetings about De Gaulle to whom we gave our 'critical support'." In other meetings of his local cell, visiting party experts lead the discussion of both the intricacies of French deterrence doctrine and its connection to the Party's foreign policy position in favor of national independence and European "non-alignment⁸."

This position had been elaborated at the top of the Party by a handful of party leaders who had participated in the strategic seminars held at the FEDN. As General Buis recalled in his interview with me both Jean Kanapa, who became the Party's general secretary in 1974, and Louis Bayot, had both

attended the FEDN's discussion in the early 1970's. Their participation bore its fruit in 1977, when:

"...we saw the Communist party change its position out of the blue one fine day after an exchange of communiques with us. There had been a debate with us at the Foundation, and then I exchanged communiques with a Party official called Louis Bayot saying that we had met and talked, and found ourselves largely in agreement on the foundations necessary for the National Defense. And the consensus was forged largely like that⁹..."

The Communist approach to the nuclear question was in a sense quite straight forward. They have supported the national consensus as long French nuclear forces provided a rationale for France's non-integration in NATO, and an argument for neutrality in any future European crisis. The Communists supported the most extreme version of the nationalist neutralist outlook on French policy¹⁰. As the defense correspondent of l'Humanité told me:

"The strength of France's geo-political situation in Europe was the card that De Gaulle played masterfully. De Gaulle's legacy placed us in a position to be the balancing power between the United States and the Soviet Union. The French nuclear bomb symbolizes De Gaulle's policy of national independence. It is the instrument of our non-alignment. If we can learn to play this card again, I believe France has beautiful future ahead of her¹¹..."

This informant was also one of the few open advocates I met of a Franco-Soviet alliance, which only goes to show to what extent the rhetoric of "non-alignment" could become a two edged sword when wielded by members of the Party Apparat. For the Soviet traditionalists within the party, a "Communism in national colors" would speak the language of non-alignment mainly to ensure the active disalignment of France from NATO in any future Superpower crisis. Certainly they knew they couldn't hope to do anything more than work for France's armed neutrality.

This orientation did not present them with any insurmountable difficulties until the Party found itself obliged to argue simultaneously for France's nuclear autonomy within the Western alliance, and for the basic justice of the Soviet demand that French nuclear forces be included in the forces to be negotiated at the Geneva INF talks¹². As a result, for most of the eighties, the Communists found themselves obliged to hold back the growth of the French peace organizations in order to keep their four cabinet seats. The Party voted for the Socialists defense budget in 1984 (which named the USSR as France's only adversary), and worked to restrain their own peace organizations participation in demonstrations against French nuclear policy¹³. This placed them at odds with the leadership of one of their important front organizations, le Mouvement de la Paix, which they tried to bring to heel by creating a competing organization, l'Appel des Cent¹⁴. At the same time, they encouraged demonstrations against the de-

ployment of American missiles elsewhere in Europe that was actively supported by the Government to which they belonged.

The push of primal anti-American fears and the pull of the party's own pro-nuclear lobby left the party in a tight corner - which no doubt explains why they could find no better slogan for the one mammoth demonstration that received Party backing in October 1981 than a rather limp sounding "Nous Voulons la Paix! Nous aimons la vie..," that is "We Want Peace! We love life"¹⁵... More daring elements in the party peace movement managed to go beyond this to endorse the slogan "Ni les SS-20/ Ni les Pershings..," but could never bring themselves to publicly question the French National Strike Force¹⁶. Understandably this double political game was hard to maintain, and certainly contributed to the Party's eventual break with the Socialists in 1984¹⁷.

After its ministers left the government the Party was at least free to take new positions which had the virtue of being internally consistent, and better positioned to take advantage of the Soviet initiatives in the area of disarmament. However, even popular fascination with Mr. Gorbatchov was not enough to compensate for the erosion of the Party's influence in the late eighties. Its reversals on defense policy had little impact beyond its effect on the struggle between the Marchais leadership and the Communist "Renewal" forces who had seen their leader, Pierre Juquin, expelled from the Party for having paced himself in nomination as a Presidential candidate independent of the Party. Finally, the heightened visibility

of France's commitment to German security pressed directly along the old fault lines of the inter-party consensus and led the French Communists to withdraw into a position of strategic dissidence (some would say irrelevance) -something France's nuclear weapons programs never caused them to do.

It also encouraged Pierre Juquin to make the nuclear weapons question the centerpiece of his unsuccessful presidential run in 1988 at the head of a cartel of movements and parties of the extreme left. The "peace" issue was the centerpiece of both Juquin's campaign and that of the Communist candidate Andre Lajoinie, who each used it in an effort to compete for communist votes and to seduce voters from the disorganized left of the Socialist Party. To little effect, judging from the meager vote both of these candidates received in the first round of the '88 elections. Apparently the "party" label had become so discredited that even being an anti-nuclear "dissident" couldn't help Juquin shake it¹⁸.

CODENE and the Non-Communist Dissidents

From the point of view of the tiny anti nuclear organizations France, their position was defined by an unpleasant convergence between both the official and intellectual worlds against the "discourse of peace and pollution" which froze them out of the networks of political communication for most of the eighties¹⁹. However, one can argue that whatever the immediate liabilities the pacifists incurred as a consequence of this political and cultural marginalization, it also conferred certain advantages in terms of intellectual openness

and access to sources of alternative information outside of France. Moreover the activists and intellectuals of the CODENE, the local French affiliate of the END, recognized that there were intellectual publics which had systems of authority which were based on norms of rational debate and where new ideas still counted for something in the political balance²⁰. This is the position taken by Patrick Viveret among others in the wake of the rout of the anti-nuclear wing of the PS in the late seventies. As he wrote in Alternatives Non Violentes in 1982:

"I believe that the Left is condemned to juxtapose several contradictory policies, if it doesn't reopen a real debate on defense... So sooner or later the Socialist Party will be obliged to reopen it, but only if the external pressures are very strong. The internal blocages are too great that the Party could put this question back on the table on its own... But if a true anti-war movement can make itself felt by the public, and if this movement is authentically democratic - which it is not the case for the Mouvement de la Paix which is simply the political windshield of the Communist Party - then I think that the Socialist Party will have to take it into account. But we will not be able to reopen the debate alone. It will depend in large part on the emergence of an autonomous movement... which can

pose simultaneously the question of totalitarianism and that of the threat of nuclear war²¹."

This suggested a possible strategy for recovery of by anti-nuclear movement in France which involved engaging the anti-totalitarian left in a public polemic. This strategy required the movement to break with the positions inherited from the old communist dominated "Mouvement de la Paix," and to renew the stock of political ideas inherited from the independent left affiliated with the maverick PSU²². In any case, there was little choice as far as the PSU was concerned because Rocard's old party had become so marginalized by the Socialist majority that it simply dissolved itself on the eve of the 1988 presidential elections. This meant that the movement, like the rest of the Cartel des Gauches Alternatives, had to simultaneously revise its Marxist traditions in the light of the democratic anti-totalitarian wave of the preceding decade, and attempt to align itself with the rising ecology movement, les Verts. By the middle eighties the Greens, who were just setting down roots in France's alpine and eastern regions - with more than a little help from their friends among the West German Greens - represented perhaps the best hope of finding a political future²³.

The movement could not advance by warming over the political arguments which had already been rejected at the 1978 Socialist Congress, even though they were several formulated at that time which retained their appeal to some of the rank and file members of the Party. The first of these arguments

accentuated the risks of the Government's alignment on Washington, highlighting the risks to France's independence which would flow from the covert reintegration of French Defense policy within NATO, and close collaboration with Washington in Chad and the Middle East²⁴. This idea that France's path to future greatness lay in building a non-aligned Europe was stated during my interview with a young woman PSU militant who played a leadership role in the non-communist CODENE. She told me in somewhat bitter tones that "France is only a middle-range power today. But she could have been a great power... if only Mitterrand had seized the opportunity to make a non-aligned Europe." Her vision of a non aligned Europe was, of course, also one of a Europe which had stepped out of the post-war bloc system through voluntary de-nuclearization²⁵.

In the past the argument against France's "Atlantic" entanglements had emphasized the risks of "Canadianization²⁶," that is, the risk of the loss of national independence through the gradual alienation of sovereignty to the outside power center in Washington of which I heard echoes during my elite interviews. The remedy had been a nationalist one which called on France to insulate herself from the post-war system of blocs through a policy of non-alignment and orient her foreign policy in terms of North/South issues. This policy of non-alignment was not credible in a situation where the results of the Williamsburg and Versailles economic summits in the first years of the Mitterrand Presidency seemed to suggest that "Canadianization," ie financial and monetary dependance,

was already an accomplished fact²⁷. In any event, seen within the context of the renewal of the Cold War at the beginning of the decade, "Canadianization" seemed to rank relatively low on the Left's list of pressing dangers.

We might add however that by the time of Jean-Pierre Chevènement's resignation in the Winter of 1991, the case for the loss of French diplomatic and economic independence during the Mitterrand years, at least outside of the European Community, was increasingly strong. Seemingly the policy of alignment with Washington had reached its logical fulfillment with Mitterrand's decision to place French military units under American command during the Persian Gulf War, and his readiness to end France's pretense of conducting an independent diplomacy in the Middle East. This denouement of Mitterrand foreign policy realized the worst fears of both the pro nuclear independent Gaullists and the anti-nuclear partisans of non-alignment who had feared the loss of French national autonomy in the mid 1980's²⁸. These developments might just give this old non-alignment argument some new "punch"²⁹.

The Discourse of Peace and Democracy:

The anti-nuclear movement responded to finding itself on an apparent dead end track by putting the question of Eastern Europe in the forefront of its political work in an attempt to link the values of peace with those of democracy. This anti nuclear discourse of "Peace and Democracy" created an left variant on the "Human Rights" rhetoric popular among the Anti-totalitarian left. Movement leaders had come to the conclusion

that didn't stand a chance of being heard if didn't detach anti-nuclear politics from an attitude of "ideological detente," which accepted the political status quo in Eastern Europe, and remained narrowly focused on nuclear issues to the exclusion of all else³⁰. At the same time, traditional anti-Americanism of the style popular during the Vietnam war period would no longer wash with French intellectual publics - although it still just fine worked in Germany - since it was too identified as a standard Communist maneuver for ducking the issues raised by the Eastern European dissident movements. "What about El Salvador," might still suffice to close the discussion of the Communist regimes for Californians or for Berliners, but by the early 1980's it would no longer do the trick in Paris outside of a few isolated Communist circles³¹. The new line was clearly evident in Patrick Viveret's 1982 criticism of the political incoherence of the defense and foreign policies pursued by the sitting Socialist government and supported by anti-soviet, left-wing opinion leaders:

On the one hand it would keep the policy of nuclear deterrence - increasing its fleet of missile subs, developing a land-based missile, etc. But on the other hand, it will pursue an international policy which no longer corresponds to this system of defense: at once neither european, neither third-worldist nor even atlanticist. Our system of defense, based on the logic of "splendid isolation" is in contradiction with our foreign polciy. What's

worse, it's system that - if by misfortune someday it were ever put into operation - would end up massacring the very populations of Eastern Europe we claim we want to liberate³²...."

This argument was adopted by much of the non-communist anti-nuclear left and by 1984 even a strong critic of CODENE such as Nicole Gnesotto was forced to recognize that CODENE had sharply demarcated itself from its communist competitors:

"CODENE truly wishes to be both anti-totalitarian and european. It maintains tight relationships with Solidarnosc, Charter 77, the pacifist dissident in East Germany and Moscow.. Anti-communism remains the true line of cleavage within French pacifism, and CODENE has never ceased to prove its anti-totalitarian honesty..Ideological divergences and tactical competition go together - Codene wasn't present for (the demonstrations at) Vincennes and the Communists didn't come to Larzac³³..."

More generally, by the middle eighties spokespersons for CODENE had become known among Parisian journalists for their contacts with Eastern European dissidents and respected for their argument that disarmament, conventional and nuclear, might help ease the Russians out of Eastern Europe³⁴.

The Conflict between Nuclear Weapons and Citizenship:

The second of the inherited arguments focused on the tension between the nuclear and popular dimensions of the party compromise of 1978 and the exclusively nuclear orien-

tation of the Socialist Government's actual defense policy. While the Government proceeded with the modernization of France's strategic forces and created a new conventional intervention force (The FAR). it did little to implement the Socialist Party's commitments to the reform of military service (except to shorten the length of mandatory service from a year to ten months), or to begin the reorganization of the country's territorial defense along popular, decentralized lines. This left the government's defense policy open to two lines of attack: one touching on the political dangers of the professionalization of the military which would create a ready tool for massive foreign interventions, and the second highlighting the incompatibility of nuclear politics and participatory democracy. The first line of criticism was demonstrated in a "positive" fashion by the doubtful uses to which the professional units of the French Army had been put in Africa over much of the past thirty years. By contrast the real limits which the conservation of a largely conscript army placed on the French deployment of professional soldiers during the Gulf conflict makes the "negative demonstration" of the validity of this political argument.

More broadly, the Socialist government's commitment to France's nuclear forces has led it to constantly privilege nuclear weapons over the technologically "sweet," conventional alternatives to them represented by the new generation of "emerging technologies," and to favor reliance on the professional military over any popular alternatives to it. But new

military technologies were coming on line which both provide a real alternatives to nuclear weapons for many tactical, interdiction and battlefield missions - as was later shown by the Gulf War. At the same time in Lebanon and in the former Yugoslavia, the new technologies have also allowed popular "unconventional" militias to have the kind of man-portable firepower which would enable them to effectively resist in some cases and to deter in others, regular professional ground forces.

The new technologies behind smart weapons like the cruise missile also offered the possibility of striking conventional targets with such force and precision that compensating for inaccuracy of conventional artillery with the massive destructive force of nuclear weapons was no longer necessary. Tactically, the new smart munitions promised a conventional answer to traditional NATO worries about the problem of Soviet superiority in numbers of tanks, artillery and armored vehicles³⁵. Strategically, the increasing accuracy of nuclear delivery systems had already encouraged a trade-off of megatonnage for precision, so that today's more numerous strategic warheads actually carry less nuclear megatonnage than the much smaller force structure of the fifties and sixties. As Freeman Dyson suggested early in the decade, there was no reason to believe that the same trend wouldn't allow for the elimination of nuclear warheads all together, even for scary missions such as counterforce attacks on enemy missile fields³⁶.

For much of the decade the French did respond to these new technological opportunities in terms of sales of sophisticated conventional missile systems to overseas buyers - as the highly publicized successes of the Exocet missile in devastating British and American ships in the regional wars for the Falklands and the Gulf should remind us. All too often however, the French army and Air Force found themselves last in line for the delivery of these new weapons systems. Indeed, these deficits were inevitable in view of the fact that between 50% or 60% of French production runs were dedicated to overseas buyers and the French practice of dipping into Army weapon stocks to satisfy foreign contracts³⁷.

In so far as French military budgeting is concerned the French continued with their existing institutional commitment to nuclear weapons much as they had done in the field of nuclear power. The anti-nuclear movement adopted Mary Kaldor's argument that this persistent pro-nuclear commitment had all the earmarks of an institutional investment in the baroque innovation of a conservative technology³⁸, but apparently this argument was not heard outside of a narrow circle of technical analysts³⁹. Even so, the nuclear commitment did not seem to make sense either in military terms, nor in terms of the government's commitment to a high-technology future for its civilian economy.

At the same time all the talk about the Citizen/Soldier and territorial defense based on popular mobilization of local reserves came to nothing. It disappeared in the exhaust fumes

of the motorized units which have joined the traditional Bastille Day parade down the Champs-Élysée. One could argue that there is nothing surprising in this, that in addition to consummating the marriage of the presidential regime and the armed services, (the Citoyen-Soldat was sacrificed in the name of the Soldat Prince), the logic of nuclear weapons policy carries one inevitably in the direction of the forces in being model of the military organization, where there is little room for anybody but a small crops of military managers and technicians - even the traditional fighting-man has little place here as Michel Martin has pointed out⁴⁰. In abandoning the model of popular mobilization, then the government did nothing but make a pragmatic surrender to the logic of nuclear defense systems.

This surrender carries with it a political price higher than living with an monarchical presidency with its attendant costs in the form of the atrophy of political parties, rising rates of voter abstention and the decline of legislative activity and autonomy - although these are costs Socialists have apparently had little problem in accepting. Nuclear deterrence, after all, depends for its credibility on the skills and determination of a small number of men locked in a conflict of wills as well as weapons with their adversaries. In a crisis, they stand at the heart of the storm while the rest of society is reduced to the status of spectators, indeed, too much less - to the status of hostages⁴¹.

It follows then that nuclear deterrence can be politically dangerous to both our traditional concepts of citizenship and of military virtue because it increases society's dependence on military professionals who may constitute a sectional interest in their own right. This is also true because deterrent policies reduce the mass of the citizenry to a position of absolute helplessness which may be so demoralizing as to harm the very political and social cohesiveness of the society it is meant to defend.

This Pacifist argument was made by Patrick Vivret among others at the time⁴². It restated the traditional liberal objection to nuclear weapons because of their anti-democratic character in a way that even the anti-totalitarians should have found compelling. In the early eighties the anti-totalitarian Left was willing to tolerate nuclear deterrence as the lesser of two evils - anti-democratic effects or no - if that was the price that had to be paid to maintain French national sovereignty in the face of an aggressive imperial power about whose totalitarian character they had no doubts. They were convinced, given the unhappy history of a Hungary or a Poland up until that time, that France's democratic institutions would not outlast the loss of her national sovereignty. But to much of the official French Left arguments about the political reliability of France's own military, (which pointed to the political role of the colonial army in post-war politics), seemed laughable next to the realities of the then existing socialist dictatorships and given the French Left's

willingness to tolerate a totalitarian surrogate in their own midst: the PCF⁴³.

Stressing the politically de-mobilizing character of nuclear deterrence policies, however, represented an argument which could not be dismissed so lightly. It addressed the central political question of the roots of civil society's willingness to resist outside aggression, an critical issue for French given their military collapse in June 1940 and the record of wartime collaboration with the Germans by members of France's conservative elites. Anti-nuclear activists, like Christian Mellon could well argue that it may be the case that non-nuclear defense alternatives to deterrence are less of gamble for the survival of democratic polities than the nuclear policies already in place, precisely because nuclear deterrence undermines the social will to resist⁴⁴.

Nuclear deterrence makes no claim to protect society if its pact with the enemy should ever break down, it only promises sure retaliation against attack. It breaks, therefore, with the traditional contract in Liberal societies where loyalty to the state is exchanged against the promise of effective protection for members of the political community. As French public opinion surveys suggest, there was no reason in the 1980s to believe that faced with the failure of the nuclear bluff French politicians and citizens would not have preferred a policy of "pre-emptive surrender" to a "pre-emptive strike."

Unfortunately, given the centralized and professional character of France's nuclear command system, the French

President and a small group of military commanders were in a position to make this decision without consulting them and to pursue a nuclear attack without worrying greatly with the current state of public opinion. If the events in the 1980s had ever come to the "proverbial crunch" for which military strategists had been planning, it could have happened that, as Patrick Vivret argued, nuclear weapons would have proven themselves to be politically disarming as well as morally demoralizing⁴⁵. Further Vivret's anti-nuclear argument takes on a special attractiveness today in view of the emerging "intelligent" technologies which allow the "built in intelligence" of the modern weapons systems to make up for the deficiencies of the training of the people who operate them. This makes conventional territorial defense into an effective policy and military alternative, - if the local defenders are sufficiently motivated, that is, - which does not suffer from fatal political drawbacks for medium sized societies.

The Greens and the "discourse of ecology and disarmament:"

A renewal of the French anti-nuclear movement along the lines sketched out here was constrained by its institutional and intellectual ties to the official Communist Peace organization, Le Mouvement de la Paix, on the one hand, and by its ties to the old PSU, on the other. Fortunately by the early 1980's, however, there was an alternative movement with its own party organization and a culture which was independent from that of the traditional left: the Greens, or "les Verts." The French ecological movement developed out of the campaigns

against France's nuclear power program in the middle and late 1970's, and anticipated the rise of the German Greens in a number of respects⁴⁶, but by the middle eighties had come under the influence of their more successful German neighbors⁴⁷. This movement had transcended the local politics of traditional conservationism to take on France's ambitious nuclear power program, but apparently never succeeded in linking the nuclear power issue with the question of nuclear weapons⁴⁸.

It was a movement which was already in retreat when the Socialists came to power and promptly reneged on their earlier pledge to freeze France's commitment to nuclear energy. As with the anti-nuclear weapons movement, the Greens were pushed onto the sidelines during the first Socialist Government from 1981 to 1985⁴⁹. An important political focus for the anti-nuclear movement in the middle eighties was to make the rendezvous with unity that they missed in the late 70's - in large part due to the anti-nuclear weapons movement's reluctance to cut its ties with the Socialist Party. I had an opportunity to observe the contentious encounter between the "leftist" anti-nuclear movement and the "new wave" Greens in April of 1985 when I attended the founding convention of the Cartel de la Gauche Alternative. There were obviously enough bitter feelings left over from past falling outs to make this a difficult marriage to propose or consummate.

This picture was only modified in the late eighties when successors to the social movements of the 1970's, the two

Green parties and national mobilizations of Lycée students, staged a political come-back in regional and European parliamentary elections as well as in the streets of Paris which house government ministries⁵⁰, advancing under their all encompassing political slogan "Work for all, Live Better, Waste less⁵¹..." Under the second Socialist government led by Michel Rocard in 1988, the Greens broke out of their bastion in the eastern departments and spread their base of support to rural areas in the West and to major urban areas⁵². It took the surprising electoral successes of the Green party in the European elections in 1988 and the cantonales elections in 1992 to get finally the attention of the Socialist leadership⁵³.

Given the prospect of losing power in the March 1993 legislative elections, the Socialists have recently felt a pressing need to make concessions to the feelings of Green voters on the issues of nuclear testing and tactical nuclear weapons⁵⁴. These concessions duly came in the Spring of 1992 with the announcement by President Mitterrand of the suspension of nuclear testing in the Pacific for a period of a year, the cancellation of the Hades tactical missile, and the decision to phase out the intermediate range missiles based in silos on the plateau d'Albion⁵⁵ - three moves which bring the Socialists back to positions which they had adopted and then dropped in the late seventies⁵⁶.

At the same time, the Socialist leadership has been quite sympathetic to the ecological maverick, Brice Lalonde, who

served in the Rocard Government as Minister of the Environment, and who left the government in order to pull together his own environmental organization. His group *Génération Ecologie*, now rivals that of Antoine Waechter, the head of *Les Verts*. This split in the environmental movement (and their electoral lists) put the PS in a position to propose an electoral alliance to the French Greens along the lines of the Red/Green alliances which have occurred in recent German local and regional elections. Judging from the recent agreement between *Les Verts* and *Generation Ecologie* to present a common list of candidates in the upcoming legislative election, this is a Socialist ploy the Greens have rejected - given recent polls which have them running neck and neck with the PS in 1993⁵⁷.

The Discourse of Peace and Pollution revisited:

More than a simple marriage of convenience for two single issue movements, the ecological/pacifist alliance may well provide the intellectual foundation needed to challenge the generational irresponsibility implicit in much of the political discourse surrounding nuclear weapons. If the Anglo-American debate over nuclear winter in the middle eighties, or the example of the Chernobyl disaster, had any lessons to teach the French, they were that aftermath of even a limited nuclear exchange involving a nuclear strike force as small as France's would be more than sufficient to damage the biosystem of Northern Europe - depressing, if not eliminating, agricultural productivity for years⁵⁸. In the light of this

new environmental understanding of the long-term consequences of nuclear war fighting, it took a special kind of blindness to suggest as did Andre Glucksman, among others, that nuclear war and the Gulag represent equivalent threats to the future of humanity⁵⁹. The quip made in the early 1980's by Cornelius Castoriadis, the anti-totalitarian philosopher, that the pacifists only wished to defend the "zoological interest" of mankind to the exclusion of all other interests was a sexy witticism in Paris some years back⁶⁰, but in view of our evolving environmental awareness, the joke now seems to fall somewhat flat.

In Patrick Vivret's terms, the French anti-nuclear movement had to learn how to respond to the nuclear issue in ecological terms because nuclear weapons represented a long term "threat to the survival of the species"⁶¹. Fortunately by the late eighties the scientific information and arguments needed to forge a "geo-ecological discourse" about "species security" were already available from the French movement's foreign contacts in the United States and Britain. The "Discourse of Disarmament and Ecology" promises to have an impact on the French policy debate of the nineties in ways that go far beyond the discussion of Soviet disinformation campaigns.

Global Warming, Geo-Ecology and the security debate:

In its current phase the environmental policy debate is organized around the issue of global warming, the now famous "Greenhouse effect," which presents policy makers with a scientific warning about a rapid deterioration of the climatic

conditions which mankind has known for the past ten thousand years. The product of the intellectual encounter in the United States between the earth sciences, atmospheric physics climatology and the new space-based disciplines of exo-biology (for extraterrestrial), the new scientific vision of the Earth as an global biological system was a byproduct of the American Viking lander' observations of the climate system on Mars⁶². It had its first impact on the American policy debate in the early years of the Reagan administration with the controversy over Carl Sagan's "nuclear winter" thesis which had wide impact after it was endorsed by Soviet and American scientists at the international "Conference on the Long-term Worldwide Biological Consequences of Nuclear War," held in Cambridge Massachusetts in April 1983⁶³.

While the connection between ecology and security issues seemed to fade with the eclipse of the American "Freeze movement" in the middle eighties, it returned with great force during the last years of the Reagan Administration with the discovery of the depletion of the Ozone layer over the poles, and growing international awareness of the potential for rapid and unpredictable changes of the Global climate system. Public concern with these scientific forecasts was heightened when the weather disasters of the summer of 1988 -a drought conditions in the mid-west of the continental United States and in southern France; major forest fires in Europe, the United States and Canada and major hurricanes in adjacent areas of the Caribbean - seemed to conform to the scientific predic-

tions concerning of the early signs of global warming, pushing them off the front pages of the scientific journals and into to the headlines of the international press - including the lead article in the July issue of Ca m'intéresse in France, the large circulation popular science magazine⁶⁴.

The fading of the Freeze campaign as a mass movement in America, and the decline of the "anti-nuclear" groups in Western Europe at the close of the Cold War, moreover, did not result in the disappearance of the scientific and strategic issues which these movements had raised, nor the network of organizational and personal ties which they had established. The focus of mainstream ecological organizations became promoting public awareness of a transnational, transgenerational environmental threat rather than mobilizing around local or regional "pollution" problems and the nuclear disarmament agenda. Groups such as Greenpeace and Lester Brown's Worldwatch Institute have ties to the peace research institutes and policy centers and together they have sponsored a new elite discourse concerning national security and industrial strategy: a "geo-ecological" discourse which claims to provide an "alternative framework" for the analysis of global security and economic development issues - the same discourse that French critics like Paul Thibaud had dismissed as the rhetoric of "Peace and Pollution."

In the mid-80's the claims of both the environmental forecasters and the "geo-ecologists," were received by the French Socialist establishment as either as hostile pacifist

propaganda, or as examples of the vulnerability of American scientists to media hype and "catastrophist" excess⁶⁵. In official circles it was often seen as yet another plot designed to undermine public confidence in the French Nuclear Deterrent - as in the case of the Nuclear Winter scenario - or an attempt to disrupt the French nuclear testing program - as when Greenpeace sailed protestors into the waters surrounding the French test site on the Island of Mururoa. Where the French Navy saw the hand of the CIA acting through Greenpeace to cripple the technical autonomy of the French nuclear program, right-wing Sovietologist like Françoise Thom at the FEDN had perceived the handiwork of KGB disinformation experts⁶⁶. In either case the official reaction was intense and quite violent as the sinking of the Greenpeace ship, the Rainbow Warrior, by French naval intelligence officers testifies.

I heard echoes of this defensiveness myself one day in 1986 when I casually raised the topic of the Nuclear Winter thesis with a Quai D'Orsay analyst over lunch. The very notion that there was anything to discuss, immediately brought me a sharp rebuke and the angry accusation that I was giving aid and comfort to "the gang that would leave France defenseless before the Soviets." Needless to say, I was properly intimidated, and dropped the subject immediately so as to enjoy my meal without provoking any further scandal.

Since 1989 the Soviet collapse and rise of the Greens have persuaded the Socialists that ecology is not an immediate

national security threat and that they can adopt a more open attitude. The new attitude can be seen in the scramble of Socialist officials to get out ahead of the opposition on Environmental issues and in official gestures of support for environmental research. The Worldwatch Institute Europe, for instance, opened in 1991 its offices in Paris - with Laurent Fabius, the current Socialist Party leader, as its honorary President - while the Worldwatch annual report, The State of the World, has now found a French publisher with Economica, the prestigious publishing house associated with IFRI⁶⁷. Lastly, it's worth noting that the "geo-ecological" discourse received its official consecration by the CNRS and the Ministry of the Environment in the winter of 1993 with the organization of a government sponsored and funded scientific conference on "Geo-politics of the Environment and the New World Order" at the CNRS conference center at Chantilly outside of Paris.

Generally speaking, all this sudden elite interest, in France as in the US, regarding issues of "ecological security" has been sparked simply by the terrifying character of the climate forecasts which computer models have begun to generate concerning the near term future. These forecasts include a six degree celsius increase in average global temperatures by the middle of the next century - with significantly higher warming foreseen for northern and polar regions⁶⁸. In much of the northern hemisphere it is expected that severe drought conditions will become a new and permanent fact of life and will

be accompanied by a massive "dieback" of much of the existing forest cover⁶⁹. Severe disruptions are also predicted for the inhabitants of islands or coastal regions, since sea levels may rise by a meter or more, inducing wide-spread flooding of areas where human populations are currently concentrated⁷⁰. The implications of these forecasts for human populations worldwide are truly quite grim.

The fulfillment of any and all of these predictions would involve the wide scale disruption of the agricultural support systems for different local populations. Harvest failures in turn would trigger vast movements of "environmental" refugees - armies of displaced persons looking for new homes and arable farmland. It may be that populations movements of this sort have already begun with the inflow of Bengali farmers into India, the movement of East Africans into Europe through Italy and Spain and the threatened migration of tens of thousands of Haitians into the Southern US. In any event, environmental fears have already been fulfilled with chilling accuracy with the disastrous monsoon floods in Bangladesh in 1988 and the failures of the rains over Southern Africa during the past several years which have brought about catastrophic declines in agricultural productivity, and put tens of millions of lives at risk.

While climate disasters on a vast scale have not occurred outside of Africa in recent years, concern in elite circles has been maintained by continuing bad news about the depletion of the Ozone hole over polar regions. Given global declines

in the Ozone layers over the Northern Hemisphere of between 4 to 5 percent, and the emergence of a wintertime ozone holes over populated areas in Europe and Canada, increases in cancer rates in industrial core of world civilization can be expected⁷¹. Any and all of these forecasts imply a radical reduction in the "carrying capacity" of the planet, that is, a sharp downturn in the ability of regional societies to feed all of their members, and consequentially the prospect of a catastrophic "population crash" world-wide. Social disruption on this scale necessarily will raise "security" issues even in the strictest and most limited military sense of the term⁷².

Although the full onset of these drastic changes in the global climate is seen as being several decades into the future, local effects which could be quite dramatic are anticipated for the immediate future. An article by Norman Meyers in the Spring 1989 issue of Foreign Policy foresaw the outbreak of "resource wars" in the third world as highly likely - for instance conflicts between Mid-Eastern states over the control of scarce water resources for agriculture. The continued spread of desertification threatens the agricultural systems of many third world countries, while the destruction of tropical forests could worsen local drought and flooding conditions⁷³.

In the face of rapid population growth, further declines in "environmental productivity" are likely to increase the distress and deprivation of the world's poor. At the same time

it seems unlikely that all one billion of the world's poor will do the developed world the favor of staying in place while their local environments and economies collapse under them. All of these immediate changes in local environments will increase the number of "economic" refugees from third-world countries, even as drought conditions in either the United States and Western Europe could threaten the world surplus of food stocks available to feed them. Any of these disruptions could aggravate the border control and immigration problems of neighboring countries and regions and increase the risk of local wars over water and other natural resources.

The emerging environmental "paradigm" represents more than a challenge to the charity and hospitality of the mature industrial countries. According to the French Greens, it also represents an ideological challenge to the core institutions of industrial society and the "production ethic" shared by both the liberal right and democratic left⁷⁴. The Liberal philosophical framework where the liberty and well being of those currently living represents a stake greater than the hypothetical and unknowable interests of the future generations of humanity, or than our interest in preserving "bio-regions" which took eons to form has come under increasing challenge by "Deep ecologists" and other spokespersons for the environmental movement⁷⁵. As Stanley Aronowitz already remarked a while back:

"Instead of placing nature in the context of social and economic history, the Greens place human rela-

tionships in the context of natural history and hold that we can not exploit nature for human purposes without lapsing into exploitative social relations⁷⁶..."

This radical claim marks the beginning of new ideological debate which will both shape the nuclear debate in France and elsewhere even as it demands that we rethink the global crisis through which we are now living.

- 1 See James Jaspers, *op cit.*, pp. 238-39.
- 2 See Gnesotto, "Le Pacifisme aux couleurs de la France," *op cit.*, pp. 39-40.
- 3 See Mellon, *op cit.*, pp. 14-16.
- 4 Paris Interview, J. Mason, July 15, 1985.
- 5 Paris Interview, *ibid.*
- 6 Ehrmann and Schain, *op cit.*, p. 253.
- 7 Paris Interview, J. Mason, July 3rd, 1985.
- 8 Paris interview, *ibid.*
- 9 Buis Interview, *op cit.*
- 10 See Gnesotto, *op cit.*, pp. 47-58.
- 11 Paris interview, J. Mason, July 5, 1985.
- 12 Gnesotto, "Le Pacifisme aux couleurs de la France," *op cit.*, pp 36-37.
- 13 Paris Interview, Mouvement de la Paix, July 1st, 1985.
- 14 Paris interview, *ibid.*
- 15 Gnesotto, *op cit.*, p. 28.
- 16 Paris Interviews, CODENE, June 10th and 12th, 1985.
- 17 Gnesotto, *op cit.*, pp. 61-67.
- 18 See Diane Johnstone's portrait of the Juquin campaign in *In These Times*, Nov.11-17, 1987, p. 11 and Le Monde, April 10 1987, p. 10.
- 19 Jacques Julliard, "Mitterrand between Socialism and the Republic," TELOS, No 55. Spring 1985, pp. 45-46.
- 20 See Viveret, Alternatives Non Violentes, *op cit.*, pp.29-32.
- 21 Patrick Viveret, "Comment nous avons resiste..," *Alternatives Non Violentes*, *op cit.*, pp. 29-32.
- 22 Paris interviews, CODENE & PSU, June 1985.
- 23 Paris Interviews, J. Mason, April 1985,

24 See Claude Bebon's restatement of this position in Alerte Atomique, op cit., pp. 47-49. See also Daniel Beuron and Guy Guyot, "La Paix des Pactes," Alerte Atomique, No. 65, Spring 1979, pp. 19-34.

25 Paris Interview, J. Mason, June 12th, 1985.

26 Nancy Leiber, op cit., p. 129.

27 Paris Interview, PSU activist, June 14th, 1985.

28 Paris follow up interview, August 1992.

29 See Chevènement's own defense of his refusal to support Mitterrand's war policy in the Gulf. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, Une certaine idée de la République m'amène à..., Albin Michel, Paris, 1992, pp. 87-139.

30 Patrick Viveret, "Paix et Liberté," Esprit, No 54, June 1981, pp. 42-43.

31 For a sobering look at "thirty-something" anti-americanism in Germany, see Harld Mueller's and Thomas Risse-Kappen's "Origins of Estrangement: The Peace Movement and the Changed Image of America in West Germany," which appeared in International Security, Vol 12, No 1, Summer 1987.

32 Viveret, Alternatives Non Violentes, op cit.

33 Gnesotto, Le Pacifisme aux couleurs de la France, op cit., p. 36.

34 I heard this not only from my informants in the non-communist peace movement but also from journalists at Le Nouvel Observateur and Libération. Paris interviews, J. Mason, April/May 1985.

35 For a French discussion of the new possibilities opened by the "emerging technologies" of the eighties, see François de Rose and Yves Boyer, Nouvelle technologies de défense de l'Europe, IFRI, Paris, 1985, pp. 3-15.

36 Freeman Dyson, "Reflections: Weapons and Hope," The New Yorker, Feb 13, 1984, pp. 79-87.

37 See Kolodziej, op cit. p. 91.

38 See Gilbert Girondeau, "Un Autre Développement," Alternatives Non Violentes, No. 41 Summer 1981, pp. 59-64.

39 See Hugo Sada, "Un Marché Tendu" and "La France face à ses Armes," in Armes: France 31ème Grand, published by Autrement, (Paris, Oct. 1985). I owe much of this argument to Mary Kaldor's Baroque Arsenal, Hill & Wang, New York 1981, but I heard echoes of this position from both members of CODENE and some French defense specialists in interviews done in 1985.

40 Martin, Warriors to Managers, op cit. p. 113.

41 Viveret begins to develop this argument in 1982 in Alternatives Non Violentes, op cit.

42 Viveret, "Paix et Liberté, 1982, op cit.

43 Le Fort, op cit., pp. 9-12.

44 Mellon, *Alternatives Non Violentes*, op cit.. See also, Mellon, Muller and Semelin, *La Dissuasion Civile*, op cit., pp. 9-17 & 45-67.

45 Dick Howard, "Interview with Patrick Viveret and Pierre Hassner: On French Foreign Policy," *TELOS*, No 55, Spring 1983, p. 234.

46 See Julia Trilling, "French Environmental Politics," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol No 5, No 1, 1981.

47 Paris Interviews, J. Mason, April 1985.

48 Paris Interviews, J. Mason, April 19th, 20th & 21st, 1985.

49 See James Jaspers, op cit.

50 See Roger Cans, "La France 'écolo': l'étrange alchimie des origines," *Le Monde*, June 10, 1992, p. 14.

51 See "Travillons Tous, Vivons Mieux, Gaspillons Moins: Les Verts contre le chômage et la dégradation sociale pour le pouvoir vivre," the programmatic statement adopted by the Interregional National Council of La Forge, February 1985, Les Verts, Paris, Spring 1985.

52 See Jane Jenson, "From Baba Cool to a Vote Utile: The Trajectory of the French Verts," *French Politics and Society*, Vol 7, No 4., Fall 1989, pp. 1-15.

53 See Jean-Louis Saux, "L'éternelle surprise électorale," *Le Monde*, June 12, 1992, p. 1.

54 See Jean-Marie Colombani, "Le PS hésite à attaquer de front les écologistes," *Le Monde*, January 29, 1993. pp. 1 & 6.

55 Jacques Isnard, *Le Monde*, 1992, op cit.

56 See *Alerte Atomique*, op cit.

57 See *Le Monde*, January 29, 1993, p. 6.

58 Carl Sagan, "Nuclear Winter and Climatic Catastrophe," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter, 1984, Vol 62, No 2, 1984, pp. 267 & 278.

59 See his Comments on the Schell's, *The Fate of the Earth*, Andre Glucksmann,, *La Force de Vertige*, Grasset, Paris, 1983.

60 Cited by Arato and Cohen, *TELOS* No 51, op cit., P. 165.

61 Viveret, "Paix et Démocratie" op cit..

62 See Carl Sagan and Paul Ehrlich et al, *The Cold and The Dark: The World after Nuclear War*, W. W. Norton, New York, 1984, p. 3.

63 See Sagan et al, op cit., pp. vii-xx. For the scientific response please see Stanley L. Thompson and Stephen H. Schneider, "Nuclear Winter Reappraised," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 64, No 5, Summer 1986, pp. 981-1005. For an example of the neo-conservative reaction to the "political abuse" of science by peace researchers, see Russel Seitz, "Nuclear Winter Melts Down," *The National Interest*, No 5, fall 1986, pp. 3-17.

64 Marie Jeanne Husset et al, special section, "Danger: L'Homme Bouleverse le Climat," Ca m'intéresse, No 89, July 1989, pp. 57-69.

65 Paris interviews, J. Mason, Summer 1986 and 1988.

66 Paris Interviews, August 1986 & 1988.

67 This is announced in the Forward by Lester Brown to the 1992 Edition of Worldwatch's The State of The World 1992, W.W. Norton, New York, 1992, p. xiii.

68 Michael Oppenheimer and Robert Boyle, Dead Heat: The Race Against the Greenhouse Effect, Basic Books, New York, 1990, pp. 2-3.

69 Bill Mc Kibben, The End of Nature, Random House, New York, 1989, pp. 31-35.

70 Jodi Jacobson, "Holding Back the Sea," Chapter 5, State of the World: 1990, Lester Brown, Editor, W.W. Norton, New York, 1990.

71 See Cynthia Pollock Shea, "Protecting the Ozone Layer," Chap 5, State of World, 1989, op cit, and W.K. Burke, "As the World Burns," In These Times, March 18, 1992 p. 13.

72 For recent discussions of the links between environmental deterioration and security issues, see the lead article, by Thomas Homer Down, Jeffrey Boutwell and George Rathjen, "Environmental Changer and Violent Conflict," Scientific American, Vol 268, No 2, February 1993, 38-48.

73 See Norman Meyers, "Environment and Security," Foreign Policy, No 74, Spring 1989, pp. 28-32. See also in the same issue, David A. Wirth, "Climate Chaos," pp. 3-22.

74 See Brice Lalonde, Ecologie le Pourvoir de Vivre: le projet des écologistes, Ecologie mensuel, Montargis, March 1981, pp. 5-10. For a more recent American statement of the challenge to contemporary industrial societies see, Lester Brown, "The New Era Unfolds," State of the World 1993, W.W. Norton, New York, 1993, pp. 3-21. For a right-wing response, please see Russell Seitz, "Global Warming: A War Against Fire," The National Interest, No 20, summer 1990, pp. 54-62.

75 See Kirkpatrick Sale, "Schism in Environmentalism," American Environmentalism: Readings in Conservation History, Roberick Mash, editor, Mc Graw Hill, New York 1990, pp. 289-93.

76 Stanley Aronowitz, "Seeing Green," Village Voice Literary Supplement, June 1984, P. 19.

XIII

Conclusion:

For much of the 1980's France slipped from our view as an important actor in the International security system. In contrast to the heady days in the 1960's when it seemed that De Gaulle was prepared to challenge American leadership on most international issues, Mitterrand and other French leaders in the 80's have spoken with much greater caution and sobriety¹. Indeed when they have spoken up at all it has mainly been in support of American policy initiatives as in 1983 when François Mitterrand made an strong appeal for German acceptance of the American Euromissile deployment before the West German Bundestag. While these French initiatives were appreciated at the time as bringing French policy into closer alignment with American foreign policy positions, such demonstrations of solidarity have now become so routine that they pass almost without notice.

Occasional disturbances, however, in the normal calm, usually having to do with some face saving assertion of French independence, invariably grab the American headlines. The Americans, for instance, worked themselves into a fine fury over the apparent French refusal in 1986 to allow American F-111's to fly over French air space on their way to their rendezvous over Mr. Quadaffi's presidential palace in Tripoli.

Only later did we learn that the Chirac government had refused permission to the Americans to file an official flight plan while turning a blind eye to the fact that the American planes passed over the Pyrenees on their way to the Mediterranean².

It would seem, then, that the wrinkles in the Franco-American relationship have been ironed out; the bad old days of Gaullist insubordination are behind us, and the French quietly resumed their place in the ranks of the Atlantic Alliance once Mitterrand had found a place somewhere near the top of George Bush's international phone-tree. Indeed, if anything, this new spirit of cooperation has been recently underlined by the recent French willingness to place their troops under American command in US led expedition against Iraq and US sponsored "peace making" mission to Somalia³. However, we should not allow the present mood of strategic collaboration to obscure the fact that during most of the post-war period France has played and continues to play an exceptional role in the American system of alliances.

Despite the modesty of French public pronouncements of late, and the relative calm in the Franco-American relationship which has taken France off the American nuisance list, the past decade has seen major French efforts to modernize her national nuclear forces; to maintain France's traditional military presence overseas in various third world postings, and to overcome her isolation in Western Europe by building up her bi-lateral and multi-lateral security ties with her European neighbors. While few of these initiatives have

generated much heat or lasting friction with Washington, it is worth pointing out that they do not depend to any great extent on the NATO framework or upon American participation either. Whatever their modesty, these policy initiatives should tell us that the French have certainly kept themselves busy even if they have also made it a point to keep themselves out of our way.

Consequentially we really ought to entertain the idea that the French in the 1980's have toned down their verbal posturing without scaling back their main policy objectives. These could be described as follows: to maintain and modernize their nuclear forces without subjecting them to international oversight or negotiation; to remain an independent competitor with both the Superpowers in a wide range of military and civilian high technologies; to defend their global presence, and to promote the organization of an independent European defense community around the pole of Franco-German cooperation. Perhaps the French also spoke more quietly in the eighties in part because over the past twenty years they have accumulated real assets both in terms of nuclear capabilities and security links to other nations. These assets were credible enough that they thought they now could speak for themselves. Their patient pursuit of a national nuclear capability meant that by the end of the eighties they could deliver hundreds of strategic warheads over military targets and population centers of the Soviet Union. French elites believed that this real capability made their claim to play

a strategic role independent of the Superpowers more credible than it was thirty years ago when General De Gaulle first asserted it.

At the close of the decade many members of the French political elite seemed to believe that their nuclear forces had attained a degree of strategic credibility that allowed them both to expand the mission they could expect those forces to perform from that of deterring attacks on the French national "sanctuary" to that of defending their "vital interests" in the integrity of Germany's eastern frontier. They seemed ready to supplement America's security guarantee to Germany with bi-lateral Franco-German arrangements and to provide, alongside the other European nuclear power, the United Kingdom, the nucleus for a European deterrent capability which could operate independently from the United States if need be. The willingness of French political and security elites to modernize their national strategic capabilities seemed to have paid off. Their readiness to expand its military mission seemed to represent a new and major factor in the European strategic equation⁴. Events since 1989, however, have conspired to strike hard at this new found self confidence. The French now find themselves with nuclear assets, but without a major adversary to deter, nor new strategic doctrines which can rationalize how and when they might possibly be used or against whom⁵.

If we think of the French response to the momentous events of the past three years, two images come immediately to mind:

stability and immobility. The strengths of the existing French defense consensus and of France's presidential institutions were evident in the winter of 1991 in the masterful campaign conducted by François Mitterrand to prepare French public opinion for France's active role in the American led war against Iraq - previously France's principal client in the Middle East⁶. He rallied French elites to support his realignment of French Middle Eastern policy on that of George Bush, and beat off challenges to the policy of alignment by his own defense minister, Jean Pierre Chevènement, and by other pashas of the French foreign policy establishment, including such notables as Claude Cheysson, Max Gallo, and Michel Jobert⁷. French elites rallied to their chief; closed ranks and turned en bloc to isolate and quash all dissenters and non-conformists. Whatever the insufficiencies of the French army on the ground or of the French strike aircraft in and around the Gulf, this political performance, at least, was an impressive demonstration of the "cohesion" of the French political class and of the strength of the institutional mechanisms for consensus building in Foreign policy area. It was a performance which seemed to confirm the enduring strength of the presidential regime of the Fifth republic by the head count of prominent intellectuals and party officials, "des brûlés," who now were no longer to be considered as "serious players" since they had stepped outside the elite consensus⁸.

By the Fall of 1992, following the confused French response to the August revolution in Moscow in 1991, the effec-

tive withdrawal of the American nuclear umbrella over Europe, and rising social discontent in the streets of Paris and the provinces, the image was somewhat different: it was one of political rigidity, if not of paralysis, at the top. In the French media, there was evidence of a deepening policy disagreement among political elites over the orientation of Mitterrand's European policy and the constitutional arrangements of the Fifth Republic. At the same time, mounting dissatisfaction with the leadership of M. Mitterrand and that of his prime minister, Edith Cresson, was to be seen in the streets. Madame Cresson was passive in the face of successive demonstrations by farmers, nurses, doctors, truck drivers, civil servants and others, while the President was seen as behind the curve in his responses to the nuclear disarmament initiatives of the Bush Administration as well as to the sudden breakup of the Soviet Union⁹.

These two competing images of political stability and policy immobility capture the difficulties inherent in the French policy consensus which carries with costs as well as benefits. We can quickly list some of the advantages for French elites of striving to maintain the existing consensus in place. Obviously it helps to promote elite cohesion which is useful for the pursuit of long-range technological projects with France's middling national resource base. At the same time, French persistence in maintaining national capabilities in the space, telecommunications, advanced electronics and nuclear technology fields, and her success in preserving force

projection capabilities in the form of expensive Aircraft carriers or overseas bases, has had the effect of preserving these capabilities and technological competencies for themselves, and for a future European Union defense entity whenever such should emerge. The disadvantages have to do with a good deal of policy rigidity in part because of the over-centralization of decision making responsibilities in the hands of the President and his staff, and in part because of the conservatism of French strategic orthodoxy.

Taken together, the rapid succession of events since 1989 within and without Europe have worked to heighten elite anxieties about France's future ability to retain diplomatic and political leverage. These anxieties are focused to a great extent on their uncertainty about the continued relevance of the nuclear strategy and strike force which they have inherited from De Gaulle. One indice of the strength of these anxieties is manifest in repeated attempts by President Mitterrand to assure French public opinion that France remains "presente dans le monde," and maintains "son rang" as a world power - a concern which may be reflected in Mitterrand's policy of sending thousands of French troops on UN peace making missions all over the globe.

While recent events have certainly done little to threaten France's basic national security interests, they have perhaps worked to diminish France's sense of herself as a strategic player within Europe and undermined France's capacity to continue to play the exceptional role and to enjoy the unique

advantages which she had in the post-war alliance system ¹⁰. The events in question are well known: First, the implosion of the communist bloc in 1989 and the unravelling of the Soviet Union from 1990 to 1991, has led to abrupt retreat of Soviet military power to the periphery of Eastern Europe and to the reunification of Germany. Second, the end of France's privileged relationship with the Iraqi regime as a result to the 1991 Gulf War, and the extension of Syrian hegemony over virtually all of Lebanon, have called into question France's claim to have both an independent Middle East policy and role as a strategic power in the region. Finally the end of the Superpower competition, the success of the American model of high-tech conventional warfare, (which realized the hopes of the Vietnam era for "an integrated battlefield"), and fears concerning Germany's rising influence within and without the EC, have eroded the political value of privileging the development of strategic nuclear weapons as a foundation to claiming world power rank. As the Russians or Ukrainians could now tell them, nuclear weapons are no longer enough to be in Dominic Moïsi's words, "a mini-superpower."

What these events signify is an end to the post-war system in which France had an exceptional role as a strategic "free rider" within the Western Alliance system. In brief, France was the only autonomous nuclear weapons state in Western Europe and benefited from the post-war division of Europe which left her with a diminished German neighbor who was both of manageable size and a reliable economic and diplomatic

partner as well. Finally France's real security frontier, the eastern border of West Germany, was guaranteed by American nuclear weapons and defended by the frontline troops of the NATO Armies. France was thus left as a free-agent within NATO who could benefit from the positive externalities of her German "glacis," while being left to pursue various prestige projects in the high technology field and world diplomacy.

Despite France's crushing defeat in WWII and record of collaboration with Hitler, France emerged from the World War with her diplomatic status of as a "great power" certified by her role in the four power occupation of Germany and, until 1990, of Berlin, and by her permanent seat on the UN Security Council. These strategic gains and this diplomatic role has been diminished by the events of the past three years¹¹. France's diplomatic "status" has been weakened by the end of the division of Germany and the restoration of full national sovereignty to her German neighbor. This has led in turn to a shift in the power balance within the European Community in Germany's favor which threatens to make the "Franco-German couple" even more unequal than it was already¹². This shift is also reflected in proposals to rearrange the distribution of seats on the UN Security council to accommodate Japan, German and the European Community at the expense of France and the United Kingdom.

Outside of Europe, the recent American victory in the Gulf War deflated both the image of the French arms industry and the credibility of France's claim to diplomatic and strategic

autonomy from the United States. This idea was put to the test during both the Lebanon crisis of 1983 and the Gulf crisis of 1990. In both cases France discovered that the "cupboard" was relatively "bare" in so far as French conventional military capabilities were concerned - especially in the areas of long-distance air and sealift capabilities¹³. Not only was France reduced to playing along as a dependent "junior partner" of their American superpower ally, but their capacity to "project force" overseas did even not measure up to that possessed by the UK. Not only were French analysts obliged to admit that an expeditionary force on the scale of Britain's intervention in the Falklands was beyond them, but also that British forces had played a greater military role during the Desert Storm campaign against Iraq. Outside of West Africa France retains the capacity to act militarily but only in a strategic context established by American decision makers and guaranteed by the presence of US armed forces - a point driven home not only during the Gulf War, but also with the UN sponsored, and American directed, military intervention in Somalia.

France's limited contribution and role during the Gulf War has led to dissatisfaction within the French military and their supporters on the right. French pilots, for instance, were mortified to find that they were assigned missions by the Allied Command in Riyadh which involved destroying the Iraqi bunkers where advanced French weapons systems were stocked - weapons systems which had been sold to France's Iraqi client but which were not yet available to France's own national for-

ces¹⁴. They were also disconcerted that French strike aircraft were restricted to flying daytime missions because of the French insistence on using its own national "night vision" system which would not enter into production until a year after the War ended¹⁵.

French ground troops were also perplexed that they did not have the heavy armour and artillery needed to play in the same league as American and British armor spearheads - 1a Division Daguet was left to take its light armored vehicles on an end run in the desert which finally led to nowhere rather than to Baghdad. Finally, French analysts and critics noted that France's dependance on a conscript army inhibited the effectiveness of the French conventional forces and greatly limited the numbers of trained troops ready and available for overseas deployment. The result was that France with an conscript army a third as big as the volunteer force of the United Kingdom could only deploy a third as many troops to the Iraqi theatre¹⁶. This has led to renewed calls by François Fillon and others for an end to conscription, and for the creation of a smaller, more powerful professional force which would be available for a "force projection" role outside of Europe¹⁷.

The budgetary priority given to nuclear weapons development has been possible only because of the continual sacrifice of the conventional armies in France. The greater capacity of the British forces to field significant conventional forces in both the Falklands and Gulf War was due in large measure to the faustian nuclear bargain that the British arrived at

with their American partner - allowing the British military to husband significant resources for both the Royal Navy and British air and land forces. This relative modesty and economy has paid off for the British in other ways as well. Britain received a contract for Tornado fighter bombers worth 7.5 billion dollars from the Saudis in early 1993 mainly on the strength of its conventional performance during the Gulf War.

Interestingly the relatively poor showing by French forces did not seem to provoke any significant political reaction either by French elites or public opinion. Rocard and Mitterrand enjoyed levels of support in public polls following the six week war in the Gulf which were just as high as those received by President Bush in the US and Prime Minister Major in the UK¹⁸. It seemed as though it was enough that France had acted to "maintain her rank" in order to keep public opinion at home satisfied.

During the 1980's France has sought to live up to public expectations and to maintain her diplomatic influence and position one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council by dedicating significant numbers of troops to UN Peace keeping missions. French forces are currently playing this "constabulary role" in Southern Lebanon (500 troops), Cambodia (1435 troops), and Croatia and Bosnia (4800 troops¹⁹). Finally, and perhaps paradoxically given French claims to diplomatic autonomy, France has participated twice in recent years in UN expeditionary forces under American command, sending a force of some 14,000 troops to join American, British

and Arab armies during operation Desert Storm in 1990, and another 4000 troops into Somalia in 1992. All in all, the financial and manpower costs of France's overseas commitments have continued to steadily rise throughout the late eighties and early nineties - placing additional pressures on her strategic budgets and programs.

At the same time, the current scare over the advanced state of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program and "Supergun" project, which threatened the security of both Iraq's Middle East neighbors and Europe itself, has raised issues about the spread of nuclear weapons and advanced conventional technologies. These concerns are creating a climate of international opinion which may limit France's ability to use (irresponsible, indiscriminate) arms sales overseas to subsidize the development of its high-technology weapons programs. This could in the long run undermine France's ability to remain competitive with the remaining Superpower in a wide range of high-technology fields.

Overall the Gulf war has revealed deficiencies in the performance of French troops and material which point up the costs of France's single minded pursuit of nuclear "assets" which has led French governments to privilege "strategic budgets" over everything else in the Defense spending programs - with the result that France's conventional forces were slowly starved of material and skilled personnel. Dissent against this situation by Army officers and right-wing deputies may help force a change in a nuclear consensus which

values elite solidarity even at the cost of ignoring the changing security landscape in which France must operate. Indeed, François Fillon, the RPR deputy who serves as the French equivalent to Les Aspin in the French National Assembly, recently told me that the party consensus over defense was now at an end²⁰.

More generally, the combined effect of these events has been to weaken elite confidence about France's "rank" in the world, setting off a frantic debate in the mainstream press about "le déchrochage de France." These recent insults to their self-image threaten more the French sense of their weight in the world than their basic security interests, but this may be enough to weaken the defense consensus which has served as a focus for the cohesion of the French political class. Furthermore by the end of the 1980's - following shifts from the political Left to the right and then back again in quick succession between 1986-1988 and a floodtide of scandals concerning party finances - the general public has reacted with increasing cynicism against the national political leadership in polls and showed increased rates of abstention in elections²¹. Rather than targeting simply the Socialists, this popular reaction has effected the official right wing opposition as well. The public had responded to the régime of "co-habitation" with a generalized but latent disaffection towards the French "political class" a whole²² - a disaffection which finally surfaced in an active and unmistakable manner in the summer of 1992.

For many reasons then, the French "national consensus" actually hid a great deal more policy "dissensus" than French spokesmen ever let on. This became visible after 1989 when the "European Turn" in French foreign policy failed to provide a coherent policy orientation in the rapidly changing security environment of post cold-war Europe. The French political establishment found out to its great surprise the extent of the erosion of its social base during the summer of 1992 when the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was challenged by political outsiders who received strong support from traditional "jacobin" constituencies in the general electorate.

Mitterrand, always equal to his nickname, "the Florentine," had originally called for the referendum in the Spring counting on strong public support and hoping to split the leadership of the Right²³. While the treaty easily passed in both the National Assembly and the Senate, the French referendum took on Community wide significance in the wake of the failure of Danish voters to ratify the Treaty in June 1992. Neither the Danish rejection of the Treaty, nor later Irish approval, could outweigh the significance of the French vote. France was the only major Community member which put the treaty up to a popular referendum. As the stakes involved in the French referendum continued to climb, so did the chances that maverick opposition leaders - the RPR's Phillippe Seguin and Jacques Pasqua and Jean Marie Le Pen of the National Front on the Right, and Jean Pierre Chevènement of the former CERES Socialists and George Marchais of PCF from the Left - would

take the opportunity to turn the treaty vote into referendum on Mitterrand's government as well as his European policy²⁴. Many ordinary voters followed their lead. As one local influential in Montpellier remarked to me last summer: "Well, since they finally bothered to ask my opinion about something, I'm damned well going to give it - and vote no."


The unexpected intra-elite fight over the Maastricht treaty opened a long overdue debate over the meaning of "European integration," which had always received significant support in popular polls but never really had been the subject of a popular debate in France²⁵. By 1992 the rush toward European Union - the main policy direction of the Mitterrand Presidency - had finally triggered a strong popular reaction among nationalist segments of French public opinion as well as among nationalist notables in the political elite. This revolt combined elements of a populist reaction against the monopoly over political debate by the Parisian media and policy elites, (Julliard's "Superelite"), and a "Jacobin" statist revolt of the political extremes against the center. The ratification debate resulted in sharp attacks against the pro-european, leadership of the parliamentary Right and Left which put into question not only "European integration", but also the liberal pro-market orientation which lay behind the policy of transferring important powers of the French nation state to some super-european confederal entity.

In September 1992, the Maastricht treaty vote did finally pass by majority vote, but only narrowly with 51.05 % in favor

to 48.95 % against. The vote was won by President François Mitterrand only with the last-minute intervention of major figures of the Parliamentary Right - Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Raymond Barre and Jacques Chirac - who did manage to rally a thin majority of their right-wing followers in August. In many respects, the fact that the anti-Maastricht vote cut across the official left/right divide and rallied defenders of the prerogatives of the nation state from all corners may mark the opening of a new period of open policy competition and the end of the elite settlement which underlay the consensus politics of the past several decades.

In any event, it certainly marks the emergence of a new issue cleavage between pro and anti Europeans, which may lead to a realignment of French elites and a rearrangement of the French political landscape. Figure 13-1. presents my idea of what this future realignment might look like. It locates different elite and "counter-elite" groups along two axis: the first horizontal line showing the divisions between pro community and nationalist forces, and the second vertical line showing the division between "statist jacobins" of the left and right and the liberal pro-market orientation increasingly shared by centrist Socialist and moderate conservative advocates of greater French integration into the European Union.

The Maastricht vote also revealed the depth of the social divide between the political class as a whole and "le français moyen," the ordinary "Frenchman and woman." Analysts of the Treaty vote noted two major cleavages in the social pattern



in voting, both of which seem to lend support to the arguments advanced earlier by Julliard and other democratic critics of the Mitterrand years. First of all, as reported in *L'Express* there was a major class split in the voting which was expressive of the split in future time orientations between members of Socialist France's modernizing elite and the more traditional and insecure elements of the working class²⁶. In general urban blue collar workers and lower level, white collar employees, joined French peasants in voting massively against the treaty, while the managerial and professional classes supported it overwhelmingly. This meant that a majority of the PS working class and lower middle class clienteles voted against the party and the Government, bringing to life as it were, Julliard's portrait of the social and cultural split between "l'élite rose," and "le peuple de la Gauche." Further, the vote showed a split between the old jacobin core constituencies of the nation state in central France and the "peripheral regions," - regions such as Brittany, Alsace-Lorraine, and Languedoc-Roussillon on the Mediterranean coast - whose attachment to Republican cause and French central state has often been contested, and who are now being drawn into close association with neighboring regions in adjacent European Countries²⁷.

This regional cleavage suggests the possibility for a nationalist reaction against the leaderships of the very parties, the RPR and the PS, who have fought to claim De Gaulle's nationalist legacy. Seen in combination with the

social class split mentioned above, it suggests strongly that the new pro Community/ anti-European split could bring more than simply another reshuffling of the political cards held by various elite players. Indeed, it could translate into political "dissensus" at the base of French society as well as at its summits.

1 I owe this perspective to Anton De Porte. See his introduction to LePrestre's French Security Policy in A Disarming World, op cit., p. 2.

2 Paris Interview, J. Mason, IFRI, August 1988.

3 For a skeptical view of France new status as a "subaltern" power, please see Alain Joxe, "Humanisme et empires," Le Monde Diplomatique, op cit., p.6.

4 For popular presentations of this policy by François Mitterrand himself, see "Lettre à tous les Français.." Libération, op cit. and "Mon Projet - Europe, environnement: un entretien avec le Président de la République," Le Nouvel Observateur, No 1290, July 27, 1989, pp. 18-22.

5 See Lucien Poirier, Stratégie No 53. op cit.

6 See Elisabeth Dupoirier, "De la Crise à la Guerre du Golf: Un exemple de mobilisation de l'opinion," in Duhamel and Jaffré, SOFRES 1992, op cit., pp. 125-144.

7 Dupoirier, op cit., pp. 139-41.

8 This follows from a conversation with a saddened Régis Debray at NYU in May 1992 who felt himself to have been singed as well by his opposition to the Gulf War.

9 See Olivier Duhamel and Jérôme Jaffré, "Edith Cresson à Matignon: la confection d'une impopularité," in Duhamel et Joffré, SOFRES 1992, op cit., pp. 109-123.

10 See Stanley Hoffmann, "La France dans le nouvel ordre européen," Politique étrangère, IFRI, No 3 1990, pp. 503-512.

11 See Daniel Vernet, "France in a New Europe," The National Interest, No 29, Fall 1992, pp. 31-33.

12 For an idea of how unequal, unequal can really be, see Andrei Markovits and Simon Reich, "The New Face of Germany: Gramsci, Neo-realism and Hegemony, Harvard Center for European Studies, Working Paper Series No 28, Spring 1992, pp. 3-13 & 19-30.

13 Paris interview, J. Mason, May 1985.

14 Paris Interviews, J. Mason, August 1992. See also the special issue of Le Point, "La Guerre Jusqu'ou?" No 957, January 27, 1991, pp. 19-20 & 24-27.

15 See Alexis Seydoux, "Les aspects militaires de la guerre du Golfe," Thierry de Montbrial, editor, Ramses 92: Le monde et son évolution, IFRI/Dunod, Paris, 1992, p. 118.

16 The British deployed 35,000 men, including an armored division from Germany - The French deployed about 14,000 including support troops and naval personnel.

17 My conversation with Fillon, New York, November 1991.

18 See Dupoirier, SOFRES 1992, op cit., p. 132.

19 See Alain Joxe, op cit.

20 I had a conversation with Fillon at the Columbia Conference "The New France/The New Europe" in November 1991.

21 See Laurent Joffrin, "Réflexions sur l'archaïsme française," in L'état de l'opinion 1992, edited by Olivier Duhamel and Jérôme Jaffré, SOFRES/Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1992, pp. 27-36.

22 Joffrin, op cit., pp. 32-35.

23 See Jean Imbert, "Maastricht sur le fil du rasoir," Le Point, No 1041, September 4, 1992, pp. 23-25.

24 See Jean François Kahn, "Les implications politiques du référendum," L'Evenement du Jeudi, No 410, September 10, 1992, p. 22.

25 See Gérard Mermet, Francoscopie 1991, Librairie Larousse, Paris, 1991, pp. 234-241. See also, Pierre Haski, "Un septennat placé sous le signe d'Europe," Cordellier, L'Etat de La France 1992, op cit., pp. 595-98.

26 Olivier Duhamel "Premières Leçons," L'Express, September 25, 1992. p.15. See also in the same issue "Les deux France" which gives a detailed breakdown of the vote by occupation, age and gender, pp 12-14.

27 See Emmanuel Todd, "Le grand retour de la France jacobine," Le Nouvel Observateur, September 24, 1992, pp. 30-31.

Interviews with Questionnaire

Journalists

- 1) Jacques Juillard, Le Nouvel Observateur, Rocardian sympathizer.
- 2) François Schlosser, Le Nouvel Observateur, Socialist sympathizer.
- 3) Guy Sitbon, Le Nouvel Observateur, Socialist sympathizer.
- 4) Josette Alia, Le Nouvel Observateur, Rocardian sympathizer.
- 5) Pascal Crop, L'Evennement du Jeudi, Socialist sympathizer.
- 6) Brigitte Rossigneaux, Le Carnard Enchaîné, Extreme Left sympathizer.
- 7) Carlos de Sa Rego, Libération, Extreme Left sympathizer.
- 8) Paul Marie de la Gorce, Le Monde Diplomatique, Independent Gaullist.
- 9) J. F. Ravery, L'Humanité, PCF activist.

without Questionnaire

- 1) Thierry Garcin, Radio France, independent opposition.
- 2) Jean Daniel, editor Le Nouvel Observateur, Socialist sympathizer.
- 3) France Olivier Gisbert, editor Le Figaro, independent opposition.
- 4) Michel Tatu, Moscow Correspondant, Le Monde.

Military Officers retired

- 1) General Etienne Copel, L'Armée de l'Aire ret., independent opposition.
- 2) General Le Bourne, L'Armée de Terre ret., FEDN, independent opposition.
- 3) Captain Bondil, L'Armée de Terre ret., RPR sympathizer.
- 4) General Pierre Gallois, L'Armée de l'Air, ret., l'Institut International de Géo-Politique, Independent opposition.
- 5) General George Buis, L'Armée de Terre ret., columnist Le Nouvel Observateur, FEDN, independent Gaullist/ Socialist sympathizer.
- 6) Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti, l'Armée de Mer ret. independent left.
- 7) Col. Jean Paucot, l'Armée de Terre ret, director IFP, socialist party activist.
- 8) Col. Walter Schutze, Bundeswehr, SPD sympathizer, IFRI analyst.

without questionnaire

- 1) General Lucien Poirier, L'Armée de Terre, FEDN. independent opposition.
- 2) Col. Bertier, L'Armée de Terre, IHEDN. active duty officer.
- 4) Col. Przysiek, L'Armée de Terre, Socialist party activist.
- 5) Capt. J. Johnstone, US Army liaison, US Embassy.

Civilian Defense Analysts

- 1) Nicole Genesoto, IFRI, independent "Liberal."
- 2) Dominique Moïsi, Ass't Director, IFRI, "social democrat"
- 3) Pierre Lellouche, Ass't Director, IFRI, RPR
- 4) Jean Klien, IFRI analyst, Catholic "Christian Democrat."

- 5) Dominique David, Secretary General,. FEDN. Socialist sympathizer.
- 6) André Brigot, Ass't Secretary, FEDN, Left Catholic, Socialist sympathizer.
- 7) Phillippe Coste, CAP, Centre des Analyses et Prévisions, Quai D'Orsay, independent opposition.
- 8) Olivier Roy, CAP analyst, Esprit, socialist sympathizer.
- 9) Pascal Boniface, INSED analyst, socialist party activist
- 10) Hugo Sada, INSED analyst, socialist party activist.
- 11) Phillippe Rohmer, INSED analyst, socialist party activist.
- 12) Alain Joxe, Director CIRPES, independent Leftist associated with CIRPES.
- 13) Janet Finkelstein, CIRPES analyst, CERES activist.
- 14) Pierre Hassner, Director of research, L'EHESS, Rocardian sympathizer.
- 15) G. Vernodort, Ministry of Research staff, Extreme Right FN.

without Questionnaire

- 1) Michel Aurillac, Director Club 89, RPR.
- 2) Bruno La Massure, UDF.
- 3) François Audigier, Secretary General, Club 89.
- 4) David Berger, Political Section, US Embassy. Paris.

Socialist Officials and activists

- 1) Jean François Bureau, Cabinet staff. Minister of Defense, Charles Hernu, socialist party activist, Mitterrandist.
- 2) J. F. Heisbourgh, Cabinet staff, Minister of Defense, Charles Hernu, Socialist party activist, Mitterrandist.
- 3) J. P. Bernhien, Socialist party activist. Maurroy current.
- 4) Gerard Fuchs, Socialist party Activist, Rocardian current.
- 5) J.P. Cot. Deputy European Parliament, Rocardian current.
- 6) Alain Carton, National Assembly, Socialist Staffer, CERES activist.
- 7) J. Y. Autexier, Socialist Deputy, Nat. Ass., CERES activist.
- 8) Didier Motchance, Deputy European Parliament, CERES activist.

without questionnaire

- 1) Jacques Hutzinger, Socialist Party Official, Mitterrandist
- 2) Regis Debray, Presidential Staff, Elysée Palace, Mitterrandist.
- 3) Hubert Vedrine, Presidential Staff, Elysée Palace, Mitterrandist.
- 4) G. Domenach Chich, Socialist Party Official, Mitterrandist.
- 5) Helene Goldet, CFDT Official, CERES activist.

Rocardian "Anti-totalitarian, Second Left Intellectuals

- 1) Paul Thibaud, Editor of ESPRIIT, Rocardian sympathizer.
- 2) Olivier Mongin, Ass't Editor of ESPRIIT, Rocardian sympathizer.
- 3) Pierre Rosenvallon, Director of research, L'EHESS, Director Fondation Saint Simon, Rocardian sympathizer.

- 4) André Burgyere, Director of research, L'EHESS, columnist Le Nouvel Observateur, Rocardian sympathizer.
- 5) Michel Winnock, Editions du Seuil, Rocardian sympathizer.
- 6) J.F Rambeau, Socialist activist, Rocardian sympathizer.
- 7) Patrick Vivret, Editor Intervention, Rocardian sympathizer associated with CODENE.
- 8) Claude Le Fort, Director of research, L'EHESS, independent left intellectual, former editor of LIBRE.
- 9) Cornelius Castoriadis, Director of research, L'EHESS, independent left intellectual, former editor of LIBRE.
- 10) Dominique Pignon, Director of Research CNRS, former editor Les Temps Modernes.

without questionnaire

- 1) Jean Marie Domenach, former editor ESPRIT, director of CREA Ecole Polytechnique.
- 2) Gilles Batillon, researcher ESPRIT, Rocardian sympathizer, anti-Sandinista activist.
- 3) Pierre Nora, Editor Le Debat, Rocardian sympathizer.

PCF

- 1) Daniel Cierra, Mouvement de la Paix, Communist Activist.
- 2) Jean Ridoux, Mouvement de la Paix, Communist Activist.
- 3) Maurice Langion, Mouvement de la Paix, Communist Activist.
- 4) François Poirier, Communist Party member active with dissident Rencontres Communist and Politique Aujourd'hui.
- 5) Maurice Goldring, former Communist, active with dissident Rencontres Communist and Politique Aujourd'hui.

without questionnaire

- 1) George Bayot, PCF Official charged as Defense spokesperson.
- 2) Phillippe Noirot, former Communist, editor of Politique Aujourd'hui.

Peace Researchers and PSU Activists

- 1) Claude Bourdet, CODENE spokesperson
- 2) Slyvie Montrant, CODENE staff person
- 3) Chretien Mellon, Catholic activist, editor of Alternatives Non Violentes, CODENE activist.
- 4) Bernard Ravel, PSU official active with CODENE.
- 5) Bernard Dreano, CODENE spokesperson, active with the Front de la Gauche Alternative.
- 6) Yves Le Noir, CODENE member, pacifist activist.
- 7) Phillippe Tesson, CODENE activist
- 8) François Jilquin, Mouvement de la Paix, independent leftist.
- 9) J.D. Peynaud, CODENE activist.
- 10) H. Meyraud, Extreme Left activist.

without questionnaire

- 1) Benedict Vallier. Anti-nuclear analyst.
- 2) Diane Johnstone, European correspondnat, In These Times.
- 3) Joyion Howorth, END political analyst.

total interviews with questionnaire: 65.
total interviews without questionnaire: 25.

Appendix No 2 Senior Investigator
Questionnaire on the development of public opinion
concerning National Defense

This questionnaire is part of a research project directed by Prof. Bogdan Denitch of the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. All responses to the first part will be held in confidence, and those to the second and third part will remain anonymous

Part I: Personal "background"

1. Do you identify with a political "family?"
 - a. Do you have an affiliation with a political organization?
if yes?
 1. Do you consider yourself to be a political activists?
 2. Are you an officer in your organization?
 3. Have you ever stood for public office?
if no?
 1. Were you ever a party member?
 2. Have you ever been an activist in a political or social movement?
 - b. Are you a member of a group association?
2. Have you undertaken university level studies?
 - a. Did you attend a University or a "Grande Ecole?"
 - b. What degree did you receive?
 - c. Did you study in Paris or elsewhere in France?
 - d. Have you ever studied abroad?
3. Do you read or speak any foreign languages?
 - a. Do you read regularly any foreign newspapers or newsweeklies?
 - b. Have you travelled much abroad? Outside of Western Europe?
4. At what point in your life did you become politically active?
 - a. What events do you think were the most important for the development for your political beliefs?
 - b. Do you feel that your beliefs have changed much over the past ten years?
 - c. Would you say that you have been personally touched by the so-called "anti-totalitarian" movement?
 - d. Do you think that Marxism has been an important reference point for your own political thinking? Is it still important?
5. What is your occupation?
 - a. Do you have managerial responsibilities?
 - b. Are you a union member?
 - c. Have you worked in the private or public sector??
6. Do you have any publications?
 - a. Have you ever written for a party publication?
 - b. Have you ever had editorial responsibilities for a newspaper or journal?

Thank you for your co-operation. Your responses will be kept in the strictest confidence.

Part 2: The "informed" public and National Defense.

389

Your answers will remain anonymous. Please don't hesitate to modify the question asked if you think that it is off target.

1. In your opinion which three personalities (not necessarily contemporaries) have had the most influence on the opinions of the "informed" public for the questions of defense, strategy and geo-politics? (by informed public we persons who don't have direct access to governmental policy making but who do have other sources of information that the mass media).
 - a. What are your ideas concerning the three individuals who have the most impact on governmental decision-making in these areas in France today?
 - b. Who are the three individuals who you consider to be the most influential in this area for the opinion-makers in the political "family" with which you identify?
2. If a foreign journalist asked you to name three books essential to understanding the framework of the debate concerning national defense issues in France today, what books would you recommend?
3. Which three research institutes have, in your opinion, the most influence on the informed public in the area of defense and strategic issues?
 - a. And which three reviews or journals?
4. Which newspapers, and which defense journalists, seem to you to be the best informed in this area in France today?
5. How do you inform yourself about developments in this area ?
 - a. How do you inform yourself about Soviet and American policy?
 - b. How important are foreign sources of information?
 - c. Do you rely more on the Press or personal contacts to stay informed?
6. Are you satisfied with your personal access to information concerning French security policy ?
 - a. Do you think the general public in France is informed in a satisfactory manner concerning national defense policy?
 - b. Are you satisfied with the level and character of the public debate in France on defense issues?

Third Part: Defense Issues which France will face in the years ahead.

1. In your opinion, how does France rank as a power in the world today?
 - a. What are factors which you consider important to determining France's rank as a power in the world?
 - b. How do you think France will rank twenty years from now?
 - c. Do you think the "average Frenchman" shares your estimate of France's position?
2. What do you consider to be the major challenge to the security and independence of France in the years ahead?
 - a. Is this challenge also a "threat"? Are there several sources of danger? From whom does the threat come?
 - b. Lets do a game, if you please. Rate the following "threats" often cited in the French media in terms of your estimate of their probability on a scale of 0 to 5. If you wish to give your estimate of their credibility or seriousness, please do so, after having assigned them an numerical value.
 1. The threat of a military attack directly against France herself.
 2. An international terrorist campaign seeking to destabilize French political institutions.
 3. French inability to match foreign competition in the field of high-technology?
 4. The erosion of France's competitive position in the world market?
 5. The loss of political sovereignty to centers of decision-making outside of France?

- c. Do you believe that the "average Frenchman" shares more or less the same perception concerning outside threats as you? ³⁹⁰
3. In the recent past, certain students of France have noticed a general French tendency to treat the two Super-powers as equivalent dangers, that is, to treat them as equal but distinct "threats" to the independence and security of France. Do you think that this observation is true? Do you personally agree with the attitude just described? Do you think that this tendency has undergone a major modification over the course of the past ten years?
4. Let's do another exercise. I will ask you to comment on three possible policy approaches. Which of the three seems to you the best policy approach to follow in the coming years (you are not obliged to decide between the three. If you like you may combine them any way you wish, or propose an alternative to all three)?
- a. Reinforce the links between France and the Atlantic Alliance, and increase the level of military co-operation between France and her NATO partners.
 - b. Commit France completely to the project of building a European Defense Community, centered on Franco-German cooperation, and more autonomous from The United States.
 - c. Continue a national policy based on the preservation of France nuclear deterrent., and seek a greater degree of independence vis a vis the two Super-power blocs.
5. What do you think of the following European countries as potential partners for France in the construction of a European Defense Community in terms of their importance, availability and reliability?
- | | |
|-------|----------------------------|
| FRG | The Bene-lux Countries |
| U.K. | The Scandinavian Countries |
| Italy | The Neutrals |
| Spain | Yugoslavia |
6. In your opinion what are the major points of tension between France and the United States today?
7. Do you have much faith in the "credibility" of France's national deterrent?
- a. Do you think that the credibility of the French nuclear force will be eroded or enhanced over the next ten years?
 - b. Do you think that nuclear deterrence is as effective against conventional threats as it is against nuclear ones
 - c. Have your personal opinions on this matter undergone any major changes over the past ten years.
8. In your opinion are there any major differences in the approach of governments of the left or right to the problems of national defense?
- a. Do you think there are any important differences between them in terms of the competence of the management of national defense issues?
9. In your opinion what is the state of "l'esprit de defense" [the national defence spirit] in France today?
10. From your point of view, what is the significance of the rise of "pacifist" movements elsewhere in Western Europe?
11. Do you think that French attitudes toward the Third World have changed much over the past few years?
- a. What do you think is at stake for France in the Third World today?

.U.N.Y. Questionnaire

her Monsieur,

J'ai l'honneur de demander votre participation dans un sondage de l'opinion "resenseigne" en France. Ce sondage fait partie d'une etude, conduit par des chercheurs americains de la Faculte de Sciences Humaines du Centre d'Etudes Supeurieurs de l'Universite de la Ville de New York. L'objet de ce projet de recherche de voir quels sont les effets de cinqu ans du gouvernement socialist sur l'evolution du consensus entres les elites francaises via a vis le "fait nucleaire," et sa place dans la politique de la defense nationale et etrangere de la France.

Votre participation consisterait de donner vos reponses orales a series de questions au cours d'un entretien qui durerait nomalement une heure et demi. Au cours de cet entretien nous allons vous poser des questions touchant sur trois domaines: votre propre formation politique et culturelle; vos impressions concernant les "voix" les plus importantes pour la formation de l'opinion public, dit "renseigne," dans les domaines de la strategie et la politique etrangere, et finalement, vos propres impressions sur l'evolution de la politique francaise au cours des dernieres dix annaes, telle qu'elle est, et telle que vous la souhaitez etre dans l'avenir.

Toutes vos reponses au premiere partie de cet entretien seront tenues confidentielles, et les reponses aux autres parties resteront anonymes. Veuillez-vous participier a ce projet de recherche sous les conditions decrites la haut? Accepterez vous que cet entretiens soit enregistre par magnetoscope ?
Merci pour votre amiable attention a cette demande.

M. ou Mme _____

Ayant compris le caractere de cet entretien, j'accepte d'y participer sous les conditions specifiees.

sous-signé le _____ 19__
a _____

Bibliography

Books

1. Alexandre Adler et al, L'URSS et Nous, Editions Sociales, Paris, 1978.
2. Michel Albert, Le Pari Français, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1982.
3. Michel Albert, Capitalisme contre Capitalisme, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1991.
4. Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, Powers of Theory, Capitalism, the State and Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986
5. Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, Humanities Press, New York, 1974.
6. Jean Pierre Angelier, Le nucléaire, Editions la Découverte/ Maspero, Paris, 1983.
7. Horst Arheldt, Pour Une Défense Non Suicidaire en Europe, Editions de la Découverte, Paris, 1985.
8. Raymond Aron, Clausewitz: Philosopher of War, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1985.
9. Jacques Attali, Lignes d'horizon, Fayard, Paris, 1990.
10. Schlomo Avineri editor, Karl Marx on Colonialism & Modernization, Doubleday & Co., Garden City, 1969.
11. Richard Barnet, The Alliance: America-Europe-Japan, Makers of the Postwar World, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1983.
12. Enrique Baron, Europe 92: Le Rapt du Futur, Editions Bernard Coutaz, Arles, 1989.
13. Allen Barton, Bogdan Denitch, and Charles Kadushin editors, Opinion-Making Elites in Yugoslavia, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1973.
14. André Beaufre, Introduction à la stratégie, Economica, Paris, 1985.
15. D.S. Bell, The French Socialist Party, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988.
16. Nicole Bernheim, Les Années Reagan, Stock, Paris, 1984.
17. Richard Bernstein, Fragile Glory: A Portrait of France and the French, Alfred Knopf, New York, 1990.
18. Michel Bilis, Socialistes et Pacifistes: 1933-1939, Editions Syros, Paris, 1979.
19. Pierre Birnbaum, La logique de l'Etat, Fayard, Paris 1982.
20. Pierre Birnbaum, La classe dirigeante française, Presses Universitaire de France, Paris, 1978.
21. Pierre Birnbaum, Les Sommets de l'Etat, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1977.
22. Pierre Birnbaum, Les Elites Socialistes au Pouvoir, Presses Universitaires de France, 1985.
23. Bernard Boëne, L'Amérique entre Atlantique et Pacifique, Fondation pour les Etudes de la Défense Nationale, Paris, 1987.
24. Philip Boffey, William Broad, Leslie Gelb, Claiming the Heavens, Times Books, New York, 1988.
25. Pascal Boniface, edit. L'Année Strategique, Editions Maritimes, Paris, 1985.
26. Pascal Boniface, L'Armée, Enquête sur 300000 Soldats Meconnus, Edition.1, Paris 1990.
27. Dominique Borne, Histoire de la Société Française depuis 1945, Armand Colin, Paris, 1988.
28. Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1977.

29. Pierre Bourdieu, Les héritiers: les étudiants et la culture, Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1964.
30. Pierre Bourdieu, La reproduction, Editions de Minuit, Paris, Paris, 1970.
31. Pierre Bourdieu, La Noblesse d'Etat, Editions de Minuit, Paris 1989.
32. Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, War Without Weapons: Non Violence in National Defense, Shocken Books, New York, 1975.
33. Yves Boyer, Pierre Lellouche and John Roper, Pour Une Nouvelle Entente Cordiale, IFRI/Masson, Paris 1988.
34. Frédéric Bozo, La France et L'OTAN: de la guerre froide au nouvel order européen, Masson, Paris, 1991.
35. André Brigot and Dominique David, Le Désir D'Europe: l'introuvable défense commune, Fondation pour les Etudes De Défense Nationale, Paris, 1980
36. Lester Brown, The State of the World 1990: A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, W. W. Norton, New York, 1990.
37. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years, Random House, New York, 1990.
38. David Ca Beyond American Hegemony, Basic Books, New York, 1987.
39. Corneliu toriadis, Devant la Guerre: Les réalités, Fayard, Paris, 1981.
40. Jean Pi s Chévenement, Une certain idée de la République m'amène à.., Albin Michel, Paris, 1992.
41. Phillip Cerny, The Politics of Grandeur, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980.
42. Phillip Cerny, The Changing Architecture of Politics, SAGE Publications, New York, 1990.
43. George A. Coddling, Jr. & William Safran, Ideology and Politics, The Socialist Party of France, Westview Press, Boulder, 1979.
44. Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, On Democracy: Towards a Transformation of American Society, Penguin Books, New York, 1983.
45. Sammi Cohen, La Monarchie Nucléaire, Hachette, Paris 1984.
47. Stephen S. Cohen, Modern Capitalist Planning: The French Model, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1977.
48. Sophie Coignard & Jean François Lacan, La République Bananière, Pierre Belfond, Paris, 1989.
49. Sophie Coignard & Alexandre Wickham, La Nomenclatura Française, Pierre Belfond, Paris, 1988.
50. Général Copel, Vaincre la Guerre, Lieu Commun, Paris, 1984.
51. Serge Cordellier, L'Etat De La France 1992, Editions de la Découverte, Paris, 1992.
52. André Corvisier, Armies and Societies in Europe: 1494 -1789, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1979.
53. Felix Damette & Jacques Scheibling, Pour une Strategie autogestionnaire, Editions Sociales, Paris, 1979.
54. Dominique David, La Force D'Action Rapide En Europe: Le Dire des Armes, Institut de Polémologie, Fondation Pour Les Etudes De Défense Nationale, Paris, 1984.
55. Dominique David, edit., La Politique de Défense de la France: Textes et Documents, Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense Nationale, Paris, 1989.
56. Dominique David, Conflits, Puissances et Stratégies en Europe: le Degel d'un Continent, Bruylant, Brussels, 1992.
57. Régis Debray, Le pouvoir intellectuel en France, Editions Ramsay, Paris, 1979.

58. Régis Debray, Les Empires contre L'Europe, Gallimard, Paris 1985.
59. Paul Marie de la Gorce, La Guerre et l'Atome, Editions Plon, Paris, 1985.
60. Yann de l'Ecotais, Naissance d'une Nation, Grasset, Paris, 1990.
61. Bogdan Denitch, edit., Democratic Socialism, Allenheld & Osun, Montclair, 1981.
62. Bogdan Denitch, After the Flood: World Politics and Democracy in the Wake of Communism, Wesleyan University Press, Hanover, 1992.
63. Thierry de Montbrial, La Revanche de l'Histoire, Commentaire Juillard, Paris, 1985.
64. Anton De Porte, Europe between the Superpowers, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1988.
65. François de Rose, La France et la Défense de l'Europe, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1976.
66. François de Rose, Nouvelles technologies et défense de l'Europe, IFRI, Paris 1985.
67. David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, An Ocean Apart: the Relationship Between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century, Random House, New York, 1988.
68. Olivier Duhamel, La Gauche et la Vième République, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1980.
69. Olivier Duhamel et al, SOFRES Opinion Publique 1984: Enquêtes et commentaires, Editions Gallimard, Paris, 1984.
70. Olivier Duhamel et al, SOFRES Opinion Publique 1985, Editions Gallimard, Paris, 1985
71. Olivier Duhamel et al, SOFRES L'Etat De L'Opinion: Clés pour 1987, Editions Du Seuil, Paris, 1987.
72. Olivier Duhamel and Jérôme Jaffré, SOFRES L'Etat De L'Opinion 1992, Editions du Seuil, Paris 1992.
73. Albert du Roy & Robert Schneider, Le Roman de la Rose: D'Epinay à l'Elysée, l'aventure des socialistes, Editions du Seuil, Paris 1982.
74. Maurice Duverger, La Monarchie Republicaine, Editions Laffont, Paris 1974.
75. Henry Ehrman and Martin Schain, Politics in France, Harper Collins Publishers, New York, 1992.
76. Pierre Favier & Michel Martin Roland, La Décennie Mitterrand : Les ruptures, Vol. 1, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1990.
77. Kevin Featherstone, Socialist Parties and European Integration: A comparative history, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1988.
78. Luc Ferry & Alain Renaut, La Pensée 68, Gallimard, Paris, 1988.
79. Janet Finkelstein, Vers Une Nouvelle Doctrine de l'OTAN Aux Etats Unis, Fondation Pour Les Etudes De Défense Nationale, Paris, Paris, 1976.
80. Alain Finkielkraut, La défaite de la Pensée, Gallimard, Paris, 1987.
81. Andre Fontaine and Pierre Li, Sortir de l'Hexagonie, Stock, Paris 1984.
82. André Fontaine, L'un sans l'autre, Fayard, Paris, 1991.
83. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, St. Martin's, New York, 1982.
84. Lawrence Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, Macmillian, London, 1980.
85. François Furet, Penser la Révolution française, Gallimard, Paris, 1978.
86. François Furet, Jacques Juillard, Pierre Rosanvallon, La république du centre, Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1988.
87. Edgar S. Furniss Jr. De Gaulle and The French Army, The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1964.

88. Pierre Gallois, L'Adieu aux armées, Albin Michel, Paris, 1976.
89. François Géré, Les Lauriers Incertains: Stratégie & Politique Militaire des Etats-Unis - 1980/2000, Fondation pour les Etudes de la Défense Nationale, 1991.
90. Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, University of California Press, Berkley, 1985.
91. Anthony Giddens, Social Theory and Modern Sociology, Stamford University Press, Stamford, 1987.
92. Robert Gilpin, France in the Age of the Scientific State, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1968.
93. André Glucksmann, La Cuisinière et le Mangeur d'hommes, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1975.
94. André Glucksmann, La Discours de la Guerre, Grasset, Paris 1979.
95. André Glucksmann, La Force du Vertige, Grasset, Paris, 1983.
96. Pierre Goubert, The Ancien Régime: French Society, 1800 -1750, Harper & Row, New York, 1969.
97. Jacqueline Grapin, Forteresse America, Grasset, Paris, 1984.
98. Groupe X-Défense, Les Défenses Anti-Missiles: La France et l'Europe, Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense nationale, Paris, 1986.
99. Groupe X-Défense, La Paix Nucléaire en Question, Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense Nationale, Paris, 1989.
100. Alfred Grosser, Les Occidentaux, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1982.
101. Alfred Grosser, Affaires Exterieures, Flammarion, Paris, 1984.
102. Jean Guisnel, Les généraux: enquête sur le pouvoir militaire en France, La Découverte Enquêtes, Paris, 1990.
103. Peter Hall, Jack Hayward and Howard Machin, Developments in French Politics, Macmillian Education ltd, London, 1990.
104. Hervé Hamon et Patrick Rotman, Les intellocrates, Editions Ramsay, Paris, 1981.
105. Hervé Hamon et Patrick Rotman, La Deuxième gauche: histoire intellectuelle et politique de la CFDT, Editions Ramsay, Paris, 1982.
106. Michael Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1981.
107. J.E.S. Hayward, Governing France, W.W. Norton & Co. New York, 1983.
108. David Held, Models of Democracy, Stamford University Press, Stamford, 1987.
109. Charles Hernu, Soldat-citoyen: essai sur la défense et la sécurité de la France, Flammarion, Paris, 1975.
110. Charles Hernu, Nous les Grands, F.G. Press, Paris, 1980.
111. Charles Hernu, Defendre la Paix, JC Lattès, Paris, 1985.
112. Charles Hernu, Lettre ouverte à ceux qui ne veulent pas savoir, Albin Michel, Paris, 1987.
113. Seymour M. Hersh, The Sampson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy, Random House, New York, 1991.
114. Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977.
115. Stanley Hoffman & William Andrews, The Impact of the Fifth Republic on France, SUNY-Albany, Albany, 1980.

116. Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, Penquin Books, New York, 1977.
117. Alistair Horne, The French Army and Politics 1870 -1970, Peter Bedrick Books, New York, 1984.
118. Joylon Howorth & Patricia Chilton, Defense and Dissent in Contemporary France, Croom Helm, London, 1985.
119. Joylon Howorth, France: The Politics of Peace, Merlin Press, London, 1986.
120. Joylon Howorth & George Ross, Contemporary France, Francis Pinter, London, 1987.
121. Morris Janovitz, The Professional Soldier, Free Press, New York 1973.
122. Morris Janovitz, The Reconstruction of Patriotism, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1983.
123. James Jaspers, Nuclear Politics: Energy and the State in the United States, Sweden and France, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1990.
124. Jean Jaulin edit., L'Europe entre la Dépendance et l'Autonomie, Diffusion Populaire, Paris, 1985.
125. Jane Jenson & George Ross, The View from Inside: A French Communist Cell in Crisis, Univ. of California Press, Los Angeles, 1984.
126. Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, Cornell University Press, Ithica, 1984.
127. Laurent Joffrin, La Gauche en Voie de Disparition, Editions de Seuil, Paris, 1984.
128. Laurent Joffrin, La Régression Française, Editions due Seuil, Paris, 1992.
129. Diane Johnstone's, The Politics of Euromissiles, Schocken Books, New York 1985.
130. Alain Joxe, Le Rempart social, essai sur l'impérial-militarisme, éditions galilee, Paris, 1979.
131. Alain Joxe, editor, Demain la Guerre ?, les éditions ouvrières, Paris, 1981.
132. Alain Joxe, Tribulations du "Garde-Paix: MX "Peace-Keeper," Un ICBM Américain en Quête de Stratégie, CIRPES, Cahiers D'Etudes Stratégiques, No 10, Paris, 1986.
133. A. Joxe, P. Metge, A. Santos, Eurostratégies Américaines, CIRPES, Cahiers D'Etudes Stratégiques No 12. Paris, 1987.
134. Jacques Julliard, La Quatrième République, Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1968.
135. Jacques Julliard, La Génie de la Liberté, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1990.
136. Serge July, Les années Mitterrand, Grasset, Paris, 1986.
137. Karl Kaiser, Le couple franco-allemand et la défense de l'Europe, IFRI, Paris 1986.
138. Catherine M. Kelleher, Germany & the Politics of Nuclear Weapons, Columbia University Press, New York, 1975.
139. Pierre Kende, Dominique Moisi, Ilios Yannakakis, le système communiste: un monde en expansion, IFRI, Paris, 1982.
140. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, Random House, New York, 1987.
141. Mark Kesselman and Joel Krieger et al., European Politics in Transition, D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, 1992.
142. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984.
143. Wilfred Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1971.
144. Edward Kolodziej, French International Policy Under De Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur, Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, 1974.

145. Edward Kolodziej, Making and Marketing Arms: The French Experience, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1987.
146. Guy Konopnicki, Le P.C.F. ou la momie de Lénine, Editions Garnier, Paris, 1980.
147. Annie Kriegel, Communismes au miroir français, Editions Gallimard, Paris, 1974.
148. Pascal Krop, Les Socialistes et l'Armée, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1983.
149. Pascal Krop & Roger Faligot, La Piscine: Les services secrets français 1944-1984, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1985.
150. Richard Kuisel, Capitalism & the State in Modern France, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983.
151. Denis Lacorne, Les Notables Rouges, PFNSP, Paris, 1980.
152. Denis Lacorne, Jagues Rupnik & Marie-France Toinet, L'Amérique Dans Les Têtes, Hachette, Paris 1986.
153. Phillippe Lacroix, Eviter la guerre: Réponses à quelques questions sur les risques de guerre, Maspero, Paris, 1983.
154. Robbin Laird, French Security Policy: From Independence to Interdependence, Westview Press, Boulder, 1986.
155. Georges Lavau, A quoi sert le parti communiste français, Fayard, Paris, 1981.
156. Eric J Leed, No Man's Land, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981.
157. Pierre Lellouche edit, Pacifisme et Dissausion, IFRI Paris, 1982.
158. Pierre Lellouche, L'Avenir de la Guerre, Editions Mazarine, Paris, 1985.
159. Pierre Lellouche, Le nouveau monde: De l'ordre de Yalta au désordre des nations, Grasset, Paris, 1992.
160. Philippe Le Prestre, edit. French Security Policy in a Disarming World, Lynn Reinner Publishers, Boulder, 1989.
161. Wolfgang Leonhard, Three Faces of Marxism: the Political Concepts of Soviet Ideology, Maoism and Humanist Marxism, Jolt Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1970.
162. Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World's Political Economic Systems, Basic Books, New York, 1977.
163. Alain Lipietz, I, l'Audace ou L'Enlèvement, Editions de la Découverte, Paris, Paris, 1985.
164. Alain Lipietz, Choisir l'Audace: une alternative pour le XXIe siècle, Editions la Découverte, Paris, 1989.
165. Xavier Luccioni, L'Affaire Greenpeace: une guerre des médias, Payot, Paris, 1986.
166. Dieter S. Lutz, La guerre mondiale malgré nous, Editions de la Découverte, Paris, 1983.
167. The French Defense White Book 1972, Ministry of Defense, SIRPA, Paris, 1972.
168. Bill Mc Kibben, The End of Nature, Random House, New York, 1989.
169. Robert McNamara, Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age, Pantheon Books, New York, 1986.
170. Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima, New York, 1981.
171. Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power: a history of power from the beginning to AD 1760, Vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986.
172. Michel Martin, From Warriors to Managers, Univ. of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1981.
173. Jean-Luc Mathieu, La Communauté Européenne: Marché ou Etat?, Nathan, Paris, 1990.

174. William H. Mc Neil, The Pursuit of Power: technology, armed force and society since AD 1000, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982.
175. Christian Mellon, Jean-Marie Muller Jacques Semelin, La Dissuasion Civile, Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense Nationale, Paris, 1985.
176. Gérard Mermet, Francoscopie: Les Français: Qui Sont-ils? Où Vont-ils, Librairie Larousse, Paris, 1985.
177. Gérard Mermet, Francoscopie 1991: Français Qui Êtes vous?, Librairie Larousse, Paris, 1990.
178. Michel Meyer, Le Mal Franco-Allemand, Denoël, Paris 1979.
179. Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Beacon Press, Boston, 1966.
180. Pierre-Yves Monette, Les Etats-Unis d'Europe, Editions Firson-Roche, Paris, 1991.
181. Edgar Morin, de la Nature de l'URSS: Compelxe totalitaire et nouvel Empire, Fayard, Paris 1983.
182. Edgar Morin, Penser L'Europe, Gallimard, Paris, 1987.
183. Dominique Moïsi, Crises et guerres au XXe siècle: analogies et différences, IFRI, Paris, 1981.
184. Dorothy Nelkin & Michael Pollak, The Atom Besieged: anti-nuclear movements in France and Germany, MIT Press, 1982.
185. James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State, St.Martin's Press, New York, 1973.
186. Michael Oppenheimer and Robert Boyle, Dead Heat: The Race Against the Greenhouse Effect, Basic Books, New York, 1990.
187. R. R. Palmer, The Age of Democratic Revolution: The Challenge, Vol. 1, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1969.
188. Bernard Paquetteau, Grande Meutrie/Petite Ecran: présence et représentation du militaire dans les magazines du reportage 1962-1981, Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense Nationale, Paris, 1986.
189. William Pfaff, Barbarian Sentiments: How the American Century Ends, Hill & Wang, New York, 1989.
190. Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1982.
191. Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction, Stamford University Press, Stamford, 1978.
192. Lucien Poirier, Essais de Stratégie Théorique, Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense Nationale, Paris, 1983.
193. John Prados, President's Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II, William Morrow and Co. New York, 1986.
194. Keith Reader, Intellectuals and the Left In France Since 1968, St Martin's Press, New York, 1987.
195. Michel Rocard, Parler Vrai, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1979.
196. Michel Rocard, Constuire le Progrès Social, Syros, Paris, 1990
197. Richard Rosencrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World, Basic Books, 1986.
198. Mort Rosenblum, Mission to Civilize: The French Way, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1986.
199. George Ross, Stanley Hoffmann and Sylvie Malzacher, edit, The Mitterrand Experiment, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987.

200. Yves Roucaute, Le PCF et l'armée, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1983.
201. Yves Roucaute, Le PCF et les sommets de l'Etat, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1981.
202. George Rudé, Revolutionary Europe 1783-1815, Harper & Row, New York, 1966.
203. Carl Sagan, Paul R. Ehrlich, The Cold and The Dark: The World after Nuclear War, W. W. Norton, New York, 1984.
204. Antoine Sanguinetti, Le Vertige De la Force, Editions de la Découverte, Paris, 1984.
205. Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth, Avon Books, New York, 1981.
206. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966.
207. Michel Schifres & Michel Sarazin, L'Elysée de Mitterrand, Editions Mouton, Paris, 1985.
208. William Schonfeld, Ethnographie Du PS et Du RPR, Economica, Paris, 1985.
209. Richard H. Schultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatia, éditions anthropos, éditions anthropos, Paris, 1985.
210. Theda Skocpol, States & Social Revolutions, Cambridge University press, Cambridge, 1979.
211. Daniel Singer, Is Socialism Doomed?: The Meaning of Mitterrand, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988.
212. Ezra Suleiman, Politics, Power and Bureaucracy in France, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1974.
213. Ezra Suleiman, Elites in French Society, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1978.
214. Michael Tatu, Eux et Nous: Les relations Est-Ouest entre deux détente, Fayard, Paris, 1985.
215. Emmanuel Todd, La Chute Finale, Robert Laffont, Paris, 1976.
216. Emmanuel Todd, La Nouvelle France, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1988.
217. Alain Touraine, Le communisme utopique: Le mouvement de Mai 68, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1972.
218. Alain Touraine, La voix et le regard, Editions de Seuil, Paris, 1978.
219. Alain Touraine, edit., Mouvements sociaux d'aujourd'hui, les éditions ouvrières, Paris, 1982.
220. Alain Touraine, Le Retour de l'acteur, Fayard, Paris, 1984.
221. Charles Tilly, edit, The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975.
222. Charles Tilly, The Contentious French: four centuries of popular struggle, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1986.
223. John Tirman, editor, Empty Promise: The Growing Case Against Star Wars, Beacon Press, Boston, 1986.
224. Minelle Verdié, L'Etat De La France et De Ses Habitants: Edition 1989, Editions de La Découverte, Paris, 1989.
225. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century, Vol, 1, Academic Press, New York, 1974.
226. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World Economy, 1600-1750, Academic Press, New York, 1980.
227. Eugene Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: the Modernization of Rural France, Stamford University Press, Stamford, 1976.
228. David Yost's, France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe, IISS, London, 1984.