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A PSYCHOANALYTIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR

City University of New York

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A PSYCHOANALYTIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS
OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR

DONALD M. LEVINE

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Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
The City University of New York

1983

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in satisfaction of the dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

The thesis is an effort to develop a theoretically sophisticated framework for interpreting the personality dynamics of large organizations. While psychoanalysis has hitherto been used almost exclusively for understanding individual and small group dynamics, it is the contention of this thesis that it will prove equally fruitful for understanding the functioning of large scale organizations. The aim of the thesis is, therefore, to produce and explicate both a framework for analysis and a specific set of guidelines and procedures for the interpretation of "process" and genetic data about organizational personality.

Non-psychoanalytic approaches to organizational assessment and intervention were found wanting (a) because they treated organizations as either passive or static "natural systems" rather than subjects of action, and/or (b) because they treated individual members of organizations as the sole loci of psychological life, neglecting the organization as a whole. Existing psychoanalytic approaches were found to be extremely valuable, and to suggest the most fruitful basis for further development of a holistic organizational psychology. It was argued that a synthesis was required

between the group dynamics work of W.R. Bion, E.J. Miller, A.K. Rice and some other Tavistock Institute members and the holistic organizational diagnosis model of Harry Levinson. The Tavistock work was found valuable in its analysis of the psychodynamic basis of commitment to groups and organizations, the nature of regression in social contexts and the functioning of underlying psychical structures behind manifest task organization. The present thesis builds on this work, in particular, by further developing its theoretical basis in relation to the work of Levinson, and the work of Leopold Bellak, Marvin Hurvich, and Helen K. Gediman.

The thesis, thus, attempts to develop the general basis in psychoanalytic theory for the treatment of the organization as an individual. By drawing on the work of Bellak, Hurvitch and Gediman, the thesis specifies the ego-functions which are the key indicators of organizational and individual health. The thesis, therefore, attempts to translate Bellak's conceptualizations of ego-functions into terms appropriate to organizational analysis.

Finally, the thesis presents a model for diagnostic organizational analysis. This model includes a treatment of the relationship between consultant and organization, suggesting important similarities between it and the analyst/patient relationship.

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INTRODUCTION

Organizations, like individuals, develop personalities over time. Their functioning at any point is a result not only of the component parts of which they are made, but also of their histories. These histories leave residues in the forms of established patterns of adaptation and styles of operation. Any successful and relatively deep intervention into organizational life must, therefore, involve the same sort of attention to personality variables and genesis that is characteristic of the psychodynamic analysis of individuals. To attend only to current organizational activities limits analysis to the relatively superficial and transient aspects of the organization. To attend only to sociological "structures" misses the dynamic aspects of the living organization. While both current issues and formal structures are significant, attention must be focused on what they signify--the underlying life of the organization which produces both current issues and formal structures.

The present thesis is an effort to develop a theoretically sophisticated framework for interpreting the personality dynamics of large organizations. This framework will be based on the achievements of psychoanalysis, particularly modern ego-psychology. While psychoanalysis

has hitherto been used almost exclusively for understanding individual and small group dynamics, it is my contention that it will prove equally fruitful for understanding the functioning of large scale organizations. The thesis will of, course, draw on the considerable work which has been done in conventional approaches to organizational behavior, but it will also, in the first chapter, critique these perspectives, showing their inherent limitations. The aim of the thesis is to produce and explicate both a framework for analysis and a specific set of guidelines and procedures for the interpretation of "process" and genetic data about organizational personality. This is not, thus, an empirical study. It is, rather, an attempt to provide the basis for future empirical studies, including especially diagnosis of practical problems and the action research involved in their solution.

The practical significance of this sort of work is considerable. Because of its neglect of underlying organizational personality dimensions, conventional organizational behavior has been limited in its effectiveness. Short term interventions have been the overwhelming norm until very recently. There is at present, however, a growing convergence on the problem of sustained consulting relationships and long-term trends in organizational life. Academic sociologists have become concerned with the life-cycle of organizations from births to deaths.

Students of organizational behavior have argued, although only recently, for an approach to "macro-organizational behavior" (Miles, 1980) and for new procedures in organizational assessment which pay heed to genetic and psychosocial phenomena (Alderfer, 1980). A significant school of thought has grown up around the concept of "socio-technical systems" (Trist, 1981; Cherns, Passmore and Sherwood, 1978). This concept tries to relate the various formal social technologies of organizational planning and control to the psycho-social life of organizations and their members. Most organizational behavior experts have looked at psychological variables only as attributes of individuals or, less often, of groups. The macro-social psychology of organizations has yet to be fully born. It is my hope that the present work will contribute to this creative task. It is my belief that a careful grounding in psychoanalytic theory is the best basis for such a new development in organizational behavior, because psychoanalysis has been the most theoretically developed and successful of "holistic" psychologies. That is, where other views have either been reductionistic (behaviorism) or have academically subdivided personalities into component areas of specialization, psychoanalysis has persisted in treating and studying the whole person. Indeed, the very concept of "personality" has gone out of fashion in much of

academic psychology and social psychology; only the psychodynamic perspective keeps it in the center stage.

Work aimed at extending psychoanalytic theory to organizations has a distinguished pedigree, most notably in the long line of associates of London's Tavistock Institute. Their work will be reviewed in Chapter Two below. Harry Levinson has also more recently made pioneering steps in precisely the directions of the present work (1972). His research, at the Menninger Institute, Harvard, and the Levinson Institute provides the most prominent example of a psychoanalytically informed, holistic, and genetic study of organizations. His work will also be discussed further in Chapter Two, and his scheme of "organizational diagnosis" will form part of the basis for my own model as presented in Chapter Five.

A crucial condition for the present effort, however, lies in recent work on the psychoanalytic study of individuals. Bellak and his associates (1973) have made striking breakthroughs in the reconceptualization of the psychoanalytic theory of the ego and its formulation in empirically testable, functional terms. I have found this work extremely helpful in specifying the techniques of interpretation crucial to a psychodynamic approach to organizations. In Chapter Three, I discuss the foundations of the present effort in psychoanalytic theory, and in Chapter Four focus especially on Bellak's formulation of ego-psychology. I have attempted to

translate Bellak's conceptualizations of ego-functions into terms appropriate to organizational analysis.

One of the strengths of the psychoanalytic perspective on the psychodynamics of organizations is that, as I have developed it, this perspective fits extremely well with socio-technical systems analysis and provides a synthetic basis for applied research and practical interventions. Where socio-technical systems work has been preoccupied with formal planning, management information systems, and structures of social relationships, the psychoanalytic perspective brings attention to the dynamics of relating individuals to each other in organizations, and to the genetic personality basis of current styles of organizational functioning.

In the final chapter I pull the various theoretical and conceptual strands together into a program for diagnostic organizational analysis. This program includes a treatment of the relationship between consultant and organization, suggesting important similarities between it and the analyst/patient relationship. In Chapter Three I, therefore, review the psychoanalytic literature on transference and countertransference, indicating how this bears on organizational consultation. It is crucial in, particular, because psychoanalysis brings to organizational analysis the important suggestion that the consultant does not simply "analyze the organization", but rather helps in the analysis of organizational functioning crucially

through a relationship with the organization which must itself be analyzed to yield vital data. In Chapter Five I also produce a detailed outline of the many kinds of structural, process, genetic and interpretative data needed for organizational analysis. In concluding that chapter, I specify procedures for the interpretation of this data and its synthesis into an analysis of the organizational personality.

CHAPTER I

LIMITATIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE CONVENTIONAL STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR

Modern studies of formal organizations tend to trace their roots to the so-called "scientific management" school of Frederick Winslow Taylor. The first half of the twentieth century, completely dominated by Taylor's work, was characterized by a singleminded focus on efficiency. Human beings were seen as essentially malleable tools to be organized in quite the same fashion as material objects, only with attention to incentives partially replacing attention to physical characteristics. During the 1950s, this approach began to be challenged by the modern discipline of organizational behavior. Early "human relations" perspectives were markedly different from Taylor in their fully psychological conceptualizations of the human being, and consequently in their approach to organizational effectiveness. Organizational behavior, in this sense, has been the leading force in business schools' treatment of human problems in management.

At the same time that organizational behavior was taking its modern shape, heavily influenced by social psychology, so too was it being cast into a fairly

specialized and narrow domain of the business curricula. One of the features of this specialization was a focus on personnel matters--conceived first and foremost as involving the selection of the best workers, and secondarily as the production of employee satisfaction. This heritage has contributed to the surprising tendency of organizational behavior specialists to take organizations themselves more or less for granted, and to concentrate on studying the ways in which different individuals behave within them. Studies of organizational structure became more the province of academic sociology, which took its crucial lead from the writings of Max Weber on bureaucracy. The sociological studies were generally quite abstract, and not oriented to the practical problems of management. The flowering of organizational sociology during the late 1950s and 1960s, led by men like Peter Blau, Alvin Gouldner, Charles Perrow--a great many of them Robert Merton's students at Columbia--concentrated on the attempt to develop statistically reliable accounts of the relationships between various structural features of organizations, such as size and internal hierarchy. Somewhat less often, it took up problems of organizational dynamics, including some interpersonal factors and, more commonly, questions of how organizational forms change. Organizational studies emerged as one of the central components of modern American sociology, and its approach was echoed in other countries--especially Britain--by

researchers like D.S. Pugh, Joan Woodford, J. Childs, and Michel Crozier.

Organizational sociology, though it did frequently focus on whole organizations, did not look much at the internal life of organizations. It is only more recently that this has become a major concern of sociologists. The sociological work was important, however, in stimulating business school organizational behavior researchers to take a new look at the human relations issues on which they had focused. The 1970s saw an increase in the number of sociologists--as opposed to psychologists--on the faculties of business school organizational behavior departments. The trend was for organizational behavior (OB) to reduce its focus on job satisfaction and employee selection, and to increase its focus on issues of organizational design and management strategy. Social scientists looked at issues of the impact of new technologies on organizations, the implications of increasing size, the impact of variations in community setting and, perhaps in the long run most importantly, at organizations' relations to each other and to the rest of their environments. This paralleled efforts by business faculty like Lawrence and Lorsch of Harvard to develop a theory of organizations which did not take the existence of the organization and the membership of its employees for granted. Their 'contingency theory' was an important forerunner of the academic sociological studies of

Pfeffer, Aldrich, Hannan and others. This line of work achieved a considerable merger of the interests of academic sociologists with those of business faculties in organizational behavior.

Meanwhile, industrial and organizational psychology became increasingly estranged from the mainstream of American psychology. This was due, in large part, to psychology's increasing emphasis on experimental work, and the corresponding decline in interest among academic psychologists in the survey research and field studies which were the norm in industrial and organizational psychology (I/O). Clinical psychology rapidly overtook I/O as the main applied branch of the field, and testing work expanded more in the setting of school psychology. A number of researchers and consultants in organizational behavior began, however, to grow dissatisfied with both the split which had emerged between "academic" and "applied" work. Various arguments were made for the importance of "action theory" (Silverman, 1970; Argyris, 1974) with an implicit or explicit criticism of the "inapplicable" nature of the sociological studies, however advanced their methodologies. The late 1970s saw an effort by many business school professors of organizational behavior, and by a number of social psychologists and consultants in private practice, to overcome the artificial distinctions which had been introduced and which were blocking development of the

field.

A need for synthesis has been, in short, widely recognized within the field of organizational behavior. There have been literally dozens of claimants to the title of the organizational behavior. None has succeeded, however, largely because none has been able to ground its claims in a theoretical foundation which both allowed a holistic approach and provided for serious attention to the psychological life of organizations and their members. It is my contention in this thesis that psychoanalytic theory can, with appropriate modifications in some areas, provide such a foundation. Synthesis can be organized through the concept of "organizational personality".

Before setting out my own argument, however, it is appropriate to review in more detail the various more conventional approaches to organizational behavior, noting the contributions each can make to the synthesis and reorientation I propose, but also noting the limitations of those views as independent perspectives. I shall first look very briefly at organizational sociology, organizational development, industrial and organizational psychology, and modern extensions of the classical "human relations" school of thought. Though all of these have made important contributions, none of them has a central role to play in the synthesis I propose. Five branches of the field, each somewhat more idiosyncratic in

orientation, do have a more central role to play; each deserves a more extended comment. This chapter will include discussions of the work of March, Simon and associates on organizational choice, and of the "contingency" theories developed by Lawrence, Lorsch and their colleagues, and especially of "socio-technical systems" theory and "macro-organizational" behavior. The most directly related theories, those developed from psychoanalytic basis by members of the Tavistock Institute and its successor organizations, and by Harry Levinson, will be given extended treatment in Chapter Two.

Organizational Sociology

Modern organizational sociology began with Merton's (1957) return to the problem of bureaucracy which had been posed by Max Weber. The essence of the problem was to discover the implications of the formal patterns of social organization which were distinctive of modern society. Weber (1922) had feared that this form of organization constituted an "iron cage" which would imprison modern man in its rule-bound rationalism. Merton suggested that bureaucracy was indeed central to twentieth century society, but that its forms were variable and in need of a great deal of empirical study before generalizations could be attempted about overall implications. Merton retained Weber's focus on rationalism, but added an additional stress on the structure of bureaucracies. Though his essay remained influential within the social psychology of

organizations, it had more of an impact in helping to launch studies of organizational structure. A number of Merton's pupils and proteges during the 1950s and early 1960s went on to become the leaders in this field: Peter Blau, Alvin Gouldner, S.M. Lipset, James Coleman, Philip Selznick among them. They studied a wide variety of organizations, but the problem of bureaucracy left a special emphasis on public organizations. Considering the overwhelming proportion of formal organizations which are businesses, it is remarkable that so few of the major sociological studies were initially of capitalist concerns. The Weberian concern for whether modern government was a bureaucratic iron cage remained in many minds.

The sociological attempt, thus, was to formulate a general theory of organizations (For examples, see Blau, 1974; Blau and Schoenherr, 1971; Blau and Scott, 1963; Crozier, 1964; Etzioni, 1961a, 1961b; Gouldner, 1954, 1959; Parsons, 1961, 1964; Stinchcombe, 1965). Where this work has been empirical, it has most prominently been based on the comparative study of cross-sections of organizations, rather than on longitudinal data concerning the genesis of organizational patterns. "Action researchers" have faulted these attempts as being "inapplicable" and "over-generalized," and for failing to institute changes in order to study the processes of intentional change (Friedlander and Brown, 1974; French

and Bell, 1973; Silverman, 1970; and especially, Argyris, 1974). Pugh, one of the major researchers in the comparative study of organizations (Pugh, et al., 1968), also faults groundless theorizing, but suggests that it is not generality in itself which is the problem with comparative research, but the absence of an adequate linkage between levels of focus (Pugh, et al., 1975).

Organizational sociology may be faulted for failing to take into account the findings of "action researchers" and others using case study methodologies. Friedlander and Brown (1974) have gone so far as to conclude that the whole enterprise of organizational theory is irrelevant to applied work. I would not go so far. In any case, the implication that there are no serious sociological treatments of change no longer holds, however, as recent years have seen important developments in this area (Aldrich, 1979). A number of sociologists have worked in the integrated area of organizational design (Starbuck and Derthen, 1973). Perhaps most importantly, sociologists following the leads of human ecology have done a number of studies of the births and deaths of organizations, and organizational forms (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Pfeffer, 1978). The fault often found with Parsons' and other functionalist work--that it fails to deal with variables of power--is also no longer so prominent in sociological work. Certainly this was never a major problem in Blau's perspective (Blau, 1964). More recently, major strides

have been made in developing a coherent theoretical account of power within organizations (Pfeffer and Selancik, 1977; Clegg, 1975; Benson, 1977).

The greatest problem with organizational sociology, however, is the inadequacy of the theories of personality and motivation which most organizational sociologists use as a basis for their empirical research and theory-building. These psychological underpinnings tend to be both unsystematic and purely speculative. This weakness seriously inhibits their potential for undertaking freely organizational functioning. It also makes it harder to apply organizational sociology's findings to particular, concrete organizations, because they are all couched in the ceteris paribus terms of statistical aggregates, with no method for establishing the particularities of individual cases. It is in particular cases, finding out why particular organizations perform well or poorly, that the relation of individual members to whole organizations and the developmental history of each organization become crucial. In my paradigm for organizational analysis, the variables studied by organizational sociology will be important, but as essentially background information, establishing the range of possibilities within which individuals and organizations work.

Organizational Development

If organizational sociology can be faulted for

excessive generality, and theoretical abstraction, then the so-called "organizational development" (OD) movement is its opposite. OD practitioners and writers have assumed that a more or less complete separation can be made between organizational theory and organizational problem solving and change. They have even suggested, again in the words of Friedlander and Brown (1974), that a "metatheory" of organizational change can be developed without reference to any theory of organizations. They see change, in other words, entirely separable from structure. The two cannot, however, be reasonably separated.

The number of studies in OD is huge, though the largest number came during the 1960s and early 1970s (Pugh, et al., 1975; Friedlander and Brown, 1974; Alderfer, 1974; Beckhard, 1969; Beer, 1974; Strauss, 1973; Margulies and Raia, 1972; Burke, 1972; Clark and Krone, 1972; French and Bell, 1973). Such studies have been conducted, however, in a largely uncoordinated fashion. Vocabularies have been idiosyncratic and methods unevenly applied. Conceptualizations have been reinvented over and over again and adapted more or less ad hoc to the demands of particular situations. The result is that it has proven difficult to assess the results of OD for many of its important aims, including achieving productivity increases (Greiner, 1967; Buchanon, 1971; and Bowers, 1973, for attempts at comparative evaluation of OD

implementation projects). This stems directly from the attempt to separate organizational theory from applied studies of organizational change.

OD has come, in sum, to refer to a disparate variety of interventions designed to improve the effectiveness of organizations and/or the satisfaction of their members by studying interpersonal relations or considering the use of group training methods. Friedlander and Brown (1974) define OD as a

method for facilitating change and development in people (e.g. styles, values, skills), in technology (e.g., greater simplicity, complexity), and in organizational processes and structures (e.g., relationships, roles). (p. 314)

In an earlier paper, Friedlander (1972) argues this usage as a result of congruence in organizational development, but, in fact, the congruence seems to be imposed by the generality of the definition; it is certainly not apparent in the diversity of techniques. OD remains most important in certain branches of organizational consultation, where its ad hoc features may be adapted to the exigencies of situations without difficulty. The most refined method for understanding organizational issues within OD is probably the "grid" method of analysis developed by Blake, Mouton and associates (1964). This is not a theory, properly speaking, but it does provide a common vocabulary and approach to recording and analyzing data.

From the point of view of the theory-building proposed here, OD offers some interesting insights drawn from case

studies, but nothing substantial in the way of theory.

Industrial And Organizational Psychology

Industrial psychology has been around for a very long time. Its early, primary focus was on the characteristics of individuals which made them good or bad employees. It was an adjunct to the personnel orientation which preceeded organizational behavior proper. More recently, a number of industrial psychologists have become dissatisfied with the narrowness of the field and have suggested that it be relabelled industrial and organizational psychology (I/O) (Alderfer, 1980). This involves a rethinking of the enterprise which is very congenial to the present work. Among other things, it introduces the organization as such into what had previously been an almost exclusively individualistic psychology.

The older, individual-centered industrial psychology was an attempt at a unified approach to people in organizations. Its studies, however, seldom used individual motivation (either with or without the intervening variable of situations) as a key to understanding organizations as a whole or any of the impacts of structural changes. It was heavily focused on testing, and it did not attempt to assess differences which organizational membership made to individuals. Individuals were taken as more or less static, given units. By the 1960s, this approach was already waning;

the field had become somewhat stagnant. It was revived by a focus on new approaches to the study of motivation, studies which took both leadership styles and some group contexts into account.

The motivation research school is perhaps best represented by Victor Vroom (1964) and Rensis Likert (1967). Likert's notion of organizational linkages, the key "lynch-pin" roles filled by certain personnel, has been widely influential. It is particularly important, because it suggests that much of organizational life is communication. Likert sees organizations knit together by functional relations among sub-groups; he gets beyond purely individualistic notions. This is a compatible perspective to the argument of the present thesis that certain key kinds of cognitive and emotional processes constitute the information processing of the organizational ego. Herzberg, et al. (1959; Herzberg, 1966) made a more direct attempt to explain organizations on the basis of "human nature". They took human nature to be a rather narrow construct, however, empirically grounded only in motivational research. This has made it difficult for their work to deal with large scale change in social situations; it has been best in immediate workplace studies.

The perspective on motivation embodied by this whole line of work was, however, extremely important during the 1960s as a corrective to both economic and psychological

behaviorisms which treated human nature simply as a set of posited "needs". Sociological theories, where they had dealt with individuals, had tended either to accept a radical notion of operant condition based on absolute needs and organismic uniformity (Homans, 1950, 1974), or to assume profit-seeking as a universal and clearly defined a priori motivation in organizations (Blau, 1964). This amounts to using a series of ungrounded assumptions in place of available empirical research (Kroeber-Riel, 1971). It also employs exceptionally simple choice situations in order to apply its simplistic theory of motivation (Davis, 1973). This is not to say that behaviorism is entirely fallacious, or that needs are not important parts of a theory of motivation, but rather that nothing so simple and arbitrary as the assumptions of most economic notions of self-interest seeing individuals accords with the results of serious psychological investigations.

The motivation theories move far enough from old-fashioned industrial psychology to be set out rather more fully. They provide, in their more sophisticated versions, the key underpinnings to modern work in organizational behavior. They more or less merge in this capacity with the recent extensions of "human relations theory". Industrial psychology is moving towards an absorption into organizational behavior more generally. We shall, therefore, look at this common set of

theoretical foundations for OB in a separate section.

Motivation and Human Relations

OB practitioners and theorists have seen organizations as aggregates of individuals, paying either more or less attention to the interrelationships which constitute the whole organization, but never granting much autonomy to the whole. Because of this perspective, the key issue has seemed to be that of knitting people into organizations, finding out which individuals fit best, how to get them to fit better, and how to lead aggregates of individuals. Because the OB theorists are designed primarily for the benefit of managers, and taught primarily in business schools, the centrality of leadership is very much stressed.

Perhaps the "classic" theory of human needs has been Maslow's notion of a hierarchy of needs. Maslow (1943) in his classic presentation stressed that eight sets of "basic needs" underlay human action, and that they were arranged in a hierarchy of implied maturity. Any individual would develop, under proper conditions from exclusive involvement in basic needs to some of the higher needs, but even a mature individual could regress under stress or in demanding situations. The basic needs had to be satisfied for attention to be focused on the higher ones. The sequence runs from physiological needs through safety needs, love needs, esteem needs, the need for self-actualization, the desires to know and understand,

and the aesthetic needs. The last two groupings are really extensions and specializations of self-actualization. Maslow considers all self-actualization "growth" needs; the others are "deficiency" needs, implying that they represent gaps to be filled rather than absolute additions.

The Maslow theory has achieved extremely wide currency, perhaps because it is one of the simpler and more easily understood of major psychologic theories. It has been used and tested in a variety of areas, with at least some modicum of success (Maslow, 1954; Porter, 1964; Beer, 1966). There have been a variety of measurement problems, however, particularly with Porter's early need satisfaction questionnaire (Wahba and Bridwell, 1976). Some of the more prominent studies using Maslow's approach have included Hall and Nougaim (1968) on young managers at AT&T, and Lawler and Suttle (1972) on a cross-section of managers in two different organizations (with at least partially negative findings). There has been some attempt to relate variables such as leadership style to specific need orientations. Beer (1966), for example, found highly structured leadership styles to be related to safety need satisfaction. By far the most important adaptation of Maslow's work for organizational behavior, however, is Alderfer's development of Existence, Relatedness, and Growth Theory (ERG).

In a methodological article, Schneider and Alderfer

(1973) reported problems with establishing reliable indices which discriminated among needs. The methodological problem arose in the course of a research program which led Alderfer to propose a reclassification of the need hierarchy (Alderfer, 1972). Alderfer's approach was more explicitly research-oriented, and he specified a series of propositions which at once telescoped Maslow's hierarchy of needs, expanded the theory's scope, and specified certain different prepotency relationships. Alderfer's hierarchy of needs was composed of existence needs (Maslow's physiological and material safety needs), relatedness needs (Maslow's interpersonal safety, love and interpersonal esteem needs), and growth needs (Maslow's self-confirmed esteem needs and self-actualization). His ERG theory set forth the following basic propositions regarding need relationships (Miner, 1980, pp. 37-38):

1. The less existence needs are satisfied, the more they will be desired (follows Maslow).
2. The less relatedness needs are satisfied the more existence needs will be desired (reverse of Maslow).
3. The more existence needs are satisfied, the more relatedness needs will be desired (same orientation as Maslow).
4. The less relatedness needs are satisfied, the more relatedness needs will be desired (follows Maslow).
5. The less growth needs are satisfied, the more relatedness needs will be desired (reverse of Maslow).

6. The more relatedness needs are satisfied, the more growth needs will be desired (same orientation as Maslow).
7. The more growth needs are satisfied, the more they will be desired (follows Maslow).
- 8a. When existence materials are scarce, then the higher chronic existence desires are, the less existence satisfaction.
- 8b. When existence materials are not scarce, then there will be no differential existence satisfaction as a function of chronic existence desires.
- 9a. In highly satisfying relationships, there is no differential relatedness satisfaction as a function of chronic relatedness desires.
- 9b. In normal relationships, persons very high and very low on chronic relatedness desires tend to obtain lower satisfaction than persons with moderate desires.
- 9c. In highly dissatisfying relationships, then, the higher chronic relatedness desires, the more relatedness satisfaction.
- 10a. In challenging discretionary settings, then, the higher chronic growth desires, the more growth satisfaction.
- 10b. In nonchallenging, nondiscretionary settings, there will be no differential satisfaction as a function of chronic growth desires.

Propositions eight to ten go beyond the issues with which Maslow was concerned, but they are vital to giving Alderfer a theory of sufficient substance to deal with organizational life. Alderfer constructed a specific measure of desire and satisfaction for each of his need categories, generally working with scales containing items which can be grouped together in factor analysis. Alderfer then tested his propositions with various samples: 34 manufacturing managers; 138 of their

employees; 60 bank managers; 157 of their employees; 103 members of two college fraternities; 77 prep school students; 46 teachers, ministers and social workers in T-groups; 83 preparatory school students in T-groups and 112 MBA students. Only proposition three received no support at all, but Alderfer was able to propose inductive revisions of several other propositions based on the characteristics of the groups which had supported or not supported them. The revisions essentially amounted to reframing linear propositions as curvilinear. There has been some, but not extensive, further work on this scheme. It is important, however, because it enabled Alderfer to go beyond the Maslow hierarchy--and especially beyond the crude simplification of it which have taken root in management courses and practice--to specify in some detail the relation in organizational interactions and settings to need satisfaction. Alderfer's more recent work has followed this with an attempt to further move away from individualistic motivation theory toward a relationship and organization centered motivation theory (Alderfer, 1980).

Another major psychological approach to motivation which has been taken up extensively within OB is McClelland's so-called "N-achievement" or "achievement-motivation" theory. Both names are partial misnomers, referring to early versions of the theory. There is some truth to the suggestion of a narrow focus on

achievement needs, however, though in recent years these have been increasingly complemented by attention to power needs, and slightly by a notion of affiliation needs. There has been extensive empirical research, though the theory's base remains unfortunately narrow. This has limited its overall impact on OB. McClelland's own attention, moreover, though it originated in clinical psychological problems, turned over time to problems of national character and the psychological changes associated with economic development. The theory began with Atkinson and McClelland's research on projective identification and thematic apperception tests, in which they found food imagery to play an extremely important role; hunger increased the extent to which food-imagery intruded on other issues (Atkinson and McClelland, 1948). This arousal based approach underlay the early studies on sex, fear, affiliation, power, aggression and achievement, but it was the last which became the center (McClelland, 1961, 1962).

In McClelland's (1961, 1962) view, all motives are learned--a view running against both Maslow's notion of a fixed hierarchy, and Freud's understanding of basic biopsychological drives. Maslow suggested that this process of associative learning leads those who experience early gratification through achievement to place great stress on it, while others will come to associate the need for achievement not as an occasion for gratification or a

pleasant challenge, but as a threat or fear. McClelland suggests, especially following further thematic apperception test work, several kinds of situations which are more likely to arouse achievement needs than others--they are situations which allow individuals to imagine success through their own efforts rather than the assistance of others, which hold only moderate levels of difficulty and risk, and in which there is potentially clear and unambiguous feedback on achievement. Situations which offer novelty and require a future orientation are also attractive to the achievement oriented. Thus, as far as direct implications for management are concerned, one might conclude that highly achievement oriented people will do best where they have considerable autonomy--e.g. in many cases as chief executives of small firms, rather than members of management teams in larger concerns.

McClelland's theory sometimes appears like a glorification of American managerial man's fantasies about himself. Indeed, one of the major criticisms of the theory is that it has been culture-bound, or else just an extrapolation from the specific sorts of needs which competitive capitalist society gives its members. McClelland, indeed, offers an elaboration of Max Weber's (1904) theory of the relationship of protestant ethical life to the psychological underpinnings of capitalism. McClelland's theory had greatest currency during the 1960s as an adjunct to sociology's now defunct "modernization"

theory--an account of how the developing countries of the world can come to be "achieving societies" just like ours. These theories, in the psychologistic versions which adopted McClelland's work, placed great emphasis on entrepreneurship as the essential ingredient in socio-economic change. This gives a clue to one of the problems inherent in McClelland's work as a basis for organizational development. His theory posits highly individualistic structures, with relatively little attention to organizational forms. He sees an economic world of entrepreneurial individuals, not of managers and employees in large corporations. This is a very skewed vision of American economic life, and thus unable to provide full grounding for a theory of organizational behavior. Only recently, as McClelland has come to focus more on affiliation needs (1975), has he noted the considerable interdependence of individuals' need structures. McClelland does suggest that organizations can make use of various educational programs to help their members develop the sort of motives which will lead to greater success (1965, McClelland and Winter, 1969).

There have been a variety of debates on the reliability of TAT tests for this sort of work. Tests of McClelland's approach with other methods have been inconclusive. Indeed, it may be alleged that the tests structure the results to such a high degree that McClelland and his followers are bound to find some

concurrence. The majority of the major research projects have been cross-sectional attempts to measure the impact of societies' achievement aspirations on aggregate economic variables such as electric power output. A good deal of doubt remains, even in McClelland's own mind (1961; Meyer, Walker and Litwin, 1961) as to whether power and achievement motivations have anything much to do with management--a less autonomous activity than entrepreneurship. I shall suggest below that something of Simon's notion of manager's need to "satisfice" rather than maximize is important here. Lichtman (1970) has argued that power motivation has no bearing on management, though Cummin (1967) disagrees. McClelland and Burnham (1976) have described power as "the great motivator". For the purposes of the present thesis, however, I must conclude that McClelland's highly individualistic work provides no grounding for a holistic theory of organizations.

Motivation-Hygiene Theory

A motivation theory with more specific bearing on organizations and management is "motivation-hygiene" theory, as developed by Frederick Herzberg (Herzberg, et al., 1959; Herzberg, 1966, 1976). Herzberg's key initial (1959) argument was that the satisfaction and dissatisfaction were not simply opposite poles of a continuum, produced by the presence or absence of a common set of factors. On the contrary, Herzberg argued that the

factors causing positive job attitudes were different from those causing negative attitudes. Job satisfaction was produced by achievement, verbal recognition, challenging work, responsibility and promotion. Dissatisfaction, on the other hand, was the product of contextual factors-- company policy and administrative practices, technical quality of supervision, interpersonal relations, physical working conditions, job security, benefits and salary. Satisfaction, in short, is produced by a set of motivators, while dissatisfaction is produced by hygiene factors. The latter are so-called because they can remove dissatisfactions but not positively create satisfaction. Herzberg (1966) extends this argument to a general understanding of the nature of human needs, distinguishing hygiene factors as animal or "Adam" needs, and motivation factors as psychological growth or "Abraham" needs. "These two characteristics must be constantly viewed as having separate biological, psychological and existential origins" (1966, p.56). Any particular individual, though characterized by both sets of needs, may be more or less dominated by one.

Herzberg considers hygiene seekers to be poor risks for a company, particularly as managers. A lack of effective motivators, however, tends to focus anyone on hygiene needs--an obvious similarity to Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Herzberg also suggests that motivation-oriented individuals are more able to think in terms of long-term

satisfactions and goals, while hygiene-oriented people are only motivated over short time periods. Herzberg (1976) extends this to a fourfold typology of normal workers (there are also certain abnormal profiles):

1. The person who has both hygiene and motivator fulfillment, who is not unhappy and is also very happy.
2. The person who is on both need systems but has little fulfillment in the hygiene area even though his motivator satisfaction is good. Such a "starving artist" is both unhappy and happy.
3. The person who is also on both needs systems but whose satisfactions are reversed--hygienes are good, but motivators are poor; he is not unhappy but neither is he happy.
4. The down and out person who is lacking in fulfillment generally and is both unhappy and lacking in happiness.

Herzberg's work has had a major impact on the movement to redesign jobs to assume greater employee satisfaction and performance. It has, however, come under serious attack in the academic literature, especially on the grounds that empirical studies do not confirm the relationships--and in some cases even the distinctions between factors--Herzberg posited. Support has come from Schwab, DeVitt and Cummings (1971) and Grigaliunas and Herzberg (1971) as well as from Herzberg's own research as reported in the major volumes. Prominent criticisms include Gordon, Pryor and Harris (1974), Locke (1976), and Locke and Whiting (1974). Perhaps the most important body of criticism has derived from Kahn's (1961) review and critique of the

initial research. Interestingly, from our present point of view, part of Kahn's critique revolved around the psychoanalytic notion of defense mechanisms. Wall (1973), Ondrack (1974), Locke (1976) and Locke and Whiting (1974) have all argued that the findings of a distinction between motivation and hygiene factors are in fact produced by different levels of defensiveness in subjects. When defense mechanisms are called into play, it is argued, by what ever means, then subjects attribute the causes of dissatisfaction to objects outside themselves. When defensiveness is reduced, the Herzberg theory of two separate factors is no longer supported by empirical evidence.

Herzberg claims that he is not treating of the entire organizational context, socio-technical systems, etc., and that it is therefore, unfair to counter his arguments for job-enrichment with factors drawn from those variables of organizational context. Locke (1976) and this thesis, however, would both argue that the sorts of activities proposed by even the most orthodox version of job enrichment theory involve such inextricably organizational factors (Herzberg, 1976, for a list of the primary factors in job enrichment). Neither material rewards nor interpersonal relations, for example, can be abstracted from organizational context and treated narrowly as characteristics of the immediate work situation or the work itself. Herzberg's defense could

almost be considered its own indictment. While I would agree that there is important insight in the differentiation of various factors producing satisfaction and dissatisfaction, I will argue that psychoanalytic ego-psychology provides a better account of the relations of individuals to their environments and internal needs, and that an adaptation of this same theory allows for an account of the nature of whole organizations as sources of both motivation and satisfaction/dissatisfaction.

Equity Theory

Feelings of unfairness have been widely reported as central to dissatisfaction with jobs and organizational life. Herzberg's work confirmed this finding, though it did not make much of it. Other schools of thought, most notably the work of Stacy Adams (1963a, 1965), have made this central to theories of organizational behavior. Adams' work draws on the social psychological traditions of exchange theory (Homans, 1961) and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). It is essentially concerned with distributive justice within organizations and its effect on relationships and behavior. The Adams theory is unusually precise and fully formulated for organizational behavior theory, and has spawned a considerable body of research.

The basic proposition of Adams' theory is that striving for equity is the major motivating force in human relations and therefore in organizations. The

universality of this striving implies, of course, the universality of inequity. The theory begins, like most exchange theories, with an assumption of transactions among discrete individuals--each is giving and getting something. As a part of the overall socialization process, individuals have learned shared concepts of what are fair relationships between inputs and outputs in social exchange, but they enter exchange relations as individuals. This does not mean that they are isolated, but only that they are discrete. Though it is not yet organizations which figure in Adams' theory, he does place some stress on the role of reference persons or groups as the source of standards in any individual's evaluations of his or her own exchange relations. The inequity with which Adams is concerned is perceived inequity, that which an actor experiences by comparing his own ratio of inputs to outputs to that for a reference source. It is not the analyst's externally imputed evaluation.

It is important to note that this is not a theory of simple self-interest. Adams posits that individuals act to maximize equity--whether they have been getting the short or long end of the stick. The motivating force of inequity arises with deviations in either direction from the presumed (but never quite extant) ideal state of equity. Individuals will, therefore, experience dissatisfactions if they perceive themselves as overrewarded. Consider, for example, the case of a worker

who considers himself to be about as competent and hard working as his fellows, but who is rewarded much more. Rather than taking unalloyed pleasure in the rewards, their value to him will be diminished by their inequity and the clear irrelevance of the criteria on which they were awarded. This doesn't mean that any material components of those rewards--say money--will not be valued for themselves, but rather that they will not be fully valued as psychological rewards because of the inequity of their distribution. This is not, of course, to say that overrewards are as dissatisfying and motivating as underrewards; the contrary is, in fact, the case.

Most exchanges, of course, are not simple dyadic transactions. They involve multiple inputs and outcomes, and potentially affect more than two actors. Adams takes account of the former issue by noting that exchanges must be summed across all factors perceived to be relevant. Inputs may range from education and intelligence to possession of tools or a desirable spouse. Outcomes will also range widely in value, from pay and intrinsic rewards to uncertainty over one's fate to Herzberg's "dissatisfiers". Perceived inequity takes the form of either anger (underreward) or guilt (overreward) and produces a tension within the "control system" of the individual actor. The actor will attempt to lessen this tension; this is the motivation for action. It is in this conception of mental activity--as a control system

striving toward a steady state--that the influence of Lewin's work, and in particular Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory, is apparent. The attempts which individuals make to restore equilibrium may vary considerably, and will of course depend on other psychological characteristics of those individuals. Normally, one would act directly to alter inputs or outcomes; more rarely, one might leave the field of exchange entirely. It is possible in some cases for an individual to shift his or her reference source, thus lessening the perceived inequity without altering inputs or outputs. More problematically, one may distort one's perception of inputs and outcomes--one own or one's referents.

Adams (1965) recognizes a need for research on the circumstances under which one or the other of these outcomes is likely to emerge. His theory is not very explicit or elaborate on this point, however, since it is limited to the following six propositions:

1. Generally, an individual will attempt to maximize highly valued outcomes and the overall value of outcomes.
2. Inputs that are effortful and costly to change can be expected to increase only minimally.
3. Real and cognitively distorted changes in inputs that are central to one's self-concept and self-esteem will tend to be resisted. The same applies to the outcomes for a person when they have high relevance for the self.
4. The inputs and outcomes attributed to a

reference source are much more easily distorted than those attributed to oneself.

5. Leaving the field will be utilized only when the inequity is sizable and other means of reducing it are unfavorable. Partial withdrawals such as absenteeism will occur at lower inequity levels than full withdrawals such as separation.
6. Changing the object of comparison, or reference source, will be strongly resisted once such a comparison has been stabilized over time.

It is precisely in this area that psychoanalytic theory ought to be able to help. Though the ego-psychological approach developed in this thesis is based on a broader understanding of motivation than equity theory, it nonetheless addresses the same problem of determining when an individual will respond to relationships by attempting to change them materially, when by changing contextual factors and/or attitudes, and when by distortions and maladaptations. It is thus able to fill a key gap in equity theory, answering an important question in existing organizational behavior research.

Equity theory has been most important among compensation specialists, partly because pay is a factor in which equity or inequity can readily be perceived. Adams' only early tests (Adams and Rosenbaum, 1962; Adams and Jacobsen, 1964; Adams, 1963; 1968) all show support for the theory in this area. Adams research has been supported on various points by Andrews (1967), Zedeck and Smith (1968), Goodman and Friedman (1971), Kessler and Wiener (1972), Garland (1973) and others. Gergen, Morse,

and Bode (1974) and Pritchard, Dunnette and Jorgenson (1972) have challenged the significance of overreward inequity, suggesting that in laboratory experiments the effect appears to dwindle to near zero. Garland (1973) offered the opposite finding, and to date the data seem insufficient to allow a clear choice.

Lawler (1968) has raised questions as to whether all of the responses found can be shown to be due to considerations of equity, or whether some may be due to the variable insecurity of respondents. Lawler's point seems plausible, although it does not negate the equity findings in any way. The psychoanalytic model developed in this thesis takes both arguments into account and will provide a basis for integrating them. Outside of the area of pay, there has been some support for Adams' theory in research on absenteeism and turnover (Finn and Lee, 1972; Dittrich and Carrell, 1976; Telly, French and Scott, 1971). And the research of Leventhal and colleagues (Leventhall, Weiss and Long, 1969; Leventhall, Michaels and Sanford, 1972; Leventhall, Weiss and Buttrick, 1973) yields strong support for equity theory from research on reward allocation. Cook (1975) has shown that equity theory arguments are supported only where subjects have a clear perception of the composition of input dimensions and their own position on these dimensions relative to the reference source. Lastly, there has been some support for the argument that important individual differences exist

in response to equity considerations. Larwood, Kavanaugh and Levine (1978) showed that people who gambled frequently were less consistently committed to equitable allocations than those who did not. Weick, Bougon and Maruyama (1976) showed some differences between Dutch and American workers, the former being less motivated by perceived inequities. Lawler and O'Gara (1967) also showed that socially insecure people were more likely to respond to underreward inequity with high productivity increases.

Equity theory is, in short, important and strongly supported by empirical findings. It is compatible with a psychoanalytic perspective, and a psychoanalytic perspective will broaden its base and allow potential resolution to one of the key questions remaining in the theory. The theory adds an important dimension to previous psychoanalytically oriented theories which have not always addressed questions of interpersonal comparisons of equity and distributive justice. Some of its propositions will be included in our final model.

Expectation State Theory

With roots in learning theory, an approach to motivation has been developed emphasizing the expectations which people develop in social interaction. Here needs are seen as partially learned constructs reflecting prior experience and cognitive processes. This approach is thriving in cognitive social psychology generally, as well

as having an impact on theories of motivation in organizations. Of the latter, Vroom's work is probably the most important, with Porter and Lawler and Galbraith and Cummings also contributing major studies. Reviews of the field can be found in Mitchell (1974) and Wabba and House (1974).

Vroom (1964) begins his theory construction by noting that people attach positive or negative values to the anticipated outcomes of various events, either in themselves or as means to the achievement of further goals. He terms these values "valences", following a chemical analogy. High valences make an outcome desirable. Desirable outcomes do not, however, in themselves lead to action. On the contrary, an individual may want something very much, but feel that his actions have very little probability of bringing it about, and have considerable potential cost. Action stems not just from valuations, but from expectations as to the likelihood that a particular course of action could produce the desired outcome. Vroom terms this combination of motivations the total "force" on a person to produce a given action. Action is the result of a process of maximization, weighing the various forces against each other. Performance is a function of ability times motivation.

From our point of view, some of the most important work in this vein is the elaboration of Vroom's framework

by Porter and Lawler. This is especially significant because Lawler has gone on to become one of the leading figures in socio-technical systems theory--an approach on which we shall draw for our synthetic model. Lawler's work is among the most psychologically sensitive of the mainstream American (as opposed to Tavistock related) socio-technical systems approaches. The initial model developed by Porter and Lawler (1968) stemmed from research on the determinants of productivity, and emphasized nine variables:

1. Value of reward (valence).
2. Effort-reward probability (expectancy and costs or instrumentality).
3. Effort (force).
4. Abilities and traits of individuals.
5. Role perceptions.
6. Performance on job-related tasks.
7. Rewards (intrinsic and extrinsic outcomes).
8. Perceived equitable rewards (fairness).
9. Satisfaction (the extent to which rewards meet or exceed the perceived equitable level; dissatisfaction is held to result from underreward inequity only).

Porter and Lawler follow Vroom as to the multiplicative relationship among the first three variables, and also obviously draw on equity theory. They add to Vroom's formulation, a greater concern for dynamic processes, embodied primarily in the specification of feedback loops

among their variables. Thus, to the extent that performance does result in reward, they hold the perceived effort-reward probability to be increased. Similarly, when satisfaction is experienced after receiving a reward, it tends to influence the future value of that reward. Lawler (1971, 1973) has elaborated this scheme, and in particular the feedback model, and at the same time suggested in more detail how organizational structure and the particular technical systems characteristic of different kinds of work can influence the whole model. Further extension and elaboration of the Vroom model has been provided by Graen (1969). Research has been done, with generally positive results, by Vroom (1966), Vroom and Deci (1971), Galbraith and Cummings (1967) and Hackman and Porter (1968) as well as Porter and Lawler (1967, 1968a).

A variety of questions have been raised concerning the reliability of measures in expectation states theory (Galbraith and Cummings, 1967; Graen, 1969; DeLeo and Pritchard, 1974; Berger, 1976). Some researchers have also argued that outcomes should not be pretermed by researchers, as in most studies, but derived from subjects (Matsui and Ikeda, 1976; Oliver, 1974). Data from such studies, however, supports the general propositions of the theory. An important variable which has had to be added to the original formulations following empirical research is some consideration of the boundary conditions under

which the theory operates. In particular, it has had to be noted that actors in different organizations have widely varying extents of clarity regarding the contingency relations between attaining effective job performance and attaining desirable outcomes (Graen, 1969; Dachler and Mobley, 1973; Reinharth and Wahba, 1975). These studies identified ways in which managers could render an organization a conducive context for expectation state approaches to motivation, primarily by making connections between actions and rewards quite clear.

The most important criticisms of expectation states theory as developed by Vroom, Lawler and others, focus on the theory's rationalistic and hedonistic assumptions. Locke (1976) has offered a strong series of arguments against the assumption that people are either such rational actors as the theory assumes, or so clearly oriented to maximizing rewards. In particular, he suggests that people are often self-punitive, and that actual decisions often run quite counter to the rationalistic reconstructions and prescriptions of formal decision theory. Locke and especially Mitchell (1977) have drawn out the problematic implications of these assumptions for expectation states theory as a special case of utilitarian decision theory. A considerable range of arguments concerning decision theory thus must be applied to expectation states theories of organizational behavior.

The psychoanalytic basis for organizational analysis to be developed in this thesis addresses precisely this problem. It suggests that Lawler and others have been on the right track in attempting to fit a theory of individual motivation into a theory of organizational structure and technology. On all three fronts, however, they have been wrong to assume a highly rationalistic model of operation. Organizations, technical systems, and individuals all contain various forms of irrationality. Irrationality occurs both because of the intrusion of affective factors into organizational and instrumental decision making, and because of intrinsic limits to rational systems. The ego-psychological framework developed by Bellak, et al (1973), offers a basis for reworking the psychological foundations of socio-technical systems theory so as to enable it to meet the fundamental criticisms posed by analysis such as Locke (see Chapter Four).

Decision Tree Leadership Theories

Vroom and others have developed an approach to organizational leadership which it is worth mentioning here because it has very similar problems to expectations states theory. It is a rationalistic model of how managers decide on the ways in which they will deal with subordinates. The theory actual began with an influential article by Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1958) on how to choose a leadership pattern. Vroom and Yetton gave it its

strongest formulation, although by Heller's formulation (1971), a researcher at the Tavistock Institute, has also been influential. Much of the work has been focused on the extent of decision-sharing which takes place.

Vroom and Yetton (1973) differentiate between instances when, if decision-sharing occurs, it will be with two or more subordinates and thus of a group nature, and cases when only a single subordinate would be involved. They establish a continuum, in each case, between manager centered and shared decision making. The process of arriving at a position on this continuum is, however, held to be a progression through a decision tree. Managers are seen as rational actors having it essentially within their power to share decision making. In establishing their practices, they follow a series of formal decision rules based on the following criteria:

1. extent of information available.
2. extent of congruence between the goals of manager and subordinate.
3. extent to which the problem faced is structured.
4. extent to which acceptance by the subordinate of the decision is important.
5. likelihood of conflict between manager and subordinate.
6. extent to which fairness is more important than specific quality of decision made..
7. extent to which subordinates can or must be trusted.

Vroom and Yetton, whose work focuses only on groups, essentially assume that managers (a) would rather decide autocratically, and (b) modify their autocratic preference in an extremely rational, cost/benefit analytic way. They go through a series of steps, at each point making a discrete and informed decision. In later research, Vroom and Jago (1974) make similar arguments where only individuals are involved. Vroom and Jago, however, indicated that where only individuals are involved there is less pressure for involvement than where groups are at issue. In both cases, however, some questions have been raised concerning the normative nature of the research, particularly because it focused on reports by managers to the exclusion of direct analysis of subordinates and living organizational contexts. Jago and Vroom (1977) thus indicate a low level of agreement between managers and subordinates, although the subordinates agree among themselves. Research on managers does provide some, if modest, support for the theory. It does not overcome the doubt that the analysis is only rational reconstructions, and not of reality. Applications have demonstrated primarily the heuristic and prescriptive value of thinking about decisions in this way, not the utility of this model as a description of actual decision-making (Vroom, 1973, 1976).

Heller's largely parallel work has focused on a continuum of influence and power running from superior to

subordinates. It is important primarily as the source of additional research (Heller, 1971, 1973, 1976; Heller and Wilpert, 1979). The theories are not in substantial conflict, and they have contributed to some useful findings as to the circumstances under which participative or autocratic managerial styles dominate. It appears, for example, that the higher the organizations level the more likely a participative style. The research is significant in getting away from a notion that leadership styles are purely individual characteristics to imply that there are situational variables. It still suffers, however, from the problems of excessive rationalism and the postulate of hedonism. In addition, it fails to become a truly organizational theory, remaining simply a cross-sectional theory of the behavior of individuals within organizations. I suggest that the particular importance of groups needs to be understood through the psychodynamics of groups as analyzed by researchers following Bion's early leads (see Chapter Two below). Moreover, factors in the structure and genesis of organizational forms need to be taken into account to grasp why managers in some settings are more open to participation than those in others. Not least of all, this will help to provide the basis for an understanding of socio-technical change processes, as new technologies or changing environmental conditions dictate different "rationalities" and styles to organizations. In short,

the perspective adopted by Vroom and Heller fails to take a sufficiently complex view of individuals, and it attempts to generalize too much based on the individual unit of analysis. It pushes one approach as far as it can go without taking the functioning of organizational wholes into account. My analytic paradigm will, I hope, improve upon it by doing precisely that.

The Social Psychology of Organizations

The problems we have seen even with Vroom's and Lawler's very important and sophisticated theories suggest the need to turn our attention away from theories of motivation to theories which, while still psychologically informed, focus on organizational life as such. These theories take a broader view of the social psychology of management, and will provide a more important foundation for my own model. Indeed, I have included theories in this section rather than the previous one as much because I think they can closely inform my own model as because their own authors treat fully of organizational wholes.

The first at which I shall look is McGregor's famous "Theory X and Theory Y" formulation of how managers understand their organizations and lead within them. This theory is only part of the way from a motivational to a fully organizational theory, and is now quite old, but it has been widely influential. Among the work influenced by it are a number of studies--including those of Likert, Argyris, Miles, and others much closer to my own view. I

shall treat all together, but briefly, under the rubric of "humanistic management." More attention will be devoted to Lawrence's and Lorsch's "contingency theory" (along with related attempts to related the internal life of organizations to environmental factors), and to March's and Simon's very sophisticated treatments of administrative and organizational decision making. The two major psychoanalytic theories which arguably belong under the present heading--Tavistock work and Levinson's organizational diagnosis, will be discussed in the next chapter.

Humanistic Management

McGregor was the central figure in launching the "humanistic management" school during the 1950s as the replacement to so-called "scientific management." This is, indeed, the essential contrast embodied in his famous notion of Theory X and Theory Y. The bad old sort of manager sees his active intervention, his control over an organization, as the only way to make it work. He regards the average employee as indolent, lacking in ambition, self-centered, resistant to change, indifferent to organizational needs, and not very bright. Management is the job, in this theory x view, of persuading, cajoling, rewarding and punishing, coercing and controlling people. The up-to-date, good manager, however, sees things differently. In his view--Theory Y--people only become passive or resistant to change as a result of change in

organizations. The fundamentals of motivation are present in all people; management doesn't put them there, but only encourages people to recognize and develop their own potentials. The essential task of management is to arrange organizational conditions and operating patterns that people can achieve their own goals best by directing their own efforts toward organizational objectives (McGregor, 1957, 1960, 1967). The shift from Theory X to Theory Y, from external control to self-control, is what the "new" discipline of organizational behavior was to preach for the third quarter of the twentieth century. The work of such current major figures as Chris Argyris follows directly in this tradition; Rensis Likert carried it on before him. We shall look first at McGregor, the archetype, and then at Likert and Argyris.

McGregor saw four different kinds of innovations as consistent with Theory Y:

1. decentralization and delegation of control
2. job enlargement
3. participatory and consultative management
4. performance appraisal within a management-by-objectives framework.

McGregor saw the earlier "human relations" school as involving only "pseudo-participation", not as a real break with Theory X. Among other failings, the previous generations of theorists were faulted for failing to treat the expenditure of effort in work as being as natural as

play or rest. McGregor denied any contradiction between "real" organizational needs and possibilities for human self-fulfillment. Theory Y was to enable managers and employees to integrate their personal needs fully with those of the organization. Participative management was a key point in how this was to come about. Senior executives were to be advisors at least as much as bosses within their organizations.

The implication of all this is not only that the catch phrases Theory X and /Theory Y can be used to describe empirical instances of managerial practice, but that instances conforming more closely to Theory Y will be seen to be more effective. Research on this leaves doubts. Stogdill (1974) reviews the literature negatively, arguing that there is little evidence that Theory Y works; he argues accordingly against Theory Y. Schein (1975) takes a somewhat more balanced approach in his review, and indicates that the evidence is not conclusive either way; Theory Y does have a good deal going for it in some cases. The problem, Schein suggests, is that the theory lacks efficient specificity and precision. McGregor leaves us hanging, substituting an overall orientation for an actual theory. A reasonable conclusion seems to be that McGregor mixed his advocacy for a form of organizational democracy with his prescriptions for managerial effectiveness so that it is impossible empirically or theoretically to disaggregate the two.

McGregor's approach nonetheless captured widespread influence during the 1960s. It was central to the organizational development school, especially as represented by such figures as McGregor's former student Warren Bennis (Bennis, 1969). Many of the OD leaders also linked notions of participatory management both to organizational effectiveness and to overall democratic social goals. One of the problems with this perspective is that it has consistently been phrased in terms of a polar opposition between autocracy and democracy, in which the latter is seen as the maximal distribution of influence among individuals (Bennis and Slater, 1968). This is an unrealistic schema at both ends. Few stable organizations are likely to be radically autocratic, and simply promoting individualistic democracy will not secure participation. Calhoun (1980) has suggested the importance of a structure of intermediate associations. These would be smaller groups, in which individuals might form the sorts of sentient attachments which promote risk taking and commitment. In any case, careful analysis will show a close interrelationship between some such social factors and the psychological basis for participation. Such factors must be combined with attention to the various perceptual issues raised by Miles (1975). Miles found, for example, that there was no necessary correlation between managers' statements favoring participation and their assessments of their subordinates

capacities for participatory management. This lack of confidence undermines managerial commitment to Theory Y. Roberts, Miles and Blakenship (1968) have shown, however, that there is some, if not overwhelming, relationships between holding Theory Y assumptions and both satisfaction and performance.

The psychologist Rensis Likert worked on some of the same issues as McGregor, with more methodological flair, and more concern for organizational issues. His most noted contribution to organizational studies is probably his idea of "lynch-pin" figures in organizational linkages. In grappling with the problem of how to bring about greater organizational democracy, he argued that each working unit needed to be represented at a higher level through one of its own members. This would preserve the necessary hierarchy of functions with an organization, without disenfranchising and alienating those towards the bottom of the ladder (Likert, 1961). With such conceptions, Likert introduced a more systems-oriented account of organizational functioning. After distinguishing various less satisfactory approaches, he described his own ideal as "system four", a more subtle variation on McGregor's Theory Y organization. Likert's (1967) analysis of "the human organization" represented an important step beyond the individualism of McGregor's "human side of management", and a step in the direction of the present thesis. It is, nonetheless, based on a very

general account of human motivation and participation in organizational life, and it has no full-fledged holistic model of organizational psychology.

McGregor's work (1957) combined with Drucker's (1954) writings to create the modern "management by objectives" approach. This had earlier roots in Lewinian social psychology (Lewin, 1935, 1938; Lewin, Dembo, Festinger and Sears, 1944) but did not make major headway in management circles until the 1950s (LaFollette and Fleming, 1977, offer a useful historical review). Though proponents differ on this, at least one major figure has argued that "goal-setting is more appropriately viewed as a motivational technique rather than as a formal theory of motivation, despite previous suggestions to the contrary" (Locke, 1975, p. 465). Management by objectives is typically seen as following specified series of steps in setting objectives, working toward goals and reviewing performance (Wikstrom, 1968; Odiorne, 1965; Raia, 1974; and Chung, 1977, for several versions of this basic scheme). The basic idea is that both sides will clearly understand and feel a commitment to the process in which they are involved, and so will be highly motivated to achieve good results.

The question to be raised with this entire line of work is whether it can generate a theory explaining the differences among organizations, or whether it is limited to exhortations and generalizations. I would contend that

the latter is the case. In particular, the absence of a genetic dimension, an analysis of the particular histories leading to current organizational structure, culture and functioning, is fundamentally problematic. I propose, in developing my psychodynamic theory of socio-technical systems, to include show how some of the formal management schemes which grew partially from MBO implementations fail because they fail to achieve adequate fit with particular organizations. I suggest that the sort of socio-psychological and genetic theory which I offer treats a necessarily prior dimension: it establishes the conditions for successful MBO or other technical implementation.

These sorts of problems have been noted before, probably most importantly by the organizational psychologist Chris Argyris. Argyris is one of the most recent and important figures in the long line of humanistic management advocates. He has concerned himself with everything from the impacts of new technology (1976) to the development of personnel selection procedures based on more adequate incorporation of personality theory (1957) to better fit between individuals and organizations (1964) to strategies for the implementation of planned change (1971). He has identified himself strongly as an "action theorist" and has criticized organizational sociology for its "inapplicability" (1974). For the most part his work has accordingly not been theoretical, but

devoted to particular practical concerns. His overall orientation is in the broad tradition of humanistic management, but he has been attentive to the problems faced by executives wanting to implement participatory programs. He notes, for example, that people are not at present socialized to expect and deal well with participatory organizations, and therefore often find them threatening rather than encouraging.

Though Argyris's work has often been extremely creative in grappling with the organizational and psychological implications of technical changes, and other issues, it remains focused on individualistic psychology, on motivation and personality issues as they impact organizations which are presumed to be otherwise rational entities. Only within the last few years has Argyris begun to try to develop a richer account of organizations themselves. This effort began with his critique of organizational sociology (1974). Where he had previously assumed that structural and "macro-organizational" issues were the sociologist's domain, and individuals were the psychologist's expertise, he began to argue that the former were too important to be left to the sociologists. The sociologists produced theories which were very abstract and generalized, inapplicable to particular organizations and particular management problems. The sociologists were obsessed with notions of science in which statistical generalizations played the central

role. This, according to Argyris, radically limited their ability to come to terms with the process of organizational life, as opposed to its abstract structure. Only the processual view could lead, he argued, to practical help in organizational change.

Argyris's response to this problem was a move in the same direction advocated by the present work. A psychologically based theory of whole organizations had to be developed. Argyris lacked, however, any theoretical basis for such a theory. He attempted to build it--very creatively--by bits and pieces drawn from widely disparate sources. He has produced, thereby, some important work of which we shall take account in formulating our final model, but he has not been able to go beyond "think-pieces" to a more rigorous scientific framework because he lacks a synthetic theory. He advocates interpretation of affective data concerning organizational life, for example, but is unable to offer a consistent, theoretically developed and empirically tested framework and guide for such interpretation. This is the role which I think psychoanalysis--and in particular Bellak's version of ego-psychology (1973)--is particularly well suited to play. Argyris has perhaps not made his most important contributions in the area of overall theory, but in the analysis of the impact of particular technical systems of management on the social psychology of organizations.

March and Simon on Organizational Decision-Making

We have already looked at several theories purporting to analyze and or prescribe methods of making decisions in formal organizations. As early as 1949, however, Herbert Simon had argued that administrative decision making worked under very different conditions from those presumed by most management theorists. Simon is a psychologist and expert in artificial intelligence who has been awarded the Nobel prize in economics for his work on administration and organization. As the central intellectual figure in the brilliant postwar development of Carnegie-Mellon's business school, he worked closely with a number of other innovative and important figures in organizational analysis. Probably the most important were J.D. Thompson and James March, whom we shall accordingly treat together in this section. The line of work which Simon fostered has been extremely influential, and represents probably the most sophisticated attempt to deal with the decision-making process in organizations. It is, therefore, of central importance to the present effort. It will help to clarify the underpinnings of the cognitive component of organizational ego-functioning--as well as making various other, more particular contributions.

Criticizing most previous (and concurrent) management theory for offering a series of proverbs without close attention to the conditions under which they were appropriate, Simon began in the 1930s to build an

alternative. His approach was largely based on the work and teaching of Chester Barnard (1938). Key to Simon's conceptualization is the definition of administration as decision-making. He suggests the premises on which decisions are made constitute the best unit for analysis, not individual decisions. These premises are of two sorts: valiative and factual. Given values and information, individuals reach decisions. Simon takes alternatives and consequences to be the key factual elements with which decisions are made. The administrator attempts to create a list of potential courses of action from which he selects those which seem "plausible." He then tries to anticipate as closely as he can the consequences (including costs) of these in order to assess how much they will meet his ends. Crucial factors are then seen to be the constraints placed on individuals' decision making, whether through multiple ends, limited information, identification with a social group, previous training, or immediate stimuli that focus attention. It is readily apparent that such administrative commonplaces as division of tasks and flow of communication have here become incorporated into an integrated scheme rather than each treated in itself.

In Simon's conceptualization (the following draws primarily on Simon, 1957, supplemented by March and Simon, 1958), there are three major categories of people involved in organizations. These are distinguished according to

the motivations they have for being members of the organization, that is, the ways in which they may benefit from it (Blau and Scott, 1963; Blau, 1968 for general discussions of "who benefits?" typologies). Simon's categories are entrepreneurs, employees, and customers. The situation may be somewhat more complex in a government agency, where one must decide, for example, whether a legislature is the analogue of customers or entrepreneurs (1957, p. 16). In order to have the organization, whatever it may be, all the classes of people must contribute--whether funds, administration, or labor--to the organization. That is, they must regard some aspect of it--pay, product or profit--as contributing sufficiently to their own ends for them to part with their resources. Thus, Simon says, one need not posit a group mind to show how collective decisions as to "organizational purposes" are made. They are made by many small decisions contributing to a large and only partially observable stream of organizational decision. In a number of ways, these individual decisions may not themselves be conscious. They may be the results of habit; they are influenced by span of attention, learning, and memory. Unconscious motives frequently may limit the extent to which we pursue our conscious ends rationally. According to Simon:

The central concern of administrative theory is with the boundary between the rational and the non-rational aspects of human social behavior. (1957, p. 24)

Bounded rationality, not the absolute rationality postulated by economic theory or some variants of behaviorism, must be the concern of the administrator and the student of organizations.

Organizations themselves are set up largely to influence the decision-making of their members. They will generally be one of the most important determinants of individual decisions, but not always in the ways intended. Simon's and March's arguments here bear some resemblance to Vroom's analyses of normative vs. descriptive treatments of decision making in organizations, discussed above. Simon's treatment is, however, more logically and psychologically sophisticated. At a general level, he suggests five mechanisms of organizational influence:

1. The organization divides work among its members.
2. The organization establishes standard practices.
3. The organization transmits decisions downward (and laterally or even upward) through its ranks by establishing systems of authority and influence.
4. The organization provides channels of communication running in all directions through which information for decision-making flows.
5. The organization trains and indoctrinates its members. (following pp. 102-3)

These mechanisms demonstrate that Simon's argument that individual decisions are the stuff of organizational

decisions does not constitute a psychological reductionism. It does not deny more holistic factors such as organizational structure or the psychological style of organizations, but in fact gives them a prominent place. Decisions make up organizations, I think one must interpret Simon as saying, only over time. Organizations are created in a process of decision-making, but past decisions condition future ones; the residues of some decisions are long-lasting indeed. Understanding organizations as made up of individual decisions thus necessitates a genetic view. This is an indication of the compatibility of Simon's approach with--as well as its value for--the model I am developing.

Answering earlier writers (and by extension also later systems analysts as well) who suggest that all this can be reduced to a rationality of means and ends, a simple utilitarian calculus, Simon raises three objections to the means/ends schema:

1. It obscures the comparative element in decision-making,
2. it does not achieve a successful separation of the factual elements in decision from the value elements, and
3. that it gives insufficient recognition to the time variable in purposive behavior. (1957, p. 66)

the comparative element is the consideration of alternative ends which could be reached through the selection of another behavior. Ultimate ends are often vague enough--e.g. profit, efficiency, equality--that the

definition of shorter term ends, of the problem under immediate consideration, becomes crucial. The ego-psychological argument I shall develop gives central attention to this issue through its analysis of the variable capacities for attention achieved in different states of ego-functioning, and through its emphasis on factors of object-choice. This will also facilitate better attention to a factor which the means/ends schema underestimates. This is the convergence of the effects of various behaviors on each other. Even Simon's scheme assumes a considerable degree of "discreteness" among behaviors, though not so much as conventional microeconomic thought. People do not, however, deal separately with a whole range of possible actions, but tend--as Simon notes--to treat them in clusters. We have general orientations to action which link our different behaviors to each other in patterns which are hard to break. It is not enough, therefore, to say that one searches as far as is "plausible" for indications of the outcomes of one's actions. One must also incorporate into a full organizational theory the factors determining the directions in which one considers outcomes. One may look in one direction and not another because of the ways in which his job is defined, because of past experiences with one branch of an organization, because of general features of organizational style, etc. In any case, where, as well as how far, people look for the implications of their

actions is an important empirical question to be examined for each individual organizational case.

An important element in Simon's approach is the way in which individuals identify themselves with groups, and individuals and groups identify themselves with larger organizations. I noted above that this produces a constraint on decision-making. I would emphasize here that Simon points out--crucially-- that without such constraints, decision-making would be impossible. Indeed, there are such a multitude of possible values, alternative behaviors and potentially relevant sources of information that an individual who attempted to consider them all could never act. It is in this context that his famous aphorism comes into relevance: "Administrative theory is peculiarly the theory of intended and bounded rationality--of the behavior of human beings who satisfice because they have not the wits to maximize" (1957, p. 24). Identification with groups or organizations focuses the individual's decision-making on certain particular goals and behaviors. In identifying with the group, the individual selects only such of the alternatives nominally open to him as will fit with the behaviors he expects from other members of his groups. The individual may also identify his own welfare with that of the group, and thus contributes to the support of the group in ways which only indirectly benefit him (see discussion in March and Simon, 1958, chap. 4, of the

motivational constraints of people's decisions to participate). On the other hand, the individual may identify with the group's original objectives and/or values in such a way that he will reject the group should it change its foci. Since both continuity and flexibility are important, an organization cannot work long or well with an excess of either zealots or opportunists. It must achieve a certain balance. It must achieve a balance also in the identification of its members with their primary groups (immediate subgroups within the organization) and with the organization as a whole (this is a problem central to the work of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967c)).

Groups and organizations both influence their members by determining some--but not all--of the premises upon which their decisions are based. The congruency of group and organizational influence becomes an important variable. Either may influence the individual through his set of values or through his information, or information-processing abilities. Simon distinguishes the stimuli with which the organization seeks to influence the individual and the psychological set of the individual, which determines his response to the stimuli. These he terms the "external" and "internal" aspects of influence, respectively. In order to understand the individual's behavior in the organization, one must understand both of these patterns of influence (1957, p. 125, et. seq.). The social structure of the organization may be seen, thus, to

act as a determinant of even the unconscious dispositions of its members. The key to Simon's theory is his conceptualization of bounded rationality--and of the systematic, if often unconscious, character of the boundaries.

This perspective has remained central in the recent work of James March and several colleagues on problematic cases in organizational decision-making (March and Olsen, 1976). They have proposed, for example, the "garbage can theory" which suggests that managers readily and promptly make only those decisions which fall in a middle area between the trivial and the very important. They consign the most important decisions, along with the least important, to a sort of mental garbage can. The least important decisions can mount up, and failure to deal with minutiae can cause organizational problems. Much more dramatic, however, are the problems caused by refusal to deal with the truly large and complex decisions. The underlying issue, as March and Olsen see it, is the tremendous ambiguity of information and mandate faced by many modern organizations. The greater the ambiguity, the greater the organizational tendency to "garbage can" operation; the big decisions will be avoided in favor of those about which managers can develop a (probably partially spurious) sense of certainty. This is a good account of much of what happens when accountability and formal management systems are introduced into

organizations laboring in highly ambiguous circumstances as I have reported for schools (Levine, 1975). The formal systems are used to produce elaborate retrospective records, to exert administrative control, but not to plan or fundamentally change organizations. To sum up March and Olsen's point, the extent of ambiguity faced by organizations and their leaders, and their capabilities for dealing with ambiguity are crucial determinants of the quality of organizational choice.

The perspective of bounded rationality and decision-making developed by Simon and March will prove helpful in our treatment of organizational cognitive functions later. It is particularly significant because it makes a bridge between the psychoanalytic theory's focus on affective life and a more explicitly cognitive psychology and marginalist economics.

Contingency Theory

In the early 1960s, impressed by the number of recent comparative studies of organizations which stressed the interrelation of organization and environment (Woodward, 1958; Burns and Stalker, 1961), Lawrence and Lorsch set out to develop both research and conceptualizations to integrate this into organizational research. They found important further background in the work of March and Simon (1958) and in the work of the Tavistock group to be discussed in the next chapter (Rice, 1963). Their initial efforts included intensive studies of ten firms,

stratified for performance, in a highly innovative industry. This they followed up with comparisons in different industrial environments. Their initial impression of the importance of differentiation and integration as a key organizational variable was confirmed, as was their hypothesis that environmental conditions constituted a major independent variable to which organizations adapted their structures and processes either more or less well. One of their most important achievements was recognizing the variable structure of this adaptation and demonstrating its relation to productivity. Earlier writers had tended to speak of adaptation in simple causal terms applied generally across situations. It is this notion of adaptation which gave rise to the label "contingency theory", for Lawrence and Lorsch aimed to show that not just productivity but organizational structure itself was contingent on environmental (and in most cases many other) factors.

What Lawrence and Lorsch showed (1967, is the major report; 1969) was that the most effective organizations in any given environment achieved the balance of differentiation and integration best suited to that environment. There is no best balance in absolute--rather than contingent--terms. They thus treat the management of differentiation and integration as the essential adaptive task of organizations. Drawing on much recent social psychology, they also suggest the important positive

functions of conflict (and especially its resolution) in achieving integration. In an important supplement to March and Simon, they show how effective decision-making depends on the level in the organization at which decisions are made, and how the most effective level depends on the environment. At least in the diverse and rapidly changing environment of the plastics industry during Lawrence's and Lorsch's research in the 1960s, it was necessary for decisions to be made at relatively low levels of administration because of their specialized nature and/or the need for immediate response. Similarly, different kinds of decisions are appropriate to different levels. Thus questions of major capital expenditure need to be made fairly high up, but as Woodward (1958, 1965) has shown, these are a large proportion of the decisions made only in certain highly capital intensive industries. In other cases--sales, for example (Miller and Rice, 1967)--responsiveness to customer demand is more crucial, demand more flexible and decisions correspondingly more likely to be made at lower levels. In such cases the relative importance of each decision, that is, its potential cost, is much less.

Many of the issues which affect the variance among organizations may also be seen to affect the attitudes and actions of different departments within the same organization. Thus, departmental specialization may be required to deal with the scientific, market, and

techno-economic sectors respectively, but this same specialization means that each will have a different approach to issues that arise. This is not only a matter of sub-group loyalties, although these are certainly important. It is also a matter of the kind of environment to which the different groups are in the habit of responding, and the information which they have about the dependence of their portion of the organization on the whole. Some of the factors which go about differentiating the style of different departments are (a) the clarity of information with which they generally work, (b) the uncertainty of causal relationships in their tasks, and (c) the time span of definitive feedback regarding their performance. Lawrence and Lorsch combine these three factors in a total uncertainty score. It is readily apparent how such measures of uncertainty relate to the propositions Simon put forward about the necessity to satisfice rather than maximize in administrative decisions, and to March and Olsen's notion of "garbage can" decision making. It also demonstrates how total organizational integration is an impossible (as well as probably undesirable) goal. There are concrete and continuing necessary reasons for many of the conflicting aims and styles in organizations, not only retrospective or genetic ones (Levinson, 1972 and discussion below).

Lawrence and Lorsch's contingency theory pulls together not only their research findings but also a

number of earlier works in organizational research. These were preeminently concerned with small group psychology (Leavitt, 1962), and the "contingency" in them referred to variables of leadership style. Probably the most famous usage of the phrase "contingency theory," prior to Lawrence and Lorsch was indeed in Fiedler's studies of leadership (Fiedler, 1964; 1967; Fiedler, Chemers and Mahar, 1976). Numerous other researchers had also brought task and environmental variables into the foreground in a variety of different types of studies. We have already mentioned earlier industrial sociology (Woodward, 1958, 1965; Biurns Stalker, 1961; Chandler, 1962). Lawrence and Lorsch also emphasize the importance of earlier more psychological studies of individual predispositions in relation to performance in different types of organizational, environmental or task situations. Fiedler (1962, 1967) found that different kinds of leadership style paid off in high group performance under different conditions. Vroom (1960) reversed the order of variables, and found that the impact of opportunities for participation in management had greater effect on certain personality types ("egalitarians") than on others ("authoritarians"). In an earlier study, Lawrence had found that there was no universal response to variance in job complexity among the members of his sample (Turner and Lawrence, 1965). Rather, two sets of workers brought different orientations towards work into their jobs. One

group-labelled "city"--saw it as an unpleasant means to a desirable end. The other--labelled "town"--saw it as worthwhile in and of itself, as serving an expressive and/or moral function (Gouldner, 1957, on "cosmopolitans and locals"). A criticism could be levelled against the labellings in that they seem coincidental rather than direct classifications of the two populations, but the findings themselves are useful. A number of recent writers have taken work on organizations and their environments further, though almost exclusively within a social structural orientation (Child, 1972a, 1972b, 1973; Child and Mansfield, 1972; Hickson, et al., 1971; Pugh, et al., 1969; Emery and Trist, 1965; Aldrich, 1980; pfeffer, 1979; Pfeffer and Selancik, 1981).

One of the most important contributions of Lawrence and Lorsch is the demonstration that conceptual frameworks such as those of March and Simon, usually phrased abstractly, can still be translated into concrete empirical research designs. Their own contributions to theory are research on and analysis of certain contingencies, rather than a satisfactory overall conceptualization. A wide range of conceptual issues are left untouched, and there is no single unifying set of theoretical concepts. The same points may be made with regard to other research work in organizational behavior. The approaches provide new information, but they provide no framework within which to deal integratively with it

and with other varieties of knowledge. Work such as that of Lawrence and Lorsch and March and Simon argues powerfully for the importance of a holistic, integrated theory of organizations which does not fail to take into account the complexities of particular cases and the importance of unconscious psychological life. That is precisely the goal I set for the theoretical framework developed in this thesis. In the next chapter we shall turn away from broad literature review and description of the problem to examination of the work most closely related to my own; that is, the psychoanalytically inspired research and theory building of workers associated with the Tavistock institute and its key figures, and of Harry Levinson.

CHAPTER II

PSYCHOANALYTIC APPROACHES TO
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS

Introduction

The review of organizational behavior literature in the last chapter suggested that the numerous useful observations and hypotheses in that literature were not well integrated into any overall theory. I argued, in particular, that the attempts at theoretical integration which had been made suffered from either an excessive focus on the individuals within organizations, or an excessive abstraction of organizational forms away from psychological variables. Psychological perspectives, in other words, failed to deal with organizations as wholes, while holistic work in structural sociology was unable to deal with questions of how individuals are integrated into organizations. Both perspectives were faulted for an inattention to genetic variables, a neglect of both the role of particular organizational histories and general developmental patterns.

It is my argument that the best way to overcome these problems is to draw on the theory of ego-psychology within psychoanalysis. This includes at least two major advantages. First, reliance on psychoanalysis assures

that a considerable and well-elaborated body of theory will underpin organizational analysis, rather than an ad hoc collection of observations and assertions. Second, unlike other psychological theories, psychoanalytic ego-psychology is explicitly holistic, and thus will provide a framework for integrating a perspective on organizations as wholes with the understanding of individual motivation and attention patterns which has been developed by individualistic psychology. This cannot be simply a matter of direct incorporation of the one into the other. It involves some problems of translation and adaptation. The psychoanalytic theories were developed initially to explain the functioning of individuals, and to a much lesser extent, of small fact-to-face groups. Care is needed in adapting them to the level of complex organizations. In particular, it is necessary to assess which psychoanalytic propositions can be directly used in organizational analysis, and which can be used only by analogy. We shall touch on these issues in this chapter, but they are left primarily to the theory-construction parts of this thesis, Chapters Four and Five.

In the present chapter we shall survey the pioneering attempts which have been made by researchers associated with the Tavistock Institute and by Harry Levinson to apply psychoanalytic theory to organizations. As we shall see, these attempts differ in various ways from the present mode. The Tavistock approaches are heavily indebted to

the work of Melanie Klein and other proponents of the so-called "object-relations" school of psychoanalytic thought. Though I incline toward seeing ego-psychology as more helpful in organizational analysis, I shall try in this chapter to give the most positive construction I can of Kleinian psychoanalysis and the organizational theories based on it. In addition, Levinson presents a model of organizational consultation based largely on the notion of how psychoanalysts relate to patients, but does not elaborate a specific interpretative schema. It is the aim of the present thesis to do so, an aim I construe as in line with Levinson's overall approach.

Before examining these specific psychoanalytic theories of organizations, however, it is necessary to say a little about the general basis which psychoanalysis provides for organizational analysis. I shall, in particular, stress the utility I find in the notion of an "organizational personality."

Psychoanalysis and Organizational Analysis

Psychoanalytic analyses of social organization date from the very early years of psychoanalytic history. Freud and a number of his closest followers all engaged in sociological analysis. They did so, however, primarily by reasoning about the social implications of psychoanalytic discoveries about individual life. In other words, early psychoanalytic sociology--and much of current social thought in psychoanalysis--focus on the ways in which the

dynamics of individual life, especially unconscious life, affected social institutions. It has only been more recently that any considerable body of literature has developed arguing a more direct extension of psychoanalytic theory to social organizations. There are various tacks which such an argument can take. I wish to stress the notion that the organization, taken as a whole, may be considered to have a personality directly analogous to that of the human individual. Just as corporations are treated as persons in law, so I think firms and other formal organizations can profitably be treated as persons in psychoanalysis. In terms of the aggregate psychological lives of its membership, and in terms of its dealing with other actors in its environment, an organization comes to have a psychological life of its own.

In such a view, the organization itself may be taken as the unit of a psychoanalytic inquiry, differing only in particulars from psychoanalytic inquiry into the conscious and unconscious lives of individuals. This is not to argue that the organization in any sense "contains" all the psychological lives of its members, and therefore is simply a total of them. On the contrary, they remain separable individuals, some of whom may be more involved or more devoted than others. Each member, however, brings a certain psychological content to the organization. Each of these elements is a sort of building block, as units of experience are to the individual. Tied together into an

organic whole, these units constitute the psychic "stuff" of the organization. They are like many variables expressed as one function. Because they are knit--more or less tightly--together into an organization, each of these individuals is affected by the whole, and in turn affects others through the whole as well as directly. Moreover, the whole comes to take on a life of its own, distinct from any of the particular individuals which make it up. It has its own history and development, its own functional patterns, and its own goals. In addition, I will argue that organizations as a class follow certain developmental patterns; they are a common genetic phenomenon, just as human individuals are.

In this sense, it is commonly held that the extension of psychoanalytic conceptualizations to organizations must proceed on the basis of an organic analogy. It is assumed that the parts of an organization are related to each other as the parts of an organism are related. I do not wish to counter this notion of how an organization constitutes a "whole". I do, however, wish to suggest that it is not the only possible one. A functional interpretation need not rest on an organic analogy, but is itself an independent ground for asserting commonality between human individuals and complex organizations. When an ego-psychologist discusses the integration of an individual's personality, he is discussing an autonomous psychological variable; the individual does not

automatically have an integrated personality because of his biological, organic existence. Similarly, we can hold that it is appropriate to treat of organizations as wholes because they manifest some considerable degree of integration. This integration is demonstrated not by analogy but by direct reference to functional unity, by showing the dependence of particular aspects of organizational functioning on others. This is what the Bellak, et al (1973) scheme of analyzing ego-functions will enable us to do. Whether founded on organic analogy or direct reference to functional unity, the psychoanalytic concept of organizational diagnosis and consultation demands treating the organization as a whole, not simply dealing with those parts of it which are expressing its overall problems at any one point in time.

Miller and Rice (1967, p. 15) have argued in a similar vein that the Tavistock approach based on object relations can be extended without fundamental modification to individual, group and large organizational levels. The reason that the same analytic structure is appropriate to all three levels is that all three are instances of the same principles of psycho-social organization. In other words, all three are organizations. When we use the term organization in ordinary language, we refer only to relatively large organizations, those which are not constructed on a basis of face-to-face or other direct communication. This difference of complexity, however,

does not alter essential characteristics. These are consistent because they are founded on a limited set of concepts concerning human potentials for interaction with the environment. The psychoanalytic theory of the individual is fundamentally a social theory, a theory of the growth of the individual within the family, a set of influential others (Bateson, et al., 1956). Freud's great achievement was not simply to look deep within the individual for the source of whatever problems presented themselves on the surface. In the first place, the kind of problems most crucially addressed by psychoanalysis deal with the interface of individual and environment, usually with interpersonal relations of one form or another, either directly or at some level of symbolic abstraction. Still more importantly, the sort of internal "evidence" the psychoanalyst seeks concerns the same sort of boundary issues, as they influence growth at crucial early stages of development. It concerns the way in which the child forms (or is unable to form) relations with his parents and siblings.

It is here, of course, that object relations and ego-analytic schools of psychoanalytic thought begin to diverge. The former emphasizes the child's imaging of the world around him, suggesting that early relationships predispose the way in which he will later view experiences of others and ways in which he will see himself. They held and/or cause him to differentiate his view of himself

from his view of the rest of the world. This is a function of the basic underlying psychological mechanism of projective identification. As the child identifies, (and then sees and works through the problems in his identification of himself) with objects in his environment, he develops his own identity. Later, this mechanism is used again by individuals to form identifications of themselves and others in organizations. Bion holds it to be central to the mechanisms of unconscious group formation and the existence of the phenomena of apparent "group mind". And, this is held to be the core reason for the existence of relations to the organization as a unit--rather than as a collection of component parts.

While ego-analysts in general, and I in particular, have no great quarrel with this characterization, we would contend that it fails adequately to explain the cohesion of the individual personality. In terms of psychoanalytic therapy, it neglects the component of ego-strength which alone allows the individual to ally himself with the analyst in pursuit of improved psychic functioning. Ego-psychology holds not that projective identification is unimportant, but that there is a great deal more to maturation than that. This is why the child goes through more clearly differentiated stages of development than Kleinian analysts are want to find. The child learns distinctively new ways of adapting to his environment and

to internal drives, each of which interacts with the others. Thus, the child's ego--his abilities to function as a more or less integrated personality, and to maintain the integrity of this functioning--becomes more and more important, partially displacing the earliest projective identifications and imagings. The ego-analyst sees a functionally integrated human personality, which must be dealt with holistically, rather than a collection of largely discrete images and identifications, which can be dealt with directly.

This line of psychoanalytic reasoning provides a special justification--beyond the organic analogy--for treating organizations as wholes. This is the extent to which perception of organic wholes is a necessary (or at least apparently universal) part of the psychic life of groups. The organic analogy is thus not a purely artificial and abstract device employed by social scientists to describe phenomena. The unity it attempts to describe is present in the observed phenomena, because people in general conceive of groups and organizations holistically. This is not to argue that groups somehow exist physically apart from their members, to imply that organicism is not an analogy. But, as Thomas (1966) pointed out, participants' definitions of their situations are crucial: that which people define as true is true for them, and is the true foundation of their action (Merton, 1968). The "organization as person" is not just a legal

fiction concerning corporations; it is a psycho-social reality.

The organization may also be seen as a person by a greater stretch of analogy when we emphasize the extent to which its patterns of operation are interrelated. When an organization takes action, one component may be responsible for the planning and/or executive operations. But the whole environment is involved. This is so because the environment responds to the whole organization. All actions with regard to an organization have a sort of "ripple effect" by which they influence all the other component parts of the organization and the balance among them. If one fails to remember the interrelationship of the parts of an organization, it is easy to think that one can solve problems in one part simply by changing or removing it. But this is seldom so. Since the part is engaged in a complex set of transactions with its environment (which includes elements both inside and outside the organization), a change (in it) will affect these other parts. Further, if influences from the environment, including other parts of the organization, remain constant, they will tend to force the original part back into its problematic mode of functioning. The logic is similar to family therapy--if the problem inheres in a system of relationships, treating an individual will at best be a limited intervention, helping that individual to cope with a problematic situation. Treating the whole

system is desirable. In sum, then, it is necessary to keep constantly in mind that an organization (a) is interrelated to form a more or less functional whole, and (b) is treated as a unit by members and outsiders alike.

A crucial factor in both of these kinds of relationships, both kinds of construction of the identity of the organization, is "boundaries". Much of the attention of the Tavistock group has been focused on the various intrapsychic and social mechanisms which bring them into prominence. As we have noted, the Tavistock perspective has been deeply influenced by the work of Melanie Klein on early childhood. We shall not discuss these psychoanalytic underpinnings very extensively here; rather, they will be brought up only as essential to our review of the literature focused specifically on groups and organizations. We shall look now at the various lines of research and theory-building associated with the Tavistock institute, taking a developmental approach and concentrating most on those directly involved with psychoanalytic theory (Bion, 1961; Miller and Rice, 1967) and least on those more resembling organizational sociology (Jacques, 1951).

The Tavistock Perspective

The key contribution which Kleinian psychoanalysis and other object-relations thinking made to the development of group and organizational analysis at the Tavistock Institute can be summed up in a simple theorem. The

crucial issues of an individual's internal life are the same as those which dominate his current object-relations. His internal life is played out in his external life. Klein saw this initially in the games small children would make up; it is the foundation for her argument that an analyst can proceed directly, and from the outset of analysis, to the interpretation of the most basic phenomena of unconscious affective life. This theorem has two implications for organizational analysis: First, it means that one cannot understand an individual's interpersonal behavior--even in highly role-structured situations--without understanding his internal organization. Secondly, and fortunately for our capacity to understand organizations at all, the behavior of the individual displays the relevant factors of his internal psychic organization, at least to a considerable extent. In addition, the most important of these factors are not highly idiosyncratic, but are very similar from one individual to the next within a few basic orientations. The role structure of the organization is a means of reducing the tendency of the individual to externalize his internal conflicts directly. As such it tends to contain or absorb the anxiety produced by these conflicts. Such conflicts are crucially conflicts of boundaries, since they concern the individual's ability to relate to his environment.

The great virtue of organizations from the individual

psychological point of view is that they provide a stable context for boundary maintenance. They reduce the number of issues which arise requiring individual action (as March and especially Simon noted in a different frame work; see discussion in Chapter One above). If the individual faced a completely unorganized world, he would be unable to function, for he would be overwhelmed by conflicting drives, environmental stimuli, and the need to act on numerous problems at once. When organizational boundaries break down, hostility is released. Thus, psychologically the individual is dependent on his social circumstances. One cannot fruitfully speak of the isolated individual as a unit of analysis. Where a person is not involved in current realistic object-relations, he is involved in remembered or fantasized ones. While the person is always (obviously) the unit of imagination, perception, and the like, it is not equally valid to term the person an individual. At some points the person may indeed be very much divided against himself. His actions are by no means always consistent over time--indeed, assuming too much consistency in individual behavior is one of the problems of the rational-choice theories discussed in Chapter One. Further, the individual by no means always appears to himself and others as the locus of action. Frequently, the locus is a group. Group life brings to a focus the object-relations dilemmas of the individual: he must fight to keep his identity, and yet

if does not merge at all, he is not part of the group. This forms the subject of our next section, and of the most strikingly original and important of all the Tavistock work, that of Wilfred Bion.

Psychosocial Relations in Groups

The fundamental breakthroughs in the psychoanalytic study of groups came in England during World War II, primarily with the work of Wilfred Bion in the Army Medical Corps and at the Tavistock Institute. A good way to explain Bion's approach is to begin with one of the crucial original cases in which it was developed (the following discussion is based primarily on papers collected in Bion, 1961, especially one co-authored with Rickman; the other crucial early case was the famous "leaderless group" procedure for officer selection; see Bion, 1946). We shall then describe later advances, most of which have to do with conceptual refinements rather than fundamental ideas.

Our example concerns Bion's experiences when he was assigned to be the Director of the Training Wing of a wartime military psychiatric hospital. One of the first things that confronted him was the way in which groups and individuals made extraordinary demands on leaders. At first, problems presented themselves in the form of hundreds of small requests from patients and staff, each expressed as though it were urgent. Thus the NCOs would ask for explanation of duties; someone would ask for

leave; staff would demand Bion's attention to resolve misunderstandings, and so forth. The pressure of these duties took up most of Bion's time, and contributed to an atmosphere of tension and chaos in the ward. His first conclusion was that the situation resulted simply from lack of discipline--a decision with which many an administrator who has been in a similar situation will have sympathy. Dealing with this matter of discipline, Bion thought, was a distraction from his primary goal. But this turned out not to be the case.

The goal which Bion set himself when he took command followed on this basic premise:

In the treatment of the individual, neurosis is displayed as a problem of the individual. In the treatment of a group, it must be displayed as a problem of the group. (Bion and Rickman, 1961, p. 11)

In fact, the myriad of seemingly individual problems which Bion had initially seen as distractions from his administrative duties could be seen as collective problems of the group. This obviously involved a certain amount of reconceptualization. Bion's first step in this direction came when he looked to the military to find what factors promoted "good group spirit". Now, all of the men under his care came from the military, and had already had the benefit of regular care, good food, discipline and so forth with their regular units. Clearly this had not stopped them from finding their way into the psychiatric hospital, and so clearly it must not be to such factors

that Bion would look for his solution. The kind of discipline which Bion needed would have to work for a hospital, in which all members of the group were such "problem cases". He therefore decided that his problem was equivalent to that of the commander of a rather "scallywag" battalion in a theatre of war, that is, not on the back lines where all is calm. By means of this analogy, Bion came up with a working hypothesis:

the discipline required depends on two factors. (1) the presence of the enemy, who provided a common danger and a common aim; and (2) the presence of an officer who, being experienced, knows some of his own failings, respects the integrity of his men, and is not afraid of either their good-will or their hostility. (Bion and Rickman, 1961, pp. 12-13)

In other words, good discipline, or good spirit, depends on having an identity as a group and a task--both of which are provided the military front lines by the presence of the enemy--and on having a good leader. All three factors are necessary.

Some support for this particular view of military morale came from studies of the American soldier during World War II (Stouffer, et al., 1949a, 1949b; Merton and Lazarsfeld, eds., 1950; and, for a comparison to the Wehrmacht, Shils and Janowitz, 1948). The morale of the soldier was shown to be related to his extreme dependence on what has been called the "primary group". Soldiers who experience severe breakdowns, attacks of panic, etc., tended very strongly to come from units which had broken

down internally as groups. The small group seemed to be the main support for the psychological state of the men.

In the case of Bion's training wing, the common danger was the existence of neurosis as a disability of the community. This, in essence, was Bion's original program--to see collective problems as such--but how was the group to be persuaded to tackle neurotic problems as a collective or communal issue? Certainly not just by telling it to do so. One of the problems which any group leader who wishes to effect changes in the structure of his group's life must face is the fact that groups have great inertia. They have considerable investment in remaining as they are, even if this means maintaining their problems. As Bion noted, this process often has been observed in the cases of individuals:

The neurotic patient does not always want treatment, and when at last his distress drives him to it he does not want it whole-heartedly. This reluctance has been recognized in the discussion of resistance and allied phenomena; but the existence of comparable phenomena in societies has not been recognized. (Bion and Rickman, 1961, p. 14)

The means of overcoming this resistance is to show that various of its communal problems (a) exist, and (b) are neurotic by-products. Then, neurosis itself may seem a subject worthy of community attention, study, and attack.

I will not enumerate the various details of the way in which Bion contrived to bring neurosis to the fore of collective consciousness as a collective problem. In

brief, he required that all men in the ward be engaged in a number of organized, straightforward, productive activities. He also provided for one occasion daily on which the men (a) assembled together as a group, and (b) viewed their collective activities, their collective products as objectively as possible. In other words, there was some organization of which they could be inside, and there was an occasion for them to be "outside" observers. Administrative actions and/or psychological interpretations took place during the daily assembly, when the men were set to view their activities as "outsiders".

This last activity means that these directions and comments were addressed to the group's faculty for objectivity, observing, regulation. In effect, they were addressed to the group's ego. Now, instead of continuing with this example, it seems more helpful to say something about what we mean by the group's "ego", and how this relates to its capacity for effective operations and management. Bion's experiment proved highly successful in running the ward, eventually bringing its author to this conclusion:

The whole concept of the "occupation" of the training wing as a study of, and a training in, the management of interpersonal relationships within a group seemed to be amply justified as a therapeutic approach. (Bion and Rickman, 1961, pp.21-22)

It is important to remember the qualification that Bion was only eventually brought to this conclusion. This is

an important qualification. The experiment did not and could not have an instant curative effect. Rather, there was an intermediate process required. This was interpretation and working through, always a fairly lengthy matter when it deals with deep-seated issues. There is no short way out in group work, no patient-medicine cure. A leader must focus the group's attention on self-observation over a long period, and with as much attention to the boring times as to the exciting ones.

Let us now return to the issue of group "ego" and related notions. When Freud introduced the notion of ego, he did it using the German word "ich", which is the equivalent to "me" or "I" in English. He preferred not to use the classical terms which give the illusion of some separate entity in individuals. Many analysts, notably Sullivan, have followed him in this, but ego is the more commonly used term today by far. When we refer to the ego, then, it is useful to remember that we are referring importantly to the sense of self, or more accurately, to the ability to maintain a sense of self (a notion rooted in Adler, 1912; the present discussion of ego will be quite cursory and the concept will be developed in more detail in Chapter Four). One of the most important psychological distinctions, as we discussed above, is simply that between inside and outside. This amounts to a distinction between what is a part of one and what is

not. This implies a boundary, and this boundary constitutes what we call self. But it is not only an outside limit, a statement of where "I" ends; it is the point of contact between two regions: the individual or group and its environment.

In a view generally shared by both ego-psychology and Kleinian object-relations analysis, the ego develops in the child's life as the ability to distinguish between objects and images which are inside and outside. Kleinian's stress this to the point of maintaining that the ego is, in essence, the boundary function. I should not go so far, but rather argue that the ego is more substantial and more manifold in its functions. Nonetheless, we need to see Bion's work in terms of the Kleinian notions on which it is based. At this point, therefore, when we are talking about the ego, the first thing to remember is that we are talking about identity, the identity of the individual or group whose ego we are considering, in the context of its larger environment. How this environment is structured becomes an important variable to take into account (as indeed Lawrence, Lorsch and organizational sociologists have argued, see above, Chapter One). Thus, the environment of a group may help to reinforce its ego function of maintaining identity--as in the example of a military group united by a common enemy. Or, it may make it difficult to maintain identity--if, for example, the environment refuses to

treat the group as such. A non-recognized union would be such a case. It is difficult for a union to maintain its members' loyalty if other organizations--particularly their employers--persist in treating them solely as individuals.

There is another aspect to ego-functioning, however, related to this. Since the ego is the ability to maintain identity, to maintain control over boundaries, it represents a more advanced state of development than various undifferentiated ways of functioning. It is the ego which keeps the individual from regressing into undifferentiated infantile modes of functioning. Where "ego-psychologists" and the apparent "mainstream" of psychoanalysts hold ego to be a development relatively late in life, Fairbairn, Klein and others regard the infant as having a complete ego from the beginning. They suggest that this "pristine ego" is injured--especially, split--by early life traumas, and that its ramification is the developmental struggle. Which view one holds does not fundamentally affect our argument. It is, however, important to recognize that in groups as well as in individuals, there are more primitive states of functioning. Bion calls these the "basic assumption" states. He suggests that they are not ordered developmentally, but I find Slater's (1966) argument that they are so ordered convincing. We shall go into these states in some detail below. First, let us develop our

consideration of individual and group identities, with special attention to the role of the organization as a context for such identities.

The child develops his identity in relation to a number of key persons--generally his mother, father and siblings. These persons constitute his first--and always highly important--reference group. His ego is largely at first a sense of himself as a part of those relations, and eventually as a member of that group, especially in relation to his mother while he is yet an infant. In the child's development of a response to this group, an important factor is the extent of congruency and interlocking of members. In other words, it is important how much the individual's relations with any one member of the group imply and/or fit with his relations with others. If his relationships are not congruent, they will pull him in different directions as they make conflicting demands upon him (Merton, 1957). This will make it difficult for him to form a stable identity for his most important "leaders". Each expects him to follow their rules, but the two sets of rules do not match. A certain amount of incongruency is inevitable wherever there are two parents. It is not in itself bad. It is a fact of life based on the differences among people, and learning to deal with those differences is a key aspect of maturation. A completely uniform environment provides little "push" towards maturation and ego-development. A

child must learn to deal with diversity and conflicts, being neither overwhelmed by them nor overprotected from them. This becomes a serious problem only in cases where the two parents diverge radically--as in many instances of divorced couples, or indeed, those who stay together and fight. Sometimes--and this is most difficult of all for the child to deal with--one parent will give internally conflicting and irreconcilable cues or demands. This was found to be the case in Bateson et. al.'s (1956) study of schizophrenic mothers, and they named it the double bind syndrome. A simple example is a mother who is afraid of her affections for her child, and of the child's dependence on her, but who also wants to conform to society's and her own model of a good mother. She is liable to encourage the child to act affectionately toward her, thus fulfilling the norm. When the child does so, however, she will become frightened of the extent to which it depends on her (she may well sense her own inadequacy) and will repulse the child. The child in effect experiences two mothers and can never act to please them both.

Situations of this sort have their most dramatic impacts when experienced in early childhood, but they have definite analogues later in life. Thus in organizations, for example, we are aware of how important it is for leaders to be consistent in their commands. Nonetheless, not all leaders are consistent, and often people are

subject to multiple authority and conflicting directions. What is true of individuals in this respect is also true of groups, with the exception that groups can in fact split down the middle and go in two directions, which individuals cannot do. Even groups are limited in this capacity, however, by the fact that they are often functionally constituted in an organization in such a way that they must work together--or at least be accountable together for some "product".

Even where groups can split in two, this may not always solve the problem. Many strains cannot be removed by splitting. Thus a group may contain two leaders with different purposes: one, say, a finance chairman and the other a policy chairman. Each is likely to acquire a certain amount of generalized authority, and to impinge on the other's special areas, or to compete for control of those issues not clearly belonging to one or the other. Such a problem may result simply in one becoming the overall leader, but as long as there must be a division of labor, there will be points at which both have power. Since groups generally identify themselves in terms of their leaders--at least behaviorally--such a situation can make for a leadership crisis.

Problems such as the above, however, only point to a deeper underlying characteristic of life in groups. This is the fact that people have identities both as individuals and as members of groups. Further, they may

be members of more than one group. Just to take the former point, we can see that there is conflict between the individual egos of group members and the collective ego of the group. In order to participate in groups, individuals must sacrifice a certain amount of their independent identity and share a common identity with the others. Since their individual identity is a matter of their ego, however, this means that they must regress. That is, they must give up a certain amount of their ego control as individuals and return to an earlier, less differentiated, state of functioning. This means that as members of groups, people will be less able to make sophisticated distinctions and will be more subject to various emotions and drives. They will also be more similar than their often highly heterogeneous outside identities would lead one to believe. But this is an essential part of "being in touch with a group". If this regression does not to some extent take place, the group remains a mere collection of solidarity or community. It has no reason to act as a unit.

Let us follow this up by exploring the implications of a key passage of Bion's. He says:

I hope to show that in his contact with the complexities of life in a group the adult resorts, in what may be a massive regression, to mechanisms described by Melanie Klein (1932, 1946) as typical of the earliest phases of mental life. The adult must establish contact with the emotional life of the group in which he lives; this task would appear to be as formidable to the adult as the relationship with

the breast appears to the infant, and the failure to meet the demands of this task is revealed in his regression. The belief that a group exists, as distinct from an aggregate of individuals, is an essential part of this regression, as are also the characteristics with which the supposed group is endowed by the individual. Substance is given to the fantasy that the group exists by the fact that the regression involves the individual in a loss of his "individual distinctiveness" (Freud, 1921, p.9), indistinguishable from depersonalization, and therefore obscures observation that the aggregation is individuals. It follows that if the observer judges a group to be in existence, the individuals composing it must have experienced this regression. (Bion, 1961b, pp.141-142)

This passage places four main propositions in a logical progression:

1. It is necessary for the individual to be emotionally integrated into the primary group in which he lives,

But,

2. This is difficult, a formidable task comparable to that the infant faces in relating to a mother who seems sometimes nurturing and sometimes depriving.
3. Faced with failure to establish contact with his primary group emotionally, the individual will resort more and more to regression.
4. It is regression in common which allows for individuals to reconstitute themselves as a group.

Therefore,

5. Group life implies regression. A group is an aggregate of individuals all in the same state of regression.

It should be mentioned, a propos of the last statement, that this refers to a psychological group, an emotional

group. We are only concerned here with groups which have some kind of emotional cohesiveness, which have a psychological group life. But it should be remembered as well, that this indicates in some degree almost all active groups, almost all bounded sets of frequently interacting people, especially if they share a common responsibility. It is very difficult to keep a set of people together without having them form a psychological group.

One function of the regression which is implicit in group life is to make the individual members of a group much more susceptible to leadership than they would be outside it. As we saw, when a person's defenses prove inadequate to his circumstances, he resorts to earlier and less differentiated ones. Since the individual's earlier circumstances are more governed by universal laws and patterns of development than his later ones, the defense mechanisms associated with his early life are less distinctively his, and are of more common types. At the same time they are more general. That is, they take defense against a wide range of threats; they are not specialized, as are the defense mechanisms of later formulation. This is what is implied when Bion indicates that regression involves a loss of individual distinctiveness. It is the basis for a seeming merger of personalities. Because the defense mechanisms which form his personal ego within the group are very general, they can be turned in a number of different directions. It is

as though a part of his "character armour" (Reich, 1933) has been removed. It is much easier for him to let down his defenses to be in the group. However, by becoming a member of the group, the individual has given up unconsciously some of his own ability to control his actions.

A primary group, as we have used the term, refers only to any group for which the individuals concerned have made the decision to remain members whatever (in as much as they can conceive) may happen, rather than withdraw. Some groups are thus more primary than others. That is, it would take a great deal to make the individual alter his (often unconscious) decision to remain a member in such cases. Some, such as the family, are inevitably primary--no matter how much one may wish to, one can never fully withdraw his or her emotions from their roots in the family--that is, from the circumstances of one's own physical development. From later group attachments one can remain relatively aloof and still be a member. It is in this sense that March and Simon (See above, Chapter I) suggest that the only personal decision the individual makes vis-a-vis the organization is whether or not to be a member. Perhaps, however, this is an oversimplification.

Regression is not in any sense "total" when individuals enter groups. In fact, the ability to be an active member of a group does depend on a certain extent of individual development. A person who was perenially

overwhelmed by interpersonal situations could not cope with the group environment; one too rigidly locked into his defenses could not respond to it. What I am saying, rather, is that the group's solidarity is founded not only on its rational purpose or on some calculation of personal advantage which its members make. Its solidarity is founded crucially on a shared set of emotions. In Bion's terms, there is a work-group, which proceeds the explicit tasks of the collectivity, and there are "basic-assumption groups" which constitute a sub-stratum to the collectivity:

Work-group activity is obstructed, diverted, and on occasion assisted by certain other mental activities that have in common the attribute of powerful emotional drives. These activities, at first sight chaotic, are given a certain cohesion if it is assumed that they spring from basic assumptions common to all the group. (Bion, 1961b, p. 146)

It is with the relationship between these two levels that anyone who wishes to lead a group is concerned--whether he be administrator or outside change agent, or group psychotherapist.

Bion distinguishes three types of basic-assumption groups: the fight/flight group, in which members struggle to maintain discrete identities and avoid dealing constructively with underlying group issues; dependent groups, in which the group looks for an authority to lead it, whether from an officially sanctioned source (such as a psychoanalyst) or from one of its members; and the pairing group, in which binary relationships (of at least

underlying, and often overt, sexual nature) come to the fore and are the focus of the group's attention.

Paradoxically, in the last case the equality of members often becomes the focus of the group's attention. Where there is a leader, all members expect to be treated equally by him or her. Where there is no leader, an idealization of the group itself, as an abstraction, often takes the place of the leader. In all cases, when one of these basic assumption is dominant, the others retain some of their importance, but covertly. This is because none of them is adequate as a defense against the threatening aspects of group life, nor does any of them state a full situation (as we shall see below, Slater holds a different, more developmental view of this).

Rather than being themselves fundamental, the expressions of primary material in the psychoanalytic sense, the basic assumption states are reactions against, and thus only indirect expressions of a deeper, more fundamental emotional state. This is the state of complete lack of differentiating ability: the primal experiences of the foetus and neonate and one of the deepest unconscious fears of us all. These experiences of infancy were dominated by part objects, unreal introjections of single aspects of objects. Thus, basic-assumption states are recourses of the group to emotions which have some coherence, show some ego control. The very earliest experience of part-objects is

an experience of complete helplessness and inability to organize the many stimuli presented by the environment. This state is the equivalent of very deep psychotic anxieties--although it may sometimes be seen briefly in relatively stable groups. We should not, however, think that this helplessness is a totally irrational perception. It is in a sense a fact of life with which we all must deal. As Freud commented:

When a human being has himself grown up, he knows, to be sure, that he is in possession of greater strength, but his insight into the perils of life has also grown greater, and he rightly concludes that fundamentally he remains just as helpless and unprotected as he was in his childhood, that faced by the world he is still a child. Even now, therefore, he cannot do without the protection which he enjoyed as a child. But he has long since recognized, too, that his father is a being of narrowly restricted power, and not equipped with every excellence. (Freud, 1933, p.163)

In this passage, Freud is describing what he sees as a part of the process of development of a belief in god, based on the earlier, more undifferentiated and overvalued, faith which the child had in its father. However, as Bion, Slater and others have pointed out, such faith can be applied to deify almost anyone and anything. Most especially, group leaders are likely to be deified, the more so if they consist of "those archtypical autocrats, the doctor or the teacher" (Slater, 1966, pp. 7-8). Paradoxically, the ability of a group to deify its leader depends on its not having a realistic assessment of him. This means that a distant, ambivalent, or indistinct

leader is often the most likely to be deified. The deification springs from the group--the leader need do nothing but sit there.

Such deification is, according to Slater, a part of the process of moving through the basic-assumption states in the course of group development. Before we consider Slater's perspective on groups as a microcosm of social change, let us look at Bion's analysis of the "basic-assumption groups", focusing on leadership, the issue which most brings his analysis into the arena of organizational issues. In the fight/flight group, no leader will be recognized who does not afford an opportunity for flight or aggression. If a leader counsels caution and rational consideration of an issue, the group will grow impatient and switch to another leader. In the dependent group, a leader is sought who can produce the magic--as opposed to hard work--which the group desires. The leader is thus treated with either worshipful attention--and the refusal by members to do any work themselves--or with silence. The latter is a sort of conspiracy to deprive the leader of the material he needs in order to act "scientific"--an attitude the group does not want him to take. The pairing group enjoys present feelings about which it may be guilty, and so appeals to a future outcome which regards as morally unexceptionable--a birth. This is glorified and generalized so that the group seems always to be waiting for its leader, who is

yet unborn. In each case the group can be seen to be avoiding the issue, though each in a different way. The issue, of course, is the immediate internal nature of the group and its practical tasks - not the outside threats seen by the fight/flight group, not the magical influence or "prescriptions" for the doctor desired by the dependent group, not the glorified but unachievable future which pre-occupies the pairing group.

The group which deals in a practical way with the here and now, Bion calls the "work-group". "In a therapeutic group, the analyst is the work-group leader" (Bion, 1961b, pp. 152-153). That is, he refuses to participate in the avoidances and fantasies of the members and attempts to get them to work on the task of understanding themselves as members of a group. The efforts of the work-group in general, and the emotional backing which the leader can receive in particular, depend on the basic assumptions. The leader's position vis-a-vis the group will fluctuate according to which basic assumption is dominant and the extent to which the group sees the leader as fitting in with what is required in these different states of mind. What is required of a thereapeutic leader is that he interprets these different activities and emotional states to the group. What is needed of an administrative leader is that he not get caught up in these irrationalities, but be able to recognize them when they arise and know the diffiiculties which they will pose. Perhaps the most

difficult of these is the tendency of dependent groups to overtly accept what a leader says, but not to consistently follow what he suggests. It is always difficult to remember that this acceptance may not be genuine, or even, if it is genuine, may not be complete. It may be the acceptance of only one of the basic assumption states, and thus not enough to motivate the unification of the collectivity into a work-group for action.

Each basic-assumption state attempts to maintain itself as it is, resisting not only any hard work, but any suggestion that there should be a change. In a therapeutic group this is plainly contradictory, since the members of the group are meeting precisely to seek change. Even in ordinary work-groups, however, basic assumption states prevail to hold members to practices and patterns of relationship which may have been rationally shown to be impractical. Failure to recognize this is a prime reason for the failure of formal management systems, predicated as they are on assumptions of universal rationality. The work-group, as I have said, is the mature intellectual function of the group, to which the leaders must appeal for validation of his suggestions and help in controlling boundaries or instituting changes designed to bring about new balance. The work-group can be seen, thus (though Bion does not take up this analogy) as fulfilling many of the functions of the ego in an ego-psychological theory of individual personality. Just

as the individual needs to maintain through his ego a certain amount of control over his primary drives, so the work-group must maintain a certain control over the expression of basic assumption states.

If the specialized work-group cannot, or does not, cope with the basic-assumption phenomena that are its province, then the work-group functions of the main group are vitiated by the presence of these basic assumptions. As work-group function consists essentially of the translation of thoughts and feelings into behaviour which is adapted to reality, it is ill-adapted to give expression to basic assumptions. For basic assumptions become dangerous in proportion as the attempt is made to translate them into action. (Bion, 1961b, p. 157)

Specialized groups, as the name implies, are those with a special tie to one or another of the basic assumptions.

The social psychologist Philip Slater suggests that groups tend, as they develop, to pass through a sequence of stages in which the various basic-assumption groups are dominant. This process does not always go through all of its possible steps--some groups even in therapeutic settings with attentive leaders become "stalled" at one or another stage. In groups which do develop, however, the states are the normal course of this development. The situation begins with the "merger" which members experience as they lose their sense of distinct boundaries vis-a-vis each other in a group. Their relations with each other tend to be unconscious in a degree which they otherwise seldom are. In this they may be affiliative or combative, but in neither case for reasons of which the

members are aware. It is as though the group forced them into particular styles of relationship--because the sources of these styles are unconscious. This is the meaning behind something of a confusion in Bion's discussion of the same phenomena, where he says, "regression includes the belief that a group exists" (Bion, 1961a, p. 141). The group appears to the individual as an outside force, a) because he is unaware of the extent of his unconscious participation and b) because the group, i.e., the set of relationships is beyond his control, even in its effect on his emotions. As Slater puts it:

An individual who enters a group for the first time tends to perceive it as an undifferentiated mass. He may pick one or two individuals for special attention, but this will perforce be on the basis of unconscious fantasies--of transference. Thus insofar as he is discriminating he distorts, and insofar as he is empirical he is vague. (Slater, 1966, p. 175)

This remains true of the intragroup relations through both the fight/flight and dependency stages. The struggle for identity is out and out in the fight/flight stage; but in the dependency stage, however, it has become ambivalent. The identity issue tends to recur with renewed intensity at intervals:

the blurring of boundaries between oneself and the group tends to occur when the group member experiences sudden reinforcement by the group of feelings, impulses, and fantasies of which he is not fully conscious. At such a time he will feel swept away by forces that seem to come both from

within and from without. (Slater, 1966, p. 179)

Fight and flight are mechanisms by which the individual attempts to avoid the unpleasant sensations, including depersonalization, which this includes. Fighting is a very basic way of emphasizing difference:

It is like pinching oneself to be sure one is not dreaming, except that the members pinch one another, saying, as it were "I hurt--therefore I am". (Slater, 1966, p. 179)

Fight demonstrates distinction by distance instead of by contradiction.

With the onset of the dependency attitude, the same issues are played out with somewhat greater sophistication and focus. Individuality seems to be at once acknowledged and denied, through an attempt at symbolic union with authority figures (see also Mahler, 1968, 1972 for psychoanalytic discussion of symbiosis and separation in childhood). Piaget comments, in a related context:

Egocentrism insofar as it means confusion of the ego and the external world, and egocentrism insofar as it means lack of cooperation, constitute one and the same phenomenon. So long as the child does not disassociate his ego from the social world he cannot cooperate, for in order to cooperate one must be conscious of one's ego and situate it in relation to thought in general. And in order to become conscious of one's ego, it is necessary to liberate oneself from the thought and will of others. (Piaget, 1932, p. 87)

I have already discussed the role of projective identifications in both childhood development and group life. In an ambiguous situation, an individual attempts

to extend some one or another of the categories he has internalized to account for circumstances at hand. In the group setting, one's fellow members and the group itself start out ambiguous in this way and are subject to the individual's projections. The leader in a therapy group remains ambiguous precisely to bring out these projections. An organization has formal roles precisely to minimize the influence of such projection (though it can never be eradicated). In ordinary situations of leadership, such projective mechanisms continually operate, though in less dramatic and more hidden forms than in therapy. The leader needs to be conscious of whether he fits well or poorly with the group's projection onto him. The projections (in either case) may support or hinder effective organizational operation, and the leader may need to embark on some scheme of re-education of group or organization members in order to bring the projections into the open.

The relationship to the leader is central to the dynamics by which group development and reality-consciousness come about. They are based on the development of dependency and the subsequent revolt against it. This "most dramatic change" is made possible by:

the leverage provided by having a common object for fantasy projection. The presence of an ambiguous authority figure allows the members to share a fantasy, and as they become increasingly engrossed in this sharing, they are gradually

seduced into sharing a reality instead, and thereby freed realistically to confront one another. That is, in order to realize the enjoyment of a shared fantasy, they are led to invest it increasingly with group-relevant elements and decreasingly with personal-familial elements, until it becomes dangerously susceptible to disconfirmation. (Slater, 1966, pp. 172-173)

A revolt is the logical culmination of this process of replacing fantasy with reality. To be sure, not all groups ever manage to institute a revolt--some remain forever snipping at authority without "getting it together" to attack.

It is worth noting that a successful revolt usually involves a period in which the differences in members' attitudes toward the leader are brought forward. A group, in other words, cannot effectively revolt so long as it perceives itself as a mob or mass, but only when it can differentiate clearly among its members. (Slater, 1966, p. 176)

In this sense, the group is involved in trying to substitute conscious bonds for unconscious ones. The unconscious ones are always threatening members with being enveloped by the group. The conscious ones allow for cooperation. Thus it is by no means simply true that groups work together better the more they have emotions in common--as some group dynamics writers and practitioners seem to suggest. They also need some way to bring their emotional attachments under conscious management. An organization, however, cannot tolerate repeated revolts against leaders as a means of improving its practice. This

is why Tavistock seminars, for example, encourage the expression of such revolt in a contained and non-practical situation.

Because, as we have indicated, the ability to influence the boundaries and actions of a group from within depends on being conscious of what these boundaries and the sources of action are, a revolt generally results

in a total increase in power in the group. Defining power as the ability to influence, everyone, including the group leader, has more influence on everyone else. (Slater, 1966, p. 163, following Bennis)

This is so because the revolt itself brings about a considerable increase in conscious awareness of what is going on in the group. In addition, the revolt tends to free the group from the domination of many established patterns of interaction. There is greater flexibility in the role relations of members, in their attitudes toward authority. From the point of view of the leader, group members will act much more realistically in response to his comments. Instead of either treating them as sacred (and doing nothing about them) or contradicting them irrationally, the group may consider the leaders' interpretations rationally and take action accordingly.

This is coupled with a greater equality and freedom from hierarchy. Indeed, the freedom may

produce an exaggerated emphasis on democracy among the group members, as they attempt to ensure that no one member of the group fills the deposed leader's shoes too soon. Later, of course, as group members proceed to assess each other realistically, group leaders do emerge based on useful personal characteristics such as perceptiveness. Following the revolt, group members are no longer placed in fear of either the unrestricted domination of the leader nor of their common emotionality with each other. They have formed more rational bonds of cooperation with each other, at least for the time being. The post-revolt group is unstable as well, however. It is only one step on the group's progress toward a workable balance between emotionality and practicality or rationality:

The danger of engulfment is less important because it is no longer the sole basis for unity. But the secularization of the group, the leader, and other members, while generating greater rationality, autonomy, and understanding, also raises the threat that perhaps there is no emotionally intense reason for being together at all. Thus the pairing group--although the most secular of the three types in most respects--attempts to reintroduce the sphere of the sacred in a non-interfering way, by placing it in the future and divesting it of all practical consequence save for an oversanguine mood and a certain passivity. (Slater, 1966, p. 182)

The pairing group thus tries to maximize both consciousness and involvement, while the fight/flight

group represents the attempt to maintain a balance between individual and group identity under conditions of minimum consciousness and involvement.

The pairing group exists primarily in response to the desire of members to have a secure sense of the future. Its theme is procreation, reproduction. Differentiated relations among members which previously were taboo are now tolerated, and indeed prized, as the source of this idealized productive power. The pairing group also results, however, from the apparently inherent instability of the equality which follows the revolt. There is a brittleness and tenseness to this equality, stemming in large part from its essentially negative nature. It is equality still vis-a-vis the deposed leader. It is thus in a sense only the obverse of the dependency group. It has, however, freed forces which have productive aspects in fact as well as in fantasy:

At the time of the revolt (the equality or levelling stage) hostility is all funnelled onto the leader, with intermember hostility prohibited. This continues for some time after the revolt, gradually giving way to the final stage, in which new criteria of differentiation emerge and hostility between members is open and tolerated. Since these criteria differ considerably from group to group, however, it is difficult to make any generalizations about this last stage. It is probably fair to say, however, that in many groups understanding and perceptiveness (now freed by the revolt from the stigma of either competition with or seeking favor from the leader) become important elements in the status structure of the group. (Slater, 1966, p. 159)

It will be observed that the effects of revolt in the group appear to be much the same whether the group is a small one convened for educational purposes or a large organization, or indeed, a society. There are, of course, greater complications in the last case, but not a fundamental difference in kind.

From Groups to Organizations

The two most obvious differences are (a) the absence of face-to-face communication as the primary mode of interaction in the large collectivity, and (b) the frequently much greater formal organization of the large collectivity. Both of these are, in fact, quite important. Face-to-face communication is one of the characteristics which gives small groups their propensity to high levels of unconscious and emotional internal relations. It also means that all members have, at least physically, the same opportunities for communication with all others. In a large collectivity--formally organized or not--there are usually a number of small component groups and fairly regularized networks of communication. Although small groups may split, it is usually difficult for them to maintain this extent of internal differentiation. A large part of the effects of face-to-face communication may be summed up by saying that it predisposes members to informal rather than formal relations.

Most discussion of small groups--academic and

non-academic alike--presents them by comparison to formal organization, and emphasized the more "personable" relations they contain, their greater freedom of emotional expression, and security of interpersonal relations. Formal organization is taken as the standard, and informal organization in small groups treated as the deviation. The psychoanalytic perspective which we have outlined above gives us a somewhat different view. Both unconscious factors and small groups seem to merit a certain primacy of attention, rather than treatment as residual categories. In this perspective we come not only to a greater understanding of small groups, but also to an important new perspective on organization as such. The psychodynamics of small groups may be seen to underpin a psychanalytic understanding of whole organizations. Organization has generally been treated in textbooks in terms of its utilitarian values or practical necessity; men organized themselves in order to get something done. And so, presumably, they did and certainly still do. But this is by no means the only reason for forming organizations, even though it may be the most explicit.

Organizations are created, and more importantly are maintained, because of the stability of identity which they afford individuals and groups, and because of their effectiveness in managing boundary transactions. Beginning with the basic self/other distinction and ramifying into a welter of complexities, the individual's

experience of the world is largely one of boundaries. On the one hand, the individual finds himself, especially in modern societies, a participant in a wide range of different social situations. Each of these involves a different aspect of his personality, skills and resources. In order to manage these many different statuses, an organization produces relatively explicit or formalized roles. These are normative patterns of behavior which the individual is expected to fulfill (and not usually to exceed) in various situations in accord with his position or status. But of course he is one individual, however divided his many statuses vis-a-vis other social actors may be. This means that he has a basic problem of maintaining a sense of personal unity despite his many varying social identities. Closely related to this is another basic dilemma of individual existence. There is an ultimately irresolvable conflict between the desire for incorporation and community and the desire for individuality and freedom. For different people at different times, one or the other of these two sides may predominate, but the submerged one never disappears. It stays below the surface, giving an added negative strength of avoidance to its counterpart. People thus accommodate to this conflict but do not eradicate it.

The hostilities which come from identity conflicts in small groups are by no means unique to them. On the contrary, they are very basic and endemic to social life.

Organization is one of the ways by which they are controlled, by which people achieve accommodation with the conflicts at their source. An organization cannot be understood fully without recognition that whatever its explicit purpose, it is also helping people to deal with this kind of boundary issue. Organizations provide routinized and other ritualized ways of moving from a position in one set of statuses to one in another. And, as the structure of boundaries of emotional identification for their members, they absorb much of the hostility and intrapsychic conflicts which result from the conflict between social and individual life. To generalize using a colloquial term: a function of organization in society is to absorb craziness. This craziness is not confined to those who are institutionalized in psychiatric hospitals; for the rest of us, institutions of a less specialized nature fulfill a similar function.

This is the underpinning of much of the Tavistock group's work on the psychodynamics of formal organizations. In a variety of settings, researchers have explored the interrelationship between formal/instrumental, social and psychic factors in producing patterns of organizational behavior. The first work in the Institute's industrial division--and perhaps the most important of the early work--was that of Eric Trist and his colleagues (Trist and Bamforth, 1951; Trist, Higgin, Murray and Pollock, 1963; Emery and Trist, 1969)

which laid the groundwork for the development of socio-technical systems analysis. Here it may simply be noted that the classic study of contrasting technologies of coal mining (reported in Herbst, 1962, as well as the works cited above) showed that human needs can be so frustrated by the purely technological organization of work that task performance suffers. Small group craft-style production was replaced--with unfortunate consequences--by techniques splitting previous groups into task-defined shifts. This is an essential problem with which many organizational theorists, both early and late, have been concerned: how can task organization and human social needs be modified to produce mutual satisfaction (see, among many, Argyris, 1957, 1962, 1964, 1971; Alderfer, 1969; Bennis, et al., 1969; Birchall and Wild, 1973; Blood and Hulin, 1967; Brown, 1960; Katz and Kahn, 1966; Likert, 1961; McGregor, 1960; Porter and Llawler, 1965; Hulin and Blood, 1968; Sayles, 1964; Schein, 1965; Sofer, 1961, 1972; Zaleznick and Moment, 1964). We shall explore this further in Chapter Four. Cyril Sofer's and Elliot Jacques' work tackled problems closer to conventional management theory. Sofer (1970) for example, looked at the problems of executives in mid-career. His general book (Sofer, 1972) is perhaps the best overall account of the Tavistock perspective on organizations (an historical review is also to be found in Menzies, 1974). Jacques' early work included psychoanalytic studies

(1955) as well as sociological studies of organizations. Among the latter his longitudinal study of a London factory is a classic, being one of the earliest long-term organizational studies. This study--the famous Glacier Metal Project--focused on joint consultative relationships as a way of changing organizational culture to produce greater "health" of functioning. Jacques' interests then turned to the problems of equitable payment and to the creation of a general theory of bureaucracy (1970). From the beginning of his work, Jacques was equally a psychoanalyst--trained as a psychiatrist in Canada and as an analyst under Melanie Klein--and a sociologist--completing his PhD at Harvard under Talcott Parsons. His later work has tended more towards the sociological interests and orientations, and thus, though influential, is of less direct interest to us here. The center of the Tavistock approach to complex organizations for us is the work of A.K. Rice and E.J. Miller.

Rice wrote a wide variety of essays and books, including an important early research study introducing change into a family firm in Indian textiles (Rice, 1958)--a study which has been especially significant because of its attempt to take up the problem of productivity and social organization outside of conventional Western

management culture. The study is modelled in many ways on Jacques' Glacier Project study. Rice is also the key figure in developing the Tavistock Seminar approach to organizational and individual development. This approach (outlined in Rice, 1965) draws on Bion's studies of groups to create a framework in which individuals are able to examine the ways in which they relate to people in groups. Its theory is something like that of training analysis--by undergoing analysis himself, the prospective analyst learns how to recognize his characteristic forms of unconscious reaction to material presented by others, and thus to control for them. Similarly, the Tavistock groups develop an awareness in members of what special responses membership brings out in them, and how to watch for those issues in work-oriented groups.

Miller also worked on the early textile projects (Miller, 1975), and in a variety of consultative roles. Perhaps his most famous study is the analysis he made of residential facilities for the severely handicapped and young chronically ill (Miller and Gwynne, 1972). Working together, however, Miller and Rice wrote the work which most effectively describes and exemplifies the juncture of a psychoanalytic and socio-technical systems approach to organizations of anything in the literature. This is their book, Systems

of Organization (1967).

Miller and Rice explicitly set out to extend Bion's work on largely informal groups to larger, more complex and more formally organized associations. Like Bion, they distinguish two dimensions of organizational functioning. As members of a work group, individuals contribute overtly and consciously to the task of the group, that is, they carry out their rationally defined roles within the task-organization established for the group. Simultaneously, however, and inevitably, they project into and out of the group their unconscious assumptions about themselves, about one another, and about their environment. The group as a whole, thus, "behaves" as though it had made assumptions about itself, and in doing so invades the personal boundaries of individuals. Similarly, external affiliations of individual members, e.g., family or church, breach the boundary of the group. Miller and Rice lay more emphasis than did Bion on both technology and the environment, largely because they were not dealing with groups for which self-observation and development--therapy--was the task. In their theory there is mediation between the environment and the inner world of the individual carried on by the ego. They are somewhat closer to ego-psychology, and somewhat more distant from Kleinian object-relations thought than Bion; they see the ego as not initially present in the infant, but as developing in a maturational process of its own.

The key function of the ego is this mediation or boundary maintenance:

the mature ego is one that can define the boundary between what is inside and what is outside, and can control the transactions between the one and the other. (Miller and Rice, 1967, p. 16)

Miller and Rice see the ego as a faculty of the individual, and leadership as the analogous faculty of groups.

Wherever they are located and whoever performs them, however, leadership activities express and confirm the distinctive identity of the group as against other groups, and differentiate between membership and non-membership. (Miller and Rice, 1967, p. 20)

As will be apparent later on, I do not place the same stress on leadership, and do argue that the ego-function can be understood as directly applicable to groups and organizations.

Organizations, then, have two functions: one an explicit task (though of course it may be poorly formulated or understood), the other a generally unconscious maintenance of emotional boundaries. Any specific organization, thus, is characterized by two corresponding systems. Miller and Rice (1967) have termed these the "task" and "sentient" systems. The sentient system is composed of the set of affective involvements and identifications in the organization and the means for managing emotional boundary transactions. It should be

noted that this moves some distance from the presumed psychopathology of Bion's "basic assumption states," though Miller and Rice are still describing what they consider unconscious and therefore largely irrational and rigid phenomena. Organization as it generally appears on formal charts, as it is the object of technical planning, is part or all of the task system. It is, in this view, both conscious and oriented toward getting something in particular done, achieving some goal. This is the perspective taken most often by management theorists and organizational sociologists: organization is a tool designed for the more efficient performance of specific tasks. This is clearly the stance taken by formal management systems. One is to understand and manage organizations in terms of their goals, the way they attempt to fulfill them, the efficacy of their technical and administrative tools. But, as Miller and Rice point out, these writers and many administrators forget that organization is also the means of handling the emotional/affective needs of individuals acting in groups.

To the extent that one is only interested in the task of the organization, human needs for satisfaction and defense against anxiety are simply constraints on task performance. If one looks at the issue from the other side, however, one realizes that organizations are necessary for these same reasons to human beings. The task of the administrator--and in a sense a task of

everyone in the organization--is to try to make these human needs mesh with the task requirements. If they do not, the "constraint" can become an all but insurmountable impediment. The systems which characterize the organization, in other words, always affect each other, but are by no means congruent. An effective planning and management system would need to take the structuring of this congruence as one of its major objectives. Unfortunately, most formal management systems ignore one dimension of the organization.

Groups and organizations, with the help of good leadership, can come to manage their boundary and identity functions effectively. In this they develop an ability analogous to that the child achieves in building his ego-strength. Still, there are always boundary problems to be managed between the members as individuals and as parts of groups, among various groups at the same level, and between small groups and the larger ones of which they are parts. Having a strong "ego" implies the ability to cope, but not the absence of problems which require this ability.

The internal world of a group is made up, then, first of the contributions of its members to its purpose and, second, of the feelings and attitudes the members develop about each other and about the group, both internally and in relation to its environment. At the level of task performance, members take part as rational, mature human beings; at the level of assumptions they make about each other and the group, they go into collusion with each other to support or hinder what they have met to do. The resulting

pattern is one of co-operation and conflict between the members as individuals and between them and the group culture they produce. (Miller and Rice, 1967, p. 18)

The external environment of the group includes the other individuals, groups, organizations and material forces with which group members interact, as individuals, as members of the organization, or collectively.

Interrelationships between groups and individuals--between systems--are what the formal organization of collectivities attempts to manage. In a sense, this organization attempts to keep members specialized in their interrelationships, rather than letting them revert to primitive and generalized responses to others. Only through specialization and differentiation can a high degree of rationality be maintained in this context. The interrelationships in the organization remain matters of sentience, however--or else people would not have adequate motivation to participate in them. For this reason, statements of the task-efficiency of various patterns of organization need also to consider sentience-efficiency:

We have tried to show that inadequate definition of task-system boundaries presents major difficulties in controlling sentient boundaries; and, conversely, that inadequate control of sentient boundaries can lead to the redefinition of tasks and of task-systems. (Miller and Rice, 1967, p. 262)

Large organizations tend to institute some form of regulating system in order to (a) manage intergroup

relations and (b) manage linkages between sentient and task organization. Such regulating systems are themselves further specializations, and usually create yet another set of boundaries within the organization. These in turn must also be managed. There is, thus, an infinite number of tasks requiring management at any one time. And there is only a finite amount of leadership. The result of this is that there are always unintended consequences to even the best planned actions within the organization (Merton, 1936; 1957, chap. 1). The more task and sentient systems, conscious and unconscious systems can be made congruent, however, the more the organization can be made to "behave" predictably. Another way of saying this is: the more the leadership which the sentient system demands is in line with the leadership which the task-system can give, the more effective will the operation of the organization be.

The regulatory systems set up to achieve this goal are generally informal components of the general management structure. Only rarely are they either fully specialized sets of personnel, or conceptually separate organizations. The regulation is thus achieved in only a haphazard manner. Each individual administrator makes a series of ad hoc decisions as to what the "whole" ought to be, and the coordination of these decisions is left to serendipity. Planners often regard the institution of a formal management system as the solution to this dependence on chance and lack of coordination. As

implemented, however, few such systems have anything to do with either intergroup relations or task/sentient system relations. They are concerned, rather, with those variables which can be readily quantified, and which are directly related to the formal task of the organization (as defined, usually, by some combination of senior management and systems analysts).

Any program of organizational change is a probable disruption to established sentient and boundary maintenance systems--whether it be the implementation of a formal management or accountability system, the merger of previously separate organizations, or a change in technical tasks. Information which organization members previously considered private (either to themselves individually, or to their primary work group) may be made public. Relationships in which considerable psychic energy is invested may be severed or transformed. Practices which hold unrecognized symbolic weight may be abandoned or given new meaning. Even in carefully planned implementations which pay close attention to the "people problems" involved, new forms of organization create new issues which must be met. A striking example of the mutual involvement of task and sentient systems, and of even a good idea creating problems, is the impact which the introduction of a set of representatives as mediators between component groups may produce. At the very minimum, when one representative goes from group A to

group B, four new dimensions of relationship are created:

1. Between group A and its representative (a).
2. Between representative (a) and group B.
3. Within group B with the addition of (a).
4. Within group A without (a). (following Miller and Rice, 1967, p. 22, et. seq.)

The situation grows even more complex when a group of representatives from two or more original groups is formed. Representatives may, in fact or in suspicion, form greater attachment to their fellow representatives than they have to their original groups. Original groups may fail to function in the absence of their representative, or they may continue to function and so change that the representative now represents only a past state of the group. In any case, issues of identity and boundaries become crucial.

This example suggests the way in which entirely different conditions and mechanisms of regulation may appear in large-scale organizations as opposed to small groups. In this connection, Miller and Rice distinguish three branches of administrative activity, concerned with three different aspects of the task-system. They describe operational systems as the actual throughout producing activities of organizations, in which they convert inputs into outputs and achieve the direct conditions for gaining new resources. Maintenance systems are those which are necessary to deal with the non-direct conditions of

production, that is, the conditions for the utilization of given resources (of which people are one) to achieve certain output. Regulating systems are those which supervene to see that operational (including both task and sentient) systems carry on as they should. In complex organizations, the three systems will be distinct, and frequently will be administratively specialized. The more intricate and technologically sophisticated the structures at issue, however, the harder it will be for specialized administrators to accomplish satisfactory integration and regulation.

Complications set in, for example, as operating systems are specialized in various ways (e.g., purchasing, manufacturing, marketing, etc.). Regulation is needed wherever there is a discontinuity between boundaries of separate activities or groupings. But in some cases it is much easier to institute regulation than in others. Automated chemical processes, for example, cannot be interrupted in midstream as can textile processes where part products are materially stable. Because of the impact of automation on regulatory systems, it cannot be regarded as simply a change in operating technology in most cases. Automation may necessitate new and more responsive strategies for dealing with the organization's environment as it eliminates the need for intermediate stores of resources, part or whole products. In the most elaborate case, the use of computers may completely

reorder the entire regulative organization of an enterprise, as it enables continuous rather than periodic checking throughout a wide range of operative and maintenance systems and/or activities. In a similar sense, my own research has shown that advanced accountability technologies may disturb the informal structure of an organization in totally unforeseen ways (Levine, et al., 1975).

Technological change may not only directly affect the internal regulating system of an organization, but it may also affect the environmental conditions which make one regulatory system or another more suited. Thus, the introduction of automated techniques may increase production to the extent that a previous shortage of an organization's products is eradicated. For example, in the case of a steel-works studied by Miller and Rice:

Instead of being production-dominated, as they had been for twenty years, the company's operations would become market-dominated. (Miller and Rice, 1967, p. 233)

Such a change necessitates greater responsiveness to consumer demands, greater flexibility in organizational functioning. Whether or not a company can restructure itself to produce these depends on its management and internal conditions. Were an enterprise unable to foresee the impacts of its technological changes, it would ultimately be doomed to failure. The strategy of maximizing resource conservation--production domination in

a seller's market--requires what Miller and Rice call a "segmented control system model" of the enterprise. Such a model breaks the organization into a number of units, generally corresponding to (perceived) sub-tasks, for which performance standards are fixed. The strategy of maximizing consumer satisfaction, on the other hand, implies an "integrated cybernetic model" of the enterprise. Such a model relates the enterprise as a total system to a changing external environment, and implies a higher order control system engaged in continuous--not either temporally or task-segmented--regulatory functioning.

Obviously this discussion of the work of Miller and Rice is already shading over into questions of the organization and operation of socio-technical systems which we take up later in this thesis. To sum up the present discussion, let us note that Miller and Rice have made major contributions to the work of laying the foundations for a psychoanalytic theory of organizations. Bion's analysis of the psychology of groups provided the crucial basis for a psychoanalytic treatment of supra-individual phenomena. Miller and Rice extended that to organizations as such. A focus on boundaries remained central to their analysis; they also built on Trist's discussion of the relationship between "human" and technological issues. Perhaps most of all, they have shown how organizations exist, among other reasons, in

order to contain the irrational in human relations. They demonstrate the ways in which crossing or breaching boundaries gives rise to anxieties. This work can be linked readily to Simon's analysis of necessarily bounded rationality (1957), March's treatment of the avoidance of major organizational decisions (1976), and Lawrence and Lorsch's (1967a) (and various sociologists') analysis of the implications of environmental factors for the internal functioning of organizations. Although Miller and Rice tend to remain optimistic about the ability of formal organizations to meet the challenges they discuss, their work also reveals a growing awareness of the extent to which administrative problems do not admit of simple "solutions" but rather require complex compromises.

The present thesis includes an attempt to extend the kind of analysis they have put forward in two major directions. First, they have underemphasized, in my opinion, the importance of a fully holistic treatment of the organization. Though they come closer to this than most Tavistock workers, they are still heavily focused on relations within and between groups. Though they draw an analogy between individual ego and organizational leadership, they do not go so far as I would in arguing that organizations have the functional equivalents of individual egos, and that these organizational egos can be analyzed in quite the same fashion. Related to this lesser emphasis on holistic "organizational personality"

is a deficiency in Miller's and Rice's treatment of organizational history and culture. When the organization is conceptualized as a whole personality, then its developmental history must clearly be brought to the fore--just as individual developmental histories are central to psychoanalysis. Miller and Rice do some of this sort of analysis in practical cases, but it occupies a negligible place in their theoretical system. Both of these lines of extension are suggested in Harry Levinson's work on organizational diagnosis. Levinson argues forcefully for both holism and attention to genetic or developmental data. I shall now turn to a summary of his work.

Organizational Diagnosis

Harry Levinson is a clinical psychologist trained at the Meninger Institute in Topeka, Kansas. After early work in individual psychotherapy his attention turned to industrial psychology. He became first the Director of Industrial Psychology at the Meninger Institute and then Ford Professor of Management at Harvard. His major work has been on industrial mental health (1961, 1962, 1964), the psychology of motivation (1974) and of leadership (1968, 1969, 1970). These contributions are of secondary relevance to the present discussion. Levinson's major contribution to the present work is his development of a model of planned change in organizations. This work is reported a guide to "organizational diagnosis" (Levinson,

1972). Levinson's work on organizational diagnosis has been primarily applied; his writings are focused on practical problems and examples of successful applications of his diagnostic approach. He has not worked as much on developing the theoretical underpinnings of his approach--the task taken up by this thesis. Levinson has written a book--aimed more at a general professional audience than at academic readers--setting out some of the psychological principles on which his organizational and managerial theories are based (Levinson, 1977). And certainly his suggestions in industrial applications are deeply influenced by his own previous training and work in psychoanalytically based psychotherapy. Levinson attempts to treat organizations "clinically" and emphasizes the similarities between the role of consultant and that of therapist. By implication, he suggests that clinical training itself is the way in which a potential organizational analyst learns how to interpret the manifold and complex data called for in his model.

The genesis of Levinson's approach is straightforward. In his earlier attempts to deal with individual emotional problems in organizations--he was especially an authority on executive stress--he came to the conclusion that sources for these problems could frequently be found only in the situation, not in the individual. This led him to look for a way to conceptualize the maladaptations of organizations of which

many individual maladaptations were symptoms. But, as he notes:

there are no widely accepted comprehensive diagnostic procedures for assessing and evaluating organizations comparable, for example, to the examination process in medicine. (1972, p. 5)

Seeing Levinson's enterprise as the development of such a diagnostic system helps to locate it precisely within the range of work to be done on organizational psychology. He is leaving theoretical issues in the background; the gathering of empirical data and its interpretation is what he sets out to explain. He is not opposed to theory building, and he should not be taken to task for not giving focused on it. In fact, he gives an indication of where he thinks we should look for theoretical foundations. His diagnostic system is based in psychoanalytic theory for its approach and terminology, and draws on Meninger's work for its specific outlines (Meninger, 1962, 1963).

Levinson, like Miller and Rice, takes the organic analogy--though within an open systems approach--as his foundation. He then asks what conditions a living system must fulfill, and suggests three: it must "maintain equilibrium"

1. among its internal subsystems.
2. between itself as a system and other systems.
3. between itself and the larger systems of which it is a part. (following Levinson,

1972, p. 4)

Thus, through the organic analogy, Levinson provides a place for--although he does not necessarily carry out--the integration of psychoanalytic and organizational theory. I find, however, that Levinson places a problematical stress on equilibrium. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a), Miller and Rice (1967), and others have shown how the different rates of change in environments--even the simple categorical difference between "stable" and "changing" environments--influence organizational structures and their effectiveness (see especially the early discussion in Rice, 1958, and Woodward's, 1958, sociological treatment). In fact, where he discusses more concrete issues, Levinson does not fall into the trap of presupposing equilibrium, and even takes up the issue of temporal bounds specifically (1972, pp. 29, 137-43, 280-84). His weakness is in his theoretical propositions. Here, closer attention to Miller and Rice's (1967) concept of the primary task could be helpful. Maintaining equilibrium could perhaps be seen as a metaphor for the long-range nature of what an organism does in surviving. But it is an inadequate description of the organization's primary tasks at any point or points in time. These refer to the immediate things which the organization--or organism--must do to survive. Hierarchies of need (Maslow, 1943 and discussion in Chapter One above) may be used to describe some of these

vicissitudes in primary tasks. The major point, however, is that equilibrium is only one of a number of possible patterns of successful achievement of primary tasks over time. Few modern industries--or indeed even public agencies--could be described as operating in equilibrium (though this might be the dream of weary administrators).

Whatever its problems--and for the most part they are based on omission of theoretical development, not commission of errors--Levinson's book is the only comprehensive effort thus far to provide a practical guide for treating the organization as a whole. Tavistock work has come closest, but, as we have seen, there is an unmistakable bias in it toward either the industrial relations or the small groups aspects of organizations. Other writers have claimed to treat "whole" organizations, either academically or in application, but their claims are frequently inaccurate. Argyris, for example, has suggested that Blau's claim to focus on

the system of interrelated elements that characterize the organization as a whole, not its component parts, (Blau, 1965m p. 326)

is spurious. Blau has, according to Argyris (1974), attempted to study the whole without its component parts. Such a focus on one level equates the organization with its formal or its macro-structural aspects. Argyris's own work may be faulted, as we saw in Chapter One, for failing to take important structural variables into account. His concentration on "openness" or "authenticity" of

communication, while valid, does not provide a comprehensive theory. At best he treats the rest of organizational life as that which members will get on with once their emotional and communicative difficulties are cleared up. Careful attention to the organizational sources of these problems, and to the generality of such issues, is given by the Tavistock workers and Levinson, but by few if any of the other major theorists we have discussed.

The notion of organizational "style" is key to Levinson's techniques for analyzing organizational functioning. Such styles, he suggests, like those in human personalities, have roots in the past. In particular, they have genetic or developmental roots laid down through the organization's experience and resolution of crises. Some of these stylistic aspects reveal themselves in current organizational perceptions. The degree of "alertness," "accuracy," and "vividness" are concepts which Levinson uses to describe the organization's internal and external "sensory" perceptions. Although they evoke readily recognizable images of life in organizations, they are hardly exact scientific concepts. There would be difficulties in trying to measure them under the definitions Levinson offers:

Alertness refers to the number of antennae the organization has out and the degree of sensitivity it has to their vibrations...Accuracy refers to the judgement about the correctness of

the interpretation of the stimuli...Vividness refers to the detail with which the stimuli are interpreted. (1972, p. 174)

Psychoanalytic writing in general has been criticized by many scientists (only sometimes justly) for depending too much on the evocative power of sensuous-descriptive imagery. Bion, in fact, has gone as far as any major analyst to bring rigorous language and technique into psychoanalytic theory and research (1970, also 1963, 1965). His work, and even more Bellak's empirical scheme for ego-analysis, suggest that it will be possible to overcome this limitation in a psychoanalytic study of organizations. The present thesis is sympathetic to Levinson's intent, and finds his guidelines comprehensive and fruitful, but argues that careful theoretical work must precede any attempt to specify standards for the interpretation of empirical evidence.

Another dimension of interpretation which is important to Levinson's approach is assessment of the discrepancy between reality and perceived reality. Here again, psychoanalysis has sometimes been too quick (but less quick than many other perspectives in psychology) to draw a neat line between reality (the analyst's perceptions) and unreality or fantasy. Not only are analysts less absolute judges of reality than they sometimes would have us believe, but reality itself is less cut and dried than they

suggest. Recent writers have discussed the relation between reality and unreality in psychoanalytic aetiology more closely and critically (White, 1963; Neu, 1973; Jacobson, 1973). The Bellak approach to empirical specification which I adopt has very strong procedures in this regard (see Chapter Four).

Levinson's insistence on treating the organization as a whole does mesh well with this approach, however, for only by treating organizations holistically can one see how such overall patterns of perceptions are formed.

Trading heavily in metaphor is a major characteristic of Levinson's work. No doubt it has contributed to its popularity by making it easily readable. It is hard, however, to empirically pin down metaphorical variables like the extent to which an organization is masculine or feminine (Levinson, 1972, pp. 270-271). Such limitations militate against taking Levinson's work as theory, or indeed as a methodological model. They are not, however, arguments against accepting his general conception of psychoanalytic inquiry into the functioning of whole organizations and attempting to provide the necessary theoretical foundations. This is the program of the present thesis. Now, it is time to turn to a closer examination of the psychoanalytic theory and research which specifically underpins my work.

CHAPTER III

THE CONDITIONS OF A PSYCHOANALYTIC APPROACH:

TRANSFERENCE AND ANALYZABILITY

Psychoanalytic methodology, not merely psychoanalytic theory, is central to the development of a psychoanalytic approach to organizational behavior. Analysts work by establishing special sorts of controlled relationships with analysands--whether the analysand is an individual, a group, or a whole complex organization. The basis for psychoanalytic work is the existence of ego-functioning at each level. Because the individual, group and organization each struggle to integrate themselves through ego-functioning, each is able to enter into relationships. Each is also able to form a more or less coherent relationship to the outside world, and reflexively, toward itself. To the extent that this relationship is incoherent, the individual, group or organization lacks ego, in a sense, lacks personality, and is unanalyzable. This is the basis for the traditional, though lessening, reluctance of analysts to take on the cases of most psychotics, and especially schizophrenics. It similarly implies that organizations are analyzable only to the extent that they do cohere through ego-functioning.

Given a sufficiently coherent ego (whether in individual, group, or organization), the analyst works first of all by forming a relationship with the analysand. This relationship is called transference because the analysand will typically bring into it affective material from key present and past relationships which appears both as inappropriate and as readily recognizable when thus removed from its original context. The transference relationship is central, for it is by analyzing it that the analyst comes to understand emotional patterns in other relationships. The analyst must also establish something of a working alliance with the analysand's ego. It is this "therapeutic alliance" which enlists the patient's ego in the service of uncovering the root causes of difficulty. In a sense, the patient does the therapeutic work himself, the analyst merely assists and advises. This is why the analyst adopts a passive, listening role through much of an analysis. He is attempting to encourage the analysand's ego to draw out new material and to produce itself the associations and inferences on which analytic success depends. The analyst does use other techniques, of course, including most of all various projective tests, interviews with relevant others, and the analysis of documents or other evidence from the patient's everyday life.

In order for us to apply this model of analysis to the

study and treatment of organizational functioning and dysfunctioning, we must grasp the nature of the transference relationship and its implications for questions of analyzability. It is by understanding what analysts mean by analyzability in terms of individual analysands that we will come to grasp the terms on which organizations are "psychoanalyzable". As we shall see, a key factor in the theoretical and practical issue of analyzability is ego-strength. It is different assessments of the importance of ego-strength to analysis that are at the heart of the prominent debates between so-called Kleinian and ego analysts. We shall examine some of these debates in the course of considering the transference and analyzability problem. It is not, however, my intention to take sides with regard to the superiority of one or another perspective for individual analysis. I am interested in both. I draw some support for the idea of organizational analysis from the stress on object relationships characteristic of Kleinian analysts among others. In this vein, I shall give particular attention to the work of Kernberg, who attempts to chart something of a middle course in the debates as well as making his own very helpful contributions. I find it necessary, however, to stress the role of ego-functioning much more than Kleinians do, as the essential feature of organizational life which establishes its analogy to individual life and permits the use of the psychoanalytic

framework.

Following my examination of transference and analyzability, therefore, I shall turn to a consideration of the most empirically and theoretically sophisticated work available on the assessment of ego-functions. This is the work of Leopold Bellak together with several colleagues. I shall explicate their theoretical and methodological approach, and give the rationale for my use of their work. This includes, among other things, the considerable advantages of a functional over a structural version of psychoanalytic theory for work on complex organizations. In the next chapter, I shall describe the twelve ego-functions of the monumental Bellak, Hurvich and Gediman (1973) study of ego-functions in schizophrenics, neurotics and normals. I then shall translate those ego-functions into concepts appropriate to organizational analysis.

There is a crucial difference between patients who come into psychoanalysis with relatively strong egos and the capacity for focused object-relations (the population to which Freud originally limited prospective analysands) and those who come to the therapist presenting weak egos and diffuse object-relations. The "classical" approach to psychoanalysis has remained basically oriented toward the analysis of adaptations to infantile instincts and object-relations as they are repeated inappropriately in current affairs, especially in the analytic situation

itself. The refinements of modern ego-psychology and the inclusion of narcissitic personality disorders within its purview has accentuated the emphasis of classical psychoanalysis on the relative coherence of the individual and the importance of the interplay of internal structures and forces. Psychotic and borderline patients have continued for the most part to be classed as "unanalyzable." There is some debate on this matter, even within the classical tradition. Kernberg (1969) has, both argued for wider definitions of analyzability, with the former stressing psychoses and the latter borderline conditions. The preponderance of opinion among classical analysts remains, as Kernberg's review of the debate indicates, against the notion that people with weak egos and diffuse object relations are analyzable.

Many other analysts, including most followers of Melanie Klein, have shifted the orientation of psychoanalysis toward earlier object-relations and traumatic experiences, particularly those which occur before the development of an adaptive ego and which are beyond the realm of memory. This shift has accompanied the treatment of patients hitherto (and still often) considered unanalyzable. The treatment advocated by these analysts has, however, been focused on diffuse and unstable object-relations. For these analysts, reenactment has replaced remembering as the dominant theme of therapy. Anxiety reduction and active interpretation have

often replaced frustration and free association. Transference is at the center of the dichotomy; for Kleinian analysts it is immediate and universal, a result of the patient's anxiety and needy object-life. For the classical analysts transference is more to be first nurtured and then worked through in the course of therapy, as the patient regresses into the extremes of transference and (with the help of interpretation) recognizes its origins and thus the process of displacement onto the analyst.

This thumbnail sketch of the issue admittedly draws the protagonists in sharper opposition than the range of views held by various practitioners and writers would indicate. Nonetheless, it is useful, for it allows us to see certain of the central issues in greater clarity than common sense or timidity usually allow. And transference is an issue central to all such arguments, just as it is central to psychoanalysis. As Arlow has observed:

With a few crucial changes (transference) may be transformed into a definition of neurotic process --that is, the neurotic process may be viewed as a distortion of realistic object-relations, integration, and adaptation by additions or intrusions from past unconscious and repressed object-relations. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that every new development in psychoanalysis has had some influence on the role of transference (reported in Valenstein, 1974, p. 311).

But central though the issues and important though the changes may be, I think that there is room for adaptation of disparate techniques, especially because each may be

appropriate to a different, but still psychoanalytic, problem.

In its essence and fundamentally, the analytic technique of yesterday and of today is the same and its aim is the same: that of helping the patient to know himself. Analysts have progressed in the assimilation and application of the truths discovered, as well as in the discovery of new truths. That different assertions are made and different techniques are discussed with all the heat and coldness of the transferences and countertransferences which are displayed among analysts, is a normal phenomenon, however much pathology it may contain (Racker, 1968, p. 70).

Ego-Strength, Frustration and Classical Analysis

In classical analytic technique, considerable emphasis is placed on the "fundamental rule" (Freud, 1911) that the patient report everything that comes into his head during the analytic hour, without criticism or censorship. This is supplemented by the interpretation of dreams and, occasionally, of material reported from outside the analytic hour. Interpretations are made only rarely while the patient continues to associate freely; more generally they are made when an interruption in the course of association (or other violation of the fundamental rule) reveals a blockage. The course of analysis is thus the gradual interpretation and elimination of maladaptive defenses causing a regression on the part of the patient into dealing directly with ever more fundamental material. It is precisely the weakening of the patient's ego controls in analysis that is seen as enabling its basic work to be done. Its work involves "reunifying" the

patient's past and present, that is, bringing the early determinations of his present behavior into his current awareness and thus enabling more appropriate current control over his actions, and more appropriate current affective life. A major tool of this is "remembering" or "recollecting" which, it should be noted, has a special meaning for Freud (1914). It refers not to an intellectual process alone, but to a realization and reconnection of past events in the intellectualized setting of the analysis. The task of the analyst is to help the patient go beyond the compulsion to repeat to a greater understanding of what, at base, he is repeating.

Analyzability

In accord with this conception of the nature of psychoanalysis, two primary criteria determine the suitability of prospective analysands for classical analysis: (a) introspective capacity, and (b) ability to withstand regression (these criteria are implied as early as Freud's 1905 formulation, p. 264). Thus, even though one may define neurosis in terms of defective ego-functioning, the prospective analysand's deficiencies must confiend to certain aspects of the ego, so that he can function outside the analysis as well as introspect and withstand regression (Fenichel, 1945). These capacities have generally been taken by the more strict interpreters of classical theory to exclude psychotics, borderline cases and some others from full psychoanalytic

treatment. Thus Kohut suggests that a psychoanalytically informed psychotherapy (1971, p. 13) is the most appropriate treatment for such patients, especially those with schizoid personalities (Kohut, 1971, p. 13).

These criteria for analyzability have been directly linked to transference formation by several writers. Reider (1957) and Wallerstein (1967), for example, speak of "transference psychoses." Nevertheless, they confine the usage of that term to:

patients deemed wholly within the neurotic range in terms of character structure and adjudged appropriate for classical analysis, in whom nevertheless a disorganizing reaction of psychotic intensity occurred within the transference (Wallerstein, p. 552)

The notion of transference psychosis is used especially for delusional states of various kinds. With this particular criterion in mind, it has been suggested that some psychotic patients and/or those suffering from severe character or personality disorders might be suitable for analysis. In general, however, classical analysts have held that the extent of ego development in most psychotic patients does not allow for the isolation of problematic (neurotic) phenomena which may then be viewed from the standpoint of the whole ego (see A. Freud, 1936, pp. 6-8, on the ego as observer). Rather than showing maladaptive character formations (Reich, 1933; A. Freud, 1936) such patients are characterized by an absence of or pervasive weakness in character formations.

However many "villains" there may be in the shape of different maladaptive defense mechanisms, the key one is repression. As Anna Freud has observed, repression is the most effective of the defenses the ego may use against unacceptable drives and/or libidinal attitudes; it is also the most dangerous:

The dissociation from the ego entailed by the withdrawal of consciousness from whole tracts of instinctual and affective life may destroy the integrity of the personality for good and all.
(A. Freud, 1936, p.50)

Repression is thus the basis of neurosis. In order, however, to carry on psychoanalysis, it is necessary that "the integrity of the personality" not be destroyed "for good and all." As Freud said, the prospective analysand "must be capable of a psychically normal condition" (1904, p. 254). Further, he must be capable not only in the abstract, but in immediate behavioral terms, so that he can carry on the work of analysis, so that he has some basis on which to evaluate the correctness of the analysts' interpretations and the inappropriateness of his own transference-reactions.

It is in a related connection that Freud argues adamantly that the analyst's task is to analyze and not to manipulate (1937, especially pp. 232-234). In other words, the patient must be capable of himself applying the analyst's interpretations to his own productions,

something which requires a fairly coherent and developed ego. We may note that this is also at the root of the discussion of the types of transference, in which the idea of "therapeutic alliance" is introduced. In this way contrasts are introduced between classical and Kleinian analysts with regard to their emphasis on the patient's developing the ability to carry on the analytic work--interpretation--himself. This is also a central element in Greenson's later formulation of the "working alliance" (1965). An important part of these notions is the idea, mentioned above, that the patient's nonneurotic and neurotic relationships to the analyst can be viewed separately, can be "split" in Greenacre's term. This is a point which Kleinian analysts directly challenge.

It should not be thought that this argument suggests that a patient must be "healthy" in order to undergo psychoanalysis. On the contrary, the distinctions made above only partially concern seriousness of disorder. To at least as great an extent, they are distinctions in kind of complaint, as will become clearer in the course of the present discussion. It is characteristic of classical psychoanalysis that the patients it treats are seen as dealing in therapy with problems of their own maintenance. And in this sense, the issue is one of ego maintenance. Thus it is that an attempt is made to separate the transference neurosis from the working

alliance. The transference neurosis is seen as taking the place of, and analytically focusing, the patient's original neurosis. In Freud's words:

Provided only that the patient shows compliance enough to respect the necessary conditions of the analysis, we regularly succeed in giving all the symptoms of the illness a new transference meaning and in replacing his ordinary neurosis by a "transference-Neurosis" of which he can be cured by the therapeutic work. (1914, p. 154)

The immediate source of the transference is the authority of the doctor (see Rieff, 1959, p. 190, on "the first paradox of psychoanalytic treatment: that it is authoritarian in order to render the burden of infantile authority-figures tolerable. The more basic condition is the repetition-compulsion, to which we shall return in more detail later, Here what is important to note is that:

The repetition compulsion, which dominates the patient in the analytic situation, extends not only to former id impulses but equally to former defensive measures against the instincts. (A. Freud, 1936, p. 19)

For the patient of classical psychoanalysis, then, there is a more or less coherent ego which can join with the analyst as observer of its less integrated or successful defenses. Interpretation is thus focused on the resistance of these opposed parts of the ego to the free association imposed by the fundamental rule.

This theoretical insight determines another practical rule: the rule that the making conscious of the unconscious has to take place not directly, but by the elimination of the resistances. That is, the patient must first find out that he defends himself, then by what

means, and, finally against what (Reich, 1933, p. 4).

Thus it is that Winnicott suggests that an analysis can be based primarily on interpretative work only after a patient has been able to develop a transference neurosis (1955).

This discussion should make it clear that classical analysts are predisposed (a) to choose patients on the basis of, and (b) to regard the patients they have chosen as having, relatively developed egos which can, over the course of the analysis, be enlisted in the analytic work. Similarly, an ego-analytic approach to complex organizations implies the existence of sufficient unity and control that the organization can be treated as a whole. Analytic work, in either case, consists largely of the interpretation of the defensive formations which are problematic to the analysand's current life, that is, those which impede the functioning of his (its) ego as a whole. This is at the core of the definition of neurosis, which is the essential definition of the analysand. And its effects are to be seen in transference and working through, the essential elements of classical analysis.

The separation of the relatively nonneurotic relationship to the analyst from the more neurotic transference reactions has important theoretical and technical implications. A patient must be able to develop both types of relationships in order to be analyzable (Greenson, 1967, p. 169).

The Development/Production of the Transference

The preceding section suggests that the patients in classical analysis can be seen as developing transference-neuroses. Before we proceed to consideration of the import of this term and its relation to transference more generally, and to the course of the analysis, we should mention one further point. This is that it has been persuasively argued by Kohut (1971) that the "transference-like" phenomena of narcissistic patients in analysis can be treated by methods well within the classical camp. This is not something which we can take up in detail in the present discussion. The "analysis of the self," as described by Kohut, is not without relevance for psychoanalytic technique more generally conceived, however. In particular, psychoanalytic discussions of the self, seen as a representation similar to those of objects--a content, not a structure, of the mind--have been far from fully developed. Capacity for self-representation is a key issue in organizational life, as well as individual life. Kohut's discussion of the relationship between the forms of "grandiose self" and "omnipotent object" is of widespread utility (see 1971, p. 9 and passim). Accordingly, we will make reference to work on narcissism at one or two points where it is relevant to the ensuing discussion. In general, the

inclusion of narcissistic personalities in the category of analysands of classical analysts strengthens our position as to the importance of ego strength as a discriminating factor between classical and Kleinian viewpoints.

Two related features distinguish the behavior of the classical analyst with his patients. First, he is likely to be frustrating to the patient's impulses, attempts at acting out, satisfying needs, etc. Second, he is likely to attempt to present himself as much as possible as an impersonal, objective observer of the analysand's productions. The reasons for such a stance are multiple and basic. In the first place, the analyst is frustrating in order (a) to force the patient beyond his everyday pathological and ultimately unsatisfying adaptations and defenses and (b) to promote the development of an active transference. The analyst attempts his impersonal stance in order that the patient's transference reactions should indeed be unwarranted displacements of earlier affect and/or defenses and not realistic responses to the present analyst. Indeed, Rieff suggests that Freud's position in "The Dynamics of Transference" implies that the patient must be convinced that his feelings are unrelated to the analyst's person "even if this is not entirely the case" (1959, p. 187). Let us look into matters a bit further.

Freud's explanation of the source of transference at its simplest is that

If someone's need for love is not entirely

satisfied by reality, he is bound to approach every new person whom he meets with libidinal anticipatory ideas; and it is highly probable that both portions of his libido, the portion that is capable of becoming conscious as well as the unconscious one, have a share in forming that attitude. (1912, p. 100)

The analyst, of course, is interested primarily in the unconscious aspects of the attachment of anticipation, and attempts to structure the analysis so as to shift the patient's everyday balance in favor of the unconscious. (It should be mentioned that Freud did not always refer so confidently to the possibility of any of the libido becoming conscious as such.) It is interesting in at least two respects to compare Freud's 1912 essay with an earlier one (cited favorable by Freud on at least one occasion) by Ferenczi (1909) on transference and introjection. Ferenczi believed that neurotic patients were hungry for transference, that physicians in general are likely to be made its objects. The predisposition exists latent in the patient, the analyst is only a catalyst. The sources for this predisposition are a tendency toward introjection and a hunger for stimuli. The analyst is a screen, or cover, for important infantile objects. Ferenczi's essay is particularly interesting because in some ways it prefigures later areas of dispute between classicists and Kleinians. The stress Ferenczi lays on infantile objects and the idea of universal predisposition toward transference both are similar to the

familiar emphases of Kleinian analysis. The idea of stimulus hunger, on the other hand, admits of interpretation in either direction. Either one might suggest that patients are relatively over-stimulated and unable to form successful foci and attachments within the field of external stimuli, in repressing the intrusions of external as well as internal forces on his overly rigid structure of defenses. This would lead one more toward a classical attitude. There is as yet no metapsychological theory which takes adequate and equal account of both tendencies, and presumably both have their instances among analytic patients.

Freud too suggests that transference is common outside of psychoanalysis and cites various examples. Indeed, he goes so far as to indicate that in his opinion:

It is not a fact that transference emerges with greater intensity and lack of restraint during psycho-analysis than outside it. . . . These characteristics of transference are therefore to be attributed not to psycho-analysis but to neurosis itself. (1912, p. 1010)

In some ways this assertion gives support to the frequent claims of Kleinian analysts to be following Freud where others have veered away (Klein, 1959). One may suggest, though, that Freud himself veered away from this early position, especially in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). Later writers from the classical position have

certainly taken a different position. Sandler has commented:

All the things that we broadly speaking call transference, all the variables, enter into ordinary object relationships as well, but they enter in a different proportion in the analytic situation; we concentrate on certain aspects. (quoted in Valenstein, 1974, p. 318).

Even in his early work, though, Freud regarded the achieving of transference as an analytic task:

The Patient, however, only makes use of the instruction in so far as he is induced to do so by the transference; and it is for this reason that our first communication should be withheld until a strong transference has been established. (1913, p. 144)

Discussions of transference are thus pervaded by the distinction between generally seeing the present in terms of the past, and more specifically focusing certain past affects on the analyst. Sandler et al., simply list inclusively the various ways in which the term is used (1973, p. 45) and there is no reason why we should not simply admit of the two levels of definitions. It is important, however, that we recognize the implications for treatment of focusing on one or the other. In order to do this, we must go back to the question of the underlying sources of the transference, in particular, the repetition compulsion.

What are repeated in the transference are various early childhood reactions. These may be reactions to instinctual urges, to introjected objects, or to defenses

built up as part of earlier adaptations. The repetitions may take the form of impulses, feelings and general attitudes, or defenses projected from their past situation into the present. Therapists are likely figures for such transferences not only because they are likely to arouse defenses, but also because they are, to at least a considerable, if variable, extent, authority figures, as were most of the child's early objects. Some forms of psychotherapy attempt to play down the authority-role of the "doctor" as socially constructed in our society. Others attempt to capitalize on it as the crucial factor in a suggestion-based therapy. In psychoanalytic thinking, it is always through transference that the patient brings his material to a focus in presentation to the therapist. Thus, as Fenichel remarked:

Any psychotherapeutic method makes use of transference, but only in psychoanalysis does this consist in interpretation of the transference, that is, in making it conscious. (1945, p. 571)

Thus it is that the transference neurosis, in taking over from the patient's original neurosis, becomes the vehicle for treatment. In his transference reactions, the patient makes the analyst aware of his psychic reservoir of affect and defenses. Further, the transference enables the patient to bring forth his symptoms with more energy attached to them than would mere conscious relation allow. This energy can be turned into motive force for

cure (Freud, 1913, p. 143). Thus:

All the libido, as well as everything opposing it, is made to converge solely on the relation with the doctor. In this process the symptoms are inevitable divested of libido. In place of his patient's true illness there appears the artificially constructed transference illness, in place of the various unreal objects of the libido there appears a single, once more imaginary, object in the person of the doctor. But, by the help of the doctor's suggestion, the new struggle around this object is lifted to the highest psychical level: it takes place as a normal mental conflict. Since a fresh repression is avoided, the alientation between ego and libido is brought to an end and the subject's mental unity is restored. (Freud, 1917, p. 454)

Although it is true, and agreed to by Freud, that all human relations contain a mixture of realistic and transference reactions (see also Fenichel, 19410 p. 72), there is an important limit to this similarity as far as the classical analysts are concerned. In everyday life (and in some forms of psychotherapy) reality testing and behavioral restrictions prevent the distortions of the transference and the compulsion to repeat from becoming manifest to the neurotic. In the classical analytic situation, the patient is encouraged not to censure his remarks in order that the transference may be as full and revealing as possible. The assumption is that unless the analysand's problems are brought fully--and in all their contradictions--into the foreground of his own as well as the analyst's view, there can be no cure.

We render the compulsion harmless, and indeed useful, by giving it the right to assert itself in a definite field. We admit it into the transference as a playground in which it is

allowed to expand in almost complete freedom and in which it is expected to display to us everything in the way of pathenogenic instincts that is hidden in the patient's mind. (Freud, 1914, p. 154)

All of this gives an impression of the considerable power which lies behind the active transference. But, classical analysts do not suggest that this power necessarily indicates that transference is always dominant.

Transference is developed; resistances to it are overcome so that libidinal drives and defenses can be expressed within it.

As we have suggested, the agents of reality testing and everyday adaptations limit the expression of the more inchoate or primitive part of the individual's psyche most of the time. These agents are both external--in the form of situational demands and a supporting or structuring environment--and internal--the ego. The situation is somewhat different within the analysis, where the balance is shifted toward the deeper unconscious structures and affect. This is accomplished externally through the abstraction of the analytic setting from reality pressures. Internally, the shift is accomplished largely through (a) the relaxation, and (b) the interpretation of ego censors and defenses. Thus, when Anna Freud says:

Transference (and countertransference) originally meant the distortion of a realistic patient-analysis relationship by additions from past unconscious and repressed object-relations; this notion was widened until it comprised whatever happens between the two partners in the

analytic setting, regardless of its precipitating cause, derivation and meaning (1968, p. 271)

she is referring to the distinction between these deep distorted elements of the transference, and more realistic and surface elements of the relationship (reiterated by Valenstein, 1974, p. 313). Without maintaining such a distinction it is difficult to emphasize the importance of working backwards in the course of the analysis to get at basic issues. A difference of opinion on this leads Kleinian analysts, for example, to place much less emphasis on the developmental aspects of the analysis over time.

It should be noted, however, that this working backwards does not mean for the classicists that the course of the analysis is a reversed image of the development of the neurosis. Some, to be sure, seem to assume or imply that it does. Gumbel, for example, suggests that "transference has to be understood in terms of a theory of trauma" and particularly will be shaped by quality of individual traumas (in Valenstein, 1974, p. 317). In general, the theory of trauma was one of the earliest and weakest of psychoanalytic formulations, and to revive it in this context seems ill-considered. Freud discarded the emphasis on trauma in order to stress the generality of the intrapsychic phenomena that he had discovered. While specific injuries may have definite

importance, either in causing or in focusing neurosis, they are not its sole and essential source. Further, Freud stressed the independence of the content of transference resistances from their structural importance to the patient, and both of these from their importance in the course of the analysis:

This (the obstinacy of a defense), however, should not lead us to conclude in general that the element selected for transference-resistance is of peculiar pathenogenic importance. If in the course of a battle there is a particularly embittered struggle over the possession of some little church or some individual farm, there is no need to suppose that the church is a national shrine, perhaps, or that the house shelter's the army's pay-chest. The value of the object may be a purely tactical one and may perhaps emerge only in this one battle. (Freud, 1912, p. 104n)

With this discussion of trauma, resistance and defense, we have moved largely beyond the realm of the development of the transference, and into a consideration of the process of working through.

Working Through

Of course, working through cannot be readily separated practically or theoretically from the ideas of transference noted above. This is because it is only in the context of an idea of transference that working through becomes an issue. This is not to say that working through refers only to the working through of transference issues. It does not. It includes also the incorporation of other insights, based on other kinds of interpretation.

Classical analysts, however, argue that the context, including the temporal context, of an anxious remark is important to any understanding of its significance. The anxiety is aroused at a particular point in a particular chain of associations, not in isolation. This is an important reason for the relatively passive attitude of classical analysts, for their relatively infrequent interpretations (see Reik, 1948, pp. 157-172, for an interesting discussion of the notion of "free-floating attention" in this context).

In connection with this interpretation of the role of anxiety, the classical analysts' interpretations may fall into two broad categories. They may be provoking, in the sense of getting the patient to go further into the more basic underlying sources of his anxieties, or they may be reality oriented. In the latter case, the analyst represents a sort of encapsulated social censor in the effort to help the analysand develop a workable structure of ego organization and defenses. Which direction interpretation takes is largely a function of the stage of the analysis. The broadest tendency is for the analysis overall to divide into a working backward characterized by the growth of (and growth of distortion in) the transference, and a working-through, moving forward in the rehabilitation of ego-control. But there are other internal trends as well. The analysis is not just one

large, but also many small, successions of discoveries and consolidations. Accordingly, there are differences in the kinds of interpretation offered (and transference on which it is based). Nonetheless, the distinction between provoking and reality-oriented interpretation is in and of itself curative. The emphasis on working-through is a recognition of the fact (according to the classical theory) that since the original events and object-relations of the child cannot be directly altered, it must be the adaptation process (essentially, the ego) which is dealt with (see Greenson, 1967, 1974).

The last stage of the analysis is focused on understanding and eliminating the transference. Interpretation is still "the supreme agent in the hierarchy of therapeutic principles characteristic of analysis" (Bibring, 1954), but here the concern is not primarily with the interpretation of id impulses or ego defenses as such. Rather, it is focused on the ramifications of the new insights which have been gained, and on the transference as such. This is not only because of the resistances to losing the nurturing analyst which typically crop up (Sandler, et al., 1973, p. 81), but also because of the tendency of patients to limit their insights to the analytic situation, treated as objective knowledge. In other words, the patient must see himself, not the analyst, as exerting ego and superego control.

The previous one-sidedness of analytic concentration on the problematic instinctual and defensive material produced by the analysand must be "made up" (see A. Freud, 1936, pp. 26-27). When Freud (1914) originally introduced the concept in its modern form, it was as part of the triad "recollection, repetition and working-through". But the main distinction is between the first two terms describing sources of discovery or insight, and the third, which describes the process of utilization. A variety of resistance to such incorporations of insight must be overcome. We cannot go into it in detail here, but only note that Freud originally emphasized the "id-resistance" (1926). This referred to something akin to what Freud (1918) (following Jung) had earlier called "psychical inertia," the tendency of instinctual drives to attempt to remain in the same patterns rather than any new ones which become available.

Greenacre (1956) has suggested that the newer concentration on analysis of ego defenses has taken over much of what would previously have been referred to as working-through. Nonetheless, the concept seems integral to the classical position in psychoanalysis under most constructions. It seems untenable to regard it as just a variety of the analyst's interpretation, as does Fenichel (1940). Such usage would leave classical (especially ego-analytic) psychoanalysis without a term with which to

treat the process of bringing the patient more and more into the role of observer himself (that is, in his faculty of ego). The point of working-through is not only that the analyst must repeat his interpretations in order to counter the patient's repetition compulsion, as Fenichel would have it. It involves a further process of assimilation of insights on the part of the patient. As Sandler, et al. point out:

Working through represented analytic work which was additional to that involved in uncovering conflict and resistances. Intellectual insight without working through was not regarded as sufficient for the therapeutic task, as the tendency for the previous modes of functioning to repeat themselves in accustomed ways would remain (1973, p. 123).

Fenichel, however, emphasized an important point when he (like many others) compared working-through to mourning. He suggested the way in which detachment must take place separately in every context in which the mourned object is implicated or remembered. In this analogy, "detachment" may refer to either detachment from an old complex of reactions or stylized object-relations, or from the transference relationship with the analyst. In the former case, we may add, Fenichel is extending Freud's original usage of working-through to include ego and superego resistances, as well as the id resistances.

In summary, the classical and ego-psychological analysts stress that only relatively "well" patients--

neurotics who still have some considerable ego strength-- are suitable for psychoanalysis as they define it. This is because psychoanalysis involves a gradual process of regression (and/or recollection) in which the ego is enlisted as the observer and critic of the id impulses and the less healthy parts of the ego itself. In the course of analysis, it is assumed that patients do, and should, develop more intense transferences: a process which classical analysts encourage by provocative interpretations. In the latter stages of the analysis this transference is itself subjected to intensive analysis and interpretations as it is seen to be an unrealistic displacement of the patient's affect onto the analyst. Working-through the transference involves incorporating this affect back into the ego-dominated structure of the analysand's psyche. Thus reunification and improved integration of functioning are added to self-discovery as prime analytic goals in the later stages.

Primitive Images, Activity and Kleinian Analysis

Our task is somewhat easier in this section, in that we have already outlined our chief concerns and mentioned some of the contrasts between classical and Kleinian positions. We may thus proceed with a somewhat briefer presentation of Kleinian ideas of transference and analyzability, treating primarily only the points of

divergence from the ego psychologists. It should be emphasized that there is a great deal of convergence as well, and a number of Kleinian innovations have been fairly widely incorporated into "classical" psychoanalysis (see Kernberg, 1969). There are also a number of what Kernberg calls "middle group" analysts, notably the object-relations emphasis itself with the Kleinians, but each has rejected various other aspects of Kleinian orthodoxy. For the purposes of clarity of contrast, we shall not treat their work in any detail here, though it will have some influence on certain specifics of our own ultimate formulation of ego.

The Universality of Transference

In Kleinian analysis, Freud's basic rule is not foregone, but the rejection of one of Freud's secondary rules alters the impact of the first. This secondary rule was the early suggestion that

So long as the patient's communications and ideas run on without any obstruction the theme of transference should be left untouched. One must wait until the transference, which is the most delicate of all procedures has become a resistance. (1913, p. 144).

The link between transference and resistance has not remained as fixed as this quote would imply, but from the discussion above it can readily be seen that this passage prefigures the later ego-analytic emphasis on the interpretation of defenses as they are aroused in the

course of the analysis. Such defenses are played out in the transference, according to classical theory, and proper dealing with them necessitates the passive attitude of the psychoanalyst. This is a position which Melanie Klein unequivocally rejects. The reason for this, on a theoretical level, is that her primary focus is on the very earliest and most primitive of infantile object-relations, and:

I hold that transference originates in the same processes which in the earliest stages determine object-relations. (Klein, 1952a, p. 53).

A result of this position is one of the most often cited characteristics--or, at least, one of the most stereotyped criticisms--of Kleinian analyses: the very active role which the analyst takes in interpreting the patient's material. This begins from the first day and extends immediately to the very deepest referent of interpretation. As Racker comments:

The interpretation must be given when the analyst knows that the patient does not know, needs to know, and is capable of knowing. (1968, p. 41)

Kleinians tend further to assume that the patient (whether an adult or a very young child) is generally able to understand deep interpretations at the outset of analysis.

Such deep interpretations are primarily interpretations of early object relations as repeated in the transference. The transference is seen as a very

generalized phenomenon which "is a constant reality which begins even before the first interview" (Racker, 1968, p. 56). In accord with Klein's comment quoted above, the transference is not particularized to the patient's relationship with the analyst, but is the universal outgrowth of infantile object-relations.

For many years--and this is up to a point still true today--transference was understood in terms of direct references to the analyst in the patient's material. My conception of transference as rooted in the earliest stages of development and in deep layers of the unconscious is much wider and entails a technique by which from the whole material presented the unconscious elements of the transference are deduced. (Klein, 1952a, p. 55)

This follows Ferenczi's (1909) linking of introjection and transference. The transference is seen in terms of symbolic representations of early objects rather than in terms of specific identifications of the physician as an authority figure (a point criticized by Anna Freud 1936, p. 26 with equal, and veiled, reference to both Jung and Klein). It is the emphasis on the importance of this basic material which eliminates the need for working backwards through the defenses of the ego in a gradual process of regression. The id contents to be recovered are seen as readily available to analytic interpretation:

Should transference be interpreted in the first session? If we follow the principle that the interpretation should be given at the level of the greatest unconscious anxiety and that what we want is to establish contact with the patient's unconscious fantasy, then it is obvious that, in the vast majority of cases, a transference interpretation will impose itself. In my own

experience, I have not had a case in which I did not have to interpret the transference from the start. (Segal, 1967, p. 202)

An example of the type of interpretations which Kleinians are apt to give early in the analysis may be taken from one of Klein's own case reports. In the second week of treatment, this four-year-old girl has been terrified at being left alone with her, and had screamed when Klein placed a wet sponge beside one of the dolls during play:

I now interpreted this material in connection with her protest against the big sponge (which represented her father's penis). I showed her in every detail how she envied and hated her mother because the latter has incorporated her father's penis during coitus, and how she wanted to steal his penis and the children out of her mother's inside and kill her mother. I explained to her that this was why she was frightened and believed she would kill her mother or would be deserted by her. (1932, pp. 55-56)

This interpretation makes manifest the important Kleinian emphasis on depth interpretation in its original context of work with young children. Klein has argued that the emotional life of the infant is characterized by an immature separation of structure (ego and id, particularly) but that such structures are nevertheless in evidence in inchoate form. The ego and id influence each other in this early development making it the ultimate source of all later psychic conflicts. This position drawn from the analysis of children has led, however, to an extension of analyzability to a range of patients often

considered analyzable.

The Extension of Analyzability

Many psychotics and borderline patients present similarly inchoate emotional structures to those which Klein found in young children and argued were still more characteristic of earlier infantile development. Rather than demonstrating the relatively integrated egos of patients considered analyzable by the "classical" school, they show a predominance of primal symbolism and a weakness in ability to order and/or censor this material. A fundamental development in Kleinian analysis was Klein's suggestion that "with children the transference takes place immediately" (1932, p. 46). This not only allowed for early interpretation, but gave the theoretical grounding to the entire process of id interpretation. By arguing that children formed transferences immediately, Klein suggested that the child's behavior in the analysis was in fact focused, albeit in terms of primary object relations, not later ego structures. This contention ran directly counter to other child analysts who suggest that children neither form transferences immediately, nor do so in the same sense as adults. A. Freud (1965), for example, suggests that they form a combination of new relationship and transference relationship to the therapist, depending on length of treatment and age of child.

Klein extended her argument for the importance of immediate id interpretation from children to adult patients; it underpins her extension of analyzability to groups conventionally excluded by ego-analysis. In particular, Kleinians hold that there is no hard and fast categorical difference between psychotics and less seriously disturbed patients. In fact, the word "psychotic" is used by Kleinians to refer to the inchoate object-relations and image formations of the child as well as for the diagnostic category. It would seem to refer, in Kleinian writings, to the ungoverned expression of distorted infantile object-relations. This is a point for which they are often criticized (see Waelder, 1936, for the original criticism--limiting "psychotic" to regressive phenomena--and Kernberg, 1969 for a more general review).

Adult psychotics and borderline patients were thus considered analyzable on the same grounds as children" vis., that it was shown that they would display a transference and thus a focused and analyzable corpus of psychic material. The conception of the origins of the transference in infantile object-relations was the unifying factor. In this the Kleinians (like others, including those influenced by Sullivan) reject the position originally formulated by Abraham and taken up by Freud in some of his earlier work (1911, 1914). That position is that schizophrenic patients had regressed to

an auto-erotic level and therefore were incapable of forming a transference. The level at which the patient's anxiety and conflicts are focused is early, to be sure, but it is not auto-erotic. It is, rather, dominated by object-relations of very primitive kinds, with the ego immature enough that introjection (again, following Ferenczi, 1909) is frequent.

In connection with this, it was a Kleinian, Rosenfeld, who first began to stress the transference psychosis in connection with the treatment of overtly psychotic patients (1952a, 1954; largely brought together in 1965). One of the distinguishing characteristics of transference psychosis, as opposed to neurosis, is its extremely intense and volatile nature. More crucial as a distinguishing factor in the present context, however, is the generality and diffuseness of the psychotic transference reactions. Searles's comment (in an essay much in influence by Kleinian work) is illustrative:

In working with the chronically schizophrenic patient, we are confronted with a person who has already become, long ago, openly psychotic, and whose transference to us is hard to identify partly for the very reason that his whole psychotic transference reactions, willy-nilly, to everyone about him, including the analyst in the treatment session. (1963, p. 657)

Searles goes on, we might mention, with a consideration less congenial to many Kleinians, namely that the transference must be developed, or "fostered," rather than simply assumed:

The difficult task is to foster the emergence of

a coherent transference meaning in the delusional symptomatology. (p. 658)

Where a classical analyst would say, thus, that one attempts first to provide the schizophrenic with sufficient ego-strength to undergo (or undertake analysis), the Kleinian sees the problem as internal, rather than prior, to analysis.

The relationship between introjection and projection cannot be overemphasized in a discussion of Kleinian psychoanalysis. In one of Klein's key formulations the conceptualization is expressed thus:

The relation to the first object implies its introjection and projection, and thus from the beginning object-relations are moulded by an interaction between introjection and projection, between internal and external objects and situations. (1946, p. 2)

"Projective-identification" is the key mechanism underlying the transference, and similarly, underlying most other object-relations. It can also work in mechanisms of defense, as when good and bad parts of the ego are projected into external objects, which are then identified with the projected parts of the self. Thus the defensive use of projective identification may be what makes the schizophrenic patient appear to have regressed to an objectless auto-erotic level of development (Rosenfeld, 1952a, b). The primary Kleinian technique for dealing with such transference is verbal interpretation, about which we shall have more to say below.

The Interpretation of Infantile Material

In the analysis of adult neurotics, transference pertains primarily to affect related to three whole persons: The patient, the therapist and a figure in the patient's past. In work with psychotics, however, the transference is more likely to involve multiple part-objects. The same is largely said to be the case for small children. This makes for a considerably different therapeutic situation. Among other things, the boundaries between objects are likely to be extremely unclear, where in fact they exist at all. The analyst must react to such a situation differently, and further, such a patient is likely to provide him with a very different sort of material and a very different configuration of anxieties. The stress in Kleinian psychoanalysis is on the basic importance of such very primitive material. Developed with children, some of its most important original contributions have been in the area of work with psychotics. Let us now look at what the stress on infantile object-relations means for the analytic work per se.

Kleinian analysts devote themselves immediately and almost exclusively to interpretations of the deepest strata of the analysand's unconscious. A variety of different reasons is given for this practice. Perhaps the most basic of them is contained in the passage from Segal's

introjection to Klein's work quoted above. This is the "principle that the interpretation should be given at the level of the greatest unconscious anxiety" (1967, p. 202), which has been the focus of a great deal of controversy between Kleinians and non-Kleinians, and of misrepresentations of the former by the latter. Greenson, for example, has suggested that

it appears that the Kleinians believe they can make deeply unconscious material instantly conscious, and simultaneously render it anxiety free, comprehensible and utilizable by the patient. (1974, p. 41)

This is a distortion, however, as Rosenfeld's (1974, p. 49) rejection of the attribution makes clear.

Kleinians do not expect such dramatic and instant results from all interpretations, but rather expect the issue to recur and gradually be worked through in the course of repeated interpretations (see Klein, 1932, p. 50)

One of the reasons offered for the introduction of early deep interpretations is that

it is important for the patient to realize that the analyst is capable of helping the patient to experience and accept feelings which the parents and the environment could not cope with. (Rosenfeld, in Valenstein, 1974, p. 318)

This would seem to be in line with the comments cited above from Searles about the diffuseness of the transference psychosis as well as with the notion of patients with poorly developed ego organizations considered more generally. The psychotic is poorly in

touch with himself and his environment. He must focus his relationship to the analyst if the therapy is to progress. In order to do so, he must be able to differentiate the analyst to some extent from his own projective identification. Searles in fact suggests that Kleinian authors appear often to be unwilling to participate fully in the patient's projection of part objects onto them. This he feels is an error for two reasons. First, it prevents the therapist from being fully in touch with that part of his own behavior to which the patient may attach his transference with some objective grounds. Secondly, it impedes the successful working-through of this delusional state, and makes unrealistic demands on the patient's weakly developed ego (1963).

Such a mandate does diverge considerably from ego-analytic work, however, in that it tends toward suggesting "supportive" or at least very active therapy. Early interpretation is seen not as provocative, but as reducing the patient's anxiety. This may be precisely because the patients treated are more severely disorganized and because the notion of working backwards from surface to depth has been abandoned. Instead of interpreting defenses, which thus allows for the production of more uncontrolled primitive affect, the Kleinians interpret very primitive material, thus

hopefully giving strength to the ego. This is particularly so because of the (Freudian and) Kleinian suggestion that reducing the affect tied up in such issues allows for greater energy to be brought to the ego (cf. Rosenfeld, 1965). The interpretation of deep infantile material is deemed possible, then, because and to the extent that the transference replicates for the patient his early object-relations.. Thus Klein says that

the differences between transference and the first object-relations . . . are a measure of the curative effect of the analytic procedure (1952a, p. 56).

This statement points to what we might call the linear character of the Kleinian conception of psychoanalysis. Kleinians do not write of analysis as divided into qualitatively different phases in a developmental pattern. Rather, they see the analysis as unitary, with each session reflecting the patient's current state of functioning. This includes, but is not limited to, the rejection of the patterns of working from the surface backwards through the analysand's defenses. Patient's defensive structures are seen as being called into play in such a way as to reveal their underlying significance in primal object-relations. This follows on the principle of interpreting the area of greatest unconscious anxiety. This does not mean, however, that in rendering deep interpretations Kleinians ignore intermediate levels:

In keeping with my subject matter, I have predominantly discussed here the earliest

experiences, situations, and emotions from which transference springs. On these foundations, however, are built the later object-relations and the emotional and intellectual developments which necessitate the analyst's attention no less than the earliest ones; that is to say, our field of investigation covers all that lies between the current situation and the earliest experiences. In fact it is not possible to find access to earliest emotions and object-relations except by examining their vicissitudes in the light of later developments. (Klein, 1952a, p. 56)

The goal of the analysis is to bring past and present together in the patient's mind. We might add that this passage suggests this overall balance rather more than do most writings of Klein or Kleinians. Many make it easy to gain a different impression, but it seems unlikely that Kleinians tend to such extremes within the constraints of the analytic hour, as opposed to within the more open setting of the polemical essay.

A more complex question to ask would be how far the Kleinian principles are applicable only to work with borderline cases and psychotics or are to be followed without distinction in the analysis of neurotic cases. Perhaps the only way to get a fully adequate answer would be to study actual Kleinian practice with attention to the proportion of different kinds of cases--a task which is outside the realm of the present thesis. Here we may only suggest that Kleinians do in fact suggest the universal applicability of their ideas, and they do include deep and early interpretation in their case descriptions of

analyses of neurotics (as in Segal's 1967 reports of cases involving training candidates). An underlying reason for this may be the argument that what is to be treated is that which is fundamental to the patient's psychic development, and that one should proceed as directly as possible to dealing with it. It would seem, however, that the stress noted above on the diffuse character of the ego and the direct expression of primitive object-relations would be an essential condition of such an argument. As we have indicated, these conditions are expressed primarily as characteristics of children and psychotics. Klein (1959), however, does explicitly extend many such findings to more "normally developed" adults.

We need now briefly to focus our attention on the role of active verbal interpretation again. We have indicated some of the reasons put forward for the practice, such as the reduction of the patient's initial anxiety in order to allow the analytic work to continue. There is the further reason of focusing the transference where it was very diffuse, and the intention to show the analyst's responsiveness, involvement and ability to tolerate that of his patient's material which the family and other environmental figures could not. Even here, though, there must be some question as to whether verbal interpretation is the only, or even the best means to achieving these ends. Searles has suggested that some greater actual

relatedness may be in order, and has criticized the focus on verbal interpretation. Where Bion (1959) continually refers to the patient's "belief that" the analyst may be hostilely defensive with the suggestion that this is unwarranted and to be interpreted as such, Searles notes that the analyst may very well be hostilely defensive, especially when confronted with the overwhelming displacement of affect which a psychotic patient may produce, and the constraining transference role in which he may place the analyst, thus threatening the latter's sense of identity.

It seems to me that relatively abundant transference interpretation might be used by the therapist in an unconscious effort not only to protect himself against symbiotic relatedness with the patient, but also to deny the extent to which his own sadism, so much at odds with his genuinely therapeutic intent, is playing a part in shaping and maintaining the patient's psychotic transference--to deny specifically the extent to which, at the deeper, symbiotic level, he is cruelly and destructively denying the patient access into himself. (1963, p. 711)

This brings to mind Balint's (1968) comments on "the basic fault." This is the idea which patients may acquire as a result of extreme regression that they have simply been bad from birth. This is accentuated by the feeling of being overwhelmed by an all-knowing analyst, taking the place of an all-knowing parent. The patient is never right, and never able to have his insights without the help of the analyst. Obviously such a situation is not

likely to help the formation of an active and adequate ego (Greenson, 1972).

One more topic needs to be considered before we conclude this comparison. This is the counter-transference, which has special importance for the Kleinian approach. In Racker's words, "the principal interpretation, the transference interpretation, springs from the countertransference" (1968, p. 60). The basic idea here (not unlike Reik's notion of listening with the third ear) is that where the patient's expression is inchoate and non-verbal, the analyst cannot expect to understand it purely verbally and intellectually. Rather, he must intuit it, through some kind of empathetic understanding, or, more rigorously, he must see the transference through the unconscious reactions which it produces in himself. Thus Bion describes his growing awareness of a patient's projective identification of his aggressiveness toward Bion in terms of his (Bion's) growing fear. Bion was afraid because the patient had "pushed" his fear of murdering Bion into Bion, despite no outward change in the patient's posture (1956). Rather than simply controlling such feelings, Kleinians advocate their use in therapy as the basis for interpretations of transference phenomena which would otherwise be inaccessible. Some Kleinians also see the counter-transference as providing a positive source for the

reunification of the patient's ego (see discussion in Racker, 1968, pp. 26-31), although this is both less central and less universal.

Kleinians, in summary, regard many more potential patients as suitable for psychoanalysis than do the classicists and ego-psychologists. In extending analyzability to include borderline and psychotic cases, they emphasize the importance of primal object-relations in determining the issues and anxiety of the patient. Considerable ego-strength is thus not seen as a prerequisite to analysis, and the analysis of the ego is largely ancillary to the analysis of id impulses and primary object relations. Symbols, for this reason, play a greater part in Kleinian interpretations of material presented in the transference. Multiple object-representations are also important, and Kleinians stress that conflict between parts of one's personality is always related to the transference, since at least one of one's own parts is always simultaneously projected onto the analyst. The analysis does not involve controlled regression as prerequisite to reunification, but rather a continuous process of reunification based on repeated verbal interpretations.

Ego-Strength or Primary Object Relations?

As is apparent, I have drawn pictures of the two analytic schools which are rather more distinct than are

the practices of the large number of analysts working more or less under one or the other label. This is not only for reasons of convenience. It also represents an attempt to express a logically coherent picture of each one. Thus, neither Kleinian nor classical analysis is here treated as a syncretistic amalgam of elements of diverse origins--although historically that may be an accurate description of both. Rather, I have attempted, through focusing on the issue of transference, as related to criteria of analyzability, to formulate that which is distinctive in each in such a way as to show the interrelations of the different major concepts of each school.

My intentions, in this comparison, have differed from those of most who draw the contrast. I have not been primarily concerned to establish the best approach of individual psychoanalysis. Still less have I been concerned simply to examine a foreign viewpoint from the perspective of my own biases, as say the ego-analyst Greenson does when he looks at Kleinian work (1974). I have no intention of attempting to adjudicate the debate over which school is truer to Freud's own ideas; I find the whole argument "a little odd". My conclusions are closer to Kernberg's than to any other commentator's. I agree that the Kleinian contributions are especially relevant in the treatment of severe character pathology,

borderling personality organizations, and schizophrenia (1969, p. 85). In general, it would seem reasonable to suggest that there be some variation of approach within psychoanalysis depending on the patient considered, rather than two competing schools claiming universality. To quote Searles again:

It is not a matter, I believe, of our having to choose between irreconcilable theoretical concepts, but rather to determine in which phase of the patient's ego-development each is more useful for us. (1963, p. 669)

My particular concern is with a very special sort of patient--a relatively large-scale, complex, inter-personal organization. The contrast between Kleinians and ego-analysts on the criteria for analyzability, and on the relative significance of the analysis of primary object relations and id-impulses on the one hand, and of ego-organizations and defenses on the other, is of great help in establishing the theoretical basis for a psychoanalysis of organizations. By seeing that different criteria for the analyzability of individual patients are employed depending on different psychoanalytic methodologies and theories, we are able to establish an account of the potential analyzability of complex inter-personal organizations. This not only helps to justify the general enterprise--showing it to be in line with good psychoanalytic thinking--but established the sorts of psychoanalytic concepts and methods which potentially apply to complex organizations, and those which do not.

In particular, the analysis of organizations as such can be based directly, not by analogy, on the notion of the ego incorporated in what I have called the classical psychoanalytic perspective. The use of analytic concepts regarding the id, and primary process material in general, present more complex problems. They can be used not directly, but only as additive properties of individual organizational members, collective properties of the aggregates, or by analogy. In other words, we have seen that ego-analysis is concerned with organization as such, while Kleinian analysis is concerned with primary process and very early object relations. Ego-analysts admit patients to analysis crucially on the basis that they have sufficient ego strength to maintain integrity of functioning during the analysis and potentially to become active self-observers and allies in analytic work. Formal organizations can meet these criteria. Formal organizations do not, however, have ids; they are social not biotic beings and therefore derive their basic energy from the contributions of individual members. Accordingly, there is no basis for a direct approach to organizational analysis based on the interpretation of primary process material.

Since organizations do not have independent biotic existence, neither do they have primary object relations based on early symbioses and dependencies. Such concepts

may be helpful by way of analogy, but the analyst must be careful to remember that it is at the level of ego that the organization exists; it is not a full person, with a biotic existence and therefore with id impulses, and an innate propensity for a certain sort of affective life. A human individual may suffer "loss of personality" as ego-functioning deteriorates. The biological individual can remain, however, with all sorts of distorted primary process functioning, in the absence of proper ego-control. A formal organization simply ceases to exist as its ego-control deteriorates. For both individuals and complex interpersonal organizations, the extent of organization is a variable; generally speaking, we call it ego-strength. But for complex organizations that is the sole psycho-social (as opposed to legal) definition of their existence. They exist in so far as they are organized, insofar as they have the ability to maintain coherent and successful functioning. The criteria which would be used by an ego-analyst to establish analyzability in a human individual may be used to establish the psycho-social existence of a complex organization. When such an organization is established to exist to any significant degree, then its functioning may be analyzed by the same basic approach which is brought to bear in the psychoanalysis of ego functions.

These considerations are particularly important because of the insight they give into the nature of the most successful previous work in organizational

psychoanalysis. I refer to the work of present and past members of the Tavistock Institute based largely on the group psychology of Wilfred Bion, which in turn was largely based on Melanie Klein's psychoanalytic theory. This body of work (summarized in the previous chapter) has focused largely on the nature of individual involvement, including especially neurotic involvement, in organizations. It has explained how individuals become members of groups and organizations, what effects this has on their individual functioning and what individual needs it serves. It has shown how this involvement often takes the form of neurotic investment in organizational boundaries and how individuals depend on organizations to keep control of their own functioning. The most important therapeutic, practical, work to come out of this perspective has been the development of a variety of techniques for helping individuals to understand the way they operate in groups and organizations. This particular line of Tavistock work has had relatively little to say about the ways in which organizations function as such, on their own rather than in the psychic lives of individuals.

Other Tavistock workers, of course, have studied organization as wholes--most notably Trist (1951), Miller (1967), and Jacques (1951)--but their work has in this regard drawn less on psychoanalytic foundations than on systems

theory. It is my contention that this "socio-technical systems" approach can best be integrated with psychoanalytic theory and methods by connecting it to the study of ego functioning in complex organizations. Both are concerned with environmental factors, reality testing and the properties of organization itself. All of this is not to say that we should disregard the work of Bion and the other group psychologists, or of the Kleinian approach generally. On the contrary, it is quite important, but it can only address a different problem--the problem of how individuals come psychologically to be parts of groups and organizations. Our present concern is with how organizations themselves function--a closely related, but not identical problem.

In the next chapter of this thesis we will turn to the most empirically sophisticated model of ego functioning that has yet been developed--that reported by Bellak, et al 1973). We shall set out the general rationale of the model, then examine each of the twelve ego-functions identified and tested by Bellak and his colleagues. After explicating each, we shall attempt an analysis of how it can be translated into terms appropriate to the functioning of large, complex, interpersonal organizations. In the final chapter, we shall draw this together with a brief discussion of socio-technical systems work, and present a comprehensive model for the psychoanalytic study of organizations.

CHAPTER IV

EGO-FUNCTIONS IN THE ORGANIZATION

In the last chapter I described the debate within psychoanalysis over the issue of analyzability. Much of this debate has centered on the question of whether a prospective analysand is able to form a transference with the analyst. Underlying this issue are various interpretations of the role of ego-strength in analysis itself and in the overall organization of the personality. I have argued that for the purposes of organizational analysis it is most helpful to draw on the work of psychoanalytic ego-psychology because the issues involved in establishing whether a prospective analysand has sufficient ego-strength to undergo psychoanalysis are quite analogous to those involved in determining whether or not it makes sense to approach any given complex organization in a psychoanalytic mode. That is, to the extent an organization can be shown to be functionally similar to an individual, theories developed for individual functioning can be used to understand it. In particular, it is ego functions, I suggested, rather than id or super-ego functions, which provide the key condition for a psychoanalytic approach to organizations.

It is now necessary to develop an account of ego-functioning as a condition for assessment. This has been done for individuals in the research of Bellak, Hurvitch and Gediman (1973). I propose to adapt their account of ego-functions for organizational purposes. Accordingly, in this chapter, I shall first describe their general approach and its theoretical background. Secondly, I shall summarize each of the twelve ego-functions of their study. And thirdly, I shall describe what modifications, if any, are necessary to allow this conceptualization to function at the level of organizational analysis.

Ego-Functions in Psychoanalytic Theory

Freud was concerned with the ego-construct under one or another definition throughout his psychological writings. It was not only a part of his structural theory, in relation to id and super-ego, but as a functional concept was a key aspect of his methodological work. Quite early on, Federn (1952) argued that the outstanding feature in schizophrenia is weakness of the ego. Tausk added attention to defects in ego-boundaries to Federn's formulation of schizophrenia (Roazen, 1969). Hartmann (1950) crucially pointed out the need to specify the ego-functions involved in specific cases of ego-weakness, and thus laid the basis for a transformation of this line of thinking from general description to systematic assessment and analysis. He held, first of all, that one must look at the internal features of the ego as a mental system as well as its relations to other

systems. His position seems still to be widely accepted by psychoanalysis, and forms the basis not only for the Bellak, et al. work but for Schafer's (1968) attempt to reformulate psychoanalytic theory in action language. The latter brings psychoanalytic metatheory more in line with the rest of the behavioral sciences.

The crucial question which must precede such attempts at systematization is that of "what ego functions?" Freud offered a preliminary list in An Outline of Psychoanalysis (1940), including self-preservation; becoming aware of, and dealing with, external stimuli; controlling voluntary movement; and learning to influence the external world to one's own advantage. Sigmund Freud himself was influenced by Anna Freud's (1936) pivotal work on the ego and the mechanisms of defense, in which she lists such functions as the testing of inner and outer reality, the building up of memory, synthesis and control of mobility. Moreover, of all the early works, hers gives the best developed rationale for a functional view of all the early works. Hartmann (1950), also developed a list of functions, and together with Ernst Kris (1951) argued a case for the primacy of thinking, perception and action as the three main functions of the ego. Bellak introduced his first major listing in 1949 in the course of a treatment of psychosomatic schizophrenia, and later expanded his list from four to five functions. Beres (1956) developed a seven function model. Arlow and Brenner's (1964) twelve function model caps off the

developmental process prior to the Bellak, et al. (1973), research, and forms its most immediate basis. There cannot be, of course, any complete and final listing of functions. Empirical utility, rather than theoretical perfection, is the measure of any particular effort.

A key feature of Bellak, Hurvitch and Gediman's (1973) intervention into this line of work is their attempt to produce a full-scale empirical testing scheme. There had certainly been previous attempts to measure ego functions and related characteristics. General psychological assessment techniques have been used in this manner, for example, though by no means all of these have been based on psychoanalytic principles. Most such assessment techniques have the aim not of specific prediction but of comprehending individual personalities. Significant examples include the Harvard studies of Murray and his colleagues (1948) and Prelinger, et al. (1964). Kelly and Fisk (1951) and Holt and Luborsky (1958) complete the list and are unusual in their focus on prediction.

The most important early psychoanalytic studies were carried out by the staff of the Menninger clinic (Wallenstein, et al., 1956; Sargent, et al., 1958; Luborsky, et al., 1958; Robbins and Wallerstein, 1959; Luborsky, 1962; Wallerstein, 1968). This research showed the importance of a number of key variables including ego-strength and specific ego-functions. Wallerstein's (1968) recent work has elaborated this approach and shown its utility in more

traditional case study research. A more directly influential attempt to measure ego-functions was made by Green (1954) working from a list of ten functions and using scales for measuring ego-functions from manifest dream contents. Two psychoanalytic research projects have developed comprehensive rating scales for character assessment including but not limited to ego functions. Bibring and associates (1961) developed one out of their work on the psychology of pregnancy. Prelinger, et al. (1964) have devised a much more comprehensive, psychoanalytically based series of rating scales, not just for ego, but for eight major categories: ideational styles, prominent affects, prominent defenses, superego, adaptive strengths, sense of self, psychosocial modalities, and character elaborations. This study used Likert-style rating scales and showed considerable reliability on approximately half of its seventy-eight sub-categories. Twelve "adaptive strengths" were reliably indentified, showing considerable similarity to the ego functions described by the Bellak, et al. (1973) research. One reason for the similarity is that Prelinger, et al., worked from a very up-to-date version of psychoanalytic theory. The validity of their scales with regard to outside criteria, however, as opposed to their reliability, remains unestablished.

In order to improve the psychoanalytic basis for their research, Bellak and colleagues also surveyed other attempts to measure psychoanalytic concepts. These included the nine

point scale of Karush, et al. (1964), part of their method for profiling ego strength, and the Hampstead Clinic's manuals for analysis of case study material and indexifications of reported case studies (Sandler, 1960, 1962; Sandler and Rosenblatt, 1962; Bolland and Sandler, 1965). The largest study prior to Bellak, et al. (1973), is Grinker's and colleagues (1968) research on the borderline syndrome. Unlike most other psychoanalytic effort, but like Bellak's work, it attempts to systematically use ego function categories to delineate a clinical syndrome. Its scaling and componential analysis both prove useful and contributed to the Bellak, Hurvitch and Gediman scheme. Absence of proper control groups, laboratory procedures and use of psychological test responses weakened the generalizability of the results, however, and led to a much more rigorous design in the Bellak, et al. (1973), research.

Before going on to more theoretical issues, two other studies should be mentioned. The lengthy research that went into the Camarillo Dynamic Assessment Scales (May, 1968; Dixon and May, 1968) drew on the Menninger research cited above, and also helped to lay the foundations for the Bellak effort. G. Klein and his colleagues have done a variety of research on individual differences, emphasizing and demonstrating that consistencies in individual functional style are found across various functions. They term these cognitive functions, but they are in fact quite analogous to the sorts of conceptualization with which Bellak and his

associates work. In their further work, Klein and Gardner (Gardner, et al., 1959) have moved away from the cognitive focus towards various system principles. As we shall see, Bellak's perspective militates against such a move.

Bellak's research plan began with the premise that these various attempts at measurement had provided the technical preconditions for serious psychoanalytic work on empirical ego-functions. Such work would require, however, not just technical sophistication, but a clarification of theory, and especially a decisive move away from structural and drive constructs in favor of exclusive focus on functions. This was not intended to deny the insights gained from other perspectives, but rather to lay the foundations for a new level of rigorous empirical research in the psychoanalytic tradition. We need to explore briefly here the import of this move towards functional analysis, and the nature of the psychoanalytic theory Bellak and colleagues systematize and appropriate for their research.

Structure, Apparatus, and Function

Freud's use of a structural model was based on the convention of the physical sciences of his day. With some danger of circularity, he defined structures by their functions. Notions of apparatuses and more refined notions of structure and functions have been introduced since (most influentially by Hartmann, beginning with his 1939a monograph, and also including the seminal work of Rapaport, 1950, 1953, 1957; Rapaport and Gill, 1959). A central

feature of this line of development is the contention that structuralization is a continuous process. Functions, it is argued, tend to "structuralize" by stabilizing in steady states which are resistant to change. It is not clear in most of the literature, however, just what is held to constitute a "low" rate of change. Within this perspective, however, the constructs Bellak, et al. (1973), wish to study as functions generally qualify and are seen as structures.

Functions are hierarchically ordered, a key feature of mental structures in this view. In the course of development, structures are not lost except as the result of organic brain damage and some psychoses. Rather, new ones are superimposed on old ones. This feature and the resulting variable of complexity and number of component elements in structures is central to the Bellak scheme of analysis.

The concept of mental structure has been used in different contexts with psychoanalytic theory to refer to (1) ego, id and superego (the macrostructures), (2) defenses, discharge thresholds, controls and identifications, and (3) specific mental constructs. The term apparatus has also been used in varying senses, and many commentators even use apparatus and "structure" synonymously. This terminological confusion is a major source of difficulty in precisely evaluating research findings.

Functions, for Bellak, Hurvitch and Gediman (1973), are theoretical constructs derived from observation of behavior and from patients' accounts of their experience. Physiological processes, thus, cannot readily be translated into the terms of mental functions. Functional approaches need not be teleological, contrary to the assertions of some critics, since they may be concerned not with final causes but rather with showing how an observation fits in with a coherent hypothesis. A structure may be considered a grouping of psychic functions according to their alignment in conflict and adaptation. Function may, alternatively, be seen as quite unrelated to structure in some cases. One may discuss a function without treating of the agency or structure which carries it out. It is important to keep the distinction between apparatuses, mechanisms, structures, etc., and activities processes, and functions on the other hand in mind.

The same structure can underlie different functions at different times. It is not necessary, therefore, to postulate a structural change to account for a functional change. There is no one-to-one correspondence between structure and function in either direction. It is possible, indeed, that the distinctions between structure and function ought to be quantitatively relative rather than qualitatively absolute. In any case, Bellak and company see little point in the distinction between structure and

function; what they call functions could just as easily be called structures.

Characteristics of Ego Functions

There has been considerable unclarity, Bellak, et al. (1973), assert, in the concept of ego-functions (see also G. Klein, 1970). Freud introduced some of the ambiguities in the concept of ego itself. It has been argued that Freud was attempting to avoid having to recast either his motivational or libido theories (Apfelbaum, 1962; Klein, 1970). Schafer's criticisms of psychoanalytic language and metapsychology make somewhat similar arguments (1970, 1976). In particular, Schafer points out the difference between formulations from the outside, which tend to be favored when the focus is on adaptation and a natural-science approach, and those from the inside, where the focus is on subjective meanings and psychic reality. Bellak, et al. (1973, p. 63) regard the point as central to any attempt to define ego functions in adaptational terms. Changes within ego functions need to be understood in terms of how close their aims are to instinctual ones and the kinds and extents of conflicts these aims involve. G. Klein (1970), Erikson (1950, 1962) and A. Freud (1963, 1965) have argued for using concepts which are at once ego and drive structures.

Following Hartmann, Bellak suggests that ego function constructs may refer to mental constructs, processes or outcomes. The various functions are abstractions, which do not qualify as categories in the strict sense because they do

not refer to events that occupy a specifically circumscribed space. Ego functions may be discussed, thus, from all the metapsychological points of view. Hartmann's general statements concerning characteristics of ego functions are important as the "jumping off points" for much of Bellak's discussion. He suggests, however, that they are in need of careful specification, measurement, and assessment of correlates. The research reported in the 1973 book attempts to carry out some of this consideration and establish qualifications as to the generality of Hartmann's statements. Some of the most important of these assertions are: (1) Ego function deficits are discrete rather than global (1950). (2) Ego functions can vary in the extent to which they are subject to regression and instinctualization (1955). (3) Ego functions need different degrees of neutralization for optimal functioning in different activities (1955). (4) Ego functions can cooperate or interfere with each other's functioning in the process of adaptation (1939). (5) The various ego functions have a rank order of biological purposiveness, and the particular order in a given person has much to do with his ego strength (1939).

Adaptation and Ego Strength

The concepts of ego strength, ego weakness, and adaptation are most relevant to an understanding of ego functions. The level of synthetic functioning is central to what Bellak, et al. (1973), mean by ego strength. This

enables the personality to reduce tensions, settle conflicts and reconcile contradictions. The variety of correlates of ego weakness includes oversensitivity to pain, high readiness to experience anxiety, proneness to develop guilt feelings, the presence of neurotic or psychotic symptoms, excessive strength of instincts, and narcissism. The first four of these correlates have causes within the ego itself, while the last two emanate from the id. Some features, of course, may indicate either weakness or strength in different contexts. A willingness to endure pain, for example, may be either masochistic or a reflection of ego strength.

Strength and weakness of the ego are critically related to the external world as well as to the id and superego. This points up the relations of the ego constructs to adaptation. Adaptation may be seen as a reciprocal relationship between organism and environment implying in the psychological context a mastery of reality. The degree of adaptiveness of any particular construct or behavior can only be determined in relation to typical (i.e., average expectable) or atypical environmental situations.

Adaptation must be considered separately from its origins. It may be found in productivity, ability to enjoy life, and an undisturbed mental equilibrium. It is influenced by constitution, external environment, the organism's developmental phase, learning, the social structure of an individual's society, and superego factors. From any of these sources, adaptation may come to be

structured in progressive or regressive fashions. Progressive attempts at adaptation are distinguished in general by being more straightforward, and coinciding with development. Some regressive attempts, such as the use of fantasy, may lead by detours to successful adaptation. Conversely, successful adaptation may lead to maladaptive outcomes, as in the development of an overly-strong super-ego.

Ego strength and adaptation are closely related, but, as Hartmann (1939, 1947) stressed, the criteria for ego strength can shed light on a person's capacity for adaptation only when his relationships with the external world have been assessed. Adaptation takes place not only to external circumstances, but to inner forces and states. Adaptation is not identical with behavior because the latter is influenced by drive factors as well as more "surface" constructs or learnings. Individuals may be seen as seeking not only energetic and drive equilibrium, but also a feeling of safety and well-being which may work to inhibit even pleasure producing activities. The individual, through adaptation, attempts to achieve autonomy from the drives, from the environment, and from superego introjects. Adaptation and ego strength/weakness are closely related, thus, to such other psychological issues as stress, development, social disorganization and overall personality.

The valuable concepts of ego strength and weakness are made even more important when considered in relation to

adaptation stress and regression. Although this general line of thought has gained wide acceptance, there does not appear to be adequate realization that not only is a detailed definition of what constitutes each ego function necessary, but also that the whole issue of the interrelationship of ego functions must be studied.

Regression, Stability and Variability of Ego Functioning

Ego functions differ in the degree to which they are subject to repression. There is a considerable degree of consistency in the level of ego functioning characteristic of a given individual. Bellak, et al. (1973), focus on three levels of change in such functioning:

1. Transient lowering of some ego functions during psychoanalysis. Here disturbances are likely to occur in body image perception, reality testing, time sense, distance judgement and depersonalization. Disturbance may be of only one or of several functions. Normally even where disturbance is focused on one function, others are involved to some degree. Regression of the ego functions in question apparently is precipitated by an anxiety-provoking situation. Most frequently this involves a libidinal or aggressive wish. It may, however, involve a superego command. The kind of anxiety involved may vary widely and regressive ego function serves both to minimize development of anxiety and allow discharge of unconscious wishes. Sometimes the reactivation of earlier ego states occurs

during psychoanalysis. Transference psychosis may be interpreted as an especially extreme form of ego regression in the analysis. The severity of regression is influenced by the severity of early traumatic experiences, age and degree of ego weakness.

2. Severe regression during psychoanalysis. Severe analytic ego function disturbances are similar to those regularly found in psychoses and allied conditions. Bases may be found in pre-existing ego defects: defensive reactions to a threatening situation, possibilities for secondary gain and attempts at belated mastery are all common.

3. Ego function deficits found in chronically psychotic persons. Here cognitive disorders are prominent. They may show substantial day-to-day variance in degree of regression. This may be manifested in different forms, including problems in perceptions, attention and thinking. The chance of reversing such disorders is related to the depth of the regression, the extent of organic impairment, if any, and other psychological factors. On occasion such psychological factors may temporarily reverse symptoms with an organic etiology. Defense against anxiety is not as readily acceptable an explanation of fluctuations in state of regression among psychotics as it is among ordinary analytic patients. Such fluctuations may, on the contrary,

be extremely complex, lacking in specific aim, and more or less diffuse.

A focus on the processes underlying ego function manifestations, in summary, leads to aspects of the interrelationship of these functions, as well as to the issue of the relationships between drives , superego factors, and ego functions.

While an integrated psychoanalytic approach to formal organizations must take account of all of these varied issues, it seems reasonable to assert that ego functions are its crucial foundation. Only by establishing analogues to ego functions can a formal organization be shown to be validly treatable in psychoanalytic terms. Moreover, treatment in terms of ego functions has special advantage of potential measurability and rigor of assessment. It promises to take psychoanalytic approaches beyond mere metaphor. Last but not least, where questions of teleology may bother some scholars concerning the functional analysis of so-called natural systems such as individuals or societies, this need not be such a problem with formal organizations. Unlike individual personalities, organizations have explicit purposes, and much more reliable criteria for evaluating performance.

I turn now to an examination of the specific list of ego functions developed by Bellak, Hurvitch, and Gediman (1973). In their work, they present a theoretical history of each ego function. I shall refrain from recapitulating

all of this, but stick to summarizing the nature of the function and evidence pertaining to it. Then, for each function, I shall suggest what issues, if any, may need to be resolved before it can be applied directly to formal organizations.

The Ego Functions

1. Reality Testing

The distinction between fantasy and reality has been central to psychoanalytic theory since its very inception. As early as 1895, Breuer and Freud held daydreaming to be one of the main activities that could lead to hypnoid states, which were in turn held to be a necessary precondition for hysterical symptom development. The notion of reality testing itself was fully incorporated in Freud's theory of mental functioning (1908) as an amalgam of attention and judgement, in which the latter played the central role in reality testing. In "Instincts and their Vicissitudes," (1915) Freud stressed that reality needed to be understood as an internal as well as an external phenomenon. In The Ego and the Id, Freud (1923) attributed reality testing to the ego-ideal, but he soon dropped this formulation in favor of treating reality testing as an ego function. Further developments appear in several works (especially Freud, 1925a, 1930). Bellak, Hurvitch and Gediman (1973, p. 82) identify three interrelated processes or subfunctions as the substance of Freud's meaning of reality testing: (1) the distinction between ideas and perceptions (1895), (2) the

decision as to whether an idea was based on a memory-trace or reality (1911, 1925a), and (3) accuracy of perception (1925c).

Balint (1942) distinguished four aspects of reality testing; Rapaport (1950, 1951), Rubinfine (1961), Weiss (1950), Linn (1954), Schafer (1968), Frosch (1966), and Hartmann (1953) also contributed important refinements to the theory as it was appropriated by Bellak, Hurvitch and Gediman.

The three key component factors in reality testing as used by Bellak, et al. (1973), are: (1) Distinction between inner and outer stimuli, (2) Accuracy of perception and interpretation of external events including orientation to time and place, and (3) Accuracy of perception and interpretation of internal events, including reflective awareness or extent to which a person is aware of accuracy or distortions of inner reality (1973, pp. 80-95).

Adaptation to organizations. In all ways, reality testing is as much an organizational as an individual ego function. Every complex organization must deal with its environment and its membership and internal states. It must assess whether any particular information it processes is derived from external or internal sources. Judging the extent to which internal organizational issues distort perception of the environment is one of the key concerns of senior management and an important source of organizational need for the services of consultants. In most large and

complex organizations, perceptual and interpretative functions are specialized at lower levels and united only at the most senior levels of central management.

2. Judgement

All secondary process thinking involves some judgement inasmuch as it requires discriminating. As an ego function, judgement also includes abilities to anticipate consequences and decide on appropriateness. It goes beyond mere adequate thought functioning; poor judgement can be found in the absence of a classical thought disorder (cf. Weiner, 1966). Freud began by using judgement and cognition almost interchangeably (1895), but with increasing development of the distinction between conscious and unconscious thought began to develop a more specialized concept of judgement as well. Judgement does not operate in dreams (Freud, 1900), and there is no process of judgement in unconscious thinking (1905). In "Negation," Freud (1926) described judgement as involving two kinds of decisions: one is affirming or denying that something has a particular property; the other is deciding whether a particular image exists in reality. Overall, though, Freud only suggested but never developed an idea of judgement as an ego function. He tended to subsume judgement as a part of reality testing.

Rapaport (1951; Rapaport, Gil and Schafer, 1946) followed much the same direction in arguing that judgement, reality testing and reflective awareness all overlap too closely for sharp distinction. Schilder (1931, 1953) made

judgement such more central, explicating the role of affective and motivational factors in judgement and focusing on reflective awareness. Despite all these relationships, though, Bellak, Hurvitch and Gediman argue that it is important analytically to distinguish the judgement function (1973, p. 99). In judgement, anticipation and awareness go beyond distinguishing inner from outer and beyond determining the accuracy of external and internal perception. Anticipation or foresight, which Freud regarded as central to anxiety and emotional life (1926) is also central to the intellectual aspects of ego functioning. Hartmann (1939) showed how crucial anticipation is as a part of adaptation as an important ego function in its own right. Bellak and colleagues suggest that it should be linked to appropriateness as a part of judgement. Appropriateness subsumes some of the social learning process crucial to ego development, and refers to the ability to use anticipation to bring affect and behavior in line with situation.

The key component factors in judgement are:

(1) Anticipation of probable consequences of intended behavior, (2) Extent to which manifest behavior reflects the awareness of its probable consequences, and the extent to which behavior expressing maladaptive judgement is repeated, and (3) Appropriateness of behavior, or extent to which a person is able to attune himself emotionally to relevant aspects of external reality.

Adaptation to organizations. Judgement is perhaps the ego function to which complex organizations pay most explicit attention. Formal management systems are attempts to systematize efforts at anticipation and selection of appropriate behavior. They are, however, only formalizations of what management itself is all about, and what managers already do. As my own previous studies of the implementation of formal accountability systems indicate, however, organizations often fail in this ego function, and emotional issues intrude on the process of judgement even where it is formalized (Levine, et al, 1975). Even when they are able to recognize the probable consequences of specific behaviors (factor #2 in this ego function), organizations like individuals reveal weakness of ego development in the repetition of their mistakes and an inability to commit themselves emotionally to appropriate lines of behavior. All three of the factors which Bellak, et al., identify as components of the judgement function are, therefore, directly applicable to organizations. The first two, moreover, are readily identifiable in organizations because organizational information control systems are attuned to these issues.

3. Sense of Reality of the World and of the Self

Related to reality testing, but separable, is the ability to manage ego boundaries, body image, self concept and identity. Disruptions of this ego-function result in depersonalization and derealization. The self-concept has

been the central focus of recent psychoanalytic investigations into this function. Full scale recognition of its importance has only dated from the 1950's, although Freud's early formulations on narcissism and the ego ideal were relevant.

Modern work began with Hartmann's (1950) clarification of narcissism as the libidinal cathexis of the self rather than the ego, Erikson's (1950, 1956) elaboration of the identity concept, Jacobson's (1954, 1964) work on the self and the object world, and Kernberg's (1970) and Kohut's (1966) work on narcissism. Kohut's (1971) monograph on the self is the most comprehensive set of formulations available. Here the self is conceptualized as both a content of the mental apparatus and as a mental structure.

Work on ego states and states of consciousness is also important in showing how a sense of reality develops or is disrupted. Crucial works include Federn (1949) and Rapaport (1951). Federn treated the ego state as the set of contents held at any one time within any set of ego boundaries. For Rapaport, the issue was more one of controls over impulses. Awareness and consciousness are seen as indications of effective controls, while hypnagogic and hypnopompic experiences and fugue states and amnesias are indications of disruptions. A variety of other altered states of consciousness from cosmic delusions and stage fright through depersonalization and certain psychotic hallucinations are

also important symptoms of disrupted sense of reality (Bellak, 1958; Woodbury, 1966).

Freud's early work on dreams (1900, 1901) depended in part on an implicit notion of sense of reality, especially in the feelings of deja vu, fausse reconnaissance, and deja raconte. In his analyses of narcissism (1914) and in his general formulations of the reality principle (1911) Freud returned to and developed the notion of a sense of reality. This was described as an ego function (Freud, 1915) and Freud argued (1927) that disruptions of it could result in depersonalization. This was related later to ego boundaries and the sense of self (Freud, 1930, 1936).

Ferenczi took up Freud's notion of a reality principle and related it to the dynamics of dependence and independence in the course of development. Fantasies of omnipotence and the catastrophic trauma of birth, after which all needs are no longer automatically satisfied were seen as central. The child was forced to come to distinguish between his own organism and the external environment. Ferenczi treated reality as a set of resistances which the child must come to accept in the course of maturation and ego development (1926).

Federn (1927, 1952) was the first analyst to fully differentiate the sense of reality from reality testing and give it a central place in the conceptualization of ego. He treated sense of reality as a sensation, however, explicitly distinguishing it from reality testing as a function. Once

ego boundaries have been established, information impinging on the outer layers of the boundary is sensed as emanating from the external world, while phenomena approaching the inner boundary are sensed as arising from within the organism and as not being real. Federn similarly pioneered the usage of analysis of ego boundaries to explain estrangement (1927), delusions, hallucinations and depersonalization (1948), and to orient treatment of psychotic patients (1947, 1948).

Frosch (1964) held that reality testing was a much more intellectually focused function, based on the ability to arrive at a logical conclusion from a series of observations, while sense of reality was "the sense that phenomena going on around and within are real." Each of these functions is crucial to distinguishing a psychosis from a severe character disorder.

As the concept of sense of reality reached some maturity in psychoanalytic thought, it came to refer to the experiential rather than intellectual side of attributions of reality, and to personal and private rather than shared standards of assessment (cf. Weisman, 1958, Novey, 1966, Bellak, Hurvitch and Gediman, 1973, p. 113). As Jacobson (1964a) has argued, the concept should not be broadened (as she holds Erikson had done) to coincide with the full dynamics of ego identity. It should be kept specific to this one experiential dimension.

The components of the functioning of a sense of inner and outer reality include:

- (1) Extent of derealization and related altered states of consciousness. The extent to which external events are experienced as real and as embedded in a familiar context.
- (2) Extent of depersonalization and related altered states of consciousness. The extent to which the body (or parts of it) and its function and one's behavior are experienced as familiar and unobtrusive and as belonging to (or emanating from) the subject.
- (3) The degree to which a subject has developed individuality, uniqueness, a sense of self, a stable body image, and self-esteem.
- (4) The degree to which a subject's self-representations are distinguished from object representations; that is, the extent to which other people are distinguished as independent entities and the extent to which a subject correctly ascribed which qualities are self-representative and which belong to others. Stated in another way, the extent to which ego boundaries between the self and the outside world are clearly demarcated.

Adaptation to organizations. This ego function is somewhat more complex to relate to organizational life than

the preceding two. In the first place, it is internally more complex. More importantly, there is a sense in which organizations are not as "real" as individuals, and therefore it is normal for there to be a less complete sense of individualization. The issue for organizations is largely one of the extent to which members identify with the whole. Organizations suffer the equivalent of depersonalization to the extent that their members are unconscious of the integrated whole, and thus experience relations with other parts of the organization as external intrusions rather than familiar aspects of a unitary functioning. This is, of course, a major issue for large, complex organizations, because sub-units are apt to form strong internal senses of solidarity which conflict with unification of the whole. On the other hand, organizations cannot function effectively without such sub-units. Unlike individuals, thus, organizations must attempt to produce coherence at two levels--that of the working group and that of the whole operating entity.

This issue of extent of consciousness of the organization as a whole is an issue of relations to the external world as well as of boundaries and relationships within the organization. The members of any complex organization exist both within it and without it. In this, they are unlike the cells of a biological organism. Organization members may identify more or less completely with a given organization. Professional staff, for example,

may identify much more strongly with their profession--say law--than with their employing firm. One of the blocks to the creation of a unitary sense of the organizational person is this extent to which members of an organization see it as one of many socially created objects in their lives. An organization's self-representations, in such circumstances, are likely to be only weakly distinguished from the representations of objects in its environment.

Factors 2, 3, and 4 of the Bellak, et al. (1973), function apply, thus, relatively clearly to organizations. It is necessary to recognize that there are more limits on the extent of unitary "personalization" possible for an organization than there are for an individual. Nonetheless, organizations experience something akin to the altered states of consciousness associated with depersonalization in individuals when they fail to maintain clear boundaries between themselves and object worlds, and come to lose the ability to establish a coherent perspective on themselves. If various organizational and work-groups identify with the organization to different degrees, or in different ways, they will undercut its capacity to function as a single actor. This amounts to undercutting the very basis of the analogy between the organization and the human individual, for it denies the organization the capacity for ego-developments. It is also the case that problems in the internal coherence of organizational relations may contribute to a derealization of the external world.

Different subunits may treat environmental stimuli differently, thus causing the organization as a whole to lose any sense of the reality of those stimuli.

To sum up, all four factors of this ego-function can be related to organizations, but many of the mechanisms by which organizations produce unitary personhood and the associated reality of perceptions are different from those operating in individuals. The Bellak treatment of the function is sound for diagnosis of organizational problems, but the analyst must look to other, largely sociological, issues to see solutions.

4. Regulations and Control of Drives, Affects and Impulses

Drive control is largely a matter of creating tolerance in an organism. As an ego function, it includes abilities to tolerate anxiety, depression, disappointment, frustration, and the necessity of postponing expected satisfactions. "It involves the expression of inner wishes, emotional strivings and urges in an harmonious and modulated manner" (Bellak, Hurvitch and Gediman, 1973, p. 125). This involves also tolerance for delays in gratification or tension release (Moore and Fine, 1968) and selection among and ordering of instincts for gratification.

Mention of anxiety tolerance is as old as Hartmann (1939) and Bellak (1949) formulated an account of frustration tolerance as an ego function. Beres (1956) developed this further as a part of his account of ego deviations and schizophrenia. Jacobson (1953) produced a

systematic account of the nature of affects in relation to the problems of managing them. Relatively little introduction to this ego function is needed, however, for it is at the heart of what psychoanalysis has always understood by the ego. Freud had clearly formulated an account of the importance of being able to manage delay in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) and it never leaves his account. Rapaport even considered delay of gratification to be "the cradle of 'conscious experience'" (1951, p. 690). the treatment of this as a specific ego function involves only sorting one set of almost always accepted operations from others, not introducing any new issues into psychoanalytic theory. Saying this is not to reduce, but to accent its significance.

The component functions of regulation and control of drives, affects and impulses are classed under two heads: (1) The directness of impulse expression, ranging from primitive and psychopathic acting out, through the activity of the impulse-riddled character, through neurotic acting out, to relatively indirect forms of behavioral expression. Maladaptiveness would be a function of the extent to which awareness of drive, affect, and impulse are experienced and expressed disruptively. (2) The effectiveness of delay and control mechanisms (including both under- and overcontrol); the degree of frustration tolerance and the extent to which drive derivations are channeled through ideation, affective expression, and manifest behavior.

Adaption to organizations. The issue of drive control appears in quite different form for organizations than for individuals. This difference has two aspects. First, to the extent that one conceives of organizational "drives" as the sum total of the drives of the individuals making up the organization, then one is concerned with individual drives directly, and with the ways in which the organization relates to its component members. One is not dealing with the organization/individual analogy, but with the organization as an external constraint on individuals. The organizational analyst may of course have a good deal to say about the way in which an organization affects the drive control of its members, but this will be said on the basis of individual not organizational psychology.

The second possible construction of organizational drives refers to the demand that an organization make money or accomplish some other end. Here organizations may clearly be understood as achieving gratification in much the way that individuals do, except that in many cases the source of the drive or impulse is external to the organization. The sensory/physical gratification must thus also take place external to the organization as such. This does not preclude an organization being set up as a mechanism for expressing impulses and gratifying needs, but only suggests that it is necessary to look at the question of who sets up the organization and whose needs are

gratified (Blau and Scott, 1966, on the typology of organizations by the question of who benefits).

Equally central to the structure and functioning of most organizations is their capacity to organize and regulate individual impulse expression. Organizations exist in large part precisely as devices to control individual impulses so that individuals may collaborate in delaying immediate gratification for greater gains in long-term gratification. This is the side of organizational life stressed by the A. K. Rice and Tavistock Institutes.

We thus see that organizations express but do not generate impulses. They are set up to gratify certain needs. They may be set up by their members to gratify their own needs, by their members for the purpose of serving others, and/or by outsiders, non-members (as in the case of a legislative mandate) to serve any given set of needs. Whatever the mandate on which an organization is formed, it will continue to exist only because it gratifies some set of needs. It is likely also that it will only survive insofar as it can provide for gratification to its members. It may provide this gratification solely through control over drives, as when members perform ungratifying work for pay which they spend elsewhere on gratification. Or it may offer direct gratification. In the latter case it is important that the gratification offered contribute to the organizations productive efficiency (the goal of much socio-technical systems and organizational psychology

intervention) or at least that it not conflict with such direct task activity. Organizations must develop the ego function of controlling and channeling drives even though they do not generate drives. They will only get their work done by directing drive energy to their tasks. The ego function Bellak, et al. (1973), identify can be seen to operate thus (albeit with qualifications) even though the metapsychological foundation is different.

5. Object Relations

The development of object relations is central to ego development. A mature ego must be able to form appropriate loving and nurturing bonds, and to sustain them over time with a minimum of hostility. Kris, for example, argued that ego functions are crucially dependent on childhood object relations (1951; Hartmann, Kris and Lowenstein, 1949). Hartmann agreed overall, but suggested that later ego development could sometimes compensate for poor early object relations (1952).

Freud saw object relations as significant as early as the "Project for a Scientific Psychology" (1895). His first major focus on the notion of objects was, of course, in terms of sexual relations (1906, 1915). This central focus was developed with differentiations between ego libido and object libido, narcissistic and anaclitic object choice, and ego and instinctual objects (1911, 1914, 1915). Freud identified the crucial mechanisms of introjection, incorporation and identification which remain central to

psychoanalytic writings on object relations (Freud, 1917, 1921; Greenson, 1954; Schafer, 1968; Meissner, 1972). In The Ego And the Id, Freud (1923) develops a notion of the ego as a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes. Through the middle 1920's, Freud's comments on object relations had primarily to do with object cathexis, object choice and kinds of consideration for the object. In his last works, however, Freud (1931, 1938) showed a growing recognition of the importance of the early mother-child bond for the development of ego structures and for optimal later object-relations, though he did not explore this aspect of the family ties as closely as he studied the later-developed oedipal relationships.

Stanton (1959) pointed out that object relations after the oedipal period are complicated by defenses, ego factors, ego interests, educational and cultural experiences, aspirations and group indentifications. A variety of social factors influence availability, appropriateness and expectations involved in object choice. One direction of further work has been to develop knowledge of these social issues. Mainstream psychoanalytic attention has been more focused, however, on the issue of stages in the development of object relations.

Abraham (1924) early on suggested a series of stages which paralleled the stages of libidinal organization. Decarie (1965) has suggested that this is only one of a number of possible phase patterns. Others include the

formation of object representations, the mode of libidinal and aggressive cathexes and the development of psychic structure. The linkage to libidinal development, which is the context in which Freud developed his own notion of object relations, remained predominant until fairly recently.

A good deal of recent work has turned to emphasize ego aspects of development and functioning, especially following Hartmann. Hartmann (1952) treated object relations as developing in three stages: primarily narcissism, need gratification, and object consistency. Again, in line with Decarie (1965) these can be viewed from a number of aspects. Bellak, Hurvitch and Gediman adopt this approach. They draw on the work of M. Balint (1942) and Mahler (1968) to suggest how the period of primary narcissism includes a normal autism and the beginnings of symbiosis under the overall aim of self-satisfaction without any notion of reciprocity. The second intermediate period in object development includes the emergence of the smiling response, the ability to wait, and voluntary use of one part of the body to decrease tension in another part (A. Freud, 1963; Hoffer, 1955). This is the period in the sense of need satisfaction becomes personalized in the relationship to the mother (Hartmann, 1952) and symbiosis (Mahler, 1968) comes into full play. Active locomotion brings this phase into fullness.

Klein (1932, 1948, 1955) and Fairbairn (1952) clearly have somewhat differing approaches to the development of

object relations. Klein, in particular, emphasized the distinction between internal and external (real world) objects (Guntrip, 1961). We have already seen the basics of the Kleinian theory in the previous chapter, and will not review it in more detail here, as Bellak, et al. (1973), generally reject it. Fairbairn did, it should be noted, develop his own theory of stages of ego development, separate from both Klein and more conventional ego analysis. This had three stages: infantile dependence, a transitional stage, and mature dependence (Fairbairn, 1952; Guntrip, 1961).

The research of A. Freud and D. Burlingham (1963), Spitz (1945, 1946, 1951) and others on the early mother child relationship also informs the perspective developed by Bellak, Hurvitch and Gediman. Bowlby (1958, 1960, 1963) made a number of significant points in somewhat similar work on attachment and loss. His work suffers, however, from excessive generalization, including especially the suggestion that the child and the adult behave no differently in response to disruptions of object relations. As A. Freud (1960) among others has pointed out, this is due to an inattention to the dynamics of ego development. She argues that Bowlby is developing a theory which is physiological rather than ego psychological. The ability to defer gratification can again be seen as a crucial instance of the development of mature ego.

Drawing on the work done by Mahler (1952, 1968) and others (Blanck and Blanck, 1968; Searles, 1961; Greenson, 1958; Bak, 1954; Jacobson, 1954, 1971) Bellak, et al. (1973), suggest dimensions for evaluating object relations.

(1) symbiosis-separation-individuation; (2) primary narcissism, need-gratification, object constancy; (3) stability, quality, and differentiation of self-representations from object-representations; (4) degree of separation or fusion of good and bad object representations (1973, pp. 153-157). Empirical research studies prior to the Bellak, et al. (1973), effort have indicated something of the utility of such an approach (Grand, Freedman, and Steingart, 1972; and Steingart and Freedman, 1972).

The overall components of assessment of the function of the ego in object relations are: (1) The degree and kind of relatedness to others (taking account of narcissism, symbiosis, separation-individuation, withdrawal trends, ego-centricity, narcissistic object choice or extent of mutuality, reciprocity, empathy, ease of communication); degree of closeness or distance and the degree of flexibility and choice in maintaining object relations. (2) Primitivity-maturity of object relations, including the extent to which present relationships are adaptively or maladaptively influenced by or patterned upon older ones. (3) The extent to which the person perceives and responds to others as independent entities rather than as extensions of

himself. (4) the extent to which he can maintain object constancy, that is, can sustain both the physical absence of the object and the presence of frustration or anxiety related to the object; degree and kind of internalization (the way the subject perceives and responds to people who are not physically present).

Adaptation to organizations. Organizations related to two kinds of acting objects (these being the crucial sorts of objects, as opposed to the inanimate): other organizations and individuals. With regard to each, organizations like individuals require ego-development in order to maintain satisfactory closeness, mature into the ability to generate qualitatively new relationships rather than only replicate old forms with new contents, perceive and accept the separateness and independence of others, and maintain object constancy with an appropriate kind of internalization. Like other ego functions, this one is manifested both in intellectual ability and emotional maturity.

Organizations must develop sophisticated relational structures and information processing systems in order to keep track of the multitude of important and complex relationships in which they engage. They are apt to sustain a variety of legally and economically significant bonds which require a level of information control quite beyond the capabilities of individuals. The relationships which most require these intellectual abilities, however, are

those least emotionally problematic. That is, assessment of primarily cognitive adaptation is crucial in determining how successful an organization will be in managing its relationships with those clients, customers, suppliers, and other individuals or bodies which interact with it in a primarily content oriented and especially formal manner. This is important, for the development of such information processing abilities may be resisted within an organization for psychological reasons. The degree of control it implies may be experienced as dehumanizing or depriving individual members of autonomy. Organization members may prefer to attempt their own relationships to clients or other outside social objects as independent individuals rather than as members and agents of the larger organization. The cognitive capabilities, thus, require internal emotional maturity, but they are problematic for reasons of information processing rather than emotional arousal.

There are, however, external objects which are highly arousing and generate emotional responses in organizations. Regulatory agencies and important clients or suppliers are among the most obvious of these for business organizations. These objects provoke responses which may be maladaptive, out of tune with the practical needs of the organization. Any organization must develop the ego ability to constrain and deal with these responses, rather than express them directly. The organization is dependent, like the individual, on its relations with objects in its

environment. This dependence as well as association with problematic early objects produces ambivalence in even the best of relationships. Organizations suffer when they cannot adequately separate their own issues from those of others, when they must terminate relations with a once important object, or when concern for their own needs leads to an inability to recognize and accommodate those of an important object. The failure of objects to conform to the expectations of narcissistic organizations may lead to inappropriate but powerful feelings of antagonism and/or rejection.

Object relations, in short, is a major area of concern for the organizational analyst. It is one in which data are fairly near the surface, though underlying causes may be hard to discover. Organizations undergoing mergers or entering into new relationships (perhaps with a change in task-orientation) are among those particularly in need of analysis focusing on object relations.

6. Thought Processes

Psychoanalysis has been more concerned with thinking than most psychotherapeutic schools. Though Freud had commented on thought processes from the beginning of his psychological work, it was in connection with The Interpretation of Dreams that Freud (1900) turned his attention fully to thinking. Here he distinguished between primary process and secondary process thinking--as, for example, in the distinction between dream thought and

thinking in waking life. In both cases, but in different manners, the individual was held to use thinking to maintain a satisfactorily low level of excitation or psychic tension.

In the early work, the functions of memory, attention, and judgment were presumed to develop from a conflict between the desire for immediate drive gratification and the frustrations imposed by the environment. Hartmann (1939), however, reasoned that these functions develop independently of drive, conflict, and environmental frustration and were thus part of the relatively conflict free sphere of ego-functioning. The secondary process is fully established, in this formulation, when repression is able to prevent drive impulses from reaching consciousness.

Szekely (1962) emphasized that thinking is to be considered an ego function, and developed in this connection an account of two instruments of thought. The first is the temporary regression that is still accompanied by reality testing and the synthetic function of the ego, while the second is the selective style of thought characteristics of mathematical thinking. Other contributors to the American Psychoanalytic Association symposium on thinking (discussed in Bellak, et al., 1973, pp. 161-162) also stressed the importance of frustration to thinking.

Though the two sets of issues are not at all incompatible, other analysts have laid more stress on the symbolic aspects of thinking (Klein, 1942; Hacker, 1957). Here the argument is that symbols are used to manipulate

internal and external reality and make it possible to deal with objects in ways in necessarily inherent in actual experience. The capacity for symbolization arises from conflict between id impulses and relations and from a preformed rudiment in the ego. Schilder's work (1953) is probably the most developed account of thought disorders, and emphasizes the various layers of mental process through which any idea must travel on route to consciousness. He stresses the extent to which imagery is dominated by affective distortions.

Rapaport (1950), by contrast, stresses the role of unconscious involvement in thinking. He considers thought a product of very early stages of ego development where primary process is still predominant, and argues that hallucinatory images are the archetype of thought. In organizing a collection (1951), Rapaport treats of thinking as divisible into five sections: directed thinking, symbolism, motivation of thinking, fantasy thinking, and pathology of thinking. His own theory of thinking is the most developed of all psychoanalytic approaches. It is based on a primary consideration of motivation, and takes up delay of discharge, hierarchy of motivational factors, anticipations, and states of consciousness.

In a classic paper, Kagan (1939) delineated three stages of development of thought in the child: physiognomic thinking (in which the child "animates objects and projects his own ego"), the phase of concrete, literal, and

overrealistic thinking, and abstract or categorical thinking, which usually emerges after adolescence and signifies the ability to use language to form generalizations. In addition, Kasanin also did pioneering work in empirically testing people for various thought patterns and relating it to clinical diagnoses.

Other significant contributions have come from Kris (1950), Rosen (1953), McGhie (1966), Rycroft (1962) and others. Throughout the psychoanalytic literature on thinking runs a focus on the various sorts of disruptions. Most of these are disruptions to chains of associations, but many are also certain sorts of logical errors and such fundamental problems as overinclusivity (Cameron, 1938; Goldstein, 1939; and the modern research of Salzman, Goldstein, Atkins and Babigian, 1966; Glasner, 1966). Various researchers connected with the William Alanson White Institute have followed the linguist Vygotsky and von Domarus in arguing that the key distortion of thinking is the confusion of logical subjects and predicates (Arieti, 1963). Wynne and Singer (1963a,b) report a number of family background characteristics of schizophrenics. Moshner (1971) lists five aspects of schizophrenic thought disorder: looseness of associations, blocking, neologisms, the expression of odd, bizarre, or distorted thoughts or associations that are not necessarily illogical, and irrelevant response patterns. It has been suggested that many of the problems of this literature are due to the extremely

heterogenous nature of the population of schizophrenics being studied. For an overall review of this literature, see Reed (1970).

The component factors which Bellak, Hurvitch and Gediman draw out of the literature on thought processes as central to the ego function include: (1) Degree of adaptiveness in memory, concentration, and attention. (2) The ability to conceptualize, including the extent to which abstract and concrete modes of thinking are appropriate to the situation. (3) The extent to which language and communication reflect primary or secondary process thinking.

Adaptation to organizations. Secondary mental processes are of course central to organizations, even more so than to individuals, since organizations have generally been created and sustained for some particular set of tasks. The issues are quite similar for organizations and individuals; the same characteristics distinguish primary from secondary process thinking. Memory, concentration, attention and the ability to conceptualize are important in both cases. We may use the same concepts to study both levels.

There is one addition we must make when we move to the collective level of analysis, however: culture. Organizations conduct their intellectual life as much through communication as through "thinking" in the everyday internal sense. In fact, the psycholinguist Vygotsky argued

that a central part of the maturational process is the development of a capacity for "internal speech." His work, and that of many linguistically oriented analysts, would suggest that language and communication are central to the socially created individual. Be that as it may, they are clearly of paramount importance in organizational functioning. Perhaps the single most important set of data with which an organizational analyst works is the records available of organizational communications. From these he is able to learn of the characteristics styles of organizational thought, the distinctive organizational culture which informs all decision making and conduct. The organizational analyst must look for the underlying emotional content of these communications as well as their specific cultural features, but it is important to treat the conceptual orientation of the organization--the myths it develops and the images of self and others it sustains--as ego-functional issues in their own right. The analyst must also look for evidence of the level of communication and intellectual activity in the organization. He must establish whether this is impeded by emotional issues, or whether its adaptiveness in new circumstances is constrained by an overly rigid structure. An important clue will be the extent to which organizations are able to sustain abstract internal communications or require that everything be conveyed in concrete terms. The later style, while it may

function well in one context, is unlikely to show much be adaptive flexibility.

7. Adaptive Regression in the Service of The Ego (ARISE)

Perhaps the least commonly cited ego function included in the Bellak, et al. (1973), listing is adaptive regression in the service of the ego. The term "regression in the service of the ego" was introduced by Kris (1936) in a discussion of the psychology of caricature. Varendonck (1921) similarly showed the adaptive importance of preconscious fantasizing and thinking. Bellak (1958) adapted the Kris conceptualization, adding the specification that the adaptational aspect be explicitly included in the name. Bellak's interest in the issue was developed largely through his work on thematic apperception (esp. 1944, 1950). There he argued the importance of certain forms of regression to creativity, which in turn could be shown to be crucial to adaptation. Kris also introduced another important aspect of this ego function conceptualization with his notion of the ego oscillating from self-exclusion to control. This too was developed further by Bellak (1954, 1958) who conceptualized the degree of ego participation on a continuum from daydreams, fantasies, hypnagogic phenomena, preconscious fantasies, free association, and projective techniques. The adaptive component of the process is that contributed by autonomous ego functioning. The sort of regression involved, it should be noted, is exclusively topographical regression of the cognitive process, not

regression in the synthetic function of the ego (Bellak, 1958b, p. 367).

The ARISE conceptualization has been used most often to account for wit and humor, artistic creativity, productive fantasy and imaginative processes, problem-solving, the capacity for orgiastic experience, ego-building identifications, motherliness, empathic writing, love and the therapeutic process itself. Schafer (Schafer, 1968) listed six conditions in the personality that favor regression in the service of the ego. (1) A well developed set of affect signals, (2) a secure sense of self and/or well defined ego, (3) a relative mastery of early traumata, (4) mild rather than severe superego pressures, (5) a history of sufficient trust and mutuality in interpersonal relations. Further research in this area has been conducted by Pine and Holt (1960) and Wild (1965). Although Weisman suggested that controlled regression in the service of the ego was necessary he also argued that creative regression should be seen as pathology rather than health (1958). He sees the artistic creative process as a residue of early psychosis. Most authors, however, tend to link adaptive regression to health, thus justifying its inclusion as an ego function (Wangh, 1957; Waelder, 1960; Kubie, 1958; Joffe and Sandler, 1968; Geleerd, 1964). There is some argument as to whether adaptive regression is the best account of artistic creativity (cf. Bush, 1969; Giovacchini, 1960; but compare Rothenberg, 1969). The more general possibility of

ARISE is less disputed. Indeed, Gill and Brenman (1959) go so far as to suggest that all regression must be seen as in the service of the ego.

Creativity is of course necessary in a wide variety of ways in ordinary life, not only in artistic endeavors. Most ordinary circumstances do not, perhaps, bring out a great deal of creativity (which may help to account for the tardy development of the ARISE concept), but each life does tend to require some at key points. It is largely a matter of social definition which restricts our interpretation of creativity to science and the arts, and thus implies that there is a bimodal distribution of creativity, with the capacity for ARISE only well developed in a small proportion of the population.

The component factors for the study of ARISE are: (1) First phase of an oscillating process: degree of relaxation of perception and conceptual acuity with corresponding increase in ego awareness of previously preconscious and unconscious contents and the extent to which these "regressions" disrupt adaptation or are uncontrolled. (2) Extent of controlled use of primarily process thinking in the induction of new configurations. Extent of increase in adaptive potential as a result of creative integration produced by ultimately controlled and secondary process use of regressions.

Adaptation to organizations. Though organizations are planned activities in which secondary process thinking plays

a larger role than in the lives of individuals, they are nonetheless built on an emotional foundation. I earlier noted the view that organizations can largely be understood as a set of constraints on the impulse life of individuals; the organizational ego is in some ways an adjunct to the ego and superego of the individual member. This is appropriate and adaptive, but as with individuals, there can be too much of a good thing. An organization which depends too much on rational planning, which controls too much from the top down, which specifies in too much detail the activities and relationships of every member is likely to become rigid and to lose its ability to command the loyalty of its members. It will, in short, cut itself off from the reservoirs of psychic energy on which it, like all other constructs of human action, depends.

Schafer's (1958; summarized above) list of features which support ARISE is a good guideline for the organizational analyst. It suggests the importance of internal communication, secure sense of self, mastery of previous problems, moderation in central control and high level of trust and mutuality in both internal and external relationships as conditions for ARISE in organizations. An organization which feels itself to be under attack, or in danger of internal dissolution, will be unable to innovate. It will be unable to draw on the unconscious lives of its members to establish new but still deep patterns of relationships and habitual attitudes. It will tend to "work

to the book" rather than adapt. This will be especially evident during crises or processes of radical change, but it should have reflections in the feeling tone of the organization even during good times. Excessive rigidity and resistance to ARISE will not only make innovation more difficult, but it will inhibit the organizations sensitivity to those internal and environmental stimuli which do not enter its "official" or formal information processing channels. It will be unable to learn, for example, from the minor adaptive problems of subunits what major issues may be developing.

8. Defensive Functioning

Freud (1915) considered repression the cornerstone of psychoanalysis, its most essential concept. Repression is not an isolated concept, however, but rather the most fundamental of a class: the defense mechanisms. Freud used a theory of defensive functioning from the 1890's, treating defenses throughout as the techniques of which the ego makes use in dealing with the conflicts which may lead to a neurosis. More attention has been paid to defenses than to any other area of ego functioning, with the possible exception of object relations (Bellak, et al., 1973, p. 192).

Freud's development of the concept of defense mechanisms began with a focus on repression, seen as the wish to forget unpleasant ideas or experiences (Freud, 1893, 1894,). Freud made a notion of internal censorship central

to his discussion of dream interpretation (1900). Only gradually did he begin to separate the notion of repression from the general class of defensive mechanisms. Sublimation was separately defined in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905). This led to the development of the theory of reaction formation (1909, 1915) in which Freud argued that instincts are subject on occasion to reversal, turning round upon the self. The fullest account of repression in Freud's writings (1915) treats it as a means of keeping instinctual material and close derivatives from reaching consciousness. First cathexis is withdrawn by the preconscious system, establishing repression; then an anticathexis develops to maintain the repression. In this formulation, repression seems a complement to the possible outcomes of regression and fixation (Freud, 1926).

As Freud moved from the topographic to the structural model of psychic life (beginning with 1923), he realized that repression and repressing forces needed to be understood as fully parts of the unconscious. In the mature Freudian formulations, however (1926, 1937), the repressed material is seen as unconscious, but the repression itself as one of the defenses by which the ego maintains stability of its functioning. This contrast between content and form of repression was developed significantly by Reich (1933), who also added that defensive functioning needs to be understood as protecting the ego against external as well as internal dangers. This line of attack, with its stress on

the limits of focusing purely on instinctual drives, was continued in Anna Freud's landmark book, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense (1936).

Anna Freud underscored that instinctual drives are transformed, and the personality accordingly influenced by the ego operations. These defensive operations, she held, could only be understood by recognizing that the ego activity could be on occasion fully part of the unconscious. She listed ten different defense mechanisms: regression, repression, reaction formation, isolation, undoing, projection, introjection, turning against the self, reversal, and sublimation. These different mechanisms could of course be combined by an ego, and in particular, repression is generally used in conjunction with other defenses. Most defenses need to be repetitive or continual, though more efficient defensive functioning can be achieved through repression, which need be applied only once and then simply maintained through counteracthesis. Hartmann added to A. Freud's formulation the notion that the ego might contain a conflict-free sphere, in which it functioned autonomously, and not simply in defense against instinctual or other pressures. At the same time he stressed that defenses may be seen to have an adaptive aspect, especially in relation to external forces. This early phase of treatment of defenses as synthesized by Fenichel (1945) who also added a number of more specific conceptions of defensive mechanisms.

Waelder (1951), Hoffer (1954) and Hartmann (1950) argued that the complexity of defensive functioning required further internal differentiation and a conceptualization of the relation of defenses to each other. This has come to be known as defense organization. Most analysts have also argued that a differentiation is necessary between the adaptive and pathological aspects of defense mechanisms (Lampl de Groot, 1957; Mahler and McDevitt, 1968; A. Freud, 1965; Sperling, 1957 dissents somewhat from this approach). Some analysts have argued that it is important to distinguish between defense mechanisms, which are relative simple and discrete, and defensive operations which mix defense mechanisms with each other and with other ego activities (Siegel, 1969).

Analysis of ego organization and defensive functioning has been an important link between psychoanalysis and socio-cultural studies (Schupper and Calogeras, 1971). Such linkages generally depend on seeing ego's defensive functioning as part of a general regulatory principle (Lichtenberg and Slap, 1971).

Bellak, et al., also draw on a variety of studies which analyze precursors and prestages of defense, hierarchical layering and chronology of defenses, as well as the obvious distinction between adaptive and maladaptive aspects of defenses. The components of functional analysis which they specify include: (1) The extent to which defense mechanisms, character defenses, and other defensive

functioning have maladaptively affected ideation, behavior, and the adaptive level of other ego functions. (2) The extent to which defenses have succeeded or failed: for example, degree of emergence of anxiety, depression, and other dysphoric affects.

Adaptation to organizations. As Tavistock researchers have argued, and as I have already indicated, organizations can be seen from the point of view of an individual member as essentially constraints. In this view organizational roles are such like extensions of the individual's defensive functioning or "character armor" in the Reich's (1933) phrase. It is important to look at organizational role structures, thus, to ascertain how they affect the psychic lives of individual members. An organization cannot function well if the roles it establishes deny the emotional needs of individual members, or so distort their intellectual orientations as to severely inhibit drive expression. It also cannot function well if it fails to constrain impulse activity significantly enough to channel members' energy into the main organizational tasks. Organizations, thus, may help or hinder the individual adaptation of their members.

Beyond this, organizations themselves may over-defend or fail to defend sufficiently against both external or internal pressures. Much of this was suggested in my discussion of ARISE. An organization may develop rigid patterns of functioning in defense against either the threat

of internal conflict or the pressures of external change. This rigidity will constrain the activities of members, preventing adaptation and will absorb much of the psychic energy which might otherwise be directed towards organizational tasks. Consultants are familiar with organizations which put so much of their energy into pattern maintenance that they lose sight of their other goals. Excessive rigidity is perhaps the greatest problem organizations face in connection with defensive functioning.

In some cases, however, organizations also face serious difficulties with inadequate defenses. They may be unable to contain the emotional energy their members bring to them or to cope with the arousal initiated by external contacts. An important example of the former problem is the difficulty faced by many young and growing organizations which generate a high level of excitement and involvement from their members. Especially where these organizations (as, say, in high technology research and development) include a large number of highly skilled and autonomous workers, all members are likely to feel deeply emotionally committed. They will pour energy into building the corporation and enjoy the feelings of innovation and fellowship it provides. If their efforts are materially successful, however, the organization is likely to grow beyond the range where it can function as a mass democracy, with only ad hoc decision making procedures and high levels of untamed energy; it will have to routinize its operations. This will be anxiety-provoking

and often profoundly depressing for the original members. To successfully gain autonomy as an organization, such a firm will have to defend itself against the emotional commitments which lead its members to express often intrusive primary process impulses, but without losing all of that emotional commitment. The same sorts of issues can face organizations under other circumstances. In whatever case, the organizational analyst must be able to detect not only individual maladaptation to organizational circumstances, but the arousal of anxiety or depression in organizational culture and relational patterns. The provocations for such crises are as wide ranging and sometimes apparently arbitrary as in individual life. An organization may lose (or win) a lawsuit; introduce a new product or be beaten to the competitive punch. In all cases, the analyst must be sensitive to the ways in which the organization coped with the experience, and the costs in adaptative potential paid for each defense mechanism introduced.

9. Stimulus Barrier

Though Freud mentioned the notion of a stimulus barrier quite early in his work, it was not fully developed until Beyond the Pleasure Principle. At the beginning (Freud, 1895) the concept denoted simply the organism's need for some control over the admission of stimuli from a stimulus-charged world. World War I may have been influential in leading Freud both to elaborate the position

and to give it more centrality. Bellak, et al., are of the opinion that the notion has attracted far too little attention in personality studies.

Freud thought that any experience of being overwhelmed by a stimulus, being unable to deal with it through established patterns of ego functioning, was traumatic. The flooding of the mental apparatus by excessive stimulation went beyond simple excitation to incapacity (Freud, 1920; Fenichel, 1945). More recent writers have also linked stimulus overload to psychic trauma (Furst, 1967; M. Kris, 1964; Kris, 1956; Khan, 1963). A properly functioning stimulus barrier is needed to scale down the intensity of extreme stimuli to a level within the organism's coping capacity. Freud (1940) at one point saw the stimulus barrier as a chronological precursor to the ego, a primitive defense function. Bellak, Hurvitch and Gediman argue, however, that it is more fruitful to see the stimulus barrier as an ego function controlling the organism's receptivity to and protection against the stimuli.

There has been some debate as to whether Freud's statements (1895, 1915, 1940a) about stimulus control imply the existence of two distinct stimulus barriers, one dealing with internal, one with external stimuli. This is the view taken, for example, by Anna Freud (1967). Bellak, et al. (1973), however, agree with Holt (1948) that there is one stimulus barrier protecting the ego from both internal and external impressions. This view is also seen to be in line

with the work of Benjamin (1965), Winnicott (1958) and at least the later work of Hartmann (i.e., 1950, but not 1939).

In Freud's own psychology, the organism was presumed always to seek stability of functioning, according to the so-called "Nirvana principle" (Freud, 1915). More recent commentators have, however, questioned the biological basis of this aspect of Freud's thought (see especially the comprehensive compilation of Greenfield and Lewis, 1965). Benjamin (1965), in particular, has argued for the importance of seeing the organism as stimulus-seeking, as well as boundary-maintaining. He draws especially on Hebb's (1949) pathbreaking discussion of the relationship of neurology to psychology, and suggests that we need to supplement Freud's understanding of neurology with attention to the variety of spontaneous activities in the organism. Bellak (1963 and passim) has frequently dealt with the importance of stimulus hunger, and Bellak, Hurvitch and Gediman (1973) take it to be crucial. This is in line with early studies on sensory deprivation (Buerger-Prinz and Kaila 1930) and a variety of psychoanalytic writings (Rapaport, 1957, 1967; Wolff, 1960; Rubinfine, 1962; Wallerstein, 1967; and Engel, 1962). Spitz, indeed, has presented convincing evidence of the stimulus requirements even of infants, who may not survive without it (1945, 1946).

Kahn (1962) has argued that continued stimulus deprivation and/or overload can result in a "cumulative

trauma." In this conceptualization a variety of breaches of normal ego functioning, none traumatic in itself, achieve the net effect of trauma, and may produce a change in the stimulus barrier over time. Successive failures of the mother to act as the child's protective shield, for example, may result in an immature ego's foregoing object gratification and erecting a barrier against a considerable range of stimuli (Rangell, 1967, Rubinfine, 1962; Winnicott, 1958, 1960, 1963). Parallel lines of thought have been developed by Jacobson (1964), who adds the argument that maternal stimulation of various pleasure experiences--motor, proprioceptive, tactile, etc--is necessary to ego growth, but that an acceptable overall relationship is crucial to maintaining tolerable levels of excitement. The mother must intervene at some points in tension reduction as well as in stimulation (Benjamin, 1961, 1965; Murphy, 1962).

The stimulus barrier concept has long suffered from a failure to distinguish clearly between a biological-neural conceptualization and a psychological one. This is a key reason why Bellak, et al., wish to treat the stimulus barrier issues as clearly one of ego functioning (1973, p. 217-218). All people are apparently endowed with some manner of thresholds of sensory toleration. The ego, however, works through its totality of functions to evaluate congenitally determined sensory thresholds and establish a capacity for organized and integrate sensory experience. Bellak, Hurvitch and Gediman wish to view the concept of

stimulus barrier as a part of the ego's active mastery over internal drives and external environment. They follow Freud's (1920) emphasis on ego activity, and reject an emphasis on passive aspects (Pumpian-Mindlin 1959). Recognition of both active and passive sides of this ego function is also in line with Hartmann's (1950, 1953) arguments and Holt's (1965) major statement. Most of all, they find that Benjamin's (1965) evidence of behavioral and EEG shifts at age three or four weeks conclusively demonstrates the importance of the development of active mastery, rather than mere passive, innate, filtering.

Following Holt (1956) and Rapaport (1951), Bellak, et al. (1973), suggest that motor discharge patterns and other behavioral indicators of stimulus receptivity levels may be used alongside laboratory tests of sensory thresholds. Bellak (1963) and Benjamin (1965) have developed formulations of the difficulty of overstimulated infants (and, in the former case, adults) maintaining stable affective involvements. Research on sleep has also suggested that some adults may use sleep as a (rather severe) barrier against stimulus bombardment (Cameron, 1963; Wallerstein, 1966).

The components of the stimulus barrier function include (1) Threshold for, sensitivity to, or registration of, external and internal stimuli impinging upon various sensory modalities (corresponds to "receptive function").

(2) Degree of adaptation, organization, and integration of

responses to various levels of sensory stimulation: the effectiveness of "coping mechanisms" in relation to degree of sensory stimulation, whether observed in motor behavior, affective response, or cognition.

Adaptation to organizations. Organizations clearly attempt to control the introduction of stimuli from their external environments at the same time that they require such stimulation. Like individuals they must maintain boundaries. Unlike individuals, as we have already noted, organizations do not have the obvious biologically given boundaries from which to work (or towards which to mature). Business corporations may radically alter their identities and boundaries by merger, for example.

An even more important difference is that organizations do not experience physico-sensory stimulation. Rather, their members may experience such stimulation, but they must translate it into a linguistically mediated information-flow before it enters the organization as such. Organizations also receive a constant flow of information directly from outside sources. They can be overwhelmed by this flow, just as individuals can by sensory stimuli. The organizational analyst must be prepared to identify this sort of problem. Some of the solution may be technical--an organization may require a more sophisticated information control system. It is seldom the case that a purely technical solution is adequate, however, for what organizations do with information is a complex structural and emotional matter.

Organizational coping mechanisms must be developed, not just sorting procedures.

Beyond questions of information flow, the organization analyst must be sensitive to all the many issues that can arise at the highly permeable boundaries of organizations. People themselves move in and out of organizations--a kind of information flow and psychic change at once, which can be highly disruptive but is unavoidable. How an organization copes with personnel turnover can be a telling indicator of its ego-functioning.

10. Autonomous Functioning

Freud's writings about the ego remained relatively unsystematic compared to later work. In particular, they left two closely related issues unresolved. They did not clearly establish how strong the ego should be considered in relation to the drives, or whether it is to be understood as developing on an autonomous biological basis or out of the id. The issue of ego autonomy was not clearly formulated until the work of Hartmann (1939, 1950, 1952, 1955).

Hartmann held that ego development is based on combination of instinctual drives, external pressures and its own inborn "conflict-free" sphere. The last includes the foundations of such processes as perception, intention, object comprehension, thinking and language. These functions which can develop without conflict constitute the sphere of primary ego autonomy. There is also secondary autonomy for those ego functions which can be detached from their initial

application and used in a variety of settings. Secondary autonomy is a variable; functions may be more or less refractory to regression and instinctualization.

Rapaport (1951, 1958) extended Hartmann's thinking on ego autonomy, stressing that autonomy from the id and from the environment need to be distinguished. In fact, in his second paper he held that the two are inversely related. This conceptualization is based on the notion that only a limited amount of stimulation (conceived of as 'nutriment') is available, and internal and external sources cannot both be supplying it at once. Gill and Brenman (1959) somewhat softened this notion of inverse relationship, suggesting that the two autonomies are simply asymmetrical.

Perhaps more important is the issue of autonomous ego development. Here Hartmann held that ego mechanisms and instinctual drive processes have a common origin. After this undifferentiated phase of development, however, ego-mechanisms are able to structuralize and to interact with instinctual-drive factors with considerable autonomy and in a variety of ways. Both maturation and learning are instances of autonomous ego development in this view. Bellak, et al. (1973), take the view that therapy is to be understood in the same sense. They believe that all contemporary psychiatric therapeutic measures can be conceived of as either increasing or decreasing the ego's successful interaction with the id or the environment.

Research on ego autonomy has supported much of this line of thought. Voth (1962) showed the importance of a dimension of "ego-close/ego-distant" in terms of the degree of dependence on the external environment. And, they also supported Rapaport's notion of a balance in which either too much or too little contact with drives or environmental reality decreases ego-autonomy. Ekstein and Caruth (1971) showed the relationship of ego autonomy to the capacity to vary motor activity levels.

The issue of ego autonomy is closely related to that of the neutralization of libidinal and aggressive energy. As Hartmann, Kris and Lowenstein (1949) argued, following Freud as well as Hartmann's own earlier work, sublimation and other desirably autonomous levels of ego-functioning require a neutralization of the orientation of this energy. Of course, drawing on this energy still leaves the ego open to the risk of disturbances of function and sudden introductions of inhibitions. Ego functions thus are seen as cathected with libidinal and aggressive energies, which become neutralized as development proceeds, but when an autonomous ego function becomes involved in conflict, either it becomes suffused with less neutralized energy or there is an influx of unneutralized energy followed by a regression of ego functioning in that area (Bellak, Hurvitch and Gediman, 1973; 238). White (1963) and Sandler and Joffe (1966) have attempted to account for the same phenomena without such a difficult notion as that of energy

transformation/neutralization. They suggest simply that it is the discharge form that varies in quality. Tasks and behaviors can be described in terms of the directness or indirectness of drive discharge.

All the apparatuses, functions, and manifestations of primary autonomy are subject, according to Bellak, et al., to disturbances in functioning. Difficulties may arise in visual, auditory, tactile and other sensory processing, in or in intentionality, memory, language and learning difficulties. All of the major ego functions as Bellak, et al. (1973), list them are autonomous ego functions (in both primary and secondary senses). Disturbances in these functions are to be seen as the introduction of a sexual or aggressive meaning into an activity or area of functioning not intrinsically so oriented.

The components factors to autonomous functioning are (1) Degree of freedom from impairment of apparatuses of primary autonomy (attention, concentration, memory, learning, perception, motor function, intention), and (2) Degree of freedom from impairment of secondary autonomy (disturbances in habit patterns, learned complex skills, work routines, hobbies and interests).

Adaptation to organizations. Ego-Autonomy is not a comparable issue for organizations as for individuals. This is centrally because of the nature of the analogy on which a psychoanalytic theory of organizations is constructed. If

an organizational ego loses its autonomy, the organization does not simply change its energy orientation, it ceases to exist as such, and dissolved into a psychological group. The comparable issue for an organization, thus, is its very existence as an autonomous entity. The sorts of underlying regressive groups described by Bion are the alternative to autonomous organizational existence.

The organizational analyst needs to look for the specific sorts of disturbances addressed by Bellak, et al. (1973), but since energy enters the corporation through its members, the issue of regression is differently posed. It should also be noted that this is something of a "catch-all" category for Bellak, et al (1973). Since autonomy is an issue for all the ego-functions, this is primarily a way of dealing with important sorts of disturbances not treated elsewhere and an occasion for pointed out the underlying energy issues.

Organizations' information and action systems require autonomy in a sense closely analogous to that of primary autonomy in individuals. Organizations are both a major vehicle for individuals to develop secondary autonomy and closely dependent on the extent of secondary autonomy individuals do manifest. An organization, thus, relies on the adaptive habit formation of its members (Simon, 1957) and in general on members fitting into the roles it creates for them. It maintains itself autonomously to the extent that it can have such roles consistently enacted.

11. Synthetic-Integrative Functioning

Freud (1926a, b, 1927) held a major task of the ego to be the reconciling of the conflicting demands of the id, superego and external world. This has been developed in more recent personality theory as the notion that a central or even superordinate ego-function is that of achieving synthesis or integration (Hartmann, 1939; Lecky, 1945; Rogers, 1942; Goldstein, 1939). The notion of splitting of the ego introduced by Freud (1938) and developed further by Klein (1932) emerged naturally from this.

Freud's basic notion was that the capacity of the ego to achieve unity was central to mental life. It involved both personality integration and the cognitive process of "secondary revision" which unconsciously established the compromises between conflicting trends, problems with which appeared in symptom formation. Nunberg (1930) developed a much more detailed notion of a specialized ego-function of synthesis. A key issue was seen to be the ability to assimilate alien elements. French (1941, 1945) developed the notion of integration capacity in the area of social integration and through a focus on goal-directedness. The ability to take responsibility for others and thus implicitly to create social relationships of dependency was a sign of the superabundance of integrative capacity coming from an individual (see French, 1952, 1953, 1958).

Rapaport (1957, 1960) and Hartmann (1939) argued that there were a multiplicity of synthetic functions, rather

than the single one suggested by Nunberg. Kris (1956) proposed a distinction among synthesis, organization and integration, defined in terms of an ascending scale of neutralization of libidinal or aggressive energy. Miller, Isaacs and Haggard (1965) elaborated on this distinction suggesting that those functions which Kris put at the low end of his neutralization scale result in enduring and sometimes rigid substructures (syntheses) whereas those at the high end (integrations) were flexible and adaptive. Schilder (1930), Reich (1933) and Fenichel (1938) all developed similar views of the hierarchical layering of integrative personality processes. Within an object relations perspective, synthesis and splitting appear as the central mechanisms of ego development (see Esp. Kernberg, 1966). Though conceptualization vary, the general sense of the importance of synthesis and its counterparts is widespread.

The key and more divisive question is whether synthesis is to be seen as a function of the ego or of the total psyche. Rapaport (1955) and Schafer (1968) line up on the former side, with Apfelbaum (1966) and Prelinger (1958) prominent representatives of the latter view. Somewhat similarly, Hartmann (1947) held synthesis and differentiation to be two aspects of the organizing function of the ego, and Searles (1959) treated them as opposite sides of a single growth process. Opposed to this view are Prelinger's (1958) and Hacker's (1962) contention that

synthetic and differentiating functions are separate and opposite. Bellak, et al., of course agree with those who see a single ego function of synthesis, which may be achieved to be a greater or lesser degree, rather than two opposing functions and/or a view of this as a total psychical process rather than one located in ego-functioning.

The component factors in assessing the level of synthetic-integrative functioning are (1) the degree of reconciliation or integration of discrepant or potentially incongruent attitudes, values, affects, behavior and self-representations, and (2) the degree of active relating together of both psychic and behavioral events.

Adaptation to organizations. Synthetic functioning is, if anything, of heightened concern for organizations. Because they bring numerous individuals together, they must constantly deal with differences of perspectives, knowledge, orientation and behavior. They must reconcile conflicts and attempt to function in a unitary fashion. Organizational psychology has long been concerned with the need to achieve such a reconciliation. Our perspective would suggest, however, that this cannot be done simply through attention to the attitudes and behavior of individuals. It is a feature of organizational ego-functioning as a whole. Accordingly, attention must be paid to what mechanisms within an organization solve or exacerbate these problems. It must be recognized that such problems are not contingent

but a part of the essential nature of organizational life, and thus that dealing with them is a continual and not an occasional need. In this the organization confronts an issue which admits of less complete solution than its counterpart in individual psychology. It is, however, directly analogous and can be understood by the same categories (combined with some socio-technical analysis).

Information control systems are a first clue as to how well an organizational ego is adapted to dealing with the problem of synthesis. Successful solutions require integration on the level of social relationships and emotional commitment as well, however, and thus become issues of general management not simply specialized sub-systems.

12. Mastery-Competence

Bellak, Hurvitch and Gediman treat mastery-competence as an ego-function because they want to call attention to an aspect of behavior not covered by the other functions, but they acknowledge that the conceptual status of the area is unclear in psychoanalytic theory. What the mastery notion enables them to treat is the readily recognizable variance among individuals in the extent to which they assert themselves as active problem solvers, copers and masters of their environments.

Freud noted this issue, but had relatively little to say about it. In general, he treated mastery as an instinctual phenomenon, allied to self-preservation.

Hendrick (1947) extended Freud's notions into the concept of a separate mastery instinct which was a major source of energy for the ego functions. The most important contributions to the theory of mastery were made, however, by White (1959, 1963). He argued that competence should be conceived of as a "biological purpose," and that an active ego striving for mastery is its servant. The attempt of the individual to be effective is the underlying motor of psychic development. This attempt to be effective in relation to the external world extends to the desire for active physical exercise and development and is based on a primary positive interest in the world. "Effectance", as White calls it, is not dependent on drive-reduction but has its own positive status. "Competence" describes a person's capacity to interact effectively with his environment, and is not solely a question of motivation or emotional underpinnings, but of the individual's whole history of interactions with the environment.

In developing this line of thought, some researchers looked at those individuals who seem able to cope with even extreme real-life problems, like severe illnesses or handicaps. Important research includes that of E. and W. Menaker (1965), Visotsky, et al., (1961), Murphy (1962), and Wheelis (1956). Much of this line of work suggests the importance of introducing the idea of will power into psychoanalytic thought. This is in accord with the work of the "adaptationist" school of psychoanalysis (e.g. Rado,

1956), but it stresses especially the need to conceptualize the active striving for mastery, and to recognize it as variable among individuals.

The component functions Bellak, et al. (1973), specify are: (1) Competence, or how well the person actually performs in relation to his existing capacity to interact with and actively master and affect his environment. (2) The subjective role, or subject's feeling of competence with respect to actively mastering and affecting his environment: subject's expectations of success on actual performance. (3) The degree of discrepancy between components (1) and (2), that is, between actual competence and sense of competence.

Adaptation to organization. This ego-function is absolutely central to organizational life. Consultants will immediately recognize the model of an active, effective organization, with both a strong track record in its dealings with its environment and an attitude of self-confidence about future dealings. This is the model held up in popular management texts, and it is close to the sense one gets intuitively of certain unusually strong organizations. Just as analysts have examined developmental variables such as mothering to account for individuals' ability to cope, organizational analysts need to go beyond extolling the virtues of certain attitudes to the study of what makes them develop. Founders, as well as present day CEOs often play a strong role in creating an organization

with a sense of efficacy. The nature of internal social relations may be far more important than the original attitudes of newly recruited members in producing this sense. In any case, it is a key facet of organizational style.

The results of a weak development of the mastery function appear in organizations which function adequately by internal standards but fail to develop a strong engagement with the outside world. Management is likely to perceive the problem as one of motivation for employees. Employees are likely simply to feel pessimistic about the chances for really accomplishing anything. When there are successes, they will be ascribed to chance, to individual efforts, or to other exogenous factors. There will not be a sense of organizational accomplishment. This is primarily a matter of emotional basis and strong social relations. It is also, to a lesser degree, a matter of finding media for disseminating knowledge of organizational accomplishments, for revealing how it was precisely in organizational activity that people achieved some desired result. Conventional personnel policies of incentives and group psychological work are important in practical ways, but they are limited to motivational issues, and do not address this ego function directly.

This is an appropriate place to end this chapter, for we wind up with a variable of immediate familiarity to anyone in the area of management. Yet, this variable has

always appeared as an illusory idea. It is on the foundation of psychoanalytic theory, and particularly on the conceptualization of a body of ego-functions that we are able to conceive more precisely of how this sense and reality of competence might be developed. It is the result of an overall effectiveness of ego-development, not an isolated or arbitrary phenomenon. The utility of the theory is driven by the explanatory power that it provides for the interpretation of the data of both individual and organizational analysis.

CHAPTER V

A PSYCHOANALYTIC MODEL FOR ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGNOSIS

Sources of the Diagnostic Model: Summary

As a preliminary to articulating a psychoanalytic framework for the analysis of organizational behavior, I believe that it would be useful to summarize the two major streams of influence on my present thinking; that is, an essentially non-psychoanalytic nexus of macro-organizational theorists and a clearly psychoanalytic group of theorists on individual and organizational functioning. The two groups taken together constitute five discernable lines of inquiry, each of which has made an important contribution in my attempt to integrate both psychoanalytic and socio-technical elements in a more highly developed psychoanalytic framework for the study of organizations.

The Non-Psychoanalytic Tradition

Contingency theory. The work of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) defined organizations as open systems and insisted that any understanding of current organizational functioning had to be related to the dynamics of an organization-environment interaction. This perspective saw organizations as essentially in flux and adapting and influencing

the nature of environmental demands. The health of an organization was contingent on the management of its relationship with the environment. Thus, a key predictor of organizational effectiveness was the organization's adaptive capacity. The contingency theorists struck down the notion of "static" organization and instead posed an organization responding to environmental demands. Contingency theorists saw the drama of this adaptation in the shifting needs for organizational integration and differentiation. As the demands of the environment changed, the organization would have to respond with new designs which included both appropriate differentiation and integrative mechanisms. The contingency theorists underlined the notion of a dynamically adjusting organization.

Socio-technical systems theory. Socio-technical systems theory made explicit the factors involving the adjustment process to internal and external environmental demands. Trist and Emery defined the nature of organization-environment relations in terms of the organization's attempt to optimize effective relations between technical systems and social systems at different levels of organizational functioning. The primary notion of an appropriate fit between technical system demands and social system needs explicated how primary work groups and macro-organizations resist or facilitate adapting to new system requirements. The contribution of socio-technical systems analysis was to insist that the functioning of the

social system was a critical component of the organization's ability to adapt and develop. Trist's work defined theoretically the component elements of social system, technical system, and a larger organizational environment and delineated the interdependencies which linked these components (1950). A further elaboration of socio-technical systems concepts is provided below in this chapter.

The Psychoanalytic Tradition

The group work of Wildred Bion, A. K. Rice, and E. J. Miller. The group work of Bion (1960), and Rice (1958) and later Rice and Miller (1967), represents a fundamental psychoanalytic contribution to the understanding of group (and by extraction, organizational) functioning. Bion attempted to understand the relationship of groups to work in psychodynamic terms. Productivity and the adaptation to organizational demands were seen as related to a social system's struggle for the management of work-related anxiety. Bion's positing of anxiety-related defensive assumptions characterized how groups react to changing environmental demands. In addition to defining the mechanisms of group responsive functioning, Bion also understood groups as a collectivity with an identity different from the identities of its individual members. His work laid the ground for understanding group and organizational personality and for utilizing a

psychoanalytic framework to evaluate the functioning of organizational collectivities.

In the course of defining the psychodynamic nature of group functioning, Bion, Rice, and Miller developed key concepts of interpretation. The emphasis in current organizational analysis on the notion of group boundary, role, sentient versus work mode, basic assumption life, the nature of authority and followership, and the character of regression in work environments are all the products of that interpretive work. As a consequence the entire flavor of a psychodynamic approach to organizational analysis has been influenced in great measure by this Tavistock work.

The work of Harry Levinson. Harry Levinson's work, in the psychoanalytic tradition, has consistently received attention in the development of contemporary organizational behavior and organization development. Levinson's work, begun at the Menninger Foundation, and carried forward at the Harvard Business School, delineated a comprehensive framework for the analysis of organizations which was clearly psychoanalytic in its orientation. The work also attempted to utilize structural data in the assessment of macro-organizations. It relied heavily on a psychodynamic theory of personality to understand intra and inter-organizational functioning. Levinson's contribution was unique in that it attempted to formalize a comprehensive, psychoanalytic approach to the

study of organizations and laid out in detail the major elements of such an orientation (1972). A more complete discussion on Levinson's contribution is provided later in this chapter.

The work of Bellak, Hurvitch and Gediman. The work of Bellak, et al (1973), focused on attempting to understand the dynamics of ego functioning in individuals that they classified as normal, neurotic, or schizophrenic. A special contribution is the clarity and comprehensiveness with which they define the function of the ego and the series of elaborated diagnostic instruments which they prepared in order to measure ego functioning in individuals. Their work was especially critical in its potential for application to the study of groups and organizations. A primary thrust of group and organizational analysis in work environments is the assessment of dispositions to productivity and the causes of productivity deficits. Their work, in the context of psychodynamic appraisals of group and organizational functioning, raised the possibility of assessing ego-related issues in a more precise and scientific manner.

Context of the Present Model

The present thesis has reviewed and critiqued work from a wide variety of perspectives in organizational research and practical intervention. On the one hand, it

has been established that there is a failure in the existing non-psychoanalytic approaches to deal with organizations simultaneously as holistic and acting systems. Those approaches which treat organizations as wholes tend to understand them as static systems, or, at best (as in the work of Lawrence and Lorsch) as dynamic primarily in their response to environmental factors. Thus structural sociology views organizations as wholes, but ignores all psychodynamic aspects and the role of organizations as actors. Miles's "macro-organizational behavior" (Miles, 1980) is almost unique in attempting to overcome this limitation, but the present argument suggests that it lacks a sufficiently subtle scheme for psychodynamic interpretation to carry out its treatment of the organization as comparable to the individual. Those approaches which do take action as their topic of analysis, it has been shown, tend to assume that action only takes place at the individual level of analysis. While they have yielded important findings in industrial psychology, personnel administration and related areas, these approaches have failed to address the functioning of whole organizations except as constraints on the activities of members. They have not appreciated the extent to which organizations embody characteristic patterns of functioning and psychodynamic issue formation in and of themselves, in ways not reducible to the propensities or pathologies of individual members.

On the other hand, it has been argued that the existing psychoanalytic approaches to organizations suffer from one of two limitations. Either they were primarily cast in terms of group dynamic (as in the work of Bion and some other Tavistock researchers) and thus failed to fully grasp the processes operating at the organizational level. Or (as in the case of Levinson) they saw the importance of analysis at the level of the whole organization, and thus grounded themselves in psychoanalytic method, but lacked the theoretical underpinnings to construct a powerful and systematic approach to interpretation. The present work follows Levinson in its holism and focus on the transference relationship between organizational analyst and client, it draws on the Tavistock group dynamics work to treat the nature of individual involvement in groups and organizations, and it incorporates the newer research of Bellak, et al. (1973), to introduce a more theoretically sophisticated basis for interpretation of organizational functioning.

This thesis is thus first and foremost an attempt to bolster the theoretical underpinnings of the psychoanalytic approach to organizational diagnosis introduced by Harry Levinson. Secondly, it is an attempt to remedy the failure of industrial and organizational psychology to treat the psychology of organizations as wholes. And thirdly, it is an effort to

introduce an active rather than passive and/or static conception of organizations as wholes.

In addition to this statement of general context within the field, it seems important to say something more about the relationship of the present thesis to the "socio-technical systems" approach. I have learned from this line of work, and incorporated important concepts and arguments. In particular, as summarized in Chapter Two, the work of Eric Trist and his associates has been important. I have not elaborated this perspective at length, however, because I think it is much better developed already than psychoanalytic organizational analysis, and because it is neither a part of nor a substitute for organizational psychoanalysis. Rather, it is the logical counterpart to the perspective developed herein.

The phrase "socio-technical systems" is now in widespread usage, and has become rather vague. Writers have used it to refer to almost any analysis which purports to integrate treatment of an organizations appropriation of material or social technology and its internal functioning. It is more helpful, however, to restrict the term to the research and theoretical tradition extending from Eric Trist's and his colleagues' pioneering work on coal-mining and other technicological changes in post-war Britain. Trist and his co-workers drew on general systems theory to develop a method for analyzing the systematic properties of technologies on the one hand, and social

organizations on the other. They emphasized the importance of studying each, and then assessing the extent of variance, balance and/or integration between the two. Their perspective suggests that organizations are not seamless systems, but patterns of relationship among partially autonomous systems. They stress that organizations are designed, the products of human choice rather than natural systems. Nonetheless, they are subject to ecological constraints and can be analyzed in systematic terms (Trist, Higgin, Murray and Pollock, 1963).

Though his focus is on technological and social systems, Trist is concerned with psychological functioning as well. He sees convergence in the study of organizational, industrial, community and personal development, for example, and thinks that there could eventually be a unified theory of all four (Trist, 1979a). Such a unified theory would require at least two facets. Socio-technical systems work can be understood to address primarily the first--the study of the technical demands placed on an organization and its ability to meet them. This logically implies the study of the organization's ecology or environmental situation, the technological system with its operations, and its own social organization. The unified theory must also include attention to the nature of individual incorporation into organizations and their structuring as whole actors, psychological individuals of a special sort. This is what the perspective I have

developed out of psychoanalysis contributes. The boundary between it and socio-technical systems work is indistinct, but the difference in emphasis should be clear.

Trist has, it is worth noting, contributed to both sides of this unified theory. In addition to early work which developed psychoanalytic ideas, he has recently developed an extended analysis of the capability of organizational systems to respond to different environmental conditions. This analysis stresses, for example, that the restructuring of organizations to accommodate to more turbulent environments is a matter of the psychological content of the relations which make up the organization as well as of their formal or task dimensions (Trist, 1981). Similar points are made by other researchers in the socio-technical systems tradition. A number of researchers have, for example, addressed the issue of the quality of work life (Davis and Cherna, 1975). The primary focus has been on issues such as job design which operate at the micro level, but some researchers have also focused attention on the way in which organizational structures affect the psychological lives of members (Susman, 1976). Micro-organizational psychological issues have remained underdeveloped within the socio-technical approach, however, even among those researchers with a psychological bent.

The primary contributions of socio-technical systems work have been in breaking down an old mechanistic

paradigm of human organizational functioning. The approach has been similar to the humanistic management schools discussed in Chapter One, except that it did not simply exhort a different managerial style in the abstract, or on purely individual psychological grounds. Rather, it showed how change in technology raised choices and allowed different patterns of organizational structure, each with a different arrangement of costs and benefits. In the place of technological determinism, it introduced a conception of joint optimization of social and technological systems. It introduced a conception of human resources which saw people as much more multi-faceted in their potential contributions to organizations and industry than had the Taylorian schemes before it. Because of this it stressed the importance of grouping tasks together in ways that brought out the best in human workers, rather than breaking them down to the maximum extent possible. Socio-technical systems work emphasizes the role of self-regulation, subsystems of internal controls, rather than the external controls of supervisors and formal rules. It developed a conceptualization of why organizational participation was needed in new operating contexts, and why strict hierarchical organization was not just "inhumane" but inefficient (Trist, 1981).

In all of this, socio-technical systems work stressed the need for commitment rather than alienation on the part

of members of modern organizations. It thus suggested the importance of the sort of psychological work undertaken in this thesis. It also stressed the importance of operating autonomy in organizational life, especially as the condition of innovation. In this it is clearly compatible with the psychoanalytic view that strong autonomous ego-functioning is the precondition of personal flexibility and growth. Socio-technical systems work should thus be seen as the essential complement to the psychoanalysis of organizations in the development of a unified theoretical orientation. Indeed, its ability to define the stress imposed by different technological and environmental systems allows matching technological system needs with organizational personality. In the present work I have not discussed organizational technology at any length (though see Levine, 1975). My concern has been to begin to bring the scheme of interpretation of organizational psychodynamics to a comparable level of theoretical development that Trist and his colleagues have given the socio-technical side. Since the analysis of any actual organizational problem may involve issues of either sort in greater or lesser degree, I have incorporated socio-technical systems work into my model for organizational analysis (below). Including this dimension should give a better indication of where I see the distinctive contributions of this thesis to lie, and how

they relate to the larger issue of organizational dynamics.

Assessment of Organizational Personality Functioning

Some aspects of organizational functioning may be assessed in a detached, "objective" manner. Structural characteristics, parts of organizational history, the nature of a technical system, and even much of the system of social relationships can be elicited in surveys and through conventional analysis of documentary source materials. The organizational personality cannot be studied in this manner. It appears only in action and thought, and thus can only be seen in organizational activity and self-reflective thought systems such as communications. Since observation of an organization's functioning in all its many and varied contexts is no more practical than such observation of individuals, organizational analysis like psychoanalysis must depend on the creation of a special sort of relationship between analyst and analysand. Like the psychoanalysis of individuals, organization analysis will depend a great deal on interpretation of multivocal communication. In addition to statements made directly to an analyst, these will include (more than in the case of an individual) documents revealing organizational style and culture (e.g. internal memos regarding structural problems or reorganization). What is needed to make organizational analysis work, thus, is first and foremost a rigorous and suggestive schema for

interpretation. This is what the present thesis has been, most of all concerned to provide. It is outlined in the second and third sections of the model below. The best interpretative schema is not much use, however, unless good data is available. A prefatory word is in order, thus, about the nature of the consultant/client relationship and the data for organizational analysis.

Chapter Three of the present thesis included a discussion of the issues of transference and analyzability in psychoanalysis as they bear on the question of how organizations can be analyzed. It was emphasized that the ability to form a transference relationship was a prerequisite of successful analysis. A consultant, in short, must be able to form a working relationship with a client organization which includes a high component of trust and which will generate projection and other unconscious activities which unintentionally communicate hidden mental functioning. The analysis requires a relationship of considerable duration, not just a crisis intervention. Even diagnosis--the primary focus of the model below--requires a real relationship, not just a single contact. A consultant must make clear the nature of the analysis, so that his client will expect to confront interpretations of unconscious organizational life. The consultant must also be prepared to recognize and interpret manifestations of counter-transference in himself. He must be attuned, in other words, to listening with a "third ear". The

success of the assessment and any eventual intervention depends on the sensitivity with which data regarding unconscious processes are gathered and analyzed.

The paradigm below is a model of organizational assessment. It attempts to put forward a comprehensive framework for collecting different, but related, organizational data in a strongly psychoanalytic orientation to the dynamics of organizational functioning. It further attempts to indicate the relationship of psychoanalytic to technological (socio-technical) data and the requirements for approaching statements of the quality of organizational functioning or an organizational diagnosis. The model thus is a guide to the comprehensive diagnosis of an organization from a socio-technical/psychoanalytic perspective.

The Model

The model has four parts. The first is entitled Organizational History and includes both the basic identifying information concerning the organization as well as the principal events defining the development of the organization, especially the traumas of the organization's development. The second part is entitled Organizational Technology and encompasses the description and functioning of all current technological systems. Such systems include a variety of different designs created for particular purposes (defining a production process, defining a financial process, etc.). An important aspect of

understanding the current functioning of technological systems is assessing the demand that the technological system places on the organization. This demand can be evaluated in terms of the technological system's (1) complexity, (2) intensity, and (3) required sophistication of human resources. A critical feature of the nature of the various technological systems is the interaction which they have with their various environments which stimulate a demand for the accomplishment of specific aims and influence their change. In turn, the technological systems produce outputs which influence their environments and thus set up loops of interacting influence. The technological systems, acting in the context of their environments, set up demands which the organization must meet. The nature of these demands is a function of the type and quality of the technological system. The extent to which the technological systems can function effectively depends on its FIT with the organization's personality expressed at the level at which the system is functioning. Thus, the third section of the model concerns organizational personality, especially those features of personality which concern the ability of the system to work. The ego functions of the systems are critical and are understood in terms of the organization's other drives which might interfere with the adequate functioning of the organizational personality's ego. The third section of the model is entitled Organizational

Personality: The Psychodynamics of Social System. The final section of the model is called Organizational Integration: Recommendations for Design and Intervention.

The purpose of the final stage of the model is to assess the design and intervention requirements for developing a better fit between the demands of the technological systems and the social systems which fuel them. In some cases, the design of the technological system(s) may have to be altered. In other cases, interventions into the functioning of the social system(s) may have to be introduced in order to facilitate a better adaptation to the requirements of the technological system. In the cases where interventions are required, it is of course necessary to assess the best way of implementing the intervention. Those decisions would be a function of the evaluation of the nature of the social systems and its current adaptation level as well as the historical factors which make the understanding of the social system's typical patterns and styles more accessible.

The model owes a primary debt to Levinson's (1977) conception of organizational diagnosis and its psychoanalytic perspective. Some of the categories overlap with Levinson's own model (Levinson, 1977, pp. 55-65). Yet there is a distinction in the structure and emphasis. The model which I have outlined utilizes the work of the socio-technical theorists directly and emphasizes the understanding and impact of technology.

Further, it makes explicit the use of psychoanalytic concepts, especially ego-psychological functions in their application to organizational phenomena.

A Psychoanalytic Model for Organizational Diagnosis

I. Organizational History

- A. Identifying the organization
 - 1. Describing the organization
 - a. size
 - b. type
 - c. location
- B. Complaint History
 - 1. Special attention to the nature of the present complaint
- C. The Organization's Life Cycle Phases
 - 1. Key developmental growth patterns
 - 2. Product History
- D. The Crisis Pattern of the Organization
 - 1. Financial
 - 2. Labor
 - 3. Technological
 - 4. Competitive Standing
 - 5. Leadership
- E. The Images and Myths of the Organization
 - 1. The development of its identity

II. Organizational Technology

- A. The Primary Structural Systems - General Description
 - 1. Design Components
 - a. formal organizational system
 - b. financial systems
 - c. product service systems
 - d. personnel systems
 - e. communication and information systems
 - 2. Assessment of the Level of Systemic Functioning
 - a. complexity
 - b. intensity
 - c. human resources level
- B. The Detailed Analysis of Technological Systems
 - 1. Levels
 - a. primary work systems

- b. whole organization technological systems
- c. macrosocial (including environmental) technological systems
- 2. Issues
 - a. scanning of the technical system--establishing the target
 - b. evaluation of the unit orientations
 - c. variance analysis
 - d. variance/social system table
 - e. assessment of neighboring and anxiety-arousing systems
 - f. assessment of social management strategy
 - g. recycling toward design
- 3. Preliminary Socio-technical Diagnosis

III. Organizational Personality: The Psychodynamics of the Social System

- A. Organizational Style
 - 1. Transference and countertransference style
 - 2. Management of authority and followership
 - 3. Organizational guilt
 - 4. Organizational fantasy
 - 5. Organizational aggression
- B. Organizational Ego Functions
 - 1. Reality testing
 - 2. Judgement
 - 3. Sense of reality
 - 4. Regulation and control of drive, affect and impulse
 - 5. Object relations
 - 6. Thought processes
 - 7. Adaptive regression in the service of the ego
 - 8. Defensive functioning
 - 9. Stimulus barrier
 - 10. Autonomous functioning
 - 11. Synthetic-integrative functioning
 - 12. Mastery-competence
- C. Organizational Personality Type
 - 1. Hysterical
 - 2. Obsessive-compulsive
 - 3. Narcissistic
 - 4. Schizoid

IV. Organizational Integration: Recommendations for Design and Intervention

- A. Organizational Perceptions and Knowledge: A Summary
- B. Attitudes and Relationships: A Summary
- C. Organizational Integration Patterns

- D. Organizational Technology-Personality Fit:
Psychoanalytic/Socio-technical diagnosis
- E. Recommendations
 - 1. Design
 - a. short term
 - b. long term
 - 2. Intervention Sequence
 - a. short term
 - b. long term

CONCLUSION

This thesis has developed critique, construction, and synthesis. The first two chapters reviewed existing approaches to organizational assessment and intervention. Non-psychoanalytic approaches were found wanting (a) because they treated organizations as either passive or static "natural systems" rather than subjects of action, and/or (b) because they treated individual members of organizations as the sole loci of psychological life, neglecting the organization as a whole. A variety of particular contributions from this work were assimilated, however, even though they were held to be unsuitable as the basis for future theoretical development. Existing psychoanalytic approaches were found to be extremely valuable, and to suggest the most fruitful basis for further development of a holistic organizational psychology. It was argued that a synthesis was required between the group dynamics work of Bion (1961), Miller and Rice (1967) and some other Tavistock Institute members and the holistic organizational diagnosis model of Harry Levinson (1972). The Tavistock work was found valuable in its analysis of the psychodynamic basis of commitment to groups and organizations, the nature of regression in social contexts and the functioning of underlying

psychical structures behind manifest task organization. It was found lacking, however, because it focused exclusively on face-to-face or other intimate groupings, and failed to develop a view of large, complex organizations functioning as wholes with more or less autonomous psychical lives. It was precisely this holistic view which was supplied by Levinson's work. Levinson had produced the most sustained argument before the present thesis for taking the organization as the unit of psychoanalysis, analogous to the human individual. He had also produced a comprehensive outline of the sorts of issues and data likely to be encountered by organizational analysis. The present thesis builds on his work, in particular by further developing its theoretical basis. Levinson accurately suggests the issues of interpretation of organizational life; I have used Bellak, et al. (1973); and other sources to give them consistent order and a grounding in psychoanalytic theory of interpretation.

The main constructive part of the thesis was devoted to providing the theoretical basis for the unified theory of organizational personality suggested by the synthesis of Tavistock work with Levinson's organizational diagnosis. Chapter Three developed the general basis in psychoanalytic theory for the treatment of the organization as an individual, organized as are human individuals by ego-functioning and the prevalence of certain basic psychological issues. It also, and perhaps most

importantly, developed an account of the related issues of transference and analyzability. These were shown to be theoretically intertwined, and essential to organizational as well as individual analysis. It was in examination of psychoanalytic arguments about what patients are analyzable that we found the basis for holding that an organization can be analyzed--organizations and individuals must both manifest sufficient functional ego-development to carry on the analytic relationship, reflect on themselves and form transferences. Transference was also seen to be an important issue because the organizational consultant, like the individual analyst, must become adept at analyzing the products of transference, the key data on much of the underlying emotional life of either sort of analysand.

Chapter Four drew on the work of Bellak, Hurvitch and Gediman (1973) to specify the ego-functions which are the key indicators of organizational and individual health. These form the basis of Bellak's procedures for assessing the state of psychical functioning in individuals, and the core of our improved and systematized theoretical schema for interpreting data concerning the psychological functioning of organizations. By enumerating and describing these functions in some detail (Chapter Four), we were able to specify the sort of interpretations which were initially suggested by Levinson's work. This sort of interpretation of organizational life is now put on a

stronger theoretical foundation. This not only directly improves the paradigm for organizational diagnosis (shown in Chapter Five), but also provides the theoretical basis for developing research hypotheses and instruments in order to translate the model into an empirical research tool. Just as Bellak, et al. (1973), move theory to research, so it would be desirable as a next step in the development of a psychoanalysis of organizations to produce instruments for empirical assessment and study of organizational ego functioning. The present theoretical work suggests how this could be done.

In the meantime, the present work hopes to have improved the systematization of procedures for psychoanalytic diagnosis of organizational functioning. Though data are not yet potentially quantifiable, use of the model developed in Chapter Five will help to ensure that data are comparable and thus a better basis for theoretical refinement. It will also help in practical terms to see that the central area of emotional and cognitive functioning in organizations is not left untouched in studies of organizational behavior. Not least of all, the present work helps to provide the basis for a synthesis of the psychoanalytic approach to organizational diagnosis with the socio-technical systems approach to the use of technology and adjustment to the tasks and problems set by environments. The present work provides the basis for assessing an organization's psychological ability to adapt

to the various sorts of problems which technological and environmental systems can introduce. The model outlined in Chapter Five includes socio-technical variables alongside psychodynamic ones and thus reflects the author's hope that the two will eventually converge as parts of a unified theory of organizational behavior.

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