

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI

**A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600**

Order Number 9521271

Democratization and the Islamist challenge in the Arab world

Ghadbian, Najib, Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1995

Copyright ©1995 by Ghadbian, Najib. All rights reserved.

U·M·I
300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE ISLAMIST CHALLENGE IN THE ARAB WORLD

by

NAJIB GHADBIAN

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

1995

© 1995

NAJIB GHADBIAN

All Rights Reserved

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Jan 30 1995
Date

Dankwart Rustow
Professor Dankwart Rustow
Chair of Examining Committee

Jan 30th 1995
Date

W. Ofori-Kodjoe
Professor W. Ofori-Kodjoe
Executive Officer

Professor Ervand Abrahamian

Professor J. Braveboy-Wagner

Professor Kenneth P. Erickson

Professor Howard Lentner

Supervisory Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Abstract

DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE ISLAMIST CHALLENGE IN THE ARAB WORLD

by

Najib Ghadbian

Advisor: Professor Dankwart Rustow

Serious democratization measures have occurred in the Arab world recently, particularly in Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, and Yemen. The rise of Islamic movements ("fundamentalism" or "political Islam") has coincided with this push toward democracy. Islamists have participated in and benefitted from the democratization process, especially in countries which allowed free elections (e.g. Jordan and Algeria). Why has democratization reached an impasse in the Arab world? What is the intersection of democratization with the rise of the Islamists? What are the prospects for democracy in the current contexts of the Arab world?

The dominant conflict in today's Arab world, that between ruling elites and Islamist groups which challenge them, manifests a struggle over collective identity. I examine the progress of democratization against the proposition that consensus over collective identity is a major prerequisite for transition to democracy. I trace the development of the conflict over collective identity and describe its current dimensions among ruling elites, secular forces, and Islamists. I consider two other contexts for the conflict, those of

socio-economic conditions and the international climate, to determine their role in the frustration of democracy in the region. I examine the relationship of Islamists to democracy, using both their writings and their record in praxis.

Finally, I compare how the conflict between Islamists and governments has affected democratization in two Arab countries: Egypt and Jordan. The regime in Egypt oscillates uneasily in its policy toward Islamists, between co-optation on one hand and containment and repression on the other, but is determined to deny them any meaningful participation in politics. This uneven strategy has caused high levels of frustration and polarization between contending forces. The Jordanian monarchy has succeeded so far in including Islamists in the political process, but within bounds that do not challenge the power of the king. Islamists have shown willingness and skill in working within those procedures of democracy which have been instituted. Unlike in Egypt, most political forces in Jordan have reached a working consensus on collective identity. The question remains, will the monarchy relinquish as much power as the progress of democratization will demand?

Table of Contents

Abstract	iv
List of Tables, Maps, and Figures	viii
Part I: Framework and Historical Background	
Chapter 1: The Approach	2
A. The Problem to be Examined	2
B. Key Concepts	4
C. Basic Premises	10
D. Theoretical Framework	15
Chapter 2: Identity and Democracy: A History	33
A. The Rise and Decline of the Arabo-Islamic Nation	33
B. The Legacy of Colonialism	49
C. Local Nationalisms and Early Experiences of Democracy	53
D. The Authoritarian State and Pan-Arabism	60
Part II: Democratization and Islamic Resurgence	
Chapter 3: Islamists and Democracy: The Intersection	71
A. Democratic Measures Since the Eighties	72
B. Islamist Advances	86
Chapter 4: The Islamist Challenge	100
A. Who Are the Islamists?	100
B. The Islamic Resurgence	103
C. Islamist Agendas	119
D. Islamist Positions Toward Democracy	125

Part III: The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion:	
Two Case Studies	
Chapter 5: Egypt: Coercion and Containment	151
A. Democratic Development in Egypt, 1970 – 1990 . .	152
B. The Islamist Challenge in Egypt	166
C. The Democratization Stalemate in the Nineties .	174
D. Limits and Prospects	188
Chapter 6: Jordan: A Case of Inclusion	206
A. Historical Background	207
B. The Democratic Experiment Since 1989	213
C. Limits and Prospects	240
Part IV: Conclusions	
Chapter 7: Conclusions and Prospects	249
Bibliography	267

List of Tables, Maps, and Figures

Figure 1.1: Rustow's Model for the Transition Toward Democracy	18
Map 2.1: The Arab World on the Eve of World War I	48
Map 2.2: The Arab World on the Eve of World War II . . .	48
Table 2.1: Early Experiments with Representative Gov- ernments in Some Arab Countries	56
Table 3.1: Indications of Democratization in Some Arab States Between 1985-1990	74
Table 3.2: Survey of Recent Elections in Arab Countries 1985-1993	77
Table 3.3: 1993 Parliamentary Election Results in Yemen .	92
Table 3.4: 1990 Algerian Local and Regional Election Results	95
Table 4.1: Major Islamic Groups in Some Arab Countries .	118
Table 4.2: Islamist Groups' Performance in Elections, 1985-1993	143
Table 5.1: The Results of the 1984 People's Assembly Election	161
Table 5.2: The Results of the 1987 People's Assembly Election	161
Table 5.3: The Results of the 1990 People's Assembly Election	165
Table 5.4: Casualties of Political Violence in Egypt 1993	178
Table 6.1: 1989 Jordanian Parliamentary Election Results	215

Table 6.2: Political Forces in the 1993 Jordanian	
Parliament	234
Table 6.3: Party Returns of Jordan's 1993 Parliamentary	
Elections	235

Part I

Framework and Historical Background

Chapter One

The Approach

A. The Problem to Be Examined

After making headway in many countries, democratization has reached something of an impasse in the Arab world. Discussions about the extent to which this can be attributed to cultural, religious, political, or socio-economic factors have been inconclusive; some of them have taken out of mothballs the old imperialist arguments about the inherent unreadiness of certain peoples for self-representation; some border on the blatantly racist.¹

Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, and other Arab states had pretensions to liberal democracy in the post-independence years. Most of those early experiments failed. In Lebanon, however, democracy lasted until the eruption of civil war in 1975, and in Sudan, three intervals of democratic government alternated with military rule. Despite these mixed results, many democratic values--the need for accountability of leaders, for a more inclusive process of decision-making--had deep cultural roots in the Arab world as well as powerful contemporary resonance, and retained their status as ideals. Regimes of varied ideological colorings felt obliged to use democratic vocabulary. One of Gamal Abd al-Nasser's six-point programs advocated the establishment of "healthy" democratic life. Ba'thist ideology claimed democracy as a goal. The official name of South Yemen, an authoritarian Marxist-

Leninist state, contained, for good rhetorical measure, a double emphasis on democracy: the "People's Democratic Republic of Yemen."

It was not until the early eighties, however, that serious steps toward democracy occurred in a notable number of Arab countries: Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, and Yemen. These steps reached their summit after the collapse of the Communist Bloc, perhaps best symbolized by the destruction of the Berlin wall. In the face of such a powerful blow to authoritarianism and the waning of Soviet military support, even the most despotic regimes in the Arab world, Syria and Iraq, were forced to adopt a few, albeit cosmetic, measures, to camouflage their rule with democratic trappings.

A few years after this latest wave of democratization began, only Jordan and Yemen have proceeded with democratization, while Egypt and Tunisia reversed course. In Algeria, the military put an end to the democratic experiment in early 1992.

Recent studies have been skeptical about the prospects for democracy in the region in light of another trend, the rise of Islamic movements ("fundamentalism"). Islamist groups seemed to ride the crest of every democratization wave, to gain strength with every opening for change. It is this development which alarmed many intellectuals and policy-makers into asking whether the Arab peoples are "ready" for democracy or whether democracy is even desirable in this area. To many

of these political analysts, the involvement in politics of religion in general and Islam in particular is antithetical to democracy. Can democracy develop in an Islamic cultural-political context?

Islamic resurgence, reflected in the rise of Islamist groups in the political arena, poses a serious challenge to the ruling elites in most Arab states. Islamist groups won ground in each one of those Arab countries which allowed free elections, especially in Jordan and Algeria, and Islamist groups have produced an opposition in those states which refused to open up their popular bases, such as Syria. It was the rise of Islamists that jolted ruling elites to reconsider whether they should continue down the democratic road when that course seemed to put their own survival at risk.

Why has democratization reached an impasse in the Arab world? What are the prospects for continued transition toward democracy, in light of the Islamist challenge?

B. Key Concepts

For the purpose of this research, the institutional or procedural aspect of democracy is the defining factor, following Joseph Schumpeter, who defines democracy as "[t]he institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."² Procedural elements being foremost, I conceptualize democracy, in accordance with mainstream American political science

literature,³ as the form of government which meets the following criteria:

1) Free and periodic competition occurs for all effective decision-making positions. In this process of competition, there are at least two options (candidates) and the end result of the process is a peaceful transition of government.

2) A high degree of political participation in the election of leaders exists. The adult population is allowed to participate in elections; in other words, suffrage is universal.

3) There are guarantees of human and civil rights and liberties, such as the freedom of expression, freedom of the press, the freedom to join and form political parties, etc.

4) The leaders are held accountable to the public as long as they hold office. This requires the existence of a means of removing leaders from office if they violate the laws.

Two points about this conceptualization of democracy deserve discussion. First, democracy, as defined above, is an ideal form of government. It is thus rare to find, even among democratic countries, a perfect implementation of democracy. For instance, the U.S. suffers from a strikingly low level of participation in national elections⁴ and the disproportionate influence of interest groups in the making of decisions. Second, this definition covers only "political" or "liberal"

democracy and omits the view that sees democracy as a social and economic as well as political system. In the view of social democrats, free elections and political pluralism are not enough to make democracy; economic equality must be accessible, or the state must at least be committed to moving the country toward equal economic opportunity for all. This envisions a wider role for the state than that advocated by liberal democrats. While it is true that democracy would not flourish in a society characterized by extreme social or economic inequality or extreme conditions of poverty, this investigation focuses on the narrow political definition of democracy. For "when democracy is seen in a narrow sense as a political system, it is easier to ask questions about the relationship between this political system, on the one hand, and the economic and social dimensions, on the other."⁵ However, I point to the economic dimensions of the democratic question in the case studies, acknowledging the role of economic contexts in the conflict over political participation in the Arab world, and the potential for further research in that direction.

While no Arab country has become a full-fledged democracy, some countries have moved closer to democracy than others. This is why we speak of democratization as a transitional process toward fulfillment of some criteria for democracy. Democratization, according to Hudson, "is the process through which the exercise of political power by the

state becomes less arbitrary and exclusive."⁶ Some scholars, however, distinguish between two processes, liberalization and democratization, liberalization being the process described by Hudson. Liberalization refers to a change which limits the power of the state to intervene in the life of people and allows some freer expression and oppositional activities. Democratization refers more specifically to the process of change toward free elections, popular participation, and freedom of the masses; it is a change toward democratic rule.⁷ Huntington, among others,⁸ depicts democratization as a prolonged and complex process involving bringing an end to the non-democratic regime, establishing the democratic regime, and finally, consolidating the democratic system.⁹ While democratization is more far-reaching than liberalization, the transition toward democracy could begin and usually begins when non-democratic regimes loosen--liberalize--their tight control over the populace, which might or might not lead to democratization. In this research "democratization," rather than democracy, is the dependent variable.

Although the modest steps taken by Arab regimes might only qualify as liberalizing measures, some of these measures were serious enough to induce a broad process of change. Algeria, for example, moved from a one-party to a multiparty system--although the process was then halted by military force. Even if some of the modest changes in Arab states--

such as restoring parliament or lifting martial law--only qualify as liberalizing measures, the fact that most Arab regimes are under pressure to make more such changes or face deepening legitimacy crises indicates that liberalization is pushing steadily in the direction of democratization.

"The Arab world" refers to those countries which are members in the Arab League.¹⁰ Using the whole Arab world as a single unit of analysis is not without implications. Most Western scholars assume as the norm a divided status for the region, while most Arab scholars use the term "the Arab world" without hesitation. This is a reflection of ideological bias on both sides. Much scholarship emerging from the academic and policy-research institutions of the United States and Europe does not like to consider as viable any significant change in the divided status of the Arab world, whereas most Arab intellectuals would like to see that world move toward greater integration.

One may refer to "the Arab world" without losing sight of the fact that the Arab world is dynamic rather than static. As Arab sociologist Halim Barakat points out, "Arab society is not a mere mosaic of sects, ethnic groups, tribes, local communities and regional entities. Rather, it carries within it the potential for both unity and divisiveness." He emphasizes the need to recognize "conditions that constantly pull contemporary Arab society between all sorts of polarities and conflicting orientations: unity versus fragmentation,

tradition versus modernity, sacred versus secular, East versus West, local versus national. . . "11

Taking the Arab world as the broad unit of analysis is justified, in this research, by empirical and not just ideological reasons. Despite differences between Arab countries, all are governed by authoritarian regimes which are under pressure to democratize, and all have witnessed a rise of Islamic consciousness; these are the two trends examined in this project. The emphasis of this dissertation will be on those states which have initiated a democratic opening and later witnessed a deadlock. Two case studies will be examined closely: Jordan and Egypt. This research approach balances the advantages of breadth of vision, in taking the entire Arab world into account, and specificity, in examining certain states in detail.

The "Islamist challenge" refers to the pressure generated by movements of Islamic resurgence in the Arab world. These are movements that seek to change their societies by deriving their programs and ideologies from the basic texts of Islam. The term "Islamic fundamentalism" carries connotations from American Protestantism, and reduces a wide and complex range of groups and individuals into stereotypes (e.g. extremists, militants, terrorists) sharpened in past decades in the Western news media. Moreover, "Islamist" ("Islamiyyun") is what people belonging to Islamic movements call themselves, while "fundamentalist" is what their opponents derisively call

them in a language foreign to their own. "Fundamentalist," with its negative judgmental tone and its indication of literalism, anti-modernism, and fanaticism, is a term for those who have already made up their minds about Islamists and is therefore inappropriate for scholarly research about them.¹² "Islamist" is distinct from "Muslim" in that the former refers to people with a conscious activist agenda while the latter is a general identity for people of a gamut of ideological views. The majority of the Arab world is Muslim, while only those with ideologies that call for the implementation of Islam in the public as well as private realms are Islamists.

C. Basic Premises

Early theorizing about transition to democracy concentrated on discovering certain preconditions which correlate with democracy, such as socio-economic factors, political culture, regime legitimacy, and external influences.¹³ Huntington has compiled a list of twenty-seven propositions or variables that are conducive to democracy, including:

- a high overall level of economic wealth
- relatively equal distribution of income and/or wealth
- a market economy
- a strong bourgeoisie
- a strong middle class
- high levels of literacy and education

an instrumental rather than consummatory culture

Protestantism

the development of political contestation before the
expansion of political participation

democratic authority structures within social groups,
particularly those closely connected to politics

low levels of political polarization and extremism

political leaders committed to democracy

experience as a British colony.¹⁴

While all these factors may be relevant, (1) the fact that they correlate with democracy does not necessarily mean they cause it;¹⁵ and (2) we need to know how they interact in a specific context to explain anything. If we take economic development and civic political culture as two factors which correlate to democracy, and measure them against evidence from the Arab world, the shortcomings of this approach will be apparent.

1. Economic development

A classic example of the argument that high per capita income and high literacy levels, as indications of economic development, are strongly correlated to democracy, is Lipset's work.¹⁶ This was part of a body of theorizing which posited that liberal democracy would occur as a result of modernization. Political realities in developing countries refuted this assertion, since modernization, particularly during the 1950s and 60s, did not necessarily seem to result

in increased democratization. The political reality of the Arab world as it modernized not only failed to correspond to this theory, but witnessed the rise of authoritarianism in both its populist and patrimonial forms. Some of these regimes fit what Hudson calls the "Mukhabarat state," based on an extensive secret police apparatus and operating on fear rather than consent.¹⁷

In contrast, O'Donnell argues that bureaucratic authoritarianism can be expected in the early stages of economic development as an efficient way of dealing with the difficulties of modernization.¹⁸ O'Donnell's argument better explains the existence of such regimes as post-independence Algeria's. However, the process of economic development that produced bureaucratic-authoritarianism in the 1960s has also been crucial in the initiation of the democratic movement in the 1980s. Thus it is plausible to postulate the following:

a) In early stages of economic development it is more likely that authoritarianism will prevail;

b) As economies become wealthy and complex, it becomes more difficult for authoritarian regimes to maintain tight control; therefore, economic development leads to political openness;¹⁹

c) Economic development alone cannot explain the transition toward democracy. Other factors must intervene or interact for democracy to come about. For instance, Huntington presents the causal relations between economic

development and democracy in the following way: Economic development leads to the enlargement of middle class and increase of education; these two factors, in turn, create attitudes that are supportive of democracy.

Although economic development was found to be important in explaining the "third wave" of democratization, it was not exclusively so. Huntington's conclusion was that "the two key factors affecting the future stability and expansion of democracy are economic development and political leadership."²⁰

2. Political culture

Another factor widely used to explain the existence of democracy is political culture--the values , beliefs and attitudes that support or resist a certain political order. Numerous Western scholars have used this approach to explain the absence of liberalism and democracy in the Arab world. According to one segment of this argument, certain unchanging attributes which characterize the Arab people, such as duplicity, irrationality, shame and honor, and so forth, are not compatible with democracy.²¹ In a recent survey of literature on Arab political culture and democracy, Lisa Anderson has observed "Probably the characteristic of this literature most likely to strike an uninitiated observer is the negative tone of most of the assessments. Not only are Arabs thought to be dismal prospects for democratic politics, but they appear to be fairly dismal people all around:

illogical, untrustworthy, passive before domineering rulers, while given to intrigue and violence--all in all, an unsavory lot."²² Aside from their racist undertones, such approaches are riddled with fallacies and methodological obscurantism. For example, many of these arguments simultaneously insist that Arab society is hopelessly divided and that one uniform Arab mentality exists.²³

The second segment of the argument that Arab political culture cannot produce democracy blames the absence of democracy on "Islam" in general. Several writers contrast Protestantism as the religion favorable to democracy, with others, including Islam, that are not conducive to democracy. In a widely publicized article, Huntington writes "Islam has not been hospitable to democracy . . . in Islam, for instance, no distinction exists between religion and politics or between the spiritual and the secular." He goes on to say that "[p]olitical participation was historically an alien concept."²⁴ Huntington derives this sweeping categorization by simple correlation between Muslim countries and the lack of democracy, rather than by a study of Islamic culture and its relationship to politics in the Middle East.²⁵

Despite their shortcomings, works on Arab political culture as an impediment to democracy continue to find publishers and advocates. In a recent study, a prominent scholar on the Middle East claims that democracy has failed in the Arab world because "the idea of democracy is quite alien

to the mind-set of Islam."²⁶ Not only have Arabs been long accustomed to the traditions of autocracy and passive obedience, but they have only adopted the worst of Western political tradition, that of enlightened absolutism, which, apparently, makes it questionable if the Arab peoples will ever be able to rid themselves of these evils.

Essentialism and over-generalization are the obvious pitfalls of this approach. Another problem with the cultural explanation of democracy or its absence is the assumption that beliefs unilaterally influence actions. Indeed, there is strong evidence to the fact that the relationship between beliefs and actions are reciprocal. As Rustow writes, "we shall allow for the possibility that circumstances may force, trick, lure, or cajole non-democrats into democratic behavior and that their beliefs may adjust in due course by some process of rationalization and adaptation."²⁷ In fact, Huntington acknowledges in his later work the limits of his earlier cultural explanation, because similar arguments about other cultures have not held up, because a "culture" such as Islam is complex and may contain democratic as well as undemocratic elements, and most of all, because cultures change. A more fruitful way to examine the question of culture is to ask, "What forms of politics might emerge in these countries when economic prosperity begins to interact with Islamic values and traditions?"²⁸

D. Theoretical Framework

My theoretical framework for examining democratization in the Arab world is based on the following guidelines:²⁹

1. No single factor is sufficient to explain either the development or the frustration of democracy. Rather, democratization is the result of a combination of causes, a combination which varies from country to country and is likely to vary over time.


2. While certain factors are favorable to democracy, such as high literacy rates and advanced economic development, these factors might be necessary but not sufficient for the establishment of democracy. It is crucial to maintain a clear distinction between functional and genetic explanations; as Rustow emphasizes, correlation is not necessarily causation.

3. The existence of favorable economic, cultural, and external factors is never enough to produce democracy. People or political actors, from among both the leadership and the public, must act to establish or overthrow democratic systems: "Democracies are created not by causes but by causers."³⁰ Nevertheless, political leaders cannot create democracy if favorable conditions are absent. It is the interaction between favorable socio-economic, international, and cultural conditions on one hand, and the conscious acts of political leaders and activists on the other, that brings about democratization.

Based on these guidelines, I take Rustow's model for transition to democracy and adapt it for relevance to the Arab

world. The model identifies a background condition and three phases of democratic transition. The background condition is a sense of national unity. In the first phase, there is a persistent and serious conflict leading to the breakdown of the non-democratic regime; a conscious decision to adopt democratic rule occurs in the second phase; finally, there is a consolidation phase in which politicians and the electorate becomes habituated to this type of system (see Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1: Rustow's Model for the Transition Toward Democracy



Source: George Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), p. 42.

The one background condition of national unity means simply that most people "have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to." As Ivor Jennings puts it, "The people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people."³¹ Countries have had different ways of achieving national unity. Britain and France, for example, achieved national unity before they moved toward democracy. Other nations, such as Germany and Italy, did not resolve the issue of national unity until their violent unification in the late nineteenth century. Two conditions threaten national unity. One is when ethnic or linguistic cleavages among groups within a country lead them to question their national identity, as in the former Yugoslavia. The other case is when a divided nation seeks unification, such as Germany in the mid-nineteenth century. In these two cases, the national question must be settled before moving toward democracy.

As the issue of national unity is resolved, the first phase of transition toward democracy is triggered by a long, indecisive political struggle; this is the preparatory phase. Rustow leaves open the issues of this conflict, which could be economic or social equity, political rights, or a number of other issues worth fighting for. The conflict in this phase is likely to erupt as a result of the rise of a new social group which challenges the dominant class. Although "polarization" is the characteristic of the struggle phase,

such polarization must not threaten national unity; otherwise, further national fragmentation is the outcome rather than democracy.

The second phase of the transition is the moment of decision which concludes the preparatory phase, when "deliberate decision on the part of political leaders to accept the existence of diversity in unity and, to that end, to institutionalize some crucial aspect of democratic procedure."³² This part of the transition process indicates the vital role political leaders play. Although it is understandable for rising groups to advocate democracy as a means of access to power, it is also reasonable to assume that for members of the ruling elite to open up the system, they must perceive this step to serve their interests. The decision to adopt some democratic procedures, such as widening suffrage to include more groups, might lead to unintended consequences for the makers of this decision.

The final phase in the transition toward democracy is that of habituation, in which both politicians and constituents accept and become familiar with the democratic rule. This is also the consolidation phase, which, according to Juan Linz "is one in which none of the major political actors, parties, or organized interests, forces or institution or group has claim to veto the action of democratically elected decision makers."³³

A few points about the model are in order. First,

democratization is a complex process involving various stages that might overlap. These phases do not follow a predetermined historical law that unfolds in exactly the same way in all countries. Second, the model identifies national unity or a clear sense of collective identity as the sole prerequisite for democracy. Third, democracy comes to existence as a result of a choice made by political leaders acting to preserve their own interests as a response to pressure from other groups. In fact, conflict rather than consensus is the central basis for the transition to democracy.

In a later work,³⁴ Rustow adds to the collective identity condition two other political essentials of democracy, asserting (1) that democracy's multi-organizational imperative is a politically neutral state as well as two or more political parties, and (2) that international efforts to support newly democratic countries are also a factor.

My explanation for the thwarting of democracy in the Arab world is based on Rustow's work. Democratization is held back in the Arab world by the unresolved conflict over collective identity, and complicated by the interference of powerful local and international forces committed to preserving the status quo.

Collective identity, "the sharing of essential elements that define the character and orientation of people and affirm their common needs, interests, and goals with reference to

joint action" is never a frozen, determined quality; there is always an element of flux about it.³⁵ Nevertheless, some minimum level of consensus about collective identity must coalesce before a people can come together as a democratic nation. Rustow observes that a solid feeling of national identity in the Arab world was delayed first by the Ottoman Empire until early this century, and after that by Western domination.³⁶

The conflict over collective identity is connected to the major questions that the Arab people have faced since independence, such as: How to deal with being divided into over twenty countries? How should the Arab-Israeli conflict be resolved? What is the role of religion (Islam) in the structuring of society and polity? How should economic wealth, especially oil, be divided? The collective identity crisis has not happened and is not happening in a vacuum, but within the framework of these specific issues.

Several tendencies have emerged in response to this collective identity dilemma. For instance, three responses to the issue of political fragmentation have been articulated. *Qutriyya*, or loyalty to the existing states, solidified over the decades as the post-colonial borders between Arab states proved durable; *qutriyya* is particularly manifest during Arab-Arab disputes, such as the second Gulf war. *Qawmiyya*, or pan-Arabism, dismisses existing states as artificial, and seeks Arab unity. This trend was strongest from the 50s to the 70s.

Finally, there is regionalism, an emphasis on regional unity, such as "greater Syria," "greater Maghreb" (Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria), or the Gulf (*al-Khalij*) states (those in the Gulf Cooperative Council).

As for the question of the role of Islam, it is contested from differing positions. Secularists see Islam as a historical factor but insist that the exclusion of religion from the political realm is a pre-condition for development and modernization. Islamists see Islam as the frame of reference for organizing political life. However, these seemingly conflicting ideological positions in practice sometimes overlap. This is because secularism is not a substantive political ideology in itself but a component of several differing ideologies, including communism, socialism, and Arab nationalism. An example of how secular shading is gradual and shifting is that some Arab nationalists are extremely secular, while others give more weight to Islam in their vision of politics. In the practical terms of political coalitions, therefore, an Arab nationalist may have as much in common with Islamists on one hand as with more secular political allies on the other.

The question of plurality versus unity dominated the identity struggle in the Arab world for almost two decades, from the fifties to the seventies. The emphasis was on Arab unity as the key to solving the rest of the Arab world's problems. For Arab unity, and for economic development,

democracy had to be temporarily sacrificed.³⁷ Arab leaders and intellectuals used the same arguments that socialists and communists worldwide relied on to legitimize the trade-off of individual freedoms and democratic participation for social equity and economic development. Justice, national integrity, including the restoration of Palestinian rights, and basic physical quality of life for everyone had to come before such luxuries as free expression, the argument went. The (pan-Arab) nation had to come together and defend itself against the powers that threatened it before niceties like oppositional parties could be considered.

Today the terms of the argument are reversed, and there is growing agreement that the larger problems of the Arab world cannot be solved unless some level of democratic participation is achieved. At least today Arab intellectuals, the Arab nationalists among them of particular significance, reject the idea that democracy must be traded off for anything, be it Arab unity, economic development, or the restoration of Palestinian rights. Thus the debate over the legitimacy of the Arab states in their existing borders has subsided. There is general acknowledgement that these divisions are durable for the present and cannot be erased by military force from above.

At the same time, reports of the death of the idea of Arab unity have been greatly exaggerated. It has simply altered its form from a simplistic dream to a pragmatic

realization that the present borders of the Arab world will change only gradually, through long-term economic integration (the European Community model is relevant here), through the increased circulation of people, ideas, and goods, and, decidedly, through the participation and consent of the masses. Today, the major political forces, including the Islamists, work within the arena of the existing states, acknowledging the practical primacy of local concerns.

The debate in the nineties is over the role of Islam in politics. Islam was always a component of Arab nationalism, but a secondary or tertiary one. Islam came to the forefront as a political force after the failure of Arab nationalism to achieve success with its platform. This discussion will demonstrate that Islamist movements pose a challenge to authoritarian leaders who already suffer from a conspicuous lack of legitimacy. Two elements of power for Islamists are their popularity, and the fact that they push for democratic openings in the existing systems at a time when people want any change at all from authoritarian rule. Islamist popularity is grounded in an array of social groups with wide bases in Arab societies: students, the young, professionals, the urban poor, etc. Islamists push for change because, in every Arab country except Sudan (and that exception due to relatively recent change), they are in opposition.

There are two camps of opponents to the Islamists: ruling elites and some secularists. As for the ruling elites,

despite their defensive need to prove legitimacy by granting some liberalizing measures, they hold the coercive apparatus for repressing Islamist opposition and, in most cases, are not reluctant to use it.

When ruling elites in some Arab countries allowed limited democratic openings, it was Islamist groups which benefitted from these openings. In every election with some degree of freedom and fairness, Islamists gained ground. It is this development which so perturbs ruling elites, secular intellectuals, and others, including many in the West, as to make them reconsider whether the Arab peoples are "ready" for democracy. As one observer puts it, "Islamic revivalism has often been seen and experienced as a direct threat to the ideas, beliefs, practices, and interests of Muslim secular elites as well as Western governments and multinational corporations."³⁸ The ruling elites have responded in a variety of ways to Islamist advances, ranging from allowing Islamists to participate in the political process to harsh repression. Almost every Arab government today is entangled in a debate over the role *shari'a*, Islamic law, should play in public life. This new conflict, mainly between secular ruling elites and Islamists, has hampered the democratization process in most Arab countries.

Egypt is a good showcase for this shift in the collective identity and its ramifications for democratization. Loyalty to the idea of Egypt (Egyptian nationalism) was strong before

Nasser came to power. Egypt had a parliamentary system with intense friction between the palace and leaders of nationalist parties, and constant manipulation and interference by the British occupiers. The old regime was a fake, superficial democracy, which when destroyed by Nasser and his Free Officers, found few mourners. Under Nasser, Arab nationalism or pan-Arabism dominated popular loyalties with total suspension of democracy for the sake of Arab unity, socialism, and the liberation of Palestine. Then Anwar Sadat came with a mix of ideas and a return to Egyptianism. Sadat, who was always In Search of Identity,³⁹ died at the hands of radical Islamists for isolating Egypt from the rest of the Arab world and signing a separate peace treaty with Israel. Under Husni Mubarak, Islamists have done well in elections despite widespread fraud by the government. Having failed to further democratize and solve the country's economic problems, Mubarak's government today is under attack from radical Islamists and under pressure from moderate Islamists to adopt an "Islamic solution." The government has found ways to coopt some Islamists by promoting token "Islamic" policy concessions, suppressing radical elements, and occasionally tolerating moderates, without allowing them to function as a legal party. Today Egypt is witnessing a "minor warfare" between radical Islamists and the regime, which is dominated by an elite that feels threatened physically and ideologically by an Islamist rise to power. Democratization, in the

meanwhile, is on hold until this struggle is resolved one way or another. All things considered, the regime of Mubarak has not been less authoritarian than those of his predecessors. On the contrary, its record of human rights violations and death penalties against regime opponents has been the worst.

The thrust of this dissertation is to explore this identity struggle as manifested in the conflict between ruling elites, secularists and their Islamist challengers. I hypothesize that, first, in contexts where the conflict over collective identity has subsided and some sort of tentative compromise at least, if not total agreement, about the role of Islam in the public domain has been achieved, the process of democratization has advanced. Countries whose governments have allowed Islamists limited participation, and in which Islamists have agreed to work within the system, are closer to democratization than countries whose governments have refused to recognize them at all, and in which Islamists are correspondingly more radical. The decision to accommodate diversity procedurally is achieved best if it comes first from political leaders and proceeds gradually. Second, where the sides are sharply polarized over collective identity to the point of change by violent means, the outcome is generally not democratic rule but another form of authoritarianism, whether in Islamist or secularist form. Third, democratization has not advanced in places where major local or international interests are most threatened by the rise of new forces,

namely Islamists.

This research topic is divided into the following sections: Part One lays out my methodology in the first chapter and in the second provides historical background, tracing the Arab world's struggle with collective identity and how it influences democratization. Part Two begins by surveying both the democratization measures that have taken place from 1980 to the present, and the rise of the Islamist challenge. I proceed in Part Two to describe the nature of the Islamist challenge, analyze the factors behind their rise, their agendas, and examine Islamist concepts of and actual dealings with democracy. Part Three consists of two case studies: coercion and containment in Egypt; and a milder form of coexistence in Jordan. I conclude by discussing the prospects for democracy in the Arab world.

I have used several sources and methods for data collection, including: 1) references and almanacs, such as Keesing's Record of World Events; 2) periodicals, including Arab newspapers and magazines; 3) published writings of major ideologues with the Islamic movements, from both the popular media and official documents of their organizations; 4) scholarly texts in English and Arabic; and 5) personal interviews, especially with leaders, scholars, and parliamentary representatives of Islamists in Jordan, Egypt, and Sudan.

Endnotes

1. For example, Raphael Patai, The Arab Mind (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973) and Elie Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992).
2. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 2nd ed., (New York: Harper, 1947), p. 269.
3. See Robert Dahl, Polyarchy, New Haven: Yale UP, 1991; Samuel Huntington, "The Modest Meaning of Democracy" in Robert Pastor, ed., Democracy in Americas, New York: Holmes & Meier, 1989.
4. Turn-out in presidential elections is around 50% (53% in 1992) and is even lower in congressional and local elections.
5. George Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization, Boulder, Co.: Westview, 1993, p. 12.
6. Michael Hudson, "Democratization and the Problem of Legitimacy in Middle East Politics," MESA Bulletin, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1988, p. 157.
7. See for example, Augustus Richard Norton, "The Future of Civil Society in the Middle East," Middle East Journal, Vol. 47, No. 2, Spring 1993.
8. Dankwart Rustow describes a similar process in "Transition to Democracy", Comparative Politics, No. 2, 1970, and Sorensen in his Democracy and Democratization.
9. Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave, Norman, OK: U of Oklahoma P, 1991, p. 9.
10. The twenty-two members of the Arab League are: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros Islands, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
11. The Arab World, (Berkeley: U of California P, 1993), p. xii.
12. For further explanation of why "fundamentalism" is not accurate, see John Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York: Oxford UP, 1992), pp. 7-8, and Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley: University of California, 1993), pp. 13-17.

13. For a review of literature on the pre-conditions for democratic transition, see Dankwart Rustow, "Transition to Democracy," Comparative Politics, No. 2, 1970, and Samuel Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 99, No. 2, 1984.

14. Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 37-38.

15. Rustow, "Transition," p. 346.

16. Seymour Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." APSR, Vol. 53, No. 1, 1959.

17. Hudson, p. 160.

18. Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.

19. David Apter makes this point, cited in D. Rustow and K. Erickson, Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), p. 445.

20. Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 315.

21. Some of the more notorious examples are Patai's The Arab Mind and David Pryce-Jones' The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs (New York: Harper and Row, 1989).

22. Lisa Anderson, "Democracy in the Arab World: A Critique of the Political Culture Approach," a paper delivered at the Conference on Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, McGill University, May 7-8, 1993, p. 20.

23. Barakat, The Arab World, p. 15.

24. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?", p. 208.

25. Huntington cites only one source as evidence: Daniel Pipes, In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power (New York: Basic Books, 1983). The source itself is problematic. Pipes is not a recognized expert on Islam.

26. Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture, p. 1.

27. Rustow, "Transition," p. 345.

28. Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 315.

29. Culled from Rustow's "Transition to Democracy," Huntington's The Third Wave, and Sorensen's Democracy and Democratization.

30. Huntington, the Third Wave, p. 107

31. Quoted by Rustow, "Transition," p. 351.

32. Ibid, p. 355.

33. Quoted in Sorensen, p. 45.

34. D. Rustow, "Dictatorship to Democracy: The Political Transition." Roundtable on Global Change, UNDP, Development Study Programme, Bucharest, Romania, 1992.

35. Barakat, p.32

36. Rustow, "Arab Perceptions of History and the Question of Identity," in Stanley Renshon (ed.), The Political Psychology of the Gulf War, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), p. 24.

37. For a thorough discussion of this trade-off, see a volume of symposium proceedings entitled Al-Dimogratiyya wa Huquq al-Insan fil Watan al-'Arabi, edited by Research Group Members (Cairo: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, 1993).

38. Esposito, The Islamic Threat, p. 10.

39. This is the title of his autobiography.

Chapter Two

Identity and Democracy: A History

A. The Rise and Decline of the Arabo-Islamic Nation

In the history of the Arab people, the turning point in the nascence of the Arab identity was the emergence of Islam. While the Arabs had political structures before Islam, some of which lasted until the fifth century C.E., the period that preceded Islam was characterized by internecine strife and fragmentation over water and pasturage disputes.¹ In a harsh, hot climate with scarce water, people relied on the tribe, the main social unit, in their struggle for survival. Any sense of belonging or identity was centered on the tribe. In fact, the harshest punishment in pre-Islamic Arab society was to be disowned by one's tribe.

To these tribes, a man named Muhammad began to preach a religion called Islam from the year 610 C.E. Islam not only provided the tribes of Arabia with a sense of mission in the world, but also united them in one political unit. The Prophet and his successors the caliphs initiated a process of nation-building--no simple task considering the deep-rooted tribalism it needed to overcome. Islam "replaced diversity and fragmentation with unity of religious belief; it rejected the divisive clannishness of the tribes and in its place established the bond of the creed; it cast aside tribal customs and upheld new values and standards, a common goal in life and the fundamental principles of a comprehensive system

of religious law."²

Islam called its followers an *umma* (community or nation)³ linked by faith rather than descent or kinship. In order to succeed in the process of building a nation based on new principles, Islam was direct and explicit. The Qur'an refers often to the concept of *umma*, as does the first document drafted after the historic migration of the Prophet to Madinah and the establishment of the Islamic state. In this document, the first item defines the believers: "This is a contract from the Prophet Muhammad, the Messenger of God, between the believers and Muslims of Quraysh [the tribe of the Prophet] and the people of Yathrib with them; verily they are one nation (*umma*) unique beside all the people." This document also distinguishes between community of believers (the *umma*) and those non-Muslims, especially Christians and Jews, who had a right to live as equals in the Muslim nation. The document refers to the Jews of Madinah as "a nation with (*ma'*) the Muslims," rather than a nation "from" (*min*) the Muslims.⁴ The term "with," (*ma'*) denotes alliance *between* two bodies whereas *min* denotes simultaneity or overlapping of identity. This points to the religious basis of political identity; the Jews living within the political structure of the Muslim state constituted a community allied with that state.

In its effort to build a new nation, the loyalty of the believers was declared to belong to God, his Prophet, and to

the believers. However, Islam did not suppress other loyalties, such as tribal loyalty, as long as they did not conflict with or supersede loyalty to the faith. The fact that the Qur'an was in Arabic confirmed the status of the language, and Arabization accompanied the spread of Islam. Because Islam made understanding the Qur'an incumbent upon every Muslim (rather than assigning the responsibility for textual knowledge to a priesthood), it stabilized and standardized the Arabic language for the new community. As Islam spread outside the Arabian peninsula, Arabic spread with it and soon became the *lingua franca* of a wide geographic area. The Prophet defined an Arab linguistically rather than racially, thus shifting the weight from ethnicity and race to culture. Arabic became the mother-tongue and "Arab" the primary form of self-identification for a widening circle of people, from the Arabian peninsula northward to Bilad al Sham and Iraq⁵ and westward to Egypt and Al-Maghreb (the Islamic West). Arabic "became the medium of a culture which incorporated elements from the traditions of peoples absorbed into the Muslim world, and expressed itself in literature and in systems of law, theology, and spirituality."⁶ Islam and Islamization spread further than Arabization, to Persia, India, Anatolia, into sub-Saharan Africa, and later, further still. In the core areas in which Islamization and Arabization occurred in the same degree, however, a relatively more homogenous collective identity developed over time.

The political framework of the *umma* was established during the life of the Prophet. The Qur'an and the Sunna (the practice and sayings of the Prophet) together served as the constitution of the Islamic state. The Prophet himself was the head of this state, and, following the Qura'nically mandated principle of *shura*, deliberative consultation, relied on a group of advisors in conducting public affairs. After the death of their Prophet, Muslims founded the caliphate as the main political institution of the *umma*, based on the following principles:⁷

(1) The caliph was to be chosen by the *umma*. The manner of choosing was not specified. However, the oath of allegiance was to be a contract between the *umma* and the caliph.

(2) Decisions were to be reached by deliberative consultation - *shura*.

(3) The ultimate purpose of governance was to establish justice.

(4) The *umma* was the source of legislation, but limited by *shari'a* (Islamic law). The caliph was to be obeyed and supported as long as he upholds *shari'a*.

While the first four caliphs 632 - 661 C.E. (11-40 A.H.) observed these principles, a gap between principles and reality developed with the coming of the Umayyad dynasty 661 - 750 C.E. (41-132 A.H.). The Umayyads firstly violated the principle of election of the caliph by introducing hereditary

succession as the means of transfer of power. While Islamic principles such as consultation and justice remained important in theory, caliphs were becoming despotic. This led jurists and Islamic legal scholars, in an attempt to bridge the gap between theory and practice, and in order to save the institution of the caliphate and avoid internecine strife (*fitna*), to accept the principle of hereditary succession and to justify the absolute powers of the caliph.⁸

Power changed from Umayyad to Abbasid hands in 749 C.E. (132 A.H.) and the capital moved from Damascus to Baghdad. Along with the spread of Islam and rapid Arabization, the Abbasid epoch witnessed the increased participation of non-Arabs in both political and military life. However, by the tenth century C.E., the institution of the caliphate was weakening and rival caliphs appeared in Spain and Egypt. Despite the continued formal role of the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad until the thirteenth century, a broad political division existed between three regions: Iraq with Iran, Egypt with Syria, and the Maghrib. In spite of this division, "The Arabic-speaking parts of the Muslim world had maintained social and cultural unity and showed similarities from one region to another."⁹ Moreover, the community maintained its unity and the authority of the *shari'a*, religious law, remained a fundamental concept.¹⁰ The break-up of the caliphate and the emergence of quasi-independent states and principalities accompanied the end of political unity of the

Arabic-speaking peoples.

The Arabic-speaking world soon regained its unity, but this time under the banner of the Ottoman Empire, a bureaucratic state holding different regions under one administrative system. The Ottoman Empire, in the first two centuries of its rule over Arab regions preserved religious law, *shari'a*, and protected the frontiers of the Arab world. This provided legitimacy for the Ottoman Empire in the eyes of its Arab subjects.

However, the status of the Arabic language changed under the Ottoman Empire. As Ottoman Turkish became the language of administration and of the military, Arabic was used mainly by the religious elite. Arabic *belle lettres* deteriorated, and the period was one of general stagnation for Arab intellectual life.

By the early eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire itself entered a period of decline characterized by two simultaneous processes. One is that local ruling families became more powerful and autonomous, at the expense of the central empire. The other is that a more powerful Europe began pursuing its own interests inside Ottoman lands with a freer hand.¹¹ The Ottoman ruling elite, aware of the general weakening in its power, initiated extensive reforms of the administrative system and the military. But the degeneration of the Empire was deeper than these bureaucratic reforms extended; it was a general civilizational decline as well as

a political and military one. The Ottomans discovered upon contact with Europeans that not only had they fallen woefully behind in military technology, but illiteracy and superstition plagued their subject peoples, and the institutions which were supposed to educate and inform were in a state of disrepair.

An early Arab response to the decline came in the form of religious and literary revivals with political overtones. The Wahhabi movement, begun by Muhammad bin Abdulwahhab in 1747, called for a return to the original purity of Islam, which had been corrupted by superstition, innovations, and extraneous practices. One of the things which he demanded was a return of the Islamic world to Arab leadership, and he found Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud, a Najd chieftain, a powerful ally toward this end. It was not until the 1790s that the Wahhabis challenged the Ottoman caliphate outright by capturing the holy cities of Mecca and Madinah, and threatening Baghdad and Damascus. They remained a threat until Muhammad Ali, governor of Egypt, yielding to pressure from the Ottoman Sultan, sent a force to crush them in 1818. The Wahhabi movement had intellectual and cultural parallels in Egypt and Iraq, in cultural movements which began a critical study of Hadith (the body of traditions of the Prophet Muhammad), Arab history, and the Arabic language.¹²

The second challenge to the Ottoman sultan came from the same source which crushed the Wahhabi movement, Muhammad Ali, an Ottoman army officer of Albanian descent (ruled 1805 -

1848). He not only established the *de facto* independence of Egypt from the Sultan, but he was also able to extend his rule into Sudan and Syria. Muhammad Ali's son, Ibrahim, governed Syria on his father's behalf. Although his rule lasted less than a decade (1833 - 1840), Ibrahim made a tremendous impact on that country. Among other things, Ibrahim established elementary schools in various parts of the country, improved the status of Christians, and allowed missionaries, especially American and French, to open their own schools. In addition, Ibrahim's rule contributed to the development of Arab national consciousness. A contemporary French envoy to the region relates that Ibrahim made no secret of his intention to restore Arab nationhood, to instill in the Arabs a real sense of patriotism, and to integrate them in the governance of the future empire.¹³ Ibrahim's effort to establish an Arab empire failed in part due to British opposition to the project. The fact that Ibrahim himself was not an Arab (he was of Albanian descent) did not help his cause, but more seriously, the Syrians lacked a national consciousness at this stage. "The unifying force generated by the genius of the Prophet Muhammad has remained a force so long as Arab power had remained supreme," George Antonius said. He continued:

As that power waned, its cohesive influence weakened; the diverse peoples it had welded together into a cultural whole fell gradually asunder to form separate entities, regional and sectarian, according to the district or clan

or creed to which they belonged. Side by side with that integration, a process of religious evolution was going on, which had led not only to the birth of new confessions, among both Moslems and Christians, but also to an increased emphasis on sectarian differences and to the growth of confessional loyalty as a substitute for cultural solidarity.¹⁴

The seeds of confessional loyalties which remain operative in the Fertile Crescent today were sown in this period, with expansion of the millet system into the Arab provinces. This system granted some autonomy to religious minorities. Confessionalism was strengthened by European powers which adopted one or another religious minority as proteges, as well as by the missionary schools. In the western part of the Arab world (the Maghreb) and in the Arabian peninsula, tribalism played the role of confessional loyalties, since religious minorities either did not exist or were minuscule in those lands. By the mid-nineteenth century, three major trends, not mutually exclusive but overlapping, prepared the ground for identity politics in the modern Arab world. These were Islamic revivalism, Arab nationalism or *qawmiyya*, and patriotism or *wataniyya*.

1. *Qawmiyya*. Arab nationalism began as literary revival. Syrian Christians such as Butrus Bustani (1819-93), with his dictionary Muhit al-Muhit, and Nasif al-Yaziji (1800-1871), with his Arabic grammar aimed at youth, figured

prominently in this movement. Another element in the literary revival was the wave of literary translation from European languages into Arabic, headed by Rafa'a al-Tahtawi (1801-73), who in 1835 founded a translation institute in Egypt. "The Arab literary revival provided the logical base for the political revival. To them, language and the cultural heritage in which it is embedded, constituted the basis of national identity."¹⁵ Language was a source of identity around which both Christian and Muslim could gather, and it is not surprising that its earliest and most eloquent advocates were Christian Arabs. "Awake ye Arabs and arise," Ibrahim al-Yaziji (1847-1906), Nasif's son, opened his famous poem which sang the glories of the Arabs and electrified both intellectuals and the masses with its ringing call to action. Note that, for the most part, *qawmiyya* defined itself against not European but Ottoman hegemony.

Arab nationalism did not necessarily mean separation from the Ottoman Empire. At first, *qawmiyya* simply meant an impassioned emphasis on the past achievements of the Arabs, inculcating a sense of Arab identity through the activities of literary and social clubs. Late in the nineteenth century, Arab nationalists began demanding more decentralization from Ottoman authority, even to the point of autonomy; still, the goal was improvement of the Arab province within the empire. Meanwhile, Turkish nationalism was growing, and the Young Turks' gains against Sultan Abdulhamid in 1908 advanced its

progress. Arab nationalists initially welcomed the brother sentiment among the Turks, until it became obvious that their interests were at odds. Yet even at the First Arab Conference convened in Paris in 1913, most speakers called for decentralization and more Arab power in the central government, rather than independence. Some of these leaders returned home only to be executed by Jamal Pasha, Turkish governor of Syria. Even so, it took the pressure of the British, themselves motivated by the calculations of a cataclysmic World War, to move the Arabs to seek complete severance from the Ottoman Empire. In 1916, Sharif Hussein declared Arab independence and the Great Arab Revolt began.¹⁶

Neither was Arab nationalism exclusively secular, although its secular element, led by Christians and a few Muslims, was prominent. From the Christian point of view, the only viable political entity or organization would be based on the national rather than the religious principle of community. According to this view, a theocratic state like the Ottoman Empire was incompatible with "reason" and "progress" and contradicted the new consciousness of Arab identity.¹⁷

However, *qawmiyya* had an Islamic element too. For example, Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1849-1902), Syrian Muslim intellectual, asserted the reciprocal relationship of Arab nationalism and Islam. He believed that Islam had given the Arabs political prominence, and that Arab leadership was the key to reunification of the community of the faithful, echoing

the Wahhabi movement a hundred years earlier. He also decried despotism, and considered the Ottoman Empire its prime example. The alternative to despotism was democratic government, and Kawakibi associated democracy and deliberative consultation (*shura*) with the early period of Islamic history.¹⁸ The Islamic component of Arab nationalism is also evident in Sharif Hussein's 1916 proclamation, in which he denounced the arbitrary tyranny of Jamal Pasha and the Young Turks as unIslamic, "represented the Arab revolt as a religious and national duty," and used his status as guardian of the holy city of Mecca to appeal for Islamic solidarity around his cause.¹⁹

2. *Wataniyya*. Patriotism, or love of the homeland, had roots in Arab heritage, but gained new meaning under Western influence, particularly the influence of the French Revolution. In Egypt, Rafa'a Tahtawi introduced the idea of the homeland as the object of sacrifice, and suggested that the brotherhood created by a common homeland, the *watan*, is equal to the brotherhood of faith. Islamic reformer Muhammad Abduh affirmed that the *watan* was the basis for political life and developed the notion of rights and obligations that bound the individual to the homeland.²⁰ In Syria, *wataniyya* was another alternative to sectarianism, which was more locally derived than Arab nationalism. *Wataniyya* was an off-shoot of nationalism but went one step further; it took as a basis of loyalty not the Arab nation as a whole but a specific locality

or province. Thus when Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia fell under European colonialism, *wataniyya* developed as Egyptian nationalism, Algerian nationalism, and Tunisian nationalism in those *watans*. While *qawmiyya* was directed mainly against the Ottoman Empire, *wataniyya* developed as a movement against European imperialism.

3. Islamic revivalism. Three tiers can be distinguished in the Islamist trend: Individual intellectual reformers; the traditional Muslim masses; and organized Islamic groups. The writings of *ulama* like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-97), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), Rashid Rida (1865-1935), and Shakib Arslan (1869-1945), raise a fundamental question: How can Muslims resist European hegemony and achieve strength without destroying their Islamic heritage and identity? Afghani, of Iranian origin who wrote in Arabic, espoused the unity of Islamic peoples and wanted to raise the Islamic consciousness of the masses. He believed that Muslim rulers acting in concert could resist Western hegemony, and initially supported the Ottoman sultan in an effort to realize this goal. Likewise, the Lebanese Arslan ardently supported the Ottoman state, out of a desire to see a powerful Islamic state to resist Europe. Syrian-born Rida, while he also advocated an Islamic state, rejected Ottomanism in favor of a Wahhabi-influenced approach to Islam's political dilemma. The journal he published in Egypt, Al-Manar, had important impact in raising an Islamic consciousness among Arabs in the early

twentieth century. Abduh, while exiled in France, produced with Afghani a journal addressing the problems of the Islamic world. Abduh's goal was to remove the shackles of traditionalism, return to the original sources of Islam, and, through independent legal reasoning (*ijtihad*), articulate an Islamic practice that could meet the challenges of modernity.

While thinkers like Afghani and Abduh had valuable insights for Islamic revivalism, the real power of this trend lay in the masses. "Ottomanism, Islamic reformism, and nationalism were the ideas of an educated urban minority. . . Beyond this minority . . . for the most part Islam as traditionally conceived still provided the motives which could urge men to action and the symbols in terms of which they gave it meaning."²¹

During the nineteenth century and until World War One, resistance to European occupation of Muslim lands came from religious movements and religious leaders. The Sanusiyya in Libya, the movement led by Abd al-Qadir in Algeria, and similar rebellions across North Africa, spoke the language of Islam and rallied the masses around Islamic symbols. The Sudanese Mahdiyya (1880-1899) was the most successful of these movements; its leader Muhammad Ahmad was able to displace the British-backed Egyptians and rule for nearly twenty years, drawing upon his Sufi education and his interpretation of Islamic sources.


The different solutions offered by both thinkers and

political movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were not only differences in what was "good" for their countries, but rather reflected the conflicting identities. As one study of the period puts it, "Disagreement ultimately lay in ambiguity regarding the nature of the national entity itself. Who are we? Muslims? Ottomans? Arabs? Egyptians? Christians?"²²


While the Arab Revolt of 1916 was welcomed by many Arabs in the Fertile Crescent as an expression of Arab nationalism, the revolt had failed to bring independence for the area. Despite the promises given to Sharif Hussein by McMahon between 1915 and 1916,²³ the British government had made a deal with France in 1916 to divide the area between them.²⁴ At the same time, the British government gave the leaders of the Zionist movement a promise to secure "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."²⁵

The First Arab Revolt ended in great disappointment for the majority of the inhabitants of the eastern Arab world. They witnessed the replacement of Ottoman rule with joint British and French military occupation under the name of a "mandate" given by the newly established League of Nations. Syria and Lebanon were placed under French mandate, while Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan were under British rule. Thus by 1920, all the Arab countries except part of the Arabian peninsula came under European rule (see Maps 2.1 and 2.2).

Map 2.1: The Arab World on the Eve of World War I.



Map 2.2: The Arab World on the Eve of World War II.



Source: Rafic Boustani and Philippe Fargues, The Atlas of the Arab World: Geopolitics and Society, (New York: Facts on File, 1991), p. 15.

The ancient tie between the Arabs and the Turks ended with bitterness on both sides and was worsened by disputes over frontiers with Syria and Iraq.²⁶

B. The Legacy of Colonialism

European colonial rule of the Arab world left a different legacy from one region to another. While the general goal of European control of the region was to secure sources of raw materials and markets for their products, some parts of the Arabian peninsula were controlled by Britain to secure a safe road to India. For instance, Britain had concluded various treaties with the sheikhs of prominent tribes in the Gulf region to use their lands as postal and provisional stations. Nonetheless, the colonial powers brought important changes to most Arab countries, including the introduction of financial, administrative, and communication reforms. Although these reforms appear to be positive, their main purpose was to maximize the exploitation of resources for the governments, companies, and individuals of the colonial powers.²⁷

Although its dominance in the Arab world was short, European colonialism left a caustic legacy with which modern Arab nations are still grappling. The Arab world was colonized late in the history of Europe's imperialist project, at a time in which many Europeans were questioning the usefulness of that project. European imperialists thus had developed increasingly sophisticated and duplicitous rationalizations for colonization of the Arab world, calling

it a "Mandate" and claiming to be educating the colonized in self-government. Yet, for instance, British claimed "temporary" occupation of Egypt would last from 1882 till 1946 with little assistance in self-rule.²⁸ Such pretenses did more damage to Arab identity-building than straightforward domination. Some salient problems that are part of this legacy are:²⁹

1. Rearrangement of the map which fragmented the Arab world into some twenty countries. In this context we can distinguish between three factors according to which colonial administrations redrew the boundaries of the region.³⁰ The first group of countries included those which had full or semi-independent status before European colonialism, including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt. These countries' borders, despite their direct control by European powers, did not change much. The second group had not been subject to direct European control, yet their boundaries were drawn mainly by Britain. These countries include Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states. The third group comprised countries created as a result either of the division of larger entities into smaller ones, or addition of territories. The Fertile Crescent region was divided to serve British and French interests. A drastic example of colonial administration radically remaking frontiers is the case of Greater Syria. The country was first divided into four states: Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine. The process began by France

detaching the four areas of Ba'albek, the Beka', Rasheyya, and Hasbayya, as well as the vilayet of Beirut and part of the district of Tripoli. These were added to the Druze' and Maronites' Mount Lebanon to satisfy the demands of the Maronite patriarchate, because these regions were rich in agriculture. Second, France gave up the region of Mosul to Britain, exchanging it for an interest (25%) in the stock of the Turkish Petroleum Company. Finally, France granted the Sanjak of Alexandretta to Turkey (1939)—after nominal referendum— as a guarantee for Turkish neutrality in the coming war.³¹ On the other hand, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Mauritania were formed as a result of unification or addition of territories. For instance, Iraq came into existence in its current borders because of the addition of the three Ottoman vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra. The redrawing of the Arab world left a heavy legacy of inter-Arab disputes, conflicts, and wars among neighbors. Without reducing the Iran-Iraq war and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait entirely to border disputations, one can say that these were important issues in both these conflicts.

2. The inability of the British government to reconcile its contradictory promises to Arabs and Jews in Palestine led to the eruption of the most prolonged conflict in the region. While Israelis think of their struggle to establish a Jewish state in Palestine as a liberation movement, Palestinians as well as other Arabs see the Jewish state as the worst case of

imperialism, that is, settlement colonialism. The establishment of Israel uprooted at least a million Palestinians from their homeland, and those who remained were subjected to a total distortion of their Arab-Islamic identity. The other Arab countries perceived Israel not only as the main obstacle to uniting the Asian and African sides of the Arab world, but also as an intrinsic threat to their existence because of its expansionist nature.³² The British effort to establish a Jewish homeland created a bitter long-term conflict that cost great human and material losses on all sides.

3. Following the policies of "divide and rule," colonial powers encouraged ethnic and sectarian differences in the region. The European policy of selective intervention to protect one or another of the religious minorities started in the nineteenth century. The policies regarding the "Eastern Question" raised sectarian and confessional sensitivities between the Arab-Muslim majority and ethnic and religious minorities. The colonial powers, once in direct control, followed policies that would deepen hatreds between these groups. One example is French attempts to divide Arabs and Berbers by exempting the latter from subjection to *shari'a* in personal matters, replacing it with French laws in 1930, for the ostensible reason that Berbers were readier than Arabs to accept modernity.³³ Another example is the French reliance on the "Troupes Speciales" recruited from minorities,

especially Alawis, to suppress resistance to colonial rule in Syria. Sectarian tensions that exist in Syria today cannot be adequately explained without examining the role of French colonial policy in nurturing them.³⁴

4. Colonialism distorted socio-economic development in the Arab world as in most colonized lands. Colonial powers contributed to the creation of a modern sector in the economies: oil in the Gulf states, cotton in Egypt and Sudan, and phosphates in Morocco and Jordan. Most other sectors, meanwhile, were kept back. This helped elevate one segment of the population in wealth, education, and technological training, while maintaining the majority in traditional modes of behavior. The introduction of European laws in most Arab countries created a duality in the legal system: Islamic law was retained in personal matters (marriage, divorce, inheritance), while European codes were enforced in civic and economic life. After two to three decades of colonial rule, "two distorted economies, cultures, and societies" competed within the colonized lands.³⁵

C. Nationalisms and Experiences of Representative Governments

The major types of political identity that dominated this period were those of *qawmiyya* and *wataniyya*. The nationalism of this period became more secular, taking the religious notion of *umma* but reformulating it in nationalist terms. While the idea of Arab nationalism did not wither away, the struggle for independence became the main concern of political

movements. Consequently, Arab nationalism was reduced to local sub-movements involved in the struggle against foreign rule.³⁶

Nonetheless, most nationalist movements were not antagonistic to Islam. In fact, it was during this period that the leadership of the nationalist movements transferred from Christians to Muslims, albeit to Muslims who often were not observant of Islamic traditions. And it was also during this period that many populist Islamic movements were founded; in particular, in 1928, the Society of the Muslim Brothers was established in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna.

The struggle for independence varied from peaceful resistance in the Gulf states and Lebanon, to full scale armed struggle in Algeria and South Yemen, and a mix of political and military opposition in other countries. The first Arab country to gain formal independence was Egypt in 1920,³⁷ while Djibouti was the last in 1977. Most other Arab countries gained independence in the 1940s and 50s.³⁸ The newly independent Arab states had to cope with the problems of traditional society, the legacy of colonialism, and the challenges of nation-building. These challenges included building modern political institutions, developing the economy and the society, maintaining independence and strengthening loyalties to the new state, and containing social divisions.

Most Arab countries tried political systems with elected assemblies, similar to those of the colonial powers. The Arab

countries--Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Libya, --which tried liberal or semi-liberal democracies did so before or immediately after independence. What is astonishing about the experiment is that in all these countries, representative government eventually ceased to exist. In fact, except in Lebanon, representative governments were replaced by authoritarian ones shortly after independence (see Table 2.1).

Table 2.1: Early Experiments with Representative Governments in Some Arab countries

Country	Date of Independence	Start of Representative Government Era	End of Representative Government Era
Egypt	1936	1923	1952
Iraq*	1930	1921	1938
Jordan*	1946	1956	1957
Lebanon	1946	1926	1975
Libya	1951	1951	1969
Somalia	1960	1960	1969
Sudan*	1956	1956	1958
Syria*	1946	1928	1949

*These countries also had subsequent experiences with democracy besides the one detailed here.

Sources: Ahmad Sarhal, Al-Nuzm al-Siyasiyya wal Dusturiyya fi Lubnan wal Duwal al-Arabiyya (The Political and Constitutional Systems in Lebanon and the Arab States), (Beirut: Dar al-Bahith, 1980).

Why did the early experiments with representative government fail in virtually all Arab states? There are several reasons behind the failures. The experiment lacked elements necessary for success:

1. This form of government was introduced by the colonial power in each country, in order to color its rule with some legitimacy. In fact, in most Arab countries such political systems were not the genuine choice of the population but rather the will of the colonial administration. It follows that the exercise of semi-democracy was limited to satisfying the interests of the occupier. Despite the liberal tendencies in political elites in these countries, democracy was perceived by the majority of people as synonymous with Western rule. Moreover, those elites that took part in this process and benefitted from it comprised less than 10% of the total population,³⁹ while the majority, in spite of frequent opportunities for voting, could not see the virtue or the usefulness in this exercise. What was touted as "democracy" in the post-independence period preserved the egregious inequalities of the previous era and thus mainly served the interests of the traditional propertied classes. More or less the same elite families continued in their control of land and resources, only instead of traditional legitimation doctrines they now had the "modern" veneer of the democratic label to legitimize their preeminence. The contributed to the hollowness of the post-independence "democratic" experiment

for people. Another factor made people perceive democracy unfavorably: The continuous splitting and subdivision of political parties into smaller groups, at a time when the struggle to create some kind of nation was foremost in people's minds.

2. The second reason behind the failure of this experiment was the first military defeat of the newly independent Arab nations in the war with the Zionist militia. In Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, the army officers who overthrew the "democratic civilian governments" were among those who had suffered defeat in Palestine. These officers vented their frustrations on the leaders sitting in their capitals.⁴⁰

3. Immediately following independence, many political forces were not satisfied with their political systems, and these movements were gaining popularity. These new movements cover the political spectrum left to right. With varying ideologies, these groups all agreed on the obsolescence of liberal democracies and their inability to offer real answers to the major issues of the day. These movements presented an alternative to democracy. Their agenda included Arab unity, social justice, economic development, Islamic authenticity, and the liberation of Palestine. Moreover, these new groups came to draw their support from the lower and middle strata of society, in contrast to the higher classes who happened to control the "liberal" post-independence governments.

Since their prospects of gaining a piece of the pie by

working from within the system were meager, the new movements questioned the basic legitimacy of the system and targeted liberal democracy. It was no surprise that some of these movements were influenced by communist ideologies, which had presented themselves as alternatives to liberal democracy in Europe. With the bitter experience of colonialism still fresh, it was no surprise that the post-independence generation of Arabs was dissatisfied with the answers provided by the "liberal democracies" and was attracted to these other alternatives.

Among the movements which became popular in the 1940s and 50s were those "which would blend the elements of nationalism, religion, and social justice in a more appealing fashion. The Muslim Brothers were such a movement, particularly in Egypt, the Sudan, and Syria. Communist and socialist groups also began to play a significant role in opposition both to imperial rule in its last phase and to the new governments which took its place."⁴¹ Thus, the combination of these three factors--which varied in degree from one Arab country to another--that brought the early democratic experiment to an end. In most cases, it was the politicized army officers, through the popular movements, who brought down the early civilian, and to some extent elected, governments.⁴² By the mid-1960s virtually all Arab countries, except Lebanon, were under the authoritarian rule of either populist republics or traditional monarchies.

D. The Authoritarian State and Pan-Arabism

There were four basic components in the ideologies of the populist republics: socialist domestic policies, Arab unity, standing up to Israel, and, at the level of international relations, identification with the "Third World" and neutrality in the Cold War. Ba'thism and Nasserism were the foremost ideologies of the populist type. Ba'thism emphasized the creation of one Arab state in which the Arab nation would be embodied, accompanied by staunch secularism (as many of its founders came from religious minorities). The origins of Ba'thism "lay in intellectual debates about the national identity of the Syrians and their relations with other Arabic speaking communities; a debate which was more urgent in Syria than elsewhere, because the frontiers drawn by Britain and France in their own interests corresponded less than in most Middle Eastern countries to natural and historical divisions."⁴³ Nasserism began as an enthusiasm for a charismatic figure and only later developed into an ideology. As an ideology, Nasserism contained the same bywords as Ba'thism—"Unity, freedom, socialism"--but in a different order: "Freedom, socialism, unity," with freedom defined first and foremost as the freedom of the nation (*watan*).⁴⁴

Although some of the populist ideologies paid lip service to Islam, it was ancillary to the substance of their programs. Both Ba'thism and Nasserism institutionalized one-party rule during their time in power, which precluded the participation

of the Islamist opposition in politics. The relationship of Nasser to political Islam, which began with his benign use of Islamic rhetoric,⁴⁵ soured quickly during his bitter clash with the Muslim Brotherhood, whose leaders he imprisoned and tortured. Ba'thism's and Nasserism's assignment of a tertiary role to Islam, and their fundamental underlying secularism, made the suppression of Islamists one feature of their respective terms in power.

Ba'thism and Nasserism became popular in the 1950s and early 1960s. Ba'thism was most popular as a movement; after it became the ruling ideology of Syrian and Iraqi regimes, its appeal began to wane. Nasser's early successes in nationalizing the Suez Canal and standing up to Britain, France, and Israel, ensured his popularity. However, after the secession of Syria from the U.A.R. and Egypt's costly intervention in Yemen, disillusionment with Nasserism set in. Nasser's regime and those of the Ba'th in Syria and Iraq received their worst blow from the 1967 Arab defeat by Israel.

Democracy was not a priority in these and other populist socialist ideologies. Even more, a widespread conviction existed that democracy was a luxury which needed to be sacrificed for more important goals. Regimes which adopted these ideologies comprised part of a global trend in which many newly independent "Third World" countries drew strength from Eastern bloc models. These models were appealing because of their apparent promise of fast economic development, and

because of their defiance toward the West, which still represented imperialism in the view of many in what was designated the "Third World" from the early days of the Cold War. In the so-called "progressive" regimes of the Arab world, democracy was criticized in socialist terms as a corrupt, inefficient Western ideology serving capitalist interest.

Democracy did not fare any better in the traditionalist conservative regimes, such as those of Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, and the Gulf states. Traditional rulers rejected democracy as a Western, "Christian" ideology alien to the "authentic" Islamic-Arabic heritage they claimed to represent. They characterized Western democracy as a decrepit, corrupt system which allowed undesirable, godless elements to rise and disrupt the public order.⁴⁶

Such positions toward democracy were shaken by the 1967 Arab defeat, and steadily undermined by the failures of Arab regimes to achieve any of the goals for which democracy was to be sacrificed. The legitimacy of both populist and traditionalist regimes was damaged in the 1970s by a growing realization that their lack of accountability may have been the cause of their failures. However, this damage was mitigated temporarily by the oil boom and the prosperity it brought. Mass dissatisfaction with regimes did not crystallize until oil prices collapsed in the early 1980s. Discontent at economic hardships that hit most Arab households

spilled over into political discontent and, in addition to lower bread prices, democracy increasingly became a demand at demonstrations and riots. About this time, many regimes found it prudent to promote certain democratic openings in order to ease some of the discontent before it could reach a crisis point and threaten their hold on power. From this point on, democratization became the focus of attention of intellectuals, popular political movements, and Arab regimes themselves.

To sum up, the political identity of the Arab people until the nineteenth century had been one in which Islam was the frame of reference. Even Ottoman rule was acceptable to the Arabs as long as Islam remained their main source of identity, because it embodied the continuation of the Muslim caliphate. With the decline of the Ottoman Empire and its decrepitude in the face of increasing European domination, Arab awareness of a distinctly Arab political identity began to grow, and to complicate the issue of collective identity with calls for Arab solidarity, Arab unity--Arab nationalism (*qawmiyya*). Western colonialism deferred the possibility of such unity by carving the Arab world into twenty-some political entities, which subdivisions, although in most cases at odds with the historical character of the area divided, soon acquired a logic of their own. Independence from Western colonial administration meant independence in the form of the states created by that administration. These states became

the basis of a new form of collective identity, *qutriyya*, and a history for these subdivisions was invented and projected backwards to produce a national mythology for this patriotism. In many of these states, freedom from Western imperialism came with calls for a return to the quest for Arab unity that had been delayed by colonization. This quest, including a solution to the Palestinian trauma, and the post-independence goals of nation-building, economic development, and on-going struggle against Western domination, became for a time the sacred ends for which the Arab peoples had to sacrifice democracy. Thus, the democratic moment just after independence was quickly swept aside by the urgency of what was, in fact, a fundamental disagreement over collective identity, the nature of the nation, and its priorities. Both kinds of regimes which ensconced themselves in the Arab world, populist republics and traditionalist monarchies, decided that democracy was to be forfeited in favor of other interests, such as modernization.

Late Ottoman rule, European domination, and post-independence *qutriyya* in the Arab world created the conditions for a crisis in collective identity. The crisis has two layers: the dispute over territorial borders and the dispute over what constitutes the ideological frame of reference for the postcolonial states. Together these form the basis of the conflict over collective identity. Arab nationalism and the Islamic movement are developments in this conflict, each with

its (sometimes overlapping) centers of loyalty. This dynamic of conflict over collective identity, what Rustow calls the "hot family feud" continues to gum the gears of democratization.

The failure of the Arab regimes to achieve their much-touted goals and the declining welfare of Arab populations after the crash in oil prices in the early 1980s created mass disillusionment with the nationalist agenda and brought democracy to the forefront of popular demands. At the same time, Islamists were taking advantages of inroads opened by disenchantment with the older ideologies, whose inherent secularism had begun to look not only worn and tired, but suspiciously foreign and unauthentic as well. The appeal of political Islam increased, and seemed to offer a new alternative in the debate over collective identity, which was also a reinvention of an old one, with just the shot of legitimacy lacking in the existing regimes. With widespread recognition of the arrival of Islamists in the arena, the question of Arab political identity entered a new phase.

Endnotes

1. Abd al-'Aziz al-Duri, The Historical Formation of the Arab Nation, trans. Lawrence I. Conrad (New York: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 325.
2. Ibid, p. 29.
3. Not "nation" in the specific sense of the nation-state which developed in Europe from the eighteenth century. I include the term "nation" with "community" in defining *umma* to convey a more distinctly political (as opposed to, say, cultural) basis of identity than that which "community" connotes. For the origin and development of the term nation, see, D. Rustow, "Nation," in, David Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (Macmillan/Free Press, 1969), vol. II, pp. 7-14.
4. Abd al-Rahman Sabuni, "Muhadarat fi Nizam al Hukm fil Islam" ("Lectures on the Political System in Islam"), unpublished papers, (United Arab Emirates: Shari'a and Law College, U.A.E. University, 1983) p. 26-34.
5. Termed "the Fertile Crescent" in a phase of European colonialism.
6. Albert Hourani, The History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard UP, 1991), p. 5.
7. On political principles and systems in Islam, see Sabuni, "Muhadarat"; Muhammad S. El-Awa, On the Political System of the Islamic State (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1980); Muhammad Diya' al-Din al-Rayis, Al-Nazariyat al-Siyasiyya al-Islamiyya (Islamic Political Theories), 3rd ed. (Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Library, 1960).
8. Duri, p. 40.
9. Hourani, p. 81.
10. Duri, p. 103.
11. The European powers referred to their attempts to weaken and divide the Ottoman Empire, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as "the Eastern Question." On the origin of the Eastern Question, see L. Carl Brown, International Politics and the Middle East, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984, part I.
12. Duri, p. 141.

13. George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (New York: Capricorn, 1945), p. 29.
14. Ibid, p. 32.
15. Hisham Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals and the West: The Formative Years, 1875-1914 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1970), p. 115.
16. One of the best accounts of these events is that of Antonius, cited above.
17. Sharabi, p. 18.
18. Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, Taba'i al-istibdad wa masari' al-isti'bad (The Characteristics of Tyranny and the Crimes of Oppression)(Cairo, n.d.).
19. For the Proclamation of the Arab Revolt, see chapter 10 of The Arab Awakening by George Antonius.
20. Duri, p. 157.
21. Hourani, p. 311.
22. Sharabi, p. 106.
23. For the full text of the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, see Antonius, The Arab Awakening, "Appendix A" p. 413.
24. The Anglo-Franco-Russian agreement generally known as the Sykes-Picot agreement.
25. The rest of the promise, known as the Balfour Declaration, asserted the will of Britain to facilitate this objective, without, however, prejudice or damage to "the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine."
26. Hourani, p. 319.
27. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Society and State in the Arab World, (Lebanon: Arab Unity Studies Center, 1988), p. 151.
28. Dankwart Rustow, "Arab Perceptions of History and the Question of Identity," in Stanley Renshon, ed. The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1993), p. 24.
29. An elaborate discussion of the legacy of colonialism can be found in Ibrahim, Society and State, Chapter Three.

30. Adapted from Ibrahim, *ibid*.
31. Rafic Boustani and Philippe Fargues, The Atlas of the Arab World (New York: Facts on File, 1991), p. 21.
32. Hence Israel is often described as a "dagger" in the heart of the Arab world.
33. Ibrahim, Society and State, p. 159.
34. Another French divide-and-rule policy was to divide the country into four mini-states: Damascus, Aleppo, an Alawi state, and a Druze state.
35. Ibrahim, Society and State, p. 152.
36. Sharabi, chapter 7.
37. There is disagreement over when Egypt got independence: in the 1920 Declaration, or after the Treaty of 1936. According to some historians, the real date of independence was 1954.
38. The exception is Saudi Arabia, which was never under European rule. However, the Saudi kingdom came into existence in its current borders in 1933 after a process of unification which had started in 1902.
39. Ibrahim, Society and State, p. 192.
40. See, Gamal Abd al-Nasser, Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955), for a marked expression of this.
41. Hourani, p. 403.
42. On the politicization of army officers see Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, (London: Oxford UP, 1965).
43. Hourani, p. 404.
44. Draft of the Charter of the United Arab Republic, in George Lenczowski, The Political Awakening in the Middle East (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 126.
45. See for example Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution, (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955).
46. Ghassan Salame, "Halat al-Ta'adudiyya al-Siyasiyya fil Mashriq al-'Arabi" ("The Status of Political Pluralism in the Arab East") in Saad Eddin Ibrahim, At-Ta'adudiyya al-Siyasiyya wal Dimogratiyya fil Watan al-'Arabi (Political Pluralism and

Democracy in the Arab World)(Amman: Muntada al-Fikr al-'Arabi, 1989), p. 145-6.

Part II

Democratization and Islamic Resurgence

Chapter Three

Islamists and Democracy: The Intersection

Are the two trends, the push for democratization and the rise of Islamists, parallel or colliding popular forces in the Arab world? It seems as though they developed side-by-side on separate tracks and are coincidentally simultaneous. The question of democratization has hovered over Arab political discourse at least since the era of the decolonization struggles, if not earlier. The concern for reintroducing Islam in the modern public realm has also had a history dating back at least to the decline of the Ottoman Caliphate, if not earlier. It is not a coincidence, however, that in the eighties and nineties the Arab masses have been pushing for more accountability for leaders, more participation in decision-making, more democratization, while at the same time, larger and larger numbers of people have been espousing an Islamic identity, Islamic authenticity, an "Islamic solution" (leaving aside for the moment what those things mean). Yet lately it seems as though democratization and Islamization may be colliding forces, or at least that Islamization seems to stop democratization dead in its tracks every time it gains momentum. This is not because of an essential incompatibility between the two as ideas; on the contrary, it is because they are so successful a couple that jealous regimes have kept them apart. Actually, they are neither parallel nor colliding, but rather overlapping processes whose overlap contains the

possibility of basic change in the collective identity of Arab polities. Every time a government begins to democratize, Islamists gain ground. At this infusion of Islam into the public realm, the government and parts of the society back away from democratization in alarm, questioning, "Is this who we are, who we want to be? No."

That collective identity which, as Rustow points out in his model for transition to democracy, must begin to happen before people can come together as a democratic polity, then, is still in the formative stage in many Arab countries today. Yet collective identity is not a discrete goal to be achieved but a dynamic, and that dynamic is certainly alive in today's Arab world. The contours of the debate over collective identity have shifted; in the fifties and sixties the debate did not seriously or centrally include Islamic identity as an alternative or a cluster of alternatives; in the eighties and nineties, it does. I will detail how the two processes, democratization and the rise of Islamists, have emerged in the Arab world.

A. Democratization Measures Since the Mid-1980s

In surveying democratization trends since 1985, several patterns distinguish themselves:

1. The first year of the 1990s brought many indications of democratization. Even the most despotic regimes were pressured to adopt at least cosmetic measures in that direction. Both Syria and Iraq conducted parliamentary

elections that year, in which more independents were allowed to enter the parliaments (see Table 2.1). Following that year, traditional monarchies in two oil states, Bahrain and Oman, felt obliged to appoint a "consultative council," and a third, Saudi Arabia, inaugurated its sixty-member consultative council.

2. In countries which took more serious steps toward democracy, including Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen, further democratization has yet to happen. To make a further distinction within this group, Jordan and Yemen made progress toward the possibility of further democratization, while the other three suffered reversals.

3. Rather than taking one criterion, such as the lack of a peaceful transfer of power, and arriving at a blanket conclusion that covers all the countries surveyed, we must make distinctions along a continuum from most repressive to most democratically open.

Table 3.1: Indications of Democratization in Some Arab States Between 1985 - 1990

Country	Year	Indications
Algeria	1989	Ruling party ends monopoly over power and allows political pluralism Free local and regional elections
	1990	
Egypt	1987	Parliamentary election. There are functioning oppositions & freedom of speech Court rules that the composition of the 1987 elections was unconstitutional
	1990	
Iraq	1989	Committee set up to draft new constitution Elections to the Nat'l Assembly brought in more Independents
Jordan	1989	Free parliamentary election Travel restrictions on opposition lifted; Mukhabarat power reduced; etc.
	1990	
Libya	1988	All political prisoners allegedly released
Sudan	1986	Free parliamentary election after Numayri's dictatorship overthrown
Syria	1990	Elections for People's Council - number of Independents allegedly increased
Tunisia	1987	President Bourguiba overthrown Parliamentary election, but ruling party won all seats Opposition participating in committee to amend electoral law
	1989	
	1990	
Yemen	1988	First general election for Consultation Council

Source: Compiled from Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 31-36.

Human rights are one of the criteria used to measure democracy, since basic civil liberties are required if people are to be part of the political decision-making process and hold rulers accountable. It is very difficult to make generalizations about human rights violations because there have been fluctuations yearly. For example, Tunisia improved its human rights record between 1987 and 1989, but deteriorated in this regard after its confrontation with the Islamists in 1989. The human rights violations of two other countries, Egypt and Algeria, in the form of detentions, executions, and violent raids on suspected terrorists, have recently escalated to unprecedented levels. Following the cancellation of the second round of parliamentary elections in January 1992, Algerian authorities arrested thousands of F.I.S. members and sympathizers. In protest, Islamists began a violent campaign against the regime. As of September 1994, the victims of violent acts by governmental forces and Islamist protestors combined topped 10,000 since 1992.¹ In Egypt, a record-breaking sixty executions have occurred under Mubarak; 660 people died and over 1000 were wounded by political violence from January 1992 to November 1994.² In both countries, amendments to anti-terrorism laws have raised concerns because they give governments sweeping powers to detain people.

On the positive side, human rights organizations have been established in both Yemen and Kuwait. A Freedom House

survey shows that three Arab nations, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, changed categories from non-free to partially free countries. Jordan, Lebanon, and Yemen improved their ratings. The overall record, however, is still grim. As of early 1993, no Arab country is totally free according to Freedom House's criteria; only ten Arab countries are partly free states, and the rest are non-free states.³

Examining some of the steps which some Arab countries have taken, such as free elections and human rights improvements, show that most Arab states still fall short. As Table 3.2 shows, only five out of 21 countries have had free elections since 1985: Sudan in 1986; Jordan in 1989 and 1993; Algeria in 1990 and 1991; Kuwait in 1992; and Yemen in 1993. There was only one peaceful transfer of power: Sudan in 1986. Following the tables is a country-by-country examination of democratization measures.

a. At the repressive extreme stand Syria, Iraq, and Libya. Regimes in these states do not grant opposition parties legal status; only token parties allied with the ruling elites officially exist in Syria and Iraq, while partisanship is entirely banned in Libya. Presidential elections are uncontested, unsupervised by any non-regime organization, and usually garner 99.99 percent of the vote (the figure yielded by the 1992 plebiscite for seven more years of Asad, for example).

Table 3.2: Survey of Recent Elections in Arab Countries: 1985-1993

Country	Recent Elections	Free or Not	Power Transfer
Algeria	Local '90 Parliament '91	Yes First#	No No
Bahrain	None	n.a.*	No
Egypt	Parliament '87 Shura '89 Parliament '90	No No No	No No No
Iraq	Parliament '89	No	No
Jordan	Parliament '89 Parliament '93	Yes Yes	No No
Kuwait	Council '90 Parliament '92	No Yes	No No
Lebanon	Parliament '93	No	No
Libya	None	n.a.*	No
Mauritania	Local '90 Presidential '92 Parliament '92	n.d.** n.d.** n.d.**	No No No
Morocco	Parliament '93	n.d.**	No
Oman	None	n.a.*	No
Qatar	None	n.a.*	No
S. Arabia	None	n.a.*	No
Somalia	None	n.a.*	No
Sudan	Parliament '86	Yes	Yes '86
Syria	Parliament '90	No	No
Tunisia	Parliament '89	No	No
U.A.E.	None	n.a.*	No
N. Yemen Yemen	Parliament '88 Parliament '93	Yes Yes	No No

*Not applicable.

**No data.

#The second round of the election was canceled.

Sources: Bank, A., Political Handbook of the World 1991; The Middle East and North Africa 1993 (39th ed.); Civil Society, Vols. I-III, 1992-94.

b. At the other end of the continuum are Algeria (until 1992), Jordan, and Yemen. Both the 1989 Jordanian parliamentary elections and the 1990 Algerian local elections were important because most major political forces participated; the opposition won more than half the vote; and the elections were accompanied by other moves which smoothed the way for democratic opening. In Algeria, the election was one result of a chain of political and economic reforms which included the end of one-party monopoly of power and the establishment of a multi-party system.

In Jordan, emergency law regulations in effect since 1967 were frozen; the powers of the Extraordinary Courts and the Mukhabarat (secret police) were reduced; some political prisoners were released; and passports confiscated to prevent regime opponents from travelling abroad were returned. Legislation passed in 1992 permitted the formation of political parties, and in late December, parties were allowed to issue their own newspapers for the first time in forty years.⁴ By late 1993, there were twenty political parties, representing a wide spectrum from communist to Islamist and from liberal to conservative.

What puts Yemen in this category as well is the April 1993 parliamentary elections, the first since unification of North and South Yemen. A multi-party system without restrictions had been launched a year before, and an extraordinary 46 parties responded by registering. Neither of

the two ruling parties, the People's Congress and the Socialist Party, won a majority in the elections, which were under voluntary international supervision. While the two ruling parties were able to work together for almost three years, a political crisis erupted in the summer of 1993. The essence of the crisis was disagreement over power-sharing between the General People's Congress and the Yemeni Socialist Party, which threatened the unity between the North and the South. Mediation efforts were launched by Jordanian, Egyptian and Omani officials to prevent the crisis from exploding. In February 1994, the leaders of the two parties signed a document in which they pledge to resolve their dispute peacefully, yet both sides were mobilizing their armed forces even at the time of the signing. In May the tension between the two sides escalated into a full-scale civil war. Leaders of former South Yemen announced the formation of a new state, the Democratic Republic of Yemen. In July, the Northern forces of President Ali Abdullah Saleh were able to inflict a crushing defeat on the separatists, bringing an end to two months of civil war and preserving the unity of Yemen, after 7,000 deaths, 15,000 wounded, and three billion dollars of damage to the country. In a letter to the U.N. Secretary-General, the leaders of the military victory pledged to declare full and comprehensive amnesty for the separatists, to carry out relief efforts, to respect democracy, pluralism, and human rights, and to resume national dialogue in the framework

of constitutional legitimacy.⁵

Since the military coup in Algeria and the interruption of Yemen's democratization by civil war, Jordan remains in 1994 the only Arab country to cautiously continue its experiment with democratization. Yemen's constitution is being revised and an amendment to limit presidential terms was adopted after Saleh was re-elected. This, and the fact that the southern-based Socialist Party was not banned after the war but continues its activities in a multi-party framework, are signs of strong possibility for further democratization in Yemen. Whether there will be a real transfer of power in the coming presidential and parliamentary elections will be the test.

c. The six Gulf states constitute another cluster in the middle of the continuum. Kuwait stands apart here as the only Gulf country to hold elections for parliament and officially to allow opposition parties to contest seats in its National Assembly. The 1992 parliamentary election was significant because oppositional Islamists won more than half the seats.

d. Sudan and Algeria are countries which took great strides toward democracy but reached an impasse that was resolved by military coup.

e. Tunisia and Egypt have swerved unevenly between democratizing measures and repressive measures. In March 1994, Tunisia held presidential and parliamentary elections. President Ben Ali won the usual 99.9% of the vote. His party won 144 of 163 seats in Parliament. Three other parties were

allowed to win the remaining nineteen seats based upon 2.27% of the popular vote. By comparison, in 1989, candidates sympathetic to the Islamist Nahda party had won (according to the government calculations) 14% of the popular vote but, on a technicality, were not allowed to get seats. In another indication of the regime's faint commitment to democratization, human rights activist Munsif Marzuqi and oppositional party leader Abd al-Rahman al-Hani were arrested for declaring their intention to run for president against Ben Ali.⁶

f. In Morocco and Mauritania there have been several elections with relatively fair procedures. Morocco had a parliamentary election recently which was conducted relatively freely among already-existing parties, but restrictions were placed on Islamist participation and activities. In Mauritania, there were local, presidential, and parliamentary elections. The local elections were held in December 1990. Voters had a choice between four rival lists compiled by the government. In the capital, it was reported that Islamists won two-thirds of the seats.⁷ The country's first presidential elections were held in January 1992, and resulted in the re-election of President Colonel Moaouia Ould Taya. Rather than the 99.9% typical for presidential returns in Arab states, Taya won only 62.7% of the vote, which is a good indication. His main challenger, Ahmed Ould Daddah, came second with 32.7%. Elections for the National Assembly were

held in March, and resulted in victory for the Social Democratic Republican Party, the party affiliated with the president. Out of the total 79 seats, the SDRP won 67 seats. Two other parties won one seat each, and the rest 10 seats went to Independent candidates. The major limitation of this election was the fact that the polls were boycotted by six oppositional groups, including the Union of Democratic Forces, the leading oppositional party.⁸

g. Lebanon, on the other hand, with its long denominational democratic tradition, seems to have regained political health and held parliamentary elections in September 1992. While most political forces among Maronite Christians boycotted this elections, it was significant because it incorporated into the political process groups such as Amal, Hizbullah, and Sunni Islamists, for the first time. "The showing of Islamic forces, Shi'i and Sunni alike, was striking and reflected, in significant measure, an impressive campaign to build political support at the grass roots. . . . Lebanon's democracy may be back on track."⁹ The Lebanese political life, including any prospect for further democratization, is strained, however, by the presence of Syrian armed forces on its soil and the constant intervention of other external powers such as Israel.

h. Somalia is a lone case of disintegration into civil conflict, although international effort has been trying to stop further deterioration.

What led to the extent of democratic opening I have just described. Despite the difficulty of generalizing about all these countries, there are several common factors. Ruling elites faced multiple pressures. These include tremendous socio-economic problems as a result of the increase in populations and urbanization over the last two decades. Coupled with higher levels of education, this meant regimes were faced with new demands and expectations. As oil prices decreased and import substitutions steadily rose, by the mid-1980s many Arab countries were not able to subsidize basic commodities, provide services, and create jobs. Many Arab countries witnessed debt crises which led them, on the recommendation of the International Monetary Fund, to raise food prices. These measures provoked mass rioting in a number of countries, first Egypt in 1977, then Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and most recently Algeria and Jordan in 1988 and 1989 respectively. In the Jordanian case, demonstrators demanded in addition to cancellation of the price increases, the resignation of the unpopular government of Zaid Rifa'i. In Algeria, the confrontation between demonstrators and police produced hundreds of casualties. In both countries, the leadership decided that these economic shocks required some kind of political liberalization. Arab countries seem to fit what Rustow describes as the catch-22 which most third world dictatorships are caught in: "If the economy declines under heavy burdens of rising prices, unemployment or foreign debt,

the rulers will face growing opposition or violent unrest. If the economy expands with a thriving middle class and growing export sector, pressure mounts for political liberalization and change of regime."¹⁰

Second, civil society has developed greater power and autonomy vis-a-vis the state.¹¹ In many Arab countries, opposition groups, including Islamic movements, were founded independently of the state. With the failure of the state to provide essential services and meet the basic needs of the population, some of these groups stepped in to fill the gap. This was especially apparent when natural disasters hit the region, such as the earthquakes in Egypt and Algeria. It was Islamist groups which led relief efforts to victims. Thus, some ruling elites concluded that it would be better to contain such groups within the system, which meant taking some democratizing measures.

The third factor is a less tangible shift in sensibilities: Classes which had been persuaded to sacrifice political freedom for the sake of ideals such as social justice, anti-imperialism, and Arab nationalism were disillusioned with the results of this trade-off. Such slogans no longer appealed to the middle and working classes which had emerged since independence.¹² Among Arab intellectuals, the new vocabulary began to emphasize pluralism, freedom, and democracy.

A fourth pressure was the demonstrative effect of the

changes in East Europe and other parts of the world in the late 1980s. Changes in East Europe encouraged the democratization impulse in the Arab world. Millions of Arabs watched the fall of the Berlin Wall and the bloody overthrow of Nicolae Ceaucescu. Rustow argues that the strongest pressure for change is created by intensified global communication. News sources reported that Eastern Europe's heady changes inspired the opposition movement in pre-invasion Kuwait to call for the restoration of parliament, made people in Jordan and Algeria more adamant in their demand for real change, and helped the press in some Arab countries openly to denounce corruption and abuse of power.¹³ Moreover, democratic opening in one Arab country had an affect on surrounding countries. For example, Syrians could follow the exciting restoration of Jordan's parliament on Jordanian television, and all Arabs watched the hesitant steps toward democracy in Algeria with great concern bordering on euphoria.

All these pressures combined forced ruling elites to realize that they had to liberalize their regimes to survive. Precisely because liberalization was a survival tactic for them, the point at which regimes realized that liberalization was going to lead to their demise was the moment they decided to reverse it. The decision to reverse liberalization was hastened by early evidence that it was bringing Islamist opposition dangerously close to power.

The early nineties revealed that these two trends,

popular Islamicization and democratization, had been developing simultaneously. What was their relationship to each other?

B. Islamists Advances

Islamists have been able to win ground in almost every election that had some degree of fairness and freedom. The following section is a survey of most recent elections since the mid-1980s and of how well Islamists fared in them.

1. Egypt. The first general election in which Islamists won seats was the parliamentary election of 1984. Despite the restrictive electoral law requiring parties to gain a minimum of 8% of the total vote in order to be represented, and despite alleged fraud,¹⁴ the New Wafd Party, recently allied with the Muslim Brotherhood, won 59 seats (15.8%). The ruling National Democratic Party won 72.9%. The Muslim Brotherhood entered the alliance because they would not have been able to run on their own, not being recognized as a legal party. Islamists won eight of the alliance's combined 59 seats. The significance of this election is that it was the first in more than thirty years to include opposition candidates. In addition, the New Wafd was the only opposition party, with its Islamist allies, to cross the 8% threshold.

Several factors combined to set the stage for a freer election of the People's Assembly in 1987. Demonstrations staged by Islamists to protest Asyut University's ban against women who wanted to cover their faces on campus constituted

one factor. Another was an attempted coup by officers linked to Islamic Jihad.¹⁵ Moreover, Mubarak wanted to secure a second term as president by proving himself a real democrat. Early in 1987, Mubarak's government called for a referendum to hold early elections and amend the electoral law, providing 48 seats for independent candidates. The elections, however, maintained the dominance of the ruling National Democratic Party, which gained 346 seats, compared with 389 in 1984. Having proved themselves strong partners, the Muslim Brotherhood became a desirable ally. They joined with both the Socialist Labor Party and the Liberal Social Party to form the Islamic Alliance, which won a combined total of 60 seats, of which the Brotherhood's share was 37, making it the largest single opposition group in the Assembly. The New Wafd won only 35 seats. Thus not only had the opposition scored the largest number of seats (95 plus 7 independents) since Nasser's takeover, but Islamists--both the Brotherhood and their allies--had made steady advances and become the official opposition to the ruling NDP.

The opposition party ran in the elections for the Shura Council in 1990 and did not win any seats, accusing the government of widespread fraud and intimidation.¹⁶ Having lost faith in the government's honesty, and to protest the government's refusal to allow judicial monitoring of the election, the major opposition parties, including the New Wafd and the Islamic Alliance, decided to boycott the 1990

elections for the People's Assembly.¹⁷

2. Sudan. The major free election that took place after the popular uprising of 1985, which brought down the military regime of Ja'far al-Numayri. In the election for parliament, more than 40 political parties contested during April 1986. The two traditional parties, Ummah and the Democratic Unionists, won the largest number of seats, 99 and 63 respectively. The Islamists, represented by the newly formed National Islamic Front (NIF) came in third with 51 seats. Although Islamists ranked third after the two traditional parties, they had made tremendous advances in two respects. First, their numbers had increased dramatically from the previous election before military rule, in which they had only won three seats. Second, they dominated the "constituency of the graduates," and came first among the educated sectors in major cities.¹⁸

On June 30, 1989, a military coup placed General Omar Hasan al-Bashir in power in Sudan. After an initial period of confusion, it became clear that the new regime favored the National Islamist Front and that these Islamists enjoyed influence in its ranks. This makes Sudan the only country in the Arab world where Islamists have state power, and all eyes are upon it. The regime has promised to hold parliamentary and presidential elections, having held local elections in 1992-1993. However, organizing on the basis of political parties is banned. So far, the regime seems to be

prioritizing the war in the South, social order, and economic self-sufficiency at the expense of democratic practice. Its Islamist orientation has put the state at odds with the West and many of the Arab regimes, making it the topic of a great deal of misinformation, so that it is difficult to sort out the facts. The new government has not shown commitment to democracy enough to satisfy its critics. Other Islamists are looking to Sudan to provide a model. If Sudan is a model, it is a model for the transition to power by military rather than democratic means. Given the roadblocks in the path of Islamists' democratic ascension to power (e.g. Algeria), this seems to many Islamists an appropriate response to hypocritical democratic posturing by established regimes which have no intention of allowing Islamists meaningful participation.

3. Kuwait. In the 1985 National Assembly Elections, Islamists (Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi, and Shi'i) won several of the total 50 seats. While no political parties were officially recognized, Islamists did better than the Arab nationalists (five seats) and came after the traditional and mostly "independent" candidates who tended to support the government.

In the first election after the Iraqi invasion, held in October 1992, oppositional forces won a majority of almost 35 seats. Of these, 19 belong to Islamist groups, 16 are identified with secular democratic groups, and the remaining

15 are regarded as pro-government or royalist.¹⁹

4. Lebanon. Both Shi'i and Sunni Islamist groups gained ground in contesting for the 60 parliamentary seats designated for Muslims in the first elections there in almost twenty years, which was held in September 1992. According to news reports, Hizbollah's candidates won twelve seats and Sunni Islamists have won at least five seats. Islamist victories in parliament, on such a scale, reflects a rise in the popularity of Islamist groups among the Muslim population.

5. Tunisia. The first election for parliament since Ben Ali ousted former president Bourguiba took place in February 1989. Although the government did not permit Islamists to participate as a legal political party, Islamists contested in the election, presenting candidates in 19 out of the 25 constituencies. While the ruling party, the RCD, won all the 141 seats, Islamist candidates won 14.% of the vote nationwide and a stunning 30% in major cities like Tunis and Sousse.²⁰ Opposition candidates, particularly Islamists, accused the government of widespread electoral fraud. According to Rashid al-Ghannouchi, the leader of the Islamist party Al-Nahda, Islamists won between 50%-80% of the vote, especially in major cities, and the government candidates did not get more than 20%. The government was alarmed by the results and decided to lean more toward suppression, Ghannouchi continues.²¹ Islamists were totally excluded from the 1994 parliamentary election; the major Islamic movement, al-Nahda, was outlawed

and harshly suppressed by the security forces.

6. Yemen. There was an important election for the consultative council in the Yemen Arab Republic in July 1988, before unification with South Yemen. Over half the elective seats went to Muslim Brotherhood and their sympathizers.²² Islamists maintained their strong presence in the first election for the 301-member parliament after the unification of the two Yemens. The Islamists, renaming their party al-Islah, came second with 62 seats. The General People's Congress Party, which had ruled North Yemen before unification, won 131 seats, and the party which had ruled South Yemen came in third with 56 seats. Several smaller parties won the remaining seats (see Table 3.3).

Table 3.3: 1993 Parliamentary Election Results in Yemen

Party	Seats
General People's Congress	121
Yemeni Alliance for Reform (Al-Islah)	62
Yemeni Socialist Party	56
Arab Socialist Ba'th Party	7
Truth Party	2
Nasserite Popular Unionist Organization	1
Nasserite Correction Organization	1
United Democratic Front	1
Independent	47
Undeclared	3
Total number of seats	301

Source: Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 39, No. 4, 1993, p. 39440.

The major Islamic party, the Yemeni Alliance for Reform (Islah), sided with the Northern forces in the civil war which ended with victory for them. Because of their active role in the war, Islamists have advanced on two grounds: First, they joined the People's Congress Party in forming the first government after the end of the war, taking nine portfolios out of the 28 total. Second, Islamists were able to pass an amendment to the Constitution making Islamic law (*shari'a*) "the source of all legislation".

7. Jordan. There have been two parliamentary elections since the 1988 riots protesting price hikes on basic commodities and demanding the resignation of the government. The first election was held in November 1989, with 647 candidates, most of whom were independent, due to a ban on political parties. The Muslim Brotherhood candidates were the winners, gaining 22 of the total 80 seats. If we add to this number other independent Islamists' 12-17 seats, the Islamist bloc formed approximately one-half of the parliament. In the second election, in November 1993, the Islamist bloc shrank to 22. The newly established Islamic Action Front, dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, won only 18 seats, while independent Islamists won four seats. Although this setback is significant, it does not reflect a major loss in popularity for at least two reasons. First, Islamists remain the largest organized bloc in the new parliament. Second, they won almost 30.5% of the popular vote.²³

8. Algeria. The first free elections which followed the liberalization measures in Algeria were the local and regional elections of 1990. The newly formed Islamic Salvation Front (known by its French acronym FIS) won a massive victory of 853 out of 1539 local councils (55.4%) and 32 of the *wilayahs* (regions or states) (see Table 3.4).

The Algerian local election was not a mere propaganda ritual but a manifestation of significant change because:

1. Election procedures were free and fair;
2. The opposition, especially Islamists, won more than half the vote despite the desires of Algeria's rulers;
3. The election was accompanied by other important moves of political and economic reforms, including the end of one-party monopoly of power and the establishment of political pluralism.

Table 3.4: 1990 Algerian Local and Regional Election Results

Affiliation	Municipality	%	Region	%
Islamic Salvation Front	853	55.4	32	66.6
National Liberation Front (ruling party)	487	31.6	14	29.3
Rally for Culture & Dem.	87	5.6	1	2.08
Independents	106	6.8	1	2.08
Algerian Innovation Party	2	0.3	0	0
National Party for Consolidation & Development	2	0.3	0	0
Social Democratic Party	2	0.3	0	0
Totals	1539	100	48	100

Sources: Al-Islah, No. 146, July 1990, p. 12; New York Times, July 14, 1990.

No wonder it was widely believed that Algeria after the local elections "emerged as the most liberal political systems in the Arab world."²⁴ However, many observers of Algeria predicted that the Islamists would not do as well in the coming parliamentary election, attributing the initial Islamist victory in large part to the abstention of two major secular parties, the Front for Socialist Forces (FFS) and the Algerian Democratic Movement (MDA). To the disappointment of these analysts, in the first round of the first free multiparty elections for parliament in December 1991, the Islamist Salvation Front won 188 seats in the 430-member legislature. The Front for Socialist Forces was a distant second with 25 seats, and the ruling National Liberation Front had only 15 seats. With the FIS expected to win at least 150 of the 199 seats still to be decided in the second round, the Algerian army forced President Chadli Benjedid to resign on January 11, and pressured the prime minister into canceling the elections the next day. The government arrested prominent FIS leaders, a move followed by protests and demonstrations throughout the country. On March 4, the government banned the FIS.²⁵

The FIS victory was a turning point for both ruling elites and the masses in the Arab world. It provided an additional proof for the mass disenchantment with the ruling elites and left no doubt in the mind of rulers who would win if they were to allow free elections to take their course. It

jolted the dynamic of collective identity with a surge from a new, contending discourse--Islamist discourse. But as Islamists were making headway toward power through freely contested elections, many ruling elites were working to contain and co-opt this threat before it was too late. How much of a threat do the Islamists really pose? Are the ruling elite and other secular forces justified in their perception of the Islamist threat? In order to address these questions, I will discuss in the following section what I call the Islamist challenge: Who are the Islamists, what led to their resurgence, what are their socio-economic backgrounds, what are their agendas, and what are their positions toward democracy?

Endnotes

1. Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 40, No. 9, 1994, p. 40205.
2. New York Times, Dec. 4, 1994, p. 6; Civil Society, Jan. 1994, p. 30 and Nov. 1994, p. 7.
3. Freedom Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1993.
4. Middle East International, Dec. 1 and 17, 1989; Keesing Record, Vol. 39, p. R139, Nov. 1993.
5. Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 40, No. 7-8, 1994, p. 40123.
6. Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 40, No. 3, 1994, p. 39936.
7. Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 38, No. 1, 1992, p. 38709.
8. Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 38, No. 3, 1992, p. 38802.
9. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Crises, Elites, and Democratization in the Arab World," Middle East Journal, Vol. 47, No. 2, Spring 1993, p. 299.
10. Rustow, "Democracy: A Global Revolution?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 4, 1990, p. 78.
11. Michael Hudson, "Democratization and the Problem of Legitimacy in Middle East Politics," MESA Bulletin, No. 22, 1988.
12. Ibrahim, p. 293.
13. Middle East International, No. 17, 1989, p. 3; New York Times, March 11, 1990, p. 1 & 18.
14. "Egypt," The Middle East and North Africa 1991, 37th ed. (London: Europa Pub. Ltd., 1990), p. 379.
15. Ibid, p. 381.
16. Conversation with Shura Council candidate, Nov. 1990.
17. Reasons for the boycott and the oppositions' demands were presented in opposition newspapers such as al-Sha'b and al-Wafd.

18. Muhammad Ahmad Krar, Intikhabat wa Barlamanat al-Sudan (The Elections and Parliaments of Sudan)(Khartoum: Institute of Research and Social Studies, 1989), p. 138.
19. "Election Watch," Journal of Democracy, January 1993, p. 132.
20. John Esposito and James Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam," Middle East Journal, Vol. 45, No. 3, Summer 1991, p. 431.
21. Rashid al-Ghannouchi, "Al-Dimoqratiyya wal Wad' al-Tunisi" ("Democracy and the Tunisian Situation") Al-Insan, No. 8, Aug. 1992, p. 64.
22. Conversation with source in close contact with Yemeni Islamists.
23. Al-Dustur(Jordanian daily newspaper), December 5, 1993, p.11
24. Michael Hudson, "After the Gulf War: Prospects for Democratization in the Arab World," Middle East Journal, Vol. 45, No. 3, Summer 1991, p. 417.
25. "Election Watch," Journal of Democracy, April 1992, p. 122.

Chapter Four

The Islamist Challenge

In order to understand why democratization has been jammed at the same time as the appeal of Islamists has increased, it is important to study the characteristics of the Islamist challenge. The Islamist movement is not the latest reaction against modernity of an underdeveloped people led by fanatic preachers whose beliefs are incompatible with democracy. The Islamist movement is a complex and diffuse social and political movement (with some radical branches) consciously developing a substantive critique of the existing power structure. It is the refusal of the ruling elites and their supporters at home and abroad to tolerate such a critique, or to allow its advocates to enter the political process, that has stalled democratization. This chapter will describe Islamists in the Arab world, the history of their emergence, and the agendas they bring in order to make clear the relationship of Islamization to democratization.

A. Who Are the Islamists?

The term "Islamic movement" refers to all groups which seek to change their societies by deriving their ideology from Islam. While these groups differ in methods, approaches, styles, and substantive issues, they agree on the comprehensiveness of Islam and its relevance to solving society's problems. They want to shift the frame of reference in the public realm to one in which Islam, in its various

interpretations, is a major shaping force. In this section, I will not discuss those groups which confine themselves to missionary work, such as *al-Tabligh*. (Tabligh is a group whose members go door to door proselytizing Islam and do not believe in direct political activism.) The Islamic groups under study are those which call for the establishment of an "Islamic state" as a religious duty as well as a practical necessity.

Contemporary Islamic groups in the Arab world owe much to the Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan*), founded in Egypt in 1927 by Hasan al-Banna. In fact, most are either continuations or branches of the Brotherhood (in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, the Gulf states), split from the original Brotherhood (al-Jihad in Egypt and Palestine), or influenced by its teachings and experiences (Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front). This movement distinguished itself from predecessors by three things. First, the Brotherhood went beyond theoretical preaching to form a working organization to carry out its tasks. Building one of the most popular movements in Egypt and the Arab world is considered one of Banna's greatest achievements. By the beginning of the 1950s, according to an early study, the Brotherhood had 1,500 branches throughout Egypt, with over a million actively registered members.¹ As for the spread of the movement outside Egypt, branches had sprung in Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq and Sudan even before

the assassination of its founder in 1949, and the Brotherhood had established contact with individuals in Morocco.

The second distinguishing feature of the Ikhwan is its comprehensive concept of Islam itself and their role in spreading it. Islam, Banna writes, is "doctrine and worship, nationhood and citizenship, religion and state, spirituality and action, Qur'an and a sword."² Their comprehensive approach is manifested in their involvement in a variety of activities including spiritual worship, missionary work, economic and social services, intellectual debates, and so forth.

The third point of distinction is the Ikhwan's emphasis on political action. "Bear in mind that you have two fundamental goals," Banna instructed the membership: "One, that the Islamic fatherland be freed from all foreign domination, and two, that a free Islamic state may arise in this free fatherland, acting according to the precepts of Islam, applying its social regulations, proclaiming its sound principles, and broadcasting its sage mission to all mankind."³

These characteristics of the movement did not escape the attention of those who studied it. What set the Ikhwan aside from other reform movements, according to a widely quoted study which was conducted in the early 1950s, is the fact that it is the organization of a movement, the leading of a generation, the application of the principles of the

Islamic system to government, politics, and social matters, putting them into operation as a binding constitution, besides defending them as true doctrine ... an Islamic movement in such a wide comprehensive sense with its concomitant universal revolution of thought and accompanying historical repercussions, having grave and serious effect on the future of humanity; an Islamic movement in this sense has not been known in history for a very long time, that is, until Hasan al Banna raised its banner in the twentieth century under the name of the Moslem Brethren movement.⁴

B. The Islamic Resurgence

The Muslim Brotherhood had played a role in the nationalist struggle in the late 1940s and early 50s. For instance, the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian branches of the Brotherhood formed a voluntary militia which fought in the war of 1948 against the Zionist militia. Moreover, the Egyptian Brotherhood carried on a guerrilla war in 1951 against Britain's continued occupation of part of Egypt.⁵ However, the Egyptian Brotherhood came into a clash with Nasser. At first, the Ikhwan welcomed the coup which overthrew King Faruk and established a republican system, but they quickly discovered that Nasser had an agenda that diverged from their own. After an assassination attempt on his life which he attributed to the Brothers, Nasser dissolved the Ikhwan

organization, imprisoned thousands of members, and hanged some of its leaders in 1954 and 1965.

The 1950s and early 1960s belonged to Nasser. Despite Nasser's use of Islam to legitimize his policies, especially in foreign policy, he spoke the language of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism in a clearly secular tone. Nasser's early successes in nationalizing the Suez Canal Company, standing up to the British, French, and Israeli aggression in 1956, his leadership role in the creation of the non-aligned movement, his strong (at least rhetorical) commitment to Arab unity and the restoration of Palestine, and finally, his indefatigable charisma, all made him the most popular Arab leader during this period. All these accomplishments provided Nasser with the legitimacy to pursue his goals and allowed him brutally to suppress any opposition. The Muslim Brotherhood was one such opposition.

After the Ikhwan in Egypt had ceased to be a viable political player, it was able to survive and function (amid varying degrees of intolerance) in Syria, Jordan, Sudan, and Iraq. However, even in those countries, Islamists were competing with nationalist movements beside Nasserism. In Syria and Iraq, for example, Islamists competed against the Ba'th, which captured power in 1963 in both these states. Ba'thist control of power in these countries gave another boost to the concept of Arab unity after the failure of the first "unity" experiment between Syria and Egypt from 1958-

1961. Yet local interests proved stronger than the abstract goal of unity; thus talk of unification of these three nationalist countries (Syria, Iraq, and Egypt) produced no material result.

In fact, there was a gradual decline in the performance of nationalist regimes on all fronts. Nasser's assertive involvement in the internal affairs of other Arab countries and his venture in Yemen's Civil War had exacerbated intra-Arab rivalries. The rigid and underplanned attempts at socialism in land reform and nationalization of most industries were not effective in reducing inequalities among people in those countries which implemented them. Finally, the most emphatically professed goal of the nationalist regimes, resistance to Israel and restoration of Palestinian rights, received a total blow in the defeat of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in what is known as the Six Day War of 1967. Despite efforts by the nationalist regimes to minimize the impact of the loss,⁶ this defeat became a turning point in the history of the Arab people. Historian Albert Hourani observes that the 1967 defeat was widely regarded as being not only a military loss but a kind of moral judgement. "If the Arabs had been defeated so quickly, completely, and publicly, might it not be a sign there was something rotten in their societies and in the moral system which they expressed?"⁷ Hourani points to a real gap which appeared to exist between the elite and the masses; the masses expressed their hopes and

grievances in a different language, that of Islam. "Behind this [the problem of communication] there lay another problem, that of identity: What was the moral bond between them, by virtue of which they could claim to be a society and a political community?"⁸ The significance of 1967 lies not only in the disillusionment of the masses with "imported" ideologies (e.g. socialism and secularism) but also in bringing the issue of Islam back to center stage as the main source of identity and solutions.⁹

Although 1967 could be considered a turning point in the Arab world for the questioning of dominant ideologies and of those regimes which propagated them, it would take another decade for the rise of Islamic groups to become a challenge to Arab states. There are several reasons for the delay. First among them is the coming into power of a new set of rulers at the end of the 1960s. Changes of leadership occurred in Libya, Sudan, and South Yemen in 1969. In all three cases, a younger generation of leaders claimed to infuse new hope into radical Arab nationalism; in South Yemen's case the new hope was provided by strident Marxism. Only one year earlier, the Ba'th, led by Saddam Hussein, had recaptured power in Iraq. In 1970, Hafez al-Asad toppled his rivals and led Syria into a more pragmatic and cautious political role. The 1970s dawned with the death of Nasser and the peaceful transition to Sadat's Egypt. Thus, between 1968 and 1970, new leadership across the Arab world brought changes in orientation and

policies. It would take some time before people could identify the direction of those in power. In the short term, all these regimes pledged to stay the course of Arab nationalism. An attempt to form a unified quad out of Syria, Egypt, Libya and Sudan was presented as an indication of the new leaders' commitment to the idea of Arab unity. However, after Sudan withdrew, the only sign of the new "union" was a building in Cairo in which a few bureaucrats continued to receive salaries until the late 70s.

Nonetheless, it was the success of both Egypt and Syria in the initial stages of the 1973 war that boosted the legitimacy of these regimes. A degree of solidarity among all Arab states was demonstrated in the willingness of the traditionalist regimes (e.g. Saudi Arabia) to use oil as a weapon against those Western countries which supported Israel. The decision of Arab oil-producing countries to use the oil embargo against Western nations quadrupled the price of oil. Therefore, the oil-producing countries witnessed an "oil boom" which put large amounts of cash in the hands of the leaders of these nations. While most of this surplus would be recycled as investments in the West, or wasted on buying guns and luxury consumer goods from the West, some of this wealth was invested back in the oil-producing countries, and some was given to those countries on the Israeli front. This produced a period of high economic growth in most Arab countries. For example, the annual growth rate for most Arab countries in the

70s was between 5% (Egypt) and over 10% (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). This growth was not distributed equally, nor did it happen in a balanced way in all sectors of the economy. In Syria, for example, most of the revenues went to the defense budget and to investments that strengthened the coercive mechanisms of the regime. Overall, however, the limited Arab success in the war of 1973 and the oil boom provided most Arab regimes with some leverage that would appease their populations and delay popular dissatisfaction with the established powers.

As early as the 1980s, most Arab countries, including some of the oil-producing states, entered a period of economic crisis. There was a sharp decline in oil prices beginning in 1981-82. Increased migration into urban centers put pressure on government services that were already unable to cope with the needs of the population. The spread of education, which had been facilitated by the boom years, produced a generation with more credentials than jobs, more expectations than opportunities. Governments did not know how to provide for the frustrated young--and youth made up over 60% of the population in most Arab countries. It is in this context of economic hardship, social alienation, political authoritarianism and the erosion of the legitimacy of Arab regimes that Islamic groups have made a strong comeback.

It is no accident, then, that many scholars explain the rise of Islamic "fundamentalism" in terms of the crisis

theory. That is, writers who range from conservative to neo-Marxist describe "fundamentalism" in the Arab world as a reactionary response to the deteriorating socio-economic and political conditions. A representative view is that of Halim Barakat:

The vacuum created by the failure of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism seems to have encouraged certain segments of the middle class and the lower middle classes to resort to an old political weapon. Other conditions have contributed to the revival of Arab religious fundamentalism as a political movement: enduring economic crises, social anomie, distorted modernization, deliberate manipulation and even sponsorship of religious movements by some governments, and tyranny of the state over civil society.¹⁰

It is not clear how disenfranchised classes, in accepting Islamist ideas, can be said to resort to an "old political weapon" when they do not control the means of manipulation or communication; they don't have "weapons." Nor is it clear how Islamists can be considered the sponsorees of some governments when they are subject to repressive measures in nearly every Arab country.

In any case, context is not cause, and while it is important to understand the environment in which Islamic movements have gained widespread acceptance among Arab populations, the "crisis" argument cannot adequately explain

the challenge posed by these movements. Such explanations ignore the fact that Islamic movements existed long before the current crisis, and had a significant following long before they hit the front pages of the Western media or the agenda-books of post-Cold War U.S. policymakers. Explanations such as Barakat's view Islamists today as if they were without a history, as if they sprang overnight from the desperation of a gullible underclass. Islamists in several countries have a decades-long record of providing social services to the public. Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood had over one million members in the late 1940s. One million members is not a bad showing, long before the crisis of 1967, or the post-seventies economic bust.

What happened in the intervening decades is that Islamists became less visible within Arab countries, in large part because they were suppressed by authoritarian regimes. On the world stage, much of their invisibility was due to the preoccupation of the Cold War powers with issues of bipolar conflict. During this time, Islamic movements nevertheless continued to function and continued to grow, working less on political activities and more on intellectual and social-service work. When an Islamist organization was repressed in one Arab country, it would move its activities to another country, utilizing the hidden blessings of Arab disunity.

The "crisis theory" neglects the history of Islamic movements on the one hand, and is unwilling to see a future

for them on the other. This theory assumes that Islamic resurgence is a temporary phenomenon arising in response to material needs which have been rationalized in religious-superstitious terms. If economic problems are solved, the implication is, Islamists will fade away. This paradigm assumes that material needs are basic and ideological needs superficial or secondary, whereas one may just as well advance that

there are meta-needs that may not be as pressing but are probably more enduring than those basic needs. It is these meta-needs that can motivate an individual to sacrifice his very life in the service of what is perceived as Ultimate Reality, call it God, Allah, or by any other name; and it is this capacity for self-sacrifice that forms the basis of intergenerational transfer of values which is the essence of the making of a civilization.¹¹

Proponents of the "crisis theory" are often reluctant to admit that their grounds for excluding Islamists in their vision of the future are as arbitrary as their assumptions about the universality of their hierarchy of needs.

Moreover, the "crisis theory" is mainly concerned with explaining the rise of radical, especially violent, Islamists. It has little to offer in explaining the widespread existence of moderate and middle-class Islamists, who often do not get

acknowledged at all in the "crisis theory" of the Islamist movement.

Thus, as an explanation for the origin and development of the Islamist movement in all its diverse forms, the "crisis theory" advanced in the main by leftist scholars is not useful. On the other hand, socioeconomic crisis is important in constituting one context to which Islamists, who precede "crisis," respond in forming their agendas. Also, socioeconomic crisis may be an explanatory factor when one asks why the methods of different types of Islamists varies, e.g. why peasant-based *Gama'at* in southern rural Egypt tend toward violent methods while the *Islah* party in the Gulf states produces children's tapes and focuses on education.

Another major deficiency in understanding the Islamic resurgence is the lack of knowledge, or the presence of biased knowledge, about Islam and its social expressions in history. Western scholars from a spectrum of political persuasions tend to treat religious faith as universally discredited, because of their own intellectual tradition's deep conflicts with religion. In their eyes, anyone whose political ideology derives from religious beliefs is equated with the kind of fundamentalism popularly seen in the West as literalist, escapist and reactionary. Islam, however, has remained integrated in the historical process in the Muslim world; it has remained a source of energy in social and intellectual life, and has not been segregated and compartmentalized.

Current expressions of political Islam are manifestations of what John Esposito describes as "faith-in-history," "the product of a dynamic changing process in which the word of revelation is mediated through human discourse in response to specific socio-historical contexts."¹² For Islamists, the resurgence of the late 1970s is a continuation of the process of responding to new sets of social, economic, and political conditions, similar to previous resurgences in which Islam was the prime ideological resource; they see this as a fulfillment of the Prophet's saying that "every hundred years God sends to this *Umma* someone who rejuvenates its way of life." Whether it is mined for the resources needed to resist Crusaders in the twelfth century or to mobilize the masses against European imperialism in the nineteenth, Islam has been the ideological bedrock of the Arab world and there is no reason to expect it not to continue to be so. It is the normal status for Muslims to be in a state of *sahwa* (awakening) in their constant creative interpretation of Islam's role in the temporal world; the question then becomes, what factors had operated to alienate Muslims in the Arab world from Islam before this moment. Then the issue of Islamic resurgence "changes from one about the factors external and internal which led to a renewed widespread commitment to Islam, into an inquiry into the pressures to which Muslims were subjected in order to abandon their faith."¹³

To summarize the argument thus far, attempts at modernization and nation-building in the decades following Arab independence from colonial rule had been carried out under the banner of Arab nationalism, frequently in some combination with Arab socialism, in terms that were both secularized and Westernized. It was a period in which the dominant elites in the Arab world were speaking a different language, metaphorically and often literally, from that of the masses who were largely excluded from the political process. The deliberate and enforced exclusion of Islam as a source of ideology and of Islamists as a social base from most of those experiments, and the failure of the nationalist regimes to live up to their promises, failure culminating in the total defeat of 1967, provoked the Arab people to reassess the bases of their identity and the role of Islam in it. While there were multiple answers, the idea that the Arab malaise was related to the displacement of Islam as a primary source of ideology steadily gained acceptance throughout the 1970s. With it came the notion that only Islam could provide the cultural resources needed to formulate an alternative to Western hegemony and "imported ideologies."¹⁴

By the late 1970s, signs of Islamic resurgence were apparent throughout the Arab world. Any traveller from Mauritania to Iraq could not but observe increased religious observance among the populations. Indications included growing prayer attendance at mosques, proliferation of

religious books and tapes, and the rising popularity of Islamic dress among women.

The success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran gave a psychological boost to most Islamically oriented groups and individuals. The significance of the Iranian revolution was not in its attempts to export the revolution to Arab countries, but in its demonstrative effect. It showed how an oppressive authoritarian regime such as that of the Shah could be defeated despite the odds, and even despite the support of the world's strongest power, the U.S. The Iranians pioneered the "Islamization of revolution," revealing the power of Islam as a mobilizing factor. Although no Arab state experienced a comparable revolution, there were attempts, such as the clashes following Sadat's assassination in 1981 and the efforts of the Syrian Ikhwan to topple the Asad regime from 1979 to 1982.

It was only after this period that governments began in earnest to search Islam for language and symbolism that would buttress their legitimacy and that would appropriate for themselves some of the popularity of Islamists. Three cases will give a representative idea of this phenomenon. Asad introduced an article into the Constitution of Syria indicating that the religion of the President of Syria should be Islam. This is after Asad had tried to omit any reference to Islam in his proposed draft of the Constitution in 1973; following a wave of protests and demonstrations, especially

among the *ulama*, he reluctantly reinstated the clause and quickly instructed the Grand Mufti to issue a *fatwa* declaring the Alawite religion a branch of Shi'ism, making them mainstream Muslims (the secretive Alawite religion, a splinter from Shi'i Islam, had been and still is widely regarded as outside of mainstream Islam).¹⁵ A second example of governmental manipulation of Islam is Sadat's 1980 amendment of the Egyptian Constitution making *Shari'a* (Islamic law) the main source of legislation. Even before that, Sadat had named himself *al-ra'is al-mu'min* (the Believing President). A third example: Sudan's Ja'far al-Numayri turned to Islam to salvage his deteriorating popularity in the late 70s. Then between 1983 and 1984 he carried out a noisy campaign of Islamization through the literal implementation of Islamic law, especially the penal code. His policies, while they were met with popular acceptance among Muslims in the North, generated a great deal of controversy and criticism. Given the subsequent overthrow of Numayri by pro-Islamist forces, this shows that the scheme of manipulating Islam to improve a leader's legitimacy could backfire by exposing the transparent hypocrisy of such a move, as Esposito points out: "Those who wield it [Islamic rhetoric] run the risk of being judged by that Islamic yardstick, challenged or toppled."¹⁶

Increased religious observance among the masses and governmental co-optation of Islamic symbols and language are only minor manifestations of the Islamic resurgence. The real

dynamic force behind the resurgence has been Islamist groups and organizations. From their marginal status in the political arena in the 1950s and 60s, Islamist groups rose as political players by the late 70s. In the early 1980s, it is probably accurate to say that Islamists had become the popular trend. There is virtually no Arab country without a strong Islamic movement, as the following table shows.

Table 4.1: Major Islamic Groups in Some Arab Countries

Country	Islamic Groups
Algeria	Islamic Salvation Front (F.I.S.); Islamic Society Movement; <i>Al-Nahda</i>
Bahrain	Social Reform Organization (<i>Al-Islah</i>)
Egypt	Muslim Brotherhood (<i>Ikhwan</i>); Islamic Jihad; Labor (<i>Al-'Amal</i>) Party; small groups
Iraq	Islamic Call (<i>Al-Da'wah</i>); Muslim Brotherhood
Jordan	Islamic Action Front; Muslim Brotherhood; Liberation Party (<i>Al-Tahrir</i>)
Kuwait	Islamic Constitutional Movement; small <i>salafi</i> & <i>shi'i</i> groups
Lebanon	Party of God (<i>Hizbullah</i>); Islamic Group (<i>Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya</i>);
Libya	Muslim Brotherhood
Morocco	Justice and Charity Association; Muslim Youth Movement
Palestine	Islamic Resistance Movement (<i>Hamas</i>); Islamic Jihad
Saudi Arabia	<i>Salafi</i> groups; Muslim Brotherhood
Sudan	National Islamic Front
Tunisia	Renaissance Party (<i>Al-Nahda</i>)
U.A.E.	Social Reform and Guidance (<i>Al-Islah</i>)
Yemen	Yemeni Alliance for Reform (<i>Al-Islah</i>)

Source: Compiled from *Al-Mujtama'*; *Al-Islah*; *Al-Sha'b*

C. Islamists' Agendas

It is important to shed some light on the Islamist groups, their agendas, the socio-economic background of their members, and their positions on democracy, in order to determine what kind of a challenge they constitute to the current order. The starting point for Islamist groups is that the Arab world is in a state of decline; the idea of Arab nationalism in its secular forms not only failed to provide a way out, but aggravated the problems; and Islam is the only viable and authentic solution to these problems. All Islamic groups seek to transform Arab societies and politics into more "Islamic" ones. This process of Islamization does not mean that Islamic movements reject modernism. Robin Wright, for example, sees a resemblance between Islamists and Catholic liberation movements which use religious interpretation to impart a vision of betterment for people in the temporal world. Islamists, she says, carry out "forward-looking, interpretive and often even innovative attempts to reconstruct the social order."¹⁷ It has often been noted that Islamists are quite flexible about adopting Western technologies and scientific achievements, but they think Western knowledge, values, and structures can be adopted only after being "Islamized," or sifted to determine which elements are compatible with Islam and which are not. This position is different from that of earlier Muslim reformers such as Muhammad Abduh. Abduh strove to make Islam compatible with

modernity; Islamists strive to make modernity compatible with Islam.

A second point about Islamist goals is that they share many of the concerns of Arab nationalist movements, despite their criticism of them. According to Islamists, the main flaw of nationalists was their reliance on "imported" formulae to solve indigenous problems. Islamists do not disagree with Arab nationalists on what constitutes the main issues of concern to the Arab peoples. Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an advocate of "the Islamic solution" identifies these main issues of concern to Islamists: underdevelopment and backwardness; social injustice; political despotism; dependency and Westernization; deterioration of Arab strength vis-a-vis Israel; the fragmentation of the Arab world; and moral degeneracy in Arab society.¹⁸

Islamist groups within and across countries differ in the methods they use to pursue their professed goals and in the sophistication with which they treat the task of socio-economic and political change. While there are some Islamist groups which espouse the use of violence for political ends (such as Egypt's al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and armed Islamist militias in Algeria), the majority of Islamic movements pursue their goals peacefully, using a variety of methods. For the extremist groups the struggle to overthrow corrupt and illegitimate governments is a religious duty, a part of the larger concept of *jihad*. It is a struggle between right and

wrong, good and evil, faith and unbelief. In such a conflict, they believe, violent means are legitimate recourse for the oppressed and the powerless. According to a scholar of Egyptian radical groups, they employ violence to prove their existence on the political map, to exact revenge against the state's security apparatus for killing and suppressing their members, and to demonstrate the political instability of the regime and consequently weaken it.¹⁹

There are three cardinal points about the radical groups. One, most of these groups have resorted to violence as a result of intense suppression and coercion by the most authoritarian regimes in the Arab world. In Asad's Syria, one of the world's most brutal authoritarian systems, the Alawite-dominated regime has long prevented any meaningful participation by the Sunni majority. Some of Egypt's radical Islamic groups splintered from the Muslim Brotherhood during the last years of Nasser's rule, a time when extreme terror was unleashed against the Brotherhood and many of its leaders were imprisoned, tortured, and executed.

These groups were further alienated by the continuation of authoritarian rule under Sadat and Mubarak. In the Algerian case, the groups affiliated with F.I.S. resorted to violence only after the elections that the Islamists won by a landslide were rescinded. In their view, they are themselves the duly elected rulers and the current junta is the violent usurper of legitimate state power; they have the same

authority to use violence against this regime as a state would have to use its police or army to fight armed insurgents.

Second, radical Islamist groups tend not to have a clear program of what they want to achieve. Among the small Islamic groups in Egypt, the dominant discourse is how to fight oppression inflicted by the unjust Arab rulers. This is an interesting development since Sunni tradition is usually characterized as lacking revolutionary spirit compared to Shi'ism; Sunni scholarly tradition justifies submission to the existing order as long as rulers use Islamic symbols. This had not worked for Sadat; although he invoked Islam to gain acceptance and legitimacy, he was assassinated by al-Jihad, a group which believes in toppling rulers who do not implement *Shari'a* as an utmost priority. The chief theorist of Jihad, Muhammad Abdussalam Faraj, who was executed after the assassination, wrote a tract representative of the discourse of radical Islamists, entitled Al-Farida al-Gha'iba (The Forgotten Obligation). The forgotten obligation among Muslims today, he says, is *jihad* or fighting against oppression.

We must concentrate on our Islamic mission. This mission is, first of all, to establish the Law of God (*Shari'a*) in our land and to raise up the Word of God as the highest. No doubt the first task of *jihad* is to uproot these infidel leaders and replacing them with the comprehensive Islamic system. This will be our starting point.²⁰

Third, there seem to be similarities in the socio-economic background of members of radical Islamist groups, and these groups tend to be small. While the size of radical groups varies from one country to another, most are small; for example, Jihad had no more than a few hundred members in 1981.²¹ However, the number of such groups has proliferated in Egypt due to the failure of the Mubarak regime to address the grievances of the majority of Egyptians. In the case of Algeria, on the other hand, the number of armed groups is estimated in the tens of thousands. Most of the members of radical groups are young, educated in modern institutions, and lower to middle class. If we take the 101 members of Jihad who were brought to courts after the assassination of Sadat, we find that about 75% were between 20-29 years of age. A fourth were professionals, 45% students, 15% workers, 5% owners of bookstores, 4% army recruits and police officers, 2% farmers and 3.9% unemployed.²² This is what leads Saad Eddin Ibrahim, who has done much research on radical Islamists, to remark that "[it] is sometimes assumed in social science that recruits of 'radical movements' must be somehow alienated, marginal, or otherwise abnormal. Most of those we investigated would be considered model young Egyptians."²³

The majority of Islamist groups in the Arab world have proposed to transform the dismal conditions in their societies by working from below, beginning at the grass roots level, through peaceful means. Most follow the reformist methods of

Banna which emphasize graduated change beginning with the individual. In other words, they believe that individual Muslims must reform themselves; they can then work for the reform of whole families and raise the Islamic consciousness of their society; only when society is ready can the state be reformed along Islamic principles. Islamists of the 1990s who belong to a third generation of active Islamist reform see themselves as *tayyar al-wasat* (the middle or moderate wave). They are modernist rather than traditionalist in experience and outlook. For example, a significant number of these Islamists have Western educations; many hold degrees in the prestigious "modern" professions of medicine and the hard sciences and dominate in the professional unions. The moderate Islamists include the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, Al-Nahda (Renaissance) of Tunisia, the F.I.S. (before its repression by the military) and the Islamic Society Movement in Algeria, the Yemeni Alliance for Reform (Islah), and other Islamists in the Gulf states.

What do these movements have in common with the radical Islamist groups and where do they differ? They agree on the general goal of upholding Islam as the main source of identity and legislation. They differ on the pace and method of implementation, but this divergence also reveals substantive differences. Radical Islamists proclaim their desire to implement "Islam" as soon as they gain power. Moderates not

only see the Islamization of society as a gradual process, but would take into serious consideration local contexts; their view of what society would look like at the end of the process is more pluralistic than the radical Islamist view. The other major difference is about the use of force to bring about the Islamic order. On this issue each side has condemned the other's tactics. For the radicals, participation in the existing system and attempting to change it from within is an exercise in futility because the ruling elite will never allow such change to be completed. For the moderates, using violence is counterproductive and only hinders the Islamization process, by confirming the stereotypes of Islamists as fanatic and giving justification to the regime for their continued repression. This is why the moderate groups use the following methods: Propagating Islam at the individual level (*da'wa*); building economic institutions (e.g. Islamic banks and credit unions) as both a source of income and an alternative to state institutions; providing educational and social services, such as free health care, to the populace, particularly to the lowest strata; pressuring governments to implement *Shari'a*; working toward greater influence in various organs of the civil society, such as professional and student unions; and entering the political process by participating in elections whenever they are allowed.

D. Islamist Positions Toward Democracy

One area of disagreement between radical and moderate Islamists is their positions on democracy, both in theory and in what limited democratic practices have been available to them. Radical groups and some traditionalist scholars tend to reject democracy as an "imported" form of government. Most Islamists, on the other hand, conceive of themselves as reformers of society by gradual means: education, social change, preaching, and working within the system. For them, once they got past the Western terminology and the Western models to the basic concepts, values, and procedures of democracy, they found it entirely compatible with Islam and indeed expressing some of Islam's best values.

The radicals' argument contains three grounds for rejecting democracy. The first is the supposed differences between Islamic political principles and democracy. In Islam, according to proponents of this view, sovereignty belongs to God and not to the people. Sayyid Qutb and his brother Muhammad insist on this distinction between two types of governments: those based on Islam and those based on *jahiliyya* (ignorance, or pre-Islamic degeneracy). Under Islamic rule the right of people to legislate is limited by *Shari'a*. The representatives of the people cannot pass a law which contradicts a law prescribed by God. According to this school, allowing any humans or group of humans unlimited power to legislate is a form of tyranny and a component of

jahiliyya. The only way to achieve real freedom is under an "Islamic" rule whereby no human is entitled to become the sovereign -- to hold absolute power of legislation.²⁴ Islam has its unique political system, these Islamists assert, which is better than any other one, including "democracy." Muhammad Qutb, while acknowledging what he calls positive elements in democratic systems (such as the rights and guarantees of the people against the abuse of power by rulers), Islam is the ideal system and not "democracy." Those positive elements of democracy that are compatible with the Islamic system, he says, should not make us lose track of the fact that it is not a divinely ordained system, while Islam is. One cannot abandon a divinely ordained system for an imperfect man-made one; that would signal the defeat of our system of thought and the triumph of the Western paradigm. To those who say "let's take what is best in democracy," Muhammad Qutb would say, then it will not be democracy, but Islam.²⁵ In recent years, Islamists in general have emphasized the idea that Islam is their frame of reference (*Al-marji'iyah al-Islamiyyah*). Even those who are willing to adopt Western ideas and systems find it necessary to justify that in Islamic terms. This reflects an increase in Islamists' confidence that they represent an alternative paradigm, complete with its own set of referents, rather than an enterprise that needs to frame itself within a set of referents from Western intellectual traditions.

The second ground for rejecting democracy is its connection to things Western. Conventional wisdom about democracy among Islamists has it, for example, that Western claims about the people's rule are disingenuous, that it is economically powerful groups who rule, and that elections are rituals that do not present genuine choices between substantively different policies. Another common idea is that democracy is responsible for the moral decay and sexual promiscuity which prevail in the West today. The author of a small book entitled Hukm al-Islam fil Dimogratiyya (Islam's Judgement on Democracy) asserts that the equivalent term in Arabic for democracy is *ibahiyya* (laxity, permissiveness), which means an erasure of all boundaries and the freedom to do the things God forbids, from drinking, adultery, and homosexuality, to apostasy.²⁶ Some Islamists also argue that democracy has direct historical associations in the Arab world with Western imperialism, with the colonization of Arab lands and its aftermath. Proponents of this view doubt the sincerity of Western efforts to propagate democracy and see these efforts as invested in Western political interests. Democracy did not stop European countries from colonizing and brutalizing the Arab world in the past, despite Western claims that it is an ideology of individual rights, egalitarianism, self-determination, and enlightened morality. Nor did democracy prevent the U.S. from destroying Baghdad in a military intervention resented by most Arab populations; the

Gulf war significantly increased cynicism among Islamists about the value of democracy.²⁷ There is something suspect about Western nations' insistence on "democracy" from the point of view of many formerly colonized peoples, including some Islamists, who note the relief with which Algeria's military coup was welcomed in the democratic West. Western powers are trying to interest Arabs in "democratic values," some Islamists reason, so as to produce Arab systems that are pliantly pro-Western and will support neo-imperialist Western hegemony in the region.

The third ground on which those who reject the idea of "democracy" do so is that many people have lost faith in the democratic process as implemented in various Arab countries. When Islamists, representing some of the most politicized groups in a country, are excluded from the political process, democratic measures appear as so much cynical posturing in the view of members of those groups. Thus some of the radical groups in Egypt extend their cynicism about the democratic process in their country to the idea of "democracy" in general. Several documents published by the radical Islamist groups posit democracy as the opposite of Islam.²⁸ Similarly, the theorist of the Jihad group writes, "Power is the only path for the return of Islam. We reject the idea that one can reform the system by accepting appointments and offices in government. We reject also the idea that one must

establish a wide popular base through *da'wa* (propagating Islam) as the path to establishing the Islamic state."²⁹

Groups which subscribe to this position on democracy are a minority within Islamist circles in the Arab world today. These groups are Egypt's al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and Jihad, and Jordan's small, strident Liberation (Tahrir) Party. There are some persons in moderate Islamist groups who ascribe, as individuals, to the radical hard line against "democracy" that I have described, notably some members of Algeria's F.I.S. Fahmi Huwaidi, an independent Islamist writer, says that the discourse of such Islamists is an anomaly and is circumscribed among the wider circle of Islamists. Confusion arises however, because this irregular view and its proponents receive most of the attention of regional and world media, to the point where this view has come to be presented as the Islamist norm while the views of the majority of Islamists appear exceptional.³⁰

Most of the mainstream Islamic movements were formed in the first place on the premise that their task is to transform society by working within existing institutions; thus when they have been afforded the opportunity to participate in democratic processes, they have been willing to do so. Their commitment to the democratic process has been conditioned by three factors. First, Islamists all across the Arab world have suffered a great deal at the hands of the *Mukhabarat* (secret police). They know first hand the costs of

authoritarianism. Many of their leaders and cadres were assassinated, imprisoned, tortured, executed, or sentenced to exile. Among the most prominent in Egypt, for example: Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, was assassinated by King Faruk's agents; Sayyid Qutb and a band of other Ikhwan leaders were executed under Nasser; Zainab al-Ghazali and other activists were subjected to torture in Nasser's jails. Most surviving leaders of that generation of Egypt's Ikhwan served long prison terms. Leaders as well as ordinary members of Islamist organizations in Syria, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and other states have suffered prison terms and continue to do so; many others have been forced into exile, their property confiscated, their relatives who remain in their home country harassed. Even those who are not exiled live under surveillance and the constant threat of arbitrary state violence. This has made resistance to authoritarianism a strong component of the Islamist sub-culture; they developed a language, even a mythology, one might say, with its heroes and conflicts, of such resistance. Those who suffered prison terms became especially aware of the dangers of human rights abuses and the need for a system that will prevent such abuses; despotism is the greatest obstacle, in their view, to progress. They see despotism (*al-istibdad*) as "the giant obstacle in the path of . . . the Islamic movement--which has been the greatest victim of despotism," as Rashid al-Ghannouchi, ideologue of Tunisia's Islamic movement writes,

pointing out Islamists' growing awareness of the evils of authoritarianism. This awareness was influenced, he says, by "the global wave of demands for democratization and the toppling of dictatorships" in recent years. The predisposition to accept concepts which happen to be components of democracy as understood in the West today, such as citizenship, pluralism, and the full participation of women in politics is gaining momentum among Islamists, as indicated, Ghannouchi continues, both by their writings and praxes in more than one country.³¹

The second reason why Islamists are advocating democracy is that they see it as a way to attain political power. As it is supposed to lead to peaceful transfer of power in government, democracy, for any oppositional movement with a wide popular base, is the best means to the goal. Islamists are no exception; they "have not failed to recognize that pluralism and interdependence are the catchwords of the 1990s."³² More importantly, Islamists realize that they have popular support and are running against governments that do not. It is not difficult to foresee the outcome of free and fair elections in such a setting. Although supporters and critics of Islamists alike have the right to demand guarantees of fairness in the electoral process, they have no grounds on which to exclude Islamists from the process. Questioning Islamists' intentions and commitment to democracy are tactics that were used in Western countries to attempt to exclude

leftist parties from elections; they are not ideology-neutral but obvious attempts to limit the range of ideological choices of the voters and thus beg the question of identity, which is in large part what drew Islamists into the process in the first place. The criticism often levelled by regime representatives as well as leftists, that Islamists have no business bringing religion into politics, begs this same question. The attack on their lack of sophistication in formulating political platforms is also moot at this point. The fact of the matter is that Islamists, whatever their interpretation of religion's role in politics, constitute a political movement organized into political parties in order to contest in elections in order to gain power and implement their programs. It is the task of other political parties to make sure that if this were to happen, Islamists would not suppress their opponents in the name of Allah or abolish the people's right periodically to choose their leaders in free and fair elections. But strengthening democratic institutions may go a great ways to ensuring this. Excluding Islamists now does not set good precedents for those who expect strong commitment to these institutions in the future. So far Islamists have been subjected to higher moral standards than the other players in the arena, as if they were the only authoritarians among an assembly of tried and true democrats.

Thirdly, mainstream Islamists increasingly accept the democratic process and the idea of democracy in general

because they see it as more compatible with Islamic principles than any other form of government around. Those among Islamists who speak of congruity between Islamic principles and democracy³³ emphasize the idea that Islam does not prescribe any fixed organizational structure; this task belongs to the community or *umma*. This community, which may include non-Muslims, must form its own political systems. A multiple number of forms is possible, as long as they are based on the following principles:

1. The *raison d'être* of any Islamic state is to establish justice and to work for the prosperity of the community both in this life and the hereafter.

2. The authority of the rulers in any Islamic state is limited by the Law (*Shari'a*). No individual or institution can legislate anything that clearly contradicts the *Shari'a*. Complications arise in those matters about which there is no clear ruling. Then it is the duty of all people of religious knowledge--without restriction--to conduct *ijtihad* (independent reasoning). When the community of scholars is able to reach a consensus, or *ijma'*, that consensus becomes binding on the rest of the community.

The limitation of legislative authority to the boundaries of *Shari'a* is one point where Islamist political principles seem to conflict with the idea of democracy as understood in the Western intellectual tradition. However, every society is limited by the boundaries of its collective historical

experience; even the framers of the U.S. Constitution conceived of the document they drafted as existing within the context of a "higher law." The boundaries of one's own cultural context seem invisible because they are tacit, diffuse, and accepted as the norm; they may be challenged, stretched, and reinterpreted, but boundaries nonetheless exist around every democratic system. The boundaries suggested by Islamists--specifically, *Shari'a*--appear alien, heavy, and restrictive, not only to Western observers but even to some members of the Muslim societies in which they are proposed, precisely because their installment is the focus of the debate at hand. Islamists see a distinction between democracy as a set of procedural principles and democratic culture as an expression of a specifically Western heritage. It is the first package in which Islamists are interested and not the second.

3. The leader or leaders of the state should be chosen with the approval of the community. Members of the community express their acceptance of the choice by giving a pledge (*bay'a*). Modern Sunni Islamists disapprove of hereditary monarchy (despite that concept's longevity in the region) as it neglects the element of choice. They disagree also with Shi'i Islamists who maintain that the ruler must be a descendent of the Prophet Muhammad and a religious scholar (*faqih*). There is general agreement among mainstream

Islamists that elections constitute the best way for peoples to choose their leaders today.

4. The leaders of Muslims should conduct politics according to the principle of consultation (*shura*); that is, leaders are obliged to consult the people or their representatives throughout the decision-making process.

5. Political participation is a religious duty for the individual believer, especially at two moments: choosing the most qualified person to lead the community, and voicing one's opinion in good conscience, often equated with the idea of bearing witness, during critical decisions that affect the community.

6. Islamists have begun turning their attention to the question of pluralism in recent years;³⁴ the general consensus has been acceptance of the principle of political pluralism (*ta'adudiyya*) as a natural tendency among people. Mainstream Islamists usually point out that the existence of at least four schools of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam is a strong argument for legitimizing differences. Islamists disagree, however, on whether political parties constitute the best mechanism for channelling differences of opinion in the political domain.

7. There is agreement among most Islamists that the principle of separation among the branches of the political system is a sound development in government. While there is disagreement over whether a presidential or parliamentary

system is better, or whether Islamists should not develop an alternative system that would guarantee representative government in some other way, the necessity for a strong independent judiciary is basic to Islamist thought.

8. Contemporary Islamists address human rights and individual freedoms thus: These rights and freedoms are manifestations of Allah's will to dignify human beings regardless of race, religion, or ethnicity. How these rights are defined is another issue. Islamist ideology may espouse democratic values but "has not adopted liberalism, if that includes religious indifference."³⁵ While the right to an honorable existence includes freedom from government interference, repression, and torture, "mainstream attitudes remain highly restrictive with regard to the freedom of political, religious, and artistic expression, if that involves the right to freely express one's religious feelings, doubts included, and even to give up Islam altogether."³⁶

These are a distilling of key concepts from volumes of Islamist discourse on the issue. A closer examination of Islamist writings will elucidate developments in Islamist thinking on democracy. What follow is a survey of representative Islamist writing on democracy.

Sheikh Muhammad al-Ghazali of Egypt's Islamist movement has been one of the most outspoken advocates of democracy.³⁷ Ghazali argues against those who see a contradiction between Islam and democracy. To him democracy is not a religion but

a way to organize the relationship between the rulers and the governed, and a guarantee against the abuse of power. Making rulers accountable to those they govern and preventing arbitrary rule are common goals of democratic and Islamic principles. The fact that democracy relates to the process of government, rather than its substance, makes it reconcilable with *Shari'a*, which is substantive.

Another proponent of democracy, human rights, and freedom in the Islamic resurgence is Rashid al-Ghannouchi, head of Tunisia's Islamist movement. In his latest book, al-Huriyat al-'Amma fil Dawla al-Islamiyya (Public Liberties in the Islamic State),³⁸ Ghannouchi reiterates his conviction that the struggle for freedom and the destruction of oppressive structures is a struggle for Islam. Democratic mechanisms such as free elections, peaceful transfer of power, decision-making through majority rule, and protection for the rights of minorities, are universally applicable, according to Ghannouchi. Nothing in these contradicts Islamic values. Furthermore, "if the democratic apparatus operated within a framework in which Christianity was dominant and produced Christian democracy, and within the framework of socialist philosophy produced socialist democracy, and within the framework of Jewish values produced Jewish democracy, is it then impossible for democracy to function in a framework of Islamic principles to produce Islamic democracy?" Such a development, Ghannouchi believes, would benefit not only the

Muslim nation but the whole Arab world and "all humanity."³⁹ He goes on to make two points. First, any Islamic state should provide safety valves to guard civil and political liberties and prevent any form of despotism. Those who do not accept the notion that an Islamic order could be democratic are directly challenged by this argument. Ghannouchi adopts a bold interpretation of various Islamic texts with political content, and offers a progressive agenda in areas in which Islamists are frequently criticized. For instance, he advocates the political empowerment of women, recommending affirmative action to increase their representation in legislative bodies.⁴⁰ Second, while Ghannouchi would like to see Islamists reach the goal of establishing an Islamic order, he prefers to work for the creation of a pluralistic democratic system, especially where Muslims are not a majority or do not accept Islam as their frame of reference. In these conditions, "it is enough to create a political pact between Islamists and others in which all pledge loyalty to the state, renounce imposing their order through violence, and accept the peaceful transfer of government through the ballot box."⁴¹ In such a system, it is enough to arrive at a consensus about public liberties and human rights. The democratic state, or, in Ibn Khaldun's vocabulary, rational government (*hukumat al-'aql*), is the closest form to the government of *Shari'a*, Ghannouchi maintains. Would Ghannouchi and his party be willing to give up power peacefully if they lose an election?

Definitely, Ghannouchi answers. I will withdraw to an oppositional position, prepare myself, and run again. If I am rejected, I will try again.⁴²

One of the most widely respected scholars among mainstream Islamists, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, issued a religious ruling (*fatwa*) in response to those who claim that democracy is a form of unbelief (*kufr*). The text of the *fatwa*, running over sixteen pages, can be summarized as follows:⁴³ First, those who claim democracy is *kufr* understand neither Islam nor democracy. The essence of democracy, according to Qaradawi, is for people to choose their leaders and system without compulsion, to have the right to question their leaders if they make mistakes, and to depose them if they deviate from the agreed-upon pact. Second, the main virtue of democracy lies, as a result of long struggles with oppressors and despots, in its procedures and mechanisms for protecting the populace from tyrants. Third, Islam has some abstract principles, such as *shura*, which need to be institutionalized, and requires believers to search for a new apparatus through which collectively to achieve their best interests. The search for these forms may take the believer anywhere, including the West, for "wisdom," Qaradawi notes in this regard, quoting a *hadith*, "is the lost property of the believer; wherever he discovers it, he has the best right to it." Fourth, since the first battle facing the Islamic resurgence in our time is the battle for freedom, Qaradawi

would "join others to demand democracy as the most secure available means to achieve our aim of an honorable life, a life in which we can call for Islam and work for Allah without being thrown into the darkness of imprisonment or being strung from the hangman's scaffolding." Qaradawi concludes, "Hence, Islamic *shura* approaches the spirit of democracy, or if you will, the spirit of democracy approaches the spirit of Islamic *shura*."⁴⁴ In another context, Qaradawi expresses his preference for a multi-party system as long as there is a collective benefit or interest (*maslaha*, one of the principles of Islamic legislative interpretation) and as long as the multi-party framework is consonant with religious values and moral ideals.⁴⁵

The ideas of Ghazali, Ghannouchi, and Qaradawi, and others, have been endorsed by moderate Islamist movements in Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Yemen, Kuwait, Algeria, and others. Overall, the "Islamic mainstream has come to accept crucial elements of political democracy: pluralism (within the framework of Islam), political participation, government accountability, the rule of law and the protection of human rights."⁴⁶ For instance, the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, an umbrella organization consisting of Islamic groups in several Arab countries with Egyptian Ikhwan dominating the leadership, released a statement in March 1994 supporting the gist of these scholars' arguments. "We believe in the existence of multiple political parties in the Islamic

society," the statement declares, "and the authorities ought not restrict the formation of political parties and groups as long as the *Shari'a* is the supreme constitution The recognition of multiple political parties entails the consent to a peaceful transfer of power between political groups and parties by means of periodic elections."⁴⁷

Islamist thought is very much "thought in progress activist, mobilizing thought, shaped and influenced by a political environment that in virtually all cases is neither liberal nor genuinely pluralistic, let alone democratic."⁴⁸ The position of moderate Islamist groups toward the limited democratization experiments in the Arab world has been supportive. On the level of practice, these groups have taken any opportunity to participate in elections. As Table 4.2 shows, Islamists have done better than predicted in political analyses produced by the ruling establishments and academic circles.

Table 4.2: Islamist Groups' Performance in Elections, 1985-1993

Country	Election Type	Year	Islamic Participants	Rank
Sudan	Parliament	1986	Islamic National Front	Third
Kuwait	Nat'l Assembly	1985	Islamists*	N.A.
	Nat'l Assembly	1992	Islamists	First
Egypt	Parliament+	1987	Islamic Alliance**	Second
Tunisia	Parliament+	1989	<i>Al-Nahda</i>	Second
Jordan	Parliament	1989	Brotherhood; Independents	First
	Parliament	1993	Islamic Action Front	Second#
Algeria	Local & reg.	1990	F.I.S.	First
	Parliament	1991	F.I.S.	First
Yemen	Parl. (North)	1988	Islamists*	N.A.
	Parliament	1993	<i>Al-Islah</i>	Second

* No recognized parties, but the Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Islah*) dominates here.

The pro-government forces came in first; however, the IAF was first among the rest of the recognized political parties.

** Composed of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Labor Party, and the Liberal Party.

+ Election fraud reported.

Source: Compiled from Keesing's Record of World Events; The Middle East and North Africa (London: Europa Pub. Ltd.)

To sum up, Islamic resurgence movements, radicals and moderates alike, no matter what other issues they may disagree upon, all have this in common: they want to shift people's frame of reference. They want to make Islam, diverse interpretations included, the center of Muslim people's sense of self, around which all other overlapping identities may orbit: Let us be Muslims. Another common theme among Islamists is the need to develop Arab society, deriving solutions "from Islam." A prerequisite for achieving development, they agree, is the creation of an Islamic political order (state) that ensures the widening of political participation and a fairer distribution of resources. According to one Islamist, these two tasks are inseparable and must go hand in hand: "Development will bring out an Islamic pride in asserting our cultural identity and practicing our faith."⁴⁹

Islamists have varied in the way they are pursuing their goals. While some of them--still in the minority--have resorted to radical methods, including the use of violence, the mainstream has advocated gradual and peaceful steps. The latter have taken advantage of democratic openings, and have contested and won in those elections in which they were allowed, and seem to be making progress toward their objectives. The problem, however, is that other forces, particularly ruling elites and secularists, have been seriously challenged by both radicals and moderate Islamists.

On one hand, Islamists' demands do constitute a challenge, if not a threat to the state and the privileged elites in almost all Arab countries. Thus, Arab regimes have to struggle with these two aspects of the challenges posed by Islamists using a variety of tactics, ranging from co-optation to outright repression. Those regimes which allowed some openings found that they had to slow the democratization process, if not reverse course entirely, due to Islamist success. This is because Islamists enter the collective identity dynamic with a contesting proposal, one which is connected to the enfranchisement of currently marginalized people. My analysis in this chapter shows that blaming Islamists for the democratization impasse is fallacious, when it is not they who have cracked down with repressive measures. How the struggle over the role of political Islam manifests itself and affects the democratic process is the subject of the next section.

Endnotes

1. Muhammad Shawqi Zaki, Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wal Mujtama' al-Masri (The Muslim Brotherhood and Egyptian Society) (Cairo: No publisher, 1954).
2. Hasan al-Banna, Majmu'at Rasa'il al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna (The Collected Letters of the Martyred Imam Hasan al-Banna) (Beirut: al-Mu'assassa al-Islamiyya, 1981), p. 121.
3. Hasan al-Banna, Six Tracts of Hasan al-Banna, (Kuwait: IIFSO, no date), p. 63.
4. Ishak Musa Hussaini, The Muslim Brethren: The Greatest of Modern Islamic Movements, (Beirut: Khayat's College Book Cooperative, 1956), p. 68.
5. See for example two books by Kamel al-Sharif, Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Philistine (The Muslim Brotherhood in the Palestine War) (Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, no date); and Al-Muqawama as-Sirriyya fi Qanat as-Suwais 1951-1954 (The Secret Resistance in the Suez Canal 1951-1954) (Beirut: No publisher, 1957).
6. Arab regimes called the 1967 war a mere "naksa" (setback). This term was perceived quite cynically by the Arab masses, who understood the depth of the catastrophe.
7. A History of the Arab People, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 422.
8. Ibid, p. 423.
9. On the impact of 1967 on the issue of identity, see Yvonne Haddad, "The Arab-Israeli Wars, Nasserism, and the Affirmation of Islamic Identity," in J. Esposito, ed., Islam and Development (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1980), pp. 107-121.
10. The Arab World, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 169.
11. Mohammed Shaalan, "Political-Psychological Influences in Islamic Revivalist Movements," Political Psychology, Vol. 7, No.4, 1986, p. 815.
12. "Presidential Address 1989. The Study of Islam: Challenges and Prospects," MESA Bulletin, Vol. 24, 1990, p. 2.
13. Abdulwahab El-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan, (London: Grey Seal, 1991), p. 1.

14. John Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 76.
15. The crisis, although not the fatwa, is summarized in Umar F. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria (Berkeley, CA: Mizan, 1983), pp. 110-111.
16. Esposito, The Islamic Threat, p. 423.
17. "Islam, Democracy, and the West," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 3, 1992, p. 131.
18. "Al-Itar al-'Am lil Sahwa al-Islamiyya al-Mu'asera" (The General Framework of the Contemporary Islamic Resurgence), in Saad Eddin Ibrahim, ed., Al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya wa Humum al-Watan al-'Arabi (The Islamic Resurgence and the Concerns of the Arab World) (Amman: Muntada al-Fikr al-'Arabi, 1988), p. 65.
19. Rafa't Said Ahmed, Limaza Qatalu al-Sadat: Qisat Tanzim al-Jihad (Why They Killed Sadat: The Story of the Al-Jihad Organization), (Cairo: Al-Dar al-Sharqiyya, 1989) and "Al-Islamiyyun: Al-Sulta wal 'Unf (Islamists: Power and Violence), Middle East Affairs Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1994, p. 79-80.
20. Faraj's tract is included as an appendix in Ni'mallah Junaina, Tanzim al-Jihad (Al-Jihad Organization), (Cairo: Dar al-Huriyya, 1988), p. 246.
21. Based on the testimony of Jihad members who were brought to trial for the assassination of Sadat.
22. Junaina, Tanzim al-Jihad, p. 142.
23. "Egypt's Islamic Militants," MERIP Reports, February 1982, p. 11.
24. Personal interview with Muhammad Qutb, Mecca, Dec. 13, 1992. For elaboration on the Qutb school see Sayyid Qutb, Ma'alim fil Tariq (Milestones on the Path) (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1980) and Muhammad Qutb, Jahiliyyat al-Qarn al-'Ishrin (The Twentieth Century Ignorance) (Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1978).
25. Personal interview, *ibid*.
26. Abd al-Mun'im M. Halima, (Amman: Al-Sharika al-Jadida, 1993), p. 40.
27. The main objective of the war, according to a majority of Islamists, was to destroy Iraq's capabilities.

28. See for example, Muhakamat al-Nizam al-Siyasi (Trials of the Political System), a tract published by al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya in Cairo, no date.

29. Al-Farida al-Gha'iba (The Forgotten Obligation). In Junainah, Tanzim al-Jihad, p. 224.

30. Personal interview with Huwaidi in Cairo, Aug. 15, 1993. See also his article, "Al-Islam wal-Dimoqratiyya" (Islam and Democracy), Al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi (The Arab Future), No. 166.

31. Al-Huriyat al-'Amma fil Dawla al-Islamiyya (Public Liberties in the Islamic State), (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabia, 1993), p. 224.

32. Wright, "Islam, Democracy...", p. 132.

33. Including: Egyptian *ulama* Muhammad al-Ghazali and Yusuf al-Qaradawi; independent Islamist writers Fahmi Huwaidi, Tawfiq al-Shawi, Muhammad 'Amara, Tariq al-Bishri, and Muhammad Salim al-'Awa; Rashid al-Ghannouchi, Hasan al-Turabi, and Ishaq al-Farhan, leaders of Islamic organizations in Tunisia, Sudan, and Jordan, respectively.

34. One of many conferences among Islamists on this issue was held in Cairo in 1992 on "Al-Ta'adudiyya al-Siasiyya fil Islam" (Political Pluralism in Islam), in which major Islamist scholars espoused the concept of pluralism.

35. Gudrun Kramer, "Islamist Notions of Democracy," Middle East Report, July-August 1993, p. 8.

36. Ibid, p. 8.

37. One of Ghazali's early works is Al-Islam wal Istibdad al-Siyasi (Islam and Political Despotism) (Cairo: Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi, 1949), a telling example of his attack on authoritarian rule.

38. Ghannouchi wrote it as a Phd. dissertation while in prison from 1981 to 1984 and then in hiding in 1986. It was published in 1993.

39. Al-Huriyat al-'Amma, p. 88.

40. Ibid, p. 133.

41. Ibid, p. 297.

42. Ibid, p. 316.

43. Personal interview, Cairo, Aug. 13, 1993. See also his book Fatawa Mu'asira (Contemporary *Fatwas*), (Cairo: Dar al-Wafa', 1993), Vol. 2.

44. Ibid, p. 651.

45. Ibid, p. 660.

46. Kramer, "Islamist Notions...", p. 8.

47. "Mujaz 'An al-Shura fil Islam wa Ta'adud al-Ahzab fil Mujtama' al-Muslim" (A Brief on Consultation in Islam and Party Pluralism in Muslim Society), Resolutions and Recommendations Issued by the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood. Pamphlet, March 1994, p. 3.

48. Kramer, "Islamist Notions...", p. 8.

49. Rachid Ben Eissa, "The Algerian Experiment," in Azzam Tamimi, ed., Power-Sharing Islam? (London: Liberty, 1993), p. 143.

Part III

The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion:

Two Case Studies

Chapter Five

Egypt: Coercion and Containment

Democratization in Egypt has fluctuated over the past two decades with the regime's efforts to contain the Islamist challenge. Since the mid seventies, Islamists have been the most popular force opposing the ruling order. Islamists have used the moderate increases in the margin of freedom granted by the regime and its occasional tolerance toward the moderate element of the Islamic movement to make gains. The regime, on its part, has been determined to exclude Islamists from political participation. Exclusion is accomplished by a combination of coercion and containment: That is, the state uses its repressive apparatus to try to eradicate radical Islamists while allowing mainstream Islamists to function but within constraints which preclude their political participation. This policy of exclusion has led those who rule Egypt to retreat from democratization. This is more than just a move by a ruling group to preserve its privilege and keep one more group of contenders away from power. For in the policies of the Egyptian government toward Islamists there is outraged objection to the very idea of an "Islamic solution" that seems to brook no compromise. This points to sharp disagreement over the contours of collective identity. The socioeconomic context for this conflict is that Egypt has poor resources and a huge population; the tiny ruling strata holds tightly to these limited resources, fearful of their

dissipation if they had to share them with Islamists, who seem to be the masses beating at the door. The international context further exacerbates the divide; because Egypt is not a marginal Arab state but a key ally for U.S. and European powers, these powers lend their weight to make sure the ruling group stays in control. All these factors contribute to the polarization of the conflict over who is to be included and who is to be excluded in the political process in Egypt. These factors are what structure the politics of democratization in Egypt.

How do democratic development and the rise of Islamists intersect? How did Egypt arrive at the stalemate of the nineties which has produced such violent political confrontation? What solid ground, if any, exists on which democratization in Egypt could develop?

A. Democratic Development in Egypt, 1970 - 1990

The general and gradual shift in Egypt over the post-Nasser decades has been from a one-party authoritarian state with complete control of the People's Assembly and the press, to a cautiously multi-party authoritarian state with more meaningful elections, a moderate margin of freedom of the press, and wary tolerance of some oppositional politics. Tolerance is not the same as inclusion, however. The mere existence of the Muslim Brotherhood (and other groups which advocate an "Islamic" political order) is tolerated in Egypt as it is not, for example, in Syria. Its evangelical activity

and other social or cultural activities which the government perceives as non-threatening are allowed, for the most part, to go on unimpeded. However, the regime maintains close watch on these activities; if Islamist organizations step over a certain line (arbitrarily defined by the government and constantly shifting), it is targeted for suppression. Such "tolerance" is carefully measured by the Egyptian regime so as to exclude the major opposition movement, that of moderate Islamists, from direct participation in politics; government policy is also designed to prevent them from gaining whatever is deemed as too much economic strength, leverage in professional institutions and unions, and influence in the media.

Sadat's takeover after Nasser's death marked a dramatic shift in Egypt's domestic policy and foreign orientation. Anwar Sadat, who was Gamal Abdul Nasser's last Vice President, was confirmed as President in a public referendum. After a brief power struggle, Sadat consolidated his control, dismissing Vice President Ali Sabri and left-leaning Party figures. Although it did not appear so to the world until after the 1973 War, a new leader with a different agenda had come to govern Egypt.

Sadat introduced some measure of political and economic liberalization. In the political sphere, Sadat increased the margin of freedom slightly. He released hundreds of members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) and allowed them

to resume some of their evangelical activities.¹ After the 1973 War, Sadat continued to release political prisoners of various persuasions. He also introduced a range of economic reforms. In 1974, Sadat officially replaced Nasser's socialist planning with an *infitah* (Open Door) policy, emphasizing reconstruction, encouraging foreign investment, and introducing a private enterprise sector.² However, because it ended up benefitting a very small business elite, widening the gap between rich and poor classes, and exposing the inability of government policies to meet the needs of the lower classes,³ *infitah* provided a grounding for opposition work. Islamists responded to the conditions created by *infitah* by providing economic assistance to the masses it left outside the door.

Second, Sadat committed himself to finding a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. He believed that Egypt's entry in the 1973 war was the only exit from a stalemate which had put the peace process out of reach. The War thus ironically moved the parties closer to negotiation.⁴ Third, he turned from reliance on the Soviet Union for weapons and political support, moving his country closer to the U.S. and the West in general.⁵ Finally, Sadat moved away from Nasser's Arab nationalism toward Egyptianism, changing the official name of the country from the United Arab Republic to the Arab Republic of Egypt. Sadat did not totally abandon the idea of Arabism,⁶ but believed in "Egypt first," which found

a certain following among the Egyptian people. When he opted for a separate peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict, he justified it partly in terms of Egypt's economic imperative: the country could not afford another war with Israel. In 1978 when the other Arab countries, in a Baghdad summit, offered to compensate for Egypt's promised foreign aid from the West on the condition that he abandon negotiation for a separate treaty with Israel, Sadat turned down the offer. He was ready to accept isolation from the Arab world if that meant prosperity and peace for Egypt. Sadat carried this orientation to an extreme which provoked domestic opposition, especially from Nationalists and Islamists, who perceived Sadat's foreign policy as a sell-out to the West. The "prosperity" Sadat touted never came for the Egyptian masses; the profits which were to be the trade-off for Egypt's ostracism by other Arab states accrued to a tiny business elite. Islamist social work thus continued to find a constituency whose needs remained unmet by the state.

Sadat, lacking the charisma of Nasser, needed to begin his rule with political liberalization to establish a measure of legitimacy to sustain him through his deviation from Nasserite policy. An important change during his tenure was the gradual end of one-party rule between 1976 and 1978. Sadat wanted to legalize political parties, yet without allowing the opposition too much power. He first permitted the formation of three groups within the Arab Socialist Union,

which soon developed into three political parties. He set strict rules for the formation of political parties in 1977, by which he prevented the revival of the Wafd party and suspended one of three groups initially allowed (the National Progressive Unionist Party). In 1977, Sadat announced the creation of a new political party, the National Democratic Party, under his chairmanship; a year later he allowed the formation of the Socialist Labor Party (SLP) as the official opposition party.⁷ He made sure to strengthen his authority, however, by pushing through a new constitution vesting executive power in the President, who is nominated by the People's Assembly and elected for a six-year term by popular referendum. The President appoints a council of ministers and may rule by decree when granted emergency power by the parliament (People's Assembly). The Assembly functions more as a rubber-stamping rather than policy-making body.⁸

Despite the Open Door economic program, the political liberalization, and the peace with Israel, the government faced growing opposition. For instance, in January 1977, when food prices shot up after the removal of price subsidies, intense riots broke out all over Egypt. The government had to revoke the price increases and introduce a variety of legal measures to prevent the recurrence of such riots. Discontent--over economic hardship and misgovernment, as well as increasing opposition to the treaty with Israel and the concomitant isolation of Egypt from the rest of the Arab world

rose in 1980--grew. In the summer of 1981, after an increase in sectarian strife between Muslims and Copts, Sadat ordered a crackdown on the opposition. His security forces arrested more than 1,000 opposition figures of all persuasions, including Islamists, Nasserites, and Communists; Copts as well as Muslims were rounded up. He placed Egypt's 40,000 privately operated mosques under government control.⁹ It was obvious that Sadat had unleashed forces he was no longer able to control except by reverting to coercion and repression. In some sense similar to Michael Gorbachev, Sadat became the victim of his liberalizing actions. Unlike the Soviet leader, however, Sadat attempted to turn back the tide his own liberalization had released. His crackdown on all opposition figures and his caustic words against them enraged many Egyptians. It was a small militant Islamist group, al-Jihad, which translated that rage into action. On October 6, 1981, while attending the annual military parade celebrating the 1973 "victory," Sadat was assassinated by members of Jihad.¹⁰ One week later, Husni Mubarak, Sadat's Vice President, was confirmed as President in a national referendum.

Mubarak's reign has been similar to that of Sadat. He began his rule with political opening, cultivated in two parliamentary elections in 1984 and 1987, as well as an achievement in foreign policy, restoring Egypt's relations with all Arab countries. Then, like Sadat, he reverted more and more to authoritarian tactics toward the end of his first

decade in power. As under Sadat, economic conditions have not improved, and the Islamist challenge has not eroded. In both these areas, things have worsened. Government's performance has deteriorated and challenge from radical Islamists has intensified; the country has entered a period of escalating violence in the nineties.

How much democratic opening has really occurred under Mubarak? The regime never discarded the use of coercive measures, even when some liberalizing steps were introduced. The regime has introduced some openings only as a way to preserve its hold on power. And most of the democratic steps adopted during Mubarak's rule have been superficial, as a the following survey of events from 1981 to 1990 will show:¹¹

The government released most oppositional figures who had been jailed in the summer of 1981. In 1984, 174 of the 302 people arrested in conjunction with Sadat's killing for plotting to overthrow the government were acquitted. Yet the state of emergency imposed after the assassination of Sadat was extended again and again (and is still in force). The government also continued its sweep of arrests of radical Islamists.

In early 1984, the government legalized an important opposition party, the New Wafd. In the same year, the first election of the People's Assembly under Mubarak took place. However, electoral law required parties to receive a minimum of 8% of the total vote to be represented in the Assembly.

The only party able to cross this threshold was the New Wafd, which had allowed the Muslim Brotherhood candidates to run on its lists. In this election the New Wafd, despite reported government fraud, won 15.8% of the vote (see Table 5.1). Mubarak held this election not out of commitment to democratic reform, but so that "he could consolidate his authority and at the same time (by restoring a measure of real democracy) establish himself as a popular leader, tolerant, within limits, of opposition . . . "12

The second election for the People's Assembly to occur during Mubarak's term took place in 1987 after a ruling by the Supreme Constitutional Court that the previous election in 1984 was unconstitutional because it had not allowed independent candidates to stand for election. But the immediate reasons for holding the election were the riots which erupted in the South led by Islamic radicals in protest of the government's policy to ban veiled women from campuses, and an earlier report about a coup plot involving Islamists. Mubarak wanted to secure a second term as president and needed to claim a mandate from a wider segment of the population. In this election, Mubarak's National Democratic Party maintained its dominance in the new assembly, but a new coalition of two parties (the Socialist Labor Party and the Liberal Party) with the Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood) emerged as the largest opposition bloc. The coalition, calling itself the Islamic Alliance, won a total of sixty seats, of which the Ikhwan had

37. The New Wafd won only thirty-five seats, down from fifty-eight in 1984, and independent candidates mostly affiliated with the ruling party filled the forty-eight seats provided by the new electoral law (see Table 5.2).

The 1987 election, despite widespread government fraud and intimidation,¹³ was significant because it increased the representation of the opposition substantially compared to previous elections. The emergence of the Ikhwan as the largest opposition group, even without legal recognition, startled the ruling elite who slowed down the democratic experiment and reverted to more authoritarian practices. Meanwhile (July 1987), Mubarak was nominated by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly and confirmed for a second term by a national referendum, by an alleged 97.1% of votes cast.

Table 5.1: The Results of the 1984 People's Assembly Election

Party	Seats	% of votes
National Democratic	384	72.9
New Wafd	58*	15.8
Socialist Labor	--	7.1
National Progressive Unionist	--	4.2
Liberal Socialist	--	0.6
Total	448	100

* The Ikhwan's share was eight seats.

Source: "Egypt," The Middle East and North Africa 1984-1985, 31st ed. (London: Europa Pub. Ltd., 1984), p. 342.

Table 5.2: The Results of the 1987 People's Assembly Election

Party	Seats	% of votes
National Democratic	346	69.3
Islamic Alliance*	60	17.0
New Wafd	35	10.9
National Progressive Unionist+	--	--
Umma+	--	--
Independent	7**	--
Total	448	100

*The Ikhwan's share was thirty-seven seats.

**The total number given to independents, according to the new electoral law, was forty-eight, but forty-one of them were affiliated with NDP.

+These parties failed to win the minimum of 8% of total votes required for representation in the Assembly and their votes were transferred to the NDP.

Source: "Egypt," The Middle East and North Africa 1988, 34th ed. (London: Europa Pub. Ltd., 1987), p. 368.

As unrest continued through 1988-89, the government responded with more arrests, particularly during Ramadan 1989. Most of the detainees were identified as Muslim fundamentalists. A month later the elections for the Shura Council (the upper house created in 1980) were held. This was the first time the opposition parties were allowed to contest. The Islamic Alliance contested, while the New Wafd party boycotted the election. The first sign of the regime's intention to abort the democratic project were election returns in which the ruling party got all the contested seats. It was widely believed that the government rigged the election.¹⁴ Government efforts to prevent the representation of any opposition member to the Shura Council left bitterness among Islamic Alliance candidates. According to a report close to the Ikhwan, it was the Shura election which led the Islamic opposition, and the Ikhwan in particular, to question the virtue of participation and to hesitate before running in future elections without minimum guarantees of fairness.¹⁵

In 1990 there were three positive developments related to the struggle for democracy. The first was the dismissal of the Minister of the Interior, Zaki Badr. Badr was the ugly face of the regime. Not only had he conducted the ruthless campaign against the Islamic radicals, but he also harassed and confronted most of the opposition. On January 9, 1990, the opposition newspaper Al-Sha'b published on the first page a transcript of a speech he had delivered accusing opposition

and prominent intellectuals of treason, and cursing them in vulgar language.¹⁶ All oppositional parties, journalists, and intellectuals, organized a campaign against the Minister. Badr's dismissal was considered a victory for the opposition.

The second development was more symbolic than substantive. The government legalized three new political parties, bringing the total number to nine. However, these new parties, the Green Party, the Democratic Unionist, and the Young Egypt, were distinctly lacking in popular bases.

The third development was the Supreme Constitutional Court's ruling in May 1990 that the 1987 Assembly elections were unconstitutional because electoral laws had discriminated against independent candidates. The government responded by calling for a referendum about whether to dissolve the Assembly or not. A majority of those who participated in the referendum supported the dissolution of the Assembly; it was dissolved on October 12. This set the stage for a new election. Electoral laws were amended by the government so that the 8% threshold was removed. The party list system was abolished and all candidates had to run as independents. While the main opposition parties welcomed the dissolution of the Assembly and were ready to participate in the new election, they boycotted the election because the government refused to guarantee judicial, instead of police, supervision of the election, and to repeal emergency laws. Only the left-oriented NPUP broke from the agreement reached by leaders of

Wafd, Labor, Liberals, and Ikhwan. The NPUP, despite its skepticism about the government's honesty, saw an opportunity to win seats in the absence of real competition with the more popular parties.¹⁷ The ruling party, of course, won the majority of seats (see Table 5.3).

Three remarks about the 1990 election are in order. First, despite the decision of the major opposition parties (the New Wafd, Labor, and the Liberals) to boycott the election, some of their followers did not abide by the party decision. These defectors were encouraged by the government to give the election some credibility; however, most of these candidates were suspended by their parties. Second, having anticipated no serious competition, the government had allowed a higher degree of fairness and minimized police interference in the election proceedings.¹⁸ Nevertheless, the boycott affected the election by discouraging voter turnout. Even according to governmental sources, only 19% of those eligible voted in the election. In some constituencies, especially in Cairo, the turnout was around 7%.¹⁹ Finally, government refusal to accommodate opposition demands for guarantees of fairness undermined the credibility of the election. The refusal to provide mechanisms for ensuring fair elections has increased apathy among Egyptian people, especially the young and marginalized, many of whom expressed their dissatisfaction by turning to Islamic sources for a critique of the government.

Table 5.3: The Results of the 1990 People's Assembly Election

Party	Seats	% of votes
National Democratic	348	79.6
National Progressive Unionist	6	1.4
Independents	83*	19.0
Total	437**	100

* Of the eighty-three independents fifty-six were affiliated with the NDP, fourteen with the New Wafd, eight to the SLP and one with the SP.

**Voting was suspended in three constituencies and for one seat of the fourth.

Source: "Egypt," The Middle East and North Africa 1993, 39th ed. (London: Europa Pub. Ltd., 1992), p. 396 and 374.

In foreign policy, Mubarak succeeded in balancing Egypt's peace requirements with Israel, maintaining strong relations with the U.S., and restoring diplomatic relations with all the Arab countries. The Egyptian government was able to regain the Sinai peninsula from Israel despite constraints in the relations between the two countries, which reached a low point after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Egypt under Mubarak managed to remain a main ally of the U.S. in the area. This alliance has brought American military and economic assistance to Egypt. Egypt, in turn, has acted in accordance with U.S. interest in the region, as manifesting in its joining the U.S.-led alliance against Iraq in the Gulf War. The skill of Egyptian diplomacy lay in pursuing Egyptian interests with both Israel and the U.S., while restoring the country's good relations within the Arab world. Egypt had made a comeback as a major player in the Arab world by the end of 1989. In 1990, Arab League headquarters was moved from Tunis back to Cairo. These achievements, however, neither impressed the rising opposition to Mubarak's rule, nor improved the conditions of the average Egyptian.

B. The Islamist Challenge in Egypt

Since the eighties, the Islamist movement has constituted the main political challenge to the Egyptian state, in two ways. Radical Islamist groups pose a security threat to the state. More significantly, moderate Islamists who have steadily built a popular base, developed institutions, and

begun to negotiate a space for themselves in the political process, pose the threat of an eventual transfer of power, of major change in the established order. The government has responded to the first threat by simple repressive measures. Regarding the second threat, the state has oscillated between coercive measures and co-optive tolerance intended to minimize the role of Islamists in politics. Unlike the Jordanian state, the Egyptian government has not considered inclusion of Islamists within the political process as a viable option.

The Islamic trend in Egypt has several manifestations. One is the increased religiosity among the Egyptian people in the last two decades. Another is the fact that almost all political parties, to varying degrees, have accepted the central role of Islam as a source of identity and a frame of reference. In the 1987 parliamentary election, all political parties, from right to left, including the NDP, (the ruling party) included in their campaigns a commitment to implement *shari'a*.²⁰ Even the ruling elite and its party quickly understood the necessity of using Islam to legitimize its rule. The manipulation of "Islam" by the state began immediately after Sadat took over. Not only did he release hundreds of the Ikhwan, but he allowed them to propagate their brand of Islam in a new order, calling himself "the believing President." In 1980, he affirmed Egypt's adherence to Islamic jurisprudence by an amendment making *shari'a* the main source of legislation.²¹ Of course, Sadat's use of Islam backfired

on him, as it encouraged radical Islamists to judge and ultimately indict him by what they believed to be Islamic standards.

The most dynamic manifestation of the Islamic trend is the various groups which are striving to move Egypt toward their vision of an Islamic order. These groups are of two distinct kinds: the radical militant groups and the mainstream or moderate Islamic ones, particularly the Ikhwan.

1. The radical groups. It is estimated today that the number of these groups (*Gama'at*) is around twenty. Most scholars of contemporary Egypt agree that the origins of these groups can be traced to the last few years of Nasser's rule. The brutal tortures inflicted on Islamists led many of them to question whether the people in the regime were actually Muslims like themselves. The intellectual basis for many of these radicals is their reading of Sayed Qutb in Ma'alim fil Tariq (Milestones). In this book, Qutb distinguishes between Islamic rule deriving its authority from God, and *jahiliyya* (ignorance), which includes all other rules -- nationalist, capitalist, communist, or other.²² The radical groups which emerged in the seventies and eighties carried Qutb's argument a step further. For them, the regimes which control most Arab and Muslim nations fall into the *jahiliyya* or unbelief category and are therefore illegitimate. The struggle to overthrow such regimes is a religious duty. It is a struggle between right and wrong, faith and unbelief.²³ Members of

these groups have attempted to overthrow the existing order, carrying attacks against various targets associated with the regime. For example:²⁴

- In 1974, a small group calling itself *Gama'at al-Tahrir al-Islami* (the Islamic Liberation Group) carried out an attempt to seize the Military Technical School in order to topple the regime. The attempt failed and the leader of the group, Dr. Salih Siriyya, was executed.

- Another group, *Gama'at al-Muslimin* (the Group of Muslims) known popularly as *Al-Takfir wal Hijra* (Excommunication and Emigration) abducted a former Minister of Religious Affairs. The group demanded the release of some of their members as a condition for the release of its hostage. The operation ended with the killing of the hostage and the capture of the group's leaders, four of whom were executed in the same year (1977).

- A newly formed group, *Al-Jihad*, decided to organize a revolt against the Sadat regime in October 1981. Only the first part of the plot, the assassination of Sadat, was successful. While five of the assassins were executed shortly thereafter, around three hundred members were tried in 1984. Of them, 174 were convicted, receiving prison sentences ranging from two years to life. This group and its offshoot, *Tala'e' al-Fath* (Vanguard of Conquest, or the New Jihad) and its rival, *Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya* (the Islamic Group) are the two principal radical Islamic organizations in Egypt today.

It is widely believed even by sources close to the government that the conditions in Egypt under Mubarak's regime constituted a suitable environment for the proliferation of such groups. Among these conditions are: extreme poverty, high unemployment, lack of meaningful avenues for political participation, and the widening gap between the rich and poor. Members of society who despair of ever gaining a stake in the system or a voice in its decision-making process are most likely to become radical or revolutionary. In addition, the extreme cruelty with which the regime has dealt with followers of these groups has generated counter-violence and terrorism. To the regime, these groups constitute a security threat and should be treated as such.

2. Moderate movements. Moderate Islamists include the continuation of the Ikhwan (established in 1927 by Hasan al-Banna), as well as a loose cluster of other groups and individuals who believe in the gradual Islamic reform of society and state. Of all the oppositional parties, legal and illegal, the Ikhwan has been the most popular movement under both Sadat and Mubarak. As detailed in Chapter Four, the Ikhwan had enjoyed a measure of popularity before Nasser. Despite Ikhwan support for Nasser's revolution, the movement came into conflict with him. Nasser was successful in utilizing the power of the state, particularly coercion and propaganda, to suppress the Ikhwan. After their release from prison in the early seventies, surviving movement leaders,

most of whom had spent at least ten years in prison, embarked on a very cautious and moderate approach in dealing with the political order. For the most part, they were accommodating and acquiescent in dealing with the Sadat regime. Their hard experience with Nasser led them to reject violence and to work gradually, concentrating on society rather than the state as an arena for transformation. Toward the end of Sadat's years, they became more critical of some of his policies, especially *infatah* (economic "open door") which created a small class of beneficiaries and raised the masses' expectations without being able to satisfy them. The second area of disagreement with Sadat was over the signing of a separate deal with Israel. Hence, their leaders were included in the arrest campaign in the summer of 1981 which included all opposition figures.

It was reported that it was during this imprisonment that the leader of Ikhwan, Umar al-Talmasani, and the leader of the New Wafd, Fu'ad Siraj al-Din, were able to debate a few issues and lay down the grounds for the alliance between the two groups in 1984. This alliance enabled the Ikhwan to contest that election and win eight seats. While the Ikhwan were making a political comeback through the parliament, they continued to work to reform the individual and society via propagating and publishing religious literature. Also, they were increasingly involved in forming economic institutions independent of the state.

Several mainstream groups and respected intellectuals joined the ranks of moderate Islamists during the eighties. Among the intellectual independents who made the conversion: Muhammad Amara, Tariq al-Bishri, and Adel Hussein. And among the main political movements which became more Islamic is the Socialist Labor Party. According to its Assistant Secretary General, Magdi Qarqar, it was during the fourth general conference in January 1987 that the Party asserted its Arabic-Islamic identity and defined an Islamic agenda addressing society's problems.²⁵ This transformation set the stage for the party to build an alliance with Ikhwan and the Liberal Party called the Islamic Alliance. The motto of the alliance in the 1987 parliamentary election was "Islam is the Solution." The Islamization of the Party was not without problems. A small group, led by the vice president of the party, and with governmental encouragement, led a coup inside the party to protest the takeover by pro-Islamist elements. While this consequently led to a split within the party, its leaders adhered to the Islamic character. This is why the Labor-Ikhwan alliance proved more durable than the alliance between the Ikhwan and the New Wafd. The Labor Party newspaper, Al-Sha'b, has been a strong voice of opposition to Mubarak regime and an outlet for the leaders of the Ikhwan to express their views since they do not have a paper or magazine of their own.²⁶

Having proved to be a viable partner in electoral

politics, the Ikhwan became an attractive alliance party. In the second parliamentary election in 1987, they dominated, winning thirty-seven seats out of sixty (the total share of the alliance). The Ikhwan became indisputably the main official opposition party in the country, without even being recognized as a legal political party. Through their coalition-building experiences with other opposition parties, the Ikhwan membership has learned how to function within a multi-party framework and has demonstrated a commitment to the rules of democratic participation. "No matter what the regime tries to do, there is only one solution to the crisis and only one way to a better future, and that is true and real democracy," declared an Ikhwan leader.²⁷

The demands of the Ikhwan while serving in parliament reveal their moderate and reformist agenda. For example, in their responses to the report of the government, they called for: The complete implementation of *shari'a* in compliance with the amendment to the constitution; an end to the emergency laws and widening the margin of freedom; change in the law which regulates the formation of parties, so they could form a political party of their own; an Islamic alternative to deal with particular issues, such as abolishing *riba* (usury) and replacing it with Islamic economic structures; reform of the educational system; and an end to the corruption and inertia of the bureaucracy.²⁸

In short, the most important and most popular opposition

group in Egypt, the Ikhwan, is a moderate organization which has indicated in word and deed its capacity and willingness to work within the system despite the legal and illegal constraints under which the government has put it. The Egyptian government has responded with harassment, intimidation, and determination to exclude the Ikhwan from meaningful participation in the political process.

C. The Democratization Stalemate in the Nineties

Mubarak's regime has, for the last two decades, employed a dual strategy of suppression of the radicals and co-optation of the moderates within a narrow margin of freedom. The year 1989-90 was a turning point for democratization and Islamists, in which the state tried to turn back both these trends. The blatant government fraud in the 1989 Shura Council elections and the government's refusal to guarantee judicial supervision of the 1990 elections, marked the outer boundaries of the regime's political reform and liberalization. The regime has attempted to re-shrink the margin of political freedom. The closing of the door of meaningful political participation against the moderate Islamists, the most viable opposition, has added to the regime's record of failure and corruption.

The first component of the state strategy directed at radical Islamists is one of harsh suppression. The government has used the emergency laws in effect since 1981, giving the security forces wide-ranging powers of arrest and detention. The campaign of detention has increased dramatically in

response to the violent waves of attack by militant Islamists against government figures and security forces beginning in 1991. In one figure obtained from government sources, the number of detention orders between January 1991 and October 1993 reached 24,568 detainees whose detention time lasted between forty-five days to three years. Comparing the same figures of detainees with those under Nasser and Sadat shows a conspicuous increase in the reliance on this measure. The number of political detainees under Nasser and Sadat were 14,000 and 19,000 respectively.²⁹ According to many human rights organizations, the current government uses torture routinely. Recently several people have died under torture. The most reported case was that of Abdel Hareth Madani, a lawyer known for his defense of militant Islamists. Madani was arrested on April 26, 1993; one week later, his family was asked to come and collect his body. The family's request for an autopsy was denied. This incident caused a major confrontation between the lawyers' union, dominated by moderate Ikhwan, and the government. More than one thousand lawyers demonstrated in protest of the torture of their colleague. The government used tear gas to disperse the demonstrators.³⁰

In addition to the emergency laws, the government lately has relied on two additional measures. First, the parliament passed an anti-terrorist law in July 1992 which makes membership in any organization defined as terrorist a crime

punishable by death and further empowered the security forces to detain suspects without notifying the prosecutor's office. Second, after the trial of twenty-seven suspects for killing the former speaker of parliament in 1990, in which the civilian court found all of them not guilty,³¹ the government has been using military courts to ensure the speedy trial and conviction of militant Islamists.³² Since 1992, sixty Islamists have been sentenced to death.³³ In the few years since 1990, there have been more political executions in Egypt than under any other Egyptian regime this century.

Despite the government's insistence with every arrest that it has completely eliminated the "terrorists,"³⁴ political violence is far from over in Egypt. In fact, the available numbers show an increase in the number of people killed between 1992 and 1994. The total number of people killed reached ninety-four in 1992, 341 in 1993, and 234 as of October 1994. The victims of political violence have been civilians, militants, and security forces (see Table 5.4). Militant Islamists have targeted security personnel, government officials, particularly the Interior Minister (there were assassination attempts on the life of almost every Interior Minister under Mubarak), Copts, anti-Islamist intellectuals, and lately foreign tourists. The government's intense security crackdown appears to be working. The fact that the militants lack resources, unity, and charismatic leadership,³⁵ coupled with excessive repression by the

government, all have made the militants more of a security issue to the Mubarak regime than a true threat to political stability.³⁶

Table 5.4: Casualties of Political Violence in Egypt 1993

Classification	Killed	Wounded
Security forces	120	181
Militant Islamists	111	252
Civilians	101	341
Total	341	774

Source: Civil Society, Vol. III, Issue 25, Jan. 1994, p. 30.

The second component of the government's strategy to combat the Islamist challenge has been to contain and co-opt the rise of the moderate Ikhwan. As discussed earlier, the Ikhwan decided to utilize the margin of freedom provided by the government, entering the political process on the lists of other legalized parties (Wafd in 1984 and Labor and Liberal in 1987). While their participation was tolerated, the relation between the Ikhwan and the Mubarak regime has been strained. The closest point of rapprochement with the government came after their unexpected victory in the parliamentary elections of 1987. In appreciation for what they took to be a sign of substantive change and a promise of genuine reform, the Ikhwan as well as most other parties endorsed Mubarak for a second term a few months later.

Nevertheless, the government never relaxed its campaign of arrest and intimidation against the Ikhwan, not even during that short-lived honeymoon of 1987-1988.³⁷ After 1990, Mubarak's regime decided to exclude the Ikhwan from the political process altogether. Mubarak was quoted in Arabic newspapers as having told former Algerian President Chazli Benjedid not to allow the Islamists to contest in a free election in Algeria. According to one Ikhwan leader, Mubarak "declared many times that he would not repeat the same mistake of granting the Islamists the right to officially engage in political activities or participate in democratic elections. So far, the Muslim Brotherhood, the largest Islamist group in

Egypt, continues to be prevented from acting as a political party or officially forming one."³⁸ Mubarak's fears are not unrealistic. The outcome of the Algerian elections only strengthened his conviction that allowing free and fair elections means unseating his rule. In one recent report on Egypt, Robert Kaplan concludes that "[t]he overwhelming majority of Egyptians and Western diplomats I asked said that if truly free elections were ever held in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood would probably win the most votes. That's as specific as the information gets."³⁹

Having understood the regime's unwillingness to let them win in a free election, the Ikhwan has concentrated its energies on winning control of professional associations, unions, and charitable organizations. The Ikhwan uses its leadership in these organizations to do what the government has been increasingly unable to do: provide assistance to the lower strata of society who live in the slums of Cairo and upper Egypt (where the government is only visible through the police). Another dimension of the Ikhwan's role is in providing members of professional associations under their leadership with affordable services. For example, in the 80,000-member physicians' union now led by the Ikhwan, "the union gives physicians and their families the best quality health care at a minimal price. They have a reputation for being honest and careful with union funds. That reputation has wide appeal in a country whose government is seen as

thoroughly corrupt."⁴⁰ As of 1993, the Ikhwan has been able to dominate, or at least do well in, the elected boards of the unions of doctors, pharmacists, engineers, teachers, the association of university professors, student unions at Egypt's universities, and many of the 14,000 private philanthropies.⁴¹ Louis Cantori, in his field research in Egypt, found in the area of Cairo and Alexandria alone around 9,000 charitable Islamic organizations providing welfare services, jobs, and education to the needy. Government-controlled mosques ⁴² and private mosques co-operate in running these institutions. In Egypt today, Cantori concludes, "there are Islamic infrastructure that protect and educate the masses."⁴³

What became obvious in the early nineties in Egypt is the decline of the state's ability to carry out its welfare functions. It was the Ikhwan and other Islamists who jumped to fill this vacuum. Although the work of the Ikhwan in this area contributes to the maintenance of social order, the government has repeatedly intervened in the affairs of its "independent" voluntary associations to assert its control and draw lines on what might be tolerated and what will not. Examples of such intervention:

- In 1988, the government passed a law to organize the activities of the investment companies which proliferated in the mid-eighties. Many of these companies were run by Islamists and conducted according to Islamic economic

principles. Although there was something fishy about a few of these companies because of the high profit rates they were claiming, the government was mostly alarmed by the willingness of so many people to trust Islamists with their life savings and to contribute to the economic power of Islamists.⁴⁴

- In February 1992, security forces stormed a computer company, Salsabil, whose owners were known to be Islamists. The government charged the owners of plotting with the Ikhwan to overthrow the government. Although the company's activities were well-known to the government, which had even been a client, the real fear was that Ikhwan members were becoming more skilled in the field of information-processing. Authoritarian regimes do not feel comfortable with opposition groups gaining this kind of expertise. Thus the government wanted to set limits on the expansion of Islamists in this area.⁴⁵

- After the victory of all sixteen Ikhwan candidates for the board of the 25-seat Lawyers' Syndicate, the government was alarmed by Islamist influence in one of the last strongholds of secular liberals and leftists. The government responded by issuing a new syndicate law in February 1993. The new law required a turnout of 50% of the syndicate members in the first round and 33% in the second round. Failing this, the government would appoint a council to run the syndicate.⁴⁶ The purpose of this law was to reduce, if not eliminate, the dominance of Ikhwan over these syndicates.

Thus, on one hand, the lack of popular access to meaningful political participation, as well as the government's inability to fulfill some of its social and economic functions, have left spaces which have been filled for the most part by moderate Islamists. This stabilizing role is one the government cannot easily eliminate. On the other hand, the regime cannot and has not let Islamist influence go unchecked. One researcher has characterized the relationship between Egypt's authoritarian state and the parallel Islamic sphere as marked by both contestation and accommodation. "Instead of challenging state power directly, the Muslim Brotherhood and other reformist groups are involved in the gradual appropriation of the public space, creating new models of political leadership and community in contrast to the policies and practices of state elites. Though posing a moral alternative to the secular state, such groups are nevertheless dependent on patrons within it for support."⁴⁷ Lately, the government has been less tolerant toward the Ikhwan, utilizing both bureaucratic and coercive measures to curb their rising influence and popularity.

The regime's main priority of excluding Islamists from political participation by completely suppressing the militants and containing and harassing the moderates, could not be implemented without sacrificing the few democratic steps adopted in the mid-to-late eighties. What are the major developments of the nineties which signify the retreat from

democratization in Egypt?

The first blow to the move toward democracy has been the continuation of the emergency laws since 1981. In addition to the emergency laws, "terrorist laws" have been passed in parliament which make membership in a "terrorist organization," as defined by the state, a crime punishable by death, and ordains speedy trials by military courts for those arrested under these laws. The outcome of all this has been gross human rights violations by the state and increased violence by both the security forces and the militants.

Second, the intervention of the government in the affairs of independent syndicates in order to contain the rising popularity of moderate Islamists is a regression from democratic practice. A low point in this intervention is the syndicate law which is likely to end the practice of honest elections within professional unions. Moderate Islamists and opposition leaders have described this law as a "stab in the back of democracy."⁴⁸ In the words of Fahmi Huwaidi, the new syndicate law "shocked us four times: once because it was issued, second because it was justified in the name of democracy; third because it was issued by the People's Assembly, and finally because some intellectuals and politicians welcomed it."⁴⁹ In addition, the government recently eliminated the right of professors to elect the deans of university faculties, and decreed that mayors and village council members will be appointed instead of elected. Many of

those elected in these positions in recent years have been affiliated with the Ikhwan.

The third event in the retreat from democratization was the "re-election" of Mubarak for a third term and his reluctance to introduce political reform. "To many Egyptians, the referendum signals an end to hopes that Mubarak will institute real democratic reform," Chris Hedges of The New York Times reported on the eve of the referendum. He continued, "[M]any say they believe that political renewal may come only at the point of a gun, as it has in the past."⁵⁰ Mubarak ran uncontested and was approved by 94.9 percent of the valid votes cast. Any hope that Mubarak would introduce change was shattered when he invited Atef Sidki, the same Prime Minister he has had since 1986, to form a government. No change was introduced to key ministries.⁵¹

Finally, the regime's increasing pressure against the moderate Islamists, particularly Ikhwan, is expected to have grave consequences. In addition to the frequent harassment including more arrests of local leaders of the movement, and the attempt to weaken their influence in the syndicates, unions, and local councils, the government officials have been speaking of the Ikhwan as "the other face" of terrorist organizations, attempting to redefine radicalism to include even moderate reformists. The blurring of the distinction between the moderate Ikhwan and the militants will only widen the circle of repression with potential danger of more

radicalization and subsequently violence. The spokesman for the Ikhwan, Ma'mun al-Hudaibi, was quoted as saying, "If our supporters believe we cannot achieve our goals peacefully, they may turn to more radical means to achieve them."⁵²

Amid the increased violence and counter-violence, the government has manipulated secularist intellectuals in its war against Islamists by encouraging them to criticize, ridicule, and libel Islamists and the "Islamic alternative." The recruitment of secularists, particularly communists, in the media war against Islamists is common to Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria. The annual tradition of inviting leading intellectuals to debate public issues at the Cairo Book Fair, for example, has degenerated into a one-sided diatribe excoriating Islamists, whose participation in the event has been restricted recently. "The intellectual monologue 'against terrorism' at the Cairo Book Fair in January only proved how far secular intellectuals of the right and left are ready to play into the hands of the government."⁵³ For some secularists, the lesser of two evils --the regime and the Islamists-- is the regime. As secular novelist Gamal al-Ghitani puts it, "In the battle between a religious extremism and terrorism seeking to bring down a corrupt and basically repressive Government, the choice for many of us, lamentable though it might be, is to side with army and regime."⁵⁴ There are "fundamentalist" secularists who totally reject any political role for Islamist movements, including the moderate

Ikhwan. One example is Hussein Ahmed Amin, former ambassador and prolific author. In his opinion, any Islamist group will use democracy to gain power and then abolish the democratic process for a religious rule that would be an anti-democratic catastrophe. He makes the analogy between Islamists and Adolf Hitler. "If they do reach power, it would be too late. If we put them to the test and allow them to reach power, they will never share it. This applies to the Muslim Brotherhood as much as any other Islamic group or faction."⁵⁵

To some Islamists, particularly the militants, the proclamations of these extremist secularists are not purely intellectual discourse, but rather a call for the exclusion from participation and a justification for the brutal, violent campaign by the security forces to eradicate Islamists. To militant Islamists, such individuals become a part of the oppressive state apparatus and deserve to be treated as such. It was under these circumstances that Farag Foda, the most outspoken anti-Islamist, was assassinated by militants in 1992. Foda was given a great deal of exposure by the official media to attack and libel Islamists. While the Ikhwan were not fond of Foda, they joined opposition parties in condemning the assassination and the spread of violence.⁵⁶

Although violent attempts against secular intellectuals has been limited, it could worsen if the vicious circle of violence continues and if polarization between Islamists and secularists is hardened. A case in point is Algeria, where

extremist Islamists targeted secularists and secularists formed their own militias, joining government forces to eradicate Islamists.⁵⁷

The government strategy of recruiting secularists in its ideological campaign against the Islamists, coupled with attempts at excluding the moderate Ikhwan and equating them with the militants increases the polarization and could lead the country in a direction similar to that of Algeria: civil war.

Finally, there is sporadic sectarian strife between Muslims and Copts in the southern part of the country, a stronghold of the militants and a place of relatively high concentrations of the Christian Coptic minority. The Copts already feel apprehensive at the prospect of an Islamist takeover, fears exacerbated by violent clashes between members of their community and the militants. The government has used the sectarian clashes to justify the prolonging of martial law and the denial of legal status to any political party based on religion. Since no Coptic group so far has attempted to form a political party, this policy is aimed at Islamits.

D. Limits and prospects

Egypt has a head start over many other Arab nations in some of the factors which create favorable conditions for democracy. Collective identity, at least in the sense of agreement on borders and a sense of local cohesion, is relatively stable in Egypt. Nominal opposition and some

limited freedom of expression could become a basis for political pluralism. And the strongest opposition, the Ikhwan, is moderate and willing to work within the system if allowed. On the other hand, several factors militate against democracy in Egypt. Low resources, high population growth, and poor distribution of wealth widening the gap between haves and have-nots create adverse economic conditions for democratization. Bureaucratic corruption in the government sabotages any attempt at reform. Mubarak's inferior leadership obtusely botches opportunities and stubbornly disregards the rising cost of repression. The influence of world powers, notably the U.S., has a deleterious effect on democratization in Egypt, supporting an authoritarian status quo rather than risking change. All these contribute to Egypt's politics of exclusion and obstruct the path of democratization.

In the Arab world, post-colonial Egypt was not an artificial entity. Despite the various rules before and since the Arabo-Islamic conquest, its boundaries have not shifted very much. The late Egyptian historian Gamal Hamdan describes the characteristics which made Egypt unique and a center for other Arab countries: historical continuity, homogenous population, and a uniform agricultural region, in which the people have settled along the two banks of the Nile River.⁵⁸ Egypt's population is highly homogenous. The 1986 census showed that 94% of the people are Muslim (almost all Sunnis);

the only substantial minority, at 5.8%, is the Copts, who in any case consider themselves the original inhabitants of the land of Egypt. Even as a minority, then, the Copts share with the majority a strong sense of Egyptianness. There are also about 50,000 Egyptian adherents of other Christian sects and a very small Jewish community.⁵⁹ The vast majority of the population, then, identifies as Egyptian, speaks Arabic (with a distinctive dialect) and is Muslim by religion.

While there is a strong sense of Egyptian national identity among the population, there have been differences over what constitutes Egyptianness. As detailed in Chapter Two, local nationalism (*wataniyya*) in modern Egypt has its roots in Muhammad Ali's assertion of independence from Ottoman rule just after Napoleon's retreat from his Egyptian adventure. *Wataniyya* was strong during the British occupation, when the emphasis was on liberation from colonial rule. Nominal independence for Egypt came in 1923; the aristocratic and bourgeois nationalists who formed the ruling elite left in place by the British were totally discredited by the Arab failure in the 1948 war to prevent the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land. Then came Nasser who located Egyptian nationalism within the wider sphere of Arab nationalism and defined the natural role of Egypt as the leader of the Arab world. Under Sadat, Arabism was downplayed and Egyptianism was emphasized, with a touch of Islamic character. By the late eighties, the Islamic identity of

Egypt became even more central, reflected in the 1987 parliamentary election in which almost all political forces advocated the implementation of shari'a to varying degrees. Yet with the rise of radical Islamist groups, a counter coalition defending secularism (the separation of religion from politics) arose. This coalition is composed of small but influential leftist intellectuals, some members of the ruling elite, and many in the Coptic community. Nevertheless, Islam and Egypt are not mutually exclusive. The social homogeneity of Egypt and the strong sense of national unity are favorable conditions for the prospect of transition toward democracy.

Another positive factor for a movement toward democracy is the fact that Egypt's main Islamic movement, the Ikhwan, has been willing to work from within the system and has adhered to the rules of the democratic game. The Ikhwan has condemned violence as a matter of principle, whether committed by the government or by the militants.⁶⁰ To the Ikhwan, as one of their leaders states, much of the violence stems from the lack of genuine political participation and the repression by a corrupt government. "The young men who are involved in such radical activities could have been contained and tamed through a genuine democratic process in which their grievances would have found the way to settlement and resolution, and as a result violence would gradually fade out and eventually disappear."⁶¹ They call *hiwar* (dialogue) "the forgotten obligation."⁶² This is in contrast to the militants, who say

that "the forgotten obligation" is armed struggle against the "ignorant and unIslamic regime."

Despite the democratic regression in Egypt, oppositional parties continue to function within the small margin of freedom allowed. More importantly, the press, including organs of the opposition, continue to enjoy a degree of freedom of expression which is, by the standards of the Arab world, significant. The opposition has used freedom of expression to criticize the government, expose corruption, call for reform, and present itself as an alternative to Mubarak and his party. Major opposition parties, the Labor and Wafd in addition to the Ikhwan, have adamantly opposed the renewal for Mubarak for a third term.⁶³ Although the government responded by arresting the deputy-chair of the Labor Party and two other journalists in the party's paper, Al-Sha'b, they were released on October 7, 1993 under popular pressure. This incident highlights the classic dilemma of authoritarian regimes when they allow some measure of *glasnost*: how to contain the forces they unleash.

However, in spite of the existence of a strong sense of collective identity, a nominal opposition, a relatively free press, and a moderate Islamic movement committed to working from within the system, other factors are required for democracy to come about in Egypt. First, there must be a substantial socio-economic and political reform, in order for the country to dry up the sources of corruption and violence.

Although the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank provide Egypt with significant debt relief because of its stand on the Gulf War and give Egypt good grades on its structural reforms, these reforms have not improved the living conditions of most Egyptians. Unemployment, underemployment, lack of basic services, poverty, all have remained endemic. The main economic challenge for Egypt is the growing gap between sustained population growth and natural resource depletion. For instance, Egypt's population today, an estimated 51 million, is expected to reach 65 million by the end of this decade. Simultaneously, according to one source, ten percent of Egypt's agriculture production is lost every year due to the deterioration of soil fertility.⁶⁴ It is logical to assume that Egypt's economic problems, regardless of its political system, could only be solved with regional cooperation and integration in which a portion of Egypt's labor force could get jobs in the underpopulated countries, especially neighboring Libya and the Arab Gulf states. However, what makes the matter worse is the extent of corruption and mismanagement within the government and the top bureaucracy. "Deals on every conceivable commodity are made by middlemen and commission agents, usually with some minister or Mubarak-in-law as a front."⁶⁵ Egypt has a tiny wealthy strata composed of the current and former officials (including many with military backgrounds) and private businesspeople who quietly enriched themselves during the early years of *infitah*,

in contrast to the majority who are considered middle and lower class, but border on poverty. It is the first group that continues to benefit from the Mubarak regime and to support it in return. "To raise morale, and morality," Ahmed Abdallah suggests in a Middle East Report article, "mount a serious campaign against corruption. Some present cabinet ministers are obvious candidates to stand trial." He adds, "Cleaning up the ruling party can pave the way for a coalition government, including moderate Islamists. This would set the course for expanding employment opportunities for the young,"⁶⁶ underscoring that a purge of corruption would help redress both economic and political hindrances to democracy.

Another extremely basic requirement for the move toward democracy is an end to the monopolization of power and the inclusion of the opposition in the political process. Abdallah suggests this as the crux of a "massive reform program:"

At the political level this means ending the monopoly of power, changing the constitution, having elections for president and not just yes-or-no referenda. . . . Conduct local elections, leave the unions and professional associations alone, and, most importantly, incorporate the bulk of Islamists into the system by legalizing a non-violent Islamist party (the Muslim Brotherhood is the obvious choice.)⁶⁷

The Ikhwan, as the largest and most popular opposition

movement, constitutes a meaningful avenue to political participation for a large portion of marginalized Egyptians. The inclusion of the Ikhwan is absolutely necessary if political pluralism is to be credible. The reality is that the Mubarak regime, with the blessing of some secular forces, has opted for further exclusion and even repression. Mubarak has recently associated the Ikhwan with the militants and compared them with the zealots in Algeria, pledging that the Ikhwan would remain outlawed. "They are an illegal group who stand behind most of the religiously motivated acts of sabotage,"⁶⁸ Mubarak has said. The regime recently excluded them from the long-awaited conference on national dialogue, which took place June-July 1994. In protest, some of the other opposition groups refused to attend because of what they saw as an attempt by the government to "defuse opposition and isolate the mainstream Islamist political movement rather than as a means of seriously considering the need for political change."⁶⁹

A third requirement for democratization is for those Western governments which have leverage over Egypt, particularly the U.S., to pressure Mubarak's regime to move toward democracy, or at least to improve its human rights records. The reality, however, is the West is concerned more about the stabilizing role of Egypt and its role in moderating other Arab regimes like that of Asad. Moreover, the fact that Islamists have become the viable alternative to Mubarak has

complicated things for the Western powers, which are no less alarmed by their rise than the Mubarak regime. Even American journalists have noticed the reluctance of external powers to encourage democracy in Egypt. Citing the fact that Egypt has been the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid, after Israel, Hedges, Kaplan, and others note how little the U.S. pushed the issue of democracy in Egypt. "While Egypt's basic services have significantly improved" as a result of U.S. aid, "Washington has done little to alter the one-party state or damp dissent."⁷⁰

A successful transition to democracy would have the best chances under skilled leadership and competent political engineering. The reality is that Mubarak is a very mediocre leader. He lacks the charisma of Nasser and Sadat's risk-taking initiative. Mubarak's staff members are mostly military cronies and officials from previous regimes who are considered sycophants. According to Tahsin Bashir, former spokesperson for Sadat, Mubarak "looks around him and sees people who support him 110%. He no longer acknowledges the problems in Egypt and when he does acknowledge them, he blames them on conspiracies launched by his enemies. The objective reality that is pushing young people to rebel is beyond his grasp."⁷¹ He is reported to have criticized Gorbachev and former Algerian President Benjedid, for precipitating their own ousters by unleashing reform. The alternative for which Mubarak has opted is merely to preserve a cumbersome,

inefficient, and corrupt system. As Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, prominent Egyptian journalist, sums it up, the Mubarak government "has no ideas, no vision, no values."⁷² The overwhelming economic problems of Egypt, Western support for the status quo and the international community's failure to pressure the regime to democratize, the regime's determination to exclude the Ikhwan from the political process, and the lack of competent leadership makes the prospects for democracy in Egypt bleak.

In June 1991, nine opposition parties joined the unrecognized Ikhwan to demand political reform. The Ikhwan and the nine parties (Wafd, Labor, Liberal, NPUP, Nation, Young Egypt, Green, Democratic Unionist, and Social Arab) reached a consensus on the basis of this reform which they formulated in a ten-point statement calling for:

1. commitment to the human rights and public liberties mentioned in shari'a and international law;
2. an end to the state of emergency and martial law;
3. lift of the restrictions on the formation of political parties;
4. the independent supervision of elections by the judiciary;
5. the adoption of the parliamentary system in which the executive power will be vested in the Cabinet, which is selected from the party with the majority;
6. guarantee of the right of the People's Assembly to

amend the budget; granting the Shura Council powers of oversight and legislation;

7. choice of the president through direct election from a list of several candidates, with a limit of two terms;

8. the compatibility of all legislation passed with shari'a, with emphasis on the rights of non-Muslims to follow their own religious law in case of contradiction;

9. the independence of the judiciary;

10. liberation of the press and media from government control and allowing equal opportunity for all political parties in the official media.⁷³

These demands for democratic practices are comprehensive and far-reaching. In addition, in order to implement some of these demands there must be a constitutional amendments.

The Mubarak government's response varied from strong condemnation of the opposition which is trying to weaken Egypt and ridicule its leading figures.⁷⁴ The regime refusal to concede to the demands of the opposition has not improved political conditions. On the contrary, political violence has intensified, human rights violations have increased, and radicalization and polarization have risen. The Egyptian regime has not exhausted the repression option. However, the violence will only breed more violence, as the events of the last two years have proved. Mubarak believes that the lesson of Algeria is "do not democratize because that will mean granting power to Islamists." Perhaps a better lesson to be

learned from Algeria is that if the state begins to democratize, and then reneges on democratization promises and uses its military and security apparatus to suppress brutally such a popular oppositional force as Islamists, no one will be able to control the cycle of violence that will ensue.

Endnotes

1. Many intellectuals, especially secularists and leftists, blamed Sadat for the rise of radical Islamic groups because he seemed to tolerate and encourage their activities as a counter-force against both Nasserites and leftists.

2. "Egypt," The Middle East and North Africa 1993 (London: Europa Pub. Ltd., 1992), p. 368.

3. For the negative consequences of the economic opening see, Gouda Abdel Khalek, "The Open Door Economic Policy in Egypt: Its Contribution to Investment and its Equity Implications," in Malcolm Kerr and El-Sayed Yassin (eds.) Rich and Poor States in the Middle East: Egypt and the New Arab Order (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), pp.259-83.

4. See, for example, "The Road to Peace," in Sadat's autobiography In Search of Identity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978) pp. 271-313.

5. Sadat's irritation with the Soviets is amply detailed in Chapters Eight and Nine of his autobiography. Ibid, pp. 204 - 231. He believed that ninety-nine percent of the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict lay in the hands of the U.S.

6. For example, he was involved in an attempt to create a federation with Libya, Sudan, and Syria, which eventually failed.

7. "Egypt," p. 309.

8. Arthur Banks, ed., Political Handbook of the World 1991 (Binghamton: SUNY, 1991), p. 198.

9. EIU Country Profile 1994/95, Egypt (London: the Economist Intelligence Unit, 1994), p. 5.

10. For an account of the crackdown on opposition and the subsequent developments, see Mohamed Heikal, Autumn of Fury: The assassination of Sadat. (New York: Random House, 1983).

11. Main sources of this survey are: EIU Country Profile 1994/95, "Egypt;" and "Egypt" in The Middle East and North Africa, p. 369-376.

12. Ibid, p. 370.

13. In a personal interview with Ma'mun al-Hudaibi, official Ikhwan spokesman who contested and won a seat in this election, he gave me numerous examples of government

harassment against opposition candidates. In his case, these measures included the arrest of some of his relatives on election day to occupy him from following the election procedures and ensuring their fairness.

14. "Egypt," p. 374. In a conversation with a former police officer (requesting anonymity) in charge of one election center in 1989, he told me that two hours before the polls were due to close, he listened in amazement as a voice on the radio broadcast the election results from his center. Cairo, Aug. 13 1993.

15. Mahmud Akef and Muhammad Ghurab, Al-Umma fi Am: Tagrir Hawli An al-Shu'oon al-Siyasiyya wal Iqtisadiyya al-Masriyya 1990-1991 (The Nation in a Year: An Annual Report on Egyptian Political and Economic Affairs 1990-1991) (Cairo: Umma Press & al-Istishariyyun al-'Arab, 1991), p. 205.

16. "Li Awal Mara: Tasjil Sawti li Zaki Badr Yuthbit Kulla Baza'atihi" ("For the first time: An audio recording of Zaki Badr's voice proves all his profanity"), Al-Sha'b, January 9, 199, p. 1.

17. For a detailed account of the parties' positions toward the elections see Akef and Ghurab (eds.), Al-Umma Fi Am, pp. 99-207.

18. EIU Country Profile, "Egypt," p. 5.

19. Reported in Akef and Ghurab, Al-Umma Fi Am, pp. 127-128.

20. In an interview with a leading Ikhwan figure, a former member of Parliament, Muhammad Faiz Akef mentions that even the leftist NPUP had formed a bureau for shari'a. Cairo, Aug. 14, 1993.

21. For a listing of the amendments, see "Egypt," pp. 395-396.

22. Cairo: Dar al Shuruq, 1980.

23. See for instance Rafa't Said Ahmed, Tanzimat al-Ghadab al-Islami fi al-Sab'inat (The Organizations of Islamic Rage in the Seventies) (Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 1989), p. 126.

24. Ibid, pp. 42-43.

25. Personal interview, Cairo, Aug. 13, 1993.

26. The Ikhwan were allowed twice to publish their own magazine. First they published Al-Da'wa in the late seventies which later was closed when Sadat cracked down on the opposition in 1981, and in the late eighties they took over

the management of a private magazine, Liwa' al-Islam, which was eventually forced to shut down because of its criticism of the government during the Gulf War. Recently the Ikhwan has resumed the publication of al-Da'wa from London.

27. Essam Al-Erian, "The Future of Power-Sharing in Egypt," in Azzam Tamimi, ed., Power-Sharing Islam? (London: Liberty, 1993), p. 168.

28. The Ikhwan's speeches between 1987 and 1988 in Parliament are collected in Mohsen Radi, ed., Al-Ikhwan Tahta Oubat al-Barlaman (The Ikhwan Under the Parliamentary Rotunda) (Cairo: Dar al-Tawzi' wal Nashr al-Islamiyya, 1990.)

29. Al-Mujtama' al-Madani (Civil Society), No. 23, Nov. 1993, p.7.

30. "Lawyers' Fury," Civil Society, Vol. III, Issue 30, June 1994, p. 4.

31. Al-Ahram, Aug. 15, 1993, p. 1.

32. For a summary of the government's security measures, see the EIU, "Egypt," p. 11.

33. This figure is up to December 3, 1994. New York Times, December 4, 1994, p. 6.

34. Whenever clashes take place between security forces and militant Islamists, the government claims to have captured "the most dangerous cell of the terrorists" or "the fugitive leader," etc. For one example, see "Mulahaqat al-Mutatarifin fi Misr" (The Hunt for Extremists in Egypt), Al-Majala, Dec. 25, 1992, p. 24.

35. On splits within the militant groups see "Khilafat wa Inshiqaqat Muthira Ta'sif bi al-Jihad," (Inflammatory disagreements and splits storm through al-Jihad) Al-Wasat, No. 83, Aug. 30, 1993, p. 35.

36. See the EIU Country Report, 3rd quarter 1994, "Egypt."

37. In my interviews with them, the Ikhwan leaders were very critical of the government's implementation of emergency laws and of the security forces' systematic efforts to harass them.

38. Al-Erian, "The Future" p. 163.

39. "Eaten from Within," Atlantic Monthly, Nov. 1994, p. 28.

40. Chris Hedges, "Egypt Begins Crackdown on Strongest Opposition Group," New York Times, June 12, 1994.

41. Al-Erian, "The Future" p. 166. The figure about the philanthropies is mentioned by Hedges, *ibid*.

42. Government control of mosques in many cases means that the government pays the salary of the imam and physical maintenance of the mosque; the extent of ideological control over sermons and administration varies from case to case.

43. "Al-Muhafaza wal Taqadum fi Misr: Al-Ihya' al-Islami" (Conservatism and Progressivism in Egypt: The Islamic Revival." Oira'at Siyasiyya Vol. 3, No. 2, Spring 1993, p. 19.

44. *Ibid*, p. 19.

45. For a summary of the Salsabil affair, see Mahmud Akef (ed.) Al-Umma fi 'Amm 1991-1992 (The Nation in a Year 1991-1992)(Cairo: Markaz al-Dirasat al-Hadhariyya, 1992), p. 286.

46. EIU Country Profile, "Egypt," p. 6.

47. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "Beyond Democratization: Political Change in the Arab World," PS Political Science and Politics, Vol. XXVII, No. 3, Sept. 1994, p. 508.

48. Al-Erian, "The Future" p. 166.

49. "Ijhad al-Hulm al-Dimoqrati fi Misr," (The Abortion of the Democratic Dream in Egypt), Oira'at Siyasiyya (Political Readings), Vol. 7, No. 2, Spring 1993, p. 139.

50. "As Egypt Votes on Mubarak, He Faces Rising Peril," Oct. 4, 1993, p. A8.

51. Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 39, No. 10, 1993, p. 39711.

52. Chris Hedges, "Egypt Begins Crackdown on Strongest Opposition Groups," New York Times, June 12, 1994, p. 5.

53. Ahmed Abdallah, "Egypt's Islamists and the State: From Complicity to Confrontation," Middle East Report, July-Aug. 1993, p. 30.

54. Edward Said, "The Phony Islamic Threat," New York Times Magazine, November 21, 1993, p. 64.

55. "Interview with Hussein Ahmed Amin," Civil Society, Vol. 3, Issue 33, Sept. 1994, p. 27.

56. Al-Sha'b, June 16, 1992, p. 2.

57. Arabic newspapers such as Al-Hayat use the term "eradicators" to describe the junta and secularists in Algeria because they advocate the total extermination of Islamists, as opposed to dialogue.
58. Shakhsyiyat Misr: Dirasa fi Abqariyat al-Makan (Egyptian Personality: A Study in the Genius of the Place), (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahda al-Misriyya, 1970), p. 7.
59. EIU Country Profile, "Egypt," p. 11.
60. Bayan min al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin Hawla Mawjat al-Unf wal Irtihab (Communique from the Ikhwan about the Wave of Violence and Terrorism)(Cairo: Muslim Brotherhood, March 3, 1993).
61. Al-Erian, "The Future" p. 167.
62. See the section on al-hiwar (dialogue) in Akef, Al-Umma Fi Am, p. 301.
63. See the editorial in Al-Wafd, "al-Shu'ub al-Hurra la Tuaqi' Ala Bayad" (Free Nations Do No Sign Blank Checks), Aug. 12, 1993, p. 1; and the Labor party publication by Hilmi Murad and Adel Hussein, Limaza Naqul La Fi Istittla' al-Ri'asa al-Qadima (Why we say no to the coming presidential referendum).
64. Kaplan, "Eaten From Within," p. 42.
65. Said, "The Phony Islamic Threat," p. 64. For an insider view of corruption in the government see, Tahsin Bashir, "Risalla Maftuha Ila al-Ra'is Mubarak" (An Open Letter to President Mubarak), Al-Wafd, September 3, 1992, p. 5.
66. "Egypt's Islamists and the State," p. 30.
67. Ibid, p. 30.
68. EIU Country Report, 3rd quarter, 1994, "Egypt," p. 10.
69. Ibid, p. 10-11.
70. Hedges, "As Egypt Votes on Mubarak, He Faces Rising Peril," New York Times, Oct. 4, 1993, p. A8.
71. Ibid. p. A8.
72. Said, "The Phony Islamic Threat," p. 63. See too the evaluation of Mubarak's regime by eleven prominent figures from his party and the opposition in Muhammad al-Tawil, Kaifa Yusna' al-Qarar fi Misr (How Decisions Are Made in Egypt) (Cairo: Star, 1992).

73. The ten points are listed in El-Sayed Yassin (ed.) Al-Tagrir al-Istratiiji al-Arabi 1991 (The Arab Strategic Report 1991)(Cairo: Markaz al-Dirasat al-Istratiijiyya fil Ahram, 1992), p. 385.

74. See, for example, "Khitab al-Ra'is Mubarak bi Munasabat Thawrat Yulio" (President Mubarak's Speech on the Anniversary of the July Revolution) Al-Gumhuriyya, July 23, 1991, p. 1.

Chapter Six

Jordan: A Case of Inclusion

By 1993, Jordan had emerged as the most democratically open country in the Arab world. Broadly speaking, the level of genuine political participation available to average Jordanians is greater than that available to most other Arab peoples. Inhabitants of Jordan expect and enjoy margins of freedom of the press, of speech, and of assembly, among others, wider than the margins generally allowed in other Arab countries, to varying but significant degrees. How has this state of things developed in Jordan? To what degree is Jordan a case of successful democratization? What are the limits and flaws of Jordanian democratization as it unfolds today?

Jordan's King Hussein made a decision to go ahead with the second parliamentary election in November 1993,¹ despite the risks it posed to the regional peace negotiations and to his role in them (such as the risk posed by allowing definitions of Jordanian and Palestinian collective identity to be contested in the public arena at that moment). In this way, the momentum from the democratization initiatives of 1989 was not lost. Continuity in the democratization process was maintained—with one significant change: The regime altered the electoral law, as will be detailed below, to reduce the power of oppositional forces. After a protest against the changes in electoral law, almost all parties participated in

the election. As anticipated by the government, the election produced a pro-regime assembly.

The affair of the electoral-law alterations demonstrates the limits of Jordan's democratic experiment. Nevertheless, unlike other Arab countries, Jordan has not reversed course from its early democratization. Jordan belongs at the top of any chart measuring the relative democratic openness of Arab states. What constitutes Jordan's democratic openness since 1989? How has the struggle of the Jordanian polity to articulate a collective identity worked itself out in the qualified success of the country's democratic experiment? How do regional and local conditions provide a context for this experiment? It is worthwhile first to understand the history from which Jordan's contemporary democratic experiences emerge.

A. Historical Background

The history of Jordan as an independent state is a relatively short one. It began in 1921 when the League of Nations gave Britain "mandate" power over lands which it then divided into Palestine and Transjordan. Britain recognized Abdullah as a prince of central authority over Transjordan. In March 1946, Transjordan became independent. Shortly thereafter, Abdullah assumed the title of king. Transjordan took part in the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, which left Transjordan with control of a Palestinian territory, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), and with a large number of

Palestinian refugees forced out of their homes by the Zionist state. This development would have enormous repercussions on the development of the Jordanian state for years to come. Subsequently, King Abdullah annexed the West Bank in April 1950 and unified it with Transjordan to form the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Abdullah ruled until his assassination in 1951; he was succeeded by his son Talal who was quickly removed from office on the grounds of poor mental health. In 1952, Talal's 17 year old son Hussein was proclaimed king. The history of Jordan since then has occurred under the tenure of Hussein, the longest reigning head-of-state in the region.

The first major political development in the state of Jordan was the adoption of a new constitution in 1952, a few months before Hussein's inauguration. Jordan was proclaimed a constitutional monarchy, with authority jointly exercised by the king and a National Assembly. The Constitution, still in effect today, is considered liberal because it establishes citizens' basic rights and freedoms and makes the cabinet partially accountable to the National Assembly. However, the Constitution also vests extensive executive powers in the hands of the king. He is the commander of the armed forces; appoints the prime minister and the cabinet; convenes and dissolves the Assembly; and orders general elections. Although the Assembly, in theory, has the right to override the king's veto of legislation, the King has been able to

maintain superiority over the Assembly, often by dissolving it whenever it challenges him.²

The period from 1953 to 1974 was marked by a series of crises for the King, starting with a challenge at home by nationalist-leftist forces motivated by Gamal Abdul Nasser. It was during this confrontation that Jordan's first democratic interlude occurred. In October 1956, Jordan had its first free, multi-party parliamentary election. The issues: the end of Jordan's treaty with Britain; rapprochement with Egypt; and calls for more freedoms for the people and the press. The results, approximating the dominant mood of many Arab countries during the period: Of forty contested seats, the Socialist National Party got eleven; the Muslim Brotherhood, four; the Constitutional Party, three; the Communist Party, three; the Ba'th, two, and the Liberation Party, one. The Socialist Nationalists won on a platform of Arab unity, opposition to British influence, and rejection of the Baghdad Pact (an anti-Nasser agreement between Britain, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran).

Because the Socialist National Party got most of these votes, its leader, Suleiman al-Nabulsi, was asked by the King to form the new government despite his failure to win a seat in parliament. The new government tried to implement a nationalist agenda, including the abrogation of the treaty with Britain, and the development of agreements with Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to replace British financial aid by

forming an Arab solidarity front. Domestically, the government allowed a free hand to political parties and improved the freedom of the press. It was increasingly obvious to the King that the new government was trying to strip him of his authority gradually and to exercise executive power. Moreover, the nationalist and socialist orientation of the government conflicted with the King's moderate and conservative approach to foreign policy. For these reasons, the King saw the nationalist and leftist forces as undermining the very basis of the Kingdom in concert with outside forces (Nasser and the Soviets).³

The King asked al-Nabulsi to resign five months after the formation of his government. Al-Nabulsi's replacement by a prime minister loyal to the King did not go unnoticed. Demonstrations and protest led the loyalist government to declare martial law, dissolve political parties, and adjourn the extraordinary session of parliament, which was eventually dissolved altogether in 1961. The Nationalists' willingness to bypass the King and challenge the Constitution, as well as external pressure by nationalist Arab regimes (Syria and Egypt) on one side and by world powers Britain and the U.S. on the other, precipitated the failure of this early democratic episode in Jordan.⁴

The second serious challenge to the King was the loss of the West Bank and its beloved East Jerusalem to Israel in 1967. King Hussein, like the leaders of Egypt and Syria,

survived this blow, but it led to the influx of more Palestinian refugees and consequently to some destabilization in the Kingdom. From 1968 to 1971 Jordan witnessed the most serious internal strife in its history. The various Palestinian *feda'yeen* (commandos) formed a state-within-a-state and launched attacks against the Israeli Occupation from Jordanian territory. This Palestinian challenge to Jordanian authority led to a face-off: A short but bloody war broke out between Palestinian guerrillas and loyalist Jordanian armed forces. Syrian intervention in favor of the Palestinians was deterred by Israel, which was eager to help Jordan quell the Palestinians. The Jordanians won, and the Palestinian *feda'yeen* were expelled to Lebanon in 1971. On the other hand, Hussein's 1974 acceptance of the Rabat Arab summit decision recognizing the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians was a milestone in the conflict over who represented the Palestinians.

Although the regime and the country weathered this conflict, as it had the war of 1967 and the nationalist challenge of the 1950s, these crises had a destructive effect on the democratic process. They provided Hussein with justification for dissolving parliament and monopolizing political power. As Gubser notes, "parliamentary elections were either rigidly regulated or, if a measure of freedom of choice was allowed, the parliament was soon brought under

control--for example, by changing members--or it was simply dismissed."⁵

It is important to note, however, that the Jordanian regime, unlike most of the other monarchies in the Arab world, has always felt the imperative to have some sort of consultative body, no matter how ineffectual this body may have been at times. During the 1970s the government created the Jordanian National Union in an attempt to fill the political vacuum left by the 1971 Civil War. This entity, intended as an alternative to political parties, failed miserably and was dissolved after two years.

The King had maintained martial law since 1967. Except in 1976, parliament had not met since 1974 (and would not until 1984). In 1978 the King addressed this gap by again seeking an alternative to parliament; he created a quasi-parliament, the Consultative National Council. This Council was supposed to carry on some of the functions of parliament. (Oddly enough, its sixty members ended up being very representative of the various political forces and the regional and demographic make-up of Jordan, despite being appointed and not elected.)⁶ In 1984, the King dissolved the third Council and recalled the previous parliament (National Assembly). Elections were then held to fill eight seats of representatives who had died in the interim since parliament had last met. With these elections, the gears of democratization began to turn once more.

The period from 1971 to 1984 was for Jordan one of relative domestic stability and economic prosperity. It was also a period in which Jordan had no representative assembly. Prosperity brought improvements in standard of living, health, and education, raising the expectations Jordanians had of their government. At the same time, the lack of a parliament frustrated the people's ability impose any accountability on their government when it failed to meet those expectations.

B. The Democratic Experiment Since 1989

The parliamentary election of November 1989 marked the beginning of the Jordanian democratization experiment. That this election was not a token gesture was indicated by moves that accompanied and followed it: the reduction of the power of the extraordinary courts and the *mukhabarat* (secret service); release of some political prisoners; return of passports that had been confiscated to prevent regime opponents from traveling; granting of more freedom to the press; adoption of a National Charter in June 1991 (which became a Constitutional document in July 1992); and the end of martial law in the same year. Finally in 1992, parliament passed the Political Parties Act, allowing the legal formation of parties. Before the second parliamentary elections in November 1993, the government had licensed about twenty political parties covering a wide spectrum from right to left.

The 1989 elections were significant in many ways. They were the first general elections in twenty years. They were

fair and free. They happened in a year of rapid worldwide change, about which the Jordanian people were as excited as anyone.⁷ All political forces participated in the election. Although political parties were not yet legal at that point, prominent figures commonly known to be affiliated with various parties ran in the election. The results did not match what the King would have liked (see table 6.1). In a thinly coded rebuke of Islamists, Hussein called for "objective and responsible dialogue within the framework of centrism, moderation, and rationality," and blasted "the exploitation of religion and the use of it as a means to achieve political objectives."⁸ Islamists won anyway. Islamist victories and those of other oppositional figures gave credibility to the process, and proved that these elections constituted for Jordan a significant move toward democracy.

Table 6.1: 1989 Jordanian Parliamentary Election Results

Affiliations	Seats
Muslim Brotherhood	22
Other Islamists	12
Nationalists	7
Leftists	4
Pro-government (former officials, traditionalists, community & tribal leaders)	35
Total	80

Source: Keesing's Record of World Events, Nov. 1989, p.37052;
MEI, Nov. 17 1989, p. 3.

How do we account for the transformation in Jordan? How do we evaluate its success or lack of success? Four major forces come together to produce Jordan's experience with democracy: socio-economic context; Jordanian resolution of the identity issue; the role of the Islamists; and the role of the king. Social and economic conditions in contemporary Jordan have yielded a society that is ready for the responsibilities of representative government and able to demand it. Simultaneously, Jordan has arrived at a point in its history at which debates over collective identity have subsided and something of an understanding over "who is Jordanian" and "what is Jordan" has congealed. Meanwhile, the major players in the tug-of-war for political power--in shorthand, the Islamists and the King--have accepted the boundaries and ground rules of the contest. The nature, characteristics, and policies, and tactics of Islamists and King are important variables in the uniquely Jordanian democratic experience. How exactly these forces have composed that experience requires closer investigation.

1. Socio-economic context

By the eighties, Jordanian society was highly urbanized, had developed one of the highest literacy rates in the Arab world,⁹ and had a stable sense of Jordanian identity shared by large portion of its inhabitants. These social and economic conditions, given the Jordanian regime's history of seeking legitimacy in some sort of consent from its people,

produced among the average Jordanian expectations of democratic measures. The discrepancy between expectations and available options, as in many other cases of socio-political transformation, provided the impetus for change.

What immediately triggered the regime's adoption of the democratic measures in 1989 were the riots and disturbances which erupted in the southern part of the country that spring. Jordan had struggled with a domestic economic crisis in the mid-to-late eighties on the heels of relative prosperity. The boom of the seventies had created a large urban middle class and a high level of education, two conditions widely acknowledged as favorable for democratization. However, economic conditions began to deteriorate in the early eighties. The problem lay in the decline in oil prices, which had two effects. First, it cut the employment rate for expatriate Jordanians in oil-producing countries, and second, it led these states to reduce their aid donations to Jordan. The impact of the economic deterioration was delayed until 1988-89 because Jordan relied on commercial loans. It was near the end of the decade before a marked decline in Jordan's standard of living became apparent. For instance, per capita income fell from about \$1,570 in 1985 to \$980 in 1990, and unemployment hit an all-time peak of 30% early in the same year.¹⁰ In addition, an authoritarian style of government had accompanied the economic crisis, along with nepotism, corruption, and *mukhabarat* (secret police) harassment. The

last straw for the populace was when the government, at the insistence of the International Monetary Fund, raised the price of basic commodities. As in Egypt in 1977 and Algeria in 1988, these measures provoked large-scale rioting. Protesters in a number of towns in southern Jordan demanded not only cancellation of the price hikes, but the resignation of the unpopular government of Zaid al-Rifa'i. Hussein was particularly alarmed by the protests because they came from his Jordanian (not Palestinian) subjects in the south, his major power base.

Jordan experienced great social transformation in the 1970s with which political development did not keep pace. Greater educational opportunities and relative economic prosperity raised people's level of expectations and capability without providing them with a commensurate voice in the decisions affecting their lives. Even the drafters of the National Charter acknowledged this discrepancy between the social and educational progress caused by the seventies boom and, on the other hand, the stalled state of political participation. "Absence of popular participation and the monopoly on making economic and political decisions had a great role in the deterioration of public performance and the lack of trust between the citizens and the state," the drafters write.¹¹ Then came the protests in response to the economic policy, sending a clear message that the people wanted change. Not only did Hussein accept the demands of the

rioters, he instructed the new prime minister to prepare for a return to parliamentary life, to uproot favoritism and corruption, and an end to the politicization of religion.¹²

2. Jordanian identity

One of the main assumptions of this study is that a sense of national identity is a prerequisite for the transition to democracy. While almost all Arab countries are still struggling to define who they are and what constitutes the crucial elements of their identity, they are generally resigned to their current "national" boundaries and attempt to define themselves within those boundaries. The real conflict today in most Arab countries is about the centrality of Islam in defining the national community, a struggle being played out between advocates of "the Islamic solution" and those who reject any central role for Islam. Does Jordan nationalism exist today? How is the struggle over self-definition expressed in Jordanian politics?

When Britain created a central authority in Amman and crowned a prince from Arabia as its king, Jordan was perceived as one of the most artificial entities in the Arab world. It was not unusual for many to question whether such entity could survive and create a sense of nationhood about itself. Seventy-some years after its concoction, a center of loyalty has evolved, including masses of people who have invested a great deal in identifying themselves as "Jordanians."

Although King Hussein deserves most of the credit for the consolidation of Jordanian national identity, the moment of its birth was 1922, when Prince Abdullah was crowned head of Transjordan. His issuance of the first Jordanian National Charter in 1928 made this new identity official.¹³ Being an outsider and lacking economic resources, Prince Abdullah realized from the beginning that his rule would have to be based, in significant degree, on consent. The inhabitants of Transjordan at that time were a heterogenous mix of Bedouin tribes, the settled descendants of such tribes, and Circassian and Christian minorities. Abdullah's successful manipulation of tribal loyalties and Britain's economic and security support initially assured the survival of the new entity. After the war of 1948 and the incorporation of the West Bank into the Hashemite Kingdom, a new difficulty arose, that of integrating the Palestinian population into Jordan.

When young Hussein assumed the throne in 1952, he had to address two major threats to his rule: the challenge from nationalist and leftist forces, and the impact of the Palestinian situation on his country. Hussein coped with these problems with a multi-faceted strategy. First, he continued his grandfather's tradition of building a loyal constituency and deriving strength from it. He managed to enlarge this loyal base to include prominent families and heads of tribes, as well as Circassian and some Palestinian notables. He did this by co-opting them into powerful

positions and offering economic provisions from the state. Second, Hussein strengthened the institutions of the state, especially the army and the *mukhabarat*. What consolidated the army in Jordan, in contrast to other Arab countries, was its faithfulness to the head of state and its lack of politicization. Third, Hussein followed a moderate path in foreign policy, maintaining close relations with certain external powers which were interested in Jordan's survival, from Britain and the U.S. to the Arab Gulf states, Syria, Iraq, and even Israel. Jordan's strong ties with outside powers has been important as a source of income, income with which Hussein could pursue the first two strategies just mentioned.

The monarchy's successful weathering of the troubled years in the fifties, sixties, and the Civil War years, strengthened Jordanian nationalism. The impact of the Civil War can not be overemphasized. The Palestinian *feda'yeen* threatened the very existence of Jordan as a political entity. Royal army victory over the guerrillas not only removed that threat, but consolidated the identity of East Bankers as Jordanians. Simultaneously, the war emphasized the rise of an independent Palestinian identity both in the West Bank and in the Palestinian diaspora. In addition, the effect of the oil boom and the relative political stability of Jordan throughout the seventies worked to the advantage of specific sectors,

particularly those Palestinians who had a stake in the survival of the Jordanian state.

Nevertheless, the Palestinian "question" continued to be a daunting one for Hussein, even after he recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.¹⁴ Not only are Palestinians 40-60% of Jordan's population, but the Arab-Israeli conflict is a continuing security threat for Jordan. For example, toward 1987, the claim made by some Israelis that "Jordan is Palestine" caused real alarm in Jordan. The notion that the Palestinian problem could be solved by overthrowing Hussein and establishing a Palestinian state in place of Jordan was pushed by Israeli hardliners such as Ariel Sharon.

However, events on the ground belied Israeli polemics and pointed to a distinct, if complex, Palestinian identity. The Intifadah in the Occupied Lands strengthened the Palestinian sense of nationalism and finally convinced Hussein that he did not represent the Palestinians. In 1988, Hussein decided to sever legal, fiscal, and administrative relations between the state of Jordan and the West Bank, a step welcomed by Jordanian nationalists on the East Bank. Consequently, Palestinians living in the West Bank were no longer considered Jordanian citizens, and they would not be represented in the parliament nor have the right to vote in elections. They were still allowed to carry Jordanian passports, but henceforth these would only have the status of 'travel documents.' The

king, however, stopped short of repealing the Union Agreement of 1950 in which Jordan had annexed the West Bank, thus leaving room open for future Jordanian involvement.¹⁵

When Hussein decided to restore parliament, then, he was using democratization as a defensive mechanism against the Israeli threat by pointing to the distinct and consensual nature of the Jordanian polity. In his opening speech immediately following the 1989 elections, Hussein stated that "parliament's return was a riposte to our enemies . . . who speculated that our country was on the verge of entering a dark labyrinth." Israel, he pointedly remarked, now had "to admit that the only solution to the Palestinian problem is recognizing Palestinian rights on Palestinian national soil."¹⁶

The question of Jordanian identity has not been contested by the religious and ethnic minorities which constitute around five percent of the population. The four percent of Jordan's population which is Christian (including Roman Catholic, Anglican, Coptic, and Greek Orthodox) enjoy generally amicable relations with their Muslim co-citizens and are guaranteed nine seats in parliament (11% of the total). The Circassians and Shishanis, small Sunni Muslim ethnic minorities numbering 25,000 and 2,000 respectively, have a total of three seats in parliament but "occupy important positions in the armed forces and in other sensitive areas, and are acknowledged as being fiercely loyal to the throne."¹⁷ As for the Palestinians,

those who entered Jordan in 1948 are highly assimilated. Those who entered after 1967 and remain in refugee camps with very poor living conditions are disaffected with Jordan, while the most recent Palestinian immigrants, as a result of the Gulf crisis-war, are wealthier and feel they have a stake in the Jordanian system.¹⁸

Whatever the outcome of the peace process, it is not likely to happen at Jordan's expense. Hussein has finagled from the peace agreements a prominent place for Jordan in the Middle East of the future, a place that seems secure even after his eventual exit from the political scene. The major part of Jordan's inhabitants today identify themselves as Jordanian and have a greater interest in the preservation of this political entity. Since this corresponds with the interests of both regional and world powers, the country Winston Churchill once boasted he created "on a Sunday afternoon" is here to stay.¹⁹

3. Islamists: The reasonable challengers²⁰

Islamists have co-existed peacefully with the Jordanian regime and have proven to be a stabilizing factor in the country's political life. Jordan's experience with Islamic resurgence in recent years has been similar to that of other Arab countries. In the case of Jordan it is not difficult to gauge the power of Islamists, who came first in two parliamentary elections (1989 and 1993) and won elections within professional organizations and among university

students. The King, on his side, has tolerated the Islamist movement for the most part, and has allowed it in recent years to participate in the democratic experiment. The inclusion of Islamists in the political process in Jordan is a successful model relative to other Arab countries. Cases of inclusion occur in Yemen, Kuwait, and Lebanon, but in most other Arab countries the regimes have enacted confrontational, repressive, and exclusionary policies toward Islamists. How can the reasonable working relationship between Islamists and the regime in Jordan be explained?

The term "Islamist movement" refers mainly to the *Ikhwan* (Muslim Brotherhood), which was never declared illegal in Jordan. From its establishment in 1946, the Jordanian Ikhwan has been a legal organization; its operations have been public and open to scrutiny; it has worked within the Jordanian system. While this sounds normal, one must keep in mind that precisely this is not the norm in other Arab countries. Islamists were banned from establishing a political party in Egypt and Tunisia, for example. In Syria, the most extreme case, belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood is a crime punishable by death.

Now, the Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood) is not the only Islamist organization in Jordan. There are two other categories of Islamists. One is composed of independent Islamists who are close to the Ikhwan in objectives and method, but split from its ranks for one reason or another.

These independents believe, like the Ikhwan, in working through the political system. They won twelve seats in the 1989 election. The second category is the *Tahrir* (Liberation) Party, formed in the mid fifties in the West Bank, and at one point popular among Palestinians. This party has always been harshly critical of the monarchy, blaming King Hussein and his grandfather for the loss of Palestine, and regarding them both as puppets of Western powers. Members of this party have been suppressed by the *mukhabarat*. Tahrir's real lack of a wide base among the populace comes from the party's outdated discourse and extremism. For instance, the Tahrir party line, developed in the fifties, still maintains that Britain is the world's hegemonic power. Nonetheless, The Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood) is the mainstream and more popular Islamic movement in Jordan. By studying the role of the Ikhwan as political contestants, one can draw conclusions about Islamists' experiences with democracy.

Several factors contribute to the working oppositional relationship between Islamists and the regime in Jordan. One factor lies in the fact that the Hashemite family derives its legitimacy from its claim to descent from the Prophet Muhammad and its tenure (until expelled by the Saudi family) as guardian of the two holy cities, Mecca and Madina. The Hashemites consider themselves the legitimate heirs of the Arab Revolt of 1916; as mentioned in Chapter Two, the Arab Revolt contained a strong Islamic element. Being of Prophetic

descent, plus having an immediate legacy of a strain of politically resistant Islam themselves, has given the Hashemites a tricky and vulnerable relationship to modern Islamists. This unique positioning has predisposed the Hashemites to more moderate methods in addressing the Islamists than has been the case with other regimes. Even before independence, the government of Transjordan granted license to the Ikhwan to function as an Islamic organization. In 1945, the organization opened its first center in Amman under the auspices of King Abdullah.²¹ This was a symbolic gesture on the King's part indicating Hashemite toleration of the Islamists.

A second reason for the mutually acquiescent relationship between the Jordanian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood is the fact that Islamists rallied around the monarch during several crises, especially those of the 1950s and 1960s and the Civil War. During the first serious challenge to Hussein's crown in 1956, the Jordanian Ikhwan, despite its support for the nationalist agenda of al-Nabulsi's government, sided with the King against what they perceived as a communist threat. The regime's satisfaction with the stand of the Ikhwan led the government to invite them to participate in the 1957 cabinet. The Ikhwan nevertheless turned down the offer, citing the government's lack of commitment to implementing Islam.²²

Third, Islamists in Jordan conceptualize and define a role for their movement within the boundaries that the regime

considers permissible. According to Islamist leaders, since Jordan lacks the human and material resources to be an ideal Islamic state, and since the regime bases some of its legitimacy on Islam, the movement "does not seek to topple it or replace it with an Islamic regime." Islamists consider the Jordanian regime better than leftist or secular regimes which dominate other Arab countries. They consequently accept the role of a pressure group which "expresses and defends the values, culture, and civilization of the Muslim community in Jordan."²³

The Jordanian Islamists' limited objectives, moderate message, and gradual approach has made it possible for them not only to be tolerated, but to be included in the political process. Nevertheless, it was not until 1989 that Islamists had an opportunity to participate on a large scale in Jordanian politics. In that year's election, Islamists rode the wave of popular resentment produced by government corruption, economic crisis, and the absence of political participation, to emerge as the largest winning bloc. Of the twenty-six Islamist candidates running, twenty-two won. Islamist participation in this election contributed to Jordan's democratic experiment in two ways: It gave the process more credibility, since Islamists had been, most of the time, in opposition; and, while serving in parliament, Islamists pushed an agenda of political reform. The representatives of the Islamic movement proved to be flexible

and realistic, for the most part, and were able to form coalitions with other political forces. These coalitions worked to Islamist advantage on at least two occasions: when Islamists were able to elect one of themselves as Speaker of the parliament, and when they brought down the cabinet of Tahir al-Misri by denying him a vote of confidence.

Recent Islamist participation in Jordanian politics is characterized by their willingness to join the cabinet of Muder Badran for almost five months in early 1991. The Ikhwan was given five portfolios: education, social development, justice, *awqaf* (Islamic endowments), and health. The main reason for Islamists' abdication of their oppositional role was the accord in which they found themselves with the government over the Gulf Crisis and War. The Jordanian government, as well a majority of the public, sided with Iraq. While their time in government may have been too short to judge their performance as part of the executive branch, they formed a vigorous opposition group in the National Assembly, acting as a watchdog over government activities. Another major concern for Islamists while serving in parliament was to make sure that no legislation disagreed with *shari'a*.

The relationship between the Jordanian regime and Islamists has not always been smooth. Every once in a while, the *mukhabarat* remind Islamists and other opposition groups that the government has another side: the stick. In the mid eighties, the *mukhabarat* engaged in a wide campaign of

harassment against political opponents, including Islamists. The usual measures included firing people with ties to the opposition from state-related jobs, confiscating their passports to prevent them from traveling, and occasional arrests. The justification for such measures usually entails the discovery of a plot to overthrow the regime or an attempt on the life of the King. A recent example was the trial of two members of parliament who identified themselves as independent Islamists (not affiliated with the Ikhwan). The two members, Layth Shubailat and Ya'qub Qirsh, were arrested in 1992, charged with treason and convicted. Two days after their conviction, King Hussein issued an amnesty; they were released and allowed to continue their terms in parliament.²⁴

In December 1992, the Ikhwan together with some independent Islamists formed the Islamic Action Front. The Interior Ministry's licensing of this party and nineteen others, including Ba'thists and communists, was a step toward institutionalizing political pluralism appreciated by all political forces in the country. The Islamic Action Front says that its long-term goals include the resumption of Islamic life and the implementation of shari'a; the restoration of Palestinian rights; work toward unifying the Arab nation. The IAF has publicly declared its commitment to democratic practices, pluralism, human rights, and dialogue among all political contenders in Jordan. Its economic platform is based on notions of social justice, private

property, equal economic opportunity, and Islamic development and investment.²⁵ Obvious from these stated goals, from party publications, and from interviews and public statements of Islamist leaders, is a commitment to continue to function within the boundaries set by the regime. The important development embodied by the IAF is that Islamists have entered the political process in a new form, one which requires them to translate their goals into concrete policies, compete with other parties, form coalitions, even take part in government, and, finally, open their ranks to the general public. This is a challenge which Islamists in other Arab countries have not been afforded the opportunity to face.

Near the end of 1992, it became clear that King Hussein was moving toward concluding a peace treaty with Israel, which Islamists adamantly opposed. The government, in anticipation of the difficulty of passing any peace accord with Israel by an Islamist-dominated parliament, amended electoral law so as to reduce the power of the Islamists. Specifically, the amendment allowed voters to vote on only one seat in their district, no matter how many seats were contested. The new electoral law dissipated the power of the voter and virtually disabled a party from electing more than one of its candidates in any single district. The amendment created a situation in which a party's constituency might divide its vote between two of its own candidates, thus giving the advantage to another party's candidate.

Despite protest by almost all political parties and particularly Islamists, the government passed the amendment. It made sure to slip the amendment immediately after the dissolution of the previous parliament, which would have overturned this amendment, and shortly before the second parliamentary election of 1993. The Islamists threatened to boycott the election because of this strategy designed to reduce their representation in the new parliament.²⁶ They eventually acquiesced to the new rules of the democratic contest and participated in the election anyway. The Islamic Action Front nominated only thirty-six candidates for the eighty-seat parliament, although it had the option of nominating eighty or even more candidates. According to its Secretary General, IAF strategized this move specifically to avoid a potentially explosive confrontation with the regime over any future deal with Israel.²⁷ The IAF emerged during the elections as the most disciplined and well-organized party, and secured eighteen seats in the new parliament. Yet because the IAF got fewer seats than it had won in the previous election, its opponents reached a quick conclusion that Islamists were declining in popularity.²⁸ That contention is fallacious for two reasons: With eighteen seats, the Front emerged as the largest single party in the new parliament, while the other seventeen parties achieved a combined total of only sixteen seats (see Tables 6.2 and 6.3); and the Islamist share of the popular vote (30%) was higher

than their proportion of elected representatives (22%). In fact, the number of actual votes they received in the 1993 election was even higher than what they got in 1989.²⁹ Nevertheless, the resulting parliament was one dominated by pro-government forces.

Table 6.2: Political Forces in the 1993 Jordanian Parliament

Affiliation	Seats
Islamic Action Front	18
Independent Islamists	4
Leftists	2
Nationalists	9
Liberals	13
Pro-government conservatives	34
Total	80

Source: Al-Sharq al-Awsat, Nov. 21, 1993, p. 5; Qadaya Dawliyya, Nov. 22, 1993, p. 5.

Table 6.3: Party Returns of Jordan's 1993 Parliamentary Elections

Party	Cand- idates	Winners	Political Affil.
Islamic Action Front	36	18	Islamic
Ba'th	5	1	Nat'list
Jordanian National Coalition	4	4	Centrist
Al-'Ahd (Pledge)	4	3	Centrist
Popular Unity	4	0	Leftist
Democratic Populace	4	1	Leftist
Social Democratic	3	1	Leftist
Jordanian Communist	3	0	Leftist
The Awakening	2	2	Centrist
Al-Watan	2	2	Centrist
Al-Mustaqbal (The Future)	2	1	Centrist
Liberty	2	0	Leftist
Du'a' Movement	2	0	Liberal
Democratic Arabic	1	1	Centrist
Jordanian Dem. Progressive	1	0	Leftist
Progress & Justice	1	0	Centrist
The Party of the Masses	1	0	Leftist
Progressive Ba'th	1	0	Nat'list
Total	78	34	

Source: Al-Dustour, Dec. 5, 1993, p. 11.

4. The King: A tolerant monarch adept at compromise

King Hussein remains the ultimate arbiter of domestic political life in Jordan and the final decision-maker in foreign policy. As illustrated, he has played the central role in forging a sense of national unity among the inhabitants of Jordan, consolidated a wide network of beneficiaries with high stakes in the survival of the regime; and maintained a moderate and balanced foreign policy orientation which has earned him the respect of the leaders of major powers.

Three traits of Hussein's leadership have been crucial to the unfolding of democracy in Jordan. The first is tolerance. Unlike other Arab leaders, Hussein is known for his leniency toward political critics. This has made him likeable to a large portion of Jordanians, particularly East Bankers. He has distinguished himself by rewarding dissidents with political appointments--even those supposedly engaged in political plots. He has resorted to ruthless measures only on one significant occasion: the 1970 civil conflict which threatened the viability of Jordan and his own throne. Even during the absence of parliament from political life, his rule never approached the authoritarianism of the leaders of neighboring Arab countries. Bringing political stability to the country at a relatively low cost in terms of human rights is one achievement Hussein can claim.

A second factor in Hussein's style of leadership relevant to the issue at hand is his ability to rise over local political struggles. Hussein relies on the advice of trusted consultants, friends, and family members, most of whom are part of the Royal Diwan. He surrounds himself with a few highly loyal individuals and chooses his prime minister from among them while the rest await their turn, mostly as members of the House of Notables. Each man in Hussein's pool of prime ministers is known to favor a policy or an orientation. For instance, Zaid Rifa'i is chosen when the King wants to improve relations with Syria; Zaid bin Shaker, a cousin and former leader of the Army, is known for his firmness during crises; and the conservative Muder Badran has been effective in dealing with domestic forces, especially Islamists. The crowning feature of this style of leadership lies in the fact that when the policy is successful, the King gets credit for it, and when something goes wrong, the prime minister appears conveniently at fault. Thus, when riots broke out in April 1989, people blamed the government and Prime Minister Zaid Rifa'i, and not his boss.

Finally, Hussein's penchant for risk-taking has been helpful in the face of his most serious challenges. Moreover, Hussein has shown a tendency to steer a zigzag course both domestically and internationally, sometimes pursuing simultaneously two contradictory policies. While some might consider this conduct opportunistic, Hussein's boldness and

ambidexterity in political maneuvering has contributed to his survival in a volatile region. In 1990-91 he risked opposing the U.S.-led effort to destroy Iraq. Although this position was consistent with Arab public opinion, it ran afoul of the major regional and international powers, and cost him dearly. For the next two years, Jordan lost economic aid from the Gulf states, the U.S., and the European community. His willingness to take risks is serviceable in the process of democratization, as evident Hussein's decision to recall parliament and hold free elections after the vehement popular protests against his regime in 1989, many from his own power base in the south.

Hussein's other major step toward democracy was the convening of a committee to form a National Charter. In his speech to the drafters of the Charter, Hussein characterized it as a second stride toward democracy, the first being the parliamentary election. He also wanted to regulate future political activities by building a consensus on what he termed a "social contract."³⁰ His concern over reaching a consensus was reflected in the composition of the committee: Representatives of all political trends--Islamists, nationalists, communists, Ba'thists, and independents--were included.

The final document, a testament to the art of compromise, prescribes the return of pluralism and other democratic practices as the only viable choice of Jordan, to the

satisfaction of oppositional groups; on the other hand, it stresses that Jordan is a legitimate territorial state and the Hashemite dynasty, namely King Hussein, is the legitimate head of that state.³¹ Other important articles state that the Jordanian people are part of the Arab nation and Arab unity is the only way to guarantee the security and well-being of the Arab people; that Arabo-Islamic civilization, with its universalist message, is the basis of Jordanian identity; that the state must implement the rule of law and democratic pluralism; and that Islam is the religion of the state and *shari'a* is the main source of legislation.

The inclusion of Islam as a central component of Jordan's identity and a source of legislation is the key matter which political forces in other Arab countries are still contesting bitterly. It is the inclusion of this article, an important concession which Islamists in other countries have not been able to achieve, which led Islamists to endorse the Charter.

Almost two thousand leaders reflecting diverse elements of Jordanian society responded to the King's invitation to the national conference ratifying the Charter. The National Charter seems to contain the components of a collective identity that can accommodate all the major political players in Jordan. The overwhelming consensus of very nearly all political forces on these principles is a grand achievement.

To sum up, four factors have combined to make the transition to democracy possible in Jordan. A cluster of

socio-economic factors provided Jordan with the literacy, urbanization, and civic expectations to prepare its citizenry for democracy. Relative prosperity followed by economic crisis provided the immediate motivation for political participation among the masses. Jordanian national identity consolidated in a form acceptable to nearly all political players. The country has a moderate Islamic movement which is willing to work within the political process, together with a political system that is willing to include Islamists, presided over by a shrewd and reasonable king who has managed to survive at a low repressive cost.

C. Limits and Prospects

The passage of the electoral law amendment before the second parliamentary election, in the absence of a parliament and wide opposition to it among the various political parties, especially Islamists, raises the question of whether the democratic process has reached its limits. While the elections were held as scheduled in November 1993 with all political parties participating, assuring some continuity, this intervention by the regime for the purpose of producing a "friendly" parliament is the first setback. Such manipulation of the democratic process by the regime reflects the overarching defect of Jordanian democratization: The King has placed himself above and outside the entire process. It is true that Hussein increased the scope of political participation, widened the margin of freedom, and legalized

political parties, but no mechanism was developed for the transfer of power. On the contrary, the King, in return for these reforms, has reasserted his role as the ultimate arbiter and decision-maker. Thus, the Jordanian democratic case can be characterized as democracy without the transfer of power.

In order for Jordan to move toward genuine democracy it must fulfill two conditions. First, parliament must gain enough power to appoint and change a prime minister and a cabinet based on the criterion of asking the leader of the party with a majority or the largest bloc to form the government. Second, the executive power should belong to the prime minister and his or her cabinet, rather than the king. The cabinet must be accountable before parliament; parliament would carry out the legislative function. In other words, the system of government would become a true constitutional monarchy.

The reality of the current system is that the king has the executive power, aided by a prime minister, advisors, and a cabinet. He has the power to dissolve parliament and dismiss the cabinet. The logical course for further democratization in Jordan is for the King to relinquish gradually some of his power to both parliament and the cabinet. What are the prospects for such a transformation? According to Adam Przeworski, political elites will support democratization only if they believe that their interests will be preserved under the new order.³² In Jordan, Hussein does

not seem to be willing to relinquish his powers very soon. What is more, there are strong forces in Jordanian society with an interest in preserving the Hashemite rule, especially among those who benefit both materially and politically from it. Even those forces who oppose the regime, including Islamists, have not reached the point of working or at least demand the structural changes in the political system at the expense of King Hussein. There are increasing demands among Islamists to empower parliament to carry out its prescribe prerogatives of legislation and oversight of the prime minister and the cabinet.³³ This still does not touch the King.

A second point relevant to the prospect of democracy in Jordan has to do with the role of external forces. The Gulf War demonstrated the conflict between the interests of external powers, especially in "maintaining stability" (read: containing the forces unleashed by democratization). Popular volition bitterly opposed U.S. efforts to impose its hegemony in the Arab world during the Gulf conflict. This is why the countries with some democratic openings, including Jordan, Yemen, Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt, were the scene of massive protests against the U.S.-led massacre against Iraq. In the Jordanian case, the King sided with his people, expressing strong verbal condemnation of the Western campaign to destroy an Arab country. His position was not appreciated by the U.S., Europe, and other Arab allies, and he and his country

suffered the consequences. When the Madrid peace talks began, Hussein found a great opportunity to fix the damage done by his stance during the Gulf War. Two years after Madrid, Hussein has signed a peace accord with Israel, something not popular among Jordanians of many political affiliations, but especially Islamists.³⁴ It seems that this time there is incompatibility in pursuing both goals: peace and democracy. The achievement of peace may be at the expense of suppressing the voices of opposition, which cannot be done democratically. In fact, the undemocratic change in electoral law was the first step toward creating a parliament which would acquiesce to peace with Israel.

King Hussein's reluctance to give up some of his power, the existence of various beneficiaries in Jordanian society, not the least of whom are the chiefs of the Army and the *mukhabarat*, and a preference by the leaders of external powers to deal with Hussein, all make it unlikely that we will witness a transfer of power from the king to parliament and cabinet. And if such possibility is ever to be realized, it is most likely under King Hussein than under whoever may succeed him. Hussein faces the task of reconciling his people to an unequal and unpopular peace with Israel. Since Hussein is the best-positioned to play that role, we will not see Jordan become a full-fledged democratic constitutional monarchy during his reign.

Despite the limitations and flaws in the Jordanian democratic experiment, it is useful in two ways. It provides an alternative to the polarization and violence which characterize the way other Arab regimes have dealt with opposition; and it has succeeded in including Islamists in the political process. It is a model which could be emulated by other Arab regimes, if they changed their perception of Islamists as an unmitigated evil. As for Jordan, a limited exercise of freedom and a partially democratic apparatus is better than nothing, and other democratic experiments in the world have shown that the more freedom people gain, the higher their participatory expectations, which might reach a point beyond what the ruler can or will provide.

Endnotes

1. The first parliamentary election was in 1989.
2. See Chapter 5, Article 93, of the Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
3. This view is expressed by the King in a press interview, published in the book Mihnati ka Malik: Ahadith Malakiyya (My Profession as King: Royal Conversations), trans. from the French by Ghalib Arif Tuqan (Amman: Al-Sharika al-'Arabiyya lil Tiba'a wal Nashr, 1978).
4. An evaluation of this period can be found in Abdul Fatah Rashdan, "Al-Tatawur al Dimograti fil Urdun," (Democratic Development in Jordan: 1952-1989), Qira'at Siyasiyya, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1994, p. 94-95.
5. In Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1983), p. 113.
6. Rashdan, "Al-Tatawur," p. 102.
7. Middle East International, Nov. 17, 1989, p. 3.
8. Keesing's Record of World Events, Nov., 1989, p. 37052.
9. The literacy rate in Jordan was 80% in 1990, see EIU Country Profile 1994-95, "Jordan," (London: Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 1994), p. 12.
10. Ibid, p. 11.
11. Nas al-Mithaq al-Watani al-Urduni (The Text of the Jordanian National Charter), appendix in Ranad Al-Khatib Ayyad, Al-Tayyarat al-Siyasiyya Fil Urdun (The Political Trends in Jordan)(Amman: al-Matba'a al-Wataniyya, 1991, p. 136.
12. Keesing's Record of World Events, April 1989, p. 26602.
13. See, for example, the historical review of Jordan in the "National Charter," Ayyad, Al-Tayyarat, p. 132.
14. For a recent discussion of the Palestinian impact on Jordan, see Lawrence Tal, "Is Jordan Doomed?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5, 1993, pp. 45-58.
15. "Jordan," The Middle East and North Africa 1993, 39th ed. (London: Europa Publication Limited, 1992), p. 560.

16. Keesing's Record of World Events, Nov. 1989, p. 37052.
17. EIU Country Profile, "Jordan," p. 11.
18. In mid-1992, approximately 234.000 Palestinians were still living in refugee camps, and the number of Jordanian citizens who fled as a result of the Gulf crisis is estimated around 300.000.
19. Quoted in Tal, "Is Jordan Doomed?" p. 58.
20. This section is in part based on interviews I conducted with the following Islamist leaders and Parliament members in Amman, January 19 to 27, 1993: Dr. Abdullatif Arabiyat, former Speaker of the Parliament; Dr. Abdallah al-Akailah, Parliamentary representative and former Minister of Education; and Dr. Ishaq al-Farhan, former member of the House of Notables and currently Secretary-General of the Islamic Action Front.
21. Awni J. al-Ubaidi, Jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fil Urdun wa Philistine: 1945 - 1970 (The Muslim Brotherhood Organization in Jordan and Palestine: 1945 - 1970), (Amman: Al-Maktaba al-Wataniyya, 1991), p. 36-7. See too, Musa Zaid al-Kailani, Al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fil Urdun (The Islamic Movements in Jordan)(Amman: Dar al-Bashir, 1990).
22. Ubaidi, *ibid*, p. 166.
23. Abdallah al-Akailah, "The Experience of the Jordanian Islamic Movement," in Azzam Tamimi, ed., Power-Sharing Islam? (London: Liberty, 1993), p. 99.
24. For more illustrations of the regime's use of the "carrot" and the "stick" against Islamists, see Leonard Robinson, "Al-Dawla wal Islamiun wal Infitah al-Siyasi fil Urdun" (The State, Islamists, and the Political Opening in Jordan), Qira'at Siyasyyia, Vol. 4, No. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 33-60.
25. Hizb Jabhit al-'Amal al-Islami: Al-Nizam al-Asasi (The Party of the Islamic Action Front: the Bylaws) Amman, 1992, p. 3-9.
26. Civil Society, July 1993, p., 18.
27. Personal interview with Ishaq al-Farhan, IAF Secretary General, Amman, January 19, 1993.
28. See for instance Y. Ibrahim's article in New York Times, Nov. 10, 1993, p. A8, the day after the election, in which he glibly says that the election is about peace and fundamentalism, and fundamentalism has lost.

29. Al-Dustour (Jordanian newspaper), Dec. 5, 1993, p. 11.
30. "Kalimat Jalalet al-Malik al-Hussein al-Samiyya ila al-Lajna al-Malakiyya li Siaghat al-Mithaq al-Watani" (Speech of His Majesty King Hussein to the Royal Commission Drafting the National Charter), published as an appendix in Ayyad, Al-Tayyarat pp. 119-127.
31. EIU Country Profiles, "Jordan," p. 5.
32. "Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflict," Jon Elster and Rune Stalstad, eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1988), p. 79.
33. Ishaq al-Farhan, "Al-Islamiyuun wal Masira al-Dimoqratiyya fil Urdun" (Islamists and the Democratic March in Jordan) Qira'at Siyasiyya, Vol. 4, No. 2, Spring 1994, p. 118.
34. See for example the statement issued by Islamists and ten other parties and delivered to the Prime Minister, protesting Jordan's commitment to the peace process, in Al-'Amal al-Islami (Islamic Action), July 10, 1993, p. 9.

Part IV
Conclusions

Chapter Seven

Conclusions and Prospects

A wave of democratization pulsed through the Arab world in the 1980s. It did not affect all Arab countries equally, but a significant number of Arab countries experienced the beginnings of democratization. That is, in an exciting transitional phase, the exercise of political power by the state became less arbitrary and exclusive, organized oppositional activities were allowed, freer elections were held, and there was an attempt to open political participation, in some degree, to the masses of people.

Simultaneously, the popularity of Islamists escalated. That is, the number of people who believed that the frame of reference organizing the political (and not just the private) realm could and should be derived from an understanding of the basic texts of Islam, increased, and the number of their sympathizers increased. That Islamists had become the most robust opposition to the ruling elites became more apparent with every democratizing measure. To the horror of regimes and Western powers, Islamists won clear victories wherever elections with any modicum of fairness were held.

The rulers responded by putting the brakes on democratization. In Egypt, in Tunisia, in Jordan, electoral laws were busily amended to obstruct Islamist participation. In Egypt and Tunisia, Islamist parties were targeted for exclusion from elections by being denied legal status; the

state clamped down its repressive apparatus, harassing and arresting Islamist opposition members. In Algeria, the reversal of democratization peaked when the regime canceled the second round of the parliamentary elections in January 1992 after Islamist landslides in the first round, and acquiesced to a military takeover to preserve the ruling order.

What do these trends mean for democracy in the Arab world? How can they be analyzed without resort to racist and orientalist theories essentializing "Arab" or "Islamic" culture as inimical to democracy? What would an analysis that does not assume Western interests to be the frame of reference for the region? Most importantly, what interpretive lessons can they provide for those committed to the self-determination and well-being of the Arab world and its peoples? Any attempt to answer these questions must involve an understanding of four overlapping issue-clusters in the Arab world: the basic problem of collective identity; the socio-economic contexts; political leadership; and the influential role of states outside the Arab world.

The people of the Arab world are still struggling to arrive at a minimal consensus over collective identity. The stability of collective identity in the Arab world was damaged by the invasive presence of European powers beginning in the eighteenth century. Even before the rule of Europe over the Islamic heartland occurred, the European onslaught undermined

the economy and social cohesion of those lands. For example, England and France had a very conscious policy of "sponsoring" ethnic and religious minorities (such as the Druze, Maronites), planting the seeds of discord in the Arab states they carved out. That "carving out" itself, and colonialism in disguise, furthered the fragmentation of collective identity among Arabs, creating local statism (*qutriyya*) as an option beside Arab nationalism (*qawmiyya*) after pan-Islamism faded as a viable option. Today, *qutriyya* and *qawmiyya* no longer seem mutually exclusive; Arabs have settled more or less comfortably within local state borders, while at the same time retaining the belief that pan-Arab alliance or confederation is still a viable goal. For although the entities created artificially have grown into Arab states with their own economies, local cultures, and localized combinations of ethnic and sectarian identities; although Nasser's formulation of pan-Arabism foundered; although the Gulf War sharpened certain intra-Arab conflicts; the sense that there is an Arab world remains strong. It is a more complex idea of Arab identity, one that is able to encompass the diversity within the Arab world, that has survived. The new emphasis on Islam, with its universalism and models for the integration of diverse groups, has added to the strength and richness of that identity.

The main question posed in the Arab world today is about the role of Islam in collective identity. The question

emerges in two different kinds of states. In states which have generally followed a secularist, "progressive" modernizing program in the post-colonial period (such as Syria, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt) strong oppositional Islamic movements have mobilized and the two sides have polarized in bitter conflict. Islamists have been perceived as a dire threat by the regimes and have been rendered illegal and excluded from political participation. The conflict over collective identity in these states has accelerated to very extremist positions in both camps. What should make such states move toward democratization is that the two sides are stalemated. The ruling elite lack popularity and legitimacy but control the state and its security apparatus as well as the valuable resources. The Islamists can mobilize more popular support and are gaining in resources and capability for providing basic services to people which the government is failing to provide due to corruption and mismanagement. Neither camp is likely to be able to eradicate the other; neither has a chance for complete victory. This should lead them to rethink their positions. The existence of moderate leadership on both sides who are willing to compromise and to engage in "*hiwar*" (dialogue) is a point in favor of the democratic potential. Why then has authoritarianism not budged much? Authoritarianism in Egypt and Algeria has actually retrenched. This is because the Egyptian regime has not exhausted its "repression option," while the Algerian

junta still imagines that it can completely eradicate the Islamists. Extremism and repression on the part of the governments have bred extreme militancy among Islamists and maintains the "zero-sum game" model of politics, which precludes the possibility for negotiation and compromise. Such negotiation and compromise is required for the dynamic of collective identity to reach a point capable of sustaining democracy. Only when both sides acknowledge that violent confrontation will not achieve the change they want will they turn to the *hiwar* option and only then will a politics of inclusion become possible. Democracy has frequently been preceded by civil war.

In states which remained traditional and never pursued a self-consciously extreme secular program of modernization (such as Jordan, Yemen, Kuwait, and some other Gulf states), Islamists have, generally speaking, been allowed to participate in political life and the conflict over collective identity has not been as polarized. In these countries, Islamic movements developed moderate and peaceful ways to work for their political agendas. Rather than being conducted in the arena of violence, the collective identity debate in these nations is generally conducted on the level of national *hiwar*. In Jordan, this negotiation reached a crucial threshold in the National Charter, which represents a new social contract arrived at with the participation of all contenders in the Jordanian political arena. The Islamists of Jordan have been

recognized as a legal political party and their agendas have been placed on the negotiating table alongside other agendas. A major prerequisite for democratization has thus been fulfilled in Jordan.

In Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, the ruling family has used its oil profits to evade the whole issue of democratization. By providing all the output services of government, from health care to security, without collecting taxes from its populace, this "rentier state" has silenced all demands for political participation. Even in this state, non-participation has begun to be challenged. The Gulf War strained Saudi economic resources, and consequently tested the regime's ability to silence dissent. Disagreement over the moral justification of the War itself created resentment among young Saudis at their total disenfranchisement, resentment which found expression in an activist Islam as opposed to the traditional "blind obedience" Islam of the ruling class. The beginnings of a collective identity debate are taking shape in Saudi Arabia, a debate which is more advanced in Jordan.

Overall in the Arab world, there are encouraging developments on the question of collective identity. There is generally more agreement among intellectuals and leaders of society, ranging from secular nationalists to Islamists, that democracy should not be sacrificed for any cause. Only a few fanatic secularists want Islamists excluded from democracy at any cost. Most would agree with Muhammad Hassanein Heikal in

saying, "Personally I am not enthusiastic about the idea of a religious state but nevertheless, if the will of the majority is the source and the basis, and if the majority chooses, then who am I and who are others to have the right to impose upon the masses of people in their democratic choice?" He adds that if Islamists get to power and rule successfully, that is beneficial for the Arab nation; if they get to power and botch things up, so much the better for their opponents. To exclude them from power when they earn it fair and square because of speculation that they will put an end to democracy is hypocritical and dangerous, Heikal concludes.¹ Another indication of support for democracy even if it includes Islamists is the Arab Nationalist Convention, which has been held annually since the Gulf War. Influential Arab intellectuals recognized the lack of prioritization of democracy as a serious problem in the Arab world. This signalled a change from the position (which was dominant in the sixties and seventies) that unity, economic development, and resolution of the Palestinian rights must take precedence over democracy. At the fourth meeting (Beirut, May 1993), it was agreed that democracy and dialogue must be inclusive.² They proposed the notion of "*al-hiwar al-'arabi al-islami*" (dialogue between Arab nationalists and Islamists). The agreement of nationalists that Islam constitutes a major part of "who we are," regardless of religious affiliation, was an important development toward negotiating consensus on

collective identity. Also significant was the fact that Islamists endorsed democracy and pluralism and agreed to work within such a framework, once Islam had been agreed upon as a central component.

Socio-economic contexts constitute another set of variables. The Arab world can be divided into three clusters according to socio-economic conditions. There are the oil-producing states with sparse populations and rich resources. There are states with poor resources which may have large populations, such as Egypt (where the GNP per capita is under a thousand dollars), Sudan, Yemen, and Morocco, or may be less populous, such as Mauritania and Somalia. Finally, there are middle-income states: those with moderate resources (some have oil) but also mid-size to large populations, such as Iraq, Algeria, Syria, Jordan, Tunisia, and Lebanon. What does this mean with regard to prospects for democracy?

The inequitable distribution of wealth among and within the countries of the Arab world has contributed to a gap between expectations and actual conditions. It is from these kinds of gaps that transformative change has happened in history. Within many countries, some of what wealth the state had was invested in education and infrastructure in the post-independence period, and in the economic expansion of the seventies. In addition, many Arabs from poorer countries migrated to work in the oil-rich countries, usually sending money back home. These economic developments led to an

expansion of the middle classes and the numbers of those with middle-class aspirations, middle-class literacy, middle-class education. Social and economic change was not, however, accompanied by expansion of the political institutions; the middle classes have not been accommodated in the existing political systems. Economic crisis hit in Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Sudan and Algeria (among others) in the eighties, exacerbating the tensions caused by the political stagnation. Depressed economic conditions, at that moment, constituted a favorable factor for the beginning of democratization process -- because they mobilized discontented masses and forced regimes to liberalize, relieving some of the pressure created by the closed political systems. In the oil-rich "rentier" states, this was postponed until the nineties, when the cost of the Gulf War finally dented their seemingly inexhaustible financial resources. The Gulf War was estimated to have cost the Saudis and their Gulf Community allies 676 billion dollars.³ In 1993-94, Saudi Arabia had to make a 20% cut of expenditures in order to balance its budget. Suddenly the illogic of the complete disenfranchisement of all but the ruling family became apparent to more and more Saudis, and popular discontent, similar to that rising in other Arab countries but whispered rather than roared, began to be heard in the Saudi state.

Economic conditions are variable in terms of their effect on democracy. It has been observed that most wealthy

countries are democracies -- but the oil-rich states prove an exception, so far. It has also been observed that most democracies are wealthy -- but then India proves even that is not a hard-and-fast correlation. In the Arab world, the effect of economic conditions has varied over time as well as across countries. There are some very poor states in the Arab world, and if poverty is an obstacle to democracy, regional integration would help address the problem of inequitable distribution of resources whose roots lie in the divisions left by colonialism.

External factors affecting the prospects of democracy are the legacy of the colonizing powers; the Israeli problem; the Cold War; and the post-Cold War order. Colonialism laid obstacles in the path of any future democratization project by distorting the social cohesion of the Arab world, as I have already reviewed. The problem of Israel's presence as a very real security threat in the middle of the Arab world was used to stifle dissent and justify martial law in Arab countries. Thus, Israel's role has been consistently inimical to democracy in the region. The Cold War was another external factor that worked against the possibility of democratic change in the Arab world. In the competition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., each side wanted only to gain states as collaborators and to back those states regardless of their authoritarianism. To each camp in the Cold War, the Arab states were producers of oil which they needed to buy and

importers of weapons which they needed to sell. The policies of the superpowers were designed to keep the oil flowing, the arms market booming, and stability --defined largely in terms of these two elements-- intact. Militarization helped Arab regimes to control and repress more efficiently; strong militaries were used both against foreign enemies and frequently to quell domestic strife. The security apparatus of most Arab states, notably the secret police or *mukhabarat*, expanded rapidly in such an encouraging world environment.

As the Cold War drew to a close, the crumbling of authoritarian regimes in the Eastern bloc had a thrilling demonstrative effect on Arab people. Seeing the authoritarian Ceaucescu, who had been a friend of many Arab rulers, meet his end, gave Arab populations the empowering sense that their turn was at hand. Then came the Gulf War. The United States, leader of the post-Cold War era, let loose its massive firepower to ravage Iraq's military capabilities. Once again, the Arab world got the message that keeping the oil flowing to the world powers was more important than the self-determination of Arab peoples. Whatever else had changed in the "new world order," that much was constant. "The Gulf Crisis . . . was an intervention in the name of human rights and global order that, at least in the short term, turned out to be a defense of the most traditional and least representative regimes in the Middle East, or indeed, the world,"⁴ namely, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other oil-

producing Gulf states. To make its indifference to democracy even more clear, the U.S. did nothing to support the uprising of Kurds and Shi'ites in Iraq. Even more blatant was the U.S. embrace of Syria's Asad, authoritarian par excellence, into the new world order, because he supported the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq. All was to be subordinated to preserving the status quo ante of the Gulf War. Another negative role played by the international community is the silence, complicity, and relief with which Algeria's military coup was welcomed in France, the European community, and even the U.S. The coup, and the absence of international outrage or pressure against it, was a major blow to democracy in the Arab world.

Then there is the Middle East peace process. Theoretically, Arab peace with Israel should have a positive influence on the prospects for democracy since it would deprive regimes of the excuse that it is necessary to suppress internal dissent in order to defend against the Israeli threat. The catch is that the majority of the politically active Arabs do not support it. Israel has signed treaties with regimes that are struggling to stay in power; the most popular forces contesting to gain power, Islamists, were not included in the negotiations. Jordan may perhaps be a test case for the viability of such a "peace." Thus far, Islamists have been included and integrated in Jordanian politics. Jordanian Islamists, like all others, oppose the current peace

deal. Will democracy in Jordan be subordinated to the external pressures from Israel and the U.S.? Will Jordan be constrained to suppress its Islamists to meet the terms of an unmandated peace?

International support for democracy has led to positive developments elsewhere. At least it legitimizes the struggle of groups within a particular country who seek enfranchisement and may help rulers see that it would be in their interest to allow some democratic measures to take place. The United States has pressured regimes from Kampuchea to Cuba to implement democratic measures. At the 1991 Arab-Israeli peace conference in Madrid, "one word was conspicuously absent amid President Bush's resounding rhetoric about a better future for the Middle East. The missing word was 'democracy'. . . Some were troubled that in such an important setting the U.S. leader did not offer a long-term vision of democracy as a concept that might truly stabilize the troubled Middle East . . . "5 The European Community and the U.S. have played a role in encouraging Eastern European and other states to democratize and rewarding those that did. Major powers and international institutions have played a positive role in encouraging democracy in other parts of the world. Only the Arab world has been overlooked amid solicitous international concern for democracy.

Political leadership is a fourth element. Imaginative, flexible leadership is required for democratization to

continue and to produce results; leadership that is hostile to the notion of democratic change can do considerable damage to the whole process. Generally, ruling elites in Arab countries have neither commitment to democracy nor self-motivation for political change. Asad, Qaddafi, and Saddam Hussein, recently joined by Mubarak, are leaders whose hold on power is tenacious, immoderate, and uncompromising. Jordan's Hussein certainly does not want to step down from power, but has shown more willingness to compromise, perhaps to move toward constitutional monarchy. Democratization in the Gulf states could come about following the Jordanian model, by giving more power to their elected bodies. On the bright side, all these leaders are in their sixties among a people whose male life expectancy averages between sixty and seventy years. Sometimes a change in leadership is a prerequisite for democratic change.

As far as political leadership among the Islamist opposition, there is a more diverse pool of leaders and leadership qualities. Egypt's Ikhwan, however moderate, suffers from old leadership with outdated ideas; there is something of a generational gap between the leadership and the rank-and-file. Jordan's Islamic Alliance, on the other hand, has a diverse and rotating set of leaders, which increases its ability to respond to the changing concerns of its constituency and provide fresh vision. The biggest challenge

facing the leadership is how to keep hardliners in each camp from sabotaging what prospects for democratization exist.

If we consider all the factors encouraging democratization --collective identity resolution, favorable socio-economic conditions, helpful external influences, and skillful political leadership-- it is apparent that no Arab country combines them; none is without serious impediments to democracy. Still, the crucial factor, which would at least prevent further deterioration of political cohesion, is the inclusion of Islamists in the political process.

"If secular governments in the Middle East want to avoid the problems facing regimes in Egypt and Algeria, where religious extremists have stepped up violent attacks on government officials and others, they should allow Islamist forces to participate fully in the democratic process. Instead of realizing their worst fears, secular leaders may find that such participation might moderate Islamists' behavior and defuse the tensions that have given rise to religiously-inspired political agitation in the region."⁶

Jordan's experiment is successful in that respect. Other countries which have recognized and included Islamists are Yemen, Kuwait, and Lebanon. Governments in these countries should be prepared to accept power-sharing, first in legislative bodies, and eventually, in the alternation of executive power. Islamists in these countries have so far

shown an adequate capacity for working within a system that requires sharing and rotation of power. The peaceful transfer of power at the executive level is the next step, the point at which the extent of a polity's democratization is tested and becomes habituated.

Definitely, the Arab world is experiencing the beginning of a struggle for wider participation in political decision-making. Masses of people are demanding inclusion, enfranchisement, empowerment, directly challenging the hoarding of power by tiny elites, clans, families, military juntas. Under ideal circumstances, the logical end of such a struggle would be the transformation of authoritarian systems into democratic ones.

Because there are so many obstacles to democratization from within and from outside the process of this struggle, it may work itself out in another direction. Authoritarianism may continue. Authoritarianism in some Arab states today has not exhausted its repressive options, but it is different from the authoritarianism of the past: On the level of intellectual debate, hardly anyone is left who maintains that democracy is an unauthentic foreign concept or a deferable luxury that should take a back seat to other goals. And on the level of practice, there are now many mass movements resisting the authoritarian order.

Besides democratization and the continuation of present authoritarian regimes, there is a third possibility. In the

face of the current regimes' resolve to tighten repression, violent change instigated by populist forces is a very real possibility. Such a revolution is not likely to result in a democratic state. It may bring to power populist Islamist forces which would form a new radical authoritarian state.

Two final observations. Authoritarianism is not the only problem enervating the Arab world: The unjust distribution of resources both within and among countries, underdevelopment and dependency on the North, as well as local and regional disputes, require new solutions. A higher level of inter-Arab coordination and integration must take place. There is widespread agreement that democracy cannot be sacrificed in the name of these goals any longer. More than that, economic, social, and other kinds of integration among Arab populace is considered a good which would both be encouraged by and require higher levels of democratic practice.

Finally, if democracy comes to the Arab world, it may not produce policy content supportive of Western interests. By definition, democracy is the right of the people to choose how they will rule themselves. This choice cannot but emerge from agreements painstakingly arrived at between the elements within the polity itself, based on their understanding of the world, of government and what they want it to do, of who they are and who they want to be.

Endnotes

1. "Muhammad Hassanein Heikal fi Hiwar ma' Filip Jallab," (Muhammad Hassanein Heikal in a Dialogue with Filip Jallab) Al-'Ahali, Jan. 29, 1992, p. 3 & 10.
2. "Al-Mu'tamar al-Qawmi al-Rabi': Bayan ila al-Umma" (The Fourth National Convention: A Statement to the Nation). Al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, No. 174, June 1993, pp. 141-161.
3. Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Gulf War Is Said to Have Cost the Region \$676 Billion in 1990-91", New York Times, April, 25, 1993, p. 14.
4. Dankwart Rustow, "The Gulf War and the Future Global (and Arab?) Order", in Stanley Renshon (ed.), The Political Psychology of The Gulf War. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), p. 323.
5. Gerald F. Seif, The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 4, 1991.
6. Joyce Davis, "Islamists and Secular Regimes: Is Violence Inevitable?", Special Report, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, February, 1994, p. 1.

Bibliography

English

- Abdallah, Ahmad. "Egypt's Islamists and the State: From Complicity to Confrontation." Middle East Report. (July-Aug. 1993): 29-31.
- Abdallah, Umar. The Islamic Struggle in Syria. Berkeley, California: Mezan, 1984.
- Abdel Khalek, Gouda. "The Open Door Economic Policy in Egypt: Its Contribution to Investment and its Equity Implications," in M. Keer & E. Yassin, eds., Rich and Poor States in the Middle East: Egypt and the New Arab Order. Boulder: Westview, 1982, pp.259-283.
- Abrahamian, Ervand. Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic. Berkeley: University of California, 1993.
- AbuKhalil, As'ad. "A New Arab Ideology?: The Rejuvenation of Arab Nationalism." Middle East Journal. Vol. 46, No. 1, (1992): 22-36.
- Affendi, Abdulwahab El-. "Studying My Movement: Social Science Without Cynicism." International Journal of Middle East Studies. Vol. 23, No. 1, (1991): 83-94.
- _____. Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan. London: Grey Seal Books, 1991.
- Akailah, Abdallah, al-. "The Experience of the Jordanian Islamic Movement." in Azzam Tamimi, ed., Power-Sharing Islam? London: Liberty Pub., 1993, pp. 93-101.
- Almond, Gabriel A. and Sydney Verba. The Civic Culture. Princeton: UP, 1963.
- Anderson, Lisa. "Democracy in the Arab World: A Critique of the Political Culture Approach." Paper delivered at the Conference on Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World. McGill University, May 7-8, 1993.
- Antonius, George. The Arab Awakening. New York: Capricorn, 1945.
- Awa, Muhammad S, el-. On the Political System of the Islamic State Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1980.
- Banks, Arthur, ed. Political Handbook of the World, 1991. Binghamton: SUNY University, 1991.

- Banna, Hasan al. Six Tracts of Hasan al Banna. Kuwait: IIFSO. No date.
- Barakat, Halim. The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
- Ben Eissa, Rachid. "The Algerian Experiment." In Azzam Tamimi, ed., Power-Sharing Islam? London: Liberty, 1993, pp. 141-144.
- Boustani, Rafic, and Philippe Fargues. The Atlas of the Arab World. New York: Facts on File, 1991.
- Brown, Bernard E. and Roy C. Macridis. Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings. 7th ed. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1990.
- Brown, L. Carl. International Politics and the Middle East, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984.
- Constitution of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan.
- Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale UP, 1971.
- Davis, Joyce. "Islamists and Secular Regimes: Is Violence Inevitable?" Special Report. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace. (1994): no pagination.
- Diamond, Larry, Juan Linz, Seymour M. Lipset eds. Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia (vol. 3) Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1989.
- Duri, 'Abd al-'Aziz. The Historical Formation of the Arab Nation, trans. Lawrence I. Conrad. New York: Croom Helm, 1987.
- EIU County Profile 1994/95. "Egypt." London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1994.
- EIU Country Profile 1994/95. "Jordan." London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1994.
- EIU County Report 3rd Quarter 1994. "Egypt." London: The Economist Intelligence Unit.
- Entelis, John P. and Phillip C. Naylor, eds. State and Society in Algeria. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1992.
- Erian, Essam, al-. "The Future of Power-Sharing in Egypt," in Azzam Tamimi, ed., Power-Sharing Islam? London: Liberty, 1993, 159-168.

Esposito, John. "Presidential Address 1989. The Study of Islam: Challenges and Prospects." Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, Vol. 24, (1990): 1-11.

_____. Islam: The Straight Path. New York: Oxford UP, 1991.

_____. and James Piscatori. "Democratization and Islam." Middle East Journal, Vol. 45, (Summer 1991): 427-440.

_____. The Islamic Threat. New York: Oxford UP, 1992.

Fukuyama, Francis. "The End of History?" National Interest, (Summer 1989): 3-18.

_____. "Liberal Democracy as a Global Phenomenon." PS: Political Science & Politics, (Dec. 1991): 659-664.

Fuller, Graham E. The Democracy Trap. New York: A Dutton Book, 1991.

Gubser, Peter. Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1983.

Haddad, Yvonne. "The Arab-Israeli Wars, Nasserism, and the Affirmation of Islamic Identity." In J. Esposito, ed., Islam and Development. Syracuse: Syracuse University, (1980), pp. 107-121.

Hedges, Chris. "As Egypt Votes on Mubarak, He Faces Rising Peril." New York Times. October 13, 1993.

_____. "Egypt Begins Crackdown on Strongest Opposition Groups." New York Times. June 12, 1994.

Heikal, Mohamed. Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat. New York: Random House, 1983.

_____. Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War. London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1992.

Hourani, Albert. Arab Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.

_____. The History of the Arab Peoples. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1991.

Hudson, Michael. "Presidential Address 1987: Democratization and the Problem of Legitimacy in Middle East Politics." Middle East Studies Association Bulletin. Vol. 22, No. 2, (Dec. 1988): 157-171.

- _____. "After the Gulf War: Prospects for Democratization in the Arab World." Middle East Journal, vol. 45, (Summer 1991): 407-426.
- Hunter, Shireen. The Politics of Islamic Revivalism. Bloomington: Indiana University, 1988.
- Huntington, Samuel. "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 99, No. 2, (Summer 1984): 193-218.
- _____. "The Modest Meaning of Democracy." in Robert A. Pastor ed. Democracy in the Americas. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1989, pp. 11-28.
- _____. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1991.
- _____. "Democracy's Third Wave." Journal of Democracy, Vol. 2, No. 2, (1992): 12-34.
- Hussaini, Ishak M. The Muslim Brethren: The Greatest of Modern Islamic Movements. Beirut: Khayat's College Book, 1956.
- Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. "Crises, Elites, and Democratization in the Arab World." Middle East Journal, Vol. 47, No. 2, (Spring 1993): 292-305.
- _____. "Egypt's Islamic Militants." MERIP Reports, (Feb. 1982): 5-18.
- Ibrahim, Youssef M. "Gulf War Is Said to Have Cost the Region \$676 Billion in 1990-91." New York Times, April 25, 1993, p. 14.
- Kaplan, Robert. "Eaten From Within." Atlantic Monthly, November, 1994.
- Kedourie, Elie. Democracy and Arab Political Culture. Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992.
- Kramer, Gudrun. "Liberalization and Democracy in the Arab World." Middle East Report, (January-Feb. 1992): 22-25.
- _____. "Islamist Notions of Democracy," Middle East Report, (July-Aug. 1993): 2-8.
- Lenczowski, George. The Political Awakening in the Middle East. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970.

- Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan, eds. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University, 1978.
- Lipset, Seymour M. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." APSR, Vol. 53, No. 1, (1959): 69-105.
- Lowry, Arthur, ed. Islam, Democracy, the State and the West: A Round Table with Dr. Hasan Turabi. WISE Monograph Series #1. Tampa, Florida: World and Islam Studies Enterprise, 1993.
- Miller, Judith. "The Islamic Wave." The New York Times Magazine, May 31, (1992): 22-42.
- The Movement of Islamic Tendency in Tunisia: The Facts. Sept. 1987.
- Nasser, Gamal Abdul. Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955.
- Norton, Augustus Richard. "The Future of Civil Society in the Middle East." Middle East Journal. Vol. 47, No. 2, (Spring 1993): 203-216.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism. Berkeley: University of California, 1973.
- Patai, Raphael. The Arab Mind. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973.
- The Political Program of the Islamic Salvation Front. Algeria: 1990.
- Pryce-Jones, David. The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs. New York: Harper & Row, 1989.
- Przeworski, Adam. "Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflict." In Jon Elster and Rune Stalstad, eds. Constitutionalism and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1988, pp. 59-81.
- Pye, Lucian. "Political Culture Revisited." Political Psychology. Vol. 12, No. 3, (1991): 487-508.
- Qaradawi, Yusuf, al-. Islamic Awakening Between Rejection and Extremism. Herndon, VA: IIIT & American Trust. No date.

- Razi, G. Hossein. "Legitimacy, Religion, and Nationalism in the Middle East." American Political Science Review. Vol. 1, No. 1, (Mar. 1990): 69-92.
- Rustow, Dankwart. A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization. Washington: Brookings's Institute, 1967.
- _____. "Nation." In. David Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Vol. II. MacMillan/Free Press, 1969, pp. 7-14.
- _____. "The Political Impact of the West." In P.M. Holt, A.K.S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, eds., The Cambridge History of Islam. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1970. Vol. 1, pp. 673-697.
- _____. "Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model." Comparative Politics, No. 2, (April 1970): 337-365.
- _____. "Elections and Legitimacy in the Middle East." The Annals of the American Academy. Vol. 482, (Nov. 1985): 122-146.
- _____. "Democracy : A Global Revolution?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 4, (1990): 75-91.
- _____. and Kenneth P. Erickson, eds., Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives. New York: Harper Collins, 1991.
- _____. "Dictatorship to Democracy: The Political Transition." Roundtable on Global Change, UNDP, Development Study Programme, Bucharest, Romania, 1992.
- _____. "Arab Perceptions of History and the Question of Identity." In Stanley Renshon, ed., The Political Psychology of the Gulf War. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1993, pp. 23-26.
- _____. "The Gulf War and the Future Global (and Arab?) Order." In Stanley A. Renshon, ed., The Political Psychology of the Gulf War. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1993, 317-325.
- Sadat, Anwar. In Search of Identity: An Autobiography. New York: Harper & Row, 1978.
- Said, Edward. "The Phony Islamic Threat." New York Times Magazine, November 21, (1993): 62-64.
- Schumpeter, J.A. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. 2nd ed. New York: Harper, 1947.

Seale, Patrick. The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics. London: Oxford UP, 1965.

Seif, Gerald F. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 4, 1991.

Shaalan, Mohammed. "Political-Psychological Influences in Islamic Revivalist Movements." Political Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 4, (1986): 811-816.

Sharabi, Hisham. Arab Intellectuals and the West: The Formative Years, 1875-1914. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1970.

Sorensen, George. Democracy and Democratization. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1993.

Tal, Lawrence. "Is Jordan Doomed?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5. (1993): 45-58.

The Middle East and North Africa 1993. London: Europa Pub. Ltd., 1992.

Wesson, Robert, ed. Democracy: A World Survey. New York: Praeger, 1987.

Wickham, Carrie R. "Beyond Democratization: Political Change in the Arab World." PS Political Science and Politics, Vol. XXVII, No. 3, (1994): 507-509.

Wright, Robin. "Islam, Democracy, and the West." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 3 (1992): 131-145.

Arabic

Abdallah, Ismael S. et al, eds. Al-Harakat al-Islamiyya al-Mu'asara fil Watan al-'Arabi. (The Contemporary Islamic Movements in the Arab World.) Lebanon: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1987.

Ahmed, Rafa't Said. Limaza Qatalu al-Sadat: Qisat Tanzim al-Jihad (Why They Killed Sadat: The Story of the al-Jihad Organization). Cairo: Dar al-Sharqiyya, 1989.

_____. Tanzimat al-Ghadab al-Islami fi al-Sab'inat (The Organizations of Islamic Rage in the Seventies). Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 1989.

_____. "Al-Islamiyun: Al-Sulta was 'Unf (Islamists: Power and Violence). Middle East Affairs Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1994): 71-82.

Akef, Mahmud and Muhammad Ghurab., eds. Al-Umma fi Amm: Taqdir Hawli An al-Shu'oon al-Siyasiyya wal Iqtisadiyya al-Masriyya (The Nation in a Year: An Annual Report on Egyptian Political and Economic Affairs). Cairo: Umma Press & al-Istishariyun al-'Arab, 1991.

Akef, Mahmud., ed. Al-Umma fi Amm 1991-1992 (The Nation in a Year 1991-1992). Cairo: Markaz al-Dirasat al-Hadariyya, 1992.

Ayyad, Ranad K. Al-Tayyarat al-Siyasiyya Fil Urdun (The Political Trends in Jordan). Amman: Al-Matba'a al-Wataniyya, 1991.

Banna, Hassan al-. Majmu'at Rasa'il al-Imam al-Shahid Hassan al Banna (The Collected Letters of the Martyred Imam Hassan al Banna). Beirut: al-Mu'assassa al-Islamiyya, 1981.

Bayan min al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin Hawla Mawiat al-Unf wal Irhab (Communique from the Ikhwan about the Wave of Violence and Terrorism). Cairo: March 3, 1993.

Burnamij al-Intikhabi li Murashahi Jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, al-. (Electoral Program of Muslim Brotherhood Candidates in Jordan.) Amman, 1989.

Cantori, Louis. "Al-Muhafaza wal Taqadum fi Misr: Al-Ihya' al-Islami" (Conservatism and Progressivism in Egypt: The Islamic Revival.) Trans. staff. Qira'at Siyasiyya, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring 1993): 8-26.

- Faraj, Abd al-Salam. "Al-Farida al-Gha'iba" (The Forgotten Obligation). Appendix in Ni'mallah Junaina, Tanzim al-Jihad (The Jihad Organization). Cairo: Dar al-Hurriyya, 1988.
- Farhan, Ishaq, al-. "Al-Islamiyuun wal Masira al-Dimoqratiyya Fil Urdun" (Islamists and the Democratic March in Jordan). Qira'at Siyasiyya, Vol. 4, No., 2, (1994): 115-126.
- Ghannouchi, Rashid, al-. Al-Mar'a Bain al-Qur'an wa Waqi' al-Muslimin (Woman Between the Qur'an and the Reality of Muslims). Tunisia: Matba'at Tunis, n.d.
- _____. "Al-Dimoqratiyya wal Wad' al-Tunisi" (Democracy and the Tunisian Situation). Al-Insan, No. 8, Aug. (1992): 57-69.
- _____. Al-Huriyat al-'Ammah fil Dawla al-Islamiyya (Public Liberties in the Islamic State). Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabia, 1993.
- _____. Huquq al-Muwatana: Huquq Ghair al-Muslimin fil Mu'tama' al-Islami (The Rights of Citizenship: The Rights of Non-Muslims in the Islamic Society). 2nd ed. Herndon: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1993.
- Ghazali, Muhammad, al-. Al-Islam wal Istibdad al-Siyasi (Islam and Political Despotism). Cairo, 1949.
- _____. Al-Sunna al-Nabawiyya Baina Ahl al-Fiqh wa Ahl al-Hadith (The Prophetic Tradition Between Fiqh Scholars and Hadith Scholars.) Lebanon: Dar Shuruq, 1989.
- Halima, Abd al-Mun'im M. Hukm al-Islam fil Dimoqratiyya (Islam's Judgement on Democracy). Amman: Al-Sharika al-Jadida, 1993.
- Hamdan, Gamal. Shakhsiyyat Misr: Dirasa fi Abqariyat al-Makan (Egyptian Personality: A Study in the Genius of the Place). Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahda al-Misriyya, 1970.
- Haraka al-Dusturiyya al-Islamiyya fil Kuwait, al- (The Islamic Constitutional Movement in Kuwait.) 1991.
- Hizb Jabhat al-'Amal al-Islami: Al-Nizam al-Asasi (The Party of the Islamic Action Front: The Bylaws). Amman, 1992.

- Hussain, Adel, and Hilmi Murad. Limaza Naqul La Fi Istittla' al-Ri'asa al-Qadima (Why We Say No to the Coming Presidential Referendum). Cairo: Labor Party, 1993.
- Hussein bin Talal, King of Jordan. Mihnati ka Malik: Ahadith Malakiyya (My Profession as King: Royal Conversations). Trans. Ghalib Arif Tuqan. Amman: Al-Sharika al-'Arabiyya lil Tiba'a wal Nashr, 1978.
- Huwaidi, Fahmi. "Al-Islam wal Dimoqratiyya" (Islam and Democracy). Al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, No. 166, (December 1992): 4-37.
- . "Ijhad al-Hulm al-Dimoqrati fi Misr" (The Abortion of the Democratic Dream in Egypt). Qira'at Siyasiyyah, Vol. 7, No. 3, (1994): 139-145.
- Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. Al-Mujtama' wal Dawla fil Watan al-'Arabi (Society and State in the Arab World). Lebanon: Arab Unity Studies Center, 1988.
- , ed. Al-Ta'adudiyya al-Siyasiyya wal Dimoqratiyya fil Watan al-'Arabi. (Political Pluralism and Democracy in the Arab World.) Amman: Muntada al-Fikr al-'Arabi, 1989.
- Junaina, Ni'mallah. Tanzim al-Jihad (The Jihad Organization). Cairo: Dar al-Hurriyya, 1988.
- Kailani, Musa Zaid al-. Al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fil Urdun (The Islamic Movements in Jordan). Amman: Dar al-Bashir, 1990.
- Kawakibi, Abdurahman. Taba'i' al-Istibdad wa masari' al-Isti'bad (The Characteristics of Tyranny and the Crimes of Oppression). Cairo, n.d.
- Khalidi, Mahmud. Qawa'ed Nizam al-Hukm fil Islam. (Principles of the Political System in Islam.) Kuwait: Dar al-Buhuth al-'Ilmiya, 1980.
- Krar, Muhammad Ahmad. Intikhabat wa Barlamanat al-Sudan (The Elections and Parliaments of Sudan). Khartoum: Institute of Research and Social Studies, 1989.
- Mithaq Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya fi Philistine (The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movements in Palestine.) Palestine: Hamas, 1988.

Mithaq al-Jabha al-Qawmiyya al-Islamiyya. (Constitution of the Islamic National Front). Sudan: n.d.

Muhakamat al-Nizam al-Siyasi (Trials of the Political System). Cairo: Gama'a al Islamiyya, no date.

"Mujaz 'An al-Shura fil Islam wa Ta'adud al-Hizbi fil Mujtama' al-Muslim" (A Brief on Consultation in Islam and Party Pluralism in Muslim Society). Resolutions and Recommendations Issued by the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood. Pamphlet. Cairo: March 1994.

Nefeisi, Abdullah, ed. Al-Haraka al-Islamiyya: Ru'ya Mustaqbaliyya. (The Islamic Movement: A Forward Vision.) Cairo: Madbouli, 1989.

Qaradawi, Yusuf, al-. "Al-Itar al-'Am lil Sahwa al-Islamiyya al-Mu'asera" (The General Framework of the Contemporary Islamic Resurgence). In Saad Eddin Ibrahim, ed. Al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya wa Humum al-Watan al-'Arabi (The Islamic Resurgence and the Concerns of the Arab World). Amman: Muntada al-Fikr al-'Arabi, 1988, pp. 15-114.

_____. Fatawa Mu'asera (Contemporary Fatwas). Vol 2. Cairo: Dar al-Wafa', 1993.

Qutb, Muhammad. Jahiliyyat al-Qarn al-'Ishrin (The Twentieth Century Ignorance). Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1978.

Qutb, Sayyid. Ma'alim 'ala al-Tariq (Milestones on the Path). Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1982.

Radi, Mohsen, ed. Al-Ikhwan Tahta Qubab al-Barlaman (The Ikhwan Under the Parliamentary Rotunda). Cairo: Dar al-Tawzi' wal Nashr al-Islamiyya, 1990.

Rashdan, Abdul Fatah. "Al-Tatawur al Dimograti fil Urdun" (Democratic Development in Jordan: 1952-1989). Qira'at Siyasiyya, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1994): 81-114.

Rayis, Muhammad Diya' al-Din, al-. Al-Nazariyat al-Siyasiyya al-Islamiyya (Islamic Political Theories), 3rd ed. Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Library, 1960.

Robinson, Leonard. "Al-Dawla wal Islamiyun wal Infitah al-Siyasi fil Urdun" (The State, Islamists, and the Political Opening in Jordan). Trans. staff. Qira'at Siyasiyya, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Spring 1994): 33-60.

- Sabuni, Abdurahman, al-. "Muhadarat fi Nizam al-Hukm fil Islam" ("Lectures on the Political System in Islam"), unpublished papers. United Arab Emirates: Sharia and Law College, U.A.E. University, 1983.
- Salame, Ghassan. "Halat al-Ta'adudiyya al Siyasiyya fi al-Mashriq al-'Arabi" (The Status of Political Pluralism in the Arabic East). In Al-Ta'adudiyya al-Siyasiyya wal Dimogratiyya fil Watan al-'Arabi (Political Pluralism and Democracy in the Arab World.) Amman: Muntada al-Fikr al-'Arabi, 1989, pp. 141-152.
- Sarhal, Ahmad. Al-Nuzm al-Siyasiyya wal Dustouriyva fi Lubnan wal Duwal al-'Arabiyya (The Political and Constitutional Systems in Lebanon and the Arab States). Beirut: Dar al- Bahith, 1980.
- Sharif, Kamel al-. Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Philistine (The Muslim Brotherhood in the Palestine War). Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, no date.
- _____. Al Mugawamma al-Sirriyya fi Qanat al-Suwais 1951-1954 (The Secret Resistance in the Suez Canal 1951-1954). Beirut: No publisher, 1957.
- Tawil, Muhammad al-. Kaifa Yusna' al-Qarar fi Misr (How Decisions Are Made in Egypt). Cairo: Star, 1992.
- Turabi, Hassan . Al-Shura wal Dimogratiyya (Consultation and Democracy). Khartoum: Dar al-Fikr, no date.
- _____. Al-Haraka al-Islamiyya fil Sudan (The Islamic Movement in Sudan). Khartoum: 1990.
- Ubaidi, Awni J. al-. Jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin Fil Urdun wa Philistine: 1945-1970 (The Muslim Brotherhood Organization in Jordan and Palestine: 1945-1970). Amman: Al-Maktaba al-Wataniyya, 1991.
- Yassin, El Sayed, ed. Al Taqrir al-Istratiiji al-'Arabi 1991 (The Arab Strategic Report 1991). Cairo: Markaz al-Dirasat al-Istratiijiyya fil Ahram, 1992.
- Zaki, Muhammad Shawqi. Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun was Mujtama' al-Masri (The Muslim Brotherhood and Egyptian Society). Cairo: No publisher, 1954.

Personal Interviews

Akailah, Dr. Abdallah al-. Leading Islamist figure. Member of parliament and former Minister of Education. Amman, January 25, 1993.

Akef, Muhammad Faiz. Leading Ikhwan figure and former member of parliament. Cairo, August 13, 1993.

Arabiyat, Dr. Abdullatif. At the time of the interview, Speaker of the parliament. Amman, January 25, 1993.

Farhan, Dr. Ishaq al-. At the time of the interview, member of the House of Notables; current Secretary General of the Islam Action Front. Amman, January 19, 1993.

Hudaibi, Ma'mun al-. Official Ikhwan spokesman and former member of parliament. Cairo, August 11, 1993.

Huwaidi, Fahmi. Independent Islamic writer. Cairo, August 15, 1993.

Khalafat, Fu'ad al-. Islamist figure. At the time of the interview, member of parliament. Amman, January 26, 1993.

Qaradawi, Sheikh Yusuf al-. Islamic scholar; leading Islamist. Cairo, August 14, 1993.

Qarqar, Dr. Magdi. Assistant Secretary General of the Labor Party. Cairo, August 13, 1993.

Qutb, Muhammad. Islamic scholar; Islamist figure. Makykah, December 13, 1992.

English Newspapers and Periodicals

Civil Society/ Al-Mujtama' al-Madani. Egyptian monthly periodical (English/Arabic).

Keesing's Record of World Events. Monthly periodical, London.

Middle East International. Biweekly periodical, London.

New York Times. U.S. daily newspaper.

Arabic Newspapers and Magazines

Ahali, al-. Egyptian weekly newspaper.

Ahram, al-. Egyptian daily newspaper.

'Amal al-Islami, al-. Islamic Action Front Party newsletter, Jordan.

Da'wa, al-. Egyptian weekly magazine (published temporarily in London).

Dustour, al-. Jordanian daily newspaper.

Gumhurriyya, al-. Egyptian daily newspaper.

Hayat, al-. Lebanese daily newspaper (published in London).

Islah, al-. Weekly United Arab Emirates magazine.

Liwa', al-. Jordanian newspaper.

Majalla, al-. Saudi weekly magazine.

Mujtama', al-. Kuwaiti weekly magazine.

Mujtama' al-Madani, al- /Civil Society. Egyptian monthly periodical (English/Arabic).

Rabat, al-. Jordanian weekly newspaper (discontinued).

Sha'b, al-. Egyptian semi-weekly newspaper.

Sharq al-Awsat, al-. Saudi daily newspaper.

Wafd, al-. Egyptian weekly newspaper.

Wasat, al-. Lebanese weekly magazine (published in London).