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HUMAN INTEREST IN THE SPIRIT AND THE SPIRITUAL LIFE: AN EXAMINATION OF AN ASPECT OF GEORGE SANTAYANA'S PHILOSOPHY

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

I. SANTAYANA'S CONCEPT OF INTEREST

1. A Working Definition of 'Interest' 19

2. Matter and Interests: The Source of Values 33

3. Reason as a Derived and Formal Interest 57

4. The Critics' View of Spirit 80

5. Spirit as a Derived Interest 89

II. INTENT AND INTUITION

1. Intent: The Foundation of Reason and Spirit as Formal Interests 100

2. Literal and Symbolic Knowledge 117

3. Intent and Dialectic: An Introduction to Intuition 131

4. Intent-ful and Intent-less Intuition 140

5. Intuition as Attention 160

6. Further Criticisms of the Idea of Intent-less Intuition with an Emphasis on the Psychological Underpinnings of Mysticism 176

III. THE SPIRITUAL LIFE

1. Intuition: Pure and Impure 196

2. Distraction in the Negative Sense 227

3. Liberation (or Distraction in the Positive Sense) 261

4. Union and the Idea of Christ 314

CONCLUSION 365

NOTES 383

BIBLIOGRAPHY 424

INTRODUCTION

I

The thesis of my dissertation is that the spiritual life as George Santayana conceives it is "a discipline of the mind and heart"[1] which grows out of human interests and reflects those same interests in its ideals. The spiritual life conceived after this fashion is no bit of religious humbug, nor does it suggest the exportation to other worlds by the superficial mystical means of chants and trances. In the spiritual life, Santayana does not intend to provide an answer for either the church fathers or the modern gurus. The spiritual life as a human interest is intended to fit in with other human interests in so far as human interests can be pursued rationally and satisfied to their maximum extent. In this sense, the spiritual life is perfectly compatible with common sense, with rational religion, art, and society, and with science. However, the spiritual life is more than compatible with the various pursuits or lives of reason since, if it were merely compatible with any or all of them, it might not be distinguished in any way from any one of them. The spiritual life constitutes, as Santayana expresses it, a "crown" to a life of reason. And in this sense, the spiritual life is beyond, although not exclusive of, the life of reason. In so far as the spiritual life is beyond the life of reason, its vocation is ideally to understand and to sympathize with all human interests, be they my living interests or any other's. In so far as the spiritual life is not exclusive of the life of reason, it does not undermine or renounce the living interests of the particular man in which

it thrives. In another but related sense, although the life of reason is not absolutely necessary in order for the spiritual life to rise, the life of reason, in fact, often stabilizes the spiritual life and renders it more secure than if it were seated in a man who acted upon spurious ideals or without ideals at all. Thus although the spiritual life can be seen in the life of Shelley, it is a mere flash in the pan, brilliant but short. Better that it should grow out of the heart of Socrates.

II

The first section of my dissertation is devoted to Santayana's concept of interest, in general, and to the all-important concepts of rational and spiritual interests, specifically. In general, Santayana used the concept of interest as a means of explaining the behavior of any living organism and of indicating that there is a material source for all such behavior. In so far as interests are explanations of behavior, they are, in the broadest sense of the words, the determinants of choice. In reference to a man, when one asks, 'Why did you do such and such?,' one form of explanation would be, 'Because I wanted to do, or liked, or desired, or enjoyed doing such and such. In short, I was attracted in some fashion to doing such and such.' By appealing to interests as explanations of behavior and as determinants of choice, Santayana places himself squarely in the tradition of behaviorism in psychology, or what he calls "scientific psychology."

It has been claimed by some critics of Santayana that he changed his position on many issues from his early works to his late works. Generally, the early works are understood to be those culminating in the Life of Reason, and the late works are understood to be those culminating in the Realms of Being. Specifically, however, it should be further

understood that there is a prolegomenon to the Realms of Being, namely, Scepticism and Animal Faith, and there is an epilogue to the Realms of Being, namely, The Idea of Christ in the Gospels. As I understand Santayana, these works together form what, as far as I am concerned, are the late works. The early-late question necessarily imposes itself on anyone interested in doing historical scholarship on Santayana's philosophy. I feel it is a contrived thesis with little value for understanding Santayana's philosophy. This, of course, is not to say that I do not think Santayana's philosophy developed; it is merely to say that I do not think there was a "break" from the early to the late works.

As far as the concept of interest is concerned, I hold implicitly that it remained essentially the same throughout Santayana's intellectual life. The reason I hold this position is because interests always are grounded in and grow out of the material world. If a change in the concept of interest had occurred in Santayana's philosophy, it would have come from the ground of interest. This did not occur. From Reason in Common Sense to the Realm of Matter, interests are the result of material forces at play. This, of course, does not preclude that one might not change his objects of interest. But the reason why there are interests at all would change only if they were conceived to come from another or additional source.

It is well known that Santayana was a "materialist" yet his interest in materialism was not merely a metaphysical one. Materialism for Santayana had implications in human nature; and human nature and the values that originate in human nature were the issues to which he directed his attention. To say that interests explained behavior and grew out of material conditions indicated to Santayana that these same

conditions were the sources of human nature and human values. These same ideas also indicated two implications about human nature and human values: firstly, that human nature is in a state of flux, and secondly, that all values are relative to the constitutional needs, impulses, aims of a particular person. If one wants to understand human nature and human values, one needs to discern their sources and their development; in order to explain and predict human behavior one must know its physical, biological, and psychological conditions; in order to formulate ideals for human beings to pursue, one must again know these same conditions.

There is an innumerable variety of interests a man can have from basic interests in survival to the most supererogatory interests in sheer play. Yet, for the sake of analysis, interests can be broadly classified as primary, derived, or formal. Primary interests are those interests predetermined by material and biological conditions. Derived interests are descended from primary interests, yet themselves are not directly predetermined by material and biological conditions. Derived interests are often the result of more complex conditions, such as social and cultural conditions. Derived interests at once determine the choices one makes, yet there is an element of choice in having one derived interest and not another. Primary and derived interests have the character of appetites so that to say that when one is interested in something, an attraction or an aversion to the object is felt and one is apt to move in the direction of the object or away from it. Formal interests are not actually a class in themselves, since they share common qualities with derived interests. Like derived interests they can be traced to primary interests and ultimately to material conditions. Like derived interests they are attracted not to objects per se but to formal qualities of an object

or otherwise. Formal interests warrant distinction from derived interests because they have a unique quality and that unique quality is to enlighten potentially or actually all other interests with form. With the introduction of form into one's many interests one becomes self-conscious of some of them. He sees, for example, how his desire for one thing and his desire for another are different or the same or that they are compatible or that they conflict. Generally, one can say: Reason has a formal interest in harmony of action; spirit has a formal interest in harmony of contemplation. In so far as both reason and spirit are formal, they articulate interests into ideals for their respective lives. In so far as both reason and spirit grow out of derived interests they are not autonomous disciplines imposed upon the material world. Reason and spirit are congenitally sensitive to their material home, and if they are going to flourish in their formal function, they must be forever attached to the sources of their being. As Santayana says, they must be forever pious.

There is no controversy surrounding the idea that reason grows out of derived interests and has formal interests. Although the distinction in terms of derived and formal is mine and made for my purposes, the distinction itself is not original. As a derived interest, reason is characterized after Hume's fashion as an instinct. It is analogous, says Santayana, to nutrition, generation, and art. As a formal interest, reason employs the language of "ideal terms" in order that it can function to resolve conflicts of interest for the sake of harmony in action. Santayana's concept of reason is for the most part a practical one. If reason does not always directly deal with the formulation of moral ideals, it is always conceived to apply to our actions indirectly. The fundamental materials

with which reason works are the interests of the individual in which reason occurs. Reason can be said to operate by "universal" principles; yet it only organizes particular living interests at particular places and times. So that the harmony and satisfaction which is realized by the employment of reason is no universal harmony and satisfaction but particular to the person, tribe, or state in which they occur. One could say, as a matter of fact, that reason is in the service of the body, and in so far as the body has interests which require satisfaction, reason takes the side of the body in order that maximum satisfaction in action will ensue.

As I just mentioned there is no controversy surrounding the idea of reason in Santayana's thought, as I described it. However, there has been a good deal of controversy surrounding the idea that the spirit, too, has interests. The critics of Santayana's idea of the spiritual life have declared that in the extreme the spirit has no interests at all or less extremely that the interests of the spirit are incompatible with the interests of a life of reason, a life of action. On the contrary, I believe it can be shown that on Santayana's account, spirit has interests, and that although the spiritual life is not a life of action but a life of contemplation, it is perfectly compatible with a life of reason, and it is a life that many a rational man might legitimately pursue. In order to give a fair impression of the critics I should say that, although I present them as adversaries to my view of Santayana, I do so for stylistic reasons rather than for wholly substantial ones. What I mean is that I give the impression that I stand alone in defending Santayana. Stylistically, I think this is justified. In substance, it is not entirely justified. I would say most scholars who have written about Santayana's spiritual life have been adverse critics. However, some have defended

Santayana's idea of the spiritual life. I believe my dissertation is different from those who have defended Santayana in the sense that I have attempted a detailed interpretation and defense of Santayana's idea of the spiritual life which as far as I know has not been done.

Although the objects of interest are different, one is able to see how spirit has interests in much the same way as one is able to see how reason has interests. Spirit functions as intuition and intuition has, as Santayana says, an underlying animal life. It is only by virtue of the fact that spirit has an underlying animal life that intuition is directed to look upon any essence at all. The specific animal life, the interests it has, explains why one chooses to regard some essences and not others. Intuition, as Santayana uses it, is a pregnant term. It is implicated in the approaches to essence: the sceptical, the dialectical, the contemplative. Yet in every case, intuition enables one to discern essence, to "note its idiosyncrasy, its qualitative identity, which enables me to distinguish it, study it, and hold it fast in my intent, so that I may eventually frame a definition of it, and perhaps assert or deny its existence."[2] I emphasize: intuition of essence from any approach enables one to say of an essence it is what it is, held fast in one's intent, and perhaps assert or deny its existence.

III

In section two, I concentrate on the concepts: intent and intuition. By seeing how these two concepts necessarily go hand in hand, it is further revealed how spirit has an animal basis but more importantly as far as my thesis is concerned, one sees how, since every intuition is intent-ful, spirit has a formal interest whose end is in harmony of contemplation as opposed to action.

Intent forms the basis of both reason and spirit having formal interests. I discuss intent in reason for the sake of showing that the concept of intent remained the same from the early to the late works, but essentially my concern is to show how spirit is intent-ful in order to show that at the basis of every intuition there is an interest while its aim is to discern essence. Intent is defined by Santayana as an "interest in form." Without intent, one cannot distinguish one essence from another, one cannot be self-conscious of what he thinks or does, one cannot be said to act as opposed merely to being moved, one cannot articulate ideals for either action or contemplation. Without intent, the life of reason and the life of spirit are not possible; without imputing form to one's interests, one, like a beast, is tossed hither and thither by one object of attraction and the next.

In order to get some idea of how intent works, one should look to Santayana's distinction between literal and symbolic knowledge. Santayana says that literal knowledge or pure awareness or what might be called knowledge by acquaintance is not properly designated knowledge at all. With mere literal knowledge one could not, for example, answer a question why by appeal to laws. Symbolic knowledge, in so far as an interest in form is implicated in it, reveals that at the root of knowledge there is an interest and that knowledge has a use and an aim. From Santayana's discussion of intent and its relation to symbolic knowledge one sees only a rough sketch of them. However, some other important ideas are seen. Although one does not have a complete description of intent and its relation to symbolic knowledge, one can see: (1) that intent-less intuition is not possible in Santayana's terms; and (2) that symbolic knowledge can be distinguished into two subclasses: animal faith where knowledge is

defined as a belief in existence, i.e. where from given essences one infers the not-given existence of an object, and dialectic which is defined as intent on form where belief in existence is suspended and one notes the relation of given essences to other not-given essences. These two implications of Santayana's discussion of literal and symbolic knowledge are especially important for my thesis, because, as I said, I want to show that every intuition in any sense is intent-ful and that intent may operate when all questions of existence have been suspended. In the most radical sense, what I want to show is that even a solipsist, one who might not even believe in an underlying animal life, nevertheless functions as if there were an underlying animal life, that is, he has interests, and that intent is in full operation.

In my discussion of intuition I point out that several scholars have said that Santayana's idea of intuition, specifically his idea of pure intuition, is intent-less. I look at one of them, Irving Singer, in detail. I choose him because I think he has the strongest arguments for the idea of intent-less intuition. Yet I think his arguments fail. Singer states that Santayana's idea of pure intuition leads him to a notion of uninterpreted acts of consciousness or pure awareness. I first examine Singer's arguments in order to show that they are irrelevant and are not supported by Santayana's texts. I then examine in detail what intuition means in its most fundamental sense, that is, intuition as attention, and so show that intuition as attention embodies intent in so far as there is a logical relation among the concepts interest, attention, and distinction. If intuition were pure awareness, an uninterpreted act of consciousness, or intent-less, it would be at the level of mere attention that it would be revealed as such. Unequivocally, it is not revealed.

After the discussion of attention, I show that Singer's position is further insupportable since it leads Santayana, if not to mysticism per se, to the very brink of it. In light of Singer, I examine the psychological underpinnings of mysticism for the sake of contrast to Santayana, and what some mystics have said about intuition in special reference to the common mystical idea, Unity. Unity, as the mystic conceives it, when it is examined critically , inevitably falls into paradox and juxtaposed to this I show how Singer's idea of actual uninterpreted acts of consciousness is, if not paradoxical, certainly baffling. I should add that it has not been uncommon for scholars to refer to Santayana's spiritual life as at least bordering on mysticism. However, many of those who have said that Santayana was mystical have not done so through argument and an understanding of mysticism. Although Singer does not specifically mention mysticism, as I said, he leads Santayana to it. At least, he does so, unlike many others, through argument.

IV

Section three is devoted to the development of the spiritual life as embodying intent and based on human interest. To begin understanding the spiritual life, I offer an interpretation of "pure intuition" which is an alternative to pure intuition defined as intent-less. I call this alternative definition the moral sense of pure intuition, where pure intuition means being undistracted. At this point, I introduce the idea of actor-spectator, an idea which will play a crucial role in understanding the idea of Christ and how the character of Christ is the exemplar of the spiritual man. For now, however, I bring up the idea of actor-spectator first as a foreshadowing of later discussions, and second, to

explain how inutition is purified. Essentially intuition is impure when it is used to form symbols for the sake of action and belief in existence. In this sense, intuition for the sake of action is liable to be distracted by what Santayana calls the Flesh, the World, and the Devil. In short, a person's impure intuitions are surrounded by a sense of immediate urgency and concern about his particular interests and the interests of those around him. He is like an actor in a play who in so far as he is in the thick of action is unable to rise above action. Pure intuition, on the contrary, is seen in the spectator, one removed from action temporarily. And in so far as the spectator is not interested in the immediate urgency and concern of action he is free ideally to understand action all the better. Through pure intuition, one becomes free from distraction in order to be liberated to what Santayana calls a "clarified will-lessness." Through clarified will-lessness, one comes to learn how it is possible not to be committed to action, to the realization of his living interests alone, yet be ideally committed to understanding all living interests.

Santayana provides an example in Reason in Religion and in Realm of Spirit of the actor-spectator which in this context shows clearly the distinction between rational interests and spiritual interests. The distinction is between justice and charity. This distinction is absolutely crucial for understanding the spiritual life since charity and prayer are the two essential ideals of a spiritual life. Without both, a spiritual life is never fully realized. With both, the spiritual life is clearly a crown to the life of reason. Justice provides us with an example of an ideal of the life of reason. Justice is meant to be realized in action in a society, and it is based on the living interests of that society. Charity is a spiritual ideal extension of justice which seeks to take into

consideration all living interests. It is not an imposition of one's living interests upon another's living interests, since it is not meant to be put into action. Charity never makes another man's interests evil simply because they are not one's own living interests. Charity seeks ideal sympathy with all living interests. By so doing the charitable man does not undermine actual justice; if anything, it is further supported, and possibly rendered, in some situations, more effective. On Santayana's account, we see how justice does not imply charity, while charity does imply justice, and that furthermore justice itself can become blind without charity.

The spiritual life progresses through three phases: distraction, liberation, and union. The first stage, what I call distraction in the negative sense, indicates what the spirit needs to avoid in order to live to the fullest extent. Distraction allows us to know what we are attached to and how we can detach ourselves from the rack "of care, doubt, pain, hatred, and vice." As I mentioned, there are three sources of distraction: the Flesh, the World, and the Devil. These three sources of distraction point to pain caused by our biological, physical, and psychological conditions, respectively. Briefly, we are subject to the pains of the body; we are victims of the physical environment; we are plagued by the madness of self-destruction. From all of these, the spirit desires to be detached.

It is possible to be detached or liberated from distraction, but according to Santayana, never completely so. For those who think Santayana was a mystic, the concept of liberation seems to add fuel to their criticisms. As a matter of fact, the terms 'distraction,' 'liberation,' and 'union' are part of the common parlance of mysticism. Nevertheless, these terms unanalyzed are misleading. Liberation, according to Santayana,

is what I call distraction in the positive sense. In the negative sense, we learn what to avoid in order to become spiritual. Distraction in the positive sense teaches us that we can never be completely liberated and that the only liberation possible is through the Flesh, the World, and the Devil. In order to show clearly that liberation, according to Santayana, means distraction in the positive sense, I contrast Santayana's idea of liberation to an Indian philosopher-mystic's idea of liberation. I choose Sankara. The reason I choose him is because his thought, Advaita Vedanta, is both a radical and intellectual form of mysticism. Furthermore, I choose him because of his position in the history of ideas both mystical and non-mystical. In the East, Sankara has the stature of Plato or Kant in the West. In short, his mysticism is not half-baked and to this day represents an intellectual force. I should add, another reason why I choose Sankara is that he is an Indian and some students of Santayana have suggested that Santayana's spiritual life has an Indian flavor to it; this will be discussed.

Sankara provides a striking contrast to Santayana. One clearly sees through Sankara's idea of Moksha (liberation) that it is intellectually foreign to Santayana's idea of liberation. Santayana's idea of liberation specifically and the spiritual life generally do not, like Sankara's Moksha and Advaita Vedanta, embody speculative metaphysical and theological presuppositions; Santayana's ideas do not mean or entail non-attachment from the Flesh, the World, and the Devil (non-attachment as opposed to detachment suggesting that one could be somehow consciously transported beyond the empirical world); nor do Santayana's ideas mean or entail the renunciation of all action.

Through Santayana's idea of liberation we see how the Flesh, the World, and the Devil are deeply implicated in the spirit's aspirations. In so far as they represent material conditions, they point the way to liberation through "health and knowledge." Liberation as health and knowledge takes place simultaneously in two dimensions: what Santayana calls the horizontal and the vertical dimensions of human life. The horizontal dimension is the material dimension. The vertical dimension is the ideal dimension. On the horizontal plane, health is sought by the manipulation and control of events. On the vertical plane, knowledge of ideals is sought. One becomes liberated by developing both dimensions. However, one can see an example of the liberating process by seeing how a certain aspect of life, a religious one, is transformed from the horizontal to the vertical plane. The transformation means a shift of emphasis from regarding ideals for action alone to regarding ideals for themselves, i.e. living in the ideal. The example is Santayana's, one based on the distinction between belief in a future life and ideal immortality. This example shows how one can be detached from distraction through a clarification of distracting elements and live on an ideal plane without forsaking the material plane, on an ideal plane where one sheds one's fears as well as one's illusions. Santayana's idea of ideal immortality, which he probably got from Plato, specifically the Phaedo, not only shows how one is liberated, it also shows how the end of a spiritual life, union, is a life of prayer, a life of a harmony in contemplation. Ideal immortality is not a liberation "from suffering and death" but one "through suffering and death." It is an imaginative leap one takes, not for the sake of creating fictions, but for the sake of effecting a "change of heart" gained through knowledge of ideals. This knowledge is essentially powerless in action because it is

beyond and disinfected of one's own living interests, yet it is perfectly capable of understanding all living interests.

I develop the final phase of the spiritual life, union, in the face of adverse criticisms, namely, the criticisms developed by Milton Munitz in The Moral Philosophy of George Santayana. Munitz claims that Santayana's idea of the spiritual life is mystical and is a form of post-rational morality. I show that Munitz's criticisms are ill-founded in both cases, and I do so mainly by examining Munitz's criticism against Santayana's statement in Platonism and the Spiritual Life that the spiritual life is a "disintoxication" from all values. Contrary to Munitz, I try to show that a disintoxication from all values implies going deeper into naturalistic or materialistic ground and more importantly implies going deeper into the life of reason.

Union itself is the consummatory phase of the spiritual life, and union reveals its two fundamental ideals: charity and prayer. Charity is discussed in an earlier section, since it is appropriate in the context of revealing the contrast between rational interests and spiritual interests. Also, by discussing charity earlier, it leaves me free to show better through prayer alone how the spiritual life has an interest in harmony of contemplation. This, of course, is not to say that charity is secondary to prayer. Not at all. I organize the discussions in the fashion I do for stylistic reasons which I believe facilitate the explanation of the concepts.

Contemplation has two senses: aesthetic and moral. Contemplation in the aesthetic sense reveals that contemplation is directed to form. In light of earlier discussions, the idea of contemplation further supports the idea of intent in intuition, while Santayana says explicitly in the

context of union that union is only possible in intent. Contemplation in the moral sense reveals that contemplation grows out of material conditions and interests. Also, contemplation aesthetically and morally takes us back to the idea of actor-spectator, and leads us on to the idea of Christ as the exemplar of the spiritual man.

The idea of Christ forms the core of the explanation of the spiritual life. Christ's life is a drama; more precisely, it is a tragedy, the supreme tragedy. Through the life of Christ we learn how the spiritual life is both beyond and not exclusive of the life of reason. Christ's life exemplifies the life of spirit and not the life of reason because it is a tragedy of all living interests, not a tragedy of a man's living interests, a man from Nazareth. If Santayana wanted to portray the tragedy of the life of reason, alone, he might have chosen Socrates' life. Christ no doubt is an individual and has living interests, but he is a unique individual. Christ is the Son of Man and embodies all living interests. He is the actor supreme and in this sense is the very personification of tragic flaw. Christ, too, is the Son of God and embodies God's interests. He is the spectator supreme. He literally sees everything sub specie aeternitatis and so is above all action. We see in Christ how he is distracted and how through distraction he becomes liberated. In becoming liberated, he does not lose or forsake his manly interests; on the contrary, he is re-directed toward them. He is re-directed to them, however, not as an actor, alone, one who considers only his living interests and his goods and their realization. He is re-directed toward manly interests as a spectator, from the vertical plane, as one who considers and envisions all possible living interests, all goods, the Good. In being so re-directed to manly interests, Christ is a charitable man; he ideally loves all human

interests. Also in being re-directed to manly interests from the point of view of spectator, he is able to understand all human interests, to see profoundly how each man's living interests is an accident of birth in a material world. In his prayer, his contemplation of all human interests, he makes no petition to heaven; he accepts his lot on earth while not being under any of earth's illusions. Through prayer which is essentially "oratio," says Santayana, Christ, as the exemplar of spirit, is re-united ideally with the material world, human interests, and the Good.

I.

SANTAYANA'S CONCEPT OF INTEREST

1. A WORKING DEFINITION OF 'INTEREST'

Interests, according to Santayana, form the foundation of values. Not all things in which we are interested are valuable; however, without interest we would neither value nor disvalue anything. In a world devoid of interested creatures, "no event would be repulsive, no situation terrible. We might in a word, have a world of idea without a world of will. In this sense, as completely as if consciousness were absent altogether, all value and excellence would be gone."[1] This idea expressed in the Sense of Beauty, that interests are the foundation of values, whether the values be aesthetic, religious, moral, or political, is an idea which Santayana consistently maintained throughout his long intellectual career. Because of the controversy created by many scholars, that Santayana shifted positions in his later philosophy from the life of reason to the spiritual life, one must, when examining a concept which Santayana discusses both in the early and the late works, first make sure whether the concept is either the same from both points of view or different. Such is the case with the concept of interest. To be sure, Santayana's interests shifted from reason to spirit. However, the nature and role of the concept of interest itself remained the same.

From both the early and late points of view Santayana's talk of interests is an expression of his commitment to naturalism in morals. In Reason in Common Sense, Santayana says: "The Life of Reason is the happy marriage of two elements--impulse and ideation--which if wholly divorced would reduce man to a brute or to a maniac."[2] "In Aristotle the conception of human nature is perfectly sound; everything ideal has a natural

basis and everything natural an ideal development."[3] The main problem faced by the life of reason, and I should add the spiritual life, too, "is to unite a trustworthy conception of the conditions under which man lives with an adequate conception of his interests."[4] Later, when Santayana was beginning to develop his idea of the spiritual life, he says in an essay entitled "Psyche" that "this predetermined, specific direction of animal life is the key to everything moral; without it no external circumstance could be favourable or unfavourable to us; and spirit within us would have no reason to welcome, to deplore, or to notice anything. . . . To have a station in matter, and to have interests in the material world are essential to spirit, because spirit is life become articulate."[5]

In what follows, I shall attempt to show through an elucidation of Santayana's concept of interest what a commitment to naturalism is morals means. In addition, it should be noted that the following further points will also be touched upon to greater and lesser extents in order to get a rounded sense of what 'interest' means: (1) An interest acts as a principle of selectivity or choice so that an interest gives a logically impeccable reason for doing something. In this sense, interest indicates a motive for someone doing something. To say that everyone acts from an interest is to express a tautology. The strength of the truism is to direct our attention to the fundamental source of our actions. (2) From interest as a principle of selectivity or choice, there is interest acting as a principle of emphasis. Obviously, these two principles are related. In the first case, interest determines the choice of one or more objects or actions from a field of many. For example, from a bowl of fruit, I choose an apple and the reason for my choosing it is because I like apples. In

the second case, an interested subject "is always more interested in one part of its object than in another."[6] In terms of the apple, by my interest in it, I choose it. I choose it because I like it. What I like about it is not its color, shape, or texture. I like it because I like the taste of it. Later, we shall see that this idea of interest emphasizing one aspect of an object rather than another is important for understanding reason and spirit as formal interests. (3) An interest embodies feelings which are natural outcomes of material and organic processes. In this sense, interests indicate that one is a part of the evolutionary process, that interests play a role in our adapting to our environment, while interests further suggest that an evolutionary process plays a role in the development of man's actions and consciousness, collectively and individually.[7] Besides the implicit idea that interests indicate growth (although not teleologically), i.e. potential growth, interests seen as a part of the evolutionary process indicate that interests change and that interests are to greater and lesser extents related to one another. From the moral point of view, interests in the evolutionary context draw our attention to the source of values, suggest that values are relative to particular interests, and suggest that particular circumstances play a crucial role in evaluating actions and ideals.

Before looking closely at what Santayana says about interest, I think it would be helpful to construct a skeletal definition of interest that will at once reveal the place of interest in any form of life and provide a justification for using 'interest' as a source of values. This construct will be shown later to be in agreement with the primary texts both early and late, while for now it will offer something manageable to deal with and a point of reference to which we can return.

The term 'interest' as Santayana employs it is multivalent. He uses 'interest' in a variety of contexts which often alter its meaning dramatically and many times, too, instead of using 'interest' alone, he will employ various terms which are supposed to suggest 'interest' but at the same time they are not exactly synonymous with it. Some of the more frequently used terms which are supposed to suggest interest are: 'impulse,' 'instinct,' 'demand,' 'need,' 'desire,' 'preference,' and 'passion.' From a merely superficial reckoning, one can quickly discern the differences among the meanings of these terms. Surely, it may be that what I prefer, I also need, but one does not at all imply the other; my instincts may run contrary to my interests. One wonders almost immediately whether or not the term 'interest,' which Santayana never clearly defines, has any meaning at all and even if it were defined how would it be applicable to all these other terms.

Well, the truth of the matter is that Santayana intentionally leaves the concept of interest multivalent and yet there is justification for his doing so. Here, Santayana echoes Hume who said that a "just definition" of the passions was impossible.[8] Ultimately, Santayana, like Hume, wants to discuss values and ideals. As he sees it, values must have a natural basis and this basis is discovered by reference to interests. To say there are interested creatures means that these are not only creatures who have values, they are creatures who behave in accordance with biological and psychological conditions, that is, that interested creatures are conditioned by material circumstances and their behavior is manifested through these same material circumstances. The reason, then, why 'interest' is multivalent is that it is meant to be used in a wide sense: (1) as an indication of organic and material circumstances affecting an individual

creature, i.e. these circumstances indicate powers with which a creature must deal; (2) as an explanation for why a creature is moved not only to formulate ideals but also why he is moved in any direction at all. I add the qualification of "direction" because 'interest' does not help to explain why an inert object becomes active. An interested creature is moving already; what 'interest' attempts to explain is why it is moved from here to there.

To say that someone is an interested creature is to say that he potentially or actually feels inclined to respond to various external and internal stimuli. When one is interested in something, he has a feeling or attitude which draws him toward or away from an object. So an interest always embodies a feeling, and it always has an object. Quite simply, it might be put in this way: there is a stimulus (external or internal) before me, and I feel attracted to or repelled by it, and I am moved (not necessarily physically moved) toward it or away from it because of my interest in it. If I am not moved in a direction at all, then one would say either I had no interest in it, or for some reason (conflict, fear, or another interest) I was postponing my movement toward or away from the stimulus. Also, to say that one is moved by his interests is to say there are conditions under which he is moved. In an obvious sense, this is important to say merely since 'unconditioned movement ' is a contradiction in terms. However, more precisely, to say one is moved by his interests means that one is materially conditioned to move, that is, one has a body organized in a peculiar fashion and with peculiar potentialities and that this organization determines one's interests which in turn determine the scope of one's movements and the objects of interests. What we have is that matter conditions interests; interests condition responses. It should

be noticed that this is a description of interests along Aristotelian lines. In Aristotle, both matter and desire are powers which account for movement in inanimate and animate beings. In Santayana's terms, it is perfectly correct to say that once stimulated the interested body is "one having in itself the power of setting itself in movement and arresting itself."[9]

Matter conditions interests. However, (1) this is not to say that interests themselves are material. Interests, as far as how they are produced, are loosely analogous to, let us say, heat produced by a working engine, in the sense that the engine is the material means out of which the heat is produced; yet the heat is not identical with the engine itself; (2) this is not to say that the relationship between matter and interests is one of cause-effect. Again using the engine-heat example as an analogy, it is proper in some sense to say that the engine as it functions causes heat, however, not in the sense that a cue ball will on impact cause an eight ball to move. In the case of the billiard balls, cause and effect are temporally distinct, whereas in the case of the engine and heat or the body and interests, the product is simultaneous with the working material conditions. As a matter of fact, it would be more proper to say that heat and interests are functions of their respective materials. Heat and interests are the working organization matter takes in certain circumstances. This latter point is particularly important to see because the way in which one knows that a creature is interested is only by observing his behavior. According to Santayana, it is for "scientific psychology" (behaviorism) to discover and describe a creature's interests. Therefore, one need not talk of interest as being the cause of behavior in the sense of efficient cause. Hence interests do not have ghostly qualities,

i.e. as providing internal pushes. Responses (behavior) are an expression of interest. Matter organized and working is the condition out of which interests arise.

In order to be interested in something one need not be self-conscious, that is, plants and animals might be said to be interested beings in the broadest sense of the words along with human beings. To be self-conscious of one's interests involves intent about which I will speak later. For now my discussion of interests is limited to interests as explanations of movement. I am not concerned with other psychological questions about interest. Nor for this moment am I concerned directly with the questions of values as they are related to interests; values do not come into the picture until there is intent. For now let us look at interests in the following way: A plant, for example, can be said to be interested in something in the sense that it will respond to certain stimuli like light, water, and air. We say as the ancients did that a plant <u>behaves</u> in certain ways rather than merely <u>functions</u> in certain ways.[10] Quite literally, a phototropism or a hydrotropism (sorts of interests) is a reason why a plant is moved in a certain direction. For example, why did the plant tilt 30 degrees to the left? Because light came from that direction. Now there may be further questions one might ask which are related to the plant's behavior. For example, why is a plant attracted to light and not to darkness. But such questions do not directly answer the question of why a plant <u>does</u> in fact move 30 degrees to the left. That question is answered by an appeal to phototropism. In addition, the appeal to phototropism indicates a direction in which one must look to ask related questions about plant behavior. By looking to the idea of tropism, one implicitly accepts that behavior is explained

by stimulus-response and that stimulus-response fits into a context of some sort. For Santayana, that context would be material conditions. In principle, the same idea of interest applies to a man. However, in the case of a man, the material conditions are far more complicated; hence his interests, too, are far more complicated. A man, like a plant, is interested in light, water, and air, but unlike a plant he is interested also in: freedom, power, creativity, destruction, things he can attain and things he cannot. In short, although man's interests are materially conditioned, the objects of a man's interests need not be material nor need they be in reach. Again, however, in both plant and man alike interest accounts for why each is moved in certain ways.

In his book entitled Ethics, P. H. Nowell-Smith, attempting to defend his use of the term 'attitude,' first defends Hobbes' use of the terms 'endeavour toward' and 'endeavour fromward.' What Nowell-Smith does here in terms of justifying the use of 'attitude' as an explanation of choice (why we are moved), I believe, can be put to service in my wanting to justify Santayana's use of 'interest' in respect to man. Furthermore, Nowell-Smith helps to clarify a distinction implicit in Santayana's concept of interest, that is, the distinction between asking for an explanation of behavior and asking for an explanation of material ground. For Santayana these questions are related, but they are also distinct, since as I pointed out, interests themselves are not material; they are a function of matter organized in a peculiar way.

Nowell-Smith includes 'interested in' as a member of the class of attitudes; however, what he means by 'interested in' is unlike Santayana's concept of interest. Santayana's concept of interest has wider application than Nowell-Smith's 'interested in.' Santayana's concept of interest,

in one sense, is virtually the same as Nowell-Smith's notion of attitude, since the importance of interest for Santayana is that it explains movement and is a principle of selectivity or choice in morality.

> "By [morality] I mean the principle of all choices in taste, faith and allegiance," Santayana says, and the principle of choice has its basis in matter. The animal organism with needs and drives of its own and a nature that is not infinitely plastic does not welcome all things, all events, all states of affairs equally. Selectivity is of the very essence of the animal: the psyche, which is a mythological entity invented to symbolize the subtle material organization of the body, endeavors to secure and maintain optimum conditions for expressing and discharging all that is latent in it.[11]

Nowell-Smith says: "Hobbes' claim that all motives are desires leads one to believe that motive explanations all conform to one pattern and specifically to the itch-scratch pattern."[12] On this score, Hobbes' claim, which is essentially Santayana's claim, i.e. motives are interests in the sense that interests are reasons why we move, is open to criticism. At the same time, however, one can accept Hobbes' claim and Santayana's alike if it can be shown that the use of a multivalent term like 'desire' or 'interest' is justified on another score. Nowell-Smith thinks it is in some important sense justified, and the justification is, as I have already mentioned, that 'desire' or 'interest,' or as Nowell-Smith says, 'attitude,' is an explanation, a "logically impeccable reason"[13] for why someone does something.

Nowell-Smith lists one's attitudes in terms of pro and con. The term 'attitude' suggests that men are moved to do certain things. The terms 'pro' and 'con' suggest the direction of the movement, i.e. toward or away from the object. Nowell-Smith says: "I have deliberately included in these lists concepts of different logical types in order to make clear that the use of the phrase 'having a pro-attitude toward' should not be restricted to any one pattern; and I am, for the same reason, unmoved by

the criticism that many of the items on the list would not be said to have anything to do with 'attitudes' at all. The word 'attitude' has been selected just because it is vague."[14] The point, I believe, Nowell-Smith is trying to make is directly applicable to Santayana's point in using the term 'interest' as the source of values. Attitude alone like interest alone does not constitute a moral reason for someone doing something; it constitutes a logical reason for why something is chosen to be done. "By a 'logically good reason' . . . I mean anything which, when offered as an explanation of why someone chose to act as he did, has the force of making further questioning logically odd."[15] A logically good reason puts an end to questions of why someone chose to do such and such. But this does not rule out the possibility of asking further related questions concerning why I chose or had an interest in such and such, i.e. questions of material context. All a logically good reason does is separate the essential answer to the question, "Why did you do such and such?" from the related answers or questions. If I choose to eat a hamburger and one asks why I am eating the hamburger, the essential answer is "Because I like hamburgers," an answer which makes appeal to an interest. A further question, "Why do you like hamburgers?," is not an essential question to ask, since it does not point to answer why I chose to do what I did, namely, I ate the hamburger. To ask why I like hamburgers is a psychological question which related to material conditions, and for Santayana it is out of material conditions that interests are born. However, the point is that there are two questions here, related ones, indeed, as far as Santayana is concerned. Nowell-Smith says, and Santayana would agree, "To ask why people enjoy those things that they do enjoy is to ask a psychological question which could be answered . . . . But to ask why people do the things they like and enjoy doing

is not to ask a question but to raise a gratuitous philosopher's puzzle."[16] What we have is the following: the question, why did you do x?, is answered by, I did x because I like it, wanted to, or something of the sort, i.e. by an appeal to interests. The question, why did you like it?, is answered by an appeal to material conditions, psychological or biological ones. For Nowell-Smith it is not clear how or if the first and second questions are related. For Santayana, however, who is my concern, the two questions are related. As suggested earlier, these two questions are related in much the same way as questions about engines and heat might be related. The relationship between matter and interests will become further evident as discussion proceeds in following sections. Let us say for now that interests answer the question why I do such and such but the reason I appeal to interests at all is because they are grounded in material circumstances.

As I have stated, Santayana's concept of interest in the most general sense is an expression of Santayana's commitment to naturalism in morals. More specifically, Santayana's concept of interest plays a central role in explaining why one chooses to do what he does and that such choices are ultimately traceable to a material and organic basis. As far as Santayana is concerned, I think these are the most important aspects of his concept of interest. He is not concerned with describing a psychology of interest. I think Milton Munitz explains well the import of the concept of interest. He says:

> His [Santayana's] use of the terms 'natural basis' and 'ideal development' bear the added meanings relevant to a discussion of comparative values or gradation of interests, in which we may say that natural conditions constitute subordinate elements in the organic composition of more inclusive and representative ends. It is in this context that we may speak of natural society as constituting the basis of free and ideal society, physics for ethics, piety for spirituality, and industrial art for fine art. In each case the activity represented by the second of these terms

> constitutes the ideal employment and organization of the materials supplied by the first.[17]

In addition to interests indicating a natural basis and hence an explanation why someone does something, I should say that Santayana's concept of interest goes beyond Nowell-Smith's concept of attitude; hence the comparison I have drawn between Santayana and Nowell-Smith is a restricted one. I have already mentioned that an interest like an attitude entails a feeling and an object, but further than these an interest unlike Nowell-Smith's 'attitude' is not merely a motive for doing something. An interest gives a direction toward an object and it carries one's movement toward the object until the interested subject is satisfied. This indicates that an interest in something is vital and dynamic, unlike, for example, Nowell-Smith's attitudes of "accept" and "reject" or "approve of" or "disapprove of." It is important to note that Santayana sometimes substitutes the words 'impulse' or 'passion' for interest. In later years, he expressed that he should have avoided using 'interest' and instead should have used 'passion.'[18]

Even in the early years, for Santayana "the soul is the voice of the body's interests; in watching them a man defines the world that sustains him and that conditions all his satisfactions."[19] It is necessary for Santayana that interests be vital and dynamic in order that later ideals articulated and expressed show signs of these same characteristics. Santayana would not be "unmoved" as Nowell-Smith is "by the criticism that many of the items on the list would not normally be said to have anything to do with attitudes at all."[20] On the contrary, Santayana is particularly sensitive to the idea that values grow out of natural conditions and out of the feelings that we express for the objects we pursue.[21]

Let me sum up the concept of interest as a principle of choice in the following way. In Santayana's terms, in the most general sense, interests are necessary to explain why a living organism feels inclined to move or is moved in a particular direction. Interests indicate that feelings or attitudes are present in a creature, and they indicate that there is an object of interest. Interests emphasize that behavior is explained by stimulus-response relationships and that material conditions must be taken into consideration as the basis of such behavior. In the case of human beings, interests are the determinants of choice. In some cases, the human being has no choice or control of the interests he has. For example, under certain circumstances my interests in light, water, and air are interests strictly determined by my biological nature. Yet my interest in light, water, and air would explain why I behave in certain ways. In other cases, the human being does choose to have certain interests. For example, one might have an interest in both tennis and golf, yet he does not have the time to engage in both sports. He must choose to play one or the other. He chooses tennis because he wants vigorous exercise, and he cannot devote an entire afternoon to sports alone. Whether the interests one has are chosen or not, whether we are in control of them or not, interests themselves are the determinants of choice. So that when one asks, "Why did you drink the water?" or "Why did you play tennis?," one looks to interests in order to know why.

I should add two further points. (1) Someone might think that the view outlined thus far might be committed to some form of determinism in morals. This is an issue I wish to avoid because it is irrelevant to my larger position. Let it suffice to say that I believe Santayana would adhere to the picture drawn by Gilbert Ryle concerning this issue. The

rules of chess determine what moves are allowed in any particular game, but the rules do not govern how the game will be played, i.e. rules do not determine strategy. (2) In Santayana's terms, an appeal to interests to explain why I choose to do something does not offer a full explanation for why that something was done. As Nowell-Smith says, they provide a logically impeccable reason for doing something. However, if one asks why did you throw the ball through the window, one might begin to understand why you did after you told them you wanted to. But a full explanation would entail knowing all the circumstances surrounding your wanting to. For Santayana, the concept of interest directs us to the core of why someone does something while the circumstances are necessary to fill out the entire picture. As Nowell-Smith says: "that every action must have a motive is to state a tautology."[22] However, Santayana's concern for the concept of interest, like Nowell-Smith's concern for the concept of attitude, is not merely to prove an avowed tautology. Again, Santayana's concern is to draw our attention to a natural basis for values in order that, from the source, ideals can be articulated to pursue.

2. MATTER AND INTERESTS: THE SOURCE OF VALUES

As I said at the outset, Santayana maintained the same concept of interest from the early to the late works. His objects of interest, indeed, changed, and ultimately the significance of his change in the objects of interest will be examined in detail. However, a change in one's objects of interest does not entail a change in one's concept of interest itself. Today, I like fast horses. Tomorrow, I like strong whiskey. In both cases my concept of interest is expressed by 'like.' If my concept of interest changes, then somehow the meaning of 'like' changes. The meaning of 'like' is not determined by the objects; the objects excite interest. The meaning of 'like' is determined by the subject, by the nature of the subject. I choose the object I like, but why I like that object is determined by material conditions, i.e. by biological nature and environmental circumstances. To say, then, that Santayana changed his concept of interest would mean that he came to believe that either material conditions had radically changed in respect to human nature or that material conditions no longer provided the basis of human nature. That Santayana changed his mind in either of these cases is simply wrong. What I hope to show is that Santayana, starting in Reason in Common Sense with a concept of interest which might be called an idea based on evolutionary naturalism, goes on to clarify this concept of interest by an even more stringent materialism in Realm of Matter. To the point Santayana says: "I am not a dogmatist in ethics. I am, however, a dogmatist in physics."[1] For better or for worse, I think this is true.

When examining Santayana's texts concerning the concept of interest it is virtually impossible not to find discussions of values mixed in with the discussion of interest. This, however, is no reason to believe that interest alone confers value. Santayana, himself, makes this point clear. "Life begins to have some value and continuity so soon as there is something definite that lives and something definite to live for."[2] ". . . all valuation rests on an irrational bias. The absolute flux cannot be physically arrested; but what arrests it ideally is the fixity of some point in it which can be measured and illumined."[3] "The mere fact that somebody somewhere enjoys or dislikes a thing cannot give direction to a rational will. That fact indicates a moral situation but does not prescribe a definite action."[4] Interests alone do not tell us that there is something definite to live for nor do they ideally fix anything. Interests are fixed by intent. Human experience in so far as it is defined as interested "is appetition before it is description."[5] This is particularly important, as we shall see later, when intuition is discussed. Interests, alone, only account for movement in a certain direction yet without a definite or self-conscious end. However, the reason why Santayana discusses interest and value together is that his primary point is to illustrate that, in fact, values originate in interests, and, in fact, they are virtually inseparable. My development of Santayana's concept of interest will necessarily point to values. However, it will not be entirely clear how interest and values are related until the concept of intent is discussed. Before intent can be discussed, there is much ground to be covered. I, therefore, ask the reader to hold on faith that there is a relationship between interests and values and to suspend judgement on the relationship between them until all the evidence has been disclosed.

The idea of interest is first developed through what may be loosely called evolutionary naturalism. I use the phrase to indicate that when Santayana discusses interests, or any aspect of man for that matter, he is discussing a concept which applies to man as a changing biological organism. This may seem to be a trivial point. But, in fact, many philosophers have neglected it either at the inception of their philosophical schemes or have lost sight of it as they have worked through the intricacies of their arguments. That man is a biological organism, whether he be heaven sent or a child of hazard, is the immediate fact with which we must deal. Man is simply a part and product of a long process, a process that may or may not be teleological. According to Santayana, man has no special place in the universe. There is no reason to believe that the universe will accommodate him forever any more than there is reason to believe it will forever accommodate a chicken or an oak tree. It is merely obvious that anything that is born and perishes does so on the terms of the processes of change. Also, not only does every organism depend on the processes of change, every part of every organism does likewise. So, not only am I dependent on the environment, but every part of me--biologically and psychologically--is dependent on the environment. Mother Nature is no trite metaphor, since between every organism and the environment there is an umbilical cord as long as life lasts.

A better term for the "process of change" is Santayana's term "flux," since although it might imply development of an evolutionary sort, it makes no unnecessary assumptions about change producing anything better or worse or the world heading toward an end. The flux connotes that "the realm of matter is the matrix and the source of everything."[6] For my purposes, it

is the matrix of interests, "In order to begin at the beginning we must try to fall back on uninterpreted feeling, as the mystics aspire to do. We need not expect, however, to find peace there, for the immediate is in flux."[7] The flux "is the substrate and locus of all ideas, having the obstinate reality of matter, the crushing irrationality of existence itself."[8] The flux is chaotic, however, not so chaotic as not to develop some patterns, some regularities. Santayana says: "The world I find myself in is irrational, but it is not mad."[9] The impact of the idea of flux is that existence is adventitious and its fate is irrational. In Santayana's words, "I find myself carried along by a great automatic engine moving out of the past into the future, not giving me any reason for its being, nor any reason why I should be. Existence is groundless, essentially groundless; for if I thought I saw a ground for it, I should have to look for a ground for that ground ad infinitum. I must halt content at the quia, at the brute fact. (Dante: "State contenti, umana gente, al quia.")"[10] Or from another angle: "The irrational fate that lodges the transcendental selfin this or that body, inspires it with definite passions, and subjects it to particular buffets from the outer world--this is the prime condition of all observation and inference, of all failure and success."[11] An unexplainable fate revealed through our passions (interests) is the basis of psychological activities (observation and inference) and moral activities (failure and success).

Santayana defines matter by what it does as opposed to essence, as we shall see later, which is defined by what it is. Matter is a power, and "the realm of matter . . . is the field of action: it is essentially dynamic not pictorial."[12] This view of matter is corroborated by modern physicists.[13] Yet, although a definite picture of matter cannot be drawn

and its fate is unknown, matter determines the course of events. Santayana did not gain insight into the nature of matter through a systematic study of modern physics. Santayana's real scientist associates were Democritus and Lucretius. What I am suggesting, however, is that Santayana had, as it turns out, some sound insight into the question of matter, a poetic insight such as did his ancient mentors. The insight amounts to seeing matter defined as what it does, a "dynamic permanence."[14] That is, motion is not merely an accidental attribute of matter, it is its essential character. Santayana's insight and its philosophical implications, it is interesting to note, agree with a view of modern physics stated by R. G. Collingwood, a philosopher, indeed, abreast of scientific discoveries. The import of Collingwood's view is that although reality is, at bottom, inexplicable, there is a crucial link connecting physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and ethics. ". . . just as in ethics you admittedly cannot separate what a man is from what he does, nor in biology what an organism is from what it does, so in physics you cannot separate what matter is from what it does. That separation was the foundation-stone of the so-called classical physics, which conceived motion as something external, added to a matter which already enjoyed its own proper attributes independently of such addition, and believed that an instantaneous photograph of the material world would reveal its entire nature."[15] Santayana, like Collingwood and the modern physicists, renounces the pictorial view of the material world, since it implies a static world. For my purposes, all of this means that existence on every level is essentially dynamic and that interests are an expression of that dynamism in life.

Santayana's naturalism or materialism (they amount to the same thing),[16] unlike the physicists', is based upon "ordinary perception."[17] And since Santayana is not scientist, he leaves the study of nature to those competent to unravel its problems.[18] The philosopher simply assumes the material world to exist, an assumption which states first and foremost that "substance is external to the thought which posits it."[19] Assumption of the material world is enough for the philosopher, since his interest is in the man-sized world and the patterns it reveals. As for the worlds of electrons and nebulae (other worlds, indeed, according to physicists), they are left for those who possess the proper training and instruments. For the philosopher, according to Santayana, it is enough that "I assume that there is a continuous dynamic world that I am momentarily looking at, acting upon, or thinking about; for if the world were not continuous and external, but a figment of a dream, retention or reconsideration of it would be morbid, since there would be nothing existent to be perceived more clearly or possessed more safely. Materialism marks the down of intelligence in the animal mind."[20] In short, materialism states that there are "fundamental presuppositions that I cannot live without making."[21] Materialism, for Santayana, is a hypothesis about the world, a hypothesis in both senses that a material world is assumed and that material things are literally "placed under" to support our experience. "It is the presupposition of all natural investigation and science, a presupposition rather than a conclusion, and the presupposition not only of all natural science but of all deliberate action."[22]

In the physical world, the scientist, although he can give no reason why material conditions are as they are, because existence is essentially groundless, he, nevertheless, finds patterns in the flux from

which he develops laws in order to explain and to predict particular events; that is, although the scientist cannot answer why to metaphysical questions, he can, at least, answer how. However, for Santayana, whose avowed main concern is not the study of nature, physically or metaphysically, the significance of the presupposition of matter is in deliberate action. It is not the task of the philosopher, or the scientist for that matter, to justify the assumption of the material realm; it cannot, in principle, be justified. ". . . physics says Sir James Jeans tries to discover the pattern of events which controls the phenomena we observe. But we can never know what this pattern means or how it originates; and even if some superior intelligence were to tell us, we should find the explanation unintelligible. Our studies can never put us into contact with reality, and its true meaning and nature must be forever hidden from us."[23] Santayana says: "Its [philosophy's] task, after making that assumption, is to carry it out consistently and honestly, so as to arrive, if possible, at a conception of nature by which the faith involved in action may be enlightened and guided."[24]

The presupposition of matter in terms of deliberate action turns our attention to interests. Interests are the patterns which reveal human nature just as the regularity of physical events are the patterns for physics. This is not to claim that the laws of physics and the laws of human nature are strictly analogous, simply by the fact that in both matter is presupposed. Santayana's talk of interests is not talk of laws as in physics. However, interests as patterns, no matter how nebulous they are, are those things that explain human behavior, no matter how meager the explanation may be. Santayana says: "The same primary impulses, irrational in themselves but expressive of bodily functions, is observable in the behaviour of animals, and in those dreams, obsessions, and primary

passions which in the midst of sophisticated life sometimes lay bare the obscure groundwork of human nature."[25] If, on the one hand, one disregards the place of material conditions in the world and the place of interests in human life, the result is what Santayana calls "innocent illusion." Through the character of Democritus, Santayana portrays innocent illusion as Autologos.

> Autologos is the one perfect atheist; he is persuaded that he rules and creates himself. What madness! And yet how irresistable in the voice of sensation, and will, and thought, at every moment of animate existence. The open-mouthed rabble shouting in the agora suppose that nothing controls them but their pert feelings and imaginations, by miracle unanimous; and even the demogogue who is pulling the strings of their ignorance and cupidity fancies that he is freely ruling the world, and forgets the cupidity and ignorance in his own soul which have put those empty catch-words into his bawling mouth.[26]

If, on the other hand, one honestly recognizes the place of materialism in the world and in human interests, all the intoxicating effects of dogmatism and self-centeredness are apt to be sobered up. From the point of view of Lucretius, Santayana says:

> Materialism, like any system of natural philosophy, carries with it no commandments and no advice. It merely describes the world, including the aspirations and consciences of mortals, and refers all to a material ground. The materialist, being a man, will not fail to have preferences, and even a conscience of his own; but his precepts and policy will express, not the logical implications of his science, but his human instincts, as inheritance and experience may have shaped them.[27]

From this overview of materialism and the idea of interests, it is important to see two implications, one psychological and the other moral. I will discuss each separately; however, it should be implicitly understood that the two go hand in hand. This will become evident as the discussion proceeds.

Movement in human beings is explained by interests expressed through behavior. In Santayana's terms, the psyche is understood by

scientific psychology. The psyche itself is not a substance. It is "that habit in matter which forms the human body and the human mind."[28] It "is not a material atom but a material system."[29] The psyche is the seat of our interests--"I am a nucleus of active interests and passions"[30]--it is the "inner compulsion to care, to watch, to pursue, and to possess,"[31] a material system "inherited or acquired, displayed by living bodies in their growth and behavior."[32] John Lachs sums up nicely Santayana's view of the psyche when he says:

> . . . the psyche has diverse groups of functions which conjointly define its nature. Being present in the seed, its first function is embryological and vegetative. Biologically, it is a self-regulating and self-repairing mechanism. In the search for food and shelter it is the source of locomotion. Surrounding itself with a web of organs, its psychological function is to grow perceptive and intelligent in its responses. Socially, it is the agent in all interaction and the cause of all behavior. Morally, it underlies all choice, impulse, and interest, and is the natural ground of the distinction between good and evil. Its physiological and endocrinological function is to maintain the internal health and equilibrium of the organism. Finally, one of its neurological functions is to give rise to consciousness.[33]

This view of mind (psyche) at once commits Santayana to a form of behavioristic psychology, which some scholars see as being close to Gilbert Ryle's view.[34] Santayana admits there is some justification for calling the relationship of matter and psyche and behavior causal because their interdependence is complete.[35] Yet a better word than 'cause' would be 'expression,' i.e. psyche is an expression of matter; behavior is an expression of psyche. I think he makes his position clear in the following, and indeed, the words could be Ryle's:

> The theory of interaction between mind and body is a combination of psychologism and materialism; and as even pure psychologism, against its will, turns mind into matter, so a world alternately material and psychological would be everywhere materialistic: the patches of psychological existence being only a dramatic and moral transcript of the same material series of events which elsewhere were described in sensuous or scientific terms. We are transported

> to that graphic but crude method of observation which identifies mind in others with their gestures, words, and actions, and in oneself with the immediate objects of attention--often words, and actions of one's own, i.e., motions of one's body, sometimes pictures of thoughts, sensuous or intelligible essences, probably taken for things or for the essences of things. We say that a man's head is bowed down with grief, or with the weight of thought, or that his step is made slow by solemn feelings. If we mean by grief whatsoever bows down his head, then certainly grief is a material agent, in that it does material work; but just in the same measure, grief becomes an observable thing and the emotion itself is left out of account; so that the mental factor to which we mean to ascribe efficacy has disappeared. It turns out, on our own showing, that consciousness, after all, is inefficacious, since it is nonexistent. The theory of interaction between mind and body thus dies in the arms of behaviourism. The only factors recognized are observable factors, and nothing immaterial, moral, intensive, and invisible, governs them from behind the scenes.[36]

Santayana started working out his ideas of psyche and scientific psychology in the Life of Reason. There he stated that the science of the mind arises from our knowledge of biology; it is as Aristotle expressed it in De Anima "an ill-developed branch of natural science."[37] And "the basis of mind lies in the body's interests."[38] Also, Santayana, following Aristotle again, calls the mind the "first entelechy."[39] What 'first entelechy' suggests is that the mind is defined as a disposition to behave in certain ways, and it is the dispositions of mind to which we appeal when some particular occurrence of mind needs explanation. "Habits and passions . . . have metaphorical psychic names, names indicating dispositions rather than particular acts (a disposition being mythically represented as a sort of wakeful and haunting genius waiting to whisper suggestions in a man's ear)."[40] Unlike Ryle, Santayana's development of this idea is sketchy. Nevertheless, it is clear that he is moving in a direction consonant with the Rylean formulation. (I say this with a bit of tongue in cheek, since it is Ryle who is moving in the direction of Santayana.) The example from Reason in Science which follows

is precisely the same example given by Ryle in the Concept of Mind, whether Ryle read Santayana or even plucked the example directly from Reason in Science is impossible to tell. However, even if the examples are the same by sheer coincidence, I nonetheless think the coincidence is significant.[41] Note the following, although the terms are Aristotelian, hence somewhat different from Ryle's: Santayana clearly makes a distinction between a disposition of mind and an occurrence of mind. "The first entelechy is what we should call life, since it is possessed by a man asleep. The French I know but do not use is in its first entelechy, the French I am actually speaking is in its second."[42]

The reason why Santayana, like Ryle, forces the issue of behaviorism is that he wants to take the concept of mind out of a private darkness and into a public light. Only as a public phenomenon does it make any sense to speak of a creature having a mind at all. The mind for Santayana, as far as science is concerned, is entirely public, and psychology is the science of "absolute appearance."[43] What underlies the appearances of mind, the scientist cannot know and so it is left to poetical methods to conjure images of its obsidian reaches. The scientific psychologist wants to "disclose what really is true about sentient moments, without stopping particularly to sink abstractedly into their inner quality or private semblance. It would approach and describe the immediate as a sentient factor in a natural situation, and show us to what extent that situation was represented in that feeling."[44] How do we know Napoleon? asks Santayana. Is it through his life-long soliloquy--his inner feelings alone or is it through his actions which

fit into certain material conditions and the inner feelings which actions reveal?[45] "The circumstances, open to science, which surround consciousness are thus real attributes of a man by which he is truly known and distinguished. Appearances are the qualities of reality, else realities would be without place, time, character, or interrelation. In knowing Napoleon was a Corsican, a short man with a fine countenance, we know appearances only; but these appearances are true of the reality. And if the presumable inner appearance, Napoleon's long soliloquy, were separated from the others, those inner appearances would not belong to Napoleon nor have any home in the knowable world."[46]

Santayana's discussion of the psyche and scientific psychology can be summed up quite simply. And Santayana does so in Realm of Matter: It is a "deliberate refusal to admit the possibility of any mental machinery."[47] This refusal for my purposes means: (1) with the abolition of mental machinery, there follows the abolition of causes as explanations of mind; (2) interests, being actually or potentially public phenomena, are sufficient to explain why someone does anything. Santayana's behaviorism, of course, supports what I mentioned about the relationship between him and Nowell-Smith; Nowell-Smith's argument that attitudes are logically impeccable reasons for acting is based on the assumption that behavior alone reveals ways of sufficiently explaining what a person does.

Santayana says that human nature, since it is grounded in the realm of matter, is in a state of relative flux. This is not to suggest that human nature is changing by leaps and bounds, i.e. absolute flux, but it is to suggest that human nature is slowly evolving. The factors entailed in this evolutionary process are many: physical, biological,

psychological, and cultural. How evolution takes place is the subject of the respective sciences. The questions left for the philosopher are, as I suggested earlier, ones involving the interpretation of evolution and the drawing out of its moral consequences. This is, at least, the way Santayana sees it.

To hold that human nature is in a state of flux implies two important ideas of morals (I shall use the term 'morals' in its widest sense, as does Santayana, so that it includes ethics, aesthetics, politics, and religion). Actually, what we have is a double-edged implication. On one side, morality stands on an irrational foundation. On the other side, morality has a relativistic character. Santayana says: "The predetermined interests we have as animals fortunately focus our attention on practical things."[48] This being so, "the ultimate intuitions on which ethics (or morals in general) rests are not debatable, for they are not opinions we hazard but preferences we feel; and it can be neither correct nor incorrect to feel them. We may assert these preferences fiercely or with sweet reasonableness, and we may be more or less incapable of sympathizing with the different preferences of others."[49] In the sense that some interests are predetermined, that is, that we do not choose what our interests are, morality is irrationally grounded. In the sense that one cannot debate about the ultimate intuitions of morals, there is never an absolute justification, rational or otherwise, for doing one thing rather than another.

On the surface, Santayana as an irrationalist appears as a descendent of either Hobbes or Hume or as a forerunner of either Ayer or Stevenson. Only in a superficial sense are any of these possibilities true. By placing morality on irrational ground and hence making it

relative, Santayana wants to save morality both from annihilation and dogmatism. To say that morality is grounded in interests is to say that potentially it is impossible for man not to have values. (I say 'potentially' because values, as will be explained, do not come into being actually until man is self-conscious of his interests.) While to say that values are relative is to say that when reason flowers in the human psyche, it holds no absolute authority over the contents (interests) of values, the ultimate contents of values being predetermined by material conditions. It is only contingently true that I possess the set of interests I do. However, it is necessarily true, by definition of human nature, that I am interested. An uninterested human being is not a human being at all. An uninterested human being is an automaton; hence potentially or actually the uninterested human being possesses no values at all. No distinction between a value and a non-value, or between good and evil, could even be theoretically drawn if one did not presume that there existed at least one sentient creature in the universe.[50] Moreover, since interests are in flux, there can be no clear description of human nature. The best we can say is that human nature at a particular time and place is disposed to respond in a limited amount of ways. To someone intent upon clarity in all things a position such as this one can only be frustrating. One might say to Santayana: "Well, now look at what we have: irrationality as the ground for morals, relativity as its character, and a vague sense of human nature to boot. Why not just forget it all?" Such a person Santayana would think impudent for assuming the subject matter to be clearer than it can be. Also he would suspect such a person to be an absolutist in morals for suggesting that morals rest on authority of some sort. Furthermore, Santayana seems to

think that the absolutist, in so far as he argues for the authority of his position over all others, compounds his impudence and turns out to be a moral egotist in disguise.

What if we give an absolutist a chance? What if morals is either not based on interests or based upon a clearly defined unchanging human nature? What then do we have? Santayana gives many examples of these two points of view. I have merely selected two examples which I find particularly forceful.

If one says that morals is not based upon interests at all, he might have a view held by Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore, a view Santayana calls "hypostatic ethics." Again, I say although Santayana's criticism, here, applies to ethics, it could apply to morals, in general. Santayana's attack, in particular, is directed toward Russell's essay entitled "The Elements of Ethics"; in general, it includes Moore's views, too. Both Russell and Moore set out to find the "right definition" of the predicate 'good.' Almost immediately, however, we find that the predicate 'good' is indefinable. ". . . he [Russell] says, the so-called definitions of 'good'--that it is pleasure, the desired and so forth--are not definitions of the predicate 'good,' but designations of the things to which this predicate is applied by different persons . . . . From this correct, if somewhat trifling observation, however, Mr. Russell, like Mr. Moore before him, evokes a portentous dogma. Not being able to define good, he hypostasises it. 'Good and bad,' he says, 'are qualities which belong to objects independently of our opinions, just as much as round and square do; and when two people differ as to whether a thing is good, only one of them can be right, though it may be very hard to know which is right.'"[51] What this means, according to Santayana, is

that on the one hand, Russell is saying that there is no material ground for anything we call good, and, on the other hand, that the good is absolute.

Santayana thinks that 'good is indefinable' is true, but it does not follow then that good is unconditioned. The first assertion, he says, is obvious; the second assertion is astonishing. Using intuitionist examples, Santayana says:

> Green is an indefinable predicate, and the specific quality of it can be given only in intuition; but it is a quality which things acquire under certain conditions, so much so that the same bit of grass, at the same moment, may have it from one point of view and not from another. Right and left are indefinable; the difference could not explained without being invoked in the explanation; yet everything that is to the right is not to the right on no condition, but obviously on the condition that some one is looking in a certain direction; and if some one else at the same time is looking in the opposite, what is truly to the right will be truly to the left also.[52]

If it appears to be a contradiction that the grass can both be green and not green or that left can be right, it is only, according to Santayana, because we consider the qualities, alone.

> . . . the contradiction disappears when, instead of considering the qualities in themselves, we consider the things of which those qualities are aspects; for the qualities of things are not compacted by implication, but are conjoined irrationally by nature, as she will; and the same thing may be, and is, at once yellow and green, to the left and to the right, good and evil, many and one, large and small . . . . Indeed, while square is always square, and round round, a thing that is round may actually be square also, if one allow it to have a little body, and to be a cylinder.[53]

From Russell's and Moore's arguments the inference is that "the presence of the good must be independent of all interests, attitudes, and opinions."[54] We have seen that this inference comes about by the illegitimate separation of qualities from the instantiations of those qualities. As a result of Russell's and Moore's efforts to make the good

independent, hence absolute, they have suffocated it in a vacuum. Santayana thinks that the only way to save the good is to make it relative. To make good relative is to claim that it is grounded in our "constitutional interests."[55] "For the human system whiskey is truly more intoxicating than coffee, and the contrary opinion would be an error; but what a strange way of vindicating this real, though relative, distinction, to insist that whiskey is more intoxicating in itself, without any reference to any animal, that it is pervaded, as it were, by an inherent intoxication, and stands dead drunk in its bottle. Yet just in this way Mr. Russell and Mr. Moore conceive things to be dead good and dead bad."[56]

At the beginning of Santayana's criticism of Russell, Santayana apologized (I suspect not without a grin) to Russell that he (Santayana), with logic neither "very accurate or subtle," should be the one to explode Russell's argument. However, Russell, as it turns out, was grateful to Santayana for the criticisms and abandoned his intuitionist position. I think, although it is on mere speculation, that what might have changed Russell's mind was not Santayana's "logical" arguments alone, but the consequences which, Santayana pointed out, could ensue from intuitionism. Intuitionism which seemed to lead to absolutism in turn could lead to "intolerance . . . a form of egoism."[57] I do not think that Russell, who was reared in the liberal tradition of J. S. Mill, could align himself with an egotistic ethics, even one based on British intuitions. As far as egotism, in general, is concerned, it is a particularly important concept for Santayana since, as we shall see, it paves some of the way to the spiritual life. For Santayana, absolutism and egotism go hand in hand, and egotism is diametrically opposed to

spirituality in any form; Santayana calls egotism distraction by the Devil.[58] Relativism, then, which breeds tolerance, would be a condition of spirituality. I think from the following passage one begins to get a glimpse at the relationship between relativism and spirituality, especially in what Santayana says about unselfishness. One wonders, too, to what extent Russell was convinced that his position was faulty by what Santayana brings to light, here.

> I cannot help thinking that a consciousness of the relativity of values, if it became prevalent, would tend to render people more truly social than would a belief that things have intrinsic and unchangeable values, no matter what the attitude of any one to them may be. If we said that goods, including the right distribution of goods, are relative to specific natures, moral warfare would continue, but not with poisoned arrows. Our private sense of justice itself would be acknowledged to have but a relative authority, and while we could not have a higher duty than to follow it, we should seek to meet those whose aims were incompatible with it as we meet things physically inconvenient, without insulting them as if they were morally vile or logically contemptible. Real unselfishness consists in sharing the interests of others. Beyond the pale of actual unanimity the only possible unselfishness is chivalry--a recognition of the inward right and justification of our enemies fighting against us. This chivalry has long been practised in the battlefield without abolishing the causes of war; and it might conceivably be extended to all the conflicts of men with one another, and of the warring elements within each breast.[59]

One further remark before I leave this subject. Many critics, as we shall see, have found Santayana's concept of the spiritual life seriously wanting because it supposedly detached itself from human interests and the concern for effective action--hence from human values. If, as I suggest (and I think Santayana suggests it, too), we look at Santayana's idea of relativism as a condition of spirituality, the idea that the spiritual life is detached and sedentary life begins to dissolve. More about this later.

Socratic morality, according to Santayana, is the paradigm of traditional rational morality. It is based upon human interests, yet not

human interests in a private sense; the good is found in the collective interests of man; actually at crucial junctures the private and the collective interests of men coincide. The ultimate idea of Socratic morality, one which Santayana himself accepted for both the life of reason and the spiritual life, is self-knowledge. Moral ideals, if they are going to guide human action, must be based upon the conditions which constitute the particular human situation, but if the human situation is obscured by ignorance, none of man's ideals can be profitably and completely realized; without self-knowledge, Socratic morality is not possible in the sense that if one does not know what he truly wants, that is, what is truly satisfying in any particular situation, it is impossible to define the good for that situation. Indeed, the dialogue form in which we find Socrates presented continually suggests that self-knowledge is the key to philosophy as a whole.[60]

Santayana felt throughout his career a great sympathy for Socratic morality, among other things, because it exuded sincerity and courtesy, and it was not a forced or contrived morality; it seemed to flow spontaneously from its author's heart. One did not wonder about Socrates' ulterior motives behind his opinions, as one wondered about the Stoics', Kant's, or even Russell's and Moore's motives. Socrates was entirely above board, his motives made public. His honesty lent charm to his playful prevarications, even when he was arrogant, while his impartiality was made even more credible when he was the brunt of a joke. These bits of Socrates' character, I think, made a deep impression on Santayana, since to him the moral man was not simply one who thought moral thoughts or did a moral act. The moral man was a man of character, his soul and actions imbued with good living on every level of life, living

made an art. "The character which a man achieves at the best moment of his life is indeed something ideal and significant; it justified and consecrates all his coherent actions and preferences."[61]

In so far as morality is based upon interests and its ultimate ideal is self-knowledge, Santayana has no quarrels with Socratic morality. However, Santayana did think Socrates' ethics suffered from a crucial flaw. The flaw lay in his view of human nature; that is, human nature is unchanging and although many interests are private ones, there could be found absolute unanimity in certain collective interests. For Santayana what this amounted to was a unpardonable oversimplification of morality in general. ". . . there was one ethical illusion unextirpated even from the mind of Socrates . . . ; an illusion that warped the moral impartiality of his precepts and rendered him partisan and dogmatic in spite of his intention to be absolutely courteous and fair. He assumed that human nature was single and immutable, and the soul qualitatively identical in all men."[62] ". . . all human beings were essentially identical with ourselves, indeed, the morality of the single soul would cover all public morality: all men, to be good, would need to follow the same precepts, and if all men were good, society would be perfect."[63] To say that human nature is immutable is to plant a seed for dogmatism. In a Socrates, the seed does not grow, it is dried up by an innate sense of magnanimity and justice. The same idea, however, in a Calvin brings about a moral nightmare, where, Santayana says, it attempts "to stretch moral unity beyond the range of natural organization."[64] The only solution to avoiding dogmatism in morals, according to Santayana, is to start with the idea that human interests have some constancy but are at the same time vital, hence in a state of change.

> . . . the roots of the good are alive; they are far more tentative and curiously entangled than verbal debate might indicate at Athens amid a bevy of rationalizing demogogues and sophists. Even in the individual, in whom actual preference has its only seat, ultimate sincerity presupposes a definite psyche, with assignable aspirations; and indeed some degree of definiteness any psyche must possess, else that psyche could not be the hereditary principle of organization in the body or of direction in the will. Yet this vital definiteness is not absolute. At each moment there is a limit, inwards, below which the psyche is not sensitive to variations in her own substance; and there is a margin outwards toward the infinite, beyond which what happens does not affect her specific life. Moreover, the most radical demands of the psyche are not immutable. Unfelt variations in her substance transform and undermine her desire. She is mortal; presently she will make no demands at all; and in the interval, from germination to birth and from childhood to old age, she successively develops and outgrows functions which essentially are temporary. In her origin she was a new equilibrium that changing circumstances had rendered possible; and her organism remains always potentially plastic and internal to the flux of nature at large.[65]

If one claims that morality is based upon something other than human interests, the theoretical problems are unsurmountable, Here, Santayana is in line with all those who have criticized other-worldly and intuitionist ethics. Also, if one claims that human interests are immutable one is placing the foundation of morality on antiquated ground, indeed contrary to psychological findings over the last one hundred years.

The heart of Santayana's claim that human nature is in a state of flux, hence all morality is irrationally based and relativistic in character, lies in the belief that such a view avoids the moral atrocities which a dogmatic and absolutist morality might engender. The idea that <u>one</u> way of life might hold absolute authority over another or to the exclusion of all others is an idea that was entirely abhorrent to Santayana's sensibilities. Such an idea, whether it be based on strength, divine grace, or reason, was inadmissible as far as Santayana was concerned, and it was inadmissible precisely because none of the above bases of morality or any others could demonstrate that human nature was not in

a state of change or could any of them give good cause to believe that morality should be grounded anywhere but on human interests. Indeed, Santayana's position takes authority away from any particular moral point of view. But that it does so only is a perturbance to he who holds authority sacred. Actually, by taking authority out of morals, Santayana is making room for rationality in morals in so far as reason is a means by which interests are clarified into ideals. Santayana says: "The peculiarity of the human psyche is her great relative plasticity."[66] "Human nature is therefore a variable, and its ideal cannot have greater constancy than the demands to which it gives expression. Nor can the ideal of one man or one age have any authority over another, since the harmony existing in their nature and interests is accidental and each is a transitional phase in an indefinite evolution."[67]

The significance of relativism in morals is made clear in the religious idea of piety. "Piety, in its nobler and Roman sense, may be said to mean man's reverent attachment to the sources of his being and the steadying of his life by that attachment."[68] Recognition of the attachment to the sources of being applies to every level of life from the physical environment to family ties. In short, the sources of our being are our predetermined and changing interests. "Philosophers who harbour illusions about the status of intellect in nature may feel that this leadership of instinct in moral life is a sort of indignity. . . . But the leadership of instinct is not merely a necessity in the Life of Reason, it is a safeguard."[69] The safeguard which the leadership of instinct imposes is that morals will never be "gauged impersonally,"[70] since anything that draws attention away from "material conditions and that irrational substratum of reason"[71] severs the vein which gives morality

its vitality, indeed, its very existence. In a sense, the admission of piety, Santayana says, is pathetic because it is the "subordination of physical accident and the acceptance of finitude."[72] But it is also, he says, noble because it subsumes "life under the general laws of relativity."[73] Man has the ability to be ideally impartial by means of reason but only in a qualified sense. Impartiality is limited like every other power possessed by man, so that along with being impartial, one must add that man is impartial at a certain point in space and time. In this sense, man is no more impartial than a vegetable. Piety, then, exercises "the eminently sane function of calling thought home,"[74] and every home has its own peculiar character.

I said earlier that there are two implications of Santayana's idea of interests in so far as it is based upon his materialism. We have seen that the psychological implication is scientific psychology and the moral implication is moral relativism. Milton Munitz, discussing Santayana's naturalistic approach in the Life of Reason, sums up well the psychological and moral implications seen as a whole; and indeed they should be seen as such.

> A naturalistic approach points to the status of human life within the larger context of nature; it emphasizes the inescapable giveness of natural events and the materials of conduct; it defines the fundamental place of interest, impulse, and habit as the grounds of moral preference and judgement; it calls attention to elements both of constancy and variation in moral systems; and, finally, it exhibits the locus of moral problems by pointing to their origin and initial setting. This last point calls attention to the fact that a recognition of the natural conditions of the life of reason is but the beginning and not the end of moral inquiry and endeavor.[75]

What I have done thus far is to take the idea of interest in light of Santayana's materialism in order to show how it both explains human behavior and how it is the ground of human morals. I do not think

that what I have developed deviates radically from what other commentators have said about Santayana. Even my approach to the concept of interest has not been at all radical. Although someone like Munitz or Irwin Edman might admonish me for mixing the early and the late versions of Santayana's work--confusing naturalism with materialism--others like Irving Singer or Timothy Sprigge have mixed, I believe legitimately so, the early and the late sources in reference to other ideas in Santayana's work; while Santayana himself gives one license to talk in terms of naturalism and materialism--two words with essentially the same significance--Santayana says he prefers 'materialism' to 'naturalism' because the former is less apt to suggest psychologism, and the term is safer because it is disliked.[76] Of course, for me to mix the early with the late sources is essential to my point about the concept of interest. Whether we talk of naturalism in the Life of Reason or materialism in the Realms of Being, the concept of interest does not change. From Reason in Common Sense to the Realm of Matter, interests are grounded in matter. From Reason in Common Sense to "Hypostatic Ethics" to the Realm of Truth, interests form the ground of morals.

3. REASON AS A DERIVED AND FORMAL INTEREST

As far as Santayana is concerned, the most important interests one can have are rational and spiritual interests. In order to clarify further the concept of interest so that ultimately the spiritual life can be properly understood, I want to look at what it means for one to have a rational interest in something, and what it means for one to have a spiritual interest in something.

As an introduction to talking about reason and spirit as interests, it might be helpful to put them into a context. Let us consider human interests as forming a genealogical tree. (This model and the distinctions which follow from it are mine not Santayana's. However, the model and the distinctions are implicit in Santayana's texts.) By speaking of human interests alone, I do not mean, in principle, to exclude all other interested creatures. I mean only to simplify matters. The only difference between human beings and other creatures in regard to interests is that the human interest tree is more developed. To think of human interests after the model of a genealogical tree is to emphasize that not only are human beings and their interests the outcome of an evolutionary process, but that interests themselves evolve and that in one way or another they are all related through this evolution.

As I suggested, Santayana does not systematically or clearly develop the concept of interest. Yet, generally, I think it is safe to draw the following distinctions which are implicit in the texts. At the basis of all interests, there are material conditions. Out of material conditions grow primary interests. Directly descended from primary

interests are derived interests from second generation to nth generations. Primary and derived interests form categories which cannot be precisely defined in the sense that which particular interests fall into each category depends upon the context in which and the circumstances under which the particular interest occurs. Both primary and derived interests, however, form the class of appetites men possess and express in a variety of situations. And both primary and derived interests are the determinants of choice. In addition to primary and derived interests, there are formal interests, i.e. reason and spirit. These formal interests share similar qualities with derived interests and so are in a sense themselves derived in so far as they are descended from other generations of interests and are born out of material conditions. Yet the reason why formal interests are distinguished from primary and derived interests is that they do not essentially function appetitively, and although we use formal interests to make choices, formal interests themselves cannot act as "logically impeccable reasons" for doing something. In regard to the last case, to appeal, for example, to a belief constructed by a formal interest does not tell us why someone did something.[1]

To say there are primary, derived, and formal interests in man is to say that Santayana sees man as a part of a gradual evolution from vegetative and animal consciousness to the rational and spiritual lives. I think this can be seen by a distinction drawn from Reason in Art. In the very beginning, in the chapter entitled "The Basis of Art," Santayana draws a distinction between "instincts" and "practical habits" and "creative habits." This distinction is loosely analogous to my distinction between primary interests and derived interests and formal interests. Let

us consider the following example in order to illuminate both Santayana's and my distinction for the sake of seeing interests in the scheme of evolutionary process.

Under certain circumstances, taking shelter is a primary interest. Specifically, in a cold climate, if one wants to stay alive, he must live protected by shelter of some sort. From this primary interest there descends the interest in not only taking shelter to stay alive but also to stay alive in comfort. Is it not indeed pleasant to be indoors in an easy chair by a fire when it is cold outside? When it is a question of merely taking shelter in order to stay alive, anything will do: a cave, a cluster of trees. When it is a question of comfort, it is a question of preferring comfort to discomfort. Under these circumstances, a man will work routinely in order to satisfy his preference for comfort. Hence he builds a shelter. "Creative habits are acquired in the light of reason."[2] In the light of reason, a formal interest, needing shelter and preferring comfort are transformed into ideals, moral and aesthetic. Under these circumstances, in light of reason, the question of excellence arises, and the question of excellence, indeed, is a complex one. Let us note Santayana's example of naval architecture, in full, in order to appreciate the complexity of this question of excellence in the light of reason.

> Naval architecture, for instance, serves a clear immediate purpose. Yet to cross the sea is not an ultimate good, and the ambition or curiosity that first led man, being a land-animal, to that now vulgar adventure, has sometimes found moralists to condemn it. A vessel's true excellence is more deeply conditioned than the ship-wright may imagine when he prides himself on having made something that will float and go. The best battle-ship, or racing yacht, or freight steamer, might turn out to be a worse thing for its specific excellence, if the action it facilitated proved on the whole maleficent, and if war or racing or trade could be rightly condemned by a

> philosopher. The rationality of ship-building has several sets of conditions: the patron's demands must be first fulfilled; then the patron's specifications have to be judged by the purpose he in turn has in mind; this purpose itself has to be justified by his ideal in life, and finally his ideal by its adequacy to his total or ultimate nature.[3]

Obviously, what is true of naval architecture, in principle, is true of houses, public buildings, palaces, and cathedrals. Aside from the fact that the previous quote is reminiscent of Aristotle, and aside from the complexities of excellence and the nature of primary and derived interests, one can sense the idea of evolutionary process working through Santayana's thought. Ultimately, human interests--primary, derived, formal--as part of the evolutionary process provide a context which "describes the situation which makes the existence of ideals possible and intelligible."[4]

Primary interests do not form a rigid class of interests which all men necessarily possess. To say there is a set of primary interests is not to say that there are interests which combined together amount to saying that man acts out of a sense of self-preservation, fear, self-love or any other single concept. Any such single concept tends not to take into account certain particular extenuating circumstances in which a man will not avoid pain, will sacrifice his life for another person or for an idea, or will simply commit suicide. It so happens, also, that some primary interests such as interests in water, light, and air under some circumstances are life supporting but under other circumstances not necessarily so. Primary interests are those basic interests directly predetermined by physical and biological conditions. An expression of a primary interest is a direct response to the biological conditions operating in us and to our biological and physical environment in order

to stay alive and keep an equilibrium with the environment. "The same primacy of impulses, irrational in themselves but expressive of bodily functions, is observable in the behavior of animals, and in those dreams, obsessions, and primary passions which in the midst of sophisticated life sometimes lay bare the obscure groundwork of human nature."[5] Primary interests are those interests which as Dewey says "are so much a part of our being that we cannot imagine any condition under which they would cease to be."[6] This is not to say that there are no circumstances in which a particular primary interest might not be primary. Surely under certain circumstances, I am interested in drinking a glass of water simply because its coolness delights me. However, regardless whether the water delights me on some occasions or not, my interest in water, assuming I want to prolong my life, is primary in so far as I am determined to obey that interest eventually under one set of conditions or another. In short, primary interests are "predetermined interests we have as animals."[7] They irrevocably tie me to my material environment. Primary interests indicate most forcibly that I am a material creature in a material world. That along with satisfactions to be derived from a material world, there are inevitable pressures that I must face in order to maintain an equilibrium and to gain satisfaction.

Descending from primary interests are what I call derived interests. I call them derived because they are not interests which immediately or directly reflect the biological and physical conditions under which a man lives; they indirectly reflect these conditions. Derived interests are second, third, fourth . . . generation interests which we are able to choose and to emphasize to greater and lesser extents. Like

primary interests, derived interests have an appetitive character. Unlike primary interests, I can imagine circumstances under which one derived interest or another might cease to be, certain social interests, for example. Perhaps it is best to characterize derived interests as preferences. Yet, since like primary interests, derived interests have an appetitive character, they can be ultimately traced to biological and physical conditions, and they are determinants of choice, even though they are not biologically or physically predetermined.

In the cases of both primary and derived interests, their importance lies in the fact that they point to the common sources and conditions of life. Let me emphasize, however, that the categories of primary and derived interests and the particular interests in each category are not rigid or clear-cut. There may be borderline cases where one is not sure whether an interest is wholly primary or wholly derived. Deciding whether an interest is primary or derived depends on the circumstances in which the particular interest occurs. To use an example used earlier, in a cold climate, seeking shelter would be a primary interest; in a warm climate it could be a derived interest. To decide which interests would be primary and which would be derived is the task of the biologist, psychologist, sociologist, or anthropologist. It is the task of the philosopher first to recognize these interests as the sources of being and action and then to interpret and to evaluate these interests for the sake of the role they play in the lives of reason and spirit.

Formal interests qua formal play a role in primary and derived interests to a lesser and greater extent. A formal interest is designated so in virtue of intent. Intent is defined as an interest in form. I will

discuss intent in detail later on. For now let us say reason and spirit have formal interests in so far as they embody intent. But they each embody intent for their own purposes. So reason is defined as a formal interest in harmony of action. And spirit is defined as a formal interest in harmony of contemplation. Intent as an interest in form and at its lowest level acts to distinguish the character of one thing from another. When one distinguishes the character of one thing from another be it a primary or derived interest or anything else, he becomes self-conscious of that thing. One distinguishes one thing from another and hence becomes self-conscious of it in virtue of the ability which an interest in form possesses, that is, the ability to render an experience symbolic or ideal. In this sense, a formal interest is qualitatively different from any of its primary and derived ancestors and cousins. As we shall see, intent, an interest in form, constitutes the foundation of the formal interests, reason and spirit. Also, as we shall see, reason as a formal interest functions in order to clarify primary and derived interests and their objects so that these interests and their objects might be given value in order to be harmonized for action. More precisely, reason functions in order to resolve conflicts of interest. And finally, as we shall see, spirit as a formal interest functions in order to clarify primary and derived interests and their objects so that they be given value and harmonized for contemplation. More precisely, by seeing how intuition and intent are related, how interests are not overtly acted upon yet expressed, we will see how the spiritual life emerges and then how it is acted out in charity and prayer.

"Reason as such represents or rather constitutes a single formal interest, the interest in harmony."[8] Reason as a formal interest is

> the sort of imagination that can survey all . . . interests at once, and can perceive how they check or support one another. . . . When reason is vivid and powerful it gives courage and authority to those interests which it sees are destined to success, whilst it dampens or extinguishes those others which it sees are destined to failure. Reason thus establishes a sort of resigned and peaceful strength in the soul, founded on renunciation of what is impossible and cooperation with what is necessary.[9]

This is the character of reason as a formal interest yet it shares certain qualities with derived interests. It has evolved. As a derived interest, reason has its animal basis, and it has its history. In an individual or in a culture, reason is born, it grows, it matures, it becomes senile, and it dies. It is impossible to trace the very origins of reason, although Santayana imagines that human experience in its beginnings was in "a private and dreamful chaos of its own."[10] Nevertheless, it seems to make sense that certain conditions must have been present for reason to bud.

> Reason was born, as it has since discovered, into a world already wonderfully organized, in which it found its precursor in what is called life, its seat in an animal body of unusual plasticity, and its function in rendering that body's volatile instincts and sensations harmonious with one another and with the outer world on which they depend. It did not arise until the will or conscious stress, by which any modification of living bodies' inertia seems to be accompanied, began to respond to represented objects, and to maintain that inertia not absolutely by resistance but only relatively and indirectly through labour. Reason has thus supervened at the last stage of an adaptation which had long been carried on by irrational and even unconscious processes.[11]

One can clearly see here the influence of the theory of evolution at work. Reason is an outcome of a grand process; a process of stress and conflict and of equilibrium and cooperation. Reason has no unique source, and, therefore, it has no unique authority over any other interest. Through reason, man adapts to his environment in the ways a hawk through the keenness of sight adapts to his environment. Following James, Santayana

would agree that "Reasoning is but another form of the selective activity of the mind."[12] Both a man and a hawk begin their education of the senses with their instinct. But for man "instincts are the nucleus of reason,"[13] and so reason begins with "impulse checked by experiment, and experiment judged again by impulse."[14] It is important to note that reason begins and ends with interests. Reason is in the service of the body. It does not matter whether reason be employed to combine the simplest observation into the simplest inference or whether it be employed to create laws for theoretical physics or the foundations of mathematics, always it has its roots in an animal basis, always reason is a method inspired by the body, always reason must respond to the body.

Before the dawn of reason, the body behaves in accordance to one blind interest or another. What reason brings to light are those interests themselves, and with that light, the method of reason, irrational in its source, reveals that man has something definite to live for. "When definite interests are recognized and the values of things are estimated by that standard, action at the same time veering in harmony with that estimation, then reason has been born and a moral world has arisen."[15] "The living organism, caught in the act, informs us how to reason and what to enjoy."[16] "Thought is a form of life, and should be conceived on the analogy of nutrition, generation, and art. Reason, as Hume said, with profound truth, is an unintelligible instinct."[17] It is obvious that Santayana's discussion of reason is not a logical or an epistemological discussion, it is a psychological discussion. In this sense, Santayana is not interested in reason as a method per se. He is interested in how reason comes about and what is its proper function in

reference to its origins; I suppose of the two, it is the function of reason which mainly concerns Santayana, but if the function of reason is at all detached from its sources, like any other interest, it becomes impious. On the whole, the psychology of reason is necessary in order to keep reason in its proper perspective. Reason, as Santayana sees it, is neither autonomous nor good in itself; it is a method and good only under certain circumstances, that is when it is serving to harmonize our interests in order that our interests may be well satisfied. It is possible to be intemperately rational just as one can be intemperately frugal. Those who are intemperately rational might be led to believe like those "philosophers . . . having perceived that the function of thought is to fix static terms and reveal eternal relations, have inadvertently transferred to the living act what is true of its ideal object; and they have expected to find in the process, treated psychologically, that luminous deductive clearness which belongs to the ideal world it tends to reveal. The intelligible, however, lies at the periphery of experience, the surd at its core; and intelligence is but one centrifugal ray darting from the slime to the stars."[18] What Santayana is drawing our attention to is an old story but apparently one that needs to be emphasized over and over again. Like Francis Bacon, many years before him, Santayana is warning his readers to beware of an idol of the cave, the propensity of human reason to abstract and then give substance to those same abstractions, or, a fortiori, infer eternal substance. The function of reason is clearly ideal or abstract; it has no other language; but reason itself is not a static term or any complex of static terms. Reason is a form of life, a process. To see reason as a derived interest

is to keep reason itself disillusioned. We do not want to inhibit the power of reason as do the radical empiricists, but at the same time, we do not want to fall into the illusion of the rationalists who enthrone reason in heaven and sacrifice its earthly home and tasks. "If the common mistake in empiricism is not to see the omnipresence of reason in thought, the mistake of rationalism is not to admit its variability and dependence, not to understand its natural life."[19] Also appropos of some contemporary thought, reason as a derived interest does not allow reason to degenerate into a mere technique. "The technical side of a great philosophy, interesting as it may be in itself, hardly ever determines its essential views. These essential views are derived rather from instincts or traditions which the technique of the system is designed to defend; or, at least, they decide how that technique shall be applied and interpreted."[20]

From this view of reason as a derived interest, I believe we can begin to see its relationship to reason as a formal interest. Milton Munitz in his book, The Moral Philosophy of George Santayana, notes the relationship when he says there are two principles in the Life of Reason: naturalism and moral idealism, i.e. reason as a derived and formal interest, respectively.[21] "All values," says Munitz, "must be rooted in actual need. In itself, however, this principle is insufficient for a moral theory of the rational life since to assert such a connection would be to neglect an equally important consideration, namely, that such values require the certification of critical judgement and intelligent analysis if they are to be admitted to the rational life."[22] As a derived interest, reason maintains its allegiance to its origins, its material

conditions. Reason for reason's sake like art for art's sake is as empty as a pipe dream and as self-indulgent as well. As a formal interest, reason speaking in ideal terms is critical of the facts of material existence and critical in order that reason applied to the facts may satisfactorily interpret and utilize them. Santayana, here, is thoroughly in the pragmatic tradition.[23] Like Dewey, Santayana sees reason's job to be a problem solver. When one is rational one possesses "know how" in the field of action. And know how is expressed in cooking, in moral decisions, or in logical solutions. This is not to say that know how is expressed unequivocally in each case. To say that know how is diversely expressed in various subjects is to say that reason's end is to be applied to the facts of experience either directly or indirectly, that reason has essentially a practical character and function, that on every level reason seeks to bring order into experience.

Santayana's view of reason at the service of interests in so far as it must be applied to experience might appear to be a one-sided view of reason; that is, someone might say that Santayana only talks of the practical side of reason at the total sacrifice of the theoretical side of reason, the most sublime side. It is true Santayana sees reason most importantly as a practical method. Often he thinks that logicians and mathematicians with all their pure ideas are "irresponsible,"[24] creating "new mythologies" and purely fictitious ideas.[25] Often Santayana effectively uses harsh language in order to awaken his readers out of their dogmatic slumbers. Here Santayana reminds one of Jonathan Swift, who satirizes mathematicians in Gulliver's Travels in Gulliver's voyage to Laputa, Laputans being "dextrous enough upon a piece of paper, in the

management of the rule, the pencil and the divider, yet in the common actions and behavior of life clumsy, awkward, and unhandy people."[26] In the present case, I think Santayana's language is rash, and needlessly so. As a result, unfortunately, his language is misleading, because he is not saying that there is no value to theoretical reason, what he is saying is that the distinction between practical and theoretical reason is an artificial one. (This important point will be discussed later in further detail in terms of immediate and mediate knowledge.)

Since reason as a formal interest is always at root tinged with practicality, let us see how it functions in the sense Munitz speaks of reason as a formal interest, i.e. in terms of moral idealism. "The function of reason," says Santayana, "is to dominate experience,"[27] that is, ultimately in order to dominate action. The way in which reason dominates experience is methodologically, as a means to an end, and as a means by which ends are enlightened. However, "reason has, to be sure, no independent method of discovering values."[28] Values are not discovered, they are felt. The job of reason is merely to enlighten these feelings in order that they can be pursued and satisfied. The way in which feelings are enlightened and hence satisfied by means of reason is by reason bringing into harmony "the facts of perception" (the material world) with "the facts of preference." Reason is a guide and a control of human interests, a guide in so far as it efficiently directs us to the ideals which are imbedded and latent in our interests, a control in so far as it attempts to reduce conflicts of interest.

Let us look at the problem in the following way. Interests are at once the actual content of value and the potential form of value;

content in the sense that values grow out of material circumstances, form in the sense that in interests themselves lie the ideal ends we pursue. It is as if we were sculptors with a crude block of stone before us. Within that block lies a statue. Until the statue is revealed, we can never be satisfied. To get at the statue one might adopt the method of picking up the block and by brute force flinging it against the wall. Such a method proves to be fruitless, however, since finding the statue within is not like cracking a nut. The method required calls for skilled hands, a trained eye, patience, etc. With this latter method, one has a chance of finding the statue within. It may not be Pieta or Balzac, but it will approximate them in form better than if we had merely taken the way of the brute.

The block of stone represents our interests, the content, the possibility of many statues. A statue is an ideal imbedded in our interests. The sensitive artist within us is reason. Reason is used to get at the statue in order that our interests in it be satisfied. Getting at the statue means harmonizing the materials we have to work with and an ideal we wish to pursue. What the harmony of these two reveals is the ultimate satisfaction which puts our interests to a temporary rest, that is, until we feel the need to find another statue.

Interests and satisfaction are logically complementary to one another. Without the idea of satisfaction complementing the idea of interest, it would make no sense to speak of an interest <u>in</u> something. Also, "apart from the pains and satisfactions involved, an impulse and its execution would be alike destitute of importance."[29] "Satisfaction is the touchstone of value; without reference to it all talk about good

and evil, progress or decay is merely confused verbiage."[30] In the most general sense, we are interested in being satisfied. Satisfaction, which means the revelation and utilization of ideals by means of reason is the end of all human effort. However, it is not only the end in so far as interests demand satisfaction and that 'interest' and 'satisfaction' are logically related; satisfaction is also an end in so far as it justifies all action and thought and it itself is self-justifying; there is no other reason for satisfaction except satisfaction itself. What we have in sum is: interests which move us in a direction; reason in action as a guide and control of interests, a harmonizer of content and form; the satisfaction of interests, the realization of them through enlightened action. Santayana sums this point up in the following way:

> What gives the material world a legitimate status and perpetual pertinence in human discourse is the conscious life it supports and carries in its own direction, as a ship carries its passengers or rather as a passion carries its hopes. Conscious interests first justify and moralise the mechanisms they express. Eventual satisfactions, while their form and possibility must be determined by animal tendencies, alone render these tendencies vehicles of the good. The direction in which benefit shall lie must be determined by irrational impulse, but the attainment of benefit consists in crowning that impulse with its ideal achievement. Nature dictates what men shall seek and prompts them to seek it; a possibility of happiness is thus generated and only its fulfillment would justify nature and man in their common venture.[31]

Some questions such as the following might be asked. According to Santayana: Is there a hierarchy of satisfactions? Is one thing intrinsically more satisfying than another? Is there a separate or external criterion by which it can be judged which is the more satisfying course of action or the more satisfying ideal? To such questions Santayana would answer, no, if such questions imply absolute satisfactions. It must be remembered that what characterizes human nature is its relative plasticity. In this sense, like a demand or preference, no

satisfaction is absolute and no satisfaction is complete. The attainment of satisfaction must be judged in light of the circumstances; any tendency toward far reaching or eternal principles will only lead to dissatisfaction and the frustration of interests in a static morality.

The problem of reason is to attain the maximum satisfaction in any given situation. 'Satisfaction' alone indicates fulfillment of some sort. Now, obviously in the human world, there are many situations which could be satisfying with hardly any use of reason at all. For example, I am hungry; there is food; I eat. If the food is before me, the situation looks simply like a stimulus-response situation where reason plays virtually no role. If the food needs to be found, then maybe one might admit that reason is employed but only in a rudimentary sense. In either case, no one would deny that when I eat, it is satisfying. However, even in this simple situation could one say that without reason I was maximally satisfied? I think not. One cannot assume that once hunger pangs have passed that one has satisfied one's hunger. It is clearly a fact that one can starve to death on a full belly. Maximum satisfaction does not entail merely alleviating the pangs of hunger; maximum satisfaction of hunger is the result of eating those things that produce health, and health is produced by a nutritionally balanced diet. Health is only gained by rational eating, not just by eating alone. Maximum satisfaction, then, is the result of enlightened actions. To have an interest alone reveals that satisfaction is desired, but it does not guarantee that maximum satisfaction will result. To say that maximum satisfaction follows from reason alone is to say that values in general are not

determined by interests alone. Because I desire something or take pleasure in something does not alone tell me that my desire or pleasure is worthwhile. Of course, every desire attained or every pleasure experienced is satisfying but only by sheer chance or the result of reason could maximum satisfaction be had. The distinction between 'satisfaction' and 'maximum satisfaction' is virtually the same as Dewey's distinction between 'satisfying' and 'satisfactory.' To say that something is satisfying is to make a statement of fact. To say that something is satisfactory is to judge the value of that fact. The same is true of Santayana's 'satisfaction' and 'maximum satisfaction.'[32]

What 'maximum' means will be wholly determined by the person's interests, the external material situation, and how well the person knows what his interests are and how to realize them. To say that there is a hierarchy of satisfactions implies that satisfaction is somehow abstract, and "abstract satisfaction (whatever that may mean) is not pursued."[33] To say that one thing is intrinsically more satisfying than something else is either to say that, again, satisfaction is abstract or that interests can be somehow counted individually each on its own merit and removed from its context. To say, finally, that there is a separate or external criterion by which to judge whether one thing is more satisfying than another is to ask for a reason which is detached from human interests, a god's reason, one which decides from the outside so to speak; this is, of course, what dogmatic morals requests. All three of the above are unsatisfactory. However, if one asks Santayana, is there a relative criterion by which we decide which interest is potentially more satisfying, the answer is, yes.

Santayana says: ". . . the only possible criterion for the relative values of pains and pleasures is the will that chooses among them or among combinations of them."[34] From this, the criterion for deciding where maximum satisfaction is to be found lies in the individual and is determined by the individual. Also it suggests that the method of reason is a method of comparison. Value judgements are made by reason in a particular context. Within particular contexts there arise interests in the individual which call for satisfaction. If the particular individual and the context are not taken into account, it is virtually impossible for the individual to gain satisfaction of his interests. One cannot assume in such questions of value that maximum satisfaction is the same for all men. Even though Santayana would agree with Hume that there are "common sentiments to all mankind,"[35] "a perfect morality is not really common to any two men nor to any two phases of the same man's life."[36] What maximum satisfaction means is entirely contingent upon context, so that what it means to a stock broker with a family of four living in the suburbs of New York is entirely different from what it means to a lone bushman in western Australia. Although there are similarities between the stock broker and the bushman, the differences are so many that it would be absurd simply to assume that maximum satisfaction of interests could mean the same thing to both, even though both do indeed strive for maximum satisfaction of interests within their own milieu. Santayana says: "Thinkers of different experience and organization have pro tanto different logics and different moral laws. There are limits to communication even among beings of the same race, and the faculties and ideals of one intelligence are not transferable without change to any other."[37] I

repeat for the sake of emphasis that since there is a logical relation between interest and satisfaction, one must be interested in something, one must satisfy something; therefore, satisfaction, according to Santayana, is not an abstraction so that content and context are essential to any particular idea of satisfaction.

I have suggested that, according to Santayana, no interest has any absolute authority over another. If we extend this idea, we could say that no interest is either good or bad in itself. I think Lachs makes the point well. He says: "The first point to note is that no desire can of itself be either good or bad. It is only with reference to other desires that a desire can be pronounced bad, or sometimes misleadingly, a desire for what is bad. No impulse has an object that is bad from the point of view of that impulse, though it may well be denounced morally despicable from the point of view of another rival interest."[38] In a perfect world, every interest would be known and satisfied--and satisfied without conflict. In effect, a perfect world would not require value judgements at all. But we obviously do not live in a perfect world, and conflict reigns. With the fundamental problem of conflict facing reason, it is the job of reason to devise a method whereby conflict will be kept at a minimum in order that some interests can be satisfied. This is where reason operates by comparing various interests, "by which objects of desire are compared in reflection."[39] Again Lachs says: "Comparative value judgements are based on conflicts of interests and presuppose ultimate adherence to one group of interests in preference to all others."[40] The adherence to one group rather than another is judged by seeing that the one group will give more satisfaction than the other. I will

illustrate with a mundane example. Workers for a particular company have decided to strike. They demand a 25 percent increase in wages, shorter working hours, safer working conditions. The company refuses to meet any of the worker's demands. The company says such demands will drastically cut its profits, so much so that it may have to declare bankruptcy, hence be forced to shut down operations. The union and the company are deadlocked. Both decide that they will try to bring in a mediator to help resolve the conflict, since neither the union nor the company wants a complete bust. They both want to be satisfied as best they can rather than not being satisfied at all. The job of the mediator is to discover what are the interests of each party and then in light of those interests try to decide how to maximize the satisfaction of each. Of course, maximum satisfaction, ideally, would be giving each everything that he wants. But also, of course, due to the very nature of the conflict, the company would be destroyed and the workers would be unemployed, as a result. In other words, maximum satisfaction in the ideal sense is possible here for a moment or so, but ultimately it is suicide. Obviously, what is at stake are not short-term interests but long-term ones. Well, I do not think it is necessary to draw out every detail of the illustration. I think enough has been said to see the picture. The important thing to see is that the mediator as reason attempts to compare the various interests at hand in order that a compromise be effected, a compromise which is fitting to the particular situation. Reason convinces both sides that each one's "demands being akin to one another in spite of themselves, can be better furthered by co-operation than by blind conflict."[41] It is in this way that reason acts critically in order to insure maximum satisfaction in a situation.

Now let us imagine that in this situation both union workers and company men were ultimately satisfied to the maximum under the circumstances. No one felt cheated. The mediator convinced the union people that a 25 percent increase in wages was unreasonable, and he also convinced the company that safer working conditions were an absolute necessity, etc., etc. If this sort of harmony of interests were to be reached, one would say that the mediator equally took the side of both the union's and the company's interests. If, however, under different circumstances, reason had reached some other conclusion, let us say, in favor of one and not the other, then, of course, reason would be then expressing the interests of that favored side. I should add with "good reason," since presumably only by favoring one side would maximum satisfaction ensue. For example, it might have been the case that the company had lied about its real profits and that union demands for a 25 percent increase were reasonable. In any case, it should be noted that reason takes sides with those interests which will produce maximum satisfaction under a particular set of circumstances. It has a bias towards maximum satisfaction in a given situation--"a conscious [movement] towards satisfaction."[42] Reason in the formal sense has an interest in harmony and a harmony of interests brings satisfaction of interests. So then, reason will always take the side of harmony in a particular situation. In other words, reason is committed to harmony in action. This bias towards harmony for the sake of satisfaction gives reason its objective character, a fortiori, in no other sense can reason be said to be objective at all.

I think it is obvious that reason plays the role I have previously described in any situation where there is a conflict of interest, that is,

reason's role as mediator is not limited to economic or social situations, it extends itself into situations where there are questions of value concerning religion, science, art, or the individual conscience alone. In so far as every value judgement requires a choice, there is a conflict of interest where reason has its role to fulfill.

In Santayana's later works, although he talks about reason, he does not delve into the character of reason as he did earlier; that was a job already done. However, this should not suggest that he abandoned his earlier idea of reason as having interests. Timothy Sprigge points out that there is clear evidence that Santayana's idea of reason remained essentially the same in what Santayana says in the "Apologia" where "he [Santayana] still describes reason in essentially the same fashion"[43] as he did thirty-five years earlier. Let us briefly note some of Santayana's remarks in order to see that Santayana's concept of reason remained the same and, more generally, to lend further support to the idea that 'interest' as a whole remained the same. Here, we even see the same terminology in command. First, interests themselves are the source of values, the content out of which ideals are brought to light. Santayana says: "I should say therefore that interest, if you identify interest with all passions or valuation, was the source of values; while interests conceived objectively, as the ends or goals of aspiration were identical with value. . . ."[44] Second, reason as having interests is still conceived as a means to resolving blind conflicts. "Living purposes confront [us] on every side in conservative phalanxes and in revolutionary hordes; and reason can mean only to find means for realizing those purposes, or to devise some compromise for realizing as much of them as can be realized

together. This is exactly how the principle of moral rationality works when the premises are accepted. . . ."[45] Third, harmony with its ground in interest as the end of reason as formal interest, this, too, remains. ". . . Harmony as the essence of the good is a profoundly naturalistic principle: it is akin to organic health."[46] "Now you cannot have a harmony of nothings . . . [so that] the impulse to establish harmony [is] natural, and the demand for harmony not merely within the human psyche or within the human world, but between this world and the psyche on the one hand, and the universe, the truth, or God on the other."[47] In short, reason as a formal interest is still believed by Santayana to have a "judicial peace-making function"[48] even though in the 'Apologia' Santayana's interest had long turned towards spiritual problems and concerns.

4. THE CRITICS' VIEW OF SPIRIT

The question of how, in Santayana's philosophy, the spirit is interested, is bound to raise objections. Actually the consensus among most scholars has been that the spirit, by definition, has no interests at all. This means that spirit as Santayana conceives it is utterly detached from its sources in so far as the spirit does not express human interest and is not committed to any form of action. The spirit in man supposedly is an Olympian spectator observing a parade of appearances pass by. Whether the parade exists or is just a dream is absolutely unimportant; all that the spirit discerns are essences--forms or logical characters--like masks which might or might not hide a face--it notes the similarities and differences and that is all.

If Santayana held such a view, certain radical consequences would follow: (1) He might be entirely renouncing the life of reason for an egregious form of mysticism; (2) He might be renouncing the life of reason for the spiritual life but maintaining that each had its place in different people's lives, that is, he would be saying that the two lives were incompatible with one another, one being a life of action and the other a life of contemplation; (3) He might be renouncing all values, since all values are based on human interests. (4) He might be renouncing the idea of relativism in morals for a single and immutable interest of the spiritual life, that is, adopting a dogmatic morality, or what he himself calls "post-rational morality."

As I see it, the only sure way to extricate Santayana from these difficulties is to see whether or not the spirit has an interest. If it

does, then Santayana, anyway at bottom, cannot be charged with maintaining any of the consequences I have mentioned.

In order to show that spirit is interested, I will adopt a different strategy from that I used for reason. In the case of reason, the difficulties were only expository. In the case of spirit, we are so to speak in a different ball game. Firstly, I will show what the consensus is concerning Santayana's view of spirit and the spiritual life in order that the reader will see the crux of the controversy over Santayana's alleged shift in point of view. It will be seen in this discussion that the scholars virtually all believe that Santayana abandoned the idea of human interests in reference to the spirit and the spiritual life. For the scholars, as far as I know, it was not a question of Santayana changing his concept of interest in order to accommodate his new ideas of spirit; as they conceive it, Santayana changed his objects of interest, from reason to spirit, and by so doing cut out from under interests themselves. For the scholars, it was a question of Santayana saying that the spirit and interests were exclusive of one another. Secondly, I will show from the later writings, alone, how the spirit is interested in a general sense. What this will amount to is to describing spirit as a derived interest. Thirdly, I will discuss the (long awaited) idea of intent in terms of both reason and spirit. The emphasis, of course, will be on the spirit. Reason however, will be included in the discussion: (1) in order to show further how reason has formal interests; (2) in order to show that intent in reason and intent in spirit functions virtually in the same way even though the ends of reason and spirit are different; that is, intent functions to articulate interests into ideals

for reason to use in action and for spirit to use in intuition and contemplation. Intent in both reason and spirit is an act of idealization regardless of whether action or contemplation is the end. As for spirit alone I shall unequivocally show that every act of spirit is interested both in the sense that it is grounded in interests and is expressive of interests.

The accepted view of Santayana's later work which I am about to outline will contain ideas in the rough which shall be examined as my own discussion of spirit as an interest proceeds. The brief exposition, then, which follows should be taken as an introduction to my discussion: it will serve as a foreshadowing of what I will be talking about, and also, it will serve as a description of where Santayana scholarship in terms of the idea of spirit has been and where it is at the present.

The accepted view of Santayana's later work by most scholars has hardly changed in the last fifty years or so. When Santayana published Scepticism and Animal Faith and Platonism and the Spiritual Life the common consensus was that there was a radical change in Santayana's philosophy. By the time the Schilpp volume on Santayana was published in 1940, all the Realms of Being had been published and the last volume, The Realm of Spirit, which Schilpp himself reviewed, was just hot off the press. In the Schilpp volume, the common consensus that Santayana had changed his position from the Life of Reason was made firm and official, even though most of the scholars who contributed to that volume did not have the advantage of reading The Realm of Spirit. For their view of the spirit and the spiritual life, they relied on what Santayana had written between 1923 and 1940. In short, they did not see the entire picture of

what the spirit is and how the spiritual life functions. As a matter of fact, the entire picture was to be completed not in The Realm of Spirit but several years later in The Idea of Christ in the Gospels. As for the scholars who wrote about the spirit and the spiritual life after the complete picture had been drawn, oddly enough their view, although on some counts more analytically incisive, is essentially the same as the earlier one. Let us see what this view of Santayana is (along with the reasons behind it) from both the earlier and later scholars.

First, from the early camp, let us look to Irwin Edman and Sterling Lamprecht. I believe their ideas on the spirit and the spiritual life sum up the general outlook of those who contributed to the Schilpp volume. Of the earlier works by Santayana, Edman says in his article entitled "Humanism and Post-Humanism":

> Humanism is not only his temper, it is his philosophy and it is the core and substance of the Life of Reason. It is best stated in his own words: "I was not studying history or psychology for their own sake: my retrospect was to be frankly selective and critical, guided by a desire to discriminate the better from the worse."[1]

According to Santayana, in order for reason to discriminate the better from the worse, there must be first the presupposition that the creature is interested. Reason itself does not create values. Reason guides interests in the pursuit of values. As Munitz says:

> For a value is something relative to a particular interest, expressing the importance which things acquire in virtue of the benefit or satisfaction which they bring to an animal having a particular material basis or bias.[2]

Of the later writings, Edman says:

> We have passed from the Life of Reason to the spiritual life, to the life of detachment in which Spirit is free.[3]
>
> The ideal itself is detachment. . . .[4]

> In the Realms of Being, spirituality is episodic, irresponsible. . . . Spirituality is disinterested; it is detached, indiscriminate. It ignores its origins and is committed to no ends. . . . All human ideals are now seen to be founded in a human bias, and all human bias is a failure to be free.[5]

Of essences, Edman says:

> They are by definition irrelevant to human interests as human interests are irrelevant to them.[6]

Lamprecht says virtually the same thing as Edman but in some sense is more extreme:

> The spiritual life, as he now defines it, has no concern with values at all.[7]

The spiritual life is

> a matter of escape from the mundane realm.[8]

> It is a contemplation of essence, contemplation so detached from worldly affairs, from moral promptings, from consciousness of change in the realm of matter, that it is utterly unaware of its existential basis and its temporal relations. . . . Spirit then means loss of even self-consciousness; and this is, not metaphorical, but actual.[9]

(A similar view is expressed by Munson in regard to mysticism and the abolition of human nature in Santayana's later philosophy.)[10]

One of the reasons why Santayana holds this detached view of the spiritual life is that, according to Lamprecht, intuition, which is the basis of the spiritual life, is "a passive and quiescent contemplation of essence."[11] Lamprecht calls it "the detached intuition of essence."[12]

What we have from the Schilpp volume is the idea that Santayana has abandoned the ship of reason. He has become aloof and otherworldly in his concerns, if he has any at all. He has no human interests, hence there is no better or worse, and spiritual activity (intuition) is irresponsible and even suicidal.[13]

I should say that Edman and Lamprecht are not dogmatic in their views of Santayana. I think they try to see how the spiritual life has

positive value, but somehow they cannot. They both even bring in references from Reason in Religion in order to compare it to the later writings on spirit. But as far as they can see, there is hardly comparison at all. Theirs is a hope against hope to revive the old Santayana. To them, The Realm of Essence and Platonism and the Spiritual Life are irretrievably beyond human interests and reason, even though in Platonism and the Spiritual Life Santayana says:

> Anything is enough if it be pure; but purity itself comes to things from the simplicity of the spirit which regards them, not indeed with indifference, rather with joy, but without any ulterior concerns.[14]

In the same style as Edman and Lamprecht, Munitz, who also contributed to the Schilpp volume and wrote a book on Santayana, tries to see if there is any possible reconciliation between the life of reason and the spiritual life. In his book, The Moral Philosophy of George Santayana, Munitz makes a case for two interpretations of the spiritual life. He says:

> There are at least two ways in which we may construe the spiritual life: one makes it a legitimate vocation within a widely conceived life of reason, the other a form of post-rational morality radically inconsistent with the general principles of rational ethics. This is due to the fact that Santayana has described the spiritual life in two opposite and incompatible ways: on the one hand, as life of understanding, in which cognitive intent (itself a form of natural existence) is directed upon the ideals of truth and clarity of meaning; and on the other, as an escape from existence, as a disintoxication from all ideals, as a reversion to the immediately given that in itself possesses no meaning nor significance. From one point of view, the spiritual life is a life of knowing, marked by intent, engaged in inquiry, and one that achieves significant results in terms of that inquiry. . . . From the second point of view, the spiritual life constitutes a mystical reversion to the immediate.[15]

Munitz examines both interpretations of the spiritual life, but finds the evidence for the second view stronger than the evidence for the first. Accordingly, the spiritual life is not interested (without intent)

"in some selected and finite conception of the good as a concrete ideal for practice, but rather in a mystical and wholly abstract intuition of the Good."[16]

In recent years, interest in Santayana has flagged; only a handful of books have been published about him and not many more articles. Of all the available literature on Santayana, there are three authors who are of central importance: Irving Singer, John Lachs, and Timothy Sprigge. They all hold virtually the same view of the spirit and the spiritual life as did those of the Schilpp volume.

Singer's view of the spiritual life is ambiguous. On the one hand, he says that "Spirit comes to improve the work of the psyche, to make it more resourceful and more intelligent."[17] (This has implications which would be similar to Munitz's first interpretation.) On the other hand, Singer says: "Spiritual discipline serves to effect a moral purgation by detaching the agent from his action."[18] (This is Munitz's second interpretation.) Unlike Munitz, however, Singer does not discuss the possibility of two interpretations. Furthermore, Singer claims that Santayana holds the view that intuition is an actual uninterpreted (intent-less) act of consciousness, and that the end of intuition is not clarity but a blurred experience, one analogous to that of an infant's. This is close to the loss of consciousness view held by Lamprecht.

John Lachs' view of the spiritual life is nearly a carbon copy of the earlier view garnished with contemporary analytic trimmings. Lachs' view comes out of two long articles: "Santayana's Philosophy of Mind" and "Santayana's Moral Philosophy." Lachs says:

> If preference is a necessary and indispensable condition of value, universal sympathy [Lachs' phrase for the spiritual life] eradicates

> the distinction between good and evil--it altogether removes the ground of value judgements.[19]
>
> . . . To spirit no essence is preferable to any other, and ultimately the intuition of essences is not preferable to the dumb oblivion of death.[20]

In "Santayana's Philosophy of Mind," Lachs admits intent, which implies preference, into spirit. "Intuitions are intentional acts directed upon objects" ('objects' here means essences).[21] But he says that when intent is in intuition, intuition is not spiritual.[22] I am not precisely sure what this means, but anyway intuition can be intentful, but pure intuition cannot. "Santayana's interest in intent is slight because it is only the study of intent-free intuition that yields an insight into the nature of spirit."[23] I should say that Santayana does talk about pure intuition, however, he never, as far as I know, talks about it as intent-free or intent-less. Pure intuition is defined by Santayana as intuition "freed from all distress and distraction."24

Timothy Sprigge writes only an eight page chapter on the spiritual life. In this short space, he offers some interesting insights into the spiritual life, but nothing is developed in any detail. As did those in the Schilpp volume, he talks of how the spiritual life might be the same as the life of reason and how it might be an alternative to the life of reason. For my purposes, this chapter is not very important; first, because it is too brief; second, because he makes little attempt to connect the ideas of spirit (intuition) and spiritual life; this connection is crucial to any understanding of Santayana. What is important in Sprigge, however, is his discussion of intuition and intent, and how it, like Singer's and Lachs' views, could lead to an erroneous idea of the spiritual life. First, Sprigge like Lachs, says that some intuitions

are intent-ful and some are not. Second, he says that Santayana identifies intent with belief. ". . . all intuitions which are not 'pure' contain an element of belief."[25] Now again, I say, Santayana never said there were intent-less intuitions. But furthermore, he never said that intent was identical with belief. Santayana says that there is intent in intuitions and symbolic knowledge.[26] However, belief is only an aspect of animal faith and not an aspect of dialectic.[27] In other words, intent cannot be identical with belief because the former has a wider application than the latter.

To sum up, as I see it, the accepted view amounts to something like the following: The Schilpp volume interpretation of Santayana stresses that the spirit is uninterested and hence the spiritual life is valueless. It is suggested that the reason why this is so is that Santayana has utterly renounced interests and reason for the cold eye of intuition. The recent scholars seem to hold the same view of the spiritual life, but direct discussion of it is kept to a minimum. Now, the discussion is more on the philosophy of mind issue--the one of intuition. However, what all this discussion amounts to (with some revisions) is what was suggested by Edman, Lamprecht, and Munitz.

5. SPIRIT AS A DERIVED INTEREST

As we have seen, the term 'interest' as it is used in the life of reason has a variety of expressions. Santayana says that interest is "impulse," "instinct," "animal desire," "need," "preference," and so on. These are all psychological terms, with a biological base, which I believe suggest one thing. What they suggest (and this is the reason why Santayana uses the term 'interest' to cover them all) is that a particular organism requires something which explains why it is moved. To act means first to be moved and moved in a direction. In this sense, Santayana's treatment of interest is a behavioristic explanation of action, an explanation based on the notions of stimulus and response. Man is a subject having interests. He is at root, according to his nature, an interested creature. The world, other men, and the interested individual himself present objects of interest which create movement in the subject toward or away from those objects. The manner of movement may be described by a variety of adjectives: fast, cautious, stealthy, sure, anxious, etc., etc. It also may be described as rational or irrational, and spiritual or non-spiritual. No particular manner necessarily includes or excludes another. And some manners of action may be apparent while others go more or less hidden.

What I want to do here is show that spirit, as it is defined by Santayana, is an aspect of man's character that has interest. Spirit is not only, as Santayana clearly says, attached to the material world physically, it is also morally attached to the material world by the interests it has. The two attachments are two only conceptually; in fact,

they are inseparable. If, in fact, they were separable, then spirit would be sui generis a substance. Unequivocally, Santayana denies that possibility. There is little disagreement among scholars about the natural ground of Santayana's idea of spirit. Most seem to concur that spirit must be enacted, that it is a function. Intellectual fur may be raised about what I propose, however, and that is that not only does spirit have a naturalistic ground, it also has interests just as let us say desire has an interest in desirable objects, or human reason has an interest in rational objects. In other words, a human being, among other things, is a spiritual subject which is moved to action by spiritual objects. In this sense, of course, spirit has its origin in material conditions and makes choices although it is not an ultimate determinant of choice.

In the first chapter of the Realm of Spirit, Santayana defines the spirit in the following way: "Spirit is an awareness natural to animals, revealing the world and themselves in it. Other names for spirit are consciousness, attention, feeling, thought, or any word that marks the total inner difference between being awake or asleep, alive or dead."[1] There are two things that ought to be noted here. One is that spirit is natural to animals. Spirit only exists in particular creatures at particular times. There are no pure or disembodied spirits floating about in Santayana's realm of spirit. The other is that Santayana does not pinpoint what names can be applied to spirit. All that is essential to the idea of spirit, thus far, is that it marks the difference between being awake or asleep, alive or dead, or more specifically, in the human sphere, it marks the difference between whether I am awake or asleep,

alive or dead. I mention this latter point especially because there are some who claim that Santayana's spirit alone intuits essences, that it is a searchlight which shines on one form here and another there, that this alone constitutes the definition of being awake or alive. Well, that is true as far as it goes, or if you assume 'intuition' to have a univocal meaning. But in any case, this does not exclude other acts of spirit of which Santayana speaks, other acts which sometimes occur simultaneously with or after intuitions of essence. "Pure awareness or consciousness suffices to exemplify spirit, and there may be cold spirits somewhere that have merely that function; but it is not the only function that only spirits could perform; and the human spirit, having intent, expectation, belief, and eagerness runs thicker than that."[2] One function of the human spirit is the intuition (a pregnant term as we shall see) of essence; let us say that it is the most rudimentary function, but this is one function among a great variety of functions. Santayana says, considering the human and beyond, that the possible number of kinds of spirit, hence functions of spirit, are infinite, as great as the realm of essence. The human kind of spirit, however, is one limited and determined by what 'human' means. What 'human' means, according to Santayana, is defined by human interests. Human spiritual interest, then, "is comparable to our natural interest in human survival, in science, or in some particular art like music: absolutely legitimate interests, physically inevitable at certain junctures."[3]

In order to comprehend fully what Santayana means by spirit and later the spiritual life, one must recognize the full implication of the phrase 'human spirit.' Although Santayana mostly talks of just spirit

and spiritual life, the term 'human' is always understood. This is obviously true when he discusses the spirit's "expectation" or its "eagerness." But it is also true when he speaks of intuition.

The essential activity of the spirit is intuition. Intuition is that faculty which gazes upon essences. Essences are the forms of the realm of possibility which things might or might not wear. Essences themselves do not exist. They are immediately given, the appearances of intuition, the principle of essence being identity. Intuition of essence is not identical with essence. They form two separate realms of being. One, the realm of essence, has being without existence, an essence being defined as what it is, i.e. strictly by its formal character. The other, the realm of spirit, requires existence for its being, that is, since a spirit is more than a mere essence, it is defined by what it does.

When Santayana talks of intuition, like spirit generally, he means human intuition. "Intuition would be impossible without an underlying animal life, a psyche; for how should the sheer light of intuition actualise itself, or choose the essence on which it should fall?"[4] As Santayana says, human intuition "runs thick," it is accompanied by desire, belief, expectation, in general, interest. Further, when he talks of essence, he is interested only in the finite number of essences which concern human life; of the others, they are there as possibilities to contemplate, irrelevant possibilities or otherwise. From the previous quote, it is obvious that intuition does not shine haphazardly, it chooses where it will shine depending on the particular animal psyche. Or consider the following: "Essence without intuition would be not merely nonexistent (as it always is), but what is worse, it would be the

object of no contemplation, the goal of no effort, the secret or implicit ideal of no life. It would be valueless. All that joy and sense of liberation which pure objectivity brings to the mind would be entirely absent; and essence would lose all its dignity if life lost its precarious existence."[5] "As for me, partial as I am to the realm of essence, and happy in the presence of non-existent objects, when they are beautiful or significant, it would never occur to me to eulogize all essence. That would be treason to human nature and to the Good."[6] Does this mean that essences have value? Yes, some do; on certain occasions under certain circumstances when the animal psyche is human and that particular human being is intuiting them. Essences alone are valueless. For something, according to Santayana, to have value, it must be an object of interest. Let us look again to Santayana. He says: "The fact that intuition has a direction is an added proof of its existential character."[7] Not only does this add proof to the existence of intuition, it adds proof to my contention that intuition involves interest since Santayana says that intuition has direction. If we were to ask Santayana: Can a human being have direction, be directed to something without interest? He would have to say, no. Finally, "Interest, in marking the differences and precise characters of things, which are all the mind can take from them, is the great revealer of essence."[8] Not only is psyche the material ground for intuition, not only does the psyche condition the interests for intuition to choose, intuition itself is described as exhibiting an interest itself.

Santayana draws a distinction between intuition and pure intuition which will be discussed in due course. For now, let us say that pure intuition is the kind of intuition that a god would have, or better the

intuition the Christian God would have. This pure intuition, by definition, would be utterly detached from human interests. Even though this god might empathize with human beings, his interests, if he had any, would be godly ones, whatever they may be. Human intuition, an impure sort, involves interests in the following sense: intuition is always intuiting x as _____, i.e. intuition as a mode by which we attend, synthesize, perceive, expect, deliberate, remember, and so on, or any combination thereof.

> These sentiments (and "intellectual powers") form a moving but habitual background for any particular essence considered; they frame it in, not only pictorially in sensuous perspective, but morally, by its ulterior suggestions, and by the way in which, in surveying the whole field of intuition, that particular feature in it is approached or attacked or rejected. In such settings given essences acquire their felt meanings; and if they should be uprooted from that soil and exhibited in isolation they would no longer mean the same thing to the spirit.[9]

What Santayana is describing here is the relatively familiar notion that meaning depends on context. Just as the meaning of a word changes when the context changes, so too does an essence change in meaning when the intuiting context changes. A word may have meaning alone, even though it may be useless. An essence, alone, however, does not even have meaning (unless one wants to say that identity is sufficient for meaning), and certainly it has no use. But Santayana, I believe, is going further than all this.

To understand the idea of intuition as intuiting x as _____ is to contain the idea of intuition within the realm of the human, within the "felt meanings" of the human sphere. All kinds of creatures <u>might</u> possess intuition, but the intuitions of bed bugs and the intuitions of God have very little in common. There are many factors which go into the

make-up of any particular form of consciousness. Intuition is one aspect of consciousness and one that is neither isolated nor remains unaffected by other psychological dispositions. I suppose in a sense one could say that each and every creature in the great chain of being constitutes a world of his own, in so far as the very structure of the mind determines how the world will appear and whether or not it will be understood. Santayana seems to agree with this view to the following extent. He gives an illustration in Scepticism and Animal Faith of a disembodied spirit which if addressed to the realm of truth would see truth under the form of eternity, all past, present, and future truths in one. Santayana says that this would be a very special kind of spirit and "many an essence would be excluded from its intuition."[10] For instance, the spirit would discern no essence of surprise, since surprise entails ignorance of the future. I think the point of this illustration supports what I say about intuiting x as _____. Our intuitions are limited by our very nature, a part of our nature being not able to know the future as does the disembodied spirit. In other words, we could say that we are intuiting x as far as we are attending to x. We could say we are intuiting x as far as we are perceiving x. Attending and perceiving are functions applicable to human beings, beings rooted by certain interests. We could not say we are intuiting x as far as bed bugs perceive x. We could say we are intuiting x as far as God (under the form of eternity) synthesizes x. Also, we could not say we were just intuiting x, because that would suggest that the infinite realm of essence were open to us, and it is not. If there be a God, maybe he could just intuit. However, I doubt it, since He cannot be surprised, and I assume He has his interests,

too. For even God, then, the infinite realm of essence is not available for his inspection.

The spirit, which is the seat of intuition "is itself a natural passion, and not less an expression of the flesh . . . than the random impulses it condemns."[11] It is one of the functions, the ultimate function of the spirit to discern and express "the highest good," yet the spirit being a natural passion is interested in every level of life.

> Consider, for instance, the earnestness with which evil is condemned. If this evil is pain, the objection to it could not be more instinctive. Why should pure spirit detest pain? . . . The psyche, or the principle of bodily life, is somehow striving against the event or stimulus which produced the pain (perfectly harmless essence to contemplate in itself), because the psyche is congenitally a system or cycle of habits which that obnoxious event interrupts. It is this material pressure and effort not to be stifled or rent in any of her operations that the psyche imposes on the spirit, commanding it to pronounce it a terrible evil that he should be rent or stifled. These strange and irrational pronouncements of spirit, calling events good or evil, are accordingly grounded on nothing but on a creeping or shrinking of the flesh.[12]

Here, I believe, we clearly have a statement of how natural circumstances condition the spirit. How also, there is a connection between particular interests and the "highest good," how the spirit has a moral attachment to bodily life. The spirit is <u>interested</u> in the life of the psyche out of which it grows in the sense that <u>the spirit detests pain</u>. On behalf of the psyche, it expresses what is evil. If its function were to be entirely aloof from human situations, it would be commanded by nothing and it would pronounce nothing; it would merely see. It must be that the spirit, "a natural passion," is attracted or repelled through the intuition of the essences of things or events. "The occasions in which spirit arises in man are the vicissitudes of his animal life; that is why spirit runs so thick. In intent, in belief, in emotion a given

essence takes on value. . . ."[13] A given essence takes on value because a human being is intuiting a particular situation, and because within the spirit interests are felt. "In me it takes my point of view, it is the voice of my humanity."[14]

The spirit has interests and is interested in the same objects as the psyche, yet the two are distinguished by Santayana. They are distinguished mainly because their interests are realized differently. The interests of the psyche, alone, are best expressed by reason, and reason as a formal interest is a commitment to a certain set of interests which will bring maximum satisfaction in action. The interests of the spirit, alone, are identical with the interests of the psyche. However, in this spiritual sense, the point is not to be committed to overt action, the point is to express interests into ideals in order to contemplate them. Although when we speak of rational and spiritual interests we are speaking of two sets of interests, this does not mean that their sources of interest are two. We are only and always speaking of one psyche. It follows, then, that rational and spiritual interests are not necessarily mutually exclusive of one another. Consider the following loose analogy: there are two bosom friends who are born in the same country, live under similar circumstances, and are educated in similar ways. One becomes a soldier, a man of action, the other becomes a poet, a man of words. One fights to save his country and is wounded, the other immortalizes the one in a poem about courage. Both have interests, one in fighting (to alter material conditions) the other in words (to express material circumstances). Under these particular circumstances, the soldier conditions the interests of the poet, while at root their interests in patriotism,

because of their backgrounds, are the same. What we have in this case is simply common interests expressed by different means. It would be absurd to say that the poet, because he did not fight, has no interests in his country or that he cannot "feel" the pain of his comrade. Well, of course, in a physiological sense the poet cannot feel the pain, but where the soldier cannot, the poet can understand the pain and to that extent feel it; this is merely another way of saying that the poet empathizes with the soldier. But it is also saying more since although the poet does not physiologically feel the pain, he "feels" the pain profoundly because he has the talent to articulate and to communicate it, i.e. to formalize it, in a way in which the soldier might not be able to do. If there were no feeling at all, there would be no reason to write a poem.

What we have, here, are both cases of human interest. The soldiering interest is to alter directly the world through the manipulation of men and events. The poetic interest is not necessarily or primarily one which will alter anything directly but will certainly alter the state of the poet's view of the world and possibly do the same for any prospective reader. Yet this is not the heart of the difference between the soldier and the poet. The heart of it is this. The soldier acts courageously in terms of <u>his</u> country's interests. The poet is inspired by the soldier's acts, but the acts of the poet, the poems he writes, tell of courage not only in <u>his</u> country but of courage wherever it happens to occur. The acts of the poet go beyond his interests in his country alone. The famous poem, "Ode to the Confederate Dead," by Alan Tate, for example, is no mere diatribe on Confederate interests and

ideals. This idea will be developed in detail later. For now, let us note: "The psyche creates spirit . . . and in directing her action or endeavour, backward or forward, upon those remote events she creates intent in spirit, so that the given essences become descriptions of the things with which the psyche is busied."[15] The psyche creates spirit and she creates intent in spirit. This means not only are bodily processes the ground of both the spirit and its intuitions, it also means that the spirit is expressive of the interests of the psyche like that of my soldier and poet. To understand how the spirit is expressive, that is, how it has formal interests we will have to look to the nature of intent and how it is implicated in every act of intuition.

II.

INTENT AND INTUITION

1. INTENT: THE FOUNDATION OF REASON AND SPIRIT AS FORMAL INTERESTS

I have spoken, generally, about spirit as a derived interest. I asserted that spirit is a natural passion; that it makes choices; that its essential mode of activity, intuition, is a function that includes other functions, such as: desire, belief, intent, etc.; that spirit is expressive of the interests of the psyche.

What I would like to do now is look closely at one particular aspect of both reason and spirit and analyze it at close quarters. The one I choose is intent, a choice by no means arbitrary. I should say that if one does not understand the nature of intent, it is impossible to understand what reason as a formal interest and what the human spirit as a formal interest mean. The idea of intent is defined by Santayana as an interest in form. Intent defined as an interest in form indicates that intent has a "natural basis"; that is, it is an operation of mind which selects certain objects and other interests and that it is an operation which emphasizes particular aspects of certain objects and interests. Through intent, an interest in form "perception becomes recognition."[1] Unless there is intent, "No existence is of moment to a man, not even his own, unless it touches his will and fulfills or thwarts his intent. Unless he is concerned that existences should be of specific kinds, unless he is interested in form, he can hardly be interested in being."[2] In a fundamental sense, an interest in form "consists in seeing

how things hang together perspicuously and how the later phases of any process fill out--as in good music--the tendency and promise of what went before."[3] In this sense, an interest in form emphasizes an aspect of a particular object or a particular desire, want, preference, etc. in order to distinguish it from other objects or interests, to classify it among other objects or interests, to compare it with . . . , to compare it to . . . , etc. An interest in form is one not interested in those aspects of objects or others which particularize them. Obvious examples of interests in form would be the grammarian's interest in particular sentences, or the logician's interest in particular arguments. Their interests, figuratively speaking, give "shape" to particular sentences and arguments.

For Santayana, intent as an interest in form clearly has its most significance in the formulation of moral and spiritual ideals; by our interest in form we are brought to them. In the Realm of Spirit, Santayana says that there is a "vital dependence of spirit on nature [which] involves a responsive affection towards nature on the part of spirit."[4] This comes out of a context where Santayana is discussing natural sympathy. There are occasions where a man will feel a sympathy for another man just as a dog will lick another's wounds or as a lioness will protect her pride. In man from his sense of natural sympathy in conjunction with an interest in form he will extend his natural sympathies to other men who share his living interests: to his family, village, or society. Such an extension is the result of an interest in form. So, one begins, then, to see how one's particular interest--a natural sympathy--can be distinguished from others, classified among other

interests which share common characteristics, compared . . . , contrasted . . . etc. This is the beginning of the ideal of justice. From the ideal justice, one extends one's interest in form even further into charity in order to see how not only one can act in a social situation, where there are common living interests, but also how one can ideally sympathize with all living interests. This will be discussed in detail later. For now, let us note in terms of intent, an interest in form, that from a particular object or interest, intent draws the particularity out of it in order to see it in wider and wider contexts; an interest in form is a move from particular objects and interests to ideal objects and interests which are guides for action and contemplation.

A few things ought to be noted at the outset. Reason is always intent-ful; if it were not, it would make no sense to speak of reason as a formal interest. This is true of spirit, too. In the case of reason, intent operates in order that moral ideals (formal ends of action) be fixed. Reason is born in the midst of interests and functions actively within those interests. By functioning intent-fully, reason raises certain interests to the plane of ideals, ideals being nothing but interests formally, or another term Santayana later uses, symbolically, rendered as "something definite to live for."[5] Intent in the life of reason explains: (1) how reason has a formal interest, how interests are articulated into ideals, and (2) how mere movement is distinguished from action. "Without articulate and fixed purposes, without ideals consciously entertained, action collapses into a mere motion and activity into mere change."[6]

In the case of spirit, intent in intuition operates in order that essences (formal characters) be discerned and spiritual ideals (formal

ends for contemplation) be contemplated. The formal interest of spirit is wider in scope than is the formal interest of reason. Reason as we have seen is a method by which moral ideals are articulated for the sake of maximum satisfaction in action. In so far as spirit is contemplative, it is close to reason, being a kind of method--a discipline. However, not every act of spirit, that is, every act of intuition is a contemplative one. There are acts of spirit which are more rudimentary than contemplation or reason, so that some acts of spirit are just acts of attention or acts of perception. Within the life of reason, acts of spirit, in this sense, play a role in reason in so far as they attend to or perceive "ideal terms."[7] Within the realm of spirit, as Santayana later conceives it, there is the suggestion, indeed the fact, that there is a distinction between acts of spirit and the spiritual life. Intent in spirit functions both in acts of spirit and in the spiritual life. In the case of acts of spirit alone, intent functions in order for intuition to attend to and to identify an essence as simple as a colored patch or the musical note B-flat. In the case of the spiritual life, intent functions in order for intuition to contemplate the ideals of Liberation, Charity, the Good, and the like.

Whether we talk of essences, moral ideals, or spiritual ideals, we are always talking of formal qualities. Indeed, there are differences; not all essences are ends of action as are moral ideals; not all moral ideals are spiritual ideals, or vice versa. However, all have exactly the same quality, that is, they are formal, and all are experienced by our interest in form--intent. In other words, in every case, intent is the same, i.e. an interest in form, but in each case, intent is expressed

differently. If it is as a derived interest that reason and spirit have direction, that is, that they are moved to choose; it is by intent, which aims reason and spirit at form, that reason and spirit have formal interests. If interests are the contents of values, then intent functions to bring out the form in the content.

Let us call intent a process of mind which sees and searches out form in those things we are interested in. Intent defined in this way can apply to an essence, a moral ideal, or a spiritual ideal. Santayana discusses intent in Reason in Common Sense, and devotes an entire chapter to it in Reason in Science. Later it arises in Scepticism and Animal Faith, Realm of Essence, Realm of Spirit, besides being sprinkled, like so many of Santayana's ideas, in an essay here and there. The concept of intent throughout these works remains defined as an interest in form. However, although in essence it does not change, 'intent' is modified, actually whittled down, when Santayana moves from talking about action in the Life of Reason to intuition, alone, in Scepticism and Animal Faith, the latter strictly being a psychological examination of intent and intuition. Again, however, as we shall see the germ of the strictly psychological sense of intent was present right from the start.

In the Life of Reason, Santayana developed the concept of intent in order to show that there is a natural basis for and a continuity between two important ideas: (1) all thought is practical, (2) all knowledge is symbolic. What these two ideas mean is that thought begins with interests and these interests are articulated into ideals. These two ideas both rest on the concept of intent, and for good reason, too; they complement one another.

In Reason in Common Sense, Santayana wrote a chapter entitled, "How Thought is Practical." In it we find the beginnings of a crucial idea for both the life of reason and the spiritual life: "Intelligence is most at home in the ultimate, which is the object of intent."[8] In Santayana's own words let us see what this means. (1) Thought "translates natural relations into synthetic and ideal symbols by which things are interpreted with reference to the interests of consciousness itself."[9] (2) "Thought is essentially practical in the sense that but for thought no motion would be an action, no change a progress; but thought is in no way instrumental or servile; it is an experience realized, not a force to be used."[10] In reference to (1), when Santayana speaks of thought, he means for it always to be intent-ful. It is by the very fact that thought is intent-ful that it has the ability to translate natural relations into ideal symbols. An ideal symbol is the form of a natural relation. An ideal symbol allows us to see more than the particular which is immediately present to consciousness. By definition, a symbol although it can stand for one thing, more often means to stand for many things. For example, in language the paradigm of a symbol is the common noun. A far more complicated example would be related to memory: "Memory is an obvious case of the same thing; for the past, in its truth, is a system of experiences in relation, a system now non-existent and never, as a system, itself experienced, yet confronted in retrospect and made the ideal object and standard for all historical thinking."[11] In reference to (2), in so far as thought is intent-ful, there is human action. Now, this is not to say that intent causes action; intent is not a "force." Intent is expressive of human interests in so far as it articulates human

interests. So in one sense, intent brings human interests to the level of self-consciousness, and in another related sense, intent expresses human interests to enlighten ideals. In the life of reason, intent looks to the ends of action in order to guide action.

In so far as intent transforms motion into action, intent is an essential ingredient in the moral life from its very inception in pre-rational morality. "Every man, in moral reflection, is animated by his own intent; he has something in view which he prizes he knows not why."[12] "For intent, beneath which there is no moral judgement, sets up its own standard."[13] "Intent is one of the many evidences that the intellect's essence is practical. Intent is action in the sphere of thought; it corresponds to transition and derivation in the natural world."[14] As I understand Santayana, from the previous quotes and elsewhere, intent is an expression of an active interest within a particular subject, a person, and that intent is cognitive in nature, too. Unlike desire, which can be aroused on certain occasions like a reflex action, intent seems to embody formal elements which bring about purposive behavior. When I say "I intend to eat," or "I intend to paint a landscape," or "I intend to become a doctor," I am expressing an interest in doing something, that is, I am attracted to something, yet whether the satisfaction of the particular intention might be immediate or not, the fact that "I intend . . ." suggests also that I thought about my interest, that there is a plan at work, a plan that could only be conceived in terms of ideal symbols. In Santayana's terms, certain interests can explain only movement in the subject, for example, desire, alone; others which are intentful explain action. Action is only distinguished from movement by

entailing a conscious purpose. Let us say further that intent by giving purposes to interests defines them and makes them more appealing or more interesting than they would be if left unarticulated.

Intent raises interests to the level of ideals but at the same time it grounds interests more firmly in their natural surroundings. "In art, in politics, in that form of religion which is superior, and not inferior to politics and art, we define and embody intent; and the intent embodied dignifies the work and lends interest to its conditions."[15] What Santayana is trying to do with his idea of intent in the life of reason is to establish a moral world, a world of moral experience which is distinguishable from, while part and parcel of the natural world, the world of physical events. The physical world moves along according to the habits in matter just as animals and the animal aspects of man move along according to the habits in mind. Within the sphere of habits alone there are no values per se. There is the ground of value, interest, which explains the habits of mind, why one responds and moves; but there is no action. There is action, not just movement, only in so far as there is intent. Santayana says: "The science of ethics has nothing to do with causes."[16] "Moral experience is not expressible in physical categories, because while you may give place and date for every feeling that something is important or absurd, you cannot so express what these feelings have discovered and have wished to confide in you."[17] In other words, to stay within the immediate realm of the physical is to miss the moral, the realm of ideals. "The rational moralist is . . . not a mere spectator, a physicist acknowledging no interest except the interest in facts and in laws of change. . . . The rational moralist represents a

force energizing in the world, discovering its affinities there and clinging to them to the exclusion of their hateful opposites. He represents, over against the chance facts, an ideal embodying the particular demands, possibilities, and satisfactions of a specific being."[18] "The mere fact that somebody somewhere enjoys or dislikes a thing cannot give direction to a rational will. That fact indicates a moral situation but does not prescribe a definite action."[19] In order for prescription as opposed to mere description to be appropriate, there must be something for the sake of which an action is performed. This "something for the sake of which" is clarified by intent. However, "moral energy, so closely analogous to physical interplay, is of course not without a material basis. Spiritual sublimation does not consist in not using matter but in using it up, in making it all useful."[20]

Intent is straddling two worlds (I hesitate at this point to say two realms of being, but as we shall see that is what it amounts to). "In intent we pass over from existence to ideality . . . ,"[21] but by no means do we leave existence forever. Intent, as Santayana says, makes consciousness both "cognitive and practical." If through intent we left existence behind for some empty realm of forms, there would be no meaning at all in the ideals which we sought to define. Ideals are interests which are articulated or they are nothing at all. Eloquent as usual, Santayana says:

> Meditative persons are ever inclined to regard the disembodied life which they think they enjoy at times as the true and native form of experience; all organs, applications, and expressions of thought they deprecate and call accidental. As some pious souls reject dogma to reach pure faith and suspend prayer to enjoy union, so some mystical logicians drop the world in order to grasp reality. It is an exquisite suicide; but the energy and ideal that sustain such a flight are annihilated by its issue, and the soul drops like a paper

> balloon consumed by the very flame that wafted it. No thought is found without an organ; none is conceivable without an expression which is that organ's visible emanation; and none would be significant without a subject matter lying in the world of which that organ is a part.[22]

In so far as intent is expressive of ideals, "Thought belongs to the sphere of ultimate results."[23] However, as we have seen intent also transforms movement into action, so that to say that thought belongs to ultimate results does not at all undermine action; on the contrary, it is the basis of action, since without an ideal, a purpose, there is no action. This emphasis of thought on the ideal is essential for both the life of reason and the spiritual life, for both action and contemplation. Note what Santayana says in Reason in Common Sense:

> When we attain perfection of function we lose consciousness of the medium, to become more clearly conscious of the result. The eye that does its duty gives no report of itself and has no sense of muscular tension or weariness; but it gives all the brighter and steadier image of the object seen. Consciousness is not lost when it is focussed, and the labour of vision is abolished in its function. So the musician could he play so divinely as to be unconscious of his body his instrument, and the very lapse of time, would be only the more absorbed in the harmony more completely master of its unities and beauty.[24]

By our interest in ultimate results, in the forms of things, our action is not only defined because it has a purpose, our action becomes clear and facile, too. When the ends of action and contemplation are enlightened by intent activity becomes "pure" in so far as we are no longer tossed about by one interest here and other interests there. There is an adjustment between the "facts of preference" and the "facts of perception." "In so far as thought is instrumental, it is not worth having, any more than matter, except for its promise; it must terminate in something truly profitable and ultimate which being good in itself, may lend value to all that led up to it. But this ultimate good is itself

consciousness, thought, rational activity."[25] In short, if thought does not aim at ideals, we are faced with the despair of Sisyphus.

I do not know whether or not Santayana was aware of what I am about to say, but nevertheless his idea of intent as an aiming at ultimate results and belonging to that sphere intimates quite a familiar notion found in Zen Buddhism, namely, the notion of artless art. I allude to this interesting notion not in order to fully explain 'intent' but merely to elucidate certain significant nuances, spiritual nuances, in intent. It is also particularly interesting that these nuances are suggested in the chapter in Reason in Common Sense entitled "How Thought is Practical"; interesting, that is, for those who would like to view the life of reason and the spiritual life as distinct.

The artless art Santayana clearly describes in the passage above where he speaks of the musician, an example of how "the essence of action is contemplative."[26] The musician, intent on playing a beautiful piece, is not absorbed by the means, once the end, in this case the piece of music as a whole, has been studied and clearly conceived. This is not to say that the means serve no function. When analyzing and "putting together" the piece, the means surely are meant to serve the outcome of the total performance, and the outcome could not be realized without an analysis. Santayana is not interested in destroying the means-end distinction or in necessarily subordinating one to the other. As I see it, he is actually attempting to knit them more firmly together, in a way in which they will be complementary. Nevertheless, the means, not in a pejorative sense, is the "dirty work," where perspiration is spent, and the end is the point and justification of the means. Once the end has

been mastered the means fade even though they remain necessary. But the fact that they do fade into the background, so to speak, is telling as far as the essence of thought and action is concerned. As a matter of fact, taking the musician example, if one were playing, let us say a piano concerto, and in so doing concentrated on his fingers and each individual key he was hitting, he would probably never be able to play the concerto at all, let alone play it beautifully. To be absorbed in the means to this extent cripples action almost entirely. It is something like the myth in a ball game, be it baseball, tennis, or any other where a ball must be hit. The myth is that one should keep his eye on the ball. To dissolve the myth all one need do is to try it. If you can keep your eye on the ball, you will find you cannot hit it. If you do hit it, at some point you will have lost sight of it. In music or a ball game, the point is not to concentrate on the means, the point is to have a good sense of the means and that is produced by practice which in turn produces clearer and clearer ideas of the end.

Now the interesting aspect of all this is that when one concentrates on the end of thought or action, the means becomes more graceful to the extent that they appear effortless or even in the extreme, paradoxically, without purpose. How often has it been said of a great performer (in thought or action) that he makes it look so easy. According to the Zen idea of the artless art, the point of making it look so easy is that by so doing our goals become "inner." The means alone are external in the sense that there is "stuff" of some sort to manipulate and control. If one concentrates on the means such that they and your concentration upon them alone are supposed to lead you to the end, one

finds that the end moves farther and farther away.[27] If, however, one attempts to clarify the end (and what is the end but our own interests articulated by intent, i.e. given form), then the tedium of the means although necessary is never overwhelming because they (the means) are reflections of an ideal end. The aim of intent is always aimed inwardly. Just as in Zen, the archer may apparently aim at the target fifty feet away, he does so ceremoniously, while ideally he is aiming at his own self. Unlike in much of Western ethics where means and ends are sharply distinct, in Zen and other Eastern religions, means and ends are often blurred in order to abolish the distinction altogether. I think something of the sort can be said of Santayana's idea of intent in so far as intent grows out of interests and aims back at interests formed, ideals. Even though Santayana's position is never nearly as extreme as Zen in its attempt to dissolve means-ends altogether, Santayana is clearly in favor of the idea that all thought and action ultimately aims at the thinker-actor himself. To play upon a Zen metaphor, all the arrows of intent we shoot are boomerangs.

John Lachs, in an essay entitled "Santayana's Philosophy of Mind," defines intent as "the animal urge to use what is present and presented for the representation of the absent: by its means essence may become the symbol of existence, and the changeless may be made to yield knowledge of change."[28] Although this definition is too narrow (that is, as we shall see intent does not only point at existences) I believe Lachs is essentially correct. However, in the sense that his definition is too narrow, Lachs sees intent to be only a part of overt action, only a part of the life of reason; this is the reason why a page later in his essay,

Lachs says: "The reason why Santayana has so little to say about intent is that its study does not further his central interest in the nature of spirit and of the spiritual life."[29] I think it can be already seen from the previous discussion of intent belonging to the sphere of ultimate results that Lachs is mistaken in his narrow emphasis on intent. But let us note what Santayana says in "The Nature of Intent" in Reason in Science: "The true God is an object of intent, an ideal of excellence and knowledge, not a term belonging to sense or to probable hypothesis or to the prudent management of affairs. After we have squared our accounts with nature and taken sufficient thought for our bodily necessities, the eyes can be lifted, for the first time to the eternal."[30] In spite of what Lachs says, right here in the life of reason there is sheer allegiance to the spiritual essence of intent. Intent operates on all levels of human life when human life begins to be interested in the forms of things. However, it is clear that the ultimate employment of intent is not for the sake of sense or action alone; intent is an "aspiration"[31] towards the contemplation of ideals. As an interest in form, intent looks to ends ultimately in order to live in ends. As my discussion of the spirit and the spiritual life proceeds, it shall become more and more evident that intent, contrary to what Lachs says, is shot through the realm of spirit. It is even noteworthy at this stage to mention that Union, which is the culmination of the spiritual life, is realized only by intent. How Lachs could say that intent does not further Santayana's interests in the spirit and the spiritual life is beyond me. Especially when Santayana, who was not famous for being explicit, says quite explicitly: "Union in prayer or in love requires the persistent physical

separateness of the two beings united; and their union can be only spiritual, a union in intent, a perfect unanimity."[32] In this sense, does intent allow the human spirit to transcend the given in experience without the spirit forsaking its natural home and its homely virtues.

As will be later developed, this idea that intent is essentially of the spirit is particularly important for my overall thesis--especially in reference to Santayana's change of interest from the life of reason to the spiritual life and the compatibility of the two. Without intent's spiritual quality--its belonging to ultimate results, its living in the ideal, without intent's natural ground--its root in the psyche, its defining of action, Santayana could not legitimately hold the following:

> [The spiritual life] is not a substitute for the life of reason, but the cream or concomitant ultimate actuality of what the organized life of reason produces in consciousness. Of course, in so far as a man's thoughts are absorbed in instrumentalities, in business or politics or war or jollification, we do not call his experience spiritual: but those very actions might be food for a spiritual life if a recollected and mystical man performed them: so that the rationality of his life and its spirituality might be called two concomitant dimensions of it, the one lateral and the other vertical. The vertical or spiritual dimension is what inward religion has always added to life in the world, or in the cloister, which is a part of the world: that element may be more or less emphatic or genuine, according to a man's temperament or experience, but it is always an element, optional, private, like the love of music or like love at large. The legislator may salute it, he cannot contract to produce it.[33]

It is not altogether clear, psychologically, how intent translates natural relations into ideal symbols, so Santayana relegates this aspect of intent to literary psychology, "the art of imagining how [men] feel and think."[34] At the end of the chapter "The Nature of Intent," then, Santayana creates a myth after the manner of Plato in order to clarify figuratively that which cannot be clarified literally.[35] Notwithstanding the inner obscurity of intent, Santayana seems to think that

language provides a vague model for the process. Language is essentially an intent-ful system of communication and expression. Santayana says in Reason in Science that intent is the "soul of grammar,"[36] grammar obviously being the form of language. It is through language that form in thought, generally, is presented to and communicated by the mind. It is through language that one is able to regard "what is not yet, or not here, or what no longer exists."[37] In short, it is through language that one can go beyond the given moment so that what is past can be recalled and recognized, what is to come can be expected. In this sense, language is the very voice of intent, since it is the instrument, language, which fundamentally idealizes human experience. Later, Santayana says in Realm of Essence: "This description in words or other signs is indispensable for making an essence an object of intent when it is no longer, or not yet, an object of intuition."[38] And further: "Intended essences thus acquire, through the machinery of identification, projection, and intent, a certain remoteness and mystery; they become concepts or ideals."[39]

Unfortunately, Santayana did not have a general theory of language. It was suggested to me in a conversation with Justus Buchler that one could develop an idea of levels of language through Santayana's lucubrations on poetry; however, although this might prove to be a fertile approach, it would present problems which I believe would distract me from my end. Actually, I think the approach complicated enough to warrant a dissertation itself. Therefore, the approach I will pursue will be the simpler, and I hope the more direct one.

Although Santayana did not examine and develop ideas on language, he did so with symbolic knowledge which needs be expressed by language.

In order to understand fully how intent "looks away from existence and the actual,"[40] we must look to Santayana's distinction between literal and symbolic knowledge. There are intimations of the distinction in the Life of Reason, but in 1918, Santayana published a paper entitled "Literal and Symbolic Knowledge" which was later collected in Obiter Scripta. The date of the publication is significant because this was a period of transition for Santayana both intellectually and emotionally. The Life of Reason had been already published and established as a masterpiece in philosophy; and Santayana had been away from Harvard and the U.S.A. for several years. This time must have been a formative one for his later works, Scepticism and Animal Faith soon to be published in 1923.

The article "Literal and Symbolic Knowledge" affords an interesting perspective of Santayana. From it, one can look forward and backward, from the early to the late years seeing the intellectual landscape of Santayana's career in the process of changing color. In one sense, the article recalls the criticisms of Kant and Berkeley in Reason in Common Sense, in another sense it foreshadows the ideas: scepticism, animal faith, essence, and intuition. The point of the distinction between literal and symbolic knowledge, be it from the early or late point of view is, I shall show, that: (1) literal knowledge is meaningless, and (2) symbolic knowledge necessarily implies intent, that is, it is practical, it articulates human interests. It is the second point that is crucial to my position.

2. LITERAL AND SYMBOLIC KNOWLEDGE

For reasons of criticism and analysis, Santayana drew a distinction between literal and symbolic knowledge but, in fact, the design of his article is to show that there is no distinction at all. Literal knowledge, because its character is immediate, is intent-less. In one sense, to say this is to mean that knowledge which is not practical does not count as knowledge; in another sense it destroys any sharp distinction between immediate and mediate knowledge, and consequently between theoretical and practical knowledge. A reason why these distinctions are both arbitrary and artificial is that the mind is no tabula rasa, it is an active faculty. Immediate knowledge is not a pure awareness entirely unmediated by concepts. Nor is mediate knowledge ever so abstract that it loses its immediate ground, if it does, it simply becomes a "new mythology"--"perfectly thinkable" but "purely fictitious." Intent is always afoot in knowledge. Be it immediate or mediate, there is no purity, if purity means intent-less. Even in the case of mathematics, intent functions to bring it to its glory: "to be useful while remaining free."[1] Henry Aiken in Reason and Conduct sums up well the sense of what we shall see: "The controlling and never forgotten interest of his [Santayana's] metaphysics is always moral. Like the ancient Stoics and Epicureans, he was animated not by a driving curiosity concerning the nature of things, but rather by a search for the underpinnings of the rational life,"[2] ". . . the 'real' itself is at bottom a term of appraisal, by means of which we serve notice of what most profoundly concerns us."[3] By means of intent and symbolic knowledge everything concerns us, and that which is unknowable is meaningless, while where there is no intent there is no value.

Literalists fall into two camps: one truly sceptical believing all knowledge to be illusory while the real stands beyond the limits of reason, the other a dogmatist in a sceptic's clothing who believes that what appears is real. Santayana says of the first that he holds a kind of representative theory of knowledge, "a theory which would interpose a screen of ideas between the mind and things and would prove that the essential aim of intelligence is hopeless and that any claim to know things as they are must be an illusion."[4] This description looks like Kant. Of the second, his position often grows out of the first, for as a critique of representative theory of knowledge "the way is then open for the sceptic to deny the necessity of any realities behind appearances. . . . He will affirm that these so-called appearances are the only realities, and that after all, since we know these directly, by an infallible knowledge of acquaintance, the aim of intelligence is perfectly attained, and we know things exactly as they are."[5] This description looks like Berkeley.

It so happens, Santayana criticized both forms of the literalists' approach in Reason in Common Sense and did so for the same reason as he is doing here. The one says that the knowledge we possess is illusory and that reality is beyond comprehension, yet if by some divine grace we might be stripped of our intuitions of space and time and the categories in order to see "freely" behind them, the things in themselves would be revealed to us through a New Pure Intuition--in short our "knowledge" would be thoroughly literal. The other, in principle, is the same except the screen of ideas is absent; we know by acquaintance what appears and that is all there is. In both cases, knowledge is defined as seeing what

is immediately before us, while each in its own way destroys the possibility of knowledge.

Santayana criticized the "modern philosophers" in Reason in Common Sense because they rendered knowledge meaningless, that is, non-practical. They rendered it so because being literalists they siphoned all the intent out of the mind and replaced it with a cold eye. If knowledge is merely without intent to see what is before us it cannot guide action; if it cannot guide action it is useless. Literalists of both sorts mentioned are on a quest for certainty which is unattainable and whose sacrifices are much too dear--as Dewey was to say years later: "a quest for a peace which is assured, an object which is unqualified by risk and the shadow of fear which action casts. For it is not uncertainty per se which men dislike, but thefact that uncertainty involves us in perils of evil."[6]

Santayana thought that the literalists' approach needlessly separated theory from practice at the ultimate expense of reason itself. "The life of reason is not concerned with speculation about unthinkable and gratuitious 'realities'; it seeks merely to attain those conceptions which are necessary and appropriate to man in his acting and thinking."[7] According to Santayana, Kant's assumption, that reality is beyond appearance, is fundamentally correct because this assumption implies that knowledge is not merely literal and that reason is therefore practical and by nature hypothetical; that is, reason itself has an interest which embodies intent thereby leading us to ideals. If Kant only meant that the distinction between phenomena and noumena were a distinction between appearance and reality, then knowledge would have been transitive, as

Santayana says, "building a bridge of methodical inferences and ideal unities between fact and fact, between endeavour and satisfaction."[8] But Kant went too far. His formalism was much too enthusiastic. He made the distinction between theory and practice too rigid and sharp, thereby cutting out interest from under reason. Santayana can accept the technical mistakes of a philosopher. What he cannot accept are the insidious presuppositions which some philosophies drag in their wake. As Santayana sees it, Kant is a literalist in so far as Kant's account of knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason makes it impossible to know things as they are. Kant's emphasis on the negative in his account draws our attention away from the value of reason in so far as it is practical and hypothetical. Therefore, Kant minimizes the importance of reason as having an interest when it comes to making judgements of value and establishing ideals. Santayana seems to think that Kant's account of knowledge is unnecessarily pessimistic; it suggests bounds to knowledge and not merely limits. The result of such ideas in the case of Kant's distinction between theory and practice ultimately ended in a moral theory whose principles were completely detached from human interest; his formalism ironically contaminated his morality with dogmatism. As another critic of Kant has said: "Kant let theology in through the back door, by basing morality on a categorical imperative, on the 'ought' rather than the 'is.' . . . To base ethics on obligation is tantamount to the reintroduction of the divine judge and eudaemonism."[9] As Dewey would say, it was ethics which implied a fear of action. As Santayana says: "His [Kant's] moral law was a personal superstition, irrelevant to the impulse and need of the world."[10] ". . . A revolution (Copernican or otherwise) which

promises us infallibility, on the ground that immediate experience (or which amounts to the same thing, things in themselves) is all there is to know, begins by announcing the bankruptcy of knowledge."[11] The foundation of knowledge is transitive, that is, it points like a dog--"it has alertness and intent."[12] Knowledge has an animal basis, therefore depending upon the animal, it functions in the interests of that creature or it does not make any sense to say it functions at all.

To take the other side of the literalist's approach, imagine a mind in a Berkeleyian world. It would be a world of pure intuitions as uninteresting as it be vacant. Berkeley "wished to lay intellect to revert to a pious idiocy in the presence of Nature. . . . The outer world being thus reduced to a sensuous dream and to the blur of immediate feeling."[13] But "the shuffling of sense data is not understanding."[14] The result of Berkeley's "algebra of perception" is the same as Kant's transcendental idealism. Berkeley's perceptions are algebraic because they are not of concrete images but of mental atoms alone. Percipi is not an attribute of esse. Esse est percipi states a tautology, hence it is uninformative. However, as with Kant, Santayana viewed these technical matters as secondary. "Of the moral field, he [Berkeley] had, it need hardly be added, a quite childish and perfunctory conception. There the prayer-book and the catechism could solve every problem."[15] Just as with Kant, the moral law, according to Berkeley, could solve every problem, it simply need be applied.

Although this is no place to delve into the details of Santayana's lack of concern for "technical matters," I do want to mention an interesting contrast which illuminates Santayana's ultimate concern for

practical matters. One could aptly call Santayana's criticisms of Kant and Berkeley, although brief, incisive and harsh. One could even go further and say that Santayana's remarks about Kant and Berkeley as far as they are literalists are in need of more exposition and argument. I imagine one could say, for example, that Kant's epistemology is as symbolic in its nature as Santayana's. But Santayana is not interested so much in Kant's and Berkeley's theoretical concerns. He is interested in their practical concerns. In this respect, I think Santayana is fair in suggesting that both Kant and Berkeley, in so far as their literalist approach to knowledge undermined the place of interest in moral issues, had somewhat naive moral views. It is interesting in contrast to look at Santayana's view of Spinoza in this context. Santayana has overwhelming praise for him, not because of his epistemology, which might be interpreted as literalist (a point which Santayana may have conveniently overlooked), but because of his sensitivity to human moral endeavor.

According to Santayana, "knowledge cannot be knowledge if taken literally."[16] Knowing entirely separate from interests and actions--from intent--as pointed out, is not knowledge at all. Knowledge is used, it is practical. As Ryle would say, it is the ability to do things in a particular way. Santayana says, using the example of external objects that they "are noted and are interesting for what they do, not for what they are; and knowledge of them is significant, not for the essence it displays to intuition (beautiful as this may be), but for the events it expresses or foreshadows."[17] Or more broadly: "The ideas we have of things are not fair portraits: they are political caricatures made in the human interest."[18] The reason, therefore, why all thought is

practical is that it contains intent and functions symbolically. Without symbols there is neither knowledge nor thought. To think is to act. There may be imageless thought, but there is no thought which does not rest on symbols. The idea of symbolic knowledge per se is nothing new. It harks back to Plato and is found systematically worked out in Ogden and Richards, Cassirer, Whitehead and others. Especially in Whitehead, in a small volume entitled, Symbolism, the similarities with Santayana's ideas are remarkable. Whitehead had read Santayana, specifically Scepticism and Animal Faith and was apparently familiar with Santayana's idea on symbolism. He even praises Santayana saying that Santayana possessed an "admirable clarity of thought, a characteristic which he shares with the men of genius of the 17th and 18th centuries."[19] This is hardly a view shared by many. What Whitehead says concerning symbolism, however, is particularly instructive. It is virtually Santayana's position, and, I feel, much more clearly stated. I shall quote, in full, a section from Symbolism which deals with symbolism and perception, in particular.

> We look up and see a coloured shape in front of us, and we say--there is a chair. But what we have seen is the mere coloured shape. Perhaps an artist might not have jumped to the notion of a chair. He might have stopped at the mere contemplation of a beautiful colour and a beautiful shape. But those of us who are not artists are very prone, especially if we are tired, to pass straight from the perception of the shape to the enjoyment of the chair, in some way of use, or of emotion, or of thought. We can easily explain this passage by reference to a train of difficult logical inference, whereby, having regard to our previous experiences of various shapes and various colours, we draw the probable conclusion that we are in the presence of a chair. I am very sceptical as to the high-grade character of the mentality required to get from the coloured shape to the chair. One reason for this scepticism is that my friend the artist, who kept himself to the contemplation of colour, shape and position, was a very highly trained man, and had acquired this facility of ignoring the chair at the cost of great labour. We do not require elaborate training merely in order to refrain from embarking upon intricate

> trains of inference. Such abstinence is only too easy. Another reason for scepticism is that if we had been accompanied by a puppy dog, in addition to the artist, the dog would have acted immediately on the hypothesis of a chair and would have jumped onto it by way of using it as such. Again, if the dog had refrained from such action, it would have been because it was a well-trained dog. Therefore the transition from a coloured shape to the notion of an object which can be used for all sorts of purposes which have nothing to do with colour, seems to be a very natural one; and we--men and puppy dogs--require careful training if we are to refrain from acting upon it.[20]

In Whitehead's passage we have nearly all of Santayana's important ideas of symbolism: interest, intent, the transitive nature of symbols, quite literally the ideas of animal faith.

To talk of language, art, religion, and science as symbolic subjects of interest is part of common parlance. What makes Santayana's idea of symbolic knowledge interesting is that it brings to light the fact that knowledge is practical. One may not be able to logically derive an 'ought' from an 'is,' but one cannot help thinking in terms of 'oughts.' Or--the distinction between "attitudes" and "beliefs" may be thinkable, but just as with the distinction between theory and practice, it is hardly a distinction correspondent with the facts. Every belief, according to Santayana, is based upon an attitude or attitudes. Every belief is symbolic. Every belief is intent-ful. (As a matter of fact, T. Sprigge reduces Santayana's idea of intent to that of belief.) Also, every attitude which is articulated, brought to the level of cognition, one which is a part of action and not just movement (as "unconscious" attitudes might be) is intent-ful and symbolic. In "Literal and Symbolic Knowledge" Santayana says: "The conclusion of our whole inquiry is that complete knowledge of natural objects cannot be hoped for. We know them <u>by intent</u>, based on bodily reaction. . . . Symbols identify their objects,

and show us where to look for their hidden qualities. . . ."[21] This is not only the conclusion of this essay. This is a conclusion which Santayana held throughout his career. Without the ability to use symbols there would be no intent. It is virtually impossible to imagine one without the other. Through intent we look beyond the immediate--how else can we look beyond except through symbols.

In order to see the connection between Reason in Common Sense and Reason in Science, and then Scepticism and Animal Faith, we have to shift our eyes from actions to objects. However, as far as the idea of intent is concerned what is true of actions is true of objects, it is still a question of the interest in form. As Santayana says in Reason in Science: "It is intent that makes objects objects; and the same intent, defining the function of things, defines the scope of those qualities which are essential to them. . . . Purposes need dialectical articulation as much as essences do, and without an articulate and fixed purpose, without an ideal, action would collapse into mere motion."[22] Later, we will see that intent is also the same in regard to intuitions. Always and in all cases, intent is an interest in form.

The thread between Reason in Science and Scepticism and Animal Faith is essentially unbroken even though strands are broken off and head in other directions. Notice the similarity between the previously cited passage and the one which follows taken from the chapter entitled "Knowledge is Faith Mediated by Symbols" in Scepticism and Animal Faith: "Finally, knowledge is true belief grounded in experience, I mean, controlled by outer facts. It is not true by accident; it is shot into the air on the chance that there may be something it may hit. It arises by

a movement of the self sympathetic or responsive to surrounding beings, so that these beings become its intended objects, and at the same time an appropriate correspondence tends to be established between these objects and the beliefs generated under their influence."[23] I think it would be safe to say that at the time Santayana wrote the preceding passage, he had already formulated his ideas on symbolic knowledge which would serve the ideas of the Realms of Being yet to come, those of intuition, essence, and spirit. It is important to recognize that intent still is a bridge between interests (self sympathetic) and cognition, as Santayana asserted in Reason in Science, hence intent still defines action.

What does it mean for Santayana to know something? I have already shown that it does not mean to be acquainted with it, that is, merely without intent to be aware of the appearance of something. To be sure something appears to me, but that is not much as far as knowing it is concerned. To know something means: (1) I have an interest in it. It attracts me to the extent that I posit its possible use. (I do not say "I posit its existence" because that suggests that interests are material only. That is not true. According to Santayana, positing occurs when we have interests in ideas, fictions, fantasies, along with material objects. To limit the scope of the term 'posit' is to miss Santayana's full intent. As a result of such a mistake, there have been some scholars who have argued that Santayana commits the existential fallacy--deriving existential terms from non-existential terms. I think them mistaken because Santayana never attempted a proof for existence. Even his "Three Proofs of Realism" offers no proof, certainly not in a deductive sense.

I take Santayana at his word, that is, existence is posited; a supposition as far as I know does not count as a conclusion. Anyway what would be the sense of proof? To see things as they really are? We have already seen that Santayana thinks that absurd. We posit to use.) (2) If that interest is articulated, if I start to think about the function of that something, how it might be put to use, intent enters the scene. That something is no longer just a part of the world; it is now idealized by intent by my interest in form; it is a part of my world, that is, the world of human interest. (3) However, to know an object I must first be aware of its appearance. The appearance of that something is a symbol for the material thing itself. The symbol serves, as Santayana says, a "transitive" function. 'Transitive' has a very special meaning. A symbol is transitive to the extent that it points to objects or interests which we believe to exist or to have use. Transitivity at once describes how knowing operates and what are its purposes, that it is a "practical adjustment to [the] facts of existence."[24] As I will show later, intent can be expressed in intransitive situations, in the sense that intent can point to terms of discourse which do not have existence yet have use, for example, when intent operates in dialectic, it operates within a formal system of thought alone. The rules of that system have use within the system by generating its theorems and solving its problems. Let us say, here, that intent functions transitively in that it points to existential objects and interests.

For something to be known, it must meet at least the following conditions: it must be something we intend to use; it must be rendered symbolically; it must be within our sphere of interest. If anything

this is merely a description of the psychological conditions of knowledge. Obviously, these conditions do not tell us what counts as evidence or when one knows he knows. The justification for "I know . . . ," that is, an analysis of why some beliefs are acceptable and others are not, is another issue, an important one to be sure, and one Santayana considers in other contexts. Santayana's approach, here, can be likened to that of some of the enlightenment philosophers, specifically Locke and Hume. Like them, Santayana did not clearly distinguish between psychological and transcendental methods--"psychology is designated as the foundation of epistemology."[25] "According to Locke an investigation of the function of experience should precede any determination of its object. We must not grasp at <u>any</u> objects whatever and seek to investigate their nature on the basis of our knowledge; our first question must be what kind of objects is commensurate with, and determinable by, our knowledge."[26] Santayana defines the function of experience by making interests, actions, intent, and symbols the determinants of knowledge. What is knowledge? and How is knowledge expressed? are inseparable. Santayana "attempts to show that there is a 'natural opinion' implicated in all action."[27] By natural opinion, I understand opinions based upon and traceable to human interests. By investigating the function of human experience, Santayana affirms that shot through every facet of it there are human interests and ultimately material conditions.

> If it still be asked how intent can fix upon a thing at a distance, or of a different nature from the present sense datum and make it its present object, the answer must be, in brief, that sense data are initially signs; and we may be cognizant of the object signified either antecedantly, in consequence of some direct earlier perception (as we know the sound of a printed word from having heard it), or subsequently, by merely yielding to the suasion of the symbol and exploring what it points to--as when we raise our eyes on being

> startled by a sound, or follow a scent, or feel the strong attraction of beauty. That a sign is a sign, and that there is something behind it, is a fact conveyed to us by the concomitant reaction of the rest of our organism to that particular impression. This reaction is not caused by knowledge, it is itself the ground of knowledge.[28]

This passage summarizes Santayana's view of symbolic knowledge, and it offers some intimations of the idea of intuition. I will define intuition, shortly. But for now, we can say: (1) Intent looking beyond immediate signs or appearance is the ground but not the cause of knowledge. It follows, then, that intent in so far as it is connected with interest is present from the very moment signs appear to the mind; in a general sense, I think it is reasonable to say that appearances are not only conditioned by the interests of the human mind, but they are colored in content by those same interests. This, too, will be developed. (2) Implicit in the idea of intent is the idea of possibility. The concept of possibility is a complicated one which would require more analysis than my limited use of it necessitates. Let it merely be noted that without the ability to conceive of a possible state of affairs, a state of affairs removed from immediate view, there would be no symbolic knowledge. As Ernst Cassirer says, "For symbolic thought it is indispensible to make a sharp distinction between real and possible, between actual and ideal things."[29] And more to Santayana's point again Cassirer says: "It is characteristic of all great ethical philosophers that they do not think in terms of mere actuality. Their ideas cannot advance a single step without enlarging and even transcending the limits of the actual world."[30] (3) "By merely yielding to the suasion of the symbol" we are led to interests, that is, a sign is sign of a fact is based upon the biological and psychological constitution of the organism, the

interested reactions of the organism. This is to say that what appears to the mind is conditioned by interests and intent, that the way in which the mind responds to appearances is "determined in its existence and quality by underlying organic processes. . . ."[31] The mind's responses are not under the complete control of specifiable local stimulation, so that knowledge is "symbolic spontaneously, and its function (by which I mean its moral function of not leaving us in the dark about the world we live in) is perfectly fulfilled if it remains symbolical."[32] The only way for knowledge to be expressed in "human terms" is for it to be symbolic. Everything from sense data to religion, language, and science is symbolic in character; and from the beginning to the end of knowledge there is intent.

3. INTENT IN DIALECTIC: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTUITION

Now that I have shown how both literal and symbolic knowledge are understood by Santayana and how intent is implicated in symbolic knowledge, I want to backtrack and look more closely at intuition. 'Intuition' is a term Santayana used on occasion in his early works, but in the late works it becomes a key term with a variety of meanings. In the course of what follows, I will argue that all acts of intuition are intent-ful. If I can successfully do so, it will offer strong support for my general argument that the spirit and the spiritual life have human interests. I should say that I do not have a great deal of company in my position, so that part of my present effort will be against some formidable opponents. As far as my interpretation of Santayana is concerned, I do not intend to dogmatically argue that mine is the only and correct path. Part of the excitement of trying to understand Santayana is that his ideas are pregnant, and they invite one to participate with him in the activity of philosophizing. In short, none of this is clear cut. At the same time, however, I believe I can show my position to be quite reasonable.

I have already discussed how intent is based on interests and leads us to ideals, and how in this sense, intent is the basis of all thought being practical. By saying that all intuitions are intent-ful, what I ultimately want to say is that just as in the Life of Reason intent draws us from interests to ideals, it does so in the spiritual life, too. The ideals of the two lives are different. The spiritual life has its own ideals which shall be examined in due course. To say, however, that ideals are spiritual is not to say that these ideals are

not human, that is, that they are not based on interests or are expressions of interests. Some have said that the spiritual life, as it is developed by Santayana, is a form of mysticism. One thing this is supposed to suggest is that spiritual ideals are not based on human interests. On the contrary, I believe the spiritual life is comprised of acts of intuition which are conditioned by natural processes, and also that the contents and themes of the spiritual life are colored by these conditions. Intuitions, we will see, light up the realm of essence. If we press the light metaphor, we could say that objects like essences are independent of light and intuitions, but an object appears red or blue because light carries in itself all the colors of the spectrum. Without objects, color has no home. Without light, there are no colors.

It is not the case that the source of the spiritual life is natural while its aim is non-natural. This may be true in the trivial sense that essences, as Santayana defines them, are an independent realm of forms or logical characters. The emphasis of the spiritual life, as I see it, lies in the activity of intuiting essence. Intuition is an event in the material world and, without intuition there is no spiritual life. I understand intuition to be a <u>human activity</u> and nothing more. This is its importance for Santayana. If, on the contrary, intuition is not considered to be a human activity and its contents are not human terms, then some radical consequences ensue, consequences which, as we shall see, are entirely foreign to Santayana's thought.

Let us approach the problem in the following way. Let us first look at how intuition usually occurs in order to see what intuition means. I suggested in an earlier section that intuition "runs thick," that there

is intent in spirit (intent does not merely condition spirit but is an essential attribute of spirit), and that we should understand the notion of intuition as "intuiting x as . . . ." In short, I was trying to define the human spirit. Those suggestions now need further development. Second, let us look at what pure intuition means. Here is where controversy rages. Many scholars say that pure intuition is intent-less; I say, in Santayana's own terms, that position is not possible. 'Pure' must be understood to mean something other than intent-less, because to understand pure intuition as intent-less would lead Santayana to a position which entirely undermines his idea of the spiritual life. In this section, I will argue how intuition cannot be intent-less. In a later section, I will offer an alternative interpretation of pure intuition, one which I believe to be Santayana's.

As a preface to defining what intuition is, I want it to be understood that according to Santayana, intent functions in cases where the material world plays no direct role; intent needs no existential object in order to function. This is not a new idea in Santayana's thought. Dialectic in Reason in Science was defined by intent, and dialectic there, as in the Realms of Being, meant thought rendered in a systematic form. In Reason in Science, Santayana says that dialectic is "knowledge of ideal things."[1] "In dialectic, which is wholly intensive, we study what is; we strive to clarify and develop the essence of what we find, bringing into focus the inner harmonies and implications of forms. . . ."[2] Intent and symbolic knowledge have wider meaning than belief in an external material world, or to use Santayana's word--animal faith. Both animal faith and dialectic are species of symbolic knowledge. Intent in

animal faith seeks out existential objects. Here the not givens are existential objects, and intent in animal faith is transformed into belief in existence. Intent, however, may operate in situations where the mind does not make the move of animal faith, yet does make intended moves, moves to not givens which are non-existents. This is true of dialectic; since these moves in dialectic are called intended, both in Reason in Science and Realm of Essence, I assume that interests are still in play, even though immediately the material world is not.

I will give two examples of how intent functions. The first is an example of animal faith. The second is an example of two aspects of dialectic.

Let us say that I see before me the appearance of a particular horse. Because of intent, let us say, I intend to ride it, and so I posit the existence of this horse. By so doing I make the intended move from appearance (essence) to existence, i.e. the object or use of the object. In other words, I have an animal faith that this horse exists. To paraphrase Santayana: Experience comes in ideal terms and they point to objects of intent. Ideal terms are collections of data which in turn point to objects in which we believe.[3]

In Scepticism and Animal Faith, Santayana says: "Dialectic though so fine spun and sustained, is really a more primitive, a more dream-like, exercise of intuition than are animal faith and natural science. It is more spontaneous and less responsible, less controlled by secondary considerations, as poetry is in contrast with prose."[4] Yet even though in animal faith the end of intent is an object and in dialectic an essence, intent functions in precisely the same way.

Dialectic may be expressed in a variety of ways. Let us look at examples of just two of the ways, namely, morals and mathematics. Dialectic is "intent on form,"[5] i.e. the formal relations among essences. Dialectic as it is expressed in morals is used to gain clarity of moral terms. However, if one is not careful, as Santayana says, sophistry may easily sneak its way into discourse. Here, sophistically or philosophically, is an example of dialectic in morals: "Socrates taking 'courage' for his theme, treats it dialectically and expresses the intent of the word by saying that courage must be good, and then develops the meaning of good, showing that it means the choice of the greater benefit; and finally turns about and ends by saying that courage is consequently the choice of the greater benefit and identical with wisdom."[6] Dialectic as it is expressed in mathematics is intent-ful, too, and less prone to sophistry.

> Thus π is an essence meant [meant in the sense that I intend to use it] which can enter unequivocally into an equation; it is not expressible in arithmetical, nor in any serious experience; and it is known by circumstantial definition; it is a goal of thought. . . . When I think of π this exact proportion is signified but not intuited; what is actually before my mind is the Greek letter, its sound, and a shooting vista into a world of words, human mathematics, breaking here and there into images of specious circles, visual or given by gesture; a psychic sea through which intent can nevertheless easily steer towards the fixed but unattainable object defined as π.[7]

(Just an aside which will prove important later. The meaning of π is not just intuited because the meaning is not given in the symbol itself, even though the symbol itself is pregnant, as Santayana poetically suggests, with meaning. Also, π cannot be intuited because it cannot be distinguished. It has no exact nature.) ". . . just as the whole world of common sense, history, and physics is posited, not experienced, so the whole world of dialectic--the labyrinth of essences studied in

mathematics, logic, grammar, and morals--is meant and not [merely] intuited."[8] The terms of dialectic gain meaning through intent so that terms "[essences] signified need not be intuited."[9] Intuited here means seeing that which is immediately before me, i.e. the given. Dialectic, then, seeks out by intent those essences which are not given (not given in this context does not mean existence in any sense, it means absent essences.)

The dialectician in any of the above senses is concerned with ideal forms. The dialectician asks, given certain terms, what formal relations can be established among them, and what are the ideal consequences of such relationships. The dialecticians' concern is with the realm of the possible in thought, and it is through intent that the realm of the possible is conceived. Intent, however, also indicates that logic and morals do not hang in the air. "The first postulates of dialectic, therefore, the constant meaning of terms and the principle of contradiction are <u>rooted</u> in animal faith."[10] Animal faith here implies the interests in the material world. Logic, morals, history, and science are intimately intertwined in the sense that they all grow in the same soil; every one of these subjects expresses problems to be solved. "A problem is a natural predicament, a living perplexity, limiting the relevance of the solution sought and creating its value. Discourse would not be cumulative, it would set and solve not problems, if it did not share and express the adventures of a psyche in a material world. . . ."[11] More poetically put, Santayana says: "Intuition lyrically marks the chief crises in material life. . . . Dialectic is merely a change in scope in this organic synthesis by which a new essence is substituted for the one

first given, that is, for the theme and terms of the analysis or deduction. . . ."[12]

Since dialectic is grounded in existence, it must to some extent have interests. Yet, as we have seen, dialectic is not interested in existence per se. Yet, again, dialectic has an interest in so far as it is expressed by means of intent. Santayana says that "dialectic is more laboriously intertwined with the accidents of existence than is intuition. It is selective, responsible, perilous."[13] Yet, "intuitions are themselves incidental to animal life; in revealing the purest essence, like a colour or a number, they remain rooted in the soil, and render every image symbolic of the condition under which it arises."[14] So, "Dialectic . . . while ostensibly following ideal implications absolved from any allegiance to facts or actual instances of reasoning secretly expresses a material life."[15] In short, dialectic in the Realms of Being is essentially the same as in the Life of Reason. What I mean to say is that its function, since it is based on intent is still practical: dialectic looks to human interests and systematizes the objects of human interest, even though its mode of operation is formal.

As late as 1949, Santayana wrote an article which on the surface was a criticism of Marxism, but in a profounder sense is a criticism of the abuses of dialectic, where dialectic is not just used as an instrument of moral thought but is incorporated into the subject matter so that the subject matter itself has the attribute--dialectical. In the case of Marx, and Hegel, too, dialectic was not just a method invented for use, it was discovered in the nature of things. Santayana, on the contrary, always adhered to the Socratic view of dialectic, a "play of variations in meaning."[16]

> Dialectic is the conscience of discourse and has the same function as morality elsewhere, namely, to endow the soul with integrity and to perfect it into a monument to its own radical impulse. But as virtue is a wider thing than morality, because it includes natural gifts and genial sympathies, or even heroic sacrifices, so wisdom is a wider thing than logic. To coherence in thought it adds docility to facts, and humility even of intellect, so that the integrity of its system becomes a human virtue, like the perfect use of a single language, without being an insult to the nature of things or a learned madness.[17]

In dialectic the realm of matter is put aside, not entirely forgotten, so that the forms which things wear or might wear and their relations can be examined. Since the mind is still functioning intentfully, it must necessarily be an interested mind; since intent is still functioning, dialectic is a species of human action. Even though we are in the realm of essence, the presence of natural ground does not change. Nor do the themes change. In Reason in Science, for example, dialectic, or specifically mathematics, was conceived to be valuable when applied to the world. The same is true of dialectic in the Realm of Essence. In some respects, some might say, in the Realm of Essence the urgency of applicability, although not absent, is somewhat qualled. I think I have shown evidence that at least suggests that this is only true with a great deal of qualification. However, importantly, in other respects, dialectic is now more fecund. It is likened to a virtue and its end is wisdom. Santayana says that dialectic is not merely discourse, it is the conscience of discourse as well and has the same function as morality in the sense that both morality and dialectic seek to perfect man's nature. Dialectic is not merely an instrument, a method man uses. Dialectic is not somehow detachable from man. It grows out of his interests, and it is an act which man engages in. Hence it reveals his nature, like any other act, through his abilities and interests. In this sense, dialectic

is being continually applied even if unawares. If we are ever going to understand nature and our place in it, it will only be through its forms and their relationship to one another, that is, through dialectic--a dialectic which is not conceived to be cold and merely clever, but one which is sensitive to the interests of the creatures who employ it. If we are going to understand dialectic, however, we are going to have to understand the operations of intuition and its relation to intent.

4. INTENT-FUL AND INTENT-LESS INTUITION

Intuition discerns essence. Essence is a complicated idea which will have to be developed along with that of intuition itself. However, for some point of reference I believe it would be helpful to the discussion in general if I mention some of Santayana's notions of essence. This will at least give us a working definition, although not a complete one. The discernment of essences may be approached in a variety of ways. "Thus scepticism, dialectic, contemplation, and spiritual discipline, all lead to the discrimination of essence. . . ."[1] Essences have being but they do not exist, that is, essences have none of the powers of matter or magic. They are independent of me unlike the ideas of an idealist, yet like ideas, they are perfectly clear in the sense that they are the forms of all things both actual and possible. The principle of essence is identity, "the character which distinguishes it from any other essence."[2] Being forms, alone, the population of the realm is infinite. The realm of essence is a disembodied realm, "an unwritten catalogue, prosaic and infinite, of the characters possessed by such things as happen to exist, together with the characters which all different things would possess if they existed. It is the sum of mentionable objects, of terms about which, or in which, something might be said."[3] Tentatively, let us follow Santayana's suggestion and say that an essence is like a Platonic idea robbed of all its cosmological, metaphysical, and moral prerogatives; that essences are forms without <u>any</u> value at all.

What makes the idea of essence a complicated idea is not the nature of essence itself. To say that an object or an idea has an essence

is simply to say that it is what it is, that it has a character which distinguishes it from everything else. What complicates matters is intuition, the act of discrimination, more precisely human intuition. The various approaches to essence, alone, indicate that essence is colored by human intuitions. Also, besides the approaches to essence, in a variety of contexts, Santayana talks about: pure essences, intended essences, moral essences, dramatic essences, etc. Santayana says that essences are an independent realm of being, yet they are dependent on intuition in so far as intuition as an awareness of essences determines the manner in which they will be revealed. The importance of essences is that they enter into experience as human terms in human discourse. More clearly, since the human mind has limitations, only certain essences can appear to it; since the human mind intuits according to its peculiar means, essences always appear in a certain light. Notice in the following passage how Santayana portrays the intuition of essence as both conditioned by natural circumstances and how these conditions color essence with interests: "If I aspired to be a disembodied spirit, I ought to envisage all essences equally and at once--a monstrous requirement. If I aspire instead to dwell in the presence only of the pertinent, the beautiful, and the good, I confess that I am but a natural creature, directed on a small circle of interests and perfections; and that my intuition in particular exercises an adventitious choice, and has a private method, in its survey of essence."[4]

In order to see what occurs in the intuition of essence, that is, how intuitions of essence are intent-ful, let us strip away from the idea of intent everything except its essential meaning, that is, every

intentional act means a move from the given to the not given. The given is what is immediately presented to consciousness, i.e. what is apparent. The not given is everything which is not immediately present, i.e. what is latent. The not given is inferred in one way or another, i.e. cognitively, imaginatively, or assumptively. Any move to the not given constitutes an act of interpretation of the given. If such a move is made, even the slightest move, then we shall say that intent is in operation.

Like all human actions as opposed to mere movements, intuitions are acts of consciousness (spirit) because they are intent-ful. "Intuition is born smothered in intent; and intent is precisely assurance and expectancy turned towards the not given."[5] Intuition is defined by Santayana as "acquaintance with essence."[6] The term 'acquaintance' recalls Santayana's criticisms of literal knowledge as well as his later assertion in "Apologia Pro Mente Sua," written after the Realms of Being, that literal knowledge is impossible. Here I am not going to argue that intuition is knowledge in any sense because Santayana precisely says that "intuition of essence is not knowledge."[7] What I want to argue is that intuition is the foundation of knowledge only because intuition embodies intent. "If there is to be intelligence at all the immediate must be vehicular."[8] What this means is that intuition must, in some way, be an expression of interest. In immediate experience itself, there must be motivating factors which impell us beyond the immediate. Without interest, knowledge has no soil in which to grow; without intent-ful intuitions, interests are never made articulate. Intuition does not take place in a vacuum, nor does it occur haphazardly. It takes place in a natural context and on natural occasions. This is not merely to say that

intuitions are grounded in human interests, which is true and certainly important. It means further that intuitions themselves are acts of interest because they are intent-ful. "Thus intuition of essence first enables the mind to say something about anything, to think of what is not given, and to be a mind at all."[9] Intuition of essence allows the mind to say something in the language of human interests. There is no such thing as mere acquaintance with essence as far as the spiritual life is concerned, nor for that matter as far as any approach to essence is concerned. Intuition is not that mysterious. Some have said that Santayana holds such a view of the intuition of essence, and that intuition is not only detached from human interests, it is also passive and quiescent. Is this supposed to suggest that intuitions are floating about and out of nowhere? That intuition is a super-sensible act of seeing? Only in pure intuition could one be misled. However, as I understand Santayana, the passive or pure intuition, in the sense of intent-less, does not actually exist but is an exemplar of spirit. Intent-less intuition, if it occurs at all, is <u>not</u> intuition as it usually occurs. ". . . in spirit as man possesses it intent or intelligence is almost always the dominant element. For this reason I shall find it <u>impossible</u>, when I come to consider the realm of spirit, to identify spirit with simple awareness, or with consciousness in the abstract sense of this abused word."[10] "Intuition is itself pathetically animal."[11] "It speaks not of itself, but of the Father that sent it."[12] So here in a nutshell, we see intuition is not simply awareness of immediate essences, that it is conditioned by natural circumstances, and that its <u>interest</u> and its <u>language</u> is of its Father, the natural world. In Santayana's words, when I intuit an essence, "I

merely note its idiosyncrasy, its qualitative identity, which enables me to distinguish it, study it, and hold it fast in my intent so that I may eventually frame a definition of it, and perhaps assert or deny its existence."[13]

"Intuition has a physical basis determining the essence that shall appear. . . ."[14] It is limited by human nature to the acts of intuiting certain essences of certain specific character. But further than human nature [or interests) conditioning intuitions, it also "determines their form." "The environment determines the occasions on which intuitions arise, the psyche--the inherited organization of the animal--determines their form. . . ."[15] Or again: ". . . the choice and the interest of essences come entirely from the bent of the animal that elicits the vision of them from his own soul."[16] On the one hand, we have no control over the intuitions we have because they are determined by natural processes and circumstances. On the other hand, the contents of intuitions (essences) are colored and made human terms by our interests, that intuition contains "a contribution from my side."[17]

It has been said by recent Santayana scholars, in particular T. Sprigge and J. Lachs,[18] that intuition, as it usually occurs, is intentful. However, these same scholars argue that when intuition is pure, it is intent-less. It will be recalled that essence may be approached in several ways. Only in one of the ways, namely, the way of scepticism could one possibly interpret Santayana as holding the view that pure intuition is intent-less. I will discuss the idea of pure intuition as it is implicated in the spiritual life in the following section. However, as an introduction to that later discussion, I think the matter of

intent-less intuition ought to be cleared up. Even if intent-less intuition resulting from scepticism is a possible interpretation of Santayana's view of pure intuition, it is not the only cogent interpretation, and it is an interpretation that has questionable bearing on the spiritual life. Certainly it has no direct bearing, since "scepticism is an exercise, not a life; it is a discipline fit to purify the mind of prejudice and render it all the more apt, when the time comes to believe and to act wisely."[19]

Scepticism is a radical approach to essence. One senses that Santayana is determined to shock his reader with what appears to be a modern answer to Pyrrhonism. But unlike Pyrrho of Elis, Santayana does not seek to destroy knowledge in order to bathe in a lukewarm ataraxia. Santayana merely wants to put aside judgement about the material world in order to see the forms of what we know in their clearest light. One wonders, then, where these scholars get their notions about pure intuitions being intent-less when Santayana never says that pure intuitions are intent-less and does say such things as "in pure intuition [there is] no evidence of any existence whatever."[20] As I see it, in light of the purpose of Santayana's scepticism overall, the question of purifying the mind of existential concerns is to the point, whereas the question of intent is not.

To say that pure intuitions are intent-less amounts to saying that intuition is free from interpreting the essences it discerns; pure intuition is simply awareness of essence. In the argument which follows, I will attempt to show that intent-less intuitions are not a part of Santayana's scheme in any way. Implicit in my argument will be the idea, that many scholars have unwittingly confused the ideas of essence and

intuition, placing both in the same realm. In fact, they occupy two realms of being. The realm of essence is a realm which requires no other realm for its being. The realm of spirit, in which there are intuitions, requires a material realm for its soil. This does not, of course, hold true for disembodied spirits, but disembodied spirits are not Santayana's subject. His interest is in the human spirit. The human spirit is a sublime outgrowth, a flower in the material world. In short, intuition itself is not an essence, it is an event, while the objects of intuition are not events but essences.

Irving Singer, in his book Santayana's Aesthetics, develops a view which states that uninterpreted acts of consciousness, acts of simply being aware of the given, are virtual impossibilities. He attributes this view to Santayana. I agree with Singer's view of uninterpreted acts of consciousness. However, I do not think it is Santayana's view. Singer says that Santayana's scepticism ends with uninterpreted acts of consciousness. However, if Singer's interpretation of Santayana were true, then the end of scepticism could not be the distinguishing of essence. As a matter of fact the opposite would result, that is, scepticism would end in an experience in which none of its contents would be distinguishable. As we shall see when consciousness is reduced to a state where its contents are indistinguishable, we are at a state which some have called mystical. I do not know whether or not Singer realizes this, since he makes no explicit mention of it. Whether he does or not is irrelevant.

Although Singer does not explicitly delve into the problem of Santayana's possible affinity to mysticism, he does, through apparently

careful argument, suggest that very problem. I believe he more than any other scholar brings Santayana to the brink of mysticism by arguing that in Santayana's thought there is a sharp distinction between immediate and mediate experience. Several scholars have said that Santayana was a mystic, or more precisely a philosopher with profound mystical tendencies. Santayana always denied having any strong mystical inclinations, although he certainly admitted fascination with mystics and thought that mysticism had its place in the history of ideas. It seems to me that most of these scholars have used the term 'mysticism' as a slur against Santayana's thought while not analyzing or understanding the term, nor, should I say, Santayana's thought in full. For example: "The hidden flame of insight is the light that really captures his [Santayana's] eyes, the mystical identities and fusion of things. . . . He is a mystic saddened, sometimes almost to tears, I think, by a rationalism that perversely makes illusions of what would otherwise be real; and in his later turning to the spiritual life, he seems to recognize this dilemma."[21] Remarks such as these can be found in enough commentaries on Santayana to make one start to wonder about their truth.[22] Can all these men be wrong about Santayana? It is not that simple. Santayana is so ambiguous at times that he invites misinterpretation. From one page to the next he appears to contradict himself, and sometimes he simply does so. Very often he does not warn his reader that he is changing the sense of a word. This is particularly true of 'pure.' However, I still believe there has been misinterpretation on the part of many Santayana scholars. I think it is the right of the philosopher to express himself in the style which he prefers. I think it is the duty of the scholar to accommodate himself to

that style in order to see what lies under it. If Santayana's terms are ambiguous or poetic, then one must look for all the senses. If in all the senses there is no substance, then the scholar has his right to complain. Of Kant, Norman Kemp Smith said, "As a writer, he is the least exact of all the great thinkers." But great he was. In the case of Santayana's alleged mysticism, I have not seen argument, for the most part, to show the intended conclusion; I have seen epithets, and epithets come easily. Only Singer as far as I know offers arguments which if true reveal Santayana to be a mystic. However, I think Singer, like others, has pulled Santayana's passages out of context, without carefully examining the context itself, thereby distorting Santayana's point. Especially with someone as ambiguous or poetic, if you will, as Santayana, context is not only important it is absolutely crucial.

When I discussed literal and symbolic knowledge, part of the aim of that discussion was to show that there was no sharp distinction between immediate and mediate knowledge. Now, I am going to discuss immediate and mediate experience, again with the same purpose in mind. Experience may include knowledge, but for the present, the emphasis is going to be on intuition. As I said, Singer does not think there is such an experience which can be called immediate, that is, an experience which is uninterpreted. He says that Santayana's idea of the intuition of essence is such an uninterpreted experience. Let us see what Singer's position is, and where it leads, and then let us see if it fits Santayana's position.

Singer's explanation of essence is hardly controversial, that is, he says that essences are neutral entities, that they are universals,

logical characters which are non-existent, and that they may appear as given in some intuition. "This means that essence is just that character which any existence wears in so far as it remains identical with itself."[23] He says that there are various approaches to essence but that it is scepticism which is the most fundamental. His reason for this is that "only the sceptic concerns himself with everything that is given to consciousness."[24] Furthermore, he says, "although our argument has concentrated upon the analysis of experience, it has indirectly dealt with approaches other than the sceptic's and may easily be extended to cover them."[25] In the first place, if it were true that the sceptic is the only one to concern himself with everything given to consciousness, then he would be not only a sceptic, he would also be a dialectician, an aesthete, and a spiritual man all wrapped up in one. Scepticism is no more fundamental than the spiritual life, in the sense that it is necessarily simpler or prior to it or to the other approaches. Scepticism may be helpful to the other approaches to essence, but the same could be said of dialectic for example. Singer is taking Santayana's use of the word 'approach' too strictly. Each approach may reveal its own peculiarities, ones imposed by the way itself, as well as complement or enrich the other approaches. But no one way encompasses every other. And no way is entirely distinct from another. In the second place, no analysis of scepticism, either directly or indirectly, extends to the other approaches. There may be points where the approaches to essence overlap, but when Santayana says that scepticism is an <u>exercise</u> and not a <u>life</u>, he is saying that scepticism and the spiritual life are radically different. An analysis of scepticism does not, in any sufficient sense, "cover" the spiritual life's approach to essence.

To arrive at essence is to arrive at the given in experience. To experience the given is to experience data as would a solipsist. All there is is the present moment, and "all that the solipsist lacks is interpretation."[26] Singer says, like John Dewey and C. I. Lewis, Santayana holds the belief "in some immediate aspect of experience which lays a foundation for all our uncertain interpretations."[27] If one carefully notes the passage Singer quotes from Lewis, one wonders whether or not Singer's entire criticism of Santayana is not misapplied. It almost appears that Singer shifts what Lewis says to what he (Singer) thinks Santayana means. Singer goes on to say that "Santayana does not expressly define the word 'interpretation' (as, in fact, Lewis does), but he uses it to mean the functioning of memory and expectations in both classification and signification."[28] Singer cites the following passages from Scepticism and Animal Faith to support his view. These passages, Singer says, sum up Santayana's epistemological scepticism.

> "Not being directed by memory upon the past, nor by animal faith upon the future or upon external things, pure intuition exercises no sagacity, no transitive intelligence, and does not think. It is merely the light of awareness lending actuality to some essence. . . . If I confine myself to the given essence without admitting discourse about it, I exclude all analysis of that essence, or even examination of it. I must simply stare at it, in a blank and timeless aesthetic trance. . . . Intuition can never yield the relation of its total datum to anything not given. It cannot refer to the latent at all, since its object, by definition, is just what is given immediately. To take the leap from one intuition to another, and assert that they view the same essence, or have the same intent, I must take my life in my hands and trust to animal faith."[29]

The passages quoted here seem like outright contradictions of some of the passages I have quoted. Could it be that Santayana was that terribly confused? Not in these instances was he. What appears here to be a long passage strung together by short breaks in context is, in fact,

three different passages extracted by Singer from three different contexts. All scholars run the risk of misguiding their readers when excerpts are cited; it is an inherent pitfall of all scholarship. But to take three different passages, which supposedly "sum up" a crucial position, from three different contexts multiplies the risk while bringing into question the prudence of the scholar himself. To be kind to Singer, unlike he is to Santayana, I will simply say such scholarship is unfair. Be that as it may, let us look at the contexts of these passages.

None of the passages comes out of a context in which Santayana discusses scepticism. The first passage comes from the beginning of the chapter entitled "The Cognitive Claims of Memory" and the other two come from an earlier chapter entitled "Belief in Demonstration." If one is going to sum up Santayana's scepticism, there are more pertinent chapters to which one could look.

As far as the first passage is concerned, it comes from the beginning of the chapter on memory where Santayana is attempting to set up a definition of memory. Let us keep in mind that memory, according to Singer's view of Santayana, is one of the conditions of interpretation. And, according to Singer, the intuition of essence, since it has neither memory nor expectation is uninterpreted. This is unequivocally an erroneous view of Santayana. Let us see how memory is defined in the context of Singer's excerpt from Santayana.

In the paragraph before the first passage cited by Singer, Santayana defines what he means by memory. "When the things known are events within the past experience of the psyche, spontaneously imagined, knowledge is called memory. . . . Memory itself must report facts or

events in the natural world, if it is to be knowledge and to deserve the name of memory."[30] Santayana's definition of memory is a very restricted one. Memory is knowledge of past events. To say properly that one has a memory of something, one cannot be mistaken about what he remembers. According to Santayana's definition, if he is mistaken, he does not remember. For example, one cannot remember that Nixon did not resign from the Presidency. Memory entails knowledge[31] in past events, i.e. past existences. (Expectation--animal faith--is a belief in future events.) In intuition alone, however, no such truth values are applicable because intuition alone does not refer to events. ". . . existence can never be given in intuition."[32] Intuition does not entail the interpretation that such and such occurred. That interpretation is made by belief, specifically a belief in existence.

If we understand that memory means a report of the facts and that a report of the facts entails interpretation (an inference made from the intuition of an essence to a belief in existence) then pure intuition does not enter into the functioning of memory. Memory entails interpretation which pure intuition does not. But does this allow Singer to say that all interpretation is ruled out of pure intuition? Or in another sense, must one believe in events, external things, in order to employ interpretation in any sense at all? Singer leads us to believe that pure intuition is not sagacious because it does not entail interpretation in any sense. What Singer has done is taken Santayana's restricted sense of interpretation (an inference from essence to existence) and has used it to cover all senses of interpretation.

Interpretation can occur without memory as Santayana defines memory since without memory all Santayana excludes is a knowledge of past

events. There seems to be no reason why I might not know anything about the past yet still interpret the intuitions I possess. Actually this is the position of the solipsist. By excluding memory I do not exclude a "sense of the past"; that is not what Santayana means. What I do by excluding memory is that I say that I do not know whether or not past events once existed. Actually to say that memory, as Santayana defines it, is a condition of interpretation is much too strong a condition to impose upon the concept of interpretation. Santayana, however, imposes no such condition. If we say that memory is a condition of interpretation, then interpretation is not only ruled out of intuition, it is also ruled out of dialectic as well. In dialectic, defined as intent on form, interpretation need not refer to events in order to function. It is possible to imagine a solipsist engaged in a dialectic of pure fictions. Santayana would think that such dialectic would be senseless, however, it would be possible. One might grant that in intuition, alone, in the solipsism of present moment, interpretation is controversial, but to say there is no interpretation in dialectic is to remove intent from it and render dialectic meaningless.

The second and third passages cited by Singer are more difficult to explain. The chapter "Belief in Demonstration" from where these passages come is concerned with explaining the nature of dialectic and its relation to scientific demonstration. One could get bogged down for pages and pages on what Singer writes off in a few sentences. Certainly, to understand Santayana completely, here, would take more than citing the surrounding context as I did in the first case. This much, however, can be said. As I mentioned, Singer says that these passages summarize

Santayana's epistemological scepticism. ". . . the search for an indubitable element in ordinary experience. . . ."[33] A simple look at the context will show this is not true. In both passages cited by Singer, Santayana is essentially working out the idea of what is the analysis of a particular essence and how that analysis is confined to the realm of essence, that this analysis need not concern itself with questions of existence; that is, in analysis questions of existence may be temporarily suspended. For example, I intuit the essence 'dog.' "My dog is one and the same dog unmistakably, without prejudice to the possibly infinite complexity of his organism or the interpenetration of his qualities."[34] However, if I take notice of one of these qualities, let us say, his bone structure, that intuition of that essence is in some sense included in the first unanalyzed intuition of my dog. What I have done is turned a "passive (unanalyzed) intuition into analysis" which in turn may bring "analysis into some fresh synthesis of the elements identified and distinguished in the given essence."[35] Quite simply, what Santayana is saying is that we can intuit one essence on many different levels and that the original intuition is affected by these closer and closer looks. None of this analysis need include the <u>belief</u> that my dog exists, although the intuitions must be accompanied by intent. This sort of talk seems to me to be the language of interpretation, whether my dog be Fido or Cerberus. Singer's view of Santayana is falsely based on the idea that Santayana is, in these passages, talking about actual states of affairs. The second passage which Singer cited begins with "If." Yes, If I confine myself to the given essence without admitting discourse about it, then I exclude all analysis of that essence. . . . What this

says is that without discourse, there is no analysis. Hardly a profound statement. However, in fact, as my citings of Santayana have suggested, there is no confinement to the given essence. Quite bluntly, the surrounding context of the if clause explains that there is, in fact, discourse about essence. As far as the third passage is concerned, where Singer cites Santayana saying that to leap from one intuition to another entails taking my life into my hands, to this I simply say, yes, again, I necessarily do.

Thus far, I believe, we can at least say there is some doubt about Singer's interpretation of Santayana. Let us go on with Singer in order to see what he means by uninterpreted experience. "Let us suppose . . . that we could attain a datum that was wholly uninterpreted. I would still not satisfy the needs of epistemological scepticism. For it could only be a datum that was wholly indeterminate, wholly vague; and our experience could then be nothing more than a blur."[36] "Thus, apart from all interpretation, there is only total vagueness and the annhilation of consciousness. It is the function of interpretation to make the datum determinate in some respect or other."[37] Singer cites a psychologist who describes the perception of infants. In infants classification of perceptions is at a minimum, and perceptual responses are diffuse. Differentiation, accordingly, comes with learning, or in other words, with the ability to interpret perceptions. Singer says, Santayana's "epistemological scepticism considered the datum to be a determinate and 'perfectly definite' character."[38] Singer holds the view that a datum is always more or less determinate. Also, "to the extent that a datum is uninterpreted in some respect, it is in that respect--as we say--'less

meaningful,' 'less significant,' and something that we are 'less conscious of.' To this extent it is less determinate, definite, clear-cut, distinctive, or precisely discriminated. And vice versa; the more we focus our attention upon a datum and interpret it to be a certain something, the more it becomes determinate."[39] Finally, Singer says: "According to Santayana, the solipsist experiences the datum, sees it for instance, apart from all external relations and devoid of all classification."[40]

As I said earlier, I think Singer is correct that uninterpreted acts of consciousness are vague. A view which holds that there is consciousness without interpretative processes is a view with annhilates consciousness as we know it, and, in some sense, as we shall see, such a view empties consciousness of its contents. This, however, is not Santayana's view. It is true that the solipsist's intuition of essence is one which is apart from external relations, that is, there are no assumptions made concerning the existence of the essences intuited. However, the solipsist's intuition of essence is not devoid of classification, nor does "devoid of classification" necessarily follow from "apart from external relations." Classification, that is, the identity of essence is the very end of scepticism. Scepticism is an exercise for the sake of purification. What purification means here is the shaving away of assumptions about existence. The end of scepticism is the "loss of faith" which "has no tendency to banish ideas."[41] It is the renunciation "for the moment [of] all transitive intelligence,"[42] i.e. intelligence which makes moves from essence to existence. "The sceptic, then as a consequence of carrying his scepticism to the greatest lengths, finds

himself in the presence of more luminous and less equivocal objects than does the working and believing mind; only these objects are without meaning, they are only what they are obviously, all surface."[43] In the sense that the objects of intuition are all surface does intuition "run no risks of error."[44] When Santayana uses terms such as "meaning" and "error" in contexts like these, he is saying there is no meaning or error when there are no assertions or denials made concerning existence.

When Santayana says that the intuition of essence is indubitable, he means that there can be no mistake that something is appearing, that is, there is a character which I distinguish before me. The intuition of the character itself is not necessarily clear and distinct in any Cartesian sense. Santayana is not setting his foundation of knowledge on the indubitable like Descartes or Lewis. The foundation of knowledge for Santayana is a very shaky one. It is based on a psychological concept--belief, not an epistemological or logical one. The very fact that essences, as we saw, can be analyzed attests to the fact that they do not have a definite character in any absolute sense. More clearly, an essence itself has a definite character--that is analytically true. But the intuition of a particular essence does not have a definite character. Nor, should I say, does indubitable have any logical weight here as it does in Descartes. "I think, therefore, I am" is indubitable, according to Descartes, in the sense that to deny it entails a contradiction. For Santayana, the indubitability of an essence before me entails no questions of any such contradictions. Indubitability applies to appearances, therefore, I can say that I intuit a chair while I am awake and I intuit a chair while I dream. In both cases, the intuition is indubitable.[45]

By attending to the surface, alone, do essences become classified, hence clear. "Any essence is a model of explicitness; it is all surface without substance."[46] The point of attending to the surface is not to arrest interpretation altogether. It is to arrest interpretation of a certain kind. It is to free ourselves from irrelevant assumptions: "The sceptic withdraws into the intuition of a surface form, without roots, without origin or environment, without a seat or a locus; a little universe, an immaterial absolute theme, merely rejoicing in its own quality."[47] The sceptic is merely doubting and denying the existence of any object. Logic is a surface subject in this sense. The logician purifies his thought of all content, i.e. subject matter, in order that relations and the conclusions of these relations may be seen more perspicuously. To say that such a purification entails the abolition of interpretation or classification seems to be wrong.

Singer says that "the more we focus our attention upon a datum and interpret it to be a certain something, the more it becomes determinate." Is this not just what Santayana claims scepticism to be; to focus on the datum alone and through a systematic process of interpretation end at the identity of the datum itself, at the point of--"distinction, infinitely minute and indelible distinction of everything from everything else"[48]--essence.

To say as Singer does that the end of scepticism is an uninterpreted datum is to make a farce of scepticism itself. I have argued that the issue of interpretation is not to the point as far as scepticism or intuition of essence is concerned. If scepticism were to end with uninterpreted data, scepticism would lead us to a dead-end street.

Santayana uses the exercise of scepticism for the sake of building not destroying knowledge. We analyze terms themselves in order that a later synthesis will be relatively clear.

> . . . a mind enlightened by scepticism and cured of noisy dogma, a mind discounting all reports, and free from all tormenting anxiety but its own fortunes or existence, finds in the wilderness of essence a very sweet and marvellous solitude. The ultimate reaches of doubt and renunciation open out for it, by an easy transition into fields of endless variety and peace, as if through the gorges of death it had passed into a paradise where all things are crystallized into the image of themselves, and have lost their urgency and their venom.[49]

This seems hardly a view from the cradle, where, in fact, <u>everything</u> is urgent and anxiety has its origin. Rather it seems like a celebration of the multiplicity of appearances which pass before the liberated and enlightened mind, and the joy which its clarity brings.

5. INTUITION AS ATTENTION

What does it mean to distinguish one essence from another? I see before me a household full of furniture--I have intuitions of the essences of lamp, chair, couch, table, etc. I make no claims about their existence; I am a solipsist. I say of the essences that I now intuit that they are only what they are. They must have, at least, a specific character, if not, I could not say they were before me. They are before me. That is, from "here . . . the centre of attention,"[1] I view the solipsistic dream. From here, I assert of essence, it is what it is.

The aim of intuition is to distinguish essence. ". . . intuition is a name for that spiritual wakefulness by which attention discerns characters and distinguishes one character from another."[2] Intuition is its most fundamental sense is defined as attention, and attention can be paid to anything in perception or thought. To attend to something, one must feel inclined towards it; an interest in x explains why one attends to x.[3] As Santayana says: "Intuition would be impossible without an underlying animal life, a psyche; for how should the sheer light of intuition actualize itself, or choose the essence on which it should fail?"[4] Also, all attention requires not only an object of attention, it requires a background from which objects are drawn. "The vital continuity of consciousness is not suspended, and there is a comparatively stable background, in my sense of the world and myself in it, against which I notice each new feature."[5] From the idea that intuition is defined as attention and on the evidence cited which suggests that attention entails interest, moves from the given to the not given, and

sometimes even purpose, I want to piece together an interpretation of Santayana which shows that intuition is always intent-ful. Now I say "piece together" because Santayana, as is typical, does not formulate any full-blown theory of intuition as attention, he does not even offer any sustained analysis of the concept of attention. However, I believe there is enough evidence to show that my interpretation of intuition is supportable.

Intuition works something like this: I have an interest in x which inclines me to attend to x which in turn leads me to distinguish x from y, z, ... This is the way intuition as attention always operates when to distinguish something is its aim. This is not to say that attention always operates in this way. There is an aspect of attention which some have called "spontaneous" or "unordered," whereby neither interest is necessarily presupposed by attention nor to distinguish anything is the aim of attention.[6] It is the ordered or voluntary sense which clearly concerns Santayana. I think what I am driving at might be better put in contemporary terms, terms which, I believe, do not distort Santayana's meaning at all. The end of intuition is to notice the character of an essence. To notice falls under the "category of what Ryle has called 'achievement' concepts--that is, such concepts as finding, winning, arriving, discovering, . . . getting to know."[7] To distinguish (Santayana's term) seems to me to fall under this same category of achievement. To notice (distinguish) something necessarily presupposes attention and interest; to notice something one must attend to it and one must have an interest in it. When Santayana speaks of intuition, he is interested to show how intuition makes an essence stand out from its

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context. This idea fits perfectly the idea of to notice something. In contemporary discussion about the philosophy of mind the following is typical:

> The fact that what we notice stands out from other things is reflected in the grammar of the word "notice." We speak of noticing the color of a tie, the tie on the table, and the table in the room, we notice the chimes of the clock. . . . This same fact is emphasized in the work of psychologists by their distinction between the "figure" and the "ground" in perception. Something can be seen as such, only if it seems to stand out from its background.[8]

Notice what Santayana says about intuition in its most fundamental sense in so far as it includes interest, attention, and distinction. "A datum is by definition a theme of attention."[9] "Attention cries halt, it reconnoitres, it takes note, it throws a lassoo over the horses of Poseidon, lord of the flux. And why? Because the organs of spirit are structures; they are mechanisms instituted in nature to keep doing certain things, roughly appropriate to the environment, itself roughly constant. It is to this approximate fixity of function and habit that spirit owes its distinct ideas, the names it gives to things. . . ."[10] "Intuition finds essence by watching, by exerting animal attention."[11] (Here it is in a nutshell--Intuition finds--an achievement concept--by animal--interested-attention.) "Intuition . . . is a view of essence, attention fixed upon it."[12] In the Realm of Spirit Santayana says more broadly: "What I call spirit is only that inner light of actuality or attention."[13] "Spirit is an awareness natural to animals . . . other names for spirit are consciousness, attention, feeling, thought."[14] Even of pure intuition Santayana says: "Awake attention, intensify it, purify it into white flame, and the actual and unsubstantial object of intuition will stand before you in all its living immediacy and innocent

nakedness. But notice, this attention, discovering nothing but essence, is itself an animal faculty: it is called forth by material stress, or by passion."[15] These examples could be multiplied, but I think the point is sufficiently made: an act of intuition is a complex act which includes interest (as a determining ground), attention (the act), and distinction (the achievement).

Now the question is: in which way could it be said that intuition in this fundamental sense is intent-ful? Intuition is intent-ful in a three-fold way. (1) Intuition always has an underlying interest which determines which essences are to be intuited. (2) Intuition has a purpose in the sense that its end is to distinguish one essence from another and to distinguish is an achievement. (3) Intuition acts to draw a given essence out of a not given context; the not given context is always necessarily assumed by intuition, hence moves from givens to not givens are continually being made by the intuiting mind. Let us look at these three points in turn.

As far as (1) is concerned, I think it is already relatively obvious by what I have cited that without animal interest, according to Santayana, there is no attention or distinguishing of essence, i.e. interests determine which essences are to be chosen for intuition. I do not think it is off the mark to call these interests interpretative. Does a photographer, for example, merely picture the facts? I do not think so. He focuses on and frames in some facts and not others. By attending to some facts and not others he is performing an act of interpretation; our interests provide a basis of selection for those things to which we attend and these interests provide an "indirect

explanation"[16] of why we notice one thing and not another. "On their communal walk, the geologist notices the rock formation; the botanist, the plant life; the painter, features of the landscape; the philosopher, fails to notice anything at all. The point illustrated is not a factual discovery about human behavior, not something for which we need experimental evidence; it is a logical truth about the relation of the notions of attention and notice to that of interest."[17]

As for (2), I think that it could be maintained that according to Santayana, to distinguish an essence is conceptually separate from to attend to an essence, so that to distinguish an essence is the purpose of intuition. For example, when Santayana says: "Intuition finds essence by watching . . ." the distinction between act and achievement (purpose) is clear. But maybe the inclusion of purpose without qualification, since 'purpose' is vague, in the form of achievement is stretching matters a bit; to be safe let us say that all acts of intuition are purposeful in the sense that all acts of intuition are conscious achievements. Only some acts of intuition are purposeful in the sense that they point beyond intuition to animal faith, dialectic, or some other more complex activity of spirit: such as, articulating moral or spiritual ideals. In these latter cases, it would be perfectly appropriate within Santayana's framework to say that intuition is purposeful in the sense that one would attend to various essences for the express purpose of solving a problem, formulating an ideal, attaining it, or contemplating it. Attention, here, would entail a search for something.[18]

Finally, I maintain that in Santayana's view every act of intuition is intent-ful in sense (3). I recall the fact that intent in its

simplest sense is defined by Santayana to be any mindful move from the given to the not-given. In (1), intuition is intent-ful in so far as interest is the ground and the ground works to determine the selection of essences. In (2), all intuitions are purposeful as conscious achievements, hence intent-ful. In (3), all intuitions are intent-ful, pure or otherwise, no matter who intuits the essence--gods, beasts, or men.

In the chapter entitled "Intuition" in the Realm of Spirit, Santayana, in three different contexts, states how the background of intuited essences is necessary to any act of intuition. This background is not, strictly speaking, given to intuition. What is given is an essence, and no matter how simple or complex the essence might be, a background to that essence is always assumed by the mind. Without such an assumption, i.e. a background which is taken for granted, intuition, in so far as it is defined as attention, is impossible. Let us note what Santayana says: First, there is the quote I cited earlier, namely, "The vital continuity of consciousness is not suspended, and there is a comparatively stable background, in my sense of the world and myself in it, against which I notice each new feature."[19] Secondly, "In waking life and even in sleep intuition is normally uninterrupted, though what is constant here, amid a stream of changes, is singularly vague and nameless."[20] Finally, ". . . something very like such a vacant but positive tension endures in waking life, supplying the background to all ulterior data. The glance of attention would disclose nothing distinct if a constant blank field, the specific datum of expectancy, did not spread round each image, precede it, limit it, contrast with it, and swallow up an island or the sky a star--data which could never have been given to

intuition except within those broader fields."[21] The terms: "stable background," "blank field," "nameless"--all clearly suggest the not given, but a not given which is necessarily assumed in order for intuition to distinguish anything. This I declare constitutes intent.

As I mentioned, the aim of intuition is to distinguish an essence. To do so is to divide consciousness into a foreground and a background. This is a familiar notion which goes back to William James. It is "James' own characterization of attention when he says of it: 'Focalization, concentration, of consciousness, are of its essence.'"[22] This, too, is Santayana's view. The foreground and background idea of attention implies that there is a center of attention (the given essence) around which the background (the not given) is clustered, and "The structural relationship between foreground and background will be determined by the nature of the centre."[23] If there is no distinction between foreground and background, there is no attention at all; "it would be like claiming that a landscape painting could have a foreground without an background and that would be an obvious impossibility."[24]

Now, someone might say that the background, as Santayana presents it, is given too. But this would bring up questions which Santayana never explicitly discussed, that is, can one attend to more than one essence at a time? Also, by saying that the background is given might corrupt the very definition of background, which would result in the collapse of the distinction between background and foreground, a distinction necessary for an idea of attention. On what Santayana does say, however, I think one must think of background as not given, since Santayana uses the words "nameless," "blank field," etc. to describe

background. Surely, to describe that which is given, in these terms, would be a contradiction. In light of Santayana's view of intuition as attention, every act of intuition must involve not only a move from the given to the not given, but countless such moves; attention must involve continual moves from given to not given to given and so on.

In ordinary experience, the view of attention as dividing into foreground and background seems to hold. I am constantly pulling an essence into the center of attention, dropping it, and then moving on to the next. However, even when an unusual situation is presented to the mind, there seems to be an impulse in the mind to divide into foreground and background. A simple example, I think, will suffice. In recent contemporary painting, artists have played with distorting perspective for the sake of creating some unusual effects. A master of this sort of technique was Henri Matisse. There is a famous painting of his, entitled "Harmony in Red," where a woman is pictured at a dining room table which is covered with a cloth whose pattern is exactly the same as that of the wallpaper in the room. The table stands in the foreground. The wall is in the background. However, Matisse does not use any of the techniques of perspective as far as the relationship between the table and the wall is concerned; they at first appear to be indistinguishable and they would be so if it were not for a thin line which separates them. Yet without any perspective at all and only a thin line as a subtle cue, one puts the picture into perspective, i.e. one divides the picture into foregrond and background.

Whether Santayana recognized intuition as attention precisely as I have developed it, I do not really know. His arguments, however, lead

in such a direction, and to interpret Santayana's view of intuition in this way does not lead to any inconsistencies in regard to other related ideas. As a matter of fact, this view of Santayana clarifies his idea of intuition all for the better.

I can only find two pieces of evidence where Santayana says explicitly that attention is intent-ful, i.e. attention which moves from the given to the not-given. The first piece of evidence is straight forward. Santayana says: ". . . attention is no impartial exercise of spirit but a manifestation of interest, intent, preference, and preoccupation."[25] The second piece of evidence is not as straight forward as the first, because it is found in the context of animal faith where the not-given means existence. Santayana uses 'not-given' equivocally, sometimes in a broad sense, i.e. not present to intuition; sometimes in a narrow sense, i.e. existence. In the broad sense, it is possible for both essences and existences to be not-given. In the narrow sense, essences are excluded from the not-given. The aim of the passage I am about to cite is to show that spirit is "born, bred, and propagated in distress."[26] However, as far as I am concerned, if attention can be intent-ful in terms of animal faith (a move from essence to existence), I do not see any reason, on Santayana's account, why attention could not be intent-ful in the realm of essence, alone. As a matter of fact, as I pointed out in the section on dialectic, Santayana admits intent there, where there are no questions of existence. Anyway, this is what Santayana says: "That attention should be turned towards the not-given [existence] may seem a contradiction in terms, and would be such if attention were always pure intuition ["pure" here means not concerned with existential matters],

since then the datum would be the whole object and this object a pure essence. But in fact attention is always attracted, in the first instance, to the not-yet-given, because the psyche is struggling with a disturbance or uneasiness of which she has yet no idea."[27]

This analysis of intuition, as I have presented it,--interest--attention--distinction--, assumes no ideas of existence as far as the objects of attention are concerned. Under this analysis, it is perfectly plausible to say that I am a solipsist, a dreamlike ghost with no enduring self in a dreamlike world created by me at the moment. The solipsist, as Santayana says, has the "feeling that something is happening."[28] To say that there is a belief in the objects of attention (essences) would be to go beyond intuition. Santayana says that intuition of essence offers merely a "perspective." The principle of essence is only identity; identity being another term for distinction or noticing; identity being the result of attention. ". . . identity implies two moments, two instances, two intuitions between which it obtains."[29] This idea of the principle of essence leads us even further than the three characteristics of intuition I have already mentioned; it implies that the identity of essence itself is intent-ful in so far as it is interpretative, that is, cognitive. In order to identify an essence concepts such as sameness and difference need to be employed. To identify an essence means to establish clarity. To establish clarity means to go beyond so-called uninterpreted intuitions. As James would say: "Clearness, so far as attention produces it, means distinction from other things and internal analysis or subdivision. These are essentially products of intellectual discrimination, involving comparison, memory, perception of various relations."[30]

I should like to add that my analysis also does not assume that the intuiting mind uses a language. If I use a language then surely there is intent; if I name an essence to which I attend, I do so within the context of language--a symbolically intent-ful system of communication. But as I have shown language is not necessary in order to see that intuition is intent-ful. Intuition without a language used is not a mere searchlight act.

When Santayana says that we have an intuition of essence, it is not like a Lockian simple idea of sense, a Humian impression, or an acquaintance with Russellian hard data. I believe Santayana was strongly influenced by Jamesian psychology, in so far as Santayana's idea of intuition is concerned. This might be the subject in itself for a dissertation. It seems true to say that Santayana "expounded James' psychology as an analysis of experience"[31] both in Reason in Common Sense and in the Realms of Being. Santayana, like James, saw unresolved problems which British Empiricism had created. In particular, it had created an atomistic view of experience where experience could only be held together by artificial laws of association dropped by means of deus ex machina into the mess of sensation. Part of the problem behind the atomistic view of experience, as both James and Santayana conceived it, was the British Empiricist idea that "every perception perceived itself,"[32] i.e. there was no natural ground for perception. Of Hume Santayana says "he invoked an alleged habit of perception always to follow one another in the same order--something flatly contrary to fact. . . . Intuitions follow the same routine; but the conditions for an intuition are not the previous intuition, but the whole present state of the psyche and the

environment. . . . All these haltings and incoherences [in Hume's thought] arose in the attempt to conceive experience divorced from its physical ground and from its natural objects, as a dream going on in vacuo."[33]

The Principles of Psychology, which by the way, Santayana reviewed and praised, is simply full of criticisms of British Empiricism along many lines. As far as atomism is concerned, one of James' most famous ideas--the stream of consciousness--is a direct attack of the atomistic views of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. In the beginning of the chapter, "The Stream of Thought," James says: "No one ever had a simple sensation by itself. Consciousness, from our natal day, is of a teeming multiplicity of objects and relations, and what we call simple sensations are results of discriminative attention, pushed often a very high degree."[34] "Discriminative attention" is what Santayana calls intuition. As a matter of fact, Santayana's idea of intuition in so far as it is constituted of interest, attention, distinction--that it implies a background and a continuity of experience--all these are ideas which can be plucked directly out of the Principles. Especially the idea of attention, Santayana must have drawn from James. From Santayana's criticisms of Hume, we can see that it was important for Santayana to conceive an idea of intuition (a psychological idea) which had a ground in the natural world; what could be more natural than interests rooted in the psyche. James, criticizing Herbert Spencer, who had a Lockian view of experience, says that experience is not just impressed upon us, sometimes hard and other times softly. James says, and Santayana's idea of psyche confirms it, "My experience is what I agree to attend to . . .--without selective interest, experience is utter chaos."[35] Santayana says: "If you cut your animal traces you run mad."[36]

Before James, the idea of attention was virtually neglected; Sir William Hamilton discussed it in some detail and one year before the Principles was published, a French psychologist, T. H. Ribot, wrote a book on attention. There is no evidence that I can find which shows that Santayana read either Hamilton or Ribot. However, it is a well-known fact that Santayana read the Principles. Let us note some of the things Santayana says about this work. ". . . it seems to me, his best achievement is his Principles of Psychology."[37] "In its ostensible outlook it is a treatise like any other, but what distinguishes it is the author's gift for evoking vividly the very life of the mind. This is a work of imagination; and the subject as he conceived it, which is the flux of immediate experience in men in general, requires imagination to read it at all. It is a literary subject . . . and can be treated only poetically; and in this sense Shakespeare is a better psychologist than Locke or Kant."[38] What Santayana likes about James' psychology is that experience is conceived to be "something dreamful, passionate, dramatic, and significative."[39] In "A General Confession" Santayana talks about days when James read chapters of the manuscript of the Principles of Psychology in class at Harvard, how he was chiefly influenced by James' "sense for the immediate."[40] Santayana says: "I pride myself on remaining a disciple of his [James'] earlier unsophisticated self, when he was an agnostic about the universe, but in his diagnosis of the heart, an impulsive poet: a master in the art of recording or divining the lyric quality of experience as it actually came to him or to me."[41] I think here it can be plainly seen that Santayana owed a great deal to James in regard to his idea of intuition. And I think his debt becomes even clearer when Santayana criticizes James for abandoning his earlier romantic idea of experience. Santayana's

criticisms of Hume are strong but cool. When Santayana criticizes James, the critical barbs are sharp and they are also hot. Of James' radical empiricism Santayana says: "The word experience is like a shrapnel shell, and bursts into a thousand meanings. Here we must no longer think of its setting, its discoveries, or its march; to treat it radically we must abstract its immediate objects and reduce it to pure data. It is obvious . . . that experience so understood would lose its romantic signification, as a personal adventure or a response to the shocks of fortune. 'Experience' would turn into a cosmic dance of absolute entities created and destroyed in vacuo."[42]

For both the early James and Santayana, attention is a crucial concept for any broader idea of experience. First, because it provides a natural ground of experience. Second, because it helps to explain the continuity of experience. Third, there are no outrageous metaphysical presuppositions (experience is comprised of elements) to complicate and distort matters. James parodies the British Empiricists in a marvelous passage that is simply too good to pass by. The gist of the passage is that without animal interest as it surfaces in attention there is no consistent or coherent idea of experience.[43] James says:

> If such an account were true, a race of dogs bred for generations, say in the Vatican, with characters of visual shape, sculptored in marble, presented to their eyes, in every variety of form and combination, ought to discriminate before long the finest shades of these peculiar characters. In a word, they ought to become, if time were given, accomplished connoisseurs of sculpture. Anyone may judge of the probability of this consummation. Surely an eternity of experience of the statues would leave the dog as inartistic as he was at first, for the lack of an original interest to knit his discriminations on to. Meanwhile the odors at the bases of the pedestals would have organized themselves in the consciousness of this breed of dogs into a system of 'correspondences' to which the most hereditary caste of custodi would never approximate, merely because to them, as human beings, the dog's interest in those smells would for ever be an inscrutable mystery. These writers have, then, utterly ignored the glaring fact that subjective interest may, by laying its weighty index-finger on particular

> items of experience, so accent them as to give to the least frequent associations far more power to shape our thought than the most frequent ones possess. The interest itself, though its genesis is doubtless perfectly natural, makes experience more than it is made by it.[44]

Let us go one step further from a slightly different angle. The fact that in intuition I distinguish an essence out of a context leads me to believe that Santayana is saying something closely analogous to what Wittgenstein said (Wittgenstein, too, was familiar with James' psychology) about "seeing as" or "noticing an aspect." I intimated this idea in an earlier section.[45] Take the illustration from the Philosophical Investigations. "  here a glass cube, there an inverted open box, there a wire frame of that shape, there three boards forming a solid angle . . . . So we interpret it, and see it as we interpret it."[46] One could say that Wittgenstein discussed 'seeing as' in order to illustrate how perception (which is intuitive) always implies thought (intent), or at least that the act of seeing is by no means uncomplicated. Seeing is an activity in the full sense of the word. It is not passive. If seeing were merely passive, there would be no issue where two people see the same thing, yet one does not notice something that the other one does. Wittgenstein's example of Jastrow's duck-rabbit is a good one, Here, there is a picture that can appear as a duck or a rabbit. Yet it is one picture, one essence. I see a duck. You see a rabbit. The disagreement cannot be explained or resolved by passive perception or uninterpreted intuition, alone.

Let me sum up this discussion taking again the most radical, and psychologically barest, point of view, the solipsism of the present moment. From this point of view, as we have seen, there is feeling, perspective, distinction, interpretation, naming, attention, seeing as--in short, all

terms of intent. If pure intuition be intuition minus the above terms, then pure intuition simply and unequivocally cannot occur. One could not even give an example of what a pure intuition might be. The best one could say is that the world of pure intuition would be a buzzing and blooming one--unmatched confusion. Is it reasonable, then, to assume that the spiritual life, possibly the most important of all the topics Santayana discussed, is based upon sheer idiocy? I think not. If there be pure intuitions, they must mean something else.

In both the early and the late works of Santayana, as I have tried to argue, intent is the link between spirit and human interests. In a strict sense of the word, when Santayana speaks of the realm of spirit, he is speaking of <u>human</u> spirit, a spirit with human interests. There is no pure spirit, just as there is no pure intuition, if by 'pure' one means uninterpreted or uninterested. As I mentioned earlier in this discussion, even the spirit of God must be an interested spirit, one interested in Godly objects. As we shall later see, Santayana follows up this idea when he talks of Jesus Christ being the son of God and the son of Man, that is, having interest in heaven and earth.

6. FURTHER CRITICISMS OF THE IDEA OF INTENT-LESS INTUITION WITH AN EMPHASIS ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS ON MYSTICISM

In my analysis of Santayana, I have attempted to work out the consequences of his idea of the intuition of essence. Contrary to Singer, I have argued that Santayana's position leads him to the idea that all acts of consciousness are acts of interpretation in so far as they are acts of intent and attention. To this extent consciousness always acts with interest. With a view such as Singer's, one might believe that on one level, consciousness operates without interpretation being merely aware, and then on another level interpretation clicks in the mind and we have belief. This is a rather contrived view of the human mind. The human mind is not constituted by sets of distinct operations. It has various functions which often operate simultaneously and are constantly criss-crossing one another.

As I stated earlier, Singer brings Santayana to the brink of mysticism. Singer does so by arguing that acts of consciousness, as Santayana presents them, are uninterpreted; this is the reason why Santayana's scepticism supposedly does not fulfill its aim. Let us now work out the consequences of Singer's ideas, first with the aim of seeing that they do not fit Santayana's position and second with the aim of further clarifying Santayana's ideas of intuition.

At this stage, one might think that I am beginning to take a perverse pleasure in bludgeoning Singer's view. This is not true. Singer, as I see him, is a model of all those who have misinterpreted Santayana's idea of intuition. By looking at the consequences of Singer's arguments,

I hope that my results will check not only Singer's position and its kind, but also check those who have explicitly asserted Santayana to be mystical.

In what follows, I do not expect to give a full analysis of what mysticism means. There is a question as to whether or not such a broad term could ever be adequately defined. Some scholars on the subject think it can be defined; others do not. What I want to do is merely look at a prominent feature of mysticism in order to show that Santayana was no mystic, at least, in this particular sense. The sense of which I am thinking is the mystics' experience of Unity. The experience of Unity, as we shall see, is based upon a faulty conception of mind. As it happens, this faulty conception is precisely the one Singer attributes to Santayana. The mystical consciousness is a clarity of mind which is supposedly attained when all interpretation has been obliterated. The result of mystical consciousness is the destruction of all distinctions in the mind. If mystical consciousness is the end of Santayana's scepticism, dialectic, contemplation, or spiritual discipline, then, indeed, Santayana has quite a naive view of psychology. This is not true. Certainly, as we have seen, Santayana's psychology hardly seems to be based on specious ground. When one thinks of those who might have influenced Santayana's concept of mind, one thinks of Aristotle, Lucretius, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, James. But maybe in the later years of life Santayana's own "metaphysical ambitions," against which he so insistently warned in Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, got the best of him.

Of all the well-known authorities on mysticism I have examined, not one neglects discussion of the mystics' experience of Unity. In a psychological sense, if unity is not an absolute common quality of all mystical experience, it is certainly common enough for many to put in

the forefront of any discussion on mysticism; this is the case whether the discussion be historical and descriptive or philosophical and critical. On the question of the importance of Unity, all the scholars seem to concur. Also, the place of Unity in mystical experience apparently transcends cultural lines, so that the idea is found in both the East and West, and it transcends temporal lines so that one finds evidence of it as far back as the Upanishads and as recently as in conversations with experimenters of psychodelic drugs.

There are several classics written on the subject of mysticism, and I have chosen three of them in order to illustrate the idea of Unity. These classics, Christian Mysticism, by R. Inge; Mysticism, by E. Underhill; Mysticism: East and West, by R. Otto, I consider to have mainly historical and descriptive import. Otto may be an exception here; however, for my limited purposes I find it convenient to treat him just as an historian.

According to Inge, mysticism is expressed in a variety of forms. Mysticism may be practical or devotional, it may be rendered symbolic as in poetry, it may have as its subject matter the natural world. He says mystical experience of all kinds proceeds in stages; and these stages are reached not by reason but by love. "This scala perfectionis is generally divided into three stages. The first is called the purgative life, the second the illuminative, while the third, which is really the goal rather than a part of the journey, is called the unitive life, or state of perfect contemplation."[1] Inge says: "The Unity of all existence is a fundamental doctrine of Mysticism,"[2] that mysticism always aims at unity, an ideal where "man beholds God face to face . . . the attainment of which would be at once its consummation and annihilation."[3] Since Inge's interests are in Christian mysticism, he writes

about mysticism in so far as it is an aspect of religion. His concept of unity itself seems to be an elaboration of St. Paul's famous passage: "For now we see through a glass darkly; but then face to face; now I know in part; then shall I know as also I am known."[4]

Although it is not essential to my argument, it should be mentioned that mysticism and religion do not necessarily go hand in hand. There are many cases of mystics who were not believers in any traditional religion, and certainly, as it is clear in Buddhism, mysticism requires no transcendent diety. The unity of mystical experience, then, is not necessarily based on any religious doctrine, nor is it based on a metaphysical or ethical theory (theory implies reason and mystical experience is considered to be beyond reason). Mystical experience, and Inge recognizes this, is based on a view of consciousness. "Ecstasy or vision begins when thought ceases, to our consciousness, to proceed from ourselves."[5]

Inge is very sympathetic to mysticism, so part of his argument is that although mysticism may be beyond reason, it does not exclude reason from its doctrines. I do not follow Inge, here. On the one hand he says that supernaturalism is destructive to mysticism because supernaturalism taints mysticism with notions that are "above reason," while on the other hand, he recognizes that mysticism leads to irreconcilable paradoxes, such as "we can only achieve inner unity by transcending mere individuality."[6] I shall look at these problems when I discuss mysticism critically, in light of Santayana's ideas.

Underhill sees the psychological basis of mysticism in the possibility of a "higher consciousness." Emotion, will, or intellect, alone, cannot attain this higher consciousness; however, some kind of unusual integration of these faculties, which is reached through spiritual

discipline, enables the mystic to go beyond and above these faculties. The spiritual quest is a "way out" or "way back" to a state of Absolute Truth. Part of the way out is conceived as the freeing of the conscious self from the imprisonment of percepts and their concepts, in Underhill's words, a freeing from the "symbolic world." Contemplative states, according to Underhill, allow the soul to "stretch sensitive fingers beyond that limiting envelope in which her normal consciousness is contained . . . to find and feel the Infinite above all reason and above all knowledge."[7] The mystic seeks a consciousness in which "the pull of the phenomenal world is diminished."[8] In this way does the soul reach the wellsprings of the mind and Absolute Truth. Quoting from Germanica Theologica, Underhill writes: "if the soul shall see with the right eye into eternity, then the left eye must close itself and refrain from working, and be as though it were dead. For if the left eye be fulfilling its office toward outward things . . . then must the right eye be hindered in its working."[9] Mystical contemplation puts to sleep the "Normal Self" in order to awaken the "Transcendental Self." The normal self is the individual. The transcendental self is non-individual, it is not anyone's particular consciousness.

Contrary to mysticism, says Underhill, there is philosophy and science; and philosophy and science approach the nature of reality in three basic ways: naturalistically, idealistically, and sceptically. What all these ways have in common is that they are unable to attain absolute truth. Underhill hardly notes the positive achievements of philosophy and science. She notes that they show us the weakness of reason and the disappointments of attempting to understand without love. The assumption all these approaches make is that knowledge is conditioned by the limits of our own

personality. "On this basis, not the ends of the earth, but the external termini of our own sensory nerves are the termini of our explorations; and to 'know oneself' is really to know one's universe."[10] Underhill views naturalism as the "comfortable creed of 'common sense'" based on conventional standards. As for idealism, "whilst the naturalist's world is constructed from an observation of the evidence offered by the senses, the Idealist's world is constructed from an observation of the processes of thought."[11] Finally, the philosophical sceptic refuses to admit either the realistic or the idealistic views. ". . . confronted with the riddle of reality [he replies], there is no riddle."[12] "The intellectual quest of Reality, then, leads us down one of three blind alleys: (1) To an acceptance of the symbolic world of appearance as the real; (2) to the elaboration of a theory--also of necessity symbolic--which, beautiful in itself, cannot help us to attain the Absolute, which it describes; (3) to a hopeless but strictly logical scepticism."[13]

As we saw with Inge, the end of the mystic's way, according to Underhill, is unity, or what she calls the "Unitive state." The mystic "is in no way concerned with adding to, exploring, rearranging, or improving anything in the visible universe. The mystic brushes aside that universe."[14] In that universe is included the individual personality. The mystic's "heart is always set upon the One."[15] This state of consciousness "moves securely upon levels unrelated to our speech,"[16] and it moves by an all-consuming love of the Real, the One, God. The Unitive state is a turning away from the multiplicity of the empirical world. In this state the normal self disappears; "in this state, in which consciousness of I-hood and consciousness of the world disappear, the mystic is conscious of being in immediate relation with God himself."[17] Again, it should be noted, as

with Inge, we end in paradox; when all consciousness, as we know it, disappears, we are then conscious of God or the One or what have you.

Rudolf Otto's Mysticism: East and West is a comparative study of two mystics: the Indian, Sankara, and the German, Meister Eckhart. In the history of mysticism, these two men are considered to be in a class of the most intellectual mystics. The idea of Unity plays the same role with them as it does with other less intellectually inclined mystics. The difference, however, between, let us say, a Sankara and a St. Teresa of Avila is the means by which unity is reached. In the case of St. Teresa, love is the guide to Unity. In the case of Sankara a rigorous logic is the guide. However, even with Sankara, "dialectic" can go only so far. "By means of an arresting question, which brings the pupil up short, where hitherto he has been able to answer readily, he is led to the point where intuition suddenly springs into being almost explosively within him. Now he himself has intuition, the perception of non-differentiation, the intuition of Unity."[18] The leap to Unity, here, is not a leap of love; it is one based upon a mystical intuition, and although helpful, dialectic is not necessary. "'Intuitus Mysticus' lies at the basis of the teaching both of Eckhart and Sankara, and is the real source of their strange assertions and their deep pathos. The intuition is not the result of dialectic but a first-hand and immediate fact and possession of the mystical mind . . . [yet] they try to prove that consciousness apprehends only Being and not any form of Being."[19] Being for both Sankara and Eckhart is without content and without form. In what Otto calls the "Inward Way" to Unity, the introspective approach, he says: "This intuition would flourish were there no world given."[20] That is, if there were no multiplicity.

Apart from and in some cases antagonistic to the Inward Way, there is, according to Otto, "the way of Unity." What the relation between these two ways might be is ulterior to my purposes. All I am interested in is a description of the intuition of Unity. In the case of the Inward Way, be it antagonistic to the Way of Unity or not, unity is of utmost importance. The Way of Unity has as its purpose, the unity of reality; it is outer directed. The Inward Way is primarily a doctrine of the soul. In fact, however, Sankara in his doctrine of Advaita Vedanta blends the two ways by identifying the Soul and Reality. At least, by Sankara's example, we can see that the two ways are not mutually exclusive. Eastern thinkers have had no qualms about identifying the two ways because for them the identification never meant contradicting any sacred texts or committing any heresy. In the West, God as "reality" has had to be conceived of as distinct from the soul because of theological dogma. Eckhart, for example, is careful in his talk of Unity, in the sense that there is always a "spot" or trace of the individual soul even in unified experience. However, he was not careful enough, since he was indicted on charges of heresy.

The Way of Unity is based on intuition, too. It is outer directed and yet not directed to the empirical world. Otto says the way proceeds in three stages. "First, things and events in so far as they are conceived by this 'intuitive' vision are no longer multiple, separate, divided, but are in an inexpressible way an All."[21] Second, "'The One' is no longer a predicate of the many but becomes an equation of the One and the many: Many is one and One is many."[22] Third, "what first began as a mere form of the many appears now as the <u>real</u> above the many."[23] The end of contemplation, according to the Way of Unity (like the Inward Way), is a vision in which there are no distinctions. "This identity of all things is here first and

foremost the object of contemplation."[24] In order for this vision to be possible, intuition itself must transcend space and time. Space and time imply multiplicity, the empirical world, the world of appearance. Space and time are menaces to the mystical experience. It is space and "time, which [are] what keep the light from reaching us."[25]

Let me summarize the important characteristics of Unity as far as my aims are concerned. (1) 'Unity' in mystical thought is paradoxical, whether it be from the standpoint of the "Inward Way" (introvertive) or the "Way of Unity" (extrovertive). (2) Unity is perceived by a mystical intuition which is higher than normal consciousness. What "higher" seems to mean, besides its normative and emotive connotations, is that it is devoid of the interpretations of the percepts and concepts of ordinary experience; it is "pure" intuition. (3) It follows from (2) that Unity is completely undifferentiated. The reality grasped in a mystical state is different in kind from the empirical world, and that acts of consciousness, too, are different in kind from the ordinary acts of consciousness which perceive and understand the empirical world. By all accounts, Unity is an absolutely fundamental aspect of mystical experience. In light of these three points about Unity, let us see how these points compare and contrast to Santayana's idea of the intuition of essence. Also, let us keep in mind Singer's remarks about how uninterpreted acts of consciousness lead to the annihilation consciousness, in order to see the close relation between these acts and the mystic's way to and state of unity.

The issue of paradox in mysticism is not directly related to any of Santayana's thought. However, what the issue of paradox offers is a striking contrast to Santayana. The end of mystical discipline is the vision of Unity, and from the concept of Unity, we arrive at paradoxes of

one sort or another. The end of Santayana's various approaches to essence is simply the discernment of an essence or essences, that is, a form or forms of appearance. An intuition of an essence brings no truth or falsity in itself. An act of intuition merely distinguishes one essence from another. Paradox, by definition, on the contrary, entails questions of truth and falsity. Nowhere have I read nor in any way can I find either the idea of Unity in Santayana's thought or the inevitable paradoxes Unity drags in its wake. Even Santayana's concept of union, which I shall discuss later, does not come near the mystics' idea of Unity.

As I have shown, the classic studies of mysticism recognize the existence of paradox in mystical thought, and in particular the paradoxes resulting from Unity. Other recent scholars on the subject also recognize paradoxes in mystical thought. Some, both old and new, have tried to explain away these paradoxes, either by logical means or by showing that the paradoxes have metaphorical and not descriptive use. I do not know which is the true course to take, the logical or the literary interpretation of the paradoxes. The best description of the paradoxes, however, I have found in W. T. Stace's work. Also, he offers an alternative approach to the paradoxes and says simply that the mystics intended the paradoxes to be so, i.e. not to be resolved and not to be interpreted metaphorically.

There are several paradoxes which I could cite as examples, but since I am interested in Unity and its relation to Santayana's intuition of essence, I will mention only the one concerned with consciousness. The paradox is a result of what Stace calls the introvertive experience. Stace claims that the introvertive experience of the mystic is a common trait of all mystical experience. With this controversial issue, I am not concerned. The existence of the paradox itself, however, in <u>many</u> mystical

experiences is not controversial. Stace says of the Unitary consciousness that it is "from which all the multiplicity of sensuous or conceptual or other empirical content has been excluded, so that there remains only a void and empty unity. This is the one basic, essential, nuclear characteristic, from which most of the others (the other aspects of mysticism, e.g. the feeling of joy, ineffability, paradoxicality) inevitably follow."[26] This last sentence presents a questionable idea, but I include it in order to show the power the idea of Unity supposedly possesses, that is, that Unity has the power to generate the entire gamut of mystical experience.

The introvertive mystical experience of Unity ends with the dissolution of individuality. There is no multiplicity, no distinction, no subject and object. ". . . minds are distinguished from one another by their empirical contents and by nothing else. It follows that if A and B have suppressed within themselves all empirical contents, then there is left nothing whatever which can distinguish them and make them two; and if A and B have thereby reached the mystical consciousness of their pure egos, then there is nothing to distinguish them or make them two pure egos."[27] For the moment, let us not consider the question of whether or not we can suppress all empirical content in consciousness. What is important to see now is that to arrive at Unity, one must get rid of the basis of individuality, i.e. the empirical contents of the mind--so that "the 'I' ceases to be 'I' and yet continues to be 'I.'"[28] The ceasing and continuing of the I is a paradox. The paradox was suggested by the phrase "empty unity," but now we see explicitly that the pure Self both has and does not have qualities. Later on, Stace says that this is an "expression of a pure uninterpreted experience."[29]

A pure uninterpreted experience is distinctionless in the sense that it is entirely passive; yet, according to some mystics, being entirely passive, it is entirely active. The uninterpreted pure experience destroys the individual consciousness and at the same time reveals a universal consciousness.

The Unity which results in paradox here is a unity of nothing at all. To show the meaninglessness of such an idea all we need do is go back to Plato's Parmenides and start working through the history of the metaphysical debates concerning the One and the Many. That might be an interesting approach, but, for my purposes, the problem here lies in the idea of mystical intuition, the idea which assumes there are actual uninterpreted acts of consciousness. If we assume there are actual uninterpreted acts of consciousness, we are not merely led to the annihilation of consciousness; we are led to a consciousness of a different kind, one in which "Normal Consciousness" is put to sleep.

A consciousness whose acts are altered in the sense that there is no interpretation or less interpretation or even more interpretation at work in it does not merely constitute a difference in degree of consciousness, even though the words 'more' or 'less' suggest it. Such an alteration constitutes a difference in kind. There are many possibilities. Take, for example, an infant. An infant's consciousness is potentially a normal human consciousness, but since it is undeveloped and unable to perform certain interpretative acts which are considered human, e.g. speak and understand a language, he does not actually possess a normal human consciousness. The stages of an infant's development are stages through which he will undergo qualitative changes. Modern psychologists such as Jean Piaget and Eric Erikson support this notion of development, the

former in terms of cognition, the latter in terms of personality. The idea that infants are merely different in degree, that is, that they are homoncules, is an idea long out of reput. Maybe the case of the infant is not entirely clear. Let us take another example; a dog, a lion, just any beast will do. In the case of the beast one could say that his consciousness has a less interpretative character than ours; hence in some ways his consciousness is more vague than ours. His past is less defined; his conception of the future extends hardly beyond the present. Unlike the infant, he has no potential to become human. Beasts live in a different world from ours. And no matter whether or not their consciousness might become, through evolution, more interpretative than it is, or even more interpretative than ours, they would never live in a human world. What constitutes the qualitative differences between a man's and a beast's consciousness are many, I am sure. But the interpretation of experience must play a crucial role. In the example of language, alone, I believe, we can see how my interpretations of experience are not merely different in degree from a dog's, my interpretations constitute a part of a peculiar world, a human world.

If one is so inclined, one might say that besides infants', beasts', and others' consciousnesses, there is a mystical consciousness, a consciousness in which there are actual uninterpreted acts, a consciousness which would be a paradoxical non-conscious consciousness. For those who are so inclined, I am sure they would call this mystical consciousness "higher" in order to distinguish it from the infant's "lower" consciousness. Putting aside these evaluative issues and the issue of paradox, I merely want it to be understood that this consciousness of the mystic, if it exists, is qualitatively different from normal human

consciousness. From the mystics themselves, I would hear no dispute on this score. However, I am not concerned with them for the moment. I am concerned with Singer. Singer says of Santayana's scepticism that "we should have reached bottom, since all interpretation would really have been excluded from consciousness."[30] Be this state mystical or infantile, I hardly care. But it must be recognized that this state of consciousness, according to Singer, the one that intuits essence, is necessarily qualitatively different from normal human consciousness. Can it be seriously maintained that Santayana was seeking a state of consciousness, through his scepticism or any other approach, which was qualitatively different from human consciousness? I do not think so. Maybe someone sympathetic to Singer's view might at this point say that the solipsist's consciousness is qualitatively different from normal consciousness. Well, in what way? The only possible way is that the solipsist makes no claims about the existence of anything, including himself. If that is a qualitative difference, then the solipsist's consciousness is different but only in that sense, not in the sense that he lacks interpretation. The solipsist, as Santayana defines him, is "an incredulous spectator of his own romance, thinks his own adventures fictions, and accepts a solipsism of the present moment."[31] Where Santayana defines solipsism (or anywhere else to my knowledge) there is no mention of anything that resembles interpretation. Of course, the solipsist makes no interpretations of the external world, but as I showed earlier, the idea of interpretation is not limited to application to the external world.[32]

Furthermore, the phrase "uninterpreted acts" on the one hand seems like an outright contradiction in terms; that is, 'uninterpreted,' Singer says, means passive, so that here we have passive-acts; on the other hand

we do not have an outright contradiction; yet we do have a problem, that is, uninterpreted acts may be in one sense passive and in another sense active. The questions then are, how are they passive? and how are they active? The first question cannot be answered by "They are passive in the sense they are uninterpreted," because that merely begs the question. The second question does not seem answerable. One wonders whether or not Singer could give an example of an uninterpreted act of consciousness. The mystic admits he cannot; his uninterpreted acts of consciousness are ineffable. If Singer accuses Santayana of holding such a view, it is certainly reasonable to see an example.

These ridiculous conundrums are the result of talking about actual uninterpreted acts of consciousness. This applies to mystics in the sense that I have presented them, and to Singer who says Santayana adheres to the position that actual uninterpreted acts of consciousness play a role in his scepticism. As we have seen, to say that a consciousness can be comprised of actual uninterpreted acts of consciousness results in a view that qualitatively alters the state of ordinary consciousnes. However, I wonder whether or not a view of actual uninterpreted acts of consciousness might not lead us beyond a view of consciousness as a function alone to a view of consciousness as having a substance. If Singer strictly takes the position of actual uninterpreted acts of consciousness in regard to Santayana, and I believe he does, then Singer might be led to the conclusion that the end of Santayana's scepticism does not just result in a blur; it also results in the assertion that on Santayana's account there is a substance to consciousness, a non-conscious consciousness or Pure Self of the mystic. That is, it seems to follow from Singer's view that if Santayana's scepticism is an exercise which wipes out interpretation entirely, this is the

same as saying that, on Santayana's account, scepticism wipes out all function and content from consciousness. I believe it is generally recognized by psychologists and biologists that even the simplest functions of consciousness are interpretative, such as attention and perception, so that 'interpretation' and 'function' in terms of consciousness are virtually the same. Also notice that if consciousness does not function, it makes no sense to say it has content. Even though the solipsist might argue with psychologists and biologists about the ground of function he certainly would not argue about the very activity of functioning alone. The solipsist simply does not want to admit that the ground of consciousness or anything exists. If one takes out all function and content and still says there is consciousness, that is, that consciousness has not been annihilated, then we are left with only one alternative, that is, consciousness is a substance of some sort--maybe the mystic's pure consciousness. If one says, however, that there is still functioning at the level of uninterpreted acts of consciousness, then it is incumbent upon him to show how.

Santayana, of course, vehemently denied that consciousness was a substance. He was also quite familiar with the problems of dualism; hence, he took care to place consciousness in the status of function. I know of no Santayana scholar who has argued that Santayana claimed that consciousness is a substance, even though those who say Santayana is a mystic move in that direction. To claim, explicitly or implicitly, that Santayana holds such a view of consciousness is stretching the imagination beyond warranted limits. The logical outcome of implying or stating that someone is a mystic is to assert that he holds consciousness to have more than a function; if one is not a mystic in this sense, then on

all expert accounts, he is not a mystic in any essential or full-fledged sense.

Now, it may be wondered: is it not one thing to say that actual uninterpreted acts of consciousness result in a blurry infant's view of the world, and quite another thing to say these acts result in a mystical consciousness? I have argued that these conscious states are qualitatively different from normal human consciousness, but some might say that that does not mean that the infant's and the mystic's consciousness are at all the same, or that the former would imply the latter. It is true that the infant's and the mystic's consciousnesses are not exactly the same, and it is true that one does not necessarily imply the other. However, they are close enough that mystics themselves often employ metaphors which suggest child-likeness of the mystical experience. Also, a recent scholar of mysticism, Ben-Ami Scharfstein, believes that the similarities are close enough to warrant a chapter in his book on mysticism. (Freud remarks the same idea on mysticism.)[33] What Scharfstein says about infants and mystics is quite close to what Singer says about infants and the end of Santayana's scepticism. Scharfstein says that adults are different from infants to the extent that adults establish relatively clear boundaries between themselves and the world and one another. (A Freudian view, as a matter of fact.) The infant or the mystic sees no such boundaries. "Everyday mysticism expresses the power of each human self . . . to abolish the otherness of other persons and things. This stripping off of differences is almost the power to return to the indifferentiation of early infancy."[34] The blur of infancy is based upon the fact that the infant does not have the ability to distinguish one thing from another. The mystic tries to recapture that ability he, like everyone

else, once had. Scharfstein attempts to describe what the infant's consciousness might be like, in order to gain some possible insight into mystical consciousness. He says: "At first the world is a succession of different sensations and feeling states. What varies is the quality and distribution and intensity of sensations. Except for the difference in the nature of the sensations involved, hunger, which we say originates from within, and a sharp sound or cold breeze which we cannot imagine except as something that reaches us from the outside, are indistinguishable. There is no awareness of such things as approach, withdrawal, or direction of any sort."[35] I do not think that Singer would have any quarrels with Scharfstein's description of infancy, "a kaleidoscopic chaos."[36] Again, however, I ask: does this appear to be the outcome of any of Santayana's approaches to essence?

The sceptic ends with the solipsism of the present moment, which I have argued in a moment of interest. One of the reasons why it is a moment of interest (even though the eyes of the solipsist look to the realm of essence) is that it is a moment of awareness. What characterizes intuition is acute awareness. And what characterizes awareness is attention without which there is no awareness. Intuition, awareness, attention are terms which Santayana employs always with the intent that they go hand in hand. Also, it will be remembered that "attention" makes no sense if it does not entail interest. The solipsist's intuition of essence, it could be said, embodies a concentration of interest, not the absence of it. To say, then, that Santayana's scepticism in any way resembles the mystic or the infant, in so far as their consciousness is an undifferentiated One or a blur, is an untenable position. The solipsist's world might be a lonely one, but it is not unclear.

Also, the solipsist's world is not beyond space and time. The solipsist's intuitions are composed of moments, albeit fictions. The solipsist, unlike the mystic, is perfectly willing to be satisfied with dreams. He says of the mystics: "Let them hug Icarian madness to their bosoms, as being the acme of bliss and joy."[37] For the solipsist, dreams are just fine, as long as they do not deceive him. The solipsist's intuitions sense a temporal order, and beyond solipsism Santayana says that intuitions are events in the natural temporal order. In the mystic, intuition itself is eternal and infinite. For Santayana, intuition is "the seeing," "the exercise of sight."[38] Or, "intuition is a fact and an event, as the essence cannot be; so that even if spirit meant nothing but pure consciousness or the activity of a transcendental ego, it would need to be posited, in view of the continuity of discourse and could not be an element in the given essence."[39]

As Santayana presents it, the basis of the solipsist's world is the very opposite of the mystic's or the infant's world; that is, the basis of it is distinction, the celebration of multiplicity. As I have said, Santayana's basis for distinction lies in attention, a species of intent. The mystic consciously attempts, through discipline, to do away with attention and so abolish the world of multiplicity. In the mystic, pure intuition is defined as inattention. Underhill says that "the fixity of attention [is] necessary to any intellectual process."[40] On the contrary, she describes the mystical process in this way: ". . . by a deliberate inattention to the messages of the senses, such as that which is induced by contemplation, the mystic can bring the ground of the soul, the seat of 'Transcendental Feeling,' within the area of consciousness."[41] In terms of inattention, Stace explicitly corroborates Underhill's view.[42]

Implicitly, any scholar who describes the mystic as attempting to do away with the contents of consciousness is actually talking about the mystic's ability not to attend to ordinary experience. In the case of the mystic, he wants to stop thought in order to transcend the empirical limits of this world. What he sacrifices is its multiplicity and his reason and his individuality. In the case of the infant, thought has simply not begun. In the infant, there is no awareness because he has developed no attention span as yet.

III.

THE SPIRITUAL LIFE

1. INTUITION: PURE AND IMPURE

In its broadest sense, the Life of Reason attempts to describe the phases of human progress through common sense, art, society, religion, and science. 'Human' means the interests that are peculiar to the species, man. 'Progress' means the rational guidance of interests and the ultimate formulation of ideals. In the Realms of Being, it has appeared to some scholars that Santayana had forsaken the idea of human progress in order to replace it with an ontology based on eternal forms and an epistemology based on passive intuitions. This view of Santayana, as we have seen, has led many to believe that the themes of the Realms of Being imply an utter detachment from human progress and human interests.

In the previous section, I argued at length that in Santayana's own terms, the intuition of essence (as a psychological concept) did not allow him any break from his idea of human interests. The spirit must be interested. In view of this, I do not think that the Realms of Being is primarily a treatise on ontology and epistemology. Contrary to what some believe, Santayana, after many years of being concerned with moral issues, did not suddenly turn to theoretical concerns, alone, theoretical concerns which supposedly sought to undermine all values by utter detachment from human interest. One can safely say that theorizing was neither Santayana's main concern nor was it his strong point. The Realms of Being, as I see it, represents the progress of the spirit, aesthetically wrapped in essence, piously grounded in matter, disillusioned by truth, and culminating in the spiritual life. Santayana is interested in defining a way of life, a disciplined life, which is concerned with understanding the meaning (if any) and value (if any) of life. Through

the spiritual life, Santayana seeks to define wisdom. There are a multitude of lovely passages in Santayana's work I could cite to show what I mean here. I will cite three which I find both beautiful and clear.

> . . . spirit is in another realm of being altogether, and needs the being and movement of matter, by its large sweeping harmonies, to generate it, and give it wings. It would be a pity to abandon this consecrated word to those who are grubbing for the atoms of substance, or speculating about a logic in history, or tabulating the caper of ghosts; especially as there is the light of intuition, the principle of actuality in vision and feeling; to call by that name. The popular uses of the word spiritual support this definition of it; because intuition, when it thoroughly dominates animal experience, transmutes it into pure flame, and renders it religious and poetical, which is what is commonly meant by spiritual.[1]

> Spirit--the voice of the inner nature in so far as it is already formed and definite--accordingly suffers continual defeats, by the defeat of those animal impulses which it expresses; and if these impulses become confused or exhausted, it sinks with them into vice or discouragement. It would soon perish altogether, and annul the moral problem which its existence creates, unless in some way a harmony could be re-established between the individual and the world. This may be done in society at large by some firm political and moral regimen; or it may be done religiously by the discipline of the inner man, so that a part of him is weaned from the passions and interests which distract the world and is centred upon purely intellectual or spiritual aspiration. Religion is hard for external events to defeat, since ill-fortune stimulates it as much at least as good fortune. Thus within strict limits, and in a soberer garb, the play-life of childhood is restored to the soul.[2]

> A study of the realm of spirit is therefore an exercise in self-knowledge, and effort on the part of spirit to clarify and to discipline itself. Not so much that a new province is added to moral life (although this happens sometimes in religion, poetry, and music, or even in mathematics) as that the common world takes on a new colour, is focussed in a new centre of interest, as when a man falls in love.[3]

In his examination of the spiritual life, Santayana is going back to the very origins of philosophy. He is anachronistic: a sage in a world of machines, a world finishing up "The Great War" and building up for an even greater one. When fashions change so quickly both in the street and in the towers of learning, who can think of living wisely?

The emphasis is on what is happening. The idiomatic salutation is "What's new?" Who has the time to listen to another sage with just another way of life to sell? In spite of circumstances, however, wisdom (not the cheap and easy sort) was Santayana's goal both intellectually to define it and emotionally to live it. Philosophy, for Santayana, was never a job with weekends free and holidays in the summer. Nor did he need backgammon or Hollywood westerns to distract him. The mystic closes one eye in order not to be distracted by the world, the other is an eye on eternity. Santayana, amidst the hub-bub, kept both eyes open in order to define wisdom for the modern world. There is a good deal of suppressed despair in Santayana's words about the modern world, but there is also an unflagging courage to meet it as it wags.

The Realms of Being, then, in a classical manner, assumes a distinction between reason and wisdom. Reason is used as a means for an end of action. Wisdom entails reason but is itself an end. To reason well is a technical problem which needs to be solved by logical and epistemological means. Wisdom entails reason, but it also includes seeing things from a particular point of view and, as we shall see, with a change of heart. To reason well one needs to be clever. To be wise one needs to be disciplined in a peculiar way. Aristotle says that a man can knowingly, i.e. know the mean, do what is not best for himself; that is, in Santayana's terms, he knowingly may be led astray by the Flesh, the World, the Devil. Spirituality, added to knowing--reason--would aim at doing the best. This is not to say that spirituality guarantees that the best will be done; all that it says is that one will be strongly disposed, because of the habits created by spiritual discipline, to do the best in ideally any given situation. I believe all this will become clear

as we see that the Realms of Being, like the Life of Reason, is concerned with the phases of human progress, but where human progress goes beyond action to contemplation. These two are inseparable in a life of wisdom, in a spiritual life in its fullest sense. For Santayana, reason signifies a method for action. Spirituality signifies a stance for understanding. As Aristotle says in one of the most famous passages in the Nichomachean Ethics: "But we must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and being mortal, of mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best in us."[4] Aristotle, here, is not asking us to renounce our humanity for the sake of some mystical path to the Divine. What he is asking is that we recognize in ourselves that divine ability which makes us thoroughly human. To recognize that ability and use it does not undermine reason. And so Santayana, too, asks us the same thing. Santayana's Life of Reason was of "human things." The Realms of Being is of those things, mortal and immortal, thoroughly human.

Pure intuition is the foundation of the spiritual life. There are two fundamental senses of the term intuition, the psychological sense and the moral sense. To keep these two senses distinct when analyzing Santayana's texts is at best difficult and sometimes impossible. It seems to me that he makes the distinction between the two senses, but at the same time, he makes little effort and sometimes no effort in particular contexts to inform the reader in which sense he is using the term. Maybe it is incorrect to assume that the two aspects of intuition are separable, since the psychological and the moral realms of discourse often necessarily overlap. However, for the sake of some clarity, I will mention the important meanings that intuition can have. At the same time, the

reader will be aware that the distinction, as I am presenting it, is somewhat contrived and is to be taken with a grain of salt.

First, in the psychological sense, intuition means awareness or wakefulness. In this sense intuition includes faculties of attention and intent; it is an activity which functions interpretatively. The opposite of intuition in this sense would be pure intuition meaning that it would be clear of these faculties of mind, something closely analogous to the mystic's consciousness. Pure intuition in this sense is non-interpretative. Second, in the moral sense, intuition also means awareness and wakefulness; it also includes attention and intent, but now its significance lies in the fact that intuition is racked with care, because of the beliefs to which it is attached. It is distracted by the Flesh, the World, and the Devil. The opposite of intuition in this sense would be pure intuition, too, meaning now intuition which is liberated and seeking union with the Good. Intuition, in this sense, "is life at its best."[5]

There are several important points to notice here: (1) Santayana never argues that pure intuition is possible or even desirable in the psychological sense of the word. As a matter of fact, as I showed earlier, he denies it. If he were to argue the psychological sense of pure intuition, then the spirit would have no interest. (I should mention that in all that I have read of Santayana there is only one place where he says "spirit has no interests."[6] Believing that the spirit has interest, when I first came upon this phrase, I was quite surprised. However, if one looks carefully at the context, it is soon evident that Santayana is speaking of a "pure spirit," a hypothetical one without any animal ties, that is, a fictional disembodied spirit.) (2) He argues for pure intuition in the moral sense in order that the spirit be undistracted in its

survey of essence. Santayana uses many words to describe the contemplative activity of the spirit. He says it is disintoxicated, not committed, detached, and the like. Santayana never says, however, that the liberated spirit is intent-less and none of these terms (moral terms they are) suggests that psychologically the spirit is intent-less. In the course of what follows, I will examine what these words mean. For now, I simply want to draw attention to their opposites: intoxicated, committed, attached. All these terms suggest distraction.

As I said the distinction between the psychological and moral senses is difficult to discern and keep. Yet I believe the failure to recognize the distinction is one of the reasons why scholars have misinterpreted Santayana's later works. They have thought of him as an ontologist--a critical realist and an epistemologist--a sceptic with a latent propensity for idealism. As we have seen and shall further see, his concern for these matters was secondary; primarily his interest in spirit, and in pure intuition, in particular, is a moral and religious one. ". . . the concept of spirit doesn't interest me, except as a technicality; it is the life of spirit that I am talking about, the question what good, if any, there is in living, and where our treasure, if any, is to be laid up. It is a religious question. It is not a question of words."[7]

The progress that the spirit makes is one of purification. It is first distracted. As it becomes purer, it is then liberated. And ultimately there is union with the Good. The chapter entitled "Intuition" in the Realm of Spirit immediately precedes "Distraction." As I see it, it is somewhat of an introduction to the spiritual life which is developed in the chapters "Distraction," "Liberation," and "Union." What I shall

do now is try to understand what intuition and pure intuition means in the moral sense of the words by looking mainly at the chapter: "Intuition."

At the beginning of the chapter, Santayana says that the spirit which has been generated out of the material world is the moral counterpart of that world. Through spirit we discover what our experience means, and the only way we understand what experience means is through symbols. Intuition is the activity which discerns symbols. What experience means is determined in one sense by what the spirit is naturally fit to do; that is to say, that the spirit is naturally limited to the human sphere. Santayana says: "For the sake of clearness let me state at once the conclusion I shall come to: the reader will then see the details more readily in the particular perspective that concerns us here. This perspective is not psychological or historical, but religious, or rather what the ancients would have called philosophical. The end in view is liberation, or the attainment, if only in glimpses, of the highest Good."[8] The natural function of spirit, of intuition, is religious in a specific sense and philosophical in a general sense. In a religious sense the spirit seeks salvation, but a salvation in nature and one purified philosophically. "Without in the least quarrelling with nature, spirit is in its interests somewhat withdrawn from nature, as are painting and music and history."[9] Spirit is withdrawn from nature but this does not preclude spirit from having interests. Spirit transcends nature in ideals, but it does not deny it. The end of spirit is liberation in order to see the Good, and liberation is made possible by purification. The purification of intuition takes place in steps which remind one of the mystic's way. Also, like the mystic, the end of pure intuition is to see the Good. But unlike the mystic, it is the Good, the what might have been, of this

world as it appears. The sight is not of Brahman, the One, or the Godhead. Actually, it is not a sight of anything in particular. In a sense, it is no sight at all. According to Santayana, it is the seeing that is valuable, that is, the play, the joy, the prayer--the activity of what is best in man.

"The perfect function of spirit is pure intuition."[10] Although the words suggest things sublime, their meaning is down to earth. Pure intuition is a way of looking at the essences of the actual and possible worlds. It is an attitude or a stance which one adopts in order to sharpen and refine one's understanding and appreciation of anything. To say that pure intuition, as some have, is just a psychological concept, or just an aesthetic concept or just any one particular concept, is to sell Santayana's idea short. Pure intuition is an idea which covers many aspects and interests of a life. As Ryle would say of attention, one could say of pure intuition; it is a polymorphous concept. Pure intuition is not a separate activity with a subject matter of its own; it accompanies many activities. So then pure intuition is not only just a psychological, aesthetic, or any one particular concept; it also does not embody any doctrine, even though it is religious and philosophical.

Just as "the spirituality of spirit and the ideality of data follow directly from materialism,"[11] Santayana says that the inclination of intuition to become pure is quite natural. Intuition in an impure sense means that the spirit is distracted; it is harassed by all the pains of existence. The spirit naturally desires to be free from distraction, that is, to become pure in order to be free to express itself. This longing to be free from worldly entanglements along with the desire to be free to express itself are indications that spirit is interested in

the moral sense. Santayana says: "I think that the most desultory spiritual insights induce a new habit, open a path to a deeper stratum of the soul."[12] The words "new habit" suggest action of a sort, action which is not merely done deliberately, but action which is also wise. If the spirit were not interested or if it were absolutely free, then the questions of distraction and expression of the spirit would not be issues. In the moral sense of the words, pure intuition simply means, from a negative point of view, free from distraction, "it is merely absence of distraction."[13] There is no notion that free from distraction implies or is equivalent to the spirit being uninterested.

Thus far I have used the terms 'intuition' and 'spirit,' both pure and impure, interchangeably. To do so is not a mistake. Spirit is not a substance; it is a function. Santayana says to look for a spirit behind intuitions is a mistake. Intuitions are the spirit. Also, there is nothing miraculous about intuition. The important issue for intuition lies in the sphere of functions. Intuition has a natural job to do. Santayana says intuition is not divination which supposedly reveals something which the senses and the intellect cannot. Intuition does not, strictly speaking, have a definite end in view, like Reality. Pure intuition reveals nothing new, and as far as the material world is concerned it creates nothing new. It is impotent both in any magical or material sense. ". . . by intuition I mean direct and obvious possession of the apparent, without commitments of any sort about its truth, significance, or material existence."[14] Intuition finds importance in the ordinary and obvious. But it can only find importance there, if it is not thrown about by the accidents of the world. When Santayana talks about not being committed to its truth, etc., he means the nagging

commitments involved in affairs where manipulation of one sort or another is required. As with Aristotle's liberal man, to do deeds implies more than simply doing. The man of action needs money, power, opportunity, "for deeds many things are needed, and more, the greater and the nobler the deeds."[15] Santayana says there are three stances one might take in facing the world. First is where intuitions are applied through animal faith to overt actions. This position strengthens the spirit, enriches it with "the clearness of genius and the movement of things near us."[16] Second is where intuition thrives on imaginary things. From here we become sick and "our thin intuitions would grow thinner and wilder, as our troubles grew thick." [17] Finally, there is the stance where the world of overt action and imagination are set on a stage so to speak. It is the position of a mind that has mastered itself. It is intuition that is educated. It is not committed to anything in the sense that it refuses to compete. It realizes that win and lose in the world are insidious chimeras, if they be considered so in any absolute sense, and that all the luggage of deeds is mere paraphernalia. To say there is no interest in the spectacle is false. I go to the theater because I am interested in the lives of the characters in the play. They are like me when I play out my character. For the moment, however, it is my turn to watch without being concerned about obligations and consequences. The actors play out those concerns. My interest is in the "triumph" of learning without being "dominated." In the final sense only is there pure intuition. But just as I only go to the theater on occasion, the "triumph over nature and human nature can never be complete and the movements in which it almost exists are rare."[18]

"Intuition, then, is always with us, but dispersed over occasions that continually confuse and interrupt it. It is comparatively clear in the poet, in the wit, sometimes in the child; it is the constant friend of the artist lost in his work."[19] Elsewhere, Santayana says that pure intuition is clear sometimes in the mystic and philosopher. But artist and child (not infant) are his favorite allusions. Through such allusions Santayana suggests that what pure intuition reveals cannot be communicated directly or through the employment of philosophical argument, alone. The revelations of pure intuition are understood by indirect means. The wit might open up the fool's world from the point of view of pure intuition, but to merely describe that world would tell us nothing. Part of Santayana's point is that pure intuition, in order to be fully understood, needs to be experienced. In this sense, one needs to be converted to the view of pure intuition. One must follow the way of purification, since although purification is in part an intellectual exercise, it is also a feeling to be had.

The quality of an intuition (e.g. one that leads to animal faith) and a pure intuition is not different. It is the feeling that is different. At best, the simplest feelings can be described only by metaphors. To describe the feelings of intuition and pure intuition, it would be necessary to use many metaphors in order to capture their many facets. Generally, let us say that intuition in an impure sense entails all the aspects of distraction and the misunderstanding distraction often causes. Generally, let us say that pure intuition entails "life at the top," where one is not a passive victim of circumstance and the opportunity to understand is always propitious.

Let us recall the theater. The satirist, let us say, Moliere, brings to his drama a set of moral principles which he intends for the

edification of his audience. If the satirist is poor in his craft or the production of the play is not up to par, the audience will walk away from the work as they do from a lecture. If it is good, they will walk away laughing about hypocritical priests, charlatans, and cuckholds. In the first case, they will have been taught about the ways of the world, but the realization of those same ways will have been imposed upon them. (This is not entirely true, since some lecturers have dramatic talent.) In the second case, the illusion is created that the realizations of the audience members come from themselves. It is as if Moliere were a mere catalyst, and they, the audience, the comedians seeing the world of deceit for the first time. This is the impact of pure intuition, minus the illusions necessarily created in the theater. It is a form of realization, more strongly an epiphany, partially because it is removed from the world of affairs and partially because it comes in the form of self-revelation, which entails truth, significance, and material existence, but whose value lies in the revelation itself. In some sense it could be said that as a member of the audience (either literally or in Santayana's sense, figuratively) one is, although not a member of the cast, a participant in the drama. Actually, one is more of a participant than the active members themselves. As a member of the audience, I am able to see what the characters cannot. I am a participant, not in the sense that I am efficacious in changing the course of events, but a participant in the sense that I understand the events better than any of the players. Furthermore, even though I cheer for the dashing young hero and I am charmed by the lady in distress, I can also, though my blood curdles, comprehend the ways of the villain. Actually, my participation is more profound than I suggest by my trite example. Nothing is quite so simple as hero and villain. However,

by pure intuition, by standing apart, one sees, let us say, in the famous characters of Othello and Iago, how Othello is "made weak by his very strength" and how Iago, the epitome of deception, can be called "honest!."

From philosophical literature, I believe the idea of the impact of pure intuition, that is, the feeling conversion about it, the epiphany, is clearly present in the Platonic dialogues.[20] In them, surely the truth is not merely something to be described; it is something to be felt, and felt profoundly. The truth possesses a dramatic quality. For example, when the slaveboy in Plato's Meno learns about geometry, the feeling is different (although the content of what he learned would have been the same) from the feeling the slaveboy would have experienced had Socrates taught (described) the slaveboy geometry. Of course, in some sense, Socrates taught the boy geometry, but he did so indirectly. Part of the purpose of the Meno is to show that it is more valuable to learn than to be taught. Direct argument, in the sense that it describes a problem and in the sense that it assumes that the listener is passive, fails to communicate anything profound. To say that pure intuitions reveal a world to which I am not committed takes us just so far. In a sense, we have to follow the steps toward purification, as the slaveboy followed the steps of Socrates' questions, in order to appreciate that which is to be revealed. And, indeed, Santayana invites us to do so when he says of liberation, for example, that "perhaps a surer and more positive idea of liberation may be drawn from observing what spiritual men are than by discussing what they say."[21] Here, if one likes, would be Santayana's interest in and sympathy with mysticism, because the mystic being anti-intellectual says throw away your arguments, "we come to you not as thinkers, but as doers."[22] I do not mean to imply that Socrates or Santayana are advocates of mysticism,

but I do mean to imply that doing of a certain sort is their point.

It is the moral aspect of intuition that leads to liberation. As I understand Santayana, this is how pure intuition is properly understood. So that "intuition, when it thoroughly dominates animal experience, transmutes it into a pure flame, and renders it religious or poetical, which is what is commonly meant by spiritual."[23] Pure intuition discerns a "moral presence";[24] it is an "acute ideal concentration."[25] As I see it, the way of purification in the spiritual life can be best understood through the idea of Will in spirit, through the idea of how pure intuition dominates animal experience while at the same time it renders domination (the essence of animal experience) secondary. The Will in spirit actually amounts to the interest the spirit has. The Will in spirit is not interested in existence in so far as an interest in existence means to manipulate or possess the objects of existence. The Will in spirit is a "clarified will-lessness which is the result of experience and discipline, and is will-less only in respect to existence, being still the Will to understand that which exists."[26]

The Will (with a capital), says Santayana, is a poetic term for "the observable endeavour in things of any sort to develop a specific form and preserve it."[27] Santayana says he takes this idea from Hobbes, and although the Will is universal it is not meant to suggest that behind or within inanimate movements there is some psychological force. All that 'Will' indicates is that through nature, animate and inanimate, there is attraction, repulsion, conflict, and harmony. The idea of a universal Will, it seems to me, is merely an extension of Santayana's earlier idea of interest, beyond animate nature, a poetic image of matter defined as "What it does." With the introduction of universal Will, "the psyche

becomes a particular instance of universal Will,"[28] and "the spirit . . . an expression of Will."[29] "Life, where it has arisen, is by definition a nucleus of Will, a point of reference for imputing good and evil."[30] There is no radical difference between the behavior of nature at large and the behavior of human beings. More explicitly than in the Life of Reason, man is conceived by Santayana to be a highly sophisticated machine. Also, just as I drew the distinction between derived and formal interests in the life of reason, that distinction holds true in the realm of spirit, and more explicitly than it did earlier. The psyche, in so far as it is an instance of Will, is derived from the material world. The spirit, in so far as it is an expression of Will, has a formal interest in the world. Furthermore, spirit has a formal interest in so far as it is intent-ful. Note in the following, although intent is not explicitly mentioned, the point is that the spirit ("all ideal demands")[31] expresses itself by looking beyond to the not-given.

> We may then say that spirit arises whenever Will in one place finds it profitable to mark, trace, and even imitatively share the movement of Will elsewhere . . . . To mark, to trace, or to share any and every movement going on in the world is precisely the function of spirit; only that for spirit this marking, tracing, or sharing is purely ideal, and being ideal may tend to become adequate to the life of the object; whereas marking, tracing, and sharing for the psyche involve only a material response and an instinctive readjustment.[32]

The way of purification comes about by sharpening the consciousness or spirit which lies dormant in the psyche. The psyche is essentially egocentric. It acts in terms of self-interest, alone. The problem the psyche faces in any animal is how to adapt to the environment in order to survive. In this sense, the psyche is entirely racked by care, and all those aspects of Will which are contrary to the particular psyche are alien to it. The psyche, although it is a product of Will, can never feel at home in the

world. It is by nature diffident, since around every corner and behind every tree, there is something that seeks to prey upon and destroy it. Spirit, on the contrary, if it "could be entirely dominant we should esteem everything in nature as if it were the inmost part of ourselves and everything in ourselves as if it were the remotest and the least part of nature."[33] In so far as man has spirit he is free from fear and there is an "interest of his in things not edible which issues in art and intelligence."[34]

The actual life of the human spirit is one of compromise between its interests and the interests of the psyche. On the one hand, the interests of the spirit are remote; it has affinities in abstract realms. On the other hand, the interests of the psyche are local. On the surface, it appears that spirit and psyche would be in constant conflict with one another but that is only what appears to be so. In fact, the psyche and spirit are two levels of human life.

> Adaptation creates intelligence . . . . When the Will in an animal began to react upon and mimic external objects, it was bent only on absorbing or on dominating those objects materially; the habit of retracing the environment and as it were, sinking into it and catching its rhythm, was something secondary, instrumental and oblique; and the response was strictly practical, touching only what touched the organism . . . . Now it is precisely this preliminary but indomitable interest in fact, in form, and in truth for truth's sake that is the Will proper to spirit; a Will that wills heroically what the psyche as a whole willed only conditionally.[35]

By becoming pure the spirit acts heroically. What this means is that the spirit as a "consciousness of animal aspirations" tends to soar, through the intellectual and moral life, toward a unanimity with the Will, sometimes called the Will of God. By unanimity with the Will, the spirit endeavors to abolish the egocentricities of the psyche. It is through egotism, as Santayana sees it, that one often acts compulsively and hence suffers needlessly. Egotism, as we shall see, is the work of the Devil.

Although not entirely, the egotist brings about a good deal of his own suffering, setting up conflicts of will which are futile. The egotist takes his cues entirely from the psyche, a psyche gone haywire, and hence wants to possess everything and dominate every situation. The spirit, however, through the domination of understanding, seeks the opposite; it renounces domination in the material world. "The freedom and glory of spirit come from its impotence; by its impotence it is guiltless, by its impotence it is universal, by its impotence it is invulnerably supreme. Its essence is to be light, not to be power; and it can never be pure light until it is satisfied with an ideal dominion, not striving to possess or to change the world, but identifying itself only with the truth and beauty that rise unbidden from the world into the realm of spirit."[36]

I think at this point one might wonder: If the way of purification is followed through the moral and intellectual life, how is this different from what Santayana said early in his career in the Life of Reason? Well, first of all the two lives are different, and they are different not so much in quality as in quantity. The spiritual life is one of a more universal way of life in terms of point of view than the life of reason, the end of the spiritual life being universal understanding and universal love. Ultimately, we will see what this means, but for now let us consider that the spiritual life is less egoistic than the life of reason which is exemplified in rational morality, and certainly the spiritual life is less egoistic than any prerational morality.

It will be recalled that the end of the life of reason is a harmony in action whose result is a maximum satisfaction of some interests. By the very fact that one is committed to some overt action in the life of reason, not all interests in any given situation can be satisfied.

Therefore, reason itself as a formal interest takes that side by which maximum satisfaction will ensue; that is, reason itself is committed to a certain set of interests at the sacrifice of others. From a spiritual point of view, the one of pure intuition, since one is not committed to any action and maximum satisfaction in action is beside the point, ideally it is unnecessary to commit oneself to any particular set of interests at all. This is not to say that one might not value some interests more than others; since one is still an interested creature, one is still very much in the moral realm; more strongly, since interests are still formed by intent one is still in the moral realm; commitment to act upon a certain set of interests always requires intent; however, the converse is not necessarily true; commitment to act upon a certain set of interests is a species of the moral realm, the moral realm being also purely ideal.

'Commitment,' as Santayana uses it, seems close to the idea of loyalty. In the life of reason, one asserts his loyalty to <u>his</u> living purposes or interests in order to act upon them and realize them through action. In the spiritual life, one is loyal to his living purposes, but one is also loyal ideally to all living purposes. To be loyal ideally to all living purposes is not to act upon them and realize them. It is to understand them ideally from the point of view of those other living purposes. In other words it is a commitment to understanding and sympathy. Furthermore, to say that one is not committed to any particular interest in so far as being committed means to act upon such a commitment is not to say that one is no longer committed to any particular interest at all, that one has <u>denied</u> all interest. It is to say that since one is not interested in overtly acting in terms of his living purposes, alone, the question of sacrificing one interest for another does not arise, and hence one is left

to understand better not only the interests which might have been appealing to act upon but also to see the good, if any, in those rival interests which in action are often so repugnant. One ought not even to think that an ideal commitment is a sacrifice of one's own living interests. One's own living interests are maintained and are acted upon as before, However, if, in addition to one's own living interests, one has an ideal commitment to all living interests, maybe one's own living interests will take on a new light and one's acting upon the may be altered, and altered for the better.

In Reason in Religion, Santayana provides an example of a rational and a spiritual interest. I believe through this example one can see how the spiritual life is less egoistic than the life of reason, how the spiritual life in so far as it is a clarified will-lessness does not undermine or in any way contradict the life of reason, how the spiritual life purifies intuition in the moral sense.

Santayana's discussion of justice and charity as interests parallels Hume's idea of sympathy. Santayana, like Hume, says that the source of justice is sympathy, and Santayana merely extends the idea of justice to charity, which is defined as universal sympathy. Hume says and Santayana would agree: "Now we have no such extensive concern for society but from sympathy; and consequently 'tis that principle, which takes us so far out of ourselves, as to give us the same pleasure or uneasiness in the characters of others, as if they had a tendency to our advantage or loss."[37] For both Hume and Santayana, justice (and charity for Santayana, alone) is based on a natural passion; Hume calls it a "remarkable" sentiment and one which is deeply rooted in the human mind as deeply as perception and conception.[38] If one conceives of sympathy as the source of justice and

charity, then implicitly it can be said that although most interests are self-interested, there is an interest which is not, i.e. in some pre-cognitive state there is a sense of sympathy. Now Hume clearly holds this view. And it seems that Santayana does, too. For Santayana, however, it must be understood that sympathy is the source of justice, while it is only intent which clarifies sympathy in order that it be raised to the ideal level.[39]

In the chapter entitled "Charity" in Reason in Science, Santayana draws a distinction between justice and charity, the former being a rational interest, the latter being a spiritual interest. (For those who might argue that Santayana changed his ideas about these and other subjects from the Life of Reason to the Realms of Being, I shall provide evidence from Realm of Spirit where Santayana discusses charity again at some length and to the same point.) Furthermore, the chapter "Charity," among other things, indicates how charity grows out of justice, how a spiritual ideal grows out of a moral ideal.

In a perfect world where every interest could be satisfied without conflict, justice and charity are identical. However, in the actual world, it is possible, according to Santayana, to find justice without charity. In this sense, justice is a narrower concept than charity. Santayana says charity is the highest expression of justice, "without which justice remains only an organized wrong."[40] "Of justice without charity we have a classic illustration in Plato's Republic and in general in the pagan world. An end is assumed, in this case an end which involves radical injustice toward every interest not included in it; and then an organism is developed or conceived that shall subserve that end, and political justice is defined as the harmonious adjustment of powers and functions within

that organism."[41] Now whether or not Santayana's criticism of Plato's Republic is accurate is beside the point. Santayana's point is that within any society, one might have an entirely fair way of dealing with its members; however, no society is airtight so that outside interests must always affect what goes on inside. Santayana's criticism of Plato's Republic is not directed so much at the questions of internal justice, even though it seems to me that within any given society it is an oversimplification to assume that there could be an actual unanimity of interests. Santayana's criticism is directed rather toward the question of justice as it extends outside the community, outside its private interests. Within the Republic there is no distinction between private and public interests; they are one and the same. Surely the Republic does not suffer, at least theoretically, from the same internal iniquities as a society ruled by the will of majority where a minority is wont to be tyrannized. The Republic, it seems to me, more than any treatise on politics, attempts to insure, by making everyone's interest the interest of all, that justice will be the primary ideal. It is therefore surprising to find that even when justice is the primary ideal of a society that that society could also be uncharitable. If this is the case, in those societies where justice, in any rational sense, is secondary or non-existent, charity is simply beyond the imagination. To the point, Santayana says: "Plato could never have answered the question whether his Republic had a right to exist and to brush aside all other commonwealths; he could never have justified the ways of man to the rest of creation nor (what is more pertinent) to man's more plastic and tenderer imagination."[42] This last remark recalls Santayana's criticisms of Socrates who conceived man's nature to be immutable. In the political sphere, Plato suffers, too, from similar static notions.

The danger inherent in any ideal is that it will be elevated to absolute authority by those who have chosen it. This illusion created by uncharitable, although well-intentioned individuals, is one which leads uncharitable persons to believe "that they and their chosen interests alone are important or have a legitimate place in the moral world. Having discovered what is really good for themselves, they assume that the like is good for everybody."[43] What this ultimately boils down to is a sense of intolerance about the ways of others, and intolerance is a form of injustice itself. Correct or not in his criticisms, Santayana seems to be saying that Plato's Republic, when confronted by the interests of other societies, will act on the principles of Polemarchos, doing good to your friends and harm to your enemies, principles which Plato himself unmercifully exposed as entirely inimical to an idea of justice based on reason.

From another quarter of the pagan world, I think we find a perfect illustration of the myopic sort of justice Santayana finds in Plato's Republic. It is an extreme example and is found in Euripides' play The Bacchae. In this play, I believe it is reasonable to assume that Pentheus, the king of Thebes, is a just, although uncharitable ruler. He is just in so far as he has a certain set of interests which he shares with Theban society, and based upon those common interests he legislates in favor of all, in favor of maximum satisfaction. When a society is homogeneous and interests are shared, it is relatively easy for a king to be just. However, Pentheus is able justly and effectively to lead his people only as long as no foreign interests are allowed to permeate Theban society. When a foreign interest in the form of a new and different religion, the religion of Dionysus, is welcomed by much of the population (including Pentheus' mother and Cadmus, his grandfather, and Teiresias, the wisest

men of the city), Pentheus adamantly denies the power of this religion and attempts blindly to exorcise the new God and religion from the city. To Pentheus, the new religion represents only drunkenness and promiscuity, inclinations which ought to be repressed and not expressed by human beings. Because he is uncharitable, Pentheus does not have the imagination to see, as a good leader should, that even irrational or dark sides of the soul can be made to be constructive and certainly need to be expressed. Of course, Pentheus does not realize that he is dealing with a god. In the course of events, Dionysus puts Pentheus under his spell, and Pentheus, dressed up as a Bacchante, goes up into the hills to hunt the Bacchae. But it is all a trick, a black trick, and there in the hills Pentheus is attacked and killed. The attack is led by Pentheus' mother, Agave. She and a mob of crazed women literally tear Pentheus limb from limb, and Agave, out of her mind like the rest, takes her son's head for a prize.

If we look at Dionysus and his followers as those "other" interests of man (in or out of any particular society), and Pentheus as a repressive and uncharitable form of justice, I think Euripides' intent can be easily seen. In every city and every soul, we have those darker sides of humanity, or merely other interests, if you like, which are always ready to come to the fore. No city or soul merely possesses an impenetrable single set of interests; if possible, such would be the case of a completely repressed soul (in Freudian terms a raving neurotic), or as in Thebes a repressed city. Under these circumstances there is no telling what could happen; the city might brutally kill its king or the soul might be driven to insanity. Euripides seems to be saying that the acceptance or even the recognition of other interests is a very delicate matter for a ruler to face, and other interests, if they are strong enough (as strong as a

god's), must find expression somewhere; if not, tragedy will result.

Charity is a spiritual interest in so far as it is a willingness to recognize the possible good of other interests. Unlike Pentheus, who might be perfectly rational in terms of his own interests, yet who does not recognize other interests at all, the charitable man transgresses in imagination personal and corporate interests.[44] "Value is attributed to rival forms of life; something of the intensity and narrowness inherent in the private will is surrendered to admiration and solicitude for what is most alien and hostile to one's self. When this imaginative expansion ends in neutralizing the will altogether, we have mysticism; but when it serves merely to co-ordinate felt interests with other actual interests conceived sympathetically, and to make them converge, we have justice and charity."[45]

By using the example of The Bacchae, I had ulterior motives which this last passage I have quoted from Reason in Religion begins to make clear. That is, in The Bacchae, as well as here in Santayana's words, we see that there is no sharp distinction between justice and charity. Although the just man is not always charitable, the charitable man is always just. Only when "imaginative expansion" of charity becomes mystical could we say that justice and charity are distinct. Santayana never reaches that point. What this means to me is that justice as a rational interest is a species of charity as a spiritual interest. Through charity we never deny our own interests. Pentheus, himself, would not have had to accept unequivocally the interests of Dionysus in order to avoid tragedy. He could have charitably said: "That which is here and now impossible, impossible forever for me, must be renounced; but it remains a good and cannot be detested without blindness. It may have its day in eternity."[46]

I think the charitable attitude could be imputed imaginatively to Cadmus and Teiresias. Certainly old men as they were and wise, they did not suddenly with the advent of the new god take up thrysi to go galavanting drunk through the hills and chasing young girls. Teiresias says: ". . . we're the only wise ones, all the rest are mad."[47] Yet they were wise because they recognized Dionysus, that, indeed, it was necessary to admit him into Thebes for the sake of Thebes' well-being. Pentheus, rational as he is, has his interests and ideals, and hence he is king, of all of Thebes. He believes his interests are everyone's interests, and alien interests are always potentially corrupting. He does not understand Teiresias, the blind prophet, who says: "No Dionysus can make women continent in love; in all things one is continent or not by natural instinct always. Just consider this: A woman who is continent will not be lost even in Bacchic revels."[48] Although the particular passage refers specifically to the continence of women, the general idea is that corruption in any form is not merely a case of titillation, and "that virtue which requires to be ever guarded is scarce worth the sentinel."[49] Pentheus, meanwhile unswerving in his interests, his reason, his ideals, is brought down in the most ignominious fashion. To be charitable, all he had to do was recognize others' interests besides his own. "Charity does not imply liking your neighbor."[50] "Charity is nothing but a radical and imaginative justice."[51]

This is the crux of the difference between justice and charity, between rational interests and spiritual interests. When one is just, one is committed to a certain set of interests, interests which represent a particular social group. One is just in order that within that group social harmony will be established and maximum satisfaction will result. The idea that from one social group to the next there might be an actual harmony is

an idea which the rational man finds hard to conceive. It is difficult enough within a social group to find a common set of interests; to try to extend justice to other social groups, other interests, multiplies the difficulties beyond manageability. Justice merely seeks to work within certain limits. As far as the practical limitations of justice are concerned, Santayana is in complete agreement with Plato; justice needs both a small and homogeneous population in order to be effective. Under these conditions the chances that justice will be maintained are fair, maybe even good. With a heterogeneous population which is also large, justice hardly stands a chance. This is more obvious in our day than even in Santayana's. However, even when the conditions are the best no absolute justice can ever be maintained. From one social group to the next interests are different, and within a social group, interests are in flux and the interests of one individual are different from another. Since justice is in the realm of interest-action-satisfaction, there must always be conflict. Justice is always concerned with the interaction of one animal will with another, and wills by nature collide.

The charitable man does not give up his interests; he cannot. The charitable man, being spiritual, does not renounce justice; he keeps it and embellishes upon the idea of justice in order to make it universal imaginatively. Practically, as a means, justice cannot be universal. Ideally, as an end, it can be. Ideally, then, there can be harmony. There is "no unanimity or harmony amongst animal wills."[52] However, ideally in charity, "there can be harmony . . . in so far as all are willing to renounce their wills."[53]

In the Realm of Spirit, Santayana clarifies his idea of charity in the chapter entitled "Union," a chapter which deals with the culmination

of the spiritual life, one aspect being charity and the other, which I will discuss later, being prayer. As in Reason in Religion, charity in the Realm of Spirit is defined as justice universalized, but here Santayana is more careful to guard against the imaginative expansion of charity into mysticism. This is particularly interesting since so many scholars have argued that in the later writings Santayana showed himself to be mystical. To the contrary, I find that in the concept of charity now Santayana emphatically states that in order for there to be charity, there must be some one who is charitable and there must be some one to receive the alms which charity bestows. Santayana says that "charity is seldom pure or universal, but touches home sentiments with more or less spiritual light."[54]

The potentially charitable man attempts to transcend his private interests first through good will (justice) which is a "natural sympathy in kindred beings,"[55] and then through a clarification of good will he rises to charity, a sympathy with both kindred and alien beings. Unlike the man ruled by psyche, by home interests alone, the charitable man finds that it is nonsense to say that "some goods are good and other goods are bad. All are good, but not all are compatible in the same family."[56] It must not be thought that Santayana is trying to make every interest a man can have a good. He is not that naive. There are interests which men have that are incompatible even in the same family. What Santayana is attempting to do by means of charity is show that it is unreasonable to make another man's good an evil just because his good does not coincide with yours. On the one hand, "charity must begin at home and never lose its moorings there,"[57] so that charity, by definition, must always be tinged with self-interest; however, on the other hand, "charity has more insight

into nature than conscience or self-interest can have; it understands the innocence of contrary wills and the goodness of contrary goods. For this reason charity seems unnatural or supernatural to the conventional mind."[58] The charitable man can be likened to a wide-eyed traveller and his opposite to the perennial stay-at-home. The stay-at-home feels safe only on familiar turf, and on that turf with all its peculiarities he may feel like a lord. He is a patriot of the land he can cover on foot, yet this patriotism is based on prejudice; his love is not compared with or evaluated in light of anything else. Because he is literally land-locked, he is suspicious of outsiders and their unusual ways. As a matter of fact, what most characterizes the stay-at-home is that what is unfamiliar appears more unfamiliar than it actually is. The traveller, and Santayana was one, seeks out the unfamiliar. "There is wisdom in turning as often as possible from the familiar to the unfamiliar; it keeps the mind nimble, it kills prejudice, and it fosters humour."[59] The traveller always maintains a home base, at least in his heart, just as "Ulysses remembered Ithaca."[60] However, being a traveller, and here is the value of travel, Ulysses would have admitted with a light heart and clear mind "that Troy was unrivalled in grandeur, Phaeacia in charm, and Calypso in enchantment: that could not make the sound of the waves breaking on his own shores less pleasant to his ears; it could only render more enlightened, more unhesitating, his choice of what was naturally his."[61] Ironically, the traveller is the real patriot, because his love is deepened by comparison and an acquired sympathy for others; it is a transformation of a natural love into a spiritual one by "imaginative reason (charity) by which we detach ourselves from our accidental persons and circumstances and feel the equal reality of all other persons in all other plights."[62] So are we

able to realize that our circumstances and plights are no less accidental than others', and all are equally profound. I should add that 'stay-at-home' and 'traveller' are not only applied to people's mobile habits in terms of geography alone. I remember reading somewhere that a journalist once asked H. D. Thoreau whether or not he traveled a great deal, and Thoreau replied, "Yes, I have traveled a great deal, around Concord."

Charity is not entirely self-less, hence it makes sense to say that it is an interest in something. It is an interest or a love of the Good at the level of imaginative reason. "There is . . . no love not directed upon the Good, not directed upon something that makes for the fulfillment of the lover's nature. This good may be the good of others; but doing good to others will to that extent be a good for oneself."[63] There is no love for love's sake. "Flattered as everyone would be by the idea of being loved and full of ready love in return, yet if it were impossible to benefit anybody, the whole world would be tormented by a perpetual desire to do good and a hopeless inability to do it."[64] Love for love's sake is no ideal; it is a parody of some indefinable urge in the tradition of Rousseau; better, it is the imaginative expansion Santayana spoke of in Reason in Religion, the mystics' love which is no love at all, but an amorphous sentiment directed toward everything and nothing. There is also another side to this coin. The lover in love with love is the model of the egoist, self-centered, a disciple of Eros. This mystical lover seeks to deify desire and hence make possession and domination ideals. This is what Santayana suggests in a section he calls "Charity versus Eros."[65] Eros is a blind lover who has no fidelity to anyone. Everyone is an instrument to Eros to be used in order to satisfy his desires. The idea that another has similar desires (even the object of Eros' love) or different ones does

not occur to Eros. Every one is a means to his end, alone. No one is an end in himself. Eros believes that life is made better by the intensification of life. To give up the illusions of passion, Eros must be enlightened. Eros is necessary, a child of the psyche, in order that there be a vital aspiration toward something, but unenlightened Eros is destructive to those he enslaves and self-destructive as well. There is an internal paradox in Eros: on the one hand he is full of life and on the other hand he is full of death. The same impulse which adores life negates it. "The God Eros is the slave of death because he wishes to elevate life above our finite and limited creature state."[66] Through charity, "a form of Eros,"[67] aimless erotic inclinations are brought down to earth. They are tamed by fidelity, the refusal to cultivate the illusions of passion,[68] and so Eros himself is saved. Through charity, the Kantian ideal of treating everyone as an end in himself and never as a means becomes another human interest. "The great tragedy of Eros is its blindness: remove the blindness produced by a too narrow and intense light, remove the bandage that turned vision into dreams, and Eros is charity itself: the pursuit of all Good, guided by all knowledge."[69] Enlightened Eros, charity, claims that life everywhere is sacred. Charity is a reverence for life which affirms the will to live in every creature by means of clarified will-lessness, the refusal to dominate and possess, to enslave, and hence be enslaved. Of course, as Santayana says, charity can never be complete; that is why it is an imaginative justice. Out of necessity we must dominate and destroy in order to survive. But necessity needs only to be reckoned with, while ideals, such as charity, need to be pursued.[70]

2. DISTRACTION IN THE NEGATIVE SENSE

Santayana's later philosophy is characterized by such epithets as: detached, non-humanistic, anti-naturalistic, agnostic, valueless, aesthetic, and so on. The broad-stroked picture painted by Santayana's critics is one that shows a philosopher who has retreated from the world in nearly every respect. After resigning from Harvard, Santayana left the United States never to return. The rest of his life was spent abroad as an intellectual vagabond: first in England, then for a time in France, and finally to Rome with jaunts here in the summer and there in the winter. He was voluntarily out of touch with the intellectual currents of his day. He felt more comfortable in the company of old ladies and young men than he did with professors. The close relationship he had with his sister became strained when she married. His friendship (I use the term loosely) with his college chum C. A. Strong soured as years went by. At the end of his life Santayana was virtually alone--"The bed, the books, the chair, the moving nuns,"[1] being cared for by the Blue Sisters and, with his vision seriously impaired, translating the poetry of Lorenzo di Medici. To some, Santayana's lonely way of life may appear gloomy, but for Santayana it was not; he intended it to be that way. The society of others for Santayana seems to have been an amusement more than anything else. "People are friends in spots."[2] With the exception of his sister, I cannot imagine Santayana being entangled in his relationships. As he says in My Host the World: "I desired solitude and independence . . . after the fashion of ancient philosophers, often in exile, but always in sight of the market place and the theatre."[3]

Santayana's life, indeed, seems to have been one which turned more and more inward, and therefore he became more and more isolated. His philosophy, it has been said, took essentially the same inward turn. He is said to be mystical in his later writings. He alludes to Plotinus, St. John of the Cross, the Plato of the middle dialogues, and, of course, the Indians--the Indians--a questionable lot to many Western intellectuals, and those who allude to them are probably more than questionable; they are: affected, obscurantists, stark-raving mad. By turning inward, Santayana suffered the same fate as many great men. He established himself in the intellectual world by professing one thing. He developed it for all it was worth and then struck out for more fertile soil. In his later life, he merely found interest in something different, something not necessarily contrary to his early work, just something different. Those who had adhered to Santayana's earlier views who had put him on a pedestal found themselves disappointed. Suddenly the old man changed, and they were left with a doctrine that even the originator no longer held dear. Like pack horses they had no leader to follow, like students no master's feet at which they could sit. Just as Santayana could never be a disciple of anyone, it seems he avoided, consciously or otherwise, producing disciples of his work. Philosophy, as Santayana saw it, contrary to the actions of many, is not meant to form clubs.

I want to approach Santayana's idea of the spiritual life from a crucial passage in his essay "Apologia Pro Mente Sua." As I see it, this passage is the core of Santayana's idea of spirituality; also it is an idea which recurs throughout Santayana's intellectual career. More strongly, and risking the charge of oversimplification, I believe what we shall see is what Santayana thought to be a fundamental problem of moral philosophy:

the relationship between interests and ideals and actions. Santayana says:

> You cannot be detached without being previously attached; you cannot renounce or sacrifice anything significantly unless you love it . . . . Your detachment will not be spiritual unless it is universal; it will then bring you liberation at once from the world and from yourself. This will neither destroy your natural gifts and duties nor add to them; but it will enable you to exercise them without illusion and in far-seeing harmony with their real function and end. Detachment leaves you content to be where you are; and what you are. Why should you hanker to be elsewhere or someone else: Yet in your physical particularity detachment makes you ideally impartial; and in enlightening your mind it is likely to render your action also more successful and generous.[4]

In a sense, we are attached to the world; this I shall call the positive sense. In a sense, we are detached from the world; this I shall call the negative sense. If one recalls some of the ideas discussed earlier, I think these ideas of attachment and detachment should fit in with them, if not explicitly, certainly implicitly. To the "material world" surely we are attached. By "ideal terms" we are able to detach ourselves from the material present. By justice our home interests are made harmonious. By charity our will is identified with Will of all.

From the previous quote, I want to develop a picture of the spiritual life which reveals how the spirit is both attached to and detached from the world and further to show how attachment and detachment are perfectly compatible with one another. As I develop it, it will be seen that the life of spirit is another level of life which does not undermine the life of reason; rather the spiritual life complements and enriches life in every sense. As I discussed earlier, the charitable man does not renounce justice for charity. The charitable man holds justice dear while ideally he universalizes justice and so makes it "holy."

"But how should harmony be achieved in living if the inward spirit is distracted and the outer conditions of existence are unknown."[5] In

these lines, Santayana, in his "General Confession," sums up the fundamental problem which the spirit faces, the problem of distraction. It is a very old problem in the history of ideas both east and west. In philosophies which have aspired to spirituality, the world has been an unfriendly place to lesser and greater extent. On one extreme, the hope of the philosopher lay in the possibility of explaining the world away; on the other extreme, he merely acquiesced to the mysteries and the inimical forces at play. However, from one extreme to the other, any real control over the world by spirit has been thought to be absurd and egotistical.

Santayana falls into this tradition of philosophers, artists, and religious thinkers, which aspires to transcend the world. But I believe that he holds rather a unique position in this tradition. By drawing from a number of disparate points of view, from the highly rationalistic to the irrational and mystical, Santayana, with always at least one foot on naturalistic soil, attempts to develop an idea of the spiritual life that is true to the facts of existence. As I see it, it is intellectually a courageous undertaking. There are no sickening dogmas, and when the flights of fancy become a bit unrestrained they are meant to be charming and not simply fatuous.

The spiritual life is developed out of the idea of distraction, and distraction is a negative idea for the most part. It is something to avoid; it is a form of enslavement. One is distracted when one is committed to the affairs of the world. In the world, we are never victorious; always something must be sacrificed, something must be compromised. In its negative sense, distraction provides a motive for detachment in the same sense in which one desires to detach himself from situations which

cause pain. However, distraction also has its positive side, and this positive side, as I see it, reveals not only a clear view of distraction itself, but in a broader sense sets the entire stage for the spiritual life. In Scepticism and Animal Faith, Santayana set up the limits of our epistemological world through an unyielding and, some might say, a destructive scepticism. On the slim solipsism of the present moment, he constructed a theory of knowledge. In the Realm of Spirit, I believe he is doing, in principle, the same thing with distraction. He is setting up limitations for the spiritual life, not only declaring this is how far you can go, but also, here is the kind of ground upon which you can walk. For spiritual thinkers, especially those with mystical inclinations, the idea is to get off the ground entirely and that is why distraction is only negative for them. For Santayana, if the spirit ever leaves the ground entirely, it burns up like Icarus. Santayana does not believe there is a world behind and beyond this one. Santayana believes only in this world; through the spiritual life we gain a different perspective of this world and therein lies the value of spirituality. Santayana, as I read him, wants to take the sting out of the world in order that it be clearly understood. He wants to make it more like home. Unlike the mystics, he does not want to explain it away. I think we will see that even though Santayana talks of renunciation and detachment, he does so only negatively, to disinfect and to clean the spirit. Once that task is done, Santayana in a positive sense seeks to save the appearances and revel in them.

The problem of distraction both in its negative and positive senses is a moral problem. More precisely, it is a problem with moral roots, which later grows branches of aesthetic, religious, ontological, and epistemological implications. That distraction is a moral problem is revealed

by the fact that the spirit is interested in not being distracted. That distraction is a moral problem, I think is merely typical of Santayana's approach in general. As I cited earlier, Santayana says in a letter to Paul A. Schilpp that the concept of spirit interested him only as a technicality. His real interest was in the life of spirit. I believe we can take Santayana at his word here, since he emphasizes the same sentiment in many other works, and for Santayana this was not a failing, even though he has often been accused by others of not being technical enough in his philosophy. The priority of spirit as a way of life over the spirit as a concept reveals an attidue of Santayana's that is very important to recognize. In Aristotelian terms, the attitude could be described as function being prior to form. Or, in other words, to render and to comprehend the concept of spirit, one must see what the spirit does with all its vital signs in order. From an investigation of how the spiritual life emerges and thrives, we see what the concept of spirit is. The concept of spirit neither precedes the spiritual life logically nor temporally.

My discussion of distraction will center around Santayana's chapter entitled "Distraction" in the Realm of Spirit; however, other sources will be conferred besides this one. This will be done mainly to make sure that a myopic view of distraction in particular and spirit in general does not emerge. In an ancillary sense, I hope it will be shown that Santayana's thoughts on these subjects remained fundamentally naturalistic, even though they did not remain the same in any static sense.

First, I will look at the idea of distraction from a negative point of view. Distraction is that which the spirit seeks to escape. In the Realm of Spirit, Santayana says at the very beginning of the chapter entitled "Distraction": "We are distracted or distraught when torn asunder

by contrary and inescapable commitments."[6] Further, he says: "By distraction I understand the alien force that drags the spirit away from the spontaneous exercise of its liberty, and holds it down to the rack of care, doubt, pain, hatred, and vice. And I will distinguish the chief agencies in this distraction, after the picturesque manner of Christian wisdom, as the Flesh, the World, and the Devil."[7] The three forms of distraction are not entirely distinct from one another as Santayana defines them. All of them are always at work in human experience, the one or the other or the next coming to the fore to assert itself depending upon the situation. I think Santayana intends that these distinctions not be taken too strictly; however, I do think that some immediate notions ensue and that these ought to be not only taken strictly but quite seriously. (1) Santayana explicitly states that distraction is inevitable. ". . . the spirit suffers this distraction because it [spirit] exists."[8] Distraction cannot be entirely avoided, because it is a fact of life. (2) When one is distracted the <u>person</u> suffers. The reason why the person suffers is because his spirit has encountered an obstacle, and, as a result, the proper activity of the spirit is impeded. In a prosaic sense we can think of 'distraction' as the word is ordinarily used. For example: "I was distracted by the noise of the children while I was trying to read my book." Here is a case where my attention is directed toward reading and because of annoying outside circumstances, I am taken away from my "proper activity." (It should be noted that in a psychological sense, distraction is the opposite of attention. When one cannot focus his attention on something, he is said to be distracted. In Santayana's terms, not being able to attend to something, one is unable to clarify his interest in that something. In the psychological sense [which for Santayana

always entails a moral sense] we see that the spiritual life has its basis in the most rudimentary aspects of consciousness.)[9] In Santayana's more lyrical sense, distraction is the result of care, doubt, hatred, vice--the result of commitment in general. The Flesh, the World, the Devil drag us away from one kind of activity in order to involve, or better, to impose upon us, another kind of activity. In both senses, however, distraction is essentially the same. It is something we try to avoid. In both senses distraction causes us to suffer whether it be a petty annoyance or a tragic fate.

Further, distraction is felt either as the result of some internal cause or as the result of some external cause. Although I would not want to be strictly held to it, the Flesh generally represents internal distraction, the World external distraction, and the Devil, although internal in a unique sense, is caused in varying degress, both internally and externally. Santayana says that he makes his distinctions "after the picturesque manner of Christian wisdom," and since he does so, I will develop my analyses following those distinctions. However, even though his distinctions are picturesque, I think for the sake of clarity my additional observations and distinctions ought to be kept in mind. Simply, we ought to look at it like this: Santayana is talking about the spirit being impeded when he talks of distraction, impeded both internally and externally. When the spirit is impeded the person as we will see suffers a sort of pain. And pain, no matter how it is caused, is evil. "It [pain] exemplifies the very essence of evil for the spirit."[10]

In order to understand the senses of distraction--the Flesh, the World, the Devil--one must recall the idea of what Santayana means by 'psyche.' In every sense, the psyche is involved in distraction. When the

psyche is self-indulgent the person suffers the pains of the flesh. The world is that which nourishes the psyche and gives it a place to live. The Devil, at work everywhere, entangles the psyche and sets it fighting with itself and others. Although the psyche is the ultimate source of distraction, it does have a redeeming side which I will examine when looking at distraction in a positive sense. For the time being, however, the psyche should be seen as the ultimate condition under which we experience pain.

Distraction by the Flesh begins on the simplest level of human life, that is, on the biological level. This typical outset reminds one of Santayana's method employed in the Life of Reason. Whether discussing common sense or science, Santayana began with natural or historical origins in order to get a footing and then built from there. Here on a much smaller scale he recalls his old ways. On the biological level, we experience distraction in much the same fashion as do other living creatures. We seek to survive, to maintain a tenuous harmony of parts within our physical bodies. Essentially the instinct to survive is a search for safety in a precarious world. Yet even if relative safety is found, the laws that govern all physical existence will eventually destroy any inner equilibrium gained bringing with it pain and death. As Santayana says, physical pain is a sign that all remedies have failed.[11] Pain also is a sign that our body, no matter how well we care for it, is fundamentally weak and imperfect. On the one hand, our body, which in some sense we know better than our mind, is a friendly companion and not merely a vehicle. On the other hand, it is a monster that is eating us alive. The picture that Santayana draws of the biological world is one where conflict dominates and harmony comes up to breathe only on occasion and then only for

a short time. It is a horrible Darwinian world where there are forces at work over which we have no control and about which we hardly understand. If anything indicates that distraction is inevitable, it is here where distraction is most crude. Try as we will, in this sense we are distracted until we die.

On the biological level, it is a mistake to think of distraction strictly in a moral sense; that is, it is ridiculous to apply the adjectives good and evil to the facts of circumstance alone. We might say that physical existence is an evil in the sense that pain is a concomitant of that physical existence, and we all wish to avoid pain. However, that is as far as we can go, since there is no one or nothing responsible and no one or nothing to blame for the facts. The facts are neutral. Nevertheless we can go further and say that distraction on the biological level inspires moral feelings within, first in the form of empathy and then in the form of humility and charity on those occasions when we are witness to the suffering of others. "We do not ask whether the wretch lying robbed and wounded by the wayside deserves to be helped. He needs help, and that suffices to secure unreservedly our spiritual sympathy. His calamity is external to him. In respect to it, there is integrity in his soul, however distracted and criminal may have been the business that led him into his plight. We disregard these circumstances, which we feel to have been accidents in that blind life, snares into which a poor animal soul was drawn insensibly, filth that clotted and distorted it against its primary intent. Now in his extremity the broken ruffian is again a child. He asks only to breathe, to sleep, to be nourished, not to be tormented. And with that elementary Will in him the Will in every spirit is unanimous: all recognize the common enemy, physical misfortune, physical disaster."[12]

Here Santayana, the naturalist and humanist, shines as he did in the Life of Reason. The facts are neutral. True. Yet the facts in human experience are shot through with values, even at the lowest levels of experience. Sure, we do not ask about desert or responsibility where the mere facts are concerned. They are concepts useful only in special circumstances. Yet this does not preclude the use of all moral predicates. Physical pain, as Santayana says, calls for help, and man will respond to suffering.

As psychical life becomes more complicated, the facts become more and more value-laden. Also at the more complicated levels of psychical life, we have somewhat of a choice as to whether or not we are to be distracted. At the biological level the choice, strictly speaking, is not ours, the facts cannot be manipulated for our own ends. However, if we start talking about distraction, if intent comes into the picture where our interests are concerned, then we do have the option of either following our blind interests or formulating a different alternative. At this level one may begin to apply correctly the concepts of responsibility and the like.

Santayana discusses distraction at this more complicated level by turning to love. He says that in one sense love is unhealthy, that is, distracting, when it is merely concupiscent. Here the psyche is in a state of disorder. "Hence ill-timed cravings, annoyance, shame, hypocrisy and perpetual dissatisfaction."[13] Erotic love is not entirely satisfying and therefore is distracting because it has no direction and no end. It "pursues anything suitable that offers."[14] In another sense, there is a tame side of lustiness which is found in the domestic scene. Passion has been bridled by laws and institutions, yet it remains as distracting as

before. Santayana's description of the domestic life seems to border on parody. He talks of the family and its "belongings" and how such ties enrich the soul by "confinement." Family ties form "accidental" themes for the spirit. Love between a husband and a wife is a "partnership." And the result of all this is that "a household rather smothers the love that established it. Nature seems repressed there more than obeyed; the family becomes a political institution and a part of the world, where the fortunes of spirit are entangled in all sorts of interests not those of the heart."[15] This may be a harsh picture of love that Santayana is drawing, but his purposes warrant it. He is not merely being cynical or bitter about an unhappy youth. What is distracting about love in both cases is that often it is vain and seeks after a security that is not to be had. In Reason in Religion Santayana had talked about the same ideas using for illustration the mystic and the fanatic, the first being the "libertine" and the second the "prig." In the case of the mystic, it is a complete disregard for discipline that leads him to chase after superficialities. In the case of the fanatic it is a false sense of discipline that leads him to empty obligations. "Vanity, vanity is the common epitaph."[16]

The man distracted by love is in one way or another self-indulgeent and the self-indulgent man is nothing but a stock comic figure, the subject of the satirist's clean-cutting wit. Only the undistracted spirit is the subject of tragedy, that form of drama which shows man to be noble. The comic figure is the poor soul. At the comic figure we laugh until we cry. He is pathetic, and "laughter soon turns into a dead seriousness. This jollity has opened a long chapter of human responsibility, human conflicts and human sorrows."[17] Even the comedian himself who observes others in love is subject to the same distraction as he who is the brunt of the joke.

He is not a "free observer." The cynic, as Santayana calls him, "is divided against himself."[18] "His satiric scorn is not really merry; it mocks his secret sympathies, and betrays the spiritual confusion at the root of his being."[19] Although the cynic laughs at the folly of love, he nevertheless craves to be the victim of its wooing. He is a romantic manqué.

Whether love, in the sense I have been discussing it, is wild or tame, simple or sophisticated, it is always distracting because it is self-centered. It is something to avoid, if we want to be detached and free from the aimless pursuits of the flesh. What Santayana says of sophisticated love may be applied to all its unenlightened forms. Love attaches "the heart where nothing deserves or rewards attachment."[20]

As we just saw, man's servitude to the flesh was described first biologically and then emotionally. In both cases, Santayana used the psyche as the ground of both forms of distraction. When he, as we will presently see, discusses distraction by the World, we ought to keep in mind the things he said about the Flesh, since they are implied in the World. "The natural attachment of spirit to the world follows upon its attachment to the flesh."[21] Especially Santayana's moral tone ought to be kept in mind, because it is what is most importantly carried over to this other sense of distraction. "The necessary servitude of the spirit in man is thus double: to the great world, and to the animal psyche. The great world conditions psychic life; and the psychic life so conditioned conditions the spirit."[22]

That the last reference is taken from Dominations and Powers is significant for beginning this analysis of distraction by the World. Distraction by the Flesh would exist even in a state of nature. We might say

that distraction by the flesh is close to what Francis Bacon has called an "Idol of the Tribe." In a state of nature our bodies would still be weak, our desires would still be strong. In the World we become subject to the "Idols of the Market Place." Hence politics and economics come into play. However, although Santayana develops distraction by the World into a discussion of business at large, he begins in much the same way he did with the Flesh. In the case of the flesh, it was biology. In the case of the world, it is physics. "A fundamental point in which the political and the physical worlds are alike hostile to spirit is their instability."[23] Physical forces like biological forces are brute and dumb. The analogy, however, does not entirely hold between the affairs of the world and passion. As was suggested in Santayana's discussion of the flesh, when human culture with all its traditions and, more importantly, its institutions, become involved, there seems to arise an insidious design, a conspiratorial force, a paranoid would say, whose sole purpose is the stifling of the spirit. This notion with its implication of purpose is not essential to distraction by the Flesh, but it is essential to distraction by the World, i.e. the social affairs and the social institutions of the world. The reason, as I hope to show, why I claim that in the affairs of world distraction has become purposeful is because ideals are now truly in the picture; I say ideals as opposed to "aimless pursuits"; ideals, indeed, but misguided ones.

Let us look first at what Santayana says about physics. Like Santayana's discussion of biology, we should not expect a scientific discussion in any strict sense. Santayana is neither a scientist nor does he have scientific inclinations. His discussion of physics is a commonsensical look at physical existence with the intent of discovering its moral implications.

As I stated in an earlier chapter, it is well known that Santayana was a materialist. Materialism was a position he maintained throughout his intellectual career. So in order to understand how we are distracted by the World, we must first recall what materialism means to Santayana. It ought to be mentioned at the outset that like the flesh the material world causes pain, and therefore the material world is something the spirit seeks to avoid and transcend. (This is only, of course, in the negative sense of distraction of which I spoke earlier.) In the face of the material world Santayana says we are like "characters in a play, creatures full of limitations, and impatience, who are trying to preserve the past or command the future, but always in vain."[24] The World is "treacherous and unpredictable, blind and contradictory, and always making false promises."[25] In a nutshell, the reason for Santayana's moral stance against the world both in the physical and political senses is that it changes and the changes are "irrational," though not "mad." Everything that exists is material, and nothing exists apart from the material world. Yet the material world cannot be <u>proven</u> to exist. According to Santayana this is merely the ring of Common Sense.

> At first sight it might seem an idle observation that the first task of intelligence is to represent the environing reality, a reality actually represented in the notion, universally prevalent among men, of a cosmos in space and time, an animated material engine called nature. In trying to conceive nature the mind lisps its first lesson; natural phenomena are the mother tongue of imagination no less than of science and practical life. Men and gods are not conceivable otherwise than as inhabitants of nature. Early experience knows no mystery which is not somehow rooted in transformations of the natural world, and fancy can build no hope which would not be expressible there.[26]

From Santayana's common-sensical view of matter there has arisen a great deal of controversy as to where he exactly stands. Some say his is a thoroughgoing materialism, i.e. material existence is the first and

only reality. Others say that Santayana's materialism has a pragmatic flavor to it. And still others say that it is a latent idealism. As far as I can see, all of these, although serious in their intent, miss the point. I could envision, and in fact it might be true, that Santayana was all of the above. Yet his point, which as I have suggested before, is moral, would still hold. Firstly, by positing matter Santayana does not claim to know unequivocally of its existence. He believes it exists, that is, he has an animal faith in its existence. "Belief in substance, taken transcendentally, as a critic of knowledge must take it, is of the most irrational, animal, and primitive of beliefs; it is the voice of hunger."[27] Secondly, by believing in the material world, he contends that something exists independently of the mind and that all causes are physical.[28] Finally, wrapping up the first two, Santayana's materialism asserts that existence, since it is "groundless," is mysterious.

> Substance is to Santayana a serpent writhing away in the dark; we feel its pulsations, but we cannot see it. Strange how his hands, the immediate thing to common sense, has retreated into a lair from which it influences us at all points yet in its throbbing vitality defies our utmost efforts at penetration. Still modern science, as well as Heraclitus, confirms Santayana's intuitions. The more minutely scientists penetrate into atom and electron, the farther away they seem to get from the brute matter we brush against in daily life. And though they chart something of its behavior, their symbols become more and more erudite and matter remains as mysterious as ever.[29]

Historically, we have seen that Santayana's materialistic allegiances hark back to Democritus and Lucretius. In Three Philosophical Poets, Santayana expresses his debt to both these thinkers, and by so doing sets a definite moral tone to his physics. The material world is likened to dust where nothing remains for long. It seems that only death is victorious in the world; yet at the same time something new is always being born. Matter is "eternally fertile." The evanescence of the

material world taught Lucretius that life was vain, and it taught Democritus that life was a joke, while it taught both to shun mythical teleologies which seek to portray a universe at our service. The true materialist is merely an observer. As far as teleology is concerned, or any other ornamental conceptions, its explanatory force is verbal only, a "mock explanation." "Final causes certainly exist in the conduct of human beings, yet they are always inadequate to describe the events in which they are manifested, since such events always presuppose a natural occasion and a mechanical impulse."[30]

From the realm of matter everything arises. Another word for it is nature, but nature disinfected of speculative metaphysics. Physics, says Santayana, in the sense that physics is the study of matter in motion, reveals to us the "foundations of things." Ontology is a subsequent excursus of the mind."[31] Santayana, at other times, applies the words "universal mother" or "Father" when referring to matter. And he does so especially when he wants to convey the power of matter. However, these are only metaphors, literary pleasantries, and should be understood as such. Quite explicitly Santayana says the "Indispensible Properties of Substance" are: (1) "Substance is external to thought which posits it." (2) "Substance has parts and constitutes a physical space." (3) "All the parts of substance are external to one another." (4) "Substance is in flux and constitutes a physical time." (5) "Substance is unequally distributed." (6) "Substance composes a relative cosmos."[32] Substance, quite simply, is the underpinning of all being. Santayana says in "Note on Οὐσία" "Οὐσία" is traditionally rendered by "substance"--but it is rather the subject of discourse, Socrates, the horse; a logical entity with physical functions, i.e. something metaphysical. What corresponds to

what I call substance is not οὐσία , but ὑποκείμενον or ὕλη .[33]

As far back as Reason in Science, Santayana had said that his mechanistic view of substance did not stand in the favor of many. He said there exists "a reigning aversion to mechanism." I have no qualms about mixing materialism and mechanism, because I believe, although they are not identical in content, their implications for my purposes are essentially the same. It has been pointed out, notably by Milton Munitz, that Santayana's "notion of mechanism is reminiscent of that form of metaphysics which, in putting its emphasis on matter in motion, seems to relegate the facts of life, mind, and value to the sphere of appearances, thus recalling the "billiard ball physics" of the nineteenth century."[34] The materialism of the Realms of Being does bring up questions of a dualism between the mechanical and the symbolic features of being. However, as I understand the Realm of Matter, the emphasis is still on matter in motion; and for both mechanism and materialism "productivity" is central. My point, of course, is that mechanism (or materialism) and our aversion to it is related to distraction by the World. In this sense, I think I am not stretching matters when I say both concepts hold. One reason why we are inevitably distracted by the world in the physical sense is because we are not in control of events. As in the case of the Flesh, we are victims of circumstance. The world wags for reasons we do not understand or possibly for no reasons at all. Ultimate explanations of contingencies, explanations that seek first principles, unfailingly plunge into infinite regress. Even if we knew all the reasons, assuming there are some, we realize that our knowledge would be hardly efficacious. To know how and why the engine works by no means implies that we can change it to work differently, to suit our wishes. To think so would be sheer egotism.

So with or without our knowledge of it, nature moves at its own pace and on its inexorable way. If Santayana conceived the world to be less cold, if he conceived the world to be a stage of idolatry, many of our fears might be quelled. However, such a conception would ultimately be more distracting and less brave.

Morally Santayana's materialism asks a great deal of us. It asks us to be humble, to accept ignorance and failure. Most of all it tells us, not asks, that we cannot run away from the vicissitudes of existence. Whether we be Bishop Berkeley or Dr. Johnson kicking stones in refutation there is no refuge from the world; substitution of mental atoms for material ones solves nothing at all. Furthermore, what is frightening almost to the point of despair about Santayana's concept of nature is that not only is nature blind to our desires and deaf to our commands, it is entirely neutral in what it gives and what it takes away. Two examples will serve more than adequately to sum up. The first is fiction. The second is fact. In both Santayana declares, tough-mindedly as would a David Hume, that in the physical world everything has an efficient cause but not everything has a reason. As a result the world itself is distracting by its very meaninglessness. In "Normal Madness," one of Santayana's Dialogues in Limbo, Santayana dramatically portrays meaninglessness in a short tale about an old woman who prunes a mythical garden, an old woman who goes about muttering "surly words to herself which were not intelligible," an old woman who indifferently snips off the heads of young boys as well as those of flowering plants. More poignantly, in a letter to Iris Origo, Santayana writes about the death of her little boy and says: "We have no claim to any of our possessions. We have no claim to exist; and as we have to die in the end, so we must resign ourselves to die piece-meal."[35]

In the Realm of Spirit, Santayana begins his discussion of what I call distraction by the World in a political sense with talk about money, the earning of it and the keeping of it. Money represents security and power. With it, we think that we are able to control events in the political sphere of our lives. As a result of this false belief caused by a capriciously formulated ideal, we are distracted by the World. As is the case throughout all the aspects of distraction, Santayana is admonishing us again not to think we have very much at our command. The myth that money creates, i.e. the possession of security and of power, is particularly dangerous because it permeates our moral ideals and our moral actions as well. Santayana finds this form of distraction especially despicable, as many others have found it so, because unlike the more rudimentary forms of distraction we ourselves decide to worship the God of Mammon. Such worship is hardly based on sound judgement; rather it is based on impulse, an impulse without an ideal. In the words of Santayana's countryman, Don Quixote, "the possessor of riches is not rendered fortunate by having them but by spending them--and not by spending them as he pleases, but by knowing how to spend well."[35] As Santayana says: "Safety . . . is only good when there is something to preserve better than courage, and when the prolongation of life can serve to intensify its excellence,"[37] "Wealth must justify itself in happines.."[38]

For those who are distracted by the World the control that money brings means freedom from vicious circumstance. In Dominations and Powers, Santayana distinguishes between "freedom from" and "freedom to." The slave is occupied only with release, to be free from the shackles around his legs. Once free he finds he is troubled; he has given no serious thought to freedom and its implications; he has only seen one side of

freedom, hence the freedom that seems "so full of promise" is actually empty. "The charm of vacant freedom is entirely secondary, borrowed, deceptive."[39] Money, indeed, often affects release from one set of bonds, but it also establishes a new set of bonds that are equally undesirable even though apparently more comfortable.

> The poor and the very young may imagine that they would be perfectly free and happy if they had plenty of money. Money would procure all necessaries and comforts without labour, and would open the doors of all beautiful places and all important persons. The world would be at one's feet . . . . The world is to be that of the Arabian Nights, all magic entertainments and easy conquests. But in reality the rich, unless they are more than rich, are slaves to the world, and captives of their successes and their possessions. They must keep earning their money, or defending it, spending it as the world demands, trembling at losing it or finding it insufficient, and countering the endless claims, obligations, and jealousies that it brings.[40]

What futility! The more we attempt to become secure and powerful--the more we attempt to put events under our thumbs, the more insecure and impotent we become. Illusions thicken in our search for freedom from vicious circumstance. We become not only bound but entangled in the world all the time swearing we are free. And so "evolution has exacted a terrible price for its benefits by creating a new set of artificial wants and compulsions: the human slavery to labour, war, politics, morality and imposed religion."[41]

It might appear that Santayana is, in principle, merely parroting the ancient shibboleth, "money is the root of all evil." To some extent this is true; but it is not as simple. Money, I believe, is used by Santayana as a symbol for, on the one hand, activity or involvement in the world, and on the other hand, the means by which the world entices our baser yearnings. In a broad sense, money is the symbol of conventional morality and the one who pursues riches follows the actions and the ideals of others; he is not a thoughtful initiator of his own actions. Much of what Santayana had said earlier in his life in Reason in Society both suggested and

explicitly led to the conclusion that conventional society is irrational. Hence the conventionally moral man, too, is fundamentally an irrational creature. However, more importantly, the conventionally moral man not only sacrifices his rationality for the sake of impulses, he sacrifices his dignity, he gives up his self, not as the mystic does to God, but to the crowd.

Santayana was an advocate of individualism in his own way, but certainly not in a Whitmanian sense. For Walt Whitman everything is unique and worthy of praise, and so, as Santayana aptly criticized, nothing is unique and worthy of praise. If anything, Santayana was a strong opponent of any form of cosmic democracy where everything and everyone existed in a kind of lukewarm paradise. Nevertheless Santayana shared, I believe, this much with Whitman and his like, that is, Santayana saw society not only as a place where man could realize his potential but also, and possibly more so, as a place where man's dreams were blindly dashed.

> Occidental society has evidently run . . . into great abuses, complicating life prodigiously without enobling the mind. It has put into rich man's hands facilities and luxuries which they trifle with without achieving any dignity or true magnificence in living, while the poor, if physically more comfortable than formerly, are not meantime notably wiser or merrier. Ideal distinction has been sacrificed in the best men, to add material comforts to the worst. Things, as Emerson said, are in the saddle and ride mankind. The means crowd out the ends and civilization reverts, when it least thinks it, to barbarism.[42]

The key idea here is sacrifice. The world in the political sense is distracting because what it asks of us is irrational and too much. Society imposes slave labor upon the individual, especially upon the morally weak individual. It makes him work in order to eat and eat alone. Work offers nothing but money. In the modern world work does not even offer a finished product for the individual's pride, since the individual is just one part

of the assembly line. "The working world is distracted in the highest degree, because people are compelled to do what they do not wish to do, and compelled to put up with what does not content them. They are organized they know not why into a system of universal slave-labour for the production of rubbish."[43] Again from another source, namely, Dominations and Powers in the preface, Santayana says: "If one political tendency kindled my wrath, it was precisely the tendency of industrial liberalism to level down all civilization to a single cheap and dreary pattern."[44] In one sense, all the examples of how the world distracts us are Santayana's criticisms of Santayana's world, that is, the Victorian world where mechanization and commerce were fast on the rise. But I believe behind Santayana's criticisms of the world there is significance for any world. First, as far as money is concerned, economic slavery was a fact before the concept of money arose. Whether we are enslaved by a financial abstraction, feudal lords, or an untilled field, we are equally enslaved; only in the case of money, the enslavement has been taken to its absurd and most insidious extreme. Second, in the case of work, the theme goes back to Plato, and again modern conditions merely seem to augment the meaninglessness of work with no dignified end. For Santayana as well as for Plato, working to earn aliving alone is a perversion of what work ought to be. Work is supposed to earn one dignity. In work there is nothing but ourselves and work, in this ideal sense, is nothing but a search for ourselves. The man who sacrifices work in this ideal sense for work in the sense of earning a living is sacrificing himself and with himself his dignity as a human being. He has been duped most maliciously by the world, and in Kantian terms he is treating himself as a means, a commodity, and not as an end. Third, and finally, in the modern world

especially, there is a growth in the importance of public affairs and public interests. Inversely, there is a decrease in the importance of the individual. "This is not because the public is wicked but because it is public."[45] Although Santayana is an Aristotelian in many ways, I do not believe he sees the world in the political sense as being prior to the moral side of man. It is true that a man, especially one of distinction, suffers tragically in a poor society, in a company of fools. Society determines more or less what and how human potential will be realized. But unlike Aristotle and one of his followers, Dewey, Santayana believes the human spirit is in a sense autonomous, and not just conditioned by its social environment. The spirit has "moral autonomy in physical dependence."[46] It is the "moral centre of the universe," "a transcendental station" from where it surveys Being in all its forms and according to its own nature. As Santayana says in the "Indomitable Individual": "The individual is the only seat and focus of social forces."[47]

Distraction in every sense of the word seeks to destroy the individual. In the case of the flesh we are consumed by aimless passion. In the case of the world we are stifled by the trivial ideals of conventional morality. When we attempt to possess what cannot be had or to possess what is irrelevant to our nature we become troubled and hence obscure our real potentialities. Simply put, a creature in pain is unable to function well. He is sick. The medical doctor cleans the body of disease employing the necessary cures of his art. Or, if he a man of foresight and integrity, he counsels his patients on how to avoid disease before it strikes. In the same sense, Santayana, by discussing distraction by the flesh and by the world, is illustrating how the individual soul keeps alive, and not merely exists: the individual soul lives by both avoiding and renouncing

the intoxications of the flesh and the opinions of the world. The healthy and strong soul is impatient with the nonsense of the flesh and the world. It is better to cast it aside and to try to live like the poets, the hermits, and the ancient philosophers--with God, with nature, or with thought.[48] When I discuss distraction in the positive sense, later on, I will return to this topic of individuality. For now I will turn to the Devil.

Of the three facets of distraction, the Devil is the one that would most concern psychology. The Devil is "mental distraction."[49] Whatever the cause, be it external or internal, the Devil twists, turns, obscures, and contradicts healthy and unhealthy impulses alike in order to set the mind against itself. The Devil is the potential enemy of ourselves within each of ourselves. The Devil may use the Flesh or the World in order to wreak His havoc, or He may use the elements of the mind itself: language, reasoning, imagination, self-consciousness.[50] With the Devil in control, "when each passion begins to assert its primary right to life and to liberty,"[51] the psyche begins to disintegrate, the personality becomes divided, and hence the spirit suffers. The result of the personality at war with itself is insanity and possibly its extinction. But as Santayana says, insanity is an extreme form of distraction. Santayana's discussion of the Devil centers around a less extreme form of distraction, less in degree but not in kind; the principles and the results of the Devil are the same be they applied vigorously or moderately, the principles being based on confusion and the result of inner conflict. In contemporary terms, Santayana is not dealing with psychosis, he is dealing with neurosis; let us say neurosis with emphasis upon its moral and spiritual implications. He says:

> I conceive the devil after the manner of modern poets as a civilized tempter, intellectually inbred, and perhaps secretly ravaged by some beastly or insane force. He is aggressive and revolutionary, scornful of nature and custom, not merely whimsical and helplessly odd; much less is he to be identified with a genuinely original mind, tending to establish new standards in logic and morals . . . . The nerve of bedevilment is that it renders any harmony impossible either within a man or between man and nature. It is a rebellion of spirit against the sources of spirit; an attempt to be intelligent without docility, spiritual without piety, and victorious without self-surrender.[52]

Anyone--psychologist, philosopher, poet--who attempts to bring up the topic of neurosis will naturally lead his readers to wonder about comparisons or contrasts that might be made to Sigmund Freud. As far as Santayana is concerned, I believe little could be profitably developed in that quarter. Yet perhaps some mention would be enlightening. Santayana wrote too little about neurosis, in any systematic sense, to get a grip on what might be his ideas about it. He did write a small piece on Freud entitled "A Long Way Round to Nirvana," and in Daniel Cory's Santayana: The Later Years, I seem to remember Freud being mentioned in connection with Santayana's repressed personal feelings concerning sexuality. Allusions are made to psychoanalysis in Scepticism and Animal Faith and elsewhere. All in all the subject of madness both "normal" and otherwise crops up, I would say, with a fair amount of regularity throughout Santayana's intellectual career. It seems to have been of some concern to Santayana, and I think this general concern is related to what Santayana says about the Devil. One of the strong points that emerges from his discussion of the Devil is that He is inexplicable and works in as many mysterious ways as does God. To this extent I think we could say that Santayana was sensitive to what Freud was talking about in terms of the unconscious mind. Through parapraxes and dreams a great deal of unconscious material, according to Freud, can be interpreted and hence explained.

Santayana, unlike Freud, does not dig so deeply; yet for Santayana interpretation is very important for understanding the Devil, or at least trying to apprehend His ways. Santayana uses the literary figures Mephistopheles and Lucifer in order to describe the character of the Devil. Opting, therefore, for poetic imagery rather than logical and scientific rigor, Santayana is saying that maybe metaphor is the best we can do to understand the Devil or the inner workings of the mind as a whole; that is, here we may gain only dramatic not scientific truth.

The allusion I have made to Freud has an ulterior motive; it is a means of introducing an important point. It is crucial to realize, as I have already stated, that the Devil's ways are mysterious, but it is the reason why they are so which we should seek. The reason, as I understand Santayana, is that the Devil, unlike the Flesh and the World, is of the spirit. The Flesh and the World are sources of the spirit. They may be so conditioned to enrich the spirit or they may destroy it. But whether enriched or destroyed the spirit is affected by them from the roots, so to speak. In the case of the Devil, the spirit suffers and dies by itself, by its own madness, by rebelling <u>against</u> its sources. In the case of the Flesh and the World, we have the sources poisoning the spirit; in the case of the Devil, we have the reverse. What this means is that the Devil is not merely another facet of distraction; it is a form of distraction that in some sense is qualitatively different from the Flesh and the World.

The Flesh and the World are discovered to be distracting to the spiritual life by simply observing them. This is not entirely so with the Devil. Manifestations of the Devil can be observed, but since His actions are in the mind, they can only be imaginatively conceived. The Flesh and the World are metaphors for the sake of poetry. The Devil must be

metaphorical because empirically and logically He can never be seen. He is not a substance. He is a kind of internal activity that causes self-destructive overt behavior. Santayana says that the Devil is of the spirit. The Devil is not an object of experience. He is a demon of consciousness. In this sense, Santayana may be a good deal like Freud, except I do not think that Freud would like to admit that ego, id, libido, and superego are merely metaphors.

As we have seen, scientific psychology is a part of biology. It describes and explains the behavior of animals, that is, it investigates the nature of psyche. The contents of scientific psychology are publicly observable events; being in space and time these events are objects of experience. Scientific psychology is clearly in the realm of matter. As far as distraction is concerned, we could say that the distractions of the Flesh are discovered through scientific means, that is, through the observation of the biological conditions of existence. For the modern behaviorist, a strict empiricist by tradition, scientific psychology, as it is defined by Santayana, is the only means by which we can know about the mind. Some radical behaviorists would even say that what we mean by the mind is simply that it is equal to overt behavior. Santayana does not accept this one-sided view since it leaves untouched that aspect of mind which we figuratively call 'inner.' Inner life cannot be <u>explained</u> scientifically, but it can be <u>interpreted</u> in a literary sense. Hence, Santayana says we have literary psychology. "Literary psychology is the art of imagining how they [animals] feel and think."[53] Its concern is with the "moral field." What Santayana means by the moral field is that the "literary psychologist divines the existence of thoughts and purposes in nature: . . . a reading of the flux of nature in terms appropriate only to spirit. The result of literary psychology is myth."[54]

Santayana uses the mythological character, the Devil in order to imaginatively explain insanity, the self-destruction of the spirit. Unlike the Flesh and the World, the Devil must be viewed metaphorically. He is a figment of the imagination, and only as such can one get any insight into the inner life of man--that side which science by its own standard cannot. A strict behaviorist might say that since the inner life of man is inexplicable in terms of scientific principles, we ought simply to disregard it. Santayana would say that that attitude is unnecessarily dogmatic. If we have some means of entering into the thoughts and feelings of man, be they imaginative or what not, then why not try them. As long as we know that we are not speaking scientifically, there is nothing to fear. Has it not been the poets, the playwrights, the story tellers who have plumbed the depths of the inner man, the unsystematic men of imagination who have often inspired the systematic men of reason to formulate their schemes? One need only look at the references made by the great scientists of the mind from Freud to Skinner to appreciate the debt these men owe to the men of art. Personally, I find the art vs. science notion entirely repugnant, and I do not think that Santayana's distinction between scientific and literary psychology was meant to add fuel to the fires of either side. If anything, I think Santayana's distinction tries to show implicitly that the scientific and literary ways of looking at things go hand in hand; they are complementary.

As far as the Devil is concerned, we are not to take our myths about Him, in particular, or about the spirit, in general, in any literal or descriptive sense. Myths are meant only to suggest possibilities. However, "such myths should be taken seriously . . . . They should be made to yield whatever insight they can."[55] The insight that is gained through

the figure of the Devil is that not only is He the harbinger of evil, He may well be the very ground of evil. Like all mythical characters the Devil is invisible. He is nowhere to be found. Nevertheless, He is distracting. He is an imaginative force, hence a mysterious force; maybe for the very reason that He is intangible, is He so insidious. The Flesh and the World may be easily avoided as compared with the Devil, since at least they are concrete. Even the deceptions of the Flesh and the World are merely complex, something to unravel like a ball of knotted string or a problem in chess. The Devil's work is not merely complex, it is profound. There is often nothing to see, nothing to unravel. Yet, at the same time, does not the Flesh rot and the World crumble whenever the Devil enters? Being essentially mythical, the Devil does not have to abide by the ordinary laws of nature. (We must always keep in mind when dealing with Santayana that we are dealing with an expert in language. All the nuances must be considered.) The Devil is a fallen angel. In the great chain of being He is above the Flesh and the World, therefore more powerful than they because He is incorporeal. I am sure Santayana took all these notions into consideration when he decided that the Devil would represent insanity, or, better, moral disease.

The Devil reveals Himself in fundamentally three ways through omnipotence, omniscience, and impiety. In every case the spirit takes on the character of the natural self, the psyche, a pose which undermines the spirit's function and one which consumes the spirit and the psyche alike. Like the glutton whose main impulse is to possess and consume everything, ultimately the bedeviled spirit loses everything by self-destruction. In everyone of the ways in which the Devil creates discord by a wanton self-indulgence, the final result is egotism. As we saw

earlier in Santayana's career, egotism seems again to be the culprit which thwarts, no, renders impossible, moral or spiritual well-being. Implicitly Santayana is saying all problems, moral and spiritual, lie within us; implicitly, all problems, moral and spiritual, are solved by self-knowledge. Here in a nutshell is the disease of the Devil. When the psyche usurps "those divine prerogatives proper to pure spirit--

> the assumption of jurisdiction, of centrality, of comprehensiveness then becomes an insult to the rest of nature. Spirituality has become egotism; and the ego, full of natural pride and jealousy, begins to assert itself defiantly, arguing the absolute freedom of some natural impulse in the self, not because this impulse is natural (as all impulses must be) but because this impulse is mine, because it exists, because nothing else can abolish its right to be as it is. But in reality this self, this psyche, is a natural and precarious growth in the heart of nature, the creature and sport of circumstances; any separation or superiority assumed by it is a lie.[56]

Santayana's discussion of omnipotence in the Realm of Spirit recalls his short discussion of magic in Reason in Religion. Believing in one's own omnipotence is like believing in magic since in both cases there is the belief that we possess powers we do not have. Essentially the belief is a lie we tell ourselves, a lie which attempts to create the illusion that one's powers are unlimited. Spiritually, the pose of omnipotence is one completely unwarranted. The spirit functions only to comment on existence, not to change it.[57] Nothing is gained when a spirit believes it possesses magical powers. "An experimental study of nature would have served better; because while this, too, subjects the spirit to a forced discipline, it secures genuine results, genuine wealth, genuine powers over matter, and above all it yields cogent and steady images of things, and methods of thought; whereas magic is as vain as it is pretentious, confused and idiotic."[58]

It is the psyche which has power; however, its power is hardly unlimited, and it is the spirit as the voice of the psyche that discerns the psyche's limits in order to hold vanity and pride in tow. This is the true dignity of the spirit as far as its relation to the psyche is concerned. The spirit's realization that omnipotence is a shaky pose makes the psyche all the more sane. Here we see that the spirit in a sense has power and in a sense it does not. Although the spirit is powerless, that is, it cannot cause anything to occur, the healthy spirit is the reason why a psyche can be free from the Devil. Loosely we do say that understanding causes certain mental states of affairs, certain feelings. But here we mean 'cause' in the same sense that words can cause joy or anger. The power of the spirit, in so far as it understands, is analogous to the power of words. This is not to be confused with the power of the Word of God which is an efficient cause in some sense. The power of the words of the human spirit, in terms of the pose of omnipotence, reveals the limits of the psyche's powers in order not to be destroyed by ambitions impossible to realize. "The dream of spiritual omnipotence . . . is shallow morally, because omnipotence, if we had it, would merely stimulate our will to try every folly, not recognizing any limits or character to our human nature, or to the vocation of spirit in its very special ideal infinity and peace. We should be more distracted than ever, thinking we might do anything and become everything; as magicians actually are distracted by their nostrums and shams, and as wealth and science are distracted in their worldly triumphs."[59]

There is no need to go into the details of omniscience and impiety since the outcome of both is essentially the same as omnipotence. By committing "intellectual suicide" or establishing intellectual anarchy or

"divorcing itself from piety," the spirit deludes itself by imagining it has powers it does not possess. "Pure spirit . . . is selfless. Separation, judgement, scope, while they are essential to a witness that is not an actor, involve no arrogance, so long as this superiority remains spiritual only, impartial, docile to every possibility, respectful to every power, and charitable towards every feeling."[60] The spirit only becomes corrupted by the Devil when for one reason or another it comes a "will-ful egotism, be it in a man, in a nation, or in a philosophy. Then spirit, instead of being a diety in swaddling clothes, born helpless and despised, to suffer in all who suffer, and rejoice in all who rejoice, becomes the voice of an animality that has taken to praising itself, unnecessarily and wickedly confirming itself, in the name of heaven, in all its partiality, delusion, injustice and hate."[61] "For the Will in spirit is precisely not to will but to understand the lure and the sorrow in all willing."[62]

Santayana sums up the discussion of the Devil with some remarks about the "inevitable sadness of imperfection,"[63] remarks which I believe not only sum up the Devil but all the aspects of Distraction. At the same time, this summation gives us a glimpse at what I call the positive sense of distraction. In heaven, there is no distraction, as Santayana says there is no faith, because heaven is perfect; both distraction and faith are reserved for Hell and Purgatory. The fact that there is imperfection in the world "touches the heart with hopeless sorrow."[64] Yet the more spiritual one becomes "the less absolute that universal imperfection will seem."[65] To become more spiritual in a sense means to seek perfection from within the spirit. "The criterion of perfection must not be imposed from the outside."[66] There is no transcendent God to look to, according to Santayana. To look for perfection within means to actualize one's

individuality minus the distracting, hence self-destructive, elements of egotism. That which is perfect in us is the ability to see, to understand, and to enjoy what we experience without being absorbed in passing events and the urgency we tend to feel about them. In the undistracted spirit there is none of the paranoia of the world against me and vice versa, paranoia being the insane extreme of egotism. When perfection is sought from within "even the successes of the psyche now interest us not as prizes gained but as harmonies achieved, as ideas defined, illuminated, made to shine before the spirit in all their perfection."[67] However, "the psyche, which is itself a physical episode, cannot help being absorbed in passing events, in things to be done or enjoyed here and now at all costs, with absolute rebellion against denial; but the spirit in turn rebels against that distraction, contemplates that necessity, and masters both as far as it can."[68]

3. LIBERATION (OR DISTRACTION IN THE POSITIVE SENSE)

The positive side of distraction is seen through Santayana's idea of liberation; it is implicit there. In the positive sense of distraction, we will see that Santayana is very careful not to destroy the individual by spirituality but to clarify what the individual must do in order to maintain his identity while at the same time being free from distraction. In short, the positive sense of distraction implicit in liberation reveals how the individual remains individual without being egotistic.

Santayana was quite familiar with religious and mystical traditions, so that I am sure that the problem of liberation and individuality was known to him. In the mystical traditions, liberation is a common idea, a goal for the mystic. However, for the mystic liberation from distraction means a loss of identity in order to be consumed by the All. Santayana saves his idea of spirituality from these mystical flames by what I call the positive side of distraction, that side which maintains that distraction is the inevitable fate of spirit as long as it lives, that is that the positive side of distraction morally ties us to existence so that we are forced to act and to suffer in the world and hence maintain the dignity of being an individual. In so far as individual identity is actualized by liberation, the Flesh, the World, and the Devil, as the grounds and limits of the spirit, are necessary elements in the spiritual life. Without them, the spirit not only cannot fulfill itself, it cannot exist. Only as an individual human spirit can we seek for that perfection within.

In an earlier section, I discussed how Santayana did not share in the psychological underpinnings of mysticism. Now I will show that through liberation, since one is forced to act in the world, liberation does not merely mean a freedom from distraction, but more importantly a freedom to act through distraction.

> Thus in the midst of labour and war--in the worst conflicts of life with matter and of life with life--the spirit is able to rise clear and to attain perfect freedom in art or in heroism. This possibility shows us once more that spirit does not come from or demand another world, or reject any form of life as unworthy. It is ready to participate in any undertaking and to rejoice in every achievement. What it requires is form, distinctness, in that action, so that there may be intuition of its character and of its field: and this intuition in turn cannot attain distinctness and form, cannot become what it aspires to be, unless there is an approach to wholeness in the movement that produces it.[1]

In the chapter entitled "Liberation," Santayana contrasts his idea of liberation with some traditional ones. He refers mainly to those religions and philosophies which posit another world. For them, the issue of liberation is relatively clear-cut. One is liberated by rejecting the material world for a heaven of some sort. But, according to Santayana, this idea is somewhat naive since another life in another world would not solve any problems for the spirit, its problems would merely be extended and the "spirit would find itself there as much entangled and beset, if not as much tormented, as it ever was in the human body."[2] Quite generally, any idea of a personal soul which survives this life in another life is essentially based on materialistic principles; an individual soul in another world would still necessarily face circumstances regardless of whether they be ghostly or not.

The Indians, according to Santayana, have a more sophisticated view of liberation, precisely because the personal elements are taken

out of it. With the Indians, it is still a question of another world, one beyond this one, the world of Brahman, but the "reality" which one seeks in Brahman does not result in some personal salvation; what one seeks is an identity with Brahman, a reality beyond the empirical world, which destroys personal identity; as long as one is individual there is no salvation. According to the Indians, the reason why we suffer, why we are attached to a personal identity, is because of ignorance. Santayana says: "Thus when the Indians tell us that only ignorance makes us suppose that a world exists or that we have a natural self living in that world, I would understand them to speak of moral ignorance only. . . ."[3]

Both the examples of the traditional ideas of liberation are, as I said, contrasts to Santayana's view of liberation. Of this he is absolutely explicit. However, since Santayana has been accused of being mystical I think the latter view he cites, namely, the Indians', ought to be pursued a bit. I shall pursue this latter and not the former view because no one, as far as I know, would say that Santayana's spiritual life is an argument for the immortality of a personal soul. But many commentators have suggested that Santayana was led astray by mysticism, Indians' and others', and that detachment in the spiritual life which Santayana talks of is one which, like the Indians' means a release from the empirical world--the world of appearance and action.

Before looking at what liberation, according to the Indians, means, I would like to mention something about Santayana's knowledge of this tradition. From Santayana's writings one gets the feeling that he indeed read some of the "Indian" literature. However, I do not believe one could call Santayana an expert on Indian thought or even a student of

Indian philosophy. Only on a few occasions does he make explicit reference to where he has gotten his ideas, and by the very fact that he refers to an extraordinarily complex tradition as "Indian" is telling. To talk of "Indian" philosophy or religion is so vague that it is virtually meaningless. I think that Indian thought simply served as suggestion for some of Santayana's own ideas, and nothing more. Actually, he goes so far as to distort outright some of the ideas of Indian thought in order to accommodate them to his own; for example, above where Santayana equates "ignorance" with "moral ignorance." Such an equation is highly questionable and to know so one need only cursorily examine the idea of Advidya (Ignorance), a prominent idea in the major movements of Indian thought. I mention Santayana's slight grasp of Indian thought in order to point out that what he calls "Indian" is not so much legitimately Indian as Indian a la Santayana. So then, those scholars who are apt to say that Santayana was led astray by Indian mysticism had better look again. Because Santayana throws around terms such as Brahman, Nirvana, Karma, and the like means absolutely nothing as far as his understanding of Indian thought is concerned. Indeed Santayana was fascinated by the Indians, and I am sure the fascination was intelligently pursued, but it does not follow that he took the time to understand them or that (more unlikely) he was a disciple. Santayana was not the kind of character to be a disciple of anything.

By looking at Indian mysticism, I want to develop the argument that Santayana was merely curious by mystical ideas, Indian or otherwise, and not really affected by them profoundly. There is too little similarity and too much difference between Santayana and many mystics to

warrant any serious comparisons. Of course, comparisons can be made between any two things, but the question remains: to what end? In order to see dramatically the contrast between Santayana's idea of liberation along with the implicit positive sense of distraction contained in it, I am going to look at the idea of Moksha (Liberation) as it occurs in the philosophy of Sankara, the father of Advaita Vedanta (Non-Dualism). I choose Moksha as it is expressed by Sankara precisely because it is an idea of liberation in the extreme; it contains no positive sense. Moksha entails a complete renunciation of the empirical world, a complete loss of self, a complete denial of the worth of any action whatsoever. Although it may sound odd, if one attains Moksha, one is guaranteed a liberation from the world which is more absolute than death, since in death, according to Indian thought, it is possible to be born again. One who has attained Moksha is saved from the cycle of life and death. In Santayana's terms, Moksha is a complete freedom from distraction.

The idea of Moksha comes out of the Upanishads and the Mahabarata and is interpreted in a variety of ways by the schools of Indian thought. In Sankara, "Moksha transcends the three goals of life recognized by the Hindu tradition--as being legitimate--kama, artha, and dharma--'desire or pleasure, the acquisition of wealth, and the pursuit of righteousness.'"[4] The way to Moksha is strictly through knowledge, however, knowledge not in a scientific, ethical, or even metaphysical sense. Moksha is sought for the sake of salvation; the knowledge we seek, then, is not one to explain the world. "We do not explain the world. We explain it away."[5]

The idea of Moksha presupposes three important concepts: Brahman, Atman, and Maya, which need to be looked at. Since these concepts, like

Moksha, are used differently in each school of Indian thought, I will present them in the context of Advaita Vedanta which, by the way, in the East, has the philosophical and historical status of let us say Platonism or Kant's Transcendental Idealism. In short, Advaita Vedanta is a well-recognized and powerful intellectual movement in the East, even to this day. What follows is merely a sketch of Advaita Vedanta and ought to be taken only as such. My point is, of course, only to use it as a contrast to Santayana.

Advaita means non-dualistic. Vedanta means the final aim of the Veda. And the Veda means knowledge in a theological sense. Knowledge in a theological sense means the knowledge derived from the Upanishads, i.e. the identity of Brahman and Atman. Advaita Vedanta, then, is a philosophy of non-dualistic knowledge. In Sankara's introduction to the commentaries on the Vedanta Sutras, he explains what he means by 'non-dualism,' hence explaining the essential aspect of his philosophy. The material that follows his introduction is all for the sake of the concept of non-dualism, either to refute other positions, notably dualistic ones, or to develop the idea of soul and its final release. The same is true of his popular writings, that is, they all, regardless of the particular subject matter, revolve around non-dualism. Non-dualism is Sankara's system and everything emanates from this simple yet fecund notion.

> The system proceeds from a very simple assumption--and one which has some spiritual backing. This is the thesis that there is complete identity between the self (Atman) and the one Power (Brahman) sustaining the cosmos. It follows that the apparent multiplicity of selves is an illusion; and by extension, the whole variegation of empirical existence is likewise illusory. There is, then, only Reality, and everything else, in so far as it gives the impression of being a substantial and independent reality, is productive of a kind of bewitchment of the mind. The Power [Brahman] alone exists: or in different terms the Self [Atman] alone exists--and empirical

> existence is an insubstantial appearance. Once this has been realized existentially, there is release [Moksha].[6]

The preceding passage is a capsule of Sankara's system, and I believe there are very few scholars who would not agree that it is generally accurate.

Ninian Smart defines the Brahman of Sankara to be the "implicit power of growth."[7] Yet at the same time Brahman is said to have no attributes. Contradiction apparently surrounds Brahman as Paul Duessen points out: "'Non-Existent was this in the beginning, thence the Existent arose' while on the other hand it is said: 'Existent only, dear one, was this in the beginning, alone and without second.'"[8] Brahman is sometimes conceived to be personal, other times to be impersonal. He is Intelligence and Bliss. He is the Being of all beings, and He is free from all Evil and all Causality. Brahman is without form, differences, and limitations. Brahman is "'not thus, not thus' (neti, neti) i.e. no shape and no idea corresponds to his real being. Therefore, it is 'different from what we know, and from what we do not know.'"[9]

Of Brahman the one thing which seems to make any sense is "neti, neti," since for the most part nothing really substantial has been applied to Brahman. I could even continue in this vein quoting from the Upanishads, the Vedanta Sutras, and sundry secondary texts yet without going much further in saying anything positive about Brahman. Well, in some sense, that is the crux of the matter. According to Radhakrishnan, we get to the real by showing the unreal. Quoting the Vedanta Sutras, he cites: "Whenever we deny something as unreal, we do so with reference to something real. . . . Something is not, means something is."[10] The use of negatives, then, is not meant to show non-existence; that would be

absurd, as Sankara says, and would imply "the doctrine of the general Void."[11] The negatives are meant to bring home the point that Brahman exists but not on an ordinary plane. Brahman is beyond speech and thought. "Brahman is that whose nature is permanent purity, intelligence, and freedom; it . . . does not fall within the category of 'object.' . . . Of this Brahman our text denies all plurality of forms; but Brahman itself it leaves untouched. This the Sutra expresses in the words, 'for it denies the suchness which forms the topic of discussion.'"[12] Radhakrishnan says that Sankara uses Brahman in somewhat the same way that Descartes used the cogito. Both the cogito and Brahman can be conceived as being the foundation of reality as well as being identical with reality itself. The difference between Descartes and Sankara is that Sankara does not say that Brahman is a substance, whereas for Descartes the mind is. Brahman is a "supersensible reality" or a permanence within the world of change, or maybe outside the world of change. Some scholars have likened it to the Greeks' logos. "We may speak about it, though we cannot describe it adequately or have any logical knowledge of it. . . . Brahman has no genus, possesses no qualities, does not act, and is related to nothing else."[13] "It can only be negatively described as the other of its own otherness. It is sat [real], meaning that it is not asat [unreal]. It is cit [consciousness], meaning that it is not acit [unconsciousness]. It is ananda [bliss], meaning that it is not of the nature of pain [duhkhasvarupa]. . . . It is real and yet devoid of the nature of the world."[14]

On the purely objective side, reality is Brahman. On the purely subjective side reality is Atman. And both Brahman and Atman are one;

Atman is the Brahman (reality) that is within us. It is the immortal in us which is free from desire and pain and which is wise and self-sustaining. If one knows Brahman, it necessarily follows one knows Atman. By saying that Brahman and Atman are one, Sankara is committed to the view that objective reality is characterized by consciousness. However, here as with Brahman, we are not to think of consciousness in any ordinary sense, i.e. consciousness is not to be thought of as possessing the faculties of perception, imagination, reasoning and the like. Atman is not the individual ego by any means. In reference to Brahman, Radhakrishnan said that there is some similarity between Sankara and Descartes; it is no wonder then since Brahman and Atman are one that Smart would say this about Atman:

> Sankara claims that we are introspectively, through an immediate intuition, aware of an 'I' which is prior to all particular contents of consciousness: a subject which is never itself the object of discriminated experience and which is therefore of the nature of pure consciousness. . . . Moreover, we can be assured that our awareness of a pure subject indulging psychological phenomena is not mistaken, since the statement "I doubt the existence of the self" itself presupposes the doubting I. But further, if the self has no features, being pure consciousness, one cannot individuate one self from another, i.e. there is one Self only.[15]

It must be pointed out that although the presence of Descartes is clearly felt, one cannot trust the feeling entirely. Descartes' and Sankara's intentions are not quite the same. Descartes was for one reason or another trying to <u>prove</u> the existence of the ego, the thinking self. Sankara attempts no such proof, even though Smart's passage may suggest so. The existence of the individual self is an illusion, while like Brahman "unknown and unknowable, unprovable, and self-proved is the Atman."[16] Again Radhakrishnan says: "Though it [Atman] escapes our knowledge, it does not entirely escape us. . . . It cannot be proved,

since it is the basis of all proof and is established prior to all proof."[17]

As in the case of featureless Brahman, Sankara divests Atman of all content in order to arrive at a consciousness that is "pure." Atman is pure intelligence in the sense that it is pure light. Atman, however, embodies no activity like that of ordinary intelligence. If it were an activity, it would be an agent of some sort and hence it would be limited. Atman is none of this. Atman is infinite and eternal. Like Brahman, since they are one and the same, Atman cannot be positively described. In chapter X entitled "Right Conception of the Nature of Consciousness" in the Upadesa sahasri, Sankara makes these remarks: "I am the supreme Brahman which is pure consciousness. . . . I am by nature devoid of objects. . . . No perception belongs to me. Beginningless and devoid of attributes I have neither actions nor their results. Therefore I am the supreme One without a second."[18]

As I noted earlier, since Brahman and Atman are one, Sankara is committed to the view that objective reality is consciousness. I think that should be clear now. Also, and importantly so, another point should begin to make a bit of sense, and that is the reason why nothing can be said of Brahman. The reason is that Brahman is not Object, it is Subject. Paul Duessen puts it nicely when discussing the possibility of perceiving Brahman. He says: "That the attributeless Brahman cannot be perceived depends on the fact that He is the inner Self of all; as such He is on the one hand the greatest certainty of all and cannot be denied by anyone; on the other hand He is not to be perceived because in all perception He is Subject, and can therefore never become object."[19]

The identity of Brahman and Atman is the gist of Sankara's nondualistic system, however, one is unable to realize this identity, that

is, one is not liberated (Moksha) until one has "explained away" Maya (the empirical world).

Any discussion of Maya, according to Sankara, is in reality, that is from the metaphysical point of view, about illusion. Brahman-Atman is the only reality, the result of Knowledge (Vidya). Maya is the result of Ignorance (Avidya). Depending upon the translator or scholar, Maya is said to be, along with illusion: delusion, magic power, becoming, dream, phenomena, unreal. In the Brhad-Aranyaka Upanishad it is said: "This whole world the illusion maker projects out of this Brahman. And in it by illusion the other is confined. Now one should know that Nature is illusion. And that the Mighty Lord is the illusion maker. . . ."[20] All the objects we perceive, all the concepts which result from what we perceive are tricks. Thus the knowledge we have of the world is based on error, or more emphatically, Radhakrishnan says "positive error."[21] Sankara characterizes the world in this way: "She has no beginning. . . . She is neither being nor non-being, nor a mixture of both. She is neither divided nor undivided, nor a mixture of both. She is neither indivisible nor whole, nor composed of parts, nor a mixture of both. She is most strange. Her nature is inexplicable."[22]

Imagine we are all an audience at a magic show where the Magician is performing a trick where he holds before us what appears to be a snake. Actually it is a rope. There is nothing to fear in reality, the rope cannot bite. However, most do not realize that the appearance of the snake is merely a trick. Most do not even realize that it is a magic show and that on stage there is a Magician. Most believe that the Magician is a snake charmer and nothing more. Those who fall for the

trick are lost in ignorance, they cannot discriminate between the real and the unreal; between the temporal and the eternal. He who takes the snake for what is real is "He who perceives diversity in Brahman [and] goes from death to death. . . ."[23] The snake-rope example is one that Sankara uses throughout his works, and the example applies to the external world as well as the individual soul. It illustrates Maya and Ignorance.

It may be wondered: Does Maya cause Avidya or vice versa? The question is not an easy one to answer. Sankara is not clear on this point, and scholars do not agree. For my limited purposes, I shall say that they go hand in hand being two sides of the same coin. What I want to make clear about both Maya and Avidya is: (1) Being multipliciy (the world of names and forms) and forever changing, Maya is unreal and our knowledge of Her is as reliable as the knowledge gained from a dream. Or from the Avidya point of view: "the whole aggregate of individualizing bodily organs and mental functions, which in our ordinary experience separate and distinguish one giva [soul] from another, is the offspring of Maya and as such is unreal."[24] The real, according to Sankara, is one and permanent, therefore, all empirical knowledge is opposed to the metaphysical knowledge of the Vedanta.

> For all those laws of empirical knowledge and action are valid for us only so long as we are influenced by Ignorance, resting on a false transference, which nature imposes on us, of which it is said in conclusion: "Thus it stands with this beginningless, endless, innate transference, which in its essence is a false assumption, producing all the conditions of doing and enjoying (or suffering) and forming the natural standpoint of all men. To remove this, the root of the evil, and to teach the knowledge of the unity of the soul--this is the aim of all the texts of the Vedanta."[25]

(2) Ignorance, the root of evil, is conditioned by Upahis, i.e.,

"individualizing determinations" or "ascribed limitations" which Maya imposes or which is self-imposed by Ignorance. Because of the Upahis, the soul identifies itself with the body and sees itself as a part of the empirical world. By its connection with the Upahis, the soul sees itself as not being omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent, rather the soul sees itself as an individual and so becomes an agent, one who possesses desires and aversions.

"Moksha is a matter of direct realization of something which existent from eternity, though it is hidden from our view. When the limitations are removed, the soul is liberated."[26] When limitations are removed Atman and Brahman are one, and giva (individual soul) is virtually no longer functional in the sense that the knowledge it brings has no value. "Sankara declares in many passages that the nature of liberation is a state of oneness Brahman . . . so the state of Moksha cannot be described in terms of our knowledge."[27] Our knowledge deals with space and time, cause and effect, persons and things, etc.; Moksha is beyond all these. As a matter of fact, when one has attained Moksha, the world and our knowledge of it "becomes for him false and illusory."[28] "It is because of this, that liberation is not accomplished through any sort of work, nor through moral improvement, but by knowledge (not in the ordinary sense) alone."[29] If Moksha were established by means of works or moral improvement or anything for that matter which entailed limitations, then literation would never be absolute. Moksha belongs to incorporeal Being.[30] "If dependent on works or any other of the forms of Maya, it would necessarily be: (1) transitory (owing to the consumption of works), (2) graduated (because of their different value), both of which contradict the

conception of liberation as an eternal and paramount condition (admitting neither less nor more)."[31]

At the level of the identity of Brahman-Atman, there is no action; more emphatically, there are no attributes at all which the identity possesses; Brahman-Atman is not the identity of two objects. Through Moksha, we are swept away from all of the pain in the world, we break the bonds entirely. "The question of the possibility of a release from individual existence which forms the cornerstone of the Vedanta as of other Indian systems presupposes the pessimistic view that all individual existence is a misery."[32]

> If he knows Brahman works are of no weight,
> To him there cleaves no stain of earthly woe.[33]

Through the ideas of Brahman, Atman, Maya, and Moksha, Sankara, like many other mystics, tries to arrive at a sense of sameness.[34] It is multiplicity which is an illusion. "The more intellectual mystics do not merely deny that things can be different, but, as we know, try to prove that they cannot be."[35] The illusion of differences is likened to a kind of blindness or immaturity of the intellect which once enlightened would reveal reality, but a reality which seems to be nothing but a vacuum. On Sankara's view of Moksha, both experience and reality in an ordinary sense seem to be impoverished beyond restitution. Recalling the paradoxical character of mysticism in the psychological sense, we end up, from another angle, with what Stace refers to as the "vacuum-plenum paradox": Brahman is both personal and impersonal. Atman has both qualities and no qualities. Liberation is both negative and positive.[36]

Before looking at Santayana's view of liberation let us simply note the obvious contrasts of his view to the Indian view. (1) Santayana's

spiritual life embodies none of the metaphysical or theological paraphernalia of Sankara's Non-Dualism. Although, as I mentioned earlier, mysticism in general does not need a religious soil in which to grow, it does need super-scientific presuppositions like "Reality" or "Pure Consciousness" or "The One." Notwithstanding Sankara's claims, these are illusions, or at least unwarranted assumptions which Santayana always sought to avoid. Santayana's is a philosophy of disillusionment which begins in scepticism and is built upon the solipsism of the present moment. (2) Liberation, according to Sankara, means non-attachment or complete freedom from distraction. For Santayana, as we shall see, liberation means detachment from distraction. The distinction between non-attachment and detachment, Santayana suggested in a passage I quoted earlier from his "Apologia": detachment always implies being previously attached to something. In this sense detachment can never be complete. I may renounce and detach myself from my nationality, my religion, my family, but always I will be an American, Catholic, Perricone. Non-attachment does not imply attachment at all. Atman was never attached to giva. Giva, in the words of Sankara, is "superimposed" upon Atman. Giva like every other aspect of Maya is a trick, so that attachment itself is just another form of illusion. (3) Finally, I think the most important point for my thesis is that liberation, according to Sankara, entails no work, no moral improvement. Liberation is inaction, hence it is an amoral idea. Nothing, as we shall see, is more foreign to Santayana's idea of liberation or spirituality in general than the idea that inaction is an ideal. For Santayana, ideals, by definition, entail action since they are born of interests. In the most general sense,

then, Sankara's philosophy is impious, a form of distraction by the Devil, since the spirit in it denies its attachment to the sources of its being. Sankara falls victim to "the pride of Lucifer," "the mock independence of the Stoic sage," "the egotism of German philosophy," and most notably to "the acosmism and absoluteness of the Indian mystic." Sankara's thought is "a flight through nothingness." "The trouble with such forced attitudes is that they attempt to divorce spirituality from piety, which is the other half, and the fundamental half, of a sound religion."[37]

At the outset of this discussion I said that Sankara's thought offers an example of a most extreme sort of mysticism. Unlike in the West, Eastern thought has not suffered from fears of inquisition as far as mysticism is concerned, at least from a social and political standpoint. Hence it has had a free rein to develop in some of the most radical ways. Although this is a complicated historical matter, one of the reasons for this is that the idea of a transcendent God has not played the same role in the East as it has in the West. Unlike in the East, it is blasphemous, no, an outright heresy, in the West to say that the individual soul is identical with God. No Western mystic, anyway years ago, would have gotten away with any idea resembling Moksha. In the West, there always had to be a sharp distinction between the soul and God. For this reason, Western mysticism has been for the most part less radical in its claims than Eastern mysticism. Meister Eckhart serves as a good example of one who tried to protect his mystical views from the charge of heresy. For him it was possible to actually unite with the Godhead yet in every creature's soul there was a "spot" which was absolutely distinct from the Godhead and characteristic only of the

creature himself. Unfortunately, as I mentioned earlier, though careful in his distinction between Godhead and creature, even Eckhart in his mystical zeal was brought up on charges of heresy. However, as far as Santayana is concerned, whether the mystics are as radical as Sankara or less radical than some of the Christians or even as conservative as many of the Jews (the Jews seem to be the least tolerant of mysticism in their ranks of all the great religions), although inspired by the trappings and flavor of mysticism, Santayana is fundamentally non-attached to it.

In the most general sense, Santayana escapes many of the faults inherent in mysticism because of the positive element of distraction implicit in liberation. This positive element of distraction, contrary to mysticism, unequivocally asserts that there are limitations to liberation, that liberation is never complete. It is surprising that S. Freud, with whom Santayana had intellectually little in common, expressed virtually the same idea of distraction. By mentioning Freud I think it will help to shed some light on what Santayana says. Freud says there are "three sources from which our suffering comes: the superior power of nature, the feebleness of our own bodies, and the inadequacy of the regulations which adjust the mutual relationships of human beings in the family, the state and society."[38] In Santayana's terms these three sources are: the World, the Flesh, the Devil, respectively. As Freud expresses it,

> In regard to the first two sources, our judgement cannot hesitate long. It forces us to acknowledge those sources of suffering and to submit to the inevitable. We shall never completely master nature; and our bodily organism, itself a part of nature, will always remain a transient structure with a limited capacity for adaptation and achievement. This recognition does not have a paralyzing effect. On the contrary, it points the direction for our activity. If we cannot remove all suffering, we can remove some, and we can mitigate some. . . .[39]

Of the third source of suffering, Freud says we have more control over it than the other two, however, for my point, I simply want it recognized that the third source of suffering too "points the direction for our activity."

In the earlier discussion of distraction in the negative sense, even in terms of the Devil, it was somewhat evident that the negative sense implied a positive sense. For example, since the ambitions of omnipotence and omniscience were the workings of the Devil, one could infer that limitations were a necessary feature of the spiritual life. Explicitly, from the positive side of distraction, Santayana states that one must recognize his limitations in order to live spiritually; these limitations are necessary conditions for spirituality and as necessary conditions they keep spirituality down to earth and within the realm of human action. Santayana says that:

> there are animals, there are races, there are circumstances in which spirit may take happy but very limited flights; a little wit, a little fancy, a little innocent pleasure; and no repining, no suspicion that bolder flights are missed. If we regarded such limitation as unfortunate or wrong, we should be condemning every phase of spiritual life possible to man; because all phases are conditioned and limited by the same power of circumstance that keeps the child a child, and a drudge a drudge.[40]

The limitations we possess are simply a part of our human nature, and in an oblique way, one recognizes his limitations by the interests which he has. It is not, however, limitations themselves which are the cause of the problems for the spirit. The problems for the spirit are the lies and the false hopes which grow out of the limitations with which the spirit is faced; we have the power to manipulate our environment to certain limited ends, yet often out of this limited power, harmless and often beneficial in itself, we are deluded in thinking that our

power is unlimited, there is born a megalomaniac. Although this seems like a fundamental mistake, upon the slightest reflection, a laughable sort of egotism, nevertheless the empty drive for unlimited power is sadly evident throughout the history of mankind. Omnipotence, like other forms of distraction, cuts out from under our attachment to the world. The pose of omnipotence and the like are the poses of the "baffled child." While in the positive sense of distraction, the spirit recognizes that it "has no materials or instruments of its own with which to build a better world, except in fancy; and even fancy will dry up and lose its charm if not constantly fed by external contacts."[41] Spiritually, "The better we know the world the more inescapable will be our perception of its tragic and comic character, that is to say, of its vanity as an experience and of its richness as a truth."[42]

As we saw in Sankara's radical mysticism, liberation means to lose oneself and not to be born again. Santayana says this is a "negative solution."[43] On Santayana's account of liberation, one detaches himself from his individually peculiar impulses (interests) and sees them as pathetic accidents.[44] "Physically, existentially, historically, nothing will be changed by this second insight; but morally the whole natural world, with our persons in it, will be removed to a distance."[45] Again we notice the allusion to the theater. But again, let us also notice that although spiritually we are not merely actors we participate all the more so in the drama. The Flesh--"It is then the flesh as a power that liberates us from the flesh as an obsession."[46] The Flesh alone does not imprison the spirit. It imprisons it only when it "distorts, starves, and degrates"[47] itself. When the Flesh is a constructive

force, when it is enlightened, it gives birth to the most profound feeling in man--love. The World--"Nor is it liberation for the spirit to be removed from the world."[48] The world is the inevitable home of the spirit, better, as suggested by Santayana's autobiography, the world is the spirit's host. Being the inevitable environment of spirit, the world is "its appointed theme when spirit is intelligent."[49] As far as the World is concerned, Santayana is so close to that spirit of the life of reason for which he was praised by so many, so close to bringing together the idea of the man of contemplation and the idea of the man of action that I must quote in its entirety what he says about the world as distraction in the positive sense.

> Perhaps a purely sensuous, musical, or conceptual life might never discern a material or social world beyond the sphere of linked images; but when images are acted upon and understood, when objects, events, possibilities and certainties loom before the mind, then spirit, by becoming intelligent, becomes a conscious and absorbed inhabitant of nature. It lives by finding itself in the world, by seeing how the world wags, by tracing with emotion the tragedies of history. The greater the range or deeper the insight of spirit the more inextricably will it live the life of the world, though not as the world lives it. Ignorance is not liberation; and for that reason the world is such a slave to itself; not in the least understanding its own mechanism or foreseeing its destiny. But spirit, in the measure which, by attentive study and sympathy, it may have understood the world, will be liberated from it, that is, from distraction by it.[50]

The Devil--"As for the Devil--all that mesh of deceit, which language, imagination, reasoning and self-consciousness weave around the spirit out of its own creations--the devil needs indeed to be exorcised, but cannot be destroyed so long as spirit endures, because in their substance the two are one."[51] The Devil surely exhibits both the negative and positive aspects of distraction. He is a fallen angel, so while He deceives us, "We need only follow the thread backward through that diabolical labyrinth to find the gate to freedom."[52] As with the Flesh and

the World so too with the Devil we attain liberation through Him. ". . . but only a long discipline can avail in most cases to smooth out all sophistry and banish all pride, so that undisturbed by the devil, spirit may deploy all its notes and all its tints in a new springtime of inspiration."[53]

"Health and knowledge: essentially nothing more is requisite for liberation from distraction by the flesh, the world, and the devil."[54] Liberation is not an escape from living. It is a learning how to live.[55] "Individual life must subsist, with a station from which to survey the world, a set of organs and interests to canalize that survey, and render it graphic, lyrical, tragic, and moral, if ever the spirit is to arise or to endure or if in any positive sense it is to be liberated."[56] Yet it seems, and Santayana recognizes it, that the spirit is caught between Scilla and Charybdis. If liberation is as the mystics claim, then liberation means extinction. If liberation is as Santayana would like it to be, i.e. liberation through the Flesh, the World, and the Devil, then is there not endless distraction? ". . . it might seem that for spirit there were no salvation at all."[57] But this is only what seems. Liberation is another level of psychic life. Liberation "is not to lose or destroy the positive possessions to which the spirit was attached. It is merely to disinfect them, to view them as accidents, to enjoy them without claiming, to transcend them without despising them."[58]

We can begin to get an idea of what liberation means as health and knowledge, if we backtrack and look at an essay published several years earlier than Realm of Spirit in 1933, an essay entitled "Ultimate Religion." Ostensibly the essay, which was written for the commemoration

of Spinoza's birthday, reveals Santayana's intellectual debts to Spinoza's philosophy, however, also quite obviously one can see the groundwork of some of Santayana's ideas on the spiritual life.

In the beginning of the essay Santayana asks: "What inmost allegiance, what ultimate religion, would be proper to a wholly free and disillusioned spirit?"[59] Implicit in this question is: what are the requirements for health and knowledge? Santayana thinks Spinoza an outstanding philosopher because "he reconciled his heart to the truth. Any clever man may sometimes see the truth in flashes; any scientific man may put some aspect of the truth into technical words; yet all this hardly deserves the name of philosophy so long as the heart remains unabashed, and we continue to live like animals lost in the stream of our impression, not only in the public routine and necessary cases of life, but even in our silent thoughts and affections."[60] In a trivial sense, I think Santayana is slightly mistaken here. In so far as the truth is revealed by anyone and by any means, I think it deserves the appellation 'philosophic' in the broadest sense of the word; that is, a truth is potentially grist for any philosophical quest. In a more profound sense, I think Santayana is right on target. The truth, as he expresses it, is useful to man. In a figurative sense the truth implores us to use it, yet as is commonly recognized, both philosophers and laymen alike neglect to use, to act upon, the truth when it is revealed. This is a very old story yet one which is entirely with us to the very present. "So long as the heart remains unabashed" the truth is useless, no it is a farce, and those who pursue it buffoons. Liberation as health and knowledge is the first step in that conversion, that change of heart, which will make the

truth useful, not only useful when the truth is easily swallowed, in our favor but also when it is not, when it hurts.

Santayana asks his readers (and audience--this essay was delivered at the Hague by Santayana) to abstain from all "easy faith" in order to begin on the path of spiritual self-knowledge. He does not ask his readers to be radical sceptics as he asked in Scepticism and Animal Faith. However, he does call for a certain amount of scepticism when he says: "imagine the truth to be as unfavourable as possible to your desires and as contrary as possible to your natural presumptions; so that the spirit in each of us may be drawn away from its accidental home and subjected to an utter denudation and supreme trial."[61] In this way without the support of our aspirations we may quietly observe what we find, "and whatever harmonies may then appear to subsist between our spirits and the nature of things will be gifts to us and, so far as they go, unchallengeable possessions."[62]

Santayana is calling for an introspection which some psychologists would say is hardly possible, and if possible at all, only open to a few particularly honest and acute minds. For those who are radical to the extent to say that any introspection at all would be riddled with insurmountable self-deception, to those I would say that any honesty at all on their account would be precluded from expression since if every introspective act were one of self-deception then chances are that every judgement about anything else other than the self would be also open to deception. In other words, self-deception is not special in itself, it does not work on different principles from deception in general. Anyway, Santayana is not asking us to purify ourselves of all deception, he is

merely asking us to let go of our "easy faith." I mention all this as an aside only because it is obvious that Santayana is calling for introspection, for "self-examination," and I want it to be clear that he is not asking too much of introspection and what he is asking, in spite of a small group of radical psychologists, is an old and established method of investigation, and one with some, although not absolute, credibility. I should add that it might be true that fruitful results from introspection could only be gained by a few particularly honest and acute minds, however, that, of course, does not discredit introspection itself.

What is the result of the examination which Santayana calls for? ". . . the spirit has come upon one of the most important and radical of religious perceptions. It has perceived that though it is living, it is powerless to live; that though it may die, it is powerless to die; and that altogether, at every instant and in every particular, it is in the hands of some alien and inscrutable power."[63] Santayana says he will not call this power almighty, since he does not know how much it can do, but he does say that it is "omnificient: it is to me, by definition, the order of everything that is done."[64] In short, this power is matter. With the realization of power, Santayana asks us to submit to it and by submitting to it learn its ways. Therefore, "from being passive my spirit becomes active."[65] If one is not submissive to the power which he recognizes as being more powerful than he, then his spirit will remain passive never able to learn the truth, never able to experience a change of heart. One who does not submit to power greater than his own is like one who complains about the weather and never takes the opportunity to see the regularity in its changes, hence he never sees that the weather

can work to his advantage. Also this passive-active idea which Santayana expresses here is no paradox. Santayana is saying that that part of us which believes, which cares, fears, hopes--which puts its "eggs" in the future or is imprisoned by the past, viz. the psyche, must learn to be passive in order that the spirit can flourish. Quite simply, if one is distracted by power--and power is the root of distraction--the spirit is never liberated to learn. In the following question Santayana makes this clear. "In proportion as we renounce our animal claims and commitments, do we not breathe a fresher and more salubrious air?"[66]

Spinoza's philosophy, according to Santayana, is based upon health and knowledge. Notwithstanding its rationalistic zeal which Santayana questions, Santayana characterizes Spinoza's thought as "that intellectual love of God in which the spirit was to be ultimately reconciled with universal power and universal truth. This love brings to consciousness a harmony intrinsic to existence. . . ."[67] Santayana makes it clear that harmony intrinsic to existence is not precisely the harmony of the life of reason, since it is not a harmony of the psyche "resting on faith," "but a harmony [in spirit] which as far as it goes, is actual and patent."[68] "In the realm of matter, this harmony is measured by the degree of adjustment, conformity, and co-operation which the part may have attained the whole; in a word, it is measured by <u>health</u>"[69]--this is the harmony of the life of reason. However, "In the realm of truth, the same natural harmony extends as far as do capacity and pleasure in understanding the truth: so that besides health we may possess <u>knowledge</u>."[70] Knowledge shows the spirit how to live and to live with dignity. ". . . spirit, however cruelly circumstances may play with it, remains

congenitally positive, self-justified, heroic; it has been sent into the world by the very power by which the world was created; and it aspires to live, to find a good and beautiful world to live in. It loves, and although it suffers only because it loves, it wills to love and to suffer."[71] There is no hard and fast distinction between health and knowledge just as there is no hard and fast distinction between psyche and spirit, since we see that both are the result of power, of matter. Also, the peace which one finds in both health and knowledge is "no dead peace" as one would find in the selflessness of Indian thought, in dreamless sleep. In health and knowledge, the spirit rejoices. Santayana here brings spirituality down most clearly to naturalism, while making health and knowledge inseparable. "In so far as omnificient power endows us with health, we necessarily love that power whose total movement makes for our own perfection; and in so far as we are able to understand the truth, we necessarily love the themes of an intense and unclouded vision, in which our imaginative faculty reaches its perfect function."[72]

According to Santayana, it seems that Spinoza more than any other philosopher was a liberated man, and to illustrate I can do no better than simply to note Santayana's words:

> Of this religion of health and understanding Spinoza is a sublime prophet. By overcoming all human weaknesses, even when they seemed kindly or noble, and by honouring power and truth, even if they should slay him, he entered the sanctuary of an unruffled superhuman wisdom, and declared himself supremely happy, not because the world as he conceived it was flattering to his heart, but because the gravity of his heart disdained all flatteries, and with a sacrificial prophetic boldness uncovered and relished his destiny, however tragic his destiny might be. And presently peace descended; this keen scientific air seemed alone fit to breathe, and only this high tragedy worthy of a heroic and manly breast. Indeed the truth is a great cathartic and wonderfully relieves the vital distress of existence. We stand as on a mountain-top, and the spectacle, so out of scale with all our petty troubles, silences and overpowers the heart, expanding it for a moment into boundless sympathy with the universe.[73]

Liberation as health and knowledge takes place simultaneously[74] in two dimensions: what Santayana sometimes calls the lateral or horizontal dimension and the vertical dimension. The horizontal dimension is the materially active dimension of liberation. Socially, the horizontal dimension exists "in so far as a man's thoughts are absorbed in instrumentalities, in business or politics or war or jollification."[75] Religiously, too, the horizontal dimension exists in so far as liberation means "the escape or migration, or resurrection of spirit . . . in the direction of further instances and developments."[76] The actual material resurrection of Jesus Christ would be an example of the horizontal dimension, religiously. The vertical dimension of liberation is an ideal dimension, and ideally liberation can take place at any moment. In other words the vertical dimension makes liberation possible now. On the vertical dimension liberation is always at hand. Yet the vertical does not undermine the horizontal at all. The materially active and the spiritually active are concomitant dimensions of liberation. To live in the vertical in the spiritual dimension is merely to shift centers. Using the Biblical characters Adam and Christ, Santayana illustrates the two points of view.

> In Adam, in the human psyche, the spirit is secondary, dependent, intermittent, only a point of view occasionally taken histrionically, by transcending animal egotism only the better to serve it; but in Christ, in the spirit that then enters into us, the opposite happens. There the centre is divine, and what is put on like a garment or a dramatic mask is human nature. And though this assumption of humanity be voluntary, the very fact that it is voluntary makes it incomplete. The humanity that can coexist with divinity in the same person must be a singularly chastened, subordinated humanity. Such in fact is the humanity depicted in Christ and admitted by Christians into their ideal of life.[77]

Although the horizontal and vertical dimensions of liberation are concomitant, Santayana emphasizes the vertical dimension, the ideal

dimension. The horizontal dimension is necessary for liberation, however, if one were to live on the horizontal plane alone, that is, if one were to live without ideals, liberation would not be possible. As I have pointed out, on the horizontal plane one is at the mercy of events. Actually, however, for man it is impossible to live on the horizontal plane alone. Man's life is never entirely at the mercy of events, since by necessity of his nature, it is shot through with ideals. The vertical plane in man then is as necessary as the horizontal. It is as if to say that man by nature can be impartial in his views of things, as a knower of ideals, while at the same time these ideals are born of man's partiality. But this, of course, is merely to restate what has been said already, i.e. man is both attached to and detached from the world, man is liberated by means of two dimensions in his life.

As early as Reason in Religion, there were intimations of the distinction between the horizontal and vertical dimensions. What I have in mind are the ideas of a belief in a future life and ideal immortality. The distinction between these two ideas reveals: (1) how the horizontal dimension by itself cannot lead to liberation, yet (2) how when the horizontal dimension is idealized, what alone seemed like crude superstition, now can be transformed into something to live for. This process of idealization effects the shift of the center from Adam to Christ. On the horizontal plane alone ideals are introduced only to serve to better animal existence in the world. Whereas on the vertical plane that part of me which impells me to transcend the world, which looks beyond my interests, is served. My interest in transcending the world is an interest which does not merely serve to better animal existence, i.e. material

existence. My interest in transcending the world serves my ideal existence, and this interest is a disinterested interest. If I am interested in the ideal aspects of something, I am only secondarily interested in that something as an existential event or what have you. I am not interested in form as I am in food.

The idea of disinterested interest can be traced back most notably to Kant and his Critique of Judgement. For the sake of a working definition, it would be profitable to keep some of Kant's thoughts on the subject in mind, even though his thoughts on the subject are not strictly the same as Santayana's; for example, Santayana is not interested as is Kant in setting up a priori principles of aesthetic judgement. Also, Kant sometimes talks of aesthetic experience as satisfying without reference to any interest; this, of course, is entirely foreign to Santayana's view of either aesthetics or the spiritual life. Leaving differences aside, however, Kant's idea of disinterested interest, in so far as it emphasizes attention on form[78] and that one derives satisfaction from attention on form, is quite close to what Santayana has in mind. The satisfaction that one derives from attention on form for both Santayana and Kant is the result of a harmony, "harmony in the play of mental powers,"[79] of an internal harmony, which as Robert L. Zimmerman, a Kant scholar, says of Kant, and it equally applies to Santayana, is extremely difficult, if possible to describe directly. However, as Zimmerman goes on to say, there is a patent difference in what one feels when one is hungry and what one feels when one is standing before a beautiful landscape. ". . . one can at least roughly approximate the difference by calling attention to the pure bodily process in the first

[the appetive feeling] . . . and the rational [ideal]-but-bodily conditioned feeling in the aesthetic state."[80] The point of this is that disinterested interest although it does not directly serve animal existence, there is satisfaction derived from it. The satisfaction is in the very act of idealization itself.[81]

In a note in the Critique of Judgement, the editor quotes Mendelssohn on the "disinterestedness of our satisfaction in the beautiful."[82] Although as the editor points out, "disinterestedness," according to Kant, goes beyond what Mendelssohn says, I think what Mendelssohn says is quite to the point in the case of Santayana. "'It appears,' says Mendelssohn, 'to be a particular mark of the beautiful, that it is contemplated with quiet satisfaction, that it pleases, even though it be not in our possession, and even though we be never so far removed from the desire to put it to our use.'"[83] A disinterested interest in ideals, as I believe Santayana would express it, is one which is quiet and one which is not interested in possession. In so far as 'disinterested' means not being interested in possession, manipulation, and the like for the sake of serving self-interest in material concerns, Santayana would say we have a disinterested interest in ideals, alone. Yet at the same time, since ideals grow out of animal processes, we are never far removed from the interest to find a use for the ideals we contemplate. Yet, again, as we contemplate ideals and find satisfaction in that act, use is a secondary concern. I should add that both Santayana and Kant are clear about the fact that contemplation of the beautiful and contemplation of ideals respectively require both an "intellectual process"--an interest in form--and an "accompanying animal process," e.g. an organ of sight.[84]

Animal processes are the determining ground for the ideal or aesthetic state. Also, the aesthetic or ideal state for both Santayana and Kant is related to moral, spiritual, and religious experience. (Although for Kant, alone, the aesthetic experience is quite unique.) Finally, the brief comparison I have made between Santayana and Kant is not intended to go beyond the question of form. The comparison is not intended to identify aesthetic experience and ideal experience, i.e. the vertical plane. The point has been to illuminate the idea that a disinterested interest in form is satisfying. If anything, the relationship between aesthetic experience and ideal experience (contemplation) is as Irving Singer suggests. Although I do not follow his position to the letter, I think he is correct in saying that aesthetic experience is a species within the genus contemplation or ideal experience.[85]

The existence of a future life, as we have seen, can only be based on materialistic principles. To believe in a future life means to believe in a life which is an escape from this one but is "in the direction of further instances and developments." A belief in a future life is an animal concern. In Reason in Religion, Santayana sharply criticizes the idea of a belief in a future life, and thinks it fatuous and inadmissible in any rational religion. Santayana rejects the belief in a future life first on the ground that such a belief is not in the province of religion at all; actually it is an empirical question for science to deal with. Second, he rejects the idea on moral ground. If anyone thinks Santayana's ideas on spirituality, in general, are tender minded let them note the following. Santayana had the resources of wit to cut you without your feeling it and also to clobber you silly. The following on the

supernatural is an example of one of Santayana's clobberings.

> That such subtler influences [of the supernatural] should exist is entirely consonant with reason and experience; but only a hankering tenderness for superstition, a failure to appreciate the function both of religion and science, can lead to reverence for such oracular gibberish as these influences provoke. The world is weary of experimenting with magic. In utter seriousness and with immense solemnity whole races have given themselves up to exploiting these shabby mysteries; and while a new survey of the facts, in the light of natural science and psychology, is certainly not superfluous, it can be expected to lead to nothing but a more detailed and conscientious description of natural processes. The thought of employing such investigations to save at the last moment religious doctrines founded on moral ideas is a pathetic blunder; the obscene supernatural has nothing to do with rational religion.[86]

Ultimately, Santayana argues that a belief in a future life may be an ideal since the belief can be traced to man's interests; however, "To say that an ideal will be inevitably fulfilled simply because it is an ideal is to say something gratuitous and foolish."[87] The belief in a future life is an empty ideal, because it adds no inspiration to life, it is merely "an immortality of selfishness."[88]

The doctrine of immortality lends itself to more confusion than any other religious concept, a confusion between moral truth and superstition. The question of the belief in a future life is a matter of blind faith. ". . . it is a prophetic hypothesis regarding occult existences."[89] The question, then, of immortality in this sense is one of a scientific nature. Santayana cites one of the arguments which might be used to prove immortality. For example, a man is essentially the same man in the morning as he was the night before, even though there has been a break in his consciousness. "After many changes in his body and after long oblivion, parcels of his youth may be revived and may come to figure again among the factors in his action."[90] With such evidence, if one wants to call it such, the mind with occult tendencies may argue that it

is reasonable to suppose that "breaks in consciousness" are signs that a soul may be transported from one body to another at a different time and a different place. Most of the occult evidence, purportedly scientific, has been hogwash. It has, for the most part, played upon the gullibility of others. As a result what has been claimed to be scientific or religious has merely been side-show black magic. And many people have fallen into the clutches of tricksters' arguments whose sole product is pathos.

Probably the main reason and cause of our doctrines of immortality are moral demands. Death is surely a feared and unknown event, therefore illusion and superstition can easily surround it. One of the illusions is that after death ultimate rewards and punishments are dealt out, and that these rewards and punishments are based upon your past conduct on earth. "To establish justice in the world and furnish an adequate incentive to virtue was once thought the chief business of a future life."[91] Rather than helping the cause of justice, however, this notion has done more to aggravate it. If anything it has made men more vain and more selfish; based upon the shaky foundations of artificial reasons the chief value in life is its prolongation. "It would be genuine happiness for a few to rise again in the flesh and live forever in Ezekiel's New Jerusalem, with its ceremonial glories and civic order. It would be truly agreeable for any man to sit in well-watered gardens with Mohammed, clad in green silks, drinking delicious sherbets, and transfixed by the gazelle-like glance of some young girl, all innocence and fire."[92] Again: "Being apparently interested in nothing but their own careers, they forget that a man may remember how little he counts in the world and suffer

that rational knowledge to inspire his purposes."[93] Belief in the future world has never given man any direction or purpose in the here and now, consequently this sort of immortality has added nothing to the nobler instincts of life. As T. Sprigge says, and I think this the gist of Santayana's point, "The animal dread of death is a fact to be faced as well as we can, helped by our recognition of its essential irrationality, for the judgement that mere duration of existence is a good as opposed to approximation towards our ideal in our time, is not one which can be sustained on reflection."[94] Those who have argued from the moral considerations of immortality have appealed to our egotistic sensibilities and have pulled a sophistic trick on us. They have argued for the egotistic claim that what I want will be, never realizing that what I want may be foolish.

There is a form of immortality, however, that is not an egotistical one, one compatible with realizable human aspirations. This form of immortality rather than stifling the possibility of human fulfillment, allows for its possibility and encourages it. Santayana calls it "ideal immortality." "Ideal immortality is a principle revealed to insight; it is seen by observing the eternal quality of ideas and validities, and the affinity to them native to reason or to the cognitive energy of mind."[95]

Ideal immortality the vertical aspect of the whole question of immortality draws its vitality from the horizontal aspect, i.e. the belief in a future life, but transforms the selfish belief into a spiritual ideal. The disinterested interest in the vertical saves the horizontal from distraction by the world. ". . . for life would not be healthy and free, but diseased and slavish, if it were ultimately turned

only towards its instruments and to the pressing need of keeping itself going; a life so employed would not be worth living, and a healthy spirit would abandon it."[96] What transformation means then is taking an idea, immortality, which obviously has had a powerful influence over people, removing the venom of illusion with which it has become imbued, and then turning it over in order that it will serve as inspiration for our thoughts and actions. This is not an inspiration based upon a faith in some future reward but upon the human imagination and the possibilities it offers now. As we shall see later, this is the reason why Santayana talks about the idea of Christ and not the historical Christ. In general, this theme, which occurs in Reason in Religion and later in Realm of of Spirit and Idea of Christ in the Gospels, harks back to an earlier work than all of them, that is, to Interpretations of Poetry and Religion where Santayana identifies the highest poetry and the highest religion. The transformation of the belief in a future life to ideal immortality is a transformation of religion as pseudo-science to religion as poetry. So, too, in general, the transformation of the horizontal dimension to the vertical dimension is a transformation from concern with facts to concern with ideals.

The possibility of immortality exists via the path of ideal immortality, which begins in the Flesh, in love, whether it be sexual, fraternal, or paternal. A love, which when it becomes enlightened, implies sacrifice, a sacrifice of self-interest. We give ourselves to others by loving and reproducing, and by giving way to others we find ourselves reborn. "Nature, in denying us perrenial youth, has at least invited us to become unselfish and noble."[97] Although altruism finds its

expression, especially in parental and social scenes, we never entirely forget our mortality, and how the world blindly carries us along. ". . . spiritual interests can never abolish or cancel natural existence on which they are grafted."[98] Death remains an evil under all conditions. The material world is and ought to be a constant reminder of our dependence to it. We are not essentially "free and victorious creatures."

Memory offers us the evidence that we are victims to an ever-changing material world.

> In endowing us with memory, nature has revealed to us a truth utterly unimaginable to the unreflective creation, the truth of mortality. Everything moves in the midst of death, because it indeed moves; but it falls into the pit unawares and by its own action unmasks and disestablishes itself, until a wonderful visionary faculty is added, so that a ghost remains of what has perished to reveal that lapse and at the same time in a certain sense neutralize it.[99]

Memory brings us down to the lowest depths of existence and makes us shudder, but it also is that power that can make us be like the gods. Santayana explains that it was a divine oracle that told us of our mortality making us partners with the gods' eternity. The oracle gave us the feeling that we are dying in a world of flux and along with that feeling the knowledge of memory that allows us to enter an ideal immortality.

By combining our ability to love and our ability to remember, we are able to be "immortal in representation." The representation is not a superstitious fiction. The representation is a true picture of experience and a "knowledge of mortality." With the ability to remember we are able to gather a fund of experience that allows us to reflect intelligently upon the ideal and its eternal quality. In so far as we can see behind and beyond the present moment, we can detach ourselves from the

flux and personal destiny. Detachment, as Santayana explains, is no guarantee for eternal life or absolute happiness, however, it opens up the possibilities for intelligent pursuit of life and all that goes with it. We are then able to escape death, not biological death, but spiritual death, by circumventing the imperfections of an ever-changing world. To this extent <u>through</u> the Flesh, the World, and the Devil, man is able to free himself from distraction. So that ideal immortality is an escape from death in so far as death means being a victim to the imperfections of the material world.

> Memory, nay, perception itself is a first stage in this escape, which coincides with the acquisition and possession of reason. When the meaning of successive perceptions is recovered with the last of them, when a survey is made of objects whose constitutive sensations first arose independently, their synthetic moment contains an object raised above time true in its ideal deliverance though of course fleeting in its psychic existence.[100]

Existence is essentially temporal and mortal,

> But ever since substance became at some sensitive point intelligent and reflective, ever since time made room and pause for memory, the history, for the consciousness of time, a god, as it were, became incarnate in mortality and some vision of truth, some self-forgetful satisfaction, because a heritage that moment could transmit to moment and man to man. This heritage is humanity itself, the presence of immortal reasons in creatures that perish.[101]

To be able to participate in that vision beyond the moment is to participate in the divine. The thought that is able to grasp the timelessness of truth and beauty is able to freeze the material flux in ideas and is therefore spiritual. Two thoughts of two instants are existentially different yet ideally they are the same. The material world is forever different and forever in conflict. When disputes arise they have their bases in "physical survival." Their concern is not the love of truth. "Doctors disagree in so far as they are not truly doctors, but, as Plato

would say, seek, like sophists and wage earners, to circumvent and defeat one another."[102] However, the spirit allows for ideal union of intelligences, for doctors to agree. On the intellectual plane, there are no "winds of doctrine." "The intellect, being the organ and source of the divine is divine and single; if there were many sorts of intellect, many principles of perspective, they would fix and create incomparable and irrelevant worlds."[103] Truth like the imagination is a unifier of mankind. The content and means of arriving at the truth are diverse; but the form and end are identical. It is reason, an "inviolate principle" that lifts man to the plane of immortality. But being immortal is not having any existential status in eternity. All existence remains problematic. "What is meant is only that whatever exists in time, when bathed in the light of reflection, acquires an indelible character and discloses irreversible relations . . . in that ideal sphere of truth which is the common and unchanging standard for all assertions."[104]

Men have sought one form of immortality or another throughout the course of human history. Evidence for this is abundant in the histories of religion and art, especially. There has been interest in the subject dating back to one of the world's oldest extant epic poems, The Epic of Gilgamesh, a poem which dates to the third millenium, B.C. Santayana's work shows that he was well-informed about the history of religion and art, but I believe, since, as he said, that he "cleaved" the Greeks, that it is they in their religions and myths, according to Santayana, who quite well interpreted the desires of the human heart. In the Greek myths, we find all the faults and ideals that are human; more importantly, we find not defeat but the possibility of satisfaction and dignity. The

Greek myths express better than any others, the will to live and to live well. However, the myths were ideals and being so the aspirations they expressed precluded any actual immortality for us humans. Although Santayana does not explicitly reveal the source or sources of his ideas on ideal immortality, it seems to me that it has affinities to Greek myth in general, and more specifically to the kinds of myths created by Plato.

In J. A. Stewart's book, the Myths of Plato, Stewart claims that Plato's use of myth weds reason and imagination. According to Stewart, myth evokes the same feelings as poetry, and like poetry, the platonic myth appeals to a major part of man's soul which is prescientific. Although Stewart makes a distinction between the prescientific and the scientific aspects of Plato's thought, J. H. Randall, on the contrary, holds that the two are intimately related and indistinguishable. He says: "Plato is a philosopher because he is a poet. True philosophy is poetry--poetic insight and vision, the imaginative enhancement of life."[105] Actually, Santayana is closer to Randall's view of Plato than he is to Stewart's. Nevertheless, poetry, I believe Santayana would agree, appeals to that part of us which feels, wills, and acts. Long before man thought about values, he felt them, and feeling was reinforced by flights of imagination. "In appealing, through the recital of dreams, to that major part of us which feels values, which wills and acts, Plato indeed goes down to the bedrock of human nature."[106] It is at the level of feeling that man is closest to immediate experience: "At one with Universal Nature." "It is good, Plato will have us believe, to appeal sometimes from the world of senses and scientific understanding, which is 'too much

for us,' to this deep-lying part of human nature, as to an oracle."[107] The information received from the oracle is not of a scientific nature; it is poetic. It is evocative and adumbrated, a feeling, for Plato's purposes, controlled. Stewart talks of this feeling as being transcendental. "Transcendental feeling is at once the solemn sense of Timeless Being--and the conviction that life is good."[108] Transcendental Feeling accompanies all experience. It is a human interest, a disinterested interest.

This sort of interest is not a blind one, or is it what Santayana would call a mere psychical interest. It is not explicitly concerned with events or with understanding in any scientific or literal sense of the word; even though it may prepare the way for action and for scientific understanding or indicate the limits within which action and science are possible. For Santayana, as for Plato, this sort of interest suggests that understanding strictly as means to ends as in the life of reason is not the whole of man. The charm of myth (poetry) surely lies in the feelings it evokes. But it also, for both Santayana and Plato, has a more noble purpose. It is through the poetic imagination that the process of idealization occurs. According to Stewart, this process of idealization in Plato is based upon "a priori conditions"[109] which regulate conduct and knowledge. Santayana would not go as far as Plato, here, however Santayana like Plato talks of ideals not literally but symbolically, or poetically if you will. The difference between Santayana and Plato lies in what the symbols signify. For Plato, some say and Santayana agrees, ideals symbolize powers. However, as mythological or poetic expressions of the literally inexpressible, Santayana and Plato

are on the same ground, since as expressions per se "the philosopher himself claims no more than symbolical truth."[110] As Randall says, a story or something idealized does not state anything new. "The function of Plato's Socratic myths is to make us see a point . . . the function of Platonic myths is to provoke an emotional as well as an intellectual response, to make us feel something as well as to make us see something: in Plato's language, to provoke eros for their objects as well as nous--objects which the Symposium and the Phaedrus ultimately identify. That is . . . the function of Platonic myths is to provoke an existential commitment to one's ultimate concern."[111] As we shall see Santayana is in total agreement here with Randall's ideas on Plato, since immortality in representation, as a process of idealization, is meant to affect a change in heart.[112]

Santayana's concept of the process and end of idealization in spirituality closely resembles that of Plato's ideas on myth and some of the ancient Greek's ideas on myth, in general. Religion in the ancient world lacked all the urgency and commitment that we moderns know. According to H. D. F. Kitto, Greek religion was not authoritarian or dogmatic, i.e. in the literal sense of having no fixed dogma. Greek religion amounted to explanations about life, explanations that one could take or leave. There was nothing that compelled a man to believe one story or another. This sort of attitude in Santayana's philosophy is evident throughout, since he stresses the imagination and reason in religion and denounces blind faith. Bertrand Russell says of Santayana's ideas on religion: "He did not see any reason to wish that the populace should believe something true. What he desired for the populace was some

myth to which he could give aesthetic approval."[113] The general sense of Russell's remarks are accurate, however, one ought not to think that Santayana intended that the populace should believe something false. It is precisely for the reason that one is apt to believe something false that Santayana takes literal truth out of religion. This, of course, is not to say that symbols could not suggest or approximate what is true. In short, by taking literal truth out of religion Santayana is not taking reason out of religion. His point is how to keep reason in religion without corrupting either of them. In Reason in Religion, Santayana is working towards a rational religion, some might say a mythology, that is consummated in the Realm of Spirit and the Idea of Christ in the Gospels. In this latter work, Santayana shows that it is the idea or myth of Christ we have created that is important. It is irrelevant whether or not Christ ever walked the earth.

According to Santayana, man is a dreamer. To delight in what is seen, in the immediate, holds certain value, but we need more than the immediate which is merely transitory. As he says in Platonism and the Spiritual Life: "The spirit lives in [the] continual sense of the ultimate in the immediate."[114] Therefore, in the later sections of Reason in Religion when Santayana explicitly discusses the spiritual life, he shifts the emphasis from the imagination, and the immediate images it evokes, to reason and immortality. The imagination still remains important but it must be conjoined with reason in order to give value to the present. If the images of the present are fleeting, they are insignificant. A sense of timelessness must be added to the images in order for them to become spiritual ideals worth holding. In this latter part

of Reason in Religion, we see Santayana follow up some of his Platonic tendencies by favoring the Platonic concept of reason where the end of reason is the participation in deathlessness.[115] The concept of reason as it was discussed in sections of Reason in Common Sense may appear remote to Santayana's position here. However, like Plato, although reason is thought to function contemplatively here, this does not preclude its practical function to guide action. In other words, the contemplative and practical functions are not mutually exclusive. As we shall see later contemplation entails practical functions. The shift of center from the psyche to spirit does not destroy the psyche. Reason in spirit moves "upwards" away from the world, but as in Plato this is "only a step leading on to the most supremely positive behaviour. Katharsis[116] is only the gateway to philosophy; and it is philosophy which teaches man how to reach what alone is positive, the "acquisition of intellectual knowledge. . . ."[117]

In these later chapters of Reason in Religion, one is tempted to say that Santayana might have written these chapters, especially "Ideal Immortality," with his works of Plato opened in front of him. The similarity of the Phaedo and Symposium to Santayana's ideas is remarkable. I shall merely offer a sketch of the similarity.

In the Phaedo, we have discussions of immortality that apparently parallel some of the discussion in Santayana's final chapter of Reason in Religion. There is evidence that Socrates is not talking about a belief in a future life, but about ideal immortality; Santayana, we saw, did the same thing, but now we will see it was done in much the same way; Santayana, however, unlike Plato takes great pains not to be accused of

hypostasizing his ideas. In the beginning of the Phaedo, Socrates indicates that he is not going to be talking about immortality in any literal sense. Cebes asks Socrates why he has been writing lyrics since he has been taken to prison. Socrates replies that he has been doing so in order to find out the meaning of some of his dreams and also to clear his conscience. Socrates explains that he has had a recurring dream, and in it he has been urged to "practice and cultivate the arts." In the past he thought that the dream was only encouraging him to continue pursuing philosophy, since it is the greatest art, but now Socrates thinks the dream may have meant the "popular arts." Therefore, he is writing poetry, that is, working on "imaginative themes," not "descriptive ones." In one sense the idea of Socrates turning to poetry is comedic. It is a parody of Socrates, where Socrates at the end of his life is repenting to the gods just in case the gods had intended him not to cultivate philosophy but instead had intended him to be a popular song writer. Of course, the idea is absurd, and one senses that Socrates knows it is. Socrates, in this sense, like the character, Cephalos, in the Republic, is concerned with paying his debts in order to enter the next world a just man. Soon, however, this parody of Socrates ends (if, indeed, it is a parody) when explicit philosophic discussion of immortality begins. Socrates says: "Well, even my information is only based on hearsay, but I don't mind at all telling you what I have heard. I suppose that for one who is soon to leave this world there is no more suitable occupation than inquiring into our views about the future life, and trying to imagine what it is like."[118] In all seriousness, the Phaedo is going to be an imaginative exercise in much the same way that

Santayana conceives religion to be. Literal truth is not really important, and proofs are somewhat beside the point.[119] Poetic truth is the point. Again Socrates, at the close of the dialogue: "Of course, no reasonable man ought to insist that the facts are exactly as I have described them. . . . We should use such accounts to inspire ourselves with confidence. . . ."[120] So in the Phaedo all talk of immortality will only be in an ideal sense; it is not meant directly to serve animal egotism. It will not be superstitious, that is, it will not really have anything to do with life after death, because there can be no understanding of that. The only reason for talking about immortality is that it may have pertinence for the living, and may be aesthetically pleasing to hear.

Socrates finds no reason to despair because of impending death. He expects to enter the company of good gods and shades who are wiser and better than he. Any man who has devoted his life to philosophy should be cheerful at the prospect of death, because what he has been doing all along was preparing himself for it. The true philosophers have been really "half dead" while they were alive; that is, they have been living in the soul, a life in the eternal. Death is only a release from the body, and while he is alive, the philosopher does his best to engage that release.[121]

The truth, if it is to be seen, must be seen through the soul not the body. The senses and the world perceived by the senses is much too transitory to embody the truth. The senses are, in fact, impediments. They not only prohibit clear perception in the soul, they also distract the soul by pleasure and pain. By separating the body and soul in this

life, we become wise, and wisdom is a kind of purification. "Perhaps these people who direct the religious initiations are not so far from the mark, all the time there has been an allegorical meaning beneath their doctrine that he who enters the next world uninitiated and unenlightened shall lie in the mire, but he who arrives there purified and enlightened shall dwell among the gods."[122]

Now Socrates introduces the subject of the doctrine of reminiscence into the discussion of immortality. It is interesting to note that this section reveals a kinship with Santayana's notion of memory in the chapter "Ideal Immortality." Socrates brings in the doctrine of reminiscence as an argument to support the immortality of the soul. However, I believe it is introduced for more important reasons; that is, to show that one of the basic aspects of learning is based upon memory[123] and that through memory which breeds learning and the rational life, we are able to eternalize our ideas. Since we are able to eternalize our ideas we are able to become "invisible," "divine," "immortal," and "wise." The lover of wisdom is more than human because he loves that which is more than fleeting. (It should be recalled that Santayana based memory on our interest in form, i.e. intent.) Socrates suggests an idea of love in the Phaedo but not in explicit terms. In the Symposium, Diotima explains what the lover of wisdom seeks. Note the similarity between Diotima's and Santayana's approach; Santayana, too, talks of the various kinds of love: from propagation to immortality. "And why all this longing for propagation? Because this is the one deathless and eternal element in our mortality. And since we have agreed that the lover longs for the good to be his own forever, it follows that we are bound to long

for immortality as well as for the good--which is to say that Love is a longing for immortality."[124] Philosophy, in the Phaedo and Symposium, is the interest in immortality in the ideal; it is the spirit's interest. Philosophy is not merely an interest in finding definitions, in conjecture and refutation of dialectic. It is not merely a system of knowledge. The Diotima myth, as Stewart points out, is an imaginative development of the notion of philosophy. It is a form of religion. It is a "Life Eternal--the true life of the Immortal Soul." The longing for immortality is the same as the longing for the good, the beautiful, and true. And, as Diotima says, it is this longing that makes life worthwhile. Finally, as Santayana says: "Salvation is demanded, and in one sense is possible, because by virtue of his intelligence man already has one foot in eternity."[125]

We have seen that the pursuit of ideal immortality is the vertical aspect of liberation, a process of "idealization."[126] However, as I have mentioned, liberation, since it is both horizontal and vertical, is not a liberation "from suffering and death," but one "through suffering and death."[127] Santayana says our sufferings, and he means here distractions, "chasten and transfigure our attachment to the circumstances and passions that caused those sufferings."[128] "Salvation comes by shifting the centre of appreciation from the human psyche to the divine spirit. It is a shift within the psyche, otherwise it would not enter at all into our lives."[129] This shift of center of appreciation is likened, as we have seen in reference to Adam and Christ, to the human person assuming a divine nature and it entails a "change of heart."[129]

To look at the world from the point of view of ideal immortality, specifically, or from the vertical point of view, generally, is to make

an imaginative leap. It is comparable to the imaginative expansion Santayana talked of from justice to charity. It is by an imaginative leap that one is no longer a part of what he beholds. One no longer perceives objects, as it were from within their midst. One is imaginatively abstracted to a point of view outside the world. Essentially what we have here is Spinoza's idea of looking at things sub specie aeternitatis. However, I think it is clear that in Santayana's context eternity is not to be taken literally. One cannot actually place himself at the point of eternity. Literally it makes no sense to talk in such a way. To look at the world sub specie aeternitatis means to establish a relation with the world, an ideal relation where one can imaginatively see the world as a god might. Of course, man can only see the world from this aspect imaginatively because, unlike a god, he must establish the eternal point of view through the Flesh, the World, and the Devil. In light of current linguistic analysis T. Sprigge points out that Santayana by using the idea of the eternal is not submitting to the prose of philosophical "consolation." (I suppose this means that Santayana is not a Norman Vincent Peale.) Nor, says Sprigge, is Santayana playing upon linguistic confusion.

> What he [Santayana] does do is make the quite explicit suggestion that up to a point a man's emotions may be transformed so that they are no longer directed on things as existences as offering transitory opportunities for animal satisfactions, but directed on them as elements in the eternal truth. The extent to which such transformation is possible is a question of psychological fact, but there is nothing confused or nothing disreputable in the observation that such transformation may bring us peace and a measure of reconciliation with our fate.[130]

There was an interesting essay written by J. R. Jones entitled "Love as Perception of Meaning" which mirrors, although in different

terms, much of what Santayana says about liberation. To round out my discussion of liberation and throw a bit more light on it, I think it would be instructive to examine this essay in some detail. Also, this essay, as it will be compared to Santayana's ideas, should prove interesting by the very fact that it is "contemporary" and comes out of the analytic school at Oxford. I mention this, of course, since there are many "contemporary" thinkers who feel that Santayana's ideas no longer represent living issues.

Jones points out that Wittgenstein uses the phrase sub specie aeternitatis, and that Wittgenstein "shows what the consequences are for our awareness of the world by looking at it in this way. He wrote in the Notebooks, 'The usual way of looking at things sees objects, as it were, from the midst of them, the view sub specie aeternitatis from outside. In such a way that they have the whole world as background.'"[131] The world viewed under the aspect of eternity tells us, according to Wittgenstein, not how the world is but that it is. Jones says that how the world is in a sense covers everything, that is, all you have is science. "The world is the totality of facts. And, looking as it were from the midst of this, how the world is, how it goes, the facts of it, will cover everything."[132] The world from this point of view as the 'facts' suggests is everything which is done. Analogously, in Santayana's terms, how the world is is what it does i.e. the realm of matter, the horizontal dimension. Science, then, quite justifiably takes the facts of the world as given, assumes they are explorable, and "looks at objects from the midst of them."[133] In this way the scientist, both physical and social, uses the world for his elected ends. Although the scientist

reaches out vertically to formulate his ideals--his principles--he lives on and for the horizontal dimension. Ideals, for him, are meant to serve in the direction of further instances.

That the world is is another point of view, the vertical plane alone. "'How the world is,' says Wittgenstein, 'is completely indifferent to what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world. The sense of the world must lie outside the world. The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time.'"[134] Essentially, I think, Santayana would agree with Wittgenstein here, however, not in every detail. Speaking from the point of view of spiritual endeavor, how the world is is not, according to Santayana, completely indifferent to what is higher. If it were, the mystics who say "turn your back to the world" are correct. No, for Santayana, how the world is and that the world is are views of two levels of life.[135] If how the world is and that the world is were completely separate, then Santayana would not say that the horizontal and vertical dimensions of liberation were concomitant. In this sense God does, for Santayana, reveal himself in the world and we find Him through the world. As far as the sense of the world, that it is, must lie outside the world, this I believe can clearly be translated into Santayana's terms; as we have seen in the discussion of intuition, Santayana emphasizes intuition of essence as the foundation of the spiritual life. The sense of the world for Santayana lies in the realm of essence, the forms which things may or may not wear. The realm of essence is non-temporal and non-spatial, and even if it does not present us with a particular riddle to solve, it is the means by which we understand the sense of the world; without the realm of essence

there is no sense of the world. For Santayana, through essence alone, what it is, we understand the sense of the world, that it is. In this sense, Santayana goes beyond Wittgenstein. For Wittgenstein that the world is is ineffable, a silent realm; Wittgenstein comes close, much closer than Santayana ever did, to being a mystic. For Santayana, a sense of the world, that it is, can be gotten through what it is since what it is permits leaps into the ideal and life in the ideal.

According to Wittgenstein, "the meaning of life" is found by concentrating on the world that it is and not on how it is. For Santayana, there is not the issue of "the meaning of life," if the 'meaning of life' suggests that there is a riddle to solve and an answer to be found. Through the idea of liberation, Santayana is asking us to concentrate on the world as that it is, but it is the very act of concentrating on the world in this sense that is significant. There is no reward for this act beyond itself in the form of an answer. As a matter of fact, to expect an answer from a concentration on the world as that it is is merely to shift one's attitude back to the world as how it is. In other words, it is from the how it is standpoint that answers to questions are appropriate, not from the standpoint of the world as that it is. Or, again, an ideal is not an answer to a question, although it may help to answer some, it is either a guide to action or a guide to contemplation.

Jones says that one of the fundamental problems for religion is the "problem of liberation or release--the problem of drawing man out of the bondage of preoccupation with himself--preoccupation with his own (to him) overwhelming misfortune or overwhelming grief or overwhelming guilt."[136] I think both Santayana and Wittgenstein would agree, at

least, in part. In line with Santayana, Jones also says that liberation does not alter the facts, every thing that was harsh before remains harsh. However, "The point is that those whom love has made perceptive . . . feel accepted by life, no longer estranged from its sources of power and meaning."[137] Although as Santayana sees it, love falls within the scope of union, within liberation, as we have already seen in the previous discussion of ultimate religion, love plays an important role, since as with Plato, knowledge without love is inconceivable in man; without love, power remains inexplicable and meaning irrelevant. Love at bottom indicates that human interest is afoot. And love, when it is ideal, draws us out of the "net of our own subjectivity and self-concern."[138] Without love, we perceive a thing materially, only for "its utility, its exploitability, its availability for our satisfaction of our wants or the furtherance of our purposes."[139]

Jones speaks of love for the most part in terms of persons. In this sense, he speaks of it as Santayana spoke of charity. However, I think we can reasonably extend Jones' idea of love of persons to love of ideals, since the purpose of his discussion is to show that love is liberating in the sense that through it we come closest to seeing things as God sees them. "We can have love towards all living things and towards the non-living as well."[140] Through love, Jones says alluding to St. Paul, "It is then we see it, as it were, from Eternity, with the whole world as background to it."[141] The background is the events of the world, it is how the world is. "Where persons are concerned, what love of another gives is a perception of his or her unconditional significance."[142] Through love and the knowledge which accompanies it, i.e.

liberated love, we see the person or thing ideally not merely as a collection of particular attributes, but that it is. The idea of unconditional significance in terms of persons at least can be seen in the love a parent feels for a newborn child. In a sense, the love a parent feels for a newborn child is felt from within the midst of things, it is egotistic, that is, the parent sees the newborn child as an extension of himself. Yet, since the newborn child's attributes are merely potential, even his physical attributes are indistinct, the love that is felt comes close to the idea of a love of that it is. At this stage, the parent might have egotistic dreams of Johnny becoming a doctor, or president of the United States, but those are dreams for the future, as Santayana would say "ulterior concerns." Now what permeates a parent's feelings is the "miracle" of life, that Johnny is. That Johnny is mine, an egotistic presumption, is in the background. Without such ideal love one cannot be liberated, one remains egotistic. One cannot, for example, understand "Love thy neighbor as thyself" in so far as it encourages a change of heart. Through ideal love, where my interests are not the point, one is liberated by seeing everything as unconditionally significant. Everything is not merely "an adjunct to my life,"[143] and in this way, one establishes an acceptance of life, one forms an agreement with life and the world. "I begin to see what it means to understand as all along, from Eternity, I have myself been understood."[144] I begin to feel harmony with the world.

4. UNION AND THE IDEA OF CHRIST

"Liberation is something negative, as freedom itself is."[1] Liberation emphasizes a freedom from distraction, even though as we have seen there is implicit in the idea of liberation the positive elements which provide the basis for a consummatory phase of the spiritual life. Liberation is a "preliminary to Union."[2] In other words, freedom from in Santayana's conception of the spiritual life implies freedom to. I think it is reasonable to look at the development of the phases of the spiritual life from liberation to union very much in the way T. Sprigge does. He talks of it in terms of ideal immortality. He says from the point of view of liberation that "the mind may participate in the eternal by developing its sense of values, so that existences are prized not for what they are (he means here how they can be possessed, manipulated, or used) but for the eternal forms of good they suggest to the mind, even if only by prompting it to work out what is unsatisfying in the actual."[3] This last phrase indicates ideal immortality is intended to liberate, to free one from distraction. From another point of view of ideal immortality, it has the positive function of answering the question: Now that I am liberated, what am I to do? From this point of view, Sprigge states in the rough the idea of Union. He says: "At its simplest this may take the shape merely of delight in some sensory form, but it is likely to be more sustained if the forms contemplated are those descriptive of substantial aspects of human life, especially such as touch ourselves, so that our personal worries are neutralized by interest in their relation to a wider scheme of things. Such, thinks Santayana, is one of the rational functions of prayer."[4] As we shall see, prayer is the very heart of union.

The idea of union is a critical idea for my thesis, because union reveals the proper and positive activity of the spiritual life. In union, if my thesis is to hold true, I must show that spirit unequivocally functions as an interest and that spirit does not seek to undermine and render nugatory all human aspiration and action, but it seeks to elevate aspiration and action to their legitimate high levels. This, of course, does not mean that contemplation primarily serves action, i.e. the psyche or self-interest; that as we have already seen is not the primary function of contemplation. However, what it does mean is that although contemplation is intended to serve ideal concerns, this does not preclude it from rendering action or self-interest more noble. Now I believe that this view of union has already been seen in Santayana's idea of charity. Again, however, since charity only is a part of union, one who is sceptical of Santayana's position might not yet be convinced of the positive outcome of the spiritual life. The sceptic might still declare that charity is merely an ancillary aspect of union and that the heart of union, i.e. prayer or contemplation--they mean the same thing--is where Santayana's idea of the spiritual life goes off into mystical oblivion. Taking the sceptic into consideration, I think it is best to approach Santayana's idea of union, specifically contemplation, in the face of adverse criticism. That is, rather than merely explicating what Santayana means by union as contemplation, I think it would make my interpretation of union stronger if my interpretation grew out of answering criticism against it.

Against the concept of union itself, there is no sustained criticism by any scholar I know of. However, since union is the culminating point of the spiritual life, I believe I will be on safe enough ground

if I look to some scholar's criticism of the spiritual life in general. I say safe enough ground with qualification since to identify the spiritual life with contemplation alone or with charity alone is a mistake. The spiritual life, as I understand it, begins in distraction and ends in union, i.e. contemplation and charity. What I shall do then is look at the section "Mysticism and post-rational morality" in M. Munitz's book, Moral Philosophy of George Santayana. I choose Munitz in this context because he criticizes in this section the outcome of spiritual life, and although it is not precisely a criticism of union it comes closer to being so than any other criticisms I have read. Also, I choose Munitz because although many have criticized Santayana's idea of spiritual life, none have delivered against it the sustained attack that Munitz has. Finally, I feel from my conversations with Munitz that his criticisms were motivated by a love for Santayana's ideas, that his criticisms were not merely the result of the exercising of intellectual swordmanship. By saying that love was Munitz's motive, I do not intend to suggest that it clouded his perception of the issues; what I mean to suggest is that it made his perception all the more acute. One senses in Munitz's criticism that if there were anything redeeming about Santayana's idea of the spiritual life, he would not hesitate to say so. He even offers two interpretations of the spiritual life. However, according to Munitz, the weight of the evidence falls on the side where there is little or no redeeming aspects at all.

To recall the two interpretations of the spiritual life, according to Munitz, he says that the two interpretations are incompatible with one another, the one "being a legitimate vocation within a widely conceived life of reason, the other being a form of post-rational morality radically inconsistent with the general principles of rational ethics."[5] My position, as we will see developed through the idea of Union, is that the spiritual

life, the life of contemplation, is continuous and compatible with the life of reason, the life of action. In line with Santayana I want to show that because the spirit constitutes another interest in human life; there is "the perfect continuity of post-rational with rational and with pre-rational morality. We begin with the instinct of animals, sometimes ferocious, sometimes placid, sometimes industrious, always self-justified and self-repeating; we proceed to a certain teachableness by experience, to a certain tradition and progress in the arts; we proceed further to general reflection, to tragic discoveries, to transformed interests."[6]

The questions we must ask Munitz are suggested by the title of the section in which he criticizes the spiritual life. They are: Why is Santayana a mystic? Why is the spiritual life a form of post-rational morality? Actually these two questions are in a sense one, that is, post-rational morality is a generic concept and mysticism is one of its species. In the following analysis I will try to keep the questions separate in accordance with Munitz's criticism; however, the reader ought to keep in mind their relationship.

Munitz begins his discussion of Santayana's mysticism by showing that Santayana himself early in his career was a severe critic of mysticism. Munitz points out that Santayana considered mysticism to function "as a principle of dissolution,"[7] both epistemologically and morally. Epistemologically, "the mystic is impressed by the fact that all our ideas and interpretaions of nature are obtained through the faculties of sense, understanding, and imagination, which, being human, are therefore taken to be infected with relativity, conventionality, and subjectivity."[8] Through human faculties alone the mystic claims that one can never reach any sense of "total reality," since human faculties are inherently affected

by their partiality. In order to reach a total reality, human faculties need somehow to be suppressed in order that some "higher consciousness" can flourish.[9] Morally, "the same principle of dissolution, directed to the specific and biased nature of all experience of value, is an attempt to escape moral discriminations and preference."[10] The mystic seeks absolute value and thereby seeks to do away with all sense of partiality. "The mystic's cure for the illusions and partialities of human striving lies in rescinding all such human and passionate interests."[11] Now I think that Munitz's portrayal of Santayana's criticisms of mysticism is a fair one. However, in so far as the portrayal suggests that Santayana himself turned to mysticism, that I believe is a mistake. Just superficially, one can see that the very so-called weaknesses inherent in human consciousness which the mystic seeks to avoid, Santayana uses and develops not only in the life of reason but also in the spiritual life; sense, understanding, imagination, relativity, subjectivity, moral discrimination, partiality, all are concepts which occur over and over again in support of the spiritual life. Also, "total reality" or another "higher consciousness" are concepts which never enter into the positive aspects of the spiritual life. How then can Munitz say "Santayana's later analysis of the spiritual life fits exactly, almost point for point, the mysticism he was himself at one time so eager to condemn."[12]

Munitz's argument revolves around the long essay Platonism and the Spiritual Life which was published in 1927, the same year Santayana published the Realm of Essence. Notwithstanding Reason in Religion, Platonism and the Spiritual Life was Santayana's first elaborate discussion of the spiritual life, and there was none other until the publication of Realm of Spirit in 1940, and then again in 1946 with the appearance of

Idea of Christ in the Gospels. Of course, when Platonism and the Spiritual Life was published, Santayana surely intended it to stand alone; it was not intended to be a prolegomena to the Realm of Spirit. However, with the advantage offered by retrospect, one sees that Platonism and the Spiritual Life in part is an outline of some ideas that were only to be developed in the Realm of Spirit. Platonism and the Spiritual Life, compared with Realm of Spirit, is a fledgling work on the spiritual life; nothing in Platonism and the Spiritual Life is developed a great deal. As I said above, Platonism and the Spiritual Life is an essay somewhat in the tradition of Montaigne or Emerson; it is not a treatise. Unfortunately, at the time Munitz wrote his book he did not have the advantage of reading the Realm of Spirit or Idea of Christ in the Gospels. Munitz's book was published in 1939. Had he that advantage his ideas might have been different.

I have all along, using mainly Realm of Spirit as a source, argued that Santayana was never near being a mystic. Does this mean, then, maybe Platonism and the Spiritual Life alone makes Santayana appear to be a mystic? Could it be that Santayana changed positions not two, as many scholars believe, but three times--from the Life of Reason to Platonism and the Spiritual Life to Realm of Spirit? I do not think so. Platonism and the Spiritual Life is somewhat of a response to Dean W. R. Inge's The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought. Apparently in Inge's work Santayana sees some interesting comparisons between Platonism and "spiritual religion." Actually Santayana's interest in the comparison is a literary device which acts as a spring board for Santayana to criticize the Platonic idea that values are not only ideals but creative powers. Through this criticism, Santayana actually wants to show that Platonism

and spirituality are quite different. Contrary to the platonic view, Santayana says that "value is something relative, a dignity which anything may acquire in view of the benefit in satisfaction which it brings to some living being."[13] It will be noted that this is simply and exactly the old line out of the Life of Reason. Values, Santayana consistently maintained, are not powers, they are ideal expressions of interest. The only power in the universe lies in matter. However, Santayana goes on later to say: "Here, at the risk of parting company with Dean Inge and even with Plato, I come to a radical conclusion. Spiritual life is not a worship of 'values,' whether found in things or hypostatized into supernatural powers. It is the exact opposite; it is disintoxication from their influence."[14] Well, here it is. In this passage is the nucleus which has fueled criticism against Santayana from 1927 to the present. Around 'disintoxication' Munitz and others have built up the case that Santayana had become a mystic, at least, sympathetically. In all respect to Munitz and others, I boldly assert they are wrong.

If I were sycophantic, I could say: Well, the reason why Munitz and others misinterpreted Santayana is that Santayana's style is ambiguous and metaphorical. I can see how they could be led astray. Also, Santayana tends to be inconsistent; he doesn't spell things out. Of course, anyone might easily misread him. No. Such a tact would be absolving the critics from responsibility which any good critic is willing to bear. In short, I would be sugar-coating my criticisms at the disservice of all. I think what Santayana says in Platonism and the Spiritual Life is clear and I think it in no way commits him to the mysticism which Munitz has described, or any other of which I know.

In reference to Munitz's criticism of Santayana, here, that is, Munitz's claim that Santayana is a mystic, I want it to be understood that the emphasis in Munitz's criticism is put on the moral side of mysticism (although the epistemological side is not excluded), that side from which the mystic attempts to escape moral discriminations and preference. Munitz is criticizing the spiritual life. This I take to be the reason why Munitz's criticism centers around disintoxication from all values. I maintain that Santayana holds the view that values grow out of interests, that the spiritual life is a disintoxication from all values, that there is no contradiction between these two ideas, and that they are perfectly compatible. In order to see that the position I hold is legitimate, let us look at the context which surrounds Santayana's claim that the spiritual life entails a disintoxication from values. In so doing let us keep in mind the ordinary meaning of the word disintoxication. According to Webster's Dictionary, the prefix 'dis-' is firstly defined as separate and secondly defined as negation. I believe Santayana to be using the term disintoxication as meaning separate from intoxication. I believe he is holding to this meaning of dis-, since as in the case of attachment and detachment, disintoxication implies that one has been intoxicated and has now, through some discipline or another, separated himself from intoxication. In terms of the Realm of Spirit, the spiritual life begins in distraction (intoxication); it proceeds to liberation (disintoxication) in order that it can be fulfilled in union. To think that Santayana meant by 'disintoxicated' non-intoxicated would mean that one were never distracted, somehow born liberated. Of course, this is not true. 'Disintoxication' means, then, separate from intoxication, but separate from intoxication as one who has been intoxicated, not as one who has never been

intoxicated. This ordinary meaning of disintoxication is quite important to note, since here as we saw with 'attachment' and 'detachment,' Santayana cannot be committed to mysticism since most of the major mystics would say either that "in reality" we were never intoxicated, or they would call for a disintoxication from values which was complete, i.e. which amounted to a negation of values. 'Disintoxication' for Santayana is used as the alcoholic uses it; to him it means not a cure for alcoholism (there is none) but a state of continuing recovery.

In the pages immediately preceding Santayana's statement of disintoxication he discusses why in one sense Platonism fails to be spiritual. He says: "As to the Socratic philosophy of love, there is an obvious spiritual tendency in it, in as much as it bids the heart turn from the temporal to the eternal; and it does so not by way of an arid logic but by a true discipline of the affection, sublimating erotic passion into a just enthusiasm for all things beautiful and perfect."[15] In this description of Platonism and the spiritual life, I find no suggestion that one undermines all values by turning from the temporal to the eternal. To the contrary, one sublimates, not in the psychoanalytic sense which suggests to repress, but in the sense of "to cause to sublime, to refine, to exalt"[16] passion into a just enthusiasm, a just feeling filled with god for all things beautiful and perfect. Simply by turning from the temporal to the eternal, interests are refined, not denied.

"Yet who has not felt that this Platonic enthusiasm is somewhat equivocal and vain? Why? Because its renunciation is not radical."[17] What does radical renunciation mean to Santayana? He says: "In surrendering some particular hope or some personal object of passion, it [Platonism] preserves and feeds the passion itself."[18] What Platonism does is to say

that the things of the temporal world, the world of becoming and opinion, are not those things about which we should feel a sense of care or urgency; however, it preserves and feeds these very same feelings by introducing eternal objects. To maintain these feelings of care and urgency whether they be directed toward temporal objects or eternal objects is to maintain an unspiritual and distracted stance. ". . . the beautiful and the good, for the Platonic enthusiast, remain urgent values."[19] Why? Because they have been hypostatized into objects to be worshipped. One "would cease to be a true Platonist or a rapt lover if he understood, if he discounted his illusions, rose above the animal need or the mental prejudice which made those values urgent, and relegated them to their relative station, where by their nature they belong."[20]

"The spiritual life, then, is distinguished from worldly morality and intelligence not so much by knowledge as by disillusion."[21] The conventionally moral man either worships his own opinions or the opinions of the mob. Under the illusions of the evanescence of becoming, the conventionally moral man feels a sense of urgency, care, anxiety about his own or his group's values. He is distracted by these values, because he sees value in the things of the world and the possession of them. He feels his values must be realized now, and they must be adopted by everyone. He is a missionary of sorts. Plato thought that the problem with conventional morality lay in the fact that it was based upon mere opinion and centered around an evanescent material world. So his solution to conventional morality, the worship of things, is to take morality out of opinion and the material world and place it in a heaven above the heavens. According to Santayana, this is no solution to the root problem of conventional morality, because by moving the matrix of values from things and

opinions about things in the world to an eternal realm where values are now eternal things, one makes a gratuitous move which leaves the spirit as distracted as ever. The sense of distraction is kept intact by the feeling of urgency directed toward objects--temporal or eternal--which produces the same sense of dogmatism in the Platonist as it does in the conventionally moral man. The difference between the Platonist and the conventionally moral man lies only in the objects they worship. Both are unspiritual because they worship something. The problem, then, for spirituality to solve through disintoxication is one directed against worship and dogmatism. What Santayana urges is that one sees the relativity of values, that they grow out of natural soil, human interests, and if one sees values as such, the sense of urgency about them is likely to disappear, one rises above them, and the spirit is "truly emancipated and enlightened."[22]

One cannot understand values if either one worships them as temporal objects and in the midst of them, so to speak, or one worships them from afar as divine objects. To worship something implies by the very meaning of the word that there is justification for holding the object of worship absolute, holy, or what have you. If there is no justification, worship is unwarranted. In the case of the conventionally moral man what this means is that worship is inappropriate because one cannot justify "local values" as being alone valid.[23] That is, one cannot justify the values of his own tribe to hold true for every other. The values of one's own tribe are based upon the interests it has, ones created by the circumstances of nature and of place and time. Any attempt of one tribe to foist its values upon another has for the most part ended in the strong arm tactics of a prerational morality. That

strong arm tactics ultimately are the "justification" for local values, of course, is telling about validity of local values. What Santayana calls "intuitive ethics"[24] is the epitome of the belief and the attitude it sustains that local values are alone genuine. He says:

> The disarray of intuitive ethics is made painfully clear in the conflicts which it involves when it has fostered two incompatible growths in two centres which lie near enough to each other to come into physical collision. Such ethics has nothing to offer in the presence of discord except an appeal to force and to ultimate physical sanctions. It can instigate, but cannot resolve the battle of nations and the battle of religions. Precisely the same zeal, the same patriotism, the same readiness for martyrdom fires adherents to rival societies, and fires them especially in view of the fact that the adversary is no less compromising and fierce.[25]

In the second instance, to worship values as divine objects takes all the humanity out of them. Indeed, to worship values as divine objects is to establish a post-rational morality of the worst kind, a post-rational morality which entails the denial of naturalism and one motivated by despair. Post-rational morality "is introduced and nominally supported by a formidable indictment of physical and moral science, so that the wretched idol ultimately offered to our worship acquires a spurious halo and an imputed majesty by being raised on a pedestal of infinite despair."[26] Let it be noted very carefully that Santayana sees Platonism as being unspiritual precisely because values are hypostatized into supernatural powers or what amounts to the same thing, in principle, values are found in <u>things</u>, albeit eternal things. Santayana criticized Plato to the same point but in different terms in <u>Reason in Science</u> when he said that Platonism itself, turning morality into metaphysics, was a form of post-rational morality. It can be inferred, then, that spirituality and post-rational morality in some sense are at opposite ends of the spectrum. The following passage is crucial for this point. In this

context Santayana is speaking of Plato in so far as he claimed that "values had brought things into being."[27] Santayana says:

> Out of the play of notions carried on in a prayerful dream wonderful mysteries can be constructed, to be presently announced to the people and made the core of sacramental injunctions. When the tide of vulgar superstition is at the flood and every form of quackery is welcome, we need not wonder that a theosophy having so respectable a core--something, indeed, like a true logic misunderstood--should gain many adherents. Out of the names of things and of virtues, a mystic ladder could be constructed by which to leave the things and the virtues themselves behind; but the sagacity and exigencies of the school would not fail to arrange the steps in this progress--the end of which was unattainable except, perhaps, in a momentary ecstasy--so that the obvious duties of men would continue, for the nonce, to be imposed upon them. The chief difference made in morals would be only this: that the positive occasions and sanctions of good conduct would no longer be mentioned with respect, but the imagination would be invited to dwell instead on mystical issues.[28]

From the spiritual point of view, to understand values is to be "disintoxicated from their influence" in so far as they are presented to the spirit in the forms of prerational and post-rational moralities. The spiritual life, indeed, excludes these forms of morality, where values are "found in things or hypostatized into supernatural powers." Yet nowhere does one find that interests or rational morality are excluded from the spiritual life. On the contrary, interests are affirmed along with Socratic morality, which is synonymous with rational morality. As a matter of fact, immediately following Santayana's mention of the infamous 'disintoxication,' he does precisely affirm interests and rational morality. "All animals have within them a principle by which to distinguish good from evil, since their existence and welfare are furthered by some circumstances and acts and hindered by others. Self-knowledge, with a little experience of the world, will then easily set up the Socratic standard of values natural and inevitable to any man or to any society."[29] The spiritual life excludes only dogmatism be it in the form

of "animal arrogance" or "moral fanaticism."[30] By so doing, the spirit acts "in the interests of detachment and freedom,"[31] and in this way the spirit is able to function properly "which is to see such things as come in its way under the form of eternity, in their intrinsic character and relative value, in their transitiveness and necessity, in a word, in their truth."[32]

Let us return to Munitz's criticism in order to see where we stand. I think I have shown that the spiritual life as a disintoxication from all values is not a principle of dissolution, that is, it is not mystical. The spiritual life, contrary to what Munitz suggests, is not an impartial and blank stare at essences passing by. It is not "a mystic contemplation of a universal good that has no relevant content nor direction for the specific interests of a given life."[33] For Munitz the spiritual life is no life at all. Contrary to him, I think that I have shown that none of these is true, not only in reference to disintoxication but also in reference to earlier sections as well. For the sake of a final emphasis I will cite with my own underscoring what Santayana explicitly states is the character of the human spirit.

> A perfectly free spirit (if it could exist) would not consider eternal being in their ideal capacity, because it would no longer refer them to the fancies or hopes of some living creature, but would consider them in themselves, ranging from one to another quite speculatively, that guided by the intrinsic formal relations of similarity or inclusion which obtain between them. It would therefore virtually traverse the infinite, its path not being hedged in by pre-existing irrelevant interests in one form of being rather than in another. But evidently this perfect impartiality is not human; it is contrary to the initial status of spirit, as the hypostatic synthetic expression and realization of some discursive phase of animal life--some adventure, some predicament, some propensity, some pre-occupation. It is therefore natural that the intrinsic infinity of Being should remain in the background, even in the spiritual life, and that essences should be contemplated and distinguished rather as ideals for the human imagination than as beings necessary in themselves.[34]

Contrary to Munitz, I believe the spiritual life as it is set forth in Platonism and the Spiritual Life and later in Realm of Spirit is essentially the same as the spiritual life described in Reason in Religion. Describing the spiritual life in Reason in Religion, I believe Munitz himself expresses faithfully the position Santayana held throughout his career.

> For as described in Reason in Religion , spirituality marks a devotion to selected ideal ends, guided by and based on piety or a recognition of and loyalty to the necessary material forces of life and nature. To be spiritual in this view is not to renounce life's interests. On the contrary, it is to accept them in all their fullness and urgency, simply refining and imaginatively elaborating their genuine purposes in order to make of them a rational whole. The spiritual man is one who has become conscious of his ideals and is devoted to the perfection of the materials of his life. A man is "spiritual when he envisages his goal so frankly that his whole material life becomes a transparent and transitive vehicle, an instrument which scarcely arrests attention but allows the spirit to use it economically and with perfect detachment and freedom." A spiritual man can be said to be not-worldly only in the sense in which this term signifies the avoidance of a blind subservience to the instrumentalities of life. The aim of spirituality is the same as that of intelligence in its analysis and clarification of ideals. To lead the spiritual life is to understand and to act in accordance with that which is morally relevant to life as a whole. Ideals acquire validity in their applicability to material conduct and affairs. The spiritual man is not apart from the world; rather by his elevated and penetrating vision he is brought into closer contact with its essential and ultimate values.[35]

As for post-rational morality, the spiritual life is, in a sense, a form of post-rational morality and, in a sense, it is not. As we have just seen Santayana's view of spirituality in Reason in Religion, according to Munitz, is understood as "a devotion to ideal ends, guided by and based on piety." This seems to me to be the point from which Munitz's criticism of Santayana springs, since, I believe, that Munitz thinks that Santayana's so-called later view of the spiritual life is marked by impiety, hence in it there is no devotion to ideal ends; "readjustment is no longer sought in a renewed effort to envisage the ideal

forms of action and social behavior, but by laying up one's treasures in another world."[36] In the way Munitz develops it, I cannot see how Santayana's idea of the spiritual life is at all a form of post-rational morality. First of all, as far as I know there is only one world of which Santayana talks in his philosophy, the realm of matter. The 'world,' as we have seen (and I believe Munitz recognizes it) in the analysis of the chapter "Distraction," has a specific meaning stemming from physics and implicated in society and politics. Essentially, the term signifies power. There is nothing in the universe which embodies power aside from the material universe. There is, as we have also seen, another realm or aspect of being which is non-material, i.e. the realm of essence, and indeed in this realm lies our treasures. What is most significant about this realm, however, is not that it is non-material or independent of human life (although these are important factors to consider, since Santayana is not an idealist, i.e. the realm of essence is not a realm of ideas dependent upon a mind); what is most significant is that we enter this realm of essence, that we are able to see what a being, material or otherwise, is, by the fact that we have an interest in form. With this interest in form, both in a rational and spiritual sense, we are creatures who have the ability to conceive truth, beauty, and goodness; we are able to live beyond the mere present. This ability to enter into the realm of essence is hardly an entrance into another world; all it is is a shedding of new and clearer light on this world, no, the only light of this world and nothing more. Secondly, if I have done anything at all up to this point in this dissertation, it has been to show, to emphasize, and to re-emphasize that the spirit and the spiritual life must be attached to and must be expressive of the conditions under and by which it

lives. In a word, the spirit must be pious. If what I have shown is true of Santayana's position, then Munitz must by his very own arguments admit that the spirit is devoted to ideal ends. This is not to say that the spirit is devoted to the same ideal ends as reason. But it is to say that if the spirit is pious, then the spirit is devoted to ideal ends of some sort and has a legitimate place in the life of reason and action.

In another sense, although not a pejorative one, the spiritual life according to Santayana, is a form of post-rational morality. In this sense, indeed, the spiritual life is born out of despair; that all is vanity. In this sense all is vain because the world blindly moves along. Physically, the world is out to destroy us. Socially and politically, it is forever conventional, i.e. egotistic and dogmatic. In a sense, Santayana believes that even rational ethics falls into the trap of conventionality in so far as it identifies itself with a single "Kultur."[37] The life of reason thrives in the midst of local interests and ideals. Its concern in action is with its own living purposes. In the life of reason maximum satisfaction in action is defined, and legitimately so, in terms of the circumstances out of which action grows and satisfaction results. In this sense the life of reason is susceptible to the opinions of Mrs. Grundy, since even the life of reason "represents only one possibility (in a particular soil), one type of an approachable harmony, such as the ideal of chivalry was also, or that of Franciscan brotherhood."[38] The spiritual life tends to be less dogmatic and egotistic in the sense that it attempts through contemplation to see not only one possible harmony, but all the harmonies possible. This does not entail despising any particular interest or ideal, nor does it mean renouncing

or undermining one's living purpose. What it means is to take into account imaginatively all possible goods, i.e. the Good, in order to see them critically. To do so means not only to come to an understanding of other interests, other living purposes; it is also to come more profoundly to an understanding of one's own living purpose. The spiritual life is ultimately, in this sense, a life whose ideal is self-knowledge. When one intelligently assesses other living purposes, one cannot help but reassess his own living purpose. Being harsh to his critics, Santayana says:

> I should therefore ask Edman, Vivas, and Munitz to admit post-rational sentiment into their life of reason as an element, and to coordinate it with all the other profound and perennial elements in human nature. If they refuse to do so, it seems to me that rational life in them would itself sink to the prerational level. They would be fighting for a closed circle of accidental interests, established by them as absolute and alone legitimate, and fighting in the prerational jungle, like cats and dogs, or like prophets crying anathema to all other prophets.[39]

In the sense that the spiritual life is one which entails self-knowledge, it goes deeper than the life of reason, deeper into naturalism, since "Reason alone can be rational, but it does not follow that reason alone is good. The criterion of worth remains always the voice of nature, truly consulted, in the person that speaks."[40] Also, in this sense the spiritual life goes deeper into relativism, a concomitant of an honest naturalism, because seeing critically all possible goods, the Good, it tends not to make any other possible good, any other living purpose, an evil simply because it does not coincide with one's own. In the life of reason the end is to find what is my living purpose and then to realize it in action. My living purpose entails the circumstances which surround my life, my family, my tradition, and so on, and my actions are reflected by these circumstances. The spiritual life entails no such commitment to action; however, it does not deny it. The spirit's commitment is to seeing

and understanding all living purposes, all actions because "health and morality are not based on spirit, spirit is based on them."[41] If spirit were based on morality, the spirit would take the view of the life of reason, a single living purpose, and would thereby be corrupted. From this point of view the spirit might think that 'good' and 'Good' were identical. In that case, subjectivism of the worst sort, viz. egotism, would be the ideal of the spiritual life such as Santayana characterizes German philosophy. "The great characteristic of German philosophy is that it is deliberately subjective and limits itself to the articulation of self-consciousness . . . . The direction in which German philosophy is profound is the direction of inwardness."[42] This is the egotism, the distraction of the Devil, which the spirit, if it were to take on the task of the life of reason in action, might fall prey to. But let us be clear what 'egotism' means.

> Egotism is a bastard word meant to designate something spurious and artificial, not to be confused with the natural egoism or self-assertion proper to every living creature. To condemn the latter would be to condemn life, which could not go on without it; but like every normal faculty, self-assertion has degrees, and poses insensibly from the happy mean to the opposite vices of excess and defect. Egotism, on the contrary, though more or less pronounced, is always a vice because it is founded on a mistake. It assumes, if it does not assert, that the source of one's being and power lies in oneself, that will and logic are by right omnipotent, and that nothing should control the mind or the conscience except the mind or the conscience itself.[43]

Even worse, one imagines, are the moral implications. Such a spirit being committed to its living purpose might think that only the living purposes of itself, people, nation, and tradition were the true ones and that its mission was to reform the world by any means.[44] When one hears demogogues spouting diatribes about the "Spirit of the Nation" one does not know whether to laugh at the transparent fallacy or to shudder at its possible

acceptance. We see here the importance of the spiritual life not being confused with the life of reason, the importance of the spiritual life remaining free to understand and not committing itself to action. Here we surely see that the spiritual life goes to the very bottom of relativism and at the same time is wholly naturalistic. In a very powerful statement in the "Apologia," Santayana sums up this very point.

> The notion that a single universal vocation summons all mankind and even all the universe to tread a single path towards the same end seems to me utterly anti-natural. It has come into modern opinion as a heritage from religion; and I respect it in religion when it expresses the genuine aspiration of some particular race or, in the best instance, of spirit in anybody; but I cannot respect it as a view of history; and I positively deplore it when it undertakes to coerce spirit in everybody into the worship of some insolent local, temporary, material ambition.[45]

I will begin my discussion of Union as contemplation (or prayer) by looking at contemplation as one of the approaches to essence. Santayana discusses contemplation as an approach to essence in the beginning of the Realm of Essence. In this section, Santayana talks about how contemplation has both aesthetic and moral sides to it, and also in so far as having an interest in form generally and ideals specifically, it has roots in animal life and embodies intent.

Contemplation in a rudimentary sense is open to every human being and might occur on the spur of the moment. It is sometimes the case that one is arrested by something and for a moment or so attention concentrates upon this something. This concentration of attention is contemplative because it recognizes what is before it in its "ideal sphere."[46] Santayana claims that this is not an unusual occurrence. He gives the following example: "As I was jogging to market in my village cart, beauty has burst upon me and the reins have dropped from my hands. I am transported, in a certain measure, into a state of trance. I see with extraordinary

clearness, yet what I see seems strange and wonderful, because I no longer look to understand, but only in order to see. I have lost my preoccupation with fact, and am contemplating an essence."[47] Santayana continues to say that although this experience might appear to be essentially aesthetic, it is not. "It is really intellectual, and the high Platonic road."[48] What he means here is that contemplation in its most rudimentary sense is neither essentially aesthetic nor essentially interested in understanding, yet it is intellectual because it has an interest in form. It is not essentially aesthetic because it might be the case that as I was jogging to market, ugliness burst upon me and yet because animal attention directed me to it I was caught contemplating ugliness. Also, it is essentially not interested in understanding at this stage because one need not understand in order to see form. Obviously, I could see something before me, yet if asked to explain it I could be at a loss to do so. Yet, again, what is essential to contemplation of essence is that it is intellectual, an interest in form, since contemplation is provoked by animal attention and as we have already seen there is a logical relationship of interest and attention and distinction. At the rudimentary level, this is all one need know in order to understand the concept of contemplation.

The aesthetic side of contemplation, although it is not essential, helps to explain, if only partially, why "the clearest and purest reality should be form or ideal."[49] Santayana says it seems like a paradox to say that animal instinct is directed to form. Yet the fact that it is is clearly displayed in the experience of beauty, where the pleasure of the experience lies in intellectually separating essence from existence and concentrating on the former. ". . . the beautiful is a great liberator

of other essences. The most material thing, in so far as it is felt to be beautiful, is instantly immaterialized, raised above external personal relations, concentrated and deepened in its proper being, in a word sublimated into an essence."[50] Although every contemplation of essence is not aesthetic, every aesthetic experience is a contemplative one, that is, every aesthetic experience is essentially concerned with form and it is concerned with form because of a "vital animal motive."[51] I do not want to get into a full-blown analysis of aesthetic experience since that is beside the point. The point is that aesthetic experience is essentially related to our interest in form and that existence is primarily, although not entirely, out of the picture when one contemplates beauty. Chances are Santayana got some of his ideas here from Schopenhauer who developed an aesthetic theory entirely around form. Schopenhauer even created a hierarchy of aesthetic objects starting with architecture being the least formal and the most functional to music being the most formal and the least functional. To what extent Santayana would agree with Schopenhauer is questionable. However, to the extent that form is essential to aesthetic objects, Santayana is in complete agreement. I believe even radical functionalists would say that form is essential. For them, however, form is revealed through function alone.[52]

Santayana does not give any complete answer as to why someone thinks one thing beautiful and another thing ugly. It seems to me he does not have any answer besides the fact that "my nature is attuned"[53] to certain forms and I just delight in them. To decide which object of two is more beautiful is ultimately rooted in interest. But aesthetic interest in form, since if one examines the reasons "people in the know" give for the beauty of an object, it will be evident that the reasons entail

harmony, balance, integrity, symmetry, completeness, rhythm, and so on; all terms of form. I think it is interesting to note that much discussion of aesthetics, especially in terms of aesthetic objects, revolves around terms most closely associated with music, music being, according to Schopenhauer, the most formal of the arts as well as the paradigm of beauty. Even Walter Pater, who is hardly a formalist in aesthetics (he claims that the matter of each of the arts must be examined separately; and he is against any abstract definition of beauty), even he emphasizes form in art saying: "All art constantly aspires toward the condition of music."[54] The point Santayana makes, as I see it, is that the attention that one focuses on a beautiful object is an attention to the form of it, and from such attention pleasure is derived. Attention to or a pleasure derived from the existential aspect of an object, i.e. that it is functional, is not properly called aesthetic. This, of course, is not to say that an existential subject is not necessary to aesthetic experience, but it is to say that an existential object is not essential.

The aesthetic aspect of the contemplation of essence shows that the spirit has a "native affinity to essence."[55] However, there is a moral aspect to the contemplation of essence, and this moral aspect is equally implicit in the contemplation of essence as is the aesthetic aspect. In this moral sense of contemplation, Santayana reasonably reminds us of the animal life underlying intuition. "A psyche, the hereditary organization and movement of life in an animal, must first exist and sustain itself by its 'intelligent' adaptations to the ambient world."[56] These adaptations remain unconscious until intuition as a formal interest articulates them. "The psyche and the material circumstances by their special character and movement, determine the choice and succession of

themes on which intuition shall be employed in some particular person; in so far as spirit is kindled there at all, it will have raised those themes to the plane of essence; the whole movement of nature and human affairs, which imposes those themes, becomes itself only another theme for contemplation, if present to the mind at all."[57] Much of what Santayana says here merely reiterates the ground which I have covered in earlier discussions: intuition as a derived and formal interest, intuition determined by and expressive of material conditions. What is important to note in this context, however, is that these ideas are discussed in relation to contemplation as an approach to essence. The approach to essence by contemplation is one <u>through</u> the material conditions of the world, and <u>through</u> the material conditions of the world essences are chosen for contemplation and expressed as themes of contemplation. Here in the strongest and most unequivocal terms Santayana places the spiritual life within the legitimate confines of a life of action. Although through contemplation we rise "above" the world we rise above it only by living in it.

> Thus contemplation does not require a man to shut his eyes or to fix them exclusively on the stars; it does not require him to stop living or acting. Often the most contemplative minds are the most worldly-wise, and the most capable of directing business. But though they may survey or foresee action, they do not live in action, because they see it in its wholeness and in its results; as a spectator who sees the plot of a play understands the emotions of the characters but does not succumb to them.[58]

Here in the <u>Realm of Essence</u>, at the very outset of the <u>Realms of Being</u>, there is a clear statement that the approach to essence through contemplation is not mystical. Anyone vaguely familiar with mystical literature will immediately recognize Santayana's allusion to the idea of shutting the eyes. As W. R. Inge says: "A mystic is one who has been, or is being, initiated into some esoteric knowledge of Divine things, about which he

must keep his mouth shut. . . .' 'Mysticism' . . . was explained to mean deliberately shutting the eyes to all external things."[59] Shutting the eyes would require one to stop living and acting. However, explicitly Santayana says that the contemplative life does not entail shutting the eyes. It does not entail the knowledge of esoteric things. The contemplative life requires not to live in action in order that one can understand better the actions which he performs as well as the actions of others. A fortiori, contemplation not only purifies understanding through its approach to essence, it also purifies actions by seeing the consequences which they entail, while not being driven by any one of them, that is, a victim to any one of them, and hence being able to act nobly if one must. A life of reason without contemplation is a life of material adjustments and noble enough within its limits. But man can go beyond the life of reason. Beyond the life of reason, one does not deny the perfections of the life of reason; that would be most uncharitable. One tries to build upon them in order to develop new perfections, "spiritual fruits" which are internal or tangential to action,[60] so that human experience through contemplation is unified into an organic whole. Without experience having an organic unity, experience is impossible to interpret. It is impossible "to wrest the truth of nature out of empirical confusion."[61] To do so is the futility of idiocy.[62]

Since Santayana is so fond of the image of the drama and the spectator of it, let me clarify this point using this image as I have done before. Human experience does not precisely mirror a drama. In an obvious sense, we know nothing clearly of the beginnings of our particular lives and we know nothing of the final outcome. Nevertheless, to the

human being, experience is not a bundle of discreet impressions with no connection whatsoever between one and the next. Whether the connection be necessary or contingent, there is a connection. This connectedness which we experience is the result of a psychological mechanism, as we have already seen it is intent. Intent gives our lives a sense of organic unity (or, as Munitz says, a "rational whole"), that it has come from somewhere, it possesses a history, and it is heading in a direction. It should be understood, however, that Santayana does not believe that events themselves possess a connectedness or an organic unity. The material world itself is adventitious. It is the mind alone through intent which due to its very nature imputes connectedness. In the psychological sense, there is naturally a sense of drama in human experience and through this sense of drama we interpret and understand ourselves and others. A mere series of events, "an incessant generation of new forms"[63] is not a true picture of human experience. Events themselves are surely necessary but they are hardly sufficient to count as a clarified description of human experience. A clarified description of human experience is attained in contemplation, as I have mentioned and as we shall see, in so far as there is Union in intent.

As actors in a drama we are dragged along by events and although by our very nature these events are formed into an organic unity by virtue of our interpretation of them, it is hardly a wide view we behold.[64] This also seems like a simple psychological fact; from the point of view of directing business, it is difficult to understand business. As spectators, however, it is precisely our function to remain detached from events in order to see the wide view. It is precisely the function

of spirit through contemplation to develop a sense of organic unity to transform all events, actual and possible not merely the local ones, into parts of a drama, the drama of our experience. This, of course, widens the concept of experience for the reason that if the spectator were suddenly to become an actor he would act all the better. The point of Santayana talking of a spectator is not to create a "pure" spectator. A spectator, by definition, is a born actor. Santayana's idea of spectator somewhat resembles the idea of the Greek chorus in ancient Greek drama. The Greek chorus is both spectator and member of the cast. The chorus sees better than any of the other characters what is happening, and although it does not have intercourse with the other characters, it often suffers as well as judges what is happening. However, the Greek chorus idea takes us just so far. Let us imagine a new sort of drama in order to see how the spectator has a privileged position not only as far as understanding the drama is concerned, but also as far as acting in it is concerned. It is an example simple and obvious in its implications. Suppose our new drama is of a naturalistic sort, let us say, one like Ibsen or Chekov might author. The only difference in our drama is that one of the characters sits in the audience. Unlike the other characters in the play, he knows what is happening, since he sees scenes as the characters themselves do not, where the hypocrite reveals his true colors, where the secret lover pours out his unrequited desires, and the like. Our spectator is an eavesdropper of sorts. If he were introduced into the action of the drama it seems reasonable, because of what he knows and what others do not, that he could only be more effective as an actor in the events than any of the others. This is not necessarily so; however,

if he were called upon to act, and if he were, indeed, more effective, he would be so because he had more knowledge than any of the other characters. Furthermore, and again however, if he were more effective it would not only be because he knew more than any of the others, it would also be because he was detached from the action and that the knowledge he brings to the action he brings as an outsider. In short, as an outsider with knowledge is the spectator more effective as an actor. Of course, now being an actor, the spectator loses his privileged position as outsider, hence he suffers from his mere inside knowledge, as he must.

Surely in human experience actor and spectator are not as contrived as I have presented them here. Yet in human experience we are actor-spectators: sometimes more of an actor, sometimes more of a spectator; one moment an actor, next moment a spectator. As I see it, Santayana's idea of the spiritual life allows for the fact that we continually are playing one part and then another. However, I think the important aspect of the actor-spectator idea is that, according to Santayana, we only understand in the most comprehensive and profound way when we are in the role of spectator, and that in the role of spectator, when it comes time to change into the working clothes of actor, the change and the performance are, in virtue of spectatorship, graceful. As Santayana says:

> We live in this human scene as in a theatre, where an adult mind never loses itself so completely in the play as to forget that the play is a fiction; and he judges it, not for what it pretends to present, but for the stimulus and scope of the presentation. So in the whole verbal, sensuous, and moral medium through which we see the world we may learn not to see the world falsely but to see ourselves truly, and the world in its true relation to ourselves.[65]

It may appear that Santayana is simply trying to get a lot of mileage out of the hackneyed Shakespearean line: "All the world's a

stage." This is hardly the case. As I see it the idea of the actor-spectator is a central one, and one absolutely crucial for the understanding of union. I think in order to illustrate the importance of this idea, namely, actor-spectator, so that union will be seen in its clearest light, I am going to jump ahead to the Idea of Christ in the Gospels. The idea of Christ, says Santayana, helps to answer the question: What is union?[66] The character of Jesus Christ, as Santayana portrays it, is the exemplar of the spiritual man. In the idea of the life of Christ, one sees the compatibility of the life of spirit and the life of action, and how union necessarily engages both lives.

As I mentioned earlier, Santayana was fond of the image of drama, and as we have seen, he uses it in order to illustrate various aspects of the spiritual life. In the Idea of Christ in the Gospels, we see that Santayana was more than fond of the image of the drama, the image of the drama forms the core of the explanation of the spiritual life: how in the spiritual life "one proceeds further to general reflection, to tragic discoveries, to transformed interests."[67] In the spiritual life, we are able to sense the tragedy in life, where tragedy means not just sadness, but nobility in the act of realization. The idea of the life of Christ is an idea of tragedy. A tragedy which begins with a miraculous conception, a natural birth and development, supernatural and natural acts, a natural death, and a supernatural resurrection. The idea of the life of Christ is the supreme tragedy. Loosely following the Aristotelian idea of tragedy, the typical tragic character is one who embodies a flaw, something blinds him, precisely a flaw blinds his judgement. As a result of this flaw, he suffers and through his suffering emerges an epiphany.

The flaw in the tragic character is necessary but it is the epiphany which is sufficient to raise the character to the status of tragic. Without epiphany, the character is merely pathetic. Often, too, I should add the tragic character has a noble ancestry. However, again without epiphany his nobility is never wholly realized.[68]

Jesus Christ has the noblest ancestry of any tragic figure. He is the Son of God. He has God's interests, and this forms the basis of his epiphany. However, mixed into this noble ancestry is the humblest ancestry, too. He is the Son of Man. He is distracted unlike any natural man. And this forms the basis of his flaw. Let it be noted that Christ is not the son of a man. He does not have a family. He is the Son of Man, he inherits all the traits of man. He is a thief and a scoundrel. He is a philosopher and a king. His interests are all possible human interests. In this sense, he is more of a man than any particular natural man, in this sense, I repeat, he is the humblest man of all. As the Son of God, he is the spectator par excellence. As the Son of Man, he is the actor first and last. As the Son of God, Christ comes to the world to fulfill the "original prophecies of a Messiah."[69] And he comes with the mind of a divine spectator. As the Son of God, it follows that "he must be as much God as the father."[70] Christ is no mere angel, "an ethereal messenger, intangible, serene, uttering a few oracular words and vanishing into thin air."[71] He is "no mere ray lost in space of divine light and power, but a centre of light and power a focus of divinity."[72] We see here that Santayana follows Christian theology in his interpretation of Christ, but it is only up to a certain point for the obvious reason that the ends of Christian theology and the ends

Santayana has in mind are quite different. Keeping in mind the model of actor-spectator, I will develop Santayana's ends as I see them.

The central importance of the idea of Christ is the idea of God in man. Although Christ is the Son of God and the Son of Man and is unique in virtue of doubleness, the importance of Christ lies in the fact that he is an instance, a unique example, of God in man. Christ in the Idea of Christ in the Gospels interpretation of him is the mythical model of spirit, a wedding of the realm of essence and the realm of matter. ". . . through the Word (essence) all things were made into what they are; and from the reflection of the Will (matter) in the Word proceeds the Spirit."[73] Following Christian theology, Santayana intimates that the Word has power, although for him we have seen that it does not. Strictly speaking, the Word does not make anything, however, it does account for what things are. The thing to note in the previously cited passage is that the Spirit proceeds from a reflection of the Will in the Word, that Spirit counts as an individual instance in the universe, that in Christ we see he is an individual center of light and power. The Spirit gives credibility to the human spirit. From the point of view of Christ as an individual, as every other spirit, we come to learn about God and Man. But since He is a unique individual, a Spirit, his knowledge of God and Man is special. Unlike man, Christ is omniscient. He literally sees things sub specie aeternitatis. However, like man, he suffers from distraction and is liberated through it.

Now, it is interesting to follow the strategy which Santayana employs in revealing the idea of Christ. If Santayana were a strict Christian, he would attack the problem from above so to speak, from the

point of view of Christ as God, as omniscient. Contrary to the Christian strategy, Santayana reveals the idea of Christ from below, from the point of view of Christ as Man. From Man we go to God. Even in his idea of God in Man, Santayana emphasizes interests in the material world, on power and its individual manifestations. Only in an individual can the Spirit be born; only in an individual can the Spirit be set free. I do not mean to suggest here that 'Spirit' and 'spirit' are the same. They are not. When one talks of Christ, one talks of God who has taken the form of a man. When one talks of a spiritual man, one talks of a man who has assumed or adopted what might be called a divine nature, where 'divine nature' means being impartial, detached, and sympathetic. But as I mentioned, I see the importance of Santayana's discussion of Christ not so much in the distinction between Spirit and spirit, but in the strategy he uses to account for the idea of Spirit. That strategy, as I said, is from the point of view of man, hence the idea of Spirit is for the sake of mankind, being an idea drawn from human interests to be articulated into ideals. In short, Santayana's idea of Christ is not theological in the least.

If one expects to learn of God alone through Christ as the Son of God, one ought not to turn to Santayana. The picture which Santayana paints of Christ is of a man who feels more at home on the earth than he does in heaven. "The Son of God, so oppressed by his accepted finitude, preferred to call himself the Son of Man."[74] Christ as God in Man, as Spirit, "In the first place . . . was remembered or conceived to have been a man, a child, youth, a young inspired healer and preacher, living continually with his disciples, jostled by crowds, rich in individual

initiative and bursts of tenderness, above all in the end, seized by his enemies, tormented and crucified."[75] Or, again ". . . in spite of his absolute holiness, or because of it, he shows a spontaneous sympathy, shocking to the Pharisee, with many non-religious sides of life, with little children, with birds and flowers, with common people, with beggars, with sinners, with sufferers of all sorts, even with devils."[76] As I see it, the importance of the idea of Christ in the first place is that he is an actor. He lives. He participates. No where is this more explicitly seen than in Santayana's choice of favorite Gospels. He chooses Mark. Santayana says: ". . . the image of Christ in Mark seems to me the most perfect to be found in the Gospels."[77] Mark is the least mystical of the four gospels. John is the most mystical. In Mark, the doubleness in Christ's character is least distinct; he feels alien on earth and heaven; and as a result, he appears more human. Santayana says of Mark:

> It has dramatic truth: for such would certainly be the experience of a spirit fed by two natures, able to make them alternate centres for its intellectual survey and its moral sentiment. A man leading a double life, belonging to two nations or to two families, does not altogether lose his sense of the one which, at the moment, may be in abeyance. He remains the same person throughout; yet the portion of his life that is not being enacted becomes shadowy and at moments almost incredible to him, as if he had lived it only in a dream.[78]

In John, the distinction between the Son of God and the Son of Man is clear. In John, Christ as the Son of God is non-attached to Christ as the Son of Man; God is literally trapped in Man like a bee in a bottle. In John, Christ is "a visiting God speaking through a glazed mask of humanity."[79] His home is clearly in heaven. If John were Santayana's favorite gospel, there would be indeed serious doubt about the relationship between the life of spirit and the life of action, even though Santayana might have still emphasized the idea of Christ as an instance

of God in man. However, Santayana emphasizes the instance of God in man so that the life of spirit and the life of action are compatible, where the spirit is attached and detached from its natural sources. Although there is a distinction between Spirit and spirit in Mark, even this distinction is not entirely clear. That it is not is no fault of Santayana's interpretation. On the contrary, the vagueness of Mark in respect to Spirit and spirit further supports Santayana's sentiments and opinions about the spiritual life. It is because Mark is vague on this issue that Santayana finds it his favorite gospel. In this gospel, one is not clear whether we are seeing God in man or man in God. In Mark, Christ is always a man. Even "when the divine nature in Christ breaks through, as before his judges or during his Passion, the human is not superseded, as sometimes in John, but on the contrary remains spontaneous, manly and young."[80] Christ is a man, an actor. Yet it is Christ in Mark as a spectator that the vagueness between contemplation and action and Spirit and spirit is discovered. A vagueness yet which suggests the compatibility between contemplation and action and the importance of Spirit for the human spirit. When Christ gives up the ghost, he sees that "his humanity had been obsessed, strained, at once inspired and arrested, by his divinity, he had carried that sacred but almost intolerable burden all his life, locked secretly in his heart; and now the spirit may burst from its prison free at last from all limitations and partialities."[81] Free from all partialities, as a spectator, Christ sees clearly from eternity the course of his life, the organic unity of his life. He sees how he, although divine, lived in the midst of distractions, how his humanity was obsessed. It is as if life were a bad dream and now awake

Christ will forget about it. But it is not that at all. Christ is still obsessed with his humanity, even though he is free from all its limitations and partialities. Here is the vagueness in the character of Christ in Mark, according to Santayana, and here too, in spite of all the unpleasant details associated with the history of Christianity, the beauty of Christ's spirit is inimitable. Christ returns to the body! ". . . that brave body, so sanctified and so tried, could not be abandoned to perish in dishonour. It would be revivified presently: the spirit would return to it, not now to lay any further burdens upon it, but to transmute it into an incorruptible body, a pure lamp for the light, a perfect instrument for the word, a wise heart, loving all things justly."[82] In the myth of Spirit, the Spirit that has taken on the flesh is forever a lover of it. It is never entirely free from the flesh even though It may not even live in it. Once born an actor, even a "pure" spirit, is always an actor; even as spectators we turn to acting to understand acts and so perfect our acting selves--what else is there to perfect? It is essential, then, for any complete idea of Spirit, of Christ, that he is the Son of Man.[83]

In the idea of Christ as actor-spectator, we see that as the Son of God (spectator), Christ loves the world, and as the Son of Man (actor), Christ loves God. Analogously, in the human spirit, the spirit loves the world, and the spirit aspires to ideals. In so far as the human spirit aspires to ideals we already have seen through the idea of ideal immortality what it means for the spirit to love God or eternal essences; how ideal immortality is explicable in terms of spiritual interests which grow out of the human psyche and which can be ultimately traced to various

primary interests which human beings happen to possess. The problem now, however, is to explain how as a spectator the human spirit would look back on the world. Why is it that Christ could not abandon the body? Why is it that the spirit in us must love the world and its own life in the world?[84]

If we adhere to Christian theology, the question boils down to: why does God love man? The question of why does man love God is not a difficult one to answer. To say that God exists and He ought not to be worshipped is a contradiction.[85] If there is a God, human reason dictates that we love Him. However, it is not as simple as that concerning the question why does God love man. Even assuming that God exists, there do not appear to me to be arguments which show with certainty that God should love man. Santayana himself mentions two possibilities and neither of them seems to carry any logical weight. God loves the world as an artist or a father loves the object or child which he has created. As far as the artist or the father is concerned, there is no contradiction in saying that he hates a particular work or child of his own. Even though God might be defined as all loving, it does not seem to follow that he must love and care for every particular creation of his own. Surely God does not love evil; he may understand it or pity it, but that is something else. As an artist God understands once He has created the world that "works confront their maker with their separate fortunes, appear in novel lights and turned, perhaps, to disgusting uses, and produce conflicting sentiments in his mind. There may be sometimes wrath, but the prevailing feeling is probably anxiety, disappointment, sorrowful alienation."[86] As a father, God pities: "These children know not what

they do. Initially they are innocent, sprightly and brave, yet a curious precocity invades them, some devil possesses them, they instigate one another to collective crimes, and their spirit is smothered and enslaved in unnecessary passions and cruel sufferings."[87] If one looks at God merely as a creator, there is no sufficient reason why He must love the world or man. Like the artist, God may merely love being absorbed in the act of creation. Like the father, God may merely love being absorbed in the act of insemination. In neither case must he love the objects or children which are finished or born.

However, in Christian theology, God is not merely a creator. And Jesus Christ is not merely the Son of God, he is the Son of Man. In this sense God, although he is a Father, is more than a creator who might just pity his children. In Christian theology, God has given birth to a Son; Christ is God's direct offspring, unlike the rest of the flock, and He is a Son with a special mission, a mission predicated on God's interests. His special mission is necessarily involved with the fact that He is also the Son of Man; just as God made Christ as the Son of God, God, too, made Christ as the Son of Man. So, too, then, Christ's mission is predicated on Man's interests. It is in this sense that one can say that "God loves man" is necessarily true, since through the birth of Christ at least one of God's interests is an interest in man's interests. Christ, the man, as a material instance of God comes with the word of God to the world to save the world for man. "Like his Father, who found matter an indispensable medium for creation, he does not come to destroy matter but to reanimate it: not to separate the souls of men from their bodies but to endow them, when redeemed, with those bodies renewed and rendered perfectly obedient to their souls."[88]

> . . . the whole life and teaching of Christ, and especially his Passion and death show that this descent was not accomplished for its own sake as the creation was. It had an ulterior object: the salvation of man, his elevation from the human to the divine level. This demands a tragic transformation in man himself, who must sacrifice his animal will and a great part of his nature in order to assimilate his spirit to that of God.[89]

Through the Passion and death of Christ, we see the Spirit rise vertically, it "craves union with God at God's level."[90] Quite simply the Spirit has an interest in union. If the interest is pursued, a point is reached at an indeterminate spiritual apogee where the spirit is able to look down upon the world. It is like the end of reasoning in the sense that a harmony is perceived, "but it does not proceed by reasoning,"[91] i.e. it is not concerned with the press of affairs. It is love, too, "but it claims possession of nothing."[92] "Spirit in us drinks in and watches all the vicissitudes of fortune, suffering them all; but suffering them, as it were, from above, innocently and without contamination, as Christ endured everything human."[93] Christ must necessarily obey his Father who has sent him to save the world. We, too, as human spirits, have a Father to obey, namely the material world, and the material world is more than a creator, since it has produced human spirits, which come not to destroy it or shut its eyes to it but to reanimate it and enlighten it.[94] Reason and spirit have formal interests which grow out of material circumstances, and both are obligated by their sources to look upon the very same, on the one hand to save man in terms of action on the other hand to save man in terms of contemplation. "The ladder by which transcendence climbs must not be kicked away from under one's feet; and that a man should remain man is the first condition of God's coming to dwell in him."[95] "For what profit is there in discovering

the order of nature or the history of mankind except that we may thereby protect and sweeten the transit of the soul through the world, and choose eternal objects of study and love?"[96] How else is life safe except through rational action? How else is life sweet except by understanding everything we do? So then the analogy is complete. In so far as the human spirit in one sense is based on the model of Christ as the Son of God and as the Son of Man, Christ is obliged to love the world, so, too, in so far as the human spirit is born and sent by its Father, it, too, is obliged to love the world and gain its inspiration from it.[97]

For the sake of analysis, it has been convenient to distinguish sharply between rational and spiritual interests. In this way I hoped to show, and I think I have done so, that rational and spiritual interests are compatible. But now it seems to me that more follows from my analysis than the compatibility of the two. I think now that one can see that there is a relationship between the two. The relationship was suggested in the discussion of justice and charity, where I pointed out that a just man is not necessarily charitable, but a charitable man is necessarily just. The reason for the truth of these statements is quite simple. A just man acts justly based upon his living interests alone. Right and wrong are defined in terms of local values. It is possible, as we have seen, for the just man to act unjustly (uncharitably) when the question of other living interests comes into play. The charitable man, since he has sympathy ideally with all living interests is not only presumably just in terms of his own living interests, he is just, if need be, in terms of all living interests, even though he might not be able to renounce his living interests for others. To talk of a life of

contemplation and a life of action, i.e. a spiritual life and a rational life respectively, is merely to generalize from charity and justice and so include all forms of spirituality and all forms of action. Like charity and justice, contemplation and action are identical in a perfect world; a perfect world would not be a distracted one. A perfect world would not suggest to the spirit that it be detached from affairs. Like charity and justice, too, contemplation is an imaginative expansion of action where all living interests are seen sub specie aeternitatis. The life of action grows out of certain interests that demand to be idealized for guidance in action, and each life of action has a certain set of goods to attain. The life of contemplation, too, grows out of certain interests but these interests look not to action, alone, how my living interests are to be guided, alone, it looks to the Good, all possible goods, including my own, and it does so "in order to preserve and eternalize this humanity, as spirit alone can, clearly, victoriously, and in peace."[98] In this sense, indeed, the spiritual life implies the life of reason, that the spiritual man will not only be a rational man of action, but, also, implied here is that the spiritual life is the crown of the life of reason, it is the "cream of experience."[99]

Remembering the actor-spectator model and remembering the inspiration offered by Christ as equally the actor-spectator, the actor-spectator supreme, let us look at what Santayana says about prayer in order to round out this discussion of union. Santayana says:

> Prayer is essentially oratio, the eloquence of destiny; it contains the whole free comment, lament, and jubilation of the spirit, challenging its fate: a continual contrite reconsideration of all things, for which memory and hope supply the materials; so that prayer, as a sincere spirit may utter it, abounds in regrets, praises, aspirations, laughter, and curses, but all transposed from the plane of

> action to that of reflection and prophecy. Omnificient power and eternal truth mightily sustain this contemplation, rendering it, in so far as it conforms to them, victorious and full of light. Action is not excluded, as it is not in the drama. Prayer may easily glow with an assurance of the direction in which omnificient power, perhaps through our own agency, is carrying the world. We may be fighting with the big battalions, or even leading them; yet in the midst of action that which is proper to spirit is only observation, wonder, comparison, judgement.[100]

In the passage here from Realm of Spirit, Santayana is talking about the human spirit, how it understands, how it is sad, how it is joyful. Union as prayer in the human sphere is a reconsideration of things. And this reconsideration is analogous to Christ's reanimation of the material world. The human spirit also reanimates the material world yet ideally through intent, through a process of idealization whose end is prayer. Prayer is not a petition to heaven. Even if there is a God, surely, in the words of Herbert J. Muller, He is no "cosmic bellhop." Besides, petitions, if there are to be any would come from the life of reason. However, as I just said, through prayer there is Union in intent, since the materials through which and for which a reconsideration of things occurs are memory and hope. As we have seen, at the basis of memory and hope, there is nothing but intent. Union as prayer, that is, union in intent, a reconsideration of things and analogous to Christ's reanimation of things is actually a re-union. We are all well-acquainted with the things of the world in virtue of our acting in it. We are all well-united with it well before we begin to reflect. We know regret, praise, aspiration, laughter, and curses. The spiritual life changes none of this except that now from above, all transposed from the plane of action, we are reunited with it and see it in a different light. It is as if after many years apart, one were to bump into an old chum on the street.

And in light of those years, one wonders why way back when the two of you were inseparable or even that sadly the friendship was no more than a mere convenience, or even happily that one no longer needs those kinds of friends.

In so far as union is a reunion, surely neither action nor interests can be excluded from it and hence union as prayer is self-knowledge. Prayer in this sense, says Santayana, is "the only perfectly rational form of life."[101] "To this we must come morally to the end, accepting inevitable evils for the sake of the good still possible."[102] Self-knowledge can be understood to a certain extent if we look at laughter, even though ultimately "laughter is not entirely satisfying and lapses sadly into a blank."[103] The kind of laughter Santayana has in mind is what he calls "pure laughter." Pure laughter indicates that one has seen to the heart of the matter, that self-knowledge has been gained, but unlike in prayer, the self-knowledge which pure laughter brings is incomplete. It is incomplete because pure laughter does not require that one have ideals to pursue. In pure laughter, "there is no acceptance of ultimates, only merriment at present absurdities and deceptions. The Olympians did not pray to Fate, they did not <u>care</u> enough for that; but being free and happy, they laughed at existence."[104] Pure laughter brings incomplete self-knowledge not only because there is an absence of ultimates but also concomitantly there is no care. The implication here is that one need to care in order that there be ultimates. In other words, in order for there to be ideals there must be interests. This is merely what has been argued all along in both the life of reason and the spiritual life. Furthermore, and specifically here, without ultimates

and care there is no prayer and there is no union. Union and the self-knowledge it brings is only possible when there are creatures who have interests and articulate those interests into ideals and then detaching themselves from the field of action reconsider the spectacle, accepting the inevitable for the sake of the good.

Union, as I have described it, points toward what Santayana calls an experience of inner unity in the spirit. Neither self-knowledge nor inner unity is to be thought of as a knowledge of a self or a unity of a self. The self for Santayana is no Cartesian substance. For Santayana self-knowledge and inner unity are a knowledge and unity of functions. Santayana is not discussing a doctrine of the soul. Yet this inner unity is the end of spiritual life as prayer, since the "spirit cannot be the world; it can only think the world."[105] The spiritual life as prayer brings inner unity, because unlike the life of reason which grows out of local interests into living purposes, it looks to the Good. In the life of reason one comes to understand the limitations and virtues of his life and its circumstances. But one life at one place and time does not tell us what are all the possible goods of life, hence through the life of reason one recognizes only his own limitations and not the limitations of life in general. Without knowing what the goods and limitations of life under all circumstances might be, inner unity in spirit is not possible. This is not to say that one ever actually accounts for all possible goods. Santayana does not say that. Union is in intent only. It is an ideal impartiality. It is an ideal understanding and an ideal sympathy with all possible goods. Imagine, for example, trying to write a history without ideal understanding of and ideal sympathy with

the other living purposes of the people you are studying. Imagine writing about the ancient Greeks from the point of view of modern American living interests. Only in the facts would we see a trace of ancient Greece, if we saw any of it at all. The product would hardly be a history, it would be propaganda. And as propaganda, history not only will never reveal the true past, it will never tell us about ourselves now.

Unlike the goods of the life of reason which seek harmony "in the economy of nature," an approach to the Good means that "an influence is to be felt, an inner transformation to be experienced, a beatific vision and union with God."[106] In union one feels a "moral unanimity or fellowship with the life of all substances in so far as they support or enlarge its own life."[107] It should be noted that there is a necessary tinge of egoism here (not egotism) since moral unanimity is not an absolute unanimity. The spirit feels a sense of unity within itself in so far as it can ideally sympathize, not with every interest, but only with those interests which enlarge its life. The unity which the spirit feels grows first out of the psyche and the life of reason. Without a life of reason, the spiritual life might exist but it would be precarious. If actions were not carried out rationally, they would ultimately become distracting. So first, indeed, one needs to be adapted to the facts of existence. This is merely another way of stating what was said about liberation, that is, we need health in order to know. In "Union" Santayana says essentially the same thing. ". . . the healthy limitations of the psyche give to each special spirit its special circle of sane thoughts."[108] "The first step towards union the Good is to have settled one's accounts with the

world and with the truth."[109] Since "the Good lies not behind all this movement but before it; it is the end that life proposes when conscious and rational."[110] Once adapted to the facts the Good is approached by a "radical readaptation to the facts, so that in living in harmony with them, it can live in harmony with itself."[111] This is union as reunion, an inner harmony or inner unity which is established through a "true education and discipline."[112] In fact, it is the entire course of the spiritual life which must be followed in order to establish inner unity, a course which begins in the suffering of the Flesh, the World, and the Devil. It is a true education because the end is self-knowledge and moral scope. As I said self-knowledge does not indicate that one merely knows the contents of the self. More to the point, self-knowledge indicates the absence of illusions by which we often live. An approach to the Good, a feeling of inner unity is impossible when illusions are heavy and thick. It is impossible when dogmatism reigns and egotism is its motive. This attitude of Santayana's can be traced back at least to Scepticism and Animal Faith where scepticism plays a vital role in the foundation of knowledge. But even more profoundly, self-knowledge in this sense goes down to Santayana's materialistic roots. In terms of materialism, self-knowledge continually reminds us that existence is an accident and it is ultimately inexplicable. This is not to say that self-knowledge suggests that disillusioned we find that everything is an illusion. That is absurd. What self-knowledge tells us is that our knowledge is always partial and incomplete, and it is only by recognizing our knowledge for what it is that a relatively impartial approach to the Good is possible. This seems to me to be the naturalistic stance at its

best. In the following passage Santayana talks of the knowledge of self-knowledge: Nothing, Nothing, Nothing: "The spirit can never be altogether spiritual, or morally other than a caprice of blind Will, until it has traversed the Dark Night described by Saint John of the Cross, and adopted his motto: Nothing, Nothing, Nothing. It is only on this understanding that all things may be understood without confusion, loved without disgrace, and touched without infection, or that a life of action, for the spirit, can be a life of prayer. Henceforth we are playing a part. . . ."[113] Truly educated and with self-knowledge, Santayana says dramatically all is nothing. 'All is nothing' is dramatic only, since otherwise it would be a contradiction in terms. At best, literally, 'All is nothing' means that 'nothing is absolute,' spirit or otherwise. While dramatically it is a call for humility, not a false humility, not an obsequious hand-wringing sort. 'All is nothing' has the dramatic impact of 'the solipsism of the present moment,' in so far as it presents a shocking revelation and a point upon which to build. It acts as an intellectual disinfectant while it suggests that human joys are tenuous. But it is the implications of 'all is nothing' that I find interesting, that is, that action and prayer are less distinct now than when we were under the influence of illusions. Under the influence of illusions we were players, actors, who did not realize we were playing a part. Now we do. We are actors who realize we are only actors. And so we approach the ideal of actor-spectator, Christ, who both acts and understands equally.

> . . . we do not become kings because we may wear a crown upon this stage, not fools because it is set down for us to talk nonsense. We may give commands, when they are in character, without arrogance, follow our fortunes without greed, and declare our affections without

> fear of disillusion. The disillusion has come already, and the affection flows out notwithstanding, without any claims. We know that the power that prompts our acts is the Poet's, and not our own; that our knowledge is but faith moving in the dark; our joy a gift of grace, our immortality a subtle translation of time into eternity, where all that we have missed is ours, and where what we call ours is the least part of ourselves. We are not impatient of injustice. It is not the fate that overtakes us that makes our dignity but the detachment with which we suffer it. All belongs to the necessary passion and death of the spirit, that to-day rides upon an ass into its kingdom, to be crucified to-morrow between two thieves, and on the third day to rise again from the dead.[114]

Out of self-knowledge arises moral scope. "Inwardness makes moral scope possible."[115] Put in another way, the fruits of spirit which are ripened in solitude produce "morally the most social states since it knows no enemies; and the concentration it allows equalises distances, natural and moral, and places the spirit at its own source, from which flow all the radiating varieties of moral life, none of which then seem unnatural or alien."[116] This moral scope which results from self-knowledge, hence prayer, is close to the idea of charity. Just as the charitable man is likened to a traveler and by virtue of travel the charitable man is rendered patriotic, a lover of his home, so, too, the solitary man of prayer is the great lover of society. The man of prayer is the great lover of society because "storms are not appalling to the spirit, nor even death."[117] The man of prayer does not love what the world loves, since the opinions of the world are riddled with illusions. He does not adopt the passions of the world, he understands them "holding all those passions in suspense, as possible sentiments, and seeing their interplay and their moral issue."[118] In a world without conflict, moral scope as it is born in prayer would be possible. In the absence of class struggle, economic iniquity, ideological schisms, and the like, social and spiritual union, just as we saw in charity and justice, would become the

same, "because when bodies pull well together, and psyches are akin, spirits for the time being become unanimous. Each has the very purpose, the very hope, that animates each of the others; and this actual spiritual unison is not unconscious."[119] But again as in the case of charity and justice, the world is in conflict. It is made of heterogeneous psyches, each with its own interests to serve, while only at the spiritual level, which is homogeneous, that is, in so far as the spirit understands and sympathizes with all possible goods, is union in the world possible and only a union in intent. A lover of the world, a man of society, has no moral scope to speak of. He is a dreamer, asleep. Maybe he is like the "fat man in the street, toddling by under his shabby hat and bedraggled raincoat. Perhaps he is in love; perhaps he is a Catholic, and imagines that early this morning he has partaken of the body and blood of Christ; perhaps he is a revolutionist, with a millennium in his heart and a bomb in his pocket."[120] Only the winds of inspiration and doctrine blow through these minds, winds which carry fronts of low pressure. "Nothing could be madder, more irresponsible, more dangerous than this guidance of men by dreams."[121] To rise above dreams, above the winds of inspiration and doctrine brings moral scope.

One can rise above the prevailing winds of society to solitude yet be the most social of creatures. There is no contradiction here. In an essay entitled "Society and Solitude," Santayana presents this problem of the relationship between society and solitude or in the terms of the Realm of Spirit between moral scope and prayer. In "Society and Solitude," Santayana talks of Saint Bernard who said "O solitudo, sola beatitudo" but Santayana says he might have just as well said "O societas,

sola felicitas." Santayana's argument, he says, is not with those who either say that only society brings happiness or only solitude brings beatitude. His intentions are to show that the two with some imaginative alterations go hand in hand. Santayana says that "it is evident that the beatific solitude of Saint Bernard was filled with a kind of society."[122] It was a society created out of his imagination and intellect. He communed with the Trinity and composed fervent compliments to the Virgin Mary, while he avoided society found in the inns, hovels, castles, sacristies, and refectories.[123] Now one might say that society with images and ideas is not society at all; it is a gross corruption of the word society. But that is not true. When one retreats into his own imagination and intellect, it is peopled, although figuratively, yet, in principle, the same, with both "tormenting demons and ministering angels." This is so because man is rooted in society; it is an interest of his. Hence whether we talk of fat men or the Virgin Mary, society or solitude, man forms ties, and "if he ever finds happiness in solitude, it can only be by lavishing on objects of his imagination the attentions which his social functions require that he should lavish on something."[124] Furthermore, "without exercising these faculties somehow his nature would be paralysed; there would be no fuel to feed the spiritual flame."[125] By substituting ideas for things, the solitary man, the man of prayer does not give up society, hence moral scope. He cannot. To give up society would mean to give up or to renounce interests upon which the spiritual life thrives, it would mean especially to give up sympathy and love. To live in a society of ideas is to live in an ideal society. To live in Santayana's idea of solitude is not as the primitive soul or the mystic

conceives it. The primitive soul yearns for a specious solitude. He hates order and the happiness found in it. He seeks the solitude of a single cell floating deliciously in a warm liquid, a protoplasmic peace: no noises, no alarms, no lusts, no nonsense.[126] This is not solitude as ideal society. This is not a solitude of moral scope. One must live his appointed life but one must do so with detachment.[127] Solitude and moral scope like spiritual insight and natural virtue are not separate lives or two strands of action and interest.[128] They go together and the latter provides material for the former. In the latter, there are personal perspective, practical urgency, perpetual change, defeat, and imperfection,[129] while in the former there is a relative moral victory where through imperfection and understanding an equilibrium is established. This equilibrium brings a security which natural society or solitude, alone, could never afford, it brings an inner security which is an inner clearness. This inner clearness, as Santayana expresses it, is a discovery of a "centre," a disillusioned centre out of which the light of spirit emanates and to which each of its infinite rays may be traced. Santayana says:

> In the animal psyche the passions follow one another or battle for supremacy, and the distracted spirit runs helter-skelter among them, impressed by the sophistical arguments which each of them offers for itself; but if the psyche grows integrated and rational, its centre, which is the organ of spirit, becomes dominant, and all those eloquent passions begin to be compared and judged, and their probable issue to be foreknown and discounted. The waves will not be stilled, but they will now beat against a rock. And with inner security comes a great inner clear-ness. We may now become aware of the world to any depth, in any degree of complexity. We shall have reduced our psychic centre to its precise function as a centre; and from this centre, in duly shaded perspectives, the spirit may spread its silent light over all nature and all essence.[130]

Is there actually a centre? Does the spirit run helter-skelter? Are

there waves and rocks and silent light? Are we playing parts? Are we spectators in the bleachers? Is there a Flesh, a World, a Devil? Is Christ the examplar of spirit? In sum, is there a spiritual point of view? "No, for those who miss these things, there is none of them and those who miss these things do not regret them."[131] Yet "verily they have their reward. Yet that reward is itself their punishment, for it keeps them from ever understanding the power of their own minds or judging anything otherwise than by an accidental passion."[132]

CONCLUSION

The spiritual life, as a human interest, is Santayana's conception of the final stage of a moral life. A life is called moral when there are creatures who have interests which need to be satisfied, and satisfied at least when these interests are made conscious by intent and at best when they are articulated by intent into ideals to pursue. As Santayana expressed in Reason in Science, the moral life begins in prerational morality, it progresses to rational morality, and ends in post-rational morality. In some cases, this progression is historical. However, the progression is not necessarily historical so that a rational morality might degenerate into a prerational one. Or a post-rational morality might be continuous with a rational morality, or it might take on the characteristics of a fanatical or mystical otherworldly morality. In the best sense of the idea of moral progress, there is a continuity among each of the phases. Many years after the Life of Reason had been written, Santayana had the following to say about his idea of moral progress:

> There is one suggestion that I should remove, if I could, from the account given of these matters in Reason in Science, the suggestion, due to my historical manner, that these phases of morality are successive, and as it were, abolish one another.[1]
>
> . . . I see the perfect continuity of post-rational with rational and with prerational morality. We begin with instinct of animals . . .; we proceed to a certain teachableness by experience to a certain tradition and progress in the arts; we proceed further to general reflection, to tragic discoveries to transformed interests.[2]
>
> Between the spiritual life and the life of reason there is accordingly no contradiction: they are concomitant, yet there is a difference of temper and level, as there is between agriculture and music.[3]

In my presentation of the spiritual life, I have attempted to show that since the spiritual life grows out of human interest and there is the presence of intent in it, it, like the life of reason, has its ideals, and that these ideals are compatible with the life of reason and a crown to it. In the present terms, essentially I have argued for the place of the spiritual life in the continuity of moral progress. At the ground of moral progress, there is a human interest, which provides the material basis for our values. By intent, an interest in form, we distinguish one interest from another, become self-conscious of our interests, and form ideals to pursue in action and to envision in contemplation. I will look to these phases of morality in order to draw out some implications of the spiritual life as a form of post-rational morality. By looking at the phases of morality, I do not expect to look at each of the phases in full; that would be beyond the scope of my present purposes. For example, I am not interested in prerational morality as it is manifested in what Santayana calls "barbarism." Nor, for example, am I interested in post-rational morality in so far as it grows out of despair and is sustained by Stoicism, Epicureanism, or Christian otherworldliness. I will look to each of the phases of morality within the limits of my purposes; that is, to conclude my dissertation, I will look to the phases of morality in order to see how the spiritual life fits into post-rational morality in so far as the spiritual life is continuous with and a development out of the earlier phases of morality.

A prerational morality, as Santayana says, has reason in it, but what characterizes prerational morality is that ideals are external to those individuals who pursue them. Prerational morality is clearly seen in children who, for example, are born of a certain religion, who are

Catholic, Jewish, Protestant or what have you, simply because their parents happen to have also been born in that faith. The ideals of prerational morality are external not because they have not actually grown out of the individual's interests, but they have not been critically examined in light of those interests. A prerationally moral man has implicit faith in authority, whether it be religious or otherwise. Without an authority, prerational morality breaks down until another authority is established. The prerationally moral man is an instinctive follower. He has never grown up. Santayana mentions the character of Sancho Panza to illustrate the prerationally moral man. Sancho lives by two instincts. On the one hand, he is guided by his famous homey maxims, which are dubious guides at best for sound action. On the other hand, he is guided by his faith in Don Quixote, madman or saint. In either case, Sancho is the character most deceived in the adventures of Don Quixote, because he is the least self-critical of all the characters. Even when Sancho is the trickster and Don Quixote the brunt of the trick, Don Quixote sees the trick for what it is, and Sancho, who fancied himself so clever, is duped by his own devices.

What characterizes prerational morality is that although there is reason in it and hence intent, reason as a formal interest in action never serves its proper function in the context of a critical evaluation of ideals for the sake of action. Sancho's interest in form is at a bare minimum. Yes, Sancho intends, he is conscious of the fact that he follows Don Quixote. In some sense, Sancho is responsible for his actions; he knows the circumstances of his actions even though he is ignorant of ideals. Yet he is driven and bamboozled into his actions. When we are sympathetic with him we say he is a poor fool, he really does not know

what he is doing. When we are not, we say he is a thick-headed peasant. Sancho does not use his ability to reason, to express his interest in form in action in order to compare one ideal with another. He has nothing definite to live for except the promises of Don Quixote. In this sense, he leaves the satisfaction of his interests in the hands of someone else.

In rational morality, there is a perfect wedding of living interests and ideals, a perfect collaboration between matter and form. Intent, an interest in form as it is expressed through reason, that is, for action, effects the wedding for the sake of maximum satisfaction. The rationally moral man takes full responsibility for his actions both in the sense that he knows the circumstances of his actions, and he knows ideals, what is good for himself, as well. His ideals are the products of his living interests. He has studied them. He has critically compared them with one another. He is not merely taking chances following this one or that. It should be noticed that the rationally moral man is less egoistic than the prerationally moral man. The latter leaves the decisions of what he is to do to his instincts. Fundamentally, he acts as if the best way is the easy way. He is an egoist such as a child is. The rationally moral man will not merely follow one prophet or party or the next. At the same time, however, he recognizes that sacrifices are necessary for maximum satisfaction to result. The rationally moral man is not a Whitmanian robust sort with a dream of some cosmic democracy in his soul, a dream in which every desire is satisfied. No, the rationally moral man realizes, unlike any other, that conflict reigns in the world, and he is prepared to minimize conflicts at a just expense. The model of the rationally moral man is Socrates, and rational morality "is the expression of living interests, preferences and categorical

choice. . . . The rational moralist represents a force energising in the world, discovering its affinities there and clinging to them to the exclusion of their hateful opposites. He represents, over against the chance facts, an ideal embodying the particular demands, possibilities, and satisfactions of a specific being."[4] In the rationally moral man, intent functions as it should in action: it distinguishes one living interest from another, it is self-conscious of those living interests, and it transforms those living interests into purposes which will guide action, purposes to be tested in action, purposes which seek to integrate my living interests, "to clarify my own intent, to cling to what ideals may lie within the circle of my experience and practical imagination, so that I may have a natural ground for my loyalties, and may be constant in them."[5]

The human interest in the spiritual life is a form of post-rational morality which does not deny or renounce action. It is a refinement of action into contemplation. Contemplation, in this sense, is still within the realm of action. First, in so far as it is a reflection on action. Second, in so far as it is not mere motion or inaction. Quite simply, one understands 'to contemplate,' in Santayana's terms, as embodying intent; one understands 'to contemplate' in ordinary terms as an active verb and not as some peculiar or mystical state of being verb. The spiritual life, according to Santayana, is the activity of reflecting on human interests and the ideals which grow out of human interests.

The spiritual life looks on the good and the bad, the prerational, the rational, and the other post-rational moralities, but for itself accepts only the ideals of rational morality in order to expand those ideals for its own contemplative use. The spiritual life looks to the goods of

living interests in order to envision the Good, i.e. all the possible goods of all living interests. This suggests that contemplation is discriminating and functions by comparing ideals. That is, in principle, contemplation functions somewhat as reason does. This latter point further suggests that there is a continuity between rational morality and the spiritual life, while the essential difference between them lies in the fact that reason compares ideals in terms of a set of living interests for action, and the spirit compares ideals in terms of all interests for contemplation. From the idea of charity alone, one can see how the spiritual man accepts an ideal of the life of reason, justice, which, by definition, is based upon a set of living interests, and then expands that idea into charity to include all living interests. The expansion of justice into charity is a refinement of justice, in particular, and an example of a refinement of the life of reason into the spiritual life, in general. Charity is not an ideal which is put into action. If it is, it is no longer charity. It is not, for example, an ideal of missionaries and colonists who expect to impose their living interests on others by sometimes dubious means. As a matter of fact, missionaries and colonists alike have too often corrupted the idea of charity. In the case of Christian missionaries, they have gone far and wide to "civilize" the unknowing heathen quite literally turning him into a lamb. In the case of the colonists, the English, for example, with their liberal utilitarian principles applied at home, have virtually endorsed slavery elsewhere when it suited the purposes of their eternally sunlighted empire. If anything, Santayana's idea of charity is designed to avoid its being applied to particular living interests and so corrupted. Indeed, charity begins at home, in my living interests,

in justice, but the end of charity is removed from my living interests, from action; it is purely a sympathetic interest in the forms of all interests.

From the example of charity, I think one can begin to sense some ideas implicit throughout my dissertation. These implicit ideas surround the progression and continuity of the moralities: prerational, rational, and post-rational. Notice in prerational morality, one merely uncritically follows and adopts the interests of someone else; in rational morality living interests are critically evaluated for the sake of maximum satisfaction--they are internalized by reason; in post-rational morality, the spiritual life, all interests are taken into consideration for the sake of sympathy and understanding, i.e. charity and prayer. As I see it, the progression of the moralities implies two important ideas: (1) the progression is a moving away from egoism; (2) the progression is a movement toward integration or, in the terms I mentioned earlier, toward an organic unity of the spirit. The two ideas, as we shall see, go hand in hand.

As we saw in the early section of my dissertation, egoism and dogmatism, according to Santayana, often are intimately related. Santayana always sought to avoid these two ideas, since I believe he saw them as the root of moral conflict and abuse. In the prerationally moral man, since he is a follower of others' ideals, he is an egoist, as I said, as a child is. Whether he follows out of blind love or fear (sometimes they are indistinguishable) he does so for the sake of easy and immediate satisfaction; notwithstanding, he is often at the mercy of another's whim. The ultimate irony of the prerationally moral man's position is that egoism produces a sense of dogmatism and when it is expressed in its

worst terms his egoism is self-destructive. It is the prerationally moral man who is ready to die for God and country, for a god he never understood and a country he was only accidentally born in.

The rationally moral man avoids the egoism and dogmatism inherent in prerational morality by critically examining his interests. First, egoism in him is avoided to the extent that he is no longer willing to follow ideals which are merely easily and immediately satisfied; he is no longer willing to leave the question of ideals in the hands of someone else. Instead, he turns to a principle which grows out of his living interests and one which compares interests for the sake of maximum satisfaction, namely, reason. Second, rational morality is less egoistic than prerational morality to the extent that it considers all my living interests. Unlike the easily satisfied interests considered in prerational morality, reason, which is primarily utilized for the sake of action, considers and enlightens all my living interests so that under my present circumstances, I can achieve certain satisfactions while others are sacrificed or held at bay. Finally, rational morality is less egoistic than prerational morality in the sense that the rationally moral man is willing to take the full responsibility for any consequences which might follow from his actions, i.e. responsibility for knowing both the circumstances and ideals of his actions. Unlike the prerationally moral man who might attempt to justify his actions with "I was only following orders," the rationally moral man, regardless of the consequences, can appeal only to rational principles, which strive for the maximum satisfaction of his interests, to justify his actions. Indeed, in Santayana's eyes, only the rationally moral man has any real justification for his actions, and one of the reasons why only the

rationally moral man has any justification for his actions is that he has removed the basis of action from his ego and easy satisfaction alone, from what he immediately wants alone, and has brought an interest in form into action. In short, the rationally moral man appeals to principles of judgement which grow out of his primary and derived interests, principles which are objective in so far as they attempt to put internal order into living interests. Only the rationally moral man can say with full justification, "I did it."

Although rational morality is a move away from egoism, it still embodies egoistic elements. Quite simply, reason functions for the sake of action and in so doing, it can judge only according to a particular set of living interests under a particular set of circumstances. The scope of reason is not unlimited in the sense that it can pronounce what is good and what is bad eternally under all circumstances. Reason is a relatively local interest for the sake of local actions. The end of reason is the harmony of certain interests for the sake of maximum satisfaction in action, so it must take the side of maximum satisfaction under the particular circumstances at hand. In the sense, then, that reason is inextricably tied to particular sets of living interests and their maximum satisfaction (reason is in the service of them), reason itself necessarily embodies egoistic elements.

In the spiritual life, as a form of post-rational morality, one is removed from action in the world, let us say the social world, for example, and to the extent that action is beside the point, egoism enters less into the picture. Outside action, one is not essentially concerned with <u>his</u> living interests and the maximum satisfaction of them. This, as I have argued, is not a renunciation of interests or action. The

spiritual life represents another level of action where action is defined in terms of understanding and sympathy. Although many scholars have made much of Santayana's idea of the spiritual life as being outside action, I think the idea, if we see spirit as having interests, is nothing unusual. 'Outside' or 'beyond' action means, as I have suggested, a refinement of action. In terms of egoism, I think this is easily seen. The move from action in the life of reason to beyond action in the spiritual life is essentially a move from the consideration of my living interests to a consideration of all living interests. The reason why a consideration of all living interests is beyond action is that it is both logically and physically impossible for an individual to articulate all living interests into ideals for their realization in action. It is impossible since (1) my living interests and all living interests are not identical and never can be; and (2) at some junctures, differing living interests necessarily come into conflict with one another. From the view of the spiritual life, one realizes that all living interests cannot be realized at the same time; however, the spiritual man recognizes that just because some others' living interests might, in action, conflict with mine, this does not necessarily mean that others' living interests are necessarily bad or irrational. In the life of reason, the end in view is to keep conflict from arising in order that my living interests will be satisfied. When the danger of conflict arises, one is moved to moderate interests by reason in order to resolve conflicts. This is done by self-imposed sacrifices as well as imposing sacrifices on the living interests of others. Munitz sums up well the problem of conflicts of interests. He says:

> If habits did not conflict with new interests and if each impulse as it arose could be satisfied in turn without preventing the satisfaction of another interest, there would be no moral problem

> at all. Intelligence is necessary when conflict arises and this means, not that the irrational core of impulses and needs be subverted altogether, but, on the contrary, that this core become conscious of its ends and that it proceed to satisfy its demands in the most harmonious manner. The conflict between impulses within the life of a single individual, the conflict between the competing needs of the individuals in a given group, and the conflict between societies themselves, together with their different moral and political interests, set the stage and pose the problem.[6]

In the spiritual life, there is no stage set, no problem posed; not because there are no interests at all; no, there are spiritual interests. There is no stage set and no problem posed because action is beside the point, hence conflict does not arise. And since both action and conflict are not issues, my ego and my living interests do not directly enter into the ideals of the spiritual life.

The spiritual life requires that one go outside or beyond action in order to understand and sympathize with all living interests. Again, if we see the spirit as having interests, this is a rather simple matter. In a limited sense, one adopts a spiritual attitude in friendship. If I establish a friendship with another person, I assume that his interests and mine are not identical. Yet if the friendship is going to develop, it can do so only if we are both willing to suspend, at times, each other's living interests in order to understand or to sympathize with one another. If I act in terms of self-interest alone I can never feel a sense of friendship with another person, certainly not in any profound sense. I believe this idea of friendship can be generalized <u>mutatis mutandis</u> into the terms of families and nations. A family or nation which lives only in terms of its own living interests is bound to find conflict when it comes into contact with others. It is bound not to have friends. However, more than friendship and conflict alone, one wonders about individuals, families, and nations alike, whether any

of them who act in terms of their own living interests alone ever fully understand not only the living interests of others but their very own living interests. Certainly in terms of my living interests alone, I understand them in some sense in so far as they are articulated into ideals for action. Yet if I want to understand my living interests in the context of all others, I cannot look to my living interests just in terms of acting upon them. I must for the moment, at least, ideally remove myself from my living interests in order to reflect upon them as I would reflect upon others. This, indeed, as Santayana sees it, was the message in the idea of Christ. Acting upon literally my interests, my family's interests, or my nation's interests precludes understanding and sympathy with the living interests of others and precludes a view of one's own living interests in the perspective of their actual context.

It is ironical that many scholars who have studied Santayana's philosophy have seen it as developing more and more inward and insular; in terms of the spiritual life being a move away from egoism in both prerational and rational morality, I think just the opposite emerges from Santayana's thought. Santayana is thoroughly modern and cosmopolitan in his outlook. He sees the world is becoming smaller, while the individual is becoming less physically isolated. We no longer live in times in which a few souls can strike out for the hinterlands and live in an ideal classless society or a republic ruled by philosophers. The hinterlands no longer exist. Even if one could build a society on immutable and universal interests, which is highly doubtful, the world would creep in. No, the smaller the world becomes, the less chance one has of removing himself from the contact of others' interests and their inevitable influence. The more one has contacts with others' interests the more

chances there are that interests will conflict and change. Surely even since Santayana's time the question of many living interests coming into contact with one another has grown to extraordinary proportions. Today, one is literally forced to consider the living interests of others. We all are in the thick of all other living interests. And the solutions to the problems created when living interests conflict has become more and more compelling. To a great extent I think Santayana's idea of the spiritual life proposes not necessarily a solution to potential conflicts of interests but at least an attitude with which one can approach such problems, an attitude which starts by removing the sting of egoism by suspending action and embracing all living interests.

The progression of the moralities can be looked upon as a moving away from egoism; yet, of course, one never becomes entirely non-egoistic. As we have seen throughout my dissertation, the spirit must always have its foundation in animal life. At the same time, the progression of the moralities can be seen as a movement toward an integration of the spirit. In some sense, one could see this integration in terms of egoism itself. As the spirit becomes less egoistic, it also becomes more integrated, since egoism tends to distract the spirit and to render its attention diffuse. However, I think that the idea of the integration of the spirit can be best seen in terms of a movement in the moralities toward a refinement of intent, i.e. an interest in form.

Let us consider the progress of the moralities both in aesthetic and moral terms in order to get a rounded sense of the way in which I mean refinement of intent. First, aesthetically, imagine the painting "The Naked Maja" by Goya is before a representative of each of the moralities. The prerationally moral man would see "The Naked Maja" as

the picture of a woman he might feel lust for. He might even feel lust looking at the picture alone. The rationally moral man would see "The Naked Maja" as a picture of a woman with an intelligent countenance, a picture of a woman he might marry. In each case, the prerationally and the rationally moral man would ask: "Who is that woman?" In the case of the post-rationally moral man, the spiritual man, he would not be curious about the woman in "The Naked Maja"; he would be curious about "The Naked Maja" only as a picture of a woman, and as a picture, a form to understand for itself, its beauty. I use "The Naked Maja," an aesthetic object, as an example of how the moralities progress aesthetically, but my point is not intended to be applied to aesthetic objects alone. My point is that in terms of any essence (aesthetic object, moral ideal or what have you) an aesthetic sense is aroused in so far as an aesthetic sense implies the concentration on form at the expense of material concerns; as a concentration on form augments, material concerns diminish.

Second, in terms of the progress of the moralities themselves, intent becoming refined can be seen in terms of the clarification and widening of interest from immediate interests and easy satisfaction to living interests and maximum satisfaction, to all living interests and understanding. In prerational morality, intent is least refined. It functions minimally, as we have seen. In prerational morality, one is self-conscious of ideals, but since they are external to or imposed upon one's interests, intent never functions to articulate ideals and through reason to evaluate them critically for action. In other words, one has an interest in form in a prerational morality, but it is not what one would call a vital interest. In a prerational morality, one

lives more on instinct than on intent. In rational morality, intent is refined to the extent that an interest in form is put to its full critical use in action and in terms of one's living interests. As I mentioned earlier, in the life of reason, there is a perfect wedding of living interests and ideals, matter and form, and this wedding is effected by virtue of an interest in form for maximum satisfaction in action. In post-rational morality, in the spiritual life, intent is refined to the extent that since one is beyond one's own living interests and the wedding of those interests and ideals for action is beside the point, one is able to have an interest in all living interests in terms of forms alone; one has time for sympathy and prayer.

As an interest in form increases and develops, an integration of the spirit follows. On the strictly biological level, integration is a defining aspect of life. The very fact that one calls living things "organisms" suggests that integration plays an essential role in the defining of life. Also, another way of stating that one struggles to survive is to say that one tries to maintain a biological integration of parts. When life begins to fade, disintegration sets in, and indeed death is defined as a disintegration of the parts of the body. On the biological level alone, I do not mean to suggest that the striving after integration is a conscious one. In Santayana's thought, as far as I know, there is no <u>elan vital</u> or anything resembling it. What I do want to suggest, however, is that on a different level of life, namely, self-conscious life, there is a complex striving for integration and this self-conscious striving mirrors to some extent the striving for integration on the biological level. This striving on the self-conscious level comes from the spirit, from its interest in form. In other words, in

the biological sphere, there must be a certain level of order for life to exist and to continue to do so. In the self-conscious sphere, there must be a certain level of order, too, first of all to stay alive, and second of all, to stay alive with dignity. This latter point suggests that in man, there is not merely an "urge to live," there is a "zest for life." The zest for life indicates that in man the question of survival alone is not the only question. This zest for life indicates that man has an interest in the integration of his conscious life and that this integration is expressed through intent.

In some ways, clearly man can be viewed strictly as a biological organism. He is subject to the same advantages and disadvantages as any other living organism. In the biological scheme, human life is not sacred. Man is in some fundamental ways merely moved here and there, as are other organisms. Yet by means of intent, man also is able to act, to pursue ideals to be realized and to reflect upon those ideals. This distinction between movement and action was made earlier in my dissertation. However, now, with the advantage of retrospect, we can look at it a little more closely. To say that intent, an interest in form, distinguishes action from movement is to say that man establishes a "centre" from which his activity emanates. This centre, in Santayana's terms, is the spirit. From this centre, integration of conscious life is formed. Let us take a simple example in order that my point will be clearly seen. Let us look at intent expressed in action in the world: I intend to hit the ball. As we have seen, surrounding such an intent, there is an underlying animal interest; there is attention to one object and another; there is distinction of one object from another; there is, in this case, animal faith in the existence of a material world; there is a purpose in mind; there is

the expectation of satisfaction. In addition to all these factors, there are innumerable motor activities which occur involuntarily and unconsciously: eyes blinking, heart beating, limbs moving, etc., etc. Yet all these activities--conscious and unconscious, voluntary and involuntary--cluster around my central activity, namely, that I intend to hit the ball. By means of intent, I focus in on one main thing to do. Everything else is secondary. Because I have an acute interest in form, I can virtually shut out all the innumerable happenings which surround me and concentrate on what I intend. Unlike any other creature, man can do <u>one thing at a time</u>. I intend to hit the ball. My knees are shaking. The team is relying on me for a hit. The fans are cheering. Others are booing. I could not be more distracted from what I intend to do. Yet I control my knees. I disregard the team, the fans, everything. I focus in on only that which I intend to do. Without a centre that was strictly an interest in form, I could not focus in and concentrate on the one thing at the expense of everything else, while at the same time, everything else to greater and lesser extents contributes to the one main thing I am doing.

Regardless of the sense in which intent functions, be it in prerational, rational, or post-rational morality, the very character of intent, in so far as it makes a man focus and concentrate on one thing, indicates an integrated quality, a moving toward the centre, about man's mind, a spiritual quality, which, as Santayana says, "aspires to God" or seeks unity within itself and with the world. The aspiration to God is present throughout all the phases of morality. Yet the progress through the moralities indicates a greater and greater concentration on form toward the integrating of the elements of self-conscious life. The move from prerational to rational morality is a move toward God, the centre,

in so far as man attempts to detach himself from instinct and rise above brute material circumstances. Rather than a life being governed by so many dispersed occasions, the rational man looks to select ideals for a definite direction to move in through common sense, art, society, religion, and science. From the rational to the spiritual life, the centre draws nearer since life becomes governed not by actions alone but by ideals themselves. In the life of reason, there is an aspiration to God within the material sphere. In the spiritual life, the aspiration to God is beyond the material sphere where the particular circumstances of my life play less of a role, where occasions in any sense are of little direct concern. Under these circumstances, the spirit becomes patient and tranquil: it knows that it has distraction under some control, that it can function through distraction as long as it maintains its centre. Removed from its enemies, at least, for the time being, it is as if the spirit were with friends at sea. In one sense, the sea, more so than the land, is a constant reminder to the understanding spirit of the precarious world in which the spirit is stationed. Yet, in another sense, to the sympathetic spirit friends are near, the ship is tight. All around there is light and space and nothing to do but contemplate them. It is a newly discovered world for the spirit. Sometimes the light is colored and space closes in. There are clouds in the sky. In them, the spirit sees that the course of events depends so much on the weather while the weather is never precisely the same one day to the next. Sometimes the light is pure--no clouds in the sky--anything is possible at sea.

NOTES

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43. Ibid., p. 113.

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45. Ibid.

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66. Santayana, Realm of Matter, p. 342.

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74. Ibid.

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76. Schilpp, Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 508.

I. 3. Reason as a Derived and Formal Interest

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2. George Santayana, Reason in Art, Vol. 4 of The Life of Reason, p. 5.

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11. Ibid., p. 40.

12. William James, Principles of Psychology,vol. 1, p. 287; cf. also John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: The Modern Library Publishers, 1930), p. 31 and John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), p. 95.

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27. Santayana, Reason in Common Sense, p. 204.

28. Ibid., p. 244.

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32. Cf. John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1960), pp. 259ff, and cf. Munitz, Moral Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 70.

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36. Santayana, Reason in Common Sense, p. 281.

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38. Lachs, Animal Faith and the Spiritual Life, p. 346.

39. Santayana, Reason in Common Sense, p. 265.

40. Lachs, Animal Faith and the Spiritual Life, p. 346.

41. Santayana, Reason in Common Sense, p. 267.

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43. Sprigge, Santayana: An Examination of His Philosophy, p. 158.

44. Schilpp, Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 578.

45. Ibid., p. 561.

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47. Ibid.

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I. 4. The Critics' View of Spirit

1. Schilpp, Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 298.

2. Munitz, Moral Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 98.

3. Schilpp, Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 305.

4. Ibid., p. 306.

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13. For more detail on this view, cf. ibid., pp. 50, 57, 116, 211, 243, 293-313, 396.

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17. Singer, Santayana's Aesthetics, p. 70.

18. Ibid., p. 5.

19. Lachs, ed., Animal Faith and the Spiritual Life, p. 348.

20. Ibid., p. 349.

21. Ibid., p. 259.

22. Ibid., p. 263.

23. Ibid., p. 264.

24. George Santayana, The Realm of Spirit, Book Fourth of Realms of Being (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940), p. 92. Sprigge notes this aspect of pure intuition but only in passing; cf. Sprigge, Santayana: An Examination of His Philosophy, p. 211.

25. Sprigge, Santayana, p. 116.

26. Symbolic knowledge includes "dialectic" and "animal faith"; cf. Justus Buchler and Benjamin Schwartz, eds., "Literal and Symbolic Knowledge," in Obiter Scripta: Lectures, Essays, and Reviews (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936)

27. Dialectic is "intent on form"; Santayana, Realm of Essence, p. 95.

I. 5. Spirit as a Derived Interest

1. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 18.
2. Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, p. 275.
3. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. xii.
4. Santayana, Realm of Essence, p. 9.
5. Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, p. 129.
6. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 287.
7. Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, p. 132.
8. Santayana, Realm of Essence, p. 17.
9. Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, p. 277.
10. Ibid., p. 276.
11. Ibid., p. 280.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 276.
14. Ibid., p. 278.
15. Ibid., p. 166.

II. INTENT AND INTUITION

1. Intent: The Foundation of Reason and Spirit as Formal Interests

1. Santayana, Reason in Science, p. 127.
2. Ibid., p. 121.
3. Ibid., p. 123.
4. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 228.
5. Santayana, Reason in Common Sense, p. 42.
6. Munitz, Moral Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 70.
7. Cf. Santayana, "Concretions in Discourse," Reason in Common Sense, pp. 166ff.
8. Santayana, Reason in Common Sense, p. 130.
9. Ibid., p. 207.
10. Ibid., p. 214.
11. Ibid., p. 167.
12. Santayana, Reason in Science, p. 156.
13. Ibid., p. 154.
14. Ibid., p. 124.
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16. Ibid., p. 154.
17. Ibid., p. 124.
18. Ibid., p. 174.
19. Ibid., p. 181.
20. Ibid., p. 126.
21. Ibid., p. 131.
22. Ibid., p. 128.
23. Santayana, Reason in Common Sense, p. 233.
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30. Santayana, Reason in Science, p. 123.

31. Ibid., p. 124.

32. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 219 (my underscore).

33. Lachs, ed., Animal Faith and the Spiritual Life, p. 70.

34. Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, p. 252.

35. Cf. Santayana, Reason in Science, p. 132.

36. Ibid., p. 129.

37. Ibid., p. 125.

38. Santayana, Realm of Essence, p. 114.

39. Ibid., p. 116.

40. Santayana, Reason in Science, p. 132.

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2. Henry David Aiken, Reason and Conduct: New Bearings in Moral Philosophy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), chap. xv, "George Santayana: Natural Historian of Symbolic Forms," p. 315.

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4. Buchler and Schwartz, eds., Obiter Scripta, p. 109.

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6. Dewey, Quest for Certainty, p. 8.

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13. Santayana, Reason in Common Sense, p. 91.

14. Buchler and Schwartz, eds., Obiter Scripta, p. 11.

15. Santayana, Reason in Common Sense, p. 110.

16. Schilpp, Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 518.

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29. Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1970), p. 62.

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31. Buchler and Schwartz, eds., Obiter Scripta, p. 128.

32. Ibid., p. 134.

II. 3. Intent in Dialectic: An Introduction to Intuition

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2. Ibid., p. 136.
3. Santayana, Physical Order and Moral Liberty, p. 88.
4. Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, p. 263.
5. Santayana, Realm of Essence, p. 95.
6. Santayana, Reason in Science, p. 137.
7. Santayana, Realm of Essence, p. 115.
8. Ibid., p. 114.
9. Ibid.
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15. Ibid., p. 99.
16. Lachs, ed., Animal Faith and the Spiritual Life, p. 119.
17. Santayana, Realm of Essence, p. 100.

II. 4. Intent-ful and Intent-less Intuition

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2. Ibid., p. 18.
3. Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, p. 77.
4. Ibid., p. 133.
5. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 110.
6. Santayana, Realm of Essence, p. 4.
7. Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, p. 167.
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10. Ibid., p. 275.
11. Ibid., p. 283.
12. Ibid., p. 285.
13. Santayana, Realm of Essence, p. 5.
14. Ibid., p. 67.
15. Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, p. 88.
16. Ibid., p. 76.
17. Ibid., p. 133.
18. Cf. Sprigge, Santayana: An Examination of His Philosophy, p. 116; Lachs, ed., Animal Faith and the Spiritual Life, pp. 258ff.
19. Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, p. 69.
20. Ibid., p. 50.
21. Schilpp, Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 57.
22. Cf. Section I, chap. 4, note 13, "Critics' View of Spirit."
23. Singer, Santayana's Aesthetics, p. 6.
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26. Ibid., p.

27. Ibid., p. 15.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., p. 14.

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31. Cf. Ibid., p. 180.

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33. Singer, Santayana's Aesthetics, p. 13.

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47. Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, p. 39.

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II. 5. Intuition as Attention

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2. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 93.

3. Cf. Alan R. White, The Philosophy of Mind (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 67, 85.

4. Santayana, Realm of Essence, p. 9.

5. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 99.

6. Cf. C. O. Evans, The Subject of Consciousness (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1970), pp. 93ff.

7. White, Philosophy of Mind, p. 68.

8. Ibid., p. 73.

9. Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, p. 54.

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11. Ibid., p. 113.

12. Ibid., p. 117.

13. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. vii.

14. Ibid., p. 18.

15. Santayana, Realm of Essence, p. 16.

16. White, Philosophy of Mind, p. 85.

17. Ibid., p. 86.

18. Cf. Evans, Subject of Consciousness, on "interrogative attention," p. 108.

19. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 99.

20. Ibid., p. 101.

21. Ibid., p. 97.

22. Evans, Subject of Consciousness, p. 75.

23. Ibid., p. 77.

24. Ibid., p. 106. For more detail concerning this argument, cf. Evans, p. 105.

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26. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 111.

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45. Cf. discussion of intuiting as ____.

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23. Ibid., p. 70.

24. Ibid., p. 76.

25. Ibid., p. 85.

26. W. T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy (New York: Macmillan Co., 1960), p. 110.

27. Ibid., p. 151.

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29. Ibid., p. 176.

30. Singer, Santayana's Aesthetics, p. 21.

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33. Cf. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, trans. James Strachey (New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1961), chap. 1.

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38. Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, p. 273.

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42. Cf. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, pp. 85-86.

III. THE SPIRITUAL LIFE

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2. Santayana, Realm of Essence, p. 12.

3. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. ix.

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6. Ibid., p. 163.

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8. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 91

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10. Ibid., p. 92.

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15. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, op. cit., 1178b1.

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49. Oliver Goldsmith, The Vicar of Wakefield (New York: The New American Library, 1961), p. 29.

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66. Denis de Rougement, Love in the Western World (New York: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1969), p. 326.

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70. It may be interesting for some to note that charity is defined as "Eros enlightened" and not as agape.

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6. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 119.

7. Ibid.

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9. Cf. my earlier discussion of attention, Section II, chap. 5.

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13. Ibid., p. 131.

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27. Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, p. 191.

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43. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 151.

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54. Lachs, ed., Animal Faith and the Spiritual Life, p. 271.

55. Ibid.

56. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 176.

57. Ibid., p. 170.

58. Ibid., p. 168.

59. Ibid., p. 171.

60. Ibid., p. 176.

61. Ibid., p. 177.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., p. 179.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid., p. 181.

III. 3. Liberation (or Distraction in the Positive Sense)

1. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 154.

2. Ibid., p. 182.

3. Ibid., p. 188. Cf. also, an essay by Santayana entitled "Spirit in Indian Philosophy," in Lachs, ed., Animal Faith and Spiritual Life, p. 301.

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12. Ibid., p. 169 (III,2,22).

13. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, p. 535.

14. Ibid., p. 537.

15. Smart, Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy, p. 477.

16. Otto, Mysticism: East and West, p. 99.

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19. Deussen, The System of the Vedanta, p. 457.

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21. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, p. 572.

22. Sankara, Crest Jewel of Discrimination (Vivekachudamani), trans. Swami Prabhavananda and Christopher Isherwood (New York: American Library, 1970), p. 49.

23. Sankara, Upadesasahasri, p. 16.

24. Sankara, The Vedanta Sutras of Badarayana (Thibaut Introduction), p. xxvi.

25. Deussen, The System of the Vedanta, p. 58.

26. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, p. 636.

27. Ibid., p. 639.

28. S. N. Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, vols. 1-5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922-55), p. 489.

29. Deussen, The System of the Vedanta, p. 401.

30. Ibid., p. 402.

31. Ibid., p. 403.

32. Ibid., p. 474.

33. Ibid., p. 406.

34. Scharfstein, Mystical Experience, p. 142.

35. Ibid.

36. Cf. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, p. 163.

37. Santayana, Platonism and the Spiritual Life, p. 278.

38. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, p. 33.

39. Ibid.

40. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 122.

41. Ibid., p. 165.

42. Ibid., p. 149.

43. Ibid., p. 184.

44. Ibid., p. 187.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid., p. 193.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid., p. 194.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid., p. 195.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid., p. 196.

56. Ibid., p. 197.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., p. 200.

59. Buchler and Schwartz, eds. Obiter Scripta, p. 280.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid., p. 282.

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64. Ibid., p. 285.

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66. Ibid., p. 287.

67. Ibid., p. 288.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 207.

72. Buchler and Schwartz, eds., Obiter Scripta, p. 289.

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74. Cf. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 210.

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77. Ibid., p. 211.

78. Cf. Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1964), pp. 38-39, 61.

79. Ibid., p. 65.

80. Robert L. Zimmerman, "Kant: The Aesthetic Judgement," in Kant: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Robert Paul Wolff (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 391.

81. Cf. Kant, The Critique of Judgement, p. 142.

82. Ibid., p. 45, n. 7.

83. Ibid.

84. Cf. Zimmerman, "Kant: The Aesthetic Judgement," op. cit., p. 390.

85. Cf. Singer, Santayana's Aesthetics, pp. 73-74; Cf. Arnett, Santayana and the Sense of Beauty, p. 123.

86. Santayana, Reason in Religion, p. 161.

87. Ibid., p. 171.

88. Ibid., p. 170.

89. Ibid., p. 159.

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid., p. 152.

92. Ibid., p. 158.

93. Ibid., p. 170.

94. Sprigge, "Ideal Immortality," p. 235.

95. Santayana, Reason in Religion, p. 159.

96. Santayana, Soliloquies in England, p. 226.

97. Santayana, Reason in Religion, p. 175.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid., p. 178.

100. Ibid., p. 180.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid., p. 181.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid., p. 183.

105. Randall, Plato: Dramatist of the Life of Reason, p. 3.

106. J. A. Stewart, The Myths of Plato (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1960), p. 21.

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid., p. 42.

109. Cf. ibid., p. 74.

110. Erwin Rhodes, Psyche: The Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality Among the Greeks, Vol. 2 (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 469.

111. Randall, Plato: Dramatist of the Life of Reason, p. 199.

112. It is interesting to note in the chapter entitled "Platonic Immortality," Randall refers the reader to Santayana's chapters in Reason in Religion on belief in a future life and ideal immortality in order to elucidate the Platonic concept of immortality; cf. Randall, Plato, note on p. 219.

113. Bertrand Russell, Portraits from Memory (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 94.

114. Santayana, Platonism and the Spiritual Life, p. 301.

115. Cf. Randall, Plato, chap. xvi, "Platonic Immortality"; also, in so far as reason's participation in deathlessness is "vertical," cf. Rhodes, Psyche, pp. 465, 468, 469, 470.

116. This term means "withdrawal from contact with the ephemeral as the source of pollution and debasement," Rhodes, Psyche, p. 470.

117. Ibid., p. 473.

118. Plato, The Collected Dialogues, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), Phaedo, 61d.

119. Cf. Rhodes, Psyche, p. 468.

120. Plato, Phaedo, in The Collected Dialogues, 114d.

121. Ibid., 64aff; 67e; 114c.

122. Ibid., 69c.

123. "What we call learning is really just recollection," Phaedo, ibid., 72e.

124. Plato, Symposium, in The Collected Dialogues, 206e.

125. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 213.

126. Cf. Santayana, Reason in Religion, p. 183.

127. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 207.

128. Ibid.

129. Ibid., p. 208.

130. Ibid.

131. Sprigge, "Ideal Immortality," p. 232.

132. J. Jones, "Love as the Perception of Meaning," in Religion and Understanding, ed. D. Z. Philips (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 144.

133. Ibid.

134. Ibid.

135. Ibid., p. 145.

136. Cf. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 229.

137. Jones, "Love as the Perception of Meaning," p. 153.

138. Ibid., p. 152.

139. Ibid., p. 149.

140. Ibid.

141. Ibid.

142. Ibid.

143. Ibid.

144. Ibid.

145. Ibid.

III. 4. Union and the Idea of Christ

1. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 214.

2. Ibid.

3. Sprigge, "Ideal Immortality," p. 234.

4. Ibid., p. 235.

5. Munitz, Moral Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 88.

6. Schilpp, Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 564.

7. Munitz, Moral Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 93.

8. Ibid., p. 94.

9. Cf. my earlier discussion of mysticism from the psychological point of view, Section II, chap. 6.

10. Munitz, Moral Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 94.

11. Ibid., p. 94. Cf. also my discussion of Sankara, Section III, chap. 3.

12. Ibid., p. 95.

13. Santayana, Platonism and the Spiritual Life, p. 221.

14. Ibid., p. 248.

15. Ibid., p. 246.

16. Cf. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield: G. & C. Merriam Company, Publishers, 1963).

17. Santayana, Platonism and the Spiritual Life, p. 246.

18. Ibid., p. 247.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 301.

22. Ibid., p. 247.

23. Ibid., p. 248.

24. Cf. Santayana, Reason in Science, p. 157.

25. Ibid., p. 158.
26. Ibid., p. 190.
27. Ibid., p. 197.
28. Ibid., p. 198.
29. Santayana, Platonism and the Spiritual Life, p. 248.
30. Cf. ibid., p. 249.
31. Ibid., p. 254.
32. Ibid., p. 251.
33. Munitz, Moral Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 104.
34. Santayana, Platonism and the Spiritual Life, p. 286.
35. Munitz, Moral Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 102.
36. Ibid., p. 105.
37. Schilpp, Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 560.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., p. 565.
40. Ibid., p. 563.
41. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 206.
42. Santayana, Egotism in German Philosophy, p. 12.
43. Ibid., p. 169.
44. Cf. ibid., chap. VII.
45. Schilpp, Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 558.
46. Santayana, Realm of Essence, p. 6.
47. Ibid., p. 7.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid. Cf. also, Santayana, Sense of Beauty, pp. 77-78, 81.
50. Santayana, Realm of Essence, p. 8.
51. Ibid., p. 7.

52. There is an interesting short discussion of this latter idea in reference to Alfred Loos, one of the fathers of "modern architecture," in Janik and Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna; cf. pp. 252ff.

53. Santayana, Realm of Essence, p. 7.

54. Walter Pater, Renaissance (New York: The New American Library, 1959), p. 95.

55. Santayana, Realm of Essence, p. 9.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., p. 10.

59. Inge, Christian Mysticism, p. 4.

60. Santayana, Realm of Essence, p. 10.

61. Ibid., p. 13.

62. Cf. Santayana, The Birth of Reason and Other Essays, ed. Daniel Cory, p. 37.

63. Santayana, Realm of Essence, p. 10.

64. Cf. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, "Distraction," p. 142.

65. Santayana, Realm of Truth, p. 66.

66. Cf. Santayana, The Idea of Christ in the Gospels, p. 167.

67. Schilpp, Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 564.

68. Cf. Aristotle, Poetics, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, chaps. 11-16; F. L. Lucas, Tragedy (New York: Collier Books, 1965), chaps. 1 and 2.

69. Santayana, The Idea of Christ in the Gospels, p. 53.

70. Ibid., p. 54.

71. Ibid., p. 58.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid., p. 65.

74. Ibid., p. 66.

75. Ibid., p. 58.

76. Ibid., p. 251.

77. Ibid., p. 22.

78. Ibid., p. 23.

79. Ibid., p. 22.

80. Ibid., p. 24.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.; also cf. "The Resurrection," in Idea of Christ in the Gospels, chap. XI, especially pp. 159-161.

83. Cf. Santayana, The Idea of Christ in the Gospels, p. 69.

84. Ibid., p. 213.

85. Cf. Smart, Reasons and Faiths, p. 31.

86. Santayana, The Idea of Christ in the Gospels, p. 214.

87. Ibid., p. 215.

88. Ibid., p. 74.

89. Ibid., p. 219.

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid., p. 220.

94. Cf. ibid., pp. 201-202.

95. Ibid., p. 248.

96. Ibid.

97. Cf. also, Schilpp, Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 27.

98. Santayana, The Idea of Christ in the Gospels, p. 220.

99. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 259.

100. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 247. When Santayana was writing the Realm of Spirit, he was reading, for inspiration, the Bhagavad Gita, a work which he highly praised; cf. Schilpp, Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 571, a work concerned with the idea of God in Man, a work which deals with the problem of the compatibility of contemplation and action. The

previously cited passage from the Realm of Spirit seems to come directly from the Bhagavad Gita where Arjuna, a warrior, is faced with the question of whether or not to fight. With the guidance of Krishna (God), Arjuna, through contemplation, by seeing things from above, is convinced that it is his obligation to act according to his assigned role as warrior, in other words, to act according to his living purposes.

101. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 247.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid., p. 249.

104. Ibid., p. 247.

105. Ibid., p. 226.

106. Ibid., p. 216.

107. Ibid., p. 220.

108. Ibid., p. 263.

109. Ibid., p. 267.

110. Ibid., p. 268.

111. Ibid., p. 224.

112. Ibid.

113. Ibid., p. 269.

114. Ibid., p. 270.

115. Ibid., p. 225.

116. Ibid.

117. Ibid., p. 226.

118. Ibid., p. 227.

119. Ibid., p. 253.

120. Santayana, Soliloquies in England, p. 123.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid., p. 120.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid.

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid., p. 121.

127. Schilpp, Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 571.

128. Ibid.

129. Santayana, Soliloquies in England, p. 120.

130. Santayana, Realm of Spirit, p. 270.

131. Santayana, The Idea of Christ in the Gospels, p. 254.

132. Ibid.

CONCLUSION

1. Schilpp, Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 564.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 27.
4. Santayana, Reason in Science, p. 174.
5. Ibid., p. 183.
6. Munitz, Moral Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 64.

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