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AFFECTS AND AGENCY:

AN INTERDISCIPLINARY, PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY

by

Elliot L. Jurist

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

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Abstract

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Elliot L. Jurist

Adviser: Professor Steven Ellman

There is currently a burgeoning interest in affects across a number of disciplines-- philosophy, psychology, neuroscience and psychoanalysis. Yet, it remains unclear to what extent one can infer that a common set of problems and concerns exists. In this project, therefore, I undertake an interdisciplinary inquiry with the aim of providing conceptual clarity about the meaning and function of affects. In particular, I begin with the history of philosophy; then I turn to focus upon psychology-- exploring the notion of "basic emotions" as well as the question of whether affects can exist without cognition. This leads to an examination of recent work in neuroscience. My conclusion is that the perspectives of psychologists and neuroscientists are a necessary, but insufficient way to conceive of affects, and that to understand affects fully,

one must consider the theme of agency.

The capacity for regulation is a rich area in which to investigate how affects and agency are connected. I synthesize literature about regulation from developmental psychology, infant research and psychoanalysis, delineating three stages of development: pre-agency, agency proper, and self-conscious agency. More specifically, I propose that agency comes into being through "affect regulation." In enabling an infant to identify and modulate his/her affect states, affect regulation fosters the unfolding of a sense of agency. Affects are not simply found states in the mind; it is possible for them to be crafted and refined. Thus, I suggest that a new term, "affectivity," is required to characterize the ability that adults have to self-regulate affects. Clinical material is introduced to illustrate the concept of affectivity.

My view supports the psychoanalytic assumption that affects contribute to the emergence of a sense of agency and that a sense of agency allows us to experience new and more differentiated affects. The claim that there is an integral relation between affects and agency depends upon a range of perspectives-- about the brain and behavior, but also about subjective experience, which is both influenced by culture

and is radically unique. In my conclusion, I stress the importance of preserving the scientific and hermeneutic aspects of psychoanalysis.

PREFACE

This project represents a kind of fulfillment of the Platonic injunction to study philosophy as a young person and as an old person, but not in between. Still, philosophy remains an old and faithful intellectual companion, and, so my ideal is perhaps better conceived as seeking ground for the integration of philosophy and clinical psychology, rather than giving up philosophy. In this work, I attempt to combine the philosophical ambition of conceptual clarity with my own reflection and experience about clinical psychology.

My first book, Beyond Hegel and Nietzsche (forthcoming from MIT Press), provides the basis for my interest in affects and agency. In the present work, I shift from the relentless abstraction of 19th century German philosophy to confront the empirical realm of psychology, neuroscience, and developmental psychoanalysis. This is not as much of a jump as it might seem: psychoanalysis grows out of German Idealism in ways that have not been sufficiently appreciated-- especially in the commitment to describe the internal world of human beings.

The field of clinical psychology has allowed me to develop long-standing interests in a new, practical direction. Clinical work offers an extraordinary opportunity to see ideas instantiated in human reality. Yet, its true value can be measured by the lives that are affected. I want to thank my patients for teaching me how to be a psychotherapist as well as to be more of a human being. I would also like to thank my supervisors from City, Phyllis Meshover, Sandra Pine, Brett Gorkin; from Columbia-Presbyterian, Goldie Alfasi, Ivan Bresgi, Mark Gerald, Mark Kuras, Seymour Moscowitz; and from IPTAR, Phyllis Beren and Hannah Kapit. I feel fortunate to have worked with Carol Kaye as my supervisor for three years at City and now at IPTAR; her wisdom and shining intuition continue to guide me. I am especially indebted to Neil Skolnick for his part in helping me to develop as a therapist and as a person.

The clinical psychology department of the City University of New York is a special place, and I feel privileged to have been trained there. I feel especially indebted to my fellow students who, during lean years of little funding, virtually ran the Psychological Center ourselves. In particular, I wish to thank Sharone Bergner, Jeannie Blaustein, Peter Costello, Ellie Gellman, Francoise

Graf, Ilene Green, Suzanne Little, Catherine Monk, Virginia Picchi, Elizabeth Pike, Carlos Prieto, Melissa Ritter, Madeline Rhum, the late Jeff Segal, Mara Silverman, Neal Vorus, and Addette Williams. I would also like to thank my teachers, A. J. Franklin, Larry Gould, I. H. Paul, Arietta Slade, and Steve Tuber.

The members of my committee have been consistently supportive and kind. I wish to thank Diana Diamond for introducing me to theories of severe psychopathology-- which during internship, proved to be invaluable-- and also to contemporary Kleinian ideas. I appreciate her diligence and have always taken great pleasure in our conversations that invariably range to subjects beyond psychology. Paul Wachtel has been an inspiring presence in my life, since we met in 1990. Not only is he an exceptionally thoughtful interlocutor, but he is a devoted teacher/scholar. I genuinely appreciate his unfailing generosity to me personally. To my delight, Beatrice Beebe agreed to be on the committee without knowing much about my project and despite her hectic schedule. I have been an admirer of her work for a long time, and so it has been a pleasure to get to know her. I met Mike Moskowitz initially as a student in his adult practicum. His presence fostered a perfect atmosphere, in which there was intense bonding as a group

and serious reflection and care about our patients. Mike has become a friend over the years, and I value our relationship. I want to thank Steve Ellman, the chair of my thesis committee, for allowing me to develop my work in an autonomous way. Steve has also been an important influence in my life; my respect for his ideas will be apparent in this work, although my debt goes beyond such formal recognition. I greatly appreciate his benevolence over the years.

My mother, Hilda Braurman Jurist, died as I was just beginning to work on this project. The fact that the project was completed in a relatively timely fashion is due, I know, to her-- the drive to work passionately and the will to prevail are traits in myself that are "inherited" from her. My father, Sumner Jurist, was encouraging and loving throughout as I secluded myself to work; in many ways, we have been able still to find a way to grow closer during the last year. My sister, Andra Jurist, brother-in-law, Bruce Stewart, and nieces, Marney and Lindsey Jurist-Rosner have also been loving presences in my life. My friends Cliff Simms, Dorothea von Moltke, Nora von Moltke-Simms, Joel Whitebook, Kitty Ross, Charley Whitebook, Gyuri Gergely, Danny Gergely, Chris Christian and June Christian also deserve appreciation for years of sustaining friendship.

I dedicate this project to my companion, Ruth Ben-Ghiat, who was fervently engaged in writing a book during this year, but who always found time to listen-- to encourage, console, admonish and praise me with fairness and love-- and, most importantly, to share a space in which work could be put aside in favor of real positive affects, and, of course, pleasure.

FOR RUTH M. BEN-GHIAT

AFFECTS AND AGENCY:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY, PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY

Table of Contents

I. INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVES

The notion that an integral relation exists between affects and agency will seem strange to some, less so to others. One's reaction is likely to depend upon several factors, especially how one understands the terms, affects and agency; so let me begin with some definitions. By "affects," I mean an overarching concept that embraces both "emotions" (the realm of biology and hence what is universal) and "feelings" (the realm of subjective experience and hence what is particular-- influenced by individual idiosyncrasy, family, and culture).

Affects are a part of our motivation system, and as such, they form a primary way of responding to the world. Yet, affects also serve the function of complex, highly differentiated communication-- the fruit of individual development and human evolution. What distinguishes affects, in particular, is how readily they combine with other capacities, like perception, cognition and memory. In Chapter II, I shall more to say about the distinctiveness of affects in relation to other mental phenomena-- drives, phantasies and moods.

I shall introduce a new term, "affectivity" at the end of Chapter III and develop it further in Chapter IV. Affectivity denotes the capacity to experience affects

well-- to know what one feels, to be able to shape one's feelings (as much as that is possible), and to have them available for communication-- to and from others. It is revealing, I think, of our suspiciousness about affects that we lack a term that means "using affects well"-- in contrast, for example, to the term "rationality" in the sense of meaning "using reason well."

Ambivalence about affects permeates our everyday language. On the one hand, we think of affects as denoting gut-level responses, that is, expressing our truest desires, and on the other hand, we think of affects as dangerous, as leading us astray, as beclouding our ability to know our truest desires. This ambivalence is profound, and, in fact, can be found throughout the history of Western thought and values.[1]

Let us turn briefly to consider the history of philosophy. Most philosophers would pause at the notion of an integral relation between affects and agency, given their propensity to defend rationality as the optimal criterion for agency. From ancient to contemporary philosophy, there is a predominant emphasis that agency is best determined by rationality. This is not to overlook that numerous philosophers who have discussed affects and in some cases, such as that of Hume, even have accorded respect to affects.

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[1]The anthropologist Catherine Lutz (1988) has written about non-Western cultures, like the Ifaluk of Micronesia, who see affects as social in nature, as opposed Western culture.

Nevertheless, it would be hard to dispute the claim that in the philosophical tradition-- and well as within the mainstream of contemporary Anglo-American philosophy-- affects are put into the category of irrationality, and irrationality is construed in terms of being a failure of rationality. The distinction between affects and rationality can be traced back to the strict separation of the body (the source of affects) from the mind (the source of rationality). Indeed, it is possible to claim the contrast between affects and rationality resides at the heart of the philosophical tradition and is a fundamental assumption in Western culture.

In Plato's dialogue, the Phaedo, Socrates, facing doom, welcomes death as representing the ideal for a philosopher-- to be released from the constraints of the body in order to exist in a realm of pure thought and to attain knowledge (67a). In the Republic, Plato's hostility to the influence of the poets in the *kallipolis* is precisely because they address themselves to emotions, rather than, as the philosophers, to rationality.[2]

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[2]Although Plato can be regarded as the source of the philosophical bias against affects as well as the firm distinction between affects and rationality itself, his views, on closer examination, are more complex. For one thing, according to the model of the mind in the Republic, the appetitive part (responsible for our desires for food, drink, and sex) cannot be bypassed or eliminated. Furthermore, in the Phaedrus, a late dialogue, Plato suggests that we are motivated by the irrational part of the soul, even though it must be harnessed by the rational part of the soul.

Aristotle affirms Plato's distinction between affects and rationality in the sense that rationality is regarded as the best part of the soul. However, Aristotle is the philosopher who first becomes interested in understanding and valuing affects (Stocker, 1996; Kosman, 1980; Fortenbaugh, 1975). Aristotle sees affects as having an evaluative aspect, thus supporting the notion that affects can include cognition. Moreover, he grants affects an indispensable role in the life of virtue, which enables human beings to flourish and achieve happiness. Aristotle also emphasizes, in particular, how constitutive pleasure is in the experience of affects.[3] Perhaps the most significant aspect of Aristotle's perspective on affects is that they can be crafted in order to occur appropriately. In other words, affects do not simply happen to us, but they can be shaped and determined by us.

Nussbaum (1994) has highlighted the basic contrast between the Aristotelian and the Stoic position on affects. For Aristotelians, affects can be cultivated to be appropriate-- to occur at the right time, to the right

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[3]Aristotle's view of the relation between affects and pleasure in Bks. VII and X of the Nicomachean Ethics is quite interesting from a psychoanalytic point of view. I shall deal with pleasure in relation to affects in presenting the so-called "basic emotions" view and primary process in the next chapter and again in the last chapter. For an excellent discussion of the importance of Aristotle's view of affects and pleasure, see Stocker's Valuing Emotions (1996). Also see Gosling & Taylor's The Greeks on Pleasure (1982) and my review of Stocker (forthcoming in Metaphilosophy).

person, in the right way. For Stoics, affects, by definition, elude such cultivation. However, if we withhold our consent to the overpowering force of our affects, then we can achieve the "detachment" and "self-sufficiency" which allow us to flourish as human beings. According to the Stoic position, we need to exercise rationality over our affects; our affects cannot be reformed, and we cannot simply do away with them; thus, we ought to elect not to endorse or act upon them. According to the Aristotelian position, affects are dangerous only insofar as they influence us without being mediated; the propensity to regard them as wild and natural interferes with the prospect of taking seriously the work of crafting them.

It would seem that, insofar as rationality is celebrated at the expense of affects, it is the Stoic position that has been vindicated in the history of philosophy. The significance of Stoic philosophy is felt in another sense as well: it was a crucial influence upon early Christian doctrines and thus has had a strong impact on Western values, especially concerning the body. It is beyond the aim of this project to follow the twists and turns of the history of philosophy. But it can be stated, in general, that in modern philosophy, the defense of rationality has continued to entail a devaluing of affects. In the Enlightenment philosophy of Kant, for example, rationality becomes enshrined as the exclusive criterion for agency.

I have begun this study of affects and agency by mentioning theories of affects in the history of philosophy because many of the issues introduced there reappear in other theories. Specifically, current scientific knowledge addresses and resolves some of the issues raised in the history of philosophy. For example, Damasio's (1994) brain research, which suggests that there is overlap in the neural circuitry of emotions and cognition, challenges the assumption of a fundamental divide between affects and rationality. And LeDoux's (1996, 1995, 1994a, 1994b, 1993) proposal of two systems of emotional response-- one of which is unamenable to conscious control and the other of which is mediated by cognition-- can be deployed as a way to account for the apparent opposition between the Stoics and Aristotle.

The philosophical past, however, also formulates issues in a way that continues to prove to be illuminating. For example, the Aristotelian view of affects gives expression to the importance of the subjective experience of affects as part of the claim that we can shape and determine affective experience internally. This Aristotelian insight, which I shall develop with the concept of affectivity, highlights an aspect of affects that most psychologists and neuroscientists ignore.

Before departing from the topic of philosophical views of affects, it is worth acknowledging that there are philosophers currently working in the field of moral

psychology, like Stocker (1996), Vetlesen (1994), Nussbaum (1994, 1990), Oakley (1992), A. Rorty & Flanagan (1990; also A. Rorty, 1980), DeSousa (1987), Taylor (1990, 1985), and Calhoun & Solomon (1984) who are drawing attention to positive features of affects and have urged philosophers to rethink their assumptions about affects and rationality.[4] Although some philosophers have come to have a deeper appreciation for the complexity of affects, there are other philosophers who have moved to defend rationality by expanding its meaning.[5] A contrast can still be observed between the dawning appreciation of the complexity of affects and the sophistication that characterizes philosophical approaches to agency.

Agency is a term that is common in philosophy. The philosophical meaning of the term, not only departs from, but comes close to being the opposite of many of the ordinary associations that we might have about agents-- as in FBI agents, State Farm agents, sports agents, and other mega-dealmaking agents-- who are engaged in representing others, not themselves. Thus, agency has a technical meaning as it is used by philosophers.

Traditionally, when philosophers use the term, they are concerned with the implications of having free will. The

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[4]I discuss some of this work, especially Taylor, in my paper "In What Sense Do Affects Contribute To A Sense of Agency" (forthcoming in Constellations).

[5]An example of this view is found in Davidson (1984, 1980), which will be introduced in Chapter V.

sense of agency is predicated upon our capacity to choose for ourselves, particularly the capacity to engage in second-order reflections on one's own desires and beliefs (Taylor, 1985, Frankfurt, 1971). The philosophical meaning of being an "agent," therefore, is not circumscribed by its literal meaning of one who acts, juxtaposed to being a "patient," that is, one who is acted upon. I shall be using the term to denote a person who has the capacity to act and to live well-- a status that is determined by the evaluation of one's own desires and beliefs.

There is a tension to be noted between philosophers who are concerned with what we can call a thin and thick sense of agency. The thin sense of agency denotes efficaciousness (success measured in terms of the commensurability of one's beliefs and actions), while the thick sense of agency describes something fancier, like self-realization (happiness achieved through a good character). Efficacious agency is more abstract; it has the merit of presuming less, but also meaning less.

Self-realizing agency suggests that one achieves the status of being a desirable person. Such a qualitative state of well-being demands an account of its genesis. Determining agency shifts from a yes/no evaluation to assessing a process that must entail development and cultivation. The thick conception of agency, moreover, opens the door to tough issues about the private vs. public nature of agency, and forces us to entertain questions like

whether agency can be meaningful as a universal notion, devoid of a particular content.[6] The goal of describing a thick sense of agency exceeds the aim of this project, although this is where my sympathies lie. I hope that this work is a step in that direction.

Let us shift our attention to other disciplines. A connection between affects and agency is in some ways no less alien to psychologists (and neuroscientists) than to philosophers. It is plausible to suppose that psychologists would be more receptive to the study of affects than philosophers, as psychologists have always been interested in human motivation. However, during the era of behaviorism in psychology, mental phenomena such as affects were deemed unsuitable for scientific study, and the subsequent "cognitive revolution" has been no more hospitable to the study of affect. Still, there has been a proliferation of interest in affects in psychology and neuroscience in the last twenty years or so, which I shall describe in the next chapter.

This interest in affect does not necessarily include agency or affectivity. Indeed, it is tempting to conclude that while philosophers have contributed much to our

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[6]It is worth observing in this connection that the term agency is appealing precisely because it avoids the ethnocentric connotations of the term selfhood: all cultures have some notion of what a desirable person looks like, but not all cultures share the Western view that the proper telos of development is an individuated self (Kitayama and Marcus, 1994).

knowledge about agency and have had less to say about affects, psychologists have dwelled upon affect with less to offer about agency. Of course, such a conclusion is too facile: philosophers are becoming interested in including affects as a component of agency, and there are also psychologists who are moving away from affects as static entities in favor of studying how affects can be regulated. Moreover, it would be mistaken to ignore the germination of interdisciplinary interest in affects-- of which this project is proudly a part.

Psychoanalysis is one field in which it is natural to make the connection between affects and agency. Psychoanalysts readily assume that affects contribute to a sense of agency and that agency provides us with new, differentiated kinds of affects. Although the term, agency, is not as familiar in psychoanalysis as the term, self, both have to do with human subjectivity.[7] Interest in the origins of human subjectivity has been responsible for the shift in focus within psychoanalysis from the Oedipal to the pre-Oedipal period.

Development is a fertile ground in which to explore the relation between affects and agency. The notion that one

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[7]The term, agency, was used by Schafer (1976) in connection with his introduction of action language as a replacement for metapsychology in psychoanalysis. The philosophical use of the term, while associated with action, is not as restrictive. My use of the term, agency, follows the philosophical meaning and should not be confused with Schafer's narrower usage.

becomes an agent by virtue of the affective interaction with a primary caregiver is widely accepted by psychoanalysts of varying orientations. Psychoanalysis offers the most subtle and comprehensive account of the subjective experience of affects-- beginning with the challenge of mastering affect regulation and then self-regulation. Regulation will be a crucial component for understanding how affects and agency are connected. The concept of affectivity, the generalized capacity for such regulation in adults, will serve as a bridge between affects and agency.

The history of psychoanalytic thinking about affects themselves is a complicated topic. First and foremost, there was the difficulty of conceptualizing affects in a way that did not compromise drive theory. This difficulty had to do with the following dilemma: either affects are derivative of drives (which means they are less important to study in their own right) or affects are as fundamental as drives (which means that we must question whether drives form the exclusive basis of motivation). I shall return to the vexing relation between affects and drives in the next chapter.[8]

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[8]One reason I am drawn to study affects is because of their mutability-- the way in which they can be modulated internally through reflection and choice, which coincides well with the aims of psychotherapy. Another reason I find the study of affects to be compelling is that at this point in time psychoanalytic debates about drive theory have played themselves out, leaving us with proponents vs. opponents and little in between. It is one thing to agree to disagree, and it is another thing to seek to locate areas

This brings us to a second complication concerning a psychoanalytic theory of affects. In the psychoanalytic literature on affects, one tends to find two sorts of arguments. One argument bemoans the lack of a single theory of affects in psychoanalysis and goes on to make such an proposal. The other argument suggests that psychoanalysis already has a perfectly good theory of affects which only needs to be made explicit. A good example of the second argument is found in a recent book by Spezzano (1993), who reacts negatively to the supposition that psychoanalysis is obliged to take account of affects as they are understood in other disciplines. It is worth quoting directly from two passages:

> ...the measure of a psychoanalytic theory of affects is not how well it tallies with the theories of neuropsychologists or infant researchers but how useful it is to us both in our efforts to talk with patients and with each other about the clinical situation and in our efforts to extrapolate from that situation a coherent and meaningful language of human experience (p. xii).

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for constructive dialogue. It seems to me that the study of affects offers a productive area for further debate, as no psychoanalytic orientation is prepared to argue that we can dispense with affects.

> The success of this argument...depends, in turn, on the epistemological authority of psychoanalysis to talk about affect without necessarily looking over their intellectual shoulders each step of the way to make sure they have not deviated from or contradicted the discourse about affect being carried on by scholars in other fields (p. 4).

There are a number of reasons why I find this position objectionable. There is no good reason, in my opinion, to set research against clinical experience so defensively. Indeed, making sense out of the contrasts and differences between findings in these respective spheres can itself be fruitful.

Spezzano's strongly hermeneutic view of psychoanalysis does not pause to reflect whether an appreciation of the hermeneutic position requires us to disregard science. Spezanno is content to credit psychoanalysis with "epistemological authority" based upon that it has its own tradition. The liability of this position will be apparent at once, if the reader returns to the second passage and substitutes the word "alchemy" for "psychoanalysis."[9]

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[9]Although I find some of Spezzano's views about a psychoanalytic theory of affect to be untenable, his book has a number of virtues. At one point, he suggests that a

In advocating a retreat for psychoanalysis, Spezzano is laying out a vision for psychoanalysis that is at the polar opposite of my own point of view. My argument, simply stated, is that unless psychoanalysis is responsive to such external perspectives, it is dooming itself to irrelevance.[10] Moreover, according to the view that I develop in the last chapter, we ought to appreciate psychoanalysis as both scientific and hermeneutic. It is mistaken to assume that we must choose between these two positions. The hermeneutic aspect of psychoanalysis can be valued without condemning its responsiveness to scientific evidence. In particular, I shall defend the view that it is

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theory of affects can serve as a link between the general theory and clinical theory-- which is a good insight (p. 39). His discussion of the relevance of the specific affect, "interest/excitement" for psychoanalysis is quite illuminating (p. 104). Spezzano also makes the interesting observation that when we use the term "psychological," what we often mean is "affective" (p. 113). Finally, I agree with his affirmation that affects are at the center of human subjectivity (p. 64).

[10]There are two opposing tendencies within the relational model of psychoanalysis: one of which is outward-looking and open to the influence of new ideas, and the other of which is immersed in intramural debate, wherein one engages in defining oneself-- often quite polemically-- in relation to the classical position. The first tendency is manifest in the introduction of feminist philosophy to psychoanalysis (Benjamin, 1995, 1987). Both the Freudian and the relational view have been prone to the phenomenon which plagues the political left, where factional battles are waged at the expense of successfully organizing a united front against one's (real) opponents. It will be interesting to see what the future brings, as the relational position matures and a post-Freudian position unfolds. My project is an attempt to contribute to "working through" one-sided alternatives-- to seek ground where there is convergence, without obscuring differences.

possible to reconcile the big divide between those who see affects in scientific terms and those who do not.[11]

This project has five chapters in total. Chapter II examines research about affects in psychology and neuroscience, beginning with the "basic emotions" view of Tomkins and Ekman et al, and some criticism of this view, and then moving on the debate between Zajonc and Lazarus. Next I introduce the views of neuroscientists-- LeDoux, Damasio and Edelman. Following this, I introduce Freud's view of affects and reflect upon a psychoanalytic theory of affects in light of recent theories in other fields.

In Chapter II, I focus upon understanding what it means to have affects, in particular, to what extent cognition plays a part in affective experience. I also dwell upon the claim that affects form a primary human response to the world. My conclusion in Chapter II is that in order to understand affects, we need to pay attention to the theme of agency.

In Chapter III, therefore, I turn to address the question of how agency comes into being, featuring psychoanalytic ideas about the mind and development. I begin with the work of developmental psychologists who study affect regulation. Next, I explore the evolution of a sense of agency according to a wide range of infant researchers

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[11]The two most recent psychoanalytic books on affects take opposite positions: Spezzano (1993) defends a hermeneutic perspective, while Jones (1995) defends a scientific one.

and psychoanalytic theorists. I delineate three stages: pre-agency, agency proper and self-conscious agency. More specifically, I focus in depth upon the psychoanalytic notion that through the affective interaction between infant and caregiver, the infant acquires the capacity to modulate his/her own affect states and thus attains a better sense of agency. At the center of this view is the crucial role of affective mirroring, which fosters affect regulation and self-regulation. I also propose the term affectivity as the generalized form of such regulation in adults. Chapter III concludes that psychoanalysis gives us the tools to explicate affectivity and to grasp how this concept serves as the bridge between affects and agency.

In Chapter IV, I descend from the heights of theory to contend with affectivity in the clinical setting. I present four cases, wherein we shall consider varying capacities for affectivity, ranging from two cases in which there is little or inconsistent affectivity, to a case in which the treatment helps to develop an increased capacity for affectivity, and to a case in which the patient comes to treatment with a high degree of affectivity and works on making it function even better. I also ponder pathologies of affectivity-- organized into the categories of excessive negative affect, absence of affect and affect dysregulation.

Chapter V applies my study of affects and agency to the larger frame of psychoanalysis. In order to understand the relation between affects and agency, both science and

hermeneutics are required. It is desirable to incorporate our current knowledge of affects from psychology and neuroscience, philosophical work on agency, and psychoanalytic theories of development and clinical practice. Both our growing knowledge of the brain and biology must be brought to bear upon our subjective experience of affects. With the universality of science and the sensitivity to particularity of hermeneutics, psychoanalysis offers the most comprehensive and profound view of how affects and agency are connected. The last chapter concludes with an affirmation of psychoanalysis as science and hermeneutics, along with some proposals for future research, and a summary of the work as a whole.

II: THE PRIMACY OF AFFECTS IN HUMAN LIFE

As the Introduction has shown, rationality-- according to the Western philosophical tradition-- is understood largely as opposed to as well as superior to affects. The legacy of this tradition is also apparent in psychology: studying thinking and behavior is respectable in a way that studying affect is not. Indeed, by excluding all mental phenomena as unsuitable for scientific study, behaviorism was responsible for fostering an especially inauspicious context for the study of affect. The subsequent "cognitive revolution" also has not been friendly to the study of affects. Affects are admittedly difficult to study; but this can neither explain nor justify the disinterest in affects.

For a long time, Silvan Tomkins' work stood as the single voice in American psychology defending the value of studying affect. In this chapter, I shall trace the emergence of Tomkins' view about the fundamental importance of affects; then I shall examine the contemporary version of Tomkins' view in the notion of "basic emotions." I discuss the work of Ekman and others, including criticism of basic emotions. I shall move on in the second section to focus upon the debate between two psychologists, Zajonc and Lazarus, zeroing in on the issue of whether affects can exist without cognition and how this bears upon the issue of

their primacy in human life. In the third section, I consider the implications of recent neuroscience research by LeDoux, Damasio and Edelman for the central issue. In the fourth section, I introduce psychoanalytic ideas about affects in order to clarify their importance and to lay the basis for linking the theme of agency to affects.

1. A Brief, Recent History of Affects in Psychology

A. Tomkins' Lonely Path

In contrast to the wide consensus amongst American psychologists, Tomkins (1995a, 1995b) maintained that affects are worth studying in their own right; he also argued that affects, in fact, constitute an independent sphere of knowledge-- distinct from perception, cognition, and memory. According to Tomkins, affects are primary biological motivating mechanisms, and, thus, can be understood as having primacy in human life. Following Darwin, Tomkins viewed affects as manifest through facial expressions and as leading to action. Tomkins' work focuses upon the link between affects and facial expressions, and, in his later work, he included the importance of the skin (1995a).

For Tomkins, affects are both innate and learned. His work is, perhaps, best known as articulating that there are a determinate number of primary affects (or basic emotions), paired in terms of a low-high continuum: interest/excitement; enjoyment/joy; surprise/startle;

distress/anguish; fear/terror; shame/humiliation; contempt/disgust; and anger/rage. These basic emotions are divided into positive and negative affect-- an important way to organize the range of affects. The first two pairs are positive; the last five pairs are negative (surprise/startle belongs to a separate category, which Tomkins describes as "resetting"). Although both positive and negative affect are activated by stimulation increase, Tomkins claims that negative affect is a product of a continual unrelieved level of non-optimal stimulation, whereas positive affect can occur through a decrease in stimulation.

The weight that Tomkins places upon affects as biological ought not obscure the fact that he regards affects as acquired and thus as influenced by our capacity to make meaning. As Demos (1988) emphasizes, Tomkins is careful to mark the distinction between affects per se and affect-related information; the latter of which foreshadows the process of affect regulation. In his later theory, Tomkins developed what he termed "script theory," where place, cast and action determine how affects are experienced (Tomkins, 1995a, 1995b). Nevertheless, there is a decided emphasis in Tomkins' work to define affects as amplifications-- that is, amplifications of drives. As he claims: "affect either make good things better or bad things worse" (Tomkins, 1995a, p. 20). According to Tomkins, this also means that the function of affects as communication must be secondary.

Although Tomkins draws our attention to the role of affects as amplifying drives, he sees drives and affects as separate motivating mechanisms. He differentiates between the generality of affects compared to the specificity of drives-- the regular appearance of hunger, its satisfaction through the mouth. Tomkins was an early critic of Freudian drive theory because of its reliance upon a notion that he finds implausible-- psychic energy. Yet, he does not want to reject drives as part of a biological, motivating system. Tomkins' reflections on psychoanalytic drive theory is an aspect of his thinking that is not well-known, but which remains relevant.[1]

Recently, there seems to be a revival of interest in Tomkins' work: two collections of his writings have been posthumously published. Tomkins was a gadfly who was ahead of his time, particularly in his undaunted criticism of the limitations of inquiry in academic psychology. Tomkins criticizes psychology from multiple angles. He persistently raised questions about the narrow and rigid constraints of behaviorism. Yet he was equally unsympathetic to the cognitive turn in psychology-- not merely because of the insufficient attention to affect, but because of the

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[1]What is interesting about Tomkins' criticism of drive theory is that although he rejects the language of psychic energy, he does not want to give up thinking about drives or affects in biological terms. Thus, his view differs from relational theorists for whom Freud's way of conceptualizing drives leads to the conclusion that psychoanalysis is a hermeneutic, but not scientific theory.

tendency to smuggle in cognition everywhere, especially the notion that affects require cognitive appraisal. Tomkins affirms that cognitive appraisal can determine affects, but he thinks that we should not ignore how affects can be activated by other means, perceptual or motoric. Tomkins rejects the findings of Schachter and Singer's (1962) research that the appraisal of physiological arousal determines the recognition of emotions; such a view, he maintains, obfuscates and devalues our conscious experience of affects (Tomkins, 1995a).

There is an appealing phenomenological orientation in Tomkin's writing about affects. He grapples extensively with specific affects and does not rest content with positing a generic theory of affect. Tomkins stresses the value of affects in human life, particularly their versatility-- how affects can be readily combined with other mental capacities as well as with each other. Ultimately, Tomkins proposes that affects are joined with a feedback system that insures human freedom (Tomkins, 1995b). The distinct and irreplaceable function of affects in human life is passionately affirmed in the work of Tomkins.

B. Basic Emotions: For and Against

Under the inspiration of Tomkins, Ekman (1994, 1992) has conducted research during the 70s to the present which demonstrates that there are universal emotions that can be recognized through facial expressions cross-culturally.

Ekman argues that there are five basic emotions: happiness, sadness, anger, fear and disgust (The main difference from Tomkins is the exclusion of surprise and shame). These basic emotions are defined in terms of nine characteristics: 1) distinctive universal signals; 2) presence in other primates; 3) distinctive physiology; 4) distinctive universals in antecedent events; 5) coherence among emotional response; 6) quick onset; 7) brief duration; 8) automatic appraisal; and 9) unbidden occurrence (Ekman, 1992). Ekman concedes tnat the evidence supporting these nine characteristics varies. He cites evidence for distinctive patterns of autonomic nervous system responses for anger, fear, disgust and (tentatively) sadness, and he claims that unique physiological patterns exist for each emotion in the central nervous system. Ekman also acknowledges that emotions are best understood as families of related states, rather than denoting single states.

Ekman's research has the merit of refining Tomkin's ideas and being solidly empirical. There are two perspectives, however, from which Ekman's work can be criticized. The first perspective forces the question of whether affects form genuinely discrete categories or whether what is really "basic" about affects is their dimensions-- levels of arousal, pleasantness, and activity. For example, Davidson (1992) argues in favor of the dimensions of "approach and withdrawal" as basic, an explicit challenge to Ekman's understanding of basic

emotions strictly in terms of facial expressions. Davidson rightly notes that nothing in Ekman's studies sustains the invariability of prototypical expressions-- especially when these emotions occur spontaneously (as opposed to in the laboratory). There is no compelling reason simply to assume that an isomorphic relationship exists between emotions and their expressions. Davidson also urges us to ponder the crucial question of whether there is as much variability within emotions as across emotions.

The second perspective from which Ekman's work has been criticized concerns its cross-cultural validity. Russell (1991) observes that while Ekman's work on facial expressions shows that emotions are similar across cultures, this ought not be equated with the view that these emotions are identical. Russell also notes that advocates of basic emotions never fully agree amongst themselves about which emotions are basic (also see Ortony & Turner, 1990). He concludes that the basic emotions view is not wary enough about the question of how linguistic usage overlaps with conceptual meaning. In a similar vein, Averill (1994) has emphasized that basic emotions are, in essence, a form of classification. Invariably, this means that the dominant focus will be upon "prototypes." The problem with prototypes, according to Averill, is that secondary and unusual emotions are not often given adequate attention.

Shweder (1994), an anthropologist, develops an even more radical critique of the basic emotions view. Shweder

resists the notion that biology is the ultimate arbiter of our thinking about emotions, claiming that according such a privileged view to science itself needs to be examined as a cultural preference belonging to Western culture. In Shweder's view, emotions are "complex narrative structures that give shape and meaning to somatic and affective experiences" (p. 37). Shweder also observes-- with Ekman in mind-- that some emotions lack characteristic facial expressions. Like Russell and Averill, Shweder rejects the basic emotions view as a construct of language, rather than a description of natural objects. All three of these theorists maintain it is mistaken to assert biology over culture.

It is beyond the aim of my focus to attempt to settle the question of basic emotions, and it bears emphasizing that the primacy of affects does not stand or fall on that question. Ekman's defense of basic emotions leads him to highlight the innate and universal dimension of affects. Still, he does distinguish between the universality of emotional expressions and the display rules that govern them. Ekman's notion of display rules represents an attempt to grapple with the influence of culture. However, he remains committed to basic emotions, which provides the ground, in his view, where research can make the most progress. Ekman is prepared to disavow the subjective experience of affects as unamenable to study "because too little is known about how subjectivity maps on to other

aspects of an emotional experience"(Ekman, 1992, p. 175). Ekman adds that it is the rapid onset of emotions which explains why we perceive them as happening to us, as opposed to choosing them.

Basic emotions theorists pay little attention to our internal experience of affects; nor are they impressed by our capacity to modulate and regulate affects. Izard (1993), who is also influenced by Tomkins, is one theorist who upholds the basic emotions view, but links affects to the development of personality. Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1992) have proposed that infant research is a promising avenue for addressing whether basic emotions exist prior to acculuration and to study how they develop. The question of whether affects undergo development is an important issue, which we will have occasion to return to in Chapter II.[2]

There are other basic emotions theorists, like Panksepp (1994) who offer a perspective which is more "hard-core" (and less sensitive to the role of culture) than Ekman. Panksepp asserts that "the neurodynamics of human emotional states arise from lawful principles that can be revealed through animal research" (p. 24). Regardless of the merits of such research-- and I shall shortly discuss an example in LeDoux's work-- circumspection demands that such optimism be tempered by the present state of our knowledge.

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[2]Demos (1988) claims that basic emotions are present in infants. Questions about the affects of infants will be taken up in Chapter III.

The sensitivity to subjective experience in Tomkins' work stands as an instructive example that respect for the biological aspect of emotions in no way requires us to dismiss the subjective experience of affects. We turn next to the debate between Zajonc and Lazarus, which focuses upon the question of what it means to have an affective experience and explores the ramifications of seeing affects as having primacy in human life.

2. Can Affects Exist Without Cognition? The Zajonc-Lazarus Debate

The 1984 debate between Zajonc and Lazarus in the pages of the American Psychologist created a stir. As Scherer observed, the debate "had a major impact on the psychology of emotions in the 80's" (Scherer, 1994, p. 227). This debate provides proof about how much the topic of affect has moved to the mainstream in psychology. The debate is also important, as it will allow us to achieve greater clarity concerning what is at stake in the claim that affects have "primacy." The debate between Zajonc and Lazarus is valuable in terms of clearly laying out two, alternative views.

As a starting point, it should be noted that the debate is defined in a misleading way: although Zajonc's article is entitled "On the Primacy of Affect" (1984a) and Lazarus' article is entitled "On the Primacy of Cognition" (1984), the debate is not really about which comes first, affects or

cognition. The debate concerns whether affects exist independently of cognitive appraisal (Zajonc) or whether affects and cognition are necessarily interdependent-- the latter as constitutive of the former (Lazarus). In other words, the central question is: do affects exist in a pure form or must affects contain an admixture of cognition? As with so many academic debates, the authors square off, asserting the superiority of their respective views. There is an "either/or" quality of their positions which is unfortunate, not only because points of commonality are too readily brushed aside, but, in addition, because the possibility of establishing any complementarity is bypassed.

A. Zajonc: The Argument for Pure Affect

Zajonc's article is itself a response to an earlier article by Lazarus (1982), "Thoughts on the Relations between Emotion and Cognition." The point that Zajonc picks up with is Lazarus' claim that "affect cannot be independent of cognition because *by definition* cognition is a necessary precondition for affective arousal" (p. 117). Against this view, Zajonc offers five empirically-derived senses in which affects have primacy: 1) affective reactions show phylogenetic and ontogenetic primacy; 2) separate neuroanatomical structures can be identified for affect and cognition; 3) appraisal and affect are often uncorrelated and disjoint; 4) new affective reactions can be established without an apparent participation of appraisal; and 5)

affective states can be induced by noncognitive and nonperceptual procedures. For Zajonc, the primacy of affects boils down to the fact that affects can exist independently of any cognition.[3]

The first point in Zajonc's argument in favor of the primacy of affects is based upon Izard's work on development, which suggests that infants experience affect without the mediation of cognitive appraisal; the second point also cites Izard's work and then turns to split-brain research to support the claim of independent brain functioning for affects and cognition. The third point is rather unclear, as Zajonc fails to define what he means by the ambiguous term "often." One is left to wonder whether appraisals and affect are uncorrelated and disjointed as a norm or an exception.

The fourth point uses research that concerns olfactory and auditory stimuli in order to affirm the notion that preferences can exist without any appraisal; the fifth point strengthens this point by introducing evidence of affective responses induced through drugs, hormones, electrical stimulation (or that occurs autonomically)-- leading to the conclusion that where there is affect, there is not necessarily some prior cognitive event. Zajonc rejects the

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[3]In later work, Zajonc (1985) it is clear that he agrees with the basic emotions position in offering evidence that facial actions in emotional expressions regulate the volume and temperature of the blood supply to the brain.

implications of what he terms in another context (Zajonc, 1984b), "cognitive imperialism," the assumption that our understanding of affect must subordinate itself to the dominance of cognition.

B. Lazarus: The Argument for Cognition in Affect

Lazarus responds to Zajonc by claiming that in order for a sensory state to be transformed to be into being an affect, an appraisal of some kind must occur. Thus, he wants to draw a more discriminating line concerning what constitutes an affect. For example, according to Lazarus, startle is a reaction that is not an affect, as requires no active, involved participation. Following Ekman, Lazarus sees startle as a reflex that is distinct from the affect, fear.[4] Lazarus moves on to counter Zajonc's five senses point by point.

In response to the first point about affects and development, Lazarus points to research by developmentalists, which, in stressing infants' early cognitive capacities, provides implicit support for his view that cognitive appraisal informs affective experience. Although Lazarus is right that there is a growing body of developmental literature that emphasizes the early cognitive capacity of infants (some of which I shall discuss in

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[4]In his book, Emotion and Adaptation, Lazarus (1991) describes startle as a "pre-emotion" that prepares us to evaluate what is happening (p. 54).

Chapter III), he is too quick to pass over the question of whether it is possible that affects occur without the mediation of cognitive appraisal during infancy.

Concerning the second point about affects and neuroanatomy, Lazarus sees Zajonc as being reductionistic and charges him with arriving at conclusions that far outstrip the current state of our knowledge of the brain. As we will see in the next section, there is now research which supports Lazarus about the extent to which emotion and cognition are related, and, in particular, challenging the belief that each resides in separate parts of the brain. Nevertheless, Lazarus and Zajonc are at cross-purposes more than that their views are necessarily contradictory. Lazarus fails to address the issue of primary concern for Zajonc-- the possibility that affects exist without the contribution of cognitive appraisal, for which evidence can be cited. I shall explore these issues further in the next section of this chapter in the context of examining recent findings in neuroscience.

Zajonc's third point that affects and appraisal can be uncorrelated and disjointed elicits an indignant response from Lazarus. Lazarus protests Zajonc's assertion that if cognitive appraisal is a necessary feature of affect, then a change in appraisal ought to result in a change of affect-- which does not always seem to be the case. Zajonc adds that "persuasion" is a rather weak method of attaining attitude change. Lazarus responds strongly here because, as he

points out, his own research has featured the manipulability of affects through stimulus change. For Lazarus, Zajonc's "positivist" bent is revealed in the equation of persuasion with stimuli which is designed to produce change. Despite the name calling, there is something problematic in the way Zajonc raises the issue of the relationship between appraisal and affect, since it is unclear what he means for us to infer from the fact that there can be discordance.

Lazarus takes Zajonc's fourth and fifth points together. Both of theses senses address the possibility of the occurrence of affect without prior appraisal. Lazarus opposes Zajonc's affirmative conclusion by criticizing "the motley collection of studies" which support it and especially by disputing one particular study. This study concerns taste aversion: food (the conditioned stimulus) is established as aversive even when nausea (the conditioned response) is delayed and then obliterated by anaesthesia. (The animal was unconscious when the association between food and nausea is created).

Lazarus rejects Zajonc's main claim: that it is dubious that appraisal is a factor in the animal's learned aversion. He questions, first, whether nausea is an affect and then notes that the unlikelihood of appraisal here does not fully rule out that it has occurred. Lazarus also observes that drug effects are difficult to evaluate since they cause uncontrolled neurochemical effects. The polemical quality of discourse in this exchange is evident in Lazarus'

strategy of jumping on Zajonc's weakest case-- without attempting to address the latter's substantive claim.

At the same time, Lazarus manages to raise some doubts about whether Zajonc proves his case that affects do not require cognitive appraisal. In this sense, Lazarus gets the better of Zajonc in the exchange, especially since it is Zajonc who avers that the debate ought to be settled on empirical grounds. Zajonc is successful, however, in raising the point that cognitive appraisals certainly occur to a lesser degree in some instances and might not occur at all in other instances. Moreover, Zajonc spurs us think about what making a cognitive appraisal entails. This places a burden on Lazarus, which he does not take this up in the article.

In his book, Emotion and Adaptation (1991), Lazarus does explore what it means to make such an appraisal. He states, surprisingly, that an appraisal "implies nothing about rationality, deliberateness or consciousness" p. 169). Lazarus wants to construe appraisal in broad terms; thus, when he refers appraisals as cognitive, clearly he does not mean to restrict himself to the activity of thinking. According to Lazarus, it is the element of meaning implied in appraisal that becomes constitutive of affective experience.[5] Yet, in distinguishing appraisal from

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[5]Lazarus (1991) distinguishes between knowledge as general and appraisal as specific (p. 168) and concludes that knowledge is necessary, but insufficient for affect, while

rationality and judgment, Lazarus leaves us with deep and untractable questions. The debate between Zajonc and Lazarus founders on conceptual as much as empirical grounds.

C. Resolving the Debate

The debate between Zajonc and Lazarus is revealing in terms of what it fails to achieve. Zajonc and Lazarus speak past each other, resulting in the false impression that their views cannot be reconciled. Zajonc's main concern is to argue in favor of the possibility that affects can occur without cognitive appraisal; Lazarus' response is to show that Zajonc makes unwarranted conclusions from the available evidence and also to claim that it is more important to focus on how cognition shapes affect. Lazarus (1991) is explicit in his book that the interdependence between cognition and affect is not intended to mean that one is more important than the other (p. 178).

Izard (1994) presents a model about the activation of affect which suggests a continuum, rather than an opposition. The continuum moves from noncognitive to cognitive emotions: from the cellular (genetic) to the organismic (sense data from the interoceptors that transmit signals from physiological drives), to the biopsychological (marking the interaction of genetic and acquired knowledge)

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appraisal is both necessary and sufficient (p. 171).

and then cognitive (based upon learning and memory). The first two do not rely upon cognition; the second two do rely on cognition. Izard thus provides a potential way to resolve the either/or conceptualization of Zajonc and Lazarus. As Scherer (1994) notes, following Leventhal and Scherer (1987), the exchange between Zajonc and Lazarus can be read as a semantic debate that devolves around the question of what are the minimal standards of cognition.

In the next section, I shall investigate how recent neuroscience research might help to clarify, if not resolve, the issue of the relationship between affects and cognition. Can affects occur without cognition? Is there a physiological basis for the distinction? And what do we mean by cognition? In the fourth and final section of this chapter, I shall turn to address an issue that is neglected by both Zajonc and Lazarus-- the nature of the subject who has affects.

It is revealing that although Lazarus is not impressed with Zajonc's introduction of development in the debate, in a more recent piece, he acknowledges its importance in seeing the difference between infant and adult affects in the case of anger (Lazarus, 1994). Lazarus suggests that "ego involvement" is necessary for adult affects. Perhaps unwittingly, Lazarus ushers in the question of the subject of affective experience-- equally ignored by Zajonc and himself. The theme of agency silently, but surely appears in the background of our exploration of affect.

3. Affects and the Brain: The View From Neuroscience

Evidence from neuroscience is invoked by Zajonc and disputed by Lazarus in their debate. In the 13 years since their debate, there has been a proliferation of research in neuroscience that is helpful in clarifying the terms and presuppositions of the debate and, hence, in moving it forward. As Scherer (1993) has pointed out, brain research provides a fruitful direction for psychologists who posit mechanisms such as appraisal. LeDoux (1996) adds to this that neuroscience research, not only can confirm mechanisms, but it can offer new interpretations of them as well as discover new mechanisms (p. 67). While I believe that neuroscience offers evidence that cannot be ignored, it is not my intention to turn to neuroscience with the expectation that it will provide the exclusive means to answer the numerous the questions raised in the debate.

The contribution of neuroscience, as I see it, is to guide us and to define parameters for our thinking about affects; but it has its own limitations. The indispensability of scientific knowledge does not justify the presumption that it can dissolve philosophical problems. My focus on neuroscience here does not mean, in particular, that the influence of culture upon affect is being brushed aside. It is worth stressing that the debate between Zajonc and Lazarus turns on the matter of conceptual framework--

which necessarily governs how the empirical facts under dispute are understood.

A. LeDoux: Two Systems of Emotional Response

LeDoux (1996, 1995, 1994a, 1994b, 1993) has emerged to be a major researcher and theorist in "affective science."[6] His research has dwelled upon the emotion of fear in rats, which he believes is more or less similar across species, and his work has drawn attention to the importance of the amygdala as the focal point in the brain that determines emotional significance. LeDoux's position is that the relationship between cognition and emotion is best studied by detailed investigation of very specific forms of their representations. His view has powerful implications for how we understand the nature of the relationship between emotion and cognition as well as for how we answer the question of whether cognitive appraisal must accompany affect. LeDoux is optimistic about what the brain can tell us about emotion, but he also cautions us against thinking we know more than we do about the function of the human brain.

According to LeDoux, there are two emotional response systems in the brain: the first, which has it origin in the

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[6]LeDoux was the subject of an interview in "Scientist At Work" column in the New York Times on 11/5/96; his book (1996) was reviewed in the New York Times Book Review section on 12/1/96; and he was quoted in an article about fear and anger in the Science section of the New York Times on 1/21/97.

amygdala, is described as "quick and dirty" because it occurs automatically and is rather crude in nature, and the second, which involves neo-cortex functions, refines our capacity to respond by featuring a cognitive component. LeDoux does not wish to locate emotion exclusively in these two parts of the brain, as he is sensitive to the crucial role of other parts, like the hippocampus, and the interaction between the amygdala and neocortex. In his new book, The Emotional Brain (1996), he emphasizes repeatedly that there is no single place that emotion resides in the brain (pp. 16, 21, 103, 299).

LeDoux warns specifically against regarding the amygdala as the centerpiece of emotion or as a kind of universal emotional computer; rather, he compares it to a "hub of a wheel" (LeDoux, 1996, p.168). He emphasizes that there are pathways from and to the neocortex in the amygdala, and that the amygdala can be activated by thalamic sensory processing (without going through the cortex) at the same time that the cortex is activated from the thalamus. Thus, the representation of objects occurs simultaneously, but distinctly from emotional response. As LeDoux sums up: "We can, in other words, begin to respond to the emotional significance of a stimulus before we fully represent that stimulus"(LeDoux, 1994b, p. 221).

Emotional processing, thus, has an immediate and mediate form-- the former, while distinct, contributes to the latter. These two response systems are labeled "Type I

and II" by LeDoux (LeDoux, 1994b). Type I emotional responses are immediate and are a product of the evolutionary experience of the species; indeed, LeDoux likens them to fixed action patterns in animals. Basically, in Type I, emotions are automatic responses that occur from an initial, cursory evaluation; they are not under our voluntary control.

Type II emotional responses, rather than being elicited, are emitted. They are specific to the individual, not the species-- reflecting past experience and judgment about the applicability of the past to the current situation. In contrast to Type I responses, Type II responses are subject to our volitional control. Characteristically, Type II responses follow Type I responses: they indicate the organism's strategy for coping with the consequences of emotional arousal. However, Type II responses are possible without prior Type I responses. Evidence for how the mechanisms of Type I and II responses interact is at a preliminary stage, although LeDoux suggests that the lateral nucleus appears to have an important role.

What does LeDoux conclude from his proposal that there are two emotional response systems? It is clear that he disagrees with cognitive appraisal theorists like Lazarus: Type I emotional responses do not require any cognitive appraisal. LeDoux (1995) acknowledges, however, that there is a thorny question about what cognition means: whether it is construed broadly to include mere sensory processing

information, in which case even the automatic evaluation in Type I might count as appraisal, or narrowly, to be limited to higher mental functions (like the complex association cortex), in which case Type II responses alone would count as appraisal.

LeDoux's sympathies are with the narrow definition. He wants to uphold the distinction between older, more primitive emotional responses that have the function of being an "early warning system," allowing us to ward off threatening stimuli, despite being somewhat limited in nature, and more recent, more complex emotional responses that have differentiated functions because they enjoy the benefit of perceptual completeness and are subject to our control. In his recent book, LeDoux (1996) is also critical of appraisal theorists for relying too much upon self-reports to support their findings (p. 52).

LeDoux is comfortable with the view that emotional responses can occur in the absence of cognitive systems, and he is committed to the belief that the neural circuits for emotion and cognition, while interactive, are, separate in nature. Emotions, he notes, involve more brain systems than cognition (LeDoux, 1996, p. 299). LeDoux disagrees strongly with those who wish to regard emotion as a subset of cognition. It is fair to say that LeDoux's view can be identified as consistent with Tomkins and Zajonc.[7] However,

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[7]LeDoux favorably discusses Zajonc's work (pp.53f.), and he

it is also true that his two systems perspective affirms the validity of both Zajonc and Lazarus' positions-- affects under subcortical control occur without cognition, whereas affects under neocortical control are influenced by cognition. It is important to LeDoux's view (as to Lazarus') that much of emotional processing is unconscious, and that "feelings" are, in fact, a by-product of these processes.

LeDoux's perspective has a behaviorist and sociobiological emphasis. He observes that the subjective experience of affects is not their "primary business," rather it exists as a behavioral adaptation, which has been preserved through evolution (LeDoux, 1994a). LeDoux's wariness of depending upon introspection leads him to declare that our conscious feelings are "frills that have added icing to the emotional cake"(LeDoux, 1996, p. 302). The implications of having Type II emotional responses system, that are variable, flexible, and voluntary, are not pursued by LeDoux. To affirm its basis in evolution does not do justice to the philosophical (or even the biological) issues that are raised.

At times, LeDoux adopts a voice that is extreme-- suggesting that there is nothing more or less subjective about the experience of an emotion than the experience of

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offers qualified support for the basic emotions view (pp.113f.).

redness of an apple or the memory of eating one (LeDoux, 1996, p. 37). Yet, LeDoux recognizes that while an evolutionary account of emotions is a useful starting point, there is more to say about our subjective experience of emotions. LeDoux's Type II emotional response system depends upon the existence of some kind of self-organization, although he does not pursue the significance of having a volitional emotional response system. Without elaborating, LeDoux observes that "the capacity to have feelings is directly tied to the capacity to be consciously aware of one's self and the relation of oneself to the rest of the world" (LeDoux, 1996, p. 125). The trail of linking affects to agency is getting warmer.

B. Damasio: The Interaction Between Emotion & Cognition and the Neural Basis of the Self

The next neuroscience perspective that I shall consider contends more directly with issues connected with agency. Damasio's book Descartes' Error (1994) is conceived with explicit attention to philosophical issues: as the title suggests, Damasio attacks Cartesian dualism in the name of materialism, that the mind and body form an interactive unity. According to the neurologist Damasio, philosophers have perpetrated misleading models of the mind by virtue of their ignorance of brain functioning. Damasio's research concerns patients with prefrontal brain damage who exhibit an apparent inability to feel. His main thesis is that

there is interconnection between cognition and emotion within the brain system, such that it is artificial to insist upon the difference between them.

In contrast to the narrow focus of LeDoux's animal research, which admonishes us to look at very specific functions in our approach to the relationship between emotion and cognition, Damasio's book has a broad emphasis--in part because it has a popular audience in mind. All of Damasio's research concerns human subjects; the book begins with a dramatic investigation of the injury in the famous case of Phineas Gage, a 19th century New Englander who suffered the misfortune of having an iron pole driven through his brain in an accident and subsequently underwent a personality change. As much as Damasio readily takes up the banner of perennial philosophical issues, his talent lies in his understanding and clear exposition of the functioning of the brain. As we will see, he introduces the theme of agency, but it is not his central concern, and he does not clarify its connection to affect.[8]

Damasio's insistence upon the interconnection between emotion and cognition might suggest that his view is not sympathetic to those who affirm the primacy of affect. Such

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[8]Damasio offers thin readings of historical figures like Descartes and Plato. For example, in claiming that Plato subscribed to the view of validating reason over affect, he fails to mention a dialogue like the Phaedrus, where our intrinsic motivation is portrayed as irrational. This would be less of an issue, if Damasio did not aspire so vehemently to answer once and for all philosophical concerns.

a conclusion would be premature, however. There are several respects in which Damasio's view coincides with LeDoux's. Damasio certainly agrees that our understanding of affect depends upon the growing knowledge about the brain that neuroscience supplies. In fact, Damasio cites LeDoux's work on the importance of the amygdala for emotional experience.[9] Furthermore, Damasio would concur that emotions have been given short shrift amongst cognitive scientists. More significantly, Damasio, like LeDoux, believes that there are two systems of emotions, one subcortical and the other neocortical-- which he delineates in terms of primary and secondary emotions.

The difference between Damasio and LeDoux is primarily a matter of emphasis. LeDoux's animal studies confirm that emotions can occur without cognition, although he also accepts that emotions and cognition can and do interact; Damasio's human studies feature the interaction between emotion and cognition, although he would not deny that emotions can exist without cognition. Damasio introduces a multiple systems approach to emotions, rejecting a single region of the brain as responsible for emotions (pp. 94-5). (He does state that the right hemisphere has a preferential involvement in the processing of emotions (p. 140)). The two alternatives juxtaposed in the debate between Zajonc and

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[9]LeDoux (1996) also cites Damasio's work in his book (pp. 36, 173, 250, 293, 295).

Lazarus are replaced by Damasio in his careful depiction of the interaction between emotion and cognition. Damasio casts aside this old and familiar distinction in favor of a new description of the mind.

Damasio questions the view-- influenced by philosophy-- which imagines that affirming rationality requires us to reject emotions:

> So blatant is the discrepancy between the processing capacities of `low and old' and high and new' brain structures that it has fostered an implicit and seemingly sensible view on the respective responsibilities of those brain sectors. In simple terms: The old brain core handles basic biological regulation down in the basement, while up above the neocortex deliberates with wisdom and subtlety. Upstairs in the cortex there is reason and willpower, while downstairs in the subcortex there is emotion and all that weak, fleshy stuff (p. 128).

Damasio challenges this view because, from the neural perspective, emotion is constitutive of rationality itself. As he concludes: "Nature appears to have built the apparatus of rationality not just on top of the apparatus for biological regulation, but also *from* and *with* it"(p. 128).

In Damasio's formulation, rationality is shaped by and modulated by body signals; the body contributes content to

the mind, not just life support (pp. 200, 226). The body accomplishes this through heeding itself-- becoming aware of the condition of the visceral and musculoskeletal state (p. 160). Damasio's claim is not merely that the body and emotions contribute to rationality; he wants to go further and suggest that the reduction of emotion, evident in his brain-injured patients, severely impinges upon the capacity to reason.

In order to appreciate the originality of Damasio's view, we need to explore it in greater detail. His distinction between primary and secondary emotions relies on the fact that the latter comes from acquired, rather than innate dispositional representations. Secondary emotions utilize primary emotions, but they also give rise to "feelings"-- a technical term that characterizes the experience of changes in the body landscape reflected in the mental images thereby invoked (p. 145). It is especially intriguing, as Damasio observes, to wonder why it is that feelings arise, since merely accounting for neurochemical changes or the notion that they are neural representations of the body landscape at the moment is not sufficient. Damasio argues that we need to understand the many levels of neural circuitry in the body which enable rationality and give rise to the self (pp. 147; 161). The neural basis of the self thus emerges as a key part of Damasio's account of the mind/body interaction.

Damasio describes the neural basis of the self by expounding in more depth his theory about how emotions are integrated in rationality itself-- which he terms the "somatic marker hypothesis." The somatic marker hypothesis shows that our decision-making incorporates gut-level responses that are, in fact, automatic signals from the body that protect and help us to limit and choose amongst possible options. Somatic markers are "a special instance of feelings generated from secondary emotions...connected, by learning, to predicted future outcomes of certain scenarios" (p. 174). But they also serve as a prelude to more abstract decision-making, using attention and working memory. They can occur in an "as if" manner-- without coming to our awareness. Somatic markers are part of the neural system located in the prefrontal cortices, where, as Damasio puts it, "Upstairs and downstairs come together harmoniously" (p. 183).

For Damasio, the self is implied in a neural account of emotion and especially feelings. This does not mean that he thinks we know much about the nature of such an entity. Insofar as Damasio attempts to say what he means, he acknowledges that we are talking about a mental construction that repeatedly creates itself-- at one point he uses the term, self, and says in parentheses "for lack of a better word" (p. 226). Damasio's hesitation is due to the fact that he wants to recognize our sense of experiencing an ongoing and continuous biological state-- of which we feel

like "an owner and knower for most, though not all, contents" (p. 238). At the same time, he is wary of sounding anachronistic-- mistakenly conjuring "a little person, the infamous homunculus, inside your brain contemplating what is going on" (p. 227).

Questions about the neural self lead Damasio to a consideration of the nature of consciousness itself. He suggests that the survival of the body made the brain evolve, and to accomplish this, nature found a fortuitous solution: "representing the outside world in terms of the modifications it causes in the body proper, that is, representing the environment by modifying primordial representations of the body proper whenever an interaction between organism and environment take place" (p. 230). Primordial representations are explicated in terms of biochemical regulation, the viscera, and the musculoskeletal frame. Damasio then speculates that primordial representations form a grounding reference, which anchors consciousness. Damasio points to the task of anticipating outcomes and make new plans and goals; we negotiate the future by means of the perception of pleasure and pain landscapes.

The neural basis of a self requires early sensory cortices, sensory and motor cortical associations regions, and subcortical nuclei. Damasio stresses, however, that the neural self is not predicated upon the function of language. The refined form of subjectivity which comes into being with

language creates verbal narratives out of non-verbal ones. According to Damasio, "Language may not be the source of the self, but it certainly is the source of the 'I'" (p. 243). Damasio provides no explanation of what it means to be an "I"; after raising this point, he quickly moves on. This is unfortunate, as we are left to wonder how the neural self is related to what we might describe as the phenomenological self. Without addressing this question, Damasio opens the backdoor to philosophical issues that he sought to overcome. There is also not much attention in the work of Damasio to the influence of culture; nor does he feel it is imperative to take note of human development. His attention to nonverbal experience and the negotiation of pain and pleasure landscapes are important insights that are also central to a psychoanalytic orientation.

Our two examples from neuroscience provide a path to go beyond the debate between Zajonc and Lazarus: the "either/or" better resembles a "both/and." Affects, differentiated according to brain process, occur with and without cognition. For LeDoux, less is more: understanding affect means zeroing in on specific functions of the animal brain. For Damasio, understanding affect requires opening things up and paying attention to multiples systems of the body as well as their representation in the human brain. Damasio's theory of the interaction between affect and rationality leads him to focus upon the neural basis of the self. In my view, it is not at all inadvertent that the

discussion of affects culminates with the nebulous issue of the experience of being an I.

Evidence from neuroscience establishes that affects have primacy in the sense that they form first-line response to the world. No account of the relationship between the mind and the world can afford to minimize the importance of or ignore affects. As much as this might seem like an obvious point, it is still highly relevant for much of cognitive science and also philosophy.

There is a question, however, of whether primacy might have a further meaning. That affects form a first-line response to the world connects human experience to the animal realm. Affects serve the purpose of warning and protecting us-- aiding survival and communication. As Damasio stresses, primary affects also play a crucial role in homeostatic regulation. Yet, this first system of emotional response is not able to capture what is distinctively human about us. Does it make sense to restrict primacy to mean "comes first" as opposed to "describes something essential about us"?

The primacy of affects has the meaning of describing something essential about us, insofar as it can be sustained that affects contribute to our sense of identity and are linked to agency. According to neuroscientists, the first system of emotional response is automatic and lacks the element of our volition. The second system of emotional response, on the other hand, requires choice on our part.

The so-called cognitive component to affects, which defines the secondary system of emotional response needs to be understood better. Does cognition mean only that a minimal kind of judgment is made, which is not much more significant than a preference? Or does it mean that a particular choice is selected and valued-- which would seem to suppose an underlying sense of agency?

Lazarus tries to pinpoint what he means by cognition by defining cognitive appraisal in terms of making meaning; the source of this capacity is never explored however, and his theory is devoid of any serious attention to agency. LeDoux notes the tension between a narrow and broad conception of cognition-- the latter specifying only a minimal kind of judgment; the former requiring more of a meta-level capacity for control. Although LeDoux endorses the narrow sense of cognition, he does not venture any account of this capacity for self-control and rejects the value of paying attention to subjective experience, which he sees as inherently suspect. Both Lazarus and LeDoux regard affective processing as unconscious, and therefore, feel less of a burden to contend with problems concerning agency. Damasio raises the fascinating issue of the neural basis of the self, but he does not attempt to reconcile it with the phenomenological self.

C. Edelman: Neural Darwinism and Primary/Higher-Order Consciousness

The work of the immunologist and theoretical neurobiologist Edelman (1992) is worth introducing as a final neuroscience perspective. Edelman, who has been an influence upon Damasio, is known for advocating for the position of "neural Darwinism," which applies natural selection to the development of the brain. More specifically, Edelman's "theory of neuronal group selection" highlights the role of "reentry" in memory-- which fosters a process of continual recategorization (p. 102). Edelman claims that the brain constructs maps of its own activities and does not simply respond to external stimuli; furthermore, the brain creates mapping of types of maps, through which it can recombine and make comparisons (p. 109). The adaptive value of neuronal group selection can be detected in how memory works. Edelman's view is distinctive, which has the aim of "restoring the mind to nature," includes a wariness about reducing the mind to the anatomy of the brain.[10] Understanding the mind, according

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[10]Edelman would probably accept the two emotional response systems described by LeDoux and Damasio, since he proposes two kinds of nervous system organization that, roughly speaking, are correspondent (p. 117). However, Edelman is mainly concerned with understanding consciousness, rather than with emotions. Another prominent concern in Edelman's work is his rejection of the dominant paradigm in cognitive science, which analogizes the brain to a computer.

to Edelman, requires attention to evolution, especially the morphology of the brain.

We will need to delve a bit further into Edelman's view in order to clarify its relevance for us. He makes a crucial distinction between what he terms "primary consciousness" and "higher-order consciousness." Primary consciousness is defined as mental awareness of things in the present, which is not accompanied by any sense of being a person with a past and future (p. 112). Humans, but also non-linguistic animals, have primary consciousness. Edelman suggests that primary consciousness is like a light shining into a dark room that illuminates some things, but not others (p. 122). Higher-order consciousness is defined as the recognition by a thinking subject of his or her own acts or affections (p. 112). Higher-order consciousness is a model of the personal, formed of the past and future as well as the present. In short, higher-order consciousness is consciousness which is conscious of being conscious (p. 112). Without higher-order consciousness, of course, there would be no theories of consciousness.

Edelman traces the origins of primary consciousness to the capacity to have continual reentrant signaling between the mapping that occurs from perceptual categorization in real time and memory that relies upon value categories. In other words, primary consciousness is a version of the "remembered present" (p. 120). Through the acquisition of language and symbolic memory, higher-order consciousness

beckons us beyond the "bondage of immediate time frame or ongoing events in real time" (p. 133). Both primary and higher-order consciousness function by means of bootstrapping processes, the former of which is perceptual and the latter semantic.

Primary consciousness describes a biological self that is, by definition, radically unique. Higher-order consciousness is based upon a sense of selfhood that is socially-constructed: it depends on "building a self through affective intersubjective exchanges" (p. 150).[11] At the same time, higher-order consciousness creates a more complex and deeper inner life. Edelman introduces us to the brain as determined by (individual) experience and by the social environment. Unlike LeDoux or Damasio, Edelman's view has the merit of being able to accommodate the influence of culture on biology.

Edelman offers a more substantial account of the neurological basis of the self than Damasio. His work is unusual among neuroscientists in its confirmation of the importance and value of subjective experience. Edelman highlights the importance of "qualia," a term taken from philosophers to describe the subjective sense of

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[11]In Chapter III, Section 3, I shall examine the work of Schore (1996, 1993) who, like Edelman, argues in favor of the "social brain," in particular, focusing upon the psychoanalytic idea that the self is a product of the affective bond between infant and primary caregiver.

awareness.[12] Although Edelman does not advance our understanding of affects, he offers abundant justification that neuroscience should have regard concern for the sense of agency. His view offers a clear-cut alternative to LeDoux who sees subjective experience merely as an aftereffect. For Edelman, subjective experience has a genuinely adaptive value. Finally, Edelman acknowledges that his views about the self are consistent with psychoanalytic notions-- to which we shall now turn.[13]

4. Affect Theory in Psychoanalysis

Affects do not exist as found states in the mind; they are shaped and refined within us. Affects do not simply occur within a subject; they help to form that subject and are transformed in that process. Affects are crucial in terms of our experience of being who we are. They enable us to attain well-being, not just to survive. Affects contribute to the inception of our sense of agency, and our sense of agency enables us to refine and craft our affective experience.

Psychoanalysis provides a framework that places affects and agency together. A premise of a psychoanalytic point of

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[12]In Edelman's single attempt to discuss feelings, he links them to qualia (p. 176).
[13]Edelman defends Freud against those who blanketly disregard his ideas about repression and the unconscious. Modell (1993) has observed Edelman's idea of memory as recontextualization fits and extends Freud's description.

view is that affects have a pervasive impact in human life-- in this sense, psychoanalysis came into being as a refutation of the exclusive emphasis on rationality in the philosophical tradition. Moreover, psychoanalysis has the appeal of being able to countenance both sides of the massive divide between science and hermeneutics.[14]

In the reminder of this chapter, I shall describe theories of affect in psychoanalysis and begin to elaborate upon how affects and agency are linked in psychoanalysis. It should be stated from the outset, however, that there is no unified psychoanalytic view of affects, and that this lack of a unified view even has been cause for much consternation within psychoanalysis. In this context, my aim is to highlight a few, major ideas from Freud and beyond; I shall be guided by the main theme of this chapter about the primacy of affects in human life. In the next chapter, I shall present contemporary psychoanalytic ideas about affects and development, clarifying in detail how affects and agency mutually condition each other.

A. Freud: Three Views of Affects

Freud had three theories of affect that correspond roughly to the three stages of his thought-- an id psychology, an object relations psychology, and an ego

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[14]I shall argue that this study shows why both science and hermeneutics are important to psychoanalysis in Chapter V.

psychology (Stein, 1991; Basch, 1976; Brenner, 1974; Rapaport, 1953; Jacobson, 1953). Although these three stages are chronological, it is characteristic of Freud to add new elements to his theory without abandoning old elements. Freud's first theory of affect sees affects as equivalent to instinctual discharge. The emphasis here is upon affects as biological, serving to achieve homeostasis. Freud's main concern is with the deleterious consequences of not discharging negative affect.[15] He discusses affects in negative terms and makes no room yet for the importance of the subjective aspect of affects. Freud's first theory can be seen as quite consistent with the primary system of emotions as described by contemporary neuroscientists, especially his view that affects are discharged from the unconscious. LeDoux and Edelman acknowledge a debt to the weight Freud places upon unconscious functioning; Damasio concurs that emotional processing can be unconscious and, in fact, he explicitly notes that affects are manifestations of drives.[16]

The second theory of affects in Freud is developed at the time of the metapsychology papers, and especially with the addition of the concept of narcissism (See SE, 14).

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[15]In the Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895), Freud sees affects as traces of experiences of pain, whereas wishes are traces of experiences of satisfaction.
[16]LeDoux (1996) affirms his belief in the unconscious, but distinguishes it from the dynamic unconscious, which he characterizes, rather facilely, as a "darker, more malevolent place"(pp. 29-30).

Freud (1915) portrays affects as manifestations of drives, which creates a paradox for his theory. If drives are unconscious and affects (or feelings) are their conscious manifestation, how is it possible to account for the existence of unconscious affects? Freud attempts to handle this by saying that unconscious affects are suppressed, i.e. pushed down into the unconscious. At this point, Freud still does not characterize affects in their own terms.

The concept of narcissism betokens a change in direction of Freud's theory to a richer account of subjective experience. In marking the distinction between object and ego libido, the capacity to be attached to oneself as well as to another, Freud began to develop a theory about the self as constituted by its relationship to objects-- both external (real others) and internal (representations of others within us). According to Freud, primary narcissism is a manifestation of the desire for self-preservation; its origins are instinctual, but it includes a wish for mastery that is integral for the evolution of the self.

This new theory, initially presented in Freud and subsequently developed further by Klein, Fairbairn and Winnicott, is what has come to be called an "object relations theory" in psychoanalysis. For Freud and also for Klein, object relations and instincts are integrated; for Fairbairn and contemporary psychoanalytic theorists in the so-called "relational" camp, object relations replace what

they see as Freud's antiquated drive theory (Mitchell & Black, 1995).

Regardless of one's position about the relationship between drives and affects, the proposal that the very formation of the self is based upon affective ties-- to oneself and others-- and how they are internalized is widely accepted in psychoanalytic theory. Those who would conceptualize affect as unrelated to drives have the difficult burden of construing affects without knowledge from biology and neuroscience.[17] Those who would conceptualize affect as related to drive have the obligation to clarify the connection.[18] Traditionally, affects are regarded as subordinate to drives.

There is a submerged tradition within psychoanalysis, however, that affirms both the importance and independent value of affects in relation to drives (see Brierley,1937; Glover, 1939; Novey, 1959). More recently, Kernberg (1990) has argued that drives are actually constituted from affects. For Kernberg (1984), affects are the primary motivation system and thus form the "building blocks" of

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[17]To be more specific, it seems as if the relational model accounts for what Edelman describes as higher-order consciousness, but not primary consciousness. It is strange that a psychoanalytic view would choose to limit itself to account for part, rather than the entirety, of our interior experience.

[18]Although there are many psychoanalysts who remain committed to drive theory, fewer are committed to sustaining their belief in contemporary scientific terms (See Ellman, 1993, 1991).

drives (p. 236). My own sympathies are with the view that sees affects and drives as overlapping, without supposing that that means one is contingent upon the other.[19] Neither affects nor drives are exclusive motivation systems; the need to understand both depends upon understanding each of the systems.[20] I shall not pursue the question of the relationship between affects and drives further; instead, this study will focus upon affects-- a prelude for better understanding the relationship between the two systems.

Freud's third theory of affects grows out of the structural model of id, ego and superego. As Freud (1926) began to think further about the role of the ego, the fact that affects serve adaptive purposes became accentuated, e.g.. anxiety as a signal, warning about danger. Affects as signals highlight their role as fostering communication; they are no longer defined exclusively in terms of the vicissitudes of our instincts. The problem of unconscious affects is resolved once Freud portrays the contrast in terms of the ego and the repressed, where affects signal both to and from the unconscious. For theorists in the

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[19]For criticism of Kernberg's first statements about affects and drives, see Carsky & Ellman (1985).

[20]Jones (1995) proposes that affects are "*the* language of motivation-systems" (p. 49). He bases this view on Lichtenberg's (1989) notion that affects function to inform us of which of the five motivation systems we are in (the five motivational systems are, roughly, self-preservation, attachment, mastery, aggression, and libido). It is unclear whether portraying affects as communications, which are related to motivation-systems, means that affects are themselves not sources of motivation.

interpersonal tradition, this is the Freud who liberated himself from the limitations of the intrapsychic perspective. At the same time, this is also the Freud who was the main influence upon ego psychologists, for whom a normal psychology was a necessary correction to an overemphasis upon pathology.

Freud clearly see the ego as benefiting from at least some affects in his third theory. He also exhibits a greater appreciation of the subjective experience and the context in which affects occurs. Affects have a value over and beyond instinctual release; they do more than lessen unpleasure, although Freud never fully accorded affects a truly positive role in our mental life. Jacobson (1953) was the first psychoanalytic theorist to note this and to make an explicit claim for the salutary aspect of affects.

Freud was quite aware in his later theory of complications about the relation between the intensity of drives and the pleasureableness of affects. Indeed, he forthrightly acknowledges the difficulty of understanding the tension between pleasure/unpleasure, declaring in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) that "the meaning of the feelings of pleasure and unpleasure...is the most obscure and inaccessible region of the mind"(SE, 18, p. 7). Freud's commitment to the idea that increase in excitement causes unpleasure and the diminution of it, pleasure, remained unswerving throughout his work.

Indeed, in order to assess Freud's view of pleasure and his overall theory of affect, it is necessary to take the distinction between primary and secondary process into consideration (Freud, 1911). The two principles that govern mental life are motivated, respectively by pleasure and reality. The distinction between primary and secondary process illustrates that there is an evolution of organization within the psyche, and that it is possible to differentiate between affects that are primitive and derived-- the former having to do with pleasure/unpleasure; the latter being mediated by cognition.

For some psychoanalytic thinkers, the distinction marks the ineluctability of conflict between infantile and adult functioning; Kleinians, for example, subscribe to the view that there is an abiding infantile part of one's character. Bion and Klein assert that even so-called normal people have early and enduring psychotic anxieties. For other psychoanalytic theorists, the possibility exists of reconciling the two principles through integration-- like the process of sublimation (Whitebook, 1995; Loewald, 1987).

B. Psychoanalysis In Light of Psychology and Neuroscience

It is tempting to read Freud's distinction between primary and secondary process as anticipating the two emotional response systems of the brain. However, the reliance of the continuum of pleasure/unpleasure in primary process experience does not dovetail with the basic emotions

perspective; it is also distinct from the dimensions perspective, although some psychologists who defend dimensions include pleasure and unpleasure as one of the dimensions. A good example of the dimensions perspective is found in Davidson's work (1992), where the fundamental dimension is approach/withdrawal, which imputes too much intentionality to be equated with Freud's idea of primary process. Approach/withdrawal implies goal-oriented activity, whereas primary process occurs without the supposition of such unified intentionality.

Primary process represents a more primitive realm of experience, perhaps best characterized by raw phenomenological states that require no agency-- akin to "yes, good, more" and "no, bad, less." There might be some element of appraisal here, but it is rather minimal. Primary process experience offers a theoretical description of affects that are mediated least by cognition. There are difficulties about the nature of primary process experience that I shall not pursue, as they go beyond our interests here. As Jones (1995) and Cavell (1993) note, for example, it is unclear that primary process experience actually coincides with infants' earliest experience.[21]

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[21]Jones is inclined to reduce primary process to be equivalent to affective experience, whereas Cavell ultimately finds primary process to be untenable as an idea. Both Jones and Cavell emphasize that primary process can be meaningful as a category only after it can be set against secondary process and the potential for thought. A related issue that is addressed by both Jones and Cavell concerns

Recent psychoanalytic accounts of affects affirm the primacy of affects in human life (Jones, 1995; Spezzano, 1993). A psychoanalytic theory of affects must mark the distinction between affective experience that occurs before and after agency exists.[22] Agency is construed as coming into being, rather than being present as a condition of human life. Of course, once one makes the assumption that agency is an achievement, one must take up the burden of showing how and why this happens. In the next chapter, I shall turn to focus precisely upon how one becomes an agent and its connection to affects, which will require attention to developmental literature, both psychoanalytic and not.

So far, I have traced the evolution of interest in affects in psychology, and I have sorted out some options about how to think about the relationship between affects and cognition, specifically that there are two systems of emotional response. I have also argued that it is a shortcoming of psychology and neuroscience that affects are

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phantasy, since phantasy appears to develop, not at birth, but during the second year of life-- in contrast to Kleinian beliefs (Tyson & Tyson, 1990).

[22]Jones (1995) makes the interesting argument that moods precede affects developmentally (p. 59), and that moods belong to the earlier (reptilian) brain (p. 63). If moods are construed in terms of being pre-affects, then some of the force of distinguishing between primitive and derived affects is lost. The difference between moods and affects is commonly depicted in terms of the indeterminancy and global quality of moods compared to the determinancy and discreteness of affects.

conceptualized without adequate attention to agency-- however much the theme of agency is tacitly recognized.

On this basis, we are not yet in the position of making any valid conclusions about the nature of the connection between affects and agency. The intimation that there is an integral connection awaits proof of its validity. We can conclude with confidence, however, that trying to understand affects without attending to the theme of agency will be incomplete.

It is my hope that in looking to psychoanalysis, we will be able to incorporate the merits of perspectives found in psychology and neuroscience-- adding to their achievement, and raising issues that must be faced by anyone who studies affects. Understanding the relationship between affects and agency requires more attention to the theme of agency. There is a consensus, however, about affects as forming a primary response to the world.

III: AFFECT REGULATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGENCY

The conclusion of the first chapter-- that in order to understand affects, we need to investigate the topic of agency-- points the way to the aim of the present chapter. I shall begin by examining some recent literature in developmental psychology in which a shift is proposed from the study of basic emotions to emotion regulation. This literature will be helpful as an introduction to the notion of affect regulation.

Next I turn to psychoanalytic ideas, which offer a richer and more differentiated account of affect regulation and self-regulation-- particularly in their attention to the role of agency. The importance of regulation is nicely summarized by Schore (1996): "The ontogenesis of self-regulation is an essential organizing principle, if not a fundamental mechanism, of the development of dynamic living systems. The concept of regulation is one of the few theoretical constructs utilized by literally every scientific discipline"(p. 59). The concept of regulation will help to forge a link between affects and agency.

Lewis (1993, 1992, Lewis & Michaelson, 1982, Lewis & Brooks, 1978), a developmental psychologist, has made the interconnection between affects and agency central to his work. He asserts that: "to understand the development of emotional states, it is necessary to understand the

development of the self" (Lewis & Brooks, 1978, p. 210). Lewis highlights the distinction between affect states and expression, maintaining that their correspondence depends upon the unfolding of self-awareness. He emphasizes that the development of a concept of self at around eighteen months alters our relation to affects, rendering them into conscious feelings.

More specifically, Lewis argues that at first "emotional experience" does not exist; then (at around four to eight months), it begins to emerge in a way that matches "emotional expression." Only thereafter does the sense of agency emerge, wherein emotional experience is firmly established with differentiated feelings-- including the possibility of concealing one's (true) experience in one's (overt) expression. This model features how affects abet the development of agency, and that agency then ushers in new affective experiences.[1] Although Lewis does not focus much attention upon regulation, he strongly advocates thinking about affects in terms of socialization as a counterbalance to what he sees as an overemphasis upon biological regulation (Lewis, 1982).

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[1]As stated so far, Lewis' perspective is quite consistent with a psychoanalytic one. The main difference is that Lewis (1993) contrasts his own "maturational" model of affect differentiation with, what he terms, an "interactive" model in which the mother's relationship to the infant determines the process. Psychoanalytic notions about the relationship spurring development vary; as we will see shortly; some have more of an interpersonal emphasis, while some pay close attention to biology.

It is mistaken, in my opinion, to stress the dichotomy of socialization as a rival of biology. I shall take for granted that when studying affect regulation and self-regulation, both biological and environmental factors are at stake, and that the interesting question is how to understand the way they fit together. After the first section on affect regulation in developmental psychology, the bulk of this chapter will focus upon psychoanalytic theories of development. More specifically, I shall be exploring an idea that has gained wide currency in contemporary psychoanalytic theory: that the development of a sense of agency is mediated by the affective bond to a primary caregiver, which allows the infant to attain affect regulation.

This idea will be examined in detail through three stages in early development: pre-agency, agency, and self-conscious agency. These three stages are described in the next three sections of the chapter from the perspective of a number of psychoanalytic theories of development, especially that of Stern, although I shall also refer to the work of others such as Klein, Spitz, Jacobson, Mahler, Emde, Stechler & Kaplan, Beebe, Kernberg and Schore. I focus in depth upon Gergely & Watson's recent theory of affect mirroring that offers the most precise account of how the infant develops the capacity to identify as well as control/modulate affects and how this results in the enhancement of agency. In the fifth and final section, I

present Schore's work which integrates attachment theory, psychoanalysis, and neuroscience, and I offer an updated psychoanalytic view that synthesizes the various perspectives we have encountered. I also propose the concept of affectivity as a way of accounting for the capacity to regulate one's affects well and hence oneself.

1. Affect Regulation in Developmental Psychology

Although there remain strong adherents of the basic emotions view, there are also psychologists who have begun to study affects in alternative ways. In a recent volume, The Development of Emotion Regulation (1994), the editor, Fox, who is a developmental psychologist, argues that emotions are not static, discrete behaviors; rather they regulate behavior and are also regulated themselves (p. vii). He names this position "functionalist" because it emphasizes how emotions allow an individual to organize cognitive processes and to adjust him/herself to the complexities of interaction within a social environment. Fox specifically opposes the basic emotions view, recommending a turn away from such abstract categorization.[2]

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[2]Fox, is an advocate for the dimensions view and has written a number of articles together with Davidson on this issue (1991; 1988; 1987; 1986). An even more recent source for psychologists investigating affect regulation is the issue of the journal Development and Psychopathology, 8 (1996), which is devoted to this topic and contains new articles by many of the same authors as in the Fox volume.

In the same volume, Thompson concurs with Fox about the limitations of the basic emotions view, and reinforces the idea that a turn to study affect regulation is desirable for psychologists. As Thompson expresses it: "while the discrete emotion may `play the tune' of a person's emotional response, these emotion regulation processes significantly influence its quality, intensity, timing and dynamic features and thus significantly color emotion experience" (p. 25). This mixed metaphor illuminates how much there is to be gained by taking a broader approach, which construes emotions as flexible, not stereotypical, and as necessarily situational (p. 26). The appreciation of the specific context in which affects occur is an important modification: it underscores that there is more that to be said, regardless of the validity of the basic emotions view.

Thompson moves on to offer a definition of affect regulation: that it "consists of the extrinsic and intrinsic processes responsible for monitoring, evaluating, and modifying emotional reactions, especially their intensive and temporal features, to accomplish one's goals"(pp. 26-7). According to this view of affect regulation, it is both a way to satisfy personal goals and to achieve socialization. Thompson concludes by observing: "I suspect that future research will link the growth of emotion regulation to the growth of self-understanding and of social cognition as these processes are jointly involved in the child's construction of emotion and its functions in social

contexts"(pp. 47-8). This is a complex and worthy aim. I shall demonstrate, however, that, it has been undertaken already in psychoanalytic theories of development, not mentioned by Thompson.

Although Fox and Thompson take a broad approach to the study of affect regulation, other psychologists have focused on more specific elements. One emphasis has been upon socialization-- that affect regulation functions to enable a child to join society. Affects direct us to get along with others and to affirm the values of our particular culture. For example, Sroufe (1984) claims that it is mistaken to understand emotions as external information, that their meaning is always a matter of "a person interacting with the surrounding environment" (p. 110).

Trevarthen (1984) has offered an even stronger version, which he bases upon the primacy of intersubjectivity for humans. Trevarthen suggests that infants use affects in order to communicate with others from as early as two months old when eyes and mouths are the locus of immediate perception. Trevarthen's view is, in fact, rather extreme. He maintains that "Emotions are not part of the mental processes of isolated subjects as such" (p. 137). No evidence is provided to support such a sweeping judgment.

There is also a literature on cross-cultural development that adds confirmation to the social nature of affects. Lutz (1988), an anthropologist, mentioned in the Introduction, wrote an important book that juxtaposes

Western ways of thinking about affects either as natural or private to other cultures, like the Ifaluk, for whom affects are social. Kitayama & Markus (1993), social psychologists, take Lutz as a starting point and argue that psychologists need to learn from anthropologists. In particular, they offer a contrast between cultures that feature independence and interdependence, the latter of which are inclined to acknowledge the social nature of affects.[3]

A related point of view to affect regulation as a matter of socialization is that, fundamentally, it is about the restriction of negative affect. This view is expressed in a volume entitled Emotion and its Regulation in Early Development (1992), edited by psychologists Eisenberg and Fabes. The editors describe their sympathy with the social nature of affects, and they emphasize the developmental task of regulating negative affect. In some of the essays, affect regulation comes close to denoting the process of normalization. For example, Kopp describes affect regulation in terms of control strategies "such as reduction of a strong negative state in order to achieve functional

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[3]Essays in Kitayama & Markus (1993) by Posner and Ellsworth et al draw attention to styles of affect regulation as influenced by culture. In Jahoda & Lewis (1988), Blacking describes affect regulation through polyrthymic music and dancing amongst the Venda people of South Africa. In the same volume, Overing describes the ideal of wizardry in Piaroan culture in Venezuela as hinging upon the self-control of emotions. In Heelas & Lock (1981), Hardman focuses upon the concept of niwa, which functions to control emotions, amongst the Lohorung Rai in Eastern Nepal.

responsiveness to an ongoing event, maintenance of a reasonable balance among positive, neutral and negative emotions during everyday activities, and inhibition of an outburst when requested to comply with demands that are not to one's liking"(p. 41). Even though Kopp uses the term "modulation," it is evident that she is thinking of affect regulation in terms of the child's conformity to an external authority.

The alternative to affect regulation as a matter of conformity is to see it as organizing and creating internal structure, thereby fostering the autonomy of the child. Through modulation, according to the alternative view, one learns to become aroused to the right degree-- that is, not too much and not too little. Eisenberg and Fabes do address this point in warning about negative affects as overarousing. But they have less to say about positive affects. Tronick (1989) has stressed how affect regulation helps us modulate negative affect, but that it also serves to organize and motivate us. Insofar as affect regulation has to do with modulation, the theme of agency is implicit, since the child's volition can be discerned, as distinct from the parent.

Fox and his contributors attempt to include both biological and behavioral factors in their account of affect regulation.[4] Eisenberg and her contributors address

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[4]The physiological basis of affect regulation lies in

behavioral aspects exclusively. Regardless of whether one invokes biology or behavior or both in understanding affect regulation, one will still require further attention to self-regulation, especially the interaction between having affects and being a self.[5]

Indeed, it is worth pausing over the terms "affect regulation" and "self-regulation." One way to locate the difference is to construe the former as an internal event and the latter as behavior-- as is suggested by Eisenberg & Fabes in their Introduction. This is, perhaps, more controversial than it seems. It is not evident that self-regulation can be described adequately without including an internal component.

Moreover, one might wonder if there is such a neat and clean separation between affect regulation and self-regulation. This is especially true, if one is reluctant to think about regulation as governed by parental authority. There must be some (internal) means by virtue of

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homeostasis. Kagan's contribution in the volume focuses upon the issue of temperament. Also see Damasio (1994) and Schore (1996, 1994).

[5]In the Introduction, I suggested that the term "agency" is preferable to "self," as it is less ethnocentric. In this chapter, on occasion I shall use the term "self," especially in connection with psychoanalytic theories that employ the term. However, when I resort to using the term, I am referring to the sense of full personhood-- whatever that may look like for a given culture. My use of the term, self, is without the presumption that development ought to culminate with an individuated self. I shall elaborate further about my use of the term self later in this chapter.

which the child elects to acknowledge the presence of an affect, and this presumes a capacity for agency.

There is an inherent ambiguity about the term self-regulation. Self-regulation implies that there is a self that regulates some objects -- like affects, but perhaps over mental events, too, like cognition or perception. However, self-regulation also implies that the object of regulation is the self. The issue that lurks behind this ambiguity is the question of how a self becomes what it is-- whether once it exists, it remains unchanged or whether it continues to undergo modification.

The developmental literature on emotion regulation does not venture into this territory, presuming that it is possible to contend with the capacity to regulate affects apart from the regulation of the self as a self. My solution to this ambiguity will be as follows: affect regulation exists prior to self-regulation, and thus with development, affect regulation is superseded by, but not entirely replaced by, self-regulation. Before self-regulation exists, a mutual regulation system between infant and caregiver prevails.

2. Affect Regulation in Psychoanalysis: Three Stages

Let us turn to address affect regulation and the evolution of agency. The evolution of the sense of agency is a topic which has emerged as a central concern in psychoanalysis; in particular, that it depends upon the

affective relationship between an infant and his/her caregiver. This idea has a convoluted history. It is implicit in Freud, and is perhaps most readily associated with an object relations theory, especially its variation created by Bowlby (1969), attachment theory; but it has roots in ego psychology as well, in the work of Spitz (1957).

Although there are differences among psychoanalytic orientations concerning the status of the internal representations which form the self, there is no disagreement about the nature of this early bond between infant and caregiver as an affective one. Moreover, there is a wide consensus about the reciprocal quality of the relationship between affects and agency. Stein (1991) offers a useful summary:

> Basically self and affects develop in a dialectical manner; an enhanced self and better-differentiated self and object representations enable the person to experience affects on a higher developmental level, with more discernment and nuancing, and conversely, more articulated and developed affects strengthen and consolidate the self and enhance the differentiation between self and object(p. 182).

Although some psychoanalysts might dispute formulating in the point in the language of object relations, very few psychoanalysts would be inclined to reject the idea itself. It is an idea that I shall explore now in detail.

There are three stages of the development of a sense of agency: 1) pre-agency; 2) agency proper; 3) self-conscious agency. I shall describe each of these three chronological stages in the next three sections attending to some of the points of agreement and disagreement among psychoanalytic theorists and researchers. My aim will be to illustrate the interaction between affects and agency at each of the stages as well as to trace how each stage emerges from the prior one. I will not be able to complete the story of the development of agency, which would have to include changes during the Oedipal period and beyond. Instead, I shall be content in this context to offer a theoretical consolidation, demarcating the meaning and implications of how humans become agents.

A. Pre-agency

The pre-agent period runs from birth until approximately 6 months. This period, which Emde (1983) describes as the prerepresentational self, is dominated by affects.[6] Indeed, Emde, following Rangell (1976) maintains

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[6]Emde proposes that the prerepresentational self exists up to 15 months old. This is debatable, since Gergely (1997, 1995) has demonstrated intentionality in infants of 9 months

that the core of the self is affective. He goes on to identify three principles that define the self at this stage: 1) self-regulation (understood in biological terms, such as the tendency for self-righting);[7] 2) social fittedness (synchrony or the predisposition for attachment to the primary caregiver); and 3) affective monitoring (in accordance with pleasure and unpleasure).[8] Emde sees the pre-agent period as governed by bodily experience and by the relationship to the primary caregiver. Although he regards affects as residing at the source of our identity, he does not focus upon affect regulation as constructing the sense of agency. Emde affirms affects as having primacy in human life, citing the basic emotions view. His notion of affect monitoring, based upon pleasure and unpleasure, however, is an acknowledgment of the dimensions view. This is, perhaps, not as contradictory as it seems. It is possible to construe a psychoanalytic perspective as defending the

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old.

[7]Emde is critical of developmental psychologists who overemphasize socialization at the expense of biology. This criticism is valid concerning the views found in Eisenberg and Fabes, but not those found in Fox. Self-regulation, according to Emde (1983), "is perhaps the most fundamental biological principle of self" (p. 170).

[8]Later Emde (1988) added a fourth category-- activity (pre-programmed sensorimotor systems), and he also amended his general description of the principles as "biological" to the more specific "motivational." More recently, Emde (1992) has added a fifth category of motivation-- cognitive assimilation (the wish to "get it right"-- corresponding to the Piagetian notion of processing information and structuring it according to what is familiar).

notion of basic emotions, but emphasizing that in early life they are not grasped by the infant, although dimensions are.

Stern (1985) offers a rich account of what affects are like at this early stage of development. "Vitality affects," according to Stern, are qualities captured by dynamic kinetic terms such as "'surging', 'fading away,' 'fleeting,' 'explosive,' 'crescendo,' 'decrescendo,' 'bursting,' and 'drawn out.'" (p. 54). They allow the infant to express him/herself at the time prior to having a sense of agency. Thus, vitality affects are analogous to "puppet shows," relying upon action and rudimentary gestures, rather than facial expressions and words. Stern claims that from the beginning of life, the infant can "self-regulate" the level and amount of social stimulation through gazing (also see Stern & Beebe, 1977).

Let us take a closer look at Stern's overall theory of the development of the self. He describes four stages: 1) emergent-- birth to two months; 2) core-- 2-6 months; 3) subjective-- 7-15 months; and 4) verbal-- subsequent to 15 months. I shall focus at the moment on the first two stages in this section as they comprise what I am term pre-agency.

Stern takes a strong position in favor of the existence of selfhood and self-regulation from birth. It is revealing that his first stage is the "emergent self," for he does not recognize a stage that is prior to having a self. He emphasizes, for example, that even at the earliest stage, the infant is engaged in activities such as "head-turning,

sucking and looking"(p. 39). There is also "cross-modal fluency" which characterizes infancy, allowing one sensory modality to be transferred to another. Cross-modal fluency is, perhaps, analogous to primary process experience, although Stern does not make such a claim.

Stern introduces a distinct and separate category for the next stage, the core self, wherein the infant attains more control, ownership and continuity as a being. To be more specific, the core self has four aspects: 1) self-agency; 2) self-coherence; 3) self-affectivity; and 4) self-history. By self-agency, Stern means a sense of authorship and control of one's own action.

Let us zero in on Stern's microanalysis: he claims that agency relies upon three invariants-- volition preceding the act, the possibility of propioceptive feedback during the act, and the predictability of consequences following it. He notes that volition "may be the most fundamental invariant of core self-experience" (pp. 76-77). The conception of volition that Stern has in mind is manifest in voluntary motor skills; yet it is the initiating mental event, Stern tells us, that is the place where volition resides. Stern does not reflect on the nature of such a mental event; he is prepared to assume that it is present at birth and does not face the difficult conceptual questions that come to mind, e.g.. whether or not the fact that the infant has preferences in some instances ought to imply that a unified internal world exists.

In turning to the second aspect of the core self, self-coherence, Stern attempts to support his belief that the infant has a sense of itself as a unity of locus (as well as having a number of other components of coherence that will be passed over as less germane to our main focus). It is sufficient to note that Stern offers an elaborate and sophisticated argument for the infant as a bounded physical entity. In order to understand the accompanying psychological experience of the infant, we must turn to the description of the third aspect of the core self, self-affectivity.

Stern endorses the notion of basic emotions (citing Izard and Ekman) and suggests that this perspective overlaps with what he stated earlier about vitality affects. At this early point in development, he sees affects as belonging to the self, as opposed to the other who elicits them or to a shared experience. Surprisingly, Stern has the least to say about self-affectivity: it is the shortest of the four sections.

The fourth and final aspect of the core self is self-history. Self-history is based upon the continuity of identity that depends upon memory. Stern points to the existence of memory systems that are not language-based; they can be based upon motor, perception or affects. In this context, Stern concurs with Emde's notion of the affective core of the self. Stern avers that "Of all human behavior, affects perhaps change the least over the life

span" (p. 93). It is debatable whether this is true, especially if one makes the distinction between primitive and derived affects. Regardless, it is difficult to reconcile Stern's schema, in which affects are one part of the core self, with Emde's notion of affects, in which they form the core itself.

Stern concludes his discussion of the four aspects of the core self by claiming that their integration occurs in memory, specifically the creation of "RIGs," representations of interactions which have become generalized.[9] While he clearly upholds the importance of affects, he does not make the claim that they have primacy over other aspects of experience. Stern registers doubt, in fact, about the tendency in psychoanalytic theory to valorize intense affective experiences (p. 244). Moreover, Stern does not offer an account of the connection between self-agency and self-affectivity.

In later articles, Stern (1990, 1988) questions whether affects have a privileged role in experience. In Stern (1988), he asserts that "there is no reason to believe that affect plays a special role in the organization of memories"(p. 236), and he urges us to move away from the psychoanalytic notion that affects are at the center of

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[9]In his recent work, The Motherhood Constellation, Stern (1995) introduces the term of "schemas-of-being-with" in the name of recognizing the subjective counterpart to RIGs (p. 94).

subjective experience. In Stern (1990), two views are entertained about the unfolding of representation in infant development-- as a product of excitement/discharge and as subjectively determined; a third and fourth view are added, based upon that "affects are not necessarily privileged attributes of experience so far as memory and representation are concerned"(p. 22). Stern does not endorse these last two views, but the very fact that he seriously considers them suggests that he wants to distance himself from the first two views. For Stern, affects are a necessary, but insufficient component of the core self.

Stern's work offers a rich and detailed presentation of the evolution of the self. His investment in the notion that there is the basis of an organized self at birth disputes earlier theorists like Mahler (1975) who regarded the infant as undifferentiated from the mother initially and then evolving into symbiosis and needing to be hatched (somewhere around 7 months).[10] For Stern, and also for Emde, the infant is turned toward experiencing the world to a degree unrecognized by psychoanalytic theory.[11] The

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[10]Mahler, Pine and Bergman posit four subphases of separation and individuation process: 1) differentiation (4-5 to 9 months); 2) practicing (9 to 14 months); 3) rapprochement (14-15 to 24 months); 4) emotional object constancy (25-26 to 30-36 months). Prior to differentiation, there are two stages: normal autistic and symbiotic. I shall return to aspects of this theory later in the chapter.

[11]Stern disputes that the infant lacks a self and is undifferentiated from the mother at birth; he claims that the wish for merger is actually a product of a later point

emphasis that Stern places upon the intactness of self from birth might well correct a bias in the psychoanalytic literature, that the infant is sealed off from experience. A consequence, however, is that Stern minimizes the issue of the dependency of the infant as well as the coregulation between infant and primary caregiver.

Stern cites Winnicott's (1958) idea of "going on being" in connection with the self-history aspect of the core self. This notion is unintelligible as a concept, however, without the prior stage of dependency. Hofer (1990) develops the implications of his work about the multiple, hidden coregulation systems between mother rats and pups for human development. In defending Mahler's notion of symbiosis with his own neurobiological research, Hofer's work offers a serious challenge to Stern.[12]

Beebe, Lachmann and Jaffe's work (1997, 1994, 1992) follows Stern in featuring the early capacities of the infant. They maintain that the infant and caregiver together form a system: the dyad is "the unit of organization"(Beebe, Lachmann & Jaffe, 1997, p. 5). Beebe et al. offer a superb analysis of the fluidity of the ongoing regulations, which rely not just upon matching, but

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in development. The Tysons (1990) take an interesting middle position between Stern and Mahler: siding with Stern in seeing the infant as turned outward and ready to respond to the world from birth, but siding with Mahler in supporting the usefulness of the notion of undifferentiation.

[12]Stern briefly mentions Hofer's (1980) early work.

disruption and repair; in particular, their research features "bilateral contingency" and "rapid responsivity" as characteristics of the mutuality of the dyadic system. They affirm that there is an optimal range for the ongoing regulations between infant and caretaker, which produces the best possibility both of insuring predicability (which allows for safety) and transformation (which promotes growth). They are also sensitive to the non-verbal communication cues that anticipate language development (See Fernald's (1989) work on prosody).

The conclusion that Beebe et al. come to is that: "To view the dyadic interaction alone as the source of psychic structure formation omits the crucial contribution of the organism's own self-regulatory capacities" (p. 34). They cite Brazelton's (1973) study that shows that the fetus can change its state, dampen its arousal, and eventually put itself to sleep to cope with the aversive stimulation of a bright light and then is able to approach the stimulus when the light was shone in a more moderate level (Beebe, Lachmann & Jaffe. 1997). Yet, it is premature to ascribe self-regulation to infants on the basis of such preferences. Infant may not be helpless in the way they were portrayed originally in psychoanalytic theory. There is subtlety and complexity to infant states, as researchers are uncovering. But this does not mean that we ought to assume that infants possess agency just because they are able to communicate likes and dislikes.

Stern's work on early development highlights the emergence of the self, but there is insufficient attention to the initial lack of and partial internal organization.[13] This is remedied, in part, in Beebe's work, which shows the infant's sensitivity to contingency and sense of being part of a dual unity. A more elaborate conceptualization of early infancy as defined by part-object experience and overpowering affects is found in the work of Melanie Klein.

Klein (1946) presents the infant as lacking a sense of agency and as dominated by affects, particularly disturbing affects that threaten the existence of the infant. In her first stage of development, the paranoid-schizoid position, the infant experiences him/herself and others as part objects, and primitive affects-- fostering aggression and paranoid anxieties-- loom menacingly if the appropriate input from the caregiver does not occur. According to Klein, the infant derives the experience of good and bad from fantasies about the good breast (which is a source of nourishment and comfort) and the bad breast (which is a source of distress and persecution).

Stern regards Klein's notion of the good and bad breast as suspect because of its lack of empirical validity and also because it smuggles pathology into normal development.

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[13]Jones (1995) is critical of Stern for assuming that the existence of a self; he argues that the infant becomes a self in using symbols at around 10-12 months (pp. 231, 236, 246).

Furthermore, Stern argues that Klein believes that phantasy occurs prior to reality, whereas he avers that phantasy is a later development that is, in fact, predicated upon reality.[14] Although Stern is right that Klein mistakenly attributes phantasy to infants, the fact that an infant responds to reality from birth does not negate how overpowering and central affects are without internal organization.[15] Moreover, Klein draws our attention to the way in which phantasy is necessarily colored by affective experience. Regardless of what point in development phantasy comes into being, it is represents a powerful form of affective-laden experience that contributes to the creation of the dynamic unconscious (Jones, 1995).

Klein's (1946) concept of "projective identification" offers a profound description of how the infant's own experience can be disavowed and cast out and projected onto others. According to Klein (1955), the ego splits in order to avoid overwhelming affects such as persecutory anxiety; the result is that these very affects are attributed to (and can be experienced by) the other.[16] To be sure, the

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[14]This criticism of Klein is also made by Jones (1995) and Cavell (1993).

[15]The Tysons (1990) also point out that Klein attributes fantasy to early development before it is possible.

[16]Rosenfeld (1987) makes an important distinction between projective identification as communication and as a matter of ridding oneself of what one feels. Kleinian theory has moved from seeing projective identification as a primitive defense to a kind of communication everyone resorts to on occasion. For an emphasis on the latter point, see Ogden (1989, 1982). Steiner (1993) focuses upon how projective

empirical validity of such non-verbal communication is hard to prove. Nevertheless, as I shall discuss in Chapter IV, there are clinical phenomena that are hard to account for without invoking an idea such as projective identification.

Another serious charge against Klein is that while she is insightful about negative affect, she downplays positive affect and also does not attach much weight to regulation (Stein, 1991; Tyson & Tyson, 1990). In Klein's depiction of early life, aggression and primitive affects like envy certainly are prominently featured.[17] Even if one agrees that Klein's view is somewhat one-sided, it still has the virtue of drawing attention to the domination of affects in early life.

Developmental literature corroborates the domination of affects in early life. Fogel (1982) claims that infants regularly experience highly charged affect states that overwhelm them, and that over time, there are changes in the quality and timing of affective sequences such that arousal can be regulated (p. 38). Cole et al.(1992) maintain that infancy is characterized by lability of affects that

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identification can either be owned or disavowed once it happens.

[17]Klein (1946) is critical of Fairbairn, for example, because his theory minimizes aggression and the infant's experience of hatred. Bion (1967) also highlights the infant's experience of hatred, observing that if it is not able to be expressed and tolerated, there is a danger of the infant turning the hatred against all affects. Fonagy, Moran & Target (1993) focus upon aspects of aggression, both healthy and defensive, that pertain to the emergence of a psychological sense of self.

diminishes with age (p. 87). Malestesta et al. (1989) observe that affects become more graded, subtle and complex beyond the first year (p. 2). Although Stern introduces vitality affects, there is no attempt in his work to grapple with how to understand their meaning in relation to the dawning sense of agency to which he is committed. In general, it is fair to conclude that the pre-agency period is defined by affects outweighing the sense of agency.

B. Agency

Agency proper begins at 6-9 months and runs until the 15-18 months. This age frame is deliberately vague, as it makes sense to construe the stage of agency broadly and to avoid the obvious absurdity of imagining that there is any one moment of development in which the designation of "agency" can be magically bestowed. During this stage, appropriate input from the caregiver aids the infant to be able to regulate his/her affects and to develop more of a sense of identity. It is also in this period that we can glimpse the integral relation between affects and agency. Although this is the point in development when agency comes into being, it should be kept in mind that agency continues to unfold subsequently. Our focus here will be to look closely at theories about the unfolding of agency, featuring the subjective experience of the infant as far as that is possible.

I shall pick up with Stern's theory, as the transition from the core self to the subjective self occurs. The core self culminates with an increase in the infant's capacity to experience connection with the caregiver. More specifically, the other serves to foster self-regulation--concerning arousal, but also attachment and cognition. This is the point in development, according to Stern, in which merger or fusing occurs. He maintains that such experiences of connection do not violate the integrity of being a (single) core self. Stern's then introduces the notion of "evoked companions," representations or RIGs of "being with someone" (p. 111). In amplifying the idea of evoked companions, Stern compares it to the "internal working models" of attachment theory, emphasizing that, in contrast, evoked companions have an affective, rather than cognitive basis (p. 115).

The next stage of the development of the self, according to Stern, is the subjective self. Intersubjectivity comes to the fore of experience here. The infant discovers others' minds and learns that "what is going on in my mind may be similar enough to what is going on in your mind that we can somehow communicate this (without words)" (p. 124). It is revealing that when Stern imagines intersubjective relationships, he assumes concurrence; this stage is explicitly conceived as harkening

the capacity for psychic intimacy.[18] As Stern develops his argument, it emerges that intersubjectivity relies upon what he terms "interaffectivity," that "the infant somehow makes a match between the feeling state as experienced within and as seen `on' or `in' another"(p. 132).

It is the notion of "affect attunement" which explicates the "somehow" mentioned above. Stern claims that affect attunement depends upon a threefold process: 1) the parent must be able to read the infant's feeling state from the infant's overt behavior; 2) the parent must perform some behavior that is not a strict imitation but nonetheless corresponds in some way to the infant's overt behavior; and 3) the infant must be able to read this corresponding parental response as having to do with the infant's original feeling experience and not just imitating the infant's behavior (without language) (p. 139). It is possible to analyze attunements into the following elements: absolute intensity, intensity contour, temporal beat, rhythm, duration and shape (p. 146).

Attunements occur, according to Stern, "largely out of awareness and almost automatically"(p. 145). If attunements

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[18]Stern can be criticized for lack of attention to negative affect or at least for minimizing its significance. In his work, Diary of a Baby (1990), Stern portrays the infant's negative affect as reasonable as well as easily comforted by the attentive mother. Tronick (1989) and Beebe et al (1992) have rectified this neglect of negative affect by paying more attention to the inevitability of disruptions in the interaction between infant and caretaker. Stern has also been criticized by Cushman (1991) for his ethnocentrism.

remain out of awareness, it is difficult to see how they are related to our sense of self. If the point is that they are amenable to come into awareness, Stern owes us an account of how this occurs. Insofar as Stern has a response, it is contained in the transition from the subjective self to the fourth sense of self, the verbal self, wherein language offers a new capacity to objectify the self-- our focus in the next section.

Affect attunement is a rich concept that has had a major impact upon psychoanalytically-oriented developmental theory. In part it is modeled upon the concept of mirroring, although Stern is critical of the inexactness of mirroring in comparison to attunement.[19] Stern's use of affect attunement demonstrates how affects can be identified and experienced by the infant; thus, he deepens our appreciation of the mechanism of self-regulation. He takes us beyond Winnicott's (1967) seductively simple description of mirroring in terms of the baby seeing itself in the mother's face (p. 112). In spite of the merits of Stern's concept of affect attunement, questions remain about how affects contribute to a sense of agency.

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[19]Stern asserts that mirroring has the misleading connotation of suggesting complete temporal synchrony and also (wrongly) implying that the mother is creating something in the infant that was only dimly or partially there beforehand. In addition, it is problematic, according to Stern, that mirroring is used to designate behavior, alignment of internal states and verbal validation, thus confusing mechanism, form and function (pp. 144-145).

A recent article by Gergely & Watson (1996) offers a detailed examination of "affective mirroring," which in some ways supplements Stern's view of affect attunement and in other ways challenges it. Gergely & Watson render the concept of mirroring to be precise-- redressing Stern's complaint. Gergely & Watson's subtle and nuanced account of mirroring has its source in the authors' respective research: Watson's (1994, 1985, 1979, 1972) research about contingency in infant learning and Gergely's (1995, 1992) research about infants' acquisition of "the intentional stance."[20] Gergely's research has shown that 9-12 month infants, but not 6 month infants, can interpret another as goal-oriented and, in fact, can predict his/her future action towards the goal in a new situation. In the article under discussion, Gergely and Watson take a theory of mind approach, focusing specifically upon affects.

Before getting to the heart of Gergely & Watson's argument, it is worth clarifying a few of their presuppositions. They subscribe to the basic emotions perspective, emphasizing that emotions consist of prewired bidirectional connections between facial expression and corresponding physiological states that are active from birth (also see Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1993). They regard

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[20]The intentional stance is a term used by philosophers to denote the capacity to attribute causal mental states to others. This interpretational strategy is an evolutionary adaptation that enables us to predict the behavior of others. See Fodor (1992) and Dennett (1987).

infants at birth as not yet sensitive to the internal state cues that indicate basic emotions, although there is a strong bisocial preparedness which soon begins to emerge. Gergely & Watson observe that affects are likely the earliest form of mental state, thus placing their view in line with Emde's notion of an affective core. Towards the end of the first year of life, they claim, infants achieve a new level of emotional awareness and control that goes along with a better understanding of and reasoning about the feeling states of others.

Although Gergely & Watson do not dwell upon the theme of dependency, they leave no doubt that affect regulation initially relies upon the caregiver providing the infant with what he/she cannot yet provide for him/herself. Self-regulation is accomplished by the infant only when secondary control structures have been created, encoding the meaning of the basic emotions. Mirroring produces these secondary representations in a causal sense-- by means of a feedback process which sensitizes and increases internal control. Gergely & Watson highlight contingency detection and maximizing as key factors: they allow the infant to experience causal efficacy and hence positive affect. The result is a sense of agency as self-regulating. Mirroring sets into motion a process that is distinct from soothing, wherein an infant's state is changed without necessarily contributing to his/her sense of agency.

In affective mirroring, the caregiver reflects the infant's state back in a marked way. The caregiver's affective state is marked in the sense of being exaggerated, although it must have a high, but imperfect correspondence with what he/she sees in the infant's behavior. The marked quality differentiates the affect as belonging to the infant, rather than to the caregiver. As Gergely & Watson suggest, the infant "decouples" the affect from belonging to the caretaker and then "anchors" it to him/herself. Affect mirroring helps the infant gain three developmental functions: 1) contributing to the infant's state-regulation; 2) leading to the establishment of secondary representations that become associated with primary affect states (enhancing the cognitive capacity to access and attribute affects to the self); and 3) resulting in the development of a generalized communicative code characterized by the representational functions of decoupling, anchoring and the suspension of realistic consequences. This last function can be linked to the unfolding capacity to engage in imaginary play.

There is overlap and agreement between Stern's and Gergely & Watson's respective theories. Both theories adhere to the somewhat paradoxical idea that in seeing oneself in the other, one sees oneself in a new and better way. This idea has a long history that is too complex to trace in its entirety here. Lacan is a crucial link--receiving the idea from German Idealism via Kojeve's

lectures on Hegel that influenced a generation of French thinkers in the thirties, and passing the idea on to Winnicott and object relations theory (which also influenced Kohut and self-psychology).[21] The paradoxical aspect of the idea is that the self needs the other in order to be truly itself. Both Stern and Gergely & Watson resolve this seeming paradox through highlighting how the caregiver's affect display is altered so that the communication is not mistaken as belonging to the caregiver him/herself.[22]

There are some real differences between the two theories, however, which are important to clarify. For Stern, affect attunement is about the experience of "we both feel this" and "what she is doing is what I feel." Since Stern maintains that attunements happen outside of awareness, this experience pertains to agency in the sense that the inner world apparently acquires definition. Agency is understood by Stern, it would seem, as determined by seeing oneself as the source and owner of such an experience.

For Gergely & Watson, affective mirroring is about the experience of being able to regulate one's own feelings, aided by the role of the caregiver-- "I know what I feel and

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[21]Kojeve's lectures influenced Sartre, DeBeauvoir, Merleau-Ponty, Queneau, Breton, Bataille et al.
[22]Gergely & Watson's conception resembles Bion's (1967) notion that the primary caregiver contains the infant's affects that are frightening by metabolizing them to be tolerable.

I can modulate it." Not only does the infant identify what is felt, but he/she has the further experience of being in control of this experience. In other words, agency is determined by seeing oneself as able to influence the course of what is felt. This is possible, in part, due to expanded cognitive capacity, nourished by the caregiver's lead.

Although I believe that Gergely & Watson offer a more insightful account than Stern of how affects contribute to a sense of agency, it is unnecessary to vindicate one view over the other. It is possible, for example, to think of distinguishing attunement and mirroring both as moments of regulation-- the former leading to the latter. Affect regulation illustrates that there is a connection between affects and agency. As a sense of agency is enhanced, we can note the evolution from affect regulation in the pre-agency stage to self-regulation in the agency stage.

The stage of agency is determined by the interaction between infant and caregiver; in general, it corresponds to a time in development of exploration and stimulus-seeking-- which is greatly enhanced by the power of self-locomotion. While agency is not exhausted by activity (as discussed in the Introduction), this stage is characterized by "practicing," according to Mahler (1975) and by the wish to be an "effective doer," according to Stechler & Kaplan (1980).

Another issue to consider is that the greater activity also comes up against prohibitions. Spitz (1957) goes as

far to suggest that parental prohibitions serve as an invitation to passivity (p. 45). Stechler & Kaplan have a helpful way of formulating how in this period the infant engages in initiating and inhibitory behavior, and around the end of the first year, is able to show a capacity for self-restraint in the face of a prohibition. Thus, the conclusion can be drawn that agency involves choice, especially knowing when to act and when not to act.

C. Self-Conscious Agency

The third stage, self-conscious agency, constitutes a more fully realized sense of agency. This third stage, which begins in the first half of the second year of life, is less of a discrete stage; rather it ushers in a capacity that has life-long ramifications. I shall begin the description of self-conscious agency with Stern's fourth stage, the verbal self. Stern notes that from 15-18 months an important change takes place: "children begin to imagine or represent things in their minds in such a way that signs or symbols are now in use...Children can conceive of and then refer to themselves as external or objective entities" (p. 163). This change is conveyed through the use of language.

Language, according to Stern, plays a complex role in development. It offers a way to organize our subjective experience as well as to connect with others. Yet language, is also "a double-edged sword" in the sense that it "drives

a wedge between two simultaneous forms of interpersonal experience: as it is lived and as it is verbally represented"(p. 162). This disjunction is difficult to negotiate, but it opens new possibilities-- none more important than the ability to look at oneself as an object. Stern distinguishes between the "objective" or "conceptual" self and the "subjective" or "experiential" self. That is, there is a self that is aware of and observes the self which lives in the world. The former is the basis of self-conscious agency.

The ambivalence that Stern detects with the appearance of language is given even more play in Mahler, Pine and Bergman's theory of separation and individuation. The third subphase of development is "rapprochement."[23] The rapprochement phase, in the middle of the second year, is ushered in by the appearance of an increase of separation anxiety; thus, the outward and outgoing pull of the second subphase of development, practicing, is checked. However, as the so-called "rapprochement crisis" begins to emerge, it

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[23]I do not mean to imply that Stern intends to support the notion of rapprochement. In fact, he is critical of the assumption of a conflictual wish to return to a dependent (symbiotic) state, which he regards as dubious in the first place. One can see clearly the interpersonalist backdrop in Stern's work, which makes him uncomfortable with thinking about conflict as an inherent component of human beings. Jones (1995) offers an original interpretation of rapprochement, stressing that it is species-specific and thus constitutes a marker of the evolutionary turn to have the capacity for symbolic thought (p. 182).

becomes clear that there is both a wish for reunion, but a fear of engulfment (p. 77).

The actual rapprochement crisis occurs between 18-20 months: it is defined by the contrasting tendencies of pushing and clinging-- that is, "ambitendency" (p. 95). Mahler, Pine & Bergman note that during this period, the range of affects seems to widen and become differentiated. For example, the child will fight back tears and suppress the need to cry (p. 97). By 21 months, the crisis resolves, when the child finds the "optimal distance": learning to go forward safely without becoming anxious about losing contact with the caregiver.

Mahler's work is subtle and dialectical, capturing well the sense in which development is not a linear path. The question of why the forward-locking movement of the practicing phase is interrupted has to do with language, but also with integrating the sense of "I" with the increase of varieties if affective experience (culminating in the fourth subphase, emotional object constancy). Since Stern is inclined to believe that affects do not change with development, he is not able to acknowledge this point.

The self-conscious period of agency is not defined exclusively in terms of the experience of seeing oneself as an object; it has to do, as Mahler's theory claims, with temporary moments of feeling overburdened by one's sense of being a subject. Mahler is correct to highlight failure as constitutive of the developing sense of self, although this

does not mean that we have to share her judgment which tilts towards pathology in lieu of normality (p. 224). Along with her insight, there is a strong pessimistic strain in Mahler that need not be endorsed.[24]

The point that Stern and Mahler would find agreement about is that a more complex sense of self comes into being with development that has its private (or individuated) aspect at the same time as having a social aspect. Agency is self-conscious because one has options concerning on the basis on which one chooses to act. Stechler & Kaplan offer an astute analysis of this stage of development, emphasizing that the dual tracks of initiating and inhibitory behavior lead to self-awareness.

Self-awareness is predicated upon using others' reaction as an influence upon oneself, regardless of whether one decides to act or one opts to refrain from acting. Stechler & Kaplan assert that: "It is the continuation of an unfulfilled intention over some time that is most relevant for a consolidation of the awareness of the self" (p. 100). In other words, the experience of retaining interest in the face of limitations-- as long as some gratification occurs

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[24]Mahler can be hyperbolic: proposing that the path from the pleasure to reality principle is a "tortured route"(p. 226), and even more bizarrely, that the difficulty of achieving separation and individuation is affected by "the ever-increasing dangers of living in a contaminated and essentially hostile world"(p. 227).

within some reasonable amount of time-- confirms and reinforces a sense of agency.

One can think of Stechler & Kaplan's position here as mediating between Mahler's emphasis upon the inevitability of failure in development and Stern's minimization of the limitations that an agent necessarily faces.[25] What is crucial, according to Stechler & Kaplan, is the value of holding onto one's will without needing to act upon it. Stechler & Kaplan cite Sander (1962), agreeing with his emphasis upon adaptation and self-regulation for a sense of agency. For them, self-conscious agency means that one knows when to act and when to refrain from acting; moreover, refraining from acting does not mean giving up, but postponement or adjustment. This conception of self-regulation is about more effectively getting what one wants, rather than-- as we saw in some of the developmental literature-- capitulating to others.

Spitz (1957) offers an interesting addendum to what has been said about self-conscious agency. He maintains that at approximately 15 months, the child first can articulate "No." The significance of this particular use of language is that it indicates a modification of the ego, which, in

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[25]I do not agree with Stechler & Kaplan's overall position about the self, as they are averse to thinking about the self in terms of the growth of internal structure (p. 101). But my project takes its starting point from their conclusion: "The relationship between affect and the patterns we have traced in the development of the self remain to be elucidated" (p. 104).

his opinion, indicates that the child first experiences a sense of having a self. Spitz maintains that, at first, affective experience occurs in two forms-- either as "for" or "against." It is the latter which is evident in the negation uttered by the child's "No." Affective experience is itself transformed, according to Spitz, when the child is able to put affects into words, rather than having to act upon them.

Some of Spitz's reflections about the meaning of "No" become embroiled in antiquated concerns, but his focus upon the growth of the ego is worth considering carefully. Spitz sees the ego, but not the self, as present from birth; the ego is formed from the functions of being the "executor" along with the "watcher." The executor is manifest in the exercise of one's (autonomous) choice; the watcher comes from internalizing the parental function of looking after the child (and subsequently evolves into the superego). The ego's function in taking itself as an object anticipates Stern's point about the self in a different discourse; but Spitz's notion that before the self there is an ego counters Stern's assumption that a proto-self already exists at birth.[26]

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[26]The issue of the ego in relation to the self is, of course, a difficult one. One way to read the ego/self relationship is in terms of a part/whole relationship. However, it is possible to see the ego as a technical term, while the self is a term from ordinary language (Grossman, 1982; Spruiell, 1981). Others have argued that the self needs to be incorporated as a term in psychoanalysis

It is worth complicating things further by acknowledging Jacobson's contribution. Jacobson (1964) argues that it is the superego that has a crucial role in self-regulation. She concurs with Spitz that the growth of the ego influences affective experience. Yet Jacobson places greater emphasis upon the emergence of the superego, which she delineates in three stages. In the first stage, the superego is harsh and even sadistic (corresponding to frustrating encounters with others and the infant's own aggression). In the second stage, an ego ideal, which reduces, but does not overcome the primitive force of the first stage. The third stage contributes to the toning down of the superego, resulting in realistic, demanding and prohibiting representations of the child's parents. Jacobson's complex description of the superego offers a challenge to contemporary psychoanalytic views, which have downplayed the role of the superego.[27] I shall return to

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(Lichtenberg, 1975, Kohut, 1971). Also, not everyone would agree with Spitz that the ego exists at birth. Finally, it has been argued that the ego is no longer a useful term because of the anthropomorphism of the structural model (Schafer, 1976; Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973). It is interesting to speculate whether the terms "ego" or "superego" can be reformulated without subscribing to the structural model.

[27]It is hard to say why there is less attention to the superego now in psychoanalysis. In part, it is part of a larger cultural tendency, linked perhaps to the attack on authority from the 60s. I would add that the language of object relations, in featuring self in relation to others, reduces the space for such a concept. Object relations language has the benefit of introducing a term, the self, to refer to the wholeness of a being, but it thereby obscures a level for others as the bearers of culture. Although

the superego again in the last section in connection with Schore, who argues in favor of shame as a transformative affect in self-conscious agency.

For Jacobson, the emergence of the superego leads a change to a more harmonious way to balance instinctual and narcissistic demands. Her reading of the superego is striking in terms of its positive valence-- she points out, for example, that having a good conscience is itself pleasurable (p. 127). The superego takes us beyond the mundane world to the higher-ground of morality; it is a spur for the development of the mind, increasing reality-testing. For Spitz, the child's "No" also reveals a higher capacity of thinking-- the first abstract concept used by the child (p. 52). The child is experimenting with thinking, regardless that "thinking" is just beginning to undergo development.[28] The egocentrism of early life yields to the investment in reality-testing.

In two recent articles, Fonagy & Target (1996) add considerably to our knowledge of children's theory of mind by focusing on the development of reality-testing from the ages 2-5 years. Fonagy & Target trace the change from "psychic equivalence," where the child assumes that what is

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Kernberg uses the language of object relations, he continues to use the term, superego; he also testifies to the value of Jacobson's concept of the superego (Kernberg, 1984, pp. 276f.)

[28]The experimental quality is conveyed by the example Spitz offers of the child who says "No" but complies anyway (p. 140).

in the mind necessarily is the same as what is in reality, to representation, where the child understands that the mind is not a replica as much as an interpretation of reality.

Fonagy & Target feature the enormous value of engaging in play. Play offers a pretend version of reality that actively allows the child to express and work on internal feelings, making them less dangerous than they are under equivalence. At 4-5 years old, integration of the dimensions of equivalence and pretend emerges. Fonagy & Target show how the capacity to "mentalize" results in a kind of internal reality-testing, whereby the child learns to have the flexibility to judge the reality status of his/her own ideas and feelings.

Mentalization obviously enhances self-regulation. Under psychic equivalence, the child will be inclined to construe affects as real, as powerful and even overpowering. Mentalization affords an explanation of how affective experience is shaped and determined. As Spitz and Jacobson propose, the prerequisite of new affective experience is the developing structure of the ego and superego respectively, which aids the unfolding of a sense of whole self. Fonagy & Target continue the narrative, highlighting the unfolding "core of self-structure" that emerges from the intersubjective process that allows us to reflect upon feelings and ideas (p. 461). Although Fonagy & Target are primarily concerned with reality-testing, they demonstrate how affects and agency are necessarily a part of early

cognitive experience. I wish to stress, however, that self-conscious agency is itself a complex and ongoing process that continues to evolve.

In following the change from agency to self-conscious agency, we have seen the child's interest in turning attention to his/her own mental life. We can trace the moment in affective mirroring (as described by Gergely & Watson, when the infant is encouraged to learn about causal efficacy with regard to affect states) to the moment in later development (when language fosters the capacity to reflect on oneself as an object and to think symbolically). This culminates with the capacity to see the representations of the mind precisely as representations-- an experience both of observing oneself with some (objective) distance and of finding one's inner life familiar and intimate. The new sense of self creates new affective experiences.

The description of self-conscious agency has led us to venture beyond affect and self-regulation. Thus, in the final section of this chapter, I shall return to summarize affect and self-regulation in the three stages of pre-agency, agency, and self-conscious agency. I shall also sharpen the claim that self-regulation helps us to have new affective experiences. So far, we have shown that affects form the basis of connection between infant and caregiver, and that the caregiver uses the medium of affects to help the infant understand his/her own states and to encourage the process of learning to modulate them for him/herself.

Affect regulation names this process, which relies upon the shifting and growing sense of self. The more that one understands oneself as a self, the better one is able to regulate one's affects and to achieve self-regulation.

3. An Integrated, Psychoanalytic View

In this last section, my aim will be twofold: to provide a summary of what has been said so far and to add to it by positing an integrated, psychoanalytic view, reflecting the current state of knowledge in other fields, particularly neuroscience. I shall present the work of Schore who has taken an important step in the direction of integrating psychoanalysis and neuroscience. In the final subsection, I introduce the concept of affectivity, a term that is necessary in order to account for the regulation of affects over and beyond the goal of homeostasis. Affectivity, the fruit of the connection between affects and agency, will be explored in more depth in Chapter IV. The importance of affectivity will become evident as I turn from the abstract realm of theory to clinical practice.

A short summary of affect regulation in the three stages of agency is in order. In pre-agency, affect regulation is dependent upon the external input of a caregiver. In agency, a transformation takes place in which the external regulatory function is replaced by the infant: affect regulation becomes self-regulation. In self-conscious agency, the internal function is deepened: it

occurs with more options and better flexibility. It is important to clarify that the replacement of the external function with an internal one does not entail a minimization or neglect of the continuing input of the caregiver. Just as attachment research suggests that style of attachment is sustained from parent to child (Main, 1985), it is likely that self-regulation, too, is subject to parental influence.[29]

A. Schore: Including Attachment Theory

Schore's formidable tome, Affect Regulation and the Origins of the Self (1993), is the work of a polymath. In one sense, Schore's project is to offer a neuroscientific substrate for psychoanalytic theory. In another sense, Schore borrows from neuroscience in order to support ideas from attachment theory as consistent with psychoanalysis. Schore has a wide knowledge of neuroscience. His use of psychoanalytic material is eclectic; at times, he mixes theories of development without acknowledging tensions and differences.[30]

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[29]The mitigating factor here is temperament. Often temperament is introduced in terms of its influence upon the infant's attachment to the primary caregiver; it is worth acknowledging, however, that temperament pertains both to the infant and caregiver. Therefore, the interaction between the two temperaments will affect the attachment bond.

[30]Schore is not clear about where he stands on major debates in psychoanalysis. For example, he refers to Stern and to Mahler, specifically the latter's notion of symbiosis, as if the theories are compatible and without dealing with Stern's

Like Hofer, Schore supports the notion of a biology of attachment, such that the external regulation of the caregiver determines the neurochemistry of the infant's brain and hence his/her own regulation. Schore (1993) claims that the infant's interactions with the caregiver "directly elicit psychoendocrinological changes that influence the biochemical activation of gene-action systems which program the critical period growth and differentiation of a corticolimbic structure responsible for self-regulation" (p. 18). Towards the end of the first year, according to Schore, the prefrontal cortex matures, which causes the mother's role to shift from being an "auxiliary cortex" to a socializing agent as the infant provides regulation for him/herself. Schore's work musters abundant evidence for the paradigm of external regulation leading to self-regulation.

Schore proposes a psychoneurobiological model of the ontogeny of emotional self-regulation. Like Stern and other infant researchers, he is sympathetic to how the infant is prepared to respond to the external world from birth. Schore stresses that at the beginning of life, the infant is immersed in achieving biological regulation, in particular, regulating levels of arousal. He links his position on

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criticism of Mahler (p. 231). In addition, Schore seems to distance himself from classical psychoanalytic theory, although, surprisingly, it turns out that he defends the notion of "psychic energy" (p. 536).

affective core to the work of LeDoux and Emde. He also concurs with the importance of affects displayed through the facial expressions of the caregiver. More specifically, Schore emphasizes that in the beginning of life, the infant is engaged in limiting the force of negative affect. He notes that the capacity for positive affect does not develop until 10-13 months.[31]

Schore's work is particularly insightful in describing aspects of the pre-agency stage that concern sensory modalities. Schore traces a change from the proximal to the distal: from olfactory-gustatory and tactile to the visual and then auditory modalities (p. 306). The culmination is a hierarchy and integration of sensory modalities. Schore's attention to the infant's absorption in bodily experience and the shifting nature of early development is compatible with psychoanalytic theory. Schore's work also shows the influence of neuroscience, specifically Damasio and Edelman's emphasis upon the biological basis of the self. Schore perspective about affect regulation is that it does not emerge until the prefrontal lobe of the right hemisphere establishes connections with the subcortical part of the brain at around 12 months (p. 301).

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[31]Schore's (1996) point is that positive affect is a product of the interaction with the caregiver. He emphasizes the role of positive affect as signifying that negative affect can be endured (pp. 70-71). Emde (1992) also encourages a special emphasis upon the unfolding of positive affect for a psychoanalytic theory of development.

Schore differs from Stern in showing how agency comes into being without presupposing its telos. Stern is content to infer a proto-psychological self from the existence of a physical self. Stern leans in this direction as a way to compensate against older psychoanalytic views, which in his opinion, see the infant as lacking a self or mistakenly ascribing a pathology to it. However, in describing where the infant is heading, Stern sacrifices explicit attention to the who the infant is.

Stern ignores the infant's struggle to balance levels of intense arousal as well as the infant's dependence--points that are key for Schore. Schore features the notion that affect regulation determines the sense of self, and that this is a process that is "essentially nonverbal and unconscious" (p. 542). Schore avers that this makes his view psychoanalytic. He is sympathetic to attachment theory, however, and has not yet made an attempt to reconcile tensions between the two theories.[32] Schore, like Stern, shows no interest in understanding aggression. Furthermore, he accounts for the intrapsychic solely as a product of attachment. It would be interesting to know what Schore would make of Winnicott's (1967) notion of the

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[32]Schore repeatedly cites Sroufe's (1989) work that links attachment and affect regulation and Kobak & Sceery's (1988) work that suggests that "internal working models" are styles of attachment.

"permanent isolation of the individual" (p. 118) or for what Modell (1993) has called "the private self."[33]

B. Reviewing the Three Stages

Let us ponder the implications of the three stages of agency. My stage of pre-agency departs from those, like Stern, who assume that agency exists from the beginning of life. In pushing the question of what it means to be an agent, it is not my intention to claim that the infant has no qualities that contribute to a sense of agency. To be precise: pre-agency means partial agency, rather than non-agency. Partial agency can be glimpsed insofar as the infant has states of mind wherein he/she exhibits preferences and initiates actions. Yet these states of mind, in and of themselves, do not fit the criterion of agency. Pre-agency is dominated by affects. As Schore's work indicates, the infant does not have the brain capacity to be an agent at birth.

The stage of agency is defined by the growing capacity of the infant to contribute to his/her own regulation and to make choices on that basis. It is the interaction between infant and caregiver that abets development--

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[33]Modell bases his notion on the private self on Winnicott, but he also finds support in Edelman. A merit of this kind of intrapsychic approach is that it does not deny the importance of intersubjectivity. It stresses that the infant comes to the interaction as a unique (biological) being; thus, it is one-sided to see the infant exclusively as a product of the interaction with the caregiver.

self-regulation is predicated upon the sense of being a self. Schore's central contention is that self-regulation provides a "contact point" between psychoanalysis and neurobiology (p. 534). According to Schore, "a deeper understanding of the ontogeny of the self-regulation of affect may be the key to deciphering the fundamental problem of self-organization, the origin of the self" (p. 497). As he goes on to maintain, "the core of the self lies in patterns of affect regulation that integrate a sense of self across state transitions, thereby allowing for a continuity of inner experience" (p. 498). The affective bond leads to internal representations that create the sense of being an agent.

Moreover, Schore argues that the affective bond serves to stimulate brain development. At the end of the first year of life, the prefrontal cortex begins to play a more active role in the modulation of affects. As we have already noted, the activation of the prefrontal cortex coincides with an enhanced capacity for positive affect; thus, regulation needs to be conceived in terms of modulating both negative and positive affect.[34]

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[34]Krystal's (1988) idea of "affect handling" is relevant here. It is based upon both maximizing positive affect, but also accepting negative affect. In other words, Krystal assumes that self-regulation helps us to endure negative affect-- which seems more realistic than imagining that negative affect can be obliterated from experience. For a earlier version of this position, see Zetzel's (1970) work on anxiety and depression.

Another development around this time is the ability to have delayed responses, which augments the range of possible reactions (p. 177). With respect to sensory modalities, there is a greater reliance upon visual, instead of tactile, stimulation. The infant becomes an agent in the sense of attaining control over his/her actions. Self-regulation relies upon self-awareness; self-awareness means that one reflects and exercises choice about whether to act or not.

The stage of self-conscious agency brings about further changes. Schore points out that a higher synthesis of homeostasis occurs, connecting the parasympathetic and sympathetic nervous systems with limbic function. A particular focus for Schore is the appearance of the affect of "shame," which develops between 14-16 months. Shame exemplifies self-consciousness: that one grasps oneself as an agent from an objective, not merely subjective stance. At 18 months, a number of other dramatic events occur: the caregiver is no longer a voice of positive affect, but is a voice of instruction and direction (p. 200). The infant is introduced to toilet-training and other forms of socialization. The infant is encourages to be able to tolerate frustration and to opt for delayed gratification.

What it means to be an agent, therefore, significantly shifts at 18 months. The affect of shame betokens a movement away from narcissism and in the direction of having

an ego ideal. Shame cannot exist without self-consciousness.[35] Shame offers a good example of the new range of affects that comes into being.[36] Schore maintains that the nature of one's representations undergo a change from pre-symbolic to symbolic. Presymbolic representations encode the physiological-affective responses to the expressive face of the attachment figure; while symbolic representations are internalizations of the child's affect and the caregiver's response, which can be accessed to modulate distress-related affects (Schore, 1996, pp.68, 71). With symbolic representation, the child achieves a more effective kind of self-regulation.

The difference between self-regulation in the agency and self-conscious agency stages is one of degree, not kind. The agent is defined by goal-oriented activity; the self-conscious agent manifests a new level of inwardness. The inwardness can be equated with self-reflection. The self-conscious agent is defined less by activity than by the existence of an inner life that is characterized by flexibility and modulation (which may or may not culminate in action). The crucial point is that action is no longer an either/or proposition; it can be modified and tailored to fit the particular circumstances of the moment. The representational world is brought to bear upon current

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[35]A similar argument is made by Lewis (1992).
[36]Schore quotes Pine (1980) who asserts that the array of affects increases (p. 202).

reality-- guiding one, but allowing for unanticipated and unknown experience. The self-conscious agent is an agent with definition.

C. Affectivity

In this chapter, a continuum in the evolution of agency has emerged from its biological basis in affect regulation to the self-regulation of a complex, differentiated being. Yet we are still at a very early stage of understanding the multiple dimensions of regulation. Clearly, the elementary form of affect regulation has to do with homeostasis. The more developed aspects of self-regulation, however, tend to elude our understanding. The reason, in my opinion, has to do precisely with the difficulty in being self-conscious about values that transcend oneself and one's family. Ultimately, the self-conscious agent ought to be conscious not only of him/herself, but of the culture in which one lives.

It is also worth emphasizing that the biological basis of affect regulation is relevant even at higher levels of self-regulation. Arguably, the crucial insight of a psychoanalytic point of view is precisely that underlying higher functioning remains the functioning of the body.[37]

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[37]Ernest Jones believed that Freud's distinction between primary and secondary process was his major contribution, as opposed to the emphasis upon the unconscious (Tyson & Tyson, 1990, p. 165).

Edelman's work is important because it presses the concern that psychology must be based upon biology. Schore's work confirms this in dwelling upon the fundamental transformation that occurs once the orbital prefrontal cortex becomes activated.[38] Damasio's work is also important: his somatic marker hypothesis serves to deconstruct the artificial separation between bodily emotions and mindful rationality, leading us to see that we ought to be uncomfortable with the legacy of the philosophical tradition.

It is mistaken, however, to imagine that neuroscience will answer all questions about affect regulation. I agree with Edelman's wariness of biological reductionism, particularly as he points us in the direction of knowing ourselves as unique beings. Since brain development and experience overlap, neuroscience needs to be supplemented by attention to values, including the values that emerge from one's particular culture. We barely have the language to describe the complexity of such a view.

It is helpful to designate a term to refer to the range of levels of affect regulation. The term that I propose is "affectivity." Affectivity is a generalized form of affect regulation. It is an overall way to conceptualize the

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[38]Schore shares Damasio's concerns that the right hemisphere is minimized in comparison to the allegedly "real" brain, the left hemisphere. Furthermore, Schore concurs about the interconnections between the subcortical and neocortex parts of the brain.

capacity to deal well with affects. Affectivity denotes the capacity to experience affects-- to know what one feels, to be able to shape one's feelings (as much as that is possible), and to have them available for communication-- to oneself and to others.[39]

Affectivity can be ascribed to an agent who is engaged in knowing him/herself. The model of self-knowledge does not deploy cognition to direct affects; rather within affective experience, cognition is used to adjust affective experience in accordance with a sense of agency. This is a familiar part of the aim of psychotherapy, but is quite antithetical to philosophical ways of thinking about self-knowledge.[40]

In short, affectivity is the way we do things with affects. Affects report on the state of the body, and they tell us about the world; but they also move us to flourish as agents and to pursue and attain well-being. Affectivity is about fathoming ourselves with and through affects. Affectivity allows us to confirm the link between affects and agency. Affects and agency mutually condition each other: affects enable us to achieve a sense of agency, and a

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[39]Both Krystal (1988) and Green (1977) rightly emphasize that affects are communications to the agent him/herself, not only to others.

[40]An important exception is Aristotle, for whom affects orient us to being in the world. Lear (1990) stresses that for Aristotle the unity of thought and feelings is healthy for human beings (p. 47). Jones (1995) makes a similar point without mentioning Aristotle (p. 247).

sense of agency fosters our ability to experience and craft affects in a deeper and more personally meaningful way.

IV: AFFECTIVITY IN THE CLINICAL SETTING

The subjective experience of affects, an implicit but obdurate theme in the second chapter on the primacy of affects, emerged as a central concern in the third chapter on affect regulation. However, because the third chapter focused upon development, the discussion was limited to the subjective experience of children. Nothing has been said so far about the subjective experience of affects in adults, who presumably are more aware of and articulate about their affects.

Both of the first two chapters are also heavily weighted to theory and the explication of others' ideas. In the fourth chapter, I shall turn to clinical manifestations of the concept of affectivity. The shift in direction in Chapter IV will allow us to pursue the subjective experience of affects in more depth and with greater attention to the subtleties of affective experience. One of the limitations of the basic emotions position is that it fails to acknowledge the variety and nuances of feelings; thus, the clinical realm is a kind of alternative laboratory.

In the first section, I begin with some comments about the terms-- affects, affect regulation and affectivity-- and move on in the second section to case material for illustration. Then I discuss the case material in the third section, reflecting upon treatment issues and highlighting

the theme of affectivity. In the fourth and final section of the chapter, I propose categories to organize our understanding of pathologies of affectivity-- excessive negative affect, absence of affect, and affect dysregulation, and I also suggest by way of comparison that such categories of pathologies of affectivity help us understand healthy affectivity.

1. Affects, Affect Regulation, and Affectivity

Affects form a primary response to the world. They are a component of our biological motivating system, preparing us for action and also serving to foster communication (to others and to oneself). Prior to the emergence of a sense of agency, affects are first experienced in terms of raw states of "yes, good, more" and "no, bad, less." These raw states become channeled into dimensions-- such as pleasure and unpleasure.[1] Although basic emotions might well exist from birth, this does not mean that they are experienced as such. Basic emotions are able to be experienced through interaction with a caregiver who facilitates the sense of agency. In one sense, dimensions yield to basic emotions. In another sense, dimensions form the backdrop through which

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[1]Pleasure and unpleasure are, in my opinion, more fundamental than approach and withdrawal. They are also more neutral with respect to agency. Horney's (1945) rich phenomenological distinction of "moving toward, moving away and moving against" incorporates pleasure/unpleasure and approach/withdrawal.

basic emotions are textured and diversify. The mounting evidence in support of the existence of basic emotions must be reckoned with; as we have seen, however, the subject of affects is not exhausted in contemplating prewired biological states.

Affect regulation contributes to the maintenance of homeostasis. The capacity to modulate one's affects has its source in, first, coregulation and, then, affective mirroring between the caregiver and the infant. Thus, affect regulation has a biological aspect and a cultural aspect-- as the caregiver serves as a bearer of values. As numerous theorists have suggested, affect regulation relies on achieving an optimal level of arousal, wherein the infant is not over or under stimulated (Beebe et al., 1997; Thompson, 1994; Mahler et al., 1975). With the condition of optimal regulation, the child achieves the ability to identify and direct his/her affects accordingly.

Affectivity is an advanced variation of the capacity for affect regulation. With affectivity, one crafts one's affects by adjusting them within. Affectivity allows the agent to use affects to promote his/her own well-being. The promotion of well-being means opting to pursue and attain positive affect, but it also means being able to accept and cope with negative affect. Affectivity renders affects into new shapes and forms. Affectivity depends upon knowing oneself as a biological entity; that is, knowing oneself in

bodily terms, but also self-consciously as a member of a particular culture.

It is possible to differentiate affects, affect regulation and affectivity in the following way: affects as states, affect regulation as a process, and affectivity as a style. Affects are mental states that can be subjectively experienced or unconscious. Affect regulation is a process of crafting mental states in accordance with a sense of agency. Affect regulation can occur without awareness, although the more familiar one is with one's subjective experience, the more effective regulation becomes. Affectivity is a style that is based upon how one is accustomed to experience mental states and especially how one self-consciously regulates them. With affectivity, there is not only familiarity, but a sense of comfort with one's own subjective experience. Such a demarcation of affects, affect regulation and affectivity, however, should not obscure how they overlap in functions.

In order to explicate the overlap in function with affects, affect regulation and affectivity, let us reflect upon the identification of one's affects. Identifying one's affects can be a matter of acknowledging which basic emotion one is feeling. Yet, life is often more complicated: sometimes one is not sure what one feels, sometimes one feels a mixture of different affects, and sometimes one needs to alter what one feels. Identifying one's affects is

not necessarily a straightforward matter of knowing what state one is in.

Identifying one's affects can be entwined with affect regulation, especially in instances when one starts to alter what one feels as it occurs.[2] Affectivity adds further contextualization to how one identifies affects: it is predicated upon a comparison between what I am feeling now to other instances of when I felt something similar. In general, identifying what one feels is a crucial life skill-- without which it is hard to imagine being happy.

Let me give a brief clinical illustration about a patient whom I will discuss in more detail in the next section. The patient is a man who often has great difficulty knowing what he feels. In the beginning of the treatment, it was as striking as it was perplexing that he would omit reports of feelings and at times mislabel his feelings-- like the opening moment of a session after he had just learned that a woman whom he had formed a crush on for several months was getting engaged, when he announced: "I've been feeling pretty good..." I have learned that it is helpful to aid him in identifying his feelings, although it

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[2]In this sense, I would agree with Jones (1995) who defines affects in terms of processes (p. 11). His claim that affects are the first part of on-line information processing system, however, smuggles in the analogy of the mind to a computer, which I am dubious about (See Edelman (1992) and Searle (1992) for arguments concerning shortcomings in the analogy of the mind to the computer).

is also important not to be too direct in labeling what he feels.[3]

A few years into the treatment, this patient returned from an appointment with a doctor who, after a number of tests, told him that a chronic urological problem is due to a congenital problem with his kidney. The patient was told that he might require surgery-- with two options: a more serious operation or a newer, less painful, but also more uncertain high-tech procedure. I asked the patient if he felt worried. He responded: "no, I don't feel worried at all...I mean, I hope that I won't end up having kidney failure. I would hate to have to go to dialysis, which is time-consuming and would get in the way of my work."

Despite the ostensive denial of feeling worried, the patient went on to make it fairly evident by jumping to a worst case scenario, that, naturally, he was quite concerned. It was tempting to intervene here and say something like: "Not worried, oh really? Such an intervention, of course, would be a violation of clinical tact. Moreover, from experience, I know that if I am too

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[3]There are some patients for whom the remedy to their ignorance of their own affect states is to be didactic-- as in Alexander's (1946) notion of an emotionally corrective experiences. Similarly, some clinical situations can require the therapist to play the role of the patient's ego. There is always a fine clinical line to be drawn between giving the patient what he lacks by him/herself and upholding the importance of providing the space for the patient to grasp it for him/herself. Also see Greenberg & Safran, 1989.

active in suggesting to this patient what he is feeling, he becomes defensive and disputatious.

Still, it seems inadvisable to ignore that it is preferable for this patient to acknowledge what he was feeling. This is particularly true in his case because the refusal to identify what he is feeling can have the undesirable effect of rendering his feelings more extreme. The patient continued talking by tacitly acknowledging his worry, but not naming it as such. He had something at stake in talking about his affect state without naming it-- as if to ward off falling into the state without hope of getting out of it. In other words, this patient's medical situation was complicated by a fear of his own affects-- which, unfortunately, impedes his ability to recognize the state.

The main point I wish to stress is that this patient's difficulty in identifying his affect state hinders him in being able to regulate the state. His affectivity is oblique; it does not function to get him to feel appropriately worried, that is, worried to a degree that matches the circumstances and his own history. What would it mean to have affectivity here? It is predicated on numerous contextual issues-- how the patient feels about his body, his history of medical problems (and other surgeries), and what else might be going on in his life (what he will miss in school due to the surgery, etc). There are further questions that we can say would be helpful for him to pose to himself. How does he feel about worrying? Can he accept

comfort from me and can he comfort himself? Can he feel a range within the affect of worrying-- from somewhat concerned to being fully agitated? In short, affectivity will reflect his sense of himself as a biological entity, as a member of a particular culture with particular values (is it possible for a man to reply to the question of whether he feels worried in an affirmative way?), and as someone who possesses a radically unique history.

It is an unresolved empirical question whether one can regulate an affect without knowing what it is. It seems likely, however, to affirm that knowing what an affect is must aid the process of affect regulation. Affect regulation expands the range of affects at one's command as well as spurs the degree of familiarity with them. A fruit of affect regulation is that one is both accepting of one's affects and engages in crafting them. Although affectivity is itself difficult to measure or describe, knowing what affect one feels has to contribute to abetting the process of becoming self-aware and comfortable in one's style. In the next section, I shall turn to clinical material with a view toward specifying affectivity.

2. Four Cases

In this section, I shall present four cases from my own clinical work, guided by our interest in the concept of affectivity. Although this will involve the inclusion of material that goes beyond affectivity, it is not my

intention to offer full case presentations. Unavoidably, interesting aspects of these cases will be raised without being explored. The case material reveals a range of affectivity-- from very little affectivity (and the disastrous consequences in two people's lives) to a case in which affectivity has started to emerge within the treatment and another case in which the patient came to the treatment with considerable affectivity. I shall also contend with the affectivity of the clinician. I believe that increasing affectivity is an aim of any psychotherapy. Even for those who possess affectivity, it is a continuing art which requires work and improvement.

A. Teresa

Teresa is an African-American woman in her late-thirties who grew up in New York and, in fact, once told me that has never been outside of Manhattan. She is quite disturbed, and has been in and out of hospitals, diagnosed at different times over the last 20 years as schizophrenic, bi-polar, and borderline. She was not psychotic during the two and half years in which I treated her. She was disheveled and occasionally smelled badly (to the extent that the patient who followed her once complained that the chair smelled like urine). She was also not very responsive at first, and I often wondered how I could help her, especially since she would reject, and even ridicule whatever I said.

There was, nonetheless, something likable about Teresa: she had a lively wit and occasionally she would make comments about other therapists or patients at the clinic that were mean-spirited, but funny and devastatingly accurate. It seemed curious to me that she could observe others in a way that she could not observe herself. Over time, I came to appreciate how this could be used in the treatment-- as an affirmation of her interest in the human mind, even if it was not her own mind.[4]

It is significant that Teresa came to therapy because she was ordered to in connection with her court battles to regain custody of her children. She had four children, all of whom were taken away by the Bureau of Child Welfare for neglect and abuse-- including a bizarre allegation that she had sexually abused her 8 year old son. Teresa had been physically and possibly sexually abused herself.

Teresa did not like to talk about her past. She had a husband with whom she had two of the children; they were no longer together. When Teresa would see him, she would become agitated afterwards, denouncing him violently in our sessions-- although she refused to tell me anything about the encounters. Teresa rarely spoke about her mother; she

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[4]Joseph (1983) has pointed out that with patients who are not interested in understanding themselves, one can still work with their wish to be understood. My point is related: that as a prelude of the desire for self-understanding, one can work with the patient's interest in understanding others.

said that she did not like to see her mother because "all she does is nag me." When I inquired about what her mother would nag her about, she said: "and now you're going to nag me?"

Teresa was not interested to talking about her early life. She has a sister with whom she had no contact. Her father deserted the family when she was 9. She did recall one incident shortly before her father left, when she was sitting at the kitchen table doing homework, and he came home drunk and responded to a question she asked him by smashing her in the head so hard that she fell out of the chair. Teresa grew edgy and defensive in narrating this incident and went on to claim boastfully that many other things happened to her, but they did not bother or have any other effect on her.

The affect that was most prominent in our sessions was her rage. Primarily she raged against the court system-- against the judges, lawyers (both the DAs and her own lawyers), and court officers, but she also raged against the mental health system-- including me as its representative. The sessions were repetitive and varied little in content. This atmosphere went on for a long time before I started to observe a change, not in the content of the sessions, but in that she started to miss fewer sessions-- from coming two out of four sessions to coming almost every week.

One day she came in, freshly enraged by her encounter with a court-appointed psychiatrist as part on the ongoing

evaluation of her suitedness as the mother of her youngest daughter (who, it seems, was taken away on the basis of the patient's history, but without evidence of specific wrongdoing). In the course of the interview, the psychiatrist posed a question, which anyone familiar with psychiatric evaluation will recognize as a standard one: "do you have thoughts of harming yourself?" The patient's response was: "no, but I have thoughts of harming you." As she narrated the story, it was unclear what she was feeling about the incident, but I felt a rush of feelings-- in which I was able to discern simultaneous feelings of starting to laugh and starting to cry.

Let me try to be as precise as possible about my internal reaction: what I felt was strange, that is, ego-alien, and I cannot recall having ever experienced such a state before. The feeling was distinct from experiencing a mixture of opposing things together-- expressed, for example, in the notion of a "bittersweet feeling" or in the way that in extreme situations, pleasure and pain sometimes converge. There was something unalloyed and contradictory about what I felt, which I suspect, embodied something of the patient's own unintegrated inner world that she could not articulate.[5]

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[5]Of course, it would be difficult to verify the suggestion that my mental state exactly captured her mental state. It is an obligation of anyone who engages in psychotherapy to monitor changes in one's own mental states and to understand how they have been affected by patients. The experience of

Teresa's behavior was hostile to the psychiatrist, and it is hardly consoling that her apparent disavowal of suicidal ideation was accompanied by an avowal of a homocidal wish. Her behavior was also blatantly self-destructive: it is hard to imagine her saying anything that would be as damaging to her own case. In order to understand the interaction, however, we must put aside her behavior and looks at things through her eyes. This was a woman who was incredibly sensitive to slights and tended to misread the intentions of others to her as malevolent. Thus, I suspect that she perceived the context and especially the psychiatrist's very question as an attack. In raising the specter of self-harm, she felt harmed, and then responded in kind. Her words ostensively deny suicidal intent, but, on a deeper level, it is possible to see her

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finding one's own psyche filled with the psyche of another exemplifies primary process at work in everyday life and, specifically, the Kleinian concept of "projective identification," where the presumption is that intolerable feelings (belonging to oneself) are cast out onto others. In the present case, my mental state was certainly influenced by her mental state, but this need not entail the further supposition that my own mental state was thereby banished. On reflection, I know that I was laughing because of how brazen Teresa was and because I was amused by and appreciated her sense of having triumphed over the psychiatrist. In a way, she called his bluff: since he wanted to know how she felt, she was going to comply and tell him the real truth. I was crying, of course, because in drawing attention to her own capacity for violence, she was dooming herself to be judged unfit as a mother. The psychiatrist, who met with her for an hour, judged her to be incompetent and in his report emphasized that he thought it was unlikely that she would ever be fit to be a mother.

behavior as enacting a kind of suicide directly in front of the psychiatrist.

I would like to describe another incident that occurred in the treatment of this patient. We had been meeting for almost two years, when one day, she came in and sat down. After a few minutes of silence, she said sharply: "man, look at you! Don't you know anything...you're going to catch cold, if you walk around like that" (I realized that she was looking at my leg, where in between the top of my socks and my trousers, about two inches of flesh was exposed). She continued: "Now listen to me...if you catch cold, this is what you should do: you make yourself some tea; then you take a teaspoon of honey and lemon. You drink that, and you'll be all better." She shook her head, grinning and triumphant: "You ought to listen to me. I know what I'm talking about." This little interaction was notable as a rare instance of Teresa expressing positive affect. It is significant that there was something slightly aggressive about her tone and that her associations are pretty loose. But there is unmistakably a wish to express her sense of caring for me. Her use of language is best understood here in terms of its affective meaning, as opposed to the literal meaning of her words.

This interaction was moving because of her expression of concern, suggesting that after two years, she felt less oppositional, and, perhaps, was offering a reciprocating gesture that she felt cared for by me. But the truth is

that I felt unsure about how much that I was helping her. Very little of what I ever said seemed to matter; what did matter, I believe, was that I listened to her-- being listened to, without being judged, was an experience conspicuously absent from her past history or present reality. (Notice the repetition of the word "listen" in the patient's expression of her concern for me).

Progress was made in the treatment. Teresa was, from what I could tell, extremely isolated. Her best friend-- the only friend she ever spoke about-- a homeless woman who could be found usually in one of three or four locations, would disappear for stretches of time. Thus, it was significant that she was able to form enough of a bond with me to move from coming halfheartedly and under duress to coming by choice. Her rage remained obdurate throughout the treatment. Teresa felt wronged in a profound sense, and, in immersing herself in fighting alone in the court system, managed to find a willing conspirator in making her feel wrong-- not necessarily without justice, but certainly without compassion.

Instances of positive affect remained rare and too charged to be openly acknowledged. We had some touching moments, however, when she would make me laugh or smile, and while she would not overtly reveal it, I could tell that this pleased her and could even witness that her attempt to suppress her own reaction. If I tried to draw attention to our shared pleasure, she would brutally reject it. The

treatment ended abruptly after a problem with Medicaid coverage and my subsequent departure from the clinic. Our work would remain incomplete.

A year or so later, however, I saw Teresa on the street. She was preoccupied looking through a garbage can and did not look up. I wanted to greet her, but I also did not want to intrude; I decided if she saw me, I would say hello. Since I was accompanied by a friend, the situation was awkward. Quickly, the moment passed. As I walked away, I felt a howling sadness echoing around and in me.

B. Bennie

Bennie is a Jewish man in his late forties. He grew up in a lower-middle class family just outside of New York--the son of a plumber and a schoolteacher. He was an excellent student and won a scholarship to attend an elite university, where he majored in philosophy. Bennie fell apart during his junior year and has never recovered the same level of functioning. He once showed me his transcript, which provides dramatic evidence of the manifestation of his illness: during his freshman year, he received grades of B's mostly and a few C's; during his sophomore year, he received mostly B's again with one A and one C; during the Fall semester of his junior year, he failed every course. He made a few attempts to enroll again before dropping out permanently.

Bennie's decompensation is consistent with the classic symptoms of schizophrenia. Over the years, he has had numerous breakdowns and hospitalizations. He spent almost a decade living in on the streets and in SRO's, refusing medication and relishing his choice to live within a delusional world. Bennie can be extremely articulate about this time of his life: describing his identification with Native Americans, which led him to wander through Riverside Park "on a sacred quest for meaning," immersing himself in observing tiny details of plant and animal life-- indifferent only, he is aware, to the presence of other human beings. Bennie recalls this time as a period when he was fully alive; he becomes defensive in the face of being reminded of his suffering-- for example, occasions when he was set upon and beat up on the streets.

About eight years ago, Bennie moved into a social service hotel. He has a social worker at the hotel; he has seen several psychologists-- whom, for the most part, he remembers fondly. He has had numerous psychiatrists-- whom he recalls more ambivalently. He has been taking medication for his present diagnosis of Schizoaffective disorder. About five years ago, he had to be brought to the emergency room because he was screaming "kill the Jews, kill the Jews" while thinking about his father in his room; he was released the next day.

I have been seeing Bennie two times a week for four years. In some ways, he is doing well: he never misses his

appointments, he takes psychotherapy seriously-- often bringing in a list of topics he wants to talk about, and we have a good working relationship. He is no longer actively delusional, although he does have ideas of reference. Interestingly, when we work together on his ideas of reference, he can distinguish amongst their plausibility and will jokingly rate them in percentage to their relation to reality-- usually with a fair degree of accuracy. Humor has emerged to be a crucial component in my work with Benny. It is a way for him to tolerate shared moments without feeling threatened. As with Teresa, moments of humor stand in lieu of, but might be seen as a prelude to, a more abiding sense of closeness to others.

Benny has learned to be careful not to allow himself to act on the basis of his thoughts. Sometimes Benny becomes grave and still in pondering his mind that regularly manufactures false or at least unreliable beliefs. Although I have confidence that he can identify signs of becoming psychotic and that we would have a good chance to intervene to stop further decompensation, it would be more difficult to claim that he is improving in the treatment.

There are some mental health professionals who would emphasize that to stay the course and to help Bennie from getting worse is itself a positive outcome not to be dismissed. Indeed, Bennie's positive symptoms have been well-controlled by the combination of psychotherapy and psychopharmacology. His negative symptoms remain

pronounced: he has been unable to sustain commitments at part-time jobs or to complete college courses.[6]

Benny's daily life is uneventful. He hangs out in the lobby of his building; he has a favorite restaurant in his neighborhood where he eats almost all his meals; he has some social contact with other tenants in his hotel, and he also has a few college friends with whom he keeps up. His parents have moved far away-- to be near his sister who is married to a physician and has one college-aged child. Minute details of interactions with others often become the focus of our sessions. Benny can be profoundly affected by a friendly glance of the check-out woman at the Korean grocery store.

In general, Benny is hyper-sensitive to others. I recall his comment about a bipolar patient of mine whom he heard laughing as she left the office and then observed that she was beginning to cry as she passed in front of him as she exited. Benny is not always so astute in his response to others. The behavior of others swiftly can become the basis of elaborate fantasies, some of which have a distinctly paranoid flavor. He will imagine someone looking at him on the bus and then invent tales of who they are and what they think of him. Benny tends to keep his distance from others; yet, he is also dependent in the relationships

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[6]It remains an option for Benny to try the newer neuroleptic medications that have some success with the negative symptoms of schozophrenia.

he has-- especially the group of mental health workers whom he relies upon to sustain him.[7] He both is afraid of real contact with others and craves it.

Benny is able to be, on occasion, deeply in touch with his unconscious life through his dreams. He has narrated dreams that last for 25 minutes, leaving me overwhelmed and confused by the sheer intensity of the fragmented images. He tends to be more interested in narrating the dreams than he is in interpreting them. He has a rare capacity to be in touch with psychotic parts of himself and to be able to bring them into the treatment.

It is difficult to know how reliable Benny's reports about his relationship to his parents and his early life in general. He regards his mother as intrusive and domineering; his father as unresponsive, but occasionally cold and even hostile. His parents are now in their late eighties. Benny's father has had a series of serious ailments over the last months. It seems that he is dying-- which has been confirmed by Benny's sister. Hence a main focus in the sessions recently has been whether he wants to make the journey in order to ensure that he sees his father before he dies.

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[7]At the moment, Benny sees me two times a week, a social worker one time a week, a psychiatrist once a month, a vocational counselor once a week, and a physical therapist once a week.

Benny has gone back and forth about going to see his father. This has been an important process, in which I have tried to remain neutral, in particular, trying to foster his sense of making the decision. Clearly, a certain wisdom dictates that such a visit could allow for the possibility of a final reckoning as well as to help to anticipate mourning. But Benny is fragile, and he has strong guilt feelings for disappointing his parents, and, furthermore, has complicated and negative feelings about his father as an unsympathetic and malevolent figure.

For most of his adult life, Benny has chosen to remain distant from his parents, so there is something unpredictable how he would cope with a visit that was fraught with emotion. In recent phone calls, Benny has felt disappointed in his father's response to him with seemingly little appreciation for the extent of his father's infirmity. His expectation is governed by a child-like need to receive attention-- exacerbated by his anxiety about his father's health.

Benny cannot react with empathy, not because he does not care, although he is conflicted, but because he has trouble adjusting his reactions. Benny's response to his father's illness has focused primarily on how it is a measure of passing time in his own life. Although Benny has come to the conclusion that he wants to visit his father, he has decided to put off the trip for a few months. He continues to feel anxiety and depression. It is not easy

for Benny-- nor would it be for anyone-- to face a dying parent.

C. Scott

Scott is a forty year old man who grew up in several places in the Midwest and California.[8] His early life was characterized by numerous moves that left him isolated and with few friends.[9] In high school, he started to become truant and to drink and do drugs. In his young twenties, he moved to LA and became a painter and also worked in galleries. He drank and smoked heavily and did lots of drugs. Scott was married for three years, neglecting his wife until eventually she left him to return home to the Midwest. Scott had many casual relationships and a few more serious relationships during these years. As his life in the fast lane became increasingly self-destructive, Scott turned to therapy for help. Scott spent three years in therapy, which helped him to stop abusing substances and led to his decision to move to New York.

Scott has little contact with his family.[10] His father, a fairly successful businessman, was tough, bullying

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[8]Although economically the family was middle-class, Scott was always embarrassed by his parents' taste-- for example, ridiculing that the only reading material in their home is the Readers' Digest.

[9]The reason that the family moved around so much was that his father was a troubleshooter for corporations who would be sent to spend a year or two at different locations.

[10]Scott has not seen his parents since he moved east from LA 7 years ago. He receives letters from his mother a couple

and had disdain for his son's artistic leanings. His father did not go to college himself and thought it was a waste of time for others. Scott describes his mother in generic terms: as a typical 50's housewife who was passive and conventional. He has a younger brother who is gay and has been in a committed relationship for many years.

Scott was particularly close to his paternal grandmother. When he was 6 years old, he was sent to live with her for 2 years-- ostensively because the air in Southern California would be better for his health. (He had a respiratory problem of unknown severity; he now suspects that his mother felt overwhelmed with dealing with him).[11] Scott loved his grandmother and felt loved by her; however, he realized as he started to grow up that she was disturbed. He came to see that she was unreliable as a storyteller, making up that she owned property that he would inherit and that she was friendly with famous people that they would see on TV. She used multiple names, which Scott later ascertained had to do with the fact that she had been married 6 times. She also tried to influence Scott against his mother. Later in life, she traveled around for years staying with acquaintances all over the country without

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of times a year, including Christmas. He has not had contact with his brother in 4 years.

[11]Scott's perception that his mother found him demanding is based upon some key memories of beseeching her to play with him as she ironed or cleaned and having her react by getting fed up, fleeing to the bedroom and shutting the door.

having her own home. This grandmother died alienated from Scott as well as Scott's parents.

Scott had some success in the art world in LA, but he also had some failures, and in his mid-thirties, he decided that what he really wanted to do was to get an education. At the time he entered treatment with me, he had attempted to attend college numerous times without having completed a semester. Scott has been in treatment for 5 years. During that time, he has won two scholarships, several awards, and has spent a year abroad. Interestingly, during his year abroad he formed a relationship with a woman. When he returned to NY and to treatment, he rejected trying to remain in a long-distance relationship.

He has received considerable gratification through his work, and he plans to go on to graduate school when he completes his undergraduate degree later this year. This past year Scott has returned to painting.[12] Moreover, he has become involved in a serious relationship for the first time in many years.[13] Scott also has had a series of "friendships" with older male academics in which their erotic interest in him has not been reciprocated.

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[12]His return to painting is fueled by a omnipotent fantasy that his work will be acclaimed and that he will make money from it, so that he will not need to have a part-time job. The content of his paintings is interesting in light of his early marriage which he tends to idealize retrospectively: a series of stylized paintings of brides.

[13]There is, perhaps, a parallel between his return to painting and his involvement in a relationship.

Scott has a number of ambitious academic plans, including organizing an art exhibition at a museum. At the same time, he has been struggling not to allow incompletes to mount up-- jeopardizing his achievement. Recently, he told the following story: he turned in a paper for an English class to complete the course, which was an accomplishment and also a great relief. The following week he was reading in the library, and he became aware of someone walking by him. The next thing he knew he heard a voice. He looked up to see that it was his English professor who was talking to him, telling him that the paper was excellent and that he had enjoyed reading it. Scott realized that he did not comprehend what was said until later, and he was unable to respond directly, mumbling something that was incoherent.

As Scott sat and thought about the incident, he became aware that at the moment he perceived that the person near him was his professor, he was anticipating criticism-- that he would be told that the paper was inadequate and that the professor was disappointed in his effort. His sense of confusion during the interaction was a product of the conflict between the imagined voice in his head and the external voice. He sees this conflict as having to do with his difficulty in believing in his own success-- even though he had worked hard and deserved it; the internal voice reminded him of his domineering father who he felt never believed in his success and who derided his interest in

education. It is interesting how the professor's praise manages to be blocked, in effect preventing an experience of positive affect. As the patient reflected about the incident after it happened before coming to therapy, he was consumed with worry that he had probably insulted the professor by not responding appropriately, and he also felt vaguely upset at himself. In our session, Scott was able to allow himself gratification with some prompting and to express pride that his work was praised.

This small incident shows a patient whose internal world prohibited the experience of positive affect. The intermingling between (imagined) negative affect and (actual) positive affect was paralyzing. As with Teresa's response to the psychiatrist, this patient was reacting to an imagined attack; his experience might be understood as an outbreak of primary process. But this patient was also able to make sense of the experience, which is the first step in affectivity. Still, he stays with feeling bad when he is by himself-- a victory for his past over his present. With some help in the session, he moves to amend this, resulting in some regret about what happened, but primarily a sense that he ought to feel good. The patient's tendency toward negative affect is entrenched enough to prevent him from having positive affect at first, but not so entrenched that it must be excluded at all cost. The interaction which he reports as a kind of bystander to himself is altered so that he understands the incident and reexperiences it.

There has been an interesting change in Scott's relationship to his own affects over the course of the treatment. Scott is the patient whom I introduced in the first section of the chapter, the patient who was not worried about facing surgery. I recall that at the beginning of the treatment I would be unsure whether he would omit affects because he lacked certain concepts, most notably, sadness, or whether he omitted them because he preferred to avoid/deny what he felt. Scott reminded me of the alexithymic patients that Krystal (1988) describes who often abuse substances as a way to distance themselves from painful affects.[14] Krystal suggests that it is the fear of affects that underlies the failure to be able to acknowledge negative affects, and that coping with negative affects is essential for well-being. In my treatment with Scott, we have focused upon his sense of not being understood by either of his parents as well as his pain (and its lack of recognition) in moving from place to place-- especially his move away from his family to be with his grandmother for 2 years. It is still difficult for him to know and accept what he feels inside of himself.

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[14]Like the patients that Krystal describes, Scott would report one sentence dreams-- without any ability to provide associations. In reference to the term "alexithymia," I share McDougall's (1984) reservations that it lacks evidence as a specific form of pathology. Her description of the "disaffected patient" suits Scott well.

Scott's interest in art also has risen to the fore in therapy. It serves the complex function of allowing him to distance himself and at the same time to process his affects. The painting in which he has a special interest depicts a scene from Homer's Odyssey. The context is Odysseus' famous encounter with the Cyclops, Polyphemos, who savagely gobbles up a few of Odysseus' men. The scene then reveals Odysseus at his best and worst: he restrains himself from acting, devising a resourceful way to save his men and himself. He gets Polyphemos drunk and then blinds him with a huge, sharpened pole-- crawling out of Polyphemos' cave by tying themselves to the underbelly of sheep; so when the blinded Cyclops searches for them, touching the backs of the sheep, they are able to escape. After they have escaped and are about to depart, however, Odyssey yells out to Polyphemos declaring that his name is "Nobody," which provokes Polyphemos to toss a huge boulder that comes close to shipwrecking the boat and jeopardizing their survival.

The painting that Scott is working on represents the precise moment when Odysseus boasts to the Cyclops. Our interpretation of the painting has been ongoing and from multiple angles. First of all, Scott's father, who he experienced as bullying and uncivilized resembles the dangerous Cyclops. This resemblance is confirmed through a quite extraordinary fact that came out in interpreting Scott's relationship to the painting: like the one-eyed Cyclops, Scott's father is blind in one eye (having suffered

an accident as a young man). The Oedipal theme is prominent, since Scott identifies with Odysseus who asserts himself with phallic aggression against Polyphemos. The blinding of Polyphemos, like Oedipus' self-blinding, is a symbolic castration.

However, there is a pre-Oedipal dimension as well: in the background of the painting is a mountain which is exploding, a dangerous breast, which suggests aggression from the mother as well as the father. Moreover, the very title of the painting refers to Odysseus deriding the Cyclops, which indicates the pre-Oedipal theme of omnipotence.[15] The painting resonates for Scott, we discovered together, precisely because it gives expression to the danger he associates with strong affect.

Through the external representation of art, Scott has found a way to observe his inner conflicts. To take this idea one-step further: it is hard to imagine that he would be able to deal with these issues without the symbolism. It is interesting that his intellectuality provides a means for him to be in touch with deep emotional issues.[16] One can

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[15]The oscillation of narcissistic self-esteem is conveyed in the contrast of extremes between "Polyphemos," which means "much-famed" in Greek, and "Nobody," the false name Odysseus gives to himself (the Greek word "Oudos" here is a play on Odysseus' real name). In the treatment, we are starting to address the issue of Scott's narcissism. This was spurred by his reading in psychology and observing that he has narcissistic tendencies.

[16]Intellectuality is often mistakenly assimilated into intellectualization. Intellectuality can be infused with affect and can serve to make affect intelligible, as opposed

better appreciate how Scott might have the sense that it is better not to feel, since feeling is linked to aggression that gets out of control. It is also interesting that Odysseus acts uncharacteristically here; he is usually depicted as someone who gets what he wants through restraint and adhering to a course of moderation. Perhaps the painting provides, not merely a diagnosis, but the basis for a cure.

D) Rob

Rob is a bright and sensitive young man in his mid-twenties who grew up in New England. His family was close. Rob got along with his younger brother, although he is introverted and his brother is extroverted. Rob always has been particularly close with his mother: he remembers coming home from school and sitting down with his mother to tell her about his day while drinking milk and eating cookies. Rob was also a good athlete in high school and continues to run competitively in marathons today.

Rob began therapy because he was depressed after splitting up with his girlfriend of five years.[17] Their

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to being a defense that serves to distance us from our affects. In this instance, the intellectuality is infused with a strongly visual component. There is a kind of unofficial ideology against intellectual communion in psychotherapy that overlooks how it can be used effectively with a patient such as Scott.

[17]Rob went to couples therapy with his girlfriend, and as it seemed that she was determined to leave the relationship, he sought a referral for individual treatment.

relationship started during his freshman year in college--the same year, it turns out, that his parents announced that they were getting divorced. His parents informed him of their decision by flying out together to visit him and discussing their decision. Rob had no idea that his parents were having trouble. One can discern in the family dynamic a mixture of sensitive parenting with a strong pull to suppress all conflict.

Rob reacted to the divorce by throwing himself into activity and commencing his first serious relationship. As therapy got underway, he explored how his present state of feeling depressed was a reactivation of his displaced reaction to his parents' divorce. He came to see that he had much stronger feelings about the divorce than he realized at the time, in particular, that he was quite angry at his father whom he saw as responsible for breaking up the family.

Rob's understanding of how his present state was affected by the past altered his attitude about the breakup of his own relationship. He began to see the situation less as a matter of his girlfriend leaving him, and more a matter of their interests diverging. He was able to acknowledge aspects of his own dissatisfaction in the relationship. He put together a complex interpretation, starting from his flight into a relationship in the face of his parents' divorce, which enabled him not to feel hopeless about relationships and to be a little less involved in the

aftermath of his parents' divorce, but that also served to obscure the range of feelings he had. There was an aspect of an Oedipal victory for him, since he had always been close to his mother, and she turned to him more during and after the divorce. There was also a heightened anxiety that he was really on his own and would have to fend for himself with less protection.

There was and remained real sadness about the breakup of his family: he wept in a session as he realized that leaving home coincided with there being no more home left. Over the next year, this patient underwent a shift from feeling despair about relationships and isolating himself to being sad on occasion, but ready to move ahead in his life. He is now involved in a new relationship that is less symbiotic than the first one. The patient is working on issues about his relationship to his feelings, especially his tendency to drift into how he thinks he should feel, rather than how he really feels.

Two years into therapy, Rob is dealing with his feelings about living together with his girlfriend. He is somewhat ambivalent, which has made his girlfriend more anxious, resulting in tension between them that is hardly unusual as relationships make the transition into becoming more serious. In the context of working on this issue, an incident has come up that has reopened a painful aspect of Rob's life.

Since the divorce, Rob's mother has not gotten involved in a new relationship; she works part-time and is active in the church, but she remains very much involved in her children's lives. Rob's father remarried a few years ago to a younger woman; his father has made an effort to maintain a relationship with him, but Rob feels that it is perfunctory. Rob does not like his stepmother and resents that she controls his father, although he is also critical of his father for allowing her to do so.

During a family gathering which concluded a long weekend together, Rob's father made an announcement in front of Rob and his younger brother (as well as their grandmother and some cousins) that Rob found startling: his father and wife planned to adopt a baby. Rob was aware that they had had the idea of having a child, but thought the matter was resolved when his stepmother had not gotten pregnant. Rob had a negative reaction to how the issue of adopting a child was raised-- just at the conclusion of the gathering, as if to ensure that there would be no discussion, making him feel doubly left out. In therapy, we focused upon the importance of Rob disclosing his feelings to his father. He wrote his father a letter; his father answered promptly with an e-mail-- not responding to what Rob said, but affirming the value in talking and open exchanging their opinions.

No heart-to-heart talk ensued. Rob felt that his father was obliged to be the one to follow up. Neither Rob nor his father made the time to initiate a serious

conversation the next occasion when they got together. Rob began to think that perhaps they had cooled to the idea of adoption. Several months later, Rob received a phone call from his father, explaining that, on short notice, they were leaving to pick up a baby girl to adopt. Although to some extent circumstances were beyond his father's control, Rob felt angry and betrayed. He understands that part of his reaction is irrational: that on some level he knew this might happen, that his father is perfectly entitled to choose to have a new family, and that this need not exclude him. The inception of this new family, however, has meant that Rob is facing anew the demise of his old family. Rob acknowledged both his anxiety of being rejected by his father and being left with his mother.

This experience repeated elements of his parents divorce: that the announcement was precipitous and especially that his father voiced his concern, but did manage to follow through. Rob's negative reaction to his father was exacerbated shortly thereafter when his father called after the baby was at home, but did not have time to talk-- commenting that he had thought Rob would not be at home and had planned to leave a message. The situation is actually more complicated now, as Rob's mother feels aggrieved at her former husband and has not made an effort to conceal that from Rob or his brother.

Rob is clearly sad in therapy, but he also has been withholding some of his true affect about the situation. A

week or so after finding out about the adoption, Rob left for a (scheduled) vacation. His girlfriend was busy, so he was going away by himself-- one of the first vacations he ever took by himself. The trip itself went fine, but on the way home, he suffered from a phobic reaction while flying. He was anxious and distracted during the two take-offs, ruminating about what could go wrong. It was crucial, according to what he was feeling at the time, that his fate was completely out of his hands.

Rob had had a flying phobia before, although this time was worse. We had been successful in reducing his fear about flying, especially after linking his fear of flying to his freshman year in college when his parents got divorced. Rob realized that prior to this, he suffered no fear of flying. Just as he felt that his life was out of his control in an airplane, he felt that the life of his family was out of his control when his parents announced their intention to divorce.

Rob could see that the return of the phobia was precipitated by the painful reminder that his father's new family rekindled from the past. Rob's struggle to achieve autonomy is conveyed in his attempt to go away by himself, only to have a recurrence of his phobia on the flight home-- as he was returning to face negative affects that he had pushed aside during his trip.

3. Discussion

These four cases present a spectrum from severe to mild psychopathology. The first two examples are cases of severe mental illness: Teresa is a low-functioning Borderline and Benny is Schizoaffective. Both of these patients have major psychiatric disorders and have had numerous hospitalizations. Both patients also manifest little capacity for affectivity. Although Teresa's range of affect display is more limited than Benny's, Benny's pathology is more entrenched-- a reflection perhaps of the biological basis of Schizophrenia.

Scott has a history of substance abuse and a diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder. He has been able to free himself from substance abuse, and after a number of years in treatment, his life has started to change significantly for the better. The quality of his relationships is improving. He has begun to channel his considerable intellectual abilities in a productive direction. His ambitions are being realized, although grandiose fantasies continue to obtrude. In the case of Scott, we witness the emergence of affectivity within the course of the treatment itself-- captured in the example of his encounter with the English professor.

Rob has the mildest psychopathology-- an Adjustment disorder with mixed emotional features as well as a phobia. Despite the phobia and his unresolved feelings about his parents' divorce, he is high functioning. He continues to

have academic success; he has a job in which he has been given increased responsibility; he has numerous friends--both acquaintances and close relationships; and he is involved in a stable relationship. It is evident that he brings a high level of affectivity with him to the treatment.

Let us concentrate further on the issue of affectivity in these cases. The range of affect that Teresa displayed was limited and repetitive. Her rage was explosive, and at times, frightening.[18] Her reaction to the court psychiatrist is a reenactment of trauma as well as an intrusion of primary process experience. It is revealing that this patient shows no evidence of having differentiated degrees of anger; nor is she able to regulate her affects. Her rage could flair up and become extreme, but it was virtually a constant in her psychic functioning. Her rage did not merely seem like a hyperbolic form of anger, but a monolithic, dominant presence.

It is highly revealing that even when Teresa expressed positive affect, it was tinged with some negative affect. My experience of laughing and crying offers a glimpse into

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[18]Kohut's (1971) notion of narcissistic rage is relevant here, as this patient's damaged self-esteem leaves her feeling vulnerable, requiring her to keep others at a distance and at times erupting with aggression. I describe an incident that occurred with Teresa in which she got out of her chair and threatened to hit me in my review article of John Steiner's Psychic Retreats (Jurist, 1997). Kohut's use of mirroring in the treatment of such patients influenced my treatment of Teresa.

the inner world of this patient, which was confused and disorganized, suggesting a fragmented sense of agency. Problems in her sense of agency are apparent in the episode with the court psychiatrist: although her wish to be deemed a worthy mother was strong, her behavior insured that she would be assessed as unworthy.

The consequences of Teresa not being able to regulate her affects are real. Her fragmented sense of agency interferes with the prospect of her being able to modulate her affects in relation to others. Teresa displays little indication of possessing affectivity, and it is interesting how much my own affectivity is at issue-- for example, in response to her story about the court psychiatrist and especially in response to meeting her on the street. She is a difficult patient with whom one's own countertransference reactions are powerful and must be utilized in order to infer what she is experiencing.

Teresa does show hints of developing a connection to her therapist. This is a promising sign, in my opinion, that she could develop a measure affectivity in a long-term, ongoing treatment. Whenever a patient exhibits a sense of humor, there is hope, and Teresa had a delightful, if wicked sense of humor. In conclusion, it is worth stressing that the treatment, like Teresa's development itself, was interrupted, as opposed to being a failure.

In trying to think about Benny, there is a striking difference from the case of Teresa. Benny exhibits a range

of affects, as opposed to one dominant affect. He has periods of deep depression, when he sleeps 12-14 hours and barely does anything besides come to therapy. He can be utterly sad when he glimpses the state of his life. He can be quick to anger in response to imagined slights on the streets. But he is able to express positive affects as well. Benny can be warm and concerned to others; he acts tenderly to his nephew; he has activities that he enjoys like listening to music and drawing.

Although Benny has a range of affects, he does not have a high degree of affectivity. He has difficulty regulating positive affects, and he has even more difficulty adjusting affects to fit particular occasions. For example, during a visit with his 3 year old nephew at a restaurant, he was pleased to engage in a game of hide and seek using a menu, but he felt that when the nephew fell asleep shortly thereafter it must have been because he was bored of Benny's company. His anxiety about not being liked and thereby being disregarded is played out with a young child-- without any appreciation that the child's sleepiness might have an independent cause.

Benny's sense of agency is compromised by his tendency to think that others have access to his mind. He has a rich, inner life, which is not defined by a firm boundary between internal and external. His confusion in relationships makes close contact with others to be extremely dangerous and frightening. It is not all

inadvertent that Benny's closest relationships are with mental health professionals. It remains a central concern in therapy to encourage him to form relationships with others. His mind, so engaged with fantasy, makes this difficult. Unlike with Teresa, where indications of connection with her therapist are a sign of progress, there is a danger that Benny's relationship with his therapist and other mental health professionals reinforces his tendency to shy away from other relationships.

Benny is like Teresa, however, in that his capacity for affectivity is limited. Although the development of affectivity can unfold within the relationship with a therapist (which repeats and therefore can be an opportunity to redress aspects of the relationship to the primary caregiver), it is hard to be optimistic about Benny on these grounds. Benny and I have a warm relationship to him and particularly admire his capacity to be articulate himself. But this might not mean that he can attain a higher degree of affectivity. Benny and I share moments of profound sadness about his life; we also share lighter moments together. Humor functions as a fleeting marker between us of potential well-being. His illness prevails, but we are continuing to struggle against its force.

The absence of affect was notable in the early part of Scott's therapy. Not only did he omit affects, but often he did not describe them as part of his experience. At times, he would seem to mislabel his feelings. Not surprisingly,

he had very little overt response in his transference to me. I recall that Scott would politely endure listening to me and then continue as if it was merely an interruption of his own line of thinking. This changed, particularly during breaks for vacations, when Scott reported physical illnesses that we could understand in terms of the treatment as protection against pain.

It was quite important that the treatment resumed after Scott's year abroad: he became more vulnerable, manifested by a new interest in examining the past-- like when he had been sent away and then returned home to his family. Although Scott still did not openly display his affects, I could observe a shift. This shift can be conveyed in the difference between his posture of "I've been feeling pretty good" in the face of a narcissistic rejection to an implicit recognition of his sadness of the narcissistic rejection in feeling alone and confused after being sent away from home at 6 years old.

Scott has trouble identifying his affects, but he is growing to be more interested in understanding his affective experience. He is able to look at his affects more comfortably with the distance that aesthetic objects provide. There also has been evolution in the transference. He registers what I say to a greater degree. The value of therapy for him is conveyed in the way he divides his life into a before and after. Scott does not express positive affect about therapy or me, as is consistent with someone

who would need to block positive affect as he does in the incident with his English professor (His homoerotic impulses have yet to be explored in therapy). Not only has he never asked me a question about myself, he has shown very few signs of having such curiosity. Yet, Scott is now able to express negative transference reactions to me-- like being bothered by interruptions with vacations and occasionally being annoyed by something I've said.

Affectivity has emerged within the course of therapy. Scott is clearly more alive in the way he lives, and I am less bored in sessions. The most concrete proof of Scott's emergent affectivity is that in that he often used to engage in fruitless confrontations in the course of his daily life. The first few years of therapy were filled with antagonistic encounters with others. I recall that in our first session, he described an unpleasant encounter with a security guard, who was talking on the telephone, instead of doing his job, checking the bags of students exiting the library. Scott made an audible comment about his resentment of having to wait around; the result, of course, was that the security guard took his time, they exchanged angry words, and he ended up being delayed further.

Let us compare a recent incident: Scott was crossing the street as a taxi was letting off a passenger in the crosswalk, blocking his way. He gave the driver a dirty look, which prompted the driver to get out of his taxi and start yelling at Scott. Scott had an impulse to return fire

with fire, but he decided it was not worth the effort and walked away. In the second incident, Scott displays affectivity in precisely the manner that the Odyssey recommends in the scene of Odysseus deriding Polyphemos.

Like Odysseus, whom Homer describes as "polytropos" (he is, literally, the man of "many ways"), Scott has options about how he will respond. Scott is also like Odysseus in the sense that the Odyssey is a story that explores the value of home through the pain of being away from home. Here I am verging on an interpretation that goes beyond Scott's self-understanding, revealing my own countertransference interest in this particular work of literature. Although Scott does not exteriorize his transference to me, I would guess that my countertransference interest in the Odyssey is apparent to him. Our mutual interpretation of the Odyssey has been a meeting place in our relationship.

Rob shows the highest degree of affectivity. He came to therapy with this capacity, and thus is able to use the treatment to good effect. Rob's affectivity is revealed in his reassessment(s) of what he felt about his parents' divorce, allowing him to experience his feelings in a more genuine way. He comes to see that he had opted not to experience negative affect in connection with an important event from the past and also to see that it was influencing another important event in the present, and he embraces the ongoing task of reinterpretation.

Rob's recognition that he had warded off feelings of depression has the effect of moving him into new affective experiences. He is able to move from feeling morose to feeling sad in a way that is accompanied by an affirmative sense of self-understanding.[19] His sadness pertains to the demise of both his parents' and his own (first) relationship, but he also came to appreciate that while he had no control over what happened with his parents, the end of his own relationship was neither out of his control nor opposed to his real wishes. As he came to accept what he felt, his sense of agency has been enhanced. An overall sense of gloom less lessened.

There is still room for growth in Rob's capacity for affectivity. He has a tendency not to allow his affects to emerge freely, leading on occasion to countertransference responses where I am aware of putting more affect into my voice, as if to provide examples of immediate affective reactions and to compensate for his low-keyed responses.[20]

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[19]Sadness is an affect that can be regarded as a developmental achievement. For example, Melanie Klein's depressive position occurs when a child is able to see the mother as a whole object, i.e.. as differentiated from him/herself, and thus experiences her absence as a loss. The distinction between sadness and depression is, I think, important to uphold-- marking a difference between the normal and the pathological, but also highlighting that not all negative affects are equally undesirable. It can feel good to be sad, while the same cannot be said about being depressed (although it might feel comfortable because it is familiar). The work of Samuel Beckett is preoccupied with discerning the boundary between sadness and depression.

[20]It has been an issue between Rob and his current girlfriend that he is not demonstrative enough. He has a

The meaning of such interactions has not yet been explored in the treatment.

The affectivity that Rob does exhibit in coming to terms with his parents' divorce and the impact in his life is under stress with the fresh reminder that his own nuclear family has dissolved when his father begins to constitute a new family. This does not contradict his achievement of affectivity; rather, it highlights that even with someone who has affectivity, circumstances can temporarily undermine affectivity or at least make it difficult to sustain.

Indeed, affectivity can break down at the moment when the impact of a strong affect is felt. Normally affectivity requires gaining some perspective, which in the heat of the moment can be unavailable for anyone. It is certainly possible to acquire affectivity in situations where one previously lacked it, but it would imprudent to fail to heed how much of a struggle it can be to maintain it. In drawing attention to our ability to craft our affects, I am not disputing what psychologists and neuroscientists have emphasized and what we know from common sense-- that we often feel that affects happen to us. My point is that this is not the complete story, and that it is mistaken to minimize that we can affect what we feel and, in addition,

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mixed reaction to this: on the one hand, he feels that it is alien to his personal style to be expressive; on the hand, he sees that he disavows what he feels, concluding that he would like to be able to communicate better with his affects.

that psychotherapy can serve to develop and enhance affectivity.[21]

4. Pathology and Affectivity

In this last section, I want to be more specific about affectivity, particularly what we have learned about pathology and affectivity. Problems in affectivity are apparent in different degrees and different senses in the above cases. Three categories of pathology can be derived: 1) excessive negative affect; 2) absence of affect; and 3) dysregulation of affect. These categories ought to be understood as provisional; they are not offered as replacements for familiar and well-established categories. However, since I am introducing new categories, I will make some attempt to describe them in relation to the official psychiatric disorders. My aim here will be to demonstrate that affectivity is at issue across a wide range of pathologies. It is also my hope that our attention to pathologies of affectivity will contribute to a better understanding of healthy affectivity.

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[21]Although I am less suspicious about introspection than theorists like Ekman or LeDoux, there is a legitimate issue about distortion in memory over time. My response is that arguments about how likely we are to be mistaken fail to address the critical question of whether it is possible to work on our self-representation to make it more reliable.

A. Excessive Negative Affect

Excessive negative affect can be seen at several points in the case material. Teresa's predilection to feel intense rage is one example. It is critical that she shows no signs of being able to feel negative affect in a moderate degree. What renders her negative affect excessive is precisely that it occurs without respect to specific situations. It is also relevant that Teresa is uncomfortable with positive affect-- when it occurs, it is accompanied by aggression.

Benny also experiences excessive negative affect. He can conjure malevolent motivation on the part of others where it seems highly doubtful. He also goes through periods of depression that makes the simplest of life tasks difficult to carry out. Although Benny's depression has some basis in the reality of his life, his negative evaluation can take on a life of its own-- leaving him feeling that his life is without meaning.

A different form of excessive negative affect is evident with Rob. The fear that underlies Rob's flying phobia is a form of excessive negative affect. The excessiveness of the fear is apparent in his recent flight in which he kept feeling that there was something wrong with the airplane. Rob also suffered depression after breaking up with his first girlfriend, although to a milder degree than Benny. He has a tendency to shut down in the face of things not going his way-- for example, in the way he avoids confronting his father. It is interesting that in Rob's

case his excessive negative affect serves to inhibit his behavior-- as opposed to Teresa's case in which her excessive negative affect is explosive.

Depression is probably the most common kind of excessive negative affect. When one is depressed, things look worse than they are. This can be a temporary state, as in major depression, or it can be constant, as in dysthymia. Depression can be cyclical as well, as in bipolar disorders. Regardless, depression commonly brings a weightiness of spirit, which makes it difficult to manage to sustain positive affect. Thus, excess in negative affect is bound to infringe upon positive affect. To regard excessive negative affect in terms of the absence of positive affect borders on our next category, the absence of affect.

B. Absence of Affect

The absence of affect can have two distinct meanings. It can mean that the person simply lacks affect or it can mean that the person fails to recognize affect. In the first instance, it is possible that someone does not have certain affects, for example, because of a lack of differentiation or because of neurological disorder. It is significant that neither Teresa nor Benny seem to possess the capacity for empathy, an affect that depends upon boundaries between self and other and fathoming the intentionality of others.

In the second instance, it is possible that someone does not register what he/she is feeling. Scott falls in this category. He has genuine trouble identifying what he feels and has lived his life omitting certain affects. As we have discussed, this seems to reflect the degree of pain associated with such affects, resulting in his impoverished subjective experience. Through psychotherapy, Scott has acquired an interest in his own affect states. At times, he wavers and is inclined to doubt the validity of his affects. But he has learned that trying not to feel what he does feel is not a successful option.

In Rob's case, we see a variation of the absence of affect. In his reaction to the news about his father adopting a baby, part of his initial reaction was to shrug it off as no big deal. He had a similar tendency for a long time about his parents' divorce. The minimization of affect resembles the absence of affect, insofar one distances oneself from an unwanted affect. The difference lies in that minimizing affects requires the use of defenses in order to distort and deny the original affective experience.

An implication here is that the minimization of affect is mediated by the ego in a way that is not the case with the absence of affect. It is possible, furthermore, that the minimization of affects can be adaptive in some instances. In contrast, it seems improbable that the

absence of affect could be adaptive.[22] The absence of affect is sometimes described as alexithymia, which, as I've observed, is not a well-substantiated diagnostic category. The absence of affect is consistent with Schizoid personalities; the blunting of affect in Schizophrenia, which can be organic, also would fall in this category. The minimization of affect seems more akin to Adjustment disorders and to neurotic character structures.

C. Affect Dysregulation

The capacity to minimize affects has to do with the movement of affects within us and thereby points us in the direction of our third category of pathologies of affectivity, affect dysregulation. Affect dysregulation means that one does not experience affects to an appropriate degree. "Appropriate" refers to what is fitting for the particular individual in the particular circumstance, rather than to the approval of society. Teresa and Benny both exhibit a striking inability to regulate their affects well. Teresa could become filled with intense rage at the drop of a hat. Moreover, when Teresa exhibits rage in front of the psychiatrist, it is quite different from her do so in a session with me. Problems with affect dysregulation are

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[22]An exception might be dissociation during moments of trauma.

characteristic of Borderline pathology, particularly disproportionate rage.

At this point in Benny's life, he acts out less than he did when he was younger. Still, he ascribes meaning to small encounters that become grossly distorted in his mind; although he can be aware that they may not be real, he cannot keep himself from ruminating on them. The closer the interaction between Benny and others, the harder it is for him to modulate his affective reactions. With Benny, excessive negative affect and affect dysregulation converge as he sits for hours and days and now years in stony silence on the benches of Broadway malls.

Affect dysregulation often has its origins in early childhood.[23] This notion follows what has been said in Chapter III about affect regulation: affect regulation emerges through the development of a sense of agency, and it also fosters the further development of agency. Affect dysregulation opposes, rather than affirms agency. It is implausible to think that agency could flourish with affect dysregulation.

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[23]It is important to emphasize that with Benny, there is no evidence that affect dysregulation is rooted in his childhood experience. Teresa's affect dysregulation is more likely tied to the abuse she suffered. There is controversy over links between borderline personality and abuse; there is also controversy whether borderline phenomena can be traced back to moments in development-- like the rapprochement crisis (Bach, 1985; Adler & Buie, 1979; Settlage, 1977).

Affect dysregulation is one of three varieties of pathologies of affectivity, defined by the quality of appropriateness. However, it is possible to argue that affect dysregulation is more fundamental, that it is implicated in all pathologies of affectivity. Excessive negative affect and absence of affect are ultimately forms of inappropriate affects-- the first as too much and the second as too little. From such a perspective, affect dysregulation has an overarching meaning.

Whether one conceives of affect dysregulation in the narrow or broad sense, it indicates the failure of affect regulation-- which manifests itself in a number of ways and degrees. In this chapter, problems with affectivity have been studied in four cases; we have followed such problems as a current that runs through various pathologies. Indeed, the importance of affectivity is confirmed by its ubiquitousness as a factor in so many different mental disorders.

Let us utilize our findings about pathologies of affectivity with a view towards understanding the implications for health. With excessive negative affect, negative affect prevails and positive affect is inaccessible; thus, a balance between negative and positive affect does not exist.[24] Having a balance of both positive

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[24]One might wonder about excessive positive affect in this connection-- such as exists in mania. It could be a category unto itself or it could be assimilated under the

and negative affect is necessary for well-being. We need not construe this too literally-- as entailing the arbitrary assumption that negative and positive affect ought to balanced in a 50/50 way. The point is that it is optimal to have room for both kinds of affect.

The problem with absence and minimization of affect is that they are inconsistent with a proper identification of affects. Once again, it is not easy to imagine a happy life without the ability to know what one is feeling. Finally, affect dysregulation indicates a failure-- as Aristotle would put it-- to feel the right thing to the right person at the right time in the right way. Affect dysregulation obviously can be juxtaposed to the essential ability to craft our affects according to our wishes. If affect regulation abets the growth of a sense of agency, we can say that affect dysregulation interferes with it.

Healthy affectivity involves movement within the agent. This movement within is freely chosen; it avoids the extremes of too much rigidity or too much fluidity. Healthy affectivity requires familiarity and comfort with one's own affects. There is an inherent desirability of positive affect and an inherent undesirability of negative affect, although embrace of the former does not mean distancing oneself from the latter.

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category of affect dysregulation.

Let us describe healthy affectivity in concrete, if fanciful terms. Affectivity can move the furious person to be mildly annoyed, so that the basis of one's anger can be communicated to another in a way that the other can hear it, and possibly respond to it by becoming placating or at least accepting. It can move the person aching with despair to feeling down, but clear-sighted. It can move the person paralyzed by anxiety to having just enough anxiety to perform well. And it can also move the person satisfied, but depleted to unmitigated joy. With affectivity, we push the boundary of being human to become more human.

V: PSYCHOANALYSIS AS SCIENCE AND HERMENEUTICS

The history of psychoanalysis told from a psychoanalytic point of view would be a lively narrative.[1] Indeed, understanding the boundaries of the psychoanalytic world-- internal and external-- would make for an especially rich focus of inquiry. For most of its history, psychoanalysis has existed in an insulated world, occasionally manifesting interest in, but not often engaging directly in the debates of the academic world. The reasons for this history are complex and, in their origins, are imposed as much as they are chosen. In this context, I shall not attempt the daunting task of coming to terms with this legacy, although I do wish to stress the importance of critical self-reflection about the history of psychoanalysis in order to understand and confront the present scene.

I also wish to emphasize how imperative it is now for psychoanalysis-- as it faces an uncertain future-- to be responsive to other spheres of knowledge. Whether it is an injustice or not, psychoanalysis is widely held in declining esteem.[2] There are two responses to this point of view.

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[1]Eli Zaretsky is presently engaged in writing such a history.

[2]It is important to distinguish among different realms-- viz. how psychoanalysis is regarded, in general, by the public and in the media, as an institution, as a form of treatment, and as a theory. My focus in this context is upon the latter two.

The first is to claim that psychoanalysis is misunderstood, and perhaps also to surmise that its critics are threatened by it-- thus attempting to minimize the significance of how psychoanalysis is regarded by others. The second alternative is to take seriously the need for psychoanalysis to partake in current debates, and especially to seek to vindicate its beliefs in relation to the beliefs of others.[3] My sympathies are with the latter response. Although I make the claim in this my project that psychoanalysis offers the deepest way to conceptualize the relationship between affects and agency, I have also maintained that psychoanalysis must integrate knowledge about affects and agency from other disciplines, especially scientific ones. In particular, empirical research from psychology and neuroscience provide a necessary basis upon which to build a theory of affects.

In this concluding chapter, I shall argue that the main topic of affects and agency provides a useful basis to confirm the sense in which psychoanalysis is both science and hermeneutics.[4] This position is intended to stake out ground that avoids one-sided extremes-- either that psychoanalysis ought to aspire exclusively to become a science or that it is merely an artifact of modernity and as

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[3]Strenger (1991) makes a similar point, stressing the need for psychoanalysis to look for "external coherence."
[4]Strenger (1991), Holt (1989), and Gedo & Pollock (1976) also defend this view.

such is bound by (ethnocentric) interpretation. The view that psychoanalysis is both science and hermeneutics has the virtue of inclusiveness, but it also runs the risk of displeasing everyone. Nevertheless, I believe that it captures what is most distinctive about psychoanalysis.

1. Science and Psychoanalysis

There are numerous questions that can be raised concerning the relationship between psychoanalysis and science. The most pertinent question that comes to mind is whether psychoanalysis has or ought to aspire to have the status of being a science. It would follow that to the extent that psychoanalysis is not a science, we should strive to make it more scientific; more specifically, that it is important to seek to establish scientific validity for basic concepts that belong to psychoanalytic theory.

Of course, there have always been some psychoanalysts who bring an interest in science to the subject, and, in particular, have concerned themselves with promoting the testing of psychoanalytic ideas. In this connection, it is worth recalling that Freud himself always remained invested in thinking of psychoanalysis as a science.[5] Although he abandoned his attempt in the Project for a Scientific

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[5]It ought to be acknowledged that Freud found Leonardo (and Goethe) compelling because they were both artists and scientists.

Psychology (1895), his reason was that the venture was premature, rather than impossible.[6] Today there are a growing number of psychoanalytic psychologists for whom empirical research is of paramount concern.[7] Still, there remain many difficult issues about the testability of psychoanalytic theory and practice.[8] The scientific status of psychoanalysis is unresolved and presents too large of a question to tackle as part of my conclusion.

Another related, but smaller question about psychoanalysis and science can be addressed. This question concerns the nature of the obligation that psychoanalysis has to take account of scientific knowledge. Here we must recall that Spezzano (1993) has argued that psychoanalysis ought to be free not to look to other fields in justifying its theory of affects. My project indicates otherwise: that the current state of scientific knowledge is crucial for

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[6]Hartmann (1959) stresses this point about the Project. Freud's lukewarm response to the American psychologist Saul Rosenzweig's proposal about testing psychoanalytic ideas can be read more as a statement against experimental work that is naive theoretically than as a statement against research itself (See Gay, 1988, p. 523. The letter from Freud to Rosenzweig was written on 2/28/34).

[7]It is hard to judge whether psychoanalysts in general have a strong interest in making psychoanalysis scientific. For one thing, the success of the relational model has developed in close association with a hermeneutic view of psychoanalysis (See Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983).

[8]Grunbaum (1984) makes the strongest statement that psychoanalytic concepts are not testable and hence that it impossible for psychoanalysis to attain the status of being a science. A basic problem with Grunbaum is that he relies on Freud's notion of treatment and makes no attempt to take account of current standards of clinical practice.

psychoanalysis. In fact, I would argue that to ignore it dooms psychoanalysis to irrelevance.

I want to be as precise as possible about what I mean. I am not suggesting that psychoanalysis must bow before science as to a supreme authority. Psychoanalysis is free to posit theories that do not rest on a sound scientific basis as well as to question and/or doubt the applicability of scientific knowledge; but what psychoanalysis is not free to do is to opt not to respond to scientific knowledge, where it exists, that bears on its theory.

What we are learning (and will continue to learn) about the brain needs to be acknowledged by psychoanalytic theory. For example, the notion that affects form a primary response to the world is given refinement and specificity in neuroscientists' ideas about the two emotional response systems in the brain. Progress is also being made about the interaction between affects and cognition. Neuroscientists have also offered support for the unconscious processing of affects. It is more difficult to say whether research confirms or disconfirms primary process experience.

Primary process, defined in terms of the pleasure principle, fits best with the so-called "dimensions" view of affects. The dimensions view is a counter to the main paradigm, the basic emotions view. Some psychologists have argued that what is basic about affects is the unformed positive and negative dimensions-- like pleasure/unpleasure, approach/withdrawal. Utilizing the material about

regulation and the unfolding of agency from Chapter III, it is possible to maintain both the basic emotions and dimensions view. More specifically, we can hypothesize that the infant experiences the dimensions of pleasure and unpleasure prior to experiencing basic emotions. Basic emotions require the input of a caregiver in order to be recognized as such. In a manner of speaking, dimensions transmogrify into basic emotions. However, we ought to be cautious about such a hypothesis. It is possible, for example, that it will turn out that both dimensions and basic emotions coexist-- as opposed to basic emotions replacing dimensions.

My point is that it is not necessary to construe the basic emotions view as opposed to the view that the dimensions of pleasure and unpleasure are fundamental. Some psychoanalytically- oriented developmental theorists like Emde and Stern have expressed their agreement with the basic emotions view. But, unfortunately, they do not contend with the implications of adopting the basic emotions views for the dimensions view. To uphold the basic emotions view in and of itself does not mean that psychoanalysis ought to give up the dimensions view, although we must also acknowledge that insufficient evidence exists in support of the dimensions view. Freud's intuition about pleasure as constituting difficult terrain remains true.

Regulation is one area in which psychoanalytic ideas about affects and scientific ideas are dovetailing in an

interesting way. Schore's work is an example of how psychoanalysis not only can benefit from scientific literature, but can offer something in return. Indeed, the notion of regulation provides proof that there is more to say about affects than is described by the basic emotions view. The growing interest in regulation in psychology is following the psychoanalytic lead.

The subjective experience of affects is discounted in much of the neuroscience literature-- with the important exception of Edelman who ascribes adaptive value to it. My conclusion, thus, about the scientific study of affects is that it offers a necessary, but insufficient condition for our understanding. In order to complete our understanding of affects, we must look to the theme of agency, which, I shall argue, demands hermeneutic understanding.

2. The Ineliminability of Hermeneutics in Psychoanalysis

From science, we know that affects form a primary response system and we are acquiring a deeper understanding of how affects and cognition intersect in their functioning. We are also learning about affects as part of our capacity for self-regulation. However, the subjective experience of affects has not been studied extensively. Ought we assume that the study of the subjective experience of affects is impossible? First, I would observe that the study of regulation has to involve at least some attention to

subjective experience. Yet, the difficulty of such study deserves recognition. In my opinion, the subjective experience of affects ineluctably means that there is a hermeneutic dimension of affects.

The study of affects is not exhausted by regarding them as states produced and manifested externally. Affects must be construed in terms of having meaning to an agent. The meaning of affects might have its source in basic emotions, but is altered according to culture, the values of one's family, and individual idiosyncrasies. In other words, there is a radical particularity that defines the subjective experience of affects. Subjective experience can be rendered intelligible; nonetheless, there are serious limitations concerning its generalizability. Scientific explanation relies upon what is universal; insofar as we can imagine research that is designed to be sensitive enough to register individual differences, it still could not inform us about the meaning of such experience.

The scientific literature about affects is particularly focused upon helping to understand how one identifies an affect. It relies upon the presumption that when we feel an affect, it is more or less the same regardless who one is. This forms a valuable and worthy path of inquiry-- the only point in contention is whether there is more that needs to be said. Over and beyond the issue of identifying an affect is the question of what it means to the person who has it, how he/she reacts, and, ultimately, to what extent is the

affect shaped according to the sense of agency that belong to the person.

Once one takes seriously that affects are experienced by agents, it is evident that interpretation is a crucial part of the process. In invoking interpretation, we are approaching the issue of what distinguishes a hermeneutic view, but we are also opening up a wealth of philosophical problems and divergent perspectives. The hermeneutic position can be characterized in terms of the belief that interpretation of mental phenomena necessarily differs from explanation in the natural sciences.[9] The argument goes that explanation in the natural sciences concerns the relation between cause and effect, whereas understanding the mind is different. Intentionality-- the property that defines the mind (or consciousness)-- does not conform to the law-like relation of cause and effect, and thus requires interpretation. Indeed, interpreting the mind involves reasons, rather than causes.

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[9]The hermeneutic position was originally introduced to psychoanalysis by Habermas (1971) and Ricoeur (1970); it was developed further by Spence (1982). The hermeneutic position first became influential within psychoanalysis in connection with the attack on metapsychology by Gill, G. Klein, and Schafer and others. Although at the time, this interjected a healthy antidote to dogmatic tendencies within psychoanalytic theory, Schafer's work, in particular, is guilty of throwing out the baby with the bathwater. His concession that psychoanalysis is not scientific is formulated without attention to counterargument. For a reflective discussion of issues about metapsychology, which, in particular, challenges the realism inherent in Schafer's position and offers alternative positions from the philosophy of science, see Ellman & Moskowitz (1980).

Interpretation can be understood from a number of different vantage points. One point of view, associated with the philosopher Donald Davidson (1984, 1980) and recently applied to psychoanalysis by Marcia Cavell (1993), emphasizes that although mental phenomena elude the kind of causality that is found in nature, we should not thereby assume that reasons cannot be causes.[10] As Davidson (1980) observes, while causal explanations do entail that strict causal laws links cause and effect, this does not mean that we know what the laws are. An implication is that it is mistaken to think that because our understanding of mental phenomena is based upon reason, they cannot be linked to causal explanations.

Cavell (1993) develops this further, maintaining that in understanding psychological states, we need to turn to reasons, because we are interested in justification-- that is, why it makes sense to feel or act a certain way. However, reasons are, in fact, a species of causes. Interpretation depends upon using our knowledge of what it is like to be a human being. This renders the enterprise distinct from the natural sciences, since we do not know what it is like to be a flower or a bug.[11]

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[10]While the Davidson/Cavell view can be assimilated to a hermeneutic one for our purposes, they are inclined to distinguish their view from those who refer to themselves as hermeneutic for reasons that will become clear.

[11]This argument was put forward by Thomas Nagel in his article, "What Is It Like To Be a Bat" (1974); also see Nagel (1986).

From the Davidson/Cavell standpoint, the reliance of psychoanalysis upon interpretation means that its conclusions can only be probabilistic. Hence, psychoanalysis must rest content to be a soft science. They argue strenuously, however, that this view of interpretation does not force us into relativism. They offer an expanded concept of rationality, wherein even our disagreements or misunderstandings suppose the web of common belief that language imposes on thought. They also affirm that interpretation can improve, converging toward objectivity. Although they do not believe that interpretation is always rational, they do believe that insofar as irrationality occurs, it represents a tear in the fabric of rationality.[12]

It is possible to juxtapose the Davidson/Cavell view of interpretation to two, other hermeneutic positions. One position, which can be labeled post-structuralist, is unabashedly relativistic: that since meaning is indeterminate, the relation between the signifier and signified must be arbitrary.[13] The result is that

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[12]Cavell (1993) maintains that irrationality is a failure, not an absence of rationality. She sees affects as involving attitudes toward propositions and thus as a part of rationality. Although she acknowledges the existence of mental states that are non-propositional, she underestimates their importance. The value of Cavell's work is to introduce psychoanalytic thinking to debates within analytic philosophy, but her version of psychoanalysis would not be accepted by psychoanalysts. For a critique of Cavell, see Whitebook (1996).

[13]There are a number of theorists whose views can be included under the umbrella of post-structuralism, like Deleuze, Lyotard, Foucault and Derrida. However,

interpretation in its very nature is inscrutable and, even science is understood in terms of being one discourse, amongst others. Moreover, there is no reason to have confidence that incommensurability-- among individuals or cultures-- can be overcome.

Another view, associated with German philosophers like Gadamer and Habermas, is that interpretation relies upon frameworks of meaning, so that it is best regarded as a matter of consensus.[14] Interpretation entails making evaluations that can be better or worse, vague or precise. According to this view, the quality of interpretation can improve, although this is not automatic. This view shares a commitment with psychoanalysis that better interpretations are a product of exploring the depth and complexity of self-understanding.

These two hermeneutic positions avoid the implied complacency of the Davidson/Cavell view. The Davidson/Cavell view captures the sense in which affects are universal and belong to human beings as such. The other

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post-structuralism is not a unified movement as much as it is a description of a generational change in French philosophy. For clear expositions of the post-structuralism position, especially in relation to other hermeneutic positions, see Frank (1989) and Dews (1987).

[14]There are tensions between the views of Gadamer and Habermas, which are expressed in their debate in the volume Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik. Gadamer emphasis is upon consensus as provided by the background of tradition, whereas Habermas sees consensus as a product of intersubjective agreement (for example, as among the community of scientific researchers).

hermeneutic positions address the sense in which cultures create distinct affective worlds. Cultural differences are real, and it is important not to underestimate obstacles in mutual understanding. Poststructuralists remain suspicious that such differences can be overcome, while contemporary German philosophers affirm that with self-reflection and dialogue, we are likely to make progress.

In claiming a central role for interpretation, the hermeneutic views that we have discussed concur on one point: that there is a parallel between understanding human beings and understanding texts. In the hermeneutic view, we can detect an appreciation for the radical particularity that defines our experience of affects-- especially affectivity.

3. Future Directions for Research

In supporting the relevance of both science and hermeneutics, we come to the realization that we do not need to conceive of them as mutually exclusive. Although I have presented arguments for both scientific and hermeneutic aspects of psychoanalysis, what I have not done is to attempt to show in what sense they are connected. It is fair to speculate that science offers parameters for our understanding of the relationship between affects and agency, and that hermeneutics provides nuances and subtlety. However, this is really a nod in the direction of an answer,

rather than an answer itself; a more complete description of the boundaries between the scientific and hermeneutic view and a sense of how they fit together awaits further reflection.

A fruitful area to develop my work is the concept of affectivity. So far, I have suggested that this concept comes into being as a generalized capacity for affect regulation. Many questions remain about how this occurs. The movement in my argument went from tracing affect regulation and self-regulation in theories of early development to affectivity within the clinical setting for adult functioning. It is likely that a more detailed description of developmental stages, as Erikson (1950) offers, could help us have a better sense of how affectivity emerges. It will be worthwhile, at the minimum, to examine regulation in the latency and adolescent periods.

In addition, it will be important to explore the topic of pathologies of affectivity further. The categories of excessive negative affect, absence of affect, and affect dysregulation have their origin in clinical observation; it is unclear whether they are tied to distinct developmental moments and/or actual kinds of experience. Gergely and I (forthcoming) are engaged in investigating pathological responses in affective mirroring, eg. when the parental mirroring fails to be marked or is characteristically unrelated to the felt experience of the infant.

While affectivity is a promising idea, its status must be regarded as tentative until we understand better how affects can be crafted within. The fact that we can craft some affects must be reconciled with the fact that affects can be unconscious and that some affects are less amenable to alteration than others. A series of questions comes to mind. Are there some affects that are, in fact, unresponsive to being modulated? Do we need to distinguish the process of making an unconscious affect conscious and the process of altering a conscious affect to be in accord with our sense of agency? Is there a difference within the category of altering affects between softening/heightening an affect and analyzing an affective experience into its constitutive parts? More concretely, if someone is able to move from feeling rage to anger, will that person be able to see that the anger has aspects of anxiety and disappointment?

Finally, what are the conditions on affectivity with respect to time? Is it realistic to expect that affectivity can occur contemporaneously with the experience of the affect? If there needs to be a cooling off phase, how long ought that to last? Can we assume that the faster one attends to crafting one's affects, the better the result? These are difficult questions-- to which it is certainly possible to hope for empirical answers.

Another area for future research concerns the psychoanalytic assumption that infant functioning persists

in normal adult functioning. One way of describing how this occurs is in terms of regression-- that under some conditions, a person's functioning will retreat into primary process or being infantile. An alternative would be that infant functioning is preserved at all times, so that if one learns to be sensitive to one's inner states, they can be discerned. The difference between these views has to do, in part, with intuitions about whether childlike behavior in adults is pathological or not.

The question of what it means to claim that there is an enduring influence of childhood in adult functioning needs to be refined. In connection to my project, we can wonder whether it is the kind of affect or the context in which it is expressed (or a combination of both) that determines its childlike quality. Often we think of primitive affects as undesirable, but does this mean that it is the heedless manifestation of primitive affects that is unhealthy in adults or do we imagine there is an appropriate time and place for them to emerge? A variation of this question is whether it is always preferable <u>not</u> to act on the basis of a primitive affect. I am not sure how to resolve these questions, but any answer will need to reconcile that, on the one hand, we have the expectation that adults can and should modulate their affects, and, on the other hand, we often admire people who are in touch with and can express their affects.

A key premise contained in my project is that affect regulation is formative in terms of one's style of adult functioning. This assumption is plausible according to most psychoanalytic perspectives, but it is one that requires more substantiation. As I have acknowledged, the movement from Chapter III to Chapter IV is a jump that deserves to have more attention and justification that I have provided so far.

The unruliness of these questions suggest the degree to which we are still at an early stage of understanding the relationship between affects and agency. Some of these questions are not difficult to imagine being operationalized; others would not be easily rendered in a testable form. A fitting endpoint is to affirm that progress in psychoanalysis will be expedited insofar as we are cognizant of developments in other fields.

4. Conclusion

The success of this project lies in establishing that there is an integral connection between affects and agency. A consequence of this point is that the study of affects in isolation of agency will necessarily be insufficient. Such study has a value, but it does not inform us about what is most compelling about affects. At the end of Chapter I, I conclude that turning to examine how affects influence agency takes us to a deeper level of understanding.

A more precise formulation of this project is that affects contribute to the unfolding of a sense of agency, and an enhanced sense of agency enables us to experience new and more differentiated forms of affects. In Chapter II, I depict three stages of the evolution of agency: pre-agency, agency proper, and self-conscious agency. The mechanism of affective mirroring, which spurs self-regulation, is particularly important in grounding the tie between affects and agency. Although I believe that a sense of agency is impossible without an affective component, it is mistaken to assume that affects always contribute in a friendly way to agency. Affects can be at odds with a sense of agency, and the fact that we acquire differentiated affects certainly does not mean that we are no longer privy to primitive affects.

There is also the issue of whether unconscious affects are antithetical to agency. As I suggested in the Introduction, it is not as paradoxical as it might seem to recognize that a sense of agency entails acknowledgment of the limitations of agency. Agency does not necessarily include the attribute of self-transparency. This is perhaps a revelation to philosophers, but not to psychoanalysts. The strong tendency to limit agency to rationality that is still found in the philosophical tradition is challenged by the affirmation of the integral relation between affects and agency.

My view of the relationship between affects and agency is not offered as a revolution in psychoanalytic theory. In one sense, I am simply offering a sharper conceptualization of familiar themes. The importance of this conceptualization is that it draws from interdisciplinary sources-- from psychology and neuroscience about affects and from philosophy about agency. In another sense, however, my project makes a distinctive contribution in introducing the concept of affectivity in Chapter III.

Affectivity denotes a sphere of experience in which one processes what one feels; through affectivity, a person is able to use his/her affects in order to achieve well-being. In demonstrating affectivity in the clinical realm, my aim has been to take the concept from abstraction down to everyday experience. By observing various failures of affectivity, it is possible to acquire a better sense of what it means to have affectivity in a healthy way. As I acknowledged in the last section, I would like to develop the concept of affectivity further.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate my concern about the tendency of psychoanalysis to isolate itself as a discipline; thus, I have tried to promote the idea that psychoanalysis will profit from looking outside of itself to other fields for inspiration. This admonition is valid for all psychoanalytic perspectives. The Freudian view probably has had greater sympathies with science, while the relational view has tended to validate the hermeneutic view.

Both of these psychoanalytic orientations have been guilty of engaging in intramural quarreling-- which obstructs progress.

It is a unique feature of psychoanalysis that its range of concerns embraces scientific and hermeneutic thought. There are strong cultural forces at work that encourage the polarization between the two. Indeed, in our culture, these spheres of knowledge are becoming increasingly divided. There is a constructive role for psychoanalysis to play in mitigating this polarization. Psychoanalysis has the prospect, at least, of exemplifying that the two spheres are not necessarily opposed. The very refusal to take sides in the scientific/hermeneutic divide is itself a notable intellectual and political position.

Psychoanalysis ought to aspire to become more scientific and to utilize scientific knowledge where it is relevant. At the same time, psychoanalysis exists within a socio-cultural framework: it came into being in connection with the problems of modernity, and it grew in importance as these problems deepened and there were fewer social institutions to contend with them.

Yet, psychoanalysis no longer holds the position of prominence it once held within our culture. It is possible to infer from this that psychoanalysis has become less relevant than it was once. I think this would be mistaken. But psychoanalysis needs to continue to evolve in order to be able to address the state of our culture more astutely.

Psychoanalysis must embrace the ongoing task of self-reflection and the challenge of responding to extrinsic standards.

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