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OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE.

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AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE SOCIAL PERCEPTION
OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

by

BEATRICE J. KRAUSS

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate
Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor
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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE SOCIAL PERCEPTION
OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

by

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Social psychological research on the topic of "equity" concentrates on the distribution of money in one to one interactions in laboratory settings. Political theorists such as Rawls (1971) and Nozick (1974) have developed outlines of "distributive justice" which incorporate variables not often studied in the psychological laboratory such as power, opportunity, respect, and rights. Rawls, for example, has suggested a hierarchical ordering of the rules of distribution with the equal distribution of rights being prepotent. Deviations from the equal distribution of other social goods are morally justified only under certain conditions: for example, to increase the extent of liberty for all or to increase material benefits to those in greatest need insofar as this does not jeopardize liberty.

Rawls' theory and the reaction to it (e.g., Nozick, 1974) suggest that psychology could benefit from a broader perspective on questions of distributive justice. In the present investigation, 160 college students and lawyers in New York, Texas and Georgia rated 64 vignettes on eight semantic

differential scales. The 64 vignettes represented combinations of two sources of distributive rules (rulers and citizens), four types of benefits to be distributed (wealth, rights, opportunity and power, respect) and eight distributive rules (distribution according to ability, need, effort, desire, status, intent to promote greater good, equal division and random distribution). The data were analyzed by three mode factor analysis to yield scale, item, and person or viewpoint dimensions. The interaction of factors, that is, the way different persons viewed the items on the scale dimensions were designated as "viewpoint dimensions."

Two scale dimensions were obtained, an evaluative dimension (fair, good vs. unfair, bad) and a control dimension (liberal, permissive vs. conservative, strict). Four item factors emerged. These were labeled 1) Equal Basic Freedoms, which included all equal distribution items, but those concerned with wealth, 2) Democratic Commonweal, which included items in which citizens made distributions to promote the common good, 3) Anarchy vs. Overseeing, which contrasted random distribution by citizens with pragmatic distribution by rulers and 4) Material Grants and Entitlements vs. Earning judged by Consensus which contrasted rulers giving wealth with citizens distributing social goods on the basis of effort.

Four major viewpoint dimensions resulted from the analysis. Each viewpoint was given a label which may be viewed as a tentative abstraction of characteristic choices of

persons extreme on that dimension. The viewpoints were 1) Democratic Socialism, characterized by positive evaluation of Equal Basic Freedom items and sensitivity to sources of control in society; 2) Optimism vs. Pessimism, characterized by sensitivity to the evaluation dimension and positive vs. negative evaluation of Democratic Commonweal items; 3) Democracy vs. Oligarchy, the former characterized by evaluation of the citizen as the appropriate repository of authority vs. evaluation of pragmatic or benevolent rulers as the source of fair distribution; and 4) Merit vs. Welfare advocates who differ in their judgements of how wealth should be distributed. These viewpoints have low but significant correlations in the Subject sample with demographic variables which may be interpreted as indicative of extent of social experience and position in society.

It is suggested that future research might investigate whether individuals represented on these viewpoint dimensions may differ in the criteria by which they judge fairness; namely, whether they judge a rule as egalitarian or exclusive, productive or wasteful.

Finally, it is suggested that a general theory of justice ought to take account of the possibility that the perceived fairness of distributive rules may shift according to the economic circumstances of the society, the individual's perception of his role in or degree of integration into society, the generality of agreement in the society on the definition

of the Public Good, and the preferred relationship of the individual to authority as the individual's role and circumstances change.

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An Investigation Into the Social Perception
of Distributive Justice

By equality, we should understand, not that the degrees of power and riches are to be absolutely identical for everybody; but that power shall never be great enough for violence, and shall always be exercised by virtue of rank and law; and that, in respect of riches, no citizen shall ever be wealthy enough to buy another, and none poor enough to be forced to sell himself. Rousseau, The Social Contract.

Introduction

Since ancient times (e.g., Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics), political, social, and moral philosophers have been concerned with the ways in which societies allocate their rewards and resources. Insofar as we know, for all times and all places, societies have defined some methods as fair and legitimate and others as inappropriate or unjust (Schwartz, 1978). Whether a society's rules for the fair disposition of goods are seen as arising from the apprehension of an axiomatic system of laws guiding behavior toward desired ends (i.e., natural law) or as a consequence of the evolution of habitual interaction patterns (i.e., custom), is irrelevant to the present study. No matter how such rules arise, every society, even those societies which at first appear anarchic

(Barton, 1969), has been found to have identifiable rules for the legitimate disposition of social resources. Since such rules exist, they can be investigated. Political philosophers and social scientists have studied distribution and the justice of distribution patterns for different reasons and from a variety of frameworks. The aim of the present investigation is to assess and quantify some of those variables, identified in social or political inquiries, which influence an individual's perception that a just allocation has been made.

One method by which the justice of distributive rules can be investigated is to ask the culture-bearers of a given society what they consider to be just distributions. More particularly this study sets out to investigate the following questions:

1. Are individuals sensitive, in judging fairness, to the groups which institute the distribution? Does it matter whether the decision makers are citizens or rulers?

2. Do the rules individuals judge as fair differ depending on the type of benefit distributed? Do rules vary for the fair distribution of wealth, rights, respect, power and opportunity?

3. Do different individuals vary in the degree of reliance they place on need, ability, effort, status, intent to bring about greater good and desire as fair reasons for the differential distribution of social goods? Or do individuals prefer equal or random distributions? Are some

of these reasons seen as fair and appropriate for some social goods, but not for others? For example, is greater effort perceived as a fair reason for receipt of greater wealth, but not a fair reason for the receipt of greater power or rights?

4. Finally, do viewpoints differ regarding the nature of "fairness." Do individuals vary in the way they select adjectives to characterize distributive rules? For example, is a rule which is seen as fair by one individual seen as weak by another? Are the different ways in which individuals structure or evaluate rules of fairness related in an understandable fashion to identifiable characteristics of the individual such as political party membership?

The study of distributive justice can be encapsulated as the study of who gives what to whom, for what reason, and under what circumstances. On the whole, social psychologists have tended to study variables considered relevant in actual face to face interactions and have concentrated on laboratory studies of easily measured monetary distributions. Political philosophers, on the other hand, have studied entire social systems, often from an abstract and global theoretical perspective and have concentrated on the distribution of power and the emergence or non-emergence of power hierarchies. In some ways, these two viewpoints complement each other. Where the social psychologist tends to be empirical, the political philosopher tends to be theoretical. Where the political philosopher tends to be general, the social

psychologist tends to be specific. For whatever reason, the political and psychological frameworks have emphasized slightly different variables. This study proceeds on the assumption that a more comprehensive picture of distributive justice can be gained if some of the variables identified in political theory are added to those studied in social psychology and tested in the empirical crucible of social science with actual persons.

Characteristically, the focus of the moral or political philosopher has been on what "ought to be" or "should be" rather than on what is. The ground rules are specified for ideal societies in which participants partake appropriately in the power and wealth of their country. The most prominent recent example of this approach is Rawls' (1971) Theory of Justice. In it, the author attempts to codify and systematize a logical set of rules which represent the best possible practices of democracy. The author does not inquire whether or not people actually behave or think in the manner he describes. These questions are beyond the purpose of his book, although they are the type of questions social scientists are likely to ask.

Rather, Rawls has tried to develop a hierarchy of principles, whereby individuals who enter a society with unequal assets (skills, status, ability, power, money) can compete on an even footing for the advantages the society has to offer.

First Principle

Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

Second Principle

Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:

- (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and
- (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

First Priority Rule (The Priority of Liberty)

The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty.

There are two cases:

- (a) a less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of liberty shared by all;
- (b) a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those with the lesser liberty.

Second Priority Rule (The Priority of Justice Over Efficiency and Welfare)

The second principle of justice is lexically prior

to the principle of efficiency and to that of maximizing the sum of advantages; and fair opportunity is prior to the difference principle.

There are two cases:

(a) an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those with the lesser opportunity;

(b) an excessive rate of saving must on balance mitigate the burden of those bearing this hardship.

General Conception

All social primary goods - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored. (Rawls, 1971, pp. 302-303)

Rawls argues that this set of rules would emerge if rational unbiased men, ignorant of their future positions in society or of their offsprings' future positions in society, were able to meet together to form the rules of distribution for a society. Such a condition is necessarily hypothetical, because initial differences in status, resources, abilities, etc., would cue actual persons as to what rules would further their own self-interest. However, to Rawls, this is a democratic theory, inasmuch as, the combined biases of many

participants with differing initial status and future goals comes closest of existing systems to approximating his hypothetical condition of bias-free decision-makers. (Rawls, 1971)

Several aspects of Rawls' theory are important for our purposes. Throughout his book, he speaks of four categories of universally desired social goods: rights and liberties, opportunity and power, income and wealth, and self-respect based on the attitudes of others. Obviously, these are not of equal importance in his theory. The equal distribution of rights and liberties takes precedence over all other rules of distribution. In fact, equal distribution is favored in all cases, except where an unequal distribution is consistent with rights and liberties and acts to the advantage of the less well off or, in other words, helps those in need. Self-esteem, based on the attitude of others, is correlated with the preservation of rights and liberties in Rawls' scheme: the prerogative of every individual to make decisions and help set goals is an acknowledgement of equivalently valid individual viewpoints. Next in importance to the establishment of justice is the equal distribution of opportunity, such as opportunity for education, and power, such as the power to hold and exercise political office. Again, deviations from equal opportunity can only be justified on the basis of furthering equality. Finally, least important in the hierarchy, is wealth. Unequal distribution of wealth is fair only if it

helps provide those conditions necessary for equal liberty, e.g., to provide a common defense or to maintain public order, or is to the advantage of those otherwise in need, e.g., for the more efficient production of low-cost staples.

Rawls, then, is essentially saying that it matters a great deal for judgements of fairness which of the social goods is being distributed. He says that all citizens should have some voice in distribution, except under special circumstances, where granting of power to another increases the efficacy of advocacy without reducing individual freedom. Further, social goods ought to be distributed equally, on the basis of need, or for the common good when that common good supports conditions of equal rights, opportunities and powers, and esteem.

The arrangement of social goods in a hierarchy has one final implication; that is, the distribution of one social good is not necessarily correlated with the distribution of another. The distribution of money does not necessarily determine the distribution of rights. However, Rawls theorizes, the equal distribution of rights will tend to equalize the distribution of power and wealth.

In summary, it appears that any comprehensive model of distributive justice must take account of at least these four social goods: rights and liberties, opportunity and power, income and wealth, and esteem. Until evidence accumulates to the contrary, research based on distribution

of one social good, e.g., money, ought not be used to infer the probable distribution of other social goods, i.e., esteem, opportunity and power, and rights.

Several authors have elaborated on the implications of Rawls' theory. We will look closely at two reviews, one by David Spitz, a political philosopher, and one by Arthur Okun, an economist.

Spitz (1974), argues that the perception of justice does not require equality or equity in the distribution of social goods in and of itself, rather it requires that the range of differences between one person and another be constrained in such a way that one man is not seen as either significantly demeaning of another or demeaned by another. This "demeaning" refers to making hopeless the attainment of another's ends. Prevention of "demeaning" justifies principles such as equality of opportunity. One path to equality of opportunity, he feels in opposition to Rawls, is equal distribution of barterable goods (Spitz, 1974; Okun, 1975). The essential point here, however, is that equalization for some writers is not an end in itself but is in the service of a more pervasive principle. In this case the principle is recognition of each man's common humanity.

This sort of equality - what may be called equality of consideration - is an ultimate end in that it affirms the intrinsic value of every human being. It does not deny that there are differences (inequalities?) among

men. It rather insists that such differences do not justify - except for good and sufficient reasons - the withdrawal from some men of the conditions which are required for the development of their varying individualities. (Spitz, 1974, p. 77)

These conditions for development include not only adequate economic resources, but social pathways for the exercise of choice in determining one's individual ends and in constructing a society in which an atmosphere of mutual concern for one another's well-being is possible (cf. Deutsch, 1975).

The economist Arthur Okun (1975) calls such pathways rights or universal entitlements and notes their efficacy in controlling the potentially demeaning nature of the marketplace. He further notes that because of their different purposes, accepted principles for the distribution of rights bear very little resemblance to accepted principles for the distribution of money or other barterable goods. "Rights," he argues, are acquired and exercised without direct charge and hence people lack incentive for economizing on them (I'll save my vote for next year); because they are universally distributed, they do not evoke the economic principle of comparative advantage which channels people into specializing, to receive greater return for what they do well; rights are generally not distributed as incentives, or as rewards, or punishments (except in restricted cases, such as

denying the right to vote to convicted felons); the distribution of rights stresses equality at the expense of equity and freedom (e.g., duties such as tax revenue for public schools are expected even of the childless); and finally, rights cannot be bought and sold. Rights, he notes, are usually justified on three grounds: libertarian, pluralistic and humanistic.

LIBERTY: To the advocate of laissez-faire, many rights protect the individual citizen against the encroachment of the state, and thus convey benefits that far outweigh any cost of economic inefficiency. . . . Thus, the libertarian embraces equality not because he cares at all for equality but because he cares a great deal about a limited government whose powers are circumscribed by explicit and objective rules. To him, rights are seen mainly as rights conferred an individual against the state, and this view prevails explicitly regarding individual rights in the marketplace. (Okun, 1975, pp. 10-11)

Further, Okun says the libertarian view is supported by the occurrence of "externalities," which involve the interest of third parties. Public service and public interference with exchange usually rests on these "externalities," which are defined by situations in which there is no effective way to keep benefits or harm channeled to buyers or non-buyers. For example, no one can be permitted to bargain away his

right to call the fire department in return for a tax cut, because his next door neighbor may be harmed by his action. Similarly, Rawls (1971) defines future generations as innocent bystanders. For Rawls instituting "savings" for the future to invest is a primary facet of making a just allocation of goods.

The pluralistic defense of rights also advocates an extended view of society. "The network of relationships in a viable society has to rest on a broad base of human motives and human interests," remarks Okun, paraphrasing his teacher Karl Polanyi; material gain is, at most, only one of many motives behind economic activity, and economic activity is only one aspect of society. "Rights" protect a society's subordination to market values.

Society refuses to turn itself into a giant vending machine that delivers anything and everything in return for the proper number of coins. When members of my profession sometimes lose sight of this principle, they invite the nastiest definition of an economist: the person who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing. Society needs to keep the market in its place. The domain of rights is part of the checks and balances on the market designed to preserve values that are not denominated in dollars. For the same reasons that an investor holds many different stocks and bonds in his portfolio, society diversifies its mechanisms for

distribution and allocation. It won't put all of its eggs in the market's basket. (Okun, 1975, p. 13)

The humanistic justification of rights stresses the attribution of human dignity to all citizens and grants rights equally as a type of "mutual respect . . . owed human beings as moral persons". (Rawls, 1971, p. 511)

Rights, Okun adds, are in a state of flux. Deutsch (1975) suggests that every society defines a social minimum in goods and privileges which is necessary for the physical and psychological well-being of its members so that they can continue as competent members of the society. Okun, following similar reasoning, suggests that the most likely new candidate for "righthood" is the right to survival, that is, a right for a basic minimum in nutrition and health care credits (cf. also Boulding, 1962; Devlin, 1971, for a discussion of law as the social minimum of morality.)

Okun and Spitz make several interesting points. First, they seem to agree that there is a definable social minimum of goods and powers, below which a just society is not possible. However, they define the minimum in different ways. Spitz argues that it occurs when an individual possesses so few power or material resources that it becomes possible that he can be coerced into a demeaning action or situation by someone who possesses more, i.e., to live or behave in a manner consistently contrary to his own goals or beliefs. Spitz, therefore, defines the social

minimum in terms of individual effects.

Okun, on the other hand, defines the social minimum in terms of a group consensus that may vary in response to custom, to the availability of resources, and to changing social definitions of what is necessary for competent citizenship.

For the purposes of this study, the social minimum is investigated in terms of the proportion of individuals within the society who are satisfied with their lot. This, of course, implies the proportion who are dissatisfied. If only 15 percent express satisfaction, the remaining 85 percent are necessarily indifferent or dissatisfied. Spitz's level of definition was chosen in preference to Okun's for two reasons: 1) individual satisfaction is a variable much studied in social psychological studies of organizational behavior and 2) the complexity of Okun's definition would require and, indeed, deserves a great deal of research effort, in and of itself.

Secondly, Okun argues and Spitz demonstrates that similar principles of distribution can be chosen for differing reasons. Hence, the equal distribution of rights can be justified on at least three grounds: humanistic, pluralistic, or libertarian. The first has to do with the extent to which a society defines all of its members as equivalent in dignity; the second concerns a society's tolerance of human diversity; and the third concerns the

degree to which a society tolerates decentralization of power and authority. Each of these dimensions are important in the structure of societies. The essential point here, however, is that experts recognize that one principle of distribution can be advocated for different reasons and, indeed, experts themselves differ in their reasoning. Spitz (1974) feels the humanistic justification is primary. John Stuart Mill (1971) took a libertarian point of view. He felt it was more important to maintain a system of equal liberties, under which many men would err in their judgement and eventually ruin their lives, than to maintain an authoritarian system in which each individual could be guided away from error, but concurrently denied his freedom to make good or bad choices. If these experts appear to agree on the distribution of rights, they certainly disagree on how wealth should be distributed. Perhaps their underlying differences will be illuminated in the way in which they advocate distribution of all four social goods. The structure of the system of justice thus appears to be very important.

If experts disagree about this structure, it stands to reason that ordinary individuals would disagree as well. As Hammond (1965), a social psychologist, has pointed out, individual differences in beliefs may be primary causes of conflict. Even when individuals agree on goals, their varying perceptions of admissible ways to achieve these goals may generate disagreement. A thorough study of distributive

justice must take account of differing individual perceptions of what variables are most important to justice, and how these variables are interrelated (Dolbeare, et al., 1973; Ashford, 1972). This study will undertake to discover whether more than one consistent viewpoint about what is fair and just exists in the subject population studied.

Thirdly, Okun and other authors (e.g., Dahl, 1956) have suggested that the degree of centralization or the locus of control of decision-making is an important variable. Dahl, in his book Polyarchy (1971), defines some characteristics of democratic control.

In this book, I should like to reserve the term "democracy" for a political system one of the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens. Whether such a system actually exists, has existed or can exist need not concern us for the moment. Surely one can conceive a hypothetical system of this kind; such a conception has served as an ideal, or part of an ideal, for many people. As a hypothetical system, one end of a scale, or a limiting state of affairs, it can (like a perfect vacuum) serve as a basis for estimating the degree to which various systems approach this theoretical limit.

I assume further that in order for a government to continue over a period of time to be responsive

to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals, all full citizens must have unimpaired opportunities:

1. To formulate their preferences
2. To signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action
3. To have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government, that is, weighted with no discrimination as to the content or source of the preference.

(Dahl, 1971, p. 2)

At the opposite end of this hypothetical scale is hegemony, or domination of the many by the few. Dahl characterizes hegemonies as systems in which socioeconomic sanctions, police and punitive powers, and authority are concentrated and responsive only to the wishes of a few or to those holding a particular ideology. To succinctly capture this discrimination, we will study how individuals rate the fairness of distributions controlled by citizens and distributions controlled by rulers.

Finally, Okun (1975) noted that different social goods have different distributive properties in a mathematical sense. One can grant a right and still have exercise of that right. If one gives money, one does not have that money. If one respects one's fellow men, one has not lost respect and

may even gain respect. If one has power, its exercise, depending on the success or failure of the outcome, will tend to increase power or diminish power (cf. Foa & Foa, 1974). Okun draws the conclusion that different sets of principles or decision criteria may be appropriate for different sets of social goods. He examines what these principles usually are for one of the social goods, money, in a discussion on the ethics of reward.

He notes that traditional Marxian, capitalist, and egalitarian economists are all debating one principle - whether income ought to be based on contribution to "output," i.e., productivity. The Marxists attribute all value to labor input, not output. The capitalist attributes all value to contribution to productivity. The egalitarian places value on products according to their "utility," i.e., their contribution to the greatest good for the greatest number by meeting the desires of individuals.

Okun identifies four sources of productive contribution: 1) skills and assets acquired in a lifetime; 2) abilities and talents with which one is born; 3) effort and 4) the fluctuating supply of and demand for services related to the ones the contributor can offer. Okun notes that payment for effort is almost universally regarded as fair; that payment for skills acquired through effort is also regarded as fair; that payment for assets resulting from efforts of others (e.g., family savings) is sometimes regarded as fair; that payment

for assets reflecting social and economic disparities among families (status, privilege) are regarded as unfair; that reward for natural abilities is unfair, but immutable, and that "the principle of redress" (society must give more attention to those born with fewer native assets and less favorable social position) tries to balance this built-in unfairness; and, finally, as far as supply and demand are haphazard events beyond control (e.g., attributable to luck), they are unfair, but provide door-prize like market incentives and hence are not discarded; as far as supply and demand fluctuate through joint personal efforts or personal happenstance (cf. Kelley's 1968 discussion of interdependencies and payoff matrices which follows this line of thought), they are seen as fair to the extent "teams" receive rewards or "trickle-down" effects spread the benefit. Okun's general conclusion, much in line with Rawls, is that incentives for economic efficiency are justified to the extent that they increase the total benefit "pie" for society by eliminating overlapping and waste in providing the greatest good for the greatest number; and that equalization of rights is usually a much less costly way than equalization of income to more justly distribute social goods.

A careful reading of Okun and other political and social scientists reveals that at least eight reasons for differentially distributing social goods have been set forth. These include allocations made on the basis of ability,

effort, need, status, desire, luck, equality, and to pay off those who have provided a greater good for a great number of persons. Not all of these reasons for distributing goods seem to be equally fair. Okun suggests that Marxists, capitalists and persons with other political beliefs would differentially rate their fairness. He suggests that distribution schemes that promote efficiency, such as higher pay for workers with greater native ability, are not necessarily seen as fair. Although Okun specified these as varying reasons for distributing money, his list appears to be complete enough to provide a starting point for questioning the fairness of different rationales for distributing esteem, power and opportunity, and rights.

Rawls, Okun, and Spitz have all emphasized that distributive schemes, whatever they may be, are in the service of providing just outcomes: a society in which fair competition can take place among persons with initially different statuses, a society which promotes the total number of benefits available to its members, and a society in which different individuals are able to comfortably pursue their individual goals without infringing on similar rights for others. Another theory of current interest states that outcomes are less important than the process of distribution. Nozick (1974) asserts that a distribution is just, if it arises from a prior just distribution by legitimate means. In his system, there are only two legitimate means: voluntary

exchange and gift. For the rectification of unjust distributions, he has only one principle: voluntary reparation to those made worse off because of the injustice. Thus an unequal outcome is not necessarily unjust if it arose by just means; e.g., two parties agreed that a winner would take all in the flip of a fair coin. Nozick assumes that just means lead to perceived just ends.

The conflict between "process" and "outcome" theories cannot be investigated in detail in this study. However, it will be interesting to note whether principles of distribution advocated when the great majority of the society will be satisfied are the same as those advocated when few will be satisfied.

This review of political and economic literature has been by no means exhaustive. Yet a number of variables have been identified which, through historical inquiry, anecdote and armchair theorizing, appear to be important in determining how fair a society's rules of distribution will appear to be to its members. Meehl (1971) cautioned psychologists not to ignore or reject the results of armchair theorizing. History, he felt, had performed experiments which the laboratory could never recreate. Ethics, lack of meaningfulness, size, time span all impose restrictions on laboratory investigations which are not present in historical inquiries.

The Model

We return at this point to our original statement of

what constitutes an appropriate investigation of distributive schemes; it is the study of who gives what to whom, for what reason, and under what circumstances. In the present study, citizens or rulers will distribute each of Rawls' four universally desired social goods -- wealth, rights, esteem, opportunity and power -- to residents of a hypothetical country. They will differentially reward ability, status, need, desire, effort, intention to bring about greater good, or will distribute the goods equally or randomly. These distributions will take place under conditions of high satisfaction or low satisfaction. The decision-makers will have knowledge of their future position in the society or will be ignorant of that future position. Each resulting written vignette will be rated by actual persons on scales designed to measure the perceived fairness, goodness, strength, rightness, justice, permissiveness, liberality and democracy of the distribution scheme.

A fairly recent technique of factor analysis (Tucker, 1964; 1966; 1972) allows the author to derive summary factors for not only scales and items, but also persons. These person factors may be conceived of as "viewpoint" factors. It is possible then to quantify an individual's extremity of viewpoint and to correlate this score with demographic, socioeconomic, political and social indicators. It would be interesting to know, for example, if those who advocate that rulers make distributions are themselves in

a decision-making position in their own society. A word of caution must be extended, however. Significant results in investigatory, as opposed to hypothesis testing, studies are suggestive but always open to question on the grounds that unique results arose from a unique sample or that, out of many possible correlations, several were significant by chance. The results of this study will be suggestive, not definitive, until replication with other measures, and samples occurs.

At this point, we will shift our focus from the theoretical to the empirical and review what social psychological studies have noted about the implications of the different roles of distributors, the social goods they distribute, and the principles by which the goods are distributed. Each variable derived from the political and economic literature will be treated in turn, after a review of major relevant psychological formulations.

Social Psychological Studies of Distributive Justice

Social psychologists have tended to study the microcosms of small groups and face to face interactions rather than the macrocosms of entire societies. Hence, the emphasis in psychology often has been on the informal rules of interpersonal trade in limited situations rather than on the formalized rules, relevant across many situations, that are studied at the societal level. For this reason, social psychological theorizing about justice has tended to develop

in a piecemeal fashion. As studies in one area have accumulated, books or reviews have attempted to develop coherent models for summarizing the results of an evolved literature and for resolving apparently conflicting results. However, this has been a relatively rare occurrence for distributive justice.

At least six areas of psychology, some of them only peripherally interested in distributive justice, have developed a literature which contributes to our understanding of how people react to, or think about, just and unjust allocations at a personal level. These areas include Lerner's "Just World" studies, equity theory, game and decision theory, studies of attributions, studies of cognition and ideology, and cognitive developmental studies of moral judgement.

At least one author (Lerner, 1975) has suggested that a person behaves in concordance with many different rules of distributive justice. How a person behaves, Lerner indicates, depends on the nature of his relationship to the person or persons with whom he is dealing.

Equity theory began as the study of how people behave in business relationships when they are paid less or more, or contribute less or more, than is standard for their co-workers (Homans, 1965). Recently, equity theory has been expanded beyond monetary trade to trade in help, guilt, harm, and emotional intimacy (Walster, Berscheid & Walster, 1976).

Game theory and decision theory have investigated the conditions under which individuals will equitably divide resources, compete for resources, or pool resources. These researches have also asked what individuals expect to gain in return when they undertake one of these strategies (cf. Gamson, 1964).

The thought patterns of older children and adults provide data for attributional research. Several researchers have asked why individuals think they receive rewards or sanctions (Weiner, et al., 1974) and, to a lesser extent, have studied the circumstances under which subjects feel this is fair (Brickman, 1975). Another branch of cognitive literature explores the formation of beliefs, the influence of beliefs on perceptions, and the organization of thoughts and feelings into ideologies (Adorno, et al., 1950; Foa & Foa, 1974).

Since Piaget's early investigations of children's responses to the rules of a game of marbles, cognitive-developmental theorists have tended to study how notions of "fair play" and fair trade evolve as a child's social and intellectual horizons expand (Piaget, 1932; Kohlberg, 1964, 1976).

Although each of these approaches may shed some light on the topic of distributive justice, most of them differ from the current study in an important way. That is, although in many experiments, allocations are made by an experimenter or

chosen by a subject, rarely is it asked if the allocation is just or fair. In a recent bibliography of equity research (Adams & Freedman, 1976), 137 empirical studies were cited; six of those included perceived fairness as a dependent variable. More commonly, experimenters accept a pre-existing notion of what is fair, on the assumption, perhaps, that their notion is universally shared. Experimenters then confront subjects with pre-defined fair or unfair payment and note the subject's job satisfaction, willingness to continue working, or liking for the allocator, for one example. Experimenters may confront a subject with a moral dilemma and note if the subject reasons his way to a solution which coincides with a predetermined level of moral justice defined by fiat, for another example. Subjects may not be reacting to the unfairness of distributions and dilemmas; they may be reacting to their artificiality or inefficiency. It may be, as has been suggested (Deutsch, 1975), that fairness is not a cogent question unless rewards and sanctions reach a meaningful level. In psychological studies of equity, for example, the vast majority of rewards are under \$5.00 (Brickman, 1975; Brehm & Mann, 1975).

Nonetheless, let us examine, for those cases where a systematic model has been developed, what some of the psychological definitions of justice may be. We will then examine how the results of research deriving from many approaches apply to the variables extracted from the

political literature.

Just World. Lerner (1974) has developed an outline of psychological theories of distributive justice and has suggested the nature of social relationships necessary for each theory to hold. Initially, he divided psychological theories into four types: equity, "parity" (Lerner's use of the term is equivalent to equality), legalistic, and Marxian. Lerner feels that all of these theories have a common developmental base in a need to see justice in the world. This need grows from a personal contract made with oneself when immediate rewards are foregone for delayed rewards. The "foregoing" involves effort and one promises oneself future reward for this effort. Therefore, one likes to feel that rewards are received on the basis of deservingness, that things worked out as one promised oneself. Often, however, attainment of reward requires joint effort with others, and it is here that problems of allocation arise.

The equity norm, as suggested by Homans (1965) and Adams (1965) and revised by Walster, et al. (1976), requires that reward be divided according to the relative investment (time, resources, effort, ability, education, etc.) of each participant. Lerner suggests that the equity norm holds when people pursue mutual goals, but have no particular regard for one another. This situation often arises when people bargain. Equality, on the other hand, may occur when participants like one another or have a high degree of interdependence (e.g.,

Table 1
Forms of Justice

Perceived Relationship			
Object of Perception	Identity	Unit	Non-unit
Person	Perception of O as self	Perception of similarity, belonging with O	Perception of contesting interests and personal differences related to claims
	Needs	Parity	Law, Darwinian Justice
Position	Perception of self in O's circumstances of need	Perceptions of equivalence with O	Scarce resources with equally legitimate claims within the "rules"
	Entitlement, Social Obligations	Equity	Justified Self-Interest

(Lerner, 1975, p. 15)

as in a team), in attaining a goal. Marxian justice, in which each participant is rewarded according to his needs, holds under very special circumstances, Lerner feels, when there is a high degree of perceived identity among participants, tied to feelings of sympathy and empathy, such as exist in a family. Finally, legalistic justice, or reliance on rules, tends to predominate in situations where there is competition for goals, and negative feeling among participants.

Lerner (Lerner, 1975; Lerner, et al., 1976) has recently expanded this model by noting that people often develop different rules for relating to individuals as specific persons, with a specific set of characteristics and traits, or as occupants of positions, i.e., as persons in situations or roles which define traits transpersonally such that anyone in that position would feel and react in a similar manner. He presents the following Table (1975, p. 15).

It is evident from the Table that Lerner feels forms of justice vary with the degree and depth of relationship between individuals (see also Blau, 1977).

Equity. Equity theory assumes that there should be an equivalent direct relationship between the reward and the contribution to an exchange for each participant in that exchange; the greater the contribution, the greater the reward $\left(\frac{B's\ reward - B's\ costs}{B's\ contribution} = \frac{A's\ reward - A's\ costs}{A's\ contribution} \right)$ where A and B engage in an exchange). In research on equity (Adams & Freedman, 1976), contribution has been defined in

terms of such variables as possession of appropriate skills, ability, education, seniority, effort, time at task, degree of responsibility, status, superior performance and so forth. Homans' (1965) theory is essentially a normative theory and requires a consistent group consensus about the relative value of each source of contribution, cost, and reward. Homans (1976) recognizes that this poses a major problem:

Ever since Aristotle's discussion of the subject in his Nichomachean Ethics, the study of distributive justice has been concerned with the relationship between two further relationships: first, the relationship between at least two persons or groups in the amounts of reward they receive, when the distribution of reward results from direct exchange between the parties or when it is made by some third party, such as a boss, an organization, or even a market; and second, the relationships between the same persons or groups in the amounts of contribution, however that be defined, which they make to the direct or indirect exchange. When the ratio of their rewards is equal, as perceived by all the parties, to the ratio of their contributions, then the distribution of rewards is said to be fair, just, or equitable. Thus distributive justice always entails a comparison by the parties of the contributions each makes and the rewards each receives, but what they compare is not the subjective value and cost of the

rewards and contributions - for there can be no comparison of subjective values - but rather the outward and visible amounts of the rewards and contributions. Thus workers in a factory compare their earnings but not how much these earnings "mean" to each of them. (Homans, 1976, pp. 231-232)

For purposes of the present study, it appears that equity theory predicts differential allotments on the basis of effort, ability, and status when the characteristics are conventionally seen as increasing the quality or quantity of a product. Homans (1976) describes equal distribution as a special case of equity; equal distribution is fair when every participant makes an equivalent contribution. Needs and desires describe the motivational states of recipients and are defined, above, as irrelevant to distributive practices.

Homans suggests that all possible sources of contribution to an exchange can be summarized by the term "power". Except perhaps for some philosophers, an equitable distribution of rewards may simply be a distribution by relative power - provided only that the relative powers of the parties, power and countervailing power, have managed to remain equal and constant for some considerable period of time. An inequitable distribution may be no more than one that no longer reflects the actual distribution of power. (Homans, 1976, p. 244)

Game Theory. Gamson (1964) reviewed three theories of power which predict the distribution of rewards in coalitions. Two of these theories suggest that subjects will make equal distributions. The third, minimum resource theory, predicts equitable distributions.

Gamson holds a position consonant with equity theory. He predicts subjects will form coalitions among participants with the minimum resources to win a game or goal. In that way each member will get the largest possible share of the winnings proportional to his investment. For example, individuals whose resources could be quantified as four units, three units and two units will tend to form three-two coalitions. The pooled resources equal five units, enough to beat the individual with four units of power. Additionally, when the three-unit and two-unit individuals divide up the spoils, their proportional share of the winnings would be greater than if they had joined with the four-unit individual; i.e., $3/5$ and $2/5$ are greater than $3/7$ or $2/6$ ($3+4=7$; $2+4=6$), respectively.

However, Gamson cites two theories which would predict equal distribution of rewards, anticompetitive theory and minimum power theory. Anticompetitive theory is mentioned in Vinacke's (1969) research with college females, in which the subjects appeared less interested in playing a coalition game than they were in maintaining the peace. Taking turns, making sure each member got a chance to win, seemed to be the goal.

Hard bargainers were avoided and penalized. "Playing to win" was "playing to lose."

The other theory, minimum power theory, is based on the assumption that amount of resource is not the crucial variable. Rather, the number of coalitions in which a person can "tip" the balance of power is the variable of importance. Hence, for persons with 4-3-2 power and for a great many other combinations, all have equal power, since all are equally capable of forming winning coalitions. ($4+2>3$; $3+2>4$; $4+3>2$) Thus, in this case, rewards should be equally distributed.

The mode of distribution, equitable or equal, apparently shifts according to the definition of goals by the subject (cf. Bales, 1970; Cartwright, 1959; Deutsch, 1975). If the subject wishes to maximize his material gain, he forms coalitions and divides winnings according to equity. If the subject's primary concern is peace-keeping, an equal distribution is appropriate. If the subject merely wants to win and is indifferent to his "cut", strategies resulting in equal distribution, again, prevail.

Decision Theory. One of the most popular of the rational decision theories is expectancy-value theory (Vroom, 1964). Like equity theory, and theories of coalition formation, expectancy-value theory hypothesizes that the individual seeks information about possible reward patterns and rationally weights that information in deciding upon a strategy for achieving a reward. Lawler (1968) states that

expectancy-value theory emphasizes the individual's perception of the probability and relative personal importance of a reward (see also, Pollard & Mitchell, 1972). Expectancy-value theory can be said to emphasize a person's attempt to maximize his positive outcomes, while equity theory emphasizes the achievement of balance between inputs and outcomes. Thus, equity theory predicts that if an individual is overpaid, he will work harder or devalue the reward or refund part of the reward or convince others to accept higher pay for the same work or elevate his perception of his contribution (Adams, 1965). In short, he will try to restore balance between contribution and reward. Expectancy-value theory predicts, on the other hand, that if a person desires money and foresees no cost to himself for taking it, he will accept overpayment.

Expectancy-value theory is essentially an operationalized version of justified self-interest. The meaning of the reward to the recipient is crucial. Therefore, small amounts of a needed and desired reward have more attraction to an individual than large amounts of a socially valued, but personally irrelevant, reward.

Issues of fairness arise when several persons conflict in their justified self-interest. The social costs of conflict reduce the desirability of the reward so that each party becomes willing to accept less. The individual with the greatest power gets more simply because he can get more,

whether or not this is fair. However, if the other party's good opinion is a desired reward in itself, a tendency toward equal distribution of rewards will ensue (i.e., reward-social cost is maximized for each individual). As with Lerner's formulation, expectancy-value theory predicts advocacy of equal distributions among friends of equal status (cf. Morgan & Sawyer, 1967; Huesmann and Levinger, 1976) and self-interested attempts to get as much as one can among the strong (Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973), and among strangers with little empathy for one another and little probability of future interaction (cf. Shapiro, 1975; Bennett & Carbonari, 1976; Dawes, et al., 1977).

Attribution Theory. Attribution researchers have not explored how subjects obtain rewards, but why subjects feel they have succeeded or failed (Wiener, et al., 1972) and who appears to be responsible for an action and its outcome (Kelley, 1972; Brehm, 1966; Rotter, 1966).

Weiner, et al. (1972) have suggested that common reasons for achieving reward can be collapsed into a 2 X 2 table representing the source of an action (internal to the person vs. external) and the consistency of the characteristic (stable over times and situations vs. unstable).

Wiener asserts that moral evaluations, such as are made in determinations of fairness, "rest upon the distinction between ability (can) and effort (try)" (p. 97; cf. Maselli & Altrocchi, 1969).

Table 2
Classification Scheme for the Perceived Determinants
of Achievement Behavior

Stability	Locus of Control	
	Internal	External
Stable	Ability	Task Difficulty
Unstable	Effort	Luck

(Wiener et al., 1972, p. 96)

An experiment by Schmitt (1964) nicely illustrates this point. Schmitt established hypothetical situations in which an act was not committed either because of the actor's lack of willingness or because of the absence of ability. For example, a situation was described in which an individual did not repay a debt either because he did not have the money (can) or because he was unwilling (try). Subjects then disclosed the degree to which the borrower was morally obligated to return the money. The data clearly demonstrate that the invocation of moral sanctions is expressed primarily when the individual is unwilling to repay the debt. That is, moral judgements are linked to the attribution of intentionality, rather than with ability. (Wiener, et al., 1972, p. 97)

The converse holds as well, Wiener argues. Rewards are more frequently differentially distributed on the basis of effort than ability. Since ability is seen as a stable attribute of a person, presumably it cannot be altered or controlled by reward or punishment; attempting to do so is seen as a futile exercise. Effort, on the other hand, can vary and will be responsive to contingent rewards. Wiener cites supporting data (Wiener & Kukla, 1970; see also Leventhal & Michaels, 1971).

Among pupils either with or without ability, those who are perceived as having expended effort are

rewarded more and punished less than pupils believed not to have tried. Conversely, given either effort or no effort, low ability pupils are rewarded more and punished less than pupils believed to possess ability (see also Lanzetta and Hannah, 1969). In addition, . . . effort is a more salient determinant of rewards and punishments than is ability. (Wiener, et al., 1972, p. 98)

Degree of responsibility is also seen as a contributing variable. Low ability, which is seen as not being under personal control, is compensated for. Effort, however, is more important than ability in determining how rewards are allotted, because an individual can control and, hence is responsible for, how much effort he exerts.

The issue of personal control has been examined by other researchers (Rotter, 1966; Brehm, 1966). Rotter (1966) argues that there are individual differences in beliefs about how much control one has over one's fate. At one end of his continuum are Externals who believe their lot in life is determined by fate and luck; at the other, are Internals who feel personally responsible for what they have earned in life. In contrast, Brehm (1966) argues, that all else being equal, all people prefer to perceive that they have individual freedom. He specifies that attributions of personal freedom and responsibility occur when one cannot hypothesize an external cause for a behavior, but can hypothesize an

internal one. Thus, if someone is told to do something by someone in power, he feels less free in doing it, than if he had not been told. Brehm feels that there is motivation to feel in control (see also DeCharms, 1968; DeCharms, et al., 1965) and that this accounts for oppositional behavior, doing the opposite of what one is told, and for the fact that individuals seek and prefer situations in which they appear to exercise choice.

In summary, then, Rotter's view predicts that some individuals consistently tend to feel as if they exercise responsibility and some do not. The implication for the present study is that the choice of citizens or rulers as preferred decision-makers may vary according to the personality of the respondent. Internals, for example, should prefer to make their own decisions and hence prefer choices made by all citizens, unless, of course, the individual expects to be a ruler. Others may not prefer this amount of freedom.

Brehm, however, feels all individuals prefer situations of free choice. Hence his formulation suggests an overwhelming preference for decisions made by citizens.

Cognition and Ideology.

For any society, an existential base creating certain common experiences interpreted through certain cultural premises by men with certain personal qualities in the light of certain social conflicts

produces certain political ideologies. (Lane, 1962, pp. 415-416)

Many authors have suggested that persons differ in the degree of complexity with which they view the world (cf. Kelly, 1955), the degree of rigidity with which they judge it (cf. Rokeach, 1960), and the core values by which they evaluate occurrences (Tomkins, 1965; Foa & Foa, 1974; Eryspenck, 1954; Adorno, et al., 1950). Liberal vs. Conservative, Tough-minded vs. Tender-minded, Open vs. Closed, and Authoritarian vs. Democratic represent some of the dimensions along which structured political beliefs have been ordered. The "Authoritarian Personality," perhaps, is the ideological configuration which has received the most scrutiny within psychology.

This area of study was historically responsive to the rise of Nazism in Germany, but is currently experiencing a rebirth of interest (Goldstein & Blackman, 1978). Although from the vantage of the 1970's much of the work in this area appears methodologically flawed, it generated a great deal of research and a number of hypotheses which are still under debate. The originators of the F Scale measure of authoritarianism included items purporting to measure hostility toward outgroups, a tendency toward power at the expense of human values, use of projection as a defense mechanism, conventionality, submission to conventional moral authority, and a tendency toward rigidity among other items.

Subsequent research (cited at length in Goldstein & Blackman, 1978) has characterized high scorers on the F Scale as acquiescent (for both methodological and politically relevant reasons), as socially naive with limited role experiences, as conservative, of lower socioeconomic status and education, and as having a moderate tendency to be reared by strict, moralistic, conventional parents who advocate cold and controlling methods of discipline.

Again, there is the suggestion that a subset of individuals would prefer to submit to decisions made by others or to be part of selected group of decision-makers whose values would be prepotent over the values of others.

Cognitive-Developmental Theory. Kohlberg (1964, 1976) expanding on the work of Piaget (1932), has posited six hierarchically ordered levels of moral reasoning, the highest of which he describes as "the morality of justice." Stage six morality is based on universal ethical principles in which humanitarian values ("persons as ends in themselves") are prepotent over social contractual arrangements. Kohlberg suggests that at this stage what is seen as moral involves equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.

Like Piaget, Kohlberg suggests that a developed intelligence is necessary but not sufficient to achieve higher levels of moral reasoning. In addition, experiences which facilitate or inhibit the individual from taking

various social perspectives (i.e., opportunities to be a leader and a follower, to interact in many groups, to adjust to groups which have different norms) are important in determining at what level the individual will function. These factors are related to the expanding range of social possibilities which come with age and experience: the broader the social perspective, the higher the possible moral level.

Recently, Hogan (1975) has taken exception to Kohlberg's hierarchy. He argues that in modern legal philosophy two points of view are prevalent which can be considered equally valid: (1) there are higher laws discoverable by reason and intuition; a human law is just if it corresponds to the higher law and (2) laws are just to the extent they are instrumental in promoting the general welfare of society. Hogan labels these the ethics of conscience, which he feels Kohlberg unnecessarily elevates to an ultimate morality, and the ethics of responsibility. Moral maturity, Hogan argues (1973; 1975), is indicated by a position central to these two extremes. He suggests man is both "a rule-formulating and rule-following animal," and that individuals override the social rules which have withstood biological and cultural evolution only with extreme caution and when exceptional hurt is likely to otherwise occur (Hogan, 1973).

Hogan and Dickstein (1972) have uncovered belief and personality correlates of both viewpoints: those favoring

the ethics of conscience believe people are naturally benevolent and social injustice is produced by oppressive institutions; those favoring the ethics of responsibility believe people are naturally malevolent and that institutions restrain this malevolence. Individual differences in viewpoint are obviously predicted.

The Model Revisited

It should be obvious that the various approaches in psychology do not lead to a uniform set of predictions for the model of distributive justice derived from the political philosophy literature, and presented earlier in this chapter. However, where a generalization appears justified, it will be stated as we consider each variable in turn.

Foreknowledge of Future Position by Decision-Makers vs. Lack of Bias of Decision-Makers. The psychological literature has little to say about this variable. In expectancy-value theory, it is assumed that each individual acts in his own self-interest and that those with power will be more effective in achieving their ends. It does not ask if individuals would more likely choose to enter a game whose values were determined by those who knew or by those who did not know how much power they would have at games' end.

Perhaps the only relevant research is that which suggests that more cooperation and equal distribution occurs when individuals in positions of power know they might switch positions with those not in power in future sessions

(e.g., Sinha & Sinha, 1975; Gouldner, 1960). Thus, lack of foreknowledge may tend to be associated with increased selection of equal distribution. Similarly, since those in power often choose "cutthroat" strategies to assure that there is no future return to power of their opponent (Sinha & Sinha, 1975), rules made by biased decision-makers should be perceived as possibly unfair.

High Satisfaction vs. Low Satisfaction Within the Society. A number of theorists suggest that satisfaction with outcome defines fairness (e.g., Pollard & Mitchell, 1972). Likewise Jones and Davis (1965) suggest good procedures, intentions, and characteristics are inferred from personally favorable outcomes. In contrast, Brickman (1975) indicates that fairness and satisfaction may represent two independent dimensions. His research results suggest satisfaction and fairness coincide only when attainment of reward is attributed to luck, for example, but not when it is attributed to ability.

Bennet and Carbonari (1976) suggests that if individuals perceive unlimited resources, they feel it is fair to maximize their own self-interest. However, if limited resources are available, individuals tend to try to maximize joint welfare.

To summarize, attributions of fairness appears to be more probable the more generally satisfied are the individuals of that society. When the resources which lead to

satisfaction are limited a shift toward rules which increase the common good can be predicted. Beyond this, there is no clear one to one relationship suggested between judged fairness and satisfaction.

Citizens vs. Ruler Distributors. Brehm's (1966) research seems to predict a consensus that distributions in which each individual has a voice (cf. Folger, 1977; Michener, et al., 1975) will be perceived as more desirable than distributions by rulers alone.

However, other researchers suggest personality differences and differences in belief among individuals (Adorno, et al., 1950; Rotter, 1966; Hogan, 1975) about who should formulate social rules, rulers or citizens. Research suggests differences should be related to age, social experience, and socioeconomic variables.

Social Goods: Wealth, Rights, Opportunity and Power and Esteem. Equity theory seems to suggest that whenever an individual's contribution to an outcome increases the quality or quantity of that outcome, he believes he should be rewarded. Thus, if ability is relevant to the exercise of power, and an individual possesses greater ability than his neighbor, he assumes he should receive more power than his neighbor. Equity theory, therefore, seems to predict that no matter what social goods are being distributed, rights or wealth or esteem or power, individuals will expect that these goods will be differentially

distributed according to the relevant personal contributions of recipients. Nonetheless, equity studies have confined themselves to studying distribution of monetary reward and, occasionally, esteem. Homans says, for example,

A man that will not exchange, that will not give you what he has when you need it, will not get from you the only thing you are, in this case, able to give him in return, your regard. (Homans, 1965, p. 181)

Beyond this, equity theory has not considered how individual contribution are related to particular tasks and for what contributions and tasks, the various social goods are appropriate as rewards.

Yet several psychologists (Foa & Foa, 1974; Deutsch, 1969; Schopler, 1965) have recognized that the differing nature of various social goods may be important. Deutsch (1969) suggests it makes a difference if receipt of a harm or benefit is reversible (if one does not have rights, can one easily get rights?). Schopler (1965) suggests it makes a difference if a resource is consummable, tradeable or something one can give and yet still possess, like information. Foa and Foa (1974) have suggested a developmental scheme in which certain social goods become important during different stages of life. Their sufficiency, and how they are traded at those stages, help determine the individual's outlook on and conception of society. Thus the importance of unconditional love precedes inferences

about one's status and later motivation for competency through trade in information. Likewise, they suggest trade in services is related to trade in goods and money. They hypothesize that different rules of exchange hold for each of these commodities.

Humanitarian formulations such as those of Kohlberg seem to suggest that rights and esteem should be equally distributed. Hogan's formulation implies that distribution of social goods should either promote greater good, or be equally distributed, depending on the ethical orientation of the recipient.

A number of game, decision and exchange theories operationalize power as a difference in material resources such as money or tokens and as a difference in freedom of choice among many alternatives (cf. Gamson, 1964; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Adams & Freedman, 1976). These operational definitions seem to imply that power, money, and rights are all consensually distributed by the same social rules.

The current study will attempt to determine if these assumptions are justified.

Mode of Distribution: Ability, Effort, Need, Desire, Status, Greater Good, Equal, Random. Although attribution theory predicts that payment according to ability will be seen as generally unfair, equity theory predicts payment according to ability, when ability contributes to performance, will be judged fair.

Both equity and attribution theories agree that reward for effort is fair. There is no data, however, to suggest if it is fair to earn power, esteem, and rights in the same way one earns wealth.

Need. Deutsch (1975) has suggested that "for cooperative relations in which the fostering of personal development and personal welfare is the primary goal, need will be the dominant principle of distributive justice." This norm, Deutsch feels, evolves in groups in which an atmosphere of trust in others' good intentions exists. He feels it is intensified in relationships of legitimate dependency (such as parent-child), in which long term perceptions of an individual's welfare outweigh short-term considerations of equality or equity. Distribution according to need reaffirms a group's caring about each other's well-being and seeks to insure a group members future ability to participate in a group as a competent member. Schwartz (1975) reviews some of the empirical literature on helping to note that a perception of need in another and a sense of salient personal responsibility motivate helping. He also noted that a tendency to think about situations in terms of their consequences for the welfare of others yielded significant correlations with ratings of consideration and helpfulness by peers. Thus empathetic, identificatory or sympathetic perception of need, feelings of responsibility or of being depended upon, and long term "sufferance" of a

non-reciprocal relationship will be characteristic of this form of distributive justice (Deutsch, 1975; see also Hoffman & Maier, 1959).

Desire. According to expectancy-value theory, desire plays a part in determining whether a reward is, indeed, perceived as a reward. For that reason, distribution on the basis of desire should be legitimate when a social good can be obtained without taking it away from another (i.e., in the case of rights, but not of wealth).

Status. Equity theory, again, predicts that when higher status improves accomplishment, as may be true in the case of power, it ought to be differentially rewarded.

Greater Good. Hogan's ethics of responsibility and summative versions of expectancy-value theory, in which the desires of many individuals are tallied into a consensus, suggest that this decision rule is an important determinant of fair distribution. As mentioned earlier, Bennet and Carbonari (1976) suggest it is more important under conditions of scarcity than under conditions of plenty.

Equal. Gouldner (1960) has suggested that there is a universal norm of reciprocity, such that all equal trades are socially approved. Attribution theorists (e.g., Kelley, 1972) note that a tendency for equalization of harm or benefit between two interacting parties, however, is modified according to the perceived reason for the other's action. If the other is constrained by external circumstances (e.g.,

an institutional rule or role) his action is less likely to be reciprocated than if the other is seen as the origin of the action (e.g., intending to harm). Kruglanski (1975) criticizes this internal vs. external distinction and suggests in its place an exogenous vs. endogenous distinction, analogous to means vs. ends. Kruglanski suggests that when an actor's intention is seen as benevolence or malevolence toward another, it is reciprocated. However, when an act of benevolence or malevolence is seen as having a justifying reason whether internal or external (e.g., maneuvering for votes or craving for status), it is less likely to be reciprocated. In fact a number of authors (Lott & Lott, 1972; Tedeschi, 1974) have suggested that liking and likeability are strong power bases because of the ability of liked persons to evoke return rewards for seemingly altruistic acts.

Deutsch (1975) provides a similar analysis. He suggests that where intrinsic enjoyment of social relationships is emphasized, equality will be the dominant principle of distributive justice. Equity will not figure in such relationships, he suggests, because the rewards of such relationships are supported by mutual respect and esteem. Any deviation from equality and mutuality in these emotions will lead to perception of differential valuation and disruptive emotions such as envy or personal devaluation. Other psychologists (Huesmann & Levinger, 1976) have tried

to take account of the special qualities of intimate social relations by hypothesizing that reward increases with depth of personal involvement, so that this form of equality can be seen as just another special case of equity. It appears, therefore, that there will be a tendency for esteem to be equally distributed.

Gamson (1964) has given other reasons why equal distributions of power might occur in his analysis of coalition formations reviewed earlier.

Random. Except for Brickman's (1975) finding that a lucky outcome was perceived as fair by the lucky party, random distribution appears to be seen as unfair and undesirable. For those psychologists who suggest feelings of personal control are important (i.e., Brehm, 1966), luck represents the antithesis of control. Also, random distribution is antithetical to equitable distribution. Since random distribution is indiscriminant and non-universal it goes against humanitarian values which require equal consideration of each individual. These points are illustrated by the popular response to one case of random benefit distribution. Several years ago the University of Illinois chose by lot 3350 new students from a field of 4200 qualified applicants. This "fair process" invoked a storm of protest and an editorial in Science (1970) by Dale Wolfle in which he suggested any benefit conferral required that the persons involved and their needs be

considered.

Summary. Psychological research, although relevant, does not fit easily into the model suggested here. The requirements of laboratory research are that the experimenter exert control. Thus, it is not easy to examine the rights and opportunities and powers, which are emphasized by political theorists, in laboratory settings where realistically the power and rule-defining role is in the hands of the experimenter. An exception, of course, is Milgram's (1974) experiment in which the reactions to experimental authority were themselves measured.

Secondly, distribution of money and tokens is more easily accurately measured than distribution of rights, opportunities, and esteem. The present research takes the viewpoint that written ratings of the distribution of social goods like checked voting boxes may have some political and social relevance, even though one step removed from other behaviors. Finally, the accuracy of the laboratory is sacrificed, in the trade Cronbach (1970) refers to as bandwidth versus fidelity, for the larger view that can be obtained if subjects are asked to judge a model in which factors theorized to be important at the societal level are included.

Future research will determine if this study of personal philosophies of distributive justice provides any benefit for the eventual understanding of behavior and

conflict, concerning the rules of social trade in opportunity and power, esteem, rights and wealth.

Method

Subjects

One hundred sixty adults in New York City, Houston, Texas, and Athens, Georgia completed questionnaires for this study in the Spring and Fall of 1976. The majority of the sample consisted of college students attending psychology and sociology classes at Hunter College (N=33), University of Houston at Clear Lake (N=58), and University of Georgia (N=56). In addition, thirteen corporation and American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) lawyers working in New York City were included as a comparison group.

Each of the three colleges was unique in several respects important to the accurate interpretation of results. At the time the questionnaire was given, Hunter had recently begun an open enrollment program attracting a variety of urban minority students, many of whom attended college at night in addition to their full time employment. Shortly after the questionnaire was administered (Spring 1976), Hunter closed down temporarily as a result of New York City's fiscal crisis. Rumors of New York City's impending bankruptcy, a daily newspaper topic, probably influenced the atmosphere in which test responses were elicited.

In contrast was the atmosphere at University of Houston at Clear Lake. This institution also served an older population of students, many of whom also worked. The setting, however, was suburban rather than urban. The

economic atmosphere also was in direct contrast to that of New York City. Houston was experiencing an economic boom (N.Y. Times, February 9, 1976); the cost of living was 30 percent cheaper than that of New York City and the unemployment rate was 56.3 percent lower (4.9 percent vs. 11.2 percent).

University of Georgia's subsample represented a more traditional college student population, the students tending to fall in the 18-23 year old age range. The University drew the majority of its population from the state of Georgia; hence urban, suburban, and rural backgrounds were represented in that subsample.

The lawyers were either employed in the law offices of a large national corporation (N=6) or actively affiliated with the New York City chapter of the ACLU (N=7).

The 160 questionnaires analyzed represent a 91.43 percent return rate from 175 questionnaires originally distributed. Questionnaires which had more than two of the 64 social justice items left blank were omitted from the study. The respondents for these omitted questionnaires did not significantly differ from the analyzed sample in sex or geographic location (see Table 4). However, these respondents tended to be younger than those who completed questionnaires (M=20.93 and M=28.48 yrs., respectively), the majority being under 20. These respondents were all single; and all but the one lawyer defined themselves as students.

Table 3
Some Demographic Characteristics of
Questionnaire Respondents^a

Sex	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Male	71	44.65
Female	88	55.35
Total	159	100.00
Age ^b	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
18-24	79	50.00
25-34	43	27.22
35-49	32	20.25
50-64	4	2.53
Total	158	100.00

^aAll responses were voluntary. N's differ because some Subjects chose to omit items.

Table 3 - Continued

Marital Status	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Single	94	59.50
Married	60	38.00
Divorced	3	1.90
Separated	1	.60
Total	158	100.00

Self-Report of Occupation	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Professional	23	14.38
Managerial	6	3.75
Elementary or High School Ed.	12	7.50
Social Service	10	6.25
Secretarial or Clerical	11	6.88
Blue Collar	4	2.50
Housewife	8	5.00
Student	79	49.38
Other	7	4.38
Total	160	100.02

Table 3 - Continued

Self-Report of Ethnic Identification	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
White American	79	61.24
Black	10	7.75
Hispanic	5	3.88
Asian	3	2.32
East European	6	4.65
West European	15	11.63
Jewish	11	8.53
Total	129	100.00

Table 4
 Comparisons of Demographic Characteristics
 of Subjects Who Completed Questionnaires
 With Subjects Who Failed to Complete
 Questionnaires

Sex	Mean Age in Years				
	Complete	Incomplete	Total	Complete	Incomplete
Male	71	10	81	28.48	20.93
Female	88	5	93		
Total	159	15	174		

$\chi^2 = 2.68$ (df = 1, n.s.)

Percent Reporting Marital Status as Single

Complete	Incomplete
59.50	100.00

Table 4 - Continued

Subsample	Complete	Incomplete	Total
Hunter	33	2	35
U of Georgia	56	6	62
U of Houston/CL	58	6	64
N.Y. Lawyer	<u>13</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>14</u>
Total	160	15	175

$X^2 = .55$ (df = 3, n.s.)

Percent Reporting Occupation as
Professional or Student

	Complete	Incomplete
Professional	14.38	6.67
Student	49.38	93.33
Total	63.76	100.00

The high return rate for a questionnaire which took 45 minutes to an hour to complete suggests that the majority of the sample took the task seriously. Perhaps there is something about being young, single and not in the job market which makes matters such as distributive justice questionnaires seem irrelevant or tedious.

Subjects were randomly selected to receive one of the four forms of the questionnaire. This resulted in four groups, each with forty Subjects.

Questionnaire

Each item of the questionnaire represented one of two distributors (citizens or rulers), distributing one of four social goods (wealth, rights, opportunities and power, or esteem) on the basis of eight decision criteria (ability, effort, need, desire, status, chance, the greater good, or equality). Thus 64 items resulted, exhausting the combinations of 2 distributors x 4 social goods x 8 decision criteria. Each of the 64 items were rated on eight 7-point semantic differential scales: good-bad, fair-unfair, just-unjust, strong-weak, strict-permissive, democratic-authoritarian, right-wrong, and liberal-conservative. The order of both the individual items and the scales on which the items were judged were randomly selected to control for effects of fatigue or response bias. Thus a Subject was likely to encounter the same number of items concerning wealth or ability or citizen distributors at the beginning

of the questionnaire as at the end of the questionnaire.

Likewise, a Subject encountered a scale adjective, and the negative or positive pole of the adjective (good-bad vs. bad-good) in a randomly pre-determined order. However, the order of the scales did not vary from item to item. Pilot administration of the test demonstrated that changing scale order for each item increased the difficulty of filling out the questionnaire and lengthened the time it took to complete the questionnaire. Since Osgood, et al. (1957) and Friedman, et al. (1964) have presented evidence that scale order does not significantly affect semantic differential ratings, it was decided to maintain the same randomly pre-determined scale order to make the Subject's rating task easier. Two sample items follow. The entire questionnaire can be found in Appendix A.

In the country of X, rights and liberties are granted such as the right to vote and freedom of speech. The rulers have decreed that these rights and liberties should be granted to those who have attained positions of influence, according to the status of their position, as determined by the rulers of X.

good	— — — — —	bad
unjust	— — — — —	just
right	— — — — —	wrong
weak	— — — — —	strong
liberal	— — — — —	conservative

unfair _ _ _ _ _ fair
 permissive _ _ _ _ _ strict
 democratic _ _ _ _ _ authoritarian

In the country of X, there is wealth, such as natural resources, property and income from jobs. The citizens of X have agreed that this wealth should be divided among those who have need of it, according to the strength of their need as determined by the citizens of X.

good _ _ _ _ _ bad
 unjust _ _ _ _ _ just
 right _ _ _ _ _ wrong
 weak _ _ _ _ _ strong
 liberal _ _ _ _ _ conservative
 unfair _ _ _ _ _ fair
 permissive _ _ _ _ _ strict
 democtaric _ _ _ _ _ authoritarian

Each set of 64 items was preceded by three face sheets. The first gave instructions (adapted from Osgood, et al., 1957):

In this questionnaire, you will make judgements about the different ways in which societies distribute social goods.

This is a descriptive study. We really don't know how people feel about these forms of distribution and we want to find out how people do feel about them.

The value of this questionnaire will depend on your considered judgement and your frankness. Try to make your best judgements, but do not spend too much time on any one item.

For each question there are eight scales, the ends of which are marked by opposing feelings, statement or attitudes. Please put an X on the point of the scale (this X; not _ X _) which you think best indicates the strength of your feelings or attitude about the particular item. Even if the scale is irrelevant, you are required to give your best judgement. Do not skip pages or items.

If you have any questions, please ask the person who passed out the questionnaire.

The second face sheet asked for biographical information. No name was required. Examiners instructed the Subjects that all responses were optional. The biographical information requested included age, sex, marital status, number of children, occupation, political affiliation, ethnic group, citizenship, if the Subject or his/her parents were immigrants, country of origin, number of generations of citizenship, number of siblings, and birth order.

The third face sheet provided an experimental manipulation. This sheet introduced the 64 item questionnaire with one of four sets of scenarios. The scenarios described a situation in which those who developed a constitution knew or did not

know what their future status in society would be. The scenarios also indicated whether 85 percent or 15 percent of the people in the society would be satisfied with the results of the distribution. Thus, two levels of satisfaction (15 percent vs. 85 percent) crossed with two levels of foreknowledge (know vs. do not know) resulted in four scenarios. Two samples follow:

(1) In the country of X, a new constitution is being constructed. The people who are making this constitution have no idea what their ultimate position in this society will be, since the society is not yet formed. They do not know whether they will be rich or poor, powerful or weak, blessed with natural abilities and talents or deficient in them. For example, the citizens do not know if they will become rulers; the rulers do not know if they will become ordinary citizens. Please keep this in mind as you judge the many alternate principles these people consider in the following pages. Also keep in mind that no matter what principles are chosen, about 15 percent of all the people of X will be satisfied with the result.

(2) In the country of X, a new constitution is being constructed. The people who are making this constitution know what their ultimate position in this society will be. They know whether they will be rich or poor, powerful or weak, blessed with natural

Procedure

Questionnaires were distributed in the Spring and Fall of 1976 to four Experimenters who had no knowledge of the hypotheses or purposes of the present study. Behavioral science Professors at University of Georgia, Hunter, and University of Houston randomly selected one to two (depending on course size) of the classes they taught for administration of the questionnaire. Each professor received a randomly ordered set of the four possible forms of the questionnaire to distribute. Students were instructed that their participation was voluntary and that inclusion of biographical information was optional.

The lawyers responses were obtained by leaving the questionnaire and a return envelope in mailboxes at a large national corporation based in New York City. The ACLU lawyers were a randomly selected subset of those attending a chapter meeting in New York in the Spring of 1976.

Statistical Analysis

The exploratory nature of the present study determined that the analyses be weighted toward description rather than inference. The data analysis was carried forward in several steps:

1. Correlation. The intercorrelation of items was calculated with "fairness", the major focus of this study, as the dependent variable.

2. Factor Analysis. The factor structures for "fairness"

of item clusters for each of the four social goods were compared. This stage of the analysis utilized Principal Factor Analysis with varimax rotation (Harris, 1975; Morrison, 1976). The rationale for Principal Factor Analysis as opposed to Principal Component analysis lies in the judgement that specific items might carry as much influence as clusters of items, e.g., that decisions based on ability alone may have as much influence as decisions based on weighted combinations of effort and desire. The decision to use varimax rotation resulted from the desire to extract several factors of probable equal importance, rather than one general factor at this stage of analysis.

3. Three Mode Factor Analysis. Using the technique developed by Ledyard Tucker (1964; 1966; 1972), the questionnaire responses were factored over the 64 items, over the eight scales and over the 160 persons answering the questionnaire. This resulted in a core matrix demonstrating a person factor by scale factor by item factor interaction. Such a procedure might also be called a "point of view" analysis since it highlights how different person groups respond in structuring the same stimuli. The three modes, then, are persons, scales and items.

Tucker's procedure is analagous to unrotated principal axis or principal component methods and hence extracts a general factor and a subset of orthogonal factors for each mode. In addition to the core matrix, three matrices of coefficients relating the raw data for each mode to the

derived factors for each mode are calculated. In the present study, these coefficients are not factor loadings (i.e., the correlation of the raw data with the factor), but represent the characteristic vector multiplier for each observation. These characteristic vectors may be interpreted in a manner analogous to factor loadings, since factor loadings are merely characteristic vectors multiplied by a constant (the constant being the square root of the associated characteristic root, a number proportional to the percent of variance summarized by the factor in traditional two mode principal axis analysis). In interpreting characteristic vectors, it is important to note that the sum of the squares of the characteristic vectors for a factor must equal 1.00 in Tucker's method, hence the size of the individual coefficients for a mode is affected by the number of observations for that mode. For example, if eight scales are factored, characteristic vectors above .354 in absolute value represent substantial relationships ($8 \times [.354]^2 = 1.00$). Likewise, for the item mode, characteristic vectors above .125 ($64 \times [.125]^2 = 1.00$) may represent more than ordinary relationship to a factor. For the person mode, .079 ($160 \times [.079]^2 = 1.00$) may be taken as a similar benchmark for interpreting characteristic vectors.

This method of factoring has the advantage of yielding a readily interpretable set of mathematical relationships in the core matrix, labelled G by Tucker. Let M represent a diagonal matrix related to the factors derived from the person

mode, the elements representing the characteristic roots (proportional to the amount of variance summarized) of the factors retained, arranged in descending order. Let similar matrices be obtained for scales, matrix P, and items, matrix Q. Looking at Figure 1

. . . each root in matrix M is a sum of squares of entries in a horizontal plane in the core matrix G. Similarly . . . each root in Matrix P is the sum of squares of entries in a vertical plane of G parallel to the end planes and each root in Q is the sum of squares of entries in a vertical plane parallel to the front plane of G. (Tucker, 1966, p. 296; see Figure 1)

If X is defined as the matrix of raw data, then, if certain statistical conditions of orthonormality were met,

. . . the sum of squares of the X matrix for any given G matrix equals the sum of squares of the G matrix . . . (Tucker, 1966, p. 296)

Hence, the numerical entries in the G matrix represent the degree to which a subset of points of view (i.e., the way different sets of persons divide items into clusters and accentuate the importance of certain scale characteristics) accounts economically for a significant amount of the variation in the raw data. To clarify with an example, Tucker (1965) reports a study in which people rated their bodily and emotional responses to different kinds of anxiety-provoking situations. The results indicated three




FIGURE 1.

EXAMPLE OF THE INTRINSIC STRUCTURE OF THE CORE MATRIX IN THREE MODE FACTOR ANALYSIS.
 (ADAPTED FROM TUCKER, 1964.)

major sorts of people: one generally shy and physically queasy, one generally exhilarated by all situations and a kind of person who felt pleasant in interpersonal situations, but miserable in anxiety arousing situations involving impersonal stimuli.

Tucker's Three Mode Factor Analysis, Method III, requires a complete data matrix. Any missing scale responses were coded as neutral, a "conservative" procedure recommended by Campbell and Stanley (1966) since any bias introduced by missing data is in a direction neutral to the hypotheses of the study.

4. Multiple Regression. Finally, using each of the person factor characteristic vector coefficients as criterion, the biographical variables and experimental manipulations were entered in a step-wise multiple regression as predictors of those factor coefficients.

The major purpose of the analyses was to determine if the wealth of data (160 persons X 64 items X 8 scales = 81,920 variables) could be reduced to a subset of variables which accounted for a significant portion of the variance and which was related, in a meaningful way, to the background experiences of respondents or to the experimental manipulation applied to them.

Results

This study set out to explore several questions:

1. Are individuals sensitive, in judging fairness, to the groups which institute the distribution? Does it matter, for certain decision criteria or social goods, whether the distributors are citizens or rulers?

2. Do individuals report that certain decision criteria appear fairer when applied to certain social goods? Do people discriminate in their ratings of fairness among the four social goods included in this questionnaire?

3. Do certain ways of categorizing the methods of distribution emerge? Attribution theorists (cf. Weiner, et al., 1972) have categorized ability and effort as stable and unstable internal characteristics, and task difficulty and luck as stable and unstable external characteristics. Do the individuals responding to this questionnaire group the methods of distribution over categories such as discriminating (e.g., ability and effort) vs. indiscriminant (e.g., random and equal), internal vs. external, or motivational characteristics vs. non-motivational characteristics?

4. Finally, do differential viewpoints exist regarding the use of dimensions, along which the distribution of social goods are judged? Do some people perceive that something that is fair is also weak? Do different persons structure these relationships differently? What aspects of a person's background might be related to these differences?

This section provides some provisional insights into the answers to these questions by reporting a set of data summarizations which begin with general overviews of the data and lead to more and more specific analyses.

Means, Intercorrelations for the Ratings of Fairness, and
Factor Analysis of Combined Social Goods

Table 5 presents the mean ratings of fairness for each of the four social goods. The Table is introduced at this point to aid the reader in interpreting the intercorrelations and factor analyses which will follow.

Examination of Table 5 reveals that in every case random distribution and distribution on the basis of status are perceived as relatively unfair. Equal distribution is perceived as relatively fair for the disposition of respect, rights and opportunities and power, but as nearly neutral for the disposition of wealth. The only means of distribution rated as more than a little fair for wealth is distribution on the basis of effort by citizens. Also, it is interesting to note that in every case, distribution by citizens is perceived as fairer than distribution by rulers. These inferences, unsubstantiated by significance tests, are set forth cautiously at this point.

Table 6 presents the correlation matrix for methods of distribution across all social goods. Again, judged fairness is the dependent variable. Similar correlation matrices (Appendix B) were developed for each of the social goods,

Table 5
 Mean Fairness Ratings for the
 Distribution of Social Goods
 (-3 = Unfair, +3 = Fair)

Fairness in the Distribution of Wealth									
Distributor	Mode of Distribution								Average Rating
	Ability	Need	Effort	Desire	Equal	Random	Status	Greater Good	
Citizens	.18	.20	1.11	-.68	.29	-2.03	-1.12	.68	-.17
Rulers	-1.30	-.72	-.71	-1.67	.08	-2.14	-2.19	-.70	-1.17
Average Rating	-.56	-.26	.20	-1.18	.19	-2.09	-1.66	-.01	

Fairness in the Distribution of Opportunities and Power									
Distributor	Mode of Distribution								Average Rating
	Ability	Need	Effort	Desire	Equal	Random	Status	Greater Good	
Citizens	.33	.30	.91	.79	2.59	-1.95	-.89	1.14	.40
Rulers	-1.06	-1.32	-1.06	-1.19	2.24	-2.16	-2.19	-.99	-.97
Average Rating	-.37	-.51	-.15	-.20	2.42	-2.06	-1.54	.08	

Table 5 - Continued

Fairness in the Distribution of Rights									
Distributor	Mode of Distribution								Average Rating
	Ability	Need	Effort	Desire	Equal	Random	Status	Greater Good	
Citizens	-.43	-.44	-.19	.26	2.48	-1.97	-1.74	.49	-.19
Rulers	-1.52	-1.78	-1.18	-1.09	2.19	-2.32	-2.31	-1.32	-1.17
Average Rating	-.98	-1.11	-.69	-.42	2.34	-2.15	-2.03	-.42	

Fairness in the Distribution of Respect									
Distributor	Mode of Distribution								Average Rating
	Ability	Need	Effort	Desire	Equal	Random	Status	Greater Good	
Citizens	.34	-.14	.93	.14	2.36	-2.09	-.31	1.20	.30
Rulers	-1.24	-1.38	-.93	-1.20	2.14	-2.36	-1.56	-.77	-.91
Average Rating	-.45	-.76	.00	-.53	2.25	-2.23	-.94	.22	

Table 6
Item Correlation Matrix for Fairness in the Distribution
of all Social Goods
(N=160)

Citizens									Rulers								
	Ability	Need	Effort	Desire	Equality	Random	Status	Gr. Good	Ability	Need	Effort	Desire	Equality	Random	Status	Gr. Good	
C	Ability	1.00															
I	Need	.17	1.00														
T	Effort	.42**	.27*	1.00													
I	Desire	.25*	.46**	.30*	1.00												
Z	Equally	.00	.23	-.02	.11	1.00											
E	Random	.06	.19	.12	.22	.04	1.00										
N	Status	.30*	.25*	.37**	.28*	-.07	.27*	1.00									
S	Greater Good	.38**	.39**	.44**	.41**	.10	.13	.33**	1.00								
	Ability	.18	.15	.16	.13	-.13	.11	.18	.21	1.00							
R	Need	.01	.31*	.08	.18	.03	.11	.03	.13	.30*	1.00						
U	Effort	.21	.05	.25*	.05	-.16	.02	.10	.10	.45**	.17	1.00					
L	Desire	.04	.15	.07	.27*	-.04	.03	.04	.14	.34**	.34**	.22	1.00				
E	Equality	-.07	.12	-.10	.01	.49**	-.10	-.15	.02	.00	.17	-.03	.06	1.00			
R	Random	-.01	.05	-.02	.10	.01	.53**	.14	.06	.12	.12	.04	.13	.03	1.00		
S	Status	.16	.03	.05	.04	-.19	.17	.26*	.01	.40**	.23	.28*	.14	-.09	.19	1.00	
	Greater Good	.12	.18	.11	.15	-.08	.04	.12	.20	.44**	.31*	.41**	.33**	.05	.16	.27*	1.00

*p < .01

**p < .001

separately. Each of these matrices were submitted to Principal Factor Analysis using squared multiple correlations as the estimates of communality (Harman, 1967; Ferguson, 1971).

Factor analysis of the matrix for combined social goods yielded seven factors accounting for 41.5 percent of the total variance. Of these seven factors, three contributed more variance than a single item would have been expected to contribute (i.e., the factor contributed variance greater than 1.000).

In naming the factors emerging from this matrix and other matrices, a nomenclature was evolved, derived from definitions given in The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (1966). If high factor loadings were found only for ruler distributor items, the factor was described as Oligarchic, since oligarchy is rule or government by the few. Similarly, if high factor loadings were found only for citizen distributor items, the factor was described as Democratic, since democracy is government by the people. For the decision criteria or modes of distribution, names were assigned as follows: 1) if only one mode had high loadings, the factor was given the name of that mode, 2) if several modes had high loadings, names were assigned on the basis of the highest loadings and the pattern of loadings as connoted by several commonly used terms.

Table 7
 Factor Loadings for Fairness in the Distribution
 of all Social Goods: Principal Factor
 Analysis, Varimax Rotation

Item	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III	h^2	s^2
Citizens by Ability	.130	<u>.576</u>	-.017	.356	<u>.644</u>
Citizens by Need	.087	<u>.370</u>	.099	.447	.553
Citizens by Effort	.107	<u>.648</u>	-.005	.444	.556
Citizens by Desire	.067	<u>.428</u>	.144	.430	.570
Citizens Equally	-.164	.056	.028	.439	.561
Citizens Randomly	.005	.150	<u>.670</u>	.489	.511
Citizens by Status	.069	<u>.494</u>	.237	.381	<u>.619</u>
Citizens by Greater Good	.110	<u>.604</u>	.050	.454	.546
Rulers by Ability	<u>.657</u>	.162	.082	.483	.517
Rulers by Need	<u>.424</u>	-.018	.082	.349	<u>.651</u>
Rulers by Effort	<u>.582</u>	.198	-.032	.403	.597
Rulers by Desire	<u>.456</u>	.004	.045	.332	<u>.668</u>
Rulers Equally	.070	-.102	-.044	.414	.586
Rulers Randomly	.141	-.027	<u>.643</u>	.436	.564
Rulers by Status	<u>.442</u>	.066	.204	.378	<u>.622</u>
Rulers by Greater Good	<u>.611</u>	.107	.056	.404	.596
Factor Variance	1.836	1.800	1.015		
% Total Variance	11.5	11.3	6.3	Total =	29.1%
% Factor Variance	27.7	27.1	15.3	Total =	70.1%

Factor I - Oligarchic: Merit

Factor II - Democratic: Earning for the Commonweal

Factor III - Random Distribution

Factor Saturation:
Highest to Moderate

<u>Term</u>	<u>Connotation</u>	
Merit	inherent worth, excellence claim to commendation	<u>ability</u> effort, greater good status, desire
Deserve	to merit, be qualified for or have claim to because of one's acts, qualities or <u>situation</u> (the most generic term of those listed)	<u>need</u> ability, effort, desire status, greater good
Entitlement	have grounds for laying claim	<u>need, equal</u>
Earn	to gain in return for labor	<u>effort</u> desire, greater good need
Purpose	intended, desired or determined result, motivational in meaning	<u>desire</u> need, greater good
Commonweal	the common welfare, the public good	<u>greater good</u> ability, effort, status, desire

Thus, for Table 7, Factor I was named Oligarchic: Merit since only ruler items loaded highly and the highest mode loadings, in descending order, were ability, greater good and effort.

Factor II was Democratic: Earning for the Commonweal.

Factor III concerned Random Distribution. These three factors contributed 29.1 percent of the total variance. If the reader were not interested in making such fine distinctions, the reader could note that Factor I represents rulers making discriminations and categorizations in judging the fairness of distributing social goods. Factor II represents citizens

drawing distinctions. Factor III represents an indiscriminant, but not egalitarian, distribution of goods.

Since the correlation matrix used for this analysis combined all social goods, one would expect more reliability and hence higher communalities (h^2 represents the lower limit of reliability) for this analysis which included four measures (wealth, opportunity & power, rights, respect) for each item than for the individual social good matrices which have only one measure per item. This would be true, unless the items change meaning or weight as the social good changes. If the latter is true, combining social goods should increase error and decrease loadings.

At least five items had quite high amounts of specificity ($s^2 = \text{specific variance} + \text{error variance}$) for the combined social good factor analysis. They were citizens distributing by ability, citizens distributing by status, rulers distributing by need, rulers distributing by desire, and rulers distributing by status. Two alternate hypotheses are that these are important specific item factors or that these are unreliable items. If the second hypothesis is correct, these items should exhibit low communalities in all further factor analyses. On the contrary, their communalities tend to increase.

Principal Factor Analyses for Each Social Good

Wealth. It was hypothesized that the distributive qualities of wealth made its fair disposition a different

Table 8
Factor Loadings for Fairness in the Distribution
of Wealth: Principal Factor Analysis,
Varimax Rotation

Item	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III	Factor IV	h^2	s^2
Citizens by Ability	.005	.047	<u>.673</u>	-.002	.518	.482
Citizens by Need	<u>.651</u>	.038	.163	.153	.544	.496
Citizens by Effort	-.123	.090	<u>.683</u>	.003	.507	.493
Citizens by Desire	.218	-.000	<u>.448</u>	.157	.452	.548
Citizens Equally	<u>.744</u>	-.118	.046	.133	.625	.375
Citizens Randomly	.151	.023	.124	<u>.790</u>	.681	.319
Citizens by Status	-.102	.028	<u>.413</u>	.172	.436	.564
Citizens by Greater Good	.203	.212	<u>.606</u>	.102	.520	.480
Rulers by Ability	.052	<u>.616</u>	.126	.087	.555	.445
Rulers by Need	<u>.472</u>	.173	-.003	.023	.335	<u>.665</u>
Rulers by Effort	-.086	<u>.691</u>	.187	-.026	.540	.460
Rulers by Desire	.167	<u>.505</u>	.017	.076	.412	.588
Rulers Equally	<u>.748</u>	.069	-.132	.038	.612	.388
Rulers Randomly	.109	.188	.012	<u>.785</u>	.675	.325
Rulers by Status	-.052	<u>.437</u>	-.036	.195	.510	.490
Rulers by Greater Good	.090	<u>.710</u>	.045	.143	.586	.414
Factor Variance	1.957	1.949	1.774	1.421		
% Total Variance	12.2	12.2	11.1	8.9	Total = 44.4%	
% Factor Variance	23.0	22.9	20.9	16.7	Total = 83.5%	

Factor I - Material Entitlement

Factor II - Oligarchic: Earning for the Commonweal

Factor III - Democratic: Earning and Merit

Factor IV - Random Distribution

matter from that of the other social goods studied here. At least one factor emerged for wealth that was not present for any other social good.

Table 8 summarizes the results of the factor analysis for fair disposition of wealth. Nine factors were obtained accounting for 53.2 percent of the variance. Of these nine factors, four contributed variances about 1.000 and, together, accounted for 44.4 percent of the total variance. The first of these, Entitlement, did not occur for any other social good or for the combined social goods. It appears to be a factor specific to wealth and hence was called Material Entitlement. Material Entitlement accounts for 12.2 percent of the total variance and 23.0 percent of the factor variance for the fair disposition of wealth. The second factor is an Oligarchic factor, subtitled Earning for the Commonwealth, which accounts for 12.2 percent of the total variance and 22.9 percent of the factor variance. Factor III is Democratic: Earning and Merit (11.1 percent of the total variance, 20.9 percent of the factor variance). Random Distribution is Factor IV (8.9 percent of the total variance, 16.7 percent of the factor variance). Only one item has a very high degree of specificity in this analysis: that is rulers distributing by need (66.5 percent).

Again, a less detailed interpretation would remark an Entitlement factor, an Oligarchic discriminating factor, a Democratic discriminating factor, and a Random, indiscriminant

factor.

Opportunities and Powers. For opportunities and powers, three factors, accounting for 27.4 percent of the total variance were selected from nine factors, which accounted for 43.9 percent of the total variance. These were: (1) a Democratic: Earning for the Commonwealth factor (11.5 percent of the total variance, 26.1 percent of the factor variance); (2) an Oligarchic: Positive Purpose factor (8.0 percent of the total variance, 18.2 percent of the factor variance); and (3) a Random Distribution factor (7.9 percent of the total variance, 18.0 percent of the factor variance). The following six items had high degrees of specificity: citizens distributing according to ability (66.1 percent specificity), citizens distributing equally (66.1 percent), citizens distributing according to status (64.0 percent), rulers distributing according to effort (65.2 percent), rulers distributing equally (75.8 percent) and rulers distributing to attain greater good (62.9 percent).

Opportunity and power was the only social good category for which selected factors accounted for under 30 percent of the total variance and for which so many items with such high specificity emerged. Two explanations offer themselves: 1) respondents found it difficult to rate "opportunity" and "power" together even though Rawls (1971) categorizes these social goods together; or 2) especially in the case of equal distribution, it makes a great deal of difference for this

Table 9
 Factor Loadings for Fairness in the Distribution
 of Opportunities and Power: Principal Factor
 Analysis, Varimax Rotation

Item	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III	h^2	s^2
Citizens by Ability	<u>.446</u>	-.069	-.085	.339	<u>.661</u>
Citizens by Need	<u>.485</u>	.228	-.010	.442	.558
Citizens by Effort	<u>.638</u>	.025	-.021	.454	.546
Citizens by Desire	<u>.541</u>	.251	.026	.418	.582
Citizens Equally	.107	-.147	-.098	.339	<u>.661</u>
Citizens Randomly	.107	-.031	<u>.770</u>	.649	.351
Citizens by Status	<u>.433</u>	-.036	.176	.360	<u>.640</u>
Citizens by Greater Good	<u>.636</u>	.107	.029	.450	.550
Rulers by Ability	.131	.260	.052	.508	.492
Rulers by Need	.084	<u>.650</u>	.040	.481	.519
Rulers by Effort	.080	.149	.023	.348	<u>.652</u>
Rulers by Desire	.120	<u>.663</u>	.069	.504	.496
Rulers Equally	.025	.094	-.098	.242	<u>.758</u>
Rulers Randomly	.069	.141	<u>.771</u>	.629	.371
Rulers by Status	.135	.183	.080	.496	.504
Rulers by Greater Good	.144	<u>.327</u>	.021	.371	<u>.629</u>
Factor Variance	1.837	1.278	1.264		
% Total Variance	11.5	8.0	7.9	Total = 27.4%	
% Factor Variance	26.1	18.2	18.0	Total = 62.3%	

Factor I - Democratic: Earning for the Commonweal

Factor II - Oligarchic: Positive Purpose

Factor III - Random Distribution

category of social good not only what the decision rule is, but who is applying that decision rule. If the second point were correct and item reliability were not in question, these specific factors would be appropriate for judging the fairness of opportunities and power.

Rights. Eight factors were extracted accounting for 45.6 percent of the total variance. Three of these factors summarized acceptable proportions of the total variance.

Factor I, labeled Democratic: Positive Purpose, accounted for 13.3 percent of the total variance, and 29.2 percent of the factor variance. Factor II was an Oligarchic: Deserving factor which summarized 11.9 percent of the total variance and 26.1 percent of the factor variance. The third factor cut across ruler and citizen categories; it was labeled Earning. The Earning factor accounted for 7.1 percent of the total variance and 15.5 percent of the factor variance.

Five items had high degrees of specificity. They were citizens distributing randomly (63.9 percent), rulers distributing according to effort (63.7 percent), rulers distributing according to desire (65.0 percent), rulers distributing randomly (74.3 percent) and rulers distributing rights equally (72.5 percent).

In summary, the factors for this social good seem saturated with motivational connotations, i.e., desiring, working for and needing. Again, Democratic vs. Oligarchic factors emerged.

Table 10
 Factor Loadings for Fairness in the Distribution
 of Rights: Principal Factor Analysis,
 Varimax Rotation

Item	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III	h^2	s^2
Citizens by Ability	<u>.323</u>	-.029	<u>.528</u>	.411	.589
Citizens by Need	<u>.705</u>	.166	.114	.559	.441
Citizens by Effort	<u>.355</u>	.087	<u>.555</u>	.493	.507
Citizens by Desire	<u>.731</u>	.160	.044	.604	.396
Citizens Equally	.003	-.286	-.123	.361	<u>.639</u>
Citizens Randomly	.255	.070	-.021	.457	.543
Citizens by Status	<u>.444</u>	.022	.256	.456	.544
Citizens by Greater Good	<u>.702</u>	.154	.204	.589	.411
Rulers by Ability	.146	<u>.693</u>	.173	.575	.425
Rulers by Need	.154	<u>.695</u>	.021	.543	.457
Rulers by Effort	-.024	.226	<u>.530</u>	.363	<u>.637</u>
Rulers by Desire	.210	.476	-.013	.350	<u>.650</u>
Rulers Equally	-.011	.060	-.184	.275	<u>.725</u>
Rulers Randomly	.002	.059	.005	.257	<u>.743</u>
Rulers by Status	-.004	<u>.573</u>	.158	.583	.417
Rulers by Greater Good	.165	<u>.400</u>	.186	.427	.573
Factor Variance	2.133	1.909	1.130		
% Total Variance	13.3	11.9	7.1	Total = 32.3%	
% Factor Variance	29.2	26.1	15.5	Total = 70.8%	

Factor I - Democratic: Positive Purpose
 Factor II - Oligarchic: Deserving
 Factor III - Earning

Table 11
 Factor Loadings for Fairness in the Distribution
 of Respect: Principal Factor
 Analysis Varimax Rotation

Item	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III	Factor IV	h^2	s^2
Citizens by Ability	.137	<u>.635</u>	-.019	-.005	.455	.545
Citizens by Need	.064	.225	<u>.652</u>	.013	.512	.488
Citizens by Effort	.110	<u>.615</u>	<u>.387</u>	.038	.559	.441
Citizens by Desire	.070	.198	<u>.604</u>	-.015	.515	.485
Citizens Equally	-.139	.118	.092	<u>.762</u>	.631	.369
Citizens Randomly	-.036	.079	.291	-.074	.363	<u>.637</u>
Citizens by Status	.058	<u>.521</u>	.315	.060	.537	.463
Citizens by Greater Good	.107	<u>.629</u>	.239	.003	.495	.505
Rulers by Ability	<u>.754</u>	.113	.154	-.035	.626	.374
Rulers by Need	<u>.401</u>	-.006	.150	-.028	.411	.589
Rulers by Effort	<u>.793</u>	.122	.030	-.018	<u>.669</u>	.331
Rulers by Desire	<u>.315</u>	-.016	.087	-.042	.353	<u>.647</u>
Rulers Equally	.055	-.074	-.086	<u>.774</u>	.627	.373
Rulers Randomly	.060	-.005	.032	-.047	.300	<u>.700</u>
Rulers by Status	.264	.236	-.088	-.053	.418	.582
Rulers by Greater Good	<u>.760</u>	.158	-.062	-.032	.656	.344
Factor Variance	2.186	1.669	1.262	1.201		
% Total Variance	13.7	10.4	7.9	7.5	Total = 39.5	
% Factor Variance	26.9	20.5	15.5	14.8	Total = 77.7	

Factor I - Oligarchic: Earning for the Commonweal
 Factor II - Democratic: Merit
 Factor III - Democratic: Purpose
 Factor IV - Equal Distribution

Self-Respect. Of eight factors accounting for 50.8 percent of the total variance, four met the standard of contributing variance greater than 1.000. The first, an Oligarchic factor, Earning for the Commonweal, summarized 13.7 percent of the total variance and more than a quarter (26.9 percent) of the factor variance. Two Democratic factors followed: Merit (10.4 percent of the total variance) and Purpose (7.9 percent of the total variance). The fourth factor was clearly Equal Distribution (7.5 percent of the total variance), cutting across citizen and ruler categories.

Summary. Clear Oligarchic and Democratic factors emerged for all four of the social good categories and for combined social goods. Respondents obviously discriminated and reacted differentially to the two sources of distribution.

All four social goods had at least one significant factor emphasizing Earning. Wealth and respect yielded Merit factors. The non-material social goods - respect, rights, opportunities and power - each yielded a Purpose or motivational factor. In addition a Deserving factor, with high loading of need, emerged for rights, an Equal Distribution factor for respect and a Material Entitlement factor for wealth.

The differences between Earning, Deserving, Merit, etc., are not as clearly drawn as for Oligarchic vs. Democratic. One might argue, since Random or Equal Distribution factors emerged, that these factors could be more tidily categorized as factors in which discriminations are made among recipients

of social goods and factors which result in indiscriminant dispositions to some (random) or all (equal) recipients. However one chooses to categorize the factors, it is noteworthy that for each social good, three to four factors summarized 27.4 percent to 44.4 percent of the total variance. Slightly over a quarter or slightly less than half the variance can be summarized by a limited number of factors, at least for "fairness." In sociopsychological research, this probably represents a significant reduction of data complexity (Zetterberg, 1966). This result, with standard factor analytic methods, justified the use of Ledyard Tucker's Three Mode Factor Analysis which factors not only over items, but also over scales, and over the responses of people answering the questionnaire. All eight scales were included in this analysis to examine how fairness related to such scales as good, permissive, democratic, etc. All 64 items (2 distributors x 4 social goods x 8 methods of distribution = 64 items) were included to see if the Oligarchic vs. Democratic distinction was replicated in a principal axis (in which a first relatively general factor tends to emerge) method of factoring, to see if the four social goods tended to group in any interpretable fashion, and to see if the distinctions drawn between Earning, Merit, etc. tended to reemerge in any clearer fashion. In addition, Tucker's method allows one to factor across people to attain abstract or idealized "persons" who structure the scale and item factors in a characteristic manner.

These "persons" and the meaning of their points of view can be investigated by correlating background variables to person factor coefficients (Tucker, 1972).

Three Mode Factor Analysis

Scale Factors. Tucker (1972) recommended visual inspection of a plot of characteristic roots (see Appendix C), arranged in descending order of magnitude, in order to choose the appropriate number of factors. The investigator examined this graph for roots above an asymptotic line, which represented a clear break in the slope of that line.

Two factors were selected. The characteristic vector values for each scale adjective are listed in Table 12. Characteristic vectors for each scale adjective's opposite are entered by reflection in the latter half of this Table. Since the sum of the squares of the characteristic vectors must equal one, coefficients above .354 ($8 \times [.354]^2 = 1.00$) represent substantial relationships between an adjective and factor. Factor I (Characteristic Root = 270,626) represents a predominant Evaluative dimension; Factor II (Characteristic Root = 48,180) represents a Control dimension. The relationships among the scale adjectives on these two dimensions are represented graphically in Figure 2.

It can be seen that fair, just, right, and good form a positive evaluation cluster, relatively neutral on the second factor dimension. Similarly strict and conservative anchor one end of the Control dimension. To be strong is to be both

Table 12
 Characteristic Vectors Relating Scale Adjectives
 to Two Scale Factors

Adjectives	Factors	
	I	II
bad	<u>-.425</u>	.151
just	<u>.424</u>	-.140
wrong	<u>.418</u>	.141
strong	<u>.275</u>	-.440
conservative	.202	<u>-.583</u>
fair	<u>.417</u>	.109
strict	<u>.247</u>	-.564
authorization	.337	<u>.273</u>

Reflected Adjectives	Factors	
	I	II
good	<u>.425</u>	.151
unjust	<u>-.424</u>	.140
right	<u>.418</u>	-.141
weak	<u>-.275</u>	.440
liberal	.202	<u>.583</u>
unfair	<u>-.417</u>	.109
permissive	<u>.247</u>	.564
democratic	.337	<u>.273</u>

Factor I: Evaluative Dimension, Negative (-) to Positive (+)

Factor II: Control Dimension, Overcontrol (-) to Under-control (+)




FIGURE 2

SCALE ADJECTIVES REPRESENTED IN UNROTATED EVALUATIVE FACTOR AND CONTROL FACTOR SPACE.

moderately good and in control. The word Democratic is evaluated positively and perceived as somewhat undercontrolled.

Item Factors. Four factors represent the major dimensions along which items were arrayed (see Appendix C). For the item factors, characteristic vector coefficients above .125 represent substantial relationship between an item and a factor.

Factor I. Table 13 presents the items with high positive and high negative loadings for Factor I (Characteristic Root = 147,210).

Six of eight possible equal distribution items relate highly to this factor. Interestingly, these represent every social good except wealth, which has a neutral relationship to this factor. The positive end of this factor dimension is labeled Equal Basic Freedoms. The negative end of this dimension is characterized by random or capricious rule. All eight possible items including random distribution relate negatively to this dimension; half of all status items anchor the negative end of this dimension, implying that many decisions on the basis of status are perceived as counter to Equal Basic Freedoms.

Factor II. The second item factor (Characteristic Root = 43,310) had only negative coefficients. The highest of these are reported in Table 14. While citizen items tended to have high negative coefficients for this factor, the ruler items had coefficients near zero. Clearly, this is a Democratic

Table 13
 High Positive, Neutral, and High Negative Item Characteristic
 Vector Coefficients for the First Item Factor

Characteristic Vectors: Factor I

Distributor			
Citizens	Opportunity & Power	Equally	.213
Citizens	Rights	Equally	.212
Citizens	Self-Respect	Equally	.200
Rulers	Rights	Equally	.178
Rulers	Opportunity & Power	Equally	.176
Rulers	Self-Respect	Equally	.165
Citizens	Wealth	Equally	.047
Rulers	Wealth	Equally	.017
Citizens	Rights	Status	-.149
Citizens	Rights	Random	-.150
Citizens	Self-Respect	Random	-.152
Citizens	Opportunity & Power	Random	-.153
Citizens	Self-Respect	Status	-.156
Citizens	Wealth	Random	-.158
Rulers	Wealth	Desire	-.159
Rulers	Rights	Ability	-.160
Rulers	Rights	Need	-.170
Rulers	Self-Respect	Random	-.177
Rulers	Wealth	Random	-.179
Rulers	Rights	Random	-.180
Rulers	Opportunity & Power	Random	-.180
Rulers	Opportunity & Power	Status	-.194
Rulers	Rights	Status	-.205

Item Factor I: Random Rule vs. Equal Basic Freedoms (+)

Table 14
High Negative Characteristic Vector Coefficient for the
Second Item Factor

Item			Characteristic Vectors: Factor II
Distributor	Social Good	Method	
Citizens	Rights	Gr. Good	-.247
Citizens	Rights	Desire	-.242
Citizens	Self-Respect	Desire	-.226
Citizens	Wealth	Ability	-.226
Citizens	Self-Respect	Effort	-.222
Citizens	Opportunity & Power	Gr. Good	-.216
Citizens	Opportunity & Power	Effort	-.215
Citizens	Wealth	Gr. Good	-.214
Citizens	Rights	Need	-.209
Citizens	Wealth	Effort	-.208
Citizens	Self-Respect	Status	-.206
Citizens	Self-Respect	Gr. Good	-.201
Citizens	Opportunity & Power	Need	-.198
Citizens	Opportunity & Power	Desire	-.189
Citizens	Self-Respect	Need	-.180
Citizens	Opportunity & Power	Status	-.172
Citizens	Self-Respect	Ability	-.169
Citizens	Wealth	Desire	-.168
Citizens	Rights	Effort	-.166

Factor II: (-) Democratic Commonweal

factor, concerned with discriminating distribution of social goods. Since all four greater good items have substantial coefficients, this factor is labeled Democratic Commonweal. The factor, saturated also with desire and need, ought to carry the connotation of rewarding motivation.

Factor III. Coefficients for the third item factor (Characteristic Root = 27,583) are presented in Table 15. The negative pole of this dimension is saturated with random distribution, disposition by citizens, and a mixture of all four social goods. However, rights, and opportunities and power, social goods having the highest negative relationships to this factor, represent paths to enfranchisement or inclusion in the governing of the society. The negative pole of this factor seems to represent the spurious assignment of these social goods. Anarchy, the label applied to this pole, gives some of the flavor of disposition by the people, and disposition in such a way that governing or material powers do not accrue in a regulated fashion.

The positive pole, on the other hand, is anchored by a number of ruler items. This factor seems to represent the ruler's disposition of esteem, material goods, and other social goods on the basis of evidence of positive motivation and ability in the recipient. The positive pole of item Factor IV was designated "Overseeing", a term which seemed to capture the notion of management originating from rulers.

Factor IV. The Characteristic Root for item Factor IV

Table 15
 High Positive and High Negative Characteristic Vector
 Coefficients for the Third Item Factor

Distributor	Item		Characteristic Vectors: Factor III
	Social Good	Method	
Rulers	Wealth	Effort	.240
Rulers	Self-Respect	Effort	.223
Rulers	Self-Respect	Gr. Good	.218
Rulers	Wealth	Gr. Good	.204
Rulers	Self-Respect	Ability	.183
Rulers	Rights	Desire	.182
Rulers	Opportunity & Power	Gr. Good	.172
Rulers	Rights	Ability	.163
Rulers	Opportunity & Power	Desire	.161
Rulers	Opportunity & Power	Equally	.160
Rulers	Opportunity & Power	Ability	.154
Rulers	Rights	Random	-.137
Citizens	Wealth	Equally	-.146
Rulers	Opportunity & Power	Random	-.147
Rulers	Wealth	Random	-.157
Citizens	Wealth	Desire	-.184
Citizens	Self-Respect	Random	-.225
Citizens	Wealth	Random	-.237
Citizens	Opportunity & Power	Random	-.244
Citizens	Rights	Random	-.249

Factor III: (-) Anarchy vs. Overseeing (+)

was 17,366. This is substantially less than the Characteristic Roots for the first three item factors. Nonetheless, this factor did have some interesting qualities. Examination of Table 16 reveals that the high positive items tend to concern wealth, and the distribution of it equally, by need or, to a lesser extent, by desire. The positive end of this factor was named Material Grants and Entitlements. This pole seems to represent the view that those who need and desire wealth ought to have it. If people need and desire wealth to a similar degree, wealth ought to be distributed equally. The sense of disposition by the few is connoted in the term "grants."

The negative pole concerns distribution of the four social goods by citizens on the basis of effort. The one status item may have the flavor of earned rather than ascribed status. This pole has the connotation of Earning as judged by Consensus, with the notion that it is a common, democratic or grassroot consensus.

Person Factors. Four persons factors emerged (see Appendix C) as representing significant common variance out of the 80 factors calculated for the 160 persons participating in this study. The Characteristic Roots for these factors were (1) 140,962; (2) 33,690; (3) 17,429 and (4) 13,033. Characteristic vector coefficients above $.079$ ($160 \times [.079]^2 = 1.00$) represent substantial relationships between a person and a factor. Tucker (1972) recommends the use of idealized

Table 16

High Positive and High Negative Characteristic Vector
Coefficients for the Fourth Item Factor

Distributor	Item		Characteristic Vectors: Factor IV
	Social Good	Method	
Rulers	Wealth	Equally	.424
Citizens	Wealth	Equally	.391
Citizens	Wealth	Need	.321
Rulers	Wealth	Need	.238
Rulers	Opportunity & Power	Equally	.159
Rulers	Wealth	Desire	.152
Rulers	Rights	Equally	.146
Citizens	Wealth	Effort	-.140
Citizens	Self-Respect	Status	-.169
Citizens	Rights	Effort	-.171
Citizens	Opportunity & Power	Effort	-.174

Factor IV: (-) Earning judged by Consensus vs. Material
Grants and Entitlement (+)

persons or real persons with unusual characteristics for use as reference points in the interpretation of person factors. Prior to the analysis, several such actual people were identified: a professed Communist, a Republican, a Democrat, a person who responded positively only to equal distribution items, a person who responded negatively to nearly all items, a person who responded positively to nearly all items, a person who responded negatively to almost all ruler items, a person who responded negatively to almost all citizen items. The ways in which these people arrayed themselves in the person space aided in the interpretation of person factors.

Factor I. The first person factor was a general factor which cut across all persons, all individuals but five having a positive coefficient. Table 17 presents some relationships which will help illuminate the nature of this general factor.

The four individuals with the highest coefficients for this factor described themselves on the liberal side of the political spectrum. The items these individuals evaluated positively concerned the distribution of basic freedoms for the common good or to everyone equally. Hence, the factor was titled Democratic Socialism, the socialistic aspect being in the disposition of general enfranchisement into the rule and respect of the society and contribution to the society rather than in the ownership or distribution of material goods. Individuals represented strongly on this factor seem to perceive social justice in somewhat the same manner as Rawls

Table 17
 Item Response and Political Characteristics
 of Persons with Strong Relationships^a to
 Person Factor I

Subject	Political Affiliation	Characteristic Vector
2	Communist	.129
151	Democrat	.123
65	Democrat	.121
81	Democrat	.120

Table 17 - Continued

Unanimously Positively Evaluated Items	Unanimously Negatively Evaluated Item	
Citizens-Rights-Equally	Citizens-Wealth-Ability	Rulers-Wealth-Ability
Citizens-Opportunity & Power-Equally	Citizens-Wealth-Random	Rulers-Wealth-Effort
Citizens-Opportunity & Power-Greater Good	Citizens-Wealth-Status	Rulers-Wealth-Desire
Citizens-Self-Respect-Equally	Citizens-Rights-Random	Rulers-Wealth-Random
Citizens-Self-Respect-Greater Good	Citizens-Rights-Status	Rulers-Wealth-Status
Rulers-Rights-Equally	Citizens-Opportunity & Power-Random	Rulers-Rights-Ability
Rulers-Self-Respect-Equally	Citizens-Opportunity & Power-Status	Rulers-Rights-Need
	Citizens-Self-Respect-Random	Rulers-Rights-Effort
	Citizens-Self-Respect-Status	Rulers-Rights-Desire
		Rulers-Rights-Status
		Rulers-Opportunity & Power-Need
		Rulers-Opportunity & Power-Effort
		Rulers-Opportunity & Power-Desire
		Rulers-Opportunity & Power-Greater

Factor I: Democratic Socialism

^a Characteristic vector is greater than 1.5 x .079 or .119

(1971) describes. These individuals consistently negatively evaluate 50 percent of ruler items involving other than equal distribution.

Similarly, citizens distributing randomly or on the basis of status are rated negatively. Evidently the distribution of wealth according to ability is categorized as being as bad as random or status distribution, a viewpoint counter to those who advocate meritocracy.

Factor II. The second factor to emerge could be classified as a response style factor. The individual (#34) with the highest positive characteristic vector coefficient (.25) rated all items, with the exception of equal distribution items, with near maximum ratings of bad, unjust, wrong, weak, conservative, unfair, strict and authoritarian. Other persons with high coefficients (person #110, .21 characteristic vector coefficient; #115, .20; #11, .10; #113, .19) negatively rated some equal distribution items as well. The positive pole of this factor appears to be a negativistic or pessimistic response style.

As expected the individuals with high negative coefficients (person #153, -.19; #150, -.17; #112, -.16) tended to rate all items as good, just, right, strong, liberal, fair, permissive and democratic.

This factor was labeled Optimism vs. Pessimism. Although clearly a response style factor, it could well be a factor with political belief correlates. The Optimist may well believe

that justice will out in this best of all possible worlds.

Factor III. The next factor to be obtained was a Democracy vs. Oligarchy factor. The individual with the highest negative coefficient (person #90, $-.335$) on this factor rated all 32 of the ruler items as bad, unjust, wrong, weak, conservative, unfair, strict and authoritarian, and 31 of the 32 citizen items as good, just, right, strong, liberal, fair, permissive and democratic. The person with the second highest negative coefficient (person #74, $-.137$) rated 25 (78 percent) of the 32 ruler items negatively and 23 (72 percent) of the 32 citizens items positively. The negative pole of this factor represents a democratic orientation.

The results for the positive endpoint of the factor were not as strong. The individual with the highest characteristic vector coefficient (person #25, $.213$) rated 19 of 32 (59 percent) ruler items positively and 18 (56 percent) citizen items negatively. The individual with the second highest coefficient (person #153, $.190$) rated 20 (63 percent) ruler items positively and 10 (31 percent) citizen items negatively. Yet with the prevalence of a democratic bias in our culture (Dolbeare, et al., 1973), the differentiation is strong enough to suggest that the positive pole of this factor be labeled Oligarchy.

Factor IV. Table 18 summarizes the differential responses of the individuals who anchor the poles of this factor.

This factor seemed to contrast Welfare vs. Merit points

Table 18
 Unanimous Ratings and Characteristic Vector
 Coefficients for the Individuals with High
 Negative and Positive Relationships^a
 to Person Factor IV

Subject	Characteristic Vector Coefficients	
113	.233	
2	.195	
117	.187	
30	-.179	
126	-.199	
22	-.228	

Item	Unanimous Evaluative Ratings ^a	
	Individuals at Positive Pole	Individuals at Negative Pole
Citizens-Wealth-Ability	had, unjust	good, just
Citizens-Wealth-Need	good, just	bad, unjust
Citizens-Wealth-Equally	good, just	bad, unjust
Rulers-Wealth-Equally	good, just	bad, unjust
Rulers-Rights-Ability	bad, unjust	good, just
Rulers-Self-Respect-Ability	bad, unjust	good, just
Rulers-Wealth-Gr. Good	bad, unjust	good, just
Rulers-Self-Respect-Gr. Good	bad, unjust	good, just

^aRatings of +3, +2, -2 or -3

of view. The discriminating items deal largely with wealth and its distribution. Individuals at the negative pole positively evaluate dispositions of wealth on the basis of ability or contributions to the greater good. Likewise, ruler's dispositions of rights and self-respect on the basis of ability are rated as good and just. Distributions of wealth equally or according to need are negatively evaluated. This seems to represent a meritocratic point of view.

The Welfare pole individuals positively evaluate equal distribution of wealth or distribution by citizens to those in need. Negative evaluations are assigned to dispositions on the basis of ability or contribution to the greater good for those items listed.

Core Matrix. From 160 person x 64 item x 8 scales, 81,920 variables resulted. Tucker's method of factoring reduced this overabundance of data to 4 person factors by 4 items factors by 2 scale factors. This summarization of common variance ignores random error variance, but may also ignore specific factors, if such were important. Nonetheless, we have moved from 81,920 variables to 32 (4 items x 4 persons x 2 scales). These 32 pieces of information are summarized and assigned relative importance in the Core Matrix presented in Table 19. The absolute value of the coefficient for each person by item by scale category denotes the relative importance in data summarization of that cell in the Table. The sign of the coefficient indicates the direction of the

Table 19
Core Matrix: Three Mode
Factor Analysis

Person and Item Factors	Scale Factors	
	Scale Factor I Evaluation (-)Negative to Positive(+)	Scale Factor II Control Conservative Strict to Liberal (Permissive(+))
Person 1: Democratic Socialist (+)		
Items: (-) Random Rule vs. Equal Basic Freedoms (+)	<u>362.22</u>	15.91
(-) Democratic Commonweal	-16.11	2.02
(-) Anarchy vs. Overseeing (+)	8.64	<u>-68.97</u>
(-) Earning judged by Consensus vs. Material grants and Entitlements (+)	6.12	<u>40.36</u>
Person 2: (-) Optimist vs. Pessimist (+)		
Items: (-) Random Rule vs. Equal Basic Freedoms (+)	13.70	-6.51
(-) Democratic Commonweal	<u>178.90</u>	-13.21
(-) Anarchy vs. Overseeing (+)	-14.04	15.13
(-) Earning judged by Consensus vs. Material grants and Entitlements (+)	1.12	-.53
Person 3: (-) Democracy vs. Oligarchy (+)		
Items: (-) Random Rule vs. Equal Basic Freedoms (+)	-4.87	15.09
(-) Democratic Commonweal	11.13	14.42
(-) Anarchy vs. Overseeing (+)	<u>112.08</u>	3.14
(-) Earning judged by Consensus vs. Material grants and Entitlements (+)	59.28	8.08
Person 4: (-) Merit vs. Welfare (+)		
Items: (-) Random Rule vs. Equal Basic Freedoms (+)	3.68	<u>50.41</u>
(-) Democratic Commonweal	.05	14.24
(-) Anarchy vs. Overseeing (+)	<u>-43.48</u>	14.20
(-) Earning judged by Consensus vs. Material grants and Entitlements (+)	<u>68.57</u>	<u>-30.73</u>

relationship. We shall discuss each relevant pole of a person factor as if it referred to one idealized, abstracted, or conceptual individual.

Person 1, the Democratic Socialist, responds to the first item factor with extreme evaluative ratings and average control ratings. Equal Basic Freedom items are perceived as very good, fair, right and just; Random Rule items are perceived as very bad, unfair, wrong and unjust. The Democratic Socialist does not discriminate along the Evaluation dimension for any other set of items. However, he does differentiate along the Control dimension for two sets of items: Anarchy vs. Overseeing and Earning Judged by Consensus vs. Material Grants. Anarchy is perceived as permissive and liberal, Overseeing as strict and conservative. The giving of Material Grants is perceived as liberal and permissive, Earning as somewhat strict and conservative. Note the contrast here between the giving of material goods (evaluatively average, liberal) and the granting of Basic Freedoms (positively evaluated, average on the Control dimension). The Democratic Socialist, then, highly values Basic Freedoms, is sensitive to the sources of control in the society and feels a society that gives away its material goods is quite liberal, but one that requires they be earned is quite conservative.

The second person factor contrasts Optimists and Pessimists. These two persons, as indicated by their signs, have opposite points of view. As one would expect for such a

person dimension, the Optimist and Pessimist make differentiations along the Evaluation dimension, but not along the Control dimension. The Pessimist describes Democratic Commonweal items as bad, unjust, unfair. To put it bluntly, contributing to the public good is no good. If one is pessimistic about the state of the nation, this viewpoint makes perfect sense. The Optimist, on the other hand, positively evaluates the Democratic Commonweal items.

The third person dimension contrasts advocates of Democracy and Oligarchy. Surprisingly, these individuals do not make significant discriminations along the Control dimension, rather they differ in their evaluation of two sets of items. The Oligarch describes Overseeing and Material Grants in positive terms. This kind of person might almost be called management-oriented.

The Democracy advocate, on the other hand, evaluates Anarchy and Earning items as fair, good and just. The Democracy advocate seems to be a person interested in individual freedom, or dispersed or decentralized distribution of social goods. This decentralized distribution is evaluated positively in and of itself. Questions as to whether this decentralization is strict or permissive seem not to enter.

The final factor is anchored by Merit and Welfare advocates. These persons are sensitive to both Evaluation and Control dimensions.

The Welfare advocate sees Equal Basic Freedoms as liberal and permissive, and Random Rule as conservative and strict. This person negatively evaluates Overseeing, but positively evaluates Material Grants. Material Grants are also seen as being conservative and strict, while Earning appears liberal and permissive. A picture emerges of the Welfare advocate as one who bristles under the sometimes unpredictable restrictions of paternalistic authority. Grants are seen as mechanisms of control. Earning as judged by Consensus and Basic Freedoms are seen as ways of loosening control.

The Merit advocate, in contrast, views Equal Basic Freedoms as strict and conservative. This person positively evaluates Overseeing and negatively evaluates Material Grants. These grants are seen as permissive and liberal, while Earning is seen as conservative and strict. To elaborate somewhat fancifully on this point of view, things should not be given away, they should be earned. Someone in authority must be there to make sure things run properly. Basic Freedoms are obligations or mechanisms of order.

These observations, derived from the Core Matrix, may now be submitted to a final analysis. Background information as to age, sex, marital status, region of residence, number of children, place in birth order, ethnic identification, country of citizenship, number of generations of U.S. citizenship, education, number of siblings, if the Subject or his/her parents were immigrants, occupation, and political affiliation

was requested from each Subject. In addition, each Subject had received one of four forms of the questionnaire, representing two levels of two variables (constructors of the constitution knew or did not know their future position in society; 15 percent or 85 percent of the people were satisfied with the results of the distributions). These variables were entered into a step-wise multiple regression with the four person factor coefficients to determine if any meaningful relationships existed between background or experimental variables and the points of view summarized here.

Multiple Regression

Democratic Socialism. Two variables emerged as predictors of Democratic Socialism responses. If the Subject was single, the Subject's responses were lower on the Democratic Socialism factor. If the Subject received a questionnaire describing only 15 percent of the recipients of social goods as satisfied, the Subject scored higher on the Democratic Socialism factor. These two variables, together, accounted for only 8 percent of the factor variance. However, in terms of Rawls' (1971) theory of justice and Lerner's (1975) relating of justice concepts to life roles, these appear to be psychologically significant concepts.

Optimism vs. Pessimism. Four variables accounted for 15.2 percent of this factor's variance.

Being single and being part of the Texas sample which was experiencing an economic boom at the time of questionnaire

Table 20

Multiple Regression for Democratic Socialism

Multiple R	.282				
R ²	.080				
Analysis of Variance					
Source	df	Sums of Squares	Mean Square	F	p
Regression	2	.00962	.00481	6.775	.005
Residual	157	.11115	.00071		
Variables in Equation					
Variable	B	Beta	Standard Error B	F	p
Single	-.0137	-.245	.00431	10.098	.005
15% Satisfied	.0096	.174	.00424	5.098	.05
(Constant)	.0774				

Table 21

Multiple Regression for Optimism vs. Pessimism

Multiple R	.390				
R ²	.152				
Analysis of Variance					
Source	df	Sums of Squares	Mean Square	F	p
Regression	4	.15015	.03754	6.96	.005
Residual	155	.83520	.00539		
Variables in Equation					
Variable	B	Beta	Standard Error B	F	p
Professional	.0416	.186	.01720	5.859	.025
Single	-.0516	-.324	.01485	12.084	.005
Texas	-.0364	-.223	.01467	6.161	.025
15% Satisfied	.0291	.160	.01172	4.592	.05
(Constant)	.0154				

administration increased the optimism of questionnaire responses. Being single implies responsibility for one's self, alone, in attaining the social and material benefits of a society. Perhaps that task is less easy when one must provide for others.

Those who received questionnaires describing only 15 percent of the recipients of social goods as satisfied, answered their questionnaires in a pessimistic manner. That a one sentence remark implying lack of satisfaction could influence significantly questionnaire responses, indicates the potency of this variable.

Classifying one's self as a Professional, also was related to increased pessimism. With effects of ethnic identification (Western European) partialled out, this variable diminishes in importance. However, future studies may want to investigate the relationship between responsibility and pessimism.

Democracy vs. Oligarchy. The correlates of this viewpoint, accounting for 15.4 percent of the factor variance, are rather interesting. The four individuals in the sample who were not U.S. citizens (two of them described themselves as Africans, one as an Asiatic and one as a Western European) tended to be more extreme in their democratic ratings than the remainder of the sample. Whether this effect is due to minority group membership, status as an outsider, the motivating factors which caused the individual to study in the U.S. or other equally probable explanations is not clear. Being male, and being part of the

Table 22

Multiple Regression for Democracy vs. Oligarchy

Multiple R	.393				
R ²	.154				
Analysis of Variance					
Source	df	Sums of Squares	Mean Square	F	p
Regression	6	.15271	.02545	4.66	.01
Residual	153	.83559	.00546		

Table 22 - Continued

Variables in Equation					
Variable	B	Beta	Standard Error B	F	p
Texas College	-.0323	-.198	.01318	6.005	.025
Non-U.S. Citizen	-.0957	-.190	.04056	5.572	.025
Male	-.0246	-.155	.01198	4.209	.05
Age	-.0179	-.200	.00776	5.321	.025
Only Child	.0432	.160	.02147	4.056	.05
Generations/U.S.	-.0081	-.113	.00589	1.906	n.s.
(Constant)	.0864				

Table 23

Multiple Regression for Merit vs. Welfare

Multiple R	.364				
R ²	.133				
Analysis of Variance					
Source	df	Sums of Squares	Mean Square	F	p
Regression	4	.13246	.03311	5.93	.01
Residual	155	.86466	.00558		

Table 23 - Continued

Variables in Equation					
Variable	B	Beta	Standard Error B	F	p
Republican	-.0333	-.172	.01464	5.162	.05
Armed Services	.1911	.191	.07502	6.494	.025
Blue Collar	.0916	.181	.03801	5.811	.025
Black	-.0497	.153	.02466	4.068	.05
(Constant)	-.0038				

optimistic Texas sample also related to increases in the Democratic point of view. In addition, growing older relates positively to the Democratic viewpoint.

Youth, being an only child, being female, and being a U.S. citizen are related to higher Oligarchic factor scores.

Merit vs. Welfare. Four variables accounted for 13.3 percent of this factor's variance. Republicans tend to score toward the Merit end of this dimension. Blacks, blue collar workers, and armed services personnel tended to score toward the Welfare end of this dimension. Not more than four members of the armed services took this questionnaire. Because of that extremely small sample size, any inferences about the reason for their score pattern must wait for replication in another sample.

Although the background variables did not account for very large proportions of factor variance, the relationships which did emerge were statistically significant and were reasonable in terms of the factor interpretations set forth.

Discussion

The 160 Subjects of the present investigation articulated at least four points of view in their evaluations of 64 societal distribution vignettes. The raw data of their ratings was factored by means of three mode analysis across scales, items and persons. The factor structure revealed that Subjects rated data along at least two implicit scale dimensions and grouped vignettes into at least four clusters of items. Individuals used the scale dimensions differently to rate these items; these differences in the way Subjects evaluated item groups, have been summarized by the term "viewpoint."

The first viewpoint extracted was a general component, upon which every Subject, with the exception of five Subjects, had a positive loading. This factor, labeled Democratic Socialism, is a general factor which has significant correlations with the other three viewpoints (see Table 24). However, the remaining three viewpoints appear to be independent of one another.

Before these four viewpoints are discussed in detail, however, it is important to identify the ways in which Subjects structured scales and items, for two reasons: 1) to relate this structure to the psychological and philosophical studies reviewed earlier and 2) to discuss in concrete terms the scale and item dimensions which for convenience are referred to by more abstract factor labels in the remainder of

Table 24

Correlations among Person Factors

Person Factors	Democratic Socialism	(-)Optimism vs. Pessimism(+)	(-)Democracy vs. Oligarchy(+)	(-)Merit vs. Welfare(+)
Democratic Socialism(+)	1.000			
(-)Optimism vs. Pessimism(+)	.329**	1.000		
(-)Democracy vs. Oligarchy(+)	-.294**	.013	1.000	
(-)Merit vs. Welfare(+)	.145*	-.007	.006	1.000

*p < .05

**p < .01

of this paper.

Scales

The eight rating scales were summarized by two relatively uncorrelated dimensions ($r = -.154$, $df=6$, n.s.) representing evaluative adjectives (good, just, right, fair, and their opposites) and adjectives referring to styles of control (conservative and strict contrasted with liberal and permissive). Theoretically, the emergence of these two dimensions has interesting implications. Frankena (1962), for example, argues that classical libertarian conceptions of law predict that what is good is not necessarily just. The province of justice and fairness is in the equal application of rules whether or not these rules result in an outcome that is perceived as "good" or "right". In contrast, beneficence, the greatest good for the greatest number, the establishment of the good or ideal society is perceived by libertarians as the province of morality and mercy (cf. Mill, 1949). Defenders of the welfare state, rather than libertarians, Frankena suggests, would equate or correlate good, right, just and fair.

In the same volume, Vlastos (1962) emphasizes the incentive value of rewards (cf. Skinner, 1969). He remarks that a distributive scheme which increases the supply of what individuals perceive as good, through the judicious use of rewards for producing that good at the highest obtainable level, will be perceived as contributing to fairness and

justice as long as the rights and liberties of the individuals concerned and of future society members are not weakened (see also Rawls, 1971). In short, these authors argue that the equation of just, fair, good and right presupposes a predilection for "outcome" as opposed to "process" theories of justice. If this is the case, the naive Subjects of the present sample seem to structure justice in consonance with "outcome" theories.

The fair application of a rule is not sufficient for justice to be perceived (cf. Deutsch, 1975), the rule must also lead to tolerable or good results.

One implication of this finding is that Subjects such as those included in this study, may encounter situations in which they literally can perceive "no justice." Boulding (1962) indicates that for some individuals no distributive solution will be considered fair when necessary resources are scarce, i.e., "when more come to table than can be fed." Several authors (e.g., Boulding, 1962; Dahl, 1971) have suggested that, for this reason, affluent societies are more likely to have the conditions necessary, but not sufficient, to being perceived as just societies.

The second scale factor resembles a dimension frequently found in political research and variously labeled Tender-Minded vs. Tough-Minded (Eysenck, 1954) or Liberal vs. Conservative (Lane, 1973). Correlates of the more detailed conservative dimensions described in other research (Lane,

1973) include resistance to change, caution in responding to problems, support for free enterprise, and support for individualism. Since only two adjectives anchored each pole of this dimension in the present study, the interpretation, here, must be considerably less detailed. The conservative-strict pole, seems to represent caution and control, in the context of traditional values. The term "liberal" has received much less clear definition in the political literature reviewed. Lane (1973), for example, remarks that his samples of Yale undergraduates and Connecticut workers tend to confuse the several meanings of the term "liberal," even when asked to identify their political beliefs, and seem to refer to "liberal" as generous, "not conservative," tolerant, innovative and concerned about other's welfare. For the present study, liberal-permissive seems to suggest a quality of openhandedness, accompanied by tolerant standards of social regulation.

What appears to be important is that these two dimensions are relatively independent. What is seen as liberal is not necessarily seen as fair; what is fair is not necessarily liberal for our Subjects. Likewise, what is seen as conservative is not necessarily seen as fair and vice versa. The adjectives which had moderate loadings on both dimensions illustrate this point: democratic (somewhat liberal, somewhat good), authoritarian (somewhat conservative, somewhat bad), strong (somewhat strict, somewhat good) and

weak (somewhat permissive, somewhat bad). Both democratic and strong are judged as moderately good and fair, but they differ in their degree of liberality or conservatism.

Several Subjects indicated by spontaneous comment or by notes on their questionnaires that they used the strong-weak scale as if it were synonymous with an "efficient" or "effective" vs. an "inefficient" or "ineffective" scale. Future research should explore if the interpretation by these Subjects is generally held: if, indeed, judgements of efficiency or productivity tend to fall midway between positive evaluative judgements and judgements of degree of conservative regulation.

If this is the case, the "intuitive factor analysis" of at least two authors (Boulding, 1962; Okun, 1975) would seem to have found a consensual reflection in this Subject population. Further, such research would demonstrate that equity theory, which is concerned with judgements of appropriate pay for productivity, is measuring a dimension related to but not identical with judgements of fairness, one that is slightly strict and conservative in its orientation, and which ignores more liberal formulations.

Boulding (1962, p. 83) writes

The concept of justice is profoundly two-dimensional. It encompasses, on the one hand, what might be called "disalienation," that is, the idea that nobody should be alienated from the society in which he lives. This




FIGURE 3

HYPOTHETICAL ORGANIZATION OF BOULDING'S TWO FORMS OF JUSTICE.

is the aspect of justice which is reflected in the struggle for equality. . . . The concept here is a familistic one - society is conceived of as a great family from whose table not even the humblest of her members shall be excluded.

Boulding labels the second dimension "desert"

It is this concept which gives rise to a productivity theory of distribution according to contribution, and leads to the view that he who does not contribute to the social product does not deserve any reward out of it. There is considerable tension between these two dimensions of justice. In general, they cannot both be satisfied. . . . We face the dilemma, therefore, that if everyone gets his deserts, some may be driven from the table; and if everyone comes to the table, some may not get their deserts.

(Boulding, 1962, p. 83)

Okun (1975) echoes this viewpoint even in the title of his book, Equality versus Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff.

Both Boulding and Okun suggest resolutions to this dilemma. Boulding feels that justice impels societies to provide a social minimum of goods, rights, and services equally to all its citizens; above that minimum notions of "desert" are prepotent. Okun suggests that the use of rewards as incentives for productivity is fair to the extent

that the productivity promotes general welfare with each individual having an equal vote in what this welfare might be. We will examine shortly whether these resolutions are reflected in the viewpoints of Subjects.

It seems, then, that liberal-permissive and conservative-strict form a dimension only weakly correlated for our Subjects to the more important evaluative dimension. The evaluative dimension tends to equate judgements of goodness and justice. It appears to represent an "outcome" above and beyond a "process" orientation to justice on the part of the Subjects. "Strong" (and perhaps efficient) is descriptive of that which is moderately fair and moderately conservative. "Democratic" is descriptive of that which is moderately fair and moderately liberal, for this Subject group.

Items

The items in this study were analyzed using 1) principal factor analysis over all social goods, and over each social good individually with "fairness" as the sole dependent variable, and 2) by Tucker's three mode procedure in which all social goods were included and subject to clustering or separation, and in which the two scale dimensions, evaluation and control, were both represented as dependent variables. The factors resulting from these two methods indicate that, if one collapses across categories (the four social goods, for example) and over dimensions (the evaluation and control dimensions) slightly different

summarizations of perceptions of distributive justice emerge.

Examination of Table 25 reveals that when all social goods are summed together and judged on fairness alone, three significant factors emerged for our sample. The first factor resembles equity as applied by rulers, emphasizing ability; the second resembles equity as applied by citizens, emphasizing effort; and the third represents random distribution.

When each social good is taken separately, a quite complex pattern develops. For wealth, for example, there are four factors: 1) distribution equally or to those in need, 2) distribution by rulers equitably, emphasizing the greater good, 3) distribution by citizens equitably emphasizing effort and 4) random distribution. For the remaining social goods, there are factors which could be interpreted as ruler-centered or citizen-centered for each social good, factors which could be interpreted as representing equitable distributions for opportunity and power (effort), rights (effort), and self-respect (effort and also ability), and factors which, in the framework of expectancy-value or utilitarian theory, could be represented as motivational factors, emphasizing desire and need for opportunity and power, rights, and self-respect. In addition, there is one equal distribution factor for self-respect. Thus, all major psychological theories -- equity, equality and expectancy-value -- receive some support in

Table 25
 Summary of Principal Factor Analyses of Judged
 Fairness of Social Goods

Items	Social Good Factors								
Citizens-Effort	AII ₁		WIII ₁	OPI ₁		RI ₅	RIII ₁	SRII ₃	SRIII ₃
Citizens-Greater Good	AII ₂		WIII ₃	OPI ₂		RI ₃		SRII ₂	
Citizens-Ability	AII ₃		WIII ₂	OPI ₅		RI ₆	RIII ₃	SRII ₁	
Citizens-Status	AII ₄		WIII ₅	OPI ₆		RI ₄		SRII ₄	
Citizens-Desire	AII ₅		WIII ₄	OPI ₃		RI ₁			SRIII ₂
Citizens-Need	AII ₆	WI ₃		OPI ₄		RI ₂			SRIII ₁
Citizens-Random		AIII		WIV ₁		OPIII			
Citizens-Equal			WI ₂						SRIV ₂
Rulers-Effort	AI ₃		WII ₂				RII ₂	SRI ₁	
Rulers-Greater Good	AI ₂		WII ₁		OPII ₃		RII ₅	SRI ₂	
Rulers-Ability	AI ₁		WII ₃				RII ₂	SRI ₃	
Rulers-Status	AI ₅		WII ₅				RII ₃		
Rulers-Desire	AI ₄		WII ₄		OPII ₁		RII ₄	SRI ₅	
Rulers-Need	AI ₆	WI ₄			OPII ₂		RII ₁	SRI ₄	
Rulers-Random		AIII		WIV ₂		OPIII			
Rulers-Equal			WI ₁						SRIV ₁

A = All Social Goods

W = Wealth

OP = Opportunity & Power

R = Rights

SR = Self Respect

Roman Numerals Refer to Factor Numbers

Arabic Numerals Refer to Rank within Factor

portions of this Table. The degree of support is not clear, however. Principal factor analysis with varimax rotation tends to divide common variance into factors of approximately equal proportions. This accounts, in part, for the generous number of factors and the lack of a coherent pattern of results. The patterns which do appear, such as the prevalence of citizen-only or ruler-only factors, take on a different structure when the data is submitted to three mode analysis. This analysis allows extraction of general factors, allows similarities and differences between social goods to manifest themselves, and allows ordering of items simultaneously along evaluative and control dimensions.

Table 26 summarizes the four major item factors obtained by three mode analysis. The first applies primarily to rights, opportunities and powers, and self-respect. Wealth is only slightly related to the positive end of this dimension. The factor includes both citizen and ruler distribution. Labeled Random Rule vs. Equal Basic Freedoms, it seems to contrast universal entitlement to dignity, liberty, and mobility within society with spurious distinctions made by a non-representative ruling set. As such, it seems to have properties coincident with Rawls' (1971) First Principle (see Introduction).

The second factor was represented by citizen items only. All citizen items had negative coefficients and all ruler items had near-zero coefficients. Each of the four

Table 26
 Patterns of High and Low Factor Coefficients for Four Item Factors
 derived by Three Mode Factor Analysis

Distributor's Mode	Social Goods															
	Wealth				Opportunity & Power				Rights				Self-Respect			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Citizens Effort	-			-				-								
Citizens Greater Good	-															-
Citizens Ability	-															
Citizens Status																
Citizens Desire		-														
Citizens Need																
Citizens Random	-															
Citizens Equal	0															
Rulers Effort																
Rulers Greater Good																
Rulers Ability																
Rulers Status																
Rulers Desire	-															
Rulers Need																
Rulers Random	-															
Rulers Equal	0															

Factor I: Random Rule vs. Equal Basic Freedoms
 Factor II: Democratic Commonweal
 Factor III: Anarchy vs. Overseeing
 Factor IV: Earning judged by Consensus vs. Material Grants and Entitlements

+ highest coefficient
- lowest coefficient

social goods were included. Six distributive principles loaded on the factor; in descending order of importance, they were greater good, desire, effort, status, ability and need. The factor was labeled Democratic Commonwealth to capture the connotation of citizens agreeing to distribute the four social goods for the greater good. The order of the distributive principles, if replicated with other samples and measures, suggests the importance of goal-orientation (greater good), motivation (desire), and activity (effort) as opposed to the more static traits of status and ability in defining at least this one consensual rationale for the allocation of rewards. The grouping of greater good, desire and effort also is consistent with the connotation of benevolence (willing good) and beneficence (enacting good). The exclusive loading of citizen items suggest that this is a consensual good rather than an imposed good.

The vague and general label "greater good" within the questionnaire, however, sidesteps several important research issues: do the Subjects agree in specific terms as to what constitutes "greater good," do Subjects assume they agree when indeed they might not (Campbell, 1958), what conditions promote such agreement, if a majority agrees are they willing to tyrannize or to compromise with a dissenting minority (Bickel, 1975; Dahl, 1956)? Such questions were beyond the scope of the present study. However, research in

the fields of game theory (Gamson, 1964; Gamson, 1968), small groups (Hare, Bales & Borgatta, 1965), and interpersonal attraction (Huston, 1974) underlines the importance of mutual goal agreement. Such agreement encourages cooperation, respect, and liking. Blau (1977) describes mutuality of interests as one of the factors which promotes social commerce across class lines in heterogeneous societies. Homogeneity of values has been described as a necessary condition for the existence of certain forms of social organization (The Sociology Department, Hebrew University, 1960). In a society such as the United States, which has been described as a pluralistic society, it would be interesting to find, describe, and quantify the extensiveness of the relatively common goal agreements which define the Public Good. Points of view may vary, here, as well (see Messick, 1974, for an example in education).

The third item factor, Anarchy vs. Overseeing, contrasts dispositions made primarily by rulers with those made primarily by citizens. The citizens' allocations uniformly include random distribution. In addition, in the case of wealth, equal distribution or distribution according to desire are also associated with the negative pole of this factor. Random distribution by rulers also loads here. The implication appears to be that equal distribution of wealth or distribution of it according to desires is associated with as haphazard or decentralized a state of affairs as

random distribution.

The positive pole of this item cluster reflects differential distribution of the four social goods by rulers. Wealth and self-respect are distributed on the basis of effort, intent to bring about greater good and ability. Rights are distributed, in order of importance, by desire and ability. Opportunities and powers are distributed on the basis of intent to use for the greater good, desire, equality, and ability. Once again, activity (effort), goals (greater good) and motivation (desire) are emphasized, even though ability also appears to play a role here, too.

The Anarchy vs. Overseeing item factor seems to represent common discriminations made about the wise disposition of authority in democracy.

Throughout the political science literature (Aristotle, 1953; Bickel, 1975; Dahl, 1956; Plato, 1952), democracy or majority rule is described as having certain dangers. One has been that government would be carried forth in response to the lowest common denominator of majority interests, i.e., mobocracy as opposed to democracy, or in response to idle changes in fad and fashion. Thomas Jefferson, John Dewey, and others recognized, therefore, that democracy required an educated and enlightened citizenry. If one does not believe such a citizenry exists, populism would appear to have a disorganizing effect on society (Hofstadter, 1955),

analagous to the random distribution by citizens in this item factor.

A second danger of democracy, as pointed out by Madison and Hamilton in the Federalist Papers (1911), is that majorities will tyrannize minorities. The rise to power of a benevolent, wise, educated, efficient and protective class of public office-holders or judicial standard-keepers (Bickel, 1975) was, therefore, desirable. In conservative thought, the standards express themselves as the result of social evolution -- customs captured in institutions. Quoting Edmund Burke, Bickel (1975) writes,

Under such a government, a partnership Burke calls it, "the restraints on men, as well as their liberties, are to be reckoned among their rights," and "all men have equal rights, but not to equal things," since a leveling egalitarianism which does not reward merit and ability is harmful to all and is unjust as well.

Civil society is a creature of its past, of "a great mysterious incorporation," and of an evolution which in improving never produces anything "wholly new," and in conserving never retains anything "wholly obsolete." (p. 20)

This statement seems to add meaning to the item cluster Overseeing as it is opposed to Anarchy. To reward effort, positive motivation and ability, is to preserve the standards of the society against a chaotic clamor. It is interesting

to note that, in this cluster, respect and wealth are granted for the same reasons; in fact, the three wealth and the three respect items represented on this factor are the six items with highest loading. According to Hofstadter (1955), equation of wealth and respect also is representative of some forms of conservative thought echoed from Calvinist tradition.

. . . Sumner expressed an inherited conception of economic life, even today fairly widespread among conservatives in the United States, under which economic activity was considered to be above all a field for the development and encouragement of personal character. Economic life was construed as a set of arrangements that offered inducements to men of good character, while it punished those who were, in Sumner's words, "negligent, shiftless, inefficient, silly, and imprudent." (pp. 10-11)

While the Overseeing pole of the item factor seems to represent some common threads in conservative or, as Bickel would call it, pragmatic thought, the Anarchy pole deserves discussion in its own right. Since it is saturated with random distribution items, one could well ask what random distribution would accomplish. There appears to be two politically relevant artifacts of such distribution: 1) recipients would be statistically representative of their society and 2) goods would be dispersed across all conceivable class, power, community and interest group lines. Both

liberals and conservatives have been concerned with the self-perpetuating nature of social inequalities (Hawkins, 1977), that wealth begets wealth, and power acts as an instigation to and base for greater power (cf. Blau, 1955 for empirical support). Random distribution by citizens, and distribution of wealth equally or to those who desire it, seems to be a cynical corrective to the tendency toward centralization of rewards and distributive rule-making in society.

The final item factor is concerned primarily with the allocation of wealth, and, to a much lesser extent, with the distribution of other social goods. The positive pole is dominated by ruler items, the negative by citizen items. The major modes of distribution are equally, according to need and according to desire, for the positive pole, and according to effort for the negative pole. Thus, there is a contrast between citizens giving social goods to those who have earned them and rulers granting wealth equally to all, to those in need, and to those who desire it. This factor is labeled Earning as judged by Consensus vs. Material Grants and Entitlements. The item clusters seem to contrast two commonly recognized paths to the "good life": control and distribution of wealth by an even-handed central authority versus individual purchase through the earning of individual "salaries." Sir Geoffrey Vickers (1970) suggests this is a common, but false antithesis:

. . . Either, it is argued, some paternal dictator decides what is good for us or some process sums our own individual valuations of these goods and thus disentangles our preferences as the market does. . . .
(p. 54)

Likewise, the National Urban Coalition, published in Counterbudget (1971), an alternative budget to that of the Federal government, what it saw as six priorities in the creation of a better society. The first priority was full employment and the third was provision of the "basic necessities". These necessities were to be provided, either through creation of expanded job opportunities and work incentives or through a program of centrally administered welfare. In this case, the National Urban Coalition emphasized the former at the expense of the latter.

Summary of Item Factors

The item factors reviewed seem to indicate that this sample of Subjects discriminated to some extent between wealth and the other social goods. The first factor excluded wealth; the last factor emphasized wealth. For three item factors, Subjects were sensitive to the source of distribution: the second item factor included only citizens, the final two item factors contrasted citizens and rulers. Next, Subjects tended, as Wiener, et al. (1972) suggested, to make more extreme discriminations on the basis of characteristics of persons amenable to manipulation, i.e., on the

basis of effort, more than ability. Similarly, Subjects tended to respond relatively strongly to motivational state (needs, desires) and goal orientation (greater good) expressed in items. Perhaps, Subjects weighed the subjective utility of a reward to the society at large (greater good), to the individual recipient (need, desire) and possibly also as a guarantor of or incentive to future action (Deutsch, 1975; Walster, et al., 1976). In contrast, ability and status, relatively stable characteristics, were ranked more moderately and figured strongly in only two item factors. This is only a questionnaire analysis, however; Subjects encountering real individuals may selectively attend to other variables. It would be interesting to see if Subjects replicated these emphases in judging other written material, such as applications for jobs (in which case, the "greater good" of the hiring institution would be served), and leaflets for political campaigns. For example, Jasso and Rossi (1977) found that higher payment for a male, for a married person, or for a well-educated individual was perceived as fair in their study of hypothetical employees. However, it would be enlightening to discover if, for certain opportunities and tasks, there is a social minimum of ability required, above which evidence of motivation is prepotent, below which evidence of motivation is irrelevant.

In summary, then, four item groups were found: Equal Basic Freedoms, Democratic Commonweal, Anarchy vs. Overseeing,

and Earning vs. Material Grants. These items seem to involve a system of equally distributed liberties, furtherance of democratically assessed goals, decentralization of authority versus pragmatic or customary authority, attainment of social benefits -- particularly wealth -- through earning or through administrative disposition.

If, indeed, another 160 Subjects might structure distributive justice in this way, it implies that only a small aspect of distributive justice, one that collapses across many dimensions, is being studied in psychological laboratories. Specifically, it appears that the majority of the studies concern pragmatic or customary authority, the distribution of wealth and esteem.

Points of View and Their Correlates

The four points of view which emerged in the Subject sample were labeled Democratic Socialism, Optimism vs. Pessimism, Democracy vs. Oligarchy and Merit vs. Welfare. Figures 4 through 7 compare how individuals extreme on each point of view would rate the fairness or unfairness, the liberality or conservatism, of each item group. The Figures are a graphic representation of the Core Matrix resulting from the three mode analysis.

Each point of view was related to demographic characteristics of Subjects. Background variables were entered into a step-wise multiple regression equation in order of their greatest contribution to the reduction of unexplained variance




FIGURE 4

FACTOR SPACE FOR PERSON 1,
THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST





FIGURE 5

FACTOR SPACE FOR THE SECOND PERSON DIMENSION, OPTIMIST AND PESSIMIST




FIGURE 6

FACTOR SPACE FOR THE
THIRD PERSON DIMENSION,
OLIGARCHY vs. DEMOCRACY





FIGURE 7

FACTOR SPACE FOR FOURTH PERSON DIMENSION, MERIT vs. WELFARE.

so that prediction of point of view scores could be obtained with as few variables as possible. Necessarily, this procedure results in some loss of information, even as it promotes simplicity. Appendix D contains the simple correlation of each background variable with each point of view factor. Secondly, the arbitrary order of entry into the equation, consistent with the exploratory nature of this research, does not guarantee that variables significant on initial steps will remain significant when the effects of variables entered on final steps are partialled out. For the third point of view factor, Democracy vs. Oligarchy, the four significant predictors -- age, sex, sample, country of citizenship -- remained significant throughout all steps. Appendix E presents the multiple regression equation on the final completed step for the other three points of view, so that future research may investigate if variables emerging as significant in the final steps do so because of the action of suppressor variables included in the present research or because significance occurred more or less by chance in a large matrix of variables for a unique population. These disclaimers aside, the standardized prediction equation for each point of view is presented in Table 27. In conjunction with Figures 4 through 7, this provides the basis for discussion of the four viewpoints.

By far the most predominant viewpoint was that labeled Democratic Socialism. This general factor correlates

Table 27
 Standardized Prediction Equations for Four Views
 of Societal Distributive Justice

Viewpoints	Predictors
I. Democratic Socialism	= -.245 (Single) + .174 (15% Satisfied)
II. Pessimism	= .186 (Professional) -.324 (Single) -.223 (Texas) + .160 (15% Satisfied)
Optimism	= -.186 (Professional) +.324 (Single) + .223 (Texas) -.160 (15% Satisfied)
III. Oligarchy	= -.198 (Texas) -.190 (Non-U.S.) -.155 (Male) -.200 (Age) + .160 (Only Child)
Democracy	= +.198 (Texas) +.190 (Non-U.S.) +.155 (Male) +.200 (Age) - .160 (Only Child)
IV. Welfare	= -.172 (Republican) +.194 (Armed Service) + .181 (Blue Collar) + .153 (Black)
Merit	= +.172 (Republican) -.194 (Armed Service) - .181 (Blue Collar) - .153 (Black)

positively with the Pessimism ($r=.329$), Democracy ($r=.294$) and Welfare ($r=.145$) outlooks described here. It is associated with very positive evaluation of Equal Basic Freedoms and positive evaluation of very little else. The other items are arrayed along the liberal-conservative dimension.

Low satisfaction in society increases extremity of responses on this factor. Rawls (1971, p. 535) writes that disparities between individuals, such as those that occur when a portion of society is dissatisfied, generate envy and that "the main psychological root of the liability to envy is a lack of self-confidence in our own worth combined with a sense of impotence." He sees equal enfranchisement both as a pathway to power, which may serve to reduce disparities, and as a recognition of individual worth. Dahl (1971) makes a similar argument, but hypothesizes that passive availability of freedoms are not sufficient, rather an active process of contestation and opposition must be encouraged by the society. It is interesting to note in this context that, for this outlook, low satisfaction inclines responses toward positive evaluation of a system of equal liberties and options rather than toward evaluation of schemes for the distribution of wealth. For this Subject group, the response to a social minimum of satisfaction is to heighten the importance of freedom. Apparent freedom of action has been recognized as an important variable by psychologists such as Brehm (1966), Rotter (1966), Langer (1974), Seligman (1975), and also to

psychologists such as Thibaut and Kelley (1959) and Lewin (1951). These psychologists have related freedom to maintenance of self esteem and to perception of options for the reduction of conflict. Generally, the Subjects in this study seem to attach a great deal of importance to perceived equal liberty as a fair mechanism of social regulation, especially when the society is not serving its members well.

However, in this sample, individuals who are single tend to score lower on this viewpoint dimension than those who are or have been married. Even with effects of age, occupation and education partialled out, this relationship persists. Marriage may be described as a very small community with continually interacting participants who are often forced to cooperate. In this close community, couples may have found that some form of equal recognition of worth, rights, opportunities and powers is a preventive, as Gouldner (1960) phrased it, to running up a bill of social indebtedness. Other authors (Morgan & Sawyer, 1967) have argued that equal distribution is the most rational distribution for reducing the likelihood of future conflict (see also Sampson, 1969, 1975). It offends no one; it sets no person above another.

Kohlberg (1964, 1976) defines equal distribution of rights, and the concomitant recognition of the equal dignity of men, as a precept of higher levels of moral thought. He hypothesizes that these higher levels are more likely to be achieved by those who have had expanded social experience,

of the public good is seen as working and is therefore seen as fair. It should be noted that Bennett and Carbonari's (1976) statement that scarcity of goods would promote allocations which increase joint welfare was not upheld, here. Rather, the opposite appeared to be true for these Subjects.

In summary, Optimistic vs. Pessimistic viewpoints seem to result in judgements that it is fair to democratically promote and share abundance but unfair for the same acts to result in scarcity. These individuals appear to be sensitive to how things turn out.

The third viewpoint factor, Democracy vs. Oligarchy, concerns the Subject's perception of the appropriate repository of authority, citizens or rulers, and the appropriate purpose for which authority is wielded. As suggested by some psychologists who have studied ideology (i.e., Adorno, et al., 1950) or morality (e.g., Hogan, 1973) or beliefs about locus of control (Rotter, 1966), Subjects differed in the types of authority they advocated.

The Oligarch tends to give moderately fair ratings to Overseeing, the pragmatic use of power by rulers, and to Material Grants, i.e., the benevolent dispensation of wealth by rulers. Anarchy and Earning as judged by Consensus are rated as moderately unfair. The extremity of Oligarchy scores tends to be increased by variables such as being young, female, a U.S. citizen, an only child, and a member of one of the college samples outside of Texas. These

variables suggest that some advocacy of a wise or pragmatic set of rulers, administrators, or adjudicators is normative for U.S. citizens. Robinson and Bell (1978), for example, characterize the U.S. as having a limited egalitarian ethic. The remaining predictors are amenable to several interpretations. The first is that individuals who represent an Oligarchic viewpoint may not be, themselves, representative of managers, or others who would be authorities within the society. Rather, they may tend to be somewhat naive about those roles (cf., Goldstein & Blackman, 1978) or to be socialized in a relationship of dependency to authority (Adler, 1956; Lane, 1973). The rating of Equal Basis Freedoms as quite permissive suggests, in conjunction with this interpretation, a hesitancy in the face of too much freedom. Secondly, the relationship of the Texas sample to this outlook could occur for several reasons about which we can only speculate here. Texas has a reputation for an individualistic democratic political style. The economic conditions at the time of questionnaire administration could also be implicated. Individuals in a context of increasing prosperity may feel that they need no help from authority in the effective allocation of social goods.

Correlates of the Democratic viewpoint include increasing age, socialization in a family with more than one child, being a citizen of another country and being male. This viewpoint seems to indicate a certain irreverence for centralized authority arising from social experience.

requiring accomodation to many roles. To the extent marriage satisfied this definition, the Subjects taking this viewpoint satisfy Kohlberg's prediction.

Rawls (1971) had also hypothesized that equal distribution of rights, opportunity and power, and esteem would be the rules chosen by hypothetical rule-makers ignorant of their future. Biased rule-making would lead to diminished perception of fairness. Even though the "foreknowledge" manipulation appeared in the third step of the regression equation (after "single" and "15 percent satisfaction"), it was not significant. Reference to Appendix E will show it was significant in the final step, depressing Democratic Socialism scores. Nonetheless the very hypothetical nature of the variable makes it relatively inaccessible to, and perhaps irrelevant to, empirical research.

The second viewpoint is Optimism vs. Pessimism. For the Pessimist (see Figure 5) there are no really fair rules, only neutral or unfair distributive rules. Contributing to the Democratic Commonweal is perceived as quite unfair. Not surprisingly, receipt of a questionnaire describing only 15 percent of the society as satisfied, deepens this pessimism. Evidently, the Pessimist judges he is in a situation below the social minimum of fairness. Yet demographic correlates of this view reveal the Pessimist in this sample is not likely to be a poor man, in education or occupation, but rather a professional, of Western European extraction. He is likely

of a wise or pragmatic set of rulers, administrators, or adjudicators is normative for U.S. citizens. Robinson and Bell (1978), for example, characterize the U.S. as having a limited egalitarian ethic. The remaining predictors are amenable to several interpretations. The first is that individuals who represent an Oligarchic viewpoint may not be, themselves, representative of managers, or others who would be authorities within the society. Rather, they may tend to be somewhat naive about those roles (cf., Goldstein & Blackman, 1978) or to be socialized in a relationship of dependency to authority (Adler, 1956; Lane, 1973). The rating of Equal Basis Freedoms as quite permissive suggests, in conjunction with this interpretation, a hesitancy in the face of too much freedom. Secondly, the relationship of the Texas sample to this outlook could occur for several reasons about which we can only speculate, here. Texas has a reputation for an individualistic democratic political style. The economic conditions at the time of questionnaire administration could also be implicated. Individuals in a context of increasing prosperity may feel that they need no help from authority in the effective allocation of social goods.

Correlates of the Democratic viewpoint include increasing age, socialization in a family with more than one child, being a citizen of another country and being male. This viewpoint seems to indicate a certain irreverence for centralized authority arising from social experience.

The last factor contrasts Merit and Welfare points of view (see Figure 7). The viewpoints are relatively straightforward. The welfare advocate feels Material Grants are fair, but strict; Earning is less than fair, but liberal. The political, ethnic, and socioeconomic correlate of this outlook (see Table 27) suggests that the structuring of items may have historical antecedents. For example, jobs, votes, and socialization into the mainstream of business have been relatively difficult for Blacks to achieve (Urban Coalition, 1971), hence to receive them appears liberal.

For the Merit advocate, on the other hand, Earning and Overseeing appear somewhat fair; and to borrow Bouldings' concepts (1962, see Figure 3 and Table 28) Anarchy and Material Grants appear wasteful.

These interpretations for the Merit and Welfare viewpoints find consensual validation in an article by Robinson and Bell (1978). They labeled their dimension "equality," but since their five item measure included distribution of housing, and money equally and by need, it resembles the Material Grant item factor of the present research more than the Equal Basic Freedom factor. The authors found that the underdogs in society favored this form of equality. They also found that considerations of both having and achieving monetary success suppressed evaluative ratings of their welfare (my term) factor.

Conclusion

Exploratory research is necessarily speculative. Results are open to question, as well they should be. Generation of further more definitive research is part of the purpose of any social science that hopes to evolve a cumulative literature. With a bow to Lerner, et al., (1976) and Boulding (1962), the following Table is offered as a summary of the present research of social perceptions of distributive justice at the societal level.

It should be repeated that the points of view are listed in the descending order of their importance. The Democratic Socialist's embracement of Equal Basic Freedoms is clearly the most popular viewpoint in this Subject sample.

Secondly, variables representative of the presence or absence of social naivete (i.e., age, marital status, occupation), descriptive of the generosity of the social milieu (i.e., 15 percent of citizens satisfied, residence in an economically advantaged area) and representative of the individuals' definition of his identity in that milieu (i.e., Black, Republican, Professional) correlated with these viewpoints. As Lerner, et al., (1976), Kohlberg (1964, 1976) and others have suggested, social relationships and social positions seem to moderate perceptions of justice.

In the psychological laboratory, often a socially naive Subject (e.g., a single college sophomore) is tested with monetary reward -- usually only for ease of measurement -- in

Table 28

The Social Perception of Distributive Justice

Viewpoint	Familial Justice		Desert	
	Values		Values	
	Exclusive	Equalitarian	Wasteful	Productive
Democratic Socialist		Equal Basic Freedoms		
Pessimist			Democratic Commonweal	
Optimist				Democratic Commonweal
Oligarch	Earning	Overseeing Material Grants		
Democrat	Overseeing Material Grants	Earning		
Welfare			Earning Overseeing	Material Grants Anarchy
Merit			Material Grants Anarchy	Earning Overseeing

an environment in which, realistically, the Experimenter makes the rules, assigns the choices, and owns the resources. An attenuated concept of distributive justice may result.

Field experiments, questionnaires, and new designs in laboratory research may replicate or repudiate the results noted here.

The results of this study have implications for the political theories of justice mentioned in the Introduction as well. In the preface to A Theory of Justice, Rawls (1971, p. viii) writes,

My ambitions for the book will be completely realized if it enables one to see more clearly the chief structural features of the alternative conception of justice that is implicit in the contract tradition and points the way to its further elaboration. Of the traditional views, it is this conception, I believe, which best approximates our considered judgements of justice and constitutes the most appropriate moral basis for a democratic society.

The current research cannot validate Rawls claim to a best approximation of "considered judgements" for several reasons. Rawls' theory, it will be recalled, is a hierarchical ordering of principles. Although this Subject sample emphasized a general appreciation of equal distribution of rights, opportunity and power, and respect, it cannot be determined through the methodology used here if this viewpoint

is prepotent over other views which may be held simultaneously by the same individuals. A type of measurement which incorporates the notion of hierarchy, such as Guttman scaling, may be useful in future studies to test such hierarchical orderings.

However, the present study does suggest that not all individuals agree on a normative notion of justice within American society. Four viewpoints, not one, emerged from the data. Extremity on these views was related, to a small but significant degree, to variables descriptive of the economic and social experience of individuals in the sample. In addition, it appears that the same terms, i.e., "equal," "wealth," "rights," "need," have different connotations to different individuals. In the present research, the viewpoint dimensions revealed that Subjects differed in their perceptions of the degree of liberality or strictness, and in their positive or negative evaluation of the same terms. This poses a problem in definition for any theory which purports to be a general theory of justice. Individuals entering into a system of justice, as Hawkins (1977) suggests, may distort or redefine that system according to their implicit interpretations of the rules of that system. Where productivity may be seen as generally beneficial to the needy by one individual, it may be seen as exploitive of an economic class by another. A truly general theory of justice would have to define terms in response to the many connotations possible.

Finally, the current investigation suggests the possibility that rules of fairness may shift under varying circumstances and for various types of social goods. It appears that the Subjects in this sample agreed with Okun that different distributive rules apply to different social goods. The same individuals who perceived the equal distribution of rights as fair, tended to give a neutral evaluation to the equal distribution of wealth, for example. Although psychologists have recognized that different rules seem to apply to different social goods to a certain degree (e.g., Foa & Foa, 1974), future research can benefit from the types of distinctions among social goods made by economists such as Okun. The definition of rights and formulation of rules for the legitimate distribution of rights are particularly important areas for further study.

More problematical for both psychology and political theory is the possibility that the perceived fairness of distribution rules may shift according to the economic circumstances of the society, the individual's perception of his role in or degree of integration into that society, the generality of agreement in the society on the definition of the Public Good, and the preferred relationship of the individual to authority as the individual's role and circumstances change. The results of the present research suggest that these possibilities ought to be entertained.

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Appendix A

In this questionnaire, you will make judgements about the different ways in which societies distribute social goods.

This is a descriptive study. We really do not know how people feel about these forms of distribution and we want to find out how people do feel about them.

The value of this questionnaire will depend on your considered judgement and your frankness. Try to make your best judgements, but do not spend too much time on any one item.

For each question there are eight scales, the ends of which are marked by opposing feelings, statements or attitudes. Please put an X on the point of the scale (this X; not __X__) which you think best indicates the strength of your feeling or attitude about the particular item. Even if the scale seems irrelevant, you are required to give your best judgement. Do not skip pages or items.

If you have any questions, please ask the person who passed out the questionnaire.

Go to the next page and begin.

Biographical Information

Date _____

Age _____

Sex _____

Marital Status _____ Number of Children _____

Education _____ Occupation _____

Political Affiliation:

Republican _____

Democrat _____

Other _____ (Please Specify)

Ethnic Group _____

U.S. Citizen: Yes _____ No _____ If no, of what country
are you a citizen?

Are you an immigrant? Yes _____ No _____

If yes, from what country? _____ When? _____

Did your parents emigrate to the U.S.? Yes _____ No _____

If yes, from what country? _____ When? _____

For how many generations has your family been U.S. citizens?

1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4 _____ or more _____

How many brothers and sisters do you have? _____

Check those which apply. Are you the: eldest child _____
second child _____
third child _____
fourth child _____
youngest _____
oldest _____
other _____

In the country of X, a new constitution is being constructed. The people who are making this constitution have no idea what their ultimate position in this society will be, since the society is not yet formed. They do not know whether they will be rich or poor, powerful or weak, blessed with natural abilities and talents or deficient in them. For example, the citizens do not know if they will become rulers; the rulers do not know if they will become ordinary citizens. Please keep this in mind as you judge the many alternate principles these people consider in the following pages.

Also keep in mind that no matter what principles are chosen, about 15 percent of all the people of X will be satisfied with the result.

unfair _ _ _ _ _ fair
 permissive _ _ _ _ _ strict
 democratic _ _ _ _ _ authoritarian

- 3) In the country of X, there is wealth, such as natural resources, property and income from jobs. The rulers of X have decreed that this wealth should be divided among those who have need of it, according to the strength of their need as determined by the rulers of X.

good _ _ _ _ _ bad
 unjust _ _ _ _ _ just
 right _ _ _ _ _ wrong
 weak _ _ _ _ _ strong
 liberal _ _ _ _ _ conservative
 unfair _ _ _ _ _ fair
 permissive _ _ _ _ _ strict
 democratic _ _ _ _ _ authoritarian

- 4) In the country of X, rights and liberties are granted, such as the right to vote and freedom of speech. The citizens of X have agreed that these rights and liberties should be granted to those who have shown the ability to exercise them, according to the degree of their ability to exercise them, according to the degree of their ability as determined by the citizens of X.

good ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ bad
 unjust ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ just
 right ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ wrong
 weak ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strong
 liberal ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ conservative
 unfair ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ fair
 permissive ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strict
 democratic ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ authoritarian

- 5) In the country of X, rights and liberties are granted, such as the right to vote and freedom of speech. The rulers of X have agreed that these rights and liberties would be granted to those whose names were chosen in the random drawing.

good ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ bad
 unjust ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ just
 right ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ wrong
 weak ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strong
 liberal ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ conservative
 unfair ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ fair
 permissive ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strict
 democratic ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ authoritarian

democratic _ _ _ _ _ authoritarian

8) In the country of X, rights and liberties are granted, such as the right to vote and freedom of speech. The citizens of X have agreed that these rights and liberties should be granted to those who have worked for the privilege of exercising them according to the strength of their effort, as determined by the citizens of X.

good _ _ _ _ _ bad
 unjust _ _ _ _ _ just
 right _ _ _ _ _ wrong
 weak _ _ _ _ _ strong
 liberal _ _ _ _ _ conservative
 unfair _ _ _ _ _ fair
 permissive _ _ _ _ _ strict
 democratic _ _ _ _ _ authoritarian

9) In the country of X, people value their self-respect some of which derives from the attitudes of others. The rulers of X have agreed to respect the dignity of those who are in positions of influence, according to the status of their position, as determined by the rulers of X.

good _ _ _ _ _ bad
 unjust _ _ _ _ _ just
 right _ _ _ _ _ wrong
 weak _ _ _ _ _ strong

liberal _ _ _ _ _ conservative
 unfair _ _ _ _ _ fair
 permissive _ _ _ _ _ strict
 democratic _ _ _ _ _ authoritarian

- 10) In the country of X, rights and liberties are granted, such as the right to vote and freedom of speech. The citizens of X have agreed that these rights and liberties should be granted to those who have attained positions of influence, according to the status of their positions, as determined by the citizens of X.

good _ _ _ _ _ bad
 unjust _ _ _ _ _ just
 right _ _ _ _ _ wrong
 weak _ _ _ _ _ strong
 liberal _ _ _ _ _ conservative
 unfair _ _ _ _ _ fair
 permissive _ _ _ _ _ strict
 democratic _ _ _ _ _ authoritarian

- 11) In the country of X, rights and liberties are granted, such as the right to vote and freedom of speech. The rulers of X have decreed that these rights and liberties should be granted to those who will use them for the greater good of the people of X, as determined by the rulers of X.

good	— — — — —	bad
unjust	— — — — —	just
right	— — — — —	wrong
weak	— — — — —	strong
liberal	— — — — —	conservative
unfair	— — — — —	fair
permissive	— — — — —	strict
democratic	— — — — —	authoritarian

- 12) In the country of X, people value their self respect, some of which derives from the attitudes of others. The citizens of X have agreed to respect the dignity of those who have demonstrated abilities and skills, according to the degree of their ability, as determined by the citizens of X.

good	— — — — —	bad
unjust	— — — — —	just
right	— — — — —	wrong
weak	— — — — —	strong
liberal	— — — — —	conservative
unfair	— — — — —	fair
permissive	— — — — —	strict
democratic	— — — — —	authoritarian

democratic _ _ _ _ _ authoritarian

- 15) In the country of X, opportunities and powers are granted, such as opportunities for education and powers of political office. The rulers of X have decreed that these opportunities and powers will be open to those who have shown the ability to use them according to the degree of their ability, as determined by the rulers of X.

good _ _ _ _ _ bad
 unjust _ _ _ _ _ just
 right _ _ _ _ _ wrong
 weak _ _ _ _ _ strong
 liberal _ _ _ _ _ conservative
 unfair _ _ _ _ _ fair
 permissive _ _ _ _ _ strict
 democratic _ _ _ _ _ authoritarian

- 16) In the country of X, opportunities and powers are granted, such as opportunities for education and powers of political office. The citizens of X have agreed that these opportunities and powers will be open to those who desire them, according to the strength of their desire, as determined by the citizens of X.

good _ _ _ _ _ bad
 unjust _ _ _ _ _ just
 right _ _ _ _ _ wrong

weak ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strong
 liberal ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ conservative
 unfair ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ fair
 permissive ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strict
 democratic ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ authoritarian

- 17) In the country of X, there is wealth, such as natural resources, property and income from jobs. The citizens of X have agreed that this wealth should be divided among those whose names were chosen in a random drawing.

good ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ bad
 unjust ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ just
 right ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ wrong
 weak ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strong
 liberal ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ conservative
 unfair ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ fair
 permissive ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strict
 democratic ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ authoritarian

- 18) In the country of X, people value their self-respect, some of which derives from the attitudes of others. The rulers of X have agreed to respect the dignity of those who are lucky.

good ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ bad
 unjust ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ just
 right ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ wrong

weak _ _ _ _ _ strong
 liberal _ _ _ _ _ conservative
 unfair _ _ _ _ _ fair
 permissive _ _ _ _ _ strict
 democratic _ _ _ _ _ authoritarian

- 19) In the country of X, there is wealth, such as natural resources, property, and income from jobs. The citizens of X have agreed that this wealth should be divided equally among all those within the borders of X.

good _ _ _ _ _ bad
 unjust _ _ _ _ _ just
 right _ _ _ _ _ wrong
 weak _ _ _ _ _ strong
 liberal _ _ _ _ _ conservative
 unfair _ _ _ _ _ fair
 permissive _ _ _ _ _ strict
 democratic _ _ _ _ _ authoritarian

- 20) In the country of X, there is wealth, such as natural resources, property and income from jobs. The citizens of X have agreed that this wealth should be divided among those who have need of it, according to the strength of their need as determined by the citizens of X.

good _ _ _ _ _ bad
 unjust _ _ _ _ _ just

right ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ wrong
 weak ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strong
 liberal ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ conservative
 unfair ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ fair
 permissive ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strict
 democratic ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ authoritarian

21) In the country of X, people value their self respect, some of which derives from the attitudes of others. The citizens of X have agreed to respect the dignity of those who desire such respect, according to the strength of their desire, as determined by the citizens of X.

good ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ bad
 unjust ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ just
 right ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ wrong
 weak ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strong
 liberal ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ conservative
 unfair ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ fair
 permissive ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strict
 democratic ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ authoritarian

22) In the country of X, people value their self-respect, some of which derives from the attitudes of others. The rulers of X have agreed to respect the dignity of those who desire such respect, according to the strength of their desire, as determined by the rulers of X.

- 27) In the country of X, opportunities and powers are granted, such as opportunities for education and powers of political office. The citizens of X have agreed that these opportunities and powers will be open to those who will use them for the greater good of the people of X, as determined by the citizens of X.

good	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	bad
unjust	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	just
right	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	wrong
weak	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	strong
liberal	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	conservative
unfair	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	fair
permissive	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	strict
democratic	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	authoritarian

- 28) In the country of X, there is wealth, such as natural resources, property, and income from jobs. The rulers of X have decreed that this wealth should be divided among those who have attained positions of influence, according to the status of their position, as determined by the rulers of X.

good ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ bad
 unjust ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ just
 right ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ wrong
 weak ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strong
 liberal ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ conservative
 unfair ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ fair
 permissive ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strict
 democratic ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ authoritarian

- 29) In the country of X, opportunities and powers are granted, such as opportunities for education and powers of political office. The citizens of X have agreed that these opportunities and powers are open equally to all who live within the borders of X.

good ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ bad
 unjust ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ just
 right ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ wrong
 weak ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strong
 liberal ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ conservative
 unfair ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ fair
 permissive ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strict
 democratic ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ authoritarian

- 30) In the country of X, people value their self-respect, some of which derives from the attitudes of others. The citizens of X have agreed to respect the dignity of those

32) In the country of X, there is wealth, such as natural resources, property, and income from jobs. The rulers of X have decreed that this wealth should be divided among those whose names were chosen in a random drawing.

- good ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ bad
- unjust ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ just
- right ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ wrong
- weak ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strong
- liberal ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ conservative
- unfair ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ fair
- permissive ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strict
- democratic ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ authoritarian

33) In the country of X, people value their self respect, some of which derives from the attitudes of others. The citizens of X have agreed to respect the dignity of those who are lucky.

- good ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ bad
- unjust ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ just
- right ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ wrong
- weak ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strong
- liberal ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ conservative
- unfair ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ fair
- permissive ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strict
- democratic ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ authoritarian

permissive _ _ _ _ _ strict
 democratic _ _ _ _ _ authoritarian

- 36) In the country of X, rights and liberties are granted, such as the right to vote and freedom of speech. The citizens of X have agreed that these rights and liberties should be granted equally to all those who live within the borders of X.

good _ _ _ _ _ bad
 unjust _ _ _ _ _ just
 right _ _ _ _ _ wrong
 weak _ _ _ _ _ strong
 liberal _ _ _ _ _ conservative
 unfair _ _ _ _ _ fair
 permissive _ _ _ _ _ strict
 democratic _ _ _ _ _ authoritarian

- 37) In the country of X, people value their self-respect, some of which derives from the attitudes of others. The citizens of X have agreed to respect the dignity of those who try to bring about greater good for the people of X, as determined by the citizens of X.

good _ _ _ _ _ bad
 unjust _ _ _ _ _ just
 right _ _ _ _ _ wrong
 weak _ _ _ _ _ strong

liberal	__	__	__	__	__	__	conservative
unfair	__	__	__	__	__	__	fair
permissive	__	__	__	__	__	__	strict
democratic	__	__	__	__	__	__	authoritarian

- 38) In the country of X, people value their self-respect, some of which derives from the attitudes of others. The citizens of X have agreed to respect the dignity of those who need self-respect, according to the strength of their need, as determined by the citizens of X.

good	__	__	__	__	__	__	bad
unjust	__	__	__	__	__	__	just
right	__	__	__	__	__	__	wrong
weak	__	__	__	__	__	__	strong
liberal	__	__	__	__	__	__	conservative
unfair	__	__	__	__	__	__	fair
permissive	__	__	__	__	__	__	strict
democratic	__	__	__	__	__	__	authoritarian

- 39) In the country of X, people value their self-respect, some of which derives from the attitudes of others. The rulers of X have agreed to respect the dignity of those who need self-respect, according to the strength of their need, as determined by the rulers of X.

good	__	__	__	__	__	__	bad
unjust	__	__	__	__	__	__	just
right	__	__	__	__	__	__	wrong
weak	__	__	__	__	__	__	strong
liberal	__	__	__	__	__	__	conservative
unfair	__	__	__	__	__	__	fair
permissive	__	__	__	__	__	__	strict
democratic	__	__	__	__	__	__	authoritarian

- 40) In the country of X, opportunities and powers are granted such as opportunities for education and powers of political

democratic _ _ _ _ _ authoritarian

- 46) In the country of X, there is wealth, such as natural resources, property, and income from jobs. The citizens of X have agreed that this wealth should be divided among those who desire it, according to the strength of their desire, as determined by the citizens of X.

good _ _ _ _ _ bad
 unjust _ _ _ _ _ just
 right _ _ _ _ _ wrong
 weak _ _ _ _ _ strong
 liberal _ _ _ _ _ conservative
 unfair _ _ _ _ _ fair
 permissive _ _ _ _ _ strict
 democratic _ _ _ _ _ authoritarian

- 47) In the country of X, rights and liberties are granted, such as the right to vote and freedom of speech. The rulers of X have decreed that these rights and liberties should be granted to those who have need to exercise them, according to the strength of their need, as determined by the rulers of X.

good _ _ _ _ _ bad
 unjust _ _ _ _ _ just
 right _ _ _ _ _ wrong
 weak _ _ _ _ _ strong

liberal _ _ _ _ _ conservative
 unfair _ _ _ _ _ fair
 permissive _ _ _ _ _ strict
 democratic _ _ _ _ _ authoritarian

- 48) In the country of X, opportunities and powers are granted, such as opportunities for education and powers of political office. The citizens of X have agreed that these opportunities and powers are open to those whose names were chosen in a random drawing.

good _ _ _ _ _ bad
 unjust _ _ _ _ _ just
 right _ _ _ _ _ wrong
 weak _ _ _ _ _ strong
 liberal _ _ _ _ _ conservative
 unfair _ _ _ _ _ fair
 permissive _ _ _ _ _ strict
 democratic _ _ _ _ _ authoritarian

- 49) In the country of X, there is wealth, such as natural resources, property and income from jobs. The citizens of X have agreed that this wealth should be divided among those who try to bring about greater good for the people of X, as determined by the citizens of X.

good _ _ _ _ _ bad
 unjust _ _ _ _ _ just

right ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ wrong
 weak ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strong
 liberal ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ conservative
 unfair ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ fair
 permissive ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strict
 democratic ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ authoritarian

- 50) In the country of X, people value their self-respect, some of which derives from the attitudes of others. The rulers of X have agreed to respect the dignity of those who work, according to the strength of their effort, as determined by the rulers of X.

good ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ bad
 unjust ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ just
 right ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ wrong
 weak ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strong
 liberal ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ conservative
 unfair ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ fair
 permissive ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strict
 democratic ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ authoritarian

- 51) In the country of X, there is wealth, such as natural resources, property, and income from jobs. The rulers of X have decreed that this wealth should be divided among those who work for it, according to the strength of their effort, as determined by the rulers of X.

good ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ bad
 unjust ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ just
 right ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ wrong
 weak ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strong
 liberal ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ conservative
 unfair ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ fair
 permissive ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strict
 democratic ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ authoritarian

- 52) In the country of X, opportunities and powers are granted, such as opportunities for education and powers of political office. The citizens of X have agreed that these opportunities and powers are open to those who have worked to earn them, according to the strength of their effort as determined by the citizens of X.

good ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ bad
 unjust ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ just
 right ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ wrong
 weak ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strong
 liberal ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ conservative
 unfair ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ fair
 permissive ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strict
 democratic ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ authoritarian

unfair _ _ _ _ _ fair
 permissive _ _ _ _ _ strict
 democratic _ _ _ _ _ authoritarian

- 55) In the country of X, opportunities and powers are granted, such as opportunities for education and powers of political office. The rulers of X have decreed that these opportunities and powers are open to those who have need for them, according to the strength of their need, as determined by the rulers of X.

good _ _ _ _ _ bad
 unjust _ _ _ _ _ just
 right _ _ _ _ _ wrong
 weak _ _ _ _ _ strong
 liberal _ _ _ _ _ conservative
 unfair _ _ _ _ _ fair
 permissive _ _ _ _ _ strict
 democratic _ _ _ _ _ authoritarian

- 56) In the country of X, opportunities and powers are granted, such as opportunities for education and powers of political office. The rulers of X have decreed that these opportunities and powers are open to those whose names were chosen in a random drawing.

good _ _ _ _ _ bad
 unjust _ _ _ _ _ just

right ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ wrong
 weak ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strong
 liberal ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ conservative
 unfair ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ fair
 permissive ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strict
 democratic ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ authoritarian

- 57) In the country of X, rights and liberties are granted, such as the right to vote and freedom of speech. The citizens of X have agreed that these rights and liberties would be granted to those whose names were chosen in a random drawing.

good ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ bad
 unjust ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ just
 right ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ wrong
 weak ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strong
 liberal ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ conservative
 unfair ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ fair
 permissive ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ strict
 democratic ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ authoritarian

- 58) In the country of X, people value their self-respect, some of which derives from the attitudes of others. The citizens of X have agreed to respect equally the dignity of all those who live within the borders of X.

good ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ bad

unjust _ _ _ _ _ just
 right _ _ _ _ _ wrong
 weak _ _ _ _ _ strong
 liberal _ _ _ _ _ conservative
 unfair _ _ _ _ _ fair
 permissive _ _ _ _ _ strict
 democratic _ _ _ _ _ authoritarian

- 59) In the country of X, rights and liberties are granted, such as the right to vote and freedom of speech. The citizens of X have agreed that these rights and liberties should be granted to those who desire to exercise them, according to the strength of their desire, as determined by the citizens of X.

good _ _ _ _ _ bad
 unjust _ _ _ _ _ just
 right _ _ _ _ _ wrong
 weak _ _ _ _ _ strong
 liberal _ _ _ _ _ conservative
 unfair _ _ _ _ _ fair
 permissive _ _ _ _ _ strict
 democratic _ _ _ _ _ authoritarian

- 60) In the country of X, people value their self-respect, some of which derives from the attitudes of others. The rulers of X have agreed to respect equally the dignity of

all within the borders of X.

good	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	bad
unjust	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	just
right	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	wrong
weak	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	strong
liberal	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	conservative
unfair	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	fair
permissive	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	strict
democratic	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	authoritarian

- 61) In the country of X, opportunities and powers are granted, such as opportunities for education and powers of political office. The rulers of X have decreed that these opportunities and powers are open equally to all who live within the borders of X.

good	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	bad
unjust	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	just
right	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	wrong
weak	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	strong
liberal	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	conservative
unfair	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	fair
permissive	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	strict
democratic	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	authoritarian

- 62) In the country of X, there is wealth, such as natural resources, property, and income from jobs. The rulers

Item Correlation Matrices for Fairness in the
Distribution of Each Social Good

Fairness in the Distribution of Wealth								
Items	Citizens Ability	Citizens Need	Citizens Effort	Citizens Desire	Citizens Equal	Citizens Random	Citizens Status	Citizens Greater Good
Citizens Ability	1.000							
Citizens Need	.140	1.000						
Citizens Effort	.470**	.025	1.000					
Citizens Desire	.369**	.327**	.254*	1.000				
Citizens Equal	.038	.514**	-.102	.269*	1.000			
Citizens Random	.106	.281*	.066	.235	.241	1.000		
Citizens Status	.411**	.066	.250*	.232	-.061	.256*	1.000	
Citizens Greater Good	.420**	.287*	.427**	.357**	.196	.182	.309*	1.000
Rulers Ability	.215	.047	.121	-.005	-.031	.125	.214	.262*
Rulers Need	.012	.437**	-.034	.146	.249	.102	-.030	.107
Rulers Effort	.167	-.040	.276*	.021	-.147	.012	.052	.179
Rulers Desire	.099	.198	-.012	.233	.069	.121	.120	.127
Rulers Equal	-.110	.440**	-.163	.022	.623**	.090	-.172	.080
Rulers Random	.033	.185	.009	.177	.144	.729**	.158	.162
Rulers Status	.107	.045	-.068	-.008	-.073	.205	.343**	.068
Rulers Greater Good	.011	.170	.029	.098	.000	.149	.049	.323**
	Rulers Ability	Rulers Need	Rulers Effort	Rulers Desire	Rulers Equal	Rulers Random	Rulers Status	Rulers Greater Good
Rulers Ability	1.000							
Rulers Need	.127	1.000						
Rulers Effort	.406**	.050	1.000					
Rulers Desire	.439**	.223	.321**	1.000				
Rulers Equal	.062	.371**	-.003	.120	1.000			
Rulers Random	.242	.096	.070	.206	.139	1.000		
Rulers Status	.503**	.022	.320*	.307*	-.034	.289*	1.000	
Rulers Greater Good	.441**	.194	.535**	.379**	.057	.268*	.313*	1.000

*p < .01

**p < .001

Fairness in the Distribution of Opportunity and Power

Items	Citizens Ability	Citizens Need	Citizens Effort	Citizens Desire	Citizens Equal	Citizens Random	Citizens Status	Citizens Greater Good
Citizens Ability	1.000							
Citizens Need	.138	1.000						
Citizens Effort	.327**	.312**	1.000					
Citizens Desire	.224	.435**	.295*	1.000				
Citizens Equal	-.014	.087	.049	.078	1.000			
Citizens Random	-.038	.067	.054	.079	-.164	1.000		
Citizens Status	.159	.232	.339**	.235	-.166	.277*	1.000	
Citizens Greater Good	.334**	.340**	.427**	.418**	.135	.057	.209	1.000
Rulers Ability	.235	.145	.078	.184	-.218	.131	.167	.081
Rulers Need	-.009	.306*	.060	.234	-.146	.045	.052	.112
Rulers Effort	.148	.087	.194	.030	-.193	.096	.094	-.014
Rulers Desire	.037	.135	.133	.254*	-.152	.007	.021	.172
Rulers Equal	.093	-.056	.020	.081	.230	-.190	-.209	.090
Rulers Random	-.094	-.027	-.066	-.003	-.141	.683**	.126	-.013
Rulers Status	.012	.015	-.111	.029	-.415**	.116	.171	-.156
Rulers Greater Good	.192	.274*	.077	.141	-.091	.037	.098	.140

Items	Rulers Ability	Rulers Need	Rulers Effort	Rulers Desire	Rulers Equal	Rulers Random	Rulers Status	Rulers Greater Good
Rulers Ability	1.000							
Rulers Need	.250*	1.000						
Rulers Effort	.419**	.181	1.000					
Rulers Desire	.340**	.509**	.206	1.000				
Rulers Equal	-.086	.079	-.100	.041	1.000			
Rulers Random	.073	.115	.049	.176	-.072	1.000		
Rulers Status	.403**	.245	.290*	.102	-.221	.181	1.000	
Rulers Greater Good	.399**	.331**	.120	.304*	.002	.079	.281*	1.000

*p < .01
 **p < .001

Appendix B - Continued

Fairness in the Distribution of Rights								
Items	Citizens Ability	Citizens Need	Citizens Effort	Citizens Desire	Citizens Equal	Citizens Random	Citizens Status	Citizens Greater Good
Citizens Ability	1.000							
Citizens Need	.265*	1.000						
Citizens Effort	.457**	.348**	1.000					
Citizens Desire	.310*	.576**	.240	1.000				
Citizens Equal	-.106	-.041	-.051	-.075	1.000			
Citizens Random	.126	.177	.148	.297*	-.161	1.000		
Citizens Status	.285*	.405**	.365**	.328**	-.228	.253*	1.000	
Citizens Greater Good	.342**	.547**	.413**	.554**	-.064	.189	.403**	1.000
Rulers Ability	.095	.200	.217	.209	-.300*	.129	.123	.341**
Rulers Need	.047	.263*	.114	.230	-.181	.119	.138	.190
Rulers Effort	.309*	.088	.344**	.018	-.219	-.013	.170	.097
Rulers Desire	.000	.249	.065	.278*	-.108	-.077	.016	.169
Rulers Equal	-.161	-.030	-.212	.066	.161	-.239	-.197	-.045
Rulers Random	.059	-.031	-.035	.066	-.098	.315*	.157	.007
Rulers Status	.160	.087	.158	.120	-.462**	.317*	.176	.085
Rulers Greater Good	.066	.243	.195	.241	-.215	-.034	.270*	.156
Items	Rulers Ability	Rulers Need	Rulers Effort	Rulers Desire	Rulers Equal	Rulers Random	Rulers Status	Rulers Greater Good
Rulers Ability	1.000							
Rulers Need	.530**	1.000						
Rulers Effort	.302*	.137	1.000					
Rulers Desire	.350**	.396**	.114	1.000				
Rulers Equal	-.048	.053	-.119	.132	1.000			
Rulers Random	.080	.139	.026	-.045	.003	1.000		
Rulers Status	.501**	.477**	.252*	.169	-.135	.104	1.000	
Rulers Greater Good	.312*	.404**	.249	.284*	.135	.127	.257*	1.000

*p < .01

**p < .001

Fairness in the Distribution of Respect


Items	Citizens Ability	Citizens Need	Citizens Effort	Citizens Desire	Citizens Equal	Citizens Random	Citizens Status	Citizens Greater Good
Citizens Ability	1.000							
Citizens Need	.109	1.000						
Citizens Effort	.428**	.398**	1.000					
Citizens Desire	.101	.511**	.398**	1.000				
Citizens Equal	.070	.094	.090	.066	1.000			
Citizens Random	.033	.257*	.196	.284*	.003	1.000		
Citizens Status	.344**	.334**	.511**	.324**	.110	.309*	1.000	
Citizens Greater Good	.424**	.346**	.518**	.271*	.100	.087	.393**	1.000
Rulers Ability	.169	.227	.215	.125	-.124	.066	.216	.173
Rulers Need	-.018	.208	.189	.128	-.098	.164	.013	.139
Rulers Effort	.222	.064	.188	.127	-.143	-.038	.093	.144
Rulers Desire	.023	.022	.081	.293*	-.078	.080	.014	.068
Rulers Equal	-.055	-.076	-.025	-.116	.650**	-.180	-.022	-.085
Rulers Random	-.048	.069	.038	.145	-.090	.340**	.130	.076
Rulers Status	.303*	.005	.193	.031	-.118	.092	.328**	.049
Rulers Greater Good	.205	.021	.151	.105	-.100	-.008	.089	.203

Items	Rulers Ability	Rulers Need	Rulers Effort	Rulers Desire	Rulers Equal	Rulers Random	Rulers Status	Rulers Greater Good
Rulers Ability	1.000							
Rulers Need	.370**	1.000						
Rulers Effort	.654**	.319*	1.000					
Rulers Desire	.237	.278*	.253*	1.000				
Rulers Equal	.001	-.009	.059	-.055	1.000			
Rulers Random	.071	.150	.005	.218	-.055	1.000		
Rulers Status	.279*	.276**	.257*	.044	-.027	.182	1.000	
Rulers Greater Good	.609**	.356**	.673**	.364**	-.021	.123	.248	1.000


*p < .01
**p < .001

Appendix C


Plots of Characteristic Roots for Three
Mode Factor Analysis



CHARACTERISTIC ROOTS FOR
THE SCALE MATRIX



CHARACTERISTIC ROOTS FOR THE ITEM MATRIX



CHARACTERISTIC ROOTS FOR PERSON MATRIX

Appendix D

Simple Correlations of Demographic Variables

With Point of View Factor Coefficients

	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III	Factor IV
Age	.11	.15	-.19	-.14
Number of Children	.12	.19	-.17	-.14
Education	.13	.24	-.08	.15
Generations of Citizenship	.08	.04	-.00	-.09
Number of Siblings	-.03	-.13	-.08	.04
Sex (Male)	-.12	-.02	-.16	-.02
Citizenship (Non-U.S.)	-.05	-.13	-.16	.07
Parents Immigrants (Yes)	-.60	.10	-.00	.11
Immigrant (Yes)	-.02	-.01	-.05	.03
Foreknowledge of Position(Yes)	-.11	.04	-.09	.09
Satisfaction(15%)	.14	.13	.02	-.01
Sample (New York)	.00	.09	.10	.11
Sample (Texas)	.12	-.05	-.27	-.18
Sample (Georgia)	-.17	-.14	.16	.04
Marital Status (Single)	-.22	-.22	.14	.12
Marital Status (Married)	.17	.22	-.14	-.18
Marital Status (Divorced)	.08	.11	.03	.12
Marital Status (Separated)	-.02	-.08	.09	.06
Occupation (Professional)	.16	.26	-.05	.01
Occupation (Managerial)	-.00	.01	-.04	-.06
Occupation (Elem. or H.S. Teacher)	.04	.01	.00	.13
Occupation (Social Service)	-.02	.06	-.04	-.06
Occupation (Secretarial/Clerical)	-.05	-.07	-.05	-.11
Occupation (Blue Collar)	.08	.03	.01	.19
Occupation (Housewife)	-.02	.03	-.06	-.05
Occupation (Student)	-.12	-.19	.09	-.05
Occupation (Armed Service)	.02	-.06	.10	.19
Republican	-.01	.01	-.05	-.22
Independent	.04	-.00	-.10	.10
Democrat	.07	.05	.07	.13
Communist	.10	-.04	.05	.09
Black	.06	.02	-.03	.16
West European	-.02	.02	-.09	.08
Hispanic	-.03	.07	-.02	.08
Jewish	-.02	-.02	.15	.01
East European	.01	-.02	-.04	-.09
Asiatic	.09	.05	-.03	.05
Eldest Child	-.02	.01	.03	-.09
Youngest Child	-.06	-.01	.00	.04
Only Child	.00	.07	.05	.03

Appendix E

Final Step of Multiple Regression for Democratic
Socialism, Optimism vs. Pessimism, and Merit
vs. Welfare

Democratic Socialism						
Variable	Multiple R	R ²	R ² Change	B	F	p
Single	.22	.05	.05	-.065	7.3	.05
15% Satisfied	.28	.08	.03	.007		
Foreknowledge	.31	.10	.02	-.013	7.2	.05
Communist	.34	.11	.02	.044	4.3	.05
Asiatic	.36	.13	.02	.033		
Blue Collar	.38	.14	.02	.035		
Democrat	.40	.16	.01	.014		
Independent	.41	.17	.01	.011		
Only Child	.43	.18	.01	-.027	5.4	.05
Number of Siblings	.44	.19	.01	-.004	5.2	.05
Generations of Citizens	.45	.20	.01	.004		
Georgia	.46	.21	.01	-.002		
Housewife	.47	.22	.01	.004		
Male	.48	.23	.01	-.007		
Secretary	.49	.24	.01	-.002		
Manager	.49	.24	.01	-.004		
Black	.50	.25	.01	.010		
Republican	.51	.26	.01	.008		
Married	.51	.26	.00	-.047		
Separated	.52	.27	.01	-.061		
Immigrant	.53	.28	.00	-.012		
Eldest Child	.53	.28	.00	-.008		
Youngest Child	.53	.28	.00	-.004		
Divorced	.53	.28	.00	-.028		
Hispanic	.54	.29	.00	-.005		
Professional	.54	.29	.00	.017		
Texas	.54	.29	.00	.005		
Elem. or H.S. Teacher	.54	.29	.00	.016		
Parents' Immigrants	.54	.30	.00	-.003		
Armed Service	.54	.30	.00	.018		
Number of Children	.54	.30	.00	-.001		
Age	.54	.30	.00	.001		
West European	.55	.30	.00	.003		
Student	.55	.30	.00	.009		
Social Service	.55	.30	.00	.012		
Non-U.S. Citizen	.55	.30	.00	.005		
Education	.55	.30	.00	-.000		
Jewish	.55	.30	.00	-.001		
(Constant)				.119		
Optimism vs. Pessimism						
Professional	.26	.07	.07	.022		
Single	.31	.10	.03	.013		
Texas	.36	.13	.03	-.012		
15% Satisfied	.39	.15	.03	.033	4.9	.05
Number of Siblings	.42	.17	.02	-.009		
Separated	.43	.19	.01	-.026		
New York	.44	.20	.01	.047		
Armed Service	.45	.21	.01	-.129		
Only Child	.46	.21	.01	-.021		
Generations of Citizens	.47	.22	.01	.008		
Parents' Immigrants	.48	.23	.01	.033		
Blue Collar	.49	.24	.01	.022		
Asiatic	.49	.24	.01	.061		
Social Service	.50	.25	.00	.008		
West European	.50	.25	.00	.026		
Black	.51	.26	.00	.038		
Non-U.S.	.51	.26	.00	-.061		
Student	.51	.26	.00	-.005		
Jewish	.52	.27	.00	-.015		
Married	.52	.27	.00	.090		
Divorced	.53	.28	.01	.103		
Hispanic	.53	.28	.00	.035		
Secretary	.53	.28	.00	-.034		
Manager	.53	.29	.00	-.041		
Immigrant	.54	.29	.00	-.033		
Age	.54	.29	.00	-.009		
Number of Children	.54	.29	.00	-.006		
Communist	.54	.29	.00	-.026		
Youngest Child	.54	.29	.00	.009		
Male	.54	.29	.00	.005		
East European	.54	.29	.00	-.014		
Eldest Child	.54	.29	.00	.008		

	Multiple R	R ²	R ² Change	B	F	p
Georgia	.54	.30	.00	-.026		
Education	.54	.30	.00	.005		
Elem. or H.S. Teacher	.54	.30	.00	-.025		
Housewife	.55	.30	.00	-.022		
Independent	.55	.30	.00	-.003		
Foreknowledge	.55	.30	.00	.001		
Constant				-.111		

Merit vs. Welfare

Republican	.22	.05	.05	-.008		
Armed Service	.28	.08	.03	.111		
Blue Collar	.33	.11	.03	.067		
Black	.36	.13	.02	.055		
Elem. or H.S. Teacher	.39	.15	.02	-.016		
Parents' Immigrant	.40	.16	.01	.016		
Age	.42	.18	.01	-.019		
Education	.44	.19	.02	.015		
Divorced	.46	.21	.02	.076		
Housewife	.47	.22	.01	.012		
Separated	.48	.24	.01	.135		
West European	.49	.24	.01	.028		
Eldest Child	.50	.25	.01	-.016		
Secretary	.51	.26	.01	-.074		
Number of Children	.52	.27	.01	-.007		
Independent	.52	.27	.01	.033		
Only Child	.53	.28	.01	.041		
Male	.54	.29	.01	-.019		
Generations of Citizens	.54	.29	.00	-.008		
Manager	.55	.30	.00	-.060		
New York	.55	.30	.00	.000		
Communist	.55	.30	.00	.060		
Foreknowledge	.55	.31	.00	.014		
15% Satisfied	.56	.31	.00	-.014		
Social Service	.56	.31	.00	-.052		
Student	.56	.32	.00	-.035		
Professional	.57	.32	.00	-.027		
Georgia	.57	.32	.00	.026		
Asiatic	.57	.32	.00	.024		
Democrat	.57	.33	.00	.001		
Jewish	.57	.33	.00	-.001		
Texas	.57	.33	.00	.014		
Number of Siblings	.57	.33	.00	.001		
Married	.57	.33	.00	-.034		
Single	.57	.33	.00	-.031		
Non-U.S.	.57	.33	.00	.013		
Immigrant	.57	.33	.00	-.007		
Youngest Child	.57	.33	.00	.002		
(Constant)				.143		