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POLICE STRIKES OF 1918 AND 1919 IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND BOSTON AND THEIR EFFECTS

By

JOSEPH F. KING

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Criminal
Justice in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New
York

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
JOSEPH F. KING

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
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ABSTRACT

POLICE STRIKES OF 1918 AND 1919 IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
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JOSEPH F. KING

ADVISER: PROFESSOR LAWRENCE SULLIVAN

My central thesis is that policing in the United Kingdom and Boston developed from the same historical beginnings, but, as a result of these strikes, especially for the officers, took different paths. These departments experienced similar labor conflicts in the early 1900's. These officers took similar actions, strikes. The strikes had similar results: rioting and a public outcry against the strikes and the strikers. All of the officers who struck in 1919 were fired. The primary reason for the different paths of the police was the increased role of central government in funding and terms of employment in the United Kingdom. This centralization resulted in the Police Act of 1919, which required the formation of the Police Federation, "to represent the interest of all ranks." This Federation still exists today as the official representative body for every police officer in the United Kingdom. The situation in Boston, and the United States in general, was to be markedly different. Police unionization was dead. No serious attempts at unionization were to be undertaken for half a century.

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Dr. Gerald Lynch, the President of John Jay College, has always been especially supportive of both me and the idea of a comparative history of these police forces. Since I began studying for my Masters Degree at the College in 1969, I have always been supported in the various studies

and projects I undertook. Thanks to Jerry's advice, leadership and personal friendship I completed this project. His leadership had been evident in the 30 year affiliation I have had with the College. I am very thankful for this.

I am very indebted to the police officers in Ireland and the United Kingdom for their help. I first started working with officers from the Special Branch in the various UK forces and the Garda Siochana in the course of my official duties in 1978. During the years we worked on matters of mutual interest, many of these officers gave freely of their time and memories to express their interest in police history and to foster my own. The numerous officers who helped me in my research and making things and people available to me did so because of our common interest. I want to thank all these officers, especially in the Metropolitan Police, Merseyside Police, the RUC and the Garda. I would also like to thank these officers, especially the Garda, for their ability to convey their criticisms with a touch of wit.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The concept of the police is not a new development to our society. Various articles and studies have been written concerning ancient methods of policing. Ancient Rome used various formations of the military to administer the duties which today would be police functions. In 6 A.D., the Emperor Augustus Caesar formed a group, known as Vigiles, "To guard against fires he devised a system of night patrols and night watchmen" (Stead, 1977, p.15). Later in his reign, Augustus formed the Urban Cohorts specifically to police the seat of his empire, Rome. Eventually, control of these forces passed to the City Perfect.

The maintenance of the public peace and of order at the shows is also held to be under the jurisdiction of the City Perfect: clearly he must have soldiers stationed at various points to maintain the public peace and to bring news of any incidents anywhere (Stead, 1977, p.21).

The concept of Police, from this Roman philosophy to our

idea of the "Modern Police," has undergone evolutionary and revolutionary changes. Clearly, the twentieth century has seen the greatest changes, both in function and technologies, to policing.

The beginning of the twentieth century saw much tumult and many social changes. The Age of Innocence, the Edwardian Period, ended with the First World War and the Russian Revolution. The social fabric and order in industrialized Europe and America experienced drastic changes due to increased urbanization, skyrocketing inflation and a dramatic rise in union membership and its influence. Among these changes were efforts at the unionization of the police. Police in several jurisdictions had already formed some type of union or association, by the onset of the First World War. The Police of Paris formed a union to represent their interest in 1912 (Wishnia, p.8) and, they formed the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of New York in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century. Although often banned, police associations continued to increase in appeal. Among the reasons for the allure of police unionism was the declining position of the police in both the United Kingdom and the United States, rapid inflation, the spiraling cost of living, and the desire to negotiate with management to address these basic issues, the

right to confer.

The union movement in this period was described by one writer as "epidemic" (Allen, p.44). The labor organizations welcomed this epidemic. The American Federation of Labor's membership rose from just over a half-million in 1897 to 2.5 million in 1917 (Morison, p.238). Membership in the ten largest unions in Great Britain more than tripled from 1,160,000, in 1910, to 3,582,000, in 1920 (Clegg, p.570).

The rise of the influence of trade unionism can readily be seen by the emergence of the Labour Party in Great Britain.

The original Labour Representation Committee with the aid of the Trade Union Congress, developed into the Labour Party, which was to become one of the principal forces in the government of the United Kingdom. So "the unions had secured from the ballot-box the respect for their privileged position which had been denied them..." (Pelling, p.117).

The police in the United Kingdom, specifically London, were aware of the rise in the membership and influence of unions. It was their duty to police the various gatherings and demonstrations and, when strikes turned unruly, it was the police who would be sent to manage the situation. Indeed,

large detachments of Metropolitan Police were dispatched from London to assist General Macready, in 1910, in the famous Tonypandy mining strike. General Macready would later, in 1918, become the Commissioner of Metropolitan Police directly responsible for the eradication of the Police union.

The police saw their position deteriorating. The cost of living had doubled since 1913 in both the United States and the United Kingdom (Clegg, p.195). The police observed their position in society decline as the wages of even the lowest paid workers were surpassing their salaries. Therefore, the police pushed for an association that would have the right to confer with management and discuss pay and benefit issues. The Boston Police Department in 1918 was being paid a salary that had been voted to it, by the City government, in 1898. This situation did not invoke any action by the department or government, even though the cost of living soared 106% in that period (Koss, p.3).

In 1919 there were approximately 2,665 strikes in the United States alone. British workers were not far behind their American cousins. Strikes occurred in almost every British city. Several general strikes were held in attempts to shut down the whole economy. This presented a problem. How could

a public service organization, responsible for the maintenance of law and order, be allowed to incorporate into a union with ties to other labor organizations and still be expected to maintain their ability to police these groups? How would traditional labor-management tensions and conflicts be handled? The police by their position as the peace-keepers for society, typical labor problem resolution techniques, i.e., work slowdowns, rulebook job actions and strikes, were forbidden to them.

The officers of the Boston Police found themselves in a similar situation. Faced with rising inflation, no input in departmental operations, no ability to negotiate pay or benefits and their observation of the extraordinary rise of power and influence of organized labor, the Boston officers followed a course similar to that of their British colleagues. Just before the strike by the Boston officers, organized labor, under the auspices of the American Federation of Labor, staged several strikes and job actions in both the public and private sector.

The London and Boston Police Strikes were some of the most astonishing events of the World War I era. "And then, in September, came the Boston Police strike, and the fear was

redoubled" (Allen, p.43). This fear, or "red scare," was a very important factor in the world scene in this era. Still, this was only one of the many factors that would influence these strikes. There was a commonality of factors: low pay, wartime inflation, lowering of social status and a desire to "confer" on the issues. There were other similar issues. For instance, both Police Departments were responsible to political units other than the ones they policed. The London Metropolitan Force was responsible to the Central government; the Boston Force was under the control of the Government, but paid for out of the City's funds. These structures, and the politics involved in them, added to the problems.

Strikes by public employees are hardly unheard of today. The nightly news shows, which have become an integral part of our lives, are replete with reports of teachers, sanitation workers and others voting to strike. The reports of "blue flu," and other job actions by police, are treated as inevitable. However, these reports would become major news if the President or Prime Minister was to step in, or intervene in the negotiations. Indeed, it is rare for a state Governor to interfere in what is perceived as local matters. It was precisely the interference of Prime Minister Lloyd George, that quickly settled the 1918 strike, and set the groundwork

for the 1919 strike in the United Kingdom. Likewise, it was the position and actions of Governor Coolidge that dictated the Boston Strike.

Lloyd George's actions can be viewed as those of a leader concerned with the war in France. "I want this thing settled...can it be done tonight?" was the Prime Minister's concern. Nevertheless, the wily Welshman was not giving away the store. After the strike was settled and the government had agreed to an organization to "represent" the police officers, George stated "whether it is to be the Union...is something to be decided" (Judge, 1968, p.61-62).

On the other hand, Calvin Coolidge admitted "No doubt it was the police strike of Boston that brought me into national prominence. That furnished the occasion and I took advantage of the opportunity" (Coolidge, 1929, p.141). Coolidge knew the importance of this public opinion and exploited it. There can be no doubt that any student who has completed an American history course today, would not recognize the statement "There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anytime, anywhere." This quotation, given by Calvin Coolidge to Samuel Gompers (a founding father of the American labor movement), is seen as characteristic of his stand against

anarchy and lawlessness. The stand which indeed catapulted him into the office of the Vice-Presidency.

Indeed, the strike did prove to be a major catalyst in the political career of Calvin Coolidge. The favorable amount of publicity which he received as a result of his so-called actions during the strike, led to the rising of voices whispering "You can be President" (White, p.166).

The other personalities that had great impact on these situations were the respective police Commissioners. The London Force was a mix of personalities. Sir Edward Henry, served more than fifteen years as the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. He was credited with many reforms and greatly increasing the efficiency of the Force. "As Commissioner he was undoubtedly the most outstanding figure since Mayne" (Browne, p.308). Nevertheless, he was hastily jettisoned and replaced by Sir Nevil Macready, a military officer of notable accomplishments. Macready had previous experience with "mutinies" and labor troubles. In 1910, he gained fame in the "Tonypany" mining strikes in Wales. Macready had been the commanding officer in Belfast during the "Curragh" mutiny in 1914. Macready was described, by the union officials, as a "Prussian."

In Boston, Stephen O'Meara served as Police Commissioner from 1906 until his death in December 1918. He was succeeded by Edwin Curtis. O'Meara is credited with "professionalizing" the police department. The force was described as "the most successful community police department in the history of the United States" (Repetto, p.119). O'Meara was liked and respected by his men. " 'The fairest man anyone could ever hope to deal with' one of his patrolmen called him years after his death" (Russell, 1975, p.38). His successor was not accepted in the same way. Curtis was described as an uncompromising martinet; and, like his counterpart, Macready, a "Prussian." These various issues and personalities were highlighted by the events of 1918-19.

The two strikes, under study, had some results in common. Both resulted in rioting, violence, troop deployment and a public outcry against the strikers. The police who struck, in 1919, were fired and replaced by new recruits. One of the main results was the lasting labor peace in the police profession in both countries. The English Police were to have Lord Desborough. Boston was not.

In England, the Desborough Committee was set up to examine the policeman's lot. The Committee's report and

recommendations were embodied in the Police Act of 1919. Some provisions of this bill were the establishment of what became the Police Federation, an internal association to represent the interest of officers of all ranks. This Federation still exists as the official representative body for the police of the United Kingdom. During its eighty year history it has often negotiated many points with management, but it has not resorted to a strike. While some officers are dissatisfied with the Federation's position and have described an association without the ability to strike as a toothless tiger and as "a vasectomy recipient...equipped with all the negotiating machinery ...but without the power to strike..." (Reiner, 1978,p.54), the Federation is generally accepted by the rank and file.

Boston police were not to be as fortunate as their British brothers. While the Storow Committee was formed to look at the situation, it was formed before the 1919 strike in an effort to forestall the strike. Following the strike, there was no Desborough-like report to lead the way for improvements in the terms and conditions of service for the Boston force. Indeed the Boston Police were not allowed to organize into a representative organization until 1965, 46 years after the strike. The Ghost of 1919, as one author has termed this

strike (Bornstein, p.25), continues to have enduring effect today. No national union or association of police has emerged in the United States at either the state or the national level.

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine, study and explain, through comparison, the effects of these police strikes on the emergence of policing in both countries. These departments experienced similar factors in the growth of the union movement. Both were in similar positions in terms of the larger economy and similar unsatisfactory working conditions and salaries. This study will show the causes and consequences of these police strikes and how in the United Kingdom, a police service and federation emerged on a national footing. While in Boston, the police union movement and any attempts at centralization of the police service were virtually destroyed. It is proposed that a large part of the difference can be attributed to the relationship of the police to the governmental unit it is responsible to, i.e., in England a nationally dictated uniform standard and conditions of service and in the United States, a multitude of departments, each under local and independent control, a "Balkanization" of policing.

The dissertation will be divided into five sections. The first section, INTRODUCTION, will deal with an introduction to the study, the methodology used and a review of the applicable literature on policing in both situations. The second section, UNITED KINGDOM, will examine the development of the policing in England and Wales, the arrival of the "New Police" and their development throughout the countryside. This section will survey the causes for and the growth of the police unions, specifically in London, and the strikes themselves. It will also examine Desborough, the "Policemen's Charter," and the further centralization of the Police Service in the United Kingdom.

The third section will look at the history and development of the Boston Police Department and the background of the causes for and the growth of the union in this force. The strike itself and its aftermath both on the Boston police and policing in general in the United States will be studied. The fourth section will present my conclusions on the study and some observations on the present situations of policing in both situations. The fifth section is the bibliography. This section, REFERENCES, is an extensive list of both primary and secondary sources on the areas studied.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

The basic methodology of this study will be a historical comparison of the strikes in their two settings. "Comparative history is not new. As long as people have investigated social life, there has been recurrent fascination with juxtaposing historical patterns from two or more times or places" (Skocpol, 1980, p.174). Comparative history has been described as the systematic comparing and contrasting of the cases to identify and explain the similarities and differences. This comparison has two primary goals. "First, by examining more than one instance of historical change, comparative historians try to identify significant aspects or features of each instance which might have escaped the notice of historians focused on a single case. Second, ...comparative historians hypothesize and test generalizable theories or principles of historical change" (Andrews, p.162).

John Stuart Mill described one method of comparison as

the Method of Difference. "Here...the historian seeks cases with similar preconditions and different outcomes" (Ibid). To accomplish this comparison an amassing of historical data is necessary. To achieve this amassing, a variety of tools were used to gather information related to for both strikes. Standard library and archival research, of primary and secondary sources, were the basis to begin the process of comparison. In addition to this research field interviews of contemporaries to the strikes, noted authorities in the field and ranking officers in the present forces were conducted.

Modern advances have lightened the researcher's burden considerably. The computerization of the library catalogue of the City University of New York, (CUNY), as well as the other computerized indexes that are available, greatly aided the process. There were several steps in this strategy. First was to design the research and look at the general works of the various headings, i.e., Police, Boston Police Strike, History of Police, United Kingdom Police, London Police, Rise of Labor, Sociological Theory, etc. Naturally, a computerized search such as this yielded an enormous printout. There are, of course, in each of the subject areas prominent or seminal works which had to be investigated.

With the excellent facilities available in New York it was relatively easy to begin the process of research. The various research tools were easily available at John Jay College's library, the primary base of my operations, the Graduate Center, CUNY, and Columbia University. The Library of Congress Catalogue and the British National Bibliography were consulted to identify works, both in the United States and the United Kingdom, related to this topic. It is interesting to note that the topic of the Boston Police Strike has been far more examined than its United Kingdom counterparts.

The computerized services of the University Microfilms International (UMI) were very useful in both researching the topic, for domestic and international theses and dissertations, and acquiring copies of the works. These dissertations proved to be a valuable resource, both for the examination of the topic they studied and as additional "leads," from the bibliographies of these works. Several other indexes or abstracts were also consulted, the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, Criminal Justice Abstracts, Sociological Abstracts and Social Sciences Index.

All of these indexes or abstracts had problems in common.

There was a lack of examination of policing, in a historical sense, which became evident in these manual searches; and, the past practice of inclusion of any research dealing with police histories to be put in other disciplines or headings. Of course in a computerized search, with the availability of the "keyword" function some of these problems were minimized. However, this function has its own problem in that the match must be exact. So this function requires several trips to the computer. The topic of the London Metropolitan Police, for example, would require several tries at the computer for London Police, Metropolitan Police, Police-Great Britain, Police-United Kingdom, etc...

The New York Times Index served as the standard guide for newspaper articles associated with both strikes. While the New York Times provided coverage of both strikes, it was not "front page" until the eruption of violence. The Index did provide a framework for specific dates. For more in depth newspaper coverage the Boston Public Library maintains copies of the Boston Daily Globe, Boston Evening Transcript and the Boston Herald and Journal. For the United Kingdom, the London School of Economics maintains copies of the Liverpool Daily Herald, the Liverpool Daily Post and Echo and the London Times. The New York City Public Library also maintains copies

of the London Times.

Following this initial stage of the research, it became clear that a great deal of the material, both primary and secondary, was available in Boston and the United Kingdom, primarily, London. Over a several year period, these field trips, the associated research and field interviews were accomplished.

The primary sites in the United Kingdom, London, were more accommodating than I was led to believe. A prime source for this inquiry, the files of the Home Office, are subject to the Official Secrets Act. However, all the documents requested from the Public Records Office (PRO) were opened for public inspection. The PRO maintains an excellent index of documents and papers specifically related to the Metropolitan Police and the City of London Police. Also available at the PRO were copies of the various Parliamentary committee reports of the central government on the police and specifically the strikes of 1918-19. Most important of these committee reports, the Desborough Report, is available in its entirety here.

The London School of Economics (LSE) was also a valuable tool. The library indexes are computerized and it is the

repository for the doctoral dissertation of G. Davies, which dealt extensively with the strikes. Also the library maintains copies of Hansard, The Report of the Parliamentary Society, which details the debates in Parliament. The LSE is also where Professor Robert Reiner, a noted author on British policing, was interviewed.

The headquarters of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) is also in London. The library of the TUC maintains copies of the Police and Prison Officer's Magazine and several other documents and papers of interest. An unpublished paper by John Hayes, a leading police union official and striker, on the strikes of 1918-19 was found in this library. This was also the location where John Monks, Deputy General Secretary, of the TUC, was interviewed. The Police Federation's national headquarters is also located in London. The Federation maintains a small library but it was the site for the interview of Anthony Judge, a leading authority on the strikes.

Several primary sources, the Commissioner's reports, orders, etc . . . were found at the City of London Police Commissioner's Office and the library of the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. Authorization to examine the

documents and archives was obtained and I am grateful to the various officers who helped in that process. The library at the Police Staff College, Bramshill, was a valuable source of several works on police history and several unpublished papers on the topic. The staff at the College was very helpful and furnished several avenues of interest.

The last of the United Kingdom sites was Liverpool. Today, policing in Liverpool is under the jurisdiction of the Merseyside Constabulary. The research was greatly aided by Chief Superintendent William White. It was through his offices that I was granted access to the primary sources of the old records of the Liverpool Police and the Birkenhead Police, which had been amalgamated into the Merseyside force. Access was also granted, through his offices, to pension records to locate several retired officers who served during the strike or were hired immediately after. It was during one of these interviews that a comment by retired Sergeant Henry Grumley concerning a relative who had been active in organizing the old Dublin Metropolitan Police for the National Union of Police and Prison Officers that led to the last foreign site, Ireland.

As in the United Kingdom, most of the research in Ireland

was undertaken in the capital, Dublin. The principal research site was the Museum of the Garda Siochana. The staff, especially J.P. Duffy, was of great assistance in acquiring various articles and papers and arranging some interviews. The National Library acts as the repository for official documents in the Republic of Ireland. Through the indexes, several committee reports on the police, both the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Metropolitan Police, in Ireland, under British rule, were located and examined.

The principal site for primary research, domestic, was Boston. Here again the same format of going to primary sources, as much as possible, was applied. The State Library, at the State Capital Building, proved a valuable tool. For the period under investigation, the Boston Police Department was under the jurisdiction of the Governor and hence its official papers are stored in this state repository. Additionally, a large collection on Coolidge is maintained here.

One problem at the library is the card catalogue. None of the records are computerized and the indexing and headings are confusing, i.e., no heading was found for the Boston Police Strike, but several items were located under the heading, POLICEMEN. An additional problem with this library is several

of the items are shown in the catalogue as being in the library. However, after calling for the items, they were found to be in the State Archives, which luckily, is located in the basement of the same building. The staff of both facilities are very helpful.

The Boston Public Library also has a very helpful staff. The rare book division maintains the personal papers of Mayor Andrew J. Peters and several other primary sources. The circulation division maintains copies of most Boston newspapers. Boston has excellent academic research facilities. The Burns Library, Boston College, is the repository for the college's archives. An excellent thesis by Cyrus Fitzgerald is here.

Harvard University's libraries are excellent and diverse. The University Archives is the repository for dissertations and honors theses, of which several deals with the Boston Police Strike. The Houghton Library contains rare books and papers. The personal papers of Brigadier-General Samuel D. Parker, commanding officer of the Massachusetts State Guard, during the strike are located here. Several original orders of march and reports are in this collection. Also found in the collection was a typewritten paper on the Boston Police

Strike, dedicated to General Parker by Eben Howard Gay, a private in the State Guard, who served on strike duty.

The principal circulation library of Harvard, Littauer Library, was also consulted. Several dissertations had listed a collection of materials on the Boston Police Strike by Richard W. Hale, at Littauer. However, various attempts to locate this collection were unsuccessful. The library staff, specifically, Mary Ellen McCarthy, was able to locate references to this collection in the retired card index. It appears that during a reorganization and later computerization of the library, this collection was misplaced.

The Boston Police Department was surprisingly lacking in historical documents or files. The unofficial historian of the department is Police Officer John Wills and he was exceptionally helpful in this research. James Cernel, Vice-President, Boston Police Officers Benevolent Association, was also of assistance in arranging several interviews, but again lacked any historical documents or files.

One final comment on the research. I became aware of several dissertations on the Melbourne, Australia, police strike of 1923, which I felt would be useful in this research.

The staff of Melbourne University library and La Trobe University library, both located in Melbourne, were exceptionally helpful in my contacts with them. Their assistance in arranging access and copies of the materials was of great help and eased the research burden.

CHAPTER 3

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

While the topic of police strikes is well known and familiar, relatively little has been written about the Boston strike and less about the United Kingdom strikes. No work was found which compared these strikes to each other either in a causal relationship or in the aftermath of these actions. This section will be divided into two basic grouping, the United Kingdom and the United States, with sub-grouping.

The general background of the development of the police in England, is excellently dealt with by T. Critchley, A History of Police in England and Wales 900-1966, P. Stead, The Police of Britain, C. Reith, A New Study of Police History, D. Ascoli, The Queen's Peace: The origins and development of the Metropolitan Police, 1829-1979 and W. Hewitt, British Police Administration. All of these works are scholarly reviews of the general history and development of policing in the United

Kingdom. None made other than brief reference to the strikes. These works are all of the traditional view that policing in England grew out of the old parish constable system, due to that systems inefficiencies and the increases in crime and disorder. Several of these works credit the studies of J. Hart on the development of the police. Both her articles, "Reform of the Borough Police, 1835-1856", The English Historical Review and "The County and Borough Police Act, 1856", Public Administration, are valuable and instructive on the development of rural policing in England.

An alternate view of these events, the revisionist, is seen in R. Storch's works. Both his articles, "The plague of blue locusts," International Review of Social History and "The policeman as domestic missionary," Journal of Social History, expresses the view that policing developed out of a need by the ruling classes, particularly during the industrial revolution, to maintain its position and the public order. A third view of these events is found in the work of C. Emsley, The English Police: A political and social history.

Emsley sees the police as a multifaceted institution. The "English police developed their particular characteristics primarily because of the cultural and political environment in

which they spent their formative years" (Emsley, 1991, p.6). One of the most interesting points in this work was Emsley's observation of the continuing trend toward centralization of the police in England. Along the same theoretical line of "sceptical synthesis," the recent work of D. Taylor, The new police in nineteenth-century England, offers a valuable look at the new police. This work has an appendix containing thirty-nine selected documents on policing in England during the period, an excellent access to some primary sources on the topics. Similar to Emsley's point on centralization, the article by D. Philips and R. Storch, "Whigs and coppers: the Grey ministry's national police scheme, 1832," Historical Research, is an interesting study of the first aborted attempt to form one force for the policing of rural England. Along this line is a recent work, Before the Bobbies: The Night Watch and Police Reform in Metropolitan London, 1720-1830, by E. Reynolds. This is an interesting "new" look at the patchwork of parish watches that constituted the police of London before 1829.

A less historical, but interesting approach is seen in R. Reiner, The Politics of the Police. Especially of interest in this work is his examination of the traditionalist and revisionist theories on the origins and development of the

Police. The major works that examine the strikes in the United Kingdom are A. Sellwood, Police Strike-1919 and A. Judge and G. Reynolds, The Night the Police Went on Strike. Sellwood gives an excellent journalistic account of the 1919 strike, with particular reference to the situation in Liverpool, where most of the rioting occurred. The most comprehensive work on the strikes is found in Judge's work. This work is an excellent look at the events and personalities of these strikes. Unfortunately, this was not written as a scholarly work and does not contain any footnotes or citations.

The autobiographies of two of the main character in the strikes were very useful. W. Nott-Bower, in his Fifty-Two Years A Policeman, provided both an excellent look at that the strike, especially at the City of London force, and his attempts to avert it. Annals of Active Life, by N. Macready, is a two-volume work which goes into great detail of the General's life. It gives a lengthy history of the event leading up to the strike and some incite into political and bureaucratic machinations of the strike and its aftermath. This work also gives an excellent perception of General Macready's understanding and approach to policing.

Police-Labor relations were well examined in J. Morgan,

Conflict and Order: The Police and Labour Disputes in England and Wales, 1900-1939. This work is unique in its examination of the police strike and some other labor troubles of Lloyd George's government. Another interesting examination of police's peace keeping function is found in S. Palmer, Police and Protest in England and Ireland, 1780-1850.

There are several journal articles on the English strikes. "The national union of police and prison officers," The Economic History Review, by V. Allen, is an excellent scholarly review of the strike, with a particular emphasis on economic questions. The strike, in Liverpool, is given a fine study in R. Bean, "Police unrest, unionization and the 1919 strike in Liverpool," Journal of Contemporary History.

A contemporary article, which gives interesting look into society's view of the strike is found in E. Osborn, "The police mutiny," The Nineteenth Century. An extremely interesting work which examines the status of the police in both the English societies and at both of these strikes was found in C. Robinson's work "The Deradicalization of the Policeman: A Historical Analysis," Crime & Delinquency.

Very little dissertation or unpublished works were found

on the United Kingdom strikes. G. Davies' doctoral dissertation, The Police Service of England and Wales between 1918 and 1964, with particular reference to problems of personnel, recruitment and command, is an admirable account of these strikes. This work was well researched and gives easy access to the many Home Office documents dealing with the police. A yeomanly approach to the police strikes was found in a thesis, submitted to Bramshill, by O. Griffiths, Police Strikes in Britain. Two excellent dissertations in this area are R. Sopenoff, The police of London: The early history of the metropolitan police, 1829-1856, and B. Griffin, The Irish Police, 1836-1914: A Social History. Sopenoff presents a view into Peel's efforts at the foundations of the New Police and the attempts to reform the rural policing. The Irish Police and their context in the overall policing of the United Kingdom are clearly examined by Griffin. One of the most interesting points is his examination of the labor troubles of the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Metropolitan Police.

Another unpublished paper, available at the TUC library or Bramshill, is by J. Hayes, Some observations on the Police Strikes 1918 & 1919. This work was written by one of the principal police officers who organized the union. He resigned

as a Sergeant in the Metropolitan Police to become the General Secretary of the NUPPO. This paper was written as an "appeal for fair play" for the strikers whom they fired. At the time, 1921, Hayes was a Member of Parliament, and he continued to champion the strikers' cause for reinstatement or pension benefits until his death.

Also available at Bramshill, is an unpublished paper by A. Dixon, The Home Office and the Police between the Two World Wars. This work is of particular interest in that Dixon was the Principal Assistant Under Secretary of State in the Home Office during the strikes. It is also of interest for its documentation of the Home Officer's efforts to further consolidate its control over policing in the country through its new office, the Police Department. This office had been one of the recommendations of the Desborough Report.

The principal official documents dealing with these strikes are the Report of the Committee On The Police Service of England, Wales And Scotland, generally called the Desborough Report, and its Minutes Of Evidence and the Report of the Committee Appointed To Enquire into the Claims of the Men Dismissed From the Police and Prison Services on Account of the Strike of 1919, generally called the Mackenzie Report.

These reports and the supporting documents and testimonies give a clear and informative description of the situation of the police before the strikes and some of the results. The Desborough Report was also the foundation of the Police Act of 1919.

In order to gather information on relevant causes to the strikes, several works were reviewed on the rise of labor in the United Kingdom, the economy and the rise of women in the workplace. P. Blanshard's work, An Outline of the British Labor Movement, gives a good examination of the rise of the Labour Party and an interesting, if dated, comparison of American and British labor. The English Labour Movement, 1700-1951, by K. Brown, gives a substantial review of the general labor movement. G. Bain in The Growth of White-Collar Unionism, provided an very engaging look at the rise of unionism, particularly as it affected the civil service in the United Kingdom. Strikes-A Study In Industrial Conflict, by K. Knowles, gives a good examination of effort to control strikes by the British government during World War I. Of particular interest is the section on the police strikes.

H. Pelling in A History of British Trade Unionism, gives an excellent and scholarly review of the trade unionist

movement. His work gives emphasis to the period of World War I. Another scholarly work which examines the labor movement in this period, in great detail, is A History of British Trade Unions Since 1889- Volume II 1911-1933, by H. Clegg. It is interesting that both works make only passing reference to the Police Strikes.

The general economical and political situation was clearly examined by G. Cole in two of his works, The Common People, 1746-1946 and British Working Class Politics, 1832-1914. Of particular interest in The Common People, was the examination of the political situation and position, during and after World War I. The rise of Labor's influence in the politics of the British government, prior to World War I, was the principal point of interest in Cole's other work. An interesting work, Exploring English Character, by G. Gorer was useful for its examination of sociological settings of English society. Of special interest was Appendix One, which deals with "The Psychological Role Of The Police In England." This section gave a historical look at the composure of the early Metropolitan Police force and some public attitudes toward the police. These factors proved very interesting in the comparison of and the public judgment of the two strikes.

The final area that was researched was the changing role of women in society, especially in the period of 1914, the beginning of World War I in Europe, to the end of 1919. Two works of particular interest were both by A. Marwick, Women At War: 1914-1918 and The Deluge: British Society and the First World War. In both these works Marwick examined British society during and immediately after WW I, however, Women At War, is a specific look at the rise of women in the workforce and the economy. The statistical tables were especially interesting. Another study of the emergence of women in the workforce in society is J. Williams The Other Battleground, The Home Fronts Britain, France and Germany 1914-18. An article that was of express interest was by P. Levine, "Walking the Streets in a Way No Decent Woman Should": Women Police in World War I, Journal of Modern History. This scholarly article was an excellent look at women in the period and the occupation under study.

To a large extent the growth of labor in the United States parallels that of the United Kingdom. Organized Labor in American History by P. Taft was a superb look at the overall growth of the labor movement in the United States. A more detailed examination of this topic is found in T. Brooks' Toil and Trouble: A History of American Labor. A Brief History

of the American Labor Movement, issued by the U.S. Department of Labor, was a sturdy examination of the topic, as was Organized Labor, by H. Millis. Millis paid particular attention to the influence of Samuel Gompers on the development of American Labor. Mr. Gompers' influence and philosophy were further examined in L. Reed's work The Labor Philosophy of Samuel Gompers. Another general survey of the labor movement is found in American Labor, by H. Pelling. Perhaps the best of these general surveys was Labor in America: A History, by F. Dulles. This work is a very good examination of the American labor movement from its inception until the 1970. Dulles pays particular attention to the development and influences of the Knights of Labor, the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations. An interesting work, especially concerning woman workers in the early 1900's, is Life and Labor: Dimensions of American Working-Class History, edited by C. Stephenson. A collection of articles which looks specifically at the working class history of America in the late 18th century and early 19th century. Dangerous Classes: the underclass and social citizenship, by L. Morris, is an excellent examination migrant labor and the underclass in England and the United States.

An incident of particular interest was The Seattle General Strike, by R. Friedheim. This strike, which occurred in early 1919, was of interest both from the viewpoint of labor and the "red scare" hysteria that was widespread during the 1919-1920. The seminal work concerning the "red scare" and the general period in question is the Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919-1920, by R. Murray. Murray set the Boston Police Strike in the total picture of the period. Another excellent look at this period is 1919-America's Loss Of Innocence, by E. Asinoff. While this work is written in a journalistic style, it gives a good look at the Boston Police Strike.

An examination of the growth of labor of government employees, is found in D. Ziskind's One Thousand Strikes of Government Employees. This book gives an excellent study of the of several strikes by various police and fire agencies during the early twentieth century. The effects of the growth of unions and the strikes, especially during World War I, is available from A. Bing's, War-time Strikes and their Adjustment. Of specific interest was Boston's Worker: A Labor History, by H. Donahue. This work gives a good historical development of labor in Boston.

For a look at the economic situation, two works were principally examined. P. Douglas in Real Wages in the United States, 1890-1926, gives an excellent look at the cost of living during this period and a comparison of the wages of skilled and unskilled during this period. The Growth of American Trade Unions, 1880-1923, gives an excellent look at both the rise of the labor movement and the economic situation in pre and post World War I.

The specifics of the development police unionism were examined in several works. E. Schweppe's work, The Firemen's and Patrolmen's Unions in the City of New York. A Case Study in Public Employee Unions, was a through examination of both of these unions, their development and associations. Another work in the same vein was a doctoral dissertation by P. Kienast, Policemen and Fire Fighter Employee Organizations: A Comparative Study of Historical And Sociological Factors affecting Employee Organization Structure. This work takes a limited look at the Boston Police Strike, but concludes that one effect of the Boston Strike was that no single or united organization was to emerge for the police on a national scale as opposed to the International Association of Fire Fighters, the firemen's spokesmen. An extremely well researched work of the development of police unions was found in a doctoral

dissertation by D. Whitney, Law and Order Politics: A History and Role Analysis of Police Officers Organizations. Another historical examination of the development police unions was found in P. Murphy's thesis, Police Employee Organizations. The issue of unionization in the police was the subject of several works. Two of the most interesting of these were Police Unionism, by H. Juris, and Bureaucratic Insurgency, by M. Levi.

Several works which dealt with police strikes were also examined. The seminal work in this area is Police Strikes: Causes and Prevention by W. Gentel. This work, using the historical background of the Boston Police Strike, studied several strikes in the United States during the early 1970's. An excellent journal article, Police Strikes: A Model to Study Underlying Factors, Australia & New Zealand Journal of Criminology, by J. Meyer, gives a conceptual examination and model of several police strikes.

A number of works on the historical development of the police in the United States were examined. L. Fuld's work, Police Administration, gave an interesting look at the history of European policing. A more detailed examination of this history was found in European Police Systems, by R. Fosdick.

This work gives an interesting examination of the recruitment practices of the London forces. Fosdick continued his examination of policing in his later work, American Police Systems. This work was especially interesting for its analysis of the rise of State control of local police forces. An excellent examination of the development of American policing was found in R. Fogelson's Big-City Police. This work had a special section on unionism in policing; the anti-police union attitude, following the Boston Strike, and the development of the militancy of the 1950' and 60's.

Perhaps one of the best works on the historical development of policing in America, and an in depth examination of the Boston police strike, was The Blue Parade, by T. Reppetto. Reppetto gives an interesting comparison of several departments, their developments and the personalities associated with them. One of his most interesting observations was that the Boston Strike confirmed the low social status police officers. The historical development of policing was exceptionally studied by J. Richardson in his doctoral dissertation and book, The New York Police: Colonial Times to 1901. His ideas were a further development of his earlier article, "The Struggle to Establish a London-Style Police Force for New York City," New York Historical Society

Quarterly.

A comparison of the historical development of New York and London was also exceptionally studied by W. Miller in his doctoral dissertation and book, Cops and Bobbies. Both works were scholarly examinations of the development of policing, but Miller's work was the most useful in its observation and analysis of the London force. Both works are of interest for the study and comparisons of the London force and its influences on their American counterparts. Another excellent historical work on police is S. Harring's, Policing Class Society. Harring's examination of the police as "strikebreakers," was an excellent look at that the police's performance of this duty.

A number of works were of specific interest to the Boston Police Department, either on its development or on the strike itself. One work on the Boston force was Police Administration in Boston, by L. Harrison. This work gave an excellent examination of the various crime and administrative crime problems of the department, but made little reference to the strike. Perhaps the best historical examination of the development of policing in Boston was done by R. Lane in Policing The City: Boston, 1822-1885. This work gives a

scholarly study of the development of the Boston force and the setting and background of the movement to state control of local police force in the 1880's. A reprint by Arno Press in 1971, Boston Police Debates: Selected Arguments, gave an excellent look at several primary sources concerned with the development of the Boston Police. Another reprint by Arno Press which was very helpful was The Boston Police Strike: Two Reports. This work was very helpful in the initial research in that it made available the annual report of the Police Commissioner for the year of the strike and the Storrow Report, generally viewed as Mayor Peters' view of events.

D of the Tenth, published by the Massachusetts State Guard, was a day by day account of the war service of this regiment, especially its duty during the police strike. The major work on the Boston Police Strike was found to be F. Russell's A City in Terror. This chronological narrative of the Boston Police Strike was a very comprehensive examination of the strike and as one author stated, "Russell captures 1919 Boston," fitting the strike into the "Red Scare" of the same period. The main problem with this work is it is written as a journalistic account and has little, if any footnoting or documenting of his sources. An interesting point of this work is his view of Police Commissioner Stephen O'Meara and the

actions of Governor Coolidge. Russell, like Reppetto, credits O'Meara with the professionalization of the Police Department and examines the inability of Commissioner Curtis to deal with the Department and the strike situation. Coolidge is generally credited with the restoration of order and "saving the day." Russell clearly does not view Coolidge in this light. He attributes most of the credit for "saving the day" to Mayor Peters.

A number of works on Calvin Coolidge were studied, including two of his own works. Have faith in Massachuetttes and The Autobiography of Calvin Coolidge, both clearly give Mr. Coolidge's view of events during the Boston Strike. Have faith in Massachuetttes is a collection of the Governor's speeches and proclamations issued as part of his reelection bid in 1919. Surprisingly, Coolidge's autobiography makes little reference to what has been called the "strike that made a President" (Russell, 1963). The collection of proclamation, speeches and other documents, Have faith in Massachuetttes, was very helpful in this research. In its collection are several documents directly related to the strike, including Coolidge's reply to a telegram from Samuel Gompers and Coolidge's speeches to the Republican State Convention, the outcome of which was the nomination of Coolidge for reelection as

Governor.

Several biographies of Coolidge were also found useful. The preeminent work in this field is by W. White, A Puritan in Babylon. This extensive work gives a good narrative of the events of the Boston Police Strike. It is clear that Coolidge was the savior of a bad situation, according to White. The author called Coolidge a "hero...who stepped forward to save Boston, and subsequently America, from anarchy..." (White, p.50). C. Fuess's work Calvin Coolidge, The Man from Vermont, gives a more extensive examination of the strike and a more measured account of the career of Coolidge. Several other works on Coolidge gave interesting narratives of the strike and his career including, D. McCoy, Calvin Coolidge, The Quiet President, and E. Whiting, President Coolidge, A Contemporary Estimate. A less flattering look at Coolidge was found in I. Stone work, Calvin Coolidge: A Study in Inertia. Stone details Coolidge's ability to maintain a "laissez faire" approach to any action and surface as the "winner," in a variety of situations, including the Boston Police Strike.

No other biographies of the principals in this strike were found. One fictional work, The Memory Book of Starr Faithful, by G. Vanderbilt, gave an interesting account of

Mayor Andrew Peters's sexual liaison with his eleven-year old niece, Starr Faithful, her life and mysterious death. In his "Reflections on retiring from office," Harvard Graduate, Peters presented an interesting article giving insight into the events of the strike, from his perspective

Unlike its United Kingdom counterparts, the Boston Police Strike has been extensively examined by the academic community in several thesis and dissertations. P. Robeson, a nephew of Mayor Peters, in his master's thesis, The Boston Police Strike of 1919, gave an excellent historically description of the strike and used a variety of primary sources. Primary sources and documents were also widely used in C. Fitzgerald's master's thesis, The Boston Police Strike of September, 1919. This work was an excellent look at the strike and the personalities involved. A steady, but limited, examination of the strike was found in R. Heffman master's thesis, The Boston Police Strike of 1919. This work, written entirely from secondary sources, gave an interesting look at the strike and the economy of the times.

T. Silver in his doctoral dissertation, Prelude To An Interpretation: Coolidge and the Historians, offers an apologetic view of Coolidge's career. His examination of the

events of the Boston Police Strike, specifically Coolidge's, must be read with his views in mind. However, his examination of other historians views of the Governor's actions in the strike, is very engaging. Perhaps the best work on this strike was by F. Koss, The Boston Police Strike of 1919. This work, a doctoral dissertation, gives an excellent historical examination of every aspect of the strike. Koss, who was aided by his location as a professor in Boston University, gave a distinguished examination of the police union views and actions in this strike. Propitiously, Koss was able to conduct interviews with some participants and their survivors.

Another excellent work on the strike was done by J. White, in his doctoral dissertation, A Triumph of Bureaucracy: The Boston Police Strike and the Ideological Origins of the American Police Structure. This work gave an excellent examination of the strike in the development of policing in the early 1900's, and the "legacy" of the strike in both the police union movement and the bureaucratic development of policing in the United States. Several other unpublished papers were very interesting, especially since they're written by participants in the events of the strike. The Boston Police Strike by H. Long is a typewritten page done by Governor Coolidge's private secretary. This paper, written from

Coolidge's perspective, gives an excellent narrative of the events of the strike. Another unpublished paper, The Boston Police Strike by E. Gay was written as a record of events by a private in the State Guard, who served on active duty during the strike, and dedicated to his commanding officer, Major General Samuel Parker.

Several journal articles were found on the strike. "Mayor Peters of Boston," Survey, by H. Parsens, at the close of Peters last term in office. The article is an excellent examination of the trials and tribulations of the Mayor's reign, with special attention to the strike, as well as Peters viewpoints of events. R. Lyons in his article "The Boston Police Strike of 1919", The New England Quarterly, gave an excellent narrative of the events of the strike.

In a follow up to his dissertation, J. White in "Violence During the 1919 Boston Police Strike: An Analysis of the Crime Control Myth," Criminal Justice Review, gave an excellent review of the secondary literature on the Boston Strike and an examination of the causes of the rioting and related violence. In an article in Police, "Boston Police Strike of 1919", W. Bopp gave an interesting look at the role of the police as the "oppressed" or "victims of the system." An interesting

article, published in 1978, at the time of widespread unrest among several police forces in the United States, was by T. Bornstein, "Police Unions: Dispelling the Ghost of 1919," Police Magazine. This article gave an engaging look at one of the results of the strike, the "death" of police unionism in the United States, until the militancy of the 1960's.

An interesting look at a nonparticipant in the strike was "The Professor and the Police," Harvard Magazine, by I. Kramnick. This work was an examination of Professor Harold Laski and his defense of the striking police officers in 1919. This was an interesting look at events at Harvard, where many students volunteered, with the blessing and the urging of the Harvard administration, for the special police.

Another event which looked at related issues was found in R. Herron's work "The Police Strike Of 1918," The Bulletin. This was an engaging look at the causes and events of the police strike in Cincinnati, Ohio, the year prior to the Boston Strike. This gave an very interest look at a police strike, with similar causes, wages and unionization, which result in the dissolution of the police union and the raise of pay for the police officers. Its interest to note in this article that several officers who were fired for their union

activities, were reinstated following the settlement of the situation.

SECTION II

THE UNITED KINGDOM

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"Our English police system...rests on foundations designed with the full approval of the people, we know not how many hundreds of years before the Norman conquest, and has been slowly molded by the careful hand of experience, developing as a rule along the line of least resistance, now in advance of the general intelligence of the country, now lagging far behind, but always in the long run adjusting itself to the popular temper, always consistent with local self-government, and even at its worst, always English" (Lee, p.xxvii). This statement by Captain Lee, one of the first historians of British policing, shows his view, and that of other Whig, or orthodox, historians (see Critchley and Ascoli), that British policing developed "in relatively simple terms of progress and presupposed the emergence of a broad consensus in politics and society from the Victorian period" (Emsley, 1991, p.3-4). The development of the police system of the United Kingdom is a much more complex event. The policing system of England and Wales, the areas which this paper will

primarily deal with, was greatly influenced by the foundations laid down by the Normans, King Charles, Colquhoun and others who sought to perfect the maintenance of the "King's Peace." This section of the paper will endeavor to describe the foundations of the English policing system, the constable and watch, under the supervision of a magistrate, and the various attempts at reform of this less than perfect system. It will seek to recount the function of these offices and attempts to affix new responsibilities to these ancient offices.

This paper will seek to show that these attempts to coordinate and direct the activities of the offices were failures. These failures and the continued urbanization of the population led to an intolerable condition. The traditional views of the development of the new police as a response to an ever growing crime problem and the increased disorder of the street has to be taken into the overall situation. But whether one explains the development and passage of the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 as a reaction to spreading crime or to the spreading political disorders of the period, one of the underlying causes of its passage was the disordered system it was to replace.

By the time of the passage of Peel's Act, London was

policed by some 86 separate law enforcement agencies, with "little or no communication or cooperation among these different officers of law enforcement; their activities often interfered with each other causing conflict, jealousy, corruption and inefficiency" (Sopenoff, p.4). Indeed, the strongest opponents of Peel's new police were the various parish authorities, who like the City of London authorities, where not anxious to lose their authority or prerogatives. "It was not in the attempts at improving, regulating and supervising the traditional officers of law enforcement that reformers failed to reform the system, but in the failure of the local districts to cooperate in these changes because of their unwillingness to give up their independent authority. In the end a more radical solution was imposed on them by Parliament" (Sopenoff, p.13).

Peel adroitly negotiated the passage of his bill and the creation of the new, centralized police for the Metropolitan area of London. This Act was to be the first in several key pieces of legislation in a process of centralization of the police in Britain. Two key factors aided this process, as described by Professor Emsley (1991, p.6). First, for reasons of "economy and efficiency," legislation was introduced bringing uniformity to the various forces and bringing them

closer to central government and away from the grasp of local government. Second, during periods of national emergencies, i.e., war or widespread strikes, the Home Office was able to push various measures for closer contact with and control by central government.

The police labor relation problems and the resulting strikes in 1918 and in 1919 were to give central government the excuse to bring forward new legislation, the Police Act of 1919, which set universal standards of pay and service for every police officer in the United Kingdom. The Act further strengthen the authority of the Home Office, through the power of the purse strings, to centralize the police service. This trend toward centralization is clearly seen in the number of separate police constabularies and their consolidations. Following the passage of the County and Borough Police Act of 1857 the number of forces in England and Wales, including the Metropolitan and City of London forces, was 239 and by 1920, with the passage of the Desborough inspired Police Act of 1919, the total had fallen to 191. This number further dropped to 129, in 1949, following several reforms during the emergencies of World War II. The number was again consolidated to 43, the present structure of the police service, as a result of the Police Act of 1964.

This centralization of the police has created a police service with universal pay, promotions, pensions and conditions of employment. The police service which has emerged is far from the "local self-government" force which Lee wrote of, but the national police service of today has that force as its basis.

CHAPTER 2

The Foundation

In 6 A.D., the Emperor Augustus Caesar formed "a system of night patrols and night watchmen" (Stead, 1977, p.15), known as the Vigiles. Later in his reign, Augustus formed the Urban Cohorts specifically to police the seat of his empire, Rome. Eventually, control of these forces passed to the City Prefect.

The maintenance of the public peace and of order at the shows is also held to be under the jurisdiction of the City Prefect: clearly he must have soldiers stationed at various points to maintain the public peace and to bring news of any incidents anywhere. (Stead, 1977, p.21)

These concepts of policing initiated by Augustus were to be part of life in England for the approximately three hundred years of Roman rule. However, the true origins of modern English police ideas are found "in the tribal laws and customs of the Danish and Anglo-Saxon invaders" (Critchley, p.1).

During the centuries following the withdrawal of the Roman legions, various tribes invaded and conquered sections of England. It was not until the Ninth Century that King Alfred of Wessex conquered and merged the "Danelaw" districts into one kingdom. Under Alfred the Great, every man in his kingdom had to join a group known as the "Frithbohr." In this system, each man was equally responsible for the maintenance of law and order in his community. This concept of "collective responsibility" was initiated to prevent "criminals from running away from, and avoiding the Punishment which the Law inflicts" (Radzinowicz, p.28). Alfred the Great guaranteed a state of peace and security, the "King's Peace," in return for the good conduct of his subjects.

Under Alfred and his successors, a system developed by which the Earls of each province were held responsible for keeping the "King's peace." To assist in this process, the country was divided into shires each with a Shire-Reeve (Sheriff) appointed whose job it was to maintain the peace and report to the Earl. "Each shire contained many 'tithings' or groups of about ten families" (Hewitt, p.4). The Shire-Reeve had the authority to raise all the forces of the shire, posse comitatus, to pursue any felons through the "hue and cry," by which all members of the community were required to join in

the attempts to arrest the fugitive (Critchley, p.3).

The Norman Conquest of 1066 led to a variety of changes in this scheme. The tithing system was expanded and renamed the "Frankpledge." This pledge has been described as having "great historical significance" and as the "most important police institution of the Middle Ages." The pledge was "a system of compulsory collective bail fixed for individuals, not after their arrest for crime, but as a safeguard in anticipation of it" (Critchley, p.3). The Normans required these Sheriffs to hold special hundred courts, groups of tythings were formed into a unit called the hundred. These courts were known for their repression. One of these courts, the "Bloody Assize" was recorded as "there hanged more thieves than ever were known before, that is, in a little while, four and forty men altogether: and dispoiled six men of their eyes and mutilated them...First they are bereaved of their property and then slain" (Solmes, p.16).

STATUE OF WINCHESTER

With a variety of refinements to the duties of the

Sheriffs and the organization of the court systems, this organization was maintained until the Statute of Winchester in 1285. This landmark statute provided:

1. The Hundred was to be answerable for all offenses committed in it. Every man between fifteen and sixty was to have arms in his house, prescribed in accordance with his rank and property, ready for use in keeping peace.

2. The Hue and Cry was to be revived. The Sheriffs were to follow law breakers with the whole countryside and the pursuit was to follow everywhere and anywhere until the offender was caught or reached sanctuary. If the Hue and Cry was not levied at once the residents were to be fined.

3. Watch and ward was to be kept in towns. The gates of walled towns were to be shut between sunset and daybreak, and a watch of six men was to guard each gate. Every borough was to have a watch of twelve persons, and small towns were to have watchmen according to their population. (Hewitt, p.6)

The statute created separate regulations for the capital, London. The city was divided into 24 wards, with six watchmen supervised by an Alderman in each ward. Additionally, the watch was to be "marching," in that the watch was authorized to march or patrol the city and arrest transgressors and bring them before the mayor. This Statute is regarded as the foundation of policing in England. It "was the only general public measure of any consequence enacted to regulate the

policing of the country between the Norman Conquest and the Metropolitan Police Act, 1829, so that for nearly 600 years it laid down the basic principles" (Critchley, p.7). Watchmen were thus created as the local officials responsible for law enforcement. These watchmen or parish constables were to be assisted in their duties by the Justice of the Peace, a royal official, whose position and duties were clarified in the Justices of the Peace Act, 1361.

The Statute of Winchester of 1285 and the Justices of the Peace Act of 1361 "mark the transition from frank pledge...into a rudimentary police system based on a working partnership of constable and justice" (Critchley, p.8). The Justices of the Peace Act also detailed the responsibilities and duties of these officials as the King's officers and their responsibilities for the maintenance of the King's Peace. Traditionally, the Justices were appointed from the gentry of the county and their higher social status degraded the constable to the status of the Justice's man. These parish constables, who were appointed by the Justices, had a variety of duties ranging from the charging of those who failed to attend church, or who refused to keep watch to the arrest and prosecution of violators and fugitives.

Much has been written about the nature and character of the parish constables. Sir Francis Bacon writing in the early 1600's stated that they "are of inferior, yea of base condition...The petty constable ought to be the better sort of resident, not the worst." Sir William Blackstone commented that "the average constable is an ignoramus who knows little or nothing of the law. Considering the type of man who commonly acts as such, it is just as well that he should remain in ignorance of the powers that are entrusted to him." These problems were further influenced by the practice of allowing a proxy to serve for those citizens selected by the Justices. These situations did bring reactions from the courts. In 1598, the assizes in Kent indicted several men for contempt for the election of William Sheafe to the office of constable, "although they knew him to be an infirm man incapable of discharging the office" (Emsley, 1991, p.10).

However problematic, this was the policing system in England for the greater part of the Middle Ages. The major change in this system was to be the militarization of policing under Cromwell and his Puritan followers. Cromwell found that the gentry in the counties, who held the majority of the positions as Justices and were responsible for the maintenance of order, were royalist and his enemies (Lee, p.125). "The

resulting friction hampered the Protector's administration...he was often compelled to resort to novel expedients to police the new commonwealth" (Glover, p.32). To address this situation in 1655, Cromwell divided England and Wales into twelve military-police districts. Each of these districts was led by an official known as a Major-General and was garrisoned by a force of 6500 soldiers. These Major-Generals ruled with almost absolute power and their military policed with a "rod of iron." However, the use of the military for policing functions was very unpopular. The "memory of the 'tyranny' of the major generals ensured that the idea of a standing army remained unpopular in... England" (Emsley, 1991, p.13). Yet, troops were to be the conventional recourse of the authorities faced with riots or threatened disorders, well into the nineteenth century.

CHARLIES

In May 1660 the monarchy was restored in Great Britain and Charles II ascended to the throne. In an attempt to curtail some of the lawlessness which was common to the capital, an Act of the Court of Common Council, was passed in

1663. This provided for the establishment of a watch, primarily in London, employing 1,000 watchmen to be on duty from "sunset to sunrise." These watchmen became known as "bellmen" or "Charlies," after the King. Their principal duties were to secure the City gates, close taverns and to parade and announce the time and the state of the weather. Being aged and totally unsuited for what today would be called "police work," these Charlies were of little practical use. "Charlies were...contemptible, dissolute, and drunken buffoons who shuffled along the darkened streets after sunset ...calling out the time and the state of the weather, and thus warned the criminal of their approach, while attracting to themselves the attention of ruffians and practical jokers" (Critchley, p.30). The sporting practice of "Charlie baiting" and overturning the watch boxes, provided as rest stops for the watch, with the watchman inside, did little to enhance the public's confidence and trust in the Charlies.

The office of Justice of the Peace was also to be brought into disrepute. Various tales and stories are told of the trading justices and the thief-takers. Probably the best known characterization of a trading justice is found in Henry Fielding's Amelia. The character of Justice Thrasher was known as someone who "never made a favorable decision unless he

received a liberal fee; his justice was determined by the size of the suppliant's pocket; his enforcement of the law was dependent upon the financial benefits he could attain" (Sopenoff, p.6). Jonathan Wild was a thief who learned how to manipulate the system. He devised a method by which he controlled most of the thievery in London from 1715 to 1725. Wild, who became known as the Thief-Taker General, was able to return most of the stolen property for private reward or to inform on those outside his circle for the public reward. Unfortunately, he became the victim of his own success and was hung in 1725.

The system of law enforcement was not working. In a pamphlet on crime sent to the Lord Mayor of London in 1730, Daniel Defoe warned that "wickedness" and "robbery" were everywhere and that no one was safe either in the street or in their homes. Defoe explained the situation as "troops of human d(evi)ls" let loose on the citizens, and that "if suffered to go on, will call for Armies, not Magistrates, to suppress" (Silver, p.1). The Justice-Constable system was collapsing.

Other factors were adding to the collapse of the existing system and the feeling of alarm and unrest. Increased urbanization and the onset of the Industrial Revolution

greatly changed the face of the landscape, particularly London. Population estimates showed that approximately 200,000 people lived in greater London in 1600. This estimate rises too 575,000 in 1750, 900,000 in 1801 and 1,275,000 in 1821 (Repetto, p.4). This was a remarkable increase of six times the population in 200 years. The criminal justice system, as it was, and the infrastructure of society could not function effectively in this situation.

Added to these problems was the development of the "dangerous classes," which Ascoli seeks to describe in stating, "At no time in its long history was London a more dissolute or disorderly place, ill-governed and at times virtually ungovernable, in which crime became the principal industry and corruption the accepted practice" (p.27). The middle and upper classes were seeing more of these dangerous people in the streets of London, as populations increased. Working class and poor, besides the criminal elements, were now seen as a reality in the streets. In his description of the times, one author states that "Even the Webbs (noted nineteenth century historians) confessed to 'despair of conveying any adequate picture of the lawless violence, the barbarous licentiousness, and the almost unlimited opportunities for pilfering and robbery offered by the

unpoliced London streets ' ...'one is forced to travel, even at noon, as if one were going to battle" (Critchley, p.21). Whether it was the actual growth of these classes, as Ascoli and Critchley would argue or the perception of them and the dangers they could bring, as in the French Revolution, as Emsley would argue, the fear of these "dangerous classes" was to greatly influence the development of policing reforms.

Two other events added to the unrest of the early 1700's. Increased hordes of mustered out soldiers and sailors, released after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, had descended on London and added to the social and criminal problems. To make matters worse, Parliament adopted a liberal policy on the new substance, gin. "Starting about 1725, gin was introduced to England and rapidly became a staple of the lower classes, who had previously drunk low-potency beer. Gin provided a cheap and powerful substitute, and the London poor became much more violent and dangerous" (Repetto, p.6).

In 1745, Parliament passed an act which stated that upon payment of a L5 license fee, distillers were allowed to sell gin at the retail level and within a short time these dram shops sprang up everywhere. The annual consumption of this new and cheap gin grew to "over one gallon per man, woman, and

child," by 1750, less than five years after Parliament's authorization (Lyman, p.142). Eighteenth century England, especially London, was the scene of social disorder and unrest which began to threaten the existing political system. A variety of commentators and ideas sprang up from this situation. One of these commentators was Henry Fielding, who was appointed Chief Magistrate of Bow Street in 1748.

FIELDING

Fielding began to reorganize and express his ideas. His pamphlet, An Enquiry into the Causes of the Late Increase of Robbers, was an expressed attempt to rouse the powers-that-be to the dangerous situation of crime and disorder. This pamphlet set forth a plan which "alike opposes those wild notions of liberty that are inconsistent with all government, and those pernicious schemes of government which are destructive of true liberty" (Critchley, p.32). Fielding published several other pamphlets expressing his ideas on the causes of crime, drunkenness, vagrancy, gambling, sexual laxity, etc. and with the over harshness of the law. His writings were very influential on the Parliamentary committees

established to review the operations of the night watch in Westminster. Henry Fielding began to recruit several "householders" to act as constables, the majority of which came from the Bow Street area. This group, the forerunner of the Bow Street Runners, proved to have minor successes in breaking up several gangs and the apprehension of violators.

Henry Fielding only served six years in office, dying in 1754, and was succeeded by his brother, John, who was to serve in office for 25 years. John Fielding continued the ideas and publication of those ideas that his brother had began. Fielding suggested that householders should begin associations for mutual protection against burglars and collect a subscription fee which would be used to pay for the investigation and pursuit of violators. Under this plan, published as A Plan for Preventing Robberies within Twenty Miles of London, Fielding called for these householders to collect any information on crime and pass it to the Magistrate. This information was collected and distributed at various public gatherings and places. Fielding was able to secure a grant of funds from the Treasury, which he used to pay for four full-time "pursuers," who could act anywhere in the country. Burglaries continued to increase and a Parliamentary committee issued a report in 1770. This report,

also written by John Fielding, stated:

The Watch is insufficient; their Duty too hard, and Pay too small...That as they are paid Monthly, they borrow their Money of a Userer once a Week...That the Watch in Westminster is in every Parish under the Direction of a separate Commission:-That Commissioners of the respective Parishes appoint the Beats of their Watchmen without conferring together, which leaves the Frontiers of each Parish in a confused State, for that where one side of a street lies in one Parish, the Watchmen of one Side cannot lend any Assistance to Person on the other Side, other than as a private Person, except in Cases of Felony. (Lyman, p.142)

Several other persons appeared before the Parliamentary committee, and expressed similar disapproval of the watch system and the watchmen themselves. Some other ideas were expressed as methods to improve the operation of the watch, including improved discipline in the ranks and consolidation of some Parish Watches. The Act of 1773 was the result of these Parliamentary hearings. This Act was far from what Fielding and his supporters hoped and applied for only to Westminster. Other than instituting a minimum wage for the Watch, "The Act changed nothing nor improved anything, and apathy reigned for another decade" (Lyman, p.143). The only force resembling a "police" force in London or England was the Bow Street Runners. Fielding's Runners, through fees collected

for their work and grants from the Treasury, were able to continue their "policing" duties. Additionally, a foot patrol of central London was added in 1782 and a horse, or mounted, patrol was begun in 1805 (Repetto, p.15).

They filled the times following this parliamentary Act with social and economic unrest. During the period 1778-1780, the British Empire found itself engulfed in a war with the American Colonies, a war which threatened to become a global affair with its traditional enemy, France. The specter of a European war compounded the need for additional troops to a government which was already raising taxes to pay for the rental of Hessian soldiers fighting in the colonies. In an attempt to recruit more men to the colors, the government decided to repeal an anti-Catholic statute which required anyone joining the army to take the oath of attestation.

The act was introduced by Sir George Saville, a well-known anti-Catholic, and this mild relaxation of the repressive anti-Catholic laws was passed. The Protestant Association was inflamed at this legislation and recruited Lord George Gordon, a member of Parliament, to lead a march on Parliament and demand the repeal of the Catholic Relief Bill. These and other activities inflamed the religious bigotries of

the lower classes. The anger of the repressed classes now had a direction and a rallying point. "The prisons, the Inns of Court, the Bank and the houses of magistrates were all hated and assaulted as symbols of oppression, riches, and dishonest power" (Lyman, p.143). The stage was set for Lord Gordon's march.

On June 2, 1780, approximately 50,000 marched on Parliament and surrounded the approaches. Little was done by the various "police" authorities of London to control the situation, "every noble lord who came in, bore about him some marks of the resentment of a mob, then collected to the amount of several thousand...The archbishop (sic) of York was ill used" (Lyman, p.143). The situation was quieted only on the arrival of army, cavalry and infantry units. Within several hours, the mob dispersed and moved throughout London. Several embassies of Catholic countries were attacked and looted. Troops ordered to these scenes stood by and watched as no magistrates were available to authorize or order the troops to fire.

The rioters moved over the next few days to various part of London. Areas where Irish laborers, predominately Catholic, lived were attacked; Newgate and several other prisons were

stormed and the prisoners released; the houses of the Lord Chief Justice and that of Sir John Fielding in Bow Street were looted; and, much of this as troops stood by. The military was convinced that it could not act without the orders of civil magistrates. This finally prompted action by the King. George III called an emergency meeting of his council and demanded action by the army. The outcome was a decision that army officers, without the benefit of instructions by civil authorities, could order troops to fire on the mobs. The result of this action was that at the next major confrontation of the mob and troops, a fierce attack on the Bank of England, the mob was repelled by infantry volley fire and cavalry charges (Stead, 1985, p.27). Estimates vary, but it is generally stated that some 500 people died during this one week of rioting and losses exceeded L825,000 (Soles, p.99).

Both Houses of Parliament, the Lords and Commons, joined in their condemnation of both the rioters and the failure of the civil, "police," authorities to act in this situation. The Lord Chief Justice, Mansfield, summoned the magistrates of Westminster and several other parishes to explain their actions or lack of actions before and during these riots. The magistrate defended himself stating "that as yet he has not been able to get more than six constables together...(and) it

was in vain to expect to do any good in dispersing or quieting so very large and tumultuous a mob...with so small a number of constables" (Lyman, p.143).

The action of the civil authorities and their failure to maintain order during the Gordon riots was the cause of much condemnation. Lord Shelburne, who was later to serve as Home Minister, stated "the police of Westminster was an imperfect, inadequate, and wretched system; that the commission of the peace was filled by men, base to the last degree, and capable of every mean act, derogative and opposite to the justice of the laws..." (Lyman, p.143-4). Shelburne also advocated the restructure of the system along the lines of the French system of police. He spoke praisingly of the French system and thought that it could be adopted for use in England and that the traditional liberties of the English people would not be interfered with by this centralized police system (Critchley, p.36). Shelburne found himself quite alone in these suggestions. Despite the massive lawlessness of the Gordon Riots, little was done to improve or change the woefully inadequate system.

In an attempt to address this situation, the government of Prime Minister Pitt introduced a bill to Parliament, in

1785, to reorganize the policing of London. The Act was proposed by Sir Archibald Macdonald, the Solicitor-General. This Bill, titled a "Bill for the Further prevention of Crime and Punishment of Offenders against the Peace....," was aimed at the unification of the various policing agencies of London, Westminster and the City. The Act not only unified the various parish based constable and watch forces into one centralized force, but also put the command of this force into the hands of three salaried commissioners, appointed by the central government. "The Metropolitan area was to be divided into nine divisions, in each of which was to be a force of 'petty constable' under the command of a chief constable...The constables...were to patrol on foot and horseback, and to be armed with the powers of search and arrest...They were to be forbidden to receive tips or other rewards" (Critchley, p.36). This legislation met with bitter opposition.

The various vested interests in Parliament raised very vocal opposition to this legislation. The Bill was described as an attack on the chartered rights of the City of London, a danger to traditional British liberties and to "produce more mischief...than it would advert" (Sopenoff, p.21). A variety of attacks were launched comparing the police this Bill would produce, as foreign and to closely resembling the police of

Paris, with their network of spies, and as "a threat to the forms established by the wisdom of our ancestors" (Sopenoff, p.22). With the little support the Bill was able to muster and the vehement opposition it produced, it was withdrawn. The government of Prime Minister Pitt had to rethink its position on policing the Metropolis of London. This repositioning led to the Middlesex Justice Act of 1792.

JUSTICE ACT of 1792

This statute was an attempt to reform and reorganize the existing system of magistrates and constables. It was far less important than its predecessor in the development of a professional police force. The Act provided for the appointment of seven police offices, each staffed by three stipendiary magistrates, who were paid L400 per annum. Six constables, who were also salaried, were assigned to these offices. Additionally, this statute authorized these constables to arrest persons on suspicion of having committed an offense. These newly created police offices were modeled on Bow Street in an attempt to both purify the system, by putting the people on salary rather than fees and rewards, and

increase their efficiency in the maintenance of order. The Act was also an appeasement to the vested interest of the City and others, as it made no mention or interference in the affairs of the City, and maintained the status quo of the parish-watch system.

The Magistrate's Act of 1792 was not the only significant legislation to arise from Pitt's attempt to reform policing in London. "While the British Parliament had rejected the Police Act of 1785, the Irish Parliament passed the Irish Police Act rapidly in 1786" (Lentz, p.5). Dublin, like other rapidly growing cities in the British Empire, had experienced a jump in crime. One author (Henry) has described crime and violence in Dublin, during this period as catastrophic. "Dublin...reported 173 homicides...the three Dublin courts transported 1,400 convicts to the Americas...a total of 46 felons were executed in Dublin, including two females who were burned at the stake...Dublin had become an urban jungle before its time" (Henry, p.167). With Pitt's attempt at centralization of the police in London as their blue print, the Irish Parliament moved quickly on reorganizing and centralizing the 19 different parish authorities of Dublin.

This Act provided for Dublin to be divided into four

divisions with a central police headquarters. The force would be run by three police commissioners and was to be paid for by a "police" tax to be placed on houses and tenements. The force was mustered out on September 29, 1786 and proved a rapid success. "Overnight the city was occupied by an army of uniformed men: 40 petty constables were mounted on uniformed horses, and 400 policemen were armed with muskets charged with bayonets. The new police arrested hundreds of criminals in their first weekend, seeking to establish their superiority over the old, discredited parish watch" (Henry, p.167). This experiment in policing was to become a victim of its own success. The centralized power of this new police greatly reduced both the power and the influence of the old ward or parish system. This added with the general dissatisfaction at the expense of the "police" tax led to the Police Act of 1795.

This statute dismantled the Dublin police and authorized a reconstituted parish watch system. The nine years of existence of the Dublin police proved it to be quite successful in the policing of Dublin, but not in the politics of the Irish Parliament. This Act and the police force it created had wider consequences than those in Dublin. Robert Peel, who was to become the founder of the London Metropolitan Police, served as Chief Secretary for Ireland for six years,

1812 to 1818. During this period, Peel introduced several items of police reform and undoubtedly was influenced by the previous police legislation in Ireland. "A full history of the new police would probably lay its first scene in Ireland, and begin with the Dublin Police Act passed by the Irish Parliament in 1786" (Critchley, p.38).

CHAPTER II

FOUNDATIONS

One of the most successful consequences of the passage of the Middlesex Justice Act was the appointment of Patrick Colquhoun as a stipendiary magistrate. Colquhoun served for more than 25 years as a magistrate in London and was prominent, as a result of his writings, in the realm of police reforms. In his first publication, A Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis, in 1797, Colquhoun sought to make the case for the creation of a preventive police force to help cut the crime rate in London, which he estimated as epidemic. To bolster his argument he included statistics on the overall crime rate in London. By his estimates there were some 115,000 people who were engaged in some type of criminal activity. This is an extraordinary figure when compared to the overall population of London, which was estimated at approximately 1,000,000 people. An astonishing statistic, by Colquhoun's estimate, of better than 10% of the population engaged in some criminal activity. Also interesting is that the total force of

watchmen and constable employed in the entire metropolitan area of London was estimated at 1,000. This force was employed by 70 different trusts, working completely independent of each other.

Colquhoun wrote that much of the crime and disorder that Londoners were plagued with was due to nine causes.

1. Imperfections in the criminal code.
2. Lack "of an active principle, calculated to concentrate and connect the whole Police of the Metropolis and the Nation." He recommended a police under the direction and control of the Home Office.
3. Lack of police magistrates in the dockyards.
4. Lack of a public prosecutor for the Crown in criminal cases.
5. Lack of a regularized system for obtaining pardons.
6. The systems of hulks.
7. Lack of penitentiaries "for...punishment and reformation..."
8. Lack of a system for handling convicts sentenced to hard labor or transportation.
9. "The want of a more solemn mode of conducting executions..." (Lyman, p.145).

Colquhoun further argued that a "well-regulated and energetic police" was necessary for the security of London. In

a statement which should be considered visionary for its emphasis on a new centralized, preventive force, Colquhoun wrote; "Police in this Country may be considered as a new science; the properties of which consist not in the Judicial Powers which lead to Punishment and which belong to Magistrates alone; but in the PREVENTION and DETECTION OF CRIMES; and in those other Functions which relates to INTERNAL REGULATIONS for the well order and comfort of Civil Society" (Stead, 1985, p.29-30). These views were not without strong opposition. Edmund Burke, a leading intellectual of the times, wrote in his Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, "The State ought to confine itself to what regards the State..., namely the exterior establishment of its religion, its magistracy, its revenue; its military force..., the Corporations that owe their existence to its fiat...In its preventive police it ought to be sparing of its efforts, and to employ means, rather few, infrequent, and strong..." (Lyman, p.144).

Colquhoun furthered his ideas with a specific plan. He proposed the creation of a central police board, staffed by five police commissioners, who would control and pay the various officers under it. A small professional police force would be established in each of the parishes, with a high constable in charge of each division or parish. Additionally,

this board would maintain a registry of known offenders, organize an intelligence service and publish a Police Gazette, "not only for the purpose of aiding in the detection of crime, but also as a vehicle of moral education--"with commentaries suited to the comprehension of the vulgar, tending to operate as warnings, and to excite a dread of crimes..." (Critchley, p.39-40).

Colquhoun's writing and his testimonies before a Parliamentary select committee in 1798 were well received. This Parliamentary committee, the Select Committee on Finance, recommended that Colquhoun's proposal be adopted. A bill outlining his proposal was drafted but never submitted to Parliament. The strenuous opposition of the political interest of the City marked the death of this legislation. The bill was viewed as "a new Engine of Power and Authority so enormous and extensive as to threaten a species of despotism and inquisition hitherto without a parallel in this country..." (Critchley, p.40). Mindful of the political unrest in France, following the Revolution, which threatened to spread to other parts of Europe, and the objection of the City, Prime Minister Pitt had little choice but to maintain the status quo. Colquhoun's ideas were to receive a much warmer welcome in the private sector.

Colquhoun who had written on crime in and around the docklands in his Treatise, and later in his Treatise on the Commerce and Police of the River Thames, was invited by the West India Planters and Merchants to devise a scheme to cut theft and crime in general from their property, the various dockland along the river Thames. Together with John Harriot, Colquhoun organized a force of 60 salaried officers to form the Marine Police, making it the largest full-time force in London. This force was headquartered at Wapping, with Harriot as the resident magistrate and Colquhoun as the supervising magistrate. The Marine Police were armed with cutlasses and were charged with patrolling the river and the wharves. The force was organized into four departments: one, the Preventive Department, guarding ships and quays and general surveillance of the dock land area; the Judicial Department, hearing minor cases and committing serious crimes to higher courts; the Solicitor for Prosecutions; and, the Fourth for controlling the employment of dock laborers and contractors, an innovative plan, controlling access to the goods and completely in line with Colquhoun ideas on prevention. During the first eight months of operation "losses from theft were reduced by ninety-five percent. The government was so favorably impressed that the scheme (minus the dock labor branch) was taken over as a wholly public responsibility. Colquhoun had proved that the

presence of a disciplined police, in contrast to that of shabby watchmen, was an effective means of preventing crime" (Stead, 1985, p.31).

The Force was taken over by central government and converted into a ninth police office, under the Thames River Police Act. The Thames magistrates, like those of Bow Street, reported directly to the Home Secretary, unlike the seven parish magistrates set up under the Middlesex Justices Act. Bow Street and the Thames River Force were to be central government's first steps toward a centralized police force. As Colquhoun stated a disciplined and centralized police force could be used "To prevent Crimes, means must be employed to bring constantly under the view of the Delinquent, the fear of Detection and the certainty of being conveyed to a Magistrate. This effect belongs exclusively to the Science of Preventive Police, which is only beginning to be understood" (Stead, 1977, p.60).

The forces under the control of the magistrates at Bow Street found themselves at a variety of new duties, directed by the Home Office, during the Napoleonic Wars. The appointment of a new Chief Magistrate, Sir Richard Ford, and the statutory regulations giving board discretion authority to

these magistrates allowed the Home Office to use these forces for counterespionage work and the use of the constables as "spies and informers to deal with enemy aliens" (Critchley, p.43). Ford, who has been described as enterprising and ambitious, used his position to expand the staffing and influence of Bow Street. He revived, in 1805, the concept of a mounted patrol.

This patrol of sixty men, principally selected from cavalry regiments, monitored the major roads within twenty miles of London. This patrol wore blue coats and pants, black boots and hats and crimson red vests, which led to their nickname, Robin Redbreasts. This force operated in posses and was armed with pistols and cutlasses. They were very effective in their mission and as a result were dispatched to various parts of England. The patrol was known for its habit of announcing their presence with horn blasts and the cry, "Bow Street Patrol." This patrol was expanded in 1821 with the appointment of an additional 100 officers to serve as an unmounted patrol. This force operated in suburban areas within six miles of London. Two points are especially interesting about these mounted and unmounted patrols. First, they were the first uniformed police force in England, and, second, provisions were made for meeting points for both of these

patrols, overlapping the "beats" of the officers. This management of the uniformed patrol force was another example of the uniqueness of the Bow Street Patrol.

During the next several years, a variety of economic factors added to the social turmoil. As a result of several blockades on the French ports, the Orders in Council of 1807, unemployment in the agriculture and maritime industries greatly increased. These factors, added to the rising prices of food, caused increased social unrest and a surplus of labor. In 1811, two specific incidents led to another Parliamentary Committee on the Police. The increasing use of machinery in industry, especially in the highly industrialized Midlands area of England, caused high rates of unemployment and social unrest. Rioting broke out in the winter of 1811-12 and widespread destruction of machinery, primarily stocking-frames, and factories took place. These riots, and the several murders which transpired during them, caused the Government to rush through legislation making frame breaking a capital crime.

In December 1811, two brutal murders took place in the East End of London. Two entire families were cruelly murdered in their own homes. The Wapping murders took on a highly

public profile.

"Complacency about the need for reforming the police vanished overnight. The watchmen in the area were instantly discharged. Special armed patrols were appointed ...Public concern mounted throughout the whole country, and just as after the Gordon Riots, so again a welter of suggestions poured into the Home Office from all over the country, but most seem to have looked no further than an improvement in the quality of the parish police and the nightly watch. Even Colquhoun now contented himself with a series of minor suggestions designed to improve the quality of watchmen" (Critchley, p.41).

COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY

These events lead the Government to launch a Parliamentary committee of enquiry into the state of the nightwatch. The committee issued a report, which later was introduced as legislation in Parliament in July 1812, calling for improved arrangements for supplying information to the eight police offices. Bow Street magistrate's office was to act as the central clearing house for crime and it was to act under the direct authority of the Home Secretary. As is often the case, the months passed and the public out cry died away. The Bill was dropped.

Domestic politics was overshadowed by the continuing war with France. Finally, in 1815, Napoleon and France were defeated at the battle of Waterloo. The peace that followed was characterized by a period of economic depression in England. The labor pool was overwhelmed by the thousands of discharged soldiers and sailors. With the declining need of the military, both industrial and agricultural interests suffered as orders dried up. Parliament, which was still heavily influenced by the landed gentry, tried to protect these special interests through the passage of the Corn Laws in 1815. This legislation forbade the importation of foreign wheat, until the domestic price of wheat reached the artificially high price of eighty-four shillings a quarter. This policy kept bread and other baked goods, the mainstays of the poor, at artificially high prices. These special interests went back to Parliament and demanded and received the repeal of the property tax and other special taxes that had financed the war with France. The perception of the masses that they were ill-treated by the "haves" and the growing economic problems led to demonstrations and rioting in the major cities. London became the focal point of these demonstrations and revived memories of the chaos and confusion of the Gordon Riots of 1780.

As was the case in 1780, the civil authorities in London were ill-suited to control or even attempt to control the situation. When the rioters stormed Parliament, in March of 1815, the Government was forced to call for the deployment of troops. Once again the several "police" authorities of London failed to maintain any degree of law and order. In June 1815, following the curtailment of the rioting, "The Secretary of the Admiralty claimed that the civil power had been guilty of neglect of duty, and summoned the High Bailiff of Westminster to explain. His testimony is self-explanatory of the urgent need for police reform "...of his 80 constables, about 50 attended today...; he found this force, quite insufficient to restrain the mob...He had no power over any constables but his own" (Lyman, p.146). Society was continually concerned with the complete failure of civil authorities to deal with these types of situations. These concerns, however, did not lead to any attempts at reform or reorganization of the "police." Indeed, a level of acceptance of the situation was characterized by a statement by Lord Castlereagh. "The police had not been negligent: but no police could prevent such attacks from being made in different parts of the town under circumstances like the present" (Lyman, p.147).

PETERLOO

The economic depression and the civil disorder that it fostered were to continue for several years. Unrest and rioting broke out in manufacturing and textile centers around the country. These demonstrations were usually met with the summoning of troops. A large meeting was held on August 16, 1819 at St. Peter's Field, Manchester. The purpose of the meeting was to hear a well-known radical orator, Henry Hunt, on the subjects of the repeal of the Corn Laws and the reform of Parliament. The meeting was well attended by some sixty thousand people. The local magistrates, fearing the worst, ordered the arrest of Hunt and his committee. In order to effect that arrest, the magistrates ordered the reading of the Riot Act and ordered the local militia, a troop of yeomanry cavalry, to disperse the crowd. "With drawn sabers, the mounted yeomanry charged. About eleven of the crowd were killed and four hundred wounded" (Lyman, p. 147). This yeomanry unit, an amateur volunteer force of local gentry who supplied their own equipment and horses, was unfit to perform these types of duties. Fearing for the safety of this yeomanry unit, the magistrates ordered in newly arrived units of regular army cavalry. This secondary charge added to the chaos and to the overall casualties (Stead, 1985, p.33).

The specter of these events at St. Peter Field, which became known as "Peterloo," led the Government to quickly pass a series of repressive measures that became known as the "Six Acts." " The Acts prohibited unauthorized drilling; authorized the seizure of seditious and blasphemous literature, making transportation the penalty for a second offense; authorized the issue of warrants for the search for arms; imposed a stamp duty on pamphlets and leaflets; and restricted the size of public meetings. To workers and Radicals, Peterloo became a battle-cry" (Lyman, p.147). These Acts were responsible for the transportation of several hundreds of convicted persons and numerous hangings.

The economic and social unrest were to take on new dimensions in 1820. The death of King George III in January 1820, permitted the Prince Regent to become King George IV. The Prince had been famous for his sexual exploits. He was legally married to Queen Caroline, illegally married to a Mrs. Fitzherbert, a Roman Catholic, and known to have several mistresses, which he openly flaunted. Directly after his coronation, he instructed his Government to begin divorce proceedings against Queen Caroline. The wronged Queen received great sympathy, especially from the lower class who viewed her as a victim of the same injustice system that they were

suffering under. Added to this was the discovery of a plot, the Cato Street Conspiracy, to murder the entire Cabinet. The situation was unsettled, when in April a revolt broke out in Scotland. The Government called out troops to secure the situation both in the country side and in London. With the troops in control, the Government moved ahead with charges of adultery against Queen Caroline.

Demonstrations took place throughout London, and huge crowds waited outside during the Queen's trial. A fear of revolution was sensed. The "police," and even the troops, were unable to prevent these demonstrations. Various threatening placards and pamphlets appeared. In October 1820, during the debate on a new repressive law, The Manufacturing of Seditious and Treasonable Placards, one of these placards was read outloud.

Let us, in this mighty crisis, bear in mind that the great are not our only foes. Those middling ranks who make us hew and draw, and dole our pittance to us according to their humour--these are our most grinding enemies. What is the constituent body but the tyrants of the nonrepresentatives? What are the tens of thousands of wretches...in Westminster...but the oppressors of their non-enfranchised fellow-citizens-content to crawl before higher orders, that we may continue slaves to both? Alike then, and equal be their common destiny. The brave, though starving outstanders of Manchester (Peterloo), should be avenged in

London. Shall we non-represented Britons...be scared by the fear of gibbets or bayonets?... let us in one heroic day, convince mankind that the grievances of non-representation are now become insupportable (Lyman, p.148).

The situation continued to move toward instability as fresh rioting broke out. The Queen's trial ended in November 1820 with her complete vindication. This was a cause for great celebration by most of the lower classes, and it proved to be the catalyst for riots and widespread destruction. Troops, again, took to the streets to keep some pretense of order. Even the troops were unreliable; a detachment of the Guards regiment mutinied in 1820. This mutiny provoked the Duke of Wellington to urge the creation of a force to maintain order:

In one of the most critical moments that ever occurred in this country, we and the public have reason to doubt in the fidelity of the troops, the only security we have, not only against revolution but for the property and life of every individual in this country who has anything to lose...The Government ought, without the loss of a moment's time, to adopt measures to form either a police in London or a military corps, which should be of a different description from the regular military force, or both (Repetto, p.16).

During the next few months, the Government suffered a great loss of support in Parliament. The political situation worsened, when in August 1821 Queen Caroline died. The Queen's

funeral procession became a battle as troops tried to keep order. "The scene at this moment was most awful-the carnage of Manchester...shot across our memory. Here a contest arose, and here blood was shed. Some stones and mud were thrown at the military, and...the soldiers were sanctioned in firing their pistols and carbines at the unarmed crowd...the number of shots fired...was not less than 40 or 50" (Lyman, p.148). Rioting spread to other parts of London. The impotence of the various "police" forces was again brought under a glaring light. For his part in attempting to keep order, the Chief Magistrate of Bow Street was dismissed. The Government was in a precarious position and changes were necessary. In a Cabinet reshuffling, the Home Office was offered to Sir Robert Peel, an appointment which would prove to one of the most important for the future of policing in London.

CHAPTER 3

PEEL AND THE NEW POLICE

Peel was sworn in and received the seal of the Home Office on January 17, 1822. He was immediately faced with a diversity of problems. High on his agenda of reforms were the "police." Almost immediately, Peel was able to have Parliament form a new select committee to examine the "Police of the Metropolis." Peel pressed for the creation of a centralized vigorous police force. The Select Committee of 1822 chose to mirror the statement of the previous committee on the police (1818): "a unified police system would of necessity be odious and repulsive...and among free people, the very proposal would be rejected with abhorance." The committee of 1822 asserted "...it is difficult to reconcile an effective system of police with the perfect freedom of action and exemption from interference, which are the great privileges and blessings of society in this country" (Sopenoff, p.31-32). Peel knew that the time was not right for his plan.

Among the other plans which Peel brought into office was the revision of the complex criminal laws. Peel was preceded in this effort by several noted members of Parliament, Sir Samuel Romilly, Henry Brougham and others. The intellectual ground work was laid by Jeremy Bentham in his Constitutional Code. Peel stated that "The most perfect laws...were those which ensured the greatest certainty of the conviction of the guilty'" (Sopenoff, p.41). In order to accomplish this Peel maintained that his plans were for pruning and grafting the existing laws rather than a radical change of scraping those in existence. During 1823, Peel was able to consolidate 130 statutes dealing with larceny into one Act. "The death penalty was abolished for more than one hundred offenses...He increased the number of judges and instituted a Third Assize to lessen delays...`When he finally left office in 1830 he had reformed and consolidated practically the whole of the Criminal Law of England'" (Lyman, p.149).

Peel also sought to bring other legislation in line with his thinking. He allowed the repressive Six Acts of 1819 to lapse. As the Home Secretary, Peel enjoyed some administrative and oversight responsibilities of the various "police" forces in London, thanks to the Middlesex Magistrates Act and the Thames River Police Act. As the Home Secretary, he tried,

through these Acts, to regulate the assignment and conduct of the various constables. He also gained favor by increasing the salaries of the magistrates, the constables of the police offices and the River Police. Peel took an active and direct interest in the day-to-day operation of the various forces that constituted the "police" of London.

Peel had to concern himself with the continuing problems of the economy. In 1825, a recession overtook the English economy. "There was a run on banks. Seven London banks and eighty country banks failed. Wages dropped, factories and mills closed, and unemployment resulted. In the textile counties strikes against wage-cuts erupted, then riots. In London ten thousand Spitalfields weavers were jobless. Machinery was destroyed and troops fought mobs. Hungry people raided shops for bread" (Lyman, p.149). These events and the "police" force's inability to deal with them reinforced Peel's belief in the urgent need of reform. Peel wrote to Henry Hobhouse, his under-secretary;

The continuous increase of crime in London and its neighborhood appears to me to call for some decisive measure...My plan would be to take a radius of ten miles, St. Paul's being the center. I consider the whole of the district included within the circumference excepting the city...I would make six Police Divisions, not limiting them...by straight lines, but

throwing together contiguous parishes. I would have no concern with parochial authorities...(Sopenoff, p.44).

Peel felt that he could now turn his attention to reforming the police. However, politics and outside factors were to intrude. The Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool, under whom Pitt served, was forced to resign after suffering a stroke and died shortly thereafter. The new Prime Minister, Lord Canning, was known to favor Catholic Emancipation and made several pro-Catholic appointments to the Cabinet. These policies caused several ministers to resign, among them Peel and the Duke of Wellington. Peel's plans were to be temporarily shelved. The new government of Canning, however, was to be short lived. In August 1827 Canning died and the King asked the Duke Wellington to form a new government. Peel was returned to the Home Office.

COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY

Peel immediately moved for the establishment of a new Parliamentary committee to inquire into the state of the police, the fourth such committee since 1803. He presented

most of his proposals in a speech to Parliament on February 28, 1828. Using a statistic on the increase in crime in the London area, showing a 55 per cent increase of all crimes in the period from 1821 to 1828, Peel stated;

...that the time is come, when from an increase in population, the enlargement of its resources, and the multiplied development of its energies, we may fairly pronounce that the country has outgrown her police institutions, and that the cheapest and safest course will be found to be the introduction of a new kind of protection (Sopenoff, p.49).

Peel did not intend to have a repeat of the report of the 1822 committee. He was appointed the chairman of the new committee and, as such, controlled those who would testify and the presentation of evidence or documents. Peel also maneuvered the appointment of the other members of this committee, to those members of Parliament who were in sympathetic to his views. The committee was to examine the present system of policing in London and to report their findings. The committee heard testimony about the corrupt and inefficient practices of the various parish watches and the failure of the magistrates at the several police offices to take any effective action to combat the continuing increase in crime. Peel, aware of the political situation in London, did not want to invite the opposition of the City of London to his

plans. The committee's report lauded the work of only two police organizations: the Thames River Police, for their preventive tactics and as a disciplined, regulated force; and, the City of London. The report itself stated that there be no "interference with the powers at present exercised by the municipal authorities of the City of London over the Police and Watch Establishment of the City" (Sopenoff, p.52). By eliminating any threat to the powerful special interest of the City and the various trade groups, Peel helped smooth the way of his proposal through the hurdles of Parliament.

The committee issued its report in July 1828. This report, Select Committee of 1828, Police of Metropolis, was an embodiment of Peel plans for the policing of London. It stated;

...that the present system is, and must continue to be defective; that its condemnation has been the almost uniform result of previous inquiries; and that a better system can be adopted probably at less expense, and with no new restraint on the liberty of the subject (Sopenoff, p.53).

The report was all that Peel could have wanted. It recommended the establishment of the Office of Police under the Home Office, which would be responsible for the policing of the entity of the Metropolitan area, giving unified control

of all policing, except the City of London, to one office. Additionally, financing of the force would be accomplished by the levying of a special rate on the parishes in the Metropolitan area, again excluding the City of London, and the remainder from the public funds. The Office of Police would be managed by specially appointed magistrates.

Peel knew that there would still be opposition to any legislation which would arise from this report (for the details of the opposition to act, see Emsley, The English Police and Critchley, A History Of Police In England And Wales). Some opposed the imposition of the new tax. Some opposed the exclusion of the City of London. Peel decided to delay the introduction of any legislation and in a letter to one of his assistants wrote that "he was worried about the expense of a new police and was concerned about overcoming "the combined opposition of vestries and all other parish authorities" (Sopenoff, p.54). Peel continued to try and sway public opinion and additional members of Parliament. The Edinburgh Review, an influential publication supporting the Whigs, the opposition party, came out in support of the Select Committee's Report.

...while the increase of population outstrips
that of employment, the number of offences

against property cannot...be stationary. But the public authority cannot connive at these irregular proceedings: they must be punished and prevented...The Review also supported the concept of a centralized police with arguments based on cost and freedom. "...such a system would be a great and decided improvement,...it might be adopted...at a less expense than the [parish watch], and with no new restraint on the liberty of the subject" (Lyman, p.150).

METROPOLITAN POLICE BILL

As public support rose and Parliamentary opposition waned, Peel was ready to move forward. In April, 1829 Peel introduced his legislation, A Bill for Improving the Police in and Near the Metropolis. This legislation provided for the appointment of certain Crown Justices to be in charge of the new Office of Police under the Home Secretary. The title of Justice was later changed to Commissioner. The new force would police any area comprising all of Westminster, parts of Surrey, Kent and Middlesex and would be called the Metropolitan Police District. The Force would be paid for by the imposition of a new tax, the Police Rate, on property holders within the new police district. All monies received for the force were to be controlled by a salaried official, the Receiver. Central government was given the power to compel

any parishes within twelve miles of Charing Cross to become part of the Police District. Additionally, the new force was only accountable to Parliament on an annual basis, for its expenditures and activities, another assertion of central governments control.

The preamble to this Act clearly states Peel's philosophy of the new police;

Whereas Offences against Property have of late increased in and near the Metropolis; and the local Establishments of Nightly Watch and Nightly Police have been found inadequate to the Prevention and Detection of Crime, by reason of the frequent Unfitness of the individuals employed, the Insufficiency of their Number, the limited Sphere of their Authority, and their want of Connection and Cooperation with each other; and whereas it is expedient to substitute a new and more efficient System of Police in lieu of such Establishments of Nightly Watch and Nightly Police, within the limits hereinafter mentioned, and to constitute an Office of Police, which, acting under the immediate Authority of One of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, shall direct and control the whole of such new System of Police (Stead, 1985, p.37).

Peel was able to negotiate the passage of the bill through the House of Commons with public support as "The demand for protection became widespread as business and industrial interests exerted a pressure which transcended party lines, a pressure which Parliament dared not ignore"

(Lyman, p.152). The Duke of Wellington, who was the Prime Minister, offered the bill to the House of Lords. In relaying the bill to the Duke of Wellington, who had been a advocate of a "police corp" since the Peterloo incident, Peel wrote, "Pray pass the bill through this session...for you cannot think what trouble it has given me" (Critchley, p.50). Wellington prevailed in the Lords and the bill received the Royal Assent on June 19, 1829.

Peel had succeeded in establishing a centralized preventive police force free from the restraints of the restrictive control of the various parishes. The new force was not to be the only force in London. The new legislation did not call for the abolition of several of the existing forces. The Bow Street Runners and the mounted and unmounted foot patrols, controlled by the Chief Magistrate at Bow Street, the Thames River Police and the constables employed by the Seven Stipendiary Magistrate offices, established by Middlesex Justice Act of 1792, were all left in place. Additionally, the policing of the City of London was left in the hands of that City's local control. It is interesting to note that while Peel was enormously successful in the passing of this Act, it was left to his successor's to consolidate these various forces into the presently existing Metropolitan Police.

THE NEW COMMISSIONERS

The problems of recruiting and organizing this new force was now to be Peel's next problem. The new police, as Peel envisioned it, would be a uniformed and disciplined force. To further that ambition, he decided to look toward a military man. With this in mind, Peel looked to his former command in Ireland. In writing to his friend, William Gregory, for advice, he stated;

It has occurred to me that if there was a Military man conversant in the details of the Police System of Ireland, he might possibly be very usefully employed here. But then he must be a very superior man to what I recollect of police magistrates in Ireland...I require a man of great energy, great activity both of body and mind, accustomed to strict discipline, and with the power of enforcing it, and taking an interest in the duty to be assigned to him. Then he must be a gentleman and entirely trustworthy.

There will be probably a force between two and three thousand men ultimately under his command. With the soldier I should unite a sensible lawyer as the other Magistrate (Sopenoff, p.57-58).

Several individuals were presented to Peel for these positions by a variety of sources, including the politically

connected. Peel decided on two Anglo-Irish gentlemen to fill the two positions that were authorized by this Act. The ex-military man was Colonel Charles Rowan, who retired from the 52nd regiment and had fought under Wellington at Waterloo. The sensible lawyer was Richard Mayne, a practicing Irish barrister.

The last of the positions authorized under the Act, the Receiver, was Peel's next appointment. Peel felt strongly about all three of these appointments and their influence on the success of the new police. Strong political pressure was brought to bear on Peel by Lord Chandos, one of the most influential men of the period, to appoint one of his proteges as the Receiver. Conscious of the political situation he found himself in, Peel wrote to Chandos that "The success of an important measure---and my own credit---are involved in this matter" (Sopenoff, p.58). With this in mind, Peel appointed John Wray as Receiver. Peel's appointees now went to work on the organization and recruitment of the new force.

The process of the establishment of the force was set into motion. The newly appointed commissioners decided that while the force should be uniformed, their uniform would be blue rather than the red of the British military, to thwart

those critics who would equate the police with the oppression of the military. The command structure was to be based on the military, with the exception of the ranks. The area of their jurisdiction was to be divided into seventeen police divisions. Each division would be comprised of 165 men, giving the new force a total compliment of approximately 3,000 officers. A superintendent was given command of the division. Each division was assigned four inspectors and sixteen sergeants, the only rank to be borrowed from the military. These sergeants were to be the principal field supervisors, being in charge of nine constables. These officers were to be armed with a rattle, for calling for assistance, and a short truncheon which was to be concealed under their coats. One of the principal decisions of the new commissioners was to design the new divisions without regard to the prior existing parish lines. "They (the commissioners) wanted a clean break with the parish authorities and felt such action was an important ingredient for structural unity" (Sopenoff, p.66).

The new force was to be under the centralized control of the commissioners, whom local authorities would not interfere with. The new headquarters would be the central command for the operations of the force and would be housed at "number four and five Whitehall Place. The rear of the building

adjoined a courtyard known as Scotland Yard. It was so named because it had been the site of the Palace of Whitehall where the Scottish ambassadors and Kings resided while in London prior to the Union. The entire complex in 1829 was in poor condition and was described as resembling a rabbit-warren of interconnecting alleys and tortuous passageways" (Sopenoff, p.66).

THE BEGINNINGS

Peel expressed his ideas on the new force, both to the force and the public, in his Instructions.

It should be understood at the outset, that the object to be attained is the prevention of crime.

To this great end every effort of the police is to be directed. The security of person and property and the preservation of a police establishment will thus be better effected by the detection and punishment of the offender after he has succeeded in committing crime...

He (the constable) will be civil and obliging to all people of every rank and class.

He must be particularly cautious not to interfere idly or unnecessarily in order to make a display of his authority; when required to act, he will do so with decision and boldness; on all occasions he may expect to receive the fullest support in the proper exercise of his authority. He must remember that there is no qualification

so indispensable to a police-officer as a perfect command of temper, never suffering himself to be moved in the slightest degree by any language or threats that may be used; if he do his duty in a quiet and determined manner, such conduct will probably excite the well-disposed of the bystanders to assist him, if he requires them.

In the novelty of the present establishment, particular care is to be taken that the constables of the police do not form false notions of their duties and powers (Critchley, p.52-53).

The structure of the new police was complete and the first officers were to appear on September 29, 1829. To mark the assumption of their new duties, notices were placed on the doors of the churches throughout London. These notices informed all that the "new police will be ready to undertake the change of the said Parish of _____ on the 29th of September, the Night Watch and Night Police appointed within the said Parish previously to, or independent of, the said act of Parliament, will be discontinued..." (Sopenoff, P.65).

The job of recruiting and training the new force was now to move forward. Peel felt strongly as to who would best serve in the new police and expressed his views in a letter to his Commissioners;

I propose to refer all applications to you, for inquiry into the character and qualifications of the candidates...all nominations for employment in the Police, as well as...promotions from

inferior stations, should depend exclusively upon character, qualifications, and services of the person selected...I am convinced that on a strict adherence to this principal must entirely depend the efficiency and character of the new Establishment.

When the whole Establishment shall be...in full operation, it may be fit to establish, as a fixed and inviolable rule, that all appointments...above that of...common constable, shall take place from out of the ranks of the Police...The experience which you have already had will enable you to determine...what is the age, and...previous occupation of candidates, which offer the greatest probability that they can be usefully employed in the Police. And a reference to these..., combined with a personal examination into their character and habits of life, will enable you to select...those best entitled for recommendation. (Hewitt. p.28)

Peel therefore gave over most of the authority of the new force to his two Commissioners. During the period of 1829 to 1830, a total of 8,000 men were hired and over 3,000 were fired, for a variety of reasons, by the Commissioners (Ibid). (For a discussion of these recruits, see Miller's dissertation, The Legitimation of the London and New York City Police 1830-1970, and Sopenoff.) The guiding principals of the force were to be set forth in The General Instructions of 1829, which stated;

The absence of crime will be considered the best proof of the completely efficiency of the Police.

...(the constable) must be particularly cautious not to interfere idly or unnecessarily

...He must remember that there is no quality more indispensable to a police officer than a perfect command of temper, language or threats ...; if he do his duty in a quiet and determined manner, such conduct will probably induce well disposed bystanders to assist him...(Lyman, P.153)

The tone of the new police was set, a disciplined centralized force, answerable to the Commissioners and they to the Home Secretary, with little comment from the local parishes and vestries, that had previously held sway in the old constable-watch system. Within several weeks of the force taking to the streets, Peel wrote, "I have been again busy all the morning about my Police. I think it is going very well, the men look smart, and a strong contrast to the old watchmen" (Lyman, p.153).

One of the most overlooked aspects of the new force was the position of Receiver. This position which Peel had fought to keep from a political appointment was filled by John Wray. The importance of this office was described by the Home Secretary,

The success of the bill turns on the office of Receiver. The Receiver will have to fight the battle with all parishes to collect the rates from each of them. He will have the whole police property, watch houses, watch boxes, arms, etc., vested in him, and the making of all legal contracts for the purchase of land and buildings

(Sopenoff, p.87).

The opposition to the new police rate, the tax imposed by the Police Act of 1829, proved to be more extensive than anticipated. Peel had expressed concern over the cost of his new force and had related them to the force's administration. Wray was famous for his review and oversight of any contract that the force would enter into. Despite the austerities of Mr. Wray's administration, the opposition to the new rate continued for several years. One parish clerk wrote:

...time and experience only serves to confirm the Inhabitants of this parish in their original conviction of the vast superiority of the former system of watch altho the present System has increased the burdens of the parish L 1,200 per year...so universal and deep is the feeling... against the Metropolitan Police Force that the Parochial authorities have determined to adopt every constitutional means within their reach to obtain removal and to restore the ancient and more efficient economical and constitutional system of watch under the Management of the local authorities (Sopenoff, p.89).

The situation that was created forced a series of compromises on the administration. Peel continued to press for economy and efficiency in the new police. He was compelled to allow the parishes to make installment payments of the new police rate and to allow the borrowing of substantial funds from the treasury by the new administration. Opposition to the

new force was not limited to finances. A variety of stories were raised against Peel's force. "A coup d'etat was contemplated--it was Sir Robert Peel's intention to place the Duke of Wellington on the throne--English liberty was to give place to military tyranny--under the pretence of providing protection for the people..." (Lee, p.245), so one news account related (A length examination of opposition to the new force is available in Sopenoff's work).

A new uniformed force, un-armed, highly centralized and answerable to the Home Secretary was to now take over the primary policing of the new Metropolitan Police District. The traditional answer to the growing crime problems of a rapidly industrializing and urbanizing England had been the creation of stipendiary magistrates, with staffs of constables to assist them. This traditional answer resulted in a decentralized, locally controlled, organization with little or no coordination between the various magistrates offices. The new force was a complete departure from this tradition (Emsley, 1991, p.229).

The new force moved quickly to establish itself in London. With the able leadership of its two Commissioners, and the strict discipline that they encouraged, praise was

promptly forth coming. This praise is seen in an exchange of letters between Peel and the Duke of Wellington:

"I congratulate you on the entire success of the Police in London, it is impossible to see anything more respectable than they are" (Wellington wrote). Peel replied, "I am very glad indeed to hear that you think well of the Police. It has given me from first to last more trouble than anything I ever undertook. But the men are gaining a knowledge of their duties so rapidly, that I am very sanguine of the ultimate result. I want to teach people that liberty does not consist in having your house robbed by organised gangs of thieves, and in leaving the principal streets of London in the nightly possession of drunken women and vagabonds" (Stead, 1985, p.42).

FIRST PROBLEMS

The new force, with Peel's backing, moved with astonishing progress to make itself part of the landscape. The police were not to have their champion for long. In November 1830 the government was to change hands and Peel was out of office. He was to be succeeded as Home Secretary by Lord Melbourne, who was not as enamored with the new force as his predecessor. Several significant problems were to be faced by the force under Melbourne. The first of these was the case of

police sergeant William Popay.

The sergeant was assigned to report on the meetings of some radical groups, in plain clothes. In order to blend into the situation better, Popay posed as an impoverished artist, over the course of several months, to infiltrate the meetings. He was, however, recognized and denounced as a police officer and a spy. The public outcry which resulted led to Parliamentary hearings on his actions. The hearings found that his actions exceeded his instructions and he was dismissed. His superiors were criticized for lack of supervision. The Parliamentary committee denounced Popay's actions as "a practice most abhorrent to the feeling of the people and most alien to the spirit of the constitution" (Critchley, p.55). Commissioner Mayne maintained that these operations were necessary for the maintenance of order:

I believe it is the practice and has been at all times, to send constables to any meeting where danger is apprehended; and as the police could not with safety or usefully appear in their regular dress they must be in plain clothes (Sopenoff, p.132).

The Police were to have their first major confrontation with the London mob in May 1833. A meeting and demonstration by the ultra radical group, the National Political Union, were

organized at Cold Bath Fields. The Home Secretary, Lord Melbourne, ordered the arrest of the ringleaders, if the meeting took place. The police operation was led by Colonel Rowan. As one author (Stead, 1985, p.45) has written, the police were subjected to attacks by bricks, stones, knives and even pistols. Three police officers were stabbed, numerous injuries and one officer, Constable Robert Culley, died immediately. The fleeing crowd was pursued by the angry truncheon wielding police, who exacted some measure of vengeance.

Public feeling against the police rose rapidly and as an expression of these feelings a verdict of justifiable homicide was returned by the coroner's jury in the death of Constable Culley. The government was successful in quashing this verdict on appeal to the courts and a Parliamentary Committee found that the police had acted properly and with some restraint. "No member of the public was killed...The death of Constable Culley was followed by an unexpected surge of public sympathy for his widow, and subscriptions poured in. The aftermath of the Cold Bath Fields riot saw the police accepted by the majority of citizens" (Stead, 1985, p.45).

BOW STREET

The Metropolitan Police were coming into their own. Under the leadership of Commissioners Mayne and Rowan the force was establishing its place in the policing of London. One of the lingering problems for the Commissioners was the existence of the several police agencies that had existed prior to the Act of 1829 and which Peel, in his political wisdom, had not attempted to amalgamate into the new police or to repeal their existence. A particular thorn in the side of the new force was the Chief Magistrate at Bow Street. As the primary stipendiary magistrate in London, the Chief Magistrate, Sir Frederick Roe, was responsible for the activities of the Bow Street Runners, the Horse Patrol, the Unmounted Patrol and the constables assigned to his police office. Prior to the passage of the Police Act of 1829, Sir Frederick Roe was the leading police official in London.

The several agencies which now existed along side the new police led to rivalries, recriminations and a jockeying for position by both the individual constables and the agencies themselves. This jockeying for position was manifested in the case of Police Inspector Woveneden. As a result of an alleged

rape by Inspector Woveneden, of a female in police custody, in the summer of 1834, the Home Secretary, then Viscount Duncannon, appointed Sir Frederick Roe to investigate the matter. This investigation was seen as a direct confrontation between the Chief Magistrate of Bow Street and the Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police. Roe's investigation failed to establish any criminal action and the whole matter was viewed as an assault on the authority of the Commissioners. Commissioner Mayne wrote a considerable brief to the Home Secretary on the matter and threatened to resign unless the Home Office supported the authority of the Commissioners to maintain discipline in the force. Mayne stated;

The Commissioners...feel...by the mode in which the late proceedings in Mr. Woveneden's case were originated, and have been carried on, that they have failed to obtain the confidence of the secretary of State, in their management of the Police force. It is...their opinion that, if their authority over the numerous body of police...should be in any way impaired, or the respect for the Commissioners, so necessary for the maintaining the organization of the Police force, be at all shaken, it will become extremely difficult, if not impossible for them to carry on the service, with credit to themselves, or advantages to the Public (Sopenoff, p.125).

SELECT COMMITTEE

Mayne was to have his way and the Home Office gave the Commissioners their full support and backing for the operational control and regulation of the force to the Commissioners. This matter also occurred at the same time that a Parliamentary Committee on the police, the Select Committee on the Police of the Metropolis, was issuing its report. In its findings the committee called for the restriction of the authority of the stipendiary magistrates to judicial function and the transfer of their policing functions to the Metropolitan Police. The Committee also recommended that the responsibility for policing the City of London be transferred to the Metropolitan police. The report of this select committee spoke glowingly of the new police; "It appears to your committee that the Metropolitan police has imposed no restraint, either upon public or individuals, which is not entirely consistent with the fullest practical exercise of every civil privilege, and with the most unrestrained intercourse of private society" (Lee, p. 261). The committee further stated that the new police "in repressing crime and the security it has given to persons and property, is one of the most valuable modern institutions" (Ascoli, p.107).

Public and Parliamentary sentiment appeared to be in support of the new police and a sense that the new police were making some difference in the policing of London could be felt. "The object ...long sought, viz. an efficient and systematic establishment of Police, has been practically attained.' The Committee found that violent offenses had decreased and detection of lighter ones increased, 'which is...what was to be expected from a good system of preventive Police" (Lyman, p.154).

The success of Peel's experiment was beginning to show. As one noted historian said, "the Metropolitan Police, which they had created and then defended against all comers, seemed now, in its solid respectability, to be a natural symbol of the new Victorian Age" (Ascoli, p.114). The traditions of the past, the constable and watch system, were broken with. The new uniformed, centralized and preventive police, the "Bobbies," were making a difference on the streets of London and in the eyes of the public.

The trend to place all policing for London under the Metropolitan Police continued and was examined by several Parliamentary Committees. The most influential of these committees', the Select Committee of 1837, brought forward

several major points in its report. These points, which were viewed as a restatement of the Select Committee of 1834 and an endorsement of the centralization of the policing function, are:

1. The stipendiary magistrates should be required "to execute such duties only as are of a judicial character."
2. The public offices should become police courts of summary jurisdiction and police constables should attend upon the magistrates for the serving of warrants and summonses.
3. The Marine Police should be incorporated as a new division of the Metropolitan Police.
4. The Bow Street Runners, The Bow Street Officers and the peace officers attached to the other public offices should be disbanded or, where suitable, absorbed into the Metropolitan Police.
5. The City of London should be incorporated into the Metropolitan Police District and operational control of its policing should be vested in the Metropolitan Commissioners.
(Ascoli, p.113)

The future centralization of the policing function for the capital was viewed as only a matter of time. Indeed, the Horse Patrol of the Bow Street Magistrate, was amalgamated into the Metropolitan Police in 1836 (Emsley, 1991, p.29), without much opposition or fanfare. The success of Peel's new police in London was to bring calls from both Parliament and the public for the expansion of the police to the rest of the country. The calls for the expansion of the new police were

based on a belief in the rise of crime. As one author explained:

it is usually suggested that the new London police was so effective that after 1829 criminals migrated en masse to other parts of the country, with the result that the police in the boroughs was reformed in 1835; and, further, that the new watch committees in Provencal towns were so active that a fresh migration took place to the rural areas, which in turn stimulated the reform of the rural police in 1839 (Hart, 1955, p.411).

CHAPTER 4

THE NEW POLICE EXPAND

This "migration thesis" was a popular perception of the movement of crime and the rise of crime outside London (See Hart, 1955 and Lee). This perception of the situation, the rise of crime in some areas of the country and the disorder of this period, 1835-1840, caused by the Chartist movement, led to Parliamentary action. Chartism was a popularist movement with a wide social agenda of change. Among its objectives was universal suffrage, vote by ballot, equal electoral districts, payment of elected officials and annual elections, and the abolition of property qualification for election to the House of Commons. These ideas struck at the very core of Victorian England. Chartism was "an expression of intense dissatisfaction with social evils and with the 'unjust laws' which were held to have created them" (Briggs, p. 399). Disorders broke out in several towns in the latter part of 1831, the worst of which was in Bristol. These actions spurred

Parliamentary debate on the riotous situations and several measures to deal with them. One of these measures was the passage of the Special Constables Act, 1831. This act, in another departure from traditional policing, required authorized magistrates to conscript specific citizens to act, under certain circumstances, as fully empowered constables. This act is seen as a further separation from the traditions of the past in that under the Frankpledge "every free Englishman was compelled to take an active part in maintaining the peace." Under this Act and the Police Act of 1829, policing would now be centralized in the "hands of individuals, either chosen or hired for the purpose" (Lee, p.276).

Reaction to the continued disorders and the need to revamp the country's police, can be seen in a speech before Parliament by Peel. Peel asked for a "measure for the establishment of a municipal police in the cities and towns of the kingdom ...(which)...called for all the energy and attention of the government" (Critchley, p.60). The central government pushed forward with its examination of the police outside of the capital and a centralized plan for their improvement. "(B)oth the national governing class and the provincial ruling class were increasingly defining as a

problem the inadequacy of existing policing arrangements in provincial England" (Philips, p.76). Peel expressed his support for a measure which would apply "to all the counties in England" during the debate on the CHESHIRE CONSTABULARY ACT in 1829. Indeed, Peel views on this legislation were characterized as "an experimental bill, and as a step to the introduction of an improved general police throughout the kingdom" (Ibid, p.77).

The fears of large scale public disorder, outside of London, was highlighted by the riots in Derby, Bristol and Nottingham, in October 1831. The Prime Minister, Earl Grey, and the Home Secretary, Lord Melbourne moved to draft a bill for the creation of "a national police system-apparently the first government police measure designed to apply to the whole country" (Ibid, p.78) (for a discussion of this recently discovered ill-fated legislation see Philips and Storch, 1994).

Melbourne moved forward with this effort and in March 1832 the draft of this legislation was ready. The draft of this legislation, A Bill for the Establishment of an efficient Police in such Towns and Districts in England and Wales as may require the same, stated in the preamble "the Police in many

of the Towns and Districts of England and Wales has been found insufficient for the Protection of Property and the Preservation of the Public Peace...a new and more efficient System of Police ...would be established under the authority of the Home Secretary" (Ibid, p.79).

Lord Melbourne saw this bill as a way "set up a national network of police agencies responsible to the Home Office through the stipendary magistrates...(who would be) appointed and removable by the Home Secretary." Melbourne saw this bill as giving central "government a discretionary power 'to establish a constabulary force, on the model of the Metropolitan Police" (Ibid, p.80-81). This legislation was never to reach Parliament. In May 1832, Earl Grey resigned as Prime Minister and the Whig government attempts at Police reforms died in light of the larger political problems of the day. Central government would have the political will to address this issue for several years.

MUNICIPAL ACT OF 1835

Parliament saw the need for reform, for a variety of

reasons; "Put quite simply, the police in most towns were defective and shown to be so, and the opportunity was taken to reform them when municipal reform generally was being undertaken" (Hart, 1955, p.415). The first of these opportunities manifested itself in the Municipal Corporations Act, 1835.

The Act required that those boroughs which had elected a council, to appoint from its members, together with the Mayor, a watch committee. This committee was required to appoint a "sufficient" number of fit men to be sworn in as constable, for preserving the peace. The Act of 1835 applied to 178 boroughs. Within two years of passage of the Act, in spite of statutory obligations, only 93 boroughs had established some form of police force in compliancy with this Act. It is interesting that many of these new police forces, formed by the boroughs, were captained by officers recruited from the Metropolitan police.

Many of the other boroughs chose to put their old constables and watch officers into a "new" uniform, and christened them the police. The watch committee was to be in total control of the police, its appointments and operations. This Act, however, provided for no oversight or funding from

central government, and was generally viewed as insufficient answer to the problems. The Act did not require that an officer appointed under its provisions be employed full time in policing duties, nor did it specify how or who was to pay these officers. The receipt of fees or gratuities for services or anticipated actions was not illegal for these officers, under this act. These provisions were part of the cornerstones of Peel's new police. An interesting point in this legislation was the Home Secretary was given no powers to make any regulations for these forces, a situation which would not be allowed to happen again.

The reforming of the police in the provinces was to be carried out over several years. One historian, Jennifer Hart, has characterized this trend as;

it seem probable that in most boroughs the reform of the police was gradual and not spectacular as in London, and the level of efficiency was still low in the eighteen-fifties. The impression gained from looking at the evidence is often that in the boroughs one is much nearer the world of early nineteenth-century watchmen earning a few schillings by casual police work than to the new world of professional, full-time, carefully recruited and supervised Metropolitan police officers. 1835 is no doubt an important date in the history of the borough police, but there are some grounds for thinking that 1856 was more of a landmark (Hart, 1955, p.421).

Parliamentary reaction to the situation continued to move toward new legislation and a fundamental role for central government. The failures of the rural police were indisputable. Calls for their reforms led to the appointment, in 1836, of a Royal Commission, "for the purpose of Inquiring as to the best means of establishing an efficient constabulary force in the counties of England and Wales." Edwin Chadwick, a noted Utilitarian reformer of the period, engineered his own appointment to the Commission. The other members of the Commission were Colonel Rowan, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and Shaw Lefevre, a country gentleman.

Much of the Commission's report was the work of Chadwick. He was an outspoken advocate of a well regulated, centralized police force for the country and he had largely been responsible for the passage of the Poor Law reform of 1834. Much like Peel in his control of the evidence presented to and in the writing of the final report of the Commission which led to the Act of 1829, Chadwick carefully selected the presentation and the material for inclusion in the final report of this Commission.

A ROYAL COMMISSION

The report took a total of three years for its preparation and presentation. Chadwick pressed for the popular theory of "migration" of in his report. He stated "it is also clearly shown in evidence that the habits of vagrancy have received a considerable impulse from the operation of the new police established in the provincial towns upon the principle of the Metropolitan Police" (Critchley, p.75). Chadwick was mindful of the opposition to any reforms of these forces and knew that many of the arguments put forward against the formation of the Metropolitan Police would be used against his report and any legislation coming from it. The Commission's report declared;

The safe course for maintaining the freedom of the subject appears to us to be, not to render the authorities impotent, but to make them strictly responsible for the use of the power with which they may be invested for the public service...The great mass of evil indicated in our Report is ascribable not to the abuse, but to the neglect and disuse of beneficial powers. The chief and proper objection, as we conceive, to the police forces abroad are, that they act on powers which are arbitrary: the force which we propose could only act on powers which are legal, and for which they would be responsible to the courts of law, and ultimately to the Parliament (Critchley, p.75)

The Commission was careful to present evidence which

clearly supported its views. Their report used a variety of situations to expose the failures of the existing system. The stories of murderers who escaped because of a constable's refusal to leave his bed or the pilfering of shipwrecked cargos and crews, including the dead, were emphasized. The Commission found the Act of 1835 had done little to improve the policing of the country. In its examination of the boroughs it found one, Stockport, which "does not appear to have been strong enough to supersede by one uniform, well appointed and complete force, the various private watches"...the majority of whom were thought to be corrupt" (Critchley, p.67). The fear of crime was apparent to the Commission and the government. More than five hundred voluntary associations for the detection of crime or the apprehension of violators were functioning at the time of the Commission's report (Lee, p.290).

The government of Prime Minister Melbourne was agreed to move forward with some reforms of the existing system. The rising specter of violent uprisings in various parts of the country by the Chartist had caused great concern. The Home Office pushed forward a variety of stop gap measures to meet the unrest. The Home Secretary issued arms to the "principal inhabitants of a disturbed district" and magistrates were told

to make close arrangements with local military officers. The situation continued to worsen. The Chartist called for several public meetings during that summer. One of these was held in Birmingham, and emphasized the seriousness of the situation. The local magistrates had called for assistance from the Metropolitan Police and a detachment of ninety officers was sent to assist. This detachment was immediately sent to a large meeting held by the Chartist, at a location called the Bull Ring. The situation was precarious;

The Superintendent in charge of the constables peremptorily ordered the crowd to disperse; his summons was as positively disregarded, and within five minutes blows were exchanged. In the melee which followed, the police were worsted, and the situation was barely saved by the opportune appearance of the military. On the ensuing Monday evening, a second conflict took place, in which the police were victorious. ..A spurious semblance of peace having thus been restored, fifty constables returned to London, and only forty were left to deal with any recrudescence of disorder; for this they had not long to wait, as an attempt to break up a public meeting, a few days later, was followed by the most serious consequences...the crowd, now animated by a worse temper than before...drove the small force of constables to take refuge in the policeyard. For the next hour and a half the town was at the mercy of the rioters, who, having begun by smashing lamps and windows, ended by pillaging shops and warehouses. Eventually the police charged the mob with drawn cutlasses, and, assisted by dragoons, got the upper hand (Lee, p.312-3).

The fear of these events was highlighted by the military, in the person of Major-General Sir Charles Napier. Following the events in Birmingham and faced with the threat of a general strike, Napier wrote to the Home Office and stated that: "My belief is that concession must be made to the people's feelings, or the establishment of a strong rural police hurried on. I would do both thinking them absolutely necessary; if the police force be not quickly increased we shall require troops from Ireland" (Hart, 1955, p.427).

In the early part of 1839, the government, mindful of the political climate and the continuing fear of crime, introduced a series of police reforms. The draft of a new Metropolitan Police Act was one of these. Intense opposition of the City of London doomed any legislation the government would put forward modeled on the Commission's recommendation to incorporate policing for the City into the Metropolitan Police. Shortly after the Home Office began examining a draft of the new legislation, the Lord Mayor of the City presented a petition directly to the Queen stating that the City of London already had "a Police fully adequate to its wants and equal, if not superior, to the Metropolitan Police" (Ascoli, p.113-4). The Home Secretary, Lord Russell, had other ideas.

The City was given a choice by Russell, either reform its forces along the lines of the Metropolitan Police or, despite its "immemorial rights and privileges," be drafted into the Metropolitan Police District. The City yielded and quickly thereafter Parliament passed the City of London Police Act. Under the provisions of this act, a force of 543 officers, modeled on the structure of the Metropolitan Police, was organized. New style preventive police forces would now be policing all of the capital, an arrangement which still exists today. The City of London Police Act was the first of a series of police legislation to be passed under the leadership of Lord Russell.

POLICE ACT OF 1839

Russell used this opportunity to introduce the long sought reforms and expansion of the Metropolitan Police and the rural police. A primary piece of this plan was "an Act for further improving the Police in and near the Metropolis." Under this Act, the Metropolitan Police, in jurisdiction and manpower, was greatly expanded (see Sopenoff, p, 207-211). The basic recommendations of the Commissions of 1834 and 1837

were codified. The Bow Street Runners and the Marine Police were absorbed into the Metropolitan Police and all policing functions of the stipendiary magistrates were transferred to the Metropolitan Police. Additionally, the geographic area of the Metropolitan Police District was expanded to a radius of approximately fifteen miles from Charing Cross. A key provision of this bill for the officers was the creation of a retirement fund, Superannuation Fund, for the Metropolitan Police. The new police, which Peel had originally envisioned, albeit ten years later, was now to be responsible for policing the capital. The Commissioners were now able to consolidate both the department's and their own positions.

Mindful of the events of the summer of 1839 the government turned its attention to the country outside London. Lord Russell, the Home Secretary in the Whig government, was fortunate in having Robert Peel as the leader of the opposition party, the Tories. Russell was to submit his several police reform bills to a Parliament in which he was the Home Secretary of the majority party and Her Majesty's loyal opposition, the Tories, was lead by the father of the preventive policing, Peel. Russell and Peel are said to have reached a private understanding (Critchley, p.83) on the several police reform bills that the Whig government was to

submit.

The Rural Constabulary Act of 1839 was perceived by some as the setting up of a centralized, uniformed, preventive police force, which was recommended in the Parliamentary report. The opposition to these ideas was still very much alive. In opposition to the government's proposal the Times wrote;

With respect to Lord John Russell's "County and District new Constabulary" (the appellation of it is as long as a constable's staff)...the friends of the constitution are put into a great difficulty. If it be requisite, undoubtedly it should be granted. But whose and what counsel have rendered it requisite?" The Whig Government had created conditions in which life and property had to be protected 'by an apparatus which we have no question will be very injurious to public and general liberty and the free expression of opinion' (Critchley, p.80).

The final draft of the legislation left behind the centralization of the Commission's report and became widely known as "The Permissive Act." "The Whig government, faced with the storm of criticism which the Report aroused throughout the nation and mindful of its weak parliamentary position. The provisions of the new Act allowed local magistrates to establish a police force, if they chose, for the whole of the county or any part thereof, with permission

of the Home Secretary. The key to this legislation was that all appointments and regulation of these forces would be in the hands of the local magistrates. Additionally, all costs for these forces would be borne by the counties. The principal powers that the Home Secretary was given by this legislation were the approval of the appointment of the chief constable for these forces and to make certain regulations for the county forces.

This Act was seen, almost immediately, as defective. Lord Russell's successor as Home Secretary, Normanby, took office several weeks after the passage of this Act. In correspondence, Normanby stated, "I think it is a serious and almost fatal error in the Bill that the new (Rural) Police is not more under the Government; this arises necessarily from our weakness for all legislative purposes" (Critchley, p.80). While both Russell and Peel were supportive of police reforms, the reality of the political situation was that the Government and its loyal opposition were only able to push through legislation within those limits that the people and their representatives would accept.

As part of Russell's reform package several individual bills were submitted for the growing urban centers of the

north, which were subject to the dangers of the disorders and riots caused by the Chartist movement. The principal piece of this legislative package was the Birmingham Police Act, which was presented to Parliament along with two companion bills, the Manchester Police Act and the Bolton Police Act. The disorders of the riotous situation of the Bull Ring and the looting that followed in Birmingham caused many voices to be raised for specific action in the northern industrialized cities. One of the most prominent was that of the Duke of Wellington. He stated that "he had been in many towns taken by storm, but never had such outrages occurred in them as had been committed in Birmingham" (Critchley, p.81).

Various factors forced the central government to submit these pieces of legislation. Birmingham and the two other cities, at the times of the Chartist disorders, were policed by the old constable-watch system under the control of the magistrates. The riots in Birmingham and the other industrial towns of the north highlighted the failure of the old system, and its dependence on the military, to maintain order in the rapidly industrializing cities and towns. Almost as if on command the specter of an armed insurrection by Chartist appeared in Norfolk. In an attempt to raid the regional jail and set free their leaders. The Chartist misjudged the Crown's

forces, and when shots rang out the troops answered with a volley of shots directly into the crowd of rioters. The result was twenty-two Chartists dead. The existing structure of the parish watch showed itself totally inadequate in maintaining the public order, without the assistance of the military, and deaths were the usual consequence of the military's intervention. In spite of the apparent dangers to the public order various special interests were opposed to any changes that effected their position or power. In light of this differing interest, the central government moved forward with its plan for police reforms. The principal ideas behind these pieces of legislation came from the leader of the opposition, Robert Peel.

THE QUEEN IS PLEASED

Peel had not lost the desire to reform a system he saw as a failure. It was his ideas that were embodied in the final pieces of the legislation that were submitted for these three towns. Each of the bills set up a new style preventive police force for these individual cities, which was to be recruited by and under the command of a Commissioner, appointed by the

Home Secretary. These forces would be financed by a grant from the Treasury and the Treasury was to be repaid by the towns from the local rates. With this legislation, England now had three new forces on the same par as the Metropolitan Police.

The Home Secretary would now have the Commissioners from four police forces reporting directly to him. These bills were the object of furious protest. Various interests in Birmingham raised the cry of establishment of a "French system of police" and the town council of Birmingham denounced the Birmingham Police Act "as an insidious and alarming step toward that system of centralization which is so alien from the habits of the people of this country and from the ancient usages of the Constitution" (Emsley, 1991, p.39). In spite of this opposition, the package of these three bills was passed by a large majority in Parliament.

These pieces of legislation were sent to the Queen to receive the Royal Assent. Even Queen Victoria was pleased to express her support of the spread of this form of unified policing, which had proven such a success in London. In her official remarks, Queen Victoria stated; "I have given a cordial assent to the Bills which you have presented to me for the establishment of a more efficient constabulary force in

those towns which peculiarly required it, and for effecting the important object of generally extending and invigorating the civil power throughout the country" (Critchley, p.87). Apparently, the news of the disorders and the riotous conditions had spread to the august quarters of the Palace. The Queen was well pleased.

Within several weeks of the incident at the Bull Ring, Parliament had passed and Queen Victoria had assented to the passage of six separate pieces of legislation for various reforms of the police throughout the country. Lord Russell was able to coerce the City fathers of London to create a new preventive force and to expand the territory and jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Police, both matters that had eluded Peel in 1829. In addition, he was able to create centralized police forces for three towns caught in the Chartist maelstrom and to give the whole of the country the choice to create preventive police forces.

THE PERMISSIVE ACT

The Rural Constabulary Act met with a wide variety of

acceptance and success. By 1841, only twenty-four counties, out of the fifty-six counties in England and Wales, had adopted, in some form, the provisions of this Act (for a detailed discussion of the counties acceptance of this Act and the Obligatory Act of 1856, see Critchley, p.89). A simplistic view of the less than envisioned results of the Permissive Act can be seen in the statements of one historian;

in the counties which adopted the Permissive Act, the record is one of almost constant progress towards efficiency; in the counties which preferred to prolong the defective regime of the parish-constable, the story is largely one of stagnation, unnecessary friction, and weak-kneed experiment. Although these tendencies are so diverse, the migratory habit of criminals makes it impossible to follow the history of either to the exclusion of the other. No police system can rightly be considered without constant reference to neighbouring systems...crime follows impunity. The influences of pride and local jealousies proved powerful enough to prevent a complete recantation by those counties which had pinned their faith to the status quo ante, but they were not sufficiently potent to produce insensibility or indifference when the day of reckoning came (Lee, p.296).

The failure of the reforms outlined under the Rural Police Act, and the outcry of the opposition to the additional expenses of the new force was evident by 1842. Petitions were circulated calling for the elimination of these new forces in those counties that had adopted some form of this legislation.

"EXPENSIVE; if not INEFFICIENT" was the denouncement of this experiment (Emsley, 1991, p.43). Parliament, in an attempt to appease this opposition and "to infuse new life into the decrepit parochial system," passed, in 1842, the Parish Constables Act. This Act, and its amendment, the Superintending Constable Act, required the magistrates to draw up a list of persons who were suitable to be sworn in as constables. These persons were required to be ratepayers, between twenty-five and fifty-five, of good character and fit.

The principal section of these bills created the office of Superintending Constable to have "the supervision of all the parish-constables within the Petty Sessional Division of the county for which they might be appointed--such superintending constables to receive a fixed salary out of the County Rates" (Lee, p.299). Parliament, hoping these Superintending constables would be selected from the ranks of the new police, tried to create a measure of professional, full-time police officers to supervise the force of part-time amateurs which made up the old constable-watch system. This attempt to reform the old system and breathe some life and efficiency into it was to be no more successful than the measures of the late eighteenth century to reform the old system in London.

It is generally agreed that the forces of law and order authorized by both the Rural Constabulary Act and the Parish Constables Act were failures at achieving any degree of the efficiencies and crime prevention that had been hoped for. The success of Peel's reforms of policing and the continued growth and success of the Metropolitan Police were not to be carried over to the rest of the country under these Acts. The inadequacies of these forces to deal with ordinary crimes were all too clear.

Their attempts to deal with the disorders of the widespread strikes and disorders due to the economic conditions and the spread of the Chartist movement were completely a failure. By early 1842 some three million people were said to have signed the Chartist petitions (Critchley, p.94). Clearly, these old style forces could do little in the face of what the authorities saw as a huge mob, without relying on the military for the type of discipline and weapons thought necessary to control the situation.

The events in Staffordshire illustrate the position that most of the local governments found themselves in. Faced with the threat of Chartist disorders in the county, local authorities had sworn in more than two thousand special

constables and appealed to the Home Secretary for additional ammunition. Additionally, the local authorities requested the central government to keep military forces standing to assist these amateur forces. The authorities wrote to the Home Secretary that "willing as men were to act in their civil capacity...unless supported by a military force the weapons with which they are armed will be totally ineffective against a mob, which carries not only weapons of the same kind more effective, but Fire Arms also" (Critchley, p.96).

THE CHARTIST

The status quo was to continue for several years, with the occasional county magistrates organizing new style police forces. The threat of Chartist disorders continued to grip the country, until 1848, when the movement mounted its last large scale demonstration and chose London for the location. 1848 was a period of great social unrest and revolution throughout most of continental Europe. Many of the capitals of Europe saw the students and reformers take to the barricades. London was mindful of these developments when it prepared for the onslaught of the Charists.

The specter of an enormous crowd moving through London brought memories of the horrors of the Gordon riots. Had London, the imperial seat of the Empire, still to worry of the disorders and mayhem that had plagued it in the early eighteen hundreds? Was not this one of the main reasons for the passage of the Peel reforms? To a greater part of England this demonstration was to be the acid test for the Metropolitan Police, and by implication for the new police. Troops, as usual under the old system, were ordered to take position in and around London. The Duke of Wellington, at the age of eighty, assumed personal command of the troops, ready to regain lost glories. The Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police prepared to handle the demonstration without resort to the military. Some 200,000 special constables were sworn in to support the regular officer of the Met. On the day of the demonstration, April 10, 1848, the Chartists found themselves out maneuvered by the police.

Through the positioning of their officers and the special constables, the Metropolitan Police were able to convince the Chartist leadership that the police were in control of the situation and other than a peaceful demonstration was futile. The Metropolitan Police showed that they were a force capable of controlling not only crime but the disorder and riot which

had plagued all of England, especially the growing industrial cities of the north. One Metropolitan officer, Superintendent Mallalieu, reported, in 1853, "that he had attended every riot in London since the time of the Reform Bill riots, including the Chartist demonstration in 1848, and 'the military have never been called out since the establishment of the police force; we have never felt the slightest doubt of being able to preserve the peace" (Critchley, p.100). The reforms of 1829 and 1839 produced a force which proved itself capable of maintaining law and order in the capital and an excellent example of what the new style of policing could produce.

The Home Office was for several years, as Critchley stated, "arid in ideas and bankrupt of policy (which) came to abrupt end when Palmerston arrived...in December, 1852" (p.101). The new Home Secretary was already familiar with police reforms, from his effort to amalgamate the local police force, Romsey, where he lived, with the County force. Almost immediately after taking office, Palmerston was approached about police reforms by Lord Fortescue, a former Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. Fortescue wrote that he believed present social conditions "had 'outgrown the rude machinery framed by our ancestors for the enforcement of the law' and suggested something akin to the Royal Irish Constabulary be

established in England" (Emsley, 1991, p.47). Palmerston knew that the government lacked the power to make the fundamental changes which were suggested. In an effort to explore this issue, a parliamentary select committee was appointed, in 1852, To Consider the Expediency of Adopting a More Uniform System of Police.

ANOTHER COMMITTEE

The report of this Committee has been described as a neglected document that not only laid the foundations and groundwork for needed legislation, but gave great insight into the state of policing and the effect of the previous reforms of 1835 and 1839 (Critchley, p.105). The Committee held hearings for over a year. The report is full of accounts of the failures of the existing system and various recommendations for new legislation.

One of the key witnesses to present evidence to the Committee was Edwin Chadwick, the principal architect and author of the police reforms of 1839. Chadwick pointed out that local jealousies and costs had been keys factors in the

failure of the police reforms. Crime could only be challenged by the merger of the various small forces into an efficient rural police. Chadwick stated that, "In the towns the hand must be placed, from which fingers may be extended and withdrawn according to the need" (Critchley, p.106). The various drawbacks of the existing police system with the geographic and jurisdictional restrictions was clear.

One scheme that was presented to the Committee was submitted by Captain McHardy, Chief Constable of the Essex Constabulary. The paper titled a "Scheme for an Efficient Constabulary and Defensive Force throughout England and Wales," was an outline for more than a national police. In it he stated:

A well-trained constabulary of one constable to a population of 1,000 would afford an efficient and respectable defensive force of 14,000 men (exclusive of the Metropolitan Police), which, in cases of emergency, could be augmented and armed, as may appear most desirable; and by the Government directing at its pleasure... the police to enrol and train, at the respective petty sessional divisional stations, such numbers for the militia as it may deem expedient, not exceeding a limited number to the population, as by enrolling five men out of every 1,000, a force of 70,000 would be raised making, with the standing constabulary of 14,000, a total of 84,000...the expense would be considerably less than any other system; and the men so enrolled would, from being in contact with the constabulary, render it more efficient, and afford a source from

which to complete or augment the constabulary or standing army (Emsley, 1991, p.54).

This proposal not only would give the central government a national police force, similar to the Royal Irish Constabulary, but also a light infantry division that would assist in the national defense. This proposal did not receive widespread support. The proposal of Earl Grey for the formation of a national police force, paid for by the central government, along the lines of the Irish model was much more mainstream. Even the Times, which had opposed the previous attempts at police reform, gave the idea of reforming and increasing the police its support.

In response to a riot by cotton operatives in Blackburn, the mayor requested a detachment of soldiers to assist his borough's force of thirty officers. The Times, in a biting review of the situation, wrote; "Before invoking such assistance he should have tried what 80 constables would do. Let him raise his police force, as so magnanimously projected, from thirty men to a hundred, and then it will be time to ask for bayonets in aid of staves ... Everybody knows, and every magistrate ought well to consider, that the real power of a police force is commensurate with the number of its regular members" (Emsley, 1991, p.50).

THE OBLIGATORY ACT

The Committee's report made eight proposals to reform the policing for the country (see Critchley, p.105-118 for a discussion of the report and the attempts at legislation). In 1854, based largely on the Committee's report, the Home Secretary, Palmerston made several attempts at securing the passage of reform legislation. These efforts were thwarted by local jealousies and special interests. By 1856, Palmerston had become Prime Minister and appointed Sir George Grey as his successor as Home Secretary. The new Home Secretary, with the complete backing of the Prime Minister, was able to secure the passage of the new government reforms. The County and Borough Police Act was passed on July 21, 1856. Under the provisions of this Act, local governments at the county and borough level were obligated to form a police force. The central government would pay up to one-quarter of the expenses for the pay and clothing of these forces in the form of grants from the Treasury, upon the certification of the Inspector, a newly created position, as to their efficiency. Chief constables were required to submit an annual report, to the Home Secretary, of the state of crime in their areas. Through

incentives, government grants, small borough forces were encouraged to merge with the county forces.

The introduction of the position of Inspector of Constabulary, with the authority of oversight and the power of the purse, is viewed as one of the central points of this legislation and key to London's efforts to standardize and centralize the police forces in the country. This legislation marked an essential development of policing in England;

A new pattern of police administration was created which was to last for more than one hundred years. It reflected a reconciliation of central supervision with local management; it marked the establishment of two separate police systems in England: the metropolitan police of London under autonomous control of the commissioners, who were directly responsible to the Home Office, and the borough and county constabulary who maintained local control of policy decisions but who had to adhere to minimal standards set by government inspectors...Police throughout England, though modernized along the lines of the police in London, differed in style from the metropolis. After 1856 there were 226 separate police forces, which varied in size from one man forces in thirteen small boroughs to large urban forces in Birmingham and Manchester (Sopenoff, p, 268).

This legislation provided, for the first time, a paid, full-time police force for the entire country. Some saw this legislation as an attack on the very foundations of England,

denouncing the Act as "an insult to the nation" and the office of the Inspector of Constabulary as "dangerous and degrading" and the Home Secretary as "a second Fouche' with spies all over the kingdom" (Hart, 1956, p.405). Others saw it as a linear development of the previous police reforms. "The effect of this Statute was...completing the process which had been initiated at Bow Street more than one hundred years before" (Lee, p.306). Indeed, Lee, stated that one of the principal reasons for the passage of the Obligatory Act was the continued migration of crime from those areas which established efficient police;

The Metropolitan Police Act, the Municipal Corporations Act, and the Permissive Act, valuable and indeed indispensable as they undoubtedly were, had been effective only in certain districts: delinquents, whom the activity of the metropolitan police had driven out of London, found a home in other large towns; a second migration followed when the Boroughs got their police; and yet a third took place, as we have seen, after the partial introduction of rural constabularies...The Obligatory Act tended to reduce crime in many ways, for not only did a criminal career become much less attractive after the last Alsatia had been closed, but the efficiency of all existing police bodies was enormously increased by the uniformity and co-operation between different units which naturally followed upon the compulsory adoption of one general system through the whole country (p.307) .

England of 1856 was in a remarkable different situation

on matters of policing, than some thirty years before. The stage was set for a uniform system of police for the entire country. The regulations for limited control of both the county and borough force were in the hands of the Home Office and the power of the purse was completely settled in the office of the Inspector of Constabulary.

THE FINAL PIECES

It is also interesting to note that a provision of the County and Borough Police Act dealt with the statutory confirmation of a single Commissioner of Police for the Metropolitan Police. For sometime a bureaucratic struggle was waged between Sir Richard Mayne, one of Peel's original appointments, and Captain William Hay, appointed as the replacement for Colonel Charles Rowan, who retired in 1850. As the situation grew worse, the Home Office was finally obliged to take action. In February 1856 a Police Act was passed which confirmed the appointment of a single Commissioner, with two Assistant Commissioners, to lead the Metropolitan Police (Ascoli, p.124). These changes in Peel's original legislation were found to require additional legal confirmation,

necessitating the corrections of July (Sopenoff, p.258).

The form of policing in England was set and remained relatively unchanged for several years. The principal means of the exercise of London's control was the Inspector. The Act authorized the appointment of three Inspectors and required the report of their finds to the Home Secretary. These officials were able, through politics and the withholding of government grants, to foster changes and standardization in the country's policing. Through these reports the Inspectors highlighted the various problems in the different forces and some problems endemic in policing. The problems of differences in pay, standards for appointment or discipline were all topics for these reports. One recurrent quote of the description of the position of these Inspectors is, "The Inspectors may approach the local authorities, and lead them in the right direction-but it must be done with discretion" (Hart, 1956, p.408). Professor Hart wrote extensively on the development of the Office of Inspector of Constabulary. Hart has chronicled the development of the powers and influence of this office. She states that "it is undoubtedly true that in the long run the Police Act of 1856 led to a greater degree of central control, in particular in regard to the general standard of policing which was considered necessary...(and) By

constantly drawing attention to the grievances of the police...the Inspectors were instrumental in getting some of the irregularities stopped" (p.413).

The last remaining sections of the infrastructure of British policing were found in the Municipal Corporations (New Charters) Act, 1877, and the Local Government Act, 1888. The Act of 1877 limited the formation of new police forces in the boroughs to those areas with a population of more than 20,000. London hoped that by this, and the withholding of Treasury grants to forces in areas with less than 5,000 in population, to check the spread of small forces and foster the merger of these forces. The Local Government Act took these changes further. Under its provisions no borough with less than 10,000 inhabitants could maintain its own police force, mandating consolidation. This provision resulted in the absorption of forty-eight separate police forces, reducing the number of forces in the country to 183 (Critchley, p.133). Additionally, in another departure from the pre-Peel policing of England, the control of the constables in the counties was removed from the magistrates. Henceforth, these forces were to be responsible to a new group, the Standing Joint Committee. The Committee was to be composed half of magistrates from the county and half from the membership of the elected county

councils. This agreement was to last until 1964.

These last bits of legislation formed the final pieces of the foundations of British policing, which was to remain unchanged until the Police Act, 1919. That Act was the direct outgrowth of the Desborough Committee and the Police Strikes of 1918-19.

CHAPTER 5

LABOR RELATIONS AND OTHER ISSUES

Much of the legal foundation and organization of the Metropolitan Police, which was begun in 1829, were completed with the passage of the Police Act of 1856. As we have seen, the last vestiges of the old parish watch system in London were either done away with or merged into the Metropolitan force with the passage of the Police Act of 1839. The development of a strong centralized Commissioner and its relationship to the Home Office, as outlined by the Act of 1856, played a key role in the formation of this force and the events of 1918-19. The role of the first Commissioners, Rowan and Mayne, in the formation and development of the force is well documented in the various histories of the period. (See Ascoli and Sopenoff for the development of the office of the Commissioner.)

It is clear that Peel was correct in both the lengthy

process he went through and in the selection of these Commissioners. Both Commissioners played key roles in the development of the force. Rowan served for almost twenty-one years, retiring in 1850 and Mayne died in office in 1868, serving almost thirty-nine years. Mayne, through his manipulation of the situation in 1856, was able to secure control of the force in his confirmation as the single Commissioner for the force. In this position the office of Commissioner was in a unique relationship with the Home Office. As the single officer responsible for all policing in the capital of the country and the empire, the Commissioner was accountable to only the Home Secretary for the performance and effectiveness of the department. This concentration of authority would be a key factor in any situation arising within the department.

Trouble within the ranks was quick to come. One of the first recorded incidents of serious labor problems occurred in 1853. The problem was pay. As is often the case, the lack of a mechanism to address problems or grievances only compounded the situation. As a result of discontent among the police over rates of pay, an anonymous letter was sent to the Home Office complaining of the leadership of the Force and the dismissal of two constables who had petitioned the Home Secretary for

pay raises. The efforts for both a pay raise and to assist the dismissed officers were rejected out of hand by Commissioner Mayne. The complaints of the men continued for sometime.

During the period 1845-55, several complaints arose about the abuse of power and favoritism of superior officers. Almost all of these complaints were dismissed by Mayne. He was forced to take action against one superintendent after an article in the Times revealed favoritism in a series of promotions and discrimination against Roman Catholics on the force (Sopenoff, p.201). One letter to the Home Secretary described some of the grievances that the constables tried to publicize;

We look to you (Lord Palmerston) as our only friend--you we are given to think was the cause of our wages being a little raised ...we are not treated as men but as slaves we englishmen do not like tyrannized by a set of Irish sergeants who are only lenient to their own countrymen we the D division of Paddington are nearly all ruled by these Irish Sergeants ...there are a great many of these things that try our temper (Sopenoff, p.203).

The Metropolitan Police had experienced its first serious labor relations problems, and the officers were forced to appeal to outside persons for assistance. This lack of any mechanism to air the grievances was to foster other labor problems in the force. In 1872 and again in 1890, the

Metropolitan Police were forced to deal with troubles in the ranks.

In December, 1867 two members of the Irish militant group, the Fenians were being held in Clerkenwell prison. Despite advanced information on a plot to break them out of prison, no action was taken by the Metropolitan Police. On the 13th of December, the conspirators caused an explosion at the prison, killing four and injuring forty people. The escape did not take place and four of the conspirators were arrested and one, Michael Barrett, was publicly executed.

The outcry at this failure of the police led the Home Office to examine the shortcomings of the force and a departmental committee was setup. This committee filed its findings in a confidential report on May 6, 1868. In these findings, "They do not recommend...any general increase in the pay...(and) the Committee considered the old scale (pensions) excessive, especially having regard to the lax way in which constables were passed for pension" (Ascoli, p.141).

RUMORS OF UNREST

Within several months of the issuance of the report, rumors of unrest in the ranks had made their way to the desk of the Commissioner, Edmund Henderson. Henderson was informed by his senior officers that the men were concerned over the issues of pay and pensions. On September 3, 1872, the Commissioner was shocked to receive a petition from the officers in "N" Division, signed by 42 sergeants and 538 constables. The petition stated;

We, the undersigned of "N" Division of the Force, beg most humbly to make application for an advance of pay House rent and provisions being now at such high rates that we are unable to keep up that state of respectability which is required by the rules and regulations of the Service (Judge, 1968, p.202).

Commissioner Henderson was caught completely off guard by this action. Within several days of the action by the men in "N" Division, the men of "C" Division submitted a similar petition to their Chief Superintendent. Rumors of further unrest spread after the Commissioner replied to the petitions that he would not be "justified" in recommending a salary increase for the men. On October 17, a meeting was held to discuss the pay and pension issues. More than 3,000 sergeants and constables turned up for this meeting, sending shock and alarm waves to both the Commissioner and Home Office (Emsley,

1991, p.92).

As a direct result of these events, Henderson issued word that "The question of pay will be immediately submitted to the Secretary of State" (Judge, 1968, p.204). The officers continued to push for discussion of their pay. At a meeting on October 24, a handbill was passed out to the officers present, which stated;

METROPOLITAN POLICE

Referring to a telegram from the Commissioner stating that the question of pay will be laid before the Secretary of State immediately, will Colonel Henderson recommend the scale of pay and change of hours of day duties as laid down by the meeting at Cannon Street Hotel on Thursday, 17th instant? If not, we intend to continue the meetings until we are successful.

United we stand, divided we fall (Judge, 1968, p.205).

An extraordinary statement for a police assembly. Trade union slogans being used to foster a meeting of police officers. The outcome of this meeting was the election of PC Henry Goodchild of "P" Division to become secretary and a statement by the chairman that, "They have endeavoured to prevent men from attending the meeting but we have a right to attend any meeting we like and a perfect right to combine for

an increase in pay..." (Judge, 1968, p.205). The reaction to the attempts to block these meetings provoked the rhetoric of union formation. The seriousness of the situation was not lost on the officials at the Home Office. Within several days of this meeting a pay raise was authorized and announced in Police Orders, on November 7. Also included in the announcement was a change in the tours of duty, a continuing irritant in the force, lessening the reserve time. The Order also stated "that the whole subject of pensions would be discussed as a matter of urgency with the Home Secretary" (Ascoli, p.142).

Commissioner Henderson decided to make an example of the elected secretary, PC Goodchild. Goodchild was transferred to a station some fifteen miles out of London, when he refused this as a disciplinary move, he was dismissed from the force. As one author, Ascoli, states, "From such sparks, unexpected bonfire start" (p.142). More than 180 refused to go on duty at various stations around the City. The Commissioner suspended all the men and 109 were dismissed. One constable, PC John Brown, was arrested and charged with "withdrawing himself from his duties without notice." Police officers from all over London converged on his trial in Hammersmith Police Court. One of the omnibuses hired for the occasion carried a poster

"Policemen on Strike" (Judge, 1968, p.209). Brown was found guilty and sentenced to one month in prison.

By the end of November, the situation had turned against the dismissed officers. Some of the dismissed officers sent petitions to the Commissioner stating that they had been misled. Henderson reinstated all but a handful, who he viewed as ringleaders or who were charged. In making the announcement, the Commissioner stated, "It must be clearly understood...that meetings of the police can only be held in future by permission of the Commissioner" (Judge, 1968, p.211-12). While the initial events caused alarms in the Home Office, Henderson endeavored to down play the whole event. In his annual report he wrote, "This occurrence...has left nothing behind it but a regret that by the unjustifiable conduct of a few men, a stain should have been left on the honourable annals of the force" (Ascoli, p.143). The first attempts to confer by the police resulted in the dismissal of the leaders and the assertion of the Commissioner's right to approve of any meeting of police.

UNREST SPREADS

Labor troubles for police in Great Britain were not confined to the London force. In March 1882, discontent among the ranks of the Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP) was the cause of concern to the government. As a result of the activities in the Land War, a popular uprising against landlords and their agents, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) was given a bonus of three months pay. The officers of the DMP were not included in this arrangement. Several officers organized a petition to the Chief Commissioner asking for a bonus similar to that granted to their counterparts in the RIC. The petitions also asked for improvements in pensions, living allowances and the public trials of police officers for discipline matters.

Captain Talbot, the Chief Commissioner, rejected the petitions and forbade the officers any unauthorized meetings. An unauthorized meeting was held on August 31 and attended by 234 constables to discuss the pay situation. Talbot acted quickly, and the following day dismissed all 234 officers. The situation was growing worse as 121 officers resigned in protest. Detachments of troops were ordered into the City and volunteer special constables took to the streets. At a special meeting the strikers were persuaded to apologize for holding the prohibited meeting and asked to be taken back. The

situation was resolved by the return of all but 17 of the officers, who were viewed as ringleaders. "They were taken back as `they could not be replaced for years; they were trained, and they had local knowledge of every blind alley and every wide-awake blackguard within the Circular Road'" (Griffin, p.594). The problems of pay, pensions and the right to confer continued to trouble the police.

The police, throughout Great Britain, were questioning their right to confer. Sir Robert Peel, the Father of the new police, had himself, in support of the Combination Law of 1824, said; "Men who...have no property except their manual skill and strength, ought to be allowed to confer together, if they think fit, for the purpose of determining at what rate they will sell their property" (Pelling, p.22). Thus in support of a law that some see as the beginnings of the legal foundation of trade unionism, Peel expressed support for the right to confer, a principle that was to be a cornerstone in the police strikes of 1918-19. The right to confer was an important issue to the constables and it carried a much broader meaning than merely determining their rates of pay. To the officers involved in this incident and to most other officer, up to and including those in the 1918-19 strikes, the right to confer was a fundamental issue of their voice in the

department. The officers saw this as their stake in the department and the issues of policing and administration of the force. The right to confer was their "seat at the table, their access to the halls of power" (Rowe).

UNION INFLUENCE

Trade unionism had rapidly increased both its membership and its influences. The Trade Union Congress was founded in 1868 and by 1880 had become an influential voice in Parliament. Union membership grew rapidly in the 1880's and unions extended into trades previously unorganized. Membership in some unions jumped by fifty percent in one year and powerful new unions were begotten. The powerful Miners Federation of Great Britain was formed in 1889. (See Pelling, Chapter Six, for a discussion of the rise of unionism.) This changing of the social landscape did not go unnoticed by the police. The police, by the nature of their jobs, came into close contact with these unions and witnessed these successes.

Trade unions experienced rapid growth in the interval 1892 to 1902. Membership in trade unions rose approximately

30% in this period (Mitchell, p.137). London of the 1890's saw the beginnings of "new unionism." These new style unions recruited the semiskilled and poorly paid workers, unlike the "old style," which restricted their membership to certain skilled, specialized groups. Additionally, these new unions relied on low entrance fees and "aggressive strike tactics" to further its membership and goals. In 1889, London dock laborers and gas workers formed their own unions, and shortly thereafter, went on strike. The dock workers, led by Thomas Mann, called for a general strike of all the London trades to start in the end of August. After a five week strike, the union was successful at gaining a substantial raise and overtime pay for its members. With this success in mind these new unions spread throughout England (Pelling, p.91-93).

Attempts were made to organize the post office workers and rumors of surreptitious meetings between police officers and some trade union leaders were making their way to the Home Office. Several "meeting of police delegates during 1890 were held both in working men's clubs and on the premises of the S.D.F. (Social Democratic Federation), and the police received vocal support from trade union activists" (Emsley, 1991, p.93). Commissioner Monro was asked by the Home Office to report on these rumors. In his report, of December 20, 1889,

Monro wrote that he was unaware of any meetings "but he also took the opportunity to complain about the treatment his men were receiving...`The Force feel...that they are very hardly dealt with in the matters...and I agree with them'" (Judge, 1968, p.213).

Much of the police officer's discontent was centered on the Police Superannuation Bill that was being debated in Parliament. This bill, as introduced, would not only lower the percentage used to calculate a police officer's pension, but also limit pensionable service to that time after age twenty-one. Many officers joined the police at age nineteen and would therefore lose two years of pensionable service.

RUMORS

By May 1890, rumors were again circulating of clandestine meetings and Commissioner Monro was again compelled to report to the Home Office. Just prior to his report a newspaper report published the details of a petition, allegedly, being circulated among the force. The petition stated;

'We have met...and not being allowed to join a union or form a society, discussed the matter and decided to send you in writing our demands if such they may be termed. Men in the force have to go on night duty after having been tramping miles that day with a procession. For this they receive nothing extra.' They therefore asked for three shillings per week increase in pay and recruitment of extra men (Judge, 1968, p.215).

Monro, in his report, acknowledged that these petitions were being circulated among the force. Monro stated that much of the feelings in the force were due to the delay in the question of the retirement bill and their lack of any compensation for extra duty. The Commissioner also stated, "I consider that the men have very substantial grievances in connection with all matters above alluded to...I have no doubt that the agitation in connection with labour questions which is going on all around us is being made use of with reference to the police...it will be very unwise to disregard the fact of such dissatisfaction existing until it spreads and gets beyond control" (Judge, 1968, p.215). Monro may have been nearer to the truth than he realized.

On the day following his report, officers meeting at a worker's club, claiming to be the representatives of the 13,000 man force, agreed to continue to press for some relief. A proposal to call for a strike of the officers was voted down

by the committee. Men in uniform, members of the Metropolitan Police, were discussing a strike. The seriousness of the situation was not lost on the Commissioner, who again wrote to the Home Office to appeal for the passage of an adequate retirement system for the force. To aggravate the situation, the Home Secretary, Matthews, was trying to appoint one of his private secretaries to a vacancy as an Assistant Commissioner, pushing aside the Commissioner's selection of a serving police officer. This jockeying for position was to cause very hard feelings between the parties.

In an exchange of memoranda and proposals between Scotland Yard and the Home Office, Monro insisted on a pension system of two-thirds' pay for twenty-five years' of service, without regard to age or medical condition. Before Matthews could make any decisions, Monro resigned and allowed his letter of resignation to become public. The Commissioner was trying to outmaneuver the Home Secretary, and succeeded.

On June 12, 1890, a new Police Superannuation Bill was introduced in Parliament and the Home Secretary appointed a senior police officer, Howard, as the new Assistant Commissioner. Monro had pushed forward not only his candidate for the vacancy, but emboldened his officers to believe that

like their civilian brothers, they could "confer" and negotiate for pay and benefits. One of his last official acts was to authorize a meeting of police officers on June 20, at Paddington Police Station for a discussion of the retirement bill. This authorization was viewed by some officers as an acceptance of their right to "confer." Some of the younger officers held another, unauthorized, meeting and passed resolutions calling not only for pay and pension reforms but the formation of a police union. A police union with the right to strike; public safety? The mob? Victorian London was truly taken back by these concepts. Monro's actions proved to bring about more than just the appointment of his candidate for a vacancy (Judge, 1988).

Several hundred off duty officers gathered outside of the Bow Street Station and a demonstration resulted. Shortly thereafter, a meeting was held by a large number of officers and it was agreed to request a meeting with the new Commissioner, on June 30, and to call for a strike if any actions were taken because of the Bow Street episode. As a result of this meeting, a petition was forwarded to the new Commissioner, which asked that their weekly pay be increased to "the labour market value, which is ...15% higher than we receive" (Ascoli, p. 170). Following these meetings two

officers were suspended for carrying on discussions of the Superannuation Bill. As a result of these suspensions, officers around London refused to "turn out" for duty. The situation continued to worsen over the next several days, as more officers refused to "turn out" for duty. Several meetings were held by the officers, and they issued a statement to the press:

The constables at Bow Street this day decided in the interests of the trades people and householders generally, that it will be desirable to close their premises early on Monday night and safeguard by all possible means the entrances, as a strike of London policemen is now inevitable and will take place in all divisions simultaneously at 9.15 p.m. (Judge, 1968, p.222).

The threat of danger to public safety was perceived as very real. It was not that long ago that ideas of the "dangerous classes" were used as an argument for the establishment of the new police and now London, without its police, was in danger of being returned to those very "classes." These classes were described as the "scum of the depraved elements of all classes" and "The dangerous class, the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers off...society" (Morris, p.15). The threat to public order, posed by these "classes," was clearly evident.

The situation in London was very difficult. Recently, several post office workers were suspended for union organizing activities and troops of the Grenadier Guards had mutinied when ordered to attend a special parade. The new Commissioner, however, had dealt with mutiny before. The Home Secretary picked Colonel Sir Edward Bradford, a distinguished officer and a veteran of the Indian Mutiny to be the new Commissioner. Bradford would know how to deal with these insubordinate officers. He would not be sympathetic, but decisive and extinguish the rumblings of a few malcontents (Judge, 1988).

39 DISMISSED

Bradford did not let the Home Secretary down. On July 6, Bradford went to the Bow Street Station and personally dismissed thirty-nine officers who were identified as "ring-leaders." He followed this with the wholesale transfer of ninety-one other officers to other divisions. The greater part of Bow Street's complement of constables was gone. The situation was ripe for confrontation. A mob gathered at the Bow Street Station, hoping to see trouble among the police.

The police, however, changed tours of duty without incident. They were not going to strike. The mob became agitated. Mounted police were ordered in to clear the street, but they were met with rotten vegetables and mud. The situation was becoming serious. However, the timely arrival of a troop of cavalry from the Life Guards regiment had a calming effect on the mob. "The mob, who had treated the mounted police with contempt, were obviously uneasy about the new show of force. The police they had attacked but nobody was prepared to take on the Cavalry" (Judge, 1968, p.223).

The suspended officers were not to be as lucky as the comrades of 1872. Commissioner Bradford refused to reinstate any of these officers, they were to pay a high price for advocating the "right to confer." The rest of the force was to manage better than the dismissed officer. In August 1890, The Police Act became law. Under the provisions of the act, the police of the entire country were to be given a universal pension system. While the bill gave the local police authorities some freedom in the actual carrying out of the act, for the first time;

Every policeman gained a legal right to a pension after twenty-five years of service or, on medical grounds, after fifteen years. Police authorities were to settle the amounts

of pension within a prescribed maximum and minimum, and to impose a minimum qualifying age, but the ordinary expectation (and in the Metropolitan Police the rule) was that a man could retire after twenty-five years' service with a pension amounting to three-fifths of his pays, whatever his age. Special pensions were provided for officers injured in the course of duty and for the widows and children of officers who died during their service... (Critchley, 1967, p.171).

This legislation was seen, especially by the older officers, as a great victory and the modest pay raise that was included in this package was most welcome by the younger officers. The officers' "right to confer" was not to be addressed by the Home Officer. This was left to the Commissioner. Bradford issued new orders forbidding any meeting of police officers without permission from the Commissioner's office. Bradford made it clear that he would deal harshly with any officers who were involved in any organizing efforts or union discussions.

The new Commissioner, however, tried to show his support for the men. He personally visited every station to meet with the officers and used the situation to gain extra funds for improvements to existing stations and the building of new ones. He made it clear though, to both the officers and the Home Office, that he would not tolerate these unionizing

efforts or any interference with what he saw as the internal discipline of the force (Judge, 1988). The police had achieved a significant improvement in their lot, but the "right to confer" was to continue to be a pivotal issue in police labor relationships for the next generation.

The police over the next generation were to witness the enormous growth of trade unions and the ability of organized labor to turn their "right to confer" into a powerful weapon to improve their economic and social conditions. Membership in trade unions doubled in the period from 1892 to 1911, rising from 1,576,000 to 3,139,000 and doubled again to 6,633,000 by 1921 (Mitchell, p.137). Various reasons account for the growth of these unions. The rise in prices in this period is always taken as a factor. The overall wholesale price index rose from 100% in 1900 to more than 368% in 1920, an increase of over 250% in the cost of living (Mitchell, p.729). During this same time, only the wages of the skilled crafts, represented by their unions, managed to keep up with the rise in prices (Mitchell, p.170). These facts were apparent to the officers in their struggle to make ends meet and in their daily police duties, especially those involving labor strikes and demonstrations.

BELFAST

The police could see the achievements of their organized fellow worker's, throughout the United Kingdom. The policing of the city of Belfast was the assignment of the Royal Irish Constabulary. This detachment of the RIC was in daily contact with organized labor in this highly industrialized city, and it was to learn from their successes. A committee of enquiry, in 1901, had recommended a pay increase for these officers, but no action had been taken by 1907. This denial of a recommended pay raise and the extra duties that were forced on the RIC by several labor strikes in the city, led to wide spread discontent in the detachment.

On July 24, 1907, officers met at the Musgrave Street barracks to discuss their dissatisfaction. This meeting was held in spite of an order from superiors forbidding it. The officers sent a petition to the chief secretary outlining the demands of the Belfast 'mutineers'. These labor troubles were blamed on the prolonged dock strike in Belfast in 1907 by Deputy Inspector-general Considine, RIC, when he stated;

This long fought struggle...has no
doubt impressed the Belfast force with what

combination can effect; and the doctrines so constantly preached as to the right and the power of labour found a receptive soil amongst men who have long thought themselves unfairly treated (Griffin, p.410).

Combination, or the right to confer, was now seen as the reason behind police unrest. The RIC officers who petitioned the chief secretary did not fair as well as the dock strikers. They were all dismissed. Their actions, however, did bring the RIC to implement the pay recommendation of the 1901 committee.

TRADE UNION CONGRESS

The victories of organized labor to raise their members both economically and politically was not lost on the police constable. The emergence of the power of organized labor through the Trade Union Congress (TUC), and its offshoot the Labour Representative Committee, who were becoming powerful forces in the parliamentary system, was clear to the police officers. Constables, by statute, were not even allowed to vote until 1887, in Parliamentary elections, and 1893, in local elections. These officers could watch every day as organized labor was able to use their basic 'right to confer',

the power of their ballot and their ability to direct union funds to help and reward their political friends. "Many of these officers were very clever and they could see that unlike their brothers in the unions, they had no one to speak for them, to help with pay and other problems and they had no method to improve their lot" (Monks, 1988).

The general election of 1906 brought further evidence of the continuing advantages of 'conferring'. To foster their positions and candidates, several labor organizations agreed to support all candidates approved by the Labour Representative Committee and the Parliamentary Committee. This agreement, termed the 'Caxton Hall Concordat', gave great support to their candidates. These candidates were referred to as 'Lib-Labs', since most of them would support the Liberal Party in Parliamentary votes. Nearly all the nominees put forward by the 'Labs' did well in the election and a total of fifty-four 'Lib-Labs' were elected to Parliament. This victory emboldened the candidates to clearly identify themselves further, and the name of the Labour Representation Committee was changed to a simpler form, the Labour Party (Pelling, p.117). Immediately after assuming office, the new Labour Party used its position to better the station of the unions through the passage of the Trade Disputes Act.

This Act bestowed a statutory recognition on trade unions as 'legal entities', with full protection of the law. This Act provided wide protection of union funds from court action, an enormous problem for the unions as a result of their loss in the court case Taff Vale in 1901. "Thus, the unions had secured from the ballot-box the respect for their privileged position which had been denied them in the courts" (Pelling, p.117). The victories of trade unions and their increasing ability to manipulate the Parliamentary system was clear to all, most of all the constables. It was clear that the Liberal government of Lloyd George and Churchill "took care to placate the unions, because they wanted the support of their M.P.s in the Commons debates and the continued backing of the trade-union vote at future general elections" (Pelling, p.118).

The police were in the position of being responsible for the maintenance of law and order at the various strikes and seeing the unions continually gain in position and power. An additional irritant to the police was that these strikes and related events usually resulted in extra duties and additional time on patrol or strike details for the officers and rarely if ever brought any additional compensation or bonuses. The increasing number of strikes, some four thousand between 1911-14 (Clegg, p.25), were a hard burden for these officers. The

year 1911 is described as the most violent since the days of the Chartist movement. It is interesting to note that one of the worst of these strikes, Tonypandy, saw several hundred Metropolitan Police officers sent to Wales for service in the dispute. In Tonypandy, both the police and military were placed under the sole command of General Nevil Macready. In 1918 Macready would become Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and a key figure in the police strikes.

The concepts of overtime, night pay and other special provisions were totally foreign to police management in this period. It is true that some Chief Officers were aware of the burdens of these extra duties, and some did try to help with requests for other funds. Most, as did the Home Office, considered all of this to be 'part of the job' (Rowe, 1990). The 'right to confer' and the benefits accruing to it were to be pivotal issues in the labor problems of the police service in 1918-19.

SUFFRAGETTES

Another major issue in the police unrest in 1918-19 was

the changing role of women, both in fiscal and political terms. With the rise of political power of the trade unions, the last remaining disenfranchised group, women, moved to get the vote. The Women's Freedom League was formed in 1908 for the purpose of securing the right to vote for women. The League and other Suffragette movements, especially the Women's Social and Political Union, were to pose a new problem for the police. "(T)he police found themselves involved in a kind of public disorder for which there was no precedent" (Ascoli, p.190). From the beginning of the Suffragette movement to the start of the World War, the militant members moved gradually to adopt more violent methods.

During the period 1907-10, the movement conducted numerous demonstrations in London. Most of these were conducted near the Parliament in an attempt to gain entrance into the House of Commons. These demonstrations, which tied up thousands of police officers, brought the constables into contact with women of a class with which they were not used to dealing (see Tang for an in depth discussion of the movement, its methods and this conflict). Increasingly turning to violence the movement continued be confronted by the police. These officers lived with lengthy regulations which guided their lives, and those of their wives.

Police officers were not allowed to marry without permission and had to present evidence of the respectable nature of the woman in question. These officers were now faced with controlling and arresting women that they and society considered respectable. Many of these officers resented these intrusive rules and found it odd that they were arresting women that the force would find too good for them.

SIDNEY STREET

One incident which highlighted the regulation of the officer's lives, which primarily the officers of the City of London and the Metropolitan Police took as a great affront, involved the Siege of Sidney Street. In 1910, a botched jewelry store robbery resulted in the shooting of five unarmed police officers in London by members of an anarchist group. Three of these officers died, one being shot 12 times. Members of this group were traced to 100 Sidney Street, and on December 16 and 17, 1910 a battle ensued. The battle not only involved more than 250 police officers but also two squads from the Scots Guard regiment. The building caught fire and was allowed to burn to the ground, killing the two men inside.

In the aftermath of this operation the murdered officers' widows were awarded funds. "Mrs. Amelia Tucker and Mrs. Louise Bentley, were given pensions of thirty shillings a week so long as they remained widows and of good character" (Rumbelow, p.164). The murder of three officers by an anarchist; a siege and violent gun battle in the middle of London and the authorities thought so little of the sacrifice of not only the three murdered officers but the hundreds involved in the whole operation to use the occasion to remind not only the widows of these murdered officers but the serving officers and their family to remain "of good character," or suffer the financial consequences. This was to add salt to the open wounds of many of the officers, as a reminder of the arbitrary power of their superiors to intrude into their lives. (This incident was the focus of great attention throughout England. Twenty-five years later, Alfred Hitchcock used the Siege as the ending for his movie "The Man Who Knew Too Much.")

CHANGING ROLE

The changing role of women in the domestic economy as the country plunged into the First World War was further to

exacerbate the deteriorating position of the police officers. After the start of the war the situation of women changed rapidly;

British women were...rallying to the call of duty in ever-increasing numbers...beside taking on a host of civilian jobs normally done by men, they were absorbed by the thousands into Lloyd George's war factories...the Board of Trade issued an appeal to all women willing to take 'paid employment of any kind' in trade, commerce or agriculture...The appeal added: 'Any woman who by working helps to release and equip a man for fighting does national services' (Williams, p.56-7).

Women's role in society was changing. The traditional place of women in the home or only certain types of employment was to be forever changed as a result of the War. "Expansion of job opportunity was the central phenomenon of women's war experience" (Marwick, 1977, p.162). This expansion was to put women into well paying jobs in the munitions factories, pay well above that of a police officer. Indeed, the number of women employed in the munitions industry rose to 520,000 in 1915 and almost doubled to 920,000 by 1918 (Marwick, 1965, p.91). With good pay and a freer life, many women used the opportunity to leave domestic service, a traditional breeding ground for policemen's wives, for the factories or other jobs. More than 400,000 women left domestic service during the War;

many soon found themselves in government offices...The Censor's department and the Census of Production, Post Office...the greatly expanded War Office...Outside government employment, hundreds took jobs in clothing, tailoring...as gardeners...laboratory assistants...tram and bus conductors, bank clerks, ticket collectors...plumbers' assistants, milk and newspaper delivers, gas-meter readers...nursing orderlies...there were in fact few occupations...into which women did not penetrate (Williams, p.57).

Many officers now found themselves having to ask the force for permission to allow their wives to work and having them get better paying jobs in the factories. "Many of the lads were embarrassed to have their wives or their daughters bring home money more than them...you were supposed to be the man of the house, but the pay was the truth of the situation. Many a little girl would leave school and within a month be making more than her policeman father, who had to do nights and the reserve duty...prior to the War it would be like pulling teeth to get permission of the Chief Constable for the wife to work. It was often said you didn't manage right if the wife had to work" (Grumley, 1988). In fact many forces specifically forbade constables' wives from working outside the home. This total ban was lifted, temporarily, during the War, by Home Office order.

Additional pressure was placed on these officers lives in

the increased number of women being employed as women police. The effects of the War was spreading to even the masculine bastions of the police. Both the unpaid volunteers of the Women Police Volunteers (WPV) and the paid members of the Women Police Service (WPS) had numerous reasons for their works (See Levine, Women Police in World War I, for any in depth discussion). Some saw themselves as the morality police others "because the money and working conditions were preferable" (Levine, p.47).

The role of women in policing was changing and these events did not go unnoticed by the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir Nevil Macready. Macready pointed out that in the recruitment of females, "the main point was to eliminate any women of extreme views--the vinegary spinster or blighted middle-aged fanatic--and to get broad-minded, kindly, sensible women" (Levine, p.48). The sight of a women police sergeant or inspector was beyond belief to many officers. "There were even times when one of the ladies (WPS) thought she could actually issue orders to us because someone had given her a title of Inspector; can you imagine, they weren't real Constables" (Grumley, 1988). The police officers were losing ground in the overall economy, losing they place as the bread winner and now losing their place as the protector of

society and women.

The English policeman of the early Twentieth Century was faced with static pay, rising inflations, loss of status and the inability to "confer" with his colleagues to try and better their position.

CHAPTER 6

THE STRIKES

One of the most influential events in the foundation of the 1918-19 strikes was the case of Inspector John Syme of the Metropolitan Police. As a result of an incident at the Gerald Road Police Station on August 17, 1909 two constables were disciplined for arresting two men when "there is nothing to justify the arrest of the men on the charge preferred against them" (Judge, 1968, p.9). Inspector Syme, who was the duty officer at the time of the incident, expressed support for the constables and, at their disciplinary hearing, spoke for leniency for the two. This action ran him afoul of his superiors, specifically Sub-Divisional Inspector Reed and Chief Inspector Shervington. The disciplinary hearing, with Chief Inspector Shervington as the deciding official, resulted in a reprimand of the constables, but the reprimand was not put in their official records.

However, the hearing report also stated that in view of

the "attitude taken by Inspector Syme...(he should be) removed to another station" (Judge, 1968, p.10). Syme was subsequently transferred to the Fulham Station. Needless to say, Syme did not take this well. He immediately appealed to the Commissioner, Sir Edward Henry. A long drawn out proceeding followed, wherein Syme launched an attack on his adversaries. He charged that Reed and Shervington spied on the men, offered harsh discipline for trifling infractions and "treated (them) to a display of childish petulance" (Judge, 1968, p.12). Syme made other accusations of bad management and supervisory abuses of the men. He gave the names of sixteen officers who would testify in support of these charges.

The Commissioner had to act on the charges. But Syme found the cards stacked against him. The officer chosen to lead the inquiry was Superintendent Isaac. Isaac was the commander of the division being investigated and the sixteen officers whom Syme had named failed to confirm any of the allegations. Syme was not the first or the last to be surprised by the actions of fellow officers during an inquiry. The situation deteriorated as Syme began personal attacks on his superiors. The board of inquiry progressed slowly until, in December, Syme stated that he wished to call a total of 170 witnesses. Commissioner Henry decided to terminate the case.

On December 20, 1909, Syme was demoted to the rank of Station Sergeant and was transferred to a rural village station.

Syme would not accept the Commissioner's judgement. He appealed to the Secretary of State. When that was denied, he sought to have a member of Parliament bring his case before the House of Commons. Commissioner Henry could not tolerate this action and, on January 29, 1910 he dismissed Syme from the force. Syme began a personal crusade to regain his position and to publicize the evils of the Metropolitan Police as he saw them. Syme formed a friendship with John Kempster, publisher of the Police Review, and used the publication to highlight his plight. Within a short time, Syme became a cause celebre.

During the ensuing year, Syme met with the new Home Secretary, Winston Churchill, who offered him reinstatement at the rank of Station Sergeant (Judge, 1968, p.17). Syme refused. He wanted complete vindication. Syme sought to gain more publicity by writing letters that threatened attacks on several public persons, including King George V and Home Secretary Churchill. As a result of his action on July 4, 1911 Syme was convicted and sent to Wormwood Scrubbs prison for six months (Judge, 1968, p.17). After his release, Syme founded

the "John Syme League," to foster his public speaking and pamphleteering. Syme was encouraged by events on the continent. The Police of Paris formed a union in 1912 and, shortly thereafter, received official recognition and negotiated improvements in pay and conditions (Allen, p.133). On October 24, 1913, the Metropolitan Police Union was formed and an appeal for members was published in the Police Review. The advertisement listed John Syme as the organizer and stated the aims of the union as:

To safeguard the police against official tyranny and injustice, to improve the conditions of the police service, to ensue equal chances of promotion...purge the service of corrupt and unworthy members...and efficient police administration (Judge, 1968, p.19).

Syme's appeal met with such response that on November 14, 1913 he announced the formation of a branch for county and borough police (Allen, p.134). Syme continually agitated for the officer's "right to confer." The issue of the right to confer had been raised several times in the past. Several years before, in 1907, Ramsey Macdonald, a Member of Parliament, asked a Parliamentary question of the Home Secretary if "he would sanction the formation of an Association in the Metropolitan Police with the right to make representations to the Commissioner." The response was that

the government considered the proposal "subversive of discipline" (Dixon, p.6).

NUPPO

Shortly after Syme's announcement in November, the title of the League was changed to the National Union of Police and Prison Officers (NUPPO). Commissioner Henry took the idea of the union seriously and issued an order, in December 1913, making it a fireable offense for an officer to join the union. The order stated:

It has come to the knowledge of the Commissioner that attempts have been made to induce members of the Metropolitan Police to join a Federation or Union. He desires to point out that membership of such an association is prohibited by Standing Orders; and that any men who violate these Orders, or incite others to violate them, renders himself liable to disciplinary proceedings, which may result in his dismissal from the force (Griffiths, p.10).

The Commissioner's order was followed by a Home Office directive to all Chief Constables stating that an officer who joined the union "will render himself liable to dismissal" (Allen, p.134). This order and the Home Office directive

would, it was believed, effectively "kill" the union.

The idea of the union was more and more becoming a sore point with His Majesty's government. John Kempster, the publisher of the Police Review, split with his friend Syme over the union. Kempster suggested a National Police Federation, which would be modeled on a union idea, but would explicitly refuse the "right of strike." Kempster wrote that the union:

would be injurious. It is inconceivable to give them the power to strike. The absence of this power should not, however, deprive so loyal a body as our British Constabulary of the advantages of combining for reasonable conferences as to necessary improvements in the conditions of their service (Davies, p.39).

Kempster's idea met with no support and the NUPPO flourished. Syme's organizing activities did not lessen his personal attacks on Commissioner Henry. In January 1914 Syme was charged with libel and slander against Commissioner Henry. Syme accused Henry of fostering perjury and blackmail within the ranks. Syme conducted his own defense and a very strong personal cross-examination of Commissioner Henry (Judge, 1968, p.21). Syme was found guilty of criminal libel and was sent to prison in July 1914 for eight months (Allen, p.134).

His Majesty's government was given a short reprieve in the police union struggle by Syme's incarceration. With war in Europe on the horizon and the union's organizer in jail, Commissioner Henry was free to concern himself with war preparations. London experienced rapid growth in this period and the Metropolitan Police grew accordingly. One of the results of this expansion was a change in the character of the recruits to the force. The idea of the farm lad off to London to join the police changed and the new recruits came from the urban areas, where the ideas of unionism were more prevalent. These new recruits had seen the successes of organized labor and the strength of the TUC, first hand. Many of these officers would come from working class family with first hand knowledge of labor unions. Indeed, Sir Nevil Macready, who was Commissioner Henry's successor after the 1918 strike, in addressing the Desborough Committee, stated "They were deeply imbued with trade union ideas, when they joined the force" (Judge, 1968, p.22). Syme's union and the new character of recruits were to prove fundamental to the events of 1918-19.

ISSUES OF THE STRIKE

Strike actions which enjoy the broadest support of the

union membership are usually tied to pay and/or benefits questions. The membership of the police union was no exception. Britain, by 1915, was engulfed in the war. The police, especially the Metropolitan Police, were burdened with extra war-related duties. The society overall was undergoing a basic change of the social fabric. For years, the police basic rate of pay was slightly higher than that of workmen in factories. The build up of armament and related industries just prior to World War I and the shortage of labor due to the war caused a drastic increase in the wages of the workmen and brought women into the work force. "For long, certainly from 1914, the Police were miserably underpaid. It was hard for many men to keep body and soul together..." (Nott-Bower, p.283).

His Majesty's government's solution to the wartime inflation was the use of a war bonus. The police found their pay frozen by wartime government price control and their only reward was to be a war bonus, which was not to be a part of the pay used to calculate their pension. The monetary situation worsened. "I well remember Sir Edward Henry and myself...together begging for a very small increase of wages, and receiving the reply, 'Impossible, Impossible'" (Nott-Bower, p.284). The police were still falling behind in

terms of wages. A London constable at the beginning of the war in 1914 was paid 40 shillings a week, compared to 38 shillings for some skilled laborers.

By 1917, the constable had risen to 48 shillings, while the skilled worker had risen to 67 shillings per week. During the same time, inflation had risen in excess of 70 percent. "No longer did the working classes have any reason to envy and consequently respect the police. For even the most menial jobs, wages were outstripping those paid in many forces ..." (Judge, 1968, p.24). In addition to London, the idea of a police union was well received in Liverpool. Liverpool police "had major grievances concerning earnings levels and hours of work which were somewhat worse than those appertaining in many other forces" (Bean, p.639).

The wartime emergency brought additional work and hours to many officers. The average work week for the Liverpool police was seventy-eight hours "for a flat week pay" (Ibid). The average pay rise for dock laborers and porters, 1918-19, was 137%. At the same time the police received an average of 84% and the cost of living had risen 110%. The police officers in Liverpool

had thus experienced a relative

decline not only in pay but, equally crucially, in economic status and prestige vis-a-vis other reference groups, particularly in terms of their normative perceptions of themselves as skilled men, i.e., a relative deprivation in social stratification. They claimed that not only were they unable to match the living standards of 'equal status' engineers and draughtsmen...but even ordinary labourers now disparaged them. Seeing themselves as markedly undervalued they looked to the police union, as a potential collective bargaining agent, to restore their pay and prestige" (Ibid, p.638).

One grievance which is not usually spoken of was the "charge allowance." This allowance was paid to sub-divisional Inspectors in "busy houses" when the number of charges, or arrests, exceeded the number that the Headquarters allowed for the subdivision. Many officers felt that their superior officers were more concerned about keeping the "numbers" up, to keep their salary levels, than about law and order. Constables complained of harassment by inspectors if the "numbers" fell. One incident highlighted this grievance. An Army deserter gave himself up to a constable at a Police Station. Since the man surrendered, the "number" would not count toward the "numbers" needed for the inspector to maintain his charge allowance. The inspector pressured the constable to say that he recognized the deserter and arrested him. This "story" was what the constable told the court.

However, the deserter's brother, who had talked him into surrendering and had accompanied him to the police station, was in court and gave evidence in support of the "truth." The constable was charged with perjury. The inspector escaped punishment for his efforts to maintain his "charge allowance" (Judge, 1968, p.25).

A final issue was that of the union itself. The police had long sought the "right to confer" with each other concerning the various problems of the police. This "right to confer" had been at issue in the labor troubles of 1872 and 1890 and had a significant role in the founding of the NUPPO. John Kempster, in his opposition to Syme's original proposal, advocated a federation which, while disavowing the right to strike, would rely greatly on, and strongly advocate, the police officers' "right to confer." With these concerns as a background, agitation for the NUPPO was increasing.

John Wilkinson, a Metropolitan Police constable, was dismissed by Commissioner Henry for union activities. Restlessness was becoming obvious. Preferring to be drafted into the army and face the trenches in France, 86 officers resigned over compensation grievances. Sir Henry felt compelled to issue a special order, in November 1916:

It is now further notified that all members of the Metropolitan Police Force are, under similar penalty [the Order of 18.12.1913 threatened dismissal for joining the Union] prohibited, unless detailed for duty, from attending meetings organized by an association styling itself 'The National Union of Police and Prison Officers' and from attending any meetings which there is reason to believe are held with the object of inciting Police Officers to insubordination or to violence of the disciplinary regulations of the Service or where language is used calculated to undermine police discipline (Judge, 1968, p.27).

Commissioner Henry followed this order with the dismissal of five men for union activities. Sir Henry was not the only official to take a serious stand against the union. The Defense of the Realm Act was amended to make it an offense to do anything to undermine the discipline of any police force. The NUPPO was seen by Sir William Nott-Bower, Commissioner of the City of London Police, as a clear threat to the discipline of the police and the society in general. Nott-Bower cited a letter from the General Secretary of the Communist Party wherein he states, "There is no objection to members of the Party joining the police...Half a dozen good Party members in the Police Forces of the big towns would certainly be very useful" (Nott-Bower, p. 286).

Within days of the amendment of the Defense of the Realm

Act, a prosecution of John Syme and other union officials was undertaken for articles in the union magazine. Syme was convicted and sentenced to six months imprisonment. While on bail pending appeal, Syme was arrested under the same act and given another six month sentence. Syme was sent off to one of His Majesty's prisons and while he was gone, a new leadership emerged. A group of younger officers, who saw Syme's personal vendettas against Commissioner Henry as a deficit to the union, moved to have Syme removed from union office.

NO STRIKE

By February 1917 the NUPPO leadership had changed. Syme was forced out of the union and serving officers from the London forces took control of the management. In an attempt to placate its critics, the new committee amended its rules with a "no strike" policy in the union objectives:

- (A) To use every legitimate and reasonable effort to maintain a just, impartial and efficient Police Service.
- (B) To promote and encourage at all times the due observance of the Regulations and Discipline of the Service.
- (C) To rigidly maintain a true sense of obligation to the public by permanently

guarding against any possibility of members withholding their services as a means of obtaining redress, and to have all differences between the authorities and members arranged or decided by amicable and conciliatory means (Dixon, p.7).

This amendment to the rules was part of plans to secure the legitimacy of the NUPPO. In April 1917 an approach was made to the Home Secretary, Sir George Cave, to allow the formation of a police union. Cave stated "The Police have amply opportunity for making any representations they may desire to the Commissioner, through their Superintendents, and they may apply to see the Commissioner" (Allen, p.135). This admonishment was met by a second delegation from the powerful Trade Union Congress (TUC), who met with both the Home Secretary and the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir Edward Henry. Henry expressed concern, in his testimony to the Desborough Committee, that the trade unions were trying to get control of the police. In his letter to the TUC, Henry wrote:

Practically all the objects sought to be secured by the formation of a Union are already secured by our men in the Police Service...I cannot help thinking that whoever drafted the terms of this proposed constitution has gone beyond even what you yourself proposed. The result would be to create a new control

over the police and it would not be unfair to describe the power to be entrusted to the Executive Committee as 'despotic' in view of the Rule that 'No order shall be questioned, reversed, controlled or suspended, except by vote of the members.' The incalculable harm that might result from such a Rule at a time of sudden crisis must be obvious... the Metropolitan Police, happily, have many friends in the House of Commons and when they have a grievance, real or imaginary, there are always members (of Parliament) ready to champion their cause (Davies, p.52).

Sir Henry was not impressed by the new leadership. He was an authoritarian figure who was firmly against the union. "He was simply opposed to the idea of giving the police the right to confer. The police were a disciplined body who were there to obey orders. If they needed anything, he would see to it...Unions were for dockers and miners, not for his policemen" (Judge, 1968, p.32).

Commissioner Henry was not alone in his views. In his autobiography, Sir William Nott-Bower, Commissioner of the City of London Police, described the strikes as a mutiny. He states:

"Strikes" may be a legitimate and, possibly indeed, the only resource in the case of trade disputes; but in the case of public servants, or whose discipline and efficiency the community have to rely for the maintenance of peace and

order, and for the safety of life and property, a so-called "strike" is nothing short of a "mutiny," a crime of the worst possible description, which no grievances, no matter how great, or how well founded, can ever justify, a crime which should always be met with the sternest repression, and punished with the utmost severity (Nott-Bower, p.283).

Both Commissioners Henry and Nott-Bower continued to press their "fatherly" role toward their men. The situation of police officers was deteriorating. By mid-1918, the government had undertaken a study to raise the war bonus and to begin a widow's pension. The idea of a widow's pension was favored by and lobbied for by both Commissioners Henry and Nott-Bower. Both Commissioners were soon to be overtaken by events. "Henry...showed himself to be divorced from feeling in the force. No senior officer at Scotland Yard had any idea of the true situation" (Judge, 1968, p.39).

THE STRIKE OF 1918

By August 1918 the situation had worsened. Police morale was low and there was no word of redress for their grievances. The Union had established strong links with the London Trades Council, with over 100,000 members. The Council had reported "eagerness to support the Police in any claim they may make as

a corporate body possessing the right of combination" (Ibid, p.39-40). Indeed, Sir George Cave, Home Secretary, answered a parliamentary question on police pay in the end of July by stating that he did not expect to make a decision in the matter for some time. The lack of concern by senior government officials was clear from their actions. Cave, the Home Secretary, left for vacation at his country house. Sir Edward Troup, Under Secretary of the Home Office, also left for vacation and Commissioner Henry had already left London for vacations immediately prior to the strike. To heighten tensions, an official of the NUPPO was disciplined for his activities.

Constable Thiel of the Metropolitan Police was the subject of a complaint from the Chief Constable of Manchester for his (Thiel's) union organizing in that force. Thiel was called to Scotland Yard to appear before Assistant Commissioner Wodehouse, the most senior police official in London at the time. Thiel did not repent his actions. Indeed, he admitted his organizing activities as well as his membership in the NUPPO, an illegal union. On August 25, 1918 Thiel was dismissed from the police. Low wages, poor morale, numerous other grievances and, now, a martyr. The situation was perfect for the union to act.

The NUPPO took the action on August 27, 1918. An ultimatum was delivered to the government which made the union's position clear. Their demands were: an immediate increase in pay, bonuses and pensionable pay; the immediate reinstatement of Constable Thiel; and the official recognition of the NUPPO. The union also stated that unless its demands were met by midnight on August 29, it would suspend Clause C of its by-laws, the "no strike" rule. The ultimatum was delivered to the Home Secretary, Cave, by Assistant Commissioner Wodehouse. In addition to the letter, Wodehouse gave his assurance that he and his superintendents felt that "all was well" in the Metropolitan Police and the reports of union strength were an exaggeration. The general consensus was that only a small number of union diehards would strike.

To deal with these militants, Cave passed the ultimatum to the Director of Public Prosecutions for possible prosecution under the Defense of the Realm Act. To further undermine the union, Cave issued a press release that a pay raise for the police was under rigorous consideration. With the situation well in hand, Cave decided to continue his summer holidays as did his deputy, Sir Edward Troup, since the threats of a strike were not believed to be serious (Judge, 1968, p.43). While the Home Secretary went off to his country

house and his deputy, Sir Edward Troup, went to an inn, which he described as a "primitive little pub on the downs, but possessed of an excellent cook" (Judge, 1968, p.40), the union held its final meeting before the strike order. A meeting was held at the Pimlico Mission Hall, on the evening of August 29, in anticipation of their ultimatum's dateline.

The meeting was "packed to the doors...(and) the mood of the force was in support of an immediate strike" (Ibid). The Chairman of the Union, Constable James Marston told his members that they had the support of organized labor and the time for action was now. Marston was later described by Sir Nevil Macready as heavy and stupid with no gift for argument. Macready stated that "It was a considerably increasing wonder to me how or why an intelligent body of men like the Metropolitans could have allowed themselves to be led by the nose by this man" (Macready, p. 311). The support for the strike was explicit. The decision was made. The morning tour would not report. It was a strike.

STRIKE

Sir Frederick Wodehouse, the senior police official in

London received report of the first men leaving their posts in the early hours of August 30. Bow Street station, the historic home of London policing, was solid for the strike. Some of that station's officers wrote of the strike:

No ordinary strike was this, (wrote the Bow Street men) every man was jeopardising his pension with the muddy Flanders trenches looming in the background. They had made up their minds and they were going on strike. They did not know how they were supported by their comrades in the other divisions. Would hunger and cold make them also desperate, or would they try to linger on a little longer? But there was no going back, and soon hopes rose as 40 men arrived from a neighbouring station to see what Bow Street was doing. Then there was a meeting in the billiard room and the men solemnly repeated their intention of remaining suspended until wrongs were righted, or some other fate had claimed them. They changed into civilian clothes and went to encourage the others who still hung back-those who wanted to join the strike proved that the strike was spreading like wildfire. Then the early relief had to be attended to and almost to a man joined their comrades en masse (Judge, 1968, p.44-45).

In an interview to the press (Daily Chronicle, August 30, 1918) Marston stated that in April 1917, just fifteen months prior to the strike, the NUPPO had only 47 paid-up members in the Metropolitan and City Police Forces. Marston declared that the membership had grown enormously and he

expected four or five thousand officers to follow the Union call to strike. Events were to surprise even Marston expectations. "By midday on Friday 30 August, with very few exceptions the entire Metropolitan Police Force, numbering 12,000 men, and virtually all the men in the City of London Police Force had withdrawn from duty" (Allen, p. 135-136). The senior officials of the police force and the government had completely misjudged the situation and now they rushed back to London. One official who was on the scene and prone to action, Sir Nevil Macready, Adjutant General and the next Police Commissioner, immediately ordered a Guards unit to Scotland Yard and ordered all police officers presently serving in the Army to be ready to return to London to act as police, if needed, but under Army discipline (Judge, 1968, p.48).

Some officers who joined the strike were ardent supporters of the police union and its official recognition by the government, but most of these officers were concerned with pay and benefits. "The Union was a grand idea, but the lads were worry about putting food on the table...things were bad. I know several of the lads who looked the other way for a pound note. They wouldn't have done that before, but the War brought terrible prices on food" (Hampton). "We all wanted more pay, the brothers were both in the shipyard and making three times

as much as me. Several times I had to go to my little brother to tide us over" (Revill).

Lloyd George order General Smuts to deal with the situation. Smuts, after conferring with several senior officials at Scotland Yard, decided to meet with the strikers' representatives. This meeting was not without opposition. "This is not a strike," Wodehouse (Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police) had said, 'these men are mutinying in the face of the enemy. They have laid the capital open to sabotage and other grave dangers. In order to prevent them, we feel justified in taking the strongest possible action'" (Judge, 1968, p.62).

Smuts' invitation to meet with two representatives from each division was met by the Union with cheers. Marston told several hundred member outside the Home Office, that "General Smuts has asked to see us...There is nobody who can represent you unless they hold a Union card." When asked by a Home Office official if they were the delegation of two officers from each division, Marston replied "No...We are a deputation from the Union and the Union will not allow any other men than ourselves to see General Smuts or discuss the matter with the Government. If General Smuts declines to see us we will call

the City Police out on strike ..." When Smuts refused to meet the Union, Marston left declaring "we will call out the City Police" (Judge, 1968, p.53).

Marston made good on his threats and the call was issued to the City of London force and almost the entire force responded and refused duty. Other labor officials warned of further strikes. The Secretary of the London Trades Council stated that "If the authorities want trouble...they will get it. Manchester is waiting for the call to come out. Other towns will be out if you are not reinstated by tomorrow" (Ibid, p.54).

LLOYD GEORGE

Lloyd George held a War Cabinet on the afternoon of August 30 and it was decided to ask Charles Duncan, a Member of Parliament and General Secretary of the Workers' Union to act as an intermediary. Duncan was an odd choice for this job, for one of his other titles was President of the National Union of Police and Prison Officers. Duncan was told by Lloyd George "I want this thing settled...can it be done tonight?...Does that mean the police can have a Union (asked

Duncan)...I said that the men could have an organization to speak for them...whether it is to be the Union or an internal body is something to be decided (was Lloyd George's answer" (Ibid, p.62).

With Duncan as the intermediary, a meeting was arranged on the next day. The strike progressed on Saturday, the 31, and a march was called. Thousands of officers in plainclothes held a march to Tower Hill. As they marched in fours, "A constable of the City Police, defying his colleagues and the union by parading for point duty, held up the traffic at Blackfriars for the procession to pass. On the whole it was all very British and restrained" (Browne, p.305). The Union was mindful of the War with Germany and their apparently unpatriotic actions. "(I)t was by no means an uncommon thing to hear that German money and influence was at the bottom of the whole trouble" (Macready, p.327). Officers were told to return to duty if there was a Zeppelin raid and Metropolitan officers on duty at the Royal Dockyards around the country were persuaded to stay on duty and continue their war work.

The events were now highly publicized and the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, was not pleased. Cave returned to London and offered his resignation. It was refused. Lloyd

George told him that he was misled by Scotland Yard officials. Sir Henry was the next to return to London and found himself out of office. His fifteen year tenure in office (1903-1919) was the first casualty of the strike. One commentary on the police management stated;

The astonishing police strike presents the same sinister feature we have remarked in so many recent industrial troubles. It has been precipitated with extreme suddenness on an enraged public and no time is left for rational discussion in public of the points at issue.

On other occasions we pointed out what reasons must have happened-either the Service might have been unconsciously influenced by anti-national influences or the 'competent authority' must have been utterly incompetent. In this case only one inference is possible. We all know the London police. They are generally speaking an extremely fine body of men, indefatigable, and trustworthy. They could not possibly be suspected of unpatriotic or revolutionary tendencies. How then are we to account for the disquieting spectacle of the Strike?

Clearly there must be something very wrong somewhere in the management of these men and the consideration of their demands-the substantial justice of which it is impossible to deny-for an increase in wages to meet the greatly increased cost of living. (Evening Standard, September 2, 1918)

Within hours a new Commissioner, Sir Nevil Macready, was ensconced at the Scotland Yard. Lloyd George wanted the affair

settled quickly. "The war was at a critical stage, and the horrors of the Bolshevik uprising in Russia, only ten months earlier, persuaded them that any false step could precipitate revolution in England" (Critchley, p.186). The memories of the Sidney Street siege were still fresh in many minds.

The Prime Minister was determined to go ahead with the meeting and secure a settlement. The morning newspapers did not aid his position. The Morning Post wrote, "The police force are, in fact deserters. Morally they are betraying their trust." Another paper, the Manchester Guardian, compared these officers to the soldiers in France and recommended they all be liable to military service. Lloyd George was determined to move ahead. An agreement was reached and gave the strikers the majority of their demands. The settlement stated:

1. An increase of pay of 13s. week
2. The grant of widows' pensions.
3. The cases of men dismissed for joining the Union would be favourably considered by the Commissioner.
4. A body should be set up representing the members of the force in matters connected with their conditions of service and general welfare, other than questions of discipline. In setting up this organization, it was arranged that the Home Secretary should consult with the representative of the Metropolitan Police.

5. There would be no objection to members of the Force joining the National Union of Police and Prison Officers, so long as the Union did not claim or attempt to interfere with the discipline of the Service or to induce members of the Force to withhold their services (Mackenzie, p.10).

The agreement was signed by James Marston for the officers. At the conclusion of the meeting both leaders, Lloyd George and Marston, bid farewell. "Now don't forget, 'the Prime Minister had said as, shaking hands with Marston...if ever a similar situation should arise you must come and see me" (Sellwood, p.6).

NOT IN WARTIME

Marston and the Union were thrilled. They had gotten everything they had wanted and then some. Or had they? Marston explained the agreement to his men stating that the Government could not recognize a police union in wartime, but, "The Prime Minister is on our side" (Ibid, p.11). The conversations at these meetings were to be the subject of much discussion. James Carmichael, one of the Union negotiators, stated to a Union meeting that "the effect of Mr. Lloyd George's reception of the Executive Committee of the Police Union is Government

recognition of the Union" (Ibid). But in a prepared statement given by Sir George Cave, the Government stated:

The Prime Minister (the statement read) said to the deputation of policemen who saw him ...that he could not in wartime sanction recognition of a Police Union. He pointed out that the trouble in Russia had to a great extent risen from the existence of a Union or a Committee among the soldiers. He thought the Police were a semi-military force, and that to a great extent the same conditions applied to them, and he would not have a repetition in this country of what had happened in Russia.

The Prime Minister added that he thought there should be machinery under which the Police Force could bring before the police authorities any grievances which they had, as to their conditions of service. Subject to this, they should have no kind of power to interfere with the discipline of the force, but he promised that he would, with myself, discuss with the men at an early date some means for communication. Of course, that is quite a different thing from a Union in the ordinary sense (Judge, 1968, p.69).

The Union's view of these conversations was greatly different. One of the NUPPO at the negotiations was Sergeant John Hayes, who was later to be elected a Member of Parliament. In recalling these discussions, Hayes stated:

Well, so far as the recognition of the Union is concerned, the War is

still on, and this is not a matter which we can talk about now. We will talk about recognition after the War is over, but for the time being you can have your committees. You say you have your Union and you have your branches also formed. Very well, go ahead with them and set up the committee on the basis which has been agreed upon, and you can go ahead and there will be no interference with you (Davies, p.65).

This point was to become the primary concern of police labor relations for the next year. The Union continued to claim recognition, but the government's position was clear. "(M)y recollection," Lloyd George stated in a letter dated October 4, 1919, "is that I definitely discouraged formation of the Union and said that the Government would not agree to recognize it" (Ibid). That issue would be settled in a second strike in 1919.

By the evening of the 31st, the men had returned to duty. While the strike and the agreement were confined to officers of the Metropolitan and City of London Forces, other provincial forces gained from the strike. Immediate pay raises were granted to several forces and when the members of the Manchester Police, which had been organized into a chapter of the NUPPO by Constable Thiel, threatened to refuse duty, they were given the same concessions as the London forces and

remained on duty. The union leadership was elated. They viewed the situation as victorious. No officer was to be punished for the strike. Sir Nott-Bower, Commissioner of the City, felt required to reinstate two officers who had been dismissed prior to the strike for union related activities. As a further concession to the "right to confer," membership in the union was not "forbidden provided that no claim or attempt was made to interfere with discipline, or induce men to withhold their services" (Browne, p. 307). The strike was over.

The effects of the Union were not limited to the mainland United Kingdom. Union organizers had been working for sometime in both the RIC and the Dublin Metropolitan Police. One principal organizer was an ex-RIC sergeant, T. J. McElligott. McElligott, an active Sinn Fein supporter, "got in touch with Collins (Michael Collins, head of the military branch of the IRA) and became sort of agitator and organizer of the R.I.C. Ostensibly working to improve their pay and conditions of service, he was really bent on breaking up the force, or rendering it harmless and was financed by Collins" (Neligan, p.54-55). The British authorities' decision to follow the London settlement and grant the demands of the Irish officers strongly influenced the eventual defeat of the Union and the failure of McElligott's scheme.

The personal actions of Lloyd George, and his "concession of all demands of the union...it only produced an 'armistice' and not a 'peace', for the agitators thought (and rightly) that they had won a great victory...until the strike of 1919 happily came as a blessing in disguise, for it ended...the Police and Prison Officer's Union" (Nott-Bower, p.288).

THE STRIKE OF 1919

"The question of pay has been settled for the moment...there still remained the setting up of machinery under which members of the force could bring forward any grievances, real or imaginary, as to their conditions of service, subject to the proviso that there be no power to interfere with the discipline of the force" (Macready, p.311). Within six days of the ending of the strike, the Representative Board scheme was initiated. The Board was to be composed of members elected by all ranks of the force below the rank of Chief Inspector. The Board would be composed of one member from each of the twenty-six divisions.

A meeting was held on September 7, 1918 in the new Commissioner's office of one selected man from each of the

twenty-six divisions, "in order to explain the scheme to them, and incidentally to make their acquaintance. This action on my part, four days after I had taken over, brought about the first skirmish with Police-constable James Marston, the figure-head of the union" (Ibid). Macready set forth his ideas on the Board to the officers. "I left them to discuss the scheme, and on my return they were good enough to receive me with a cheer. I knew then that Marston and his friends had not had it all their own way" (Ibid, p.313).

As soon as the Board was set up, trouble began. The NUPPO was aggressive in pushing its members for election to the Board. In the first report of the Representative Board of the City of London Police, issued on October 20, 1918, their attitudes were clear. The report called for the repeal of laws which forfeited the pension of constables convicted of indictable crimes; reducing the authority of the Commissioner to dismiss officers; granting promotions by competitive examination; and giving NUPPO the right to post notices in police stations (Nott-Bower, p.291).

The situation was similar in the Metropolitan Force. Commissioner Macready wrote that the Representative Board " was dominated by certain men who, as time went on, hardly

concealed their intention of governing the Force in all respects" (Browne, p.311). The situation was deteriorating. The union felt it was in a strong position. Its membership had grown from 10,000 officers in August 1918, to 50,000 in November 1918, in a country that had a total of 60,000 officers.

The election of the Representative Board was held on September 6, 1918. The new Board was composed of mostly union members and the NUPPO was determined to gain control of the Board and its activities. The elected Secretary of the Board, Constable Patterson, stated;

The Representative Board must be leading Union members, so the name of the Representative Board is merely camouflage for the National Union of Police and Prison Officers...Every member of the Board must be a Union member and only Union members' complaints be considered by the Board. I know that the Authorities will say that this is victimisation, but I would refer them to the very old saying 'self preservation is the first law of Nature" (Davies, p.72).

Resentment between Macready and the union's surrogate, the Representative Board, grew. By January 1919 the Commissioner and the Board were dealing with each other only in writing. Macready refused to negotiate with them until the

next election which was scheduled for the end of March 1919. Macready was to prove himself a worthy adversary for the Union. Using the argument of force discipline the Commissioner brought forward a new scheme for this Representative Board. Macready's new plan would split the existing Board into four Boards for the four main ranks of constables, sergeants, inspectors and the senior ranks of superintendent and chief inspector. "As the union leaders were mainly constables, their power was reduced at one stroke. The simple axiom of divide and rule was implemented" (Allen, p.128). The plan was approved by the new Home Secretary, Edward Shortt, who took office in December 1918 and was set to be implemented on April 1, 1919. "Lloyd George...was not about to allow a union to lead the government around by the nose, but the clever Welsh politician knew how to manipulate a situation" (Repetto, p.116).

These measures prompted the union to a show of force. A mass meeting was held in the Albert Hall on January 19, 1919 and a letter of demand was approved to be sent to the Home Secretary. The demands were, as ever, increases in pay and pensions and the recognition of the NUPPO by the government. The Government was alarmed at other issues in the security forces at this same time.

SOLDIERS STRIKE

On January 11, 1919, "the weekly Call...carried the front-page headline 'The Soldiers Strike,'" and stated, "It is natural that the soldiers proclaim their discontent by agitation on matters vitally affecting them as soldiers" (Rothstein, p.90). A union in the military had been fostering underground and had now surfaced. The Soldiers', Sailors and Airmen's Union (SSAU) began circulating handbills in the security services which stated its views were:

improve the status of serving men; to increase pay; to bring about shorter hours of duty; adequate pensions and maintenance for all dependents; prevent victimisation; secure recognition of the Union by the Government and prevent servicemen from being employed as strike-breakers (Englander, p.10).

The Government gazed at a situation with an underground union in the military and spreading mutinies in the forces concerning the sending of troops into Russia to support the "White" forces. Indeed, Lloyd George told President Wilson, at a conference in Paris on January 21 1919, "He felt certain that, if the British tried to send any more troops there (to

Russia), there would be mutiny" (Rothstein, p.103-104).

To allay some of the turbulence concerning the police situation, on March 1, 1919, the Government appointed a committee, under Lord Desborough to enquire into "the method of recruiting for, the conditions of service of, and the rate of pay, pensions and allowances of the Police Forces in England, Wales and Scotland" (Davies, p.79).

Many senior officials felt that this police union was becoming too strong and action should be taken against it. "On 17 March 1919, the Cabinet announced that it had definitely decided not to recognize the union. This decision was elaborated in an order by Macready who threatened to dismiss any Metropolitan policeman who did not leave the union" (Allen, p.139). Macready would make his position clear.

In view of the interference of the National Union of Police and Prison Officers with the discipline of the Service and the inducement to members of the force to withhold their services, the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary of State, calls upon all members of the force to forthwith sever their connection with such union. The Commissioner would point out that any member of the force failing to comply with this direction will be liable to dismissal from the force

(Macready, p.354-355).

Elections for the new representative associations were scheduled and posted in the Police Stations. The Union was clearly against this new scheme. "(I)f three separate Boards of three different ranks were set up, an excellent opportunity would be presented to the Authorities to play off each Board against the other" (Police and Prison Officers' Magazine, June 25th 1919, p.2). The NUPPO moved to stiffen its hold on power. On March 27, 1919, an amendment to the rules of the Union was issued which stated;

To rigidly maintain a true sense of obligation to the public, and to have all differences between Authorities and Members arranged or decided by amicable or conciliatory means, and that in the event of this failing, a ballot vote of all members of the Union be taken, and services not withdrawn unless a majority of two-thirds declare in favour of such withdrawal (Davies, p.80).

The NUPPO had now given itself the provisions for a strike action and had notified the Government and the people of its' power. Macready moved ahead with the new election and the Union announced its intent to boycott this election. One constable, who was also a union official, was dismissed from

the force by Macready for interfering with the new representative elections. The union sought to make a new martyr out of this officer, Constable Spackman. The new Representative Boards took office and Macready's scheme took shape.

STRIKE VOTE

The union applied for a permit to hold a mass meeting at Trafalgar Square. The Home Secretary, Sir Edward Shortt, issued the permit after conferring with Commissioner Macready with the comment, "Let them hang themselves" (Judge, 1968, p.112). The meeting was held on May 4 and, as a result, it was decided to issue a ballot calling for strike authorization from the membership. The ballot with a simply "Yes" or "No" answer, asked the men if they were prepared to strike for; a) Complete recognition of the Police Union, b) Reinstatement of Constable Spackman, c) Immediate increase of pay and pension at scales to be agreed by the Government and the Executive Committee of the Union and d) Total abolition of military control of the Police and Prison Services (Davies, p.84). The union announced the ballot returns on the strike vote, as 44,539 in favor of the strike and 4,324 opposed. The specter

of another strike propelled the government to act.

Prior to the union meeting, the Government set up a committee under Lord Desborough to "consider and report" on the rates of pay, pension and allowances of the Police. After the union vote, the Desborough Committee moved rapidly on its mission. It was clear that a pay raise was to be given and that other reforms would be the result of the Committee's work. On May 28, the Home Secretary announced a substantial pay raise for the Metropolitan Police. He authorized the issuance of a Police Order, by Commissioner Macready, that an officer who failed to report for duty when ordered would be dismissed with the loss of all benefits and no hope of reinstatement (Judge, 1968. p.114-122). The order stated:

It having come to the knowledge of the Commissioner that a movement is on foot to induce the Metropolitan Police to again withdraw from their duty to the State, although the Commissioner is confident that the great majority of the force have no intention of so doing, he considers that, in view of the events of August, 1918, it is necessary for him to make known clearly the consequences that will overtake any officer or man who may be led away by persons who place individual interests before those of the State.

It is to be distinctly understood by all ranks that any officer or man,

of whatever rank, who fails to report in the ordinary course of duty, or when called upon, will be forthwith dismissed from the force. Such officer or man will under no circumstances be permitted to rejoin the Metropolitan Police, and dismissal will result in the loss of all service counting toward pension. The Commissioner will be unable to accept excuses that men are unable to parade or carry on their work owing to intimidation.

Officers and men will, if necessary, defend themselves by all legitimate means if interfered with in the execution of their duty (Macready, p. 364).

This action was further emphasized by a Commissioner's Order, City of London Police, on May 30, which stated that the officers must report for duty or be dismissed and "defend themselves by all legitimate means, if interfered with..." The Order also pointed out that police officers were not "workmen" as defined in the Trades Dispute Act of 1906 (Nott-Bower, p.294). Under the provisions of this Act, the mechanism for settlement of trade disputes was established. But, as the Commissioner pointed out, the Government was not covered by this legislation and any dispute between the Government and the police officers would be exempt from the mechanism provided therein. The Government was beginning to press its campaign against the union.

FOR HE'S A JOLLY GOOD FELLOW

On June 10, 1919, Commissioner Macready issued an invitation to all officers to attend a general meeting with him. He addressed a meeting of several thousand officers in Queen's Hall (for the complete speech see Macready, p. 367-403). He planned to address the meeting in spite of warnings from his superintendents of possible trouble. Macready spoke of the dismissed officer, Spackman, and gave terms for his reinstatement, including tearing up his "union ticket." This caused some excitement and tension. Nevertheless, Macready was able to sway the crowd and convince them of his good intentions toward Spackman and the "rank and file" of the Force. Of course, the upcoming pay raise strengthened his position. Some writers have characterized Macready's speech as "ill-judged," losing for him the tacit support of many of the rank and file. His remark about the "union ticket" was treated as an "affront to trade unionism" (Allen, p.140).

However, since the majority of officers rose to sing "For he's a jolly good fellow," it is doubtful that Macready viewed the speech as a defeat (Judge, 1968, p.124). On the contrary, Macready, in his autobiography, stated;

The men then rose, and the cheers which rang through the hall when I had finished...told me that the game was won. I was more than repaid for the insults of the past weary months on the part of Marston, Hayes and Co. by the knowledge that I had gained the confidence of my men, and perhaps there was the suspicion of a quaver in my voice as I thanked the audience for their hearty cheers (p.403).

The original organizer of the NUPPO, John Syme, was opposed to a second strike. In an article for the Police Review, in June 1919, Syme wrote that he thought the strike would be beaten in two days. He stated that Union lacked a strike fund and described that strike vote as "an absolute farce." Syme warned that the authorities were better prepared for any emergency and that the alleged support of the organized labor was untrue. "There is something wrong somewhere ...The Police Union must be saved-but the Police Union will be of no advantage to the men if its governing body is...unjust and autocratic" (Judge, 1968, p.128).

The Government was pushing ahead with its plans and the Desborough Committee was finishing its hearings. The Committee was described as;

It lost no time in tackling the difficult questions referred to it. It held thirty-four sittings, took an enormous amount of evidence, including the fullest

representation of the views of the men themselves, of whom eighty-seven witnesses were heard from the Metropolitan and City Police, Counties and Boroughs of England and Wales...The award of the Committee was received with enthusiasm by the general body of the Police; it soon became known as "The Policemen's Charter"...it conceded to them more than they had hardly dared to hope, and they would have been only too ready to accept it joyfully then, as they did so very soon after. But of course it was not welcomed by the National Union of Police and Prison Officers, who knew that it would prove a deathblow to their subversive aims, and they at once determined to try and counteract its effect (Nott-Bower, p.293).

THE POLICEMAN'S CHARTER

With the completion of the first phase of the Desborough Committee's work, a report was issued on July 1, 1919. This Report made sixteen principal recommendations (see Desborough, 1919, p.18-19). These recommendations were formulated into legislation and the government introduced the Police Bill on July 8, 1919. The Act was passed on August 1, 1919 and received the Royal Assent on August 15, 1919. This legislation was to become known as "The Policeman's Charter." This legislation provided a substantial pay increase for the police and that "all ranks should be given a house or quarters rent

free or be given allowances in lieu." The Act also provided for a Police Federation, which would be divided into three branches, one each for constables, sergeants and inspectors; and that the Police Federation would elect a central conference and committee.

The Bill further stated that, "it shall not be lawful for a member of a police force to become, or after the expiration of one month from the passing of this Act to be, a member of any trade union...if any member of a police force continues...he shall forfeit all pension rights and be disqualified for being thereafter employed in any police force" (Allen, p.141). The government announced that it would standardize police pay on a national basis and it also made it a crime, subject to two years imprisonment, for "any person causing disaffection in the police" (Judge, 1968, p.130). The Act specified, "It shall be lawful for the Secretary of State to make regulations as to the government, mutual aid, pay, allowances, pensions, clothing, expenses and conditions of service of the members of all police forces within England and Wales, and every police authority shall comply with the regulations so made" (Police Act, 1919, 4,1). Additionally, a "Police Council was established as central consultative and advisory body before which regulations were to be laid"

(Critchley, p.194).

The end of the NUPPO was near. This was the first legal repression of a trade union in the United Kingdom since 1825 (Allen, p. 141). The union saw this as fight for survival. "We hereby challenge the government...and leave it to Father Time to prove that they have apparently misjudged the measure of our worth" (Browne, p. 316). The police had secured by legislation their "right to confer." Additionally the Home Secretary, Sir Edward Shortt, announced that the new pay would be retroactive to April 1919, entitling each officer to four months back pay. Shortt announced that rather than waiting for a "lengthy process of calculating arrears...they (each officer) would be paid L10 on account immediately" (Judge, 1968, p.131).

The forces around the country were watching the situation in London. One force which was supportive of a strike was Liverpool. This force had "a long history of grievances...grievances which the City fathers had done nothing to put right, but on the contrary had recently exacerbated...When you had a wife to keep ...the Liverpool City Police Force was no bed of roses" (Sellwood, p.68-69). Of all the forces that made up the Police Service, Liverpool was

considered the worst to serve in. "I wanted to go to London and join the Met, but the wife wanted to stay near the family. So I joined the (Liverpool) City force. For the first few years it was a horror" (Smith).

THE CALL

On July 31, 1919 the executive committee of the NUPPO issued a statement to the membership:

Your executive committee has, therefore, decided upon making use of the final argument, and this statement should be accepted as the official notification that members of the National Union of Police and Prison Officers WITHDRAW THEIR SERVICES IMMEDIATELY, such withdrawal to remain effective until the gross injustice imposed by the provisions of Sections I, II and III of the Police Bill are remedied, and full and frank recognition of our Union is conceded (Allen, p. 142).

A second police strike was on. The call went out to the members. The first refusals for duty began at 9.45 p.m., on July 31, 1919, when the night duty tour paraded. "But now, with generous pay secured, with all their more important grievances remedied, and with means provided for

representation" (Nott-Bower, p.296), the rank and file were not "to walk." The government was in a much improved position than in 1918.

Contingency plans for use of the military and the Special Constabulary had been prepared for months. Military detachments were identified and had their orders. The Special Constables had been instructed to be prepared for action. Both Commissioners Macready and Nott-Bower, of the Metropolitan and City of London Forces respectively, reissued their orders concerning dismissal for strike action. Both informed the Home Secretary that they would not reinstate any of the strikers and, if ordered to do so by higher authority, would resign.

The union officials were trying to gather support from the other trade unions. But this support was limited to messages of goodwill and support. The cause was floundering. By August 2, 1919 Macready saw the battle as over and issued a Special Police Order which stated, "During the last two days the Force has passed through a crisis from which it has emerged with credit to itself...the attempt which has been made to seduce the Metropolitan Police...has failed." Thanking the Force for its loyalty, he assured the men of his support of "their interests and their welfare." This Special Police

Order was issued with the Police Orders of the day, August 2, 1919, which detailed the dismissal of more than 400 officers who were identified as refusing duty or withdrawing from duty. This order followed the instant dismissal, in Police Orders on August 1, 1919, of all of the officer, more than 700, who had initially refused duty. Macready, true to his word, dismissed every man from the force who followed the Union call. Similar Police Orders were issued by the other forces dismissing all of the strikers.

UNSWERVING LOYALTY

As the next several days progressed, the union's situation deteriorated. On August 7, 1919, the Representative Board of the City of London Police issued a statement of support to its Commissioner. The statement repudiated the actions of the striking officers and stated the "unswerving loyalty and firm determination to carry out our duties as policemen...the Commissioner...can rely upon us all standing firm at our posts, thereby safeguarding the interests of the City of London, and the community as a whole" (Nott-Bower, p.298). Only 58 officers of the City Police, out of a total of 970, went on strike. The turnout at the Metropolitan was as

disappointing for Union. A total of 1,156 officers out of a force of 18,200 answered the call.

The situation outside Metropolitan London was different. In Birmingham a total of 120 officers, out a force of 1,320, struck. A leaflet was issued by the Birmingham branch of the NUPPO setting out their case. It stated;

This is not solely a policemen's fight but an effort to safeguard the elementary rights of citizenship and freedom...Our Union is about to be smashed, ruthlessly, once and for all...This Union is, up to now, a perfectly legal organisation; but if once the present Police Bill becomes law, you will witness the unprecedented occurrence of a properly constituted TRADE UNION BEING WIPED OUT By Act of Parliament! If that happens, a serious blow will have been struck at Trades Unionism in the country (Shackleton, p.72).

Over half the force went on strike in Liverpool, a total of 954 officers, out of force of 1874, struck. The neighboring cities of Bootle, where 63 officers out of a total of 77 struck, and Birkenhead, where 114 officers out of a total of 180 struck, were the worst effected. Rioting broke out in these three cities, commonly referred to as the Merseyside District. It took several thousand of His Majesty's troops, four tanks, one battleship, two destroyers and several

thousand special constables to restore order. The rioting in Merseyside was so severe that "there were bayonet charges and bloodshed" (Critchley, 1978, p.189). Several hundred persons were arrested and damage was reported in excess of L 122,000 (estimated at approximately \$15,000,000, today). "In all about 400 shops were looted...During the looting one of the rioters was fatally shot while making an attack on the troops" (Mackenzie, p.22). This was also the last time that troops were used in the mainland United Kingdom for public disorders.

The strike was over. The police remained loyal, more than 96% of the officers refused the call. It is somewhat difficult to understand this situation when the union had claimed 44,539 of its members had voted in favor of strike action. There have been various claims of voting fraud in the union's assertions. But since only 2,366 officers, out of a total of 60,000 officers, went on strike, there must be some answer other than the union's ballot manipulation. The Police Act of 1919 is seen by most as the abrogating factor in the strike. "It's marvelous...what a ten-pound note will do," said one striker of his fellow officers who did not strike (Judge, 1968, p.151). The Union Secretary, Hayes, would later write, "they failed at the last ditch when the five and ten pound notes were put into their hands with the promise of more...Thus was

their birthright sold for a mess of pottage" (Hayes, p.24).

Macready saw it differently. In writing to the Editor of The Times Sir Nevil stated:

the real cause of the strike of July 1919 was the passage of the Police Act...under the provisions of which the present Police Federation was established and men were prohibited from belonging to a trade union or any similar organization. This was the death blow to the National Union of Police and Prison Officers, which had endeavoured, under the nominal leadership of John [sic] Marston, to dominate and impose its will on all Police Forces throughout the country...Marston and a few others found employment, I understand, at the Soviet House, the home of Russian activities in London...(Judge, 1968, p.195).

In commenting on this second strike the Police Review, in its editorial stated:

...the police, by an overwhelming majority, refused to desert their posts and hand the country over to mob rule, though they had joined in their tens of thousand...The disaffected ones have, by their own act, dismissed themselves from the service, for it is nonsense to talk about Labour coming to the rescue of the police strikers when it is clear that the great majority of the police themselves do not approve the strike policy. The tail, however violent, is not going to wag the dog. All the same, a heavy burden of responsibility rests on

those who misled their comrades by statements and assurances which have since been discovered to have had little foundation in fact...(Judge, 1968, p.151).

All of the strikers were dismissed from service, with a loss in benefits and pensions as promised in the Home Office's position and Police Orders. No striker was ever to serve as a police officer, in Great Britain, again. The idea of the dutiful constable was reinforced. A Punch magazine cartoon of the day, titled FAITH RESTORED, showed a gentleman admiringly looking up to a constable, saying, "I was afraid for a moment that my idol has feet of clay." The NUPPO slowly faded with time. Over the years calls for reinstatement of the strikers were raised, most vocally by John Hayes. Hayes who was the Secretary of the NUPPO, and an ex sergeant in the Met, was elected as a Member of Parliament in 1920. Hayes became the chief apologist for the strikers.

In 1921, Hayes published a lengthy paper on the strikes (Some observations on the Police Strikes 1918 & 1919). This was the beginning of a public relations campaign to win reinstatement of the strikers. This campaign led to a Parliamentary Commission, with Sir William Mackenzie as Chairman. In its final report, which was issued in 1924, the Committee stated, "we desire to make it clear...that we do not

wish to appear in any way to condone the Strike of 1919...A majority of our number hold the view that the men concerned should not be re-instated or re-appointed (Mackenzie, p.33).

The Union eventually changed its name to the "Association of Police Strikers." In 1958, the association was disbanded by disposing of its total assets, £30. The Police Federation was firmly established and grew with time. Commissioner Macready had succeeded in destroying the Union and cleansing the ranks of the dissidents.

Macready was to leave the Force in April 1920, after only twenty months as the Commissioner. Never one to avoid difficult assignments, Macready took over as the Commander-in-Chief of the forces in Ireland. He now was to command more than 60,000 troops in Ireland, three times as many as he commanded at Scotland Yard. However, the problems in Ireland were more than three times those of the Metropolitan Police. He had succeeded in crushing a union. He would not to succeed in crushing the cause of Irish independence.

CHAPTER 7

THE DESBOROUGH REPORT AND AFTER

The second report of the Desborough Committee was issued in January 1920. This report, which made 35 principal recommendations on the reorganization of the Police Service, "opened up a new era for the Police Service as a whole. Here, indeed, was what amounted to a new conception of the Police as a Service, an integrated system, rather than a collection of separate Forces each concerned with its merely local requirement and personnel" (Dixon, p.22).

The Committee in its various recommendations called for the expansion of the powers of the Home Secretary in the setting of wages, recruitment of officers, consolidation of forces, retirement, pensions, promotions and disciplinary matters (see Desborough, 1920, p.23-25). The Report stated, "The natural development by which police administration has come more and more to be a matter of national rather than

purely local concern, makes it, as we have pointed out, desirable that there should be more uniformity in the conditions of service of the Police, and consequently increased supervision and control by the Central Government" (Desborough, 1920, p.25).

The Desborough Committee and the reports it issued are viewed as a cornerstone of the police service in the United Kingdom today. In actuality, the Desborough documents are composed of three separate documents. The first is Minutes of Evidence, a transcript of the hearing and testimony of the witnesses. This document is replete with the testimony of officers and the conditions they and their families were living in because of the wages and working conditions of the various forces.

One of the officers, George Miles, gave forceful testimony, which was often quoted. He stated: "In the past a policeman has been paid no more than an ordinary labourer: consequently, he has been valued accordingly ...There is no doubt we are now suffering from our lowly origin. There is no comparison between what is expected from the policeman of today and the policeman of old." Another officer, Herbert Waight, stated: "we have not had enough money. In all branches

of labour, if I may so put it, they have regular times, but a policeman has any time. He may have duties two or three times in one week, which means double sets of meals...I could formulate a lot more cases" (Minutes of Evidence, q. 3563 and 463).

Based upon the testimony of the various witnesses and other evidence presented to it, a report was issued in two parts. The first on July 1, 1919 and the second on January 1, 1920. Part One of the report was the basis for the legislation which was passed as the Police Act, 1919. This report gave a lengthy examination of the Police Service, which it found to contain "nearly 250 separate Police Forces, varying from the Metropolitan Police, with a total authorised strength of 21,500 men, to...small Borough Forces of 12 men or less" (Desborough, 1919, para.3). The Committee found that the officers in these forces served "under materially different rates of pay and other conditions...these differences have very materially contributed to the unrest and dissatisfaction which have prevailed of late in the Police" (para.3).

The Committee also rejected the idea of nationalization for the Police as "foreign to the constitutional principle...(for) the preservation of law and order...(and)

prejudice the intimate relations between the Police and the localities they serve" (para.17). However, the Committee did find "that the Police administration would be more economical and efficient if a greater measure of centralisation and standardisation of conditions of service could be introduced" (para.18).

The Committee also examined the pay and pension benefits of the various force and found, "In view of the evidence which we heard as to the work of the Police and the high standards of qualifications required, we are satisfied that a policeman has responsibilities and obligations which are peculiar to his calling and distinguish him from other civil servants and municipal employees, and we consider the Police entitled thereby to special consideration in regards to their rate of pay and pensions" (para.28). In fact, out of the sixteen principal recommendations this report made, fourteen specifically dealt with increases and standardisation of pay and pension benefits. (See Desborough, 1918, p.18-19) In advocating the standardisation which the Committee recommended, the Home Secretary would be given power "to fix the standard scale of pensionable pay...and...should have the power to withhold the whole or any part of the grant from the Exchequer..." (para.58-59).

The first part of this report was issued quickly, by July 1, 1919, to allow for the submission of the Police Act, 1919. It is interesting to note that the bill, as introduced, had as its first paragraph the foundation of the Police Federation. This ranking shows the high priority that the Government placed on the destruction of the NUPPO. The further standardisation of the forces were placed in section 4, paragraph (1) of the statute. It stated:

It shall be lawful for the Secretary of State to make regulations as to the government, mutual aid, pay, allowances, pensions, clothing, expenses and conditions of service of the members of all police forces within England and Wales, and every police authority shall comply with the regulations so made.

The second report, also went into great detail on pay and pensions, recommended greatly increased powers and responsibilities for the Home Secretary. Among his new powers, the Home Secretary was to form a branch, known as the Police Office, to deal with all questions of police administration. The Central Government now had one focal point for all police matters, including funding. He was also to be empowered to merge all borough forces with under 50,000 population into the county forces and no new forces could be established without his approval. The Secretary was allowed to "group" smaller

forces for administrative purposes. The dismissal of any Chief Constable needed the approval of the Secretary and a standard disciplinary code was to be issued by his Police Office. Even the standardisation of police uniforms was now within the power of central government (see Desborough, 1920, p.23-25).

The report was to be not only a "Policemen's Charter" for the individual police officer, but another building block in the centralization of the Police Service and the growing power of the Home Office. In concluding the Report stated:

(T)hat the numerous recommendations we have made for the improvement of the Police Service as a whole must not be regarded as indicating any reflection on the local authorities...The natural development by which police administration has come more and more to be a matter of national rather than purely local concern, makes it, as we have pointed out, desirable that there should be more uniformity in the conditions of service of the Police, and consequently increased supervision and control by the Central Government. This has been recognised by the new grant...(of) up to a full half of the total expenditure on police purposes...In making recommendations for this purpose we have been guided...by a desire for the improvement of the police service as a whole rather than by any unfavorable opinion of the administration of individual police authorities (Ibid, p.25).

The central government had succeeded in using the dual emergencies of the World War and the Police Strikes to initiate new legislation to further strengthen its hold on the Police Service. The government through the Desborough Committee and the Police Act, 1919 continued the centralization of authority in the Home Office, a process which was begun by Sir Robert Peel in setting up the Police Committee in 1828 and the passage of the Police Act, 1829.

THE TREND CONTINUES

The Government tried to consolidate its powers over the Police Service in the period between the two World Wars. In an attempt to force consolidation of smaller forces, a key recommendation of the Desborough Committee, a bill was introduced in Parliament in 1922, The Economy (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill. This law would have empowered the Home Secretary, in the interest of economy, to order the amalgamation of forces. The bill was dropped after much opposition.

Several other attempts at empowering the Home Secretary

authority over the Police Service were undertaken in this period. These attempts all met with substantial opposition and were routed. Speaking against the amalgamation of police forces, one Member of Parliament stated, "One thing I would ask the Home Secretary to avoid, and that is the more centralisation of authority. Let us remember that the movement towards liberty means decentralisation" (Emsley, 1991, p.153). Once again the Home Office would need a national emergency to overcome the opposition to the centralisation of its police powers. That opportunity came in the beginning of World War II.

In 1939, with war in Europe on the horizon, the Government passed Defence of the Realm Regulations. These regulations gave widespread power to the Central Government and military to take actions necessary under the wartime emergencies. Under Regulation 39, the Home Secretary was given wide temporary powers over the various Chief Constables. He could now give direct orders to the various forces, including amalgamation (added by the Emergency Powers (Defense) Act, 1942), for the prosecution of the war. One of the first orders issued under this regulation was the dividing of England and Wales into eleven regions, with a Regional Commissioner in charge. "(A)n unconsciously ironic echo of Cromwell's 'little

poor invention," the establishment of the military Major Generals (Ascoli, p.247).

The Home Office now had direct control over the Police Service, if even temporary. The government moved forward quickly with its plans and in 1943, for the defense of the realm, ordered the amalgamation of twenty-six forces on the southern coast of England into six forces. These amalgamations, while not without opposition, were considered "a great success" (Emsley, 1991, p.159).

The changes were so successful that a new post war government, the Labour Party, passed the Police Act, 1946. This legislation provided for the forced amalgamation of forty-five borough police forces. When this legislation took effect in April 1947, four other forces voluntarily agreed to be amalgamated.

With these amalgamations, the number of total forces in England and Wales was decreased to 131. A remarkable decrease of fifty-seven forces, over thirty percent of the 188 forces examined by the Desborough Committee (Desborough, 1919, para. 8-11). Several other attempts at amalgamation of forces were successful and by 1960 the number of separate forces was

reduced to one hundred and twenty-five (Critchley, p.245).

Events would again assist the Home Office in the 1960's. Amidst the concerns of rising crime and the control and constitutional position of the Police Service, the government appointed a Royal Commission, chaired by Sir Henry Willink. "The fundamental question which the Royal Commission found itself having to confront was where the ultimate control of the provincial police should reside" (Emsley, 1991, p.162). The Commission was instructed to specifically consider:

- (1) the constitution and functions of local police authorities;
- (2) the status and accountability of members of police forces, including chief officers of police;
- (3) the relationship of the police with the public and the means of ensuring that complaints by the public against the police are effectively dealt with; and
- (4) the board principles which should govern the remuneration of the constable, having regard to the nature and extent of police duties and responsibilities and the need to attract and retain an adequate number of recruits with the proper qualifications (Critchley, p.275).

Thus was created the platform for the advocates of

centralization to conduct an examination of the existing Police Service, with all its faults. The Commission's final report was issued in May 1962. This report found that "the creation of a national police service...(was not) constitutionally objectionable or political dangerous'; however, it believed that 'there is much value in a system of local forces' and concluded that the best policy was to develop the existing system in accordance with the demands of the modern, fast changing world" (Emsley, 1991, p.163).

This was a significant departure from the findings of the Desborough Committee's statements on the nationalization of the Police Service, finding it "foreign to the constitutional principle...for the preservation of law and order" (Desborough, 1919, para.17). This departure marked a milestone in government philosophy and another step toward centralization of the Service. Not all on Willing Committee agreed that nationalization of the Police Service was not the "best policy." One member, Dr. Gathered, dissented from the majority and proposed the creation of "The Royal English and Welsh Police."

Within eighteen months of the issuance of the report, the Government introduced the Police Act, 1964. This bill gave

sweeping powers to the Home Secretary to promote the efficiency of the forces. The Secretary was given powers to call for reports from the chief constables, to approve the appointment of the senior officers in the various forces, to compel the retirement of inefficient chief constables, to order cooperation between forces, to provide common service arrangements and to amalgamate police areas. Local police authorities were empowered to maintain "an adequate and efficient force, properly housed and equipped, and the appointment, and if necessary removal, of the chief constable" (Critchley, p.294). The Chief Constables of each of the forces "were to have powers of appointment, discipline, and promotion over the subordinate ranks" (Ibid).

The powers and responsibilities of the Home Secretary concerning the Police Service were clearly enumerated. His direct, centralized control of the provincial police forces had been accomplished. "Thus another milestone in police history, comparable in magnitude to the events of 1919 and 1920, had been passed" (Ibid, p.295). The Home Secretary moving quickly in the use of his new powers, announced a proposal to amalgamate 117 forces to 49 forces. His proposal took effect over several years and the total force reduction was achieved by 1970. For reasons of economy, this number was

further amalgamated to 41 forces, under the Local Government Act, 1972.

Today the Police Service of England and Wales is composed of 41 provincial forces, the Metropolitan Police and the City of London Police. The 43 forces are commonly referred to as the Home Office forces. These forces were further examined in 1993 by a Commission (Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards) headed by Sir Patrick Sheehy. Sheehy conducted an in depth examination of the Police Service in the entire United Kingdom. The sections of his report which dealt with the forces in England and Wales were incorporated into a Government paper, Police Reform: A Police Service for the Twenty-First Century. This report, by the Home Office, sets the pattern for future legislation. This paper states;

10.3 This pattern (of present police forces) is partly the result of historical accident and the merging of organisations which were established haphazardly over more than 100 years. It is also partly the result of re-organisations instigated by government to establish police forces which are large enough to provide an effective response to contemporary policing problems and have the flexibility to deal with varying demands. The result today is a patchwork quilt of forces of widely varying sizes and types.

10.5 Value for money and efficiency are fundamental to the Government proposals for the police service. It is questionable

whether 43 separate organisations are now needed to run police operations...

- 10.8 The Government considers that for all these reasons it may be desirable in the long term to reduce the number of police forces. However, there is at present no objective basis for deciding centrally what the precise number of forces should be, nor which individual forces should be amalgamated.

The strategy for the future centralization of the Police Service has been laid. Accordingly, the departure of English policing from its traditional roots, which was begun by Sir Robert Peel in the establishment of the Metropolitan Police in 1829, has continued. The revolution of the "New Police" to a centralized instrument of the Central Government will continue.

SECTION III

BOSTON

CHAPTER 1

The Foundation

"Since the United States were originally colonies of Great Britain, it is natural that early police conditions in America were similar to those in England...When the American cities were first settled...(they were) placed in the care of a single paid night-watchman, whose duty it was to...notify the constable in case of fire or disorder" (Fuld, p.25). So the American colonies inherited their early policing systems of constable-watch from the motherland. The first records of policing in Boston show the establishment of a Watch in April 1631.

A Watch, by order of "The Court," was to "be set at sunset, and if any person fire off a piece after the watch is set, he shall be fined forty shillings, or be whipped" (Savage, p.11). The Court was the governing body of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and Boston. The Court was composed of

the Governor, Deputy Governor and some other officials. By 1634, a Town government for Boston was organized and one first act of the new Selectmen was the appointment of one William Chesebrough as Constable.

They strengthened the organization of the Watch in 1636, when a regulation was pasted that "upon pryvate warning, it was agreed y there salbe a watch taken up and gone around with from the first of the second month next ye summertime from sunne sett an houre after ye beating of ye drumbe, upon penaltie for every one wanting therein twelve pence every night" (Ibid, p.12). This Watch, with varying changes, lasted until 1853. The Watch in Boston was to suffer the same problems and complaints of their counterparts in Great Britain.

In 1789, several citizens complained of the Watch's performance, after several burglaries. "It is high time the watchmen were overhauled; they have been asleep since New Year's. The Captains are generally men in their prime, aged from ninety to one hundred years, and the crew only average about fourscore, and so we have the advantage of their age and experience, at least the robbers do" (Russell, 1975, p.28). In an attempt to improve the operation of the Watch, the State

Legislature, in 1796, passed a law both recognizing and reorganizing the Boston Watch. With this reorganization the Constable was charged with the oversight of the Watch and "to see that all disorders and disturbances are suppressed, to examine all persons walking abroad after ten o'clock at night, who they have reason to suspect, to enter houses of ill-fame, to suppress disturbances, and to arrest all violators of law or disturbers of the peace. Watchmen are to walk their rounds once an hour to prevent damage by fire and to preserve order" (Savage, p.45). Additionally, five watch houses were set up around the Town of Boston. Each of these houses was to be staffed by one Constable and six watchmen.

POLICE

By 1810, Boston had grown to more than 33,000 people and in another attempt to organize the watch better the Town appointed one Police Inspector and two Assistant Police officers to oversee the Watch. The Watch was consolidated into three divisions, with a total of seventeen constables and thirty watchmen. These and subsequent reorganizations did little to quiet the criticisms of the Watch. Several leading citizens complained that "They care for nothing but their pay, and are sure to get that; give us a private watch" (Ibid,

p.60). This disapproval of the Watch system was not limited to Boston.

In a critique of the Watch system in New York, Charles Christian, a Magistrate, published A Brief Treatise on the Police of the City of New York. Christian argued that the Constable-Watch system was inadequate for the growing City, dealing with crime on an ex post facto basis. He mirrored the arguments of his English predecessor, Patrick Colquhoun in A Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis, calling for the creation of a preventive police force. Christian realized the difficulties in establishing such a force in a country proud of its freedom from arbitrary government. "(F)or the laws that guards [sic] the rights and liberties of an honest man, are applicable in their forms, to the vicious that live in a constant state of open or secret hostility against both'. This theme of incompatibility of republican institutions with a police force which resembled a "standing army" was to be heard again and again in discussions of police reorganizations in subsequent decades" (Richardson, 1961, p.37).

A CITY

The continued growth of Boston forced a change in the

government. In 1822, the state legislature passed an act of incorporation for the City of Boston. This was the first chartering of a city in Massachusetts. "And Boston had finally to decide upon the need for 'alterations in the present government of the police" (Lane, p.3). With the new city charter the office of mayor was created and in May 1823, Josiah Quincy was elected the first Mayor of Boston.

Quincy moved quickly on the issue of policing the City. Under a statute of 1801, the first Selectman of Boston and later the Mayor, was appointed the "Superintendent of Police." The new Mayor knowing the duties and responsibilities of his office in a rapidly growing city were overwhelming, passed legislation which abolished the office of Superintendent of Police and created the new office of City Marshal. This office would be a full time position devoted to the policing of the city.

Benjamin Pollard was appointed the first City Marshal and was to supervisor the activities of the constables and watch employed by the city. The Marshal was to supervise a number of city activities in addition to the watch. In writing on his duties Pollard stated that the police were divided into two branches, the first dealing with health and the second with

the general police.

The second division of the municipal police comprises the misdemeanors and irregularities affecting the safety, the peace, and convenience and comfort of the community. In this branch may be included the violation of the license laws, the infraction of the several ordinances, regulating the streets...the sale and stands of wood and bark--woodsawyers--unauthorized fire works.. .firing of loaded arms--unlawful games and plays--paving of streets and cellar doors...and various other subjects (Lane, p.19).

Quincy also moved quickly to organize and push "a strong police" into new areas. The West end of the city was known for "houses of infamous character" and other vices. The mayor organized a posse and with the police conducted a series of raids on the district. Numerous arrests were made for a variety of violations and several establishments were closed. Quincy also used this incident to cancel a number of liquor licenses and to permanently reduce the overall number of licenses available.

The Mayor campaign against vice was taken up by others in the city. During the summer of 1825 rioting broke out in Ann Street which was described as "disgraceful...taking place almost every night by gangs who broke windows, damaged

furniture and destroyed 'several small houses'" (O'Connor, p.43). These attacks against the houses of the "sisterhood" culminated in the destruction of one infamous building, the "Beehive." Although the rioters claimed virtuous motives, Quincy moved in with his force of constables and restored order. Thereafter, the Mayor, in a preventive move, stationed six constables in this "Irish district from ten o'clock at night until morning in an attempt to keep the peace" (Ibid).

Oddly, the Mayor declined to take any actions when a riot broke out at the Boston Theater. "A fearful riot occurred at Boston Theater. Edmund Kean (an actor)...was driven out, the house and furniture nearly destroyed...5,000 people, more or less, connected with the riot" (Savage, p.65). Quincy stated that as the Mayor of the City he lacked authority to act. "His job was only to take care that 'all laws for the government of the city are executed' and riot was an offense against the state" (Lane, p.25).

The growth of the population and political changes lead to new leadership in the City. General Harrison Otis succeeded Quincy as Mayor. Otis, as a Congressman, had introduced legislation to place a twenty-dollar tax on all certificates of naturalization to prevent "wild Irishmen and others" from

being allowed to vote. He sought to prevent these "hordes of wild Irishmen and other disorderly people" from destroying our government (O'Connor, p.28). Otis short reign as Mayor did not win him reelection, and his successor, Charles Wells, noted the situation of the City in his inauguration. Wells noted "that some measures may be taken to suppress the dangerous riots, routs, and tumultuous assemblies in and about Board Street." In response the City ordered "that the committee on the city watch be instructed to consider the expediency of providing a more extensive watch than now exists, and by paying them more wages get a more efficient class of men" (Lane, p.28). These recommendations were followed and the Watch was increased both in numbers, from thirty-six to fifty-two, and in wages. These changes, however, were not enough to quell the dissatisfaction with the Watch or the disorders in the street.

THE COVENANT

Within a year of these reforms several street disorders had caused concerns of the ruling classes and these were to multiply. Anti-Irish sentiment was spreading in Boston with calls of Popish religion and conspiracies (for a detailed discussion of the Irish in Boston, see O'Connor). In response

to these agitations a crowd gathered, on August 11, 1834, at the Ursuline convent in Charlestown. The crowd smashed their way into the convent and, after ordering the nuns and students to leave, set fire to the building. No officials interfered with the mob's actions and several fire companies that responded were accused of adding to the carnage.

The Mayor and the leading Protestant citizens and newspaper condemned these actions, but rumors of an Irish reprisal spread fear throughout the city. Mayor Lyman, knew the police forces at his disposal would be no match for what was rumored to be "twenty thousand Irishmen" coming for revenge. He called out the militia units in the city, hired a considerable force of special constables and arranged for the posse comitatus to be called up. These precautions proved unnecessary. The warnings by Bishop Fenwick of Boston to his flock proved sufficient to restrain their actions.

The burning of the convent and fear of a terrible riot was sufficient to force both the State and City governments to act. The riot act of Massachusetts, largely copied on those acts of the mother country, England, was amended to give the Mayor and Alderman in Boston the power to "read the riot act" and the authority to deal with any situation arising from the

reading. Additionally, the City's Board of Aldermen passed the necessary legislation and "ordered the mayor be authorized to establish in addition to the usual watch a strong and efficient body of patrol and stationary police, for the preservation of good order during the night...and to establish such rules and regulations respecting the same as may be deemed expedient" (Lane, p.31). Unfortunately, due to the increased cost of this night police, the measure never took effect and the disorder and riot in the streets was to continue.

Within several weeks of the city's failure to arrange financing for additional policing resources, a major riot occurred on the event of an abolitionist speech by William Lloyd Garrison. Large crowds had gathered in front of the Liberator, an abolitionist newspaper. Garrison was scheduled to give a speech in the city the following day. Disturbances broke out and the Mayor and the City Marshal went to the scene to try to quiet the crowd. The Mayor knew he had no resources available, since the Watch would not come on duty till the night. The Mayor upon arriving at the scene, "cap in hand, almost on his knees, entreating the men who were his social companions to have the kindness to obey the laws." The Mayor was no match for the rioters, and Garrison was seized and

nearly hung. The Mayor himself was roughed up and his office stormed. The entire incident was looked out as another shameful example of "a lamentable lack of police resources" (Ibid, p.32).

CHAPTER 2

THE PREVENTIVE POLICE

The penurious city government still did not see the need for increased expenditures for police resources. That decision would quickly come back to haunt them. The friction between the Catholic Irish immigrants and the Protestant WASP of the city was to surface in a rather unlikely situation. On June 11, 1837, an Irish funeral procession continuing on Broad Street, in the Irish section, clashed with a volunteer company of firemen, returning from an alarm. The situation, which started as a fist fight, quickly mushroomed as fire companies, and others, from all over Boston responded to the aid of their brother firemen. On the Irish side, other immigrants quickly emptied out of the tenements along the route. Within a relatively short period more than fourteen thousand were engaged in this disorder. Shops were looted, tenements destroyed and wide spread damage was inflicted on the Broad Street area. For the first time in history the militia was called out. Mayor Eliot was able to call up a regiment of

cavalry, the National Lancers, and eight hundred soldiers of the militia, with fixed bayonets, to restore order (O'Connor, p.49). While some in the city government blamed the riot on the Irish for "retaining their national ways," Mayor Eliot moved to reorganize both the fire fighting arrangements in the city and the policing of the city.

Mayor Eliot, in an address to the City Council, called for the creation of a new class of officer to combat the spreading violence and disorder in the city. Eliot stated that the existing system of police basically consisted of a handful of constables and that the system, Constable-Watch, was more adapted to the situation in the city of half a century before. The Mayor called for an officer who would be there to prevent crimes. "(T)he use of armed militia was dangerous as well as slow" the Mayor stated "the prevention of an evil is far easier than the application of the remedy " (Lane, p. 35).

The Council Committee reported most favorable on the Mayor proposal and stated, "It is intended to imitate, as far as may be, the system of London, were [sic] a similar patrol is established, and is found to be of advantage in various ways besides the enforcement of laws" (Ibid). The Committee's plan, however, while creating this new class of officers

maintained the existing system of the Watch. Under its plan the City would create these officers under the control of the municipality to act as full-time officer for the prevention of trouble or crime. Unlike constables and the Sheriff their would not work for fees, but would be salaried at a given rate per day.

This concept of the need for a preventive force was not restricted to Boston. Philadelphia and New York were also experiencing similar movements and discussions. In New York, the Board of Aldermen presented a report, Plan of a Preventive Police, which called for the creation of one department, a paid preventive police force, to be responsible for the entire city. This London styled force was to be known as "City Policemen" (Richardson, 1961, p.66). While many had previously expressed misgivings about the European style uniformed police and their intrusion on the liberty of the people, little opposition was raised to this new plan. "No real objection to any of these principles was offered in 1837, although the earlier reformation of the fire department had raised a storm...But the reformation of the police raised no such problems; once the fiscal conservation of the council was overcome, its proposals passed smoothly on to the General Court for the necessary legislation" (Lane, p.35).

THE NEW POLICE

This lack of attention and general indifference to the problems of policing was apparent in the passage of the enabling legislation. Without notice in the press, the law was passed, April 15, 1838, allowing the City of Boston to appoint policemen with all the powers of a constable, excluding the civil powers. Quickly afterwards, the City appointed six officers at a salary of two dollars a day. These officers were to work fulltime, during the day and were assigned to the Marshal for whatever duties as be required. Shortly thereafter, at his inaugural address, Mayor Eliot was happy to announce, "The public peace has been...uninterrupted during the past year, and...the reputation of the city has suffered no such blow as was inflicted on it the previous years...Great pains have been taken...to prevent the violation of the laws and ordinances" (Ibid, p.39).

These new police would be useful for the growing City of Boston. Her triple problems of crime, immigration and growth would be great challenges to this force. Boston was growing at a remarkable rate. In 1848, the Mayor stated, "Railroads have changed the character and destiny of Boston--our narrow streets are thronged with a population that was never

anticipated, and our marts with men of all nations and languages" (Ibid, p.53). This was not the only official reference to the railroads and population change. In the Common Council's report, Report on the Watch and Police Department, December 5, 1850, the Council observed:

In former times the Night Watch with a small constabulary force, were quite sufficient to keep the peace...But the rapid development of the system of railroads and of the means of communication with all parts of Europe, have brought among us great numbers...

The failure of the old system to meet the want of the new state of things gave rise to the establishment of the Day and Night Police.

The City is growing rapidly - and it is notorious that the increase of crime outstrips the growth of the City...(Bacon, pp.483-484).

Besides the domestic expansion of the population, Boston was a hub for immigration, especially Irish. The City was accustomed to the arrival of 4,000 to 5,000 Irish immigrants a year for most of the 1830's. This was drastically to change with the Irish famine. In 1847 more than 37,000 new arrivals were to descent upon the shores of Boston. These famine Irish were a shock to the Boston establishment. They were described as "vicious, criminal (and) profligate...who imported their vile propensities and habits from across the water" (O'Connor,

p.64). One of these habits was drinking. Following the arrival of these new Irish immigrants, licenses to sell liquor jumped in one year, 1846, from 850 to more than 1,200. The need for the policing of this growing liquor industry became apparent. To meet these expanded challenges. The newly elected Mayor, Josiah Quincy, Jr., selected a new City Marshal, Francis Tukey.

MARSHAL TUKEY

Tukey moved quickly to reorganize the existing police forces. He arranged to hire eighteen new police officers, giving him a force of twenty-two day and eight night police officers and over one hundred and fifty watchmen (Savage, p.84). Additionally, three officers were to be detailed to the Marshal's office. These officers were to act for the detection of crimes, the first detectives on the city force. Tukey was to use his new force to expand the enforcement of the various liquor licensing and related laws. Arrest under these statutes rose from 418 in 1850 to more than 718 the following year.

Tukey used this enforcement to highlight his own agenda. Never one to shy away from the spotlight, Tukey arranged for a highly publicized recovery of stolen monies. The Hughes

Company, in Boston, was robbed of \$1,100. Within several days, Tukey had "information" on the location of the monies. In a somewhat staged event, Tukey had his officers begin to dig up sections in the Public Garden. Quickly, his officers, to the delight of the onlookers and the press, recovered the stolen monies. To further his agenda, the Marshal staged a series of dramatic raids or "descents" on the more boisterous areas of the city.

"On the eve of the 23d of April, this year, (1851) we made the great Police descent in Ann Street, capturing some one hundred and sixty bipeds, who were punished for piping, fiddling, dancing, and attending crimes" (Savage, p.90). Prior to the Ann Street raid, Tukey had organized two other descents in March, which resulted in more than a hundred and thirteen arrests, mostly related to prostitution. The Marshal was well aware of the influence of the press on public opinion. To highlight both his position and his appreciation of the press, Tukey began a weekly "show-up of rogues." This operation was

designed to identify suspicious persons for the benefit of both police and public. At the first of these spectacles, 'Seventy-six pickpockets, burglars, panel thieves, etc.'-among them twelve women-'were shown up to the whole police force.' None were legally under arrest, and all, upon leaving the office, were forced to

run a gauntlet of crowing citizens who tore their clothing and marked their backs with crosses in chalk...The 'show-up' was an almost totalitarian display of power, fully appropriate for a man who had become the most important local officer in Boston...The fact that he was a popular hero, admired by temperance men and bankers as well as reporters, made his elective superiors equally hesitant to interfere with him (Lane, p.66-67).

Like many before and after, Marshal Tukey was taken by his own successes. In a rapprochement with the Irish community, Mayor Bigelow instructed that an Irishman be appointed to the police. Tukey objected to this appointment but the Mayor insisted, and one Barney McGinniskin was appointed. Tukey decided to "dabble a little in politics at the election." The Marshal on the day of the Mayoral election published an open letter concerning the appointment of the Irishman. Tukey objected to the appointment of a common cabman who had a criminal conviction. Naturally, the Marshal forswear any prejudice, but McGinniskin was "outrageously Irish: he had arrived at work, for the first time on the afternoon of November 3, announcing himself to the night force as 'Barney McGinniskin, fresh from the bogs of Ireland" (Ibid, p.77). An interesting announcement for the newly appointed officer, who had been in the United States for more than twenty years.

Tukey ordered his men to support the candidacy of Benjamin Seaver of the Common Council. It appears Tukey's and the support of the police was the winning edge for Seaver, and he was elected Mayor. Tukey and the police were to regret this dabbling in politics. "I have said that the municipal elections resulted in our choice; but no sooner had we got our man in, than he began to get us out,--served us right, too, for meddling in politics" (Savage, p.91). The new Mayor was quick to react to Tukey interference, enough thou it resulted in his election. He abolished the night police, leaving the night completely to the Watch, and fired all of its officer. He also ordered the Irish addition to the police, Barney McGinniskin, be kept on duty.

CHIEF OF POLICE

To continue his reform of the police, Mayor Seaver pushed a new police ordinance through the council. The title of City Marshal was changed and the new title of Chief of Police was initiated. The Chief would be a full-time officer, charged with the peace and order of the city. Tukey found himself without a job and the new Mayor, the man he had backed, was not about to continue his appointment as the new Chief of Police. Seaver appointed his own man to the job. A former

councilman, Gilbert Nurse, was appointed to the position which under the recent reforms was to be an annual appointment. Tukey did not take his loss well. Finding himself out of favor with the local press, Tukey decided to run for office. The death of one alderman result in a special election to fill this vacancy. This election, in December 1853, resulted in a resounding defeat for Tukey and a reaffirmation of Seaver's reform of the police. Following this humiliating defeat, Tukey left Boston for the golden shores of California.

One of the first official acts of the new Chief of Police, Nurse, was the organization of a Harbor Police unit. "(R)obberies on vessels and on the wharves having become common, a Harbor Police was organized...They were furnished with row boats, and armed with Colt's revolvers..." (Ibid, p.92). This was the first official arming of the police or the Watch in Boston.

To further the reforms of Mayor Seaver, the State Legislature passed an act authorizing the City of Boston to combine the Watch and the police, under one chief. The city was now clear to combine its law enforcement agencies to one modern department. This merger was not to move smoothly. Rivalries existed between the Board of Aldermen and the Common

Council over control of appointment of the police and the Council was able to block the enabling legislation. The Mayor, with the support of the Board of Aldermen, moved to break the deadlock. The Mayor discharged every officer of both the Watch and the Police and subsequently appointed the new Department of Police out of their numbers. "On the 26th day of May, 1854, at precisely six o'clock P.M., the Boston Watch and Police, which had lived two hundred and twenty-nine years ceased to exist, and 'The Boston Police Department' became an Institution" (Ibid, p.94). Additionally, all the officers in the new force were to be salaried. The salaries were fixed at \$1,800 for the Chief, \$3.00 a day for Captains and \$2.00 a day for Patrolman. Consequently, "Every officer (was) to devote his whole time, and have no other employment..." (Ibid, p.96).

CHAPTER 3

THE BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

The Mayor had succeeded in unilaterally forming one department of these forces but was still under legal constraints and was forced to appoint the Chief of Police as the Captain of the Watch and to appoint the Police Captains as constables over the watch. This situation was to remain the operational guide for the police for over one year, until the city branches of government were to arrive at an agreement. In May 1855, the Common Council, the Mayor and the Board of Aldermen agreed on a city ordinance which recognized the previous reorganization of the police and formally recognized the Boston Police Department. In return for its support of the ordinance, the Council extracted an ordinance which stated "the chief of police and other officers shall receive such compensation as the city council may from time to time determine to be meet and proper" (Lane, p.100). This ended an argument over the acceptance of various fees by the watch and police.

Several other innovations were quick to follow on the heels of the formation of the new department. Legislation was passed to authorize peace officers in the state to carry clubs no longer than eighteen inches, of course officers continued, quietly, to carry whatever weapons they thought necessary. The first specifically built police station was opened in the city, in 1857. When opened this building was described, by the Chief of Police, as the best designed station in the United States. The officers of the Boston police were fully uniformed, by departmental authorization, in 1859. The department's adoption of a uniform, was to pass without the fanfare or discussion of similar measures in New York and Philadelphia. The situation of the policing of Boston was improving. "The attorney general wrote in 1859 that 'at no time in the history of Massachusetts have life, liberty, and property been more secure than at present.' And observers with wide experience shared the opinion of the local press and government that the Boston police department was the best in the Union" (Ibid, p.117). The decade of the 1860's was not as to be this kind to the police department.

The city found itself at odd with several influential forces in the state and the country. The temperance and anti-slavery movements had long argued that the authorities in

Boston were failing to enforce both the anti-liquor laws, passed by the State Legislature, and failed to protect the abolitionist and the runaway slaves in the city. Several episodes of the arrest of runaway slaves by federal authorities with the assistance of the Boston police, led to outcries in the press and the legislature. These outcries were added to those of the temperance movement, who had been successful in the passage of various pieces of legislation through the State government. These successes were to be stifled in the City of Boston by the actions, or lack thereof, of the city authorities.

THE METROPOLITANS

These forces were to find common ground during the Civil War and used these times to press for the removal of the control of the police from city authorities. In March 1863, this opposition crystallized in legislation. This act called for the transfer of the control of the police in the City of Boston to a board of three commissioners, to be appointed by the Governor. A similar act had been defeated in 1861. The metropolitan police would continue to be paid for by the city. This act also provided for the retention of officers during good behavior and for their removal only on written charges.

This bill was introduced by Charles Ellis, who gave a lengthy argument in favor of its passage.

Ellis argued that the police in its present form was to close to the sentiments of the city. Ellis stated, "The tendency of the present system is, in this city, to make crime a power. This is its tendency in all cities" (p.20). He argued that the people of Massachusetts had passed these laws and the Boston authorities failed to carry them out. He stated that the present system would lead "the abandoned, dangerous and perishing classes to scout all idea of moral control; and lastly, its demoralizing influence on the community at large, in its moral sense, and its respect for law and virtue" (p.23). Ellis asserted that "Boston had changed from the town it was forty years ago to a great metropolis, and other elements control it now, as they have ruled New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, New Orleans and London. But you have the means of controlling it..." (p.39). He held out the successes of these forces after their transfer to state control. The city government was a "standing committee appointed by the grog shops of the peninsula" (Lane, p.120).

A recent decision in the New York courts, People v. Draper, upholding the legality of the creation of the

Metropolitan Police in New York City was often quoted. "How have the local authorities of that great city discharged its duty of local government to its citizens and to the state at large'...The state had made the law...and it was 'bound to protect the citizen...irrespective of locality" (Ibid, p.120). Mr. Ellis' arguments were not without opposition.

Thomas Amory presented the city's arguments against the bill. "History teaches us," Amory stated, "that free institutions are only practicable in small communities..." The principle of home rule is a cornerstone to both the state of Massachusetts and to the Constitutions. On the successes of other cities, Amory stated:

Can these petitioners say in
their hearts that Boston...deserves
...so great a misery as to be subjected
to an unwilling yoke...indifferent to
her murmurs and her wrongs.

The petitioners hold up for our
example the system of London and Paris,
as derived by appointment from the
supreme authority. In monarchies,
absolute or limited, the police force
is less the watch-dog of the cottage,
or for the protection of the public,
than the bloodhound of authority, ever
ready to strike its fang into the feeble
and needy...Long may it be before we
have forced upon us a constabulary like
that of Ireland...(pp.9-13).

The arguments for the passage of this temperance favored legislation continued. One of the most noted figured of Boston society, Wendell Phillips, addressed a gathering of this legislation's supporters on April 5, 1863. Phillips stated:

The capital of the civilized world, London, many years ago, found herself utterly unable to contend with the evils of accumulated population--found municipal machinery utterly inadequate for the security of life or property in her streets; and the national government, by the hand of Sir Robert Peel, assumed the police regulation of that cluster of towns which we call London...the police regulations in the city of Boston have been modelled on those of a small town; that is, the inhabitants themselves have called into existence a body of constables, in fact, to execute the laws of the State and the by-laws of the city...and I shall attempt to show you that it is necessary here, to put control of the police force into other hands than those of the voters of the peninsula. That is our claim--that the men of the peninsula, like those of other great cities, are not to be trusted with the execution of the State laws, but that executive power must be based on broader foundations...

A metropolitan police has been necessary in London, and now its streets are the safest in the world. In New York it has saved the city from convulsion and bloodshed...(The City) would be largely independent of the "dangerous classes" (pp. 2-3 and 30-31).

Whether the arguments of Amory or the politics of the

times prevailed, this legislation went down to defeat. However, Phillips' warnings of the "dangerous classes" and bloodshed in the street, were to come to the fore very quickly. On July 14, 1863, Boston was to experience the worst rioting in its history, The Draft Riots.

THE DRAFT RIOTS

In preparation for a new round of draft notices, two assistant Provost Marshals visited a residence on Prince Street. After an altercation with a woman in the building, the Marshals were set upon. "In an instant the street was filled with infuriated men and women, each vieing with the other in revenging their imaginary wrongs" (Savage, p.350-1). The disorder quickly spread to other parts of the City and the police found themselves outnumbered and out-gunned, as the only lawful weapon available to the police was the club authorized by the legislature.

The crowd quickly grew to several thousand and a direct attack was made on the Gunhouse, a combination arsenal and armory. The Mayor, in anticipation of the troubles, had asked for the assistance of the regular Army, in addition to calling up all the militia units in the City. As a result of that

request, a Battery of regulars had occupied the Gunhouse and was in position when the attack came. "(T)he mob made a furious attack on the rear with bricks, stones, clubs and a plentiful discharge of pistols. The attacks were so furious that the Lieutenant ordered his men to wheel and fire...In a few moments the Rioters had demolished all but the double door on the Cooper Street side, and those heavy oak doors were fast giving way...the order was given to the Artillery men to fire, and a brass cannon swept all before it" (Ibid, pp.359-60). The situation was so dangerous that the use of artillery was considered self-defense.

A similar situation occurred at the Cooper Street Armory and again field artillery unit opened fire on the rioters. The Mayor ordered the arming of the police and led the attack on the mob in the Court Square. The Mayor was at the head of several cavalry and infantry units. The infantry with fixed bayonets and cavalry with drawn sabers were more than a match for the mob. The hastily armed Boston police performed remarkably well and received high praise for their courage and actions. The mob was breaking. One of the ringleaders extolled his comrades, "Don't run, like cowards, but let us give the dam' Yankees hell!" (Ibid, p.362) Unfortunately, for him, he was shot in the head by police officer.

The riot was over and estimates differ on the death toll. Savage recounts the death of one old man and eight rioters. He also states that the actual number was shrouded in mystery. Another result was the permanent arming of the police, which was formalized by the legislature in 1864. The Boston Police were to receive high praise for the acts in the riots. "(T)he force had served well, and the actions of certain patrolmen were heroic...Local officials and police had decisively shown their ability to move against the 'dangerous and perishing classes' in their midst" (Lane, p.134). Even their famous critic, Wendell Phillips, was quick to praise the city police force and the administration for their actions. The action of the Boston Police Department during these riots was to quite the calls for the reform and removal of the force to state control.

The praise for the city police was short lived. In 1864, led almost completely by the temperance movements, new legislation for the creation of a metropolitan police for Boston, under the control of the State, was pushed out of committee for passage by the legislature. In a political gamble, the Boston delegation succeeded in passing an amendment to this act which required all the police in the state of Massachusetts to come under the control of the

governor. As a compromise to this situation, a bill was introduced which created a new body of police, Constables of the Commonwealth. The new constables would be state wide officers appointed by the governor. These officers would "especially use their utmost endeavors to repress and prevent crime by the suppression of liquor shops, gambling places, and houses of 'ill-fame' (Ibid, p.137). This compromise legislation quickly passed into law.

STATE POLICE

These new state officers, the first state police force in the United States, were to concentrate the major part of the efforts in Boston and by 1867 this force had amassed several thousand arrests for liquor laws' violations. The prohibitionists continue to press for the removal of control of the city police to the state, but the city police supporters had an additional argument, the State Constabulary. After one attack on the city police for their laxity in enforcing the liquor control laws, Chief Kurtz, of the Boston City Police, "merely replied that he had been asked by the governor to leave the problem to the (State) constables" (Ibid, p.139). The prohibitionist, and their supports, were to continue the battle for the control of the city police.

In 1869 another legislative attempt to rest control of the police from the city government was introduced. In a statement, Against the Establishment of A State Police in the City of Boston, Clement Hill gave the City's view of this legislation. His lengthy presentation relied heavily on the arguments of local self government and the constitutional nature of that government. "You must remember," Hill stated, "that all these arguments against the...police tell equally against all self-government in Boston" (p.11). In addressing the nature of the attacks on the Boston City Police, Hill stated, "the real foundation of this movement in favor of a State police in Boston is the alleged neglect to enforce the so-called prohibitory law by the Boston police...That it does not enforce the laws against intoxicating liquors is the gist of the indictment presented against the Boston police; all else is mere matter of aggravation" (p.35). This legislation, like its predecessors, failed to muster the required votes.

During the next decade the city's control of the police force was to go relative unchallenged but was not without its problems. The several scandals which swept the department, especially the detective bureau, led to the resignation of Chief Kurtz and the abolition of the detective bureau. The new chief was to be the first professional officer, who had risen

through the ranks, Edward Savage. "During his eight years as head of the department, Savage carried his 'preventive' plans into operation. In practice, the system did not entirely eliminate the use of specialists. Temporary assignments to headquarters tended to become permanent, and several 'specialist officers' worked in all but name as full-time detectives...the new men successfully avoided major scandal" (Lane, p.159). During Savage's administration the department saw its first pay dispute.

In 1872, the police were able to organize a petition for a raise in salary. This petition was signed by citizens worth \$1,000,000 in property, an impressive list of supporters. At the time these officers were paid \$1,095 per annum. However this request was not without opposition. One Republican alderman declared "The pay of laboring classes as competent as are the police officers is not over \$12 or \$15 a week." Another alderman, a Democrat, found that the policemen's job was not especially difficult or demanding and "he would be tempted to fire those who complained" (Ibid, p.181). This dispute was finally settled by a compromise measure which raised the police appropriation by \$60,000 which was not used for pay raises but rather to increase the force to a total of 550 officers. The Boston officer's first organized attempt to

secure a pay raise was not quite a failure.

THE COMMISSION MOVEMENT

While this period was relatively quiet and the police department was free to grow with the City, politics was to be an important factor in the development of the police. Several mayoral and council elections in this period led to a continuous tug of war between the Republicans and the Democrats, especially the Irish Democratic faction. In this continuing struggle, several Mayors of both parties had called for the creation of a board of commissioners to run the police department. The Commission Movement, as one author, Lane, has termed this trend, was a means of removing politics from the operations of the government.

Following the election of a Republican mayor and a Republican majority in the Board of Aldermen in 1878, the mayor petitioned the legislature for the authority to place the Boston Police Department under the control of a three man Board of Commissioners. The Legislature agreed to this and under Chapter 224 of the Acts of 1878, the commission was created. Its members were to be nominated by the mayor with the approval of the city council. Two other provisions of the

Act were also very important. The first gave the mayor the authority to take command of the department in an emergency. The second authorized the city to grant pensions, one-third of pay, to police officers on retirement. A last provision of the act made the new Board of Police the sole agency responsible for the issuance and renewal of liquor licenses in the City of Boston, an important concentration of power.

The new administration was relatively successful. In the next few years several administrative changes were effected. The Chief of Police was renamed the Superintendent and several other duties were now carried out by Inspectors, both titles taken from their London counterparts. Promotions were to be granted upon examination and a school for new recruits were opened. Additionally, a police signal system, or alarm boxes, were installed and every officer, for the first time, was issued and required to carry, on patrol, a Smith & Wesson .38 caliber revolver. The success of the new Commissioners was not to be without political interference.

In 1881, the Republican, who had lost control of the Mayoralty, launched a Board of Aldermen's investigation, Reports Of The Special Committee Appointed To Investigate The Official Conduct Of The Members Of The Board Of Police

Commissioners, on the conduct of the three nonpartisan Police Commissioners. This inquiry found that one Commissioner "has not attempted to have the laws enforced" (p.4) and recommended his removal. The report also found that both other Commissioners had "acted in violation of the statutes and ordinances" (p.8). The Republican report called for the removal of all three Commissioners. But the Democratic Mayor was not about to follow these recommendations. However, the election in December 1881 returned a Republican to the Mayor's office. The new Republican Mayor, Samuel Green, used this report as his excuse to replace the three Commissioners with his own appointees, all Republicans.

The greatest threat to the City Board of Commissioners and the City's control of the police department was the continuing rise of the Democratic majority, of which the majority was Irish. The Republicans could not be assured of control of the police and therefore this "influential class of citizens which had felt left out of politics for at least a generation...could hope for satisfaction only in the General Court. Their temptation (was) to appeal to the legislature..." (Lane, p.213). The election, in 1885, of Boston's first non-Yankee Mayor, Alderman Hugh O'Brien, a foreign born Irishman, galvanized opposition to the City's control of the police and

the liquor business. The Yankee Republicans in an alliance with the temperance movement, pushed a bill through the legislature, in 1885, for the removal of the police from the clutches of the Irish Democratic party.

CHAPTER 4

STATE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

This new legislation for the creation of a metropolitan police for Boston evoked the same arguments of its predecessors. The arguments of local rights and the necessity to enforce the general laws of the state were presented for weeks. After several weeks of arguments, filibusters and gag rules, the legislation passed on June 11, 1885. The Boston Police Department was now to be under the control of the State, with the new Board of Commissioners appointed by the Governor. It was hoped that this move, in conjunction with the Civil Service Law of 1884, would remove the police from the political pressures in the city. As one author, Lane, observed:

In 1885 as in 1822, dissatisfaction with "the government of the police" sparked a movement to change the traditional form of the city government as a whole. The new act...created a new relationship among the city, the state, and the citizens, the meaning of which was not at once understood. Part of the confusion resulted from the mixture of motives responsible for the reform. Boston had been incorporated on a positive note, in order to increase efficiency, to

stimulate achievement, and to recognize the fact that it was already a city. Some of the same sentiments were involved in the Acts of 1885, but they were clouded by bitterness and bigotry. The new charter was the work of a minority; it was not clear whether it would fit the needs of reformers, Republicans, or the rest of the inhabitants.

After a few years of experience it became in fact apparent that the changes were not as radical as either friends or opponents had expected. The tacit division of power between Republicans and Democrats, state and city, was never complete...it contained tensions not formerly eased within the framework of local politics...Boston was politically vigorous enough to assert itself regardless of forms: 'The nature of things sets limits to theories. In theory the General Court creates cities; in fact cities grow...' (p.219).

The Boston Police Department was now to be paid for by the City and ruled by the state controlled Commissioners. The reform was condemned by several succeeding mayors of Boston. Mayor Nathan Matthews, in 1893, advocated the abolition of the State Board of Police. He stated it was "not responsible to the city government, and composed necessarily of gentlemen who, whatever their personal qualifications, are yet regarded by the majority of the voters of the city with distrust " (Koren, p.51). In 1905, Mayor Patrick Collins characterized the 1885 legislation as a violation of the first principle of home rule, and a needless and profitless wound to

the pride of the first city of the Commonwealth" (Ibid p.82). This situation was to prove unmanageable. "Running the police department with three commissioners, often of different views, proved both unwieldy and inefficient. Graft and corruption, while not as blatant as in most American cities, were still evident. Finally in 1906 the legislature abolished the State Board of Police, and the three commissioners were to be replaced by a single commissioner with virtually complete authority over the department..." (Russell, 1975, p.36). The first person to be appointed under this new legislation was Stephen O'Meara, a Republican Irishman.

O'MEARA

O'Meara was an immigrant to Boston having been born in Prince Edward Island, Canada. He rose through the ranks of journalism eventually becoming publisher and owner of the Boston Journal. His newspaper position opened many doors to him, normally closed to Irish immigrants. He was a member of several prestigious private clubs and was awarded an honorary degree from Dartmouth. O'Meara counted Joseph Pulitzer, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and the illustrious Theodore Roosevelt as his friends. The new commissioner was to find his office fully empowered to run the department. The main powers,

as outlined in Chapter 291, Acts of 1906, were:

The Police Commissioner shall have authority to appoint, establish, and organize the police of said city, and make all needful rules and regulations for its efficiency. He shall from time to time appoint a trial board to be composed of three captains of police to hear the evidence in such complaints against members of the force as the Commissioner may deem advisable to refer to said board. Said trial board shall report its finding to said Commissioner, who may review the same and take such action thereon as he may deem advisable.

With this legislation, the new Commissioner was put in a unique relationship for a police official in America. One author, Repetto, observed the situation as:

In effect, O'Meara was given the standing and authority of a European police commissioner--he was appointed over, not by, the community, and the force would be under a quasi-military discipline.

It was not exactly a European administration, though. The governorship, which frequently changed hands, was much weaker than an English prime minister's post...In many respects, therefore, O'Meara's power was greater than that of any of his European counterparts. Another difference was in the composition of the force. The cops were not outsiders, peasant lads sent in to police the urban proletariat; instead, they were drawn from the local

Irish working class and so while administratively they may have been an army of occupation, socially they were not (p. 97-98).

O'Meara, armed with these powers, was to become one of the most influential persons in the history of the department. He moved forward quickly to announce his position.

The first efforts of the police commissioner were directed to the task of convincing the men of the admirable police force over which he took control, that they were absolutely free from outside interference; that the commissioner himself in coming to the department had no entanglement and no obligation and that his duty was to the law alone; and that they, in turn, were to look only to their department superiors for rewards and punishments (Koss p.15).

O'Meara was to serve for a total of twelve years in office. He died in office in 1918. He is credited with bringing the Boston Police Department to a position where it was considered one of the best in the country. O'Meara's "success was in no small measure attributable to his uninterrupted tenure of service. In the twelve years of his commissionership he had the unique opportunity of making himself...an efficient police executive" (Fosdick, p.230). Commissioner O'Meara went to great lengths to secure his

position as the one authority for both the hiring and advancement of officers. Several famous stories of his disregard of entreats of his own political supporters for a particular applicant or officer are often quoted (See Koss and Repetto). His standards were such that one influential Bostonian remarked that "Boston policemen are physically finer than West Point cadets" (Repetto, p.98).

O'Meara boastfully wrote, in 1912, of his action:

In the five and a half years for which I can answer, no appointment, promotion, or transfer of a police officers, no expenditure of a dollar, no grant or refusal of the tens of thousands of licenses and permits which the police commissioner controls have been influenced by a political personage or a political consideration (Koss, p.16).

The Commissioner jealously guarded his authority over the department. In departmental promotions his attitude was as rigid. In his annual report, he wrote, "The police...are held to the knowledge and observation of a multiplicity and ordinances and regulations. Their official life and much of their private lives is checked by police rules" (Ibid, p.17). His control was absolute and his view of his promotional system was clear. When vacancies existed he would ask for a

list of nominations from the divisional captains and then;

The Commissioner then examines his own memoranda of names--men whose work had attracted attention or much favorable expression. After weeks of inquiry, examination of records, without interference from any source, the Commissioner decides upon the men whom he will nominate to the civil service commission for examination (White, 1982, p.130).

O'Meara continued to centralize the power in the Department in his office. In his Annual Report of the Police Commissioner for 1908, he stated that 27 officers were convicted of serious offenses and that he dismissed 14 of these officers. "The number is the largest number of dismissals with two exceptions in 55 years and probably since the department was established" (Koss, p.19). The Commissioner was very proud of his disciplinary record for the force. He sought to professionalize the force and increase the public's confidence in it. His aims were described as:

To establish public confidence, to remove outside interference, to develop a high standard of honesty among members of the force, and to deal fairly with his men were Commissioner O'Meara's principal objectives...At the time the police force developed a certain pride in its position in the community. It

maintained a high standard of integrity and self-respect, accompanied by a sense of satisfaction... (Harrison, p.23).

O'Meara centralized the complete power and activities of the department in his office. The Boston Police Department, under O'Meara, was described as "the epitome of urban bureaucratic power...Power and authority were centralized in one office. If graft worked in New York, autocracy worked in Boston" (White, 1982, p.127). The Commissioner was credited with several innovations, including the expansion of the Force, that earned his department the claim to be the best in America. One author, Repetto, has characterized his contributions as:

1. A relatively high ratio of police to population, which permitted full utilization of the beat system.
2. The employment of officers from the local community, which avoided connotations of an army of occupation.
3. A high standard of integrity.
4. A strong hand for the top administrator.
5. A strict adherence to legality. (p.119)

O'Meara in his benevolence helped and encouraged his officers, in 1906, to form the Boston Patrolman's Social Club. This club was to become a forum for the discontent and anger of the officers. The basic structure of the Boston Police

Department was set for the events of 1919.

CHAPTER 5

LABOR AND OTHER ISSUES

Much like their English colleagues, several other factors were to influence the events in Boston in 1919. Among those were the continuing rise and influence of organized labor, the wartime inflation and the declining position of the officers in society.

Trade unions, of various kinds, are among the oldest institutions in the United States. The first of these unions were association of skilled artisans who associated to maintain the craftmanship of the guild and their wages. The first of these unions was formed by shoemakers in Philadelphia in 1792. These guilds spread throughout the country. In 1804 one of the first strikes of these unions occurred in Baltimore when tailors struck for higher wages. The growth of the labor movement was to reflect the swings of the business cycle and the rapid development of the unions did not occur until the 1870's. "So many strikes occurred during this period that it

is known as the 'Great Upheaval' (Gammage, p.12). It is during this period that the labor federation came upon the scene. A noted historian of the labor movement, Selig Perlman, observed "the experience of these years 'nationalized' the labor movement, developing within it a consciousness of solidarity and common purpose. For the first time, also, unskilled workers ...played a significant role in industrial conflict, and the organized labor movement was no longer identified exclusively with the craft groups" (Moore, p.11).

One of the most significant organizations to come out of this period was the American Federation of Labor (AFL). This organization which claimed 138,000 members in 1886 rose to more than 4,000,000 members in 1919. This organization, with its president, Samuel Gompers, was to become the leading force in the labor movement during the early nineteen hundreds. With the rapid growth of its base, the AFL sought not only to secure better wages and working conditions for its members but also to gain respectability and national influence. Like its British counterpart, the TUC, the AFL tried to secure power and influence through political influence. In 1910, "organized labor's participation in the congressional elections produced results regarded by the leaders as satisfactory, and then, in 1912, a party of distinctly prolabor predilections came into

power" (Millis, p.126). The coming to power of the Democrats and the election of Wilson as President were to bring great comfort to the AFL. Gompers had championed labor's support of the Democratic party and had warned the labor movement of the isolationist results labor political party. He stated that "the organization of a political labor party would simply mean the dividing of the activities and allegiance of the men and women of labor between two bodies, such as would often come into conflict" (Reed, p.110).

Gompers was to see the fruits of his support quickly. In 1914, with President Wilson's support, the Clayton Amendment to the Antitrust Act became law. This law was described by Gompers as a "bill of rights" and a "new Magna Charta" for labor and a vindication of Gompers political policies (Millis, p.127). This Act declared "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce...The act, adopted in 1914, forbade the use of injunctions in labor disputes unless a court decided that one was necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property" (Brooks, p.107). Organized labor was to use its new found political power to not only push forward its agenda but also to increase its base. Union membership jumped from 2,102,000, in 1910 to more than 4,775,000, in 1920. Unions better than doubled their membership and political base

in less than 10 years (Bain, p.38).

Labor, through a series of strikes in 1915-1916, sought to move forward with their gains. As the war in Europe dragged on, labor was to find new support from its Democratic Party allies. In anticipation of the American war effort, the AFL, at a conference in March 1917, one month before the United States involvement in hostilities, declared the full support of all labor organizations in the upcoming war with Germany. "Wrapped up with the safety of this Republic...are the ideals of democracy...a heritage that is to be maintained and handed down to each generation with undiminished power and usefulness." This support of the war effort and the policies of Wilson was to be rewarded. President Wilson appeared at the annual convention of the AFL in November 1917, and stated that, "While we are fighting for freedom...we must see among other things that labor is free" (Dulles, p.216-7).

Labor was to use the progress of the War to better its position at the bargaining table. In order to assure the flow of goods for the war effort, President Wilson appointed a National War Labor Board. This board would act as a final arbitrator in all industrial disputes. The board was to be composed of members of labor and management and:

The general principles upon which the National War Labor Board operated were immensely significant as a reflection of new government attitudes toward labor ...In return for a general pledge that there would be no further strikes or lockouts for the duration of the war, the Wilson administration was prepared to accord labor full support for virtually all its traditional demands. The right to organize and bargain collectively through "chosen representatives" was definitely recognized and was not in any way to be abridged or denied by employers; all existing agreements in respect to union or open shops were to be upheld on their prewar basis; the eight-hour day was to be applied as far as possible; women entering industry were to be given equal pay for equal work; and there was complete acceptance of "the right of all workers, including common laborers, to a living wage.. .which will ensure the subsistence of the worker and his family in health and reasonable comfort" (Ibid, p.218).

By 1919, organized labor had found its status had risen remarkably since the 1890's. However, after the Armistice and the return to peacetime activities, labor would have to fight to keep the gains it had won. The gains of organized labor and its overall effect on all workers could be seen in the overall earning of the workers. By one estimate workers earning grew by almost 150% in six years, 1914 to 1920. The highest jumps going to Male unskilled workers at 158% and females workers at 138% (National Industrial Conference, p.43). The War had caused an immense rise in the wages of workers and an

accompanying rise in the cost of living.

COST OF LIVING

A study (Douglas) on wages and the cost of living in the United States during 1890-1926 offers a variety of statistics on this period. The cost of living, using 1890 as the base of 100, had risen to 218 in 1918, 247 in 1919 and 286 in 1920. Similarly, using 1914 as the base of 100, the cost of living rose to 157 in 1918, 178 in 1919 and 206 in 1920. Organized labor was able to keep up with these huge increases in the cost of living through strikes, political activities and collective bargaining. The officers of the Boston Police did not have this machinery available to them. In 1918 these officers were paid \$1400 a year, a salary that was voted to them by the city government in 1898, but was not granted until 1913 (Fitzgerald, p.29). The relative position of these officers in society was declining. The situation could not continue.

A recruit to the Boston Police Department, who was sworn in 1918 was paid \$730 a year, or approximately \$2.00 a day. This was the same salary a policemen would have received in 1854 when the force was established. A recruit, or reserve

man, would advance to full salary, \$1400, after six years in the force. These officers were also required to pay for their own uniforms and equipment which in 1918-19 was running approximately \$200 a year (Russell, p.48). By 1919 the attitudes towards labor and strikes were changing. Strikes awoke "unstinted condemnation from almost every walk of life...and evoked what were already becoming the inevitable charges of Bolshevism" (Dulles, p.222).

RED SCARE

One of the other results of World War I was the social and political disorder which was characterized as the Red Scare. "Through misreporting, exaggeration, misinterpretation of fact, and excessive claims and charges, what was a mere theoretical possibility of radical revolution gradually became in the minds of many a horrible reality" (Murray, p.83). Several general strikes, orchestrated by the radical syndicalistic union the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) took place in 1919. The IWW leadership had been indicted for seeking to hamper the war effort in 1917 and 101 defendants in that trial were convicted and sentenced to prison. The IWW, however, continued with its organizing and strike activities.

Capitalizing on the strike situation in Seattle, the IWW fostered a general strike. The city was shut down as 60,000 workers struck. Mayor Hanson used the strike as a platform for his anti-union feeling and his own aggrandizement. He warned of anarchy, Bolshevism and the rule of the soviet. He requested federal troops and ordered the total mobilization of the police. He personally led the detachments of troops in their deployments throughout the city. "(H)e could and would secure if necessary every soldier in the Northwest to protect life, business, and property. 'The time has come' said Mayor Hanson, 'for the people in Seattle to show their Americanism...The anarchists in this community shall not rule its affairs'" (Ibid, p.63). Within a few days the strikers bowed to various pressures, including pressure from the AFL, and the general strike was called off.

A far longer general strike occurred in Winnipeg, Canada, in June 1919. Here some 30,000 workers went on strike. A variety of city workers joined in these actions and for several days the government of the city, including police and fire protection, was in the hands of the strike committee. Headlines warned of the "Russian sickness" and the "Bolshevist interim." Most organized labor, including the AFL, condemned these actions as fiascos and ill-advised. Organized labor

found itself in a different position after the World War.

Thus, having attempted from the beginning to run with the hounds on the issue of domestic radicalism, by the fall of 1919 organized labor found itself identified with the hare instead. Its position had become increasingly precarious as the disappearance of public confidence made even the wildest antiunion charges seem believable. In fact, by the fall of 1919 all strikes, regardless of their nature, had come to be considered "crimes against society," "conspiracies against the government," and "plots to establish communism" (Ibid, p.121).

Other incidents in 1919 added to the Red Scare. On April 30, 1919 thirty-four letter bomb packages were discovered in the mail addressed to a variety of high ranking public officials and private persons. Public alarm spread and newspapers announced "REDS PLAN MAY DAY MURDERS." The following day, in Boston, a May Day parade went forward without a permit. The marchers clashed with the outnumbered police and a number of officers were injured, including a Captain who died of a heart attack. The citizens of Boston reacted violently with groups of vigilantes, most ex-servicemen, exacting their own justice on any suspected radicals.

On June 2, bombs exploded in eight cities around the country. One of those blew the front off the house of the U.S. Attorney General, A. Mitchell Palmer. Palmer, who was famous for his anti-radical stand, declared these bombings to be the beginning of the radicals' attempts to takeover the country. Palmer was to use these bombings as the basis of a series of raids on a variety of radical groups. Rumor spread of a major bombing campaign to take place on July 4. The government ordered federal troops to secure important federal buildings around the country. The campaign did not materialize. What did appear was an increase in strikes. Some 360 strikes occurred in the month of July. Two strikes of 1919 were to hit home to the officers of the Boston Police.

THE CHANGING ROLE OF WOMEN

Julia O'Connor was one of a few women who headed a major union in Boston. O'Connor was the president of the telephone operator's union. This union was composed mostly of women. Many of these women were the wives, daughters or sweethearts of Boston's Finest. Because of the war, the phone company was under the jurisdiction of the Postmaster General. The phone operators' contract expired on January 1, 1919. O'Connor tried for several months to negotiate a new contract with the

telephone company with the approval of the Postmaster General. By April 15, 1919, no negotiations were entered into by the management. Ms. O'Connor and her ladies struck, tying up telephone service throughout New England. The ladies' male counterparts in the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers joined the strike. The ladies were very effective in organizing their strike and the entire matter was settled in seven days. Women had traditionally been in occupations that were poorly organized. The representation of women in trade unions increased fivefold from 1910 to 1920 (Wolman, p.23). The ladies had won higher pay and improved working condition.

The next strike of unique interest to the Boston officers was that of the Boston Carmen. The Carmen's union, which represented the operators of the streetcars and the elevated trains, called for a strike on July 13. The Carmen succeeded in tying up the city and remained out until their demands were met. This was viewed as quite a success for a union that was only organized in 1912 (Donahue, p.96). With this victory, the Carmen found themselves making "fifty cents a day" more than the police. The strike was not without its opposition. "The Boston Herald observed angrily that 'every self-respecting person must have a feeling of disgust over the thought that an army of public service employees can get their wages raised by

so despicable a performance as quitting their jobs..." (Russell, 1975, p.25). The officers of the Boston police would have done well to heed this editorial.

Police Unions and Other Strikes

The astonishingly high cost of living increases caused by the World War caused widespread discomfort in many police departments. The fact that the cost of living had risen 79% in three years was of concern to every officer. This discontent manifested itself into inquiries concerning union organization and even discussions of strikes. While the Boston Police strike was the focal point of police unionization in this period, two other police strikes, in the United States, occurred prior to the eventful days of September 1919.

The first recorded record of a police strike occurred in Ithaca, New York on April 3, 1889. While little is written on this strike (see Ziskind), it is generally agreed that as a result of a change in administration (the election of a Democratic mayor) a pay cut, from \$12 to \$9 a week, was authorized. The officers of the force, all appointed by the prior administration, protested this act and were removed by the Mayor. The Mayor quickly appointed new men, Democrats, to

fill the vacancies. Following up on these appointments, the City Council, again controlled by the Democrats, voted, on April 18, to restore the old pay rate of \$12 to the new force of loyal Democrats. The aborted strike and the political battle that was at the cord of it was settled.

CINCINNATI

The second strike of policemen occurred in Cincinnati, Ohio in September 1918. Again, little is written on this strike (See Ziskind and Herron). As in other labor strikes, the basic cause of the unrest was salary. Cincinnati police officers were paid \$1250, having been given a \$100 raise in early 1918. As a result of the unrest caused by this salary and the lack of any initiative on a pay raise by city authorities, in light of skyrocketing inflation, officers began to secretly meet to discuss the possibility of forming a union. One of the clandestine meetings was discovered by the Chief of Police and, as a result, several police officers, leaders of the clandestine movement, were suspended for conduct unbecoming. One officer, John Hill, took command and quickly formed a committee to negotiate both these suspensions and the pay issues.

Chief Copelan declined to issue any answer to the officers' committee or their demands. The officers refused duty starting at 3 p.m. Saturday, September 14. Within an hour, Mayor Galvin, who was described as "Galvinized" by the strike (Herron, p.184), immediately called out the Home Guard. The Guard were locally organized paramilitary units designed to replace the National Guard, which had been federalized. In Cincinnati, the Guard totaled almost 3000 men. Within four hours, over 600 guardsmen began to patrol the streets. In an odd twist, "Striking patrolman in civilian dress accompanied the Guardsmen for the first few hours to show them their duties..." (Ibid, p.185). While these officers assisted in patrol, their colleagues voted to form a union, the Home Federal Policemen's Union, and to apply for a charter from the AFL.

Mayor Galvin was quick to denounce this as a mutiny and a crime against the city and its people. Seeking public support, the Mayor asked for, and received, over 600 Boy Scouts for traffic control duties. Galvin was quick to recognize a good public relations opportunity. When asked to address the striking officers he jumped at the chance. In an emotional speech to these officers, he extolled the police as the "greatest in the world" and reminded them that their flag

was "being carried to victory by Americans in France." Mayor Galvin stated that "I believe in labor unions and have always been friendly to union labor. But a labor union in the Police Department is incompatible with the discipline and work of the department" (Ibid, p.190). Certain guarantees were issued over the suspended officers and the strikers voted to return to work and abandon any efforts to form a union or affiliate with the AFL. The officers did form a welfare association and "They proceed at once to the election of its officers and...they selected as the officers of the new association the same men who had been the officers of the union" (Ziskind, p.39). This new association and the strikers were welcomed back by the administration and the citizens of Cincinnati.

Organized labor, particularly the AFL, was never on close terms with the police of the country. They were traditionally seen as the foe and tools of the company owners. "You would never want to be seen with one of them, even if he was in the family, you would stay away from him. Anyway after the start of the war, who wanted that job when you could make better money in almost any factory" (Mayo). This attitude of labor was to alter during the war. The AFL had received several inquiries about affiliation from various police groups, but had a policy against accepting police organizations.

THE AFL

In 1897, as a result of an application of a police group in Cleveland, the annual AFL convention adopted a policy that states "It is not within the province of the trade union movement to specially organize policemen, no more than to organize militiamen, as both...are too often controlled by forces inimical to the labor movement" (Slater, p.10). This attitude of looking at the police as the enemy was to attenuate during the turbulent struggle of the War. Prompted by numerous inquiries from police organizations concerning affiliation, the AFL, at its convention in June 1919, reversed its policy and stated it favored the formation of police unions and would look favorably on the granting of charters of affiliation to these new police unions. By September 1919, the AFL had received 65 requests from police organizations and had chartered 37 locals. Gompers remarked that in 36 years as AFL president, he had never seen as many application in as short a time from any trade" (Ibid).

The situation for police unionization moved rapidly. By September, only three months from the reversal of its policy, the AFL issued 33 charters to police unions (See Slater for a complete list of the unions). The fact that police had sought

union affiliation was not well received. The Mayor of Jersey City, Frank Hague, ordered the Police Chief

to suspend and prefer charges against the promoters of the plan and policemen who join the union...If members of the police department were to become affiliated with the American Federation of Labor it would mean that the members were serving two Masters, organized labor...and...the people of Jersey City (Boston Herald, August 2, 1919).

Other city administrators joined Mayor Hague in condemnation of police unionization. The menace of a unionized police in the United States was viewed as a threat to public order. Calls for the disbanding of any police union and the firing of any officer who was to join these unions came from various quarters. A nationwide attack on police unions was forthcoming:

In Portland, Oregon, the mayor fought unionization, claiming that it would cause divided loyalty in labor disputes. The policemen replied that joining the AFL would help them understand the views of workers. The mayor of Los Angeles raised wages and formed a police relief association to impede unionization. Officials in Terre Haute and Norfolk ordered union members to leave the AFL or resign, and Norfolk's Director of public safety threatened to use soldiers to patrol the city. Typifying much opinion in Congress, Senator H. L. Myers (R-MT)

proposed that union policemen in the District of Columbia be denied pay... Detroit Police Commissioner Inches ordered the dismissal of all 400 members of a police association: '[a]s long as our organization often has to be the fence between employers and strikers, it must be neutral and it certainly could not be that and have union affiliation'. Officials in Lynn, Massachusetts barred allegiance by police to any group which required greater loyalty than that owed to the government. 'If the cap fits the American Federation of Labor,' Mayor Creamer added, 'it can well wear it.'

The AFL resisted these attacks. It advised police that they had the right to organize and the labor press across the country supported police unions. The New Jersey Central Labor Union declared it would fight for the Jersey City local. Police officers battled to stay in the AFL. The District of Columbia local won a temporary restraining order which blocked the ban on the AFL on the grounds that it was not 'needful' and the Commissioners' authority extended only to 'needful' rules (Slater, p.12-13).

Organized labor was holding out its hand to the police and the police were mindful of the gains that these unions had won for their members. "You have to remember the times. Inflation was killing people. The unions had won tremendous gains in salaries and benefits for the men. Women, too, look at what the girls in the Boston telephone operators did with their strike and the ladies in the Lawrence mills. No wonder the police were fed up" (Mayo).

Female wages skyrocketed some 238% from 1914 to 1920 (National Industrial Conference, p.43). The police of Boston and in many other cities around the country found themselves making less money than their wives and daughters. A government report found that the minimum level of subsistence for a family of five, a characterization which fit the majority of the Boston Police officers, was \$1575 a year, some \$175 above the maximum salary for a patrolman (Russell, 1975, p.56). Wages for the Boston Police became an exhausting burden. One author noted:

The high wages received by comparatively unskilled labor, in the factories and shipyards, was probably the most potent force in stirring up insurrection in the heretofore staid Boston police force. Many of these officers living on less than twenty-three dollars a week were arresting shipyard and factory workers on their Saturday nights in Boston. Their spending was profligate. Wages of seventy-five dollars to one hundred dollars a week were common through the pyramiding of high overtime rates (White, p.145).

It was this background that the Boston police found themselves facing in 1918-19, as the World War was brought to a close and the promise of peacetime prosperity was exalted by President Wilson.

CHAPTER 6

THE STRIKE

The officers of the Boston Police found themselves at great financial disadvantage as America entered the World War. Salaries were low, hours were long and working conditions were terrible. The average officer worked a seven day week with only one day off in fifteen and the average work week schedule required the officers to be on duty for 78 hours. Additionally conditions in the Station Houses were terrible. These Station Houses, which were home to these officers, were denounced as in terrible states by the officers and the Commissioner. The officers maintained that if these public buildings were privately owned, they would be condemned by the Board of Health. One report stated:

The sanitary conditions were so deplorable and the vermin so numerous... that the leather was eaten off the helmets of the men. Bedbugs and roaches were so numerous it was nothing unusual when changing one's clothes to go home to find he had carried considerable of these vermin with him into his house

to the distress of his wife and children (Koss, p.7).

These conditions were known to the Commissioner. In March 1917, Commissioner O'Meara forwarded a report on the deplorable conditions in many Station Houses to the City Council. This report highlighted that the City had not provided any new facilities to the Department since 1882. The City Council took no action on the report. The only avenue open to these officers to express themselves was their Social Club. This Club, which had been organized by Commissioner O'Meara, was the only access to the centralized bureaucracy of the department. O'Meara had unofficially listened to the Social Club committee on some matters in the department. In September 1917, Commissioner O'Meara was approached by a committee of police officers from the Social Club to express their concerns about their salaries and the possibilities of a raise. O'Meara was sympathetic to the officers' position, but with America entry into the World War, advised them to wait for a more auspicious time (Russell, 1975, p. 48).

Again the officers found themselves powerless to effect their conditions. While the Commissioner was sympathetic to their position, under the existing legislation the salary of the officers was set by the Mayor and the City Council.

However, the city government had no voice in the appointment of the Commissioner or his administration of the force. The officers were to become more and more disgruntled with not only their specific grievances but with their entire lack of ability to effect the situation. Rumors were circulating by the spring of 1918 concerning the situation in the department and the possibility of the officers forming a union and affiliating with the AFL. O'Meara wanted to silence these rumors and decided to issue an order to his force on this subject. A General Order, Number 129, was issued to the department on June 28, 1918 which stated:

It is probable that the printed rumors to the effect that members of the police department are discussing the advisability of organizing a union to be affiliated with the American Federation of Labor represent no substantial sentiment existing among them. Under ordinary conditions no attention would be paid to such rumors, but even though unfounded, they are likely to injure the discipline efficiency and even the good name of the force, and the times are so favorable to the creation of discontent among men who are bearing their share of the war burdens, though still at home, that I feel it to be my duty to make the situation clear.

There is no substantial disagreement as to the wisdom and even the necessity of maintaining unions among persons following the same industrial occupations.

Though a union of public employees,

as distinct from those composed of employees of private concerns, is in itself a matter of doubtful propriety, such union in any case and at the worst could affect the operations only of a particular branch of the city service. The police department, on the other hand, exists for the impartial enforcement of the laws, and protection of persons and property under all conditions. Should its members incur obligations to an outside organization, they would be justly suspected of abandoning the impartial attitude which heretofore has vindicated their good faith as against the complaints almost invariably made by both sides in many controversies.

It is assumed erroneously that agents of an outside organization could obtain for the police advantages in pay and regulations. This is not a question of compelling a private employer to surrender a part of his profits; it has to do with police service which is wholly different from any other service, public or private--a service regulated by laws which hold to a strict responsibility certain officials, of whom the Police Commissioner is one. The policemen are their own best advocates, and to suppose that an official would yield on points of pay or regulation to the arguments or threats of an outside organization if the policemen themselves had failed to establish their case would be to mark him as cowardly and unfit for his position.

I cannot believe that a proposition to turn the police force into a union, subject to the rules and direction of any organization outside the police department will ever be presented formally to its members, but if, unfortunately, such a question should ever arise, I trust that it will be answered with

an emphatic refusal by the members of the force who have an intelligent regard for their own selfrespect, the credit of the department and the obligations to the whole public which they undertook with their oath of office (Curtis, 1919, a, p.8-9).

O'Meara was confident that he had the situation in hand and these rumors of unionization would be ended. The Commissioner understood some frustration of the officers and personally approved of their request for a raise. During the summer of 1918, a committee from the Social Club met with the Commissioner concerning a salary raise. O'Meara knew he could not give the men a raise and arranged for meeting with Mayor Peters for the committee to present their case. At that meeting, Officer Michael Lynch, the President of the Boston Social Club, stated the case for the police pay raise. He asked for an across the board raise of \$200 a year. Peters listened but stated the city did not have the funds for this raise, but that the new city budget would be announced in December. He would see what he could do about this raise with the new budget.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS

The city's new budget was announced on December 7, 1918.

Peters planned to give a 10% pay raise, about \$100, to about 75% of the officers, those at maximum, and nothing to the rest of the force. The men and their representatives were very disappointed. To add to these problems, Commissioner O'Meara died suddenly on December 14 of a cerebral hemorrhage. The much revered architect of the then existing Boston Police Department was gone and the force was without its leader and there was no one of his eminence to fill the void. As required by the existing statutes, the Governor of Massachusetts, Governor McCall, who was in the last two weeks of his administration, appointed Edwin Curtis as the new Commissioner of the Boston Police Department.

The officers continued to press for their pay raise despite the change in the administration. A committee, lead by Michael Lynch, of four from the Boston Social Club was selected to meet with the Mayor and the new Commissioner. This meeting was held on December 26 at the Mayor's office. Lynch pressed their demands for an across the board raise of \$200, but the Mayor refused to consider it and stuck with his offer as outlined in the budget. The committee warned the Mayor of severe consequences if their demands were not met. Lynch warned that the best men would leave the job for better pay, leaving the department disorganized and the new Commissioner's

job much more difficult. The committee also warned the Mayor of what had happened in Montreal, where a recent police strike had led to costly rioting and disorders, and the committee "didn't want things to go in Boston as in Montreal" (Koss, p.30). In a statement to the press, Peters said that "while the word strike was not used the whole situation was far more serious than he realized" (Ibid).

The committee held a meeting, on December 30, with more than 700 officers of the Boston Social Club, to consider their salary demands. The meeting voted unanimously to stick to their demands for a \$200 raise. Following the meeting, Lynch met with the press and reminded them that the present police wages were voted them more than twenty years ago. He also stated that when asked to defer their salary question during the war, they did. For all of their cooperation with the city, this was the treatment they were receiving. This vote was taken after the new Commissioner had issued his first official statement, following his official swearing in. Curtis stated that he felt that any officer who was so dissatisfied with the department was free to resign. Subsequently, Curtis stated:

No increase in salaries can be given the police department except by concurrent action of the mayor and the police commissioner. Undoubtedly we

shall consult on the subject. Meanwhile, everyone should talk and act with moderation with regard to the matter. Knowing the membership of the department by reputation that they will gratefully accept our final decision (Russell, 1975, p.54-55).

The men continued to press for their raise and Clarence Rowley, the attorney for the Boston Social Club, asked to debate Commissioner Curtis on the police officers' salary question. Curtis refused, seeing no gain in such a debate, and stating, "I do not share your fear that there is a danger that our Police Department will be demoralized." Rowley used this occasion to issued a formal statement on the situation:

Boston police officers have worked faithfully more than 60 hours per week throughout the war; they have received no increase in pay for more than five years, while the pay of thousands of alien workmen has been advanced from 50 to 70 per cent or more, during the same period. The pay of cartmen has advanced very materially and the cost of living 72 per cent...

The effect of a demoralized Police Department will be immediate and will endanger life and property. The maintenance of law and order and the prevention of crime demands a properly governed and fairly paid Police Department (Ibid, p.55)

Discussions continued between the administration and the

officers' representatives. Finally, after the tax limit of the city was raised by the state legislature, Mayor Peters announced, on May 10, 1919, that with the prospects of the additional revenues, the city would raise the pay of both the police and firemen by \$200 a year. The officers had won their raise, but this raise came two years after the initial request and the skyrocketing cost of living had taken any joy from the officers.

Curtis backed away from contact with the Boston Social Club. As an offset to the Club, Curtis set up a Grievance Committee structure for the department. Under his plan, each division or Station Houses would elect one man to sit on this committee. However, from the start, the committee was doomed. Several press reports showed the elections had been tampered with by the divisional Captains, in an attempt to put their men on the committee. Curtis' Grievance Committee was to offer the men of the Boston Police Department no more of a voice in the affairs of the department than the Social Club had. Rumors continued to spread of the formation of a police union. Press reports recounted the change in the AFL charter allowing the formation of police unions. Certain factions of the Boston Social Club maintained that it was their unified militancy that had won the recent pay raise, not the benevolence of the

Mayor or Commissioner Curtis.

RUMORS

With these rumors spreading, Curtis felt that he had to restate the department's position on this matter. On July 29, 1919, Curtis issued a General Order on the subject. The Order stated:

I note that a movement among the members of the Boston police force to affiliate with the American Federation of Labor is actively on foot. I had hoped that the older men in the service who have served under my predecessor, Stephen O'Meara, who understood his attitude on such matters would have speedily and effectually terminated such a movement. Mr. O'Meara issued a General Order to the police force on June 28, 1918. I repeat to the members of the force what he said in that General Order, and trust that every member of the force will weigh every word carefully...

I desire to say to the members of the force that I am firmly of the opinion that a police officer cannot consistently belong to a union and perform his sworn duty. I am not an opponent of labor unions, and neither was Mr. O'Meara. He pointed out in well-chosen language that there is no question in the police department as to how much of an employer's profit should be shared with the workers. Policemen are public officers. They have taken an oath of office. That oath requires them to carry out the law with strict impartiality, no matter what their personal feeling may be. The

laws they carry out are laws made by the representatives of the people assembled in the Legislature. Therefore it should be apparent that the men to whom the carrying out of these laws is entrusted should not be subject to the orders or the dictation of any organization, no matter what, that comprises only one part of the general public. A man who enters the police force, as I have stated, takes an oath of office, and he should realize that his work is sharply differentiated from that of the worker in private employ. It is difficult to see, under these circumstances, what a policeman can hope to gain by the proposed affiliation, although it is easy to see how the other affiliated bodies may gain a great deal. Mr. O'Meara put it well when he said that "policemen are their own best advocates, and to suppose that an official would yield on points of pay or regulation to the arguments or threats of an outside organization if the policemen themselves had failed to establish their case would be to mark him as cowardly and unfit for his position."

As Police Commissioner for the City of Boston I feel it my duty to say to the police force that I disapprove of the movement on foot; that it my opinion it is not for the best interests of the men themselves; and that beyond question it is not for the best interest of the general public, which this department is required to serve (Curtis, 1919, a, p.9-10).

The Commissioner had made his position clear on the matter of police unionization and affiliation. Curtis was confident that his order would be sufficient to quash the unrest and grumbling in the ranks. His confidence was put to the test the following day. The following day, July 30, 1919,

the Boston Globe carried a story on the situation with the Police Department. Quoting an anonymous police sergeant, the paper reported that as many as 890 officers had signed up for the proposed union. A high number, considering the force had a total of 1544 patrolmen. If this report was correct, almost 60% of the men were prepared to defy the Commissioner's new order and move forward with their plans for a union.

To clarify their position, the officers of the Boston Social Club called an emergency meeting of the members at the Intercolonial Hall for August 1. This meeting was to consider the Commissioner's adamant stand on unionization and a committee report on the advisability of forming a union and affiliating with the AFL. Michael Lynch, the President of the Club, extended an invitation to Commissioner Curtis to address the meeting, which he promptly declined. In spite of Curtis' failure to appear, many of the speeches were praiseful of the Commissioner's role in winning the men their recent raise from the City Administration. Nevertheless, the general tone of the meeting was militant. The gathering was packed, as well more than 1400 members attended. The outcome of the meeting could be predicted. The vote was taken and 940 officers vote for the formation of a union and affiliation with the AFL. Nearly 500 other members at the meeting abstained from the vote and not

one "NO" vote was cast. The officers of the Boston Social Club had their directions from the members.

UNIONIZATION INEVITABLE

Following this meeting, press reports described the unionization of the Boston police as inevitable. One report in the Boston Herald, August 2, 1919, stated:

That the policemen of Boston will ask the American Federation of Labor for a union charter was practically assured at a meeting composed of more than 1400 patrolmen held last night in Roxbury last night...The members were unanimous in demanding relief from the present conditions. Commissioner Curtis who had been invited by President Michael Lynch and the members of his committee to address the meeting was forced to decline owing to ill health...The efforts of Commissioner Curtis to improve the working conditions of the men and obtain a salary increase for them was praised by every speaker.

The position of the officers was now clear. Despite the General Order issued by Curtis, the men would move ahead with their plans for both a union and affiliation. A confrontation seemed certain. The situation, however, remained quiet. "If quiescent Boston grew more conscious of the imminence of a police crisis, it was due more to police disturbances

elsewhere in the nation and the world" (Russell, 1975, p.74). Boston newspapers carried headlines of the police strike in the United Kingdom and the rioting in Liverpool. While at home, the firm opposition of Jersey City's Mayor, Frank Hague, to a police union was leading the headlines. Closer to home, the papers reported that Brockton and Lynn, Massachusetts, police forces were unionizing and Springfield and New Bedford, Massachusetts, police were demanding salary increases (Koss, p.46).

This quiet was to prove the quiet before the storm. The policemen of the Boston Social Club were quietly moving ahead with their plans for unionization. The committee had, on August 8, officially asked for a union charter from the AFL. The charter was granted almost immediately on August 9, and Local 16,807, Boston Police Department, was officially organized. The Boston Herald, August 11, carried the details of organization. The formal acceptance of their new charter was set for August 15, at Fay Hall in Roxbury where Frank McCarthy, the New England organizer of the AFL, would turn over the charter to the men. That same day, acting on these press reports, Curtis moved quickly and forcibly. Curtis stated that he was compelled to promulgate a new rule, since no attention was paid to the disapproval "of both the present

and former Commissioner." That order stated:

GENERAL ORDER No. 110.

It is or should be apparent to any thinking person that the police department of this or any other city cannot fulfill its duty to the entire public if its members are subject to the direction of an organization existing outside the department. It is a well-recognized fact that a police officer is not an employee but a State officer. He is charge with an impartial enforcement of the laws under the direction of a commissioner who is himself a statutory officer. The following rule interferes in no wise in a policeman's interests and activities as a man and a citizen. It does, however, forbid him and the department from coming under the direction and dictation of any organization which represents but one element or class of the community. If troubles and disturbances arise where the interests of this organization and the interests of other elements and classes in the community conflict, the situation immediately arises that always arises when a man attempts to serve two masters, -he must fail either in his duty as a policeman, or in his obligation to the organization that controls him. Therefore the following is hereby added to and made a part of Rule 35 of the Rules and Regulations, and designated as section 19 of said rule:--

19. No member of the force shall join or belong to any organization, club or body composed of present or present and past members of the force which is affiliated with or a part of any organization, club or body outside the department, except that a post of the Grand Army of the Republic, the

United Spanish War Veterans and the American Legion of World War Veterans may be formed within the department (Curtis, 1919, a, p.10-11).

Expectedly, this issuance was met by vocal opposition from the officers and their supporters. The AFL's man, McCarthy called Curtis' order "amazing, unfair, coercive, unsound in law as it is unAmerican in principle" (Boston Herald, August 13, 1919). Several newspapers ran articles in support of Curtis' position. The conservative Herald warned the police "to regard themselves as officers of the law, representing all the people, and to trust to the public for a satisfactory share of the product of the community" (Koss, p.50). On the other side the Labor World argued, "Leaving out all the pretty theories and grandiloquent phrases about their duty to the State, can a man...even live on such a wage? No, he manages to exist, that is all" (Slater, p.15). James Vahey, the counsel who engineered the victory of the Carmen's Union and the recently hired counsel to the police union, threatened to ask for an injunction against Curtis' illegal act. Vahey contended that as workers the police were covered by a 1909 law, which states:

No person by himself or by his agent
may coerce or compel a person into a
written or oral agreement not to join

or become a member of a labor organization as a condition of his securing employment of such person (Peters, 1947, p.11).

NEW FORMS

Curtis felt that he had the public's support and moved forward with his initial plans. He ordered a rush order from the City's printing office. Curtis ordered one thousand suspension and discharge forms, which were delivered on August 14, one day before the hand over of the new union charter. The forms were under the letterhead, "City of Boston Police Department, Office of the Commissioner," and read:

a) To _____

Boston Police Officer

By authority conferred on me by the Police Commissioner, you are hereby suspended until further order of said Commissioner. The cause and reasons for such suspension are as follows:

Specifications _____

Signed _____
Michael H. Crowley, Superintendent

b) To _____

Boston Police Officer

By authority conferred on me by
the Police Commissioner, I hereby
discharge you from the Police Department.
The cause and reasons for such discharge
are as follows:

Specifications_____

Signed_____
Edwin U Curtis
Police Commissioner for the City
of Boston (Koss, p.55)

If these notices were meant as intimidation for the officers who were scheduled to meet the following day, they did not achieve their end. The arranged meeting of the officers took place at the Fay Hall on the afternoon and evening of August 15. The final outcome of these meetings, after a vociferous and animated meeting, was that the officers voted unanimously to accept the AFL charter and Local 16807 was officially begun. Following this official act, the membership elected the first official slate of officers of the union, who names were kept secret.

The officers had cast their fate to the wind. The new officers of the Police Union knew they had their work cut out for them. Within 24 hours, they were meeting with officers of the Boston Central Labor Union (BCLU), the principal coordinating body for all AFL unions in the city. The policemen won the full support of the BCLU and their pledge of

support. The assembly decried Curtis' action as un-American and tyrannical. The assembly also voted to support the collective bargaining rights of the officers with necessary actions. The Boston Globe, August 18, quoted one official as saying, "if Curtis discharged a single person, the entire force would walk out."

Almost as a counter-balance to this reports from the BCLU, Governor Calvin Coolidge gave a statement to the press in support of Commissioner Curtis. Coolidge was quoted as:

I am thoroughly in sympathy with the attitude of the Commissioner as I understand it...I sincerely hope the matter will be adjusted amicably, but I have every confidence in the ability and judgement of Mr. Curtis and I intend to support him in any action he may take. Mr. Curtis is the Police Commissioner and I intend to allow him a free hand in the management of the department (Peters, 1947, p.12).

Events were starting to move quickly. The BCLU girded itself for battle. Several unions, including the Firemen's Union, voted to directly support the police to the point of a general strike. Various press reports claimed that more than 80,000 unionized workers in Boston were ready for a general strike in support of the policemen's right to unionized and

affiliate with the AFL. One paper, the Boston Herald, editorialized on the seriousness of the situation:

Seldom has the feeling in this community been more tense than it is today over the conditions in the police department...We shall take a long step toward "Russianizing" ourselves, or toward submitting to soviet rule if we, by any pretext, admit an agency of the law to become the servant of a special interest. We have entire confidence that Commissioner Curtis will stand firm... We believe the "solid right-thinking people of the state" will take this stand (August 19).

Curtis was aware of his stance's unpopularity with the labor organization and their political supporters in Boston. To counteract his position, he authorized the issuance of a circular with facts about him (Boston Police Department, 1919, c). In this circular, he laid out that in a relatively short time in office, 8 months, he had a complete inspection done of every station house in the department and the results furnished to the Mayor, who "no doubt, (is) proceeding with all expedition possible." He also hailed his part in successful securing the recent \$200 raise for the force. After reciting several minor changes in the regulations he allowed, to make the policemen's lot better, he reproduced, in whole, two letters from the officers of the Boston Social Club

complimenting him on his stand on various matters. One letter, May 12, 1919, thanked him for providing refreshments, at his own expense, for a large detachment of men on parade duty. The second letter, July 16, 1919, again praised him for his efforts on several items "vital" to the police. This letter cited his "champion(ing)" the non-contribution pension, which the police had recently been given. The Commissioner tried to show himself as sympathetic to the officers demands.

However, the men did not see this. Michael Lynch, the president of the Social Club was later quoted as saying that the department's longstanding grievances continued to plague the men and that "unionization at first was neither 'the will nor the wish of the majority of the Social Club' and that affiliation with the AFL developed from the dissatisfaction of a minority" (Fitzgerald, p.35). Events would move the officers and their Commissioner into direct confrontation.

The men moved toward the official foundation and membership of the union. On the evening of August 20, the men met at Fay Hall and elected a slate of union officials, all police officers, for their new union. Curtis acted quickly and issued a special order summoning eight of the new union officials to his office. Upon their arrival, each man was

interviewed by Superintendent Crowley on their union membership and activities and their awareness of rule 35. While these meeting were going on, the Commissioner was meeting with members of the City Council. Following this meeting, the City Council issued a statement which stated that Curtis did not believe that police officers were "employee's in the ordinary sense" and union membership "is not compatible with their duties to the people and to the state" (Koss, P.73).

NECESSARY STEPS

Following the events of the day, Curtis issued General Order 119, canceling all leave for detectives and superior officers, and requested the notification of all retired officers of the possibility of recall to active duty. The Commissioner would take steps necessary for the preservation of law and order. Almost as if requested, the Boston Chamber of Commerce, one of the most influential groups in the City, issued a statement (see the Storrow Report, Appendix 29, for the complete statement) in support of the Commissioner. The Chamber of Commerce believed it was "impossible that he (the Police officer) should be actually affiliated with any outside body which shall in the least influence his action as an

impartial upholder of the law." It went on to say "that the present difficulty is not at all with the general principal of organized labor. It is whether officials of the law should themselves be affiliated with labor unions and subject to the direction of their leaders." The statement made clear its position in its final sentence, "No man can serve two masters." This statement was followed by several newspaper editorials also supporting the Commissioner's stance.

The opposition was quick to move to counter balance these reports. In a statement issued by Frank McCarthy, the AFL's man in Boston, the union would not:

in any manner interfere with the executive direction of the department..
.(the union would) lend assistance within legal lines in protecting the economic condition of the Boston Police and establishing within the department the principle of collective bargaining in all matters affecting the working conditions of the police (Boston Herald, August 21, 1919, p.4).

The matters came to a head when Curtis issued a statement to the press that he had decided to bring charges "against eight men for violation of Rule 35 and that the hearing will be on Tuesday next" (Ibid, p.1). The headline of the Boston Herald roared, WAR ON POLICE UNION IS ON. As Curtis was

distributing his notice, a committee from the BCLU was meeting with Governor Coolidge, Commissioner Curtis' direct supervisor. This committee tried to reaffirm labor's belief that this situation was a fight of organized labor, not merely a police affair. Organized labor was in full support of the officer's right to belong to a union and unions would react in sympathy to any actions against their brothers. "Coolidge listened with silent impassivity, merely remarking afterward that he stood by his earlier statement" (Russell, 1975, p.88), in full support of the Commissioner.

VOLUNTEER POLICE

Following this, on August 23, Curtis authorized the forming of a Volunteer police force and called retired Superintendent Pierce out of retirement to organize and train this new force. To add to this mix, Curtis authorized the buying of 500 badges to be given to this new force. The next day advertisements appeared in the newspapers for the Volunteer Police, and there stated:

Able-Bodied Men willing to give
their services in case of the necessity
for part of the day or night for the
protection of persons or property in
the City of Boston.

Apply to me at Room B, Third Floor,

Chamber Of Commerce Building, Boston--daily
except Sundays.

William H. Pierce
Supt. of Police (retired)
(Ibid, P.89)

The recruitment of this Volunteer police force was to be a special irritant to the officers. The overwhelming majority of members of the department were Irish Catholics. These officers saw the Volunteer force, made up primarily of businessmen and Harvard students, as the reaffirmation of their lower social status. The willingness of the Boston's Brahmins to reaffirm their position of authority in the City and over the police and the Irish was to rub old wounds. The officers saw these "sentiments as proof that old-time Bostonians continued to regard them as an inferior group, still not fully assimilated after nearly a century" (O'Connor, p.193).

Curtis was beginning to show his hand. On the labor side, the BCLU call a meeting on Sunday of all its member unions to discuss the police union situation. This meeting resulted in the unanimous vote of all 300 delegates to support their new brothers in the police union. Following this vote, the AFL man's, McCarthy, stated:

We have a serious situation to face if Commissioner Curtis goes through with his program, and I have no doubt that he will try as he has the support of those higher up and the organized interests of capital. He is trying to create the impression that the ultimate direction of the affairs of the city will be by the militia, but I want to warn him and his backers that the time when a soldier takes orders to work against his brothers and sisters is past (Koss, p.81).

Another speaker at this meeting, Councilman Moriarty, urged the delegates to give the Governor the fight of his life and implored them to tie up the city if "any policeman is discharged" (Ibid, p.82). Curtis moved ahead with the departmental trials of those charged with violation of Rule 35. Eight officers were tried on August 26 and a further eleven were tried on August 29. This nineteen constituted all the officers and leaders of the new union. The official view of this matter was presented in a departmental issuance, Undisputed Facts in Boston Police Situation. Curtis stated:

At the request of the counsel for the men The Commissioner heard the cases himself instead of referring them to a trial board. There was no denial of the facts. The men persisted, and the Counsel, argued that the rule was invalid, unreasonable...

The Commissioner took the case under advisement and went into the Law of the matter extensively. While he was so doing

these men were not inactive, but continued vigorously their work of getting more members of the department to join their Union. The Commissioner found the men guilty and delayed imposing the finding.

He suspended his finding on the cases of these nineteen men, merely suspending them from duty (Boston Police Departments, 1919, b).

STORROW COMMITTEE

In an attempt to forestall the coming confrontation, Mayor Peters issued a statement appointing a citizen's committee, chaired by James Storrow, to look into these matters and report to him. In charging the committee, Peters stated:

The issue between the commissioner and the policemen is clear cut. It is the question of whether the policemen have a right to form a union and become affiliated with the A.F. of L...But it is argued that policemen are not, in this sense, ordinary workers; that they are in reality public officials...(But) Policemen are human, like the rest of us...I earnestly hope both the A.F. of L. and the Boston police officers will voluntarily relinquish their plan (Storrow Report, Appendix 2).

The Mayor's statement and position were not universally applauded. Henry Long, Governor Coolidge's Secretary,

characterized the position as acting without any legal authority since the Mayor had no direct control over the police department (p.5). Mayor Peters agreed with this characterization and later wrote, "In the minds of the informed there is little doubt that, had the Police Commissioner been responsible to the Mayor at the time of the strike in 1919, much confusion and consequent loss of life and property might have been avoided" (Peters, 1947, p.8). The Committee moved quickly and held a series of meetings with the police officers' counsels from August 28 to September 1.

The committee moved quickly in making recommendations that it thought would ameliorate the situation (for the complete detail see the Storow Report and Appendix). The basic finding of the committee would allow the officers to form an in house union, the Boston Policemen's Union. This Union, the Report recommended, should deal with "questions arising relating to hours and wages and physical conditions of work" and should "not apply to question of discipline." It also recommended that no actions should be taken against any member of the force "because of any prior affiliation with the American Federation of Labor" (Storow Report, Appendix 8). The plan which was transmitted to Commissioner Curtis, by Mayor Peters, with assurances of his "whole-hearted support in

making the plans suggested in the report effective" (Ibid, Appendix 9). Curtis was prompt in his response to the plan. He stated:

The Commissioner can discover nothing in the communication transmitted by Your Honor and relating to action by him which appears to him to be either consistent with his prescribed legal duties or calculated to aid him in their performance. The Commissioner approves necessary betterment in the economic conditions of the Police Force of the City of Boston and has heretofore expressed such approval, but these are not the conditions which require his present action.

The Commissioner has therefore felt compelled to proceed to make his findings upon the complaints pending before him pursuant to the adjournment of such action heretofore declared (Ibid, Appendix 10).

FINDINGS

The situation was moving towards a conclusion. Curtis was determined to move forward with his finding, despite efforts by both the Storrow Committee and the Mayor to win a postponement of any action in these matters. On Monday, September 8, 1919 his report was issued. In his lengthy decision, Findings of Police Commissioner Curtis in the matter of complains against certain patrolmen for violation of the provisions of Section 14 of Rule 35 of the Rules and

Regulation of the Police Department of the City of Boston,

Curtis gave a legalistic statement as to his verdict. The Commissioner cited:

I conclude therefore upon the consistent and decisive authority of the adjudications referred to, the rule here in question does not infringe upon any constitutional protection...The objections submitted in behalf of the accused in this regard appear to be wholly untenable and must be disregarded...

I am of the opinion that the duties and the services of a member of the police force with relation to state or city are not those of an employee or to be defined or limited by the mere contractual relations as between employees and employers, the relation of master and servant does not exist.

The police officer...was not a servant or agent of the city...He was a public officer appointed to discharge important duties...(p.13).

Absolutely convinced, as I am, of the occasion and necessity of the rule to secure that harmony in service, that undivided allegiance to the public, that impartiality of judgement and action vitally essential to a police force, which is the last line of public defense and protection...

This separation and protection against the possible taint of disqualifying interest ...is a salutary principle of our law. Adhering to it, I deem that I am required by the duties and obligations of my office, and in obedience to my conception enforce the regulation, for violation of which the

accused have been brought to trial (Curtis, 1919, a, p.25-26).

Curtis was convinced of his position. After all, Curtis, as described by Russell, considered the officers "his men" and "his orders were to be obeyed without question" (1956, p.404-405). He had decided to move forward with his findings and disregard any attempt at compromise offered by Mayor Peters and his Citizens Committee Report. Mayor Peters had attempted to bring Governor Coolidge, the Commissioner's only superior, into the fray by giving a copy of the Storrow Report to him over the weekend. The Governor proved elusive. This was not unusual for Coolidge. One of his much quoted statements to a subordinate revealed his views. "Never go out to meet trouble. If you will just sit still, nine cases out of ten someone will intercept it before it reaches you" (Asinof, p.158).

Coolidge had been asked to meet with the Mayor and the members of his committee prior to Curtis' findings, to discuss a compromise, but declined to interfere and "he did not consider it is duty to communicate with the Commissioner on the subject" (Koss, p.133). When the Storrow Report was issued, the Mayor made several attempts over the weekend to locate and deliver the report to the Governor. Indeed, the Mayor's private secretary, E. Parker, stated "that the

Governor was very difficult to reach throughout the strike period" and "In his opinion the Governor was avoiding committing himself on a doubtful issue by keeping out of sight" (Peters, 1947, p.22).

Faced with this elusiveness, the Mayor decided to issue the report to the newspaper on Sunday night, for the Monday morning editions. The plan was well received by the newspapers and the public. The facts of the case against the nineteen officers and the deplorable working conditions and salary grievances of officers were generally agreed upon. The matter of affiliation with the AFL was another matter and this report offered a compromise and a way out of this situation and a possible police strike to "right thinking people." One newspaper, the Boston Globe, stated that "For either the commissioner or the police to refuse this solution of the difficulty would be a grave mistake" (September 8, 1919).

Peters was still attempting to meet with the Governor when the papers were spreading their reports to the public. In an attempt to formalize the process, Mayor Peters delivered a copy of the report, by letter, to the Governor's office on Monday, September 8, in the afternoon. The letter stated, in part:

The solution of the problem presented in the report of my Committee, it seems to me, is a basis for a satisfactory solution of the situation.

I have been and am still trying to get in touch with you on the telephone this afternoon, as I should like to go over the matter with you personally; and I am now sending this information to you at the State House in order that it may be laid before you at the earliest possible moment.

In addition to this correspondence, I personally laid the matter before the Commissioner at a conference this noon and am unable to obtain his approval. I am now presenting it to you with my strong opinion that it offers a basis of solution. I hope you may feel that you can take steps to assist in the solution suggested, and I am glad myself to cooperate in any way possible (Storrow Committee, Appendix 11).

Coolidge chose to remain above the fray and took no action to refrain the Commissioner from issuing his findings. Curtis ordered that his findings in this matter be read at the afternoon roll call to keep the entire department aware of the case. The Commissioner's only action towards a compromise was the suspension of his sentence of dismissing the nineteen officers:

Police Commissioner Curtis suspends the sentence to be imposed on each case upon said finding of guilty, and pending the imposition of said sentence, and by virtue of Rule 40 of the Rules and

Regulations of the Department suspends from duty each of the following named patrolman... (Koss, p.159).

Curtis stated that he issued this order to give the nineteen officers time to reconsider their membership in the illegal union and resign from it. Curtis stated he did this because he was "without the power to reinstate them" (Curtis, 1919, b) if they were discharged. Curtis' orders were read at roll call throughout the department on Monday evening. These orders were greeted by "wild cheers" in some station houses and "union officers enacted scenes such as have never been witnessed in police circles in this city..." (Peters, 1947, p.23). The officers were cheered by the decision of the Commissioner to force a showdown.

A VOTE

For its part, the Police Union had previously scheduled a meeting of the membership on Monday night, in anticipation of Curtis' findings. The Union meeting at Fay Hall took place with the nineteen suspended officers chairing the meeting. These officers had just come from their respective station houses after surrendering their badges, guns and other equipment. The meeting would prove to be long and eventful.

John McInnis, the newly elected president of the union and newly suspended officer, gave a lengthy statement trying to summarize the events of the last few weeks, including the various meetings with the Mayor's committee and the report of his committee. McInnis told of the poor working conditions, the low wages, the petty bureaucrats and the overall loss of position in the community. He saw no hope for the men other than affiliation with the AFL. He warned "that the union `has once and for all come to stay" (Koss, p.161).

While the union was engaged in its meeting, the Mayor and James Storrow, Chairman of the Committee, succeed in meeting with the Governor. The meeting took place in the Adams House Hotel on Monday evening. Coolidge advised that he was in the western part of the state, Northampton, where he maintained a house, and had only such now driven back. In a statement, the Governor's private secretary, Henry Long, described the Governor as hurrying back to Boston by automobile (p.9), taking over three hours for the trip and seeing fit to stop along the way. The Mayor and his committee were sure that the union would call a strike and wanted the Governor to intervene. Coolidge was not sure a strike was imminent and restated his support for Curtis. Indeed, at a private meeting with Curtis, Coolidge, after reading the recommendations of

the Storrow Committee, told Curtis, "we have to give in or there will be trouble." Curtis was sure of his decision and answered, "If we give in now there will be no army, no police force, no government and this whole great country will fall to pieces--look what happened in Seattle!" (Russell, 1975, p.117)

Coolidge concluded by saying that he would keep himself available and advised that if the Mayor and the City authorities wanted to go forward with a pay raise for the police they were free to do so. Storrow questioned the matter of public order if the police struck and advised that 3000 or 4000 troops of the State Guard be mobilized. The State Guard was a volunteer militia which was organized after the national guard had been called to federal service in the World War. Coolidge also declined this request finding that Commissioner Curtis had things in hand and both felt that if a strike occurred it would not amount to much. Peters again asked for the troops, telling Coolidge, "I know you are running for reelection and that you do not want trouble with labor...All right, let me take the responsibility, call out the troops at my request" (Ibid, p.120). Following this meeting, Peters complained, "They frosted me out" (Ibid). There is some debate as to the exact conversation in this meeting. Coolidge stated to the Boston Herald:

I made no such statement...I told the Mayor that he had the authority, under the law, to call out the units of the State Guard that are located in Boston and that I, of course, could call out those units and also other units in the state. I further said to him that if he did not care to exercise his authority in the first instance, I would, on his request, call out the troops if he should request me to do so (September 11, 1919).

The dispute of the details of this meeting continued for several years. Peters and Henry Wyman, the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth under Coolidge, indulged in a debate, via the newspapers, in the 1924 Presidential debates, with little results. The discussion of the debate of these conversations is reviewed in Robeson Peters work. However it should be noted that Robeson Peters is the nephew of Mayor Peters.

The question of a strike was to be settled in Fay Hall. The membership of the Boston Policemen's Union, Number 16307, began a vote at 9.45 p.m. The choice was no-strike or strike, by paper ballot. The balloting went on until to 2 a.m. on Tuesday, September 9. The results were clear before midnight. The votes were overwhelmingly for a strike. The vote was 1134 for a strike and two opposed (Russell, 1975, p.113). One author, Koss, claimed that 1375 members voted (p. 162) for a strike with no opposed votes. Both reports are based upon

differing newspaper accounts. Regardless of the numbers, over 80% of the officers on the force had voted for a strike to begin the following afternoon, September 9.

CURTIS' PLAN

Curtis had informed the Governor and the Mayor of his plans for the public safety. Curtis stated (Boston Police Department, 1919, d) he had organized a volunteer police force, of several hundred men, and had asked his only superior, the Governor, to have troops prepared for a prompt mobilization. The Commissioner had also asked and received from the Governor, the assistance of the State Police and the Metropolitan Police Force, the latter being the specialized force of the Metropolitan Park District. More than sixty State Police and one hundred Park policemen were made available to the Commissioner. "Subsequent events have shown that the Metropolitan Police did not the efficient service the Police Commissioner had the right to expect." Indeed, these officers were seeking membership in the union and fifty-three of these officers refused street duty and were suspended. These suspended officers then marched in a group, minus their badges and guns, to Fay Hall to join their brother officers. Eventually, nineteen of the Metropolitan officers were fired

for disobedience to orders (Peters, 1947, p.30-31).

Prior to the police walk out at 5:45 p.m., September 9, the Governor wrote to the Mayor to reaffirm his position, or lack thereof. He stated:

It seems plain that the duty of issuing orders and enforcing their observance lies with the Commissioner of Police and with that no one has any authority to interfere...

Regarding the matter of improvements in the conditions of employment in the police department of Boston, the law requires that they be initiated by the Mayor and City Council, subject to the approval of the Commissioner. If wages, hours or station houses ought to be improved, such improvements can be initiated by the Mayor...I believe such improvements or such parts thereof as can be, should be made forthwith, accompanied by a statement that such additional improvements will be made at the earliest possible time ...

There is no authority in the office of the Governor for interference in making of orders by the Police Commissioner or in the action of the Mayor and the City Council. The foregoing suggestion is therefore made, as you will understand, in response to a request for suggestions on my part. I am unable to discover any action that I can take (Storrow Committee, Appendix 12).

Coolidge had again managed to "dodge the bullet" and pass

responsible to someone, anyone else. The bureaucratic dance was coming to a close as the strike deadline neared. Curtis believed he could handle the situation with eight hundred patrolmen staying on duty and two hundred and twenty-five superior officers. The force would have over one thousand men for duty. Curtis was to be surprised.

5:45 P.M.

At 5:45 p.m., September 9, the officers of the Boston Police Union walked off their jobs. The total number of officers who left duty rose to "1,117 patrolmen out of 1,544 in the department" (Curtis, 1919, a, p.5). Curtis was shown to be completely out of touch with the actual situation in the rank and file. One by one, the officers at the various stations left duty or refused to turn out. Most of the officers left with minor incidents. However, a large crowd, estimated at 1,200 people began throwing mud and stones. The remaining handful of officers were hard pressed to keep control of the station houses. By 8.00 p.m., crowds had gathered in Harvard Street and the appearance of four non-striking officers attracted the crowd. The crowd became a mob and backed the officers into the wall of a building. The officers drew their clubs and managed to disperse the crowd

without incident. One man, Charles Wood, described the evening as:

I stood on the upperside of Scollay Square at nine o'clock at the night of the "Police Strike"...Then, without apparent leadership, several men started toward Washington Street. Others followed, unhurried, still aimless...Mostly silent, or talking in low tones, like those you hear before funeral services begin. There was an air of expectancy without knowing what was expected. There was no patrolman. No police power. None in sight. The people were "on their own." For over three hours nothing happened.

Then came the sound of two hard substances in sharp impact, followed a second later by a louder one and the thrilling crash of falling, splintering glass. A plate show window had been shattered. Instantly the window and its immediate vicinity were filled with struggling men, a mass of action, from which emerged from time to time bearers of shirts, neckties, collars, hats. In a few seconds the window was bare. Some with loot vanished...Lootless ones were attacking the next window...

None appeared who failed to show a desire to take part in the looting. The sense of distinction between right and wrong which had been emphasized by nearly three hundred years of discipline disappeared in three hours. I did not, until then, realize how frail we are, how thin the veneer of civilization, how easily we may be led into a situation capable of breaking down defenses which most of us indifferently accept as a matter of fact, because they are existing order (Wood, p.10-11).

The city was turning and the police were gone. Curtis did not want to deploy the five hundred or so volunteer police officers before the actual walkout and by now, late in the evening, it was difficult to contact the volunteers. Indeed, no volunteer officers were to take to the streets until the following day, Wednesday, September 10, at 8:00 a.m.. The volunteer officers grew to well more than one thousand by Wednesday afternoon. This recruiting was spurred by advertisements in the papers, which stated that the real question of these actions was who "shall assume control of the destinies not merely of the city but inevitably of the Republic itself" (Boston Globe, September 10, 1919). Many of the volunteers were students of Harvard College, whose president, Lowell, urged "all students who can do so to prepare themselves for such service as the governor of the commonwealth may call upon them to render" (Ibid). Curtis had also misjudged the situation in not asking for, and in fact declining on several occasions, the offer, of both the Mayor and the Governor, to have the State Guard stand by at its armories for any eventualities.

THE CITY IS DEFENSELESS

The disorders continued to spread on Tuesday night and by

midnight a crowd of ten thousand filled the area around Dorchester Street. Violence and rioting broke out as groups burned cars and trolley cars. Over \$20,000 worth of merchandise was stolen or destroyed in several hours (Boston Herald, September 10, 1919). By early morning on Wednesday, the lawlessness had spread to several sections of the city. Governor Coolidge was not to know of this until he awoke on Wednesday, because he gave specific orders not to be disturbed during the night (Koss, p.189). According to one author, Russell, the principal reason for Coolidge's not wanting to be disturbed was a tussle between himself and Mayor Peters. According to this report, Coolidge had gone to the Commonwealth Armory to meet with some of the Guard officers. Peters came to the Armory, in search of the Governor, and met him on the staircase, as he was leaving. Coolidge, after some conversation with Peters, told the Mayor, "You have no business here!" This was it for the Mayor and he landed a punch "squarely in the governor's left eye...Troopers seized the gesticulating mayor" (1975, p.129-30). From the armory, Coolidge went back to his undistributed sleep.

Mayor Peters was to be informed of the chaos earlier than his colleagues. "At 2:30 Wednesday morning, the Mayor's secretary drove to his home in Jamaica Plain, and told him of

the rioting in the city...Peters instructed his secretary to summon his advisers...and to...communicat(e) with the commanding officers of the State Guard units located in Boston" (Peters, 1947, p.36).

Peters had previously been informed of his authority to call up some units of the Guard by Commissioner Curtis and this was reinforced in a letter from Curtis delivered in the early morning of September 10 (Storrow Report, Appendix 18). In this letter, Curtis reminded the Mayor of his authority under Chapter 327, Part I, Section 26 of 1917. This statute read, in part:

In case of a tumult, riot, mob or a body of persons acting together by force to violate or resist the laws...or...when the unusual police provisions are inadequate...the mayor of a city...may issue a precept...to any commander of a brigade...directing him...to aid the civil authority in suppressing such violation and supporting the laws; (Ibid, Appendix 19).

Peters was now armed with the legal authority to act and the morning newspapers called for it. "Somebody blundered! Boston should not had been left defenseless last night in the face of the rioting in Liverpool..." (Boston Herald, September 10, 1919). Peters was sure that Coolidge was using the police

situation to ruin him politically (Russell, 1975, p.129). His advisers told him to act and he did. The Mayor confirmed to the press that he had the "opportunity to consider the statement (of) Governor Coolidge, in which he tries to place on me the responsibility for the distressing disturbances...I think I am entitled to state the facts...I made every human effort to avoid the strike...but received no co-operation from the police commissioner and no help or practical suggestion from the governor" (Peters, 1947, p.40). Peters issued two proclamations, which in essence called out the units of the State Guard in Boston and assumed control of the Police Department. The first of these stated:

I have hitherto relied upon the statement of the Police Commissioner that he had complete control of the situation.

I am now in receipt of a communication from him in which, in substance, he says that riots are threatened, that the police provisions are inadequate to preserve order, and requests me to take the steps contemplated by the statutes of 1917, Chapter 327, Part 1, Section 26, namely; to call upon such militia within the City of Boston to preserve order.

This letter, coupled with the occurrence of last night, when substantial disturbances of public order took place, shows that the time has come when the business of preserving order should be concentrated in the hands of one person. Under such circumstances, the law places on the Mayor the power and

duty to assume control, and I propose from now on to see to it that order is preserved and persons and property are protected within the limits of the City of Boston. I have therefore issued the following proclamation; have called out such militia as are within the City, and have requested the Governor of the Commonwealth to furnish me with such additional troops as I consider necessary (Storrow Report, Appendix 20).

PETERS TAKES COMMAND

Peters was now starting to take control of the situation. He was also to issue a second proclamation assuming full control over the Police Department. The order stated in part;

(I) under the provision of Section 6, Chapter 323 of the Acts of 1885, assume control for the time being of the police of the said City of Boston, and call upon the Police Commissioner to execute all orders promulgated by me for the suppression of such tumult and the restoration of such public order (Ibid, Appendix 21).

Peters was now in sole control of the police and security forces for the City, and these forces were growing rapidly. A side light to Peters taking control of the Police Department was Curtis' fear that the Mayor would reinstate the union officials, in an attempt to quell the troubles. The

Commissioner immediately requested clarification of the situation from the State Attorney-General, who was quick to response that the Mayor lacked any authority "to direct the reinstatement of any police officer removed by the Commissioner" (Peters, 1947, p.70).

The State Guard, which Peters had called up in Boston, was composed of approximately 1,000 men, mostly of the Tenth Regiment (For a detailed description of the Regiment's activities, see D Of The Tenth). The State Guard was a volunteer militia formed after the national guard was federalized for the War effort. The Guard was described as "Made up of underage enthusiasts, the physically unfit, and the overaged who saw in domestic military service a recompense of sorts for the war they had missed..." (Russell, 1975, p.140). This amateur force was surprisingly quick to react to the call to arms.

The Commanding Officer of the State Guard was Brigadier General Samuel Parker, one of the only officials who actually took preparation for the eventualities of the police crises. Prior to the issuance of Commissioner Curtis' finding on Monday, September 9, the General saw fit, on Saturday, September 7, to order additional support units and motor

transports into the Boston area and to notify his subordinate to be ready for duty in Boston. Several officials were surprised at the speed with which the initial movement of troops appeared. Coolidge, in an attempt to show his support of the Mayor, issued an order calling the entire State Guard to duty in Boston. By Thursday, September 11, almost 5000 troops were on duty in the city (Adjutant General's Report, p.5).

By Wednesday, September 10, the first unit of the Guard began to patrol the streets at 5:00 p.m.. Disorders continued as the mob moved through various parts of the city (the best descriptions of the disorders are found in Koss, Russell and the Boston Herald). In Scollay Square, one of the most troublesome areas, fighting broke out between the volunteer police, the Guardsmen and a huge mob. The situation was saved only by the arrival of a troop of mounted cavalry. The sight of cavalry men charging, with sabers drawn, was enough to turn the tide (Koss, p.199). Disorders continued and several shots rang out, killing one man and wounding a woman. The strike had its first death. The Guard, with the cavalry units, continued to engage the crowd and by 11 p.m. order had been restored in Scollay Square. Guard units were placed at key locations around the city and machine gun units were placed at every

police station, to cower the mob.

Disorder spread to South Boston. Several thousand people had gathered in the area of Broadway and fell upon a group of volunteer police officers with cries of "Strikebreakers." These officers were saved by the arrival of a company of Guardsmen. Several shots rang out. The Guard Captain ordered "Make ready...Aim..." The troops fired into the crowd. The crowd ran, the mob was beaten, of course, two men were killed and nine people were wounded. But "the firing had a salutary effect; it cowed the mob" (Adjutant General's Report, p.25).

By Thursday, the forces of the State were in control of most of Boston. But the casualty list continued to rise. When troops breaking up dice games on Boston Common were met with resistance, the troops again fired, killing two and wounding several others. Also, the only striking policeman to die, Richard Reemts, was killed after attacking some of the volunteer police officers. Ironically, Reemts was shot by a bystander, not any of the security forces (Russell, 1975, p.164-65). The strike had now claimed seven dead and twenty-two people seriously injured (Koss, p.205). Now, with the Guardsman in control of the streets, the Governor choose this relatively safe moment to take center stage and assume control

of the situation.

COOLIDGE SEIZES THE OPPORTUNITY

Coolidge, after meeting with the commanders of the State Guard, issued a Proclamation on September 11, assuming control of the State Guard, the loyal Boston Police and indeed all police and security forces in the City. The Proclamation read:

The entire state guard of Massachusetts has been called out. Under the constitution the Governor is the commander-in-chief thereof by an authority of which he could not, if he chose, divest himself. That command I must and will exercise. Under the law I hereby call upon all the police of Boston who have loyally and in a never-to-be-forgotten way remained on duty to aid me in the performance of my duty in the restoration of order in the city of Boston, and each of such officers is required to act in obedience to such orders as I may hereafter issue or cause to be issued.

I call on every citizen to aid me in the maintenance of law and order (Storrow Report, Appendix 27).

Governor Coolidge immediately thereafter issued an executive order to the Police Commissioner and sent telegrams to the United States Secretaries of War and Navy. He also issued copies of these to the press for publication. The

executive order read:

You are hereby directed for the purpose of assisting me in the performance of my duty pursuant to the proclamation issued by me this day to proceed in the performance of your duties as police commissioner of the city of Boston under my command and in obedience to such orders as I should issue from time to time and to obey only such orders as I may issue or transmit (Boston Herald, September 12).

The Governor had effectively removed Mayor Peters' authority to act or have any direct involvement in the situation in Boston. Coolidge had effectively nullified Peters' proclamation and any control of the police or the troops. Coolidge had previously expressed fear that Peters may use his temporary authority over the Police Department to somehow interfere with the Commissioner's findings and win favor with the labor unions. "In fact, when Herbert Parker suggested that the Governor apprise Peters of his plans, (the two proclamations) the Governor dismissed the suggestion with the words: 'Let him find out in the papers' (Koss, p.218).

Following his official notification, the Mayor stated that Coolidge's actions disrupted his plan to control the situation in the city, which most felt was now in hand, and that he would have expected some prior notification. However,

under the law, Peters had no choice. For Peters this was a "coup d'etat. For Coolidge it was a stroke of luck. The governor, not the Mayor, would receive most of the credit for upholding the principle that the sole allegiance of policemen should be to the public" (McCoy, p.92).

Coolidge sought to secure his position as the defender of law and order with his telegrams to the War and Navy department. In these, he addressed his position on labor's suggested support of the police union's actions:

The entire state guard of Massachusetts has been called out. At present the city of Boston is orderly. There are rumors of a very general strike. I wish you to hold yourself in readiness to render assistance from forces under your control immediately on appeal which I may be forced to make to the President (Fuess, p.223).

Coolidge now had the possibility of more than twenty-five thousand soldiers and marines, hardened war veterans, in the Boston area at his disposal. As an explanation of the Governor's action, his secretary, Long, wrote:

A general strike of firemen, telephone operator and other unions was threatened. During the middle of

the second day conditions were in such a state of disorder that the Governor saw he must take charge of the situation. ..and restore law and order to the city. Governor Coolidge acted instantly, the duty now was upon his shoulders, he knew the course to pursue and immediately set about his task (p.11).

While this was the common perception of Coolidge's actions, he was not without his detractors. One of the leading authors on this side of the argument, stated:

The Governor, who up to that moment had been unwilling to assist in preventing the strike...now took his first public action...Coolidge sat discreetly on the fence until he saw on which side public sentiment was gathering. When this had manifested itself distinctly against the police, and after Boston's danger had been averted, Governor Coolidge climbed down from the fence on the side with the crowd and issued a bombastic proclamation...(Green, 1924, April, p.484).

A GENERAL STRIKE

Coolidge was less concerned about a general strike than he let on in public. Prior to the issuance of his proclaiming his assumption of command, he was visited by one of the most powerful labor leaders in the city, James Timilty. Timilty at

this time was head of the largest labor organizations in the State and was also a powerhouse in the Democratic party. He served as a State Senator and ward leader for the Democrats in Roxbury. The Senator had visited the Governor to give him his assurances of which path to take. Timilty told Coolidge:

I just went in to see my little pal and tell him not to worry over all this mush about a general strike. You know, I'm president of the largest labor organization in the state...with the largest membership of any union in Massachusetts. I just told Cal that 'we won't go out,' and we have more votes in the central labor organization than any of the others. You see, "Cal's my kind of a guy, and he's right about these damned cops" (White, W, p.156-57).

The threat of a general strike had also been lessened by the Mayor. Peters had been able to deal with the both the Fire Commissioner and the Department on a direct level, since there was no legislation placing the State government into the appointment or operation of the Fire Department. The Commissioner was a Mayoral appointment and Peters was free to deal with all these matters directly. He met with the fire union representatives and showed himself willing to discuss a salary increase. These discussions resulted in a firemen's union press release which described the Mayor as "a keen sympathizer with the underpaid workers of this city" (Boston

Herald, September 9). Additionally, as a precaution, motorized units of the State Guard had been held in reserve and organized as a fire fighting force (Peters, 1947, p.50). With these factors, there was little support to join a general strike. In fact, the fireman union, Local 19 of the International Association of Fire Fighters, later voted unanimously to withdraw from the AFL (Ibid).

Coolidge was now in control of all the security forces in Boston and had reassured his full support of Commissioner Curtis. Even his adversary, Mayor Peters, in the face of several newspaper editorials, had to issue a public statement of full support for the Governor and condemnation of any threats of a general strike. Peters stated that "on the of police affiliation with the A. F. of L., 'No compromise is possible" (Koss, p.226). The streets were now safe and well in hand of the security forces. The threat was still from labor.

The BCLU held a meeting of its 400 delegates on Thursday, September 11, to discuss the police union and its suppression by the City and State authorities. The meeting, which represented more than 80,000 workers, disappointingly, for the police union, resulted in no more than endorsements of the police union's stand. Even the telephone operators' union,

which had recently won a major victory with its strike against the phone company, and who had been a vocal support of the police union, voted only to support a general strike if all the union did and the walkout was "not confined to any particular group of unions" (Ibid, p.227). The striking policemen now realized that the cause could well be lost.

GENERAL ORDER 125

On Friday morning, following the results of the BCLU meeting, Commissioner Curtis, again in full command at Police Headquarters, issued General Order 125, firing all nineteen police officers who had been suspended for union membership. With news of the firing, Samuel Gompers, President of the AFL, and a cornerstone of organized labor, took a hand to try and quiet the situation. He telegraphed Governor Coolidge, and several other officials. He stated:

No man or group of man more genuinely regrets the present Boston situation than do the American Federation of Labor and I. You have undoubtedly been apprised of President Wilson's suggestion to the Commissioners of the District of Columbia who adapted a similar regulation to that adopted by Boston authorities ordering policemen not to be members or to retain membership in a Union affiliated to the American Federation of Labor. The President requested that such order be

held in abeyance and the entire matter remain in status quo until after the conference which he has called for October 6 for the consideration of all matters affecting the relations between workers and employers and workers standards. The Commissioners of the District of Columbia complied with the President's request. I therefore appeal to you and to the authorities who issued the order that its enforcement be deferred until after the Presidential conference. Am telegraphing the representative of the American Federation of Labor in Boston Mr Frank McCarthy, 30 Wheatland Avenue, to appeal to the Policeman's Union to cooperate and return to their posts just as if the order had not been issued at all upon information that the enforcement of the order has been postponed to await the outcome of the Presidential conference (Long, p.12).

To which Coolidge quickly replied to Mr. Gompers:

Under the law the suggestion contained in your telegram are not within the authority of the Governor of Massachusetts but only of the Commissioner of Police of the City. With the maintenance of discipline in his department I have no authority to interfere. He has decided that the men have abandoned their sworn duty and has accordingly declared their places vacant. I shall support the Commissioner in the execution of order (Ibid, p.13).

Coolidge had come down firmly on Curtis' side and Curtis was now free to take whatever actions he deemed appropriate.

Gompers knew he would have no success with Curtis and replied to Coolidge with:

Your telegram received. While I am not a responsible public official I assure you that I am as much concerned in the maintenance of law and order as anyone could be. The question at issue is not one of law and order but the assumption of an autocratic and unwarranted position by the Commissioner of Police who is not responsible to the people of Boston but who is appointed by you. Whatever disorder had occurred is due to his order in which the right of the policemen to organize has been denied, a right which has heretofore never been questioned. My appeal to you as Governor and to Hon. Andrew J. Peters, Mayor of Boston, was not to sustain lawlessness but to honorably adjust a mutually unsatisfactory situation.. .Nothing but good can result from favorable action upon my suggestion... (Ibid).

Curtis, with the full support of the Governor, issued a statement to the press on Friday evening confirming his instructions to his divisional Captains. It stated "That none of the police who failed to report for duty Sept. 9, 1919 or since that time may return to duty under any circumstance..." (Boston Herald, September 13). The same evening, he issued another statement to the press formally announcing that the desertion of duty of the striking officers had rendered their positions vacant and that he would now move forward to fill

these vacancies. He asked the State Civil Service Commission to speedily give him a list of candidates, and, as allowed by law, requested that returning veterans be given preference. The striking policemen's lot was all but lost. Their actions had been described as a crime against civilization by President Wilson and as an attempt to "Sovietize" the country by a leading United States Senator. Senator Myers went on to describe their action as "one of the most dastardly acts of infamy that has ever occurred in this country since the act of Benedict Arnold" (New York Times, September 12). Condemnation was flooding into their actions from every corner of the United States and from almost every political party.

NO RIGHT TO STRIKE

As a further set back to the striking officers, the AFL headquarters in Washington, D.C., issued a statement that "Mr. Gompers does not want a general strike and the Federation does not want a general strike" (Peters, 1947, p.49). The fate of the police union was all but sealed, the final coup de grace was to come from Governor Coolidge, in his reply to Gompers last telegram. That message read:

Replying to your telegram, I have already
refused to remove the Police Commissioner

of Boston. I did not appoint him. He can assume no position which the Courts would uphold except what the people have by the authority of their laws vested in him. He speaks only with their voice. The right of the police of Boston to affiliate has always been questioned, never granted, is now prohibited. The suggestion of President Wilson to Washington does not apply to Boston. There the police remained on duty. Here the Policemen's union left their duty, an action which President Wilson described as a crime against civilization. Your assertion that the Commissioner was wrong cannot justify the wrong of leaving the city unguarded. That furnished the opportunity; the criminal element furnished the action. THERE IS NO RIGHT TO STRIKE AGAINST THE PUBLIC SAFETY (*italics added*) by anybody, anywhere, any time. You ask that the public safety again be placed in the hands of these same policemen while they continue in disobedience to the laws of Massachusetts and in their refusal to obey the orders of the Police Department. Nineteen men have been tried and removed, Others having abandoned their duty, their places have, under the law, been declared vacant in the opinion of the Attorney General. I can suggest no authority outside the Courts to take further action. I wish to join and assist in taking a board view of every situation. A grave responsibility rests upon all of us. You can depend upon me to support you in every legal action and sound policy. I am equally determined to defend the sovereignty of Massachusetts and to maintain the authority and jurisdiction over her public officers where it has been placed by the Constitution and laws of her people (Boston Herald, September 14).

The simple phrase "There is no right to strike against

the public safety" was the finish of the Boston Police Union and for police unionization in the United States for some 50 years. This phrase also made Coolidge a national hero and assured his political career.

The Boston Police Department was now to change. Experienced men, some 1117, were fired by the Commissioner; a force which had been characterized as one of the best in the United States. The new force was to be described as, "Many of the new men were unequal to their tasks and had to be watched with special care. The police officials felt that they were doing well if they kept the system from breaking down completely" (Harrison, p.24). Boston would return to normal. The last of the State Guard would leave and be demobilized on December 21, 1919. This date also marked the completed recruitment of the new force. The new officers would also receive a raise of \$300 in salary and \$200 in uniform allowances. The Strikers were fired and would never return to the Boston Police Department. Like their British colleagues, several legal and political attempts were made to restore these officers to their jobs and pensions. None, like their British colleagues, succeeded. Unlike their British colleagues, there was no sustained effort to keep these officers out of policing. Many of these officers found work as

police officers in other departments in Massachusetts, some with the assistance of the Governor.

CHAPTER 7

THE AFTERMATH

Coolidge was almost unanimously applauded in editorials around the United States (see Koss and Russell). There was talk of his running for President. First, however, he was up for reelection as Governor in November 1919. In a speech before the election to the Middlesex Club, on October 27, 1919, just 10 days prior to that election, Coolidge stated:

Recent events here have turned the eyes of the Nation again towards Bunker Hill. What others see clearly there is a danger in the confusion of a campaign, we may fail to perceive.. .From then until now the question has been whether terrorism was to succeed. So long as law and order is maintained there is no terrorism...The terror of force has failed. The terror of falsehood is failing.

Coolidge's campaign and his political endorsements were to carry him to reelection. Indeed, he was returned to office by a plurality of 145,000, the largest majority of anyone elected to the Governorship in the history of the state. Even

the Democratic President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, telegraphed the Republican Governor on his victory. He wrote, "I congratulate you upon your election as victory for law and order. When that is the issue, all Americans stand together" (Boston Herald, November 6). With a huge victory and the growing national press acclamation of his position, the future was bright. One historian described this time as, "Thus the road to the presidency opened for Coolidge, The historical accident of the police strike gave Coolidge a national reputation that brought him to the vice presidency; thereafter President Harding's death made Coolidge president" (Koss, p.283-84). Coolidge, in his Autobiography, agreed with the prominence of the strike on his future. "No doubt it was the police strike of Boston that brought me into national prominence" (p.141).

The final chapter of Koss' work is titled "JUDGMENTS." Koss is detailed in his allocation of guilt. Russell, Peters, Green and White are all equally ready to spread the guilt for the situation in Boston. All agree that Curtis was not chastised for his lack of preparation in the face of a possible strike and that Mayor Peters did not get the credit he deserved for his actions and in the restoration of order. Curtis was to die in office on March 28, 1922. Peters was not

to hold elected office again. He died in 1938, in relative obscurity, his reputation ruined by news of his sexual affair with his cousin, a minor at the time (see Markey).

There were many wrong decisions and misread situations. Several authors assigned a good deal of the responsibility for the entire situation to organized labor. Russell described labor's support of the police as "weasel words." Koss described the police as "victims, organized labor from Samuel Gompers down is the nearest thing to the villain in the piece...despite all of its brave words...and frequent promises...Labor retreated and left the policemen to their fate" (p.340).

While there is much debate as to the assignment of guilt, there is general agreement on the lasting impact of the strike; the death of police unionism in the United States. Within days of the situation in Boston, police unions around the country returned their union charters to the AFL. "Most central, however, is the fact that the Boston affair resulted in the `complete destruction of the policemen's trade union movement" (Whitney, p.103). The police of the District of Columbia were a fitting example of the union situation.

WASHINGTON

The police in Washington were some of the first to receive a charter from the AFL. These officers chose to stay on duty and attempted to ligate the commissioners' rule forbidding membership in a union. The Washington Police Commissioners issued an order forbidding police officers to join or remain a member of any organization of police affiliated with any labor organization, even if the organization was bound by a "no strike" clause. The police union, in this case, chose to take the matter to court and obtained an injunction forbidding the enforcement of the Commissioners' rule. Following the Boston strike, the United States Congress, the law making body for the District, dealt with the police union question. To add his important voice as an opponent to police unions, President Wilson telegraphed the Congress. It stated:

I am desirous, as you are, of dealing with the police force in the most just and generous way, but I think that any association of the police force of the Capital City, or of any great city, whose object is to bring pressure upon the public or the community such as will endanger the public peace or embarrass the maintenance of order should in no case be countenanced or permitted (Ibid, p.107).

With the Presidential support, Congress passed legislation to forbid the District's police from membership in any union. This legislation prohibited under federal law, membership in "any organization, or of an organization affiliated with another organization, which itself...holds claims, or uses the strike to enforce its demands" (Congressional Record, p.8692-93). To sweeten the loss, the DC officers were given a bonus of \$360 over two years (Whitney, p.108).

At the opposite end of the spectrum were the police in Macon, Georgia. The Macon police were also one of the first to receive a charter from the AFL and following the events in Boston refused to give up their charter or affiliation. Following a public outcry, the chief of police, who had allowed the union, was removed from office and replaced by a new chief. The new chief was met by stubborn opposition from the union forces, and was also forced from office. At the municipal election, in November 1919, the police union with the support of other unions, backed the election of a new mayor, known for his labor sympathy. However, despite their election victory, the officers, under continuing public pressure, were forced to surrender their AFL charter. Shortly thereafter, all of the police unions which had received AFL

charters either returned their charters or had them canceled by the AFL.

Not all in the police labor movement were sorry to see the AFL forced out of the picture. The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), in its official history, stated that the Boston Strike actually helped the formation of the FOP. Following the strike, FOP officials met with a leading Congressman on the situation. Congressman Campbell then gave an expressive defense of the FOP before Congress. He stated that policemen should belong to "an Organization of Police" and only police. Campbell declared that "the Fraternal Order of Police alone is the organization which meets the demands of this hour." Following this speech, the FOP "received a shower of inquiries" (Walsh, 1977, p.50).

IACP

Police unionization was to suffer a devastating blow from the Boston Strike. The damage lasted for years. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) continued to highlight the significance of this strike in their bulletins on Police Unions in 1944 and again in 1958. The IACP in both bulletins was antagonistic to the unionization of

police. The 1944 bulletin described the results of 1919 as:

Thus has the Boston police strike of 1919 gone down in law enforcement history as an unfortunate example of the result of police employees placing personal consideration above the welfare of the citizens whom they are sworn by solemn oath to protect. Through the years it has served as a reminder to police employees of the nation that divided allegiance can bring nothing but sweeping public resentment against, and destructive criticism of, the police profession as a whole (p.2).

Some fourteen years (1958) later, the IACP again visited the question of police unionization. The IACP again found the idea of police unions, "Contrary to the basic nature of police duties ...(and)...The majority of police administrators concur in this opinion" (p.3). In this report, the IACP stated:

In Boston the police union membership question is inevitably associated with the chaos created by the 1919 police strike. That act left its indelible imprint not only on Boston civic history, however. Its effects were so far reaching it is still discussed and the statements of Presidents Wilson and Coolidge are still quoted whenever the subject of police unions arise. Through the years it has served as a poignant reminder to police of the nation that divided allegiance can bring nothing but sweeping public resentment and destructive criticism that the passing of almost forty years has not entirely erased (p.5).

The vote taken by the patrolmen of the Boston Police Union, Local 16,807, on September 8, 1919, authorizing a strike was to have significance to police officers in the United States until this day. While over the last eighty years other state and local governmental workers have formed strong local and national unions, police have been sequestered from any national or statewide formation by legislation, public opinion or, as one author has termed it, the "Ghost of 1919" (Bornstein).

While teachers and transit workers are afforded the benefit of strong statewide and national organizations, the police are divided into locally based organizations, with little effect pass City Hall. Associations such as the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), the largest affiliate of the AFL-CIO, have developed into strong spokesmen for their members' interest before the various State legislatures and the Congress. Indeed it is impossible to conceive of a bill passing Congress without the teachers' national organization involved in the hearing and negotiations. This is not true for the police. "While other municipal groups asserted themselves before legislative bodies and formed strong national labor organizations, police

remained "balkanized"-- sharply divided among a large number of locally based, independent organizations..." (Ibid, p.25).

This Balkanization of the police union movement was to have lasting consequences on policing in America. "The Boston police strike of 1919 is a watershed in the history of protective service employee organizations. It had a dramatic and continuing negative impact on trade unionism in police departments..." (Kienast, p.177). Indeed, the Boston Police Department was not to have a labor organization with bargaining rights until 1967, the Boston Police Patrolmen's Association, some 48 years after the strike. Even now this Association is a local, stand alone unit without direct affiliation to a national trade union.

Policing in America, a collection of more than 40,000 various forces, is to a large extent, the victim of this Balkanization. As one noted author, Samuel Walker, was to question: "The defeat of police unionism in 1919 presents one of the great imponderables of American police history: how different the development of the police might have been had they gained rather than lost a formal voice in police administration" (1977, p.119-20).

SECTION IVCONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

One method of studying comparative history, as previously stated, is the Method of Difference. In this method the researcher seeks and studies "cases with similar preconditions and *different* outcomes" (Andrews, p.162). This is precisely the case in this study of the two police strikes in 1918-19.

CAUSES

The police in both of the strikes under study found themselves in an analogous position. Working conditions were horrible. The wartime effort had increased the duties and total hours of the police in both countries, but not the salaries. An often quoted fact is the Boston police in 1918 were being paid a salary that had been voted to them in 1894. It is almost impossible today to imagine anyone going without a pay raise for twenty-four years, and less likely to imagine this would happen without some type of outcry or common action. The Metropolitan police and almost every police force in the United Kingdom found themselves in the same situation.

While their duties were greatly increased by the war effort, their salaries were stagnant. When any discussion of a pay raise was aired, the government's answer was not now, with the war effort and the need to control wages, particularly the munitions industry, it would have to wait.

Several efforts were made in the United Kingdom to placate the police by the issuance of one time bonus for the emergency. These funds were not pensionable and were not guaranteed to the officers. However, the extra hours of work, sometime adding up to 80 or 100 hours a week, were. The entire concepts of overtime and a five-day work week, while common in the private sector thanks to the labor movement, were a complete anachronism to both police services.

This decline in real wages of the officers in both police services led to a decline in their position in society. The police now found themselves "downwardly mobile." The overall situation for both these groups of officers was one of declining horizons and prospects. This mobility is described as:

The downwardly mobile have been
betrayed by the forces of the market
...they feel they have betrayed
themselves...it is a broken covenant.

..Downward mobility is a bewildering experience not only because it threatens personal identity but because it leaves its victims unsure of what cultural rules to abide by in order to reverse their fall (Newman, p.230).

This was exactly the situation that the Boston and English officers found themselves in, in the closing days of World War I. The economy was leaving them behind, their social position was eroding and they had no way to reverse their fall.

Both groups of officers of this era found themselves policing demonstrations and strikes of an increasingly powerful and economically rising labor movement. In the United Kingdom, the police witnessed a remarkable growth of both union membership and influence. Union membership in the period from 1892 to 1921 rose more than 400%, to a high of over 6,633,000. Accompanying this increase was the expansion of the TUC from an umbrella group to a highly organized political factor in the life of the country. The TUC was able, through its Labor Committee and later the Labor Party, to become one of the most influential and powerful organizations in the country.

Thus, by 1918-19, the police were conscious of the position of organized labor and its influence on the government. As stated previously, the government of Lloyd George "took care to placate the unions" both for their support in the Commons and most important, at the general elections. Officers in the United Kingdom were to have this influence reinforced during the war by observing the TUC win concessions from the government through several strikes by miners and munitions workers. These events clearly demonstrated to the police their own inability to improve or negotiate their salary or working conditions.

America was in an analogous situation. Organized labor was to go through a similar rise in membership and influence. Overall union membership rose from 1897 to 1920 by more than 1100%, from over 400,000 to more than 5,000,000. The AFL was to experience an even more dramatic growth, with membership rising by over 1500%, from 265,000 to almost 4,100,000 in the same period. Likewise, the political clout of the unions, especially the AFL, was to experience rapid growth. The AFL, at the instigation of its president, Samuel Gompers, maintained an "independent labor party," supporting specific candidates and parties, in their own self interest. Like its counterpart in the United Kingdom, the AFL was able to use the

circumstances of the World War to manipulate its influence in the economy and with the government. Indeed, the AFL was able to sign agreements with the federal government, in 1917, to monitor wages and allow adjustments. "This was the first time in our history that the United States Government entered into an agreement with labor unions" (Bing, p.15).

The officers in Boston were to have the influence of organized labor brought home in two specific strikes in 1919. The carmen and the telephone operators in Boston both struck in early 1919. Both of these striking workers were affiliates of the AFL and both resulted in victories for the workers and the unions. Again the officers found themselves policing a strike where the victors were now making more than them. To add insult to injury, the telephone operators, the victors in this strike, were women. "Can you imagine, especially in those days, a big strong policeman going home to the house and the daughter brings more in the (pay) envelope than him? It was a very bad position to be in" (Mayo).

Women and their changing role in society were to be another factor in common. In the United Kingdom, "By the end of 1915 the munitions plants were employing three women to one man..." (Williams, p.59). In America, the situation was

similar. In fact, female membership in trade unions, from 1910 to 1920, jumped fivefold (Wolman, p.23). The war had brought national emergencies to both countries and had presented the opportunity for various changes including the role of women. "The world, and women, had changed...Some of the earlier prejudices about women were gone for good" (Marwick, p.163).

In both these situations, the officers were faced with the loss of their role as the breadwinners. Officers in the United Kingdom were required to obtain the Chief Constable's permission to marry and for their wives to work. With the war, the "wife and daughters, especially in Liverpool, had no bother getting jobs and good jobs in the war effort and making two, sometime three, times what the poor copper husband or father made. It really was a disgrace" (Grumley). Boston officers fared the same. Many of the wives and daughters of the Boston officers were the victorious telephone operators. Indeed, the president of the telephone operators union, Julia O'Connor, was the sister of Boston police officer (Mayo). This officer and his fellows were faced with the "girls at the telephone company" making more than them. "It was one thing to see construction workers and steel jacks making big money from the war when you have to arrest them on Saturday with their load on and their pockets full and another when you yell at

your daughter, who making more than you and is paying most of the bills. Most men would rather deal with the drunken workers" (Ibid).

A pivotal factor in these strikes came down to dollars and pounds. By 1918, both sets of officers had their salaries eroded by the war time economies. The officers in Boston, in 1918, were paid a salary voted to them in 1898. At the same time the cost of living had risen almost 250%. Ironically, recruits to this department were paid the same salary in 1918 as they would have been in 1854 at the founding of the department. Likewise, in the United Kingdom, the bobbies were faced with an almost identical rise in the cost of living and a frozen salary. While most of these officers, especially in London, were given war bonuses, these were only temporary and failed, woefully, to keep pace with the cost of living and the salaries of other workers. Most troubling to these officers was the fact that they were now paid less than most common or casual labors. Both of these groups of officers found themselves in the same position, they

experienced a relative decline not only in pay but, equally crucially, in economic status and prestige vis-a-vis other reference groups, particularly in terms of their normative perceptions of themselves as skilled men, i.e. a relative

deprivation in social stratification. They claimed that not only were they unable to match the living standards of 'equal status' engineers and draughtsmen in the communities in which they lived, but even ordinary labourers now disparaged them. Seeing themselves as markedly undervalued they looked to the police union, as a potential collective bargaining agent, to restore their pay and prestige (Bean, p.638).

RESULTS

The immediate results of both the strikes under consideration were disastrous rioting, mobilization and deployment of troops, deaths and injuries, the firing of all the officers who struck, in 1919, from the respective departments and the destruction of the police unions involved. Another factor in common, was the condemnation of these strikers as mutineers by the leading authorities in the governments. While Coolidge's remarks concerning the strike were to propel him to the national scene, President Wilson's were less reported. He characterized the strike as a "crime against civilization" and similar to the mutiny of a soldier, "leaving the city at the mercy of an army of thugs" (Russell, 1975, p.170). Likewise, Prime Minister Lloyd George portrayed the strike as a mutiny against both the society and

Parliament.

Similarly, these strikes had immediate results on both police services. Both the forces were given immediate pay raises and new recruits were hired and trained to replace the strikers. Efforts were mounted, in both instances, by various supporters and relatives of the strikers, to have the dismissed officers rehired and/or given full pension rights. All of these efforts failed (See Koss and Mackenzie). The greatest divergence in these strikes comes in a common factor. Outside committees were formed, by both governments, to examine the situation. The mandates of these committees, their subsequent reports and legislation were to be the greatest area of divergence in these strikes.

DESBOROUGH COMMITTEE

On Friday, August 30, 1918, the vast majority of the police left duty in and around London. The initial reaction of senior government official to this action by the police was shock. But the government, specifically Lloyd George, was able to regain its balance and move quickly. The Prime Minister was explicit in his instruction; he wanted the matter settled immediately, *that night*. He took a leading role in the

negotiation and the subsequent settlement. Within 24 hours the officers had returned to duty and been given the majority of their demands. But the Prime Minister was playing for time. Within that same 24-hour period, he had replaced the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police with his own hand picked man, General Macready. In a subsequent message to Macready, Lloyd George stated:

The police force is so essential to the stability of social order that at all hazards we must take steps to ensure that we have a body of men at the disposal of the State who can be relied upon...we cannot command at the present moment as long as you have thousands of men who are under contract to disobey the authorities at the behest of an outside committee (Robinson, 1978, p.144).

With this statement, the Prime Minister expressed his position on the relationship of the police and the State, the central government in London. Following upon this statement, Lloyd George called for the appointment of a committee by the Home Secretary to examine the entire question of the police. This committee, hand picked by Edward Shortt, Lloyd George's Home Secretary, was under the chairmanship of Lord Desborough and given a mandate "to consider and report whether any and what changes should be made in the method of recruiting for,

the conditions of service of, and the rates of pay, pensions, and allowances of the Police Forces of England, Wales and Scotland" (Desborough, 1919, p.1). With this mandate, given on March 1, 1919, this committee was now free to look at all the 250 separate police forces of the United Kingdom.

The committee moved quickly on its mandate. Desborough was careful to stay in contact with Commissioner Macready, Lloyd George's point man on the issues of policing (see Macready, p.360-64). With this and other guidance from the Home Office, the first question to be examined was the possibility of nationalization of the entire Police Service. This was not the first time the nationalization of the Police was considered by the government. In 1829, prior to the passage of the Metropolitan Police Act, Sir Robert Peel had looked at the Cheshire Constabulary Act as a "step to the introduction of an improved general police throughout the kingdom." Peel was described as in the process of developing a nation wide policing scheme for the entire country during the Parliamentary debates on the Cheshire Act (Philips, p.77).

Lord Desborough's Committee, after examining several proposals for a nation force and amalgamation of a number of

the existing forces, reported that "we are of the opinion that the Police administration would be more economical and efficient if a greater measure of centralisation and standardisation of conditions of service could be introduced" (1919, p.6). By July 1, 1919, this Committee submitted its report of sixteen principal recommendations, which moved quickly to codify them in the Police Act of 1919.

This legislation gave the central government, in the person of the Home Secretary, extensive powers, through the purse strings, to centralize authority, standardize pay and conditions of service and retirement for all police in the country. "The police and their strikes had given the (central) government the opportunity that they had been looking for. London (central government) was now free to compel all of the various police forces to follow its lead" (Judge, 1999). This centralization was to be carried forward by successive administrations, often using national emergencies as their justifications, to produce the present structure of the Home Office forces.

This Act, known as the "Policemen's Charter," also provided the police with a "Representative Body...to enable the Police...to submit their views...to the Central

Authority..." (Desborough, 1919, p.17). This in-house union, the Police Federation, was to be the second major legacy of the Police Strikes in the United Kingdom. The Police Federation gave these officers a local representative body to deal with local issues and a national committee to deal with national issues and what is most important, the Home Office. This legislation "provide(d) the police with a means of bringing their views on welfare and efficiency to the notice of the government and the police authorities" (Police Federation, 1997, p.1).

This gave the police officers a voice in both levels of administration of the service. "The Police Federation has developed an active voice in all policing matters. It has given the officers a seat at the table in the professionalization of the police both in the departments and in the social structure" (Judge, 1999).

STORROW COMMITTEE

The Storrow Committee was appointed by Mayor Peters to consider the Police situation. The Mayor had no direct authority over the Police Department or the Police Commissioner. This Committee was not appointed by either the

Police Commissioner or his superior, the Governor. In fact, the committee and its interim report were rejected by Commissioner Curtis. This report was submitted to the Commissioner on September 6. He declined any comment until the report was released to the press on September 8, where quickly he issued a letter stating that the report had no relationship "to the present duty of the Commissioner."

The Storrow Committee confined its inquiries solely to the question of a union for the Boston Police, and its affiliation with an outside labor group. The Committee did not have a mandate, nor did it try, to look at the structure of the department, pay, pensions and working conditions of the officers or the relationship of the police to the State. Unlike its British predecessor, the Storrow Report was to become an interesting footnote to the strike, with little effect on the officers or policing.

For the Boston Police Department and its officers there were several legacies of the strike. The isolation, or localness, of the department was reaffirmed. The American concept of policing as a local issue or power, as laid out in Article X of the United States Constitution, was also

reaffirmed. The Police Department which under Commissioner O'Meara had earned the reputation of the "London" of America, for its impersonal style of policing, was now to follow, what Wilbur Miller calls, the traditional personal authority of American police. The result of this shift was an increase in corruption of the force (See Harrison). The new officers hired as a result of this strike were to be the majority of the force well into the 1940's. This new officers' corp lacked the tradition of the O'Meara spirit and were able to form their own groups and traditions. The resulting scandals in the 1930's and 1940's further eroded the department's position in the city.

The officers themselves were also to be reminded of their position in the society of the day. The overwhelming majority of the striking, and subsequently fired, officers were Irish Catholics. The ruling Boston power structure was, both in the City and State government, old line Protestant Yankees, more commonly referred to as Brahmins. Many of the striking officers and other Boston Irish saw the Volunteer Police, especially the Harvard students, as a reaffirmation of their lower social status and a clear "indication of the wide gap that still existed between the workers and the owners, between the people and the princes" (O'Connor, p.193). Anti-Irish

comments were part of the aftermath of the strike. Calls that the police had too many Irish and should now be replaced with "Yankee boys," because "Good American Yankees...do not strike" (Ibid), were often heard in the days following the crushing of the police union.

It is appropriate to discuss the relations of the police and the government in the United States. While America was a collection of British colonies and took many of its foundations, both legally and socially, from the mother country, it was still 13 separate colonies. These colonies viewed themselves as sovereign states, not to be interfered with by the other colonies or a federal government. It was this theory that fostered the passage of the first ten amendments, the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution. No specific authority on criminal issues or policing was delineated to the Federal government and the Tenth Amendment reserved all powers not delegated "to the States respectively, or to the people." Policing is therefore, both legally and traditionally, a local matter. It is true that the Federal government, since the beginning of the 1900's, has sought to create a Federal criminal power. Primarily through the use of the taxing authority and the

commerce clause, both delineated in the Constitution, the government has created a Federal criminal code and the necessary forces to enforce it. However, the general policing that we think of is the reserve of the States and the local communities. Likewise, the States, through a wide range of legislation, have delegated the police authority to the local communities to administer as they see fit.

The principal legacy of the Boston Police Strike was the death of police unionization in the United States. This strike resulted in the "complete destruction of the policemen's trade union movement" (Berney, p.103). For decades following, the Boston Police Strike was used as a weapon and a reminder to American police officers of their position and status (For a discussion of police unions in this period see Berney and Kienast). On several occasions, in 1944, when rumors of police organizing were circulated, Commissioner Sullivan, invoked Curtis rule on unionization and reminded the officers of the events in 1919. His position was echoed by the International Association of Chiefs of Police. "Through the years it has served as a reminder to police employees of the nation that divided allegiance can bring nothing but sweeping public resentment against, and destructive criticism of, the police profession as a whole" (IACP, 1944, p.2). This position was

restated by the IACP in its 1958 study of police unions and added that "forty years has not entirely erased" the effects of that strike (IACP, 1958, p.5).

Indeed, in Boston, no police union or association developed until 48 years later. The strike left "a tradition of anger and bitterness in the Boston Police Department. The complete crushing of these officers and the subsequent treatment of both the strikers and the serving officers reaffirmed the officer's lower social class, with no voice in the department, and laid the foundations for the police militancy of the 1960's" (Bratton).

The "Ghost" of this strike is seen in the complete failure of the development of any statewide or national group to represent the officers and their interest. "Our research has revealed that national and state bodies do not play major roles in police employee relations; that police unionism is primarily a local phenomenon" (Juris, p.27). In Massachusetts, today, there are "300 separate departments, all of these have their own officers' association, PBA, FOP, etc. This give us more than 1,000 associations representing officers, detective, sergeants and superior officers. There is no one organization or union that speaks for these officers on employment or

professional matters" (Bratton). The 1919 strike reaffirmed the "localness" of Boston and all American police. This localness, want of a voice in the department and lack of a representative association was to defer discussion of professionalization in policing until the 1960's and 1970's, well behind our British colleagues.

The above observed cases fit accurately into Mill's Method of Difference. When studying the general situation in both the development of these "new" police departments and the mix of variables that led to these strikes, the similarities are clear and the outcomes are distinctly different. The different outcomes of these strikes can be explained in Emsley's theory (1991) of the centralisation of the police in the United Kingdom.

Emsley states that there are three different pressures that have fueled the trend of centralisation of policing first introduced by Peel in 1829. The first of his pressures was the logicalness or naturalness of various pieces of legislation which, for efficiency or economic reasons, standardized practices, procedures, pay, etc. for the various forces and brought them into a closer relationship with the central authorities. The government of Lloyd George moved quickly to

enact the legislative provisions of the Desborough Report. The codification of those provisions in the Police Act of 1919 was seen as a logical answer to both the tumultuous situation of a police mutiny and the illogicalness of a police union. Additionally, the various differences in standards, pay, retirement, etc. in the more than 250 police forces of the United Kingdom was seen inefficient and counterproductive. Using this situation, the government was able to greatly increase the influence and authority of central government in all policing matters and issues.

The second of Emsley's pressures was the central government's ability to use "a national emergency, such as world war or widespread strike activity" (p.6) to further the centralisation of the country's police service. Clearly in the case of the strikes, in 1918 and in 1919, Lloyd George made clear his position on the relation of the police to the state, especially in the time of the World War. His government was quick to seize the opportunity presented by the 1918 strike of the police to move forward bringing the entire police establishment of the country closer to central government. As pointed out in previous chapters, successive governments were also quick to used other emergencies to foster the amalgamation of the police service in the United Kingdom to

the present level of 55 forces (this figure represents the 43 Home Offices force, 3 referred to as Channel Islands, 8 Scottish forces and the RUC, for Northern Island).

The final pressure of this theory is the professionalisation of the police. Emsley states that two factors effect this trend. As the police become more professional in their handling of crime and public order, the government ministers and high ranking civil servant tend to deal directly with these officers and their associations, increasing the centralized decision and power of London. An additional aspect of this situation is the increase in the power and influence of the staff associations which represent the various ranks of the officers.

The Police Act of 1919 set up not only the Police Federation, which represents the lower ranks, but also called the representative associations for other ranks, including the Chief Officers. These associations have fostered the ideas of professionalisation of police work, almost from their inception in 1919. These associations coupled with professionalisation have assured the police officers a voice not only in the operation of their local constabulary but a seat at the table in dealing with issues of policing, terms of

service and all other matters affecting the police.

The Police Federation, of England and Wales, today represents more than 126,000 officers in all ranks below that of Superintendent. The Federation, and its two sister associations, are clearly and an integral factor in policing in the United Kingdom as the country moves into the next century. In a recent article, Police Review (October 23, 1998), the president of the Association of Chief Police Officers, John Newing, stated that his association recognizes "that regionalisation could be a real possibility over the next 5 to 10 years." He added that this regionalisation could amalgamate the present 43 Home Office forces into 12 cross-country forces which "would provide us with a more efficient service." Again the logicalness of efficiency to further the centralisation of the police service, but now from a staff association, not the government, born out of the police strike and the Desborough Report.

A final comment on the conditions and satisfaction of the police officers involved in the present day Boston and London Forces. In doing the research for this paper and in my own law enforcement career, I have dealt extensively with both of these police departments and numerous officers on the forces.

While generalizations are easy to make and difficult to defend, it has been my experience that the officers in London and most United Kingdom officers, are generally more satisfied with the position of the officers in the service and their ability to express their views, through the Federation, than the officers in Boston.

The bitterness and anger, which Commissioner Bratton spoke of, is clear in the attitude of the officers toward the department. Today's officers are still influenced by the legacy of the way both the power structure and the Department treated the officers in 1919. They also remember the way subsequent officers' grievances, in 1944 and 1958, were treated by the Department (Carnel). The anger and resentment of the average Boston police officer to the loss of almost 50 years of labor organization and negotiation are clearly seen today. Many of these officers are aware of their limited ability to negotiate conditions of service, through the local BPBA, but resent their lack of a voice in the operation of the Department and the issues of professional policing(Machean).

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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT






Joseph F. King was born in Brooklyn, New York. He holds a BA degree from St. Francis College, Brooklyn, and a MA degree from John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY. He has served as a Special Agent, in numerous command capacities, since July 1968. Mr. King has worked in a variety of undercover assignments in narcotics, money laundering, weapons trafficking and terrorism. He has received thirty-nine citations for bravery and meritorious conduct and was "Police Officer of the Year" for the IACP in 1980 for his activities in the investigation of the assassination of the Chilean Ambassador to the United States. Mr. King has also served on the White House Legal Task Force on Iran-Contra Matters and as Principal Investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the October Surprise. He is presently Commanding Officer of the Strategic Operations Unit in the New York Office.

Mr. King's interest in the history of policing is a family affair, which started in 1848. Mr. King's great-grandfather, George Flood, was a constable in the Royal Irish Constabulary, serving from 1848 to 1880. His grandfather, Edward Murphy, was one of the first, 1917, New

York State Troopers, serving until 1937. His father, Joseph King, served in the New York City Police Department from 1930 till 1965. Over 150 years of policing has fostered a deep interest in the history of the profession.

His previous publications include, "Iranian Weapon Trafficking in the United States," "Undercover Operations and Penetrations of Terrorist Groups," "Fundamentalist Terrorist Groups and Weapons and Narcotics Trafficking in Lebanon and Iran," and "KGB and GRU Operations in New York City for Acquisition of Advanced Technology." Mr. King was also the recipient of the Niederhoffer Prize for outstanding Doctoral Student at the City University.

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