

BEING ALL SHE CAN BE:
GENDER INTEGRATION IN NATO MILITARY FORCES

by

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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New
York

2010

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the
Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the
dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

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For centuries national military forces excluded women from their ranks. However, in the last four decades numerous states have passed legislation permanently integrating women into their military services and have dramatically increased their numbers and their role. By examining twenty-four NATO member states, this study will attempt to build the theoretical model that explains why states abandon their policies of exclusion and seek to integrate more women into their military services. It combines both large-N quantitative analysis and case studies of the United States, Italy, Hungary and Poland. The main argument put forth in this dissertation is that civilian policymakers and military leadership no longer surrender to parochial gendered division of the roles, but rather integrate women to meet the recruitment numbers due to military modernization, professionalization and levels of threat to national security; to meet the demands of domestic women's movements and to meet state's responsibilities under international agreements regarding gender equity and gender mainstreaming in the military.

Acknowledgements

This project started as a term paper in Dr. Joyce Gelb's class four years ago. Along with my grade, she wrote that one day it could make a good dissertation topic. But it was not until two years later, when I approached Dr. Irving L. Markovitz, that the real work started. I am greatly indebted to him as my adviser, mentor and a friend for his incredible support, advice and guidance. Over the past two years, Dr. Markovitz has challenged me to refine my arguments, clarify the logic of my method and inquiry, and take ownership of my findings. His encouragement and belief in me and the value of this project helped me complete this dissertation.

I am grateful to Professor Kenneth Erickson for teaching me how to edit, for his review and suggestions along the way, and Professor Peter Liberman for his invaluable comments on research design, methods and analysis.

I would also like to thank Professor Joyce Gelb, Professor Thomas Weiss, Professor Susan Woodward, Professor Joan Tronto, and Professor Joe Rollins for making this department such a good place to study political science and grow both intellectually and personally.

There are a number of my colleagues in the Political Science Department who have made my days and nights writing this dissertation less solitary, but I need to particularly thank my friend Billie Jo Hernandez for making it more fun.

I am grateful most of all to my family, to whom I dedicate this dissertation. Thanks to my mom Majda, the most beautiful and strongest woman I have ever known, who took me out of the jaws of war in Bosnia, and brought me to the United States. She gave me love and encouragement to pursue my goals, inspired and motivated me to be the best person, daughter, researcher and teacher I can be. I will always aspire to be like her. Thanks to my stepfather John for being proud of me the way my father would have been had he lived to see me succeed. And my sister Lea, for making our lives more colorful and exciting.

Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my husband, David Candler. He has been the greatest partner and supporter throughout this project, who was often forced to listen to my incoherent research dilemmas and ideas, and read my drafts. Thank you for loving me, thank you for always standing by me.

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CHAPTER I

Integration of women into NATO armed forces

"I think we've made historic progress in opening up opportunities for women in all of the services. Expanding the roles for women in the military is the right thing to do, and it's also the smart thing to do. It allows us to assign the most qualified individual to each military job, which is very, very important when what we really rely on is the high quality of our personnel." -- Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, from a special news briefing at the Pentagon Jan. 13, 1994

1. INTRODUCTION

The military has traditionally been an all-male dominion. While there are many historical examples of women such as Joan of Arc, Margaret Corbin and an all-female Russian 588th Night Bomber Regiment fighting wars and standing beside men, for centuries men made up the majority of recruits and held the highest ranks. Most often, they joined or were recruited during wartime to help fill multifarious positions, from secretaries and nurses to bomber pilots and snipers. Once a war was over, however, the women were sent home, with their accomplishments relegated to historical archives.

Following World War II and during the early days of the Cold War, women were incorporated into the military services in most states on both sides of the Iron Curtain, but the presence, role and impact of these women were rather insignificant. In the majority of states, women performed their duties in administrative, personnel, and medical positions. They were prohibited from attending military academies and were not allowed to climb through the ranks to command levels. Most states had strict laws and regulations limiting the number of women soldiers and professional positions open to them.

However, since the mid 1970s and early 1980s this trend that had persisted for most of humankind's history has started to change worldwide. Numerous states have passed legislation permanently integrating women into their military forces and have dramatically increased women's numbers and the extent of their service. The number of female soldiers in NATO forces increased from 30,000 in 1961 to approximately 300,000 today.¹ Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-91 included more than 40,000 US women soldiers and since 2003, 160,500 American female soldiers have served in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East, meaning one in seven soldiers is a woman.² In 1970 the number of women in the US military was a meager 1.4 percent, but by 1980 it had increased sixfold to 8.3 percent, and today women make up 15 percent of US forces. Similarly, Spain increased its number of women in the military from 5.8 percent in 2001 to 13.47 percent in 2006, while Portugal's numbers rose from 6.6 percent to 12 percent. The change is particularly evident in NATO's new member states in Eastern Europe, such as Latvia, which boasts 17 percent, Slovenia 15 percent, and Hungary 20 percent.³ In fact, all NATO member states, with the exception of Iceland, since it does not have a standing army, have passed legislation permanently integrating women into the military ranks, and assigning functions and duties traditionally performed by men.

Not only are the numbers increasing but the roles that women play in the armed forces is expanding. The NATO multinational forces for the first time deployed women in peace-enforcing and peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo. In Iraq, US women soldiers serve as members of search teams and Canadian women patrol

¹ Nielsen, Vicki. "Women in Uniform" *NATO Review* (Summer 2001): 30-34

² Solaro, Erin. *Women in the Line of Fire*. (Emeryville, CA: Seal Press, 2006), 15.

³ All of the data is available from the Committee on Women in the NATO website which publishes the annual report for each member state. http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/index.html Accessed August 14th, 2008.

Afghan check points. The impact of this change is best illustrated by former U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman J. Vessey's observation that “the influx of women has brought greater change to the U.S. military than the introduction of nuclear weapons” (Carrol Hall, 1993).

Yet not all states have integrated women to the same extent. Some have erased all legal obstacles to women’s progress in the military, but others continue to impede it by setting limitations to their access to certain careers, combat, ranks, or by simply not seeking to change the basic social and family-friendly policies. Only a decade ago the Italian military had no women in its ranks and today they occupy only 2.6 percent of positions. Although women have been in Turkey’s military since the time of Ataturk, the state today allows women only to enter as officers or non-commissioned officers, and most serve in administrative and medical areas. Greece established its Ministry of Defense Gender Equality Office only in 2004 to collect data and seek to eliminate gender discrimination. France and Denmark still lack effective policies that facilitate work for women who have children and families. Among the newest members of the alliance, Poland and Romania show the least commitment, with only 1.2 percent and 3.6 percent of women in the military, respectively.

What explains the degree to which different democratic and developed NATO member states have integrated women into their military services? Why are women increasingly being integrated into some states’ armed forces and not in others, despite an enormous organizational transformation, adaptation of facilities, change of physical prowess standards and interaction regulations – all very different from the integration into civilian employment where women have participated for many decades?

What structural, institutional, cultural or international factors explain states' military personnel policy regarding women, and which factors are the most important?

Such a significant variation in women's participation in the military services demands an explanation and much greater scrutiny. In the last three decades, social scientists and social commentators have highlighted the reality of the integration of women into the military, but they have not paid sufficient attention to the factors that might explain its cause. While most of the research on this question has taken place only in the last fifteen years, almost all of it was within sociology and gender studies. Surprisingly, the silence is particularly deafening within political science, where it appears the state's policy on integration of women into the military has fallen through the cracks between our levels of analysis and our increasingly narrowed subfields. For that reason, the central purpose of this comparative study is to seek to determine what specific factors cause states to integrate women into the military and expand their role. By employing both quantitative and qualitative methods, it will seek to test previously developed hypothesis and add new ones based on original research and data, as well as contribute to the literature in political science by attempting to bridge the gap between domestic and international levels of analysis.

2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES

2.1 Women in the Military

While many social scientists have written about the role of women in the military in the past three decades, most studies have failed to search for the causes of the recent changes in states' policies facilitating the integration and expansion of the role of women in the armed forces.

Military history works are primarily concerned with the historical presence of women fighters, documenting both their accomplishments and failures. While they offer a great deal of insight, the majority of these works are narratives describing the involvement of women in some type of warfare in an official uniform, with little or no policy or pattern analysis. DeGroot and Peniston-Bird offer a rich selection of essays exploring the role of women as camp followers and supporters of military forces during conflict and in peacetime before and after World War II in Europe, North Africa, Asia and even the Middle East (2000). Similarly, Linda DePauw reviews the role of women as warriors in all eras and in all parts of the world, from prehistory through the Crusades and revolutions to the Great War (1998). Others focus only on the involvement of US military women in the Civil War (Harper 2004; McDevitt 2003) and in World War II (Gruhzt-Hoyt 1995; Saywell 1986). One of the biggest contributors to this body of literature has, in fact, been a military woman herself, retired Major General Jeanne Holm, who traces the steps of women in the military from the American Revolution through the 1991 Gulf War (1992).

In addition to these scholarly works, there is a plethora of personal memoirs written by women soldiers who have recorded their experiences within the military structure, and biographical works about individual heroines (Churchill 1992; Cornum and Copeland 1992; Walker 1994; Bragg 1996; Edmonds 1999; Adams-Ender and Walker

2001; Bragg 2004; Karpinski 2006; Wise and Baron 2006). While they successfully address the problems women face once they are in the forces, they do not address the factors prompting their integration.

Feminist writers base their works on the ongoing debate between feminist antimilitarists who oppose women's integration into the military and their participation in official use of violence, and feminist militarists who are ready to conquer this last bastion of machismo (Feinman, 2000). Supporters of the military recruitment of women wish to ensure equal rights and responsibilities of all citizens when it comes to defending their country (Stiehm 1982; Stiehm 1996; Fenner and de Young 2001). This argument has especially been popular among American feminists and members of the National Organization of Women who have been advocating equal status of women in the military since the 1960s.

The feminist antimilitarists, on the other hand, are pacifists who claim that the military is no place for women. Some contend that women are by nature more peaceful, and therefore should not be part of the war machine (Ruddick 198). Others fear that integration may lead also to the militarization of women's lives both inside and outside of the military establishment as governments seek to control and increase women's participation in their war-waging industries to insure military efficiency (Enloe 1983; 2000).

There are other skeptics outside of feminist scholarship who support the idea of a military without women even though their arguments are much harsher and somewhat anti-women. Critics such as Brian Mitchell argue that the integration of women is akin to social engineering that only creates a less effective and less disciplined military force.

According to Mitchell, “it has been twenty years since women first forced themselves into the federal service academies, where they have shattered tradition, fractured morale and confused academies’ purpose – which is to train combat officers” (Mitchell 1998). He lists the scandals of the Citadel, the Virginia Military Institute, and the sexual escapades of Air Force pilot Kelly Flinn to argue that today’s military is no more a military than the US Postal Service. While Mitchell’s work is not necessarily scholarly research, as it often lacks data, and opinion polls quoted are not referenced, it is, however, essential to discuss it because many of his arguments seemed to have influenced more conservative policymakers who sought to block women’s entry into combat units (Weinstein and White, 1997). Weinstein and White are careful to point out that while this was not an official policy of the US Defense Department, House of Representatives Speaker Newt Gingrich, who was one of the adamant and vociferous opponents to women in combat, often made comments that reverberated Mitchell’s arguments such as claiming that “females have biological problems staying in a ditch for 30 days”.⁴

Similarly, Gutmann argues that scandals such as Tailhook and Aberdeen have forced the Defense Department and military establishment to adapt and inadvertently overcompensate for their past mistakes by ignoring a negative effect women will have on unit cohesion, combat readiness, morale and, ultimately, the rate of success in military operations (Gutmann 2001). Other authors point to similar issues and explore high divorce rates, adultery, single-parenthood, and high dropout rates since gender integration

⁴ Weinstein, Laurie Lee and Christie C. White. *Wives and warriors: women and the military in the United States and Canada* (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Publishing 2007), xv.

has taken place (Tuten 1982; van Creveld 2000; van Creveld 2001; Fenner and deYoung 2001; Schlafly 2003).

Judith Hicks Stiehm was among the first to study military policy concerning enlisted women in the United States from 1972 to 1986 and “justifications offered for those policies as they have developed through law, research, and bureaucratic decision making” (1989). While her chapters on draft abolishment, equal rights legislation and legal decisions that played a part in formulating US military policy regarding women’s integration are useful to this dissertation, most of Stiehm’s book lacks theoretical analysis as she merely compiles the data. Her book is concerned with the historical account of the policy change to demonstrate the military’s bias against women and need to implement a fairer policy - for example, resegregation of forces, giving the US Air Force entirely to women, or redesigning equipment to easily fit women.

2.2 Theoretical Models Proposed

Discussion regarding the factors influencing the integration and expansion of women’s participation in the military services is a relatively new one. However, there are four proposed models that have paved the way for future research. In 1995, building on works such as Stiehm’s, Mady Wechsler Segal, an esteemed military sociologist, proclaimed that it was time for a systematic theory of the conditions under which women’s role in the military expands and contracts. Her 1995 article “Women's Military Roles Cross-Nationally: Past, Present, and Future” that appeared in *Gender and Society* identifies three categories of variables broadly titled “military, social structure, and

culture” and seeks to hypothesize the relationship between each of the three sets of independent variables and her dependent variable, participation of women in the military. Table 1 in Appendix A presents the variables within each category that are supposed to have some effect on the degree of representation and nature of activities of women in the military, but the way it was presented by Segal, the model lacks explicit causal flows.

The main argument is that “the military need for personnel has been the driving force behind the expansion of women’s military role through history and across nations, but cultural values supporting gender equality also contribute and seem likely to have increased influence in the future”.⁵ In addition, Segal argues that women are more likely to be participating in modern all-volunteer forces during times of either high or low threats to national security, and serving mostly in administrative and logistical roles. Segal’s work is helpful because she was the first scholar who sought to study the factors affecting women’s military roles and who has identified a large number of variables, though her methodology, conceptualization and empirical evidence raise problems. While the author studied integration primarily within NATO member states, different sets of propositions were sometimes applied outside of the sample to make the model look stronger. For example, her the proposition that “other cultural issues” such as religion and race play a strong role in determining military integration were tested in Israel and South Africa, two obviously extreme cases. This sort of a research design is neither scientific, nor appropriate for theory building.

Moreover, there is a serious problem regarding conceptual stretching (Sartori, 1970), particularly regarding what Segal terms Cultural Dimension. Most political

⁵ Mady Wechsler Segal. “Women’s Military Roles Cross-Nationally: Past, Present, and Future.” *Gender and Society*, Vol. 9, No. 6. (1995): 757.

scientists would agree that conceptualizing and measuring culture is one of the most difficult tasks in comparative politics. According to Segal's empirical evidence, culture is at times synonymous with the existence of gender discrimination laws, and religious fundamentalism among others. While religious fundamentalism can be classified as a cultural variable, state's gender discrimination policies and laws should by all means be considered institutional or political variables.

In 2002, Iskra, Trainor, Segal and Leithauser try to address some of the shortcomings of Segal's first attempt at theory building. These authors expanded the model by proposing that states with legitimate civilian-led governments, liberal political leadership, egalitarian public policy initiatives, and lack of non-violent sources of social change will have greater participation of women in the military and they tested these propositions in Mexico, Australia, and Zimbabwe (Table 1.2 Appendix A). Again, the model looks more like a list of possible variables as it lacks explicit causal flows between independent and dependent variables.

These propositions are valuable to this study because they explore domestic political actors and institutions, but their article suffers from the same conceptual and empirical problems as Segal's 1995 article. The authors have adopted the somewhat ambiguous definition of cultural variables that sometimes became synonymous with the existence of anti-discrimination laws, such as the Australian equal opportunities acts of 1984 and 1985, yet clearly these are public policies which they themselves cast as "political variables". Similarly, empirical evidence is completely flawed in the case of Zimbabwe because propositions were mostly tested against the Liberation War guerrilla forces rather than the official Zimbabwean Defense Forces. This evidence does not help

us find the causes of the state's policy change considering that over fifty percent of women guerrillas were sent home and were not integrated after the Liberation War.

Besides both conceptual and empirical problems, both of these two works fail to explain why states such as Botswana, India, Italy, Libya or Liberia integrated women into their military services, despite their traditional and patriarchal societies and low levels of threat. Other states, such as Eritrea, Malaysia and Peru, draft women into the army, while Bolivia, Chile and Guatemala already allow women in combat, unlike the United States. None of these states has been known as a champion of women's rights.⁶ In fact, one of the main arguments in the Iskra et al. article is that in such societies cultural values will continue to negatively influence female participation. They particularly argue that machismo will continue to be an obstacle to women in Mexico. Yet, only seven years after their article was published, Mexico's elite military academies were open to women and there was a 61% increase in women's applications to those schools in only one year.⁷

Additional criticism of these sociological works is offered by Gerhard Kümmel, who argues that all of the previous models neglected international system variables and that, "given the impact of what Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye called complex interdependence, it is deemed appropriate to elevate the international context to a separate category" of variables.⁸ Kümmel sought to further Segal's research and sketched out a model (Table 1.3 in Appendix A) that includes the four categories of national level variables (military, social structure, culture and domestic politics) and adds the

⁶ In fact, most of these states are on the bottom of the United Nations Development Program's Gender related development index with Eritrea being 136th, Botswana 108th, Bolivia and Guatemala holding 117th and 118th place, and with slightly better scores Malaysia 57th and Peru 75th.

⁷ "Military careers open up for women in Mexico" CNN story on September 28th, 2007. <http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/americas/09/28/mexico.soldiers.ap/index.html> Accessed April 25th, 2008

⁸ Gerhard Kümmel, "When Boy Meets Girl: The 'Feminization' of the Military," *Current Sociology*, Vol. 50, No. 5, (2002): 626.

international environment as a fifth category. He argues that we need to look at the international security circumstances and the way threats change over time, but he has not made any specific hypothesis nor has he tested his proposed model, or what might look like another list of variables without direct and identifiable causal flows.

The last work to pose a question regarding women's participation in the military is the book "Gender and the Military" by Portuguese sociologist Helena Carreiras (2006). While the book was published only two years ago, data presented are by now at least eight years old and outdated due to the expansion of NATO and dramatic changes within both old and new member states' armed forces. The author makes a valid point that the previous works lack parsimony and that concepts need clarification. But the model she develops does not seem to be any simpler. Carreiras opted for a large N analysis of eighteen NATO states that is supposed to eliminate the large number of variables proposed by previous studies.

First, the Index of Gender Inclusiveness (IGI) is developed based on eight different indicators that help her quantify the dependent variable. Next, the author separates her independent variables into two major categories: military "internal" variables (organizational structure, military culture and strategic orientations) and societal "external" variables (socio/economic, political, and cultural factors). While it is presented as two simple categories, in reality these are six very different sets of variables that previous authors have discussed.

In addition, the international geo/strategic context and length/history of women's military presence are also considered important factors, and in the model they appear as additional separate dimensions. While previous models have had up to five different sets

of categories, Carreiras's "simplified" model includes a total of eight, which unfortunately ends up making the model both visually more complicated and methodologically less parsimonious (See Figure 1.4). With all these variables one expects a more laborious and fruitful quantitative testing, yet Carreiras tests only four independent variables. These are: conscript ratio, the percentage of women in the labor force, Gender Empowerment Measure, and time.

The greatest contribution of her study is that time is not a good "predictor of women's representation in the military: a longer presence of women in the ranks does not imply a consistent increase in their relative numbers" (Carreiras 2006, 126). While she offers a great deal of data in her appendix, Carreiras does very little with it. Her original model also includes culture, but she finds it too difficult to quantify and declares that "culture should be understood as a layer, affecting all other spheres, from the global political and social contexts to the military institution itself" (Carreiras 2006, 21) and argues that it is simply unnecessary to test cultural variables because "gender values cut across and intersect with the remaining dimensions," but she fails to show how.

Similarly, political variables, social and economic variables are subsumed in the United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) Gender Empowerment Measure and therefore it is impossible to see how they interact. Instead of testing them all and measuring their individual weight, which this dissertation will do, Carreiras proceeds with the qualitative analysis of Portugal and the Netherlands and content analysis of interviews with female and male soldiers in those two countries to study dynamics of gender integration on the micro-level. Case selection is also problematic because out of

18 cases whose gender inclusiveness index score varies from 0 to 17, Portugal and the Netherlands (11 and 14) do not show much variation.

2.3 Theoretical Contribution

The contribution of this project is fivefold. This is the first study to situate the question regarding factors that influence women's participation in the military within political science, and particularly within a larger debate in comparative politics and international relations. Second, it will reconceptualize key terms in order to eliminate ambiguity and confusion created by previous models as most fail to situate both the discussion and terminology within any theoretical literature in security and gender studies. Thirdly, although prior models provide us with the umbrella categories, this project will add the necessary deductive rigor and test all the variables both quantitatively and qualitatively, and will offer a more concise and parsimonious model. Fourthly, it expands the study to include new member states of Eastern Europe in the sample. And lastly, by being the first project to empirically test international level variables, it will seek to bridge the gap between comparative politics and international relations.

2.3.1. Military Manpower Shortage: Demographics, Unemployment and Professionalization

All of the four proposed models argue that demographic variables, professionalization and unemployment in the civilian sector have an effect on the military recruitment of women. However, none of the authors situate their analysis within the

security studies literature on military modernization in the 21st century nor do they actually test their own hypotheses with strong empirical data. This research project will seek to accomplish both tasks.

When discussing manpower shortage, we need to study the security implications of shrinking youth cohorts due to low birth rates on further integration of women into the ranks to compensate for the lost recruits. In 1985, Colonel William Hunter, Jr. argued that the American All-Volunteer Force would have to find an alternative to the projected 20 percent decrease in the white male population between 1978 and 1990. According to Hunter, the “American All-Volunteer Force could not have been maintained in the past without a significant increase in the number of women being recruited and without black Americans”.⁹ The latest study by Rickard Sandell argues that military forces will be the first to feel the impact of the new reality” because “human resources targeted by military recruitment are a population resource in crisis” due to low birth rates.¹⁰ He shows that the armed services, which as an employer rely largely on the young men, are starting to adapt to these new realities by moving away from large conscript armies toward small professional military forces. His argument seems to be particularly visible in the developed NATO states.

Similarly, RAND Corporation researchers argue that the United States needs to pay more attention to demographic variables such as shrinking youth cohorts and low

⁹ William Jr. Hunter, “Military Manpower Alternatives for the All Volunteer Force in the 1980s/1990s” Army War College (Carlisle Barracks, PA, April 15th, 1985) <http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA157202&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>. Accessed 31 July, 2008.

¹⁰ Rickard Sandell, “Coping with Demography in NATO Europe: Military Recruitment in Times of Population Decline” in *Service to Country: Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries*, ed. Curtis Gilroy and City Williams (Cambridge, Mass: JFK School of Government, 2006), 72-73. Sandell’s arguments will be discussed in a larger detail later in Chapter III as a key source on the shortage of males in targeted recruitment cohorts (ages 15-30) in the next four decades.

fertility rates in Europe, because they affect the way these developed states will organize their armed services, and meet national security threats in the future (Nichiporuk 2000).¹¹ Others suggest that besides some highly qualified individuals from the civilian sector, such as doctors, lawyers and scientists, armed services have virtually no “lateral entry” and therefore no way to replace the labor required to sustain large conscript armies (Quester and Gilroy 2002). These works are important to this study because they have already successfully demonstrated the importance of adopting security and personnel policies that reflect the changes in the demographic composition of modern societies.

The proposed models have also ignored the literature that demonstrates that in many states men are simply not joining up as they used to because there are better economic opportunities in the private sector. Rickard Sandell points out that military recruiters will be competing for the same shrinking youth cohorts as both educational and market institutions. Today, the most popular explanation for recruiting patterns over the last several decades is that the military attracts a lot of young people who are unable to find employment when the civilian job market is in decline and endures a corresponding shortage of labor when job markets are favorable for young people.

In fact, only one study found no correlation between the effects of unemployment and military labor shortages (Ash, Udis, and McNown 1983) and others successfully demonstrated that it suffered from serious data collection and analysis problems (Dale and Gilroy 1985; Brown 1985). Warner, Simon and Payne’s research findings show that each 10 percent decline in civilian unemployment results in a 2 percent to 3.5 percent reduction in high-quality enlistments. Similarly, a 10 percent increase in military pay will

¹¹ Nichiporuk underlines that this is one of the alarming demographic trends along with the increasing urbanization around the world and high fertility rates in the developing world which might help us predict future “zones of conflict”.

help increase enlistments by 10 percent.¹² In fact, prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the Army, Navy and Air Force were encountering trouble recruiting in part due to a booming economy, better-paying jobs in the private sector and a higher number of young people enrolling in colleges.¹³ The problem exists elsewhere within the alliance. Keith Harley presents the case of the United Kingdom where the recruitment figures have dropped as well due to low unemployment and the highest number of college students ever.¹⁴ The United Kingdom has already openly stated that the decision to permit women to serve at sea was taken because there were too few men joining the Royal Navy.¹⁵

Lastly, it is crucial to take a closer look at the modernization and transformation of military forces that have taken place in the years since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War and how they might have affected the integration of women into the services. Throughout the 1990s, states around the world reduced personnel, cut defense budgets, closed their military bases, and formed new volunteer-based forces. As the threat from communism has disappeared, so have the large mass armies based on conscription that were intended to fight Communist states. Most states realized that as their strategic situation and geopolitical landscape changed, the expenditures of such a military organization were no longer justified (Adams 2008). They moved from the

¹² Warner, John T., Curtis J. Simon, and Deborah M. Payne. "Enlistment Supply in the 1990's: A Study of the Navy College Fund and Other Enlistment Incentive Programs" (Arlington, VA: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2001), 41.

¹³ "Patriotism touted as lure for recruits" by Sorokin, Ellen, *The Washington Times* August 17, 2002.

¹⁴ Harley, Keith. "The British Experience with an All-Volunteer Force" in *Service to Country: Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries*, edited by Curtis Gilroy and City Williams, 307. Cambridge, Mass: JFK School of Government. 2006.

¹⁵ "Shortage of men allowed women to join warships" by Michael Evans, *The Times*, July 25th 2005 discusses the Memorandum by Admiral Sir Brian Brown, the Second Sea Lord "Employment of WRNS [Women's Royal Naval Service] personnel in the Royal Navy" written in 1990 but released to *The Times* under Freedom of Information Act in 2005. <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article547749.ece>. Accessed 31 July, 2008)

heavy to the light force model, meaning they shifted their emphasis from large, conventional warfare forces, to light, high-quality and high-tech forces designed to conduct asymmetrical warfare (Snow 2007).

With the new force configuration model, states had to possess a new kind of soldier whose training and skills would be far beyond those of conscripts. In fact, most of the time states did not train their conscripts to use sophisticated technical equipment and they did not send them to conduct missions abroad due to the relatively short duration of compulsory service (Sloan 2001; Williams 2005; Williams and Gilroy 2007). This heavy conscripted-force model was not providing states with the skills that this new era required. Indeed some observers noted that keeping such an expensive and bulky service was a waste of money that could be used instead to update military technology and train professional soldiers (Russell 2003). This was particularly the case after September 11, 2001, when it became clear that future security challenges such as international terrorist networks will not be successfully met by conventional military forces but rather by smaller, more efficient and more effective forces.

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Ryan Henry sums it up by arguing that the new security environment in which we find ourselves today has implications for the kind of manpower we will need. He argues that:

“our sense of the new strategic landscape – and the opportunities opened up by emerging technologies – has led to a new way of measuring military effectiveness. Numbers of troops and weapon platforms are no longer the key metrics. Rather, military effectiveness is now a matter of capabilities – speed, stealth, reach, knowledge, precision and lethality. Thus, our defense planning should place less emphasis on numbers of forward forces than upon capabilities and desired effects that can be achieved rapidly.” (Henry, 2006, pg. 15)

What followed was the end of conscription in most NATO member states, and it ushered in a new era of professional military. The argument is that states will seek to recruit and retain those who have high-quality professional skills. Thus, the military had to compete in the labor market for the best candidates, while changing their recruitment and compensation system (Moskos and Wood 1988). In order to attract and retain higher-quality soldiers in their new volunteer-based armed services, states started to remove legal limitations to women and invested a great deal of resources in making military services more family- and women-friendly places (Shields 1988; Williams 2005). Some authors suggest that integration benefits the armed services because women who enlist tend to be better-quality recruits than men, with more education and better scores on standardized tests (Binkin and Bach 1977; Quester and Gilroy 2002).

Therefore, this research will seek to contribute to the literature on military personnel recruitment and labor markets by studying the effect that the shortage of military labor – especially of young educated males – has on the integration and expansion of women’s roles in military services.

2.3.2. Domestic Context: Women’s Movements, Women in Parliaments and Political Parties

As mentioned above, the Iskra, Trainor, Segal and Leithauser model was the first to include a political dimension, and others have followed by expanding the list of possible variables (2002). Yet, all of them have failed to address political actors that

scholars, particularly those within the comparative gender policy literature, have identified as crucial in developing successful gender policy. There are plenty of research works, such as Halsaa's study on the promotion of women candidates in Norway (1998) or Weldon's cross-national analysis of domestic violence policy, that demonstrate the effectiveness of "strategic partnerships" between women in parliament, women's groups, and women's policy agencies (2002). Amy Mazur, for example, identifies women policy agencies as one of the essential government organs that actively promote the advancement of gender equality. In addition, she shows that these "strategic partnerships" and feminist advocacy coalitions have to involve non-feminist allies, such as government ministers, party officials and even the chief executive in order to be successful (2005).

Another branch of this literature looks at whether women politicians have a different policy agenda than men. While some claim that there are no differences and that women cannot be treated as a unitary or predictable group (Dolan and Ford 1998), Thomas and Welch in their study of twelve American states demonstrate that "women and men have somewhat different policy priorities. In addition to supporting women's issues to a greater extent than do men, they are now also giving these issues a higher priority than men" (1991, 454). The argument was also tested abroad and the evidence from the Norris and Lovenduski study of British parliament seems to point in the same direction (1989). Even more recent studies commissioned by the Center for American Women in Politics support the findings that women legislators are more involved in women's rights and children's issues than men (Carroll 2001). The latest study of women representatives in the US Congress also shows that women are more likely to sponsor and more intensely pursue legislation on women's issues (Swers 2002). In fact, when it

comes to the integration of women into the military in the United States, a four-term representative and four-term senator from Maine, Margaret Smith Chase, is often credited with playing a crucial role in the policy outcome. Some argue that without her, “it is certain that momentum would have been lost and the fight would have been bitter and protracted”.¹⁶

Other gender policy scholars, in particular those in the United States, have for many years focused on the argument that the increased representation of women in state and local legislatures makes governments more responsive to women’s issues and concerns. What this literature really focuses on is “critical mass” – an idea that “the election of an adequate number of female politicians will result in governance more responsive to women” (Gray 2001, pg. 1).

The concept only arrived in political science via sociology, that in turn borrowed it from nuclear physics, to demonstrate that we need to reach a quantity that will trigger the chain reaction. In political science literature, the chain reaction would be the irreversible process by which legislatures would become more concerned and quicker to respond to women’s issues. But what is the actual number of women necessary to reach that tipping point? For some writers, a meager 15 percent has been enough to turn the tide (Straub 1996; Gray 2001); others double this (Dahlerup 1988).

However, some authors have recently argued that reaching that magic number is not necessarily going to affect the female legislators’ ability to act more and to persuade

¹⁶ Jannan Sherman, “They Either Need These Women or They Do Not”: Margaret Chase Smith and the Fight for Regular Status for Women in the Military”. *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Jan. 1990): 77. There are many other supporters of this idea including the Margaret Smith Chase Library that claims that she “almost singlehandedly won the permanent status for women in military”. <http://www.mcslibrary.org/bio/biolong.htm> Last Accessed October 24th, 2008.

others to join her in an effort to improve legislation on women. On this side of the debate are scholars such as S. Laurel Weldon, who argues that:

“the proportion of women in the legislature is likely to have an impact on policy involves a fallacy of aggregation. Such a fallacy occurs when one assumes that something about a whole unit can be understood merely by aggregating the characteristics of the parts. But the whole may be more than sum of its parts....Most of the research on the impact of women legislators examines individual – level variables, such as policy preferences, legislative or leadership style, and party or other political affiliations. But these differences do not necessarily aggregate in ways that make the activities of legislatures reflect these different characteristics...Thus, many questions remain as to how the differences that have been documented aggregated in the legislature to affect policy outcomes.” (2002, 90)

Weldon’s concept of “fallacy of aggregation” seems to hold true particularly outside of the United States where party systems are stronger and legislators have primary loyalty to the party’s policy agenda and not to feminist causes (Studlar and McAllister 2002). Studies of laws establishing quotas for women’s participation as candidates in national elections in twelve Latin American states also demonstrate that such policies can be passed with even less than 15 per cent of women in legislatures (Rodriguez 1998; Htun and Jones, 2002). It is therefore possible that previous models have overemphasized the impact that the degree of women’s political activity might have on the level of women’s participation in the military.

While there is no clear consensus regarding the role that women legislators play in the promotion of women-friendly policies, what all these works underline is the need to take into account the impact that women legislators have on the framing and passing of gender equality policies. This study will therefore seek to contribute to this body of

research by exploring the impact that female politicians have had on the improvement of women's status within such a male-dominated institution as the military services.

Besides ignoring the women inside the government, the theoretical models proposed have also completely neglected to study the role women in the military played in the passage of legislation integrating women into the military. In her influential work on the protest of the feminist movement within the church and military, Mary Katzenstein successfully shows that "feminism in the military engages in an influence-seeking interest-group form of politics" (1998, pg. 18). She argues that the women of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), the Women's Officers Professional Association (WOPA) and the Women Military Aviators (WMA) were integral in keeping equality on the military agenda. In fact, there is no discussion in the previously discussed theoretical models of the different kinds of political activism and lobbying by women's groups regarding the question of military service.

Yet, it is not enough to just explore the general role that women inside the government and its institutions play. Rather it is also necessary is to explore the effect that women's movements outside of the government have on policy agenda. There are very few works that study cross-nationally the role that women's movements play in policymaking (Gelb 2003). There are no works at all studying comparatively how different types of feminists view the integration of women into the military, or how perceptions of the state and strategies of different feminist movements have an impact on the formulation of policy on women in the military. Single case studies of the United States and Israel demonstrate that liberal feminist movements have been particularly active in helping women overcome legal obstacles to allow them entry into the military

ranks as a central component of equal citizenship, whereas radical feminist movements have seen the integration as just another strategic move by the patriarchal state to co-opt and oppress women (Feinman 2000; Sasson-Levy 2003; Barak-Erez 2007).

In addition to studying the impact that women's agencies, women legislators, and women's movements have on policy outcomes, many scholars have already suggested that we need to explore political parties as crucial actors. In their model, Iskra, Trainor, Segal and Leithauser contend that "the more liberal ideology of the political leadership in the state, the greater women's representation in the armed forces" (pg. 731). However, there is a need to clarify who constitutes "political leadership" and scrutinize more closely the role that political parties as linkage institutions play in interpreting the needs of women in uniform and civilian women's movements fighting for gender equality into actual policy outcomes.

Other authors have already put forth the argument that left-wing parties have a tendency to respond to women's demands regarding equality in society and the workplace. Political parties on the left side of the ideological continuum tend to stand for a more inclusive and equal citizenship, and are more likely to adopt gender-equality issues as part of their political agenda (Sacchet 2002). This was also the case in Latin America, where left-wing parties were the first to start adopting gender quotas (Reynolds 1999; Htun 2002). However, authors like Amy Mazur find that although left-wing parties tend to be more supportive of feminist policies, right wing parties are not necessarily hostile to gender equality causes (2002). But Lovenduski's research shows that while right-wing political parties may approve and support certain women-friendly policies, most of the time it is the left-wing and center-left parties that initiate those policy

changes. According to her argument, other political parties seek to do the same only once they realize that they need to appeal to female voters (Lovenduski 1993).

This dissertation will attempt to contribute to this literature by studying the impact that critical mass, left-wing political parties and different kinds of women's movements have on defense policies that integrate women into the military ranks.

2.3.3. Culture in Gender Studies

All four previous models argue that women's position in society and particularly their presence in non-traditional employment such as politics are explained not only by structural, institutional, or international factors, but also by cultural factors. But as mentioned above, the conceptualization and measurement of "cultural factors" remain rather problematic, ranging from vague to completely irrelevant in all four. But these authors are not the only ones having trouble defining it. One of the biggest problems with studying the culture as a dependent variable is the actual conceptualization and measurement. What do we mean by "cultural factors"?

As Harry Eckstein points out "the term culture, unfortunately, has no precise, settled technical meaning in the social sciences, despite its centrality in them" (1988, pg. 801). Others argue that culture does not differ only from state to state, but from region to region, class to class, or from one ethnic group to another, therefore making it even more difficult to assess and measure as a possible determinant of our national policy outcomes (Narayan 1997).

But that does not mean we should give up on *culture* as an independent variable, but rather that we should try to be as specific in identifying different aspects of it as we

can for the sake of both parsimony and theoretical model building (Weldon 2002).

Therefore, I will discuss the literature that tests some of the specific cultural indicators as possible determinants of policy outcomes in both the national security arena and gender studies.

Culture has been used to explain why northern European states, such as Norway and Sweden, have higher percentages of women in their parliaments than other Western European states (Karvonen and Per Selle 1995; Solheim 2000). Norris and Inglehart find that in the states with what they term “egalitarian culture” regarding women leaders, the proportion of women elected to the lower houses of parliament is higher than in those where traditional values favoring male leadership persist (2003).

Many political science and, in particular, gender policy scholars have assessed the effect that different types of religions have on gender equality as part of their cultural thesis. Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris have been at the forefront of this discussion. They have argued that Catholicism slows down women’s progress, and declared that Islam is, however, “the most powerful barrier to the rising tide of gender equality.”¹⁷ Elsewhere, they have followed Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” argument to contend that democratization alone will not bring gender equality to the Muslim states due to the strong influences of Islam.¹⁸ Similarly, others have found that Islam and Hinduism are negatively correlated, while Protestant religions are positively correlated with gender equality (Dollar and Gatti, 1999). But as Mala Htun points out, while Anglo-Protestant culture has been found to contribute to the development of liberal democracies and

¹⁷ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 71.

¹⁸ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris. “The True Clash of Civilizations”, *Foreign Policy*, No. 135 (March-April 2003): 62-70.

capitalist systems, it does not mean that it has been more supportive of gender equality (2000). On the contrary, she argues, most of the anti-discrimination policies in the United States are so recent that even the Catholic, *macho* states of Latin America, which tend to be hostile to democratic and capitalist ideas, have caught up. Htun's data demonstrates that the status of the Latin American women is similar to the status of women in the United States in terms of their political presence, economic participation, wage gap, and existence of anti-discrimination laws. In addition, she shows that although there are "growing structural similarities in the position of women"¹⁹ in both Anglo-Protestant and Latin American cultures, there are still significant differences between the status of women within the Latin American states that share cultural traditions and values.

Similarly, there are plenty of examples where women have participated actively in wars, national liberation struggles, and revolutions in the Islamic world. Muslim women have held significant positions in early Islamic history, including Prophet Mohammad's youngest wife, Aisha, who led troops in the Battle of the Camel in 656 AD (Lindsay 2005). In more modern times, women have not been absent from military actions. Algerian women played a decisive role in undermining French rule (Lazreg 1994). Elsewhere, women have served as military leaders of guerrilla and terrorist groups. Maryam Rajavi is the main leader of the largest anti-Iranian group, MEK, or People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (Shahidin 1997). In Palestine, women were involved in both "military and paramilitary activity within the work of the Palestinian resistance in the 1970s".²⁰

¹⁹ Mala Htun. "Culture, Institutions, and Gender Inequality in Latin America" in *Culture Matters*, ed. Samuel P. Huntington and Lawrence E. Harrison (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2000), 193.

²⁰ Taraki, Lisa. "The Role of Women" in *Understanding the Contemporary Middle East*, ed. Deborah Gerner and Jillian Schwedler (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2004), 352.

Although some would argue that the extent of women's military engagement was largely limited in most of these examples (Shahidian 1997; Taraki 2004), it is important to discuss them because they all demonstrate how some Muslim women have resisted the patriarchal values and the use of Islam by the more conservative branches. Today women continue to challenge these by joining police forces²¹ in Islamic states and official military forces, therefore making it necessary for us to study the effect of Islam on gender inclusiveness.

In addition, to avoid the oversimplification of focusing only on type of religion as a main cultural variable, this study will also focus on what Norris and Inglehart term strength of religiosity. While almost all of the authors center their research only on studying the effects that a type of religion has on gender equality, Norris and Inglehart, in their book *Rising Tide*, have developed a six-point Scale of Religiosity as a way of measuring actual levels of religiosity in individual states (2003). The following chapter will discuss the six indicators on which the scale is developed in a greater detail. This dissertation will adopt their methodology in order to measure the degree to which the strength of people's religious beliefs affects their beliefs regarding gender equality in the military ranks.

2.3. 4. Culture in National Security Studies

Scholars only started to study the effects of culture on defense and security policy in the late 1970s when Jack Snyder first wrote of Soviet nuclear and military strategies being a product of a distinctly Soviet cultural and historical context (1977). According to Snyder, US analysts failed to predict Soviet responses because they expected the Soviets

²¹ The first ever International Islamic Police Women Conference was held in October 2008 in Kabul, Afghanistan where representatives from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Malaysia, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Turkey participated to exchange ideas regarding policing.

to behave the same way as the Americans would. Instead, he suggested that Soviet nuclear strategy could be explained by studying the domestic cultural and historical context within which “elites articulate a unique strategic culture related to security-military affairs that is a wider manifestation of public opinion socialized into a distinctive mode of strategic thinking”²².

His seminal work paved the way for other scholars such as Colin Gray, who defined strategic culture as “referring to modes of thought and action with respect to [military] force which derives from perceptions of the national historical experience, from aspirations for responsible behavior in national terms ... civic culture and way of life.”²³ The main characteristic of these early works is that all of them are studying the United States’ and Soviet Union’s nuclear strategies, contending that the universal model of rationality as suggested by neorealism is distorting the analysis, and arguing for a more contextualized, ethnocentric approach of explaining each state’s strategy (Booth 1979; Glenn, Howlett, Poor 2004). But conceptualization and operationalization problems haunted the research and Gray himself admitted the methodological shortfalls of the concept (1988).

In the 1990s, after the failure of neorealism and neoliberalism to predict the end of the Cold War and the rise of constructivism in international relations, culture found its way back into security studies literature. In fact, much of this new literature was influenced and inspired by the constructivist research on social construction and the role norms play in international security. One of the most influential works was Peter J. Katzenstein’s edited volume “The Culture of National Security” (1996) which challenges

²² Jeffrey S Lantis. Strategic Culture and National Security Policy. *International Studies Review*, Vol.4 No.3 (Autumn 2002): 93

²³ Colin S. Gray. *Nuclear Strategy and National Style* (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986), 36-37.

both realist and neoliberal assumptions regarding a state's interests and its behavior in international relations. Although the authors were unwilling to completely walk away from the dominant power politics argument, they did contend that national security policy is also determined by "the cultural institutional context of policy on the one hand and the constructed identity of states, governments, and other political actors on the other".²⁴

Since that book was published we have seen the proliferation of works studying the effects of culture and historical experiences on military strategy in China (Zhang 1992; Johnston 1995; Booth and Trood 1999), cultures of anti-militarism in Japan and Germany (Berger 1998; Lantis 2002), Norwegian focus on international operations (Graeger and Leira 2005), and Sweden's tug-of-war between the professionalization of military forces and the democratic legitimacy of popular defense through conscription (Asselius 2005).

While strategic culture literature is only now experiencing significant growth, no scholar has yet studied whether these societal beliefs regarding the importance, utility and organization of military forces have any impact on the degree to which women have been integrated into those forces. In other words, what we now need to study is the societal beliefs, values and ideas about the military and strategy and how they influence defence community decisions regarding not only the utility of military forces, but also the way that military force will be organized and used by a society in order to achieve its goals. If we are to claim that states organize their forces according to these beliefs, then we should expect it to have an effect on gender integration. This dissertation will seek to explore this hypothesis and contribute to the larger body of the strategic culture literature.

²⁴ Katzenstein, Peter. 1996. *Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, pg. 4.

2.3.4. International Factors: International Security Context and International Non-State Actors

Scholars have shown that any defense and national security policy analysis must start with the examination of the international framework “within which the state, its bureaucratic agencies and its decision makers are immersed.”²⁵ Similarly, Phillip Cerny urges that the “image of policymaking processes as being constituted predominantly through endogenous variables” is less useful today because it does not account for the change in preferences of domestic actors in a more interdependent world.²⁶

As mentioned earlier, this study seeks to further Gerhard Kümmel’s contention that in order to fully understand the changes in the gender integration policy, we need to consider international context within which these changes take place. Carreiras also follows his proposal, but her quantitative analysis remains entirely focused on the military, socio-economic and political factors. Therefore, this study will be the first to quantitatively measure the relationship between states’ integration of women into national militaries and international level variables, particularly international security context within which states find themselves, states’ participation in international organizations seeking to mainstream gender and types of missions in the post Cold War era.

When it comes to the relationship between domestic military personnel policy change and international institutions, Gwyn Harries-Jenkins contends that the European Court of Justice rulings on the cases of Tanja Kreil v. Germany and Angela Maria Sirdar

²⁵ Douglas J Murray and Paul R. Viotti. *The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1982), 477.

²⁶ Phil Cerny. “From “Iron Triangles” to “Golden Pentangles”?: Globalizing the Policy Process”, *Global Governance* 7 (October 2001): 397.

v. The British Army Board were crucial determinants of the integration policy in Germany and Great Britain (2002). In the former case, the European Court argued that domestic policies that restricted women from “military posts involving the use of arms”²⁷ were in direct violation of the European Union’s regulations regarding gender equality in the workplace while in the latter it only allowed the Royal Marines to maintain their restrictions but it removed all others.²⁸

Although not specifically examining women in the military, the edited volume “Service to Country: Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries” is one of the chief sources that explore both national choices and international pressures regarding the military human resources in the post-Cold War era. The general argument is that while military personnel policies are traditionally affected by national factors such as security threats, demographics and economics, increasingly we are seeing international institutions asserting their role and promoting standardization among member states (Gilroy and Williams, 2006). In her chapter, Jolyon Howorth makes a significant contribution by demonstrating that the recent transformation of military personnel policies and military training was due to standardization among European states after the creation of the European Security and Defense Identity and then the European Security and Defense Policy in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The volume also offers a qualitative analysis of the impact NATO membership has had on specific countries.²⁹

²⁷ Karen Raible, “Compulsory Military Service and Equal Treatment of Men and Women – Recent Decisions of the Federal Constitutional court and European Court of Justice”, *German Law Journal*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (April 2003): 239.

²⁸ Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, “Women in Extended Roles in the Military: Legal Issues”, *Current Sociology*, Vol. 50, No. 5, (2002): 752.

²⁹ See Vaidotas Urbelis, “Impact of NATO Membership on Military Service in the Baltic States” in *Service to Country: Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries*, ed. Curtis Gilroy and City Williams (Cambridge, Mass: JFK School of Government. 2006), 97-119.

Others would argue that the political and security changes, and increase in disaster relief operations, humanitarian interventions, and less aggressive role that modern militaries play have taken place since the fall of communism have all challenged the long held stereotypes regarding women's participation in the ranks and would further help the integration (Olsson and Tryggestad, 2001). When it comes to types of missions in the post Cold War era, Judith Hicks Stiehm successfully demonstrates that in five years since the Beijing International Women's Conference there has been an increase in the number of women peacekeepers by at least 3 percent (2001). The next section of this chapter discusses some of the UN attempts to mainstream gender in peacekeeping operations around the world in the last decade.

In addition to the works that have sought to answer the question of women's participation in the military and military personnel transformation in general, the comparative gender policymaking literature is helpful to this study, because it has already identified different international gender equality initiatives regarding family policy, labor inequality, social services, reproductive rights and political representation as causes of domestic policy change (Berkovitch 1999; Riddell-Dixon 2001; Htun and Jones 2001; Naples and Desai 2002; Mazur 2002). None of these studies, however, has examined the integration of women into the military.

The last is the international relations, and particularly constructivist literature that successfully provides a counterpoint to those in comparative politics who have primarily examined domestic actors and institutions and their impact on domestic policymaking. They posit that there are other policy innovation and policy-learning mechanisms besides emulation that help explain the cross-national convergence of policies, ideas and norms.

Some provide a useful example by convincingly demonstrating how international human rights pressures change human rights practices domestically (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse-Kappen, Ropp and Sikkink 1999). Finnemore and Sikkink in “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” successfully outline the evolution of norms through “life cycles”, from their international level emergence to their domestic internalization (1998). Equally persuasive is the argument presented by Martha Finnemore, according to which smaller states can be “taught” by international agencies such as UNESCO to adhere to international norms and build national science agencies (1996). Peter Haas, on the other hand, identifies “epistemic communities” as the important disseminators of international knowledge, norms and therefore act as a mechanism of social construction (1992). His argument is further supported by Emmanuel Adler, who argues against structural realism and posits that arms control ideas diffused from the US to the USSR, thanks to epistemic communities consisting of MIT, Harvard and RAND scholars (1992).

This study will seek data to contribute to the argument that we can no longer examine only domestic variables when analyzing the sources of domestic policy change. From this perspective the needs and demands of the military establishment, political parties, members of the parliamentary or congressional armed forces committees, and women’s associational groups must be considered within both their domestic and international context.

3. CONCEPTS

To avoid the conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970) from which the aforementioned theoretical models suffer, it is necessary to define a few key terms. This is a comparative *military personnel policy study*, which means that it will aim to study states' "course of action or inaction pursued under the authority of government" (Heidenheimer, Heclo and Adams 1983, pg. 4) regarding the integration of women into the military services and expansion of their roles.

First, this study will focus on *gender inclusiveness*, meaning the degree to which individual states have taken action to abandon their policies of exclusion and to integrate women into their military forces and expand their participation. It is not concerned with social integration or what Winslow and Dunn refer to as "full acceptance of women as equals" once legal integration has happened (2002). Thus, it will only focus on the political process of integration and expansion of women's roles in the armed forces and not on personnel interaction, soldier attitudes and "interpersonal dynamics" prior to or after the gender integration policy has been legally passed by the state's authorities.³⁰ In other words, the study will not evaluate the effect that these policy changes might have had on the overall armed services, their effectiveness and readiness. Chapter II explains in greater detail how I intend to measure gender inclusiveness as the main dependent variable.

³⁰ For the microlevel analysis that seeks to explain how soldiers feel about the gender integration, discrimination and civilianization of the military see Chapter 7 in Carreiras, Helen. *Gender and the Military: Women in the Armed Forces of Western Democracies*. London, UK: Routledge 2006..or Titunic, Regina F. "The First Wave: Gender Integration and Military Culture" *Armed Forces and Society* Vol. 26, No. 2, (Winter 2000): 229-257; Miller, Laura. "Not Just Weapons of the Weak: Gender Harrassment as a Form of Protest for Army Men", *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Mar., 1997): 32-51.; Stevens, Gwendolyn and Sheldon Gardner. "But Can She Command a Ship? Acceptance of Women by Peers at the Coast Guard Academy", *Sex Roles*, Vol. 16, No. 3-4 (Feb. 1987): 181-188.

While in recent times we have witnessed an increase in irregular forces, paramilitaries, rebel forces (Kaldor, 1999), and corporate warriors (Avant 2005; Singer 2003), it is necessary to understand that this study will only analyze states' military forces. According to Max Weber, *the state* is a human community that has a monopoly on legitimate violence over a specific territory (Caforio 2003). This dissertation will adopt Weber's definition of the state and its use of the military as the most tangible expression of that monopoly.

Next, it is necessary to clarify term *professional military*. It will refer to those

“who pursue a lifetime occupational career of service in the armed forces, where to qualify as a professional, he [and she] must acquire the expertise necessary to help manage the permanent military establishment during period of peace and to take part in the direction of military occupation if war should break out” (Rukavishnikov and Pugh in Caforio 2006).³¹

Therefore, this term assumes a long-term commitment of professional individuals who are not conscripted and who are not participating in military operations on behalf of private military corporations. Before proceeding further, however, it is also important to mention that other terms such as armed forces, armed services or military forces will be used interchangeably to describe professional military.

Another term that is being increasingly used by policy scholars, policymakers and advocacy groups around the world is gender mainstreaming. Although the question of “mainstreaming” or the strategy of situating women's issues in the middle of a larger international debate on development has been around since the mid 1980s (Razzavi and Miller 1995), the term itself became part of policymaking and policy scholarship after it

³¹ Vladimir Rukavishnikov and Micheal Pugh have adopted this definition from Sills, D.L. (Ed.), *International Encyclopedia of Social Science*, Vol. 10 (The Macmillian Company and The Free Press, New York, 1972), 305.

was presented in the Platform for Action of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000). This study will therefore adopt the official terminology offered by the Assistant Secretary-General and Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women, whose responsibility is to support and monitor the implementation of it throughout the United Nations system. According to them, *gender mainstreaming* is:

“a globally accepted strategy for promoting gender equality. Mainstreaming is not an end in itself but a strategy, an approach, a means to achieve the goal of gender equality. Mainstreaming involves ensuring that gender perspectives and attention to the goal of gender equality are central to all activities - policy development, research, advocacy/ dialogue, legislation, resource allocation, and planning, implementation and monitoring of programmes and projects.”³²

The need to familiarize ourselves with this term also arises from the recent integration of gender perspective by the Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security that clearly requires more women to enter into both peacekeeping and peace-support operations. Equally important for this study is the fact that the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces has sought to incorporate this concept into its agenda and CWINF Guidance for NATO Gender Mainstreaming in order to “promote, facilitate, support and monitor incorporation of gender mainstreaming in all NATO operation activities.”(2003, pg. 34).

³² This definition is available on the website of the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women Department of Economic and Social Affairs <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/gendermainstreaming.htm> (Accessed November 16, 2008).

4. ARGUMENT

The analysis and argument are divided into four explanatory categories on two different levels of analysis: system and state. The three independent variable categories on the state level are: military manpower supply and demand, domestic political factors, and cultural factors. On the system level, analysis will examine the impact that international variables have on the state's behavior toward the integration of women soldiers.

The first cause of the policy change is that of military personnel supply and demand in the 21st century. The propositions put forth are that integration and expansion policies will be implemented in order to fill the ranks due to the abolition of draft requirements, lower birth rates of targeted male population, and low unemployment rates will create the need for the integration of women. Similarly, when military battlefields move from the ground to computerized rooms thousands of miles from the front line, when better weapons and communications modes are available, and when physical strength is no longer the prime criterion for military prowess, the need for participation of women will increase. Technological improvements also create the need for specialized knowledge; therefore by extending the recruit pool to include women, military forces have a greater chance of filling their ranks with experts. Also, it will seek to examine if the integration and expansion of women's role in the military will be achieved when the levels of women in professional and technical fields are high in both private and public sectors. The argument is that there is a spillover effect from these sectors into the military sector.

Secondly, in terms of domestic political context, the study will examine the proposition that an invitation to women will be extended especially when left-of-center political parties are in power and are also cooperating with women's movements outside of the government. The last political proposition is that the numbers of women in the legislative branch and on the ministerial level is irrelevant to the passage of the bill and that they will not necessarily be the ones seeking to promote the policy.

Thirdly, unlike authors who have previously attempted to answer the same question, this study will argue that cultural factors among the primary determinants of defense personnel policy in the 21st century. While it is not excluding cultural factors from the theoretical model, the research will contend that issues of national security do not allow policymakers and military leadership to surrender to parochial gendered division of the roles. Societal definitions and perceptions are less important than overriding military organizational needs. This study will explore the proposition that cultural aspects of a particular nation, such as levels of religiosity of the society's population, specific religions or societal values regarding women's role, will have an effect on the passage of policy. Additionally, the proposal is put forth that cultural values in the society will be overridden by military needs, and the state's international security commitments.

The last set of variables will hypothesize that higher integration of women took place in states exposed to lower levels of security threat. In addition, in the post-Cold War era humanitarian missions, refugee support and responses to natural disasters became part of military missions. This study examines the proposition that states have added women soldiers to their ranks because of the increase of such "other than war"

operations where women can be useful in the roles of peacekeepers and humanitarians, and due to the increased pressure by military alliances seeking standardization and consistency among member states.

5. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

In this introductory chapter, I have attempted to firstly present the puzzle, the dramatic change in policies regarding the integration of women and subsequent expansion of their roles in the armed services in some states and stalled progress in others. Secondly, I have reviewed the literature that has tried to solve that puzzle as well as theoretical literature in comparative politics, international relations and gender studies that could help me further the research on the subject. Lastly, I have defined and clarified the concepts and arguments that will be presented in the remainder of this dissertation.

By extrapolating data from state reports on women and military and from interviews with Committee on Women in NATO Forces (CWINF) female officers and delegates, Chapter II develops and defines the six indicators based on which the dependent variable - the gender inclusiveness – will be measured in this dissertation. It discusses the choice of case studies and research methods used. Lastly, it presents the four categories of hypotheses which are going to be tested, as well as the sources of data that was used to test them.

Chapter III presents and discusses the findings of the large-n quantitative analysis. It shows that the levels of gender inclusiveness in the military are not necessarily a reflection of gender equality in political life of the society. Rather, the multiple regressions demonstrate that the primary causes of the integration and expansion of

women's roles in the military are rooted in the abolishment of conscription, professionalization of the military services and technological advancements that require soldiers to have technical skills and not necessarily be present on the battlefield. In addition, the research shows that women will be more successfully integrated in those societies where they are more economically active. The quantitative analysis also demonstrates the need to study the subject qualitatively, as it fails to answer some of the research questions, particularly regarding regional differences.

It is followed by the small-N qualitative analysis of the United States and Italy in Chapter IV, and Hungary and Poland in Chapter V. These two chapters trace the policy process in four different states and confirm that in fact there are different forces at work in original member states of NATO in Western Europe and North America, and in new member states in Eastern Europe. Liberal women's movements have played a large part in advocating expansion of women's role in original member states, yet they were largely irrelevant in new states. Secondly, it is demonstrated that level of gender inclusiveness in the military in the United States and Italy are largely affected by the women's quantitative and qualitative presence in labor markets, clearly pointing to the spillover from the civilian into military sector. On the other hand, in Eastern Europe it was the membership in the alliance itself that was a greater incentive to incorporate women into the military. However, it is level of threat and level of military operational capabilities and sophistication of armed services that determine the level of gender inclusiveness in Hungary and Poland.

Chapter VI summarizes all the findings, makes policy recommendations and suggests future research in the field, particularly regarding the expansion of the study to

include Croatia and Albania, and other possible candidates in the Balkans. Next, it argues that it is necessary to study democratic states elsewhere in the world. Finally, it recommends comparison with non-democratic states, and states in other military alliances.

Chapter II

RESEARCH DESIGN

1. CASE SELECTION

This study focuses on twenty-four of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) twenty-eight member states. Iceland has no standing army and Estonia has not submitted a single yearly report on gender integration with NATO's Committee on Women and therefore both have been omitted from the analysis. After the data collection process was completed and the analysis of data finalized, Croatia and Albania were welcomed into NATO. Hence, these four states have been left out of the study.

Why NATO states? Firstly, the sample units are culturally, socio-economically and militarily diverse and the evidence from this large-N empirical study will help make generalizations on the relative significance of the factors. About half of the states are Catholic, whereas the other half is Protestant and Turkey is the only Muslim state. GDP per capita varies from \$85,000 in Luxembourg to \$12,500 in Romania. Their military expenditures also vary greatly, with Turkey being the biggest spender (5.4 percent of their total GDP) and Luxembourg the lowest (0.9 percent of their total GDP).³³

Secondly, NATO member states offer information-rich cases because no other military alliance systematically compiles data or requires its members to submit yearly reports regarding gender integration within their armed forces. This allows me to obtain

³³ CIA Factbook Country Comparison GDP per capita (PPP) and Military Expenditures tables are both available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/rankorderguide.html> (Last Accessed March 5th 2009).

reliable data, access and conduct interviews with military officials and then test a large number of hypotheses on both a domestic and international level of analysis.

Thirdly, from a theoretical perspective the sample allows for a closer scrutiny of two sets of categories. One is the proposed set of hypotheses regarding women's participation in politics, civil society, and labor markets. According to Weldon, it is important to study gender policymaking in democratic states, because it is possible to measure "the degree of latitude afforded women's organizations" (2002, pg. 22) and therefore their ability to organize, and work within and outside government structures. States that are not considered democratic do not necessarily allow for the same level of women's participation in the government, or the necessary freedoms of speech, assembly and association. They tend to impose strict regulations on the formation of political parties, their activities and their agendas. In such states, public opinion can be manipulated by government authorities, leaving little or no space for gender equality advocacy. Thus, it would be difficult to assess what role non-governmental organizations, women's movements, legislators and political parties play in integrating and expanding the role women play in the armed services.

All NATO member states are considered electoral democracies by the 2008 edition of Freedom House's annual report.³⁴ Of twenty-four states considered here twenty-three are classified as "free" states. This classification means that besides having democratic electoral systems these states respect and protect civil liberties, have no

³⁴ In order to be classified an electoral democracy, a state must have met the following criteria: 1) A competitive, multiparty political system; 2) Universal adult suffrage for all citizens (with exceptions for restrictions that states may legitimately place on citizens as sanctions for criminal offenses); 3) Regularly contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy, reasonable ballot security, and in the absence of massive voter fraud, and that yield results that are representative of the public will; 4) Significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open political campaigning.

corruption, support free and independent press, and nurture free associational life of their citizens. Only the Republic of Turkey is classified as a “partially free” state. It held free and fair parliamentary elections, but civil and political liberties remain somewhat limited, corruption is widespread, and journalists practice self-censorship in order to avoid discussing sensitive topics.³⁵ Although Turkey is not as free as other member states, I have retained it in my sample in order to see if it will offer any additional answers or even generate additional questions regarding the integration of women into the military.

Lastly, one of the main arguments in this research study is that norms regarding women in the military are disseminated through international organizations such as the United Nations, European Union and NATO. Studying these twenty-four states allows me to evaluate the gender mainstreaming and standardization initiatives within these international organizations and what if any effect they have on the change of domestic policy on women in the armed forces. We can then seek to identify the mechanisms through which these norms trickle down to individual states. This research would then be useful to students and scholars of comparative politics, military and gender studies. Moreover, it would allow us to study theories of international relations regarding actors involved in designing and implementation of national security policies, and in particular the role that international organizations play in disseminating information and encouraging policy innovation and formulation at the domestic level.

³⁵ Journalists can be sued, arrested and jailed under the penal code for writing on Armenian genocide, division of Cyprus, and insulting Ataturk’s principles of “Turkishness” and sanctity of military forces. More information is provided by the Reports sans Frontiers organization which publishes an annual report on freedom of the press around the world. http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=25503, (Last Accessed March 5th 2009)

2. METHODS

This study will combine both quantitative and qualitative methods in order to offset weaknesses of each and strengthen the value of the study. The mixed method allows for the triangulation of the data and will allow me to verify and contextualize the findings (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998; Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003; Cresswell and Clark 2007). It will improve the overall quality of the research done, and show that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive but rather complement each other.

Quantitative Analysis

The quantitative analysis allows us to test a large number of variables in a large number of states. This method has not been used by the scholars of comparative military personnel policies. As mentioned in Chapter I, most of the published works explore individual states without much comparison or factor analysis (Murray and Viotti 1994).

The case is rather similar with the students of comparative gender policymaking (Weldon 2002). In fact, there has been a lot of disagreement over whether it is necessarily good to conduct large-N studies quantitative studies of gender policy scholarship because, as some suggest, statistics are associated with “masculinity” and therefore the scientific method suffers from gender bias (Keller 1983). Such an argument should be ignored as it is has nothing to do with scientific discovery and progress. In fact, there are more recent feminists studying international relations who argue that by ignoring quantitative methods “feminists marginalize and devalue the applicability of quantitative

research for furthering feminist goals and, ultimately, themselves as well”.³⁶ In fact, in recent years there have been quite a few large-N quantitative analyses that have helped advance our understanding of the processes that bring about gender equality in society (Gornick, Meyer and Ross 1998; Weldon 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2003).

By using the quantitative method, this study will seek to establish which one of the factors tested has more impact on gender inclusiveness in military forces cross-nationally. It will conduct the analysis by running multiple linear regressions and correlations using SPSS software. I will use the SPSS Pearson correlation to measure the strength, direction and significance of the relationship between two variables.

Correlations tell us whether two variables are linearly related to each other. Multiple linear regressions are used to examine the relationship between my dependent variable, gender inclusiveness index, and all other dependent variables. Regression not only goes beyond correlation by adding prediction capabilities but it permits statistical control on confounding variables. In addition, bar charts and scatterplots will be used to show the relationship between two or more variables. They help illustrate the direction, strength and form of each relationship.

Qualitative Analysis

Quantitative analysis is very useful in identifying the most important factors that influence the process of integration and it allows us to eliminate variables from the previous “laundry list” models. However, in order to see if the general arguments reflect

³⁶ Mary Caprioli, “Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Analysis: A Critical Analysis”, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 6. No. 2 (October 2004): 253. Caprioli’s argument is directed at those who openly discard or simply fail to recognize feminist empirical works in international relations because in their opinion is based on sexist assumptions and methodology. She accuses them of hypocrisy because by rejecting quantitative works, they themselves create hierarchies – something that feminist IR scholarship as a whole has been trying to deconstruct.

the process of policy change in individual states and to better observe and contextualize human behavior, it is necessary to explore specific cases of women's integration into the military. Studying qualitatively different sets of variables in the most responsive and the least responsive states will help trace policy development and enrich the overall research. It also helps address the often heard criticism that quantitative analysis can give us correlations that mean very little in the "real world". Consequently, this dissertation will seek to paint a better, more detailed and more concise picture of gender integration in the military.

The qualitative analysis and chapters will focus on four very different NATO members: the United States of America, Italy, Hungary and Poland. These four were chosen based on two different but equally important variables. The first is their gender inclusiveness score. Both Hungary and the United States rank highest among all the states, whereas Italy and Poland lie at the bottom of the scale. The second variable is the length of NATO membership: Hungary and Poland are both new members, joining in 1999, whereas Italy and the United States were its founding members in 1949.

3. MEASURING GENDER INCLUSIVENESS IN THE ARMED FORCES

Comparing national security policies of different states is always a difficult endeavor and, as discussed in Chapter I, very few academic studies have attempted to do so. Because integration takes place on different levels, in order to measure and compare women's participation and the extent of their inclusion in the armed forces in different states this study will first develop a scale based on indicators similar to the one first

proposed by Segal, Segal and Booth in 1999, and the one developed by Carreiras in 2000. Therefore, the main dependant variable in this study is the *index of gender inclusiveness*. This index allows us to employ consistent criteria, or indicators, upon which we can then score the progress each state has made regarding women in the military.

The scale developed in this chapter includes the following six indicators: percentage of total force, occupational restrictions, formal rank restrictions, percentage of women in officer ranks, family programs, and harassment regulations. Therefore, this scale drops Carreiras's category "percentage of women in traditional functions" and "training segregation". The reason for excluding this category is purely a matter of research design and new legislative realities. Since the writing of her book, the majority of NATO states have, in fact, opened most occupations to women, and thus, "the percentage of women in traditional functions"³⁷, becomes irrelevant to the question of government's inclusiveness. Therefore, today, unlike eight years ago, it is primarily the women themselves and not the legislative and policy changes that are determining the career path. In terms of training segregation, most states have implemented gender neutral training standards, where women and men must meet the same physical standards, while others have different physical demands for each sex. Training, instruction and materials, however, remain the same in all. The only exception is Turkey because there are no enlisted women.

The data used to build the scale and obtain the final score for each state was provided by the individual country delegates to the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces, but in cases where they did not respond to my questionnaire (See Appendix B), the data was extrapolated from the individual country reports submitted in 2008 to the

³⁷ Carreiras focuses on the occupational distribution of military personnel by gender in NATO forces.

Conference of the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces. This committee is a consultative body within the alliance whose primary mission is to recommend policy changes, advise and guide the military leadership of both NATO headquarters and individual member states on issues regarding the effective deployment of women, and mainstreaming of gender perspective into all areas of operation. It has met once a year since its inception in 1961, and the last conference was held at NATO headquarters, in Brussels, Belgium, from June 2nd - June 6th, 2008. Therefore, the following information is the summary of original data collected, processed and analyzed in the year 2008, which expands Carreiras's model by adding six Eastern European states, updates the statistics, and modifies the indicators.

(1) Percentage of Women in Total Active Force Indicator

Most states have, in fact, data available describing the proportion of positions in the armed forces that are occupied by women. While this is the most important indicator, it cannot be studied alone if we are to assess the full scope of the integration policy. The number indicates only the quantitative presence, while the other indicators help measure the quality of that presence. The gender inclusiveness index shows that the numbers vary from country to country. The highest percentages of women among the NATO states are: Hungary with 20 percent, Latvia with 17.2 percent, Slovenia with 15.8, the United States and Canada with 15.5 percent and 15.1 percent, respectively. At the other end of the scale, states with the lowest percentages are Turkey with less than 1 percent, Poland with 1.2 percent and Italy with 2.6 percent. What this data demonstrates, however, is that the top three states are all new NATO members from Eastern Europe that have only recently

opened their ranks to women. Only eight years ago (See Table 4.2.1), the top three states were the United States (14 percent), Canada (11.4 percent) and France (8.5 percent). Hungary had a meager 6.8 percent in 2000, but that number has since tripled. In terms of the bottom three, not much has changed. Italy has made the most improvements because it opened its military services to women only in 1999. Therefore, it no longer occupies the last spot on the scale with a zero percentage. Turkey seems to be the one lagging the most, whereas Poland has only recently started to restructure its armed forces and its numbers are expected to rise in the coming years.

Table 2.1 Percentage of Women in NATO Forces 2000 and 2008

<i>COUNTRY</i>	<i>Percentage of women in 2000</i>	<i>Percentage of women in 2008</i>
Belgium	7.6	8.25
Bulgaria	n/a	10.13
Canada	11.4	15.1
Czech Republic	3.3	12.39
Denmark	4.2	5.8
France	8.5	14.2
Germany	1.4	7.6
Greece	3.8	5.6
Hungary	6.8	20
Italy	0	2.6
Latvia	n/a	17.7
Lithuania	n/a	12.2
Luxembourg	4.2	6.25
The Netherlands	8	9
Norway	3.2	7.7
Poland	0.1	1.2
Portugal	6.6	13.7
Romania	n/a	3.16
Slovakia	n/a	8.65
Slovenia	n/a	15.86
Spain	5.8	12.3
Turkey	0.1	
United Kingdom	8.1	11.6
United States	14	15.5

Sources: Compiled using the annual reports of the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces – 2008.

(2) Occupational Restrictions

This indicator measures the number of occupational restrictions imposed on military women. It will look at how many different positions are actually available to women. Turkey has the highest number of restrictions as it does not allow women to enlist. The only way for women to join the Turkish armed forces is to enter military academies first and then be assigned as officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Many other states have also limited career opportunities for women by excluding them from specific branches or positions. In the United Kingdom, women are not permitted in the Royal Marines General Service (as Royal Marine Commandos), the Household Cavalry and Royal Armoured Corps, the Infantry and the Royal Air Force Regiment, submarines, and mine clearing. In the Netherlands, with the exception of the Marine Corps and the submarine service, all posts are open to women.

The situation varies among the newer member states in Eastern Europe. In the Czech armed forces, there are no occupations from which women are barred, including combat positions. The Bulgarian delegate to the Committee of Women in NATO and president of the Bulgarian Armed Forces Women Association, Vera Nikolova, reported that women are excluded from submarines, special and specialized units such as reconnaissance, field artillery, aviator pilot for the fighter aviation, air defense of troops, and anti-aircraft troops. Poland limits their posts in Missile and Artillery Forces, Navy and Radio-Technical Forces.

Then there are states such as Spain, Portugal, Canada, Norway and Germany that have absolutely no occupational restrictions and women are allowed in combat. The debate regarding occupational restrictions continues in the United States, where women

are still barred from the combat zones, yet on May 1st, 2008, Pfc. Monica Brown was awarded the Silver Star, the third-highest combat medal for her heroism in Afghanistan.³⁸

The question of women in combat continues to be debated in the United States Congress, where many are calling for an official change to the policy. This issue of occupational restrictions in the United States will be revisited in Chapter IV.

(3) Formal Rank Restriction

Since 2000, almost all NATO members have eliminated restrictions which can prevent women from reaching the top of the military hierarchy. The Bulgarian delegation reported in their survey that there are partial restrictions, but did not offer further details. The Turkish armed forces seem to be the only ones limiting promotional opportunities, primarily because women are not allowed to enlist as privates, and therefore cannot attain ranks that demand field experience.

(4) Percentage of Women Officers

While all states have opened military academies to women and eliminated all rank restrictions, the actual percentages of women who have successfully climbed the ladder varies from state to state. The reasons for this also vary but most stem from the exclusion of women from combat occupations, and/or the timing of the changes in the states' legislation regarding the opening of military academies and specialized occupations. Some of the individual states' reports argue that women will be in commanding posts in the future, because it takes time to gain the necessary education, field training and

³⁸ "Woman Gains Silver Star -- And Removal From Combat Case Shows Contradictions of Army Rules" by Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post, Thursday, May 1, 2008; Page A01

experience to be promoted to a higher rank. To speed up the process, states have sought to shorten the length for rank promotion so that women who take maternity leaves would not lag behind their male colleagues. The table below indicates the percentages of women officers, women NCOs, and enlisted in all twenty-four states studied.

Table 2.2. Percentages of women by rank

<i>Country</i>	<i>Percentage of women officers</i>	<i>Percentage of women NCOs</i>	<i>Percentage of women enlisted</i>
Belgium	7.44	6.6	10.4
Bulgaria	2.4	6.98	15.67
Canada	15.4	12	16
Czech R.	1.98	N/A	N/A
Denmark	6.5	3.9	6.7
France	9.8	13.5	14.2
Germany	6.98	5.86	10.72
Greece*	N/A	15.9	N/A
Hungary	19	29	11
Italy	1	N/A	2.6
Latvia	12	24.1	13.4
Lithuania	10.3	10.5	13.5
Luxembourg	4.91	3.8	7.28
The Netherlands	8	7	11
Norway	7.7	11	8.5
Poland	2.4	0.8	0.5
Portugal	11.6	6.64	17.84
Romania	5.29	5.46	0.47
Slovakia	4		
Slovenia	19.71	10.2	15.4
Spain	5.61	1.17	18
Turkey	N/A	N/A	0
United Kingdom	11.9	8.28	9.5
United States	15.78	13.8	17.9

* Greece does not offer cumulative percentages (3.1% senior officers, and 10.61% junior officers)

Source: 2008 reports of the Committee on Women in the NATO and surveys completed by country delegates

The states with the most women officers are Hungary (19 percent), Slovenia (19 percent), the United States (15.78 percent) and Canada (15.4 percent). The states with the least numbers of female officers are Italy (1 percent), the Czech Republic (1.98 percent) and Bulgaria (2.4 percent). However, it must be kept in mind that Italy only opened its ranks and academies to women less than a decade ago. Time can therefore explain the relative shortage of women officers, but if the numbers continue to remain low for another decade, clearly we will need to look for different explanations. In addition, data regarding the Turkish and Greek armed forces remains a mystery. All of the data for both states indicates the actual numbers of women in officer ranks rather than percentages.

(5) Family programs

In order to measure how inclusive each one of the twenty-four governments has been, it is crucial to assess the scope and breadth of the programs that address work-life balance. Therefore, here I have compiled the data regarding the maternity and parental leaves in each state, the existence of child care provisions and programs, family assistance, and flexibility of hours.

The specific family programs for military personnel vary dramatically from state to state. Most of the states claim to have adopted civilian labor codes and regulations regarding family policy. However, there are quite a few that have gone beyond that and implemented specific policies addressing the needs of military families. For example, in Germany, an “operational test” is intended to be conducted over the next two years which would allow both male and female soldiers to bring their children to work in case of emergencies. The German report states that “the aim is to reduce the stress, for example,

linked with having to make emergency arrangements or for looking for alternative care” (2008, 4). In Belgium, military personnel have a choice of starting their workday any time between 7am and 10am and end between 3pm and 6pm so that they can take their children to school and collect them afterward. In terms of maternity leaves, some states are more generous than others. Greece leads with 56 weeks of paid maternity leave, while the United States is the last with only 42 days on average of convalescent leave. Slovenia offers maternity leave and post-maternity rights to all members of its force regardless of gender. Others have focused on policies regarding the work of pregnant women and mothers of young children. For example, in the Netherlands women with children under the age of 5 are not obliged to be deployed. In Romania, women who choose to return to work before a child turns one are able to work only six hours a day while receiving full salary. And in Spain, the opening of sixteen nursery schools for children of military personnel has already resulted in an increase in the female recruitment rate, according to its report.

All in all, across NATO states have started to dramatically expand their family programs by providing child-care facilities, extend maternity leave rights to both parents, and create more flexible working hours. Not all have done it to the same extent, so we can see some variation in the table below. The Czech armed forces have no special provisions or policies regarding family life yet. According to the Czech delegate to Committee on Women in NATO, Magdalena Dvorakova, “CZAF is following the civil law and doesn’t have a nursery system for females and other institutions to help raising the kids of single-parent. Mostly, we depend on family support.”³⁹ In fact, social and family policies have been cited in several country reports as one of the biggest reasons

³⁹ Email correspondence October 16th, 2008.

why the percentages of women remain low. Closer inspection of the index below reveals exactly that – Turkey, Italy, Denmark, the Czech Republic and even France all have fewer social and family policies, and lower percentages of women.

(6) Harassment Regulations

Many scholars, feminists and activists would argue that it is much harder to be a woman soldier than her male counterpart because at times an enemy is hiding within one's own ranks. Researching the subject and trying to assess both the quantity and quality of the policies that states have passed to prevent sexual harassment in the military is a challenging task. While policies might have been passed by the state's legislative body, and monies allocated to run the workshops, print the brochures and build the counseling centers, it is common knowledge that sexual discrimination and harassment persist. The true number of sexual assaults on female soldiers is hard to ascertain, in part because crimes frequently go unreported.

Recent analysis of sexual harassment in the US armed forces showed how widespread the problem remains, and how sexist behavior, intimidation and rape still occur in the daily life of a female soldier. In fact, the numbers are incredibly disturbing.

The New York Times reports that:

“new data released by the Pentagon showed an almost 9 percent increase in the number of sexual assaults reported in the last fiscal year — 2,923 — and a 25 percent increase in such assaults reported by women serving in Iraq and Afghanistan... The truly chilling fact is that, as the Pentagon readily admits, the overwhelming majority of rapes that occur in the military go unreported, perhaps as many as 80 percent. And most of the men accused of attacking women receive little or no punishment.”⁴⁰

⁴⁰ “The Great Shame” by Bob Herbert, New York Times online March 20th, 2009 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/21/opinion/21herbert.html?_r=1 (Last Accessed March 21st, 2009)

The problem is not unique to the United States. In November 2000, Belgian Army female military personnel gathered in Brussels to discuss the problems. About 92% of women reported that they have experienced sexist talk, 33% of women suffered physical harassment, 33% receive continuing sexual propositions, and 25% have been psychologically terrorized.⁴¹ Does this mean that Belgium has not tried to protect its female soldiers? Since 1997, the Belgian government has tried to solve the problem by establishing a confidentiality unit, but Defense Minister Andre Flahaut himself admitted that “64% of the personnel have never heard about the unit”.⁴² In Eastern Europe, the Bulgarian government has been under a lot of pressure following several scandals, including the harassment case against Colonel Alexander Petkov for sexually harassing five female soldiers in his brigade.⁴³

Yet, none of this means that the United States, Belgium, Bulgaria or any other state that is encountering sexual harassment problems in its military service has not done anything to prevent it. Of all states included in this study only the Hungarian and Czech military delegates to the Committee on Women in NATO reported not having any specific policies regarding sexual harassment in the military, but rather they use civilian labor laws and their democratic constitutions as guarantees of protection for all citizens regardless of gender. Most states have not only passed policies but also ask that soldiers undergo training specifically addressing respect for diversity, appropriate attitudes

⁴¹ Data and charts are available on the RoSa- factsheet regarding women in military whose aim is to familiarize general public with the scope of equal opportunities in Flanders.
<http://www.rosadoc.be/site/maineng/pdf/07.PDF> (Last Accessed April 14th, 2009)

⁴² Original quote appeared in “25 Jaar vrouwen in het leger : een balans”, in De draad van Ariadne, Number 14, October 2000 and cited by RoSa-factsheet report on
<http://www.rosadoc.be/site/maineng/pdf/07.PDF> (Last Accessed April 14th, 2009)

⁴³ “Bulgarian Colonel Appeals Sentence for Sex Abuse” March 14th, 2007, Sofia News Agency online
http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=77880 (Last Accessed March 18th, 2008)

regarding sexual harassment, mobbing, or any other kind of violent and disrespectful behavior. All members of the Belgian Royal Armed Forces can undertake three-day diversity training, including gender education.

German forces have only recently opened all positions to women, but they have also been the most active in implementing the gender mainstreaming requirements at all schools of the armed forces. Soldiers study topics such as “men and women in the Bundeswehr”, “discrimination, mobbing, sexual harassment”, “partner-like behavior”, “compatibility of family and work” and “communicative behavior” to eliminate inappropriate conduct between sexes. Greece, on the other hand, has only started to run its gender awareness education pilot program in its Air Force academy with the hope of extending it to the Army and Navy.

It is necessary to remember that states will only be scored based on the existence of policy dealing with the question of harassment and not the question of policy effectiveness. Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark all integrated women earlier and therefore have been trying to solve problems relating to harassment for many years. However, time or money invested do not seem to make any of these states more immune to the problem than other states that are just starting to incorporate diversity programs and workshops into their military school curriculums.

The table below shows how different indicators were measured in my index of gender inclusiveness and how each state was scored. It is this index score that will be then tested against the possible explanatory variables in the following chapters.

Table 2.3 Index of Gender Inclusiveness

<i>Country</i>	<i>Percentage of women in total active force (1)</i>	<i>Occupational restrictions (2)</i>	<i>Formal rank restrictions (3)</i>	<i>Percentage of women in officers ranks (4)</i>	<i>Family programs (5)</i>	<i>Harrassment regulations (6)</i>	<i>Index score</i>
Belgium	2	3	2	2	2	2	13
Bulgaria	3	2	1	1	2	2	11
Canada	4	3	2	4	2	2	17
Czech R.	3	3	2	1	1	0	10
Denmark	2	3	2	2	1	2	12
France	3	2	2	2	1	1	11
Germany	2	3	2	2	2	2	13
Greece	2	2	1	0	2	2	9
Hungary	4	3	2	4	2	0	15
Italy	1	3	2	0	1	1	8
Latvia	4	3	2	3	2	1	15
Lithuania	3	3	2	3	2	1	14
Luxembourg	2	3	2	1	2	2	12
The Netherlands	2	2	2	2	2	2	12
Norway	2	3	2	2	2	1	12
Poland	0	3	2	1	1	1	8
Portugal	3	2	2	3	2	2	14
Romania	1	3	2	2	1	1	10
Slovakia	2	3	2	1	1	1	10
Slovenia	4	2	2	4	2	1	15
Spain	3	3	2	2	2	2	14
Turkey	0	1	0	0	1	1	3
United Kingdom	2	2	2	3	2	2	13
United States	4	2	2	4	2	2	16

1. Percentage of women in total active force 0 = 0-2%; 1=+2- 5%; 2= +5-10%; 3=+ 10-15%; 4=+15-20%; 5=+20%

2.Occupational restrictions 0=total (no women at all); 1= many (no enlisted women); 2=few (submarines, special forces); 3=none

3. Formal rank restrictions 0=total; 1=partial; 2=none

4. Total percentage of women officers 0 = 0-2%; 1=+2- 5%; 2= +5-10%;3=+ 10-15% ; 4=+15

5. Family programs (maternity programs, child care, paid leave.) 0=none; 1=few; 2=many

6. Harrassment regulations (anti-discrimination regulations and monitoring within the armed services) 0=none; 1=few; 2=many

4. HYPOTHESIS AND DATA COLLECTION

In seeking to maximize theoretical replication, this model offers four categories of variables, each with several testable hypotheses as presented in the proposed model in Chapter I. Each category is followed by a review of the data that was collected and used to test against the hypothesis. The four sets of hypothesis put forward in this research are: military personnel supply and demand, domestic political context, culture, and international context. All hypotheses will be analyzed by using quantitative method in Chapter III.

Military Manpower Shortage

MSD1. The greater the shortage of men due to abolition of conscription, the greater women's participation in the military.

MSD2. The lower the birth rates in the state and ratio of men to women, the greater the participation of women in the military.

MSD3. The higher the percentage of women in technical and professional fields, the greater the participation of women in the military.

MSD4. The lower the unemployment rates, the greater the participation of women in the military.

Data Collection: Primary data regarding personnel and accession policies in the NATO member states were collected from the Committee on Women in NATO yearly reports. These are available for the years 2000-2008 and include information regarding the evolution of the forces and the specific policies regarding integration and expansion of the role of women in the individual states. It is important to point out that not all states

have contributed the same quantity or quality of data, and therefore at times the data from the aforementioned reports were combined with outside sources. These include official ministry of defense web sites, the Rand Corporation and International Institute for Strategic Studies Military Balance publications that provide additional information such as statistical data regarding armed forces in individual states, final texts of legislation, directives and decrees on draft, professionalization and modernization of the armed forces and women's service.

Birth rates for all case studies were obtained from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) country reports. In addition, analysis of the female labor market and female employment rates in technical and professional fields will also be conducted by utilizing the data provided by the UNDP in its Human Development Index (HDI). The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Statistical Office of the European Communities and the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have provided unemployment rates in all countries. The information in this study was also supplemented by research published in academic articles, reports and books analyzing military policy in individual states. Both percentages of women in technical and professional fields and unemployment rates are listed in Appendixes E and F.

Domestic political and economic context

DP1. The greater the percentage of women in legislatures, the greater the participation of women in the military.

DP2. The greater the percentage of women in ministerial positions, the greater the participation of women in the military.

DP3. The greater the percentage of women in the labor force, the greater the participation of women in the military.

DP4. The more economically developed the state, the greater the participation of women in the military.

DP5. The more autonomous women's associational groups involved in defense policy, the greater the participation of women in the military.

Data Collection: Parliamentary and Congressional data on women legislators, party ideologies and existence of women's policy agencies will be reviewed. For all states, the newest statistics regarding the numbers of women in lower and upper levels of the legislative bodies is readily available from the Inter-Parliamentary Union web site www.ipu.org (See Appendix G). The UNPD Human Development Index provides statistics regarding both percentage of women in ministerial positions (see Appendix H) and states' level of development, as measured by the Gross National Income per capita (Purchasing Power Parity) in 2008, was provided by the World Bank (See Appendix I) . To measure women's participation in labor force I have used the data from both OECD and World Bank. The OECD provides 2008 data on women's labor force as percentage of total population aged 15-64 for its member states, while World Bank has provided me with 2007 data on Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia Romania, and Slovenia. No 2008 data were available as of June 2009.

The data regarding the parties in power and their ideologies is obtained from sources such as government and party web sites, as well as newspaper articles. It will

analyze women's institutional and associational groups that were involved in the framing of the legislation in the United States and Italy. Examples of such organizations are DACOWITS (US Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services), the National Organization of Women, or the Women's Research and Education Institute at Minerva Center in the United States. The information regarding the activities of these organizations came from both primary and secondary sources. In terms of primary sources, I have been able to get in touch with a number of veterans, soldiers, academics and researchers working on the subject via H-Net listserv that is administrated by Linda De Pauw Grant and MINERVA Center in Washington D.C. These outstanding women and men were willing to offer their opinion regarding my research on the impact of women's movement and political parties on gender inclusiveness in the military and publicly share it on the listserv.

In Italy, I study the radical and Marxist feminist groups Movimento Di Liberazione Di Donne and Rivolta Femminile, and the new Gruppo Donna Soldato representing both current and aspiring women soldiers primarily through secondary sources. Last, specific legal decisions regarding the rights of women in the military and society at large in these states will be analyzed in Chapters IV and V.

Culture

C1. The less religious the population, the greater the participation of women in the military.

C2. The more Protestant the population, the greater the participation of women in the military.

C3. The more egalitarian the values regarding women in business, the greater the participation of women in the military.

C4. The more egalitarian the values regarding women politicians, the greater the participation of women in the military.

C5. The more confidence the society has in its military service, the greater the participation of women in the military.

Data Collection: Data on types of religion was collected from the United States Department of State Background Notes, which is available online for each state included in this study.⁴⁴ Data on all states regarding family values, morals, religiosity, and role of women in society, in politics, and in the workplace was obtained from the World Values Survey. It was based on three indicators:

- a) Whether people think that men make better executives than women
- b) Whether people think that men make better political leaders than women.
- c) Whether people think that men should have more right to a job than a women when jobs are scarce.

The answers for the first indicator (a) were available for only 13 states from the study years 2005-2008, while the answers for the second indicator (b) were available from 19 states, of which six are from study years 1996-1999. The answers for the third indicator are available for all twenty-four states. The full survey questions and tables with answers for each state are available in Appendix C. I have simplified the analysis by combining answers 1 and 2 (Agree Strongly/ Agree) and answers 3 and 4 (Disagree/Disagree Strongly) and using the mean for each as a state's score in my dataset.

⁴⁴ This data is updated frequently and all of it is from years 2008 and 2009. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/> (Last accessed January 29th, 2009)

When it comes to measuring a level of religiosity, there is no scientific consensus on how exactly we are supposed to assess that. Those individuals who declare that they believe in God may not attend religious services on a regular basis, and those who do attend may be just trying to decide which religion to choose or might be under pressure to conform. Measuring it therefore requires looking into a number of dimensions that reflect people's behavior and beliefs regarding a whole set of religious, social and cultural traditions. To complete this task I have adopted the Strength of Religiosity Scale developed by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart by using the data from seventy-five different states pooled by the World Values Survey 1981-2001⁴⁵. This scale includes answers to the following questions:

- d) How important is God in your life? (% Very, scaled 6-10)
- e) Do you find that you get comfort and strength from religion? (% Yes)
- f) Do you believe in God? (% Yes)
- g) Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are...a religious person? (% Religious)
- h) Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? (% Once a week or more)
- i) Do you believe in life after death? (% Yes)

The factor analysis and scores for all twenty-four states in this study were already available, so no additional analysis was performed. For full questions and possible answers, see Appendix D.

⁴⁵ Norris and Inglehart, pg. 53-55. I have used the factor analysis of six indicators from the WVS survey that Norris and Inglehart have used to develop their 100-point Religiosity Strength Scale. Each state was assigned the score based on the answers in the survey.

International context

IN1. The lower the national security threat, the greater the participation of women in the military.

IN2. The greater the participation in international peacekeeping missions, the greater the participation of women in the military.

IN3. The greater the promotion of standardization by the multinational alliances to promote effective military cooperation among members, the greater the participation of women in the military.

Data Collection: Information regarding levels of threat for each state will be analyzed by examining the level of Conflict Intensity (See Appendix J for the chart and explanations) developed by Julian Lindley-French and Franco Algeri in Venusberg Report.⁴⁶ Each state was placed on the Conflict Intensity Scale of one to ten, in which one is the lowest level of readiness and capabilities for warfare, and ten is for the highest level of global operational readiness reserved only for the United States.

Secondly, the impact of the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces in their promotion of standardized regulations regarding women soldiers is investigated to see if it had an impact on domestic legislation in the member states by reviewing their country reports. All of the data here is collected directly from the CWINF via direct correspondence with the named person and via reports published on the committee's web site. Lastly, to establish the link between international peacekeeping missions and domestic legislation on women soldiers, this research will use the United Nations

⁴⁶Data was adapted by using the Bertelsmann Foundation European Defense Strategy 2nd Venusberg report published in 2004 available on the following website http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/2004/2004_Venusberg_Report.pdf (Last Accessed March 12th, 2008)

Department of Peacekeeping data ranking troop donations by individual states, as well as data regarding percentages of women deployed abroad by each NATO member.

The model and the data available offer a chance to build a theory to help explain why democratic and developed states integrate women into their military services. However, it is important that in the future the model be extended to include developing and non-democratic nations to discover if the model applies to them. Due to the nature of this project, time constraints, and data availability, expanding the research to include these states was not possible to accomplish. All of the research problems and recommendations will be further discussed in Chapter VI.

Chapter Summary

This dissertation will study both quantitatively and qualitatively the integration of women in the military in twenty-four NATO member states. Analyzing the process of policy change in democratic states allows us to assess the validity of previous models and arguments that the integration of women in the military is a reflection of cultural, socio-economic and political status of women in society as a whole. With the exception of Turkey, all of the states in my sample are considered democratic and economically developed, yet they show significant variation in a degree to which they have opened their military institutions to women.

This chapter presented and explained each of the six indicators that make up my dependent variable – the index of gender inclusiveness (IGI) or the degree to which each state has incorporated women into their military. It also developed the four sets of hypothesis on both domestic and international levels of analysis. They will be tested

against the IGI in the following chapters by using the data collected from primary and secondary sources in twenty-four nations of NATO.

Chapter III

Cross-National Analysis of Gender Integration in NATO

1.INTRODUCTION

This chapter is divided into four sections reflecting the four categories of hypotheses presented in Chapter II, and in each section I test a set of arguments quantitatively using data from all twenty-four NATO states. In the first section I explore whether states are expanding the role of women to meet their manpower demands due to abolition of conscription, negative birth rates, high percentages of women in professional and technical fields and low unemployment rates. In the second, I look at women's status in both politics and economics of the state to see if there is a spill-over from the civilian into military sector. Whether cultural factors such as type of religion and levels of religiosity or societal values regarding the appropriate role for women have an impact on the levels of inclusiveness in the military is the focus of the third section. And in the last section, I examine the effects of international security context and membership in NATO on domestic military personnel policy formulation concerning expansion of women's role in the military.

The arguments are confirmed by the statistical evidence. First, the states that are still conducting active conscription, and keeping large mass armies continue to be the least responsive to women's integration into military, but the recent professionalization and modernization have forced them to include more women to fill technical and professional positions. In addition, the evidence validates the argument that states where

women have already reached higher levels of economic activity in the civilian sector are more likely to expand opportunities for women in the military. Lastly, unlike all the previous models, this study demonstrates that cultural values are no longer main determinants of the degree to which women have been integrated. Rather it is autonomous women's movements that are responsible for making the inclusion and expansion of women in the military possible.

None of the other domestic political, economic or cultural variables seem to affect the degree to which NATO member states have opened their ranks to women. The analysis shows that states' accession to NATO affects the timing of the policy change, and for the most part this seems to be more pronounced in Eastern Europe. Although it is possible to generalize, there are differences between the original and new membership of NATO. In Western European and North American states, active women's movements pushing for equal opportunity in all areas, higher percentages of women working in the civilian sector and higher percentages of professional and technical female candidates in particular are leading to a higher degree of integration of women into the military, whereas in Eastern Europe the main predictors are NATO membership itself and lower levels of threat and low operational capabilities.

2. MILITARY MANPOWER SUPPLY AND DEMAND

Conscription

Since the end of the Cold War, most states within NATO have changed their personnel policies, particularly regarding the compulsory service of young men and general reduction of numbers in active and reserve forces. With the exception of Turkey, Greece, Norway, Denmark, Germany and Lithuania, all NATO member states have officially abandoned conscription and fully adopted a new all-volunteer and professional armed services model.

Table 3.1. Status of Conscription in NATO States

Country	Status of conscription	Type of force structure
Bulgaria	ended in 2008	AVF
Canada	Never had conscription	AVF
Czech R.	ended in 2005	AVF
Denmark	keeps conscription	Pseudo Conscript Force
France	ended in 2001	AVF
Germany	keeps conscription	Pseudo Conscript Force
Greece	keeps conscription	Hard Core Conscript Force
Hungary	ended in 2004	AVF
Italy	ended in 2005	AVF
Latvia	ended in 2006	AVF
Lithuania	keeps conscription	Pseudo Conscript Force
Luxembourg	ended in 1967	AVF
The Netherlands	ended in 1996	AVF
Norway	keeps conscription	Soft Core Conscript Force
Poland	phasing out started in 2008	Soft Core Conscript Force
Portugal	ended in 2003	AVF
Romania	ended in 2007	AVF
Slovakia	ended in 2006	AVF
Slovenia	ended in 2004	AVF
Spain	ended in 2001	AVF
Turkey	keeps conscription	Hard Core Conscript Force
United Kingdom	ended in 1963	AVF
United States	ended in 1973	AVF

Source: see footnote 2

The reasons behind the elimination of a compulsory military service vary from purely economic consideration and the transforming international security environment, to changing demographics and dramatic increases in conscientious objectors.⁴⁷ Some states have already completed the transition, while others are slowly phasing out their compulsory military service, and yet some are choosing to keep their mass military model. Based on data collected from various sources⁴⁸, Table 3.1. demonstrates some of the most recent changes that have taken place in individual member states.

To make the measurement possible, I have divided states into four categories following the typology of force structure by Karl Haltiner. He divides states into four categories depending on the conscript ratio, which is “defined as the percentage of conscripts compared to the total of country’s regulars (not counting reserves)”.⁴⁹ These categories are: All-Volunteer Force (with zero conscripts), Pseudo-Conscript Force (conscript ratio below 50 percent), Soft Core Conscript Force (conscript ratio between 50 percent and 60 percent) and Hard Core Conscript Force (conscript ratio above 60 percent).

The model shows a strong, negative and significant correlation between the index of gender inclusiveness score and conscript ratios ($R = -.587$, $p = .010$). This negative correlation suggests that when the level of conscripted military personnel is higher, then the level of gender inclusiveness is lower. It confirms the hypothesis that the greater the

⁴⁷ For a further discussion of possible reasons see Christopher Jehn and Zachary Selden.2000. “The End of Conscription in Europe?”, National Security Division, Congressional Budget Office United States Congress, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG265/images/webS0228.pdf> (Last Accessed March 27th, 2009)

⁴⁸ I have used the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) *Military Balance 2006-2007* (London: Routledge/IISS, 2007) and have updated their data based on the information available on individual states’ Defense Department websites. .

⁴⁹ Haltiner, Karl, “Decline of European Mass Armies” in *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Caforio, Giuseppe, 361-384. (New York, NY: Springer, 2006), 366.

shortage of men due to the abolition of conscription, the greater women's participation in the military.

In addition, the model reveals another interesting relationship between the year that conscription was abolished and the year that women were admitted ($R=.549$, $p=.015$). Greece, Norway, and Turkey still have not announced possible dates for the abolition of conscription and have therefore been excluded from the plot below.




Figure 3.1 timing of conscription abolition and year women were admitted into the ranks.

Demographics

All previous models have argued that birth rates will affect the degree of women's integration into the military. Moreover, many state reports to the CWINF cite demographic changes as one of the main reasons for the inclusion of women and

expansion of their role in the military. While it is true that almost half of all NATO member states have had negative population growth rates in 2009 (See Figure 3.2), the other half is still experiencing positive growth. The result does not show any significant correlation to my dependent variable ($R=-.152$, $p=.477$). This is contrary to the proposed hypothesis that gender inclusiveness score is determined by the population growth rate.




Figure 3.2. Plot of IGI and Population growth in 2009

The graph only tells us that a negative trend seems to be more pronounced in Eastern Europe, and that Western Europe and North America population growth rates remain positive in all except Germany and Italy. Yet there is no observable relationship between the IGI scores and population growth. States with the lowest scores, such as Poland and Italy, have low population growth, but Turkey has the highest. Similarly, while both the United States and Hungary have high IGI scores, the former has positive while the latter has negative population growth rates. Clearly the only observable pattern

is a rather chaotic one, and there is no evidence to support the idea that lower population growth rates are associated with the degree of women's integration into the military.

Women in Technical and Professional Fields

The result confirms that there is a weak positive correlation between the percentages of women in technical and professional fields in civilian society ($R=.482$, $p=.020$) and IGI. In addition, this variable alone explains 27 percent of the variation between the IGI scores ($R\text{-squared} = .269$).




Figure 3.3. Plot of IGI and Percentage of Women in Professional and Technical Fields

States with the lower percentage of women in professional and technical fields in civilian society tend to have lower IGI scores, while the states with higher percentages have higher IGI scores. Although we should be able to argue with confidence that this variable is a good predictor of women's presence and extent of their role in the military, visual inspection of the scatterplot shows that Turkey is skewing the result. Secondly, the

visual presentation reveals another rather interesting point. All of the new member states in Eastern Europe have well over 50 percent of women in professional and technical fields, while most of the original membership is below that number with only three exceptions Denmark, United States and Canada. I will explore differences between new and old members in a greater detail later in the chapter.

Unemployment rates

The hypothesis that the lower the unemployment rates the greater the participation of women in the military seems not to be supported as there is no direct relationship between the two ($R = -.282, p = .182$).




Figure 3.4. Plot of IGI and Unemployment Rates

States such as Turkey and Spain have relatively high levels of unemployment, yet Turkey has the lowest and Spain among the higher IGI scores. Similarly, Italy and Canada both have slightly more than 6 percent unemployment, but when it comes to the IGI, Italy is on the bottom and Canada on top of the list. This means that governments do not integrate more women into their military ranks during times of low unemployment.

Figure 3.4 reveals the lack of observable pattern and therefore lack of explanatory power of this variable.

2. DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT

Percentages of Women in Legislatures

Most authors have argued that if we have a higher number of women in politics, we will have a higher number of women-friendly policies. Contrary to this contention, I noted in Chapter I that the data establish that women's mere presence in a state's legislature will not have any impact on the degree of women's integration into the military. In fact, the numbers show no relationship between the percentages of women in legislatures and IGI ($R=.239$, $p=.262$). A closer inspection of *Figure 3.5* shows no clustering of states and no pattern to support the argument that more women in politics is going to lead to more gender inclusiveness in the military.

For example, Canada and the United States, states with the highest IGI scores, have almost the same percentage of women in their legislatures as Italy and Poland, states with the lowest IGI scores. Therefore, this variable has no explanatory or predictive power.




Figure 3.5. Plot of IGI and Percentages of Women in Legislatures

Women at Ministerial Level

As discussed in Chapter I, many scholars have argued that it is not the quantity but the quality of women's legislative position that matters when it comes to presenting and supporting legislature dealing with gender equality. I find no correlation to support this argument.

Once again, the scatterplot (*Figure 3.6*) shows a rather chaotic pattern . While Slovenia and Spain share similar IGI scores, Slovenia has 18 percent while Spain has 44 percent of women at ministerial level. The correlation shows no relationship between the two with $R=.240$, and $p=.258$.




Figure 3.6. Plot of IGI and Women at Ministerial Level

Women's Labor Participation

Next among the variables tested in this section is the labor participation of women (percentage of population aged 15-64). There is a very strong and very significant positive correlation between female activity in the labor market and IGI ($R=.743$, $p=.000$). What is interesting about this specific result is that it is completely contrary to the result that Carreiras's model produced eight years ago.⁵⁰ She tested the female economic activity against her IGI scores. It is important to note that I have opted for testing labor participation of women (as calculated by the World Bank and OECD) as opposed to female economic activity (as calculated by the ILO and processed by the UNDP Human Development Index) that Carreiras has used.

⁵⁰ Carreiras, 2006, 125.




Figure 3.7. Plot of IGI and Women’s Labor Participation

Because Turkey is dramatically skewing the result, I repeated the model once again without it and still found a very significant and moderately strong positive correlation ($R=.551$, $p=.006$). Therefore, it is safe to confirm the validity of the argument that the level of gender inclusiveness in the military will be higher in states with higher levels of female economic activity. The graph shows that the United States and Canada, with the highest percentages of working women, have the highest IGI scores, while the opposite is true for states such as Italy, Greece and Poland, which have the lowest percentages of working women. When Turkey is kept as a part of the model this variable also alone explains 55 percent of the variation ($R\text{-squared}=.552$), making it an excellent predictor of how well women will be integrated into the military. On the other hand, when Turkey is taken out that number drops to about 30 percent ($R\text{-squared}=.304$).

Although the percentage is much lower, this single variable remains a strong predictor of the level of gender inclusiveness.




Figure 3.8. IGI and Labor Participation – without Turkey

Level of development

There seems to be no correlation between the level of a state's economic development measured by the Power Purchasing Parity GNI per capita and IGI score ($R=.284$, $p=.178$). There is a significant variation in the IGI scores among some of the poorest states with a GNI below \$20,000. Latvia, Hungary and Lithuania have among the highest IGI scores, while Poland and Turkey have the lowest. Similarly, there is a variation among the richer states with a GNI between \$30,000 and \$60,000. The graph below clearly demonstrates that although Eastern European states are still less developed than Western European and North American states, their IGI scores are not lagging behind. Therefore, there is not enough evidence to argue that this variable will be a very good predictor of the IGI.




Figure 3.9. Plot of IGI and GNI

Autonomy of Women's Movement

Unlike previous models I have argued that we need to study the impact of women's organizations, as they tend to be the main conduit able to articulate women's issues and problems to parliaments and parties. More specifically, I have hypothesized that states with autonomous women's movements should have a greater IGI score. Including all twenty four states in this statistical analysis was not possible.

First, it would be incorrect to include women's movements from Eastern European states because for the most part of their history they were acting as an arm of the Communist Party and therefore did not have a choice to become independent of government structures. Therefore, I am only studying those movements that had a choice between working as an arm of a political party and being a completely independent organization with its own goals and agendas. Second, I am studying the movement at the time that the policy discussion was taking place and not today. The movements tend to

change and so do their demands. But in order to account for the role that the movement played in the integration it is necessary to consider the way it articulated its demands at the time that policy was passed.

I have created a dummy variable where the autonomous movement was coded (1) and the non-autonomous movement – or working within existing political parties and caucuses – was coded (0). The findings suggest that there is a very strong, positive, and significant relationship between the two variables ($R=.689$, $p=.005$). It tells us that the states with autonomous women's movements have higher IGI scores. Moreover, it explains 32% of the variation in my dependent variable.

The other interesting statistical finding is that it is also positively, significantly, and strongly related to percentages of women in the military ($R=.781$, $p=.001$). States with autonomous movements tend to have more women in its ranks. In fact, Italy, Turkey, Greece, Denmark and Luxembourg all have relatively low percentages of women in their ranks and have all had non-autonomous movements at the time the policy discussion was taking place.

3. CULTURE

Religion and Religiosity

In terms of the cultural dimension, of three religions only Islam is showing a significant and strong negative correlation ($R= -.617$, $p= .011$). However, I will not claim that there is a pattern or that this variable has a strong explanatory power because it is based on a single observation – Turkey.

The results also suggest that there is no correlation between Catholic ($R=.139$, $p=.517$) and Protestant religions ($R=.283$, $p=.180$) and IGI. This is contrary to the literature and the original hypothesis that expected Protestant states to perform better than Catholic states. Among Catholic states are some of the best performers (Spain, Portugal, and Slovenia) and some of the worst (Poland, Italy). Therefore, it would be wrong to suggest that Protestant states will be more accommodating than Catholic ones.

Some have been critical of this argument alone and have suggested that it is necessary to test for levels of religiosity.⁵¹ It is common knowledge that people in states such as Italy and Poland are more devoutly Catholic on average than people in other states. In Chapter II, I have discussed the adoption of the Inglehart and Norris Strength of Religiosity Scale and below is the chart that graphically illustrates the scores of all twenty-four states. It shows that the United States, Canada and Hungary, the states with the highest IGI scores, have the same levels of religiosity as Turkey, Poland and Italy, the states with the lowest IGI scores.

The results suggest that there is no correlation between the Strength of Religiosity and my dependent variable ($R=-.298$, $p=.157$) and thus the hypothesis is not valid. The extent of women's integration into the military services is not affected by the level of religiosity of the population.

⁵¹ I thank Dr. Irving Leonard Markovitz and Dr. Joan Tronto for offering feedback and urging me to add "levels of religiosity" to my model during the CUNY-The Graduate Center Department of Political Science Graduate Student Conference on Dec. 5th, 2008.




Figure 3.10. Plot of Strength of Religiosity and IGI

Societal Values – Men better politicians and Men better executives

The model included variables that tell us whether the way the society in general views women as fit to fill positions in politics and business has any effect on the IGI score. The results are mixed. There is a very strong, negative, and significant relationship between IGI scores and the way that the society views women as capable of filling executive positions in business ($R=-.719$, $p=.006$). This result would allow me to argue that societies where the majority of people agree that men are better business executives will, in fact, have lower gender inclusiveness in their armed forces. However, before such a statement is made it is important to acknowledge the limitations of this correlation.

What remains problematic in this case is the actual number of observations and Turkey. Unlike most of the hypotheses in this study, this one was tested only in thirteen cases, and not twenty-four. Unfortunately, this World Values Survey was not conducted in all of my sample states, and therefore it is possible that this smaller sample is skewing the final

result and producing a rather large correlation.




Figure 3.11 Plot of Societal Values (Men Better Executives) and IGI – 13 states

In fact, once Turkey is excluded from the model, the correlation does not reach significance level in this small sample ($R=-.469$, $p=.124$). Therefore, the evidence is rather inconclusive and a more in-depth study of the relationship should be conducted once all the information is available.

When it comes to public opinion on whether men are better politicians than women, the result shows no correlation to the IGI score ($R=-.276$, $p=.252$). This test was conducted using data on thirteen states from the 2005-2008 World Values Survey wave plus data from an additional six states from the 1999-2000 wave. The graph below shows that although the public in Italy and Canada share the same views, they are at opposite ends when it comes to the IGI scores. And even though more than 50 percent of the public believes that men are better politicians in Hungary, Lithuania and Latvia, those countries still have among the most highly integrated military services. Hence, we can

argue with confidence that the degree to which women are integrated into the armed forces is not affected by societal views regarding women as political leaders.




Figure 3.12. Plot of Societal Values (Men Better Politicians) and IGI

5. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT

Threat Levels

Previous models have argued that the integration of women is conditioned by levels of threat. While there were vague assumptions about what constitutes a threat and how we identify it, none of the models dedicated much time to the exploration of the concept itself. The reason for this is simple. It is difficult. Is it posed by humans, economic instability or environmental changes? Is it sporadic or constant? What is the likelihood of the threat actually becoming a violent event? And how do we account for different definitions of a threat in different states due to their political and socio-economic peculiarities? Asking all of

these questions and building a matrix to account for and incorporate all possibilities is a research project on its own.

In this study, I have sought to look beyond the concept itself, and measured states' reaction to the threat that might be posed to each one of them. That way we can account for those definitional differences, as well as go beyond biased perceptions of threat and still be able to generalize. In order to do that, I have used the Conflict Intensity Scale developed by European researchers (Appendix J) that ranks states according to their military's operational capabilities and therefore their ability to face a threat.




Figure 3.13. Plot of IGI and Conflict Intensity Scale

All states of my study, with the exception of Luxembourg, Norway and Canada, have been ranked and the scale shows how different states are with “defence diplomacy at one

end ... to robust preventive missions, possibly anywhere in the world”⁵² on the other.

Contrary to the previous findings, the data shows no correlation between my dependent variable IGI and state’s military preparedness and capability to fight potential enemies (R=-.036, p=.879).

However, the model reveals another very important, significant, and strong negative correlation between the timing of women’s integration and level of military preparedness (R= -.547, p=.010). It demonstrates the opposite of what was hypothesized – states with high levels of military preparedness seem to have admitted women into their ranks earlier.

Nevertheless, that does not mean they have done more than pass the legislation, because the level of military preparedness still fails to predict both the percentage of women in the ranks and the IGI score.




Figure 3.14. Plot of Conflict Intensity rankings and Year Admitted

⁵²Venusberg Report, http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/2004/2004_Venusberg_Report.pdf (Last Accessed May 2, 2009), pg. 9.

Participation in Peacekeeping Operations

The second hypothesis in this category looks at the effect that the state's involvement in peacekeeping operations might have on the integration of women into the military. As discussed in Chapter I, the United Nations has been trying to influence states to increase the percentages of women peacekeepers to better deal with the humanitarian emergencies around the world, because 80 percent of refugees are women and children.⁵³ That women are increasingly participating in peacekeeping is clear from the latest data. According to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "between February 2007 and January 2008 there was an increase of over 40% of women serving in peacekeeping".⁵⁴

But does the extent of state's participation as well as the increased female participation in these operations have an effect on the IGI? First, I ran a correlation between IGI and the size of an individual state's personnel contributions to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The mere volume of personnel contributed to the UN does not seem to reveal anything ($R=.302$, $p=.162$). There is no correlation between the two which shows that just because the state contributes a large number of forces to various peacekeeping missions, it does not mean that they will be more inclusive of women.

⁵³ Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children (now the Women's Refugee Commission) <http://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/about/714-20th-anniversary> (Last Accessed May 2, 2009)

⁵⁴United Nations Peacekeeping Factsheet February 2008, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/factsheet.pdf> (Last Accessed May 2, 2009) .




Figure 3.15. Plot of IGI and UN peacekeeping troop donation rank of each state

In addition, I ran a correlation between IGI and the percentage of women participating in military operations abroad in general. It also shows that just because the state sends proportionately more women soldiers to participate in military operations abroad, it does not mean that they have integrated women to the highest degree ($R=.023$, $p=.925$).

Alliance Standardization

The last hypothesis is that IGI is affected by international military alliance standardization. Because the sample states all belong to the same military alliance, the best way to assess the impact that NATO headquarters has on domestic policy changes is to test the correlation between the timing of the integration of women into the military

and the timing of accession into NATO. The model shows a rather significant positive correlation between the two ($R=.602$, $p=.002$). Moreover, a closer look at the scatterplot shows clustering on two sides. This clustering tells us that the original member states of NATO (states ascended prior to 1989) on average integrated women much earlier than the new members (states ascended after 1989). The timing of NATO membership also explains 36% of the variation in timing of the integration of women into the military in individual member states.




Figure 3.16. Plot YearAdmitted and NATOyear membership.

6. ORIGINAL VS. NEW MEMBERSHIP

The original “laundry list” has been reduced to five independent variables: conscription ratios, percentage of women in professional and technical fields, women’s participation in the labor force, autonomy of women’s movements, and timing of membership in NATO. The first three variables have not only shown a significant

correlation to IGI in tests including all twenty-four states, but also explain an extremely high degree of variation in my dependent variable ($R=.843$, $R\text{-squared}=.710$). Together they explain 71% of the observed variability in the Index of Gender Inclusiveness. This is a remarkable result. The “autonomy” variable has also shown to be a great predictor, but it was tested only in Western European and North American states. In those regions, it explains 43% of the variation in IGI ($R=.653$, $R\text{-squared}=.426$)

The last variable, the timing of membership in NATO, is useful for another reason. It demonstrated the need to adjust the model to account for regional differences. Another reason to adjust the model are possible outliers. Because regression analysis assume that variables have normal distributions, it is always necessary for visual inspection of data to check for outliers that can distort relationships and significance tests. That outlier has consistently been Turkey, the only member state with a majority Muslim population and the only member that is not considered a completely free and democratic state. In order to adjust the model, I have run it again without Turkey and I have controlled for the length of NATO membership.

In this model, I divided states into two categories, original Western European/North American members and new Eastern European members. Then, I created a dummy variable where each group is coded as belonging to (1) and not belonging to (0).

In the original member states, the strongest and most significant correlation is between IGI and women in professional and technical fields ($R = .676$, $p=.011$) and alone it explains 48.7% of the variation. The next relationship that is also a strong, positive and significant correlation is between IGI and women’s participation in the labor force

($R=.622$, $p=.018$). And the last strong determinant of IGI is the presence of an autonomous women's movement ($R=.653$, $p=.011$). This means that Western, highly developed and democratic states that have autonomous women's movements, a high number of women in professional and technical fields, as well as high percentages of women employed in general, have higher IGI scores. In addition, these three variables together explain 82.5% of variation in IGI values.

On the other hand, the new members from Eastern Europe seem to have very different reasons for integrating and expanding the role of women. The only, and relatively strong, correlation that the model reveals is between the Conflict Intensity Scale and IGI ($R = -.710$, $p=.032$). This negative correlation tells us that the lower the state's military operational capabilities and the lower their ability to fight full-scale warfare, the higher the gender inclusiveness. States such as Latvia, Lithuania and Hungary all have only general purpose ground forces and very high levels of gender inclusiveness, while others, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, have more sophisticated Special Forces and MEDEVAC capabilities, and low levels of gender inclusiveness. This variable is a strong predictor and explains an overwhelming 50.4% of variation in gender inclusiveness levels in Eastern Europe ($R\text{-squared} = .504$). These regional differences will be further explored in Chapters IV and V.

Chapter summary

By examining twenty-four NATO member states, I sought to determine which factors help us explain why states abandon their policies of exclusion and seek to integrate more women into the military. I found that the primary causes of the change are

rooted in the abolition of conscription, professionalization of the military services and technological advancements that no longer require most soldiers to be physically present on the battlefield. In addition, it demonstrated that levels of gender inclusiveness in the military are not necessarily a reflection of gender equality in the political life of the society, nor are they affected by cultural variables such as levels of religiosity or type of religion. What this model also shows is that although comparative policy studies tend to focus on domestic structural, institutional and cultural factors, we need to start incorporating international level variables in order to get a better picture of the process of gender integration into the military. Different levels of national security threat and a state's membership in military alliances have been shown to have an effect on the timing and level to which women have been incorporated.

Table 3.1 Summary of correlations		All NATO	Original Members	New Members
conscriptRatios	Pearson Correlation	-.587**	-0.425	-0.387
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.008	0.130	0.303
	N	24	14	9
Unemployment	Pearson Correlation	-0.282	.056	0.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.182	0.849	1
	N	24	14	9
popgrowth2009	Pearson Correlation	-0.152	0.438	-0.365
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.477	0.117	0.334
	N	24	14	9
PercProTech	Pearson Correlation	.482*	.676**	0.483
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.020	0.011	0.188
	N	23	13	9
LaborParticipation	Pearson Correlation	.743**	.622*	0.499
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.018	0.171
	N	24	14	9
GNI	Pearson Correlation	0.284	0.419	0.241
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.178	0.120	0.532
	N	24	15	9
Autonomy	Pearson Correlation	.689*	.653*	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.005	0.011	
	N	15	14	
PercLowerHouse	Pearson Correlation	0.239	0.062	-0.144
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.262	0.833	0.713
	N	24	14	9
WomenMinisters	Pearson Correlation	0.240	0.254	0.276
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.258	0.360	0.471
	N	24	14	9
Catholic	Pearson Correlation	0.139	-0.009	0.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.517	0.976	1
	N	24	14	9
Protestant	Pearson Correlation	0.283	0.243	0.260
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.180	0.402	0.500
	N	24	14	9
Islam	Pearson Correlation	-.608**	.a	.a

	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.002	0	.
	N	24		
Religiosity	Pearson Correlation	-0.298	0.152	-0.445
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.157	0.603	0.231
	N	24	14	9
MenBetterExecutives	Pearson Correlation	-.719**	-0.354	-0.468
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.006	0.389	0.532
	N	13	8	4
MenBetterPoliticians	Pearson Correlation	0.276	0.105	0.153
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.253	0.788	.694
	N	19	9	
ConflictIntensityScale	Pearson Correlation	-0.036	0.493	-.710**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.879	0.159	.032
	N	21	11	9
UNtrooprank	Pearson Correlation	0.302	0.144	0.668
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.162	0.698	0.070
	N	23	14	8
PercFemDeployed	Pearson Correlation	0.023	0.172	-0.073
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.925	0.613	0.863
	N	19	11	8
yearadmitted	Pearson Correlation	0.147	-0.377	0.122
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.494	0.184	0.755
	N	24	14	9
NATOyear	Pearson Correlation	0.029	0.131	0.274
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.893	0.656	0.476
	N	24	14	9

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). a. Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant.

Chapter IV

Gender Integration in the Original Members of NATO: Case studies of the United States and Italy

“Were it not for intense political pressure, there would be virtually no women in the military.”

Brian Mitchell, pg. xiii

1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I trace the process of integration of women into the military and expansion of their role within two original NATO members, the United States and Italy, to examine whether my argument captures the dynamics of policy change in individual cases. Today 15.5 percent of American armed forces are women, while females constitute only 2.6 percent of Italian forces. The US government has undertaken a broad policy on women’s military service since 1948, while the Italian government engaged in institutional discrimination by excluding women from the services until the year 2000. Therefore, the US has among the highest levels of gender inclusiveness in the military (IGI = 16), while Italy has the lowest of all Western European members (IGI = 8).

This chapter will attempt to illustrate that the quantitative analysis correctly identifies the major factors that explain the degree to which women have been integrated in the United States and Italy. These were: conscription, presence of independent women’s movements, women’s labor participation and women in professional and technical fields.

Both states started to expand the role that women play in their services around the same time that they abolished the conscription. However, the extent to which gender

integration took place in these two states is really determined by the other three factors. In the United States progressive women's groups advocating expansion of women's role in the military were successful in framing their agenda within a larger discussion of equal opportunity in labor force, forming strategic partnerships with congressional and service members sympathetic to the cause, and presenting a united front to the American public. Today, the number of American women in the military reflects their general participation in the U.S. labor market, and thus--their nonparticipation in direct combat aside--they are all they can be. Although not all positions are opened to women in the military today unlike those in the civilian sector, we can confidently confirm that both the statistical analysis and the historical narrative of policy change in the United States support the argument that the gradual increase in women's participation in the military since World War II mirrors the gradual increase of women in the labor market and women in professional and technical fields in the civilian sector. The case of the United States not only confirms that there is a clear spillover of highly qualified, educated and skilled women from the civilian into military sectors but it also demonstrates that the expansion of women's role in the military is largely dependent on the success of institutional reforms providing access and equal opportunity to women in the civilian labor market.

On the other hand in Italy, the legacy of the Fascist regime's cooptation of women's life and women's agenda, and the resistance movement's Communist call for class equality rather than gender equality are the main factors behind the lack of interest of the women's movement in a policy of integration of women into the military. Simply put, the Italian women's movement regarded military integration as another right-wing attempt at the militarization of women's lives. In addition, Italian feminism in the 1970s

developed largely through radical leftist political ideologies which the American public generally during that period found absolutely unacceptable. In the United States, radical left-wing parties were never crucial political players that could provide feminists with better access or be a significant political force behind feminist agenda.

On the other hand, there is no evidence to argue that the other proposed hypotheses are valid. First, among the military shortage variables, demographics and unemployment rates both fail to explain the difference in IGI scores between Italy and the United States. Italy has the lowest birth rates among all original members of the alliance, while the United States has among the highest. When it comes to the unemployment, both states have relatively similar rates with the United States at 5.78 percent and Italy at 6.75 percent, yet very different IGI scores. This is exactly the opposite trend from the one that was proposed in Chapter II.

Second, among domestic political and economic variables, there are three factors that have shown not to have an effect on the IGI in the quantitative analysis: percentage of women in legislature, women at ministerial level, and level of economic development. This seems to be true in both of my case studies. Italy has a higher percentage of women in legislature (21.3 percent) than the United States (16.8 percent), and both have exactly 24 percent of ministerial positions occupied by women. This is contrary to the original propositions, and demonstrates lack of the explanatory power of both factors. Although the Italian level of economic development is lower than that of the United States, it is still relatively on a par with the rest of Western European states that have much higher IGI scores.

Third, both cases help us reject the original argument regarding the effect of cultural variables on the level of gender inclusiveness in the military. Both Italy and the United States have much higher levels of religiosity than the majority of the original membership, as well as similar societal values regarding women in politics and business. Again, this confirms the findings from the quantitative analysis and refutes the original propositions.

And lastly, it was hypothesized that states with lower levels of threat and bigger contributions of forces to various peacekeeping missions around the world will have greater participation of women in the military. Although the US armed forces have the highest level of military preparedness among all NATO members, Italian armed services are not far behind. Both states have continued to improve their services in the past decade. As the level of threat increased in the post 9/11 world, the United States only sought to recruit more soldiers regardless of gender, and Italians dramatically expanded the role women play in their armed forces. Again, this is contrary to what was initially argued. Similarly, volume of peacekeeping contributions does not seem to be a useful predictor either. Italy is the highest contributor of all NATO states and has the lowest IGI score, while the United States ranks 10th in contributions, and has the highest score.

2. GENDER INTEGRATION IN THE US ARMED FORCES: FROM CIVIL WAR TO 1950s

Throughout much of American history, women have served in the military ranks as unofficial and temporary soldiers, nurses, spies, and support personnel. Having been ignored by many of the scholarly works on the Civil War, their stories were rescued from

complete historical amnesia only in recent years by feminist historians seeking to set the record straight. Thanks to such works, today we know that women joined both the Union and Confederate ranks by assuming male identities (De Pauw 1981; Leonard 1994, Leonard 1999, Blanton and Cook 2002, Tendrich-Frank 2007). While many were nurses, spies, and messengers, most of the women serving in the Civil War were members of the infantry engaged in combat alongside men, including five women who fought at Gettysburg.⁵⁵ It is estimated that about 400 women soldiers participated in the war.⁵⁶ However, as the conflict ended, women went home, and since they had officially not been part of the war, their efforts were largely forgotten.

During the Spanish-American War, the US Congress allowed the military to recruit 1,500 nurses in the fight against typhoid fever in military camps, though they were considered civilian contractors.⁵⁷ As their presence on the field was crucial to the survival of the troops, the nation recognized the need for an on-going presence of women military nurses. The creation of the Army Nurse Corps in 1901 and the Navy Nurse Corps in 1908 marked the official entry of women into the United States armed forces. As M.C. Devilbiss points out, “women served *with*, not *in* the armed forces” for much of American history, and the two Nurse Corps were still somewhat outsider and auxiliary organizations due to the fact that women did not have a rank or right to veteran’s benefits. Finally, in 1917, women entered the Naval Coastal Defense Reserve as yeomen and the Marine Corps Reserve as clerks in 1918. These 12,500 Navy recruits and 305

⁵⁵ Blanton and Cook, 15; Linda Grant DePauw, “Women in Combat: The Revolutionary War Experience,” *Armed Forces and Society* 7, no. 2 (Winter 1981): 209-26.

⁵⁶ Blanton and Cook, pg. 6; Jeanne Holm, *Women in the Military: Unfinished Revolution*. (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982), 6.

⁵⁷ Barbra Mann-Wall, “Sisters of the Holy Cross in the Spanish-American War” in *Nursing History Review Official Journal of the American Association for the History of Nursing*, Volume 9, (2001): 56; For an in-depth historical account of Mercedes H. Graf, “Women Nurses in Spanish-American War”, *Minerva Quarterly Report on Women and the Military* (Spring 2001): 1-24.

Marines were the first women to hold actual military rank and status.⁵⁸ About 34,000 women served in World War I, including approximately 20,000 in the Army and Navy Nurse Corps.⁵⁹ After the war, the women of the Nurse Corps were kept active and the rest discharged.⁶⁰

The first attempt to bring women back was a bill proposed by Congresswomen Edith Nourse Rogers in 1941 to create the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC), which would allow women to attain the same military rank and privileges as men. However, the bill was regarded as too controversial by the War Department and was resisted for months. The final legislation was a compromise that created an auxiliary force in which women again not only lacked military status, but they also did not possess binding contracts and legal protections if stationed abroad. The attack on Pearl Harbor and subsequent manpower shortage resulted in the creation of the Navy Women's Reserve, in the form of the Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES), which was founded in July, 1942, and Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC), which followed in June, 1943. Both WAVES and WAAC gave women full military status. Soon thereafter, the ineffective WAAC was transformed into the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAC), which granted women the same status as men.⁶¹ Their utilization was seen as pure necessity and the best way to free up men for combat. The majority of the 350,000 women who served during World War II were employed in nursing, administrative and menial positions, using their skills from the civilian labor market. They were excluded from combat, and from all jobs requiring

⁵⁸ M.C. Devilbiss, *Women and Military Service* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1990), 1-3

⁵⁹ Holm, 10.

⁶⁰ Devilbiss, 4.

⁶¹ Holm, 24-27.

physical strength, all supervisory positions, and other roles such as personnel specialists and psychological assistants, as those, too, could be classified as “combat” positions⁶².

After the war, women’s future role with the military was once again called into question.

The central debate was between those who advocated permanent military status for women and those calling for a permanent women’s reserve. Two powerful groups faced off over this issue. On one side were congressional leaders, claiming to speak for the American people, and on the other side were the commanders of the armed forces. At the center of this heated debate was Maine Representative Margaret Chase Smith, who pushed for legislation giving women regular military status. She was the first woman to serve in both the Senate and the House. The first meeting in which women’s potential permanent military status was discussed took place within the House of Representatives Naval Affairs Committee in May, 1946, when debate resulted in no agreement, and a frustrated Chase Smith proclaimed the “Navy either needs these women or they do not”.

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It was not until the Eightieth Congress (Jan. 3rd, 1947- Jan. 3rd, 1949), when the Naval Affairs Committee and the Military Affairs Committee were merged to form the Armed Services Committee, that the issue came up again. During the Senate hearings, the military leadership, including General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz, admitted that women were necessary because of their clerical skills and “nothing short of permanent status was an option”.⁶⁴

⁶² Holm, 45; Devilbiss, 7.

⁶³ Janann Sherman, *No Place for Woman: A life of Senator Margaret Chase Smith* (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2001), 69.

⁶⁴ Sherman,70.

Shortly thereafter, the Women's Armed Services Integration Act was passed in the Senate in July, 1947, but once it arrived at the Armed Services Committee in the House, the act's progress came to a full stop. Committee Chairman Rep. Walter Andrews (R-NY) and a ranking minority member, Rep. Carl Vinson (D-GA), sat on the bill for more than six months before being confronted by another ASC member, Chase Smith.⁶⁵

On February 18, 1948, the first hearing of the House Armed Services was convened. Among those present were Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, General Eisenhower, General Bradley, Admiral Denfeld, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Army Director of Personnel and Administration, General Paul, and his counterparts in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, Director and WAC Colonel Hallaren, and her counterparts in the other services.⁶⁶ Rep. Andrews openly expressed his antipathy towards women being in regular permanent forces just like men. On the other side of the debate representing integrationists, General Eisenhower simply said: "I think it is a mistake to put [women] on a Reserve basis rather than a Regular. I think they should be an integrated regular part of the Army. I think the Air Forces feel the same way. We need them."⁶⁷

The original bill was revised again giving women reserve status only and it passed with 26 yes votes, with a single no vote from Chase Smith. The bill was quickly listed by Andrews on the consent calendar, where most non-controversial bills are directed. After Chase Smith publicly complained and demanded unanimous agreement before the bill's listing, it was forced to the House floor. This way she would be able to publicly

⁶⁵ Sherman, 70-71.

⁶⁶ US Congress, House, Armed Services Subcommittee No. 3, Hearings on S 1641, 80th Congress, 2nd session, *Congressional Record*, 18 Feb 48, p. 5565

⁶⁷ House Hearings on S 1641, *Congressional Record*, 18 Feb 48, p. 5566.

demonstrate and discuss the value of women in the armed services. She singlehandedly succeeded in the endeavor by making the members of committee confront the injustice they were attempting to commit against women by excluding them from permanent service. Without Chase Smith's forcing of this particular piece of legislation, women's integration into the military would have suffered a major setback.⁶⁸

The delay in the passage of this bill also allowed other congresswomen, women veterans and major women's organizations that supported the legislation to organize and publicize their cause to the American people. Among these were Congresswomen Edith Nourse Rogers, WAVES Director and Capt. Joy Bright Hancock, and WAC Col. Hallaren, Daughters of the American Revolution, the Women's Patriotic Conference on National Defense, General Federation of Women's Clubs, Women's Overseas League and National Civilian Advisory Committee for the Women's Army Corps.⁶⁹

Major newspapers came out fighting the House ACS and sided with the military leadership. The New York Times called for women's integration with full military status and declared that "to dispense of their services would be a sorry blunder. Replacements for them simply cannot be found, with the shortages that now exist in all ranks."⁷⁰ The Washington Post called the failure of the House ASC "a shortsighted waste"⁷¹ and the

⁶⁸ Betti J. Morden, *The Women's Army Corp, 1945-1978*, Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 2000, 51-52; Sherman, 71-72.

⁶⁹ Holm, 115; Morden 53.

⁷⁰ "Women in the Services" *New York Times (1857-Current file)*; Mar 31, 1948; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2005), 24.

⁷¹ "Women And Defense", *The Washington Post (1877-1954)*; Jan 7, 1947; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The Washington Post (1877 - 1992), 8.

Christian Science Monitor concurred by warning of “weakening of national defense by assignment of able-bodied men to jobs that women usually perform more efficiently.”⁷²

Finally, after years of debate and numerous changes made to accommodate both armed services and congressional members, on June 2, 1948, Public Law 625, the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act was passed. It was signed into law by President Truman 10 days later. The Women’s Army Corps was now a permanent and separate organization within the Army. Although the act guaranteed women permanent status in the military services, it placed highly specific restrictions on women. They could make up no more than 2 percent of the total enlisted ranks. The proportion of female officers, excluding nurses, could equal no more than 10 percent of enlisted women. No woman could serve in a command position, reach the rank of general, or hold permanent rank above lieutenant colonel or Navy commander. It established separate promotion lists for women officers in the Army, Navy and Marine Corps. Only the Air Force had an integrated promotion list for ranks below colonel. This act specifically prohibited women from being assigned to aircraft or ships engaged in combat missions. Because the Navy and the Air Force have the most ships and aircraft, this act applied most directly to them. However, the Secretary of the Army developed policies to exclude women from direct combat, based upon the implied congressional intent of the Navy and Air Force statutes.⁷³

3. GENDER INTEGRATION IN THE US ARMED FORCES: 1950-2009

Women’s groups inside and outside of the Pentagon

⁷² “Why Bar Women?” *Christian Science Monitor* (1908-Current file); Mar 29, 1948; ProQuest Historical Newspapers Christian Science Monitor, 16.

⁷³ Ellen C. Collier, *Congressional Research Service Brief, Women in the Military*. (Washington D.C. Library of Congress, 1991), 3; Holm, 119-120.

During the 1950s and early 1960s, nothing changed regarding women's status in the military. However, this is not to suggest that nobody was working on the change. Shortly after women were integrated in 1948, Secretary of Defense Marshall at the urging of his Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Anne Rosenberg, helped create the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS).⁷⁴ It was to be composed of civilian women "to provide advice and recommendations on matters and policies relating to the recruitment and retention, treatment, employment, integration, and well-being of highly qualified professional women in the Armed Forces".⁷⁵

DACOWITS's first recruitment campaign was not a success, managing to recruit only 6,000 women, far less than the anticipated 72,000.⁷⁶ Holm calls it a "disaster...ill-conceived and very poorly timed."⁷⁷ DACOWITS's situation was exacerbated by the Korean War, whose horrific images only turned women away from joining. After the war, numbers started to rise again, and this time DACOWITS stopped focusing on recruitment and instead directed its energies toward the general improvement of women's life in the military and the elimination of rank restrictions. They argued that women's components "reached maturity which calls for re-examination of the structure with respect to the maximum career potential afforded to new recruits."⁷⁸ And this time DACOWITS's efforts were well-timed as they coincided with a more widespread political protest against discrimination based on sex. The passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act gave women another opportunity to fight to eliminate the legal barriers

⁷⁴ Brian P. Mitchell, *Women in the Military: Flirting with the Disaster* (Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc, 1998), 8.

⁷⁵ DACOWITS official website factsheet http://www.defenselink.mil/dacowits/tableabout_subpage.html (Last Accessed May 23rd, 2009)

⁷⁶ Mitchell, 9.

⁷⁷ Holm, 152.

⁷⁸ Mitchell, 12.

imposed by the Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948. The following year, President Johnson eliminated discrimination within the executive branch. Although this executive order did not directly address the military services, the Department of Defense decided to finally heed DACOWITS's advice and submitted legislation to remove percentage caps.

It is here where the real accomplishments of DACOWITS lie. They fought the battle on many fronts and succeeded. Holm describes their efforts and how

“committee members pulled out all the stops – soliciting support from women's groups, encouraging letter-writing campaigns, focusing media interest, and individually lobbying Congress...[they] held regular strategy planning sessions with military women; after each DACOWITS meeting the members fanned out over Capitol Hill, paying court to whomever they knew, gaining support for the legislation. Many had political connections in the White House and on the Hill, others direct access to the media, which they used.”⁷⁹

Twenty years after the initial Women's Armed Services Integration Act and seven years of the DACOWITS campaign, President Johnson signed Public Law 90-130 on November 8, 1967, removing the 2 percent cap on enlisted women and lifting promotion restrictions. The president declared: “There is no reason why we should not some day have a female Chief of Staff or even a female Commander-in-Chief.”⁸⁰

The enthusiasm did not last long and membership withered away with the Vietnam War and radicalization of the civilian membership of DACOWITS that some accused of not knowing enough about military. This was followed by the forced opening of DACOWITS meetings to the public where other feminist organizations joined the discussion, among them the National Organization of Women and the Women's Equity

⁷⁹ Holm, 199; Also, quoted by Mitchell, 13-14.

⁸⁰ Holm, 192

Action League.⁸¹ Authors like declare that from here on “the committee’s recommendations to the Defense Department were merely modulated renditions of the demands of professional feminists”.⁸²

While he may not be wrong in his assessment, Mitchell portrays these feminists as wicked witches who ruined the party for the boys. No matter how nasty and biased, this argument, in fact, shows that the autonomous and liberal women’s movement did have an impact on gender inclusiveness in the military, and a positive one at that. Working with organizations outside the Pentagon meant stronger demands and better results for both sides – the US Armed Forces and women. It shows that the women of DACOWITS and the “second wave” outsider feminists organized, disseminated information, and lobbied in order to amplify those voices seeking a greater integration of women into the military. While DACOWITS members were only concerned with the military, for the outsiders this was just another battle for equal opportunity in the work place and equality in citizenship between men and women.

The American “second wave” feminists framed women as a minority group and this perspective focused on the equal opportunities and emancipation as opposed to liberation and class struggle of the radical left-wing. American feminists embraced classical liberalism that focuses on the rights of the individual, equal rights of all citizens, and property and privacy issues largely based on Locke’s ideas of equal rights and protection.⁸³

⁸¹ Brenda Moore “From Underrepresentation to Overrepresentation: African American Women” in *It’s Our Military, Too!*, ed. Judith Stiem, 115-135. (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1996), 124.

⁸² Mitchell, 113.

⁸³ Imelda Whelan. *Modern Feminist Thought* (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1995), 27.

In 1971, the National Organization for Women started actively debating the role of women in the military and issued a resolution requesting the cessation of sexist practices in the military and the sexist basis for compulsory service.⁸⁴ Although DACOWITS did not press the issue of combat participation right away, by 1974 it was demanding a repeal of combat exclusionary laws and the opening of military academies.⁸⁵ In 1975, Public Law 94-106 admitted women into federally funded military academies and a year later the first women entered these institutions. In addition, now that the draft had ended with the expiration of the Selective Service Act and the All-Volunteer Force era had started, recruiting goals for women began to increase.

President Jimmy Carter's administration expanded the membership of DACOWITS, and within a week of being part of the government, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown requested a report on women in the military. The *Use of Women in the Military* was completed in May, 1977, and followed up by the publication of *America's Volunteer* in December, 1978, both with the goal of furthering women's role in national security by increasing their numbers to 80,000, or 11.4percent of the total force. In 1978, the Women's Army Corps was abolished as a separate institution within the Army, and women in the Navy were assigned to noncombatant ships and temporarily on any ship for a period of less than six months.⁸⁶

But as President Ronald Reagan's administration came to power, it was clear that progress was to not only decelerate but that it actually went into reverse. Holm argues that it was not a secret that many in the ranks and in the government "believed that

⁸⁴ National Organization for Women and War Resolution adopted at the National Conference in 1971. Available on <http://www.now.org/issues/military/policies/war.html> (Last Accessed May 24th, 2009)

⁸⁵ Mitchell, 113.

⁸⁶ Bernard D. Rostker, *I Want You: The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force*. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 563-564.

military policy decisions were being made by well-meaning amateurs, . . . motivated more by political expediency and misguided desires for social equity than by the requirements of national defense.”⁸⁷ In fact, the Army “decided that the time was right to rollback the Carter program”⁸⁸ and started to plan its reductions only a month after Reagan took office, by preparing to level out women’s numbers to 65,000 instead of following Carter administration’s recommendation of 80,000. In addition, the Army hinted at a new draft to fill 100,000 positions necessary for Reagan’s new military build-up. Instead, the services were prevented from proceeding by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger who told them to eliminate institutional barriers.⁸⁹ Only a year later, Weinberger declared that “the most rewarding development we have seen in our armed forces over the past decade has been the tremendous expansion of opportunities for women.”⁹⁰

The Reagan administration added new members to DACOWITS. The organization now had some Republican women, who, regardless of their ideological stands, continued to pursue the feminist agenda within the military. For these new members, “being strong Reagan supporters was not synonymous with a conservative perspective on gender discrimination”.⁹¹ In May 1981, the Army commissioned a study to review the assignments of women to physically demanding positions. The report presenting the results of this study, known as Women in the Army Policy Review (WITA), made recommendations regarding Army personnel policies as they related to mission, combat readiness, quality of life aspects, and the utilization of female enlisted

⁸⁷ Holm, 387–388.

⁸⁸ Rostker, 565.

⁸⁹ Rostker, 567-568.

⁹⁰ Rostker, 560.

⁹¹ Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, *Faithful and Fearless: Feminist Protest in Church and Military* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 74.

soldiers in the Army. The main finding was that only 3 percent of women are able to perform heavy lifting but they occupied 42 percent of positions requiring the skill.⁹² Both WEAL and DACOWITS fiercely opposed the findings, and demanded review of the study. They argued that not only was the methodology wrong⁹³, but that such a study was negatively affecting the moral of women in the ranks, and was going to deprive the Army of the available and skillful recruits.⁹⁴ In October of 1983, the Army decided to reconsider the study to correct methodological errors. DACOWITS and WEAL members succeeded in pushing for the reopening of 13 out of 23 positions that WITA closed to women.⁹⁵ Women were to be employed in all positions except those explicitly prohibited by combat exclusion statutes and related policy.⁹⁶

The work of women's organizations continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and new organizations started to spring up outside the walls of the Pentagon. On the evening of December 7, 1982, at an event sponsored by the Women's Equity Action League, Dr. Linda Grant De Pauw thought of starting and publishing a journal on women and war and women in the military. Shortly afterwards, she and a small group of other women established the MINERVA Center, which today is the most important sources of information on women in the military. MINERVA originally published the MINERVA: Quarterly Report on Women and the Military, a scholarly journal, and Minerva's Bulletin Board, a news magazine focusing mostly on American women in service and women veterans, which also carried a number of stories and news relating to women and the

⁹² Martin Levin, *Feminism and Freedom* (Edison, NJ: Transaction Books, 1987), 231.

⁹³ Part of their argument was that the sample of women soldiers at Fort Jackson was too small to make such broad generalizations regarding physical abilities.

⁹⁴ Mitchell, 120.

⁹⁵ Mitchell, 122.

⁹⁶ Rostker, 569.

military around the world. The news magazine was replaced in 1995 by H-MINERVA, a listserv associated with the H-NET consortium of scholarly discussion groups.⁹⁷

In 1987, DACOWITS visited Navy and Marine posts in the Far East and came back with a list of problems ranging from lack of promotion opportunities to sexual harassment. The report described the ships where abuse and disrespect were encouraged, incidents of which the Navy was clueless. Written by DACOWITS Chairwomen Jacquelyn Davis, the report was not only submitted to congressional hearings but was circulated in the media by the Women and Military Project⁹⁸ of the Women's Equity Action League (WEAL). In fact, this organization quickly became the main source of information for reporters, congressional offices, DACOWITS and military women. In terms of lobbying, WEAL was the main organization supporting gender equality in the military ranks.⁹⁹

The task force created by Weinberger to investigate DACOWITS's complaints also found "problems concerning the implementation of the combat exclusion rules...[and that] sexual harassment was a significant problem in all Services".¹⁰⁰ It found that combat exclusion rules were very problematic and difficult to interpret and as a solution, in 1988 the Department of Defense Task Force on Women in the Military recommended the "risk rule," which barred women from areas of the battlefield where the "risk of exposure to direct combat, hostile fire, or capture is equal to or greater than

⁹⁷ As a member of H-MINERVA listserv I have had honor of corresponding with Dr. De Pauw Grant and other members whose work on women in the military spans more than three decades and learning about the history of the Center.

⁹⁸ The project was transferred later to Women's Research and Education Institute and it continued being a crucial source of information for the Congressional members. This group has done a great job facilitating exchange of ideas and expertise between feminist groups, equal opportunity networks and policymakers,

⁹⁹ Fainsod Kazenstein, 67.

¹⁰⁰ Rostker, 570.

that experienced by associated combat units in the same theater of operations.”¹⁰¹.

Although by now the government did open 63 percent of all positions in the military to women, it still severely limited their possible assignments, and the National Organization of Women mobilized to actively fight for a place for women in combat. In 1990, NOW issued a resolution to fight this “inequality of opportunity”. It demanded “equality for women in joining the military and in training, job assignments and benefits in the military; and ...that NOW actively supports elimination of statutory restrictions on women in the military.”¹⁰²

Progress continued in 1989 when two women commanded units in Panama. In 1990, the first female commanded a Navy ship; and in 1991, in the Persian Gulf War, large numbers of women moved forward with their units into combat zones, which they were officially forbidden to enter. This progress prompted more questions regarding the meaning of combat exclusion. Representative Patricia Schroeder, a Colorado Democrat and an advocate of rescinding all rules excluding women from combat argued that "the Persian Gulf helped collapse the whole chivalrous notion that women could be kept out of danger in a war. We saw that the theater of operations had no strict combat zone, that Scud missiles were not gender-specific -- they could hit both sexes and, unfortunately, did." ¹⁰³

Hence, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the biggest issue on the Pentagon's agenda became women's role in combat. While General Vuono of the Army and General

¹⁰¹ Rostker, 571.

¹⁰² This resolution was adopted by the organization's National Board in September 1990. The text of the entire resolution is available on <http://www.now.org/issues/military/policies/wim.html> (Last Accessed May 24th , 2009)

¹⁰³ Jon Nordheimer, "Women's Role in Combat: The War Resumes," *New York Times*, May 26, 1991, New York edition.

Gray Jr. of the Marine Corps were completely opposed to women soldiers in combat, Admiral Kelso Jr. of the Navy and General McPeak of the Air Force opposed the issue personally but were willing to support it if legislative changes were made. But women's achievements, including the fact that more than 40,000 women participated in the Gulf War, in which fifteen were killed, pushed the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel to consider repealing the ban on women in combat in June, 1991. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney supported the House legislation, which had passed only a month earlier, and allowed services to have women in combat, though they were not required to do so. Cheney's Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, Christopher Jehn, agreed but he also requested "maximum flexibility in regulating women in combat" so that it did not affect combat readiness and effectiveness of the troops as "it has a lot to do with the behavior of the men...and whether we are psychologically ready for it or not". Although many senators agreed, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) worried that this "blanket denial of combat roles for women strikes many people as outdated and unfair."¹⁰⁴

The years 1992 through 1994 saw considerable legislative and policy changes regarding the roles of women in the military as DACOWITS and congressional members such as Patricia Schroeder pushed to end the restrictions. The WEAL Women and Military Project was now part of the Women's Research and Education Institute under the direction of Carolyn Becraft, who successfully organized the lobbying strategy. Feminists inside and outside the military worked together to make it happen. While the

¹⁰⁴ Erick Schmitt, "Ban on Women in Combat Divides Four Service Chiefs," *New York Times*, 19 June, 1991, A16, New York edition.

uniformed women, particularly women pilots, could not directly lobby congressional offices, they went along with civilians to provide information and firsthand accounts in response to any question that those on the Hill might have.¹⁰⁵

Shortly thereafter, in 1991 Congress allowed women on combat aircraft assignments and established a Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces that spent the following seven months studying the possibility of opening more positions to women.¹⁰⁶ The commission's report was criticized by women's advocates, such as the National Women's Law Center, as "strongly biased against increasing assignment". Critics pointed to a number of weaknesses. Complaints included the use of anecdotal rather than empirical evidence, concern with problems outside of the military effectiveness scope, little study of negative implications of current limitations, as well as problematic membership of the commission that included some well-known opponents of expanding women's role in the military.¹⁰⁷

The Presidential Commission recommended allowing women to serve on all surface combat ships except amphibious vessels but keeping them off the crews of combat aircraft and out of ground combat units. However, as the new administration came in, the issue of women in combat was quickly taken up by both President Clinton and his Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin. In April 1993, Aspin sent a memorandum to the services asking them to give women the opportunity to compete for assignment to combat aircraft and to open as many Navy ships to women as possible under the legal restrictions that still prevented them from being assigned to ships engaged in combat missions. Since

¹⁰⁵ Katzenstein, 50-51.

¹⁰⁶ Susan Godson, *Serving Proudly: A History of Women in the US Navy* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 281.

¹⁰⁷ Shirley Sagawa and Nancy Duff Campbell, *Women in the Military Issue Paper: Women in Combat* (Washington D.C: National Women's Law Center, 1992), 7.

World War II women had served on a variety of combat support vessels but were prohibited from assignment to destroyers, aircraft carriers and other fighting vessels. Moreover, Aspin's memorandum asked the Army and the Marine Corps to "justify the continuing exclusion of women from ground infantry units" but did not prescribe additional gender integration in these two services. Instead, it reaffirmed the exclusion of women from units below brigade level whose primary mission entailed direct combat on the ground.¹⁰⁸

Additional changes in law and policy regarding the assignment of women were finally implemented in 1994, opening between 15,000 and 20,000 jobs previously off limits in the Army and Marine Corps. Troops in ground combat still excluded women, but Aspin replaced the "risk rule" with a new definition barring women from direct ground combat. According to this definition, women could not be in jobs engaging an enemy in close combat while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force's personnel.¹⁰⁹ Basically, this memorandum directed that women be assigned to all units except those "below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground."¹¹⁰

Today, females make up 15.5 percent of the United States armed forces ranks, a total of 390,000 women. More than 95 percent of career fields and more than 80 percent of all jobs are now open to them.¹¹¹ Women in the Navy are excluded from submarines and Navy SEALs but the other 94 percent of positions are open to them. In the Army,

¹⁰⁸ John Lancaster, "Aspin to Open Combat Roles to Women; Pentagon is Ready to Lift Ban of Female Pilots in Attack Aircraft," *Washington Post*, April 28th, 1993, A1.

¹⁰⁹ Eric Schmitt, "Aspin Moves to Open Many Military Jobs to Women," *New York Times*, 14 January, 1994, A22, New York edition.

¹¹⁰ Rostker, 576.

¹¹¹ United States National Report to Committee on Women in the NATO 2008, 1.

women can enter 91 percent of positions, 93 percent in the Marine Corps, and 99 percent of all Air Force positions are open to women.¹¹² Although legislative progress has stalled, the participation of women in the military has expanded. In the years since the “risk rule” was rescinded, 1,000 women have served in Somalia, 1,200 in Haiti, 15,000 in Bosnia, and 8,000 in Kosovo, including women piloting combat aircraft.¹¹³

Debate regarding the extent of women’s inclusion in the military continues, particularly as wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have exposed women to combat more than any other conflict, but the limitations persist. In May, 2005, the now-disgraced Republican representative from San Diego, Duncan Hunter, proposed limiting the role of women in combat once again. In the end, House Republicans abandoned their own plans after the original bill ran into opposition from the Pentagon and lawmakers from both parties.¹¹⁴

For retired Air Force Lt. Col. Karen Johnson, now executive vice president of the National Organization for Women, serving in combat positions is the duty of every citizen, including women. She argues that “to be an American citizen, you have a right to be able to participate in the military and to serve the military as a full and responsible citizen. As women, we are patriotic. We care about our country. And we're willing to fight and to die for our country.”¹¹⁵ And they do die for their country. Up to 2008, 97

¹¹² Georgia Clark Sander, “Women in Combat: The US Military and the Impact of the Persian Gulf” in *Wives and Warriors: Women and the Military in the United States and Canada*, ed. Laurie Lee Weinstein and Christy C. White., 79-98. (Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey, 1997), 91-92.

¹¹³ WREI Factsheet, Available online at <http://www.wrei.org/Womenpercent20inpercent20thepercent20Military/Womenpercent20inpercent20thepercent20Militarypercent20Chronologypercent20ofpercent20Legalpercent20Policy.pdf> (Last Accessed May 30th, 2009)

¹¹⁴ “House Rejects Limits on Women in Combat” Associated Press, May 25th, 2005 <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,157607,00.html> (Last Accessed May 30th, 2009)

¹¹⁵ Brian Dakss, “*Women In Combat Debate Rekindled Killing, Wounding Of 14 Female Troops Last Week Spotlights Danger*,” *CBS News*, 30 June, 2005.

women soldiers and three female civilian contractors were killed, including 61 by hostile action.¹¹⁶

From 2002 until 2008, 191,500 women have served, which is roughly 11 percent of all troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. With their numbers increasing and their role expanding, problems they face when they get home are also increasing. These women have been more likely to suffer mental problems, post-traumatic stress syndrome and homelessness, and many times services are not adequate. But it is necessary to remember that male soldiers have experienced similar problems in recent years. Nearly 35 percent of all soldiers needed therapy a year after the war in Iraq started, and today nearly one in five soldiers suffer mental problems.¹¹⁷ There are not enough clinics to deal with brain injuries regardless of sex, and there are not enough beds in mental hospitals to accommodate all who require help.

But there is a concern in the ranks that is mostly¹¹⁸ a women's problem, and that is sexual harassment, which continues to plague the armed forces. As mentioned in Chapter I, this dissertation is concerned with the factors influencing women's integration and extent of their participation in the military, not social acceptance as an equal. That is the reason why my research question from the beginning has been why states pass certain legislation regarding women in the military rather than how well it was accepted by male soldiers. In addition, it is still difficult to compare the states because, besides the United States, United Kingdom, Belgium and

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/06/30/earlyshow/main705317_page2.shtml?tag=contentMain;contentBody (Last Accessed May 30th, 2009)

¹¹⁶ "100 Female U.S. Service Members Have Died in Iraq" *CNN*, 24 July, 2008.

<http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/07/24/iraq.main/index.html> (Last Accessed May 30th, 2009)

¹¹⁷ United States Army Medical Department Press Release Mental Health Advisory Team V Report <http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/news/releases/20080306mhatv.cfm?m=3&y=2008> (Last Accessed May 31st, 2009)

¹¹⁸ I say "mostly" because in 1995, the US Department of Defense survey showed that 35.8 percent of males have also experienced sexual harassment behavior in that year alone. For more details see Heather Antecol and Deborah Cobb Clark, "Men, Women and Sexual Harassment in the US Military", *Gender Issues*, Vol. 19, No. 1, (December 2001), 3-18.

Denmark, no other NATO member has revealed any studies or data regarding sexual harassment. The most recent study by Helen Benedict shows that a third of US female soldiers have been sexually assaulted or raped, while 71 percent to 90 percent have been sexually harassed.¹¹⁹ While the numbers seem outrageous, Belgium and UK report even more acute problems.¹²⁰

However, it is necessary to bring it up because today it is the main issue on the agenda of all groups concerning themselves with women in the military in the United States. The effort by the women's groups both inside and outside of the military institution focused solely on gender discrimination as opposed to a whole array of issues ranging from racism to homosexuality allowed this coalition to succeed.¹²¹ Eliminating sexual harassment has from the beginning been under the umbrella of gender discrimination and these women's groups continue to fight it.

Last year, Rep. Louise Slaughter (D-NY) and Rep. Jane Harman (D-CA) provided testimony to the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs outlining the abuses and lack of punishment for the abusers. Rep. Slaughter pledged to introduce a bill that would reduce violence against military personnel and their families, establish a victims advocate office within the Department of Defense that would be responsible for providing services to victims, protect those who report the assaults, and court-martial those who violate "no contact" or protection orders. Moreover, all branches of the services would have to provide victims advocate programs and train recruits in violence prevention. The response from the Department of Defense was familiar as it asserted that SAPRO, or Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, an organization responsible for sexual assault policy, already exists. Michael Dominguez, principal Under Secretary of Defense

¹¹⁹ Helen Benedict, "For Women Warriors, Deep Wounds, Little Care," *New York Times*, 26 May 2008, Op-Ed.

¹²⁰ In the UK, 99percent of servicewomen have reported being subject to some form of sexual remark by male colleagues in 2006, while in Belgium 92percent reported sexist talk and 14percent reported violent sexual propositions.

¹²¹ Katzenstein, 75.

for Personnel and Readiness, ordered the SAPRO director Dr. Kaye Whitley to ignore the congressional subpoena to testify.¹²²

After congressional members expressed their outrage, Whitley was forced to testify in January, 2009, where she admitted that “even though she was in a car in front of the Rayburn House Office Building, testimony in hand, ready to walk into the hearing... understood the implication of ignoring a subpoena but was accustomed to following orders”¹²³ and therefore failed to show up. The following month Slaughter reintroduced the Military Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault Response Act (H.R.840) in the House. The National Organization for Women has taken action and is actively working on lobbying congressional members. As of April, 2009, they had gathered 30, or one-third, of necessary votes to push the bill through the committee hearing and to the House floor, but the likelihood of it being passed is still uncertain. Meanwhile, the women of the United States military services are suffering in numbers higher than ever.¹²⁴

As for DACOWITS, the most important organization supporting women in the military, the story is almost over. President George W. Bush allowed their charter to expire in 2002, and by 2008 it had been allowed to almost disappear. DACOWITS has only five members today, 35 less than it boasted in 1951. In December, 2008, the National Women’s Law Center and Women’s Research and Education Institute issued recommendations to President Obama’s Transitional Team asking him to re-establish DACOWITS under the Federal Advisory Committee Act with the mission to advise the Secretary of Defense on a full range of matters and policies relating to women in the armed forces; to again serve as a vital link between the civilian community and the

¹²² Linda Wadding, “Soldier Rape: Don’t ask (for help), Don’t tell (a soul),” *Iowa Independent*, 6 August, 2008, <http://iowaindependent.com/3494/soldier-rape-dont-ask-for-help-dont-tell-a-soul>

¹²³ Gina Cavallaro, “Assault prevention officer faces House panel,” *Army Times*, 12 September, 2008. http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/09/army_whitleyhearing_091108w/ (Accessed July 20, 2009)

¹²⁴ Kim Gandy, President of the National Organization for Women column “Below the Belt: Stop Rape and Assault: And That’s an Order”, 6 April, 2009. <http://www.now.org/news/note/040609.html> (Last Accessed June 4th, 2009)

Department of Defense; to increase its membership to a minimum of 25 to be chosen from diverse backgrounds and geographic areas; and to allow the committee to focus again on military women's issues.¹²⁵

As the influence of DACOWITS waned, so did the progress of women's integration during the eight years of the George W. Bush administration. Although there are other military women's and veterans associations and groups around the country for military women to exchange information unique to their experience and to offer advice and suggestions to those women who are considering joining the United States armed forces, nobody has managed to lobby or stand for US military women the way DACOWITS did. Instead, during the Bush administration, groups opposing women in combat, and even joint training, have gained strength by joining forces with the right-wing and the Christian right. Among the most outspoken critics of mixed-gender basic training, gays in the military, and women in combat is Elaine Donnelly, president of the Michigan-based Center for Military Readiness. She and 15 other advocacy groups have been seeking to end equal opportunity in training, and prevent it from ever taking place in combat because it is "being imposed on the military by liberal activists"¹²⁶ In 2001, Donnelly made the following statement that tells us just how limited her appreciation of combat is:

"The DACOWITS and Pentagon feminists keep demanding that all-male, tip-of-the-spear combat units--the ones that directly and successfully engaged Taliban fighters on the ground--be made politically correct by including women. Never mind that the job of

¹²⁵ Recommendations from joint letter to Presidential Transition Team jointly signed by Women's Research and Education Institute & National Women's Law Center "DACOWITS Should Be Revitalized", Dec. 8th, 2008. <http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/DACOWITS.pdf> (Last Accessed May 23rd, 2009)

¹²⁶ Elaine Donnelly, *Social Experimentation in the Military*, speech given at the Heritage Foundation on March 3rd, 1995. Transcripts available at http://www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/upload/92136_1.pdf (Last Accessed May 25th, 2009)

Special Operations helicopter pilot, as vividly portrayed by the real-life character Michael Durant in the film *Black Hawk Down*, is not just another "career opportunity."¹²⁷

A year later, Donnelly was awarded a Conservative Political Action Conference Ronald Reagan Award.

This section has demonstrated that in DACOWITS, WEAL, WREI, the National Women's Law Center and NOW have contributed greatly to the promotion of women's integration into the military and expansion of their role. Regardless of what administration was appointing women throughout the 1970s and 1980s, DACOWITS members stood united with other women's groups outside the government seeking to expand the role women played in the United States military services.

Women in Labor and Women in Professional and Technical Fields

Women's groups fighting for women in the military presented their cause tactfully to the American people in the package that the population was already familiar with – equal opportunity. Mary Fainsod Katzenstein has argued that the

“emergence of organized feminist activism would not have been possible without the law's legitimation of equal opportunity . . . the courts and congressional endorsement of antidiscrimination norms gave advocates of equality a voice that otherwise might well have been overpowered within the institution.”¹²⁸

In fact, since World War II the progress of women in the military has always following the progress of women in the market place. By the time that war ended, 19 million women, or 36percent of the U.S. work force, were employed in the American war

¹²⁷Elizabeth Book, "Military women 200,000 an counting," *National Defense Magazine*, October 2001, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/ARCHIVE/2001/OCTOBER/Pages/Military_Women4193.aspx (Last Accessed June 25th, 2009)

¹²⁸ Katzenstein, 80.

effort. Although Rosie the Riveter and millions of her fellow women helped keep the American economy running, as World War II ended and men returned from the front lines, women left the factory to retreat into the home, just as female soldiers did. Labor Committee Chairwoman Mary T. Norton urged women not to do so. She understood the pressure on women from industry and labor unions to vacate jobs that their husbands and brothers were seeking to obtain.

“This is the time for women everywhere to prove that they appreciate the responsibility they have been given. Women can’t be Sitting-Room Sarahs or Kitchen Katies. They have homes to keep up, food to prepare, families to clothe . . . but they have their world to make. . . . American women today stand on the threshold of a glorious future . . . They can grasp it . . . or they can let it slide. Women are going to be pushed into a corner, and very soon at that. ”¹²⁹

Although some women did return home by the time the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act was passed in 1948, the percentage of females in the labor force dropped to only 3 percent. From that low point, over the years that number continued to rise.

The passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act gave women another opportunity by eliminating all discrimination in the labor market based on sex. As discussed above, this act created a momentum which allowed women’s movements to make greater demands seeking expansion of women’s participation in the military. It allowed the movement to situate their cause within a larger context of discrimination of women in the work place and present it to both the public and Congress as such.

In 1973, as the conscription system ended and an All-Volunteer Force was created, the Pentagon realized that it would need to recruit fewer, but more qualified and

¹²⁹House Document No. 108-223, *Women in Congress 1917 – 2006*, (Washington D.C.: GPO), 2006, 144 Available on GPO website <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/cdocuments/hd108-223/part1-chap2.pdf> (Last Accessed May 22nd, 2009)

skilled, professionals to fill its jobs. But in 1978, an average of 60 percent of male Army entrants possessed a high school diploma compared to 81 percent among 19-20 in the general population, and 71 percent of draftees in 1964. In addition, in 1964 over 40,000 persons with some college education entered the Army's enlisted ranks; in 1978 the figure was less than 5,000.¹³⁰ Therefore, the Department of Defense was forced to tap into the female labor market and recruit the most qualified to fill vacant positions.

In 1991, Congress passed the Non-Traditional Employment for Women Act, requiring training and placement of women in fields traditionally dominated by men, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which provided for punitive damages in cases of intentional discrimination.¹³¹ This also marked the beginning of changes in the military ranks, as there were no more legal obstacles to women in other civilian labor sectors that were previously dominated by men.

In 2005 Janet Hoffheins, deputy director of DOD Civilian Personnel Management Service, argued that the modern military force is, and will continue to be, composed of highly competent and dedicated women. She continued by saying that “as we move forward into the 21st century, our challenge is to ensure that the department attracts and retains the best and brightest ... the right people with the right skills to achieve the mission.” Hoffheins used the Defense Manpower Data Center and the U.S. Census Bureau reports to show that the number of active-duty women officers increased in several nontraditional occupations, such as engineering and maintenance, tactical operations, and supply and procurement, whereas the number of enlisted women

¹³⁰ Charles Moskos, “National Service and the All-Volunteer Force” prepared for presentation to the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives and published in *Social Science and Public Policy*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 70-72.

¹³¹ Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Pub. L. 102-166), as enacted on November 21, 1991 and published by the EEOC on <http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/cra91.html> (Last Accessed May 23rd, 2009)

increased in the areas of tactical operation and supply and procurement. The top five occupations in 2004 for active-duty women officers were nurses, physicians, biomedical sciences and allied health officers, health services administration officers, and manpower and personnel. At the same time, the top five occupations for active-duty enlisted women were general administration, supply administration, general personnel, general medical care and treatment, and operators and analysts.¹³²

Today 68 percent of American women aged 15-64 are employed and women make up 47.5 percent of total American work force.¹³³ Of all jobs in scientific research and development in 2007, US women held 43 percent and 34 percent in national security and international relations.¹³⁴ Women in the United States make up 55 percent of professional and technical employees today.¹³⁵ In certain professions, particularly high-paying management and professional occupations, women are already at 51 percent. Men have also been outnumbered by women in occupations such as financial managers, human resource managers, biological scientists, writers, accountants and budget analysts, educational administrators and medical and health services managers.¹³⁶ These are the same occupations that women in the military are largely occupying today.

From this narrative it is clear that the women's movement was crucial in expanding the participation of women in the United States armed forces by successfully

¹³² Rudi Williams, "Women Rising to Higher Positions in the Military," *American Forces Press Service*, March 31, 2005. <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=31046> (Last Accessed May 23rd, 2009)

¹³³ World Bank GenderStats Data Query for data from 2008 <http://www.genderstats.worldbank.com> (Last Accessed May 23rd, 2009)

¹³⁴ US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Women in Laborforce: A Databook*. December 2008, Table 14 Employed Persons by detailed industry and sex, 2007 annual averages. Available on <http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-table14-2008.pdf> (Last Accessed May 23rd, 2009)

¹³⁵ United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Indices 2008*, Table 5 pg. 41-44 http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI_2008_EN_Tables.pdf (Last Accessed on May 23rd, 2009)

¹³⁶ U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Employment and Earnings, 2008 Annual Averages and the Monthly Labor Review*, November 2007, <http://www.dol.gov/wb/stats/main.htm> (Last Accessed May 23rd, 2009)

presenting women's struggles, demands, and professional aspirations within two larger important policy issues: equal opportunity and manpower shortage. In a recent email Dr. Joshua Goldstein, international relations specialist and author of *Gender and War* (2001), roughly confirmed this argument when he wrote that in his opinion:

“the integration of women in the U.S. military came about from a combination of changing norms about women's roles, in turn growing out of the women's movement, and the practicalities of a large, post-draft military in need of personnel. Once women began to integrate in larger numbers after the Vietnam War, practical experience showed this to be a cost-effective way to maintain desired force levels and showed resulting problems to be manageable.”¹³⁷

The first issue, on providing a greater equal opportunity in the workplace to women was meant to mobilize the American public, rally their support and start changing norms regarding women's roles in labor in general. Because the issue was articulated within this larger context, today American women's role in the military is largely a reflection of women's position in the civilian labor market.

The second policy issue, on providing military services with competent and skilled recruits at all times to prevent manpower shortage, was meant to appeal to the national security community, and in particular Department of Defense and the White House. Situating women in the military within a broader manpower debate forced the policymakers to allow women to participate in increasingly higher percentages in the armed forces, and to occupy more skilled, technical and professional positions where they can use their expertise and knowledge.

¹³⁷ Joshua Goldstein, email message to author, July 27th, 2009.

4. EXCLUSION OF WOMEN FROM THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES: 1945-2000

Ideological Evolution of the Italian “Second Wave” Women’s Movement

Women’s participation in the economic, political and social life of Fascist Italy was largely limited to *Fasci Femminili*, the Fascist Party women’s wing encouraging women’s subordination, and occasional aristocratic and professional women’s organizations, which handed over their household and childcare chores to female servants and housemaids from the lower classes. While the former possessed no political power, the latter organizations were allowed to operate on the condition they did not present a threat to party membership and allegiances. The most important women’s professional association, FIDUS, or organization of women degree-holders, survived in the beginning although its calls to end labor discrimination were repeatedly ignored. But as its affiliation with the international women’s movement, Jewish, lesbian and independent thinkers became more obvious, and as the regime created ANFAL, a carbon-copy Fascist version of FIDUS, the organization was asked to disband in May of 1935.

With the outbreak of World War II, things started to change as the regime abruptly abolished the policy of labor exclusion to fill jobs once held by men now being sent to the battlefield. While the government did not change its emphasis on state’s supremacy over family affairs and patriarchic and sexual hierarchy, women did manage to carve out their own destinies, even if temporarily. On the Fascist side, on April 14, 1944, Decree 447 was issued as the first official call for women to join the military. About 6,000 women joined the “Feminine Auxiliary Service” and some of them took up

arms to fight the resistance even as it became clear that Mussolini's Republic of Salò was not going to survive.

However, most women joined the resistance. From 1943 until the end of the war in 1945, 70,000 women joined Women's Groups for Defense and for the Assistance of Freedom Fighters (Gruppi di difesa della donna e per la assistenza ai combattenti per la libertà) and another 30,000 armed women joined the partisans to fight the Fascists.¹³⁸

Unfortunately, this large and active participation of women in the resistance movement did not lead to women's emancipation. They did not join to fight the Fascist regime's chauvinist policies but to stop the regime that was sending their sons and husbands to their certain death. There was no feminist agenda as there had been no autonomous feminist movement since the Fascist Party came to power.¹³⁹ In fact, historians such as Alexander De Grand argued that "perhaps the greatest success of the [fascist] regime was the destruction of an independent political consciousness on the part of women."¹⁴⁰

The Italian "second wave" feminist movement developed when urbanization, the rise of the consumer society in the 1960s and the loss of women's jobs in agriculture meant women increasingly worked at home within the patriarchal nuclear family. Although there were many different kinds of women's groups with large memberships, there was no united movement and they had no power as their goals and ideologies differed greatly. But any discussion of the Italian feminist movement reveals two

¹³⁸ Gigliola Gori. *Italian Fascism and the Female Body: Submissive Women and Strong Mothers*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2004), 72.

¹³⁹ Perry Wilson, "Women in Fascist Italy" in *Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany: Comparisons and Contrasts*, ed. Richard Bessel, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 84.

¹⁴⁰ Alexander De Grand, "Women under Italian Fascism," *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Dec., 1976), 947.

important subjects that are crucial in our understanding of their role and impact on women in the military. The first is the relationship between Italian women's groups and the political Left, and the lack of relationship with the political Right. The second subject worth exploring concerns notions of difference and equality and how these translated within an Italian feminist context.

Among major women's groups were the Centro Italiano Femminile (CIF) and the Unione Donna Italiana (UDI). The Centro Italiano Femminile, with strong ties to the Catholic Church, focused its energies on the preservation of life and sanctity of family and marriage. The Catholic Church has traditionally rejected the notion of women's involvement in the military and conflict, because they were not seen as appropriate places for a "weak" gender. Likewise, the women of the CIF did not spend their energy on initiatives concerning women in the military as they found the subject equally repulsive. And the situation has not changed. In the 1990s, after the Vatican Council II, many clergymen turned against the military service in general as they and some other religious groups sought to promote peace and support conscientious objectors. This, however, never became the official policy of the Church.¹⁴¹

The only other group exerting influence was the UDI, the largest women's association, which was working with the Communist Party of Italy (PCI). The UDI was created in 1944-45 out of female defense groups and mobilized in the early 1970s in response to the influences of American feminism and Italy's failure to legalize divorce and abortion. The feminist movement largely sided with the left wing as the right wing sought to curtail their rights with the anti-divorce referendum led by the Christian

¹⁴¹ Paoletti, 206.

Democratic Party in 1974 and the rejection of the 1976 legalization of abortion bill by both the Christian Democratic Party and the Neo-Fascist Party.¹⁴²

Around the country, women were joining consciousness-raising organizations and starting their own centers and magazines. Therefore, as these groups formed and began various initiatives, their discussions in assemblies and meetings quickly distinguished liberation from emancipation, the former dealing with the radical transformation of everyday life while the latter was seen as having a more limited focus on public life, including the work place. This also meant that the Italian women's movement was not going to fight for the traditional notion of equal rights. It perceived equality as just another way to subject women even further, because, for the women's movement, equality of opportunity meant emancipation and becoming more like men. Italian feminists perceived this as an imposition of an asexual identity that turned them into just another political category developed by patriarchal, right-wing governments. Instead, they wanted revolutionary change.¹⁴³

During this period, Italian leftist parties and labor unions started bringing up the issue of women in society, including in the work force. Italian women used the existing structure to organize themselves within these institutions simply because, "although mass movements have been successful in voicing and aggregating demands from various interest groups, they have not succeeded in reaching decision-making levels through bypassing party and institutional structures."¹⁴⁴ In fact, by the mid-1970s, feminists were

¹⁴² Marila Guadagnini, "The Latecomers: Italy's Equal Status and Equal Opportunity Agencies", in *Comparative State Feminism*, ed. Dorothy M. Stetson and Amy Mazur, 150-167 (London, UK: Sage Publications, 1995), 153.

¹⁴³ Ergas, Yasmine, "1968-79: Feminism in the Italian Party System: Women's Politics in a Decade of Turmoil," *Comparative Politics*, (April 1982), 262.

¹⁴⁴ Marila Guadagnini, "A Partitocrazia Without Women; the Case of the Italian Party System" in *Gender and Party Politics*, ed. Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris, (London, UK: Sage Publications, 1994), 169.

a central component of many Leftist organizations, and by the late 1980s main leftist parties such as the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano) established the principle of equal representation of men and women in its internal institutional bodies, Executive Boards and delegations with quota minimum of 33 percent of seats going to women.¹⁴⁵

However, as much as it was good for Italian women to push their agenda within the established network, the central focus of the left was the class struggle, in which gender issues were sometimes forgotten or sidestepped. The issue of women in the military was a non-issue because the movement

“opposed authority and institutions...and stressed the need for a distinct and separate identity for women as women within institutions...With “difference” as its trademark, the movement was more interested in reproduction and sexual issues than in labor issues, and it did not try to achieve positions of political and social power. Rather than seeking to become a pressure group, the movement in the 1970s stood aloof from decisional mechanisms.”¹⁴⁶

This history of socialist politics behind the feminist movement played a significant role in the policy issue of women in the military. Inclusion of women in the Army was actively opposed by virtually all feminist organizations and networks.

The inclusion of women in the Italian armed services was first brought up in 1963, when Law No. 66 abrogated the 1919 law and 1920 regulations and gave women access to all public professions and governmental jobs, with the possibility of openings in the military, too. But since the women’s movement was not interested in participating in the military, it did not participate in what it regarded as another attempt by the

¹⁴⁵ Patrizia Longo, “Italian Feminisms: Past, Present, Future,” (paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, August 28-31, 2003), 8.

¹⁴⁶ Guadagnini, 1995, 152.

conservative right wing parties to co-opt and corrupt women for their capitalist exploitation. Parliament rejected an amendment proposed by the government aimed at excluding women from employment in the armed forces, but it left the regulation on women's service in the Army and Special Forces to future particular laws.¹⁴⁷

There were no women's groups trying to fight for equal position and obligations in the military services, nor did they perceive it as a way of improving women's socio-economic standing until 1991.

5. THE THIRD WAVE AND GENDER INTEGRATION IN THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

By the time the Cold War neared its end, the Italian military was composed of 385,100 members, of whom 258,000 were conscripts. By the early 1990s, Italy was one of the few states in the world sending conscripts abroad on peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Mozambique. They ended their missions in 1995, after having deployed only volunteer troops to Bosnia.¹⁴⁸ As the ethnic wars continued to rage on the Balkan peninsula through the 1990s, it was becoming clear that Italian forces were not modern or sophisticated enough to participate in peacekeeping operations, and parliamentary debate was starting to focus on transition to either a mixed model or volunteer force military model.

In 1992, the Italian government decided to conduct an experiment near the Sabatini Barracks, home of the 8th Regiment "Lancers of Montebello" in Rome by

¹⁴⁷ Legge n.66 del 9 febbraio 1963. Ammissione della donna ai pubblici uffici ed alle professioni. http://www.donne-lavoro.bz.it/download/284d2588_v1.pdf (Last Accessed June 5, 2009)

¹⁴⁸ Domenico Villani, "Recruitment in a Period of Transformation: The Italian Experience" in *Service to Country: Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries*, ed. Curtis Gilroy and Cindy Williams, 381-398, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 382.

inviting women to join the Army ranks for a day and a half. Thousands of Italian women responded to the state's call and applied to the Ministry of Defense, demonstrating that things were starting to change in Italy. Twenty-nine Italian women were chosen to participate and were given a chance to live in the barracks for 36 hours training in and carrying out military activities. This was a test that would hopefully provide the Ministry of Defense and military services with more information to help them better formulate proposals for the new defense model law which was to be voted on in parliament. At that point, volunteers made up only 4.9 percent of the entire force, and the reform was to add 65,000 more.¹⁴⁹ The women soldier was to be part of the new grand defense personnel model that would include both conscription and voluntary systems.

Three years later, on May 25, 1995, 12 of those 29 young women in the experiment formed an organization called ANANDOS (National Association of Women Soldier Aspirants). These women started a very serious debate that involved radical feminists, the Catholic Church, and the New Left. Radical feminists and women in peace movements did not want to take part in pushing for what they call "equal opportunity to kill".

ANANDOS membership quickly increased and it continued pressuring the government to give members full equality in enrolling in military service. In a survey conducted on June 15, 1999, 600 ANANDOS members were interviewed to find out which positions in the military they would like. 43 percent of the women declared a desire to enter military academies and become officers; 22 percent wanted to be non-commissioned officers, and 12 percent simply said they would like to join the armed forces. Of these 12 percent, 21 percent wanted to join the Air Force, 19 percent to serve

¹⁴⁹ "Oggi Trenta Donne Soldato," *Corriere della Sera*, November 23, 1992, 12.

in the Army, 10 percent in the Navy, 14 percent in the gendarmerie, and 9 percent sought to join the financial police.¹⁵⁰

Such surveys helped ANANDOS raise awareness and lobby parliamentarians unfamiliar with their cause. The group started to promote the recruitment of women in the armed forces through the media, online forums and web sites, and subsequently collaborated on the writing of the text of the actual law.¹⁵¹ The bill was introduced on January 15, 1997, by the Social Democratic parliamentarian Valdo Spini. It was examined by the lower house on July 24, 1998, and approved seven days later. Anna Finocchiaro, the Minister for Equal Opportunity, immediately commented that this law, if passed, would eliminate the final obstacle for women in public administration, while Spini argued that “the approval comes at the moment when the Italian Armed Forces are engaged in many peace missions abroad...and we were the last country of NATO to allow women in the military.”¹⁵²

On September 16, 1998, the bill was assigned to the Senate and examined until July 15, 1999. With a number of modifications, it was finally approved on July 21, 1999.¹⁵³ In the end, the bill was returned to the lower house, which approved it on September 29, 1999, with an overwhelming majority, with 592 votes for, nine against, and nine abstentions. All nine votes against the bill were from the old left Communist Refoundation Party (Partito Rifondazione Comunista – PRC), with whom the “second

¹⁵⁰ Carabinieri (military and civilian police) and Guardia di Finanza (financial police) are both considered branches of the Italian Armed Forces. Ministero della Difesa Archivio Servizio Femminile (Ministry of Defense Archives on Female Service)

<http://www.difesa.it/Approfondimenti/ArchivioApprofondimenti/Servizio+femminile> (Last Accessed June 10, 2009); Military Police or Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza

¹⁵¹ Italy National Report to the Committee on Women in NATO 1999-2000, pg. 1.

<http://www.nato.int/ims/1999/win/report99.pdf> (Last Accessed June 15, 2009)

¹⁵² “Donna in Divisa, Camera Dice di Sì”, *La Repubblica*, 30 July, 1998.

¹⁵³ “Arrivano le donne soldato ma non in prima linea” *La Repubblica*, 29 September 1999.

wave” feminists worked closely, and the nine abstentions came from the Green Party (Verdi) and Party of Italian Communists (Partito dei Comunisti Italiani – PdCi). With this last approval, Law No. 380 was finally signed on October 20, 1999, allowing women to enter military academies beginning in the year 2000. In 2001, they would be allowed to enter as non-commissioned officers, and in 2002, as enlisted soldiers. Although there were no obstacles to women’s career advancement, they were not allowed to be assigned in situations of the extreme risk of direct contact with the enemy.¹⁵⁴

The Italian National Report to the Committee on Women in NATO proudly declared that the notion of the woman soldier was borne from the demands of civil society, namely the women’s organization ANANDOS. What it fails to mention is that one of the main reasons why this women’s organization became so strong is that the old left was no longer a significant player in the Italian political arena and its radicalism and that of the “second wave” feminism were no longer very relevant.¹⁵⁵

After the passage of this law, the autonomous social movements felt betrayed by the willingness of the new left parties such as the Social Democrats to work with parties they labeled Fascist and imperialist. Those movements still argue that man-woman parity had nothing to do with this legislation, and that it exploits the talents of women on the organizational and logistical level far away from the combat. According to these Old Left radical parties, this law is an attempt of the imperialist Army to appear more democratic and popular, because the real change would be if the Army served only to defend the country and promote peace, not invade other countries. While it is difficult to defend their

¹⁵⁴Communiqué by the Partito Marxista-Leninista Italiano (Italian Party of Marxists-Leninists) “Ora il regime si appella alle donne per rafforzare l’esercito imperialista e intervenista” (Now the regime calls women to reinforce its imperialist and interventionist military) <http://www.pml.i.it/donnesoldato.html> (Last Accessed June 20th, 2009)

¹⁵⁵ Italy National Report to the Committee on the Women in the NATO 1999-2000, 1.

radical points to view, it is interesting to note that Debora Corbi, the president of ANANDOS, is considered one of the “donne di Fini”, or women of Fini, the leader of the Alleanza Nazionale (AN), the 1990s political party reincarnation of the neo-Fascist MSI-DN.¹⁵⁶ Clearly, the women of the “third wave” are no longer inclined to follow the leftist class struggle rhetoric.

On January 11, 2000, the European Court of Justice decided that limiting women’s role in the military was a clear “violation of the principle of equal opportunity . . . in about half of all European armed forces women are admitted to combat units without restrictions”¹⁵⁷ The 20 percent quota for female recruitment (percentage of the total available places) was abolished in 2005, followed by the elimination of employment restrictions in 2006.¹⁵⁸ With the exception of submarines and Special Forces, all military jobs are open to women today. In 2008, there were 10,000 women serving with the Italian armed forces¹⁵⁹ and since 2001 they have been deployed to Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon.¹⁶⁰

The reforms regarding women in the military coincided with passage in the Italian parliament of the Armed Forces Reform Act in November 2000 to make the transition from conscription to an all-voluntary army by 2005. The transition was viewed by policy-makers as necessary to reduce costs and to meet the challenges facing Italy’s armed forces, including participation in the European Defense Forces, peacekeeping missions,

¹⁵⁶ Maria Latella, “Cocktail e politica, le «donne di Fini» cercano spazio,” *Corriere Della Sera*, 1 June, 2002, 9.

¹⁵⁷ K. W. Haltiner and P. Klein, “The European Post-Cold War Military Reforms and Their Impact on Civil-Military Relations” in *The European Armed Forces in Transition: A Comparative Analysis*, ed. F. Kernic, P. Klein and K. Haltiner 9-30, (Frankfurt am Main, Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften 2005), 22–23.

¹⁵⁸ Italy National Report to the Committee on the Women in the NATO 2008, 2.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 1.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid*, 3.

and the defense of interests beyond the national borders (read Iraq and Afghanistan). The decision to move to an all-volunteer force was matched with a decision among Italian policy-makers to preserve and expand significantly the civilian service program which had been developed for conscientious objectors. By 2000, Italy was the only NATO state that not only did not have women serving in its military, but that also had very few professionals with university diplomas and expertise. Within this new organization of the armed services, the presence of qualified women was certainly seen as a positive addition and the Italian parliament was more than willing to accommodate ANANDOS to help fill the ranks with eager young women with necessary qualifications.

After almost 10 years, in 2004 ANANDOS dissolved and was replaced by the Gruppo Donna Soldato (Group of Women Soldiers), which today is the only organization in Italy dealing with women soldiers and young women aspiring to serve. This new organization took over ANANDOS's agenda and their friendly relationship with the Ministry of Defense. Their biggest battle today is eliminating current height (161cm) and age (26 years old at the time of entry) restrictions but the Ministry of Defense Communications and Research Representative Capt. Rosa Vinciguerra in a recent radio show argues that this is not unjust, because men also have height and age limitations. However, she does acknowledge that not all is "roses and flowers when it comes to the four services of the Armed Forces, but there is a march ahead."¹⁶¹

In an interview in February, 2008, Sabrina Brettone Piazza, the president of GDS, acknowledges problems of hazing and sexual harassment but surprisingly identifies

¹⁶¹Program "Donne in Forze Armate" (Women in the Armed Forces) on Italian state radio station RAI on 3 January, 2008. The program is available online: (Last Accessed June 15th, 2009) <http://www.radio.rai.it/radio1/iaradioneparla/view.cfm?NOTIZIA=237133&DATATEMA=2008-01-03>

the exclusion of the women and men of the Italian military from the law 151 of 2001 as the biggest problem women face. This law allows public administration workers with children younger than 3 to be transferred temporarily to the region or province where the other parent resides. Basically, women and men are forced to leave their small children at home, which, according to the GDS president, is contrary even to the constitutional protections of the family as sacred unit. She agrees that women are still unable to say that they are on equal footing with men, and suggests that it is necessary to have an equal opportunity commission within the armed forces to deal with it.¹⁶²

This concern was also voiced in the aforementioned radio program by Dr. Donatella Linguiti, the Under Secretary for Rights and Equal Opportunity, and First Marshall and military union Cocer delegate Luca Tartaglione, who argue that there is no reason why the military should not have a commission for equal opportunity when all other branches of public administration already have one.

Although I have asked them to provide information regarding total percentages of women in the Italian armed forces, as well as percentages of commissioned and non-commissioned officers, I was told by Brettoni Piazza to submit my request to the armed services. It is surprising that the main organization representing women in the military would not have such information readily available or even attempt to show any interest in obtaining it. Questions regarding political parties or any other women's groups that have

¹⁶²Giuseppe Paradiso, "La condizione della donna nelle forze armate" (Condition of women in the armed forces), *GrNet* the information service for those in Defense and Security, 9 February, 2008, 1.

provided legislative support for women in the military were completely ignored by the GDS.¹⁶³

The narrative shows that women's movements that perceived the state as a potential threat and the military as just another way of corrupting women did not participate or work on legislation that would open the Italian military to women. The new generation of women's groups that has been more interested in working with the state officials and political parties has been successful in promoting equal opportunity in arms.

Italian Women in Labor and Professional and Technical Fields

Italy has been a latecomer when it comes to the equality of women in the economic sector. This section demonstrates that the gender inclusiveness index remains low due to continued low levels of female economic activity and low numbers of women with technical skills necessary to fill military positions.

In the aftermath of the unification of the Italian peninsula and prior to the arrival of Fascism, women were largely considered "the charming, empty-minded, useless creatures"¹⁶⁴ of lower level whose primary job was to take care of their families. Most of the women working in professional fields were teachers and school principals. In other

¹⁶³ Italian researchers have expressed their frustration privately to me and others who have wondered publicly on the GDS online forum whether obtaining information about Italian female soldiers is a utopian dream. Over the past year, I have attempted to establish contacts with soldiers willing to comment on their situation in the ranks, including emailing their associations and posting requests on various military forums for information, all with little success. I have communicated with a few Italian researchers seeking similar information. Some researchers have had their questionnaires even edited by the Ministry of Defense, and others were unable to find just one woman willing to anonymously discuss their position, problems and successes within the ranks. Most researchers are frustrated by some sort of code of silence regulating the behavior of these soldiers who are unwilling to participate and comment even anonymously.

¹⁶⁴ Madam Fanny Zampini Salazar. "Women in Modern Italy" in *The Congress of Women: Held in the Woman's Building, World's Columbian Exposition, Chicago, U. S. A., 1893*, ed. Eagle, Mary Kavanaugh Oldham, 157-164. (Chicago, ILL: Monarch Book Company, 1894), 158.

fields, such as law, business and even medicine women were scorned and quickly excluded by their male colleagues.¹⁶⁵ The majority of Italian women worked in agriculture, and failed to receive any professional or technical training. This was particularly true in southern Italy, where family ties and community came before woman's professional and educational advancement. In fact, women were viewed more as a family possession tied to the family home and always supervised by the kin rather than persons capable of making any independent decisions. Their primary responsibility was their family household, and at most farm tasks, some clothing and food production. Women working outside of their nuclear family homes were seen as undesirable and immoral potential marriage partners.¹⁶⁶

From the Italian unification until the 1920s, the schooling of women was also not a priority, particularly among the poorer classes, where women's labor from an early age was necessary for family survival.¹⁶⁷ Among the wealthier classes, girls attended school at a higher rate, but educational associations and organizations trying to expand opportunities were largely limited in their aim and scope, and were often despised by true women's rights pioneers such as Fanny Zampini Salazar, who argued that:

“nothing could better reveal the subjection of our women to prejudices and old ideas than this association of theirs, which pretends to promote woman's culture by a weekly lecture, mostly regarding ancient history, and carefully excluding any and all of the modern questions regarding social, educational, legal or political matters.”¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, 162-163.

¹⁶⁶ Miriam Cohen, *Workshop to Office: Two Generations of Italian Women in New York City, 1900-1950* (Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 19.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, 22.

¹⁶⁸ Zampini Salazar, 161.

The arrival of Fascism in the 1920s brought with it the *Nuova Italiana*, or New Italian Woman. Victoria De Grazia superbly captures the gender dynamics from 1922 until 1945 in one single sentence: “Mussolini’s regime stood for returning women to home and hearth, restoring patriarchal authority, and confining female destiny to bearing babies.”¹⁶⁹ Italian women were to become the main protagonists of Mussolini’s pronatalist policies. During this period they were not only supervised by their kin but also by the state, which used them to fulfill Fascist, imperialist and mercantilist agendas. Besides deliberately limiting women’s economic activity by preventing them from getting or staying in jobs, Mussolini’s regime also nationalized brothels and banned contraceptives, abortion, and sex education. By doing so De Grazia argues, the Fascist and militant state “sought to nationalize Italian women”.¹⁷⁰

After the war ended and the new Italian Constitution was written in 1948, Article 3 guaranteed equal social status and equality before the law, without regard to sex. In terms of labor, Article 37 on Equality of Women at Work reads:

“Working women are entitled to equal rights and, for comparable jobs, equal pay as men. Working conditions have to be such as to allow women to fulfill their essential family duties and ensure an adequate protection of mothers and children.”¹⁷¹

In defining women’s equality, the constitution discriminates by assigning the family duties and childcare explicitly to women. Women’s employment should not get in their way of performing primary duties as mothers and wives. With such an article being part of the constitution, it is no wonder that post-war modernization, although largely

¹⁶⁹ Victoria De Grazia, *How Fascism Ruled Women 1922-1945* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 1.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 6.

¹⁷¹ La Costituzione Italiana (Italian Constitution) available on the website of the President of the Italian Republic <http://www.quirinale.it/costituzione/costituzione.htm> (Last Accessed May 26th, 2009)

characterized by the transition from village-based extended families to urban nuclear families, did not produce greater numbers of women in the work force. In fact not much was done to ensure equality between women and men. By 1963, women had only gained access to public and administrative offices, but another 14 years would pass before the 1977 Law No. 90 finally gave women equal opportunity in the work place.¹⁷² It was only after this law was enacted that women started to enter the labor market in higher numbers, and between 1970 and 2000 female labor participation increased by 70 percent while males' participation was static.¹⁷³

Italy was also slow in establishing agencies that would implement equal opportunity and promote gender equality. Almost a decade after the majority of Western European states established official state agencies to accomplish those tasks, in 1983 the Italian government finally decided to create the Equal Status Committee (ESC) attached to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security for the sake of implementation of equal treatment and equal opportunities for men and women in the work place. A year later, another agency was established within the prime minister's office, called the Equal Status and Equal Opportunity National Commission (ESNC). With this agency the government sought to "...further women's active participation in political, social, and economic life, especially in the economic and political decision making process".¹⁷⁴

Guadagnini argues that the passage of the 1977 law and the establishment of both the ESC and ESNC were not a result of domestic political pressures or women's groups organizing to lobby, but rather resulted from international pressure to meet the directives

¹⁷² Legge n. 903 del 9 dicembre 1977, Parità di trattamento tra uomini e donne in materia di lavoro, text available in Italian on <http://www.donne-lavoro.bz.it/291d2678.html> (Last Accessed June 5th, 2009)

¹⁷³ Patricia Albanese, *Mothers of the Nation: Women, Families and Nationalism in Twentieth Century Europe* (Toronto, CA: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 149.

¹⁷⁴ Guadagnini, 1995, 156.

of the European Community regarding equal treatment and pay, and pressures from the UN to expand opportunities during the International Decade for Women.¹⁷⁵ As such, they lacked contacts with the grassroots organizations and women's groups, and therefore did little to promote feminist goals of breaking away from the patriarchic understanding of women's primary duties to their families.¹⁷⁶

Today, only 52 percent of Italian women are employed, a very low figure compared to the other OECD states, whose average is 63 percent,¹⁷⁷ and 5 percent of top management positions are held by women.¹⁷⁸ According to a report published in April, 2007, by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, 54 percent of "precarious workers" are women. Although they have obtained higher levels of education than men, 20 percent of women in Italy are employed in positions requiring less education. In fact, the numbers are so dismal that only 1.2 percent of women accumulate a total of 40 years of social security contributions, and 52 percent less than 20 years.¹⁷⁹ Similarly, IRIS research shows that women get 80 minutes less leisure time than Italian men, the biggest differentiating factor in comparisons with the other OECD states. The researchers suggest that an Italian woman's family remains her main responsibility.

But there is another argument by old feminists, social researchers and commentators why Italy continues to lag behind other Western European democratic states. They argue that feminism and the fight for equal opportunity of the 1970s are out,

¹⁷⁵Ibid, 155.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, 165-166

¹⁷⁷ OECD Labor Force Statistics by sex and age indicators available on <http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx> (Last Accessed May 31st, 2009)

¹⁷⁸ Emma Wallis, "Why are Italy's women out of work?," *BBC News Rome*, 9 April, 2008. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/business/7337145.stm> (Last Accessed June 4th, 2009)

¹⁷⁹ Marta Santi, "Working towards equal opportunities for women in employment," Center for Studi Economici e Sindicali (CESOS), 10 April, 2007. <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2006/12/articles/it0612059i.htm> (Last Accessed June 5th, 2009)

and show girls and sex symbols are in. Italy's current Minister of Equal Opportunities is Mara Carfagna, a former show girl and protégé of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi whose media empire makes billions from TV shows full of women's flesh and who himself enjoys the company of high-end prostitutes.¹⁸⁰ Whether the women of Italy can really expect their situation to change in the near future with these two at the helm is beyond the scope of this study, yet it is a necessary point to consider when studying equal opportunities in both civilian and military labor sectors.

This dismal situation of women in the labor market in general and in professional and technical fields reflects the situation of women in the Italian military. As in the case of the United States, the two sectors seem to be mirror images. In neither are there legal barriers to the women's employment of women, but in both sectors their numerical presence and the quality of that presence remain low. Although women have been recruited for the past eight years, they are still lacking in numbers of both enlisted soldiers and junior and senior officers. Women make up only 2.6 percent of the entire force, and represent only 0.2 percent of senior officers, and 1.1 percent of junior officers. Unless the situation changes regarding the employment of women and their percentages in professional and technical fields in civilian society, we should not expect a greater inclusiveness of women in the Italian military service.

Chapter summary

I demonstrated in this chapter that IGI scores can be explained by studying the relationship between the state and women's movements and women's presence in the

¹⁸⁰ Sylvia Poggioli, "In Italy, Feminism Out, Sex Symbols In," *NPR Morning Edition*, 3 December 2008. Transcripts of the show available on <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=97402636> (Last Accessed June 10th, 2009)

labor market and in professional and technical fields. In the United States, the independent women's movement was a crucial player responsible for articulating demands regarding women in the military and pressuring policymakers to expand and improve their status. By contrast, in Italy the complete disinterest of women's groups fearing corruption and militarization of the women's agenda by the right-wing political parties stalled the reform and left the issue unresolved for much of the 20th century. Change came only in the 1990s with the reorganization of both party politics and the women's movement's agenda.

Furthermore, it is clear that in the United States high levels of women's quantitative and qualitative presence in the labor market have led to higher levels of gender inclusiveness as the military seeks to fill its ranks with qualified and skilled individuals. In Italy, where women are still largely absent from both the civilian job market in general and in particular from professional and technical fields, the levels of women's participation in the military continue to be very low.

Chapter V

Gender Integration in the New Members of NATO: Case studies of Poland and Hungary

1. INTRODUCTION

While much has been written in the field about women fighting alongside men in both Western Europe and North America, there is little comparable literature concerning women in Eastern Europe. However, during both world wars women served as pilots, sharpshooters, nurses and spies, though “collective memory of the world wars is both selective and essentially gendered.”¹⁸¹ In fact, for much of the 20th century women largely remained out of the history books and out of the ranks of the Warsaw Pact militaries. This chapter is the first academic attempt to study the integration of women into the military in the region since the end of the Cold War.

From the beginning of this study I have argued that we need to start to study the effects of multilateral military alliances and international security context on domestic decision-making and policy regarding women in the military. In this chapter I illustrate the argument by analyzing the process of integration and expansion of women’s participation in the military in Eastern Europe, where international variables have had a much greater impact than in Western Europe and North America, particularly in the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the transition to democracy and a free market.

¹⁸¹ Nancy Meriwether Wingfield, Maria Bucur, *Gender and War in Twentieth Century Eastern Europe*, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006), 10.

As the threat of communism disappeared in 1989, all of the Western European and North American members of NATO were faced with a new and arduous task of transforming their “ponderous armored formations with hundreds of thousands of soldiers...to become much smaller and deadlier, light and agile, capable of rapid deployment across intercontinental distances.”¹⁸² The same process was to take place in Eastern Europe, though the starting point for these states was very different. They had to first define the role of the military as an institution in their newly democratized societies, and only then pursue professionalization most appropriate to their domestic socio-economic and political context, as well as the new international security environment in which they found themselves. Policies regarding personnel were passed and implemented quickly and often inefficiently. Therefore, integration of women into the military in Eastern Europe involved different sets of variables and obstacles than in Western Europe.

The argument was confirmed by the quantitative analysis which suggested that different factors determine levels of gender inclusiveness as well as timing of the integration in old and new members of NATO. While in the previous chapter I focused on the old members from Western Europe and North America, in this chapter I study the newcomers in Eastern Europe. It is a narrative account of policy change since the end of the Cold War in Hungary and Poland. These two states were chosen because Hungary has achieved the highest level of integration of women into the military in the region (IGI = 15), while Poland is on the bottom of the gender inclusiveness index among Eastern European states (IGI = 8). This method allows me to compare their different

¹⁸² Thomas K. Adams, *The Army After Next: The First Postindustrial Army*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 3.

patterns of integration and explore the causes behind them, just as I did for the original members.

The two short narratives below confirm my argument that women were initially integrated into the military in Hungary and Poland in order to conform to NATO's standards. These narratives demonstrate that both Hungary and Poland began to open their armed services to women as a down-payment for their accession to NATO, and that the main determinant of the different levels of gender inclusiveness is a level of military operational capabilities due to different perceptions of external threats.

The political and economic development of Hungary and Poland has been similar since the fall of communism, but each state has maintained different security policy priorities and different perceptions of external threats. While the relative absence of an external security threat and lack of interest in national security by the government and the people has led to low levels of military operational capability force and high IGI scores in Hungary, the continued threat posed by Russia, geopolitical location, historical experiences and high level of interest in national security has led to high levels of military preparedness and relatively low IGI scores in Poland.

There is no evidence to argue that other variables have had much impact on these IGI scores. While Poland abolished conscription in 2008, Hungary abolished it only in 2004, which does not really give its government or the military services that much head start when it comes to the gender integration. Although their IGI scores are so different, both states have negative birth rates. Similarly, the status of women in the military is not a reflection of women's position in the labor market as Poland has a higher percentage of women in the labor market than Hungary, and both have among the highest percentages

of women in technical and professional fields of all NATO states, Poland with 61 percent and Hungary 62 percent. Their unemployment rates are also similar – Hungary at 7.83 percent and Poland 7.18 percent.

In terms of domestic political and economic context, contrary to what was expected in the original hypothesis, Poland has a higher percentage of women in the legislature (20.20 percent) than Hungary (11.1 percent). Poland also has a higher percentage of women at ministerial level (26 percent) than Hungary (21 percent). Although Hungary is doing slightly better than Poland in terms of their levels of economic development, both Gross National Income per capita (Purchasing Power Parity) are below \$20,000 mark. In fact, the difference between the two is less than \$500. The difference in their IGI scores is also not explained by the activity of domestic women's rights groups as in Western Europe and North America. Such groups range from virtually non-existent to politically weak and irrelevant in both states.

When it comes to cultural variables, it becomes a bit more difficult to compare them. Poland does have much higher levels of religiosity (over 80 percent) than Hungary (48 percent), but Hungarians seem to have higher numbers of those who believe that men make better politicians (53 percent) than Poles (44 percent). It remains difficult to show that religiosity has had an impact of the gender integration in the military, because women's participation in politics or economics does not seem to be affected by it at all as their percentages are relatively high in both sectors.

Lastly, Poland is 4th highest contributor to the UN peacekeeping missions among NATO members, while Hungary ranks 15th. Again, this is contrary to the original

hypothesis that expected bigger contributors to have greater gender integration in the ranks.

2. GENDER INTEGRATION IN THE HUNGARIAN DEFENSE FORCES

The first women in the Hungarian military ranks were nurses during the revolution and independence war in 1848-49, and, during both world wars and for much of the communist period, women continued to serve in this capacity. However, for much of the 20th century, women nurses were officers' wives as they were the only females allowed to join the Army. Still, they were treated as civilian employees. Throughout the 1980s, they typically worked in modest garrisons usually at small military staff units in medical and signal fields. The officers' wives were permitted to work in the military as a way to ease the struggle of military families existing on a single salary.¹⁸³ It was not until the end of the Cold War that women's roles started to really change.

Security threats in the post-Cold War era and budget cuts

Hungary's military history is not one of a grand and victorious military strategy. It was on the wrong side in both world wars, and during the 1956 uprising the Hungarian armed forces mistakenly shot at their Soviet colleagues, and in the end completely fell apart as they failed to reestablish order.¹⁸⁴ Until 1989, Hungary was a loyal member of the Warsaw Pact, but as it did not boast a very important geo-strategic location the Pact did not pressure it to spend money on major defense reforms and improvements, as was required of Poland. The lack of interest on the part of the Soviet Union, allied to

¹⁸³ Hungary National Report 2008 to the Committee on Women in the NATO, 1.

¹⁸⁴ Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne, János Rainer, *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution*, 195-196

Hungary's own lack of interest regarding military issues in general, affected defense reforms in years to come, particularly in terms of budget cuts from the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s.¹⁸⁵

In the late 1980s, as Hungary started to transition to democracy, military elites stayed largely out of the political discourse, just as they had for much of the Cold War, because the constitution did not allow soldiers to be members of political parties, and, indeed, prohibited them from participating in politics.¹⁸⁶ The reformed communists attempted to influence the 1989 elections and further shield the Hungarian military from the political forces by separating the Ministry of Defense from the armed forces, which were placed under the command of the president. They hoped the president was going to be their reform leader, Imre Poszgay. The reform communists lost the elections, but their Defense Reform of 1989 created problems for the next twelve years before the armed forces were finally placed back under the command of the Ministry of Defense.¹⁸⁷ For most of the 1990s, civilians heading the MOD had little or no knowledge of defense, and the minister's post was used to reward political loyalty and to negotiate deals. Most of the ministers not only lacked knowledge but also interest in defense and armed forces. On the other hand, old military professionals also lacked expertise as they had been told what to do by the Soviet High Command for more than 40 years.¹⁸⁸

By 1980s among the Warsaw Pact member states, Hungary had not only the smallest army and air force but also the fewest of light armored vehicles, artillery pieces

¹⁸⁵ Pal Dunay, "The Half-Hearted Transformation of Hungarian Military", *European Security* Vol. 14, No. 1, 17-32, March 2005, 18.

¹⁸⁶ Dunay, 20.

¹⁸⁷ Zoltan Martinusz, "Defense Reform in Hungary: A Decade of Strenuous Efforts and Missed Opportunities" in, *Post-Cold War Defense Reform.*, ed. István Gyarmati, Theodor Winkler, 269-, 271

¹⁸⁸ Dunay, 22.

and anti-aircraft weapons. Besides lacking in the numbers of weapons available, Hungarians were lacking in quality of the equipment available. According to western analysts, Hungary's military forces had the lowest combat readiness in the Warsaw Pact and were the least trusted force even by the Soviet leadership in Moscow.¹⁸⁹

In the early 1990s, the situation did not change as defense remained far behind other more pressing issues such as economic restructuring and development and institutional changes to curb widespread corruption and crime. The people of Hungary did not believe that investing in the military was a necessity, and therefore political leaders did not seek to allocate funds to an institution that appeared to be entirely useless and broken beyond repair. In fact, the political parties in power did not even believe NATO would offer them an invitation in the foreseeable future and thus chose to reallocate a big part of the defense budget to improve the Hungarian economy. The government simply felt that there was little need to improve the situation of the armed forces due to the lack of significant threats. Defense was placed on the bottom of all political agendas, because both government members and parliamentarians paid little attention to it. As Dunay argues, their disinterest "reflected the largely threat-free geostrategic environment that Hungary finds itself in, as well as Hungarian society's traditional lack of interest in defense issues."¹⁹⁰ Defense spending was cut to dangerous levels of 1.4 percent of GDP in 1995, and 1.2 percent in 1996.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁹ Stephen R. Burant, *Hungary : A Country Study*, (Federal Research Division, Library of Congress Research September 1989)

¹⁹⁰ Dunay, 23.

¹⁹¹ James Sherr, "A Corner Turned?" in *The evolution of civil-military relations in East-Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, ed. Natalie Mychajlyszyn and Harald Von Riekhoff , 63-82 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), 69

Therefore, the Chief of Defense, the highest ranking military commander of the Hungarian Armed Forces, and Chief of Human Services were left with the task of developing a plan that would counter the budget cuts as well as find personnel interested in defense to keep their ranks filled as most men were leaving due to better opportunities in civilian life. Military leadership was forced to deal with manpower shortage and assign women to positions traditionally regarded as appropriate for men only.¹⁹² As the Statute (CX / 1993) on National Defense opened up certain officer, non-commissioned officer and regular positions to volunteer soldiers in order to strengthen the professional character of the Hungarian Defense Forces,¹⁹³ women were to be integrated under the command of the Chief of Defense, or the military leadership, and not under the civilian leadership of Ministry of Defense and parliament.

NATO Accession

Although domestically security and military policy were on the bottom of the political agenda, the Hungarian government was actively seeking membership in one of the most exclusive clubs – NATO. The quantitative analysis in Chapter III revealed a relationship between the timing of that membership and the timing of women's inclusion in the military ranks of Eastern European states. In Hungarian case, decisions to start phasing out conscription and to start integrating women were clearly affected by the establishment of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994. This program is aimed at strengthening security ties between NATO and Eastern European states and

¹⁹² Judit Bolgar, Women in the Hungarian Armed Forces, *Minerva: Quarterly Report on Women and the Military*, (Fall-Winter, 1999), 1.

¹⁹³ Hungarian Ministry of Defense , Contracted Military Service Statutes http://www.hm.gov.hu/recruitment/contracted_military_service (Last Accessed June 15th, 2009)

helps educate and prepare applicants' armed forces for their participation in the alliance.¹⁹⁴

In 1994, when Hungary became a member of PfP, women were finally allowed into military academies, though they were initially limited to studying only logistics, finance, signals, radio-reconnaissance, and informatics. Women's involvement in the military expanded to include anti-tank destroyers and airborne infantry posts in 1997, and all faculties, except for reconnaissance, and training programs in 2005.¹⁹⁵ In 1996, all positions, including combat assignments, were opened to women and in 1999 the Hungarian Armed Forces Equal Opportunities Committee, representing middle management in each service, was created in order to report information and ideas to the Chief of Defense regarding gender integration.¹⁹⁶

In 1999, Hungary became an official NATO member, and it was clear that the government and the people of Hungary would have to start paying attention to defense issues. But the government only realized how dire the situation was after it took the armed forces six weeks to identify and assemble 300 qualified soldiers that were to become part of NATO's Kosovo Force.¹⁹⁷

The crisis of manpower became a source of embarrassment and, although Ministry of Defense civilian leadership recognized it as such for more than ten years, it was responsible for withholding finance necessary for basic functioning military capabilities. The Ministry of Defense failed to deliver the funds because the Hungarian

¹⁹⁴ Partnership for Peace website <http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html> (Last Accessed June 22nd, 2009)

¹⁹⁵ Hungary National Report 2008, 2.

¹⁹⁶ Hungary National Report in *50th Anniversary Women in the NATO Forces Report*, (Brussels: Office on Women in the NATO, International Military Staff, 1999), 32.

¹⁹⁷ Sherr, 74.

people did not support the investment and never really saw their armed services as an instrument of foreign policy or even national security.¹⁹⁸

Another problem affecting the personnel of the Hungarian armed forces was the fact that a large portion of civilians in the defense sector were and continue to be political appointees, which does not allow for much stability as they are demoted and dismissed depending on election outcomes. Besides the lack of permanency, the political appointees often lacked any knowledge of the defense sector or genuine concern with military personnel issues as the positions were only serving as springboards for other, more important political positions.¹⁹⁹

By 2001, when defense reform finally made the highest military commander, Chief of Defense subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, only 52 percent of total authorized enlisted slots were actually filled and this crisis within the services was actually providing an opening to women.²⁰⁰ As a part of the new reform, in November, 2003, the Committee on Women of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) was established by the joint decree of the Administrative State Secretary and the Chief of General Staff of the Ministry of Defense of Hungary. This committee's aim is to analyze women's position in professional and contracted service, study problems regarding female personnel and propose solutions to the Ministry of Defense.²⁰¹

A year later, the Hungarian Defense Forces became a voluntary, professional army consisting of professional and enlisted soldiers, and their role became to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Hungary and to contribute to the

¹⁹⁸ Martinusz, 286.

¹⁹⁹ Sherr, 79.

²⁰⁰ Martinusz, 292

²⁰¹ Hungary National Report 2004, 1.

collective defense of NATO. Recruitment problems remain, but the numbers of women continue to rise as does their proportion at all levels. Women make up 21 percent of all junior officers, and every second OF-2 officer (Captain) and every third OF-3 (Major) officer is a woman. The percentage of female non-commissioned officers from OR-6 to OR-9 (several ranks of Sergeants) is between 22-42 percent which is the highest among all NATO members.²⁰²

The main complaint is that the majority of women remain working in medical, administrative and human resource fields, but their numbers are slowly starting to rise in other areas. For example, women now make up over 34 percent of Air Combat Support and 11 percent of Artillery, but there are no women in the Special Forces. Since July 1, 2007, a woman has been acting as Senior State Secretary in the Ministry of Defense of Hungary. The Hungarian Defense Forces were dramatically reduced in size, including some of the units where women traditionally have been overrepresented, such as the medical service, financial, and logistic units. However, this change did not negatively affect women's representation among military professionals, because the majority of the personnel downsized or retired were male employees.²⁰³

Hungarian women have enjoyed a rather dramatic expansion of their role in the services in a very short period of time unlike women in most Eastern European states. Hungary still faces numerous challenges to its military modernization program, as reflected in the 2008 Hungarian defense budget, set at 1.17 percent of GDP, which continues to be well below the NATO target of 2 percent. The government has also

²⁰² Hungary National Report 2008, 4.

²⁰³ Ibid, 3

sought to solve all of the territorial disputes with its neighbors and improved its relations by signing basic treaties with Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine.²⁰⁴

Therefore, the lack of security concerns, lack of military history, and decades of general disinterest in defense by the people and the government due to such low levels of threat has led to creation of the new Hungarian Home Defense Forces with low operational capabilities. On the Conflict Intensity Scale, Hungary is still ranked among low-intensity forces, lacking the ability to operate and sustain missions abroad. As long as the Hungarian Home Defense Forces remain structurally weak and unable to participate in operations on higher end of the Conflict Intensity Scale, we should expect Hungarian women not only to continue to comprise a significant portion of the military, but to be more present in higher ranks and more occupations.

²⁰⁴ Background Notes, Hungary, U.S. Department of State, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Bureau of Public Affairs, Bureau of Public Affairs: Electronic Information and Publications Office, June 2009 <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26566.htm> (Last Accessed July 2, 2009)

3. GENDER INTEGRATION IN THE POLISH ARMED FORCES

As was the case in all states studied, women soldiers are no novelty in the history of Poland either. Polish women also have a long tradition of military service going back to 1830 and a noblewoman, Emilia Plater, leading a revolt against Russia. Their participation continued in the in the national uprisings of the 19th century and the struggles for independence during World War I.²⁰⁵ In 1938, Polish Sejm granted women a right to serve in auxiliary detachments and in 1939 the Women's Auxiliary Army Service (Pomocnicza Sluzba Kobiet or PSK) was formed. Three years later, it was renamed and elevated to the Women's Military Service. In 1943, women were granted the same rights and obligations as males by presidential decree. In addition, Polish women actively participated in the partisan underground movement, including women's diversion and sabotage detachments and women's mine-laying patrols, whose responsibility was blowing up rail lines around Warsaw. Over 60 percent of the couriers during the Warsaw Uprising were women. After it failed, the Germans captured more than 2,000 women soldiers and granted them all prisoner of war status.²⁰⁶

It has been estimated that almost 5,000 Polish women soldiers perished during the war, which is about 10% of those in active service. After the war, many received military decorations. Forty percent of those who received the Silver Cross of Merit with swords were women, as were 50% of those who received the Bronze Cross of Merit with swords.

²⁰⁵ Arthur Lehman Goodhart, *Poland and the minority races*, (New York, NY:Brentano's 1920), 157.

²⁰⁶ Alicja Deck-Partyka, *Poland, a Unique Country and its People*, 55-56

Some women even received the Order Virtuti Militari, Poland's highest military decoration for courage equivalent to the United States Medal of Honor.²⁰⁷

Communism and Polish Women: 1945 – 1989

However, women's service was not formally recognized by the new Communist regime after the war. Instead, women soldiers were met with a certain dose of social disapproval, which merely reflected a great ambivalence of the regime's attitude regarding women's "double burden" of being active participants in the labor force and filling the traditional role of mother and wife. During this period Polish women were expected to find employment and contribute to the workers' paradise, as well as continue to perform all household chores, raise the children and most importantly wait in endless lines to buy groceries that at times were impossible to find.

But one of the major legacies of the Communist regime is that women were very active participants in the civilian labor market. Even though Poland always lagged behind other Eastern European states, including Hungary, female labor force participation was already at 43.4 percent in 1979, much higher than in many Western European states.²⁰⁸ Similarly, women achieved relatively high levels of professional and technical education. While in 1950 35 percent of all students enrolled in university were women, by the time the Communist regime was collapsing women accounted for slightly over 50 percent of

²⁰⁷ M. Ney Krwawicz, "Women Soldiers of the Polish Home Army," London Branch of the Polish Home Army Ex-Servicemen Association: 28 October 2002), 2. http://www.polishresistance-ak.org/PR_WWII_texts_En/12_Article_En.pdf (Last Accessed June 20th, 2009)

²⁰⁸ Anna Titkov, "Women in the politics of Poland" in *Women in the Politics of Post-Communist Eastern Europe*, ed. Marilyn Rueschemeyer, 24-32, (Armonk, NY; M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 24.

all students in Poland.²⁰⁹ By 1992, the educational level of both women and men was exactly the same, 11.1 years. But unlike in Western Europe, the percentage of women in the workplace, or their professional and technical training, did not affect the integration of women into the military.

It was not until 1988, that women returned to military service when basic regulations were established to allow them to participate. Although most Polish annual reports to the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces cite 1988 as the year women entered military service, it is necessary to point out that this legislation does not even meet minimal standards of integration compared to the other twenty-three states in this study. What this legislation did was only allow for a limited women's presence in medical units, where they largely served as physicians, dentists and nurses. They were not allowed to enter military academies or non-commissioned officer schools, nor were they allowed to enlist. The all-male conscription, in place since the end of World War II, remained. Therefore, gender integration as defined and measured in earlier chapters really did not take place in 1988.

In the late 1980s, the Communists started roundtable talks with the Solidarity organization, and the door to democratization and a market economy began to open slowly. During this period the status of women in the society changed dramatically but their position in the military remained unchanged. As one author argues, "the June 1989 parliamentary elections signaled the beginning of a series of threats to women's health and their personal, public and political autonomy".²¹⁰

²⁰⁹ "Women in Poland," (U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration Bureau of the Census, Population Division, International Programs Center, July 1995), 4. http://www.census.gov/ipc/prod/women_po.pdf (Last accessed July 1st, 2009)

²¹⁰ Titkov, 27.

As democracy arrived even the women of Solidarity were quickly forgotten and pushed into obscurity while men became the new political leaders of Poland.²¹¹ And in 1993, abortion was banned.²¹² Many felt that democratization remained unfinished for women, particularly as the Christian organizations (that played a much bigger role in the early days and before the 1993 election) started to push for a more traditional role of women seeking to confine them to the realm of the “church, the kitchen and children”.²¹³ But before we start jumping to any conclusions regarding the effect that the religion or high levels of religiosity might have on women in Poland in general, and more specifically on gender integration in the Polish Armed Forces, it is necessary to point out that these were simply unrealistic goals of the Church seeking to return women to their traditional roles after more than 40 years of active participation in all spheres of life. A survey conducted in the summer of 1991 shows that although 86 percent of Poles thought that the Church was playing an important role in the national life, only 7 percent thought it should.²¹⁴ In fact, both pro-natalist and pro-family discourse clearly did not resonate with the Polish people as both birth rates and marriage rates have been dramatically dropping since the end of the Communist regime.²¹⁵

²¹¹ Shana Penn, *Solidarity's Secret: The Women Who Defeated Communism in Poland* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 3.

²¹² Ann Snitow, “The Church Wins, Women Lose; Poland's Abortion Law,” *The Nation*, Vol. 256, April 26, 1993, <http://www.thenation.com/archive/detail/9304130117> (Last Accessed July 1st, 2009)

²¹³ Titkov, 27.

²¹⁴ Christine E. Gudorf, “Women and Catholic Church Politics in Eastern Europe,” *Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion*, Vol. 11, No. 2, (1995): 102.

²¹⁵ Titkov, 30.

NATO membership

Throughout much of the 1990s, there was no discussion regarding the expansion of women's numbers or roles in the military ranks as other more pressing political and economic problems associated with the transition were on top of policy-makers' agendas. However, unlike in Hungary, political and economic problems never completely overrode the issues regarding national security. On the contrary, from the beginning, the Poles were keen to improve their armed forces and actively sought membership in NATO. By the mid-1990s, the Polish government sought to show its commitment to the alliance by joining military exercises with NATO troops, including a Polish assault battalion's participation in the NATO-led peace implementation force in Bosnia.²¹⁶ At the same time, Hungary was not able to help and even in 1999 was still scrambling to find a meager 300 troops to join NATO operations in Kosovo.

In 1996, Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski reaffirmed "Poland's continuing and unequivocal aspiration to become a full-fledged member of the North Atlantic Alliance at the earliest possible date" and sought to speed up the accession by pointing out that Poland is working hard to "achieve full military interoperability with the Allied forces, commencing with command, control, communications, and intelligence as well as management of air-defense systems."²¹⁷ But why was Poland so much more committed to becoming a full member of NATO than Hungary? And did this have any effect on women in the military? According to Polish Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati,

²¹⁶ Alexander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, "Poland and NATO", XIIIth NATO Workshop, On Political-Military Decision Making, Warsaw, Poland 19-23 June 1996, in *European Security: Beginning a New Century Supreme Allied*, eds. Commander Europe General George A. Joulwan and Roger Weissinger-Baylon published online by Center for Strategic Decision Research <http://www.csd.org/Rosati.htm> (Last Accessed July 2, 2009)

²¹⁷ Ibid.

becoming a member of the alliance was the most important issue on the government's agenda in the mid-1990s because

“it is also clear that Poland's political and cultural development, its economic prosperity, and, ultimately, its military security depend on rebuilding and cementing its ties with the West - the cradle of our culture and statehood. Poland will feel fully secure only as an integral and indispensable element of the European family of nations, whose cultural roots, values, and aspirations we share. This is the main reason why political, declarative guarantees of security are of no interest to us-they simply fail to provide what we are looking for. For us, NATO enlargement means much more than extending security guarantees to new nations. In Poland's view, enlargement is the only realistic way to build a new, effective security architecture for Europe and to overcome the divisions of the continent.”²¹⁸

Although Poland and Hungary differed in their approach to the alliance, and although Poland sought to modernize and reorganize its massive military, while Hungary was caught up in political and institutional chaos, both were invited to join at the same time in March, 1999. What followed was a series of changes in policy regarding women in the military at the urging of the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces and NATO headquarters.

The same year, Poland established the first Council on Women in the Polish Armed Forces, and sent delegates to the committee to participate for the first time. In fact, 1999 was a year of remarkable change as women were now able to attend military schools and service academies, and were integrated in the services under the command of the Chief of Defense. They were to work and train with their male counterparts and to

²¹⁸ Dariusz Rosati, “New Security Architecture in Europe: A Polish View” XIIIth NATO Workshop, On Political-Military Decision Making, Warsaw, Poland 19-23 June 1996, in *European Security: Beginning a New Century Supreme Allied*, eds. Commander Europe General George A. Joulwan and Roger Weissinger-Baylon published online by Center for Strategic Decision Research <http://www.csdr.org/Rosati.htm> (Last Accessed July 2, 2009)

become subject to the same chains of command, standards of performance, and discipline. Also in 1999, regulations were passed to allow women to become either permanent regular soldiers or voluntary contract soldiers. Only women with a university degree or with high school degree could apply. Those with a university degree were to become part of the officer corps, while those with secondary education were allowed to join the warrant officer corps or non-commissioned officer corps.²¹⁹

Yet, while integration took place quickly to fulfill the obligations and responsibilities under the NATO charter regarding modernization and equal opportunity in the ranks, Poland did not expand the role of women the way Hungary did. On the contrary, it seems that progress has stalled. Even as Poland is phasing out the all-male conscription, the armed services continue to openly declare their preference for male recruits. The 2008 report to the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces states that

“as women in Poland are not subject to conscription, their calling takes place in case of “justified need of the Armed Forces” if they possess particular qualifications or skills. Hitherto recruitment to professional Private Corps aims at drafting of over-term soldiers and soldiers who served in the military thus men have easier access to this formation.”²²⁰

Today there are only 1,218 women in the Polish Armed Forces, or 1.2 percent of all professional soldiers. Their recruitment still depends on the number of candidates to military academies and schools as announced by the Minister of National Defense every year. The occupational limitations continue to exist and are quite different from those imposed in other NATO states. Women are not to serve in posts that require physical

²¹⁹ Poland Annual Report in *Women in the NATO Armed Services, A Year-in-Review 1999-2000*, The Office on Women in the NATO Forces, International Military Staff, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, 44.

²²⁰ Women Military Service in Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland in 2007, 4.

effort and transport of heavy goods and forced body position; in cold, hot or unsettled microclimates; in posts that expose them to noise, vibration, electromagnetic fields, ionizing and ultraviolet radiation and monitor screens; underground and at high altitudes; posts that expose them to high or low pressure, hazardous biological elements and chemical substances; and posts that could cause them grave physical or mental injury.²²¹ No other NATO state is as specific as Poland when it comes to defining posts that could be strenuous and detrimental to women's health.

When it comes to sexual harassment, Poland has also been lagging behind. "Most often the victims of sexual harassment are the students of military academies. They are afraid of losing the chance to serve in the army, so they do not notify the prosecutor about the offense," says Lieutenant Bożena Szubińska, the chairwoman of the Council for Women's Affairs in the Polish Army. But what the government is doing seems little and inadequate to fight sexual crimes. The Ministry of National Defense financed the publication "Co-educational Army. Gender Equality as an Issue for the Teaching Staff in Military Schools", while in 2007, two educational films – one on discrimination and fighting societal stereotypes of women's role and the second on sexual harassment in the military – were produced.²²²

The data of the Military Courts Department in the Ministry of Justice show that in 2003, only seven soldiers were sentenced for sex crimes, in 2004 none, and in 2005 eight. According to Polish criminal law, rape with a special cruelty is punishable by up to 15 years in prison, "ordinary" rape up to 12 years, and harassment up to 3 years

²²¹ Poland Annual Report 2008, 6-7.

²²² Ibid, 7.

imprisonment. Yet military courts seem to be quite liberal and soldiers receive a suspended one- or two-year prison sentence.²²³

New Threats and Current Military Capabilities

Today the Polish Armed Forces are numbering about 140,572 troops divided among an Army of 87,877, an Air and Defense Force of 31,147, and a Navy of 21,548. It continues to rely on conscription and will do so until 2010 when it is expected to transition to an all-volunteer force. All Polish male citizens were subject to a 12-month term of military service until recently when it was reduced to nine months. Although financially Poland is not always able to support the restructuring and modernization of its military, it has been able to move forward with U.S. assistance on acquiring 48 F-16 multi-role fighters (that were delivered between 2006 and 2008), C-130 cargo planes, and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs or more popularly known as Humvees).²²⁴

It continues to be the strongest military in Eastern Europe and with the highest operational capabilities. Unlike any other state in the region, Poland took over command of a sector in Iraq in September 2003 with 2,000 deployed soldiers. In addition, 7.5% of the entire Polish Army is available for deployment on operations.²²⁵ In fact, Poland is represented in a second tier of conflict capabilities along with the other Western

²²³ Agnieszka Mrozik, "Sexual Harassment in Polish Army: General Dismissed," *Poland National VAW Monitor*, 28 May, 2006.

²²⁴ Background Notes, Poland, U.S. Department of State, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Bureau of Public Affairs, Bureau of Public Affairs: Electronic Information and Publications Office, January 2009. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2875.htm> (Last Accessed July 2, 2009)

²²⁵ Julian Lindley-French and Franco Algieri, *A European Defense Strategy* (Gutersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Foundation, 2004), 34. http://www.cap.lmu.de/download/2004/2004_Venusberg_Report.pdf (Last Accessed July 4, 2009)

European states: Netherlands, Italy and Spain.²²⁶ No Eastern European state is represented on this level. Although it has been ten years since NATO's expansion, Poland still sees the alliance as a shield against Russia. "Russia was, is and will remain unpredictable. It won't stop being a problem. We saw that with the Georgia crisis. Putin has clear ambitions to rebuild a military superpower," said Polish security policy expert Jan Czaja.²²⁷ Today, Russia is in resurgence and Poland is concerned about its security once again, especially after violent actions in the Caucasus, which came as a great justification of Polish traditional distrust of Russians. In the aftermath of the Georgian conflict, the United States and Poland signed an agreement to place an American missile defense base on Polish soil. Polish government officials supported this agreement wholeheartedly because they felt this would strengthen the commitment of the United States to defend Poland against Russia. "Poland and the Poles do not want to be in alliances in which assistance comes at some point later — it is no good when assistance comes to dead people," said the Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk, on Polish television.²²⁸

Since Poland entered NATO and was required to join the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces in 1999, virtually no additional policies expanding women's military role have been passed by Polish legislators. With Russia flexing its muscles since Putin's arrival in 2000, and strong and unequivocal support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Poland has been forced to tailor its military personnel needs accordingly. Defense spending

²²⁶ Ibid, 31.

²²⁷ "Ten years since NATO expansion, Poland sees alliance as bulwark but worried about Obama," *Associated Foreign Press*, Warsaw, Poland, 19 March 2009.

²²⁸ Thom Shanker and Nicholas Kulish, "Russia Lashes Out on Missile Deal," *New York Times*, 15 August 2008.

accounted for 1.95% of Polish GDP in 2008, making it one of the biggest military spenders relative to its size not only in its neighborhood, but in the whole of Europe. Hence, we can see that although NATO membership has forced Poland to creek the door open to women in the military, its fear of Russia, and security concerns since 1999 simply did not allow for a larger expansion of women's role.

Yet, there is hope that the Polish Armed Forces will soon be forced to change their gender integration policies. As the last conscripts complete their service in September, 2009, and with close to 38,000 conscripted soldiers cycling out next year, up to 20,000 additional professional soldiers will be needed to make up the difference. The biggest problem for this new professional military will be to fill its ranks by attracting volunteers. Wladyslaw Stasiak, head of the National Security Bureau, which gives military advice to President Lech Kaczynski, argues that this speeding up of reform "coincides with a lack of a thorough action plan, solid calculation, indication of sources of financing, as well as a motivation system for volunteers willing to put on uniforms."²²⁹ Extending the invitation to Polish women, might just be an answer to their manpower problems.

²²⁹ Nicholas Kulish, "As Draft Ends, Polish Military Faces Struggle to Modernize," *New York Times*, 11 December 2008, A5.

Chapter Summary

Poland was conquered by Russia and Germany and hence Poles worry more acutely than most European states and NATO members about questions of national defense. Defending one's land is an integral part of the Polish narrative, yet it's almost absent from Hungary's. The absence of a security threat has meant that the Hungarian government and the people are largely uninterested in investing in their military services or creating a sophisticated force able to participate in major military operations. Although the lack of reform has left the force in shambles for most of the 1990s, once Hungary became a member of NATO, it became clear to policymakers just how empty their ranks were and they quickly opened them to all that were qualified to serve – including women. Today, Hungary is seeking to modernize its new all-professional force, yet it continues to be on the bottom of the military-readiness scale. This has allowed the numbers of women and their role to keep expanding faster than in any other NATO nation.

On the other hand, Polish policymakers are forced once again to tailor both their national security policy and their military manpower needs according to levels of threat posed by new and more aggressive Russia. The age-old enemy has caused both people and the government to seek greater cooperation with NATO, but also to keep and heavily invest in their old mass military model, including all available males and virtually no females. While NATO has exerted just enough pressure to open the Polish military to women, it has not succeeded in extending their role. It seems that the legislation allowing more women into the ranks was more of a down payment for Polish membership in NATO, and once accomplished, women's role in the military was overshadowed by

continued international security threats, lack of modernization and the Polish mass military model.

Chapter VI

Concluding Remarks and Future Research

1. WHY STUDY WOMEN IN THE MILITARY?

Every nation in the world has a story of a brave woman who fought and died for her people and her land. From Mohammad's wives to Joan of Arc to Molly Pitcher, women united with men on the battlefield, but most of the time their heroism and accomplishment earned just a footnote in the history books, with no mention in political science. Although national security and military affairs have traditionally been examined by political scientists, most of the works on women in the military have derived from sociology, history and gender studies.

In 1995, Mady Segal was the first sociologist to study causal factors concerning the integration of women into the military and expansion of their roles. Her seminal work was followed by a handful of other scholars from the same field who expanded the list of possible causes, but they largely followed Segal's conceptualization and method. While their work has shaped my approach to the question of women in the military, my conceptualization, methods and arguments differ considerably from theirs.

The purpose and contribution of this project is fivefold. First, this comparative study is the first attempt to situate the discussion on women in the military within political science literature, and contribute by bridging the gap between domestic and international levels of analysis. Second, it sought to clarify and reconceptualize key terms in order to eliminate ambiguity and confusion created by previous models and authors, as

most fail to situate both the discussion and terminology within any theoretical literature in security and gender studies. Third, I sought to reduce a large number of both previously developed and new propositions by testing them both quantitatively and qualitatively. This study added a necessary deductive rigor to offer a simpler, concise and parsimonious model. Fourth, this research is the first to include new member states in Eastern Europe. And last, it is the first to empirically test international variables as possible catalysts of change.

The analysis and arguments in the previous chapters were divided into four variable categories: military manpower supply and demand, domestic political and economic factors, cultural factors, and international security context. The principal argument was that the first cause of the policy change is that of manpower supply and demand in order to fill the ranks due to the abolition of draft requirements. Once the state initiates modernization and transition of its forces from mass military model to an all-volunteer force, the need for participation of women with specialized and technical knowledge from the civilian sector will increase. The argument is that there is a spillover effect from these sectors into the military sector.

In terms of domestic political and economic context, the study argued that numbers of women in the legislative branch and on the ministerial level is not a useful predictor of gender inclusiveness in the military. Rather, it is strong independent women's movements inside and outside of the government that have been crucial in promoting and influencing the degree to which women have been integrated.

Unlike previous analysis, I argued that cultural factors are not among the primary determinants, and that Catholic states are no different from Protestant ones, or that levels

of religiosity have had any impact on military personnel policy regarding women. Similarly, societal values regarding women's roles in politics and economics were expected not to have any effect either.

In terms of international security context, I argued that lower levels of threat to national security in the post-Cold War era, particularly in Eastern Europe, would lead to a greater gender integration in the ranks. Moreover, these new members in Eastern Europe were expected to start opening their armed services to women due to the increased pressure by NATO seeking standardization and consistency among member states. Lastly, I argued that states have expanded women's roles or numbers in the post-Cold War era because of the increase of "other than war" operations where women can be useful in the roles of peacekeepers and humanitarians.

After testing an exhaustive list of structural, institutional, cultural and international variables, I was able to empirically confirm most of these arguments in Chapter III. However, I found no evidence that the last argument regarding use of women will increase in the post-Cold War era due to states' increased participation in humanitarian missions, refugee support and natural disasters.

Qualitative analysis allowed me to study particular cases of integration of women in the military in old and new members of the NATO alliance, and to examine in greater detail causes of the policy change. In the United States active women's movements directly lobbying and working with the Congressional members regardless of ideological differences succeeded in opening and extending the role that women play in the US military. By presenting their demands within a larger context of equal opportunity in the workplace and equal citizenship they allowed for qualified women from the civilian

sector to “spill-over” into military sector. This case confirmed that in the original NATO member states in Western Europe and North America, independent movements, or movements that are not functioning as a party wing or political caucus but representing women’s choices, were crucial in articulating demands and mobilizing resources to pass the legislation.

Although the women’s movement in Italy was slow to start organizing around the issue, similar to their American counterparts, they organized, lobbied and formed strategic partnerships with legislators who would present the bill at the time when the rest of the government members could not afford not to support it. In the US, it was the time of Equal Opportunity Act and abolition of draft, and in Italy, it was the time of reorganization of party system, rise of the New Left and New Right, as well as abolition of conscription. These events opened a window of opportunity for the women’s groups to pressure the government to change the legislation regarding their access to military services.

On the other hand, the story of women in Hungarian and Polish militaries has not been determined by domestic women’s movements, nor did the abundance of women in professional and technical fields generate the same spill-over effect. Rather, demands to open up militaries came from NATO as part of their standardization, professionalization and modernization efforts. Therefore, in Eastern Europe, it was demands from the international military alliance that forced the domestic policy makers to include more women as part of their accession process. However, that does not mean that all states adopted all NATO’s gender mainstreaming measures. What the narratives showed is that the degree to which women were integrated in Eastern Europe is largely conditioned by

the perceived levels of threat by the nation, and the corresponding readiness and operational capabilities of state's armed services. Threat of potential attack by Russia, has kept Polish Armed Forces heavily armed, conscripted, and with a rather low level of gender inclusiveness. On the other hand, relatively safe and calm international security environment, has helped turn Hungarian Defense Forces into one of the most female friendly employers.

2. RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Collecting data on military services is a rather complicated task as many states are not willing to share information regarding their manpower and resources. My study has focused on twenty-four members of NATO. They are all developed and democratic states, and information regarding women in the military was still very difficult to obtain. Some military officials are not interested in working with a student, others are afraid of sharing data with a foreigner and a complete stranger, and others embarrassed as they themselves lacked information regarding their women soldiers.

Measuring women's quantitative presence in the ranks was facilitated by the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces that attempts to keep tabs on their member states. The Committee has laid out a specific set of guidelines in the Handbook for Delegates, asking them to provide information on percentages of women and gender-related issues, such as policies, recruitment, training, career development, and deployments but even they have openly admitted their inability to interpret some of the badly written and poorly translated country reports handed over to them. A few times, I

was forced to recalculate the numbers and arrived at completely different percentages from the ones presented.

I was able to obtain the data following the 2008 meeting in Berlin thanks to Sabine Kreuz, Staff Sergeant of German Armed Forces and Administrative Assistant in the office on Women in the NATO Forces in Brussels, who emailed me all of the reports as soon as they became available. Similarly, most of the delegates to the Committee were willing to answer my questions regarding the status of women in their military services. The real data problems arose when I started to ask questions regarding support given by political parties and women's movements. My repeated emails to the same delegates as well as women soldier associations were completely ignored. Linda DePauw, a leading scholar on women in the military and director of Minerva Center in Washington D.C., has even sent emails on my behalf to her entire mailing list asking recipients to answer such important questions – and with the great exception of international relations scholar and author Joshua Goldstein, no academic, soldier or legislator answered. This clearly did not stop me from finishing my study and should not stop us from repeating the analysis or expanding our case studies outside of this small sample.

For example, the NATO alliance is continuing its expansion into Southeastern Europe. Croatia and Albania were admitted only months ago, while Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia are still on the waiting list. In many of these Balkan states women have participated in the recent wars and were awarded medals for their accomplishments. Yet, although violence subsided only ten years ago, these female soldiers have already been forgotten. Instead, women's roles as victims of rape

and crimes against humanity have been the most often heard version of their involvement in these conflicts.

Hence, it would be useful and interesting to observe these states as they prepare for transition to professional military services, and if and how they chose to open the ranks to women. This would also allow us to further study the impact of the demands on part of the alliance on domestic policymaking in new member states.

Future research should also include democratic states outside of NATO or any other military alliance, such as India or South Korea – both democratic states with strong ties to Western powers but very strong cultural and social values regarding gender roles and under continuous and high levels of threat posed to their national security.

Lastly, I have pointed out that Turkey, the least democratic and the only state with Muslim majority was constantly an outlier not always fitting neatly in the model. Therefore, I would recommend that the future studies seek to explore the causes of women's integration in the military in non-democratic states and in the Islamic world.

This study attempted to increase our understanding of the reasons why states chose to integrate women into their military and expand their role. The results of both quantitative and qualitative analysis should be relevant and useful to any future research as it simplified and reformulated long lists of possible variables. Including studies on women in the military in political science is crucial as it will make our understanding of comparative defense policies and international relations more comprehensive.

APPENDIX A

Previously Proposed Models

Table 1.1 Mady Segal's model

MILITARY - National Security situation - Military Technology - Combat to support ratio - Force Structure - Military accession policies	SOCIAL STRUCTURE - Demographic patterns - Labor force characteristics - Economic factors - Family structure	CULTURE - Social construction of gender and family - Social values about gender and family - Public discourse regarding gender - Values regarding ascription and equity
PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN THE MILITARY (degree of representation and nature of activities)		

Source: Mady Wechsler Segal, "Women's Military Roles Cross-Nationally: Past, Present and Future," *Gender and Society*, 9 (1999): 759.

Table 1.2 Iskra et al. model

ARMED FORCES - Purpose/function of the armed forces - Subculture ideology - Subculture demographics - Military technology - Organizational structure - Military accession policies	SOCIAL STRUCTURE - Demographic patterns - Labor force characteristics - Economic factors - Family structure	CULTURE - Social construction of military - Social values about force, power, domination - Social construction of gender and family - Social values about gender and family - Public discourse regarding gender - Values regarding ascription and equity	POLITICAL - National security situation - Civil-military relations - Political ideology - Current leadership - Public policy regarding race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, etc. - Sources of change other than armed conflict
PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN THE MILITARY (degree of representation and nature of activities)			


Source: Iskra, Trainor, Leithauser and Segal, "Women's participation in Armed Forces Cross-Nationally: Expanding Segal's Model," *Current Sociology*, Vol. 50, No. 5 (2002): 786.

Table 1.3 Gerhard Kümmel’s proposed model

<p>ARMED FORCES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Changing images of war - Military missions - Military technology -Combat to support ratio - Organizational structure - Level of women’s integration - Personnel & access policies - Leadership - Soldierly interaction 	<p>SOCIETY</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Demographic trends - Structure of working population - Gendered segregation of professions -Economic development - Family patterns 	<p>CULTURE</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social construction of the family - Social construction of gender roles - Norm system of masculinity, femininity and family - Discourse on gender roles in society - Key social values: power, equity 	<p>POLITICS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political system and leadership - Modes of political change - Policies on race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality - Political ideology - Law - Media - Civil-military relations 	<p>INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Security political context -Civil-military relations abroad -Armed forces in foreign countries -International military cooperation
<p>PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN THE MILITARY (degree of representation and nature of activities)</p>				

Source: Kümmel, Gerhard, “ When Boy Meets Girl: Feminization of the Military: An Introduction Also to be Read as a Postscript,” *Current Sociology*, Vol. 50, No. 5 (2002): 631.

Table 1.4. Carreiras's model



(Duration of women's presence and previous tradition of female military involvement)

Source: Carreiras, 2006, pg. 19.

APPENDIX B

Questionnaire to the Committee on Women in the NATO Armed Forces Delegates

1. Percentage of women in total active force:

2. Do women have access to military academies?

Yes or No

3. Are there occupational restrictions?

Many (no enlisted women) Few (submarines, special units) None

4. Are there formal rank restrictions?

Yes or No

5. What is the total percentage of women in officers ranks?

6. Is there training segregation?: Total Partial None

7. Are there family programs (maternity, child care, paid leave)?

None Few Many

8. Harassment regulations (anti-discrimination regulations and monitoring within the armed services):

None Few Many

APPENDIX C

Societal Values Variables World Values Survey Questions

Survey years 1981-2001

Men make better political leaders than women do

D059.- For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each. Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly?

On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do

Possible answers:

- 1 Agree strongly
 - 2 Agree
 - 3 Disagree
 - 4 Strongly disagree
-

Belgium [1999], Bulgaria [1999], Canada [2000], Czech Republic [1999], Denmark [1999], France [1999], Germany East [1999], Germany West [1999], Great Britain [1999], Greece [1999], Hungary [1999], Italy [1999], Latvia [1999], Lithuania [1999], Luxembourg [1999], Netherlands [1999], Norway [1996], Poland [1999], Portugal [1999], Romania [1999], Slovenia [1999], Spain [1999], Spain [2000], Turkey [2001], Turkey [2001], United States [1999]

Survey years 2005-2008

Men make better business executives than women do

V63.- For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each. Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly? On the whole, men make better business executives than women do.

(V63) Men make better business executives than women do

Possible answers:

- 1 Agree strongly
- 2 Agree
- 3 Disagree
- 4 Strongly disagree

Bulgaria [2006], Canada [2006], France [2006], Germany [2006], Great Britain [2006], Italy [2005], Netherlands [2006], Poland [2005], Romania [2005], Slovenia [2005], Spain [2007], Turkey [2007], United States [2006]

APPENDIX D

Cultural Values Variables World Values Survey Questions

A) Believe in: God

F050.- Which, if any, of the following do you believe in?

God

Possible answers:

- 0 No
- 1 Yes

B) How often do you attend religious services

F028.- Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?

Possible answers:

- 1 More than once a week
- 2 Once a week
- 3 Once a month
- 4 Only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter days
- 5 Other specific holy days
- 6 Once a year
- 7 Less often
- 8 Never practically never

h) Believe in: life after death

F051.- Which, if any, of the following do you believe in?

Life after death

Possible answers:

- 0 No
- 1 Yes

APPENDIX E

Percentages of Women in Technical and Professional Fields

Country	Percentage of women in professional and technical fields
Belgium	49
Bulgaria	60
Canada	56
Czech Republic	52
Denmark	53
France	47
Germany	50
Greece	49
Hungary	62
Italy	46
Latvia	65
Lithuania	67
Luxembourg	N/A
Netherlands	50
Norway	50
Poland	61
Portugal	50
Romania	57
Slovakia	58
Slovenia	57
Spain	48
Turkey	32
United Kingdom	47
United States of America	56

Source: United Nations Development Program Human Development Index data.

APPENDIX F

Unemployment rates in 2008

Country	Unemployment rate
Belgium	6.98
Bulgaria	5.6
Canada	6.13
Czech Republic	4.41
Denmark	3.36
France	7.8
Germany	7.31
Greece	7.65
Hungary	7.83
Italy	6.75
Latvia	7.3
Lithuania	5.7
Luxembourg	4.88
Netherlands	2.76
Norway	2.52
Poland	7.18
Portugal	7.74
Romania	4
Slovakia	9.57
Slovenia	4.5
Spain	11.38
Turkey	12
United Kingdom	5.64
United States of America	5.78

Source: UNECE Statistical Division Database, compiled from national and international (EUROSTAT, OECD, CIS) official sources.

APPENDIX G

Women Percentage in Lower or Single Houses after Parliamentary Renewals in 2008

Rank	Country	Lower or single House				Upper House or Senate			
		Elections	Seats*	Women	% W	Elections	Seats	Women	% W
8	Netherlands	11 2006	150	62	41.3%	5 2007	75	26	34.7%
9	Norway	9 2009	169	66	39.1%	---	---	---	---
10	Denmark	11 2007	179	68	38.0%	---	---	---	---
13	Spain	3 2008	350	127	36.3%	3 2008	263	79	30.0%
15	Belgium	6 2007	150	53	35.3%	6 2007	71	27	38.0%
18	Germany	9 2009	622	204	32.8%	N.A.	69	15	21.7%
33	Portugal	9 2009	230	63	27.4%	---	---	---	---
47	Canada	10 2008	308	68	22.1%	N.A.	93	32	34.4%
51	Italy	4 2008	630	134	21.3%	4 2008	322	58	18.0%
54	Bulgaria	7 2009	240	50	20.8%	---	---	---	---
55	Poland	10 2007	460	93	20.2%	10 2007	100	8	8.0%
56	Latvia	10 2006	100	20	20.0%	---	---	---	---
56	Luxembourg	6 2009	60	12	20.0%	---	---	---	---
58	United Kingdom	5 2005	646	126	19.5%	N.A.	746	147	19.7%
59	Slovakia	6 2006	150	29	19.3%	---	---	---	---
64	France	6 2007	577	105	18.2%	9 2008	343	75	21.9%
66	Lithuania	10 2008	141	25	17.7%	---	---	---	---
68	Greece	10 2009	300	52	17.3%	---	---	---	---
"	United States of America	11 2008	435	73	16.8%	11 2008	98	15	15.3%
76	Czech Republic	6 2006	200	31	15.5%	10 2008	81	14	17.3%
87	Slovenia	9 2008	90	12	13.3%	11 2007	40	1	2.5%
95	Romania	11 2008	334	38	11.4%	11 2008	137	8	5.8%
97	Hungary	4 2006	386	43	11.1%	---	---	---	---
105	Turkey	7 2007	549	50	9.1%	---	---	---	---

APPENDIX H

Women in Ministerial Positions (% of positions)

HDI Rank	Country	2008
1	Norway	56
4	Canada	16
6	Netherlands	33
8	France	47
11	Luxembourg	14
13	United States	24
15	Spain	44
16	Denmark	37
17	Belgium	23
18	Italy	24
21	United Kingdom	23
22	Germany	33
25	Greece	12
29	Slovenia	18
34	Portugal	13
36	Czech Republic	13
41	Poland	26
42	Slovakia	13
43	Hungary	21
46	Lithuania	23
48	Latvia	22
61	Bulgaria	24
63	Romania	0
79	Turkey	4

Notes

Data are as of January 2008. The total includes deputy prime ministers and ministers. Prime ministers were also included when they held ministerial portfolios. Vice-presidents and heads of governmental or public agencies are not included. IPU (2009).

APPENDIX I

Gross national income per capita 2008 PPP

Country	PPP GNI
Belgium	34760
Bulgaria	11950
Canada	36220
Czech Republic	22790
Denmark	37280
France	34400
Germany	35940
Greece	28470
Hungary	17790
Italy	30250
Latvia	16740
Lithuania	18210
Luxembourg	64320
Netherlands	41670
Norway	58500
Poland	17310
Portugal	22080
Romania	13500
Slovakia	21300
Slovenia	26910
Spain	31130
Turkey	13770
United Kingdom	36100
United States of America	46970

Source: World Bank 2008

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf>

APPENDIX J – Conflict Intensity Scale

Level of intensity	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Type of operation	Petersberg tasks with low intensity			Petersberg tasks with medium intensity			Advanced Expeditionary Warfare		Full scale Warfare	
Required Capabilities	- general purpose ground forces			- NBC protection - specialised forces - CIMIC - MEDEVAC			- special forces - sea control - air support - air-to-air refuelling - strategic lift - PGM - TBMD		- CAISTAR (NEW) - satellite intelligence - sensor-to-shooter network - nuclear deterrence	
USA	USA									
	Austria									
	Belgium									
	Denmark									
	Finland									
	France									
	Germany									
	Greece									
	Ireland									
	Italy									
	Luxembourg									
	Netherlands									
	Portugal									
	Spain									
	Sweden									
	UK									
	Cyprus									
	Czech Republic									
	Estonia									
	Hungary									
	Latvia									
	Lithuania									
	Malta									
	Poland									
	Slovakia									
	Slovenia									
EU +10										

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