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The Spirit of Discipline:

**Communitarianism
in
Social Policy
and
Sociological Theory**

by

Bennie Ricardo Brown

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The City University of New York

2001

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

The Spirit of Discipline:
Communitarianism in Social Policy and Sociological Theory

by

Bennie Ricardo Brown

Adviser: Professor Stanley Aronowitz

This study is focused upon the productions of knowledge, the techniques of discipline, and the various deployments of authority and desire referred to as "community".

Community is always assumed to be both a normal condition of everyday life, and by its very nature moral, ethical, responsive, and evolving. We are told that community enters into sociological discourse because community is a call to something deep within us.

A more critical examination reveals a sociological discourse wherein community is allied with or subject to the inevitable pathologies of disorganization and degeneration. In the specific instance of communitarianism each time it is invoked, community appears doubly as a social problem and, as a social instinct for a polis. This doubly makes community an object of sociological investigation.

This dissertation describes a discursive formation that includes sociology as an essential component. This discursive formation determines both a specific domain of sociological knowledge production and also determines the field of a political intervention by academics. Communitarianism is sociology, Amitia Etzioni, Philip

Selznick, and others maintain, and communitarianism harkens American sociology back to its origins as moral philosophy.

The movement of sociology towards communitarian political intervention is coincident with the tendency in sociology to recast community as an essential aspect of human existence--- community as culture itself. Binding community to culture minimized the territorial aspects of community. Territoriality (nature) and blood (fate) were replaced by blood (biological descent) and culture (community) as the basis for social cohesion and social conflict. This bio-cultural community is portrayed as the result of nature and progress. The “moral anarchy” of our day, the communitarians tell us, forces us to transform biology and sociology into the great bio-social discourse of communitarianism. With communitarianism, sociology returns to its origins.

Chapter One presents a history of the largest communitarian organization, the Communitarian Network. *Chapter Two* discusses the central issues raised by communitarianism regarding community and authority. *Chapter Three* presents the regularities of communitarian discourse. *Chapter Four* and *Chapter Five* present a critical introduction to the sociological study of community. These chapters outline the discourse of community since c.1920.

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Since words can not adequately express my thanks to those close to me for their friendship, conversations, and for enduring various moments of indecision, hubris, doubt, despair, and joy during the struggle to produce this dissertation, I will simply related their names. As they know me, they know how much small gestures really mean, without them, this work would have been unimaginable: My wonderful companion, Nancy K. Cauthen, the indomitable Jacob Cauthen-Brown, Bennie and Lillian H. Brown, my sister Carmen Renee Brown, Elizabeth Scott, Fred Daley, David Byrd, Melinda Russell, Jenny Stern, Jessie, and Babette.

My father probably provided the most important foundation to this dissertation: taking me to numerous weekend chess tournaments when I was a kid even though he was exhausted, and to my regular Friday night games with Mr. Wiley.

To My Parents, Sister,
and to
Nancy and Jacob

*It is not the one that denies the gods of the multitude,
but the one that affirms the common beliefs about them,
that is truly impious. —Epicurus*

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

At the end of the Reagan-Bush era, *The New York Times* reported that politicians felt a real "fear of crime in the air" (Berke 1992:E1). "Unwed mothers," a term used almost interchangeably with "teenage mothers," were often described as welfare cheats having babies just to get higher benefits (Claiborn 1993). Communities were threatened, we were told, because of the offspring of these women. There was a great menace threatening the very foundations that define "us". Crime, spawned in the deviant morality of a growing "underclass," was said to be only the most obvious manifestation of a "hallowing of America" (Etzioni 1983:1). In a campaign advertisement, the mayor of Seattle walked down a well-kept residential street telling voters "I hear you. These are our streets. And we must take them back" (Berke 1992:e4).

The former Editor of the *New York Daily News*, Pete Hamill, writing in *New York* magazine, declared the homeless to be morally, mentally, and physically ill, and this constitutes grounds for the declaration of a public health emergency. The homeless (represented in an accompanying drawing of a bedraggled and drooling African-American male) are "infected with diseases and they are passing them on to others" in the larger "community". To deal with this danger, Hamill, like the mayor of Seattle, proposed taking back "our" streets. Closed military bases should be converted into "tightly" secured "sanctuaries" for the homeless. "...[I]n a health crisis, the rights of the community must take precedence over the rights of the individual". The "'able bodied" homeless should be put into boot-camps where, in addition to physical disciplining, "every man would also undergo sustained education in subjects that most have never heard of: ethics, moral philosophy, and the history of law".

Further up the coast, Adam Walinsky of the *Atlantic Monthly* warned of a “crisis in public order” that would soon lead to “one long descending night” that could only be prevented by hiring “at least half a million [police officers] in the next five years, and perhaps more thereafter” (1995:37-53). This mobilization, he says, was a social necessity, despite its regrettable “contribution towards a race behind bars” (1995:47). The ultimate blame lay with “a deliberate if misguided act of government to create a welfare system that began the destruction of black family life”. And the Black family, like the coal miner’s canary, was sounding a warning for the rest of America: “but let none of *us* pretend that the bell tolls only for blacks: there is no salvation for one race alone, no hope for separate survival. At stake for all of us is the future of American cities, the promise of the American nation, and the survival of our Constitution and of American democracy itself” (1995:54).

On the western approaches to New York City, Prospect Park, a “New Jersey enclave... where order is law” shared these concerns. A contemporary observer characterized the 1980s and early 1990s as an anxious time when “suburban parents and homeowners see their safety and well being under constant threat, quality of life has become an obsession of municipal governments” (Gladwell, Malcolm *Washington Post* August 30, 1995, A1). In suburban Pine Island, N.Y., “Community 2000: an experiment in democracy,” began. One hundred twenty five of the 27,000 residents met to “make their dreams come true”. Their most meaningful and motivating dream being to preserve their “small town life” from the encroaching danger of urban areas such as New York City, “a mere fifty miles away” (Strum 1993:b5).

And in the academy, Amitai Etzioni, the President of the American Sociological Association, decried our general “moral anarchy” and harkened back to the time when “our founding fathers [lived in] closely knit communities”. The solution to the problem

of crime and of the "general deterioration of the social and moral fabric of our society," Etzioni said and continues to affirm, is to be found in the building of "a responsive community".

"Communitarianism" is the emerging ideological and political movement that unites the preceding instances of social criticism. The intention of this dissertation is to examine communitarianism as a social phenomenon. This dissertation takes the view that the importance of communitarianism rests not in the degree of its influence or the size of its following. Like all social phenomena, communitarianism is most important when understood as an expression of the currents of contemporary social struggles. Therefore, this essay traces the genealogy of the communitarian intervention into social policy and social theory. It does not seek to establish *the* origin of communitarianism, because no single point of origin exists. Nor does it attempt to *explain* communitarianism, because there are no linear determinations or causal relations. Instead, communitarianism coalesces in the confluence of multiple determinations and movements which comprise the very anarchy of the social relations of contemporary capital. By investigating communitarianism, these productions and transformations can be analyzed and their interrelations historically situated. As such, it can tell us quite a lot about the context of America at the end of the Cold War. But more importantly, communitarianism can tell us much more about the American Right. This work is intended as the first in a number of investigations leading to the formulation of a historical materialism of fascism in everyday life, tentatively defined as the everyday reproduction of the desire for one's own repression.

Now one must admit that it would have been easier---and perhaps wiser--- to have kept this study within the realm of ideas---a simple tracing of the connections between communitarianism and certain theories of society---never asking *why* it is that

we should even be speaking about such matters. One might even endeavor to show the points of agreement between communitarians and liberals---their points of difference have already been widely discussed in the law reviews (e.g., Tassel 1986; Selznick 1987, 1989; Galston 1994, Gardbaum 1991, 1992)---perhaps extending the discussion into their relationship to social reformism and the welfare state. But communitarian discourse is increasingly centered on a reproachment with liberalism (Bell 1992; Taylor 1993; Carney 1992; Selznick 1992). Furthermore, the administrations of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair have made the point about the close ties between communitarianism and reformism. So in this essay, we will approach communitarianism from a different direction. My intention is to examine communitarianism as both a political intervention into social policy, and as an intervention into social, especially sociological, theory. If nothing else, communitarianism points out the social significance of academic knowledge in general, and sociology in particular, in the regulation of society.

Thus, the wording of the title is not accidental, it is drawn from Durkheim's *Moral Education*. The name of Durkheim appears in the discourse of communitarianism as both a forerunner and a liberal foe (e.g., Cladis 1992, 1993), but much more often the former (e.g., Gardbaum 1992, Hawkins 1999). The association of the names Emile Durkheim, and Talcott Parsons with the origins of communitarianism indicates at the very least the importance of sociology as the intellectual foundation of communitarianism. As we shall see, sociology is frequently referred to by the communitarians "as saying the same things" that they do (e.g. Philip Selznick, Etzioni, and Alan Wolfe). But this relationship with sociological theory is not necessarily noble, for along with what the communitarians call the *Spirit of Community* there comes as well the *Spirit of Discipline*. The specter that haunts the West is the emiseration and proletarianization of its "vast middle classes" This specter materializes within "the

community" in the form of the underclass--- degenerate and atavistic others whose everyday production is, paradoxically perhaps, fashioned by the middle classes into entertainment. Simultaneously, that the underclass makes bourgeois anxiety real can be seen in the continued construction of prisons, "wars on drugs," and the utopian discourse of a lost of community.

Divine intervention can not be relied upon to save us, the communitarians tell us (although they would not turn down the offer), for their god is as distant as those of Epicurus. The specter can only be quieted through continual affirmation of our duty, responsibility, obligation, and debt to the community. For the communitarians, the reference to a *Spirit of Community* which is the very essence of the self is both a genuine and contrived reference to Hegel. Hegel may prowl the century, but he does not bear the responsibility for the emergence of communitarianism (see Benhabib 1992, Taylor 1989). For its emergence, communitarianism owes much more to sociology than it does to philosophy.

The line of argument in this dissertation will avoid investigating communitarianism in the realm of Ideas or engaging in philosophical speculations regarding the nature and existence of a Spirit of Community. This study is focused upon the productions of knowledge, the techniques of discipline, and the various deployments of authority and desire referred to as "community". Community is always assumed to be both a normal condition of everyday life, and by its very nature moral, ethical, responsive, and evolving. We are told that community enters into sociological discourse because "community is not a referential sign, but a call or an appeal" (Singer 1991:125) to something deeply within us. At the same time, more critical examination reveals a sociological discourse wherein community is allied with or subject to the inevitable pathologies of disorganization and degenerance. In the specific instance of

communitarianism---but perhaps in other cases as well--- each time it is invoked, community appears doubly as a social problem and, as an instinctual "desire" for a polis (i.e., as a "social instinct," see Freud in Rickman 1937:170). This doubly makes community an object of sociological investigation as well.

To successfully undertake a study of community such as this one entails the avoidance of more than just idealism and speculation. There are many other obstacles and traps, the foremost being the guises in which the sociologist often appears. The sociologist believes that the apparent anarchy of humans producing socially can be ultimately understood. Moreover, once understood, changes in society might be rationally guided. Sociology becomes both a product, and a herald of Enlightenment. At the same time, the sociologist has tended to categorize, to define, and to present society as a sequence of evolutionary or cultural stages along a continuum that stretches from barbarism to civilization. Those classes that either "stagnate" or de-evolve---the "demoralized family," the dependent, the delinquent, the degenerate are the best examples of this decay---have been made to admit their trespasses ethnographically in their own words or through the statistical analysis of their aggregated actions. (This is all that currently passes as normal science in sociology cf. Dorothy Smith 1990). The truth of their pathological deviation from normal social life is extracted from them so that society might benefit from this social statistic. Sociology's sole mission being the expansion of the domain of knowledge applicable to the promotion or prevention of social change, it preserves these narratives as data. Gradually, through regulation and government, sociologists became the voyeurs and watchdogs of society. But that is perhaps what they were intended to be from the beginning.

Alan Wolfe, a communitarian sociologist, has explicitly argued that sociologists must go beyond these roles and position themselves as the moral philosophers of society

(Wolf 1989). Wolf envisions sociology as a secular ministry, one that puts into action the higher truths.¹ Despite this grand call, sociologists are increasingly aware that we do not have the power to speak the truth either to social subjects, or for them. What Gouldner called the “coming crisis in Western sociology” arrived, and with it came the realization that we as sociologists are just as embedded in the milieu as our subjects, and so too is the discipline itself. We can not escape the cave and “grasp by pure intelligence the very nature of goodness”. Despite our most noble desires, we have never embarked on “that journey we call the Dialectic” (Plato 1945:237)

It is fitting that sociology, a discipline so immersed in its own object of study, would also appear as the healer of social ills. As such, our role revolved around the diagnosis of social pathology, and the proscription of social policies that might re-establish the equilibrium of the “societal community”. In order to apply the cure, sociologists developed a number of discreet areas of knowledge---criminology, social work, applied sociology, social movement participation, etc.---which, allied to social theory, promised to provide a full anatomy of the social organism. This anatomy would set the limits of the social world, thereby unifying it as one organism. This concern was as true in Herbert Spencer as it is later in Ehrenscraft and Etzioni's *Anatomies of America* (1969), which is not embarrassed to provide “the anatomies and diagnoses of contemporary America as provided by sociologists”. Even Bellah et al.'s *Habits of the Heart* is seen by one of its admirers as “an elaborate physiology of American spiritual distress” (Birnham 1985).² The sociologist, having examined the social body, renders a

¹Gouldner offhandedly remarks that in 1964, one-quarter of the members of the American Sociological Association had at some time considered becoming a member of the clergy. E.O. Wright, the central figure of analytical marxism, was in seminary when he did the ethnographic research for *Politics of Punishment*. Cooley also makes this remark somewhere

²The social physician transforms easily into the social hygienist. This figure haunts much of sociology, from the eugenicists and social Darwinists to theorists of social change. In another sense, the figure of the social engineer is allied with those of the planner and the ideologist. Social problems are assumed to be

diagnosis, but this examination and diagnosis is not a medical intervention, but a political one. "Social science [Bellah et al.] insist, is not like natural science: it is a form of political discourse (Birnham 1985)," a social politics tied to a knowledge of society put in the service of governing--- a social knowledge which object of study is society itself. Thus, the need to avoid the usual personae of the sociologist is equaled by the need to avoid writing about sociology as the great achievements of great men in the development of a grand tradition. The point here is that we will not present sociological theory as though it were an evolutionary development, nor will we romanticize the origins of sociology itself.

The customary manner of periodizing sociology is given by Gouldner. It, or a similar scheme, is familiar to anyone who has taken survey courses in sociological theory.

There have been four major periods in the international development of Western Sociology, which are here largely defined in terms of the theoretical synthesis dominant in each:

Period I, Sociological Positivism, which began about the first quarter of the nineteenth century in France and to which the key contributors were Henri Saint-Simon and August Comte;

Period II, Marxism, which crystallized about the middle of the nineteenth century and expressed an effort to transcend the powerful tradition of German idealism and syncretize it with such traditions as French socialism and English economics;

Period III, Classical Sociology, which developed about the turn of the century prior to World War I, and may be conceived as a period of consolidation and accommodation. It strove to accommodate the central developments of the first and second periods by bridging positivism and Marxism, or to find a third path. It also sought to consolidate earlier developments, often only programmatic in nature, and to embody them in detailed, scholarly researches. It was a 'classical period' because most of those scholars now regarded by academic sociologists as 'classical' did their work at that time: for example Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Vilfredo Pareto;

technical problems, with technical solutions. In such a situation, it is only appropriate that so much of sociology comes to be dominated by statistical technique.

Period IV, Parsonian Structural-Functionalism, which crystallized during the 1930's in the United States in the evolving theory of Talcott Parsons and was given complex development [by his students] (1970:88-89; for an alternative, though essentially similar)

Gouldner's periodization is one of the sort that I sought to avoid in this essay.³

It is not that it lacks value, and certainly it is the periodization that I was taught and have often relied upon. However, its obscuring of the history of sociology makes it a burden. For if the crisis that Gouldner and others predicted is indeed upon us, then it is all the more important that sociologists examine sociology itself, especially its history as a discipline and the history of its interventions into public policy.

We begin with communitarians own texts on the concept of community. Rather than putting their writings only at the end of a long development, we will read them together, as contemporaneous expressions. While writers as ideologically diverse as Gouldner and Smith(1979) make such a development the foundation for their periodizations, such concerns are far less important for this work.⁴ The focus in the following pages is the discourse of community in sociology, and this necessitates that we dispense with the common periodizations of sociological theory. Instead, we will investigate the sociological study of community, and the several discursive formations which often intersect with each other in this discourse. These discursive formations---definition and classification, evolutionary development, territoriality, identity and new social movements, degeneration, and boundaries of enclosures---provide the historical *a priori* of communitarianism in sociology (Foucault 1972).

³For examples of slightly different periodizations, see Halmos 1970 and Hinkle and Hinkel 1975).

⁴The periodization of sociology must not be based upon authors, but upon thematics and repetitions which cut across the works of authors, the unity of texts, and the practical deployments of sociological knowledge in the form of social policy.

Disciplines rest upon their regimes of truth. A genius lived, a discovery was made, a theory was put to the test, predicted outcomes observed, and finally a group of texts establish an entire horizon of knowledge. These limits are represented by the mythical history of a discipline, its “report, naming, the narration of a Beginning, but also presentation, confirmation, explanation” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1969:8). Sociology is no different, its origins reveal the precariousness of its mythic history, too. This is no great sin; it is a general condition of the disciplines. Similar examples of unseemly origins abound in the disciplines: take geography, with its legacy of environmental determinism, or Indo-European studies and historical linguistics, which were often allied with Aryanism and the scientific confirmation of a historical Germanic/Anglo-Saxon supremacy (Fiske 1889; Rydberg, 18 Gossett 1963). As for sociology, it has amongst other tendencies its’ evolutionism---teleology, Spencerism, and Social Darwinism----which have been forgotten or minimized in the histories of sociological ideas. There are numerous examples of this. Take for example the Gouldner periodization quoted above. There is no mention of Spencer or Sumner. A subtle reminder that the process of forgetting sociology’s past “scientific ideologies” is not limited to any one political position. A less subtle example would be Carneiro (1967), in the preface to what became the standard edited volume of Spencer’s evolutionary writings, clearly states what has been lost.

“I have also left out a number of biological analogies when it seems that other examples already cited by Spencer had mad the parallel sufficiently clear. When Spencer went beyond the bounds of science and introduced considerations of ethics or values, such passages have generally been deleted. Occasional passages in which Spencer proposed racial explanations for certain cultural features have also been omitted. Their omission is not intended to conceal the fact that Spencer held such views; it was made in order to exclude from the volume interpretations that are no longer tenable” (1967:v).

A sanitized Spencer, one useful for contemporary sociology, but does anyone really believe that the "racial explanations" can be so easily disengaged from his sociology? That would be a deliberate misreading of Spencer and his legacy in sociology. A similar case is that when relating the great achievements of the "masters of sociological theory," Coser does not mention degeneration in his summation of Cooley's work, but it is at the center of Cooley's *Social Process* (Cooley 1966). "Sociology has a venerable genealogy" Albion Small said (1924). While the value judgment explicit in the statement belie his vision of sociology as a quest for objectivity, it is quite true that sociology has a genealogy, or even several genealogies intersecting to produce the various specialized fields of sociology. Although it only addresses the narrow question of community in sociology, this study attempts to present in broad strokes an alternative to the usual history of sociology. The history of sociology, like the history of any science, is as much the history of errors as it is the history of truths.

Of course, Kuhn (1970) and Foucault (1972) have shown the importance of stepping outside of the usual periodizations. There are differences, of course, beyond the obvious ones of method and style. Kuhn's paradigms tend to be monolithic totalities, especially during the period of normal science. There is little indication of the existence of competing paradigms, or of the continued existence of older paradigms both independently and as incorporations into the new paradigm. Anomalies emerge in the course of doing normal science and engaging in normal intellectual dialogue. The paradigm is inherently stable until the time of an anomaly. Foucault, conversely, does not assume a totality united by an over arching discourse, but a multitude of discourses which change at different speeds and in different ways, but which are folded into each other. No matter how hard one tries, one can not simply remain within a discourse, one

must also constantly refer to what is outside of discourse, not just *the* other, but also to the *multiple others*. Thus, a fundamental question was posed by Aronowitz:

The empirical/historical question is how discursive formations position themselves in these relations [of discourse as social object, the knowledge/power axis, and the economic/social formation]. What is their political affectivity, and which alliances do they choose to make in their own interest or in relation to the (conflictual) structures that have formed them and reproduce them (Aronowitz 1988:298)

As a response to this question, this dissertation can be briefly summarized as follows. *Chapter Two* presents a history of the formation and interventions of the largest communitarian organization, the Communitarian Network. This history is focused on the linkages that exist between the Communitarian Network, the discipline of sociology, and the formulation of public policy. The Communitarian Network is shown to be an important node in the circulation of discourse between the domain of government policy and that of academic knowledge. The Communitarian Network arises at this time, according to its founders, as a reaction against the growing strength of the authoritarian right and the growing licentiousness of radical individualism. Both of these threaten to submerge the values of “the vast middle of America” in a tide of moral anarchy. This hyperbole is not mere histrionics, but serious moral and political positions taken by academics and others in the name of the middle class. Communitarianism is a political intervention related to a great current of social anxiety. What emerges from our description is the pivotal role of sociology and sociologists in the development of communitarianism. While this intervention is certainly undertaken with great sincerity, the investigation highlights the important part played by the disciplinary crises within sociology in the rise of communitarianism. Sociology, like all other disciplines, has been under increasing pressure to justify its existence at a time when the boundaries between fields are rapidly evaporating. Sociology and sociologists

respond by pointing to the vital role that sociological knowledge plays in governing and social reformism, and many now emphasize the important role of communitarianism as a political doctrine based upon sociological principles (Etzioni, Selznick, Wolfe, etc.), and one essential to the preservation of American values.

Chapter Three is a discussion of the some central issues raised by communitarianism regarding community and authority in the writings of Taylor, Benhabib, and MacIntyre. Taylor, as a generally regarded communitarian philosopher, is given special attention. Taylor asserts a uniformity to the Western intellectual tradition's adoption of idealism. The attempt is made to undermine his position through an examination of his treatment of Greek atomistic and materialist philosophy. Turning from there to another Greek, the centrality of the figure of Oedipus is discussed briefly in relation to the communitarian desire for the restoration of the family romance of the "two-parent, biological family" (Whitehead 1994). The chapter concludes with some final considerations on authority and community.

Having investigated the history of the Communitarian Network and excavated some foundations of its idealism, *Chapter Four* presents what might best be described as the regularities of communitarian discourse. Using the more popular expressions of communitarianism, this chapter analyzes the regularities of communitarian discourse: family, community, the nation as a community of communities, duty, obligation, debt, and responsibility. These concepts are repeated and commented upon in almost every communitarian text. It is important to notice that every element in this group, which at first glance might appear concrete, but which closer scrutiny reveals to be an abstraction. Each of them could be ruthlessly critiqued, and the critique of any one must of necessity overlap with others. This chapter focuses upon the deployment of a discourse of community by the communitarians. At the same time, the purpose of this

chapter is to call into question the communitarian's conception of community and to show that community exists for them in close alliance with many other discourses. If it exists at all sensuously, community exists for the communitarians as a disciplinary apparatus. This apparatus is deployed through the regularities of communitarian discourse which allies community, family, and authority.

Chapter Five and *Chapter Six* present a critical introduction to the sociological study of community. This chapter outlines the features of the sociological discourse of community since c.1920. Community is a fundamental element of sociological analysis, but the meaning and importance of community has always been a problem for sociologists. What is community? What is its definition? What are its characteristics and structures/functions? How is it to be preserved or developed? These have been questions that sociologists have grappled with since the beginnings of the discipline. The questioning of community is one approach to the sociological investigation of human social production.

Around 1975, there was a break in the sociological investigation of community. Of course there have been others, but this one attracts our attention because it marks a particular shift that opened the space for the formation of communitarian ideological practice. Before this date, the sociological investigation of community centered on the requirements of definition and classification, which entailed the creation of a systematic nomenclature and a descriptive terminology; the mapping of territories, as community was understood as being territorial; the tracing of the history of community as the evolutionary development of a particular human essence. This period differs with our own, which is the subject of Chapter Five. In our period, the question of community centers on the creation or presence of *identity* as defined in the emergence of multiculturalism and postcolonialism; the rise of *new social movements* which combine

with identity to produce new struggles over everyday life as well as new forms of academic knowledge; *degeneration*, which reemerges as a threat to a bourgeoisie whose destiny is no longer quite so manifestly positive; and *new enclosures of community* expressing in an anxiety of loss, along with new boundaries marking the *reterritorialization* of community as the domain of the middle classes.

The rationale behind this order of presentation is simple. The argument moves from the particular (communitarianism) to the general (the sociological study of community). We begin with what is said, both about the communitarians and by them. We ask what are the specific features of communitarianism? What are the social objects that it constructs? What are their relations to other objects of knowledge? What is their political intervention at the level of ideology, etc.? Then we investigate, through the investigation of the sociological study of community, the historical conditions of knowledge production which provide the possibility for communitarianism.

Discourse and Ideological Practice.

The discourse of communitarianism is more than just words. Discourse is at once the content of the archive as well as the rules, interconnections, and modes of the discursive formation it records. Discourse is a limit to the possibilities of social expression. A discourse expresses the contents of an archive of permissible statements. The archive circumscribes the possibilities of expression---it establishes its forms and sets its limits at the same time it makes discourse possible. This is the realm of experience that Horkheimer called "life as it is lived". But this limit is not simply a limit of language and thought, it is a limit allied with the repressive apparatus of social order and the force of the everyday. We experience the content of the archive as the repetitions of phrases, facts, modes of argumentation, social statistics, declarations of common sense, etc. But these are not simply, as Foucault says, "on the surface" (1972).

The archive also represents the material accumulation of expression of society: layers, strata, omissions, lost knowledge, which like the geologic Earth, are constantly shifting and folding.

While the archive presents us with a seeming anarchy of discourse, it actually provides us with the material for a history of the expressions contained within them, their relations to each other in accordance with their relations to other archives, and the history of their formation and transformation. It is a history of life as it is lived, the manner of expressing ourselves within this history, and the historical strategies for the deployment of hegemony. The archive of a discursive formation finally provides the range of possibility for alliance with other discourses. The expression and formation of the archive are two aspects of discourse that enable us to establish the link between discourse and practice.

Just as discourse is more than mere utterance, practice is more than mere speech acts, because it expresses both speech and the possibilities/parameters of sociality, i.e., how society --and in this case, community--- is reproduced.⁵ Practice is not ritual, it is more like repetition. What appears to us as an eternal return is merely the return of capital to itself. The regularities of discursive practices express, in our historical moment, the social relations of capital. One might even hazard at this point to use the word ideology. To sociologically situate communitarianism, we must understand ideology as a production of the social relations of capital (Marx 1967 [1867]:77).

⁵ *“Sound never leaves a room,
It just keeps bouncing off the walls forever,
Until somebody opens the door,
and the sound spreads out,
becoming part of the landscape.”*

---David Byrne, *Songs for the Knee Plays*

Ideology is not merely the symbolic representation of production. It is present at every moment in the process of production and accumulation, in every movement and gesture. Ideology and practice are inseparable: ideology is practice and practices are always ideological. The alliance of ideology/practice is found in the discourses, technologies, and moralities of everyday life. It is, as we find it now, capitalist production itself. The mystification of social conflicts is not mere mental abstraction, but in the production and commodification of desire in everyday life, since part of capitalist social production is given over to the production of desire itself (Horkheimer and Adorno 1969[1944]; Lukcas 1968[1921]). Deleuze and Guattari's critique demonstrates that desire is an organizing principle of both capitalist production and the production of individual identity in contemporary society. False consciousness, they argue, can not be explained away as mere ideology, and ideology can not be reduced to false consciousness. False consciousness is "a problem of desire, and desire is a part of the infrastructure" (1986:104). Desire, especially the desire for one's own repression, is a social relation located "in the particular social character of the labor that produces them" (Marx 1967:77). The creation and production of a desire for community and identity occurs within the boundaries of capitalist reproduction and is never discontinuous from it. Ideology is produced through the practices of ideological production and practice is, after all, something we do in the world.

Dorothy Smith uses the phrase "ideological practice" as well, and to a large degree it is used here in a similar sense. However, it is also a reference to Foucault, from whose work Smith distances herself. In this way, the usage here also contradicts Smith's use. Smith writes that Foucault established only a "mystical connection" (another term borrowed from Marx) between power and knowledge. This because Foucault disavows the ownership or authorship of discourse. Smith sees this as

producing a separation between the experience of the speaker (especially when this speaker is a woman) and the utterances and practices that comprise their everyday life's. It is the nature of sociology, she says, to remove the subject from the data. In doing so "a virtual reality vested in texts is thereby constituted, cutting social science off from the actual relations and organization of people's lives" (1990:45). Despite the fact that Smith and Foucault both often speak of the importance of the everyday in very similar terms, they part company over the issue of the subject. With Smith, the subject is already present and precedes ideology; with Foucault, the subject is constituted within ideology itself. Perhaps the real difference is that Smith is ambivalent about whether ideology is a reflection or an expression (indeed, she often uses both terms in the same passage). Another possibility is that while Smith's analysis of the *German Ideology* is very exact, she does not relate her reading to Marx's critique of standpoint as given in *The Holy Family*. Smith wants to preserve the unique oppression of women in the structure of domination, support for which may be found in the *German Ideology*, but not in the *Holy Family*.

Ideological practices, as used in this dissertation, may best be thought of as working in at least three ways. First, ideological practices appear as the regularities of expression produced during the formation and study of particular ideas, abstractions, etc., within an established discipline (e.g., community in sociology). Ideological practices are also visible during the process of knowledge production. Ideological practices rely upon the determination of what is allowed, mandated, and reproduced in the production of knowledge.

Second, ideological practices are the regularities of the reproduction of everyday life, such as common sense, family, morality, etc., which appear natural, but are actually internalized and become the desired objects of individual cathexis (the concept of an

economy of the psyche is itself only understandable in the context of a parallel concept of political economy). In fact, individual "investment" in a social object, no matter how desirous it might be aesthetically, is a *capitalization* of desire.

Third, ideological practices are expressive of the regularities which are the reproduction of the social relations of capital, which subsumes the above two moments as it constantly seeks to overcome its own limits through its equally inherent imperialism.

This brings us back to our argument that whenever discursive practices are coincident with the reproduction of the social relations of capital, we must term them ideological practices because of their embeddedness in this reproduction. They are the anarchy of capitals repetitions, its' *Library at Babel* (Borges 1964). Community is one of the repetitions of capital now that it has invaded every corner of the world. Now we can hardly avoid mention of the commonplace manner of speaking of community as either a New England village, a "shining city on a hill," or simply as an "intentional" utopia (see Meinig 198x). Indeed, community for the communitarians is often associated with a utopian vision of the past and of the future. As for sociology, in particular contemporary sociology, community is more complex, or rather we should say the communitarian view is one of many sociological discourses of community. There are those conceptions of community that focus upon "intentional communities," utopias of the past and the future, from Brook Farm to Twin Oaks and now cyberspace. One of the many achievements of the New Left was in moving the study of community from the restrictions of the dichotomy of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, and towards, on the one hand, community studies allied with political commitment, and on the other, intentional communities as models of radical democracy. Utopia ceased to be of merely literary interest, at the same time the conceptions of dystopia and the breakdown of

community also rose to prominence. Social Darwinism, contrary to Hofstadter's implicit argument, never disappeared. Today's utopias hold fast to H.G. Wells's description:

"The utopia of a modern dreamer [differs] in one fundamental aspect from the Nowheres and Utopias men planned before Darwin quickened the thought of the world. Those were all perfect and static States, a balance of happiness won over ever against the forces of unrest and disorder that inhere in things. But the Modern Utopia must be not static but kinetic, must shape as a hopeful stage, leading to a long ascent of stages. That is the first, most generalized difference between a utopia based upon modern conceptions and all the utopias that were written in the former time" (Wells 1905:226-227).

As I hope to show, the utopianism of the communitarians is no different. That communitarianism seeks the restoration of a long line of ascent, and this evolutionism emerges as a justification for insularity and preservation. To displace Enlightenment as a universal discourse, and reform it according to Aristotelian politics, with all the social implications therein, are the fronts on which communitarianism battles. At this point the question of the relation of community to domination and authority comes to the forefront.

Perhaps tied up with this idea of capitalism being everywhere is our own encounter with the globalization of capitalist authority. i.e., with capitalist authority as the set of procedures for the production of social life---for capitalism is nothing if not productive--- that are the multivaried modes of the reproduction of capital. We speak here from not about marxism, though it is still with Marx that we speak, but about authority and of capitalism

The Tasks of This Study

The task I set for myself is to provide a context for understanding the meaning and consequences of the communitarian intervention into social policy. As noted in the previous section, providing such a context will necessitate uncovering the genealogy of

the sociological knowledge/practice---through professional organizations, particular social theories, and the formation of public policy---that is allied with this intervention. However, the work of tracing this genealogy is necessary, but not sufficient, for understanding communitarianism as a expression of real social conflicts. Following Foucault's suggestion to focus on local problems in order to address more general questions, and to see general problems as local ones, I will use the examination of the Communitarian Network to bring into relief the specific problems involved in the construction of a critical sociology of the New Right, and simultaneously address the more general sociological problem of authority under conditions of Capital.

This dissertation, therefore, is not only about communitarianism. It is also about situating the "New Right." The term is, as I have argued, a mystification that conceals something else. An important problem that this dissertation will address is the demystification of the New Right, i.e., it questions our understanding of this phrase. Grounding this study in the analysis of communitarianism and the Communitarian Network allows a number of sociological questions regarding authority and fascism to be raised. In doing so, this dissertation will provide a sociological account for the appeal of authority that does not resort to the psychology of crowds, self interest, degeneracy, or false consciousness.

The first problem to be address is perhaps the most immediate. Why use the Communitarian Network as a means to study the New Right? Why not simply study the New Right directly? Indeed, from the description of communitarianism given earlier in "the object of investigation," it might appear at first glance that the study of the New Right could serve as the best way to understand communitarianism. However, I argue that, in fact, exactly the opposite is true. First, our understanding of the New Right remains, despite efforts both small and monumental, incomplete. In part, this is because

we are confronted with a moving target. Like the Cheshire Cat of Carroll, or Kafka's Oledrek, we experience its presence; we "just know" that it is "out there." But whenever we gaze directly at it, it vanishes, leaving only an inscription of its force. Even the term "New Right" itself denotes a messy amalgam of extreme conservatives, fundamentalist and evangelical Christians, military and industrial interests, etc., whose power results from one of those wonderfully abstract pendulum swings of American politics. To pursue the Communitarian Network through the New Right, or to uncritically lump it into the *abstraction* that is the "New Right," would be to ignore the fact that the New Right itself must be more accurately situated in the arena of everyday conflicts. That this goal has so long eluded researchers raises the troubling possibility that there is no single authoritarian ideology emanating from a central source. Instead, as my study of the Communitarian Network will show, the New Right is a concept abstracted from the authoritarianism that flows throughout everyday life under capital, the anarchy and ambient noise of its repetitious articulation continually producing the conditions for its own near-hegemony. Any critical analysis of the New Right must also allow us to understand authoritarianism more generally in terms of its place in the reproduction of social relations.

If it is difficult to characterize the New Right, it follows that it is at least as difficult to use the New Right to explain the intervention of the Communitarian Network. This leads me to the second reason for looking at the Communitarian Network in order to comment upon authority. C.S. Peirce noted in his essay "The Fixation of Belief" (1961) that there is no meaning inherent in a concept, even a scientific one, but the concept and its meaning are to be found in its effects. Using the example of electricity, Peirce demonstrated that the social meaning of electricity is not to be found in electricity itself, but that meaning is expressed in electricity's effects upon

real sensuous objects. Taking this lesson to heart in terms of the New Right, it leads us to look for its meaning through an investigation of its effects, rather than looking at it in isolation from those effects. The New Right and its effects are constitutive of each other. This becomes clear when we remember that there is no organization, association, or other grouping that claims to be *the* New Right; there is no agreement, just idealistic and abstract theories, on *what* the New Right is and *who* is in it. In short, there is no sensuous object of sociological investigation that can represent, or that represents itself, as the New Right. Nor can we easily draw a line between the far, the New, Christian, and various other Rights. Those on the right might claim such a demarcation into discrete units ---and so too would many critical commentators--- but their claims are not sufficient reason for accepting such a view. But neither is there a compelling argument for the assumption of a common moral origin (except on the most abstract level). The Communitarian Network, by its own admission and its ideological practices, is one such effect of the presence of the ideologies and practices that are all too often conveniently labeled "New Right." Through the examination of communitarianism, we can begin to understand how the ideological practices of the Right are modified, and affirmed, by political moderates, especially those of the middle classes. By doing so, we come to understand communitarianism as an expression of the currents of contemporary social conflicts, conflicts that are deeply influenced by the specter of the Right and the desire for a secure middle class utopia. For, as Marcuse noted, there is no need to postulate a "right turn" when "the tendency is to the Right" (Marcuse 1989).

But one more obstacle must be overcome. Anytime we try to talk about fascism, it is immediately associated with the Third Reich or its descendants. One problem is, therefore, how to get away from this conception of fascism with a capital "F." Attempting a coherent examination of authority itself raises a number of questions and

problems. Any examination of authority must immediately address the spatial and temporal demarcations. Even if the New Right is confined to our national borders, there is always the problem of comparison and classification. Is this fascism the same as that one? Is the New Right in the US the same as that in the United Kingdom or France? Many works on fascism and authority take for granted the uniqueness of fascism, and, giving it a capital "F," confine it to the Nazi horror. Other studies either ignore the question by focusing on the organization (e.g., an aspect of the otherwise outstanding documentary *Shoah*) or spiritualism of fascism (e.g., *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, or *The Occult Origins of the Third Reich*), or reduce fascism to be the inevitable product of the end of capitalism and the beginning of the equally inevitable revolution (e.g., the position of Third International; see R. Palme Dutt's *Fascism and Social Revolution* (1935) for one of the best articulations of this position and Poulantzas's (1974) equally good critique *Fascism and Dictatorship*).

A general tendency of research on authority is to attempt the explanation of both European and American fascism. Often, this tendency is allied with an argument that points out the obvious impossibility that the Right in the United States is the same as European fascism. Of course, the Christian Coalition is not the National Front, but where does this "insight" leave us? One fundamental problem with the comparative/difference approach is that it is focused almost exclusively upon the most superficial aspects of organization, almost to the point of an interrogation: "Do they wear uniforms?" "Do they salute Hitler?" "If not, then it is not fascism, it is bigotry, or inequality, or social stratification, or simply that usual old silly racism." This dissertation abandons the comparison/difference question, which is always a matter of idealist abstraction, and replaces it with an argument for discrete, material analyses of authority. The term authority is borrowed directly from the Frankfurt School and from

Horkheimer in particular and is useful because it avoids the usual misreading of Foucault's "power," while the term authority already appropriates the domains of alienation, bureaucracy, and the constellations of force and labor that are typical of the social relations of capital: social relations that ground our participation in, and desire for, our own repression.

The reproduction of the customs, habits, discourses, that are often referred to as "culture," express "the fixation of belief" (1961:99). The fixing of belief is accomplished through four methods: tenacity, authority, a priori, and scientific. Each method is present at any given time, but Peirce tries to understand them both historically, and also within the context of the present. Historically, the methods correspond to a given time and to a given moment in social development. But in the context of the present era, each is simultaneously present, but the "scientific" predominates (or so he hopes). For example, Peirce shows tenacity to be the most simple, almost instinctive, method of fixing belief. It is reflective of our most primitive social being, but it is also manifest in the sophisticated thinking of present day bigots and social darwinists. Likewise, authority "has, from the earliest times, been one of the chief means of upholding correct theological and political doctrines, and of preserving their universal or catholic character..." (1961:104). Peirce has no illusion about authority, stating flatly that "cruelties always accompany this system; and when it is consistently carried out, they become atrocities of the most horrible kind....Nor should this occasion surprise, for the officer of a society does not feel justified in surrendering the interests of that society for the sake of mercy, as he might his own private interests. It is natural, therefore, that sympathy and fellowship should produce a most ruthless power" (1961:104) All this, he says, amounts to nothing less than the "intellectual slavery" of the masses of humanity.

Peirce looks to the a priori, especially art, and ultimately to the scientific method of fixing belief as the most recent creation of human society and the most agreeable to Reason. The scientific method in particular, Peirce believes, will enable at least the scientists to gain a clear understanding of the world. However, the historical nature of the methods does not mean that they are tied to discrete eras. Each are present today. This means that even if we grant Peirce's hope regarding the triumph of the scientific fixing of belief, we must say that science encompasses all of the other methods, subordinating them to itself. The scientific now calls to authority as the method that "will always govern the mass of mankind" (1961:110). Science and the war machine are allied, and social studies like sociology are all too often accepts the discourses and techniques which form the a priori of acceptable knowledge---ironically through the methods of tenacity and authority. But science itself is not the episteme of the present, that privileged seat belongs to capital. Science today is nothing outside of capital, it is thoroughly commodified. Peirce, working at the level of abstraction, can take us only so far in understanding the question of the relationship between capital and authority.

A possible route is derived from the Frankfurt School and focuses our attention on the question of authority. Like them, we are still confronted with the problem of identifying the authority that flows through the whole of capital, and that, because capital is a vital part of ourselves, is an authority that is shot through and through our very mode of being in the world. One of the fundamental insights of the Frankfurt school was that even the most aesthetic labor expresses the various conflicts within society. We are always saying, in a situation of "total administration," the questions: "Who is authorized?" "Am I authorized to do this?" "I have the authority to act...." "I am authorized...." "I will faithfully execute the office...." The question of authority is directly related to the question of agency. However, this agency may be expressed,

according to the configuration of social forces, as the desire for our own repression. Indeed, the central question in the study of authority remains “How is it possible that the ‘masses’ have so often come to desire their own repression? (Foucault 1983)”.

In considering such questions, Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1969) still serves us. For even if we assume with Peirce that science might have once been autonomous, in the present neither its critics, nor its sponsors in Congress and the Pentagon now grant the enterprise of science such freedom. Now we do not have to call to authority. Authority is always already present in the reality of the reproduction of capital, in the commodity, in the fixing of belief, in the totality of our *sensuous* experience. A critical theory of authority under capital must confront the reality of this tendency and show the manner of its production. It must show, in other words, that authority as we know it is the authority of capital.

As Horkheimer saw, it was the project of enlightenment to combine authority and reason so as to lay all questions before the Authority of Reason. Indeed, a work like Ellis's *Social History of the Machine Gun* supports in the extreme, and perhaps unintentionally, Horkheimer and Adorno's view that reason, science, and technology, along with the culture industry, have become ineluctably intertwined. However, while the despair of the Frankfurt School is understandable and even at times attractive, it is not altogether justified. The multiplicity of consciousness, the reality that alternative knowledges are threats no matter where and when they occur, reminds us that power is indeed powerless precisely at the point of demonstrating its greatest strength in preventing these alternatives. In other words, it can silence them, but not only do they appear again and again, but power must always record them itself, in the construction, techniques, management and punishments of the repressive apparatus....even in the book-keeping and discipline of the “accountant and the foreman.” It is enough to

remember that Marx found that alternatives always lay in wait, and that they are to be found everywhere, even now under the society of control (Deleuze 1994).

So in the final analysis, this dissertation addresses the relationship of authority and capital to the scientific ideologies of the academy. In one sense, the reader can take away from this work the most timid proposal, that social theory and sociology matter, that they have real effects in the world, and that they are a part of the social relations they describe. The aim of this dissertation is to demonstrate the materiality of ideology. The core question here concerns ideology not as symbol, idea, or false consciousness---although it can certainly be an aspect of bad consciousness---but ideology as it exists in the world. Ideology is not transcendental---although there might indeed be, as William James said "a will to believe"---and is never universal. A sociology that addresses ideology would be impossible if ideology was not located in the materiality of everyday life; if it did not find expression in the materiality of social relations. Our object of study, communitarianism, is an expression of the everyday social struggles of our time. Even if we find communitarian tendencies in Aristotle (as MacIntyre and Taylor do) it is not the same as *this* communitarianism. This dissertation addresses a specific ideological practice that has crystallized some particular contradictions of our time. If indeed the "tendency is to the right" (Marcuse 1989), then the study of communitarianism and the politics of community allows us to examine a ideological constellation as it coalesces into an apparatus of reactive politics.

"You will see that I have quoted you"
 Senator Durenburger

CHAPTER TWO

A Sociological History of the Communitarian Network

A degree of continuity exists between communitarianism and various historical communal movements. Communitarianism, as in communalism, was imagined by the New left as a new moral order, but a moral order that was in its theory and practice deeply critical of the everyday life of the middle classes. The New Left confined communitarianism to this realm, perhaps in order to evade the communitarian critique of Enlightenment that later and more conservative writers would develop. The New Left had good reasons for confining communitarianism to a utopian future, chief among these being their own engagement with Reason and the "science of society". It is important to note that even after the demise of the New Left, communitarianism remained, but without the New Left, communitarianism no longer functioned as a communal utopia of the future, but as a critique of liberalism in the name of an imagined past. It became a defense of the very kind of community---a community of the middle classes---that the New Left's communalism steadfastly opposed (Sargent 1989)

With the passing of the New Left, an embarrassed silence fell on the subject of communalism. Social Democrats and liberals disdained communalist movements as unrealistic, utopian, or promiscuously hedonistic. Writers like Habermas embraced Reason and the welfare state as, if not the furthest horizon of history, then as nothing less than a necessary and civilizing transition to an egalitarian future.⁶ These tendencies

⁶Habermas being only the foremost example, for an extend discussion see my study of Habermas's reconstruction of historical materialism (Brown 1998 and forthcoming 2000).

only intensified with the collapse of Soviet state-capitalism. Communitarianism was at this very moment taken up *not* by the Counter-Culture Left, as envisioned by Gusfield (1975) and Sargent (1989), but by conservative legal theorists attracted to its latent critique of Enlightenment liberalism. [“Civic republicanism” ---John Major’s “civic conservatism”---was a further development of this communitarian tendency] that the New Left had sought to repress was captured by a completely different site of knowledge production: the law reviews. The bibliography of this work is extensive, although its contribution to the development of communitarianism as a social intervention is not. Often communitarianism is just a casual reference, a mere two sentence aside, or a gratuitous slap at Enlightenment liberalism. Nothing more than a brief mention along the way to an engaging discourse on contracts----a connection whose significance should not be completely overlooked (see, for example various law review articles 198x-199x). Besides, the encounter between the sociological development of community and legal theory certainly precedes this period (see, e.g., “On Community” by Parsons and Cowan’s comment in Friedrich 1959). Chart X shows the distribution of law review articles mentioning communitarianism. The frequency of law review articles has remained steady over the years, but when compared to the media stories on communitarianism, it becomes rather minor relative to the place of communitarianism in the social sciences. Certain sociologists do appear in the law reviews, usually to remind the lawyers that communitarianism originated in sociological discourse. It is important to note that it is here, through the engagement of sociologists like Phillip Selznick and Alan Wolfe in correcting the judicial appropriation, that communitarianism is preserved and brought back to the center of sociological discourse.

In 1984, Bellah et al. publish *Habits of the Heart*, an exploration of what the authors call the “character” of America through interviews conductive exclusively with

those identified as the “white middle class”. Bellah et al., along with the second edition of MacIntyre's *After Virtue* and works by Lasch, Wolfe, and other social conservatives, stimulated the circulation of communitarian texts in sociological discourse. In 1990, this intellectual interest in communitarianism would merge with the considerable resources that sociology brings to the understanding of social problems. Sociology could again intervene directly into social policy. The catalyst for this intervention was the close formal and informal associations of the Communitarian Network with the Clinton Administration and with academic sociology.

The Communitarian Network

In this chapter, I will focus upon the social history of the Communitarian Network and their intervention. The purpose of this analysis is to situate the Communitarian Network in the interstice between the academy, the state, and everyday social conflicts. The Communitarian Network is the largest communitarian organization. To a great extent, it is a primary node in the current discourse of communitarianism. This is not to say that the philosophers and lawyers haven't made their contributions, but the Communitarian Network served to concentrate their efforts and to center them around the principles of the Communitarian Platform. The formation of the Communitarian Network is linked to the formation of communitarian discourse in sociology, as well as the erosion of sociology within the academy. It is vital for the codification of communitarian discourse. But sociology has provided one space for communitarianism to exist as an ideological practice. Providing a chronology is simple, but is important to move beyond chronology. It is also easy to discuss the role of the media here as though it were a passive medium, but the media is not passive. The rise of the Communitarian Network can not be understood apart from its relationship to the media, the federal government, the public policy apparatus, and the academy. Members

of the Communitarian Network also occupy positions in all of these sectors, sometimes simultaneously, sometimes in series.

According to information available in 1999, the Communitarian Network has approximately 6,000 members and a budget of at least \$400,000.⁷ The organization's quarterly journal, *The Responsive Community: Rights and Responsibilities*, has a reported circulation of 6500. A companion monthly newsletter, *The Communitarian Update*, is sent via E-mail to approximately 4400 subscribers in 43 countries. In addition, several Internet discussion groups focus upon issues of concern to communitarians. The lists comnet@civic.org and civic-values@civic.org are devoted to communitarianism and topics of interest to communitarians. The importance of various media---academic journals, activist newsletters, E-mail discussion groups, and journalistic accounts--- for the deployment of communitarian ideological practices will be discussed later in the next chapter. At this point, it is more important to understand the history of the Communitarian Network in relation to the formation of the communitarian ideological practice, for their use of various media is in fact one of their ideological practices.

In the clearest and best-selling exposition of communitarianism, Etzioni's *Spirit of Community: the Reinvention of American Society*, a brief, almost Hesiodic narrative of the Communitarian Network's organizational founding is given (1993a:14-17). The Communitarian Network began with a 1990 meeting of fifteen "ethicists, social

⁷*The Encyclopedia of Associations* lists the Communitarian Network as having 1,000 members and a budget of \$40,000, based upon information provided by the Communitarian Network itself. In its' own publications, the Communitarian Network provides the circulation information for the postal service which, along with other citations, makes it possible to piece together a more accurate picture of the size of the organization (e.g., every subscriber to the Responsive Community is also a member of the Communitarian Network; the Communitarian Network must provide information to the DC Secretary of State on its operations, etc.). Given other available public information, membership is much higher than the self-reported information.

philosophers, and social scientists". This meeting was convened by Etzioni and William Galston, a University of Maryland political scientist, to find new ways of thinking "beyond left and right" about "America's polarizing social conflicts". An additional purpose was to create an organization to disseminate such new thinking. The newly formed Communitarian Network, taking advantage of its academic resources, began publishing the *Responsive Community* as a forum for the exposition and development of communitarian theory and its application to social policies as varied as the v-chip and contact tracing of HIV-infected citizens. It would later present itself as "the only journal of the vast middle" (Communitarian Network, August 1998).

From the beginning lacking warm bodies, and having an ambivalent stance towards grassroots organizing, the Communitarian Network devoted most of its early efforts to gaining the attention of policy makers and journalists. Its efforts were effective. The Communitarian Network received some attention from major journalistic outlets, but none from local (and presumably more community--oriented) papers. First, *Business Week* published an article on the efforts of local activists in suburban Maryland to organize in support of an anti-loitering ordinance aimed at getting drug dealers off street corners. The ordinance eventually passed over the objections of civil libertarians who viewed it as an unreasonable restriction on the constitutional right to free assembly. The reporter asked a supporter of the ordinance about these objections, and was told that the need to combat drug use was more important than the protection of constitutional liberties. Drugs, the reasoning went, presented a greater threat to the nation than the proposed restriction of constitutional rights. The nation is founded upon a community of communities, she argues, and not the constitution. At this point, the reporter provides the link between this local conflict and the Communitarian Network: "an emerging group, sometimes called 'communitarians,' believes that the cause of

individual liberty has gotten out of hand, jeopardizing community needs and public safety" (1991), a view supported by the activist, who had no prior knowledge of the Communitarian Network. The journalist thoughtfully supplied the activist with an ideological designation. And just as important, this designation is supplied by a reporter from *Business Week*, a publication never known to be politically "left of center". Already, we are far from the communalist vision of Gusfield and the others of the New Left. The ideal of community is still there, but it is a floating signifier which fulfills the varied desires of those former leftists attracted to communitarianism, but this is where the continuity ends. The communalist aspect has been supplanted by the communitarian vision of the citizen/member as the embodiment of obligations and duties. Its sign is the civic republic, the *polis*, not the commune.

The *Washington Post* then published a somewhat critical article. This was followed by supportive coverage in *U.S. News & World Report*, which focused on the Communitarian Network's desire to "restore the moral order" of America. Communitarianism is described as "not simply majoritarianism. It does not exalt the group over the individual. It asks for social responsibility and laws based upon connectedness" (in Etzioni 1993a:7). *U.S. News & World Report's* Washington correspondent John Leo later became a contributor to the *Responsive Community* (Leo 1993; 1994-95) after writing several articles supportive of the views of the Communitarian Network.

Together with these initial reports, articles discussing the Communitarian Network appeared in the *Boston Globe*, *Washington Times*, *American Review of Public Administration*, *Chicago Tribune*, an additional article in the *Washington Post*, and finally the *Chronicle of Higher Education*. The *Washington Post* also published an op-ed piece by Etzioni titled "The New, Rugged, Communitarianism" that drew a sharp

line between the New Left's communalist vision and, well, the title speaks for itself.

The cards and letters began pouring in. Etzioni remarks, noting the critical importance of the press to the growth of the Communitarian Network.

Then *Time* magazine weighed in with a full-page story. Many others followed. We were on the map within months.... Community leaders, colleagues, ministers and Rabbis, and fellow citizens sent us a most encouraging stream of mail.... Most astonishing, two foundations (which usually must be courted long and hard before they write a check) called us to ask if we would accept their contributions to our cause (we readily acquiesced)" (1993:17).

It was the media that put communitarianism "on the map" Etzioni says. The early efforts of the Communitarian Network were confined to seeking media attention for their political and policy formulation. Etzioni says that many other articles followed the initial coverage in 1990, but this is technically incorrect. Media coverage of the Communitarian Network did not begin in earnest until November 1991. In fact, we have just mentioned in the previous paragraphs the entirety of the print stories appearing 1990. Then in November, the Communitarian Network held its first major event, the First Congressional Teach-in at the Russell Senate Building. Etzioni describes the event:

On November 18, 1991, at a 1960's style teach-in, we took the next step and issued a Communitarian Platform, summarizing our approach and listing our basic positions. Seventy community leaders, from a wide variety of walks of life, joined us in signing the platform, which gave it more public recognition. As active citizens we shared the Communitarian Platform with those in office, those running for office, and with those to whom they are accountable: our fellow citizens. At the teach-in, we saw the first signs of interest not only in the public at large, but among our elected officials; four senators---two Democrats (Al Gore and Daniel Patrick Moynihan) and two Republicans (Dave Durenburger and Alan Simpson)---joined us for the teach-in. Strong letters of support followed from Senator Bill Bradley of New Jersey and Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Jack Kemp (1993a:18).

At the meeting, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the pathologist of the Black family, declared his allegiance to the principles of communitarianism, finding it to be the only

means to discuss the issues of family, welfare, and “the defining issue of today...the trend of high dependency” (1991-92:22). Senator Alan Simpson, who had lead the attack on Anita Hill during the confirmation hearings of Clarence Thomas for the Supreme Court, made these remarks to the meeting:

I welcome this new group to the national and Washington scene....I've always been personally concerned not so much by the expansion of rights, which are critical, but with the apparent loss of a sense of personal responsibility in our society...I welcome this new voice to the national debate.

Next, then Senator, and now Vice President Al Gore spoke. “I believe very deeply that you're really on to something. I am one of those who believes that our civilization is in deep crisis....I believe that we have lost our connection to conscience in which we form values, in which we relate to others, in which we relate to the Earth itself” (RR 1991/92:22-23).

Senator Dave Durenburger, a Republican, wrote to Etzioni afterwards:

I'd like to thank you for inviting me to participate in the Communitarian Teach-In yesterday. I found your platform intriguing and consistent with many of my views. I enclose for you a copy of a recent floor statement on values. You will see that I have quoted you. I believe we should reinforce positive values whenever we can do so. Please keep me informed about your activities and feel free to call on me if I can be of assistance to you (Durenburger 1991, quoted in *Responsive Community* 1991-92:89).

Bill Bradley, then the Democratic Senator from New Jersey, and a future Presidential candidate in 2000, sent the following letter to the Communitarian Network concerning their Teach-In.

Thank you for sharing with me a copy of 'The Responsive Communitarian Platform'[sic]. It is a thoughtful and articulate contribution to the current political discourse. I agree with many of the ideas contained in the Platform, and look forward to hearing them debated throughout our nation. Please keep me posted on your progress (Bradley to Etzioni, 2.10.92, reprinted in *Responsive Community* 1992:xx).

Finally, the Bush administration's Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Jack Kemp (who would be replaced under the Clinton Gore Administration by Communitarian Network member Henry Cisneros) wrote the following note that was read to the assembly by Etzioni:

I extend my warm greetings and best wishes as you gather on Capital Hill. I applaud your efforts to encourage and shape the dialogue on fostering strong, healthy communities rooted in a shared sense of rights and responsibilities. Our Founding Fathers viewed democracy as a common commitment to a common good. The extremes of either excessive individualism or majority oppression could best be tempered they believed, by a society centered firmly on common purposes---from families and churches to neighborhoods and communities...

The questions you raise---questions of individual liberty and common obligation---go to the very heart of American self-government. Good luck and Godspeed as you continue this noble mission (RR 1991/92:23).

These statements, along with 1,100 other "spontaneous letters of support" (Communitarian Network FAQ 1995), indicate that, apart from media access, the initial efforts of the Communitarian Network were also directed towards elected officials and policy makers. The platform, as Bradley's letter alludes, was distributed to all members of the House and Senate. The Communitarian Network's FAQ cited both media coverage and the support of political leaders as the group's major accomplishment to date. The Communitarian Network "garnered media coverage in major newspapers, *National Public Radio*, and *C-Span*; the number of references...in the press increasing from nearly nothing in 1989 to over four hundred in 1993" (FAQ 1995).

Then, in one of those wonderful events that can only happen in an Epicurean universe, the Communitarian Network's Second Annual Teach-In took place on the same day that Vice-President Dan Quayle delivered his Murphy Brown/Family Values speech. In San Francisco, Quayle announced himself as a future Presidential candidate under the banner of the Religious Right. Murphy Brown, a fictional, single,

professional, and pregnant, character on one of the top rated situation-comedies of the day was declared symptomatic of a hedonistic Hollywood establishment and an indication of the kind of immorality that directly contributes to "the moral decay of our cities and our nation". While Quayle was making his pitch to the Right,⁸ in New York City the Second Annual Teach-In was turning out to be a great success. This gathering was more than twice the size of the first, with more than 200 participants and co-sponsored by the People for the American Way and the American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities---"a communitarian public interest law firm." closely allied both ideologically and organizationally to the Communitarian Network. This Teach-In was followed by the congressional testimony by representatives of the Communitarian Network regarding Quayle's call for restoring "family values". The testimony, from *Atlantic* contributor Barbara Defoe Whitehead, Etzioni, and Harvard Law Professor Mary Ann Glendon amongst others, was generally supportive of Quayle's position, but voiced concern over its potential excesses (*Reuters Daily Report Card*). What was especially noted was the need "to recapture [the issue of family values] from the religious right and recast it" as a middle class issue (Feinsilber 1992, see also Vobejda 1993). Through the adoption of "pro-family" policies, "family Values" the issue might be transformed into "a mainstream issue" and useful for the rising New Democrats led by Bill Clinton (Vobejda 1993, *American Political Network* 1993).

During this time, two additional indicators of the increased attention given the Communitarian Network can be found. First, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) rose on the floor of the Senate to ask, in reference to the perceived loss of moral values and traditions of America, "Where did the train leave the tracks?" (1992 *Congressional Record* S-11061). For the answer, he turned to Etzioni's communitarian writings on the

⁸Brown 1992. John Fiske also does a gloss on this in his *Media Matters*, but it is painfully shallow.

importance of family and education to the moral foundation of American society, and concluded with a general endorsement of communitarianism. This speech coincided with the release by the Communitarian Network of a position paper on the family in conjunction with their congressional testimony and intensified lobbying in the wake of Quayle's speech.

In addition to Gore, Durenburger, Simpson, etc., the Communitarian Network caught the attention of several other members of Congress. Rep. Wolf, described in the *Congressional Directory* as "a Republican first elected in 1980 from a district most of which was inside the Beltway, an earnest hard-working politician. "and a voting record described as "very conservative" (1993:1327-1328). He approvingly refers to the Communitarian Network during Floor speeches in January and April of 1993. Rep. Abercrombie (D-HI) suggests that a "communitarian perspective" might help restart the Arab-Israeli negotiations (1993 CR E-2499). Representative Sweet (D-NH) extolled the moral and civic values that the Communitarian Network seeks to foster, values which he said necessitated his introduction of the Congressional Accountability Act (1994 Congressional Record H-80). He later stated that "Etzioni's *Spirit of Community* is required reading" during his speech introducing the Government Reform and Savings Act of 1994 (HR-3400)

A second instance deserving notice was the first time "communitarian considerations" were explicitly used in a Federal Court's decision. As noted earlier, communitarianism had gained a good deal of attention in the law reviews, but on a practical level, it had little impact on the practice of the law. But here, in the case of *USA v. Conception, et al.* (*Federal Supplement* 795:1262), a judge in a criminal trial based his ruling and sentencing on "communitarian considerations". *Conception* was at the time the largest welfare fraud case. The 42 defendants, most of them case workers

and recipients who assumed multiple identities, were accused and convicted of defrauding the various social welfare programs of Moneys and services totaling \$4 million.⁹

During the summer of 1992, the Communitarian Network sought media exposure even more aggressively. The spirit of community not being quite extensive enough to cover job security, the Communitarian Network replaced its Promotion Manager as well as the editor of *The Responsive Community*. As seen in Chart One, what might be called the bottom line for the Communitarian Network---the number of monthly mentions in the press---certainly increased after this time. But it is unclear whether this was due to any action by the Communitarian Network, or to more momentous events.

The Election of 1992

Certainly, nothing could have supplied greater opportunities for both media access and policy interventions than the presidential campaign and election of Bill Clinton in 1992. Four members of Clinton's first administration were endorsers of the Communitarian Platform. Etzioni described the influence of the Communitarian Network on Clinton's administration in an interview for the trade-paper *Legal Times*: One of the founders of the communitarian movement was William Galston, a professor of public affairs and an influential member of the Progressive Policy Institute--- the think tank connected to the Democratic Leadership Council and associated with Clinton. Galston and another founding member, Daniel Yankelovich, presented detailed papers during a Democratic retreat in New Orleans in which Clinton participated. I prepared a statement on communitarian thinking and policies, which the Progressive Policy Institute distributed to all members of the 1992 Democratic Convention. Galston now serves... as deputy assistant to the President for Domestic Policy... Henry Cisneros, an endorsee of

⁹While the crime was the largest of its kind, it pales in comparison to Medicare frauds committed by doctors and companies. One private elder care unit in Brooklyn was indicted for stealing over \$100 million in Medicare funds.

the communitarian platform, serves as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. Alice Rivlin, who served on the board of a communitarian public-interest law firm, The American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities, serves now as Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (1993h).

In addition, Isabel V. Sawhill, another early endorser of the Communitarian Platform, served as Director of Human Resources under Rivlin. Galston, along with Etzioni and Mary Ann Glendon, drafted the Communitarian Platform. Glendon, being a Harvard Law Professor, took a position more removed from politics. She served as head of the Vatican's delegation to the International Year of the Woman Conference in Beijing.

Clinton's victory was quickly followed by a steady increase in press attention (Table X). It was in the midst of Clinton's transition that Etzioni's popular statement of communitarian politics, *The Spirit of Community*, was published. Soon, it was noticed to occupy a conspicuous spot on the President's desk (*Time*, Summer, 1993). Clinton's election and Etzioni's treatise are important moments in the political intervention of communitarianism. At the same time, they mark the moment of the internal crisis within the Communitarian Network. A long simmering debate within the organization over grassroots organizing emerged (Beardsley 1993). The members of the Communitarian Network had looked upon themselves as "opinion leaders" and not an organization located within any particular community---except the national one. The initial response of "community leaders" that so pleased Etzioni resulted in many activists coming to the Communitarian Network. But they came with an orientation towards local organizing, and not towards media and federal level intervention. As Beardsley's report of the sessions at the 2nd annual meeting of the Network indicates, they were unable to resolve the issue. Any decisions on the issue were postponed in the wake of Clinton's victory. This amounted to a de facto resolution in favor of remaining "opinion leaders". Although the rhetoric of the Communitarian Network continues to

include many references to the necessity of local organization, it sees its role as "opinion leadership".

The quick success of the Communitarian Network was also a liability. Clinton's selection of Galston, Revlin, Cisneros, and Gore effectively removed them from any formal connections to the organization. It also meant that the four lost the ability to make explicit statements in support of the Communitarian Network, though not, it is true of communitarianism in general. The exceptions to this were occasional short pieces appearing in the *Responsive Community*, which for obvious political reasons always strictly adhered to the existing policy of the Clinton Administration. On the other hand, the prominence of members of the communitarian Network in the administration led to a number of White House conferences on such issues as the 1994 conference on "The Protection and Development of Public Spaces," which concerned such topics as gun-sweeps in public housing, and the series of annual White House Conferences on Character Building and Education. Many of these were sponsored by Galston's Office of Domestic Policy in conjunction with the Communitarian Network and other allied organizations.

Success left Etzioni as the principal public spokesperson for communitarianism.¹⁰ With the movement of so many members into the government, the Communitarian Network's activities shifted to issuing policy statements addressed to administration officials on such issues as the family, health care (4/28/93) and violence (8/30/93). Etzioni's new prominence also coincides with the moment when the connections between communitarianism and the discipline of sociology become

¹⁰In all of the questionnaires and conversations with communitarians in preparation for this dissertation, Etzioni was consistently ranked in the top three in terms of promoting the public awareness of communitarianism. This may be the result of his singular effort in promoting communitarianism, or perhaps the result of his being the most prominent spokesperson not already in government.

increasingly important for sociological theory, the maintenance of disciplinary boundaries, and social policy. This perhaps makes sense of his occupation of the dual position in 1992 as President of the American Sociological Association and President of the Communitarian Network.

The formal, or institutional, confluence of the Communitarian Network and sociology began during the years 1994 and 1995. During this time, there emerged significant indications of not only communitarianism's debt to sociology, but perhaps more importantly, particular ideological camps within sociology began to look to communitarianism for intellectual and institutional support. To understand this linkage, we have to look at the status of sociology as a discipline in recent years.

The Decline of Sociology and the Rise of Communitarianism

It is widely held, though not universally, that sociology as a discipline is in crisis. The reasons given for this crisis vary with the agenda of the analyst, but there seems to be general agreement that the crisis is both theoretical and institutional. Gouldner had already noted with some enthusiasm the coming crisis in Western sociology as early as 1970, while Parsons still lived. But more often the loudest pseudo-Cassandras have come from the "mainstream" of the discipline. Horowitz has decried the "decomposition of sociology" (19xx). Pearson calls the discipline "sadly dilapidated" (1995). In June 1998, *Footnotes*, the ASA's monthly newsletter, featured a call for members to submit booklists for local bookstores. It seems that the editors of *Contemporary Sociology* had noticed the disappearance of a distinct sociology section in the stores, as well as the infiltration of "non-sociological" texts. A special issue of *Sociological Forum* was devoted to the question of "What is Wrong with Sociology?" (1994). Two related answers stood out amidst the plethora of name-calling and finger-pointing at the "non-sociological." First, the loss of disciplinary prestige, which

is bound up with the loss of disciplinary cohesion and boundaries. These problems are to be found on both a theoretical and an institutional level. The theoretical challenges take the form of multicultural and New Social Movement attacks on classical sociological theory and methodological assumptions, the critique of the domination of sociological discourse by a will to scientificity, a closely allied critique of the uses of sociological knowledge in the formation of social policy, and the loss of disciplinary boundaries occasioned by the success of these challenges. Aronowitz places these challenges in the context of the rise of Cultural Studies, limited acceptance of Women's Studies, and the emergence of multiculturalism as transdisciplinary critiques. Aronowitz and DiFazio's "Taxonomy of Teacher Work" (1994) provides a remarkably frank discussion of the changes in academia as a workplace, as a site of knowledge production, and the problems resulting from the consolidation and elimination of programs.

The institutional challenges to sociology are not at all separate from the theoretical and practical ones. And with the challenge to the boundaries of sociology comes the loss of relevance to social policy formation. The possibility that sociology could continue providing its contribution to governmentality was in doubt. It was revealed for all to see that if sociology was to maintain its disciplinary coherence, it would have to contribute more to governing than surveys and statistics. Given these conflicts and crises within sociology, a political intervention seeking to promote nothing less than the revitalization of American society using "elementary sociological facts" as the basis for its platform might appear as divine intervention. But there is more to the relationship between sociology and communitarianism than coincidence.

The first annual meeting of the Communitarian Network was held in conjunction with the Annual Meeting of the ASA in Los Angeles in August 1994. The

Communitarian Network meeting was announced in *Footnotes*, the monthly publication of the ASA. By this time, Etzioni had already been voted President-elect of the ASA. Immediately, in keeping with his office of ASA President-elect, Etzioni announced the next meeting in Washington would be called the Community of Communities, and serve as a vehicle for the further linkage of Communitarianism and sociology as well as the Communitarian Network and the ASA.¹¹ At the meeting of the Communitarian Network, he was also voted President of the Communitarian Network.

The formal confluence of the Communitarian Network and sociology as a discipline began in Los Angeles in August 1994, but the relationship became even more obvious at the next ASA meeting in Washington in 1995. Just one day prior to the meeting, a Theory Day focusing on the work of Etzioni was held. The selection of the meeting theme, as well as the organization of the most important panels, was Etzioni's by right of being President-elect and Chair of the Program Committee. The theme and the meeting highlighted the now overt intersection of sociology and communitarianism at both the theoretical and practical levels. The theme of the meeting, "Community of Communities: Shaping Our Future," was a direct reference to the oft-mentioned Communitarian Network's description of the United States as "a community of communities". The thematic statement aptly demonstrates the Communitarian Network's influence on the meeting, as well as the move to make the questions of community again the center of sociological work:

From Los Angeles to Bosnia, from India to Canada, various communities have identified themselves along ethnic, racial, gender, national, religious, and other lines. Must they be blended away to ensure civility? Or, can we have a

¹¹ In the meantime, communitarianism was getting increased international attention. Translations of the Communitarian Platform could be found in the coffee shops of Prague (Krysl, Personal Communication). Additional media attention was afforded communitarianism and the Communitarian Network with Tony Blair's "New Labour." Media reports in Great Britain explained Blair's purging of the Labour party's socialist wing and his "Clintoneques" style as illustrative of his adoption of communitarian rhetoric. "Advisers to [Blair] can quote Mr. Etzioni at the drop of a hat" (*Economist* 1994-95).

society of vying tribes without shared bonds and values? Or, can there be a shared framework in which many colorful elements find a new place? And what shall such a community of communities be--urban? national? cross-national?

Subsidiary to these over-arching questions are the basic questions: What makes a community? Is the family an essential unit? Is character education required? How are neighborhoods best composed and how do they best govern themselves? What is the role of shared values, symbols, practices and institutions?

How to ensure a balance between individual rights and social responsibilities? Between socially prescribed roles and personal autonomy and self expression?

We shall seek to bring to bear the methodological, practical, and theoretical tools, the findings and insights of sociologists, to examine substantive issues that face our social world, and to suggest future directions (1995 ASA Annual Meeting program).

There was more than just this statement that evidenced the increasingly close relationship between the formal organization of sociology and the Communitarian Network at the 1995 meeting. It is not just a matter of being able to set the theme of the conference. The ASA president plays a significant part in the organization of panels and the selection of participants. In effect, Etzioni could use the meeting to enhance the legitimacy of communitarianism within the discipline of sociology; to identify communitarianism with, as Selznick says, the central problems of sociology. Of the 479 panel sessions, 78 are listed as being organized specifically on the communitarian theme of the conference. In any given year, these sessions are considered the most prestigious panels.¹² Etzioni's Presidential Address to the meeting began with a statement that boldly linking sociology to social policy:

My thesis is that sociology can provide a compelling answer to an age old problem, an exit from an entrapping dilemma: how to maintain both social order and personal autonomy in one and the same society; in other words, how to

¹² The President is given control of about 20 percent of the sessions, which in 1995 included: 1 Presidential Plenary, 3 Thematic Plenary Sessions, 18 Thematic Sessions, and 56 Special Sessions. The Washington meeting was also the largest meeting to date of the ASA, with over 5000 members attending.

construct a society that protects its members from one another---from civil war to violent crime---and does so without oppressing them (1996:1)

Etzioni uses the names of Parsons, Marx, and Freud as “markers to indicate the intellectual place of my presentation and more generally, communitarian thinking [but]...I reference their theories merely to place the discussion in a context” (1996:2).

This context is the context of sociological theory.

I put forth, then, that *there is a fundamental contradiction between society's need for order and the individual's quest for autonomy....I maintain that this fundamental contradiction can be reduced by means other than fitting people into social roles --- namely, by rendering the social order more responsible to the members true needs* (1996:3, emphasis in original).

Parsons is only partially useful for Etzioni; Parson's vision of a normative order is flawed, Etzioni says, because socialization is never complete. Etzioni maintains that Marx's influence is slight because Marx “defines away” what are for Etzioni the fundamental contradictions of human life---order and autonomy, society and individual, and community--- through his emphasis on class conflict and the specificity of knowledge and morality. Freud is slightly more useful to Etzioni, because Freud shows us that civilization is a thin veneer. However, Etzioni says that Freud unfortunately does not allow for the possibility of “recasting” society.

True needs, according to Etzioni, are distinguished from those “falsely implanted” by the degree to which they persist when socialization and social control are removed. If they persist, then they express the “true nature” of “a people” (1996:30). After this, he no longer makes any distinction in the text between sociology and communitarianism. The slippage discloses the degree to which Etzioni implicitly agrees with writers like Selznick and Wolfe. Etzioni does not notice that he shifts from a discussion of the relation of sociology to communitarianism, and towards the discussion of communitarianism as no different from sociology

Etzioni reports the following comment made by Selznick during a session of the 1995 meeting: "Much of the communitarian writing of the 1980s by non-sociologists [mostly in law reviews] focused on remaking this basic sociological point: there are no well formed individuals bereft of social bonds or culture" (1996:4). My notes from that session are in general agreement with Etzioni, except that I indicated Selznick's statement as being about sociologists as well as non-sociologists, concluding that "there is little difference between a communitarian perspective and a proper sociological perspective" (Selznick, notes in possession of the author). According to Selznick, MacIntyre and Sandel are "doing sociology". Sociology and communitarianism are in fundamental agreement regarding the nature of the social self, and that communitarians are simply following "the historic tendency of sociologists to criticize autonomic actors". Selznick has made these points in a published article as well (1987).

When his address ended, and after taking applause, Etzioni returned to offer a few personal remarks that he did not want to include in the official text of his address. Join the debate over the relation between communitarianism and sociology, join the debate over the future of community, but "be prepared to be attacked, be prepared for innuendo and deceit, and to have hurtful things said about you". He furthered complained about the attacks on communitarians from the left.¹³

Etzioni declared that sociology has a stake in society, and that sociology is a knowledge vitally necessary for the "recasting" of society. Sociology, and its political

¹³Worried by rumors that there might be protests at the meeting over the communitarian theme, Etzioni sent a pre-emptive letter to the Progressive Sociologist Network discussion list.

I, along with Celia Winkler, wrote a response to Etzioni, which was endorsed by c. 300 signatories from seven countries, most of whom were sociologists, graduate students, or other academics, but included five trade unionists and several non-academics. The text and the extended E-mail discussion that followed has been edited and archived on the PSN site at www.csf.colorado.edu/psn and from the author

companion communitarianism, can offer solutions to social problems, solutions that offer little threat to the normative order, or status quo, of either the society or the discipline. And it is a discipline, we should remember, that is in a state of "confusion" on the nature of its role in society. Etzioni's presidential address would be published, albeit in a highly edited and revised form, in the *American Sociological Review* (Etzioni 1996).¹⁴

A Blasted Landscape

In a critique of the extent of the communitarian influence in the discipline, Pearson refers to sociology as a "blasted landscape," reminiscent of the very landscapes of the "inner-city" that sociologists used to position themselves within the institutional structures of the welfare-state (cf. Cauthen 1998). First, Pearson defends sociology, the "Queen of the Sciences," from reformers of any kind. "For those interested in understanding social phenomena rather than proscribing social outcomes---that is, for those interested in the practice of a broadly useful sociology---the task before us is to mount a palace coup to oust ideology from the court of the sadly dilapidated Queen of the Sciences" (1995:na). The problem with communitarianism, according to Pearson, is not so much its reformism, but that its political intervention is worn on its sleeve. Like Pearson, communitarians are explicit in their desire for sociology to be relevant. But they are also clear about the kind of political intervention they want to make and what groups this intervention will help and harm.

¹⁴One curiosity of the meeting was the heavy marketing presence of the Technidyne Corporation, maker of the "TV Guardian". Just two months before *USA Today* reported that

A Miami company - beating Congress to the punch - is selling a \$ 129.95 TV remote control that allows parents to block any shows they don't want their kids to watch. "We formulated this a year ago when everyone was talking about TV violence and the effect it has on children," said Emily Andorra of Technidyne Corp., makers of TV Guardian. The product is similar to the "V" chips that members of Congress are considering requiring on new TVs. (June 14, 1995).

One wonders if Technidyne actually saw the convened sociologists as prospective buyers or as prospective supporters and unofficial marketing agents.

Pearson, let us be clear, is no friend of the left. He condemns Etzioni's turn to communitarianism as "the latest chapter in a career-long effort to elevate Marxist doctrine to a central place in contemporary sociological thought" (1995) Pearson's is speaking from the position of Traditional Theory, in the sense that American sociology derived Weber's sociology via the writings and interpretations of Talcott Parsons. His article has two critiques of communitarianism as adopted by sociology, but only one is relevant to us here. Pearson objects to the connection between sociology and social policy that communitarianism would like to promote.¹⁵

The point is not that sociology should regain its position as the intellectual adjunct of the welfare-state. Pearson actually wants sociology to disassociate itself from its practice of recommending remedies for social problems and the provision and evaluation of social welfare services. It too messy and too close to the pathological elements of society. Sociology, Pearson asserts, must focus on the objective analysis of social policy. Pearson does not elaborate on this, but the work of Cauthen (1998) suggests that what is at stake here is whether sociology contribute to social policy will continue to focus its attention on social pathology, turn towards a more detached, "scientific," stance, or take a critical path, which is the least likely, at least in the short term. Even Pearson admits that sociology must sometimes return to its traditional social reformist roots. But first "what the discipline and those it serves urgently require these days are clear heads and clearer thinking. For it is these and these alone, that make our discipline useful as an academic enterprise and as a tool for informing social policy" (1995:na). Sociology must become "militantly anti-ideological" if it is to pull back from "the brink of academic extinction and practical irrelevancy". Well, such an escape from

¹⁵His other critique concerns the lack of empirical, objective, and scientific findings on the nature of community.

ideology has been long sought and never achieved. It is more interesting to note that if we follow the logic of Pearson's argument, practical relevancy for the efficient functioning of government is the fundamental reason for sociology's existence. Sociological questions are inherently tied to questions of government. What Pearson doesn't get, because he is writing solely from within the discipline, is that sociology embraces its use by government in the formation of public policy. It is precisely because of its status as "scientific knowledge" that sociology is "happily not at war, but in alliance with the social order and practice" (Lombroso 1911:379). In fact, sociology can not be distinguished from this relation to public policy which is why it always *appears* liberal, because it is always concerned with social conflicts, policies, and most importantly, social reform.

The communitarian intervention is necessitated precisely because of the relationship between sociology and social policy. In fact, that the communitarian intervention in the one area can not be disentangled from its intervention in the others highlights the degree to which sociology and policy are dependent upon each other. Sociology finds its relevance, and its institutional justification, in its service to government. The work of government can not be conducted without disciplines like sociology. Power is blind, as Foucault remarks, so it must acquire apparatuses for surveillance, and sociological knowledge has been one key apparatus. *With a new science, so too is a new historical actor constituted.* Sociology has effects. The success of the communitarians in academia can not be disentangled from their success in politics. Communitarianism in this respect goes beyond criminology, which obviously serves the purposes of government and authority, but criminology, unlike communitarianism, lacks a coherent set of ideological practices.

Internal Conflicts

The movement of communitarians from academia to government and back occasioned some problems for the Communitarian Network. Many in the Communitarian Network felt that the organization's members functioned best as "opinion leaders" rather than as organizers of community or grass-roots level interventions. The rhetoric of the Communitarian Network certainly emphasized the importance of local organizations, community level policy initiatives, and personal responsibility to the local community. The Communitarian Platform speaks of the need to "join together to form active communities that seek to reinvigorate the moral and social order" (in Etzioni 1993a:267). These active communities are nothing less than the spaces where "seedbeds of civic virtue are patiently nurtured" (1993a:267).

The Second Annual Conference of the Communitarian Network featured a panel on "Building the Communitarian Movement". The panel's primary purpose was to address the question of the proper role of the Communitarian Network given the need for both local organization and national influence.. According to Beardsley, Ann McBride of *Common Cause*, began the session by arguing that "What is needed is a nationwide, grassroots movement that catches the imagination of the masses: We have to reach out to those disaffected with the political system. While many of the participants agreed, it was also noted that the Communitarian Network was at a crossroads: it could either engage in outreach to try to become a mass political movement, or it could claim the high ground as a opinion leader for those already involved in civic affairs. One participant said that it would be a classic mistake to try to grow the movement too quickly....No formal decision was reached....The unspoken consensus seemed to be, however, that it should be the 'opinion leader' route. One participant said privately that the communitarian movement lacks the specific focus needed for a mass movement.... (Beardsley 1995).

The informal decision to maintain the position of the Communitarian Network as opinion leaders, which helped produce their success, also contributed to its failure to

commit resources to the creation of a grass roots organization. The resources that were expended in this area came as by products of their extensive coverage in the media. The policy of opinion leadership was also practical, as the Communitarian Network had lost many members to the Clinton Administration, as well as members like Beardsley to more activist organizations. One former member of the Communitarian Network said

I formally joined the Communitarian Network a few years ago, but dropped out when I realized that it was modeled 'top --> down'. It was interesting to hear of national meetings and Washington agendas, but really rather pointless when my interest lay in finding others of a 'communitarian mind set' who live in and around my community. It would be better, I think, for the Network to improve networking at least as much as it debates national agendas -- otherwise there is no constituency (personal communication).

One member put the issue in terms of the practice of community building:

Basically, I'm trying to understand how communitarianism looks in terms of implementation. Although I am not that well read, I find communitarian ideas very appealing theoretically and philosophically....I have been involved in community building work for several years....Despite the seemingly great similarities between communitarianism and community building work (which is advocated largely, but not entirely by non-profits and philanthropic foundations), there is a curious disconnection between these two movements.... (personal communication).

Another member of the network described the situation in these terms:

"In my view, the problem lies in the difficulty of organizing movements today. Etzioni tried (is trying?) to start a Communitarian Movement. While academics will cooperate, neither they nor Etzioni knows how to motivate large numbers of people to participate in developing a movement on an ongoing basis. The nation and the world is [sic] extremely fragmented. Something as vague as communitarianism won't pull it together" (personal communication/response to written questions).

Of course, not everyone was pessimistic about this. And certainly many individual communitarians see themselves as active participants in grass-roots organizations, and not only as opinion leaders. And they are more optimistic, and realistic, about the communitarian movement as a whole.

...lots of organizations/movements are being started every day. If

they "meet the market", they survive. If communitarianism is indeed vague... no, it probably won't survive as a "movement"--but perhaps as an ideological thread in the fabric of political discourse. Not an entirely dismal outcome (personal communication).

I think that communitarianism is an important social and theoretical movement, in general. I read whatever I can get my hands on.....I even teach this aspect in some of my classes and public lectures. However, as a religious person and community activist, I have a sense that there needs to be more engagement between communitarian "believers" and their own neighborhoods and social worlds. My praxis has to be introduced and acted up. As well, I have a sense (and please correct me on all these points if I am missing the bigger picture) that religious ideas and systems which are deeply communitarian (Catholicism, in my case) seem to be sidelined, or not engaged in this process. (Even Bellah and James Coleman write pages on social communitarian theory of Catholicism in their work). I am not sure if there is mistrust (that would be sad) or plain anti-religious (anti-secular on the part of religious types) in engaging in on-going dialogue(personal communication).

I would wonder if we have more community than ever. It is just of a different kind (personal communication).

We do seem to have lost or weakened many paths to community we used to have in this country, but they are certainly not all gone. I can think of many, characterized by families, religious groups, fraternal organizations, some neighborhoods (we're not all afraid to walk around at night), schools, etc. As personal examples, my extended family, my church group, the Boy Scouts (I'm a Scoutmaster), and my neighborhood, while all clearly imperfect, all fit the description [of community] (personal communication).

Of course, the role of opinion leader is not very far from that of educator, which returns us again to the close relationship between the Communitarian Network and academia, especially sociology and social policy. The results of this decision, which to some seemed a forgone conclusion, can only be fully explored by shifting our attention away from the organizational history of the Communitarian Network, and towards communitarianism as an ideological practice. While there might be some doubt as to the possibility of making communitarianism a coherent ideological ideology, that does

not result from any lack of trying. In the next chapter, we will turn to the consideration of communitarianism as an ideological practice.

CHAPTER THREE

Community Against Materialism: Notes on Communitarian Social Philosophy

The Call of Community and the "Proliferation of Discourse"

Communitarians have mounted a determined attack on liberalism and liberalism's conception of the individual as unencumbered and autonomous. They reject the conception of the autonomous individual self, which is the starting point of Enlightenment liberalism. Communitarians argue that the individual is a social construction and is constituted through her socialization into a community. In the place of the "Aufklärer" (Taylor 1989:564), the bearer of Enlightenment, their aim is to create communities whose members are its representations. Instead of community being a representation of its members, communitarians refer to community as the real subject of history, and its members as its constructs. In the ideological practice of the communitarians, real human beings produce themselves, but each becomes a little communities wherein discipline is combined responsibility, duty, obligation, punishment, and pleasure. We are all little communities, the communitarians tell us, because *community* (and not *social production*) is prior to us. Like the New/Christian Right, communitarianism seeks the "restoration of the moral fabric" of American society, and like the New and Christian Right, communitarian ideological practices pivot upon the linkage of family, community, and the authority to impose obligations. But this similarity is a matter of strategic convergence rather than common origins. Communitarianism emerged during the late Cold War era alongside a host of other "New Social Movements." Like these, it has its origins in the middle classes, and has its own constellation of progressive and conservative tendencies.

The juxtaposition of a denial of the actual conditions of real human beings with the idealization of community is not so strange when we consider the call of community. "Community is not a referential sign but a call or appeal. What is called for is not some objective reference. The call of community aims at response, at calling back. The call of community initiates a conversation in writing, disseminates, and desires the proliferation of discourse" (Singer 1991:125).

At first, the use of the term might bring to mind the insights of Weber in the *Protestant Ethic*. The spiritual aspect of the call was of vital importance for Weber. "The concept of calling," he said, "brings out that central dogma of all Protestant denominations....The only way of living acceptably to God was not to surpass worldly morality in monastic asceticism, but solely through the fulfillment of the obligations imposed upon the individual by his position in the world. That was his calling" (1998:80). For Weber, calling was a concept deeply effected by historical circumstances and one that contained an implicit "valuation of the fulfillment of duty in worldly affairs as the highest form which the moral activity of the individual could assume. This is what inevitably gave every-day worldly activity a religious significance, and which first created the conception of a calling in this sense" (1998:80). This concept of calling had existed since Athens, he says, but our understanding of its "meaning...is new, a product of the Reformation". What is really a historical concept, Weber tells us, we experience and believe to an aspect of an unchanging cosmic order.

It is the religious aspect of the calling that came to be experienced in "every-day worldly activity," and it is the religious aspect of the call to community that appears most often when we respond. The truth of Singer's statement for communitarianism becomes clearer if we consider Heidegger's view instead of Weber's: "the essence of mortals calls upon them to heed a call that beckons them toward death" (Heidegger

1984:101). While it might be that Heidegger intends that death act to call us towards life, such a formation puts a death above life and the denial of life is always at the core of abstraction. It is this *religious* aspect---the *deathly* aspect--- of the call that sets it against the materialism, for materialism is at its core anti-religious precisely because religion sets death above and against life itself. Epicurus, Lucretius, Nietzsche, Marx, Deleuze, Spinoza, and Engels each held this view materialist critique of religion. And did not Freud remind us of the close connection between “churches---communities of believers---and armies” (1937:178)?

Within the context of “everyday worldly activity” imbued with “religious significance,” the call of community takes on a double function. On the one hand, the call of community appears as seemingly politically progressive call to intensified human interaction. This is surely the sense in which Sargent takes it. On the other hand, which hides a view of life which receives its meaning through a from a hierarchy where death has power over life. The call of community intensifies the workings of what Horkheimer called the “cultural apparatus”. The call of community functions within this cultural apparatus: “One function of the entire cultural apparatus at any given period has been to internalize in [humans] of subordinate position the idea of a necessary domination of some men over others, as determined by the course of history down to the present time” (Horkheimer 1972:67). The call of community is not a call to emancipation, but to security (Nietzsche 1967). Community “calls us back” to the security of a community, we need only exchange our pound of flesh for thirty pieces of silver and the contract is sealed. This security has many expressions, but the desire for it produces the mystification of everyday life that is common in communitarian ideological practice. The call of community, as it is a mystical calling, can not in itself account for the “proliferation of discourse” that has arisen around communitarianism

social philosophy. Instead, we must examine the communitarian writings on the desire---which they claim each of us shares---for the security of community. For without community, we are told, we are “clanless and lawless and hearthless” (Aristotle 1958:5).

Three early works constitute a starting point for this proliferation of discourse: Alasdair MacIntyre's *After Virtue* and Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton's *Habits of the Heart*, Charles Taylor's *Sources of the Self*. These works lay out the theoretical critique of liberalism that is as a starting point for understanding the communitarian concern for family, community, and obligation. These works also point to the need for the political intervention that the Communitarian Network was soon to undertake.

MacIntyre and the New “Dark Ages”

MacIntyre argues that the “critical moral opposition” is between liberal individualism and the Aristotelian tradition of humans as political animals. Neither sociology nor moral philosophy have been able to supply us with a “rationally defensible statement” justifying liberal individualism. Marxism, the last great hope of Enlightenment, is “exhausted as a political *tradition*... this exhaustion being shared by the other political traditions of our culture” (1984:262 emphasis in original).¹⁶

MacIntyre's critique gives philosophical expression to some of the central themes of communitarianism. MacIntyre discloses the centrality of the desire for the security of belonging to a community. The multiplying social conflicts which characterize our “dark age” are both the cause and effect of this desire for the security from the “sure injuries” which await anyone outside of the community. The coupling of

¹⁶It is curious that MacIntyre argues from the standpoint of Reason against Enlightenment individualism. Universal History, Reason, and the doctrine of the individual, as different as Foucault (1970) and Cassirer (1951) have shown, albeit differently, were inseparable.

desire to a vision of the decline of society and the siege of community we will later find again in the form of the communitarian desire for a return to the "moral community".

"A moral philosophy characteristically presupposes a sociology" (1984:22).

Communitarians reject the conception of the autonomous individual. Like everything in society, the individual is seen as the production of community. In general, communitarians argue for a radical social constructionist approach to the individual. But a central problem arises in the communitarian discourse. The bonds of community are often categories, such as "race," gender, or ethnicity, that they take to be *natural*, just as community itself is assumed to be natural: "The polis belongs to the class of things that exist by nature, and that man is by nature an animal intended to live in a polis" (Aristotle 1958:5). The bonds of community might therefore also be the boundaries of exclusion. Identity and folkish identification work both ways, after all. This difficulty is temporarily postponed because both arguments, radical constructivism and essential identity, are used for the critique of liberal individualism. The problem is less troubling for many, as their primary theoretical target, Enlightenment individualism, must be attacked with all means available, even of this makes for an occasional odd mixture of weaponry.

MacIntyre begins and ends his critique of individualism with the apocalyptic assertion that we have already begun a "new dark ages" that parallels the era following the fall of Rome. MacIntyre starts with a vision of dystopia, or better, a utopia as it suffers its fall into dystopia. "A series of environmental disaster are blamed by the general public on the scientists. Widespread riots occur, laboratories are burnt down, physicists are lynched, books and instruments are destroyed. Finally a Know Nothing political movement takes power and successfully abolishes science teaching in schools and universities, imprisoning and executing the remaining scientists. Later still there is

a reaction against this destructive movement and enlightened people seek to revive science, although they have largely forgotten what it was. But all they have are fragments...." 1984:1). This is the current state of moral philosophy and its "implicit sociology," MacIntyre believes, and this view is the core of *After Virtue*: "The hypothesis which I wish to advance is that in the actual world in which we inhabit the language of morality is in the same state of grave disorder as the language of natural science in the imaginary world which I described....we have---very largely, if not entirely---lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality" (1984:2). This is the basic fact of the present era, and "if it is true, we are all already in a state so disastrous that there are no large remedies for it" (1984:5).

Hard-headedly opposed to angst as "a cultural luxury that we have to dispense with in order to survive in these hard times" (1984:5), MacIntyre says hope arises from the potential for community to be a secure refuge for the carriers of true moral values and knowledge. This is when MacIntyre announces his communitarian vision. MacIntyre argues that the only hope is to construct "new forms of community within which the moral life could be sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us.... [Unlike Rome] This time, however, the barbarians are not waiting beyond the frontier; they have already been governing us for quite some time" (1984:263).

For MacIntyre, social problems are immune to sociological explanation and reform. Certainly this is true in the present era, when the crisis has reached such a level that it can only be addressed by a strategic withdrawal into enclaves of enlightenment. MacIntyre envisions a future when Western civilization is preserved in small, geographically dispersed, monastic communities: utopias amid spaces of anarchy and fascism. Within these gated or otherwise enclosed communities, Western civilization will bide its time until its opponents exhaust or exterminate themselves. Then it will

emerge to bring order to chaos, learning to the ignorant, and moral discipline to the new primitives. The historical reference for MacIntyre remains throughout the fall of Rome, a subject that we will encounter again.

A crucial turning point ...occurred when men and women of good will turned aside from the task of shoring up the Roman imperium and ceased to identify the continuation of civility and moral community with the maintenance of that imperium. What they set themselves to achieve instead---often not recognizing fully what they were doing--- was the construction of new forms of community within which the moral life could be sustained so that both morality and civility might survive the coming age of barbarism and darkness. If my account of our moral condition is correct, we ought also to conclude that for some time now we have reached that turning point. What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us. And if the tradition of the virtues was able to survive the horrors of the last dark ages, we are not entirely without grounds for hope. This time however the barbarians are not waiting beyond the frontiers; they have already been governing us for quite some time. And it is our lack of consciousness of this that constitutes part of our predicament. We are waiting not for Godot, but for another---doubtless very different---St. Benedict (1984:263).¹⁷

Here we can see why MacIntyre does not refer to himself as a communitarian---even though he has a considerable reputation and influence as such---because he has no faith in the possibility that sociology or any other human science can generate the kinds of knowledge that will save us. No tinkering with the machinery will suffice. The collapse has already begun and like those in the far flung

¹⁷St. Benedict, "Father of Monks" (Male 1949:54), founder of the Benedictine order. "wrote the basic rules that have served as a guide for most of Western Monasticism" (Ferguson 1954:107). One is left to wonder if MacIntyre really sees community in terms of a new monasticism, and also what would provide the bases for relations between the small monastic communities that he sees as the saviors of Western civilization. It is clear, however, that community becomes for MacIntyre a disciplinary structure. Interestingly, though usually portrayed in paintings as a wise old monk, Benedict also appears as "a naked youth rolling in a thorny bush to punish his flesh for the sin of lust (Ferguson 1954:107-108). St. Benedict's rules are most explicit regarding the regulation of pleasure. "All the monks shall sleep in separate beds....If possible they shall all sleep in one room. However, if there are too many for this, they will be grouped in tens and twenties, senior in charge of each group. Let a candle burn throughout the night". This being said, we must finally wonder which lustful desires MacIntyre believes necessitate the thorny discipline of the monastic (and surely "moral") community.

provinces, we don't know that Rome has already fallen. MacIntyre dismisses the reformist ideas of Etzioni, Selznick, Walzer, and others, believing that the moral consensus they hope to build is a petite bourgeois fantasy. "Our society can not hope to achieve a moral consensus," he says. Domestically, we are in a virtual Cold Civil War. Everything in politics is tactical and strategic compromise. These compromises temper conflict, but they can not prevent the inevitable conflagulation. Against the other communitarian writers who seek recognition and reconciliation, MacIntyre says that "modern politics can never not be a matter of genuine moral consensus. And it is not. Modern politics is civil war carried on by other means" (1984:252). The American Civil War he says never ended. Then as now, the central question that we must wrestle with as we retreat to our citadels is *patriotism*. What is important here is the nature of patriotism when it is directed not towards the state, but towards the community

Patriotism cannot be what it was because we lack in the fullest sense a *patria*. The point that I am making must not be confused with the commonplace liberal rejection of patriotism. Liberals have often---not always--- taken a negative or even hostile attitude towards patriotism, partly because their allegiance is to values which they take to be universal and not local and particular, and partly on the well-justified suspicion that in the modern world patriotism is often a facade behind which chauvinism and imperialism are fostered. But my present point is not that patriotism is good or bad as a sentiment, but that the practice of patriotism as a virtue is in advanced societies no longer possible in the way that it once was. In any society where government does not express or represent the moral community of the citizens, but is instead a set of institutional arrangements for imposing a bureaucratized unity on a society which lacks genuine moral consensus, the nature of political obligation becomes systematically unclear. Patriotism is or was a virtue founded on attachment primarily to a political and moral community and only secondarily to the government of that community; but it is characteristically exercised in discharging responsibility to and in such government. When however the relationship of government to the moral community is put in question both by the changed nature of government and the lack of moral consensus in the society, it becomes difficult any longer to have any clear, simple and teachable conception of patriotism. Loyalty to my country, to my community---which remains unalterably a central virtue---becomes detached from obedience to the government which happens over rule me....[his statement of patriotism means

now that] Modern systematic politics, whether liberal, conservative, radical or socialist, simply has to be rejected from a standpoint that owes genuine allegiance to the tradition of the virtues; for modern politics expresses in its institutional forms a systematic rejection of that tradition" (1984:254-255).

MacIntyre's opposition to reformism, coupled with his pessimistic social vision, indeed distance him from the ideology of the Communitarian Network, as well as that of reformist disciplines like sociology. His work could not really serve the purpose of supporting an intervention into social policy such as that accomplished by the Communitarian Network, nor would his work support the Communitarian Network's rejection of grass-roots organizing. As he himself has said:

In spite of rumors to the contrary, I am not and never have been a communitarian. For my judgment is that the political, economic, and moral structures of advanced modernity in this country, as elsewhere, exclude the possibility of realizing any of the worthwhile types of political community which at various times in the past have been achieved, even if always in imperfect forms. And I also believe that attempts to remake modern societies in systematically communitarian ways will always be either ineffective or disastrous. I am further at odds with your editorial standpoint in taking fundamental moral conflict to be both more widespread and more politically disabling than you do (MacIntyre 1991).

What MacIntyre does obviously share with the communitarians an apocalyptic vision of moral anarchy. In MacIntyre's image of utopias amid spaces of anarchy and fascism, we confront the anxiety of the middle classes at the fin de siècle. It is exactly this anxiety that the Communitarian Network expresses. As Adorno said of society, the word community can not hold the same meaning today that it once did. Today, community confronts us as an ideological production of the middle classes regarding the structure of morality as a whole, and this moral structure is the ideological structure of the middle classes writ large.

Bellah et al. and the Moral Character of the American Middle Class

The communitarian critique of liberal individualism remained largely confined to some limited discussion of MacIntyre's thesis and the more reflective the law reviews (see Chapter Three) until the publication of Bellah et al.'s 1984 exploration of the "character" of the white middle class: *Habits of the Heart*. Invoking de Tocqueville's antebellum excursion, Bellah et al. attempt to assess the present moral foundations of everyday life in America. They also draw on contemporary neo-conservative critiques, such as those provided by Bell (1976) and Lasch (1977), who argued that consumerism and individualism-- the "culture of narcissism"-- are destroying the fabric of American life (Lasch 1978; c.f. Aronowitz 1982:289-299).

Bellah et al., while avoiding the pessimism of MacIntyre's "dark age," do share a version of the apocalyptic vision. A primary motivation for their work is their belief that America is under the sway of a rampant radical individualism that threatens to tear apart the communitarian bonds that hold us together as a nation. In everyday life, this means we are losing the vocabulary for collective moral discourse---which Bellah et al. attempt to provide (Ehrenreich 1988) . In doing so, they contribute to our ability to situate communitarianism. Community, as described by Bellah et al., is a group of humans that are socially interdependent. Their interdependence---demonstrated through the reproduction of social practices unique to their genre de vie---defines and perpetuates the community. At its most fundamental level, Bellah et al. argue that community exists as a "community of memory," i.e., as a distinct "culture." Bellah et al. define "culture" as a tradition that has a two-fold existence. First, it exists as a special language of moral discourse. Second, culture exists as the history of that discourse. Therefore, they maintain that culture is equivalent to their definition of tradition "a pattern of understandings and evaluations that a community has worked out over time" (1984:333). In this sense, community is equivalent to a community of memory. But

Bellah et al. arrive at a barrier: a tradition/culture is the historical moral discourse of a community, but a community is constituted by this same discourse. Seemingly, either community must exist as its moral discourse, or its moral discourse exists prior to community. No matter which of the two is true, Bellah et al. unintentionally emphasize the exclusionary aspects of community by presenting community as a closed system of traditional moral discourses. Furthermore, and perhaps more tellingly than we would like to think, while the authors state that they are concerned with understanding the American "character," they limit their research to "white middle class Americans" because "everyone in America thinks in largely middle class categories" (1984:viii). While the sociological reasoning here is vacuous to the point of being silly, it does alert us to two possibilities: first, if it is true that Americans think in "largely [white] middle class categories," then this constitutes a link between communitarianism and the dominant ideological apparatus, i.e., communitarianism is an expression and articulation of particular aspects of that dominant ideological practices. Second, even if we discard the assertion that white middle class categories dominate American social relations, Bellah et al. reveal communitarianism to be an expression and articulation of specific struggles *within the middle classes* for the realization of a desirable sense of self within community.

Taylor and the Moral Sources of the Self

Charles Taylor's *Sources of the Self* draws heavily upon *Habits of the Heart*, but it is written in an altogether different style (1989:509). Taylor wants to fashion the foundation for a moral and political philosophy of communitarianism. For him, Bellah et al.

...offer a too simple view out of the predicament. They often write as though the principal issue were what I have called the public consequences. They see the threat that first utilitarian and now expressive individualism pose for our public life. They search for ways to recover a language of commitment in a great

whole. But without ever saying so, they write as though there were not really an independent problem of the loss of meaning in our culture, as though the recovery of a Tocquevillian commitment would somehow fully resolve our problems of meaning, of expressive unity, of the loss of substance and resonance in of man-made environment, of a disenchanted universe (1989:509).

One way to approach Taylor's communitarianism is through his contrast of the Platonic and Christian Traditions with that of the Epicurean or materialist. It is here that we find his idealism coming up against materialism in the proper sense, and here we can begin to situate his attempt to restore the Platonic foundation of Christian virtue and resolve "the independent problem of the loss of meaning in our culture" on at least the theoretical level.

Taylor pays special attention to Epicurus for the very good reason that Epicurus stands as one of the most important materialist philosophers, and materialism is the only philosophical doctrine that he can not quite manipulate enough to make it support his idealism (although this is not for a lack of effort, and at least one point, as we shall mention, he believes he is pretty close to succeeding!).

Epicurus's great sin is that he "denies the possibility of a rational order to the cosmos on which humans can model themselves" (which is not true, for Epicurus there is a rational order to the world, but that rational order contains an element of chance as an essential, inalienable aspect of itself. Moreover, as we are part of the world there is no reason for us to model ourselves on that which we already are!), "denies what is most essential for Plato " (126). Epicurus does not provide Taylor with a basis for the "recognition of a beneficent order" of nature, nor is society already "spelled out in some notion of order, which ranks different activities in a hierarchical order...ultimately linked to a hierarchical order of the cosmos or simply an order to our goals....But in each case, reason enables us to rank higher according to reason" (1989:126).

“Reason enables...according to reason”. Does Taylor actually mean that Reason is able to produce itself? This is an instance where Taylor gives his idealism full flight. In so far as Nature exists, it is only a reflection of Reason’s essential hierarchy. Nature is produced through the classifying operations that mark the limits of reason itself. For Taylor, the moral imperative that comes from this “notion of order” is the recognition of the soul and that “the soul’s good involves loving the cosmic good”. This recognition is not only of one’s place in a Great Chain of Being, but also the recognition of one’s duty and obligation to this cosmic order for the sake of one’s very soul. Taylor wants to convince us that this view is not simply Christian, but the foundation of moral philosophy.

For the ancients, life according to nature is life according to reason. *kata physin* = *kata logon*. What we are by nature is rational life, hence acting by reason is the key to the good for us. But what it is to live according to reason is in turn spelled out by some notion of order, which ranks different activities in a hierarchical order. This may be ultimately linked to a hierarchical order in the cosmos, as it is with Plato; or it may be simply an order of our goals, as it is also with Plato, but also with Aristotle and the Stoics. But in each case, reason enables us to rank higher according to reason. The activities involving reason are by their very nature higher than those which involve mere desire. So for Aristotle, our life reaches closest to the divine when we contemplate the unchanging; and the citizen life, where we deliberate together and exercise and develop prudence, is higher than mere sensual pleasure; though all these are goods.

To buttress his claim that we are really all speaking from within the same moral discourse, Taylor asserts that even Lucretius, the great Roman commentator on Epicurus, admitted a certain spirituality, and references two specific passages (II.991 ff., III.28-29) from *de rerum natura* to prove that the materialists really were, deep down inside, spiritualists like himself! This would not be so shocking as it is silly if it were not for the deliberate misreading of Lucretius that Taylor employs. The passage from Book II reads: “we have all sprung from celestial seed; all have that same father, from

whom our fostering mother earth receives liquid drops of water, and then teeming brings forth bright corn and luxuriant trees and the race of mankind, brings forth all the generations of wild beasts, providing food with which all nourish their bodies and lead a sweet life and beget their offspring: wherefore she has with reason obtained the name of mother. For that which once came from earth, to earth returns back again, and what fell from the borders of the ether, that is again brought back and the regions of heaven again receive it" (Lucretius 1937:155-157). Only one with Taylor's Christian bias could read this as a spiritual statement. W.H.D. Rouse says in his translators note to this passage that "it is a strict continuation of [Lucretius'] argument. We are not made of sensible elements, but, like everything else, of the elements of heaven and earth commingled, which on our death return whence they came, to make other things according to their combinations" (1937:154-155). It is even more interesting that here the philosopher/poet Lucretius is actually quoting from the playwright/poet Euripides' *Chysippus*. This is itself no mere chance reference, because in his plays Euripides routinely attempts to uncover the brutality of civilization, and undertakes a "campaign against Apollo, the morality of the gods, and tender-minded human champions of 'justice'--a concept in fact cold and difficult, admirable in the abstract, ugly in the concrete situations" (Greene and Lattimore 1959:5).

In the second passage that Taylor quotes to support his reading, Lucretius is actually in the midst of praising Epicurus for ridding us of the fear of death, and from the oppression of religion that comes from this fear. It has opened the world of nature to us, Lucretius says, "from all these things a sort of divine delight gets hold upon me and a shuddering, because nature thus by thy [Epicurus] power has been so manifestly laid open and uncovered in every part" (1937:173). There is nothing spiritual about this statement, although it speaks to the power of nature, it does not place some

transcendental power above nature. For a philosopher to so badly misrepresent Epicurean philosophy would be deeply disturbing if anti-materialism did not have such a long tradition, and if we did not already know Taylor as a Christian philosopher.¹⁸

Taylor's problem is that he keeps encountering the one philosophy of nature that undermines his view of the Western Tradition: Epicureanism, that "most subversive of all ancient philosophies...[which] repudiated any belief in providence [and] renounced all recognition of a beneficent order" (1989:314). A philosophy which still threatens. Despite Taylor's claim that only "a tiny handful of atheists [were ever] influenced by Epicureanism," he finds it to present an enormous problem (1989:313-314). Because of Epicurus, he is forced to modify his claim that all of the ancients were concerned with building the foundation of his moral reason, order, and hierarchy, "this generalization is too sweeping to be true. The Epicureans notoriously stood apart from this general identification of Reason with the hierarchy of goals or actions. Human ends could be reduced to one: pleasure. But even Epicurus was enough of a child of his culture that he reintroduced something like hierarchical distinctions between pleasures, discriminating those which were more worthwhile because longer lasting and less accompanied by pain and trouble. But still, the Epicureans had the makings of a radical leveling of goals; that is why they were invoked often in the centuries which lead up to the Enlightenment" (1989:314). Taylor reduces Epicureanism to the sad character that its many enemies through the centuries have attached to it: withdrawal from society, passivity in the arenas of politics, life as the pursuit of sensual pleasures, and nothing less than amorality at best and immorality at worst.

¹⁸Indeed, one writer wondered why Taylor was not more explicit about his identification of the modern Self with the Christian Self (Oakes 1993:48-51)

George Sarton and Giorgio de Santillana long ago put this reading to rest. They argued that the Epicureans, by their practice of gender equality and their public attacks on religion and superstition, were quite conspicuous to the authorities and were ultimately viciously slandered and repressed. "Let the common people have all the superstitions they want, Plato and his disciples would have said, they are too stupid to contemplate the truth, they prefer lies. That may be true, but the immense difference between Plato and Epicurus consists in this very fact, that the former was ready to exploit popular ignorance and credulity, while the latter does his best to eradicate them. [Epicurus was] the first to proclaim the social danger of superstition and the primary need of fighting it. The people must not be lied to according to the Platonic method: they must be told the truth; if they are not sufficiently educated for that, then they must be educated; the truth will make them free, naught else" (Sarton 1952:593). In his doctoral dissertation on Democritus and Epicurus, Marx concluded that despite what he understood as Epicurean materialism's contemplative stance, it was a major advance over the Democritean system, which viewed the fall of the atom as determined, and removed chance from the workings of nature.¹⁹ In this spontaneous swerve of the atom, Epicurus located his argument for the immanence of freedom in nature, and a world not determined for people, but made by them (Marx 1975). It is instructive to note that De Santillana (1961) sees the same element of freedom in Epicurean materialism that Marx discerns, and also goes further to interpret Epicurus and Lucretius within the political context of their time (a task that Marx did not do in his dissertation). De Santillana views Epicurus as the first to bring humans to the status of god--- which simultaneously grants god the status of being a human invention---and thereby free us

¹⁹Democritus held that the atom fell in a straight line, and hence the experience of the world was essentially determined. Marx notes that Epicurus advanced the thesis that instead of falling in a straight line, atoms are subject to spontaneous swerves because of their effects upon one another.

from religion. Even one of his sharpest critics called him "...the man who destroyed the whole foundation of religious faith and overturned the altars and the temples of the gods, not by manly force, as Xerxes did, but by the force of argument" (Cicero 1972:116). And in doing so, the determinism and unity of divinity gave way to a materialism that located spontaneity and difference in nature. For materialism, chance is

an initial element of indeterminacy, of spontaneity, at the core of the atom, so that it should work out as freedom at every point, in nature and specifically in life....The message, in any case is clear: freedom does not come...from above, and to the elect as Plato would have it in his *Laws*: it comes from the very core of things, within life itself. Hence it is every man's [sic] inalienable inheritance (De Santillana 1961:291-292).

The elevation of chance, pleasure, and emancipation is the movement of nature itself. and Taylor wants to suppress this radical tendency.

But if we neglect the Epicureans, we can see that the ethic of ordinary life which arises in the modern age stands in sharp contrast to the mainstream of ancient thought (Taylor 1989:278).

This is the tonal note of Taylor's argument. He wants to neglect the Epicureans because they he wants to neglect materialism itself. But what if we do not want to neglect materialism and dwell only in the realm of ideas? If we do not make this commitment to the abstract "cosmic good," if we choose instead to emphasize the genealogy of materialism, then Taylor has lost. Taylor wants to ignore Epicurus because Epicurus does not fit his scheme of an ancient and unchanging Will to Reason (appearing here not as a line of flight but as a literal Will to Submission) which represents our essential acts of faith and commitment: nature, polis, and tradition. Taylor is particularly troubled by Epicurus' elevation of desire to the level of reason, of making reason and desire---or "presentations" as Sextus calls them in his commentary on Epicurus---of the same material. Faith in a transcendent Nature an illusion, and worse yet, a source of the fear

that necessitates duty on pain of eternal punishment. For Taylor, the good must remain an ideal, above the material just as reason floats, as the saying goes, "above it all." Like all good idealists, Taylor denigrates life in favor of a transcendental principle. Indeed, society itself is above the world of humans producing socially. Taylor has society float aloft "in the metaphysical views which tie us to a larger moral order" (Taylor 1989:354). Taylor mystifies the social world, and simultaneously denounce desire, but "all pleasure is social" Horkheimer and Adorno said (1969:105), and Sade showed us what becomes of the detachment of metaphysicians in the bedrooms of the "beneficent order": the invocation of God amid the arrangement of positions (Sade 1965).

With a mandate to place humans in an order that extends from heaven to earth, is it any wonder that Taylor should turn his attention to the relation of the soul to this rational order? And is it any wonder that here too he finds Epicurus standing in his path?

"...we can only have order in the soul in seeing and loving the order of things. For Plato this means having a vision of the Good: for the Stoics this means seeing and affirming the course of the world. This is what differentiates their ethic from that of the Epicureans, who were in this respect the odd men out among ancient moralists. For the great theories which played a dominant role in the European tradition, the soul's good involves loving the cosmic good" (1989:255).

Except there remains the problem that Epicurus did not concern himself with exploring the self, but with mastering the self. Far from merely having "some insight" into this, he knew and rejected rhetorical community in favor of real friendship. For him a self that is made of the stuff of nature itself, of which words are only an aspect "the soul is a finely divided, material thing, scattered through the whole aggregation of atoms that make up the body" (Epicurus). Yet Taylor mistakes again the pleasures of friendship between real human beings for an exploration of a self---which being "both made and

explored through words"(1989:183)---can never such real, material pleasures.²⁰ To find ones self in real human relations is to "not take into account the full consequences of our actions including divine rewards and punishments (1989:259).

At the heart of Enlightenment, Taylor maintains, is an Epicurean "notion that the that the metaphysical views which tie us to a larger moral order destroy our peace of mind, our psychic equilibrium, in the name of an illusion---that they impose extraneous demands which can only distract us from the true road to happiness and tranquillity. (1989:345). Only "the larger moral order" that we are inextricably bound to can provide happiness and tranquillity, and for this it asks only for your debt, your *patriotism*.

It is Taylor who tell us "why democracy needs patriotism". He does so by robbing democracy of its universalism and opposing it to another other universal concept that has accompanied it since Enlightenment: cosmopolitanism, even of the type of cosmopolitanism proposed by Iris Marion Young.

The most important is this: the societies that we are striving to create -- free, democratic, willing to some degree to share equally -- require strong identification on the part of their citizens. It has always been noted in the civic humanist tradition that free societies, relying as they must on the spontaneous supportive action of their members, need that strong sense of allegiance that Montesquieu called "vertu." A citizen democracy can only work if most of its members are convinced that their political society is a common venture of considerable moment, and believe it to be of vital importance that they participate in the ways they must to keep it functioning as a democracy.

This means not only a commitment to the common project, but also a special sense of bonding among people working together in this project. This is perhaps the point at which most contemporary democracies threaten to fall apart.

In short, the reason why we need patriotism as well as cosmopolitanism is that modern democratic states are extremely exigent common enterprises in self-rule. They require a great deal of their members, demanding much greater solidarity

²⁰Likewise MacIntyre says that "man in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal. He is not essentially, but becomes through his history, a teller of stories that aspire to the truth" (1984:216).

towards compatriots than towards humanity in general. We cannot make a success of these enterprises without strong common identification. And considering the alternatives to democracy in our world, it is not in the interest of humanity that we fail in these enterprises.

What Taylor does here, in arguing for the necessity of patriotism, is to make the state into the community, into an identity opposed to cosmopolitanism. Modern States can only motivate members through patriotism, loyalty to the community/state, and "mutual commitment" to each other. Members of the community (citizen is too much an enlightenment idea) must be constantly mobilized, and patriotism is the only thing we have left, since the "traditional hierarchical models" are no longer possible. Democracy requires a volunteeristic patriotism because there is no good alternative to patriotic democracy except the unacceptable one of authoritarianism.

In short, the reason why we need patriotism as well as cosmopolitanism is that modern democratic states are extremely exigent common enterprises in self-rule. They require a great deal of their members, demanding much greater solidarity towards compatriots than towards humanity in general. We cannot make a success of these enterprises without strong common identification. And considering the alternatives to democracy in our world, it is not in the interest of humanity that we fail in these enterprises.

The conditions for a genuine democratic decision can't be defined in abstraction from self-understanding. They include (a) that the people concerned understand themselves as belonging to a community which shares some common purposes and recognizes its members as sharing in these purposes, and (b) that the various groups, types, and classes of citizens have been given a genuine hearing and have been able to have an impact on the debate, and © that the decision that emerges from this is really the majority preference (1995:204).

Again the key referent is to the State, which is the only entity that can resolve the inherent contradiction of b and a ("the people" exists only as smaller groups which have a shared purpose but that owe some allegiance to something larger, its "self-understanding" as a people or community. We know from Hegel, on whom Taylor has written extensively, how important it is for Idealism that "the people" comes to exist

in the State (see *Philosophy of Right*). At the end of history, "a state unites a people and the state defines the people" (Dan Schorr NPR commentary 2/5/2000).

This is the basis for the moral order and standard of reason that Taylor urges upon us. The recognition of the authority of the community---a recognition that is founded upon the community's mode of reason---is essential to the maintenance of the moral order. In exchange for this recognition, for accepting this debt, the community obligates itself to recognize us. For Taylor, the mutual recognition of community and subject allows for the creation of patriotism, which is the fullest expression of the relationship of creditor and debtor.

Benhabib's Attempt at Recognition and Reconciliation: Situating the Communitarian Self

Upon what are we to base the ethics of "reciprocal recognition." this revealing of obligation? In *Situating the Self*, Benhabib discusses the contrast between the "ethic of justice" and the "ethic of care." The ethic-of-justice is legislative justice. It is justice that has its basis in the State. The ethic-of-caring is the ethic of the family, of community ties that bind people together.

Communitarianism and contemporary critical social theory [by which she means not the Frankfurt School, but Habermas's "new paradigm" of "the critique of communicative rationality"] share some fundamental epistemological principles and political views. The rejection of ahistorical and atomistic conceptions of self and society is common to both, as is the critique of the loss of public spiritedness and participatory politics in contemporary societies. While the critical theory of Jurgen Habermas, and more specifically his analysis of the contradictions of modern societies, can provide communitarianism with a more differentiated vision of the social problems of our societies, the communitarian insistence that contemporary moral and political theory enrich its understanding of the self and base its vision of justice upon a more vibrant view of political community offers a corrective to the excessive formalism of justice-centered and deontological theories" (1992:70).

Benhabib identifies communitarianism as being first and foremost a critique of liberalism. Which is no surprise as she is writing only at the beginning of the communitarian intervention.

“The communitarian critique of liberalism can be distinguished into an epistemological and a political component. The epistemological critique focuses on the incoherence of the Enlightenment project of justifying morality and of providing normative foundations for politics via the device of a voluntary contract between free and autonomous agents. the political critique of liberalism developed by communitarians is more varied. In the following I shall isolate two major issues of contention between communitarianism and critical social theory: (1) The Critique of the ‘Unencumbered Self’ and the Priority of the Right over the Good; (2) The Politics of Community and the Integrationist vs. the Participatory Responses to Modernity” (1992:70).

For Benhabib, the communitarian critique of liberal individualism “can be distinguished into an epistemological and a political component”. While the communitarians repeat the same “focus on the incoherence of the Enlightenment project of justifying morality and providing normative foundations for politics via the device of a voluntary contract between free and autonomous agents.” their political response is much more varied. from intervention in the case of Taylor to escape in the case of Alasdair MacIntyre. Bellah calls for a “democratic” as opposed to a “despotic” communitarianism. but has difficulty distinguishing between the two. especially because of their exclusionary practices. Bellah and Etzioni declare communitarianism to be the political and moral foundation of America, but Michael Walzer is unsure of exactly what “it means to be an ‘American’” (1990). From all of this confusion of political positions, Benhabib isolates the major political opposition amongst communitarians as an “integrationist versus a participatory response to modernity” (1992:71).

At the time of her writing, she says, communitarianism can not be identified with a positive political agenda, but only via negativa (1992:70) because the Communitarian Network was only just beginning to put forward a “positive social and

political philosophy" (1992:70) She wants to assist in the creation of this positive development of communitarianism by combining it with Habermas's version of critical theory.

Benhabib proposes a model for a "discourse or communicative model of ethics" that would "subvert the distinction between an ethics of justice and rights and one of care and responsibility, insofar as it moves the limits of moral discourse to the point when visions of the good life underlying conceptions of justice and assumptions so that needs and interests sustaining rights claims become visible." (If you show me your utopia, I'll show you mine.) For Benhabib, when we encounter an "other" in the realm of ethical discourse, we should seek to "put ourselves in their position." As the encounter continues, we develop an appreciation of the other as a "unique individual, with a certain life history, disposition and endowment, as well as needs and limitations." In this way they become mutually understandable. This is the hallmark of her discourse theory:

...our goal is the process of dialogue, conversation and mutual understanding and not consensus.... Communicative actions are actions through which we sustain...human relationships and through which we practice the reversibility of perspectives implicit in human relationships. (Benhabib 1992:12)

Within our present situation, there is one political movement that reflects this view of ethical responsibility: communitarianism. (Adler 1992). Benhabib identifies two strands of communitarian philosophy, "integrationist" and "participationist."

While the [integrationist] thinkers seek to reconstitute community via recouping and declaiming an integrative vision of fundamental values and principles, the participationists envisage such a community as emerging from common action, engagement and debate in the civic and public realms of democratic societies. (Benhabib 1992:11)

Etzioni illustrates the views of the integrationists. He believes that preference must be given to whatever is judged best for the larger community. Responsibility and duty are considered the necessary and reasonable underpinnings of community.

"Claiming rights without assuming responsibilities is unethical and illogical. To take and not to give is an amoral, self-centered proposition that ultimately no society can tolerate." Of course, Etzioni is quick to point out that this duty and responsibility must be assumed voluntarily, without "...puritanism or oppression. No society can function well unless most of its members 'behave' most of the time because they voluntarily heed their moral commitments and social responsibilities." (Etzioni in Dionne 1993:X1) These moral commitments and social responsibilities are stated by Enola Aird, Chair of the Connecticut Commission on Children, as an "ethic of shared responsibility to children, and family, and community." (Scheinin 1993:33A) Not surprisingly, Oedipus' "crime" encompasses all three pillars of the "good society."

Benhabib supports the participatory as opposed to the integrationist view, which she says is "incompatible with the values of autonomy, pluralism, reflexivity and tolerance in modern societies." (1992:11) Stephen Gardbaum makes a similar attempt to describe and distinguish between left and right communitarianism. (Gardbaum 1992:687) However, these positions are not so far apart. "Individuals enjoy autonomy not because they are sovereign subjects but because the community they live in, which is sovereign, believes they should enjoy it." (Ortiz 1993:1021) Indeed, communitarians emphasize that they are neither right nor left, echoing Barry Goldwater's line "I don't care what you call it, I just know it works." (D'Antonio 1992:32) Benhabib is right to want to distance herself, though, because many of the themes of communitarianism are the same as those that thundered from the American New Right during the 1992 national, state, and local campaigns. "[Communitarians] want to focus on rights and

responsibilities...praise the 'long overdue attention' on families and family values.... but avoid the strident negativity of the religious right." (Religious News Service 1992:4)

While her project is commendable from the perspective of reformist politics, it is "not a pipe." If only we could achieve a metamorphosis into the other! Unfortunately the very production of capitalist relations, i.e., the alienation of our "self" from our "selves," makes this a purely utopian exercise. In the placing of ourselves in the situation/discourse of the other, in the moment of caring, of transferring ourselves to the other, we can only be like Lacan's child before the mirror. The other is the distortion of our own projected "self," distorted because our self is really grouping of "desiring machines" (Deleuze and Guattari 1986) and what we desire most is to be reconciled with our alienated selves. Benhabib's "other" is Feuerbach's "god," but where Feuerbach would (and did, via Marx) lead toward liberation, Benhabib leads only back to a vague ideal of "community."

Remarks

That even Benhabib's valiant attempt at reconciling communitarianism with Habermas's with communicative ethics should produce only a vague understanding of community is hardly surprising. Let us remember what Singer says, because it illuminates the difficulty of situating the self in a community that has no real referent.

"Community is not a referential sign but a call or appeal. What is called for is not some objective reference. The call of community aims at response, at calling back. The call of community initiates a conversation in writing, disseminates, and desires the proliferation of discourse" (Singer 1991:125).²¹

²¹This is where the claim that communitarianism has anything to do with materialism is put to the lie. Even Etzioni calls Marx simply "a marker" and "not an influence". Of course, Marx also begins the *Grundrisse* with a devastating critique of the "Robinsonades" who *begin* with the individual instead of realizing that the individual is a product of history. However, Marx's argument diverges from the communitarians at this same point of convergence. The communitarians do have an *idea*, as Marx might say, of the individual. But unlike Marx, for whom humanness was essential but who viewed "the individual" as a historical product, the communitarians hold that the individual is merely of "limited characteristics and limited development of productive capabilities" (Marx 1968:541). This limiting (or

Community not only demands that we enjoy its pleasures and fear its punishment, it also demands that we speak about it. It “desires[!] the proliferation of discourse.” Indeed, as evidenced by the number of press accounts, op-eds, academic writings and conferences, and political deployments of communitarianism, we have exactly this proliferation of discourse, but it is hardly one that Singer or for that matter, Gusfield in his *Community*, had in mind. It is Heidegger, the great apologist for Being, that supplied long before the true meaning of the call of community: “the essence of mortals calls upon them to heed a call that beckons them toward death” (1984:101).

recoding, socialization or oedipalization) being *necessary* for the creation, maintenance, and survival of the moral community, morality thus appears as its barrier or limit, and appears as *naturally* limiting of humans instead of *historically* produced by humans. “The purpose of the community, of the individual -- as well as the condition of production -- [is] the production of these specific conditions of production and of individuals, both singly and in their social groupings and relations -- as living carriers of these relations (Marx 1968:541). For the communitarians, the individual is the creation of the community. For Marx, both the individual and the community are the products of human history

A deeper community spirit is needed throughout our society. Our towns, cities, and country neighborhoods should have more unity, individuality, and pride....
Cooley *Social Process* 1923

CHAPTER FOUR

Community, Family, and Authority: The Regularities of Communitarian Ideological Practices

With the 1992 presidential campaign, the New Right's "Family Values" became a familiar fixture in American political rhetoric. This ubiquitous phrase, and the political intervention into public policy it signaled, generated a number of reactions from moderate-to-liberal progressives and what remains of the Left. The latter group in particular has scoffed at what they perceived as opportunistic pandering, false consciousness, or yet another sign of the final crisis of capitalism. The former responded in what they believed to be a more thoughtful manner. This group, consisting for the most part of moderate Democrats, acknowledged that the rhetorics of "family values" did seem to "resonate" with the "general public." This led many to argue that moderates and progressives also needed their own language for discussing the social responsibility of the individual.

These various responses to the challenge of a rising authoritarianism show us that our understanding of the New Right remains, despite efforts small and monumental, incomplete. In part, this is because we are confronted with a moving target. The term "New Right" denotes an ambiguous common sense notion that covers a messy amalgam of neoconservatives, fundamentalist and evangelical Christians, military/industrial sectors, political action committees, think tanks, etc. Their grip on political power is said to result from either "a realignment of the electorate" or from one of those wonderfully abstract "pendulum swings" of American politics, and we still wait

expectantly for that eventual and inevitable swing back to the left that never quite seems to happen. It is vitally imprint that the New Right must be more accurately situated in the arena of everyday social conflicts before we can combat it. That this task has thus far proved so difficult for the Left raises the troubling possibility that there is no unitary politics of the New Right, and therefore no single authoritarian ideology emanating from a central source. Instead, we can find the authoritarianism that the New Right expresses throughout the very fabric of everyday life, the anarchy and the ambient noise of its repetitious articulation continually producing the conditions for its own near-hegemony. While I the term New Right to refer to fundamentalist, evangelical Christians, and the right wing of the Republican Party, the critical analysis to which this study contributes must allow us to understand authority and its place in the reproduction of contemporary social relations.

In this chapter, I want to call attention to the importance of communitarianism in the discourse of the second, more "thoughtful," response to the ideological practice of "family values." It is this response that substantially defines the politics of communitarianism. Communitarianism has a theoretical importance here precisely because of the difficulty in locating an essential institution or ideology that encompasses the New Right. For this reason, I will address communitarianism as a *specific reaction* to the varied voices of authority. In a nation such as ours, where political compromise and the inertial effects of the status quo are enshrined in the Constitution, it is necessary to pay close attention to attempts by political moderates to absorb the real political pressure of authoritarianism. This is especially true of the present moment, when moderates routinely co-opt elements of conservative ideology for their own political uses. One need only evoke the name William Jefferson Clinton in order to drive home the point. His State of the Union Addresses are notable for their frequent use of

communitarian rhetoric to give voice to the politics of the middle. "The links between the communitarian movement and the Clinton White House are well established"

(Etzioni 1993h:46). In Clinton's First Inaugural Address, communitarianism lay at the heart of what he called his "new covenant" with America:

We must do what America does best: offer more opportunity to all and demand responsibility from all. It is time to break the bad habit of expecting something for nothing, from our government or from each other. Let us all take more responsibility, not only for ourselves and our families but for our communities and our country....reconnecting our torn communities....we rededicate ourselves to the very idea of America (Clinton Inaugural address, available from www.whitehouse.gov or www.wiretap.spies.org).

President Clinton emphasized these communitarian themes again in his first State of the Union address.

Tonight I present to you a comprehensive plan to set our nation on that new course. I believe we will find our new direction in the basic old values that brought us here over the last two centuries -- a commitment to opportunity, to individual responsibility, to community, to work, to family and to faith.For too long we have drifted without a strong sense of purpose or responsibility or community. And our political system so often has seemed paralyzed by special interest groups, by partisan bickering and by the sheer complexity of our problems.I ask you to help to protect our families against the violent crime which terrorizes our people and which tears our communities apart ("A New Direction" Address to the Joint Session of Congress by President William Clinton February 17, 1993).

In 1995, Clinton's remarks to the White House *Conference on Character Education*, co-sponsored with the Communitarian Newark, further reinforced the importance of communitarianism in his political philosophy.

Thank you very much, Dr. Etzioni. Thank you for that introduction and for the inspiration that your work has given to me and to so many others, for your wonderful book, *The Spirit of Community*, and for working on this as hard as you have. I'd like to say a special word of thanks to one of the co-founders of this network, he's been a member of the White House staff since I became President, Bill Galston, for his constant inspiration and prodding to me. I'd like to thank the Secretary of Education, and Tom Payzant, the Assistant Secretary

for Elementary and Secondary Education, for what they have done to try to promote character education as a part of the larger strategy toward a new communitarian vision for our country. You know, from the time I began thinking about how we would get into the 21st century, and long before I even thought of running for President, it seemed to me that the -- there were three words which were inextricably linked -- as if you think about America moving into the future -- opportunity, responsibility, and community. Those were the three words that basically were at the heart of my campaign for President and have been at the heart of what I have tried to do as President. I also believe that government cannot do these things for America. I believe that we have to have, in a complicated, open, pluralistic society like this one, a great network of people working together in every major important center of our society.

Clinton's rhetoric of community should come as no surprise on the heels of the previous chapter which detailed the history of the Communitarian Network. We shall see that the rhetoric of these statements is in keeping with the broad discourse of communitarianism. As one journalist noted: "At some key junctures in the past year and a half, Bill Clinton has made it clear he speaks the language of communitarianism. Clinton's address to Congress in February [1993] and his subsequent stump speeches have been laced with thoughts and rhetoric that might have come out of Etzioni's communitarian manifesto" (Ehrenhalt 1993). This same writer would later contribute an article to the *Responsive Community*, see Ehrenhalt (1995).

By the early nineties the waning of community, which had long concerned sociologists, became more pronounced and drew more attention.... Responding to the new cues, George Bush evoked the image of 'kinder, gentler' society as a central theme for his first presidential campaign in 1988. The time was right to return to community and the moral order it harbored. Bill Clinton made the spirit of community a theme of his 1992 campaign" (Etzioni 1993:119).

Communitarianism had emerged as one of the most important efforts to provide moderates and progressives with a political rhetoric of family and social responsibility.

Communitarianism presents itself as a concise and coherent reaction by moderates to the hodgepodge of statements and institutions that make up the New Right's ideological practice of "family values." The resurgence of the New Right is,

according to Etzioni, a call for the middle class "to get its house in order"(Etzioni 1993a). The Communitarian Network. "as a coalition of individuals and organizations who have come together to shore up the moral, social, and political foundation of society," wants to help, as one of its congressional supporters said:

It is time to seriously re-examine the pro-government or antigovernment extreme ideologies which an increasingly skeptical middle class does not seem to be buying... We need to lay out the modest plan by which we humbly hope to build a new democratic community, one in which there is shared responsibility, shared accountability, shared pain and sorrow, shared love and shared joy (Rep. Swett Congressional Record 2/9/94:H400)

Positioning themselves as neither left nor right, but as the legitimate voice of the "vast middle class," communitarianism is promoted as the middle classes' only ideological alternative to the authoritarianism of the New Right.²² Most significantly, in their attempt to counter the rise of the New Right, the communitarians adopt some of the Right's more controversial positions as their own and interpret them as issues of communal existence. As a result, *communitarian ideological practices are coterminous with those of the Right*. It is not that communitarianism is an ideology of the right, as it is that ideologies of the right are inherently communitarian.

The emergence of communitarianism is significant because it returns us to a fundamental question of Critical Theory: the description of the present regime of authority within which humans desire their own repression. The communitarians allow us to analyze how the ideological practices of the Right are modified, and affirmed, by moderates---or, as they would say, "the vast middle". The communitarian reaction allows us to gauge the social effects of the New Right on middle-class moderates and

²²According to the Chronicle of Higher Education, Etzioni was so upset by a book written by a Republican Congressional staffer who portrayed communitarianism as a thin disguise for liberalism, that he demanded that the publisher, the University Press of Kansas, cease distributing or promoting the book. "Dr. Etzioni, who has a reputation for following his press clips closely, insists that he has not become thin-skinned" (*Chronicle of Higher Education*, Sept 27, 1996).

progressives. By doing so, we can understand communitarianism as an expression of the currents of contemporary social conflicts, conflicts that are deeply influenced by the specter of the authoritarian Right and the desire for a secure, middle-class utopia.

Communitarianism, the Authoritarian Right, and the Specter of Moral Anarchy

Like the New Right, communitarianism is a political movement that seeks nothing less than the "restoration of the moral fabric" (Economist 1995) of American society. And like the New Right, communitarian ideological practices pivot upon alliances of family and community. The communitarians juxtapose their utopian vision of community to the social "pathologies" exemplified by the single-mother and the homeless man, or more generally the underclass and the inner-city (Whitehead 1993; Hamil 1993, Paccione, Siegal, Toves 1988). They view poverty as the result of a lack, or a breakdown, of moral values, a prominent conservative argument in the debate over social welfare policy (Jencks and Peterson 1991, Murray 1984, Wilson 1987, Katz 1989). This "underclass" is said to constitute a different "culture" for that of the rest of America: a "culture of poverty." Not only is this underclass fundamentally different, it is presented as a threat, both morally and physically, to the nation's "intact" communities (Etzioni 1993a). It displays all the symptoms ---"family breakdown, decaying civic institutions, rising crime, addiction, and illegitimacy"--- of "America's most aggressive cultural diseases" (Coates 95/96:4) Etzioni frames the threat to community as a general lack of adequate instruction in civic "rights and responsibilities"; the underclass in particular is a pathological agent of this moral decay.²³ Without proper moral education, which ideally begins in the authority structure of the family, a person never

²³The notion of social pathology in communitarianism has its origins in Durkheim's division of the normal and the pathological, which is derived from biology and medicine, which are themselves part of a biomedical discourse on health and disease. For an extensive treatment of this biomedical discourse, see Canguilhem (1981).

develops the correct relationship to family, community, and the state. The crisis in the reproduction of this relationship is, the communitarians believe, is a fundamental source of the "moral anarchy" which they believe engulfs American society. As Rep. Swett (D-NH) put it in a speech to the House:

...a subtler, more insidious virus... pits group against group, special interests against special interests, ideology against ideology. The streets of Los Angeles during the riots, the daily drug killings in our towns, and throwaway kid syndrome exhibited by too many parents, demonstrates that societal suicide is alive and well in America (2/9/94 CR H398).'

The apocalyptic vision of "moral anarchy," and social degeneration makes the communitarian anxiety about the presence of the presence of the New Right. The communitarian ideological practice of community emerges in response to the growing involvement of evangelical Christians in political struggles (See Smith 1997; Brown 1998). The communitarian rhetoric of a "loss of community" appeared at the same time as the Right's declaration of "a poverty of values" spread by a growing "culture of poverty". While Pete Hamill believed that closed military bases could be converted into sanctuaries and reeducation camps for the homeless, others were less optimistic.²⁴

On the heels of the social strife of Los Angeles in 1992, Vice President Dan Quayle delivered a speech to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco outlining a Right position on the causes of the events there. In his speech, which was promptly dubbed the "Murphy Brown" speech, Quayle remarked upon many things, and used many words to conjure up images of the modern American city, of women in general and single mothers in particular, and of the relations among the state, the family, and the

²⁴ The science-fiction television show, *Star Trek DS9*, featured a two hour episode in which the characters return to 21st century America to find that the poor, the unemployed, and the nere-do-well have been forced into "sanctuaries" carved out of abandoned cities. These sanctuaries of course turn out to be concentration camps. Television may have preceded Mr. Hamill, or perhaps an explanation lies in the subject matter of his more autobiographical works.

socio-economic order. One image in particular superseded and variously obscured all of the others and that image was of a pregnant Murphy Brown. The Murphy Brown remark diverted other potential audiences from attending to the message delivered to the primary audience. Quayle's oration was, in other words, not a speech directed at that meaningless abstraction known as the "general public."

The text of the 3600 word speech, contains one reference to 'Murphy Brown,' and this consists of a single sentence: It doesn't help matters when prime time TV has 'Murphy Brown' --- a character who supposedly epitomized today's intelligent, highly paid, professional woman -- mocking the importance of fathers by bearing a child alone, and calling it just another lifestyle choice." In order to account for the controversy over Quayle's single sentence, we should understand both the internal dynamics of images and the external circumstances of their presentation. Such an examination of this context establishes the relation of the "Murphy Brown" sentence to the rest of the text, and also situates the entire speech in its wider social context. This is the only way to account for Quayle's use of the image of "Murphy Brown" and the specific circumstances that made possible its appearance and dispersion. Quayle's speech should be addressed in the context of its relation to the ideology of the New Right. By situating Quayle's speech, we might better understand why the image of "Murphy Brown" was so powerful, so blinding in its intensity, that it appeared to overwhelm all others. We see that Quayle used "Murphy Brown" as a diversion and as a signal to the New Right. It is in this dual capacity that an analysis of the speech shed light on the ideology of the New Right. In particular, Dan Quayle speech articulated the New Right's ideological response to the social contradictions Los Angeles laid bare. The question then becomes: What do we do about this underclass?

Both the loss of community and the poverty of values were said to produce a lawless urban underclass that threatens civil society with its contagious culture of poverty "virtually immune to politics" (Coates 95/96:4; see also Shalit 1993). Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan actually describe the inner cities as being areas where "a process of speciation" was occurring.(Quayle 1992). The ethic that the New Right encapsulated in the term "family values" included commitment to family, community, law (property), bourgeois morality, and individual responsibility to the larger social order.²⁵ It is important to note that the underclass, like gays, blacks, etc. always already has "community". It is a solid social group, it is impregnable to morality and immune to social reforms. As the middle experienced a loss, the underclass has been gaining in communal solidarity.

The communitarian solution to the loss of community focuses on restoring the spirit of community by regenerating the family and community through an intensification of individual responsibility. Peter Steinfels, the *New York Times* Religion and Ethics commentator observed early the importance of family and community in the coincidence of communitarian and New Right rhetoric.

Here's a barely noticed fact that could auger a serious change in the political landscape: not everyone who agrees with Dan Quayle about Murphy brown is a conservative....Communitarianism is a new kid on the political block, staking out territory somewhere between the liberal advocates of the welfare state and civil liberties, entrenched on one corner and conservative devotees of laissez-faire and traditional values on the other (Steinfels 1992).

²⁵"We're for law and order because if property isn't protected, who will build businesses?... When families fail, society fails. The anarchy and lack of structure in our inner cities are testament to how quickly civilization falls apart when the family foundation cracks.... So I think the time has come to renew our public commitment to our Judeo-Christian values-- in our churches and in our synagogues, our civic organizations and our schools. We are, as our children recite each morning, 'one nation under God.' That's a useful framework for acknowledging a duty and an authority higher than our own pleasures and personal ambitions. If we live more thoroughly by these values, we would live in a better society" (Quayle, 1992). For an analysis of the speech and its effects, see Brown (1994).

The anxiety caused by the authoritarian Right is important for understanding communitarianism in relation to the middle classes. Although "the middle class" has been frequently characterized by President (and candidate) Clinton as "forgotten," communitarian politics are directed squarely at the middle classes. Etzioni states this explicitly: "People often ask me if I am talking to the ghettos, and I -- I'm speaking, first of all, to the middle class...." (Etzioni 1993e). He wants to speak to the middle class about the spreading "moral anarchy" that threatens to dissolve the bonds of the American "community of communities" and "...the institutions of civil society"(Etzioni 1993e). These bonds find their origin in the morality of the American "vast middle class...who work hard and play by the rules" (President Clinton 1993).

And it was the middle class that was getting squeezed in the 1980s. In the United States, the appearance of communitarianism coincided with the social dislocations that intensified during the Reagan-Bush administrations and culminated in a Democratic President's gutting of the Social Security Act under the guise of "welfare reform" (Klein and Ronen 1989; Phillips 1990, Plunkert 1990; Cauthen 1998). During the decade leading up to the founding of the Communitarian Network, capital accumulation shifted dramatically from the industrial sector to finance capital, and appropriation shifted from the industrial to the service sectors. The "Go-Go 80s," as the screen work of Michael Moore makes clear, were not a period of economic growth for vast segments of the population. The working and middle classes, usually singularized in political rhetoric, were squeezed during the 1980s. "Once blue-collar sons could follow their fathers into the plant and make \$13, \$14 an hour. That meant the middle class, a car, maybe a cabin on a lake, a chance for kids to go to college. Once, but not anymore" (Phillips 1990:19). At the same time, instead of the expected formation of strong working class organizations, "identities based upon relations of production were

significantly loosened [in part by the displacement of manufacturing workers]....This shift has occurred even as, ironically, living standards for most Americans, evaluated in quantitative measures, have steadily declined" (Aronowitz 1992:27). One is reminded of Marcuse's observation that late capitalism had deproletarianized the proletariat through its inclusion in the middle class. At the same time the proletariat was being brought into the middle classes (usually through unionized manufacturing jobs), the middle class as a whole was being increasingly left behind by the wealthy. The richest 1 percent of American families accounted for 70 percent of the growth in average family incomes from 1977 to 1988 (Krugman in Nasar 1992). While the Republican Party's own Kevin Phillips pointed out the tax burden had become steadily shifted to the middle and working classes and that the bedrock Republican issue of lower taxation on the wealthy might come back to haunt them, as indeed it did in 1992 (Phillips 1990).

The first part of the 1980s saw two general economic recessions in the United States. Jobs and factories considered marginal were eliminated and closed. The closing of manufacturing plants reached such a state of intensity that the Federal government attempted to regulate the process throughout the passage in 1988 of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (PL 100-379). The passage of the act only served to give notice to the problem, not to solve it. Plants continued to close, although now on the condition that employees receive reasonable notice and some retraining or other social services. Between 1980 and 1985, an average of 2.2 million American workers lost their jobs because of plant closings (BNA 1988). Over all, factory employment dropped from 23% to 18% (Plunkert 1990:14) Many factories that remained open modernized in the midst of layoffs. More and better machines increased worker output while the number of necessary workers was reduced. (Stats on robots PC and productivity here)

The factory jobs that had once meant "the middle class" could be achieved were replaced by service sector jobs which paid less and had less status. While Republicans and others would regularly speak of the 1980s as a period of general economic expansion, the service sectors were responsible for half of the job growth. "Of the 20 fastest growing industries, 11 were services, as were 17 of the 30 industries adding the most jobs. The business service industry was both the most rapidly growing and the biggest employment gainer... doubling its employment and adding 2.9 million new jobs....computer and data processing services...tripled its employment....Personnel supply services [temporary help supply firms] grew nearly as fast, adding 825,000 jobs (Plunkert 1990).

It should be noted that the loss of manufacturing jobs fell disproportionately on African-Americans. This is true not merely in numbers of jobs, but also in the quality of jobs (Gittleman and Howell 1995:437). "Black and Hispanic men were more concentrated in the worst jobs in 1990 than a decade earlier" (Gittleman and Howell 1995; see also Bound and Freeman 1992). According to Kletzer (1991), African-Americans faced during this time a higher risk of job displacement. They were less likely to be reemployed, and they tended to be unemployed longer. "Following displacement, the proportion of blacks employed in manufacturing industries and production-related occupations fell by more than did the proportion of whites employed in the same industries and occupations. In addition, among employed men, whites were more likely to regain employment in a similar industrial or occupational group (Kletzer 1991:17). But the fact that these problems fell disproportionately on African-Americans and other population minorities should not obscure the anxiety of "falling down" that existed within the middle classes as a whole, and which still exists.

At the same time, trade unions, unable and often---with a few notable exceptions---unwilling to intervene, were not up to their historical task. Those workers who were left after downsizing were given the opportunity to either count their blessings, or to become a stakeholder in an employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs). Both options were forced upon me by a previous employer. Some even got the chance to buy the company themselves, but usually with the former owners retained as the new management. This option, of course, left the inevitable pains of modernization and dislocations in the hands of the employees themselves, leaving the former bosses nominally blameless for failures or additional layoffs.

Along with the loss of industrial jobs and the restructuring of the workplace, changes in the "traditional family," which had been previously tightly structured around the demands of industrial production, were signaled by, among other things increased numbers of women in the work force at a time of relative peace.²⁶ These moments, along with a middle class "forgotten" by its elected officials, an economy benefiting some and squeezing many more, the economic realignment away from manufacturing and with it a higher premium on education continuous training, all coincided with the founding of the CN. But perhaps most important, the founding of the CN was a response to the twin specters of a growing "underclass" and a politically ascendant New and Christian Right.

Communitarians uphold the Constitution, Etzioni says, and offer the "vast middle class" a vision of what Suzanne Keller, in her Presidential Address to the Eastern Sociological Society, called "the American dream of community" had now become a social necessity (1988:167). Ironically American sociologists had by tradition

²⁶The participation of women in the workforce increased during the 1980's from 51 to 57 percent (Plunkert 1990).

associated community with rural and pre-modern formations, which had been progressively replaced by modernity. Now, community becomes the last line of defense against what MacIntyre calls "a coming Dark Ages" (MacIntyre 1984:263). MacIntyre paints the picture of a declining bourgeoisie in more stark contrasts than Etzioni. While Etzioni's vision of the future rests upon the sociological belief that social problems can be remedied without fundamental social change. He has in fact held true to his early writings on the necessity and possibility for sociology to supply the knowledge necessary for what he termed "guided social change" on a regional or even global scale.

During the First Communitarian Teach-In, a panel including Galston, Etzioni, Mary Ann Glendon, was asked whether they were not simply attempting to artificially construct a set of moral values drawn from a period that had long past (the pre-1960s). The panel collectively responded that "We are not creating artificial values, we are giving voice to values widely shared---the idea of family and moral strength. We don't believe we are inventing values as much as giving voice to what the overwhelming number of Americans believe (Anonymous 91/92:23). The deployment of this structure, call it ideology, discourse, concept, utopia, or even morality (Durkheim would refer to morality, and Etzioni certainly refers to the crucial importance of the "moral structures" of community), is central to the understanding of the communitarian movement. Etzioni is "speaking to the middle class" precisely because the Communitarian Network is a direct expression of a desire for a middle class utopia, crystallized as the post-war suburbs. In this way, communitarianism produces an ideological practice that is "a comprehensive view of the world" that reproduces "specific ways of life": both physically, in terms of the landscape of their imagined community of the suburb, and in terms of the naturalizing, *universalizing*, tendency of their particular "morality" (Lebevre 1968).

I will now turn to examine the communitarian's utopian vision of community: the suburbs of the 1950s. This will serve to introduce our discussion of two key aspects of communitarian ideology that express this tendency towards the naturalization of everyday life: family and community. The same pathologies which necessitate the restoration of the spirit of community also necessitate the production of a utopian vision or normality. Communitarianism produces its utopian vision of a suburban space produced by family and community. As Maurice Stein says in his *Eclipse of Community*, the modern version of the American dream of community "is embodied with greatest clarity in the prosperous suburb...." (1972:282).

The Utopian Vision: the Suburbs of the 1950s as a Baseline

If contemporary communitarian rhetoric is to be believed, community in the United States is under siege.(Berke 1993, Hamill 1993, Strum 1993). This loss of community is considered to be both a local and a national phenomena. These two levels are simultaneously complementary *and* contradictory. Complementary in that the loss of community at both levels is tied to a lack (or loss) of individual responsibility and voluntary subordination of self to the larger social order. Contradictory on the national level, because this loss is said to manifest itself in the splintering of "America" into various small communities with intense internal solidarity based upon race, identity, and gender, with little to connect them to each other. But it is precisely the local level where we are said to be experiencing not a bloom in local control and local solidarity, but a total breakdown of community and family. To put it in another, and perhaps contrary way, communitarianism is an expression of the experience of what many understand to be a dramatic revaluation of community and family, which many see as a progressive moral devaluation of both in favor of a ruthless individualism.*the rise of ego-centered individuals has paralleled the rise of big government. Both constitute a*

retreat from community, from family, schools, and neighborhoods, and from a viable and effective self (Etzioni 1983:1-4, emphasis in original).

In an early article on communitarian doctrine for *Partisan Review*, Etzioni offered a short definition of community. Etzioni provides us with the normative structure of community “using three basic criteria: scope... substance or ‘content’... and perhaps most significantly, patterns of ‘dominance,’ that is, how the community expresses or affirms its moral values, common interests, commitments, and ends” (Etzioni 1983:144). The essay’s analytical structure--its categories of scope, substance and dominance--clearly indicates the direction of his thought. The scope of a community is its *physical* unity. This unity is rooted in a complex mixture of linguistic, spatial, and biological forces. The unity of these factors are best expressed by both the spatial type of community and as well as its content. Etzioni contends that the production of space is necessary for the reproduction of the community, and so he turns to the “patterns of dominance” which reproduce the community’s normative values .

Etzioni’s essay features section headings for his discussion of both “Scope” and “Substance.” Curiously, when we turn expecting to find a section on “Dominance,” instead we find that through a revealing rhetorical arabesque, the term has been replaced by the phrase “The Responsive Community”(Etzioni 1983:136-144). This phrase would, of course, later be an oft repeated by communitarians and would be used in the title of the Communitarian Networks quarterly journal, *The Responsive Community: Rights and Responsibilities*.

Etzioni argues that duty and responsibility form the “patterns of dominance” that structure community. These patterns represent the community’s everyday expressions and affirmations. “The Responsive Community” has at its disposal the necessary means of coercion to force its members to obey its laws and morality. Alternatively, and more

ideally for the communitarians, the Responsive Community is the place where the individual encloses and internalizes the apparatus of social control, making it appear so natural that it appears to be an essential part of the person. Of course, Etzioni reminds us of the great benefits that would come from our submission to this apparatus. We would at least be liberated from the fears of social strife and struggle.

While the concept of community may harbor the threat of coercion, it is not necessarily the coercion of the state, *but the moral compulsion of a Salem-like community...* When people act to express a value that they have truly acquired within a pluralistic community (internalized rather than accepted as a social pressure to which they had "better" conform), they do not, nor do they feel, coerced, even in a psychological sense. Rather, they feel affirmed when they uphold what have become their values. There is nothing morally objectionable about such an act; on the contrary, without the expression of internalized values, there would be no social coherence or community-- or for that matter, viable individuals as functioning persons (Etzioni 1983:148-149 emphasis added).

The communitarians turn to history for their "Salem-like" utopia and find that the idyllic period of American life was not colonial Massachusetts but 1950s suburbia. All that remains of Salem is the disciplinary spirit invoked by the communitarian utopia. This is no "nostalgic illusion," says Alan Ehrenhalt (1995), but a practical attempt to restore the necessary foundations of American culture. Etzioni explains:

I use as my baseline the 50's. It was a rather established society, with a clear set of values.... but it was also discriminatory against women, it was racist, and a bit authoritarian.... And we challenged that society and from my viewpoint, for good reason. And that is not the problem. The problem is as we brought down the consensus, the values of the established society of the 50's, we did not replace these with any new consensus. So we have, in effect, a measure of moral anarchy (1993e).

Paradoxically, Etzioni supports the same civil and sexual rights that he says resulted in our present "moral anarchy," while he wants to restore the moral order that necessitates these very same social conflicts in the first place. Other communitarian commentators, like Fred Siegal also contrast the "anarchy" of the present with the 1950's sense of community (Andersen et al. 1988). The spread of the suburbs may have been

accompanied by heightened conformity, but viewed positively, the “suburbanites of the 1950's tended to define themselves and be defined by others in a common way of life and shared set of values”(Anderson et al. 1988:4). Despite the romanticism of their view of 1950s suburbs, communitarians assert that community is not a utopian ideal, but something that has been progressively lost since the 1960's. This is the meaning they hope to fix with the phrase “a loss of community.” The romanticized suburb of the 1950's is proclaimed the last period in which citizens had “a basic understanding of the language, beliefs, history, and institutions of his community...what Aristotle called 'concord' or civic friendship” (Galston 1980:267). Supposedly there existed a common understanding of the important role of morality and civic virtue in the constitution of the community.

Etzioni is not the only communitarian to use the 1950s as a “baseline” against which we can measure the degeneracy of American morality. The theme is a common one in communitarian tracts on subjects as diverse as bioethics and gun sweeps. Sometimes the reference is more direct than at others. Sometimes the reference is to the “postwar period,” sometimes to the days before “the upheavals of the 1960s,” or to the demographic changes “over the past 40 years”. In all of them, the 1950s is marked as the baseline from which social and moral investigations should begin. Sometimes the reference is to the 1960s and 1970s as eras markedly different from earlier times. By far the most common refrain that is found in communitarian discourse is that the 1950s was the culmination of the manifest destiny of the American middle classes, and what followed was a general degeneration of social life.

For example, Callahan (1996) discusses the rise of bioethics as resulting from two developments of the 1960s. First, ‘great technological developments swept into hospitals and clinics...death was moved from home to institutions, itself becoming a

technological event" (1996:27). Second, "the cultural changes that we associate with the sixties were making their appearance, and they integrated readily into the new medicine. The demand for self-determination, for the humbling of experts, and for individual rights began to suffuse medical relationships. A special focus of debate was the doctor-patient relationship, which many sought to transform from traditional medical paternalism--- 'doctor knows best'--- into one of equality and patient decision-making authority" (1996:27). As a result, what Callahan terms "mainline bioethics" came to embody the rampant individualism, and no perspective that sought to include the potential impact on medical decision on the community had a chance of getting a serious hearing... Whether is a matter of reproduction, genetic engineering, or organ transplant, individual self-determination is the reigning queen of values" (1996:26). It is not a all surprisingly, that Callahan finds that "as a case study in communitarian frustration, the field of bioethics is perfect. It took its rise in the late 1960s as the individualistic surge of that era gathered force with the 'rights' language of the 1970s, and has ridden ever since on the crest of that great wave called 'choice'"(1996:26).

Barbara Defoe Whitehead's view of the historical changes in the family, which we will examine in more detail below, begins with the 1950s as the final era of the social domination of the "traditional, biological, two-parent family". So, too, does David Popenoe (RC 1992:v2, n4:31), who says that "in the past thirty years the American family has been buffeted by a series of what many observers refer to as social revolutions". Note how Robert Putnam skillfully plays with using the 1950s as the key referent in his discussion of the debilitating effects of television on American civil society and community:

Thus, read not as life cycle effects, but rather as generational effects, the age-related patterns in our data suggest a radically different interpretation of our basic puzzle. Deciphered with this key, the figure on page 43 depicts a long "civic" generation, born roughly between 1910 and 1940, a broad group of

people substantially more engaged in community affairs and substantially more trusting than those younger than they. (Members of the 1910-1940 generation also seem more civic than their elders, at least to judge by the outlooks of relatively few men and women born in the late nineteenth century who appeared in our samples.) The culminating point of this civic generation is the cohort born in 1925-1930, who attended grade school during the Great Depression, spent World War II in high school (or on the battlefield), first voted in 1948 or 1952, set up housekeeping in the 1950s, and watched their first television when they were in their late twenties. Since national surveying began, this cohort has been exceptionally civic: voting more, joining more, reading newspapers more, trusting more. As the distinguished sociologist Charles Tilly (born in 1928) said in commenting on an early version of this essay, "We are the last suckers" (Putnam 1996).

The referent of the 1950s is in fact so pervasive that to list them all, both direct and indirect, would be to simply reproduce the entire bibliography of communitarian writings.

Spatially and temporally, the communitarian utopian vision is the 1950s. The two are easy to conflate into the suburbs of the 1950s, but it would further our understanding of the communitarians if we hold the two apart as well. The communitarian know full well that we can not return to the 1950s. While the baseline might be the 1950s, the most dramatic display of the communitarian vision was not *Father Knows Best*, but *Picket Fences*, a CBS nighttime drama set in the fictional, but aptly named, Rome, Wisconsin, that aired from 1990 to 1995.

Family And Community

It is my thesis that millions of individual Americans, the pillars of a free society and a vigorous economy, have been cut off from one another and have lost their effectiveness...we have experienced a hollowing of America, in which community was whittled down....More government lessens the individual, and diminished individuals foster more government. (Amitai Etzioni 1983:1-4)

Communitarians argue that in order to regain the consensus that allows for the "shared values of moral community," we must "start with the family. The best place to

start is where each new generation receives its moral anchoring; at home, in the family" (Etzioni, Glendon, Galston, 1990 and Etzioni 1993a:35). The communitarians frame the increase in divorce as a particular threat to the moral community. They hold that the liberalization of divorce laws, itself the outcome of a more general liberalization of sexual norms, and the "decline" of "traditional" social norms has led to an increase since the 1950s in the number of households headed by single-parents. This increase is symptomatic of social decline, functioning like an indicator species or the proverbial canary in a coal mine. Consequently, it is an immediate concern of the communitarians: "Our society requires a change in the very basis of the habits of the heart, in the ways we think about marriage and how we value it" (Etzioni 1993a:76). However, for all their concern for the family, communitarians are, in general, silent on such issues as domestic violence and abuse. For them, the family exists as "a haven in a heartless world" (Lasch 1977) that educates the child for her future roles of citizen and worker.

Communitarians focus their attention on the family as the foremost institution for the child's internalization of "shared values": public education is also important but comes on the scene later. For the communitarians, it is in the family that the child learns normative values, develops the bonds of obligation to the community, and assumes the duties and responsibilities of citizenship.

A citizen must be loyal to his community. Loyalty consists in two related elements: a deep and enduring bond of attachment to the community and the settled determination to give preference to the interest of the community to the extent justice permits. Thus loyalty is to the community as love is to the family (Galston 1980:268).

The Communitarian Family

If Etzioni decries what he sees as a loss of moral consensus and duty, he can take heart from the efforts of his fellow Communitarian Network member, Barbara Defoe Whitehead, has found it. Discussing the report of the National Commission on

Children, she laments that the media “ignored or dismissed what is historically and philosophically most important about the commission”. She says that it has produced nothing less than “a new consensus on cultural values. This consensus...initiates a new period of public thinking about children and families” in relation to the broader community.

The communitarians generally assert that the “traditional” two parent, biological family is the natural and immutable family. This “natural” family is the very basis of the social order. The family is structured, according to Whitehead, around the responsibility of the parent to the child, and the simultaneous physical, Oedipal, and legal dependence of the child on the parents. Through the child, the parents duty to the community is also affirmed: “Making a child is a moral act. Obviously it obligates the parents to the child. But it also obligates the parents to the community” (Etzioni 1993a:60). History and anthropology tell us that “there has never been a society that did not have two-parent families” (Etzioni 1993c). According to Whitehead, the meaning of the family is to be found in its social functions. Foremost is the family as role as an institution wherein the community's responsibility to the child is fulfilled via the parents and, following from this, the regulation of marriage and the maintenance of “traditional two-parent biological families”(Whitehead 1993:47) becomes a moral and judicial imperative of the communitarian community.

The disciplinary function of the family has been badly damaged by a new sexual revolution, Whitehead affirms, and this revolution has not resulted in a better world. In a cultural climate of sexual freedom, girls have lost much of their authority in boy-girl relationships. Until quite recently girls organized, managed, and regulated the social pursuits of their peer groups, with the strong support of adults. In romantic relationships girls exercised their power by withholding sex, keeping boys in the role of craven sexual petitioners. At the same time, they moved their boyfriends in the direction of commitment and monogamy. ‘Going steady,’ the ultimate romantic achievement for teenage girls, offered pseudo-marriage that might include parceling out some of the sexual favors of

marriage. Of course this system was seriously flawed. In the intimacy of a steady relationship, girls could lose control, "give in," and go all the way. They then had to deal with the dire consequences of their sexual transgression---a guilty conscience, a ruined reputation, and sometimes an unwanted pregnancy. The sexual revolution overturned this system of social controls by giving women technological control over their fertility (1994:21).

Perhaps a partial remedy to the normalization of single parenthood, Whitehead opines, would be to "uglify unwed teenage motherhood or even to reestablish some of the disincentives that worked in the past, including separation of the girl from her peer group. Perhaps teenage mothers should attend special high schools, as they do in some cities, rather than mixing with the general high school population---this would segregate teenage mothers from nonparent teenagers and perhaps change a peer culture that views schoolgirl pregnancy as an unobjectionable, even enviable, event" (1994:22).

There are many avenues by which to critique Whitehead's position. The most obvious is a general attribute of communitarian writings: the highly selective and at times disingenuous use of sociological research in order to buttress her universal and ahistorical statements, the foremost being the assertion that "the two-parent biological family is the most natural." Equally troubling is her use of the increase in divorce as the basis for a blanket indictment of feminism for its partial victory in the emancipation of sexual pleasure. These fallacies have been given exemplary elaboration by Stephanie Coontz and others. It is best to refer the reader to these works for serious depth historical analysis of the American family. One aspect that has not received much attention is Whitehead's desire to restore Oedipus to a central position in the family dynamic, especially in terms of the restoration of the father, and the naturalizing of duty and obligation.

Oedipus

To us refresh our memories of the Oedipus narrative, in the *Tyrannus Rex*, Apollo, the god of law, “the purifier who everywhere unifies the multiplicity” (Gaskell 1884:46) propels the action. When the play opens, we find the chorus begging Oedipus to save Thebes from a terrible plague. We do not know the symptoms of the pestilence but its pathological nature is clearly in evidence, just as it is in Poe's *Mask of the Red Death*. And Like Poe's *Prince Prospero*, Oedipus in his palace is seemingly far removed from the pestillance. A chorus of citizens comes to the palace to appeal to him to intervene as he had when he saved them from the Sphinx. All the more so, they implore, because he has ruled long and well. The citizens seek his intervention as “the man surest in mortal ways and wisest in the ways of the gods”.

Your own eyes
 Must tell you: Thebes is tossed on a murdering sea
 And cannot lift her head from the death surge.
 A rust consumes the buds and fruits of the earth:
 The herds are sick; children die unborn.
 And labor is in vain. The god of plague and pyre
 Raids like detestable lighting through the city.
 And all the house of Kadmos is laid waste,
 All emptied, and all darkened: Death alone
 Batten upon the misery of Thebes.

In the midst of their entreaties, Iocaste's brother, Creon, returns with news from the Oracle of Apollo in Delphi.

In plain words,
 The god commands us to expel from Thebes
 An old defilement we are sheltering.
 It is a deathly thing, beyond cure;
 We must not let it feed upon us longer.

The Oracle is interpreted as requiring vengeance for the murder of Laios, the ruler before Oedipus. The murderer must be exposed. Oedipus calls for the blind prophet Teiresias, a “servant of Apollo,” to “detect the criminal”. After some protest, for

he knows all too well the truth, Teiresias identifies Oedipus as the killer of Laios. He does this in a rather straightforward manner. But later, under increasing prodding, he accuses Oedipus of the even greater crimes of incest and patricide.

Oedipus rejects the accusations and accuses Teiresias and Creon of conspiring against him. The sole surviving witness to the death of Laios is summoned to the palace. In the mean time, a messenger arrives from Corinth and announces the death of Oedipus' father Polybus, and that Oedipus is now ruler of both cities. But Oedipus is deeply disturbed by the quickly unfolding events. Iocaste tries to comfort Oedipus and distract him from the investigation of the murder of Laios.

Have no fear of sleeping with your mother.
How many men, in dreams, have lain with their mother!
No reasonable man is troubled by such things.

Oedipus, sensing that the truth will soon be revealed, will not be deterred. Reflecting on his past, he explains that his flight from Corinth was caused by a prophecy. "Apollo said through his prophet" that Oedipus would 'kill his father and marry his mother.' Oedipus, thinking that Polybus was his father and seeking to avoid fate, which Iocaste says "rules us all," left Corinth. It was on this journey that he encountered and killed an old man and continued on his way. Subsequently, he solves the riddle of the sphinx and frees Thebes. The Corinthian messenger reveals at this point that he knows that Oedipus is not in fact the son of Polybus. The messenger himself, while tending his flocks "in the crooked pass of Kithairon," had discovered the infant Oedipus and at first implies that he had given Oedipus to Polybus.²⁷ The Corinthian messenger confesses that it was really he who cut the bonds which held the infant Oedipus's legs, but that another shepherd had actually found Oedipus in the brush. This first shepherd turns out

²⁷Kithairon was the pasture of Apollo, hence his epithet "Apollo Katharsios" (Gaskell 1988:54)

to be the very same witness of Laios death years later, and who was already being summoned to testify. He arrives and relates when he was a slave of Laios, Iocaste had given him the infant Oedipus to spirit away from Thebes. At this, Oedipus accepts the truth, guilt and punishment for crimes he had no knowledge of committing. But he, rather than Apollo, will render unto himself the most profound punishment. Oedipus, shamed in the public sphere of Thebes, rushes into the privacy of his palace, only to find that there too the moral order of the community has enveloped Iocaste and forced her hand. As the most prominent exponent of communitarianism says, "Public humiliation is a surprisingly effective and low-cost way of deterring criminals and expressing the moral order of the community." (Etzioni in Ehrenhalt 1993:11b). As he bursts into her rooms, Iocaste hangs herself. Oedipus takes the golden brooches from her gown and plunges them into his eyes. "Apollo dear Children, the god Apollo...brought my sick, sick fate upon me. But this blinding was my own".

Oedipus accuses Apollo of causing his ruin, and all signs in the text point to Apollo as the force behind the action. Even when Oedipus seeks to change his fate, Apollo brings his efforts back into line with his destiny. Apollo knew all along that Oedipus' fate would come to pass. It was just a matter of producing the circumstances. It is the metaphorical vengeance for Oedipus's triumph over the sphinx. It is a common theme in mythology for the hero to sacrifice part of himself in order to gain knowledge. Prometheus must suffer for bringing fire to humans, Eve is punished for bringing knowledge to Adam. Odin sacrifices an eye to learn the fate of the gods. Oedipus differs from these examples in that he has no awareness of his crime. Until it is revealed to him years later. Like Job, he is defiant and resistant, while knowing that he is no match for his oppressor. Oedipus blinds himself, and submits.

Oedipus ultimately submits to Apollo. He submits to his fate because his very wisdom has brought him to the realization of his situation (See Lefebvre 1995: 49-55). Oedipus was ignorant of his crime, but he was aware of the prophecy, and did everything to avoid patricide and incest. "Oedipus rebels against the role of son and father, [he] wants to be neither father nor son, but simply self (Rank 1941:124). He sought to step outside fate and duty, but instead the Oracle of Apollo, the god of right and law, is overwhelming. Although Oedipus submits, Kitto is correct when he says of Oedipus's submission: "We can only say that "when you are knocked flat, you must accept it, and if you cannot get up again, you must be resigned. There is little illumination in this" (Kitto 1989:142).

Hegel says that "the principle source of opposition which Sophocles in particular has accepted and worked out in the finest way, is that of the body politic, the opposition between ethical life in its social universality and the family as the natural ground for moral relations" (1956:68). For Hegel, Oedipus illustrates the importance of duty in the "reciprocal recognition of another." Duty is necessitated by guilt, and "duties summon us to action" (Etzioni 1991a:136-137).

In the story of Oedipus, the son does not see his own father in the person of the man who has insulted him and whom he strikes to death, nor his mother in the queen whom he makes his wife. In this way a hidden power shunning the light of day, waylays the ethical-consciousness, a power which bursts forth only after the deed is done, and seizes the doer in the act. The ethical consciousness cannot disclaim the crime and its guilt (Hegel 1956:279).

This point is picked up by Freud in the *Interpretation of Dreams*: "The action of [Oedipus Rex] consists in nothing other than the process of revealing, with cunning delays and ever mounting excitement---a process that can be likened to the work of psychoanalysis"---that Oedipus himself is the murderer of Laios, but further that he is the son of the murdered man and Iocaste. Appalled at the abomination which he has

unwittingly perpetrated, Oedipus blinds himself and forsakes his home. The Oracle is then fulfilled (Freud 1965:295). The very words that Iocaste spoke in order to show Oedipus' innocence are used by Freud to prove his guilt: "Like Oedipus, we live in ignorance of these wishes, repugnant to morality, which have been forced upon us by Nature, and after their revelation we may all of us well seek to close our eyes to the scenes of our childhood.... Today, just as then, many men dream of having sexual relations with their mothers, and speak of the fact with indignation and astonishment" (1965:297).

It seems that we can not escape the constellation of duty/guilt/fate that makes Oedipus "a tragedy of destiny" (Freud 1965:295) because, as Iocaste pointed out, it has always been with us (and so appears to be ahistorical and natural). "Have no fear," she says, "men, in dreams, have always lain with their mothers. No reasonable man would be troubled by such things." But even dreams become potentially criminal with the intervention of Apollo. It is at this point that social relations appear to become fixed around the patriarchal ideology of the family romance (Rank 1941:125).

"Now it is as if the Olympian magic mountain had opened before us and revealed to us ...Apollo, as an ethical deity, extracts measure of his disciples, and to be able to maintain it, he requires self knowledge. And so, side by side with the aesthetic necessity for beauty, there occur the demands to 'know thyself' and 'nothing in excess' ...because of his Titanic love for man, Prometheus must be torn to pieces by vultures, because of his excessive wisdom which could solve the riddle of the sphinx, Oedipus must be plunged into a bewildering vortex of crime. Thus did the Delphic god interpret the Greek past" (Nietzsche, 1967:4).

Nietzsche found in Oedipus the central role of consciousness in the exacting of punishment. The punished must understand the "nature" of the crime before punishment can be applied--- Kafka's "In the Penal Colony" makes this point quite clearly. There can be no punishment without the knowledge of the sin, says Nietzsche, and no social

order without punishment (see *Genealogy of Morals*, section 8-10, and *The Dawn*, Sec. 202).

The feeling of guilt, of personal obligation, had its origin... in the oldest and most primitive personal relationship, that between buyer and seller, creditor and debtor....the community, too, stands to its members in that same vital basic relation, that of the creditor to his debtors. One lives in a community one enjoys the advantages of a community (oh what advantages! we sometimes forget them today), one dwells protected, cared for, in peace and trustfulness, without fear of certain injuries and hostile acts to which the man *outside*, the 'man without peace,' is exposed...since one has bound and pledged oneself to the community precisely with the view to injuries and hostile acts. What will happen *if this pledge is broken?* The community, the disappointed creditor, will get what payment it can.... The lawbreaker is a debtor who has not only failed to make good the advantages and advance payments bestowed upon him but has actually attacked his creditor: therefore he is not only deprived henceforth of all these advantages and benefits, as is fair---he is also reminded *what these benefits are really worth*. The wrath of the disappointed creditor, the community, throws him back again into the sage and outlaw state against which he was hitherto protected: it thrust him away---and now every kind of hostility may be vented upon him (Nietzsche 1967:77)

Nietzsche argues that Oedipus is only produced within the context of the morality of an ethical community. The Oedipal complex is specific to the bourgeois moral order. In fact, the presence of Oedipus signifies the presence of this moral order. The wide dispersal of Oedipus, along with its signifying psychological complex, may appear natural, but that does not negate its historical origins in the rise of the bourgeoisie (Deleuze and Guattari 1984). Outside of the city, Oedipus operated autonomously, but returning to the polis, he is declared by law to be an evil "beyond all cure". He has violated the authority structure of the family, and equally important, his existence within the polis threatens its very existence. Defeating the Sphinx and ruling well were not payment enough. Oedipus was outside the ethical order: "For I weep for the world's outcast" (Sophocles 1977:65). The chorus at the opening of the play may

have been coming to ask for his intervention, but it became a creditor demanding its due.

“The polis belongs to the class of things that exist by nature and that man is by nature an animal intended to live in a polis. He who is without a polis, by reason of his own nature and not of some accident, is either a poor sort of being, or a being higher than man, he is like the man of whom Homer wrote in denunciation: ‘clanless and lawless and heartless is he’ (Aristotle 1958:5).

It is here that we find the sociological significance of Oedipus and its relevance to the study of authority, for it is the object of sociology itself, society, that makes authority “a problem in the emphatic sense” (Adorno 1969:108). Society sustains itself and its members while always threatening them with ruin. Devotion to duty, to the moral code, to community, to the family, marks our desire for the repressive conditions of life as it is lived

Marcuse’s “Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man” is useful in understanding at this point. For the communitarians the traditional, Oedipal, family is the foundation for community. Marcuse argues that this conception, which finds its finest expression in Freud, is no longer generally applicable. Freud’s analysis of the process by which individuals submit to the authority of the leader assumes that the individual ego stands in conflict with the demands of society (the superego) and that individuals identify with leaders as surrogate fathers. This conception relies on the family as the primary institution for the socialization of children (or as Etzioni says, “having children is a moral act, it binds the parents to the community”). Children grow into adulthood through their conflict with their fathers and come to identify first with patriarchal authority, and then with the authority of the leader. “The dynamic of the Oedipus situation is not only the hidden mode of every father-son relationship but also the secret of the enduring domination of man by man---of the conquest and failures of

civilization. In the Oedipus situation are the individual and intellectual roots of the reality principle which governs society" (Marcuse 1989:234).

Unlike Freud, who believes that Oedipus a universal expression of ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny, Marcuse rightly finds it to be historical and that the primacy of Oedipus "came to an end with the changes in industrial society in the interwar period" (1989:235). The family has changed, and the patriarchal role of the father is no longer important for the reproduction of society. "The socially necessary repressions and the socially necessary behavior are no longer learned---and internalized---in the long struggle with the father... (1989:235). We have no need for the father substitute to accept our submission. We submit not to the further. but to the totalitarian structures of control and total administration: we become "a huge captive audience. in which the vast majority enjoys the captor" (1989:237). An analysis such as Freud's renders the communitarians focus on the family problematic. For the communitarians, the family is in crisis because it---and coincidentally, the father as well---has lost its central position. but that the community is not yet an efficient and reliable instrument for socialization.

Etzioni, Glendon and Galston put it this way:

Communitarians favor not a return to authoritarian leadership, but to a climate that fosters finding agreed-upon positions that we can favor authoritatively. We require a set of social virtues, some basic settle values, that we as a community endorse and actively affirm....on the spirit of community" (in Etzioni 1992:25).

Because they do not want a leader, they can claim that they are not authoritarians (or "majoritarians," which is the term they often substitute here). But what if Marcuse's readings are correct? Then we might conclude that authoritarianism is no longer rooted in the family, but rests in the community itself. It is precisely that the relationship of communitarianism to authority that must be found at the level of community. The father's authority in the family, which is still needed in the area of sexuality, is

subsumed to the needs of maintaining the authority of the community. The community thus "has its representative in every family, so that the family becomes its most important instrument of power... for the reproduction of an authoritarian social system in the structure of its members" (Reich 190:53).

Whitehead and Oedipus

Within communitarian discourse, the specter of Oedipus is no where more in evidence than in Barbara Defoe Whitehead's writings for the *Atlantic Monthly*. The general outline of Whitehead's argument can be easily traced. The family is the fundamental unit of society, and as living socially is the essence of being human, so must, the argument goes, the family be an essential aspect of humanity. Stated at such a general level, such a comment is difficult to rebut because it rests on a series of conjectures and assumed relationships lacking in any specific context save that of the present day United States. However, we are not talking here about just any generic family because we are immediately informed that not all families are created equal. The intact family, the two parent biological family, is the only natural family unit. Whitehead argues that this family is important for three reasons. First, at a fundamental level the family serves as an economic base for the child. Second, the two parent biological family serves as the primary means for the transference of social values and traditions, of the very spirit of community. Finally, the biological family, in keeping with the Oedipal authority structure, serves as a primary regulator of sexuality. "Stepfamilies seem less likely to make the kind of ordinary investments in the children that intact families do (1993:21). Note that it is unsaid, but obvious, that these ordinary investments are not only monetary but sexual as well. From the communitarian perspective, the root problem is that in chaotic or disrupted families, the power relations of patriarchal authority is out of balance. The biological father is either not there, or

there is only a stepfather who typically is not willing to invest time or money in the stepchild with sufficient generosity. Furthermore, the step-parent is not bound by the incest taboo to the same degree. The family, with the father's crucial role in the family romance, is clearly intended to function as the great regulator of sex and the upholder of morality. This position being possible because of the mother's double role as giver of life and source of corruption and degeneracy. Social progress is impossible, Whitehead argues, unless the two parent biological family remains central to sexual regulation.,.

Family structure strongly influences early sexual activity as well. Daughters in single-parent families are more likely to engage in early sex than do girls who grow up in two-parent families. Several factors may be involved: less supervision in the home, less exposure to adults' sexuality, and the lack of a father's steady affection and protection. Girls whose relationships with their fathers have been severely damaged by divorce or their parents nonmarriage are more likely to engage in a frantic quest for male approval and to seek love through early sex than are girls from intact families. Both parents and teenagers in divorced families have more permissive attitudes toward sexual intercourse outside marriage. In fact, there is evidence of a kind of sexual trickle-down in families, not just from parent to child, but also from older siblings to younger. Teenagers with sexually active siblings are likelier to begin having sex at an early age....Early sexual activity can dampen religious ardor (1994:17-18).

Women are especially designated for this education in authority, for according to Whitehead, "Girls' sexual conduct, unlike that of boys, is governed less by hormones than by social controls" (1994:20). To manage sexual conduct, social controls must be directed towards the regulation of women's bodies and sexuality. In this way the family fulfills its other socially vital role, that of educator for authority beyond the family (Horkheimer 1972). But the family has another side to it, which emerges when the biological bond has been disturbed and the "blood tie" is absent. The step-parent appears now as a sexual threat and potential abuser.

However much our modern sympathies reject the fairy-tale portrait of stepparents, the latest research confirms that the old stories are anthropologically quite accurate. Stepfamilies disrupt established loyalties, create new uncertainties, provoke deep anxieties, and sometimes threaten a child's physical

safety as well as emotional security....One of the most severe risks associated with stepparent-child ties is the risk of sexual abuse. As Judith Wallerstein explains, 'The presence of a stepfather can raise the difficult issue of a thinner incest barrier'. The incest taboo is strongly reinforced, Wallerstein says, by knowledge of paternity and by the experience of caring for a child since birth. A stepfather enters the family without either credential and plays a sexual role as the mother's husband. As a result, stepfathers can pose a sexual risk to the children, especially to daughters. According to a study by the Canadian researchers Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, preschool children in stepfamilies are forty times as likely as children in intact families to suffer physical or sexual abuse. (Most of the sexual abuse was committed by a third party, such as a neighbor, a stepfather's male friend, or another nonrelative.) Stepfathers discriminate in their abuse: they are far more likely to assault nonbiological children than their own natural childrenthe absence of a blood tie weakens the bond between stepparent and child (1993:20-21).

And beyond being a physical threat, parents without a "blood tie" are psychologically and economically miserly.

"Disrupted families threaten the psychological well-being of children and diminish the investment of adult time and money in them. Family diversity in the form of increasing numbers of single-parent and stepparent families does not strengthen the social fabric. It dramatically weakens and undermines society, placing new burdens on schools, courts, prisons, and the welfare system. These new families are not an improvement on the nuclear family, nor are they even as good, whether you look at outcomes for children or outcomes for society as a whole. In short, far from representing social progress, family change represents a stunning example of social regress (Whitehead 1993:24-25).

Whitehead sees the future: there can be no positive social change unless the basic institution of society, the family, remains unchanged. The same position was emphasized at the First Communitarian Teach-In, where Karl Zinsmeister of the American Enterprise Institute presided over a panel on "Family, Schools, and Civic Culture". According to the conference report in *The Responsive Community: Rights and Responsibilities*, Zinsmeister advanced the "proposition that the traditional nuclear family is an institution of enormous and irreplaceable social utility for American Society; around the idea that the family is our single most important community resource....it is not the traditional

1950s family that was an oddity, but the current familial state of affairs where 40 percent of all children...are living with someone other than both biological parents---that is...not just odd...but troubling as well" (1992).

The communitarians promote family as a fundamental aspect of community and community as a necessary outcome of family. Family and community are the results of the social desire for bonds of attachment and love. In the family and in the community, a subject is produced who desires her own domination and learns that this desire is both normal and a moral necessity. It is in the family that a child learns subordination to a morality that appears as "a totality of definite rules; they already exist; they are already made" (Durkheim 1973:26). And "social attitudes about sex often speak volumes about how a society approaches moral and social matters in general" (Etzioni 1992:27). The more the family is discussed as the foundation of community, the more the importance of Oedipus in the maintenance of familial authority is made obvious. "Family breakup commonly upsets the established boundaries of authority in a family....In some instances family disruption creates a complete vacuum in authority" (Whitehead 1993:26).

As Max Horkheimer pointed out, "the family not only educates for authority in bourgeois society, it also cultivates a dream of a better condition" (Horkheimer 1972). This dream of community identifies the family as the primary institution for the reproduction of normative values, i.e., the production of a "spirit of discipline" wherein duty and responsibility are privileged (Durkheim 1972). The relationship between the family and the community is crucial. As a basis for their call for a new "spirit of community," the communitarians adopt a romanticized utopian notion of 1950s suburbia and juxtapose it to the present.

Community

Etzioni, in his "Liberals and Communitarians," notes that "for communitarians... the moral force of community is a central, perhaps the central constituent of the individual, but they maintain that it is only a constituent, not the entire self....rights are not central to the communitarian project, for 'rights do not define the community,' nor do they provide reasons for acting. Duties, to the contrary, summon us to action" (Etzioni 1991a:136-137).

Etzioni begins this essay with a discussion of the debate between "contemporary liberal philosophers (CLP)" and "communitarians." (Notice how he has used a pretty familiar right-wing debating tactic. The opponents are "philosophers" while communitarians are more, shall we say, "common.") The liberals have charged that the communitarians do not provide a basis for individual rights, while the Communitarians say that CPLs have an "excessive focus: on individual rights and a neglect of obligations to the community, to shared virtues and common purposes....Out of these charges and counter-charges, a synthesis begins to suggest itself." *Politically*, this essay is an attempt to reconcile the two competing, left/right, communitarians visions. In doing this, he advocates that the various writers specify "when they use the term "community," indicate *which* community they mean." He then gives a textbook definition from Sandel that is an example of such a general definition. According to Sandel, community is constituted by "a common vocabulary of discourse and a background of implicit practices and understandings." *Theoretically*, in this essay Etzioni attempts a definition of community based upon sociological principals.

"We now explore various communitarian notions of community, using three basic criteria: scope (hundreds, thousands or millions of people? Small group or mass society?); substance or 'content' (is the community fundamentally a moral, political, religious or cultural entity, or a complex combination of these or other elements?); and perhaps most significantly, patterns of 'dominance,' that is, how

the community expresses or affirms its moral values, common interests, commitments, and ends" (1991a:144).

"Does this mean that we all have to move back to live in small towns and villages in order to ensure the social foundations of morality, to rebuild and shore-up 'we-ness'...."

This is more than just an academic question.

Tonight I present to you a comprehensive plan to set our nation on that new course. I believe we will find our new direction in the basic old values that brought us here over the last two centuries -- a commitment to opportunity, to individual responsibility, to community, to work, to family and to faith (Clinton 1993b).

Bellah, taking off from Habermas's terminology, tells us that "the lifeworld is the world of community" (RR 6,1.95/96:52). He is very uncomfortable with the problems of authority in community, and urged what he call "Democratic communitarianism". Democratic communitarianism has four aspects: 1) "value of the sacredness of the individual." 2) "a central value of solidarity...reciprocity, loyalty, shared commitment to the good...." 3) complementary association." and 4) participation in the community exists as both a right and a duty. No of this departs very far from what some presumable "undemocratic" communitarians maintain.

Etzioni says in one of his *Responsive Community* essays "Community of Communities" that communitarians are committed to the view that unless there are some shared substantive core values--- a 'thicker' framework that most people in a community find compelling---social order can not sustain itself....If one grants the need for a 'thick' share framework, albeit one that may be recast, what are its core elements? As I see it, there are seven: a more-than-procedural commitment to democracy; a commitment to the constitution; 'layered' loyalties; respect for difference; limiting identity politics; society-wide dialogues; and a means for reconciliation of individuals who have injured the community (Etzioni 1996/1997).

For the communitarians, the degree to which a person belongs to a community is determined in the last instance by the degree to which she conforms to its whims and participates in the fulfillment of the community's "functional self-sufficiency." As a *citizen*, she can not exist outside of the community. She must either conform or cease

to exist as a citizen. Merely understanding the “mores, norms, and standards” of the community is not sufficient for inclusion. One must be recognized by the community. Without citizenship, one loses both the rights and obligations of belonging to the “moral community” and therefore the community's recognition of her as part of its moral order.

This morality, a production of humans in society, comes to be thus alienated from them and appears as a possession of “the community,” first as its utopian vision, and then as the disciplinary coding and practices that are simultaneously deployed both *individually*, through repression and socialization, or *communally*, through limiting their emancipation as humans to the enclosure of the “Responsive Community.” Of course, those excluded from the Eden of middle-class community may also form communities (e.g., gay men and lesbians, women, “racial” minorities, etc.). However, this formation only intensifies the potential threat that these smaller communities pose to the “Responsive Community.” The continued tolerance of these “non-traditional” communities is contingent, like a person’s citizenship, upon subordination to the disciplinary apparatus of the larger “Responsive Community.” Communitarianism is predicated on the fortification of the boundaries of bourgeois social relations and the disciplining of its members by a “Salem-like” authority. (Etzioni 1993a; see also Benhybib 1992:76-79).

The authority of community occupies an important place in communitarian ideology. The platform of the Communitarian Network, “The Communitarian Manifesto,” was written by Etzioni, Mary Ann Glendon, and William Galston. In it they place the utmost importance on the moral community as the fullest expression of civil society. “At its simplest, communitarianism can be defined as a de-emphasizing of *individualism* and *individual rights*... and a privileging of the individual's role in the community...” (Johnson 1991). According to Gardner, community is not limited to the

communitarian ideal of a "healthy community," but that there are also "chaotic or degenerate" communities as well (1995:170). A healthy community "reaffirms itself continually. It builds its own morale. It may face up to its flaws and tolerate criticism, but basically it has confidence in itself... A healthy community provides innumerable and ever-present affirmations of shared purpose just by being intact and vital. Everything from its nursery tales and its legendary figures to its structures of law and custom are forever conveying messages of instruction and reinforcement. Its history speaks, its symbols speak. It affirms the framework of meaning so important to community membership" (Garnder in Etzioni 1995:175).

Now we need to concern ourselves with shoring up the foundations of morality, so that communities can again raise their moral voices, families can educate their youngsters, and schools can graduate individuals who will become upstanding members of their communities (Etzioni, Glendon, and Galston 1992:13-14)

The rise of the underclass, which is the anti community, and communitarianism as an vaccine against its form of community and as a restoration of morality and the inculcation of values. "Sociologists like to point out that chaos and disorder are common aspects of malfunctioning inner-city families" (Martindale, Wight 1995/96 R&R 6, no.1 Winter).

Who's values? Whose community? The answer was quickly given: "we will attend to the question of whose values will prevail as the discussion unfolds" (Etzioni, Glendon, and Galston 1992:14).

Etzioni has said, but it is clearly the values of the vast middle classes that he seeks to preserve. As he goes on to say explicitly

We adopt the name Communitarian to emphasize that the time has come to attend to our responsibilities to the conditions and elements we all share, to the community. As communitarians we also recognize a need for a new social, philosophical, and political map. The designation of political camps as liberals or conservatives, as left or right, often no longer serves. We see at one extreme Authoritarians (such as the Moral Majority and the Liberty Bell). They urge the imposition on all others of moral positions they believe in, from school prayer to

forcing women to stay in the kitchen. At the other extreme we see Radical Individualists...the Cato Institute, civil libertarians, especially the ACLU, and laissez-faire conservatives, who believe that if individuals are left on their own to pursue their choices, rights, and self-interests, all will be well. We suggest that free individuals require a community" (1992:15).

This is followed by the answer to the question: Whose community?

When the term community is used, the first notion that typically comes to mind is a place in which people know each and care for one another---the kind of place in which people do not merely ask 'How are you?' as a formality but care about the answer. This we-ness (which cynics have belittled as a 'warm, fuzzy' sense of community) is indeed part of its essence. Our focus here, though, is on another element of community, crucial for the issues at hand: *Communities speak to us in moral voices. They lay claims on their members.* Indeed, they are the most important sustaining source of moral voices other than the inner self. Communitarians, who make the restoration of community their correct mission, are often asked which community they mean. The local community? the national Community? The sociologically correct answer is that community are best viewed as if they were Chinese nesting boxes, in which less encompassing ones (families, neighborhoods) are nestled within more encompassing ones (local villages and towns, which in turn are situated within still more encompassing communities, the national and cross national ones... (1993:31)

The community is characterized by its "moral voice" which has the authority to lay claims upon its members. But, as we have seen, communitarians like Etzioni believe that radical individualism has undermined that authority.

The disinclination to lay moral claims undermines the daily, routine social underwriting of morality.....To object to the moral voice of the community, and to the moral encouragement it provides, is to oppose the social glue that helps hold the moral order together (1992:37).

To oppose communitarianism is to oppose society itself, or so it would seem. But how are we to interpret the speech of the moral voice? Sociology again is brought in to provide the foundation for the communitarian intervention.

How do we shore up morality?....Most important for the issue is the sociological fact that we find reinforcement for our moral inclinations and provide reinforcement to our fellow human beings, throughout the community (1993:31). We require a set of social virtues, some basic settled values, that we as a community endorse and actively affirm....the times call for an age of

reconstruction, in which we put a new emphasis on 'we,' on values we share, on the spirit of community" (1993:25)

"We aim for a judicious mix of self-interest, self-expression, and commitment to the commons---of rights *and* responsibilities, of I and we. Hence the sociological recommendation to move from "'I" to "we" is but a form of shorthand for arguing that a strong commitment to the commons must now be added to strong commitments to individual needs and interests that are already well ensconced (1993:26).

Durkheim best tells us how these commitment and values are necessary reinforcements for the reproduction of our desire and our submission to community.

No society can function well unless most of its members 'behave' most of the time because they voluntarily heed their moral commitments and social responsibilities (1993:30).

For community to be real, for it to speak as a moral voice, it must not be imposed, but actively desired. Childress (1992) says that in this way, through the desire for the authority of community, community ceases to be something imposed, but instead takes on an expressive appearance. The desire for morality becomes a means of enforcing morality.

Communitarians favor not a return to authoritarian leadership, but to a climate that fosters finding agreed-upon positions that we can favor authoritatively.

"What Fascists?" Communitarianism and the Problem of Authoritarianism

The problem of the "potential of tyranny" with the Salem-like Responsive Community's (Fowler in Etzioni 1995:95) has always existed alongside the positive aspects of community. From the beginning, Etzioni, on behalf of the Communitarian Network, felt the need to respond to charges of "Puritanism" and "fascism" (see also fn. x). These charges came from both progressives and, more noticeably, conservatives. *The Economist* took early notice of the Communitarian Network, asked the rhetorical question "What do Amitai Etzioni (sociologist), Alasdair MacIntyre (philosopher), Carl Schmitt (Nazi pamphleteer, deceased) and Sir James Goldsmith (plutopundit and

Euro-politician) have in common? They are all communitarians." More than just a flip remark, *The Economist* says that, having caught the ear of both President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair, communitarian "ideas are gaining ground, which may well be something to worry about" (1995:33). Despite the attempts by various communitarians to avoid or discourage the investigation of how communitarianism and authority might illuminate each other, such comparisons began being drawn at the very beginning. In part, this is due to the manner in which the communitarians position themselves in relation to the "authoritarian Right" in the United States. If their great fear, which they tacitly admit, is of the clear and present danger that authoritarianism of some kind will become the dominant politics of "the vast middle". At the same time, because of this fear, they have been compelled to respond to accusations from both civil libertarians and conservatives that they are simply providing a smokescreen for a velvet authoritarianism.

In the inaugural issue of the *Responsive Community*, Etzioni contributes an essay entitled "What Fascists?" in response to a letter to the editor of *Business Week* suggesting that communitarianism has similarities to Italian fascism. In his short essay, Etzioni outlines for the first time an argument that will be often repeated:

...we strongly hold that those willing to make adjustments as minimally intrusive as screens in airports to thwart bombs on flights, sobriety checkpoints, disclosure of sexual contacts for carriers of AIDS [sic], and some drug testing, say, of airline pilots---all opposed by the ACLU---are those who in the longer run invite wholesale changes in public orientation, as frustration mounts to explosive flash points, with people taking the law into their own hands, New York vigilante style, or demanding harsh laws, such as a quarantine for AIDS patients. Hence, *careful, crafted adjustments, based on morally sound principles, are the best way to respond to the dangers of fascism* (1990/91:13).

Of course the question that begs to be asked is why the communitarians feel compelled to respond to the accusation of authoritarianism? And why defenses like

"This is not ideology, but sociology," why the denials, the refusals and the constant minimization of the "problem of tyranny?" Perhaps it is because they are wrongly accused, or perhaps they protest too much. Etzioni's statement is in itself remarkable. First, it creates the possibility for an entire series of statements that follow from it which can help us understand the relation of communitarianism to authority. One important point is that Etzioni's statement contains within it a theory of fascism. The origins of fascism are to be found in the frustration of the middle classes, which Etzioni always refers to in the singular. At present, there is the danger that this frustration will mount to "explosive flash points" which could either push them towards embracing draconian authority, or towards anarchy---"New York vigilante style". Thus Etzioni's vision contains a vision of a dystopia, and of an apocalypse, the coming moral anarchy.. The events of Los Angeles seems to only solidify this connection. It identifies the first enemies of the people---drug users, AIDS and other disease carriers, terrorists. We do not have long to wait for others to be added to the list, for we can rest assured that, inevitably, there will be others. These will be individuals or communities that stand outside of the vast middle. "People will take the law into their own hands" against these anti-social elements, like Bernard Getz or Charles Bronson's *Death Wish* character, or more subtly they will simply wield the law as a club in the way it has always been used. Since this might hurt, we should gradually subject the anti-social elements to discipline so that it is never more than just an inconvenience. In fact, we will come to like it, to desire it, to find it the natural state of affairs, as does the subject of the wonderfully short rich story "There is a man in the habit of hitting me with an umbrella." What Durkheim stated matter of factly, the communitarians proclaim emphatically: "when we conform to a moral rule, we not only desire to conform to it, but also desire the rule itself (1973:73-74).

Etzioni's statement also tells us that within the very limits of our community stand other enemies. First there is the authoritarian right, which is highly motivated and organized, and capable of winning the support of the middle class. Second, there are the highly motivated, but disorganized radical individualists (e.g., the ACLU) who prevent the implementation of "careful, crafted adjustments". In another essay published shortly afterwards, Etzioni explained that communitarians desire a "moral reawakening without Puritanism" and stated that "the examples given by those concerned that the new morality will revert to Puritanism are sociological rubbish" (1991:31). In any event, "... what are the alternatives to the exercise of the moral voice [of community]? There are only two: a police state, which tries to maintain civic order by brute force, or a moral vacuum in which anything goes (1993a:37).

But more importantly, there is "the" middle class itself who's mounting frustration is drawing it towards fascism. The fault lines of American social life are clearly illuminated for the communitarians. With the demise of New Deal Liberalism and the socialist left, the communitarians argue that politics in the United States have become a struggle between two camps, radical individualists and Right-wing authoritarians. While at times sympathetic to the concerns of the "radical individualists," Etzioni believes that authoritarianism is a greater threat to the middle class, in part because of the attraction of authority for an anxiety ridden middle class. Communitarians proposed a middle course between the two camps, a politics of the middle range for the middle class.

The main danger is that *unless we fashion reasonable, carefully calibrated measures to enhance public safety and public health, these [authoritarian] voices will gain in following.....* We should not underestimate the frustrations among many who must live behind triple-locked doors and barred windows; who fear to venture into most parks and many streets after dark; and who, in quite a few places, can't walk the streets safely even in broad daylight. In areas frequented by drug dealers, there are Americans who sleep on the floor to dodge bullets, who live in constant fear of violence, especially if they are old, young,

female, or otherwise vulnerable. In other realms of life, many also fear intimacy, blood transfusions, or even a visit to the dentist. Children carry guns to school because they fear preteen gunslingers, finding no effective protection by school or public authorities. Being mugged on the way to school for lunch money or a bus pass---is all too common in some parts. Although some of these fears are exaggerated, most are, to a considerable extent, quite realistic. Little wonder people are all too anxious to find effective measures that will reestablish a reasonable degree of public safety and public health. 'If we do not act because we fear that somehow, someday, an innocent law may lead to tyranny, we may as well set forth conditions that raise social stress to a level that serves those who call for 'strong' government' (Etzioni 1993a:164-166).

Communitarians like Etzioni argue that responsibility and duty are the underpinnings of the social order, and this order is in immediate danger of complete collapse. "Hence the urgent need for communities to articulate the responsibilities they expect their members to discharge, especially in times, such as our own, in which the understanding of these responsibilities has weakened and their reach [has become] unclear" (Etzioni 1993a:267). If this sounds moralistic, it is not because these are moralistic times, just the opposite, in fact. "Look also at the historical condition we are in. As we have seen, at this particular stage in our history signs of moral deficiencies abound, while incidents of excessive moralism are few and far between" (1993a:37). The Religious New Service reported that "communitarians want to focus on rights and responsibilities... praise the 'long overdue attention' on families and family values but want to avoid the strident negativity of the religious Right" (American Political Network 1992).

The increasing influence of the New Right touches every aspect of communitarian ideology. One hears the themes of "Family Values" clearly in the Communitarian Platform's call for greater responsibility to the community and commitment to shared values (Cohen 1991; Dionne 1993). The Right's construction of social problems as problems of morality is taken by Etzioni in particular to mean that "*the best way to curb authoritarianism and right-wing tendencies is to stop the anarchic*

drift by introducing carefully calibrated responses to urgent and legitimate public concerns about safety and the control of epidemics" (Etzioni 1993a:13).

The Utopian Vision in Social Policy: Some Modest Communitarian Public Policies

Contact tracing of persons with HIV is a case in point. Both the Communitarians and the New Right understand the struggles of gays only within the context of the AIDS epidemic, and not in terms of civil rights. The New Right, of course, generally proposes authoritarian responses, including more overt repression of gay men and lesbians. Against this backdrop, Etzioni views the resistance to contact tracing in the face of the deepening of the HIV/AIDS crisis as an example of the "radical individualist...refusal of any adjustment in constitutional rights, no matter how compelling the social need" (Etzioni 1993a:13). Although Etzioni says that contact tracing is a public health matter and therefore not intended to restrict the civil rights of those infected or suspected of infection, he does acknowledge that some denial of these rights will occur, but says that the existing laws against discrimination are sufficient protection.

Testing and contact tracing may lead to a person's being deprived of a job, health insurance, housing and privacy, many civil libertarians fear. These are valid and grave concerns. But we can find ways to protect civil rights without sacrificing public health....It may be harsh to say, but the fact that an individual may suffer as a result of doing what is right does not make doing so less of an imperative....We should make it clear that doing all you can to prevent the spread of AIDS or any other fatal disease is part and parcel of an unambiguous commandment: thou shalt not kill (Etzioni 1993g).

Fred Siegal, another communitarian, makes much the same argument (Anderson 1988). Gays, he says, should allow contact tracing because it is an opportunity for gays to show their commitment to the dominant heterosexual community. Because gays "unlike addicts...constitute a community," they have a greater responsibility to the larger

community" (Etzioni 1993a:187). Therefore, they should, for the good of all, willingly surrender what limited constitutional rights they have now. In part because of the reluctance of Gays to do this, Siegal maintains that the Right is able to use this issue as a potent weapon. The "radicals," having pushed individual rights to such a point of middle class absurdity, ignoring duty and responsibility, and refusing "reasonable" restrictions on civil liberties, are simply out of touch with the "mainstream of America, which is middle class and communitarian" (Etzioni 1995a).

Of course, one would easily read homophobic tendencies into such positions on contact tracing, and it is by no means certain that they are free from homophobia, but when the connection was made between the two explicitly, a tense debate ensued and the participants, mirroring the actions of the Communitarian Network as a whole, decided to put aside debate in order to focus on issues of common agreement.

Taking what he calls a "liberal-communitarian approach to the question of contact tracing, James F. Childress, in the inaugural issue of the *Responsive Community*, that "society has a moral imperative to try to control the spread of HIV infection, and that it may act through the government to do so....Societies often declare war on epidemics, and in the process sacrifice individual rights and liberties" (1990/91:70). Childress demands that the metaphor of wars be supplanted by the metaphor of "communal care" (1990/1991:75). However, he has no illusions, for at this time "our social policies shape and express our identity and community in a democracy under siege" (1990/1991:77).

To Stem the Tide: Some Communitarian Legislative Initiatives

Rep. Swett is not the only members of congress to embrace, to some degree, the ideology of communitarianism. Senators Bradley, Gore, Simpson, etc. have all taken public stands in alliance with the Communitarian Network. Sen. Dan Coates, writing in

the Responsive Community, detailed his legislative initiatives which were closely allied with the communitarian desire to “curb government and strengthen civic institutions”

(95/96:8). They include

The Character Development Act (S.1203)

would award school districts three year demonstration grants to work with local groups to develop mentoring programs.

The Family Housing Act (S.1204)

sets aside 15% of public housing units for families headed by two individuals legally married to each other.

The Adoption Assistance Act (S.1206)

offers a \$5000 refundable tax credit for adoptions by families earning less than \$60,000 and a \$2500 tax credit to adoptive families earning between \$60,000 and \$100,000.

The Maternity Shelter Act (S.1214)

would provide \$50 million in vouchers for use by women in private and religious maternity group homes.

The Compassion Credit Act (S.1216)

\$500 tax credit for the provision of home care for “individuals in need, including the homeless, battered women, abused women with children, hospice care patients (including AIDS and cancer patients), and unmarried pregnant women” (95/96:8)

The Medical Volunteer Act (S.1217)

forbids tort actions against health care professionals who provide free services to a medically undeserved person.

The Community Partnership Act (S.1218)

would institute demonstration grants for programs to match communities of faith with welfare recipients on, as directed by the courts, with non-violent criminal offenders (95/96:9)

“A Public Health Emergency”: The Homeless

By the mid-1980s, a new image dominated poverty discourse. Invoked unreflectively and automatically by commentators on poverty, the concept of the underclass captured the mixture of alarm and hostility that tinged the emotional response of more affluent Americans to the poverty of blacks increasingly clustered and isolated in postindustrial cities. What bothered observers most was not their suffering; rather, it was their sexuality, expressed as teenage pregnancy; family patterns, represented by female-headed households; alleged reluctance to work for low wages; welfare dependence, incorrectly believed to be a major drain on national resources; and propensity for drug use and violent crime, which had eroded the safety of the streets and the subways (Katz 1989:185)

The first thing that strikes you about the article is the drawing. In some sense, it is a street scene that takes on an almost religious aspect. Two men, their backs to us, have progressed far ahead that they have begun to blend into the landscape. The shadows of their shoulders, the hat of one and the hood of the other, are all that distinguishes them from the granite building beyond. The buildings rise up on either side, to the left one finds the large windows carved into the stone walls. On the right, the glass and steel of something a bit more modern. At the vanishing point between the two, and to which we are all headed, there is the white and black of pure geometric form. It is this that stands above his head. Unlike everyone else, he is facing us, and he is in our path.

He is a beggar, one of many one finds on the streets of New York. You know that it is in New York, because the cup between his feet is a dead give away. It is the ubiquitous coffee cup one gets at any deli or diner (at least before Starbucks arrived). The cup is crucial for identifying the locale. Which is why it is clearly placed on the sidewalk. The cup is on the sidewalk and his left hand is extended towards you. But it is the custom here to put the money in the cup, he should be holding the cup, jingling the change in it. But then you could not use the cup to identify the locale. Or perhaps his outstretched hand is demanding something more than just your loose change. He is bent over the cup. The perspective used communicates that he is obviously larger, taller, than you. He is bent over to look you in the eye. He is overdressed for the weather, and bent over as he is, it is difficult to see his body. The only flesh visible is his face, hands, and where his left pants leg is rolled up. He is asymmetrical, off balance, perhaps loud, perhaps violent. He wants your money, or something more. He is probably African-American, or perhaps, is a result of some new speciation. He is moving in the wrong direction, he impedes our progress. He is just not like the rest of us who walk on the brightly lit sidewalk.

Others have walked passed him. You can not see their faces and expressions. But the two people nearest you are clearly visible. They look on the beggar with contempt and disgust. His shadow turns the yellow sidewalk black under him and it spreads out towards you. This picture accompanies Pete Hamil's article "How to save the Homeless and ourselves". We have a social disease, and Hamil has found the remedy in community, responsibility, and discipline.

The community comes first in this prescription for dealing with the problem the homeless. New Yorkers have reach the end of the line, he says. They can no longer tolerate the homeless molesting them. The underclass is no longer those people who live over there where decent people would never live, who raise their families in ways that are pathological, who set and fester.

At least their aberrant families kept them in the ghetto, but now they are spilling out. The homeless are the underclass made real, they are seen as the vanguard of a more general dispersion from the inner cities.

New Yorkers want these men out of their faces. They want them away from their doorways of their supermarkets. They want them out of the 24-hour banking lobbies and away from the ATMs. They want to leave a restaurant without having to maneuver past the permanent beggar with the plastic cup, crooning his guilt-tripping tune, snarling at the refusal of money. They want these men to stop urinating on their stoops. They want to walk to a playground with their children and find the benches free of scratching vagrants, belting themselves sick with Thunderbird or crack, hocking lungers towards the sand pit (1993:26).

What's more the Larry Hogues and the Kevin Mckivers (describe in the media as both "wildmen" and "criminals") have shown that the homeless are a menace to local communities. Shelters are no use, because are dangerous precisely because the homeless themselves are dangerous. "The danger comes from these men themselves". The homeless are a health problem. And they are contagious. They have high rates of TB (50%), HIV (62%) and alcoholism and drug problems or

"are mentally ill; these are also diseases. Such numbers underlie the terrible mistakes that have been made for more than a decade. Governments, social workers, advocates, and concerned citizens, faced with thousands of the homeless, have been trying to solve the wrong problem. This is not a housing problem. It is a health problem. Not another abstract conflict between the dogmas of liberalism and conservatism. It is an emergency. Thousands of homeless men are sick and dying. And they are passing their diseases on to others..."

According to Hamil, homeless families are not the problem, nor are single mothers, except as we shall later learn, they support homeless men under the table. Quoting statistics from the 1992 Report by the NYC Commission on the Homeless, Hamil says that "more than half of the adults in these [6000] "families " are 29 or under; 91 percent are black or hispanic; almost all are on welfare." The "vast majority" are headed by single women. They, however, "aren't the same people New Yorkers see on the street. Not yet" (1993:36) No, the people "we" see are described by Hamil as "72 percent were 30 years old or older. About 94 percent were black or Hispanic, and 48 percent receive some form of welfare. About 40 percent had not finished high school. And 27 percent of the men had been in jail before arriving at the shelter (1993:36). These are not the Bowery bums of yesteryear, besides, urban renewal destroyed the traditional areas of flop houses and hotels. "The burning of the South Bronx and Brownsville in the Seventies removed many thousands of apartments from the supply allotted to the poor (1993:)37). At the same time, gentrification took hold just as the mentally ill were released from the asylums. But the problem is also not a lack of social spending or government effort. In the end, homelessness it has little or nothing to do with the Reagan era or good intentions or anything political. It is the result of a culture of poverty.

"It is impossible to ignore the city's widespread culture of poverty when discussing hopelessness; the problem isn't some isolated sideshow, like potholes. The great astonishment of this dreadful saga is that New York doesn't have even

more of the walking wounded, sick with drugs and whiskey, AIDS and TB, drifting from one stop to the next in the homeless archipelago (1993:38).

We have already heard that there is a public health problem here, but Hamil's concern is not with the health of the homeless, but with the health of the uninfected. Like those with HIV, the health of the homeless is important only in so far as the diseases of the homeless constitute a threat to the larger community. A solution will be found, but first some changes must be made and some carefully calibrated limits imposed.

Before any genuine humane progress can be made in solving the homeless problem, citizens and their servants must make certain basic assumptions. First: This is a health crisis, exacerbated by poverty. Second: In a health crisis, the rights of the community must take precedence over the rights of an individual.... Third: If state laws or outdated legal decision make it impossible for citizens to make quick, drastic changes in this crisis, then the laws must be changed and the legal decisions challenged. Fourth: Speed is essential. We don't have need of additional studies of the homeless crisis. The winter looms, and some of these people will die. And every day, they are infecting others....The engine of any effort must be the concept called tough love (1993:38).

There are eleven steps to follow, and we shall be able to help the homeless and ourselves. Because the communitarian themes are so clear, I will leave Hamil's recommendations without commentary, except to wonder about the nature of the twelfth step, which I might assume to be the a return to normalcy. Hamil's Eleven Step program for helping the homeless:

- (1)Military bases, including Fort Dix, are closing all over the nation. Because of the health emergency in this and all other large American cities, they should be transformed into homeless sanctuaries.
- (2) Those sanctuaries would be staffed by military doctors, professional therapists, experts in rehab, and some good, tough military veterans. Security would be tight, to prevent the entry of contraband liquor and drugs.
- (3)The city and state-- in coordination with the Feds-- would set a date....Before that date, the homeless would have the option to enter voluntary detox clinics or rehab programs such as Phoenix House or Daytop Village. But after that date, task forces of health and social workers, religious and charitable volunteers,

legal advisers, and police would move through the streets. They would pick up the homeless and take them to the sanctuaries. The basic principle is quarantine. The men would be treated as menaces to the public health, not as criminals.

There would be the usual paranoid declarations about the cruel forces of the state creating concentration camps for social undesirables. But such charges would be absurd..... Everyday of the week, sick people are isolated from others in order to get them well and to prevent additional contamination. There is no constitutional right to spread disease.

(4) Every homeless person would be given a complete physical in the first 72 hours in the sanctuary and separated by diagnose.

(5) The drug and alcohol addicts would be detoxed.....

(6) The chronically mentally ill-- many of them afflicted with schizophrenia or dementia-- would also be separated. Those with institutional histories returned to the institutions.....The intentional should be clear: to renew the idea of the asylum. Ordinary citizens should be protected from crazy people, but the mentally ill should also be protected from the dangers of the world -- and the self.

(7) Every man who enter the sanctuaries would also be the subject of a personal profile.....it's essential that each man begin to take responsibility for the damage he has left behind; without such an acknowledgment, the effort will be in vain.

(8) Those who chose rehab and those who did not would have common responsibilities within the sanctuaries.....All must acquire an understanding of how essential work is to a human life.....Such training could draw heavily on the experiences of the Job Corps.

(9) Every able man would also undergo a sustained program of physical rehabilitation, under medical supervision. This would be a variation of the boot-camp plan.....

(10) Every man would also undergo sustained education in subjects that most have never heard of: ethics, moral philosophy, and the history of law. I'd start them with Marcus Aurelius; no group of Americans could more usefully be exposed to the notions of the Stoic.... Some might dismiss this as a form of brainwashing; I prefer the notion of building a moral core into people who have lived with a great and terrifying emptiness.

(11) I'd also like to see these men exposed to great art, great movies, and great literature.

....{he concludes by stating] the homeless are people who have nothing to lose. In the midst of this growing health emergency, so are the rest of us. (1993:39)

The underclass can be marked off, it can be enclosed---quite literally, if we follow Hamil---and its threat to the middle classes can be neutralized. And remember that its threat is double: it is a violent threat that might overwhelm civil society while at

the same time, in popular culture the productions of the underclass are in wide circulation (e.g., rap and hip-hop music). It is the underclass that unites the degenerate, the pathological, evolution, and the other under the discourse of community. But can it really be marked off? Whenever, we talk about the need for regenerating the social fabric and the moral sense, are we not at the same time assuming the presence of degenerations, decay, and disorganization? Such a question has long been a concern of sociology, social reformism has often included programs for the moral improvement of humans. The first sociology course in the United States, according to Becker, was called "Introduction to Moral Philosophy". We must, says Hamill, do something about "people who have lived with a great and terrifying emptiness" (1993:39). Although their solutions have ranged from social darwinism to revolution, sociologists since the founding of the discipline have been saying similar things, especially when the topic has turned to the meaning of community.

CHAPTER FIVE
The Sociological Study of Community, Part I
Definition and Classification, Evolution, and Territory (c.1945-c.1975)

In sociology, community has been the subject of almost constant scrutiny. Much of this work has come from the specialized areas of rural, urban, and of course, community sociology, where “community” stands as a fundamental unit of analysis. The formal questions concerning community were asked in these areas, but they remain fundamental questions of sociology in general: What is community? What are its characteristics and functions? How is it to be preserved or encouraged? What moralities and what kinds of discipline are to be associated with it? These questions remind us that the questioning of community is one aspect of the sociological enterprise that seeks to *identify* the nature, definition, and analytical utility of concepts like family, group, nation, race, gender, class, society, culture, etc., and deploy these concepts as social objects. One might say that the questioning of community is one approach to the *sociological* question of human social production.

But the question of community has not always been asked in the same ways and with the same results. The manner of raising the question itself can tell us a great deal about the social conflicts that are expressed in its many answers. In particular, the discourse of community articulated in communitarianism reveals the artificiality of the division between academe and the state. Which means that it can tell us about the relationship between the production of sociological knowledge and the needs of the state. However, the traditional questions of community, which were always questions of definition and classification, systematic nomenclature, and description, are no longer sufficient. They probably never were. The value of communitarianism is that it allows

us to question community in new ways, and so understand the questioning of community as a questioning of authority and power.

I have used the language of "old" and "new", "traditional" and "contemporary", to characterize the questioning of community and this, it should be explained, was quite intentional. It is not that my questions are new ---although my questioning is--- and the traditional ones are obsolete. My questioning appears at a particular time and place merely because of indeterminacy of social relation (Brown 1998; 2000). I use the language of old and new because my questioning is preceded by a *discontinuity* in the sociological investigation of community.

There are, of course, other breaks. For example, there is a break between Marx and his critique of the *Gemeinwesen* of money and Tonnies' *Gemeinschaft* of common heritage, which fixed community and society in an naturalized binary. But the break that I want to focus attention upon is more recent than this. Chronologically, c.1975 marks the break between two ways of investigating community. It marks the shift from a period in which the sociological investigation into community centered on the requirements of *definition* and *classification*, the mapping of *territorialities*, the tracing of a speculative *evolutionary development*, and our own period, when the question of community centers on *identity*, *new social movements*, *enclosures* of community, and the *degenerative* effects of the lack of community. All of which points to the multiple determinations inherent in the shift from societies of discipline to a period of new enclosures of control. We will see that this break was not only due to the internal dynamics of the discourse, but also to the social shifts which signaled the end of modernity.

But we do not have to think of this break temporally, we can also conceive of it spatially. It is not that one discourse suddenly began and just as suddenly ended.

Neither did a discourse suddenly dawn and decline in the manner of an organic body. We do not even need to posit some sort of scientific revolution in established theory. Instead, the questioning of community reveals two different discourses existing simultaneously, intersecting with and contradicting each other just as they remain embedded in the social conditions of the production of knowledge. Now it is true that we can associate particular authors with the variations on these discourses, but all of the authors that we might name have aspects of both discourses in their writings, and so just as there is no strict temporal sequence, there is no way to associate an author with one tendency to the exclusion of the other. Neither tendency is completely overthrown, but each is displaced and revised within the social conditions of the production of knowledge and of everyday life. However, it is easier to describe this discontinuity in temporal terms, but I hope the reader will keep in mind that the distinction is not strictly temporal. We can date this first period from c.1945 to c.1975, although this dating, as we have just stated, is imprecise to say the least.

We can find the discursive forms of definition and classification, territoriality, and development, in a variety of works from the sociological study of community. The volume of references and studies in the field testifies to the regularity with which sociologists felt compelled to comment upon it. This chapter, and the one that follows it, examines this regularity of statements. In doing so, it is not intended to produce a summary of all previous statements regarding the sociological study of community so as to finally arrive at a true definition. Such work makes the mistake of assuming that the definitions produced by sociologists reflect existing communities "out there". At best, we might say that the only "real community" reflected in these summary definitions is the community of consensus amongst the sociologist themselves. I take as a basic assumption of my analysis that the sociological study of community refers not to real

communities, but only to itself. It is but one of a multitude of sites for the production of sociological knowledge. The "community" in sociological study is always encountered as an abstraction and an ideal. Indeed, Margaret Stacy, arguing from the standpoint of positivistic sociology, makes must the same point regarding what she calls the "myth" of community in community studies (1969?:134).

This does not mean that the sociological study of community does not produce real effects, only that these effects must be studied on the level of the production of a certain knowledge that has continuities and discontinuities with other alliances of knowledge and force. This knowledge is itself constitutive of the social relations it seeks to describe, and it intervenes in these relations with the force of authority. It provides them with a baseline from which a point of equilibrium might be established, change measured, assumptions and theories ideologically validated, and social policies proposed, implemented, evaluated, and sometimes terminated. Thus it is a point of articulation between sociological theory and social policy.

The most obvious feature that characterizes this period of classification is the postulate of an essential dichotomy between community and society. Tonnies has been given the most attention in this regard, but Marx and Simmel have also been associated with this bifurcation. In fact, Odum (1951) says that this bifurcation was not widely held and was a contributing cause of "the neglect of the scientific study of community" (1951:292). In mock astonishment he declares that "as late as 1947 the distinction between society and community was still being debated at a symposium called "The World Community". At that symposium, Louis Wirth asserted that "when we use the term 'community'" we seek to isolate and to emphasize the physical, spatial, and symbolic aspects of human group life, whereas by the term 'society' we wish to bring into focus and to stress the psychic, deliberative, rational, normative, and congenial

phases of group existence" (Wirth quoted in Odum 1951:295). It is ironic that Wirth did not see was that the period when community and society could be theoretically separated actually had come to an end. This is not so hard to understand, however, when we remember that's social scientific bias and, as he goes on to note, by the work of Giddings, Cooley, MacIver, and others, which laid the groundwork for the sociological investigation of the relationship between community and society. Wirth's statement was the general view of sociologists of the time. A defensive rather than aggressive statement. One of the things that further strikes the reader of Odum is that Tonnie's, who most American sociologists today associate with the separation of community and society, is never mentioned. But Tonnie's dichotomy of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* has figured in almost every sociological discussion on the nature of society. So too does it figure here, in this essay. But I want to focus less on Tonnie's and more on the reception of his dichotomy by mainstream American sociology. This reception is, of course, marked by the first translation of Tonnie's into English in 1957. Just as importantly, for our discussion, it is marked by the texts that envelop the English translation (Sorokin 1957; Loomis 1957; Loomis and McKinney 1957). The distinction that he makes between the "two modes of mentality and behavior, and two different types of society" (Sorokin 1957:vii) becomes a fundamental discursive regularity in sociological theory. For Tonnie's, the dichotomy of community and society itself rests upon five other dichotomies "dealing with one's relation to one's fellow beings": 1) acquaintanceship and strangeness; 2) sympathy and apathy; 3) confidence and mistrust; 4) interdependence, "the condition of being bound to others.... a feeling or a realization of moral obligation, moral imperative, or prohibition, and a righteous aversion to the consequences of incorrect, illegal and unlawful, as well as of immoral and indecent conduct and action" (1957:237); and 5) economic relations of exchange; or "*bond*".

Tonnies implies that the five form a hierarchy of related, though distinct, dichotomies of ideal types.

From these binaries, Loomis develops his *Table of Concepts* that reveals Tonnies' grand classificatory structure. But Loomis acknowledges that Tonnies work lacks a "perfectly logically ordered construction....The original book, to use Stoltenberg's apt characterization, resembles the beauty of an old castle" (Loomis 1957:263). This description is indeed apt because it shows both the relation of the *Table of Concepts* to the text, as well as the assumptions that underlie both. Though Loomis does not acknowledge it, his own *Table of Concepts*, intended only to provide a schematic representation of Tonnies concepts, itself becomes part of the "original text". There is nothing in the *Table of Concepts* that is not opposed by its antithesis. The *Table of Concepts* provides a structure consisting of intricately arranged binary concepts, some of which are hierarchically related to other pairs, but all of which are idealized abstractions. But the *Table of Concepts*, by imposing a structure on the text, also exposes a problem. There emerges not a binary, but rather a trilogy of taxonomic concepts ---vegetative, animal, and mental---that modify each other without always in opposition to each other. This problem is overcome by postulating a movement from the most primitive to the most modern. The development of each is recapitulated in the development of the others. This movement through successive developmental stages is not merely inscribed upon the binaries of the *Table of Concepts*: the binaries of the *Table of Concepts* are constitutive of the inscription of a social evolution.

In the same way as the individual natural will evolves into pure thinking and rational will, which tends to dissolve and subjugate its predecessors, the original collective forms of *Gemeinschaft* have developed into *Gesellschaft* and the rational will of the *Gesellschaft*. In the course of history, folk culture has given rise to the civilization of the state (Tonnies 1957:III).

As concerns the problem of the three taxonomic concepts, when they are arranged in a linear series each also comes to "represent stages of development" with the vegetative as the "original," the "basis" or the "foundation of all other forms of life" (1957:V).

For Loomis and McKinney, the very structure of the dichotomies underlying *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* makes a science of community possible. Tonnies provides a paradigm. His dichotomy establishes a topological tradition necessary for distinguishing "fundamentally different types of social organization in order to establish a range within which transitional or intermediate forms can be comprehended.... the types establish the 'outer limits' or standard by which the processes of change or intermediate structural forms can be comprehended from the perspective of the continuum" (Loomis and McKinney 1957:12). It is on the basis of this continuum that we can establish the link between the classification of social groups and their evolution. It was Tonnies belief that it remained for the scientific man to devise means of freeing the majority from the role of mere machines or puppets; but that the scientist must have different eyes than those of the so-called social engineer who constructs or copies Utopian plans and attempts to fit people into them; he must learn that society is a living, organic thing, unfolding naturally from within like a growing embryo or plant bud (Loomis 1957:7).

To be sure, Loomis and McKinney place Tonnies in a historical tradition that has Confucius and Plato at one end and Durkheim at the other. But Tonnies is the pivot because he makes the dichotomy of community and society a *sociological* problem around which the disciple of sociology could orientated itself. The *Table of Concepts* served as both the scheme of Tonnies work and also established the outer limits of the sociological discourse of community. After *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, the definition and morphological analysis of community centering upon the classification of types comes to dominate the sociological study of community in America. This despite the work of Giddings and Others. The referent was Tonnies, but the genealogy is

through Giddings and others. See especially the scientific study of society and Giddings discussion of classification in relation to social evolution or “social teleosis”. Only some took the view that *Gemeinschaft* replaces *Gesellschaft*. most followed Giddings in holding community to be not previous to, but an essential part of society, and as one determinate of the boundaries of “civilization”.

Before we continue down this path, there were other theoretical perspectives that deserve at least a short digression.. Marx and Simmel in particular offer different approaches, although both are often misread so as to appear to endorse Tonnies methodology of ideal types. An example is the word “community” itself. Marx used the word *gemeinwesen* and Tonnies *gemeinschaft*, both of which are translated as “community”. Marx's *gemeinwesen* is literally “common character” and is used in the context of “the community of money,” which directly admits the social and historical aspect of this particular “character”. Tonnies *gemeinschaft*, or “common stock.” is more problematic because of the implied connection to both share holding and to descent, a stock or “volk”. The analysis of community that Marx undertakes in the *Grundrisse* is a social and historical one, it is not the comparison of types, nor is it the result of a determined teleology. It seeks, based upon the then current anthropological and historical work, to describe the historical changes in the relations between humans, and their changing relation to nature.

The earth itself is the first medium of community, the social labor necessary to extract life from it being the very essence of humanness. This relation is “represented [according to the historians and anthropologists] in the chief of the clan-family or as the relation of the patriarchs amongst one another”, with the former a more “despotic” and the later “a more democratic form of the system of common character” (Marx 1992:). With the separation of city and country, the earth ceases to be the medium of

community, at least in the city, where money, rather than the body of the chief,

coalesces as the representation of *gemeinwesen*.

Money thereby directly and simultaneously becomes the real community [*Gemeinwesen*], since it is the general substance of survival for all, and at the same time, in money the community [*Gemeinwesen*] is at the same time a mere abstraction, a mere external, accidental thing for the individual, and at the same time merely a means for his satisfaction as an isolated individual" (1993:226)

In Marx, this separation of city and country is not a dichotomy, it is a process brought about in the history of human social labor. As such, it is not always the same everywhere, "it has essential modifications brought about locally, historically..." (Marx 1993:429). Community, Marx insists, must be viewed as a changing social relation. He does not romanticize the social formations of the past, and in the present there is only "the community of money," but as always, we do not know what it is that we are producing and reproducing at the level of the everyday. Marx wants to explicate this transformation by tracing the history of precapitalist formations into the "community of money" located in urban space----and as he further says, organized like a factory. It is not a history dependent upon an idealist conception of a community/society dichotomy. It is a presentation of the history of transformations in the modes of everyday life. Through the multiple determinations of social labor we create the 'community of money,' even if we are unaware of how we do this reproduction. In the much mourned loss of community, what passed was not the idyllic community, but only another social formation of the *gemeinwesen* of money; only one mode of the social relations of capital for another. And yet the "loss of community" is related as the loss of something quite ancient. This is what we hear in the many denunciations of the "loss of community". It is not the first community of the clan----and here Marx and Freud are quite close---that the mourners grieve for, because they have no stomach for the nomadic ethos of the clan (Marx 1993: ; Deleuze and Guattari 1986). They long only for a former community of

money. It is Etzioni who makes this most clear when he says "I use the 1950's as my baseline" or his Year Zero. Etzioni does not mourn the death of the primordial family, but he does bemoan the loss of the authority structure of the "traditional two-parent biological family" and its idealized environment of the postwar suburb. For Marx, community is not something lost, but something made, despite the fact that we do not know what we are making. And perhaps even more importantly, Marx quickly disassociates community from any discourse of blood and soil in favor of a transnational ideological practice of all those who stand for the worst crimes of society.

Simmel occupies a middle ground between Tonnies and Marx. Like Tonnies, Simmel bases his analysis on ideal types, but like Marx, he understood that even these types have themselves a concrete history: they appear at a certain moment in time (modernity) and in particular places (urban space). Modernity and urban space have a history that is more important, and profound, than abstract definitions and classification can do justice. This is because for Simmel, modernity is the lived experience of urban space. It is the metropolitan type, and its relation to modernity that lies at the heart of "Metropolis and Mental Life". "The metropolitan type arises from the dominance of money as the form of modernity" (Aronowitz c.1992) The metropolitan type literally embodies the complex relation of urbanism and rationalization, a relationship which rests upon the alienating social relations of exchange. "For Simmel modern social life is synonymous with the moment when exchange relations become the dominant social *fact* of metropolitan life." (Aronowitz c.1992). For Simmel, a condition of modernity is that community be lost or subsumed to the philosophy of money. The ideal metropolitan type, though an abstraction, exists at a historical moment. It is a production of this moment and this is especially important when money dominates social life, because

this moment occurs when the entirety of social life appears as a vast accumulation of commodities. Which returns us to Marx.

If community is not something lost, but rather something transformed. If capital or modernity has ripped it from its historical foundations in nature, if the binary of community and society has been subsumed, then how is community to be defined and these definitions arranged and classified? George Hillery attempted to classify all previous sociological definitions of community so as to identify all areas of common belief. More than this, he also wanted to constitute community not just as a rural or archaic lost time, but as a vital aspect of modern social life. Hillery states that his task is to gauge the "extent of agreement among definitions of community"(1955:111). This task is more difficult than appears on the surface. Conceptions of community in the sociological literature had reached such a degree of "heterogeneity" that it had become "difficult to determine whether any one of the resulting definitions, or even any one group of definitions, affords an adequate description" (1955:111). Hillery found this lack of consensus among sociologists studying community implicit in the existence of a wide variety of available definitions. His work attempts to bring order to this anarchy of discourse by classifying all of the definitions he can identify. To do this, he employs a classification based on a combination of morphological and discursive regularities. It is a fascinating study which establishes the position of classifications as of fundamental importance in the disciplinary discourse.

Hillery's emphasis is directed towards the classification of concepts and definitions, which he sees as being ideological "abstractions" (1955:112). He points out that previous classifications [Hollingshead (1948), Reiss (1954), Gillette (1926), and McClenahan (1929)] were limited either in terms of their scope, or were geared only towards demonstrating conceptual differences, rather than classifying definitions

according to both similarity and difference. Hillery notes that more than half of the definitions included in his classification appeared in the sociological literature between the time of McClenahan's 1929 study and his own, indicating the extent to which concern for a precise definition of community had become of primary importance, but as yet the study of community had not become organized or systematized. His classificatory scheme sought to overcome these limitations and at the same time use the previous works to generate a definition based upon a consensus of sociological opinion. Hence, the need to establish a classification based upon morphology and discursive regularity. Where previous authors had set up an apriori classificatory scheme based upon their own definitions. e.g., McClenahan (1929). Hillery lets the morphology and discursive regularities of the definitions determine the number and extent of the classes that make up his scheme. He maintained a "strict prohibition against discarding any definitions. If they would not 'fit,' then a separate class was created---though that class might have only one occupant" (1955:117). Implicit in Hillery's classification and definition of community is Peirce's of science as a community of consensus. His method as well as his results are dedicated to finding internal consistencies, and "areas of agreement". If indeed we are correct in stating that community exists as the consensus of sociologists, then Hillery's method expresses this quite nicely.

The 94 definitions used in this analysis are not all of the definitions of the community. However, it is believed that the picture given is a fairly representative one, as indicated by the method of obtaining the definitions. Beginning with a few definitions already known, the writer traced the references given by these authors, referred in turn to those sources furnished by these references, and so on, collecting the definitions in various works as the search progressed. As a supplementary procedure, to decrease the possibility of limiting definitions to any 'school' or 'schools,' all of the promising titles on the library shelves adjacent to those works already located were checked in the same manner. When no further references could be obtained by this method, the search was halted. Thus, the coverage given is wide, but no measure is available as to how wide; the author may only claim more conclusiveness than has hitherto been available, not finality (1955:112).

Hillery finds that sociologists agree on the general definition of community, and that the variation amongst the various definitions only exist outside of the discipline of sociology. Internally, there is a broad consensus. This consistency of opinion establishes three broad distinguishing characteristics of community: territoriality, common ties, and social interaction. The ecologists in Hillery's sample offer "deviant" definitions because they do not find social interaction to be necessary to community. Today they might say that a community is defined in terms of space and flows of energy which might be, but are not necessarily, social (Ricklefs 1979). Hillery says such an ecological definition maintains the dichotomy between society and community because it makes society the sum of community plus social interaction. Implicit in his study is the possibility that community had not been lost, but subsumed into society: it exists, but it has undergone a revolutionary transformation. While community is still taken as our connection to nature, the always tenuous and artificial division between society and community is no longer maintained.

But Hillery's task is not to define community anew, but to discover a range of discursive regularities which allow the establishment of a continuum. Hillery really only takes the literature up to 1950, but its last great articulation was by Talcott Parsons in 1965 with his theoretical alliance of evolution, classification, modernity, organicism, and community. All of these elements go into Parsons' concept of the *societal community*. Parsons' theory resolves the binary of community/society into the totality of the "societal community". For Parsons, the recapitulation of the social order is accomplished through the ontological internalization of social limits and the formation of a regulated subject (see Freud 1937[1914]:119). This internalization allows for the creation of a subject. The subject is a creation of the community and acts as though these internalized limitations were essential or natural. Normative behavior comes at

the cost of a repression that is concealed by an equally real incitement to discourse (Foucault 1980). We are constantly being called upon to admit to or proclaim which community we belong; to agree to being our type and submit to the proscribed set of equilibrium maintaining ideological practices.

As a theorist of recapitulation, Parsons' primary concern was to understand the fundamental mechanisms maintaining the stability of societal community. In order to understand this stability, he draws on the Durkheimian conception of society as a self-regulating whole, i.e., a biological organism. Jeffrey Alexander, a prominent interpreter of Parsons, characterizes Parsons' organicism as his "master concept" embedded in an evolutionary theory of differentiation and specialization leading to increased integration and adaptation (Alexander 1987:76). On this basis, Parsons argues that the similarity between biological and social "classes of living systems lies in the applicability to both of the fundamental concepts *adaptation* and *integration*. Adaptation was, of course, one of the few key concepts of Darwin's theory of evolution....[while i]ntegration concerns the relations internal to the system of parts with each other" (Parsons 1982:75). Parsons goes on to identify Durkheim as "probably the most seminal theorist in the field of studying the integration of social systems..." (Parsons 1982:75). A consistent feature in Durkheim's work is the comparison of society to an organism. In his famous duality of the normal and the pathological, we can see the influence of 19th century evolutionary theory concerning the analogy of social and biological phenomena for it is here that he announces the role of the sociologist as the physician of society. We can also identify the interwoven discourses of degeneration and recapitulation (Hawkins 1999), but these we will discuss in the next chapter.

Durkheim established the sociologist as the social physician. As one would expect, disturbances of the social organism appear akin to biological disease (the pathological). We are not disappointed. Anomie is always addressed as the equivalent of a medical problem. Disequilibrium in the biological organism is the result of disease, just as it is in the social organism. Foucault (1970) has shown the connections between organic theories and social scientific research (cf. Harris 1968:108-217; Gould 1977: 198x), including the classification of social groups as "primitive" and "modern" groups, a classification repeated in Durkheim's divisions of mechanical and organic, normal and pathological, and the social ramifications of these binaries. If society is an organism, then the division of labor is the adaptive specialization and integration of systems (organs) for the provision of the functional needs of the social organism.²⁸ It is Parsons who places the emphasis in American sociology on equilibrium and normalcy.

When Parson's remarks that no one reads Spencer anymore, it is not because of Spencer's evolutionism, but because of Spencer's "extreme individualism," his positivism, and his confidence in the direction of social change. "Is it not possible that the future holds in store something other than 'bigger and better' industrialism" Parsons asks of Spencer (1968:4)? To the end, Parsons holds out the possibility, to be realized in his later writings on the "societal community," that the evolutionary aspects of Spencerian sociology might still be of service at the societal level, though cleansed of their association with individualism and progress.

Using Hobbes' "problem of order," Parsons sought to understand the reproduction of social life and the process of social evolution (Parsons 1966:7). The social order is at its core "the patterned normative order through which the life of a

²⁸ A tendency to speak in medical terms continues in the communitarian discourse on community see, for example, Daniel A. Bell speaks of having rendered a "diagnosis" of a social problem whose symptom is the growth of Residential Community Associations, often referred to as "gated communities" (1995).

population is collectively organized" (1966:7). Parsons describes this collective as the "societal community." This community is "constituted by both the normative system of order and by status, rights, and obligations pertaining to membership...." (1966:87). To continue, or reproduce, the societal community must maintain a common "orientation" towards "the basis of its societal identity," i.e., towards those institutions and modes of action that define it as a particular social order. Thus the societal community is built upon the shared sense of the everyday legitimacy of its normative order.

Parsons use of the body as a metaphor for the societal community is revealing of many tendencies in the sociological study of community. The body in question is "the body of social theory and knowledge of empirical fact". This is a body that develops as any other body does: it evolves in the sense of its immanent properties unfolding according to an established sequence. This is the reason that no one reads Spencer anymore. "the body of social theory" has evolved beyond his preliminary remarks. If Spencer is dead, he was merely the "victim of the vengeance of the jealous god, Evolution" (1968:3). But Parsons *Structure of Social Action* can be read as the development of a "body of knowledge" recapitulating the development of an organic body, "in this case the evolution of scientific theory". This study is the study of the "anatomy"(1968:39) of this single body (as ontogeny) recapitulated in the development of scientific theory itself (phylogeny). Thus, *Structure of Social Action* can also be read as a general theory of scientific change comprising two distinct moments "the definition and classification of the elementary units and the determination of the relevant relations of the units in systems" (1968:39). It is a theory rooted in the belief that the progress of scientific knowledge consists essentially in the "cumulative piling up of discoveries of fact" (1968:6). Ironically, but tellingly, Parsons says "this study is conceived to be an

organic whole" (1968:15) recapitulating the development of a "body of social knowledge."²⁹

It almost goes without saying that Parsons and Durkheim based their views upon a belief in modernity. Both had a profound attachment to the institutions of liberal democracy and the traditions of Enlightenment. Parsons especially defended liberal institutions from the challenges of both the right and the left. Reason, and not morality, played for him a greater role in the evolutionary progress of societal communities. In the case of modern societies such as the United States, Parsons says, and is here followed by Habermas, that the focus of legitimacy is the legal system, and it is precisely this normative code that Communitarianism deems to be in peril. This view of community and the legal order does not depart significantly from the communitarian view. When asked what must be done about the "moral anarchy" that he declares threatens to engulf our society, Etzioni says that we should first "Uphold the Constitution..." (Etzioni 1996).

For Parsons, this sense of community need not be religious, *however* the morality associated with a community is derived from the religion associated with its normative structures. When discussing community, "a legitimation system is always related to, and meaningfully dependent on, a grounding in ordered relations to ultimate reality. That is, its grounding is always in some sense religious" (1966:11). According to Parsons, the norms of religion, race, and law can establish social equilibrium, but religion and "race" are at the same time frequent sources of conflict or "disequilibrium." Religious and racial differences...have appeared to be among the most serious sources of conflict.... A racial group acquires the kind of solidarity which can make it an important factor in group antagonism only in so far as it develops many of the characteristics of religious groups. Conversely, religion is a factor...

²⁹ It is not by accident that Parsons at times expended so much effort on understanding the relationship between physician and patient.

in so far as it generates group structure...often characteristic of racial groups (1993[1945]:277-8).

Parsons opposes law (jurisdiction) to religion and race. A society founded upon religion is preferable to a society founded upon "race." Even better, the healthy, normal, society would be an Enlightened community based upon law. Parsons vision here is not unlike Habermas's dream of a procedural ethic of communication inspired by the courtroom series: interrogation, confession or disavowal, punishment and reform. Community may incite us to discourse, but so too does the loss of community. We are urged to talk more about community, even when we are lead to believe that it has already been lost. We must talk about the loss of community as though we might regain it just by talking about it. At the very least, we must talk about it in order to confess our guilt at letting it pass away.

The jurisdiction of the law is one structure of community which establishes its territoriality. Community is always for Parsons associated with a specific territory (space) as well as a particular mode of conceiving of territory (place). In "The Principal Structures of Community: A Sociological View," Cowan sums up Parsons' position on territoriality/jurisdiction:

"Jurisdiction, says Parsons, refers to obligation. Obligation implies enforcement. Enforcement entails sanction. Sanction to take effect must reach its object. The object to be reached must have a location in space. We start with jurisdiction and end with space. In between we have obligation, enforcement, sanction. It adds up, a political theorist might say, to a notion of territorial sovereignty" (1959:181).

Etzioni takes from Parsons' theory the importance of social equilibrium, but lost is the Enlightenment universality of Parsons. Parsons scientific orientation leads him to minimize morality, but Etzioni's communitarianism elevates morality to the position of being the glue that binds all social interaction. Morality, for all that they might protest

the simplicity of this summation, exists for them as a given, as natural. Etzioni moves the discussion of community away from Parson's adaptation and towards a theological spirit of community subsumed to the general "community of communities". Gouldner (1970) asserts that evolutionary theory had little importance in Parson's sociology. In part, Gouldner missed it because Parson's is only just beginning to elaborate his theory at the time Gouldner is writing. In any event, others have centered on how "Parsons theory originates...as a critique of unidimensional accounts of social evolution. He did not believe that modernity is a matter of unleashing private interests, the consequent destruction of community, and its replacement by new crass and bureaucratic ties" (Mayhew, Intro to Parsons on Social Evolution:41).

In this we can also discern how Parsons has a developmental scheme and also how he subsumes the usual binary of community and society to the broader concept of societal community. This is a real value of Parsons to sociology, for he reconstructed sociology in so a way as to link epigenesis to recapitulation, terminal addition and acceleration (1986-1987). In Gould, the debate between preformism and epigenesis (Etzioni) elaborates in detail the concepts of terminal addition and recapitulation. The terminal state of equilibrium is not in fact permanent. In fact it is followed by either further development or regression and degeneration. The analogy of society as a biological organism (Cooley, Spencer, Sumner), is not simply a metaphor. If it perhaps comes to be one later, it began as a hardheaded, rational, attempt to preserve and protect the future. No other discipline, other than biology, could so easily speak of the social organism and of the organism of society.

It is Etzioni's real move to link epigenesis to a developmental sequence moving towards a terminal State, i.e., to give the social organism a teleology (Etzioni

1982:333-334).³⁰ In this developmental sequence, adaptation and integration are different aspects of the same phenomena ---the societal community. There exists an organic formation of technology and kinship organized around the incest taboo, a common language (or the capacity to create language), and religion.³¹ Social evolution unfolds as a developmental process immanent to all social systems, although unfolds at varying rates across the spectrum of social systems and "vary with the different stages of the unification process...." (1966:49). And it is by making this link between development and teleology, Etzioni, like Cooley, lays the ground for the discussion of both social progress, and also social degeneration---a problem that can only be solved by communitarianism and a renewed sociological investigation into the meaning of community.

The Break

Two works in 1975 by Effrat and Gusfield mark the transformation of the question of community in sociology. Gusfield points the way towards communitarianism (ironically, from our vantage point, invoking the communal ideal of the New Left). Effrat identifies community with the politics of localism and participatory democracy, but she is more concerned than Gusfield with providing a summation of sociological work, and so we will begin with her work. Effrat gives us a classification, and a classification of classifications articulated in accordance with a view of community as an organism. It is the same intersection of classification and organism that Giddings made the foundation of evolutionary progress.

³⁰ Etzioni later recognizes his debt to Parsons in his analysis of social relations: "The sociological scheme on which I have drawn is my adaptation of a model technically known as 'functional differentiation'" (Etzioni 1981:304, referencing Parsons, Bale and Shils 1953:163-172).

³¹ Etzioni's sequential process relies heavily on the economic stage theory of development of associated with W.W. Rostow.

As Effrat sees it, community has never been easy to conceptualize, akin to “trying to scoop up jello with your fingers” (1975:1). Faced with the same heterogeneity of definitions, but with twenty intervening years between her reevaluation and Hillery’s, she too attempts to bring order to the chaos of sociological definitions, though in a quite different manner. Instead of producing categories of definitions, she wants to speak broadly about the “process of debate” within sociology, which has led to the truly important and “controversial issues” of territoriality and function obscured community within

a gelatinous mess of hypotheses, research, and value judgments....The term ‘community’ is frequently invoked in tones of profundity by ideologues (social scientists as well as ‘laypersons’) from the far left to the far right. Like motherhood and apple pie, it is considered synonymous with virtue and desirability. Indeed, much of the problem in identifying the various definitions lies in separating the content of the conception from the value-laden imagery of warmth and camaraderie attached to it in many cases (1975:1-2).

In Effrat’s summation, the “controversial issues” of territoriality and function determine much of the debate within sociology on the nature of community are . These debate conflicts exist only within the discourse of sociologists as a “community of consensus,” and are not conflicts which reside in a community “out there”. They are questions of sociological theory, not of everyday existence. It is this power to define community that sociologists, especially the communitarians, will hold on to till death’s door, for their authority to effect social policy rests upon discourses like this one, on the very authority of the scholarly search for true community. With territoriality, the key question is ‘whether community must be grounded in a particular, delimited place, or whether it can exist among people who are territorially dispersed’ (1975:xx). [footnote: Of course Effrat is writing before the Internet, which has forced a further reexamination of this question, though it has not bring us any closer to a clear conclusion (See cites on Internet community).]

Although Hillery concluded that territoriality and social interaction are necessary characteristics of community, his classificatory scheme could not “separate the value-laden imagery” in part because his scheme depended upon the actual value-laden language of the definitions. While she is obviously aware of the political aspects of definition and classification in relation to evolution, Effrat wants to separate out “the content of the conception” by shifting the discussion towards the conflicts between the competing definitions. In fact, much like the *Table of Concepts*, her classificatory scheme highlights the conflicts between elements, while Hillery’s scheme highlights the points of agreement.

Effrat’s scheme encapsulates a history of four traditions and two main conflicts within the discourse on community. Following this lead, Gusfield gives a Weberian typology of intellectual concepts (ideal types) that he explicitly links to a series of revolutions of the sort described by Kuhn (1970). This continuous development of theoretical positions is centered on the fundamental dichotomy between “community and society,” or “concepts and counter-concepts”. According to the communitarian sociologist Alan Wolfe, no subject is more central to sociology than community, but community is always juxtaposed to society.

Wolfe retains a version of this dichotomy because he wants to defend some version of the Enlightenment, but Gusfield shows that the distinction is itself an artificial one, for community and society are always idealized concepts. In fact, Gusfield’s discussion of community is in terms of Ideal Types. Where Etzioni situates community within the parameters of “scope, substance, and dominance,” Gusfield believes that “the concept ‘community’ [has] significance in three dimensions. In one dimension, it points to and describes a specific form of human association. In another it is part of a theory of change through social evolution. In still a third dimension, it is

part of an ideological debate over the value of the present as compared to the past and to possible alternative futures" (1975:21).

According to Gusfield, the necessary, but not sufficient preconditions of community (preconditions which he critiques because of our over reliance on them) are:
 [1]"A homogenous culture...language, moralities and common histories....
 [2] common territory. It has so frequently been posited as an essential condition for community that the term is sometimes coterminous with territory as in the 'local community,' 'community studies,' 'community power structure'" (1975:32).

Gusfield's definition of community is quite clear: "as we are using it here, the concept of community is part of a system of accounts used by members and observers as a way of explaining or justifying the members behavior." "Consciousness of kind" is the implicit basis of the concept of community. Gusfield favorably compares "consciousness of kind" to class consciousness in that both are "facilitated by the capacity to evoke "symbols of community. Within the emergence of a consciousness of kind is the rise of a collective experience; a sense of participating in the same history" (1975:35). This statement is important for a number of reasons. For one, the phrase "consciousness in kind" was used by the eugenicist Ward (See Hofstadler) to define community. In this case, community is actually transformed into discourse: "a system of accounts used by members and observers." Community as a "system of accounts," is a repository (bank) of power and cultural capital. Perhaps, however, this account refers to a narrative, and not just any narrative, because then the phrase "a system of accounts" discloses more than first appears when we remember that the everyday experience of community is indistinguishable from the social relations of capital: the community of money.

Gusfield places some emphasis from the beginning on the traditional of community and society. "I use the idea of system to characterize the concepts of

'community' and 'society' and 'tradition' and 'modernity'.... Community must decline if society is to grow. 'Tradition' and 'modernity' are in struggle and one must give way to the advantage of the other" (1975:54). However, "this use of the community-society dichotomy as a theory of social evolution distorts and confuses processes of social change.... We can better understand change by emphasizing the mixture and interpenetration of types than we can by emphasis on conflict between systems" (1975:55). By making community and society polar opposites, he has removed them from the "dialectical" sentiments of these communitarians who believe that community and society develop together as the "societal community" toward the "community of communities". For them, an increase of community is an increase in social development. Gusfield seems to undermine his own utopian desire for a general "sense of participating in the same history," by making the traditional community and modern society wholly alien to each other, while privileging a vision of modernization and progress.

But Gusfield reverses himself quickly: "The persistence and continuation of communal elements and the emergence of social institutions and activities are *not necessarily* in conflict." 1995g.55 [emphasis his] Although they interpenetrate each other, Gusfield still holds community and society are ideal "sociological types," i.e., concepts. Community is conceptualized as an "existential type," i.e., as a social construction. But social construction carries a vary specific meaning here, for it refers to an evolutionary process. Gusfield finds this view unconvincing. An alternative manner of conceptualizing community and society is as a system. This is especially true in stratification theory and theories of modernization. While a third way of conceptualizing community is as a utopia. It is the utopian community where Gusfield places his emphasis and also his hopes. Community "is an anguished cry against those

facets of modern life in which men and women are categorized, isolated, typed and in which their specific qualities as human beings and as emotive and dependent persons is ignored" (1975:104). Community has an emotive quality, the "consciousness of kind" that is found in both emancipatory and reactionary utopias.

Gusfield concludes that "the scientific, semantic meanings of sociology are not sufficient to grant significance and moral direction on their own. But the infusion of dramatic, poetic, even distorting, meaning is essential for the vitality of scientific concepts and their significance for relevant human concerns. That the concept of community has had so constant a usage is testimony both to its power and to the ubiquitousness of its ideal" (1975:104).³²

Gusfield wants to move the discussion of community towards communalism and what he calls "utopian communitarianism." He cites as examples means the Kibbutz movement, 19th Century American experiments like Brook Farm, and the communes of the American "counter culture." While all of these fall under the heading of "community as utopia," they succeed in showing us the degree of alienation and commodification that pervades the everyday. The very existence of these utopias serve as potent critiques of contemporary life. "Each age is the judge of its own utopias. Put in this way, the ideology of community and the utopian movements of communitarianism are expressions of the concern of modern men [sic] with the specific quality of life today" (1975:102).³³ As a critique, they point towards certain possibilities for social change through the resistance to capital. But notice the language here: "Quality of life," a familiar political phrase at present, and "communitarianism."

³²Gusfield is also interesting because his use of "concepts" follows the *Table of Concepts* used by Loomis (1957) to explain Tonnies *Community and Society*. The *Table of Concepts* provides a point of articulation between the essential dichotomy of community and society and the evolutionary/degeneracy model.

³³ Sargent supports Gusfield's association of communalism and the New Left.

whose meaning would be radically transformed by the sociologists of the Communitarian Network. This is what makes Gusfield doubly important. Gusfield's New Left communalism helps show the discontinuity between the period of classification and the present. He assumes communalism and "utopian communitarianism" to be projects of the Left because of their mutual resistance to capital, but he does not recognize the possibility that they might become reactive movements as well. As Marcuse said at about this same time, the tendency is to the right (1989), but Gusfield is unaware of this tendency even in the midst of collapse of the New Left.

The Classification of Community

What is it about the period preceding Effrat and Gusfield that compelled them to reassess the question of community? There was before this period an emphasis on classification, definition, evolution, and the territorial aspects of community. Sociological work had centered on the concern for a definition, usually a scientific one, of community. This search was arranged and greatly aided by the community/society dichotomy on which systems of classification were readily created. The construction of systems for the classification of community existed alongside the sociological work on the evolution of community and society. Not only did the community/society dichotomy contain within it an assumption of a progressive movement towards modernity, but the task of classification itself necessitated a continuous search for intermediate types that might be linked together in an evolutionary tree. With this search for the evolution of community, territory became a mandatory characteristic of community, from territoriality arose the consciousness-in-kind rooted in a geographical landscape and sense of place. The positive aspects of a "sense of place" arising from the continuity of land and community has been extensively explored (James 1972, Johnston

1983), as too have the reactive aspects, for it is not difficult to move from this continuity towards an ideology of blood and soil.

For Effrat, the four major traditions which take community as its subject of study are, like much of sociological theory, cracking under the weight of questions that they can no longer sufficiently incorporate within the given structure of the discipline. To preserve the integrity of the four traditions, Effrat really proposes to give an ecology of discursive styles (idealized by her as the Four Major Traditions), each with its specialized niche in the production of academic discourse. Similarly, for Gusfield, community is nothing more than an abstraction, an "analytical" concept. So, too, is *society*, and thus the dichotomy between them---which is discursively traced back to Tonnies--- is also viewed by Gusfield as an analytical or abstract one and not real. In reality, the two can not be distinguished. Even if they were once distinct, they are no longer.³⁴

Gusfield never mentions Parsons in his essay, but Gusfield follows Parsons in both his denial of the dichotomy of community and society, and in his reliance on ideal types. Parsons had already made the theoretical links between community, society, and social evolution in his concept of the "societal community". But, Parsons sees the "societal community" as the subject of social evolution, while Gusfield wants to avoid any version of evolutionary sociology or modernization theory.

The dichotomy between 'community' and 'society' has played a significant role in the development of such theories, especially in the distinction between 'tradition' and 'modernity.' The linear theory of evolutionary change perceived social change as moving away from one set of conditions and towards another: from community to society.... In positing 'community' as opposite 'society,'

³⁴Gusfield's argument articulates with Habermas's thesis of the colonialization of the lifeworld. End Footnote] So for Gusfield, community exists on the level of sociological discourse, as an argument within social theory that is not only about a concept, but also about the utility of the concept within the overall production of sociological knowledge, albeit at the level of the "problem of types," i.e., at the level of rationalization, classification, and idealism (1975:20-21).

'tradition' as opposite 'modernity,' both the evolutionary sociologists and the modernization theorists have given us a simplified and distorted picture....(Gusfield 1975:80-81).

Among the regularities united under the binary of community/society are classification and the use of typologies. Only Hillery gives a taxonomy as well. But this does not mean that a taxonomy does not exist within the others, only that it is assumed rather than made explicit. If there is a typology of ideal (symbolic) types, along with a classificatory regularity, then there must also be criteria for inclusion. In talking about Parsons, Loomis gives three criteria "History, derivation, and content." which must be met for inclusion in a classification of community. Hillery gives several criteria, including, the community/society dichotomy, for inclusion in his classification of community.

Hillery's method for producing his classification of definitions is again instructive here. Much like Borges Librarian of Babel, who searches for the book which contains all other books---the book that thus contains the secret word of divinity---Hillery browses the literature of sociology and then the shelves of the library, always trusting to preexisting codes to provide the route to further definitions. First he looks up those that are in common usage, what the community of consensus regularly refers to as important works. Then he uses the references cited in these to find more definitions. In the course of tracking these definitions down, he peruses the nearby library shelves for interesting titles and includes these in his classification. The indexes of the texts and the bibliographical order of the library catalogue provided preexisting classifications upon which Hillery draws in order to construct his own. In social scientific terms, his methodology was biased in such a way as to render his results suspect. The system was already there in the bibliographies, the indexes, and on the shelves. Despite this, his study is useful because he is able, as a result of these biases, to

capture the extent of the sociological community of opinion regarding the definition of community. Hillery lets us see community as exactly those groups of coded and discursive statements. But just this abundance of codes makes possible his classification.

Gusfield shares with Effrat the project of producing a classification of all previous work on community along with its associated social typology. Effrat gives a very different scheme, but one that stays attentive to the necessity to discursively limit the question of community to social theory and associating this with a community type. Effrat gives us a simple matrix wherein the specifics of the taxonomy are assumed. At the same time, it presents a diachronic flow as a synchronic structure. Hillery scheme is quite complex. Why this movement from complexity to simplicity?

In terms of the sociological discourse of community, the break marked by Effrat and Gusfield is the shift from the classification of types and definitions to the revaluation of community in terms of identity, politics, and locality. One aspect of the break was the gradual loss of boundaries, a deterritorialization of community as "a place where one's life may be wholly lived within" (MacIver and Page in Hillery 1955).³⁵ It is more accurate to say that the discursive practice of community as identity became dominant in the academy coincident with the incorporation of multiculturalism and new social movements. At the same time, is this not the end of the era of the New Left and the rise of the New Social Movements? The break that Gusfield and Effrat mark appears only two years after the end of Bretton Woods Agreement, which David Harvey

³⁵ Not that the discontinuity between the two periods is complete, for the classificatory studies continue, e.g., Folwer's *Dance with Community* (1991). An advocate and member of the Communitarian Network, Fowler uses ten categories to classify community in the present American context. It is an explicit attempt to rework the need of classification in the context of communitarianism as a political movement.

pegs as the “start” of the postmodern era. And finally, is this not the end of Parsonian era in American sociology (Gouldner 1971; Mills 1963)?

The Discursive Formations and the Systems of Classification

It appears that in sociology there are two great discursive formations regarding community. They exist together, but one dominated the time before 1975 and another became predominate in the years since. In this chapter, I wanted to talk about the first period, which dates roughly from 1945 until 1975. This discursive formation operated on the relation of four key figures: *definition*, *classification*, *evolution*, and *territory*. In sociology, discussion of community constantly referred to these four discourses. During this period, the definition of community and the classification of definitions becomes a primary research activity. Of course, definition had been important prior to this period, for writers with a vision of social progress like Giddings and Tonnies, evolutionary and taxonomic aspects of classification are brought together on the basis of that vision. This vision could not withstand the realities of the trenches or the camps. But it was a vision of social progress within sociology that gave rise to a myriad number of definitions of community.

Hillery signals an important turn because he does not offer a definition, only a classification of definitions. In part, this was the result of nearly every writer feeling compelled to define community anew. In the chaos, the sociological study of community had come to an impasse. There were simply too many definitions. Hillery's classification of the current definitions had the great benefit of giving us the boundaries of this entire discourse. At the same time, his work subverts the discursive boundaries that he desperately wants to build. He gives a classification of definitions that is not directly identical to any single one, but that is said to include all of them. At the end of his work, the classification of definitions becomes the definitions of community, which

in turn becomes the scientific representation of an abstract community itself. Once again we confront a moment when community is expressed not as something 'out there', but as an object constructed through sociological discourse and subject to its norms.

Of course, definition is necessary because without it classification is not possible and humans are animals that obsessively classify. The definition of community is constitutive of community. The meaning or truth of community can not be understood apart from the ways in which we speak about it. This is no less true of academic discourse than it is of everyday life. For Hillary, the assumption goes that the defined types of community actually are real communities and therefore to classify definitions is the same as classifying real communities. Indeed, there is a slippage in the literature. As the definitions become synonymous with the real social relations, each tends to recapitulate the other. The definition becomes the type. The definition might even become the concept itself. This is no error, but rather an important intellectual maneuver that is mandatory if the work of classifying is to go smoothly. Now, classifying is not in itself very surprising. Even Stuart Hall has said that it is an essential human activity for understanding the world. What is important about this particular mode of classification is that it was deployed along with a discourse of social evolution.

The Classification of Community and Social Evolution

At the intersection of the discourse of social evolution and the discourse of scientific classification, Giddings tells us that "the subject matter of classification may consists of concepts only. The dichotomies are made in thought only. Societal facts are actualities. Classification of them is a sorting of them into actual, or as we usually say, factual, groups, the dichotomies of which have been actually made by processes which men have observed and may now observe" (Giddings 1924:69). It is here that Giddings provides his own scheme of what he terms "social genesis" (See Table X). The

similarities between it and the *Table of Concepts* are obvious. both present an evolutionary scheme in the form of a classificatory table.

Given, however, that "plants, animals, and human beings do not behave forever in the same way," Giddings allows that the classifications must also change. In order to understand these changes, the classification of social facts (concepts) must be articulated along with a scheme of "social genesis". "It follows that in sociology a study of societal variability, carried out into a classificatory scheme, and thereby checked up, is of correlative importance with the study of societal genesis, in a like manner carried out" (Giddings 1924:76). The scheme is always a table, which also reveals the evolutionary history of the concept itself. When we look again at the *Table of Concepts* was always intended as not only a classificatory scheme, but also the actual evolution of the concepts as they exist. What we begin to reveal is a "natural history" of ideas, a prominent feature of the most current misuse of evolutionary theory, the meme of evolutionary psychology.

Without definitions, classification is impossible. Classification is necessary for a scientific study of community that centers on social evolution, and it is the evolutionary aspect that unites community with territory. Each of these discursive figures---definition and classification, evolution, and territoriality---is essential for the reproduction of the sociological discourse on community. Of course, they can exist separately, but can not be connected in a broader discursive formation without undergoing significant transformation. But placing them in new discursive formations does not deprive them of their previous force. For example, at one time, facial and cranial measurement was an aspect of criminal anthropology, itself an important science of society. Criminal anthropology may have passed from the scene, but the techniques of cranial measurement, complete with precise assumptions regarding "race," are still

used by physical anthropologists and forensic investigators. True crime shows, such as those on *The Learning Channel* and *Discovery Channel*, regularly portray the reconstruction of a victim's features based upon these assumptions. One of my favorites being the "factual" statement made by a forensic anthropologist while she reconstructed a face for a human skull: "for an African-American nose, add 1/8' more flesh than for a white nose". But most would deny any *real* connection between modern forensic science and criminal anthropology, for the first is modern fact and the latter pre-modern fiction and "badly reasoned". In the context of the show, the scientific validity, as well as the intellectual genealogy, of her statement was never questioned, but this is hardly surprising in itself.

The consolidation of any discipline carries with it obvious benefits and costs. In the case of sociology, consolidation as a discipline, as well as its disciplinary practices, brought with it a specific scientific outlook. This view of sociology as a science of society, with its reliance on statistical dialects and methodologies, was and is not the only meaning of science. Indeed, it was not a meaning shared by many of the scientists that sociologists claimed to emulate in their search for truth. Sociologists have always deliberately misread both the theory and the substance of science. There are no better examples of this than the sociological tendencies associated with Social Darwinism and orthodox marxism.

But to misread is not necessarily to get it all wrong. Certainly, Hillery and others may have misread the ability of science to speak the truth, but they did not miss the fundamental importance of classification in the practice of science. Of course, one might argue that they did not have to start with classification. They might have started with essences or symbols, or even posit the existence of a spirit of community. But this is not likely because, for one, the many attempts to define community already provided

plenty of raw material: almost every writer on the subject begins with its definition. Secondly, the classifications did not come out of thin air, but were necessitated by the demands of a particular will to scientificity. When experimentation is impossible, as is usually the case in social research, classification becomes the necessary foundation of science. To go one further step, classification was essential for understanding social evolution. Classification provided two things, first a means to link the sociological study of community to the production of the most "advanced" forms of scientific knowledge. Second, a scheme outlining the evolutionary trajectory of human society. In Tonnies it contains a historical movement: *Gemeinschaft* gives way to *Gesellschaft*, tradition to modernity. In others, a utopian vision of social progress through the application of sociological knowledge to social problems.

It is at this point that the claim of a fundamental importance of land or territory began to be encountered. Social evolution operates within territories. Now the boundaries of these territorial communities may be established in many different ways ----through force of arms, or in the creation of the "consciousness in kind" of a "people" in a "place", or in the "blood" or "stock" native to a soil. The central problem remains one of definition, the solution to which was sought in the classification of types in relation to social evolution or degeneration. But this solution, mandated by the needs of the day, proved unable to incorporate the challenges to Traditional Theory posed by the new conditions of domination and resistance. This is what Gouldner called, while it was still on the horizon, the crisis of Western sociology.

Definition, classification, evolution, and territory, form the limits of the sociological study of community until the middle of the 1970s. At this point, these four discursive strategies become decentered. However, they do not cease to exist, but they are transformed or replaced by new strategies: *Identity* as redefined by multiculturalism and postcolonialism; *new social movements* which combined with identity to produce new struggles over everyday life as well as new forms of academic knowledge; *degeneration* reemerges as a threat to a bourgeoisie no longer confident in its manifest destiny; new *enclosures* of community express the anxiety of loss, and a

reterritorialization of community directed not at the poor, but at the middle classes. The question of boundaries, of limits as opposed to universal progress, emerges with a growing discourse on the limits of community and the dangers of the anti-community of the underclass. This suggests that the dichotomy of community and society is neither universal nor constant in sociological theory. There is a tension in the theoretical discourse because society and community are so difficult to distinguish and hold separate unless they are only considered abstractly and ideally. Communitarians sense this anxiety, or perhaps feel it themselves, and do not use the binary of community and society. Instead, they use the distinction between community and the anti-community, i.e., the gang, the underclass, the dependent, etc. Community and society are conflated to the extent that "community of communities" serves as the communitarians slogan for the American Nation State. The dichotomy returns not as community vs. society, but as community vs. anti-community. Communitarianism, as a new way of conceptualizing community within sociology, and as a political intervention into social policy, emerges at this moment.

CHAPTER SIX
The Sociological Study of Community, II
Social Movements, Identity, Enclosures/Boundaries, Degeneration (c. 1975-c. 1996)

Something happened in the 1970's. Quietly, the discursive regularities of the sociological study of community shifted. If definition, classification, evolution, and territory had previously formed the limits of community, this discursive formation dissolved away, replaced by a new understanding of community. We are all familiar with the coincident general shift in American sociology: Parsonian structural-functionalism passed from the scene, only briefly outliving its namesake. The social movements of the 1960's and 1970s, especially Civil Rights, gay liberation, and feminism, began to generate changes in the academy as new knowledges were incorporated into the curriculum. Student and faculty diversity increased. At the same time, an equal reaction occurred. "Hate speech," "sexual harassment," "speech codes," and "political correctness" became common terms in the academy---though they were used very differently by progressives and conservatives. In more general terms, the various organizations and factions comprising the New Right rapidly expanded as the economy deindustrialized and the middle classes experienced massive economic and social dislocations (Aronowitz 1993; Clough 1994).

In this chapter, the discussion will shift towards the new discursive regularities which appeared in the sociological study of community. It is also the purpose of this chapter to emphasize the recent convergence of the genealogy of communitarianism with that of sociology. This is not to suggest that the old discourses ceased to exist, but only that they were transformed or displaced within new strategies. These new discursive formations created new objects of knowledge: *Identity* as redefined in the emergence of multiculturalism and postcolonialism; *new social movements* which

combined with identity to produce new struggles over everyday life as well as new forms of academic knowledge; *degeneration* as a threat to a bourgeoisie whose destiny was no longer manifest; new *enclosures* of community expressing an anxiety of loss, and new *boundaries* marked a reterritorialization of community directed not at the regulation of the poor, but of the middle classes. In communitarianism, questions of identity center on the formation and maintenance of a identity of the middle classes. This identity would be created in the spaces of the new social movements. At the same time, these new identities belie the assumption--- which underlies much of the sociological work on New Social Movements---that these movements are progressive. Although identity and community were freed from the limits of territory, every deterritorialization is immediately followed by a reterritorialized. In the case of sociology, culture and identity became the discursive structure for a reterritorialization of community. In the case of communitarianism, the call (spirit) of community becomes constitutive of the specific identity and culture of the middle class. It is ironic that identity and culture, having been freed of a specific territorial reference, become the distinguishing markings of a largely symbolic place that is itself the new enclosure of community; an enclosure to defend against the degeneracy both beyond its boundaries and within. "...the barbarians are not waiting beyond the frontiers; they have already been governing us for quite some time" (MacIntyre 1984:263).

New Social Movements

It is important to note the coincidence of communitarianism with the rise of new social movements. A number of theorists, most notably Melucci (1980, 1992, 1994), Offe (1985) and Habermas (1985), and a host of others, argue that the distinguishing aspect of "new" social movements is that they are not class based but "symbolic". New social movements are characterized by concerns that extend beyond the narrow wage

and workplace demands of the trade union movement. The aspect of new social movements that often gives a progressive appearance to these movements is their general opposition to mass society, rampant individualism, and consumerism. Instead of being organized around the workplace, these movements focus their attention upon symbolic issues such as "body, health, and sexual identity; the neighborhood, city, and the physical environment; the cultural, ethnic, national, and linguistic heritage and identity; the physical conditions of life, and the survival of humankind in general" (Offe 1985:828-829).

Offe's list reveals if not a hierarchy of identity, then certainly a naturalized and continuous chain which moves from the "body" to "humans in general". New Social Movements, as many commentators repeat, raise the question of the "quality of life" as a political and moral question. The more quality, presumably, the better. But quality of life does not always mean the same thing, either within specific movements or across the range of contemporary movements. There is a desire for a higher quality of life, a better one, or even just a *different* life. Quality of life is raised as an political issue---even as a rallying cry: "This will destroy our quality of life!"---but like community, its implicit references and its meanings are never stable. After all, the authoritarian Mayor G. of New York City claims to be devoted to solving quality of life issues. Moreover, the issues are defined spatially, so that they appear amidst either a personal or a public sphere. Each space then, whether it is filled by personal or social bodies, possess a particular identity that is the essence of a community. We experience this essence as a spirit or a call of community: "[C]ommunity is not a referential sign, but a call or an appeal" (Singer 1991:125). Only Melucci stresses the ideological aspect of these symbolic issues.

Seen from one perspective, the theorists of new social movements make a bold claim: the modern world has been transformed and we do not yet fully comprehend this revolution. One fundamental transformation was the shifting of the jurisdiction of social conflict from the work-place to the domain of "life". Hence the concern with quality of life, rather than quality of labor, takes precedence. How is it that such a transformation occurred? Habermas for one points to the welfare state as the catalyst for this spiritual revolution. According to Habermas, the institutionalization of the welfare state has shifted social conflict away from "problems of distribution" and towards "lifestyle....[and] the grammar of forms of life" (1985:34). The welfare state has largely resolved the most pressing "problems of distribution". The dislocations resulting from capital accumulation are ameliorated by the state through transfer payments, the regulation of "the market," and the extension of civil society.³⁶ The social, fiscal, and occupational welfare of the citizens would be an entitlement of citizenship. Problems of distribution would be resolved through a de-commodification of the essentials of life, which would in effect "substantially emancipate individuals from market dependence" (Esping-Andersen 1990:22). Under these conditions, citizens might turn their attention toward issues of life-style. Thus, "a minimal definition [of the welfare state] must entail that citizens can freely, and without potential loss of job, income, or general welfare, opt out of work when they themselves consider it necessary" (Esping-Andersen 1990:23). It is at this moment that we find that "movements around lifestyle... and the grammar of forms of life" become possible (Habermas 1985:34). Within this movement, we feel in the call of community the tug of a rejection of politics, and a desire for social contact---just so long as it is not sensual human contact. And "we must answer the call" (Clinton, First Inaugural speech).

³⁶ Which Habermas treated earlier in his *Bourgeois public sphere*

But the welfare state is historically a recent innovation, and never so fully deployed in practice as it was in theory. Moreover, this arrangement of the state ideological apparatus was always precarious and dependent on the largess of the wealthy and a health rate of profit. Various welfare states display an uneven development that might never have reached its intended reconciliation in the evolution to socialism (see, for example, Bernstein's *Evolutionary Socialism*). In fact, the theory of the welfare state reached its epitome at the same moment when the forces of neo-liberalism began to react against the socialist utopias. In the United States, the very existence of a welfare state has always been in doubt. The actions of President Clinton and the Republican Congress around "welfare reform" make it even more doubtful. Given the dependence of new social movement theory on the existence of the welfare state, a difficult question awaits their attention: What becomes of the new social movements when the welfare state no longer provides the necessities of life, no longer resolves problems of distribution, and punishes any who opt out of work?

In such a historical moment, the universalism expressed by such writers as Offe resonates more and more like the particularism of the middle classes. Accordingly, Aronowitz (1992) rejects the symbolic characterization of new social movements, and instead places them squarely within the postwar rise of American dominance. A number of forces contributed to the post war expansion: consumerism and the consumer credit, the historic compromise of the labor movement, the G.I Bill, the suburbanization of the middle and white working classes. All of these are also important factors in the constitution of new social movements. It is here that the many new social movements find their ideological and economic base of support. It is also here that Aronowitz finds the epicenter of the gendered shift of white workers to the political right. Stuart Hall (1992) directs us to view new social movements in the context of the tremendous social

changes since WWII. The new social movements are just one aspect of the postmodern moment. They have appeared with the creation of the welfare states, and with the globalization of the American culture industry within the integration of the world economy. This global reterritorialization of markets coincides, Hall further shows, with the creation of new identities from the dislocations of decolonialization and diaspora. These new identities are not only created out there in the old colonies, but are also being created within the "First World" as well, in the guise of new social movements. It is at this very moment that the right, now called the New Right, began to speak of itself as a social movement, that the Christian evangelicals and fundamentalists became politicized, forming organizations ranging from mailing-lists (e.g., The Moral Majority) to civil disobedience and terrorist alliances (e.g., Operation Rescue). The New Right and the Christian Right forged alliances which allowed for an intensification of the tendency to the right (Marcuse 1989).

In fact, one might easily make the argument that the most successful new social movement in the United States was the New and Christian Rights from the mid 1970s until the end of the Reagan-Bush Administration. They fit the criteria of new social movement, but have never been considered such precisely because they are not progressive. We should remember that new social movements are suppose to have taken the place of the labor movement at the forefront of progress. But this is a limited view of social movements, or one that assumes social movements to be broadly speaking, progressive. But much of the trade union movement in the United States was never progressive in any sense, and so too is it equally the case that we should view with skepticism the claims of progressive politics so often granted to new social movements, especially when they originate within the middle classes , as communitarianism does.

There remains a great difference between movements in contradiction to power, and the affirmation of the status quo under the banner of reform.

A common characteristic of our conceptualizations of new social movements is the opinion that they do mark a profound change in American social relations. It is not surprising then that we can find evidence of this if we turn even briefly to take notice of the changes in higher education over the last 30 years. The academy is never isolated from the currents of everyday life. Patricia Clough demonstrates this in her discussion of the many ways in which feminist thought has consistently presented profound challenges to the traditional disciplines such as sociology. Indeed, feminist theory has accomplished nothing less than a "radical reformulation of the distinction between the inside and the outside of the academy" (1994:166). Sociology, as the scientific study of society, changes as its' subject changes, and so it would be absurd to maintain that sociology might isolate itself from the social world. Even Cooley tells us that the founders of the discipline did not believe that its structure was set and from the beginning held the view that the sociological work of conceptualizing and classifying society must be adjusted as social life itself changes. Giddings, too, says that we must adjust our accounts of the social world in accordance with the development of new social facts.

While Gouldner could announce in 1971 a coming crisis of western sociology, this turned out to be merely the beginning of two decades of controversies surrounding the policing of the disciplinary boundaries of sociology. Multiculturalism, gender studies, and the rise of cultural studies finally made the speculative crisis of sociology quite real. But profound change is not always welcomed by ones immersed in a disciplinary traditions. And as Clough shows, and the disciplines did sometimes react aggressively against these changes in "the student body". And yet, ironically, it is the

communitarians who have also benefited from this reformulation of the academy, because their claim for the importance of the communitarian intervention rests in large part on its reestablishment of the relationship between sociology as an academic discipline, and the formation of a sociologically informed public policy in the face of rapid changes in "the social fabric".

New Knowledges, New Identities, New Enclosures

With the eclipse of Parsonian sociology, community itself was deterritorialized. In the discourse of multiculturalism, community is deployed in such a way as to make territoriality inconsequential. Identity was no longer the result of one's attachment to a landscape, but to the call of a place and a utopia. As one member of the Communitarian Network said:

Q. What are some of the reasons you became a communitarian?

A. Due to the fact I like the principles in basis [sic] of the communitarian thesis. It assembles thoughts and ideas that should form the future landscape of societies around the world. A need for more 'green' thinking in economy, social aspects, and more care in society (personal communication).

In an era of intensified diasporas and often force migrations, identity was called upon to unite bodies made distant in both space and time. Territoriality became less and less significant in the face of a more abstract bond of identity. Community in this circumstance becomes a "genre de vie" set free from the constraints of nature and instrumental reason by technological control and the welfare state's rationalization of social conflict. Identity, first as an anti-colonialist critique and later as a politics of essentialism, came to the forefront of academic knowledge as a embodiment of the spirit of the community of a people united by essential, naturally internalized, values. It is ironic that we have already encountered this conception in the earlier concept of "consciousness-in-kind". When we first encountered consciousness-in-kind, it was used

to distinguish those of a civilized mentality from those either less developed or degenerate mind. In contrast to that former meaning, the discourses of multiculturalism work to deterritorialize consciousness itself, while reterritorializing community as a proper sociological object and a moral/political problem. It is in this way that consciousness-in-kind has re-emerged in the sociological study of community

Even if multiculturalism did not succeed in revolutionizing the entire academy, it did succeed in the Herculean task of shaking loose the meaning of community and identity from the usual discourses of blood and soil. Now, it is true that this rupture was accomplished through certain hereditarian assumptions regarding the origins of identity. Identity and race became united in the formation of anti-dominant political rhetorics, especially concerning the claim to an identity and its concurrent recognition as legitimate by the "dominant culture". As if to say, "Having long rejected your claim that I am who I am by blood, I have now changed my mind. I now accept your view. Now that I have accepted your view, you must grant me recognition and legitimacy." So it is not the state that faces a crisis of legitimacy. Indeed, multiculturalists have a stake in the State because the State bestows legitimacy, or recognition. It does so for even its most unruly subjects so long as they accept race as a scientific fact.

It is equally true that the power of the discourses of identity and multiculturalism have often made use of a reference to a geographical *homeland* from which arose a diaspora. On the surface, the concept of homeland (or fatherland, motherland, etc.) is central to most discourses of blood and soil. So what does it mean to, for example, refer to "Africa" as one's homeland? "Africa" as a concept has no depth, it does not exist beyond being the European designation of a continental landmass. This hardly sounds like the basis for an identity that is already several generations removed from that "place," and is problematic in a nation where slavery was abolished only 140 years ago.

We have a history of struggle, but in seeking to obtain an identity, we find ourselves on the verge of losing history. And yet, Africa appears today as the point of origin for a multivariied diaspora. It is a place that is said to still call to us and one that awaits our prodigal return. So Africa has been invented as an Eden and as an ambrosia which would restore the correct evolution to bodies degenerated from contact with others, which is itself merely a reversal of the Classical European view of the continent (See Combes 1995, and Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*). I use Africa only as an example, the same holds true for many other disaporic groups whose identity is constructed in relation to a mythical homeland. Whenever the concept of homeland is deployed, it is ideological.

It is precisely because homelands only exist conceptually, that the identities which call to them for legitimacy are not limited to a specific landscape or territoriality, but they are limited only by the call itself. The call can only be heard by those for whom it is intended. It has an almost genetic specificity. Identity at this moment has its basis in particular experiences that can be repeated either in memory or in the call to a consciousness-in-kind. It is said to be non-ideological in the sense that it retains an innate understanding of the call. This is a radical rejection of the Parsonian era and can only be fully appreciated in the context of the crisis in Western sociology. Hillery's finding that sociologists generally agreed on the necessity of territoriality was overthrown. From this point forward, the sociological study of community displaces territoriality with the concept of a call to identity and consciousness. "Community is not a referential sign but a call or appeal. What is called for is not some objective reference. The call of community aims at response, at calling back. The call of community initiates a conversation in writing, disseminates, and desires the proliferation of

discourse" (Singer 1991:125).³⁷ The conflicts of multiculturalism are one aspect of the proliferation of discourses and identities. It is not that multiculturalism is really a new concern. One need only remember the debate over the causes of the collapse of the Roman Empire. Frequently, this debate centered on the deleterious effects of the Empire's, particularly Rome's, great diversity. Sometimes it took the form of a debate on the effects of Christianity and other degenerate forces, as in Gibbon or Toynbee, where it is allied with a Hesiodic vision of cycles. But there was also another, less spiritual aspect, that is represented in Tenney's "Race Mixture in Rome" (1916). This work links the mixture of races in the Empire to the proliferation of "non-Roman" citizens whose racial identity made it impossible for them to ever be considered by us to be the descendent of Romulus and Remus.

What lay behind and constantly reacted upon Rome's disintegration was, after all, to a considerable extent, the fact that the people who built Rome had given way to a different race. The lack of energy and enterprise, the failure of foresight and common sense, the weakening of moral and political stamina, all were concomitant with the gradual diminution of the stock which, during the earlier days, had displayed these qualities" (Tenney 1916).

It is not at all surprising that the critics of multiculturalism make many of the same points, perhaps less bluntly, about the effects of multicultural education on "America," (Schelishinger 1991). Not only is it a danger itself, but its existence is also a further symptom of the proliferation of identities that are not "American enough." Charles Taylor refers to this as the problem of cultural fragmentation aggravated by multiculturalism. When the fundamental political imperative is the reproduction of a

³⁷ The specific nature of the call of community must be more closely examined on its own accord. Indeed it would be an idealist route to some of the same topics as those addressed in this dissertation. But such a study will have to wait until a later date. Heidegger often refers to the call or appeal in his romantic fantasies. It is Weber in his "Science as a Vocation" who clarifies Heidegger's verse, and more bluntly states the political stakes involved in the call of community.

common consensus, "one of the major political objectives" must be the prevention of fragmentation. "This is not easy to achieve in our present era of 'multiculturalism'" (Taylor 1993:25).

Recalling the rhetoric opposing mass society, Taylor argues that the centralization of power, mass media, and the intensification of social conflict have led to the proliferation of identities that naturally follows from the exclusion of the "ordinary citizen" from the political process. Taylor maintains that it is in large part true that the social divisions are excited when the "group of cultural community feels itself to be unrecognized by the larger society, and becomes less willing to function on the basis of common understanding with the majority" Taylor 1993:25). Once this process begins, it is difficult to persuade excluded groups or identities to enter into dialogue with the majority. The possibility of discourse and compromise has in fact already passed with the very creation of the *need*, crystallized in the very existence of the excluded group, for the discussions in the first place. "In the climate of presumed exclusion, the said group will not consider its demands adequately addressed unless they are completely accepted" (1993:25). Obviously, the interests of the majority would not be served by such total capitulation to the minority. They are, after all, the majority. Therefore, Taylor says that the answer lays in preventing conflicts by providing a public space, even allowing "nested public spaces" to multiply, but only so long as they do not verge towards succession. Presumably, "the said group" would not feel the need to succeed, since its views were being voiced. In fact, the active engagement in the public spheres might prevent such extreme oppositional identities from forming.

With new identities came new conceptions of community. The sociological definition of community was literally deterritorialized. Territory ceased to be a defining characteristic of community at the same moment that new identities were formed that no

longer looked to territory as a boundary of community. The deterritorialization of community has many effects. First, it is associated with the renewal of a discourse on the boundaries and enclosures of community. Second, it is formed along with an intensification of deployments of definitions and classifications of community, especially the communities of the poor and marginal. Third, it is allied with the demand for authority to reside "in the community". Since deterritorialization is also a reterritorialization, with the discourse on boundaries comes the reterritorialization of community in the form of new enclosures amidst the moral anarchy of the underclass and the rising "authoritarian right".

From the Underclass to Degeneration

The proliferation of identities also means that it is not impossible for an identity to be created that is not to the liking of many. Even the idea of deviance makes necessary a deviant who understands that they are deviant. They are a threat and they must see themselves as we see them, and they must identify with their threatening stance and so prove the validity of the stereotype.

The threat to the communitarian community is the community of the underclass. With the underclass, degeneration emerges once again in sociological discourse and so too does classification, both in the category of the underclass, as well in the systemization of its attributes. As Michael Katz has noted

Open debate on the underclass accelerated in 1977 when *Time* magazine announced the emergence of a menacing underclass in America's inner cities. Drugs, crime, teenage pregnancy, and high unemployment, not poverty, defined the 'underclass,' most of whose members were young and minorities. 'Behind the [ghetto's] crumbling walls,' wrote *Time*, 'lives a large group of people who are more intractable, more socially alien and more hostile than almost anyone had imagined. They are the unreachable: the American underclass....their bleak environment nurtures values that are often at odds with those of the majority---even the majority of the poor. Thus the underclass produces a highly disproportionent number of the nations juvenile delinquents, school dropouts,

drug addicts, and welfare mothers, and much of the adult crime, family disruption, urban decay, and demand for social expenditures'"(1992:4).

Such a narrative could have come from Dugdale 100 years before, but this is getting ahead of the story. At this point it is enough to note that the underclass appears in this narrative as a menace, as "unreachables" who refuse to enter into negotiation with or recognize the reason of the majority. They are alien to the society, yet they are produced by that same society: it is after all their "bleak environment" that "nurtures values that are often at odds with those of the majority---even the majority of the poor". Egad, even the poor, whose morals are certainly held suspect by the middle classes, are not so badly immoral as the underclass. Unlike the poor, whose members "work hard and play by the rules," the underclass willfully stands outside of the public sphere, and stubbornly refuse to enter it.

Many early discussions of the underclass treated the term as a synonym for the persistently poor. By the late 1980s, however, a consensus had developed that it included only those families and individuals whose poverty was somehow attributable to their behavior (Jencks in Jencks and Peters 1991:)

Jencks among many identifies the underclass as marked by a general set of behaviors nothing like that of the other poor. Moreover, Jencks goes on to assert that these behaviors are characteristics of Race. Racialized social pathologies emerge as an important discursive element, especially in relation to the behavior of the underclass. The members of the underclass are more than just poor. They are fundamentally different from the poor. At least the poor work and obey the rule of law and the doctrine of self-reliance. The underclass constitutes a menace to civilization, a population predisposed to violence through familial descent.

Today's ghetto neighborhoods are populated almost exclusively by the most disadvantaged segments of families and individuals who are outside the mainstream of the American occupational system. Included in this group are individuals who lack training and skills and either experience long-term unemployment or are engaged in street crime and other forms of aberrant

behavior, and families that experience long-term spells of poverty and/or welfare dependency" (Wilson 1987:8).

Perhaps the most important aspect of these constructions of the underclass is that they reveal so many unremarkable commonplaces. As Giddings said long ago, the "grades or strata [found in sociological classifications] correspond to distinctions made in popular speech" (1922:5). No matter how precisely the term was defined by sociologists such as Wilson, its legitimization as a concept was achieved through its association with the rhetoric of common prejudices. The underclass becomes any poor black individual or family that has rejected the fantasy that hard work and playing by the rules will raise them up into the mainstream. This rejection has led to a "creeping moral decay" which threatens to overwhelm the middle class (Etzioni 1991a:157). Moreover, they willfully reject the mainstream. The underclass constitutes a new class which is both wholly other, and strongly seductive in that it serves as a key referent in the culture industry. To understand this fully, we must consider some of the profound effects of degeneration and evolution on sociological discourse.

Degeneration and Evolution, Organic and Social

The proliferation of living forms was not the only type of evidence on which the fact of evolutionary transformation was based. There was confirmatory evidence both from the study of vestiges and from the process of recapitulation (Faris 1956:167)

Evolution, in its many meanings, has existed for quite some time. It was already present in the debates between preformism and epigenesis; and in the arguments over catastrophe and gradual change as evidenced by the fossils. The fossil record itself being in part an incidental discovery in the course of the provision of industrial raw materials. In the realm of biology, the ideology of industrialism was appropriated by Darwin so as to provide part of a general theory of descent with modification. Spencer

had already discussed the centrality of the struggle for existence that results in the survival of the fittest. Darwin says "I have called this principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is preserved, by the term Natural Selection, in order to mark its relation to man's power of selection. But the expression often used by Mr. Herbert Spencer of the Survival of the Fittest is more accurate, and is sometimes equally convenient" (Darwin 19xx:49). But Gould has pointed out on several occasions that Darwin's theory contained more than just *laissez faire*, but was also a materialist ideology. It is the complexity of Darwinism that results in its many discourses, some of which are very much a part of the history of sociological discourse.

Darwin sets out to answer the question: "What accounts for the diversity of species present in nature, are the number of species fixed by creation, or the result of change over time, and, following from these, what accounts for the varieties of Man?" Darwin provides the theory of Natural Selection to account for the evidence of both preformism and epigenesis. Darwin combines the work done on the classification of species, with that on evolution as the gradual accumulation of small changes, and the theoretical work of Spencer and Malthus. With these he destroys the theory of the fixity of species, and with it the ground for a Creation, or, even Cuvier's theory of a series of Creations. At the same time, and most profoundly, Darwin demolishes the scientific and sociological basis for polygenesis and the slavery it justified. Darwinism is profoundly materialistic, but unlike Marx's materialism, is based upon an acceptance of political economy rather than a critique of political economy. This is because it relies upon continuity in its interpretation of the development of species from simplicity to complexity. With Darwin the natural world moves from being a closed classificatory system and towards an infinity which "from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being evolved".

This is the only instance in the *Origins of Species* where Darwin uses the word "evolved". And it is significant that it is used in this passage to juxtapose the fixity of the law of gravity with the plasticity of his theory of descent with modification. a plasticity that is due in large part to the chance workings of Natural Selection. It is also clear that he did not want his views confused with the then current uses of evolution. Evolution, as in the unfolding of nature, had been around for a long time. Gould gives a good discussion of the reasons why Darwin would have hesitated to use the word evolution. The word had already been appropriated by embryologists in a very precise sense. They conjectured that the germ cell contained a homoculus, a miniature version of the adult in the process of becoming.

In 1744, the German biologist Albrecht von Haller had coined the term evolution to describe the theory that embryos grew from preformed homunculi enclosed in the egg or sperm (and that, fantastic as it may seem today, all future generations had been created in the ovaries of Eve or testes of Adam, enclosed like Russian dolls, one within the next---a homunculus in each of Eve's ova, a tinier homoculus in each ovum of the homoculus, and so on). This theory of evolution (or preformation) was opposed by the epigeneticists who believed that the complexity of adult shape arose from an originally formless egg. Haller chose his term carefully, for the Latin *evolvere* means 'to unroll'; indeed, the tiny homunculus unfolded from its originally cramped quarters and simply increased in size during its embryonic development (Gould 1977:35).³⁸

Gould points out that this view was incompatible with Darwin's view of development.

If every individual and species was there from the beginning, then "descent with modification" would be if not impossible, then certainly unnecessary..

³⁸The homoculus has returned in modern genetics, according to Tobach (1972) in the form of the "cryptanthroparion" "The prefix 'crypt' referring to what is hidden in the little person (anthroparion); to the fact that the essential person is hidden in something; or that the person needs to be decoded in order to be understood. What is hidden in the cryptanthroparion? No one would deny the existence and the necessity of the material transmitted from progenitor to the progeny; that is, without the material being transmitted, there is no progeny. But, that is the sine qua non of all matter, animate and inanimate. Every phenomenon has a history. All matter is derived from other matter, though the form varies....Hidden in the little person is the future of the little person (1972:233). E Tobach. 1972.

It is Darwin who provides the theory of natural selection, which can account for the evidence supporting both tendencies. Just as importantly, it establishes continuity in nature, and opposes the discontinuity that is the basis of the theories of Successive Creations (like Agassiz and Cuvier). It could combine the technique of classification with that of evolution, taking into account all of the available evidence, while destroying the prevailing theory of the fixity of species. So construed, we are provided with an almost infinite number of texts for the reading of the history of nature in the history of species. (So in a sense, Burrow (1990) is right when he says that evolution has little to do with Darwin). Foucault shows that the real epistemological break occurs between Cuvier and natural philosophy, but not between Darwin and Lamarck. Although he doesn't elaborate the point, it can be easily shown by briefly turning to Darwin's theory of inheritance, pangenesis.

Darwin's theory of natural selection had no adequate theory of hereditary transmission, and Mendelian genetics was yet to emerge. To remain consistent with his materialism, Darwin adopts pangenesis, and from this comes not only social Darwinism, but also social progress and social reformism. Darwin in fact adapts significant portions of Lamarkianism, in much the same way that Einstein followed Newton. Weismann's germ theory posited a "germ-line," which he believed 'thoroughly insulated [the hereditary germ] from influences emanating from the body". In contrast to Darwin's "gemmules" which could "make the characters acquired by the body transmissible to the next generation, while the biospores [of Weismann] could not" (Dobzhansky 1962:27-28). It is with Weismann as much as Galton that eugenics begins. The immutability of the germ-plasm" is established beforehand by its own set of relations, and these relations are unchanging. It becomes its very own end of history. Obviously, this is not at all a materialist conception, for which there is no end of history precisely

because of the very indeterminacy of materiality. Marx, after all, agitated for a future beginning of history, a revolution. But "the germ-plasm can not be formed anew, it can only grow, multiply, and be transmitted from one generation to another" (Weismann in Mckenzie 1892:144 *Science*).

Before the introduction of the germ-plasm, American sociology was dominated by the reformist Social Darwinist tendency to focus upon the environment as the cause of degeneration. Thomas Dugdale, whose study of the *Jukes* was often cited as confirmation of the inability to reform the degenerate population and the need for eugenic policies, credited the environment as the determining factor, going so far as to describe the "habitat" of the Jukes and its contribution to degeneracy through enticements to fornication, criminality, and pauperism. For Dugdale, degeneracy is both learned and inherited, with the mechanism for inheritance resembling pangenesis. And no less than Giddings writes the laudatory preface for *The Jukes*.

Natural selection as the mechanism for the diversity of species requires the creation of myriad varieties and types both fit and unfit, whose fates are determined by the environment that each generation finds at hand. But the genetic code admits a different view of types. According to Weismann, the potential survival of a given type is largely unaffected by the environment. Survival is instead a result of the quality of the germ-plasm itself. Success and fitness are predetermined by the very body of the subject, Fate reappears in modern guise.. It is ironic that Weismann retains the immutability of preformism in order to explain heredity, while Darwin's pangenesis is Lamarckian. Of course, the social and political implications of each position is fairly clear. Where Spencerian sociology focused on the fitness of the individual, eugenic sociology look to the fitness of populations, of communities, societies and civilizations.

The second tendency, held to varying degrees by Etzioni, Cooley, Lombroso, and others finds the source of degeneracy not only in heredity, but also in environmental causes. Obviously, they can not draw much support from Weismann on this point.. Or if they do, it can only be under the banner of a determinist eugenics. With the rediscovery of Mendelian genetics, there appeared the possibility of breeding better humans, and not just the bleak future of continual struggle. with an constant ebb and flow of defectives, dependents, and delinquents to be eliminated with each generation. The social reformist aspect of sociology, with its emphasis on social progress gives way to a focus upon the elimination of social pathologies by non-social means. The degenerates could be breed away, the number of inferiors could be controlled (after all, some are needed to do the necessary work that is always beneath the Superior Man. which if he engaged in it, would mark him with the atavisms of degeneracy), and the problem of class conflict transformed into a problem of public health. Sociology only held sway over this domain for a short while. Dealing with the pathologies of actual people was left to the rising tide of social workers, public health officials, and social hygienists, while sociologists contented themselves with theory as the proper domain for a science of society (Cauthen 1998). Social reform, the watchword of the Spencerian tendency, and social progress (cf. Kropotkin and Nysmiths), the tendency influenced by a reading of evolution as mutual aid, both allowed the environment some influence, and now environment had been shown to be of minimal importance. What is more, if you follow Sorokin, you can explain the social phenomena of geniuses born to the lower classes, and even further, a social scientific use for craniology and related sciences of the body. They carry something within them, some form of contamination, the genealogical health merged with public health (see Dugdale 1887). Sociology develops

criminology and social work as its applied areas allied with eugenics. See for example, the *Journal of Applied Sociology* as well as the early years of *Social Forces*).

This same tendency appeared in sociology and began to reinscribe preformism. Cooley and Parsons both held on to it. In Parsons, the structures of the normative order are already present, although they are external to us. They must be internalized through learning, a feature that Habermas explores in his essay on the development of normative structures. For Cooley, degeneracy can be traced to the level of instincts which contribute to degeneracy are present in everyone, and are worked on by the environment. Social conditions can produce an underclass, as seen in the Jukes, and almost everyone carries some atavistic characteristics, so any change in social conditions, far from being an universal omen of social progress, also creates conditions that are just as likely to be pathological as they are progressive.

What is more, with Weismann's germ-plasm, eugenics in its purifying form appears. Social reform, education, chastity, discipline, social hygiene, and public health could never be up to the task, since the germ-plasm was forever beyond their reach. While Weismann and others admitted that reform might help certain individuals, they also assures us that the reformed behavior could not be passed on, but only the latent pathology. So the prevention of breeding is introduced as the only means by which we can effect the germ-plasm, by effecting its variation in the population. The continuity between the restriction of reproduction and the restrictions on the reproduction of pleasures must be worked out more fully in another discussion, but it should be noted that at the turn of the century, the American Breeders Association contained within it an active eugenic section at the turn of the century. There was to be an "American Breeder," but even purification was only momentary. Our atavistic tendencies and instinctual drives could not be completely breed away. Eternal vigilance is the price for

the purity of community. The “menace of disease is one of the components of health” (Canguilhem 1991:287).

Evolution can mean progress, or it could mean degeneration, as had been noted since the 18th century. Evolution might entail the progressive integration of bodily functions until one arrives at the most perfect body, the human body (of course!) as described in the classification of Oken, where animals become merely “the dismembered body of man made alive” (Agassiz 1962:236-237). But what had been made whole could once again be dissolved. As Spencer had believed that the determined course of evolution is towards greater complexity, others also saw an opposite trend at work in the very same societies that had achieved so much: degeneracy.

In historical terms, the process of proletarianization is experienced by the middle classes as the corruption of degeneracy. Social progress, a fundamental assumption of Social Darwinism's evolutionary theory, is not resurrected by the communitarians, but the fear of degeneration is strongly felt and acted upon. Hence, we have located a source of the communitarians apocalyptic vision that, at first glance, seems a mystery, but like all mysteries is unmasked by its social conditions (see Marx (1975) on the “Mystery of Degeneracy”). It is in the genealogy of Murray and Hernstein's neo-eugenicist writing, in Peter Brimelow's anti-immigrant diatribes, and James Q. Wilson's moral animal that we find the deterministic tendency continued. Although, this is to some degree outside of the realm of sociological discourse, these works are routinely discussed by sociologists, e.g. Jencks and the other reactionary voices of underclass theory.

Alan Wolfe in his essay “Democracy vs. Sociology” returns the discussion of sociology to its roots as a discourse of social progress, except that no progress, except

some sort of moral progress, is possible (Hence Wolfe says that sociologists should become moral philosophers). Wolfe appropriates a little from identity politics and NSM theories in order to reforge sociology as another name for communitarianism. In fact, he implies, when we confront with what he calls *hypersociology*, we have found communitarianism as well. Hypersociology is identical with communitarianism. For Wolfe, there is little or no difference between communitarianism and sociology

Wolfe:

Nature and Society are by no means the same; the one evolves on its own and therefore demands an evolutionary theory, while the other, as both Rousseau and Durkheim would agree, is artificial and therefore needs historically-specific understanding. I see, therefore, no reason to resurrect discredited evolutionary theories of society, such as those of Spencer. Nor is an ecological perspective appropriate for understanding society, no matter how useful it is for understanding nature. One tends to balance itself by its own internal laws; the other, at least in its modern form, requires willful intervention and planning to work....society needs to be directed if nature is to be left relatively untouched. (1988:316).

Spencer would probably not disagree with the first part, at least. Wolfe denounces evolution, and lets it in through the backdoor at the same time. [[Elements of Balance (equilibrium), modern society and will, internal laws.]] As Cooley and others noted long before, directing society is not at all inconsistent with a evolutionary theory of society. Wolfe may not want to go back to Spencer, but that does not mean that he can disavow the evolutionary assumptions in his own discourse. Unless, that is, he turns this discourse away from social evolution (or social progress), and towards degeneration and regeneration. Indeed, he goes on to mention that not only is modern society in crisis (albeit not fatally), but so too is sociology. In fact, the crisis underscores the conflation of the two. "If we understand sociology as having its own unique subject matter, politics and economics are clearly squeezing it out, leaving civil society (or, depending on the theorist in question, primary groups, *gemeinschaft*, the generalized other, and the

common conscience) in tatters" (1988:318) Tattered may well be the condition of the social fabric of the "normative order of American sociology," but there is one ray of hope on the horizon: Communitarianism. "A surpassingly large number of eminent scholars, coming from quite divergent approaches, perspectives, and methodologies, agree that the root of the sociological project is the invisible bonds that hold us together" (1988:318). At least Spencer would make the bonds that exist between us real, visible, and living bonds, rather than a metaphor of the market.

Communitarianism as a state theory, not local at all or if it is, it is also at the same moment that it first displays its reliance on the community as authority. Communitarianism is in fact all about preserving the institutions that Althusser called the ISA and that Poulantzas masterfully uses to understand National Socialism.

One can look at communitarianism as making community not only an indicator of social cohesion, but also a reactive attempt to make community a compelling State interest. Not the State in its liberal role as the mediation between capital and the lifeworld of community, because the critique of liberalism carries over into the critique of the liberal state (in its modern incarnation as the welfare-state). The communitarians appeal to the State in its police/administrative/regulatory functions: it is to administer community. While opposed to the State, the communitarians would make each one of us into the body of the State (the body politic, the polis, the social organism or organic whole). Hence the State's interest in us, and our obligation/duty to it. With Freud, the problem is guilt, with the communitarians, it is duty.

Hypocrisy and vanity are often the disgusting result of reformism.... Alas! my good friend, there is no part of society or life better than any other part. All our things are right and wrong together. The wave of evil washes off our institutions alike. Do you complain of our Marriage? Our marriage is no worse than our diet, our trade, our social customs. What right have you to your one virtue? Is virtue piecemeal?

Emerson *New England Reformers*

CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusion

The Essential Argument

We have attempted to describe, in the most general terms and in rather broad strokes, a discursive formation that includes sociology as an essential component. This discursive formation does not simply determine a specific area of sociological knowledge production, it also determines the domain of a political intervention by academics. Communitarianism is sociology, as Etzioni, Selznick, and others have maintained, and communitarianism harkens American sociology back to its origins as "moral philosophy". Alan Wolfe's call for sociologists to again become moral philosophers sounds as though he is calling for them to withdraw from the reformist tradition of sociology. Quite the contrary, Wolfe is calling for sociologists "to give voice to ordinary people, struggling in the context of their lived realities to act as moral agents" (1989:234). But sociology is not necessarily a radical intervention on behalf of "ordinary people" but rather an attempt to understand them. "Sociology is not populism, an identification with the purity of the oppressed. It is about moral obligation, and it has moral obligations of its own" (Wolfe 1989:234). It is the moral obligation of sociology to intervene in politics in those spaces where "obligations to others can best be carried

out by government" (1989:235). That is the work of sociology is to understand ordinary people for the purposes of their own government.

The movement of sociology towards the communitarian political intervention is coincident with the tendency in sociology to recast community not as a pre-modern social system, as Tonnies did, but as an essential aspect of contemporary human existence--- community comes to be understood as culture itself. Binding community to culture accomplished many things. One of the most important of these accomplishments was to minimized the territorial aspects of community. Territoriality (as nature) and blood (as fateful descent) were replaced by blood (as biological descent) and culture (as community) as the basis for both social cohesion and social conflict. This bio-social community is, of course, portrayed as result of nature and progress, or even "culture." The history of community comes to be written the continuous narrative of development of sociological knowledge.

Community as society---and sociology as its self-reflection have progressed together through their brief histories. Perhaps we should say that since community (as government) became self-conscious, an event marked by the emergence of sociology, threats to community have always appeared to come from the "fringes," but in reality, these threats comes form the very center of community itself. The rising "moral anarchy" of the day, the communitarians tell us, has forced us to formally transform biology and sociology into the one great bio-social discourse of communitarianism. If, as Horkheimer says, that "Culture at each moment in time is a sum-total of forces at work amid the change of cultures" (1972:54, then communitarianism and community in sociology reduce this play of forces to nothing more than the origin of its own development.

Having brought together an archive of communitarian ideological practice, it became possible to identify particular regularities, linkages, and co-options of other ideologies within the domain of this archive. These regularities, linkages and co-options provide the foundation for the moral sociology of communitarianism and a justification for the reproduction of existing social relations, but it also sets the limit to this reproduction. In the course of tracing the genealogies of these discourses, the objects and unities created and reproduced in communitarian ideological practice emerged in high relief. Specific conceptions of community, family, nation, duty, the individual, liberalism the New Right, etc., came into existence through discursive, i.e. ideological, practice. The presence of these unities allows us to investigate the process of their formation as objects of particular knowledges---such as community sociology or the sociology of culture--- and as objects of politics---such as Clinton's "forgotten middle class." At the same time, there are larger unities of communitarian ideological practice: there is a sociology of culture that speaks of the need to moralize sociological knowledge; there is a moralization of public policy through the imposition of an obligation to work; these is a politics that relies on the "loss of community and family" and the fearsome specter of the New Right as the basis for their authority to judge and to justify intervention in a wide range of race, class, and gender conflicts. Subsuming sexuality under the familial alliance, the Communitarians at once point to their origins in the middle classes and also to the conflicts within those classes. While maintaining an active discourse on family, children, etc., their attention centers on authority, duty, and morality: the alliances of community which, like Right, finds its concrete form first and foremost in the family (Hegel 1953), and reaches its full development in "the community of communities".

These objects of knowledge and politics---and the range of their deployment---limits the domain and establishes the historical apriori of communitarianism. Within these limits it should come as no surprise that we find the antecedents to communitarian ideological practice exists along side more modern or popular expressions. We can also find the history that communitarianism claims and appropriates. The critical analysis of the communitarian archive is not an attempt to collect everything said about communitarianism and done by communitarians. Nor is it an attempt to determine whether their appropriations were complete, or whether the Communitarians accurately appropriate other ideological practices. The very make-up of an archive cautions against making such determinations. "Far from being that which unifies everything that has been said in the great confusion of a discourse...[the archive] is that which differentiates discourses in their multiple existence and specifies them in their duration" (Foucault 1972:129). But the critical analysis of the communitarian archive allows us to understand the process by which this particular amalgam of discourses coalesced into the unity that we can identify as communitarianism.

The creation of the communitarian community, i.e., the forcible disciplining of social life according to a unitary politics of community, is a process of exclusion. Moreover, "the loss of community" might also be examined as a new form or process of enclosure in the context of the contemporary reproduction of capital. Certainly, the possibilities for viewing community as a bourgeois enclosure are present in the communitarians' construction of community as an object of desire and as a utopian vision of the middle class. Although there is no unitary (or unifying) community, there are particular politics of community which seek to close off and forever fix the meaning of community. Communitarianism is one such politics but as such it is immersed in a wider circuit of reproduction of which it is just one small but defining expression. The

politics of communitarianism is ineluctably linked to a deployment of a morality directed not towards the "ghettoes," but like the bourgeois moralities of the past, communitarian morality is directed towards the middle class itself (Foucault 1980). Tim Beardsley reports that Etzioni remarked in his opening speech to the Second Annual Conference of the Communitarian Network that: "No community should be prevented from physically closing itself off in order to protect itself, Etzioni said, as the state has abandoned its duty of protecting its citizens" (Beardsley 1994).³⁹ Such a view is troubling when we understand that it is the already hegemonic classes are able to valorize their particular forms of civic discipline. Marx's summation of bourgeois morality, that "profane punishment must at the same time be a means of Christian moral education," still holds true (Marx and Engels 1975).⁴⁰ The poor are not a primary concern of the communitarians. Etzioni is, again, "speaking to the middle class."

All too often, progressives and leftists reduce the New Right to a simple brand of religious dogmatism and false consciousness devoid of all but rudimentary class content. Doing so provides an enemy that is seemingly more tangible than capitalism. But it also means that the articulation of authoritarian ideology is reduced to just one site, rather than understanding it as emanating from a multitude of locations within the relations of capital. In this essay we have examined only one such site, but

³⁹Waldron (1989) also argues for the centrality of this principal of exclusion in Communitarian ideology: "a community is entitled to uphold and enforce its own distinctive mores, norms, and standards through the agency of the law, even though this enforcement may seem undesirable from the wider point of view of liberal morality or moral philosophy....a community is entitled to do this for the sake of its own moral and cultural particularity, and in order to preserve its unique identity, its boundaries and its heritage". Marx and Polanyi both demonstrate the centrality of the enclosures to the freeing of labor and the rise of industrial capital..

⁴⁰In *The Moral Order of a Suburb* (1988), M. P. Baumgartner studied an affluent New York City suburb in which "social harmony" is maintained through a general morality that could serve as a model of community. "The conclusion is inescapable that it is not the substance of grievances but rather the organization of social life which explains the distinctively peaceful moral order of suburbia, including that of its families" (1988:60).

communitarianism serves to demonstrate that to understand the importance of the Right, we must also understand the "politics of the center." Communitarianism shows how political moderates respond to and reproduce the ideological practices of the Right. It reminds us that the "utilization of human impulses" (Marx and Engels 1975) inherent in the production of capital find expression throughout the social world.

The great value of communitarianism is in reminding us that there is no unitary politics of community. The politics of community (and its corresponding politics of identity and multiculturalism) is not confined to the liberal-progressive left and specific subaltern groups, it is also an ideological practice of the vast middle classes. Examining communitarianism and other ideologies of the middle classes gives us a window on the effects of the authoritarian tendency on the social conflicts of everyday life. This view dictates that we judge as inherently reformist and opportunistic the proposal that the Left needs a language of its own for family and community, or that it is morally necessary for us to support these "institutions" as havens from Capital's global transformation. To adopt such a view would mean forgetting history. We would be forced to forget Marx's position on community under capital as being *only* "a community of money," and the emancipatory necessity of the abolition of the bourgeois ideal of the "two-parent, biological, family" along with the rest of the ideological apparatus of capital (Marx 1993). For what good does it do us to make the bourgeois family a "better" system of domination, or "develop" bourgeois morality, or "strengthen" civil society's concealment of human misery under the guise of securing property? Of course, to suggest that we restore such a radical desire for human emancipation is to go too far. It is utopian and unreasonable, but to suggest less would be *pure moderation*.

Singer talks of the call of community, but the philosopher of Being tells us explicitly what this call really means: "...the essence of mortals calls upon them to heed

a call which beckons them toward death" (Heidegger 1984:101). Any response to communitarianism must reckon with the religious, and anti-materialist, force of a call which sets death above life, and is affirmative of authority.

The ethical question has always been: how is life to be lived? The communitarians answer this with the refrain: there is no life outside of a community. Community is vested with the power to give human life itself. Like being, it is above life as to reduce life. In the case of communitarianism, life is reduced to moral obligation. What passes for life is to lived according to "the double justice of reward and punishment," where the poor are degenerate and to be virtuous is to submit to "*surveillance de la haute charite morale*" (Marx and Engels 1975:233-236). The communitarian community is fundamentally a creditor/debtor relationship and "the feeling of guilt, of personal obligation, had its origin...in the relationship...between the buyer and the seller, creditor and debtor" (Nietzsche 1967:70)

And is nothing more frightening, by their own admission, than the judgment of the community against the offender? And is *ressentiment* never more obviously on display in all its grotesque superiority than in the work requirements brought about by Clinton's welfare reforms? The watchwords "Work Makes You Responsible" have been inscribed across the land. This is why the Second Essay of the Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals*, Marx's *Holy Family*, and Horkheimer's "Authority and the Family" came to serve as the theoretical underpinning of this dissertation.

The community stands to its members in that same vital basic relation, that of creditor to his debtors. One lives in a community, one enjoys the advantages of a community (Oh what advantages! We sometimes overrate them today), one dwells protected, cared for, in peace and trustfulness, without fear of certain injuries and hostile acts to which the man *outside*, 'the man without peace,' is exposed... since one has bound and pledged oneself to the community precisely with a view to injuries and hostile acts. What will happen if this pledge is broken? The community, the disappointed creditor, will get what repayment it can, one may depend on that. The direct harm caused by the culprit is here a

minor matter; quite apart from this, the lawbreaker is above all a 'breaker,' a breaker of his contract and his word *with the whole* in respect to all the benefits and comforts of communal life of which he has hitherto had a share. The lawbreaker is a debtor who has not merely failed to make good the advantages and advance payments bestowed upon him but has actually attacked his creditor: therefore he is not only deprived henceforth of all of these advantages and benefits, as is fair---he is also reminded that *what these benefits are really worth*. The wrath of the disappointed creditor, the community, throws him back into the savage and outlaw state against which he has hitherto been protected: it thrusts him away--- and now every kind of hostility may be vented upon him.
(Nietzsche 1967:71-72)

Is this not the perfect description of the communitarian notion of community as "rights *and* responsibilities"?

APPENDIX I: CHARTS AND TABLES

Communitarianism in the Media

Nexis Searches and search logic: (((communitar!) w/150 (etzioni or communitar!)) or (communitar!) w/150 (communitar!) or (communitarian pre/1 network))

Table 1.
Communitarian Citations in Legal Publications, 1981-1996




Table 2. Communitarianism in the Media, 1981-1996




Table 3.
 Effrat's Four Sociological Traditions
 (Adapted from Effrat 1974)

Community: The Four Major Sociological Research Traditions prior to 1975	
<i>Functions Provided by the Community</i>	
Many	Few
<p>I. The Complete Territorial Community</p> <p>Liability neighborhood</p> <p>Necessary</p> <p>a. Holistic examination of villages.</p> <p>b. Holistic studies of larger scale urban subareas Structures</p>	<p>II. The Community of Limited</p> <p>a. Studies of small scale small towns and cities</p> <p>b. Research on municipal power c. Social area analysis</p>
<i>Territorial Grounding</i>	
<p>III. Community as Society</p> <p>a. Research on minority groups</p> <p>Not Necessary</p> <p>b. Research on common interest groups membership & participation (occupational, life style, professional)</p>	<p>IV. Personal Community</p> <p>a. Research on communal institutions (ethnic, deviant, sexual)</p> <p>b. Studies of voluntary organizations c. Social network analysis</p>

Table 4.
 Hillery's Classification of Selected Definitions of Community
 (adapted from Hillery 1955)

Distinguishing Ideas or Elements Mentioned in the Definitions	Number of Authors	Definitions
I. Generic Community		
A. Social Interaction		
1. Geographic area		
a. Self-sufficiency	8	Wilson; Hobhouse. Wheeler. Ginsburg; Sanderson; Zimmerman; Fairchild; Davis; Landis; Hawley
b. Common life	9	MacIver and MacIver & Page; Morse; Park & Burgess; Kinneman; Snedden; Mcclenahan; Zorbaug; Wirth; J. Bernard
(1) Kinship	2	Tonnies; Herberle
c. Consciousness of Kind	7	Jackson; Gillette; Brunner; linderman; Cook; Nelson; Anderson & Hill
d. Possession of common ends, norms, means	20	Ward; Hieronymus; North; Dunn; Pirenne; Lundquist & Carver; Wood; Lundquist & Moore; Burr; Steiner; North; Osburn & Neumeyer; Gettys; Ginsburg; Panunzio; Hoffsommer & Pryor; Homans; Hiller; Bennett & Tumin; Hillman
e. Collection of Institutions	2	Park; Ogburn & Nimkoff

Table 4 (continued).

Distinguishing Ideas or Elements Mentioned in the Definitions	Number of Authors	Definitions
f. Locality group	5	Galpin; Burgess; Rich Sanders & Ensminger; Warner
g. Individuality	2	Howe; McKenzie
2. Presence of some common characteristic, other than area		
a. Self-sufficiency	1	Butterfield
b. Common life	3	Small; Sims; Park
c. Consciousness of Kind	5	Cooley; Cole; Differdorfer; Allport; Hayes
d. Possession of common ends, norms, means	5	Russell; Pettit; Panunzio; Morgan; J. & J. Ogden
3. Social system	1	Hill & Whiting
4. Individuality	3	Hart; Liao; Bews
5. Totality of attitudes	1	Fairchild
6. Process	2	Follett; Case
A. Ecological Relationships	3	Mckenzie; Hughes; Hollingshead
II. Rural Community:		
A. Social Interaction		
1. Geographic area		
a. Self-sufficiency	1	Gillette
b. Common life	3	Henderson; McClenahan; Sorokin, Zimmerman, & Galpin
c. Consciousness of Kind	3	Thompson; Ensminger; T. L. Smith
d. Possession of common ends, norms, means	3	Burr; Lantis; Sanderson
e. Locality group	5	Wilson; Galpin; Vogt; Sanderson; Kolb & Marshall
Total Definitions	94	

Appendix II. Organizational Affiliations of the Communitarian Network and its Members

Sources: Communitarian Network WWW site, The Communitarian Network Platform, *The Responsive Community*, and media reports.

THE COMMUNITARIAN NETWORK

Tax exempt status through *The Responsive Community* and the Center for Policy Research, George Washington University

b= Board of Directors

f = Provides funding support

p = Endorser of the Communitarian Platform

w = Appears in the Responsive community

* = Appears in more than one of the categories

ACADEMIC AFFILIATIONS

American Sociological Association: Etzioni*: Alice S. Rossi, ex pres. (p)

American University: President Joe Duffy (p); Brian frost* (w)

Arizona State University Law School: Mark A. Hall (w)

Australian National University: Robert Goodin (w); John Braithwaite (w)

Boston College Law School: Frank K. Upham (w)

Brown University: Martha Nussbaum

Columbia University: John C. Coffee (b,p,w); George P. Fletcher (w) Joseph a. Califano, Jr.*

Cooper Union: Fred Siegel (p,w)

Cornell University: Carl Sagan(w)

Duke University: Thomas Spragens, Jr. (p,w); Thomas McCollough (p)

George Mason University: Alice Relvin*(w)

George Washington University: A. Etzioni* (b,p,w), Jeffrey R. Henig (b,p); Jarol B. Mannheim (w)

Georgetown University Law School: Anthony Cook* (p)

Georgetown University: Terry Pinkard (p,w); Thomas Donaldson (p,w)

Harvard Business School: George C. Lodge (p)

Harvard Divinity School: Harvey Cox (p,w)

Harvard Medical School: Ezekel J. Emanuel (w)

Harvard University: Mary Ann Glendon (b,p,w); Nathan Glazer (w); Mark Kleinman*(w); Robert Coles(w)

Howard University: Kenneth S. Tollett (p)

Indiana University: Ilene Nagel (p,w)

LaSalle College: William Sullivan (p,w)

Mcgill University: Charles Taylor (w), Harold M. Waller (w)

MIT: Lester Thurow (p,w); Gary Marx (p)

New School for Social Research: Alan Wolfe (b,w)

New York University: Dennis H. Wrong (p)

Northwestern University: Jane Mansbridge (p,w)

Oxford University: John Gray (w)

Pepperdine University Law School: Robert F. Cochran, Jr. (w); Benjamin Stein (w)

Princeton University: John J. Diulio, Jr.*(w); Albert O. Hirsman (p)

Rice University: President George Rupp (p)

Rutgers University: Benjamin Barber(p,w,e); Michael Aaron Rockland (w); David Popenoe (p,w)
 Santa Clara University: C.E. Andre (w); Manuel Velasquez (w)
 Stanford University Law School: Ian Ayres (w)
 Stanford University: John Gardner (p,w); Nell Noddings(w)
 SUNY Stony Brook: Michael S. Kimmel (w)
 Tufts University: Norman Daniels (w)
 University of Texas (Austin): James Fishkin (r,w), Sidney Weintraub (w)
 University of California, Berkeley: Philip Selznick(b,w,p), Robert Bellah (b,w,p), Aaron Wildavsky(w)
 University of California, Berkeley: David L. Kirp (w); Neil Gilbert (w); Mary Ann Mason (w)
 University of California, LA: Rodolfo Avarez (w,p)
 University of Florida: Anthony E. Cook
 University of Maryland: William Galston (b,p,w); Douglas J. Besharov*(w)
 University of Michigan: Kim Lane Schepple (w);
 University of Minnesota: John E. Brandl* (p);
 University of Oregon: David Schuman (w)
 University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School: Thomas W. Dunfee (p)
 University of Pennsylvania: Seymour Mandelbaum
 University of Texas, Austin: Janice M. Beyer (p,w); James Fishkin (p,b,w)
 University of Virginia: Richard C. Collins (w); James F. Childress (w); James Hunter (p)
 Vanderbilt University: Jean Bethke Elshtain (p,b,w); John Immerwahr* (w); Chester E. Finn, Jr. (p)
 Whittier College School of Law: Mary Ellen Gale (w)
 Yale University: Rogers M. Smith (w); Bruce M. Russett (w)

GOVERNMENT AFFILIATIONS

Adlai E. Stevenson (p)
 Baltimore Maryland: Mayor Kurt L. Schmoke (p)
 Carter Administration: Joseph Califano* (w)
 Clinton Advisors and Administration: Jeremy D. Rosner* (w); Robert J. Shapiro* (w)
 Clinton Transition Team: Alice Revlin* (p,w); William Glaston* (w,p,b); Mark Kleinman* (w.);
 Commission of National and Community Service
 Commonwealth of Virginia: Gov. L. Douglas Wilder (w)
 Dept. Health and Human Services: Sec. Louis W. Sullivan (w)
 Dept. of Defense (Reagan): Lawrence Korb* (w)
 Ex-Attorney General: N. deB. Katzenbach(p), Elliot Richardson(p)
 Federal Communications Commission: ex-chair newton N. Minow* (w,p)
 Housing and Urban Development: Henry Cisneros* (p,w)
 Independent Presidential Candidate (1980) John Anderson (p)
 Minnesota State Senate: John E. Brandl, ex-Senator (p)
 Missoula Montana: Mayor Daniel Kemmis(w,p)
 New York City Commission on Human Rights: Comm. Dennis DeLeon (w,p)
 Office of Management and Budget: Alice Revlin (P,w)
 San Antonio, Texas: Mayor Henry Cisneros* (p,w)
 U.S. Sentencing Commission: Ilene Nagel
 United States Senate: Bill Bradley (w, p[?])
 White House Office of Domestic Policy: William Galston* (b,p,w)

NGO AFFILIATIONS

Advocacy Institute: Co-Dir. Michael Pertschuk (p)
 American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities: Suzanne Goldsmith (w), Roger L. Connor, exec.dir.
 (w)

American Enterprise Institute: Norman J. Ornstein (w); Douglas J. Besharov* (w)
 American Federation of Teachers: Albert Shanker (b, p,w)
 Arthur F. Burns Foundation: Nicola Clark (w)
 Brookings Institution II: Lawrence Korb* (w); Thomas E. Mann (w)
 Brookings Institution: Alice Revlin*; Barry Boswork (w); John J. DiIulio, Jr.* (w)
 Catholic League: Glendon (p,w,b)
 Center for Ethics and Social Policy (f)
 Center for Policy Research (f)
 Coalition for Democratic Values (f)
 Commission on National and Community Service: Exec. Dir. Catherine Milton (f)
 Commonweal: Margaret O'Brien Steinfel, editor (p)
 Family in America: Bryce J. Christensen* (p)
 Family Welfare Research Group: Neil Gilbert* (w)
 Institute for American Values (f)
 Institute for American Values: Barbara Defoe Whitehead (b.p,w)
 Joyce Foundation* (f)
 Loral Foundation: Gregory D. Curtis(w)
 Nat Hentoff (Washington Post and Village Voice columnist) (w)
 National Civic League: John Parr (p)
 National Conference of Christians and Jews: Pres. Gillian Martin Sorenson (p)
 National Council on the Aging: Pres. Daniel Thursz
 National Planning Association: Pres. Malcolm Lovell, Jr.
 New York Times: Tamar Lewin (nat. corresp.)(w)
 Philidelphia Inquirer: Donald Kimmelman, deputy op-ed ed. (w)
 Progressive Policy Institute: Robert J. Shapiro* (w); Jeremy D. Rosner (VP Domestic Policy)* (w)
 Public Agenda Foundation: Daniel Yankelovich, chair* (w)
 Religion and Public Life Institute: Richard John Neuhaus (p)
 Rockford Foundation: Bryce J. Christensen* (p)
 Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics: Etzioni*
 The Police Foundation: Brian Forst* (w)
 The Public Interest: Ben Wildavsky, exec. ed. (w)
 Urban Institute: Senior Fellow Isabel Sawhill (p)
 US News & World Report: John Leo (w)
 Vatican Delegation to China Women's Conference: Glendon* (b.p,w)
 Wall Street Journal: Nicola Clark* (w)
 William C. Norris Institute: Chairman William C. Norris (p)
 Yehuda Misky, consultant

BUSINESS AFFILIATIONS

Attorney Carol Toker Foreman, Washigton, D.C. (p)
 Attorney Robert Theobald, New Orleans (p)
 Attorney Stuart E. Eizenstat (p) Washington, D.C.
 Browning Ferris Industries William D. Ruckelshaus, CEO (p)
 Donovan Rypkema, real estate consultant (p)
 DYG, Inc.: Daniel Yanelvich (b,p,w)
 Mcdonnell Douglas: Chairman Emeritus Sanford McDonnell (p)
 Sidley & Austin: Newton N Minow* (w,p)

FOUNDATION SUPPORT

Joyce Foundation (f)

Surdna Foundation (f)

ADVERTISERS IN THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY

AARR

Baylor University Press

Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs

Chatam House Publishers

Coalition for Democratic Values

Crown Publishers: Etzioni

Linguistics & Behaviour Abstracts

M.E. Sharp, Inc. (publisher)

National Review

National Review Books

New Oxford Review (journal)

Philosophy and Public Affairs (Princeton U Press journal)

Syracuse University Press: Yankelovich

The Bureaucrat (private DC insider newsletter)

The Free Press

The Monist (journal)

Transaction Publishers

University of California Press

University of Chicago Press

University Press of Kansas

Yale University Press

Appendix III: Chronology of the Formation and Actions of the Communitarian Network, 1980-1996

April 29, 1980	<i>Christian Science Monitor</i> article "Try the New Localism" by Ed Gondolf, Professor of Sociology at Principia College in Ill.
1981	MacIntyre's <i>After Virtue: A Study in Moral Philosophy</i> published.
March 1984	Review of Etzioni's <i>Capital Corruption</i> appears in the <i>Yale Law Review</i> .
1984	Bellah et al. <i>Habits of the Heart</i> is published. Second edition of MacIntyre's <i>After Virtue</i> published.
April-November '88-August 1989	3 articles appear in the <i>New Republic</i> regarding Bellah et al.'s communitarianism.
November 1990-December 1990	First articles on the Communitarian Network appear in <i>Boston Globe</i> , <i>Washington Times</i> , <i>American Review of Public Administration</i> , <i>Chicago Tribune</i> , <i>Washington Post</i> (2 articles), <i>Business Week</i> , <i>US News and World Report</i> , <i>Chronicle of Higher Education</i> .
January 20, 1991	Etzioni publishes "The New Rugged Communitarianism" in the <i>Washington Post Sunday Outlook</i> Section.
Summer 1991	Mary Ann Glendon's <i>Right's Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse</i> is published.
November 18, 91	Federal News Service: Capital Hill 'Teach-in' News Conference, Russell Senate Office Building.
March 27-29,92	Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-economics, Irvine, California.
May 19, 92 Values	Vice President Quayle delivers his Murphy Brown/Family Speech.

- May 19, 92 Second National Communitarian Teach-in. Ethical Culture Society, NYC. Cosponsored by the people for the American Way, and the American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities 200 participants
- July 16,92 Case of USA v. Concepcion 795 F.Supp. 1262
- Summer 1992 Associate Editor and Promotion Manager at The Responsive Community are replaced.
- July 31,92 Robert Byrd (D-WV) "Where did the train leave the tracks?" using Etzioni's writings on the family and education. CR S-11061.
- November 3,92 Clinton elected President. Four members of staff are members of the Communitarian Network.
- January 5,93 Publication of Etzioni's *Spirit of Community*.
- January 5,93 Wolf (R-VA) on HR 435 and HR 436, Tax Fairness for Families Act. \$600 tax credit endorsed by Communitarian Network's "Position Paper on the Family" which describes "in effect how this \$600 per child credit could function" (CR E-18)
- March 26-28,93 Fifth Annual Meeting of the Society for the advancement of Socio-Economics, theme: Incentives and Values as Foundations of Social Order. George Washington University
- April 5,93 Reuter Washington Report: Congressional testimony.
- April 27, 1993 Reuter Washington Report: Congressional testimony.
- April 28,93 The Communitarian Network holds a news conference to criticize proposals for managed competition in health care and to release a position paper on health cares
- April 29, 1993 Wolf (R-VA) "Putting Families in Focus." introduces the Family and Economic Recovery Act of 1993 (Congressional Record H-2165), a "GI Bill for kids." \$600 per child tax credit, listing the Communitarian Network as supporters.

- August 30,93 *Communications Daily* reports that "Nationwide Communitarian Network (CN) has Targeted Violence as One of its 'Key Priorities for the Next 2 Years
- September 7,93 Congressional testimony.
- November 3,93 Communitarian Network hold a conference "Teach-in on the Future of the Family" at Senate Rayburn Building.
- October 21,93 Abercrombie (D-HI) "Japan in a New World Order: Contributing to the Arab-Israeli Peace Process." Communitarian model (Japan used as example of an existing communitarian society) for resolving Mideast conflicts. CR E-2499.
- January 15,94 "Snapshot of Communitarianism: A Movement in the Making?" by the Associated Press.
- February 9,94 Sweet(D-NH) extols communitarianism and the Congressional Accountability Act. Congressional Record. H80.
- March 10,94 Wolf (R-VA), Kasich Amendment to Budget, \$500 per child tax credit. CR H-1189 H. Con. Res. 218, Resolution Concerning Budget for Fiscal Years 1995-1999
- March 11, 1994 "Crimogenics: How the Drug War Causes Crime." Cato Institute policy forum with Steven Duke of Yale Law School and Etzioni. Reuters
- March 15,16,94 Congressional activity. Reuters
- March 1994 White House Conference on the Protection and Development of Public Spaces, organized by the Communitarian Network*
- April 9, 1994 Act Sweet (D-NH) on HR 3400, Government Reform and Savings of 1993, suggests Etzioni's Spirit of Community as required reading on campaign reform.
- May 23-24,94 Symposium on Illegitimacy. Etzioni, Charles Murray, and Rev. Alma Faith Crawford of the Religious Coalition for Reproductive Choice participate in a symposium on

	illegitimacy sponsored by Planned Parenthood. Reuters
July 1994	First White House Conference on Character Building.
August 12,14,15,1994	Congressional activity.
August 15-16, 94	Cato Institute Forum on Virtues and Values. Etzioni participating (broadcast on (C-SPAN)
August 17, 1994	First Annual Meeting of the Communitarian Network is held in conjunction with the Annual Meeting of American Sociological Association in Los Angeles.
November 1994	Republican majorities are elected to the House and Senate.
January- April 1995	Tony Blair consolidates his position as leader of the Labour Party.
March 13, 1995	Congressional testimony.
March 20, 1995	Congressional testimony.
March 27, 1995	Congressional testimony.
April 9, 1995	The Arizona Republic writes column "Communitarian Movement Forces Media to Monitor Itself" on the growing influence of communitarianism on reporter's coverage of the news.
April 9-10, 1995	Second Annual Communitarian Network Conference, Arlington, VA.
April 19, 1995	Oklahoma bombing. Etzioni appears on NPR twice to discuss its importance.
April 27-28, 1995	"Virtuous Reality: Cyberethics and the Balance of Individual, Communitarian and Corporate Interests." National conference sponsored by The Computer Ethics Institute. Reuters
May 18, 1995	Articles critical of communitarianism appear in <i>Economist</i>

- May 19, 1995 Second White House Conference on Character Building, co-sponsored by the White House Office of Domestic Policy and the Communitarian Network. Speakers include William Bennett and Hillary Rodham Clinton. Reuters
- June 27, 1995 In response to suggestions on the Progressive Sociologists Network (PSN) that the 1995 ASA conference be "disrupted." Etzioni emails a letter to the PSN. The letter is also to be published in Footnotes, the publication of the ASA. See letter in Footnotes and archived (along with relevant discussions) <http://csf.colorado.edu/psn>
- July/August 1995 Etzioni's letter appears in Footnotes. It is a highly edited version, with most of the more inflammatory passages removed or softened.
- August 18, 1995 ASA Theory Day: "A Theory Day focusing on the work of Amitai Etzioni. Washington, D.C."
- August 19-23, 1995 ASA Meeting, "Community of Communities," organized by Etzioni. 18 panels on communitarianism are featured.
- June 6-7, 1996 Conference on Character Building and Children. George Washington University. Alan Samson and H. Clinton's as well as conference carried on C-SPAN. Coincided with *US News & World Report* cover on "How to Raise Moral Children"
- July 1996 Etzioni's "Community of Communities" published in the *Washington Quarterly*
- July 12-14, 1996 Instead of the usual national meeting, the CN holds a Communitarian Summit in Geneva, Switzerland.
- November 1996 Clinton Re-Elected President
- November 15-16, 96 Conference on Communitarian Pro-Family Policies. Washington, D.C.
- January 1997 Clinton's State of the Union Address

February 20-21, 97 Community and Morality in a Democratic Society, Conference
in Honor of Etzioni, Department of Sociology, New York
University

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