

EMOTION: THOUGHT AND FEELING

by

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Abstract

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The dissertation asserts emotions are essentially personal. I advance a particular version of intentionalism: Thought provides the individuation conditions among the varied emotions.

I explore two questions about The Principles of Psychology by William James: The question of whether the notion of the unconscious in The Principles captures the contemporary notion and the question of whether The Principles adopts heterophenomenology or autophenomenology. More importantly, I argue that James's theory of emotion is cognitive.

This discussion sets the stage for exploring the question of whether intentional approaches that center on the emotional experience provide a better explanation compared to approaches that center on thought. I provide a unified interpretation of Action, Emotion and Will by Anthony Kenny and show the text captures key features of an intentional approach that centers on occurrent thought. Such a view runs through the work of William Lyons and Robert Gordon.

I address criticisms presented by Patricia Greenspan, Peter Goldie, and Paul Griffiths and I am critical of Peter Goldie's and Robert Solomon's intentionalism that adopts a kind of feeling with content. I show the position relies for support on inference to the best explanation and rebut varied arguments that an intentionalism that centers on thought will fail to capture

emotional experience. Furthermore, I make use of David M. Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory of consciousness and homomorphism theory to show that one can provide a naturalistic account of the phenomenal difference between bodily feeling and non-bodily feeling. Lastly, I argue that feeling fails to capture the personal nature of emotion.

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1 Thought and Feeling

1.1 INTRODUCTION

One might admire, be irritated by, or be envious of another's imperfections. The flaws of a stranger may elicit no affective response. In the eye of the lover, foibles are inevitably charming. When an intimate relationship turns for the worse, those once attractive quirks now spark disgust or deep loathing. Each of those experiences, whether affective or not, strikes one as distinctive.

Imagine spending an enchanting week with the person you deeply care about. You wake up to see the same person. In every way they look, speak, and behave no differently than before. Yet, the experience noticeably lacks something of significance. One immediately notices the absence of emotional warmth. And still, no visual, auditory, or behavioral difference can one avail oneself of to account for the dramatic change. The person appears exactly the same as before minus one's affective response. One's memory and cognitive resources remain unimpaired.

Such an imaginative scenario describes the frightening plight of someone suffering from Capgras Syndrome.¹ How it is for such unfortunate persons is immediate and startling. The person who was once an intimate becomes an imposter: it involves a delusion. To claim the person is not really the same person who is loved conveniently explains the absence of emotional significance. In seeing an imposter, one implicitly treats how it is for one as providing data.

¹ See Ramachandran & Blakeslee (Phantoms in the Brain, 158-173).

The lack of emotional warmth signals no emotion and that fact is best explained by assuming no significant person, even though the person is in every other respect the same. The constructed confabulation that an imposter is before one makes sense.

From the vantage point of contemporary psychology, one can't be so sure. One must rule out alternative psychological explanations. Having ruled out psychological impediments, one may lean toward trusting the patient. Still the absence of an emotional state will not be presumed based on the convictions of the patient. The absence of an emotional state is evidenced by the failure of a Capgras sufferer to elicit a galvanic skin reaction in appropriate testing conditions. And so the lack of emotional feeling may be supposed. Subjective reports by a patient collaborate what the cognitive scientist/psychologist can independently determine.

From both the personal point of view and the point of view of psychology, how it feels for one is centrally important to understand emotion - whether one anchors the account to emotional experience or underlying physiology. This aspect of emotion – emotional affect – plays central stage in contemporary accounts of emotion. The odd view out has become any position that treats emotion in terms of thought. On such a view, fear is a matter of cognitively assessing a threat, sadness a loss or failure, and so forth. It is the cognitive appraisal of a situation that differentiates one emotion from another. Feelings are not sufficiently distinctive to individuate the emotions; they remain an inessential appendage.

1.2 FEELING THEORY OF EMOTION

What is special about an emotional state? Two types of view take to heart that the eminently reasonable answer is that it consists in how the experience feels for one. Emotional experiences have a self-evidently distinctive feel. A traditional feeling theory, associated with Descartes, Hume, Spinoza, and others, asserts emotions are feelings.² A neo-feeling theory, associated with Peter Goldie and Michael Stocker, take feeling to be centrally important. For both approaches, the experience coupled with the qualitative aspect of an emotional state underwrites the account of emotion. In addition, it's the experience that is essential for understanding emotion as feeling. Both presume quale and qualia are essentially phenomenal – there is something it is like for one to have a sensory mental state. What distinguishes the two views is that only the traditional view provides a uniform account of feeling.

The traditional view holds that feelings are simple, homogenous, and lack proper parts and representational content. Feelings are nothing but bodily sensations or the amalgamation of bodily sensations. One may map out varying contrasts among varied feelings. Some feelings strike one as polar and other feelings as similar in qualitative aspect.³ Such contrasts and comparisons will help construct a sensory field, but not much more. As Errol Bedford points out, such an approach treats feeling terms as names (“Emotions and Statements

² Antonio Damasio (*Descartes' Error*) offer's a close variant – the somatic marker hypothesis. For discussion see Edmund Rolls (*Emotion and the Brain*) and Jesse Prinz (*Gut Reactions*).

³ Steven Leighton argues in “On Feeling Elated and Feeling Angry” for the claim that some emotions can't feel the way other emotions feel.

About Them,” 41). However, if emotion terms are just names of feelings, then emotions can’t be about anything, cannot be rationally assessed, cannot account for actions, and so on. And yet an emotional experience strikes one, as well as others, as about something, as appropriate or inappropriate, and as a spring to action or inaction. If an emotional state involves thought, then an intentional account of emotion will be poised to serve a natural and common sense replacement for a view bereft of explanatory power. In brief, an intentional approach supposes an emotional state has content, and in particular, conceptual content. Thus, one has the means, without need of elaborate argumentation, to explain emotional actions, how emotions are directed at objects, and how emotions may be normatively appraised. The wrangling among advocates concerned the detailed specification of the kinds of thought required, how they are (inter)related, and what to say about the object, or lack thereof, of emotion. Still, intentional views regard the traditional view of feeling as a fair account of feeling.

A neo-feeling theory departs from the traditional feeling theory and an intentional theory by supposing emotional feelings have content.⁴ As such, emotional feelings can be about objects, be appraised, and lead to action. In addition, an emotional state, like a sensory state, essentially is conscious and one is aware of the qualitative aspect. In short, there is something it is like for

⁴ Peter Goldie’s account, for example, does not depend on non-conceptual content (personal communication). York Gunther, however, is explicit in saying that the content of an emotion involves nonconceptual content (“Emotion and Force”). The issue of nonconceptual mental content will not be addressed. As José Bermúdez and Arnon Cahen put it, advancing nonconceptual mental content targets a view that endorses the Language of Thought Hypothesis (“Nonconceptual Mental Content”). As sketched in Chapter Three, intentionalism need not make such a commitment.

one to have an emotional state and one is, in some sense, aware of what it is like. Though contemporary accounts equate feelings with consciousness just as the traditional theory did, feelings need not be sensory states. William Alston rejects an analysis of feeling in terms of bodily sensations (“Feelings,” 8-9). Stocker suggests that “psychic feelings” are not like aches and pains and need not involve any bodily sensation (“Psychic Feelings,” 7). Goldie claims, “although some emotional feelings are just bodily... others are just clearly feeling towards with no bodily feeling (The Emotions, 56).” Feeling, and so emotion, centrally involves a mental quality but it seems that the qualitative aspect, the quale or qualia, need not be sensory. The qualitative aspect of an emotion remains conscious. Alston, for example defines ‘x feels *p*’ in part as ‘x is in a conscious state’. Goldie seems to treat feelings as either unreflective emotional experiences or reflective emotional experiences. One may be consciously feeling anger about the current war or one may be conscious of one’s feeling of anger about the current war. What is central for both in Goldie’s view is that there is something it is like for one to have such experiences. Namely, they involve feeling (The Emotions, 62-69).

The contemporary account of feeling distinguishes two types of qualitative feelings, those that are bodily feelings and those that are not. What unites the traditional and neo-feeling theories is the assumption that emotional affect essentially involves consciousness. An unconscious qualitative aspect remains anathema. And so, a neo-feeling theory shares some methodological as well as metaphysical assumptions about the qualitative aspect of feeling. Robert Gordon

notes a feeling theory identifies a feeling as one in which the mental state has intrinsic properties without appeal to other properties (The Structure of Emotions, ix). Anthony Kenny, in reciting Descartes' position, asserts a feeling is a private mental event with an infallible awareness (Action, Emotion, and Will, 12). Paul Griffiths, in a way combining the two, characterizes a feeling theory as one that involves an introspective awareness of an experience that identifies an emotion by its quality (What Emotions Really Are, 2). Setting aside the particular nuances, two general features become clear: a feeling theory focuses on intrinsic properties or the qualitative character of a mental state and relies on some conception of introspective awareness – when one is consciously feeling an emotion, one is also aware that they are conscious of it.

Neo-feeling theories deny that emotional feelings are sensory and deny that they are simple. Stocker advocates a view such that some forms of reason are feeling-laden. Stocker argues that (psychic) feelings cannot be reducible to judgments or other forms of reason: “To be sure, judgments, questions, scenes, can be taken as essentially involving feeling: The judgments can be made, the questions asked, the scenes imagines, out of care, concern or interest, e.g., out of jealousy, hope or anger. Only when feeling-laden do these judgments, questions, and scenes seem even close to being the jealousy, hope or anger (“Psychic Feelings,” 22).” So, although (psychic) feelings may well be about something, they are neither mere feelingless judgments nor names of bodily feelings.⁵ William Alston likewise argues for a conceptually rich account of feeling that is over and above belief (“Feelings,” 5). And Goldie writes: “What is

⁵ Stocker also argues that feelings cannot be reduced to desires (“Psychic Feelings,” 10-18).

essential to feeling towards, as I have already emphasized, is a special emotional feeling and a special content – a content which is distinct from the content of any other attitude which is held without this feeling (The Emotions, 81).” Feeling toward is not any particular sort of mental attitude. And so a neo-feeling theory absorbs the insights of both the intentional and the traditional feeling theory: emotional mental states have content and are essentially conscious (because such states are qualitative).

It might seem that such a view would be no better than an intentional one. There is, after all, nothing it is like for one to have an unconscious thought. Given that feelings are essential to an emotional state and feelings are essentially conscious, something more than thought should be required. Obviously, one can assuage one’s concern about not capturing the emotional experience by adorning an intentional account with bodily feeling. However, if an emotional experience exhibits features that cannot be explained by thought superadded with bodily feeling, then a neo-feeling will have explanatory leverage over an intentional account of emotion.

1.3 INTENTIONAL THEORY OF EMOTION

Unlike an intentional view, a neo-feeling theory advocates two distinct sorts of feeling and two distinct sorts of content.⁶ Not only are there bodily feelings, there

⁶ The view that thought provides the individuation conditions among the varied emotions I call intentionalism. I refrain from labeling this theory of emotion a cognitive theory of emotion because the term ‘cognitive’ excludes cognitive or other types of mental states. ‘Intentionalism’ provides an apt description of the positions considered in the dissertation, for no ‘cognitivist’ was one. Emotion types are individuated in terms of thought – not simply cognitive ones.

are feelings with content. But this feeling-laden content is nonetheless distinct from a bodily feeling plus thought. An intentional account advocates one type of feeling and one type of content. On principles of economy it would be folly to multiply types of mental phenomena.

Explanation will favor overriding predilections for economy. When an account captures common sense characteristics of emotion better than another, advantages of economy have little value. An intentional account easily captures the fine-grained aspects of an experience so long as conceptual content remains as fine-grained as the experience. But even if experience outstrips conceptual content, an intentional view of emotion is not a theory of consciousness. The emotional state need only be as detailed as the emotional aspect of the experience. It's because of the fine-grained nature of conceptual content that enables an intentional approach to capture what an emotion is about. This underlies the main explanatory advantage of an intentional approach; it readily captures the aboutness of emotion. Explanatory limitations of an intentional approach are thought to lie elsewhere.

In the initial stages of research, I aimed to analyze the weaknesses of an intentional theory of emotion only to discover such a view to be more resilient than critics suppose. Griffiths disposes of all varieties of intentional approaches with a brief recitation of six commonly purported difficulties. Take for example the following dispensable criticism: "Many smokers believe smoking to be dangerous but smoke without fear. There are whole classes of evaluative judgments that are never likely to be the contents of emotions (What Emotions

Really Are, 29).” This underwrites a common fallacy in criticizing intentional accounts of emotion. One notes that if emotion were to be individuated in terms one type of thought, one can have such a thought emotionally or unemotionally. But of course such a view is defective. More importantly, no contemporary advocate held such a simplistic view – not even Robert Solomon. The argument will nonetheless continue. One can imagine that one has a desire emotionally and unemotionally. And so, even if an emotion involves two types of thought, the combination wouldn’t render an emotion. Such is the fallacy of composition. Griffith’s examples involve a single type of thought or the mere combination. However, emotion types are not individuated that superficially.

The following passage from William James is often cited in the aid of a similar rhetorical strategy. The passage occurs verbatim in “What is an Emotion?” and in The Principles of Psychology.

I now proceed to urge the vital point of my whole theory, which is this: *If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no 'mind-stuff' out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains.*⁷

Though I argue in Chapter Two that the passage as commonly read misrepresents James’s position, the picture promoted is clear enough. The thrust is introspective. It requires one to simply answer whether or not such an abstraction will conceivable eliminate the emotion. If yes, then one seems to

⁷ See The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 2, Ch 25, 451 and “What is an Emotion,” 193.

accept the notion that thought may be devoid of qualitative character; whereas emotions are infused with it. In the abstraction, taking away the feeling leaves one with no emotion. Such an approach, however, works by consensus. No doubt fine-grained points may be clarified, but if most agree, then no additional argument will be required.

The troubles arise when no clear consensus emerges. Take for example John Searle's ingenious Chinese Room thought experiment. Searle neatly challenges Turing's test for determining the reasonableness of ascertaining whether a digital computer can think. By simplifying the workings of a computer program, Searle highlights concerns about whether the system reply (it's the program) or the robot reply (it's the program plus transducers) was sufficient to account for understanding. Searle assumes that putting the system in the person or the robot in the person won't amount to understanding given the person in the room doesn't understand. Others wonder why.⁸ Likewise, to admit that the thought that a lion is dangerous can occur unemotionally is not to concede that a complex account of an emotion in terms of a causal intentional structure could occur, all things considered, emotionally or unemotionally. In other words, it's not at all obvious that when one abstracts away the feeling one *could* be left with the same underlying thoughts structured as an intentional account supposes. Additional argumentation on either side is required.

A different strategy assumes the intentional structure of an emotion may be as complex as one wishes. It's not uncommon, however, to find one fearing

⁸ See David Chalmers "Subsymbolic Computation and the Chinese Room," Tim Crane, [The Mechanical Mind](#), Daniel Dennett "Fast Thinking," and Fodor "After-thoughts: Yin and Yang in the Chinese Room."

a spider yet thinking it is not dangerous (What Emotions Really Are, 28). The argument does not rely on the *ipso facto* contradiction. Any view about the mind must allow room for normal people to be irrational. The argument depends instead on an abundance of such cases. An intentional approach would then be committed to attributing an unacceptable amount of irrationality to common behavior.

However, I don't think such a scenario as intended is common. A startle reaction won't be sufficient for an emotional response.⁹ One might presume that the mere perceptual presence sparks the feeling – eight coordinated slow moving spindly legs, bristled with coarse hair. The perceptual presence elicits a felt bodily reaction. Yet, such reactions by themselves need not indicate fear even if it feels like fear. Consider the following. The mind drifts off while washing dishes and one suddenly glimpses a fast moving small object approaching one's foot. The heart races, one leaps into the air emitting a prominent shriek. Just as quick, one realizes a toddler innocently rolled a ball toward you. Was that fear? Not likely. One may well have laughed, become angry, be relieved, or any other emotion. Without some further account, being startled or surprised hardly constitutes an emotion even if the feeling seems similar.

Suppose, however, that after seeing the object as a small rolling ball one remains feeling afraid. One even states that they do not think a rubber ball of that size dangerous. Surely, however, the example so far won't count as an argument. Other reasonable accounts must be discredited. Further questions are in order. Denial or misplacing the object of one's fear – for perhaps it's the

⁹ Jenefer Robinson (“Startle”) is one of the few who advocates classifying startle as an emotion.

toddler one fears – must be reasonably ruled out. Either would provide an explanation in line with an intentional view of emotion. Furthermore, it can't be one has a phobia. Manifesting a phobia would not express an emotion. Behavioral therapy, not cognitive therapy or psychoanalysis, provides the recommended treatment for phobias.¹⁰ In brief, such treatment changes how one reacts to certain perceptual environments – spiders, closed spaces, and so on. A phobia precludes aberrant cognitive mechanisms. Cognitive therapy or psychoanalysis cannot treat patients since the adverse reactions are brought about simply because of the presence of particular stimuli.

Fearing spiders and not believing spiders are dangerous will not distinguish among the alternative explanations. And if the preponderance of critical examples involve phobias, delusions, or misplaced objects of emotions, no argument will be forth coming against an intentional account. For either the common cases involve no emotion or what the emotion is about differs from what one says the emotion is about. Of course, if common cases cannot be explained away in these ways, then an intentional account would falter. But this is more than admitting that it is logically possible for one to fear a spider and think the spider is not dangerous. Such conceptual possibilities may well be paradigmatically uncommon. To put the discussion ecumenically, evidence is in order as to whether typical cases are intentional or not and if so whether the intentional structure of an emotion contradicts sincere reports of a subject.

Another criticism notes that an intentional approach fails to account for the physiological reactions (What the Emotions Really Are, 29-30). But scientific

¹⁰ See Isaac Marks Fears, Phobias, and Rituals.

measures such as facial expressions and galvanic skin response provide poor operational definitions for an emotion as it fails to distinguish nearby competitors and so would provide for an unreasonable amount of false positives. Paul Ekman considers the standard set of facial expressions to not indicate distinct emotions but instead indicate basic emotional classes: “Each emotion is not a single affective state but a family of related states. Each member of an emotion family shares the characteristics I have described. These shared characteristics within a family differ between emotion families, distinguishing one family from another. Put in other terms each emotion family can be considered to constitute a theme and variations (“Basic Emotions, 55).” The facial expression of “fear” may well indicate fear, horror, terror, or dread. Each is a distinctive emotion that may well fall under such facial expressions, but the facial expression without context won’t indicate which one.¹¹

Likewise for bodily measures – as a lie detector does not detect lies but disruptions in physiological homeostasis, galvanic skin responses do not indicate emotions but do indicate disruptions in physiological homeostasis. At this point, Griffiths can hardly complain. He advocates two types of emotions: a cognitive one and an affect-program one. One can accept that affect-programs indicate syndromes but deny affect programs, even if evolutionarily and causally necessary, are sufficient to indicate an emotion. That is, affect program syndromes are not reliable operational definitions of cognitive emotions, so affect programs are not emotions.

Contrary to the way Griffiths paints the landscape, intentionalism has not

¹¹ See Anna Wierzbicka’s [Emotions across Languages and Cultures](#)

ignored the sciences. Rather, physiological approaches tended to adopt the traditional feeling theory of emotion. In a classic text on fear, Psychology of Fear and Stress, Jeffrey Gray identifies the neurological approach as compatible with the traditional feeling theory. Rather than emotion being a subjective state of mind, an emotion is a state of the neuro-endocrine system. Nonetheless, “while the connection between brain and behavior, on the one hand, and subjective experience, on the other, remains mysterious, we can at least be sure that the connection is an intimate one (Psychology of Fear and Stress, 9).” The traditional feeling theory was not rejected because of a failure to identify the underlying neurophysiology. The traditional feeling theory cannot account for how an emotion can be about something or directed toward things. Having tied one’s neuroscience to a traditional feeling theory provides sufficient reason to discount such data as about emotions given the overwhelming dismissal of a traditional feeling theory of emotion.

It may well be that Gray’s account is meant to merely brush off a reader’s initial surprise at not taking serious emotional experience. In The Emotional Brain, the neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux proposes an even more radical view. The fear, itself, is prior to the feeling of fear. On this view, emotions are largely unconscious. For LeDoux, experiencing an emotion is a puzzle about consciousness rather than one about emotion. He speculates in the last chapter about the mechanism that mediates an emotional feeling. Still the road toward the emotions is not via feelings. This is a highly welcomed view, and it is one aspect of his theory that sets him apart from other researchers.

Still, like many current writers on the emotions, LeDoux rejects an approach on which the emotions are essentially intentional. I suspect that two factors are central to LeDoux's rejection of the cognitive approach. The first is his argument against the value of introspective reports in understanding the emotions. The second is the finding showing a neural separation between the evolutionarily older fear system and the evolutionarily younger higher cognitive systems associated with the neocortex.

As to the first, LeDoux provides good reasons to be skeptical about the value of introspective reports. Whereas verbal reports are conscious, emotional processing is unconscious. Introspective reports about emotional experiences involve cognitive processing and have been shown to be inaccurate. So, the reliability of such reports remains suspect. An intentionalist, however, can grant LeDoux's methodological concern and claim, as LeDoux does, that the processing associated with an emotion is largely, if not completely, unconscious. Since unconscious processing is not necessarily noncognitive, such a theorist could still insist that the unconscious processing associated with an emotional behavior is intentional.

The second consideration against the intentional view of emotion is also unconvincing. Appraisal figures centrally in LeDoux's theory about emotional behavior. LeDoux states that ". . . each emotional unit can be thought of as consisting of a set of inputs, an appraisal mechanism, and a set of outputs (The Emotional Brain, 127)." It seems that it is the appraisal mechanism, on his theory, that individuates the emotions. But it is unclear how LeDoux means to

differentiate between a cognitive appraisal mechanism and a noncognitive appraisal mechanism. The fact that the appraisal mechanism involves an older evolutionary neural system and one that is sufficiently separated from those neural systems associated with higher cognitive functions does not, by itself, provide a very compelling reason to think it is not cognitive.

In general, neuroscience tends to part ways from philosophy in that automatic processing will be defined as a process that lacks awareness and control, and relies on limited resources.¹² Cognitive processes are then identified as conscious processes in some sense. An intentional state then won't be an automatic one. Though certainly a useful framework, one may conveniently part company in one of two ways. First, one need not accept such operational definitions as defining thought. Nor need one offer an alternative. Given the present state of neuroscience, it's not an unreasonable position to remain temporarily agnostic or neutral. Second, automaticity indicates physiological and/or neurological syndromes. Indeed, one can find such underlying physiological and neurological syndromes underlying the recognition of the universal classes of facial expressions.¹³ Independently of whether an automatic process entails a non-intentional process, such findings fail to individuate the cognitive emotions that fall under the identified class.

¹² See John Bargh's "The Four Horseman of Automaticity."

¹³ See Jessica Tracy and Richard Robins's "The Automaticity of Emotion Recognition."

1.4 RECTIFYING INTENTIONALISM, REIFYING EMOTION

Non-intentional approaches, whether perceptual, affect-programs, or neo-feeling theories, begin by working away from the purported weaknesses of an intentional account. Intentional approaches step off the identified weaknesses of a traditional feeling theory of emotion as well as behavioral accounts. On such a view, thought provides the individuation conditions for the varied emotion types. A thought has both mental attitude and mental content as well as causal and conceptual connections to other thoughts. An action requires both belief and desire and both bring about action. Feeling continues to be inessential, even if the emotional experience is not.

More substantive criticisms of intentionalism are addressed in Chapter 4. The conclusion, however, remains the same. The defects supposed by critics are absent. As such, a neo-feeling theory remains empirically equivalent to an intentional one. Accepting a crowded mental landscape as proposed by a neo-feeling theory is theoretically unmotivated. However, if that theory captures the emotional experience, then it remains a reasonable option despite the extra commitments. An intentional account, such as William Lyons's view, may add on feeling, but it remains an inessential adornment. A neo-feeling theory offers a different explanatory virtue – it remains true to the phenomena.

I argue a neo-feeling theory does not. What is central to the experience is not how it feels for one. Capgras Syndrome involves another dimension. One no longer experiences a personal or otherwise intimate connection. This dissertation lays hold of the personal aspect of an emotional experience as

central. As a feeling may be felt as personal or not, the feeling can't capture the central feature of an emotional experience – an emotion is personal.

Thought and the personal aspect of an emotional experience are central to characterizing the emotions. Such a claim is present in Kenny, Lyons, and Gordon's account of emotion as thought. Feeling remains inessential; the personal aspect of an emotion is not.¹⁴

1.5 CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter Two critically reviews The Principles of Psychology. I argue for three distinct claims. Firstly, The Principles neither rejects nor endorses the current conception of an unconscious mental state. James rejects unconscious mental states conceived as not wholly unconscious and only in the context of a distinct and secondary personality does James advance wholly unconscious mental states. James's fortified view of the unconscious would exclude masked semantic priming, a paradigm of an unconscious mental event. Secondly, I argue against a number of books that surfaced in the 1960's on The Principles. These texts treat The Principles from a Husserlian point of view: The Principles wed together distinctive methodologies, one phenomenological the other empirical. I argue The Principles offers a hetero-phenomenological approach. Introspective reports as well as subjective reports do not provide data. The view James promotes is neither an incomplete Husserlian position nor a mere copy of

¹⁴ David Lewis aptly quipped that his account of pain of course doesn't ignore experience, for it's impossible to do ("Mad Pain, Martian Pain). Likewise, intentionalism does not to ignore experience.

Daniel Dennett's own hetero-phenomenological position. Thirdly, I argue the theory of emotion presented in The Principles is cognitive. The interpretation, though novel, serves to highlight a consistent theme throughout this dissertation: emotions are personal.

In Chapter Three I argue that Kenny in Action, Emotion and Will provides an extended argument for an intentionalist theory of emotion. Commentary fails to connect his view of emotion with his theory of volition and his remarks on action. More importantly, I explicate and defend Kenny's position as I treat it as drawing out the central elements of intentionalism. Although the accounts by Lyons and Gordon provide favorable amendments to Kenny's position, I reject Lyons's dispositionalism and find wanting Gordon's distinction between factive and epistemic emotions.

I defend intentionalism in Chapter Four against criticisms by Patricia Greenspan, Stocker, Solomon, and Goldie. Each promotes a specific notion of qualitative aboutness that need not be explicable in terms of thought by firstly rendering intentionalism impotent. Their arguments, however, depend on certain commitments one need not endorse. Centrally, they contentiously suppose the language of thought hypothesis and an absolutist account of appropriateness. Their views on the aboutness of emotion remain unsatisfactory since such critics fail to appreciate that the qualitative aspect of an emotion is insufficient to capture the personal dimension of an emotional experience.

Chapter Five presents a theory sketch of emotional experience in the spirit of James's The Principles of Psychology: it attends to the phenomena as well as

the science of the day. To capture the significance of emotional experience in harmony with intentionalism requires explicit commitments. It supposes an error theory of phenomenology and just as thought may either be conscious or unconscious, the qualitative aspect of a sensation (i.e., the quale) may also be conscious or unconscious.

A main argument supporting a neo-feeling approach contends some emotions feel non-bodily. This phenomenal fact challenges any account of mind that treats qualitative states of emotions as bodily sensations or bodily perceptions. To account for what it is like for one to feel non-bodily feelings I rely on David Rosenthal's Higher-Order Thought theory of consciousness and his homomorphic theory of sensory quality to show how an intentional account can meet this challenge. In doing so, an intentional approach can capture the phenomenology without the need of supposing different types of feeling, bodily and non-bodily.

Feeling continues to be central to an emotional experience and to understand the emotions. However, the centrality of feeling in our emotional experiences serves a pragmatic function. It does not directly illuminate the nature of emotion, even if it does the experience. Rather, feeling expresses the personal aspect emotion.

2 William James

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Three distinct arguments will be presented in this chapter: the critique of the unconscious and adoption of the subconscious in The Principles of Psychology does not entail the denial or acceptance of a wholly unconscious state; the methodological position presumed within the text is heterophenomenology; James's theory of emotion is cognitive. The arguments center on The Principles of Psychology and will not venture off to James's other writings. As James states, every chapter of The Principles, excluding Chapter 22, was written for the text and not a collation of previous publications (Vol. 3, "The Text of The Principles of Psychology," 1541).¹⁵

The Principles gathers together research of leading thinkers in England, France, and Germany and wedded introspective and empirical methods. Psychology, as James saw it, departs from metaphysics by adhering to a collection of assumptions. For James, psychology anchors to interactionist dualism: thought and feeling interact and coexist with the (physical) world (Vol. 1, "Preface," 6). Ruth Putnam puts forward the standard interpretive position in her 1998 Routledge Encyclopedia entry for William James. James intended The Principles to stay clear of metaphysics and philosophy only to retract such a division in the "Preface" to the Italian translation of The Principles and in his 1894 Presidential Address to the American Psychological Association. Metaphysics,

¹⁵ References to the Harvard edition of The Principles of Psychology are to volume number, chapter title, and page number.

however, isn't just the willingness to challenge the assumptive principles of a discipline, it also marks approaches contrary to those present in The Principles. Psychology is as metaphysical as the views he contrasts it with. The difference is that James intended to constrain psychology by the irreducible data of psychology and additional assumptions made throughout the text. To engage in metaphysics, however, isn't to depart from the project of The Principles. For example, the automaton-theory and mind-stuff theory both remain consistent with the basic assumptions the text begins with. James's rejection of those views reflects his further refining assumptions. To stress James's repudiation of metaphysics in The Principles and his latter retraction aids an interpretation of The Principles as implicitly treating empirical psychology as deficient and therefore in need of an additional investigative methodology to augment the empirical approach. But 'metaphysics' wasn't to mark a way of knowing. It simply marks an investigation that need not cleave to any principle assumptions, which is not to say that in providing an account of how things are would not be without suppositions.

One advantage of narrowing an analysis to just The Principles and neglecting James's early magazine and journal articles and his latter radical empiricism will be to limit one's interpretation to a self-contained single source. For example, far too many writers on James's theory of emotion limit their discussion to James's article "What is an Emotion." Bits of the article appear scattered throughout Chapter 25, "The Emotions," though much is added to the chapter as well as omitting aspects of that article. The singular point of "What is

an Emotion" is simply summarized by James in his 1883 letter to Thomas Davidson: "I sent off to day a sort of a squib to Mind . . . to prove that we are sorry because we cry, angry because we strike etc, instead of vice versa (Vol. 3, "The Text of The Principles of Psychology," 1543)." The point remains alive in The Principles. But questions one might have about the characterization of thought and feeling must firstly be sought within The Principles. For example, James did not maintain the traditional view that would underwrite a feeling theory discussed in Chapter One. A feeling isn't a simple, homogeneous mental item nor does it remain distinct from thought. The Principles provides an account of feeling that drifts from the then consensus.

The Principles will also aid in shedding light on two background themes running through the dissertation. Together they help to demarcate intentional and neo-feeling theories to be discussed in Chapters Three and Four. One issue centers on Daniel Dennett's controversial proposal for heterophenomenology. Dennett contends heterophenomenology presents the only appropriate method for handling subjective reports in psychology. A number of book length studies of The Principles tend to treat the text as offering two distinct, and perhaps incompatible, approaches to understanding the mind: one empirical and the other introspective.¹⁶ The Principles pulls freely from the German physiologists as well as James's own introspective endeavors. A question arises: to what extent does the approach in The Principles fit with Dennett's proposal? Are two distinct approaches offered or is the approach heterophenomenological? The other

¹⁶ In particular, I have in mind texts by James Edie, Hans Linschoten, Bruce Wilshire, and John Wild. Each author backed into The Principles from a prior schooling in Husserl phenomenology.

independent though not unrelated issue in understanding the emotions is one's view concerning unconscious mental episodes. In Chapter 6, James argues against the need to postulate unconscious mentality. Yet, in Chapters 8 thru 10 and 27, James endorses an account of the subconscious. How James conceives of the unconscious and subconscious the dissertation now turns.

2.2 THE UNCONSCIOUS AND THE SUBCONSCIOUS

A conscious state is generally available for reporting. A mental state that is unavailable for reporting, in the way one takes a conscious state to be available, is not conscious. For James, the inability to report marks both unconscious states and subconscious states. As James argues against the proposal for unconscious states and presumes subconscious states, something other than being unaware of the content of the state must mark the difference. Joel Weinberger argues James implicitly endorses the unconscious because he endorses the subconscious (“William James and the Unconscious: Redressing a Century-Old Misunderstand”) and Gerald Myers simply contrasts James’s account of the unconscious with his account of the subconscious (William James, 377).¹⁷ Both fail to make sense of a puzzling aspect of James’s placement of his discussion of the unconscious within The Principles. His discussion on whether there are unconscious mental states appears in the latter third of a chapter

¹⁷ Neither Edie (William James and Phenomenology) or Linschoten (Toward a Phenomenological Psychology) discuss James’s account of the unconscious or subconscious. Wilshire does but only for the purposes of arguing that James is confused about ‘the object of thought’ (William James and Phenomenology, 62-64).

dedicated to undermining panpsychism, the mind-stuff theory. Allowing unconscious mental states, according to James, opens the door for panpsychism, a view The Principles works to discredit. In particular, James claims the arguments for the unconscious render a science of psychology impossible as the arguments would dispense with the principle of identity (Vol. 1, “The Mind-Stuff Theory,” 174-175). It’s not at all obvious why either allowing for unconscious states slides one toward panpsychism or why it would deny the principle of identity.

James’s “metaphysical” commitments for psychology remain in opposition to panpsychism in two respects. First, dualism allows for discontinuity; the mental differs from the non-mental.¹⁸ Panpsychism and atomism abhor “the chasm that yawns between” the mental and swirling mindless material; continuity is achieved by allowing both mental and non-mental to forever co-exist or by eliminating one end of the chasm (Vol. 1, “The Automaton-Theory,” 137-138). Like panpsychism, James treats the mental as distinct from the non-mental. However, the mental arises in creatures with a fair amount of neurons. How that happens, James claims without embarrassment, is not up for discussion as it’s one of the unquestioned assumptions of psychology.

That James accepts discontinuity need not commit James to interactionist dualism. Following David Papineau (“A Case for Materialism”), James explicitly endorses two of the three central propositions for materialism: conscious mental

¹⁸ James’s commits psychology to dualism because it relies on a distinction between the mental and non-mental (see Montero “Post-Physicalism” for discussion on the advantages of putting it this way). As materialism need not require that a distinction between the mental and non-mental track a distinction between physical and non-physical (whatever that might be), James’s “dualism” remains excusable.

occurrences cause physical effects and may do so uniquely (Vol. 1, "Introduction: The Intellectual Context," xvii).¹⁹ Whether The Principles presents evidence for the view that such effects require a prior history of physical causes is underdetermined. Furthermore, James's opposition to atomism was to a particular form of materialism, namely eliminative materialism. Both eliminative materialism and panpsychism seem to underwrite a commitment to enduring continuity. Non-reductive materialism allows for discontinuity. At one time no mental phenomena existed. Given that the kernel of James's commitments for psychology involves the rejection of an enduring continuity for mental phenomena, The Principles then need not be read as a commitment to substance dualism as some forms of materialism allow for a historical discontinuity in advocating property dualism.

Secondly, unlike panpsychism, James takes conscious thought to be the minimal mental fact (Vol. 1, "The Mind-Stuff Theory," 178). Treating thought as the minimal mental fact goes hand in hand with the commitment to linking mental states with physiological ones. To find the connection between the non-mental and the mental one must identify the minimum mental fact and the minimum non-mental fact so that a relation between them can be established. And if one could identify such a relation, one would have psycho-physical laws (Vol. 1, "The Mind-Stuff Theory," 178). James doesn't argue directly why the minimum can't be

¹⁹ Wilshire finds it significant that James rarely talks about the causal powers of mental states or specifies mental states in terms of causal powers (William James and Phenomenology, 39-41). This "evidence" leans Whishire toward interpreting The Principles as implicitly endorsing a non-empirical non-naturalist methodology. But the lack of discussion is surely explicit given James's commitment to interactionist dualism as an unquestioned assumption.

concepts or something else.²⁰ James assumes this position and creates an argumentative strategy. The data the unconscious is supposed to explain can be supplied by a psychology that embraces a discontinuity between the mental and non-mental and treats (conscious) thought as the minimal mental fact. In this sense, the psychology advanced by James will be empirically equivalent to a psychology that postulates an unconscious.

James presents ten arguments for the unconscious and proffers a counter-reply to each. James's responses to the arguments advances one or more of the following alternative explanations for the data: the explicans does not require an unconscious as a conscious thought that is quickly forgotten would equally explain the phenomena; the explicans does not require an unconscious because a learned reaction akin to a habit would equally explain the phenomena; the explicans need not require an unconscious because a conscious state that is simultaneous but split-off from the central consciousness would equally explain the phenomena. The first two types of responses remain reasonable alternative explanations. The first involves timing and the second involves having enough knowledge about the relationship between mental events and physiological ones. The science of the day was not fine grained enough to support one or the other alternative explanations. The third explanation blatantly begs the question. A non-reportable (split-off) conscious state hardly strikes one as a better explanation than a non-reportable unconscious state.

John Wild contends that James would have objected to Freud's

²⁰ In its general form, the idea is neither outlandish nor far-fetched. See W.V.O. Quine's Word and Object for the view that the sentence rather than the word is the minimum semantic fact.

supposition of unconscious factors influencing ones conscious thoughts (The Radical Empiricism of William James, 22). Freud's account, whatever the flaws, postulates distinct unconscious states that causally influence behavior and conscious states. James, however, targets the claim that the unconscious is a feature of a conscious state: "The distinction is that *between the unconscious and the conscious being of the mental state* (Vol. 1, "The Mind-Stuff Theory," 166)." Rendering the unconscious as a mental state that is conscious but not wholly sounds foreign to contemporary ears. That is, James's notion of the unconscious in this section is not Freud's or our contemporary rendering of the unconscious as a mental state that is altogether unconscious.

Why would a mental state that is partially conscious and partially unconscious provide aid for establishing panpsychism? Panpsychism seeks a more manageable entity to study the mind. In his critique of panpsychism, the mind was correlated with other physical items one could get a handle on: single cells and atoms. James writes: "what a convenience would it not be for the psychologist if ... he could treat thought as a kind of stuff or material, to be measured out in great or small amount, increased and subtracted from, and baled about at will (Vol. 1, "The Mind-Stuff Theory," 176-177)." The move to the unconscious exhibits this aspect of panpsychism: the mind may be more readily studied by essentially fusing the mental into items much easier to handle. But for James, supposing an unconscious aspect of a conscious state is far worse than supposing each cell or atom has consciousness. A cell can be manipulated and measured. How is one going to identify, i.e., provide the identity conditions for, a

conscious state that is partially unconscious? In Objection 10, the supposition of an unconscious aspect arises, in part, to explain how two distinct experiences can nevertheless be about the same thing. When savoring the same hoisin sauce one may experience for the first time the garlic flavoring; one hears the percussion instruments contribute to the rhythm of a piece of music that went unnoticed previously. In both cases one discovers something new in an experience that failed to be salient in a prior experience. It's taken for granted that in each case two distinct experiences are about the same thing. To account for how those two distinct experiences could be about the same thing, the opponent James criticizes supposes that the same (type) of mental state accounts for two distinct experiences. Each experience differs in what portion of the "content" of the mental state is conscious and unconscious. That is, the mental state underwriting each experience is identical with respect to "content" but not with respect to the portion that is conscious. And so, whereas one might have supposed two distinct conscious mental states, panpsychism offers one mental state that is partially conscious and partially unconscious. And so, despite having the same thought on two different occasions, the difference in conscious content will account for the variance in the two experiences.

This account of mental phenomena achieves a manageable entity: the thing the thought is directed toward. Though objects and events, like cells, provide a manageable way for identifying thought, it will, according to James, render a science of thought impossible because it dispenses with any principle of identity for thought (Vol. 1, "The Mind-Stuff Theory," 174-176). Whenever two

thoughts refer to the same thing (or event), they must be of the same type with respect to “content.” With this assumption there would be no hope for distinguishing different types of thought. It is, one may suppose, relatively easy to discover the contents of the conscious aspect of a thought. But to identify a thought one must identify the unconscious contribution too. And to do that one waits for a conscious thought that is about the same thing yet some conscious aspect is new. But given the seemingly limitless way experiences about the same thing may differ, James concludes one loses a handle on how to provide identity conditions for the subject matter of psychology, namely thought.

Would James reject unconscious mental states as psychology commonly treats it? I don’t find an explicit answer in The Principles. One line of reasoning might go as follows. In lacking consciousness, the unconscious may more easily be studied by empirical methods. The unconscious is more manageable to study compared to qualia, the feeling of what it is like for one, or other phenomenological items. As such, one achieves continuity in explanation contrary to James commitment to discontinuity. That is, the line of reasoning supposes that by discontinuity James affirms different methods for coming to know things: one empirical and the other non-empirical. But as I will argue, James adopts a single method for his psychology. And if unconscious mental states preserve James’s contention that mental states are whole without separable parts – in the way one might treat a thought or a sentence - then James achieves discontinuity. And so, it would seem that James’s commitments wouldn’t rule out the unconscious. Positive evidence for whether he does,

however, will not be gleaned from the account of the unconscious in Chapter 6, “The Mind-Stuff Theory.” Nor will one reach an answer from James’s account of the subconscious.

Ralph Perry points out that James’s background in medicine and his penchant for resisting conventional positions would encourage a bold psychology, one that could scientifically embrace the abnormal (The Thought and Character of William James, 155-156, 168-169). The supposition of the subconscious explains hysterical anaesthesia and embraces Pierre Janet’s theory of hysterics. Like the unconscious, the subconscious involves mental phenomena one is unaware of. Some hysterics report changes to their sensory system. They no longer can hear, see, or feel something. However, evidence that one had in fact mentally sensed something can be had by other techniques. Janet’s methods of distraction, hypnosis, or automatic handwriting are no doubt questionable techniques. James, however, considered each a legitimate scientific technique – that is, they were presumed by James to be reliable empirical methods. Of hysterical anaesthesia James writes that “*sensibility to the anaesthetic parts is also there, in the form of a secondary consciousness entirely cut off from the primary or normal one, but susceptible of being *tapped* and made to testify to its existence in various odd ways (Vol. 1, “The Relations of Minds to Other Things,” 201).*” Leaving aside for the moment why James labels this a secondary consciousness rather than an unconscious mental state, one has two mental states existing simultaneously.²¹ One of which is not directly reportable but is nonetheless supposed to exist given an acceptable method for

²¹ Gerald Myers stresses this point in “James and Freud.”

demonstrating behavior that can (only) be explained on the supposition that there is an additional subconscious.

A number of techniques in contemporary cognitive science, such as masked priming, follow the same basic method. One method will measure whether one is or is not aware of a stimulus. A second method will determine whether a stimulus one is not aware of is nonetheless producing a mental effect.²² And though the techniques adopted by James may no longer be reputable they share the same dissociative paradigm. They function by showing that one is responsive to phenomena despite what the subject reports. This then seems to offer positive evidence that James would accept the unconscious as a mental state that is wholly unconscious. However, James's account of secondary consciousness is an account of a secondary personality. Contemporary accounts of unconscious states need not have theoretical ties to an account of personality. Turning to an account of personality overflows onto other unruly ground. Such a view will likely be involved in an account of the self as well as how certain conscious states of mind tend to be personal. Certainly both play important roles in Chapter 9, "The Stream of Thought," and in Chapter 10, "The Consciousness of Self." And to have a fuller account of The Principles one needs to specify the distinction between self, personality, consciousness, and how some conscious states tend to be personal. Treatment for anyone of these topics would be beyond the scope of the dissertation.

Still, it is sufficient to show that Gerald Myers account of the unconscious

²² For discussion see Merikle, P. M., & Reingold, E. M. "On demonstrating unconscious perception" Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. 127 (1998): 304-310.

in Chapter 6, “The Mind-Stuff Theory,” as simply an impersonal subconscious fails in two respects. First, the account of the subconscious requires two (simultaneous) states, whereas the unconscious, in Chapter 6, involves only one. Second, to treat the unconscious as simply impersonal fails to identify what it is the unconscious lacks that the subconscious has. Both fail to be directly reportable and are discoverable by a method of dissociation. James’s account of the subconscious, however, focuses on a secondary personality one is unable to report as being manifested. A secondary personality makes sense given one is explaining abnormal behavior. James does think each normal person has more than one personality. However, the hysteric is one that is not simply a different personality at a different time, it is a personality simultaneously split-off from another. Janet talked of weaker or stronger personalities because each personality consumed some portion of the “cognitive” resources denied to the other. Whereas one “person” is deaf, the other will not be.

Myers effectively subsumes under the notion of personality the assumption that there must be something it is like to manifest a personality and how it is for one must be personal (“James and Freud” 594-597). Myers account of the unconscious as impersonal makes sense if one treats James’s account of being personal as indicating how it is for one. However, James doesn’t claim that consciousness is personal; he states that consciousness tends to be personal (Vol. 1, “The Stream of Thought,” 220-221). Furthermore, James’s discussion suggests that the term consciousness connects with personality (more directly, a self with interests), and isn’t explicitly an account of how it is for

one (phenomenality). The three main concepts in play, personality, what it is like for one (phenomenality), and the expression of the personal aspect within an experience, are conceptually distinct. That is, whether James would endorse the view of a mental state that is wholly unconscious, one for which there is nothing it is like for one to be in that state, can't be determined by simply appealing to what James writes about the unconscious in Chapter 6 or from his account of the subconscious. Evidence must be sought elsewhere.

2.3 HETEROPHENOMENOLOGY

The 1960's saw a renaissance of scholarly interest in William James and The Principles. James Edie, Hans Linschoten, Bruce Wilshire, John Wild, Alfred Schuetz, and Aron Gurwitsch were influential in reviving James and held to a common theme: William James took phenomenology seriously, especially in The Principles. Each expresses a unique temperamental slant; they share a decided link to Husserl. James, they argued, shares quite a bit with Husserl's project: to found an a priori science of experience. As Edie remarks, a number of scholars have established the profound impact of The Principles on Husserl's own thought (Edie, 23-24). Such a discovery resulted in varied arguments to show James as an incomplete phenomenologist, James as paving the way for phenomenology, or finding ways to radicalize James for the sake of phenomenology. In all, The Principles became a text of hidden virtues to be unearthed that would in end make sense of Husserl's explicit praise. Not everyone writing on James at this time, however, shared such an approach. William J. Earle's entry to the 1967

Encyclopedia of Philosophy for James provides a refined account of The Principles. Edie complained that Earle's article presents the "traditional provincialism" on James. He suggests Earle's failure to mention the then current revival in James scholarship was "to forestall, if possible, the effect of this literature (William James and Phenomenology, 20, 87 n9)." Edie incorrectly criticizes Earle for failing to provide any hint of how James would be opposed to (Husserl's) phenomenology. Earle did. Three features are central to understand James in relation to phenomenology and Earle's succinct account was to the point on each. Firstly, subjective reports are fallible. Secondly, *a priori* metaphysics remain anathema. Thirdly, introspection involves description, not explanation.

To bring this contrast between Earle and Edie up to date, one can ask whether The Principles offers what Daniel Dennett calls Heterophenomenology, hereafter HP, or Autophenomenology, hereafter AP. Husserl again provides the motivational link. Dennett finds a number of helpful suggestions in Husserl, though he rejects what he takes to be Husserl's autophenomenology ("Heterophenomenology Reconsidered," 246-247). Eddie and other writers from the 1960's find a number of helpful remarks in The Principles encouraging one to link them to Husserl's work. The accuracy to Husserl scholarship is not the issue. Rather, it's the contrast between HP and AP. The Principles, it will now be argued, rejects AP and adopts a version of HP.

Adherents of phenomenology tend to view Dennett's proposal as a fifth

column stratagem.²³ Dennett advertises HP as a view that takes the subject's report about their experience seriously. A subject's report of their conscious state counts for the cognitive scientist as an item to be investigated and accounted for. (Auto)Phenomenology also takes the subject's experience seriously. Both also assert a subject may nonetheless err about what is present in one's experience. However, Dennett remains quite skeptical about whether or not a subject's report reveals the nature of mind. In contrast, a "truly" (auto)phenomenological approach presumes, perhaps with sufficient training and focused attention, that the fundamental reality of the mind can only be apprehended by attending to what is given in experience. As John Wild put it, an attuned faculty of mind, "exercising the noetic faculty," can only settle disputations about what is given in experience and no psychological test could ferret out a difference ("In Reply to Mr. Read," 413). That is, only with due attention to the phenomena can one discover the nature of mind. HP differs from AP in respect to how one discovers the nature of mind. Though both accept the fallibility of subjective reports, fallibility on AP is in a sense owing to a flawed use of a mental faculty, whereas for HP, fallibility need not have anything to do with the appropriate functioning of mind but only with whether the subject is a reliable instrument for reporting data.

Dennett, importantly, contends that the subject's report does tend to track something. A subject's report is more than noise. Still, when a subject's report tracks something, what it tracks need not concern the content of the reported

²³ Recent discussion on Dennett's proposal can be found in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2007).

experience or what the experience is about. That is, a subject's report is not a mere useful fiction for some explanatory end. The claim is that even if the content of an experience is fictitious, the report may nevertheless reveal something about the mind. Dennett remains a realist.²⁴ It's just that the structure of the mind need not be the structure of one's reported experience. To use an early example of Dennett's, a subject may report a mental image, yet the structure of one's conscious experience need not involve a mental resemblance to an external object. What the report tracks are non-conscious subpersonal descriptions ("The Nature of Images and The Introspective Trap," 132-141). For HP, a subject's report can be flat wrong. But for AP one relies on guidance, in the way one might be led out of Plato's cave, and the consensus to be had among shared experiences. Eventually, the application of one's inner insight steers toward truths about mind. But one won't be that wrong in the way HP allows.

The following will be helpful in furthering the difference between HP and AP.²⁵ In the case of HP, there is more than one way to know about the subject's experience. In AP, there is but one way of knowing it. For HP, first-person psychological statements can be false because psychologists, who are not the subject, can discover a set of facts that would establish such statements as false. For AP, to say that (some) sincere first-person psychological statements cannot be false, i.e., that such statements are infallible, doesn't require having evidence, it requires but one way of knowing. Perhaps it's simply sincere avowals, perhaps

²⁴ In "Real Patterns" Dennett asserts a realists position, even if a rather thin one.

²⁵ I owe this way of casting the two methodologies to Sydney Shoemaker's "How is Self-Knowledge Possible."

its sincere avowals with due diligence. Whatever that way of knowing is, the subject owns the error. Again, explanations for error may be that one does not recognize that a report failed to be sincere, one does not realize what one meant by the words uttered, one does not fully apply one's attention or have sufficient training, and so on. However, whenever a report fulfills some such criterion, the report captures the act of consciousness under investigation. The mental facts are to be taken just as reported. The subject is reporting data, not simply providing data.

For HP, independently of whether such criterion are satisfied, first-person reports may nonetheless be false as other evidence independent of the report could, in principle, tell against it. That is, the subject's report provides data. As such, HP allows for the possibility that there are no mental objects. In addition, it may be that in understanding a creature's mental life, in all its blooming diversity, the account may nonetheless be unrecognizable from how it is for one. And so, one contrast between HP and AP is the acceptance or rejection of an error theory of phenomenology.²⁶

The other distinction between HP and AP involves the acceptance or rejection of Galileo's condition: subjective reports mesh with (cognitive) science.²⁷ An error theory of phenomenology serves as a corollary of Galileo's condition on the stipulation that the way of knowing the mind involves an empirical account.

²⁶ HP is stronger than what Tim Crane, in "Intentionality and the Mark of the Mental," calls an error theory of phenomenology. HP need not accept mental objects nor Crane's underlying assumption that an account of mind should not fail to be phenomenological.

²⁷ The view that the mind should not be beyond the reach of science is expressed, for example, in Fodor's "Propositional Attitudes," Rosenthal's "First Person Operationalism and Mental Taxonomy," and Dennett's Consciousness Explained.

Wilshire makes a traditional and erroneous (i.e., pre-Kripke) link between necessity and *a prioricity* (William James and Phenomenology, 192). The issue is not one of necessity, but about the *a priori* over the empirical. Drummond contrasts Husserl's method of eidetic reduction with HP as one that is *a priori* and identifies universal and necessary features of experience ("Phenomenology: Neither auto- nor hetero- be," 62). James casts the necessary truths of experience as necessary but *a posteriori* (Vol. 2, "Necessary Truths and the Effects of Experience"). The adoption of an *a priori* or transcendental metaphysics about (some aspect of) mind amounts to a denial of Galileo's condition. In effect, it is to make a fundamental assumption that some aspect of a conscious experience is just as it appears.²⁸ So, for example, Linschoten describes an inner discord within The Principles as follows. For James, being aware of one's conscious experience does not require being aware of the underlying physiological, neurological, or other bodily processes causing the experience. This is what the cognitive scientist might determine from a third person point of view. True enough. "[W]hereas self-awareness has the quality of subjectivity which never appears in objective processes. Every statement about their connection must therefore sound artificial (Toward a Phenomenological Psychology, 58)." The appearance of artificiality arises by depicting a sizable chasm between two items that would be unbridgeable given the link. The philosophy of mind is rife with examples: Searle's Chinese room,

²⁸ James Edie makes such an assumption (William James and Phenomenology, 34).

zombies, and imaginatively walking within a giant “thinking” machine.²⁹ Though James was willing to accept discontinuity in his rejection of panpsychism, the issue here concerns discontinuity with respect to methodology rather than metaphysics. That is, Linschoten contends James's attention to the empirical sciences and subjective reports (aka introspective psychology) must contain two methodologies – third personal (aka heterophenomenological) and the other first personal (aka autophenomenological). Wilshire too endorses this interpretation (William James and Phenomenology, 220-221). Though James regards the early chapters of The Principles as physiological preliminaries, Wilshire disregards them because they are physiological preliminaries. James's purported venture into phenomenological psychology interests Wilshire (William James and Phenomenology, 55). The difficulty, however, is that neither cites evidence in The Principles for the needed claim that two methodologies are involved rather than one. No argument is needed that The Principles adopted a third person, scientific approach. However, simply providing evidence that The Principles does take serious introspective reports will not be sufficient for showing it adopts a first person, aka autophenomenological approach, as heterophenomenology just is a third person approach that takes a subject's report seriously.

The difference then between AP and HP is that for HP there is more than one way to skin the mind. For AP, there is but one way of knowing (some aspect of) the mind. Any particular spin on the way of knowing the mind would be of

²⁹ Searle's example challenges the connection of syntactic properties with understanding; zombies challenge functional accounts of consciousness or the phenomenal; Leibniz's story challenges mechanical explanations of perception.

interest only so far as there is textual support for the claim it was implicit in The Principles. If true, it would be legitimate to claim The Principles moves toward phenomenology or to radicalize The Principles. But if no evidence exists, and counter evidence does, linking The Principles to Husserl's work, that is AP, will be misleading, even for a phenomenologist. And so, the spin Linschoten's puts on one of the ways of knowing the mind, "self-awareness has the quality of subjectivity which never appears in objective processes," is of little interest. The question is not whether AP is true, but whether James can be said to be closer to AP or HP. Linschoten's text suggests a catholic treatment; there is sufficiently insufficient evidence to tie James's psychology either to (auto)phenomenology or the denial of it (Toward a Phenomenological Science, Ch 1). However, Linschoten makes the central assertion. He writes that James "recognized the impossibility of going back behind experience (Toward a Phenomenological Science, 59)." I interpret this claim as asserting that James thought some aspect of the mind inaccessible. Linschoten presumes that whatever aspect of mind is inaccessible is inaccessible to third-person approaches. This would leave open the possibility of an explanation from a first-person approach.

One finds throughout The Principles James's own inward reflections coloring the discussion. Introspection certainly has a central role in the Principles: "*Introspective Observation is what we have to rely on first and foremost and always* (Vol. 1, "The Methods and Snares of Psychology," 185). Still, James acutely wishes the psychologist to avoid certain errors due to "his peculiar point of view – that of being a reporter of subjective as well as of

objective facts (Vol. 1, "The Methods and Snares of Psychology," 184-185)." A psychologist can, if one wishes, provide one's own report of one's inner goings on just as readily as that of a subject. But a psychologist's introspective report differs not in kind from the subject's report. Chapter 7, "The Methods and Snares of Psychology," provides the central evidence.

Three claims focus our interest.³⁰ Introspective reports are prima facie accurate and rely on a form of privileged/subjective access. Both restate the disagreement between AP and HP. The third claim asserts that to be in a conscious state is to be aware of it. For James, Ueberweg and Brantano serve as representatives for the claim one has introspective infallibility and special access while Comte serves as a representative of the claim that no introspective ability whatsoever is possible. James's sets up his sympathies to lie with both without endorsing either. Introspection is surely possible though fallible. Comte sees introspection as an untenable division of the person: "The thinker cannot divide himself into two, of whom one reasons whilst the other observes him reason (Vol. 1, "The Methods and Snares of Psychology," 188)." For James, introspection turns out to be retrospection. Contra Comte, introspection remains plausible because the person is not divided. When one introspects, one is conscious of a prior conscious episode. One's present conscious state that is introspective involves a memory, which itself is not conscious. By treating memory dispositionally his account of introspection stays clear of any difficulties surrounding the unconscious and subconscious. Introspection still involves a

³⁰ These three distinctions are presented in Armstrong's [A Materialist Theory of Mind](#). Also, see Lyons's [The Disappearance of Introspection](#) for a study and examination of introspection from Descartes to Dennett and Armstrong.

report and making a statement about one's experience both reports and expresses mental phenomena.³¹ Yet, these need not pick out, and normally do not, the same mental phenomena. James writes: "The present conscious state, when I say 'I feel tired,' is not the direct state of tire; when I say 'I feel angry,' it is not the direct state of anger. It is the state of *saying-I-feel-tired*, of *saying-I-feel-angry*, entirely different matters . . . (Vol. 1. "The Methods and Snares of Psychology," 189-190)." One may disregard the pragmatic equivalence between saying either 'I feel tired' or 'I think I feel tired.' That is, though one may likely fail to remember which of the two one actually said, James makes use of a distinction between expressing and reporting to highlight an aspect of his account of introspection. For James, introspection involves two distinct episodes – the state expressed by the report and what the report is about. Self-intimating states, ones for which one is conscious of and aware one is conscious of it, deflate a distinction between reporting and expressing. Of course, it's not a conceptual problem that a reporter reports on himself or herself: "I'm reporting in Iraq." Such self-reflecting reports are not impossible. In fact, they are quite common. This underwrites James's concern. A reporter's report may be self-intimating; however, the reporter does not exclusively know it. It's discoverable by numerous means. And though James cautions psychology about deflating reporting and expressing, it automatically deflates once one admits that self-reflective reports remain accessible only to oneself as Ueberweg and Brantano did – "it exists only within me" and "No one can doubt whether the psychic condition he apprehends in himself *be*, and *be so*, as he apprehends it (Vol. 1,

³¹ See David Rosenthal's "Moore's Paradox and Consciousness" in Consciousness and Mind.

“The Methods and Snares of Psychology,” 187).” As Ueberweg put it, this view is just one for which “when the mental image as such is the object of my apprehension, there is no meaning in seeking to distinguish its existence in my consciousness (in me) from its existence out of my consciousness (in itself) (Vol. 1, “The Methods and Snares of Psychology,” 187).”

At this point, retrospection need not yet deny privileged access. It may be that remembering, as James’s account of introspection, remains fallible. Still, perhaps when things go right, whatever that may mean, what one remembers remains accessible only to the one remembering. Even though James denies that when one is conscious they are also aware of what they are conscious of and introspection remains infallible, he may nonetheless opt for an especial method for knowing the mind over and above the empirical method. To show this Wilshire culls evidence of tension within The Principles that would be released by seeing James implicitly endorsing aspects of a phenomenological account.

Wilshire devotes two chapters of William James and Phenomenology to showing the supposed difficulties within The Principles. One such difficulty focuses on James’s criticism of panpsychism previously discussed. In that discussion, it was taken for granted that two distinct experiences can be about the same thing. One question one might press would be to explain how two distinct mental states can be directed at or be about the same thing. But James will not discuss the relation between the thought and the (external) object the thought is about. As such, Wilshire seeks to answer how The Principles will

account for one's realization that two experiences are about the same thing (William James and Phenomenology, 64, 73-74). The puzzle seems to be this. Obviously how one will account for the realization won't be in terms of the (external) object both thoughts are about. The only other option is to rely on the two thoughts. Yet, given two thoughts are about the same thing must already be apprehended prior to the realization expressed by the second thought. To make things worse for James, thoughts are treated as wholes and so one can't appeal to shared parts. And so, Wilshire supposes, the only two available options leave one with an explanatory gap (William James and Phenomenology, 64). Wilshire wishes the reader to begin to see that appealing to something else will account for the realization of sameness. Further on, Wilshire begins to suggest that it's a mental object that will fill the explanatory vacuum. This of course, won't be enough for autophenomenology. It must be that the mental object is apprehended by a transcendental intuition – namely, something outside the reach of science.

Wilshire's puzzle, however, can't get traction given James's account of introspection as retrospection. The puzzle requires two thoughts one of which is self-intimating. Yet, The Principles denies a thought can be aware of itself. As James puts it, "[n]o subjective state, whilst present, is its own object; its object is always something else (Vol. 1, "The Methods and Snares of Psychology," 189)." And so, one thought can't be about itself, let alone aware of itself as the same as another. Two experiences may indeed be about the same thing. For James, it takes a third thought to realize that. The knowledge or realization that two

thoughts are about the same thing will be a distinct experience. As such, it won't be surprising how one could realize two distinct experiences are about the same thing any more than realizing two distinct paintings are about the same thing.

Wilshire turns to Chapter 7, "The Methods and Snares of Psychology," for more pressing evidence. In this chapter, James reiterates the irreducible data of psychology: the psychologist, the thought studied, the thought's object, and the psychologist's reality (Vol. 1, "The Methods and Snares of Psychology," 184). Wilshire happily accepts James's division, along with Linschoten, Edie, and the others.³² To the extent The Principles connects with Husserl's view depends on how one interprets 'the thought's object.' This serves as a centering point for reading The Principles as friendly to Husserl's project. The battle seems to be the extent to which 'the thoughts object' picks out a mental object. Wilshire identifies "the problem." He notes that this category either slides into the thought studied or the psychologist's reality. Wilshire treats the list of irreducible data as four non-overlapping categories (William James and Phenomenology, 71-73). As such, the thought's object won't be a frog, sewage, or patriotism. As each item for what the thought is about makes up the psychologist's reality too. And if what the thought is about is not a mental object either but rather a non-relational aspect, in the way the object of a transitive verb is non-relational, then the thought's object would slide into the thought studied. If James's partitions do mark off exclusive boundaries, then the thought's object must be, so the

³² John Wild is the exception. The object of thought picks out a physical object, not a mental one.

argument urges, a mental object, that is, what the thought is about.³³ One key element, as Edie enthusiastically restates over and over, is James's invocation of transitive consciousness: one is conscious of something. And so it seems there must be an object. What troubles Wilshire is that James doesn't seem to talk about mental objects and he does talk about the thought's object as either an aspect of thought or an external object (William James and Phenomenology, 72).

The structure of the chapter, however, suggests a different reading. The chapter directs one toward a pernicious fallacy, the psychologist's fallacy. James firstly identifies four categories that capture the assumptive facts of psychology, the irreducible data of psychology, and then discusses the methodology of psychology, which includes introspection, experimentation, and comparison. The fallacy arises when the methodology fails to bracket one's knowledge of how things are and that knowledge seeps into one's account of the thought studied. In effect, James warns one may bias their understanding of the thought with one's broader perspective. The historian David Hackett Fisher dubbed the Historian's Fallacy as logically analogous to the psychologist's fallacy (Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought). Historians, like psychologists, should be wary of projecting their broader perspective onto their subject matter. In the catalog of irreducible data, the thought studied should not mirror the psychologist's reality. At this point, James will have successfully made the point independently of what he might have intended by 'the object of thought'. That is, if 'object of thought' represents an independent category, Wilshire must

³³ A common sense description of thought is that a thought is about something or is directed toward something. The object of thought may be theoretically unpacked as either referring to an external object or mental object, or as identifying the content of a propositional attitude.

provide evidence. It is little doubt that the phrase 'the object of thought' will be used ambiguously. Yet the ambiguity in understanding 'the object of thought' envelops only knowing whether the object of thought picks out the thought studied or the psychologist's reality.

The Principles also points to a denial of an additional mental object over and above the thought. James is explicit: "[t]he relations of minds to other objects are either relations to other minds, or to material things. The material things are either the mind's own brain, on the one hand or anything else, on the other (Vol. 1, "The Relations of Minds to Other Things," 212)." That is, the only existing mental item that a thought can be about is someone's thought. James makes no room for occurrent mental objects that a thought may be directed toward or be about. Introspection, to repeat, involves remembering a thought attentively. Additionally, the two earlier chapters, Chapter 6 and 7, represent the end of his discussion of the relation of a thought to its own brain (Vol. 1, "The Relations of Minds to Other Things," 212). Absent is any discussion of the relation of a thought to some internal mental object. Lastly, James seems to explicitly say that the supposition of a mental object would be a version of the psychologist's fallacy (Vol. 1, "The Stream of Thought," 265-268). Here James rejects an assumption made by associationists, sensationalists, and egoists. Each must explain the unity of thought given that the thought involves independent mental parts. James explicitly rejects the view that an independent mental item exists that a thought is related to: "*There is no manifold of coexisting ideas; the notion of such a thing is a chimera. Whatever things are thought in*

relation are thought from the outset in a unity, in a single pulse of subjectivity, a single psychosis, feeling, or state of mind (Vol. 1, "The Stream of Thought," 268).

James also identifies the object of thought with the thought: "The object of every thought, then, is neither more nor less than all that the thought thinks, exactly as thought thinks it, however complicated the matter, and however symbolic the manner of the thinking may be (Vol. 1, "The Stream of Thought," 266)." Though the identification is certainly not identity, it's quite clear that James does not intend that the object of thought be distinct and independent of the thought studied as Wilshire's interpretation requires. Wilshire's account of the psychologist's fallacy is as follows:

What he [James] calls the "psychologist's fallacy" consists in the onlooking psychologist's confusing what *he* knows with what the *thought* knows [the thought's object]. That is, through his theorizing about causes, the psychologist knows the physical structure of the thought's referent in the world [the psychologist's reality], and likewise the physical structure of the subject's brain [also the psychologist's reality]. In addition, through introspection, namely, reflection, the psychologist presumably knows the thought itself [the thought] as well. The fallacy consists in introducing these data into that which the *thought* immediately knows [the thought's object] (William James and Phenomenology, 77).

At each point he treat's 'the thoughts object' as a mental object that is distinct and independent of the thought's content. In the end, Wilshire will interpret the object of thought as something one arrives at by a transcendental

intuition. The psychologist's fallacy then becomes importing into the transcendental object either the content of the thought, the (cognitive) relation between the thought and its external referent, or any physiological data. Though Wilshire offers a burdened rendering of the psychologist's fallacy compared to the far simpler and straight-forward account offered earlier, if James endorses a distinctive method for discovering 'the thought's object' Wilshire will strengthen his interpretation of the irreducible data as non-overlapping, independent categories.³⁴

The Phenomenological Mind, by Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, argues for a Husserlian cognitive science that is sufficiently close to the way Wilshire pushes The Principles. Cognitive science, according to Gallagher and Zahavi, can be front-loaded by (auto)phenomenological insights. The phenomenological method, like the scientific method, involves a process for weighing hypotheses and evidence.³⁵ Both methods issue data. The controversy is that the "data" from the methods of AP will be from the vantage point of HP hypotheses only. Furthermore, AP doesn't suppose that the methods of HP could show such "data" wrong. To put it another way, AP treats the subject as a *prima facie* reliable instrument that doesn't require proof.

Independently of whether one thinks AP fanciful folly, determining whether or not James treats subjective "data" as revisable given experimental results serves a sufficient test for whether James is closer to AP or HP. If James adopts

³⁴ For Wilshire, the object of thought turns out to be James's notion of fringe and this connects with Husserl's concept of noema.

³⁵ It involves at minimum dialectic convergence among experts and conceptual analysis. For further discussion see Drummond's "Phenomenology: Neither auto- nor hetero- be" and the Phenomenological Mind by S. Gallagher and D. Zahavi.

HP, then an initial endorsement that the phenomenological method provides data can be overturned by experimentation. That is, the “data” is treated like any other hypothesis, even if one’s subjective assessment of the truth of the “data” remains high – what Bayesians term prior probabilities. The debate then is not whether James distinguishes experimental results from some other method, he does. The difference will be whether the other method produces data or hypotheses. If James treats the results as suitably falsifiable by experimentation, then James will naturally be closer to HP than AP.

Gallagher and Zahavi describe a difference between the phenomenological method and the methods of science as a difference between description and explanation. Happily, James too makes a distinction with the same words. And so, the question comes down to whether the term ‘description’ indicates the phenomenological method or a method for generating hypotheses. Again, Chapter 7 provides the central evidence. James endorses the view that introspection relies on a method of correction and seeks consensus (Vol. 1, “The Methods and Snares of Psychology,” 191-192).³⁶ However, given that psychology is defined as the study of thought, psychology must clarify the subject matter of psychology. Introspection allows one to have an initial grasp of the subject matter. And to begin an experiment, a clear grasp of what is being tested will be required. This will be true not only of psychology but zoology, biology, or astronomy. And just as the term ‘planet’ may latter be revised, so may one’s

³⁶ Drummond (Phenomenology: Neither auto- nor hetero- be”) as well as Gallagher and Zahavi (*The Phenomenological Mind*) vehemently stress that introspection and the phenomenological method remain distinct. James, however, doesn’t treat introspection as solipsistic as it may be honed by dialectic convergence.

initial grasp of the term 'thought'. But a science must start from somewhere. Description, that is introspection, is just such a method.

James accepts intuitively necessary truths, but his treatment of them approximates the way positivist's treat analytic truths – namely, intuition does not reveal facts:³⁷ “None of these eternal verities [necessary truths] has anything to say about facts, about what is or is not in the world (Vol. 2, “Necessary Truths and the Effects of Experience,” 1256).” Such *a priori* truths amount to conceptual or logical truths. Introspection, focusing on one's past experience, remains a vehicle for clarifying mental *terms*. It may well be that such terms help to explain behavior. But mental terms must first be characterized by a method of introspection, before examining whether such terms explain behavior and other phenomena. If the world is better explained by such terms then one “can make a *priori* propositions concerning natural fact (Vol. 2, “Necessary Truths and the Effects of Experience,” 1269).” That is, postulating mental phenomena is an inference to the best explanation of natural facts.

In writing about the German physiologists, he says such scientists are “asking of course every moment for introspective data, but eliminating their uncertainty” by experimental means (Vol. 1, “The Methods and Snares of Psychology,” 192). Introspection produces data not because of an especial method. Rather, it indicates the general assessment of the reliability of subjective reports. More importantly, James explicitly allows one to confirm the reliability of introspection by an experimental method. Such “data” is not recalcitrant to scientific investigation.

³⁷ See Alberto Coffa's [The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap](#).

With respect to the reliability of subjective reports James and Dennett are worlds apart. James, as the nitrous oxide philosopher, endorsing séances, hypnotism, founding a lab for psychical research for exceptional mental states, was, to say the least, optimistic about the powers of the mind.³⁸ Dennett remains an uncompromising skeptic. But Dennett, like James, will adjust their views if the scientific evidence turns out to be otherwise.

James commits The Principles to common sense: “I, at any rate (pending metaphysical reconstructions not yet successfully achieved), shall have no hesitation in using the language of common-sense throughout this book (Vol. 1, “The Automaton-Theory,” 144). However, James is quite willing to reject common sense, though not often. His theory of emotion remains contrary to common sense. And as I show in the next section, the rejection of common sense is predicated on what science could show, not on some especial method.

Introspection clarifies mental terms. James argues explicitly for mental phenomena based on inference to the best explanation, not by an especial mental method. For example, the automaton-theory supposes it can account for intelligence, acting in novel and suitable ways when confronted with obstacles, by a network of reflexes. As a simple reflex need not require consciousness, intelligence as a nest of reflexes need not either, it’s simply a matter of degree. James notes that a complex set of reflexes that allow for a number of possible (neural) paths corresponding to different possible behaviors would leave one with an unstable creature. Not all possible behaviors lead to favorable ends. What

³⁸ “The Hidden Self” published in 1890 illustrates James’s scientific passion for “mysticism,” which offered neither mist nor schism.

accounts for the selection among possibilities, given the assumption creatures are successful, that is, intelligent. The automaton-theory cannot account for selection simply by complexity. James finds the automaton-theory wanting. Supposing conscious thought based on one's interests provides the best explanation of suitable behavior when confronted with multiple options.

To borrow Dennett's description of his critics, Wilshire, and the others, have confused James's destination with his base camp. James, the uncompromising optimist, aimed high for the powers of the mind. Dennett, the uncompromising skeptic, does not. Each, however, will temper their judgments and convictions in the face of experimental evidence.

2.4.1 JAMES'S THEORY OF EMOTION

The theory of emotion presented in The Principles exhibits depth: both contemporary somatic theories such as Antonio Damasio's and Jesse Prinz's and neo-feeling theories such as Peter Goldie's reach back to James's theory for inspiration. Somatic theories tie emotion to physiological changes and pre-organized mechanisms, whereas neo-feeling theories embrace the claim that the felt experience is central to understanding emotion. Proponents of cognitive theories have historically been dismissive of James's theory. I argue William James advances a cognitive theory of emotion. A cognitive theory treats thought as paramount in understanding the emotions and thought provides the individuation conditions for categorizing the varied emotions. James has little patience with categorizing and describing the varied emotions in terms of thought

as he centers his view on the felt experience and physiological arousal.

James presents original and fresh arguments for his position. Contrary to common sense, his theory interchanges two of the three main phases in an emotional experience.³⁹ Common sense suggests that the perception of the exciting fact leads to the emotional feeling, which then triggers bodily changes. James switches the second and third: each occurrence of emotional feeling corresponds to a unique orchestration of bodily changes, and so, the perception of the exciting fact; rather than the feeling, causes the relevant bodily changes. His theory is fresh for it goes beyond tedious descriptions of how the varied emotions are individuated by anchoring feeling to physiological science.

James states that the feeling of bodily changes is the emotion. Such a thesis, left literally, will have difficulties effectively distinguishing pathological and non-pathological cases of emotion. Yet, James claims that it's a virtue of his theory that it does (Vol. 2, "The Emotions," 1073). Furthermore, the central examples James uses to promote his theory, for both the courser and subtler emotions, are non-pathological (normal). I argue that James supposes a conceptual link in the central cases between the perception of the exciting fact and the feeling of bodily changes. Furthermore, the perception of an exciting fact for James is seeing an object as exciting in just the way cognitive theories would suppose.⁴⁰ Pathological cases, on the other hand, are just those for which the conceptual link is severed. By associating emotion with feeling, James unifies

³⁹ His theory of emotion marks a significant departure from the general agreement with common sense *The Principles* exhibits. James writes that he "shall have no hesitation in using the language of common-sense through-out this book (Vol. 1, "The Automaton-Theory," 147)."

⁴⁰ See Paul Redding's *The Logic of Affect* for a similar claim.

pathological and non-pathological cases. However, one understands the varied emotions in terms of the normal cases, not the pathological ones. In this sense, James's theory is cognitive: the right kind of perception necessitates the normal cases.

2.4.2 EXPERIMENTAL AND INTUITIVE SUPPORT

James writes the following: "A positive proof of the theory would, ... , be given if we could find a subject absolutely anesthetic inside and out, but not paralytic, so that emotion-inspiring objects might evoke the usual bodily expressions from him, but who, on being consulted, should say that no subjective emotional affection was felt (Vol. 2, "The Emotions," 1070)." This might strike one as initially puzzling. If one no longer had the feeling and the emotion was the feeling, then wouldn't such a case serve as evidence to counter James's theory?

Charles Sherrington, an early critic, argues James's theory is false since a reduction in sensation in subjects failed to produce appreciable changes in behavior ("The Experimentation on Emotion"). Sherrington, however, falsely assumes that the appearance of bodily manifestations of emotion entails feeling.⁴¹ James rejects the entailment. To determine whether a feeling is present, one must ask the subject. James laments that since no theory like his was available, the experiments of his day failed to document reports by subjects on how they felt. Still, if there was a bodily manifestation and the subject reports

⁴¹ For a concise discussion, see C.L. Golightly's "The James-Lange Theory: A Logical Post Mortem."

no feeling, wouldn't this disprove his theory? No. The complete anesthetic patient is one for which a causal link has been severed. In such a case one can hypothesize, given one's theory, about what effects will no longer present. Common sense predicts the bodily manifestations of an emotion should cease. And so, if the bodily manifestations of an emotion persist in the absence of feeling, the evidential support for common sense wanes. In this sense, a complete anesthetic but not paralytic subject provides support for James's theory. It would also support nearby competitors. For example, it would support the view that the perception of the exciting fact brings about concurrently and perhaps independently bodily changes and feelings,⁴² but James omits consideration of other possibilities.⁴³

Prior to putting forth an empirical test for his theory, James writes "I now proceed to urge the vital point of my whole theory, which is this: *If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no 'mind-stuff' out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains* (Vol. 2, "The Emotions," 1067)." It's an often-quoted passage in the philosophy of emotion. It tends to be mistakenly treated by opponents of cognitive views as an objection.⁴⁴ Rather, James presents a thought experiment to steer intuitions in the direction of the

⁴² Neuroscientific theories tend to support a dual track emanating from the perception of the object: the high-road leading toward the cortex and the low-road leading toward the primitive brain. See Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, and Antonio Damasio, Descartes' Error.

⁴³ James does contrast his view with materialistic and spiritualistic alternatives, but neither option is pertinent to issues here.

⁴⁴ For more contemporary examples, see Paul Griffiths What Emotions Really Are, Michael Stocker's "Psychic Feelings", Peter Goldie's The Emotions, and Jesse Prinz's Gut Reactions.

empirical test. It shares all the relevant features that his proof requires. One conjures up a complete anesthetic via imagination rather than medically bringing one about or relying on a vicissitudinous accident. And since one abstracts the feeling from an existing emotion, the corresponding bodily manifestations are supposed, just as the proof requires. Lastly, but not less importantly, James extends the thought experiment to a life without bodily feeling (Vol. 2, "The Emotions," 1068). Likewise, in James's proof the subject is a complete anesthetic prior to and after the perception of the exciting fact.

James in effect takes advantage of a thought experiment to offset a weakness of his theory. As James indicates, his theory cannot be falsified.⁴⁵ The intuition pump thereby stems reservations one might have for a non-falsifiable psychological theory. Still, the theory is grounded in science. One can show that common sense is mistaken about which comes first, the feeling or the bodily manifestations.

2.4.3 THE COGNITIVE AND PERSONAL ASPECTS

One may protest: the thought experiment establishes that the residual mind-stuff cannot constitute an emotion. Namely, intellectual perception is not sufficient for an emotion. This, however, underwrites the error. Though James's main focus

⁴⁵ For James it's an impossible introspective task to be able to distinguish corporeal feelings from spiritual ones. And so, a report of a feeling wouldn't determine whether the feeling was corporeal or spiritual. Michael Stocker, in "Psychic Feelings," and Peter Goldie, in The Emotions, for example, misinterpret James when they criticize his view as only considering bodily feeling. James didn't. Furthermore, such views fail to engage James's contention that one cannot introspectively distinguish bodily feeling from psychic feeling, to use Stocker's term, or feeling towards, to use Goldie's term, as both are forms of spiritual feeling (i.e., not having to do with the body).

is on feeling, it's not at the exclusion of thought.

The purpose of imagining away the emotional feeling is "the purely speculative [question] of subtracting certain elements of feeling from an emotional state supposed to exist in its fullness, and saying what the residual elements are (Vol. 2, "The Emotions," 1067)." One must come to terms with exactly what James has subtracted. It cannot be pure/simple sensation(s), for the mundane reason that consciousness doesn't contain pure sensation: "No one ever had a simple sensation by itself (Vol. 1, "The Stream of Thought," 219)." A passing glance at the index of The Principles raises further concern for the interpretation that James treats feeling at the exclusion of thought. Under the term 'feeling' one reads "synonym for consciousness in general in this book." And for the term 'thought', the initial entry reads "synonym for consciousness at large." James relies on these two terms to indicate consciousness, but not consciousness of particular kinds (Vol. 1, "The Methods and Snares of Psychology," 185-186). Consciousness is unified, having no parts. James instead grants consciousness different aspects. Though philosophy and psychology commonly treat conscious states as involving parts, common sense isn't fine grained enough to support either metaphysical view. James's use of 'feeling' and 'thought', to borrow a phrase from Daniel Dennett, suggests a difference in center of gravity: 'feeling' indicates a qualitative aspect and 'thought' indicates having an object, what the thought is about.⁴⁶ But neither precludes another. A feeling may include an object (that is, thought) and there may be something it is like for one to have a thought.

⁴⁶ See James's description of 'object' pp. 265-266 in Chapter 9.

One might argue that the sense of cognition implicit in a bodily feeling is unimportant – no more than a demonstrative. Textual support suggests such a minimal construal. James writes, “In his [the infants] dumb awakening to the consciousness of something there, a mere this as yet (or something for which even the term this would be perhaps too discriminative, and the intellectual acknowledgment of which would be better expressed by the bare interjection ‘lo!’)... (Vol. 2, “Sensation,” 657).” But James has a thicker notion of consciousness. Namely, consciousness tends to be personal (Vol. 1, “The Stream of Thought,” 220).

T.L.S Sprigge, in James & Bradley, vastly depersonalizes James’s account of the personal aspect of consciousness. James says, “[i]t seems as if the elementary fact were not *thought* or *this thought* or *that thought*, but *my thought*, every thought being *owned* (Vol. 1, “The Stream of Thought,” 221).” Sprigge interprets James as claiming that ownership simply indicates where the thought is situated, namely in a particular body (James & Bradley, 77). However, James is indicating how the thought is for one to have it, not where it is located. That is, one is conscious of this or that thought in a particular way - as mine. The personal aspect is inscribed within the thought. Sprigge's interpretation fails to account for James’s qualification: thoughts tend to be personal. Some cases of pathology, hysterics for example, involve subjects having thoughts that they are conscious of, but they are not conscious of those thoughts as their own (Vol. 1, “The Stream of Thought,” 222-223). The thought is situated in them and they are conscious of it; they are not conscious of it as

belonging to them. Though James considers pathological cases, he need not have. Actors who memorize lines may parrot a performance where the thoughts that get expressed are not identified as their thought though thoughts they have. Dispositions and habits have this feature too: certain traits, whether psychological or physiological, manifest themselves in ways we would rather not have or do not identify with. For example, one who has been nurtured within a racist culture may have beliefs to the effect that certain classes of people are inferior. And even if one comes to see such views as erroneous, one may nonetheless find such beliefs still floating up. One can assent to the belief as the belief they find themselves as having, but not assent to the belief as their own.

Consciousness is also always selective: “Accentuation and Emphasis are present in every perception we have. We find it quite impossible to disperse our attention impartially over a number of impressions (Vol. 1, “The Stream of Thought,” 273).” Selection is not limited to what is useful for the species. It’s evident in reasoning, aesthetics, and ethics (Vol. 1, “The Stream of Thought,” 276). In a rare moment, in emphasizing the scope of the principle of selection, James provides an illuminating description of indignation in the same chapter – effectively distinguishing it from other emotions - despite his pronounced disdain for the tediousness of conceptual categorizations of the emotions. He writes, “but in the midst of our indignation with the gentleman, we have a consciousness that his preposterous inertia and negative-ness in the actual emergency is, somehow or other, *allied* with his general superiority to ourselves. It is not only that the gentleman ignores considerations relative to conduct, sordid suspicions,

fears, calculations, etc., which the vulgarian is fated to entertain; it is that he is silent where the vulgarian talks; that ... (Vol. 2, "Reasoning," 993)." James here is spelling out the relevant conceptual aspects of an emotion that the mind selects from the buzzing confusion. The selection determines and accounts for the particular emotion. James isn't here asserting one is reflectively conscious of themselves as thinking these distinctions, but rather that a particular kind of selection accounts for the indignation. One may report only the feeling of indignation and be quite unable to report what was selected or how the selection happened.⁴⁷

Emotional feelings are the fringe or psychic overtones of consciousness. James deflates the distinction between knowledge of acquaintance and knowledge-about (Vol. 1, "The Stream of Thought," 249-250). The psychic fringe is not in principle a different kind of knowledge, but it's an epistemic difference. The felt fringe need only indicate interest, leaving silent any other relations. However, the feeling of indignation is a feeling of indignation, not because of its sensory aspect, or simply because it's a feeling of bodily changes. The feeling connects to the cognitive aspect, the perception of the exciting fact. And though the feeling is a feeling of bodily changes, the felt experience serves as a reliable guide to the content of the perception of the exciting fact. With this chain of connections, James can readily claim that his theory can account for pathological and non-pathological cases. When the feeling of fear is simply a feeling of bodily

⁴⁷ The one who finds a racist belief or perception floating up finds it contrary to how they think of the world and themselves. Selection and emphasis need not be as one would want. And so, it need not be that the conscious state be personal even if the experience is charged.

changes,⁴⁸ no ground is available to distinguish between the pathological and the non-pathological. If the non-pathological cases presuppose cognition, then one can make sense of such a distinction.

The perception of the exciting object isn't simply the perception of an external object, as "The Physical Basis of Emotion," published four years after The Principles, makes explicit.⁴⁹ In the article, James addresses an objection raised by critics David Irons and W.L. Worchester. They claim that it's not seeing the object as such that produces the emotion. For seeing a bear in a zoo, in a circus, in a photograph, from afar, while sufficiently armed, etc., fails to generate an emotion. James is quick to the point: "A reply to these objections is the easiest thing in the world to make ... As soon as the object has become thus familiar and suggestive, its emotional consequences, *on any theory of emotion*, must start rather from the total situation which it suggests than from its own naked presence ("The Physical Basis of Emotion," 206)." The perception of the exciting fact selects some aspect of the total situation as being vitally important.⁵⁰ By conceding that the perception isn't simply of an exciting object, it's one perceived as an exciting object, James retains the strength of his position.

⁴⁸ Gerald E. Myers, in "William James's Theory of Emotion," argues for the view that the feeling of fear is nothing more than the feeling of bodily changes. I disagree. Such an interpretation needs to explain James's distinction between pathological and non-pathological cases.

⁴⁹ Matthew Ratcliffe, in "William James on Emotion and Intentionality," claims that James's view is not an object as perceived but simply the external object causing the perception (185). From "What is an Emotion," he offers the following citation as evidence: "... the emotion is nothing but the reflex bodily effects of what we call its "object", effects due to the connate adaptation of the nervous system to that object." Unfortunately Ratcliffe omits the 'if' proceeding 'the emotion', leaving a different reading of James's view. More importantly, the relevant text fails to appear in The Principles.

⁵⁰ That every object that excites an instinct excites an emotion (Vol. 2, "The Emotions," 1058) is immaterial. For James, the number of instincts implanted in humans out stretch those implanted in other animals as instinct slides between reflex action and habit (Vol. 2, "Instinct," 1056, ft 34) and are "implanted for the sake of giving rise to habits (Vol. 2, "Instinct," 1022)."

Accepting this aspect of common sense, that it's the respect in which one perceives something that generates an emotion, doesn't tell against James's main thesis: perceiving the object as an exciting object brings about the bodily changes and without those bodily mechanisms, there would be no feeling of bodily changes.

Nor is it just that one perceives the object in a particular way. James indirectly emphasizes that the perception of the exciting fact is selective in terms that are "vitally important" to one. In the thought experiment, what one abstracts when abstracting the emotional feeling in normal cases is more than the sensation. The personal aspect, what was vitally important to one, built in the perception of the exciting fact, is removed too. The residual after the abstraction is the mere topic of the thought, neutered of its value.

To see this one must address why James casts the intellectual perception as cold and neutral in his intuition pump and his test for the theory. The term 'cold' isn't an account of how it feels for one. By a cold and neutral intellectual perception, James has in mind something more akin to "pure" thought. Such thoughts would stand independently of the individual – a mere thought in one's head one might say. This is the sense that the term 'neutral' carries – it's a thought one is indifferent to. It's cold because one no longer treats it as worthy of one's concern. That is, the abstraction, if carried out thoroughly, mirrors stoicism. Namely, the exciting object is no longer seen as exciting. It is something unworthy of one's concern. James relies on a notion of feeling thicker than the minimal construal, a mere this or that. What one takes away when one

abstracts the feeling gathers not only the sensory aspect but the personal one too. One abstracts a life that "is too apathetic to be keenly sought (Vol. 2, "The Emotions," 1068)."

In the proof for his theory, James writes that the complete anesthetic would be like someone who eats, and so appears to be hungry, but reports he has no appetite (Vol. 2, "The Emotions," 1070). The person acts, he says, cold bloodedly: he acts not from any interest in the food. He then compares this case with the subject of his proposed experiment who would report a cold heart. This is not simply asserting that acting cold bloodedly is analogous to having a cold heart. Rather both are consequences of being a complete anesthetic but not paralytic subject. James's description of the thought experiment makes this clear. When one removes the feeling of rage, what is left is a "cold-blooded and dispassionate judicial sentence, confined entirely to the intellectual realm, to the effect that a certain person or persons merit chastisement for their sins (Vol. 2, "The Emotions," 1068)." Not only does one have a cold heart, one is left with something akin to a pure thought. Though James asserts there are no pure conceptions (Vol. 2, "Sensation," 654, ft 4), the point at issue is that the thought is not owned, even though it may occur to one. The cold-blooded judicial thought captures perceiving something without excitement, despite the bodily manifestations, just as the person who eats without excitement, captures the lack of interest in the food, despite their eating.

2.4.4 JAMES REPLIES TO OBJECTIONS

James presents three objections to his theory in The Principles. Consideration of the first two provides additional support for the thesis that James advances a cognitive theory of emotion. The first objection challenges the claim "that particular perceptions *do* produce wide-spread bodily effects... (Vol. 2, "The Emotions," 1072)." One is left wondering why James would raise an objection that challenges just that connection, if his theory was simply that the emotions are felt bodily changes. In such a view, how the bodily changes were caused would be immaterial. Common sense requires the perception of the exciting fact precede the bodily changes. James's objection to common sense focused instead only on the causal ordering between the bodily manifestations and the emotional feelings. Another opponent of James, the Platonist, might disparage the body as a locus for emotion; they need not, however, challenge that the perception of the exciting fact precedes bodily changes. They would rather challenge the identification of emotion with feelings or feelings of bodily change. But here, no such identification is being made. A natural explanation as to why James raises and addresses the objection is the presumption that in normal cases there is a conceptual link between the perception of an exciting fact and a felt experience.

James's initial response to the objection raises a number of suggestive scenarios, involving an emotional response that surprises one. Surprise presupposes a present perspective on the world that contrasts in the relevant sense with a prior one. Even when one is conscious of one's present view of

things, one may fail to predict one's emotional response. Positing surprise at an emotional feeling presumes a thought prior to the perception of the exciting fact and the emotional feeling indicates a "surprising" point of view. The sensible hypothesis is that the point of view that is "surprising" is just the perception of the exciting fact.⁵¹ That an emotional response may be surprising presupposes a perception produced the bodily changes.⁵²

James further notes that some cases that seem to be based on mere perception are not. He asks the reader to "imagine two steel knife-blades with their keen edges crossing each other at right angles, and moving to and fro (Vol. 2, "The Emotions," 1073)." The case suggests it's the mere sound or sight that produces the emotional feeling. James claims to the contrary. It's perceptively anticipating the unwanted bodily response where the "anticipation precipitates their [the feelings] arrival (Vol. 2, "The Emotions," 1073)." In such cases, one perceives the initial movement of the knives as about to produce unwanted bodily shivers. It's not simply the seeing of the knife-blades crossing, seeing the objects as such, but seeing that the crossing knife-blades will produce an unwelcome bodily reaction that accounts for the emotion.⁵³ James says something rather curious about this example: "This case is typical of a class: where *an ideal emotion seems to precede* the bodily symptoms, it is often nothing but an anticipation of the symptoms themselves (Vol. 2, "The Emotions," 1073,

⁵¹ I'm not here claiming this involves the unconscious, as sub-conscious would do.

⁵² James here considers normal cases. Pathological cases would then be those that do not require a prior perspective.

⁵³ James notes a close proximity between emotions and instincts (Vol. 2, "The Emotions," 1058). The reaction to the knife-blades crossing without the anticipation may be best explained as an instinctive one.

emphasis mine)." First, James contends that an emotion (i.e., the perception of the exciting fact) is prior to the bodily changes it produces. Though an anti-cognitivist will read into 'seems' a suggestion that it's not the case that the emotion, in normal cases, precedes the bodily manifestation, nowhere does James offer an argument that is explicitly aimed at a cognitive account.

Furthermore, some of his contemporary critics were cognitivists. And as we saw, James embraces that aspect of cognitivism. Instead, James reveals how thin conceptually a normal emotion may be: mere anticipation of a future bodily reaction.

After this, James concedes the central point of the objection: an emotional feeling may be caused without the perception of the exciting fact. These cases, however, are typically pathological (Vol. 2, "The Emotions," 1073). James then turns seeming defeat into victory. The strength of his theory, in part, captures both pathological and normal cases. A cognitive account may deny that there are objectless emotions, because they just are pathological cases.⁵⁴ James's rejoinder is to offer a broader account of emotion. This difference between the two, however, remains insignificant. Both approaches agree on the following: pathological cases are objectless; the normal cases are not; normal cases provide the explanatory standard in developing a theory of emotion; normal cases entail the perception of an exciting fact.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ A cognitivist may accept that a particular feeling event may happen even though the perception of the exciting fact does not, in effect denying that the experience counterfactually depends on the appropriate perception. A cognitivist will insist, however, either that the feeling be caused in the appropriate manner or that its labeling as an emotional feeling depend on appropriate causation in standard cases. William James opts for the later.

⁵⁵ This cannot be said for some somatic theories. See Jenefer Robinson's "Startle" for an example.

Though James identifies the feeling of fear with the feeling of bodily changes, in virtue of what is it a feeling of fear? It's not a feeling of fear in virtue of a particular orchestration of bodily changes. For the physiological changes that a particular feeling is a feeling of vary from individual to individual. Moreover, the physiological changes that a particular feeling is a feeling of vary diachronically for a particular individual. No physiological changes are unique to fear from individual to individual or within the same individual. At most, a disjunctive list of likely physiological changes might be enumerated for the typical person, but "no absolute truth" as to what physiological changes constitutes the emotion (Vol. 2, "The Emotions," 1063-1064). Given that James says the same about the items in the world that cause an emotion (Vol. 2, "The Emotions," 1064), the natural option, in normal cases, is that it's the perception and the respect in which an object is perceived as exciting that accounts for the feeling of an emotion as that emotion.

James's second objection challenges the notion that 'emotion' should cover both the pathological and non-pathological. It also attacks the link between bodily manifestation and feeling. The objection asserts that sometimes bodily changes can be produced neither by the perception of the exciting fact, as in normal cases, nor by the use of drugs or in virtue of a mental illness, as in pathological cases. Instead, one actively produces the relevant bodily changes by mimicry or pretense. The case shares a parallel with James's thought experiment. The residual remaining after abstraction is a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception. Similarly, mimicry or pretense cold-bloodedly brings

about bodily changes. Contrary to pathological cases, the bodily changes are brought about willingly. Still, like pathological cases, the emotion lacks an object. Yet, the objector asserts, emotional feeling may not be present.

James's reply appreciates how complex emotions are. He reveals how this case may broach and slide between pathological and normal cases. And though he concedes a position nestling between pathological and normal cases, it serves to reinforce his earlier claim that it's a feature of his theory that it accounts for non-standard cases when emotions are viewed as feelings. James emphasizes that such pretending and mimicry often fails to bring about any feeling. Either one is unable to produce sufficient bodily changes voluntarily or one either inhibits or isolates the relevant bodily changes. Still, in his reply, James contends that in normal cases, "panic is increased by flight, and giving way to the symptoms of grief or anger increases those passions themselves (Vol. 2, "The Emotions," 1077)." One recognizes that an increase in the intensity of an emotional feeling, in normal cases or otherwise, corresponds to an increase in physiological arousal. One might suppose that James here is only reaffirming that the feeling increases the passion. But as stated before, bodily manifestations are insufficient for categorizing a particular feeling as a feeling of a particular emotion. As a further refinement, James claims that refusing to *express* a passion leads to it dying and that if one counts to ten before expressing one's anger, "its occasion seems ridiculous (Vol. 2, "The Emotions," 1077)." In both, the emotion precedes the bodily expression. For an emotion cannot die and one cannot vent an emotion if no emotion exists. One presumes,

in normal cases, a conceptual tie to account for either.

As a final remark, James considers two groups of actors; each group can adeptly manifest emotional expressions. However, one group reports emotional feeling while the other does not. What accounts for the difference? James quotes approvingly of an English actress of his time who declares: "playing with the brain is far less fatiguing than playing with the heart (Vol. 2, "The Emotions," 1079)." Acting with one's head implies mimicry or pretense. Acting with one's heart implies an active emotion. Method Acting, not a term in James's day, relies on reviving an appropriate prior emotional experience and incorporating the experience into one's performance. Though the emotion isn't necessarily objectless, the object is certainly displaced. James leaves unclear whether the nature of mimicry and pretense is sufficient explanation for the difference, or the actor must actively inhibit the relevant bodily changes. The former provides further support. For an emotion requires more than going through the behavioral manifestations. An emotion requires sincerity, perceiving the world as exciting in a personal way.

2.5 ENDING REMARKS

I've been swimming against the current. What keeps the assertion that James advances a cognitive theory of emotion from being swept to sea and enabling some headway is the ability to make sense of diverse claims made throughout The Principles. In this chapter, I've focused on just a few. Two are central. First, James claims his theory can take into account pathological and non-pathological

emotions. Second, though a feeling of fear is identical with a feeling of bodily change, the feeling of bodily change won't account for why it's a feeling of fear. A cognitive interpretation of James's theory does well with making sense of both.

No doubt this view of James's theory of emotion strips the life out of James's close attention to experience, especially its phenomenal aspect. Emotional feeling will be taken up in the last chapter. But what is of interest in James's theory is neither thought nor feeling – rather it's the personal aspect of emotion. This aspect of emotion runs through both cognitive and neo-feeling theories as we shall see in Chapters Three and Four. The cognitivist, however, will have the better account in Chapter Five.

3 Intentionalism

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The cognitive interpretation of James's theory of emotion of the prior chapter worked with James's relaxed notion of thought and feeling. James's position more or less collapses a distinction between feeling and thought since consciousness presents itself as unified and about something. I presume, however, a distinction between feeling and thought. I provisionally treat feeling traditionally. Feelings are simple and not conceptual. And so, I treat thought and feeling as distinct. Alternative accounts of emotion that depend on a richer account of feeling reap value in virtue of husking off the central claim of an intentional (cognitive) theory: emotion types are individuated in terms of thought. I'll critique arguments against intentionalism in the following chapter. By clarifying how intentionalism understands the nature of thought one will be in a better position to evaluate in Chapter Four whether such alternative accounts of emotion bear fruit.

I provide an account of emotion centering on thought that begins with Anthony Kenny's, runs through William Lyons's, and settles on Robert Gordon's position. Solomon's theory would seem to present an obvious avenue too. For he claims that emotions are judgments, full stop. But the claim is more dramatic than precise. The bold nature of the claim has garnered Solomon's position quite a bit of attention. Solomon is often regarded as the standard bearer for the view that thought is central to understanding emotion as most criticisms against such

a view focus on his claim that emotions are judgments. I find this unfortunate. For one, neither Kenny nor Gordon accepted the view that only cognitive states were relevant for individuating the emotions. Though Lyons strictly is a cognitivist, the argument supporting it is weak enough that Lyons could just as well not be. Second, Solomon's own position wasn't that judgments were sufficient, but only that they were necessary. Kenny, however, I think, offers the better position in offering a wide variety of substantive arguments. Gordon does too and furthers Kenny's position by filling in the details Kenny left open. But since Solomon's view is relevant in so far as one addresses criticisms, I leave discussion of his view until the next chapter.

Kenny, Gordon, and to some extent Lyons, incorporate cognition and cognation into their view. This helps to dispel a myth about cognitivism. Namely, the central thesis of cognitivism is that emotion types can be individuated solely in terms of belief. Kenny argues a formal object characterizes each emotion type. The formal object restricts what may be feared, regretted, or hoped for. For example, one cannot fear spiders unless one thinks of them as dangerous. His identifying each emotion type with a formal object forms the heart of an intentionalist view of emotion. I say 'intentionalist' rather than 'cognitivist' since the latter indicates thought while excluding cognitive states. 'Intentionalism' provides an apt description of Kenny's view and the others considered in this chapter, for no cognitivist was one. Emotion types are individuated in terms of cognitive and cognative states.

Commentary on Action, Emotion and Will treats the text as containing three distinct sections: one concerning the emotions, another regarding the logical form of sentences reporting action, and the last focusing on his draft theory of volition. None of the commentary on Kenny's theory of emotion connects it with his theory of volition or his remarks on action. The theory of volition he sketches reveals emotion shares aspects not only of cognition, but cognition too. That Kenny incorporates both into his view draws from the sections on the nature of (voluntary) action. Action, Emotion and Will presents an extended argument for an intentionalist theory of emotion. More importantly, the extended argument draws out the central elements of an intentionalist theory of emotion. Both Lyons and Gordon provide helpful extensions and friendly amendments. However, Lyon's treatment of emotions as dispositions and Gordon's division between factive and epistemic emotions fail to be convincing.

3.2 GEACH'S THEORY OF JUDGMENT, KENNY'S THEORY OF VOLITION

Kenny's inclusion of desire as a piece of the formal object of an emotion is admittedly indirect. The initial chapters address modern philosophers (Descartes, Hume, and Locke), notable positions within experimental psychology of his day (including William James and the behaviorists), and his own take on feeling as it pertains to emotion. Absent is talk of cognitive thought. And when he does talk about the formal object of an emotion in those chapters he presents it in terms of cognitive thought. To see how cognitive thought fits within his view of emotion, one must look to his theory of volition.

Kenny's theory of volition parallels Peter Geach's analogy theory of judgment advanced in Mental Acts. Kenny considers Geach's book "the most satisfactory treatment of intentional sentences so far put forward" (Action, Emotion and Will, 142).⁵⁶ However accurate Kenny's description of his mentor's work, it is certainly one of the most neglected. Geach was a formidable logician, jostling with the likes of Quine, and inspired by Wittgenstein without being a devotee. Mental Acts sits well within analytic philosophy. He argues for a view of mind by focusing on what we say. It's a tired stance, though a natural approach to coming to grips with an account of thought and one Kenny implicitly adopts. Many philosophers of the emotions rail against analytic philosophy because it sought to understand the mind through language.⁵⁷ But if one relaxes the stance, allowing other approaches in understanding the mind, as Kenny actually did in his review of the psychology of emotion, one wonders why the context of an utterance cannot be revealing about the mind. Certainly, as a method for understanding the mind, it helps.

Helen Nissenbaum, in Emotion and Focus, criticizes Kenny as failing to be consistent or at least failing to be rigorous. She supposes Kenny reduces philosophical questions to questions about linguistic expressions and how they function. She calls this the linguistic condition and implicitly presents a strong and weak version (Emotion and Focus, 10-11). The strong version ties the nature of one's investigation upon the structural features of sentences relevant to

⁵⁶ Hereafter I will abbreviate the text as 'AEW'. Citations are from the 2nd edition. Sadly, the 2nd edition does not preserve the pagination of the 1st edition.

⁵⁷ Analytic philosophy has been cut in varied ways. I'm fond of Dummett's Origins of Analytic Philosophy and Coffa's The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap

the item under consideration. A weaker version also derives insights from an analysis of language but without being wedded to each structural feature of a language or languages.

It's clear that Kenny does not accept the stronger version. Not every grammatical fact or lack thereof is of importance. Kenny writes "[t]he proliferation of different constructions after affective verbs in English can hardly be of logical importance, since no two languages seem to agree on the analogies which they present between reports of different kinds" (AEW, 150). Nissenbaum finds that if there are such varied uses in language, Kenny's dismissal will be unjustified. She decries the statement as one in need of substantial justification: "To support this sweeping disclaimer, Kenny offers only one example" (Emotion and Focus, 34). But whereas she takes the same citation of Kenny to require more justification because Kenny adopts the strong version of the linguistic condition, I take the quote to support the claim that he did not adopt the strong version of the linguistic condition.⁵⁸ Nissenbaum offers little support for her claim. One reason for supposing Nissenbaum to be correct is that Kenny seemingly writes of intentionality for the simple reason that he uses the term 'intentionality.' However, in the preface to the second edition, Kenny writes "[f]ollowing Brentano and Chisholm I sought (with only limited success) to give a formal characterization of such features. I was looking for a criterion for what is commonly called "intentionality" but which, for reasons that no longer seem to me cogent, I called in this book 'intentionality'" (AEW, xi). In addition, Kenny

⁵⁸ I here address a wee complaint from Paul Griffiths who claims that for Kenny and other intentionalists "conceptual analysis is the only tool they need to investigate emotions" [emphasis added] (What Emotions Really Are, 23).

considers "the careful analysis of language one of the principle routes to philosophical insight" and makes no apologies for the style of his book, "written in the heyday of Oxford ordinary language philosophy" (AEW, xv). Though at the center of his approach is an appreciation of various types of speech as indicative of various types of thought, his view is not reductionist. He cannot thereby be committed to the strong version of the linguistic condition, which would treat an investigation into intensional structure as the only route to philosophical insight.

In Mental Acts, Geach had argued for an analogical extension of the concept of judgment from the concept of saying. To judge is to say something in one's heart, though not, in his view, necessarily with words or a mental language. Geach contrasts his own view with Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment. For Russell, judging is analyzed as a relation between the subject and what is judged, where the judging relation is dependent on the terms involved within what is judged. If I judge that Socrates is mortal, the judging relation is three-termed, having the components Socrates, mortal, and I. If I judge that Mt. Everest is taller than Mt. Marcy, the relation is four-termed. Russell's theory also maintains that any relation within the judgment remain as a term independent of the relata. As a term among others, the relation 'taller than' does not preserve the relata. It is, if you will, a relation with two holes. This peculiar feature of his theory helps avoid Meinongian creatures. Russell's commitment to the nature of a proposition constrains his view about judgment. Since Russell treated propositions as facts, one is open to admitting objective falsehoods if one understands judgment to be a relation to a proposition, i.e., a fact (Mental Acts,

50). Allowing a term to relate other terms within the judgment opens the way for propositions. In effect, Russell's theory avoids false objectives by denying the judgment a kind of unity inherent in a proposition. This feature will undermine his theory, thoroughly.

Wittgenstein, rather famously, objected to Russell's theory, effectively deflating Russell's work in progress, A Theory of Knowledge.⁵⁹ Wittgenstein presented two objections, both of which have a voice in Mental Acts.⁶⁰ In Notebooks, Wittgenstein writes "[w]hen we say A judges that, etc., then we have to mention a whole proposition which A judges. It will not do to mention only its constituents, or its constituents and form but not in the proper order."⁶¹ Whereas in Russell's theory two judgments will be identical when they have the same terms even if the order of the terms differs. For example, whether I judge that Mt. Everest is taller than Mt. Marcy or that Mt. Marcy is taller than Mt. Everest, identical terms capture both judgments. The two judgments will be indistinguishable as they both consist of the same terms: three individuals and a relation. The constituent terms fail to be sensitive to the direction of a relation inherent in a judgment, that is, no term captures the order expressed among the relation(s) and their relata (Mental Acts, 50-51). Thus, there is no distinguishable difference between the judgments. Russell's theory also fails to be adequate for

⁵⁹ Peter Hanks in "How Wittgenstein Defeated Russell's Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment" argues that Wittgenstein's argument against Russell's theory concerns the unity of a proposition and is independent of Russell's theory of types, contrary to some contemporary interpretations. Geach offers arguments in a similar vein.

⁶⁰ Geach was obviously privy to Wittgenstein's ideas and that he sings a similar tune with Wittgenstein is of no surprise. Thus, since they are likely to be Wittgenstein's ideas, I use the work of Wittgenstein to voice two of three objections.

⁶¹ Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 1914-1916, 96.

forms of judgment where the order of the relation does not matter.⁶² Explicitly, such a judgment might be ‘for any individual and for any other individual, one is different from the other’, with the logical form ‘ $(x)(y)(Dxy \bullet x \neq y)$ ’ where one is indifferent to the items in the domain. This judgment still contains a grammatical order, one for which the judgment is understandable. A mere list of terms allows for the construction of nonsense "sentences" and as Wittgenstein stressed "[e]very theory of judgment must make it impossible for me to judge that ‘this table penholders the book’ (Russell's theory does not satisfy this requirement.) (Notebooks, 96).” Geach makes a similar point. To report that someone judged nonsense is nonsense (Mental Acts, 10). Expressions and reports of judgment presume that the mental act of judging is about something.

Besides these two objections, Geach offers a third. One might understand the expression “Russell judges that Socrates is mortal” as well as “that pineapples taste sugary”, yet nonetheless not understand “Russell judges that pineapples taste sugary (Mental Acts, 49).” Russell's theory permits such a failure because a judgment is constituted by a series of terms. Understanding the content of a noun-clause as unified, however that may be, and understanding what it is to judge independent of what a judgment is about, does not entail one could unify the two. The objection succeeds, as well as the others, because Russell had foreclosed a natural move.

Geach's own view of judgment surmounts the difficulties in Russell's theory. He looks toward verbal reports of thought, distinguishing the noun clause from verbs of saying when reporting an utterance and the noun clause

⁶² I thank Lisa Tsay for discussion.

from verbs of thinking when reporting a thought. The account is reached in two stages. He begins with the observation that "... given a statement made by James in language L, the grammatical rules of L generally allow us to construct a piece of *oratio obliqua* that preserves the gist of the statement. . . . Having done this, we need only tack on the expression in L for 'James judged (that...)', and we have a report in L of the judgment expression in James's original statement" (Mental Acts, 10). That is to say, we use indirect speech to report what someone said without having to report his or her actual words. And though it may seem rather unremarkable that our language allows one to alter a report of what someone said into a report of their thought by simply changing the main verb, the point for Geach is that "[a]ny reportable act of judgment is apt for verbal expression, in a form of words whose gist is contained in the *oratio obliqua* of the report" (Mental Acts, 11).⁶³ Any reportable act of judgment may equally be a report of what is said, just as a report of what is said may equally be a report of an act of judgment. And both reports may be constructed using a that clause, that is, the *oratio oblique* of the report. As such, our understanding of the thought expressed may be facilitated given our understanding of the content expressed in the *oratio oblique* of the report. But since a report of what a person said need not be confined to the words actually spoken, something of significance must remain in the report. In particular, the report will preserve polyadicity, i.e., the relation(s) binding the varied relata. This was not an option for Russell.

Geach then proposes that the concepts exercised in an act of judgment

⁶³ For clarification and restatement, Geach is neither committed to the Language of Thought Hypothesis nor to the view that an act of judgment "is always put into words."

mirror the logical complexity, i.e., polyadicity, expressed by the words reporting the judgment. In reporting the content of someone's judgment that Mt. Everest is taller than Mt. Marcy using the words 'Mt. Everest is taller than Mt. Marcy', one notes a dyadic relation and the order of the terms 'Mt. Everest' and 'Mt. Marcy' with respect to the relational expression 'taller than'. Likewise, the mental content of the judgment consists of the concepts MT. EVEREST and MT. MARCY standing in the relation §(taller than). '§(taller than)' preserves the polyadicity of the relation 'taller than'. That is to say, '§' is an operator over relational expressions. As an undefined non-extensional operator, '§' is not applicable to 'R' in '§(R)' in the way the extensional negation-operator would be. Still, '§(R)' picks out a mental event and preserves a connection between the content in a report and the mental content in that '§(R)' and 'R' will have the same polyadicity.

In the second stage of Geach's theory, he proposes to interpret '§()' in terms of *oratio recta*, another linguistic device for reporting judgments – one using quotation. Though quotation is primarily used to report speech or text, Geach notes a metaphoric application for reports of judgment. He offers Psalm 14:1 as an example: "The fool has said in his heart, 'There is no God'."⁶⁴ The phrase, 'said in his heart', and any variant, picks out thought. The use of quotation settles on a form of "spoken" words. Such use is metaphoric. It need not be those words, nor need it be in an inner language. Quotation, for Geach,

⁶⁴ Geach relied on the King James Bible. Not all English translations use quotations for Psalm 14:1, e.g., the Douey-Rheims Bible. Whether a translation of the Bible uses quotation or not is of no consequence. What matters is that there was a form of speech to report one's thought in antiquity.

follows logical practice. One can read from the quoted expression the logical structure, i.e., the order of the signs, the relations, the relata, as well as how the relation holds among the relata.⁶⁵ The form of words expressed within the quotes provides an analogy for the concepts exercised in the judgment. Like *oratio obliqua*, one need not be committed to encasing the thought in a fixed set of words. Still, the report preserves polyadicity. In this way, Geach interprets a judgment in terms of a report of a judgment. So, when one reports that Frank said in his heart “Mt. Everest is taller than Mt. Marcy”, Frank has a judgment consisting of the idea of Mt. Everest standing in the relation ‘taller than’ to his idea of Mt. Marcy.

Geach’s account of judgment now overcomes the difficulties burdening Russell’s account. Geach’s objection focused on the possibility of not having the ability to form a novel judgment even though one had the capacity to judge and could independently understand the varied concepts in a novel judgment. Geach has separated the judgment from what the judgment is about. That is, a separation of the mental attitude from the mental content. So, if one has the capacity to judge and understands the varied concepts there is nothing more to a judgment other than having the judgment be directed toward the mental content. Second, by treating what is judged as having logical complexity, one may thereby discern among varied possible ways the relata may be positioned in a relational expression.

⁶⁵ As one can see, this offends against Quine’s injunction that items between quotations be treated as one word with no significant parts. Geach objects. See his remarks on pp. 80-85. I need not be concerned about these different approaches to quotation, as I advocate neither Geach’s theory nor Kenny’s extension, though I’m sympathetic to Geach’s challenge to Quine.

One may wonder what advantage *oratio recta* has over *oratio obliqua* as both report thought and, as Geach puts it, both preserve the gist of the statement. Geach offers two reasons. For one, *oratio recta* allows him to sidestep controversies over the priority of spoken language and thought. In *oratio obliqua*, reports of judgments were parasitic on reports of written or spoken language. In *oratio recta*, however, “we have a clear case of a linguistic device whose psychological application is secondary to its application to sensible things – bits of actual written and spoken language” (Mental Acts, 80). The psychological application of *oratio recta* is not literally dependent on speech or text even though one understands this metaphoric use in virtue of quoting actual bits of speech and text. Second, Geach argued, in Chapter 20, that a difficulty raised by Quine for quantification into *oratio obliqua* contexts may be avoided by using *oratio recta* instead. Interestingly, his account of judgment depends on his descriptive theory of quotation presented within Mental Acts and Quine adopted and advocated a name theory of quotation. The issues and details here are incidental to the dissertation. What matters now is Kenny's adoption of Geach's account of judgment.

Kenny simply extends the mechanics of Geach's argument to a theory of volition on the basis of two parallels. First, just as the difference between reporting what one judged and said may differ only in the main verb, the difference between reports of an emotion and what is stated may also differ only in the main verb. That is, given a sentence of the form “James regretted that p” one may construct a sentence “James said that p” (AEW, 144-145). Similarly,

when reporting a command, rather than a statement, one may also report one's desire. So, in the case of "Grant commanded the Army to attack" one could just as well report Grant's desire, namely "Grant wanted the Army to attack." In mastering the use of words, not only does one know how to use them in statements, but also in commands and wishes: "[j]ust as it seems that we could always report judgments by means of reports using *oratio recta*, so it seems that we could always report desires by using quoted commands or wishes" (AEW, 145).⁶⁶ Geach presented the operator '§' for interpreting reports of judgment by means of *oratio recta*. Kenny adopts the operator 'W' for volitions, which includes reports of affect as well as desire, and likewise preserves the polyadicity of a reported volition.

As one can have varied thoughts with the same content, the differences among those thoughts will be with respect to distinctive mental attitudes. How then can one determine, other than stipulation, whether a thought is a judgment or volition? Kenny puts the point this way: if we take a picture of a boxer as akin to the content, "the picture remains the same whether it is used to make an assertion or a command; and so the pictured boxer is pictured in the same way whether the predicate holding of the corresponding Idea is '§(stand so)' or 'W(stand so)' (AEW, 156)."⁶⁷ With the same reasoning used for commands and statements as analogical extensions for volitions and judgments, one needs some further way to distinguish '§' and 'W' as each corresponds to different ways of "mentally predicating" over the same concepts. And if one cannot make that

⁶⁶ By 'wish' Kenny means the verbal expression of a desire.

⁶⁷ The issue is slightly more complicated. Kenny casts the problem as one about predication and assertion.

distinction, then Geach's connection from statements to judgments will flounder. Kenny points out that Geach's theory is a theory of thought-radicals, not a theory of judgment (AEW, 160). Geach's theory took advantage of two moves. First, one distinguishes the illocutionary force of an utterance from its propositional content and then draws a parallel with the illocutionary force of a speech act and the mental attitude of a thought. In his 1965 paper "Assertions," Geach argued for "the Frege point": one distinguishes the proposition from the assertion. If one says, "the rain in Spain falls mainly on the plain", one should distinguish the content of the quoted utterance from, to use Austin's intuitive description, the act of performing an assertion. Geach was sensitive to the same distinction in Mental Acts. In Chapter 21 he argued about the role of "true" as a predicate applying to statements. In that chapter he writes "[i]n the main clauses, to be sure, 'I corroborate' has a "performatory" role – its utterance is an act of corroborating – and it loses this role in an 'if' clause" (Mental Acts, 97). In making his point he shows sensitivity to the differences between the propositional content and illocutionary force of an utterance. Kenny points out Geach's theory of judgment actually fails to distinguish between other types of illocutionary force. For what is the difference between 'S()' and 'W()'? As a result, Kenny seeks to show some differences between statements and commands and so, by analogy, some differences between judgments and volitions.

Kenny's responses are now common and well worn. First, if one wants to understand action, one cannot do so simply in terms of cognition.⁶⁸ No behavior

⁶⁸ See Geach, Mental Acts, Chisholm, "Freedom and Action" in , and Davidson, "Reasons, Actions, and Causes" in Essays on Actions & Events.

would be characteristic of a set of beliefs unless one knew the desires too. Without desire one will not tend toward an object; one cannot tend toward an object without some view of what the object is or is for. And by tending toward something, it is understood one intends to do so, least anyone confuse the movements of iron filings for an intentional action. Second, the satisfaction conditions for statements and commands differ. Kenny writes "... it seems that the one distinction of logical importance is between two modes of speech which we may call the indicative and the optative. In the first mode, the facts, or what happens, sets the standard by which the utterance is judged and found true or false; in the second mode, the utterance sets the standard by which the facts, or what happens, is judged and found good or bad" (AEW, 155).

John Searle's intuitive description is that they differ in direction of fit.⁶⁹ Statements have a word-to-world direction. It will be satisfied by whether the utterance matches the world, that is, whether the utterance is true or false. Whereas commands will be satisfied by whether what happens matches the utterance, that is, the command is fulfilled. The classification is crude but fine enough for Kenny's purposes. For to explain actions one needs something more than cognition and one notes that cognitive and cognitive states differ with respect to direction of fit and satisfaction conditions.

In allying judgment and volition with respect to having a direction of fit, it's important to keep in mind that these represent broad classifications that mental attitudes may fall under and are not themselves basic mental attitudes. O.H. Green, in The Emotions (A Philosophical Theory), takes a rather conservative

⁶⁹ See Searle's Intentionality and Mind: A Brief Introduction.

approach in his investigation. Citing the same differences, i.e., in direction and fit and conditions of satisfaction, he supposes belief and desire form the basic set of mental attitudes from which others are derivative. Kenny's own position is that desires, intentions, and emotions exhibit the same direction of fit (mind to world) and conditions of success (satisfied rather than being true or false). Volition is a general category of mind that includes desires, intentions, and the emotions. It should remain an open question whether the emotions are themselves derivative of other types of mental attitudes besides belief and desire or that the emotions are a distinctive form of mental attitude. That is, for present purposes differences in direction of fit and conditions of satisfaction provide criteria for distinguishing types of thought without presuming it also marks the difference among basic types of mental attitudes.⁷⁰

3.3 EMOTION, WILL AND ACTION

Kenny eases his discussion by inventing the verb 'to volit' such that the varied types of verbs - affective verbs, intentions, wishes, commands – are equivalent to it. He models his invented verb on distinguishing features of performance verbs identified in a prior chapter, "States, Performances, Activities."⁷¹ All performance verbs may be restated in the form 'bringing it about that p'. For example, 'Bush washes his hands' can be restated as 'Bush is bringing it about that his hands are washed'. In addition, performance verbs have imperatives: 'Bush, wash your hands!' (AEW, 129-130). One can reasonably command only what can be done.

⁷⁰ One approach would be to identify mental attitudes with the illocutionary force of utterances.

⁷¹ Zeno Vendler makes similar distinctions in Linguistics in Philosophy.

Both provide essential marks of voluntary action and so 'to volit' will be treated as akin to a performance verb.

One may wonder whether Kenny's notion of volition, that is 'to volit', can sustain such varied items given that his theory of volition springs from his analysis of language. As Kenny himself notes, there are "an alarming variety" of verbal expressions and "a bewildering array of affective verbs followed by different constructions and with different restrictions on tense and different truth-value commitments." And though he states "[t]he proliferation of different constructions after affective verbs in English can hardly be of logical importance, since no two languages seem to agree on the analogies which they present between reports of different kinds" (AEW, 150), Kenny needs to make clear what ties the varied reports such that they may be embraced by an artificial verb which one treats as a performance verb. Staying within Kenny's classification, 'to enjoy' is not a performance verb. Though some activity verbs share the relevant features of performance verbs, not all do. It would be odd to command 'Enjoy Wagner!' even though 'to enjoy' is an activity verb. Nor does it require that anything be brought about when one enjoys Wagner. That is, 'to enjoy' need not have a purpose (AEW, 129). In addition, 'to fear' is neither a performance verb nor an activity verb. When one brings something about they generally change an object. And a performance verb generally involves a change in the object brought about by the subject (AEW, 128).⁷² However, when Bush fears the truth, no change is produced in the object. That is, though one can command 'fear the

⁷² Kenny offers two counter-examples to consider. Doctors can heal themselves and when climbing a mountain, the mountain need not change.

truth', fearing something does not generally involve a change in an object in the way that washing something does. Similar remarks apply 'to enjoy' as well. Clearly if we are to follow Kenny we need some reason for now ignoring the grammatical niceties. Namely, why should emotion be equivalent to 'to volit'?

The last remark does serve to roughly distinguish intentional and non-intentional actions. Heating a pan is a change in the pan while fearing a bear need involve no change in the bear. And so, even if some emotion verbs fail to exhibit general features of performance verbs, nevertheless, if emotions are intentional, one may overlook intensional differences. Such a divide among intentional and non-intentional actions is akin to a divide among voluntary action and non-voluntary action in that all voluntary action is intentional. However, it may be that some non-voluntary actions are intentional as well. Even when emotions are springs to action and intentional, the passivity of the emotions may lean one toward treating emotion, in some cases, as non-voluntary intentional action. Still, independent reasons are needed for supposing that emotions are actions and intentional actions since the reason for embracing emotions as volitional already relied on the assumption that emotions were intentional actions.

In "Actions and Relations," Kenny intends "to show that it is not taken for granted that an object of action is simply a term of a relation."⁷³ He provides several features that action-sentences and psychological sentences share that relation-sentences do not generally have. First and foremost, a relation has a fixed number of arguments and the number of arguments remains stable.

⁷³ Kenny's Chapter "Action and Relations" provides more than sufficient evidence that he did not treat the formal object of an emotion as a relation.

Transitive verbs of action, however, have variable polyadicity.⁷⁴ Consider the following sentences:

- a) Caesar was killed.
- b) Brutus killed Caesar.
- c) Brutus killed Caesar with a knife.
- d) Brutus killed Caesar at Midnight.
- e) Brutus killed Caesar with a knife at midnight.

(e) entails (a) through (d); (a) does not entail (b)-(e); (d) and (c) individually entail (a) and (b); conjoining (c) and (d) does not entail (e). If one substitutes a dyadic relation, such as 'is taller than' for 'killed', (a) would be false, (b) would entail (c)-(e) and (e) would entail (d)-(b), though it would be trivial. That's because 'is taller than' within (e) is logically independent of 'with a knife' and 'at midnight', whereas 'killed' in (e) is not. And so variable polyadicity serves to distinguish action-sentences from relation-sentences. The same comparison will be had for any affective verb substituted in the place of 'killed'. That is, affective verbs exhibit variable polyadicity.

Secondly, action-sentences show more ways of being false than relation-sentences when one describes the falsehood "*merely by the use of terms occurring in the sentence itself* along with quantifiers, variables, and the negative operator" (AEW, 114-115). In Kenny's example, the sentence 'Lear gave away his kingdom to Cordelia' could be false if any of the following were true.

⁷⁴ In the Action Theory literature, Kenny receives recognition for raising the problem of variable polyadicity. But Kenny did not think variable polyadicity presented a problem, rather it served as the distinguishing mark of action verbs. A "problem" is how to account for the relationships among the inferences cited in first-order predicate logic. Kenny argued that a logical analysis of the verb won't work. This leaves other possibilities open.

- f) Lear did not give his kingdom to anyone.
- g) It was not to Cordelia that Lear gave his kingdom.
- h) Lear did not give anything to Cordelia.
- i) It was not his kingdom that Lear gave to Cordelia.
- j) Lear did not give anything to anyone.

One notes a similar feature for emotions such as anger, delight, and sadness. So that "Othello was furious at Desdemona's' infidelity with Casio" will be false just in case he was furious at Desdemona but not for infidelity with Casio; he was furious at Desdemona, but not for infidelity; he was not furious at Desdemona; he was not furious at all.⁷⁵

These considerations provide some justification for treating the emotions as actions, though not intentional actions. On a standard line sensory states are not intentional. Perhaps emotions might be just sensory. And for perceptual states, though likely to be intentional, it remains debatable the extent to which they are intentional. However, if emotions are not simply bodily sensations or perceptual, then supposing they are intentional presents itself as a reasonable supposition. Kenny, in effect, has the material for just this argument.

Kenny's argument appears in his third chapter, "Feelings". He relies on varied grammatical transformations that may be used among three types of constructions after the verb 'to feel'. He distinguishes emotions and sensations from perceptions as well as emotions from some bodily sensations.

Verb-Object Form: The verb "to feel" has a direct object as in "I feel the

⁷⁵ Kenny's case works particularly well for Robert Gordon's factive emotions though not for the epistemic ones.

rough surface.”

Quasi-Copula Form: The verb “to feel” is followed by an adjective qualifying the subject of the verb as in “I feel sick.”

Oratio-Oblique Form: The verb “to feel” is followed by *oratio oblique* clause as in “I feel that the moment was unpropitious.”

By themselves, the three forms provide little interest. Rather, it’s the possibility of translating among the various forms. Kenny notes that whenever expressions fitting the first cannot be transformed into expressions fitting the second, they will imply expressions of a form fitting the third. “I feel a lump in the mattress” implies “I feel that there is a lump in the mattress”, but not “I feel lumpish.” In addition, whenever expressions of the first can be translated into an expression of a form fitting the second, they do not imply an expression of a form fitting the third. So, when “I feel guilt” implies “I feel guilty”, it does not imply “I feel that I am guilty.” The second form, as in ‘I feel guilty’ is perceptual, whereas the third form, as in ‘I feel that I am guilty,’ is not.

The difference between the first transformation and the second transformation “enables us to see through the *prima facie* similarity between emotions and perceptions (AEW, 38).” In addition, it may be used to distinguish pleasure and pain in a sensory sense from an emotional one (AEW, 39).

Furthermore, Kenny notes that emotions do not provide information about the world, in the way perceptions do, nor the body, in the way sensations do. Rather, emotions provide information about oneself.⁷⁶ Further, though we may speak of an organ of perception, in some sense, no organ of emotion exists. In

⁷⁶ Kenny’s own description of this is rather peculiar – see p.39.

addition, emotions are not localized as sensations are nor are they so tightly linked to areas of the body (e.g., one feels hunger only in the stomach area) (AEW, 40). More importantly, emotions, unlike sensations, are directed at objects (AEW, 41). But it will clearly beg the question to insist the construal of objects be intentional. Rather, enough has been suggested to show emotions are neither sensory nor perceptual (in a non-intentional way) and are therefore intentional. At least, that is how the argument should proceed.

We don't have from Kenny fine grained distinctions among types of actions, such as intention versus intentional, psychological vs. non-psychological, and most importantly, voluntary vs. non-voluntary. Though Kenny aimed to offer an account of volition that captured voluntary action, in the end, he thinks he is unsuccessful in providing sufficient conditions. Nevertheless, he has the right direction. What seems to be crucial is the divide between intentional action and non-intentional action. And as the emotions are forms of volition, emotions are not forms of non-intentional actions. Whether emotions as volition are voluntary actions, though independently important, is not a central issue here.

We now come full circle. He must distinguish his theory from Geach's theory of judgment. One does so by arguing that judgment is not sufficient, even if necessary, to explain action. Affective psychological verbs may be used to explain a person's action. As such, emotions involve more than just belief, since belief is insufficient to explain what one does and so "any report of an emotion ascribes both a belief and a want to a subject" (AEW, 164). Though construing emotions as involving both cognition and congnation partially recommends a

connection to action, emotions also exhibit variable polyadicity and other features of action sentences. Next, one shows that emotion is distinct from bodily sensation and perception when the latter are construed non-intentionally. Thus, it's not so much that emotions seem to be about something or that emotions may explain one's activities that lend themselves to an intentional account, which they do, but that an intentional interpretation is the best available explanation.⁷⁷ This serves to introduce the next feature of intentionalism, namely that a formal object individuates each emotion type.

3.4 FORMAL OBJECT

One of Kenny's central arguments maintains that the relation between an emotion and its [formal] object is not contingent, but necessary. Given that Kenny seems to speak of the external object of an emotion, the object of an affective verb, as well as the formal object of an emotion, he has been variously criticized. On the one hand, if the claim that emotions have objects amounts to the claim that many affective verbs are transitive and have object-expressions, then the thesis lacks substance. Nissenbaum worries that Kenny "reduces the question about the nature of objects of emotion to a question about interpreting object expressions embedded in emotion sentences" (Emotion and Focus, 23). Her worry is unwarranted, as Kenny did not accept the strong version of the linguistic condition. On the other hand, that emotions are often related to events causally

⁷⁷ One may want a more substantive argument as well as clarification on how construing emotion intentionally remains a better explanation than construing emotion perceptually and non-intentionally. This will be addressed in the following chapter when discussing neo-feeling theories.

needs no argument. But that the relation should be necessary seems incredible. In Emotion and Object, J.R.S. Wilson objects to Kenny's theory along that line. He takes Kenny to be offering a fatal challenge to his causal analysis of the "emotion : object relation". The intuitive pull behind Wilson's thesis is that when one's emotion is directed toward something, there are two distinct items. That is, if the emotion : object relation is really a relation, i.e., having relata, then one must have at least two items in the world to establish the relation between the emotion on the one hand and some object on the other. A natural move would be to explain how one's fear of a dog, for example, and the dog are related causally. As causal connections are contingent, the emotion : object relation cannot then be non-contingent (Emotion and Object, 18). However, Kenny claims that the connection of an emotion and its [formal] object is non-contingent. *Prima facie*, Kenny must be mistaken if Wilson's thesis is defensible.

Wilson points out that one may talk as if there were two items, when really there is only one. That is, one may talk of a conceptual connection. A common line of philosophical reasoning goes as follows: When A and B are conceptually linked such that an account of A ties with B, one cannot then provide an independent description of A without implicating B; furthermore, if one wanted to show that the two are causally connected, then one should be able to describe one without referring to the other. And so, if one wants to show A and B are not causally related, one argues that independent descriptions cannot be provided. As Wilson puts it "where two items are not contingently connected, it should more properly be represented as a contrast between situations where two items are

causally connected, and situations where there are not two distinct items at all (Emotion and Object, 27).” That is, it would be trivial to say that the emotion : object relation is non-contingent, if there is but one distinct item of which two facets were conceptually tied. Wilson considers this option an unreasonable interpretation of Kenny, “since clearly it will not do in the case of emotion and object. If I am afraid of a dog, the dog and my fear are distinct items in any sense of the word” (Emotion and Object, 27). Wilson, however, is mistaken about Kenny’s thesis.⁷⁸

Kenny’s position is based upon a conceptual link. He states in the ninth chapter, "Objects", that “I have also tried to avoid using the word 'object' in such a way that it is equivalent to 'thing' or 'substance', as when people speak of finding a strange object in the cupboard, or philosophers talk of objects in the external world. The sense of 'object' which I have hitherto employed and wish now to discuss is one which derives from the grammatical notion of the object of a transitive verb. ... In discussing the nature of objects we are simply discussing the logical role of the object-expression which complete the sense of intensional and non-intensional verbs (AEW, 131).” Since intentionality is taken as a feature of emotion, his theory of emotion is a view about emotions as intentional states. Simply, each emotion has a formal object. But the formal object is not a distinct item from the mental act any more than the propositional content of a thought is a distinct item from the mental attitude. Kenny’s critique of feeling theorists and behaviorists bears on the same point. Feeling theorists and behaviorists failed to

⁷⁸ Ironically, Robert Solomon makes the same interpretive error as Wilson even though Solomon treats the emotion : object link not as a relation (Not Passion’s Slave, 18-19).

treat emotions as intentional. A feeling theorist does so since the essential component of the emotion is a uniquely identifying qualitative feel. Whereas the behaviorists identified emotions with, well, behavior. Kenny showed that neither sensation nor behavior is sufficient for individuating the emotions. The criticisms are commonplace and commonly accepted. Emotions are not names of sensations or identified with behavior since neither sensation nor behavior has the facility to individuate the varied emotions. The claim made by Kenny is that in failing to see that the emotions are intentional, one will fail to notice that one can then individuate among the emotions in virtue of the formal object. The formal object of an emotion just is the object of a mental attitude, albeit with restrictions, and the emotion just is a mental act (AEW, 135). The formal object of an emotion indicates the kind of emotion it is. That is, types of emotions have different formal objects.

Kenny also provides a number of considerations that tell in favor of a distinction between the formal object and the cause of an emotion (AEW, 50-52). For one, what the emotion is about might not be the cause when the emotion concerns the future. If I fear war with China, whatever the cause may be, it cannot be war with China since no future event can be the cause of a past one. Second, the cause of an emotion need not be what the emotion is about, even remotely. One may be angry with his daughter as a result of hunger without being angry at the state of his stomach. One may not even realize he is hungry, though he knows his anger targets his toddler's behavior.⁷⁹ Third, suppose the

⁷⁹ Certainly, the reasonableness of an emotion in a given context may be attached to the cause of an emotion. But that is another matter.

cause of the emotion is the formal object. One would then discover what one's emotion was about by induction. Sometimes, however, we just know. When one gets married or divorced and is happy, it's unlikely one needs to discover what the emotion is about, one knows it immediately.⁸⁰ Still, one may be depressed without knowing why until one hunts around reviewing past events and latches onto the right event. But even if one fails to discover the cause, being depressed is not like being happy. It's not simply that they are polar feelings, which they are. One is oriented toward the world differently when compared to other emotions. Whatever accounts for that orientation need not depend on the cause. The claim then is that the formal object provides the account. As such, it's independent of the cause. Fourth, when one does look for a cause, one searches for a particular. The formal object of an emotion concerns an emotion type: what is fear, what is hope, what is happiness, and so on. Of course, one may ask why humans tend to have those emotions. Yet, whatever the likely evolutionary or social story provided, the very possibility of an account presupposes one has a handle on what emotions are.⁸¹

Each emotion then is conceptually tied to a formal object. Identifying the cause of an emotion, though perhaps helpful, is unnecessary in coming to understand how one individuates the varied emotions. This notion of Kenny's is widely accepted. Ronald de Sousa, in Rationality of the Emotions, incorporates Kenny's definition with minor revisions into his own account of emotion. Kenny says that the "[t]he formal object of ϕ ing is the object under that description which

⁸⁰ I am not here endorsing principles that I reject on pp 40-41.

⁸¹ A functional account of the emotion remains compatible with the above arguments. In addition, a functional account does not rule out the possibility of a science of emotion.

must apply to it if it is to be possible to be ϕ it. If only what is P can be ϕ 'd, then 'Thing which is P' gives the formal object of ϕ ing" (AEW, 132). de Sousa substitutes "must be apprehended as applying" for "must apply" (de Sousa, 341 n4).⁸² The revision is a happy one. The idea is something like the following. If to fear a bear requires that the bear be dangerous, then Kenny's account is not apt. The bear need not be dangerous nor need the bear be real. Rather the subject must apprehend the bear as dangerous. And so whether the bear is dangerous or even whether a bear exists is not relevant for there to be a case of fearing the bear.

William Lyons, in Emotion, endorses Kenny's notion of formal object. In Lyons view, the formal object forms an evaluative category that "is our ultimate license for saying that this emotional state is of such and such an emotion" (Emotion, 100). Lyons too reinforces the notion that it's a conceptual link tying a type of emotion to a type of formal object (aka evaluative category). As the "evaluative categories, being concepts, can have a non-contingent conceptual connection with the concepts of emotions, and so there is a sense in which there is a non-contingent relation between emotion and object; indeed as we have seen, the formal objects of emotions are part of the defining concepts of particular emotions" (Emotion, 103). There is a sense, however, in which Lyons dismisses Kenny's view. Lyons view promotes three main ideas. First and foremost, emotions are evaluative. Second, an emotion is caused by an abnormal physiological arousal that itself is caused by an evaluation. Third,

⁸² This revision works well for Gordon's epistemic emotions, but not the factive ones. That is, Gordon can't be right if de Sousa is.

though emotions essentially involve feelings (abnormal physiological arousals) and evaluations, only the latter individuates the varied emotions. Kenny's view is compatible with the first and the third with little in the way of remarks that might address the second. But Lyons does not think that the formal object forms the central thesis of Kenny's position. In addition, Lyons view promotes two ideas contrary to my exposition of Kenny. Namely, evaluations are dispositional beliefs and sufficient for individuating emotions. Kenny treats emotion as occurrent and involves both occurrent cognitive and cognitive states. Still, Lyons' view makes more conspicuous Kenny's, for his evaluative causal theory of emotion refines Kenny's position without substantial difference.

Lyons states that "the formal object of an emotion seems to be the evaluative category under which the appraisal or evaluation of a particular object, material or intentional, falls on a particular occasion. ... it is part of the concept of that emotion (Emotion, 100, 101)." The phrase 'evaluative category' has two advantages over 'formal object'. First, 'object' suggests something else – the emotion on the one hand and the [formal] object on the other. Second, 'evaluation' suggests a more intimate connection to the person. For Lyons, the formal object of an emotion incorporates subjective beliefs. Subjective beliefs, rather than objective beliefs, individuate the emotions. The distinction between objective and subjective beliefs is not tight. Roughly, an objective belief is disinterested or factual.⁸³ Subjective beliefs are those that slide away from the objective. For example, my belief that George F. Hitt flew under the Golden Gate Bridge and shot fireworks off his plane for the 1934 Fourth of July celebrations is

⁸³ For Gordon, a factual belief is a true belief – a belief about the fact that p.

an objective belief. My belief that he was a daring adventurous pilot is not, even though I think it beyond doubt. That others can more readily and reasonably disagree with the latter provides some indication that the belief is more subjective, that is, evaluative. Lyons' reason for emphasizing evaluative belief springs from the practical observation that emotions may differ even though objective beliefs remain the same (Emotion, 35). One can believe that Glenn Gould was a celebrated pianist for playing Bach's keyboard music. This will fail, however, to distinguish envy, admiration, or even disgust. Thinking that Gould was a fine pianist, sans humming, will help narrow the possibilities, at least pushing aside disgust. What makes for a fine pianist is certainly less objective than what makes for a celebrated pianist, as more may disagree about what constitutes a fine pianist. Still, envy and admiration remain indistinguishable. Lyons' view holds that some further evaluative belief would distinguish the two. In this case, Lyons' offers the following: "Envy is viewing someone's characteristics, abilities, or possessions as fine and wishing or wanting that it be otherwise. Admiration is viewing someone's characteristics, abilities or possessions as fine, full stop" (Emotion, 84). The evaluative aspect provides the individuating conditions.

Kenny does not explicitly rule out Lyons refinement, though his examples are never colored in a way to suggest a personal, intimate, or otherwise evaluative tinge. There is one example that approaches Lyons' position. Kenny criticizes Hume's view of pride because of the contingency involved in pride. For Hume, pride always connects to the self. Kenny agrees. However, for Hume it's

an artifact about how humans happen to be constituted. Kenny, of course, contends the link between pride and self to be conceptual, not contingent on our origins. And so, the self serves as an ineliminable part of the formal object of pride. Still, it's an impersonal object. I am proud because the actions are mine. But lots of actions are actions of mine for which I fail to be proud of. Only some additional evaluative refinement would distinguish between those actions of mine that I'm proud of and those that I fail to be proud of. Kenny just does not seem to see what is of legitimate concern. Namely, emotions strike one as personal. Given that not all beliefs are, how does one capture the difference? Still, Kenny's position is not incompatible with the claim that the formal object captures the personal or subjective nature of emotion. In this sense, Lyons presents a welcome refinement.

Kenny, however, just might have the means to capture what Lyons was after. A desire distinguished envy from admiration, not a belief. Both emotions share the same evaluative category captured by 'as fine.' Lyons admits as much. However, the desire that distinguishes envy from admiration masks an evaluative belief. "The envious person, unlike the admiring one, dislikes what he sees when he compares others. This is why he wishes that things were otherwise than they are" (Emotion, 84). But why not say that every evaluative belief masks a desire. In this case, what explains one's dislike is that they wish that things were otherwise. The point is that the order of explanation could be in either direction, and so there seems to be no handle on which should have priority. That it's this way is of no surprise. For both Kenny and Lyons treat

emotions as motives. And the standard view of action is that it requires both belief and desire. As such, Kenny's own view turns out to be explicitly evaluative. That is, every emotion is a form of volition if one cannot want or wish for something in the absence of a belief about the objects worth for oneself. And so, it would turn out that Lyons' position ends up describing Kenny's position with minor refinement.⁸⁴

3.5 LYON'S DISPOSITIONAL THEORY

That beliefs often receive a dispositional rendering is common enough. For example, I believe that my daughter is Margaret Eleanor. I believe it while I'm swimming, singing, or snoozing. Just ask the name of my daughter and I'll tell you. It goes by the board that evaluations too can receive a dispositional analysis. Ask me who the most endearing baby is and I'll tell you: Margaret Eleanor. But such a rating is understandably in relation to me, the dad. And I would expect most parents to have such a standing disposition to their own children. But can my dispositional belief cause other mental events or physical events? Patently not since dispositions are not events. Yet, an occurrent emotion is a mental particular and can thereby be causally sufficient to bring about other mental or physical events. Though a disposition may well explain why I spend so much time ignoring other babies, it can't be the cause of my behavior. As Lyons rightly puts it "[i]f, as I think one should, one gives a

⁸⁴ Lyons suggests that some emotions that are not behaviorally oriented lack desires. Some examples include grief and admiration. Gordon suggests such emotions may nonetheless involve wishes.

dispositional analysis of evaluations, then one must posit some factor, *psychological or physiological*, which is in me in some real sense” (Emotion, 59). Lyons’ dispositional account claims that the evaluative aspect is linked to other psychological or physiological events that will be central in causally explaining the manifestation of the disposition. Should one want more than a cursory account, one would posit some particular factor, psychological or physiological. Lyons provides no help in this regard. In leaving the matter open, and in presenting the standard two options, which excludes the spiritual, Lyons’ view remains compatible with the view that a psychological factor causally manifests the disposition, namely, an occurrent evaluative thought.

If the factor is psychological, a mental event underwrites the occurrent emotion. Should my behavior be (causally) explained by an assertoric thought that Margaret is endearing, why settle for dispositional evaluation? One reason might be that one treats all mental phenomena as dispositional – that no mental phenomena are occurrent. This is not an option for Lyons given that he presumes emotions are occurrent mental phenomena. Note that the manifestation of a disposition will not explain how the manifestation manifested since dispositions are not causally sufficient for their effects. Perhaps all beliefs are dispositions. Lyons explicitly suggests this - ‘belief’ has only a dispositional use (Emotion, 55).⁸⁵ If true, then it is mysterious what psychological factor or other kind of mental state would occasion an emotional episode. Having ruled out beliefs, as they are dispositions, what is left, in the usual taxonomy of the mind, are sensations, desires, and emotions. Obviously, it can’t be emotions as

⁸⁵ Perhaps Lyons intends only objective beliefs to be solely dispositional.

that is what we are trying to explain. And sensations would leave us with a feeling theory. With desire remaining as the most likely candidate, then we are left with the odd feature that the psychological factor underwriting a dispositional belief is a cognitive state. Lyons states, however, that sometimes “evaluations should be given an entirely occurrent analysis” in cases of verbal declarations (Emotion, 59). It would be niggardly of Lyons to maintain that in the absence of verbal expressions one cannot presume an assertoric evaluative thought.⁸⁶ However, should examples exist where it would be improbable to posit an occurrent thought, a dispositional approach will provide solace. This is, I think, a motivation for Lyons. He considers an objection that in cases of immediate reflex emotions, no evaluation is occurrent. If evaluations were dispositions, no evaluation would be occurrent. Lyons chides William Alston’s suggestion that reflex emotions be treated as deviant cases. Alston sloughs off the central evaluative feature while maintaining a family of other relevant features suffices to treat reflex emotions as emotions. Lyons protests: “If emotion is defined as an evaluation which causes abnormal physiological changes, how can one claim that, if, with some candidate for being an emotional state, there is no evaluation present but only abnormal physiological changes, then this abnormal physiological state by itself can still merit the term ‘emotional state’ (Emotion, 88)?” Without a doubt, when a feature is central for an emotion and something lacks it is perforce reason to suggest that it is not an emotion. Or, if it is an emotion, then what one took as the central feature is not. Lyons takes the first

⁸⁶ I say this in partial jest. If Lyons presumes, as I do not, that language proceeds thought, then the absence of verbal expression in a creature would be grounds for supposing no thought.

route. A reflex emotion is an emotion. It is both immediate and may lack conscious thought. The immediacy is unimportant for Lyons as he allows for the possibility that conscious thought be instantaneous. The absence of a conscious evaluation would present no difficulty for his view since he treats evaluations as dispositions, as well as accepting the idea that reflex emotions may lack conscious thought. As a standing disposition is both active and not conscious, his dispositional evaluative theory can account for reflex emotions.

Though an understandable reply, it is hardly a justification for treating the defining feature of emotion as a disposition. Other options exist. One might conclude that reflex emotions are not emotions. After all, reflex emotions have, practically by definition, no (conscious) thought. Alternatively, positing unconscious thought would also relieve the tension, as unconscious thought is both active and not conscious. The difference between an unconscious evaluative thought and a dispositional evaluation is not a trifle. The rejection of reflex emotions as involving no evaluation is based on the lack of conscious thought. Receding to dispositions will provide a locked explanation when one further supposes that reflex emotions are emotions and there are no unconscious thoughts. Denying either will do for unseating the contention that evaluative dispositions must be the central feature.⁸⁷

Both suppositions have been rejected in prior chapters; talk of evaluative dispositions remains superfluous. Furthermore, if what underwrites the manifestation of a disposition is just an unconscious evaluative thought, explaining how the evaluation may be causally linked to behavior presents no

⁸⁷ William James offered a third option. Though an emotion, they are pathological or deviant.

obvious barriers. Lyons, however, is not so freed. He has the added burden of explaining how evaluative dispositions are causally linked to desires and behavior. Saying that the factor underwriting the disposition will be either psychological or physiological is to say what is obvious: either mental or physical particulars are sufficient for mental or physical events.

I think another independent concern tells against Lyons' account.

Dispositional beliefs require a history. Given I now have a dispositional belief that my daughter is Margaret Eleanor, my original thought that the newborn before me is Margaret Eleanor can't be the manifestation of that dispositional belief. Let's suppose it is for the sake of argument. Then I must have had such a disposition prior to thinking my daughter is Margaret Eleanor. That is, if the disposition precedes the manifestation, it must be there prior to actually ever having had the original thought. But I have the potential for an uncountable number of occurrent thoughts, and so an uncountable number of dispositional beliefs must already be present, which is absurd. And so, though I now have a dispositional belief that my daughter is Margaret Eleanor, what accounts for my initially picking up Margaret Eleanor for the 1st time and not some other baby cannot be fully accounted for by that disposition. Having a thought to the effect that this is my daughter Margaret Eleanor would. And if it did, it is unclear what explanatory force the disposition carries. It may be that some structure/disposition helps explain the occurrence of such a thought. But whether the thoughts genesis is aided by a dispositional view remains superfluous. The thought is sufficient to explain my action of holding her for the

first time. And since I can't already have the relevant disposition, a dispositional view fails to account for my action.⁸⁸

Similarly, when Lyons treats evaluations as dispositional he will fail to account for novel emotional episodes. For suppose admiration is as Lyons suggests and that I have a standing disposition to think Glenn Gould a fine pianist. The disposition manifests when you ask what I think of Glenn Gould. But suppose I watch a never-before-seen footage of Gould and I act in my typical Gouldian frenetic way. If these are actions of mine, I must have mentally identified the person, consciously or unconsciously, as Glenn Gould that fine pianist; otherwise they would not be my actions.⁸⁹ The natural explanation is that an assertoric thought to the effect that that is Glenn Gould is operative. And if that is the relevant psychological factor manifesting the disposition, why stop at the disposition? Certainly the complexity of the thought would not be a viable objection for Lyons since he supposes conscious thoughts may be instantaneous. Furthermore, the fact that one is not conscious of it presents no outright objection either.

Consider Lyons' own case:

I am standing talking with a man at a party when a third person, a woman, joins us. The man gets edgy, shifts from foot to foot, fidgets with his glass, flushes and is suddenly much brusquer in manner and tone of voice. He doesn't reveal in his conversation or expression what is

⁸⁸ Gordon provides another consideration that tells against a dispositional approach (The Structure of Emotion, 30).

⁸⁹ Of course, it might be, as it were, hard-wired that seeing such images manifests the disposition. This will explain my behavior, not my actions.

upsetting him, except that it is associated with the woman's suddenly joining us. It could be that he hates the women, or is in love with her, or is angry with her, or afraid of her, or embarrassed. I cannot tell what emotion he is undergoing till I work out how he sees, that is, evaluates the situation (Emotion, 62-63).

All of this is natural enough if only the evaluation was not a disposition. For no matter what, either sensory input of the women or an assertoric thought that identifies the women will be causally relevant for manifesting the disposition. As Lyons dismisses the perceptual route he needs there to be such a thought. But if one has the thought, why do we need the evaluation to be dispositional? Why not have it be a causally relevant feature to cause another assertoric thought, albeit an evaluative one? The only reason seems to be the considerations outlined before. And since I reject reflex emotions and that all thoughts are conscious, I find no reason to adopt the view that the evaluations are dispositions. Lyons shouldn't either. Still, his overall view remains compatible with the view that the formal object of an emotion type is not a disposition but an occurrent thought.

3.6.1 GORDON AND THE STRUCTURE OF EMOTION

Robert Gordon, in The Structure of Emotion, significantly expands on the progress Kenny's work provides. Like Kenny, Gordon treats the emotions as occurrent states. In addition, Gordon too finds philosophical insights in our discourse about the nature of emotion: "my interest has been in the logical

differences that emerge when terms we think of designating 'emotions' are followed by a 'that' clause complement" (The Structure of Emotion, 46). Gordon states he does not offer a theory of emotion. His analysis applies to emotion terms that fit the form "S emotes that p" where 'emotes' may be replaced by a verb fitting that form. His analysis will include fear, terror, worry, hope, anger, annoyance, shame, disappointment, disgust, embarrassment, fury, horror, indignation, resentment, sadness, sorrow, unhappiness, happiness, regret, delight, gladness, gratitude, and pride. He argues that a two-way division can be had among this expansive list. He does not argue that all emotions fit such a division and explicitly leaves it open for such examples. It's caution that Gordon prescribes. And in that sense, Gordon does not take himself to be offering a theory of emotion. Nonetheless, I take Gordon to have presented a level of detail missing from Kenny's work that seems to have been largely ignored in the literature. Though Kenny states each emotion has a formal object unique to it and each emotion includes cognitive and cognitive states, he offers little in detailing the individuation conditions for individual emotions. Gordon's work does much to fill that gap.

Gordon presents the intentional structure of varied emotion types as revealing a two-way broad classification. Emotions may be divided into epistemic and factive emotions. One difference will be that when S emotes that p and 'emotes' is a factive emotion, S will have a belief that p. Whereas when 'emotes' is an epistemic emotion, S need not have a belief that p. Each of these two categories may subdivide emotions into those for which a wish is frustrated

and those for which a wish is satisfied.⁹⁰ Gordon's analysis goes beyond the claim that emotions involve belief and desire as he lays out the causal structure of the emotions.

But if anything is clear in Kenny's writing it's that a causal analysis of emotion remains anathema. Still, I do not find this difference a matter of importance. First, Gordon's causal analysis refers to the causal structure among intentional states. Kenny's objections mostly targeted a causal analysis that appealed to external (i.e., non-mental) causes. Second, Kenny may be thought to have accepted the logical connection thesis for which few still do since Davidson's article "Reasons, Causes, and Actions." In the last pages of Kenny's work, one can see such a tension as hindering a fuller account of voluntary action. Kenny aims for an account where when we explain one's action we can cite the relevant reason. As an ending remark, he places the problem with that of identifying sincerity conditions. However helpful that might turn out to be, clearly it's also that one's thought be causally linked together in the right way. Kenny does seem to recognize this.⁹¹ In considering a counter-example he notes that his account fails because the cause of the action must connect causally with the relevant desire (AEW, 238). That is, it's a necessary condition that the reason is a cause too. Gordon's own account of emotion individuates the varied emotions in terms of the causal structure of the appropriate beliefs, desires, and wishes. And though the intentional structure remains a causal one,

⁹⁰ From here, I follow Gordon, rather than Kenny, in treating 'wish' as indicating a mental attitude rather than a form of speech. For Kenny, a wish has a corresponding desire, but Gordon treats wish as a different mental attitude.

⁹¹ Thus, it's not clear that Kenny did accept the logical connection thesis.

it's nonetheless conceptual. This, as far as I can tell, hardly opposes Kenny's position since he says very little about the details of the intentional structure other than they involve cognitive and cognitive states. Gordon does not disagree.

Gordon has very little to say about Kenny's position but what he does say is of interest. Gordon notes that many philosophers talk of the emotion : object relation and finds such talk misleading. Kenny too talks as if there were an emotion : object relation but as I've argued, his was a conceptual point, which remains in line with Gordon's own approach. However, Gordon thinks Kenny commits a fallacy because of such talk. And Gordon is right. Before I cited Kenny's argument that when one is afraid of the next war that it, the future event, cannot be the cause since it's a [possible] future event. True enough. But Kenny has claimed that what follows is that "despite appearances, the causal expression ('because' 'made me') must be understood as having a special non-causal sense" (AEW, 75). Gordon protests: "What is missing from Kenny's reasoning is some reason for thinking that, despite appearances, the same relation holds between, on the one hand, one's anger and the remark that makes one angry; and on the other hand, one's dread and the possible future war that one dreads. Without such reason the dreaded war poses no threat to a causal interpretation of 'I was angry because ____ ' or ' ____ made me embarrassed'" (The Structure of Emotion, 45). The issue centers on whether terms like 'because' can indicate a cause when indicating a reason. The burden Gordon places on Kenny is to say how 'because' is relevantly similar in those cases when patently they are not. When one is angry because of a remark, 'because' surely

marks a reason as well as an external cause. And the word 'because' in our early case, one was afraid because of the next war, surely does not indicate an external cause. Yet that does not thereby rule out that the intentional structure, i.e., the reason, may be given a causal interpretation.⁹² Indeed, Gordon is correct - Kenny is mistaken. Yet, as I've been stressing, such remarks (i.e., the non-contingency thesis, the emotion : object relation, as well as his strict refusal to consider causal analyses) remain superfluous adornments as none serve as a linchpin – that is, once removed his view fails to collapse. Kenny tells us very little about the details of how to individuate the emotions. And in this sense, I take Gordon to expand Kenny's view.

There remains, for my purposes, one crucial difference between Gordon, on the one hand, and Kenny and Lyons on the other. Both Kenny and Lyons make room for feeling and both agree feeling is insufficient to individuate emotion types. Gordon makes no room for feeling. He does so because when emotion terms in the form 'S emotes that p' no feeling need be present. For example, one can say that they are afraid that it will rain tomorrow without being afraid (where 'being afraid' signals a feeling). He thereby distinguishes fear from being afraid. But Gordon's division between emotion and feeling remains incompatible with his own methodological approach. Gordon says that "[i]mplicit in much of this book is an assumption that our common sense theory of emotions is embedded in a larger conceptual framework: what is often referred to as "commonsense" or

⁹² Some want to insist on a distinction between states and events. I follow Quine in treating states as boring events. I don't think anything hangs on this except to rule out considerations that do rely on such a distinction.

"folk" psychology" (The Structure of Emotion, 128).⁹³ But if anything forms part of the commonsense view of emotion it's that they are, in some sense, feelings. Gordon's division is based on grammatical form. We use the sentence 'S is afraid that p' in cases that may clearly indicate feeling as well as those that need not. And so feelings are not necessary. But Gordon's division, though helpful, fails to explain what I take to be a central issue – how does one account for feeling in one's account of emotion. The minimal claim by any intentionalist view is that feelings do not individuate emotion types. But I take it as a piece of commonsense that emotions are, in some important sense, feelings. Gordon fails to capture this. I discuss the role of feeling in the last chapter.

3.6.2 FACTIVE EMOTION

Most emotions fitting the form 'S emotes that p' are factive emotions: anger, delight, pride, and sorrow are just a few examples.⁹⁴ Emotions fitting this category require factual knowledge, namely true belief.⁹⁵ It's a striking claim by Gordon. In effect, it denies a seemingly reasonable claim. When one is angry about something, it seems reasonable to suppose the anger need only involve the person. Events outside the person remain incidental. So, for example, in saying Othello is furious at Desdemona, certainly one is saying something about Othello. No outside fact connected with Othello's fury would be necessary, but

⁹³ In this case it will involve one's wish that there not be a war.

⁹⁴ For his list, see p. 27.

⁹⁵ Gordon presumes a common feature accepted by many who offer a causal analysis of knowledge. Namely, when S knows that p then S would not have believed that p if it were not the case that p. Gordon's argument, as presented below, does not depend on it. Gordon contends, however, this argument lends support for it.

merely contingently related. Gordon denies this. Furthermore, he claims commonsense supports the idea that, on the contrary, when Othello is furious, his state necessary connects with some external fact/event.

He argues as follows. Assume Othello believes that Desdemona defended Cassio, Desdemona was no longer in possession of Othello's love token, his mother's handkerchief, and that Cassio was. Let's further assume these are the relevant beliefs in the intentional structure of Othello's emotion, namely, that he is furious at Desdemona. Gordon argues that if those are the relevant beliefs underwriting Othello's fury, then had it not been the case that Desdemona defended Cassio and Cassio, not Desdemona, was in possession of the handkerchief, then Othello would not have had those beliefs as part of the intentional structure of his fury. If Gordon succeeds, then he will have shown, assuming we can carry out the generalization, that all factive emotions assume the Knowledge Condition: if S is angry, delighted, proud, or sad (etc.) about the fact that p, then S knows that p (The Structure of Emotion, 60).

Gordon's evidence relies on how we describe another's (factive) emotion. When one says something of the form 'S emotes that p', or some such utterance that can be appropriately transformed into such a form, one commits to the truth of p. Whatever p is, i.e., whatever the fact/event is, a (causal) connection between p and the person's emotion is presumed. Thus, it's part of commonsense given that it's implied in the way we speak. But, one might protest. Othello was furious because he believed that Desdemona was a whore. And since Desdemona wasn't, there is no external fact to connect with what

Othello's emotion is about, Desdemona's infidelity. Such a reasonable reply just underwrites Gordon's point. In this case, one does something extra when inserting 'because S believes' after 'emotes' and 'that' in 'S emotes that p'. Namely, one is not committed to p. That's a function of including 'because S believes' in such utterances.

Still, that concerns the speaker's commitments. Why can't Othello's belief that Desdemona is a whore be all there is? Gordon admits that perhaps Othello's feeling furious because he believes Desdemona is a whore aims in the right direction (The Structure of Emotion, 37). This serves, however, as a distraction. To feel fury concerns one's physiological arousal rather than the emotion. And given Gordon's separation it would explain not one's emotion but the qualitative character associated with the emotion. That is, mere belief may be sufficient to explain the arousal, but not the emotion. To see why, Gordon leaves a puzzle. Othello it is assumed was not furious about his belief. And so, by asserting Othello was furious because he believes that Desdemona is a whore leaves open what he is furious about. Note that Othello's true belief that Desdemona defended Cassio and that Desdemona was not in possession of the handkerchief could explain what he was furious about, but then it wouldn't be about Desdemona's infidelity.

Suppose for the moment that those two beliefs are not true. What follows is that Othello is not furious because there is nothing to be furious about. Saying he is furious about his belief fails to capture the assertion that Othello is furious about something other than his belief. At best, Othello's fury expresses an

aroused state, not an emotion. Though Gordon separates being furious (physiological arousal) from fury (an emotion), the argument so far does not depend on it. That is, one can assume emotions do indeed have concomitant feelings and still agree that if one asserts that Othello is furious about something, then there is a fact in the offering that he believes.

Still, if one asks Othello why he is furious, he likely will mention Desdemona's infidelity. And if anyone is going to decide what the relevant belief is, shouldn't it be Othello? No, claims Gordon. And I agree. Gordon puts it conspicuously clear "what stands behind this objection is the principle that what a person sincerely reports himself angry about is the final arbiter of what he is presently angry about; or the related principle that what a person is angry about is entirely a matter of how he feels, in a sense in which to feel a certain way and to seem (to oneself) to feel that way are indistinguishable states" (The Structure of Emotion, 50-51). This view underwrites many of the criticisms of intentionalism. The last chapter will discuss how the principle may be preserved and rendered impotent as a critique of intentionalism or as evidence for neo-feeling theories. For knowing whether one accepts or rejects such a commitment is telling as to which type of theory one would adopt. Clearly then, simply asserting it would beg the question against Gordon's view without an independent argument or at least showing no arguments tell against the principle.

The argument so far suggests one element in the intentional structure of

factive emotions is true belief. Gordon pushes for an even stronger claim.⁹⁶ It's not just mere true belief that is required but knowledge. Once one accepts that if one is furious that p, one has a true belief that p, one should also presuppose knowledge too. That is, accept the Knowledge Condition where knowledge is something more than true belief.

The argument relies on a Gettier style example. One tells a story where some poor sod has a true belief but one for which they are (causally) out of reach from the truth of the belief. It's mere luck that their belief is true. So assume Othello's belief regarding Desdemona's infidelity is true, Desdemona slept with Cassio. But have it be that Cassio came to Desdemona (thinking her Bianca) in a dimly lit after chamber in the guise of Othello, because Bianca has a thing for the Moor. Wanting to pacify her husband, Desdemona beds quietly with who she thinks is her husband. Let all of this occur before Othello requests the handkerchief from Desdemona. Othello's belief will now be true. Also let everything remain the same with respect to Othello when his belief was false. When it was false, the previous argument showed that Othello could not be furious about Desdemona sleeping with Cassio. But if one now rejects that to be furious about Desdemona's sleeping with Cassio Othello must have more than true belief, i.e., knowledge, then one admits that Othello's being furious has nothing to do with his interactions with the world. But such an admission is absurd. By hypothesis Othello remains the same in the two cases except for

⁹⁶ One might agree with Gordon that third person ascriptions indicate that if one is angry that p one is committed to the truth of p and yet deny that a belief – let alone a true one – is required. One would likely offer a perceptual account of emotion. I have little to say about this option except that perception is just as vexed a notion as emotion.

whether his belief is true or false. That he has a true belief accounts for Othello's emotion. But in this case, his true belief has nothing to do with Othello's interactions with the world. His belief just happens to be true. So, if one accepts the supposition that when Othello is furious he has a true belief suitably linked to happenings in the world, one supposes that he knows. Otherwise, one admits that one's emotion need not be linked to happenings in the world. That is, all the factive emotions presuppose the Knowledge Condition.⁹⁷

As originally set up and in the play, Othello has the true belief that Desdemona defended Casio and that Desdemona no longer possessed the handkerchief. Both beliefs were based on Othello witnessing the defense and seeing Desdemona no longer in possession of the handkerchief. That is, his interactions lend support to the claim that Othello has knowledge. Also, these true beliefs, along with Iago's influence, led Othello to truly believe Cassio possessed the handkerchief and falsely believe that Desdemona was unfaithful. Othello takes his anger to be about being cuckolded, though Othello need not be the best judge. Is it appropriate to say then Othello is furious that Cassio possessed the handkerchief? He happens to believe what is true not by luck. However, his belief arose from the machinations of Iago involving lies, fakery, and misdirection. One would be hard pressed to claim this true belief constituted

⁹⁷ In the last chapter, Gordon suggests that knowledge is the primitive/default condition. He argues for a simulation theory of mind, a stance he is better known for, and ties it with the now classic study by Wimmer and Perner that provided the experimental paradigm for studying false belief tasks.

knowledge.⁹⁸ And so, Othello can't be furious about Cassio possessing the handkerchief either. One would be left with the claim that Othello is furious that Desdemona defended Casio and furious that Desdemona no longer possessed the handkerchief. Yet this explanation would miss what seems to be obvious: Othello fears being cuckolded.

Still, Gordon may insist that the two beliefs would explain what it is that Othello is furious about. Such an option, though theoretically viable, remains an unreasonable account of what his emotion is about. To say of Othello that he is furious because he believes Desdemona a whore, one commits to the claim that Othello is furious. But contrary to Gordon, one need not commit to the truth of 'Desdemona is a whore'. As Gordon stresses, it's absurd to claim that what Othello was furious about remain causally removed from Othello. In this, I remain in agreement with Gordon. However, this shows only that what one is angry about be suitably connected to the world, not that what one's emotion is about causally terminate in an object or event that mirrors the content of the emotion. In this case, Othello's belief that Desdemona defended Casio and that Desdemona no longer possessed the handkerchief succeeds, even if Desdemona was not a whore. That is, the beliefs relevant in the genesis of the belief that Desdemona is unfaithful terminate causally in an object or event that mirrors the content of those beliefs. That is, Othello does have knowledge. And so, even though one may indicate their lack of commitment by inserting 'because S believes', one is not further committed to the claim that that is not what the

⁹⁸ Iago placed the handkerchief in front of Cassio's home. Though Iago's plan depends on Cassio finding the handkerchief, he neither witnessed the event nor was he informed that Cassio possessed the handkerchief. Namely, Iago doesn't know that Cassio found the handkerchief.

emotion is about. That is, Gordon has failed to support the much stronger claim that if S is angry (etc.) that p, then S knows that p. Instead, the argument supports a much weaker thesis. If S is angry that p, then S knows something that is suitably connected to the belief that p.

Gordon writes “[t]here is apparently no satisfactory way to fill in the blank in ‘regrets that _____’ or ‘is upset that _____,’ that does not presuppose the *truth* of the sentence (clause) used to fill it in” (The Structure of Emotion, 37).

Inserting ‘believes that p’ or ‘p’ both serve as a presupposition of the truth of the sentence clause. And inserting either to fill in “Othello was furious that _____” gets across the idea that Othello was furious. But what does one indicate when one asserts ‘Othello was furious because he believes Desdemona a whore’? Certainly the speaker seems to indicate their lack of commitment to the truth of Desdemona being a whore. However, the speaker need not be committed to the view that Othello’s false belief fails to be suitably connected to the word. And so, need not be committed to the view Othello’s emotion must be about something that directly ties to happenings in the world. In a trivial sense Othello’s false belief connects with Othello, since it’s his belief. But whether the belief remains suitably connected in some more robust sense remains open given the bare utterance. In a context where it’s clear the person is crazy, one presumes the belief to be suitably disconnected. But in Othello’s case, when one understands that Othello fears being cuckolded, one will then presume the emotion is about Desdemona’s infidelity. That is, even though one commits to the view that Desdemona is not a whore, one does not thereby claim that the emotion is not

about Desdemona being a whore, since the content of that false belief may be suitably connected to the world. In the context of the play, it's reasonable for the audience or reader to think Othello fears being cuckolded.

When another describes Othello's emotion by saying Othello is furious that he believes Desdemona is unfaithful, Othello's belief remains the explanatory fact about what? The same utterance would be used independently of whether Othello incorrectly thinks Desdemona a whore or correctly takes his emotion to concern his belief. That is, the speaker fails to distinguish whether the intentional structure of Othello's emotion concerns his belief that he believes Desdemona a whore or his belief that Desdemona a whore. Othello's actions and a wider context may indicate which it is. That is, baring context, what is communicated is that Othello is furious. The context will aid in determining the intentional structure of that emotion, whether it involve Othello's belief or something else. And so, what is primarily communicated by the utterance indicates only how it is for Othello and nothing about the content or intentional structure of his emotion.

And even when Othello is not angry that he believes Desdemona a whore, the speaker is still free to suppose Othello falsely expresses the intentional structure of his emotion. One may think that the intentional structure does not concern Desdemona's infidelity, but that Desdemona no longer possessed his love token. Such a view is consistent with Gordon's point that what a person sincerely reports oneself to be emoting about need not be the final arbiter of what one is emoting. But the issue here concerns how to understand utterances of the form 'S emotes because S believes p.' I've argued that the only thing that the

utterance communicates is that S emotes. It does not indicate anything about the intentional structure of that emotion. Something additional will disambiguate varied claims about the possible intentional structure.

But Gordon's argument is not about how it is for one. It concerns the intentional structure of an emotion. Namely, factive emotions presuppose the Knowledge Condition. Yet Gordon's argument depends on an overly narrow reading of 'S emotes because S believes p.' Gordon supposes that the speaker wishes to signal no commitment to 'p'. In standard cases, this may be so. However, context could instead signal one's commitment to 'X believes p' rather than one's lack of commitment to 'p.' That is, context, not the utterance, determines whether one's focus bears on the lack of commitment to 'p', Othello's false belief, or on Othello's belief that p when Othello has a true belief about why he is furious – namely he is furious that he is disposed to believe Desdemona a whore.

Gordon claims that the presupposition of truth for the sentence clause fills in 'p' in 'S emotes that p' relies on the fact that when one wants to disavow 'p' they change the form to 'S emotes because S believes p'. But this occurs when background information rules out that it's not S's belief that he is emoting about. That is, S is sufficiently out of touch with the world. One then signals not simply that p is false, but that p is insufficiently connected to the world. This makes sense too. When the audience knows of Iago's character and intent, the purity of Desdemona, and Othello's passions, one can reasonably assert that Othello is furious that Desdemona is a whore. With such a background, it would be

pedantic to correct someone by stating – no, no, Othello is furious because he believes Desdemona is a whore. One understands, given the context, how such a false belief nonetheless was suitably connected to the world.

In summary, I agree with Gordon that assertions of the form S emotes that p involve a commitment to truth. But it's not always a commitment that p is true. Rather it's a commitment that p be suitably connected to the world. Some other belief constituting knowledge must also be linked to p. The extent to which one can give an account of how knowledge can suitable lead one to believe p when p is false need not concern us. However, Gordon presumes that the only knowledge suitable in a link to p is one for which p is true and S knows that p. But his argument at most showed that some belief must be true that one knows, not necessarily the belief that p. The reason for thinking Othello is furious, and not merely in a physiological state, is that what he is angry about is suitably connected to the world. With sufficient background, the presupposition of the truth of p in asserting S emotes that p erodes. It's quite obvious what Othello's emotion is about. And it's equally obvious that Desdemona is not a whore.

3.6.3 EPISTEMIC EMOTIONS

Few emotions fall in the category of epistemic emotions. Fear, hope, worry, and terror complete that list. Three distinguishing features highlight the epistemic emotions. For one, they function in a way similar to cognitive predicates without necessarily involving states like belief. For two, they involve a realm of uncertainty. The second tells against treating such emotions as involving beliefs

corresponding to what the emotion is about. Nonetheless, one's fears may be borne out or one's hopes confirmed in a way similar to beliefs. Gordon explains how that is so. Lastly, epistemic emotions involve a wish that underwrites what one cares about. For example, if one worries that the train will be late, one wishes (cares about whether) the train will be on time.

Gordon provides a number of examples to motivate his position; I rely on one of them.⁹⁹ Two farmers are uncertain whether it will rain or not. Neither has a belief that it will rain or a belief that it will not rain. But both believe that without water their crops will be damaged. One farmer fears it will not rain, while the other hopes that it will. It would not be unexpected that the fearful farmer does something to offset the possible damage to his crops due to the lack of rain, perhaps invest in irrigation equipment, while the hopeful farmer does little. The challenge then is to explain their actions since by hypothesis the fearful farmer fails to have a belief that it will not rain and the hopeful farmer fails to have a belief that it will rain. In addition, their individual actions are just those one might expect of a farmer who had such a belief. Thus, Gordon casts doubt on the adequacy of beliefs and desires to explain the fearful and hopeful farmer's actions.

One might protest. The farmer already has the relevant beliefs and desires. They both believe that a drought will damage their crops and they wish it to rain. Other reasonable (dispositional) beliefs might be postulated to explain their behavior. Perhaps the fearful farmer is risk adverse and the hopeful one is not. Gordon objects. He suggests that it's also quite reasonable that the farmers

⁹⁹ The example can be found on pp. 6-7.

do not have those character traits while still postulating that one farmer is fearful and the other hopeful. That is, saying that the farmer is afraid was sufficient to explain his actions. Still, one might be wedded to theoretical economy and be driven to create ever more complicated accounts, relying only on beliefs and desires. At this juncture, Gordon concedes without surrendering: “If one is to explain or predict human behavior in terms of beliefs and desires, then one should be prepared to introduce the emotions as well into the explanatory scheme. ... [Yet], [I]f parsimony is deemed more important than credibility, then one can get by without the emotions” (The Structure of Emotion, 9).

In the end, however, Gordon is arguing that to understand the intentional structure of emotion requires an additional attitude, a wish. Each emotion may be individuated in terms of belief, desire, or wish. And in this sense, Gordon’s theoretical commitments remain thin; for it’s not that every emotion is itself a distinctive mental attitude. But isn’t a wish a desire by another name? Gordon suggests otherwise. In the discussion of Othello, when Othello is furious about the fact that p, then Othello knows that p. But such a result leaves Othello “with no possibility of *instrumental or aversive action*. In such a case, the notions of wanting and desiring are thought inapplicable” (The Structure of Emotion, 30). So, though belief-desire psychology will be inadequate, belief-desire-wish psychology will not.¹⁰⁰

Gordon’s account, however, is incomplete. In his article “Fear” he hints at

¹⁰⁰ Whatever one’s commitment concerning the number of basic mental attitudes, the inclusion of wishes facilitates one’s understanding of the intentional structure of the emotions.

a problem.¹⁰¹ The concern has no voice in The Structure of Emotion nor is it resolved there. Simply, Gordon has failed to provide the individuating conditions for fear and hope. Figure 3.1 depicts Gordon's rendering of the intentional structure for fear while Figure 3.2 depicts the intentional structure of hope given his description.¹⁰² The difference between the fearful and hopeful farmer was that the fearful farmer was more apt to do something while the hopeful farmer was not. This is represented in the diagram as the hopeful farmer lacks the relevant desire and the fearful farmer does not. Yet, the only difference between Figure 3.1 and 3.2 is that in Figure 3.1 (3) and (4) cause a desire and no such desire is caused by (3) and (4) in Figure 3.2. But clearly something intentional must account for the difference; otherwise the promise of individuating the emotions in terms of intentional states remains to be seen.

The mistake took place when one accepts without qualification the notion that the farmers were uncertain about whether it would rain or not rain. For neither farmer is indifferent to whether it will rain or not. That is, they both care about whether it will rain, as (3) indicates in Figure 3.1 and 3.2. A farmer that was indifferent can't fear that it will not rain nor hope that it will. Box (4) fails to distinguish the indifferent farmer from the hopeful or fearful farmer. One solution would be to claim that the hopeful farmer of course believes that it is more likely to rain than not. That helps explain why he is hopeful. And likewise, the fearful farmer believes that it is more likely that it will not rain. And either farmer may appeal to such a belief as a reason for their hope or fear. This however remains

¹⁰¹ See his "Fear" pp. 564-566.

¹⁰² Figure 3.1 is just Gordon's Figure 4.1, on p. 76, with additional detail.

in opposition to Gordon's claim that they are uncertain. To put it another way, when we say that the farmer fears that it will not rain, isn't it more apt to say the farmer fears that rain is not likely? And likewise for the hopeful farmer, he hopes that rain is likely. That is, we can explain the difference between hope and fear as a difference in their relative confidence in whether it will rain or not. In this sense they don't have a belief that it will rain. They differ in their confidence that it will rain. The emendation relieves our initial concern about the individuating conditions for fear and hope.

The equipoise between believing that rain is likely and rain unlikely leaves one with indifference. Note that one can't rely on one's own experience. It will not do to say that one was indifferent yet nonetheless hoped or feared it would rain. For once one fears or hopes the die has been cast. Gordon will not argue from how it appears to one, for what it is like for one may not be how it is. But without relying on a distinction on how it is for one, Gordon seems to not have the means to individuate hope from fear. For the only difference seems to be that in the case of fear (3) and (4) bring about (5) but for hope (3) and (4) does not. And that difference remains unexplained. But by changing (4) to reflect confidence rather than indifference, one can then explain the causal difference. In fear, one is confident rain is unlikely and in hope one is confident it is not the case that rain is unlikely.

But now the initial difference between the epistemic emotions and factive emotions disappears. That is, when S emotes that p, S believes that p for both factive and epistemic emotions. The fearful farmer fears that rain is unlikely and

believes that rain is unlikely. The hopeful farmer hopes that rain is likely and believes that it's not the case that rain is unlikely. This leads to the next question. Why do the epistemic emotions fail to require knowledge while the factive emotions do require knowledge? Of course, if the preceding argument is correct, what knowledge is required need only be suitably connected to what the emotion is about. And in this sense, epistemic emotions, hoping for peace or fearing peace need not require knowledge about the future even if some knowledge is required. Gordon's factive/epistemic edifice collapses.




Figure 3.1 The Intentional Structure of Fear




Figure 3.2 The Intentional Structure of Hope

4 Critics of Intentionalism

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The main thrust of the prior chapter was that the individuation conditions for an intentional account involve thoughts beyond belief. In addition, such an account involves something beyond thought: emotions are essentially personal. There is a *prima facie* distinction between believing that *p* in a personal way and believing that *p* in an impersonal way. I haven't argued for the view. I'm assuming it, promoting it, and will have more to say in Chapter Five. It is a view consonant with Michael Stocker's account of psychic feelings. I'll discuss Stocker's position as I'll agree to a criticism Stocker offers against forms of intentionalism that reduce feelings to feelingless thoughts. Before I do, I will examine an argument by Patricia Greenspan. Her argument represents a class of arguments flowing from considerations of ambivalent emotions or mixed feelings. The cases exemplifying ambivalent emotions or mixed feelings are natural enough, yet seem to entail from an intentionalist approach that one is irrational contrary to what one would ordinarily think.

In Chapter Three I avoided discussing a narrow and a broad form of intentionalism. The narrow view limits the individuating conditions to one type of mental attitude. The broad view allows for any mental attitude or any combination of mental attitudes. I settled on Gordon's own account as a reasonable position, one in-between the narrow and broad view. The broad view compounds the intricacy and complications already present in Gordon's account

as one must also account for the causal structure among mental attitudes. I have not focused on, nor will I now, the detailed causal structure within a type of emotion. Nor do I consider broader views of intentionalism. I do so since Gordon's casting of intentionalism is sufficient for warding off standard criticisms of intentionalism I'll now discuss.

Judgmentalism depicts the narrow view: judgment alone is sufficient to individuate among the emotions. Sometimes, however, judgmentalism has a broader notion: judgment is essential though other types of thought may have a role too. I've ignored two prominent judgmentalist views: Robert Solomon (The Passions) and Martha Nussbaum (Upheavals of Thought). Nussbaum's illuminating book has been put to the side since it doesn't enlighten on the issues I'm considering. She reduces judgments to information processing – a rather unhelpful model. Everything contains information including diodes, viruses and creatures. Solomon, in The Passions, did not argue for a narrow judgmentalism. He incorporates, among other things, desire. However, given his recent views he isn't a judgmentalist either if a judgment is a form of thought. I discuss his view in order to not only clarify his present position in the face of misinterpretation by critics, but also highlight types of mistaken considerations that lead one toward the thesis Solomon now endorses. Surprisingly, Solomon in his latest writings asserts feelings are a form of judgment. I will show that Solomon's claim relies on a faulty rendering of intentionalism.

Neo-feeling theories, phenomenological theories, and perceptual theories of emotion are bolstered by arguments that purport to show intentionalism is

mistaken. We can summarize the main arguments into four categories. Two types of arguments have already been discussed. In Chapter One, I argued for rejecting extreme versions of phobias or anything analogous to the startle response as emotional paradigms. In Chapter One, I also showed that cases that rely on utterances of the form I emote about thus-and-so but I believe it's not the case that thus-and-so, so called 'irrational emotions', do not tell against intentionalism. The two sets of arguments considered here focus on aspects of certain types of thought. Both are general in nature: If thought has some feature(s) while an emotion does not, then not all emotions could be individuated in terms of thought, since lacking a feature is perforce reason to suppose the emotion lacks thought. To this end I'll be critically evaluating Patricia Greenspan's argument and Peter Goldie's arguments. These arguments illustrate the general lines of argumentation in the literature aimed at undermining intentionalism.

4.2 WHAT UNDERLIES INTENTIONALISM

Plato's Gorgias serves an instructive preliminary. The division Socrates generates remains analogous to the division that underwrites criticism of intentionalism. In 495-497e of the dialogue, Callicles maintains that the good and pleasure are identical. Socrates traps Callicles when he admits two things: something cannot be good and bad at the same time and in the same respect; nonetheless, pain and pleasure can be felt by the same person at the same time and in the same respect. When claiming John is healthy, for example, one

presumes that John's health is with respect to some aspect of his body. An eye is either healthy or unhealthy, but not both. Pain and pleasure, however, need not have this logical feature. In the dialogue, Socrates has Callicles concede that when one is thirsty one may feel pain and pleasure at the same time with respect to being thirsty. Drinking a cool glass of water while thirsty feels satisfying, yet the discomfort of thirst may remain, however brief. As such, even though pain and pleasure, along with bad and good, form opposites, the identification of pain with bad and pleasure with good fails.

What is of interest is that though pain and pleasure, on one hand, and good and bad, on the other, are antithetical pairs, they differ in how they are contrary. In the spectrum of bodily sensations, pain simply does not feel like pleasure. One conceives of pain and pleasure as polar pairs of feeling. Yet, good and bad may be contrary in that they form logically inconsistent pairs. As such, the good cannot be identified with pleasure, even though each has a contrary.

An analogous division has been made in Patricia Greenspan's criticism of intentionalism. As intentionalist theories invoke occurrent thoughts as a key aspect of an emotion, one might presume that logical inconsistency between pairs of emotions accounts for why some emotions appear to be contrary with respect to how the emotion feels for one. But if logical inconsistency, as a way of being contrary, captures the way some pairs of emotions seem to be contrary, a person would then fall short of governing their beliefs according to the law of non-contradiction when simultaneous and contrary emotions occur. Certainly, all of

us have inconsistent beliefs. But it's often reasonable for one to have contemporaneous contrary emotions and unreasonable to claim one is blatantly irrational. This criticism construes intentionalism as being unable to account for polar emotions because of its commitment to thought. If one agrees, then emotions will seem closer to feelings. As one promotes the importance of feeling in distinguishing the varied emotions, one must also avoid aligning with a theory no one confesses to have adopted: a traditional feeling theory of emotion.

I momentarily digress. In the following two utterances one would normally presume that one could refine what was said by adding detail without altering the meaning.

1. John's behavior was bad.
2. John was afraid.

That is, often our utterances imply complex structure, not only in what is expressed but in other ways. Such refinements might answer why or how John was afraid or why or how his behavior was bad. The same can be said about "John sees red" where the answer need not be limited to the details of physiology, appropriate conditions for seeing, and the like, as one may refine how it seems to him in virtue of shade, texture, and the like. However, our inquiry into why John's behavior was bad or why he is afraid implies a search for something more than the causal conditions that explain the presence of a sensation. As argued in Chapter One, abnormal cases involving John's being afraid merely because of the perceptual presence of something are cases of phobias, where, for example, phobic fears arise from mere perception. These

cases are precisely those for which further refinements, such as being afraid because the spider might bite me, are absent. As such, our explanation of these experiences depends upon non-intentional causes and the lack of support for supposing the requisite intentional structure. For example, on Gordon's account, though one can be angry and afraid at the same time and at the same event, one cannot be angry and afraid at the same time and in the same respect of their intentional structure. The intentional structure captures the general features of varied emotions. Reporting an emotion expresses this complex intentional structure. The structure provides the relevant differences among the emotions. Cases of phobia present no problem for intentionalism, since the best explanation is that phobic emotions are not emotions, though they may well be Affect Programs. One works toward discovering someone has a phobia in virtue of failing to discover an intentional structure underlying the phenomena. When hearing someone else say they are angry, afraid, or joyful, one does not initially interpret their expression or report as simply naming an experienced physiological or perceptual state. In seeking to understand why someone is fearful or angry, one searches for the details underlying the emotion; one presumes a yet uncovered mental structure underlying the occurrence of the emotion.

4.3.1 GREENSPAN'S CRITIQUE

Greenspan argues against Solomon's judgmentalism.¹⁰³ She rests her argument on a familiar type of event. You and your rival, who is your friend too, compete for an award. Your rival wins. You are unhappy. Yet, you are also happy. Greenspan labels this as a case of mixed emotions.

Greenspan unpacks the intentional structure of each judgment underlying one's happiness and unhappiness as follows:

3. Sue's winning is good.
4. Sue's winning is bad.

It's an unhappy rendering of happiness and unhappiness. The judgment of winning as good and the judgment of winning as bad both fail to indicate what it's in respect of or because of. I will not quibble with this overly simplistic rendering of the principal judgments. Certainly, if the two are logically inconsistent, one ought not to believe them.¹⁰⁴ Greenspan first claims that both are contrary in the sense that if one of them is true, the other must be false ("A Case of Mixed Feelings", 97). The statements express contrary valuations of the same event, Sue's winning. Greenspan agrees that we may qualify either and so alter the original valuations to achieve consistency. The qualification, however, is something additional. The qualification is not a further clarification of either, but amounts to a new judgment. One wonders why.

¹⁰³ Greenspan, "A Case of Mixed Feelings," 91-116; Jenefer Robinson, in "Emotion, Judgment, and Desire," endorses Greenspan's argument. Robinson argues that emotion cannot be identified with thought. I argue against her claim. Additional reasons for resisting Robinson's conclusion that desires provide emotions their particular color will be provided latter.

¹⁰⁴ The statement is provable in belief logic. Of course, one might accept logically inconsistent beliefs on pragmatic grounds and in that sense remain rational.

Greenspan then places the trailer in front of the truck when she asks “[b]ut would a basically rational person who does interpret them as contraries be likely to hold both of them at the same time” (“A Case of Mixed Feelings”, 97). Ironically, one would not suppose someone who interpreted the two judgments as inconsistent was reasonable since one ought to initially strive for consistency. To paraphrase Quine, one’s interlocutor’s silliness, beyond a certain point, is less likely than bad interpretation (Word and Object, 59).¹⁰⁵ Greenspan vastly underdescribes her case. A story must be given why the opening interpretation is one of inconsistency. One would treat the appearance of inconsistency as being resolved by coming to understand a deeper structure. One would presume, whether the subject could elaborate or not, that other features will distinguish the two such that the pair remain consistent. These other features are not something over and above the original judgments. Of course, if one discovers no relevant difference, a rational person will interpret the judgments as contrary.

Her argument requires, however, establishing a pair of logically inconsistent judgments. Yet, charity tells against a presumption of inconsistency that her argument opens with. In other words, the burden of proof remains with her. She needs to show why one would interpret ‘Sue’s winning is good’ and ‘Sue’s winning is bad’ as logically inconsistent even when one takes for granted polar emotional feelings. Note the intuitive plausibility of the case depends on her opening qualification that Sue is both a rival and a friend, and that I lose to a

¹⁰⁵ Quine’s focus concerns translation rather than interpretation, but a commitment to the principle of charity underlies both.

friend. We implicitly understand how to qualify the two judgments to preserve consistency and without that information, the case loses its initial conceivability. Of course, if one treats happiness as akin to pain and pleasure rather than good and bad, one will understand how emotions remain contrary in terms of a polar pair of feelings. None of the intentionalists considered in Chapter Three presumes that the intentional structure accounts for differences in feelings. Lack of attention to the nagging division between the sensory and the intentional seems to be the main error of most criticisms. But let us see where her argument leads us.

Given the inconsistency Greenspan obverts a judgment to preserve consistency between the pair of judgments by suggesting one will strive to provide reasons for each emotion so as to undo the inconsistency. Still, she disputes that “even if I do feel happy for my rival, or happy about his winning in that it satisfies a desire of someone I identify with, I would normally still feel happy about his winning – simpliciter – so that my emotion cannot be said to be truly qualified” (“A Case of Mixed Feelings”, 99). Qualification amounts to something additional and so provides new judgments rather than clarifications of an existing judgment. When one qualifies a judgment, one changes it. But, she notes, when such judgments change, the emotions may persist unchanged. So, the emotions and judgments come apart. But the argument rests on a mistake. One does not begin, on methodological grounds, by assuming two utterances by one and the same individual are logically inconsistent. Rather one works hard to avoid concluding someone is logically inconsistent. And so, when one treats the

utterances as expressing judgments of the same individual, qualifying an utterance need only amount to a refinement or clarification of what judgment was expressed by the utterance. So, changing how we put the judgment remains compatible with one's emotion not changing when qualifying a judgment.

Is this just a matter of two opposing approaches about what it means to qualify a judgment? Not exactly. The standard views about interpreting others rely on some commitment to maximizing rationality.¹⁰⁶ In Greenspan's case, one has contemporaneous judgments presumed to underwrite a reasonable experience. The case assumes, without any details, that the judgments expressed by the utterances be interpreted as logically inconsistent and she argues from that basis. If one treats 'bad' and 'good' as intrinsic features of an event independently of how one is related to it, then Sue's winning can't be both bad and good as nothing can be true and not true at the same time and in the same respect. And so, of the two judgments, if one is true, the other will be false. Yet, with such an interpretation where the badness of the winning is simply losing without consideration to whom and our relations to them, the additional information that her rival was a friend should be immaterial. But without that information the case loses its initial plausibility. And with the information, an interpreter understands how one can have two differing emotions about the same event because the interpreter knows precisely how they diverge with respect to Sue's winning.

Of course, it's conceptually possible that one have logically inconsistent

¹⁰⁶ I intend the claim to be compatible with varied ways one might proceed in interpreting another person: Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events, Dennett, "True Believers," Lewis, Philosophical Papers: Volume I, and Fodor & Lepore, Holism.

judgments. But Greenspan's argument is not the trite conceptual one. And I do not deny the conceptual possibility that one may have two contemporaneous emotions that are logically inconsistent. Greenspan's claim is that a judgmentalist account would render one blameworthy in some typical cases of concurrent polar emotions. Yet, one would not normally settle for an interpretation yielding a logical inconsistency unless all other interpretations have been ruled out. And a natural interpretation for an intentionalist is that the goodness and badness of the event pertains to oneself, namely losing to a friend. As I've suggested, emotions are not simply about the external world; emotions involve the person, their interests, and concerns.¹⁰⁷ Given the context, the 'good' and 'bad' most naturally relate the event to one's interests. And it's the context that suggests the offered judgments have a deeper structure. Without the additional information, Greenspan is left with no ground for explaining why one would have two contrary reactions to the same event; that is, she would have no basis for an argument. Furthermore, the context provides sufficient ground for the claim that the two judgments are consistent.

Still, she claims independently that emotions may resist qualification ("A Case of Mixed Feelings," 99).¹⁰⁸ Sensations resist qualification – that is one way in which a sensation is simple. Sensations may also be contrary. Pain feels quite unlike pleasure. Socrates suggested we may feel pain and pleasure at the

¹⁰⁷ Robert C. Roberts' Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology lays out the details of how one's interests are embedded in an emotion. Still, Roberts view leans heavily toward a perceptual account.

¹⁰⁸ She seems to think that since the "object" of the contrary emotions concerns the same event, there is no further qualification required. But it's not simply the winning; it is winning under one description rather than another that matters.

same time and in the same respect. We do not impugn one's rationality in such cases because such sensations fail to violate the principle of non-contradiction for the trivial reason that sensations are not truth-valuable and the simplicity of a sensation entails they resist qualification. In this way, one can then make sense of Greenspan's claim that emotions resist qualification in so far as happiness feels one way and unhappiness another. In this sense then, her claim that the feelings of an emotion resist qualification presents no challenge to intentionalism. In rejecting a traditional feeling theory, one can still accept a parallel between feeling and sensation. One denies, however, that emotions are only qualitative feelings.

In her article, Greenspan pushes for a separate claim: sometimes one has ambivalent emotions. Simply put, emotions can be contrary without impugning one's failure to follow the principle of non-contradiction in governing one's thoughts. She appeals to a notion of rationality couched in terms of appropriateness. She proposes that emotions be treated as attitudes with a different logic from judgments ("A Case of Mixed Feelings," 102).¹⁰⁹ If her point is that emotions implicate other mental attitudes, such as desire and wish, which certainly do have a "different logic" than belief, her position continues to be compatible with intentionalism. Still, her argument fails to undermine judgmentalism in particular, and so intentionalism in general.

¹⁰⁹ Her own solution involves treating emotions as "attitudes with motivational force."

4.3.2 AMBIVALENT EMOTIONS

Greenspan hopes to show that ambivalent emotions do not involve judgments.¹¹⁰

Her argument doesn't succeed. One can diagnose the problem as follows.

Ambivalent emotions share a feature of the so called irrational emotions already discussed. In both types of cases, one has an emotion indicating p and a thought that not p . Ambivalent emotions/mixed feelings involve one emotion indicating p and another emotion indicating not p . Given that an intentional approach treats emotions as forms of thought, ambivalent emotions seem no different than irrational emotions. I concede, however, that the standard cases of ambivalent emotions depict emotional phenomena; whereas irrational emotions, I argued, do not. That is, often purported cases of irrational emotions are not. As discussed in that chapter, the emotion differs in intentional structure from the surface structure of an utterance or the emotion is simply a phobia. Neither case is a case of irrationality. Ambivalent emotions, however, are more than mere logical possibilities. They capture a type of prevalent phenomena to be accounted for. I concede further that ambivalent emotions demonstrate a violation of an epistemic norm and in such cases one need not be bothered or otherwise disturbed that one has ambivalent emotions.

Critics take for granted that ambivalent emotions thus provide obvious

¹¹⁰ The literature on emotional ambivalence or mixed feelings is ever expanding since Greenspan's initial work. Both Christine Tappolet "Ambivalent Emotions and the Perceptual Account of Emotions" and Michael Brady "Recalcitrant Emotions and Visual Illusions", exemplify current discussion and issues relevant here.

evidence against intentionalism. I think not.¹¹¹ Firstly, I'll explain why the presence of two logically inconsistent emotions doesn't tell against intentionalism. Secondly, I'll explain why an intentionalist need not commit to the reducibility of feelings to thoughts.

I argue by analogy. A debate once arose between Bayesian epistemologists and their critics. The Bayesian offers a standard for the appropriate relation among synchronic degrees of belief. The standard is not our concern. In brief, by following a set of epistemic rules one can determine whether or not one violates the Bayesian standard. One dramatic device for determining whether one's beliefs violated the standard was the use of a Dutch Book, i.e., based on one's beliefs one will incur sure losses whenever one's set of beliefs violate the Bayesian standard. Ralph Kennedy and Charles Chihara, in "The Dutch Book Argument: Its Logical Flaws, Its Subjective Sources," objected that one may nonetheless violate such standards for pragmatic considerations. And in such cases one would not be irrational in the sense of being blameworthy. True enough. If coming to believe pigs can fly will reap you sufficient rewards, one ought to do that even if one violates the Bayesian normative constraint on one's belief. However, in accepting the point, one is not thereby endorsing an argument against Bayesian epistemology. A Bayesian isn't advocating an absolutist position with respect to Bayesian epistemic standards.¹¹² Being susceptible to a Dutch Book will demonstrate one has violated that standard.

¹¹¹ A perceptual account will have a similar difficulty. It must account for why we perceive the world in contradictory ways. In this way, it's a general problem. However, I think the intentionalist has far better responses.

¹¹² See, Brad Armendt "Dutch Books, Additivity, and Utility Theory" *Philosophical Topics*, 1993.

One needs another argument that such a standard is a law of thought never to be transgressed or that a Bayesian cannot appeal to other standards in changing contexts.

The parallel is as follows. One can accept that emotional ambivalence or mixed feelings suggests a normative standard different from the satisfaction conditions for belief, i.e., truth. In addition, one can assume that the relevant standard for ambivalent emotions at times may involve, entail, or merely suggest the relevant emotions are logically inconsistent. This however is insufficient ground for claiming that emotions do not involve belief. For the relevant issue is not the metaphysics underlying the ambivalent emotions or mixed feelings, but to account for why one does not blame one or hold one in disregard in those cases. And so, though one ought to aim for consistency as a standard on one's diachronic beliefs, one need not claim that other normative standards may trump such a standard. And in such a case, it is open for one to admit that when one violates one normative standard because another trumps it, they are nevertheless not to be blamed for the violation. The difficulty for the critic of intentionalism is that they are supposing, for the argument to have sufficient force, an absolutist position about norms. Independent of the circumstances and perhaps limiting our focus to ordinary cases, one's thoughts ought not to violate the law of non-contradiction - ever. Happily, one need not and I do not adopt such an absolutist view of norms. I agree a story should be told about how to understand appropriateness with respect to ambivalent emotions and mixed feelings (isn't that why such phenomena are of interest?). The point here is that

one need not commit to tying appropriateness to conditions of satisfaction for belief. The critic reasons that if one doesn't apply a norm (being blamed for logically inconsistent beliefs), then the conditions for applying the norm (i.e., having beliefs) must not exist. But such a position makes sense only by assuming a draconian notion of norms – whenever the failure conditions are met, one is blameworthy. But such is a minor minority position. And so, ambivalent emotions and mixed feelings fail to present a clear objection to intentionalism.¹¹³

4.4 PSYCHIC FEELINGS

In "Psychic Feelings: Their Importance and Irreducibility," Stocker provides a number of considerations for the centrality of psychic feelings as well as their irreducibility to simple or complex intentional states. 'Psychic feelings' refer to conceptually complex experiences whose scope may be broader than emotional experiences. And it need not be the case that every instance of an emotion type involves psychic feelings. The phenomena Stocker explores involve feelings and those feelings are more or less over and above just simply bodily feelings. One of his examples is telling. Prior to falling on the ice, one may be aware of the dangers and have a desire to avoid the dangers. But once one falls, the same knowledge about the dangers of the ice and desire to avoid them are 'emotionally present' to one ("Psychic Feelings," 141). Such a different experience roughly identifies the target phenomena – psychic feelings. Stocker limits his focus to

¹¹³ As Gordon noted earlier on, mixed emotions about the same fact when involving wishes will not result in one being irrational (*The Structure of Emotion*, 31). And so, one can be angry about not receiving a job in Decatur, Illinois and delighted at not receiving a job in Decatur, Illinois.

psychic feelings of care, concern, and interest. He suggests psychic feelings fail to be explained in terms of reason, desire, or more complex thought. In contrast, Joel Marks, in "A Theory of Emotion," claims that emotions are individuated in terms of belief and desire and the feelings of emotion reduce to the feelings of desire. Such an account remains impoverished as it shifts the issue from the qualitative aspect of emotions to the qualitative aspect of desire.¹¹⁴

It should be noted that neither Lyons nor Gordon explained emotional feeling in such a way. Gordon was rather dismissive since he treated emotional feeling as independent phenomena. Lyons treats emotional feeling as central though as a species of bodily feeling. The other possibility would be to explain psychic feelings in terms of thought that is not itself qualitative. In this sense, intentionalism as presented in Chapter Three remains neutral as to how to account for emotional feeling. Still, I intend to put forth a more credible form of intentionalism in terms of how to account for feeling in Chapter Five. I have already given reason to reject Gordon's position in Chapter Three. Here I'm sympathetic to Stocker's criticisms about reducibility to thought and his claim that emotional feeling is in some sense irreducible. I think it is important to note that one who accepts that any particular type of thought may lack phenomenal aspect need not commit to reducing the qualitative aspect of feeling to some form of non-qualitative thought. That is, intentionalism can be consistent with Stocker's

¹¹⁴ To be clear, I am not discussing how to explain a conscious state as I wish to remain neutral to the question of whether qualitative character, as opposed to the feeling, must be conscious. This is fair to Stocker as he states that "I intend this paper to be as neutral as possible on such issues as philosophical psychology as materialism and functionalism. All I intend this paper to do in this regard to these various issues is to help make clear some phenomena that any credible theory must account for ("Psychic Feelings," 130)."

account of psychic feeling. However, for those who take the qualitative aspect of emotion as central and leave out the personal aspect will fail to provide a robust account of emotion. Stocker, among others, has brought our attention to this. Still, the importance of psychic feeling lies not in the feeling.

Stocker's line of reasoning accords with a theme in Chapter Two and Three: an emotion strike one as personal. In so far as care, concern, and interest are psychic feelings, they are personal too. As psychic feelings, care, concern, and interest are feeling-laden in that "one's own well-being and what one believes to conduce to it are indeed vivid, interesting, and moving ("Psychic Feelings," 147 n19)." Stocker targets the claim that psychic feelings so described can be reducible to feelingless thought. He notes that care, concern, or interest need not be simply doing what serves one's well being. A computer checking for viruses, spyware, and other malicious software might be loosely said to tend to its well-being. But certainly the computer can't be said to care about doing so, even loosely. Nor is it doing so with feeling. The point is not simply that computers lack a mind, but that the selected phenomena cannot typically be characterized in a feelingless way.

Stocker's argument relies on an assumption that if a psychic feeling can be described as involving a particular thought, perhaps captured by such an expression as "I feel guilt", an identical thought could be expressed for which one does not care about, is concerned with, or has an interest in. One's thought is expressed in a way that is "cool" or "dispassionate", where the two words indicate subdued or the absence of qualitative aspect. I grant the assumption.

The argument, however, can be naturally extended, a point Stocker overlooks or omits. It's equally the case that one can have a "hot" or "passionate" feeling-laden experience for which one does not care about, is concerned with, or has an interest in. For example, one who loses their faith and nonetheless feels guilty about not participating in a sacred ritual need not care about, be concerned with, or even have an interest in the experience or the object of the experience, even though "emotionally" present. Certainly such types of experiences are natural enough, conceptually rich, and not simply an inner pang. Nor is such an experience pathological, even if it's dissociative. People change, but one's feelings often lag behind. Similarly, one may want a Nat Sherman Black and Gold cigarette even though one quit smoking years ago and normally smoked a different brand. Still, even if the experience is feeling-laden, one need not care about, be concerned with, or have an interest in what is putatively a psychic feeling. And so, the feeling won't capture what is central to psychic feeling; namely, psychic feelings are personal. Moreover, if neither the consciously present thought nor feeling capture the personal nature of psychic feelings, what then would capture how an emotion is personal? We leave this question for Chapter Five.

Note that Stocker's account doesn't contradict what was stressed in Chapter Two: conscious experience may appear to one as seamless. This is because Stocker's notion of irreducibility doesn't entail separability ("Psychic Feelings," 137, 145 n1). One is free to offer one account for the qualitative aspect of an emotion – its feeling-ladenness – and another to account for what

individuates the emotions, even if one accepts that one's experience appears to one as seamless. Similarly, with psychic feelings, even if the experience remains to one irreducible, the account of psychic feelings need not be. The qualitative aspect is central – but when such experiences remain the same minus the personal aspect, one loses what seemed essential to psychic feelings even though the feeling remains. And so, even though the experience remains seamless to one, one need not follow the explanatory footpath packed down by autophenomenology.

To be fair to an advocate of reducibility, one would circumvent Stocker's objection by explaining psychic feelings not in terms of the thought or the feeling identified with the experience. This leaves open some other way to explain psychic feelings. Let me make an analogy. To explain a conscious state, one need not explain it in terms of the conscious state. If one had an opposition to such an option, higher-order theories or transitive theories of consciousness would be problematic. Stocker's argument focuses not on the general claim of explaining psychic feelings in terms of thought, but reducing psychic feelings to a thought present to one within the experience. As such, an account of psychic feelings in terms of intentional structure remains open.

Though feelings are not separable from psychic feelings, "feelings are too much of an inner phenomenon and too poor conceptually to bolster up accounts of care, concern, interests and so on (144)." As Stocker takes feelings and psychic-feelings to be distinct, he would claim that psychic feelings are conceptually complex, so that they cannot be captured by thoughts since one

can have the conscious thoughts dispassionately. In this regard, Peter Goldie's notion of feeling towards serves as a reasonable extension of Stocker's notion of psychic feelings.

4.5 NEO-FEELING THEORIES

Goldie promotes what I call a neo-feeling theory. First, feeling remains central to understanding the varied emotions.¹¹⁵ Second, emotional feeling remains distinct from bodily feeling. Emotional feelings are conceptually complex in a way that cannot be captured by thought. This special kind of feeling Goldie calls feeling towards (The Emotions, 4). Both feeling towards and bodily feeling are qualitative; there is something it is like to have them. But feeling towards remains amorphous with respect to how it is felt. Though one may feel an emotion roughly around the trunk area of the body, bodily feelings are more localized. Aches and pains tend not to be as diffuse. This difference in degree lends support to the further claim that feeling towards fails to be of the same type as bodily feelings. Still, the phenomenological difference, it appearing to one as localized or diffuse, may suggest only that underlying qualitative character appears to one as different. As such, the phenomenological difference is insubstantial. Only when one further supposes that the phenomenological difference mirrors a difference in kind would such appearances matter. Still, bodily feelings tend to immediately direct one toward the body; whereas emotional feelings, though they may direct one to the body, do so indirectly. But

¹¹⁵ By 'central' I do not mean what sustains an emotion. Rather it's of basic importance for an occurrence.

again this need not indicate a difference in kind. For perhaps how it appears to one, localized or not, doesn't indicate a difference in the qualitative character (i.e., the qualia), but in how one is conscious of it. Of course, if one further supposes that how qualitative character appears to us is just what qualitative character is, i.e., no difference between the appearance and reality, no proof is needed as the two distinct experiences serve as their own evidence of a difference in kind. I'll presently assume this, though more critical remarks will follow in Chapter Five.

Feeling towards is about something or directed toward something. Headaches too exhibit aboutness since such experiences are directed toward the cranium. The term 'intentionality' to capture such phenomena has some currency in the Philosophy of Mind, though by no means is it standard.¹¹⁶ Such differences in use may be put aside. The relevant question remains: How does one distinguish feeling towards from bodily feeling? Though bodily feeling and feeling towards differ in the focus of one's experience, bodily feeling tends to be about the body and feeling towards about the world, both remain qualitative and about something. Goldie aims for a further differentiation. Feeling towards has intrinsic aboutness while bodily feeling has borrowed aboutness. He provides an extended example.

"You are sitting at your desk, struggling with a particularly intractable philosophical problem and getting more and more frustrated at your inability to find your way out of it. This is an emotional feeling of frustration towards the

¹¹⁶ Tim Crane holds such a view. See his "Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental" and "The Intentional Structure of Consciousness". Those that do not include Jerry Fodor, Colin McGinn, David Rosenthal, and John Searle to name but a few.

object of your emotion --- the philosophical problem. Then, perhaps quite suddenly, you come to have a confined feeling in your chest, so that it is hard to take a deep breath. This is a bodily feeling. But not just that, because the two feelings are immediately combined in consciousness: we might say that you feel physically hemmed in by the philosophical problem; the room suddenly seems so *stuffy*, and you feel you just have to get up and get some fresh air --- to 'clear my head', you might say, as if getting fresh air *is* clearing up the philosophical problem. So the bodily feeling is thoroughly infused with the intentionality of the emotion; and in turn, the feeling towards is infused with a bodily characterization (The Emotions, 56-57)."

Such an experience appears to one as seamless. The bodily feeling shares in the aboutness exhibited in feeling towards in a seamless way. Whereas, if, while sitting at one's desk, an itch also becomes felt in the middle of one's back, it would not be so characterized, but remains a feeling about the condition of one's body. But why would one consider the confined feeling in the chest borrowed rather than intrinsic? Isn't this, as Goldie asks, just a matter of how it seems to one? He thinks that just as bodily feelings fail to be directed toward the world, and feeling towards which is not, it seems to him "no reason other than dogma to insist that all emotional feelings must be simply one or the other, and cannot have features of both (The Emotions, 56)." One can agree that as far as emotional experience is concerned, some feelings direct one toward conditions of the body, some direct one toward the object of the emotion, and others do both. But the question remains, why not think of bodily feeling as

having intrinsic intentionality? Or, why not think of feeling towards as having borrowed intentionality? The extended example will be of no help on the grounds that it only makes clear that emotional feeling may appear to one in three different ways: just bodily, just feeling towards, and both types of feelings without borders. In asking whether this is just a matter of how it is for one, one is asking not about the experience, but about the nature of the feeling. And certainly, if one opts for no distinction between bodily feeling and feeling towards with respect to the qualitative character, i.e., qualia, which is not to be confused with what it is like for one, some story about why the phenomenological appearances incontrovertibly appear to one as different must be in the offering. But in providing an explanation one need not save the appearance. As discussed in Chapter Two, heterophenomenology is more than just phenomenology. One isn't committed to the view that how one describes their experience captures different types of feelings. I leave further discussion for Chapter Five where feeling is given its proper due in an intentional theory of emotion. At this point, advocating a distinction between bodily feeling and feeling towards and a distinction between borrowed intentionality and intrinsic intentionality is without appeal. At least not until one independently argues that feeling towards is conceptually rich without involving thought. If successful, opening the door to a conceptually rich type of feeling would certainly be reasonable. And once that door is open, one could reasonably push for a distinction between bodily feeling and feeling towards, as well as the distinction between intrinsic intentionality and borrowed intentionality.

And so, our focus is on the claim that the aboutness of emotional feelings,

i.e., feeling towards, need not be explicable in terms of thought. The arguments for this view of aboutness, where the aboutness fails to be captured by thought, tend to be of the same form. One presents a story where it's either unreasonable to claim that an accompanying thought is required or that it's reasonable to suppose none is needed. It has been central to an intentional account that thoughts individuate the varied emotions. And here, a mental attitude and a conceptualized mental content constitute a thought. Though a central role for affect need not be denied, if it can be shown that sometimes having an emotion lacks the requisite thought, then some emotions will fail to be individuated in terms of thought. This leaves open the question what then provides the individuation conditions. The option that remains foreclosed is that emotions are individuated in terms of (simple) qualitative states. That is, a traditional feeling theory remains false.

4.6 SOLOMON'S "NEO-FEELING" THEORY AND CRITIQUE

Surprisingly, Solomon's view approaches an account of emotion in which a feeling is about something without being a thought. He now embraces feeling as a form of judgment. He writes in 2001 "I am now coming to appreciate that accounting for the feelings (not just the sensations) in emotion is not a secondary concern and not independent of appreciating the essential role of the body in emotional experience" (Not Passion's Slave, 189). It may seem to be quite a concession from his early view presented in "Emotion & Choice" and in The Passions where feeling was anathema. But Solomon throughout his career

remained fixed on the emotional experience. As with neo-feeling theorists, Solomon places the phenomenon as paramount in the way ordinary language philosophers are said to make language paramount in their philosophical analysis. In this sense, the change represents a sensible revision. I agree with Solomon, emotions do indeed centrally involve feeling. But Solomon's road to incorporating feeling is paved by broadening the notion of judgment to such an extent his moniker, "emotions are judgments," (Not Passions Slave, 20) loses its ordinary sense. Solomon wants judgment to cover not only the complex ruminations of Kant, but also the subtle movements of the body in walking a set of stairs. That is, a judgment may be a form of thought or a form of perception, though not both.

Judgment in either sense represents "ways of perceiving and understanding the world" (Not Passion's Slave, 93). One will note the looseness of both 'perceiving' and 'understanding'. Not all emotions involve perceptual judgments. Nostalgia, for example, requires memory and recognizing or identifying the relevant elements in one's memory. Nor, Solomon claims, do all emotions involve thought. And so animals may understand the world in virtue of having an emotion while lacking any thought. Solomon identifies emotional feelings with perceptual forms of kinesthetic judgments. Such judgments result from responding to identifiable features in the world. When reaching for the steering wheel, one orients their hands so as to grasp it. And if one has a fractured wrist, one is acutely aware of such movements and may even speak to oneself on how to grasp the wheel. But such motor judgments do not depend on

having the ability to express them nor to recognize the steering wheel as such. My one year old daughter could not express, that is, articulate, such perceptual judgments, because she doesn't yet have the aptitude to express her judgments via a natural language. Still, she is quite adept at grasping objects at varied orientations. Gorillas too grasp bananas and tree limbs with aplomb and they have forever lacked the capacity to express thought via a natural language. Those perceptual judgments are not indicative of "knowing that" but rather of "knowing how". Solomon writes that given "that emotional judgments are not necessarily propositional, the way is open to make the further claim that they are not necessarily 'knowing that' cognitions either" (Not Passion's Slave, 191). Given that my daughter and gorillas lack language aptitude, their [perceptual] judgments fail to be forms of thought, since such [perceptual] judgments are not propositional, which, it seems, presupposes language aptitude.

The fine tuned adjustments to the world embodied in kinesthetic judgment remain distinct from the type of adjustments common to flies, fleas, and bees. It's not just that my daughter and gorillas have a mind, which surely they do, while insects do not. Some forms of reactions to the world fail to be cultivated. This forms one reason why Solomon rejects the startle response as a standard type of emotion (Not Passion's Slave, 214). Unlike kinesthetic judgments of the sort considered by Solomon, the startle response is neither cultivated nor learned. That is, kinesthetic judgments, of the relevant sort, presuppose intention (Not Passion's Slave, 213). The feelings in emotion are judgments of the body, where the kind of kinesthetic judgments are activities of preparation

and expression (Not Passion's Slave, 190). He utilizes Paul Ekman's well-known work on emotional facial expressions to further his example. Such facial expressions occur more or less automatically and have a particular feeling associated with them. Each facial expression requires particular gestures and postures and each has a particular feel associated with it. Frowning differs from glowering not only in the expression but also in how each is felt for one. And so such feelings are judgments of the body because such bodily movements serve as activities. In the end, Solomon still hung onto his early view that we are, in some sense, responsible for our emotions. And in carving out that aspect of his thesis, coupled with his notion of kinesthetic judgment, he aimed to have a notion of intention sliced rather thin. He aimed for a view such that "[a]n act (or an emotion) that fits and makes sense in one's life story can be said to be free (and one is thus responsible) even if the act (or emotion) in question is inattentive, only quasi-intentional, habitual, spontaneous, or even 'automatic' (Not Passion's Slave, 204-205). I will not pursue Solomon's account of responsibility further.

Though the distinction between cultivated judgments versus those that are not aims in the right direction, it fails to be satisfactory. One can cultivate particular reactions in animals as well as humans via conditioned learning. Certainly conditioned learning requires, in some loose sense, perceiving and understanding the world, since it depends on responding to relevant features of the world. And perhaps it works best when a creature has a brain.¹¹⁷ Still, it's a reasonable question whether it requires a mind. I am neither advocating nor

¹¹⁷ See T.M. Alloway's article "Learning and Memory in Insects."

denying any form of dualism nor asking for the individuation conditions between the mental and non-mental. Rather it's a common sense and mundane point that some things we learn can be adequately explained without appeal to the mind, and so, intention. So far, pushing judgments closer to the perceptual form of kinesthetic judgment only seems to blur what was relatively clear – that my daughter has more going on than a bee. Solomon's example, however, is not without irony. Ekman sought to show that emotions were cultural only to discover that certain emotional facial expressions were universal. That is, the extent to which facial activities are cultivated or learned concerns the species, not an individual. 'Judgment' typically denotes an activity of a person or other suitable creature, not a species.

Solomon seems to treat judgment not as a type of mental attitude but a collection of attitudes. For a particular judgment “we can distinguish between the proposition asserted and the holistic mental act(s) involved in making of that judgment” (Not Passion's Slave, 111). But having asserted a proposition, what other mental attitude would be involved such that additional mental acts could be included and still be a form of judgment? In the relevant passage, Solomon's concerned with addressing the objection considered earlier, that one can make a judgment passionately or dispassionately. His point here is that emotions involve more than just assertion. But our question is not whether an emotion involves other mental attitudes besides an assertoric one, but whether judgment, in either form, may be non-assertoric. I hope not, for a judgment is incontrovertibly assertoric.

The problem so far lies not with moving toward a perceptual account of emotion, though certainly a symptom. Rather, the problem is in moving toward perception as an appropriate element in the analysis of emotion and then supposing such a move offsets the apparent problems of an intentional account. As such, one describes perception in a way that stays clear of the problematic features. But the issues will not go away by a move toward a perceptual theory. One needs an account of the percept. It's a technical term. Our ordinary understanding as well as reliance on our ordinary experience will be wanting in this regard. For the question will be, and I offer no answer, what is the relevant difference, if any, between a concept and a percept. In one extreme view of perception, the percept is nothing but sensation. Which highlights one way that perceptual theories appear attractive – it's an attempt to mingle together aspects of both sensation and thought with the aim of preserving the qualitative aspect of sensation and the aboutness of thought without thereby being simple, as sensations are, nor propositional or indicative of language aptitude in the way thought is considered to be. In another extreme, the percept just is a concept, and so no substantial difference.

For Solomon, thoughts are necessarily articulate. Solomon states that "... I find the language of 'thought' just too intellectual, too sophisticated, and too demanding in terms of linguistic ability, articulation, and reflection, to apply to all emotions, judgments seems to me to have the range and flexibility to apply to everything from animal and infant emotion to the most sophisticated and complex adult human emotions..." (Not Passions Slave, 187). Having a language

enables quite a few advantages over creatures that do not. For one, it allows one to be reflectively conscious. The phrase 'reflectively conscious' requires care. One is reflectively conscious when they have a conscious thought about a one's present experience. One might want to extend the term to include past ones too. One might also restrict the term to capture how certain conscious experiences are for one as Solomon does. And there is general agreement that reflective consciousness presumes language aptitude. One cannot be reflectively conscious unless one has facility with a natural language. Being in a conscious state that is reflectively conscious of something requires thought, while being in an unreflective conscious state need not. One should pause at this moment. It may be true that a conscious state that is unreflectively conscious fails to manifest a thought as part of the experience for one. But it would not thereby follow that to have a conscious experience, that is, to have a conscious state, no thought is necessary. One would, I think, assume that whether a conscious experience requires thought isn't just a conceptual issue.¹¹⁸

So even assuming animals and infants have emotions and lack a natural language, one would think that whether thought be identified with a natural language isn't an *a priori* issue. Peter Geach, in Mental Acts, did not identify thought with a natural language. And though he used spoken and written language in his argument, he was explicit in denying judgment required particular words or a natural language. He relied on concepts and relations among concepts. That is, Geach divorced conceptual abilities from linguistic aptitude.

¹¹⁸ David Rosenthal, for example, has long argued for a Higher-Order-Thought theory of consciousness. It asserts that we are conscious of something when a higher-order thought represents that thing in some suitable way. See his Consciousness and Mind.

Kenny furthered the claim in Action, Emotion and Will by arguing that emotions exhibit variable polyadicity. What Solomon, neo-feelings theorists, and intentionalists agree upon is that emotions may be about something or directed toward something. One disagreement then is in how to explicate this rough notion.

Both Geach and Solomon agree that a judgment need not be in a form of words. Even though Geach thinks the structure of thought mirrors the structure of language, he was not committed to the view that to have a thought one must have linguistic aptitude. In this sense, infants and warm blooded animals may have thoughts. The thought is nonetheless conceptual. So, although a thought need not be articulate in Solomon's sense of being expressed in a natural language (either as an utterance or to oneself in "inner speech"), one needs to know whether for Solomon judgment need not involve facilitation with concepts.

On this issue Solomon offers little guidance. Still, another claim suggests his view is steered in this direction. He maintains judgment need not involve propositional contents.¹¹⁹ Namely, when one is angry they are rarely angry at a proposition (Not Passions Slave, 48-55; 184-185).¹²⁰ This point does not clarify whether or not judgment need involve facilitation with concepts -- it only confuses. Though this is no place for a dissertation on propositions, the issue needs to be addressed.

As stated before, I presume that a minimum condition of a judgment is that

¹¹⁹ Norman Malcolm ("Thoughtless Brutes") claims that animals show forms of thinking without necessarily having thoughts. He takes this to show that thinking is non-propositional. But his notion of a proposition seems to necessitate a natural language or at least that it consist of a form of words.

¹²⁰ Robert C. Roberts in "Propositions and Animal Emotions" argues in like fashion.

it is assertoric. It's natural enough to claim that for something to be assertoric, it makes a claim about something. Furthermore, the claim is evaluable as true or false. Accepting these two features is enough for one to entertain propositions. Is Solomon objecting to either of these claims? No. So what more does one need to begin taking propositions seriously?

Philosophers that have as part of their analysis that-clauses may well have in mind robust propositions. Still, that-clauses help identify what one judges or asserts. Frege, in "On Sense and Reference," argues that it must be an abstract entity that ties the similarities between verbs of saying and verbs of thinking – call that abstract entity a proposition. For such a realist, as a referring device, the nominalization of a that-clause does not and could not be referring to items in the tangible world. And so the object of an emotion is a proposition. Alonzo Church, a realist of a different sort, in "Propositions and Sentences," argues that propositions serve as the meanings – what is common between two declarative sentences that mean the same thing but have different inscriptions.

Solomon isn't arguing against realism. In an early paper, Solomon critiques Davidson's rendering of Hume's account of pride. Solomon's chief complaint against Davidson is that Davidson is an extensionalist and propositions in that line of philosophical wrangling lack intentionality. Davidson is a Quinean and Quine (Word and Object) is an extensionalist about meaning and a nominalist about propositions. Propositions are metalinguistic.

But the reliance on language was the method, not necessarily a prerequisite. Wilfred Sellars, another metalinguistic nominalist about

propositions, claimed that non-linguistic animals can have thoughts and those thoughts may be of a propositional form, even though they are non-linguistic animals.¹²¹ To further push the point that it can't be either propositions or language that concerns Solomon, consider Arthur Prior's position, in his unfinished book, Objects of Thought. Prior puts forth a non-metalinguistic nominalist account of propositions. He notes the following, and I quote, "it is unusual for people to say 'X fears the proposition that so-and-so', ... I am not sure what is the reason for this; we do say 'X fears that so-and-so', and we do say 'That so-and-so, is a proposition', yet we do not say 'X fears a proposition'. I suspect that we treat propositions as entities when we feel we have to, otherwise not; and in reality we *never* have to (Objects of Thought, 15)." For Prior, that-clauses are neither metalinguistic devices nor do they refer to abstract entities. Rather, they refer to items in the tangible world. To my understanding, a theory of emotion ought to remain neutral as to whether propositions are real or fanciful though fortuitous logical constructions. Still, it's trivial that all emotions stand in a relation to a sentence or utterance, for one can use a sentence or utterance to describe what the emotion is about. And if a proposition serves as the vehicle for the truth-value or meaning of a sentence, all emotions stand in a relation to a proposition too. That is to say, of course, the emotion consists in something other than a relation to a proposition. And so, I adopt Prior's recommendation when he writes "X fears (thinks) that p' does not mean that X stands in some

¹²¹ Wilfred Sellars, "Behaviorism, Language and Meaning," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (1980): 3-30; "Mental Events," Philosophical Studies 39 (1981): 325-345; Sellars, "Structure of Knowledge," in Action, Knowledge, and Reality, ed. H-N. Castañeda, 1975; Andrew Chrucky dissertation Critique of Wilfred Sellars' Materialism, Fordham University, 1990.

relation to some sentence [or proposition] by which we would ordinarily assert that p – we must stick fast to that" (Objects of Thought, 16-17). So, even if one wants to admit that sometimes the object of a judgment is a proposition (Not Passions Slave, 187), that would not foreclose talking about what the thought represents – or is about.

In the end, it's the case that Solomon would rather approach the emotions by a different road. It's not that he has argued that emotions do not involve propositions in any of the varied ways a realist or nominalist might invoke them. For Solomon it's the experience that is paramount. So be it, but let not one conclude that an analysis of experience points to sacred ground where no nominalization may tread, at least not without an argument.

4.7 GOLDIE'S CRITIQUE

Goldie presents a similar line as Solomon's with respect to emotions without thought. He writes: "But once it is accepted, as it should be, that the object of an emotion need not be a proposition, and can be for example, a person, then it becomes clear that I can perfectly coherently say that you are angry with James ... whilst at the same time insisting that your emotion is entirely ungrounded (The Emotions, 22)."¹²² The emotion is ungrounded not in the sense that it involves a false belief or one out of touch with cultural norms, but that no relevant

¹²² Goldie thinks that intentionalist "is based in part on the idea that emotions must have propositions as their objects" (The Emotions, 22). The claim is false, to say nothing about running rough shot over Quine, Sellars, and Prior. Charity suggests Goldie is just being stylistic and like Solomon, taking a different road. To be clear, I remain agnostic about propositions and about whether thought requires language. That is, in leaving one's theoretical commitments as thin as possible, I also leave them as open as possible.

belief exists. And so, when one concedes that the object of emotion need not be a proposition and the object of belief can only be a proposition, then an emotion need not involve belief, even if uttering sentences help illustrate what the emotion is about.

Why is it that if one accepts, as they should, that what one is afraid of, or what brings about ones fear, need not be a proposition, that no belief is present? The answer lies in a slight of hand. Goldie, in the prior paragraph, notes that philosophers when talking about the object of emotions have used various ways of describing such phenomena. One of his examples invokes talk of the formal object of an emotion discussed in Chapter Three. His preferred method is in terms of determinable and determinate features. He claims that these terms capture more or less the same distinctions (The Emotions, 21). But he is mistaken, for they do not.

Goldie says the following about the distinction between determinable and determinate features:

The idea can be illustrated with a simple example. If Peter is afraid of the bull, then there will be a feature of the bull which Peter thinks it has. If this feature is a determinable one (its being dangerous), then he will think it dangerous in virtue of having certain determinately dangerous features (having long horns which could harm him, perhaps), even if he is not able to say what they are. And if the feature which he thinks it has is a determinate one, then it ought to be possible for Peter to explain why this determinate feature falls under the determinable one (The Emotions, 21).

The description makes it relatively clear that the property is a property of the bull, not a property of a proposition or of a mental state. To further push the idea, it's a property of the bull Peter thinks it has. Still, Peter need not be able to report it. This leaves it open how to interpret 'thinks'. Thinly, 'thinks' may pick out information processing. A slightly beefier notion might treat 'think' as involving inferential processing. And a robust notion will treat 'think' as one involving unconscious linguistic inferential processing. It doesn't matter for Goldie, or an intentionalist, what one means, as long as one keeps it straight. The important point, however, is not in how one treats 'think', but that the determinable feature of the bull have a determinate property of, in this case, the bull, such as having long horns. In doing so, one at least opens the door to objective criteria for describing how an emotion is brought about in non-linguistic creatures. A determinate property has a slightly more involved criterion: Peter must be able to provide an explanation as to why a determinate feature falls under a determinable feature. Of course, the strength of possible is left open. Is it restricted to the practical limits of science (what subjects can report) or left to the limits of metaphysics and one's favorite possible world semantics? Again, this is a point about clarity. In either case, the determinable and determinate features are features of an external object.

But this confuses the issue. Assume realism about propositions. Still one can talk about what causes the emotion or the content of experience. In either sense, the object of emotion is something other than a proposition. Would pursuing either the cause or the content of experience preclude talk of

propositions? Even if an intentional account commits to realism about propositions, that won't foreclose talking of emotions in terms of the cause or the emotional experience. And in discussing either, one will need to be clear about the terms 'think' and 'possible.'

Still, the spirit of the objection reaches too far. Perceptions and feeling towards have content and that content must have a certain structure one can appeal to when describing how two perceptions or feelings towards are either about the same thing or not. Propositions serve, whether real or not, as a vehicle for determining whether two different sentences (or utterances), extensionally or intensionally, mean the same thing.¹²³ Something must similarly serve as the vehicle for perceptions or feeling towards – what that might be is unimportant. And even if it is agreed that one's emotion need not be about one's perception or feeling towards, wouldn't it follow that in such cases the emotion is without perception or feeling towards? I would think not. Wouldn't then the explanation as to why be available for an intentional theory? I would think so. The best interpretation of the dialectic is that critics are traveling down a different road without critically closing off the well-packed intentional route. Given the lack of details offered by critics for the advantages of their favored detour, I move on.

To a large extent, Goldie's own expansive view of emotion remains compatible with much of the central points of Chapter Three. Kenny was clear that the way to understand the object of an emotion is to treat the object of

¹²³ One can substitute any other realist or nominalist emendation if one has qualms with Church's way of putting it. In the end, Critics failed to see that in throwing out the bath water (propositions), they also threw out the baby (explaining how different inscriptions, utterances, or expressions can have something in common).

emotion in the way one treats the object of a transitive verb. Goldie agrees (The Emotions, 17). One also feels at home when Goldie writes “the more natural idea that the object of an emotion is that onto which one’s thoughts and feelings are typically directed, and to which they typically return, so the object of my pride in this example [of being proud of one’s house] is not just myself, nor just my house, but my-house –which-belongs-to-me” (The Emotions, 17). Namely, emotions especially involve the person in a way that belief and desire need not. Goldie also captures the central view of intentionalism when he writes “[d]oing this [establishing the intentional structure that underlies an emotion] is merely to make the emotion intelligible, as in your envy of your own fruit trees can be made intelligible by your false belief that the fruit trees are on your neighbors land. Intelligibility in this sense is thin. For one thing, an emotion such as your envy of your own fruit trees may be intelligible but also irrational if the false belief which putatively grounds it is one which was not arrived at by a suitably rational process (The Emotions, 22).” Similarly, as outlined in Chapter Three, an intentional account need not commit to a view about or indicate what accounts for appropriateness or an emotional experience. Nor does it make any particular commitment about social, cultural, or evolutionary factors in an emotional experience. It doesn’t purport to offer a full explanation of the emotional experience. Intentionalism is thin. Yet, it would certainly be a mistake to have an account of emotion while ignoring the experience; fortunately, no one has made that mistake.¹²⁴ An intentional account provides an understanding of one’s emotion in so far as each type of emotion may be individuated from the others.

¹²⁴ The point, of course, is the one made by David Lewis (“Mad Pain, Martian Pain,” 233).

Such an account is not merely, as Jesse Prinz puts it, identifying core relational themes that correspond to each emotion (Gut Reactions, 66). An intentional account identifies a type of intentional mental structure for an occurrent emotion. Core relational themes help one conceptualize differences without committing to the type of states that underwrite an emotional experience. Intentionalism makes such a commitment but absolutely does not offer a full-blooded view of the emotions. Still, the opposition to the view concerns not its thinness, but rather the claim that each emotion has an intentional mental structure.

And so, intentionalism remains attuned with much of what is unique to Goldie's own view, namely, what is important in understanding one's emotion is to understand one's narrative (history). What I'm objecting to is the claim that feelings capture a way that an emotion is directed at or about something that thought cannot capture and, furthermore, that only feelings can capture the personal and intimate nature of emotion.

Critics insist that focusing solely on mental attitude and conceptual mental content will leave feeling out. In one sense it's obvious but unimportantly true. Thoughts are just different than feelings for the mundane reason that one may have feelingless thoughts. Goldie agrees. The issue, however, is more complicated. If one limits the claim to conscious thought, it's not obvious. If any mental state is conscious, then it has phenomenology and phenomenology captures, in part perhaps, what it is like for one. Given that a conscious thought is a conscious mental state, it follows there is something it is like for one to have a conscious thought. David Pitt, in "The Phenomenology of Cognition, or, *What*

Is It Like to Think That P?", provides arguments for the claim that all conscious thoughts have phenomenology and one cannot distinguish the content of one conscious thought from another conscious thought with distinct content without phenomenology.¹²⁵ And so, if one can't have a conscious thought for which there is nothing it is like to have it for one, then no conscious thought is feelingless (i.e., without phenomenology).¹²⁶ What then could the distinction be between feeling towards and a conscious thought when the feeling isn't simply a bodily feeling? Of course, an unconscious thought is feelingless for the trivial reason that there is nothing it is like for one to have an unconscious thought.¹²⁷ Even if a conscious thought has a phenomenology, it's not essential to the thought. By thought, we must mean a mental state.¹²⁸ That is, one can have two occurrent mental states that are identical in all relevant respects except that one is conscious while the other is not. What is owed is an account of the difference between the thought that is conscious and the one that is not. Namely, one

¹²⁵ I don't accept Pitt's argument because I reject his claim that the phenomenology of conscious thought constitutes the thoughts representational content. It's immaterial that I reject the claim. The point here is that for Goldie to claim there are feelingless thought and by that one means feelingless conscious thought, then the claim is (a) not obvious, and (b) indistinguishable from feeling towards. Both consequences are unhappy for Goldie's position.

¹²⁶ My claim is agnostic as to whether one wishes to interpret qualia such that all mental experiences are qualitative (there is something it is like to have them) or only some types of mental experiences are qualitative, perhaps those with feeling. For Pitt, the former case is explained in terms of the latter.

¹²⁷ But once one allows for unconscious thought, the value of experience depreciates. It's no longer obvious experience reveals the way things are mentally. Is this just irony? Nissenbaum objected to Kenny asserting that the only way one can learn about the emotions is by intensional means. I denied Kenny invokes that strong of a position. Then shouldn't I be charitable and deny a neo-feeling theory is one that claims that the only way one can learn about the emotions is through one's experience? Well yes and no. Certainly, Goldie's own view relies heavily on how one is educated and one's history (i.e., on a narrative). But it nonetheless places not just priority on the experience, but that the experience itself has an ineliminable aspect that cannot be had in any other way – that is, it's perspectival (*The Emotions*, 19, 82, 181-182). Goldie may protest, by perspectival he means personal. But he thinks that one can't account for the personal functionally or in terms of that-clauses. I disagree.

¹²⁸ One may insist that conscious experiences involve an episode. So be it. I take a state to be a boring event following Quine (*Word and Object*).

needs an account of what makes the thought conscious. However, a theory of emotion ought to remain neutral with respect to viable theories of consciousness.¹²⁹

Goldie contrasts feeling towards with an “add-on” theory. For such a view it is sufficient to distinguish an emotional thought from an unemotional thought by simply adding onto the thought a further psychological dimension such as a felt sensation or physiological disturbances (The Emotions, 40). Yet, Kenny, Lyons, Gordon, nor Solomon adopts such a view. Gordon explicitly denies the add-on view. And Lyons, who does think that the right sort of physiological disturbances are essential to emotions, did not assert that the difference between an evaluative thought that was emotional and evaluative thought that was not was the missing felt physiological disturbance. Rather, the evaluative thought was more personal. That is, it’s the thought and not some additional psychological feature that distinguishes an emotional thought from an unemotional one. On this, all were in agreement.¹³⁰

One might freely turn the tables on Goldie. His position also is a type of add-on theory. Though perhaps bodily feelings and psychic feelings differ, what gives them their aboutness is nothing other than the addition of thought. For Goldie to claim that “in feeling towards, the feeling is essentially related to the content, so there could not be some other psychological episode, say belief or thinking of, with the same content but with no feeling” (The Emotions, 72), would

¹²⁹ That is, in approaching the emotions, one can do so given prior commitments – perhaps to theories of consciousness, thought, concepts, sensations and so on – or not. Though no theory is theory neutral, my own approach to understanding the emotions has been to remain as unspoiled as possible from prior commitments.

¹³⁰ For Solomon, one must substitute ‘thought’ for ‘judgment’.

be to beg the question against a view that claims feeling bears no relation to content or has only borrowed intentionality. From the vantage point of what has been stated in Chapter Three, construing intentionalism as an add-on theory amounts to a category mistake. If after showing a visitor the City University of New York and the visitor says: “Thanks for the tour of all the college campuses and administrative buildings, but you haven’t shown me the City University of New York”, then they’ve made a category mistake. Similarly, showing the intentional structure of an emotion, attaching the necessary *ceterus paribus* clauses, is the emotion sliced thin.¹³¹

A similar reply isn’t open for Goldie. For Goldie collapses Stocker’s distinction between the question of reducibility and the question of separability. For though the experience strikes one as essentially related to the content, that is, such an experience is not reducible to a feelingless thought; nonetheless, the experience may have proper constituents even though it does not appear to us that way. When one hears and sees a play, the seeing and hearing go together in one’s consciousness seamlessly even though we know each involves different sensory modes. That is to say, it’s not obvious that in feeling towards, the feeling is essentially related to the content. To insist that feeling towards is essentially conscious binds our ordinary view of emotion to a theory about the nature of qualitative aspect. And so, it’s fair to claim that what provides feeling towards with its content is the additional, perhaps underlying, thought. However, if one offers an argument that an emotional experience involves no thought, then

¹³¹ If one, as one is likely to do at this juncture, pushes the abstraction argument, I can only remind them of the reply presented in Chapter One.

thought would not be a constituent of that experience. But Goldie's only argument for a case of an emotion with no thought has been dismissed. Another tack would be to claim that emotions have features not possessed by the relevant intentional structure. And so, independently of whether feeling towards is essentially related to the content or requires other constituents, the main point will be that no thought could capture emotional content.

I agree with much of the objections Goldie presents aimed at any view that treats belief as essential, desire as essential, or belief and desire as essential. But such considerations fail to touch any position outlined in Chapter Three. For one can agree that some emotions do not involve belief or desire (The Emotions, 81), as other mental attitudes may do. Though believing and desiring without motivation may present a conceptual impossibility (The Emotions, 81), believing and wishing without motivation does not. A wish captures a type of thought similar to desire without the conceptual ties to motivation. So, when an emotion lacks motivation, belief and desire are not sufficient to explain the phenomena. But the relevant thoughts underwriting the causal structure of an emotion need not be limited to thoughts with such mental attitudes. Furthermore, even if belief, desire, or any other mental attitude lacks a phenomenology (The Emotions, 81), intentionalism need not reduce feeling to some form of thought.

Goldie notes that some emotions are producible at will. With respect to believing, one cannot believe X as Y in the way that one might say imagine chocolate pudding as disgusting and be disgusted (The Emotions, 72-73). Of course, one may think of something as something else, but the point here is that

believing at will is impossible. One can agree that not every emotion can be producible at will. Though one can be afraid while watching a scary flick, the excitement may lie in coming to believe, however brief it may be, the unfolding events. Merely imagining or supposing won't do. Similarly, though I might fear dogs near my daughter, imagining or supposing one is near does not produce fear. That is, at most, what the objection would show is that disgust does not involve belief. His example, however, is not without concern, for it doesn't show that disgust doesn't involve thought. Imagine, if you will, picking up a worm, with all the dirt still clinging, and carrying the slimy beastie into the bathroom. You look into the mirror dangling the worm next to your face – you open your mouth wide – and in a moment – you fling the worm in. Perhaps what you imagined was enough to provide a feeling of disgust within you. But beliefs, if not producible at will, cannot be part of the intentional structure of disgust when it is producible at will. Furthermore, imagination is not a form of unadulterated thought as it certainly involves perceptible qualities, and so, one can assume it's not obviously simply a form of thought. Still, one need not imagine putting the worm in one's mouth – one might have simply supposed it. Even if imagining isn't a pure form of thought and supposing need not be qualitative, supposition would have been enough to explain the phenomena. Goldie needs to argue that imagining is not supposition superadded with perceptual aspect.

Another argument is rather compact. He claims that the relation between emotion and belief are distinct with respect to assent (The Emotions, 74). When one believes that Mini Coopers are smart looking, it's true that one is disposed to

assent that Mini Coopers have that feature. And it's also true one may feel envy toward owners of a smart looking Mini Cooper, yet not think the owners unworthy to be in possession of a Mini Cooper, that is, one takes the emotion to be inappropriate or disproportionate (The Emotions, 74). Yet, what one is assenting to remains ambiguous. One who has been nurtured within a racist culture may have beliefs to the effect that certain classes of people are inferior. And even if one comes to see such views as erroneous, one may nonetheless find such beliefs still floating up. One can assent to the belief as the belief they find themselves as having, but not assent to the belief as their own. In a sense, one might describe such a belief as impenetrable. And one understands why someone may have "impenetrable" racist propensities or, for that matter, envious tendencies, even when they admit such propensities inappropriate. Moreover, when one is aware that they have such tendencies, one need not be blamed for having such beliefs. One readily explains this in terms of dispositions: certain traits, whether psychological or physiological, manifest themselves in ways we would rather not have or do not identify with. And so when Goldie claims that some emotions are cognitively impenetrable in that they seem, as a matter of degree, not to be affected by one's beliefs (The Emotions, 76), one notes this is not a peculiar feature of feeling or emotion. Hard to get at dispositions cut across the mental landscape and account for a variety of manifested mental states that one does not identify with nor find appropriate. And so, that some states seem impenetrable or inappropriate does not tell against treating emotion as intentional.

Though in saying that cognitively impenetrability admits of degrees, Goldie does think some emotions are cognitively impenetrable in just the way the Muller-Lyer illusion provides a standard example of something that is wholly cognitively impenetrable, admitting of no degree. But the extent to which emotional phenomena fails to be cognitively penetrable, the closer it will be to a phobia, which I've already argued in Chapter One is not an emotion. Once one loosens up on the notion of cognitive impenetrability, the case of fear will be no different than one who finds themselves with unwanted but lingering racist beliefs.

Goldie's point may simply be that feeling towards remains indifferent to whether one has a similar belief, no belief, or a contrary belief. The last defense might make sense if feeling towards and thought do come apart. They might come apart if one initially accepts that 'I feel fear of the ice, and yet the ice is not dangerous' is a coherent utterance. But to think the two views would then come apart presumes that an intentional account must unpack 'I feel fear' as expressing the belief 'the ice is dangerous', which would then entail the utterance was contradictory and therefore incoherent.¹³² If this is his claim, then it's another fanciful version of Griffith's dispensable criticism already discussed in Chapter One.

Goldie notes that one's emotion may tend to over come one, disappear, and come over one again yet one need not be regarded as irrational, inconstant,

¹³² Goldie considers such a sentence not open to Moore's paradox in the way belief is (The Emotions, 74). True, but it's beside the point. Moore's paradox relies on a difference between the assertability conditions and truth conditions: 'p, and I don't believe p' need not be a false, yet it cannot be sincerely asserted. But 'I fear p, but I don't believe p' involves a contradiction and yet it can be sincerely asserted. This isn't a paradox. It's a fanciful version of "irrational" emotions discussed in Chapter One.

skittish, or fickle. Given the right circumstances, one may say the same about belief. Modifying one of Goldie's examples (The Emotions, 73), suppose one's beloved partner recently dies and the feelings of grief and longing which one has towards her comes and goes. Suppose further that the thought that one's partner has died also comes and goes, as one once again realizes their love has departed. Such fluctuation in this case is neither inappropriate nor a mark against one's rationality, for one was disposed to think she was not departed. One can agree with Goldie that the phrase 'being overcome with a wave of grief' is an entirely appropriate metaphor and the phrase 'being overcome with a wave of belief' is not. This, however, is not because there is a striking separation between emotion and belief. Rather, it's a separation between feeling and belief that accounts for the difference.

4.8 ENDING REMARKS

The arguments against intentionalism rely on certain features of thought, perhaps limited to features of particular mental attitudes such as belief and desire. The central claim is that some emotions fail to have those features. This represents the bulk of the arguments considered and they've been found wanting.

Admittedly, it's possible for future arguments to pop up showing an emotion may involve no thought or an emotion has none of the features exhibited by the purported intentional structure. In this sense, I do not offer a general argument against such possibilities. Simply, I don't do so since I don't think defending intentionalism is simply a conceptual matter. Another type of argument I've

accepted: The qualitative aspects associated with feelings or feeling towards are not reducible to forms of thought. However, I haven't offered an account of feeling. And so, there is but one more task. It begins by granting the seamlessness of an emotional experience, an emotional experience strikes one as personal or intimate, and that emotional feelings strike one on occasion as distinct from bodily feelings. I intend to capture both the personal aspect of emotions and the emotional feeling. And so I can agree that if intentionalism fails to offer an adequate explanation of feelings, then one might overlook the fact that most objections against intentionalism fall short as well as any hinted at shortcomings of the alternative approaches. What is owed is a more robust positive account of emotional feeling.

5 Moving Beyond Thought

5.1 INTRODUCTION

I have elaborated an intentional account distinct from those in the current literature. An emotion involves occurrent thought and thought provides the individuation condition among the varied emotions. This account of emotion does not exclude emotional feeling. In addition, it takes serious the notion that something especial attaches to feeling. Yet it does not explain such psychic feelings by supposing as Goldie does a third kind of mental state over and above the qualitative and intentional. In unison with James, I have come to the conclusion that an emotion without psychic feeling does not suffice as an account of emotion. In this chapter, I will wrap up by showing how to provide a naturalist account of distinct types of emotional feelings. Furthermore, I show that what distinguishes emotional thought or feeling from unemotional thought or feeling is the personal aspect inherent in all emotions.

Gordon, Lyons, and Kenny each put forward distinctive views about emotional feeling. I agree with Gordon that an emotion may on a particular occasion remain wholly unconscious (*The Structure of Emotion*, 29). And in addition, I agree with Kenny that it is absurd to suppose that emotions could quite generally completely fail to exhibit public manifestations (AEW, 43). That is, though emotions may be unconscious, measures other than the testimony of one's experience will be available. Such reasoning partially grounds Gordon's distinction between being afraid (having the feeling of fear) and fear. Gordon

treats, rightly, our talk of fear as involving complex inferential relations. He notes, rightly again, that a wee mouse may be afraid, yet the mouse can't, reasonably, be thought to have the same kind of inferential interconnections as we do (The Structure of Emotion, 71). However, he confines such arousal to a narrow classification of fears. These involve such things as fear of death or injury to oneself whereas the intentional structure of fear may range as far as the topic of a subjunctive sentence (The Structure of Emotion, 72). Here, Kenny, Lyons, and I part from Gordon who treats emotional feeling as a distinct phenomenon separated from emotion.

One may feel fear for the next war not because of death or bodily injury, as one is too old for a call to arms, but because the international news outlets will divert attention away from the plight of tribal peoples, the price of oil will soar, Obama's presidency will be undermined, and so on. Secondly, though one can presume an unconscious emotion with noticeable non-experiential effects, such a case does not strike one as the typical or normal case. Gordon himself states that "[i]mplicit in much of this book is an assumption that our commonsense theory of emotions is embedded in a larger conceptual framework: what is often referred to as "commonsense" or 'folk' psychology (The Structure of Emotion, 128)." It bends credulity that Gordon can maintain a commonsense framework and readily dispense with the feelings of fear as not part of our commonsense theory of emotion. In unison with James and the vast majority, I assert our understanding of emotion centers on capturing the nature of emotional feeling.

Lyons directly asserts emotional feelings are abnormal physiological

disruptions. But his own account, to use Goldie's description, is an add-on theory. Emotional feeling signifies that some aspect of the body is felt and may assist one in labeling one's emotional experience. Beyond that, Lyon's view asserts that an appraisal (a dispositional evaluative belief) brings about a felt abnormal physiological disturbance (The Emotions, 52). Emotional feeling in isolation from appraisal is nothing but bodily sensation.

Kenny's account fared slightly better. He rejects the idea that terms for emotional feelings are names of sensations. He distinguishes emotions from bodily sensations not because of differences in one's experience but because of differences in how one uses words. Unlike sensation terms, e.g., itches and tickles, emotion terms are not used to describe our bodily states. We do not say I feel the horror in my eyes, though we will say I saw the horror in their eyes (AEW, 40). In addition, types of bodily sensations feel situated in particular places of the body and not others – as Kenny notes, constipation is not felt in the cheeks¹³³ –whereas emotions do not similarly seem to be so tightly tied to particular bodily locations. Kenny, however, was tracking how we use terms, not how it is for one. He fails to tie emotional feeling to the phenomenology. Though I argued earlier Kenny clearly did not intend his account to be confined by ordinary language philosophy, his focus simply was not on the experience.

An account of emotional feeling must leap over two hurdles. As both Stocker and Goldie argued, among others, emotional feeling need not be bodily. In addressing the phenomenology, one must at least explain why some

¹³³ Ramachandran tells of a patient whose orgasm is felt in a phantom foot (Phantoms in the Brain, 36).

emotional feelings at times strike one as non-bodily, even if they are not.

Second, one must explain why emotional feelings strike one as something beyond the feeling of abnormal physiological arousal.

5.2.1 EXPERIENCE OF BODILY AND NON-BODILY FEELING

With a bodily feeling one consciously feels a quality as if it were located on or within the body. Bodily feelings can direct one to a spot. Itches may then be scratched and muscle aches massaged. A headache or nausea direct one toward the body and tend to indicate more. One realizes coffee is needed or that pregnancy likely. Such connections may be spontaneous. Still, such bodily feelings direct one primarily to the head or bowels, not toward the kitchen or a memory of a previous nights happening. Affect Program theories, neo-feeling theories, and cognitive theories treat such feelings alike in that attention is drawn to a state of the body. It does not matter, as phantom limb pain demonstrates, that a bodily state exists. Though inaccurate, bodily feelings with no bodily part remain situated as if on or within the body. As Peter Goldie had argued, such bodily feelings may even be described as being about something in a loose sense that such feelings may direct one's attention toward something other than the body. A more controversial claim may be staked out: sensory states are intentional in that they involve thought. Such a position, however, continues to be a minority, though important, position.¹³⁴

The authors considered in this dissertation, however, do not endorse that

¹³⁴ William Lycan offers such an account in Chapter Eight of Consciousness and Chapter Six of Consciousness and Experience.

view about bodily feeling. Bodily feelings are sensory. They may be about something other than being situated – but derivatively. Take Jesse Prinz’s account for example. Emotional feeling acts as a messenger, detecting core relational themes, and so in that sense has content (Gut Reactions, 66-67). His account follows the James-Lange theory that emotional feeling involves the somatosensory system (Gut Reactions, 224). In this way, bodily feeling involves a well-defined sensory system.¹³⁵

James, like Prinz, treats emotion as having a bodily sounding board. James, though not Prinz, talks of spiritual feeling – that is, non-bodily feeling.¹³⁶ By stipulation, this type of feeling lacks bodily aspect – in need not lack a body too. James’s own introspective analysis did not reveal a feeling without an accompanying bodily change. Rather, emotional feelings that may initially strike one as non-bodily may upon reflection have a bodily trim. In James’s words, “for us, emotion dissociated from all bodily feeling is inconceivable (Vol. 2, “The Emotions,” 1068). James, however, recognizes that non-bodily emotional feeling would undermine his theory. But his lack of prowess in identifying such emotions did not engender reasonable doubt toward spiritual feeling. Rather, he notes that there would be no empirical mooring to anchor such feelings. He thus raises two obstacles for an account of non-bodily feeling: no satisfactory criteria are available for distinguishing bodily feelings and non-bodily feelings and when one

¹³⁵ Following Sherrington’s classic text The Integrative Action of the Nervous System, a sensory system involves information from the environment via the sense organs (exteroception), but also from one’s body, either from the viscera (interoception) or movements of the body (proprioception).

¹³⁶ Prinz discusses bodily feelings that fail to have a bodily source. Such feelings remain bodily and share the same underlying neurophysiology despite a physical break with the somatosensory system (Gut Reactions, 5-6, 57-58).

begins to pay attention to emotions that initially appear to one as non-bodily, one finds a bodily aspect (Vol. 2, "The Emotions," 1070).

Emotional feeling with bodily aspect is still unlike an itch and ache. When a black bear peers through the wood one is not normally directed toward one's navel or the goings on in the chest. One's attention will above all be directed toward the emotional eliciting object. The bodily aspect still adorns the experience even if not immediately conspicuous. Despite James's insistence that the phenomenology of emotion involves bodily trim, his account provides the possibility of studying emotional feeling independently of how it is for one. Bodily feeling, whether subtle or not, remains tightly correlated with the somatosensory system. Non-bodily feeling would then seem to lack independent means other than the consensus to be had among fellows with familiar experiences.

Creatures with an aesthetic sentiment provide ample examples of emotions with non-bodily feeling. Consider Freud's account of the oceanic feeling in his opening remarks of Civilization and Its Discontents. Such a feeling put forth by Freud's friend Romain Rolland was proffered as a source of religious conviction.¹³⁷ It's the feeling of unboundedness and oneness with the cosmos. Yet such experiences need not be invoked by Bible Belt awakenings or Rolland's suggestion of a *Spiritus Mundi*. Grand vistas freed of city lights, soaring orchestrations, fiery sunsets, to say nothing of mountain perches and oceanic views, can evoke such feelings. Rolland credits the power of nature to usher oceanic feelings and such feelings are not readily identifiable as bodily. As

¹³⁷ See William Parsons' "The Oceanic Feeling Revisited" for discussion of the correspondence between Rolland and Freud.

Freud notes, it's a feeling one must analyze in terms of the ideational content rather than any possible bodily feeling, if there be any (Civilization and Its Discontents, 11). Such grand feelings fit well with Goldie's account of feeling towards and Stocker's notion of psychic feeling. The content of unbounded oneness welds to the feeling. That is how it is for one. One might as well suppose that is the way it is – a feeling towards or a psychic feeling.

One might put forward the following operational definition(s) for non-bodily feeling. Bodily feeling has a bodily source. A sensory apparatus will inevitably be involved. Non-bodily feeling, though obviously a result of brain physiology, does not involve a distinctive sensory system. In addition, non-bodily feeling has a distinctive phenomenology. When experiencing an oceanic feeling, one is not conscious of a (localized) bodily aspect, even upon reflection.

Affect Programs attain a form of scientific simplicity. By defining emotion as the primary effect of certain organic changes in the body, one obtains a readily manageable entity. Bodily feeling connects to bodily physiology. In comparison, accounting for non-bodily feeling now presents the harder problem. The assumption that non-bodily feeling is not the primary effect of certain organic changes in the body strains both James's theory and Affect Program approaches. Each commits to a perceptual/sensory account of emotional feeling. Thus, in the absence of an independent measure for non-bodily feeling, one must, it seems, inevitably and always depend on 1st person reports to understand non-bodily emotional feeling.

5.2.2 HIGHER ORDER THOUGHT THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

As highlighted in Chapter Two and expressed by Gordon in Chapter Three, subjects are not necessarily reliable instruments about their own mental states. In determining the nature of emotion, subjective reports ought to mesh with cognitive science. James treated emotional feeling perceptually. Spiritual or non-bodily feelings were not emotional feelings. But neo-feeling theories reject a sensory account based on how some emotions may be for one: an emotion felt as non-bodily. Though James claimed he never found such a feeling in his experience, I myself cannot say so; neither can Stocker or Goldie. And so, even if James never did have a feeling experienced as non-bodily, others have.

Watching a nearby black bear staring at you through the wood one's pounding heart against the chest blends with the tightly clenched fingers and the unsteady legs. One feels fear fringed with varied bodily aspects. The feeling can nonetheless integrate non-bodily feeling. One's feels one's perception of the world diminishes and compresses into an intimate connection with the illuminated movement of black eyes and branches. The world narrows with respect to oneself and over illuminates the bear's movement. The non-bodily feeling blends with the bodily one – each an aspect of feeling fear. To preserve a perceptual account, one can explain the difference in bodily and non-bodily feeling in terms of the way one is conscious of a sensory or perceptual state. Namely, how it is for one to have a bodily feeling is to be conscious of the qualitative state as a bodily feeling or a non-bodily feeling. What refines how one consciously feels depends on how one is conscious of the sensory or perceptual state.

Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory of consciousness offers an explanation. According to Rosenthal, consciousness is due to having a suitable thought that one is in some mental state. Differences in phenomenology are not due to intrinsic features of the conscious state. Rather differences in experiences are due to differing higher-order thoughts. The commitment one makes on such an account is that conscious states can be explained in terms of how one is conscious of those states.¹³⁸ Higher-order states, in particular, a higher-order thought, hereafter HOT, determine what it is like for one. A higher-order theory of consciousness allows for a possible mismatch between subjective reports and third person measures such that subjective reports may be unreliable (Consciousness and Mind, 3, 158-163). But though one may initially treat subjective reports of non-bodily feeling as unreliable, it would be unreasonable to do so. Phenomenological reports frame problems. In particular, how can bodily and non-bodily feeling be uniformly accounted for? A HOT theory allows for such an explanation without adopting an initial skeptical stance.

The difference between bodily feeling and non-bodily feeling is not a difference in kind, but a difference in how one is conscious of the qualitative state. A HOT theory of consciousness preserves the empirical aspect of James theory as well as the appearances. Two experiences are different ways of experiencing the same type of state – namely a perceptual or sensory state. This preserves James's methodology. One relies on science with a natural commitment to common sense. For it allows the experiences to be as they are –

¹³⁸ That is, one is committed to the transitivity principle: a states being conscious consists in one's being conscious of that state (Consciousness and Mind, 4, 113)

different – and explains such differences in terms of how one is conscious of sensory or perceptual states.

Perception of bodily movement or viscera gives rise to feelings. Even when such complex sensory states arise they may nonetheless be experienced as different. Such a claim is not surprising. No doubt one has had similar sensory orchestrations from viscera or proprioception giving rise to feelings. But one may at times have the bodily aspect present to one and at other times not. Hang gliding, rappelling, parachuting, and other adventure sports tend to produce fear. To the novice, one focuses on the precarious nature of one's position relative to the ground below. With experience, one may remain fearful and notice the accompanying bodily commotion. James would have it that if one could attend to such feelings one would notice the bodily aspect. Such an account presumes one has sufficient cognitive resources to do so. But striking fear precludes flexible cognitive abilities. The entire experience seems to absorb and foreclose other types of reflection or courses of action. One seems to be unable to do anything else but attend to the dangerous circumstance. That is, one can explain why sometimes one consciously feels fear but not the bodily aspect in terms of cognitive load – the felt danger is all consuming even if one is not consciously feeling the bodily aspect. One can thereby explain differences in how one HOT may differ from another even though both are about the same conscious state by appealing to additional factors.

One natural objection to such an approach is that feelings at times seem ineffable. One may describe a particular feeling but these are mere shadows of

the experience. Verbal buoys aid others in navigating down one's stream of experience as long as they've sailed similar waters. Still, such markers never reveal the depth of one's experience. And what one can say to others is no more than what one can say to oneself. That is, the content of a HOT may not reveal the depth of one's feeling.

The assumption that one's experience has indescribable depth would not follow simply from ineffability. The absence of a description can't be an argument for emotional depth or the lack of it. Rather, by probing the experience and hitting upon a novel sentiment yet to be described one nonetheless distinguishes it from others. A new experience stands out relative to others. One may notice whether it is painful, pleasurable, has a ticklish quality, or perhaps it's oceanic. The depths of our felt experience rest on one's ability to sound out differences or similarities to other feelings. Such descriptions may be incredibly thin: a mere this described simply as not that and remains unlike a third feeling and it is also without description, and so on.

One might suppose further that the mere discriminative ability tells against adopting a HOT theory. For even if one can identify an emotional feeling as different or similar to other feelings, one does so only in virtue of such feelings being conscious. But a HOT theory was of help in explaining how one could consciously feel phenomenological distinct feelings by being conscious of a qualitative state in two different ways – as bodily or non-bodily. Yet how can a qualitative state contribute to two ways of consciously experiencing the same qualitative state? In effect, the objection presumes that some aspect of the

qualitative state cannot be unconscious. One need not be wholly conscious of the qualitative state. For what it is like for one to experience the feeling may at one time have bodily aspect and at another time fail to have it.

Whatever content accounts for the content of experience, that content must, it seems reasonable to assume, be identical to the content of experience. If one explains what it is like in terms of a conscious state, then that conscious state must wholly capture the content of the experience. Consciousness would then be intrinsic to the conscious state. On such a view, it would then be absurd to account for what it is like in terms of an unconscious conscious state. That is, the HOT theory of consciousness would allow the content of a conscious state not to be wholly conscious. However, the absurdity results on the assumption that the content of experience is to be explained solely in terms of the content of the conscious state. Such a view remains in harmony with (auto)phenomenology and treats experience as essentially involving a prereflective awareness or intrinsic introspection. Such views have noted difficulties.¹³⁹ As stated in Chapter Two, I reject (auto)phenomenology and side with James and heterophenomenology.¹⁴⁰

A HOT theory of consciousness explains conscious states in terms of being conscious of that state. The content of the higher order thought may misrepresent, need not be identical to, the content of the conscious state the

¹³⁹ James, following Comte's objection, complained such a view was unreliable. Dennett's chief objection was that it was autonomous from science ("Who's on First," 23). Rosenthal criticizes the view on the grounds that it commits one to the claim that all mental states are conscious states (Consciousness and Mind, 32).

¹⁴⁰ For arguments against the view that introspection is intrinsic to a conscious state see Chapter Four of Consciousness and Mind.

higher order thought is about (Consciousness and Mind, 13, 166). However, the content of experience is identical to the content of the higher order thought. In this way, a HOT may depict a qualitative (conscious) state in different ways and thereby provide an account of differing experiences in terms of differences in the content of HOTs rather than different conscious states.

However, a problem arises. If certain emotion types are systematically non-bodily and other emotion types bodily, the mere ability to explain the difference in experience by way of a HOT will not explain the systematic differences in types of emotion. If oceanic feelings invariably involve non-bodily aspect, and some other emotion does not, yet both involve the same type of sensory state, it strikes one as ad hoc to explain such differences in this way. Appealing to cognitive load is an appeal to contingent factors of the experience. Here the issue is that a type of emotion seems to essentially involve non-bodily feeling. The kind of explanation open to an account of emotion advanced so far might appeal to differences in the cognitive or personal aspect of an emotion. But like James, I would rather find a way out that does not require leafing through varied descriptions of individual emotion types in terms of either the personal aspect or intentional structure. In addition, I've presumed throughout a demarcation between the intentional and qualitative. Happily, Rosenthal's homomorphic theory of sensory quality offers an additional and alternative explanation.

Rosenthal's account remains true to the phenomena and naturalism. As discussed before, one can describe one's feelings in terms of similarities and

differences to other feelings one has or has had.¹⁴¹ Assume, for the moment, that the content of a HOT accurately captures the content of the conscious state. That is, in such a case, differences in bodily feelings need not be accounted for in terms of differences in how one is conscious of a sensory state but by distinct conscious (sensory) states. One may thereby provisionally assume that a report of one's experience captures not merely appearances, but a difference in conscious states. One must still rely on subjective reports. And so without independent means to account for different sensory states, one might as well treat conscious states as intrinsic. However, a homomorphic theory of sensory quality postulates that the differences and similarities in bodily feelings can be mapped onto the similarities and differences of perceptible properties of the body. On such an approach, properties of qualitative states do not represent physical properties (Consciousness of Mind, 158-168). Rather, a systematic relationship exists between two radically different types of properties – properties of states and properties of objects. Radical differences thereby remain inessential. When a mapping systematically captures types of feelings, one will have independent ground for understanding sensory states. What the theory will need to explain is the tight pairing between radically different properties.¹⁴²

Leaving the details to the side, a homomorphic theory can provide an account of varied emotional feelings by way of perceptible properties of the body.

¹⁴¹ Rudolf Carnap does so in The Logical Structure of the World. For forceful criticism see Nelson Goodman's The Structure of Appearance as well as his own account in terms of just noticeable differences.

¹⁴² Rosenthal provides such an answer in Chapter Six of Consciousness and Mind. For discussion of spatial qualities see Doug Meehan's Ph.D. dissertation "The Qualitative Character of Spatial Perception."

For bodily feeling, the similarities and differences among how those feelings are for one resemble perceptible properties of the somatosensory system. The perceptible properties of the body can thereby explain, independent of one's report, various bodily feelings. This account, however, will work only for perceptible properties – namely bodily feelings. When non-bodily feeling does not involve the somatosensory system, it seems non-bodily feeling will lack an independent measure.

5.2.3 NON-BODILY FEELING AND PHARMACOLOGY

You don't need to see Hairspray, taste a Jacques Torres truffle, or listen to John Denver to feel uplifted. Drugs will do. Cheap drugs. A cup of coffee, a Guinness, or a Nat Sherman will affect one's feelings fast without the need of securing an emotional eliciting environment. Psychoactive substances sidestep sensory organs. They directly influence the brain by seeping through the brain blood barrier. Though not news, the literature on emotion misses a mundane point: feeling need not require a perceptual route. Such causes are neither exotic nor extraordinary – herbal remedies existed long before Hippocrates.

The science of psychopharmacology ignores perception. The main focus concerns not how the body reacts or responds to perceptible properties but on biological, behavioral, or cognitive consequences. Caffeine for example increases mental and physical performance. One feels focused and more alert. The varied effects occur at the molecular level and involve action on numerous regions of the brain and involve differing kinds of metabolic changes. Still, the

experience is fairly uniform when one sticks to one cup of coffee in the morning rather than binge drinking a pot of coffee.

Pharmacology evaluates the efficacy of specific chemical substances introduced within the brain in hopes of alleviating bodily or cognitive impairments. Psychoactive drugs may affect the body and so cause bodily feeling. However, felt experience need not be generated by such a circuitous route. In which case, in the absence of sense organs or a dedicated perceptual system, those feelings can't be perceptual. The neurophysiology affected by such psychoactive substances may swim in perceptual circles of the brain. In this sense one may say that such drugs act as if perceptual. But one might as well say that the perceptual route acts as if it were neuropharmacological. The difference, no doubt, would be in the causal history. To the extent that the causal route remains incidental, whether the cause is perceptual, drugs, or direct electrical stimulation of the brain, then psychoactive substances do not simulate what is brought about by a perceptual means. Rather, the psychoactive drug duplicates what may happen by a perceptual route and the perceptual route duplicates what may happen by a chemical one. But if a psychoactive substance brings about non-bodily feelings and one insists that all emotional feeling is perceptual, one is left with a puzzle about how the perceptual system gives rise to non-bodily feeling. Opting for a perceptual account commits one to providing an account of feeling in terms of perceptible properties. A perceptual account might claim that such non-bodily feeling simulates perceptible properties. Simulation, however, requires a fiction not merely the absence of a sensory causal chain. Damasio,

for example, asserts that emotional feelings arise because one senses something happening in the body (The Feeling of What Happens, 279). But he suggests that in the absence of bodily detection and bodily feeling remains, the underlying neurophysiology reacts 'as-if' bodily disruption was detected (Descartes Error, 184). Such an assumption works nicely for bodily feeling. Under the homomorphic theory, what is preserved is the similarity and differences among perceptible properties of the body in the absence of the body. This isn't simulation but duplication.

One might still preserve what seems correct about the explanation of bodily feeling. Namely, bodily feeling seems to be tightly linked to a perceptual cause, one involving the sensory system. The discomfort from bloating arises because of registered changes in the intestines or intestinal muscles. Prozac, though a psychoactive substance, may bring about sensory changes and so may bring about feelings of nausea via a perceptual route. In this way, a perceptual view captures much of what is right about emotional feeling – they tend to involve a bodily aspect registered by a sensory system. James strived for a scientific account of emotional feeling because the nervous system was measurable. As James recognized, spiritual emotions undermine perceptual accounts. And since the running assumption is that non-bodily feeling is not bodily, the perceptual account will be unable to account for non-bodily feeling.

A neuroscience of emotion, however, includes more than sensory systems. As Gray stated, it was not simply the autonomic system, that is a sensory system, but the endocrine system too (Psychology of Fear and Stress,

53-67). And so, unlike James's account, current neuroscience recognizes two distinct though co-operative systems. What is of special note about the endocrine system is that glands serve as one's own pharmaceutical plant. Having been a teenager or having a teenager nearby, one fairly well knows the effect of hormones on the pubescent.¹⁴³ Hormones released may bypass sensory systems. As such, some feelings or moods will not readily be accounted for by focusing solely on sensory systems and/or perceptible properties.

A natural supposition would be to postulate that the two distinct types of feelings correspond to distinct types of bodily systems. Bodily feelings arise from sensory systems and non-bodily feelings arise from a non-sensory system, perhaps the endocrine system. This approach remains in line with James. Feelings correspond and correlate with measurable physical properties. One can thereby discover what one felt by a means other than one's subjective report.

Pharmaceuticals seek the new Prozac. The search for new drugs requires a theory about how a novel drug might bring about desired biological and behavioral changes. Pharmacology relies on Receptor theory.¹⁴⁴ This theory integrates molecular-level responses at the cellular level with higher-level responses. The aim is to eventually classify chemical compounds in terms of biological and behavioral effects. In brief, the theory identifies receptors on the surface of cells in terms of the kind of molecules that bind to them. A receptor acts as an electro-chemical gate and is activated or inhibited by the binding of

¹⁴³ For a technical account see "Reversal of Neurosteroid Effects at $\alpha 4\beta 2\delta$ GABA_A Receptors Triggers Anxiety at Puberty" by Hui Shen et al.

¹⁴⁴ See Kenakin's "Principles: Receptor Theory in Pharmacology" as well as "A Short History of the Rise of Molecular Pharmacology of Ionotropic Drug Receptors" by Halliwell and "The Evasive Nature of Drug Efficacy: Implications for Drug Discovery" by Galandrin et al.

particular molecular structures. By understanding the receptors effects and the chemicals (ligands) that bind to them, one can come to understand such higher-level effects. The theory remains in its early stages of development. What matters here is that it presumes that the structural features of a chemical compound will account for differences in higher-level activities. The activity may be simply the neuron, a neural system, or may include higher-level accounts such as the immune system or emotion.¹⁴⁵ In so far as phenomenology brings to light varied descriptions among non-bodily feelings, the way is open for the possibility that phenomenological classifications of non-bodily feeling map to steady features of chemical compounds binding to receptors. That is, it's an open possibility that the classification of non-bodily feeling will be in tune with the classification of receptors in a more robust Receptor theory.

This wildly speculative suggestion seems to make a remarkable claim: how it is for one need not involve a sensory state. Qualitative aspect has been typically associated with sensory states. But as sensory states are tightly bound to sensory properties and non-bodily feelings are tightly bound to the chemical properties of psychoactive substances, then it follows from this hypothesis that phenomenal states need not be sensory states. How it is for one to consciously feel a bodily or non-bodily feeling continues to be relevantly similar with respect to being qualitative. For it may be that one need not classify qualitative states in terms of perceptible properties, but in terms of pharmacological properties as well. Would it matter? Certainly it would not for the homomorphic theory. The phenomenological similarity and differences (for all types of qualities) remain

¹⁴⁵ For examples involving disease see "From Molecule to Malady" by Frances Ashcroft.

mapped at the level of receptors. For bodily feeling, however, the relevant structure at the level of receptor can be further mapped to perceptible properties of the body and in the case of non-bodily feeling, it cannot. Though qualitative states need not be sensory states, sensory states remain linked to perceptible properties.

One can lift the traditional assumption that qualitative states must be sensory states. When one is conscious of one's non-bodily feeling, one isn't conscious of it as being bodily. The feeling does not share a bodily quality. Thus, it's a reasonable assumption that what accounts for non-bodily feeling involves neither interoceptive nor proprioceptive sensing. Furthermore, under the assumption that the physical properties tie to qualitative properties, it's open that the physical properties are not perceptible properties. Still all perceptible properties are properties of specialized receptors that distinguish the varied sense organs. And so, a view that focuses on receptors leaves open the possibility for other natural and non-sensory avenues in mapping out and accounting for qualitative character.

5.2.4 ENDING REMARKS

Emotional experience may involve bodily or non-bodily feeling. Rosenthal's homomorphic theory of qualitative states and HOT theory of consciousness suggest alternative avenues for capturing the phenomenal character of non-bodily feeling as being conscious of a qualitative state that is non-sensory or being conscious of a sensory state as non-bodily. This matches Goldie's as well

as Stocker's contention that non-bodily feelings indicate a different kind of phenomenal state from bodily feelings. But one need not endorse the further claim that it is intentional too. Two kinds of qualitative states account for different kinds of feelings – one tied to perceptible properties of sensory states and how one is conscious of those states and the other to pharmacological properties rather than perceptible properties. Rosenthal's HOT theory of consciousness offers an alternative type of explanation. Bodily and non-bodily feelings involve the same kind of mental state – a sensory state. The difference in experience between bodily and non-bodily feeling concerns not a difference in distinctive sensory states but in how one is conscious of a sensory state. Namely, how it is for one will depend upon whether one is conscious of the state in a bodily way or a non-bodily way.

Both empirical options dispense with an initial priority given to the phenomenological claim that non-bodily states strike one as not involving the body. When independent criteria can explain phenomenology, what it is like for one need not determine how a conscious state must be.

5.3.1 THE PERSONAL: PRELIMINARY REMARKS

A prevalent assumption in the philosophy of mind is that when one is conscious one is aware that it is oneself who consciously has the experience. This is a thin account of self-intimation and supposes that consciousness involves direct

ascription to oneself.¹⁴⁶ When one thinks of oneself that p, one immediately and infallibly picks out the experiencer, namely oneself. It is simply the experiencer – one who has a conscious state – that is directly and immediately picked out. In this way, one is infallibly aware that they have an experience.¹⁴⁷ However, one may nonetheless be mistaken about the content of the experience. No especial status that transcends science need be extended to the content. In effect, one takes the individual as primitive but allows him or her to be mistaken about the content of his or her own conscious state.

This preserves the assumption that something about one's own experience one cannot be wrong about. In effect, the creature that is the agent of a conscious state and the experiencer of the conscious state are the same entity. Even Dennett holds such a view. Dennett supposes that when one reports one's experience, the reporter and experience reported pick out the same subject ("Heterophenomenology Reconsidered," 258). This also captures Shoemaker's point brought up in Chapter Two. If something is subjective, then there cannot be more than one way to discover it. But there is an important caveat. The reason in this case that there need not be more than one way to discover that there is an "I" behind the sounds emanating from a human orifice is the presumption that something is stated.¹⁴⁸ Following James's terminology, that

¹⁴⁶ David Lewis in "Attitudes De Dicto and De Se" argues that de se descriptions are distinct from de dicto and de re. John Perry in "The Problem of the Essential Indexical" stresses a puzzle for de se ascriptions given a Fregean approach toward mental attitudes. Roderick Chisholm, in The First Person, argues for the view that de se ascriptions are fundamental. David Kaplan, in Demonstratives, talks of such ascriptions as direct.

¹⁴⁷ David Lewis would have such a priori results grounded in the innocence of truth across worlds or contexts, not by some especial means of latching onto or grasping the joints of nature.

¹⁴⁸ Even Quine assumes in the case of translation that a linguist has settled on what expressions count as assent and dissent (Word and Object, 30).

there is a thinker or speaker is an irreducible assumption of heterophenomenology. To put it less contentiously, psychology requires experiences.

But why allow an experiencer to be aware of anything? This follows rather immediately given a distinction between conscious mental states and unconscious ones. An operational criterion for distinguishing conscious mental states from unconscious mental states requires conscious states be reportable (though not infallibly). Unconscious mental states are not simply unreportable information that one receives at the tips of one's sensory apparatus. The information received has an effect on performance of some task that is itself conscious. Thus, postulating an unconscious process requires a noticeable change in behavior without one being able to notice the stimulus that accounts for the change. This account leaves it open whether the process is uninterpreted (not conceptual) or interpreted (conceptual).

Masked priming serves a paradigmatic example. First, a stimulus is provided that one fails to report noticing. Next, the stimulus is nonetheless measured to see if it produces a measurable change. One can determine how quickly to flash a word or long sentence on a screen at a rate that one begins to fail to report a change. There will be nothing it is like for one to see the word or sentence flashed. A word like 'Nurse' flashed with a mask will produce a behavioral change. A subject's response time quickens in stating words placed on the screen that have similar semantic connections to the masked word. However, if a sentence or long phrase is primed with a mask, no change is

noticed. Therefore, a word (of the right size) shows evidence of semantic unconscious processing while a sentence or long phrase does not. Whether or not the sentence or phrase was processed in any sense will be evidenced only when the masked prime elicits behavioral changes. Until that time, no reason will be available to claim that the flash was noticed unconsciously.

A subject's report of his or her own experience shall be treated as a reliable indicator unless one faces contrary scientific evidence. So, for example, prior to Benjamin Libet's famous experiment, it was reasonable to suppose that consciously willing one's finger to lift caused one's finger to lift.¹⁴⁹ But given the robust repeatability of the experiment and experiments like it, it's no longer reasonable to treat the subject's awareness of wanting to lift a finger as the cause of the finger rising even though it seems that way to the subject.¹⁵⁰

In demoting the subject's report, one can see why one might have thought cognitive theories beg the question. For example, suppose two similar disruptions in physiological homeostasis capture the bodily experience of fear. The subject experiences both as fear but one lacks the relevant thought required by an intentional account. Assuming the claims true, one may wonder on what grounds a cognitivist can assert thought necessary. Clearly, if emotions are identified by the experience and the experiencer labels the two experiences as experiences of fear, one can't just stipulate that the subject must be mistaken.

¹⁴⁹ See Libet, Gleason, Wright and Pearl's article "Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential). The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act."

¹⁵⁰ For some discussion from the point of view of cognitive/neuroscience, see Soon et. al. article "Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain," Daniel Wegner's article "The Mind's Best Trick: How We Experience Conscious Will," as well as Patrick Haggard's "Conscious Intention and Motor Cognition."

And though I argued one does not assume subjects infallible labelers of their experiences, because I do not think one's experience beyond science, one must offer reasons for discounting the subject. Certainly, however, if the emotional feeling were independent of one's perceived environment, perhaps from a drug or electrical stimulation, such a case would be abnormal. Furthermore, it's not unreasonable to claim that some standard scientific measures of fear, for example, the open field test and the fear potentiated startle response, fail to offer standard conditions of fear. Fear of war or fear of airplanes involves more than an unexpected aversive stimuli. And though one can certainly agree that the amygdale is sufficiently separated from the neocortex,¹⁵¹ James was explicit that it wasn't mere perception of something, but that something is perceived by one for one in the relevant way.¹⁵² Tigers in the Bronx Zoo elicit excitement not fear.

The claims so far are not that distant from Prinz's perceptual account of emotion. On his theory, the somatosensory system must detect core relational themes (Gut Reactions, 225). But for Prinz, core relational themes are not thoughts. I've ready addressed standard objects against the view that emotions are thoughts and additionally urged that a dispositional account requires occurrent thought – namely a perception of a bear must involve perceiving it as a dangerous bear, or at least as a danger, for the emotion to follow the emotionally eliciting object. And so, a perceptual account isn't far removed from an

¹⁵¹ Recent evidence suggests that the neocortex and parts of the amygdale have a developmental link. See Jan Deussing and Wolfgang Wurst's article "Amygala and Neocortex: Common Origins and Shared Mechanisms."

¹⁵² Rainer Reisenzein, among others, offers compelling neuroscientific arguments for a cognitivist account of emotion. See Emotion 1 (2007) for a useful exchange between Reisenzein and Matthias Siemer on the one hand and Brain Parkinson on the other.

intentional one. However, the view being advanced in the dissertation is that emotions express what vitally matters to one – that is, emotions are personal. The same feeling can be felt personally or impersonally. Were emotions personal, then emotions would be independent of the physiological disruption. That is, something else, over and above the qualitative character of the experience, no matter how the subject labels it, must account for the personal aspect of emotion. And so, if two subjects label an emotion as fear, it may nonetheless feel like fear and still fail to be fear.

5.3.2 THE PERSONAL

Knowing another's ideals, aims, and aspirations help identify what is valuable to them. And these help define the shape of one's personality.¹⁵³ No doubt how one's perception colors the world is a product of one's social environment and may be arrived at by questionable as well as appropriate means. The same is true of emotion. One may hate another because of the other's pedigree or one may pour affection over a hairless dog rather than a homeless person. As affective states, emotions reflect both personality and upbringing. As psychic feelings, emotions express what one cares about, has an interest in, or is of concern. It won't simply be that there is an emotional object – being afraid of a dangerous bear – it will depend, as James argued, on the context and one's stance toward the emotional eliciting event. One may be uplifted by his or her daughter's performance. But it matters whether the emotion arises because she

¹⁵³ For a recent and helpful discussion on personality see Peter Goldie's [On Personality](#).

is thought to outperform the child of one's superior, successfully faced a challenge, or experiences a sense of accomplishment. But in being uplifted, one need not be aware of it in any of these ways. One identifies the affective state and may only be aware that it concerns one's daughter.

I've argued that the thought underlying an emotion couldn't be completely dispositional. I've advanced the view that emotion requires occurrent thought. Part of the consideration involved emotions arising from novel situations. But though one can have an emotion in a novel situation, one cannot have an emotion toward something with complete indifference. James's abstraction argument removed more than the feeling. For when one removes psychic feelings, one is left with a state of indifference. That is, independent of the thought one has or the soaring physiological orchestration bringing about feeling, one must, to use Stocker's terminology, care about it, it should be of concern for one, or it should matter to the individual.

Caring about something requires a history. One does not come into the world predisposed to care about items and events in the world. Nor can one care about something they do not understand. A precondition of caring about something is to see it in a particular way – that is, to have thoughts about it. And yet in coming to care about something, the original thoughts need not be there - as if to care for something requires a rebirth of thought each time. In short, psychic feelings involve dispositions.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁴ See Michael Smith, David Lewis, and Mark Johnston's "Dispositional Theories of Value." The article consists of three distinct pieces by each author. I will follow David Lewis as offering a preliminary sketch: psychic feelings are dispositions to desire to desire where the desire concerns oneself – that is, it is a desire de se.

Psychic feelings are learned dispositions. Such an account will nonetheless naturally touch base with affect programs or other universal “emotional” dispositions found in our species and others. Toddlers tend to be cautious to novel surroundings and items. Parents tend to want to introduce a child to new experiences. Introducing an attractive toy one thinks one’s child will find enjoyable may misfire when the new toy makes an alarming noise or unfamiliar movement. This highlights one way affect programs bring about emotional responses. As John B. Watson demonstrated on poor Albert, loud noises produce a startle reaction (“Conditioned Emotional Reactions”). Such predisposed happenings orient oneself to items and events in the world. Once oriented, one may care about or have an interest in that item. The toy one hoped would bring about joy in the child will not. It becomes an object to be avoided. Dispositions underwriting an affect program tend to be couched in terms of what is universal of the species; whereas emotional dispositions as psychic feelings involve habits of a creature. To put it differently, psychic feelings express what one cares about, is concerned with, or has an interest in.

Lyons’ account of emotion as evaluative belief captures the personal aspect of an emotion in terms of his distinction between objective and subjective belief. On his view, the personal aspect involves an evaluative component that others could readily disagree with. Agreement or disagreement however, need not require that the person with the relevant evaluative belief have conviction. Though a third person measurement, the fact that others can more readily disagree seems to have little to do with or provide a mark of what one cares

about. As James indicated, a dispassionate evaluative thought lacks the capacity to bring about action – it lacks valance for the individual. Whether others can agree or not will provide little evidence that one cares about that evaluative belief.

Our convictions, what one holds dear, express dispositions. Psychic feelings manifest the relevant dispositions. Still, the view is not that particular feelings necessarily manifest particular dispositions – not for the species and not even for the individual over time. Furthermore, simply labeling a particular feeling as a psychic feeling, the feeling of anger, fear, and so on, need not be accurate. From the point of view of how it is for one, one can't know whether the feeling expresses a disposition or any disposition at all. This approach will no doubt be at odds with the tendency to treat one's "emotional" feeling as revealing what there is. But treating psychic feelings as the manifestation of dispositions isn't buoyed solely by the common sense observation that sometimes one's emotion will be mislabeled. One thinks of oneself as not jealous when one is. One describes the emotional state as anger or irritation at another and likely confabulates reasonable reasons. In this kind of case, one misidentifies an emotion. However, the view staked out here is far more radical. One could think one is angry because of a pre-reflective awareness of a felt feeling and yet have no emotion. That is, the criteria for determining whether an emotion exists or not, not simply what emotion it might be, do not rest on one's account of their own experience.

In a classic paper, "Cognitive, Social and Physiological Determinants of

Emotional State” Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer proposed that one needed a physiological arousal (a feeling) and cognitive label appropriate to the situation. In the experiment, subjects thought they were being injected with a vitamin solution but instead were injected with adrenaline (or saline for the control group). Three groups were formed with one informed as to the felt physiological effects to be expected from the injection, another group was misinformed, and the last group received no information. These groups were then further subdivided into two emotional eliciting environments. The goal was to determine whether the information mattered in how subjects interpreted their aroused state. The experiment reverses the progression for both James’s theory and common sense. The difference between James and common sense was whether the felt experience or the bodily disruption came first. The emotional eliciting environment was assumed to precede either the felt experience or the bodily disruption. In this experiment, the bodily disruption preceded the emotional eliciting environment.

The results suggested that the bodily disruption was not sufficient, one needed to (appropriately) label the bodily state, which seemed to be determined by context. Though the results remain questionable,¹⁵⁵ what matters is the underlying assumption. On this view, one can’t be wrong about having an emotion – only wrong about what to label it. But on the view being promoted, given that the disposition and thoughts need not be conscious, one could have feelings that arise by some other route, being injected by adrenaline for example,

¹⁵⁵ For review see Plutchik and Ax’s article “A Critique of ‘Determinants of Emotional State’ by Schachter and Singer,” Reisenzein’s article “The Schachter Theory of Emotion: Two Decades Later,” and Gordon’s Chapter Five of The Structure of Emotion.

and such a feeling need not manifest the relevant disposition. The experimental design relied on two measurements – physiological arousal and self-reports. Physiological arousal was caused by the injection of epinephrine. As a necessary condition, physiological arousal and the bodily markers will be independent of environmental causes. Second, by relying on subjective reports, the experimental design took for granted that subject's did not confabulate or that they could not be mistaken. Subjects were treated as reliable instruments. Schachter and Singer explain away the data for the subjects in the anger condition because they had other interests – receiving a grade and participating in future experiments. But that a subject intentionally deceives experimenters does not explain the kind of misidentification at issue. Subjects might confabulate or be mistaken despite having good reasons.¹⁵⁶ Schachter and Singer mistakenly treat subjective reports as reliable.

Felt physiological effects will not determine whether or not a feeling is a psychic feeling. Even when the feeling remains the same for one, it does not follow that there will be no differences. The occurrent state underwriting the personal aspect will elicit functional differences compared to feelings that arise simply from epinephrine. When one has psychic feelings, one will be poised to discover what they care about, is of concern, or what matters to them. Often when one has an emotion, one may readily know what thing our emotion is directed toward but unaware of why or how. Someone receives a promotion over you. You become angry. But it might as well be a discovery that what

¹⁵⁶ For a review of confabulation see William Hirstein's [Brain Fiction: Self-Deception and the Riddle of Confabulation](#) or "Models of Confabulation: A Critical Review and New Framework" by Kasey Metcalf, Robyn Langdon, and Max Coltheart.

accounted for the psychic feeling might not have been that one cared about the promotion per se. Rather one cared that the other did not get promoted, or that one's own accomplishments and contributions were not recognized, or one trusted others to act fairly, and so on. That is, when angry, what we care about is not always on one's sleeve even when one knows what they are angry about. Still, it's by having such emotions and working through them that one discovers what actually matters. That is, in virtue of having those psychic feelings one may uncover what mattered to one.

One might object on different grounds. The personal aspect of psychic feelings is welded into the experience. One need not, on such a view, be reflectively aware of the feeling as a psychic feeling. On this view, psychic feelings are not dispositions.¹⁵⁷ Rather, one looks to what must be true of the experience for it to be a psychic feeling. An analysis of psychic feelings would anchor itself to the structure of experience. It may be unarticulated or pre-reflective, but the psychic feeling is part of the content of the experience.

One can describe the difference between the view I'm advancing and the one above in the following way. In treating psychic feelings as expressing dispositions of a certain sort, the personal aspect is functionally part of the emotional feeling, that's how the felt effects from epinephrine differ from emotional feeling. On the alternative proposal, the personal aspect is experientially part of the emotional feeling. It is, on this view, what accounts for

¹⁵⁷ The argument is suggested by Dan Zahavi in "Self and Other: The Limits of Narrative Understanding" and can be found again in Chapter 10 of *The Phenomenological Mind* by Shaun Gallagher and Zahavi. The argument centers on the self but is readily applicable to psychic feelings as well.

the subjective character of the experience. In particular, subjective experiences have the character of mineness or a sense of ownership. If a mental state did not, then one may wonder how such a state could even be experiential – that there could be something it is like for one to be in that state.

Clearly psychic feelings as Stocker and Goldie intend them will be thicker than having a sense of ownership welded into a psychic feeling. However, if this minimal claim, that what it is like to have an experience has mineness embedded into the experience, can reasonably be challenged, then any more elaborate rendition remains arguable. The underlying assumption strikes at a major chord in distinguishing a heterophenomenological approach from a (auto)phenomenological one. The presumption of a pre-reflective awareness of mineness entailed in an experience is bolstered by Sydney Shoemaker in “Self-Reference and Self-Awareness.” In particular, what it is like to have an experience exhibits immunity to error through misidentification. In building into the experience, the conscious state, a pre-reflective awareness of oneself, no issue arises about the possibility of mistake when the awareness of oneself is non-observational, direct and unmediated. There is but one way to be aware of it and it is by being built into the structure of experience.

Such an approach, however, tends to commit one to a particular view about consciousness, namely being conscious is intrinsic to a conscious state. But one can agree that consciousness exhibits immunity to error through misidentification in the limited case of oneself but disagree that such is an intrinsic feature of a conscious state as opposed to an extrinsic feature. In brief,

one needs a theory of state consciousness. And though much of the argumentation in previous chapters remained neutral, this chapter does not. That is, Rosenthal's HOT theory of consciousness captures Shoemaker's insight without having to presume that immunity to error is an intrinsic feature of conscious states. Rather, it's a feature of a higher-order thought. As higher-order thoughts are unconscious – there is nothing it is like for one to be in an unconscious state – immunity to error need not be a feature of a conscious state, even if it's a feature of the explanation of a conscious state.

A HOT model can capture what seemed central: a conscious state is centered on a self or mineness. As a HOT makes one conscious of a mental state and that mental states belong to entities, a HOT makes one conscious of a mental state as belonging to oneself (“Unity of Consciousness and the Self,” 358). In this way, a HOT captures, as Rosenthal calls it, thin immunity. It's thin because a HOT theory allows for the conceptual possibility of radical error.

One might offer a further objection. Assume that the mineness – the subjective aspect – is a property of a conscious state; it's just not an intrinsic one. But dispositions are never conscious, nor are they conscious states. And so, what seemed central, the personal aspect, that one cared about, or had concerns, and so on, involved an individual. That is, unlike personality traits that classify types of people, psychic feelings involve a particular person. Still, on this view, when psychic feelings manifest, one is nonetheless poised to discover what it is that they cared about. And in becoming conscious of that disposition, one is conscious of oneself. And so, because psychic feelings poise one to be

conscious of oneself in a particular way, the disposition invariably involves a particular individual.

5.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Emotion involves thought and feeling. Thought provides the individuation conditions for emotion types. Psychic feelings provide the hard to describe quality distinctive of emotional experience. The personal aspect marks emotional experience as something beyond feeling.

This position remains distinct from Stocker's notion of psychic feeling and Goldie's notion of feeling-towards. They hold the distinctive feature of emotional feeling to be a necessary feature, and a necessary feature of emotion. I hold the distinctive feature of psychic feelings to be a contingent feature about us and a necessary feature of emotion. A feeling, of any sort, need not manifest the disposition. Still, from a phenomenological point of view, that doesn't seem true of our emotional feelings. This, however, only supports an argument about human emotion. In adopting heterophenomenology and in particular an error theory of phenomenology, consciousness fails to be the end-all to understanding the mind. Phenomenology frames problems from our point of view. Emotional experience is an artifact of evolutionary biology, not demonstrative evidence of what emotions really are. Though an artful adjunct, emotional feeling promotes understanding our emotional experience and emotion. In expressing dispositions, emotional feeling clarifies the nature of emotion. Like personality traits, dispositions underwriting psychic feelings – one's that express what one

values or cares for – foster explanation of and prediction of actions when such dispositions remain reliable in reliable contexts. Though one rarely needs to justify why one's emotion and emotional responses are important to one, if pressed, one is poised to do so.

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