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**Power and personality: Totalitarian power, resistance, and
the sense of self in the German Democratic Republic and
Czechoslovakia**

Scheye, Eric, Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1994

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A

**Power and Personality:
Totalitarian Power, Resistance,
and the Sense of Self
in the
German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia**

by

Eric Scheye

**A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy, The City University of New York**

1994


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
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
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I would like to thank Stanley Renshon for the painstaking time, patience, and energy he expended in guiding me through this work.

I would like to thank Bob Sullivan who, among other advice, repeatedly reminded me to keep each chapter as short as possible so that I would finish this work as expeditiously as possible. No better advice could be given. To all the others who know who they are, love.

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Introduction

In Book 8 of the Republic, Plato argued that there is a symmetry or correspondence between regime type and the sense of self of the citizens living under that regime. A political system, according to Plato, has the power to reproduce its own image in the sense of self of its citizenry. More specifically, he claimed, that an aristocratic political system, produces individuals with an aristocratic sense of self and that a "democratic" regime engenders the development of a democratic sense of self. Borrowing a Platonic metaphor, if the individual's sense of self were a dyed piece of wool, the individual assumes the color corresponding to the political institutions and system into which he is born and that that hue will be "indelibly fixed, never to be washed out by pleasure and pain, desire and fear" (Plato, 1945, p. 123).

Tocqueville, in his analysis of the French Revolution, offered a comparable claim. The French Revolution did not and could not further the cause of freedom or, fundamentally, redesign the country's social and political power relationships because the French citizen's sense of self had been so molded by centralized monarchical rule that change was virtually impossible. The monarchy was overthrown, but the centralized political institutions and structures which arose from those ashes merely mimicked the original model because those "foundations had been laid immutably in the minds of all Frenchmen" (Tocqueville, 1955, p. 72).

At first glance, Plato and Tocqueville's claim appears to be a straightforward argument about the ability of a regime to socialize its

citizenry with its own ethos. A political regime, which is able "indelibly" to fix the color or "immutably" to lay down the foundation of an individual's sense of self, is a regime that embodies a remarkable degree of power. Plato and Tocqueville, however, were not merely laying out a strong version of a structural argument, focusing upon the degree of power embodied by particular political regimes and ignoring the individual's ability to resist the demands of his environment and, therefore, shape his own world. Rather, they were making a more expansive claim about the nature of power.

Plato did more than adopt Thrasymachus' argument that might makes right, highlighting the all-too obvious linkages between power and knowledge.¹ Being the first political psychologist, he refined Thrasymachus' argument into a much more subtle claim about the relationship between power and the individual's sense of self, namely that the strongest, and, perhaps, most invisible form of power is its ability to influence, mold, or indelibly fix the individual's sense of self. Echoing Plato's claim, Tocqueville was not merely pessimistic about the course of the French Revolution, but awed by the power of the ancien regime to reproduce itself in the sense of self of the individual long after its physical demise, thereby, molding France's political future.

In political science, the discussion of power has traditionally concentrated upon two major themes: (1) power is defined as the

¹See Sullivan (1989) for an analysis of Gadamer's reinterpretation of Plato. What is at stake is not only an interpretation of Plato, but the nature of politics. Adopting a hermeneutical approach to Plato means that politics and the study of power becomes an interpretive endeavor or, as Robert Sullivan has argued, "politics... is the ongoing attempt to determine meaning through conversation" (1989, p. 19). The "stuff" of politics, therefore, is a contest about who will control meaning in time and space.

capacity to control or influence the behavior of others, measured by actual outcomes (A causing B to do what B would not otherwise have done);¹ or (2) power is determined by an individual's or group's access to scarce resources, however those resources are defined.² As a result, the questions raised by an analysis of power are usually limited to the following three: (1) "Who, if anyone, is exercising power and how did they acquire that degree of power?"; (2) "What issues have been systematically removed from the political agenda and by whom?"; and (3) "Whose interests are being harmed and who is it that is initiating the harm?"³

Taking Plato's and Tocqueville's analysis of power seriously necessitates the inclusion of a fourth question: "How does power reproduce itself in the individual's sense of self? What kind of sense of self is produced by different political regimes or social systems? What is the relationship between resistance, an individual's sense of self, and power?"⁴ It is this set of questions which lies at the heart of this study.

Czeslaw Milosz's landmark analysis of post-1945 Poland, The Captive Mind, inaugurated the study of the relationship between totalitarianism and the sense of self of the individual subjected to totalitarian rule. Milosz postulated that a totalitarian regime fragments the individual's sense of self. Rephrased in Platonic or Tocquevillean terms, Milosz claimed that totalitarianism embodies, possesses and/or

¹See Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963); Dahl (1957, 1968); and Lukes (1974).

²See Lasswell (1945).

³These questions, as well as the fourth, have been adopted, though slightly modified, from those posed by Digeser (1992).

⁴According to Tracy Strong, it is precisely this question which has triggered a "crisis" in political theory (1990).

exercises a sufficient degree of power to produce an individual who experiences his sense of self as fragmented.

Based upon interviews of citizens of the former German Democratic Republic (DDR) and the former Czechoslovakia conducted in 1991 and 1992, this study analyzes the relationship between a totalitarian regime and the sense of self it produces.¹ What was the psychological effect(s) of totalitarianism in the DDR and Czechoslovakia? What kind of sense(s) of self was produced by totalitarian rule in the DDR and Czechoslovakia? Did totalitarian rule in the DDR and Czechoslovakia, in fact, produce a fragmented sense of self? What groups of people experienced the loss of a cohesive sense of self and why? What groups did not experience that loss and why not?

To evaluate the questions posed by this study, it is necessary to define the relevant terms. Consequently, the first two chapters of this study define "totalitarianism" and "the self" respectively. Rereading the two classic texts of totalitarianism, Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski's Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy and Hannah Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism, the first chapter offers a definition of totalitarianism. Chapter two opens with a psychological definition of "the self" and a "fragmented sense of self," which, then, widens into philosophical discussion, laying out the framework and generating the hypotheses necessary for empirical analysis.

Chapters three and four place the examination of totalitarianism in the DDR and Czechoslovakia in a wider context. Broadly, both

¹Given the impossibility of generalizing about an entire population, comparable groups of professionals were chosen in the DDR and Czechoslovakia.

chapters discuss the relationship between resistance, power, and the individual's sense of self. More specifically, comparing totalitarianism with other types of "total institutions," the third chapter raises certain theoretical issues having to do with hegemony, role theory, and a "protean" sense of self while also addressing empirical concerns, pertaining to the effect(s) of a total institution. Chapter four, using eye witness accounts of totalitarianism in Central Europe as a stepping stone, discusses the connections between totalitarian power, dissent, and a cohesive sense of self.

Beginning with chapter five, which lays out the study's methodology, the interview data is presented. In chapter six it is argued that most individuals, excluding "ideologically" committed communists, experienced Soviet-communist domination of the DDR and Czechoslovakia as an hostile and aggressive environment which penetrated their sense of self. The seventh chapter describes the different ways in which the professional's sense of self was fragmented by totalitarian power in the DDR and Czechoslovakia. Not all individuals, however, experienced that fragmentation. Two groups, in particular, did not, namely dissidents and "ideologically" committed communists. Chapters eight and nine discuss these two groups, analyzing, respectively, the psychological effect(s) of resistance and adherence to totalitarianism.

Only by way of conclusion will the narrower question of totalitarianism and its effect(s) on the individual's sense of self be placed in the larger argument about the nature of power. Only then can the Platonic and Tocquevillean understanding about the nature of

power and the relationship between power, resistance, and an individual's sense of self be redeemed.

CHAPTER I

The Nature of Totalitarianism

Since World War II totalitarianism has been a contested term in political science (Schapiro, 1972). The concept has been applied to fascist regimes in Italy (Germino, 1959; Gregor, 1968) and Germany (Arendt, 1973; Buchheim, 1968; S. Neumann, 1942), to communist dictatorships throughout the world (Arendt, 1973; Ulam, 1962; Brzezinski, 1967; Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1956; Moore, 1966) as well as to Western liberal democracies (Marcuse, 1964). Benjamin Barber has correctly pointed out (1969) that the term of totalitarianism has also been applied to movements (Arendt, 1973), parties (Cassinelli, 1962; Lippincott, 1965) as well as ideas (Popper, 1963; Talmon, 1961).

Given such diversity, some theorists have argued that the term totalitarianism possesses little definitional consistency and that the term is applied more as a weapon of ideological warfare than as a tool of academic rigor (Fleron, 1968; Spiro and Barber, 1970). Furthermore, critics accuse the "totalitarian literature" of being misleading and ahistorical.¹ Given this debate, it is unclear whether the term "totalitarianism" retains heuristic and classificatory value and, if so, what it might be. The task of this chapter, therefore, is to define the term totalitarian and make it operational.

¹To mention but a few of the critics, see Allen (1981); Barber (1969); Burrowes (1969); Curtis (1969); Godwin (1973); Groth (1964); Holmes (1986); C. Johnson (1970); P. Johnson (1977); Kautsky (1973); Menze (1981); Rustow (1970); Tucker (1961, 1965); and White (1987). Curtis has, in the meantime, changed his mind, now arguing that the term totalitarianism does refer to a definitional constellation of political attributes (1981).

Barber, in his critique of the totalitarian literature, divided the debate into a number of competing, though not necessarily mutually exclusive, camps (1969). His basic division was between those theorists who argue from a phenomenological position and those who adopt an essentialist perspective. The phenomenological approach, originally associated with Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, attempted to identify a constellation of attributes or an institutional framework which is unique to totalitarianism. The essentialist camp, in contrast, argued that totalitarianism is primarily an ideological and philosophical entity. Borrowing the Aristotelian method, Hannah Arendt, the essentialist's leading light, claimed that totalitarianism can be identified according to its ideological goals which, in turn, determine the organizational structure of the regime.

Gregor (1981) and Schapiro (1972) have noted that though the term totalitarianism has been defined by many other theorists, the two schools are still identified with the work of their foremost proponents: Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski's Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (1956) and Hannah Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism (1973).¹ Consequently, for the sake of analytic clarity, Friedrich and

¹Many other theorists have also defined totalitarianism, including Feher (1983); Linz (1975); Lowenthal (1960, 1967, 1970); S. Neumann (1942); and Schapiro (1972). None of these theories, however, significantly alter the foundations laid down by either Friedrich and Brzezinski or Arendt. Lowenthal, for instance, argued that the totalitarian state is freed from "all legal limitations in the exercise of its tasks" (1970, p. 108) and that totalitarianism instituted a "permanent revolution from above" (1960, p. 506). Given Friedrich and Brzezinski's assertion, however, that the totalitarian political party monopolizes all social, political, and economic institutions, the ruling political apparatus is effectively freed from "legal limitations" usually associated with an independent judiciary.

Linz, on the other hand, reduced Friedrich and Brzezinski's six point schema to down to three, emphasizing totalitarianism's ability to mobilize the populace and encourage "citizen participation." If the concepts of mobilization and participation are to be taken seriously, none of the regimes typically

Brzezinski's contribution will represent the phenomenological school while Arendt's opus will be used to set forth the essentialist position.¹

classified as totalitarian- Soviet-communist dictatorships, the Third Reich, North Korea - would qualify. Though the citizenry may have been organized into political formations and required to attend mass rallies, there was virtually no participation in decision-making processes (see Cocks, 1970; Feher et al, 1983; Nelson, 1980). In the case of the DDR, for instance, what participation did exist "took place within a network of control. In fact, virtually no participation in public life was allowed without control by the center.... [Other than Churches,] no associations that were the result of private initiatives were allowed" (Rueschemeyer, 1989, p. 4; see also Ludz, 1970; Scharf, 1984).

It could then be argued that none of the above-named totalitarian regimes were, in fact, totalitarian: history does not fit the classification. Such an argument, however, puts the cart before the horse, requiring that history resemble abstract theoretical constructs. Rather than rewrite history, it is more appropriate to argue that these schema do not reflect historical realities and are, thus, misleading.

Other errors mar the work of Schapiro and Neumann. Using fascism and Stalinism as his prototypical models, Schapiro argued that the role of The Leader was the single most important element of totalitarianism (see also Cassinelli, 1962; Tucker, 1965). Though a concentration on the role of The Leader may have been fitting for particular forms of totalitarianism, such an emphasis proves limited in coming to terms with other variations of totalitarianism, particularly those which developed in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s. It was not The Leader per se who was of prime importance, but the operation and organization of the political apparatus. At certain times the political apparatus may have been dominated by a leader, but those moments are epiphenomena and the fact remains that the leader achieved dominance through the machinations of a political apparatus.

Neumann, though underlining the role of the totalitarian leader, developed the Trotskyian concept of the permanent revolution. What he meant by this was that totalitarian regimes sought to extend their control over "all agencies and activities of the body politic" (1942, p. xi). For a totalitarian regime, however, the issue is not one of revolution, but control and the continual extension of that control (Feher, 1983). If revolution is meant to imply the continual aggrandizement of the political apparatus' control over resources, be they physical, natural, social, economic, and/or psychological, then Neumann's understanding of totalitarianism fits nicely into the Friedrich and Brzezinski and Arendt typology. If revolution is meant to be a more encompassing concept it once again does not match historical realities.

¹In later work Brzezinski, writing alone, added an essentialist element to his understanding of totalitarianism. Brzezinski writes "Totalitarianism is a system in which technologically advanced instruments of political power are wielded with restraint by a centralized leadership of an elite movement, for the purpose of effecting a total social revolution, including the conditioning of man, on the basis of certain arbitrary ideological assumptions" (Brzezinski, 1967, p. 46-47). Or again later, "The essence of totalitarian rule is the elimination of any political life and the atomization of society. The objective is to make certain that every individual is left alone to face the system as a whole, feeling isolated and often adrift in his or her internal but never publicly expressed opposition" (Brzezinski, 1990, p.

It will be argued that although these two works belong to different schools they agree upon a single common characteristic of totalitarianism. Quite simply, that common characteristic is the attempt of a political apparatus to penetrate and colonize, and thus, ultimately, fragment the everyday life and the sense of self of the individual.¹

I

In order to come to an understanding of Friedrich and Brzezinski's concept of totalitarianism it is important to stress the limited nature of their approach, and do so quite precisely, because many of their critics have misread their narrow intentions. Although Friedrich and Brzezinski asserted that "totalitarian dictatorship is historically unique and sui generis" they did not attempt to explain the rise of totalitarian dictatorships (1956, p. 5). Furthermore, they understood totalitarianism as a political system which was expected "to undergo a steady evolution, presumably involving both growth and deterioration" (p. 6; see also

117). Picking up on Brzezinski's 1960s move, Friedrich labels it "essentialist or teleological" (Friedrich, 1969, p. 127; see also Barber, 1969, pp. 8-11).

¹For a discussion of colonization see Habermas (1987, pp. 145-148, 154-155, 173, 183-187, 316-318, 332-373). For a discussion of colonization and the self see Horkheimer (1990) and Marcuse (1970). According to Habermas, colonization means, first, that "everyday conscious" has been fragmented and, second, that action has been robbed of its meaning. Fragmentation occurred because of the differentiation of the lifeworld into numerous different and "autonomous" life spheres, and the subsequent "value- and norm-free" instrumentalization, technologization, and bureaucratization of the lifeworld. Though Habermas argued that colonization is a derivative of late capitalism, it need not necessarily be limited to late 20th century Western development. The fragmentation and loss of meaning due to instrumentalization, bureaucratization, etc. can also be applied to other social systems.

Schapiro, 1972).¹ Because totalitarianism was deemed susceptible to change a comprehensive and all-encompassing definition of totalitarianism was impossible. Consequently, "totalitarian dictatorship is a relative rather than an absolute category" (Friedrich, 1969, p. 153).

In short, all Friedrich and Brzezinski attempted to do was outline a "'syndrome,' or pattern of interrelated traits" which could be considered as the core characteristics of totalitarianism (p. 9). They merely sought to sketch out a "preliminary conceptual schema" that would stimulate and focus subsequent research into totalitarianism (Gregor, 1981, p. 140). It is for this reason that Friedrich argued that it is "meaningful to speak of totalitarian features in terms of more or less, and that it is meaningful also to speak of totalitarian trends (Friedrich, 1969, p. 153).²

¹One of the most frequent criticisms of the "totalitarian model" is the claim that the model forecloses the possibility of change (see, for example, Rustow, 1970; White, 1987, p. 16). To account for the all-too apparent changes in communist-totalitarian regimes, theorists abandoned the totalitarian typology and deployed instead modernization theories. Academic interest focused on the role of competing elites, and/or pluralistic centers of power (see, for example, Deutsch, 1954; Godwin, 1973; Groth, 1964; Hough, 1976; Jowitt, 1971; Kautsky, 1973; Korbonski, 1972; and Ludz, 1968). Totalitarian regimes were no longer totalitarian, according to this argument, due to the forces of technology and rationalization. The monolithic core of a totalitarian regime had supposedly fragmented into competing factions. Unfortunately, the assumptions implicit in and the predictions generated by modernization analysis of communism did not match the actual development of communist rule (White, 1978). Furthermore, Cocks (1970), Dallin and Breslauer (1970), Fainsod (1953), and Feher (1983) have all indicated the multiple ways in which a totalitarian system can undergo change, including modifications in the bureaucracy, the relationship between the Party and the bureaucracy, and in the use of terror, without significantly affecting the overall power and control of the political apparatus.

²Critics of Friedrich and Brzezinski who have attacked their work based upon faulty reading of their premises include Allen (1981); Azrael (1970), Barber (1969), Burrowes (1969), Fleron (1968), Groth (1964), and Linz (1975). Azrael, for example, although acknowledging that Friedrich and Brzezinski had not offered a "model" of totalitarianism, nevertheless, proceeded to criticize their "totalitarian model" (1970). Allen and Linz have argued that "total domination" lies at the heart of the "totalitarian model," although Friedrich and Brzezinski made no such assertion.

Friedrich and Brzezinski's preliminary schema was designed to function as an "ideal type," suggesting "something about the empirical reality of some loosely characterized class of political systems" (Gregor, 1981, p. 141). An ideal type is precisely that: an analytic ideal. It is not meant to be a comprehensive definition of a political reality, systematically explaining the origin and future development of the phenomenon under consideration. Nor can an ideal type be realized in a pure and unadulterated form. Rather, as Weber clearly stated, an ideal type distorts reality in order to be better able to understand political phenomena (Weber, 1946, p. 292).¹ Its function is comparative and analytic, outlining a set of related characteristics or "a cluster of interrelated traits, intertwined and mutually supporting each other," for purposes of classification (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1956, p. 9).

At the heart of Friedrich and Brzezinski's classification of totalitarianism is a six point schema. The six traits are "an ideology, a single party typically led by one man, a terroristic police, a communications monopoly, a weapons monopoly, and a centrally directed economy" (p. 9). In later writings, Friedrich slightly modified this six point schema in order to accommodate the historical changes undergone by totalitarian regimes.² Following the pattern of his earlier

¹For a discussion of ideal types see Brown (1974) and Mommsen (1989). As Holmes has written, "an advantage of the ideal-type over the model is that it can be used to show change over time and/or between countries or systems, whereas major changes in an observed phenomenon would normally require a new model (1986, p. 389).

²The totalitarian schema is often critiqued because it is not historically accurate and cannot explain the divergent paths taken by various totalitarian-communist regimes (see Groth, 1964; Holmes, 1986, pp. 385-387; White, 1987, pp. 15-16). The first critique misunderstands the nature of ideal type analysis while the second ignores how ideal type analysis highlights differences between phenomena. The six point schema does not refer to "systems that have reached perfection, but rather those that are driven by a never-ending effort to reach it, to swallow all

outline, Friedrich claimed that totalitarianism could be characterized by "(1) a totalist ideology; (2) a single party committed to this ideology and usually led by one man, the dictator; (3) a fully developed secret police; and three kinds of monopoly, or, more precisely, monopolistic control: namely that of (a) mass communications; (b) operational weapons; (c) all organizations, including economic ones, thus involving a centrally-planned economy" (Friedrich, 1969, p. 126).¹

The only difference between these two classifications is that the second schema expanded and clarified the concept of "monopolistic control" to mean domination "of the three major forms of interpersonal confrontation in an industrial mass society" (Friedrich, 1969, p. 126). Whereas in the earlier work Friedrich and Brzezinski hedged on whether the communications monopoly meant that the government actually owned the means of communication (1956, p. 107), Friedrich, in his latter work, argued that ownership by either the government or ruling party was not of prime importance. What was crucial was "that

channels of human communication, and to eradicate all spontaneously emerging social life forms. In this sense all Soviet-type regimes have been totalitarian, yet they have differed from each other in the degree of achievement - in the distance separating their real conditions from the inaccessible ideal" (Kolakowski, 1983, p. 133). Furthermore, history has proven that the differences between totalitarian-communist regimes were not as important as their similarities. Only a theory which notes the similarities between these regimes can explain the virtually simultaneous collapse of communist rule throughout Central and Eastern Europe. ¹It is important to recognize that nowhere in this definition does the idea of "total domination" come into play. Totalitarian ideology may be totalistic, but there is no assumption that the ideology is successfully and hegemonically realized. Nor is it assumed that single party rule operates as a monolithic entity (see Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1956, p. 109). Writing from within the essential school, Buchheim admitted that "totalitarian rule is no uniformly rationalized apparatus, equally effective in all its parts.... [A]s a whole, the totalitarian claim to power is realized only in a diffused way, with varying intensity at different times in the different areas of life - and in the process, totalitarian traits are always mingled with non-totalitarian ones" (1968, p. 38). It is for these reasons that critics such as Allen (1981), Linz (1975), or Rustow (1970) miss their target.

such monopolistic control [be] in the hands of whatever 'elite' rules the particular society and thereby constitutes its regime" (Friedrich, 1969, p. 126).¹

The central feature of their description of totalitarianism, then, is the concept of monopolistic control of virtually all political, economic, and social organizations.² Curtis labeled this "the controlled interdependence of economic, social, cultural, administrative, and political institutions" (1969, p. 101; see also Lowenthal, 1960; Malia, 1992).³ In other words, virtually all "free institutions" are eradicated (Curtis, 1981, p. 129; see also Linz, 1975).⁴

¹Friedrich's clarification neatly sidesteps the need to define the troubling relationship between a totalitarian party and the offices of the government. The question is no longer whether the Party controls the government or vice versa. The issue is only (1) whether a political apparatus - be it the Party, the secret police, and/or the government - exists which exercises monopolistic control over decision making with respect to weaponry and its use, communications, economics, and virtually all other legal social organizations and (2) whether an opposition is legally permitted to organize and publicize its activities and thereby challenge that monopolistic control.

²When Friedrich and Brzezinski spoke of virtually all social organizations, they meant all professional associations (legal, medical, chemical engineering, etc.), civic organizations (local community associations, the national Goethe Society, youth clubs, etc.), recreational clubs (soccer, water polo, dance, etc.), academic societies and educational institutions (theology, archeology, micro-biology, nursery schools, universities, research institutes, etc.), and cultural opportunities (theatre companies, movie houses, art museums, etc.).

³Ognian Pishev, the Bulgarian Ambassador to the United States, claimed that "the only dimension that really determined individual behavior [during totalitarianism in Bulgaria] was the political organization of the socialist society. Political power represented by the Communist Party... was the final arbiter of every economic decision; it issued the aesthetic verdict on every piece of art. Personal loyalty to the party leadership was the ultimate criterion for promotion not only in public administration but even in science" (1992, p. 67).

⁴Franz Neumann also concurred with this understanding of totalitarianism when he wrote, "It may be necessary to control education, the means of communication and economic institutions and thus to gear the whole of society and the private life of the citizen to the system of political domination. The term for this type is totalitarian dictatorship" (1957, p. 236). He went on to add that under totalitarianism "society ceases to be distinguished from the state; it is totally permeated by political power" (1957, pp. 244-245).

Leaving aside the monopolistic control over the means of violence, the political domination of mass communications is the nerve center of totalitarianism (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1956, p. 107). All sources of information, including publishing houses, magazines, journals, newspapers, television, radio, film, music, and the press, are centrally controlled. The aim is not only to curtail severely all information which has not been previously cleansed and approved by the elite, but to affect the manner in which the individual processes information. Since all information is censored - a fact of which the individual is more than aware - no information can be considered reliable. The result is

a profound distrust of all news and other kinds of information. Since people do not have any other source of information, there develops a vast amount of rumor-mongering as well as general disillusionment. And since man cannot think without having valid information upon which to focus his thought, the general public tends to become detached from all general questions (1956, p. 112).

The resulting widespread distrust and growing passivity is coupled to a much more disturbing phenomenon. Since censorship is all-pervasive, communication is marked by a constant repetition of words, phrases, and patterns of thought. These patterns of thought duplicate and reinforce not only the methods of totalitarian education, but its content as well (1956, p. 118).¹ Textbooks, lesson plans, curricula, pedagogical methodology, selection of teachers, student enrollment and faculty promotion are all under monopoly control. From nursery school on up, teachers are seen as instruments of indoctrination

¹For a discussion of the social and natural sciences in Soviet-Central Europe, for example, see Peterlik and Waldhaeusl (1990).

and thus educators are carefully screened (1956, p. 129). Such screening, however, is not limited to educators. Similar constraints are imposed on all forms of higher education as well, for "political loyalty [is] the prerequisite consideration for admission to higher institutes of learning" (1956, p. 128).

Friedrich and Brzezinski argued that, sooner or later, "a general pattern of thought, almost a style of thinking, proves increasingly irresistible as the regime continues in power" (1956, p. 115). The ability to think in ways different from those desired by the elite becomes problematic, for "even those who profess the most violent hostility to the [totalitarian] system tend to think in patterns instilled into them by that regime" (1956, p. 115). This is not to argue that opposition ceases to exist or that a totalitarian system actually succeeds in its effort to achieve total domination. Rather the claim is more troubling: the individual's daily vocabulary and the implicit value judgements embedded within it function as mechanisms reinforcing the totalitarian power structure. "Unconsciously" each individual recreates and reinforces his own domination (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1956, p. 115). Rephrased, the everyday mental and linguistic life of the individual has been penetrated and colonized by the political apparatus.

The individual's economic life is also penetrated by totalitarianism. Typically, the domestic and international economies of totalitarian countries are heavily centralized (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1956; see also Curtis, 1981, p. 129). The individual plant, factory, agricultural cooperative, or private farmer may have more or less room to maneuver. The methods may vary from outright ownership, to delivery quotas, barter arrangements, and fixed prices, to detailed

regulations concerning profits. Whatever the case may be, the end result is the same: functional monopolistic control resides in the hands of the political apparatus (Lauterbach, 1954, p. 339; see also Timasheff, 1954, p. 333).¹

The political apparatus' direction of economic life is macro-economic as well as micro-economic. It pertains to production as well as individual consumption. Although constitutionally "guaranteed," employment is largely dependent upon the dictates of the authorities. Transfers, promotions, salaries are all controlled by the central political powers. Hannah Arendt has neatly summarized this line of argumentation. "One must eat," she wrote, "and in modern societies one must work to eat, and in totalitarian societies working is a political act" (Arendt, 1954, p. 337).

Taken to the next step, totalitarianism's control over employment enables the political apparatus to penetrate and colonize the individual's sense of self. "The major element in commanding mass conformity in a totalitarian society is the power of the political authority to assign or withdraw employment, that is, the means to live.... In these circumstances, one need no longer speak of a desire to conform: it becomes instead a *necessity* of conforming" (Duchacek, 1954, p. 333).

The individual's consumption patterns are also dependent upon the whims of the political apparatus. The distribution and availability of consumer goods, i.e., apartments, fruits and vegetables, automobiles,

¹Totalitarian societies "manifest the presence of strong controls, the maintenance of administrative allocation of materials, the limitation of incentives, the linking of managerial bonuses to profits by administrative decree.... Economically, they are command economies with many detailed targets set by the administration. Even the Soviet Central Planning Agency acts by reference to political leaders rather than according to technical criteria" (Curtis, 1969, p. 101).

vacations, consumer durables, are all rather tightly allocated under totalitarian economics. The acquisition of some consumer goods is difficult under the best of circumstances, requiring years of waiting, while the procurement of other goods are legally prohibited. Even if stores and shops are not state controlled, prices are either administratively determined or severely regulated. Through the individual's consumption patterns, therefore, the political apparatus penetrates and colonizes the everyday life of the individual.

So far, Friedrich and Brzezinski's phenomenology has been confined to the organizational and structural apparatus of totalitarian society, i.e. the institutional arrangements by which the political apparatus exercises monopolistic control. What has not yet been discussed is the means, or what Friedrich calls the "methods" and "techniques" by which totalitarian control is enforced (1969, p. 135).

According to Friedrich and Brzezinski, the totalitarian secret police reinforce and supplement the political apparatus' monopolistic control. Historically, repressive measures are needed to impose the totalitarian order (Dallin and Breslauer, 1970). These measures, "which aim first at eliminating [the political apparatus'] open enemies, are gradually extended, in snow-ball fashion, to other sections of society. Totalitarian terror grows by leaps and bounds" (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1956, p. 131).¹ Eventually

terror embraces the entire society, searching everywhere for actual or potential deviants from totalitarian unity.

¹An adequate definition of terror is provided by Dallin and Breslauer, who wrote that error is "the arbitrary use, by organs of political authority, of severe coercion against individuals or groups, the credible threat of such use, or the arbitrary extermination of individuals or groups" (1970, p. 192).

Indeed to many it seems as if they are hunted, even though the secret police may not touch them for years, if at all. Total fear reigns (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1956, p. 137).¹

At first the terror only paralyzes resistance. As the terror expands, however, the individual's fear of the terror is internalized. "The people become familiar with a pattern of conformance, they know how to externalize a behavior of loyalty, they learn what not to say and do" (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1956, p. 138). In other words, the individual's everyday actions have been colonized. The individual behaves in his everyday life as the totalitarian power wants him to act without the need for the regime to dictate specific patterns of behavior.

Given the individual's adoption of those behavior patterns desired by the totalitarian power, the regime is able over time to reduce the level of terror. This does not mean that the terror vanishes. Rather the use of terror recedes into the background and its application is, to use a Weberian term, rationalized and routinized. "The carrot of a welfare state, material incentives, and increasing consumption..., to some extent, [substitutes] for the stick of terror" (Curtis, 1969, p. 94). Despite this reduction in the level of physical terror, the ubiquity of the secret police preserves a level of psychological terror, a fear of punishment, and a palpable level of anxiety (Friedrich, 1969, p. 145).²

¹Once again, Franz Neumann added his voice, agreeing with the supposition that terror is an essential aspect of totalitarian rule. He wrote, "the final factor in totalitarianism is the reliance upon terror, i.e. the use of non-calculable violence as a permanent threat against the individual. Care must be taken, however, not to define a totalitarian dictatorship simply as a rule of violence. Without it, it is true, such regimes could not survive" (1957, p. 245). It such be noted that Dallin and Breslauer's definition of terror does not necessitate the use of violence.

²Dallin and Breslauer have noted that though the terror has been rationalized and routinized, selecting now only specific individuals, there exists "widespread uncertainty [in the populace] about the intended scope of the intimidation and the credibility of threats.... Some citizens are clearly intimidated by threats and by

Psychological control is totalitarianism's modernization of power. Physical terror is largely replaced by the organizational and psychological penetration and colonization of the individual's everyday life and his sense of self. Though there is marked "quantitative decline in terror," this does not mean that a totalitarian organization of society has necessarily undergone a "qualitative transformation" since the basic threat of severe coercion and death still exists (Malia, 1992, p. 98; see also Feher, 1983).¹ As Di Palma has noted, "the 'heat' of exterminations and purges/autos-da-fe to the 'cool' of psychiatric testing suggests an attempt to codify cognitive control, not a wish to discard it" and the concept of terror upon which it was predicated (1991, p. 64).

Totalitarianism's attempt to implement "cognitive control" coupled with the earlier analysis of the political apparatus' penetration of the everyday life of the individual indicates how Friedrich and Brzezinski's analysis of totalitarianism can and should be revised. Rather than classify totalitarianism according to a six point schema, the phenomenological description of totalitarianism can be boiled down into

examples of deterrent action. 'Here, too, memory plays a key role, leading many people to exaggerate the intensity of the threats and to assume that they are intended to apply broadly rather than narrowly' (1970, p. 202). For a discussion of the role of memory and uncertainty after the cessation of terror see K. Nowak (1988) and Marody (1988). According to these sociologists, there is little doubt but that the terror institutionalizes specific and identifiable patterns of behavior which persist long after the years of actual terror have passed.

¹Ignoring the historical establishment of totalitarian rule, some critics have claimed that totalitarian regimes can exist without terror, arguing that totalitarianism evolves into administered or bureaucratic rule (see, for example, Meyer, 1961; Kassof, 1964). The bureaucratic model of totalitarianism was itself later critiqued (Dawisha, 1980; Pakulski, 1986; White, et al., 1987), spawning yet other interpretations of totalitarian rule: the corporatist model (Bunce, 1980) and communist rule as Weberian normalization (Janos, 1976, 1991). A problem with the bureaucratic model of totalitarianism and its critics is a misunderstanding of the logic and rationality embodied by a totalitarian bureaucracy and the fact that that rationality does not coincide with and is unintelligible to the values of a capitalist bureaucracy and its bureaucrats (see Feher, et al., 1983).

a single proposition: Totalitarianism is a system of governance in which a political elite's monopolistic control of political, economic and social organizations results in the penetration and colonization of the everyday life and the sense of self of the individual.

II

In contrast to Friedrich and Brzezinski's phenomenological interpretation of totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt's treatment of the subject is the crowning glory of the essentialist school.¹ Instead of Friedrich and Brzezinski's focus on organizational structures, Arendt, and the essentialist school in general, concentrated primarily on the abstract goals, aims, and visions of a totalitarian ideology, believing that institutions and practices are of secondary importance.

According to Arendt, a totalitarian ideology is one which claims to "obey strictly and unequivocally [the] laws of Nature or of History" (1973, p. 461).² Human existence is governed by a set of immutable

¹Vaclav Havel is the most recent and influential adherent to the essentialist school. The major sole difference between Havel and Arendt's arguments is that Havel does not emphasize the role of terror. It was, perhaps, for this reason that Havel labeled the system he described as post-totalitarian. Although Havel does not stress the role of terror, it is clear from his description that fear plays a significant role in the behavior of the individual, a fear which, in part, arose due to a previous reign of terror.

²Arendt was referring specifically to Nazism and Stalinism, though her analysis would apply to any metaphysical ordering of human history, a claim Arendt implicitly made with respect to Marxism in her later work, The Human Condition (1958). Even the most cursory examination of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* reveals his belief in the "biological laws of Nature." Hitler's racial policies were grounded in a biological hierarchical ordering, which coincided with Nature's "eternal will" (for a discussion of Nazism racial ideology, see, Burleigh and Wippermann, 1991). Substituting History for Nature, Leninism/Stalinism also rests upon "scientific laws." After all Lenin wrote that communist theory must be put "on a scientific

and eternal laws which are known to the leadership of the totalitarian movement.¹ Recognizing totalitarianism's concealed religiosity, Havel called totalitarianism a "secularized religion," which promulgates metaphysical and existential certainties and consigns "reason and conscience to a higher authority [i.e. the laws of Nature and/or History]. The principle involved here is that the centre of power is identical with the centre of truth" (1990a, p. 25).²

Echoing Rousseau, the totalitarian ideologue insists that good government should not "wield its power in the interest of one man," but rather should be "prepared to sacrifice everyone's vital immediate interests to the execution of what it assumes to be the law of History or the law of Nature" (Arendt, 1973, pp. 461-462). In other words, each and every individual is superfluous, an epiphenomenon, because reality is defined by the laws of Nature and/or History and not by human conduct. Truth, knowledge, justice derive their meaning in reference to the laws of History and/or Nature rather than to the particular actions

basis [which is capable] of demonstrating its necessity and inevitability from the point of view of the materialist conception of history" (1988, p. 75).

¹Buchheim noted that a Kantian and metaphysical foundation underpins a totalitarian ideology when he wrote that the "totalitarian claim to control rests on the conception that the world can be known without lacunae, that such knowledge can readily be translated into practice, and that man has the right to enforce the actualization of the theoretically known on his fellows" (1968, pp. 17-18).

²Martin Malia referred to totalitarianism's belief in suprahuman laws as a "secular theocracy" or, borrowing Nicholas Berdyayev's term, an ideocracy (see Berdyayev, 1960). Malia wrote, "in a traditional theocracy, God rules not directly but through His priests; and in a secular ideocracy, the Idea of Socialism also rules indirectly, through its 'vanguard party,' in a dictatorship of the proletariat that is in fact a dictatorship of the apparat" (1992, p. 93). Leszek Kolakowski also understood communist ideology as religious in nature (1982). For him communist ideology was designed to force the individual "not only to believe what the authority revealed but to accept those pronouncements as empirically true....[Ultimately,] 'the acceptance of the populace consist[ed] apparently in their powerlessness to resist the coercive system; they accept[ed] it as a reality in the same way one accepts the weather'" (1982, p. 48).

of individuals. The individual is merely material to be shaped and perfected by "objective forces" or as Buchheim has written: "Since the regime regards people as the objects of its measures, as human material, it denies the individual character of their being..." (1968, p. 45).

It is precisely because totalitarianism denies the uniqueness of the individual that the individual can be shaped and perfected according to "objective laws." Implicit in the belief that human behavior is governed by eternal laws which can be known by a political apparatus, then, is a belief in human omnipotence (Arendt, 1973, p. 387). The individual is omnipotent in a double sense. First, the individual can know the universal laws upon which human existence rests as they are enunciated by the political apparatus. Second, since those revealed truths can be realized in the course of human endeavor, knowledge of those laws conveys "God-like" powers. Consequently, "everything is [not only] permitted" to the keeper of the flame, i.e. the political apparatus, but "possible" (1973, p. 387).¹ This double presumption of omnipotence implies that the ultimate goal of totalitarian rule by a political apparatus is not only the "transformation of the outside world or the revolutionizing transmutation of society, but the transformation of human nature itself" (Arendt, 1973, p. 458). In fact, human nature must be transformed because the "law of Nature or the law of History, if properly executed, is expected to produce mankind as its end product" (1973, p. 462). The totalitarian goal, therefore, is the

¹Aleksander Wat, a Polish writer and ex-Communist, echoed Arendt's formulation when he wrote: "I had already begun to theorize that the fundamental but unwritten assumption of Soviet law is that everything that can be conceived is possible and everything that is possible is real!" (Wat, 1990, p. 200).

creation of a "new man," the realization of a heaven on earth (see also Buchheim, 1968, p. 22).

To achieve its goal of heaven on earth, totalitarianism, so Arendt argued, requires the institutionalization of terror.¹ Totalitarian terror is neither arbitrary nor haphazard nor a mere tool of political expediency. Rather the terror is called for by the ideological need to realize the laws of Nature and/or History.² According to Arendt,

terror seeks to 'stabilize' men in order to liberate the forces of nature or history. It is this movement which singles out foes of mankind against whom terror is let loose, and no free action of either opposition or sympathy can be permitted to interfere with the elimination of the 'objective enemy' of History or Nature.... The rulers themselves do not claim to be just or wise, but only to execute historical or natural laws; they do not apply laws, but execute a movement in accordance with its inherent law. Terror is lawfulness, if law is the law of movement or some suprahuman force, Nature or History (1973, p. 465).³

Totalitarian terror "stabilizes" the individual so that he can be "controlled" and the laws of History and/or Nature realized (Walter,

¹Shadowing her essentialist argument, Arendt constructed a hidden phenomenological perspective. The cornerstone of this secondary line of argumentation is that "above the state and behind the facades of ostensible power, in a maze of multiplied offices, underlying all shifts of authority and in a chaos of inefficiency, lies the power nucleus of the country, the superefficient and supercompetent services of the secret police" (1973, p. 420).

²Wat's personal experience and analysis of the communist system parallels Arendt's discussion of totalitarianism. Reflecting upon his experience of the Soviet Gulag and the use of terror, Wat wrote: "It is essential that the subject of the camps be constantly present in people's minds, while even the word camp was under the strictest taboo; it was precisely this duality that, by causing religious dread, accelerated the 'reforging of souls' to maximum speed" (1990, p. 182).

³Once again, the parallelism between Arendt's argument and Havel's is striking, for Havel asserted that "no matter what position individuals hold in the hierarchy of power, they are not considered by the system to be worth anything in themselves, but are only as things intended to fuel and serve this automatism" (1990a, p. 30).

1969, pp. 13-14). Through terror the individual is made to act in harmony with the dictates of the totalitarian political apparatus. The ideological presupposition that the individual is merely material to be perfected fits in nicely with a reliance on terror. "Violent treatment," Walter wrote, "is encouraged by ways of thinking that dehumanize classes of persons or reduce them to objects. Resistance is not acceptable from an instrument. A tool that refuses to carry out the purposes of its owner is defective, and it is either discarded or hammered into shape" (1969, p. 19).

Because of her belief that totalitarianism spells terror, Arendt claimed that "terror is the essence of totalitarian domination" (1973, p. 464). At the same time, she seemingly contradicted herself when she asserted that "the essence of totalitarian government... is to make functionaries and mere cogs in the administrative machinery out of men, and thus to dehumanize them" (1963, p. 289). If an essentialist argument is to hold water there cannot be two "essences" to a single phenomenon. It is essential, therefore, that Arendt's twin claims be reconciled with one another.

To begin this reconciliation one must first step back in order to grasp Arendt's definition of what it is to be human. For Arendt, the human individual is uniquely capable of creating "new beginnings," to give birth to something new (1973, p. 465).¹ In fact, human freedom as well as humanity itself is defined by the ability to create new

¹For an excellent summary and interpretation of Arendt's philosophy see Bernstein (1983, pp. 207-211). Bernstein has argued that Arendt's "central vision" is that "what is most distinctive about human individuals [is] their natality and plurality" (p. 211); for other discussions of Arendt see, for example, King (1984), Pitkin (1972), Ring (1991), and Villa (1992).

beginnings (Arendt, 1953, pp. 390-391). This capacity to create is possible only when the individual acts and is able to act upon his own initiative. "To act, in its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to begin... to set something in motion" (Arendt, 1958, pp. 177). Humanity is "the potentiality of something entirely new and unpredictable" being created by the individual, working, acting, and above all else, speaking within the given limits of a community (1973, p. 465; see also Arendt, 1958, pp. 178-179).¹

But it is precisely the individual's ability to give birth to a new beginning that totalitarianism attempts to eradicate. First, totalitarianism eliminates the possibilities of independent action. Second, once robbed of the ability to initiate action and, thus, forced to live a purely private existence, the individual is also denied the opportunity for speech. Condemned "to live an entirely private life means above all to be deprived of things essential to a truly human life: to be deprived of the reality that comes from being seen and heard by others" (Arendt, 1958, p. 58). Having been already excluded from the public sphere, the individual's isolation is deepened by totalitarian terror's destruction of all arenas of political activity as well.²

¹For Arendt the distinction between speaking and acting is essentially nonexistent. The one implies the other. Man can live, she wrote, without laboring and working, but "a life without speech and without action, on the other hand... is literally dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived among men" (1958, p. 176). To be able to speak, however, the individual needs a space in which action can take place and the community can come together. That space is the polis, i.e. the political arena (Arendt, 1958, pp. 194-195).

²According to Arendt, without a public space in which individuals can meet, speak, and act, there can be no politics. The "political realm," Arendt argued, "rises directly out of acting together, the 'sharing of words and deeds.' Thus action not only has the most intimate relationship to the public part of the world common to us all, but is the one activity which constitutes it" (1958, p. 198). The totalitarian destruction of public space, thus, eliminates political activity as well.

Besides privatizing the individual, totalitarianism forces the individual into reactive patterns of behavior by instilling fear in its citizenry. This is one of the primary purposes of the terror (Walter, 1969, p. 7).¹ According to Arendt, the production of reactive patterns is part and parcel of the ultimate goal of a totalitarian ideology: to transform human nature in light of the revealed truths of Nature and/or History. Only when the individual reacts, instead of spontaneously acting, can he be utilized as an instrument or tool.² Only then with the destruction of human freedom is man suitable material to be molded to conform to the laws of Nature and/or History.³

The institutionalization of totalitarian power is achieved by the political apparatus' coupling of terror with the quest for "unlimited power. Such power can only be secured if literally all men, without exception, are reliably dominated in every aspect of their life" (Arendt,

¹ The absence of physical terror after a long prolonged period of terror does not necessarily mean that the induced fear and anxiety have vanished as well. On the contrary, fear and anxiety persist long after the cessation of the worst abuses of terror. In Poland, for instance, "the memory of the repressive character of the system in the Stalinist era [was] objectivized in social experience" (K. Nowak, 1988, pp. 186-187). The result was a "multilayered structure of fear" (K. Nowak, 1988, p.203). Furthermore, the persistence of that fear and anxiety continues to "stabilize" those who had been subjected to the terror. Into the 1980s, more than thirty years after the end of the terror, Polish attitudes and behavior were still dominated by high levels of anxiety and it is those anxiety ridden "attitudes [which] stabilize the political and economic system" (Marody, 1988, p. 103).

²The metaphor of man as a tool, material to be utilized, is for Arendt an indication of the death of humanity. "The term 'human material,'" she wrote, "is no harmless metaphor." It signals the intent "to kill man, not indeed as a living organism, but qua man" (Arendt, 1958, p. 188).

³Arendt argued that because totalitarianism seeks to realize the end of history, the subject of history, the human individual, is destroyed. If everything is controlled by objective laws of historical or natural causality, the possibility of new beginnings is eradicated. Without being able to begin again, the generation of understanding and meaning through human action is emasculated and, thus, destroyed human existence (1953, pp. 388-390).

1973, p. 456).¹ In order to achieve such overwhelming domination, the political apparatus seeks to have "the most intimate details of [the individual's] life and death depend upon political decisions - that is, upon causes and ulterior motives which have nothing to do with [personal] performance," talents, or desires (Arendt, 1973, p. 409). Quite simply, this means that "totalitarian rule attempts to encompass the whole person, the substance and spontaneity of his existence, including his conscience.... Totalitarian rule cannot as a matter of principle acknowledge the citizen's personal autonomy" (Buchheim, 1968, p. 14) because autonomy contains within it the possibility of new beginnings (Arendt, 1973, p. 456).²

With the destruction of personal autonomy and the possibility of action and speech, the individual is, according to Arendt, rendered reactive and, thus, predictable (1973, p. 339). Institutionally circumscribed into a "world of conditioned reflexes," the individual is little else but a "marionette... without the slightest trace of spontaneity" (1973, p. 457; see also Ebenstein, 1962). Devoid of spontaneity, the individual becomes superfluous since his reactions are not only predictable but "calculable." In other words, the individual has been penetrated and colonized or, as Havel has argued, the individual loses his identity and is reduced to a function or a digit in a "pseudo-scientific" equation:

¹Karl Deutsch, agreeing with Arendt's assertion that totalitarianism dominates the individual in all spheres of life, wrote that "the citizen of a totalitarian state or culture has not time and no possessions that he could truly call his own" (1954, p. 309).

²Buchheim went on to add that the essential point about totalitarianism is its "unique trait... to subjugate daily life and normal human behavior to its claim to power and to put them to its uses (1968, p. 44).

Individuals are reduced to little more than tiny cogs in an enormous mechanism and their significance is limited to their function in this mechanism. Their job, housing accommodation, movements, social and cultural expressions, everything, in short, must be cossetted together as firmly as possible, predetermined, regulated and controlled. Every aberration from the prescribed course of life is treated as error, licence and anarchy (Havel, 1990a, p. 73).

The apparent contradiction in Arendt's essentialist argument is, in fact, no contradiction at all. Totalitarianism is defined by terror as it produces administratively manageable and calculable human cogs. But it is a mistake to assume that her conception of totalitarianism focuses on terror per se. It is not terror, itself, which is the essence of totalitarianism. Rather totalitarianism is defined by the effect of terror: the penetration and colonization of the individual's sense of self or, in Arendt's words, the destruction of the human ability to act and begin anew. For Arendt, totalitarianism without terror would still be totalitarian as long as the aim of the regime were the annihilation of human agency and autonomy in accordance with a professed allegiance to the objective laws of Nature and/or History. The fact of the matter is, however, that at some point the application of terror may be essential in order for a political apparatus to begin to produce a predictable and calculable human being.

To summarize Arendt's analysis of totalitarianism, then, one can say that totalitarianism seeks to eliminate individuality and promote conformity (Arendt, 1973, p. 314). The ideological goal of totalitarianism is the organization of "the infinite plurality and differentiation of human beings as if all humanity were just one individual," thus attempting to reduce "each and every person... to a

never-changing identity of reactions" (Arendt, 1973, p. 438). To achieve its ideological aims, a totalitarian system strives (1) to dominate and terrorize the individual "from within" (Arendt, 1973, p. 325); (2) to destroy the individual's "autonomous existence" (Arendt, 1973, p. 322); and (3) to penetrate, colonize, and annihilate the individual's self (Arendt, 1973, p. 477). Consequently, for Arendt, totalitarianism can be defined as a political apparatus dedicated to the annihilation the individual's sense of self in accordance with unlimited ideological goals.

III

Although Friedrich and Brzezinski and Hannah Arendt began from fundamentally different theoretical perspectives, their analysis of totalitarianism converges. Beginning from a phenomenological perspective, Friedrich and Brzezinski defined totalitarianism as a system of governance in which a political apparatus' monopolistic control of political, economic and social organizations results in the penetration and colonization of the everyday life of the individual. On the other hand, Arendt's essentialist position defined totalitarianism as a political apparatus' dedication to the penetration, colonization, and annihilation the individual's sense of self in accordance with unlimited ideological goals. Combining the two perspectives, totalitarianism is

defined by the penetration and colonization of the everyday life and the sense of self of the individual by a political apparatus.¹

¹It is interesting to note that Bettelheim's definition of totalitarianism, combining his psychological and political insights as well as his personal experiences, is identical to the one developed in this chapter: "The inescapable power of the modern totalitarian system rests exactly on its ability to reach into even the most minute and private life activities of the individual, by means of the mass media and other aspects of modern technological society" (1979, p. 322).

CHAPTER II

The Nature of the Self

Arguing that totalitarianism is defined by a political apparatus' penetration and colonization of the everyday life and the sense of self of the individual requires, first, an operationalization of the terms "the self" and "penetration and colonization" thereof and, second, the generation of empirically testable hypotheses to validate or invalidate the given definition of totalitarianism.¹ Similarly, a discussion of the larger Platonic and Tocquevillean themes cannot be redeemed until those terms are fixed and the definition of totalitarianism validated. The task of this chapter, therefore, is threefold: (1) to make the term "the self" operational; (2) to operationalize the term "penetration and colonization of the self;" and (3) to place those definitions into the context of power in order to generate testable hypotheses.²

I

Neither Sigmund Freud nor his immediate successors wrote much about "the self."³ Freud's use of the term was infrequent at best and

¹According to Stephen Toulmin, "the self" can be conceptualized in one of three non-exclusive ways: (1) as a reflexive prefix or postfix; (2) as an hypothetical entity; and (3) as a psychological diagnostic term (1977). Following Toulmin and for the purposes of this chapter these three theoretical approaches will be conflated.

²Throughout the first two sections of this chapter the existence of an entity called "the self" is presumed. Only in the third section is that assumption called into question.

³For a historiography of early Freudian thought see Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) and Pine (1985).

largely confined to the explication of questions of narcissism, self-esteem, or loss of object love (Freud, 1914; 1915; 1917; see also Gedo and Goldberg, 1973, p. 56). His references were, invariably, tied to the operations or composition of the ego, leaving the reader with the distinct impression that the self was only an aspect of the ego, and a subordinate one at that. Even if one were to follow Heinz Hartmann's claim that before 1923 Freud's use of the term "das Ich" should have been translated as "the self" rather than as "the ego," as has been customary, "the self" is still left largely undefined in Freud's oeuvre (Hartmann, 1964b, p. 287; see also Gedo and Goldberg, 1973, p. 57; Khan, 1974).

Though Hartmann tried to make room in ego psychology for "the self," he remained wedded to his Freudian roots, arguing that the self was only a substructure of the "ego system," the perception of which was only one of the many functions which the ego performed (Hartmann, 1950, pp. 75, 84; see also Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 305; Taehkae, 1988, pp. 105-106). More specifically, Hartmann defined the self "as one's own person" in "contradistinction to the object," (1950, pp. 91, 84), pointing out that the "opposite of object cathexis is not ego cathexis, but cathexis of one's own person, that is self-cathexis" (1950, p. 84). Despite having posited a connection between object- and self-cathexis and, therefore, their representations, Hartmann left open the mechanics of that relationship, not to mention the precise position of the self in the ego system. Consequently, the structure, content, and process of the self remained vague and amorphous

Following Hartmann's lead, three ego psychologists, Edith Jacobson, Joseph Sandler, and Bernard Rosenblatt, began to flesh out the

contours of the self. Though Jacobson claimed that the self refers "to the person as a subject in distinction from the surrounding world of objects" (1964, p. 6, ff2), a statement perfectly in tune with Hartmann's distinction between the individual's experience of the external world of objects and that of his own person or his sense of self, she and her two colleagues moved beyond Hartmann's simplistic schema.

All three theorists recognized that human experience is based upon representations, mental constructions which organize and structure sensations (Sandler and Rosenblatt, 1962, pp. 131-133).¹ The earliest human representations are derived from the child's experience of its body (Sandler and Rosenblatt, 1962, p. 134).² Therefore, the individual's initial sense of self, or to use Daniel Stern's terminology, the core sense of self, pertains to his experience of his own body (Stern, 1985, p. 46).³ As the child develops these body representations come to include "all those aspects of the child's experience and activities which he later feels (consciously and unconsciously) to be his own," his sense of self (Sandler and Rosenblatt, 1962, p. 134; see also Jacobson, 1964, p. 19; see also Schafer, 1968, p. 28).⁴

¹Sandler claimed that we do not know the world as such, as a thing in itself. Rather the world, including our sense of self, is known only as it is represented. The metaphor that Sandler and Rosenblatt used is that the representational world is a "stage set within a theater" (1962, p. 134). Their metaphor comes into full force when examining the "external" cohesion of the sense of self as will be discussed later in this chapter.

²This psychological insight means that the individual's sense of self is inseparable from the body. This is precisely the insight which is at the core of much feminist thought (Pateman, 1988, pp. 206, 231). The individual's sense of self is "inseparable from the sexual [gender and orientation] construction of the self" (Pateman, 1988, p. 207; see also Elshtain, 1987).

³Any fragmentation of the individual's sense of self, therefore, may filter down into fragmented and conflicting body images and experiences.

⁴Leo Spiegel proposed a similar definition of the self: "I believe it more convenient to consider the self-representations as images of the body (and

For Jacobson, the collection of representations which define the individual's sense of self are associated with feelings of identity and self-sameness over and in time, by which she meant, quoting a colleague, that the sense of self has "the capacity to remain the same in the midst of change" (1964, p. 23). This does not mean that the individual's sense of self is forever fixed, but that "as soon as the 'I' experience arises, there may be a feeling awareness of the self as a whole, despite the fluidity and variety of self images" (1964, p. 20. ff. 12). Of crucial importance are the self's qualities of continuity and direction, of flexibility and fluidity amidst change. The self is no longer merely the cathexis of one's own person or body, as it was for Hartmann, but the experience of possessing an identity or, as may be the case, a lack of an identity, over time.

In the writing of Heinz Kohut, psychological theorizing about the self came to fruition with the self becoming the superordinate concept and the ego, if the Freudian structural model were to be maintained at all, being relegated to a secondary phenomenon (Kohut, 1971, p. 120; see Greenberg and Mitchell for a discussion of early and late Kohutian thought, 1983). What is most curious about Kohut's writings on the self, however, is his open refusal to define the self. In fact, Kohut acknowledged that he "never assigns an inflexible meaning to the term self" and never "explains how the essence of the self should be defined" (1977, p. 310).¹ Ultimately, he settled on the claim that the essence of

various body states) and the 'self' as a collective name for the totality of these body images" (1959, pp. 85-86).

¹For Kohut the self is both "a specific structure in the mental apparatus" and "the center of the individual's psychological universe", but he claimed that it is irrelevant to distinguish whether the self is either a structure or a mental content (1977, pp. 310-311). Thus in an early work, Kohut wrote that the self is

the self could not be "differentiated from its manifestations" (1977, p. 311).

Unfortunately, if totalitarianism is to be understood as a political apparatus' penetration and colonization of the self, it is imperative to be able to define and operationalize the term. Such vague generalizations that the self is "the center of personality," or that it is "the center of initiative and recipient of impressions" simply do not suffice (Kohut, 1977, pp. 283, 99). Nor is it sufficient to know that the self has a "bipolar structure," caught between the opposing poles of "grandiosity" and "idealization" (Kohut, 1977, p. 133). If the self is to be the measure by which the psychological effect(s) of totalitarian rule is to be evaluated a more concrete definition is required.

Giving Kohut the benefit of the doubt that the self cannot be differentiated from its manifestations, it may still be possible to derive a definition of the self by reference to its manifestations. The centerpiece of self psychology is the idea of the cohesion and unity of the self. Implicitly agreeing with Jacobson, Kohut argued that the primary features of the healthy self are cohesion, flexibility, continuity, and a certain degree of predictability (Kohut, 1971, 1977). Fred Pine, making essentially the same point, argued that

we generally regard a self experience with a maximal range of *contents* to be preferable psychologically, such that the broad array of a person's thoughts and feelings can be held as 'my own' rather than disowned.... Similarly, we ordinarily regard a broad range of *qualities* of the self experience to be preferable, with generally positive tone, but

"a content of the mental apparatus. While it is thus not an agency of the mind, it is a structure within the mind" (1971, p. xv).

nonetheless with a substantial range of moods and self appraisals, dependent upon inner and external reality conditions (1985, p. 122).

The self, then, can be said to be successfully established when the individual experiences "a sense of the abiding sameness of the self along the time axis" (Kohut, 1977, p. 184; see also Kohut, 1985, pp. 236-237).¹

This sense of sameness, however, needs to be distinguished from external realities. The individual may feel as if he were continuous with himself, but that does not imply that he experiences himself as continuous with the external world. Rather the self is "the actively experiencing and functioning organization of the mind through which the individual is enabled to experience himself as existing and alive, as well as to observe an experientially separate outside world and to interact with it" (Taehkae, 1988, pp. 106-107).²

If the self is to be understood in experiential terms, it becomes preferable to refer to a "sense of self" rather than to a "self" per se.³

¹Though Spiegel was an ego psychologist, his conception of the self fits in nicely with that of self psychology. The self, defined as a totality of body images, is a "constant frame of reference... thus act[ing] as a steadying flywheel to overcome the disturbing continuity of intermittent self-representations" (1959, p. 97). Spiegel's notion of the self as the formation of the "constant frame of reference" or a "pooling function" which averages experiences, foreshadows Stern's conception of the self as "invariant patterns" (1985). Once again, the self maintains a self-sameness over and in time despite differing experiences and varying circumstances.

²The distinction between the self and an object is one in which the "object world refers to the phenomena experienced as 'not-me,' separated from the self. The external ('real') objects are experienced as existing outsided the self, whereas the so-called object representations are experientially located inside it" (Taehkae, 1988, p. 107).

³The substitution of "a sense of self" for "the self" is meant to reinforce the notion that the term refers to a "important subjective reality" that serves as the individual's "primary subjective perspective that organizes social experience" rather than an a priori psychic structure (Stern, 1985, pp. 6, 11). Masur Khan made a similar argument. Since "no one can communicate directly from his self or can be related to directly in his self" and since the self "is as much created by its symbols, as it is represented and expressed by them," Khan argued that it is preferable to underline the experiential nature of the

The point is that the self, as Kohut noted, cannot be defined and fixed once and for all simply because it refers to a range and a degree of self-sameness over time. In other words, the individual has a sense of continuity or discontinuity, of flexibility or rigidity, of cohesion or fragmentation, and it is that sense which comes to define the self. The criteria by which one can assert that the sense of self is coherent and cohesive, and thus the yardstick by which the totalitarian penetration and colonization of the individual's sense of self can be measured, is when the individual feels as if his actions, feelings, and experiences are "familiar, 'owned,' stemming from an 'I' that does or feels or thinks rather than an 'it' that happens to me" (Pine, 1985, p. 121).

None of this implies that the experiences of continuity or discontinuity are necessarily and always conscious.¹ As Stern has pointed out, even though it may be true that "no one can agree on exactly what the self is, as adults we still have a very real sense of self that permeates daily social experience.... Most of these senses of self reside out of awareness, like breathing, but they can be brought to and held in consciousness" (1985, pp. 5-6). Thus the sense of self is both a conscious and unconscious phenomenon. Therefore, the self can best be defined as "a mental content rather than a psychic structure, that is, a content having to do with people's theories about themselves, including

self and minimize its potential metaphysical connotations by referring to it as a sense of self rather than an entity in itself and for itself (1974, p. 294).

¹Even political philosophy is moving to an acceptance of incorporating a notion of the unconscious into theories of action (see, for example, Giddens, 1979; Smith, 1988). Building on the work of Nietzsche, it may be that the unconscious is constructed by linguistic machinations, but that does not undermine its importance or existence (see Foucault, 1980a, 1980b; Lacan, 1975, 1988; Nietzsche, 1967).

their fantasies, both conscious and unconscious about self-integration and self-disruption" (Bach, 1985, p. 12).¹

II

Having defined the self in terms of an individual's conscious and unconscious feelings of continuity, self-sameness, and cohesion, the more pervasive an individual's experiences of discontinuity and disruption are the less that individual will perceive his sense of self as being whole. The less cohesive an individual experiences his sense of self to be, the less that individual feels as if his experiences were his own, familiar, and stemming from his "I." Lastly, the more disrupted and discontinuous his sense of self, the more that individual feels as if his actions were happening to "him," instead of his being the instigator and initiator of action.

The penetration, colonization, and, thus, fragmentation of the individual's sense of self, therefore, are questions of degree and intensity and can be measured by the individual's expressions of

¹Emphasizing the experience of continuity and discontinuity of the defining feature of the sense of self fits in nicely with the philosophical requirements of autonomy and self-knowledge needed in a definition of the self as laid out by Toulmin (1977). As Toulmin has argued, "even at this most sophisticated level, the character of any particular agent's 'self' - whether it is cohesive or fragmented, whether it has clear or confused boundaries, whether it is vertically split, etc., etc. - remains an experiential matter, to be understood from the point of view of the agent himself; and, in this sense of the term, what the agent's 'self' is like depends on how he sees himself (his self-perception), how he judges his own capacities and propensities (his self-understanding), how he orders his goal and intentions, and how far he controls his actions (his self-command)" (1977, p. 317).

disruption and discontinuity. Since totalitarianism has been defined as a political apparatus' penetration and colonization of the individual's everyday and his sense of self, it is imperative to make operational what is meant by "fragmentation of an individual's sense of self" or "loss of a cohesive sense of self."¹ Without operationalizing the terms it will be impossible either to measure empirically the psychological effect(s) of totalitarianism or to redeem the Platonic and Tocquevillean conception of power.

The Freuds and Deutsch

Beginning with Sigmund Freud, psychoanalytic theory has primarily focused its explication of fragmentation on the individual's experience of a hostile, unresponsive, and aggressive external world. Given his drive theory, Freud initially phrased the question as one in which there is "a conflict between the demand by the instinct and the prohibition of reality" with emphasis being placed on the force of libidinal urges and the subsequent repression of those urges (1938b, p. 275). Later on, Freud modified his analysis, turning his attention to the effect of the external world on the individual.

Distinguishing a split ego from the more common neuroses, Freud described the "split ego" as being one in which "two attitudes persist

¹These two terms will be used as synonyms throughout this study. In strict clinical terms, a fragmentation of an individual's sense of self implies that the individual is "coming apart" or has already "fallen apart" and that he is no longer able to function adequately or appropriately in his everyday life. For the purposes of this study, fragmentation does not have these psychological and clinical connotations. Rather it means that the individual feels as if he has lost a "part of himself" and that his sense of self is no longer experienced as cohesive and continuous. For this study, a fragmented sense of self does not necessarily imply a loss of functional ability.

side by side throughout [the life of the individual] without influencing each other" (1938a, p. 203). This fragmentation is not, as in the earlier paper, based upon repression. Rather it is a "disavowing" of reality coupled with an accurate perception of reality. These two attitudes are "contrary to each other and independent of each other" and, unlike the neuroses, both of these attitudes exist simultaneously within the psyche (1938a, p. 204).

Phrased somewhat differently, Freud was tentatively suggesting that the cleavage is a vertical split rather than a horizontal fragmentation.¹ Anna Freud has described the distinction between a horizontal and a vertical split as one between "repression and denial" (1966, p. 101). A horizontal split involves the ego "defending itself against its own inner processes" while a vertical one corresponds to the ego's reaction "against external stimuli" (1966, p. 101; see also p. 109).

Anna Freud theorized that a vertical split originates in the individual's perception of "objective anxiety or unpleasure," by which she meant that the individual perceives the environment to be and experiences it as inherently dangerous (1966, p. 102). More specifically, she defined objective anxiety as "the anticipation of suffering which may be inflicted on the [individual] as a punishment by outside agents, a kind of 'forepain' which governs the ego's behavior, no matter whether the expected punishment always takes place or not" (p.

¹Because the cleavage in "split ego" is vertical rather than horizontal, Freud's discussion of the "split ego" can be distinguished from O. Rank's analysis of the double. For O. Rank, the creation of a double or phantom ego is caused by "the secret, always suppressed wishes of [the] soul" and the detachment and then projection of unacceptable "instincts and desires" onto that double (1971, p. 76).

143, emphasis added).¹ Because of "objective anxiety," the individual abandons those activities which he believes might incur the wrath of "outside agents," thus restricting his sense of self, losing flexibility and adaptability and becoming passive and apathetic. Whether the individual would have been or, in the past, actually had been punished by "outside agents" is largely immaterial. What is important is that the individual experiences objective anxiety, believing that he has committed a transgression or would be committing a punishable transgression if he were to continue in his actions.

Helene Deutsch with her description of the "as if" personality furthered the analysis of a fragmented sense of self, even though she explicitly rejected the notion of an "as if" personality having a split ego. Deutsch described an "as if" personality as an individual who is unable to be emotionally invested in his surrounding environment because the environment has failed him in some important way (Deutsch, 1965, pp. 276-277).² The contrary and mutually independent attitudes mentioned by Sigmund Freud and attributed to a vertical split are acted out by the "as if" personality in his everyday behaviors. Exhibiting his conflicts in daily life, the "as if" personality disavows reality not in word or thought, but in deed (Deutsch, 1965, p. 278).

¹At an extreme, the individual is "threatened by annihilation" anxiety because of a sense of deprivation experienced by an unresponsive environment. In other words, the individual may believe that his very existence is threatened with extinction.

²According to Hartmann the environment fails the individual because the environment continually frustrates and disappoints the individual. Experiencing the external world as hostile, the individual is unable to resist its impositions and, thus, cannot form stable object relations (1964a, pp. 183-204; see also Jacobson, 1964, p. 68).

The result is that the individual acts "as if" he were involved in meaningful and active relationships while, in fact, all relationships are devoid "of any trace of warmth, ... all the expressions of emotion are formal, [and] ... all inner experience is completely excluded" (Deutsch, 1965, p. 264). In other words, the "as if" person lives in a "simulated" world. Life becomes an empty series of imitations in which the individual picks "up signals from the outer world and [molds] oneself and one's behavior accordingly" (Deutsch, 1965, p. 265). No matter how passive, inconsistent, and automatic the actions of the "as if" individual appear to be, that individual comes to believe that such a life is perfectly normal.¹ Much like an actor, the "as if" individual is capable of both "the greatest fidelity and the basest perfidy," depending upon the role which he has temporarily assumed (Deutsch, 1965, p. 265).² Thus, even though Deutsch argued against the notion of the "as if" personality having a "split ego" her description leads one to conclude that a fragmentation of the individual's sense of self has, in fact occurred because the "as if" personality does not act in life, but reacts, allowing life to happen to him rather than being the initiator of activity.

Applying the Freuds' and Deutsch's respective theories to the study of totalitarianism, one would conclude that if totalitarianism fragments the individual's sense of self, the result would be a passive and apathetic citizenry, believing their lives are not under their control.

¹Deutsch suggested that the passivity, in fact, is only a masking of the individual's aggressive tendencies.

²Cleckley's analysis of psychopathology records similar characteristics (1964). Cleckley argued that even though the psychopath acts reasonably, he is unable to experience the meaning of his actions and thus does not experience affect (pp. 410, 432). The "fragmentation of the personality" of the psychopath is subtle, curtailing "function without obliterating form" (p. 433).

These individuals may claim that they live perfectly normal lives, but there will be indications that their lives are, in fact, affectless and sterile. In addition, one would expect to find a citizenry which reacts to perceived threats without the totalitarian political apparatus' need necessarily to make good those threats. Anticipating the possible future repercussions, the individual subjected to totalitarian rule foregoes activities he believes are frowned upon by the political apparatus absent any actual demand by the political apparatus. Lastly, the totalitarian-dominated citizen's everyday behaviors may be contradictory, the result of conflicts being acted out rather than repressed. A vertical fragmentation would imply the existence of contradictory attitudes within the individual's sense of self, i.e., "the dissociation of incompatible self- and object representations, identifications, repression and isolation of ideas and affects, and the disruption of logical and temporal sequence" (Blum, 1985, p. 320).

Winnicott, Khan, and Kohut

Though the Freuds and Deutsch may have laid out the basic tenants and mechanisms by which a loss of a cohesive sense of self occurs, it was not until D.W. Winnicott and the subsequent work of Kohut that the notion of a cohesive or fragmented sense of self took center stage.¹ For both Winnicott and Kohut, the most important

¹Though both Winnicott's and Kohut's theories were meant to explain child development, the crux of their work focuses on how the environment "affects" on the individual. There is no reason to assume that the environment cannot affect the adult as well as the child, causing an interruption in the continuity of being. This may be especially true given that totalitarianism renders the adult perpetually dependent, depriving him of the experience of relative independence and autonomy. Furthermore, in the DDR and Czechoslovakia, children were being born for more than forty years into an already existing

psychological relationship was between the individual and the outside world. Winnicott claimed that only when the individual is relatively independent and autonomous is he able to feel a "continuity of being" and "a going-on-being" (Winnicott, 1965, pp. 47, 86). In other words, only then does the individual feel as if he exists within time, exhibiting a coherent and continuous sense of self.

Kohut, on the other hand, stressed the individual's relative dependence on the external world rather than his relative independence. For Kohut, the "continuity, this indefinable sameness, identity, unalterableness" of the individual's sense of self exists over time only if the external world responds empathetically to the individual's needs, desires, and feelings (Kohut, 1985, pp. 237-238). Phrased differently, the individual's sense of self "depends for the maintenance of its cohesion on the near-perfect empathic responses" of its immediate environment (Kohut, 1977, p. 91).

For both theorists the loss of cohesive sense of self occurs due to the individual's experience of a hostile external world. Winnicott argued that fragmentation follows the individual's experience of external impingements which disturb the "continuity of being." Consequently, a "false self" arises in contradistinction to a "true self," resulting "in a feeling unreal or a sense of futility" (Winnicott, 1965, pp.

totalitarian state. From birth on they were subjected to an impinging and unempathetic environment. Though their parents may have been able to experience relative independence before the imposition of totalitarianism, these children were never awarded that hypothetical opportunity. Consequently, both Winnicott's and Kohut's theories, in particular, and child development theory, in general, may be applicable to the study of totalitarianism.

52, 148).¹ If the disruptions are severe and persistent enough, "a pattern of fragmentation of being" will set in and the individual may be unable "to continue to have a self with a past, present and future" (Winnicott, 1965, pp. 60, 86). Rather than being able to "live with" his surrounding environment, reliably anticipate what may occur next, and, therefore, be able to create his world as he is being shaped by it, the individual feels as if he had been hit by a "clap of thunder" (Winnicott, 1965, p. 141). "Instead of a series of individual experiences, there is a series of reactions to impingement" with "each reaction being an interruption of the... 'going-on-being' and a rupture of the... self" (1958, p. 211; 1965, p. 97). More gently, Masur Khan argued that the individual's "sense of wholeness of his self... can get dislocated or hidden or can even fail to personalize, if... environmental care is too maladaptive" (Khan, 1974, p. 304).

Kohut's emphasis, in contrast, centered on the external world's lack of empathy. Since the cohesion of the individual's sense of self depends upon the external world's empathy, any experienced disruption of empathy threatens that cohesion. Empathy failures, Kohut noted, are inevitable and unavoidable and if "appropriate" do not fragment the individual's sense of self (Kohut, 1977, p. 115, fn. 7). But, as in Winnicott and echoing Anna Freud's notion of objective anxiety, if

¹ Though Winnicott used the terms "true" and "false" and had a tendency to write as if the "true self" were a pure and unadulterated crystallization of the individual's actual, real personality, as Khan has noted, there is no need to reify the true self and assign it a metaphysical status (1974, p. 303). The "true self" is not true in any idyllic or absolute universal sense nor is the "false self" false according to Nature. Rather the terms refer to the individual's emotional experience of their sense of self. When acting in harmony with his "true self," the individual feels alive, real, integrated, me (Winnicott, 1965, p. 148, 184).

those failures are experienced as being sufficiently severe and aggressive, "disintegration anxiety" will build up due to "the anticipation of the breakup of the self" (Kohut, 1977, p. 104). If the environment is persistently unempathetic, the individual's cohesive sense of self will fragment.

Paralleling Anna Freud's discussion of objective anxiety, it is the individual's subjective experience of a maladaptive environment, rather than the actual impingements or empathetic failures, which is crucial to an understanding of both Winnicott's and Kohut's notion of fragmentation or loss of cohesion. Loss of cohesion occurs when the individual experiences an external attack upon his sense of self, be it recorded as an impingement or empathetic failure. Perceived environmental hostility and aggression as they are colored by prejudice, fantasy, and other unconscious motivations are of much greater import than actual events. This is not to say that actual events are of no importance. Instead the argument recognizes, first, that individuals react differently to the same circumstances, depending, in part, upon their differing psychological vulnerabilities, and, second, that the events themselves carry less weight than the subjective experiences of those events.

Furthermore, it is important to note that the experience of impingement or empathetic failure need not necessarily be coterminous with the historical moment which may trigger it. In addition, external impingements are rarely single occurrences or experienced as sharp, excruciatingly painful, and vivid. The outside observer may not be able notice their occurrence and the affected individual may not be capable of putting the experience into words. External impingements are

frequently quiet and slight, barely noticed at that moment in time, for as observed by Khan, trauma occurs not only "cumulatively and in retrospect" but "silently and invisibly" as well (1974, p. 47; see also Kohut, 1971, pp. 79-80).

Trauma is, most often, the strain and "effect of long-lasting situations," triggered by the "accumulation of frustrating tensions" rather than a single tremendous explosion (Kris, 1956). Winnicott's "clap of thunder" or Kohut's empathetic failures may be the sustained erosion due to the experience of a steady drizzle or a maddening but persistent drip. The experience evolves into a "rhythm of a pattern," which the individual believes he has "no means of eliminating" (Khan, 1974, p. 60). However the trauma may be experienced, the result is the same: "disruption of true ego-integration" or, phrased more psychoanalytically "multiple dissociations [which] take place intrapsychically (Khan, 1974, pp. 52, 63).¹

¹Despite the dissimilarities in the genesis of cumulative trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder, there are decided parallels between the two fields of research. In both cases the individual confronts a situation in which he "feels helpless because mastery of the event is not possible" (Vyner, 1988, p. 113; Furst, 1967). In both cases psychological structure is modified in an effort to integrate (however unsuccessfully) past, present, and future images of the sense of self because "awareness of the self becomes extraordinarily painful" once the individual has been exposed to trauma, be it cumulative or post-traumatic (Horowitz, 1976; Spiegel, 1990, p. 134). Both syndromes may involve "emotional numbing [and] ideational avoidance" (Vyner, 1988, p. 113). As Karkiner has written, after trauma the individual's sense of self is fragmented because "some portion of the integrated ego is either destroyed or inhibited... [Consequently] the subjects feel deserted and obliged to face a world that must annihilate him because he no longer has any defense against it" (Kardiner, 1941, p. 95; see also Kolb, 1989). Phrased differently, the sense of self is fragmented because suspension of a cohesive sense of self may offer the individual relief from the pain of trauma (Hilgard, 1970; Spiegel, 1986). "This defense trades awareness of immediate physical helplessness during trauma for a subsequent sense of psychological helplessness" (Spiegel, 1990, p. 135). The result may include denial and psychic numbing, self-hypnosis and dissociation, and alternations between extreme passivity and outbursts of rage (Terr, 1991, pp. 10-20; see also Herman, 1992). What is of most important to

While echoing the earlier psychoanalytic descriptions of a fragmented sense of self, Winnicott and Kohut were more specific in noting the consequences. If the external world's impingements were experienced as sufficiently severe and aggressive, the individual may experience annihilation anxiety (Winnicott, 1965, pp. 47, 256). The individual may believe that his very existence is threatened. This is not to say that the individual will fear imminent physical death. Rather, the experience is one in which the individual believes that his sense of self is threatened with extinction. This is not a question of a disruption and/or discontinuity resulting in a loss of cohesion or fragmentation of the individual's sense of self, but the individual's belief and/or fantasy that his sense of self can be eradicated or has already been eradicated.

According to Winnicott, a less severe dysfunction is when the individual develops "a caretaker self" due to the experience of external attack (Winnicott, 1965, p. 58). Winnicott claimed that this type of "organization of an aspect of the personality... is false" (Winnicott, 1965, p. 58), by which he meant that the individual experiences a part of his self as being as if it were false to his sense of who he is.¹ According to

remember for both cumulative trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder is that the "the subjective experience of a traumatic event varies from person to person and from one event to another" (Wilson, 1989, p. 5). Furthermore, it is noted that the individual's reaction to trauma, be it cumulative or not, is dependent on, at least, three different variables: (1) the traumatic event itself; (2) the cognitive and psychological vulnerabilities and capabilities of the individual; and (3) the post-traumatic event environment (Green et al., 1985).

¹It is precisely for this reason that this study consistently uses the term "sense of self" (see Khan, 1974, p. 294). Because the sense of self is defined by the conscious and unconscious experiences of disruption and continuity, this study's definition avoids the metaphysical trap of assuming the *a priori* existence of "a self." It may be that there is no such entity as a self qua self (Rorty, 1987, p. 56). It may be that the self is only a linguistic construction, but such an assertion says nothing about the fact that virtually everyone in the

Winnicott, "the false self" serves the important function of protecting "the true self," shielding it from the external world's hostility, permitting the "true self" to live a secret and silent life (Winnicott, 1965, pp. 142, 150).¹ At other moments, when the "false" or "caretaker" sense of self predominates the individual experiences life as unreal, empty, bad, and "not-me." Futility, passivity, helplessness, compliance, and despair are often associated with such moments (Winnicott, 1965, pp. 133, 147).

Much in line with Winnicott's notion of the "true" and "false" selves, Kohut's analysis of the dissolution of the individual's sense of self postulates both the release of aggressive desires and an induced passivity coupled with the sensation that one is no longer in control of one's own life. At the same time, the individual may feel dead and depressed while, simultaneously wanting to eradicate the offending reality. As Kohut noted, fragmentation produces "mixtures of wholesale withdrawal and unforgiving rage" and "severe forms of despondency and helpless rage" (1971, pp. 65, 90).² Because of the disruption and discontinuity in his sense of self, the individual may want "to wipe out

Western world believes or acts as if he or she believes that they possess a self (Lukes, 1985, pp. 298-300).

¹Though Winnicott did not acknowledge the phenomenon, the "false self's" protection of the "true self" presupposes an already existing fragmentation of the individual's sense of self. Because of the pre-existing fragmentation it is incorrect for Winnicott to argue, as he did, that the "polite and mannered social attitude" is part and parcel of a false self (1965, p. 143). It is not necessarily true that "proper" social etiquette must be experienced as a disruption of the individual's "continuity of being."

²Specific indicators of fragmentation may include work inhibitions, lack of sexual interest, pathological lying, "inability to form and maintain significant relationships, lack of empathy for others, and hypochondriacal complaints (Kohut, 1971, p. 23).

the offending, disappointing reality" and "to do away with himself" (Kohut, 1971, pp. 181, 231).

Once again, as in the work of Deutsch, the question arises as to the individual's recognition and awareness of the fragmentation of his sense of self. Though Deutsch indicated that the person may not give voice to feelings of helplessness and emptiness, Winnicott, Khan, and Kohut suggest that such expressions are one of the tools with which the existence of a fragmented sense of self can be uncovered. Such expressions need not necessarily mean that the individual is consciously aware of the loss of cohesion. In fact, Khan wrote that the person is not able to "relate from one part to the other. Only someone other than them can see it, recognize it and put them in the know of it" (1974, p. 249).

Furthermore, and paralleling Deutsch's discussion of the "as if" personality's acting out, both Khan and Kohut noted that unconscious conflicts are not the telltale sign of fragmentation. Rather the "dissociated states are enacted in life" (Khan, 1974, p. 249). The loss of of a cohesive sense of self causes "the side-by-side existence of disparate personality attitudes in depth; i.e., the side-by-side existence of cohesive personality attitudes with different goal structures, different pleasure aims, different moral and aesthetic values" (Kohut, 1971, p. 183). The actions of the everyday, then, become the battleground of the fragments of the individual's sense of self. The cleavage is not horizontal with repression being the psychological tool of choice. Rather, as already noted, the fault line is vertical, separating the sense of self into two or more relatively independent entities. Much like Freud's mutually contradictory and independent attitudes, "the

antagonism [between fragments of the sense of self] results from the incompatibility entailed in the fruition of each" (Khan, 1974, p. 249).

Applying Winnicott's, Khan's, and Kohut's respective theories to the study of totalitarianism suggests, first and foremost, that the individual subjected to totalitarian rule may not be aware of the fragmentation of his sense of self even though he may express feelings of lack of control over his body, affect, and actions; helplessness; inability to form significant emotional relationships; withdrawal; rage; emptiness; futility; etc. As Khan argued, only an outside observer may be able to interpret the individual's expressions for what they are: signs of fragmentation. Indicators of more severe forms of loss of cohesion would center on annihilation anxiety, the belief that one is threatened with extinction, and the turning of one's rage against oneself. Typical of such expressions would be fears of being eaten, pervasive death imagery, and fantasies of self-mutilation. Lastly, as already indicated, individuals subjected to the penetration and colonization of a totalitarian political apparatus may act out their fragmentation in their everyday life, believing they are living perfectly normal lives, even though they have split themselves into two separate selves whose values, beliefs, and activities are inherently contradictory.

In conclusion it seems safe to say then that a fragmented sense of self is produced by the individual's subjective experience of a hostile, aggressive, and/or unempathetic external world. The breakup of an individual's sense of self occurs slowly over time, silently and invisibly, because of an individual's continuous experience of strain and the steady accumulation of perceived injury inflicted upon the individual by his surrounding environment. Because loss of cohesion is a

subjective experience, the degree or intensity of fragmentation, or even its occurrence, will differ depending upon the individual even if the circumstances are the same. What is important to remember, however, is that the fragmentation of an individual's sense of self is a process of cumulative trauma.

III

Despite the importance psychology places on the external world in an analysis of a fragmented sense of self, neither psychology's understanding of the sense of self nor its conception of a fragmented sense of self adequately reconciles the subjective experience of the sense of self with political phenomena. Though Erik Erikson used the term identity rather than the self, his understanding of identity centered on the individual's experience of continuity and discontinuity and, thus, can be the vehicle by which psychological and political phenomena can be reconciled and the stage can be set for the later discussion of power (1980, pp. 21-23).

One of the highlights of Erikson's theory is the effort he made broadening psychology to include more explicitly political questions. The centerpiece of his effort was his integration of "psycho-sexual" and "psycho-social" development (1980, p. 23). "The term 'identity,'" he wrote, "expresses ... a mutual relation in that it connotes both a persistent sameness within oneself (selfsameness) and a persistent sharing of some kind of essential character with others" (Erikson, 1980, p. 109). Recognizing that the individual is both unique and a member of

a particular historical community, both driven by internal psychological forces and molded by the meanings of the community into which he is born, Erikson consistently argued that the establishment of a coherent and cohesive sense of identity required the merging of these two elements. "What could consequently be called the self-identity emerges from all those experiences in which a sense of temporary self-diffusion was successfully contained by a renewed and ever more realistic self-definition and social recognition" (1980, p. 161).

Erikson's insight is important for, at least, two reasons. First, even though the sense of self is defined psychologically by an experience of continuity or discontinuity over time, the sense of self's historicity has not been adequately acknowledged or fleshed out. Second, the psychological definition of the sense of self is decidedly individualistic, ignoring the implications of the individual's having been born into a particular community and the consequences that may have for the construction of that individual's sense of self.

Both of these arguments need to be addressed in order later to redeem the Platonic and Tocquevillean conception of power. The need to confront these issues is only compounded by contemporary political philosophy's almost obsessive preoccupation with the concept of the self (Alford, 1991, p. 1).¹ The roots of this preoccupation have been well

¹For three recent and disparate explorations of the self in political philosophy see Norton (1988), Taylor (1989), and Warren (1992, 1993). Though an analysis of the self is the central question of each of these three works, none of these explorations provides an adequate definition of the self. To argue that the self is an assemblage of discourses or a "multiplicity," as each of these three authors does, makes, in fact, no claim about the nature of the self. A definition of the self in terms of specified or unspecified discourses or "multiplicities" is equivalent, for instance, to defining baseball as a game which is played with a bat and ball. Though baseball is unquestionably a game played with a bat and ball - as the sense of self is defined by its discourses - the definition fails to

watered. At the turn of the century Emile Durkheim had already noted that the self had become "the object of a sort of religion" (1933, p. 172; see also pp. 194, 226). The following generation, both Karl Mannheim and Hannah Arendt argued that "an exclusive concern with the self" is the defining characteristic of the "modern" world (Arendt, 1958, pp. 254; Mannheim, 1936, p. 14). More recently, Tracy Strong has claimed that the very idea of the self has come under attack in the twentieth century, thus initiating a crisis in contemporary political philosophy (1990).¹ The result is that in political philosophy today the self is, at one and the same time, a means to evaluate contemporary phenomena, an arid construct, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing, and "a tune

distinguish baseball from either cricket or jai alai and provides virtually no clues as to the unique characteristics of the game.

¹The idea of the self has come under attack for three separate but related reasons: (1) the concept of the self is a metaphysical notion and that no such entity exists (Nietzsche, 1967; Lacan, 1975, 1988; Rorty, 1987); (2) the idea of the self is a product of structures of discipline and surveillance (Foucault, 1973, 1979, 1980a); and (3) the idea of the self represents an ideal which is impossible to attain given the contemporary socio-economic condition and its colonization of the self (Horkheimer, 1990; Lukes, 1987; Marcuse, 1970). The result of these critiques as well as the wide range of intellectual approaches to the discussion of the self has left political philosophers adrift in their handling of the self as was evidenced at the 1992 Political Science Association's Annual Meeting. Although James Glass, for instance, argued passionately and persuasively for a cohesive and wholist conception of the self in contradistinction to a self composed of multiple selves, he, nevertheless, failed to provide a definition of the self and, in the course of his paper, referred to four distinct selves - (1) core self, (2) democratic self, (3) civil self, and (4) psychotic self - without indicating how these selves may or may not relate one to another: or what type of distinct entities they may be (1992; see also Glass, 1993a, 1993b). In another paper, Emily Gill presented a critique of Michael Sandel's conception of the self. She, too, never provided a definition of what she meant by "the self," except for noting that the self is, first and foremost, a body (1992). Both Glass and Alford have pointed out that much of the debate ignores the blood and guts nature of the self, preferring a discussion of philosophical abstractions and "beautiful ideals" to the messiness of desire and "affective and emotional conflict" (Alford, 1991, p. 173; Glass, 1992, p. 7, see also Glass, 1993b, pp. 25-26, 157).

we whistle in dark times to pretend that individual experience is more orderly than it is" (Walkup, 1987, p. 3).¹

As argued previously, the sense of self is the individual's subjective experience of integration and disintegration over time or, phrased differently, in history. The individual's sense of self and, therefore, experiences of integration and disintegration, have a past, present, and future (Dilthey, 1961, pp. 99-105). Phrased philosophically, the sense of self's historicity implies that it "is constituted by a tale" or "narrative" (Benhabib, 1986, p. 349; MacIntyre, 1981).² As Charles Taylor has written, "in order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a notion of how we have become, and where we are going" (1989, p. 47; see also Habermas, 1987, p. 98).

If the individual's narrative, his past actions and feelings, is not experienced as being continuous with present actions and feelings, the individual may experience the loss of a cohesive sense of self. If current actions and feelings are themselves contradictory, the individual may experience a fragmentation of his sense of self as well.

¹Alford, despite recognizing the disemboweled nature of political philosophy's rendering of the self, calls for further theorizing about the nature of the self, arguing for "the importance of putting the self at the center of our studies" as "a moral act" (1991, pp. 176-181). Fortunately, Alford accepts his own challenge and defines the self as "a provisional partial unity created out of the imaginative integration of the events of one's life, events that may be categorized in terms of ambitions, talents, ideals, and so forth" (p. 188), a definition which nicely dovetails with the one presented in this chapter.

²Depending upon one's philosophical allegiance, this insight can be attributed to either Nietzsche (1983) or Heidegger (1962). Hannah Arendt, being a student of both, figuratively and, in the case of Heidegger, literally, summarized the argument when she wrote "though disclosing itself intangibly in act and speech, [the individual's sense of self] becomes tangible only in the story of the actor's and speaker's life; but as such it can be known, that is, grasped as a palpable entity only after it has come to its end" (1958, p. 193). The general point is not only that the individual's sense of self is historical, but that it is continually open to revision and reinterpretation.

Third, if the individual cannot become who he would like to be he may feel thwarted and, thus, experience the loss of cohesion. In this case, the individual experiences a disruption between his past and present sense of self and what he anticipates, contrary to his desires, his future sense of self will be. Furthermore, the loss of cohesion may also occur when the individual is unable to imagine what he would like to become and is, thus, unable to project himself into the future. The experience of having no future because the future has, for some reason, been cut off may also result in the disruption of the individual's sense of self. In other words, if the individual's dreams and hopes are thwarted, if the individual anticipates that his dreams and hopes will be thwarted in the future, and/or if the individual is unable to imagine a future his sense of self may fragment.

The individual's inability to realize his ambitions need not necessarily result in a fragmentation of his sense of self. The individual may recognize that he does not have the requisite skills to become, for instance, a concert pianist or astro-physicist. That recognition may cause the individual to reevaluate what he wants to become in order to reconcile and regain a continuity with his past and present sense of self. Due to this constant process of revision, the individual's narrative "is never complete: the past is always reformulated and renarrated in the light of the present and in anticipation of a future" (Benhabib, 1986, p. 349).¹ The loss of cohesion occurs only when the entire package, i.e. the past, present, and future, does not cohere.

¹Despite Arendt's assertion to the contrary, even after death, the narrative may be incomplete, for the story can always be reinterpreted by whomever is telling the tale (Arendt, 1958, p. 192). During the individual's life, he may be

An understanding of the historical continuity or disruption of the individual's sense of self is crucial for the study of totalitarianism because, as previously noted, cumulative trauma is only recognizable after the fact. Cumulative trauma which occurred at time A will only become evident at time A+1. It is only with hindsight that the present can be understood for what it is. If totalitarianism fragmented the captive individual's sense of self it is only after the cumulative trauma has occurred that it can be attributed.

The historical nature of the sense of self applies not only to cumulative trauma, but to the entire concept of the sense of self. An individual's sense of self is a cognitive and emotional construction which continually integrates - or does not integrate - current actions with its previous incarnations. Returning to the metaphor of the narrative, George Herbert Mead argued that the sense of self is a continual dialogue of continuity or discontinuity between the "I" who acts and will act in the future and the "me" who existed prior to that particular action (1962, p. 174). Mead's distinction is the familiar recognition that the sense of self is both the subject and object of action.¹ The temporal ordering of this relationship is important because the sense of self as the subject of action - the "I" who acts - can only be known after the

the actor as well as the storyteller, but after death it is the storyteller who reigns unchallenged.

¹The subject-object dichotomy, however, is not a necessary phenomena. Stephen Toulmin, perhaps picking up on an argument made in passing by Nietzsche (1954, p. 483; 1966, pp. 23-29), has argued that the subject-object dichotomy, into which an analysis of the sense of self so easily slips, may be a function of the grammatical structure of contemporary Western languages (1977, pp. 295-300). According to Toulmin, ancient Greek had a middle voice which, "acknowledging reflexive activity, attitudes etc. as a distinct species of conduct," sidestepped an automatic and necessary subject-object dichotomy (1977, p. 300).

completion of that action and after the "I" who has acted has been reconciled with the "me" which existed prior to that action. It is this temporal ordering of the sense of self as both the subject and the object of action which accounts for such everyday expressions as: "I was not myself when I did that;" "I am feeling out of sorts;" or "I was really into what I was doing." Therefore, "if you ask, then, where directly in your own experience the 'I' comes in, the answer is that it comes in as a historical figure" (Mead, 1962, p. 174).

In other words, in order to evaluate an individual's sense of self - to analyze an individual's narration of his own story - one is condemned to hindsight, always peering into the past from the present and its anticipated future (Dilthey, 1961, p. 106). The present perpetually distorts or, at the very least, clouds what once was the individual's sense of self.¹ This is not to say that there was a previous sense of self which has been obscured by current occurrences. The sense of self is not a psychic structure existing once and for all times, a fixed Archimedian point from which all future and past actions can be evaluated and measured. Nor is it an entity or object which can be labeled and classified and, if destroyed, rebuilt, much like a bridge, according to an earlier blueprint or model. The individual's sense of self is the perspective, both conscious and unconscious, the individual

¹Conversely, the past molds the present and future. Dilthey said this quite well when he wrote, "from the present we run through a series of memories back to the point where our small malleable and unformed self is lost in the twilight and penetrate forward from the present to the possibilities which are grounded in it but at the same time assume vague and vast dimensions" (1961, p. 103). He continued his argument, claiming that "our conception of the meaning of a life is constantly changing.... The purpose we set for the future conditions how we determine the meaning of the past. The actual pattern of life is judged in terms of the meaning we give to what we remember" (1961, p. 106).

adopts towards himself, concerning his own cohesiveness or lack thereof. That perspective changes and must change according to the current situations in which the individual finds himself. The absence of change would indicate a certain degree of inflexibility, inevitably disrupting that individual's cohesive sense of self. Too much change in one's current sense of self with respect to one's previous historical perspectives could lead to the same result, i.e. fragmentation. The issue, therefore, is the perspective the individual adopts to himself, present, past and future, and whether his sense of self exhibits flexibility and continuity over time.

For the study of totalitarianism's psychological effect(s) on the individual and the redemption of the Platonic and Tocquevillean conception of power this recognition is crucial. The presumption derived from Friedrich and Brzezinski and Hannah Arendt is that totalitarianism fragmented the individual's sense of self. Empirical data was gathered only after the collapse of the totalitarian dictatorships in the DDR and Czechoslovakia because reliable contemporaneous data would have been impossible to collect. Through the filter of a post-totalitarian present and despite the fact that the interviewees' lives have undergone extensive changes since the overthrow of the Soviet-communist regimes of the DDR and Czechoslovakia, the interviewees were asked about feelings and experiences which occurred two, seven, twenty, and thirty years in the past.

It could be argued that the current situation in the former DDR and Czechoslovakia distorts recollections about the past. Since such distortion is an inevitable and natural aspect of the construction of an individual's sense of self, the truth claim of the argument is banal and

meaningless. More seriously, however, is the possibility that the current historical context may be the cause of whatever fragmentation will be found. Simply put, the interviewees' past and the present may no longer cohere and they may falsely attribute their experience of a fragmented sense of self to the imprecations of the totalitarianism past while the "real" cause of their loss of cohesion may be rooted in their present circumstances. It was precisely to avoid this methodological error of false attribution that respondents were drawn from three separate groups: (1) professionals, (2) political and/or religious dissidents, and (3) "ideologically" committed communists. As will be explicitly argued below, it is hypothesized that the latter two of these groups did not experience a fragmented sense of self under totalitarianism.¹ If the data indicates that these two disparate groups did not experience a fragmented sense of self, the current post-totalitarian context could not be the cause of the fragmentation of the third group, i.e. professionals, since all three groups face the same disruption of the past by the present.

So far the Erikson critique of the psychological conception of the sense of self has emphasized the historicity of an individual's sense of self as a narrative process of interpretation and reinterpretation (see also Bruner, 1987; Schafer, 1981). The second half of the Erikson critique shifts its ground to look at how the story of the individual's sense of self is told, focusing on the "external" coherence of the tale, whereas up to now only the "internal" coherence had been examined.

¹For the reasons why it is hypothesized that dissidents and "idealistically" committed communists did not experience a fragmented sense of self see the discussion later in this chapter on "external" coherence as well as the chapter entitled, "Witnesses to the Effect of Totalitarianism."

Echoing Erikson original formulation, the individual's sense of self must be "in tune" with the sense of self "others in the culture form of themselves and with the versions that others form of him" (Polonoff, 1987, p. 50).

Until recently, there were two predominant tales philosophy told about the sense of self. The sense of self was defined in terms of either a knowing agent, cogitating in splendid isolation, or a productive one, appropriating the world in which it lived (Sklar, 1991, p. 105; Benhabib, 1986, p. 242). Neither tale necessarily requires the existence of other selves or postulates a necessary relationship between selves. What had been lost in both of these renditions was the Platonic and Aristotelian conception of the human being as speaking animal, one whose words presuppose his membership in a community.¹ Paraphrasing Hans-Georg Gadamer, language is not a human possession or capability. Rather language as it belongs to a community not only makes humans human, but presents humans with the world in which they live (Gadamer, 1988, p. 401; see also Arendt, pp. 176-177).² Political philosophy's hermeneutical or linguistic move is significant for three different but connected, and now rather commonplace, reasons: (1) the individual's sense of self depends upon on that of others; (2) the disclosure of the

¹It is recognized that not all human experience can be reduced to language or can be spoken about. Some spiritual, bodily, affective, and unconscious experiences are "beyond" language. As Warren noted, "the point is not a Romantic one but rather a recognition of the manifest inadequacy of language to inner experience. It is to recognize that inner experience, though it may not be formulated in discourse, anchors part of the self" (1993, p. 232; see also Moon, 1991, pp. 216-222). Nevertheless, language establishes who humans are, for even these "inner experiences" need to be "translated," however poorly, into language in order for them to become intelligible.

²This philosophical stance accounts for Bruner's claim that "there is no such thing psychologically as 'life itself.'" Instead there is only a "recounting" of one's life as "an interpretive feat" (1987, p. 13).

individual's sense of self to himself also discloses it to others; (3) the act of disclosure itself constructs the individual's sense of self.¹

Though the claim that an individual's sense of self is dependent upon that of others is a rather trite assertion today, it was not so obvious, for instance, to Descartes or Hobbes. The triviality of the assertion, however, rests upon the linguistic nature of the sense of self. Borrowing Arendt's terminology, Nature's sheer physicality is mute and devoid of meaning. In and of itself the human body, for example, is an inert mass, a bodily existence, but not much else. It is distinct, but not distinctive (Arendt, 1958, p. 176). Nature's physicality gains meaning, becoming distinctive, only because it becomes a common space of human interaction through an initiation into language (Taylor, 1989, p. 35). The narrative, which constitutes the individual's sense of self, can only be told once the common space of the community, the World, has been established by and in language.² The individual becomes an "I am," a distinctive agent, only in relation to that common space, by telling his story to others or, as Benhabib has argued, only "in acting and speaking [can and do] we show who we are and our difference from others" (Benhabib, 1986, p. 244).³ Individuality is dependent upon the irredeemable difference between individuals, a difference which requires a pre-existing common space and language.

¹The sense of self as a narrative disclosed and constructed in the telling of its own story corresponds to Erving Goffman's sociological analysis of the self as (1) self as performer; (2) self as audience; and (3) self as that which is performed (1957).

²In Seyla Benhabib's terms, "human action is linguistically mediated, both for the actor and for others, who formulate their intentions and the definitions of what they do in linguistic terms" (1986, p. 243).

³Echoing Arendt's metaphor of "the 'web' of human relationships," Taylor argued, that "a self exists only within... 'webs of interlocution'" (1989, p. 36).

It is not merely that the individual acquires a sense of self due to the presence of others.¹ The individual's telling the tale of his sense of self discloses that sense of self to both the "I," who is speaking, and the other, who is listening (Harre, 1987).² But this simultaneous disclosure is intelligible to both partners only if the individual's story finds a home within the mores of his listeners, i.e. if it belongs to the common space of that community. In other words, the individual's sense of self must have particular characteristics, belonging to a particular time and space, in order for it to be intelligible to those who listen. Each community may have only a limited number of possible stories the individual can tell about his sense of self. Certain stories make no sense or are nonsense (Mannheim, 1936).³

The home in which any particular individual's sense of self may be located need not necessarily be found in his community's current history. An individual's continuity with his community may hark back to his community's past and the historical traditions which current events have superseded. Similarly an individual's integration with his

¹In psychological terms the "telling of the tale" to others need not necessarily mean the continual physical presence of another person. Rather what is required is that the presence of an other can be evoked in memory (Stern, 1985, pp. 110-119). Even for infants who have yet to master language, "subjective experiences," Stern argued, "are largely social, regardless of whether we are alone, even (perhaps especially) during the first half-year of life. The infant engages with real external partners some of the time and with evoked companions almost all the time. Development requires a constant, usually silent dialogue between the two" (1985, p. 118).

²This double disclosure defines the "talking cure" which is psychoanalysis.

³Karl Mannheim argued that the individual "speaks the language of his group; he thinks in the manner in which his group thinks. He finds at his disposal only certain words and their meanings. These not only determine to a large extent the avenues of approach to the surrounding world, but they also show at the same time from which angle and in which context of activity objects have hitherto been perceptible and accessible to the group or the individual" (Mannheim, 1936, p. 3).

community may look toward his community's future strivings, ideals and values yet to be realized, but those whose beginnings have already been enunciated. Just as the individual's sense of self is a personal (internal) history of integration and disintegration, the individual's sense of self is also an expression of an external "continuity in time" or the lack thereof with respect to the goals, roles, expectations, and meanings of the wider community in which he lives.

The necessity of an external coherence between the individual's sense of self and that of the community is more than just a "continuity in time." Mirroring the "internal" dialogue of continuity and discontinuity between the "I" and the "me," the individual's external conversation is a back and a forth of integration and disintegration between the desires of the individual and the roles and expectations of the group (Mead, 1934, p. 186; Habermas, 1987, p. 99).¹ The individual's sense of self coheres externally only when the individual's desires, talents, dreams mesh with the possibilities offered him by the community across various roles.

Depending upon the community those boundaries may be more or less rigid, providing more or less flexibility and leeway for continuity and discontinuity.² Some discrepancies between role expectation and subjective desire may be more important than others. Those

¹In Freudian terms, this distinction can be assimilated to the tensions between the id and the superego. In sociological terms, the categories would be the individual's subjective standpoint the and "objective" realities or between subjective desires and role requirements. The possible discrepancy between the individual's subjective desires and role requirements accounts for the sociological emphasis on the individual's integration into the social system (see, for example, Parsons, 1951, pp. 234-235).

²This is the sociological Pandora Box, the classical debate between the spontaneity of agency and the limitations of structure.

discrepancies that are less fundamental may be resolved by the individual being able either to modify the role expectations or to revise his sense of self in line with what is demanded of him without sacrificing his cohesive sense of self. This sacrifice is evidence of loyalty to an organization or government and, modifying Hirschman's exit, voice, loyalty schema, can be represented in the study of totalitarianism in the DDR and Czechoslovakia by "ideologically" committed communists (1970, 1993).¹ Thus, the first hypothesis is that "ideologically" committed communists maintained a cohesive sense of self.

Other individuals may experience cleavages between role expectation and subjective desire and/or between the conflicting demands of different roles or life spheres which resist reconciliation.² If there is a significant lack of external coherence between the individual's "subjectivity" - his sense of self - and the roles and expectations hoisted onto him by the community or between the competing requirements of various life spheres the result may be either exit from the community or voice/dissent within the community (Hirschman, 1970, 1993). Exit "is an act of simply leaving" and is

¹According to Hirschman, organizations naturally "evoke a specific degree of loyalty among its members" (1993, p. 197). Under totalitarianism that loyalty is best expressed by those who were ideologically committed to communism rather than those who joined their respective communist party in order to advance their careers or for other opportunistic reasons (Hirschman, 1993, p. 197). For other uses of Hirschman's schema as a means to categorize East German politics and the revolution of 1989 see Brubaker (1990) and Pollack (1990a, 1990b). For other uses of Hirschman's schema see Azarya (1988) and Scott (1986).

²The lack of continuity between life spheres could be expressed, for instance, by a disjuncture between one's work and one's private life, between public activities and private ones, and/or between competing gender roles across life spheres. The compartmentalization of life spheres which could result in the loss of a cohesive sense of self is virtually endless. The question is how the individual experiences that compartmentalization.

"essentially a *private* and also typically a silent decision and activity" (Hirschman, 1993, pp. 175, 194, italics in the original). It can be expressed both physically and/or psychologically. Given the practical difficulties that accompanied emigrating from the DDR and Czechoslovakia, exit, for purposes of the study of totalitarianism, was first and foremost a psychological leavetaking or fragmentation of the individual's sense of self. Coupling Friedrich and Brzezinski and Hannah Arendt's analysis of totalitarianism with Hirschman's understanding of exit, it is hypothesized that those individuals who were not "ideologically" committed communists nor expressed "voice/dissident" experienced a fragmentation of their sense of self.

Voice/dissent, on the other hand, "is the act of complaining or of organizing to complain or protest, with the intent of achieving directly" an alteration of the existing situation or improving the performance of an organization (Hirschman, 1993, p. 176). Voice/dissent is an inherently "public activity" of opposition, expressed through political, religious, and/or cultural means, and usually entails the establishment of an alternative subgroup within the larger community (Hirschman, 1993, p. 194). Contrary to the presuppositions of both postmodernism (Cixous, 1974; Deleuze and Guattari, 1977) and Harold Lasswell (1977), because the individual stands up for himself against the dictates of the general environment and refuses to be made silent and speechless, it is presumed that the resisting individual is able to maintain a cohesive sense of self.¹ Consequently, the third hypothesis is that religious

¹In his writings Primo Levi wrote that resistance and survival in the concentration camp required "a truly solid moral armature" (1989, p. 68). The argument boils down to the claim that commitment to a spiritual or metaphysical belief system offered the individual a means to defend his sense of self against the

and/or political dissidents in the DDR and Czechoslovakia, were able to maintain a cohesive sense of self.¹

The requirements of external coherence are more stringent than may first strike the eye. As already indicated, the individual's sense of self depends upon the prior existence of a common space and language. That common language predates the individual and it is within that arena that the individual is socialized and learns the inherently limited number of words and stories with which he is to interpret and reinterpret his sense of self. By telling his story the individual reproduces the conditions by which he was able to tell the story of his sense of self in the first place.² The common space and language not only permit the individual to disclose his sense of self in the telling of it, but construct that sense of self as well (Benhabib, 1986, p. 335; Habermas, 1987, p. 99). Language not only socializes the individual to be able to live within a community, but shapes the content of the

attacks and impingements perpetuated by a total institution (for a discussion of concentration camps and totalitarianism as types of total institutions, see chapter entitled "Total Institutions: Slavery and Concentration Camps"). Levi argued,

not only during the crucial moments of selection or the aerial bombings but also in the grind of the everyday life, the believers lived better.... It was completely unimportant what their religious or political faith might be. Catholic or Reformed priests, rabbis of the various orthodoxies, militant Zionists, naive or sophisticated Marxists, and Jehova Witnesses - all held in common the saving force of their faith. Their universe was vaster than ours, more extended in space and time, above all comprehensible: they had a key and a point of language, a millennial tomorrow so that there might be a sense of sacrificing themselves, a place in heaven or on earth where justice and compassion had won, or would win in a perhaps remote but certain future (1989, p. 146)

¹Which of these three paths - loyalty, exit, voice/dissent - an individual takes, and in what proportions, is largely, if not entirely, dependent upon the individual's psychological vulnerabilities and propensities.

²Anthony Giddens has argued that these conditions are not entirely discursive, but involve "the accumulation of practical [both conscious, preconscious, and unconscious] knowledge of the conventions drawn upon in the production of reproduction of social interaction" (1979, pp. 129-130).

narrative by which the individual comes to experience his sense of self.¹ The individual's conscious and unconscious feelings of continuity, self-sameness, and cohesion are those provided to him by the language into which he is born.² Ultimately, "the culturally shaped cognitive and linguistic processes that guide the self-telling of life narratives achieve the power to structure perceptual experience, to organize memory, to segment and purpose-build the very 'events' of a life" (Bruner, 1987, p. 15).

Among the limited number of stories available with which the individual may be able to tell the tale of his sense of self may be stories which themselves do not cohere. One of the stories which makes sense under totalitarianism may be a narrative of a fragmented sense of self. Rephrased, the individual living under a totalitarian regime may be socialized into believing that a fragmented sense of self is not only acceptable in terms of the roles and expectations of the community, but perfectly normal. Totalitarian power, then, resides not merely in its capability actively to fragment the individual's sense of self, but in its ability radically to narrow the possible stories the individual has at his disposal to tell. The individual's sense of self may lose its cohesion because under totalitarianism the individual no longer possesses the words with which to experience his sense of self as coherent. Plato's conception of power indelibly marking the individual's psyche would then be translated into totalitarianism's having shaped the cognitive

¹The argument need not necessarily be a linguist one; it can be behavioral as well. According to Willard Day, "people have only that knowledge of their own behavior which the verbal community has enabled them to have" (1977, p. 231).

²For an exploration how different cultures produce very different senses of self see Kakar (1990) and Roland (1988).

and linguistic processes that guide the individual's telling of his narrative in such a way as to prohibit the possibility of most individuals being able to structure their perceptions, memories, and experiences as to generate a cohesive sense of self.

CHAPTER III

Total Institutions: Slavery and Concentration Camps

Totalitarianism, defined as a political apparatus' penetration and colonization of the individual's everyday life and the sense of self, is a total institution. As a total institution, totalitarianism shares certain characteristics with other types of total institutions, one being the effect(s) of the total institution on the individual. To place totalitarianism's effect(s) on the individual in an appropriate theoretical and empirical context and tease out the relationship between totalitarian power and the loss of a cohesive sense of self it is useful to examine how other total institutions have affected the individual. Two total institutions have been chosen: American slavery and German concentration camps. To flesh out theoretical issues pertaining to resistance, hegemony, role theory, a protean sense of self, and fragmentation, the examination of American slavery will focus on Stanley Elkins' controversial study, Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life. To address more empirical concerns, the material from German concentration camps will concentrate on the psychological reactions of both the prisoners and the German SS doctors who helped administer the camps.

I

According to Erving Goffman, a "total institution" is defined as a political system whose inhabitants are cut off from most, if not all, outside influences for extended periods of time and are forced to lead an enclosed and administered life (1961, 1969). Claiming that "the handling of many human needs by the bureaucratic organization of whole blocks of people... can be taken... as the key fact of total institutions," Goffman noted that total institutions are characterized by a "basic split between a large class of individuals who live in and who have restricted contact with the world outside the walls... and the small class that supervised them" (1969, pp. 314-315).¹ The split between "inmates" and "staff" indicates that "the central relationship [of total institutions] is not guidance or periodic checking... but rather surveillance" in conditions in which the total institution "take[s] over 'responsibility' for the inmate and must guarantee to have everything that is defined as essential 'laid on'" (1969, pp. 315-316). Echoing Goffman, Robert Jay Lifton defined the prerequisites of a total institution as including control over communication, mystical manipulation in the name of a higher authority, the sacredness of "science," a faith in an ideology over and above the value of individual

¹It should be acknowledged that Goffman's conception of a total institution was limited to prisons, mental hospitals, concentration camps, merchant ships, military organizations, religious orders, etc. Goffman does not recognize the possibility that one may be born into a total institution, which would have to be the case if totalitarianism were to be considered a type of total institution. It is precisely for this reason that the two total institutions chosen were American slavery and German concentration camps, the former being an example, over the years, of individuals being born into a total institution and the latter, of individuals being involuntarily thrust into one.

life, and the ability of those in charge to decide the life or death of any particular individual (1961).¹

Furthermore, when an individual is subjected to the dictates of a total institution, his "permanent and semi-permanent personal relationships are determined primarily by the demands, rules, and objectives of the organization" (Blassingame, 1972, p. 189). Goffman argued that "in a total institution... minute segments of a person's... activity may be subjected to regulations and judgements by staff; the inmate's life is penetrated by constant sanctioning interaction from above," which may result in the individual's loss of "self-determination" (1961, pp. 38, 44). Consequently, a total institution is capable of penetrating and altering an individual's sense of self² (1961, p. xiii).

It is quite evident that the total institution distinction between inmates and staff is applicable to totalitarian, slave, and concentration camp societies, especially as it is one of the main functions of the total institution's staff to manage, control, and maintain a relatively constant surveillance on its inmates, whether they are citizens (totalitarianism in the DDR and Czechoslovakia), slaves (American slavery), or prisoners (German concentration camps). When it is assumed that the staff of a total institution monopolizes the means of communication to the outside world, the similarities among these three political systems become all the more obvious. The staff's reliance on "scientific" knowledge, whether it is racial (American slavery and German concentration camps) or historical (totalitarianism in the DDR and Czechoslovakia), as

¹Goffman also includes "control of communication" as an element of a total institution (1961, p. 8).

²Goffman's term for the process by which a total institution penetrates the individual's sense of self was "mortification of the self" (1961, p. 14).

the justification for their supervision of the inmates makes the comparison all the more telling.¹ Lastly, a total institution's staff deprives "the inmate from knowledge of the decisions taken regarding his fate," consigning the individual to be a tool suitable for manipulation without regard for individual desires which was an everyday reality under totalitarianism, American slavery, and German concentration camps (Goffman, 1961, p. 9).²

It cannot be doubted, therefore, that totalitarianism, American slavery, and German concentration camps all qualify as types "total institutions." This is not to claim that totalitarianism can or ought to be compared to the genocide of German concentrations camps. The extreme horror of the concentration camp was unique and such a direct comparison would be insulting to the memory of the victims of German barbarity. Nor is it to say that the experience of the black slave during

¹It is interesting to note the convergence between Goffman's and Lifton's definitions of a total institution and the concept of totalitarianism as developed by Friedrich and Brzezinski and Hannah Arendt. While totalitarianism seeks to eradicate the autonomous activity of the individual until he is but "a planned, mechanical continuity of functions" devoid of responsibility, a total institution deprives the individual of responsibility in the name of "a single over-all rational plan" (Buchheim, 1968, p. 15; Goffman, 1969, p. 314).

²For a brilliant analysis of slavery world-wide, see Patterson (1982). There can be little question that slavery, whether in the United States or in other countries, qualifies as a "total institution." As Orlando Patterson wrote, "'natal alienation'... goes directly to the heart of what is critical in the slave's forced alienation, the loss of ties of birth in both ascending and descending generations. It also has the important nuance of a loss of native status, of deracination. It was this alienation of the slave from all formal, legally enforceable ties of 'blood,' and from any attachment to groups or localities other than those chosen for him by the master, that gave the relation of slavery its peculiar value to the master. The slave was the ultimate human tool, as imprintable and as disposable as the master wished" (1982, p. 7, emphasis added). Thus, according to Patterson, the slave was "socially dead" with the slave's experience springing "from that raw, human sense of debasement inherent in having no being except as an expression of another's being" (1982, p. 78).

American slavery was identical to that of concentration camp victims.¹ Nevertheless, despite the notable differences of degree between and among these three political systems, all are examples of "total institutions" and as such they may prove useful in determining the psychological effect of totalitarianism on the individual (Blassingame, 1972, p. 226).

II

One of the central questions of Stanley Elkins' study of American slavery was "whether living within such a 'closed system' might not have produced noticeable effects upon the slave's very personality" (1959, p. 82).² In answering his own question in the affirmative, Elkins claimed that American slavery "infantilized" the slave in ways in which other forms of slavery, Latin American slavery, for instance, did not.³

¹See the work of Blassingame (1972), Caulfield (1970), Genovese (1971), Lewis, (1971), and Thorpe (1970) delineating the ways in which the concentration camp differed from American slavery. Most of these authors, however, make the error of assuming that a "closed" or "total" institution must be absolutely closed in order for it to qualify as a "total institution" (see Lewis, 1971, p. 78). According to these critics, any "elbow room" immediately disqualifies a political system from being a "total institution." This error is similar to the one made by critics of the totalitarian schema. They, too, have repeatedly argued that for totalitarianism to be totalitarian it must be a thoroughly successful monolithic entity rather than one which is inherently incomplete and in which power is monopolistically controlled. Any all or nothing argument not only lacks subtly, but robs the analyst of the ability to make meaningful comparisons.

²Though Elkins raised this question referring only to American slaves, the question is more than applicable to all slaves and slave societies. In fact, Eugene Genovese has argued that Elkins' findings ought to be generalized to include all slave societies (1971, p.43-74).

³Both Patterson and Genovese have pointed out that this sense of infantilization appears in other slave societies as well, invariably leading to

According to Elkins, the production of a "recognizable [American slave] personality type" was due to the slave's "adjustment to [the] absolute power" wielded by white owners within the "closed system" which had been forced upon the slave (1959, pp. 87-88).¹ The crux of Elkins' argument is that "the sanctions of [white] authority... were effective and pervasive enough to require that such infantilism be characterized as something much more basic than mere 'accommodation'" (1959, p. 86).²

Debunking the racist claim that the slave's infantilized behavior was part and parcel of "his nature," Elkins outlined the mechanisms by which the American slave was systematically and brutally detached from his historical past and cultural roots. The separation of the slave

descriptions of slave behavior as lazy, cowardly, irresponsible, passive, indifferent, and dull (1982, pp. 85, 87, 338; see also Genovese, 1971).

¹Elkins' findings are controversial (see, Lane, 1971; McCarthy and Yancey, 1971). Patterson, for instance, has criticized any attempt to psychologize the slaves' sense of self based upon evidence derived from their public behavior patterns (1982). Patterson claimed that what was real about slaves' psychology was "the slave's own feeling of being dishonored and degraded" (1982, pp. 96, 81). He then argued that "there is absolutely no evidence from the long and dismal annals of slavery to suggest that any group of slaves ever internalized the conception of degradation held by their masters" (1982, p. 97). Patterson's apparent contradiction can only be resolved if he meant that the conception of degradation held by the slave master was different than that held by the slave, a highly conjectural assumption at best.

Another critic of Elkins has argued that the perception of American slave infantilization served "the unconscious needs of the white population" (Caulfield, 1970, p. 186; see also Thorpe, 1970). Though this may be some truth to this claim, it does not explain the entire range of infantilized behavior, for "any historian who denies that Sambo, *often feigned*, but sometimes genuine, was *one side* of the bondsman's personality is probably guilty of being unrealistic" (Thorpe, 1970, p. 165, ff. 15; Caulfield, 1970).

²Without doubt, Elkins overstated the slave owner's power over the slave. His argument, however, does not rise or fall upon the "absoluteness" of that domination. Nor is necessary to argue that there was a single universal slave personality or that slaves were perpetually condemned to infantilism in all spheres of their lives, without recourse to various forms of resistance, for Elkins' argument to hold water (for a discussion of slave resistance, see Genovese, 1971, p. 72; Bryce-Laporte, 1971). There were distinct individual differences between and among slaves, depending in part on the personal characteristics and vulnerabilities of the individual slave as well as the slave's position in the plantation or slave establishment (see Blassingame, 1972).

from his past was reinforced by the slave's being legally defined as the property of his master. A piece of property has no personal characteristics or interests which are intrinsically its own. Instead property is a tool or instrument to be utilized and disposed of according to the whim of the owner. The family life of a slave could and often was disrupted or disbanded by the white owner for economic or purely personal reasons, having nothing to do with the wishes of the slave family itself. There was no private sphere into which the slave could seek refuge nor any part of his everyday life which was not susceptible to invasion.¹

According to Elkins, it was the perpetuation and operation of this closed system which produced the particular personality type: slave infantilism. "Absolute power for [the white owner] meant absolute dependency for the slave - the dependency not of the developing child but of the perpetual child" (Elkins, 1959, p. 130).² The slave's "psychic security," according to Elkins, demanded that "childlike conformity," for to behave otherwise would have been essentially, though not in each and every instance, irrational and self-defeating (1959, p. 130).

One problem to which Elkins continually returned was whether the slaves' infantilization was "internalized as a part of their very

¹It is important to point that susceptibility to penetration does not necessarily mean actual invasion. Despite the suppression of autonomous slave groups, such organizations did exist. For an analysis of slave religion see Genovese (1974) and Raboteau (1980). For a discussion of slave culture and how slavery was a "culture-building era" see Caulfield (1970).

²Because of the existence of the previously mentioned "independent slave communit[ies], the possibility that the owner would remain the only significant other [as Elkins had argued] vanished" (Lewis, 1971, p. 78). It is important to note, once again, that, as in totalitarianism, the attempted suppression of alternative "social bases" does not necessarily imply that that suppression was successful. "Absolute power" can never be absolute.

selves," thus constituting a character transformation (1959, p. 123), or was a strategically assumed role suggesting an implicit resistance to slavery, which may or may not have concerned the sense of self of the involved individual.¹ If infantilization had been a strategically assumed role, it would qualify as a type of resistance to domination. James Scott, writing about various forms of resistance to domination, has argued that "the greater the force majeure compelling the performance, the less the subordinate considers it representative of his 'true self' and the more it seems merely a manipulative tactic having little or no bearing on his self-conception" (1990, p.110).² The question asked by Elkins and the challenge posed by Scott raises the issue whether or not the slave's sense of self was experienced as cohesive or fragmented and whether or not the slave's infantile behavior was strategic or not, suggesting a complicated scheme of resistance to slavery. With respect to political philosophy the question can be rephrased in terms of the relationship between power and hegemony and the extent to which resistance is possible and what types of resistance are tolerated. In sociology the issue concerns the relationship between the roles an individual adopts

¹A corollary problem is whether the apparent infantilization was, in fact, a form of resistance to power, following a Jamaican slave saying: "Play fool, to catch wise" (Patterson, 1982, p. 338; see also Blassingame, 1972; Bryce-Laporte, 1971; Dollard, 1937).

²For social psychological research supporting Scott's claim see Brehm and Brehm (1981). For social psychological research contradicting Scott's argument see Gergen (1971, 1977). According to Gergen, "if the social environment continues to define a given individual in a specified manner, we may reasonably anticipate that, without countervailing information, the individual will come to accept the publicly provided definition as his own" (1977, p. 145). The hole in Gergen's claim is the caveat "without countervailing information." Even in total institutions there will be "countervailing information." Though an experimenter may be able to devise an hermetically sealed research situation absent outside interference, human society cannot.

and the integration or cohesion of his sense of self and, in psychology, the distinction is between conceptualizing the sense of self as a series of parallel selves or as a fragmented sense of self.¹

The concept of hegemony first gained prominence through the work of Antonio Gramsci (1971).² Since then the term has come to refer to the "naturalization of power" or, more simply, to "non-violent forms of control exercised through the whole range of dominant cultural institutions and social practices" (Mitchell, 1990, p. 553; see also Bourdieu, 1977; Giddens, 1979; Willis, 1977). Hegemony refers not only to a society's "dominant symbolic framework" or its "common sense," but also to the "institutionalization" of practices which reflect that dominant symbolic framework (Laitin, 1986, p. 183; see also Geertz, 1973). With respect to the American slave, infantilization would be evidence of the hegemonic power of the slave owner to penetrate and colonize the slave's sense of self, especially if infantilization represented a "character transformation." Translated into totalitarian terms, a fragmented sense of self indicates the hegemonic power of the totalitarian political apparatus.

If, on the other hand, the infantile behavior had been a strategic choice, the slave owner would not have exercised, possessed, and/or embodied hegemonic power.³ First, the slave's ability to make a strategic choice implies the existence of independent slave beliefs and

¹The psychological concept of parallel selves mirrors the "post-modernist" definition of the sense of self being a series of multiple, and often unrelated, discourses. Just as each parallel sense of self corresponds to a particular activity, each discourse represents a different sense of self.

²For discussions of Gramsci and his use of hegemony see Adamson (1980) and Femia (1981).

³Slave narratives often indicate that the American slave was quite conscious of his or her public play-acting (Osofsky, 1969).

values, a symbolic framework separate from those imposed by the slave master. Second, the assumption of strategic choice also suggests that the slave was able to resist the penetration and colonization of his sense of self and that his sense of self remained largely unaffected by his feigned childlike behaviors.¹ The fact that the slave's sense of self remained untainted by the behaviors to which the slave's body was subjected indicates the absence of hegemonic power (Abercrombie et al., 1980; Scott, 1990). Once again, translated into the study of totalitarianism, a fragmented sense of self may have been a strategic choice on the part of the individual, indicating his resistance to the dictates of the political apparatus.

There are two problems with this anti-hegemonic argument, both of which have to do with the binding of hegemonic power into individual's sense of self. In a fascinating study of the Peruvian working class, Susan Stokes detailed how hegemony can and does function. Her analysis indicates that, although resistance is always an available alternative, most individuals in subservient groups often do adopt the ideological perspectives of their ruling elites. The adoption of the hegemonic values is, however, unconscious and becomes part and parcel of the individual's sense of self. Hegemony does not necessarily operate consciously or discursively, Stokes argued, but rather "relations of authority and subservience that appear inevitable and right may by their very nature remain unquestioned and un-talked-about and the norms and rules of behavior that support them only tacitly understood" (1991, p. 285; see also Willis, 1977). In other words, the stories the

¹Resistance includes the slave's conscious accommodation to slavery in the sense that the slave was "saving" himself in order to fight another day.

individual tells about his sense of self and the world in which he lives are limited by hegemonic power's determination of what is judged to be common sense. The slave's infantile behavior, therefore, becomes bound into the slave's sense of self.

The second critique pertains to the apparent rupture between the individual's supposed "true" sense of self and his beliefs and values, on the one side, and his body and practices, on the other. As previously argued, an individual's experience of his body is the original wellspring of his sense of self. If the behaviors practiced by the body are divorced from the individual's beliefs, values, and reputed "true" sense of self, it is highly unlikely that that individual's sense of cohesion will be unaffected. Rather that individual will, most likely, experience a fragmented sense of self and it is that loss of cohesion which testifies to hegemonic power. Even if the slave's infantile behavior were a strategic choice implying resistance, the consequence of that performance was, to borrow Elkins' terminology, a "transformation of the slave's character," i.e. the slave's loss of a cohesive sense of self.¹

Infantile behavior, however, may not have been a strategic choice suggesting resistance. The rupture between the individual's beliefs and the practices performed by that individual, which is implicit in the assumption that infantilism was a strategic choice, may have been "precisely the effect introduced [by hegemonic power] and it is through this elusive yet powerful effect that... systems of domination are maintained" (Mitchell, 1990, p. 561). In other words, the apparent separation between meaning (beliefs and the presumed "true" sense of

¹How that fragmentation was then experienced is yet another question.

self) and physical reality (practices and the body) is evidence of hegemonic power because it is that separation which provides the individual with the illusion that he is exercising "strategic choice" and engaging in resistance when, in fact, he is not. Rather than offering resistance, the slave's infantilism reinforced the slave owner's power. Because the slave believed that his actions did not affect him or represent his "true" self, he continued to perform the activities required of him by the dominant elite. The illusion of resistance was a tool in the arsenal of hegemonic power.

Rephrased, hegemonic power socializes the individual by shaping his cognitive and linguistic processes in such a way so that he tells a story about his sense of self in which meaning and physical reality exist in two separate, distinct, and unrelated realms. The other-worldly realm of meaning functioned as a sanctuary for the slave's beliefs and depository for his "true" sense of self without altering the balance of power to which the slave was subjected in his everyday life.¹ Rather than offering resistance, the slave escaped into metaphysics and the safety of other-worldly redemption. The slave's "strategic choice," therefore, is merely further evidence of the slave master's hegemonic power, for what the slave succeeded in accomplishing was his fragmenting of his own sense of self. Summing up, Scott's theory of strategic choice cannot explain the mechanisms of hegemonic power and, thus, is analytically unable to understand the relationship between power, resistance, and the loss of a cohesive sense of self.

¹For a discussion of the political ramifications of an escape into other-worldly metaphysics see Nietzsche (1967) and Weber (1946, pp. 267-301, 323-359).

Similar arguments come into play with respect to sociology's distinction between role theory and an integrated sense of self and the psychological differentiation between a sense of parallel selves and a fragmented sense of self. Role theory assumes that in a given context individuals will behave in similar ways (Biddle, 1979, p. 58). A sufficiently refined role theory will be able to explain most, if not all, human behavior and that, depending upon the given role, "the individual [will] confirm virtually any concept of the self at any time (Gergen, 1977).¹ According to role theory, a cohesive sense of self is a contradiction in terms, for each and every role will produce its own unique sense of self. To speak of the slave's infantile behavior being "internalized," as Elkins' does, is, according to role theory, nonsense as is any notion of strategic behavior. Role theory would argue that the slave behaved as he did because of the requirements of the role in which he found himself, i.e. slave, father, mother, child, religious leader, etc.

Translated into psychological terms, since each role or activity produces its own sense of self, the result is a series of parallel selves or, to use Lifton's metaphor, a "protean" sense of self (1970, 1976).² Rather than experiencing all his differing activities as belonging to himself as each is part of a continuous sense of self, the protean individual experiences each of his activities as producing a different sense of self;

¹Even Goffman's weaker version of role theory, in which the individual is given some "elbow room" in his performance of a role, "implies a social determinism" (Goffman, 1969, p. 41)

²The equivalent concept in "post-modernist" theory is that each activity corresponds to its own discourse or that the self is a "multiplicity." Each discourse is different and there is no necessary connection between discourses, for each is essentially untranslatable into the language of another discourse. Consequently, there is no "connectedness" or continuity between discourses.

there is no self-sameness across activities. Rephrased, and as lauded by postmodernist theory, role theory presupposes that the individual possesses multiple selves. Like the Greek mythological figure after whom he is named, the protean individual changes his sense of self with ease and can experience continuity only when "seized and chained" (Lifton, 1970, p. 319).¹ Applying Lifton's analysis to Elkins' description of the American slave means that the slave's sense of self was not infantilized, but an infantilized sense of self may have been just one of a number of parallel selves, any one of which may have been able to offer resistance to slavery.

Difficulties abound with both arguments. To begin with, role theory cannot adequately explain differences in human behavior, why, for instance, one teacher is condescending and arrogant in his exercise of intellectual authority while another is generous and tolerant. Furthermore, role theory has no persuasive means of understanding the emotive aspect of a performance (Mischel, 1977, p. 24). Nor can role theory comprehend an individual's experience of self-sameness across roles (Glass, 1993b). Any attempt to allow for individuation or affect necessitates reference to the individual's unique sense of self, to the experience of continuity and discontinuity, or to a metaphysical realm

¹There is an inherent contradiction to Lifton's analysis which reduces his argument to incoherence, which also appears in the work of other postmodernists (Harding, 1986, p. 247). Though Lifton argued that the protean individual can only experience self-sameness when chained down, he also claimed that there exists a "commonly held and enduring emotional-symbolic substrate" grounded in the "mother-child relationship" (1970, p. 77). The protean individual's denial of self-sameness is, therefore, dependent upon a deeper experience of continuity and cohesion. The superficial denial of integration is, then, only a question of "style" which obscures an "ultimate unity" (1970, p. 77). See Di Stefano (1990) for a critique of postmodernism on precisely this point.

of beliefs, norms, and values, which, as has been already shown, is an attribute of hegemonic power (Giddens, 1979, p. 116; see also Parsons, 1949, pp. 227-228; 1967, pp. 3-34). Because role theory denies the possibility of there being an integrated sense of self, the slave's experience of his infantilization is unintelligible. Elkins' question, Scott's challenge, and the relationship between resistance, cohesion, and power cannot be addressed, let alone answered. Intelligibility and explanatory power are regained only when infantilization is placed back into the theoretical framework of a cohesive sense of self.

To claim that the slave's behavior evinces strategic choice and resistance, testifying to the possible existence of a protean self or a sense of parallel selves, is similarly problematic. Throughout Lifton's exposition of the protean sense of self are clues that the "protean" individual's experience of the discontinuity between and among his parallel selves disturbs him. Lifton's "protean" individual experiences "a break in [his] sense of connection," leaving him with the "profound conviction... that [he] can connect nowhere, at least not in the manner [he] can be inwardly proud of [sic]" (1970, pp. 29-30). The "protean" individual, for instance, feels "alienated from those very elements of his personal and cultural past which were at the core of his character structure" (1970, p. 32). Artists, individuals who, for Lifton, epitomize the "protean" sense of self, are reported to complain that the "turnover in art movements is so rapid as to discourage the idea of holding still long enough to develop a particular style" (1970, p. 322). "Often feeling himself uncared for, even abandoned," Lifton argued, the "protean man responds with diffuse fear and anger. But he can find neither a good cause for the former, nor a consistent target for the latter. He

nonetheless cultivates his anger because he finds it more serviceable than anxiety... His difficulty is that focused indignation is as hard for him to sustain as is any single identification or conviction" (1970, p. 329).

Lifton's description of proteanism is, in fact, a moving testament to the experience of a fragmented sense of self.¹ A sense of parallel selves is an experience in which the individual's sense of self does not cohere, either externally or internally. The individual is alienated from his "cultural past" and has no future into which he believes he will belong because nothing "holds still long enough." The protean individual with his sense of parallel selves believes in nothing because he feels that his external environment "abandoned" him in the past, leaving him "uncared for." The protean individual, in other words, is one who has already experienced cumulative trauma and, thus, cannot address the relationship between power, resistance, and a loss of a cohesive sense of self.

Whether the American slave's experience testifies to a fragmented sense of self or not is an empirical question, one which Elkins' study

¹Glass has argued correctly that "postmodernism calls for multiple selves [i.e. a protean sense of self], *without taking into account the psychological effects of literally living with multiple (discrete) selves within the same body*" (1993a, p. 260, italics in the original; 1993b). The difficulties with the postmodernist understanding of the individual's sense of self, which have already been referred to in the chapter entitled "The Nature of the Self," reappear with Lifton's argument. As Mannheim argued, "a psychology without a psyche cannot take the place of an ontology. Such a psychology... [negates] every evaluation, every trace of common meaning... What may be valuable for a specialized discipline as a research hypothesis may, however, be fatal for the conduct of human beings" (1936, p. 23). Lifton's theoretical incoherence proves the validity of Mannheim's and Glass' insights.

cannot by itself answer.¹ As has been shown, the only way that the issue of the infantilization of the American slave can be addressed, and by analogy the totalitarian fragmentation of the individual's sense of self, is if the discussion takes place within the theoretical framework of a fragmented sense of self. Neither Scott's anti-hegemonic analysis nor role theory nor a parallel selves paradigm can adequately answer the question whether American slavery as a total institution "transformed the character of the slave" or whether totalitarianism fragmented the individual's sense of self. None of these alternative theoretical frameworks can address the relationship between power, resistance, and fragmentation and, thus, none of them are capable of redeeming the Platonic and Tocquevillean conception of power.

III

Elkins' study of American slavery as a total institution raised certain theoretical issues it was unable empirically to answer. Those questions, however, can be answered by the study of German concentration camps. The psychological effect(s) of the concentration camp on both the German concentration camp prisoners and the SS doctors who administered the camps can be used as a guide to frame the empirical foundation upon which to study the psychological effect(s) of totalitarianism on the individual, including members of the

¹Elkins study largely predates the discovery of slave narratives and, thus, there is virtually no primary evidence in his work. Because of the absence of slave narratives, Elkins' study is unable to address the question he raised.

communist party apparatus. Despite the enormity of the differences between German concentration camps and the totalitarianism of the DDR and Czechoslovakia, both were total institutions and, as such, they are comparable.

The Prisoners

There are several different ways of analyzing the psychological effect(s) of the concentration camp on the individual. A psychodynamic interpretation, originating in the work of concentration camps survivors such as, among others, Bruno Bettelheim, Elie Cohen, and Viktor Frankl, is the older tradition. An analysis of the human reaction to extreme stress/trauma is a more recent undertaking. Though both models attempt to assess how the individual tried to cope with an intolerable situation, the extreme stress/trauma interpretation focuses more consistently on the context into which the individual was thrown while the psychodynamic explanation rests primarily on intrapsychic reactions. These two approaches need not be mutually exclusive and can fairly readily be combined, thus, offering a composite understanding of the psychological effect(s) of the concentration camp on the individual.

Because concentration camp victims lived most of their lives outside the confines of the camp, the rules and regulations of camp life imposed an entirely new set of demands and behaviors upon them. Their past lives were of little, if any, relevance. Unable to cope with the initial shock of entrance into the camp, many individuals collapsed psychologically (Des Pres, 1976). Frankl referred to the initial prisoner's reaction as "a kind of emotional death" (1959, p. 18). Cohen's

understanding is similar, for he noted that many prisoners, himself included, experienced "an apparent splitting of [the] personality" (1953, p. 116). Cohen argued that the individual underwent an "acute depersonalization," which he described as feeling "as if I did not belong, as if the business did not concern me; as if 'I were looking at things through a peephole'; I felt untouched by any compassion either for the prisoner, who had probably been beaten to death, or for the incoming labor group" (1953, p. 116).

Though both Cohen and Frankl speculated that the disintegration of the personality was a "necessary mechanism of self-defense" (Frankl, 1959, p. 27; see also Cohen, 1953, p. 117), the consequence was that the individual's sense of self fragmented and that the individual experienced his sense of self in the everyday life of the camp as a self "to whom things happened" (Bettelheim, 1979, p. 52).¹ Many prisoners "experienced... a feeling of detachment and unreality, as if they lived in a surrounding of ghosts and were only spectators of events that had no real bearing on themselves" (Kral, 1951, p. 186).

The individual thought of himself as an object of his own experiences instead of the subject who experiences (Bettelheim, 1979, p. 62; see also Cohen, 1953, pp. 116-117). The everyday sense of self was no longer one of action and initiative. Affect was anaesthetized; individuality obliterated. The individual was thoroughly dominated and rendered reactive by the terror of the camp. More poetically, "life [was]

¹Agreeing with Bettelheim, Frankl, and Cohen, Hilde Bluhm argued that the collapse was a "blocking mechanism" which "established a sort of 'mental emergency regime' under which the ego was able to function without breaking down" and which "was characterized by feelings of estrangement, especially lack of emotion" (1948, p. 9).

freezing to numbness in this chill. As though one were gazing through a thick sheet of ice at very distant things" (quoted in Lederer, 1965, p. 471).

Despite the depersonalization and disintegration of the individual's sense of self, those who survived adapted and experienced "a basic change in [their] personality" (1979, pp. 68, 69).¹ In other words, the concentration camp, as a total institution, transformed the individual's sense of self (1979, p. 68). According to the psychodynamic explanation, the individual's new transformed sense of self was dominated by numerous different, but overlapping patterns, only two of which are applicable to the study of totalitarianism: a regressed sense of self and emotional numbing (Cohen, 1953, p. 173; see also Bloch, 1947; Bluhm, 1948; Bondy, 1943; Kral, 1951).

In addition to the depersonalization and fragmentation of the individual's sense of self, Bettelheim noted that "prisoners developed types of behavior which are characteristic of infancy or early youth" (1979, p. 75; Cohen, 1953, pp. 174-175).² Paralleling Elkins' description

¹Bettelheim argued that adaptation meant that a new cohesive sense of self was constructed from out of the previously fragmented sense of self. Though few deny that the individual's sense of self was transformed, Bettelheim's conclusion is highly controversial. Eitinger, for instance, argued that adaptation did not "heal" the fragmentation of the individual's sense of self. Rather "with the help of psychic insensibility and resignation with regard to unavoidable conditions, many - especially those endowed with strong personality - built up an inner world that they tried to take care of and cultivate" (1980, p. 129; see also Ornstein, 1981). To use Winnicott's terminology, a "false" self arose to protect a "true" self, but this still implies that the individual's sense of self remained fragmented.

²Following Cohen, Bluhm has argued that the death camps produced a "regression of the major part of the personality to the narcissistic stage of infancy [and] a dissolution of the ego" (1948, p. 17). She went on to claim that it was the regression which caused the emotional numbing as well as the prisoner's identification with the aggressor.

of the infantilization of American slave behavior, the regressed sense of self included childish behaviors such as a

lost feeling for the sequence of time; they became unable to plan for the future or give up immediate pleasure satisfactions to gain greater ones in the near future. They were unable to establish durable object-relations. Friendships developed as quickly as they broke up. Prisoners, would, like early adolescents, fight one another tooth and nail, declare that they would never again look at one another or speak to one another, and become close friends once more within a few minutes. They were boastful, telling tales about what they had accomplished in their former lives, or how they succeeded in cheating foremen or guards, and how they sabotaged the work. Like children, they felt not at all set back or ashamed when it became known that they had lied about their prowess (1979, pp. 76-77).¹

Other signs of regression were the fantasies many prisoners had about life after liberation from the concentration camp. As is typical after experiencing a disaster, many prisoners created utopias, ideal and perfect worlds in which loved ones returned (Wolfenstein, 1977). Although these utopias are "infantile wishes for omnipotence, to revive the dead and consequently become 'whole' again" (Klein, 1971, p. 70)

¹Bloch noted that the prisoners engaged in "childish bickering and sulking, and in sporadic flaring out in savage hostility and open fighting" (1947, p. 340). Bondy, also a camp survivor, argued that the prisoner lost "self-control. The ruthless struggle of 'each against all' began. No one spoke in ordinary tones, every one screamed. Some even satisfied their physical needs on the spot. The main thing was to get something to eat and to drink. When food was brought in, an excitement ensued which one can otherwise observe only among animals" (1943, p. 455). There are other reports, however, that the prisoner did not engage in a "struggle of each against all." Tomas Radil-Weiss, also a survivor, has noted that a "substantial part of the psychic adaptation of the individual was based upon formation of relationships with other prisoners... Such social structuralization of the mass of prisoners was of extraordinary importance for their psychic power of resistance and evidently, through it, for their psychological resistance as well" (1983, p. 265).

and represent a "denial of death as well as a denial of the feeling of fragmentation and emptiness" (Klein, 1971, p. 70), they may be helpful in survival.

Emotional numbing or a deadening of all affect was another consequence of the transformation of the prisoner's sense of self. Survival required "emotional anesthesia," which resulted in the prisoner's becoming dull and asocial (Lederer, 1965, p. 469; Friedman, 1949). The annihilation of all bonds to the outside and pre-camp world, the immediacy and unpredictability of death, and the fact that all the individual's energies had to be concentrated on survival, all contributed to the destruction of emotional expression (Bluhm, 1948, p. 14).

This psychodynamically informed picture of the transformation of the concentration camp prisoner's sense of self led to the development of a classification called "the survivor syndrome" (Chodoff, 1969; Eitinger, 1980; Hoppe, 1984; Krystal and Niederland, 1968; Niederland, 1968, 1988).¹ Repeating and elaborating on the earlier description of the transformation of the prisoner's sense of self, the survivor syndrome emphasizes the individual's regression (Hoppe, 1984; Krystal, 1984; Krystal and Niederland, 1968), and emotional anesthesia (Bychowski, 1968; Krystal, 1971; Lifton, 1988; Niederland, 1968) as it appears over the years. Summarizing the research findings, Henry Krystal wrote that the survivor's condition "is characterized by an impoverishment of the areas of the mind to which the 'I' feeling of self-sameness is extended, and a hypertrophy of the 'not-I' alienated areas"

¹For a review of the psychological literature on the survivor syndrome see Chodoff (1975) and Hoppe (1971a).

(1984, p. 126).¹ Simply put, the German concentration camp as a total institution fragmented the survivor's sense of self.

One of the dubious hallmarks of the psychodynamic understanding of the effect of the concentration camp on the prisoner is the assumption that virtually every survivor suffered from the syndrome. Although both Bettelheim or Cohen offered a nuanced psychological description, the "survivor syndrome" argues that "the long years of traumatization and starvation in the death camps broke down nearly all endowed capacity for tolerance among the victims of the camps (Meerloo, 1969, p. 1187; see also Shuval, 1957-58). According to "survivor syndrome" theorists, though the individual's unique experience may alleviate or aggravate the syndrome, the individual's psychological makeup - his vulnerabilities and strengths - as well as the individual's perception of his experiences are of relatively little value in assessing and understanding the survivor's experience. As argued by these theorists, there is "a complete lack of significant influence of the previous personality and of early past on the type and severity of the present psychiatric picture" (Eitinger, 1980, p. 133, emphasis added). Ironically, the psychodynamic model assumes that everyone was affected similarly.

¹One must be careful to distinguish between different types of fragmentations of the sense of self, to which there is no agreement within psychology. Some authors, such as Krystal and Niederland, when analyzing the fragmentation of the individual's sense of self are arguing for a horizontal splitting of the self in which affect laden memories are repressed, lying unprocessed in the individual's unconscious (1968, p. 344). Others, however, claim that the fragmentation produces doubling, a vertical splitting (Lifton, 1988). Deep down this disagreement involves a theoretical controversy regarding the development and structure of the psyche, pitting more classical psychoanalysts against their more contemporary brethren, and at the heart of which is the role of aggression and object relations.

The psychodynamic model's negation of individual differentiation is obviously problematic and recognition of that fact led to the development of the extreme stress/trauma interpretation.¹ In contrast to the psychodynamic explanation's concentration on uniform endogenous reactions to extreme circumstances, the extreme stress/trauma interpretation insists on the absolute importance of the context and the individual's perception of it.²

Nevertheless, the stress/trauma argument not only recognizes that a fragmentation of the individual's sense of self occurred, but maintains that fragmentation is a method of adaptation (Des Pres, 1976, p. 156; Rustin, 1988, p. 166). "Depersonalization (psychologically removing oneself from the situation), intellectualization (dispassionately observing and trying to record events for history or psychological analysis) and denial (attempts at minimizing the scope or seriousness of a situation)" were the coping mechanisms and defensive manoeuvres available to the concentration camp prisoner (Rustin, 1988, p. 169; see also Dimsdale, 1980; Kahana et al., 1988; Terry, 1984). The degree to which the prisoner experienced a disintegration of his sense of self or

¹The stress/trauma interpretation not only critiques the psychodynamic model as being thoroughly unscientific in its research methods (Berger, 1988; Des Pres, 1976; Harel, 1983; Marcus and Rosenberg, 1988; Rustin, 1988; Solkoff, 1981). The stress/trauma model also disputes some of the psychodynamic's empirical findings (Leon, 1981; Shanan and Shahr, 1983). Furthermore, the stress/trauma interpretation argues that the psychodynamic explanation ignores the "physical and physiological realities in the concentration camp" (Berger, 1988, p. 177). Des Pres has claimed that "the fact that the survivor's situation was itself abnormal is simply ignored. That the preoccupation with food was caused by literal starvation does not count; and the fact that the camp inmates were *forced* to live in filth is likewise overlooked.... action was not the index of infantile wishes but of response to hideous necessity" (1976, p. 56-56, emphasis in original).

²For a discussion of coping and stress see Antonovsky (1979), Appley and Trumbull (1967, 1977), Kobasa (1979), Lazarus and Folkman (1984), White (1974), and Wilson (1989).

emotional anesthesia, according to the stress/trauma model, depended completely upon the individual's actual experiences, perception of those experiences, as well as his prior psychological constitution and the subsequent posttraumatic situation.

Ultimately both the psychodynamic and stress/trauma explanations conclude that the concentration camp prisoner experienced, among other effects, a constriction and fragmentation of his sense of self due to the domination of a total institution. Because the totalitarianism of the DDR and Czechoslovakia was also a type of total institution, the empirical findings from the study of German concentration camps can guide the study of the psychological effect(s) of totalitarianism on the individual. The study of the psychological effect(s) totalitarianism may uncover the loss of a cohesive sense of self as it is expressed in terms of emotional numbing and infantilized regression.

The Nazi Doctors

As analyzed by Goffman, total institutions are comprised of two distinct groups: inmates and staff. Under American slavery those two groups were the slave and the slave owner. Though the distinction between staff and inmates under the totalitarianism of the DDR and Czechoslovakia is blurred, members of the communist party, who possessed certain privileges due to their membership, functioned as the staff while the average citizen was the inmate. In the German concentration camp, however, the boundary between the two groups could not have been sharper.

Though the staff of a total institution is not necessarily cut off from the outside world and is not subject to the obtrusive surveillance and intrusions of control, they too, however willingly, must adhere to the authority of the institution, submitting to its organization, ideology, and discipline. Much like the inmate, the staff becomes part of a machine, a tool "devoid" of responsibility and dedicated to the efficient operations of the institution.

This is not to argue that the staff member has no responsibility as an human individual. Rather it is to argue that the staff person in his role as staff possesses little, if any, responsibility in the schema of the total institution itself. Consequently, the total institution may exert a decided psychological influence on the staff as well as on the inmate. The psychological effect of the total institution on the staff, therefore, may provide further guidance to the interpretation of the interview data from the DDR and Czechoslovakia, especially given that both communist party members and non-members were interviewed.

Robert Jay Lifton (1986) has written about the psychological effect(s) of the concentration camp on the Nazi doctors who helped administer, supervise, and execute the Final Solution. In his study of Nazi doctors, Lifton concentrated on the widely divergent roles of doctor and murderer, family man and butcher, that the Nazi doctor was called upon to perform in the camp. While Elkins suggested that the slave owner's position of authority as well as the discontinuity of the various roles the American slave performed produced infantilization, Lifton claimed that the discrepancies in the roles of the Nazi doctor called forth a doubling of his sense of self.

The first line of Lifton's theoretical chapter lays out his claim as succinctly as possible: "The key to understanding how Nazi doctors came to do the work of Auschwitz is the psychological principle I call 'doubling': the division of the self into two functioning wholes, so that a part-self acts as an entire self" (1986, p. 418). One of the Nazi doctors Lifton interviewed described the doubling as "calling forth two radically different psychological constellations within the self: one based on 'values generally accepted' and the education and background of a 'normal person;' the other based on 'this [Nazi-Auschwitz] ideology with values quite different from those generally accepted'" (1986, p. 211).

Phrased more psychoanalytically, doubling can be thought of as a horizontal splitting or fragmentation of the self.¹ The self of the Nazi doctor broke apart, dividing into two halves, each with their respective object representations. Unlike the previous discussion of the disintegration of the prisoner's sense of self, Lifton's conception of a doubled self does not mean that an aspect of the self was sequestered so that it ceased "to respond to the environment... or else [was] in some way at odds with the remainder of the self" (1986, p. 419).

For Lifton, a doubled self implies a "dialectic between [the] two selves in terms of autonomy and connection," in which "one part of the self 'disavows another part'" (1986, p. 419, 422). The appropriate

¹Lifton explicitly rejected the term "splitting" as a description of doubling. He argued that splitting was a psychological phenomena incompatible with a holistic conception of the self. Though a holistic conception of the self is essential - see the previous arguments about hegemony, role theory, and parallel selves - the concept of splitting is not necessarily incompatible with a self so defined. The idea of a horizontal split in the sense of self was championed by Kohut, who himself argued for a holistic conception of the self. Lifton is, however, correct to point out certain connotational difficulties with the term "splitting." It is for that reason that the word "fragmentation" and "loss of cohesion" have been substituted for "splitting."

metaphor is not a amoeba splitting into two distinct and separate entities. Rather the analogy is of an egg before it has been cracked. The yoke and the white, though clearly identifiable as such, are still combined within a single, cohesive shell and whatever might happen to one will directly affect the other.¹ Consequently, the fragmentation does not involve parallel selves, but a single sense of self which has fragmented into two.

There is, unfortunately, one logical contradiction in Lifton's presentation. Lifton asserted that in the case of the Nazi doctor, the two parts of his divided sense of self, though contradictory, were not "at odds" with one another. Given, however, that the competing roles performed by the Nazi doctor were thoroughly incompatible, based upon diametrically conflicting value systems, logic would suggest that the two fragments were continually and irreducibly at odds with one another. Whether the Nazi doctor was aware of the conflict raging within his self is irrelevant. The beauty of the idea of a vertical split is that the loss of cohesion can take place outside the consciousness of the individual and as Lifton, correctly noted, the fragments exist as if they were "functioning wholes." The conflict between the fragmented parts of an individual's sense of self is acted out within reality as if two separate individuals existed within the same breast (Lifton, 1986, pp. 210-211).²

¹In a later essay, Lifton argued that doubling is defined by the "formation of a part self, which ultimately becomes an entire and considerably autonomous self. Although the two selves are interacting parts of a holistic self, a dialectic exists between them when autonomy connects with the considerable autonomy of the second self (1988, pp. 28-29).

²Though a fragmented sense of self is at war with itself, Lifton argued that doubling does not "include the radical dissociation and sustained separateness characteristic of multiple or 'dual personality.' In the latter condition, the two

Even if the Nazi doctor in his "normal" life with friends, at home, after "work," etc. appeared to be well-adjusted and no different from his fellow human being (see, for instance, pp. 395-401), Lifton provides ample evidence to indicate that the two parts of the doctors' sense of self were, in fact, in continual conflict and that doctors "worked hard" to maintain the division between the fragments. It is no secret that the doctors engaged in excessive drinking and that one of the functions of the drinking was to ease the "initial transition" into the fragmented sense of the self Lifton called the "Auschwitz self" (1986, pp. 194-197). But, as Lifton noted, the heavy drinking persisted long after the doctor had passed through the "initiation stage" (1986, p. 199, 444). The drinking, therefore, was not merely for the neophytes, but was one of the tools by which the doctor was able to drown out the continual conflict between the two parts of his sense of self.

Other mechanisms were employed, consciously as well as unconsciously, to still the conflict between the fragments of the sense of self.¹ It was the rare exception when a doctor's family came to the camp either to visit or to live. The two worlds had to be kept strictly apart; neither world was allowed to infect and perhaps undermine the "integrity" of the other. As Lifton wrote, the doctors "remained extremely aware of the separateness of the two worlds. One's wife, children, and parents came to stand for purity, as opposed to an inner sense of Auschwitz filth" (1986, p. 211). Returning to the camp after a

selves are more profoundly distinct and autonomous, and tend either not to know about each other or else to see each other as alien" (1986, p. 442fn.).

¹The post-war turmoil experienced by two of Lifton's doctors indicates the presence of perpetual conflict between the unreconciled fragments of the self (1986, pp. 327-334; 395-414).

visit with his family, one doctor described how he was "troubled by the 'contrast' Auschwitz presented to his peaceful family scene" (1986, p. 319).

If the conflict between the fragments of the sense of self had to be silenced, the emotions experienced by the "Auschwitz self" also had to be tamed. Lifton mentioned three mechanisms by which the doctors managed their day to day work: (1) psychic numbing, (2) derealization, and (3) disavowal (1986, pp. 422, 442-447). Psychic numbing refers to the individual's "diminished capacity or inclination to feel" while derealization implies the "divesting oneself from the actuality of what one is part of, not experiencing it as 'real'" (1986, p. 442, emphasis added). Disavowal, on the other hand, is the rejection of the meaning or significance of one's actions (1986, pp. 422, 442).¹ According to Lifton, it was the employment of these three mechanisms which enabled the Nazi doctors to perform their functions.

If the experience of Nazi doctors is to be instructive in investigating the psychological effects of totalitarianism in the DDR and Czechoslovakia, then, one can expect to find evidence for the loss of a cohesive sense of self along the lines explicated by Lifton in members of the communist party of both countries, be they "ideologically" committed communists or not. Attention should, therefore, be directed towards expressions of psychic numbing, derealization, and disavowal as well as the more profound behaviors and symptoms of vertical

¹The distinction between derealization and disavowal is that derealization refers to the actual event itself and the individual's experiencing the event as not real. Disavowal refers to the meaning of the event and not to the actual circumstances. Someone who disavows an event denies that the event had any meaning, but does not deny that the event was real.

splitting, i.e. the fragments of the sense of self "acting out" their respective and contradictory worlds.¹

¹Some of the behavior patterns Lifton specifically refers to are: "a disorder of feeling (swings between numbing and rage), pathological avoidance of a sense of guilt, and resort to violence to overcome 'masked depression' (related to repressed guilt and numbing) and maintaining a sense vitality" (1986, p. 423).

CHAPTER IV

Witnesses to the Effect of Totalitarianism

So far the reports about totalitarianism's effect(s) on the individual have been those of outside observers, the first hand reports of German concentration camp survivors notwithstanding. In order to provide the discussion with more flesh and blood before moving on to the interview data, accounts and analyses of how totalitarianism invaded the everyday life and the sense of self of the individual by those who actually experienced totalitarianism will be presented. The overall purpose is to clarify the relationship between resistance, totalitarian power, and a cohesive sense of self as well as resolve other unsettled theoretical issues. More specifically, to refine the three hypotheses, data will be drawn from three different sources. First, two classic "stories" about totalitarianism will be presented: Bettelheim's analysis of the Nazi salute and Václav Havel's tale of the Czech green grocer. The purpose of telling the two stories is to expand the analysis of power and develop the relationship between guilt and dissent. Second, two memoirs from Central Europe will be analyzed to indicate how individuals subjected to totalitarianism in Poland and the DDR experienced their plight. This time questions of power and the relationship between dissent and a cohesive sense of self will be emphasized. Lastly, recent academic work coming out of Central Europe will be presented in order to deepen the analysis of the differences between a fragmented sense of self and a sense of parallel selves.

The Nazi Salute

The individual who was morally and/or politically opposed to Nazism was a potential dissident, but first he had to confront and overcome the evil banality of totalitarianism. To do so required him to maintain his voice and act upon his moral and/or political convictions, which itself, as was indicated earlier, may require a cohesive sense of self (Hirschman, 1970).

Bettelheim began his analysis of the Nazi salute by asserting that the sense of self of the potential dissident was sandwiched between two competing poles (1979, p. 319).¹ The individual sought first, to further his own interests and, second, to support the strictures of his conscience, once having experienced Nazism as the embodiment of contemptible evil. On the one side, the individual recognized that obedience to Nazism was appropriate in order to survive and that he had to execute the Nazi salute as required. On the other, survival entailed a sacrifice of one's conscience. Caught between these two competing and inherently contradictory forces, the individual found himself in "an experience that shook his ego and weakened his integration.... [The Nazi] salute demand split the opponent's ego right down the middle" (1979, p. 318).

The repetitive banality of the Nazi salute symbolized the battle lines of the loss of cohesion of the potential dissident's sense of self.

¹For purposes of illustration it is unimportant why the individual opposed Nazi rule. Following the earlier discussion of external coherence, it could have been that the dissident grounded his sense of self in the traditions of his community's past or upon the vision of what his community could become in the future.

The greeting - both its physical and verbal components - was supposed to be given upon meeting not only official representatives of the government, including mailmen, teachers, bureaucrats, etc., but also friends and business colleagues. Each time the salute was performed the individual implicitly indicated his allegiance and support for Hitler.¹ For the individual who was opposed to Nazi policies and ideology, each greeting was an assault upon his beliefs and freedoms and, each time he succumbed to the assault by raising his right arm, the individual felt as if he betrayed himself, thus, producing feelings of guilt.²

According to Bettelheim, to avoid this sense of self-betrayal, the potential dissident could have justified his actions as being strategic in one of three ways. First, saluting was essential to escape arrest. Second, it was necessary so as not to place someone else in jeopardy. Those who witnessed a failure to salute were required to report the transgression to the police and failure to report a transgression was a punishable offense. Third, the individual could have argued that the gesture was devoid of meaning.

In all three cases, however, stress was placed on the cohesion of the potential dissident's sense of self. The first two justifications, Bettelheim argued, violated the individual's conscience. According to Bettelheim's interpretation, the potential dissident would believe he had

¹Saying "Heil Hitler" also carried religious and mystical overtones. In German "Heil," as a noun, means grace, welfare, luck. But as a verb it means to cure and as an adjective, holy or sacred. In effect, "Heil Hitler" was not only wishing Hitler good luck and health, but also indicating that he deserved reverence because of his being a holy man who could cure.

²Just as in the previous chapter, issues of strategic choice, hegemony, role theory, and practices come into play. These issues will not be discussed this time around because the analysis would be identical to that presented previously.

sinned, even if sinning ensured his own or another's survival. Consequently, the potential dissident's compliance would be accompanied by pangs of guilt. The third excuse implied a splitting of thought and emotion from action. This disavowal of the meaning of one's actions also damaged the cohesion of the individual's sense of self. It may have been possible to justify saluting every once in a while as an absolute necessity, "and still maintain some semblance of integration through mental reservations about doing it," Bettelheim argued, "but this deception becomes extremely difficult when it has to be repeated all the time" (1979, p. 319).

In his explication of the psychological effect of the Nazi salute, Bettelheim related a dream of a German factory owner who was a potential dissident (1979, pp. 321-322). In his dream, the factory owner was visited by Goebbels and, consequently, he had to make the appropriate obsequience. "Standing in front of all the workers, I had to raise my arm in the Nazi salute. It took me half an hour to get my arm up, inch by inch.... Then I stood in my own factory, arm raised pilloried right in the midst of my own workers. And so I stood until I woke up" (1979, p. 321). Struggling not to salute, the factory owner eventually succumbed. Survival triumphed over principles, but the cost of succumbing, as the factory owner reported, "broke my backbone." A broken back can signify that one's sense of self has been shattered or that one is spineless, lacking a backbone. In either case, the result is the same: the defeat or absence of resistance is associated with a fragmentated sense of self.

What is important in this dream is not merely the psychological effect of totalitarianism on the potential dissident and his experience of

guilt.¹ Just as important is the extent and reach of totalitarian power.

As Bettelheim concluded,

It was not Goebbels who forced him to salute, but he who forced himself to salute in order not to give open expression to his conflict with the regime. The fact that the regime was able to force people to do this to themselves shows how devastatingly effective the system was" (1979, p. 322).

Totalitarianism, through the banality of a salute, had invaded the factory owner's everyday life and his sense of self by forcing itself into his unconscious dream life. The dream is "a most convincing demonstration that the regime has the power to invade and dominate even one's most intimate life" (Bettelheim, 1979, p. 330-331).

Totalitarianism did not actively force the factory owner to submit to its domination. He unconsciously acquiesced to his own domination, fragmenting his own sense of self. The power of totalitarianism, therefore, lies in its ability to penetrate and colonize the individual's unconscious.

The Green Grocer

If Bettelheim's example of the invasiveness of totalitarianism applied to those who were, at first, in opposition, Havel's story about the green grocer applies to everyone else, except perhaps to "ideologically" committed communist party members. Once again, the example is pathetically banal: the green grocer's placing of a communist party

¹A corollary question about guilt is whether or not the individual who acts upon his moral and/or political convictions also experiences guilt. It may be that guilt is produced only for those who do not actively engage in dissident activity.

slogan - "Worker's of the World Unite!" - in his store window. Havel's question is why was the placard in the window and what meaning did it have.

According to Havel, the reason for the green grocer's window arrangement is obvious: fear. The green grocer did not display the sign because he necessarily believed in the meaning of the slogan's words. Rather accepting delivery of the sign from the state business enterprise, the same organization which provided his produce, the green grocer placed the placard and fruits and vegetables alongside one another in the window

simply because it has been done that way for years, because everyone does it, and because that is the way it has to be. If he were to refuse, there could be trouble. He could be reproached for not having the proper 'decoration' in his window; someone might even accuse him of disloyalty. He does it because these things must be done if one is to get along in life. It is one of the thousands of details that guarantee him a relatively tranquil life 'in harmony with society' (Havel, 1990b, pp. 27-28).

The green grocer's behavior was habitual, automatic, part and parcel of his everyday. He did what he was supposed to do because that is what one had to do to get along. He did not need to think about how to behave.

Nevertheless, habit concealed fear. According to Havel, the grocer had more than just an inkling about what would happen if he did not display the party slogan. He could have been, for instance, transferred to a produce warehouse; permission to vacation in Bulgaria may have been rescinded; and his children may not have been granted permission

to attend higher education (Havel, 1990b, p. 39). In other words, to borrow Anna Freud's terminology, the green grocer lived in a state of "objective anxiety."

The green grocer did not question where the placard should be placed or whether it should sit in his display window at all or even whether he wanted the workers of the world to unite. Furthermore, he did not care if the sign was read or even noticed. In fact, the opposite was true. The presence of the slogan to those who passed by his shop would only have been noted in its absence. The slogan belonged to a produce store window in much the same way as the fruits and vegetables themselves. Without all three elements, the store would not have been recognized for what it was: an officially recognized, non-political fruit and vegetable store in which one could buy fruits and vegetables. The absence of the slogan, in contrast, would have meant that the store was a center of dissidence and, thus, a store where fruits and vegetables could not be bought without fear of retribution.

Much like the Nazi salute, the store window arrangement spoke of the green grocer's acceptance of everyday life under totalitarianism. But the existence of the communist party slogan in the window had more far reaching consequences. To be able to conduct business each store had to have its slogan prominently displayed. The green grocer's placement of his slogan meant that others had to place similar placards in their store fronts, office bulletin boards, or factory lampposts. All those who displayed party slogans "adapted to the conditions in which they live[d], but in doing so, they help[ed] create those conditions. They [did] what [was] done, what [was] to be done, what [had] to be done, but at the same time - by that very token - they confirm[ed] that it must be

done in fact" (Havel, 1990b, p. 36). The green grocer's acceptance of the everyday requirements of communist rule meant and helped insure that others had to agree as well. Once again, it is not that anyone noticed the presence of the hundreds of mottos, but the existence of each and every slogan indicated that there were particular rules by which life was conducted and that there were particular norms which were to be upheld.¹

As "part of panorama of everyday life" one may be tempted to argue that the displaying of slogans had no meaning (Havel, 1990b, p. 35). However, just the opposite is the case. A background's meaning does not merely lie in its crafted individual details, but in the mood and latent messages which the details convey. The uniformity of the placement of the green grocer's slogan alongside all the other party mottos "remind[ed] people where they [were] living and what it expected of them" (Havel, 1990b, p. 35). It was a sign of collective compliance. The slogan was a confirmation of the green grocer's existence and his position in the world, i.e. he did what he was told to do even if no one had explicitly told him what it is he was to do (Havel, 1990b, p. 28). In other words, common sense was defined by the existence of the slogan and the existence of the slogan reproduced common sense.

Whether he wanted to or not, the green grocer, and all the others who displayed similar signs, had become agents of their own domination by totalitarianism. Because of their fear induced "objective anxiety" and their desire to live a relatively tranquil life, one in which

¹The rules may have been enforced by fear, but that does not invalidate the presumed recognition of the rules of the game by all involved.

they were essentially left alone, they had "surrender[ed] their human identity in favour of the identity of the system" (Havel, 1990b, p. 36). The sign in the window was not only a ritualized element of the everyday life of the green grocer, but an integral part of the green grocer's sense of self. This is not, according to Havel, a question of living part of one's life in public and another in the private recesses of one's family, the false dichotomy produced by power and lauded by role playing, parallel selves, or strategic choice theorists. Rather, the individual lived a "pseudo-life" in which the "very notion of the [individual's] identity" was challenged (Havel, 1990b, p. 38). Individual identity, which according to Havel is characterized by moral integrity and free expression, was reduced to "blind automatism" and trivialized behavior, dominated by purely utilitarian considerations (Havel, 1990b, pp. 30, 38).

One need not necessarily accept Havel's stark conclusions, to understand that the placard placed in the store window is an example of the totalitarian penetration and colonization of the individual's everyday life and sense of self. Much like the Nazi salute, the slogan itself may have been irrelevant but its effect was telling: totalitarian power was characterized by the individual's fragmenting his own sense of self.

II

Turning from analytic first hand accounts to personal memoirs only deepens the thesis that individuals subjected to totalitarian rule

fragmented their own sense of self because of their experience of living in an hostile and aggressive environment.¹ Only two works have been chosen, neither of which were or could have been published officially in their native country. Both authors had worked for their respective communist regimes, Czeslaw Milosz's The Captive Mind (Poland) and Wolfgang Leonhard's Child of the Revolution (DDR), and were written shortly after their respective defections in the early 1950s.² These two

¹Given the political realities of totalitarianism and the role of censorship the use of literary evidence to provide first hand accounts is tricky. Whatever literary evidence may exist written from within a totalitarian country can be found primarily in works that could not be officially published, writings published underground, emigre memoirs, or those works officially published during those rare moments of the temporary lifting of cultural censorship. The official literature is literature tainted by the hand of and approved by the totalitarian political apparatus (for the role of censorship in the DDR see Darnton, 1990). Officially approved literature is a literature of political expediency or so heavily encoded in order to wiggle unscathed through the censor's bureaucratic maze that decoding becomes a rather problematic endeavor. This is not to claim that the official or public literature is false and the samizdat is true. It is merely to assert that the two literatures were intended to appeal to different audiences and, addressing different issues, spoke different languages. Questions concerning the psychological effect(s) of totalitarianism on the individual were almost entirely forbidden from expression in the official literature. Nevertheless, even samizdat literature raises difficult hermeneutical questions, for as both Stefan Heym and Christa Wolf admitted, artists living under totalitarian rule censored their own thoughts and works (Heym, 1990, p. 69; Wolf, 1980, p. 84).

²Art and literature under totalitarianism are more highly esteemed, both socially and politically, under totalitarianism than they are in Western democracies. Under totalitarianism art, fashion, music - culture in general - functions as a type of compensation against the pervasiveness of politics (for the philosophical underpinnings of culture as compensation see Arendt's discussion of intimacy, 1958, pp. 39-69). Culture is the one area in which a restricted individualism is allowed expression (Meyer, 1989, p. 163). As Guenter Kunert, a famous East German poet, wrote, "The reader [under totalitarianism] seeks for something in literature that he cannot find elsewhere. This begins with information and extends to the transcendence of his existence - to point out that 'something' in lofty language. The reader in the DDR is left to his own devices and thus somewhat helpless. He therefore searches in literature for reference to what has imprecisely been called the existence" (Kunert, 1979, cited in Trommler, 1984, pp. 355-54). The exiled Polish writer Stanislaw Baranczak makes essentially the same argument when he asserted his faith in literature vis-a-vis totalitarian rule: "I hereby admit that I indeed believe in literature's power in naming reality - or, to put it differently, in letting us hear and comprehend reality's many-voiced hubbub

memoirs were among the first to be written and published and, for that reason as well, they have been included.

Although Milosz's work is an analysis of the effect(s) of totalitarianism on intellectuals and artists and Leonhard's is a more straightforward memoir of the education and work of a leading member of the German Communist Party (hereafter SED), these two very different approaches come to the same understanding of the psychological effect(s) of totalitarianism on the individual. While Milosz was brutally direct in his dissection of totalitarianism and its effect(s) on the individual, Leonhard described a similar phenomena, but in more personal, softer, and, ironically, more explicitly political terms.

Without equivocation, Milosz hammered home the idea that totalitarianism caused the individual to become "schizophrenic"¹ (1990, p. 22), by which he meant that the individual experienced a "split" in his sense of self.² The fragmentation that Milosz described refers to the lack of cohesion between the individual's past experiences and his present behaviors. Because of this cleavage, the individual wants to

more subtly and fully than any other kind of account. In this sense, the testimony supplied by the literary imagination may carry more weight on the witness stand than the evidence of our senses, especially when the evidence has been fabricated to fool us; and the imagination may be a more efficient interpretive tool than abstract reasoning, especially when we face a reality whose absurdity transcends rationalistic thinking" (1990, p. 234). For other discussions of the popular need for artistic expression as a means for the subjected citizen to understand his own totalitarian reality and as the birthplace of much dissident activity see Lewis (1992), Maron (1990), and Urban (1990).

¹It is unfortunate that Milosz chose the word schizophrenic to describe the condition of the individual under totalitarianism, for his use of the term is easily misunderstood. Milosz does not use the term in a technical or clinical sense and his meaning should not be confused with the medical pathology which is labeled schizophrenia.

²In other places in the book, Milosz called the phenomena of splitting "the Ketman personality."

"rid" himself of his past, but past experiences continuously seep into and disrupt daily life, even though they no longer correspond to present day realities (1990, p. 5).¹

Leonhard portrayed a similar phenomenon. He argued that many SED officials suffered from "political collywobbles" (1958, p. 373), by which he meant that the official line of the party did not coincide with the individual's thoughts, feelings, or hopes. Adhering to the SED line and obeying the strictures of communist party discipline, the individual's sense of self lost its cohesion. This time the discrepancy is between the individual's subjective desires and the values and social practices into which he had been socialized.² Speaking about himself, Leonhard wrote that "there were many other things which had oppressed me... but I generally resisted these memories and doubts, because they did not fit in with the picture of the world that had been inculcated in me, and because I did not want them to interfere with my beliefs, my activities, and my hopes" (1958, p. 374).³

¹Twenty-five or so years later, Brandys, Milosz's his fellow countryman, wrote his memoir. Borrowing the title of Milosz's book, Brandys argued that "the illness that a poet called the 'captive mind' is now manifesting less violent symptoms but is spreading more widely" (1983, p. 129). Twenty-five years may have mellowed the rough edges of the Kertész personality, but, according to Brandys, intellectuals and artists were no longer the only ones susceptible to a fragmentation of their sense of self. The "disease" had seeped down into all levels of Polish society.

²For a fascinating and frightening description of this split in the individuals who comprised the leadership of the Polish government after 1945 see Toranska (1987).

³Echoing Leonhard, Brandys was also plagued by doubts and memories as well. "I had my doubts from the beginning," he wrote, "but the stronger they were, the more I repressed them and the more vociferous were my denials of them. Every doubt damaged the logic and the ethics of the basic assumptions I had come to accept, and burdened me with guilt... At bottom, I was only defending myself from myself" (1983, pp. 93-94). At bottom, Brandys' self-portrayal is of a fractured sense of self at war with itself.

For both Milosz and Leonhard the individual's loss of a cohesive sense of self arose because of the experience of a hostile and aggressive environment. According to Milosz, the individual subjected to totalitarian rule defined his sense of self negatively or in opposition to his external environment (1990, p. 79). "In short, Kتمان means self-realization against something" (1990, p. 80). That "something" was the totalitarian environment of fear, an environment which was perceived to be continuously invasive (1990, p. 219). "Fear paralyzes individuality," Milosz wrote, "and makes people adjust themselves as much as possible to the average type in their gestures, clothing, and facial expressions" (p. 66). Facing the threat of annihilation of his sense of self, the individual sacrificed his individuality.¹

Leonhard's analysis differed only slightly from Milosz's. Leonhard's final break with the SED was triggered by the 1948 Yugoslav Communist Party's declaration of independence and its rejection of the Soviet controlled Cominform, the international association of communist parties. One day while in his room reading documents from the Yugoslav Communist Party's Fifth Congress, which were unavailable in Soviet-controlled eastern Germany, Leonhard heard a "sharp knock on his door. It was the first time that I had been frightened by a knock on the door in East Berlin" (1958, p. 392).² After his visitor left, Leonhard "carefully locked up the pamphlets... This was the first time that I had

¹In his memoir, Havel argued that totalitarian power "had unintentionally revealed its own most proper intention: to make life entirely the same, to surgically remove from it everything that was even slightly different, everything that was highly individual, everything that stood out, that was independent and unclassifiable" (1990a, p. 129).

²Leonhard had lived in Russia during the years of Stalin's bloody purges so that a "knock of the door" was a sound pregnant with meaning. During the purges, Leonhard's mother was arrested and imprisoned.

ever deliberately hidden anything from the Party" (1958, p. 392). Concluding his recital of the incident, Leonhard wrote that, "I had reached my decision" (p. 392), i.e. the decision to defect to the West.

What is of psychological interest here is not only that Leonhard's sense of fear and insecurity propelled him to make a decision, but that the decision to assert his individuality was made as a reaction to or against the surrounding environment. Implicit in Leonhard's story is the assertion that individuality under totalitarianism required one to "lock up" what is most personal. Only by "locking up" his individuality was Leonhard able to reach his decision. Only after "locking up" could his sense of self claim its uniqueness. Ultimately, however, "locking up" meant his emigration.

What is also important is Leonhard's sketch of the relationship between dissent and totalitarian power. As already argued, dissent presumes a cohesive sense of self. That cohesion, according to Leonhard, was only possible when the individual "locks himself up" against the impingements and invasiveness of a totalitarian regime, reclaimed one's "memories and doubts," and, thus, regained a continuity with one's past sense of self (1958, p. 374).¹ Only then was the

¹The argument that regaining one's "memories and doubts" and possessing a continuity with one's past is part and parcel of a cohesive sense of self and is an important element of dissident activity is validated by the total institution literature. According to a survivor of a German concentration camp: "Generally speaking, we see in the camp that anyone in whose life there are certain religious bond (using the term in its most comprehensive sense, so as to include the devotion to a political system or a humanist view of life), manages to recover the most quickly, after the initial stupor. It is therefore no mere accident that the convinced Christians as well as the Communists, who would seem to be their psychological opposites, should have shown the greatest power of resistance in camps, and even managed to set up certain forms of anti-Fascist organization" (quoted in Cohen, 1953, p. 148). The same argument also appears in the discussion of American slavery. As Blasingame argued, "Subordinate members [of a total institution] are able to reject

individual able to reach a decision and assert his individuality. Dissent was an assertion of individuality, a claim of uniqueness, and a refusal to permit the fragmentation of one's sense of self.

For those who were not dissidents, however, "locking up" meant finding a temporary hiding place, safe from the impinging environment. This place of respite or, as Milosz described it, "inner sanctuary," is "the more precious the greater the price [the individual] pays in order to bar others from access to it" (1990, p. 57). External behaviors may have become uniform and devoid of individuality, but within his "inner sanctuary" the individual tenaciously held onto what he believed to be his "true sense of self." But it is clear from Milosz's description of the "inner sanctuary" as a "wall of protection" against which the individual "batters" himself that there is a more profound meaning to the "inner sanctuary," one which belies the notion that within his sanctuary the individual experienced his "true sense of self" (1990, p. 79).

The wall erected by the non-dissident against the externally impinging environment was a Berlin Wall which prevented the individual from experiencing his own desires, feelings, and thoughts. The "strategic choice" to seek refuge in an "inner emigration" resulted in the fragmentation of the individual's sense of self. The Wall permitted and enforced totalitarianism's need to "conquer" and "deny" the past (Milosz, 1990, p. 17). Because of the Wall the individual now believed his past to be composed of "irrational and childish feeling[s]" in need of

institutional expectations when they hold rigid religious beliefs, expect or accept their peer group or subculture for self-esteem, or values and expectations which differ from those of the [total] institution" (1972, p. 217).

destruction (1990, p. 18). The individual "operate[d]" on himself (1990, p. 17) to exorcise the past.

Describing the effects of cumulative trauma and a fragmented sense of self, Milosz noted that the individual did not emerge "unscathed" from the self-mutilation demanded by his construction of a intra-psychic Berlin Wall. Poetically written, Milosz argued that "the aftereffects [of the individual's "strategic choice" to operate on himself] manifest themselves in a particular kind of extinguishment that is often perceptible in the twist of [the] lips" (1990, p. 20). Apathy was another psychosomatic consequence, even if an attempt was made to mask it by "feverish activity" (p. 23). Apathy, according to Milosz implied an "internal paralysis" (p. 24). What has been extinguished was the individual's spontaneity (p. 245) and, consequently, he felt as if his sense of self were a "fiction" (p. 245).¹

The individual became an "actor" (1990, p. 54), playing whatever role was assigned him by the totalitarian political apparatus. Ultimately, this "role-playing" or "protean sense of parallel selves penetrated and colonized the individual's unconscious: "After long acquaintance with his role, a man grows into it so closely that he can no longer differentiate his true self from the self he simulates." (1990, p.

¹Havel's memoir reveals a similar description of the fragmentation caused by the cumulative trauma of living under a totalitarian regime. According to Havel, the individual experienced a "deep emptiness of life devoid of meaning" (1990a, p. 16). The phrases Havel used to color in this emptied sense of self were: "buried under a landslide of general apathy" (1990a, p. 51), "stiff and corpse-like" (p. 51), "moribund silence" (p. 119), "endless, unchanging wasteland" (p. 184), "vacuity" (p. 184), and "sterility" (p. 184). The prevailing images of lifelessness and death are no coincidence. The individual's environment had "buried" him. Once again the images are those of an impinging environment threatening the individual with the annihilation of his sense of self.

55).¹ The fragmentation of the individual's sense of self was then complete. Even if the "inner emigration" had once provided a safe haven, it now became the prison within which the individual lived. The individual accepted his loss of cohesion as natural and normal. What once was perceived as being a safe haven, protecting a "true sense of self" was just another fragment. Even if the individual were able to experience a degree of cohesion and continuity, he would not be able to trust his own experience, for it would appear to be irrational and, thus, untrustworthy. "The lone individual inevitably asks himself if his antagonism is not wrong; all he can oppose to the entire propaganda apparatus are simply his irrational desires. Should he not, in fact, be ashamed of them?" (Milosz, 1990, p. 213).

No matter how pessimistic Milosz and Leonhard's description of the effect(s) of totalitarian power on the individual were, both writers indicated how an individual can escape the clutches of totalitarianism. Though both men chose physically to "exit," Leonhard hinted at how voice/dissent and resistance were possible. The battleground of dissent, he suggested, was the cohesion of the individual's sense of self.²

¹Brandy's inner war, ultimately, led him to experience a high level of uncertainty. Mirroring Milosz's analysis of the individual's inability to differentiate between the role and the actor, Brandys argued that "since we have been experiencing our fate outside of real experience, we no longer know what we project and what is falling on our heads" (1983, p. 37). His perception of reality became problematic as Milosz had predicted. To state it in psychological terms, Brandys was no longer able reliably to test reality.

²In both Milosz's and Leonhard's memoirs it is difficult to miss the high degree of intrapsychic conflict which is associated with the maintenance of a cohesive sense of self when confronted by a hostile and aggressive environment. Milosz's memoir, for instance, is filled with images of conflict, aggression, and war. It may be that the ability to tolerate high levels of intrapsychic conflict as well as aggressive emotions is correlated with a cohesive sense of self.

Since both Leonhard and Bettelheim have suggested that there is a connection between dissent and a cohesive sense of self, the interviews of Czech, Slovak, and East German dissidents needs to address this question directly. Are resistance to totalitarian power and the maintenance of a cohesive sense of self, in fact, connected? Did the maintenance of a relatively cohesive sense of self enable individuals openly to resist totalitarian domination? Conversely, did open resistance to totalitarian power enable the individual to regain a relatively cohesive sense of self?

III

Since 1980 and Solidarity's challenge to totalitarianism in Poland, a growing body of work has accumulated within Central and Eastern Europe analyzing the effect(s) of totalitarianism on the individual. This work has been done by historians, social and political psychologists, dissidents, sociologists and political commentators describing their own societies after the imposition of Soviet domination and the establishment of totalitarian rule.¹ These writings concentrate their analysis on three factors: (1) the loss of history and language; (2) the

¹The data from which these analysts derived their conclusions varies tremendously, including psychological and sociological statistical analyzes, autobiographical accounts, psychotherapeutic interventions, and linguistic interpretations.

experience of a hostile environment; and (3) what has been called "the socialist schizophrenia."¹

Communist domination of Central Europe was often understood by the area's residents as an historical aberration imposed upon them by an external and foreign power (Tourraine, 1983, p. 2; Tymowski, 1982; Wojcicki, 1981, p. 101). Many believed that Central Europe had been conquered by the Soviet Red Army and that a totalitarian system had been foisted upon them. Soviet occupation, the imposition of an "alien" political system, and its accompanying ideology resulted in a loss of local or "native" history and traditions or, as one Czech political psychologist wrote, history "is being eliminated" (Zelman, 1991, p. 18; see also Arendt, 1973).

Just as an individual's sense of self is historical, cohering if its past, present, and future expresses a continuity, a culture or society also coheres if there are no radical disruptions or disjunctures which divorce the past from the present or the present from the future. In Central Europe, however, as one Czech psychoanalyst noted, "we became a nation divided from within. Continuity with our history and tradition was repeatedly disrupted" (Marlin and Smith, 1991, p. 208). Separated from the past, it is not only the individual who is left, figuratively, ungrounded, dangling in the air. A culture can also lose its sense of place and time, having its feet cut out from under it. Echoing Milosz and Brandys, the result for both the individual and the culture was gnawing doubt, a questioning of "the accuracy of... memory [and] the

¹Once again, the term "schizophrenia" is used rather loosely by Central European writers and does not necessarily have technical and clinical connotations.

authenticity of... experience... And people cannot then recall how it really was'" (quoted in Zelman, 1991, p. 18).

In Central Europe, totalitarianism not only divorced the past from the present, but also imposed a new language on the peoples it subjugated. The stories both the individual and Central European cultures told about themselves and out of which their individual and cultural sense of self developed were no longer told in the indigenous languages of those cultures. "Just the language these people were using," an East German dissident said, referring to communist politicians, "was appalling to me. One cannot express oneself in these abstract party-line categories" (quoted in Philipsen, 1993, p. 68). New words were used and old words were given new meanings. As Adam Michnik wrote, "during the course of [communist hegemony], most of our society lost its language" (1981, p. 67).

The totalitarian imposition of a communist language deepened the individual's loss of cohesion by divorcing the individual from his culture. Polish dissidents claimed that the communist language "destroys effective communication, particularly public communication as it alters and neutralizes formulations which stood for authentic meanings and real attitudes. [Communist language] disintegrates communication in an even deeper sense: it kills confidence in language in general" (Flying University, 1979, p. 171). The result of this betrayal of language was that no one could "distinguish any longer between what is real and what is unreal" (DiP report as quoted in Ascherson, 1981, p. 126).

The inability to distinguish between truth and falsity was only exaggerated by the blatant lies propounded by communist rhetoric and propaganda.¹ According to a leading Polish journalist

incomplete, incomprehensive information - that is disinformation - the lie, really, perpetrated on a daily basis, enter[ed] our blood and be[came] our second nature, even sometimes a moral or national obligation. People who have accepted a convention of the lie consider lying a patriotic and historical duty.... Millions of people in Poland no longer [knew] what is and what is not the truth, and what it means to be a 'sincere witness.' For decades, not only our language has been changed, but our mental criteria (Kisielewski, 1983, p. 284).

Both the individual and the culture were left isolated and alienated. Unable to express "authentic meanings and real attitudes" the individual's sense of self fragmented and the culture was left rootless.

Partially because of the loss of their language and their history, many Central Europeans experienced Soviet-communist domination in terms of living in an hostile environment. At a minimum, communist totalitarianism was perceived as a "frustrating environment," requiring the establishment of a "psychological defense," built in order to lessen

¹Leszek Kolakowski wrote that the corruption of the language was due to the communists' ability to manipulate the truth. The regime lied persistently and demanded that society accept the "truth" of that lie even if the lie had been previously exposed. As he wrote, "if... there is absolutely no way anybody can establish what is 'true' in the normal sense of the word, nothing remains but the generally imposed beliefs, which, of course, can be again cancelled the next day. There is no applicable criterion of truth except for what is proclaimed true at any given moment. And so, the lie really becomes truth, or at least, the distinction between true and false in their usual meaning has disappeared. This is the great cognitive triumph of totalitarianism: it cannot be accused of lying any longer since it has succeeded in abrogating the very idea of truth" (quoted in Di Palma, 1991, p. 65). It is this inability to recognize the difference between a truth and a lie which Kolakowski called "a schizophrenic form of thinking" (1982, p. 48).

or alleviate the individual's vulnerability to external pressure (Zelman, 1991, p. 18). Exit, both physical and psychological, was one such defense. In practical terms this meant "escape, internal and external emigration, indifference, [and] enhanced egoism" (Zelman, 1991, p. 18; see also Ash, 1989, p. 12). Other defenses were repression, denial, and projection (Maaz, 1991b, p. 59). Over time, the individual came to the conclusion that his life "cannot be improved. Finally the individual resigns ('I am against but I have to submit')" (Zelman, 1991, p. 19).¹ For both the individual and the culture resignation, if sufficiently profound, caused the loss of a cohesive sense of self, for it involved "making concessions against ourselves" (Marlin and Smith, 1991, p. 219).

At the point at which one was making a "concession against oneself," it became apparent that the cohesion of one's sense of self was beginning to or had already fragmented (Plichtova, 1991, p. 25). Whether conscious of the choices confronting them or not, many perceived the need to make concessions as a form of "suicide" (Plichtova, 1991, p. 25). Stated rather boldly and perhaps simplistically, the choice was "to be free, honest[,] or not to be at all" (Plichtova, 1991, p. 25). Fragmentation became synonymous with annihilation: "I had already died before September 1989" (quoted in Ast, 1991, p. 101).

If annihilation anxiety were a rather extreme reaction to totalitarian power, the experience that one was living in an unfriendly environment was not. Life was lived under the cloud of fear or "objective anxiety," for the individual was subject to a constant threat

¹Hans-Joachim Maaz, an East German psychoanalyst, reported a similar resignation phenomena: "It was not purpose; I can do nothing; it changes nothing; I am only the dumb one" (quoted in Maaz, 1991a, p. 29).

(Marody, 1988, p. 103; see also Philipsen, 1993, pp. 158, 188). For some the fear and the threat corresponded to residual memories of the post-1945 Stalinist terrors which took place in Central Europe. For others the fear and threat originated in the recognition of the political apparatus' economic and administrative power, its ability to deprive a person of employment, education, vacations, passports. It did not matter if one had actually been punished or knew anyone who actually had been punished. The fear and the threat were part and parcel of the individual's "common knowledge of social reality. On the one hand the knowledge included the conviction as to what the reality was like (menacing) and on the other hand it included the ways to find one's bearings in that reality" (Nowak, 1988, p. 197).

It also did not matter whether one were a leading member of the political apparatus or a prominent dissident; nearly everyone experienced the "objective anxiety" that totalitarianism induced. "Everyone," Jan Urban, a leading Czech dissident, argued,

was at some moment in their life put into a situation of dire choice: to prove their loyalty to the regime by humiliating themselves or to lose everything. Everybody knew what everything meant.... It meant to lose not only your career, but to blight the future of your children, because they would not be allowed to attend University" (1990, p. 109).

The constant threat of punishment was experienced by the individual as being forced to live in a state of "perpetual" humiliation. "This perpetual humiliation, punctuated from time to time with demands for proof of loyalty, was," argued Urban, "the best method [of keeping] the people silent" (1990, p. 105).

Urban's point is validated by the experience of Andre Brie, a dedicated member of the former SED. In 1988, Brie tried to organize an open letter of protest to the SED Central Committee because the party had banned the importation of a Soviet journal, *Sputnik*. Even though his party cell originally and unanimously accepted his request, Brie never wrote the letter. Threatened with the loss of his research institute job and the virtual impossibility of having his work published in the DDR, Brie "caved in." "I was simply scared of not being able to work at all anymore," he said. "I had to write a five-page self-criticism. It was extremely humiliating." (quoted in Philipsen, 1993, p. 179).

The totalitarian environment did more than only threaten and impinge. Totalitarian penetration and colonization of the everyday life was "like a fog [which] infiltrated our lives" (Marlin and Smith, 1991, p. 208). In other words, the "'aggressor' now was internal as well as external" (Marlin and Smith, 1991, p. 208). It is in this sense that the "concessions one made against oneself" were of one's own doing. Rephrased, it was the individual who fragmented his own sense of self.

The East German Irene Koeppe's response to the existence of the Berlin Wall is a good example of the colonization of the individual's sense of self. Koeppe, a political activist, said that she was afraid to apply for a trip to the West because she "feared" that she would be turned down and because of that rejection she

wouldn't have known how to continue living here [in the DDR], because this would have meant - at least that's how we perceived it - that I would be forced to accept the thought that I was imprisoned for the rest of my life. If I didn't apply, at least they could not turn me down, and there would be no concrete proof that I was permanently stuck in

East Germany (quoted in Philipsen, 1993, pp. 189-190).

Rather than risk knowing that she lived in an actual prison, Koeppe "voluntarily" became her own jailer, denied having certain dreams and desires, and accepted a psychological imprisonment. Engaging in self-censorship, the individual, as Juraj Zelman, a Slovak psychologist has argued, internalized the totalitarian control (1991, p. 18; see also Siklova, 1991).

It was precisely this notion of colonization and the making of concessions against oneself that characterized the syndrome Central Europeans labelled "socialist schizophrenia" (Sztompka, 1991, p. 300; Urban, 1990, p. 105; Zelman, 1991, p. 18). What was meant by this rather elaborate, and technically inaccurate term, was that the individual lived a type of double life (Misselwitz, 1991, p. 31). As reported by the one of the foremost Western historians of Central Europe

East Germans make the most elaborate arrangements to withdraw from the collective marketplace into their own unpolitical niches. The split between the public and the private self, official and unofficial language, outward conformity and inward dissident - in short, the double life - is a phenomenon common to all Soviet-bloc countries (Ash, 1989, p.10).¹

¹Elemer Hankiss, a prominent Hungarian social scientist, described the socialist schizophrenia in similar terms. He wrote that the "split life" referred to "people who had two minds or souls: one for their daylight and official lives and another which became activated when they were moving about in the second society or in their family environment. There were among them people who switched on and off their respective consciousness cynically as they moved to and fro between these spheres. Others suffered from this split personality, which had been forced upon them, and still others sank into an apathetic state of depression and did not want, or were unable to face the world and themselves" (1988, p. 26).

Simply put, "socialist schizophrenia" referred to a fragmentation in the individual's sense of self (Maaz, 1991b, p. 59).

One of the most prominent features of this "split" in the individual's sense of self was a retreat from public life into the seemingly safe confines of one's private life (Sztompka, 1991, p. 299).¹ One East German dissident, Jens Reich, equated the individual's retreat or "inner emigration" to "living in a snail's shell, hidden and stubbornly defending what was considered worth living for. The snail sits in its cramped but cosy shell, making itself as comfortable as possible under the circumstances" (Reich, 1990, p. 71). According to a sociological study of Polish adaptive strategies, "retreating from participation in public life into one's private world [was] considered the most appropriate, or, at least, the safest, behavioral strategy" to ward off the effects of the feared and hostile environment, (Ziolkowski, 1988, p. 164; see also Misselwitz, 1991, p. 30).

Within these enclosed niches or "safe sanctuaries," the individual felt as if he were "safe and secure" while in the outside world the individual experienced "mistrust, sometimes anxiety and fear, conversational incapability, and defensiveness" (Misselwitz, 1991, p. 32). Once have retreated into his own private world, believing he was actualizing his "true sense of self," the individual was rendered passive and docile or, as one East German machinery work said, "Everybody had

¹Sztompka, echoing the earlier discussion of the effects of hegemonic power, argued that totalitarian power depended upon and was based upon the "polar, binary opposition" of the private versus the public (1991, p. 299). Again, the retreat was not a "strategic choice" freely entered into by the individual, but an aspect of totalitarian power. The private and the public did not represent different parallel sense of selves, but rather contradictory parts of a fragmented sense of self.

a niche in which he sat and privately complained" (quoted in Philipsen, 1993, p. 127). Coexistent with this passivity was "an unimaginable conformity," for although the niches may have varied from person to person the flight from reality was uniform (Maaz, 1991a, p, 29).

It may appear that the retreat from totalitarianism's hostile environment into the solitude of the private enabled the individual to function relatively "normally," because life in one's snail's shell was "authentic" and "cosy" in contrast to the "artificiality" of the public world (Nowak, 1988, p. 187). But, as Milosz had argued earlier, such was not the case. The individual's "retreat" or "inner emigration" was no strategic choice, expressing a protean sense of self or the possibility of resistance. There was no "true sense of self" securely ensconced beneath the facade of a "false sense of self." Rather the coziness of the snail's shell and the binary opposition of the private versus the public - the "true" versus the "false" - epitomized totalitarian power and symbolized the fragmentation of the individual's sense of self.¹

¹Mira Marody, a Polish political psychologist, though precisely describing the fragmentation of the individual's sense of self, argued against this interpretation (1988, p. 107). Her critique, however, falls apart because of her failure to distinguish between vertical and horizontal splitting, her reliance on role theory, and her claim that fragmentation ignores the machinations of societal power in its concentration on the individual. Marody wrote that "though contradictory in their content, the pairs of behavioral attitudes do not actually seem to give rise to any special mental conflicts, which is understandable only if we consider the fact that each of the mutually contradicting habits is activated in different situations or, to put it more accurately, within the framework of different roles played by an individual" (1988, p. 107). A vertical fragmentation, as previously argued, does not necessarily entail unconscious and intrapsychic conflicts. Rather those conflicts are "acted out" in the mutually irreconcilable roles the individual performs. And it is because of the hegemonic status of totalitarian power that, as Marody herself wrote, "these [contradictory] habits are not controlled by the consciousness of the acting people. Developed in response to the recurrent specific conditions of activity, they function as peculiar automatisms and do not transform into verbalized cultural standards" (1988, p. 108). Fragmentation becomes the language of common sense and the actual

Passivity and docility were only the tips of the iceberg because once inside the snail's shell, the individual "was trapped in the cage [and] one's spirit had flown" (Reich, 1990, p. 78). Mirroring Elkins' and Bettelheim's work, totalitarianism's imprisonment of the individual promoted "regression to childlike thinking, dependency, [and] denial" (Marlin and Smith, 1991, p. 209) or, as Marody argued, a "learned helplessness" accompanied by a childlike "shortening of the temporal perspective" (1988, pp. 101-102; see also Zelman, 1991, p. 17).¹

In the DDR, this phenomenon was attributed to the paternalism inherent in totalitarian rule. Like a "father," the totalitarian state arrogated to itself the responsibility for supplying the individual with security and safety as well as all the other possible human needs for survival: food, clothing, shelter, discipline, education, entertainment, etc. (Meyer, 1989). Once the individual acquiesced to the colonization of his sense of self, totalitarianism had succeeded in the creation of a "dependent" person, trained to "rely" on the political apparatus for the satisfaction of all "private" needs (Reich, 1990, p. 79).² "An important

and institutionalized practices of everyday life, even if the meaning of fragmentation remains latent and cannot be verbalized in everyday life. The colonization and, therefore, the fragmentation of the individual's sense of self, thus, reproduces totalitarian power.

¹Passivity could be seen as a rational response to a situation in which the individual believed he had been rendered powerless. Conversely, "the ideology of impotence... was a perfect justification for [the individual's] passivity.... Once cannot rule out the possibility that it was an act of psychological rationalization performed by people who were ashamed of their own fears" (Nowak, 1988, p. 201).

²Irene Boehme, a leading East German dissident, argued that "the population saw themselves being treated as a child and behaved themselves correspondingly.... They expected from the State that their wants would be satisfied as children expect from their parents that their housing, food, and clothing will be provided. They rejected the State as a son rejects a strict father, an over-caring mother. They push responsibility away from themselves, expected oppression, and resentfully and unwillingly submitted and became inactive. Consciously or unconsciously infantilization continues

peculiarity of the life of the DDR was," according to Joachim Maaz, an East German psychoanalyst, "a definite infantility: an entire population was kept in an eternal childhood, so that one could torment, make stupid, and keep the children small with a 'black pedagogy'" (1991a, p. 85).

Having imprisoned and infantilized themselves, many suffered from inhibitions of initiative and creativity as well as being "weighed down by a sense of guilt" (Misselwitz, 1991, p. 31). More disturbingly, the result was all too often an emotionally "walled-in" individual in whom feeling, thoughts, and experiences were split off one from the other (Marlin and Smith, 1991, p. 209). The separation of these three realms of behavior led to the experience that "we simply did not feel any more what we saw and heard. Even what we ourselves experienced, we could no longer feel" (Maaz, 1991a, p. 77). The loss of cohesion was not merely a question of emotionally numbness, but one which included more profound expressions of disassociation.

Maaz argued that behind this desensitization boiled a "murderous rage, hate, deep pain, and often bitter sadness, which remained excluded from one's consciousness" (Maaz, 1991a, p. 76; see also McFalls, 1992, p. 7). Aggression built up that could not find a means of expression, release, or, sometimes, even recognition of the affect at all (Konrad, 1984, p. 82). The deeper the aggression bored into the individual's unconscious the worse the loss of that individual's cohesive sense of self.¹

to exist in a part of the population, who limit and rob themselves of the possibility of emancipation" (quoted in Meyer, 1989, p. 163).

¹The effects of unconscious aggression can be seen in the "paranoid, split view of the world [as] promoted in education and in the public sphere. Our

Nevertheless, this double life, originally represented by the twin masks of the private and "true sense of self" versus the public and "false sense of self" slowly became to be accepted as "natural normality" (Maaz, 1991a, p. 77). "Socialist schizophrenia" was the expected norm; it was the common sense story the individual told about his sense of self. In other words, totalitarianism had succeeded in shaping the cognitive and linguistic processes that provide content to the individual's telling the story of his sense of self in such a way as to prohibit the possibility of most individuals being able to structure their perceptions, memories, and experiences to generate a cohesive sense of self

system was always good. The capitalist system was destructive, inhuman, totally bad. There were no shades of gray" (Marlin and Smith, 1991, p. 209). This is not to say that there were no ideological reasons for the black and white division of world politics. It is to claim, however, that these ideological principles, due to unconsciously buried aggression, were reinforced by the defense mechanism known as projection .

CHAPTER V

Methodology and Research Design

To test this study's three hypotheses interviews were conducted from the fall of 1991 to the spring of 1992 in both the former DDR and Czechoslovakia. Interviews conducted in the DDR were held in German while those done in Czechoslovakia were in either German or English, depending upon the language competence of the interviewee.

Although the national histories of the DDR and Czechoslovakia are different and the degree and type of communist domination exercised in the two countries varied, it is presumed that both countries were subjected to totalitarian rule. If the individual's response to totalitarian domination in the DDR and Czechoslovakia indicates a common pattern, "then their source may be expected to lie in those common [totalitarian] structures, rather than in [the respective countries'] idiosyncratic histories" (Sztompka, 1991, p. 298).

I

In both countries men and women were interviewed. Two criteria were used to determine the suitability of a subject. The first was to limit the age range of the interviewees to those who were twenty-five (25) or older in 1989. No upper age limit was set so that interviewees would be drawn from age groups that were born before and after the imposition of Soviet-communist rule. Once again, since the purpose of the interviews was to determine whether or not

totalitarianism caused the fragmentation of the individual's sense of self, it was important to draw from as wide a sample as possible.

At the same time the sample had to be sufficiently focused so that meaningful comparisons across countries and age groups could be made. Therefore, respondents were selected according to their societal position.¹ Given that "real-existing socialism" was supposed to be a classless society, income or wealth could not be used as a benchmark, dividing social groups. Communist societies, however, were stratified societies with respect to the political, educational, and economic resources inherent in one's social position (Stark, D. 1992). Consequently, education and professional standing were used as indicators of differences of position. Subjects, therefore, were limited to urbanized individuals who possessed university degrees, were professionals, and/or in training to become professionals, i.e. academics, photographers, editors, entrepreneurs, singers, doctors, engineers, accountants, pastors, etc. No distinctions were made with respect to political affiliation, i.e. membership in the communist party or lack thereof.

Because of this self-imposed limitation - the exclusion of skilled workers, manual workers, farmers, service employees as well as the upper echelons of the political elite - the results of this study cannot be claimed to be statistically representative of the general populations of either the DDR or Czechoslovakia. The issue, however, is not whether the results of the interview data are statistically relevant, but whether they say something of importance concerning the psychological

¹For a theoretical explication of the concept of position see Bourdieu (1986, pp. 241-258).

reaction(s) of individuals living under totalitarian domination and whether those results speak to the Platonic and Tocquevillean understanding of power.

It may be argued that the urbanized professional class were particularly susceptible to penetration by totalitarian power because of their educational and occupational status. By their very nature, urbanized professionals were, in fact, more exposed to the dictates of the totalitarian political apparatus than, for instance, manual laborers or farmers. After all, the professional's years of education were filled with hours of propaganda and indoctrination, hours of study which were thoroughly irrelevant to his area of interest. Furthermore, a centralized totalitarian bureaucracy not only requires hordes of professionals to staff and administer its myriad offices and departments, but bombards professionals with hundreds of directives and instructions of what to do and what not to do.

Consequently, it may be true that urbanized professionals were more exposed than other social groups. Such a claim, however, says nothing about the necessary effect(s) of totalitarian power on the individual. Increased exposure does not necessarily imply actual penetration or colonization of the everyday life or the sense of self and it is the penetration, colonization, and, ultimately, fragmentation of the sense of self which is of empirical concern. Nor does the fact that the study of the effect(s) of totalitarianism on the urbanized professional cannot be generalized to the overall populace mean that totalitarianism had no effect on the individual.

The nature of totalitarianism made the recruitment of respondents a difficult task, even though the interviews for this study were conducted after the collapse of totalitarian rule in the DDR and Czechoslovakia. As previously argued, individuals subjected to totalitarian domination experience high levels of fear. Such mistrust produces unreliable informants and, thus, is not conducive to the standard techniques of survey data or in-depth interviews (Yakushev, 1972; see also Connor and Gitelman, 1977; Zaslavsky and Z, 1980).¹ Respondents typically "see no reason to distinguish sociological questionnaires from official forms, sociological interviews from testimony given, say, in court or at the police station" (Yakushev, 1972, p. 144).

Nevertheless, the in-depth interview technique has been successfully used in the DDR, for example (Borneman, 1991; Davey, 1987; Niethammer, 1991). What is most important is to gain the trust of the subject. Since totalitarianism causes the individual to retreat to an "inner emigration," it is essential for the interviewer to be accepted into the individual's "private sanctuary."² Entrance is solely dependent upon personal friendships (see Ash, 1990). Consequently, subjects to be

¹Thomas Davey, who in the 1980s studied the socialization of children in a divided Berlin, confronted this problem directly. Knowing that personal contact with Westerners could result in official punishment, ranging from home visits by the Stasi, the East German secret police, to receiving poor grades at school and being prohibited from attending secondary education, Davey not only guaranteed the anonymity of his respondents, but rarely took notes of his interviews while in East Berlin and did not tape-record his interviews (1987, pp. 36-38).

²For an analysis of the networks produced by a society of "private niches" see Hankiss (1988) and Siklova (1991).

interviewed were never directly approached by the interviewer.¹ A go-between was always used, one who had already trusted the interviewer and was trusted by the person who was to be asked for an interview. The go-between asked the potential subject if he or she would be interested in giving an interview. Only thereafter was the interviewer introduced the interviewee.

One possible drawback to this methodology is that the sample might be skewed, comprising only a distinct handful of friendship networks, all of whom had and may still have similar political, social, psychological, and moral outlooks. To guard against this claim, over twenty (20) go-betweens were used to collect thirty-nine (39) subjects. Most go-betweens referred the interviewer to only one subject. Only one go-between procured three subjects and in that case the three respondents did not know one another, lived in different countries, and fell into two different classifications - professionals and "ideologically" committed communists.

When recruiting potential respondents, the go-between was asked to reveal as little about the interview process as possible. The go-between was asked to say that the interview would focus on the relationships individuals had before 1989, that the interviewer was writing his doctoral dissertation, and that the interview could last up to six hours, though the average duration was between three and four hours. Lastly, the go-between informed the potential subject that the

¹In thirty-nine interviews only one subject was asked directly by the interviewer if he would participate in the study. Trust had already been established in that case because of the existence of mutual friends and prior social contact with the potential respondent. In fact, it was only after being invited to and attending a party hosted by the prospective interviewee in his apartment that the interviewer broached the subject.

interviewer would gladly meet the respondent at a time and place convenient to him or her and would be happy to conduct the interview in the respondent's home.¹

Because of the interviewer's need to gain the respondent's trust, it was important that the interviewer be invited into the home, i.e. into the respondent's "private sanctuary." Given the realities of totalitarian power, Davey argued, the interview process is most successful only when conducted in the "safety" and "security" of the respondent's home (1987, p. 87; see also Zaslavsky and Z, 1980). Only at home does the individual subjected to totalitarian domination feel at ease and, furthermore, admittance to the home implies that the interviewer has been accepted into the subject's private niche.

III

The instrument used to conduct the interview was an eleven question protocol. This protocol was pre-tested (Scheye, 1991) and, thereafter, slightly modified and expanded. New questions were added and some were dropped. Questions were more precisely worded and the order in which they were asked revised to provide the interview with a better flow and rhythm. The pre-test also provided the interviewer with invaluable experience, enabling him to hone his skills and refine his technique.²

¹Only one respondent insisted upon interviewing the interviewer before agreeing to an interview.

²For a discussion of the interview process and technique see Thompson (1988).

An effort was made to keep the questions as simple, non-prejudicial, and open-ended as possible in order to allow the subject maximum freedom of response. In the course of an interview, the interviewer posed numerous follow-up questions, pursuing themes already introduced by the subject, seeking clarifications, pointing out apparent contradictions, and on occasion challenging the interviewee. Even though the specific phrasing of the follow-up question depended completely upon the respondent's narrative, the most frequent follow-ups were: "I do not understand what you meant when you said ____"; "What do you mean by ____?"; "Could you say a little more about ____?"; or "How did you feel when ____?" At no time did the interviewer introduce new material or topics of conversation. Nor can it be said that the follow-up queries probed any one particular subject area more or less than another.

Because of the pre-test revisions, the interview was divided into two sections. Questions one (1) thru six (6) belonged to the first half of the protocol, questions seven (7) thru eleven (11) to the second. The first two questions of each half were the most difficult and time consuming. The purpose of this arrangement was not only to produce a symmetry between the two halves of the interview, but also to provide the interviewee with breathing space inbetween. It should be noted that the length of an interview varied tremendously, ranging from two and a half hours to up to six hours.

1. **Wie war es? Konnten Sie Ihre Gefuehle und/oder Erfahrungen vor 1989 beschreiben?** (What was it like? Could you describe your feelings and/or experiences before 1989?) The simplicity and flatness of the question was intentional. Since the question

presented the interviewee with no pre-determined handle or hook for him to grasp in order to orient himself, nor any hint as to the direction the interviewer would like the interview to take, the subject was left alone without guidance to determine how the interview would proceed. In other words, the question was designed so that the interviewee's response would be a direct reflection of his experience of his sense of self. If the respondent asked whether or not his response ought to be personal, professional, and/or political, the interviewer invariably answered that the choice was the subject's and whatever direction or theme the interviewee choose to pursue was perfectly acceptable.

The specific dating of the question - 1989 - was meant to create a clear "before" and "after" demarcation, forcing the subject to talk about feelings and experiences which occurred before the overthrow of communist domination.¹ The point was to compel the subject to go back in time and to develop a personal and historical narrative. Occasionally, an interviewee could ask if the dating of the question was intended to focus discussion only on the months of political unrest immediately preceeding the social transformations which occurred in the fall and winter of 1989. The standard response was that those few heightened months are, at this moment, not of prime concern. The years preceeding those extraordinary months, however, are. To assist the subject, further, the interviewer would, then, randomly name three or four years, for instance, 1977, 1985, 1973, and 1987, and rephrase the question accordingly.

¹Any extended discussion of current events by the interviewee in response to the first question was cut short by the interviewer.

The dating of the question was also of importance with respect to the definition of totalitarianism. As defined earlier, totalitarianism is the individual's experience of the penetration and colonization of his everyday and his sense of self by a political apparatus. In order to question whether communist rule in the DDR and Czechoslovakia was totalitarian it was essential to date its existence and probe the individual's experience prior to its collapse.

2. Konnten Sie Ihre Gefuehle und/oder Erfahrungen vor 1989 mit fuenf Adjektiven beschreiben? (Could you describe your feeling and/or experiences before 1989 with five adjectives?) This question, and the following one as well, were borrowed, though in slightly altered form, from a standard psychological interview schedule, the Adult Attachment Interview. Although the Adult Attachment Interview is designed to measure the level of attachment a woman has with her mother, one of the central features of the Interview is that, in eliciting memories about the individual's past, it allows the interviewer to draw certain conclusions about the woman's experience of her sense of self. It was for this reason that this question was chosen.

Once again, the simplicity and flatness of the question ensured that the subject took command of the interview, telling the story of his sense of self by choosing the topics of conversation. The intentions and interests of the interviewer were kept as hidden as possible. As with the first question, the second forced the respondent to extract his feelings and/or experiences while living under communist domination. Rather than allowing the subject to tell a narrative as in the previous question, given the task of naming only five adjectives, the interviewee

was asked to distill his memories. The intention was politely to demand a purification of emotion and thought.¹

More than one respondent expressed difficulties with this question, protesting that it was virtually impossible to encapsulate a lifetime of experiences into five words or phrases. Although agreeing with the complaint, the interviewer, nevertheless, asked for compliance.

It did happen that a number of interviewees were unable to come up with five adjectives. If after gentle pushing and silent waiting, the subject still could not name a fifth adjective both parties agreed to go on to the next question.²

3. Sie haben (first adjective from question 2) gesagt. Haetten Sie ein Schluesselerlebnis, eine Schluesselerinnerung, oder ein Gedaechtnis dazu? (You have said _____. Do you have a special experience, recollection, or memory connected to that adjective?) As with the previous question, and for the same reasons, this one is also borrowed from the Adult Attachment Interview. This time, however, the subject was given the opportunity to flesh out the adjective already selected and tie it to specific events, thus telling the story of his sense of self. Metaphorically, the relationship of this question to the previous one is similar to adding water to dehydrated and dried foods. The material expands, ripens, and becomes three dimensional as the subject constructs a narrative, detailing his experience of his sense of self.

¹If the subject began to expound upon any particular adjective, he was quietly but firmly asked to select a single adjective or noun phrase which would sum up the particular feeling or experience.

²Quite frequently, a subject would need up to or more than five minutes to choose his adjectives.

Question three was asked five (5) times, once for each adjective named in question two. The adjectives were taken in the order they were said by the respondent.¹

4. **Wie hat die Partei und/oder die Regierung Sie in Ihren alltaeglichen Taetigkeiten beeinflusst?** (How did the party and/or government influence you in your everyday activities?) As is quite apparent, this question was specifically targeted to address the question whether communist domination was experienced as penetrating and colonizing the individual's everyday life and, thus, could be considered totalitarian.² When a subject asked what was meant by "everyday activities," the interviewer responded, for instance, "Tuesday afternoon and Thursday morning, Saturday night and Wednesday evenings. Shopping, vacations, the workday, etc."

It is also important to note that the question asked about both the communist party and the government. No attempt was made to distinguish between the two political organs, for any distinction might have been construed by the subject as prejudicial.³ Furthermore, since the definition of totalitarian does not specify the type of political organization penetrating and colonizing the individual's everyday, it was inappropriate to assume that any one particular political apparatus was of more importance than another.

¹It did occur that in the course of explicating one adjective, the interviewee without pause began discussing a second. In those cases, the order of the questioning of the adjectives was altered.

²After the interview, one subject, an academic, in fact, wondered whether this question had been formulated because of the writings of Friedrich and Brzezinski as well as Hannah Arendt.

³It should also be noted that nowhere in the interview did the word "totalitarian" appear. Great care was taken to avoid all reference to the term during the interview. The term "communism" was used only rarely and with great caution.

5. Waren Sie politisch beschaeftigt? (Were you politically involved?) This question served a dual purpose. First, if the information had not been offered previously, the question was meant to elicit whether or not the individual was a member of the communist party and what his role in the party may have been. For demographic reasons such categorization was of interest even though nothing in the literature would lead one to believe that a member of the communist party would necessarily exhibit significantly different psychological behaviors than a non-member. Membership in the party, after all, was not confined to those who were "ideologically" committed to communist ideology. On the contrary, party membership was rife with "opportunism" and "careerism."

Second, the question enabled the respondent to identify himself as a dissident, if he had not done so already. Political activity was not necessarily limited to communist party membership. The identification of dissidents was crucial in order to validate or invalidate the hypothesis that political and/or religiously inspired dissidents did not experience the loss of a cohesive sense of self.

6. Wie wichtig ist Ihre Religion? (How important is your religion to you?) Similar to the previous question, this query was meant to ascertain whether individuals for whom religion was a central facet of life might experience their sense of self differently from their non-believing neighbors. In addition, and more importantly, dissent in both East Germany and Czechoslovakia was often, if not primarily, conducted under the aegis of and in association with the church, both Protestant and Catholic (see Benda, 1985; Philipsen, 1993; Zverina, 1985). To test the hypothesis that dissidents were able to maintain a

cohesive sense of self it is crucial to understand the intensity and depth of the individual's religious faith and to determine if the respondent's religious beliefs were the fount of the dissident's activities.

It is important to note that the term "religion" was not defined in the question, but rather it was left up to the subject to establish his own perspective. A "spiritual" commitment may be expressed in purely political terms and need not necessarily contain traces of conventional religious thinking, i.e. beliefs about God, an afterlife, etc. Consequently, whenever a subject asked what was meant by the term "religious," the answer was, " a spiritual or moral belief which influences if not determines behavior, though it need not necessarily mean a belief in God or any established religious authority."¹

7. **Koennten Sie die Wende seit 1989 beschreiben?** (Could you describe the changes since 1989?) As is apparent, this question mirrors question one (1) and is the first query of the second half of the interview. The intention was to note changes in the interviewee's experience of his sense of self by asking him to discuss post-1989 developments.

8. **Was haben Sie seit 1989 verloren?** (What have you lost since 1989?) This question deepens the approach of the previous query, by focusing more directly on feelings of loss. The intent was to narrow the interviewee's attention on differences between pre- and post-1989 feelings and experiences, i.e. to compare and contrast the two historical periods, before and after the collapse of communist rule.

¹The German word used was "geistig," which implies both an intellectual or mental as well as spiritual belief. For this reason, it was possible for a committed Marxist and/or member of the communist party to consider themselves "religious."

Though the question assumed that the respondent had experienced some sort of loss after 1989, the interviewer made no assumptions as to what that loss might be.

Furthermore, the question was purposely phrased with "demand characteristics." The phrasing of the question compelled the subject to confront directly the issue of loss, offering him little or no opportunity to duck it. That does not mean that the subject was forced to answer the question affirmatively, but that a negative answer required active work on the part of the interviewee.

9. Wir alle haben ein Selbst und Koerperbild - zum Beispiel, wie ich meinen Koerper verstehe and und was meine Beziehung mit meinem Koerper ist. Wie hat Sich Ihre Beziehung mit ihrem Selbst seit 1989 geaendert? (All of us have a picture of ourself and our body, for example, how I understand my body and what my relationship to my body is. How has that relationship changed since 1989?) Once again, the interviewee is asked to compare and contrast pre- and post- 1989 conditions, though this time with respect to his body. As previously argued, psychology assumes that "self-experience is intimately related to body-ego" and that the individual's sense of self is originally bound up with one's relationship to one's own body (Khan, 1974, p. 297). Therefore, it was presumed that changes in the individual's experience of his sense of self could be traced through changes in the individual's experience of and attitude to his body.

10. Wie haben Sie Sich vor 1989 Ihre Zukunft festgestellt und/oder vorgestellt? Nun heute? (Before 1989 how did you perceive or what did you imagine your future would be? And today?)

Questions about the future delve into the respondent's feelings of hope. Rather than ask the interviewee directly about the degree of hope he may or may not have had and how that compares to his feelings today, the intent was to encourage the subject to remember how he had projected himself into the future and how he does so today. By eliciting the comparison, one may be able to draw conclusions as to the respondent's sense of self during the respective periods in question.

11. Wer und/oder was war Ihr Feind vor 1989? Nun heute? (Who and/or what was your enemy before 1989? And today?) This question was meant to elicit political and or personal expressions of aggression and anger. Unfortunately, the interviewees, more often than not, responded to this answer by claiming that they had no enemies.

IV

At the beginning of the interview, the subject was informed that the protocol was designed to focus on the relationships individuals had before 1989. Other than saying that the interviewer was writing a book, no other indication was given as to the interview's purpose. The subject was also informed that any discussion which took place would be kept confidential and anonymous. A tape recorder was not used during the interview because of fears the interviewee might have about the permanence and future use of his recorded voice. Instead the interviewer took notes during the conversation.

As mentioned previously, the interviews lasted between two and a half and six (6) hours. With the longer interviews, one break was

taken, during which time the conversation turned to other matters and refreshments were had. These breaks lasted no more than forty-five (45) minutes.¹

There were four situations in which the entire interview was not conducted. In two of those cases the reason was one of time. Nevertheless, in both circumstances the most important questions of the interview were posed: questions 1, 2, 3, 7, and 8. In the other two cases the interview was cut short because the interview proved to be too painful for the subject. Both times, the interviewer did not press the subject for further details pertaining to particular topics because of the fear that deeper revelations could prove damaging to the interviewee. In each case, the interview had already lasted more than three hours.

Unfortunately and unexpectedly, one interview had to be discarded entirely because of religious differences and animosities which arose during the discussion. The subject was a Slovak Catholic fundamentalist whose views this interviewer found insulting to his own religious heritage.

¹On three occasions, however, the break was longer. One of these pauses lasted over three hours because the interviewee had family matters to which he needed to tend. In the other two cases, the interview had to be broken into two parts over two days because of time restraints. The time between the two sessions were three and seven days respectively.

Thirty-nine (39) interviews were conducted in both the DDR and Czechoslovakia.¹ Twenty-one (21) East Germans and eighteen (18) Czechs and Slovaks were interviewed. Seventy-two percent (72%) of the sample - twenty-eight (28) respondents - were men while twenty-eight percent (28%) or eleven (11) subjects were women. Broken up into the two different nationalities: there were

	<u>DDR</u>	<u>Czechoslovakia</u>
Men	14 (66.6%)	14 (77.8%)
Women	7 (33.3%)	4 (22.2%)

The ages of the respondents ranged from twenty-five (25) to sixty-eight (68). Broken up into the two different nationalities, the age ranges as of the autumn of 1989 were:

	<u>DDR</u>	<u>Czechoslovakia</u>
25-34	9 (42.9%)	3 (16.7%)
35-44	5 (23.8%)	8 (44.4%)
45-59	7 (33.3%)	5 (27.8%)
retired	0 (0.00%)	2 (11.1%)

¹For a comprehensive subject by subject breakdown of the sample by see Appendix A.

Fourteen (14) of the total sample were members of their respective country's communist party while twenty-three (23) were never members of the communist party. Two respondents had been thrown out of the Czech communist party, one in the 1950s and the other in the early 1970s. Broken up into the two different nationalities, respondent political affiliation was as follows:

	<u>DDR</u>	<u>Czechoslovakia</u>
Party	10 (47.6%)	4 (22.2%)
Non-Party	11 (52.4%)	12 (66.6%)
Expelled	0 (0.00%)	2 (11.1%)

CHAPTER VI

Totalitarianism: Living in an Hostile Environment

Totalitarianism, as it has been already defined, is the penetration and colonization by a political apparatus of the everyday life and the sense of self of the individual. Penetration and colonization implies that the individual's sense of self is fragmented, by which is meant the conscious and unconscious feelings of disintegration, disruption, and discontinuity. This loss of cohesion, in turn, is produced by the individual's subjective experience of "objective anxiety," the experience of an hostile and aggressive external world. In the case of totalitarianism, the experience of an hostile external world is the experience of being dominated by a political apparatus. Consequently, to argue that totalitarianism fragments the individual's sense of self it is necessary to show that the individual experienced an hostile and aggressive world and that "objective anxiety" can be attributed to a political apparatus.¹

To prove that the respondents experienced their environment as hostile and aggressive and that that aggression was attributable to the respective communist political apparatuses of the DDR and Czechoslovakia, interview data will be presented. In this chapter the East German respondents will be kept separate from their Czech and

¹Whether the individual consciously or unconsciously attributed his experience of "objective anxiety" to the political apparatus is largely besides the point. What is crucial is that the experience of "objective anxiety" was attributable to the political apparatus and that the respondent consciously or unconsciously made that attribution.

Slovak colleagues. Within each country, the data will be discussed as a composite whole, thus minimizing the discussion of individual interviews. Only in subsequent chapters will individual cases be interpreted in depth.

I

In 1991 and 1992, twenty-one (21) interviews were conducted in the former DDR. Eighteen (18) of the twenty-one (21) respondents, eighty-six percent (86%), expressed, in one way or another, the belief that they had lived in a world which was aggressive and hostile, at worst, or unresponsive and unempathetic at best. All eighteen (18) believed that the SED's domination of virtually all political, social, and economic organizations was the cause of the external world's apparent hostility and/or unresponsiveness. This experience of external aggression was not limited by gender, age, or political affiliation.

Only three (3) respondents did not experience their surrounding environment as aggressive and unempathetic. All three were communist party members. They were not just members of the communist party. They were "ideologically" dedicated members, believing in the party's ideology, as opposed to those who may have joined the SED in order to advance their career. What this suggests is that it was their "idealism" and "ideology" rather than merely their party affiliation which determined their experience of totalitarianism.

The totalitarian penetration and colonization of the everyday

One of the questions of the interview protocol was specifically designed to elicit the respondent's experience of everyday life and the degree of influence the government and/or the communist party had on that experience. Of the eighteen (18) respondents who believed that the DDR was an hostile and aggressive environment only six (6) interviewees unhesitatingly reported that the government/party had influenced their lives. The other twelve (12) at first denied that the government/party had much, if any, influence on their everyday lives. As these respondents told their stories, however, all of them acknowledged that the government/party had, in fact, negatively affected their day to day lives and that they had experienced their external world as hostile and aggressive.

Typical of those who unhesitantly spoke of the government/party's aggression was Mr. 1., a twenty-seven (27) year old medical scientist and SED member living in Berlin with his wife and child.¹ Echoing Friedrich and Brzezinski's description of totalitarianism, he said that the government/party "basically, fundamentally" affected his "every day, from morning to night and into the night because the Party-Government-State was not separated one from another. And the economic system was dependent upon the political and social decisions made by the Party-Government-State. From the books I could read at night... the radio I could hear. Naturally it was all of one piece" (Mr. 1., 1991, interview).

¹All interviewees are identified by their gender or title and have been assigned a number. The East Germans respondents are numbered 1 through 11. The Czech and Slovaks subjects begin with the number 20.

Mr. 2., a thirty (30) year old non-communist opera singer, married with a child and living in a northern DDR city, also noted that the government/party's influence was all pervasive. He reported that when he thought about how "the Party-state was responsible for what our living standard was, what we could buy or with what difficulties we could get certain things, then it is simple to say [that its influence was] in the everyday. In Halle, for example in order to get an apartment" (Mr. 2., 1992, interview).

For him, however, the power of the totalitarian regime was much more immediate and sinister. Mr. 2.'s wife could not nurse their daughter when she was born. Unfortunately, the baby was also unable to digest properly the normal, commercially available ersatz milk. In Halle, the city in which he was living, a coffee company was manufacturing a new type of baby formula. This milk was being produced primarily for the export market and, thus, was unavailable for domestic purchase. Only those who were in the SED or had the correct connections could purchase the milk.

Somehow, Mr. 2. knew that in Halle there was a children's clinic which had access to the locally produced ersatz milk. "I went there and spoke to a doctor," Mr. 2. said, "and it was fortunate that this doctor was good. He said I could pay here and take the milk with me. And when I think how unfair it is - against all the others who had such children - that the Party, who always said that we do everything for our children, practiced this. I asked the doctor why we couldn't buy the milk and he said that the milk was only for export" (Mr. 2., 1992, interview).¹

¹It should be noted that the doctor's sale of the milk was illegal.

More interesting than those who unstintingly recognized the pervasive power of the East German political apparatus is the majority of respondents who at first denied being affected by the government/party's power.¹ Though during the course of the interview these respondents did acknowledge the government/party's influence, their initial denial indicates the type and depth of power embodied by totalitarianism. Their responses directly address the Platonic and Tocquevillean conception of power.

Mr. 3., a fifty-three (53) year old divorced and remarried editor and party member lived in Berlin. Though at first he claimed that the government/party had no direct influence, he admitted in his very next sentence that the system's power was all encompassing.

Every law came from the government. Naturally, this had affected, influenced my life. For example, I could not travel where I wanted. Everyone was obligated. In every house was a so-called 'house book.' In this book was written down who lived there and who visited and stayed longer than three days. It had to be written down. We had nothing written in this book even though we had many visitors. The police came here and asked about visitors and we said we had no visitors more than three days. I do not know how strictly this was enforced in other houses (Mr. 3., 1992, interview).

Even though he disobeyed the law of the land, Mr. 3. recognized that his welcoming guests into his house was susceptible to national authority. The point is not whether he broke the law, but whether or

¹The interview data did not indicate why some respondents immediately acknowledged the power of the political apparatus while others did not. The difference had no effect on whether or not the individual experienced a fragmentation of his sense of self.

not he perceived that the government/party reached into his everyday life.

Mr. 4.'s response to the question of government/party influence mirrored Mr. 3.'s almost word for word: an initial denial followed by an acknowledgement. Immediately after repeating his denial a second time - "nothing from the government" - Mr. 4., a thirty-eight (38) year old professor and former diplomat who had been a member of the party and was living in Potsdam with his wife and two children, noted that the government/party's influence

was in another direction. The problem is to specify the effect. This or that. In principle [the government] was everything. It was very strong. It is difficult to find something, to [name and] pull something out that is specific and definitive. Mondays were always given away. These meetings [communist party meetings] were almost always meaningless, senseless, but that is not the problem (Mr. 4., 1992, interview).

Even some dissidents fell into the same pattern. At first, Mr. 5., a fifty-eight year old married pastor and dissident living in Berlin whose four children had already moved out of the house, said that

in my everyday activities the system had not actually influenced me. I never did something because of practical reasons. I was not dependent upon the state. I was not financially dependent. I could be critical at every time. There were no demands on me; I made no concessions (Mr. 5., 1992, interview).

He went on to say, however, that "it lay on the person to say yes or no" to the regime. "That they could influence me was my choice. One could say that my turning my rage against myself, yes that was their

influence. The unconscious is in any case stronger than the conscious and the influence was overall and general. When you want to see it that way, the party and the state had a constant force" (Mr. 5., 1992, interview).

In each of the twelve (12) cases the initial denial concealed a profound effect. Though none of the twelve (12) could put their finger on a particular individual or action by the government/party which had influenced them, each and every one of them testified to the government/party's power. Mr. 4., for example, admitted that the government/party had a "very strong" influence, despite the fact that he could not name what it was. While refusing to accept the possibility of influence, Mr. 5., on the other hand, attributed his turning his rage against himself to the influence of the political apparatus. Despite testifying to the normalcy of life in the DDR, Dr. 1., a fifty-eight year old pastor and church leader, married with six children and living in East Berlin, emphasized that almost everyone had "conformed" to the dictates of the regime.

It is this conformity which, in part, accounts for the pattern of denial and subsequent acknowledgement of government/party influence. Since the government/party's influence was in "every law," "everything," and "overall," there was no escaping totalitarian power. Life in the DDR was "normal" because everyone was affected. It did not matter whether one was a SED party member, dissident, or unaffiliated citizen. Because of the impossibility of escape, most individuals had only one story to tell about their experience of everyday life. But because there was essentially only one story to tell "it [was] difficult to find something, to [name and] pull something out that is specific and

definitive." It was common sense. The government/party, when "seen in that way," was, as Mr. 5. said, a "constant force."

As was indicated in the chapter entitled "Witnesses to the Effect of Totalitarianism," and as will be argued below and in subsequent chapters, the experience of being continuously subjected to "constant force" rendered the individual helpless and powerless. The individual subjected to totalitarian domination was no longer in control of his own life. His denial of being affected by the totalitarian political apparatus was also a denial of his experience of helplessness and powerlessness. It was a denial of reality. In other words, the initial denial was a defensive manoeuvre, a way for the individual to reassert control over his sense of self, which he had, in fact, long ago lost. It was a denial that totalitarianism had penetrated and colonized the individual's sense of self when, in fact, the opposite was true.

Invariably the denial was followed by an acknowledgement of the scope and depth of totalitarian power in the DDR. The individual could not deny that totalitarian power had penetrated and colonized his sense of self. Though "it lay on the person to say yes or no" to the regime, the political apparatus had "influenced" the individual's "choice."¹ These respondents had conformed and they could not run away from their conformity. Despite their initial denials, they could they escape their

¹The recognition that the totalitarian regime "influenced" the individual's behavior is often a means by which the individual avoids accepting responsibility for his own actions. Denying the power of the totalitarian regime, on the other hand, implies that the individual is in control and responsible for his actions. The question of individual responsibility, therefore, often, though not always, works in the opposite direction from the individual's denial of having been influenced by the government/party. Dissidents with their experience of guilt are the primary exception to this rule.

experience of helplessness and powerlessness. To acknowledge anything else would be, as Dr. 1. said, "nonsense."

Totalitarian power as an hostile and aggressive environment: the experience of "objective anxiety"

Whether or not the individual initially denied the government/party's influence on his everyday life, all eighteen (18) East German respondents experienced totalitarian power as aggressive and hostile. As outlined in the theoretical discussion of cumulative trauma, the experience of a hostile and aggression external environment is not necessarily a question of specific deeds or misdeeds. Rather it is an accumulation of silent and often invisible events, the steady pattern of behaviors embodied in an intangible and prevailing atmosphere. If one were to look for a single dramatic event, an individual piece of legislation, or violent action one would all too frequently misunderstand the words one was hearing. If one were to expect that each and every respondent experienced totalitarian power in the same way one would not recognize the effect of totalitarianism for what it was. It was not just because totalitarian power had become common sense that Mr. 4. could not name or specify the effect of totalitarianism. It was also because the penetration and colonization was silent and invisible.

The experience of totalitarianism in the DDR as hostile often originated in the very mundane and practical nature of everyday life, embedded in the government/party's monopolistic control over education and employment, as had been theorized by Friedrich and Brzezinski. Dr. 1. said, for instance, that his children were not allowed to take their Abitur, the qualifying national examination to enter

university, simply because he was a pastor. Dr. 2., a fifty-nine year (59) old Berlin micro-biologist married with one child, claimed that he was not allowed to become a full professor because he was not a SED party member, even though he had published three or four times the number of articles almost every other full professor in his department had. Although her job involved international trade and all other members of her office were given permission to travel abroad for work, Ms. 2., a twenty-five (25) year old divorced Berlin businesswoman, was not given a passport because she had refused to join the SED. Ms. 3., a thirty-four (34) year old theatre producer and non-party member living outside of Berlin, was not allowed to go to a library in West Berlin to read a rare theatre book, which she needed to produce a particular play.

These restrictions and impediments accumulated over time and in time became something much more damning. For instance, whenever Ms. 2. received a letter or telephone call from the West, her father, a party member and prominent executive of a large national company, was questioned by the authorities.

My father had difficulties in his job because of me and I saw the consequences and moved out. Because of my father's job he was watched. Things I did reflected on him. I received a call from West Berlin and the next day my father was called in and asked why he didn't have a positive influence on his daughter. It was also with letters. He could not get letters from the West and then neither could I. When I got one my father had to justify it. I did not want to hurt my father in his job so I moved out. We did not quarrel; we understood one another well. I moved out in order not to burden him. At that time I had no idea I was in opposition

to the system. There were only accidental things. A call from West Berlin, a letter from Angola, or a peace service in the church (Ms. 2., 1992, interview).

Over time, because of a letter here, a conversation there - the mundane activities of everyday life - even Ms. 2.'s parents' home was no longer safe from the machinations and power of the DDR's political apparatus. To protect her relationship with her parents from being further penetrated by the political apparatus, Ms. 2. was forced to leave her parents' home.

Dr. 2.'s inability to be promoted to full professor was not the first time he had been discriminated against because of his refusal to join the SED. Once while he was working in the countryside, Dr. 2. was offered a better job, only on condition of his joining the party.

I could have been the chief agriculturalist and would have received a motorbike. I was the highest qualified person and the position was open. Normally I should have received the position. But when I was invited once more to be in the party and asked if I wanted to have this position, I said no and received a bicycle and assigned to the animals [despite the fact that he had previously lost a leg in a farming accident] (Dr. 2., 1992, interview).¹

Dr. 2.'s job assignment was, as he noted, a form of "indirect punishment." The more direct punishment was that he was told that his actions made him politically suspect, "an uncertain person." As a result, over the years he felt he was being "observed," even though "one never

¹Dr. 2.'s refusal to join the SED reflected a strong and cohesive sense of self. He knew what he wanted and vigorously asserted his beliefs. Such a claim, however, is only valid for the time period during which he turned down the party's invitation. His refusal, however, says nothing about the condition of his sense of self during the years and decades since then.

knew who" it was who was doing the observing. Decades after his refusal to enter the party, Dr. 2. felt as if he were still "tolerated only on the second level" despite his technical and professional excellence. "I was tolerated," he continued, "only as a needed and necessary idiot. I could not make decisions. Only Frau Professor, my [former] student could" because she was a party member (Dr. 2., 1992, interview).

Dr. 2.'s being labelled an "uncertain person" stuck with him for almost forty years and, eventually, made him feel as if he were a "useful idiot," a tool to be manipulated according to the whims of the political apparatus. Over time, Dr. 2. was made to feel powerless and helpless. Even an incompetent former student was given the power to lord over him. It is in this sense that the professional came to experience his external environment as hostile and aggressive. It was not the words which were first spoken in the early 1950s which made Dr. 2. experience his environment as he did. Rather it was the decades long consequence of those words, the silent and continuous accumulation of experiences, which told him that his environment was unfriendly.

Living in the DDR, the professional anticipated what might happen, what could happen, and fearing the worst reacted accordingly. It was life lived in a constant state of dread or, as Anna Freud would categorize it, in perpetual "objective anxiety." Ms. 4.'s experiences with the Stasi are illustrative of a life lived in dread. One day in the mid-1980s on her way back from school, Ms. 4., a thirty (30) year old half-Bulgarian, half-German, non-party medical doctor living in Berlin with her husband and daughter, was approached by two Stasi agents, who tried

to recruit her to be an uncover agent. Over the next few weeks they returned time and again.

I have thought it over for a long time and was oppressed and did not know if it would affect me in the future or my father or mother professionally. Years long. I attempted to block it out because I did not want to be burdened by it and because I couldn't change it and I didn't want to go to Bulgaria. It was in the unconscious and it was always there. The information would stay there eternally. It was always disquieting and unsettling. They always said they would come back, but when? Next year? Sometime? Anytime?" (Ms. 4., 1991, interview).

After the initial series of attempts, no one ever visited Ms. 4. again; nothing was said and, to the best of her knowledge, she never suffered negative repercussions. Nevertheless, Ms. 4., to quote Anna Freud, lived in objective anxiety, "the anticipation of suffering which may be inflicted on [her] as a punishment by outside agents" (A. Freud, 1966, p. 143). Reduced to a state of powerlessness and living a life in constant dread - "forepain" - Ms. 4. experienced cumulative trauma.

For Mr. 6., the thirty-one (31) year old music director of medium sized city's theatre company and orchestra, the experience of living in a hostile and aggressive environment caused him to give up part of his sense of self, namely his dreams and ambitions. Rephrased, Mr. 6. abandoned who he would like to become because he knew that the political apparatus would not allow him to realize his sense of self.

Recognizing the extent of totalitarian power, Mr. 6. "knew that there were certain things against which one could do nothing. And on the other hand, one knew one had to do certain things" (Mr. 6., 1992,

interview). He knew, for example, that he could not apply for musical positions or competitions in the United States. Nor could he write and produce a musical work without government/party approval.

Once, in the early 1980s, he had written a satirical musical piece. He showed the piece to his composition teacher who told him

that it would never be performed in the DDR. He said I would end up in jail and the performance would never happen because in the auditions it would be stopped. One needed permission to perform anything. And he said that if it were ever given permission the head of the university would be in jail. He convinced me to stop; that there was no purpose. They advised against it. I gave up writing it. In this position I had given up on myself" (Mr. 6., 1992, interview).

What is of interest is that no one in a position of political authority told Mr. 6. to stop writing his musical piece. No-one had to tell him, for he never even asked. Other than showing a work in progress to his composition teacher, nothing, in fact, happened. He stopped himself because of what he feared and expected. No one told Mr. 6. not to apply to musical competitions held in Western countries. He had never been singled out, reprimanded, or punished. Mr. 6. was rendered powerless not merely because he felt powerless, but because he acted as if he were, in fact, powerless. Absent any direct effort by the government/party, Mr. 6. robbed himself of his freedom. His sense of self had been penetrated and colonized. As he admitted, "I dissuaded myself too quickly.... One should not say one had to. One should admit that we adapted and conformed. Anything else is a lie. We believed that the State had power over us. That is the feeling of powerlessness" (Mr. 6., 1992, interview).

Because the political apparatus of the DDR penetrated and colonized the individual's sense of self, communist rule was totalitarian. The government/state had power over the individual because the individual consciously and unconsciously experienced his life as being under siege or attack from an hostile, aggressive, and/or unempathetic external world. But it was not only that that the individual lived in a hostile and aggressive world and that his sense of self had been penetrated and colonized. Life itself had become inhuman.

Mr. 1., for instance, said that the most important feeling was the experience of being "restricted, narrowed, confined." He was not only referring to his inability to pursue the scientific research he wanted or to the impossibility of reading the newspapers and novels he wanted to read. The sense of restriction had deeper and more profound roots.

Mr. 1. felt

imprisoned and incapacitated. My voice had no worth. One developed a fine sense of when one had to wear a mask and not wear one. It was to check the person who sat across from one. This feeling was very well schooled so that we did not come into conflict. To wear a mask, to move stiffly, was very unpleasant. It was like being a worm, who in whichever direction he turned around inhumanly vegetated and did not see the sun."

The issue is not whether Mr. 1. lived in his own private sanctuary, safe and sound in his "inner emigration." For Mr. 1., life had become inhuman. Phrased differently, the totalitarian power had blocked the sun and, consequently, life vegetated and withered.

Persistently attacked or ignored by her external world, Ms. 5., an unaffiliated, thirty (30) year old, married with two children, editorial assistant, living in Berlin, also experienced life in the DDR as inhuman.

The rage was never gone. One resigned oneself to it somehow. Often one had the feeling that one fell into a deep hole. One fell in the hole and one was helpless, injured, and enraged. I cannot say exactly when one fell in. There were too many situations. In principle, it was that one ran into the wall of the state. For example, one did not receive certain things. Shopping. Every time one comes to the same border, the same Wall. It was not that I was alone in the hole I fell into, but one noticed that others fell in too. It is so and one must so live. It was not a good feeling. What will one do? One must continue with the situation and live the life one is given. One could only do the best. One had accepted and excused a lot in order to have a relatively quiet life for oneself. For many things one closed one's eyes. Simply ignored. One had the rage in the stomach and one said so at home. Today this and this happened. That had stilled the rage. Then one was not pleased with oneself, but what do you want to do? It was a daily compromise that one made with oneself. Like an animal in a locked cage in a zoo and eventually it does not spring against the bars. For a person, one seeks the inner freedom. But often we felt like an animal in the zoo. There are many animals who are deadened. Somewhere closed. So that is how I would describe it. I did not fear anything or anyone. One deadened oneself. The opposition was broken (Ms. 5., 1992, interview).

Penetrated and colonized by totalitarian power, Ms. 5., mirroring the responses of "inmates" of other total institutions, deadened herself. Experiencing her external world as aggressive, she, like Wolfgang Leonhard, locked herself up. For her, however, "locking herself up" was

not the prelude to a decision, as it was for Leonhard. Rather, like Mr. 6., she "compromised" herself. Although she herself had perpetuated the colonization of her sense of self, having actively numbed her emotions, she experienced her sense of self as having been reduced to that of a caged, but pacified, beast.

For others, however, being rendered powerless and helpless, was not experienced as inhuman, but as being threatened with annihilation. Though Mr. 7., a thirty-nine (39) year old actor and party member living outside of Berlin with his son and the mother of his child, was convinced that he "lived in the better part of the world," he, nevertheless, thought it unadvisable to question the regime. The consequence, he feared, would be that his life would be changed because the government/party was "always present." "The party came out," he said, "through one's colleagues, over concrete things," such as rehearsal times, backstage arrangements, audiences. "They were small points," he said,

that were not existential. It goes with, it was always the point of discipline. Probably from the very beginning the point and goal was to be in what was greatest: that was from the FDJ [the communist party's youth group] till work. It was always that one had the responsibility for the entire humanity and that was a form of discipline. One believed that discipline was necessary for one to get ahead. It was better, so it was thought, to be a victim of things than to have feelings. The individual was not as important as the society. I was not as important as the development of society (Mr. 7., 1991, interview).

Mr. 7. felt unimportant, almost superfluous, preferring to be a victim of circumstances rather than a feeling individual. Carrying these

feelings to the next level, Mr. 7., referring to his fantasies and anxieties, said, "I believed that the thing would overcome me and not me it. That it would eat [fressen: eat in the manner of animals] me and not me it" (Mr. 7., 1991, interview). The fear was of being wounded, overcome, and annihilated. One conformed in order not to be consumed. "Objective anxiety" became annihilation anxiety. Or as Dr. 2. confessed, "Here, if one were thoroughly stubborn one would have been destroyed" (Dr. 2., 1992, interview).

Whether the fear of personal destruction or annihilation was an accurate perception of reality is, to some degree, beside the point. Reality matters, but just as important is the experience of reality and the respondents acted and experienced their external world as if it were aggressive, hostile, and unempathetic. Though actual punishments were rare, most East German respondents experienced "objective anxiety," consciously or unconsciously, believing that their everyday life and sense of self had been penetrated and colonized by the communist political apparatus. Some felt that they were not permitted the full human range of thoughts, feelings, and desires. Others experienced totalitarian aggression as reducing them to an animal-like existence. Others still believed they were threatened with annihilation.

Totalitarianism as experienced by "ideologically" committed communists

As already mentioned, it cannot be claimed that every respondent experienced the external world as hostile and aggressive. Three (3) of the twenty-one (21) subjects did not. All three were members of the SED. All three fervently believed in the party's ideology, bordering on a religious adherence or faith.

Mr. 8., for instance, a married Berliner with two children, was an officer in the East German army and worked in the Defense Ministry. When questioned about his faith in the party despite the "evident" economic decay of the late 1980s, he answered

I never believed or even possibly thought that the [economic] numbers could not be true. I had never. It was like a faith. You can compare it to a religion. [The party] may have been scientifically grounded, but one had simply believed. Religion is an idealistic Weltanschauung in which there is a supernatural knowledge of the creation of the world and the people in it. The idea is that a manifested God had the idea to create the world. I believed in something that can be rationally grasped. With the Party words, when one reads them I read them like the Ten Commandments. One must believe in the Party and not God. But the Party is materialistic and God idealistic and religion is idealistic" (Mr. 8., 1992, interview).

This "idealistic" belief in communist ideology as represented by the SED was seconded by both Ms. 6. and Ms. 7. They may have disagreed with particular policies and individual members of the party, but both steadfastly held to their political convictions. Ms. 6., a forty (40) year old divorced literary editor, stated without equivocation that she "was a member of the Party. I had to obey the rules but that was voluntary. [It was] my choice and I agreed with it. I could have resigned. I was a member and every Monday I went to the regular meetings" (1992, interview). Perhaps it was their "idealistic" and fervent commitment to the party and its ideology which enabled these three individuals to avoid the experiences of their fellow countrymen, but what is of importance is that, unlike their fellow citizens, none of

the three believed or perceived that their external world was threatening or aggressive.

II

In 1991 and 1992, eighteen (18) interviews were conducted in Czechoslovakia. All eighteen (18) respondents expressed, in one way or another, the belief that they had lived in a world which was aggressive and hostile, at worst, or unresponsive and unempathetic at best. Once again, this experience of external aggression was not limited by gender, age, or political affiliation. It also made no difference whether the subject was Czech or Slovak.

Seventeen (17) of the eighteen (18) respondents believed that the communist party's domination of virtually all political, social, and economic organizations was the cause of the external world's apparent hostility and/or unresponsiveness. The only exception was Mr. 20., a thirty-four (34) year old communist party member, who with his wife and two children, lived in Prague and worked as a staff person for a committee on the highest rungs of the party.

The totalitarian penetration and colonization of the everyday

The one striking difference between East Germans and their Czech and Slovak counterparts is that the Czechs and Slovaks were much more likely than the East Germans to admit uninhibitedly to having been influenced by the government/party. Fourteen (14) of the eighteen (18) Czechs and Slovaks, seventy-eight percent (78%), spoke openly of the government/party's influence on their everyday life.

One of the reasons for this difference could be the Prague Spring of 1968.¹ After having attempted to develop a different form of government and break loose from Soviet imperialism, Czechoslovakia was invaded by the Warsaw Pact. What seemed "normal" and "inescapable" to East Germans was understood by Czechs and Slovaks as "corrupted" and "debased," the result of a foreign military occupation.²

Time and time again respondents spoke of the consequences of 1968 and the differences in levels of "freedom" before and after that fateful year. Almost thirty percent (30%) of the respondents had been directly affected by the events of 1968 or communist party cleavages which occurred beforehand. Four (4) of the eighteen (18) interviewees, twenty-two percent (22%), were either thrown out of the communist party after 1968, had been thrown out of the party during the early 1950s, or were children of parents thrown out of the party.³

¹Yet another possibility could be the divergent paths of post-1989 developments in the DDR and Czechoslovakia. The DDR has been colonized by its big brother and now no longer exists. Its "revolution," it could be argued, have been hijacked (Borneman, 1991a, 1991b; Philipsen, 1993). The "Velvet Revolution" in Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, was essentially a homegrown concoction. Furthermore, before its disintegration, Czechoslovakia was governed by Vaclav Havel, a highly popular and deeply respected moral leader. Consequently, Czechs and Slovaks may be better able to confront and accept their past than their East German compatriots.

A third reason could be that Czechoslovakia's history is not identical to Germany's. The Czechs and Slovaks are more accustomed to being a subjugated cultural, whereas German history is not replete with long periods of foreign domination. The Czech and Slovak Weltanschauung is, therefore, different from the German's and, thus, enabled them to acknowledge their servile status more easily.

²It could be argued that the DDR was also subjected to a foreign military occupation. In the case of East Germany, however, most professionals understood the occupation as being the result of having lost a war, for which their country was to blame and during which their country committed crimes against humanity. The Soviet occupation of the DDR, therefore, was justifiable in ways in which the occupation of Czechoslovakia could never be.

³For discussion of the Prague Spring and its aftermath see Skilling (1976), Simecka (1984), and Wright (1984).

Mr 21., for instance, a sixty-eight year old retired and widowed economist, was never able fully to practice his career after being expelled from the communist party in the early 1950s. "For the first few years after my expulsion," he said, "I was forced to work in a railroad car factory. I had made my university studies; I knew languages and after being expelled I was prevented from looking for jobs, let alone just getting them, [being hired after finding a vacancy]. Once I applied to a tourist office and thus part of the state apparatus and, therefore, I could not work there. That was in 1958" (Mr. 21., 1992, interview).

In the mid-1960s, due to the loosening of communist party restrictions and the gradual liberalization which eventually led to 1968, he was able to gain employment at a major Prague economic institute. In 1972, during the period of "normalization," Mr. 21. was, for the second time, dismissed from his post because of his political leanings. Once again, finding any form of employment was difficult.

I had this mark in my papers.... I went looking at twenty-five (25) different jobs and sometimes getting the job seemed close and so they wanted to see my papers. When I phoned to see if I had the job in three days, they said the job was not longer open (Mr. 21., 1992, interview).

Mr. 22., a forty-four (44) year old married historian with two children, told a similar story. After being fired from his post in the national museum, he eventually found employment in a building association as a clerk doing public relations. He was always fearful of losing his job or being the pretext whereby his wife would lose hers. Like Ms. 4., Mr. 22. lived in a constant state of dread of "objective

anxiety." These fears became especially pronounced in 1977, the year in which Charter 77, the umbrella Czech dissident movement, was organized. "During 1977," he said,

the police interrogated me. It was because of Charter 77. I had contact with those who signed the Charter, but I did not have the opportunity to sign the Charter. I was under the control of the police for a couple of years and they called me in. It was dangerous for my wife who worked in [a Czech governmental organization]. It was dangerous. The police forced me into a neutral position and that lasted two or three years. After that there was more peace for me. The police had the possibility to make me lose my work. The position of my wife was precarious and we had two children. I was not here and to search for another work was too difficult. I had a thick correspondence with firms, various authorities. The Labor Bureau came to my office from time to time (Mr. 22., 1992, interview).

Although Mr. 22.'s wife was not punished for the actions of her husband, quite often the children of those who were the victims of post-1968 "normalization" were also singled out. Mr. 23., a married thirty-three (33) year old stoker and lawyer with two children living in Prague, believed that his inability to attend university as a regular student was the result of his father's expulsion from the communist party. Ms. 20., a single thirty-six (36) year old teacher, librarian, and researcher from Bratislava, believed that she was discriminated against because of her father's having been an associate of General Secretary Dubcek in 1968. Ms. 21., a forty-three (43) year old married account with two children, living outside Bratislava, was convinced that her son had difficulties attending university because the family was known to

be religious and in political opposition. Whether these respondents' familial ties actually hindered their or their family's future prospects is essentially unimportant, for it is the individual's subjective experience of his environment as hostile and aggressive which is paramount. What is crucial is that the individual believed that he was discriminated against by the government/party because of his political or religious convictions.

Just as profound an effect as not being able to practice one's profession or being able to attend university was the attendant social isolation and ostracization. Mr. 22., for instance, noted that the friends he had had in the government and the party "slowly sank" after his expulsion. Being known as a troublemaker and an individual in whom the police had a decided interest, Mr. 23 admitted that

people at the factory were frightened to speak with me. When I ate lunch I ate alone. There was no-one around. This situation from a psychological point of view had an influence on me. It was a bit depressive. I started to behave a little differently. Not to talk to everybody about what I think and know. But that was after a particular experience. But still I felt freer. When I said something I could say the truth without exceptions. But that is mainly from a moral side. But from the practical, I had more problems" (Mr. 23, 1992, interview).¹

¹Mr. 23.'s experience of greater freedom because of his dissident activity will be discussed later in the chapter entitled "Dissidents." There is nothing contradictory about Mr. 23.'s experience of social isolation while at work and his greater sense of freedom. As he pointed out, social isolation was a practical problem while freedom is a moral one. Furthermore, Mr. 23. was not isolated within the community which mattered the most to him, i.e. the dissident community.

Totalitarian power as an hostile and aggressive environment: the experience of "objective anxiety"

Those who were not singled out by the communist regime for punishment after 1968 also experienced their environment as hostile and aggressive. Echoing the testimony of the East Germans respondents, often, as Mr. 21 said, the experience of hostility and aggression was rooted in the details or minutiae of everyday life. Since changes in one's life had little to do with one's own efforts, achievements, or actions, the individual experienced a loss of control. In other words, the individual's sense of self had been penetrated by the political apparatus.

Ms. 23., a Slovakian forty-three year old married geographer with one child, spoke about her experience of loss of control and the concomitant dread. When asked to describe her feelings and experiences in the years before 1989, she said that she felt as if a

nervousness and stress was controlling me. I felt very weak. Sometimes I could control my nerves and stress, but in some cases it just went through me, behind me. It was very strong and not a very pleasant feeling. I was ready to quarrel about silly things in that moment for example. When later thinking about the reason of the quarrel I knew it was silly, but I couldn't control myself (1991, interview).

Not only could she not control herself, but Ms. 23. could not define what it was that was wrong. "I recognized," she said, "that in society and among my friends that I and my family, we were not in a very good mood. That something is wrong. Some stress increased. Of course,

maybe we felt the reason, somewhere inside us we recognized that something was not in order, but we could not define it."

Mr. 24., a fifty-one (51) year old museum curator and party member in a large Czech city, married with two children, also experienced a loss of control. Telling about his needing to acquire the approval of the local political apparatus in order to open an exhibit, he had to include "a couple of pictures from the Red Army or a picture or two from modern factories" because the exhibit "had to go up to today to show the glorious history of today" (Mr. 24, 1992, interview). Once after leading a group from his museum to Belgium, Mr. 24., upon his return to Czechoslovakia, was interrogated by police because one evening in Belgium some members of the tour had "had a bit to drink." Mr. 24. was informed that he "had the responsibility for what happened. It was clear then that I was in a police state. There were also small stories that I can hardly remember. It was an injustice. That the one who was not the cause had to be responsible to watch over everything" (1992, interview).

Paralleling the East German data almost word for word, the result of these almost insignificant moments was that the individual often felt humiliated, for his life was not his own. Repeating Ms. 5.'s metaphor, Mr. 24. confessed that life in Czechoslovakia

was similar to being in a cage. Every trip was a problem. Because one lived here for so long, it was only occasionally that one knew that. It was a normal life. Only here and there did one climb into the problem. That was the normal life. One had somewhere [done something] against the traffic rules. And then came the police and [they were] asking you what you have done here. They knew

exactly where I had been. I did not know their names. It was cat and mouse. It was like a lord with his slave. It was humiliating. The one was so small (1992, interview).

Followed, harassed, and toyed with, the individual felt small, insignificant, and demeaned. Wherever one was and at almost every moment of the day, at work or at home, Mr. 24. continued, one had to live within the political apparatus' "small rules and all rules came from the party. They had made all the rules. The instructions, directions. Different state festivals, meetings, authorities who lead the firms. It was the method of control, work control" (Mr. 22., 1992, interview).

Even if the respondent "did not meet the government" in his everyday as Mr. 25., a thirty-five (35) year old, married with two children state prosecutor and party member living in Prague, claimed, one was still open to being controlled and attacked by the government/party. Mr. 26., a married non-party scientist and inventor with six children, living in a large Czech city, acknowledged that there was no need to be in contact with the government/party on an every day basis to feel the effect of the government/party's totalitarian power. It was evident, he said, "through those conditions they arranged. You are not in contact with the sun, but [with] the rays you are in contact. Like the clouds and the rain. You have to look at what is coming. You have to protect yourself not from the sun, but the rays" (Mr. 26., 1992, interview). Once again, the individual lived in a state of "objective anxiety," ever cognizant of the need to protect himself against the possibility of being attacked or contaminated, burnt by the "rays" of totalitarian power.

Because of the experience of "objective anxiety," the individual, to protect himself, inhibited and censored his desires, wishes, dreams. As hypothesized by the theory of cumulative trauma, repressing or denying one's dreams and desires was not necessarily related to any specific actions or misdeeds by the government/party. Rather it was a way of life, part and parcel of common sense, and, thus, accepted as normal and routine. It was the conventional story most individuals told about their sense of self. "In this time," Mr. 25. said, "I stood before some barriers in myself. I knew what I could not want. It is not pleasant, but people are used to it. The barrier, the expression, self-censorship. For example, because of my job I could not travel to the West. For me it was worse than for others. There were many books which I could not read. I knew about it, but..." (Mr. 25., 1992, interview).

Just as with the East Germans, Czech and Slovaks adapted themselves and conformed to the dictates of totalitarian power. The cages within which they lived were of their own making. Because it was the individual who censored himself, the political apparatus had successfully penetrated the individual's sense of self and colonized it. There was no possibility to retreat to a "safe haven," within which one realized one's "true sense of self," for the individual's sense of self was inexorably bound up and defined by totalitarian power.

Mr. 27., for instance, a forty-two (42) year old divorced non-party mathematician living in Prague, believed that his thoughts were not entirely his own. "You see," he said, "they devastated the country. In everyday life almost nothing can be done in a natural way.... It was not as it should be. One was disturbed every day and couldn't think about

what one wanted" (Mr. 27., 1991, interview). Not being able to think his own thoughts, Mr. 27. knew that his sense of self had been affected. Totalitarianism, he said, "influences your character. Perhaps you may be quite tolerant, but every day if you were irritated you may not be tolerant. Disturbed by any noise, upset all the time. Not in a normal mode. You are in some... Like if you get an electric shock every day, then, you don't behave normally" (1991, interview).

Phrased differently, Mr. 27. feared that totalitarian power had invaded his unconscious, transforming his sense of self. Unlike Mr. 25., Mr. 27. did not believe that his life was normal or natural. Unfortunately, and this time much like Mr. 25., Mr. 27. had no other story to tell about his sense of self. Totalitarian power had limited not only the narrative possibilities, but his narrative capabilities. Feeling that there was nothing he could do about his transformed sense of self, Mr. 27. felt helpless and powerless. "I felt a very big tension and the pressure," he said.

I was not satisfied. Not satisfied with either society or myself. If one was not able to manage, one is not satisfied. I mean manage in the sense of change. To change society and also myself. I felt much worse than the people that come from the West. If you hate something for many years, it changes you. You are no more a cultured/civilized man (1991, interview).

Totalitarianism as experienced by "ideologically" committed communists

On the other hand, as already mentioned, there was an exception to the overall pattern. Unlike the East German "ideologically" committed communists, Mr. 20. experienced his external environment as hostile

and aggressive. He did not believe, however, that the government/party was responsible for that experience.

Mr. 20. admitted that the Czechoslovakian situation in the 1980s was "difficult" and that many opposed the rule of the government/party. Consequently, he described his experience as a "feeling of tension, of uncertain position, of movement in our neighborhood, in international connections, in society and even in my job some tension. Not certain feelings. We have no definition of this process; we tried to name all these problems, but we failed" (1991, interview).

On one level, the growing pressure Mr. 20. experienced could be attributed to the political situation, the waning strength of the government/party and the concomitant percolating power of dissent. As such, Mr. 20's perceptions would appear to be quite perceptive and prescient.¹ At the same time, however, Mr. 20. believed that he was surrounded by enemies and isolated. Being one against many, his enemies caused the tension he experienced. "I personally thought," he said, "that a part of the opposition were not friends of mine. If I thought, for example, of the ideas of the dissidents and the policy of our leadership - the worst enemies would be dissidents." Even though he believed that the government/party's policies were not optimal, Mr. 20. judged the dissident movement as being his enemy.

¹In the sample, Mr. 20. was the highest ranking communist party member interviewed. His elevated position of authority and power may explain why he perceived his environment as hostile. Simply put, because he knew more, he was better able to judge the political situation and note the deterioration of the communist party.

Furthermore, he sincerely thought that the dissidents' policy "was designed to cause a conflict in society" and because of his party position he believed that the party was not about to compromise its power or change its policies. "In spite of this feeling," he confessed, "even then, [the party's] leadership was part of my own position. That is why it was extremely difficult. The feelings of tension were not so high as to destroy barriers of discipline or take a position of strong opposition to this leadership." Knowing something was wrong and fearing conflict, Mr. 20. remained wedded to his political ideology; the government/party was not at fault. Following the analysis of the East German data, what seems to be the case, then, is that it was Mr. 20.'s ideological commitment to and relative comfort in the communist party which prevented him from attributing his experience of living in an hostile and aggressive environment to the political apparatus.

III

Members of the professional class in both the DDR and Czechoslovakia experienced their surrounding environment as hostile, aggressive, and unempathetic. Excluding "ideologically" committed communists, professionals in both countries believed that their respective government/party was responsible for the creation of such an environment, whether or not particular actions or deeds could be attributed to the government/party. Furthermore, in both countries the individual's sense of self had been penetrated and colonized.

Given the data, one can safely assume that in both countries the professional individual believed that he had lived under a totalitarian regime. Summarizing the data up to this point, defining totalitarianism, and referring to the "objective anxiety" experienced by the individual due to totalitarian domination, Mr. 28., a Czech mathematician and non-party member living in Prague with his wife and two children, said,

Communism was a system of anonymous power. Decisions were made without any concrete responsibility. Both sides, nobody was responsible for anything.... The anonymity and responsibility, and the stupidity of the propaganda made me angry. Always someone else made the decision, but no one knew whom. I organized my life to avoid this intervention in my private life. Therefore, I refrained from certain acts. Everything was political, everything could be interpreted in political terms. If I go to the central square or if I don't go both could be interpreted politically. Any kind of joke was considered a political action" (Mr. 28., 1991, interview).

CHAPTER VII

Professionals

Most respondents living in the DDR and Czechoslovakia, as has been shown, experienced "objective anxiety." Their everyday life and sense of self was penetrated and colonized by the totalitarian political apparatus. It was hypothesized that totalitarianism fragmented most professionals' sense of self, by which is meant that most professionals experienced conscious and unconscious feelings of disintegration, disruption, and discontinuity.

This loss of cohesion was not a strategic choice on the part of those professionals who were neither dissidents nor "ideologically" committed communists, understandable in terms of role theory or indicating some kind of resistance. Nor was it an expression of a "protean" sense of self. Rather, as suggested by Plato and Tocqueville's understanding of power, the individual's loss of a cohesive sense of self was the result of totalitarian power being able to determine what was considered common sense and, thereby, influence, mold, or "indelibly fix" the individual's experience of his sense of self. In other words, the hegemonic story totalitarianism told was about the individual's loss of a cohesive sense of self. More specifically, because totalitarianism had created an environment which was perceived to be hostile and aggressive, most professionals, having experienced "objective anxiety," exhibited signs of a fragmented sense of self due to cumulative trauma.

To assert that professionals experienced a fragmentation of their sense of self does not mean that the level of disintegration was similar in each and every individual. The degree and severity of the loss of

cohesion varied significantly from individual to individual, ranging from expressions of emotional numbing to annihilation anxiety. Objective criteria such as level of political responsibility, parental upbringing, gender, and exposure to political pressure, among others, may account for much of the differences of degree. Subjective factors may include, but not be limited to, the degree of satisfaction, or lack thereof, derived from employment, family, and friends. Lastly, it cannot nor should it be overlooked that individual differences may have been the result of inherent psychological factors - differing capacities, vulnerabilities, and thresholds - which are not be susceptible to analysis.

Twenty (20) of the twenty-five (25) individuals, eighty (80) percent, who were neither dissidents nor "ideologically" committed communists, exhibited signs of a fragmentation of their sense of self. What is striking is the data's remarkable consistency, regardless of nationality. The vast preponderance of professionals, irrespective of gender, political affiliation, or age, displayed some symptoms of a fragmented sense of self. The uniformity of the data suggests the remarkable power of totalitarianism to influence, shape, and determine the individual's sense of self.

For ease of presentation, the case studies will be analyzed by type of fragmentation. The data could be arranged in a half dozen different ways and categories, all of which would be equally valid. The point is not how the data is presented, but the uniformity of the data and range with which a loss of cohesion was experienced and expressed. Nine different, but not mutually exclusive, categories have been broken out: (1) a sense of powerlessness; (2) emotional numbing; (3) compartmentalization of life spheres; (4) compartmentalization of one's

love life; (5) withdrawal into creative isolation; (6) disease as a metaphor; (7) fear of being eaten; (8) annihilation anxiety; and (9) the exceptions to the rule.

I

As previously argued, totalitarianism caused the individual to experience feelings of powerlessness and helplessness. Often this sense of powerlessness was associated with the individual's feeling a loss of control due to his believed inability to initiate action or further his own dreams and desires. Feeling impotent in the present and thwarted in the possibility of achieving future goals, the individual's sense of self fragmented.

Mr. 24.'s experience was typical of those who expressed feelings of powerlessness. Mr. 24., a fifty-one (51) year old Czech curator and member of the communist party, described his life under Soviet-communist domination as requiring the "art of schizophrenia." Part of what Mr. 24. meant by the "the art of schizophrenia" was that he felt as if he had been "poisoned." It was not so much that Mr. 24. had been poisoned by someone else, but that he had done it to himself. "One had to choose," he said, "to be a dissident or to conform." Acknowledging that he did not have the courage to be a dissident, and feeling guilty because of it, Mr. 24. conformed and as a result felt as if he and his country "were always dependent upon someone else."

There was a time, however, when both Mr. 24. and Czechoslovakia were independent and powerful: the spring of 1968. Czechoslovakia

had held its "own fate [in] its own hands," Mr. 24. said, but "then came the Soviets, and then came the knowledge that we cannot and may not change ourselves." With that knowledge came the sense of powerlessness, which he described as one of "gloom, melancholy, sadness, and hopelessness." It was as if "one's mother had died."

It was not just that he was grieving and alone in a hostile world, but that he had acquiesced to that bereavement. Mr. 24. was "poisoned" because he did not resign from the communist party, believing that his resignation would entail the "destruction of my existence. It meant the loss of all existential security. Not only for me, but children and wife." Metaphorically, having already lost his mother and the generation who had given him life, Mr. 24. feared losing his present family as well. His connection to the past had already been taken away from him and, now, his present bonds were being threatened as well.

Consequently, Mr. 24. "made himself small." He constructed his life around a series of "closets," within which he "sought to remain [him]self." As he described it, secrecy was necessary to "maintain the feeling of oneself. It is humiliating. It is beautiful to be a gentleman. It is simple. It is difficult to be a gentleman in Czechoslovakia when the politics have changed four or five times."

Being an historian, Mr. 24. filtered many of his beliefs and attitudes through his professional lenses. His understanding of Czech history, much like his art of living, stressed a split image. Mr. 24. began by acknowledging that Czechs are a Catholic people, but then questioned that assumption by asking "how was it inside?" The Czechs, he said, were among the first to experience the Reformation, but, he noted that

in 1627 Prague was the scene of a mass executions of Protestants after the Czechs lost one of the major battles in the Thirty Years' War.

And then the entire population was re-Catholicized against the Reformation.... Many Czechs, however, stayed Protestant inside. Under this schizophrenia, our forefathers have also suffered. The schizophrenia has a long history. Throughout our history we have been so formed and stamped. Now Communist or non-Communist. For 200 hundred years Catholic or Protestant within. And before, Hus or being an opponent of Hus. Or also with the question of German-Czech. Am I Czech? What is better for me? So today I am Czech. Either/or.

Who am I? Mr. 24. wondered. Perhaps his understanding of Czech history is realistic and the choices he made to fragment his sense of self rational, evidence of strategic choice. Given overwhelming levels of oppression and violence - be it the Counter Reformation, German domination, or Soviet-communist dictatorship - Czechs, a small, powerless people practiced realpolitik and played the roles assigned them by the great powers. Nevertheless, although Mr. 24. described his "inner emigration" as if he had split himself into a "true sense of self" and a "false sense of self," the story he told about his sense of self betrays a profound discontinuity in his sense of self. If his answer to the question "what is better for me?" appears calculatingly rational, his answer is also decidedly disjointed. Is he Catholic-Protestant? German-Czech? Communist or non-Communist? Quite simply, powerless and motherless, Mr. 24. was not sure who he was.

The story with which Mr. 24. summarized his history lesson epitomizes the fragmentation of his sense of self. Returning to the theme of Catholicism, Mr. 24. told the following yarn: "I will never go in

the Church and when I must I will never pray. And when I pray I will not kneel. And when I kneel I will keep my convictions. It is difficult to keep one's convictions if one must kneel." Though Mr. 24. denied that he had been forced to kneel, his being forced into an "inner emigration" and his use of the word "schizophrenia" to describe both Czech history and his own "art of living" bespeak of his having had to kneel as well. Kneeling was no strategic choice. Nor was it the assumption of particular role, suggesting the possibility of future resistance. Rather, it was the story Mr. 24. told about his sense of self. Powerlessness, penetrated, and "poisoned", Mr. 24.'s sense of self had lost its cohesion.

Mr. 24.'s "art of schizophrenia" caused by his experience of powerlessness corresponds to Ms. 21.'s maternal anguish. Ms. 21., forty-three year old Slovak accountant, first spoke about her experience of powerlessness when telling of the post office's illegal inspection of a package she had received from the West. "I felt as if I wanted to cry," she said,

but it wouldn't help. I wanted to get angry, but I was not allowed to go the post office and ask them to explain why the letter was ripped. It was impossible. I wanted to go to the post office. The anger was inside. With this special anger I did nothing. That was the fact. We could not move it. Like a stone.

Summarizing her overall feelings, Ms. 21. said that "with the best will in the world, I don't, can't do what I want when I have the opportunity." Thwarted from doing what she wanted by her sense of powerlessness, Ms. 21. believed that she "was not in control" and, as a result "bad things happened."

Although it could be argued that Ms. 21.'s experience was only an exaggerated form of a loss of efficacy, it was not simply that Ms. 21. had little effect on the world. No one told Ms. 21. not to go to the post office. Her fear stopped her. She would not let herself go there. It was not that she was incapable of expressing her anger and rage. Rather, she believed that she was not permitted to and, thus, could not let herself feel those passions. This does not mean that Ms. 21. numbed herself, for emotions did exist somewhere inside her, but, "like a stone," they were inert and immovable. Consequently, she had little control over her own emotions. Refusing to exercise initiative and be the master of events, she believed that life happened to her. Powerless, Ms. 21. held onto and tightly bundled her anger and as a result blocked further expression of affect.

The greater her experience of her helplessness, the more tightly she wrapped her affect and anger. Eventually all her energy was focused on protecting herself from her emotions and, thus, from acting as well. She became brittle and her brittleness emerged as maternal anguish. Recognizing the influence a mother can have on a child, Ms. 21. noted that she could not show her emotions to her children. "I can cry at night when I am asleep," she said.

It is very important for [the children] to see that their mother is happy. When I see mothers on the tram who are crying, you want to have your child to sit down without moving. The mothers are so nervous, even when the child only moved. All mothers only want their child to sit down and be good. You can see these mothers. She is not speaking with the child. She is only sitting and thinking about I do not know what. When the child asks something, the mother is very nervous and

shouting, 'Shut up. At home I do not have time for you. Go and watch TV. Go and leave me.' It is only now that I know it. Twenty years ago I was like this. Sometimes yes. I had very much to do. It is very bad. It was and it is (emphasis added).

Terrified of falling apart herself if she were to loosen the iron grip on her emotions, Ms. 21. only wanted her children to be good; to behave well and leave her alone. The child's neediness was mirrored by her own lack of control. The child's slightest movement reminded her of how tenuous her grasp on herself was and interfered with her maintaining her fragile equilibrium. Without extraordinary control, Ms. 21. feared that she would burst like a hot air balloon. Perhaps Ms. 21.'s iron discipline and refusal to express the emotions she experienced forestalled an explosion. Nevertheless, she lived the life of a marionette, rigidly controlled from above. Penetrated and colonized by totalitarianism, she fragmented her sense of self.

II

Even if Ms. 21. had not emotionally numbed herself, other professionals did. Rather than tightly binding their affect, those who were emotionally numbed, as Lifton had indicated, denied and disavowed their emotions. Their emotional numbness was an expression of a loss of cohesion.

Dr. 2., a fifty-nine (59) year old micro-biologist, spent a long time at the beginning of his interview recounting his "pre-history." Over and over again, he mentioned that his "pre-history is important [for an]

understanding of my attitude" before 1989. Never once was he specifically asked about his World War II experiences and never once did he make clear precisely how his "pre-history" was related to or explained his experience of Soviet-communist domination. Nevertheless, it was evident that he associated communism with Soviet domination.

The number of deaths and tragedies recorded in Dr. 2.'s pre-history were in the dozens. The neighboring farmer disappeared one day after being taken away by the Russians. He himself was taken as a prisoner of war, even though he had not been a soldier. Germans who had been in the Nazi party, as his father had been, "were taken into a bunker. And when the bunker was full, they were shot." His grandmother was shot by the Russians because she could not walk. His mother died of pneumonia. His ten year old sister, "without a mother, among strange people, died of hunger in four weeks." Dr. 2. almost died himself because in a Soviet labor camp he developed tuberculosis, which later required his having to spend two years in a hospital.

The most remarkable aspect of Dr. 2.'s story was the absolute matter-of-factness with which he spoke and the clarity of his memory. His voice never wavered, changed intensity, or betrayed the slightest emotion. At the same time, his recollection of dates and miles walked, for example, was stupendous. The combination of the two left the interviewer with an uneasy feeling, as if these events had happened to Dr. 2. without involving him at all. It was as if Dr. 2. had been thoroughly numbed by his experience, resulting in his having filtered out or dissociated affect from what happened.

Dr. 2.'s psychic numbing was explicitly evident in his reaction to his work. He described how, in his academic and research work, totalitarianism had made him act submissively and feel submissive. Nevertheless, when asked whether that state of submissiveness made him angry, Dr. 2. answered that he was

never angry. We were used to it. I was also not sad. It was impossible to demand; I cannot demand something impossible. I had harmonized my wishes with the conditions, my wishes with the possibilities. The borders here were respected. I am realistic. Envious, sad. Not so. Because no one of us thought that it could change. If one did something, one would have hurt oneself.

Rather than hurt himself, Dr. 2. rationalized his behavior and silenced his emotions. Since nothing could be changed, his desires and dreams had to be curtailed. Numbing himself was his defense against the invasive nature of totalitarianism rather than a sign of resistance. This was not a strategic choice or a role freely adopted. He numbed himself because, as he acknowledged, to do otherwise would have been overtly masochist or, to borrow a phrase Dr. 2. used later, "suicide." Colonized by totalitarian power, Dr. 2. chose to numb himself and fragment his sense of self (see Kohut, 1977, pp. 192-193).

At the same time, however, he felt guilty. When describing how he had become a "necessary idiot," Dr. 2. said the "guilt is only a self-induced guilt. Not a guilt about the system. One must do what I did. The guilt is mine." Why did Dr. 2. feel guilty? He had committed no crimes; he had broken no civil laws and, having repeatedly refused to join the SED, he had remained "true" to his religious convictions.

Dr. 2. felt guilty because he had become part of the system. Although he did not commit "suicide," he had hurt himself. At his research institute, he took on the responsibility of organizing those cultural events deemed worthy by the political apparatus. Accepting totalitarian hegemony, he believed that "everyone had to have such a function. Without such a function one could not remain at the University. It was the admission. It was necessary. If I had not done this societal work, I would then have been suspicious."

When Dr. 2. commented on how he felt about assuming responsibility for cultural events, he said, referring to the communists, "these idiots, they hurt themselves. It was nonsense. They hurt only themselves." But it was Dr. 2. who was the "necessary idiot" who "hurt" himself. He had assumed the "societal function" without having been requested to do so, willingly making himself a fellow "idiot." Because the pain was self-inflicted, he knew he was guilty. Phrased differently, Dr. 2. believed that the two choices confronting him were suicide or a guilt-swept numbing. Either way, the cohesion of his sense of self was a stake.

Like Dr. 2., Mr. 25.'s goal was to prevent himself from masochistically hurting himself. Like Dr. 2., Mr. 25., a thirty-five (35) year old lawyer and communist party member, numbed himself. Describing his generation's upbringing, Mr. 25. said that "we grew up here [in Czechoslovakia] and we are used to it here. I was not so courageous to do something against the regime. The regime let us sleep."

"Sleep" had many different meaning for Mr. 25. "Sleep" was one way by which he protected himself. As he said, "I knew what I could

not want. It is not pleasant, but people are used to it. The barrier, the expression, the self-censorship." "Sleep" was also "not only sleep. It was agreeable, pleasant. But I did not believe that I could make something better. I did not think I could effect the destruction of the regime. I thought it was possible and I hoped it was really possible to live and work without hurting myself." In other words, Mr. 25.'s metaphoric falling asleep was a response to his self-censorship, to his "knowing that I could not say what I want." Sleep was not having to experience the powerlessness and helplessness. Rather than hurt himself, he choose the more "pleasant and agreeable" alternative, emotional numbing in an attempt to protect his the cohesion of his sense of self.

But much like Mr. 24.'s "art of schizophrenia," Mr. 25.'s sleep did not prevent fragmentation. The defense against an externally perceived assault failed. Mr. 25. fell asleep because he knew "it was better not to think about some things." Admitting that he was deadening his desires and was living a life largely devoid of desire and affect because such emotions were deemed dangerous, he acknowledged that he fell asleep "in many places." This was not a strategic choice suggesting resistance. Rather than suffer the anguish of desire's self-inflicted pain, Mr. 25. choose to dissociate affect from thought and action. His sense of self was not continuous and flexible, but disrupted and fragmented because so much of it was relegated to the realm of affectless existence. Following in the footsteps of Dr. 2., Mr. 25 numbed himself.

III

Contrary to the theory of a "protean" sense of parallel selves, when an individual experiences discontinuity and disjuncture between the various different activities of his everyday life he often suffers from the loss of a cohesive sense of self. This type of loss of cohesion can take many different forms. A discontinuity can exist between one's work and one's home life, between one's work and one's public life, or between one's political activities and one's personal life. Many professionals living under totalitarianism experienced such a radical and relatively impermeable disjuncture between two or more life spheres.

It is wholly unremarkable to find evidence of a division of life spheres in the everyday life of the individual. Regardless of the political environment, in the course of any given day each and every individual participates in numerous different activities and assumes the duties and obligations of many varying roles, most of which are completely unrelated. How one behaves, for instance, as a father may have little if any bearing on one's performance as a graphic designer and, in turn, may have little to do with one's participation in a local botany club. Despite the unrelated nature of varying life spheres and the individual's activities in them, most individuals experience their performances in each and every life sphere as theirs, belonging to them. There is no radical rupture across varying and disparate roles for most individuals. Rather, there is a sense of continuity and self-sameness regardless of the functional requirements of the role.

What is striking is that in the DDR and Czechoslovakia the individual experienced the separation of life spheres as an unbridgeable gulf. It is not particularly important which specific life spheres were involved. What is important is that the individual's sense of self did not cross the borders between life spheres. Instead the individual experienced each life sphere as distinct and separate from each and every other life sphere, with each requiring its own unique sense of self. In other words, there was little continuity in the individual's sense of self across and among the different life spheres and activities of daily existence. The professional individual, thus, experienced his life and his sense of self as being fragmented between and among life spheres with little or no communication between the varying shards.

For Mr. 9., a twenty-seven year old married engineer with two children, living in Berlin, his loss of a cohesive sense of self was due to the irrevocable division of his life between his political activities in the SED and his personal life. Mr. 9.'s reasons for joining the communist party may have been ideological, but in equal measures his motivation was purely personal: "One must conform to what is because one cannot do much against it" and "Why not go into the Party? Why not? One can arrange things for oneself if one goes where the Party/power is" (Mr. 9., 1992, interview). A careerist, Mr. 9. sought, whenever and wherever possible, to "satisfy [him]self."

Personal advancement, Mr. 9. knew, required compromises. Often, as he said, one must "hold [one's] mouth. I never lied, but the compromises were there when it was something not to do, not to say." Because of his ambition, Mr. 9.'s rationale was to "learn everything. I

wanted to understand everything. Be better rhetorically to argue back. And then with power to punch them back."

Mr. 9.'s tactic, however, resulted in a vicious circle. The more compromises he made, the more "frustrated and lost" he felt. The greater the need "to hold his mouth," the more intensely Mr. 9. strove to learn, "to find the correct way, not the direct way, but the way around."

Mr. 9.'s technique for "satisfying himself" involved not only a high degree of rationalization, but also a denial of all affect other than that of ambition and revenge. When asked what role affect played in his desire "to punch back" and what emotions he experienced in his political activities as the SED Party Secretary of his factory, Mr. 9. answered that

the emotions, then, it is difficult to remember. That is a disadvantage of our [communist] world. Our world did not have much to do with emotion. Marx had forgotten about the emotions. My emotions were on another level. I had felt disappointed, very down. But this life outside had not much to do with emotions. The frustrations were an intellectual argument. But with real emotions it had nothing to do.

In other words, for Mr. 9., "life outside," which referred to his political activities, was a realm thoroughly devoid of affect other than those pertaining to careerism. "Real emotion" existed only in his personal life. Consequently, Mr. 9. lived two distinct and separate lives. One was the public and political or, to use Mr. 9.'s word's, the "official one." It was in this life sphere that Mr. 9. wanted to punch back and satisfy himself. The second world was "the internal one, where one is alone." Although one could not be satisfied in the internal world, it was only in the internal world that real emotions existed.

Often during the interview Mr. 9. spoke about the conflict between these two life spheres or worlds. Impassioned, he spoke about his attempts to bring these two realms together. Each time, his conclusion was the same.

These two worlds had overall no relationship with one another. Absolutely none. None at all. Altogether none.

As a result, Mr. 9. was "permanently dissatisfied." Living in "these two worlds, there was no place where I felt at ease, whole." Mr. 9. was not a "protean" individual experiencing a sense of parallel selves because he could successfully function in both worlds, raising a family and being a SED Party secretary. On the contrary, by keeping his life spheres divorced from one another Mr. 9. had fragmented his sense of self. The realm in which he sought satisfaction was a barren and emotional wasteland. His personal and family life, the life sphere susceptible to real emotion, was impotent and incapable of providing fulfillment. Though existing in both life spheres, it was as if Mr. 9. lived in neither.

Mr. 9. divorced the life spheres within which he lived because of his career ambitions. In contrast, Mr. 26.'s experience of a discontinuity between life spheres originated in his acceptance of a marxian theory of human nature, although he did not belong to the communist party. As a result he devalued all other life spheres, i.e. familial, aesthetic, ethical, erotic. In Western parlance, Mr. 26., a fifty (50) year old scientist and entrepreneur, was a workaholic, but for him work was, at one and the same time, the means by which he could "realize" himself and the method by which he escaped totalitarian aggression.

Mr. 26., in fact, gave work an almost religious status, saying that from "work, he [made] a religion." Following Marx, Mr. 26. argued that

work is the way to realization. You have no other way to realize yourself. For me it is work, producing work.... The main reason of life is to realize yourself. And to realize is to produce.

Continuing his marxian analysis, he noted that the world is invariably and naturally divided into two groups, for instance, nobles and peasants or communists and non-communists. Since Mr. 26. was not a member of the communist party or a nobleman, he was a peasant and, thus, had to labor accordingly. When asked what it was like to feel like a peasant, he answered that he "did not draw a conclusion from it. Some people did and they left the country. I took it in stride. It was natural. If someone is handicapped, I took it as natural to be handicapped." Soon thereafter, Mr. 26. used another metaphor: that of Christians being fed to the lions. "Nero took them and fed them to the animals. But the Christians, they had no anger. They accepted it as natural.... If I was angry, so... I would be an angry man all the time. What would I get?"

It is not merely that Mr. 26. suppressed his anger and swallowed his emotions, numbing himself and rationalizing oppression as natural and immutable. Echoing Mr. 24.'s description of Czech history, Mr. 26., referring to and praising the philosophy of Masaryk, the first president of Czechoslovakia, claimed that he and the Czechs were experts at handling violent oppression. Czechs, he said, like Masaryk, have the ability to be "two-faced." Mr. 26.'s method of being "two-faced" was to flee into work to the detriment of all other life spheres. Work was his

"inner emigration," a safe haven and sanctuary relatively free from the threat of totalitarian aggression.

It may appear that Mr. 26.'s technique of coping in an hostile and aggressive environment was a reasonable and rational means by which he sought to protect the cohesion of his sense of self. The difficulty with such an argument is two-fold. First, Mr. 26.'s flight into work was an escape from reality, causing an irrevocable breach in the unity of his life spheres. Work became thoroughly separated from all other life spheres and was the repository of Mr. 26.'s religious striving to realize himself.

Furthermore, spiritualizing work and echoing the early Christian motto - Give unto Caesar what is Caesar's - Mr. 26. denied the influence and importance of the environment in which he lived. Equating himself with the Christians in the Coliseum, Mr. 26. condemned himself to death. His martyrdom was symbolized by his imprisonment in work. When asked about how he had envisioned his future before 1989, Mr. 26. admitted that his future "was connected with what was outside of work," by which he meant his "property, garden, and houses." Confessing that he worked in "two shifts," Mr. 26. acknowledged that "what was most important was after work." Though work was the only means by which Mr. 26. could realize himself, that attempt at realization was inherently meaningless, for meaning cleaved to what was after hours. In other words, Mr. 26. condemned himself to a meaningless death.

"Two-faced," Mr. 26. had, in fact, worked a "double shift" and as a result his sense of self was fragmented. There is no hint here of a "protean" sense of self or an individual who assumes a particular role in

defense of his cohesive sense of self, suggesting resistance to hegemonic power. Having split off his life spheres one from another, Mr. 26. fled into work. But work was an umbrella beneath which there was nothing to protect.

IV

If both Mr. 9. and Mr. 26. expressed their loss of a cohesive sense of self by emphasizing the importance of work, some professional women exhibited their fragmentation in terms of more personal relationships. Time and time again, just as Ms. 21. spoke about her maternal anguish or, as will be shown later, Ms. 1., a forty-eight (48) year old East German opera singer, told about her being forced to give up the man she loved, female respondents' fragmentation was often expressed in terms of their love relations and familial lives. Perhaps this can be explained by totalitarianism's being, as discussed earlier, experienced as a paternalistic society. Irrespective of their formal legal equality, women were doubly dependent. Not only were they, as were most professionals, excluded from public life and made dependent upon the political apparatus. They were made dependent as women. Consequently, it was as a woman, and in terms of their bodies as sexual beings, that they expressed their fragmentation.¹

Ms. 20., a thirty-six (36) year old researcher, admitted that she experienced totalitarianism as paternalistic. "I would have liked to try

¹It ought to be remembered that the individual's sense of self is first experienced in terms of one's body.

my own forces. Our society was paternalistic. Like some fathers who said you could do this and this and this. Also in the family. I was economically dependent upon my parents. Also with an apartment." She testified that she was dissatisfied because she was "doing something, but your life was going away. You were spending your life in ways you don't want to. Monotonous, greyness of life.... It was not my life. I did not want to do it."¹ If Ms. 20. experienced her life as if it did not belong to her, whose life could hers have been? The answer quite simply is that, of course, it was her life, but her experience of paternalism had successfully fragmented her sense of self so that it appeared to her that she was not in possession or control of her own actions.

For Ms. 20. this loss of cohesion was acknowledged in two different ways. First, she knew that before 1989, she had denied herself various emotions, desires, and forms of action. As had many other respondents, she said, "there was a strong self-censorship in us." In one case, she had actually written an article critical of Soviet-communist rule, but had decided not to publish it for fear of the consequences. Confessing her hesitancy she said, "I knew what I could not write. It would be fine if I wrote it. But no, I cannot. So I didn't

¹What is interesting is that after 1989, Ms. 20. no longer believed she was a dependent person. Her body and self image after 1989 was one of increased self-esteem. "I think I feel more myself," she said. "I began to rely on myself. To believe in myself. I changed my job and met new people and started to do new activities I did not do before. Perhaps I know myself now better. I have to rely on my own forces if I want to do something." Theoretically, it seems possible that the fragmentation of the individual's sense of self can be overcome in a relatively short period of time and a cohesive sense of self achieved.

publish it. I did not always know when I was self-censoring. Many times I did not know."

The second acknowledged form of fragmentation, Ms. 20. described as living a "double life." "I was personally ashamed," she said, "that I could not do it, [i.e., live the life she wanted], publicly. I wanted to do only what I was persuaded about. I told myself I could not continue [therefore as a teacher]. It was not pleasant to be in such a double role." Trying to preserve her integrity, Ms. 20. left her job and became a librarian and research assistant. But Ms. 20.'s attempted escape was much more profound than merely one of changing jobs. "I wanted to run from the life in which I could not tell what I thought," she explained. "I was trying to hide my personality, my meaning about myself. Not hide, but to protect. I always wanted to be free. I thought it was the only possibility to be free." This was not a question of a "false sense of self" protecting a "true sense of self" because freedom, for Ms. 20., meant saying and acting as one wanted in public. Freedom meant being in control of one's own life, which was possible only when one was who one was at all times. Freedom was maintaining a cohesive sense of self and living an "authentic life."

Authenticity, in turn, was possible under only two circumstances. The first was when she was with a small circle of friends. The second was when she was able to leave Czechoslovakia and travel abroad. In fact, when asked what her image of an "authentic life" was, Ms. 20. answered, "me in Paris." Authenticity meant escape into friendships or foreign places. When in Yugoslavia on vacation, Ms. 20. said that life was "fantastic. Sometimes I thought that the real life was there. It is a

tourist view on the life because you have no problems.... It was a feeling of being authentic. I felt free there."

Curiously enough, it was only when she was on vacation in the former Yugoslavia that Ms. 20., a single woman, mentioned having any love interests. It seems as if love was possible for Ms. 20. only outside of Czechoslovakia, only when she could escape the daily horrors of totalitarianism and a fragmented sense of self. Only when she believed that her life was her own, "authentic," could she develop a love interest. Only when she fantasized that her sense of self was, once again, cohesive, could she fall in love. It is also worth noting that her love interest invariably settled upon a foreigner as well. Freedom and authenticity, therefore, not only meant being able to escape the clutches of totalitarianism, both figuratively and literally, but, more importantly, it offered the possibility of falling in love.

The almost identical story was told by an East German woman, Ms. 3., a thirty-four (34) year old theatre producer and director, who for years had lived a dual life, divided between Prague and Berlin. Mirroring Ms. 20.'s experience, it was only in Prague that Ms. 3. could fall in love and only if it were with a foreigner, i.e. non-German. With her Berlin lovers, on the other hand, she had to withdraw into herself and away from them. She felt inferior, as if she had done something wrong and as if she were worthless.

She was "freer" with her foreign lovers; "they were more exciting." She "did not have to defend [her]self" when she was with them. In Berlin, she had to "limit [her] demands" while in Prague she was "more integrated." She idealized her foreign love interests, losing herself in them and their culture. She went so far as to tell an African man not

only that she would like to be African so that she could become his wife she would like to become African, but that she felt as if she already were African.

Her idealized lovers enabled her to imagine that she possessed a cohesive sense of self. With them she could escape her own fragmented sense of self. With her foreign lovers, she did not have "to withdraw" her anger and "turn it against [her]self" as she did in the DDR, causing her "to turn off her consciousness." When subjected to totalitarian power, she said,

the conscious is turned off, all excluded, [and] then there is unconsciousness. Perhaps it is self-protection. That is perhaps how I survived. When one is unconscious the heartrate goes down. When the heartrate goes up, it is not healthy. Then one becomes unconscious. The unconscious is not so negative. Then one can breathe freely.

It was only in Prague that she could fall in love and breathe freely. Only there could she imagine her sense of self as cohesive. Only there was she a conscious human being.

V

Time and again respondents sought refuge in an "inner emigration," fleeing into some private niche or other in order to try to regain control over their lives. The escape could take many different forms, depending upon the strengths, weaknesses, and needs of the individual. Dr. 2. took protection in numbing himself emotionally; Mr. 25., in falling asleep; Mr. 26. sought safety and control in an

overevaluation and spiritualization of work and Ms. 20. and Ms. 3. ran into the arms of foreign lovers.

For some professionals their "inner emigration" was into creativity. Mr. 10., a fifty-one (51) year old married accountant-businessman and SED party member, married with one child, living in Berlin, for instance, fled into the literary and philosophical world of Goethe. Goethe was a safe sanctuary in which he could find the comfort and safety his management and party responsibilities no longer offered him. As he quite succinctly phrased it, Mr. 10. "buried [himself] in Goethe" (Mr. 10., 1992, personal interview). With Goethe he once again felt as if he were in control of his life.

Goethe offered Mr. 10. a free and relatively uninhibited space. "Goethe was," he said

a fleeing from other things, for being occupied by politics as I had to be.... It was a fleeing from what was demanded from me by the Party, from being a responsible Party comrade. It was a fleeing from the discrepancy between theory and praxis. It was a fleeing from my work.

Despite his high position in the political apparatus, Mr. 10. recognized that totalitarianism had rendered him powerless and that his flight into Goethe symbolized his helplessness. Admitting that communist ideology's "either/or" thinking no longer sufficed, Mr 10. confessed that he "had found no answer, no answer for things that happened in society." It was only in Goethe that he could find answers and discovered a balanced and other-worldly vision of humanity. Goethe recognizes, he said, that "there is something above the will of

man and something above nature. Goethe was not a Church person, but he was a believing person."

Although his flight into Goethe had, in effect, separated his life into its different and disparate life spheres, he knew, at the same time, that because of his responsibilities he "could not separate the profession, [i.e., his management work] from the Party, the society, and [political] work. One could not separate these things. Those who separated these threads would have to go into the opposition. And I was not in the opposition. I am not that type." As a result, Mr. 10. experienced a loss of his cohesive sense of self. However hard he tried to maintain a cohesive sense of self, Mr. 10.'s flight into Goethe was an acting out of the various shards of his fragmented sense of self.

Like Mr. 10., Mr. 28., a thirty-five (35) year old married non-party mathematician living in Prague with his wife and two children, sought refuge and control in creativity, which in his case meant the logic and beauty of pure mathematics. Mr. 28. tried to organize his life in such a way as to escape totalitarian power and

avoid [political] intervention in my private life. Therefore, I refrained from certain acts. Everything was political, everything could be interpreted in political terms. If I go to the main square or if I don't go, both could be interpreted politically. Any kind of joke was considered a political action (Mr. 28., 1991, interview).

Despite the inherent contradiction in his claiming that everything was political, Mr. 28. purposely chose a non-political occupation: theoretical mathematics. "I always tried to concentrate on my work," he said. "My philosophy was my job. Not to think about reality. Just do mathematics. Mathematics is absolutely pure. This is the reason I

chose math as my job: its purity. It has nothing to do with politics. Math as a refuge, a place to retreat to." Mathematics was an escape from the necessity and reality of totalitarianism into an, as Mr. 28. phrased it, pure freedom. It is precisely this irreconcilable opposition and conflict between necessity and freedom which symbolizes the fragmentation of Mr. 28.'s sense of self.

Mr. 28.'s loss of cohesion was evident in his response to traveling abroad. As a well-known mathematician, Mr. 28. was invited to numerous international conferences. Crossing the border back into Czechoslovakia was usually an uneasy experience. When asked to describe the transition from the West back into his homeland, Mr. 28. said that "it was a little like TV. At the end of the movie you switch off the TV and you are back in reality. Back at home was reality. Italy, France were the movies."

Mr. 28.'s private life of mathematics was a film, an unreal adventure into freedom, standing in opposition to the reality of communist politics. Though he fled into the purity of math, Mr. 28. awoke to an aggressive reality whenever he had to turn off the TV. Mr. 28.'s sense of self was unmistakably fragmented. Mathematics was not a defense against a hostile environment, a safe haven behind which Mr. 28.'s sense of self maintained its "true" cohesion, playing the "false" role when in public. Nor was it a strategic choice implying resistance. Mr. 28. did not experience his sense of self as "protean." Rather his flight into the creativity of theoretical mathematics symbolized the loss of cohesion.¹

¹Douglas Emery (1993) has suggested that creativity is a crucial source of resistance to totalitarian power. As will be argued in the subsequent chapter

As repeated throughout, a fragmented sense of self means that the individual experiences feelings of discontinuity. There is a disruption of his experience of self-sameness or his being "in tune" with himself which is often associated with a loss of control. Since one's body is the original source of an individual's sense of self it is not surprising that the metaphor of disease - the loss of control over one's body or disruption of one's experience of one's body - was one way in which professionals expressed the loss of a cohesive sense of self.

Mr. 4., a thirty-eight (38) year old diplomat and academic, for instance, equated his having contracted cancer with his experience of communist rule. Cancer and disease, in general, symbolized not only his experiences in the DDR, but also his experience of his sense of self.

Mr. 4.'s father was a "simple worker," who, according to his son, had no interest in intellectual activities. His father originally came from West Germany and a large part the family still lived in the West. The combination of these two facts caused Mr. 4. to believe that he grew up antagonistic to prevailing norms, that he was somehow different, and that he needed to make something special of himself. "I think I have a deep and fundamental pattern against the system or have problems with the system," he confessed.

We always received packages from the West. Then comes the father-murder, generational problem. There was the feeling that I must do something

on dissidents and is indicated in the case histories of Mr. 28. and Mr. 10., resistance did not originate in creativity per se, but in an ability to tolerate higher levels of aggression.

different. I had the feeling that I always wore second hand Western clothes. I was fed up with the West. I had to be something for me.

Throughout his life, Mr. 4. desperately tried to set himself apart. Ironically, cancer was one way he could indulge his need to be different. The first time, he used illness as a weapon was in the army. Though he did not yet know that his physical problems were the first symptoms of cancer, Mr. 4. said that "in the army my sickness emerged. I used that. Sometimes I could not breath with the gas mask. I used it to my advantage. The last six months I could give up certain things." What is most striking about Mr. 4.'s recounting of his army experience is the absence of the expected and, perhaps, "natural" fear of someone confronting an unknown and potentially dangerous disease. Instead, Mr. 4. exploited the situation using his disease to his advantage, setting himself apart from others.

Later, working as an academic in a foreign affairs research institute, Mr. 4. knew that he had little control over his future. It had been planned out for him by the political apparatus. "My future," he said, would "always remain the same for [the next] fifteen years. I was so firmly positioned. I wanted out. If not I would have been part of the Mafia," i.e. the political apparatus. Cancer gave him the opportunity to escape the rigidity of a pre-planned and deadened future. Cancer allowed him to get out and become different: "I had cancer. I got away."

It was only after the onset of his cancer that the political apparatus gave him permission to leave the DDR and be assigned to a diplomatic post in Latin America. On a vacation flight back to the DDR one summer, Mr. 4. had the sensation that he would never be allowed to leave the DDR again. He had no "objective" reasons for his suspicion; it

was purely intuitive. Changing planes in Amsterdam for the flight into East Berlin, Mr. 4. said that he

had the feeling something was wrong. It was not graspable. We had [a special diplomatic passport] and had no unfriendly experience, but it was so deep within, this feeling of not being well. It was the thoughts that were false. It was in the unconscious. It was the problem that one was traveling home and would not get out.

If, as Mr. 4. acknowledged, his vision of the DDR was impregnated with cancer, the sense of not being well which lay in his unconscious was the festering of an uncontrollable disease. Returning to the DDR meant, once again, being subjected to the ravages of a silently and secretly spreading malignancy. At the same time, however, Mr. 4. required the existence of that malignancy in order to imagine that he was someone special. A disease which threatened to kill him was also a badge of courage. Being threatened with death from within enabled Mr. 4. to escape the confinements of the DDR. M. 4. not only experienced his sense of self as being fragmented, but feared that it was also susceptible to annihilation.

Unlike Mr. 4., Mr. 29., an unaffiliated married engineer with two children, living in a major Czech city, was not afflicted with any medical problems. Nevertheless, he experienced the cumulative trauma induced by totalitarianism' as a fatal disease, equating it to the AIDS virus.

The image of death was a constant theme throughout his interview. When asked to describe his pre-1989 feelings, he answered that he was never a member of the communist party and then said that even as an adolescent he had felt communism to be reprehensible. Then he began to talk about World War Two:

I can remember when I was nine, the killing of the chief of the Gestapo. I can still remember those June days. We heard the shooting of Czech people here in my city. In the evening and night my father was listening to London, even though listening to foreign broadcasts was prohibited under penalty of death. Thus I was sensitive to politics. After the war, I could see that some entering the communist party were not the best people (Mr. 29., 1992, interview).

In those few short unsolicited sentences, Mr. 29. wove together communist domination, a patriotic and moral assassination, a murderous retaliation against innocent civilians, and the death penalty, implicitly drawing an equation between communist rule and the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia. Both were foreign occupations and both meant living under the constant threat of death.

These twin and linked themes of armed foreign occupation and violent death coursed through Mr. 29.'s interview. He said that 1968 was proof that Czechoslovakia "was governed by Moscow" and referred to Husak's post-1968 normalization policies as "the return of the Soviets." Mimicking the Nazi occupation, the Russian army was in Czechoslovakia "to control [us] and [was here] in case there was something hot here. They were not here to fight America, but to control us."

Furthermore, he understood communism as a "Russian system of ruling" and, for him, Russian rule was inherently murderous. It was not just that one of Mr. 29.'s first encounters with Russians was when four German soldiers, who were trying to surrender, holding up a Russian leaflet instructing them how to do so, were murdered by a Russian soldier. The Russian occupation of Czechoslovakia meant that Mr. 29.

feared that his country, he, and his family could lose their respective identities. He believed, for instance, that Czech and Slovak communists had been planning a Soviet incorporation of Czechoslovakia. "In 1985," he said

there were rumors that Husak was willing to make part of our Republic a part of the Soviet Union.... You can hear such rumors. The existence of the gulag was the reality of Soviet rule. I had no doubt that the gulag was there. I had the occasion to pass through the gulag. It was clear that if we were part of the USSR a certain percentage of our people would go to the gulag.... Maybe our family in such a case would be split. Our sons, for example, could be sent to Afghanistan.

It was not that Mr. 29.'s fears were constant, but the dread

was very deep in my mind and deep in my heart. It does not mean I was not laughing, playing with my children. But deep in my heart, when I was thinking of the future, this was the concentrate of my feeling. It was a little too pessimistic. It was not that I was thinking twenty-four hours a day. But sometimes a politician said something or something happened and once again those black ideas were actual.¹

Summarizing his experience of totalitarian power, Mr. 29. confessed, "you cannot live forty years in water and not be wet. I do not know how much we are affected. I am sure we are affected, but it is hard to say how much."

¹It should be noted that, for Mr. 29., black meant unhappiness, destruction, and death. When I asked him to describe the color black, he said, "black as something. All the nice things we describe as white."

At the end of the interview, in response to the question how his body and self image had changed since 1989, Mr. 29. admitted that he had

really lost a nightmare, which was communism. Every morning, every night. This is something you cannot understand. Three years ago, if we were sitting here, a car could come and ask, 'What are you doing here? Do you have approval from the company? Why is he here?' Now no one can come. Can you imagine such a thing.? That someone would come to you and say you had AIDS. And he would convince you you had AIDS. And then you come to the test and you find you don't.

Under totalitarianism, Mr. 29. believed he had been infected with AIDS. Metaphorically, an insidious, uncontrollable disease was eating him from within and there was no known cure. As the disease progressively weakened his immunological defenses, his mind, body, and identity drifted out of his control. This is not merely a question of the fragmentation of a sense of self, but the anxiety of its likely destruction. Ravaged by disease, Mr. 29. believed that he had been scheduled for annihilation. Only after 1989 did he regain the possibility to live, for only then could he ask whether the original diagnosis had, in fact, been correct.

VII

As previously discussed, some professionals experienced totalitarianism's hostility and aggressive as a malevolent force which, they feared, would eat and consume them, leaving no trace of their

existence behind. For them it was not a question of their sense of self being fragmented and their experiencing discontinuity and disruption. The threat to their sense of self was more global and encompassing. They felt and fantasized that they could be swallowed whole and, unlike Jonah, never reappear again.

Mr. 7., a thirty-nine (39) year old actor/songwriter and member of the SED, as has already been mentioned, expressed such a fear. In fact, he perceived his life as a battle in which one either ate or was eaten. In order to avoid being consumed, Mr. 7. willingly subjected himself to communist party discipline, by which he meant that

it was better, so it was thought, to be a victim of things than have feelings. The individual was not as important as the society. I was not as important as the development of society. Actually, to amputate oneself is not good, but it was good to do so for the society, for what was better than I. Yes, I amputated myself.

To escape being eaten, Mr. 7. consumed himself. Figuratively, he amputated parts of his body and sense of self, the first victim being his feelings.

His amputations did not stop with his numbing his emotions. Mr. 7. knew that artistic expression in the DDR was strictly censored. "One knew," he said that certain themes were themes "better not heard. Then one had not bothered with such themes and that was conscious." Much like other respondents who exercised self-censorship, Mr. 7. practiced the same techniques on himself and his artistic work. He described his self-censorship, however, as a form of self-mutilation. "When I amputated myself," he confessed, "it was not painful. There

were always ways out. When one does it to oneself it is never painful. It was only painful when I had other possibilities."

Mr. 7., then, spoke of how he had amputated himself, saying that one did not need one's pinkie in order to write. Consequently, he could and, figuratively, did painlessly cut off his pinkie. The same logic held true for both the ring and middle fingers. With the two fingers remaining, Mr. 7. claimed that he could still write songs and other theatre pieces. When asked about his thumb and forefinger, he responded, "I could go on the street up to the [Berlin] Wall and then comes the pain." Eventually, Mr. 7. knew that his life stopped at the Wall, beyond which were no ways out.

Amputation was not a form of resistance. Nor was self-censorship a cunning choice, the strategic adoption of a role to protect his "true sense of self." Instead Mr. 7.'s story about amputation was his experience of his sense of self and how it had been penetrated and colonized by totalitarian power. Despite his attempt at forestalling his annihilation through self-mutilation, Mr. 7. feared that he would eventually be eaten and consumed.

This same fantasy flooded Mr. 30.'s life. Mr. 30., a twenty-nine (29) year old research engineer, believed that life under totalitarianism was a staged drama. "Sometimes I was an actor," he confessed later in the interview.

I was one of the herd. The wolf is not hungry and the sheep is alive. Sometimes, yes, I was afraid I would be eaten. Maybe sometimes, I was not [Mr. 30. used his first name]. Sometimes I was an actor.

Fearing the wolf, Mr. 30.'s theatrical endeavors were in direct response to the threat of physical and psychological annihilation. Mr. 30.'s believed that his choices were limited to acting as if he were a sheep or death by consumption. Being an actor necessitated his discarding his sense of self. Though Mr. 30. claimed he knew when he was not himself - "I knew when I was not [use of his first name]. It was not very often. I knew when I was not [first name] when I was on the edge, when they would push me down." - such consciousness does not belie his having jettisoned his sense of self. Mr. 30. periodically killed himself in order not to be consumed. Perhaps Mr. 30.'s "suicides" were the means by which he attempted to rescue the smallest modicum of control over his own life, a last ditch attempt to "be whole like the sheep." Nevertheless, believing it necessary to eliminate his sense of self for periods of time so that he could physically survive over and through time, it no longer mattered whether or not Mr. 30. was eaten by a third party; he had chosen to annihilate himself.

VIII

This fantasy of being annihilated by totalitarian power was widespread. Seven (7) of the twenty-five (25) respondents, twenty-eight percent (28%), who were neither dissidents nor "ideologically" committed communists expressed a version of the fantasy. Some respondents feared that they already had been annihilated. However it is expressed, annihilation anxiety is a more severe form of a fragmented sense of self because it is the entire sense of self which is at risk. With

annihilation anxiety, the sense of self is not threatened with fragmentation, but obliteration.

Ms. 22., a fifty (50) year old married librarian with two children living in Prague, and member of the communist party, believed that totalitarianism had already annihilated her. The first blow struck against her took place during the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia. Thereafter, her perception of Soviet-communist domination as a hostile and aggressive environment perpetuated and accentuated her earlier fragmentation.

Ms. 22. began the interview by claiming that she was the same person today as before 1989. "My thinking has not changed. I was free before 1989 and now I am free inside too" (Ms. 22., 1992, interview). Immediately thereafter, she spoke about the stupidity and awfulness of a political system which insisted that certain library books not be circulated or read by the general public. Being a librarian, Ms. 22. had access to a special collection of forbidden and censored books. The general public, however, was required to possess "special papers from a department" in order to have the privilege of access. The irony of a public lending library which collects, essentially, unreadable books was not lost on Ms. 22. and she blamed the Catch-22 situation on the political apparatus. "It was stupid of the Communist Party," she said.

The situation was the result of many many stupid people who did not have a normal view of the situation.... The base of this situation was that for people it was not good when they had information. And a book is a source of information.

When asked to describe her feelings, however, Ms. 22. fell silent, struggled in vain to put her emotions into words, and began to doodle.

The drawing she produced was a square, within which vertical and horizontal lines intersected like the bars of a cage (see Appendix B). It was as if Ms. 22. was drawing her own inability to speak while accurately portraying the paradox of the library in which she worked. After all, she had information of which other people were deprived and no matter how hard she and her fellow librarians tried, which she claimed they did, they were unable to change the library's policy. The library, instead of being an educational lending institution had become a prison, within which she was incarcerated, for communist policy had made her work inherently futile and meaningless.

The drawing had yet two other meanings for Ms. 22. First, she made a connection between prohibited information and her inability to travel abroad. Unable to travel freely coupled with her inability to work as a librarian in any real sense was equated to an actual physical imprisonment. Second, and more importantly, she tied the library situation to her relationship to her two daughters. "I tried to live here," she said. "I saw everything, but I had two children. I was afraid and tried to keep my two daughters from a negative situation. I did not tell them about this situation in the library. I wanted a happy life for my daughters, a normal childhood without negatives." Referring to how some Czechs had retreated into an "inner emigration," she continued, "some people in my country lived a little bit only with small groups. But I have something against it. For children it is not good when parents are in stress. I was not able to fight against these parts of the system. I saw it, but was not able to fight."

In other words, the drawing symbolized not only the situation in the library, but that of Czechoslovakia itself as well as Ms. 22.'s familial

relationships. Ms. 22. was not able to give her daughters accurate information because such information was implicitly dangerous. Her family's future happiness and tranquility depended upon, or so Ms. 22. believed, on her barring and imprisoning her feelings and censoring her relationship to her children.

When asked how she felt about lying to her daughters, Ms. 22. dramatically shifted gears and spoke about her own childhood. From then on, the drawing referred not only to the library, Czechoslovakia, and her relationship with her daughters, but to her own sense of self. "Our life," she began, "was a little different from the life of my children. When I was born the Second World War started." Visibly unsettled, Ms. 22. stood up and began to walk around her living room. After a while she sat down again and continued,

from age three I was afraid for my parents because the house next to ours was a school. And in the school were German soldiers. For example, I was afraid that someone would take my father away. It was the practice of German soldiers in my home town.

Fearing for the life of her father and her consequent abandonment, Ms. 22. lied to her daughters so that they would not be abandoned, just as she had feared that she would be left alone as a three year old. Even though, she said that it was bad for children to live with parents who experienced stress, it is worse to be an orphan alone during wartime. If Ms. 22. had told her daughters the truth about the library she would have effectively abandoned them to face totalitarianism alone. In other words, at the root of her feelings and

experiences prior to 1989 was an all-encompassing terror of being abandoned and abandoning.

If the Germans had threatened her with a lonely and imminent extinction, the Russian troops who marched into her town to liberate it were her and her father's saviors. "I was so happy," she said, "when the Germans went away and I was not afraid. It was wonderful. And it was great in my little village that the Russians were coming." The Russians, and hence communism, meant, for Ms. 22., security and safety.

Unfortunately, her father had absolutely no desire to be saved by the Russians. He despised them and their communist politics and, when Ms. 22. was "six of seven," he told her about "Stalin's mistakes in Russia," saying that "when there will be Germans in Czechoslovakia it will be terrible [a]nd when this country will be under Stalin it will be worse." In addition, her father told her about the Russian atrocities at Katyn, but Ms. 22., not believing him, thought that "his information was bad."¹ In fact, her ecstatic joy at being liberated by Russian troops had been in response to a question probing her political conflict with her father.

The animosity between the communist political apparatus and her father infected Ms. 22.'s life. Her father was an independent businessman, a wallpaperer, and gave many speeches against the communists. As a result, Ms. 22.'s father was forced to give up his business and was held up in her school as an example of a bad capitalist. When asked how she felt about the vilification of her father, Ms. 22. answered, that "it was very bad for children to hear in school

¹At Katyn, under Stalin's orders, the Russian secret police massacred the officer's corp of the Polish army.

what hurts the family." Once again, it was dangerous to possess information.

Although Ms. 22. believed that communism had saved her father's life and had rescued her from the threat of being abandoned, it forced her to become what her father hated. Drawn back from the brink of extinction, the family was, nevertheless, torn asunder. Furthermore, Ms. 22. had to pay for her father's capitalist crimes. Despite being first academically in her class, she was not allowed to continue her studies. Ultimately, Ms. 22.'s drawing symbolized her own sense of self, imprisoned and fragmented in whichever direction it turned.

More than being merely imprisoned and fragmented, Ms. 22. sense of self was threatened with annihilation. Given her childhood experiences, it was not surprising that one of the adjectives or phrases Ms. 22. used to describe her feelings and experiences before 1989 was "no fear of war." This time, however, war referred not only to World War II, but to the Cold War as well. What she meant was that the Cold War ensured a balance of terror between the U.S. and the former U.S.S.R. and that that terror guaranteed the peace. "For normal people," she said,

it is better when... I am sure that the existence of these two blocs had some meaning, some sense. It was important. To balance. The existence of the two blocs was a little bit like a play, a theatre performance.

Not only did she divide the world into two competing camps: the U.S. and the former U.S.S.R. She split the world into "normal people," like herself, who were powerless and subjected to extinction, and actors, who possessed deathly power. Meaning, itself, if any existed at all, was

generated not by the "normal people," but by the actors, who performed according to a pre-written and pre-arranged theatre script.

Life became theatre, a production in which the individual was not only meaningless but non-existent. Asked where Czechoslovakia was located in this "high political play" - the opposite ends of a table being used to locate the U.S. and the former U.S.S.R. - Ms. 22. said that "Czechoslovakia is inbetween," pointing to a spot on the table closer to the ex-U.S.S.R. When asked to locate herself in the fantasy drama of the superpowers, Ms. 22. fell silent and, once again, began to doodle. This time she drew a ninety (90) degree angle and blackened in the perpendicular lines. It was as if she blackened in the angle in order to reassure herself that she did, in fact, exist, even if it were only at the intersection of those two lines. Finally, she said, "I am so small. I am so small. I do not know." She then drew two circles and labeled them, respectively, U.S.S.R. and U.S. When questioned where in the drawing she was, she had no answer.

Though the world had become peaceful, it had also extinguished her life. Eventually she said,

I thought everything is better for me, for my family, for my country, for the world with this balance than with war. I needed more freedom, more contact with the world. I had a friend who was German and she was in West Berlin and I in the East. I could not see her. Everything though is better without war. It is not so dangerous.

War, for Ms. 22., meant assured annihilation. During peacetime, however, she was not sure she existed. Born into war she had been immediately threatened with annihilation. To have any contact with the "inhuman world" meant, at best, accepting being fragmented into

two, split between the West and the East, a father and a daughter, a mother and her two daughters, a dedicated communist and her party, a librarian and the library in which she worked. At worst, the inhuman world was a play in which there were no human actors.¹

Like Ms. 22., Ms. 1. experienced annihilation anxiety as well. Ms. 1.'s problems began when she fell in love with the wrong man: a West German. Perhaps because her father was an officer in the Stasi, police agents visited her apartment complex and questioned her neighbors. As she told the story,

the Stasi came to my house and asked whether I had many visitors and how often. Then I decided; I did not want [my West German lover] to get into difficulties. They never spoke with me, but the visit was enough. I feared that someone would accuse him of something; whatever they wanted to prove. I decided and quickly married someone else.

Having voluntarily given up the man she loved, Ms. 1. was never happy again, believing that her "life [was] destroyed because of it." She despaired or, to use her words, was "really despairing. Helpless. Lost." At another moment in the interview, when speaking about her opera career, she said, " I couldn't do anything. I was senseless."

¹Only after 1989, with the destruction of totalitarian rule, could Ms. 22. begin to heal the utter fragmentation of her sense of self. Only after 1989 could she wake up in the morning and admit that "when I see my face I have a good feeling. I do not need to lie. I need not lie." Information is no longer inherently dangerous. Information no longer means annihilation. Only after 1989 could she acknowledge that prior to 1989 she had not been human, for now she could hope that "maybe the world will be more human, [even though] it is still inhuman." Once again, it can be theorized that a fragmented sense of self can relatively rapidly cohere, if and when the hostility and aggression of the external world is removed.

Because of her West German lover, Ms. 1. believed that her opera career suffered. Ms. 1. said that the state apparatus feared that if she became a famous opera diva, she would receive a contract to sing in major opera houses and, therefore, would have the opportunity to flee to the West to rejoin her lover. Consequently, during the national competition and auditions which followed the completion of her studies, Ms. 1. claimed that

someone gave me something to drink and I sang poorly. But I was the best student. Therefore I had to sing all over again, for two men who could not understand anything. I suppose they were Stasi. No one else had to sing for them.

Whether the unknown man who gave her "something to drink" was or was not secret police is irrelevant. What is of importance is the depth of Ms. 1.'s paranoia, her belief that she had been singled out and persecuted by the political apparatus. Because she had fallen in love with the wrong man, Ms. 1. believed that her opera career had been purposefully destroyed.

Two failed marriages later and a once promising artistic career now stuck in the provinces, Ms. 1., blaming the political apparatus for her predicament, fled from her personal problems and dove headlong into her work and children. Much like many other respondents, Ms. 1. confessed that she "worked only in order to repress [her] personal problem. I had worked a lot. A fleeing into work." Later, after she had admitted that she was "angry with the State" and had "given up," she said she had turned her anger "against myself [and] I had hidden myself in my work. Only work, work." She admitted to "disappearing into" her children. "Without children I do not want to live. Without

children I can disappear into my work. They are balanced: work-children." Other than living for someone or something else, Ms. 1. did not want to exist, nor did she think she did.

Ms. 1.'s favorite operatic role, Lady MacBeth, symbolizes the condition of her sense of self. "What I wanted to do, but could not be, I wanted to be on the stage," she said.

I, a woman who victimized herself, who did everything for her man to put him in power. She is a murderer, certainly. She was victimized. It is a side of her. In the opera she is somewhat different than in the drama. Lady MacBeth tries with all her means to put her husband in power. Death, murder. All means were right. She loved her man. She did it out of love. One can accuse her naturally, but...

When asked who she wanted to murder, Ms. 1. answered,

No definite person.... I do not want to murder someone; they would put me in the hospital for it. Someone is really crazy when they cannot get past their problems.

But Ms. 1. could not "get past" her problems. Like Lady MacBeth, Ms. 1. did everything for her man, sacrificing her life for his. The murder she committed was her own, killing someone who was "absolutely powerless." Like Lady MacBeth, Ms. 1. could not wash out that bloody spot. The blood on her hands, however, was her own.¹

¹Rumors were rife in Ms. 1.'s opera company that Ms. 1. was a Stasi agent. If these rumors were true, Ms. 1. murdered herself in more ways than one.

IX

It would be incorrect to assert that all professionals, who were neither dissidents nor "ideologically" committed communists, experienced a fragmentation of their sense of self. Five (5) of the twenty-five (25) respondents, twenty percent (20%), did not.

Two characteristics seem to link all five anomalies together, explaining why none of them experienced a loss of cohesion. First, all five had a belief system and/or the illusion of a "way out" which enabled them to maintain a cohesive sense of self. Ms. 4., a thirty (30) year old doctor, was half Bulgarian and, therefore never identified with the DDR, believing that she could always leave Berlin; Mr. 6., a thirty-one (31) year old symphony conductor, had been raised in a religious household, socialized into a value system hostile to totalitarianism; Mr. 21., a sixty-eight (68) year old economist, was old enough to have experienced pre-World War II Czechoslovakia and could, thus, make comparisons between his country under totalitarianism and its condition as part of the West; and Mr. 27., a forty-two (42) year old mathematician, had developed a spiritual belief in a life after death, for which he had to prepare himself. Mr. 22., a forty-seven (47) year old historian, had a deeply held political belief, which caused him to be thrown out of the Czechoslovak communist party.

Perhaps because of their beliefs, three of the five respondents, Mr. 6., Mr. 21., and Mr. 27., accepted responsibility for their own actions, in ways in which few, if any, other professionals had. Mr. 6., for instance, referring to the time he stopped writing a musical piece because his

composition teacher told him that he would never be performed for political reasons, said,

One should not repress what we did wrong. One should not say that one had to. One should admit that we adapted and conformed. Anything else would be a lie. We had believed that the State had power over us. That is the feeling of being powerless.

Similarly, Mr. 21., a sixty-eight year old economist, explained that he did not participate in dissident activity, despite his having rather extensive contacts with leading dissidents, because he was scared. "I was afraid," he said,

of being arrested and brought to jail. I do not think I could have stood it. To lose the little freedom I had. And then the family life would have been disrupted. I did not know how my wife would have experienced it. It was simply being afraid. When I saw [he named a leading dissident] come back from the first four year imprisonment, I was just afraid.

Lastly, Mr. 27.'s spiritual commitments made him confront himself more directly than most other professionals. "It is our task," he said,

to prepare ourselves for another stage of existence which will come after our death. I think that if one is in difficult situations it forces one to think about things one would not otherwise do if one was not in such situations. Perhaps one had to think who one was and how one behaved. One must tell the truth about oneself

Second, the totalitarian political apparatus knew that each of these respondents was opposed to Soviet-communist domination, even though none of the five engaged in open and public dissident activity. Two of these four subjects, for instance, had been thrown out of the Czech

communist party, Mr. 21. in the 1952 and Mr. 22. in 1970. A third, Mr. 27., was questioned on more than one occasion by the Czech secret police, who were inquiring into his beliefs and foreign contacts. The fourth respondent, Mr. 6., was raised in a religious household, refused to become a member of the official musicians and composers organization, and had turned down a musical position which had been assigned to him by the political apparatus. Lastly, the fifth interviewee, Ms. 4., refused a Stasi invitation to join the secret police.

X

Twenty (20) of the twenty-five interviewees, who were neither dissidents nor "ideologically" committed communists, experienced a fragmentation of their everyday life and sense of self. It seemed to make little difference whether the respondent lived in the DDR or Czechoslovakia, was male or female, young or old, a member of the communist party or a politically unaffiliated citizen. For the professional, the psychological effect(s) of totalitarian domination cut across all categories, even if the degree and severity of fragmentation varied from person to person. The high level of uniformity and consistency of the data suggest that the psychological effect(s) of totalitarianism on the individual was dramatic.

Furthermore, it is clear that the interview data validates the suppositions and predictions laid out in the theoretical literature on totalitarianism and on "total institutions." The fragmentation experienced by most professionals was not a strategic choice on their

part, understandable in terms of role theory or indicating any form of resistance. Nor was it an expression of a "protean" sense of self. Rather, as suggested by Plato and Tocqueville's understanding of power, the individual's loss of a cohesive sense of self was the result of totalitarian power being able to determine what was considered common sense and, thereby, influence, mold, or "indelibly fix" the individual's experience of his sense of self. In other words, the hegemonic story totalitarianism told a tale about a fragmented sense of self and it was that tale that the individual recounted. More specifically, because totalitarianism had created an environment which was perceived to be hostile and aggressive, most professionals, having experienced "objective anxiety," exhibited signs of a fragmented sense of self due to cumulative trauma.

CHAPTER VIII

Dissidents

In contrast to the professionals, whose sense of self had been fragmented by totalitarian power, dissidents told a different story about their sense of self. They told a story about resistance to totalitarian power rather than passive, helpless accommodation and surrender. Dissidents spoke about joy and love instead of silent fear and the threat of infection. They rejected the common sense propagated by the totalitarian political apparatus, attacking totalitarianism rather than allowing themselves to be attacked by it and, thus, fragmenting their own sense of self. In short, as previously hypothesized, dissidents told a story about a cohesive sense of self.

As had been earlier discussed, a cohesive sense of self presumes a continuity in time and space. This self-sameness is continuous both internally and externally, by which is meant that the individual experiences his present sense of self as being "in tune" with his past and future senses of self as well as existing within the history of his community. The dissident's communal home need not necessarily be found in his community's current history, but may hark back to the community's past and its traditions or look forward toward ideals and values as yet unrealized, but whose beginnings have already been enunciated. Either way the dissident experiences his sense of self as belonging to and being integrated into his community even if that entails the establishment of an alternate subgroup within the larger social structure.

Bound up with and implicit in the dissident's finding his societal home, especially if it coincides with a rejection of his community's current history, is a high degree of aggression. This is especially true given the realities of totalitarianism. The dissident not only had to withstand the hostility and aggression directed at him by the totalitarian political apparatus. In order to find his home, he had to carve out his own community in the face of totalitarian hostility, which meant that he redirected the aggression he experienced originating from the political apparatus against the political apparatus itself. To gain his voice and maintain his cohesion, therefore, the dissident learned both to tolerate and use aggression, directing it outward, using it as a means by which he made his sense of self cohere.

As Wolfgang Leonhard had intimated, internal cohesion also implies a high degree of aggression. Before becoming a dissident, the individual may have experienced pangs of guilt, the self-inflicted wounds of his conscience. The presence of guilt suggests that the potential dissident's sense of self was not integrated and continuous with his past sense of self. Under totalitarianism, guilt meant that the individual was attacking himself in ways which were conducive to the perpetuation of totalitarian power. Guilt, in fact, may have been one of the first signs of the penetration and colonization of the individual's sense of self by the political apparatus.

To become a dissident, then, implies overcoming one's guilt, freeing one's sense of self from the political apparatus' penetration and colonization. To do so, as one East German activist argued, the dissident must "forge a sense of the need to know within [himself] where [he] stands; to know that there is right and wrong and to accept the

individual's responsibility to make, hold and when opportunity presents, to act upon one's judgement (Reich, 1990, p. 68). In other words, totalitarianism required that the dissident, first, confront himself and reclaim his "doubts and memories," thus, overcoming his common sense experience of helplessness and powerlessness. Or as another East German dissident described the process, "it increasingly dawned on me that one cannot always continue to sit still as a victim and say 'it's terrible what's happening around us, but basically we are helpless.'... In short there was a growing desire in me to become active in order not to have to accuse myself of not having 'done anything'" (quoted in Philipsen, 1993, pp. 38-39). To become a dissident meant becoming active, stepping out from behind one's "inner emigration" to maintain a cohesive sense of self. A dissident openly and publicly said "no" to totalitarianism to say "yes" to himself.

The question arises whether it was dissident activity which engendered a cohesive sense of self or whether it was a cohesive sense of self which enabled the individual to engage in dissident activity. According to the interview data to be presented below, for different individuals the causal relationship was different. Some dissidents regained a lost cohesion because of their activities. For others, dissident activity enabled them to maintain and defend an already cohesive sense of self.

However a dissident managed to say "no," it was the statement of resistance and the activities which followed that assertion of voice which were paramount. Consequently, dissident activity is defined by "illegal" actions undertaken with the, at least, tacit knowledge of but without permission of the political apparatus, the communist

government/party, and which were viewed by the political apparatus as political in nature. Furthermore, the acknowledged intent of the illegal actions must have been to alter and/or undermine the political and social authority and power of the political apparatus. Such activities included, among others, the continual refusal to be recruited into the secret police, the publication of articles criticizing the performance and/or values of the political apparatus, the organization of banned religious gatherings, and participation in illegal public demonstrations.

Turning directly to the empirical data, as already discussed, thirty-five (35) of the thirty-nine (39) interviewees reported that communist rule in the DDR and Czechoslovakia was the reason they experienced their external environment to be hostile and aggressive. Of these thirty-five respondents, only nine (9) of them engaged in active and public political and/or religious dissident activity. It is hypothesized, therefore, that these nine (9) individuals, regardless of their nationality, age, gender, did not experience a loss of a cohesive sense of self after having accepted the responsibility of being a dissident.

For ease of presentation, respondents will be divided into three groups, each illustrating a slightly different phenomenon. For the first group, dissident activity was the means by which they regained the experience of a cohesive sense of self. The second group, on the other hand, had, since childhood, experienced themselves as separate from the prevailing norms. In some sense, their upbringing had already socialized them into the future dissident activity. They, therefore, never did experience a fragmentation of their sense of self. The third,

and last group, illustrates the particular characteristics of religious dissidents.

I

Mr. 23., a thirty-three (33) year old former stoker turned lawyer, acknowledged that before engaging in dissident activity he had felt uneasy. Referring to the phenomenon that under totalitarianism most individuals retreat into their private niches, he said that in his "isolation" he had felt frustrated. The frustration, he admitted, "was more my personal problem. Problem of my plans. What I wanted to study and accomplish. It was something that did not allow me to reach what I wanted." Thwarted and assuming that he was at fault for his failure to become who he wanted to be, Mr. 23.'s future sense of self was being divorced from his present sense of self.

Part of his "problem," and one of the reasons for his feeling thwarted, had to do with his family. His great grandfather had been one of the founders of the Czech social democratic movement and, in 1970, his father had been thrown out of the Czech communist party. Because of his heritage, Mr. 23. was deemed inherently suspect by the Czechoslovakian political apparatus. For years he was forbidden to attend university, relegated to working as a stoker to make ends meet. Given the political realities of Czech totalitarianism, "it was clear" to Mr. 23. "that [he] would not be someone more."

At the same time, Mr. 23.'s frustration was more than that of an ambitious man who had been politically singled out for punishment.

Though his frustration was tinged with "sadness, [being] frustrated mean[t] something more too." He confessed that he "felt guilty in some sense." Guilt is usually associated with the notion that the individual has done something wrong or has imagined that he has committed a transgression. Because of that transgression, the individual believes that he deserves to be punished. Guilt is, then, a form of punishment, a turning of aggression against oneself. For Mr. 23. guilt was tied up with his responsibility and obligations as a Czech citizen. A citizen, according to Mr. 23., is active and engaged in improving the conditions of his country, but before becoming a dissident, he admitted that he was one of "this silent group" who did nothing. He, too, had retreated into his private niche and it was this transgression which made him feel guilty.

In addition, Mr. 23.'s "inner emigration" and experience of guilt made him question himself.

I saw that this system was very stable. But sometimes I had such ideas: am I right or wrong? Will we live all our lives in this system? What can we accomplish in this system? What can I accomplish, me personally, in this system? I thought change inevitable, but you can think that you are completely wrong and that there is no way to the future.

It was not merely that Mr. 23. was frustrated that he had no future, thwarted in his ability to realize his sense of self. Nor was it merely that he experienced guilt. Mr. 23. began to doubt himself and he turned that doubt against himself. In short, Mr. 23.'s sense of self had been penetrated by totalitarian power and he was whittling away at the cohesion of his sense of self, weakening it.

Whether it was his family heritage or not, the childhood socialization he had absorbed from his father in their discussions about Stalinism and the events of 1968, Mr. 23. became a dissident. He did not remain condemned by totalitarian power to silence, inactivity, and a sense of powerlessness. For whatever reason, perhaps even to maintain and defend what little was left of his cohesive sense of self, Mr. 23. knew that "it was no longer sufficient to remain passive, to study only and discuss in a closed group. It was time to do something in a practical way." Almost instinctively, Mr. 23. knew that he "must be active." Consequently, he began to organize opposition to a water dam, which brought him to the attention of Charter 77 activists. He began to publish illegal underground articles and, eventually, was repeatedly interrogated by the secret police. On important political anniversaries he would be followed by the police, questioned, momentarily detained, and even imprisoned.

Because of his dissident activity his future prospects were bleak, at best. "It was necessary to think about prison," he acknowledged, "how to behave during the investigation, trial." He knew that "there would be an exam in my personal life. Prison, trial, interrogation. Some violence. Something against my family," but he, nevertheless, continued his dissident activities. He did not stop, in part, because, as he said, "it was clear. It was simple. There was the enemy and it was simple. You were against him."

Instead of turning his doubt and sense of guilt against himself, as he had done before becoming a dissident, Mr. 23.'s dissident activity enabled him to turn his aggression against the political apparatus. Once having become active, Mr. 23. no longer felt guilty, because there was

no transgression for which he deserved punishment. Rather than continuing to direct the aggression he had experienced coming from his environment against himself, following the pattern of the non-dissident professionals, Mr. 23. redirected it outwards, against the political apparatus. His dissident activity, in other words, gave him an outlet for his aggression.

Once having chosen to turn his anger against the political apparatus, Mr. 23. felt free. "There was the sense," he said, "that you were more free, more free than before when one worked in the opposition." The cause for this change, he assumed, was that he had become active and had stuck up for his "moral" principles, no longer being "reduced to silence. That was the difference. It makes one more free in a moral sense. Not in practice, because of some laws, rule," but morally.

Time and time again, Mr. 23. returned to the connection between freedom and dissident activity. Rather than being guilty and frustrated, "it was possible for me to be open in the future. It was possible for me to be honest. It was not necessary to have self-censorship. When you are open it is more difficult than in the past, but also more free." Mr. 23. was free not only because he could act as he chose rather than as he was instructed to act. He was free not only because he had regained control over his own life by making a choice, despite the fact that his future would probably entail a lengthy stay in prison. He was free because he had regained a cohesive sense of self. He no longer had to censor his thoughts, feelings, and desires, suffering the consequence of his sense of self being colonized by totalitarian power. Mr. 23. had thrown off the shackles of totalitarian induced guilt, the passivity which

would have inevitably fragmented his sense of self. Mr. 23. was free because being a dissident unified his sense of self, making it impenetrable to totalitarian power.

Ms. 2.'s story parallels Mr. 23.'s, although for her dissident activity did not relieve her of a sense of guilt, but rather of an overwhelming anxiety and a need to close herself off from others. Throughout her childhood and adolescence Ms. 2. was almost paralyzed by anxiety and fear. She refused to speak in the classroom, even if she knew the answer to the teacher's question, and she was terrified, when out with her father, that the street trolley would arrive before her father returned from buying his newspaper. She also admitted that she hid herself so that others would not know who she was. Even marriage offered her no solution, for she fled her marriage bed for the arms of numerous lovers. Summarizing her feelings, she said "I had the sense that I did not really live. I felt as if I lived as it was possible, but not as I wanted. Or in order not to become agitated."

Only after she was asked and repeatedly refused to join the SED, even though her career depended upon party membership, did her anxiety lessen. "This anxiety," she said,

the overall anxiety was gone after the first no. I then was anxious only about my future, my professional future. The general anxiety was gone. Afterwards I lived more easily. I had been very strictly raised. Very straight. I had little pocket money. I do not know. Almost always as a child I had this general anxiety. It was not all gone. I always have a little, but.. It was simply abrupt. It was a step.

Before her refusal to join the SED, Ms. 2. "always had the feeling that everything might be a solution, but it was only a step and then I stagnated" again. Her refusal, however, was more than a single step. Though the reasons why she was able to turn down the political apparatus are unknown, her refusal opened up a future in which she could participate. Her rejection of the SED, she confessed, "was only personal for me. It was a continuation of my personality. It was only to be true to myself. I will do only what I want. It was opposition, but in addition it was my personality. After the first [refusal], I felt that I could say what I wanted. I did not have to hide myself anymore." Refusing to join the communist party meant that Ms. 2. could show herself in public; she did not have to hide any more. Actively and openly saying who she was, she no longer passively accepted the conditions into which she had been born.¹

Coinciding with her standing up to the SED was her growing interest in photography. Photography was, partially, a means by which she could escape her husband and her work, but it was also more than that. It was her way of coming out in public and wanting to be recognized as who she was. It was her way of seeing and being seen, the expression of her political opposition. "With the beginning of my photography," she said, "I bought new things and felt good and was recognized." Not surprisingly, she photographed illegal political demonstrations and the underground activities of the East Berlin anti-

¹Interestingly enough, after the first refusal, Ms. 2. enjoyed her confrontation with the party committees which questioned her about party membership. "In principle," she said, the first time I had to say no was difficult. Afterwards it amused me." Later in the interview she expanded upon that theme: "Afterwards, after that [first] time, I felt joyous. After saying no that first time, I felt very good."

government/party cultural scene and, with her husband, joined the first environmental movement in the DDR.

Furthermore, she brought these activities into her work. At the weekly political meetings at work she spoke up, changing her old habit of remaining silent and passive. "I often said things," she said,

and, therefore, they told me that I could no longer attend the meetings. At one demonstration where the police attacked the demonstrators, I was there. At the work meeting the boss said that the police had not attacked. I said I was there. And they said I lied and told me to leave the meeting.

Her husband's brother, a Stasi agent, once came up to Ms. 2. and told her not to attend a particular illegal demonstration. At the march, she saw her brother-in-law in a police uniform. "I was frightened," she admitted, "but, nevertheless, it was a good feeling. And then I knew I could no longer make a career with my profession and that I had to find a completely new way. This was September [1989], the first illegal demonstration."

Her new career was to become a photographer, the vehicle by which she had publicly accepted who she was. As a dissident photographer, Ms. 2. had learned to accept who she was; she recognized herself and was recognized by others. By becoming a dissident, Ms. 2. shed her anxiety, no longer needing to hide herself. Rather than stagnating in a life that had been given to her and one in which she believed she had no future, Ms. 2. refused to accept a fragmented sense of self and sought an alternative. Her rejection of membership in the SED was the first step in affirming the cohesion of and reversing totalitarianism's penetration of her sense of self. Reproducing the

dissident activities in which she participated through photography, Ms. 2. made her sense of self cohere and she began to live life "joyously" and "spontaneously."

If dissident activity for Ms. 2. and Mr. 23. was the means by which they regained and further developed a cohesive sense of self, warding off the effects of anxiety, guilt, and frustration, to live freely, openly, and joyously, Mr. 5.'s experience of dissident activity, though grounded in his religious beliefs and work as a pastor, was one of love and rejuvenation. Becoming a dissident changed Mr. 5.'s entire life. Resignation and the need to flee reality was replaced by a lust for life. Loneliness and a sense of futility gave way to being a member of a community and a sense of almost adolescent enthusiasm.

Even though he was a pastor and deeply believed he had a calling to be a religious leader, Mr. 5., much like many of the professionals who had experienced a fragmented sense of self, felt that his life, before he became a dissident, was dominated by "a widegoing resignation," a despair which "had killed off all other feelings." Expressing the deadening or emotional numbing common to many, he knew that his life had been reduced to living "in a private niche." "Although I lived here [in the DDR]," he confessed, "spiritually I had actually emigrated."

Mr. 5.'s sense of self had lost its cohesion and he admitted that he, instead of resorting to alcohol as did many of his parishioners, "fled from reality. Life can only be borne by boozing. My emigration was certainly a flight. I wanted or could not, I could not bear reality and thus I fled into books, films, etc. One sought an island to which one could flee." He summarized his feelings by saying that he had "noticed that we were a bit schizophrenic," meaning that his life seemed to be

compartmentalized, with none of the various segments cohering with one another. Echoing Hannah Arendt's analysis of totalitarianism, Mr. 5. felt as if he were "nothing but a number or disposable material. It was the condition of Dante when he described Hell: Let all who enter here lose all hope."

But then he became a dissident. Exactly why and when he became a dissident Mr. 5. could not say. Perhaps it was when another dissident came up to him and told him he was being followed by the Stasi and asked Mr. 5. if he could help him evade their surveillance. Or perhaps it was when a pre-planned church function was ordered cancelled by the church hierarchy on instructions from the government/party and Mr. 5. had to inform over three hundred (300) people

that the meeting could not take place. I am still enraged against myself over that, that I did not have the courage to see the meeting through. I was enraged against those who said I could not hold the meeting and then with myself. I could have delegated the guilt: I wanted to do it, but they did not. It was their fault and not mine. But I had not thought so.

As Mr. 5. described it, his transformation into a dissident happened and cannot be rationally analyzed. "Normally, the flight instinct is very strong," he explained,

but if pursued, then the flight instinct turns to attack. Perhaps that was the example. The anxiety and fear feeling was pursued and pursued and then it turned. I cannot say the time and moment. In the moment when I felt a threat from someone.

What is important is Mr. 5.'s image of aggression being turned back upon the aggressor. For years Mr. 5. had experienced his environment as hostile and unfriendly. He had turned that hostility against himself, believing he was the one who was guilty. Being passive and "enraged at himself," Mr. 5. numbed himself, thus, allowing his sense of self to be penetrated, colonized, and, ultimately, fragmented. The moment, however, when he "walked out of [his] resignation and began to do peace and justice work," he could tolerate the aggression and use it productively. "I could put up with the anger more," he said,

because I did not hit myself. The rage was firmly attached to those who caused me to feel the anger. Only when I do what I believe in, then I am not angry, but he is. It is only when I do not do what I want that I turned the rage against myself.

Becoming a dissident, Mr. 5. felt reborn. "We had the feeling," he said, that "we were no longer material, but actors." Mr. 5. regained control of his life, no longer being a passive observer, but an active participant. Modifying Descartes infamous dictum, Mr. 5. said that "in that moment [when I became a dissident], I knew I was, existed." Dissident activity enabled Mr. 5. to heal his sense of self, reversing totalitarianism's penetration; dissident activity made his sense of self cohesive. By turning the aggression against the aggressor, Mr. 5. transformed himself from a tool to be used to a man who could act in his own name. Now he could tell his own story about his sense of self, rather than having to acquiesce to the one which totalitarian power had given him.

Referring to the decision to become a dissident and, thus to the transformation of his sense of self from one which had been fragmented

to one which cohered, Mr. 5. said that "the sudden recognition was not true for all. Some [were able and did for years] block it. I did. It could be that it is love at first sight, but then I can block that feeling. The act is for me to decide. It is a decision after an inspiration." In other words, dissident activity was a falling in love. It was the equivalent to allowing oneself to love and be loved. Just as Mr. 23. and Ms. 2. had spoken about feeling free, spontaneous, and joyous, Mr. 5. acknowledged that

the decision [to be a dissident] was liberating. It was liberating and then it was also fun to work again. It was pleasurable to trick those who worked for the Stasi. The fantasy returned and the creativity too. All these things which before were not there. It was beautiful. It was like love. It was dangerous and beautiful.

If Mr. 5. had not been a fifty-six (56) year old man with four adult children, one would imagine him an adolescent in the first throes of love. But that is precisely what he was: an adult reborn into the ecstasy and euphoria of first love. His renewed passion for life, the rejuvenated bursts of fantasy and creativity, was the energy produced by a sense of self which had regained its cohesion. Life may have been more dangerous for the dissident, but in exchange for danger one became the subject in one's own life.

II

Not all dissidents experienced a loss of cohesion prior to engaging in actual dissident activity. For some reason, be it their family heritage,

religious upbringing, or peculiar psychological make-up, some individuals were immune to penetration by totalitarian power. Mr. 11., a single twenty-six, (26) year old graphic/industrial designer living in Berlin, for instance, was one such individual. Mr. 11. began his interview by stating that "many things have not changed," continuing to add that "I am now as before. I have not changed. With my openness I had many more political problems than I do now" (Mr. 11., 1991, interview). Unlike other respondents who had made the same claim, throughout Mr. 11.'s interview there was not the slightest hint of an undercurrent which could contradict his assertion. This is not to say that the political upheavals of 1989 had no effect on Mr. 11. On the contrary, after the collapse of totalitarianism he did not have to worry about being rearrested and beaten in jail as he had been in October 1989 for having participated in an anti-government/party demonstration. In addition, after 1989, Mr. 11. could finally enroll in design school, an opportunity which had previously been closed to him because of his political activities. After 1989 Mr. 11.'s life did change, but, he claimed, that he himself did not.

His behaviors testify to a steadfast course of action. Invited to become a reserve officer in the DDR's army, Mr. 11. turned down the commission, even though he knew that, as a result, his application to industrial design school would be rejected. Though he felt disillusioned by the hypocrisy of the DDR's political apparatus, Mr. 11. accepted his decision as being the correct one. "I felt good," he said, "that I had not been unfaithful to myself. Before [1989] I was never unfaithful to myself. No, never."

Part of being faithful to himself meant his being open and honest in his dealings with others. Mr. 11. was under no delusion that in the DDR he could say what he wanted when he wanted. Rather he acknowledged that he too had to respect certain limits. "I said what I wanted, but there were... I wanted to say much more," he admitted. "One could have been more aggressive. But that would have had no success. No rewards."

Instead of being frustrated by his inability to say everything he wanted and swallowing his anger because of the apparent impossibility of expressing his aggressive feelings like those professionals who did not engage in dissident activity, Mr. 11. hated the government/party for limiting and attempting to silence him. "I could say that I hated the system as this system influenced me to do what I did not want to do," he said. Accommodation, for Mr. 11., did not mean acceptance, for it was his anger which fueled his dissident activity. In other words, his experience of living in a hostile and aggressive environment did not cause him to turn that aggression against himself, but rather to direct it back against the political apparatus, those who had injured him.

Perhaps Mr. 11. could tolerate the aggression better than others because he had always believed that he was different from other people. "I was always a bit different from others as a child. I was a loner. I was not as strong, as big as the others. I had no friends, connections. And I was definitely, probably, ugly. It must have been so because I had problems with the girls in the classroom." Whether or not Mr. 11. was decidedly ugly is irrelevant. What is of importance, however, is that he was accustomed to being singled out; he said he was a loner, used to being thought of as different and experiencing the

communal wrath of being an outsider. Being the target of aggression, therefore, was nothing new to him.

Mr. 11. carried this sense of being an outsider throughout his life. "I come from [name of his hometown]," he said.

I was alone with my feelings. A bit of an outsider. A crazy guy. I thought that here [in Berlin] I was a completely normal type, but that was here. But in my hometown I was the crazy guy. I was, but I never felt that I was the crazy guy. I have sometimes thought that I live and they have their destinies given to them. That I am active. That I am not crazy. Yes, that I was different, but that has nothing to do with being crazy. Perhaps not normal, but then normal has not much to do with what is good.

Because he believed himself to be an outsider, Mr. 11. had to choose the community to which he felt he belonged. Being a loner, he felt that he had to be "active," determining for himself what was "good," even if it was not considered "normal" by others. Rather than accept being labelled by others, being rendered helpless and powerless in the process, Mr. 11. rejected what was considered common sense and asserted control over his own life. While others sat back, hidden in their "inner emigration" and private niches, thus, experiencing a loss of cohesion, Mr. 11. was active, maintaining a cohesive sense of self.

Mr. 12., a forty (40) year old married East German pastor with one child, also testified to being immune to totalitarian power's machinations. Unlike Mr. 11., Mr. 12.'s cohesion can be attributed to his childhood socialization and family upbringing. Mr. 12. was raised according to the precepts of what he called "Christian humanism," by which he meant that he believed in "tolerance, freedom in the family,

school, in the life with one another and upbringing [so that one could] live without violence" (Mr. 12., 1992, interview). More practically, Christian humanism meant that Mr. 12. was socialized to reject totalitarianism. "We lived in a hostile environment," he said, "but through the security of the parent's house we were capable of being in opposition. From the medical point of view we had sufficient antibodies. We were resistant." Unlike those professionals, who had also experienced totalitarianism as an virus infecting the body, Mr. 12. was immune to the infection. Totalitarianism could not and did not penetrate and fragment his sense of self.

Once again, the image of the dissident warding off aggression and turning it against the aggressor is prominent. Mr. 12. admitted that he needed to feel the aggression in order to be a dissident. When asked if he were angry, he answered, "a whole portion of anger. This anger we needed in order to reach our goal to overcome and liquidate the state." "When one wants to destroy a societal order," he said later, "then one has to learn to hate. And this hate gives one strength to have the courage that others do not have."

Though Mr. 12 argued that hate was necessary to fuel his dissident activity, he, like other dissidents, believed that hate could not dominate one's opposition. As has been already noted, opposition was joyous as well. In total contrast to the professionals who had experienced a fragmented sense of sense, for the dissident hate and love were intimately bound together. "It was fun to expose the society," Mr. 12. said.

It gave us joy to challenge the society and to cause it pain. The DDR had represented itself as the one

truth and that was not true. It was a joy to scratch the society, to cause it pain, to de-mystify it. And the joy was stronger than the fear. And from the joy was produced more strength. The joy and anger came together to give us courage. It was a little like love and hate. It was a leitmotiv to love my society which caused the hate, but the hate helped me want to change it."

In part, because of the combination of hate and joy, the dissident experienced a cohesive sense of self rather than a fragmented one, as did the non-dissident professional.

III

Not all dissidents, even if they experienced their environment as hostile and aggressive, felt hate and turned the aggression they experienced back upon the political apparatus. For the deeply committed Christian dissident hatred and aggression were not part of their vocabulary. Their attention focused on Christ, Christ's love, and their religious calling. As Mr. 31., a sixty-three (63) year old married Slovak Catholic statistician with four grown children, said, "when the persecution was so bad, we - my wife and I - were prepared to suffer. We wanted to change the politics, but the correct way to change is through the laws of Christ" (Mr. 31., 1992, interview). What Mr. 31. meant by the laws of Christ was that it was his religious obligation "to show [other people] love in the small concrete things" of life.

Mr. 31.'s concept of love, however, cannot be equated to the swelling emotion Mr. 5. and Mr. 12. experienced. Their expression of love was decidedly sensual and sexual, a rejuvenated flood of energy,

while Mr. 31.'s was inherently spiritual. For Mr. 31. love was the desire and wish "to give my freedom to others and to show it to others so that they could live in freedom." He wanted to give to others his love of Christ because he was convinced that God must eventually triumph. "The truth must show itself," he said. "It must show what is good and evil so that the people can more easily decide."¹

Because of his religious faith, Mr. 31. experienced no fragmentation of his sense of self. Though he suffered for his beliefs - having been forbidden to enter the clergy and being made to work as a machine worker rather than as a teacher for more than a decade - and experienced his environment as hostile, Mr. 31.'s sense of self remained cohesive because totalitarianism was unable to penetrate the protection shield of his religion. Unlike other dissidents, Mr. 31. never experienced a weakening of his sense of self. Despite being difficult, his life was simple and certain. "As a believer," he said,

I did not act as others. I feared nothing. I attended Sunday masses. And I am not short. They could always see me. I feared nothing. I knew that we could not get higher career positions. We were prepared to be victims because we thought that the meaning of life was something other than to make a career. We wanted all people to be able to see that we realized Christ's life and that it was realizable.

This does not mean that Mr. 31. did not take precautions, rationally taking into account the political environment in which he lived. Unlike the professionals who never engaged in dissident activity,

¹In a practical sense, Mr. 24.'s expression of love was the organization and leadership of four (4) different religious opposition groups, each of which met once a week, as well as assisting in the organization and coordination of international religious opposition between Czechoslovakia and the DDR.

Mr. 31. acted strategically. Referring to a biblical parable, he knew that he "had to be cleverer than the snake as Christ said." No matter how much freedom his religious beliefs offered him, Mr. 31. recognized political realities. "It was that I felt that I was not as free as I needed to be," he confessed. "In everything I did, I could not show. It was like a brake. It was what was natural in this time. It was self-preservation. We were prepared to be victims, but we wanted to be clever too."

Frustration was accepted as part of the struggle to achieve a higher and greater goal: political change. Frustration was part of the cost of war. Consequently, Mr. 31. never turned that frustration against himself, thus, allowing totalitarian power to penetrate his sense of self. Knowing that he was acting strategically, he said that he "could have great freedom and peace inside, although the external world was more often than not bad. [Life] was a present from God because I had him for a final goal."

Just as Mr. 31.'s personal faith in Christ protected him from experiencing a fragmented sense of self, Dr. 2.'s belief that he had a "religious mission or calling" enabled him to sidestep totalitarianism's penetration of his sense of self. Unquestionably part of Dr. 2.'s calling derived from the fact that his father was a Lutheran minister, but his personal commitment was deeper than merely being a familial heirloom. "I think," he said,

Christians have a calling. Jesus' mission is to represent the people where they live. The calling is more important than a political relationship. That is why I stayed in the DDR. From 1950 through 1955 I studied in the West. In the fall of '55 I came back because it was more important to be

Jesus' ambassador here [in the DDR] than in the West.

As a minister and later as a leader of the Lutheran community in the DDR, Dr. 2. knew that he lived on "the margins" of society. "As Christians," he acknowledged, "we were respected, but we were also excluded from many aspects of the society." On the one hand, the exclusion fostered a feeling of security, for one lived in a "principled community" in the family and the Church. On the other hand, Dr.'s 2.'s family was discriminated against because of their beliefs. The former permitted Dr. 2. and his family to ward off and protect themselves from the totalitarianism's intrusive penetrations of everyday life while the latter produced frustration and a sense of powerlessness.

Dr. 2. resolved this tension through an understanding of what his calling meant. "It is a question of what worth the Christian belief has," he said.

When I would say that the education of my children was more important, then I would not have continued. When the belief in Christ is most important, then it is that my son could not study or get a passport to go to England. Then these things are [however] not so important.

In other words, Dr. 2.'s religious convictions enabled him to resolve the tension, for his calling told him how to rank his priorities.

Like Mr. 31., Dr. 2. had a goal: to represent and further Christ's love on earth. "When I am convinced that I had the mission," he continued, "then everything else is at variance. It was on the second or third rung and it is inside me. Personally, it did not hurt me as much. It was the risk of the profession." It is not that Dr. 2. did not experience the environment's hostility and the sense of powerlessness that the

political apparatus' aggression engendered. It was, however, that his religious commitment prevented totalitarianism's attacks from penetrating and fragmenting his sense of self.

Though Dr. 2.'s calling was religious, his mission was inherently political. Unlike other ministers "who were completely unpolitical and...[who] would avoid political subjects - [believing] that the Church had nothing to do with politics - I had the belief that the Church belonged to all areas: politics, economics, police. When one believes that one should have no other God but He, then one cannot be unpolitical." Consequently, Dr. opened up his parishes to environmental, artistic, and political groups, who needed the sanctuary of the Church in order to organize their activities. It is important to recognize, however, that Dr. 2. perceived his work as religious rather than political because it was due to his religious attachments that his sense of self cohered. "A Christian man," he said, "is a free person and, above all, a person and not a serf. It means a dialectic unity. The independence is given to every man. And the freedom is only for people who serve." Because Dr. 2. served, actively accepted the responsibilities of his calling, and returned to his flock, his sense self remained cohesive.

IV

In different ways and for different reasons each and every dissident, sooner or later, openly and publicly said "no" to the totalitarian political apparatus. Some dissidents drew their strength from the family legacies, continuing along the path in which they had

been socialized. Family socialization in beliefs opposing totalitarian rule did not necessarily mean that one became a dissident. A decision had to be made; concrete actions undertaken. For the religiously motivated dissident, the decision was one to follow the precepts of his faith, as Mr. 32., a thirty-seven year old married Slovak geographer explained:

I see that as a man I make a lot of mistakes, did wrong things and so on, but there is some normality and norms which are shown by the life of Jesus Christ on this earth. It means daily confrontation between my acting and the life of Christ. That is the conscience that lead me (1991, interview).

Despite the necessity of making a personal decision, the religious dissident could fall back upon something which was, in some sense, perceived to be outside himself. The politically motivated dissident, however, did not necessarily have that luxury; he had to rely mainly on himself and it was to himself that he had to be true as Mr. 2. discussed after he had been asked to join the SED: "I went to my father to ask what they meant and what would ensue from my yes or no. He said that it is very obvious that for us it is important to remain honest."

However the dissident managed to say "no" is less important than the bold fact of that utterance and the activities which followed from that refusal. Before becoming a dissident the individual was subjected to the same pressures and forces which fragmented the sense of self of most professionals. Before being able to say "no" and act upon that decision, the future dissident often experienced a weakening of the cohesion, if not a fragmentation, of his sense of self. It was only after opposition had become public and active that the dissident's sense of self cohered. After engaging in dissident activity, the individual was no

longer susceptible to penetration and colonization by totalitarianism's aggressive attacks. The aggression was turned away from the individual's sense of self and redirected back towards the totalitarian political apparatus. Dissident activity enabled the individual to regain control over his life, no longer being the tool of totalitarian power. As a dissident the individual was once again able to love and hate, experiencing the whole range of human emotion and, therefore, possessing a cohesive sense of self.¹

¹This conclusion partially contradicts and disproves both Harold Lasswell's theory about why individuals engage in political activity (1977) and postmodernism's assumption that political opposition requires and presupposes the existence of multiple selves (Cixous, 1974; Deleuze and Guattari, 1977). Lasswell's thesis correlated political involvement with personal "deprivation," indicating that their political activity functioned as an "outlet" for "strong rage" (p. 300). Lasswell's concept of both deprivation and rage parallels Kohut's understanding of narcissistic injury, suggesting that the political individual experiences a fragmented sense of self. This study, on the other hand, suggests that dissident activity, the only "political activity" available under a totalitarian regime, necessitated and/or engendered a cohesive sense of self. Though some dissidents may have experienced rage, their rage did not fragment their sense of self. On the contrary, it enabled them to regain or maintain their cohesion.

CHAPTER IX

"Ideologically" Committed Communists

While most professionals, regardless, of their political affiliation or lack thereof, experienced a fragmented sense of self, "ideologically" committed communists did not. For the most part, although over time the cohesion of their sense of self became progressively more unstable and uncertain, "ideologically" devoted communists told a story about a cohesive sense of self. As already indicated, they did not experience the same sense of powerlessness and hopelessness as did most professionals. Despite obstacles and setbacks, these respondents knew for what they were fighting and, even if they occasionally doubted the wisdom of particular policies promulgated by the political apparatus, those uncertainties did not completely undermine their cohesive sense of self.

Unlike the dissidents, "ideologically" committed communists did not resist totalitarian power. On the contrary, as already suggested, they spoke of an almost religious devotion to communist ideology, and the communist parties of the DDR and Czechoslovakia, respectively. For the most part, as previously argued, they did not experience their environment as being hostile and aggressive. Even if they did, they either did not attribute that experience to the machinations of the political apparatus or, turning their conscience over to their communist party, their "idealization" of the communist party and communist ideology functioned as a shield, protecting their sense of self from the consequences of that experience. As a result, totalitarian power was generally unable to penetrate and colonize their sense of self.

Of the thirty-nine (39) respondents, only five (5) fall into the category of "ideologically" dedicated communists. Though all five lived in either Berlin or Prague, that coincidence may have more to do with the vicissitudes of the sample and the centralization of the political apparatus in the country's capital city than anything else. The only characteristic that tightly ties all five individuals together is their religious commitment to and idealization of their respective communist parties and communist ideology.¹ It is that bond which this chapter will first explore. Thereafter, three different mechanisms by which the "ideologically" devoted communist reinforced their cohesive sense of self will be presented: (1) rationalization; (2) disavowal of reality; and (3) party discipline. For reasons of clarity, the three will be discussed separately, even though "ideologically" committed communists used them interchangeably. Lastly, the case of one "ideologically" committed communist will be analyzed to show the difficulties even this group of individuals had in maintaining a cohesive sense of self.

¹Three of the five were raised in politically committed families, in which one or both parents were socialist or communist activists. It could be argued that the absence of a fragmented sense of self is attributable, at least in part, to the familial socialization process. Much like a number of the dissidents, who had been born into religious households, individuals whose parents were politically active party members acquired a protective shield, behind which a cohesive sense of self was maintained. Unlike those dissidents, the "idealists" protective shield did not function as an "antibody" to the prevailing conditions. Rather these individuals' socialization may account for their quasi-religious adherence to communism, the communist party, and communist ideology. Even if the socialization argument were convincing, it could not explain all five cases. Nor would it be able to account for those individuals born into families whose parents were communist activists, but who, nevertheless, experienced a fragmented sense of self, Ms. 1., for instance. Socialization, therefore, is neither a sufficient nor necessary factor in explaining the "idealistically" committed communists' cohesive sense of self.

As already argued, three of the five "ideologically" committed communists - Mr. 8., Ms. 6., and Ms. 7. - did not experience their external environment as hostile and aggressive. Instead, as has been shown, they had an almost religious devotion to communism. The fourth, Mr. 20., believed that his environment was hostile, but attributed his belief to the activities of those opposed to communist rule and not to the machinations of the political apparatus. In other words, four of the five individuals did not experience their external world as hostile and aggressive or did not believe that the communist party was responsible for the institutionalization of such an external world.

The one exception, Mr. 3., acknowledged the pervasiveness and intrusiveness of the political apparatus. He admitted that he "had sought to slip out of the pressure. I slid out and tried to put it off. The playspace was always becoming narrower" (Mr. 3., 1992, interview). Recounting an incident at the newspaper at which he was an editor, he said,

it happened that [Egon] Krenz or the Party said we could not write something. There was the problem with Bahro in 1978.¹ He was writing for the same newspaper. It was politically difficult. Although we stopped writing what we were told not to write, the newspaper was closed. And then suddenly reopened. The pressure and the boundaries were quite limited. The feeling was that one was

¹Bahro was a member of the SED who wrote a scathing Marxist critique of the organization and domination of the party. For his troubles he was arrested and, eventually, deported to West Germany.

oppressed because one thought what one had done was right.

The issue here is not that Mr. 3. was subjected to an attack by the political apparatus and, therefore, experienced his surrounding environment as hostile and aggressive, which he did. What is of importance is that Mr. 3. "idealized" the SED and communist ideology and believed that his actions were politically and morally correct. Continuing with the 1978 incident, he added, "my feelings were that I had to publish those things in order to change what was here. I wanted what was here, but a better socialism."

Time and time again, Mr. 3. returned to this theme. Referring to a party discussion group in which he participated, he said that the group "was never an opposition. It was always with the socialist idea. We wanted to contribute to the presence of socialism. What was in the Bundesrepublik was never an alternative. No one wanted that. One wanted another socialism." Or later, he repeated and expanded upon the theme, saying that he "had no anxiety or fear of the Stasi. I had never had a fear of the Stasi. I wanted nothing to do with the Bundesrepublik. I had no anxiety that I was being followed or anything. I was convinced what I was doing was for the future of socialism." Even though Mr. 3. experienced his external world as hostile, and aggressive, his ideological belief in the righteousness of communism shielded him from the consequences of that experience, i.e. a fragmented sense of self.

It is this "idealization" that binds together all five respondents. All five sincerely and "ideologically" believed in the past, present, and future of communist ideology and their respective communist parties.

As has been suggested earlier, their adherence to communism bordered on the religious. Mr. 3., too, referred to the "ideologically" devoted communist's almost religious faith when he said that he "had no fear because my opinion, I was convinced, was in the direction in which socialism should move. My conscience was a protective umbrella."

Unlike dissidents, who experienced guilt before engaging in dissident activity, "ideologically" dedicated communists had no such difficulties because of their "idealization" of the party and ideology. Consequently, they lived behind a "protective umbrella," which enabled them to maintain a cohesive sense of self.¹ Ms. 7., for instance, said that "the goals of Christianity and socialism are similar" and that both are "humanist" philosophies. She went on to add that it is necessary for any individual to possess a belief in something greater than himself. "Only with something to believe in can man live. So I believed. Perhaps the idea of socialism is not realizable. We sought a just solution" (Ms. 7., 1992, interview). Later she expounded upon what she meant and equated it directly to a religious adherence. "I am an atheist," she said I believe that one needs to believe to live. A goal, an ideal." When she was asked whether such a need to believe was, in fact, atheistic, she responded,

then that is religious. I acted in the line of my religion. I was brought up a humanist. No one can do everything good. Everyone makes mistakes. I had attempted to follow through and behave [according to] the socialist relationship.

¹Kohut has extensively discussed the role of idealization in the maintenance of a cohesive sense of self (1977). For Kohut, however, idealization is only one pole of the "bipolar self," the other being grandiosity and exhibitionism. In his psychoanalytic theory, the individual balances these two opposing tendencies in order to solidify a cohesive sense of self.

Ms. 6., a divorced mother of one, also spoke of her religious "idealization" of communism. She said that for her "socialism was salvation. It was my dream. The big USSR and the small DDR, industrious, successful, very tidy" (Ms. 6., 1992, interview). The DDR's coming of age was her own passage into adulthood and personal redemption. Her identification with the DDR was absolute, for the DDR's coming of age was her own. "When the DDR was internationally recognized," she said, "it was my university days and it was my triumph. It belonged to us when we were accepted into the UN." Later in the interview, she underlined her bond to the DDR and the SED by admitting that she "always said I am as old as the DDR. I had fully identified with the DDR. I could not imagine how the DDR could not exist. My land is gone. Something is missing. I feel like an exile. It is bitter." Ms. 6.'s "idealization" of the SED and communist ideology was a religious merging of her own sense of self into that of her country's.

First and foremost, then, it was their "idealization" of communism, their respective communist parties, and communist ideology which binds these five (5) respondents together and enabled them to experience a cohesive sense of self. Their almost religious conviction was a "protective umbrella," shielding them from experiencing the external world as hostile and aggressive. Even if they were, in fact, able to experience the world as their fellow professionals did, their "idealization" protected their sense of self from being penetrated and colonized by totalitarian power. Stated more psychologically, their "ideological" devotion permitted them to maintain a cohesive sense of self.

II

Because these respondents' "idealized" communism, they did not run the risk of their sense of self being penetrated and colonized by totalitarian power. "Idealization," however, by itself was not enough to ensure their maintaining a cohesive sense of self. They reinforced and bolstered their cohesive by engaging in various defensive manoeuvres, one of which was rationalization. Ms. 6.'s case history clearly indicates how rationalization supplemented "idealization", thus, enabling her to maintain a cohesive sense of self.

Having been born in 1949, Ms. 6. described herself as being a member of the first generation after the war. "I belong to the afterwar generation," she said. "I saw the ruins of the war. In my city, all the churches were destroyed by British bombs. And Berlin was terrible." The conclusion she drew from her childhood observations was that "with something totally destroyed one must rebuild. And that takes time. And it was fun" (Ms. 6., 1992, interview). More than recognizing the necessity of patience and hard work, Ms. 6. understood the lesson of World War II to be that she participate in the reconstruction and transformation of Germany. Because of the Nazi horror, she had to "be active and a critic and [had] to improve the world. I would not only say yes. I will be a doer and not a victim."

It was precisely this combination of patience, dedication, and pleasure which dominated her behavior and experience of totalitarianism in the DDR. At the beginning of the interview, when asked to describe her experiences before 1989, she said, "in my profession it always went forwards. Always step by step I could go

forward." Though she went on to note that the political apparatus' instructions and demands led to conflicts with the young artists she published, the regime's censorship did not disturb her unduly. Her "ideolgical" commitment convinced her that conditions in the DDR were "becoming better. I always had the feeling that it will be better. Even the conflicts."

One example of her patient and determined optimism involved her love of reading. "I loved to read so much," she confessed. "The whole past of literature was there. I had to read it all. Shakespeare, Dante." Nevertheless, she knew that certain books were unavailable in the DDR. One such author was Kafka. She admitted that when she first came across Kafka's name in another book "I was a student and Kafka was still unloved. One did not speak about him. No books of his could be bought." Despite the regime's prohibition, she "never felt [proscribed literature] as forbidden, but as a shortage. If one wanted to read [a book] then one found a way. I did not feel deformed." Knowing that the only way to be able to read Kafka was to acquire a copy of one of his books from "friends or from the West," she solicited that help, partially relying on a grandmother who lived in West Germany. "I needed to conquer the situation. I saw how those on [my] left and right conquered. I saw one taboo after another being broken."

Whereas other professionals in their recounting of such an incident would have expressed some level of discontinuity or disruption of their sense of self, Ms. 6. exhibited not a single sign. She completely ignored the fact that her "love of reading" required her to engage in a small but illegal act of rebellion against the political apparatus and, instead, recognized the virtues of persistence, patience, and rational

thought. Referring to her Kafka saga, she recounted what she told her young artists. Achieving one's goals "is a process," she said, "through which reason sees itself. The intelligent must push through to reason. It goes so because I had experienced it."

In contrast to other professionals, who had experienced their work as either a refuge from or as having been penetrated by totalitarian power, Ms. 6. experienced her work as vital, pleasurable, and fulfilling. Ms. 6. did not need to retreat from the inherently public nature of work into a private sphere or select a type of work which purposefully isolated her. Rather, perhaps because of her divorce, the converse was true. Despite censorship and the political apparatus' conflict with young artists, Ms. 6. experienced the literary seminars she conducted as "good because they had not a false moment. It was complete in me. It was intensive work in which there was something valuable in every moment. I had the feeling that one should live every minute like this. Almost euphoric." In short, despite prohibitions and obstacles, Ms. 6. rationalized away the difficulties and was able to experience an intense emotional connection to her work.

Whenever she confronted and overcame these external hindrances, Ms. 6. derived pleasure and satisfaction, paradoxically paralleling the experience of dissidents. "When the pressure came from outside," she said, referring to a seminar she led, which took place in the northern DDR,

it was even more fun. This was in Schwerin. And the people from Schwerin were there; they are provincial. And they said that what we were doing was counter-revolutionary. But since they were from Schwerin, we thought nothing of it. I felt the

pressure, but I pushed back. I was strong, very strong. Thus I could ignore the pressure.

Rather than lapsing into passivity and helplessness, Ms. 6. rationalized away the obstacle as the work of a few recalcitrant and pig-headed provincial bureaucrats, as in Schwerin, and fought back.

When the East German political apparatus forbade the importation of a Russian magazine, which heralded the achievements of Gorbachev, Ms. 6. protested. "We were not powerless," she asserted.

Honecker had forbidden Sputnik. And something happened that had never happened here. People wrote letters to the Politburo or the Central Committee. It was many people. Not only some. It was a wave. They not only grumbled and cursed at home, but they did something. Letters are better than saying yes.... I wrote letters. I was very angry because I saw that what was happening here was completely wrong.¹

Acting in the name of her idealist beliefs, Ms. 6. did not victimize herself, allowing her sense of self to lose its cohesion. Instead, believing that she was standing up to injustice and bureaucratic ossification and rationalizing away the discrepancies between her "idealization" of communism and the reality of communist rule in the DDR, Ms. 6. reasserted her religious commitment to communist ideology. Believing that her actions and "ideological" dedication were furthering the dream

¹Letter writing was an accepted and customary way of expressing one's opinion to the political apparatus. As noted by Borneman, following a German tradition beginning with Frederick the Second, a 1975 DDR law enshrined the right of East German citizen to write petitions to the political apparatus with the expectation of receiving a response within four weeks (1991, p. 73). As one East German dissident noted, "in this kind of feudal state, it was normal for the underlings to write to the ruler.... There is a long history in this country of people writing letters and petitions to Honecker" (quoted in Philipsen, 1993, p. 74). Even committed communists wrote letters and petitions (see Borneman, 1991, pp. 73-84; Philipsen, 1993, p. 116).

of building a socialist utopia, Ms. 6. maintained her cohesive sense of self.

III

Ms. 6.'s rational pursuit of her idealist dream was typical for an ideologically committed communist. Having identified with their country, and hence the communist party, the ideologue rationalized patience and persistence enabled them to avoid the experience of a fragmented sense of self. Closely tied to rationalization was a second defensive mechanism: disavowal of reality. Though most "ideologically" dedicated communists exhibited both forms of behavior, Ms. 7.'s case history exemplifies how a disavowal of reality enabled her to maintain a cohesive sense of self.

Ms. 7. identified with the DDR, referring to it as "always [being] my state." As already mentioned, she believed that communism was humanism writ large, a religious faith and that progress would bring "heaven" down onto earth. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, communism in the DDR was "the guarantee for anti-fascism. That was the main emphasis. We had concealed a Jewish family during the war. Most important was to destroy fascism and not allow it to return" (Ms. 7., 1992, interview).

Given these two bedrock beliefs, Ms. 7. denied that the government/party had any influence on her everyday life and assumed responsibility for her own actions. Unlike most professionals, she

believed she was in control over her own life, making her own choices and decisions. "I had arranged everything myself," she said.

I must situate myself with what exists. There weren't some consumer goods. I had the feeling that we could decide what we wanted. In our office the travel plans were decided very democratically. There were lots of possibilities of traveling and then one applied and the committee decided democratically on the basis of who went last year, who needed it more, and for whom it would be more beneficial. Naturally, we waited ten years for the auto, but it is ridiculous to say that it was the Party. The economy was obviously a Party decision. But to say it was their fault and to claim that I suffered from it. Yes, I waited to find a freezer. It was not so important to me to think of what I wanted to eat and run through all [East] Berlin to find it. I go shopping, see what is there and then decide.

Though Ms. 7. recognized certain limitations, she accepted those boundaries and made rational decisions according to them. Since one had to wait years for an automobile or a freezer, Ms. 7. did. Since many consumer goods and food were not available, she made decisions only after knowing what could be readily acquired. It was not a question of Ms. 7.'s having consciously or unconsciously to repress her desires as was the case with most professionals. Rather her dreams and desires were bounded by a rational choice grounded in a dedication to a fulfillment of her political-religious beliefs.

That is not to say that Ms. 7. silenced herself into accepting whatever the political apparatus said. On the contrary, Ms. 7., like Ms. 6., claimed that she was frequently critical of the government/party. Once, for instance, when her son grew his hair long, school officials

threatened him with a haircut. "I told the school that no one could decide when to cut his hair," she said. "That was my decision. I told them I would write an article in the newspaper and go get a lawyer. Then nothing happened. They did not cut his hair. I thought it was always a piece of politics."

Another incident also occurred at school during a parents' representative meeting. Instead of following the agenda and discussing educational issues, the school authorities launched into political speeches. "I was in a rage and I sprang up," Ms. 7. said, rebuking the school principal. The parents were "here to speak about the school and not about politics. I received applause."

Ms. 7. attributed her outspokenness to her personality. "I am very spontaneous," she confessed. "I have a fresh mouth. I always say what I mean. I was like that as a child too." Just as, if not more important, was Ms. 7.'s belief that she spoke with the voice of a committed communist. It was her ideological conviction and "idealization" of communism which enabled her to speak her mind. Consequently, unlike those professionals whose experience of "objective anxiety" silenced and fragmented their sense of self, Ms. 7. felt no external pressure nor anxiety when she spoke up and, consequently, experienced no threat to the cohesion of her sense of self.

At the same time, Ms. 7.'s behavior and experience of totalitarianism depended upon both a selective testing and a more radical disavowal of reality. Ms. 7. was correct when she said that the typical East German citizen had ample opportunity to travel. She accurately noted that the individual could travel to numerous different destinations. Just as Ms. 6. ignored the political apparatus' censorship of

Kafka, Ms. 7. chose to ignore, first, that the political apparatus "granted" permission to travel outside the DDR, permission which was often withheld for political reasons, and, second, that it was impossible to travel as a private citizen to most, if not all, Western countries. Moreover, for Ms. 7. to deny that the SED was responsible for the economy was contradictory. Her denial was a disavowal of reality, for she had already admitted that all economic decisions were made by the political apparatus.

It appears as if Ms. 7.'s "ideological" devotion blinded her to and/or assisted her in disavowing reality. "Democratic" decision-making as to who would be permitted to travel obscured the fact that no one was free to travel. Ms. 7. believed that it was better to wait ten years for an auto because the alternative was the Bundesrepublik and "the Bundesrepublik was a fascist state." On these more fundamental issues, Ms. 7. remained silent because, as she said, public criticism "would help the [DDR's] opponents," i.e. the fascists.

It would be unfair to argue that Ms. 7. was completely blind to reality. Towards the end of her country's existence, she finally recognized the cleavages which were to tear apart and doom the DDR. Attending a 1988 youth conference, Ms. 7. observed that the meeting seemed to be "schizophrenic" with "two different types of demonstrations." She thought about unnamed terrorists and opponents of communist dictatorship and "how they could not push through and accomplish what they wanted to do. How with discussions and conversations nothing could be achieved." She empathized with those terrorists' presumed feelings of rage, frustration, and powerlessness, saying that she understood "the helplessness that leads to aggression.

That was my feeling. I thought one would have to become psychologically sick, a terrorist, or give up because there is nothing else. I gave up."

Like most professionals, Ms. 7. eventually retreated into the private realm of her friends and family. Despite her "idealization" of communism, the SED, and communist ideology, she too emigrated into her private niche. Rather than become "psychologically sick" or explode, she "gave up." Ultimately, totalitarianism made her feel as powerless and helpless as it had most professionals. Reality finally broke through her disavowal of it and her "ideological" devotion to communism was no longer a match for her pent up feelings of aggression. Since the overthrow of totalitarianism in the DDR occurred so quickly after Ms. 7. "gave up," it would be highly speculative and, therefore, unproductive to predict how she would have reacted over the long haul to her inner emigration. What is, however, useful to note is that such a retreat was not a completely uncommon reaction for an "ideologically" committed communist. Eventually, totalitarianism ate its own children, even those who had "idealized" it.

IV

The third and last mechanism employed by the "ideologically" dedicated communist respondents to bolster and maintain their cohesive sense of self was communist party discipline. Though the sample is much too small to draw any statistical inference, it is nevertheless interesting to note that party discipline was only an issue

for the male respondents and not for the female ones. Just as it was only female professionals who spoke of their fragmented sense of self in terms of their love and sexual relationships, it was only the male "ideologically" committed communists who spoke of discipline.

Mr. 3., for example, spent years as an editor, having been assigned by the political apparatus to various different journals and newspapers. Much like Ms. 6. and 7., Mr. 3. sought to make his religious vision real. Noting his efforts to begin a discussion of the cultural and political relationship between the DDR and Prussia, Mr. 3. said that he and his editors began with

trivialities and hoped to cast their nets from them. We wanted to write what was possible. We were the first to write about the relationship of the DDR to Prussia: militarism. And Kant and the great thinkers were Prussians also. This created a disturbance. Two or three years later, the relationship to Prussia came to light (Mr. 3., 1992, interview).

Mr. 3.'s intent was not to revolutionize the DDR or even challenge the system, but "to bring things to a discussion, so that they could be argued." It was, he thought, "good for our consciousness to discuss these things and to try to find a solution."

Nevertheless, he always wondered whether he would once "go too far that the newspaper would be closed down." Each time he approached that imaginary line, he was made to realize to whom he was responsible. At one journal, he said, it was clear that power lay with the "FDJ [the communist youth association]. We had to be responsible to them. A discussion there was impossible. One had no chance. They had their opinion and that was that."

Time after time, Mr. 3. realized that his efforts were in vain. Each time the political apparatus would refuse to give him permission to publish particular articles and at the weekly Thursday SED meetings "whenever there was a contribution that the KP [the communist party] did not like, there was strong criticism." Once, when there was no time to cancel and reprint an issue," he said, "a black line was printed through a 'rock' text, [an avant-garde form of poetry], because the Party forbade its publication."

Each time, Mr. 3. would try again, despite knowing that he would eventually run "into a wall and then it [would be] over. It was futile and fruitless."¹ One of his reasons for persistence was his "ideological" dedication to and "idealization" of communism and, more importantly, the SED. "I could have said no," he admitted.

I could have said that the border has been reached for me and become a cemetery gardener. But it was a question of Party discipline. 'You must go there where the need of the Party was greatest.' I had submitted to this discipline. It did not have to do with emotion, but with theoretical things. I bit my teeth. It was in the interest of objectivity and the development of society because these people had a better overview of the society.

Unlike Ms. 7., Mr. 3. did not disavow reality. For him, the choices were to become a graveyard gardener or to continue on, patiently and persistently. Like Ms. 6., however, he often rationalized his behavior, heralding his minor successes and believing he had made significant

¹Accurately describing a totalitarian system, he said, "a thing that ran through the years was that one could not think of a development that the Politburo would not decide. The Politburo decided something and then one had to break one's head over how to manage the decision. That was from the big questions to the tiny ones. It was never a question of what, but only how once the the decision was made."

progress. "With this Prussian relationship," he confessed, "it gave one the sense of possibilities. It was always from time to time, now and then." Despite the graveyard image and the futility which loomed before him, his singular successes were deemed to be great triumphs and each triumph reinforced his "ideological" devotion to communism, allowing him to maintain a cohesive sense of self. "The feeling," he acknowledged was one of "senselessness, but there was always here and there the possibility with small things to publish something new. And then one thought, yes something can happen. One had the strength because of very small successes." Each success was another flower in the cemetery.

Those singular moments of achievement were not the exceptions which proved the rule. He lived in a cemetery and it was only an illusion that he could make it bloom. Though he probably knew unconsciously that it was but false hope to believe that totalitarianism could be reformed, each time he confronted the wall, Mr. 3. remembered his brief successes. Momentarily, his patience would be rewarded and his "idealization" rekindled.

To buttress the cohesion of his sense of self, Mr. 3. internalized the dictates of party discipline. Having experienced the power and aggression which the political apparatus had unleashed, Mr. 3. submitted to the SED's commands, turning over his conscience to the party. Even though Mr. 3. thought that each of his attempts to approach the wall and push it back were right, he accepted the SED's assessment of his actions. Even though Mr. 3. "bit his teeth," he accepted the SED's decision because its judgements were based upon an "objective" appraisal of societal conditions. In short, and echoing Arendt's analysis

of totalitarianism, Mr. 3.'s "idealization" of and religious devotion to the communism required him to believe that, like the Pope, the SED was infallible; it knew the truth.

Even if the SED's commandments were unwelcomed, Mr. 3. believed, a committed communist had to submit. Historical truth had nothing to do with personal and subjective emotions. Individual autonomy was no match for theoretical objectivity. Given the SED's lock on objectivity, the individual's emotional experience was irrelevant. Consequently, Mr. 3. silenced himself and acquiesced. But because of the "ideological" faith in communism and the SED, Mr. 3. did not experience a fragmentation of his sense of self. His "idealization" was the shield with which he protected and maintained the cohesion of his sense of self.

This shield could be only so strong. Each time Mr. 3. ran headlong into the wall and each time he submitted, quelching his emotions, the shield weakened. Over time, momentary successes were no longer sufficient to revitalize him. It appeared as if each collision drew the bargain he had made more vividly: growing flowers among the dead if he persisted with his actions or deadening himself if he continued to submit to communist discipline. In the early 1980s, "the possibilities became ever more limited, restricted," he admitted. After the incident with the black line being drawn through an article, Mr. 3. "said that [he] had to leave" his job as an editor. His "ideology" failed him and to stay would have been to draw a line through himself.

Consequently, Mr. 3. applied for and obtained a job in the Academy of Sciences. He withdrew from the public into the private spaces of academic research. He denied, however, that his retreat had

anything to do with his being against communism. Rationalizing his actions, he said that his retreat was only a response to "the way [communism] was practiced here." Nevertheless, Mr. 3. confessed that his withdrawal was a way for him to "slip out" and sidestep "the pressure." Like Ms. 7., he had given up. "The space in which one lived," he said, "was always becoming narrower. In the last years before 1989 [the pressure] became stronger. By 1989 one would have been a dead man." He retreated into the Academy to try to retain his cohesive sense of self, but even there his cohesion was threatened.

Like Mr. 3., Mr. 8. relied on discipline to maintain his cohesive sense of self. Perhaps because he was a military officer Mr. 8. repeatedly returned to the theme of discipline. For him "discipline meant security" and discipline was one of the four cornerstones of his "ideological" dedication, the other three being, according to Mr. 8., "honesty, openness, and authenticity/reliability" (Mr. 8., 1992, interview). If one of the four foundations is "out of kilter," Mr. 8. noted, the system cannot work correctly. An imbalanced system is one which produces doubt and uncertainty. It is not surprising then that during the interview each of Mr. 8.'s references to discipline followed a moment of doubt or was an attempt to resolve a creeping uncertainty.

From family and friends Mr. 8. heard that the economy of the DDR was not operating efficiently or effectively. Though individuals Mr. 8. loved and trusted gave him this news, Mr. 8. did not "believe that the entire economy was lying on the floor because there was no more money." It was not possible that what his loved ones were saying was accurate "because the year end statistics were always good.... I believed

what was said in the Party. Honesty, openness, reliability. What the Party said I believed."

Rationalizing what he heard, Mr. 8. thought "that perhaps some businesses" were bankrupt because of peculiar circumstances or the individuals in charge. The DDR was not facing a general economic collapse. Disjunctures in reality were attributed to the specific mistakes of identifiable individuals. They were contingent occurrences, epiphenomena, rather than the rule.

This form of rationalization through personification was typical for the "ideologically" committed communist. Each time it was an effort to reconcile reality with the individual's "idealization" of communism. Ms. 6. believed that the party officials from Schwerin were anomalies rather than being the "true" representatives of the SED. Ms. 7. believed that hope lay in a "new Party leadership." Honecker and his aged cohorts were to blame for the condition of the DDR. The system, itself, was sound and, thus, all that was required "was almost a biological solution." Or as Mr. 3. succinctly phrased it, everyone hoped "that the leadership would die out."

In other words, mistakes could be made by the communist party leadership, in the details of how the system worked, or in the execution of orders, but the system itself was never at fault. As Ms. 6. mentioned, after 1985

I said that certain processes or decisions were wrong. But it was not against the system. Sometimes very small things. A good author, whom I knew, had been invited to go to the West for a reading. I thought it was dumb [to forbid him to go] and tried to get him to be able to go over. I

thought it was dumb not to take advantage of the opportunity.

Another time, Ms. 6. wrote an article about a famous poet. She was subsequently told that, although the article may be good, it was unpublishable. "I was enraged," she said.

Enraged. But not at the system, but at the particular people. For instance, a band could play and perform in the South - near Dresden, for example - and the Party Secretary would say, 'come youngsters, we will discuss this.' But in the North - Brandenburg, let's say - the Party Secretary would say it was counterrevolutionary. No, I was not enraged against the system, but individuals and individual decisions.

The "ideologically" dedicated communist's religious devotion meant that it was nearly impossible for the communist party as an organization to err. Its purity was and had to remain intact. When asked how he reconciled the Leninist-Stalinist faith in the absolute rectitude of the party with Marxian principles, Mr. 8. answered,

it was supposedly because many people in the Party were making decisions. Supposedly. If the positions were properly prepared, [worked on] in the correct [governmental] institutions, then the decisions were scientifically grounded. The logic is good when not just one person decides. It is okay when many heads think over a problem. Then the possibility of a problem or mistake is very small. The role of discipline was important. The Party could work only when there is the discipline.

Communism was "scientifically" constructed and scientifically maintained. Any mistakes which did occur had to be attributable to particular individuals. For the "ideologically" committed communists, it was not only the party's purity which was a stake. More importantly,

because of the "idealization" of the communist party, the individual's cohesive sense of self was at risk. When mistakes did occur and when anomalies were brought to the individual's attention, party discipline stimulated the individual to rationalize away the difficulty or disavow reality. Discipline was the glue which kept the "ideologically" devoted communist's sense of self cohesive and warded off the experience a fragmented sense of self.

When that glue or protective shield weakened, doubts and uncertainties arose, as already indicated in the discussions of Ms. 7. and Mr. 3. The political apparatus' banning of the Soviet journal *Sputnik* caused grave problems for Mr. 8, just as it had for Ms. 6. Working in the Defense Ministry he had access to the banned journal and read it despite the official prohibition. He

had doubts about the correctness of the Party decision. When the Party says something is right it is right. But when one continually doubts, the question is why one questions or doubts the Party. It becomes a question of Party discipline. When the leadership decides something, then each of us must carry out that decision. I never had a problem before, till this point. One could not question this decision in the Party group. It was an contradiction and [created] internal conflict.

Forced to make a choice between communist discipline and the communist virtues of honesty and openness, Mr. 8. sacrificed the latter two, effectively withdrawing into himself, turning away from friends and colleagues.

Contrary to Mr. 8.'s own claim, the *Sputnik* decision was not the only problem he had with the political apparatus. Two other incidents also produced doubts and uncertainties, one of which entailed violating

military regulations. Nevertheless, Mr. 8. experienced "no anxiety or guilt" about his actions. He had no "bad conscience." What he did was to withdraw into himself. "I simply did not speak about it to others," he said. "Not even [my wife], although otherwise we had understood one another well." Mr. 8. no longer denied the "contradictions and conflicts" as he had before. He merely refused to talk about them, keeping them inside and silent, pretending that they were "completely small details."¹ Withdrawing into a shell helped Mr. 8. preserve his "idealization" of communism and enabled him to maintain a cohesive sense of self, however attenuated it may have become.

V

As with Ms. 6. and Mr. 3., it is only speculation to say whether or not Mr. 8.'s sense of self would have fragmented in time if the events of 1989 had not taken place. It could be argued that the "ideologically" committed communist's "inner emigration" was the first step in the the loss of his cohesive sense of self, as it had been for the vast majority of professionals. Mr. 8.'s admission that since 1989 he has "changed" and become "more flexible than before" suggests that the supposition has validity. In post-1989 Germany, he said that "if one wants to reach what one wants, one needs to be more flexible than before." Though

¹One of the other conflicts Mr. 8. had with the political apparatus was over Rosa Luxemborg's famous slogan that freedom was the freedom to be different, a slogan which was used to great effect by dissidents. After rereading Luxemborg's work, Mr. 8. rationalized away his difficulty by saying that Luxemborg had written those words on the margin of a letter to Lenin. The slogan, therefore, was, in all senses of the word, marginal.

Mr. 8. said this with respect to employment, it also applies to his experience of his sense of self. Political freedom has provided Mr. 8. with personal freedom as well. Though he has lost everything in which he once believed, Mr. 8. has recognized that the security the communist system had offered him had also deprived him of initiative and ambition.¹ He had been inflexible and rigid and it was that rigidity which had been threatened with fragmentation. In post-1989 Germany, life, though "more strenuous, [is] better, but only when one has the opportunity to work." The challenge now is "to deal with different situations and circumstances," by which Mr. 8. meant not only a new socio-economic system, but the chance to pursue one's own desires and dreams. Flexibility, he said, is required "if one is ambitious. It is necessary, if one wants to reach a goal."²

The supposition that the "ideologically" dedicated communist's retreat was the first step in the fragmentation of his sense of self can be

¹The sense of loss due to the upheavals of 1989 is profound. Mr. 8. confessed to "a feeling of loss. One is suddenly there and there is nothing more. Alone. And also deceived. Or misused. One had fought for these things and one thought one was fighting for the people and not against them, but it was so." For Mr. 3. the sense of loss was also earth shattering. He has lost his sense of security, commitment, and meaning in the world. "What I felt," he said, "about the DDR and had worked for has been liquidated [abgewickelt] and lost. Like in a sense of war. I have lost, surrendered." With the loss of employment as well as her country, Ms. 7. said that she lost her "humanity."

²It could be argued that Mr. 8. is adapting to the post-1989 situation as would any rational actor. The new circumstances require different capabilities. Foremost among those new capabilities is flexibility and ambition. Recognizing what those new capabilities are and the benefits which will accrue to those who possess those capabilities, the rational actor adopts those behaviors. Though there may be validity to the rational actor claim, it is striking that Mr. 8. distinguishes his behavior in 1992 with that of pre-1989 and associates that change to one of flexibility. What is most striking about the "idealist" communist is the thorough lack of flexibility they exhibited prior to 1989. They were instruments of communist ideology and, at least for Mr. 8., saw themselves as such. Their commitment was a rigid and "idealized" religious adherence. It is only after 1989 that Mr. 8. can admit to wanting to fulfill his desires and achieve his ambitions.

more adequately addressed by examining the case of Mr. 20. The sense of inner contradiction and conflict, which was evident in three of the previous four respondents, was much more pronounced and explicit for Mr. 20.

In answering the first question of the interview, Mr. 20. said that his feelings were divided into two. The first dominant motif was of satisfaction in his job, the security of knowing what the future would hold for him and his extended family, and a palpable confidence of being in control. The second strain was one of increasing tension, disintegration, and an inexorable movement into the unknown. While the first cluster of experiences mainly pertained to his personal life, the second dwelt almost exclusively with political and public circumstances.

What is notable about Mr. 20.'s emotional cleavage is not only the rather typical bifurcation of private-personal and public-political life, but his description of the tension and its resolution was achieved through the application of communist discipline, as with Mr. 3. and Mr. 8.¹ Referring to the tension, Mr. 20. said that since he

was very near the political situation in Czechoslovakia, I could feel something was changing very rapidly. There was a chance to change the situation. But we didn't know the direction of this change. We hoped it would be in a socialist direction. But we felt there were many difficulties so we felt that the time was full of tension. For example, in my job there were differences between the leadership and the rank and file. We knew that

¹It should be noted that, despite his political activities, Mr. 20.'s bifurcation was not an inversion of the usual dichotomy. The private remained a place of control and contentment while the public was one of disequilibrium and pain. The major difference in Mr. 20.'s case was that his political obligations prevented his conceiving of a retreat into the private.

some decisions of the leadership were not right"
(Mr. 20., 1991, interview).

Despite this tugging apart, Mr. 20. heeded the strictures of communist discipline and did not voice his opinions publicly or act against the stated interests of the political apparatus. Quite openly, he confessed, that "we had no tradition in that time to express our views, our thoughts quite clearly, quite publicly because we were in a position of quite strong discipline. It was not discipline on paper only. It was our internal discipline."

Even more than either Mr. 3. or Mr. 8., Mr. 20. internalized the conflict between the experienced tension and the need for discipline. Though both Mr. 3. nor Mr. 8. had acted out this contradiction, retreating into themselves in response to the increased vulnerability of their sense of self, the issue was more pressing and immediate for Mr. 20. His notion of discipline was not a question of an external force restricting or constraining him, but of his own actions against himself. "It is internal censorship," he said.

Internal. Internal. The worst kind of censorship is internal. It is like a journalist writing an article and writing it with an internal censor. He is not afraid of some censor in some office, but the censor inside himself. It is a conflict between one feeling you must fulfill - some aims, ideas, proposals - and not to do thing which may destroy these aims.

Though he tried to minimize the conflict between these two sets of feelings, labeling them of different importance and scale, the depth of the cleavage is apparent in the association which followed his first reference to discipline. Mr. 20.'s first mention of discipline was intimately bound up with images of aggression, war, and loyalty to his

father and grandfather. This is not an attempt at an introduction of a latent Oedipal complex, but rather an acknowledgement that Mr. 20. experienced communist discipline as a battleground pitting internal as well as external enemies against an exposed sense of self. As a way of explaining the discipline to which he subjected himself, Mr. 20. referred to the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia and his father's guerilla warfare legacy, the Soviet "problem" of 1968, during which he and his family were evacuated to Moscow, as well as his initial perception of the Charter 77 dissidents as enemies.

As mentioned earlier, it could be argued that Mr. 20.'s experience was an accurate intuitive assessment of the changing political landscape of Czechoslovakia. Given his political position it is not particularly surprising that he was able to evaluate the changing climate of Czechoslovakia. Nor is it difficult to imagine that his understanding of Czechoslovakia's evolution was unable to penetrate his conscious thought. He was not only a ranking member of the next generation of communist leaders, but one of his grandfathers was a founding member of a social democratic party in Czechoslovakia before World War II while the other was an early and influential member of the communist party. Furthermore, his father fought in the communist resistance within Czechoslovakia during the war and emerged, thereafter, as one of the leaders of the post-war party.

Nevertheless, Mr. 20.'s reaction to current events was more than a mere intellectual, albeit intuitive, assessment. The basic cleavage Mr. 20. perceived within Czechoslovakian politics was one which was mirrored in his sense of self. The tension and contradictions, he experienced were not limited to politics. Politics was, however, the

metaphor by which he understood himself. "To name [the tension]," he said,

was one of the biggest problems for me. Name the process. One of our biggest problems for me. We had stereotypic names. Like counterrevolutionary, revolution, class struggle. It was very difficult. The use of those names to refer to all these processes in our society, in Poland, in Hungary, in the USSR, is extremely difficult. And in me too.

Unable name the political events he was witnessing, he was also unable to name the experience he was undergoing. All he had were "stereotypic" communist slogans, which were wholly inadequate to cope with the political situation. The same was true with respect to his personal feelings. Knowing no other language than that of the communist party, he was speechless in describing his subjective experiences. Consequently, Mr. 20. was unable to control either his experience of events or his sense of self. It was not just Czechoslovakia which was undergoing a velvet revolution, but Mr. 20. too. If in the crudest of terms, Czechoslovakia were divided between the totalitarian political apparatus and civil society, so too was Mr. 20.'s sense of self. As Mr. 20. said, "and in me too."

VI

There can be little question but that Czech and East German communists, who were "ideologically" committed to their respective communist parties and communist ideals, reacted differently from other

professionals to the experience of totalitarianism.¹ Because of their "idealization" of communism, which was of a religious intensity, these respondents were able to maintain a more cohesive sense of self than were other professionals, be they communist or not, whose sense of self had been fragmented by their experience of totalitarian rule. It is important to remember that it was their "idealism" and "idealization" of communism which distinguished the "ideologically" dedicated communists from other respondents who were also members of the communist party.

Because of their ideological adherence and its concomitant discipline, most "ideologically" dedicated communists did not experience totalitarianism as hostile and aggressive. Even when totalitarianism was perceived as unempathetic and invasive, communist "ideology" and its associated discipline functioned as a shield, protecting the individual from the consequences of that experience. It was as if their religious faith was a buttressed wall through which the reality of totalitarian power could not easily penetrate.

Alongside their discipline, "ideologically" devoted communists engaged in two, intimately connected, defensive manoeuvres which assisted in preserving the cohesion of their sense of self, the first of which was a disavowal of reality. The innumerable discrepancies between the cold hard facts of reality and their "idealized" perception of it were ignored as if those disjunctures simply did not exist. It was not that these individuals were unaware of these disjunctures. Rather they

¹In the interview sample no Slovaks respondents qualified as idealistically committed communists.

disavowed their existence, removing the discrepancies from consciousness.

Alongside the disavowal of reality was a second defensive manoeuvre: rationalization. Those discrepancies which could not be disavowed or those individuals who were psychologically unable to disavow reality rationalized away the disjunctures. Progress was being made; reform was possible if only one spoke up and acted. Fault and blame were assigned to particular individuals who were accused of not being able to perform up to the correct standards. Each and every anomaly was considered an exception, a singular detail which could be explained away without jeopardizing the whole. Never was the whole questioned even when it was recognized that the entire leadership of the SED was incompetent or that socialist economics, for instance, was an unmitigated failure.¹ Anomalies had to be mere contingent errors because their religious convictions could not be questioned.

Nevertheless, over time even the "ideological" communists experienced a weakening of the cohesion of their sense of self. Their defensive manoeuvres could not longer completely protect them from

¹"One knew there was a problem," said Ms. 6. "We all knew that there were problems in the economy and that there were no solutions to the problems. It was not an objective problem: a bad manager, but a principle problem. And this principle problem was that the way we produced was not efficient. And there was in my youth many arguments to explain this. East Germany was the poor part of the land. The DDR had to make reparations to the USSR and we had war damage. And with every 5 year plan these things became worse and worse. It was that our working productivity was lower than that of the Bundesrepublik. It could be improved with socialist methods. Competitions. But all these methods did not nothing to improve the situation. Then there were the first voices that people had to be fired who did not want to work. But that is not socialism. There must be no unemployment. Everyone must have a chance. That was the discussion. It must somehow be improved with socialist property. To return to private capitalist property would be a historically backward step."

the penetrations of totalitarianism. Fragmentation of their sense of self loomed imminent. In a last ditch effort to maintain their cohesion, these individuals retreated into themselves. They fell silent both at work and at home and sought employment in more private, less public, endeavors.

Only one respondent experienced the beginning of a fragmentation of his sense of self: Mr. 20. Interestingly enough, of the five respondents, Mr. 20. had, because of his job, assumed the most political responsibility. It may be that his position of authority hastened the fragmentation of his sense of self, a condition which the other "ideologically" committed communists did not experience because of their avoidance of overt political responsibility. Whether the other respondents would have experienced a fragmentation of their sense of self if the upheavals of 1989 had not occurred is purely speculative, but the example of Mr. 20. may be more instructive than not. If so, the only professional group able to maintain a cohesive sense of self under totalitarianism would have been the dissidents.

CHAPTER X

Conclusion

This study posed two related sets of questions. The first set focused on the psychological effect(s) of totalitarianism, in general, and in the DDR and Czechoslovakia, in particular. The questions asked were what kind of sense(s) of self was produced by totalitarian rule in the DDR and Czechoslovakia? Did totalitarian power in the DDR and Czechoslovakia produce a fragmented sense of self? What groups of people experienced the loss of a cohesive sense of self and why? What groups did not experience that loss and why not?

The second set of questions was predicated on the first, placing the narrow issue of the effect(s) of totalitarian power into a wider and more theoretical discussion about the nature of power. This set of questions included: How does power reproduce itself in the individual's sense of self? What kind of sense of self is produced by different political regimes or social systems? What is the relationship between power, resistance, and an individual's sense of self? These questions, rather than concentrating on more traditional themes of power - power being defined by the capacity to control or influence the behavior of others as measured by outcomes or being determined by access to scarce resources - examine the relationship between power and the individual's sense of self.

To accomplish both tasks, this study began by defining totalitarianism, the self, and a fragmented sense of self. In the process, three specific hypotheses were generated: (1) those professionals in the

DDR and Czechoslovakia who were neither dissidents nor "ideologically" committed communists experienced a fragmented sense of self; (2) dissidents did not experience a loss of a cohesive sense of self; and (3) "ideologically" dedicated communists did not experience a loss of a cohesive sense of self.

Thereafter, by comparing totalitarianism with other forms of "total institutions" - American slavery and German concentration camps - and analyzing recent eye witness accounts coming out of Central Europe the theoretical discussion was given some flesh and blood. At the same time, the relationship between resistance and a cohesive sense of self was explored and theoretical concerns having to do with hegemony, role theory, and a "protean" sense of self were addressed.

Lastly, the empirical data was presented and analyzed based upon the thirty-nine (39) interviews which were conducted in the DDR and Czechoslovakia in 1991 and 1992. Separate chapters were devoted to: (1) the individual's global experience of totalitarianism as a hostile and aggressive environment; (2) the professional's experience of a fragmented sense of self; (3) the dissident's ability to maintain or regain a cohesive sense of self because of his oppositional activities; and (4) the "ideologically" committed communist's tenuous hold on a cohesive sense of self.

Only now by way of conclusion can the two original sets of questions be answered. First, the empirical data will be summarized and the three hypotheses validated. These findings, then, will be placed into their wider setting so that the Platonic and Tocquevillean conception of power can be redeemed.

Based upon a rereading of the two classic texts of totalitarianism, Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski's Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy and Hannah Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism, totalitarianism was defined as a system of governance in which a political apparatus' monopolistic control of political, economic, and social organizations results in the penetration, colonization, and, ultimately, fragmentation of the everyday life and the sense of self of the individual. Subsequently, the individual's sense of self was judged to be his subjective experience of continuity and cohesion, having to do with conscious and unconscious feelings of self-integration and self-disruption. The loss of a cohesive sense of self is due to the individual's experience of "objective anxiety" which, in turn, is caused by the individual's belief of living in an hostile and aggressive external world. The individual's loss of a cohesive sense of self occurs slowly over time, silently and invisibly, and can be considered a type of cumulative trauma.

Combining the East German, Czech, and Slovak data, thirty-five (35) of the thirty-nine (39) respondents experienced "objective anxiety," believing that they lived in an aggressive and hostile environment due to the political apparatus' control over virtually all political, social, and economic organizations. This experience of external aggression was not limited by gender, age, or political affiliation. Only four (4) individuals did not experience their surroundings as aggressive and hostile and/or did not attribute that aggression as originating in the machinations of the political apparatus. All four (4) were members of

their country's communist party and, more importantly, were "ideologically" devoted communists.

There was one major difference between East Germans, on one side, and Czechs and Slovaks, on the other. Many of the East Germans, at first, denied being affected by the government/party, even though they immediately thereafter spoke of the multitudinous ways in which the government/party had penetrated and colonized their everyday lives and their sense of self. Czechs and Slovaks, in contrast, were much more likely than their East German compatriots to admit uninhibitedly to having been influenced by the government/party. The difference may be attributable to cultural and historical differences between Czechoslovakia and Germany as well as the Warsaw Pact invasion and the subsequent foreign military occupation of Czechoslovakia. The East Germans' denial of their being affected by the government/party can be understood, in part, as a defensive mechanism by which they asserted that they were in control of their lives, even though they continuously spoke about feeling helpless and powerless because of the political apparatus' domination of their everyday lives.

The individual's recounting of the events which produced the penetration and colonization of his sense of self varied enormously. The experience ranged, for instance, from the seemingly innocuous inability to buy books and read what one desired to the fear of being blacklisted if one were to perform a particular musical work, knowing full well that there was but one national employer; from the anxiousness of receiving letters and telephone calls from abroad to the need to terminate a love relationship because of not so veiled police threats; from the difficulty in finding materials to repaint one's apartment to being unable, initially,

to acquire a baby formula for one's sick daughter because of not having the necessary political connections; and from being repeatedly passed over for promotion because of one's political and/or religious beliefs to being periodically interrogated and imprisoned by the police for having spoken one's opinion.

However experienced, the respondents, consciously and/or unconsciously, spoke about their living lives which were not under their control, but subject to domination by the Soviet-communist political apparatus. Time and time again, respondents spoke about being "imprisoned and incapacitated," believing that it was "more important to be the victim of things than to have feelings." Respondents experienced their sense of self as being more like that of a blind worm's than a human being's because their voice had "no worth." Many felt manipulated as if they were "marionettes." Because their sense of self was penetrated and colonized they "couldn't think about what [they] wanted."

The actual experience(s) of totalitarian domination, however, were by and large unimportant. This is not to claim that reality does and did not matter, but that it was the individual's subjective experience of his environment which was paramount. The individual was rendered powerless not merely because he was felt powerless, but because he acted as if he were, in fact, powerless. Though actual punishment was rare, the East German, Czech, and Slovak respondents experienced "objective anxiety" because they lived in anticipation of suffering which could be inflicted upon them by the political apparatus. Furthermore, it was unlikely that it was just a single, isolated event which caused the individual to experience his external environment as hostile and

aggressive. Often, the individual was unable to pinpoint any specific single event which triggered that belief. The experience of living in a hostile and aggressive environment accumulated over time, the combined weight of many silent events over the course of years - like the slow drip of a leaky faucet - and it was this accumulation of trauma which eventually eroded the individual's cohesive sense of self.

Because most respondents believed that they were incapable of defending themselves against and were unable adequately to respond to the political apparatus' aggression, the feelings generated by "objective anxiety" and the experience of living in a hostile and aggressive environment clustered around expressions of hopelessness, helplessness, and loss of initiative. Many felt thwarted in becoming who they wanted to be. The result was silent passivity and conformist behavior. Furthermore, most of the professional respondents turned the experienced totalitarian aggression against themselves.

Rather than being merely a victim of totalitarian power, the individual was an accomplice, becoming his own jailer and censor. Though the political apparatus established and organized the environment in which the subject lived, it was ultimately the individual who imprisoned himself, silencing his own dreams, desires, and wishes. All too frequently, respondents spoke about how the political apparatus' prohibitions had become their own, a lurking, dark presence. The Iron Curtain was not only an armed divider, separating Central and Eastern Europe from the West and cleaving apart the two halves of Germany, but an intrapsychic Berlin Wall across which the individual feared to tread. The slogan "one dies due to the wall in one's head" made famous by the dissident Reinhart Lampe in 1986, when he chained himself to a

window to protest the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Berlin Wall, speaks of how totalitarianism made the individual an accomplice to his own dehumanization and imprisonment (quoted in Philipsen, 1993, p. 78).

The fact that the individual became his own jailer indicates the degree to which totalitarianism penetrated and colonized the individual's everyday life and sense of self. Though John Borneman, an anthropologist of totalitarianism has persistently argued that the DDR was not a totalitarian state, he has, nevertheless, succinctly and unwittingly summarized this study's argument. Based upon a series of interviews he conducted, he wrote that the political apparatus' domination had been "domesticated," for "fear had become integrated into the habits and practices, the dream spaces... of everyday life." The individual had "introjected [the] habit of self-checking and self-silencing." What "better mechanism of control" exists, he rhetorically asked, "than to convince the people that, from cradle to grave, Big Brother's eye was upon them?" (Borneman, 1991a, pp. 156, 173, 58). Rather than relying on the individual's conviction that Big Brother was watching, the totalitarian political apparatus of the DDR and Czechoslovakia "convinced" the individual to eye himself and, by making the victim an accomplice, totalitarianism penetrated and colonized the individual's everyday life and sense of self.

To specify the psychological effect(s) of totalitarianism, the penetration and colonization of the individual's everyday life and sense of self, respondents were divided into three distinct groups: (1) professionals; (2) religious and/or political dissidents; and (3) "ideologically" committed communists. Ignoring national differences, it

was hypothesized that only those respondents who fell into the professional group would experience a fragmentation of their sense of self while the other two groups maintained and/or regained a cohesive sense of self.

The interview data supported each of the three hypotheses. Of the twenty-five (25) respondents who were classified as professionals, twenty (20), eighty percent (80%), experienced a fragmentation of their sense of self. Though the degree and severity of the loss of cohesion varied from individual to individual, ranging from expressions of psychic numbing to annihilation anxiety, the data validate the hypothesis that totalitarianism fragmented the sense of self of the professional who was neither a dissident nor an "ideologically" dedicated communist. It made no difference whether the respondent was Czech, Slovak, or German. Age, gender, political affiliation were all equally irrelevant in determining who was susceptible to the loss of cohesion.

Of the nine (9) respondents who were religious and/or political dissidents, none experienced the loss of a cohesive sense of self after engaging in dissident activity, though a number of them had beforehand. Of the five (5) respondents who were "ideologically" committed communists, four (4) did not experience a loss of a cohesive sense of self before the dissolution of totalitarianism, even though their cohesion had weakened and frayed over time.

Most often, the professional, having experienced his environment as hostile and aggressive, made "himself small" and retreated into an "inner emigration," hoping to protect himself against totalitarianism's power. That "inner emigration" or private sanctuary varied from

person to person. Some sought refuge in a passion for Goethe or in the joys of pure mathematics. Others relaxed in the joys of "sleep" or hid in the rationalizations of history. Others still fled into the arms of foreign lovers or into the toils of work.

None of these attempts signified resistance to totalitarian power. The professional's "inner emigration" was not a strategic retreat into his "true sense of self" in contradistinction to a "false sense of self." This was not an adoption of a role, a mask which could easily be exchanged for another, or the expression of a "protean" sense of parallel selves. Rather, penetrated and colonized, their flight into "inner emigration" symbolized their loss of cohesive sense of self.

A few respondents had no private niche into which they could retreat. Some of these subjects pictured themselves as caged animals anxiously pacing up and down behind their bars, waiting for the next feeding, or as actors on stage mouthing meaningless words. Many felt as if they were prohibited from feeling, dreaming, and desiring. To feel, dream, and desire were painful and, possibly, dangerous. It was better, therefore, to be numb and experience as little affect as possible. Worse still, some lived as if they had been infected with incurable diseases or feared being consumed, believing that they had been targeted for annihilation. Of these respondents, some, metaphorically, "amputated" themselves and some sacrificed themselves on an altar of their own choosing, no longer believing that they existed at all.

However the professional tried to protect himself against totalitarian power, most of them experienced their sense of self as no longer being continuous across life spheres and activities and/or in time, language, or space. Futility, helplessness, passivity, compliance,

and despair were their everyday companions because their sense of self was no longer cohesive. Experiencing feelings of discontinuity and disruption, they acted in mutually contradictory and conflicting ways as if they had disparate personalities with different goal structures, different pleasures, different moral and aesthetic values. Unable to resist totalitarian power, their everyday life became the battleground on which the fragments of their sense of self competed. In short, their daily lives had been split into two, or more, diametrically opposed and irreconcilable pieces rather than being a flexible and multifaceted whole. Ironically, what was thought to be a safe sanctuary was, in fact, the vehicle with which the individual turned totalitarianism's aggression against himself and fragmented his sense of self. Trying not to hurt themselves, the professional respondents murdered their own cohesive sense of self.

In return for the sacrifice of their cohesive sense of self, professionals in the DDR and Czechoslovakia received a modicum of material comfort and guaranteed security and stability. As long as they remained silent, their and their family's future was assured. Their acceptance of and their complicity in the fragmentation of their sense of self, however, totalized totalitarian power. Their behavior made it appear as if totalitarianism's control was absolute and monolithic when, in fact, it was not.

Two groups of individuals were largely successful in maintaining and/or regaining a cohesive sense of self: dissidents and "ideologically" devoted communists. Given the data, a correlation exists between dissident activity and a cohesive sense of self. For the "ideologically" committed communist, on the other hand, a cohesive sense of self was

associated with an ideological adherence, a political dedication with decidedly religious connotations.

The path to dissident activity and resistance to totalitarian domination varied according to the individual. Some dissidents drew their strength from family legacies and the beliefs with which they were raised. Others did not. What was important, however, was the dissident's decision to act openly and publicly against totalitarian rule. Before becoming a dissident, these respondents were subjected to the same pressures and forces which had fragmented the sense of self of most professionals. Before being able to say "no" and act upon that decision, the future dissident often experienced a weakening of the cohesion, if not a fragmentation, of his sense of self. Like other professionals, many dissidents-to-be fled into an "inner emigration," escaping to their private islands, before being able to engage in dissident activity. Much like their fellow citizens and as Hannah Arendt, among others, had predicted, they thought of themselves as "disposable material." They, too, felt inferior and incapable and they, too, believed that they were somehow responsible for their inferiority. Feeling guilty, they believed that their difficulties were personal rather than political problems. In other words, before becoming a dissident, the dissident-to-be had, often, accepted totalitarianism's aggression and had turned it against himself.

It was only after opposition had become public and active that the dissident's sense of self could maintain and/or regain its coherence. After engaging in dissident activity, these respondents were no longer susceptible to totalitarianism's penetration, colonization, and fragmentation. Resistance inoculated the dissident against totalitarian

power. Totalitarianism's power was no longer total because the dissident had developed an antibody. Rather than allowing totalitarianism's aggression to be turned against himself, fragmenting his sense of self, this group of subjects redirected that aggression back onto the political apparatus itself. Then the dissident could speak of joy, becoming suddenly younger, and falling in love. Many felt a new creativity and spontaneity instead of the professional's experience of passivity, hopelessness, and fear. Though the dissident's life was made insecure, difficult, and unpleasant, he regained possession of his desires and dreams. By resisting totalitarianism's power the dissident freed himself.

"Ideologically" committed communists, on the other hand, surrendered themselves to totalitarianism's ideology and fantasized utopia. Because these respondents fervently believed that they were fighting for a greater good, the "ideologically" devoted communist's sense of self could not be penetrated. Much like an armored shroud, his "idealist" beliefs, "idealization" of communist ideology, and religious adherence to communist party discipline protected him. His religious armor made him unable accurately to perceive the reality of the world in which he lived and/or provided him with the rationalizations to brush away whatever discrepancies he, however dimly, saw. Consequently, his sense of self was, for the most part, cohesive.

Even though these twin defensive maneuvers, disavowal of reality and rationalization, worked together to preserve the cohesion of the "ideologue's" sense of self, the cohesion of his sense of self weakened over time. Discrepancies between their religious faith and reality could no longer be so easily disavowed or rationalized away. Fault and blame

could still be assigned to particular individuals and anomalies could still be considered anomalies, but doubts began to gnaw away at the cohesion of the "ideologue's" sense of self. The fragmentation of their sense of self loomed imminent. In a last ditch effort to maintain their cohesion, many "ideologically" dedicated communists retreated into themselves. They fell silent, both at home and at work. Like their professional compatriots, they entered into an "inner emigration." The revolutions of 1989, however, interrupted the process. Perhaps the "ideologically" devoted communist's sense of self would have fragmented as had the sense of self of most professionals. Because of the revolutions of 1989, one can never really know.

II

Unlike the more traditional and common understandings of power, the Platonic and Tocquevillean conception locates power as it is embodied in the individual's sense of self. Rather than define power according to a calculus centering on the capacity to control or influence behavior (A causing B to do what B would not otherwise have done) or on access to scarce resources, the Platonic and Tocquevillean understanding sees power as it invisibly circulates in social practices, forms the individual's sense of self, and reproduces itself through the social practices engaged in by those whose sense of self has already been penetrated and colonized.¹ Rephrased, the individual's sense of

¹For one of the earlier explications of this argument see Nietzsche (1967). Most of Weber's writings on the nexus between religion and politics is a development of

self "is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation. The individual which power has constituted is at the same time [power's] vehicle" (Foucault, 1980b, p. 98).¹

This is neither the time nor the place to rehearse the well-known debates between the "three faces of power" and power being defined in terms of the formation and development of the individual's sense of self.² Suffice it to note that the debate began with Robert Dahl's causal and behavioral conception of power (1957 1965, 1968), with its roots reaching into Hobbes, Locke, and Hume and an emphasis on questions of law and obedience.³ The next step was taken by Peter Bachrach and

Nietzsche's ideas (see Weber, 1946, 1958). For works that trace the influence of Nietzsche on Weber see Eden (1983, 1987), Habermas (1987), Hennis (1988), Mommsen (1984), Strong (1975, 1987), and Whimster (1987). For a more contemporary version of the Platonic and Tocquevillean argument see Ball (1978), Isaac (1987), and Smith (1988), who, for instance, attempted to trace the way power is embodied in the individual's unconscious.

¹Dilthey (1961) argued that a causal analysis of power is inherently wedded to and dependent upon a natural science model which is inappropriate to the human sciences. On the contrary, he argued that "in the human studies power is the expression, in the form of a category, of something that can be experienced. It originates when we turn towards the future" and is, therefore, grounded in the notion of "production" (pp. 109-110). Accordingly, power "produces" the individual's sense of self.

²For an excellent overview and analysis of the debate see Clegg (1989), Connolly (1983), and Flathman (1980). Clegg's discussion is the most comprehensive while both Connolly and Flathman primarily focused on Lukes' "third face of power." This debate is not limited to the abstract discussions of political theorists, but crosses the discipline. In international relations, for instance, similar questions appear when one tries to analyze hegemonic power (see, for example, Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990; James and Lake, 1989; Keohane, 1984; Kindleberger, 1986; Nye, 1991; and Strange, 1987). In fact, James and Lake (1989) wrote that the philosophical debate about the "three faces of power" "inspired" their own discussion (1989, p. 4) while Nye specifically referred to both the "first" and "second" faces of power in his explication of how power operates in international relations (1991, pp. 26-32).

³For an analysis of the relationship between Dahl, Hobbes, and Hume see Gibson (1971). The connections between Dahl, Hobbes, and Locke as well as an explication of how Dahl's conception of power places undue emphasis on law and obedience see Benhabib (1987), Foucault (1980a, 1980b), Hirschman (1989), and Young (1987).

Morton Baratz (1962, 1963), who expanded Dahl's understanding of power to include questions of intentions, interests, and, above all, nondecisions.¹ At the heart of Bachrach and Baratz' claim about power was an argument about the "mobilization of power" and the "values and biases that are built into the political system" (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, p. 950; see also Schnattschneider, 1960). Although Bachrach and Baratz furthered the debate, they were still mired in a conflictual model of power emphasizing individual actors. Steven Lukes recognized this flaw and argued that power is best understood in terms of collective forces and cannot be limited or confined to instances of actual and observable conflict (1974, 1976).² Taking Bachrach and Baratz's discussion of the "mobilization of bias" seriously, Lukes claimed that power is best understood when analyzed with respect to social actors' "real interests" and the social system's "shaping [of actors'] perceptions, cognitions and preferences" (Lukes, 1974, p. 24).³ The result is that power is evident in those social values which are deemed legitimate and/or in those social practices into which the individual has been socialized.⁴

¹For a critique of power as being circumscribed by intentions see Connolly (1983), Thomas (1978), and White (1971). For a critique of power as being circumscribed by its exercise see Oppenheim (1976).

²Although Lukes claimed that power could not be confined to instances of actual and observable conflict, he waffled repeatedly on the issue, arguing that "consensual authority, with no conflict of interests, is not a form of power" (1974, p. 32). See Isaac (1982) for a critique of Lukes' vagueness on the relationship between power and conflict. See Layder (1985) for the claim that Lukes never abandoned an individualist conception of power, even though he had argued for the need to include collective actors in any ascription of power.

³Because Lukes tied his discussion of "real interests" to questions of autonomy, he was roundly criticized (see Benton, 1980; Betts, 1986; Hindess, 1982; Knights and Willmot, 1982; and Thomas, 1978).

⁴For a discussion of these issues see Chazel (1976), Flathman (1980), and Mitchell (1990). For a discussion of these issues in international relations see Henberry and Kupchan (1990). Legitimacy, for instance, does not adhere to a policeman's

As is apparent, the course of the debate moved irrevocably toward, but did not quite reach the Platonic and Tocquevillean notion of the invisibility of power and its ability to "mold the human personality" (Kernohan, 1989, p. 713).¹ It is but a short step from Lukes' position about power's creation of the individual's "perceptions, cognitions, and preferences" and the socialization of the individual into particular social practices to an analysis of the individual's sense of self.² In fact, the individual, consciously and unconsciously, experiences his sense of self and comes to know who he is, in part, because of his perceptions, cognitions, and preferences and through the social practices in which he behaves. His thoughts, desires, and behaviors are among the cornerstones of his experience of his sense of self. When one speaks of an individual's perceptions, cognitions, preferences, and social practices,

uniform, badge, gun, or person. Rather legitimacy is embodied in an individual's repeated obedience to the orders of that policeman, an obedience which, presumably, reproduces a pattern of behavior which had been previously socialized. Legitimacy is conferred by the repeated acts of obedience - in the structured relationship between the policeman and the person who obeys.

¹Rousseau also bought into this understanding of power when he argued that the "most absolute authority is that which penetrates into a man's inmost being, and concerns itself no less with his will than with his actions" (quoted in Day, J., 1977, p. 263).

²The inculcation of the individual into particular social practices and the shaping of the individual's "perceptions, cognitions, and preferences" is the real subject matter of political socialization and has been from the very beginning (Fromm, 1990). From this point of view, political socialization is not primarily or narrowly about "images of the benevolent leader" and "diffuse support" (Easton and Dennis, 1969; Greenstein, 1965, 1975); political trust, learning, or party identification (Jennings and Niemi, 1968, 1981); the role of childhood in structuring adult behavior (Davies, 1977; Searing et al., 1973); or particular socializing agents such as the family, school, or peer groups (Langton, 1967, 1984; Langton and Karns, 1969). Rather, political socialization is about the process by which the individual "has learned to think and feel in the ways that someone of his age, sex, and placement is supposed to think and feel" (Clausen, 1968, pp. 9-10). The core question of political socialization is, then, one of power and how power influences and molds the individual's "psychic organization that we have labeled basic beliefs" (Renshon, 1975, p. 77) as well as "the deep cognitive structures" (Leach, 1976) with which the individual reproduces the social patterns within which he acts (see also Merelman, 1986).

one is, in effect, discussing an individual's sense of self. In other words, power is embodied not only in the individual's experience of his sense of self. An examination of the individual's sense of self, his conscious and unconscious feelings of continuity and discontinuity, is the best means by which power can be analyzed.

Empirically, this study has proven that power, in this case totalitarian power, is capable of molding the individual's experience of his sense of self. After all, the vast majority of the professional respondents experienced a fragmented sense of self because of the activities of the totalitarian political apparatus. This does not mean that the totalitarian political apparatus or the dominated individual was consciously aware of an exercise of power.¹ Nor does it mean that the political apparatus intended to fragment the individual's sense of self or believed that it was in their interest to achieve that result. As John Galbraith has argued, the existence of power does not necessitate that those exercising power or those subjected to it need be "always aware that [power] is being exerted" (1983, p. 24). Furthermore, because of the possibility of unintended consequences, the existence of power cannot be tied to the coattails of intention or interests (Betts, 1986, pp. 44-45; Giddens, 1979). Rather, as power circulates invisibly, and often anonymously, it, to borrow Galbraith's term, "conditions" the individual's conscious and unconscious experience of his sense of self.

As Mr. 28. said in his interview, totalitarian power was anonymous. Someone, but no one knew who, if anyone, was making

¹In international relations theory, James and Lake also argued that the hegemonic power need not be "consciously" aware of an exercise of power. Once the hegemon has acted, the anonymous and invisible rules of international political economy come into play (1989, p. 8).

decisions. Therefore, power does exist in circumstances in which there appears to be no one to blame or to whom responsibility and culpability can be assigned. In fact, there was no instigator of the process which lead to the individual's experiencing the loss of a cohesive sense of self and, in that respect, there was no exercise of power or anyone, individually or collectively, who possessed power. Instead, power existed and came to be embodied in the individual's "objective anxiety" and fragmented sense of self. Because the individual's sense of self had been penetrated and colonized, power existed, buried in the individual's sense of self. It existed invisibly because the individual living under totalitarianism had been socialized into believing that the loss of a cohesive sense of self was not only acceptable in terms of the role and expectations of the DDR and Czechoslovakia, but was perfectly normal. It was common sense. Power existed not merely because the individual experienced a fragmented sense of self, but because the individual had few other words or stories with which to tell the tale of his sense of self. Power had "indelibly marked" the individual's sense of self because it had shaped the cognitive and linguistic processes which had guided the individual's telling of his narrative in such a way as to prohibit the possibility of most individuals being able to structure their perceptions, memories, and experiences so as to generate a cohesive sense of self.

At the same time, the empirical evidence makes it clear that a strong case of the Platonic and Tocquevillean argument cannot be made. After all, some individuals - in particular, dissidents - were able to resist totalitarian power and the loss of a cohesive sense of self. Even though totalitarian power was successful in penetrating and colonizing the professional's sense of self, totalitarianism was unable to fragment

the dissident's sense of self. The core of the Platonic and Tocquevillean understanding of power, then, must be modified to take into account the relationship between power, resistance, and the individual's sense of self.

The question then becomes how best to conceptualize and analyze the tension between power and resistance. According to the empirical data, resistance to totalitarian power required both a cohesive sense of self and, often, a heightened ability to tolerate aggression. This suggests, then, that it is not the individual's sense of self per se which is the Holy Grail of an analysis of power. Instead it is the cohesion or lack thereof of the individual's sense of self which is the principal and most fundamental arena within which power operates as well as being the field upon which it can be contested and resisted.

The individual's sense of self per se cannot hold centerstage in an analysis of power for theoretical as well as the above mentioned empirical reasons. As earlier argued and as Emile Durkeim noted, the individual's sense of self is an historical construction (1933, p. 194). Since the structure of the self continuously changes, there is no standard or "metaphysical self" by which any particular individual's sense of self can be evaluated or judged.¹ Although a genealogical analysis of the self, such as the vastly differing projects of, for instance,

¹For an interesting study of how the structure of the self changes depending upon the culture and the history of that culture see Kakar (1990) and Roland (1988). Mirroring the argument presented in this study, Roland concluded "that the intrapsychic self varies significantly if not radically according to the social and cultural patterns of societies" (1988, p. 4). Kakar made a similar claim, arguing that "cultural ideas and ideals... manifested in their narrative form as myths, pervade the innermost experience of the self. One cannot therefore speak of an 'earlier' or 'deeper' layer of the self beyond cultural reach" (1990, p. 443).

Foucault (1980a, 1980b, 1985, 1986, 1993) and Taylor (1989), can trace the evolution of the Western understanding of the self, its broad sweep does not allow for either the individual's subjective experience or particularized political circumstances. A genealogical approach, therefore, cannot analyze power as it is concretely embodied in the individual's sense of self. Only by concentrating on the minute mechanisms and processes with which the individual's sense of self coheres and/or fragments can one record and measure the often invisible means by which power circulates, molds the individual's sense of self, and is resisted.

This supposition is reinforced by the claim that only a hegemonic model of power which concentrates on the question of cohesion is able to explain both the resistance to totalitarianism as well as fragmentation of the individual's sense of self caused by totalitarianism.¹ As was argued, neither the theory of strategic choice nor role theory nor the idea of a "protean" sense of parallel selves was able adequately to conceptualize either resistance or the loss of cohesion. None of them can explain the empirical data, either the uniformity of the correlation between a cohesive sense of self and dissent or the remarkable consistency of professional's experience of a fragmented sense of self. In addition, because the more traditional theories of power - the "three

¹For an interesting study of power, hegemony, resistance, and the formation of the sense of self of young members of the British working class see Willis (1977). Willis also argued that power is ultimately embodied in the construction of the individual's sense of self. "I suggest," he wrote, "that cultural forms provide the materials towards, and the immediate context of, the construction of subjectivities and the confirmation of identity. It provides as it were the most believable and rewarding accounts for the individual, his future and especially for the expression of his/her vital energies. It seems to 'mark' and 'make sense' of things" (1977, p. 173).

faces of power" - do not perceive the individual's sense of self to be the arena of power, they are fundamentally unable to speak to the relationship between power, resistance, and the cohesion of the individual's sense of self.

This is not to say that all other understandings of power are unusable and invalid. Rather it is to suggest that there are different levels of power which are dependent upon one another and that none of the "three faces of power" are sufficiently comprehensive, able to dive down into the invisible bedrock which is the most fundamental source and the wellspring of power.¹ If the study of the psychological effect(s) of totalitarianism can be extrapolated into a broader understanding of power, then the relationship between power, resistance, and the individual's sense of self rests in the individual's experience of both conscious and unconscious feelings of continuity, self-sameness, discontinuity, and disruption. It is in the invisible corridors of the cohesion of the individual's sense of self that power is realized and resisted.

¹There is an inverse relationship between power's visibility and its strength. The more visible power's enforcement mechanisms are the weaker that form of power is. Each of the "three faces of power" is, then, a derogation of power with Dahl's causal and coercive conception being the weakest or lowest form of power.

Appendix A

List of Respondents

The following is a list of all thirty-nine (39) respondents, noting their nationality, age, gender, profession, place of residence, marital status, and political affiliation.

East Germans

Ms. 1.: forty-eight (48) years old, opera singer, lives in a northern East German city, divorced with two children, member of communist party.

Ms. 2.: twenty-five (25) years old, businesswoman/photographer, lives in East Berlin, divorced, politically unaffiliated.

Ms. 3.: thirty-four (34) years old, theatre director/dramaturge, lives outside East Berlin, living with father of her child, politically unaffiliated.

Ms. 4.: thirty (30) years old, medical doctor, lives in East Berlin, married with child, politically unaffiliated.

Ms. 5.: thirty-one (31) years old, assistant editor, lives in East Berlin, married with two children, member of communist party.

Ms. 6.: forty (40) years old, editor/publisher, lives in East Berlin, divorced with child, member of communist party.

Ms. 7.: fifty-five (55), writer/editor, lives in East Berlin, remarried with child, member of communist party.

Dr. 1.¹ (male): fifty-eight (58) years old, Lutheran minister, lives outside East Berlin, married with six children, politically unaffiliated.

Dr. 2 (male): fifty-nine (59) years old, micro-biologist/professor, lives in East Berlin, married with one child, politically unaffiliated.

Mr. 1.: twenty-seven (27) years old, medical scientist, lives in East Berlin, married with child, member of the communist party.

¹In Germany the title "Doctor" is used, in part, to convey an individual's prestige and status in the community. It is not merely a means of indicating one's employment in the medical profession. In this study the title "Doctor" is used in its Germanic sense and is not meant to distinguish between genders or professions.

Mr. 2.: thirty (30) years old, opera singer, lives in northern East German city, married with child, politically unaffiliated.

Mr. 3.: fifty-three (53) years old, editor/publisher, lives in East Berlin, divorced and remarried with child, member of the communist party.

Mr. 4.: thirty-eight (38) years old, academic/diplomat, lives in a central East German city, married with two children, member of the communist party.

Mr. 5.: fifty-six (56) years old, Lutheran minister, lives in East Berlin, married with four children, politically unaffiliated.

Mr. 6.: thirty-three (33) years old, musical director/conductor, lives in a northern East German city, married with three children, politically unaffiliated.

Mr. 7.: thirty-nine (39) years old, actor/songwriter, lives outside East Berlin, lives with mother of child, member of the communist party.

Mr. 8.: thirty-six (36) years old, military officer, lives in East Berlin, married with two children, member of the communist party.

Mr. 9.: twenty-seven (27) years old, electro-engineer/Party Secretary, lives in East Berlin, married with child, member of the communist party.

Mr. 10.: fifty-three (53) years old, businessman, lives in East Berlin, married with child, member of the communist party.

Mr. 11.: twenty-six (26) years old, electrician/graphic artist, lives in East Berlin, single, politically unaffiliated.

Mr. 12.: thirty-eight (38) years old, minister, lives in East Berlin, married with child, politically unaffiliated.

Czechs and Slovaks

Ms. 20.: thirty-six (36) years old, teacher/librarian/administrator, lives in Bratislava, single, politically unaffiliated.

Ms. 21.: forty-three (43) years old, accountant, lives in a Slovak town, married with two children, politically unaffiliated.

Ms. 22.: fifty (50) years old, librarian, lives in Prague, married with two children, member of communist party.

Ms. 23.: forty-three (43) years old, demographer/professor, lives in Bratislava, married with child, politically unaffiliated.

Mr. 20.: thirty-four (34) years old, communist party functionary, lives in Prague, married with two children, member of the communist party.

Mr. 21.: sixty-eight (68) years old, economist, lives in Prague, widower, expelled from communist party.

Mr. 22.: forty-seven (47) years old, historian, lives in Prague, married with two children, expelled from communist party.

Mr. 23.: thirty-three (33) years old, stoker/lawyer, lives in Prague, married with two children, politically unaffiliated.

Mr. 24.: fifty-one (51) years old, museum director/historian, lives in a large Czech city, married with two children, member of communist party.

Mr. 25.: thirty-five (35) years old, lawyer/state prosecutor, lives in Prague, married with two children, member of communist party.

Mr. 26.: fifty (50) years old, scientist/inventor, lives in a large Czech city, married with six children, politically unaffiliated.

Mr. 27.: forty-two (42) years old, mathematician, lives in Prague, divorced, politically unaffiliated.

Mr. 28.: thirty-five (35) years old, mathematician, lives in Prague, married with two children, politically unaffiliated.

Mr. 29.: fifty-seven (57) years old, engineer, lives in a large Czech city, married with two children, politically unaffiliated.


Mr. 30.: twenty-nine years old, research engineer, lives in Bratislava, single, politically unaffiliated.

Mr. 31.: sixty-three (63) years old, statistician, lives in Bratislava, married with four children, politically unaffiliated.

Mr. 32.: thirty-seven (37) years old, environmentalist, lives in Bratislava, married with children, politically unaffiliated.

Mr. 33.: forty-one (41) years old, engineer, lives in Prague, married with two children, politically unaffiliated.

Appendix B



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